Constructing the Zhonghua minzu: The frontier and national questions in early 20th century China

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Content CONSTRUCTING THE ZHONGHUA M INZU: THE FRONTIER AND NATIONAL QUESTIONS IN EARLY 20™ CENTURY CHINA VOLUME I by James Patrick Leibold A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (HISTORY) December 2002 Copyright 2002 James Patrick Leibold R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. UMI Number: 3103934 UMI UMI Microform 3103934 Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90007 This dissertation, written by James Patrick Leibold under the direction of h £ s Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY )ean of Graduate Studies D a l e ...... DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Chairperson R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. u ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It has been nearly fifteen years to the day that I first set out to learn more about China, its language, culture, history and peoples. A journey that has been equal parts intellectual discovery and emotional growth. Along the way, I have acquired quiet a few debts, without which, this study would never have come to fruition. Eugene Swanger, Stan Mickel, James Huffman and my other professors at Wittenberg University set me firmly on the path of academic learning— serving as my first guides to China and the rest of Asia. Their passion for teaching and love of the region sparking an unquenchable thirst for more, and propelled me to first visit Mainland China in 1988-89 and Taiwan in 1990-91. At Washington University, Laurence Schneider’ s graduate seminar on Republican era historiography introduced me to China’ s tumultuous transition from empire to nation-state and its rich, yet highly politicized, historiography in the West, while Isenbike Togan helped to transform my curiosity about the minority cultures and peoples of China into one of the central research questions that would guide my dissertation research: The rmodun or contradiction between a Chinese nation-state which claims a homogenous and unbroken history of cultural and racial unity and the powerful historical memories of the Tibetan, Mongolian, Manchu and other non-Han peoples who used to rule, if not dominate, much of what we now call “China.” My training as a historian began in earnest when I arrived in Los Angeles and came under the careful intellectual guidance of the University of Southern California’ s excellent humanities faculty. Gordon Berger and Michael Robinson provided me with a R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Ill comprehensive introduction to modem Japanese and Korean historiography, while other members of its history, political science and anthropology departments provided their time and helpful questions. My dissertation committee— Charlotte Furth, John Wills and Eugene Cooper— helped shape this final product through countless hours of discussion, long emails and several careful reads of previous drafts. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my mentor Charlotte Furth, who continued to show great interest in my research even after her own interests shifted backwards in time from the Republican period towards the Ming and Qing and away from politics towards culture, medicine and gender. Her probing questions, sharp acumen and inspiring command of social theory and academic literature helped me carefully pull together my diverse and jumbled research findings into a single coherent— I hope— argument about the cultural and political construction of the Zhonghua ninzu during China’ s incomplete transition from a multi-ethnic empire to a unified nation-state. I own a special thanks to the archivists and librarians of the many institutions where the actual research for this study was conducted: the East Asian libraries at Washington University and the University of California at Los Angeles and Berkeley, the University of Southern California libraries; the Harvard-Yenching library the Hopkins-Nanking Center library the Nanjing University library the Nanjing Municipal Archive; the Shanghai Municipal Library and most importantly the excellent collections held by the University of Hong Kong— especially its Fu Ping Shan Chinese language library, where countless hours were spent hunting for obscure references with the complete confidence that they would be found. The Centre of Asian Studies at the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. IV University of Hong Kong served as my institutional base for the five plus years I spent in Hong Kong and Shanghai researching and writing this thesis. I am especially grateful to its staff and faculty for their assistance, guidance and encouragement. This project could not have been completed without generous financial assistance from Washington University, the Hopkins Nanjing Center, several Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships, the National Resource Foundation Fellowship, an Abe Fellowship and a NSEP Graduate Research Fellowship. Along the way numerous people contributed to this project in different ways— from proofreading to encouragement or with a cold beer or random reference— without which the years would not have passed as quickly as they did: John Fitzgerald, Bruce Jacobs, Ken Richter, Pete Ditmer, Linda Tassera, Joe Allen, Hong Lianjing, David Bello, Jeanette Barbarier, Paul Van Dyke, Charlie Musgrove, Anna Bernstein, Yang Jieshi, Li Liangyu, Rob Culp, P.T. Lee, and Geoff Wade. Terrance “Saul” Thomas deserves particular thanks for not only reading several of my chapters in meticulous detail and finding many a useful sources, but more importantly for helping me to craft the scope, outline and argument of this study over many a lingering dinner in Nanjing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. I would not be where I am today without the tremendous love and support of my parents— Frank and Danielle— and my three sisters— Lori, Debbie, and Liz— and their families. They were a constant source of emotional, and at times financial support, over the years that this dissertation took shape. Finally, no one, besides myself, knows the inner workings of this thesis and my cluttered mind more than my beloved R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. wife Kate. From the day we first meet in Nanjing in 1996 and she learned that I was “completing” my dissertation, she has been nothing short of a solid rock of support. Through numerous moves back and forth between the Mainland and Hong Kong, chapter after chapter, footnote after footnote and rewrite after rewrite, she has served quiedy as my chief editor, intellectual sounding board, emotional consoler, financial supporter, and now the proud mother of our first child, Bridget Danielle Leibold. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vi CONTENTS VOLUME I Ac k n o w l ed g e m e n t s: ii List o f F ig u r e s: ix Ab b r e v ia t io n s: x A b str a c t: xiii In t r o d u c t io n : 1 FromEnpire to Nation 1 The Cultural Ongns cf the Nation 4 The Frontier and National Q u e s t i o n s ineady20t h C en tu ry China 7 Minzu a s a So cial E vdutionary Disamse of National I n c o r p o ra ti o n 12 Literature Redew & S o u m e s 17 Cha pte r Oimiew 25 Part O n e : Co m p e t in g P aradigm s o f N a t io n -B u il d in g 1 . The Positioning of Chinese “Minzus” within Sun Yat-sen’s Discourse of Minzuzhuyi 34 Anti-Manchulsm& theImentknqfMinzuzhuyi(1895-1911) 38 Minzuzhuyi and the Q o i n e s e Repiiik (1911-1920) 59 Minzuzhuyi and C h in e s e A nd-Inperialism(1923-1925) 7 4 C an du di ng Remarks 95 2. The Failure of the Bolshevik National Question Discourse: 102 The United Front & The Bdshedk National Q ue sti o n D is c o u r se 105 The CCP’ s Bdshedk Frontier P r o g r a m m e 112 National Sdf-deterrrinatian & The “ Mo ngptian Q u e st io n1 ’ 116 The Anti-Red M o u e m e n t & the S tr u g g le to Interpret Sun Yat-sen’ s L e g a c y 131 A nti-Red C ri tiq u e s ofMongphanlndependenx & “ Red Imperialism” 145 Defendingtbe O O P 's Patriotic C r e d e n t ia ls 1 51 Strains mthin tlx CCP’ s Frontier Programmed the National Socialist A hematite 159 The C o ll a p s e cf the United Front & the Nationalization of d o e National Q u e s tr a n 174 CondudingRemarks 193 P art T w o: Strateg ies o f P olitical In t e r v e n t io n 3. The Kuomintang Central Government & the “Frontier Question” 197 Frontier Wadordism& Chime E n cr o a c h m e n t on the Inner Mangiian Frontier 202 The Failed Inner M on gol ian A u t o n o r r a u s M o v e m e n t, Part I 215 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vii LiuWenhui& CMmeErmxuhrrentalongtheXikangFrontiercfTibet 237 The Disputed XikangTihetan B o rd e r 244 HuangMusongs Mission & tlx Failure o/Sino- Tibetan R a pp ro c h e m e nt Part I 249 Wu Zhongciris Mission & the Failure cf Sino-Tibetan Rappnxhenent, Part II 257 Kwrrirtang Frontier Po lic y inthePcstmrEra 265 T he Failed Inner Morqplian /I u t a n o m o u s Moierrmt, Part II 280 ConducbgRermrks 288 4. The Chinese Communist Party & the “National Question” 293 The C ir c u m s c r i b i n g cf National Sdf-detemimtion 297 The LongManh & the O r i g i n s cf the United Front Tadic 307 The Sinfcaticn c f Marxism & the Rise cfthe Maoist Nationality P ol ic y 315 The Northwest Work C o m m i tt e e & the Deidcprmt cfthe Maoist Nationality P ol ic y 324 Maoist Nationality P ol ic y in the Pastwr Era 341 TheEasternMongolian Q u est io n• The Triunph cfthe UrutedFront Tactic 348 C o n d u c ti n g Remarks 374 VOLUME II Part T h r e e : N arratives o f H istorical In n o v a t io n 5. The Kuomintang & the Construction of the Z honghua m in zu 378 Origjm, Unity and Continuity The Rods cfTwo ConpetingNarratives 381 LiangQithao & the Scientific Questfor Z h o n g h u a ninzu O r ig i n s and Unity 394 The May Fourth Inddert & the Rising Tide ofKuonintang Cultural Nationalism 401 ThePmblemtfSm Yat-sen• E nter the YdlowE m p e r o r 409 Gu Jiegtng and the “ Doubting of A ntiquity” 413 The Manchurian Incident & J a p a n e se Irrperialism 428 The Prob lem cfGu Jiegtngand the J a p a n e s e : Enter PekingMan 439 Re-thinkingMinzu: Gujiegzng& the An throp olo gists 452 The Ja pan ese Imasion& The DiscowrycfEthnic Diversity 459 The 1939 De b a te : E nligftenrmrt P o s tp o n e d 474 China’ s Destiny The New C o n s e n s u s ? 503 CondudingRemarks 509 6. The CCP & the Construction of the Z honghua m inzu: 514 The Zh c m g fu a minzu and the Problemcf “ Minzu” 517 The Z h o n g h u a ninzu & the P ro bl e m of History 533 Fan Wenlan & the C o n c i s e G e n e r a l History c f C hi na 538 Anhaedogy& the M on op h y le ti c Origi n cf the Z h o n g h u a ninzu 548 The Zhonftua minzu & the P ro b le m cf “ Zhongy u” 562 Rereading the Historical and A nhaedogitnl Evid enc e 568 C o n st r u c tin g a G e n e a l o g y cfthe Z l o o n g b u a ninzu Unity 576 TheZhonfrua rrinzu& its Han Nucleus 586 C o n c lu d i n g Remarks 590 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Co n c l u sio n ; Political Int er v e n tio ns & Han D e m o g r a p h ic Hegrmny Historical Innovation & the So c ia l Scientific C o n st r u c tio n cfthe Zhonfiom ninzu Ch a r a c te r Glossary: B iblio g ra ph y: R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Republican Era Images of Peking Man and the Yellow Emperor Figure 2: Jian Bozan’s 1943 Chart “The Chinese Racial Family” R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. OOP CDZX CEC CER CFASS CMTA CSDF CYL C L2X EH S EMAG FIMAM FSXJ G FQ GFWJ GMWX GSB IMAG x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Chinese Communist Party {Gonghandang) ChenDnxiu Zhuzmxmn Kuomintang Gentral Executive Committee (J&tonintang Zhongyang zhixing imymrhw) Chinese Eastern Railway Chinese Frontier Administration Study Society (Zhongguo bianzheng xptehw ) Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs [Mengzang wym rhui) Paul Kesaris, ed., Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: China [Micrxfilmj: Internal Affairs, 1945-1949 Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo Gongfhanzbuyi Qmgmantmn) Renjianshu et. al., eds., CbenDuxiu Zhnzuaxmn Zhongguo gongchandang, comp. Erda’ he ‘ SandaZhongyw Gongchandang Dier-sanci DaiUao Dahui Ziliao Xuan Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government Federation of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement ( Ndmeng zizhi yundong liarhehw) Fu Sinian, Fu Sm anXuanji Sun Yat-sen, Guefu Quaffi Zhonghua minguo gejie jinian guofu bainian danzhen shoupei weiyuanhui et. al., ed. and comp., Guqfu SixiangLunwenji Luo Jialun, ed., Geming Wenxian Gu Jiegang, ed., Gwhibian Inner Mongolian Autonomous Gov’ t (Neimengg* zizhi zheng/ii) R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. KMT L S W L D X LD ZW J L G Z Y N ZYL NWC N W Z MLAPC MPR MPRP M ZDJ M ZXJ M ZW T PRC PRPIM S W SWPC SW ZJ xi Kuomintang (Guommdang) Li Dazhao Wenji L i Dazhao Xuanji Zhongguo Li Dazhao yanjiuhui, comp. L i Dazhao Wenji L iangpng (hi), Gong yh an guq ji yu Zhongzuo Guonin Gening Yudong (1920- 1925) Neimenggu zizhi yundong lianhehui dang’an shiliao, comp. NM m en gg u Zizhi Yundong L iarloehui; Dangan Shiliao Xuanbian CCP’s Central Committee Northwest Work Committee {Xibei gpngzrn wym rlm t) Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, ed. Neimenggu Wenshi Ziliao Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council (Menggi difang zizhi zhengmwsiymnbui) Mongolian People’ s Republic Mongolian People’ s Revolutionary Party Takuechi Minoru, e d , Mao Zedongji Mao Zedong, Mao ZedongXuanji Zhonggong Zhongyang Tongzhanbu, comp. M inzu Wenti Wenxian Huibian, 7.1921 - 9.1949 People’ s Republic of China {Zhongfua renningpngfegud) People’ s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu gpring venindang) Mao Zedong, Sdected Works cfMao Tse-tung Southwest Political Council Sichuansheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed, Sichuan Wenshi Zilioa Jiae Dhtujuan Minzu Zongiao Huajiao Bian R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. S Y X W Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, comp. Shoo Ymmhang Xiansheng Wenji SZSQ f Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhonghan Quarji XCW Xiao Chum Wenatn XM W Z Gansu sheng tushuguan shumu cankaobu, comp. Xibei Minzu Zongiao Shiliao Wenzhai• Gamu Fermi YBSQ f Yirbinshi Quanji, Liang Qichao YCP Young China Party (Zhongguo Qngmandang) ZGQZ Rong Mengyuan, ed. and Sun Caixia, comp., Zhonggto Guommdang L id Daibiao Dahui ji Zhongyang Quarbm Ziliao ZJGZ Zongtongjiang GongSixiang Yanlun Zongji ZMKS Kuomintang Dangshi Weiyuanhui, ed., Zhonghua Mimguo Zhongyao Shiliao Cbubian-Dui R i Kangzhan Shiqi ZMSD Zhang foua Minguo Shi Dang'an Ziliao Huibian, comp. Zhongguo Dier Lis hi Dang’anguan ZMSS Zhongjrua ninguoshi Shijiyao ( bugao) ZMWL Ru Yifu, Zhongguo M inzu Jiqi Wenhua Lurkao ZSP Chen Qingquan et al., Zhongguo Shixuejia Pingzkuan R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. XU1 ABSTRACT This study examines the attempts by China’s Han ethnic majority to politically and culturally incorporate the ethnically heterogeneous polities of the former Qing empire (1644-1911) into a new national imaginary during the Republican Era (1911- 1949), or what Sun Yat-sen first called a single, pure Zhonghua ninzu (Chinese nation/race). In their attempts to fashion this new sense of corporate identity, Han political elites used a series of political and cultural strategies aimed at reifying the fluid political relations between the ethnically diverse citizens of the new Chinese Republic. The state’ s goal was not only the allegiance of the Tibetan, Mongolian and other frontier minorities towards the political center, but the construction of a myth of national belonging rooted in the perception of a common history, soil and blood. My treatment of Chinese nation-building attempts to demonstrate how, in many ways, the frontier and its ethnic minorities were central rather than peripheral to the process of “revolution” in modem China. Despite their relatively small numbers, the frontier minorities inhabited roughly sixty-percent of the Republic’ s national territory, most of which was located along the remote yet resource-rich borderlands crucial to the state’ s economic modernization yet also coveted by the imperialist powers. In the days following the collapse of the Qing empire in 1911, Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria and other frontier regions broke with the Han political and cultural center. Faced with the possibility of losing much of their national territory and wealth to the foreign imperialists, Han elites stressed the urgent need for both the rhetorical and physical absorption of the frontier minorities into a thoroughly unified and ethnically pure R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. XIV Chinese Republic. By uncovering the complex process of nation-building in early 20th century China, my study attempts to shed new light on the Chinese state’ s attempts to homogenize (if not erase) ethnic and cultural diversity from its political and historical landscape. In short, the national and frontier questions in Republican China was fundamentally about the construction of a united, monoethnic and modem Zhonghm ninzu— an “imagined community” capable of naturalizing the heterogeneous polities of the Qing empire into a single homogenous Chinese nation. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1 INTRODUCTION The concepts of “nation,” “race,” “frontier,” and “ethnic minority” are all modem political constructs. In early twentieth century China, these discursive categories were crucial to the process of incorporating, both politically and culturally, the peoples and territory of the late Qing dynasty into a new Chinese nation-state. This study seeks to analyze the efforts of Han male elites to fold the ethnic diversity of the empire into the homogeneity of a single national community. Frvm Enphv to Nation Faced with the rising power of national identities and the global appeal and violence associated with nationalism in the twentieth century, academics have begun to tackle the apparently simple, yet often elusive, questions of: “What is a nation?” and “Why and how did it emerge?” A group of “modernist scholars” have convincingly demonstrated that national identity, and its accompanying concepts of the nation, race, frontier, and ethnic minority, arose with the modem transition from empires to nations. Under the pre-industrial system of competing dynastic states, political affiliations were essentially “centripetal and hierarchical” with one’ s identity and source of loyalty traced upwards toward the religious clergy and the political sovereign. Industrialization gradually displaced these traditional forms of identity, causing them to be replaced with a “ boundary oriented and horizontal” social organization. This new form of political self-consciousness— which Benedict Anderson associates with the rise of print capitalism and Ernest Gellner with the need for a homogeneously educated R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 workforce— attempts to bind the heterogeneous communities of the empire into a unified national citizenry.1 The transition from religious and dynastic allegiances to a new national identity has also been closely associated with the rise of capitalism. The “uneven diffusion” of industrialization, Tom Naim has argued, forced the national bourgeois and intelligentsia in smaller or weaker societies to draw a firm boundary around their territory and peoples in order to protect and exploit their own economic market free from foreign hegemony.2 This roping off of national sovereignty produced a more rigid concept of “national borders” and the disputed “frontier regions” located between competing nation-states. As Benedict Anderson puts it: “In the modem conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory. But in the older imagining, where states were defined by centres, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another.”3 The frontier, as Owen Lattimore demonstrated for imperial China’ s inner Asian frontier, existed as a “margin or zone of differentiation,” where a multiplicity of cultural and ethnic identities melded into and out of one other, only to periodically harden into an ethnic “reservoir” for a concerted tribal conquest of China or the encroachment of Chinese farmer onto the steppe. Yet, as Lattimore has astutely pointed out, the principal tools of capitalist expansion— the rifle and the railway— forever 1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagi ned Conm m des: Ref l ect i ons on the Ori°jn and Spread cfN ationalism , rev. ed. (New York Verso, 1991). 2 Tom Naim, The Break-up c f Bri t ai n: Cri si s and Neo-nat i onal i sm (London: NLB, 1977), 96-98. 3 Anderson, Irm gm d Conmumt i es, 19. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 altered the balance of power in this ebb and flow along the Inner Asian frontier in favor of the sedentary population of the Chinese central plains.4 The nation, much like its dynastic predecessor, is a highly contested space. Despite the state’s attempt to present the nation as organic and primordial, national identity remains a social construct that is constantly being culturally constituted. “Nations,” Eric Hobsbawn has stated, “do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around.”5 Instead of viewing national identity as a perennial and objective entity, it is best viewed as a complex process of negotiation and interaction between a multiplicity of fluid political identities. In other words, nations are “imagined” (Anderson) or “invented” (Hobsbawn and Ranger) in ways that make them inherently unstable, producing what Etienne Balibar has called “fictive ethnicity.”6 “No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally,” Balibar writes, “but as social formations are nationalized, the population included within them divided up among them or dominated by them are ethnicized— that is, represented in the past or in the future as f they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions.”7 The modernists, in sum, stress the novelty of national identity as a distinct mode of consciousness. 4 Owen Lattimore, Manchur i a: Cradl e c f Confl i ct (New York The Macmillan Co., 1932): 210-11; Owen Lattimore, “Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice” in St udi es in Front i er Hi st ory: Col l ect ed Papers, 1928-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 113-18. 5 Eric J. Hobsbawn, Nat i ons and Nationalism Sim s 1780: Pr q g r a r nr m, M yt h, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 10. 6 Anderson, Imagi ned Communi t i es , 6; Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, eds., Thel nuent i on of Tradi t i on (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1; Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Race, Nation, Cl ass: A ni nppous Identities, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 96. 7 Balibar, “The Nation Form,” 96. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 The QdturaL Origm c f the Nation Another group of scholars who study nationalism have rightfully questioned the modernists’ assumption that “nations do not have navels.”8 The so-called “ethno- culturalists” do not reject the view that nationalism and the nation-state are modem phenomena, but rather insist that they are rooted in premodem ethnic communities and were not created ex w hU o? Anthony Smith, one of the leading proponents of the ethno- culturalist view, contends that modem nation-states are rooted in premodem ethnic community or what he calls “ ethrneEtbnies are “named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites.”1 0 Smith is careful to distance himself from those who argue ethnic identity is an innate and primordial attachment rooted in the blood or territory. Rather the cohesiveness and discrete boundaries of the ethmewzx and wane as the subjective consciousness of its members rise and decline. Smith and the ethno-culturalists do not challenge the need of modem nationalists to “imagine” the nation or “invent” new cultural traditions; they do, however, argue that these social constructions must be “ cultural-specific.” In other words, only an identity that is rooted in some sort of genuine sentiment of cultural belonging can appear and authentk enough to serve as the basis of a shared 8 Anthony D. Smith, “Theories of nationalism: alternative models of nation formation,” in A sian Nat i onal i sm, ed. Michael Leifer (London: Routledge, 2000), 6. 9 See Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” Ethnic and Racial St udi es 12.3 (fuly 1989): 340- 67; Walker Connor, E thnam tkm lism The Quest fa r Underst andi ng (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 68-86; John A. Armstrong. Nations hfoce Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 5 national community. Anthony Smith perceptively describes the transition from empire to nation as the process during which pre-existing “ethnic cores” or “dominant etbnies” incorporate outlying or “peripheral etbnies” before gradually coalescing into a fully sovereign and fixed-boundary nation-state. In the annexation and attraction of peripheral etbnies, the ethnic core employs both political and cultural tactics. In short, the dominant etbnies uses its cultural, military and political apparatuses to “regulate and disseminate the fund of values, symbols, myths, traditions and memories that formed the cultural heritage of the dominant aristocratic ethnic core.”1 1 Yet, one of the primary dangers of the ethno-culturalist approach is what Richard Handler has identified as “the substantive overlap between nationalist ideology and social science theory.” 1 2 Handler argues that the tendency among social scientists to privilege bounded social entities, such as “societies,” “cultures” and “nations,” in their analysis of nationalism dovetails all too closely with the desire among nationalists for an integrated nation-state. Both discourses in Handler’ s view share a similar “epistemology of entitivity” which assumes that “discrete social entities” are the “normal and healthy state of social life.” Handler warns against the penchant in the study of nationalism to reify the “fuzzy boundaries” of the nation and calls upon social scienticists to recognize the permeable, contested and contingent nature of national identity. Prasenjit Duara attempts to deal with Handler’ s concern, or what he calls the “privileging of the nation as a cohesive collective subject,” by proposing a “bifurcated” 1 0 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 40. » Ibid., 55. 1 2 Richard Handler, N atim dism and t he Pol i t i cs o f Cul t ure in Que be c (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 16. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 6 theory of history and community narratives.1 3 Duara chooses to view national identity as both the transmission of historically-based political and cultural communities and the dispersal of these representations over time and space according to present needs. Duara follows Smith in rejecting the novelty of national consciousness and argues instead that it is the world system of nation-states, which “sanctions the nation-state as the only legitimate expression of sovereignty,” rather than some unique and unprecedented mode of consciousness that is unique about modem nationalism.1 4 Yet, unlike Smith, Duara is not interested in charting the transformation of premodem ethnic communities into modem nation-states; rather he attempts to bifurcate linear national history by exposing the fluid and historically contingent network of representations that underpin the master narrative of the nation in 20th century China. In his monograph Rescuing History from the Nation, Duara adopts a Foucauldian genealogical approach in order to de-center the Chinese nation and expose the forced “closures” of the “polyphonous” voices of political identity in modem China. It is precisely because of the empire’ s diversity and the long tradition of alternative “nation- views,” Duara argues, that the nation-state is never able to completely eliminate the myriad of parochial or counter- national narratives that uneasily coexist with the modem state’s official apologue of national unity. As a result, the state and its elite, which often come to represent the dominant ethnic community and its national bourgeoisie, must 1 3 Prasenjit Duaia, Res cui ng H istoryfrom t he Nat i on: Ckxst kmmg Narratives c f Modem Chi m (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 51-82. 1 4 Ibid., 8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 7 constantly guard against these alternative formulations of the nation while actively attempting to shore up its own narrative of national belonging. The need for effective state integration creates a new set of problems for the nation-state. The frontier, which serves as the frontline of the nation-state’ s attempt to map its national sovereignty and protect its economic markets, is often home to a heterogeneous and polyglot group of peoples. One of the state’ s crucial tasks is to homogenize these disparate ethnic identities by drawing vertical lines of distinction between the national “self” and an alien “other.” This process of “nation building” is most highly contested along the frontier, where ineffective communication and transportation networks often limit the political and ideological reach of the state. The gradual “naturalization” of the old empire’ s territory and people is, in the poetic words of Anderson, like “stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”1 5 The Frontier and National Questions in early 2<f’ Century China The transition from empire to nation did not come easy in China. The last Chinese dynasty, the Manchu Qing empire, represented a loose coalition of several largely autonomous ethnic groups. In exchange for their symbolic recognition of Qing authority, the Manchu court afforded the Han, Mongols, Tibetans, and Hui (so-called “Chinese Muslims”) a high degree of political, cultural and economic autonomy. With the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the new Chinese state was declared a “Republic of Five Lineages” (w tzugcs^e), with all the ethnic communities of the Qing 1 5 Anderson, Irm gm d Conmmi t i es, 86. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 8 empire proclaimed equal citizens of the new, multi-ethnic “Zhonghua Republic” {Zhon^ma Mingtd). “The uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan territories into a single country,” Sun Yat-sen declared in his inaugural speech as provisional president in January 1912, “also means the uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan races into a single people.”1 6 Yet, when Mongolia and Tibet, with the encouragement of Gzarist Russia and British India, declared their independence from China that winter, the inherent fragility of the new Republic became readily apparent. Han nationalist leaders, like Sun Yat-sen, began stressing the urgent need for the political and cultural integration of the “small and weak rrinzu (ruaxiao ninzu) into a single national polity, which was now termed the “Zhonghua nation/race” [Zkongbua ninzu). The fact that Sun and other Republican elites used the neologism “Zhongfaa” rather than the more common Hamm (Han people) or Zhongzuomi (Chinese people) when referring to the new republic and its people reflected, I would argue, a conscious effort on their behalf to absorb the heterogeneous Qing peoples into a new corporate body politic.1 7 1 6 Sun Yat-sen, “Linshi dazhongtong xuanyanshu” (Proclamation of the Provisional President), 1 January 1912, in Sun Zho ng s ha n Quanj i (Compl et e Works cfS rn Yat -seri ), comp., Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiushi et. al (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 2: 2 (hereafter cited as SZSQ f). 1 7 Chinese scholars have traced the neologism “Zhan^m f back to a linguistic combination of “Z h c r n g r u d ’ and “ H unch” during the Wei and Jin dynasties (ca. 220-419 AD). Its modem usage seems to be linked -with the 1895 political programme of Sim Yat-sen’ s Tongmenghui, -which echoed the first Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang, in calling for the “driving out of the Tartar beasts and the restoration of Zhonghua” { qudou ddu, hui f u Zhorpj j ua). It is unclear whether Sun’ s initial choice of terms reflected a conscious desire to forge a multi-ethnic union from amongst the heterogenous Qing population. We do know, however, that from an early date Sun was uncomfortable with the virulent anti-Manchuism of Zhang Binglin and others while sympathizing with Liang Qichao’ s call for a “great minzuzhuyi” { da ni nzuzhuyi see Chapter One). After the revolution, Sun and others reworked the terms Zhon$rua ninzu and Z h o n g j c u a r r i nguo— ironically first coined, it would seems, by Zhang Binglin— to signify the non-violent evolutionary melding of the disparate Qing subjects into a new, homogenous national people. On the origins of Zhon^ma see Chen Liankai, “Zhongguo, Huayi, Fanhan, Zhonghua, Zhonghua minzu— yige zai R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 9 In the past, the collapse of the Qing dynasty has been characterized as an epistemological break in the way diversity was conceptualized in China. In his now classic trilogy on Qynfurian China and its Modem Fate, Joseph Levenson argued that China’ s transition from empire to nation-state represented a parallel shift from “culturalism” to “nationalism.” Levenson contended that in premodem China, ethnic diversity was subsumed under a tianxia concept of universal empire, in which adherence to Chinese cultural practices and moral values served as the only boundary between barbarism and civilization. Chinese nationalists, beginning with the late Qing Anti- Manchuists, sharply broke with Confucian culturalism when they developed an exclusivist national community (gtqia or ninzu) in which the Manchus and other barbarians had no place.1 8 Prasenjit Duara and others have challenged Levenson’ s rigorous tradition/modernity dichotomy by convincingly demonstrating the existence of a circumscribed “Han” political consciousness— or what I prefer to call a “Sinitic” identity to avoid an overly essentialized and anachronistic usage of the 20th century ethnonym “Han”— throughout imperial Chinese history. This ethnocentric Sinitic identity was strongest during times of invasion by pastoral steppe tribes like the Mongols and the Manchus, when the relativization of the tianxia ideal led to the creation of a hard and impermeable boundary between the sedentary Chinese and the nomadic barbarians. As far back as the Zhou Dynasty classic, the Zuozhmn, He Chengtian, Jiang Tong, Wang Fuzhi and other Chinese literati argued lianxi fazhan bei renshi de guocheng” (One Process for recognizing the developmental relationship between the terms Zhongz uo, Huayi , Farhan, Zha^m a, and Zhor^m i ninzu), in Zhon$rua M inzu Yanj i u O nM niPidm inary Res ear ch on t he Zhan^j ua ninzu) (Beijing: Zhishi chubanshe, 1994), 59-69. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 10 that the barbarians possessed a fundamentally different “lineage” (za), “nature” (xir$, “substance” (zhi) or “psycho-physical energy” (qi) from the sedentary inhabitants of the Central Plains.1 9 Rather than “inventing” a radically new mode of consciousness, the late Qing intellectuals introduced new discursive categories— namely “race” and “nation”— for rationalizing human diversity within a global taxonomy of territorially and biologically defined rrnnzu (race/nation/people), while reinforcing the age-old Sinitic prejudice against non-sedentary pastoral cultures and economies. In other words, it was the discourse of modernity, with its circular signifiers of race, nation and history, that was unique to 20th century Chinese political thought rather than narratives of ethnic difference. In early 20th century China this exclusivist Sinitic political community was reinforced by the clear demographic strength of the Han people within the new Republican state. As Ho Ping-ti and others have demonstrated, the population of the sedentary Central Plain region in China exploded during the Qing dynasty, with enhanced political stability, increased agricultural cultivation and new crop strains contributing to a sharp rise from roughly 150 million in 1741 to nearly 430 million in 1 8 Joseph Levenson, C orf m an Chim and Its Modern Fate (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 1:95-116. 1 9 Duara, Rescui ng H istory From t he Nation, 56-61; Frank Dikotter, The Di scourse i f Race inM odem Chi na (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 2-60; Marta Hanson, “Robust Northerners and Delicate Southerners: The Nineteenth-Century Invention of a Southern Medical Tradition,” Posi t i ons: E ast A sian Cul t ure Critique, 6.3 (Winter 1998): 515-50; Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modem China,” L atelnperial Chim , 11.1 (1990): 1-35; Rolf Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese Nationalism,” in Cri si s and Prosperi t y in S tag Chi na, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), 199-214; Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “Proto-Nationalism in Twelfth- Century China? The Case of Ch’ en Liang,” H arwrdJournal o f A siatic St udi es, 39.2:403-27. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1850.2 0 The nomadic populations of Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria, on the other hand, remained relatively stable during the early Qing before declining with the spread of Buddhist monasticism and the arrival of Chinese colonists and their diseases during the late Qing dynasty.2 1 In fact, according to Republican-era estimates, the non- Han population of these four frontier regions was a mere 8 million people by the time of the empire’ s collapse, representing, in sharp contrast to the Tsarist and other truly multiethnic European empires, less than five-percent of the Qing empire’ s total population.2 2 To many Republican elites, the proportional girth of the Han population seemed to make China a uniquely homogenous nation-state. Sun Yat-sen, for example, declared in 1924 that only in China does a single homogeneous ninzu comprise a single political state (gtcjia). In reaching this conclusion, Sun dismissed the frontier minorities 20HoPing-ti, St udi es m t he Popidationrf Chim, 1368-1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 266-82. 2 1 See Yang Zihui, comp., Zl xr nggr o L idai Renkou Tcngi Ziliao Yanj i u (Chi na Historical Popul at i on D ata and theRdarunt St udi es [szcj (Beijing: China Reform Publishing House, 1996), 1217; Morris Rossabi, Chi na and Inner A sia: Fr om. 1368 to t he Present D ay (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 193 & 203; Thomas J. Barfield, Th e Peri l ous Front i er: Nomadi c Empi res and Chi na (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 301 and passim. Of the Mongol, Tibetan, Hui and Manchu populations only the Manchus increased in numbers during the Qing dynasty. It is estimated that the Manchu population grew from 600,000 at the time of their conquest of Clina to roughly 3.5 million by the collapse of the Qing empire. Yet, most of this increase occurred among the sedentary Manchu bannermen living inside the Great Wall. According to Zhang Qiyun’ s 1907 Record (fth e Zhaqjma ninzu ( Zl xmgj j ua M inzu Zhi ) less than 2 million or 10% of the 20 million people living in Manchuria during the late Qing were Manchus. See Yang, Zhar qguo LidaiRenkou Torrgi Ziliao Yanj i u, 1478. 2 2 Based on the data collected in Yang, ZhongruoLi dai Renkou Tongi Ziliao Yanjiu,l477-89 the estimated non-Han populations of these four regions at the time of the Qing collapse was: Manchuria: 2 million Manchus; Mongolia: 1.7 million Mongols (1.1 million in Inner Mongolia and 600,000 in Outer Mongolia); Northwest: 4.5 million Hui (2 million in Gansu Province and 2.5 million in Xinjiang); and Tibet: 1.7 million Tibetans (1.1 million on the Tibetan steppe and 600,000 scattered through Xikang, Qinghai, Yunnan and Gansu If one includes the southern minorities and the Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people living inside China proper, the total minority population of late Qing China rises to around 37 million or roughly 10% of the total Qing population. Compare this to a 1897 census of the Tsarist empire which identified 55% of the regime’s population as non-Russian natives. See Helene Carrere d’ Encausee, The Great Chal l eng: Nationalities and t he Bdsheuk State,1917-1930, trans Nancy Festinger (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), 3. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 12 as a backward and insignificant group of “non-natives” (wiilai), whose motley ten million paled in comparison to the over 400 million strong Han people.2 3 The problem for Han nationalists like Sun Yat-sen was not the demographic size of the frontier minorities but rather their geographic distribution over vast tracts of the new nation-state’ s boundaries. Despite their relatively small numbers, the frontier minorities inhabited roughly sixty-percent of the new Republic’ s national territory, most of which was located along the remote yet resource-rich borderlands crucial to state’s economic modernization yet also coveted by the imperialist powers. Faced with the possibility of losing much of their national territory and wealth to the foreign imperialists, Han elites began stressing the urgent need for the political and cultural absorption of the frontier minorities into the Chinese Republic. The problem of incorporating the “frontier races” {bianjiang ninzu) into the new nation-state became known as the “national question” (ninzu im ti) or the “frontier question” {bmyiang wznti) in modem Chinese political discourse. “In this (to date) century-long process,” Jonathan Lipman has pointed out, “the Chinese nation-state has inherited, reimagined, and acted upon a modem, hegemonic paradigm of “Chinese” society, one based on the powerful concept of ninzu?1 * M inzu as a Social E vdutiamry Discourse o f National Incorporation The Chinese discourse of ninzu (which intentionally blurs the semantic lines between the slippery Western concepts of “race,” “nation” and “people”) served as the 2 3 Sun Yat-sen, “Mmzuzhuyi - Diyijiang” (The Principle of M inzu - Lecture Number One), 27 January 1924, SZSQJ, 9:184-85. 2 4 Jonathan N. Lipman, FanHi ar St rangers: A H istory ( f M uslim in N ortbuest Chim (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), xx. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1 3 discursive conduit for the spread of social Darwinian thinking among early 20th century Han elites. The discourses of race and nation, Etienne Balibar and others have pointed out, are closely interrelated.2 5 The nature of one’ s “race,” or in China’ s case ninzu, was seen as a crucial indicator of one’ s ability to evolve towards civilization. It was believed that certain “inferior ninzu? due to the impurity of their blood or the deleterious environmental conditions under which they lived, were incapable of progressing towards independent nationhood. Within social evolutionary thought, the world was seen as divided into what Liang Qichao, following Hegel, labeled as “historical” {y ou U s k n ) and “ahistorical” (fe&shi) races.2 6 The nation’ s development was seen as the natural and teleological unfolding of human evolution and progress. Yet, because not all peoples were equally endowed by nature, only those races who possessed the capacity for progress, the so-called historical races, were capable of forming their own nations. The only course of action for the ahistorical races, or what Karl Kautsky referred to as “an old piece of inherited family furniture” and Fredrick Engels as “ethnic trash,” was to allow the natural process of dissolution and absorption by their stronger neighbors to run its course.2 7 For Han elites in Republican China, the social Darwinian discourse of “the nation as progress” meant the assimilation of smaller and inferior peoples into larger and superior ones. 2 5 Balibar, “The Nation Form,” 37 f£; Duara, Res cui ng H istory from tlx Nation, 20-23; George Stocking, Vi ct ori an A rt f hrcpdagy (New York; The Free Press, 1987), passim. 2 6 Liang Qichao, “Xin shixue,” (New Historiograph)), 1902, in Liang Qichao, Yinbinglri Wenj i (Collected Works from the Ice Drinker’ s Studio) (Taipei; Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 4:7. (Hereafter cited as YBSW j). 2 7 Kautsky’ s phrase is cited in Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Si nce 1 7 8 0 ,36; Engels’ phrase is cited in Walker Connor, The National Quest i on in Marx ist-L en n st Theor y and St rat egy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 15. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 14 In his path-breaking monograph on Chim and Charles Dandn, James Pusey convincingly demonstrates that, following its introduction by Yen Fu in 1895, social Darwinism came to thoroughly underpin the ideology of late Qing and early Republican Han intellectuals.2 8 This was particularly true of Han thinking on ethnic diversity in early 20th century China. Despite the pre-1911 rhetoric of some “revolutionaries” (such as Zou Rong and Zhang Binglin), who argued that the Manchu rulers should be forcefully expelled from China, nearly all Han elites came to accept Sim Yat-sen’ s social evolutionary formulation of the problem. Sun believed that the Han, as an inherently superior race, had the evolutionary duty (what one might term the “Han man’ s burden”) to rule over and assimilate the small and “backward” frontier minorities. Due to their inherent weakness and exploitation by the foreign imperialists, it was in the best interest of the nation as a whole for the frontier minorities to give up their separate identities and “smelt” (mr^ye) together with the Han majority in a “single furnace” (heyilu) to create a single, large, and evolutionarily-fit Zhorrjrua ninzu}9 Sun Yat-sen seemed to trust that Darwin’ s forces of nature, if given the opportunity to work, would eventually amalgamate all “Chinese” into a single national community; many of his followers, on the other hand, grew impatient, particularly in the face of growing Japanese hegemony during the 1930s, and set about discursively “constructing” the Zhon^ma ninzu. In their attempt to “invent” a new Zhonghua national identity capable of encompassing the threatened frontier minorities of the Qing empire, intellectuals and policymakers associated with the two major political parties of 2 8 James Reeve Pusey, Chi m and Charl es D arw n (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 15 Republican China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang Nationalist Party (KMT), pursued an active agenda of nation- and state-building. As Geoff Eleyand Ronald Sunyhave pointed out, “creative political action is required to transform a segmented and disunited population into a coherent nationality, and though potential communities of this kind may clearly precede such interventions (so that they are rarely interventions into a vacuum), the interventions remain responsible for combining the materials into a larger collectivity.”3 0 Following Eleyand Suny, I have chosen to divide the different strategies of incorporation employed by the CCP and the KMT into the two categories of “political intervention” and “historical innovation.” Political intervention is the process of state-building. Logistical limitations and the jumbled ethnic geography of the frontier make the imposition of the state’ s political and economic authority over the hinterland particularly difficult. The state has essentially three options for dealing with the frontier minorities: assimilation, national autonomy, or national self-determination. While Sun Yat-sen claimed to have been influenced by the concept of “national seh-determination” (jrinzuzijufy late in his life- overseeing its incorporation into the Kuomintang’ s political manifesto— Han political leaders never seriously considered its application towards the frontier minorities. The right of minority political independence seemed to fundamentally contradict the social evolutionary framework through which Chinese elites viewed the problem of the non- Han minorities. In the mind of Sun Yat-sen and other Han nationalists, the principle of 2 9 Sun Yat-sen, “Sanminzhuyi” (Three People’s Principles), 1919, in SZ SQ j, 5:187. 3 0 Geoff Eleyand Ronald Suny, “Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation,” in Beami ng Natiom h A Raider (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 16 self-determination only applied to the evolutionary-fit Han race. “The Tibetans, Mongols, Hui and Manchus lack the ability of self-defense,” Sun Yat-sen declared in 1921, “thus, the task of fostering a glorious and large mmuzhuyi, assimilating the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui and Manchus into our Hanzu and constructing the biggest possible nation-state rests solely with the self-determination of the Han people.”3 1 Of the remaining two options, assimilation most clearly accorded with Darwin’ s lessons for the nation-state. Political intervention, however, is a dialectical process, which involves numerous political actors and a fluid series of identities. While the eventual assimilation of the frontier minorities into the Han majority was the ultimate goal of both the CCP and the KMT, they were often forced to accept the long-term nature of this evolutionary process. In the meantime, the proffering of limited regional autonomy seemed the most effective short-term tactic for exercising national sovereignty over the recalcitrant frontier peoples. The Han intellectual elites in Republican China also engaged in the complex process of historical innovation. Han cultural leaders used literature, movies, theater, art, religion, festivals and other “national traditions” to produce a sense of national belonging among the Qing peoples. Yet, more powerful than these “cultural artifacts,” was the ability of modem social sciences to produce “empirical” knowledge about the nation’ s past. Edward Said and others have highlighted the importance of science in reinforcing and legitimizing traditional “Orientalist” prejudices.3 2 Among these new 3 1 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang” (Speech before the Yunnan- Jiangxi-Guangdong Army at Guilin), 10 December 1921, in SZSQf, 6:24. 3 2 Edward Said, Ori ent al i sm.(New York; Vintage Books, 1979), 231-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 17 “scientific disciplines,” history, archaeology and ethnology played an important role in China in fashioning a myth of historical rootedness or what Anderson calls a “biography of the nation.”3 3 As Stevan Harrell has recendy pointed out: Any government that wishes to gain the loyalty of its citizens must convince them that they are citizens by virtue of their historical and cultural attachment to the nation and that this attachment is a long, glorious, and immutable one. A government must not simply ignore, it must also actively attempt to hide, the fluid, multivalent nature of ethnic identity. It does this, ordinarily, by constructing narratives of national unfolding, what Homi Bhabha calls “the attempt by nationalist discourse persistendyto produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress” or what Benedict Anderson characterizes as “the process of reading nationalism genealogically^- as the expression of a historical tradition of serial continuity.” These narratives of unfolding are stories of the processes by which an ancient people has come down through the ages as agent, as victim, as subject and object, but most importantly as a unity.3 4 By attempting to manufacture and manipulate narratives of the past, Han intellectuals hoped to reify the organic unity and antiquity of the Zhon$m ninzu. “Getting its history- wrong,” as Ernest Renan stated in his famous 1882 Sorbonne lecture, “is part of being a nation.”3 5 LiteratureReiiew& So urc es The existing western scholarship on China’ s early 20th century frontier and national questions is limited and incomplete in both scope and analysis. Political studies on the integration of the frontier minorities into the new Chinese nation-state have provided only partial treatment of the problem during the Republican period. China's 3 3 Anderson, Inugned Comrurrkks, 204-06. 3 4 Stevan Harrell, “Introduction,” in N egtiating E thni dt i es in Chim and Tai nan, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1996), 4. Hie quote from Bhabha is from Homi Bhabha, ed., N ation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990), 1; and Anderson’s quote can be found in Anderson, Irm gm d Convmni t i es, 195. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 18 Forty Millions, June Dryer’s now classic treatment of Maoist minority policy, offers the most sophisticated examination of the problem in the People’ s Republic of China; yet, Dryer provides only a scant twenty-five-page introduction— filled with numerous errors— to the development of CCP and KMT policy during the Republican era. Other works by Heberer, Moseley, and Eberhard also focus almost exclusively on the post- 1949 period. A more recent treatment of the problem by Australian scholar Colin Mackerras attempts to place the “integration and modernization” of the Chinese minorities within the framework of the entire 20th century. Despite its ambitious goals, the fact that Mackerras relies, almost exclusively, on PRC secondary source materials foreshortens, if not biases, his analysis of the problem. Another pioneering essay, Walker Connor’ s “Minorities and the Creadon of the Chinese People’ s Republic,” also suffers from its reliance on primary source materials available in English translation. Finally, Germaine Hoston’s far-ranging monograph, The State, Identity and the National Question in Chim and Japan, overlooks entirely the importance of the frontier and national minority questions to the discourse of state-building in early 20th century China. By treating the problem at the level of an assumed “Chinese nation,” Hoston reinforces, rather than questions, the notion of a stable Chinese national identity.3 6 This reflects, I believe, a general tendency in East Asian studies to overlook ethnic and cultural 3 5 Gted in Hobsbawn, Nations and Nat i onal i sm. Si me 1 7 8 0 ,12; for a slightly different translation see Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” trans. Martin Thom, in Beami ng National, 45. 3 6 June Dryer, Chi na’ s Forty Mi l l i ans: M inority Nationalities and N ational Int egrat i on in the Peopl e' s Republ i c ( f Chi m (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Thomas Heberer, Chi na and its National Mi nori t i es: Aut onomy or Assimilation? (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); George Moseley, 1he Party and t he National Quest i on in Chim (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); Wolfram Eberhard, Chi na’ s M i nori t i es: Yest erday and Today (Belmont, CA; Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1982); Colin Mackerras, Chi na’ s M i nori t i es: Int egrat i on and Moderni zat i on in t he Twent i et h Cent ury (London: Oxford University Press, 1994); Connor, The National R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 19 diversity in favor of the accepted, unexamined and bounded categories of “Chineseness,” “Japaneseness,” and “Koreanness.” Owen Lattimore’ s numerous studies of the Manchurian, Mongolian and Xinjiang frontier regions continues to offer valuable, first-hand, insight into the Chinese Republic’ s often fitful attempts to integrate the Qing frontier into the new nation-state. Lattimore, probably more than any other first- or second-generation “China watcher,” appreciated the complex and multivalent process of state building and frontier incorporation in China. The last couple of decades have witnessed the publication of a number of excellent regional histories that, in building upon the tradition of Lattimore, either explicitly or tacitly deal with the national minority question. Andrew Forbe’ s treatment of Republican era Xinjiang; Melvyn Goldstein’s marvelous history of Tibet; and Jonathan Lipman’ s examination of Gansu and Mngxia, for example, have all been important sources of information and guidance in my study of the problem.3 7 Yet, rather than beginning from the margins, I want to draw our discussion back towards the center, and consider for a moment how and why the Republican state attempted to impose its authority over the frontier region. My study attempts to offer a more systematic treatment of the problem; one that views the process of state-building from Quest i on in M arxist-Leninist The or y and St rat egy, 67-100; Germaine A. Hoston, The State, Ident i t y, andthe National Quest i on in Chi na andJapan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 3 7 Lattimore, Manchur i a, Cradl e c f Carfl i ct ; Owen Lattimore, The Mongol s <f Manchur i a (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935); Owen Lattimore, Mart gl Journeys (London, Jonathan Cape, 1941); Owen Lattimore et.al., P iw t cjA sia: Skkiangand t he Inner A sianF rortiers cfChina and Russia (Boston: Little & Brown, 1950); Owen Lattimore, Inner A sian Front i ers c f Chi na (New York: Capital, 1951); Owen Lattimore, St udi es inFmntier Hi st ory: Col l ect ed Papers, 1928-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); AndrewD.W. Forbes, War l ords and M uslim in Chi nes e Cent ral A sia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Melvyn Goldstein, A H istory c f Modem Ti bet , 1913-1951: The D enise cfthe Larm ist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Lipman, Fami l i ar St r angers; Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion The Mosl em Chal l e nge to Chi nes e A uthority in Xinjiang 1944-1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 20 the perspective of the Han center (as embodied by its two major political parties the CCP and the KMT) rather than a specific region or minority group. During the last couple of decades, a number of solid studies, which can be placed under the general rubric of cultural studies, have provided a new language for analyzing issues of ethnicity, race and national identity in China. Cultural anthropologists, such as Dru Gladney, Stevan Harrell and their students, have lead the way in revising our approach to ethnic relations in China.3 8 By choosing to view social identity as a shifting and fluid process of negotiation rather than as an objective, primordial and fixed consciousness, anthropologists have provided us with a powerful new tool of analysis. Unfortunately for the historian, their work often lacks historical depth and scope. The anthropological methodology— in which one often picks a “people” and then spends months, if not years, studying through first-hand field work— does not lend itself easily to a historical perspective. As such, the work of these anthropologists has tended to rather narrowly focus upon contemporary issues and the conditions of a single ethnic group in China. In spite of these limitations, the analytical framework of my study has been greatly informed by the social theory of this new generation of anthropologists. The work of new cultural historians, in particular Frank Dikotter and Prasenjit Duara, has also influenced the theoretical direction of my research. Despite its analytical 3 8 See, for example, Dm G Gladney, M uslim Chi ne s e : Et hroe Nationalism in t he Peopl e’ s Republ i c (Cambridge: Harvard University, Council on East Asian Studies, 1991); Stevan Harrell, ed., Cul t ural E mount e r s m Chi na’ s Ethnic Front i ers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995); Melissa J. Brown, ed., N egtiatingE thnidties in Chim and Tai mm (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1996); Louisa Schein, M inority Rul es: TheM iaoandtheFeninine in Chi na’ s Cul t ural Pol i t i cs (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 21 shortcomings, Dikotter’ s Discourse o f Race inModem China remains a pioneering study on the uses of race in the construction of social identity in 20th century China.3 9 Building on the earlier work of James Pusey, Dikotter demonstrates how modem notions of “Chineseness” are deeply rooted in a social evolutionary (especially Neo-Lamarkian) discourse that privileges biological markers of difference. Yet, by focusing rather narrowly upon the supra-national tension between the White “outside barbarians” (wryt) and the Yellow “Chinese race,” Dikotter misses, I believe, the important role of race in the Republican era discourse of nation-building and minority incorporation. The Han Chinese did not always perceive their ethnic minorities, as Dikotter claims, according to sociocultural differences. In practice, racial and cultural typologies often overlapped and the inherent ambiguity of the central concept of ninzu lent itself to the blurring of the boundaries between the various markers of difference. Narratives of shared descent, I will argue, played a crucial role in the dialectical process of constituting a single Zhonghua identity, one that subsumed the Qing frontier minorities at the same time as it fashioned a hard boundary between the “Self” (the Zbongfcua ninzu) and the “Other” (the foreign imperialists). Prasenjit Duara’ s Rescuing History from the Nation does a better job at describing the highly dynamic and contingent nature of ethnic and national identity in modem China. As discussed earlier, Duara demonstrates how competing ideologies of nationhood in early 20th century China were produced through a complex process of negotiation with historical identities placed within the modem framework of the nation 3 9 Dikotter, The Di scourse of Race i nM odem Chim . R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 22 state system. Duara provides a very nuanced analysis of the barbarian “Other” in the construction of a premodem Sinitic political community, convincingly challenging Joseph Levenson’ s culturalism to nationalism thesis. Yet, for all its careful attention to the role of ethnic diversity in premodem China, the frontier minorities largely fade into the background of Duara’ s discussion of 20th century Chinese nationalism. Interested more in non-ethnic forms of political identity, such as religion, secret societies and provincial identity, Duara tends to essentialize national identity in modem China at the level of the “Han nation,” foreclosing, like Hoston, Dikotter and others, the important role of the frontier minorities in the formation of Chinese national identity.4 0 In contrast to what Duara would have us believe, Sun Yat-sen and other Republican era elites did not always view the Chinese nation and the Han people as one in the same; rather Han elites actively pursued the political and cultural incorporation of the non-Han peoples into a new corporate and organic Zhon^rua ninzu identity. I see my work as a correlative project, if not a constructive (in what I like to think is the positive sense of the word) counter-narrative, to Duara’ s deconstructivist historiography. Believing that our knowledge of the frontier and national questions in early 20th century China is still at a preliminary stage, I attempt to trace the historical processes by which the Han state constituted a unitary discourse of “Chineseness” which explicitly integrated the heterogeneous peoples of the Qing empire into a new Zhon^ma ninzu. At the same time, by exposing the invented, contested and unstable nature of this narrative of national identity, I also hope to avoid Handler’ s 4 0 Duara, Rescui ng H is toyfrom t he Nation, 27-48. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 23 “epistemology of entitivity,” while contributing to our understanding of the frontier and national questions in early 20th century China. Despite its sheer size and fundamental usefulness, the Chinese secondary literature on the national and frontier questions remains firmly locked within a set of rigid ideological constraints. Thanks to the academic institutionalization of the “national question” on the Chinese Mainland and the “frontier question” on Taiwan, Chinese scholars have analyzed a wide range of issues related to the incorporation of the Qing frontier into the Chinese nation-state. Yet, CCP and KMT scholars continue to hold diametrically opposed views of each other’ s treatment of the national minorities. Communist historians, generally speaking, characterize KMT policy as the forced assimilation of the frontier minorities. They argue that the Kuomintang purposely blurred the lines of distinction between the scientific concept of nationality {ninztij and the unscientific myth of race (zhongtu); and then used this concept of race to forcefully erase the national identities and individual histories of Chinese national minorities, which resulted in Chiang Kai-shek’ s declaration in China's Destiny that the minorities were consanguineous “lineages” (zongzhi or zongzu) of a single Chinese race.4 1 Kuomintang scholars, in turn, contend that it was actually GCP policy that aimed at the elimination of ethnic consciousness in China and the forced assimilation of the frontier minorities into the Communist state. They argue that Communist officials blindly imitated Soviet Russian policy on the “national minority question”; and accordingly, 4 1 See, for example, Jiang Ping et. al., Zhonggj o M inzu W en tickL ilm yu Shixian (The or y and Pract i ce c f Chinas National Ques t i on) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994), 106-113 and passim; Huang Guangxue and Shi Lianzhu, Zhongsi t o de M inzu Shi hi e {Di scerni ng Chi nes e Nationality) (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1995), 8-18 and passim. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 24 their policy of “regional autonomy” {quyu zizhi) attempted to appease the frontier minorities while first dividing and then consolidating Party control over the non-Han peoples. Finally, they claim that, following its founding in 1949, the totalitarian Communist state set about systematically destroying the frontier people’s ethnic identity, cultures, religions and land rights.4 2 Despite its clearly polemic nature, Chinese secondary material can still serve as a valuable source of information for analyzing nationalism in early 20th century China. The art of extracting facts from polemics and reading against, rather than with, the ideological grains are crucial skills for any Western historian hoping to offer a critical perspective on Chinese history. One of the most effective methods for accomplishing this is to use Chinese secondary source material as a supplement to primary source materials. In spite (or perhaps because of) these ideological constraints, Chinese scholars have devoted considerable attention to the painstaking process of preserving, collecting, categorizing and reprinting Republican era historical documents. Given the sensitivity of the national question in China today, it has proven difficult to conduct archival research on these topics. Consequently, these reprinted collections, such as M inzu Wend Wenxian Hwbian [Gdlectian c f Documents on the National Question], Gening Wenxian [Documents from the Revolution] and the reprinted documents of the Commission of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (Mengcang wtiyuarhw] contained in the multi-volume Zhonftua Mingto Shi Dang'an Ziliao Hwbian [Collection cfA nhivd Documents on Republican History] and many others, have 4 2 See, for example, Zhang Xingtang, “Bianjiang feiqing gaishu” (Frontier conditions under the communist bandits), in Bkrt j i angLurmEri j i {Col l ect edEssays on t he Front i er), comp. Bianjiang lunwenji bianzuan weiyuanhui (Taipei: Kuofang yenjiuyuan, 1964), 2:1333-55; Zhou Kuntian, “Dui zhonggong R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 25 served as an important source of primary documents for my study.431 have also drawn heavily on the compiled works of leading Republican era politicians and intellectuals. Despite the edited nature of these works (that is, the omission rather than alteration of controversial documents or topics), these rich materials still serve as a valuable, and largely untapped, source of information about early 20th century China. Finally, these reprinted collections have been used to supplement the original materials, mainly Republican era books and periodicals, I examined during several years of research in the libraries of Shanghai, Nanjing and Hong Kong. By drawing on a wide variety of secondary and primary source materials from China and constantly cross checking different narratives of the past in CCP and KMT sources, I hope to contribute to our understanding of the process of nation-building in Republican era China. Chapter Chmiew In sharp contrast to Chinese scholarship on the national and frontier questions, one of the principal aims of my study is to demonstrate how both CCP and KMT policy and discourse on the “minorities” in Republican China was set within a social evolutionary framework, one which privileged the development of a single, Han- centered Z l o o n g t - m a ninzu. The ultimate goal of both parties was the political and ideological incorporation of the Qing frontier and its people into a culturally and ethnically unified nation-state. By moving the frontier and its people to the center of ‘shaoshu minzu’ zhengce de pipan” (Criticism of the CCP’ s “national minority” policy), in Sarmi rubuyi de Biarjiang Zhengx (The Thr e e Peopl e’ s Pri ndpl es Front i er Pol i cy) (Taipei: Mengzang weiyuanhui, 1984), 73-88. 4 3 Zhonggong zhongyang tongxianbu, ed ., M inzu Wend Wenxi an H w bian 7/1921 - 9 /1 9 4 9 (Col l ect i on c f Document s an t he N adom l Ques t i on, July 1921 to Sept ember 1949) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991) (hereafter cited as M ZW T); Zhongguo Dier Lishi Dang’anguan, comp., R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 26 our discussion of the Chinese revolution and examining different narratives of nation- building, I hope to reveal the important role the “national minority question” played in both parties’ efforts to impose its control over the entire territory of the former Qing empire. At the same time, by stripping away the layers of rhetoric, I hope to demonstrate the process by which both parties tried to naturalize the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Qing empire into a unitary Chinese nation-state. Part one examines what were essentially two of the major paradigms for dealing with the problem of ethnic diversity in the early 20th century Chinese nation-state: Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of ninzuzhuyi and the Bolshevik discourse on the national question. This section attempts to demonstrate how Sun’ s social Darwinian framework, which privileged the ethnic and territorial unity of “China,” came to provide the basis for much of the early 20th century discourse on the positioning of ethnic minorities within the nation-state. This discourse established the analytical framework within which both the Communists and the Kuomintang formulated their minority policies and provided the ideological underpinning for intellectual discussions of the origin and historical development of the Chinese nation. Chapter one fleshes out the key ideological constants within Sun Yat-sen’ s dynamic discourse of rmzuzhuyL Sun viewed the frontier minorities of the former Qing empire as evolutionarily-unfit ethnic relics that were destined for eventual assimilation by the culturally and demographically “superior” Han majority. Despite an inherent ambiguity within his positioning of the minorities, Sun firmly believed that national Zhor t y hua M ingio Shi D angan Zil i aoHuHmn ( Col l ect i on cfA nhi ut l Document s anRepuH iam H istory) (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1994-) (hereafter cited as ZM SD). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 27 unity was crucial for China’ s continued existence in the global struggle for survival among competing races and nations. As a result, Sun called for the gradual and non violent melding of China’ s disparate ninzu into a new, homogenous gpazu (state-race lineage) with a distinctly Han cultural and racial core. Sun referred to this more evolutionarily robust body politic as the Zhcngjjua ninzu, a goal towards which both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang worked throughout the Republican period. Chapter two looks at the early development of the CCP’s discourse on the “national question” under the watchful eye of the Comintern. During the 1920s, the political programme of the Party uncritically adopted Bolshevik policy on the national question, including Lenin’ s controversial insistence that the Chinese Communists must recognize the right of all ethnic minorities to national self- determination, including political secession, from Han hegemony. Within the context of this new pledge, the CCP publicly supported Outer Mongolia’s attempts to break with the Chinese Republic, even though it was clear that the movement was being supported, if not manipulated, by Moscow. This chapter demonstrates how CCP support for Outer Mongolian independence placed the Party in a vulnerable position within the first revolutionary United Front, and eventually contributed to its collapse. Finally, it tries to demonstrate how the failure of this early experiment with Bolshevik policy engendered the “nationalization” of the national question” in China, transforming it from a question of international relations within the era of global capitalism to a purely domestic issue of Han/minority relations. The inadequacyof the Bolshevik paradigm left Sun’ s discourse R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 28 of ninzuzhuyi as the principal framework for dealing with the problem of ethnic diversity in the Chinese nation-state. In Part two, chapters three and four focus upon the strategies of political intervention adopted by the KMT and CCP in their attempt to incorporate the Qing frontier and its peoples into the nation-state. It is argued that, despite sharply contrasting rhetoric, both parties employed similar techniques rooted in the jin i (“loose rein”) tactics of the Qing court in their attempt to impose Han political authority over the frontier region. In exchange for the nominal recognition of Chinese sovereignty, both parties were willing to grant the frontier minorities a high degree of political, cultural and economic autonomy. It is suggested that superior organizational tactics rather than specific policy initiatives appears to be responsible for the comparative successes of the CCP’ s nation-building project. Despite the political expediency of their strategies, Sun’s social evolutionary framework ensured that the ultimate goal of both parties’ policy was the gradual assimilation of the frontier minorities into a single Zhor^m t ninzu. Chapter three examines some of the difficulties the Kuomintang Central Government faced in consolidating its control over the vast frontier regions of the former Qing dynasty. Making use of recently declassified documents from the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, it traces the development of Kuomintang policy towards Inner Mongolia and Tibet. In its efforts to incorporate the frontier regions into the Republic, Chiang Kai-shek’ s Nationalist Government lent its support to the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement of De Wang and agreed to R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 29 recognize the political authority of the Lamaist government in Lhasa. Yet, this chapter also demonstrates how the Han frontier warlords, who jealously guarded the Suiyuan and Xikang border regions against Central Government encroachment, repeatedly blocked the Kuomintang’ s policy of frontier autonomy. In the end, the Kuomintang proved both unable (due to its lack of military strength) and unwilling (due to the priority it placed on defeating the communists) to implement its frontier policy over the resistance of the frontier warlords. As a result, the policy of the Kuomintang Central Government came to be closely associated with the forced assimilation and Han colonization efforts of the frontier warlords. Chapter four examines the development of CCP minority policy following the Party’ s break with direct Comintern supervision during the early 1930s. It demonstrates how the Maoist national minority policy developed within the context of the “salification” of Marxism By claiming that Marxism could not be practiced in a vacuum, Mao called for the application of Bolshevik theory on the national question to the specific conditions of the Chinese revolution. This break with Marxist dogma allowed the CCP to craft a national minority policy that stressed the conjoined national liberation of all the peoples of the former Qing empire. Through a detailed examination of the CCP’ s Inner Mongolian policy following the Sino-Japanese war, this chapter highlights the importance of Lenin’ s united front tactic to the success of Maoist policy. On the Inner Mongolia steppe, the CCP called for a broad anti-imperialist, anti-KMT united front couched in the moderate language of Sun Yat-sen’ s Three People’ s Principles. This allowed the Party to win over important segments of the Mongolian R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 30 elite who had become frustrated with the Nationalist Government’s repeated failure to rein in the hegemonic oppression of the frontier warlords. Finally, through the maintenance of firm Party control over these united front apparatuses, the Communists were able to carefully isolate and then destroy all “disloyal and unpatriotic” elements while securing their authority over the frontier region and its peoples. Part three shifts the focus from politics to culture. This section examines Han narratives of historical innovation aimed at incorporating the former Qing frontier and its people into a unified Zhonghm ninzu. Specifically, it examines the role of the modem discourse of social science (in particular history, archaeology and ethnology) in the production of knowledge and the fortification of the social Darwinian paradigm of racialized national identity in early 20th century China. Imperial Japan’ s manipulation of the national aspirations of the frontier minorities during the 1930s and 40s pressured Chinese intellectuals into constructing historical narratives that stressed the antiquity and consanguinity of the Zhonghua ninzu and explicitly included the Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetan peoples. Chapter five examines Kuomintang-affiliated intellectuals, highlighting the tension between two competing historical formulations for incorporating the frontier minorities into a new corporate identity of the nation. A group of cultural nationalists used historical and archaeological evidence to manufacture a myth of shared “Zhonghua” descent. By fashioning individual ethnogenealogies linking various “lineages” in China to a single ancient progenitor— either the Yellow Emperor or Peking Man— the cultural nationalists hoped to erase all traces of diversity from R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 31 Chinese society and unify the frontier minorities around the superior Han culture and race. A group of enlightenment scholars, lead by Gu Jiegang, resisted this distortion of historical facts for immediate political gains. They contended that only the truth about the importance of the barbarians in Chinese history and the gradual fusion of minority and Han sentiments could serve as the basis for national salvation in China. Drawing upon the work of American ethnographers, the enlightenment scholars challenged the narrative of common racial origin, arguing that national unity in China must be based upon a subjective consciousness of shared history and common destiny rather than an unscientific myth of shared descent. Chapter six examines the narratives of historical innovation employed by CCP historians. Initially, Communist historians adopted a narrative strategy that closely resembled those of the Kuomintang cultural conservatives. In their early histories, CCP scholars highlighted the significance of the Yellow Emperor and Peking Man in binding the heterogeneous peoples of the former Qing empire into a single, organic ninzu, which following Sun Yat-sen they also called the Ih a n ^m rrinzu. Yet, the heightened ideological rhetoric which accompanied the collapse of the Second United Front and the publication of the Kuomintang manifesto China's Destiny in 1943 forced CCP historians to adopt an alternative narrative strategy for constructing the myth of Zhonghua national unity. In particular, Communist scholars pointed to the discovery of a racially distinct “South Pacific” hominid by archaeologists, arguing that this provided scientific evidence of the multiracial origins of the Chinese people. At the same time, they began echoing Gujiegang’ s narrative about the evolutionary, non-violent “fusion” R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 32 (ivngjx) of distinct minority cultures and bloodlines around a single Han-centered Zhan^iua ninzu. Yet, under the same pressure as KMT historians to counter Japan’ s manipulation of ethnic aspirations along the Qing frontier, CCP historians also manufactured intricate ethnogenealogies which placed the minorities at the very origin of Chinese history and linked the multivalent “Chinese” rrinzus together into a single organic whole. In doing so, the Communists, like the Nationalists, projected Sun Yat- sen’s desire for national unity backwards in time, using history and archeology to demonstrate the fundamental consanguinity and antiquity of the Zhon$m ninzu. My treatment of early 20th century Chinese nation-building attempts to demonstrate how the frontier minorities were, in many ways, central rather than peripheral to the process of “revolution” in China. To most outside observers, China is still viewed in a remarkably bounded and homogenous fashion, with Eric Hobsbawn (among others), claiming that China (like Korean and Japan) “are indeed among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogenous.”4 4 While this popular characterization does reflect the reality of Han demographic hegemony, it also prevents us from understanding the crucial role China’ s ethnic minorities played in the construction of national identity in modem China. By uncovering the social Darwinian ontology of nation-building in early 20th century China, my study hopes to shed light on the attempt by the modem Chinese state to homogenize (if not erase) ethnic and cultural diversity from China’ s political and historical landscape. Dm Gladney has perceptively argued that the politics of ethnic 4 4 Hobsbawn, Nations a rd N a tk m lism S im 1 7 8 0 ,66. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. representation in contemporary China has more to do with the reification of an undefined “Han” majority as “united, monoethnic and modem” than it does with the minorities themselves.4 5 In a parallel fashion, my study suggests that the national and frontier questions in Republic era discourse were fundamentally about the construction of a united, monoethnic and modem Zhongbua ninzu— an “imagined community” capable of naturalizing the heterogeneous polities of the Qing empire into a single homogenous Chinese nation. 4 5 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” JournalcfAsianStudies 53.1 (February 1994): 93. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 34 CHAPTER 1 The Positioning of Chinese “minzus” within Sun Yat-sen’s Discourse o f Minzuzhuyi It is no coincidence that Sun Yat-sen placed his principle of rrirtziizhuyi first amongst his famous political programme for Republican China, the Three People’ s Principles {Sanninzhuyi). Sun felt strongly that ninzvahw^ was the crux of his programme for saving China from potential “national extinction” (g m rn r^. He described rmiziahuy. (literally, “the doctrine of the people’ s lineage”), mmqmnzhuyi (literally, “the doctrine of the people’ s sovereignty”) and rrinsherqgfaqi (literally, “the doctrine of the people’ s livelihood”) as the “three evolutionary stages” or “three great revolutions” through which China needed to pass in order to guarantee its survival as a race and a state in the modem world.1 Sun believed the propagation of a spirit of ethnic inclusiveness among the Chinese people was a prerequisite for the successful implementation of both nirqmnzhuyi and rrmhar^zhicfl. Ironically, however, Western scholarship on China’s most famous “nationalist” has largely ignored the very principle— ninzuzhwf,— upon which his historical reputation has been based, preferring instead to address the more controversial issues surrounding Sun’ s definitions of mnquanzhuyi (viz. “democracy”) and rrmhen&huyi (viz. “socialism”). Furthermore, among those who have examined ninztahw ^ the natural tendency to simplify, reify and canonize the highly enigmatic 1 Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 1919, in SZSQ [, 5:185. There are primarily three English language translations of Sun’ s Samri nzhuyi . The most widely available is Frank W. Price, trans., San M in O m I: The Thr e e Pri nci pl es <f t he Peopl e (Taipei: China Cultural Services, 1977). This Taiwan reprint is a revised and abridged edition of Price’s complete translation, Frank W. Price, trans., S an M in O m l: The Thr e e Pri nci pl es c f t he Peopl e (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1929). Another complete English language translation is itself a translation from a French edition, Paschal M. D ’ Elia, trans., The Triple D enism cfSun Yat -sen (Wuchang: The Franciscan Press, 1931). Although all translations from the original text are my own, I have drawn upon Price and D ’Elia for guidance. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 35 thought of Sun Yat-sen has lead most Chinese and Anglo scholars to focus almost solely upon his late Qing “anti-Manchuist” rhetoric or 1924 “anti-imperialist” Sanrrinzhuyi lectures, while failing to contextualize these two apparently disparate formulations with one another or any of Sun’ s numerous other discussions of ninzu. This introductory chapter will attempt to redress this imbalance through a careful analysis of the historical and intellectual development of Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of ninzmhuyi, while setting the stage for my discussion of the frontier and national questions in early 20th century China. In particular, I will attempt to demonstrate how Sun’ s discourse of ninzuzhuyi created new discursive categories for analyzing human diversity in China while simultaneously positioning China’ s non-Han frontier minorities firmly within the confines of a new bounded and organic Chinese nation/race, or what Sun termed the Zhonghm ninzu. Sun’ s thinking on ninzuzhuyi evolved gradually over his 30 plus years as a political activist. Ideology, as far as Sun was concerned, was simply a tool for achieving practical ends; and thus, ideas needed to be flexibly interpreted depending upon the specific historical context in which they were employed.2 Sun’ s self-professed intellectual utilitarianism has lead two leading scholars of his thought, Leonard Gordon and Sidney Chang, to describe the Three People’ s Principles as “a doctrine in continuous development, an ideology that would grow and change according to the 2 With reference to cosmopolitanism, and one could also safely assume rrinzuzhuyi, Sun stated: “We cannot say in general that ideas, are good or bad. We must judge "whether, when put into practice, they prove useful to us or not. If they are of practical value to us, they are good; if they are impractical, they are bad. If they are useful to the world, they are good; if they are not useful to the world, they are not good.” See Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - Disanjiang” (Principle o iM in zu - Third Lecture), 10 February 1924, in SZSQT, 9:216. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 36 needs of the times.”3 The dynamic and flexible nature of Sun’s doctrine has contributed to an often contradictory characterization of his principle of ninzuzhuyi— with Sun having been portrayed as everything from a rabid racist to a champion of Chinese multi- culturalism to an advocate of national minority seh-determination and political independence. One scholar has made repeated use of the word “inconsistent” when describing Sun’ s ideas on ethnic diversity within China, while another expert on modem Chinese minority policy has concluded that Sun “was never very concerned about minorities and his ideas on that subject are not very well worked out.”4 Could Sun’ s thoughts and actions be more accurately described as “opportunistic” than “nationalistic,” as one scholar has recently suggested?5 I believe a deeper probe into the totality of Sun’ s writings on ninzuzhuyi reveals a marked continuity and single-mindedness. This chapter attempts to demonstrate how Sun’ s discourse of ninzuzhuyi consistently viewed the relations between China’ s different ninzus. in stark social evolutionist terms. In Sun’ s mind, the peripheral minority peoples of the Qing empire (Tibetans, Mongols, Muslims, Miao, etc.) were ethnic relics destined for eventual assimilation with a superior “Han Chinese” majority via the dispassionate “scientific law” of “natural selection.” The natural, evolutionary melding of China’ s 3 Sidney H Chang and Leonard Gordon, A 1 1 Under Heaven: Sun Yat -sen and H is R eidutkm ry T h o u g h t (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), 96. 4 David Deal, “National Minority Policy in Southwest China, 1911-1965” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1971), 52; Mackerras, Osina’ s M i nori t i es, 261. In her classic biography of Sun Yat-sen Lyon Sharman writes: “As a matter of fact ‘Nationalism’ was the one of the Three Principles that had in the course of years proven most variable in interpretation.” In her analysis, Sharman speaks about three different connotations of Sun’ s ni nzuzhuyi. See Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat -sen: H is L ife and its Meani ng (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 286-7. 5 Bruce A. E lie man, D iplam cy and Decept i on The Secret H istory (fSino-Souet Dipl omat i c Rel at i ons, 1917- 1927 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 63. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 37 peoples and cultures would gradually give rise to a new, organic Zhon^om rrinzu with a distinctly Han cultural and racial core. In many ways, Sun Yat-sen’s discourse of nim iahuyi can serve as a starting point for our analysis of the national and frontier questions in early 20th century China. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the language and specific policy initiatives embedded in Sun’ s rrirtzuzhup provided the theoretical framework from which both Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party intellectuals and policymakers initially approached these important issues, with its social evolutionary ontology firmly guiding both political party’ s positioning of the ethnic minorities within the new nation-state. Before proceeding, however, it is essential that we first pause briefly to consider the semantic confusion surrounding the Chinese word rrinzu. The term is not indigenous to China; rather, it was adapted from the Japanese term rrinzdku (which itself was a neologism for translating the German word, vdk) around the early 1880's. However, the term did not come into widespread use among Chinese intellectuals until the first decade of the 1900s.6 In early twentieth century China, and one could argue today as well, rrinzu was often used to express a cluster of meanings and associations similar to those expressed by the English terms “race,” “nation,” “people,” “ethnic group” and “nationality.”7 Some Chinese authors went to great lengths to define the 6 See Akan et. al, L m M in zu (On M inzu) (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1989). 7 Much like rrinzu, these English language terms are also imprecise and ambiguous. Generally speaking, these expressions are all malleable social constructs used in the creation of both exclusivist and transgressable boundaries between different social groups. Furthermore, these boundaries are constantly in flux and determined by external issues of power and resource distribution. I would argue that the difference between these terms should lie in the type of boundaries constructed. I would like to suggest that we use the terms “race” and “racial” to define those boundaries that are based upon biological signifiers (Le. skin color, body height, hair texture, head-shape, etc.). The terms “ethnicity” and “ethnic group” should be used to define those boundaries that are based upon cultural signifiers (i.e., customs, R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 38 term, listed any number of objective criterion necessary for rrinzu formation. Many others, however, employed itina very loose and often contradictory fashion, frequently, for example, using it interchangeably with the term zhongzu or race. Although most users of the term undoubtedly believed that rrinzu expressed a specific objective reality, the ambiguous nature of the term added to its polemical value. Partha Chatterjee has pointed out that “‘politics’ necessarily operates in an ideological world in which words rarely have unambiguous meanings; where notions are inexact, and have political value precisely because they are inexact and hence capable of suggesting a range of possible interpretations.”8 The fluid nature of the terms rrinzu and ninzuzhuyi requires that we avoid an a priori definition and instead interpret their meaning based upon the specific context in which they are employed. As a result, wherever it is possible without confusing the reader, I have chosen not to translate rrinzu and rrinzuzhup, in my text, allowing the broader context of the term’ s usage to determine its meaning. A nti-Manchuism & the Invention qfMinzuzhuyi (1895-1911) When Sun Yat-sen, the self-proclaimed “son of a coolie” from the hamlet of Cuiheng situated in the Pearl River Delta, cut off his queue in 1894 and declared his intent to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty, he saw himself more as an anti-dynastic habits, language, food, religion, etc.). Finally, the terms “nation” and “nationality” should be reserved for those boundaries that are based upon territorial signifiers (i.e., Dongyang county, China, Xinjiang, Mongolia, huaqi ao, Guangdong etc.). In the daily reality of Western society, of course, these terms are often conflated or used interchangeably to express one or all three of these meanings. I am only suggesting that scholars adopt a more precise and standardized definition in order to better isolate and analyze various discourses of group identity. I have dealt with this issue in more detail in James Leibold, “Problematizing M i nzu: Re-thinking and Expanding our Conceptualization of Ethnicity in Modem China,” unpublished paper presented at the Regional Conference of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, Pacific University 0une 16-18th, 1995). 8 Partha Chatterjee, N ationalist Th o ug ht and t he C dom d Wor l d- A D erhnthe Di scourse (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1986), vii. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 39 rebel than a modern-day revolutionary. Young Sun grew up within the shadows of Ming dynasty loyalism kept alive for over two centuries by the so-called Triad secret societies of southern and diasporic China. Inspired by the writings of Wang Fuzhi (1619-92) and other Ming loyalist scholars, the Triads continued to foster the image of the Manchu emperors as uncultured barbarian invaders who unjustly usurped the dragon throne from the Chinese Ming dynasty in 1644. During the decade immediately prior to Sun’ s birth in 1866, the smoldering embers of Triad “anti-Manchuism” were re-ignited by the Taiping rebels of southern China. In their bloody decade-long quest to overthrow the Oing dynasty the Taipings often characterized the Manchu emperor as a “Tartar caitiffs” (dalu) of “barbarian origin” and the “mortal enemy of us Chinese.”9 As an impressionable youngster Sun was captivated by the vivid stories of the Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan told to him by his uncle and other village elders. And after Sun vandalized the wooden idols of a local temple in a manner similar to the Taipings with close pal Lu Haodong, he even earned himself the nickname HongXiuqmn from his childhood friends.1 0 Inheriting the Taiping’ s revolutionary mantle, Sun and his friends aimed to drive the Manchu barbarians out of the Middle Kingdom and restore the imperial mandate of the Han majority. Sun’ s own crusade to overthrow the Qing lead to the creation of his own anti- Manchu secret society, the Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society), which was established 9 On the Taiping’s anti-Manchu rhetoric see Jonathan D. Spence, God’ s Chi nes e Son: The Tai pi ng H eam iy Kingbm cfH ong Xiuquan (New York; W.W. Northon & Company, 1996) and Li Guoqi, “Zhongguo jindai minzu sixiang” (Contemporaiy Chinese nationalist thought), in ]indai ZhangguoSi xi ang Renrn L im M i nzuzhuyi (Essays m M odem Chi nes e T h o u ^ J t s and Personal i t i es: Nat ionalism), ed. Li Guoqi (Taipei; Shibao wenhua chuban shiye, 1981), 29-31. 1 0 Jen Yu-wen, “The Youth of Dr. Sun Yat-sen,” in Sun Yat -sen: Ti m Convm m ratiie Essays, Lindsay R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 40 first in Hawaii during November of 1894 and then moved to Hong Kong in early 1895. Sun insisted that all members swear a secret oath to “drive out the Tartar caitiffs and restore China” (quchu dalu, bafu Z h o n g g 4 c > ) when joining the society.1 1 The Xingzhonghui’ s eight-character pledge represented a slightly revised version of the Ming dynasty slogan “expel the northern barbarians and restore China” (quzhu hulu, fnxing Zhanyfwi), first employed byZhu Yuanzhang during his bid to drive the barbarian Mongol Yuan dynasty beyond the Great Wall.1 2 The charter of the Xingzhonghui, written by Sun in early 1895, stressed the incompetent and corrupt nature of Qing rule while arguing that its Manchu rulers represented a “different lineage” (y izttf from the majority “Chinese people” {HuamfyP In a 1896 autobiographical essay, Sun claimed that since the Manchus crossed over the Great Wall, “our sacred altars have fallen into ruin and our civilization has sunken into savagery,” and proclaimed the mission of “driving out the cruel [Manchu] robbers and re-creating China (Zhongfad) based upon a revival of the order during the [Chinese] Three Dynasties of Han, Tang and Ming and an emulation of Western ways.”1 4 Much like Zhu Yuanzhang and Hong Xiuquan before Ride and Jen Yu-wen (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1970), 1-22. 1 1 Sun Yat-sen, “Tanxiangshan Xingzhonghui Mengshu” (The oath of the Honolulu branch of the Revive China Society), 24 November 1894, in SZSQf, 1:20. 1 2 On Zhu Yuanzhang’ s proto-nationalist attitudes toward the Mongol Yuan dynasty see Chen Wutong, “Lun Zhu Yuanzhang de minzu zhengce” (Discussion of Zhu Yuanzhang’ s nationality policy), in Zhu Yuanzhang Yenj i u ( Re s e a r c h on Zhu Yuanzhang) , ed. Chen Wutong (Tianjin: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 241-63; Also see Edward Farmer, Zhu Yuanzhang and earl y M ing L egsl at i on: t he Reorderi ng o f Chi nes e Soci et y fdloiringtheE ra cfM ongi Rul e (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). 1 3 Sun Yat-sen, “Xianggang Xingzhonghui zhangcheng” (The charter of the Hong Kong branch of the Revive China Society), 21 February 1895, SZSQf, 1: 21-24. The term yizu dates back the 3rd century B.G R ites cfZhou (Zhoul i) where it referred to anyone with a different xing (surname). During the “barbarian” Jurchen Jin Dynasty (1115-1234) it began to be used in reference to “barbarian” tribes that observed non-Chinese cultural habits. See the entry in Luo Zhufeng, comp., H anzuD aadian ( Encycl opaedi a c f t he Chi ne s e L a n g u a g e), miniaturized 3 vols. ed. (Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1997), 2:4639. 1 4 Sun Yat-sen, “Fu Zhai-li-si han” (Letter to H A Giles), November 1896, in SZSQf, 1:46-48. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 41 him, Sun Yat-sen believed that since the Manchus had lost the “mandate of heaven” (Tiam ir$ by failing to uphold orthodox cultural rites a Chinese led “rebellion” (zacfan) was justified to restore Confucian morality and order. It was not until after the failure of Sun’ s 1895 Canton rebellion and his banishment from China that he began to conceptualize his movement as a modem revolution and call for the replacement of the Qing dynasty with a republican form of government. In addition to the rich tradition of Ming loyalism imparted by his uncle, Sun’ s modem education outside China introduced him to another set of ideas that seemed to confirm his suspicions about the “barbaric nature” of the Manchu rulers. As a student first at a Hawaii missionary school and then the English curriculum Government Central School in Hong Kong, Sun came to accept the necessity and inevitability of the Victorian notion of progress, especially as embodied in the “scientific axiom” of human evolution. During his eight months of study at the British Museum in 1897, Sun undertook a comprehensive study of Charles Darwin’ s scientific findings as filtered through the lenses of Western sociologists.1 5 Sun found that Darwin’ s discoveries while traveling aboard the HMS Beagle proved all species (including man) were locked in a continuous process of adaptation with their natural environment. This struggle lead to the survival of those species endowed with more favorable attributes, whereas less fortunate species perished. Darwin termed this struggle for existence “natural selection” or “the survival of the fittest.” The so-called “Social Darwinists,” men like Herbert Sun’ s autobiography essay was written at the request of English Sinologist Herbert Giles for inclusion in his Chi ne s e Bi og-apki ad Di ct i onary that was published in 1898. 1 5 Gao Zhengyi, Zhonghan Xl ansheng Jinhm SixiangXihm (. A nA m lysis o f Sun Yat -sen’ s Tho u^X on E vdutiai) (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co., 1993), 40-42. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 42 Spencer and Thomas Huxley, expanded Darwin’ s theory from its rather narrow focus upon natural selection among individual species into a new political ideology about the competition for survival among racial and national groups within world history. In China, Darwin’ s message came to signify the importance of an impending “racial war” (zhon&barl) among the world’ s human population. In his hugely influential 1895 essay “Whence Strength?” (Yu qian£), the eminent translator Yan Fu introduced the key ideas behind Spencer’ s multi-volume Principles (fSociology. Yan Fu explained how Spencer used Darwin’ s biological organism as a paradigm for society, writing: “When a qrn (group or society) is formed, it is in body, function, and capability no different from the body of a living thing..If we know what keeps our own bodies alive, we will know what makes a qrn secure.”1 6 In Yan Fu’ s mind both biological and group survival hinged upon “group solidarity” (qunzhuyi or literally, “groupism”): By struggle of species, it is meant struggle for survival. By natural selection, it is meant the survival of the fittest race (zhang). The idea is that people and living organisms appeared in the world and coexisted in all their variety, feeding together on the benefits of nature. When they come into contact with each other, they struggled for their own survival. In the beginning, races struggled with races (zhongzhen^, then groups struggled with groups. The weak constantly became the prey of the strong, the stupid constantly become slaves of the intelligent. Those who survived and perpetuated their species had to be resistant and valiant, agile and ingenious.1 7 Unity, Yan Fu stressed to his readers, was the key to progress, evolutionary survival and the obtainment “wealth and power.” 1 6 Quotation adapted from Pusey, Chi na and Char i es Darum, 64; also see Benjamin Schwartz, In Se a r c h c f Weal t h and Poi t or. YenF uandthe West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Chang Hao, L i ari g Ch’ i -ch’ ao and Int el l ect ual Transi t i on in Chi na (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971): 105-12. On the impact of the “Darwinian revolution” in Europe see George W. Stocking, Race, Cul t ure, ardEvolution: Essays inthe H istory c f Ant hropol ogy (N ew York: The Free Press, 1968); Stocking, V idorian A nt hyopdcpy. 1 7 Gted in Dikotter, The Di scourse cfRaae inM odem Chi na, 104. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 43 Given the urgency of Darwin’ s message, one of the central questions for 20th century Chinese intellectuals became: “What qrn shall we unite?”: the “Cantonese” or the “Fukienese”; the “Han” or the “Manchu”; the “Chinese” or the entire “yellow race.” For Sun Yat-sen and other Cantonese members of the Xingzhonghui China’ s destiny rested with the majority “Chinese” ( Huareri), an amorphous mass of people who appeared to share a common written language and set of cultural traditions. The minority “ Manchu” (Marmi) rulers had already proven themselves evolutionarily-unfit by failing to meet the challenge of the West and now stood in the way of all future Chinese progress. While Sun’ s thinking drifted towards a theoretical de-construction of the “yellow race”— distinguishing between an “us-group” (the Huam,r ) and a “them- group” (the Manreri)— he did not initially perceive of this division in racial terms, but rather the difference between a superior, awe-inspiring Chinese civilization and an inferior, debased barbarian tribe. In Sun’s early writings the Manchus are described only as a “different lineage” (yizu) and not as a different “race” ( zhongzu or rrinzu). Around the turn of the century another group of Chinese youths— based mainly in the Yangtze River delta cities of Shanghai and Hangzhou and amongst the expatriate student community of Japan— began echoing the Xingzhonghui’ s calls for the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Their criticism of the Qing dynasty however went beyond Sun’ s charge of a corrupt and barbarian system of rule; rather, they drew upon the theories of classical scholar and self-proclaimed “madman” Zhang Binglin to argue that the Manchus were a fundamentally different “race” (zhon&u, renzhorrgox rrinzu) from the vast majority of the Chinese. In Qusbu (Book ( f Persecution), originally published R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 44 in 1900 and revised in 1902, Zhang Binglin merged the popular Qing discourse of “distinguishing lineages” (bianzulei) with the social evolutionist metaphor of blood (x^e) in order to contend that all Chinese subjects of the Qing empire shared a common biological lineage, referred to by Zhang as the Hamit, or “Han lineage-race,” and a common progenitor in the mythical Yellow Emperor. Zhang also claimed that the “Manchu lineage-race” (M arzhaau), a distinct and uncivilized rrinzu descended from the Don$m (Eastern Barbarians) of the Jin dynasty, were attempting to usurp the “heirship” (zangzz) of the Hamu by systematically destroying their racial consciousness.1 8 While Zhang Binglin’ s Qusbu created a new analytical category for conceptualizing Manchu-Han difference, it was eighteen year-old Zou Rong’s brazenly seditious Geningun ( . Rendutkmry Army) that popularized Zhang Binglin’ s often impenetrable language among young Chinese revolutionaries. In this lucid and vigorously argued polemic, which is reported to have sold over one million copies, Zou Rong used Zhang Binglin’ s racial theories to demonstrate the immutable difference between the Han and Manchu and the need for the Han lineage-race to “annihilate the five million or so furry and homed Manchu race.”1 9 After Gerringuds 1903 publication 1 8 See Kai-wing Chow, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood: Zhang Binglin and the Invention of the Han “Race” in Modem China,” in The Const ruct i on cfRacial Ident i t i es in Chi na andJapan, ed. Frank Dikotter (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), 39-40; Dikotter, Di scourse cfRaoe inM odem Chi na, 61-96; Onogawa Hidemi, “Zhang Binglin paiman sixiang” (Zhang Binglin’ s anti-Manchuist thought), in Ji ndai Zh o n g g p o SixiangRenrn Lure M i nznzhuyi , ed. Li Guoqi (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye, 1981), 246-52; Kauko Laitinen, Chi nes e Nationalism in the L ate Qi ng D ynasty Zhang B ir% Ji n as an A r ai - Manchu Propagandi s t (London: Curzon Press, 1990). 1 9 Tsou Jung (Zou Rong), The Revol ut i onary A m y: A Chi nes e N ationalist Trad cf1903, trans. John Lust (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1968), 108-9. My translation differs slightly from Lust’ s and is based on the accompanying Chinese text, p. 34. On the Subao affair see Lust’ s introduction, pp. 3-17; Marie-Gaire Bergere, Sun Yat -sen, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 110-111; Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat -sen and t he Ori gi ns c f the Chi nes e Revol ut i on (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1968), 265-74. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 45 in the Shanghai journal Subao (Jiangu Journal), Chinese authorities placed pressure on the municipal council of the Shanghai International Concessions to arrest, tiyand then imprison both Zou Rong and Zhang Binglin (who wrote the preface to Gerringun). Zou Rong’ s eventual death in prison turned the entire “ Subao affair” into a cause c e le b r e for the increasingly inflammatory and violent calls among Chinese students for “racial revolution” (rrinzu ^ n in ^ . Zhang Binglin’ s brand of “narrow racism” (xia’ ai ninziczhuyi) did not immediately appeal to Sun Yat-sen. "W hile hiding from Manchu investigators in Japan, Zhang Binglin asked Sun to join him in convening a “Meeting to Commemorate the 242nd Year since the Ruination of China” in early 1902, but Sun refused. Zhang later recalled that Sun was “utterly lacking in wholehearted devotion to the idea of saving the Han race” at the time of their first meeting.2 0 Prior to 1905 Sun Yat-sen’ s ideas on rrinzu seem to be closer to those of Liang Qichao. Liang and his mentor Kang Youwei rejected the violent racism of Zhang Binglin and instead called for a series of gradual reforms that would transform the Qing dynasty into a modem constitutional monarchy. After Kang Youwei left Tokyo for Canada during the summer of 1899, Liang and Sun— both natives of Guangdong— developed a close friendship that resulted in their cooperation on a number of joint ventures including the co-authoring of several articles in Liang’ s journal Qingyibao (Public Opinion). Their collaboration, however, was short lived. Fearing (perhaps justly) that his top protege was about to join Sun’ s revolutionary movement, Kang Youwei ordered Liang to leave Japan in late 1899 and establish 2 0 Gted in Shimada Kenji, Pioneer c f d o e Chinese Reidutiarv Zhang Binjin and Confucianism, trans. Joshua Fogel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 28. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 46 branches of Kang’ s “Society to Protect the Emperor” (Baohuanghui) in Hawaii and the United States.2 1 The intellectual bond between the two men was not, however, so easily broken. In their rush to separate late Qing dynasty intellectuals into two neatly divided camps— the so-called “revolutionaries” (Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Binglin other members of the Tongmenghui) and “reformers” (Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and others members of the Baohuanghui)— scholars have largely overlooked the affinity in nationalist thought between Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao.2 2 A close examination of their writings on rrinzu, however, reveals, an uncanny similarity in both language and conclusions. Avid disciples of social evolutionism, both men feared the destructive potential of Zhang Binglin’ s narrow “racial revengism” ( zbongzufudoou zhuyi) and attempted to re direct public attention towards the larger evolutionary struggle of the yellow and white races (renzhon{ g), and in particular the life or death struggle between these two races’ strongest components the Chinese and Anglo-Saxon rrinzu. In his 1902 call for a “New Historiography,” Liang Qichao invented the term guazu (state/national lineage) to describe what he saw as the highest stage of human evolutionary struggle: the impending battle between truly global state/national lineages— such as the Chinese and Anglo-Saxon rrinzu. Liang contrasted this final 2 1 Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Orifois, 148-67. 2 2 Two classic examples of this tendency are Robert Scalapino and George Yu, Modem China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional O der 1895-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), in which chapter three is titled “Liang Qichao and the Defense of Reform” (pp. 109-47) and chapter four “Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary Movement” (pp. 148-230), and the extremely influential textbook John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, China: Tradition & Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), which portrays to Sun and Liang as the two competing “protagonists” of the 1911 revolution, see pp. 406-11. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 47 evolutionary stage with the previous struggles between jiazu (clans) and htzu (tribes).2 3 Soon after his forced exile to Japan following the Hundred Days of Reform debacle, Liang began arguing that racial mixing, rather than the preservation of an unsullied bloodline, was the key to evolutionary survival. “Racial improvement,” Liang wrote in late 1898, “arises from the amalgamation of many different races.”2 4 Inferior races, like the Manchus, who do not submit themselves to racial mixing with superior races, like the Han, are destined for evolutionary extinction. Liang was one of the first Chinese intellectuals to urge the Qing court, for the sake of its own evolutionary survival, to “tear down the boundaries between Manchus and Han.” By 1903, however, he appeared sufficiently satisfied with the court’ s reform efforts— in particular the 1 February 1902 edict lifting the ban on Han-Manchu intermarriage— to begin echoing Kang Youwei’ s assertion that the Manchus had already been “sinicized” (Zhongguohua) by the Han majority, or at the very least were well on their way.2 5 Liang found additional theoretical support for the unity of the “Chinese ninziT {Zhonggto rnrnu) in the work of Swiss legalist Johann Bluntschli. Liang pointed to the important distinction between the legal 2 3 Liang, “Xin shixue,” 7. 2 4 Gted in Edward J.M. Rhoads, Manchu & H an E thnk Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 3. 2 5 The question of whether or not the Manchus were already assimilated became the primary focus of a 1902-03 written debate between Kang Youwei and Zhang Binglin. In a late 1902 article written from the United States, Kang argued that the Manchus had already adopted the doctrines, rites and music, language and clothing of the Han Chinese, removing any cultural or racial barrier between the two people. See Kang Youwei, “Bian geming shu” (On Revolution), 16 September 1902, in in Xinhai Gening Qanshinian jian SMunxuan {Select Works front Ten Years Prior to the 1911 Revolution), comps. Zhang Xiang and Wang Renzhi (Shanghai: Xinzhi sanlian shudian, 1977), 1.1:210-217. In a 1903 reply to Kang’ s article, Zhang Binglin listed, in excruciating detail, examples of how the Manchus had not only retained their own religion, hair-style, dress and language, but also forced these barbaric customs upon the Han Chinese. See Zhang Binglin, “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu” (Disputing Kang Youwei’ s Letter on Revolution), May 1903, in Zhang Taiyen Quanji {Complete Works c f Zhang Bin^id) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), 4: 173-84. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 48 concept of gtonin (citizenry) and the ethnological term rrinzu (race/ nation) in Bluntschli’ s Theory ofthe Modem State (Lehrewmmxkrnen Stoat). What Liang found most intriguing and useful in Bluntschli’ s work was his historical observation that a guonin need not be comprised of only a single rrinzu. Liang used this notion to criticize the “petty rrinz^izhuyl, (xiaoninzuzhuyi) contained within Zhang Binglin’ s racist anti- Manchuism and to distinguish it from his idea of a “broad rrirtzuzbcyT {d a ninzuzhuyi) which aimed at uniting all the rrinzu of China together into a single, unified gm rin or gmzu}b Sun Yat-sen appeared to sympathize with both Liang’ s non-racial definition of China and his brand of “broad rrinzuzhuyi? yet he could not accept Liang’s assessment that the Manchus had already been “assimilated” {tongbua or Hanhud) by the Han majority. To do so would abrogate the very need for revolution. More a man of action than words, however, Sun shunned direct participation in the debate between Kang/Liang and Zhang/Zou, choosing instead to focus his efforts on raising money among overseas Chinese for yet another peasant uprising in southern China. Sun’ s neglect of propaganda work cost him dearly. Upon returning to Japan in June 1903 he discovered that only a handful of his Cantonese activists remained loyal to him. Most others had been won over by Liang Qichao’ s persuasively aigued case for gradual reform and national unity.2 7 Sun quickly swung into action. Making use of the outrage over the Subao affair among Chinese students studying in Japan, Sun Yat-sen 2 6 Liang Qichao, “Zhengzhi xuejia Bo-lun-zhi-li zhi xueshuo” (The theories of political scientist Bluntschli), 4 October 1903, in YBSWJ, 5:71-77. 2 7 Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins, 306-07. Liang not only convinced the president of the Yokohama cell of the Revive China Society to finance his publications, he also persuaded Sun Yat-sen’ s own brother, Sun Mei, to become president of the Hawaii branch of the Society to Protect the Emperor. See Bergere, Sun Yat-sen, 123. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 49 began using the racist language of Zhang Binglin to attack the reformers, stressing for the first time that the Manchus were a “different race” (yzhon^ from the “Han race” {Hanzu or Hanzhon,g). In a passionate plea to his fellow countrymen, Sun declared that “as long as an uncivilized and debased race (yefanjianzhong) of nomads from northeastern Manchuria enjoy imperial authority, our Han people’ s race {zhongzu)— with its four thousand year-old civilization— cannot enjoy its civil liberties {rri?quan)” 2 S In a long article entitled “Refutation of the Newspapers of the Society to Protect the Emperor,” Sun upheld anti-Manchuism as the sole criterion of patriotism and criticized the reformers calls for a constitutional monarchy.2 9 Yet, at the same time as Sun began employing race to attack the reformers, he was also developing his own spatiocultural definition of the Chinese state or what he began calling “Zhina” or China. The neologism Zhina, first used to transliterate the Sanskrit name for China (d m ) in Tang dynasty translations of Buddhist sutras, was the common name for China in Meiji Japan,3 0 and Sun’ s usage of the term seemed to indicate an effort on his behalf to move beyond Zhang Binglin’ s narrow racialist definition of China as the Han race {Hanzu). In an August 1903 speech discussing the various arguments among foreigners for and against the dismemberment of China, Sun argued that while the cruel and ineffective rule of the Manchu Qing dynasty appeared to 2 8 Sun Yat-sen, “Jinggao tongxiang shu” (Respectful declaration to fellow countrymen), December 1903, in SZSQf, 1:232. 2 9 Sun Yat-sen, “Bo Baohuangbao shu” (Refutation of the newspapers of the Society to Protect the Emperor), January 1904, in SZSQf, 1:233-38. 3 0 On the etymology of Zhina see its entry in Luo, Hanzu daddian, 2:2730. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 50 justify the imperialist partitioning of China, its single “national character” {rrinxing) did not: During the last five or six hundred years, the territory of the eighteen provinces has been solidly unified and never suffered disintegration. Despite the vastness of its territory and the immensity of its population, nevertheless, except for the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, where the spoken language differs from that of China proper, the spoken languages of the other regions are the same, with only slight local, dialectal difference, and the entire country shares a common written language and common customs....For the Powers to partition this nation, with its uniform habits, customs, and character would be tantamount to destroying a man’ s home and scattering his wife and children. Not only would this disrupt heavenly harmony, but it would also go completely against the grain of the Chinese people.3 1 "When Sun attempted to semiologically imagine and spatially anticipate the “Chinese state” (Zhim r^io ) in a 1900 map, he was careful to stretch the taut skin of the Chinese state firmly over the frontier regions of the Qing empire.3 2 Furthermore, in an effort to physically bind the nation together, Sun drew a vast network of proposed railway lines— what he once termed “the arteries {ningrmi) of the nation”3 3 — on his map, physically linking “central China” {Zhina benbu) with the “dependencies” (shudi) of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Though Sun wanted the overthrow of the 3 1 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhina baoquan fenhai helun” (A joint discussion on the preservation or dismemberment of China), 21 September 1903, in SZSQf, 1:218-224. The translation has been adapted from Julie Lee Wei, Ramon Myers and Donald Gillin, eds., Prescriptions fctrSanng Qmcu Selected Writing cf S m Yat-sen (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1994), 23-28. 3 2 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhina xianshi ditu” (Map of Chinese Territory), 14 July 1900, in SmZhonghanJi Waiji (Supplement to the Works fS u n Yat-sen), eds. Chen Xulu and Hao Shengchao (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1990): 17-28. 3 3 Gted in Key Ray Chong, “Cheng Kuan-yin (1841-1920): A Source of Sun Yat-sen’ s Nationalist Ideology?” Journal cf Asian Studies 28.2 (February 1969), 262. For the original text see Sun Yat-sen, “Shang Li Hongzhang shu” (Memorial to Li Hongzhang), June 1894, in SZSQf, 1:14. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 51 Manchu empire, he still hoped to preserve the nation as a bounded territory which included inside all the various peoples of the Qing empire.3 4 Sun’ s new racist rhetoric however bore little fruit. The bloody defeat of the group’ s 1900 Huizhou insurrection and Sun’ s inability to gamer much support for his revolutionary cause among Japanese, French, British and American officials left the Xingzhonghui with few followers by 1905. Moreover, its membership remained almost exclusively Cantonese (186 out of 271 identified members). In fact, traditional prejudices and provincialism among the Chinese emigre community (especially in Japan) had caused the entire revolutionary movement to be divided along “native-place” ( tangciang) lines. The establishment of the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance) represented an attempt by three major factions to bridge this disunity. In July 1905 Huang Xing’ s Hunan/Hubei based Society for China’ s Revival decided to join forces with the Cantonese revolutionaries of Sun’ s Xingzhonghui to create the Tongmenghui; and, following Zhang Binglin’ s release from prison in late 1906, his Zhejiang/Anhui based Restoration Society also joined the Tongmenghui. Because of his advanced age, long revolutionary career and numerous overseas connections, Sun was made president of the new alliance. Yet, as Marie-Claire Bergere has pointed out, the decision of these divergent provincial and interest groups to rally under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen did 3 4 Once again, here, Sun’s thinking closely dovetailed that of Liang Qichao. On the Liang Qichao’ s reconceptualization of China as a bounded territory within a modem system of competing nation-state see Tang Xiaobing, Global Spaas and tlx Nationalist Discourse cf Modernity: TheHistariad Think mg of Liang Quhao (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 52 little to eliminate the factionalism which continued to plague the revolutionary movement.3 5 The Tongmenghui’ s provincial sectarianism was exacerbated by the lack of a coherent ideology. Attempting to seize an early hold on the ideological direction of the Tongmenghui, Sun put foreward what he called the “three great isms” (sandazhuyi)— ninzuzhuyi, ninquanzhuyi, ninshengzhuyi— to serve as the new organization’s guiding ideology in the inaugural forward of Mvrixto {Peeples Jourml), the Tongmenghui’ s principle propaganda paper.3 6 Sun’ s three “isms” were incorporated into the Tongmenghui’ s 1906 Manifesto in the form of a set of concrete but vaguely defined goals: 1) ninzuzhuyi: the elimination of the Manchus and the restoration of China; 2) rrirquanzhuyh. the establishment of a Republic and; 3) nmhengzhuyi-. the equalization of land.3 7 The task of expanding these broad goals into a systematic ideology was left to Sim’ s trusted Cantonese adjutants and skilled polemicists Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, Zhu Zhixin and Feng Ziyou in their capacity as editors of Mirbao. With Sun’ s daily guidance these men crafted what came to be known as the Three People’ s Principles (Saminzhuyi) during the first year of Minbuo’ s existence. In several ways the task of theorizing Sun’ s principle of ninzuzhuyi proved the most difficult. The entire Tongmenghui agreed upon the need to overthrow the 3 5 Bergere, Sun Yat-sen, 123. The Tongmenghui began with seventy founding members but quickly grew to 963 members by 1906. The Cantonese members of Sun’ s Revive China Society comprised less than 10% (112 members) of the Tongmenghui. 3 6 Sun Yat-sen, “Minlxto fakanci” (Forward to Minbao), 12 October 1905, in SZSQf, 1:288-89. Sun describes ninzuzhuyi in the forward as some vague evolutionary force that transformed the Roman empire into the various independent countries of Europe and would now eliminate the evil Manchu dictatorship and revitalize China. 3 7 Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing, Zhang Binglin et al., “Zhongguo Tongmenghui reming fangliie” R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 53 Manchu Qing dynasty, yet beyond that there was little consensus on what to do with the various non-Han peoples living along the empire’ s frontier following the establishment of the Republic. On one end of the spectrum, there were those like Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong who called for the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Han Republic. In Reudtakmry A rmy Zou Rong called upon the Han to forcefully expel the Manchus from China (or even better, exterminate their entire race), while Zhang Binglin declared in 1907 that “if the Muslim chiefs’ hatred for the Manchus has so penetrated them to the bone that they extend their grudge to us, and fiercely desire independence to restore the domains of their Turkic ancestors, then we should give in to their desires, knowing they but look on us as we look on the Manchus.”3 8 Sun Yat-sen clearly felt uncomfortable with this radical position. In a Tokyo speech before six thousand Chinese expatriates (Revolutionary manifesto of the Chinese Tongmenghui), Fall 1906, in SZSQf, 1:296-318. 3 8 Gted inPusey, China and Charles Damin, 331. For the original text see Zhang Binglin, “Shebui Tonfun shangdui” (A discussion of Sumy c f Sociology), March 1907, in Zhang Taiyctn Qnaryi (Complete Works f Zhang Bingfiri) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), 2: 333. Chang Hao refers to Zhang Binglin’ s conception of “perfect nationalism” as a “moral vision of universal racial-ethnic liberation,” a concept that not only applied to the Chinese Muslims but also the Indians, Burmese, Vietnamese and other Asian people who had traditionally suffered under Chinese hegemony and were now being colonized by the Western powers. See Chang Hao, Chime Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911) (Berkeley University of California Press, 1987): 113. Yet, in contrast to Chang Hao, my own reading of Zhang Binglin reveals a marked tension between the construction, on the one hand, of an ethnically pure Han Republic and a multi-ethnic Zhonghua Republic. Take, for example, Zhang assertion in his 1907 article “Explaining the Republic of China,” that “from the standpoint of regulating the borders of the Republic of China, the two prefectures Vietnam and Korea must be recovered and the district Burma follows slightly behind in priority as for Tibet, the Hui areas and Mongolia, let them decide themselves if they want to be incorporated or rejected.” Gted in Torbjom Loden, “Nationalism Transcending the State: Changing Conceptions of Chinese Identity,” in Asian Ferns qfthe Nation, eds. Stein Tonnesson and Flans Antlov (Richmond: Girzon Press Ltd., 1996), 281.Wong Young-tsu has notes that while Zhang was “sympathetic to the aspirations of self-determination for all races, including the Manchus,” he also realized that it was impractical to identity all Manchu people and send them back to Manchuria. At different times Zhang suggest everything from their extermination or the creation of an autonomous state of Manchuria, to finally their naturalization and assimilation into a homogenous Han Republic. See Wong Young-tsu, Search far Modem Nationalism Zhang Binglin and Reidutionary China, 1869-1936 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989): 61-66. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 54 celebrating the one year anniversary of the Minbao and the controversial passing of its editorship from Wang Jingwei to Zhang Binglin, Sun explicitly cautioned against Zou Rong’ s brand of racial vengeance: “I have heard claims among our brothers that the mnzu revolution aims to exterminate the Manchus as a rrinzu. This is utterly mistaken.” Sun continued, “...we do not hate the Manchus per se, but only those Manchus who are harming the Han. If, when we achieve the aims of our revolution, the Manchus do not oppose us or do us harm, there will be no reason for us to fight against them.”3 9 Here Sun added a new political dimension to Zhang Binglin’ s biological definition of rrinzu, arguing that “ ninzuzhuyi certainly does not mean that whenever people meet a person of a different rrinzu they exclude them, but rather that they do not permit a person of a different rrinzu to steal our rrinzvts sovereignty.”4 0 In Sun’ s mind, the goal of ninzuzhuyi was the return of political authority to the hands of the Han majority, “the globe’ s largest, oldest and most civilized rrinzu? and not the killing or driving out of the evolutionarily-unfit Manchu minority. The struggle to control the ideological direction of M irim and the festering dispute over the meaning of ninzuzhuyi eventually produced a cantankerous split between Zhang Binglin and Sun Yat-sen in November 1909 and the gradual decline of the Tongmenghui. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Liang Qichao called for the fusion of all China’ s rrinzu mxo a single, composite “Zhonghua nation” (Zhongfrua rrinzu). Liang argued that Western and Eastern scholars alike recognize the historical strength of 3 9 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Dongjing ‘Minbao’ chuanH zhounian qingqu dahui de yanjiang” (A Speech at a ceremony in Tokyo to celebrate the ten anniversary of M irim ), 2 December 1906, in SZSQf, 1:324. 4 0 Ibid., 324-25. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 55 China’ s “assimilationist powers” (tontfjucdi). The Manchus, like the Jurchen and Mongols before them, had already been drawn into Chinese civilization and transformed. In order for China’ s remaining ninzur- the Han, Mongols, Tibetans and Miao— to construct a strong, democratic state, it was necessary for all rrinzu to “smelt together in the same furnace (rongerm yuyilu)” while the Han majority continued to serve as the cultural and ethnic core of the new Zhon$rua rrinzu. During his visit to the United State in 1903, Liang had been struck by American’ s own efforts to assimilate its numerous immigrant populations in a single national “melting pot.” And now back in China, he became convinced that China’ s very evolutionary survival required “the adoption of imperialist policies to unite the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui, Miao and Tibetans into a ‘single large nation’ (yida rrinzu) that would comprise one-third of humanity, possess the greatest ambition on the five continents, and capture the respect of principled men.”4 1 Sun Yat-sen clearly sympathized with Liang’ s call for the creation of a single Chinese nation comprising the vast territory and peoples of the Qing empire, yet acceptance of Liang’ s entire formula would nullify the very foundation of his revolutionary activism^- the need to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Sun’ s predicament— what Pamela Qossley has labelled the “conceptual crisis” of late Qing nationalism and Michael Gasster as called the choose between Scylla and Charybdis— hinged upon the need, on the one hand, to explicitly exclude the Manchus from the “Chinese rrinztT in legitimizing the 4 1 Liang, “Zhengzhi xuejia Bo-lun-zhi-li zhi xueshuo,” 76. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 56 creation of a Han-dominated Republic and, on the other hand, the desire to inherit the territorial boundaries, and by extension the various ethnic polities, of the Qing empire.4 2 The difficult task of squeezing Sun’ s ninzuzhuyi between the racial exclusionism of Zhang Binglin and the spatial inclusionism of Liang Qichao fell tp Sun’ s most trusted polemists, Wang Jingwei. In a long two-part article entitled, “A M inzu of Gtizens,” which was serialized in the first two issues of the Minbao, Wang attempted to tackle the meaning of Sun’s rrinzuzhuyi. Wang Jingwei began his discussion by accepting Bluntschli’ s distinction between the legal concept of guorrin (citizenr^ and the ethnological term of rrinzu, and then asking whether it was necessary for a single rrinzu to comprise a single guonin4 3 Wang answered this question by arguing that the world’s most evolutionaiily fit states were those comprised of only a single rrinzu. Only in an ethnically homogenous state, Wang contended, would equality and freedom be completely assured. Members of the same rrinzu shared innate feelings of fraternity towards one another. Wang Jingwei called this “natural equality” (tiarmnzhipingfeng), reversing the classic Zuo G m m ta ry dictum: “If they are not of our kin, they are sure to have different minds” to contend that those of the same rrinzu were of a single mind and thus naturally inclined to protect the freedom of its members. It was this natural inclination, Wang told his readers, that served as the basis for Sun Yat-sen’ s principle of rrmzuzhuyi. Natural equality could be suppressed but never eliminated. 4 2 Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirron History and Identity in Irrperial Ideology (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1999), 344; Michael Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Reiduttancf 1911: The Birth cf Modem Chinese Radicalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 82. 4 3 Wang Jingwei, “Minzu de guomin” (A rrinzu of citizens), October-November 1905, in Zhang and Wang, eds., Xirhai Geming Qianshinian jianShilunxmn, 2.1:82-114. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 57 At this point ninzuzhuyi s goal for an ethnically homogeneous state appears to have differed little from the blueprint mapped out by Zhang Binglin; yet Wang went on to explicitly criticize what he termed the “narrow racial revengism” of Zhang while echoing Liang Qichao’ s call for the assimilation of all Chinese rrinzu into a single “ ’ rrinzu of citizens” {rrinzu de guoniri). Next, Wang proceeded to disagree with Liang over whether or not the Manchus and other non-Han populations have already been assimilated by the Han. The bulk of his essay puts forth concrete examples demonstrating how the Manchus have not only preserved their own language, customs and bloodline, but also how they have attempted to assimilate the Han by destroying their ethnic consciousness. The evolutionary process of natural selection was a gradual one, and one that still had not been completed in China. In a 1907 Minbao essay Wang Jingwei went so far as to advocate a “limited period” of ethnic equality among China’ s rrinzu to protect their interests while the natural process of evolution did its work, stating: “Our party advocates the future implementation of assimilationist policy towards the various rrinzu^ but now we have no alternative to establish a limited period of political equality without a system of ranks.”4 4 Most cursory discussions of late Qing anti-Manchuism highlight the central role of Sun Yat-sen in the formulation of Han racist attitudes towards the Manchu rulers of China. As the leader of the Tongmenghui, Sun’ s principle, rrinzuzhuyi, is often described 4 4 Gted in Rao Huaimin, “Shilun ‘ Minbao’ shiqi Wang Jingwei de minzuzhuyi sixiang” (Inquiry into Wang Jingwei’ s nationalist thinking during the period of Minbao), in JimanXinhai Gening Qishi ZhoumanXueshu Tadunhui Wenji (Collected E ssayfirm an A caderric Seminar on the Seienty A rmkorsary (fthe 1911 Revolution), ed. Zhonghua shuju bianjibu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 3:1978. Wang made this suggestion in a Minbao article entitled, “ Yanjiu minzu yu zhengzhi guanxi zhi ziliao” (Materials on the research into the relationship between rrinzu and politics), Minbao, 13 (1907). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 58 as the ideological fountainhead of anti-Manchu rhetoric, causing Frank Dikotter, among others, to translate ninzuzhuyi as “racial nationalism”4 5 and even inviting comparisons with the racist nationalism of Italian Fascist Enrico Corradini and Alfredo Rocco.4 6 Chinese scholars, who always go to great lengths to depict Sun’ s thought in its most positive light, have also stressed the “narrow nationalist” and “Han chauvinist” tendencies in Sun’ s pre-1911 principle of ninzizzhuyif7 Yet, I think it is unwise to assume, like Michael Gasster does, that Sun’ s anti-Manchu views provide a “convenient summary of most of the revolutionaries’ later arguments ”4 8 Despite the biological metaphors which interpolate his usage of rrinzu, the non-violent social evolutionism that underpinned Sun’ s conceptualization of political community sharply differed from the violent racial exclusionism of Zhang Binglin and others anti-Manchuists. From early in his political career Sun’ s definition of China was based more upon geographic and cultural signifiers than biological ones. Sun’ s expedient use of anti- Manchu rhetoric cannot hide the fact that he envisioned the new “Zhina State” (Zhimgud) as a single political community occupying the entire territory of the Qing empire. Any cultural and ethnic diversity within this community was only temporary, awaiting gradual homogenization through the natural forces of human evolution and 4 5 Dikotter, The Discourse c f Race in Modem China, 123-25. 4 6 A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Nazionalfasdsmo and the Revolutionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen,” Journal <f Asian Studies 39.1 (November 1979): 21-37. 4 7 See for example, Deng Hui, “Xinhai geming shiqi Sun Zhongshan de minzu tongyi sixiang” (Sun Yat-sen’ s national unification thought during the time of the 1911 Revolution), Zhongun rrinzu xueyuanxuebaa 2 (1996): 83-87; Li Shiyue and Zhao Shiyuan, “Sun Zhongshan de minzuzhuyi he ‘fanman’ wenti” (The problem of Sun Yat-sen’s ninzmhuyi and anti-Manchuism), in Sun Zhonghmyu Zhonggto Minzhu Gening {Sun Yat-sen and China’ s National Revdution) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1984), 68-84. 4 8 Gasster, Chinese Intellectuals and the Revdution c f 1911,71. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 59 Sun’ s program for national development. Finally, the tendency of scholars to indiscriminately divide the thought of Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen into the neat categories of “reformer” and “revolutionary” has overshadowed the remarkable similarity between their conceptualization of rrinzu. Both men called for the gradual, non-violent fusion of all the Qing empire’ s peoples into a single national citizenry, disagreeing only on whether or not this process had already occurred among the Manchu rulers and the type of political system best suited for the new nation. Minzuzhuyi and the Chinese Republic (1911-1920) Despite a triumphant proclamation that the goal of rrimuzhuyi had been achieved upon stepping down as provisional president of the new Republic of China on 1 April 1912,4 9 Sun Yat-sen and his fellow revolutionaries were soon forced to re-think the exclusivist rhetoric that helped bring down the multi-ethnic Qing dynasty. The new Republic was coming apart along its ethnic seams. Outer Mongolia and Tibet officially declared their independence from the provisional Nanjing government on 1 January 1912; Xinjiang, although nominally part of the new Republic, was under the autonomous rule of the Chinese warlord Yang Zengxin; and finally, Russian, British, Japanese and French imperialists were quickly encroaching upon the old Qing frontier regions with hopes of adding to their colonial territories. To make matters worse, several of China’ s interior provinces had declared their independence from Beijing, demonstrating the tenuous nature of the newly imagined Republic. Attempting to stem the centrifugal disintegration of the Qing empire, the new Republican government 4 9 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Nanjing Tongmenghui huiyuan jianbiehui de yanshuo” (An address given at a Tongmenghui farewell banquet in Nanjing), 1 April 1912, in SZSQf, 2:319. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 60 began downplaying racial and ethnic differences among its citizens and stressing instead the national unity of what it called the “five major rrimtZ (mda rrimu) of the Republic: the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Tibetan and Hui, Accordingly, Sun’s principle of rrimuzhuyi quickly expanded to include a new “positive” dimension: the construction of what Liang Qichao had first called a single Zhon^ma. rrimu from amongst the various ethnic inhabitants of the Qing empire. By the time Sun returned to Canton from yet another fund-raising trip through America and Europe in December of 1911, the faltering Qing empire was already being declared a multi-ethnic, “Zhonghua Republic of Five Lineages” {Zhongbua rrimu mtzu gpn$e) by the revolutionaries, with these five lineages symbolically represented by a new five-color national flag. A good deal of confusion exists over Sun’s position on the “Republic of Five Lineages” {imzu gmghe) and the “five-color flag” (wisegroqi). In both China and the West, Sun is often held up as a proponent of ethnic pluralism and racial equality following the establishment of the Republic, representing what analysts have described as a “radical transformation” or “reinterpretation” of rrinzuzbuyi following the 1911 Revolution.5 0 In reaching this conclusion scholars make frequent reference to Sun’s uses of these two new concepts of Chinese ethnic diversity. Prasenjit Duara, for example, points to the new “five-color flag” in arguing that “Sim Yat-sen began to speak of the doctrine of the autonomy of five major races as the basis of the Republic,” while Gottfried-Karl Kindermann uses Sun’ s apparent support for the vtuzugpngjx concept in explaining his goal of integrating all Chinese minorities into the “framework 5 0 See, for example, Deal, “National Minority Policy in Southwest China,” 49; Hoston, The State, Identity, and the National Question, 190. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 61 of a multi-ethnic Chinese nation-state.”5 1 In China, the officially sanctioned Sun Yat-sen Enydcpedia (Sun Zhanghan Cidan) defines wuzu gpn$x as “the model used by Sun Yat- sen to solve the domestic national question during the early republican period.”5 2 Upon closer examination, however, Sim’ s attitude towards these two icons of pluralism reveals a radically different story— one that requires us to reconsider previous assumptions about his support for ethnic diversity within the Republic. Recently several Chinese scholars have demonstrated Sun Yat-sen’ s “extreme opposition” to the adoption of the five-color national flag first proposed by Song Jiaoren, Chen Qimei, Zhang Binglin and other Shanghai revolutionaries following the Wuhan Uprising. Sun favored instead the “white sun against a blue sky” (qingian bain) banner created by his old Cantonese friend and martyr of the failed 1895 Canton Rebellion, Lu Haodong. Alternatively, he proposed a modified version of this flag, which included three colors (red, blue and white) symbolizing the French revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. In a public appeal directed at the newly established national assembly, Sun gave three reasons why the five-color pennant was inappropriate as a national symbol: 1) the five-color flag was originally used to 5 1 Duara, Rescuing History firm the Nation, 142; Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, “An Overview of Sun Yat-sen’ s Doctrine” in Sun Yat-sen’ s Doctrine in the Modem World, ed. Cheng Chu-yuan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 55-56. 5 2 Zhang Lei, ed., Sun Zhonghan Cidian (Encyclopedia cfS m Yat-sen) (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1994), 83. For other notable examples of Chinese and Western misinterpretations of Sun’ s position on these two symbols see Gladney, MuslimChinese, 83; Stevan Harrell, “The Nationalities Question and the Prmi Problem,” in Brown, NegliatingE thmdties in China and Taiwan, 277\ Norma Diamond, “Defining the Miao: Ming, Qing and Contemporary Views” in Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, 106; Mackerras, China’ Minorities, 53-58; Lin Jiayou, Sun Zhanghan Zhencing Zhongjjua Sixiang Yen/in (Research on the Development c f Sun Yat-sen’ s Chinese Though) (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1996), 118 & 159; Li Jiayou, Xinhai GerringyuMinzu Wenti (The 1911 Reidutionandthe National Question) (Guangdong: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe, 1992), 356-57; Tao Xu, WanqingMinzuzlruyi Siehao (Nationalist Thou$rt during the Late Qing) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), 215-218. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 62 distinguish top-ranking Qing navy officials; 2) the distribution of the colors meant to represent the five great rrinzu of China were incorrect since the color yellow signified the Manchus and not the Han, and, most importantly, 3) now that the national integration of the five rrinzu had been established, it was no longer appropriate for the national flag to represent them as distinct groups.5 3 After much debate, the provisional assembly rejected Sun’s plea and voted on 10 January 1912 to adopt the five-color pennant as the new national flag. However, Sun’ s refusal to remove the white sun/blue sky flag from the offices of the provisional national government in Nanjing created an impasse which was only broken after he stepped down as provisional president in favor of Yuan Shikai. The newly relocated national assembly in Beijing once again formally decreed the five-color banner as the national flag on 10 May 1912. Sun, however, continued to oppose the use of the multicolored Republican flag. Lu Haodong’ s white sun/blue sky banner became the Kuomintang (KMT) party flag in 1919, and Sun’s tri color pennant the “national flag” of his rogue Canton regime in 1925 and finally, after 1927, the Nanjing Republic founded byChiang Kai-shek.5 4 Sun was equally opposed to the usage of the term “Republic of Five MinzU* (w{zugpn$)e) when referring to the new Chinese state. The mainland Chinese scholar Deng Hui pointed out that following the outbreak of racial violence between the Han 5 3 Sun Yat-sen, “Fu canyihui lun guoqi han” (Letter on revising the assembly debate on the national flag), 12 January 1912, in SZSQf, 2:17-18. 5 4 See Li Xuezhi, ‘ “Zhonghua minguo guoqi shilue’ zhengwu” (A correction of errors contained in ‘Adiscussion of the Republic of China’ s national flag), LishiD anganl (1996), 105-07; Qu Youci, “Zhonghua minguo guoqi shilue” (A discussion of the Republic of China’ s National Flag), Lishi Dangan 1 (1991), 133-34; Xin Ping, “Wuseqi— qingtian bairi mandi hongqi” (Five color flag— Blue shy, white sun, and red background flag), in Mingta Shehui Daguan (The Grand Sight afRepMiom Society), Xin Ping et. al. (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1991), 32-35. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 63 and Manchus in the wake of the Wuhan Uprising, a group of prominent gentry raised the issue of declaring the new state a republic of five rrim u in the hopes of neutralizing this rising tide of violence. Under pressure to quickly organize a new government and stabilize the national situation, Sun reluctandy agreed with their proposal.5 5 Yet several times during the subsequent years Sun expressed his disapproval of the notion of a five- minzu republic and its symbolic five-color flag. In 1919, for example, Sun stated: After the Han rrinzu toppled the political power of the Manchu Qing dynasty and escaped the yoke of alien rule, the goal of rrinzuzhuyi was at last achieved. But then the strangest thing happened. Just as the revolution succeeded, some bureaucrats took hold of the idea of a republic of five rrinzu made up of the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans, and selected a five-color flag [devised by] some Qing general as the national flag of the Chinese Republic, with the five colors representing the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans. Members of the revolutionary party took little notice and made use of this decrepit bureaucratic flag, abandoning the national flag of the Zhonghua Republic with its Blue Sky and White Sun designed by the first martyr of the Republic, Lu Haodong. I relentlessly opposed this, but the Senate made the Blue Sky and White Sun into the navy’ s flag. Alas! This is why ever since the establishment of the Republic, China has been rent asunder, and the navy has always upheld justice. The misfortunes of the Republic are all due to the inauspicious five-color flag.5 6 In a 1920 speech in Shanghai, Sun stated even more unequivocally: “Now some people have said that our Republic is a five rrinzu republic; yet, actually, the term five-rrinzu is inappropriate. How can we say there are only five rrim u in China?”5 7 Instead, Sun followed Liang Qichao in calling for “all the different rrimu of China to meld together ( r o r q f o e ) into a single Zhon$rua rrimu (like America, which was originally a mix of 5 5 Deng, “Xinhai geming shiqi Sun Zhongshan de minzu de sixiang,” 87. 5 6 Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 1919, in SZSQf, 5:187. The translation is adapted from John Fitzgerald, A wakening China: Pditks, Qdture, and Class in the Nationalist Rewlutim (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 183. 5 7 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Shanghai Zhongguo guomindang benbu huiyi de yanjiang” (Speech before the Shanghai Branch of the Chinese Nationalist Part}), 4 November 1920, in SZSQf, 5:394. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 64 different European nirtzus, and now forms only a single American rrinzu making it the most glorious rrinzu in the world).”5 8 In his articles and speeches Sun rarely employed the term mczu gprqfie, preferring instead the more inclusive term Zhongfota rrinzu, which stressed the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of all citizens of the Republic. Like Hanzu and rrinzu, the term Zhonghua rrinzu is a modem construct. It entered the Chinese lexicon around the turn of the century with the combination of the common Tang Dynasty term for China, Zhon$rua (literally “central flower”), and the neologism rrinzu to create Zhonghua rrinzu or the “Central flower nation.” Prior to the revolution, the term was popular among the cultural conservatives and constitutional monarchists, with Liang Qichao, for example, making frequent using of the term to stress the ethnic and cultural unity of China’ s different rrinzu?* Following the 1911 revolution the term gradually entered Sun’ s vocabulary, replacing both the exclusivist terms Hanzu and Manzu and the pluralistic republican slogan of w tzu g p n g h e . By 1919, Sun was not only championing the existence of a single, unified Zhon$rua rrinzu— which he proudly declared the world’ s “oldest, biggest, and most civilized rrinzu with the greatest powers of assimilation (tongftuali)” ^ — but also arguing that all symbols of ethnic diversity (such as the five-color flag and the mczu gmgfx cliche) hindered the natural evolutionary fusion of a single Chinese people. 5 8 Ibid. 5 9 On the origins of Zban^rm nirtzu see Chen, “Zhongguo, Huayi, Fanhan, Zhonghua, Zhonghua minzu,” 62-66; It is quite possible that the term was coined by Liang Qichao himself. To the best of my knowledge the earliest usage of the term in Liang’ s written occurring in October 1903 when Liang return from his tour of the United States. See Liang, “Zhengzhi xuejia Bo-lun-zhi-li zhi xueshuo,” 75. 6 0 Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 1919, in SZSQf, 5:186. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 65 Sun’ s speeches and articles during the early years of the Republic contain numerous references to its citizens as either a “single race” (tong:hon$, “single family” iyijia), “single people” (yjjm), or “single body” (yiti). In his inaugural speech as provisional president in 1912, for example, Sun stressed the theme of ethnic and territorial unity; The essence of the state exists in its people. The uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan territories into a single country also means the uniting of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other lineages (zu) into a single people (yum). This you could say is rrinzu unity. Since the Wuhan Uprising ten provinces have successively declared their independence; yet, this so-called independence only represents a breaking away from the Qing court and the union of each province. The desire of Mongolia and Tibet is the same. The entire movement does not represent a divergence, but rather a movement towards the center, and a consolidation of the four comers of China. This you could say is territorial unity.6 1 This territorial and ethnic unity was grounded upon the equality of all citizens (regardless of rrinzu, age, and gender) and their freedom of expression, demonstration and redress now that the “poisonous autocratic system” of the Manchus had been replaced with a “democratic republic.” Sun referred to this state of political equality as rrinzu pingkngor the “equality of rrirrzun ( ‘ 2 The benefits of the new republic, however, were not to be distributed evenly amongst the various social and cultural groups of the new state. Though Sun argued for the political equality of all Chinese peoples within a republican system of government, he did not harbor any illusions about the equality of men before nature. He called 6 1 Sun Yat-sen, “Linshi Dazongtong Xuanyanshu” (Proclamation of the Provisional President), 1 January 1912, in S2SQT, 2:2. 6 2 Sun Yat-sen, “He wuzu wei yiti jianshe gonghe” (Uniting the Five Minzu into one Body to Construct the Republic), 7 September 1912, in Goring Wenxian (Documents from tlx Revolution), ed. Luo Jialun (Taipei: Zhongyang wenhua kongyingshe jingshou, 1953-), 2:264-65 (hereafter cited as GMWX). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 66 Rousseau’ s notion of inalienable natural right “unreasonable” and in fundamental conflict with the principle of historical evolution.6 3 “There are no two things absolutely equal or alike. There is no equality in the natural world,” Sun confidently declared; rather, “science has revealed the truth that men are not bom equal and that equality is a social creation.” Instead of manufacturing some sort of “artificial equality” (as existed in autocratic societies) or “false equality” (as existed in communal societies), Sun argued for the establishment of “true equality.”6 4 In other words, Sim favored the equal opportunity of all individuals to develop to the best <f their natural ability without hindrances imposed by society. It naturally followed in Sun’ s mind that the discordant natural abilities of China’ s ethnic groups meant that the “advanced” Han majority and “backwards” minority peoples could not expect to benefit equally from the changes brought about by the establishment of a republican government. Sim theorized that the puerile and underdeveloped natural ability of China’ s minority peoples slated them for eventual assimilation with the superior Han ninzu, whose historical destiny it was to lead all Chinese people into the modem world. Besides differences in natural ability, population size was also a crucial factor in determining a group’ s piece of the republican pie. Since the Han people were the largest rmtzu in China, it again followed in Sun’ s mind that the promotion of their interests would benefit the nation as a whole. The new science of demography allowed Sun to claim that the overthrow of the minority Manchu rulers had successfully solved the 6 3 Sun Yat-sen, “Minquanzhuyi - Diyijiang” (The Principle of Minquan- Lecture Number One), 9 March 1924, in SZSQf, 9:264. 6 4 Gted in Yu-long Ling, “The Doctrine of Democracy and Human Rights,” in Sun Yat-sens Dextrine in the Modem Wartd, ed. Cheng Chu-yuan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 181-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 67 problem of ethnic and political inequality in China. “Never again,” he boldly proclaimed to a Hong Kong correspondent in 1912, “will a situation of strife arise. From this day forward the five great rrinzu will work in concert with a common heart and a common plan for advancing the state, advancing China into a position as the largest and most civilized state in the world.” How could Sun be so confident of this? Naturally, because the majority Han ninzu now occupied their rightful position as the dominant ethnic and political group of China. As Sun stressed to a reporter in May 1912: Because there is certainly no racial animosity in China, it does not matter if there are disturbances along the frontier region. All four hundred million Chinese people ( . Hmren) are wholly of the same race and heart (tongphong tangciri). How can this mass of people be compared with the less than one million Mongols, over two million Manchus, and five million Tibetans, who along with the other lineages (zu) comprise only fifteen million people? Even if there exists some animosity among these races (zhongpu), they are merely an extremely small minority— not a strong enough force to stir up trouble.6 5 The demographic “reality’ of China’ s ethnic composition was enough to justify in Sun’ s mind the continued marginalization of these peoples within the new Republic. What was to become of this small and insignificant group of peripheral peoples living along the strategic frontiers of the Chinese Republic? Borrowing one of Liang Qichao’s colorful expressions, Sun declared in 1919 that they were destined along with the Han majority “to be combine in a single furnace (head y & u ) to create a new order of the Zkon$m n in zu” 6 6 Sun’ s goal was the ethnically homogenous “melting pot” championed by American and Swiss nationalism. “When we speak of China,” Sun 6 5 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Xianggang yu Nanqing zaobao fangyuan Wei Luchen tanhua ‘ Nanbei Tongyi hou zhi Zhengzhi yu Waijiao Fangzhen’” (Commenting in Hong Kong on ‘The Political and Diplomatic Principles following North and South Reunion’ with Nanqing Morning Daily reporter Wei Luchen), May 1912, in M engzangZhengxjiFdingXmrji (Selection(f Pronouncem ents on Mongolian and Tibetan Polity), comp. Mengzang weiyuanhui (Taipei: Mengzang weiyuanhui, 1966): 2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 68 asserted in 1921, “no matter what rrinzu maybe added to our country in the future, they must be assimilated (ton$m) into our Hanzu.” 6 7 With the establishment of the Republic the goal of racial amalgamation became central to Sun’ s formulation of ninzuzbuyi. In one of his first official proclamations to the citizens of the republic as provisional president, for example, Sun declared that in order to unite the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people into a single family “from this day forward our citizens should serve the “melding” (xiaomng) of ideas in order to remove boundaries and private interests with no benefit to the public good.”6 8 This melding of ideas was supposed to work in concert with the natural process of “racial evolution” (zhorgpu jinhud) listed second among the Tongmenghui’ s nine-point political agenda.6 9 The fact that this evolutionary process was to occur through the assimilation of smaller, weaker ninzu with the Han majority was confirm ed when the Tongmenghui was re-organized into the Chinese Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1911, and the new Party’ s manifesto listed “the strict implementation of racial assimilation (zhongpu ton^pw)” as one of its five point agenda.7 0 It is important to note, however, that in Sun’ s mind, the establishment of national homogeneity was not to be carried out through the “forced assimilation” « Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 1919, in SZSQf, 5:187. 6 7 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Zhongguo guomindang benbu teshe zhu ou banshi chu de yanjiang” (Speech given at the special founding of a branch office of the Nationalist Party in Canton), 6 March 1921, in SZSQf, 5:475. 6 8 Sun Yat-sen, “Bugao guomin xiaorong yijian juanchu zhenyutu wen” (Announcement declaring the melding of ideas among our citizens in order to remove boundaries), 18 February 1912, in SZSQ, 2: 105. 6 9 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo Tongmenghui kai quanti dahui tonggao,” (Notice on the Convening of a National Conference of the Tongmenghui), 3 March 1912, in Guqfu Q&znji (Complete Works c f the National Father), comp. Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomingdang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1973), 1: 787. 7 0 Sun Yat-sen, “Guomindang xuanyan” (Manifesto of the Nationalist Party), 13 August 1912, in R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 69 {(panning tan$jud) of peripheral peoples, but rather the non-violent and natural process of “ ninzu melding [n in zu ron$x$.” It was Darwin’s “invisible-hand” of natural selection and not human coercion that would fuse the diverse peoples of Qing empire China into a new homogeneous Zhonghua ninzu. Social Darwinism was first popularized in China through the slogan “survival of the fittest” (youshengliebai), literally “the superior survival and weak perish.” However, this emphasis upon violent struggle conflicted with the ideals of harmony and non action enshrined in the Confucian and Taoist Classics.7 1 Following the 1911 revolution, Sun and other Chinese intellectuals began distancing themselves from the contentious notion of survival of the fittest in favor of what they perceived to be the more scientific and humane law of “natural selection” (ziranxmnze). In a 1912 lecture, Sun stated that the principle of the survival of the fittest, which rests upon the concept of “the superiors dominating inferiors and the strong devouring the weak,” was no longer applicable in the modem world, but rather was “tantamount to barbarism.” “World evolution,” Sun argued, “depends upon learning,” that is “learning how to advance from barbarism to civilization,” from lower forms of intelligence to “the divine sagacity of sages.”7 2 In his 1919 PmgranrrEfor National Reconstruction \Jianguo F a n g /H e] , Sun divided the process of evolution into three distinct stages: the “evolution of matter” (wtzhi jinhud); the “evolution of species” [ d o n g u i u SZSQf, 1:399. 7 1 Pusey, China and Charles Darwn, 116 & 60. 7 2 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Beijing Hu-Guang huiguan xuejia huanyinghui de yanshuo” (Speech given at a welcoming ceremony of education circles at the Beijing’ s Guangdong-Hunan Club), 30 August 1912, in SZSQf, 2:422-24. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 70 jinhud); and the “evolution of humanity” (m id jinhud). He argued that the principle of survival of the fittest only guided animal evolution, whereas human evolution was directed by what the Russian populist Kropotkin called “mutual aid” (jjuzhu), a principle already encapsulated in the age-old Gonfucian maxims of morality, love, friendship and justice. Although the instincts of animal heritage have yet to be completely extinguished, “once mankind entered the period of civilization, his inner being spontaneously sought the principles of mutual aid.”7 3 The Darwinian principle of natural selection assured that more civilized ninzu (those who practice the principles of mutual aid) would be “selected by nature” (tianze) for evolutionary advancement over those ninzu that continued to act according their instincts like “birds and beasts (qinshou).” When considering China’ s own domestic rrinzus, it naturally followed in Sun’s mind that since the Han rrinzu possessed the most “civilized knowledge” {w ining zhishi), they inherited the Yellow Man’ s Burden of civilizing China’ s instinct-ridden minority peoples, helping to lead them and other uncivilized members of the yellow race out of the darkness of barbarism and into the light of civilization.7 4 Sun referred to this non-violent, civilizing project as gtnhua, or the “reforming the people’ s minds through examples of moral superiority.”7 5 The result of this civilizing project would be the dissolution of all “backward” ninzu through their gradually melding into the “civility” of Han society. 7 3 Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs cfa Onnese Revolutionary: A Programme cfNational Reconstruction for Qiina (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 73; For the original text see Sun Yat-sen, “ Jianguo fanglxie” (The International Development of China), 1917-1919, in SZSQf, 6:157-493. 7 4 This idea was a fundamental part of Sun’ s lecture on “military spiritual education” before the commanders of his Canton regime’ s army in 1921. See Sun, “Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang,” 10 December 1921, in SZSQf, 6: 9-16. 7 5 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Guangzhou dui Guomindang yuan de yanshuo” (Speech to KMT members in Canton), 30 December 1923, in SZSQf, 8: 574. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 71 The principle of gtrbrn served as the cornerstone of Sun’ s policy towards those frontier regions— such as Tibet and Mongolia— which were struggling to break to the new Republican government. Sun argued that improved education and communication rather than violent confrontation were the best methods for reunifying the country and fusing all its inhabits into a single Zhonghua nation. Sun dismissed those militarists who advocated the use of punitive military campaigns to bring the Tibetan and Mongolian people back into the Chinese fold. In response to a reporter’ s query on the 1912 Tibetan declaration of independence, Sun stated: “I strongly oppose the use of force in pushing this matter. In time the Tibetan people will rise up against outside aggression and be pulled towards the interior. The [historical] relationship between China and Tibet is quite deep.”7 6 Both Tibet and Mongolia had broken away from China because they did not completely understand the benefits associated with membership in the Chinese nation-state, he told another reporter that same year: “Their education is still not sufficient, and it is not easy to enlighten them on this question; we can only gradually help them see what is right.”7 7 During a 1923 speech before Kuomintang Party members, Sun stressed that “if we want people to understand the benefits of a republic, we must use popular propaganda, to ‘reform people’ s minds’ (grnhud). We cannot achieve this through the use of military force to control the people. If we use military 7 6 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Beijing yu Yuan Shikai de tanhua” (Discussion in Beijing with Yuan Shikai), August 1912, in SZSQf, 2:427-28. 7 7 Sun Yat-sen, “Yu Xianggang ‘Shimie Xibao’ jizhe de tanhua” (Discussion with a reporter from Hong Kong’ s ShirrieXibaS), May 1912, in SZSQT, 2:363. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 72 force we will only achieve temporary success and fundamentally fail to change people’ s thinking and habits...propaganda is the process of reforming people’ s minds.”7 8 Besides improved education, another way to speed up the natural process of amalgamation was by opening the frontier to Han migration and development. In one of Sun’s first political acts, a 1894 letter to Qing minister Li Hongzhang, he suggested that China “emulate the West by recruiting people to open up the wasteland (kaikeri)” along the Qing dynasty’ s vast frontier region.7 9 Following the success of the 1911 revolution and his resignation as provisional president, Sun dusted off his 1900 map of proposed railway lines and developed it into an extensive plan for China’ s national development. The plan, which was eventually published in 1917, and translated into English in 1919 under the title The International Development c f China, called for massive infrastructure development projects to unify China proper with its frontiers, including the laying of around one hundred thousand miles of railway tracks, one million miles of macadam roads, and an equally massive telephone and telegraph system. Arguing that “the wealth of a nation can be judged by the mileage of its railroads,” Sun proposed that the government spend nearly six billion Chinese silver dollar on the construction of a three-section railway network binding the costal cities of Tianjin, Shanghai and Canton with frontier outposts in Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. This new communication and transportation network was intended to facilitate what Sun called his “cultivation and colonization ifuzhi zhiniri)” scheme. Sun proposed to develop and civilize the backward 7 8 Sun, “Zai Guangzhou dui Guomindang yuan de yanshuo,” 30 December 1923, in SZSQf, 8: 574. 7 9 Sun, “Shang Li Honghang Shu,” June 1894, in SZSQf, 1:18. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 73 frontier peoples through the forced migration of tens of thousands of decommissioned soldiers and property-less Han peasants to the frontier. He also envisioned a land-grant system similar to the American Homestead Act that would allow the new Chinese nation-state to tap the abundant natural resources of the frontier region for its own national development.8 0 In one of his last acts prior to stepping down as provisional president, Sun requested an annual budget of 300,000 yuan from the Ministry of Finance to carryout a migration scheme proposed by defacto Prime Minister Huang Xing. In justifying the large nature of this appropriation from the coffers of the cash-strapped Republic, Sun referred to the development of the “withering Northwest region” through forced migration of peoples from the crowded Southwest was one of the country’s main routes towards national wealth and strength.8 1 The growing discourse of mmuzhuyi as Chinese territorial and national unity was most clearly revealed in Sun’ s first attempt since 1906 to systematically present his doctrine of Samrimhuyi. In his 1919 hand-written draft of the Three People's Principles, mmuzhuyi was no longer defined as some vague principle of Han racial exclusion, but rather as the “righteous spirit of a rrimu.” “The basis for m m u zh u yi,Sun wrote, “has sometimes been a common bloodline (x u e to ,and religion, sometimes a shared history and tradition, or, more rarely, a common language and literature. But the loftiest and 8 0 Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Shanghai yu M idibao jizhe de tanhua” (Discussion with a reporter from Shanghai’ s Miriibad), 25 Jtme 1912, in SZSQf, 2: 382-84; Sun, “ Jianguo fangliie,” 1917-1919, in SZSQf, 6: 157-493. 8 1 Sun Yat-sen, “Ling Caizhengbu jiang bo zhu tuo zhi xiehui jingfei bianru yusuan wen” (Request from the Finance Ministry to allocate money for the budget of the Association for Assisting the Opening Up and Colonization of the Frontier), 30 March 1912, in SZSQf, 2:296-97. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 74 most civilized ninziabuyi of all is rooted in common will (yizhi).”8 2 Sun offered both Switzerland and America as examples of this most civilized type of ninzuzhuyi, what he termed “positive nimuzhuyi,” and argued that both countries had successfully merged an ethnically diverse population into a single national unit in their quest for modernization and national greatness. The citizens of the Zhonghua Republic shared a similar common aspiration to become the most powerful and developed nation on the earth. The key to achieving this goal in Sun’ s mind was the development of a more positive or constructive nationalist spirit: In overthrowing the Manchu Qing dynasty and restoring the Hanzu we have achieved only the negative aspect of the goal of mmuzhuyi. From now on, we must struggle boldly to advance toward the positive side of this goal. What is the positive side of this goal? It is for the Hanzu to sacrifice the bloodline, history, and identity that they are so proud of and merge in all sincerity with the Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans in a single furnace to create a new order of the Zhon^zua ninzu, just as America has produced the world’ s leading ninzuzhuyi. by melding scores of different peoples, black and white. This is a positive goal. Why should we talk of five rrinzvi I am convinced that when the Hanzu, the world’ s oldest and largest rrinzu and the one richest in assimilative power, is infused with the new world principles and takes positive action to bring about the full expression and development of the new Zhonghua ninzu, we will quickly surpass America and Europe and become first in the world.8 3 Sun refers to his program of ethnic amalgamation as “broad ninzuzhuy? {da ninzuzhuyi), a term ironically first used by Liang Qichao in 1903 to criticize the “petty ninzuzhuyi? {xiao nimuzhuyi) embodied in the Tongmenghui’ s racist anti-Manchu rhetoric. Mimuzhuyi and Chinese A nti-Inperialism(1923-1925) Kuomintang scholar George Yu has pointed out that: “The year 1923 was 8 2 Sun, “Sanminzhuyi,” 1919, in SZSQ T , 5: 186. 8 3 Ibid., 187-88. The translation has been adapted from Wei, Myers, and Gillian, eds., Pvesaiptions for Sating O w n, 224. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 75 important in the annals of the Kuomintang, for during the year the basic foundation was laid for the total transformation of its organization and ideology.”8 4 After several years of preliminary contacts with Comintern and Bolshevik officials, Sun signed a Joint Statement of Understanding with Moscow envoy Adolf Joffe on 26 January 1923. The Sun-Joffe Accord cleared the way for the Soviet Union to provide political, military and financial assistance to Sun Yat-sen’ s rump national government of Canton in exchange for the admission of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members into the Kuomintang and its reorganization along the lines of a Bolshevik-style, highly-centralized political party. George Yu, Hung-Ting Ku and other scholars have persuasively demonstrated that a fundamental ideological shift accompanied Sun’ s political re-orientation towards Moscow. During the last three years of his life, Sun’ s lectures and writings focused less on domestic reforms through Western assistance and more on the external oppression caused to China by foreign imperialism. A similar redirection occurred in the rhetoric of Sun’ s discourse of nimuzhuyi. Less emphasis was placed on the need for internal unity and more upon the struggle of the entire Zhon^ma rrimu to obtain equality with the other nations of the world. The repeal of the unequal treaties imposed on China by the foreign powers was now described as tantamount to the full resumption of Chinese sovereignty and its equality within the international community of nation-states.8 5 Yet, despite the concrete influence of Comintern advisors upon KMT party and military 8 4 George T. Yu, Party Pol i t i cs inRepuUiom Chi na: TheK uam tang 1912-1924 (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1966), 168-69. 8 5 Hung-Ting Ku, “The Emergence of the Kuomintang’s Anti-imperialism,” Journal <f Ori ent al St udi es 16.1-2 (1978): 87-97. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 76 organization, thought and training, the re-orientation of Sun’ s ideology after 1923 had only a minor impact upon the positioning of Chinese peripheral peoples within his discourse of nim uzhuyi It must be remembered that, in the words of Gordon and Chang, “since the earliest Soviet contact in 1920, Sun’ s interest in communist assistance was pragmatic, not ideological, and this attitude prevailed in subsequent years.”8 6 Despite the use of new rhetorical terms, chiefly “imperialism” {c kgpazhuyi) and “national self-determination” {rrimu zijufi), the underlying social evolutionist logic of Sun’ s ninzuzhuyi remain unchanged. The rhetorical redirection of Sun’ s ninzuzhuyi discourse was not immediate. The January 1923 manifesto proclaiming the re-organization of the Kuomintang only added a new external dimension to Sun’ s policy of internal ethnic amalgamation: “The principle of ninzuzhuyi that our party supports, in the negative sense, advocates the elimination of inequalities among all ninzu, and in the positive sense, the unification of all ninzu within China into a single, large Zhonghua Republic.”8 7 The new dualism between “negative nationalism” (the elimination of external ninzu domination) and “positive nationalism” (the fusion of all internal ninzu) did litde to alter Sun’s insistence upon the creation of an ethnically composite Zhon$rua ninzu. The Party’ s new political outline continued to insist that nimuzhuyi was the principle guiding “the consolidation of the various rrimu of our country into a great Zharr$rua rrimu.” s s Although Sun first 8 6 Chang and Gordon, A ll Under Heaven, 133-34. 8 7 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan” (The Manifesto of the KMT)> 1 January 1923, in GM W X, 69: 69. 8 8 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo guomindang danggang” (The Party Outline of the KMT), 1 January 1923, in G M W X, 8:39. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 77 employed the term rrinzu zijue (national self-determination) in March 1921 and ckgmhuyi (imperialism) in April 1922,8 9 they did not become a regular part of his lexicon until late in 1923. In fact it was not until after the arrival in Canton of the Comintern’ s chief political advisor to the Kuomintang, Mikhail Borodin, in early October 1923, that one notices a significant change in the language of Sun’ s principle of rrinzuzhuyL A man of exceptional talent and personal charisma, Borodin quickly won Sun’ s trust by demonstrating the usefulness of the Comintern’ s anti-imperialist doctrine in his quest to reunify China. At Borodin’ s insistence the Kuomintang convened its First National Congress (or Reorganization Congress) in January 1924 with the task of formalizing a new ideological programme for the party. The Congress’ Manifesto endorsed Sun’ s Three People’ s Principles as the party’s official doctrine and the “only means of saving the people of China.” The document also provided a thoroughly revamped interpretation of Sun’ s ninzuzlouyi-. The Kuomintang’ s principle of rrinzuzbuyi contains two meanings: 1) the self- seeking liberation of the Chinese n in zu and 2) the equality of all the n in zu living within Chinese territory. In support of the first aim, the KMT proposes to secure the recognition of the freedom and independence of China among the nations of the world.... In the eyes of the masses the fight for the emancipation of the Chinese people is an anti-imperialist movement....When imperialism has been beaten down, the people can then enlarge their activities and unify themselves to accomplish the other aims of the revolution....In support of the second aim..equality of all rrinzu living within China...the KMT will work for alliances and organized discussion of problems which concern us all. The KMT hereby formally guarantees the right of self-determination for all domestic rri nzu^ and as soon as the revolution achieves victory over the 8 9 See Sun Yat-sen, “Sanminzhuyi zhi juti banfa” (Concrete methods for implementing the Three People’s Principles), 6 March 1921, in SZSQf, 5:480; Sun Yat-sen, “Yu Meiguo ‘Huashengdun Youbao’ jizhe de tanhua” (Conversation with a Reporter from the Was hi ngt on Posi), April 1922, in SZSQf, 6:101- R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 78 imperialists and the warlords, we will do our best to organize (upon the voluntary agreement of all rrim u) a free and united Zhonghua Republic.9 0 At first glance, the document appears to mark a radical transformation of Sun’ s nim m huyi in support of the right of Chinese peripheral peoples to determine their own national form and a condemnation of all forms of imperialist domination. The explicit inclusion of the right of national self- determination for China’ s minority peoples within the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto has lead several analysts to speak about yet another “remarkable ideological shift” within Sun’ s ninzuzhuyi— this time from what Bruce EUeman has described as “'Wilson’ s ethnically based definition of nationalism” to “Lenin’s anti-capitalist definition of nationalism.”9 1 It must be remembered, however, that the Reorganization Congress marked a high- point of both Bolshevik (in the person of Borodin) and Chinese Communist Party (in the form of the first so-called “United Front” between the KMT and CCP) influence on Sun Yat-sen’ s ideology. Yet, in the end, the Manifesto not only met with Sun’ s approval at the time of the 1924 Congress, but was also listed by Sun in his last will and testament as one of the four major texts to guide the Kuomintang’ s ideology after his death.9 2 In light of the complex background surrounding Sun’ s use of Bolshevik rhetoric during the 9 0 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo guomindang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” (The Manifesto of the KMT’ s First National Party Congress), 30 January 1924, in SZSQf, 9:118-19. 9 1 Elleman, D iplam cy andDeoept i on, 61. 9 2 Sun signed this will drafted by Wang Jingwei the day before his death at a Beijing hospital on 12 March 1925. The will was printed in all the National papers and greatly influenced the ideological development of the KMT following his death. The fours documents included in Sun’ s last revolutionary programme were Mani fest o cftbe F irst National Congr e s s , Out l i ne for N ational Reconst ruct i on ( Ji anguo Dagzng) , Fundament al s of ' National Recons t r uct i on ( J i a ng uo Fangl i t e), and the Thr e e Peopl e’ s Pri nci pl es. See Chang and Gordon, A II Under Heaven, 133-34. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 79 last years of his life, it behooves us to take a closer look at his specific understanding of digmhuyi (imperialism) and ninzu zijue (national seh-determination). It is my contention that Sun Yat-sen interpreted the Bolshevik discourse of imperialism and national self- determination through the same social Darwinian prism as he did the survival and extinction of individual ninzu and gpqia (states), and not Lenin’ s theory of imperialism as the “highest stage of capitalism.” In Sun’s first Canton University lecture on rrinzuzhu^^ which was delivered only four days after the passage of the Kuomintang’s new Manifesto, he argued that the difference between gwjia and ninzu lies in the nature of their origins. States develop through military force— the compelled assimilation of small and weak ninzu into a single unified state or the violent splitting apart of a single ninzu into several different states. Sun used the Chinese term badao or the “way of might” in reference to this unnatural process of state formation. A ninzu, on the other hand, was forged out of natural forces, such as a common livelihood, language, religion, customs, and most importantly bloodline ( x u e t x j m ^ . Sun referred to this process of ninzu evolution as the wngiao or the “way of right.” According to Sun, China occupied a unique place within the international family of nation-states, for unlike others that have formed numerous states from a single ninzu (i.e., the Anglo-Saxon rrinzu) or combined several ninzu into a single state (i.e., the United Kingdom), only in China does a single ninzu form a single giqia. In other words, Sun declared, “the principle of ninzuzhuyi is equivalent to the doctrine of ^ia zh u y T in China. Once again Sun borrowed a term from his old nemesis Liang Qichao, this time 9 3 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - Diyijiang,” 184-96. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 80 the neologism %mu (state/national lineage), to express the completely homogeneous nature of the Chinese nation-state. "W hat about China’s minority ninztH The other four so-called “great ninzu" (da ninzu) which once comprised the Qing empire? Sun dismissed them, as he had done in the past, as numerically insignificant: China’s ninzu total four hundred million people. Among these people there are only a few million Mongols, over a million Manchus, a few million Tibetans, and some hundred thousands Mohammedan Turks— all totaling no more than ten million non-natives. Thus, considering the vast majority, we can say that the four hundred million Chinese people are entirely Hanzu. sharing a common bloodline, common language, common religion, and common customs— a single, pure ninzu?1 ' In Sun’ s mind the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Hui did not have an independent role in China’ s political future; rather, their historical destiny was to be their assimilation into the superior Han lineage-race in the evolutionary process of constructing a single Zhonghua ninzu. When Sun used the term “ ninzu equality” (ninzu pingkni) during the last years of his life, he referred not to the equality of the various ninzu within China but rather the freedom of the entire Chinese guazu (state/national lineage) to obtain equal footing with the other nations of the world; and when he spoke of “our ninzu? he did not mean the so-called “five great ninzt? of China, but rather a single Han-dominated Zhon$m ninzu. In his second lecture Sun argued that although military force has proven the key factor in the victory of one state over another, the evolutionary force of “natural selection” (tianmn taotai) has guided the survival or extinction of individual ninzu. Sun 9 4 Ibid., 188. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 81 rejected Malthus’ theories about the demographic limits of human population, arguing that population size was the key variable in the natural selection process among rrimu. “From ancient times,” Sun stated, “the increase and the decrease of population has played a large part in the rise and fall of rrinzu. This is the law of natural selection.”9 5 The Han people’ s large population had frequently led its intellectuals to boast that China could not be easily exterminated, using the example of the assimilation of the Yuan Dynasty Mongols and the Qing Dynasty Manchus to prove their point. Yet, Sun cautioned his listeners that during the last hundred years the population of the United States has increased tenfold; that of England and Japan, threefold; that of Russia, fourfold; that of Germany, two-and-one-half-fold; and that of France increased by one fourth, while the population of China had failed to increase the slightest bit. At this rate, Sun warned, China would be exterminated by the white race within the next one hundred years. Furthermore, this figure of a hundred years declines to only ten years once one considers the un-natural human forces affecting evolution. Sun’s next three lectures turned to the “man-made factors” (rm m li) impacting rrinzu evolution, namely political and economic hegemony. It was these factors, Sun told his audience, that weighed most heavily upon the continued survival of the Zhongfrua rrinzu: If it were a matter merely of natural selection, our rrinzu might survive, but evolutionary force in the world depends not only on natural forces, but rather a combination of natural and human forces. Human agencies may displace natural agencies, so called man over nature. Of these man-made forces the two most potent are political forces and economic forces. They have a greater 9 5 Sun Yat-sen, “Mnzuzhuyi - Dierjiang” (The Principle of M inzu - Lecture Number Two), 3 February 1924, in SZSQf, 9:197. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. influence on the rise and fall of rrimuxhaxi the forces of nature. Amongst global trends, our rrimu is not only being oppressed by these two forces but is also stuck deep within its scourge.9 6 Sun emphasized China’ s century long suffering at the hands of Western political and economic domination. This long period of imperialist subjugation had transformed China into a “hyper-colony” ( < dzhimm di), the slave of not one imperialist power but several. Prior to the First World War many European countries adopted imperialist policies in order to expand their influence and power, and more recent Japan was following in their foot-steps by forcefully colonizing Korea, Taiwan and other small Asian ninzu. Sun defined imperialism as a “policy of aggression on other countries by means of political force, or, in the Chinese phrase, long-range aggression {jin yu an lm ) ”9 7 In other words, imperialism was the use of political and economic hegemony, or as Sun often called it, the “way of might” (badad), to forcefully subjugate and eventually exterminate small and weak ninzu. Sun viewed the First World War as a watershed in the white race’ s ktdao expansionism. Unlike Lenin, he did not perceive the war to be a form of inter imperialist aggression, rather as first and foremost a race war. The war was essentially a struggle between the four major sub-branches of the white race (i.e., the Teutonic, Anglo-Saxon, Slavic and Latin) for supremacy in Europe; and, now that the Anglo- Saxon race had triumphed, the attention of the entire white race had turned towards Asia and Africa. Greatly influenced by the race war theories found in Homer Lea’ s The % Ibid. 9 7 Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - Disijiang” (The Principle of M inzu - Lecture Number Four), 17 February 1924, in SZSQf, 9:221. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 83 Valor cfIjzporance (1909) and Lothrop Stoddard’ s The Rising Tide c f Color A gtinst White World Supremacy (1920),9 8 Sun believed the white race was on a mission to “swallow up (tunrni) all colored races.” They had already succeeded in destroying the “red barbarians” (hongfan) of America, he told his audience, while the “black people” (he ir en ) of Africa were on the verge of extermination with the “brown people” ( zongeren) of India soon to follow. Finally, the white race was exploiting the yellow race of Asia and, if it did not take preventative action, it too would be destroyed. The First World War was only imperialist in so far as the various sub-branches of the white race were attempting to use violent aggression to expand their influence throughout Europe and Asia. Sun was not opposed to the evolutionary expansion and decline of rrinzu through the non-violent means of ethnic amalgamation so long as this process occurred according to the yellow race’ s “way of right” {uaughd) and not the white race’ s “way of might” (bttdad). In their haste to promote Sun as a stalwart of anti-imperialism and racial equality, both Western and Chinese scholars have failed to consider Sun’ s own imperialist tendencies toward what he called the “small and weak rmtzrn” (ruaxiao rrinzu) of Asia. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, for example, are clearly misguided in stating that “there is no suggestion that Sun conceived the Chinese ‘race’ superior to any of the others.”9 9 Rather, it was precisely because of the perception of superiority that 9 8 For the influence of these two writers upon Sun see Paul M.A. Linebarger, The Political Doct ri nes cfSm Yat - sen: A n Exposition cfthe San M in Cl y u I (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), 195-96; Chang and Gordon, A U Under Heaven, 87-88. 9 9 A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Thought of Sun Yat-sen in Comparative Perspective,” in Sm Y at-sen’ s Doct ri ne in the Modem Worl d, ed. Cheng Chu-yuan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 121. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 84 Sun believed the Hanzu was destined to assimilate and rule over all the small and weak rrmzm of Asia. In a key section in his fourth lecture, Sun implied that China’s past history of benevolent imperialism differed significantly from the type currently being practiced by the European powers and the Japanese. Historically, Sun told his audience, the territorial expansion of the Chinese state was based upon the consensual recognition of China’ s cultural superiority among her small and weak neighbors, and the institutionalization of this hierarchical world order (following the fall of the Yuan Dynasty) in the tribute system. “If at that time all the small states of Malaysia wanted to pay tribute (jingyn$ and adopt Chinese culture (g/A ia),” Sun stated, “it was because they admired Chinese civilization and spontaneously wished to submit themselves; it was not because China oppressed them through mihtaiy force.”1 0 0 This type of consensual veneration, Sun argued, does not exist among the colonial subjects of Western imperialism. Even the United States’ “benevolent and generous” colonialism in the Philippines has failed to win the allegiance of the Filipino people. Yet, according to Sun, the small ninzus bordering China continue to “admire” and “respect” its cultural superiority. To illustrate this point, Sun described a meeting he had with the Foreign Office of Siam (Xiardud) more than ten years previously, during which “the Siam Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, ‘ If China could have a revolution and become a strong people and wealthy country, we Thai would gladly renew our allegiance to China 1 0 0 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - Disijiang,” 17 February 1924, in SZSQf, 9: 227. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 85 and become a province of China’.”1 0 1 Since the meeting was held in public offices and the individuals involved were all government representatives of the Thai people, Sun concluded that the comment must represent the sentiments of all the Thai people. Sun clearly longed for the day when Han civilization would resume its ancient duty as protector and cultural model for its less civilized neighbors. Along with Siam, Sun’ s dream for a “greater China” explicitly included Annam, Korea, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Borneo, Sulu, Java, Ceylon, Taiwan and other former Qing dynasty tribute states.1 0 2 In his sixth and final lecture on Minzuzhuyi, Sun concluded that “amongst all the states and the peoples of the world today, China alone preaches peace while all other countries talk only in terms of war and advocate the overthrow of states by imperialism” As a result, it was the “heavenlyduty” (tianze) of the Zhon^ma rrm zuto “aid the weaker and smaller rrirnu and oppose the great powers of the world.”1 0 3 Sun took yet another step forward in his call for an Asian anti-imperialist alliance during his famous speech on “Pan-Asianism” {dayazhaczhuyi) delivered in Kobe Japan on 28 November 1924. Sun argued that the fundamental difference between Occidental and Oriental culture was that the former was badao while the latter was wmgko. “The rule of right [Orient] respects benevolence and virtue, while the rule of might [Occident] only respects force and utilitarianism” Thus, while “Oriental civilization,” contended Sun, Ibid., 228. 1 0 2 See Ibid.; Sun Yat-sen, “Zai Guangzhou Quanguo Xuesheng Pingyihui de yanshuo” (Speech before a Canton session of the All Students Discussion Society, 15 August 1923, in SZSQI, 8:116; Sun, “Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang,” 10 December 1921, in SZSQJ, 6:16. In this 1921 speech Sun went so far as stating: “With regards to Chinese territory, Vietnam, Korea, Burma, Tibet and others are all either China’ s vassal states or dependencies.” 1 0 3 Sun Yat-sen, “Mnzuzhuyi - Diliujiang” (The Principle of M inzu - Lecture Number Sixth), 2 March 1924, in SZSQ, 9; 246 & 253. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 86 “was far behind the Occident [materially], morally the Orient was superior to the Occident.” He went on in his lecture to argue that only by applying benevolence and virtue throughout Asia and unifying the entire yellow race in an anti-imperialist, Pan- Asian alliance could the yellow race fight off extermination and eventually triumph over the aggressive white race.1 0 4 How did Sun’ s call for assisting the weak and small rrinzu of Asia relate to the Kuomintang’ s pledge to work for the self-determination of China’ s minority peoples? A good deal of debate continues to surround Sun Yat-sen’ s usage and interpretation of the term rrinzu zijue (national self-determination). Many Western scholars make uncritical reference to Sun’ s usage of the term in describing yet another fundamental shift in his discourse of rmrzpczhuyi, namely support for the minority people to determine their own political form independent of domestic Chinese imperialism.1 0 5 Only a few scholars however have taken a closer look at Sun’ s specific interpretation of rrinzu zijue. American political scientist Walker Connor has argued that Sun never took the concept seriously- failing to envision an actual desire among the minorities for secession from their motherland— and only allowed it to be inserted into the Manifesto of Kuomintang’ s First Party Congress at the insistence of his Soviet advisers. The Taiwanese scholar Hong Quanhu, on the other hand, has argued that Sun’ s 1 0 4 Sun Yat-sen, “Dui Shenhu shangye huiyi suodeng tuanti de yanshuo” (Speech before the various organizations of a Kobe commercial meeting), 28 November 1924, in SZSQj, 11:401-09. 1 0 5 For example Colin Mackerras states: “Sun Yat-sen’s policies in the latter part of his life were based rather closely on those of the Soviet Union, which meant that he was inclined to accept notions of self-determination and autonomy for the minorities,” See Colin Mackerras, Chi na’ s M inority Cul t ur es : Ident t t i es and In ten tion Si nce 1912 (New York: St. Martin’ s Press, 1995), 9. For other notable examples see Benson, Thel U Rebellion, 11-12; Wei, Myers, and Gillian, eds., P n soiptim far Saiing Chi na, xxi; Dryer, Chi na’ s Fort y M illions, 17. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 87 interpretation of the concept contained two complementary meanings: the self-seeking liberation and independence of the entire Chinese nation and the implementation of self-rule (not secession) and equality among the minority nationalities of China.1 0 6 Both arguments contain a kernel of truth; yet, I feel that in order to fully appreciate Sun’ s usage of the term rrinzu zijue during the last years of his life, it must be placed within the context of his understanding of human evolution. Although the term national self-determination is quite old, it did not gain international prominence until American President Woodrow Wilson began advocating its implementation as the First World War drew to a close. Wilson believed that only the gradual dismemberment of the global imperialist system and the granting to colonial peoples the right to determine their own national form could prevent another world war. Wilson thus made national self-determination an important part of the Fourteen Point Agenda he took to the post-war Paris Peace Conference. Along with Wilson, Vladimir Lenin was also an early champion of the right of national self-determination, calling for the liberation of all downtrodden nationalities from the globally intertwined system of capitalist imperialism and colonial oppression. Unlike Wilson however, Lenin believed that (in theory at least) all “national minorities” (including colonized minorities living within a nation that itself was colonized by the Western imperialists) should be granted the right to break away from their oppressors and form their own independent 1 0 6 See Connor, TbeN atiom l Quest i on, 67-8; Hong Quanhu, Zhonghan XiansbengM imu Zi j udun zh i Yenj i u (Re s e a r c h onM r. Sun Yat -sen’ s The or y c f Sel f-ckt ermi mt i an) (Taipei: Guoli zhengzhi daxue sanminzhuyi yenjiusuo yanshi lunwen, 1980), 117-150. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 88 political state regardless of size. In other words, the right of political secession became a crucial component of Lenin’ s interpretation of national self-determination.1 0 7 Late in his life, Sun Yat-sen admitted being greatly inspired by the “current trend toward national self-determination” championed by US President Wilson. China— like Poland, Turkey, Czechoslovakia and other oppressed European peoples— should also have the right to rid itself of imperialist powers and carryout its own national liberation. Sun first used the term national self-determination in a 6 March 1921 speech in Canton, stating that Wilson’ s principle of rrinzu zijue was “essentially the same as our party’s principle of rrinzuzhuyL”1 0 9 Initially, Sun only applied the principle of national self-determination to the development of the Chinese rrinzu as a whole, making no mention of its right being applicable to “domestic rrinzif {grand g rrinzu). For example, in accepting the “spirit” of national self-determination, the 1923 Manifesto of the Kuomintang called for “the internal promotion of the evolution of the entire country’s rrinzu and the external quest for equality with all the world’ s rrinzu.” Towards this aim, the Manifesto advocated “encouragement of popular education to advance the culture of our country’s rrinzu and the employment of every effort to revise the [unequal] treaties in restoring ourselves to a position of international freedom and equality.1 0 9 At this point, Sun’ s usage of the term rrinzu zijue represented only the 1 0 7 On Wilson and Lenin’s interpretation and usage of the term national self-determination see Derek Heater, National Sdf - det ermi nat i on: Woodrow Wi l son and hi s Legacy (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Connor, The N ational Quest i on, 45-66. 1 0 8 Sun Yat-sen, “Sanminzhuyi zhi juti banfa,” 6 March 1921, in 525Q T , 5:480. 1 0 9 Sun, “Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan,” 1 January 1923), in GMWX, 69:69-70. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 89 unhindered evolutionary development of the entire 2hon$>ua rrinzu in its struggle with the other ninzus of the world. But why then the apparent reversal of language with the issuing of the Manifesto of the Kuomintang’ s First Party Congress, which stated: “The KMT hereby formally guarantees the right of self-determination for all domestic ninzvt} Recently declassified Russian documents reveal the tenuous and conditional nature with which the Bolshevik policy of national self-determination entered the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto. Sun Yat-sen and other KMT leaders played only a minor role in the actual drafting of the Manifesto. Rather, Sun asked Borodin to draft an English copy of the Manifesto which would then be translated into Chinese by Liao Zhongkai and checked personally by him.1 1 0 Unbeknownst to Sun and other KMT leaders, Borodin wrote the Manifesto in stria accordance with a 28 November 1923 Comintern Central Executive Committee Direaive that outlined a new interpretation of Sun’s Three People’ s Principles. Among the proposed revisions, the Directive called for the explicit inclusion within Sun’ s ninzuzhuyi of the “principle of national self-determination for all nationalities within China.”1 1 1 Yet, when Borodin’ s draft was read out before the delegates of the Reorganization Congress on 20 January 1923, it met with cantankerous 1 1 0 Sun Yat-sen, “Pi Deng Zeru de shangshu” (Criticism of Deng Zeru written on his letter to Sun), 29 November 1923, in SZSQj, 8:458. Sun revealed this information in reply to the charge by veteran KMT party member Deng Zeru that CCP leader Chen Duxiu had drafted the Manifesto. 1 1 1 “Gongchan guoji shining weiyuanhui zhuxituan guanyu Zhongguo minzu jiefang yundong he Guomindang wenti de jueyi” (The resolution of the Presidium of the Comintern’s Central Executive Committee concerning China’s national liberation movement and the question of the Kuomintang), 28 November 1923, in Li angpng(Bu), G anghangytjiyi Zl x mg g u o Guonin Gening Yudong(1920-1925) (Rus s i an Bol s hevi k Parly, Conintem and t he Chi nes e N aticm l R etduticm ry Movement , 1920-25), trans. and comp. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi diyi yanjiubu (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1997- ), 1: 342-345 (hereafter cited as LGZY). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 90 opposition from several party veterans who felt Borodin’s broad ranging re interpretation of the Sarmmzhuyi betrayed their original meaning. In particular, Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and others opposed Borodin’ s insistence that the KMT grant its frontier minorities the right of political national self-determination prior to the victory of the Chinese revolution.1 1 2 In a private meeting with Borodin several days later, Sun Yat-sen suggested the replacement of Borodin’ s contentious draft Manifesto with a more benign document, Jungia Dagzng (Outline for National Rejmtmaiari), recently drafted by Sun.1 1 3 In the Outline all explicit mention of ethnic minority political independence was removed in favor of a more paternalistic and vaguely worded pledge that it was the responsibility of the national government to “prop-up and foster” (juzhi) the ability of all China’ s “domestic small and weak rrinzvT to “self-determination and self-rule (zijue zizh i)” iU In order to save his Manifesto Borodin agreed to revise and in some places water-down its language (particularly on the national and land questions) and to have Sun’ s Jiauguo D ating published alongside the Manifesto. The precise language of the Manifesto finally approved by the Reorganization Congress on January 23rd reveals the extent of Borodin’ s compromise. First, the Kuomintang only promised to recognize the “right of self-determination for all domestic rnm iT rather than the Comintern’ s insistence that “national self 1 1 2 [Michael Borodin], “Bao-luo-ting zai you Sun canjia de weiyuanhui shang suozuo de shengming” (Borodin’ s statement during a meeting of the committee attended by Sun Yat-sen) in “Bao- luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao” (Reading notes and reports of Borodin), 12 Feburary 1924, in LGZY, 1 : 448-50. 1 1 3 [Michael Borodin], “Xuanyan de weiji shike” (The crisis moment of the manifesto), n.d., in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” 16 February 1924, in LGZY, 1: 471. 1 1 4 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhongguo zhengfu jianguo dagang” (Outline for the reconstruction of the Chinese government), 23 January 1924, in SZSQT, 9:127. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 91 determination” [rrinzu zijue) explicitly include the right of political secession. Second, the carefully worded promise of self-determination is immediately followed by a contradictory pledge that the Party would “organize (upon the voluntary agreement of all rrinzu) a free and united Zhonghua Republic.”1 1 5 Finally, the Manifesto states that the implementation of domestic rrinzu self-determination could only occur “after the revolution achieves victory over the imperialists and the warlords.” In other words, until the badao of imperialism and warlordism had been successfully defeated and a Han- dominated Kuomintang government was established throughout China, the wzngko of ethnic evolution could not proceed unhindered. In a report before the GCP, Borodin admits his disappointment with the vague and antipodal nature of the Kuomintang’ s insistence upon both minority self-determination and the construction of a united Zhonghua Republic, and called upon the GCP to publicize these inconsistencies and work for a revision of its wording.1 1 6 In a recent monograph Bruce Elleman has used what he perceived to be a change in Sun Yat-sen’ s policy towards Outer Mongolia to argue that Sun’ s discourse of ninzuzhuyi “changed dramatically after January 1923.” Elleman claims that after the signing of the Sun-Joffe Accord, Sun “supported the USSR’s imperialist policies in Outer Mongolia.”1 1 7 At the request of the Mongolian People’ s Revolutionary Party 1 1 5 Sun, “Zhongguo guomindang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan,” 30 January 1924, in SZSQj, 9:119; [Michael Borodin], “Daiqianyan” (Preface), in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” 16 February 1924, in L GZY, 1:425; [Leo Karakhan], “ Jia-la-kan gei Bao-luo-ting de xin” (Letter from Karakhan to Borodin), 13 February 1924, in LGZY, 1:418. 1 1 6 [Michael Borodin], “Gongchandang dangtuan huiyi” (United Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party), 18 January 1924, in “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” 16 February 1924, in LGZY, 1: 465-66. 1 1 7 Elleman, Di pl omacy and Decept i on, 60-64. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 92 (MPRP), the Bolshevik Red Army entered Outer Mongolia in July 1921 to drive out the "W hite Russian general Baron Ungem-Sternberg. Although Sun did agree in the Sun- Joffe Accord to the continuation of the “status quo” in Outer Mongolia, declaring that he did not “view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China,” Sun had good reason at this point to trust the intentions of the Soviet leaders towards Outer Mongolia. Not only had Moscow unconditionally renounced all Tsarist unequal treaties and territorial concessions in China, its Beijing emissaries made repeated promises to return Outer Mongolia to Chinese sovereignty following the cessation of White Russian hostilities in the region.1 1 8 This promise was personally conveyed to Sun on a number of occasions during 1923-24 by Borodin and other Moscow representatives, and was eventually confirmed when the Soviet Union formally agreed that Outer Mongolia was “an integral part of the Republic of China” and promised to respect “China’ s sovereignty therein” in the Sino-Soviet Treaty on 31 May 1924.1 1 9 The Kuomintang alliance with Moscow did nothing to change Sun Yat-sen’ s insistence upon the inclusion of Outer Mongolia within a single, unified Zhon$m rrinzu. In late 1923 he rejected a personal plea by GCP chairman Chen Duxiu for the 1 1 8 For background information on the Sun-Joffe Accord and the discussions between Soviet representatives and Chinese officials over Outer Mongolia and the resumption of Sino-Russian relations see Allen "W hiting, SadetP dides in Chim, 1917-1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953); Peter S.H. Tang, Russi an and Soda P dky in Marxhuna and Out er Mongol i a, 1911-1931 (Durham, N G Duke University Press, 1959). As early as August 1922, Sun expressed his “complete confidence” in Soviet intentions towards Outer Mongolia in a letter to Moscow emissary Ignatii lurin, stating “I accept Moscow’ s guarantee that it had no intention to separate or destroy the Zhonghua Republic’ s territory or political system.” See [Sun Yat-sen], “Sun Zhongshan zhi Yue-fei de xin” (Sun Yat-sen’ s letter to lurin), 27 August 1922, in LGZY, 2:393. 1 1 9 See Appendix C, “The Sino-Russian Agreement, May 31,1924,” in Ken Shen Weigh, Russi an and Sadet P dky inM andm ia and Out er M ongiia, 1911-1931 (Durham, N G Duke University Press, 1959), R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 93 Kuomintang to formally recognize the political independence of Outer Mongolia in accordance with the principle of national self-determination.1 2 0 Sun also used the presence of Dazan, the chairman of the Red Army backed Mongolia People’ s Revolutionary Government, at the Kuomintang’s Reorganization Congress to highlight the common historical destiny of the Chinese and Mongolian peoples. Despite the fact that Dazan was under strict orders from Moscow’s Beijing envoy, Lev Karakhan, not to discuss Outer Mongolia’ s political relationship with China, Sun placed his own words in the mouths of the Mongolian representative during a 20 January 1924 welcoming ceremony for the Congress’ delegates: “The reason for Mr. Dazan’s visit to Canton was to call for Mongolia to again unite with China in creating a single, large Zhonghua Republic.”1 2 1 In one of his lectures on rrinzuzhuyi after Dazan’ s departure, Sun even claimed that when the Mongolian representative saw “the fostering of small and weak rrinzu and lack of imperialist thought within our Congress’ political programme, he enthusiastically advocated the uniting of everyone together into a single, large Oriental 349-53. 1 2 0 Zou Lu, Zhonggr o Guoni ndang S bi gm {D raft H istory o f t he Kucmi nt ar^ , 2nd ed. (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1938), 636n9. 1 2 1 Sun Yat-sen, “Huanyan Guomindang gesheng daibiao ji Menggu daibai de yanshuo” (Speech at a ’ welcoming feast for KMT representative from each province and Outer Mongolia), 20 January 1924, in SZSQj, 9:107. In a secret cable to Borodin, Karakhan warned: “Danzan does not have the authorityto sign any agreements or to make any detail guarantees or promises (with the KMT officials). His task in general is to circulate information on the situation. He has the authority to circulate information on the conditions in Mongolia and the situation and work of the MPRP. During negotiations, [you] can also allow him to say that the Mongolian people desire Mongolian independence. I suggest that you express clearly to Sun Yat-sen that the chief reason why they are demanding independence is because of China’ s situation: If they were to become part of Chinese territory, [China] would not be able to ensure the obtainment of their national aspirations, nor would it be able to provide them with order and stability. Thus, now they insist upon a stance of independence. Yet, you can imagine that if China had a democratic and honest national government and they provided a basis for a scheme of autonomy with which the Mongolian people agree, they would join the territory of the RepubEc.” See [Karakhan], “ Jia-la- kan gei Bao-luo-ting de xm,” 27 December 1923, in LGZY, 1: 389. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 94 country.”1 2 2 Finally, Sun informed the Urga authorities in late February that he had personally dispatched Mongolian Kuomintang (and recently elected Central Executive Committee member) Bai Yunti to carry out party and propaganda work among the people of Outer Mongolia.1 2 3 In spite of the Red Army’s activities in Urga, Sun clearly had no intention of allowing Outer Mongolia its political independence from China. In Sun Yat-sen’ s mind, national self-determination was always something which could only apply to the superior Han lineage-race. This fact was not only confirmed by the evolutionary backwardness of China’ s minority peoples but also the gradual transformation of their frontier territories into imperialist spheres of influence. Because “Manchuria was surrounded by the Japanese, Mongolia by the Russians and Tibet by the English,” he stated during a 1921 speech, China’ s minority peoples “no longer possess the ability to defend themselves” and thus must now “depend upon the help of the Hanzif™ In another 1921 speech before the general staff of the Canton regime’ s military, Sun related this point to the principle of rrinzu zijue. Today, although the Manchus are gone, the Zhonghua Republic is still only a half independent country. The so-called Five M inzu Republic is simply the words of deceitful men! In fact, the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui and Manchus lack the ability of self-defense. The task of fostering a glorious and large rrinzuzhuyi, assimilating the Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and Manchus into our Hanzu and constructing of the biggest possible nation-state (rrinzu guqjia) rests solely with the self-determination of the Han people.1 2 5 1 2 2 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - Dieijiang,” 3 February 1924, in SZSQf, 9:200. 1 2 3 Sun Yat-sen, “Zhi Zhongguo guomindang kunlun benbu tongzhi bao”(Telegram to the comrades of the Urga branch of the Chinese KMT), 28 February 1924, in SZSQf, 9:474-5. Also see Li Jikui, “Sun Zhongshan yu waimeng wenti” (Sun Yat-sen and the problem of Outer Mongolia,” Sbehui Kenue Zhanxi an (1991), 193-200. 1 2 4 Sun, “Sanminzhuyi zhi juti banfa,” 6 March 1921, in SZSQf, 5:473. 1 2 5 Sun, “Zai Guilin dui Dian-Gan-Ou jun de yanjiang,” 10 December 1921, in SZSQf, 6:24. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 95 In short, when it came to national self-determination, Sun believed only the Han were capable of leading all China’ s peoples towards their historical destiny. Conducting Remarks In her now classic biography of Sun Yat-sen, Lyon Sharman remarks: “It might be cogently argued that, in dealing with an easily absorbent, propagandist mind like Sun Yat-sen’ s one should not look to the shifting ideas for his real opinion, but to those formations which he clung to tenaciously all his life.”1 2 6 Social Darwinism, I believe, was one of those formations. Despite the obvious development in his thinking on ninzuz.huyi, I have attempted to demonstrate how a persistent social evolutionist logic underlay all Sun’ s representations of political community in modem China. Sun’ s discourse of nimuzhuyi hinged on the overriding desire to assimilate the evolutionarily- unfit Chinese minorities with the superior, majority Han rrinzu in fashioning a homogeneous and more evolutionarily-robust Zhon$rua rrinzu. The global discourse of social Darwinism marked at least two important departures from past Chinese conceputalizations of human diversity, first, the use of scientific empiricism to reinforce the cultural distinction between “civilization” and “barbarism” in the traditional Confucian worldview, and second, the employment of the new category of “blood” (xue) to scientifically validate the traditional Han Chinese bias towards non-sedentary minorities. As Daniel Kwok and others have pointed out, Sun Yat-sen came to intellectual maturity during the era of rising “scientism” in China, which was marked by an intense 1 2 6 Sharman, Sun Yatseru H is Life and Its Meamng, 282. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 96 faith in the ability of “scientific knowledge” to transform China from a backward and weak empire into a powerful and modem nation-state.1 2 7 For Sun and most other 20th century Chinese intellectuals, social Darwinism provided not only a scientific framework for analyzing social diversity and change but also a new “epistemological truth” or constitutive discourse to replace the crumbling Confucian worldview. In the imperial discourse on yixia. zbibie, or “the distinction between Chinese and barbarians,” the Chinese literati contended that the frontier barbarians needed to adopt “Chinese ways” (read culture) to become “human” and participate in the “universal cosmology’ (tianxia); now Darwin seemed to be telling Sun and other Chinese intellectuals that the frontier “ ninzus” must adopt Han blood and culture in order to “survive” and remain part of world historical progress. In short, social Darwinism provided Sun Yat-sen with a new “scientific ontology’ which strengthened the traditional cultural bias among the Han elite against the non-sedentary frontier minorities. It was the supposed empiricism of this social Darwinian ontology, I would argue, that lent Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of ninzuzhcyi such authority in the eyes of most 20th century Chinese intellectuals. Unlike the speculative or idealistic assumptions of the Mandarins, social Darwinism carried with it a new level of “axiomatic truth” which could be measured, quantified and verified through the new scientific disciplines of biology, demography, anthropology, ethnology, history and archaeology. As Edward Said has demonstrated among European Orientalists, the modem social sciences played 1 2 7 D.W.Y Kwok, Saertism in Chi nes e Thou$i t , 1900-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 97 an important role in supporting and reinforcing the antiquarian biases of one group of people against another, giving rise to the modem discourse of racism.1 2 8 Social Darwinism played a central role in the introduction of “blood” (xu$ as a new discursive category for analyzing human variation in Chinese intellectual thought. Central to modem racism is the notion that inherent sociocultural and physical differences are transmitted from generation to generation through the blood. In his own “scientific” inquiry into the forces constituting a rrinzu, Sun concluded in 1924 that “blood is the most powerful force.” “Since the blood of one’s ancestors is always transmitted by heredity down through the r r in z u Sun wrote “bloodline (xuetong) is the greatest force.”1 2 9 In Sun’ s mind, the importance of blood was closely related to population size. Breeding, that is the passing of one’ s blood and by extension culture onto future generations, was a decisive factor for Sun in the evolutionary struggle for survival. It was precisely because of their small and insignificant populations that the Mongol, Tibetan and other frontier peoples of the Qing empire had no choice but to physically meld together with the numerically and culturally superior Han Chinese. Thus, when Sun noticed the relative decline of the Han population in comparison to the other leading rrinzus, of the world, he was quick to stress that: “Just as the Miao, Yao and other indigenous Chinese people whose ancestral sacrifices of blood and food have long ago been severed, if we [Han] do not broaden our horizons and use the strength of 1 2 8 Edward W. Said, Ori ent al i sm (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 231-33. 1 2 9 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - diyijiang,” 9:187. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 98 all our lineages (zon^ttt) to form a single gtazu in resisting the foreigners, our ancestors might some day find themselves without sacrifices just like the Miao and Yao.”1 3 0 Frank Dikotter, Prasenjit Duara and others have demonstrated a polarity or tension within imperial Chinese thought between an inclusivist cultural universalism and “a circumscribed notion of the Han community and fatherland (gtd) in which the barbarians had no place.”1 3 1 Rather than marking a shift from “culturalism to nationalism” as Joseph Levenson and others have claimed,1 3 2 Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of ninzitzhuyi represented the introduction of new “scientific” categories for conceptualizing human diversity and, through its underpinning social Darwinian ontology, a global framework for categorizing and explaining the rise and fall of different “races” {rrinzu or zhongzu). At the same time, however, it needs to be stressed that it was not a case, as Dikotter has recently argued, of race “permanently replacing more conventional emblems of cultural identity.”1 3 3 Rather, in the thought of Sun Yat- sen and other 20th century Chinese intellectuals, the new discourse of “race” (rrinzu or zhorqgu) came to reconfigure and reinforce a whole series of premodem markers of difference, such as “lineage” (zu), “nature” (xifig), “substance” (zbi) and “psycho- 1 3 0 Sun Yat-sen, “Minzuzhuyi - diwujiang,” (The Principle of Minzu - Lecture Number Five), 24 February 1924, SZSQJ, 9: 239. 1 3 1 Prasenjit Duara, “Bifurcating Linear History; Nation and Histories in China and India,” Posi t i ons: E ast A sia Cul t ures Cri t i que, 1.3 (1993): 786; Also see Dikotter, TheDi socmse (fRaae inM odem Chi na, 1-96; Duara, Res cui ng H istory From t he Nation, 56-65. 1 3 2 Levenson, Corfudan Chi na and Its Modem Fat e, 95-116; James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism,” in Chi nes e Nat i onal i sm, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 1-30. 1 3 3 Frank Dikotter, “Racial Nationalism in Modem China,” Jindai TJxngs uo shi ytnjiu t angcun, 24 (1997): 61 and Frank Dikotter, “Racial Discourse in China: Continuities and Permutations,” in The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan, ed. Frank Dikotter (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), 16. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 99 physical energy” while interacting with other, distinctly modem, social scientific categories of human diversity, such as “people,” “citizenry,” “ethnic group,” “nationality,” and “national minority.” The complex interplay between these various categories of difference is evident in the ambiguity within Sun’ s discourse of rrinzuzbuyi over the ultimate markers of rrinzu variation. In addition to stressing the importance of blood in his 1924 lectures on rrinzuzhuyi, Sun also listed a common livelihood, language, religion and customs among the forces responsible for constituting a ninzu. In his 1919 draft of the Three People’ s Principles, Sun even argued that “the loftiest and most civilized rrinzuzhuy? was rooted, not in a common bloodline, but rather in an amorphous “common will” (yizhi). Finally, as we have seen, there were other times when Sun’ s formulation of Z J o o n g b u a rrinzu was based upon a distinctly cultural or even spatial notion of difference. As we shall see in the following chapters, the inherent ambiguity within Sun’ s thought regarding the ultimate source of Zhongjrua rrinzu identity engendered several competing narratives of Chinese origins and unity among 20th century Chinese intellectuals, as they looked toward different aspects of his rmnzuzhuyi for ideological guidance. Despite Sun’ s use of the Social Darwinian metaphor of blood, one finds no evidence within his writings that he viewed biological markers, or any other marker of difference for that matter, as an impermeable or hard boundary between the Han majority and the various frontier minorities. Racial mixing rather than the purity of 1 3 4 On premodem Chinese conceptualizations of human diversity, in additional to Dikotter and Duara, also see Marta Hanson, “Robust Northerners and Delicate Southerners,” 515-50; Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicityin Early Modem China,” 1-35; Trauzettel, “Sung Patriotism as a First Step toward Chinese Nationalism,” 199-214; Tillman, “Proto-Nationalism in Twelfth-Century China? The R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 100 one’ s blood was the key to evolutionaiy survival. Like Confucius before him, Sun Yat- sen was a strong advocate of “using Chinese ways to transform the barbarians” (yongcia bianyi). As the Gonfucian literati believed the barbarians could be culturally absorbed— literally laihm or “to come and be transformed”— through the adoption of a sedentary lifestyle and Chinese clothing and language, Sun now contended that the frontier minorities could be ton$m (assimilated) through the infusion of Han blood and culture. After encountering the American paradigm of the “melting pot” in either Liang Qichao’ s writings or through his own travels in the United States, Sun championed the American model of fusing, or literally “smelting” (r ong ye or ran^rua), together the racially and culturally diverse populations of the Qing empire into a single, homogenous Zhon^oua rrinzu. Evolutionary strength in Sun’ s mind lay in the size and strength of one’ s population and not the purity of its blood. Finally, one finds within the thought of Sun Yat-sen and other turn of the century Chinese intellectuals a marked tension and analytical slippage over the spatial scope and temporal origins of the Zhonghua rrinzu. Sun failed to offer a consistent or coherent answer to the question of which “group” ultimately mattered in China’ s evolutionary struggle for survival. In his revolutionary quest to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty, the boundaries of China’ s rrinzu were intentionally circumscribed to highlight the difference between the majority Hanzu and the minority Manchu rulers. Following the 1911 Revolution and the threatened dismemberment of the Qing empire, Sun stretched the boundaries of the Chinese rrinzu firmly over the heterogenous polities Case of Q i’en Liang,” 403-27. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 101 of the Qing empire or what he began to call the Zhon$m rrinzu. At other times, however, such as his 1924 trip to Japan, Sim redrew the lines of the global evolutionary struggle along supranational racial lines, calling on all members of the yellow race to unite together in opposition to white imperialist oppression. This spatial tension over the ethnic boundaries of the Chinese rrinzu dovetailed with a temporal ambiguity over its historicity. Sim failed to develop a consistent attitude, as Prasenjit Duara has pointed out, on “whether the nation is already fully awakened or whether national consciousness needs to be further aroused,” reflecting a systemic anxiety within nationalists thought between the desire to root the nation in history while also expressing it as an unprecedented form of consciousness.1 3 5 'While Sim emphasized the long and glorious national tradition of the Hanzu, he also acknowledged that the natural and ongoing evolutionary process by which the diverse peoples of the Qing empire were being transformed into a new and homogenous Zhon$rua rrinzu. In the coming chapters, we shall see how the enigmatic and fluid nature of Sim Yat-sen’ s discourse of rrinzuzhuyi contributed to the continued debate among Chinese intellectuals and policymakers over the exact composition and origins of the Chinese rrinzu. Yet, the one thing that none of them seemed to doubt was the urgent need to unify the various peoples of the new Republic into a single political and cultural entity. 1 3 5 Duara, Rescmrg H istory From t he Nation, 32. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 102 CHAPTER 2 The Failure of the Bolshevik National Question Discourse On 20 January 1924, nearly two hundred members of the newly formed Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and recently reorganized Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) converged upon the grand auditorium of the Guangzhou National Teachers College for the KMT’ s First National Party Congress. This “Reorganization Congress” marked the formal commencement of a political alliance between China’ s two largest revolutionary parties. In exchange for military and political assistance from the Bolshevik-controlled Third Communist International (Comintern), Sun Yat-sen agreed, against the objections of many veteran Party members, to admit individual members of the CCP into the Kuomintang in order to create a revolutionary United Front against their common enemy— domestic warlordism and international imperialism. The influence of the Comintern was particularly evident in the Congress’ Manifesto, which was drafted by Comintern representative Mikhail Borodin and personally pushed through the Congress’ January 23rd session by Sun Yat-sen. Lenin’s extension of Marxist philosophy into the realm of European political praxis, and its application to Asian and African colonies through his theory of imperialism, served as the ideological framework for the Manifesto. More specifically, the document echoed the conclusions of the Comintern’ s 1920 Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, which called for a global alliance between the proletariat of the “advanced countries” (namely the Soviet Union) and the various movements of “national liberation” in the “backwards” colonies of Asia and Africa. According to the Theses, the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 103 initial revolutionary struggle in these colonial and backward countries would be of a bourgeois-democratic rather than socialist nature. As a result, the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto called for all Chinese revolutionary parties— including those that represented the proletariat and the bourgeois— to join together in a strategic alliance against the imperialist powers and their warlord lackeys in Beijing. The Comintern’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions also set forth an important new strategy for dealing with the problem of ethnic minorities. In marked contrast to Sun Yat-sen’ s call for the incorporation of the frontier peoples of the former Qing dynasty into the new nation-state, the Theses contended that the frontier minorities needed to be granted “national self-determination,” including the right of political secession, before their eventual reunion with all proletariat in a borderless world free from national and class oppression. Borodin carefully incorporated Lenin’s tactic of national self-determination into the Congress’ Manifesto with the following pledge: “The Kuomintang hereby formally guarantees the right of self-determination for all domestic rrinzu.”1 On its face, this promise appears to represent a radical departure from Sun’ s discourse on rrinzuzhuyi a closer examination, however, reveals the Manifesto’ s silence on the exact meaning and implication of self-determination in China. This chapter argues that it was not until Soviet Russia began employing the slogan to justify their assistance of Mongolian efforts to break away from Chinese hegemony that the exact meaning of the United Front’ s bold new language was thrust into the forefront of public debate. Both the Comintern and CCP leaders argued that the 1 Sun, “Zhongguo guomindang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan,” 119. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 104 Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto pledged support for the right of the Mongols and other frontier minorities to determine their own political fate independent of Chinese wishes, even if that meant their temporary separation from the Republic. Yet, most Chinese intellectuals, including an increasing number of Chinese Communists, viewed support for Mongolian political independence as tantamount to lese mtjeste, and a direct contradiction of the revolution’ s stated goal of liberating all “Chinese” peoples. This chapter examines the Comintern’s controversial introduction of the Bolshevik discourse on the national question into Chinese revolutionary politics during period of the First United Front. It looks at the implications of Lenin’ s policy of national self-determination— and its usage by GCP and Comintern leaders to legitimize Outer Mongolian independence— on the already fragile CCP-KMT political alliance. Special attention is paid to the then growing perception among Chinese intellectuals of a contradiction between Russia’ s military and financial support of Mongolian independence in the name of proletarian brotherhood and their simultaneous pledge to respect Chinese sovereignty. It attempts to demonstrate that the perception amongst large segments of the Kuomintang of CCP complicity in Russian “red imperialism” in China played a significant, and heretofore unrecognized, role in the collapse of the United Front. It also attempts to show how the intense ideological contradiction between Sun Yat-sen’ s Darwinian discourse of national unity, on the one hand, and the Comintern’ s promotion of the right of what most Chinese intellectuals viewed as evolutionarily-unfit ethnic minorities to determine their own political and cultural fate, on the other hand, lead to the eventual “ nationalization” of the national question in R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 105 China. By the 1930’s, the Chinese discourse on the national question had shifted from a broadly international issue revolving around the need to liberate “small and weak nations” (ntaxiao rrinzd) from the global system of imperialist oppression, to a purely domestic issue of how best to incorporate the “national minorities” {shaoshu rrinzu) into the new nation-state. In other words, this chapter examines the process by which the national question was theoretically de-linked from the Comintern’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions and reattached to the social evolutionary orientation of Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of rrinzuzhuyi. In short, this chapter traces the introduction and eventual failure of the Bolshevik national question discourse in 1920s China. The United Front & The Bdsheuk National Question Discourse Contrary to expectations, the formal establishment of the CCP at its First Party Congress in July 1921 did not mark the introduction of the Bolshevik discourse on the national question into China. Besides a rudimentary grasp of the basic tenets of orthodox Marxism, the Congress’ thirteen participants possessed little or no understanding of Leninism or the Comintern’ s newly promulgated Theses on the National and Colonial Question. In fact, one of the central debates at the Congress was over what type of communist party China should adopt, with Party members evenly divided between a Bolshevik-style dictatorship of the proletariat and the more moderate Mensheviks- style social- democratic party. The condition of China’ s struggling labor movement, and not the interconnected nature of global capitalism, was the central concern of China’ s early communists.2 The manifesto and political programme passed 2 Tony Saich, ed., The Rise to Power qfthe Chinese Commmst Party: Documents and A natysis, with R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 106 by the Congress are clear illustrations of the CCP’ s limited understanding of Bolshevism, representing instead a remarkably orthodox interpretation of Marxism. Both documents were devoid of any consideration of China’ s unique political situation or the Comintern’s policy of fostering revolution in the imperialist colonies. Finally, with national consciousness dismissed as a form of false consciousness in orthodox Marxism, it is not surprising that the Congress failed to mention the national question or how the Party’s agenda for socialist revolution related to China’s frontier regions and its ethnic minorities.3 It was only under the influence of the Comintern’ s first representative to China, Hendricus Sneevliet (alias Maring) that the young CCP transformed itself into a Bolshevik-style revolutionary party. Following his arrival in China during the summer of 1921, Maring set to work explaining the finer points of Bolshevik doctrine and the Comintern’ s new colonial policy to CCP members. He was uniquely qualified for this task After returning to Europe from several years of work amongst the anti-Dutch partisans in Indonesia, Lenin asked Maring to chair the “Commission of the National and Colonial Questions” at the Comintern’ s Second Congress held in Moscow during the summer of 1920. Working closely with Lenin, Maring drafted the Congress’ s contribution from Benjamin Yang (Armonk, NY: ME. Sharpe, 1996), 4-6 & 11-28; Also see Michael Luk, The Origins c f Chinese Bolshevism A n Ideology in the Making 1920-1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 39-42. Luk writes: “For those intellectuals who decided to go the Russian Way in the summer of 1920, Bolshevism remained largely an unknown entity. What they knew of it was that....it represented a radical, uncompromising, and authoritarian school of Marxism.” See p. 41. 3 Saich, The Rise to Power cf the Chinese Gomrnrist Party, 4-6. Also see “Zhongguo gongchandang diyi ge gangling” (The First Program of the CCP), July 1921, and “Zhongguo gongchandang xuanyan” (Manifesto of the CCP), November 1920, in Yidx Qfanhou: Zhongguo GonghandangDiyid Daibiao Dahui Qwhau ZiM ao Xuarinan (A round dye Tims cfthe First Parly C ongress: Corrpikd Doatmsnts frarnbfore and after the CCP’ s First National Congress), comp. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan xiandaishi yanjiushi et. al. (Beijing: R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 107 “Preliminary Draft Theses of the National and the Colonial Questions,” which became the cornerstone of the Comintern’ s policy for fomenting anti-imperialist revolution within the colonial world. Immediately following the Congress, Maring was dispatched to Shanghai with orders to implement the Theses’ programme in China.4 As a result, Mating’ s explanation of the Bolshevik discourse on the national question must be understood in the context of these seminal Theses passed by the Comintern’ s Second Congress. As Maurice Meisner has pointed out, the Theses and Maring’ s interpretation of them became the linchpin for Comintern’ s policy in China during the period of the first KMT-CCP United Front, 1921-1927.5 The Comintern’ s Theses are theoretically grounded in Lenin’ s 1916 book, Imperialism, the H ifx st Stage c f Capitalism Here, Lenin looks towards the East for help in explaining the failure of socialist revolutions to break out amongst workers of the European countries participating in the First World War. Lenin hypothesized that the national bourgeois of Europe had temporarily blunted the revolutionary class- consciousness of its proletariat by redirecting much of their economic exploitation to overseas colonies. The system of imperialist exploitation created by the capitalists throughout their colonies allowed them to temporarily pay higher wages to their workers in the West. Lenin hoped that the promotion of anti-imperialist resistance among the Asian and African masses would deprive the Western capitalists of their Renmin chubanshe, 1984-5), 1:6-8 & 20-23. 4 On Maring’ s role in introducing the Thesis and Comintern policy in China see TonySaich, The Origns c f the First United Front: The Rde (fSneediet (Alias Maring (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 1:12-25. 5 Maurice Meisner, L i Ta-dxto and the Origins c f Chinese Marxism (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1967), 216. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 108 profitable overseas markets and raw materials, eventually igniting the spark of worldwide socialist revolution.6 Yet, it was only after the tenuous victory of the October Revolution and the failure of socialist revolution to break out in Eastern Europe, that the Bolsheviks began seriously looking towards the oppressed colonial masses of the East as a potential ally in their desperate struggle for existence against the encirclement of Western imperialist forces. The Comintern’ s Theses set forth the strategic and ideological basis for the formation of this global alliance. The 1920 Theses begin by stating that “the Communist International’ s entire policy on the national and the colonial questions should rest primarily on a closer union of the proletarians and the working masses of all nations and countries for a joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeois.”7 This anti- imperialist, anti-capitalist union was to be comprised of two distinct alliances. On the one hand, it called for a “temporary alliance” in the “weak” and “backwards” colonies of Asia and Africa between the “toiling masses” and the immature “national bourgeois.” These two forces were instructed to join together in a “united front” against Western imperialism, carrying out what the Theses describe as a “bourgeois-democratic liberation movement.” On the other hand, the Theses also called for a “close alliance” between Soviet Russia and these national and colonial liberation movements. Since the world was divided into two diametrically opposing “camps”— the majority “oppressed” 6 V.I. Lenin, “Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” 1916, in Works (Moscow. Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960-70), 22:185-304. 7 V.I. Lenin, “Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Question for the Second Congress of the Communist International,” 26 July 1920, in Works, 31:146. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 109 and the minority “oppressors”— there was no salvation for dependent and weak nations without their union with the “proletariat in the advanced countries,” namely the Soviet Republics. In order to foster this union, the Theses called upon the Comintern to actively support movements of “national self-determination” amongst the “small and weak nations,” which both Lenin and Stalin interpreted to mean the right of the proletariat in all nations to secede and form their own independent states.8 At the same time, however, the Theses also warned against the excesses of “national egoism and national narrow-mindedness,” which were particularly strong amongst the backward and isolated nations of the world. It stressed this narrow nationalism would “disappear only after imperialism and capitalism have disappeared in the advanced countries, and after the entire foundation of the backward countries’ economic life has radically changed.”9 As a result, genuine equality among nations could only be achieved after the disappearance of the global web of international capitalism. In sum, one of the major contributions of Lenin to Marxist thought was the strategic and theoretical merging of the national question and colonial question. In his lectures on Leninism, Stalin underscored Lenin’ s contribution as transforming the national question “from a particular and internal state problem into a general and international problem, into a world problem of the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the dependent countries and colonies from the yoke of imperialism.”1 0 8 J.V. Stalin, “Concerning the Presentation of the National Question,” 8 May 1921, in Works (Moscow; Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953), 5:53. 9 Ibid.: 150. 1 0 J.V. Stalin, PnMerrs <fLeninism (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1976), 68. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1 1 0 The merger of these two (fatmctpm blenutks in Bolshevik discourse, and its subsequent introduction by Mating into the bourgeois-democratic national revolution of the GQP- KMT United Front, produced a latent tension between proletarian internationalism (ie. loyalty to class beyond national boundaries) and Chinese nationalism (ie. loyalty to nation before class boundaries), which I will argue played a significant role in the collapse of the United Front. As Maring was working closely with the CCP’ s new general secretary, Chen Duxiu, in Shanghai, several other COP members received a firsthand education in Bolshevism while visiting Moscow as a part of the Chinese delegation to the Comintern’ s Third Congress and the Congress of the Toilers of the East. In Moscow, Chinese delegates met personally with Lenin and other Comintern officials, who explained to them the importance of a revolutionary alliance between the bourgeois- democratic liberation movements of the small and weak nations and the advanced proletarian nations of the Soviet Republics. After returning to China, one of the delegation’ s leaders Zhang Tailei became Maring’ s chief interpreter/confidant, and along with Chen Duxiu, one of the CCP’ s leading advocates of Comintern’ s policy in China. Zhang also took the lead in popularizing the Comintern’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Question, translating the entire text in the January 1922 issue of the Communist Youth League’ s (CYL) mouthpiece Xiarfeng (Vangiard).1 1 1 1 Luk, The Origins c f Chinese Bolsheusm, 66; Also see Chang Kuo-tao, The Rise cfthe Chinese Carnmrnst Party, 1921-1927 (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 1971), 1:177-218. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. I l l The information brought back from Moscow by Zhang Tailei and others, in conjunction with the work done by Maring in China, produced a noticeable impact on the revolutionary programme of the COP. By the time the CCP held its Second National Party Congress in Shanghai during July 1922, both Bolshevik doctrine and the Comintern’ s new colonial policy were firmly entrenched within the Party’ s political platform. The Party’ s Second Congress embraced the need for a temporary, anti imperialist, anti-warlord alliance between the CCP and Sun Yat-sen’ s Nationalist Party, which was now described as one of the leading bourgeois parties in China. It also called for a close alliance between the “national liberation movement” (ninzugpringymdong) of China and the “vanguard of the entire world’ s proletarian class”- — the Comintern and Soviet Russia.1 2 Finally, a resolution passed by the Congress paved the way for the CCP to become a formal branch of Comintern, confirming the Communist International’s role as the chief financial and ideological fountainhead of the early communist movement in China.1 3 1 2 On the CCP’ s Second Party Congress see Saich, The Origins (ftheFirst United Front, 1:110-113; Saich, The Rise to Potter cfthe Chinese Corrmmst Party, 6-7 & 28-55; Luk, The Origins c f Chinese Bdshetism, 67- 73. 1 3 See “Zhongguo gongchandang jiaru disan guoji jueyi’ an” (Draft Proposal for the Entrance of the CCP into the Third Communist International), July 1922, in Minzu Werti WentianHuibian, 7.1921 • 9.1949 (Compilation cf Documents on the National Question, 7/1921-9/1949), comp. Zhonggong Zhongyang Tongzhanbu (Beijing, Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 9 (Hereafter cited as MZWT). In Chen Duxiu’s report before the CCP’ s Third Party Congress in June 1923, he admited that “virtually all the Party’ s finances, some 15,000 yuan, was received from the Comintern.” See Chen Duxiu, “Chen Duxiu tongzhi daibiao Zhonggong zhongyang xiang disanci daibiao huiyi de baogao” (Comrade Chen Duxiu’ s Report to the Third Party Congress on Behalf of the CCP’ s Central Executive Committee), June 1923, in ‘ Erda’h e‘ SankZloongsuo Ckmghandang Dier-sand Daibiao Dahui Ziliao X m n (Selected Documents from the CCP’ s Seeondand Third National Party Congrases), comp. Zhongguo gongchandang (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1985), 169 (Hereafter, EFIS). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 112 The CCP’ s Bdshedk Frontier Programme In addition to introducing Marxist theory on the national question into the Chinese political discourse, the CCP’ s Second Party Congress also produced a radical new frontier programme for dealing with the Republic’ s ethnic minorities. In keeping with the Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, the Congress’ s 1922 Manifesto stressed the importance of understanding the national question within the context of the global system of imperialism. The overlapping nature of colonial and national oppression ensured that the complete “national unity” (ninzu tongyi) and “national self- determination” (ninzu zijuty of the entire “Zhonghua nation” (Zhonghua ninzu) could be achieved only after the country’s ultimate victory over domestic warlordism and international imperialism. Furthermore, the Manifesto stressed that due to the disparate economic and ethnic composition of the Zhonghua nation, a different set of policies were required for “China proper” (Zhon^tobeM ) and its “frontier regions” (bumjiang). The lack of economic and ethnic differences among the people of China proper meant that the CCP should oppose all attempts at decentralization in this region, especially the then popular “federated provincial self-rule” (lianshengzizbi) movement advocated by the warlords and their bureaucrats.1 4 1 4 Discussions about the merits of the federated provincial self-rule movement were all the rage during the first three years of the 1920's. While the CCP attempted to paint the movement as a reactionary attempt by the warlords to consolidate their power. See, for example, Chen Duxiu, “Liansheng zizhi yu Zhongguo zhengxiang” (Federated Provincial Self-rule and China’ s Political Shape), Xiangkozhoubao 1 (September 1922): 2-4. The movement received widespread support from liberal intellectuals and politicians, such as Hu Shi and Tan Yankai, and was firmly rooted in the provincial self-government movement of the late Qrng Dynasty. See Prasenjit Duara, “Provincial Narratives of the Nation: Centralism and Federalism in Republican China,” in Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity, ed. Flarumi Befu (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), 9-35. A young Mao Zedong was also drawn to this movement in his native Hunan before being convinced by Cai R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 113 The varying conditions of the frontier region required, however, a different policy. The CCP’s 1922 Manifesto described the Mongols, Tibetans and Hui as “distinct rrim.iT iyizhang ninzu) with their own history and territory. The Manifesto also argued that the economic stage of development in the frontier regions differed from the rest of China. During the early years of the Republic, China proper had progressed from the stage of petty agricultural handicrafts onto the cusp of a capitalist productive system, while Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan remained stuck in a primitive state of pastoralism. As a result of this present economic and cultural gap, the forced, unnatural union of China proper with the frontier regions advocated by the Chinese warlords would only expand their power and system of oppression, benefiting neither the Han people nor the frontier minorities. The Manifesto concluded: Thus, the Chinese people should oppose both the federated provincial self- rule of the warlord separatists and their attempts to forge a grand union through armed might. Rather, we should first overthrow all the warlords, establishing a genuine democratic republic through a democratic unification of China proper, and at the same time, in accordance with the principles of different economies, we should prevent the expansion of warlord power, and respect the frontier peoples’ ability to decide for themselves, in order to facilitate the creation of an ‘autonomous federation’ (zizhi b a ng ) of Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan, so that they can re-unite [with China proper] to form a ‘ Zhonghua Federal Republic’ {Zhonghua lianbang gmghe g w o )— a genuine democratic unification.1 5 The establishment of this new, multi-ethnic Zhonghua Federation was viewed as a long term project, with the Congress’ twelve-point Resolution stating: “The realization of the Hesen that Lenin’s dictatorship of the proletariat was the best method for saving China. See James Leibold, “The Failed Experiment: Mao Zedong and the Hunan Self-government Movement, 1920,” unpublished paper, 1992. 1 5 “Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui xuanyuan” (The Manifesto of the CCP’ s Second National Congress), July 1922, MZWT, 17. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 114 complete unification of all parts of China can only occur when China is able to cast off the encroachment of world imperialism, overthrow the feudal system of the warlords and establish a genuine democratic country.”1 6 Thus, based on the necessity for a forward-looking, strategic approach to the national question in China, the CCP’ s new frontier programme, as listed in the seventh point of the Second National Congress’ 1922 Resolution, called for: 1) the elimination of internal chaos, the defeat of the warlords and the establishment of domestic peace; 2) the overthrow of international imperialist oppression in order to achieve the complete independence of the Zhonghua nation; 3) the unification of China proper (including the three northern provinces) and the establishment of a genuine democratic republic; 4) the establishment of “autonomy” (zizhi) in the three regions of Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan, creating a “democratic autonomous federation” (ninzhuzizhi b a n g ) - , 5) the unification of China proper with Mongolia, Tibet and Turkistan, in accordance with the principle of a “voluntary federal system” (ziyou lianbangzhi), to establish a Chinese Federal Republic.1 7 The CCP’ s Second National Congress did not, however, witness the introduction of Lenin’ s concept of “national self-determination” (ninzu zijue) into CCP discourse. Initially, at least, the Chinese Communists were reluctant to publicly acknowledge that China’ s frontier peoples were entided to national self - determination, particularly if, as Lenin insisted, the term included the right to frontier minorities to 1 6 “Guanyu guoji diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo he Zhongguo gongchandang de jueyi’an” (Draft Resolution Concerning International Imperialism, China and the Chinese Communist Part)), July 1922, MZW T, 8. 1 7 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 115 form their own independent states outside the political orb of the Zhonghua nation state. In fact, the Bolshevik concept of national self-determination did not become a regular part of the CCP’ s discourse until the following year. The first few issues of the CCP’ s newly established mouth-piece, Xiangho zhodxio (The Weekly Gtddi), described national self-determination as a tool of the imperialists rather than a weapon of the working class, with Cai Hesen arguing that the imperialists “often champion the slogan of seM-determination in order to weaken a country and advance their own self- interest.”1 8 In fact, the party’ s 1922 programme promised China’ s frontier peoples only “autonomy” (zizhi) and not the right of political secession. The temporary separation between the frontier and China proper was meant to be both cultural and economic but not political. It is important to note that the immediate goal of the Chinese bourgeois- democratic revolution, according to the Comintern’s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, was the complete independence or self-determination of the entire Zhonghua nation, which nearly all Chinese intellectuals agree comprised the entire population of the former Qing empire, and not the union of all workers beyond national boundaries. Following this logic, the CCP’ s 1922 frontier programme called for the liberation and unification of all Chinese peoples— including the frontier minorities— from the bonds of imperialism, and not their separation from the Zhonghua nation in the name of socialist brotherhood. The temporary autonomy of the frontier regions was seen as simply the best method for achieving this long-term goal. 1 8 Cai Hesen, “Zhongguo guoji diwei yu chengren suweiai eluosi” (China’ s International Position and Recognizing Soviet Russia), Xianglao zhoubao 3 (27 September 1922), 19. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 116 Yet, the growing involvement of Soviet Russia and the Comintern in the “socialist revolution” of Outer Mongolia precipitated a subtle, but important, shift within the CCP’ s frontier programme. National Sdf-detemimtion & The “ Mongolian Question” The formal introduction of Lenin’ s policy of national self-determination occurred within the political context of the “Mongolian question” (Menggi mnti). Since declaring its independence from the Qing dynasty in 1912, both Russia and China had been struggling to assert political authority over the strategic Mongolian steppe. The scales of this struggle finally tipped in balance to Russia, when the Red Army marched into Urga in July 1921. The subsequent creation of an independent, pro-Moscow People’ s Republic of Outer Mongolia (MPR) transformed the Mongolian question into one of the most important political issues in China— an issue which has been largely overlooked in Western accounts of the early Republican period. While Chinese intellectuals paid close attention to English meddling in Tibet and Japanese encroachment upon Manchuria, it was the triangular relationship between Soviet Russia, Outer Mongolia and China that captivated the attention and concern of the Chinese intellegensia. The problem of Russian encroachment first exploded onto the stage of Chinese public opinion during the winter of 1912-1913; when it was revealed that Outer Mongolia and Tsarist Russia had signed a secret agreement in which Russia promised to protect Mongolia from Chinese invasion in exchange for the granting of special trading privileges on the Mongolian steppe. Telegrams from every major city in China flooded R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 117 into the offices of Yuan Shikai’ s Beijing Government demanding an immediate declaration of war on Mongolia and the dispatch of a military expedition to regain Chinese sovereignty over the region, even at the risk of provoking war with Russia. The Guangdong provincial government, under Hu Hanmin, established a special bureau to solicit contributions to the war effort and equip a division of the region’ s men to fight in Mongolia. The Hunan provincial government offered to grant Beijing nearly one million yuan as soon as Yuan Shikai declared war on the Mongolian separatists, while overseas Chinese in Singapore remitted 20,000 yuan in support of the war cause. Throughout the winter, massive public demonstrations were held in major cities from Sichuan to Hubei, with patriotic subscription campaigns launched to raise money for the war effort. Anti-Russian boycotts were also launched in Beijing and Qingdao, while “Societies for the Saving of Mongolia” {shouMen$nd) were established throughout most provinces.1 9 The chief political strategist for the newly formed Nationalist Party, Song Jiaoren, personally assisted in the establishment of a Hunan branch in January 1913, declaring in his speech before the organization’ s opening ceremony that it was the responsibility of all members to encourage the use of force to “regain our territory and awe the Russian’ s with our [military] might.”2 0 1 9 On the anti-Russian, anti-Mongolian independence movement of the •winter of 1912-13 see Michel N. Pavlovsky, Chinese-RussianRelations (New York; Philosophical Library, 1949), 50-54; Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shi-kai• L iherdismard Dictatorship in early RepiMiam China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), 182-3; Li Yushu, “Minguo chunian de Waimenggu wenti” (Problem of Outer Mongolia during the Early Republican Period), in M errggp Yargiu {Research cnManglid), ed. Guang Lu (Taipei: Zhongguo bianjiang shiyuwen xuehui chuban, 1968), 42-50. 2 0 Song Jiaoren, “Hunan shou Menghui chengli dahui yanshuici” (Speech at the Ceremony for the Establishment of the Hunan Save Mongolia Society), 11 January 1913, in SongjiaormJi {Collected Works cf Song Jiaoren), ed. and comp. Chen Xulu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 449-50. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 118 In a remarkable foreshadowing of events to come nearly a decade later, Nationalist Party intellectuals wrote essays violently condemning Tsarist Russian imperialism in Outer Mongolia. Many of these individuals later became leading Kuomintang critics of the Red Army's occupation of Outer Mongolia during the 1920s. Daijitao, the twenty-one year old secretary of Sun Yat-sen and editor of the extremely popular Shanghai magazine, Minquanbao { P eop l e’ s Rights Magazine) provides a fine example. Throughout 1912-13, Dai wrote a series of essays denouncing Russian, Japanese and English encroachment upon the Chinese frontier. Following publication of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, Dai published a series of essays under the title “Attack Mongolia and Resist Russia” in Minquanbao. Dai concluded in one essay by arguing: In sum, the sooner we attack Mongolia, the quicker we eliminate today’ s trouble; and the longer we wait without attacking the more we prolong our suffering. The policy of attacking Mongolia is a good method for resisting Russia. It is the only course of action for consolidating the Zhonghua Republic and the central crux of the survival of the Han ninzu.2 1 In response to a question from an American reporter about the apparent contradiction between the new Republic’ s imperialist attitude towards Mongolia and their vilification of foreign encroachment in China, the future Foreign minister of the Kuomintang’ s Nanjing Government, GC. Wu pointed out that other great republics had acted in a similar fashion during their infancy. “France at the beginning of her existence as a republic crushed the revolt in Vendee,” Wu stated, “and the United States fought a bloody civil war in order that the number of stars in their flag might not be 2 1 Daijitao, “ZhengMeng yu juE” (Attack Mongolia and Resist Russia), 19 October - 3 November 1912,in D dJitaoXinhai Wenji• 1909-1913 [Collected E ssa)s cfD ai Jitao in the Period cftlx RepiMimn Revolution: 1909-1913), comp. Sang Bing et. al. (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1991), 2:1252. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 119 diminished.”2 2 G C Wu could see no difference between the United States’ attempt to maintain the stars of the southern states within their national flag and China’ s struggle to retain the rightful place of the blue strip of Mongolia on the Zhonghua Republic’ s five-color flag. Chiang Kai-shek, then a twenty four year old regimental commander in Chen Qimei’ s Shanghai army, was publishing a magazine called Jumheng (Military Vokg) while in political exile in Tokyo during late 1912. At the time of the Mongolian crisis, Chiang published several articles calling for a “blood-and-iron policy” (tiexuezhuyi) to deal with Russian and British encroachment on China’ s frontier. In an essay titled “The Fundamental Solution of the Mongolian and Tibetan Problem,” Chiang wrote: “Internally, the Mongolian and Tibetan revolts over the last couple of year have been enough to hinder the progression of the Republic and disturb the public order, externally, they have been enough to draw the attention of the evil intending foreign powers and foment the dismemberment of China, causing even women and children to realize that we need to quickly put down these revolts.”2 3 Chiang rebukes those Chinese lawmakers who have attempted to appease Russia and England, causing some individuals to even tacitly approve of Mongolia and Tibet as autonomous and independent countries. “Now is the time to rouse ourselves,” Chiang wrote, “wiping off our agile means, adopting a plan for a thunderbolt of activity and choosing a policy for 2 2 Qted in Pavlovsky, Chmese-Rmian Relations, 52. 2 3 Chiang Kai-shek, “MengZang wenti zhi genben jiejue” (Fundamental Solution to the Mongolian and Tibetan Problem), Winter 1912, in Jiang Weiyuanzhang Qrnrtji (Cm fiete Works rfChdm un Chiang), ed. Shen Fenggang (Shanghai: Shanghai guotai shuju, 1937), 3:12. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 120 the ‘ suppression’ (jiaqfu) of these rebellions. If we are not able to successfully put down this frontier trouble and restore order, it will spread and cause the rebels to band together, leading to the ruin of Tibet and Mongolia at the hands of the rebels, and a disastrous carving up of China.”2 4 Finally, in the ultimate twist of irony, it was Sun Yat-sen, a life-long champion of a non-violent policy of evolutionary assimilation to solve the national question, who wrote one of the most jingoistic proclamations of the entire 1912-13 anti-Russian movement. In a 3 December 1912 telegram sent from Sun’s office in Shanghai to Yuan Shikai, the State Council, provincial governors and the offices of all national newspapers, Sim Yat-sen declared that “extraordinary events require extraordinary measures.” The Russian invasion of Mongolia, Sun claimed, was a result of China’ s financial crisis and unsetded state of affairs. To rectify the situation, Sun called for the outlawing of gold and silver coins and the printing of enough paper money by the government to pay for a massive military expedition of, if necessary, ten million Chinese soldiers against Mongolia and Russia. The very existence of the Chinese nation, Sun concluded, hung in the balance: The Republic has already existed for a year, but the foreign powers are raising obstacles and not one of them is willing to take the lead in formally recognizing us. Yet, when Mongolia became independent and Russia took the lead in recognizing it, the various nations did not create any obstructions. Doesn’ t this suggest the prospect of our country being partitioned? Rather than bowing our heads and accepting partition, why not choose the wiser course of rousing ourselves to defeat the powerful Russians in a single battle and thus consolidate for future generations the foundation of our nation? Furthermore, national morale is now high, and the body politic is new. There 2 4 Ibid., 13. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 121 is a road by which we can fight and win. To not fight will bring us certain extinction. We do not need the wisdom of a sage to know which is the better course. Applying simple common sense, we see that, at present, both fighting and not fighting will lead to our extinction. So, rather than perishing by prostrating ourselves before a strong and tyrannical power, why not die as martyrs for humanity and justice? If, on the other hand, we survive the war, then we will win greater glory for our nation by defending humanity and promoting justice before the whole world. I hope that my government and people will take up their duty without hesitation and boldly adopt extraordinary measures to meet the emergency.2 5 In sum, the Mongolian crisis of 1912-13 had transformed the “frontier problem” Qxanjiang'mti) from the rather narrow domain of government policy into the realm of public discourse in China. The entire nation’ s wellbeing and territorial integrity became an important concern for each citizen of the nation-state, particularly the intelligentsia who saw themselves as the inheritors of the Mandarin’ s responsibilities towards the state. The nation-state was now a physical embodiment of its people, and the duty of shepherding the backward minority people transferred from the emperor to Han intellectuals. 2 5 Sun Yat-sen, “Changyi qianbi geming duikang ShaE yinlue tongbao” (Telegram Appealing for a Monetary Revolution to Counter the Invasion of Tsarist Russia), 3 December 1912, in SZSQf, 2: 549. The translation has been adapted from Wei, Myers and Gillian, eds., Pmaiptions far Sating China, 111-17. In this same telegram, Sun put forth one of the most bizarre military strategies for defeating Tsarist Russia. Foreshadowing Mao Zedong’ s faith in the size and not quality of China’s military might, Sun wrote: “Today, Russia has one million regular troops and five million frontline combat troops. At the present time, we have 500,000 troops in training and innumerable militiamen. Judging from the current situation in Russia, the Russians will definitely be unable to dispatch as many as 500,000 troops within the space of six months, but we will be able to send 500,000 troops to Outer Mongolia and northern Manchuria during the same period. After another six months, we can add another 500,000 newly trained troops. Fighting Russia with this troop level means that the outcome of the war during the first year will be unpredictable, but during the second year we will be able to dispatch two million troops and probably be able to drive Russia from Manchuria and Mongolia and recapture the invaded territory of Yanhai county in Heilongjiang. But in case we still suffer defeat, then during the third year we will dispatch four million troops. And if we still cannot gain the advantage, then during the fourth year we will dispatch six million and definitely win a victory. Meanwhile, the Russians will unquestionably experience a financial crisis and a revolutionary uprising. These will give us a great many opportunities to move against them. If they still do not surrender, then we will prepare for a massive strike during the fifth year, when we will definitely field eight or ten million troops and advance straight to Moscow or Saint Petersburg without stopping.” R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 122 The Red Army’s 1921 occupation of Urga rekindled Chinese fears about a possible Russian annexation of the Mongolian steppe. While Soviet Russia claimed to be assisting the “Mongolian People’ s Revolutionary Party” (MPRP) in eliminating White Russian hegemony from the region, Moscow accepted the “request” of the MPRP for the Red Army to remain in Urga until the military situation could be stabilized. The Soviet occupation of Outer Mongolia became an immediate source of friction between the new Bolshevik government and the Chinese warlord government in Beijing. In fact, the “Mongolian question” served as the central sticking point preventing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two governments. During the early 1920's Moscow dispatched two successive high-level missions to Beijing in the hope of convincing the Chinese to transfer their diplomatic recognition from the Kerensky Government to that of the Bolsheviks. Yet, due largely to differing opinions over the Mongolian question, each mission ended in failure. The first representative, Ignatii lurin, left Beijing in August 1921 after failing to convince the Beijing government to recognize the continued validity of the 1915 Kyakhta Treaty, in which China agreed to recognize the “autonomy” (zizhi) of Outer Mongolia in exchange for Russian recognition of Chinese “suzerainty” (zangzbuquar}) over Mongolian territory. Chinese officials demanded nothing less than the complete return of the region to Chinese sovereignty, stressing that the 1919 Karakhan Declaration issued by the Bolshevik Government promised to revoke all unequal Tsarist treaties imposed on China. The next representative, Aleksandr Paikes, slipped out of Beijing under the cover of darkness in May 1922 when the Chinese Foreign Ministry received final verification of a R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 123 secret November 1921 Russo-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, whose existence Paikes repeatedly denied in public. With the arrival of Moscow’s third representative, Adolf Joffe, in August 1922, the Russians turned to the Chinese Communists for assistance in altering Chinese public opinion. Under Maring’s guidance and Comintern funding, the CCP launched a Shanghai-based weekly magazine, The Weekly Guide (Xiangdao zhoubao), in September to assist in this cause.2 6 In addition to publishing articles supporting Joffe’ s new proposals for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, Xiangdao attacked the sticky question of Outer Mongolia head on, coming out publicly in its third issue in favor of Outer Mongolian independence. One of Xiangiads editors, Gao Junyu, began his 27 September 1922 essay in an unprecedented tone of fa it acconpli: “Mongolian independence has already been a fact for two years.” Like the CCP’ s Second Congress Manifesto, Gao stressed that “both economically and culturally speaking Mongolia is obviously different from China,” comprising a separate ninzu. But he pushed this logic a step further by stating: We know that political organization is determined by economic form. To place the more backward Mongolia under the comparatively more advanced Chinese political control would not suit the needs of the Mongolian people. China’ s political and economic system would serve as a high-handed force towards Mongolia. Mongolia’ s economic form has determined its success in establishing a politically independent position [vis-a-vie China].2 7 2 6 Elleman, Diplomacy and Deception, 204-206. According to Elleman, Mating “held unchallenged authority over the contents” of Xiangko, proofing every article that appeared. See Bruce Elleman, “Soviet Policy on Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal <fAsian History 28.2 (1994), 115. 2 7 Gao Juyu, “Guoren duiyu Menggu wenti ying chi de taidui” (What the Attitude of our Country’ s People Should be Towards the Mongolian Question), Xiangho zhoubao 3 (27 September 1922), 19. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 124 The remainder of Gao’ s article advances two additional reasons why the Chinese should support Mongolian independence. First, the several hundred years of oppression suffered by the Mongolian people as an inferior “vassal state” (fanshi) of the Ming and Qing dynasties had engendered a deep sense of resentment towards their Chinese overlords. If China attempted to use force to regain control of Mongolia, Gao predicted, the already strained state of relations between the two peoples would be damaged beyond repair. Second, Gao argued that with China currently weakened under the pressure of international capitalism and domestic warlordism, it would be impossible for her to guarantee Mongolia’ s own safety. Rather than attempting to re-conquer the Mongolians, he urges the Chinese masses to follow their lead in liberating themselves, deliberately warning his complacent readers that “they [the Mongols] are rushing ahead of us.” Gao’s essay ends with a positive hint of things to come, underlining the belief among most Chinese Communists that the policy of Outer Mongolian independence was the most effective stratagem for an eventual reunion of a completely liberated, multi-ethnic Zhonghua nation: “We have faith that in the end China and Mongolia will merge together; however, in order to realize this union, at the very least, China must itself have the power to overthrow warlordism, repel international imperialism and establish a genuine republican state.”2 8 2 8 Ibid., 20. With regards to overcoming the sticky “Mongolian question” which had stalled negotiations between Moscow and Beijing over the resumption of diplomatic relations, Gao suggested the “independent and equal participation” of Mongolian delegates in a tripartite conference to determine once and for all Mongolia’ s relationship with both China and Russia. To the Beijing officials and many other Chinese intellectuals, talk of a tripartite conference seemed reminiscent of the 1915 Conference forced on the China by the Tsarist officials, yet another example of a growing list of similarities between the actions of Soviet Russia and their Tsarist predecessors. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 125 To underscore the progressive nature of Mongolian independence and demonstrate the capacity of the Mongolian people for self-rule, the CCP published two long essays by Mongolian leaders in support of their own political independence. In October 1922, Xiangko reprinted the entire report of the MPR’ s new premier, Bodoo Dogsomiin, before the Congress of the Toilers of the East, while the CYL’ s Qian/eng (Vangiord) published a glowing report on Mongolian independence written by an Inner Mongolian prince who attended the First National Congress of the Mongolian People’ s Revolutionary Party. Both essays stressed the sincere desire of the Mongolian masses to determine their own political future independent from the interference of the Chinese warlords and foreign imperialists, and the marvelous social advancements accomplished with Soviet aid since 1921.2 9 Guided byMaring, the CCP used Lenin’s principle of national self- determination to justify the need for Outer Mongolia’ s temporary independence from feudal China. During his report before the Comintern’ s Fourth Congress in late 1922, Chen Duxiu formally committed the CCP to the support of Outer Mongolian independence and the propagation of its appropriateness among all China’ s revolutionary parties .3 0 While attending the Congress in Moscow, Chen drafted a new 2 9 Deng Debu [Bodoo Dogsomiin], “Menggu ji qi jiefang yundong” (Mongolia and its Liberation Movement), Xianglao zhoubao 5 & 7 (11 October 1922 & 25 October 1922): 43-44 & 57-59; De Fu, “Wai Menggu duli xianzhuang” (The Qirrent Situation of Mongolian Independence), Qiarfeng 1.3 (February 1924): 49-59. 3 0 Chen Duxiu, “Zhonggong zhongyang shrweihui shuji Chen Duxiu gei gongchan guoji de baogao” (Report of CCP Central Executive Committee Secretary Chen Duxiu to the Comintern), 30 June 1922, in MZWT, 6 .1 question the listed date of this document; I find it highly unlikely that Chen’ s report to the Fourth Comintern Congress, which did not meet until late November, was written during the middle of the CCP’ s 2nd Party Congress. More likely, it appears that it was written after Chen’ s arrival in Moscow. It is also interesting to note that this controversial document is not included in any of Chen R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 126 political programme with the assistance of Comintern officials. In this new programme, the Party stressed the need to actively assist small and weak nations in seeking national self-determination from Chinese hegemony: According to the laws governing the organization of the state, ninzus that represent different levels of economic development, different histories and different languages can at best adopt only a voluntary federated system; it is very difficult to appropriately utilize a centralized political system. According to the reality of the present political situation in China, we must respect the quest for national self-determination [ninzu zijue), and not compel peoples of different historical and economic development and different language and ninzu to share in our imperialist exploitation and militarist oppression. On these grounds, we must not only recognize the independence of Mongolia in principle, but also render them active support in their effort to destroy the special privileges of the nobility and the lamas, and to lay the economic and cultural foundation for the independence of the Mongolian people.3 1 Finally, at the urging of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists attempted to persuade their United Front partners, the Nationalist Party, to follow suit and formally recognize Outer Mongolian independence. In a 23 January 1923 four-point joint declaration signed between Adolf Joffe and Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang only publicly committed themselves to the status quo in Outer Mongolia, by declaring that the party “does not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China.”3 2 Later in the year, however, Chen Duxiu, in the name of the CCP, issued a written plea to Sun Yat-sen requesting the Kuomintang’ s Duxiu’ s collected works. 3 1 Chen Duxiu, “Zhongguo gongchandang duiyu muqian shiji wenti zhi shihua” (The Immediate Tactics of the CCP), November 1922, in ChenDuxiu Zhuzwxmn (Selected Writing <f Chen Dux iii), eds. Ren Jianshu et al. (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1993), 2:422-27 (Hereafter cited as CZZX). My translation has been adapted from Saich, The Rise to Potter cfthe Chinese Convmrast Party, 55-60. 3 2 “ Joint Statement by Sun Yat-sen and Adolf Joffe on Soviet-Chinese Relations,” 26 January 1923, m Soiiet Documents on Foreign Polity: Vdune 1,1917-1924, ed. Jane Degras (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 371. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 127 leader to go a step further and officially recognize Outer Mongolian political independence. Sun, however, prompdy rejected the proposal with a formal rebuke of Chen.3 3 The Manifesto and Party Programme of the GCP’s Third National Congress, which met in Guangzhou in June 1923, marked the final metamorphosis of the party’s frontier programme from its initial nationalist undertone to a trenchant internationalist focus. All mention of the establishment of a unified Zhonghua Federated Republic between China proper and its frontier regions was replaced with an insistence that the relationship between Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and other frontier regions and the central provinces should be guided by the principle of “national self-determination” (ninzu z i j u e ? ) which, as the party’s policy towards Outer Mongolia now demonstrated, included the right of political secession. The documents also highlighted the inherent weakness of China’ s proletariat class, and underscored the importance of a revolutionary alliance with the working classes of the world in the pursuit of a truly global anti-imperialist united front.3 4 Bruce Elleman, the only Western scholar to closely examine the GCP’s support of Mongolian independence, contends that the CCP begrudgingly agreed to support Russian objectives in Mongolia only after a good deal of arm-twisting by the Comintern and the conclusion of a “secret CCP-Comintern arrangement” promising that “Outer 3 3 Zou, Zlx/ngsuo Guammdang Shigio, 636n9. 3 4 “Zhongguo gongchandang danggang caoan” (The OCP’s Draft Party Programme), June 1923, in EHS, 174-81; “Zhongguo gongchandang disanci quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” (Manifesto of the CCP’ s Third National Party Congress), June 1923, in EHS, 174-81. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 128 Mongolia would be returned to China after the success of the communist revolution.”3 5 Elleman’ s assertion appears to correlate with my evidence; however, I would argue that he underestimates the natural predilection among many early CCP leaders towards Mongolian seb-determination. The initial appeal of Marxism for Chen Duxiu, Li Da, Zhang Guotao and others was rooted in their frustration with China’ s cultural backwardness and the firm belief that Marxist internationalism, that is an emphasis on class loyalties over national ties, represented the only path towards salvation for the Chinese people. This point is stressed repeatedly in the pages of Xmqvngnian (New Youth) during the early 1920s. Li Da, among others, echoed the famous Marxian datum that “workers have no fatherland,” stressing that “even if the nation disappears, the workers have nothing to lose but their chains,” while Chen Duxiu argued that “both China’ s reconstruction and survival depends largely on assistance from the international socialist movement.”3 6 This cosmopolitan Wel t an s c hauung, I would argue, was central to the CCP’ s early rationalization of Outer Mongolian independence. In a November 1922 Xiangdao article, for example, Zhang Guotao stated that since the oppressed masses of Mongolia were encircled on three sides by the Chinese warlords, White Russian bandits and Japanese imperialists, it was only natural for them to seek an intimate military and economic alliance with Soviet Russia— its friendly northern neighbor described by 3 5 Elleman, Diplomacy and Deception, 205-6. 3 6 See Li Da, “Makesi huanyuan” (Fulfilling Marx’s Promise), Xinqmguan 8.5 (1 January 1921): 4; Chen Duxiu, “Shehuizhuyi piping-zai Guangdong gongli fazheng xuexiao yanjiang” (Criticism of Socialism-a Lecture at Guangzhou Public Law and Government School), Xtnqingrian 9.3 (1 July 1921): 13. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 129 Zhang as the “fatherland of all proletarians and the central barracks for the liberation of the entire world’ s oppressed people.”3 7 In Europe, where attacks on the CCP’ s support for Mongolian independence were particularly vocal, Zhou Enlai warned against the abuses of “narrow patriotism” (xiayi de ^ ia z h u y ), arguing that at the very least this type of parochial sentiment would lead to fascism or possibly support for the evil intentions of imperialism.3 8 Finally, Chen Duxiu went so far as to claim that the very concept of “patriotic thought” (aigto sixian^ was without basis in Chinese civilization— a cultural tradition that he argued contained only the concept of “universe” (tiarvcia) and not one of the state. Patriotism in China, Chen concluded, was simply a tool used by the government to oppress its own people and fleece them of their resources.3 9 It was bold statements like these that left the Chinese Communists vulnerable to attacks on their “patriotic credentials” among their opponents. In sum, the sharply disparate opinions engendered by the Mongolian question became a particular source of tension within the CCP-KMT United Front. As a branch of the Comintern and a close ally of the Soviet Union, the CCP had to not only accept but also actively support Outer Mongolian political independence in the name of 3 7 Zhang Guotao, “Haishi zanzhu xin Menggu bai” (Support for New Mongolia Unexpectedly Stops), Xiangbozhouhao 8 (2 November 1922): 68. 3 8 Zhou Enlai, “Jingguo yundong yu aiguo zhuyi” (The Movement to Save the Country and Patriotism), 1 March 1924, in ZhouEriai Zaoqi Wenji (1912/10 - 1924/6) (Early Writing cfZlxm Enlai 10/1912 - 6/1924), ed. Liu Sen (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 1993), 2:454. Zhou was aiming his attacks chiefly at Zeng Qi’ s Young China Party (YCP). Zeng Qi and Zhou Enlai were locked in a bitter ideological struggle to win the support of the Chinese students participating on the work/study program in Europe. For more information on this struggle; see Marilyn Levine, The Found Generation: Chime Conmmst in Eumpe during the Twentie (Seatde: University of Washington Press, 1993). 3 9 Chen Duxiu, “Women jiujing yingdang bu yingdang aiguo?” (Should or Should we Not be Patriotic?), 8 June 1919, in CZZX, 2 :22-24. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 130 revolutionary discipline and proletarian internationalism. At the same time, however, the Comintern backed United Front was predicated on the belief that the revolutionary situation in China was ripe for a bourgeois- national liberation movement and not an international socialist revolution. To many Kuomintang members, the contradiction between Russia’ s simultaneous support for the Chinese national liberation and the attempts of Chinese frontier peoples, like Outer Mongolia, to break with the Zhonghua nation seemed to expose Soviet Russia’ s evil intentions in China and the similarity of their policies to those of their Tsarist predecessors and all other imperialist powers. It is one of the central arguments of this chapter that CCP support for Mongolian national s elf-determination and the continued Red Army occupation of Urga in the name of socialist brotherhood placed the Chinese Communists in an inherently vulnerable position within the CCP-KMT United Front, whose stated aim was the patriotic struggle for China’ s national liberation. How could the Communists, many patriotic Chinese intellectuals repeatedly asked themselves, claim to be working for the national liberation of the entire Zhonghua nation while supporting Russia’ s attempts to tear the Mongolian people from the bosom of the nation? I will argue that the CCP’ s acceptance of Russian leadership on the Mongolian question played a significant, and as yet unrecognized, role in the downfall of the first United Front between the Communists and the Nationalists. In the past, the importance of the Mongolian question in the history of the United Front has been largely, if not completely, overlooked by both Chinese and Anglo-speaking scholars. Most scholarship has blamed the disintegration of the United Front on either the ideologically irreconcilable stance of R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 131 both parties on the land and labor questions, or the personal power struggles between Chiang Kai-shek and the Comintern in China and Stalin and Trotsky in Russia.4 0 In addition to these factors, however, the two parties also adopted radically different strategies for dealing with the frontier question— differences, which once placed within the concrete context of the Mongolian self-determination issue, added additional pressure to an already strained CCP-KMT relationship. The Anti-Red Movement & the S trugfe to Interpret S m Yat-sen s L egtcy Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in March 1925, the subterranean fissures within the OCP-Kuomintang United Front erupted into open cracks of discontent. A more conservatively inclined segment of the Kuomintang joined forces with the growing anticommunist sentiment among mainly liberal, western-educated intellectuals in an “anti-red movement” (fanchiyundot,g) which, among other things, called into question the patriotism of the Chinese Communists. The leading factions within this anti-red coalition were the “Kuomintang rightwing” lead by Daijitao; the “Western Hill clique” (Xkhanhdytpat) centered around old Tongmenghui members like Zou Lu, Xis Chi, Shao Yuanchong and others; and the “Young China Party” (Zbonggto Q ngm nkn^ (YCP) of Zeng Qi. Despite their different political agendas, all three groups joined together in a common defense of Sun Yat-sen’ s nationalist legacy, calling for a defense 4 0 See, for example G Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-28 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); C Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries cf Resolution: Scuiet A dzisets and Nationalist China, 1920-1927 (Cambridge, M A Harvard University Press, 1989); Harold Isaacs, The Tragdyofthe Chinese Revolution, 2d rev. ed. (New York Atheneum, 1966); Saich, Toe Rise to Poser cfthe Chinese Conm m st Party, Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Comrmnismand the Rise cfMao (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1951), 46-85; Li Liangyu et. al, Xinbian Zhonguo Tonghi (Neidy Edited Concise History ( f China) (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1996), 4: 53-73; Miao Jianyan, ed., Zhonggto Gtmindang Shi, 1894-1988 {History cfthe Nationalist Party, 1894-1988) (Xi’ an: Xi’ an jiaotong daxue R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 132 of Chinese national unity against what they perceived to be the bastardization of the Chinese revolution in the hands of the Chinese Communists and their masters in Moscow. In conjunction with their opposition to the CCP’s reading of Sun’ s principles of rrmhengzhuyi and nimhuzhuyi, the anti-red coalition directed the public’ s attention towards what they claimed was the CCP’s perfidious frontier policy and their apostate interpretation of Sun’s principle of nimuzhujL As Sun Yat-sen’ s long-time personal secretary, Daijitao felt obligated to clarify the true meaning of his master’ s Three People’ s Principles in the face of what he saw as Communist distortions. During the summer of 1925, Dai set forth a culturalistic interpretation of Sun’s philosophy in two privately financed pamphlets, The Philosophical Foundations cfSm Yat-serdsm (SimrWTzhuyi zhi Zhexue de Jidtu) and The National Reudution and the Chinese Kmrintang (G w nin Geningyu Zhonggto Guammdani g ). He argued that Sun’ s Three People’ s Principles represented the culmination of China’ s orthodox Confucian tradition by calling for a restoration of the time honored values of “knowledge” (zhi), “benevolent love” (renai), “courage” (y o « g ) and “decisiveness” (juexih). Sun recognized that the only path towards the elimination of imperialist oppression and a restoration of China’ s rightful place as a world leader was through a revival of its national self- confidence. Finally, Dai stressed that Sun Yat-sen believed in a revolution that would unite all the nation’s classes and peoples, rather than the divisive class and ethnic warfare advocated by the Communists.4 1 chubanshe, 1990), 119-205. 4 1 On Dai Jitao’ s political ideology see Herman Mast III and William G. Saywell, “Revolution Out of Tradition: The Political Ideology of Tai Chi-t’ao,” Journal c f Asian Studies 34.1 (November 1974): 73-98 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 133 Inspired by Dai Jitao’ s culturalist interpretation of Sun’ s legacy, a group of fiercely anticommunist Kuomintang members left Guangzhou after Sun’ s death and gathered in Beijing, where in November 1925 they convened a rump 4th Plenum of the Kuomintang Central Committee in the Western Hills suburb of the city. Despite the fact that the conference was attended by less then twenty Kuomintang members, it issued orders expelling the Chinese Communists from the Party, terminating Borodin’s service as adviser, ending the Party’ s alliance with the Soviet Union and abolishing Wangjingwei’ s so-called “leftist dictatorship” over the Kuomintang. Daijitao initially flirted with the group, but then publicly disavowed any association with the clique after their censure (and the expulsion of its leaders Zou Lu and Xis Chi from the Party) at the Kuomintang’ s Second National Congress held in Guangzhou in January 1926.4 2 Following the establishment of the CCP and the growing influence of the Comintern among both Chinese Communists and left-leaning Nationalists, many ideologically agnostic participants in the May Fourth Movement began joining anti-red organizations in the hope of preventing what they saw as the selling out of the Zhonghua nation. One of the most prominent of these groups was the Young China Party that was secretly founded in Paris by Zeng Qi on 2 December 1923. The YCP grew out of a split between left and right factions of the most prominent May Fourth social organization, the Young China Association. After developing a loyal following and Hoston, The State, Identity, and the National Question, 211-14. 4 2 On the Western Hills faction and Dai Jitao’ s relationship with this group see Guo Xuyin, GucmndangPaixi DouzhengShi {History cfFactionalism in the Kuanntan^ (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1992), 1-40. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 134 among Chinese worker-students in Europe, Zeng returned to Shanghai in September 1924 and launched the extremely popular periodical X inghi (Aw ikem ngLim Weekij). The YCP’ s mouthpiece espoused a brand of ultra- nationalism deeply rooted in French fascism and social Darwinian thought, and called for “the elimination, internally, of national traitors and the resistance, externally, of foreign imperialism.” In order to distinguish their brand of ultra-nationalism from Sun Yat-sen’ s more modest principle of rmzuzhuyi (nationalism) and the heretic Communist doctrine of gtcjizhuyi (internationalism), the YCP coined the term gucjiazhuyi (state-ism).4 3 As discussed in the first chapter, Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse on nirzuzhuyi underwent several re-interpretations throughout the course of his life, leaving a shroud of ambiguity and engendering several disparate readings of the term following his death in 1925. Depending on whether one drew primarily on Sun’ s early discussions of ninzu, the formal definition contained in the Manifesto of the KMT’ s Reorganization Congress or Sun’ s 1924 lectures on the Three Peoples Principles, his disciples could gather enough evidence to support a number of radically different interpretations of the principle. In his 1925 pamphlets, Daijitao stressed the social evolutionary framework of Sun’ s principle of ninzuzhuyL Dai contended that, from the days of the Tongmenghui, 4 3 On Zeng Qi and the YCP see Marilyn Levine, “Zeng Qi and the Frozen Revolution,” in Roads not Takers the S truve c f Opposition Parties in Tmntieth-Century China, ed. Roger Jeans (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 225-40; Chan Lau Kit-ching, The Chinese Youth Party, 1923-1945 (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 1972). Chan states that the circulation of Xinghi was an amazing 10,000 copies per issue in 1925. On the relationship of the Young China Association to the YCP see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modem China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 252-53. It is interesting to note that the two leading intellectual forces in the sinicization of Marxist thought in China, Mao Zedong and Li Dazhao, were both prominent members of the highly nationalistic Young R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 135 Sun had advocated a type of “cultural nationalism” {wnhua zhi ninzuzhuy ? ) with benevolence as its foundation, civil rights as its method and the people’ s livelihood as its goal. Sun’ s brand of nationalism, Dai contended, had always been opposed to the narrow “racial revolution” (zhongu gening advocated by Yuan Shikai, Zhang Binglin and others.4 4 Quoting from Sun’s 1924 lectures, Dai argued that the goal of ninzuzhuyi was the revival of China’ s international status and the “fostering and guiding” (ficzhi), not national self-determination, of all “small and weak ninzvT {macho ninzu) in their struggle against global imperialism. Furthermore, Sun believed that since the Zhon^yua ninzu was one of the world’s oldest nations/races and had made a large contribution to world civilization, its 400 million people had a “heavenly responsibility” (tianzhi) to guide its neighboring small and weak ninzu towards a single “grand harmony” { d c G a n ^ based on China’ s moral example.4 5 The Manifesto of the first Western Hills Conference took this Darwinian interpretation a step further, arguing that amongst the world’ s oppressed peoples only China represented a “weak but large ninzu (ntoda ninzu), which was endowed with what Sun called a “Heavenly Way” {wtnglad) culture. Sun Yat-sen’ s ninzuzhuyi advocated, the Manifesto stated, first the “fusion” (von$e) of all Chinese peoples into a single Zhon^jua ninzu, and then, based on the effervescent Heavenly Way culture, the China Association. 4 4 Dai Jitao, “Guomin geming yu Zhongguo guomingdang” (The national revolution and the Chinese Kuomintang), July 1925, in Gucfit SixiangL m w iji {CollectedEssays on the National Father's 7hou$>£), ed. and comp. Zhonghua minguo gejie jinian guofu bainian danzhen shoupei weiyuanhui et. al. (Taipei: Zhonghua minguo gejie jinian guofu bainian danzhen shoubei weiyuanhui, 1965), 3:1184-5 (Hereafter cited as GFWJ). 4 5 Dai Jitao, Sun Wen zbuyi zh i Zkxue ck Ji chu { , Phi l os ophi cal Foundat i ons c f Sun Y a t-se risn 1925 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 136 befriending of “small and weak rrinzii' (r u c o c ia o ninzu) so that they could be guided towards a Chinese-centered Datong (Grand Harmony)4 6 In a series of lectures given in 1926, Western Hills member Shao Yuanchong outlined the central aspects of ninzuzhuyi as: 1) the complete national independence and freedom of China; 2) the development of a “new Zhon^tua ninzu culture”; and 3) the harmonious unity and fusion of all Chinese ninzu into a “new Zhonghua nation/race” (Zhcngfma xin ninzu). In relation to the final point, Shao stressed Sun’ s approval of the melting pot method of racial assimilation perfected by the American and Swiss peoples.4 7 Much like Dai Jitao, the Western Hill clique emphasized the importance of a culturally and racially homogeneous Zhon$rua ninzu in its struggle for evolutionary survival. The Young China Party shared a similar, yet differently worded, interpretation of ninzuzhuyi. In a special commemorative issue of Xingshi foHowing the death of Sun Yat-sen, the YCP’ s leader Zeng Qi attempted to demonstrate how Sun Yat-sen’ s Three People’ s Principles “never exceeded the scope of guqjiazhuyi.” This was particularly the case, he argued, with the doctrine of ninzuzhuyi-. Based on our interpretation, the Three People’ s Principles are actuaHy encompassed within our guqiazhuyi. There is absolutely no conflict between the two doctrines. The Chinese Communist Party’ s interpretation, however, cannot help but represent an intractable falsehood. What is one who advocates ninzuzhuyi Obviously, it is someone who seeks the establishment of an (Reprint Taipei: Guofangbu yinzhigong, 1952), 6-7. 4 6 “Zhongguo guomindang dierci quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” (Manifesto of the Kuomintang’ s Second National Congress (Western H ll clique)), 8 April 1926, in Zhongyt o G uoninkngLid Daibi ao Dahm j i Zhong y a ng Qmnhui Ziliao ( Doc ume nt s from t he Kucmnt ang’ s N ational Party C o n g r e s s e s a nd . Cent ral Commi t t e e Plenum), ed. Rong Mengyuan and comp. Sun Caixia (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1985), 1: 399 (Hereafter, ZGQZ). 4 7 Shao Yuanzhong, “Sun Wen zhuyi zonglun” (A summary of Sun Yat-senism), 1926, in GFWJ, 1 : 434. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 137 independent country. Mr. Sun Yat-sen’ s ninzuzhuyi not only advocated the elimination of the Manchu Qing dynasty, but also the placing of the Han ninzu as the center of a ‘ fusion’ of the Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other ninzu into a single, ‘great Z h o rg fo u a ninzd. This is clearly what gpqjiazhuyi stands for. The Communists, on the other hand, still do not understand this point, and thus advocate Mongolian independence, causing our country’ s territory to be tom asunder while turning their backs on Sun Yat-sen’ s original objective.4 8 In a serialized discussion of China’ s “national character” (gicninxir^, YCP member Li Jianhua echoed Sun Yat-sen’s 1919 assertion that the Zhon^jua ninzu was the world’ s richest nation in “assimilationist powers” (tong/wali); Li argued that the entire story of Chinese history centered on the continuous assimilation of frontier barbarians by the superior of Han Chinese culture, a process that Li described as “the assimilation of others through the refining influence of learning and art (w zn de tan^rud)” ^ The Chinese Communist Party, in their defense, repeatedly referred to the Manifesto of the Kuomintang’ s 1924 Reorganization Congress, in hopes of countering these “reactionary” interpretations while demonstrating that their frontier programme conformed to Sun’ s principle of ninzuzhuyi. In addition to emphasizing the Manifesto’ s dual definition of ninzuzhuyi as: 1) the self-seeking liberation of the Chinese ninzu and 2) the equality of all the ninzu within China’ s borders, Communists often cited its declaration “formally guaranteeing the right of self-determination for all ninzu within China” in justifying their support for Outer Mongolian independence. In an article directed at the Kuomintang rightwing, Chen Duxiu claimed that their narrow 4 8 Zeng Qi, “Dao Sun Zhongshan xiansheng bing xu haineiwai geming tongzhi” (Mourning Mr. Sun Yat-sen and encouraging overseas and domestic revolutionary comrades), X inghi zhoubao 24 (21 March 1925): 1-3. 4 9 Li Jianhua, “Zhongguo guominxing lun” (Discussion of China’s national character), X inghi R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 138 interpretation of ninzuzhuyi aimed at dividing all of humanity into two Darwinian camps— the subjugators and subjugated— in marked contrast to Sun’s assertion that the world could be divided between imperialist nations and oppressed colonies. Chen worried that this type of evolutionism would lead China down the same path of encroachment as the imperialist powers.5 0 In another article, Chen challenged the YCP’ s contention that their doctrine of gtcjiazhuyi encompassed Sun Yat-sen’ s ninzuzhuyi. Following an erudite analysis of the historical evolution of nationalist movements, Chen concluded that Sun’ s ninzuzhuyi represented the ideology of “a nationalist movement in the era of imperialism,” whose goal was the united struggle of the proletariat and bourgeois in colonial and semi- colonial lands against their common enemy— the capitalist forces of imperialism. Chen argued that the global nature of this struggle naturally caused this movement to transcend state boundaries, in sharp contrast to the narrow nationalism of earlier historical epochs. The YCP’ s doctrine of guqiazhuyi, on the other hand, represented a “nationalist movement in the era of militarist society.” During this period, Chen contended that the capitalist class employed the dual slogans of “national unity” (ninzu tongyi) to expand its country’ s territory outwardly and “national assimilation” (ninzu tor^jud) to subjugate its domestic minority ninzu.5 1 In sum, Chen compared the narrow, zha& m 62 &64 (13 December 1925 & 26 December 1925): 3 &2. 5 0 Chen Duxiu, “Guomindang youpai dahui” (The conference of the Kuomintang rightwing), Xi angdaozhouhao, 150 (23 April 1926): 1414. 5 1 Chen Duxiu, “Sun Zhongshan sanminzhuyi zhongzhi minzuzhuyi shibushi guojiazhuyi?” (Is gwjiazkuyi similar to the ninzuzhuyi of Sun Yat-sen’ s Three People’ s Principles?), 25 May 1926, in CZZX, 2:1042-48. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 139 contradictory patriotism of the YCP and Kuomintang Right with the broad, democratic nationalism of Sun Yat-sen and the CCP: There are two types of ninzuzhuyi: The ninzuzhuyi of the capitalist class which advocates self-seeking liberation and at the same time does not advocate the liberation of those ninzu subordinate to oneself. This also can be called contradictory ninzuzhuyi. The other is proletarian ninzuzhuyi which advocates that all ninzu have the right of self-determination and that one’ s self-seeking liberation should not be restricted by others, and at the same time, it advocates the liberation of small and weak ninzu subordinates free from the restriction of others. This also can be called equality ninzuzhuyi?2 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, when it came to Sun’ s principles of ninzhuzhuyi (people’s rule) and ninshengzhuyi (people’ s livelihood), the CCP was quick to highlight the bourgeois character of Sun’ s ideology, yet, because of its usefulness in legitimizing their controversial frontier programme, Sun’ s discourse on ninzuzhuyi was often held forth as an example of proletarian thought. Sun Yat-sen’ s usage of the term ninzu zijue (national seh-determination) engendered an equal amount of disagreement among United Front members. Much of the controversy surrounded the source of ideological inspiration for Sun’ s usage of the term. During the waning years of the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson employed the term to champion the right of recognized “colonial nations” (ie. Korea, Turkey, Poland, etc.) to equality and independence within the existing international family of nations. In Russia, meanwhile, Lenin was making use of the same expression to support the right of “small and weak nationalities” (ie. Latvia, Georgia, Mongolia, etc.) to p d itkd se oe ssi o n h o m imperial empires. Beginning in early 1921 Sun Yat-sen cited 5 2 See, for example, Chen Duxiu, “Women de huida” (Our reply), X iangho z haubao 83 (17 September 1924): 674. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 140 both Lenin and Wilson when arguing that the right of ninzu zijue was an important component of his principle of ninzuzhuyi. The Kuomintang’ s 1924 Manifesto did litde to clear up this ambiguity. While it declared that the Kuomintang “guaranteed the right of self-determination for all ninzu within China,” a subtle shift in terminology from ninzu zijue (national self-determination) to ninzu zhi zijue (the self-determination of ninzm ) left it unclear whether Sun supported political secession for its internal ninzu or some sort of autonomy within a unified Chinese state.5 3 Among the Kuomintang rightwing, the easiest method for dealing with Sun’ s equivocal usage of national self-determination was to ignore it. When quoting from the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto or Sun’s other works, Dai Jitao and others failed to mention its existence, and spoke only of his call for the assimilation of Chinese minorities into a single Zhonghua ninzu. Others, such as Hu Hanmin, took the issue head on, realizing that there was enough ambiguity within Sun’ s use of the term to include it within the rightwing’ s culturalist definition of ninzuzhuyi. During a series of lectures on the Three People’ s Principles at Jinling University in Nanjing, Hu argued: There are those in this party who based on the Kuomintang’ s First National Congress say that ninzuzhuyi means, on the one hand, the self-seeking liberation of the Chinese nation and, on the other hand, the equality of all ninzu within China’ s borders. This explanation of ninzuzhuyi is obviously an advance over previous interpretations, but it does not represent the entirety of ninzuzhufl. The Premier’ s ninzuzhuyi, on the one hand, called for the Chinese ninzu to throw off the fetters of imperialism and seek its own national independence and freedom; at the same time, it recognized the right of ‘ self- determination’ (zijue) for all ninzu within China’ s borders to seek the formation 5 3 Sun, “Zhongguo guomingdang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan,” 119. See Chapter One for a more complete discussion of this issue. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 141 of a ‘great Zhongfua' from amongst the ninzu within our current state borders and the creation of a perfectly ‘ ninzu state’ (ninzu degtqia)?* For Hu Hanmin and other members of the Kuomintang rightwing, national self- determination represented the natural process of melding the various peoples within the borders of the former Qing empire into a new, homogenous body politic, and not the disintegration of China into several independent states as the Communists advocated. In its political resolutions, the dissentient Western Hills clique replaced the Manifesto’ s controversial definition of self- determination with the less ambiguous and more circumscribed explanation contained within Sun Yat-sen’s Jianguo Dagang {Gudim for National Reconstruction). The Outline contained a subtle, but important, reinterpretation of national self-determination, stating: “Towards the small and weak ninzu within our country, the government should prop-up and guide ijuzhi) them so that they can achieve self-determination and self-rule (zijuezizhi)”5 5 Unlike the Manifesto, the Sun’ s Outline emphasized that the responsibility for self-determination rests with the Han-dominated Chinese state and not the frontier minorities; here, self- determination was interpreted as a paternalistic policy of national integration rather than a progressive agenda for minority liberation. In a list of formal indictments of the CCP drawn up by the Western Hills clique in 1927, the clique stressed that the Communists have “misquoted [Sun Yat-sen] as advocating the ninzu zijue of small and weak ninzu within our country in order to gloss over the fact that he actually called for our 5 4 Hu Hanmin, “Sanminzhuyi de jingshen” (The spirit of the Three People’ s Principles), 17 August 1929, in H u H am m Shiji Ziliao H m ji { Col l ect i on cfHu Hanmi n’ s A am plishnm ts), ed. Zunzui xuehui (Hong Kong: Datong tushu gongsi, 1980), 2:45-6. 5 5 Sun Yat-sen, “ Jianguo Dagang” (Outline for national reconstruction), 12 April 1924, in SZSQf, R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 142 government to fuzhi (prop-up and guide) the small and weak ninzu within China so that they can achieve zizh izijw (self-determination and self-rule).” The document warned that the CCP’ s policy of national self-determination would not only cause Outer Mongolia to be sacrificed to Russia, but would also open the door to a Japanese invasion of Manchuria and English encroachment on Tibet.5 6 Zou Lu, a former Tongmenghui associate of Sun and one of the clique’ s leaders, stressed that a careful examination of the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto actually revealed that the intent of the document’ s platform of self- determination was the unification and not disintegration of China. This is why, Zou underscored, the statement “recognize the right of self-determination for all ninzu within China,” was immediately followed by the phrase “so as to organize a voluntarily united Zhonghua Republic.”5 7 The Young China Party addressed the meaning of self-determination in a long theoretical article published in Xinghi. Hu Guowei, the YCP’ s chief ideologue, pointed out that there was no such thing as a state comprised of a “single pure nationality” {ninzu (huny), rather France, Germany, America and other states were all formed through the mixture of different nationalities. Hu contended that Sun Yat-sen stressed this very point when discussing the difference between “state” (g uqjia) and “nation/race” {ninzu!) in his lectures on ninzuzhuyi. With regard to Sun’ s definition of national self-determination, Hu claimed: 9:127. 5 6 “Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan xuanbu Zhongguo gongchandang zuizhuang” (Kuomintang (Western Hills clique) manifesto announcing the indictment of the CCP), 7 May 1927, in ZGQZ, 1:480. 5 7 Zou, Zk a n g g u o Guomndang Shi gm, 622. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 143 Minzu zijue certainly does not mean that all the ninzu within a given country should split up, mutually at odds with one another. His [Sun’s] meaning was that ‘all ninzu teho share a common history and geography and jointly suffer foreign oppression should— according to the requirements of their own national character {gmcing)— assimilate, based on a unified government and culture, to create a single large ninzu with its own national character; in doing so, they can direct all their energy towards casting off foreign shackles, the realization of self-determination and the protection of all their people’ s sovereignty.5 8 This definition of national self-determination, Hu claimed, was similar to that advocated by President Wilson in that he never called for his country’ s domestic ninzu to determine their own national form and break away with the United States of America. Hu Guowei called on China’ s frontier minorities to turn a blind eye to Soviet Russia’ s “honey covered words” (niyu) of “national liberation” and “independence”; instead he called on them to carryout Sun Yat-sen’ s legacy by melding together into a single, large Ihan^ym ninzu. For its part, the Chinese government should make a Herculean effort to raise “ guqiazkuyi education,” so as to break down the “mental barriers between China’s five ninzu and replace them with a new morality of patriotism which would serve as the foundation of a single, large Zhonghua nation/race.5 9 Given the inherent ambiguity in his usage of ninzu zijue and unequivocal call for Chinese national unity, the Chinese Communists found it difficult to stretch Sun’ s limited and guarded usage of the term into open support for Outer Mongolian independence. Besides quoting from the Kuomintang’ s 1924 Manifesto, CCP writers stressed the successful implementation of this policy in the formation of the Soviet 5 8 Hu Guowei, “Minzu zijue yu guojia duli” (National self-determination and state independence), X inghi zhoubao 41 (18 July 1925): 2. 5 9 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 144 Union. In doing so, they hoped to demonstrate that national seh-determination was a necessary first step in the eventual re-unification of the stateless proletariat. In his examination of the Bolshevik handling of the national question, Zheng Chaolin underscored the importance of allowing non-Russian nationalities to initially break away from the capitalist oppression of the Tsarist empire so that they could later be voluntarily and freely reunited with socialist Russia for economic and military protection against global imperialism, making the multi-ethnic Soviet Union the “freest state in the world.”6 0 Qu Qiubai argued that the victory of the October Revolution proved Lenin right when he argued before the Second International that the right of self- determination must include the “right of secession” (fedigdqiazhiqrnri). Due to the years of oppression suffered by non-Russian minorities under the assimilationist policies of the Tsars, the right of political secession was crucial for winning over the confidence of these minority peoples in the new Soviet states and creating the basis for a genuine and voluntary union of all former members of the Tsarist empire.6 1 The assumption underlying both of these articles was that multi-ethnic China would also need to grant its oppressed frontier minorities the right of national self- determination (including political secession) if it hoped to follow in the Soviet Union’ s footsteps by creating a unified and complete free Chinese state. 6 0 Zheng Chaolin, “Suweiai zhidu dixia minzu wenti zhi jiejue” (The solution of the national question under the Soviet system), Xi nqi ngni an 4, second series (20 December 1924): 29-41. 6 1 Qu Qiubai, “Shiyue geming yu ruoxiao minzu” (The October Revolution and the weak and small nimtt), X ia r^ a o zh a ia o 90 (7 November 1924): 754-56. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 145 A nti-Red Critiques o f Mongolian Independence and “ Red Im peridisnf The continued garrisoning of Red Army troops in Urga and the growing influence of Soviet Russia along China’ s entire northern border transformed these seemly pedantic squabbles over Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse on ninzuzhuyi and minzu zijue into fundamental questions of national patriotism. Various segments within the United Front attempted to prove their nationalist credentials by couching their disparate policies in the language of Sun Yat-sen’s ambiguous political legacy. The growing evidence of Russian hegemony in China and the CCP’ s seemingly blind acceptance of non-Chinese political leadership, however, provided the best source of ammunition for those wishing to undermine the CCP’ s claim to Sun Yat-sen’ s revolutionary mantle. Every student of Dr. Sun understood the meaning and importance of aigtozhuyi (patriotism) to China’ s national survival; after all, in his final lecture on mnzuzkuyi, Sun stressed the importance, above all else, of loyalty towards the ninzu, if the Chinese hoped to prevent their evolutionary extinction as a race and a state.6 2 If it could be proven that the CCP was actively supporting Russian encroachment in China, the anti- Red coalition could associate the Chinese Communists with the long line of “national traitors” ( ntdgm he) within Chinese history— exposing their similarity to Xi Jintang, Liu Yu, Jin Gui, Zeng Guofan and others who sacrificed the interests of the Zhon$tua ninzu for personal gain. Despite their obvious skepticism of Soviet Russia’ s intentions towards China, the Kuomintang rightwing remained largely silent on question of Russian encroachment 6 2 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - Diliujiang,” 243-4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 146 in China out of respect for Sun Yat-sen’ s strategic alliance with the Soviet Union. It was only after Chiang Kai-shek smashed the United Front and “purified the party” (qingkri^ in 1927 that Hu Hanmin and others felt free to argue that “Outer Mongolia was like an old pig into whose belly they [Soviet Russia] have already bore for a long time.”6 3 Prior to 1928, the task of criticizing Russian objectives in China fell upon those members of the anti-red coalition outside of the formal apparatus of the United Front. The dissident Western Hills clique argued, for example, that when Sun agreed to enter into an alliance with the Russians, their mask of good will had yet to expose its pugnacious alter ego. They asserted, however, that the Red Army’ s continued occupation of Outer Mongolia, especially in the face of Moscow’s repeated promises to respect Chinese sovereignty and withdraw its troops from Chinese soil, clearly revealed Soviet Russia’ s inheritance of the malignant disease of encroachment from their Tsarist forefathers.6 4 The Western Hills clique also contended that the CCP’ s public support for Russian hegemony in Outer Mongolia was clearly evidence of the natural tendency of a dog to follow its master; “they must obey the directives of the Third International,” the clique claimed, “since Soviet Russia is the proletarian fatherland and Lenin is the master of the world revolution.”6 5 In a series of articles written for public consumption, Zou Lu provided numerous examples of Russian meddling in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, 6 3 Hu Hanmin, “ Yongbao wo guojia minzu de duli ziyou pingdeng” (Forever protect our country's national independence, freedom and equality), 22 July 1929, in Zunzui xuehui, H u H aw iinShiji Zi l i ao H uiyi, 2:461. 6 4 “Zhongguo guomindang dierci quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan,” 8 April 1926, in ZGQZ, 1:402- 03. 6 5 “Zhongguo guomindang xuanyan xuanbu Zhongguo gongchandang zuizhuang,” 7 May 1927, in ZGQZ, 1:480. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 147 Gansu and Tibet, aimed at demonstrating that the Bolshevik slogan of “patronizing small and weak nations” was a front for imperialist oppression. “Encroachment (y«&),” Zou wrote, “is a fundamental part of their national character (guatin$? and could not be eliminated through the simple act of political revolution.6 6 Zeng Qi’s Young China Party was in the vanguard of the anti-red coalition’ s attack on “red imperialism” ((hise digmzbuyi) in China and the CCP’ s perfidious complicity. The group stressed the fundamental incompatibility between loyalty towards a class (communism) and allegiance to a nation (nationalism or what they called gtqidzhuyi), arguing that the CCP’ s devotion to the international proletarian class was inherently dangerous to the wellbeing of the Zborqfrua ninzu. In a 1925 essay, Zeng Qi addressed the “theory of natural human instincts” (redd benxinglm) in order to impress the scientific validity of this point upon his readership. Much like Xunzi’ s famous dictum that “man is different from beast in his ability to group,” Zeng claimed that modem science (read social Darwinism) has proven that group loyalty is an essential component of human evolution; Marx’ s doctrine of communism clearly deviated from the overwhelming evidence that humans love their own groups.6 7 In the preface to a special issue of Xinghi examining Sino-Russian relations, Zeng argued that this principle demonstrated that the Russians, like all other foreign countries, could not be trusted: 6 6 Zou Lu, “SuE yu Xinjiang” (Soviet Russia and Xinjiang), in Zou Lu Wenam ( Preserwd Works o f ZouLuj, ed. Mei Ou (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1930), 3: 28; also see, Zou Lu, “SuE yu Menggu” (Soviet Russia and Mongolia), in Mei, ZouLu Wernhm, 3:39-41 and Zou Lu, “Gongchandang duansong minguo yu SuE zhi yiban” (The same class of the CCP losing the Republic forever and Soviet Russia), in Mei, Zou L u We mhun, 3:29-32. 6 7 Zeng Qi, “Guojiazhuyizhe zhi sida lunju” (The four grand arguments of those who adhere to guqj i azhuyi ), October 1925, in Zhongguo dierci lishi dang’ anguan, Zhongguo Qmgmndang, 54. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 148 Since we began publishing this journal, we have loudly advocated a policy of ‘ internally no compromise, externally no goodwill’ out of a deep understanding [of the classic dictum] ‘ If he is not of our clan, he is certainly to be of a different mind’ (fei woztdd, qixinbiyt). Today, the evil intentions of Britain and Japan are held forth for everyone to see, but people still have not seen through the secret intentions of Soviet Russia towards the Chinese people and mistakenly recognized them as our good friends.6 8 Zeng Qi and other YCP members believed that since the Russians and Chinese belonged to unrelated ethnic groups it was against the evolutionary instinct of both groups to cooperate and trust one another. Most of the articles within this special issue of X inghi stressed the failure of the 1924 Sino-Soviet Accord to solve the Mongolian question, identified by one author as “the most pressing question currently facing our country.” Despite the fact that the Beijing warlord government eventually concluded a treaty normalizing relations between the two countries and recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, YCP members found little comfort in the agreement. First, they stressed that, despite its pledge in the Accord to withdraw all military personnel from Outer Mongolia, the Red Army not only remained in Urga but was also training and equipping a local Mongolian army. Second, the Soviets had goaded the Mongols into formally establishing an independent People’ s Republic of Mongolia with its own constitution. Third, Soviet Russia was using its foothold in Outer Mongolia to intensify its encroachment along the rest of China’s northern frontier, convincing Tannu Tuva to join the Soviet Union while also dispatching loyal troops into Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.6 9 In another issue of 6 8 Zeng, “Bianyan: ZhongE wenti zhuanghao,” 1. 6 9 Yi, “Xin E huo,” 1-2; Xin, “SuE yinlue waimeng xiangji,” 2-5. Also see Hu, “‘Qinshan zhuyi’ yu ‘ waijiao zhengce’,” 2; Xu, “Feng Yuxiang maiguo yu SuE yinlue Zhongguo zhi yinmou,” 2-3. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 149 Xinghi, Hu Guowei added two additional examples of Russian encroachment in China to the laundry list of facts that would surely “cause one’ s hair to stand on end.” First, Hu quoted from a Beijing dispatch describing the details of a six-article Treaty of Mutual Defense reportedly signed between Soviet Russia and the MPR, which outlined, in Hu’ s mind, the virtual military annexation of Outer Mongolia by Moscow. “These six articles,” Hu stressed to his readers, “are even more harmful than the infamous Twenty- one Demands [of the Japanese]!” Second, Hu questioned Soviet ambassador Karakhan’ s announcement that the Red Army had completely withdrawn from Urga. Since Karakhan has lied to the Chinese people before, Hu asserted, why should the Chinese people now place their trust in the slippery words of this crafty diplomat; moreover, the Red Army’ s five-year occupation of Mongolia had certainly provided the Russians with enough time to dispatch their spies and officials to even the furthermost comers of the region. Finally, Hu contended that the existence of a Russian trained and equipped Mongolian army and the signing of a mutual defense pact virtually guaranteed that Outer Mongolia would remain firmly within the orb of Russian imperialism for many years to come.7 0 The Young China Party impugned the CCP just as maliciously as they did the Russians, asserting repeatedly that the Chinese Communists were nothing more than proselytes of red imperialism in China. In one of the early issues of Xinghi, Zeng Qi set the tone for other YCP discussions of the Chinese Communists when he labeled them “new traitor thieves” (xin mtigto za) who shared a common pedigree with a long list of 7 0 Hu, “Minzu zijue yu guojia duli„” 2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 150 national miscreants spread throughout China’ s five thousand year old history.7 1 Xinghi, authors habitually employed the expression “disciples of the Russia party” (qinEdan$ when referring to the CCP, arguing that they have not only naively swallowed Russia’ s “honey-coated words” (rriyu) about “liberating” Mongols and other small and weak nationalities from imperialist oppression, but were also acting as “a tool of Russian encroachment in China.” Hu Guowei went so far as to claim that the CCP’ s predilection to seek friendship where friendship is lacking and look for a liberator rather than liberating oneself was a prime example of the type of “inferior character” (liefpvcit^) that leads to the disaster of “losing one’ s country” {wrqgiid) and “extinction of one’ s race” ( mezha1 $ .7 2 The very essence of patriotism, Cheng Zhongxing claimed, was “the fundamental intuition to protect the profound and lasting relationship with one’ s language, culture, beliefs and customs.” “A patriot,” Cheng continued, “is one who partakes in the protection of this relationship in order to crystallize his group’ s national character {rrinzwcir$.” n In the eyes of YCP members, the Chinese Communists’ support for Russian encroachment in Outer Mongolia proved their total disregard for the deep cultural and historical relationship between Mongolia and China proper. As Hu Guowei forcefully put it: 7 1 Zeng Qi, “Gongchandang yu fuidang” (The Communist Party and the Restoration Party), Xin&hi zhonbao 28 (18 April 1925): 1. 7 2 See, for example, Chen Qitian, “Jindai guojiazhuyi yundong shi” (Contemporary history of the Guaj i azbuyi movement), June 1929, in Zhongguo dierci lishi dang’anguan, Zhongt uo Qt ^rnandang, 56-69; Liu Zhangda, “LianE zuiyan” (The crimes of uniting •with the Russians), X inghi zhoubao 68 (6 June 1926): 1-2; Hu, “‘Qinshan zhuyi’ yu Nvaijiao zhengce’,” 2. 7 3 Cheng Zhongxing, “Guojiazhuyi zhi lishiguan xuyan” (Preface: a Guoj i azhuyi historical perspective), X inghi zhoubao 38 (17 July 1925): 1. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 151 In the face of [Russia’ s] extremely obvious encroachment [in Mongolia], the disciples of the Russia party still acting like they are drunk and dreaming, loudly utilizing the words “national self-determination” to wildly declare that they are “only patronizing new Mongolia.” Alas! What is this talk? It is a pity that the Mongols have already followed Soviet Russia’s method of doing things. If we do not carryout a bit of “assimilation” {ton^ma) work among the Mongols, I am afraid that Mongolia in the future will become an object forever attached to Soviet Russia! What leeway will then remain for self-determination? This type of “Mongolian national seh-determination” movement is just a “new style of traitorous activity” for the disciples of the Russia party and “a new style of encroachment policy” for Soviet Russia.7 4 As the Young China Party saw it, the CCP was guilty of the twin crimes of rmvgio (treason) and wtgjo (damaging the national interest); rather than working for the patriotic “assimilation of the five n in ztf (mtzu ton ghud) in common defense against foreign insult, the Chinese Communists were undermining the future fate of the Zhotqjjua ninzu through their attempts to “break up the family of five n im T i^mzu fenjid). Defending the CCP’ s Patriotic Credentials The imputation of tsermjeste stung the Chinese Communists deeply. A survey of articles in Xiangflao during the last couple of years of the United Front reveals that the CCP spent almost as much time defending themselves against these charges of treason as they did advancing their own revolutionary objectives. Moreover, the growing reality of Russian attempts to transform Outer Mongolia into a political satellite, in direct violation of the Sino-Soviet Accord, caused the Chinese Communists to slowly circumscribe their support for Outer Mongolian independence, in the hope, I would argue, of demonstrating their patriotic credentials. 7 4 Hu, “Minzu zijue yu guojia duli,” 2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 152 Initially, the Chinese Communists publicized the details of the 30 MaySino- Soviet Accord in the hope of demonstrating the Soviet Union’ s friendly intentions toward China while also countering the claim that they were the running dogs of so- called “red imperialism.” Throughout 1924, Xiangdao writers put forward several different arguments aimed at convincing their readers that the signing of the Sino-Soviet Accord marked an important step in China’ s struggle for national independence. During the course of the talks, its impartial and egalitarian nature demonstrated, in the words of Cai Hesen, that Soviet Russia was “the only good friend of the Chinese people” or in the words of Chen Wairen “the most benevolent country towards China.”7 5 Unlike America, England, Japan and other imperialist powers who had unilaterally foisted unequal treaties on the Chinese, the Soviet Union treated China as an equal in international diplomacy, as evident by their renunciation of all unequal Tsarist treaties with China; rather than dealing with China behind her back or forcing her to accept their demands, “only Soviet Russia had adopted the principle of equality and direct negotiation.” The frank and open negotiation between the two countries, Chen Duxiu claimed, was a perfect example of this unparalleled “spirit of equality.”7 6 With regard to the controversial stationing of Red Army troops in Urga, which was creating big headlines in the capitalist press, Chen stressed that the Soviets had already agreed to withdraw their troops and respect Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia; and Chen questioned why reporters did not make a big fuss over American gun boats currently 7 5 Cai, “Zhongguo guoji diwei yu chengren suweiai eluosi,” 19. 7 6 Chen Duxiu, “Zhong-E huyi zhi chengbai” (The Successes and Failures of the Sino-Soviet Conference), 26 March 1924, in CZZX, 2:639. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 153 patrolling the Yangtze River to protect the economic stranglehold of the imperialist powers on China.7 7 After the terms of the Sino-Soviet Accord were made public during the summer of 1924, the Communists praised the Agreement as an unprecedented diplomatic victory for China, highlighting the “boundless” and “unilateral” benefit it brought China. In one article, Chen Duxiu compared the Sino-Soviet Accord to the Treaty of Lausanne, which lead to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Turkey and the elimination of unequal tariff agreements. In another essay, Chen went carefully through each article of the Sino-Soviet Accord demonstrating how the agreement afforded China unilateral gains; to further emphasize this point, Chen concluded his essay by quoting the well respected Beijing University professor Zhang Xingyan as stating: “Even if the Chinese army captured Moscow we still could not achieve as much as this Sino-Soviet Accord.”7 8 Xiangho writers were also quick to point out that the new Accord set a positive precedent for the elimination of all unequal treaties by creating a deep fear among the imperialist powers that the Chinese masses could rise up at any moment and demand the same from them.7 9 7 7 Chen Duxiu, “Meiguo zhu hua haijun” (The American Navy stationed in China), Xiangiao zhoubao 61 (16 April 1924): 491; Chen Duxiu, “Wairen - waijiao dangju - Zhongguo baoguan” (Foreigners - diplomatic authorities - China’ s news agencies), Xianghozhoubao 62 (23 April 1924): 496. 7 8 Chen, “Zhong-E Huiyi zhi chengbai,” 470; Chen Duxiu, “Ping Zhong-E xieding zaoan” (Evaluating the draft treaty signed by Soviet Russia and China), 12 April 1924, in CZZX, 2: 651-52; Chen Duxiu, “Gesanyi yue yu zhonge xieding” (The Lausanne Treaty and the Sino-Soviet Accord), X iangko zhoubao 63 (30 April 1924): 507. 7 9 Chen Weiren, “Zhong-E bangjiao huifu zhong de lieqiang ganbu wenti” (The problem of foreign power meddling in the resumption of Sino-Russia diplomatic relations), Xianglao zhoubao 70 (18 June 1924): 557-8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 154 With regard to the sticky issue of Outer Mongolia, Chen Duxiu stressed to his readers that the Accord had resulted in “the fundamental settlement of a long standing issue between Russia and China over the Mongolian question.” The agreement clearly stipulated that Outer Mongolia is a part of Chinese territory and pledged the eventual withdrawal of all Red Army troops from the region and Russian respect for Chinese sovereignty over the entire region. Even if one still harbored doubts about Russia’ s intentions in Mongolia, the signing of this agreement guaranteed that in the future “besides war there will be no legal means [for Russia] to not recognize...that Mongolia is part of China’ s territory.”8 0 The unequivocal nature of this statement also appears to have been meant to send a clear message to Xianghds readers about the CCP’ s frontier programme: the temporary and strategic granting of political independence to Outer Mongolia and other frontier minorities in no way compromised the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the Chinese Republic. Finally, when Soviet officials continued to postpone the Sino-Soviet Conference, which was intended to discuss a timetable for the Red Army’ s withdrawal from Outer Mongolia and the administrative hand over of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), the Chinese Communists downplayed the significance of these two “minor issues” to the overall benefit of the Sino-Soviet Accord. In April 1926, for example, the editors of Xiangtao side-stepped criticism about the Mongolian and CER questions from YCP member Zeng Youhao by arguing that his two points of dissatisfaction with the Sino-Soviet Accord were both quantitatively and qualitatively outweighed by his four points of satisfaction. Furthermore, the editors argued that the 8 0 Chen, “Ping Zhong-E xieding zaoan,” 651. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 155 failure to solve the CER problem centered, in reality, on the meddling of imperialist powers and not Russian inaction, while also contending that Russian assistance to the Mongolian people was simply a case of their sincere desire to assist oppressed nations in accordance with Lenin’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions.8 1 The Chinese Communists answered the charge of national perfidy with an imputation of their own— claiming that the class interests of their opponents caused them to become the “running dogs of the imperialists.” In a long article in the 17 March 1926 edition of Xiangbto, Chen Duxiu conducted a detailed class analysis of the so- called “anti-red coalition,” in which he concluded that the reactionary warlords and their intellectual and bureaucratic minions were behind the movement. Chen countered their claim about resisting the spread of communism with an assertion that China currently lacked a communist movement and only possessed an anti-imperialist national liberation movement. It was China’ s national independence, Chen claimed, that these reactionary forces were really opposed to. The anti-red coalition, as running dogs of the foreign imperialists, was thwarting China’ s national liberation by undermining all patriotic, anti- imperialist organizations in China. In order to prolong their life, the imperialist powers were providing financial support for the propaganda weeklies of the anti-red intellectuals and huge loans aimed at propping up the warlord government. Chen 8 1 [Editors], “Duzhe zhi sheng: SuE yu minzu jiefang” (The Voice of our Readers: Soviet Russia and National Liberation), Xi angfaozhoubao 148 & 149 (3 April 1926 & 13 April 1926): 1388-1390 & 1402- 04. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 156 warned his readers that the anti-red movement and China’ s national liberation movement waxed and waned in direct proportion to one another.8 2 In his lectures at Shanghai University, Qu Qiubai developed a systematic critique of the YCP’ s ideology of gtqiazhuyi., which he defined as “a policy of the capitalist class designed at creating individual nations or states through the division of the laboring masses and the creation of mutual hatred and isolation amongst them.” Qu argued that, in order to consolidate control over their respective states and nations, the capitalist class adopted a two pronged policy of “assimilating” (tongfad) their national minorities while consolidating the “national essence” ( g u o c m ) and “national culture” (gtm inw rhm ). The former policy usually begins with “peaceful assimilation policies,” such as educational and economic reforms aimed at fostering capitalist penetration of minority markets; yet, if the minorities possess their own capitalist class, it can develop into a “policy of forced assimilation.” The latter policy claims to foster a unified “national spirit” (mnzujingsheng) through the defining of a single “national character” (gwcing), “national soul” (gwhuri) and “national honor” (g4cgian$, while in reality the policy retards the nation’ s evolution through the pursuit of “alienation policies” iyhm zhengd) which isolate the nation from progressive outside influences. History, Qu told his audience, demonstrates that the so-called “national character” alters from generation to generation depending on changes within the economic structure of society. The 8 2 Chen Duxiu, “Fanchi yundong yu Zhongguo minzu yundong” (The anti-red movement and China’ s national liberation), X u rigko z houbao 146 (17 March 1926): 1346-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 157 glorification of a single “national spirit” is simply a tool of the capitalist class for holding the masses in ignorance.8 3 In the hope of removing the unpatriotic placard from around their necks, the Chinese Communists argued fiercely that it was they who held the genuine interest of the vast majority of the Chinese people at heart. “We are not like those who advocate Q tcjiazk^i,” the editors of Xianglao wrote, “in that our gicjia (state) is not an empty abstract gtcjia but rather the gtcjia of the vast majority of the [Chinese] people.” Although the anti-red coalition seemed to represent a more lofty form of nationalism, they were actually isolationists rather than nationalists, striving for China’s separation and not independence from the rest of the world. The Communists, on the other hand, stressed that China’ s revolution represented only a single component of the global socialist revolution, and argued that they were striving not only for their own liberation but that of all oppressed peoples.8 4 By 1927, the CCP was attempting to convince its critics that the Party’ s cosmopolitanism actually made them more patriotic than the narrow nationalism of the anti-red coalition. In a dramatic about-face from his 1919 repudiation of patriotism as a tool of ruling class oppression, Chen Duxiu now told the 8 3 Qu Qiubai, “Xiandai minzu wenti jiangan” (Lecture outline on the contemporary national question), January 1926, in Q i Quhai Wenj i (Works cfQu Qui bai ), comp. Qu Qiubai wenji bianji weiyuanhui (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1985-), 3: 493-95; Also see Chen, “Sun Zhongshan sanminzhuyi zhongzhi minzuzhuyi shibushi guojiazhuyi?” 1042-48. 8 4 [Editors], “Duzhe zhi sheng: Duiyi jieji douzheng de taolun” (The voice of our readers: a discussion of class struggle), Xi angcl aozhoubao 146 (17 March 1926): 1358; Also see Zheng Chaolin, “Zhong dong lu shijian zhong fandongpai zhi fan suilian de xuanchang” (The reactionary faction’ s anti Sino-Soviet Alliance propaganda amongst the Chinese Eastern Railway issues), Xi angdao z houbao 144 (3 February 1926): 1319-22; Chen Duxiu, “Shijie geming yu Zhongguo minzu jiefang yundong” (The world revolution and China’ s national liberation movement), 25 July 1926, in CZZX, 2:1055-61; Peng Shuzhi, “Lining zhuyi shifou bu shihe yu Zhongguo de sowei ‘guoqing’?” (Does Leninism fit with our so-called ‘national sentiment’?), Xiangfao z houbao 184 (21 January 1927): 1946-48. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 158 readers of Xiangko that Marx’ s famous datum “the workers have no fatherland” was not anathema to the concept of patriotism. Rather, he argued that the expression has a three-fold significance: first, during Marx’ s lifetime there was as yet no nation protecting the interests of the working class; secondly, workers of all nationalities should unite together without regard to national boundaries; and thirdly, workers should not help their own countries to oppress the workers of other countries in the name of “patriotism.” “It certainly does not mean,” Chen Duxiu stressed, “the absence of a fatherland (zugid) in the face of the imperialist powers, or a type of grand harmony {daton^ that destroys all national boundaries.” Support of Marxism in China, Chen concluded, does not mean that the Communist Party and the nation’ s workers are unpatriotic: Regardless of whether a person possesses lofty and far-sighted thought, they do not necessarily oppose self-preservation and patriotism in resistance of oppression. This is not the same as the imperialist powers talking about grand harmony and fatherland. In fact, during the May 30th Incident, those that made the biggest sacrifice for their fatherland were actually the fatherland-less workers and not the advocates of gjqjutzhuyi who possess a fatherland and love their country.8 5 In short, on the eve of the collapse of the United Front, the CCP was attempting to convince its critics that it was precisely because of their commitment to overthrow the global system of imperialist aggression that they were the more “genuine patriots” (zhenzheng de aigtozhe). 8 5 Chen Duxiu, “ Jiujing shi weiwu zuguo?” (Who actually doesn’ t have a fatherland?), 7 February 1927, in CZZX, 2:1198-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 159 Strains nothin the CCP’ s Frontier Programme & The National Soddist A Itematiw The cascade of anti-red criticism aimed at the CCP’s frontier programme engendered a noticeable shift in the Party’ s language, if not actual handling, of the national question. At the same time, the charge of lese majeste produced visible strains of discordance within the Party. In order to counter this criticism, many CCP ideologues began stressing how its policy of national self-determination was the best strategy for reunifying the multiethnic nation-state on a new revolutionary basis of proletarian equality. Chen Duxiu and other internationalists within the Party appealed to the practical reason of their critics, attempting to demonstrate the necessity of a temporary partitioning of the frontier from China proper. At the same time, however, Li Dazhao and other more nationalistic members of the Party made a subtle, but important, departure from the Comintern’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions; they argued that, due to China’ s unique historical circumstances, a national socialist m dution of all China’ s nim ns was required before proceeding to the stage of proletarian internationalism. Much like the anti-red coalition, the nationalists within the CCP chose to draw the circle of the Ihon^rm rrim tis self-determination firmly around the frontier minorities, stressing the conjoined struggle of all “Chinese” people against foreign imperialism. When their obtuse theoretical discussions of historical materialism failed to convince their readership of the validity of their frontier programme, Chen Duxiu and other authors of Xianglao stressed the impractical and doomed nature of a forced union between the frontier and China proper. In relation to Outer Mongolia, they aigued that R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 160 the country’s current political situation mandated a temporaiy separation of the Han majority from the Mongolian minority. Numerous articles published in Xiangko spoke of Outer Mongolia’ s encirclement by reactionary forces— the Chinese warlords to the south, the Japanese imperialists in the east and the White Russian bandits in the Northeast. The precarious nature of this situation meant that the people of Outer Mongolia were better off temporarily severing all political and economic ties with China and allying themselves with Soviet Russia, their only friendly neighbor. In a series of articles, Zhang Guotao and Gao Junyu emphasized the dangers of a Red Army withdrawal from Urga; it would be, in the words of Gao, like “offering up Mongolia as a sacrificial lamb to the imperialists and warlords.” 8 6 The premature removal of the Red Army would not only bring untold suffering to the Mongolian people, but also strengthen the power of the reactionary forces and hinder the ability of the Chinese people to liberate themselves. Internationalists within the Party also argued that successive generations of Han mistreatment had engendered a deep hatred and mistrust among the Mongolian masses. Chen Duxiu criticized the traditional attitude of “cherishing” ( hmibao or literally “nursing in one’ s arms”) the minorities, contending that many Han intellectuals and officials continued to treat the frontier peoples in a condescending and patronizing fashion. Zhou Enlai argued that only those Chinese people with “shallow knowledge” and “traditional prejudices” dismissed the necessity of Mongolian independence.8 7 8 6 Gao, “Guoren duiyu Menggu wenti ying chi de taidui,” 19; Zhang, “Haishi zanzhu xin Menggu bai,” 67. 8 7 Chen Duxiu, “Diguozhuyizhe zhiyu zhimindi de gongshi” (The imperialist formula for R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 161 "W hile Xiarqglao authors highlighted the deleterious nature of these traditional Han chauvinist attitudes, they were also quick to point out that “this animosity was not eternal and unresolvable.” Instead, they argued that the most effective method for dissipating this hatred was the temporary political separation of the Mongolian people from China, so that a new relationship could be forged on the basis of freedom and equality of their respective working classes. As Gao Junyu pointed out concerning Mongolia: We must make every effort to foster mutual understanding and alliance between the people of China and Mongolia. The oppressed masses of China want to explain to the Mongolian people: ‘Your hatred of the Chinese warlords and those Chinese people who have oppressed you is correct; however, it is a big mistake for you to hate all Chinese as a single mass without distinction. Many Chinese people are your friends. We also hate the people you hate. We want to build an intimate brotherly relationship with you, assisting us in defeating our common enemies!’ 8 8 In a Xiangko article examining the duplicity of the Beijing warlord government in the American-backed “Christian invasion” of Outer Mongolia, Chen Duxiu stressed the need for the Chinese and Mongolian masses to “jointly rise up” against their common enemies. Chen admitted, for the first time, that the CCP’s support for Outer Mongolian independence and its resistance to the dispatching of Chinese troops to retake the region was “a current strategic move” needed to prevent the region from falling into the hands of the reactionary powers. At the same time, he criticized those “short-sighted people” who questioned the CCP’s patriotic intent, and claimed that the controlling their colonies), X iangko zhoukzo 61 (16 April 1924): 492; Zhou Enlai, “Diguozhuyi baozhi xuanchuang de waimeng duli hou qingkuang” (Propaganda about the circumstances after Outer Mongolia independence in the Imperialist papers), 1 June 1924, Liu, T h w E ria i Zaoqi Wenj i , 2:476. 8 8 Gao, “Guoren duiyu Menggu wenti ying chi de taidui,” 20. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 162 Party favors the relinquishing of Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia. “The current relationship between Russia and Mongolia,” Chen stressed, “has already been clearly stated in the Sino-Soviet Accord, and we can all take a big sigh of relief without the slightest fear [of losing Mongolia], and respect the Mongolian nim ris independent self- rule (ddi zizhi) while resisting the dispatching of military troops by the Beijing warlords to take back Mongolia.”8 9 Note the subtle shift in Chen Duxiu’ s language from his earlier usage of the unequivocal expression “Mongolian independence” {Menggi dull) to the more circumscribed phrase “independent self-rule,” or in another article, “independent resistance” (ddi fankan^.9 0 Chen’ s careful choice of words clearly appears to be an attempt to emphasize the temporary and strategic nature of CCP support for Mongolian independence. In short, Outer Mongolia’ s “independent resistance” of Chinese warlordism and international imperialism was simply the most expedient method for bringing about a more enduring union of the Chinese and Mongolian people. Along with many of their readers, Xianglao polemists seemed to share an unspoken, and certainly naive, optimism about the common historical destiny of the Mongolian and Chinese people. While the Mongols were a distinct mnzn, like the Han people, and thus possessed their own independent volition, the Communists were confident that given the choice to freely unite with the liberated masses of China, the Mongols would gladly rejoin the fatherland. All that was required was for China to 8 9 Gien Duxiu, “Meiguo yinlue yu Menggu dull” (The American invasion and Mongolian independence), Xianglao zhoubao 75 (23 July 1924): 597-8. 9 0 d e n , “Women de huida,” 673. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 163 abandon the assimilationist policies of their imperial forefathers and adopt the revolutionary model of national self-determination pioneered by the Soviet Union. As Qu Qiubai stated in 1926: In the struggle of China’ s laboring masses to resist imperialism, we should adopt the model provided by the Soviet Union, organizing a revolutionary regime that will cause the Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, Muslims and other rrinzu within China’ s borders to join reidittkm ry China based on the principle of complete freedom and equality....The common people of the Chinese revolution should recognize the complete right of self-determination of these nationalities especially aiding the People’ s Republic of Mongolia, toim tew th China in opposition to imperialism based on the principle of freedom and equality.9 1 In other words, it was essential for China’ s frontier peoples to be granted the right of national self- determination so that they could freely join the Han people in their common revolutionary struggle. In fact, Qu Quibai argued, it was the failure of Chinese revolutionaries to disseminate their policy of national self-determination that caused the former Mongolian League of Tannu Tuva to join the Soviet Union in 1924 rather than a future federation with China. If only the toiling masses along China’ s frontier clearly understood the Party’s handling of the national question, “these small and weak nationalities would naturally be willing to join in a union with the Chinese revolution and at the same time provide a foundation for a federated China at the time of the revolutionary government.”9 2 Finally, in 1926 Chen Duxiu expressed his “exceedingly strong hope that in the future Mongolia will become a part of the Federated Chinese Republic,” but also warned that only after the Chinese revolutionaries have overthrown 9 1 Qu Quibai, “Lining zhuyi yu Zhongguo de guomin geming” (Leninism and China’ s republican revolution), X iangko zhoubao 143 (21 January 1926): 1300-03 (emphasis added). 9 2 Ibid., 1303. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 164 the warlord government and established a truly liberated and equal Zhonghua Republic would the Han people have the “qualifications and leisure time” to discuss this issue with the Mongolian people. In the meantime, China’ s revolutionary parties must respect the right of the Mongolian people to national self-determination in order to regain the confidence and trust of these oppressed minority people.9 3 Yet, not all Chinese Communists were willing to wait patiently for the frontier minorities to freely rejoin a federated Zhonghua Republic after the victory of the Han revolution. It is ironic that China’ s first Bolshevik, Li Dazhao, was also one of the most passionate defenders of Chinese national unity. Yet, as Maurice Meisner concludes in his authoritative biography, Li Dazhao “never really abandoned Chinese nationalism for Marxist internationalism.”9 4 Meisner demonstrates Li’ s single-minded commitment to the Chinese nation, even in the face of his harshest critics. While Chen Duxiu and others were attacking Chinese culture and calling for wholesale westernization during the New Culture Movement, Li Dazhao found himself a reluctant defender of Chinese tradition, calling for a synthesis of Oriental and Occidental civilizations— which he called the “two great pivots of world progress”— as the only path for Chinese salvation. Even after his conversion to Bolshevism in 1919, Li continued to speak of Chinese culture with a certain nationalist pride, now arguing that Russia, because of its geographic and cultural intersection between Europe and Asia, was to play a central role in the eventual creation of a new synthesis between East and West. Yet, the creation of 9 3 Chen, “Guomindang youpai dahui,” 1413-15. 9 4 Meisner, L i Ta- c hao and t he Origm i f Chi nes e Marxi sm, 37. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 165 this “grand harmony” (datan$, Li freely admitted was “a difficult and lengthy process at best,” and would first require a federated union of the Zhon$m ninzu, and then a “United States of Asia” prior to “a single federation that will completely destroy all boundaries between countries.”9 5 Thus, when the Comintern instructed the Chinese Communists to join their rival Nationalist Party in a United Front for the bourgeois- national liberation of the Chinese nation, Li Dazhao became one of its most vocal supporters. He was the first GCP member to join the Kuomintang and became the only Communist elected to the five-member Presidium of the KMT’ s new Central Executive Committee (CEQ. Maurice Meisner has argued that one of the ways in which Li Dazhao overcame the contradiction between class and nation imbedded in the work of Chen Duxiu and other early Chinese Communists was by developing a theory about China as a “proletarian nation.” Beginning in 1920, Li a r g u e d that China’ s intense oppression under international imperialism had transformed the entire Zhon^mt rrimu— factory worker and owner; Mongol and Han— into part of the world’ s proletariat class. Li’s argument was based on the implicit assumption that all class and national differences within the Zhongbm ninzu dissolved in the face of China’ s external enemies. Thus, in a single stroke Li’ s theory eliminated all internal divisions of class and nationality within the Chinese nation, shifting the main revolutionary contradiction to the global struggle between the imperialist “capitalist nations” and the oppressed “proletarian nations.” Li 9 5 Li Dazhao, “Lianzhizhuyi yu shijiezuzhi” (Federalism and world unity), 1 February 1919, in L i Dazhao Wenji (Collection cf Essays by L i Dazhao), comp. Zhongguo Li Dazhao yanjiuhui (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1999), 2:265-69 (Hereafter cited as LDZW f). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 166 Dazhao’ s “proletarian nation theory,” when placed within the context of the United Front, became the bedrock of a new found virulent nationalism.9 6 In his 1923 essay, “Popularism” {Pmgpmzhuyfy, Li hinted at the significance of his new thesis to the question of national unity in China. Here, Li contended that “all current political and social movements are movements of liberation (jiefangyundong): people seeking liberation from their country, localities seeking liberation from the center; colonies seeking liberation from their metropoles; small and weak ninzu seeking liberation from big and strong ninztc, peasants seeking liberation from their landlords; workers seeking liberation from the capitalists... .all these movements are popularist movements.”9 7 Li warned, however, that popularism should not be misconstrued as a trend towards disunion or detachment; rather it marked the evolutionary process of breaking down old, coercive forms of class-based organizations and replacing them with new, voluntary unions of the common people. For China’ s frontier minorities, popularism meant the elimination of their unjust and feudal relationship with China’ s past dynasties and the creation of a new union of equality between the five ninzu of the republic (wuzu “In China’s national flag,” Li wrote by way of example, “one color has been split into five. This is obviously an example of ‘ separation’ (faiie); but these five colors are arranged on a single flag in a very orderly fashion, and symbolize the five ninzu (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetan) forming a single new organization. This can be said to be an example of 9 6 See Meisner, L i T a-< hao and the Origins c f Chinese Marxism, 188-89; Hoston, The State, Identity, and the National Question, 195-203. 9 7 Li Dazhao, “Pingmin zhuyi” (Popularism), January 1923, in LDZWJ, 4:252. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 167 ‘ union’ (liarhe).” 9 % While in the past the five rrirnu were divided by different sentiments, customs, languages and regions, Li argued that this new, democratic-style of organization would be able to successfully eliminate all disputes, hatred and mutual suspicions among the nation’ s different races. Like the German federation, the Soviet Union or the Swiss canton system, the implementation of a political federation among the five ninzu would create a truly democratic and freely united China. Li Dazhao was one of the first Chinese intellectuals to employ the term ninzu zijue (national self- determination); yet, from his initial usage of the term in 1919 up until his death in 1927, he consistently used the term in reference to the national self-determination of the entire multi-racial Zhon$m ninzu from foreign imperialism and, not like Chen Duxiu and other Communists, the liberation of the Mongols and other frontier minorities from China proper." As far back as 1917, Li Dazhao was echoing Sun Yat-sen’ s call for the natural assimilation of China’ s five ninzu into a single, unified Zhongbua ninzu— a process that he referred to as “new Zhonghua nationalism” (xm Zba^m z ninzuzhuyi): In the distant recesses of our county’ s history, the various ninzus of Asia smelted ( y e r o n g ) together in forming a single Zhon^jua ninzu, eliminating all previous boundaries and blood lineages and forging our ninzus lofty and effervescent spirit. It is a pity that when the Republic was founded, there were those who still spoke of the five ninzu. Those with more foresight, however, realize that under a free and equal Republican system, the cultures of the five ninzu will gradually become one; thus, the terms Manchu, Han, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan (not to mention Miao and Yao) are now nothing more than 9 8 Ibid., 253-4. 9 9 Li first used the term ninzu zijue in his 1 January 1919 attack on Japanese “Pan-Asianism” {dayaxiyzzhuyi). In substitution of the “encroach-ism” (qmliiezhuyi) central to Japan’s Pan-asianism, Li called for the creation of a “New Asianism” {xinyaxiyazhuyi) that advocated the “national self-determinism” (ninzu zijuezhwfi) of all Asian countries. See Li Dazhao, “Dayaxiyazhuyi yu xinyaxiyazhuyi” (Pan-Asianism and new Asianism), 1 January 1919, in LDZWJ, 2:253-55; also see Li Dazhao, “Zailun xinyaxiyazhuyi” (Another discussion of new Asianism), 1 November 1919, in LDZWJ, 3:74-78. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 168 residual historical names. By now the boundary between them has long ago been replaced with membership in a single Zhonghua Republic, and they now comprise a new Zhon$ma ninzu ”1 0 0 Li Dazhao, like Sun Yat-sen, was a committed student of Charles Darwin, and had little doubt in the organic unity of the “Chinese nation,” or what he followed Sun and others in calling the Z.hon$m ninzu. While Chen Duxiu and other Xiangko authors were attempting to defend the merits of Mongolian national self-determination, Li Dazhao was redirecting the Party’ s discourse towards the broader, and in his mind more important, Darwinian struggle of the entire Yellow race against the White imperialist powers. In a May 1924 lecture on the “race question” (renzhong'iienti) at Beijing University, Li Dazhao criticized what he saw as the petty, internal squabbling between the brothers of the Yellow race, and attempted to draw the attention of his audience to the larger struggle for survival currently facing the entire Chinese nation.1 0 1 Li began his lecture by stressing the distinction between the terms ninzu (nation or nationality) and gm rin (citizen or citizenship) and renzhong (race). Li defined guanin as a “political and legal concept” that differed from ninzu and renzhongm that “only a group of people that form a collective life under a type of political rule can be called a guonin” The distinction between ninzu and the other two terms rested on cultural and historic differences. As a result, “only a gjtoninthst exists under a shared history and culture can converge into a single ninzu ” 1 0 0 Li Dazhao, “Xin Zhonghua minzuzhuyi” (New Zhonghua nationalism), 19 February 1917, in LDZWJ, 1:288. 1 0 1 Li Dazhao, “Renzhong wenti— zai Beijing daxue zhengzhi xuehui de yanjiang” (The race question— a lecture before the Political Study Society of Beijing University), 13 May 1924, in LDZWJ, 4: 427-433. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 169 Finally, Li argued that rmzhang was an anthropological term which related to the physical differences between peoples, such as between the Yellow renzhong and the White renzhong. Li pointed out that while not all the people of the former Qing dynasty were currently citizens of the Chinese Republic, they were nonetheless still members of a single nation The people of Taiwan, for example, were presently the gjiarrm of the Japanese empire; yet they continued to share a common culture and history with the rest of China’ s people, and thus still belong to the Zhon$m ninzu. Li viewed “citizenship,” “nationality,” and “race” as three overlapping and increasingly inclusive forms of social grouping. However, rather than placing the focus of his attention on the conflict between the various guanin within China’ s ninzu, as Chen Duxiu and other CCP members did in their discussions of the national question, Li Dazhao made the point of aiguing in his lecture that renzhong was the “pivot” (shunui) or “central concept” (zhor&inckgponniari) of these three sociological categories. Li believed, again much like Sun Yat-sen, that the Yellow and the White races, rather than the smaller Mongolian, Han, Chinese or Japanese sub-groupings, was the crux of the current evolutionary struggle. Throughout the early 1920’ s, Li was a vocal exponent of what he called “new Asianism” (gcinyaxiyazhuyi!), the federated union of the Yellow race against White imperialism. In his Beijing University lecture, Li argued that distinct “racial instincts” (renzhong b e n n e n g ) engendered inevitable clashes of opinion and conflict among the world’ s races, and stressed the importance of unity in overcoming this evolutionary struggle for survival. Li warned his Beida audience against the “pointless disputes and despicable suspicions and jealousies” that have currently divided the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 170 Zhonghua nation and the Yellow Race. In a remarkably similar vein to Daijitao and other cultural nationalists, Li concluded his lecture by stating: “Regardless of what [group we belong to], we must all vigorously and courageously advance forward, so that our national characteristics {ninzu texin$ will be given full play on the future national stage and our national spirit (ninzu jinghen) will command attention within our ninzu $ history and the history of the world; this precisely why I have chosen to discuss the race questions with you gentlemen today.”1 0 2 Believing that human evolution was naturally unfolding towards increasingly more inclusive social groupings, Li looked with disfavor on the nationalist aspirations of small, evolutionarily-unfit “minorities.” In his lecture, Li echoed Engels’ criticism of the French Bonapartists’ “principle of nationalities.” This late 19th century doctrine supported the right of all geographically distinct nationalities— regardless of size— to political independence from their large, multi-ethnic empires. Li was clearly aware of and wholeheartedly agreed with Engels’ distinction between nations, which he described as “large,” “well-defined,” “historical,” and “great” peoples of “undoubted vitality,” and nationalities, which Engels’ termed the “numerous small relics of peoples,” whose “chief mission” was to “perish in the universal revolutionary storm.” For both Li and Engels, historical progress centered on large, well-defined national populations, such as the Chinese nation or the Yellow race.1 0 3 1 0 2 Ibid., 433. 1 0 3 Ibid., 428-29; Frederick Engels, “Letter to the Editor of The Conrnmmlth” (1866), in Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), 20:155-158; Engels, “The Magyar Struggle,” 217. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 171 The tension between Chen Duxiu’ s proletarian internationalism and Li Dazhao’ s national socialist alternative comes into sharper focus when considering Li’ s views on the Mongolian question. In a March 1925 essay published in the Kuomintang newspaper, Minguo ribao, Li Dazhao depicted the Mongolian people’ s revolutionary struggle as an intrinsic and interlocking component of the entire Zhon$m rrmziis “national liberation movement.” Li began his essay by emphasizing the history of past oppression the Mongolian people suffered under the single- ninzu dictatorship of the Manchu Qing empire and foreign imperialist encroachment. Despite the sincere efforts of the Kuomintang to bring about an equitable union of all domestic ninzu after the 1911 revolution, the Chinese warlordism had rekindled the domestic and international oppression of the Mongolian people. Li contended that what was needed to overcome this state of subjugation was not a temporaxy segregation of the Mongolian and Chinese peoples as Chen Duxiu argued, but rather the “drawing of the liberation movements of Mongolia and China closer together.”1 0 4 While paying lip service to the pledge of “self- determination” contained in the Kuomintang’ s Reorganization Manifesto, Li followed the Kuomintang rightwing in quoting from Sun Yat-sen’s Outline for National Reconstruction conceming the duty of the government to “prop-up and guide” (fitzbi) China’ s domestic ninzu so that they can carryout “self-determination and self-rule” (zijuezizhi). 1 0 4 Li Dazhao, “Menggu minzu de jiefang yundong” (The liberation movement of the Mongolian nationality), March 1925, in LDZWJ, 5:41. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 172 Li made no mention of the CCP’ s policy supporting Outer Mongolian independence, but rather stressed the “convergence” (huigri) of China’ s “national revolutionary movement” and the Mongolian people’s “liberation movement,” which, he claimed, irrevocably “linked” (jiehfy the Mongolian ninzu to the Chinese Republic. To illustrate this point, Li asked his readers to recall when the Outer Mongolian government dispatched a representative to the Kuomintang’ s Reorganization Congress; and Sun Yat-sen promised that the Chinese people held only sincere friendship and good faith towards the Mongolian people. “This [event] demonstrates,” Li concluded, “that a voluntary union {ziym lianhty— like the harmonious cooperation and arrangement between an elder and younger brother— has long ago been established between the Chinese and Mongolian ninzu through the convergence of the Nationalist Patty’s ninztehuyi with the liberation movement (jiefargyundong) of the Mongolian nationality under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen and the Mongolian Nationalist Party.”1 0 5 Li Dazhao’ s choice of language seems a good indicator of his intent. Li decided to couch his argument in terms of the “liberation movement” (jiefarigyundong) of the Mongolian people and the “voluntary union” (ziyou liarhfy of the Mongolian and Chinese people rather than the rights of “national self-determination” {ninzu zijud) and “voluntary federation” {ziyou lianbang) set forth in the CCP’ s 1923 frontier programme. Li’ s language is clearly at odds with Chen Duxiu and other Xianglao authors’ handling of the national question; and reflects more closely the rhetoric of the Kuomintang critics of the COP. Li concluded his essay with a subtle reminder to the Soviet Union that they 1 0 5 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 173 have already agreed in the Sino-Soviet Accord to withdraw Russian troops from Mongolian territory in order that the question of the “relationship between these two fraternal n in zif be peacefully resolved amongst themselves. “We Chinese,” Li wrote with a hint of cynicism, “are very grateful and understanding of the Soviet Union’s respect for our right to determine our own affairs and the burning desire of the Chinese and Mongolian people for a voluntary union; and thus, they clearly understand this great opportunity for our two ninzu to advance together hand-in-hand under the flag of the Nationalist revolution.”1 0 6 Despite the fact that Li Dazhao’ s life was cut short when the warlord Zhang Zaolin had him strangled to death in 1927, his national socialist alternative proved extremely influential in the CCP’ s development. As Stuart Schram and others have demonstrated, Li Dazhao’ s thought directly influenced Mao Zedong and his efforts to “sinicize” European Marxism following his rise to power in the 1930s.1 0 7 Both men shared a firm belief in the organic national unity of the Zhonghua ninzu, and felt that the gradual, non-violent assimilation of the frontier minorities was crucial to China’ s evolutionary straggle against the foreign imperialists. Like Stalin, Mao and Li envisioned China’ s revolutionary struggle as “socialist in content and nationalist in form.” Under the watchful eye of the Communist International, however, Li’ s national socialist orientation remained marginalized within the Party. Prior to the collapse of the United Front and the fall from power of Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai, proletarian 1 ( * Ibid. 1 0 7 Meisner, L i Ta-chao and the Origins c f Chinese Marxism, 261-66; Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), 47-58. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 174 internationalism, and by extension minority national self-determination, remained the official policy of the Chinese Communist Party. The Collapse cfthe United Front & the N atkm lizatim c f the National Question With the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang rightwing holding such diametrically opposing views on the national, land, labor and other political questions, the balance of power and ultimate fate of the United Front rested squarely with what the Comintern labeled the Kuomintang “Left” and “Middle” wings. Following the Western Hills revolt of the KMT Right, Stalin concluded that close GCP cooperation with the left-leaning members of the Kuomintang was crucial for the preservation of China’ s bourgeois-proletariat United Front. To accomplish this task, the Comintern initiated a policy of “expanding the Left, criticizing the Middle and opposing the Right.” At the January 1926 Second National Congress of the KMT, the rightwing was expelled from the Party and Wang Jingwei, the leader of the Kuomintang Left, was selected Party chairman, while the Central Executive Committee (CEQ was stacked full of Kuomintang Left and Middle members. Chiang Kai-shek’s failed co u p d’ etat of 20 March 1926 and the launching of the Northern Expedition under his military command meant that the Comintern could no longer ignore the growing influence of Chiang and his loyal Whampoa Military Academy supporters. Chiang’ s clique was now referred to as the Kuomintang “Middle,” and at a July 1926 Plenum of the GCP, the Comintern implemented a new policy of “coping with” (ymgfii), rather than criticizing, the Middle in the hope of isolating Chiang from the Kuomintang Right. Consequently, Stalin and the Comintern continued to call on the CCP to cooperate with Chiang up until his tragic R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 175 massacre of Chinese Communists on 12 April 1927, and then with Wang Jingwei’ s Kuomintang Left until the dissolution of the United Front in July of 1927.1 0 8 In the past, when analyzing the collapse of the United Front, scholars have focused almost exclusively on the contentious issues of land reform and class struggle, while overlooking the important role the national question played in the estrangement of the Kuomintang Left and Middle from what was increasingly viewed as a Comintern (and by extension Russian) controlled United Front. In fact, as stated earlier, I would argue that the perception of GCP duplicity in the Russian occupation of Outer Mongolia played a significant, and largely unrecognized, role in the collapse of the United Front. The leader of the Kuomintang Left, Wang Jingwei, appeared to have shared Dai Jitao’ s culturalist interpretation of Sun Yat-sen’ s Three People’ s Principles. Wang, who once argued in 1905 that the most evolutionary fit states were those comprised of only a single ninzu (see Chapter One), continued well into the 1920s to contend that the principle aim of ninzuzhuyi was to ensure the fundamental unity of the entire Zhonghua ninzu in the Darwinian struggle against foreign imperialism. Despite adopting a critical attitude towards past Flan oppression of its frontier minorities, Wang and other members of the KMT Left favored the construction of a new union based on economic and political equality, rather than the ethnic disintegration of the old Qing empire.1 0 9 1 0 8 See Luk, The Origins c f Chinese Bdshedsm, 119-131; Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China; Donald A Jordon, The Northern Expedition: China’ s National R ew k d m tf1926-1928 (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1976). 1 0 9 See, for example, Wang Jingwei, “Women zenyang shixing sanminzhuyi?” (How can we realize the Three People’ s Principles), 1926, in Wangjingim Wenam (Collected Writing (fW angJingm), ed. Wang Zhaoming (Shanghai: Zezhi yingsu gongsi, 1935); Kao Ersong, “Minzuzhuyi” (Nationalism), in Sun ZhorghanXianshengyu Zhongzuo (Mr. Sun Yat-senandChina) (Shanghai: minzhi shuchu, 1926): 42-44; Jiangsu R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 176 From the founding of the United Front, Wang Jingwei and other left-leaning members of the KMT joined the conservatives within the Party in rejecting Lenin’ s principle of national self-determination. According to Borodin’ s own admission, Wang Jingwei was at the forefront of the opposition to his attempts to place a strong and unambiguous pledge of minority national self-determination in the Manifesto of the KMT’ s Reorganization Congress. Wang remained unconvinced by Borodin’s argument that the KMT needed to actively support Mongolian political independence if it hoped to achieve a future reunion with the Mongols and other frontier minorities following the success of the Chinese revolution; instead, he lobbied for the inclusion of a statement in support of immediate cooperation between the Han masses and the frontier minorities.1 1 0 Wang Jingwei and other members of the KMT Left appeared to have initially trusted the intentions of Soviet Russia and the Comintern towards China. Prior to the souring of relations between the Comintern and Wang Jingwei in 1927, it seemed that the Left saw the Soviet Union as a sincere ally working for the liberation of the Chinese people from the oppression of foreign imperialism In a 1925 discussion of international problems, Wang stressed the long history of foreign encroachment on China’ s frontier regions, providing a detailed description of England’ s policy in Tibet and Tsarist Russian aggression in Mongolia which resulted in the unequal Simla Agreement of 1913 and Tripartite Agreement of 1914. Yet, prior to 1927, Wang did not appear to share the Pinglun ed., Zhongiuo GuormkmgZtiopai ABC(The A B C ’ s c f theICdcmritangLeft) (Beiping: Cengshang faxing chubanshe, 1930). 1 1 0 [Borodin], “Bao-luo-ting de zhaji he tongbao,” 448-50. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 177 fears of the Kuomintang Right that Soviet Russia had inherited the imperialist “national character” of its Tsarist forefathers.1 1 1 The numerous examples of Russian intrigue in northern China publicized by the Western Hills and YCP factions during 1925 and 1926 seemed, however, to have fostered a growing suspicion among leading members of the Left about the Comintern’s ulterior motives. These doubts contributed to the Left’ s eventual decision to abandon the United Front after the new, and far less politically savvy, Comintern representative, M.N. Roy, demanded their cooperation in the carrying out of a full-scale land revolution in July 1927. Following the break, Chen Gongbo, a former communist who became one of the Left’ s leading ideologues, began blaming the collapse of the United Front on Soviet Russia’ s attempts to spread their ideology and influence in China, instead of sincerely assisting the Chinese people in their own national liberation. Chen argued that one of the Third International’ s biggest mistakes was a naive faith in the ability of the communist economic system to spread throughout the backward economies of Asia in violation of Marx’ s theory of historical materialism. Just as Chen believed China’ s economic conditions were not ripe for communism, he also questioned Soviet Russia’ s occupation of Mongolia in the name of proletarian internationalism Why, Chen asked his readers, are the Comintern and the GCP attempting to spread communism throughout Mongolia when their reports claim that “the Mongols are still at the nomadic stage of development, completely without a concept of private property and 1 1 1 Wang Jingwei, “Guominhuiyi guoji wenti caoan” (A draft proposal on international questions for the national conference), 17 April 1925, in Wang, Wangjingim Wemm, 179-224. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 178 any hope of realizing a communist society?” Chen concluded that Russia’ s “attempt to seize Outer Mongolia” was just another example of the fact that “the Third International has already abandoned its so-called ‘ materialist viewpoint’ and adopted the imperialist policies of old Russia.”1 1 2 Since the onset of the United Front, the so-called “Kuomintang Middle” seemed to share this distrust of the Comintern’ s frontier programme. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Kuomintang Middle, was one of the first KMT leaders to directly challenge Soviet intentions in China. Given his strong reaction to the Mongolian crisis of 1912-13, it should come as no surprise that Chiang Kai-shek was quick to question the Red Army’s occupation of Urga in the name of assisting Mongolian national self- determination. Just prior to the formal establishment of the independent People’ s Republic of Mongolia (and while Mating and Sun Yat-sen were engaged in negotiations over the formation of the United Front), Sun dispatched Chiang Kai-shek to head a fact-finding delegation to Moscow. The delegation was ordered to carryout a thorough study of the political, economic and military conditions of the Soviet Union while gauging their intentions towards China. When the delegation arrived in Moscow on 2 September 1923, they met with top Bolshevik and Comintern officials and toured party, government and military installations through to the end of the year. Chiang’ s biographers admit that he was greatly impressed by the military organization and training of the Red Army, and eventually used many of these same 1 1 2 Chen Gongbo, “ Jinhou de Guomindang” (The future of the Kuomintang), attached to “Zhongguo guomindang gaizu tongzhihui diyici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” (First National Conference of the Kuomintang’ s Reorganization Comrades Association), February 1929, in ZGQZ, 1: R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 179 methods while serving as commander of the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton. He was less impressed, however, with the political and ideological goals of Russian communism. Chiang was especially suspicious of the intentions of Moscow and the Comintern towards China, specifically its Outer Mongolia frontier. During a 21 October 1923 meeting, Chiang Kai-shek engaged in a heated debate with Russian Foreign Minister Georgii Chicherin over the Mongolian question. During the meeting, Chicherin attempted to convince Chiang and the Kuomintang to follow the lead of the GCP in formally recognizing Outer Mongolian independence. Yet, Chiang strenuously opposed what he saw as Soviet Russia’ s dishonest intentions towards this integral part of Chinese territory, an opinion that he reemphasized in an October 26th letter to Chicherin: The other day you stated that ‘ the Mongolian people are afraid of the Chinese.’ I want you to know that what the Mongolian people fear is the current warlord government in Beijing and absolutely not the Kuomintang who advocates ninzuzhuyi. Because the Mongolian people have fear in their hearts, they urgently desire to break away from this frightening environment. To help in this cause, the Kuomintang wants to quickly achieve the goal of mutual and intimate cooperation [between the Mongols and the Han people] by way of affording them autonomy (zizhi). If Soviet Russia is sincere [toward the Kuomintang], she should immediately help the Mongols remedy this dreadful situation. You must understand that the Kuomintang’ s policy of ninzuzhuyi does not call for the various [Chinese] ninzus to split apart, rather it advocates mutual and intimate cooperation based on a national spirit {ninzu jinsghai).1 1 3 558-78. The quote can be found on p. 562. 1 1 3 Zhongguo dier lishi dang’ anguan, ed.,JiangJieshi Nianpu Chugio (Prdininary Draft Chronology cf Chiang Kai-shek’ s life) (Nanjing: dangan chubanshe, 1992), 137-38. On Chiang’s trip to the Soviet Union also see Wang Fumin, JiangJieshi Zhuan {Biography cfChiangKai-shek) (Beijing: Jingji riban chubanshe, 1989), 58-60; Yan Ruping, “ Jiang Jishi” (Chiang Kai-shek), 'voMirtguoRenw Zhuan {RepuHiamEra Biographies), eds. Yan Ruping and Zong Zhiwen (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), 9: 3-4. According to a Russian archieve transcript of a 1923 conversation between Borodin and Qu Qiubia, Trostky also pushed Chiang to recognized Outer Mongolian independence during his visit to Moscow. [Michael Borodin], “Bao-luo-ting tong Qu Qiubai de tanhua jilu” (Transcript of Borodin’s conversation with Qu Qiubai), 16 December 1923, in LG YL, 1: 383. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 180 Upon his return to China, Chiang would have been certain to express his fears about Russian objectives in Mongolia to Sun and other Party leaders; yet, Sun Yat-sen had already made up his mind that the concerns of Chiang and others were outweighed by the Kuomintang’ s urgent need for Russian political and military assistance. Chiang also found it difficult to deny the importance of Russian aid for the Kuomintang’ s hopes of reuniting China. In fact, it was only after the successful completion of the Northern Expedition (during which Russian military assistance was crucial) that Chiang decided to openly break with the Soviet Union and its CCP allies. During a speech given only a few months after his violent April 1927 break with the United Front, Chiang made it clear that neither foreign powers nor “internal bandits” would succeed in tearing the Zhonghua nation asunder: Our Zhonghua ninzu is not a single ninzu, it is comprised of a total of five lineages (zorqszu)— the Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans— united together to form the entire Zhongjma ninzu. There is historic, geographic and cultural evidence proving that the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans must unite together and become what is known as the Zhan$rua ninzu and that they can never be split apart. Our ninzuzhuyi, externally, aims at protecting our entire ninztis independence and unity, not allowing any part of [our nation] to be invaded; internally, it aims at promoting equality and freedom, and not allowing any group of people from one ninzu to oppress another ninzu. We not only want to seek the independence and equality of the Zhcn$m ninzu, but we also must cultivate the spirit of propping-up and guiding (fiahi) the weak and small ninzu of the East so that they can unite together and jointly enjoy the benefits of independence and freedom.1 1 4 Chiang Kai-shek, as evident from the above remarks, shared the same inclusivist and social Darwinian interpretation of ninzuzhuyi as Daijitao and the Western Hlls clique. 1 1 4 Chiang Kai-shek, “Sanminzhuyi gangyao” (Essentials of the Three People’s Principles: a lecture before the Nanjing Military Academy), July 1929, in Shen,Jiar% Wdyuanzhctng Quanji, 1:177-78. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 181 The Kuomintang political resolutions passed under the tenure of Wang Jingwei illustrate the attempt by the Kuomintang Left and Middle to distance the Party from the Comintern’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions. Despite the fact that the entire period between January 1926 and July 1927 marked the apex of CCP and Comintern influence on the revolutionary platform of the Kuomintang, one finds a surprising departure from Bolshevik theory in the Party’ s pronouncements on the national question. Not only did the Left and Middle reject the CCP’s 1923 radical frontier programme, they also spumed Sun Yat-sen’ s more moderate 1924 programme which was contained within the Manifesto of the Party’ s Reorganization Congress. While the Kuomintang Left and Middle appeared receptive to the Comintern’s initiatives on the land question, they reneged on the Party’s earlier pledges to support minority national self-determination. It would seem that the Kuomintang Left and Middle were willing to acknowledge the important role of the peasants within the Chinese revolution, only if their ranks also include the non-Han masses of Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria and Xinjiang. The Kuomintang Left/Middle and Chinese Communists completely dominated the 278 delegates who arrived in Guangzhou for the Kuomintang’ s Second National Congress in January 1926. The meeting not only expelled the leaders of the Western Hills clique but also criticized Party conservatives (such as Daijitao) for their lack of revolutionaiy discipline. Its new thirty-six member Central Executive Committee (CEQ was comprised of over twenty Kuomintang Left/Middle members and nine Chinese Communists, with Daijitao remaining the only clearly conservative member of the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 182 CEG1 1 5 In the area of land policy, the Manifesto and Resolutions of the Second Congress represented a significant radicalization of the Kuomintang’ s political platform, declaring that “our Party will everywhere and always regard the peasant movement as its base and all political and economic policies will accordingly stem from it.”1 1 6 Yet, on the national question, the Congress documents represented an important departure from the First Congress’ Manifesto. The new documents omitted all reference to the right of self-determination and instead stated that all oppressed peoples should respect two fundamental aspects of equality: 1) self-seeking equality and 2) the right of others to seek equality.1 1 7 Even more revealing, the Congress’ “Draft Resolution on Party Periodicals” set forth a new, more conservative, interpretation of ninzuzhuyi, calling on Party propaganda to stress “first, the overthrowing of imperialist oppression and the achievement of independence, and second, the establishment of a unified government based on the five-power constitution” as the two most important components of Sun Yat-sen’ s principle of ninzuzhuyi. In doing so, it completely removed any mention of the 1 1 5 See the list of CEC members and their biographies in Li Songlin, comp., Zhonggpo G m rm kng Shi Dacidian (Encydopaedia c f Chinese Kuonintang Party History) (Anhui: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1993), 676 & 383-563 passim It is interesting to note that an amazing 42% of the CEC were former Tongmenghui members. Their advanced age coupled with involvement in the Tongmenghui’ s anti-Manchu propaganda campaign may help to partially explain their generally conservative handling of the national question. According to a recent study, the Kuomintang Left and the Communists occupied 168 out of the total 278 delegates (60%) to the Second Congress, while the Middle and the Right had 65 (23%) and 45 (16%) seats respectively. See Xiao Shen, “Dageming shiqi zhong Zhonggong dui Guomindang de guanzi he celue” (The CCP’s relationship with and strategy towards the Kuomintang in the great revolutionary period), JindaishiyanjiuS (1987):41. 1 1 6 Cited in Fernando Galbiati, P ’ engP’ ai and theHai-LurFengScniet (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 233. 1 1 7 “Zhongguo guomindang dierci quanguo daibai dahui xuanyan” (Manifesto of the Kuomintang’ s Second National Congress), January 1926, in ZGQZ, 1:98-114. The quote is from p. 99 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 183 significance of Sun’ s doctrine of ninzuzhuyi for the frontier minorities.1 1 8 Finally, while acknowledging the importance of the Reorganization Congress’ interpretation of the Three People’ s Principles, the Second Congress’ Manifesto also called on Party members to respect Sun’ s will, which it stressed also included Sun’s more nationalistic Jiangito Dagtng {Outline for National Reconstruction) and 1924 lectures.1 1 9 The Third CEC Plenum of the Second National Congress approved an even more significant shift within the Kuomintang’ s frontier programme. As Chiang Kai- shek’ s troops closed in on Shanghai, thirty-three members and alternates of the CEC met in Wuhan in early March 1927. Due to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and his followers boycotted the meeting, the plenum was comprised almost completely of Kuomintang Left and CCP members. Following the tone set at the Second Party Congress, the Plenum passed resolutions calling for a further radicalization of the peasant movement, giving tentative support to the Comintern’ s policy for the eventual confiscation and equalization of all land in China.1 2 0 Although the Comintern convinced the Kuomintang Left to follow its lead on the land question, it seemed to come at a significant price: the complete re-working of the Party’s frontier platform. In an important directive issued by the Plenum to all Kuomintang members, one finds a subtle, but radically important, shift in the Party’s language on the national question: Our Party has already reached a crucial time in our revolutionary unification of the country. From today forward not only must we seek to make the Zhongnia 1 1 8 “Guanyu dangbao jueyian” (Draft Resolution on Party Periodicals), 16 January 1926, in ZGQZ, 1:144. 1 1 9 “Zhongguo guomindang dierci quanguo daibai dahui xuanyan,” 113. 1 2 0 Luk, The Origns ( f Chinese Bdsheusm, 118-19; Miao, Zhongym GuomndmgShi, 189-98. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 184 ninzu free and equal with the outside world, we must also seek to make our domestic national minorities {shaoshu nirutfy entirely equal. We must confirm that our Party’ s ninzuzhuyi is in favor of national liberation, and does not have the appearance of false gxyiazhuyi (state-ism) which resists outside powers, but domestically oppresses small and weak ninzu. Our Party’ s comrades must give all their strength towards assisting in the liberation (jiefang) of the Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibet national minorities, so that they can seek a voluntary union {ziyou lianhi) after our Party unifies the country. Our Party’s comrades should pay special attention to this point.1 2 1 At first glance, the directive appears to represent only a slight alteration in the language of previous United Front pronouncements on the national question. Upon closer examination, however, the careful choice of words marks a significant change in both the meaning and intention of the Party’s frontier programme. First, the term shaoshu ninzu is used in place of ninzu, signifying that all China's minority frontier peoples comprise part of a single Zhonghua nation/race (Zhongfrua ninziij. Prior to 1927, Chinese revolutionaries, regardless of party affiliation, made exclusive use of the term ninzu or maniao ninzu (small and weak ninzu) when referring to the Mongols, Hui, Tibetans and other former Qing frontier peoples; and from what I can gather, the above document represents the first usage of the term shaoshu ninzu in either Kuomintang or 1 2 1 “Dui quanti dangyuan shunling” (Directive to all Party members), 16 March 1927, in ZGQZ, 1: 315. This new policy was also reflected in the Plenum’ s “Draft Resolution on the Question of the Inner Mongolian Nationalist Party.” In an attempt to regain control of the various political organizations established by Inner Mongolians in the name of the Kuomintang (many of whom had pan-Mongolian aspirations), the Resolution stated that the central party office must approve all work done by its Inner Mongolian branches and all work must be carried out in accordance with the directives of officials dispatched from the central party office. See “Neimenggu guomindang wenti jueyian” (Draft Resolution on the Question of the Inner Mongolian Nationalist Party), 13 March 1926, in ZGQZ, 1:331. Finally, it is interesting to note that the problem of Outer Mongolia remained unsolved at the Plenum. In a resolution on the Outer Mongolia question, the Party called for a mutual exchange of representatives between Urga and Wuhan, stating that “all issues about the relationship between the Nationalist Party of China and the Nationalist Party of Outer Mongolia should be reached through compromise after the mutual exchange of representatives.” See “Duyu Waimenggu guomindang guanxi wenti jueyian” (Draft Resolution on the Question of the Relationship of the Mongolian Nationalist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party), 13 March 1926, in ZGQZ, 1: 331-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 185 GCP discourse. What was the reason for the sudden shift in terminology? I would argue that one of the most effective and least confrontational ways for Chinese intellectuals to sidestep the Comintern’ s policy of granting all rrinzu, especially oppressed small and weak rrinzu like the Mongols, the right of national self-determination (rrbuu zijue) was to re-designate China’ s frontier peoples as “m m rity nationalities” {shacehu ninzu) within a single, multi-ethnic Zhonghua nation. In this way, it was the entire Zhon^mi ninzu and not its minority ethnic components that should be granted the right of national self- determination from foreign imperialism. Second, following on this point, the document states that China’ s national minorities were seeking their “liberation” (jiefang) and not “ seh-determination” (zijue) from domestic oppression. Furthermore, this liberation struggle was described as an important component of the Zhonghua nation’s larger struggle for national seh-determination. Finally, the goal of the Kuomintang’ s new frontier programme was the “voluntary union” (ziyou lianhe) of the frontier peoples with the Flan majority rather than the “voluntary federation” (ziyou lianharg) advocated by Chinese Communists. The Kuomintang Left rejected the federalist model advocated by both the CCP and the Bolsheviks, arguing instead that a highly centralized state system with some sort of undefined autonomy for the frontier regions was the most effective vehicle towards national unity. The importance of this new discourse cannot be overstated. The frontier programme passed by the March 1927 Plenum marked a watershed in the “ nationalization” of the national question in China. Its language was clearly meant to de link China’ s internal national question from international issues of imperialism and R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 186 colonialism, as set forth in Lenin’ s Theses on the National and Colonial Questions and the GCP’ s 1923 frontier programme, while placing the problem firmly within the realm of domestic Chinese statecraft. The national question was now described as an issue concerned fundamentally with the different ethnic components of a single Zhonghua nation, namely the relationship between the Han majority and the frontier minorities, and not political self-determination of the world’ s small and weak nations. In one fell semiotic swoop the taut boundary of the Chinese nation-state was stretched over the discontented heads of the former Qing dynasty frontier peoples, transforming them from distinct “nations” (ninzvt) into integral “national minorities” (shaoshu rrinzu) of a single Chinese nation. Moreover, the fact that this new discourse was approved at a Plenum which contained at least nine CCP members (38% of the known participants)1 2 2 suggests the tacit approval of these Communists and a parallel “ nationalization” of the national question within CCP discourse. Finally, the Plenum’ s new frontier programme not only redefined the linguistic and semantic boundaries of the national question within Republican era political discourse, but it also set the framework from which both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek constructed their own frontier programmes during the late 1930s and 1940s. The tragic collapse of the United Front left the Chinese Communist Party in near complete disarray. The bloody purge of Communists in Shanghai and other regions under Chiang Kai-shek’ s control left thousands of the Party’ s most talented members 1 2 2 For a list of Plenum participants see Miao, Zhon^uo Gmmindang Shi, 192. The CCP delegates were Mao Zedong, Wu Yuzhang, Song Qingling, Yun Daiyin, Yu Shude, Peng Zemin, Dong Xinwu, Xia YI and Jiang Hao. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 187 either dead or in prison. With the final collapse of the alliance with Wang Jingwei’ s Kuomintang Left in July, Mikhail Borodin, the Comintern's long-time chief advisor in China, left Wuhan for Moscow. Finally, two of the CCP’ s leading intellectuals and most committed internationalists, Chen Duxiu and Qu Qiubai, were removed from positions of authority within the party by the Comintern— Chen Duxiu in April of 1927 for “opportunist errors” that supposedly resulted in the failure of the United Front and then Qu Qiubai in April 1928 for the “putschism” which lead to the failure of the Canton Commune uprisings. This shake-up of the Party's leadership was accompanied by a dramatic reduction in overall Party membership from 60,000 in April 1927 to less than 10,000 by the end of the year.1 2 3 In short, by early 1929 most of the Party’ s experts on the national question— Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Zheng Chaolin and others— had been either killed or removed from positions of authority within the Party, leaving the future of the CCP’ s frontier programme in a state of uncertainty. All hope for new direction now fell on the Party’ s upcoming Sixth Party Congress in Moscow. The Congress, which met during the summer of 1928, oversaw the reorganization of the Party under the careful direction of Pavel Mif, the Comintern’ s new chief expert on China. Pavel Mif ensured the placement of the so-called “28 Bolsheviks,” a group of young CCP members trained and educated at the Sun Yat-sen Academy under Mif stewardship, to positions of prominence within the Party. The 1 2 3 See Jerome Ch’en, “The Communist Movement, 1927-37,” in The Nationalist Era in China, 1927- 49, eds. Lloyd E. Eastman et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54. Compare this decline in CCP membership with the rise of Kuomintang membership from only 150,000 in 1926 to 630,00 in 1929. See Lloyd E. Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Naking decade, 1927-1937,” in Eastman, The Nationalist Era in Chim, 3. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 188 Congress also called for a radical shift in the direction of the Chinese revolution. Without personally accepting blame, Stalin and the Comintern acknowledged the failure of the United Front and called on the CCP to establish its own army and soviet bases in the Chinese countryside. This shift in strategy marked an unofficial, but significant, departure from Lenin’ s famous Theses on the National and Colonial Questions for China’ s revolution. Talk of fashioning an anti-imperialist alliance among the Chinese proletariat and national bourgeois was replaced with a call for the CCP to ride the “rising revolutionary tide” in China by fomenting national socialist uprising among the workers and peasants. The compradors, native bourgeois and feudal landlords now joined the ranks of the foreign imperialist as enemies of the Chinese people. The emphasis within the Chinese revolution gradually drifted away from the struggle of the colonial nations and advanced proletarian nations against the global forces of capitalism towards China’ s own unique struggle for national liberation. One would expect this major shift in policy to affect the Party’ s handling of the national question; yet, a new consensus on how to deal with this sensitive issue failed to arise. The Manifesto and Resolutions of the Sixth Party Congress reflect the continued uncertainty that surrounded the Party’ s frontier programme. The Congress’ Manifesto skirted the national question altogether, while its Political Resolution included only a vague and contradictory call for “the unification of China and the recognition of the right of national self-determination.”1 2 4 The Congress’ four-line “Draft Resolution on 1 2 4 “Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci quanguo daibiao dahui tongguo de zhengzhi jueyian” (CCP Sixth National Party Congress Draft Political Resolution), 9 July 1928, in MZWT: 86. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 189 the National Question” acknowledged the importance of the national question to the Chinese revolution; yet, its failure to set forth a new formal frontier programme seems reflective of internal division within the Party on the national question. Much like the Kuomintang’ s 1927 Plenum, however, the Resolution did mark an important rhetorical shift in the framing of the national question among the CCP. It redefined the Bolshevik discourse on the “national question” {ninzu w ti) as “a question concerning the national minorities within Chinese territory” (Zhong^jingpci shaoshu ninzu de zm ti) and, for the first time, limited the scope of the problem to “the Mongols and Hui of the north, the Koreans of Manchuria, the Taiwanese people of Fujian, the Miao, Li and other primitive rrimu of the south, Xinjiang and Tibet.” In short, the Bolshevik discourse on the “national question” was now referred to as the “Chinese national minority question” (Zbongauo shaashu ninzu zeenft). In doing so, the Party removed the explosive issue of ethnic relations from the realm of international politics and redefined it as a purely domestic question concerned with the ethnic and territorial integration of the Chinese nation-state. Finally, the Resolution hinted at the need for a complete revamping of the CCP’ s approach to the national question, asking the Central Committee to prepare the materials necessary for the formulation of a new frontier programme during the Seventh Party Congress, which was scheduled to meet next summer.1 2 5 This Congress, however, did not meet as planned. In fact, it was another seventeen years before the CCP held its Seventh Congress, by which time Mao Zedong had overseen the drafting of a radically 1 2 5 “Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci quanguo daibiao dahui guanyu minzu wenti de jueyian” (CCP Sixth National Party Congress Draft Resolution on the National Question), 9 July 1928, in MZWT, 87. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 190 new frontier programme for the Chinese Communist Party: one that took its inspiration from the nationalism of Li Dazhao and Sun Yat-sen rather than the internationalism of Chen Duxiu and Vladimir Lenin. At the same time that the collapse of the United Front lead to the gradual dissolution of the CCP’ s frontier policy, it also produced the Kuomintang’ s first systematic alternative to the Bolshevik discourse on the national question. Rejecting the Comintern’ s 1920 Theses on the National and Colonial Questions, Kuomintang policy cloaked itself in the social evolutionary language of Sun Yat-sen, calling for a revolution of “Chinese” national unity— irrespective of class and ethnicity— to counter Western hegemony. When the Kuomintang’ s Third National Party Congress met in March 1929, it ushered the rightwing and the Western Hills clique back into power under the leadership of their new chief patron Chiang Kai-shek. As such, the Congress set about expunging nearly five years of Comintern ideological influence from the Kuomintang’ s political programme. The Party’ s Manifesto was rewritten using Dai Jitao’ s culturalist interpretation of nim tchu^, which stressed national unity above all else. “The laws of evolution and gradual progress,” the Manifesto began, “have been central to human survival throughout history.”1 2 6 The Manifesto asserted that Sun Yat-sen was one of the first Chinese revolutionaries to understand the importance of effective “means” and “organization” for triumph in the evolutionary survival of the fittest. Throughout his life, the Manifesto claimed, Sun stressed how “we must unite our 400 million people into a single, large gw az« (state/national lineage) and establish a solid and rich Three 1 2 6 “Zhongguo guomindang disanci quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan,” 620. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 191 People’ s Principles state; otherwise we will not be able to survive in today’ s world.” 1 2 7 In short, national unity rather than class struggle was now heralded as the key to China’ s continued survival as a people and a state. Congress delegates rejected the Comintern’ s argument that the current state of economic and political imbalance between China proper and the frontier required a temporary period of segregation through the granting of national self-determination to the frontier minorities. Instead, the Congress insisted on the fundamental unity of the entire Zhon$nia ninzu under the leadership of the Nationalist Party, with its “Resolution on Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang” stating: “Although the dialects and customs of these [frontier] peoples are different from those of other provinces, this only necessitates a slight irregularity in state administration; historically, geographically and economically, all [border provinces (t U a n s h e n g)] are firmly a part of the Zhon^om n in ziC l l % The Resolution blamed the current state of dissociation on the pernicious one-ninzu dictatorship of the Manchu Qing dynasty, a problem that was only exacerbated under the various warlord governments following the 1911 Revolution: Due to this situation, the economic, political and educational levels of the Mongolian, Tibetan and Xinjiang people have not advanced in the slightest bit. Fortunately, the evil authority of the warlords has now been destroyed, and all the rrinzus within Chinese territory should unite together in mutual affection under the Three People’ s Principles, setting upon the only avenue for achieving the goal of the complete elimination of foreign imperialism. Actually, our Party’ s Three People’ s Principles, only seeks, under the principle of mmmhuyi, the intimate union of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan peoples in the creation of a strong and powerful g m u and an external position 1 2 7 Ibid., 624. 1 2 8 “Duiyu zhengzhi baogao zhi jueyian: Meng, Zang yu Xinjiang” (Resolutions concerning the Political Report: Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang), 27 March 1929, in ZGQZ, 1:646-47. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 192 of international equality; under the principle of ninqmnzhuyi, the advanced fortunes and ability for self-rule (zizhi) of all domestic ninzu so that they are able to directly carry out their own democratic rights and participate in state governance; and under the principle of mmsherqghuyi, the development of economic strength and the organization of a completely national economy so that all our country's people can solve their own clothing, food, shelter and other basic livelihood needs.1 2 9 In contrast to the Comintern’ s formulas of “national self-determination” {ninzu zijud) followed by “voluntary federation” (ziyou liarbcm^ and the KMT Left’ s proposal of “national liberation” {ninzu ji(fan$ among China’s “national minorities” {shaoshu ninzu) followed by a “voluntary union” (ziyou lianh$, the Third Party Congress sought a more intimate amalgamation of all China’s frontier peoples into “state/national lineage” ( guazuj. The Congress’ resolutions carefully avoided any language that might suggest that the frontier minorities were anything other than indivisible members of a single national people. The “solemn declaration” of special treatment and self-determination for frontier minorities contained in the Reorganization Congress’ Manifesto was now replaced with a new promise of equal and just treatment: Our Party solemnly declares: From this day forward we will energetically correct the evil policies of the Manchu Qing and Warlord periods, where the government hoodwinked (yunon£) the Mongolian and Tibetan people and ignored {m oshi) the interests of the Xinjiang people; rather, we sincerely promise to prop-up and guide each ninzus' economic, political and educational development to ensure that we all advance together at the same time towards civilization and create a free and united Zhonghua Republic. This is the only way to protect our country’ s everlasting peace and further the Grand Harmony {D atong) of the world.1 3 0 1 2 9 Ibid., 646. 1 3 0 Ibid., 647. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 193 Like the patriarch of a large family clan, the Kuomintang State was to shepherd its frontier minority flock back into the national fold, creating a single, unified, and more evolutionarilyfit gtozu. As the fixed international borders of the nation-state replaced the empire’ s amorphous cultural boundary between civility and barbarism, the Han state needed to expand its civilizing influence throughout every inch of China’s national territory, it no longer had the luxury of waiting for the barbarians to laihua (“come and be transformed”). Now that the blank and fuzzy spaces on Qing imperial maps had been encircled by the Republic’ s international borders, the race was on to integrate the frontier and its people into a single, indivisible Zhon^ma rrimu before the imperialist powers were able to lure them away with the false promises of national self- determination. Concluding Rermrks In her pioneering monograph, The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan, Germaine Hoston details the “metamorphosis” of the national question as it was transported from Europe to Asia by the Comintern. Hoston argues that in Japan and China the significance of the national question expanded beyond its narrow “nationality” focus (namely the attempt by ethnically distinct people to construct their own nation-state in conflict with transnational class consciousness) contained within the European Marxist discourse. In Asia, Hoston asserts, the national question came to embrace a broader range of issues, such as national development, state building, cultural identity and human agency. These issues centered around the tension between, on the one hand, loyalty towards one’ s own cultural tradition and national identity in the face R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 194 of Western imperial encroachment and, on the other hand, the appeal of proletarian internationalism and its axiom that universal class interest, not narrow national ties, leads to universal freedom. Hoston contends that this dilemma was resolved in China through the Maoist “strategy of national development” and the “sinification of Marxism” into a unique brand of Chinese statism.1 3 1 While I find Hoston’ s argument helpful in thinking about Chinese national development, I take exception to her contention that the national question in China superseded its narrow European focus on national self-determination simply because “Chinese cultural identity has historically overwhelmed the claims of ethnic minorities,” and as such, “the national question [in China] is not primarily a nationalities question.”1321 would argue, on the other hand, that the problem of incorporating the frontier minorities of the Qing empire into the new nation-state was central to the entire Marxist discourse on the national question in 20th century China. Despite their small population and comparative economic backwardness, the location of China’ s minorities along the new Republic’ s strategic frontier region lent them significance beyond their numbers. This was particularly the case during the Republican period, when China was struggling to maintain her national independence and territorial integrity in the face of aggressive imperialist encroachment. One of the central goals of this chapter has been to demonstrate how the inherent tension between the international (loyalty to class) and national (loyalty to nation) aspects of this discourse led to its eventual “nationalization” 1 3 1 Hoston, TheState, Identity, andtheNaticnd Question, 3-17 & 361-401. 1 3 ^ Ibid., 8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 195 in China, reversing the Bolshevik merger of the colonial and national questions back into a purely domestic issue of majority-minority ethnic relations. In fact, rather than superseding the narrow “nationality* focus of the question in early Marxist thought, the Chinese discourse came to echo many of the same issues first raised during the Second International. Both revolutionary parties in China came to reject the internationalist aspects of Bolshevik theory on the national question, namely Lenin’s principle of national self-determination, and resisted attempts by the Third International to implement this policy in China. By overlooking the “ minority problem” and treating China as an ethnically homogeneous category of analysis, Hoston’s otherwise fine study misses this important dimension of the national question in China. Similarly, while scholars of the First KMT-CCP United Front emphasize the importance of the land and class questions in its eventual dissolution, little attention has been given to the equally important role of the national question. This chapter has also attempted to demonstrate how the internationalist implications of the Bolshevik national question discourse aggravated existing political tensions with the United Front and contributed to its eventual collapse. In the eyes of most Chinese intellectuals, the Comintern’ s call for Mongolian “national self-determination” seemed to violate the alliance’ s stated goal of carrying out a “Chinese” bourgeois-democratic revolution. The GCP’ s vocal support for Mongolian independence and defense of the Soviet encroachment in China caused Kuomintang members to question the patriotic intentions of the Chinese Communists and the Comintern-controlled United Front. To a growing number of intellectuals in 1920s China, the CCP’ s blind adherence to R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 196 Moscow seemed to contravene Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary legacy, in particular, his call for the amalgamation of all Chinese people into a single body politic free from outside interference. Finally, the success of the North Expedition allowed Chiang and his National Revolutionary Army to finally break with the United Front and Soviet financial and military aid, freeing him to set on the task of unifying the nation into a single, homogeneous Zhon$7ua ninzu. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 197 CHAPTER 3 The Kuomintang Central Government & the “Frontier Question” As one might expect, on the Chinese mainland, historians generally depict the Kuomintang’ s minority policy in starkly negative terms. They contend that Chiang Kai- shek’ s Central Government denied the very existence of minority nationalities and attempted to forcefully assimilate all minorities into a single, Han-dominated Zhon$tua ninzu. This “fascist” approach is frequently contrasted to Sun Yat-sen’s policy of minority self-determination and self-rule formulated during the last years of his life. The Central Party School’ s 1994 textbook on the national question, for example, describes Kuomintang policy as follows: After the Kuomintang’ s betrayal of the revolution in 1927, they completely turned their back on Sun Yat-sen’ s principle of ninztahuyi as announced in the Manifesto of the Kuomintang’ s First National Congress and instead employed Han chauvinism to rule the national minorities. Their nationality policy was one of national discrimination, oppression and assimilation.1 Anglo scholars have largely perpetuated this characterization outside China. Lacking an independent and systematic examination of early 20th Chinese minority policy, Western scholars have tended to uncritically adopt the attitude of their mainland secondary sources. Take, for example, the way in which Linda Benson’ s summary of Kuomintang policy closely dovetails the CCP description above: With Chiang Kai-shek’ s assumption of Kuomintang leadership on Sun’ s death in 1925, the latter’ s program of autonomy and self-determination as the basis of the Nationalists’ national minority policy was dropped. Chiang’ s primary objective with regard to the minority areas was to hold these territories as an 1 Jiang, 2.han^40Minzu Wend deLilm yu Shixian, 110. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 198 integral, indivisible part of the Chinese state. All political action in the borderlands was designed to serve this one paramount aim.2 Edwin Leung has argued that the “real function” of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, the Nationalist Government’ s frontier policy division, was to “cany out the official solution of the minority problem, namely, a complete assimilation of the non-Han peoples in the Chinese state.”3 Consequently, Colin Mackerras and others have asserted that Chiang Kai-shek was strongly opposed to any form of autonomy for the frontier minorities, regarding national unity as paramount in China’ s struggle for modernity and equality with the rest of the world’ s nation-states.4 In this chapter, I argue that this uniformly negative depiction of the Kuomintang’s nationality policy is overly simplistic and in need of revision. In reaching their conclusions, Chinese and Anglo scholars make frequent reference to the Kuomintang’ s 1943 political manifesto China's Destiny, whose authorship is incorrectly associated with Chiang Kai-shek even though it was ghost written and clearly represented the thought of conservative Kuomintang historian Tao Xisheng.5 Despite the claim in China's Destiny that all Chinese people, including the Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, Hui and other minorities, were “lineage branches” (zongzhi) of a single, 2 Benson, The Ili Rebel l i on, 11. 3 Edwin Pak-Wah Leung, “Regional Autonomy versus Central Authority; The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and the Chinese Response, 1925-1947,” Journal o f Ori ent al St udi es 25.1 (1986): 53. 4 Mackerras, Chi na’ s Mi nori t i es, 59; Mackerras, Chi na' s M inority Cultures, 9; also see Rhoads, Manc hus & Han, 275-76. 5 On Tao Xisheng and his authorship of Chi na’ s Destiny, see Arlif Dirlik, “Tao Hsi-sheng: The Social Limits of Change,” in Furth, ed., Ih eL im ts ( f Chang, 305. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 199 consanguineous Zhon$nia ninzu,6 it is important that we contextualize the book Its publication in Chiang Kai-shek’ s name, as will be discussed further in chapter five, clearly represented a significant hardening of Nationalist Party rhetoric under the growing influence of a group of cultural conservatives who controlled the Party’ s educational and propaganda apparatuses; at the same time, however, the cultural conservatives exerted little influence, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, on the actual formulation and implementation of Kuomintang frontier policy. In the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT’s Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs {imqgang wnyuarhui), the guiding philosophy of the Party's frontier policy was the Qing court’ s jin i or “loose rein” policy rather than the discourse on Zhonghua racial and cultural homogeneity championed by the cultural conservatives. It is crucial in our discussion of the national and frontier questions in early 20th century China to make a clear distinction between discourse— which often aims to inspire an ideal outcome— and policy— which is most frequently based upon redpditik considerations. This chapter focuses upon the formulation and implementation of Kuomintang policy towards the frontier. Making use of recently declassified and reprinted documents from the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, I examine the methods employed by the Central Government in attempting to incorporate Mongolia and Tibet into the Chinese Republic. In contrast to the blanket characterizations of contemporary Communist and Anglo historians, I highlight the flexible and often remarkably liberal 6 Chiang Kai-shek, IhonggiozhiMmgyun {China’ s Destinfi, 2d rev. ed. (Chongqing: Zhengyang shuju, 1943). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 0 0 approach adopted by the Kuomintang policymakers throughout the Republican period. In spite of its assimilationist rhetoric, the Nationalist Party was willing to grant the frontier minorities a high degree of autonomy in exchange for the most nominal recognition of Central Government authority over the frontier. Both the Communists and the Nationalists viewed the frontier and its people as potential allies in their struggle for political power and independence from foreign imperialism. In securing the allegiance of the minorities, the Kuomintang hoped to not only bolster its nationalist credentials but also prevent the frontier from being used as a base for imperialist intrigue and communist infiltration. I do not mean to suggest that the Kuomintang was any less paternalistic or deeply committed to national unity than their Communist rivals; yet, I do feel that past scholarship on Nanjing’s national minority policy has overlooked the highly nuanced and politically savvy approach of Kuomintang policymakers towards the national problem. This chapter also highlights the tense triangular relationship between the ethnic minorities, the Central Government and the frontier warlords. Chinese historians have long highlighted the decentralized nature of political power in early 20th century China, arguing that the Nationalist Government represented only a loose coalition of highly autonomous regional militarists.7 Many of these warlords, such as Liu Wenhui, Sheng Shicai, Fu Zuoyi, and Zhang Xueliang, used the frontier as a base for their political 7 See Lloyd E. Eastman, Se e ds (f Dest ruct i on: Nationalist Chim in W arardRetdutim 1937-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 10-44; Robert Kapp, Szedman and t he Chi nes e Republ i c Pnmndal M ilitarism and Gerttrd Pacer, 1911-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Diana Laiy, Regonand Nation• The K w tn gi Cl i que in Chi nes e Poli t i cs, 1925-1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Donald G. Gillin, Wddoni Yen Hsi -shan in Shansi Pnni nce, 1911-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 201 power and military strength, fiercely resisting any Central Government encroachment. Unlike the Central Government, these Han militarists viewed the frontier as a source of economic exploitation rather than political legitimacy. The ethnic minorities, with their “backward” customs and nomadic economy, were seen as standing in the way of “progress” and the “opening up” of the frontier, and thus needed to be placed under firm Han control. One finds that much of the assimilationist language that scholars have associated with the Kuomintang actually originated with these Han frontiersmen rather than Central Government officials in Nanjing. This chapter demonstrates how the frontier warlords consistently blocked the Central Government’s frontier policy, fearing that any form of genuine minority autonomy would weaken their power base while enhancing the prestige and authority of the Central Government. In the end, we find that while the Kuomintang was willing to grant the frontier minorities autonomy, it was often unw illing or unable to implement this policy beyond the obstructions of the frontier militarists. Furthermore, unlike the poorly armed minority peoples, the Han warlords proved a more important military ally in the Kuomintang’ s struggle against its chief political and ideological rival, the Chinese Communists. In particular, this chapter examines the development of Kuomintang policy towards Inner Mongolia and Tibet, to highlight some of the difficulties the Central Government encountered in implementing its frontier policy over the resistance of the frontier warlords. Lacking the military strength to bring these two regions under their direct control, the Kuomintang attempted to use the existing feudal leadership and Press, 1967). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 0 2 traditional administrative structures to preserve Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and Mongolia. In order to counter English imperialism in Tibet and Japanese and Russian encroachment in Mongolia, the Nationalist Government followed the precedent of the Manchu Qing court in offering the Mongolian and Tibetan people a high degree of autonomy in exchange for their symbolic inclusion within the new Republican State. While attempting to use the foreign powers as a counter-weight to traditional Chinese encroachment, Tibetan and Mongolian elites also looked towards the Kuomintang Central Government for assistance in controlling growing hegemony of Han militarists and frontiersmen. The chief concern of the Tibet ruling class was not the international recognition of Tibetan independence but rather blocking the attempts by frontier warlords to extend Chinese administration on the Tibetan steppe. The Inner Mongolian princes repeatedly asked the Central Government for legal protection against Han colonization of their pastureland. What we find is that the Kuomintang’s liberal frontier policy remained largely ineffective without the ability of the Central Government to first impose its authority upon these frontier warlords and Han frontiersmen. Frontier Warlordism& ChineseEnarmhrrmt on the Inner MonglidnFrontier There exists an over two thousand-year history of Chinese attempts to settle the semi-nomadic, loess steppe of Inner Mongolia. During times of imperial strength the Chinese would establish their authority over the region only to have it beaten back by the Mongol nomads during periods of dynastic decline. Yet, as Owen Lattimore has astutely pointed out, the invention of the gun and the railway forever altered the balance R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 203 of power in this seesaw struggle in the favor of the Chinese.8 Beginning during the late Qing dynasty, Han settlers poured over the Great Wall in increasing numbers, gradually colonizing large tracts of “virgin” Mongolian pastureland. To get a feel for the extent of Han encroachment, take the example of the Ordos region of Inner Mongolia. According to figures compiled by historian Liao Zhaojun in 1937, nearly 222 million rm of Mongolian pastureland in the Ordos was brought under cultivation between 1903 and 1932. During this period, the Han population in the region increased from a few thousand to nearly two million people, while the Mongolian population remained steady or slightly declined to less then 200,000.9 In time, Han administrators caught up with the settlers, imposing Chinese administration upon the formerly autonomous Mongolian leagues and banners. In 1914, the Beijing Government established the three “special administrative regions” {tdne xmgphergpi) of Suiyuan, Chahar andjehol to incorporate the growing Han population of Inner Mongolia into the administrative structure of the new Republic. After assuming power, the Kuomintang expanded the territory of these regions and formally converted them into fully fledged provinces in August 1928. Rather than abolishing the Mongolian leagues and banners, the Central Government incorporated them into the new provinces, where they existed side-by side with Chinese county (xiari) administrations. In Suiyuan, for example, a ring of sixteen Chinese county administrations along the great bend in the Yellow River effectively cut off the Ikhchao League of the Ordos 8 Lattimore, Manchuria' Cradle f Caflkt, 210-11. 9 See Liao Zhaojun, Suiyuan Zhiliie (Suiyuan Gazetteer), 1937, (reprint, Taipei: Nantian huaju, 1987): 35-8 & 173-4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 0 4 desert from the Ulauchab and Silinghol leagues north of the Yellow River and over the Yinshan Mountains.1 0 The inclusion of the formerly autonomous banners into Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol provinces further exasperated the tensions between the Mongolian nomads and Han frontiersmen. Beginning in early 1928 Mongolian princes led three separate delegations to the seat of the Kuomintang government in Nanjing, where they petitioned the Central Government for an end to all Chinese colonization of Mongolian pastureland and the preservation of the banner system. Citing Sun Yat-sen’ s pledge to foster minority “self-rule and seh-deterrnination” (zizhiztjue), the Mongols called for the creation of a united and autonomous Mongolian Banner Council to govern all of Inner Mongolian affairs without provincial government interference.1 1 The new Kuomintang central government was initially caught off guard by this well-organized Mongolian initiative, but eventually accepted the suggestion of veteran Mongolian Kuomintang member Bai Yundi (Buyuantai) for the creation of a special commission to formulate Central Government policy towards Mongolia and Tibet. With its creation in March 1928, the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs ifAer^arrgvEcymrhw) (CMTA) 1 0 On these administrative changes see Liao, Suiyuan Zhiliie, 44-51; Chang Yin-t’ang, TheEamonk Development and Prospects <f Inner Mongdia (Chahar, Suiyuan, Mnghsia) (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1933), 72-4. 1 1 On these delegations see Hao Weimin, Ndmengu Geningbi {Revolutionary History cfInner Mongdid) (Hohhot: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1997), 165-171; Zhang Zhaoting, “Wu Heling he ‘Menggu gemeng-qi daibiao lianhe zhujing banshichu’ de huodong” (The activities of Wu Heling and the ‘Office for Mongolian Banner Representatives in the Capital’ ), in Ndrmtgyu Wenshi Ziliao (Material c f the Culture and History (fInner Mangdid), ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1979), 6: 23-34 (Hereafter cited as NW Z). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 205 was given broad authority to draft legislation and implement Central Government policy towards the frontier regions.1 2 Based on the administrative precedent of the Qing Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifanyuan), the CMTA inherited both the language and policies of the Qing state towards the frontier. Initially, Qing frontier policy was guided by the dual principles of “combining the use of force with imperial grace” (emm btnghi) and “ruling by customs” (yisu erzbi). Yet, during the late 1700s, the Qing court began adopting more conciliatoiy policies towards the Mongolian, Tibetan and Xinjiang frontier as its political power started to wane, leading it to emphasize the en (grace) side of the emm \xnghi equation more than the im (force) side.1 3 It was these jin i (loose rein) or lon$uo (win over by all means) policies that appealed most to CMTA administrators as they began to formulate their own frontier policy that aimed, above all else, to hold the fragile Zhonghua Republic together against the corrupting forces of domestic warlordism and foreign imperialism. These conciliatory measures were predicated on the use of the ruling elite in Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang to rule the frontier according to its own local traditions, with the Manchus granting the frontier minorities a high degree of autonomy in 1 2 “Guomin zhengfu Mengzang weiyuanhui zuzhifa” (Organizational law of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affair), 21 March 1928, in 2M SD , 5.1.5:1-2; “Xiuzheng Mengzang zeiyuanhui zushifa” (Revised Organizational law of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs), 25 July 1932, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:2-4; Also see Zhang Xingtang, Bi anj i angZhen&hi {Front i er A dn inistratiaij (Taipei: Mengzang weiyuanhui, 1962), 125-6. 1 3 On the Lifanyuan and Qing frontier policy see Ma Ruheng and Zhao Yuntian, “Qingdai bianjiang minzu zhengce jianlun” (Brief discussion of Qing dynasty frontier nationality policy), Qinghi yanjiul (1991), 1-14; Ma Ruheng and Ma Dazheng, Qirigki < k BhryiangZhengve (Qing Dynasty Frontier Policy) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 0 6 exchange for a pledge of loyalty to the Qing empire in the form of the largely symbolic tribute system.1 4 Faced with the reality of the KMT’s political weakness and Sun Yat-sen’ s own pledge to “prop-up and guide” ifiahi) the frontier minorities, the CMTA moved quickly to address the concerns of the Mongolian princes. In late November 1928, CMTA standing committee member Zhang Ji recommended to Party chairman Chiang Kai- shek that the KMT express its sympathy toward the plight of the Mongolian princes and tentative support for their proposal calling for the establishment of an Autonomous Mongolian Banner Council (Menggi zizhi 'ueiymnhui}.'1 5 The CMTA also employed Wu Heling (Unenbayin), one of the Mongolian delegation leaders, as an adviser and asked him to draw up a plan for Inner Mongolian autonomy. 1 4 A survey of the numerous administrative plans and regulations drafted by CMTA reveal a striking similarity in both language and policy with the Qing’s Lifanyuan. Take for example, the series of laws created to codify, regulate and administer the systematic visits of minority princes, headmen and religious personnel to the capital, or the regulations governing the bestowing of state titles and awards upon loyal frontier princes and officials or the countless laws meant to ensure state supervision of the banners, Lamaist temples and other frontier institutions. See, for example, “Meng Zang Xinjiang huibu laijing zhenjin renyuan zhaodai guize” (Regulations for receiving personnel on extended official visits to the capital from Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), 8 January 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:4-9; “Meng Zang Huijiang ge difang changguan ji ge zongjiao lingdao renyuan laijing guanjian lijie dan” (List of protocol for extended official visits to the capital by senior officials and religious personnel from Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang), 8 January 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:11; “Meng Zang Huijiang ge difang changguan ji ge zongjiao lingdao renyuan laijing zhanguan shanglai banfa” (Regulations for the bestowing of rewards to senior officials and religious personage from Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang visiting the Capital on an official visits), 14 January 1935, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:12; “Guanli lama simiao tiaolie” (Regulations governing the management of lamaist temples), 9 December 1935, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:13; “Lama jiangzheng banfa” (Methods for rewarding and punishing lamas), 10 January 1936, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:13-18; “Meng Zang bianqu renyuan renyong tiaolie” (Regulations for the appointment of personnel in the Mongolian and Tibetan border region), 1 April 1937, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 33-35. 1 5 [Zhang Ji], “Zhang Ji wei Enheemuer deng shengqing sheli Mengqi zizhi weiyuanhui deng zhi Jiang Jieshi deng han” (Letter from Zhang Ji to Chiang Kai-shek and others about the request by Zhang Zhaoting and others for the establishment of a Autonomous Mongolian Banner Council), 16 November 1928, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:39-40. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 0 7 Han civil and military officials in the frontier provinces did not however share the Central Government’s paternalistic view of the situation, viewing Mongolian autonomy instead as a direct threat to their own authority over the frontier. This attitude of concern was clearly expressed, for example, in a letter of protest sent by a group of Jehol provincial officials to the Executive Yuan on 14 November 1928. The petition expressed astonishment over the proposals drafted by Wu Heling, arguing that following the recent administrative changes “there no longer exists an Inner Mongolia beyond the scope of Suiyuan, Jehol, and Chahar provinces.” The letter advanced several reasons why Wu Heling’ s plan for Inner Mongolian autonomy was unreasonable and potentially dangerous to social order: first, the proposal would create an irrational and potentially dangerous political structure with six new provincial-level administrations (representing the Inner Mongolian leagues) existing side-by-side with the current provincial administrations; second, the plan to create forty-nine military brigades from the Inner Mongolian banners would disrupt the current military chain of command; third, Wu Heling’ s program could lead to serious ethnic strife: Everywhere within the four provinces of Fengtian, Chahar, Jehol, and Suiyuan, the Han, Manchu, Mongols and Hui lived mixed together with the boundary between the ‘races’ (zhongpu) long ago dissolved. As a result, these peoples have lived together in peace for several hundred years under the same political rule. Today, the Mongols want to form another government, irrespective of the wishes of the Han people. Will not the Manchu and Hui people feel left out?...If Mr. Unenbayin’ s plan is implemented, we fear that racial conflict will develop in a flash-with attempts for self-rule creating opportunities for self chaos and causing us to shudder with fear when we think of the future.1 6 1 6 [Wei Xiaotao], “Guomin zhengfu wenguan chuwei Wei Xiaotao yaoqiu chenming Mengbian qingxing shi Xingzhengyuan gonghan (Public petition of national government civil official Wei Xiaotao to the Executive Yuan seeking clarification on the condition of the Mongolian frontier), 14 November 1928, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:36-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 208 Finally, the petition argued that Mongolian self-rule would assist foreigners in their attempts to “bolshevize” (chibua, literally “to make red”) China, causing the Red menace in Outer Mongolia to spread southward into Inner Mongolia and the Chinese heartland. The letter ends with an earnest plea on behalf of Chinese officials “bom, raised and matured on the frontier” for the Central Government not to cast Inner Mongolia aside “like firewood” but rather to heed their advice for the advancement of the entire Mongolian frontier. Attempting to defuse the growing tension between Mongolian officials and the Han frontiersmen, the Kuomintang government convened a two-week long “Mongolian Conference” (Mengp huiyi) in Nanjing during the summer of 1930. The Conference produced heated debate from both sides, but failed to produce a consensus on the contentious issues of the Mongolian banner system and Chinese colonization of Mongol pastureland.1 7 Despite strong CMTA support for Inner Mongolian autonomy, Chiang Kai-shek’ s fragile regime was not in a strong enough position politically to override the strong resistance from provincial officials. The success of the Kuomintang’ s Northern Expedition and the new Nationalist Government was based upon an uneasy coalition of regional militarists. Fearful of provoking a revolt of northern warlords Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Xueliang, the Kuomintang proposed a compromise solution to the Mongolian problem. The “Organizational Law 1 7 See the documents and explanations included in the entry on the “Menggu dahui bihui” (Closing Ceremony of the Mongolian Conference), 12 June 1930, in Zhcnyj i ua M ingio Shi Shi j i yao ( Chugm) ( Chr o no l o g y c f Hi st ori cal E tents an t he Republ i c c f Chi na (D raft)), comp. Zhonghua Minguo Shiliao Yanjiu Zhengxin (Taipei: Zhonghua minguo shiliao yenjiu chuban, 1974-), Year 1930,1: 754-58 (Hereafter cited as ZMSS); R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 0 9 of Mongolian Leagues, Banners and Tribes” (Menggi mengbu-qi xuzhifa), which was passed by the Legislative Yuan on October 1931, called for the preservation of the Mongolian banner system in all those regions occupied by Mongolian people and not atnendy under Chinese county administration, and placed the Mongolian banners direcdy under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan in Nanjing. While the Central Government would assume control of military, diplomatic and other issues of national concern, the banners would be granted autonomy to administer their people according to local tradition and custom. On the contentious issue of Mongolian relations with the Han county and provincial administrations, the resolution called for both sides to consult one another on all issues of mutual concern, including the central problem of Chinese colonization of Mongolian pastureland.1 8 During the early Republican period, the Mongolian frontier became an important proving ground for the autonomous authority of Chinese warlords. With the growing authority of the Nanjing Central Government over the central plains region, Chinese militarists looked with increasing interest at the frontier as a region ripe for the creation of a zone free from Central Government control. The harsh yet unexploited natural environment of the frontier provided an excellent base for the recruitment of soldiers and exploitation of natural resources necessary to keep Nanjing at bay. A symbiotic relationship developed between the Han frontiersmen and the regional Hao, Neinznggi Geninghi, 170. 1 8 “Guomin zhengfu gongbu Mengguo meng-bu-qi zuzhifa” (The national government announces the Organizational Law for Mongolian Leagues, Banners and Tribes), 21 October 1931, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 45-48. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 0 militarists as both attempted to safeguard their political and economic interests from the Nationalist State. In the Northeast Zhang Xueliang inherited the Fengtian army and the resource-rich frontier region of Manchuria from his father Zhang Zuolin. Despite declaring his alliance to Chiang Kai-shek’ s Nationalist Government in September of 1930, Zhang retained complete control over Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. Initially, Feng Yuxiang’ s 200,000 strong Guominjun ruled over both Suiyuan and Chahar provinces from his Kalgan headquarters. Chiang Kai-shek’ s defeat of the Guominjun in 1931 only paved the way for the extension of Yan Xishan’ s authority into Inner Mongolia from his power-base in Shanxi province. Yan’ s appointment by Nanjing as the “Pacification Commissioner of Taiyuan and Suiyuan” (J'atyuan Stri jing zhuren) in December 1932 ensured that two of his loyal subordinates, Fu Zuoyi and Song Zeguang, were named chairmen of Suiyuan and Chahar provinces, solidifying his authority over China’ s northwest frontier. In stark contrast to the paternalist rhetoric of the CMTA, these warlord regimes stressed the importance of developing Inner Mongolia and civilizing its backward nomads. In their publications, the “virgin” Mongolian frontier was frequently referred to as a “gold vault” (jityiao) or “treasure trove” (baoku), with frontier administrators stressing the importance of “opening up wasteland” (kaikeri), “excavating mines” (kaikuan^ and “clearing forests” (kdiliri). Frontier administrators writing in the journal Mengp xurkan [M ongpH an Banner Bi-weekly], which was published by the General Affairs Office of Zhang Xueling’ s Manchurian regime, argued that “military colonization” (timken) was the most effective method for systematically exploiting the frontier’ s R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 211 untapped riches while safeguarding against foreign invasion. Calling the task of “cutting down the thicket and opening up the wilderness” humanity’ s noblest and highest task, Zuo Zuohua pleaded with Han soldiers to build their houses among the “barren desert and wild grasses” of Mongolia in order to seek their personal fortunes while also enriching the brilliance and glory of the Zhonghua nation.1 9 Mengp xttrkan writers were quick to dismiss Mongolian criticism about Han colonization. Huang Chengguan, for example, argued that by forcing these two Zhonghua brothers to live together the system of military colonization actually fosters mutual understanding while also bringing untold material benefits to both peoples.2 0 Acting upon the advice of Zuo, Huang and other officials within his Office of Banner Affairs, Zhang Xueliang established an extensive network of military colonies in late 1929 as part of his “Great Xing’an Colonization Project.” After establishing the necessary military outposts to garrison and pacify the Jermin League Mongols, Zhang constructed a railway line to carry Han farmers directly onto “virgin” Mongolian pastureland.2 1 With their “backward customs” and “outdated pastoralism,” the Mongols were described as standing in the way of progress. Take for example, the rather typical attitude of Shanxi native and Ningxia provincial government employee, Ma Hotian. During a 1926 journey through western Inner Mongolia, he observed: 1 9 Zuo Zuohua, “Timken qianshuo” (A cursory discussion of military colonization), Mengji xwkan 1.4 (May 1929): 7. 2 0 Huang Chengguang, “Mengqi kentianbi” (The Undesirability of Military Colonization?), Meng]i xurkan 1.5 (May 1929): 3-8. 2 1 Lattimore, Mandmia: Cradle c f Conflict, 211-12. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 2 The Edsin Gol area is not only suitable for grazing; it is also a rich region 'where farming and forestry can be carried on. The Mongols unfortunately are acquainted only with raising livestock and do not make full use of the possibilities of the land. In the future, when colonists open up this new land and experiments are tried in communal farming, the river basin will become extremely profitable. It is now a forest that is said to be held in common by the Edsin Gol Mongols. The latter cannot develop it and do not know howto use it to advantage. This is really a sad state of affairs. It seems to me that among the people of China there is still a group living as primitive herdsmen. How can they seek freedom and equality?2 2 The editors of Mengji xpmkanshared Ma Hotian’s views on the Mongols. Because of their “lack of knowledge and profession” {wczhi mzzhi), Sun Shaoming argued that the task of “civilizing” (kaihm) the Mongols and “cultivating their virgin land” (kaihuan^ fell upon the more advanced Han people.2 3 Among the five rrirtzu of China, Zuo Zuohua wrote, the Han people were clearly the “apple of heaven’ s eye” {tianzhi jiaazi). “Now when you look at our Han people’ s shelter, food and other things, one cannot say they surpass those of the European and American people; but when we compare them with those of our Mongolian compatriots, we are truly “living in luxury” (yangun d o u y c ti) ” 2 4 Thus, Zhang Zitang and others concluded that it was the “heavenly duty” (tianzhi) of the Han “elder brothers” to act as the “saving star” (jiwcin$ for their Mongolian “younger brothers,” personally leading them by hand out of the darkness of a nomadic existence and into the modem industrial world.2 5 2 2 Ma Ho-tien, CbineseAgent inMongiia, trans. John De Francis (Baltimore: The John’ s Hopkins Press, 1949), 9. For the Chinese edition see Ma Hbtian, N anai Mengp Kaocha Riji [Diary cjfanImestigxtion <f Inner and Outer Mongiid), 1932, (reprint, Taipei: Nantian shuju, 1987). 2 3 Sun Shaoming, “Shoubian Mengqi jiaoyu zhi guanjian” (My humble opinion for dealing with Mongolian banner education), Mengji xurkan 1.4 (May, 1929): 9. 2 4 Zuo, “Timken qianshuo,” 5. 2 5 Zhang Zitang, “Mengqi xunkan zhi shiming” (The Mission of Mongolian Banner Fortnightly), Mengp. xurkan 12 (April 1929): 1-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 3 In western Inner Mongolia, the opium trade proved initially more valuable than the exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources. Most of the revenue for Fu Zuoyi’s provincial government came from the likintax on the transport of opium through Suiyuan. The raw opium purchased by Yan Xishan’ s Shanxi opium monopoly was grown in Gansu and Ningxia, and rather than transporting this valuable cargo through bandit-ridden Shaanxi, the safest and cheapest route was to follow the Yellow River north through the Mongolian banners and then back down through Suiyuan into Shanxi. Beside the minor “grass and water” tax traditionally levied by the Mongols, the overwhelming majority of the revenue associated with the transport of the opium went to Fu Zuoyi while Yan Xishan pocketed the enormous profits from the sale of the refined opium. Although the opium trade made Yan Xishan and his subordinates some of the richest men in China, it did little to develop the economic base of Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, which were considered two of the poorest areas in China during the 1920s.2 6 The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 shifted the nation’ s attention to the northwest frontier, where Japanese encroachment now threatened to topple Yan Xishan’ s autonomous regime. Riding the wave of Chinese nationalism, Chiang Kai-shek intensified his efforts to bring Yan Xishan’ s regime under the direct authority of the Kuomintang. Yan Xishan stood firm, resisting repeated overtures by both the Japanese and the Central Government for cooperation. In 1932, he decided to launch a radical 2 6 See Owen Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” July 1936, in Studies in Frontier History, 436; Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Prminoe, 137-38. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 4 new programme of economic modernization to strengthen the ability of his regime to maintain their autonomy. An important component of Yan’ s so-called “Provincial Ten Year Plan of Economic Reconstruction” was the agricultural development of Suiyuan province. With a population density of only two people per li (compared to an average of six hundred people per li in southern and eastern China), Yan Xishan’ s administration believed that the virgin pastureland of Suiyuan province, if properly irrigated, could provide an important source of revenue and raw materials for the industrialization of Shanxi. The abundance of uncultivated land led one Shanxi administrator to claim that over 10 million additional rru of land awaited reclamation by Han settlers, while an even more optimistic writer speculated that the province could support an additional 70 to 80 million “vagrants” (ycmm) from the interior.2 7 After the Kuomintang’ s 4th National Congress rejected Fu Zuoyi’ s draft plan for “Frontier migration, the Development of Production and the Consolidation of National Defense”,2 8 Yan Xishan decided to promote Han colonization of Suiyuan without Nanjing’ s assistance. Beginning in early 1932 the Shanxi government offered officers in its army one hundred rm of free land in the Ordos plateau along with free equipment, seeds and a monthly stipend. To finance the project, Yan set up the Western Suiyuan Land Reclamation Bank (Suixi kenyeyirihang) in Baotou with several million yuan in 2 7 Chang, The E ajm nncD eidoprm t and Pr ospect s ofInner M ongdia, 196; Liao, Suiyuan Zhiyiie, 173. 2 8 Zhang Xinwu, Fu Zuafe Yisheng ifeheLifeafFu Zuoyi) (Beijing: Qunzhong chubanshe, 1995), 49. While the Kuomintang’s 4th National Congress did eventually pass a vague proposal encouraging the “development, military colonization and migration to the fronder,” it also issued a strict set of guidelines aimed at protecting the special way of life and economic livelihood of the frontier minorities. See “Queding bianqu jianshe fangzhen bing qieshi jinxingan” (Proposal determining the guidelines for frontier construction and its earnest implementation), 19 November 1931, in ZMSD, 5.1.2:335-37. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 215 capital After only three hundred officers accepted the government’ s offer, Yan expanded the scope of the program by creating three “military colonization divisions” (turkenckd) filled with nearly fifty thousand recently decommissioned soldiers from the Shanxi/Suiyuan army. Following an extensive survey by the newly created “Military Colonization Supervisory Office,” four places in the Ordos loop were selected for irrigation and cultivation.2 9 According to a 1934 progress report, the project had achieved remarkable results. The ex-soldiers had already irrigated 2.7 million rm of land (of which 1.2 million rm had already been planted with seeds) with plans already under way for the cultivation of an additional 5 million rm of wasteland.3 0 This additional farmland helped to increase the average annual tax base of Suiyuan to around three million yuan between 1932 and 1934 and sparked a “golden age” within the territory’ s history.3 1 This economic prosperity, however, came at the expense of Mongolian grazing land and livelihood, as increased Han colonization pushed Mongolian nomads and their dwindling herds deeper into the Ordos desert and further up into the Yinshan Mountain range. The Faded Irm rM ongiw iA utonamous Movement, Part I The renewed efforts of Yan Xishan’ s Northwest warlord administration to colonize and incorporate the remaining grassland of Suiyuan sparked the first pan-Inner 2 9 On the 1932 Ordos Colonization Scheme see Suiyuan sheng zhengfu, ed., “Suiyuan sheng zhi jingji jianshe” (The economic development of Suiyuan province), February 1936, in GMWX, 90:378-83; Liao, Sui yuan Zhi yi i e, 187-191; Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Proimce, 128 & 134; Zhang, Fu Zuoyi Yisherg 47-50. 3 0 Gted in Suiyuan sheng zhengfu, ed., “Suiyuan sheng zhi jingji jianshe,” 383-87. 3 1 Zhang, Fu Zuoyi Yi sheng 48-49. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 6 Mongolian resistance movement since the early years of the Republic. The division of Inner Mongolia into forty nine separate banner administrations and five Chinese provinces made collective resistance difficult. Yet, with his youthful vigor, charismatic personality and sharp intellect, the 31 year-old leader of the West Sunid Banner, Prince Demchukdongrob was able to galvanize this growing anti-Chinese sentiment into a unified, and highly public, movement for Inner Mongolian autonomy.3 2 During the winter of 1932, De Wang, or Prince De as he was known to the Chinese, lead a delegation of Mongol princes from the Silinghol and Ulauchab leagues to Nanjing. They warned Chiang Kai-shek and other Kuomintang officials about the growing Japanese threat and protested Yan Xishan’ s renewed efforts to colonize Mongolian grassland. The Central Government, used to dealing with Wu Heling and other Mongol representative living in the capital, largely ignored De Wang. Frustrated and feeling slighted, De Wang returned to Inner Mongolia where he convened a congress of Inner Mongolian banner delegates at the Bailingmiao temple located deep within the Yinshan highlands in northern Suiyuan province. When the Congress opened 3 2 In my reconstruction of the Bailingmiao autonomous movement, I have drawn upon recently reprint Nanjing government documents and the following sources: Lu Minghui, Me ngz u ‘ Z izhi Yundong Sbiim {TheC m pkte StorycftheM ongiian ' Aut onomousMovement ) (Beijing: Zhonghuashuju, 1980); Tan Tiwu, Neimengzhi Jinxi { Inner Mongol i a Past cod Pr es ent ) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1934): 117-92; Chen Jianfu, Nehneng Z izhi Shi l i ao Ji yao { Compi l at i on <f Inportant Historical Doc ume nt s on Inner Mongol i an Autonom y (Nanjing: Nanjing fati shudian chuban, 1934); Hao, Nehrenggp G eninghi, 159-185; Huang Fengsheng, NdmengMengfj i Zizhi Yundongj i { Record cfA ctual E vent s from the Inner Mongdi an L e a g u e and Banner Aut onomous M overm i) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1935); While little has been written in English about the movement, two essays by Owen Lattimore provide a valuable non-Chinese insight into the movement. See Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 427-39 and Owen Lattimore, “The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 1936, in St udi es in Front i er H istory, 440-55; The analysis of Sechin Jagchid, who at the time was a young following of De Wang, is also particularly valuable. See, in particular, Sechin Jagchid, “The Failure of a Self-determination Movement- The Inner Mongolian Case,” in SodetA sianE thm cF roitiers, eds. William McCagg and Brian Silver (New York Pergamon Press, 1979), 229-45; Sechin Jagchid, M engpzhi Jinxi { Mongpl i a Yest erday and Todaf j (Taipei: R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 7 on 26 July 1933, opinion was divided; yet De Wang persuaded Silinghol League chieftain Prince Yun and Uauchab League chieftain Prince So to formally petition Nanjing for a “high degree of autonomy” (gtodu zizhi). The masterfully written petition, drafted byDe Wang and cabled to the Central Government on July 27th, tapped into the anxious national mood following the Japanese annexation of Jehol province and the humiliating Tanku Truce of May 31st. The petition began by admitting that Sun Yat- sen’ s Outline far National RecenstmcOm called for the Central Government to “foster and guide” ifitzhi) the frontier minorities through a period of political tutelage in preparation for a future state of “self-determination and self-rule” (zizhi zijufy, yet went on to claim that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. The imminent threat of foreign invasion required the foreshortening of political tutelage and the immediate creation of a single, unified “Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government.”3 3 Following the publication of the petition in the domestic and foreign media, De Wang’ s Bailingmiao movement garnered national attention and won the support of Wu Heling, Bai Yundi, and other Mongols closely associated with the Kuomintang. The Central Government, however, was slow to react. After waiting several months for a reply to the petition, De Wang decided to convene a second Bailingmiao Congress in October. Taking matters into their own hands, the nearly one hundred and fifty delegates decided to form the “Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government” (Neimenggi Zhonghua wenhua chubanshi weiyuanhui, 1954), 2:251-66. 3 3 [De Wang], “De Wang deng wei mixing Menggu gaodu zizhi zhenxiang zhi zhongyang dangbu shixing weiyuanhui deng dian” (The cable of De Wang and others to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee and others concerning the actual facts of promoting a high degree of Mongolian autonomy), 14 July 1933, in 2MSD, 5.1.5: 89-91. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 8 zizhi zhentfti) (IMAG) without Nanjing’ s approval. The Political Outline of the IMAG claimed authority over all Mongols living within the orignd territory of the Inner Mongolian leagues, banners and tribes, and the right, with the exception of military and diplomatic affairs, to regulate all affairs within this territory.3 4 The delegates elected Prince Yun chairman and Prince So and Prince Sha (chieftain of the Ikhachao league) vice-chairmen, while De Wang was selected head of the Political Affairs Department. De Wang cabled Nanjing announcing the creation of EMAG and calling for an immediate halt to the establishment of county administrations and Chinese colonization within IMAG territory. The new government requested Nanjing’ s active assistance in building an autonomous Inner Mongolia free from Han exploitation and foreign encroachment.3 5 As one would expect, De Wang’ s autonomous movement produced a strong reaction from Chinese provincial officials. Following the 1st Bailingmiao Congress, both Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi used force and coercion to block participation by Suiyuan and Chahar Mongols. Yan Xishan cabled the CMTA, the Executive Yuan, and even Chiang Kai-shek claiming that the Panchen Lama, who was living in exile in Bailingmiao after being appointed Pacification Commissioner for the Mongolian Banners, was providing moral and material support to the Mongolian troublemakers. He asked the 3 4 “Zizhi zhengfu zuzhi dagang” (Outline for the organization of an autonomous government), October 1933, in Chen, Neirmrig Zizhi ShiliaoJiyta, 9-14. The document can also be found in Lu, Menggt "Zizhi Yundong’ Shitta, 36-8. 3 5 [De Wang], “De Wang wei zuzhi neimeng zizhi zhengfu shixing zizhi zhi zhongyang shixing weiyuanhui tongdian” (Circular telegram from De Wang to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee concerning the organization of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government for carrying out of autonomy), 28 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:108-10. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 1 9 Central Government to limit the amount of time the Panchen could spend in the region, Yan also persuaded the Zhangjia Khutuktu (Inner Mongolia’ s highest living Buddha) to cable all Mongolian princes warning them “not to travel down the wrong road.”3 6 Meanwhile, Fu Zuoyi cabled CMTA chairman, Shi Qingyang, stating that he had dispatched “experts” to the various banners to dissuade Mongols from attending the 2n d Bailingmiao Congress. He also reported that his office had ordered the provincial and Baotou Public Security Bureaus to closely monitor the situation. If they encountered a prince or delegate travelling to the Congress, they were instructed to gently dissuade and, if that proved unsuccessful, inform them of the government’ s ban on attendance.3 7 Fu Zuoyi’ s strong arm tactics not only prevented manylkhachao and Ulauchab league Mongols from attending the second Congress, but also caused Nanjing to receive several coerced cables from Mongol banner officials expressing their opposition to De Wang’ s movement.3 8 Fu also dispatched Mongolian spies to infiltrate De Wang’ s movement and sent regular cables back to Nanjing over the next couple of 3 6 See Lu, M en gi 'Zizhi Yundang Shm d, 33. 3 7 [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei zhizhi ge qi wanggong chuxi De Wang Bailingmiao zizhi huiyi zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’ s cable to CMTA concerning the prevention of banner princes from attending De Wang’ s Bailingmiao autonomous congress), 24 September 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:96. 3 8 See, for example, Lu, M en gi Z izh i Yundong’ Shiwd, 39-42; [Ni Wang], “Ni-mu-e-te-suo-er baogao De Wang zai Bailingmiao kaihui canjia renyuan shiqing shi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Mongolian Prince Ni’ s cable to CMTA about the true circumstances behind those who are participating in De Wang’ s Bailingmiao meeting), 24 September 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:95; [Zhuo Wang], “Zhuo-te-ba- zha-pu deng wei buyuan zhuisui De Wang zizhi zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Mongolian prince Zhuo and others’ cable to CMTA expressing their unwillingness to follow De Wang’ s autonomous movement), 26 September 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 96; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi guanyu De Wang zizhi huiyi qingxing ji zizhi dagang zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’ s cable to CMTA about the conditions of De Wang’ s autonomous meeting and its autonomous outline), 11 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:103-4; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei baogao Sha mengzhang dui De Wang zizhi taidu zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’ s cable to CMTA reporting that league chieftain Sha attitudes towards De Wang’ s autonomous movement), 14 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:105. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 0 months stressing De Wang’ s evil intentions and lack of support among the Mongolian masses.3 9 While De Wang was appealing to the Central Government for assistance, Suiyuan officials were sending their own petitions to Nanjing expressing their strong opposition to De Wang’ s movement. Their first proposal argued that the Bailingmiao movement was motivated solely by the selfish desire of the feudal princes to expand their personal authority and had little or no support among the Mongolian people. The petition also argued that the Mongols lacked the basic economic, political and education requirements for self-rule and needed a lengthy period of Han tutelage prior to reaching the stage of autonomous political activity. They also stressed that, according to Sun Yat- sen’ s political philosophy, the xian (county) should serve as the basic unit of self-rule in China. Thus, on the Mongolian frontier, any future form of autonomy must be based at the level of the individual banners and counties rather than the entire Inner Mongolian region.4 0 Fearing that the Central Government might choose to back the Mongols against their wishes, the second proposal provided a list of bottom-line conditions for any form of Mongolian self-rule: first, self-rule on the Mongolian frontier must occur at the 3 9 [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi guanyu xinmeng faqi zizhi qiyin yi xuanhua qingxing zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuyoyi’ s cable to CMTA about the reasons for the origins of the autonomous movement among the Silrnghol league and pacification conditions), 16 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 105-07; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei baogao De Wang zizhi chouhua bingli ji ge meng daibiao taidu zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’ s cable to CMTA concerning De Wang’ s plans to use military force and the attitude of all the Mongolian league delegates), 21 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:107; [Fu Zuoyi], “Fu Zuoyi wei baogao De Wang yunong Menggu ge qi shixing zizhi deng zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui dian” (Fu Zuoyi’ s cable to CMTA about how De Wang has hoodwinked all the Mongolian banners into carrying out autonomy and other matters), 22 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:107-8. 4 0 Wen Tingxiang et al., “Diyici jianyi shu” (First Proposal), October 1933?, in Chen, NeinwgZizhi R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 221 banner level, and all self-governing banners must be placed under the jurisdiction of their respective provinces and undergo a fixed period of political tutelage in preparation for their ultimate binding together with the provinces; second, the boundary between the provinces and the autonomous banners should be fixed along the lines of cultivated/uncultivated land rather than the original territory of the banners; third, special legal provisions should be made to protect the rights of the nearly 170,000 Han currently living within the territory of the Suiyuan banners; four, self-rule should not be permitted in the Turned Special Banner or the eight western banners of the Chahar tribes since this territory had long been rrirken (colonized by the people) rather than grnnken (colonized by officials), and was now overwhelmingly (98% in some areas) Han; and finally, the Mongols must provide their own tax base to fund their experiment in self-rule— the Han people living in Suiyuan have absolutely no tax responsibility towards the Mongols.4 1 If the Central Government was going to grant De Wang’ s request for Mongolian autonomy, the Han frontiersmen were going to fight to ensure that it remained firmly under their control. Initially, the Kuomintang appeared divided on howto respond to De Wang’ s autonomous movement. The CMTA, the first government organ to react, proposed a dual solution to the problem: first, as a temporary solution, it called upon Fu Zuoyi to dispatch officials to dissuade Mongolian princes from attending the 2n d Bailingmiao Congress; second, towards a long term solution, the CMTA asked Wu Heling to draft a Shili aoJi yao, 25-36. The document can also be found in Huang, Nei mmgMengp. Z izhi JuncbngJi , 129-30. 4 1 Wen Tingxiang et al., “Dierci jianyi shu” (Second Proposal), November 1933?, in Chen, Neinm g Z izhi Shiliao Ji yao, 36-42; Also in Huang, NdrmngM engp Z izhi Yundongji, 126-29. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 2 report, this time with the assistance of two Han CMTA officials, examining whether or not Inner Mongolian autonomy was warranted.4 2 When completed, Wu Heling’ s report argued that the right of Mongolian self-rule was contained within the Kuomintang’ s party programme and thus should be permitted as long as it did not interfere with national unity, foreign policy and national defense, and proceeded under direct central government supervision. The report called for the immediate creation of a “Preparatory Committee for Mongolian Autonomy” which would lead to the eventual creation of a unified and autonomous Inner Mongolian government.4 3 The CMTA’ s proposal failed to meet with the approval of top Kuomintang and Central Government officials. The Nanjing leadership clearly valued its relationship with Yan Xishan more than it did with the handful of discontented Mongolian princes. Despite Nanjing’s victory over the anti-Chiang Northern Coalition in the civil war of 1930, its control over the frontier provinces remained weak. The Central Government continued to face the direct threat of rebellion from the powerful southern militarists of Guangdong and Guangxi, who formalized their autonomy from Nanjing at the end of 1931 with the creation of the Southwest Political Council (SWPQ and the Southwest Headquarters of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. In the precarious 4 2 [Fu Zuoyi], “Suiyuan sheng zhengfu zhuyi Fu Zuoyi baogao De Wang zai Bailingmiao kaihui qingxing zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui” (Suiyuan provincial government chairman Fu Zuoyi’ s cable to CMTA reporting De Wang’ s convening of a conference at Bailingmiao), 1 September 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 91- 94; “Mengzang weiyuanhui guanyu Menggu zizhi zhibiao zhiben yijuean” (CMTA’ s draft proposal for the temporary and permanent solution of the Mongolian autonomous movement), 16 September 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:64. 4 3 “Neizhengbu deng guanyu Menggu zizhi an huigao” (Ministry of Interior and others draft plan for Mongolian autonomy), September 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:63-4. The plan was signed by the heads of the Ministry of Interior, CMTA and Central Military Staff. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 3 balance of power between Nanjing and the SWPQ the support of Yan Xishan’ s northern regime was crucial. Yan’ s defection to the S W C might very well have toppled Chiang Kai-shek’ s government.4 4 In currying his favor, the Central Government yielded to Yan Xishan on nearly all issues of local concern. Therefore, it is not surprising that Nanjing’ s initial response to De Wang’ s autonomous movement closely dovetailed the opinion and policy suggestions of Yan Xishan’s frontier officials. On 7 October 1933, Wang Jingwei, chairman of the Executive Yuan, forwarded Fu Zuoyi’ s policy suggestions on the Inner Mongolian crisis to CMTA chairman Shi Qingyang, recommending that the Central Government adopt a traditional im (threaten)/en (console) approach to “snuff out (zhupd) De Wang’ s deceitful scheme.” Echoing the opinion of Fu Zuoyi’ s attached cable, Wang Jingwei contended that most Mongolian princes opposed De Wang’ s movement and the Central Government should stop at nothing to win these individuals over in order to isolate and then exterminate De Wang’ s movement.4 5 Three days later the Executive Yuan approved the “Draft Revision of Mongolian Administration,”4 6 which aimed at placating De Wang’ s request for autonomy while bringing the Mongols under more firm provincial control. The plan called for the creation of several “Mongolian Local Autonomous Councils” (MLAPQ 4 4 On the Nanjing government’ s struggle to gain control over the provinces see Eastman, “Nationalist China during the Nanjing decade,” 9-15. 4 5 [Fu Zuoyi], “Guomin zhenggu Xingzheng Yuan mishu chuwei chaosong Fu Zuoyi guanyu De Wang zizhi qingxing ji chuli banfa zhi Mengzang ■weiyuanhui” (A duplicate copy of Fu Zuoyi’ s description of De Wang’ s autonomous movement and methods for dealing with it send by the secretary of the Executive Yuan to the CMTA), 7 October 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.1:100-01. 4 6 See “Xingzhengyuan guanyu gaige Menggu difang xingzheng xitong fangan” (Executive Yuan’s plan for revising the system of local Mongolian administration), 10 October 1934, in Chen, Ndmeng Zizhi Shiliao Jiyao, 77-79. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 4 to deal directly with banner affairs. These councils would be responsible for preparing the Mongols for a future state of unified self-rule; yet, in the meantime, they were to be placed directly under the jurisdiction and guidance of provincial officials. Banner and provincial officials were to staff these councils with a top provincial official rather than a banner prince serving as chairman. In order to convey the Central Government’ s new plan to De Wang and the Mongols, the Executive Yuan dispatched a delegation of top government and party officials, lead by Minister of the Interior General Huang Shaoxing and CMTA vice-chairman Zhao Beiling, to Bailingmiao.4 7 To ensure their safety and set the tone for talks with the Mongols, General Huang’s mission arrived in Bailingmiao on 10 November 1933 under militaiy escort from the 17th Anny group. The general met with top IMAG officials and presented the Executive Yuan’s plan to De Wang. General Huang also issued a public proclamation to the Mongol people written by Wang Jingwei on behalf of the Central Government. “Presently,” it declared, “the Inner Mongolian people wish to carryout self-rule, but the Central Government ungrudgingly cannot allow this, instead it desires to foster and guide (juzhi fadad) [the Mongolian people] so that they might fully mature.” Wang’ s proclamation warned against “the skipping over of normal stages” and called for an extensive, but fixed, period of Central Government tutelage aimed at raising the level of education, culture and economic livelihood among the Mongolian people. It also warned against any obstruction to the system of provincial rule, but referred to the establishment of local autonomous councils as a “preliminary trial in self-rule” 4 7 See Lu, Menggi ‘ Zizhi Ytmdang Shmd, 43-44. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 225 graciously granted to the Mongolian people by the Central Government.4 8 De Wang, realizing that Central Government support was crucial if his IMAG had any hope of surviving, expressed his willingness to consider the Central Government’s proposal and called upon General Huang to negotiate the details of the plan in Bailingmiao. In their talks at Bailingmiao, both sides remained divided on the structure and jurisdiction of these autonomous political councils. De Wang was quick to realize that the creation of several different councils under direct provincial administration would only strengthen the grip of the Han frontiersmen over Inner Mongolia. With the aid of Wu Heling, who had recently defected to the IMAG, De Wang drafted an 11-point counter proposal calling once again for the creation of a “single, unified, high-level Inner Mongolian autonomous government directly under the administration of the Executive Yuan,” and threatening to continue with plan for the IMAG if the Central Government was unw illing to engage in serious negotiations. General Huang stressed that the Central Government could never accept the creation of a unified Inner Mongolian government. The General was well aware that Yan Xishan, Fu Zuoyi and other provincial officials had consistently insisted upon the administrative and territorial integrity of their provincial governments and would never willingly agree to relinquish administrative control over the Inner Mongolian banners. Realizing that the talks were at a standstill, General Huang agreed to present De Wang’ s 11-point counter proposal to the Central Government if the prince would agree to the creation of two separate 4 8 “Xingzhengyuan wei guanyu Menggu zizhi wend bugao” (Executive Yuan proclamation about the question of Mongolian autonomy, 13 November 1933, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 68-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 6 autonomous political councils (one comprising the Silinghol and Chahar tribes of Chahar Province and the other the Ulauchab and Ikhchao leagues of Suiyuan Province) which, the General agreed, would be placed under Executive Yuan jurisdiction while working closely with the authorities of the two frontier provinces. De Wang reluctandy agreed and on 19 November General Huang departed Bailingmiao promising to deliver De Wang’ s new proposal direcdy to Premier Wang Jingwei.4 9 General Huang did not, however, return direcdy to the capital. Realizing that any compromised solution required the approval of Yan Xishan, he traveled secretly to Taiyuan to hold talks with Yan Xishan. As General Huang was arriving in Taiyuan, events were unfolding in southern China that would ensure that, for the time being at least, Yan Xishan and not De Wang or the Central Government would be the final arbitrator on the shape of Inner Mongolian autonomy. On 20 November 1933 a coalition of Fujian-based, anti-Nanjing rebels— lead by immensely popular Chen Mingshu and his 19th Route Army, the “national heroes” of the January 1932 Japanese attack on Shanghai— declared Fujian Province independent from the Central Government. The rebels claimed that Chiang Kai-shek’ s regime was slowly destroying the nation and called upon other provinces to break with Nanjing. The Fujian rebellion momentarily shook the balance of power in China, setting off a race for allies that, according to Lloyd Eastman, “forced all elements in the Chinese political world to shift, or threaten to shift, their positions in order to 4 9 “Huang buzhang Zhao fuweiyuanzhang zai Bailingmiao yu Neimeng zizhi huiyi shangding Menggu zizhi banfa” (Methods for Mongolian autonomy negotiated between Minister Huang and vice- chairman Zhao and the Bailingmiao Inner Mongolian Autonomous Congress), December 1933, in 7M SD, R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 7 maintain themselves in the new political equilibrium.”5 0 Initially, it appeared like the powerful SWPC would support their neighbors in Fujian, while the position of Yan Xishan’ s Northwest regime was less clear. Yan made an initial pronouncement of support for Nanjing, but also dispatched representatives to meet with the Fujian rebels. He also approached other northern warlords— such as Feng Yuxiang and Han Fuqu— about a possible anti-Chiang coalition. With the Mongolian autonomous movement a huge thorn in the side of his regime, General Huang moved quickly to solve the problem and maintain Yan’ s neutrality in the Fujian revolt. In their Taiyuan talks, the two men agreed upon a secret, alternative plan calling for a largely symbolic, and virtually meaningless, form of Inner Mongolian autonomy, which in reality placed the Mongolian banners firmly under the control of Yan’ s frontier officials.5 1 On the surface the Taiyuan plan looked similar to De Wang’ s compromise proposal. The first article, for example, called for the creation of two, autonomous Inner Mongolian political councils under the authority of the Executive Yuan; yet, each of the following provisions gave sweeping economic and political authority to the provincial government to regulate the affairs of the two councils.5 2 When he returned to the capital in December, General Huang presented the 5.1.5:116-18; Lu, Menggu 'Zizhi Yundang’ Shkm, 54-57. 5 0 Lloyd E. Eastman, The A borthe Revolution: Chim under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974): 112. Eastman’ s book contains one of the most detail treatments of the Fujian Rebellion, see pp. 85-139. 5 1 Hao, Neinmggu Geninghi, 184. 5 2 For a copy of the Taiyuan plan see “Guomin zhengfu wenguanchu wei niding Neimeng zizhi banfa zhi Xingzheng Yuan gonghan” (Public circular of the methods for Inner Mongolian autonomy drafted by the national government’ s civil official department and presented to the Executive Yuan), 22 January 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:69-72. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 2 8 Taiyuan proposal to the Executive Yuan, claiming that the plan was De Wang’ s own. Following a round of discussions by the Central Political Bureau of the Kuomintang, the Central Government officially passed the “Eleven Methods for Inner Mongolian Autonomy” on 17 January 1934.5 3 In an incredible turn of events, Premier Wang Jingwei held a closed-door “tea meeting” with top Mongolian officials in Nanjing only eleven days after the passage of the Taiyuan plan. In attendance were over one hundred Mongols either living in or visiting Nanjing and top Kuomintang officials like Daijitao, Zhang Ji, Huang Shaoxiong and Zhao Beilian. Lead by Wu Heling, the Mongols aggressively pressed Wang Jingwei for a reversal of the government’ s 17 January 1934 decision, and a greatly expanded and genuine form of Mongolian autonomy. After the meeting, Wang Jingwei asked Wu Heling to draft an alternative plan more acceptable to Bailingmiao authorities, and in an unprecedented reversal, the KMTs Central Political Bureau approved Wu Heting’ s eight-point plan for the creation of a single, unified “Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council” (Menggu difangzizhi zhenguu 'im ym rhi) (MLAPQ on 28 February 1934. Several weeks later, the Executive Yuan issued an order calling for the implementation of this plan which closely resembled De Wang’ s original eleven-point proposal handed to General Huang back in November.5 4 In addition to restoring the administrative authority of the banners and leagues over thdrorigm l territory, the plan also called for the restoration of the Chahar league, 5 3 “Neimeng zizhi banfa shiyi xiang” (Eleven Methods for Inner Mongolian Autonomy), 17 January 1934, in Chen, NemengZizhi Shiliao jiyao, 68-9. 5 4 Lu, Menggi Zizhi Yundong’ Shhed, 63-4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 229 which had been abolished by the Qing court in 1757 following Chingunjav’ s failed rebellion, on its original land in western Suiyuan and eastern Chahar provinces. The plan outlawed new land reclamation projects, put an end to the establishment of county administrations on banner territory, and contained provisions protecting Mongolian tax autonomy. The plan also called for the protection of Mongolian banners from provincial hegemony by placing the MLAPC directly under the authority of the Executive Yuan rather than the provincial governments. The Council was given full authority to handle all league and banner affairs (with the exception of diplomatic, military and other national issues) and the right to elect its own chairman and vice- chairman with a single Chinese adviser to be appointed by the Central Government.5 5 In an elaborate ceremony held in Bailingmiao on 23 April 1934 the MLAPC was formally established. Prince Yun was sworn in as chairman, De Wang was named director of the Political Affairs Bureau in chaise of daily administration, and one of Chiang Kai-shek’ s most trusted generals, He Yingqin, was appointed the Central Government supervisory official.5 6 What caused the Central Government’s sudden and unprecedented reversal, and led it to finally accept a genuine form of Mongolian autonomy? The reasons appear to have been at least threefold. First, the collapse of the Fujian rebellion in late January removed the immediate threat of a Yan Xishan revolt against the Central Government. 5 5 “Xingzhengyuan wei jiejue Menggu zizhi wenti banfa yuange baxiang zhi Mengzang weiyuanhui xunling” (Executive Yuan directive to CMTA on the eight methods for solving the question of Mongolian autonomy, 24 March 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:75-6; “Menggu difang zizhi zhengwu weiyuanhui zhanxing zuzhi dagang” (Temporary organizational outline for the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council), 7 March 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5: 73-4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 0 As Yan Xishan and other provincial militarists contemplated whether to join the Fujian rebels, Chiang’ s army launched a massive offensive, and amidst heavy rebel defections, easily crushed the rebellion in a couple of weeks.5 7 The Fujian rebellion marked the last direct threat to the authority of the Kuomintang Central Government. The speed and ease with which Chiang Kai-shek’ s increasingly powerful military suppressed the rebellion caused Yan Xishan and other regional militarists to choose self-preservation within a loosely centralized Nationalist Government over outright resistance. Second, De Wang’ s representatives in Nanjing brought enormous pressure to bear on the Nanjing government. After General Huang’s departure from Bailingmiao, De Wang dispatched a delegation of Mongolian dignitaries, lead by the politically savvy Wu Heling, to keep the pressure on the Central Government. In Nanjing, Wu Heling rallied the expatriate Mongolian community in a series of high-profile demonstrations in favor of Mongolian autonomy. Through a series of carefully orchestrated press conferences and symbolic outings to Sun Yat-sen’ s tomb and other places of historical significance, the Mongols manipulated public opinion to highlight the legitimacy of their struggle in accordance with Sun Yat-sen’ s Three People’s Principles. In nearly daily reports, the Nanjing and Shanghai newspapers sympathetically chronicled the activities of the Mongolian representatives. After General Huang’ s secret meetings with Yan Xishan were made public, the Mongols presented a detailed and passionate petition to National Government chairman Lin Sen, claiming that the General had negotiated in 5 6 Lu, Mengu ‘ Zizhi Yunchng’ Sham, 71. 5 7 Eastman, A b(Miw Revolution, 130-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 1 bad faith at Bailingmiao and failed to present, as promised, their proposal to the Executive Yuan. Around the same time, the chieftain and vice-chieftain of the Ikhchao leagues cabled the Central Government claiming that Fu Zuoyi had coerced them into declaring their opposition to the Bailingmiao Congresses.5 8 Yet, the ultimate reasons behind Nanjing’ s sudden reversal appear to have been Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to personally throw his support behind De Wang’ s autonomous government. As events were unfolding during the second half of 1933, Chiang Kai-shek was absent from Nanjing and uninvolved in the Executive Yuan’ s daily handling of the Mongolian situation. Chiang was busy personally directing the fifth and final encirclement campaign against the CCP’s Jiangxi Soviet from his military field headquarters in Nanchang. Sensing that the last hope for a genuine Inner Mongolian autonomy rested with Chiang Kai-shek, De Wang sent one of his most trusted subordinates to direcdy seek Chiang’ s support for Mongolian autonomy.5 9 When De Wang’ s envoy arrived in the south, the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement had reached a position of national prominence. What Chiang feared most was a shifting in public attention away from the government’ s struggle to destroy the communist bandits and consolidate its control over the provinces. The Mongolian struggle for autonomy threatened to redirect public attention away from his domestic agenda and towards the growing threat of renewed Japanese encroachment in Northern China. Rather than a potential threat to his government’ s authority, Chiang appears to have viewed the 5 8 Gien, Ndrnmg Zizhi Shiliao Jiyao, 68-73; Lu, Menggi Zizhi Yundong Sham, 61-62; Hao, Ndrnzi&u Germqghi, 184. 5 9 Lu, Menggu ‘ Zizhi Yundang Sham, 65 & 70-1. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 2 creation of an autonomous Mongolian government as an effective counter-balance to Yan Xishan in the north. During an important speech on “China’ s Frontier Problem,” delivered at his Nanchang headquarters on 7 March 1934, Chiang explained his public support for Mongolian autonomy. Chiang began his talk by claiming that the so-called “frontier question” (bkrgiang'imti) was actually a “question of diplomacy” ( 'wyiaomrjti). If a country’ s power is sufficient, it can rely upon brute force to solve the frontier problem and secure its borders against foreign encroachment; if, however, a country is weak and faced with both internal and external enemies, like China, it must develop a careful, and well crafted, strategy for dealing with the frontier problem. Chiang claimed that during China’s current stage in its revolutionary struggle a conciliatory (mccir% ), or “loose rein” (jini), policy was the most effective means for dealing with the frontier question. Since the Chinese state currently lacked the strength to direcdy control the frontier, it was better to create a balance of power aimed at maintaining long term stability, whilst strengthening itself domestically and preparing for the day when it would be able to consolidate its frontier. “If we let them go and rule themselves,” Chiang stressed, “the border people will enjoytheir freedom; yet amongst their traditional customs there still exists a good deal of room for loose rein (jini) and enticement (longfud); they put up a bold front like a paper tiger, yet each of their national sentiments are isolated and they certainly do not have the capacity for unity.”6 0 If the Central Government denies the 6 0 Chiang Kai-shek, “Zhongguo zhi bianjiang wenti” (China’ s Frontier Problem), 7 March 1934, in Zongong Jiang GongSixiang Yanhm Zongji (Collection ( f President JiangKai-shek’ s Essays andSpeedxs), ed. Jin Xiaoyi (Taipei: Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1984), 12:108 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 3 requests of the Inner Mongols and other frontier peoples for self-rule, they will turn towards the imperialists for help and invite further foreign interference in China’ s internal affairs. Thus, Chiang argued, only a tolerant and magnanimous policy of self- rule can solve China’s frontier problem. As this important, but heretofore overlooked, speech demonstrates, when it came to dealing with actual problems along China’ s frontier, Chiang Kai-shek turned to Qing precedents rather than the idealist rhetoric of those Kuomintang ideologues calling for the frontier minorities to “smelt together in the same oven” with the Han in fashioning a single, homogenous Zhonfma ninzu. In an ironic and highly significant twist, Chiang pointed to Soviet Russia’ s frontier policy as an example of how traditional loose rein policy have prevented the disintegration of a nation. Expressing his “admiration” for Soviet frontier policy, Chiang argued that China cannot help but adopt a similar method for dealing with its own frontier peoples. To the amazement of his audience, no doubt, Chiang continued: I advocate that we follow the tradition of Soviet Russia’ s ‘ voluntary federation’ (lianbungziyou), and based upon the spirit of the five ninzu republic (wezu gx$e) and Sun Yat-sen’ s principal of the equality of all domestic ninzu, we establish a ‘five ninzu federal system’ (raza liarbcmgzhi). Simply speaking, we should adopt a laissez-faire fangvn) policy by permitting frontier self-rule.6 1 While granting the frontier their autonomy, Chiang claimed that the State could consolidate its hold over the interior, creating a strong base for the future reunification of the entire nation. In Chiang Kai-shek’ s mind it was the “disease of the body” (the (Hereafter cited as Z/GZ). 6 1 Ibid., 108. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 4 communists and provincial militarists) and not the “disease of the limbs” (minority rebels and foreign imperialists) that deserved the immediate attention of the state. In the end, however, even Chiang Kai-shek’ s public support was not enough to overcome the spirited opposition of Han frontiersmen to Inner Mongolian autonomy. Throughout the negotiation process, the issue of tax autonomy proved nearly as contentious as the land question. Both the Mongols and provincial warlords realized an autonomous Mongolian government was toothless without the ability to collect its own revenue. In his final negotiations with Kuomintang officials, Wu Heling won a modest monthly subsidy from the Central Government to cover the administrative cost of the MLAPC and a promise that the MLAPC could collect its own taxes within banner territory. De Wang’ s new government quickly realized the inherent weakness of depending upon Nanjing for their operating revenue when the money promised failed to arrive in a timely or complete fashion. The Mongols decided to test the wording and spirit of the new agreement by taxing Yan Xishan’s extremely profitable opium caravans as they passed through Mongolian territory. As one would expect, this sparked an immediate conflict between the MLAPC and the Suiyuan and Shanxi provincial authorities who dispatched Chinese troops to protect the opium route. To make matters worst, Fu Zuoyi’s Suiyuan government imposed a grain embargo on the Mongolian banner, attempting to force them into submission. The MLAPCs repeated protests to R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 5 Nanjing were ignored. Chiang Kai-shek, it would appear, was either unwilling or unable to backup his pledge of frontier autonomy with material assistance.6 2 De Wang dispatched one of his top officials, Chen Shaowu, to Lushan to request money, weapons and other equipment directly from Chiang Kai-shek while feeling out the Japanese for possible support. Chen Shaowu told Chiang about the MLAPCs troubles with the provincial authorities and warned about Japanese attempts to court MLAPC officials. Chiang agreed to provide the MLAPC with a monthly stipend of 300,O C X ) yuan, a construction grant of 120,000 yuan, and the necessary weapons and equipment to strengthen his fledgling government. Yet, again the money and equipment never arrived or were confiscated by the provincial authorities. Finally, in one last ditch effort to secure Chiang’ s assistance, MLAPC chairman Prince Yun and De Wang traveled to Kueihua in September 1934 to personally meet with Chiang Kai- shek during his tour of the northwest frontier. De Wang pressed Chiang for the promised funding and weapons to protect themselves and the nation against the growing threat of Japanese invasion. Yet, Chiang, preoccupied with dealing the Communists a deathblow on their Long March for survival, failed to make any significant promises.6 3 It appears that sometime during the summer of 1934, Chiang Kai-shek wrote off De Wang and his Mongols, leaving them for the Japanese while continuing to focus on the Chinese Communists. Frustrated, De Wang began open negotiations with the Japanese, eventually flying to Changchun to sign a formal 6 2 Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 436-8; Sechin, Mertggi zhiJim i, 2: 270. 6 3 Lu, Meng^u ‘ Zizhi Yurxbrig Shiva, 77-86. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 6 agreement of cooperation between the MLAPC and the puppet state of Manchukuo. In the end, as Owen Lattimore has pointed out, De Wang did not “go over” to Japan as the Chinese claimed, but rather he was “tied hand and foot and thrown to the Japanese.”6 4 Lattimore and others in 1930’ s China realized that the ultimate failure of Inner Mongolian autonomy was not, as contemporary observers would have us believe, the result of the Kuomintang’ s oppressive and assimilationist policies. “Nanking,” Lattimore wrote in 1937, “deserves less blame than the provincial governments for the final outcome.”6 5 While the Central Government wavered, and at times appeared apathetic, in its support for De Wang, the provincial warlords Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi ruthlessly and consistendy opposed any form of genuine Inner Mongolian autonomy. The Han frontiersmen viewed Inner Mongolia as an untapped resource for their personal exploitation and the backward Mongols as evolutionary relics destined for extinction. When considering the Kuomintang frontier policy, it is important that we pay careful attention to the fragmented and multi-dimensional nature of political power in early 20th century China. It was not simply a case of Nanjing imposing its will and control over the frontier minorities; rather, we find that the Mongols, Tibetans and other minorities were often treated as pawns in the fierce struggle among different Han political factions. 6 4 Lattimore, “The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism,” 438. 6 5 Ibid., 435. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 7 LiuW ednd& Chinese E ncmacbmznt along the Xikang Frontier c f Tibet De Wang’s revolt and the growing threat of a Japanese invasion in Northern China did not alter the Kuomintang’s m tlpditk approach to the frontier problem. With the outbreak of full-scale conflict in 1937, the Central Government intensified its nationalist rhetoric, hoping to rally the Chinese people against the Japanese invasion and consolidate its authority over the divided nation. Under the influence of the conservative G C Clique, Kuomintang propaganda began stressing the historical and racial unity of the “Zhonghua people,” with Chiang Kai-shek’ s China's Destiny declaring all the frontier minorities were “lineage branches” of a single Zhon$m ninzu. In the realm of policy, however, the Party redoubled its efforts to win over the frontier minorities in its dual struggle against foreign imperialism and domestic communism Along its southwest frontier, the Central Government made repeated overtures to the Lamaist regime in Lhasa, hoping to eliminate English interference and re establish Chinese sovereignty over the Tibetan plateau. Yet, in its dealings with Lhasa, the Kuomintang had to contend with the autonomous authority of powerful Sichuan warlord Liu WenhuL Much like the Han frontiersmen in Inner Mongolian, Liu viewed the Xikang frontier with Tibet as his personal colony, fiercely defending the region against Central Government encroachment. Lhasa, hoping that the new Kuomintang government could reign in Liu Wenhui’ s military adventurism, made the demilitarization of the Tibetan-Xikang border a precondition for any Tibet-Chinese rapprochement. In the end, however, the Han frontiersmen of Xikang, like Inner Mongolia, prevented the re-establishment of Central Government relations with Tibet. In spite of its sincere R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 3 8 desire to see Tibet return to the national fold, the Central Government could not afford to alienate Liu Wenhui and his powerful 24th Army, whose assistance was crucial in first attacking the CCP and then after 1937 in securing the new wartime capital of Chongqing. Following the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Sichuan split into several competing warlord regimes each vying for supreme control of the fertile Sichuan basin and greater independence from the Central Government. The success of the Northern Expedition and the establishment of a new Kuomintang National Government did little to alter the situation in Sichuan. After declaring their allegiance to the Kuomintang and adopting the rudimentary trappings of revolutionary rhetoric, each of the Sichuan militarists and their armies were symbolically incorporated into the new National Revolutionary Army. However, as Robert Kapp has pointed out, “the Nationalist victory opened a period of more complete provincial independence and isolation from outside affairs than Szechwan [Sichuan] had previously known.”6 6 Despite the limited nature of its authority, the Nationalist Government did decide to pick what it believed was the best of the lot as the head of “its” new government in the province. General Liu Wenhui, the charismatic 32 year-old commander of the 200,000-strong 24th Army, was tapped as chairman of the Kuomintang’ s provincial government, which existed in name only. The real prize for General Liu was his appointment as Commander- in- Chief of the “Sichuan-Xikang Border Defense Force” {fhucm-kang biarfanguri). In the Xikang frontier, General Liu saw the “untapped” resources necessary, with the help of the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 239 Central Government in exploiting them, to tip the balance of power in Sichuan permanently in his favor. Liu Wenhui’ s relationship with Nanjing was tense from the beginning. When Nanjing established the Inner Mongolian provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, andjehol in 1928, it also announced plans to create a new province from amongst the territory of the former Sichuan Border Region. General Liu immediately sent a letter of protest to Nanjing claiming that the size and resources of the proposed province were insufficient with over half of the thirty-three counties currently under the control of the Tibetan military. He asked Nanjing to increase the number of revenue producing counties to forty-five by adding eight counties from the Ya’an region of Sichuan, three counties from the Ningshu region of Yunnan and several tusi (tribal chieftain) from Qinghai. He also requested thousands of dollars from the government treasury in order to develop Xikang and restore Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.6 7 Nanjing ignored the General’ s plea and dispatched its own team of officials, lead by the half-Tibetan CMTA official Kesang Tsering, to “assist” General Liu in preparing for the establishment of the new province. Liu Wenhui refused to cooperate with Kesang Tsering, and set up his own “Xikang Special Region Administrative Committee” (Xikarg tequ zhengw r mymrbw) without Nanjing’ s approval6 8 When Kesang Tsering attempted to establish a rival 6 6 Kapp, Szednmn and the Chinese ReptMic, 62. 6 7 Liu Wenhui, “Chuan-kang bianfang zongzhihui Liu Wenhui Xikang sheng jianyi shu sidaduan” (Sichuan-Xikang Border Defense Commander-in-Chief Liu Wenhui’s four point proposal for the creation of Xikang province), 1928, in Xikang Yangp Zhi (A Record(fXikang’ s Deidoprred), Chen Zhiming (Nanjing: Boti shudian, 1933), 88-91. 6 8 On the establishment and composition of the Xikang Special Region Administrative Committee see Xikang Tequ Zhengrn WeiyuarJjui Zhotman Zhuankan ( .Special One-year A nmwsary Publication cfthe Xikang R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 0 Xikang Border Defense Force and “Xikang Committee for the Construction of a Province” (Xikangjiansheng imyuanhtd) in Batang, Liu Wenhui started executing members of Kesang’ s staff. Nanjing quickly backed down and withdrew Kesang Tsering from the region, recognizing the authority of Liu’ s administrative committee.6 9 As in the case of Inner Mongolia, when pushed, Nanjing always choose stability over military conflict along its frontier regions, believing that a policy of conciliation was the most effective method for drawing the frontier warlords closer to the center. Over the next two and a half decades, Liu Wenhui ruled Xikang as his personal fiefdom, viewing the region and its untapped resources as a springboard for eventual rule over all of Sichuan. Working from their offices in Kangding, the Xikang Administrative Committee drew up detailed plans for the construction of railway lines, new roads, hydro-electric plants, leather and wool processing factories, agricultural research centers, and the clearing, cultivation, and mining of Xikang’s vast forests and grasslands.7 0 Yet, to properly exploit Xikang’ s resources while also providing the necessary supplies to increase the size of his army, Liu Wenhui needed to attract additional people and administrators to the region. With a population density of only Special Region A dnimstrathe Committee) (Kangding: Xikang tequ zhengwu weiyuanhui, 1929). 6 9 Feng Youzhi, Xikangsbi Ship. (The Lost History tfX ikang (Kangding: Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1992), 115-20; Chen, Xikang Yange Zhi, 103. Kesang Tsering (1904- 1946) was a half-Tibetan native of Batang county in Xikang. After receiving a Chinese education in Kunming, he joined Liu Wenhui’s 24th Army as a propaganda officer. Kesang broke however with Liu in 1927 when he went to Nanjing to serve as a translator in the Panchen Lama’ s Nanjing office. After joining the Kuomintang party, he was appointed to the CMTA where he continued to serve until his death. 7 0 On the supposed accomplishments of Liu’ s regime as of late 1929 and their future plans see Du Xiangrong, “Zuijin duiyu Xikang de kaocha yu yijian: yu bianzheng shunlian suo Liubu ge tongzhi tanhua” (Recent investigation and opinion on Xikang: A talk given to the comrades of the 24th Army at the Frontier Training Institute), Bianzheng 1.1 (September 1929): 69-82. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 241 two people/square li, one Xikang writer claimed that at least one million starving Sichuan peasants could farm the “virgin land” of Xikang over the next ten years/1 In a 1929 report funded by Liu’s administration, Dong Tiaofu outlined the extensive opportunities for kerhmng (“the opening up of wasteland”) in Xikang, claiming, for example, that 75% of Liiding county, 40% of Kangding county and 80+% of Daofu county were ripe for colonization/2 What Liu Wenhui was mainly interested in cultivating was opium. He was reported to have called opium the “lifeline” (shengpmgciari) of the 24th Army, with its export to Sichuan and the rest of China serving as the main source of revenue for his regime/3 While millions did not flock to Xikang, the stability of Liu’s regime and the profits of the opium trade did produce a sharp rise in the Han population of Xikang. Take for example, the population of Kangding county, which grew from 2900 to 8234 families between 1930 and 1934. In 1936, Mei Xinfu estimated that the Han now comprised 16% or 600,000 of Xikang’ s 3.8 million people/4 Finally, to cultivate the expertise necessary for the development of Xikang, the offices of the 24th Army launched the first Chinese journal dedicated specifically to frontier administration, Bianzheng [B onder A dnimtration\, in September 1929. The journal promoted the political and economic development of the region while also attempting to lure additional colonists and Central Government resources to the region. In the 7 1 Chen Zhongwei, Xikang Wend (The XikangPrcHerr) (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1930), 99. 7 2 Gted in Mei Xinfu, Xikang (Xikang), 1934, (reprint Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1970), 230-37. 7 3 Feng, Xikangshi Shiyi, 299; On Liu Wenhui’s encouragement of opium cultivation and other aspects of his Xikang regime also see the excellent chapter entitled “Tibetan Border Region” in A. Doak Barnett, China an the Ere (fCommrust Takeover. (New York: Praeger, 1963), 215-29. 7 4 The population figures are from Sichuansheng kangding xian zhizuan weiyuanhui, ed., Kangfimg XianzM (Kangfing Canity Gazetteer) (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1995), 73; Mei, Xikang 13-14. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 2 preface to the first edition, for example, Xikang was proclaimed a “gold vault” (jirxhao) and “treasure trove” (backim) rich in gold, silver, copper, timber, medicinal herbs, and other natural resources. It warned, however, that this wealth had attracted the greedy eye of the foreign imperialists and called upon the Central Government to allocate special funds for the development of this strategic “buffer zone” (pingfafi).7 5 Unique insight into the mentality and objectives of Liu Wenhui’ s Xikang administration can be gained from a propaganda play serialized in Bianzheng during the fall of 1929. Entitled “To the Frontier” {Bianjiangqii), the play tells the story of a Chengdu youth’s decision to forsake his elderly parents and childless wife for the hardships of the Xikang frontier.7 6 The story’ s protagonist, Kong Zhenyuan or “Kong the Pacifier of Distant Lands,” learns of the importance of the Xikang frontier after returning from geological studies in England. One of his friends tells him that England has recently sent troops into Tibet and is cunningly inciting the Tibetans to raise an army and attack the interior, threatening not only Xikang and Sichuan but all of China. Another of his friends laments how the abundant natural resources of Xikang remain untapped due to the shortage of expertise and colonists needed to exploit them. Patriotism stirs Kong into action. Arguing that “family-ism” (jiazuzhuyi) needs to be replaced with “nationalism” (gpazuzhuyi), Kong ignores the emotional pleas of his family and departs for the frontier to offer services to his country. During his journey of 7 5 Hu Horn, “Bianyan” (Preface), Bianzheng 1.1 (September 1929): i-ii. 7 6 Dong Tiaofu, “Dao Biandi qu” (To the Frontier), Bianzheng 1.1-2 (September-October 1929): 1- 18 & 1-46. The author of the play appears to have been a propaganda and/or research official under the employ of Liu’s administration, although I have been unable to locate any biographical information on him. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 3 several months on foot to the Yangtze border town of Batang, Kong and his trusted servant Old Wang endure numerous hardships-a diet of tsanpa (barley paste gruel), dirty inns, freezing weather, and harsh travel conditions— before finally being stripped of all their outer garments and money by ruthless bandits. Aided by one of Liu Wenhui’ s officers, Kong finally reaches Batang, where he is treated like a messiah-king by child like Tibetan barbarians, who sing and dance in wild excitement when learning of Kong’ s intention to “bridge the boundary between the Han and barbarians, abolish their suffering and foil the secret plans of the English imperialists to invade China.” During one of the final scenes, entitled “A Glimpse at the Accomplishments,” the audience learns of the rewards reaped by Kong’ s numerous sacrifices and by extension other Chinese youths willing to head out into the frontier. When a couple of old friends from Chengdu pay a visit to the offices of his “Xikang Construction Department” in Chamdo, Kong explains the recent accomplishments of his office. Thanks to the detailed survey maps provided by Kong’ s large staff of researchers, the 24th Army has advanced within 60 miles of Lhasa and now awaited further maps from Kong before laying siege on the Tibetan capital. Kong’ s development plans have already lead to the opening of numerous gold, silver, copper and iron mines, the establishment of wool processing factories, leather tanneries, and dairies while also contributing to the cultivation of over 100,000 m i of wasteland. We also learn that all of Xikang has been returned to Chinese administration with the complete pacification of the frontier barbarians. From the comments of his friends, the audience also discovers that Kong benefited financially from his selfless contribution to his country. The play ends with R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 4 Kong’ s triumphant return home over the New Year holiday to discover that his wife has given birth to their first baby, a son of course! By performing the play throughout those parts of Sichuan under his control, General Liu Wenhui hoped to attract the necessary talent and resources for the development of the Xikang frontier region and a military campaign against Lhasa to regain lost Chinese territory. The Disputed Xikang Tibetan Border As the tale of Kong Zhenyuan reveals, the Xikang border with Tibet was a source of intense conflict between Lhasa and Liu Wenhui’ s autonomous regime. Throughout the late Qing and early 20th century, control over the rugged Xikang- Tibetan border seesawed back and forth between the Tibetan army and the Sichuan warlords. During the waning years of the Qing dynasty, Sichuan general Zhao Erfang led an expeditionary force to within miles of Lhasa, only to be pushed back over the Yangtze River following the confusion accompanying the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. The Tibetans, under the leadership of the 13th Dalai Lama, forcefully expelled Manchu/Chinese officials from Lhasa and declared Tibet proper and the ethnically Tibetan regions of Amdo (Qinghai) and Kham (Xikang) part of an independent Tibetan state. Hoping to mediate the conflict along the disputed border and secure a zone of influence in Tibet, the British government pressured the Chinese into attending a tripartite conference at Simla in 1913. Following several months of intense negotiations, the three sides agreed to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in exchange for R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 5 extensive Tibetan autonomy and the recognition of England’ s special interests in the region.7 7 The mapping of Tibet’ s border with China, however, proved much more difficult. The Chinese insisted upon using the line of Zhao Erfang’ s furthest conquest, drawing the border 60 miles east of Lhasa through Giamda. The Tibetans wanted the Buddhist monasteries of Amdo and Kham included within their territory and proposed a Tibetan frontier stretching northeastward into Kokonor and southeastward through Kangding, the capital of Xikang. Attempting to bridge the gap between the two sides, Sir Henry McMahon, the British delegate, proposed his own border. The so-called McMahon line divided Tibet into an “Inner” and “Outer” half with the border running along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. The towns of Giamda, Lagong-Ngamda, and Chamdo west of the Yangtze were included within “Outer Tibet” and placed directly under the administration of Lhasa. The towns of Ganze, Batang, Nyarong and Derge east of the Yangtze and the southeastern section of Amdo were included within “Inner Tibet” and placed under joint administration with the Tibetans retaining full control over all religious affairs. Under intense public pressure to stand firm on the frontier question, following the revelation of open Russian hegemony in Outer Mongolia, the Beijing government of Yuan Shikai refused to sign the agreement.7 8 7 7 On the Simla Conference and events leading up to it, see Li Tieh-Tseng, The Historical Status c f Tibet (Columbia, NY: King’ s Crown Press, 1956), 135-42; Goldstein, A History c f Modem Tibet, 68-88; Hugh Richardson, Tibet and its History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962): 107-113. On Zhao Erfang see Feng, Xikanghi Shiyi, 13-71. 7 8 Parshotam Mehra, The McMahon Line and Aften A Study fth e Triangular Contest on India’ s North eastern Frontier Between Britain, China and Tibet, 1904-1947 (Delhi: MacMillan, 1974) 162-244; Chen, Xikang Yang Zhi, 72-82. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 6 Liu Wenhui’ s rise to power in Xikang only exacerbated the border dispute between China and Tibet. During the late 1920’ s, the 24th Army pushed the Tibetan army west of the Yangtze River, gradually garrisoning Dawu, Litang, Nyarong, Derge, Ganze, Batang and other counties on the eastern shore of the Yangtze River. Liu’ s encroachment eventually provoked a counter-attack from the Tibetan governor-general of Kham. On the pretext of assisting the Tibetan monks of the Targye Monastery in their long running dispute with the Beri tusi (tribal chieftain) backed by the 24th Army, the Tibetan army attacked Liu Wenhui’ s positions in Xikang during the summer of 1930. The Tibetan army, which had recently received training and new weaponry from the British, quickly pushed the overextended forces of Liu Wenhui backed to within 100 miles of Xikang capital of Kangding.7 9 At the request of the 13th Dalai Lama, the Central Government sent CMTA official Tang Kesan to mediate the conflict. Liu Wenhui again refused to cooperate with Nanjing, desiring a military rather than a political solution to the problem. Attempting to override Liu Wenhui’ s authority, Tang dispatched his own officials to Ganze with orders to negotiate an immediate armistice. The draft accord reached on 7 November 1931 recognized the Tibetans as the victors in the conflict, agreeing to their demand for the establishment of a demilitarized zone in Western Xikang (which included the towns of Ganze, Nyarong, Batang, and Daofu) and the payment of a 20,000 yuan indemnity by Liu Wenhui’ s Sichuan government. Yet, when word of the agreement slipped out, it not only sent Liu Wenhui’ s regime into an 7 9 On the Targye Monastery incident see Li Chiren, Xikang Zangian (ConpMxnsiw Surrey c f Xikang) (Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1946): 225-233; Mei, Xikang, 97-99; Goldstein, A History c f Modem Tibet, 221-224. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 4 7 uproar but also captured the attention and ire of the national media. In the wake of rising nationalist sentiment following Japan’ s invasion of Manchuria, the Chinese media blamed the incident on the instigation of the British imperialists and criticized the government for appeasing rather than fighting China’s enemies. This public pressure forced the Central Government to cable Tang Kesan with instructions not to sign the accord while CMTA chairman Shi Qingyang stepped down in embarrassment over the shortcomings of his subordinates.8 0 Nanjing had little choice but to cable Liu Wenhui with complete authority to solve the matter on his own. Within weeks the 24th Army launched a massive counter offensive against the Tibetan army. With the assistance of Qinghai warlord Ma Pufang, Liu hoped to put an end to the border conflict once and for all by marching all the way to Lhasa. Liu’ s forces quickly drove the Tibetan army west of the Yangtze River and during the summer of 1932 was preparing for an attack on Chamdo. The Dalai Lama cabled Nanjing for assistance, and again the Central Government called upon both sides to put down their arms and achieve a peaceful solution to the border problem. Liu Wenhui simply ignored the Central Government and continued with his offensive, forcing Nanjing to admit to the Dalai Lama that it was helpless to prevent the “self- defense activities of the local officials.”8 1 The 24th Army might have succeeded in marching to Lhasa if it was not for an unexpected turn of events. Sensing that Liu Wenhui had over-extended the resources of his 24th Army, his uncle and fellow Sichuan 8 0 See Chen, Xikang Yange 7M, 102-09; Feng, Xikat& hi Shiyi, 109-111. 8 1 See the letter from CMTA chairman Shi Qingyang to the Dalai Lama cited in Chen, Xikang Y an glh i, 104-05. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 248 warlord, Liu Xiang, launched an offensive against Liu Wenhui’ s position in Sichuan. Liu Wenhui quickly sought a truce with the Tibetans so that his Xikang forces could join the raging civil war in Sichuan. The 8 October 1932 cease-fire called for the Tibetans to remain west of the Yangtze River and the Chinese to the east, temporarily returning an uneasy state of peace to the Xikang-Tibetan border.8 2 Tensions flared up again when it was announced on 17 December 1932 that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama had passed away. Liu Wenhui immediately cabled Chiang Kai- shek asking for Central Government assistance in sending a massive expeditionary force against Tibet amidst the political instability that followed the death of the Dalai Lama. Liu Wenhui argued that the Tibetan barbarians only understood force, or as one of his chief frontier advisers once stated: I advocate the use of force (tea) first and grace (m) second, the punishing of one person to warn a hundred others. Because of their limited knowledge the barbarians cannot be easily persuaded with words. If one uses kindness towards them they only become recalcitrant towards Han authority....For sometime now the Han frontiersmen have learned from their own experience that ‘ to give a barbarian a bit of respect is not as good as beating him a bit’. The meaning of this phrase is that treating the barbarians with kindness is not as good as first treating them with force.8 3 In Nanjing, however, Daijitao and other close advisers to Chiang Kai-shek called for a conciliatory, or jin i (“loose rein”), policy towards the Tibetans. They saw the death of the staunchly pro-British thirteenth Dalai Lama as an opportunity for Nanjing to re establish formal relations with Lhasa. On 23 December 1933 Chiang cabled Liu Wenhui 8 2 On Liu Wenhui’s counter- offensive and the 10 October 1932 Truce Agreement see Feng, X ikarghi Shiyi, 121-126. 8 3 Du, “Zuijin duiyu Xikang de kaocha yu yijian: yu bianzheng shunlian suo Liubu ge tongzhi tanhua,” 80-81. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 249 urging him not to dispatch troops and claiming that it would only invite more trouble than good.8 4 Not one to listen to Nanjing’ s orders, Liu Wenhui would have probably marched upon Lhasa himself if it had not been for the fact that his 24th Army had suffered a big defeat against the forces of his uncle and had retreated to Xikang to rebuild their strength. HmngMusangs Mission & the Failure cfSim - Tibetan Rapprochement, Part I The death of the Dalai Lama and the defeat of Liu Wenhui’s forces presented the Central Government with its first real opportunity to seize the initiative in Sino- Tibetan relations. During the waning years of his life, the 13th Dalai Lama and the religious elite became disenchanted with the aggressive, pro-British military officers of the Tibetan army. The almost constant state of conflict with Liu Wenhui’ s 24th Army was draining precious resources from the monasteries and threatening to destabilize Tibet’ s internal political situation. The religious establishment viewed Sino-Tibetan rapprochement as a potential counter-balance to Liu Wenhui’ s military adventurism on the Xikang frontier. As the Dalai Lama told CMTA official Liu Manching in 1929, he hoped that the new Chinese government would remove the “corrupt and adventurous [Chinese] civil and military officers” in Kham and replace them with honest men who would work for the mutual interests of the Tibetan and Chinese people.8 5 8 4 Li Tuanli, Guamndam L ilunjia Dai litao (Kuordntan? Theoretician Dai JitaS) (Hebei: Henan Renmin chubanshe, 1992), 342-43. 8 5 Liu Manching, Kangzang Yaazheng (Mission to Tibet and Xikang), 1933, (reprint Taipei: Nantian shuju, 1987), 119. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 250 The hopes for Sino-Tibetan rapprochement increased with the selection of a pro-Chinese Kashag, or cabinet (lead by the regent Reting Rimpoche), to form an interim government prior to the discovery and maturity of the next Dalai Lama. Attempting to seize the initiative in this new political environment, the Kuomintang proposed in late 1934 to send a delegation to Lhasa to discuss Sino-Tibetan relations and offer the nation’s condolences on the death of the Dalai Lama. Chiang Kai-shek selected one of his most trusted and skilled diplomats, General Huang Musong, for this high profile, expensive mission of over eighty specially selected CMTA officials and staff members to Lhasa. Besides representing the Central Government at a special memorial service for the Dalai Lama, Chiang also authorized General Huang to carry out high-level negotiations with the Tibetan government on the formal resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations. In exchange for a pledge of loyalty towards Nanjing and the acknowledgment that Tibet was part of a single and unified Zhonghua Republic, the Central Government was willing to grant the Tibetans the same degree of political, cultural and religious autonomy they enjoyed under the Qing dynasty. When the Kashag agreed to the Chinese request, Nanjing seemed on the verge of a historic solution to the Tibetan problem8 6 The hopes of the Kuomintang government, however, were quickly shattered. Throughout their talks with General Huang, the Tibetans seemed more interested in solving the intractable border issue with Xikang and Qinghai than discussing Sino- 8 6 On Huang Musong’ s mission to Tibet see Sun Zihe, “Huang Musong ruzang shiwei” (The complete story of Huang Musong’ s mission to Tibet) in Xikang Shishi yu Renrn (People and Events in Tibetan History) (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1995), 235-78; Goldstein, A History c f Modern Tibs, 213-51; R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 251 Tibetan relations. On his way to Lhasa, General Huang stopped in Chengdu to consult with General Liu Wenhui. Given the contentious nature of the Tibet-Xikang border issue, Liu’ s support seemed crucial for the success of the Huang mission and the peaceful resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations. The General however offered little encouragement or assistance to the mission. Fearing, perhaps, that Nanjing was willing to sacrifice Xikang for the resumption of relations with the Central Government, Liu Wenhui stressed the importance of maintaining, at the very least, the Yangtze River border between Tibet and Xikang, while also expressing his desire for a quick resumption of Chinese control over Chamdo prior to the creation of a new, permanent border along the Taniantaweng Mountains east of the Salween River.8 7 Quickly realizing that the border question was beyond his control, General Huang hoped to focus talks with the Tibetans on the more general issue of Sino-Tibetan relations while avoiding entanglement in the sticky border problem. Yet, soon after arriving in Lhasa on 28 August 1934, Reting Rimpoche stressed the Tibetan government’ s desire to solve the border issue prior to any discussion about the resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations. In reply, General Huang stated that the minor issue of the border could be quickly resolved after the resumption of relations while emphasizing that the Central Government was willing to be “highly flexible” over the exact nature of Sino-Tibetan relations. In the following weeks Huang’ s staff repeatedly pressed the Kashag to clarify Li, The Historiad Status c f Tibet, 168-72. 8 7 [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong fengshi ru Zang cefeng bing zhicha shisanjie Dak dashi baogaoshu” (Huang Musong’ s report on his mission to Tibet to confer a title and express condolences to the 13th Dalai Lama), June 1935, in 7M SD, 5.1.5:262. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 252 in writing the exact nature of the relationship they desired with Nanjing. The Kashag ignored these requests, insisting on discussing the border issue first.8 8 With negotiations deadlocked before they even begun, General Huang announced that the Chinese government had magnanimously agreed to make a big concession and discuss the border issue along side the resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations.8 9 Again, the General asked the Kashag for a written reply listing the conditions the Tibetans felt necessary for the establishment of good relations with Nanjing. The Tibetans finally acquiesced and handed Huang Musong’ s staff a written document on 5 October 1935. The Chinese were clearly disappointed, if not shocked, by the Tibetan response. The Kashag’ s letter stated that if the Central Government wanted to improve relations with Tibet, it would first “return all land and peoples where the Han and Tibetan cultures and language exist side-by-side to the control of the Tibetan government.” The Kashag made it clear that the entire region of Kham (Xikang) and Amdo (Qinghai), which had been under direct Chinese administration since the Qing dynasty, must be returned to Tibetan control prior to the resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations.9 0 8 8 [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong guanyu Rezheng deng jiejue zhongyan yu Xizang wenti taidu zhi Xingzheng Yuan deng midian” (Secret cable of Huang Musong to the Executive Yuan and others concerning the Reting’s attitude about the solution of Sino-Tibetan questions), 14 September 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:211; [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong mibao sikalun tichu cuoshang zhongyang yu Xikang wenti erhou juxing dianli zhe Xingzheng Yuan deng dian” (Huang Musong’ s secret cable to the Executive Yuan and others concerning the four shapes desire to first discuss Sino-Tibetan problems before the holding of the memorial ceremony), 16 September 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:211-12. 8 9 [Wang Jingwei], “Wang Tiaoming guanyu chuli zhongyang yu Xizang difang guanxi wenti fu Huang Musong dian” (Wang Tingwei’s reply cable to Huang Musong about Sino-Tibetan relations), 29 September 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:220. 9 0 [Huang Musong] “Huang Musong wei kalun tichu zhongyang yu Xizang wei Tanyue guanyu bing yaoqiu jiejue Kang-Xang Chuan-Xang jiewu shi zhi Xingzheng Yuan deng dian” (Huang Musong’ s R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 5 3 Despite Huang Musong’ s clear frustration, Premier Wang Jingwei saw room for optimism in the General’s cables back to Nanjing. In particular, Wang was encouraged by the details of General Huang’ s informal discussions with Reting Rimpoche during which the regent expressed his willingness to cooperate with the other four rrimu in the creation of a single Zhonghua nation in exchange for “complete Tibetan autonomy’ Qtizang rnnquanzizhi). In a cable to Huang, Wang Jingwei stressed that “Sino-Tibetan relations have already amassed an importance that is difficult to back away from; since negotiations are difficult, we need to unrestrain our ideas.”9 1 Wang told Huang Musong to offer Tibet a similar level of autonomy recently granted to Inner Mongolia and promised that the Nanjing government would take concrete steps to defuse the border issue. The Kashag agreed to discuss Nanjing’ s proposal before the Tibetan National Assembly. Once again, however, the Tibetan response fell short of Chinese expectations. The National Assembly claimed that the Chinese system of a “Republic of Five Races” {rnzu gjn szhe mngud) did not suit Tibet’ s special theocratic system of government and would violate Tibetan sovereignty. Instead, it once again called for an immediate return of Amdo and Kham to Tibetan administration. By mid-October the cable to the Executive Yuan and others about the shapes’ proposal for ‘ priest-patron’ relations between Tibet and the Central Government and their desire to resolve Xikang-Tibet and Sichuan-Tibet border affairs), 5 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:223-24; Also see [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong wei Kaxia biangua bu tichu zhongyang yu Xizang guanxi shi zhi Xingzheng Yuan dian dian” (Huang Musong’s cable to the Executive Yuan and others concerning the Kashag’ s going back on its word to discuss Sino- Tibetan relations), 4 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:222-23. 9 1 [Wang Jingwei], “Wang Tiaoming wei jiejue zhongyang yu Xikang guanxi duice shi fu Huang Musong dian” (Wang Jingwei’s cable back to Huang Musong about the policy for solving Sino-Tibetan relations), 8 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:226; [Wang Jingwei], “Wang Tiaoming wei jiejue Kang-Xang jiewu xu yu huaifu zhongyang yu Xizang guanxi bing xingshi zhi Huang Musong” (Wang Jingwei’ s cable to Huang Musong about solving the Xikang-Tibetan border issue, reviving Sino-Tibetan relations and other matters), 9 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:226-27. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 5 4 negotiations had reached a stalemate and General Huang was ordered to pack his bags and return to Nanjing.9 2 Huang Musong’ s decision to leave Lhasa appeared to set off a wave of panic throughout the Tibetan administration. Realizing that nothing had been achieved from Huang’ s visit to defuse the potentially dangerous border issue, the Kashag urged General Huang to remain a few more days in order to discuss their new thirteen-point oral proposal for the resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations. General Huang immediately cabled a summary of the Kashag’ s new proposal back to Nanjing. Despite recom m ending that the Central Government tactfully reject the Tibetan proposal, due to its insistence that Tibet be permitted to handle its own foreign affairs, General Huang was optimistic that much of the proposal’s language could serve as a basis for a future agreement restoring Sino-Tibetan relations. Once again, however, it was the Xikang border issue that blocked further discussions.9 3 The Central Government was willing to grant Tibet a high degree of political and cultural autonomy within the framework of the priest-patron relationship; however, it was not willing— or more to the point able— to accept the Tibetan government’ s repeated requests for the return of all land in Kham 9 2 For a summary of the National Assembly’s response see [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong jiang Kaxia han yaodian bao Xingzheng Yuan” (Huang Musong’s cable to the Executive Yuan reporting the main points of the Kashag’s letter), 17 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:229-30. For the complete text see [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong chenbao shiqi ri Kaxia han quanwen zhi Xingzheng Yuan deng dian” (Huang Musong’ s cable to the Executive Yuan and others with the complete text of the Kashag’ s October 17th letter), 19 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:232-33. On Huang Musong’s orders to leave Lhasa see [Wang Jingwei], “Wang Tiaoming yi Xizang dangu yejing biaotai zhu dingqi huijing shi zhi Huang Musong dian” (Wang Jingwei’ s cable to Huang Musong about already informing the Tibetan authorities that he is returning to the capital within a set period), 19 October 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:234. 9 3 [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong wei wanju Kaxia shisan xiang koutou jianyi shi zhi Xingzheng Yuan dian” (Huang Musong’s cable to the Executive Yuan stating his tactful refusal of the Kashag’s thirteen-point oral proposal), 6 November 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:238-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 5 5 and Amdo to Tibetan administration. On November 10th, Wang Jingwei stressed to General Huang that “there is no possibility to negotiate the Xikang-Tibetan dispute by yourself.”9 4 Huang Musong was again told to pack his bags for Nanjing. Wang Jingwei did however authorized General Huang to draft one final counter-proposal before leaving Lhasa, but warned that he should reply with a personal letter rather than an official proposal on behalf of the Chinese government.9 5 The exact nature of the General’ s final proposal is unclear, and there does not appear to be an official record of it in the Chinese archives. According to one of the delegations’ political advisers, Chiang Zhiyu, General Huang’ s letter did not raise the contentious border issue but rather focused on the need to alter the language of the Tibetan proposal to ensure Central Government control over foreign policy and other national issues.9 6 The more reliable account of Norbhu Dondup, the British-Indian officer in Lhasa, claims that Huang presented the Kashag with a detailed fourteen-point counter proposal. On the issue of the Tibetan-Xikang border, Dondup reports that the 9 4 [Wang Jingwei], “Wang Tiaoming guanyu Kaxia yutan Kang-Xang jiufen yi Banzhan hui Zang wenti duice shi fu Huang Musong dian” (Wang Jingwei’ s reply cable to Huang Musong about the policy concerning the Kashag’ s insistence upon discussing the Tibet-Xikang border issue and the question of the Panchen Lama’ s return to Tibet), 10 November 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:240. Along with the border issue one of the other sticking points in the negotiations was the return of the Panchen Lama to Tibet, who had been in exile in China since 1923. The Tibetans were worried that the Panchen Lama would force his way back into Tibet (potentially with a large Chinese military escort) and thus insisted that he return via India where the British could monitor his entrance rather than overland through China. The Chinese repeatedly ensured the Tibetans that the Panchen Lama would not need a large military escort if he return overland from China. In this cable Wang Jingwei gives General Huang the authority to negotiate the exact nature of the Panchen Lama’ s return. 9 5 [Wang Jingwei], “Wang Tiaoming guanyu Kaxia jiaobu qiebuke zuo zhengshi hanjian bing cusu gui shi gu Huang Musong midian” (Wang Jingwei’ s reply cable to Huang Musong stating that he must not send an official letters in negotiations with the Kashag and should quickly return to the Capital), 13 November 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:241. 9 6 Gted in Goldstein, A History cf Modem Tiba, 238-9 and Sun, Xizang Shishi yu Renrn, 267-8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 5 6 General’ s plan agreed to recognize “the boundary existing at the time of the Emperor Guangxu,” namely the Yangtze River boundary agreed upon in the 1932 armistice with Liu Wenhui.9 7 In their otherwise positive reply to the General’s proposal, the Kashag demonstrated some flexibility on the border issue, but again rejected Huang Musong’ s proposed solution to the Xikang problem. The Tibetans were willing to concede control over much of Amdo (Qinghai), but not Kham (Xikang), where Liu Wenhui’ s 24th Army continued to pose a direct threat to their government’ s future stability. The Kashag’ s reply stated: In order to improve Sino-Tibet relations while avoiding future disputes and stabilizing the border region, the northeastern boundary between Qinghai and Tibet should be maintained as proposed the year before last [1932], with Golok, which has long been under Tibet, to be included on the Tibetan side. As for the boundary between Tibet and Sichuan, the territory and people of Dege, Nyarong, Ganze and the Targye monastery should be turned over to the Tibetan government at the earliest possible date.9 8 The Kashag’ s final response made it clear that their overriding concern was the creation of a buffer zone in western Xikang to protect Tibet from any future aggression by General Liu Wenhui and his 24th Army. The Kuomintang Government adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach to the resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations, offering Tibet a high degree of autonomy if it was willing to recognize Chinese suzerainty yet, the Tibetans continued to insist upon a concrete solution to the one issue that the Central Government was not in a political 9 7 Gted in Goldstein, A History cf Modern Tibet, 236-8. 9 8 [Huang Musong], “Huang Musong wei chenbao Kaxia lai han suoti shi xiang tiaojian bing niji hui jing shi zhi Xingzheng Yuan deng dian” (Huang Musong’s cable to the Executive Yuan and others reporting the Kashag’ s ten-point proposal and his intentions to immediately return to the Capital), 16 November 1934, in ZMSD, 5.1.5:242-43. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 5 7 position to resolve. While Huang Musong was in Lhasa negotiating with the Tibetan authorities, Chiang Kai-shek’ s troops had the CCP on the ropes and were chasing a tired Red Army north through Yunnan towards the Yangtze River. With the Communists set to cross the border into Xikang, Chiang Kai-shek had no hope of dealing Mao’ s Communists a final blow without the support of Liu Wenhui’s 24th Army. Not only would Liu Wenhui never agree to Tibetan control over western Xikang, there was also the real possibility that a Tibetan controlled Kham might provide safe haven for the Communists. When it came to the struggle against the Communists, General Liu Wenhui proved a more important ally than the Tibetans. Rather than alienating General Liu, Chiang Kai-shek tried to draw him closer to the Central Government, declaring the Central Government’ s intention to finance the creation of a new province in Xikang and naming Liu Wenhui chairman of the preparatoiy committee. With negotiation on the Xikang border issue at a deadlock, Huang Musong was ordered to leave Lhasa, and all eyes shifted to the impending stmggle against the Chinese Communists in Xikang. Wu Zhorqgcins Mission & the Failure <fSino-Tibetan Rapprochement, Part II Despite the fact that the 24th Army did little to prevent the Red Army’ s march northward through Xikang— choosing to hide inside city walls rather than engage the Communists troops— the importance of Liu Wenhui’ s regime only increased with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War." Following the fall of Shanghai in late 1937, Chiang Kai-shek announced plans to move the Central Government’ s capital from Nanjing to Chongqing, where he hoped to rely upon the newly constructed Burma Road for R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 25 8 receiving crucial British and American lend-lease. The importance of Chiang’ s “rear flank” intensified as the Japanese economic blockage tightened and the coastal regions of Canton and Hainan island fell into enemy hands. Finally, when Churchill, fearing a Japanese invasion of Burma, closed the Burma Road for several months in 1939, Chiang Kai-shek began to think seriously about the need for an alternative route to bring vital outside supplies into China. To the dismay of his British allies, Chiang proposed the construction of another road linking the colonial English with China, this time through Tibet and Xikang.1 0 0 Chiang understood however that the success of this project hinged upon the successful solution of the Tibet/Xikang problem. As a result, he decided to renew the Kuomintang’s effort at securing an agreement with the Tibetan government while also attempting to loosen Liu Wenhui’ s control over the contentious Xikang border region. Using the discovery of the new Dalai Lama as a pretext, the Central Government informed the Tibetans on 29 March 1939 that it wanted to send the new chairman of the CMTA, Wu Zhongxi, to attend the Dalai Lama’s enthronement ceremony in Lhasa. Following a period of delay, the Tibet government granted the request on the condition that Wu’ s mission traveled to Lhasa via India1 0 1 Before departing for Tibet, Chairman Wu Zhongxin submitted a written proposal to the Executive Yuan in August outlining his suggested strategy for negotiations with the 9 9 Kapp, Szednmn and t he Chi nes e Republ i c, 104 & 136-41. 1 0 0 FJF. Liu, A M ilitary H istory c f Modem Chim, 1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956): 202-208; Goldstein, A H istory c f Modem Ti bet , 378-81. 1 0 1 On Wu Zhongxin’ s mission see Goldstein, A H istory f Modem Ti bet , 325-330; Li, The Historical St at us f Ti bet , 180-87. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 5 9 Tibetan authorities. In his report, Wu stressed the importance of Tibet to China’ s national defense objectives during the Sino-Japanese war. He argued that the Kuomintang need to be extremely flexible in pursuing all avenues possible for securing the sincere assistance of the Tibet authorities in China’ s war against Japan. Wu called for a continuation of Huang Musong’ s cautious methods in dealing with the Tibetan Kashag, gradually building up goodwill in Lhasa while avoiding anything that might increase tension with China’ s British allies.1 0 2 In addition to receiving a cable of support direcdyfrom Chiang Kai-shek,1 0 3 the Executive Yuan also formally approved Wu Zhongxi’ s proposal. In their 12 October reply, the Executive Yuan stating that experience has proven that a “conciliatory policy” (hmirou zhengz) was the correct method for dealing with the Tibetan problem. The Executive Yuan also provided CMTA with a detailed, eleven-point guideline for its talks with the Tibetan Kashag. The first points stated that in exchange for recognizing that Tibet was a part of China, the Central Government would promise not to convert it into a province and “based upon a special type of autonomy, permit the preservation of the Tibetan theocratic system of government.”1 0 4 Given the urgency of reaching an 1 0 2 [Wu Zhongxin], “ Wu Zhongxin niju ruzang renwu yu zuzhi ji jingfei yijian zhi xingzhengyuan zhecheng” (The submission of Wu Zhongxin’ s draft ideas to the Executive Yuan on the finances, organisation and responsibilities for the mission to Tibet), 4 August 1939, in ZMSD, 5.2.4:454-55 & 462- 63. 1 0 3 [Chiang Kai-shek], “Jiang Jieshi qing Wu Zhongxin dao Zanghou dui rezhen ji Zangzhong zhongyao renyuan youjia lianluo dian (Chiang Kai-shek’ s cable to Wu Zhongxin enthusiastically encouraging his trip to Tibet to improve communication with Tibetan officials), 11 September 1939, in ZMSD, 5.2.4:467. 1 0 4 “Xingzhengyuan chaosong ruzang tanhua yaozhi shiyixiang gei Wu Zhongxin xunling” (Copy of Executive Yuan order given to Wu Zhongxin concern 11 negotiating guidelines for his mission to Tibet), September 1939, in ZMSD, 5.2.4: 469. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 0 agreement with the Tibetans, the Central Government was also willing to go a step beyond Huang Musong’ s negotiating position by allowing the Tibetans not only political and cultural autonomy, but also the right to conduct their own foreign policy. The Executive Yuan only asked that in the realm of foreign diplomacy, the Tibetan government abide by all the international agreements the Kuomintang Government has signed with foreign countries. On the intractable border issues, point nine of the outline stated: With regards to the Tibet-Xikang border problem, the Tibetan government and the Xikang provincial government should consult one another and then request the ratification of any agreement by the Central Government; or alternatively, the Tibetans can seek a direct public solution of the problem with the Central Government based upon a detailed discussion of geographic and related conditions.1 0 5 Finally, the Executive Yuan asked Wu Zhongxin to stress upon the Kashag that the entire country was now united behind the Central Government and events similar to the “revolt of the Sichuan army’ were now impossible. As such, the Tibetans should no long harbor any doubts about the ability of the Central Government to govern the frontier. Chiang Kai-shek realized that the success of Wu Zhongxin’ s mission to Lhasa hinged upon the ability of the Central Government to wrestle control of the disputed Xikang border region away from Liu Wenhui. He anticipated that the Tibetans would once again make the solution to the border issue a precondition for the resumption of Sino-Tibetan relations; and without Central Government control over Xikang, a road 1 0 5 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 1 linking Chongqing with India could never be built. Chiang attempted to weaken Liu Wenhui’ s grip over Xikang through a series of tactical and covert actions aimed at destabilizing his regime. First, Chiang hoped to spark conflict between Liu Wenhui, Yunnanese warlord Long Yun and Sichuan militarist Deng Xihou. In early 1938, the Central Government finally granted Liu Wenhui’ s repeated requests for the formal creation of Xikang province. At the same time, the Government also approved Liu’ s old 1928 plan calling for the addition of the rich opium producing region of Ningshu and wealthy tea grow ing area of Ya’an to the territory of the new province. At the time, Ningshu was under the indirect control of Long Yun while Ya’an was the power-base of Deng Xihou. Chiang hoped that, by redrawing the administrative lines along the Xikang- Yunnan-Sichuan borders, this would spark open conflict among the warlords and weaken their resistance to Kuomintang control.1 0 6 Unfortunately for Chiang, his plan backfired. Rather than fighting over the borders of the new Xikang province, the warlords decided to band together against their common enemy. During the summer of 1938, Liu Wenhui, Long Yun and Deng Xihou met and signed a secret agreement calling for military, economic and political cooperation against Chiang Kai-shek’ s Kuomintang regime.1 0 7 1 0 6 Hu Gongxian and Liu Yuanxuan, “Liu Wenhui he Jiang Jieshi zai Ningshu de mingzheng yindou” (The open strife and veiled struggle between Liu Wenhui and Chiang Kaishek in Ningshu), in Si chuan Wens hi Zilioa Jinx Dvwtjm n: M inzu Zangiao Huaj i ao B hn (Sel ect Col l ect i on o f M aterials cn Si chuan H istory and Cul t ur e: V dunv 5: Nationality, Rel i gi on, and Overset Chi nesi j , ed. Sichuansheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996): 185-96 (Hereafter cited as SW ZJ). 1 0 7 Ren Yimin, “Liu Wenhui,” in Si chuanJi nxi andai Renmahuan { Bi ogr aphi e s cfGont enporary Si chuan Personal i t i es) (Chengdu: Sichuansheng xihuashu fuxing, 1985), 1:104. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 2 Around the same time, Chiang also tried to use the supporters of the 9th Panchan Lama to spark a revolt in the Ganze region of northern Xikang. Following a dispute with the Dalai Lama in 1923, the 9th Panchan Lama and his followers escaped Tibet for China, where they lived in exile first in Inner Mongolia and then at the Kumbum monastery in Qinghai province. Attempting to court the Panchan Lama as a possible counterbalance to the pro-British 13th Dalai Lama, the Kuomintang provided the Panchan’ s camp with lofty sounding positions, large government stipends and military supplies for a possible forced return to Tibet. Yet, before the Panchan could return, he died in exile in late 1937.1 0 8 With the approval, if not active encouragement, of the Kuomintang, the Panchan’ s supporters decided to move the body of their late leader and his political headquarters— which now comprised over one thousand followers, several hundred head of cattle and a security detachment armed with over ten thousand imported guns— to Ganze in northern Xikang. During the summer of 1938, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched one of his top frontier policy advisers, Dai Jitao, to Ganze under the pretext of paying the Central Government’s respects to the late Panchan Lama. While in Ganze, Dai Jitao gave at least tacit encouragement to the secret plans among some of Panchan’ s supporters to wrestle control of western Xikang away from Liu Wenhui’ s 24th Army and transform it into the permanent base of the next Panchan under Kuomintang patronage; and, according to Xikang historian Feng Youzhi, Dai 1 0 8 On the Panchan Lama’ s exile and Kuomintang back attempt to return to Tibet see Parshotam Mehra, Ti bet an Polity, 1904-37: 'The C orflkt betwen t he 13th D alai Larru a rd t he 9th Panchen: a cas e st udy (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1976). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 3 Jitao even actively plotted the overthrow of Liu Wenhui with the supporters of the Panchan Lama.1 0 9 With the support of Dai Jitao, the Panchan’s followers forged an alliance with the Ganze tusi (tribal chieftain) and began rallying the local Tibetan population, under the slogan “Xikang people rule Xikang,” in resistance to Liu Wenhui’s local garrison commander Zhang Zhenzhong. When Liu Wenhui ordered the female tusi placed under house arrest in order to block her marriage to the commander of the Panchan’ s military guards, the Tibetans revolted. Following a brief struggle in November 1939, the well armed Tibetans easily captured Ganze forcing Zhang Zhenzhong to commit suicide. While plans were underway to capture other towns in western Xikang, Liu Wenhui organized a counter-attack. He dispatched two of his top military commanders and nearly 2000 of his best soldiers to regain control of the region. Following a week of bloody fighting, which saw over 300 causalities and the death of one of Liu’ s commanders, the 24th army recaptured Ganze, forcing the Panchan’ s supporters and the Ganze tusi to flee into Qinghai.1 1 0 Angered by the revolt, officials within Liu Wenhui’ s regime repeated calls for a military campaign extending Xikang’ s territory westward onto the Tibetan plateau, setting off another wave of panic in Lhasa.1 1 1 Chiang Kai- shek’ s plans for destabilizing Liu Wenhui’ s regime had once again backfired. 1 0 9 Feng, Xikanghi Skiyi, 335-36;Luojiangze, Luonima, and Luoxini “Huiyi Ganzi shibian jingguo” (The process of the Ganze incident), in SWZJ, 5:19. 1 1 0 Feng, Xikanghi sbiyi, 336-50; Luojiangze, Luonima, and Luoxini “Huiyi Ganzi shibian jingguo,” 5:19-36. 1 1 1 Gted in Li, The Historical Status c f Tibet, 187. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 4 In Lhasa, Wu Zhongxin’ s negotiations did not fare any better. As expected, the Kashag continued to insist upon a solution to the Xikang border issue prior to the resumption of formal relations with China. In their 2 April 1940 written reply to Wu Zhongxin’s request for talks on the improvement of Sino-Tibetan communications, the Kashag reiterated the Tibetan desire that areas under Liu Wenhui’ s control in Kham, such as Derge, Ganze and Nyarong, be returned to Lhasa’ s control, and indicated that until this issue had been resolved they could not discuss improvement in relations. The Kashag blamed the disruption in Sino-Tibetan relations on “the various border officials who do not abide by the Central Government’s orders” and have instead forcefully occupied Kham, causing the Tibetan government to waste large sums of money in maintaining an army along the border.1 1 2 With negotiations once again stuck on the border issue, Wu Zhongxin left Lhasa on 14 April without an agreement. Throughout the war years, Chiang Kai-shek continued his efforts to bring Liu Wenhui’ s 24th Army under Central Government control, realizing that, short of force, this was the only way to incorporate Tibet back into the motherland. Yet, as Robert Kapp has pointed out: “Handling the Szechwanese commanders and their armies during the war against Japan was a serious problem for the Chinese Nationalists, who could ill afford to wage an all-out struggle against dissatisfied and potentially rebellious provincial forces in the heart of government-held territory.”1 1 3 Without the direct use of force, 1 1 2 A complete copy of the Kashag’s 2 April 1940 letter is contain in Wu Zhongxin’s formal report to the Central Government on his failed mission to Lhasa, see [Wu Zhongxin], “Wu Zhongxin fengpai ruzang zhuchi dishisi shi Dalai Lama zuochuang dianli baogao” (Wu Zhongxin’s report on his mission to Tibet to preside over the enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama), June 1940, in 7M SD, 5.2.4: 526-7. 1 1 3 Kapp, Szechuan and the Chinese Republic, 140. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 265 Chiang Kai-shek tried unsuccessfully to beguile, strong-arm and even bribe Liu Wenhui into submission. Yet, his 24th Army maintained a firm grip on the region up until, and even after, the Communist revolution in 1949. In short, we find that in its dealings with Tibet and Inner Mongolia, the Kuomintang Central Government remained largely powerless in implementing its policy over the fierce resistance of the frontier warlords. Yan Xishan, Fu Zuoyi, Liu Wenhui and other Han frontiersmen who viewed the Central Government’ s policy of minority self-rule as a direct threat to their independent authority on the frontier. The frontier warlords, fighting their own struggle for autonomy from Central Government hegemony, cared little about national unity, choosing instead the forceful assimilation of the recalcitrant and backward minorities under their control. Busy fighting the imperialists and the Communists, the Kuomintang could do little to force its unpopular frontier policy on the frontier warlords. As one would expect, this struggle for control over China’s frontier policy only intensified following the Japanese surrender in 1945. Kimrntang Frontier Pdicy intkeP cstw rE ra The end of the Sino-Japanese war elevated the importance of the frontier question for Kuomintang policymakers. As one of the “Big Four Allies” of the Second World War, the Chinese National Government and its citizens expected to reap the rewards of China’ s nearly fifty year long struggle against Japanese fascism. Throughout the war years, Chiang Kai-shek and other top Kuomintang leaders repeatedly emphasized that the war was a struggle for China’ s national independence and the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 6 maintenance of her territorial and administrative integrity.1 1 4 In China's Destiny, Kuomintang claimed that “the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, the Pescadores, Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet are all strategic regions for safeguarding the nation’ s existence; to lop off any one of them from China is to destroy her national defense.”1 1 5 With the war drawing to a close in 1945, Chiang was under intense pressure to ensure that China’ s British, American and Soviet allies recognized her territorial claims over these lost or threatened frontier regions of the former Qing dynasty. At the same time, however, the end of the war also heightened the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists for ideological and political control of China. In short, during the postwar era, the frontier and communist questions collided in a way that clearly revealed the political priorities of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang Government. As one might expect, in the Kuomintang’ s postwar maneuvering, the Soviet Union, as the Chinese Communist Party’ s natural ally, proved the most difficult for Chiang, When Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt meet at Yalta in early 1945, Roosevelt was desperate for the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan. With over one million, heavily armed Japanese troops in Manchuria and the atomic bomb still at the experimental stage, Roosevelt was convinced that without a large scale Russian attack on Manchuria it would be virtually impossible for the Americans to bring a quick end 1 1 4 For the increasingly nationalist rhetoric of the Nationalist Government during the war see Chapter 5; and Liu Xiaoyuan, A Partnership far Disorder: China, the United States, and their Policies forthePcstm r Disposition <fdoe Japanese E rrpire, 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55-80. 1 1 5 Chiang, Zhangspozhi Minpyrn, 7. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 7 the war in the Pacific. Stalin, in turn, stressed that the Russian people must have good reason for joining the war against Japan, and won from Churchill and Roosevelt the restoration of “the former rights of Russia [ie. Tsarist Russian] violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904” in exchange for Stalin’ s promise to declare war on Japan three months after the defeat of Germany. In addition to recognizing the Soviet Union’ s “pre-eminent interests” in Manchuria, in the form of joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway and a Russian warm water port at Dairen and Port Arthur, the Yalta Agreement also recognized the preservation of the “ status quo” in Oxter Mongolia. Roosevelt, conscious that China had been excluded from the negotiation, also had an important proviso attached to the final document stating that the provisions on Manchuria and Outer Mongolia “will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek.”1 1 6 Immediately following the signing of the secret Yalta Agreement, the United Stated pressured China to negotiate their own treaty of understanding with the Soviet Union. After Chiang received a copy of the Yalta Agreement on 15 June 1945, he quickly realized that, without a separate agreement with Stalin, China’ s national sovereignty and position in the postwar era could be compromised. Even more than the potential loss of Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang when Soviet troops entered China to attack the Japanese, Chiang feared that a Soviet invasion could tip the balance of power in the KMT-GCP civil struggle in the favor of the Communists. In a desperate 1 1 6 For a copy of the Yalta Agreement see Appendix C in Aitchen K. Wu, Chi na and the Souet Urnon: A Study (fSino-Souet Rel at i ons (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1950), 396-7. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 8 attempt to shore up China’ s position, Chiang quickly dispatched a team of negotiators led by Chinese foreign minister Song Ziwen [T.V. Soong] to Moscow. Throughout the two rounds of negotiation in Moscow during the summer of 1945, the issue of Outer Mongolia proved the biggest stumbling block in a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. During a meeting with the new Soviet ambassador, Appolon A. Petrov, just prior to Song’ s departure for Moscow, Chiang Kai-shek outlined his position on the Mongolian question. Chiang argued that he interpreted the phrase “ status quo” in the Yalta Agreement to mean the continuation of Chinese suzerainty in Outer Mongolia as recognized by the Soviet Union in the 1924 Sino-Soviet Agreement. He argued that the best way to solve the Outer Mongolia question was by providing the region with a “high degree of autonomy'’ (gtodu zizhi), including the right to determine its own diplomatic and military affairs. Chiang stressed that the Outer Mongolian question was closely linked with the question of Tibet, suggesting that any Chinese concessions on Outer Mongolia might lead to a similar demand from Britain over Tibet.1 1 7 In Moscow, however, Stalin asserted that Outer Mongolia was already an independent state and thus the “ status quo” meant Chinese recognition of this fact. While Song was prepared to compromise on many of the outstanding issues in Sino-Soviet relations, he stressed to Stalin that no Chinese government could survive the political fall out from relinquishing part of Chinese territory. The Kuomintang government had been assuring the Chinese people since the days of Sun Yat-sen that Outer Mongolia 1 1 7 Chiang Kai-shek, “ Jiejue Waimenggu wenti de fangzhen” (Principles for solving the Outer Mongolian question), 26 June 1945, in ZJGZ, 38:187. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 6 9 was an intricate part of Chinese territory— a reversal on this position would represent nothing short of political suicide.1 1 8 In a private meeting with Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek’ s son, Jiang Jingguo, stressed that the Chinese government would be seen as “selling national territory” {chumu gvtu) if it were to agree to Outer Mongolian independence.1 1 9 Stalin did not budge, however, claiming that Outer Mongolian independence was crucial for the maintenance of Russia’s security in the Far East. Stalin also warned that many Mongols desired the reunification of Inner and Outer Mongolia, threatening to undermine the territorial integrity of all northern China. With the negotiations deadlocked, Song cabled Chiang for further instructions. During an important 5 July meeting with top Kuomintang officials, Chiang argued that, if Stalin’ s demands on Outer Mongolia were rejected, China would not be able to secure an agreement on Chinese territorial and administrative integrity in Manchuria and Xinjiang nor would they be able to seek Russian assurances on the CCP problem. In spite of the strong opposition from Chen Lifu and other Kuomintang conservatives, Chiang decided that Outer Mongolia had to be sacrificed.1 2 0 In his dairy that evening, Chiang rationalized that China’s claim over Outer Mongolia was an 1 1 8 See the official Chinese transcript of this meeting attached to [Song Ziwen], “Xingzhengyuanchang Song Ziwen zi Mosike cheng Jiang zhuxi baogao yu Sidalin shangtan guanyu Waimeng duli yi shiyong Luxun jungang deng wenti zhi tanhua qingxing dian” (Premier Song Ziwen’s cabled report to Chairman Chiang from Moscow concerning his negotiations with Stalin about Outer Mongolian independence, the Luxun naval port and other issues), 2 July 1945, in Zhonghm M ingio Z h o n g y a o Shi hao O nM m D td R i Kangzhan Sbiqi {Prdininary G onpilatim cflrrportant Historical Doc ume nt s cfthe Repi Mi c c f Chi na: The Peri od c f t he W ar cf Resi st ance A grinst ] apart ), ed. Kuomintang Dangshi Weiyuanhui (Taipei: Kuomintang Dangshi weiyuanhui, 1981), 3.2: 577-90 (Hereafter cited as ZM KS). 1 1 9 Gted in John W. Garver, Chi nese S ari a. Rel at i ons, 1937-1945: The Di pl omacy c f C him e Nat ionalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 217. 1 2 0 Odd Arne Westad, Grid W ar and Revri ut i on: Soria-A r nmcan Rm dry and t he O r ig an s c f t he Chi nes e ChrilW ar; 1944-46 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 40; Liu, A Part nershi pfar Di sorder, 261-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 0 “empty name,” and wrote that it would be unwise to risk “national calamity” for the sake of “mere formality.”1 2 1 Given that the United State had repeatedly assured Chiang that Stalin had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and Xinjiang, Chiang appeared to have been chiefly concerned with the possibility of outright Soviet support for the Chinese Communists. Due to their proximity to the one million strong Kwangtung Army, the Communists were in a position to greatly benefit from the surrender of the Japanese army, if Chiang was unable to secure an assurance from Stalin that he would not assist the Chinese Communists following the war. It must be remembered that Chiang Kai-shek was under the impression that Stalin still wielded a great deal of influence, if not outright control, over the Chinese Communists. In Chiang’ s mind the solution to the communist problem, regardless of whether it was through military or peaceful means, hinged upon depriving them of foreign support; and with the Soviet Union their historic patron, Chiang hoped to “buy off” Stalin with Outer Mongolia.1 2 2 The next day Chiang cabled the Kuomintang’ s new position to Song in Moscow. If China could achieve national unification and complete territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity, the Nationalist Government was “willing to consider” Outer Mongolian independence. In outlining the conditions that would ensure the consolidation of domestic unity, Chiang stressed the need for written Soviet assurances on Manchurian sovereignty and to refrain from aiding the rebels in Xinjiang 1 2 1 Garver, ChineseSoua Relations, 218. 1 2 2 Westad, Cold War and Reudution, 40. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 1 and the Chinese Communist Party. Concrete guarantees on these “minimum expectations,” Chiang stressed, would ensure that: If China could be unified to this degree, the government was willing, in accordance with the Three People’ s Principles, to voluntary seek a solution to the Outer Mongolian question. If the Mongolian people vote for independence in a plebiscite, then the National Government would ask the National Assembly to consider it, and after it had been approved by the Assembly the Government would formally grant independence to Outer Mongolia.1 2 3 On 7 July, Chiang drew a more direct link between Outer Mongolia and the communist problems. In another cable to Song, he stated that the negotiations with Stalin offered a way to solve the communist problem once and for all. In exchange for a concrete promise not to support the Chinese Communists, Jiang would permit Song to solve the Mongolian question in Moscow.1 2 4 In a meeting with Soviet ambassador Petrov later that month, Chiang pointed out that the recognition of Outer Mongolian independence was an “enormous sacrifice for China,” which would certainly be opposed by many Chinese people and Kuomintang party members, and thus only with concrete assurances from the Soviet Union could Chiang guarantee its acceptance in China.1 2 5 1 2 3 [Chiang Kai-shek], “Jiang zhuxi zi Chongqing zhi Xingzhenyuanchang Song Ziwen zhishi Waimenggu duli xusi wo guonei zhen neng queshi tongyi fang neng kaolu bing gaoyi suowei guonei tongyi gonggu zhi yaozhi dian” (Chairman Chiang’s cable from Chongqing to Premier Song Ziwen concerning the possibility of considering Outer Mongolian independence after achieving domestic unity and the conditions for consolidating domestic unity), 6 July 1945, in ZMKS, 3.2: 593-4. 1 2 4 [Chiang Kai-shek], “ Jiang zhuxi zi Chongqing zhi Xingzhengyuanchang Song Ziwen zhishi bixu yi Dongbei lingtu, zhuquan yu xingzheng zhi wanzheng ji Sulian bu zai zhichi gongchan yu Xinjiang feiluan wei woguo chongxu Waimeng zhanhou duli zhi jiaohuan tiaojian dian” (Chairman Chaing’ s cable from Chongqing to Premier Song Ziwen concerning complete territorial and administrative integrity in Manchurian and Soviet refrain from support the Communist and the Xinjiang rebellion as conditions for our country to recognize Outer Mongolian independence after the war), 7 July 1945, in ZMKS, 3.2: 596. 1 2 5 Chiang Kai-shek, “Taolun Waimeng youguan wenti” (A discussion of the problems with Outer Mongolia), 19 July 1945, in Z/GZ, 38:188-9. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 2 In accordance with Chiang’ s instructions, Song repeatedly pushed Stalin for an unequivocal renunciation of support for the Chinese Communists during a fourth negotiation session on 9 July. Stalin stated several times that, while he considered the Chinese Communists “outstanding patriots,” his government did not support them nor did it intend to support them in the future. Stalin assured Song that any Soviet aid would go to Chiang’ s Nationalist Government. Song however continued to probe Stalin on the issue, finally forcing him to declare with a laugh: “What else does Your Excellency wish? Do you wish for us to send an army to help you eradicate the Communist armed forces?”1 2 6 The negotiations dragged on into August with both sides slow to compromise on minor issues of disagreement. The pace quickened however after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and the Red Army entered Manchuria on 8 August. Stalin once again pointed to the dangers of Mongolian reunification now that Outer Mongolian troops had joined the Red Army in attacking Japanese positions in Inner Mongolia and warning that, if the treaty was not signed soon, Manchuria could fall into the hands of the CCP.1 2 7 Finally, feeling that the best possible deal had been obtained, Chiang ordered his negotiators to concede on the remaining points and conclude the treaty as soon as possible. Finally, on 14 August, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in Moscow in which China agreed to recognize 1 2 6 [Song Ziwen], “Xingzhengyuanzhang Song Ziwen zi Mosike cheng Jiang Zhuxi baogao yu Shidalin huitan guanyu jiejue Waimeng, Xinjiang, Dongsansheng ji Zhonggong deng wenti zhi tanhua qingxingdian” (Premier Song Ziwen’ s cable from Moscow to Chairman Chiang concerning his discussion with Stalin about solving Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria and other problem in the negotiations), 9 July 1945, in ZMKS, 3.2: 619. 1 2 7 Garver, ChirxseSauet Relations, 226-7; Chin-Tung Liang, “The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1945: The Inside Story,” mNtaiomlistQrimDmingtbeSim-JrtpaneseWar, 1937-1945, ed. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 3 Outer Mongolian independence after a postwar plebiscite while the Soviet Union agreed to render all moral and military support to the Nationalist Government.1 2 8 As he predicted to Ambassador Petrov, Chiang Kai-shek had a difficult time selling the recognition of Outer Mongolian independence to Kuomintang party members and the Chinese public. Immediately following the public announcement of the Treaty, leading newspapers, such as Dagmgjxto and Dontfangzazhi, criticized the agreement for, among other things, relinquishing Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. Kuomintang conservatives publicly criticized the agreement at the 24 August meeting of the Legislative Yuan called to ratify the agreement.1 2 9 Having been told that Chiang Kai-shek’ s Supreme National Defense Council had already approved the agreement, the conservatives took their protest to the public. Numerous articles appeared through the Chinese press during the winter of 1945-46 condemning the agreement. Claiming that the Han, Manchu, Mongol and Tibetan lineages (zo^gz/w ) were like “the five fingers of the same hand,” veteran Kuomintang scholar Zhang Qiyun, for example, argued that Outer Mongolian independence not only violated China’ s territorial sovereignty and independence but also contravened the organic unity of the Zhongnta. rrmzu.m The Kuomintang Right also organized a series of student demonstrates in Nanjing, Shanghai and Chongqing after the text of the Yalta Agreement Paul K.T. Sih (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1977), 387-391. 1 2 8 For a full English text of the treaty see Appendix C in Wu, Chi na and t he Souet Uni on, 398-414. 1 2 9 Garver, Chi nes e- Sovi et Rel at i ons, 229. 1 3 0 Zhang Qiyun, “‘Shaoshu minzu’ mingci de jiuzheng” (Correcting the term ‘ national minority), 1946, in Bi art j i ang L tm ienji (Col l ect edEssays on t he Front i er), comp. Bianjiang lunwenji bianzuan weiyuanhui (Taipei: Guofang yanjiuyuan, 1964), 1:496-8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 4 was finally made public in early 1946. The Soviet Union’s blatant attempt to restore the special rights and privileges of the Tsarist government in China shocked the Chinese public, setting off a wave of anti-Soviet sentiment.1 3 1 Attempting to forestall some of the criticism, Chiang Kai-shek invoked the ambiguous, and always malleable, legacy of Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of mnzuzbuyi during an important address before a joint session of the Supreme National Defense Council and the Kuomintang Central Executive Council on 24 August 1945. In a dramatic wbe- face from his assimilationist interpretation of the ninzuzhuyi in China's Destiny, Chiang redefined the principle to include, rather ironically, the principal of national self- determination that many in his Party had been attempting for years to eradicate from Sun’ s legacy. With Japan’ s unconditional surrender on the 14 August and the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, Chiang claimed that “the international aspect of ninzm huyi was approaching completion.”1 3 2 It was now time, Chiang argued, to formulate definite polices and take positive action to realize the domestic phase of Sun’s principle of nationalism. Chiang divided the “domestic aspect” of ninzuzhuyi into two questions: the “question of the frontier nim u outside the provinces” (ie. Outer Mongolia and Tibet) and the “question 1 3 1 Suzanne Pepper, C hil W arm Chi na : the Political S tru ve 1945-1949, rev. ed. (New York; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999): 212-16; Garver, Chi neseScruet Rel at i ons, 229-30. 1 3 2 Chiang Kai-shek, “Wancheng minzuzhuyi weihuo guoji heping” (Completing the principal of nationalism and safeguarding international peace), 24 August 1945, in ZJGZ, 21:171; For a slightly different English translation of the speech see Chinag Kai-shek, “National Independence and Racial Equality” in The Col l ect ed Wart i me Me s s a g e s t f Gener al i s s i mo Chi angKai -shek, 1937-1945, comp. Chinese Ministry of Information (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 855. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 5 of the small and large ninzu inside the provinces” (ie. the Inner Mongols, the Hui and other minorities). With regard to the former, Chiang called for the recognition of their right of national self-determination, even to the point of their eventual independence from China. “If the frontier ninzu outside of the provinces,” Chiang spoke, “have the capacity for self-government and a strong desire for independence, and are politically and economically ready for both, our country should, in a friendly spirit, voluntarily help them to realize their independence and freedom.”1 3 3 For Tibet this meant, at the very least, the recognition of their right to a “high degree of autonomy'’ (gzoduzizhi), and “if in the future they fulfil the economic requirement for independence,” the National Government should help them gain this status. Chiang continued: With regards to Outer Mongolia, they declared their independence, in effect, from the motherland as early as 1922 when the Beijing Government was in existence. That was almost a quarter of a century ago... Therefore, we should, in accordance with our revolutionary principles and the Kuomintang’ s consistent policy, recognize, with bold determination and through legal procedure, the independence of Outer Mongolia and establish friendly relations with it.1 3 4 Toward the “large and small ninzu inside the provinces,” Chiang called for their legal and political equality, and “unhindered economic and religious freedom, so that a warm community spirit and friendly collaboration may develop among all the groups.” Chiang stressed that if the Central Government ignored the aspirations of these ninzu for equality and freedom, and restrained their urge for independence and self- government, 1 3 3 Ibid., 173 &857. 1 3 4 Ibid., 172 & 856. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 6 it would not only contravene the spirit of the National Revolution but also increase fiction between the various ninzu inside China. While Chiang Kai-shek’ s calls for the self-determination of frontier minorities found little support among Kuomintang conservatives, it did resonate with a group of frontier policymakers and academics advocating a more flexible and practical approach to the frontier question. Bianzheng gpngjun [Frontier A tbrimstradm Forunr^, founded in 1941 by Zhou Kuntian, the personal secretary of CMTA chairman Wu Zhongxin, served as the intellectual center of this liberal group of frontier specialists. The journal was dedicated to a critical examination of China’ s frontier problem and the development of a distinctly modem “Three People’s Principle Frontier Policy.”1 3 5 Its contributors wanted to shift the national discourse away from the highly pedantic, yet politically motivated, discussion of the racial and historical unity of the Zhonghua ninzu, which dominated academic discourse following the publication of China’ s Destiny, and towards the concrete and practical policies necessary for solving the frontier question. Wei Huilin, a professor in the Frontier Studies Department at the Kuomintang’ s Central Party School, contended that the recent efforts of scholars to prove the common origins of the various ninzu in China had done little to counter the very real danger of national disunity. Wei criticized the “arbitrariness” (mtduamhuyii ) of this approach, contending that the frontier problem would not disappear by simply denying its existence. “Regardless of whether we call the ninzu within China ‘lineage branches’ (zc^gza) or 1 3 5 [Editors], “Fakanci” (Introduction), Bianzheng gwgftm 1.1 (August 1941): 1-4; Zhou Kuntian, “Sanminzhuyi zhi bianzheng jianshe” (Three People’ s Principles Frontier Construction), Bianzhenggpn^un 1.1 (August 1941): 5-20. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. in prove that all the national minorities share a common origin with the Han through historical research,” Wei wrote, “it does not alter the fundamental reality of the [frontier] problem.” 1 3 6 Wei argued that Sun Yat-sen’ s goal of a single, democratically united Zhor^im ninzu would only arise through the long term and gradual process of cultural and racial melding {ro n ^ . It was the responsibility of the Central Government to adopt concrete policy initiatives to encourage this process. Those who participated in the journal were also generally critical of the “laissez- faire” and “divide and rule” frontier policy of the Qing empire, arguing that the Nationalist Government needed to adopt a more positive and democratic approach towards the frontier question. Ling Chunsheng, the head of the Education Bureau’ s Department of Frontier Education, for example, contended that a more centralized and rationalized form of “local self-rule” {djfangzizhi) was the key for solving the frontier problem1 3 7 Policymakers like Liang Oudi were highly critical of the “regional nature” {dtfarqpin^ of frontier policy in China. In the hands of regional militarists, frontier merchants and the local Han gentry, frontier policy had been transformed into a method for fleecing the minorities and exploiting their resources for personal gain. “This,” Liang argued, “was the primary cause propelling the frontier from centripetal unity into centrifugal disunity.” He continued: What our country needs today is an enlightened and truly national frontier policy. The concrete contents of this policy cannot be determined overnight. 1 3 6 Wei Huilin, “Ruhe queli Sanminzhuyi de bianjiang minzu zhengce” (How to establish a Three People’ s Principle frontier policy), Bianzhenggjnglm 4.1 (March 1945): 2-3. 1 3 7 Ling Chunsheng, “Zhongguo bianzheng gaige chuyi” (My humble opinion on reforming Chinese frontier policy), BkrtzhenggpngLun 6.1 (March 1947): 1-12. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 7 8 However, it should be based upon the principal of ‘a single policy and multiple methods’, namely supporting a policy of local autonomy and cultural interaction while being willing to adopt an elastic method for implementing this policy.1 3 8 The Central Government needed to take positive steps towards protecting the local autonomy of the frontier minorities in order to ensure that ethnic tensions were defused and cultural and racial fusion flowed smoothly and without hindrance. Naturally, these frontier specialists welcomed Chiang Kai-shek’ s call for increased attention to the domestic portion of Sun Yat-sen’s rrinzuzhuy, agenda, and intensified their efforts to implement concrete policy initiatives safeguarding national unity and local self-rule. With the support of these frontier specialists, Chiang Kai-shek was able to push Outer Mongolian independence through the National Government and, after one hundred percent of Mongolian voters cast a ballot for independence in an Outer Mongolian referendum, the Supreme National Defense Council officially recognized the Mongolian People’ s Republic on 5 January 1946.1 3 9 Kuomintang liberals, who wanted to see the peaceful solution to both the frontier and communist problems, drew upon the authority of Chiang’s new frontier policy to pass a nine-point resolution on the frontier 1 3 8 [Editors], “Bianjiang zizhi yu wenhua: benkan bianjiang wenti zuotanhui jilu” (Frontier autonomy and culture: record of a seminar on the frontier question), Biamlxnggm^m 6.2 June 1947): 6. 1 3 9 In 1950, the Kuomintang formally revoked their recognition of Outer Mongolian independence, claiming that the treaty of friendship and alliance signed between the Soviet Union and Mao’s People’ s Republic of China in 14 February 1950 nullified the earlier 14 August 1945 treaty between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang. The KMT also began claiming that the Outer Mongolian plebiscite was rigged and thus did not represent the true will of the Outer Mongolian people. See Wang Yunwu, “Su’e kongzhi Waimeng yi Tangnu Wuliangqu” (Soviet Russian control of Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva), 26 May 1950, in ZMSS, Year 1946,1:50-51. Despite being under the impression that Stalin had promised to return Outer Mongolia to China after its liberation, Mao was forced to follow Chiang in recognizing Outer Mongolian independence; although he did succeed in winning back concession Chiang granted the Soviet Union on the Chinese Eastern Railway and the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. See Wu, China and the SaiM Urion, 332-41. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 279 question during the Second Plenum of the Kuomintang’ s 6th National Congress in early 1946.1 4 0 The resolution outlined specific provisions protecting the autonomy of the “frontier minorities”— a term that now specifically included Inner Mongolia and the Hui of Xinjiang. Finally, when the new constitution was promulgated on 1 January 1947, it also contained specific guarantees for the legal equality and self-rule of the frontier minorities.1 4 1 It is important to keep in mind, however, that Chiang Kai-shek’ s recognition of Outer Mongolian independence, while representing a significant departure from previous policy, did not mark a fundamental shift in his strategy for handling the frontier question. As stated in his 1934 speech, the frontier question was essentially a question of diplomacy. In exchange for Soviet support in eradicating the communist problem in China, the Kuomintang had to sacrifice, temporarily at least, Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. It was simply a choice between the greater of two evils. The vsalpditic manner in which Chiang dealt with the Outer Mongolia question was no different from the way in which he chose to deal with Tibet and Inner Mongolia during the 1930s and 1940s. Despite sharing the same social Darwinian outlook as his political mentor Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek— as the consummate politician— viewed the frontier question as a “card” to be “played” in his quest for personal power. Chiang 1 4 0 “Duiyu bianjiang wenti baogao zhi jueyi’an” (Draft resolution on the frontier question report), 17 March 1946, in GMWX, 80:417-8. 1 4 1 See articles 119-120 and 168-9 in The Constitution of the Republic of China (Taipei: National Assembly Republic of China, 1972): 27 & 36 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 0 Kai-shek’ s top priority was always the consolidation of his personal power throughout China and the unification of the Chinese people around his Kuomintang party. In this struggle, Chiang consistently viewed the Communists as the greatest threat to Chinese unity and his own personal political power. Just as Stalin’ s support was crucial for combating the Chinese Communists in the postwar era, so was the assistance of the increasingly powerful northern warlord Fu Zuoyi. Thus, despite his commitment to Outer Mongolian independence and the new provisions on minority autonomy in the Kuomintang’ s political programme, Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to recognize the widespread call for Inner Mongolian autonomy over the wishes of his powerful anti- Communist allies. In the postwar era, much like the 1930s and 1940s, frontier autonomy was thwarted primarily because Chiang was unwilling and unable to implement frontier autonomy over the wishes of the frontier warlords. The Failed Inm-M ongdianAutorxmm M oienmt, Part II Fu Zuoyi used the war years to consolidate his control over the Mongolian banners of Suiyuan. Forced by the Japanese to retreat from the major cities along the Beijing-Baotou railway line in 1937, Fu strengthened his economic and military grip on the pastureland of the Ihkchao League in the Ordos Region. Fu Zuoyi set up the “Suiyuan Provincial Mobilization Committee” to train and build a political infrastructure completely loyal to himself, not Yan Xishan or Chiang Kai-shek, in Suiyuan.1 4 2 Fie also sent his subordinate Chen Zhangjian into the Ikhchao League to establish Han-style 1 4 2 Yu Chunzhai, “Fu Zuoyi zai Hbutao zuzhi de ‘dongweihui’ ji suowei ‘ximdanzhi’ de sheshi” (Fu Zuoyi’ s organisation of the ‘Suiyuan Provincial Mobilization Committee’ in the Ordos and the installation of the so-called ‘new county administration^, in NW Z, 7: 289-324. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 28 1 county ( xmb) administrations and to carryout the forced cultivation of Mongolian pastureland. Chen’ s aggressive tactics sparked a violent, but short lived, revolt by the Ikhachao Mongols which was brutally suppressed by over 1000 of Fu Zuoyi’ s troops. The bloody massacre of Mongolian nomads and the senseless destruction of their yurts and temples by Fu’s soldiers was later held up by Mao Zedong as a prime example of the Kuomintang’ s “Han chauvinist” national minority policies.1 4 3 In the postwar jockeying for control over the occupied territories, the importance and power of Fu Zuoyi increased significantly. Caught unprepared by the sudden Japanese surrender on 24 August 1945, Chiang Kai-shek initially attempted to rely on the Japanese and puppet troops to prevent northern China from falling into the hands of the Communists and regional warlords. Fu Zuoyi ignored, however, an order from the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army for all Nationalist and Communists troops to maintain their existing positions pending further instructions, racing instead against the GCP to recapture Japanese-held territory in Inner Mongolia. By successfully recapturing the key cities along the Beijing-Baotou railway and disarming the Japanese and puppet troops in northern China, Fu increased the size and strength of his military. By 1947, he commanded nearly half a million troops and was in control of Beijing, Tianjin, Kalgan and the strategic northern corridor ringing Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek was thus forced to recognize the importance of Fu and his army for solving the 1 4 3 Mao Zedong, “Lun lianhe zhengfu” (On a coalition government), 24 April 1945, hi Mao Zedong Xuanji (Select Works of Mao Zedong) (Jiangsu: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 3:1083-4 (Hereafter cited as MZXJ)\ Sechin, MenggizhiJirvci, 2:273; [Editors], “Yinmeng shibian: qianyan” (Praface: Ikhchao League incident), in NWZ, 43:1-3. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 2 Communist problem and in August 1947 named him commander-in-chief of “bandit suppression” in northern China1 4 4 Thanks to his increased power, Fu Zuoyi was also able to successfully block the attempts by the Central Government to restore the authority and autonomy of the Inner Mongolian banner and league princes. In a 15 March 1945 resolution passed by the Central Executive Committee, the Kuomintang called for the restoration of De Wang’ s old “Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council” (MLAPQ and a clear delineation of authority between the Mongolian and provincial governments. Following the Japanese surrender, the CMTA and the Military Affairs Commission of the KMT set up several “Mongolian Banner Pacification Corps” (Merqgfi hepingmrty which were given formal responsibility for demobilizing the Mongolian puppet army and restoring the political authority of the Mongolian princes.1 4 5 Fu Zuoyi, however, had other ideas, and forcefully blocked all attempts by the Central Government to restore any semblance of autonomous Mongolian political control. Take, for example, the case of Prince Xiong (Sunnotondop), who was recognized by the Central Government as the leader of the Silinghol League. In 1947, the Prince traveled to Nanjing to personally seek the support of Chiang Kai-shek in restoring his authority and fighting the Communists. Chiang agreed to provide the Prince with 4000 guns and US$1000 from the Beijing armory for the expenses of his troops. Upon his return to the north, however, Prince Xiong 1 4 4 Pepper, G u l W a rin O m t, 10-11; “Fu Tso-yi,” in Howard L. Boorman and Richard C Howard, eds., Bi ographi cal Di ct i onary cfRepM iam Cbim (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1967), 2:50-51; Barnett, (3rimmtheEv?<fCcmrHmst Take c ne r , 195-204. 1 4 5 Hao, Net menggi G eninghi, 444-46; Sechin, M engfi zh iJin ci, 2:284. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 3 discovered that Fu Zuoyi had countermanded Chiang’ s order, arguing that the Prince was not the legitimate leader of the Silinghol Mongols. Fu instead ordered that the arms and money be handed over to a couple of his Mongolian henchmen. The Mongols also claimed that Fu Zuoyi’ s Suiyuan Provincial Government misappropriated 2.8 billion Chinese yuan designated by the Central Government’s Treasury for famine relief in the Ikhchao, Ulauchab and Tiimet Leagues.1 4 6 The Mongols remained divided in the face of Fu Zuoyi’ s hegemony. Many youths looked towards Outer Mongolia or the Chinese Communists for assistance in checking the influences of the Kuomintang warlords; while the Mongolian princes, many of whom had been associated with De Wang’ s MLAPC and desired the preservation of the feudal banner system, continued to pressure the Central Government for the implementation of Mongolian autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. Declaring his loyalty towards the Central Government after the Japanese surrender, De Wang lead a delegation of Mongolian princes to Chongqing, where he personally lobbied Chiang Kai-shek for an autonomous status similar to Canada and Australia under the British Commonwealth. Chiang however was too concerned with the unfolding struggle between Nationalist and Communist troops in Manchuria. Despite providing De Wang with a warm reception, Chiang failed to seriously consider his proposal, telling him that the communist problem must be dealt with first. Given the 1 4 6 “Confidential American Embassy dispatch: Central Govemment-Mongolian Relations,” 2 April 1948, in Confi dent i al U. S. State Depart ment Cent ral Fi l es: Chi na (M iarfflnj: Int ernal A ffairs, 1945-1949, ed. Paul Kesaris (Fredrick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984), 198-99 (Hereafter cited as CSDF); “Confidential American Embassy memorandum: Central Government Policies Toward the Mongols,” 14 April 1948, in CSDF: 206. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 4 increasing military strengthen of Fu Zuoyi, Chiang Kai-shek was cautious not to alienate his key anti-Communist ally in the North. De Wang returned to Beijing empty handed, where he was promptly placed under house arrest by authorities loyal to Fu Zuoyi.1 4 7 Another group of Mongolian princes attempted to use the National Government’ s 1947 Constitutional Assembly as a platform for securing Inner Mongolian autonomy. In Nanjing, the princes forged a broad political coalition— which included such diverse political figures as KMT stalwart Buyuantai, KMT turncoat and former MLAPC leader Unenbayin, Mongolian CC Clique member Li Yongxin and the director of the CMTA’ s Mongolia Bureau Jahungju— demanding an article be placed in the Constitution establishing a unified and autonomous Inner Mongolian government. Despite garnering some degree support among delegates, the Constitutional Assembly failed to agree upon any concrete provisions for an autonomous Inner Mongolian government. Instead, Article 119 of the new Constitution simply declared that: “The local self-government system of the Mongolian Leagues and Banners shall be prescribed bylaw.”1 4 8 Rather than leaving the capital in frustration, the Mongolian princes remained in Nanjing, forming the “Mongolian Youth Alliance” (M ongfol jala§jus-mandala$a) to continue pressuring the Central Government for a concrete regulation protecting Mongolian autonomy from the hegemony of the Han frontiersmen. After winning the 1 4 7 Lu, Menggi ‘ Z izhi Yi mdong Shkiei, 325-38; Sechin Jagchid, “A Handwritten Letter of Prince Demchughdongrub,” M ongiian St udi es 13 (1990): 22; Sechin, “The Failure of a Self-determination Movement: The Inner Mongolian Case,” 235. 1 4 8 The Const i t ut i on o f the Republ i c cf O nm , 27; Sechin, “The Failure of a Self-determination Movement: The Inner Mongolian Case,” 236; Sechin, “A Handwritten Letter of Prince R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 5 support of new CMTA chairman and veteran Kuomintang politician Xu Shiying, the CMTA submitted a draft plan for Inner Mongolian autonomy to the Executive Yuan in January 1948. In accordance with Article 119 of the Constitution, the plan contained detailed regulations protecting the Mongolian banners, leagues and pastureland from Han interference and calling for the establishment of a unified autonomous government under the direct authority of the Central Government. Sensing the explosive nature of Inner Mongolian autonomy, Premier Zhang Chun informed the CMTA that a decision on the plan would have to wait until the next Legislative Yuan session. Before the session opened, however, Fu Zuoyi torpedoed the plan. Fu Zuoyi insisted, after being prompted by the Premier for his opinion, that while the CMTA plan was “very good,” the Mongolian leagues and banners must be placed under the administration of the provincial governments rather than the Central Government. The lack of consensus on the structure of Inner Mongolian autonomy caused Premier Zhang to shelve the CMTA plan and any further discussion of Mongolian self-rule. The Mongols, in turn, charged that the Central Government was unable to control Fu Zuoyi.1 4 9 In the realm of rhetoric, the debate over Inner Mongolian autonomy hinged, like it had during the 1930s, on the question of whose authority— the Central or provincial government— the Mongolian banners should be placed, with both sides drawing on the ambiguous legacy of Sun Yat-sen to justify their claims. The Mongols argued that, in accordance with Sun Yat-sen’ s call for the Central Government to Demchughdongrub,” 40-42; Sechin,M en ^ czh iJ im i, 2: 288. 149 “Confidential American Embassy memorandum,” 207-08. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 6 “foster the ability of rrinzu within China for self- government and self-determination” as a part of his principle of nimuzbuyi, the banners and leagues should be placed directly under the supervision of the Executive Yuan. They argued that the Mongolian leagues were equivalent to a Chinese province and thus could not be placed under the jurisdiction of Suiyuan, Chahar andjehol provinces. Furthermore, they viewed Fu Zuoyi and other frontier warlords as “anti-Mongol,” interested in expanding their own military and economic power at the expense of the Mongols, and argued that genuine Mongolian autonomy could only be guaranteed under Central Government patronage. Fu Zuoyi and his subordinates, in turn, contended that any form of Mongolian autonomy must accord with Sun Yat-sen’ s principal of democracy {rnhzhenghuyi), where he contended that the county (xiari), and not the province, should serve as basic self- governing unit. While they were willing to recognize the autonomous status of the Mongolian banners and Han counties, they argued that the banners and counties must remain under the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. The Flan frontiersmen also contended that, from the standpoint of “frontier defense” (farfang), any further division of Inner Mongolia into autonomous leagues and banners would only weaken the ability of the State to defend against outside invasions and the domestic threat of communism. Finally, they argued that only by drawing the Han and minority peoples closer together could the State ensure the advancement of the frontier minorities in accordance with Sun Yat-sen’ s principal of mnzuzhw^.X b 0 1 5 0 Yin Jingyi, “Xianfa shishi yu Menggu zizhi” (Implementing the Constitution and Mongolian autonomy, Bkm henggm gjm 7.1 (March 1948): 1-3; Sechin, “A Handwritten Letter of Prince Demchughdongrub,” 37-43; Barnett, Chi na on tlx E w cfC cm rm vst T a k e o v e r ^ 197-8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 7 Once again, however, the actual fate of Inner Mongolian autonomy was sealed in the realm of power politics rather than rhetoric. Unlike early 1934, Chiang Kai-shek was no longer in a position to intervene politically on behalf of the Mongolian activists. The loyalty of a few thousand Mongols paled in comparison to the importance of Fu Zuoyi and his over half a million troops. In late 1948 Lin Biao’s army thoroughly routed Chiang’ s best American trained and supplied troops in Manchuria causing the entire Northwest to fall into the hands of the Communists. Posted along the strategic north China corridor, Fu Zuoyi and his troops now held the key to containing the spread of Lin Biao’ s forces south of the Great Wall, and as Fu began to waver and contemplate switching sides in the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek was eager to please his powerful anti- Communist ally.1 5 1 At this crucial juncture in the civil war, any attempt to carry out Inner Mongolian autonomy against the wishes of Fu Zuoyi would have been political suicide for Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. Even the Mongolian activists realized that Fu Zuoyi and not Chiang Kai-shek held all the political cards when it came to Inner Mongolian autonomy. During the final year of Nationalist control over the mainland, De Wang launched one final effort to preserve Mongolian autonomy and prevent the entire region from falling under the control of the Chinese Communists. After Fu Zuoyi signed an alliance with the Communists in early 1949, trading Beijing for the preservation of his authority over Suiyuan, De Wang escaped from the capital and flew to Tmgyuanying in 1 5 1 Suzanne Pepper, “The KMT-CCP Conflict 1945-1949,” in Eastman et. aL, The Nationalist Era in Chi na, 344-45; Barnett, CNm m th eE w (fChmrmrri st Takeover , 202-04. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 8 Nlngxia province. In Nlngxia, he joined forces with Da Wang (Darijaya) in mobilizing the Mongols of Alashan and Etsin Gol banners against Fu Zuoyi and the Chinese Communists. In April, they convened an assembly of Inner Mongolian banner and league representatives and announced their intention to form an autonomous Inner Mongolian government. The following month, De Wang flew to Guangzhou, the temporary seat of the Nationalist Government, for one last-ditch effort to convince the Kuomintang to grant Inner Mongolia a high-degree of autonomy. Contending that the Mongols would form their own government with or without Kuomintang support, De Wang nevertheless lobbied government officials for assistance. Not surprisingly, De Wang’ s pleas fell on deaf ears. Making matters worse, De Wang’ s old nemeses, Yan Xishan, had recently been named the new premier and refused to even meet with him. De Wang returned to Nlngxia empty handed, and on 11 August 1949 formed the Mongolian Autonomous Government and the Mongolian Self-protection Militia. In a telling end to this final attempt to secure Inner Mongolian autonomy, troops loyal to Fu Zuoyi brutally crushed De Wang’ s small army in late 1949, forcing the Mongolian leader to flee to Outer Mongolia before his dream of a genuinely autonomous Inner Mongolian government could be realized.1 5 2 Qynduding Remarks In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the flexible and conciliatoiy policy of the Kuomintang Central Government towards the frontier. This policy is best 1 5 2 [De Wang], “Demuchukedonglupu zishu” (Confession of Demchughdongrub), in NWZ, 13: 156-88; Sechin, Menggi zh i Jim i, 2:289-92; See “Demchukdonggrub” in Boorman and Howard, eds., Bi ographi ad Di ct i onary qR qnM ic Chi na, 1:10. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 8 9 characterized by Chiang Kai-shek’ s 1934 and 1945 policy speeches rather than the now famous propaganda tract China’ s Destiny. It is crucial when examining Kin Chinese treatment of their frontier minorities to distinguish between policy, in which mdpdidk considerations remain primary, and propaganda, where the goal is to inspire an ideal outcome. In its policy initiatives, Nanjing was too busy consolidating authority over the recalcitrant provinces and battling the Communist insurgents to exercise direct control over the frontier. Lacking the power of direct military intervention, the Central Government proffered the frontier minorities a high degree of autonomy in exchange for nominal recognition of Nanjing’ s leadership over the territory and peoples of the former Qing dynasty. In the triangular stmggle between the frontier minorities, provincial militarists and the Central Government, it was Nanjing and not the militarists who offered the minorities their best chance at preserving, although perhaps only temporary, their unique cultural and economic way of life. I would argue that the defection of many of these frontier warlords (such as Liu Wenhui and Fu Zuoyi) to the Communist side in 1949 has encouraged a sanitization of their ethnic minority policy within mainland historiography. While the decision to join the CCP was one of political survival, the frontier warlords did play an important role in the Party’ s consolidation of the frontier after 1949.1 5 3 As a result, communist 1 5 3 In exchange allowing the Red Army to peacefully enter Beijing on 22 January 1949, the Communist allowed Fu and his subordinates to retain control over their troops in most of northern China. While Fu was removed from active military duty in the early 1950s, he was award a number of senior yet largely symbolic posts, such as minister of water conservancy and vice chairman of the National Defence Council After defecting to the Communist in December 1949, Liu Wenhui was named as vice chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee of the PRC where he assisted Peng Dehui in the Red Army's invasion of Tibet. In addition to serving as a member of the National Defence Council, Liu was appointed minister of forestry in 1959. See “Fu Tso-yi,” in Boorman and Howard, eds., R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 29 0 scholarship on these militarists generally overlooks or downplays their policies of forced Han colonization and minority assimilation while stressing their Herculean efforts to “develop the frontier,” “resist foreign imperialism,” and “assist the frontier minorities.”1 5 4 In turn, all oppression of the frontier minorities is dumped on the shoulders of Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary Kuomintang regime. Unfortunately, Anglo scholars have uncritically adopted this point of view, with June Dryer, for example, claiming: Despite their ruthlessness, warlords such as the governors Ma in Qinghai and Nlngxia, Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang, Long Yun in Yunnan, and Liu Wenhui in Xikang had a reputation for equal treatment of minorities and for making an honest attempt to deal with their grievances. In comparison, the KMT’ s inept handling of Mongolian demands for autonomy and its failure to implement reforms it had already promised in Xinjiang and toward the Hui appears at best unwise.1 5 5 The reality, as I have attempted to demonstrate, was exactly the opposite. The Central Government, assuming the role of the benevolent Confucian ruler, attempted to protect the frontier minorities from the rampant exploitation of the Han frontiersmen in exchange for a pledge of loyalty towards the State. The frontiersmen, on the other hand, viewed the minorities as evolutionary relics, standing in the way of progress and thus in need of forceful assimilation into the Han cultural and economic way of life. These two fundamentally different approaches to the frontier problem were a result of contrasting mentalities. The frontiersmen looked at the border regions from Bi ogr aphi cal Di ct i onary o f Republ i can Chi na, 2: 51; “Liu Wenhui” in Boorman and Howard, eds., Bi ogr aphi cal Di ct i onary cfRepubl i can Chi na, 2:419; Ren, “Liu Wenhui,” 1:106. 1 5 4 See for example, Ren, “Liu Wenhui,” 1:101-107; Zhang, Fu Zuoyi Yi s heng. 1 5 5 Dryer, Chi na’ s Forty M illion, 4 0 .1 have altered Dryer’ s Wade-Giles rominazation into pinying. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 291 the point of view of a pioneer. For the frontier pioneers, the Ordos region and the Xikang plateau represented wasteland ripe for exploitation. The economic dislocation and political chaos of the Republican period pushed and pulled scores of Han people— merchants seeking high profits, poor farmers in search of “virgin” farmland, opium smugglers, bandits, adventurers and social misfits— onto the frontier, where each hoped to strike it rich before returning home a local hero. In pursuit of their fortune, the frontiersmen developed open contempt for the former nomadic inhabitants of the frontier. Their backward customs and non- sedentary lifestyle hindered modem development and without their forceful assimilation, the vast natural resources of the frontier could not be properly exploited. Military leaders, like Liu Wenhui and Fu Zuoyi, came to represent the interests of these frontiersmen, using military force to protect their resources against Central Government encroachment while resisting the centralization of political authority in China. Those who shaped Kuomintang minority policy, on the other hand, looked at the frontier from the angle of the Chinese mandarin. Stability and peace along the frontier was crucial for the maintenance of Kuomintang power. For centuries, Chinese dynasties had been toppled by rebellion which originated and festered along the frontier before threatening the Chinese heartland. Much like their Qing predecessors, the Kuomintang State was quick to realize the merit in the traditional saying that “turmoil on the frontier brings rebellion to the interior.”1 5 6 The government’ s ability to maintain peace along the frontier was the ultimate signifier of its strength, authority and majesty. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 292 The goal of the mandarin was to secure the “tribute” or symbolic recognition from the “Outer Feudatories” or “External Vassals” (wiifari). During times of military weakness, like the late Qing and Republican periods, a laissez-faire or “loose rein” (jini) policy was the best method for incorporating the “barbarians” into the state while maintaining stability along the frontier. In exchange for their allegiance and symbolic inclusion in the Zhonghua Republic, the Kuomintang State was willing to grant the frontier regions a “high degree of autonomy,” in the hope that the frontier would not be transformed into a base for communist rebels and foreign imperialists. In the clash of these two mentalities in early 20th century China, the gun however proved much more powerful than the gown. 1 5 6 Ma and Zhao, “Qingdai bianjiang minzu zhengce jianlun,” 1. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 293 CHAPTER 4 The C hinese Communist Party & the “National Question” In his 1984 study The National Question inM arxist-Lenimt Theory and Strategy, political scientist Walker Connor analyzes the role of Marxist nationality theory in the development of the early Chinese Communist Party.1 Central to his contention that Communists “manipulate nationalism into the service of Marxism,” Connor attempts to demonstrate how Bolshevik parties in the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia employed the right of national minority self-determination, which according to Lenin expressly included the right of political secession, to gain power within a multi-ethnic environment. In the case of China, Connor claims that the exploitation of national aspirations was an important element in the Chinese Communist Party’ s assumption and consolidation of power during the Republican era. The Communists offered the Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other strategically important ethnic minorities political independence from Han majority hegemony in order to gain their support in its struggle against its Nationalist Party rivals; yet, immediately upon gaining power in 1949, the Communists abruptly withdrew their promise and forcefully incorporated the minorities into a unitary state structure under central Party rule. Despite its pioneering nature, Connor’ s limited access to primary source materials (and all those in translation) results, in my mind, in an unnatural and erroneous depiction of the GCP’ s nationality policy, one that contradicts recently published archival material on Communist Party history 1 Connor, The National Quest i on, 67-100. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 9 4 Connor is not the first scholar to comment on the importance of nationalism in the GCP’s rise to power.2 Yet, his focus on the slogan of national self-determination, in the case of China at least, misses the mark. In this chapter, I will argue that Lenin’ s united front tactic, rather than his principle of national self-determination, served as the raison d’ etre o i the Chinese Communist Party’ s Republican-era nationality policy. Instead of consciously manipulating the national aspirations of the minorities, the Party consistently downplayed ethnic sentiment in the hope of fostering an overarching sense of “Chineseness.” The united front tactic, with its focus on national unity over class antagonism, served as an important tool for the construction of this new national identity. From the moment of its inclusion by the Comintern into the Party’ s 1923 political programme, Chinese Communist leaders felt uncomfortable with Lenin’ s principle of national self- determination and its implication for national unity. The Communists and other Chinese nationalists blamed the country’ s backwardness on the political and ethnic division created by domestic warlordism and foreign imperialism, and worried more about the effects of foreign intrigue and ethnonationalism upon China’ s frontier than the legacy of Han chauvinist oppression and prejudice. As Sun Yat-sen had taught, the ultimate goal of China’ s revolution was the establishment of a strong, independent and unified Chinese state free from foreign interference. The granting of political independence to the Mongol, Tibetan and other former vassal 2 See, for example, the now classic, Chalmers Johnson, Peasant N ationalism and Corrvmmt Pouen T h e Energnce ( f R evdntkm ry Chi na, 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 9 5 states of the Qing Empire not only contravened the Part/s nationalist sentiment but also undermined its patriotic credentials for national leadership. Connor’ s argument that the Communists manipulated the slogan of national self-determination echoes the position of many Sinologists that the CCP’ s nationality policy represented, in the words of George Moseley, a mere “approximation of Soviet orthodoxy.”3 In chapter two, I attempted to demonstrate how early COP leaders felt ill at ease with the internationalist aspect of the Comintern’ s nationality policy, especially its support for Outer Mongolian self-determination and independence from China. This chapter continues the argument by examining how Mao and the Chinese Communists eventually broke with Leninist discourse on the national question and fashioned their own national minority policy which took the “special conditions” of the Chinese revolution as its starting point. The Party’ s early reliance on Russian and Comintern support precluded the open abandonment of Bolshevik theory; Yet, following the outbreak of the Second World War and the redirection of Moscow’ s foreign policy objectives, Mao Zedong lead a movement to “sinicize” Marxism-Leninism and create an indigenous nationality policy. In place of Lenin’ s policy of national self- determination, Mao’s minority policy stressed, like the CCP’ s Kuomintang rivals, the unity of all nationalities under a strong, centralized state and party. 3 George Moseley, “China’s Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question,” The Chi m Quart erl y 24 (December 1965): 17. Moseley argues that it was not until 1961, and the failure of the forced land reform movement among the minorities as a part of the Great Leap Forward, that the CCP arrived at “a mature position with respect to the applicability of Soviet theory in this particular field of policy formation.” In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate how much of the debate over the national question described by Moseley as taking place during the 1960’ s actually originated with the “sinification” of the Bolshevik nationality policy during the 1940’ s, if not earlier. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 9 6 It is highly doubtful whether China’ s ethnic minorities, following years of abuse and exploitation at the hands of the Han majority, actually ever trusted the Communist offer of political independence. Yet, within the Republican era’ s chaotic environment of foreign imperialism and domestic warlordism, both minority and Communists leaders attempted to use each other as a source for strengthening their own political authority. To the extent that the Communist handling of the national question contributed to their victory over the Nationalist Party, it was due to its successful mobilization of minority peoples into a broad political alliance, rather than its manipulation of their national aspirations. In its early work among the frontier nationalities, the Party came to realize that the feudal “upper strata” held the key to the successful incorporation of the frontier into the Chinese State. Instead of emphasizing intra- nationality class struggle, the Party called for all minority classes to unite together under the leadership of the CCP to fight their common enemy the Japanese invaders and their domestic lackeys. Despite their ambiguous attitude towards the Japanese and often open collaboration with the Nationalists, there was always a group of minority elites willing to side with the Communists in the hope of winning power or consolidating their authority among their people. Finally, by ensuring firm Party control over these united front organizations, the Communists also hoped to carefully isolate and then destroy all “disloyal and unpatriotic” elements, while securing its authority over the vast majority of frontier peoples. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 9 7 The Cwamaibing cfNational Sdf-detenrimtim The Jammy 1931 installation of the Moscow-trained “28 Bolsheviks” by Comintern agent Pavel Mif at the CCP’ s 4th Plenum marked, what Charles B. McLane calls, the “last identifiable instance of outright [Comintern] intervention in the internal affairs of the CCP.”4 With the shift in late 1931 of the Central Committee from Shanghai to the rural Jiangxi Soviet, the Party fell out of direct contact with their Comintern advisers. This loosening of Comintern supervision provided the Chinese Communists with enough breathing space to thoroughly evaluate, for the first time in its history, the Bolshevik’ s nationality policy, and in particular, its central tenet of national self-determination. While our access to documents chronicling the intra-Party debates of the 1930’ s is limited, a careful reading of the available materials reveals a highly ambivalent attitude among top Party leaders towards Lenin’ s insistence that the right of seh-determination must include an explicit offer of political secession. It appears that a consensus had been reached by the time of the Long March in 1935: the right of secession would only apply to Outer Mongolia— which had already obtained its independence in 1924 with the assistance of the Soviet Red Army— while all the newly defined “national minorities” {shaoshu ninzu) within Chinese territory would to be permitted mere political and cultural autonomy within a unified Chinese state. This re-evaluation of Bolshevik nationality policy needs to be placed within the context of Stalin’ s own break with proletarian internationalism. Trotsky’ s forced exile from Russia in 1929 left Stalin with supreme control over the ideological direction of R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 9 8 Russian Marxism and opened the way for his theory of “socialism in one country.” In contrast to the internationalism of Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin argued that it was possible for socialism to arise within Russia prior to a world wide socialist revolution. To accomplish this task against the encircling forces of international capitalism, however, the Russian state needed to strengthen itself while giving full play to the development of a Soviet national economy and culture. This emphasis on the construction of a new “Soviet nation” made it increasingly transparent to the Chinese Communists and other non-Russian Marxists that the Comintern was largely a tool of Russian national interest, and eventually contributed to its formal dissolution in 1943 at the height of World War Two.3 This new consensus among Chinese Communist Party leaders was most clearly reflected in the Party Center’ s private communications with its branch committees. During the late 1920’ s, the CCP became suspicious of the patriotic intentions of the Comintern-backed “People’s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia” (N einizn^ gning mrindan^ (PRPIM), and attempted to establish its own political organisations within the region— in the hope of steering the Mongols away from Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia and back towards the “motherland.” For example, the Party Center’ s February 1929 letter to its clandestine “Inner Mongolian Special Committee” (Neimsriggu tdneud), called for the secret recruitment of PRPIM activists for membership in the 4 Charles B. McLane, Soriet Polity and t he Chi nes e C om m m ts, 1931-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 9. 5 D ’Encausse, The Great Chcdkng, 173-194; Richard Pipes, Russia Under t he Bdsheuk Re gi me (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 436-89. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 2 9 9 CCP. The letter also stressed the importance of “opposing their narrow nationalist thought,” while emphasizing the unity of the Han and Mongolian masses.6 The death of PRPIM’ s Comintern adviser in 1930 allowed the Chinese Communists to more clearly articulate, without the fear of Comintern censure, their own nationalist goals for the region. The “Draft Inner Mongolian National Political Outline,” issued by the Party Center in November 1930, made several subtle but significant changes to the Comintern’ s previous political programme. 'Without removing the right of national self- determination and the call for an Inner Mongolian government, the CCP’ s Outline stressed that, in order to ensure the success of the revolution, the “Inner Mongolian Common Peoples Republic” must unite together with not only the Outer Mongols but also the Chinese Soviet. With regards to concrete work tasks, the Party Center called for the disbanding of the PRPIM and its reorganization into a “Common People’ s Revolutionary Party” (p m g rm ^n in kr^ that would better reflea the common interests of both the Mongolian nomads and the vast majority of Han migrant-farmers living within the region. Finally, the Outline emphasized the continued importance of “opposing the narrow nationalist thought of Pan- Mongolianism, without adopting an antagonistic attitude towards it.”7 While being careful not to offend their Soviet patrons, the Chinese Communists made it clear to their activists within the region that the revolutionary movements of China and Inner 6 “Zhonggong zhongyang gei Mengwei de xin” (Party Center letter to the Inner Mongolian Special Committee), 30 February 1929, in MZWT, 103-04. On the organization of the Inner Mongolian Special Committee see Hao, Neitrenggi G eninghi, 196-199. 7 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Neimeng gongzuo jihua dagang” (The Party Center’ s outline workplan for Inner Mongolia), 5 November 1931, in MZWT, 136-41. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 0 Mongolia were inextricably linked, meaning that Inner Mongolian self-determination could only occur within the context of the liberation of all “Chinese” toiling masses. The clear strategic interest of their Soviet Russian patrons in Northern China limited the extent to which the GCP could overtly challenge the nationalist and Pan- Mongolian proclivities of the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries. The situation in Southern China, however, was quite different. The absence of any direct Russian interest permitted the Chinese Communists to be more explicit in their qualification of the right of national self- determination. Take for example, a September 1929 Central Party directive to its Yunnan Provincial Committee concerning the meaning of the slogan among the Miao and other national minorities of the Southwest. Though admitting that national self-determination was an important part of the Party's nationality programme, the directive also stressed that: In our work among the Miao and other minorities, national independence {ninzu didi) is most certainly not an appropriate slogan. Because of the current need for both the Yunnanese worker-peasant masses and the Miao and other minorities to oppose imperial and feudal forces, advocating national independence will only produce an objective split within the united front between the national minorities (sbacshu ninzu) and the Yunnan workers and peasants, resulting in its inevitable use by the French imperialists. National self-determination and not national independence is our current propaganda slogan.8 Returning to the logic of Sun Yat-sen’ s interpretation of national self-determination (namely, the right of the entire “Chinese” people to determine their destiny free from outside interference), the Party Center stressed the interrelated nature of Han and minority national liberation. The fact that the foreign powers were attempting to R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 301 weaken “Chinese unity” by manipulating the national aspirations of the frontier peoples made it imperative that all “Chinese people” unite together and proceed simultaneously towards their collective liberation and independence. A close reading of CCP public documents from the Jiangxi Soviet also reveals a subtle attempt by Party leaders to modify the meaning of Lenin’s concept of national self-determination. The iconographic nature of the written Chinese language simultaneously lends itself to a high degree of ambiguity and precision. Consequently, it is common for a single text to be interpreted in several different ways. The elasticity of the Chinese language, I would argue, made it possible for Communist leaders to explicidy include Lenin’ s principle within the Jiangxi Soviet’ s 1931 and 1934 Constitutions— which would invariably wind their way back to Moscow— while also wording the promise of secession in such a way as to limit its possible relevance to the Chinese minorities. At the very least, however, the fact that the precise wording of the Party’ s nationality platform changed no fewer than four times between 1931 and 1934 should be enough to demonstrate the uneasiness (if not open disagreement) among CCP leaders over the importance and meaning of the Leninist slogan. When Party leaders sat down to draft the Jiangxi Soviet’ s first constitution in late 1931, they made several subtle, but important, changes to the language of the nationality plank included within the Draft Basic Law drawn up under the direct 8 “Zhonggong zhongyang gei Yunnan shengwei de zhishixin” (Party Center directive to the Yunnan Provincial Committee), September 1929, la MZWT, 110. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 2 supervision of Pavel Mif in Shanghai a year earlier.9 Altering the Basic Law’ s unambiguous promise of “national self-determination” {ninzuzijud), including the right of political secession, for all “small nations” (xiao rrimu) within China, Article 14 of the new Constitution revived the obscure wording of Sun Yat-sen’ s 1924 Kuomintang Manifesto: “The Chinese Soviet Government recognizes the right of national minorities (shaoshu rrimu) to self- determination {zijufy” This was followed by the statement in the next line that: “The Soviet has always recognized the right of small and weak nations {maciao ninzti) to secede from China and establish their own independent state.” Note here the inferred distinction between a “national minority,” which is entitled to only “self-determination,” and the explicit promise of independence extended to “small and weak nations.” Finally, the third line offers a more circumscribed and ambiguous form of self-determination for the “Mongols, Hui, Tibetans, Miao, Li, Gaoli and other minorities living within Chinese territory,” namely the right to “either join or leave the Federation of Soviet Republics or establish their own autonomous region.”1 0 The awkward wording of this article appears, in my mind, to represent a conscious attempt to differentiate between a general right of political secession, which applies to an undefined group of “small and weak nations,” and a more circumscribed right of 9 “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo guojia genbenfa (xianfa) dagang caoan” (Draft Basic Law (Constitution) of the Zhonghua Soviet Republic), May 1930, in MZWT, 123. 1 0 “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo xianfa dagang” (Constitutional Outline of the Zhonghua Soviet RepubEc), 7 November 1931,'mMZWT, 166. Much of this ambiguity has been ironed out of EngHsh translations of the 1931 Constitution. See, for example, the translation included in Conrad Brandt et aL,A Document aryHi st ory <f Chi nes e Qrnwmmm(London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), where no distinction is made between the terms n m iao rrinzu and shaos hu nim u, and the right of the national minorities to form their own zizb i qttyu (autonomous region) is incorrectly translated as “their own state.” See pp. 220-221. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 3 autonomy for the “national minorities” (that is the Mongols, Hui, Tibetans, etc.) living within Chinese territory. To confuse matters further, several days prior to the passage of the Constitution, the Jiangxi Congress approved a separate “Draft Resolution on the National Minority Question in China,” which added two important qualifications to the principle of self-determination. In repeating the promise to “categorically and unconditionally recognize the right of the national minorities to self- determination,” the Resolution also stated: This means that within a fixed territory in Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Guizhou and other regions, where the majority of the population is non-Han, the toiling masses (laoku qmzhon^ of each nationality shall have the right to determine for themselves: whether they wish to leave the Chinese Soviet Republic and establish their own state, or join the Federation of Soviet Republics, or form an autonomous region within the Chinese Soviet Republic.1 1 The Resolution attaches two important provisos to the right of political secession. First, it shall only apply to those nationalities whose population comprised a majority in the region it inhabits (such as in Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang); and second, and more importantly, the right is only open to the “toiling masses” of each nationality. This second qualification ensured that the Chinese Communist Party, as the only true representative of the toiling masses, was the only authority that could call for political independence. Something, of course, it had no intention of doing. As the Resolution 1 1 “Guanyu Zhongguo lingnei shaoshu minzu wenti de jueyi’an” (The Draft Resolution on the National Minority Question in China), 1 November 1931, inMZWT, 169-70. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 4 made clear, the goal of the Party’ s Zhonghua Soviet Republic, after all, was no less than the “establishment of a state without ninzu boundaries.”1 2 The precise language of the Chinese Soviet’ s nationality platform became a source of continued debate at the Second Congress of Soviet Delegates in early 1934. In a significant move immediately prior to the convening of the Congress, the Party’ s 5th Plenum— the first plenum since Pavel Mif’ s departure from China— omitted the term self- determination completely from its internal political resolution. Instead, it called on the Party to “lead the national minorities towards national liberation {jrinzujv^cm^, the ability to stand on their own feet (zili) (including the right to establish their own authority) and struggle (douzheng).”1 * Although one can clearly infer Lenin’ s concept of national self-determination from the above phrase, it remains significant, I believe, that the Party did not specifically mention ninzu zijue (national self-determination). This omission become even more significant when one considers that the term ninzu zijue had been included in every single public resolution dealing with the national question since its first inclusion in the Party’s political programme during its 3rd National Congress in 1923. The new wording appears, at the very least, to signify some disagreement or anxiety among Party leaders over the implications of the principle of national seh-determination for the nationalist revolution in China The revised 1934 Constitution endorsed by the Second Congress of Soviet Delegates offered yet another alternative locution. Interestingly, its modification of 1 2 Ibid., 170. 1 3 “Zhonggong zhongyang liujie wuzhong quanhui zhengzhi jueyi’an” (Draft political resolution of the 5th Plenum of the CCP’s 6th Central Committee), 18 January 1934, in MZWT, 205. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 5 Article 14 represented one of the only significant changes to the 1931 Constitution. The first line of the revised Article now read: “The Zhonghua Soviet Government recognizes the goal of national freedom {ninzu ziyou) for all national minorities within China.” The solemn and unconditional pledge of “seh-determination” contained in the 1931 Constitution was replaced with the even more ambiguous “goal of national freedom.” The term zijue (self-determination) remained, however, now as a part of the phrase recognizing the right of the national minorities within Chinese territory to “join or leave the Federation of Soviet Republics or establish their own autonomous region.” Finally, the Article continued to acknowledge the right of “small nations” (xiao ninzu) to “break with China and establish an independent state,” but placed it in direct contrast now with the right of Chinese “national minorities” to self-determination.1 4 Without further access to CCP documents from the Jiangxi Soviet, it is difficult to explain the exact reasons for the Party’ s desultory and inconsistent nationality discourse. Perhaps, it is an indication of open discord among the leadership over the meaning and necessity of including Lenin’ s principle of national self-determination in the Party’ s political programme, or concern that its exclusion might anger Moscow or undermine the Party’ s legitimacy as a Marxist-Leninist political organization. At the very least, however, the repeated reworking of the nationality plank appears to represent an uneasiness among CCP leaders over the possibility that the frontier minorities might actually act out the Leninist right of political secession. Out of deference to their Russian allies and their sphere of influence on the Mongolia steppe, it was necessary for 1 4 “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo xianfa dagang” (Constitutional Outline of the Zhonghua Soviet R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 6 the Jiangxi Soviet to recognize the defacto independence of Outer Mongolia in its 1931 and 1932 Constitutions as the right of “small nations” or “small and weak nations” to break away from China and establish their own state. At the same time, the Party appears to have struggled with an alternative phraseology for describing the more limited right of autonomy it was willing to offer those “national minorities” firmly within Chinese territory— experimenting with such terms as seh-determination {zijud), standing on one’ s own feet (zili), liberation (jiefang), and freedom (ziyod). The fact of the matter remained, however, that throughout the early 1930’s, the Chinese Communists continued to employ the theoretical framework of the Bolshevik discourse on the national question. The Party’ s tinkering with the language aside, one could still read into their public pronouncements the right of Chinese national minorities to determine their own political destinywithout interference from the Han majority. Publicly, at least, the environment was still not ripe for an open split with the ideology of their Bolshevik mentors. In their private communications however, the Party was beginning to chart its own course by emphasizing the unified struggle of all “Chinese nationalities” (Zhorqgpo mimus) towards a collective “Chinese liberation” (Zhon&tojufar$. One of the more influential Party leaders in this attempt to construct a uniquely Chinese nationality policy was Mao Zedong. Speaking, for example, before the Second Congress of Soviet Delegates in January 1934, Mao alleged that all Chinese nationalities suffered equally from imperialist oppression and feudal backwardness. He called for the Republic), January 1934, in MZWT, 209. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 7 replacement of this system of mutual exploitation with what Li Dazhao first termed in 1919 a “free union of all ninzus” (ninzu ziyou liaribty. As evidence of the Party’ s commitment to national self- determination (ninzu zijud), Mao cited, revealingly, the presence of delegates from Taiwan, Korea, and Annam (Vietnam) rather than the Mongol, Tibet, Miao and other “national minorities” (shaoshu ninzu) whom he clearly saw as an inalienable part of the Chinese nation. Echoing Sun Yat-sen’ s 1924 Kuomintang Manifesto, Mao highlighted the responsibility of all national minorities toward the Chinese revolution, alleging that “only by assisting the Chinese Soviet Government in obtaining victory ana national scale cm the Government achieve a thorough victory.”1 5 Like Sun Yat-sen and Li Dazhao before him, Mao believed that “the Chinese” (Zhorggtomi) could only achieve their liberation from foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism by uniting together into a single, organic national entity. TheLongManh & the Origins cfthe United Front Tactic The CCP’ s long march for survival throughout the Southwest and Western frontier region of China further impressed upon Mao and other Party leaders the importance of national unity for the nation’ s survival. In October 1934 Chiang Kai- shek’ s Fifth Encirclement Campaign finally forced the Party out of the Jiangxi Soviet and onto its epic hegira which eventually lead the Party to its wartime base in Northern Sha’anxi. This more than 6,000-mile journey on foot took the Red Army through eight provinces, across dozens of mountain ranges and over scores of major rivers in little 1 5 Mao Zedong, “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhongyang shixing weiyuanhui yu remin weiyuanhui dierci quanguo suweiai daibiao dahui de baogao” (Report before the 2n d National Soviet R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 0 8 over a year’ s time. Much of this time— roughly 33% or 125 out of 371 days for Mao’ s 1s t Route Army— was spent among the Miao, Yao, Yi and Tibetan minorities.1 6 For the first time in its history, the Party’s minority policy became more than a series of idle ideological considerations, but rather an important part of its overall strategy for survival and development. To ensure the Party’s safe passage through this hostile and unfamiliar terrain, Mao and the Party Center turned to Lenin’ s united front tactic. Lyman Van Slyke, in his landmark study on the united front tactic, convincingly demonstrates the importance of this policy in the CCP’ s rise to power.1 7 The united front tactic initially developed out of Lenin’ s 1916 theory of imperialism, which called for national liberation movements in the colonial world to re-energize the fledgling struggle of European workers against the global forces of capitalism. Lenin believed, however, that the immature nature of Eastern proletarian parties required a temporary and expedient alliance, or “united front,” with the national bourgeois. Consequently, the revolution in China and elsewhere in the colonial world would proceed in two stages: an initial national democratic revolution against foreign imperialism and then a second socialist revolution aimed at overthrowing the forces of domestic capitalism. A revolutionary alliance between the national bourgeois and the toiling masses was crucial Delegates Congress of the Zhonghua Soviet Republic’ s Central Executive Committee and People’ s Committee), January 1934, in MZWT, 210-211. Emphasis added. 1 6 See Lin Huaming, “Hongjun changzheng yu minzu gongzuo” (Nationality work and the Red Army’ s Long March), in Qoar ygheng Daskkhan [Enydcpedia (/Major Long March E tents), ed. Changzheng Dashidian bianweihui (Guiyang: Guizhou Renminchu banshe, 1996), 2:2046. 1 7 Lyman P. Van Slyke, E ne r r i e s and Fri ends: The United Front in Chi nes e Comnwnst H istory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 309 to the success of the first, during which the Communist parties would still pursue their own tactical goals while supporting bourgeois democracy.1 8 In China, Lenin’ s united front tactic led initially to the Comintern’ formation of an uneasy alliance between the Communists and Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party. In the hands of Mao, however, this tactic was transformed into a far more powerful revolutionary strategy. Van Slyke demonstrates how Mao developed and refined the tactic following the failure of the First United Front and the withdrawal of direct Comintern supervision. Mao used the techniques of the united front to first solve the practical problems of the revolution, and then “once these techniques were raised to a certain level of generality, they influenced the perception and handling of other problems”— recasting the united front as a fully fledged strategy for revolution.1 9 Yet, by placing Mao’ s reworking of the united front tactic in Yan’an, Van Slyke overlooks its initial importance to the Party’s handling of the national minority question during the Long March. In contrast to his conclusion that “once the Long March began in October (on the pretext of marching north to fight the Japanese), hardship and perils made any reconsideration of the united front policy impossible,”2 0 the Party’s journey through the Southwest frontier provided Mao with his first laboratory for experimenting with the united front policy. Prior to the Long March, Lenin’ s united front tactic had never been applied to the national question in China. As a part of its broader political programme 1 8 See Alexander Pantsov, The Bdsheriks and t he C him e Revol ut i on, 1919-1927 (London: Qirzon, 2000): 41-52; Lenin, “Preliminary Draft Theses,” 31:240-45. 1 9 Van Slyke, E ner r i es and Fri ends, 4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 1 0 emphasizing class conflict, the Party advocated minority resistance to the feudal oppression of their religious and princely leaders, which were described as the leading force of capitalist and proto-capitalist exploitation within primitive society. The “Resolution on Miao and Yao Liberation,” for example, passed by the Party’ s First Congress of Hunan Peasant Representatives in December 1926, called on the delegates to “assist the Miao and Yao in eliminating the cruel oppression of their tusi chieftains.”2 1 The Party was forced, however, to re-think this policy when faced with widespread minority resistance during the Long March. Without translators to communicate its policies or minority cadres to mobilize the masses, the strategy of class conflict did little to advance the Party’ s objectives and ensure its safety on the frontier. As Kuomintang troops chased the Communists through Guizhou, Yunnan and Western Sichuan, the Red Army had to waste valuable time and energy fending off the attacks of minority tribesmen and searching for food and other supplies without the assistance of the local population.2 2 This situation reached a crisis point in early 1935, when the desperately hungry and tired soldiers of Mao’ s 1s t Route Army’s (reduced by over half to 25,000 since the start of the Long March) reached Huili, a small village in Southern Sichuan, 2 0 Ibid.: 47. 2 1 “Hunansheng diyici nongmin daibiao dahui jiefang Miao-Yao jueyi’ an” (The resolution of the First Congress of Hunan Peasant Representatives on the liberation of the Miao and Yao), December 1926, hxMZWT, 52. Also see Zhou Xiyin, “Hongjun Changzheng yu dang de minzu, tongxian he zongjiao zhengce” (The Red Army’ s Long March and the Party’s Nationality, United Front and Religion Policy), in Cf at ng' heng Dashidian (E nc y dopedi a cfM ajor Long March E tents), ed. Changzheng Dashidian bianweihui (Guiyang: Guizhou Renminchu bansbe, 1996), 2:2040-2046. 2 2 On some of the difficulties the Red Army faces among the minorities see “Zhongguo gong- nong hongjun erfangmian jun zhengzhibu guanyu er-liu juntuan changzheng de zhengzhi gongzuo zongjie baogao” (Outline report of the political department of the 2n d Route Chinese worker-peasant red army on the experiences of the 2n d and 6th battalions during the Long March), 19 December 1936, in R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 311 with Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in hot pursuit. At a quickly convened meeting of Party leaders, Mao— who had recently assumed de facto control over the Party Center at the historic Zunyi Conference— called for the Red Army to abandon its heavy equipment and race 2000 li straight through the wilderness home of the dreaded “Lolos,” or what are today referred to as the Yi nationality. If the Red Army could beat the Kuomintang troops advancing from the Southwest to the Luding bridge crossing of the mighty Dadu River, they could join up with Zhang Guotao’ s 80,000 strong 4th Route Army in Northern Sichuan.2 3 To ensure the Army’s safe passage through the land of the fiercely independent Yi, Mao turned to the united front tactic. Mao’s first experimentation with the united front technique came during the 1s t Route Army's journey through the territory of the more placid Yao and Miao minorities of Southern Guizhou. Echoing his contention at the Second Congress of Soviet Delegates that “the starting point of the soviet policy on nationalities is the winning over of all oppressed national minorities,” 2 4 Mao declared to all his military commanders prior to entering Guizhou in November 1934 that “all successive field army actions and battles are intimately connected to the problem of winning over the national minorities, and the solution of this problem has a marked significance to the realization of our batde tactics.”2 5 Central to Mao’ s proposed solution to this problem MZWT, 436-440; Edgar Snow, Red Star owr Chi na, first rev. and enlarged ed. (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1968), 194-204. 2 3 Harrison E. Salisbury, TheLongM ai rh: the U ntddStory (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1985), 188-197. 2 4 Mao, “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhongyang silking weiyuanhui yu remin weiyuanhui dierci quanguo suweiai daibiao dahui de baogao,” 210. 2 5 Cited in Lin, “Hongjun changzheng yu minzu gongzuo,” 2:2047. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 312 was the establishment of a military and political alliance, or united front, with the Miao and Yao “upper strata” (shangpmgjieoen^. Despite their open mistrust of the Han, the tusi chieftains had a long history of uneasy cooperation with Chinese rulers among whom they lived. Furthermore, their use of the Chinese language and customs made them a better target for mobilization then the “ignorant” Yao and Miao masses that the Party purported to represent. In an important directive issued by the Political Department of Mao’ s 1 s t Route Army in late November 1934, the Party Center argued that the “extreme backwardness” of Yao and Miao economic and cultural development had retarded inter class conflict. Because of this, “the Yao [and Miao] tusi and other leaders still have a high degree of authority and prestige in the minds of the masses, and are thus still the sole representatives of the Yao [and Miao] people’s national interests”; consequently, the directive pointed out that “our Soviet Red Army cannot help but develop relations with these representatives.” In the current struggle against the national oppression of the Han militarists, bureaucrats and bourgeois, the Party Center now declared, “the upper strata obviously still possessed a revolutionary function.” In order to win over the Yao and Miao elites, the directive called for the Red Army to respect their religion, language and customs, while emphasizing in its propaganda that the Yao and Miao people are “brothers” with the Chinese toiling masses and jointly suffer from imperialist and Kuomintang oppression. Finally, the Party Center urged the recruitment of Yao and Miao youths into the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army, while also R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 313 permitting them to form their own Soviet government or join the Zhonghua Soviet as an autonomous region. While Mao’s new policy helped the Red Army pass through Guizhou without incident, the first real test of the united front tactic came in Western Sichuan amongst the warlike Yi nationality. Upon leaving Huili and entering “Lololand,” the 1s t Route Army issued an urgent reminder about the “extreme importance” of winning over the Yi upper strata in order to ensure the Red Army’ s quick passage northward.2 7 In subsequent directives the Party Center sanctioned the use of a wide variety of methods— such as the offering of gifts, money, guns, bullets or even IOUs— to win over the Yi leaders and gain their assistance in finding food and shelter for the Red Army.2 8 One of more colorful legends of the Long March— the so-called “Chicken- Blood Oath” between Sichuan native Liu Bocheng, the Red Army’ s “one eyed dragon,” and Xiao Yedan, a Lolo chieftain— actually represented the successful implementation of Maoist united front tactic. According to Long March lore, as the Red Army’ s was racing North towards the Dadu River, they ran smack into several hundred wildly chanting Yi tribesmen armed with homemade guns, sticks, spears and clubs. When they 2 6 “Zhongguo gong-nong hongjun zhengzhibu guanyu Miao-Yao minzu zhong gongzuo yuanze de zhishi” (Directive of the Political Department of the Chinese Worker, Peasant Red Army on work principles among the Miao and Yao nationalities), 29 November 1934, in MZWT, 244-46. 2 7 “Zhongguo gong-nong hongjun zong zhengzhibu guanyu zhuyi zhengqu yimin de gongzuo” (Directive of the Central Political Department of the Chinese Worker, Peasant Red Army on paying attention to the work of winning over the Yi people), April 1935, in MZWT, 258. 2 8 See “Qiangdu Daduhe de xuanchuan gudong gongzuo” (Propaganda for arousing our work in crossing over the Dadu river), 22 May 1935, in MZWT, 265; “Nuli shixian zhong zhengzhibu tichu de sida haozhao” (Work hard to realize the four great slogans of the General Political Department), May 1935, in MZWT, 267. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 1 4 refused to allow the Communists safe passage, the “chieftain” of the Red Army’ s vanguard regiment, Liu Bocheng, ashed to meet with the Yi chieftain. At the edge of a crystal mountain lake, Liu Bocheng drank a bowl full of cock’ s blood to seal an alliance of sworn brotherhood between himself and the Lolo tusi Xiao Yedan, thereby ensuring that the Red Army’ s rapid march northward and successful crossing of the Dadu River ahead of Chiang’ s troops.2 9 Once stripped of its mythology, however, the incident takes on a more prosaic significance. Liu Bocheng essentially “bought” the allegiance of the Guji faction of the Yi people with dozens of guns and nearly 1000 silver dollars; while Xiao Yedan, for his part, found the money and guns useful in his struggle against the rival Luohong faction, while also hoping that the Red Army might even assist him in attacking his enemy.3 0 What made Mao’ s united front tactic so successful was that there was always a group of minority elites willing to cooperate with the Communists in the hope that their weapons or money would alter the balance of power in their own internal struggle. On the other hand, the united front tactic also aided the Communists in gaining a foothold among minorities, where they could gradually recruit minority cadres of their own and mobilize the masses for its own struggle against their Nationalist and imperialist enemies. Yet, there were those within the Party who feared that the incorporation of Buddhist lamas, Hui imams, Mongol princes and Yi chieftains would threaten to 2 9 For two colorful versions of this myth see Salisbury, The LongM anh, 196-200; Dick Wilson, The LongMcmh 1935: The E pic o f Chi nes e G m ntm snis S u rtivd (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), 136-50. For the uses of the myth in CCP propaganda see Chen Changfeng, Q i t he LongM anh m th O m rm m M ao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1986), 40-3. 3 0 Karen Gemant, “The Long March” (PhD. diss., University of Oregon, 1980), 278-81. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 315 transform the Communist Party into a mere democratic party. Mao took these concerns on at the important Wayaopao Party Conference, which met following the successful reunion of the 1 s t and 4th Route Armies in Northern Sichuan. Arguing that ideology and not social composition determined the proletarian and revolutionary nature of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao, in language reminiscent of Sun Yat-sen, called for the transformation of the Party into a “smelting furnace of communism” {gjnghctnzhu^, de rvn^u) urging that the inclusion of minority elites and other feudal elements would result in their “tempering into Bolshevik fighters with the highest class consciousness.”3 1 Mao, in other words, viewed the united front tactic as a revolutionary strategy for enlarging both the appeal and authority of the Chinese Communist Party. TheSmficatim<fMarxism& the Rise c f the Maoist Nationality Policy Despite the attempts by Mao and Communist leaders to break with the Comintern’ s national minority stratagem, CCP policy remained largely wedded to the rhetoric and intent of the Bolshevik theory throughout the early 1930s. They tinkered with the language of its central tenet of national seh-determination and extended the Leninist united front tactic into the realm of minority politics; yet, the Party continued to begrudgingly accept the ideological framework of the Bolshevik handling of the national question. It was not until the outbreak of world war in both Europe and the Pacific that the international and domestic situation altered sufficiently for the Party to 3 1 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu muqian zhengzhi xingshi yu dang de renwu jueyi” (Resolution on the current political situation and the responsibility of the Party^, 25 December 1935, in Takuechi Minoru, ed., Mao ZedongJi {Collected Works cf Mao Zedong (Tokyo: Hokubo sha, 1970-74), 5: 38 (Hereafter cited as MZDJ). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 1 6 completely abandon Bolshevik theory and develop their own indigenous nationality policy. Internationally, the Second World War redirected the attention of the Party’ s Russian advisers and patrons away from China and back towards Europe. With the move of the CCP’s Central Committee, first, to rural Jiangxi in 1932, and then, into the frontier hinterland of Southwest China during the Long March, the Comintern’ s influence over the Party gradually waned. Lacking both the resources and logistical capacity for direct communication with the Party Center, the Comintern became less involved in the formation of GCP policy, allowing Mao to give full play to the unique features of the Chinese revolutionary situation. Not surprisingly, the decline in Comintern authority coincided with the diminishing importance of China within the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. With the establishment of diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek’ s Nationalist government in 1935 and the signing of a Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact with the Japanese in April 1941, Stalin was free to focus his full attention on the impending war with European Fascism. As long as China did not completely capitulate to the Japanese, Stalin seemed content to ignore its domestic politics. In May 1943 the last formal ties between Moscow and the Chinese Communists were severed when the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern called for the organization’ s dissolution, claiming that the world’ s Communist Parties had matured sufficiently to allow the withdrawal of central supervision. In a resolution accepting the disbanding of the Communist International, Mao stressed that the CCP had “long since been able to determine its political line R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 1 7 independently and to carry it out in accordance with the concrete situation and the specific circumstances in its country.”3 2 Nationality theory was one of the first areas where Mao charted his own political line, anxious to apply the unique reality of “Chinese” national unity to the Party’ s handling of the “domestic national question.” Domestically, the full-scale Japanese invasion of China in 1937 fanned the smoldering flames of Chinese nationalism and redirected the attention of the Chinese away from the abstract theories of Marx and Lenin and towards the concrete requirements of national survival. The series of bloody defeats that the Chinese suffered during the early years of the war fostered a sense of “national emergency,” and gave rise to an important shift within the CCP’ s rhetoric and theory. Claiming in its famous “August 1935 Declaration” that “China is our fatherland” and that “all our compatriots comprise the Zhon^dom m u (Chinese nation),” the Communists called on “men and women of all walks of life (labor, industry, agriculture, military affairs, politics, commerce and education)” to put aside their differences and unite together in a broad, anti-Japanese “united front.”3 3 China’ s “national salvation movement,” a November 1936 Party document stated, was not the sole prerogative of the proletariat but all Chinese classes. “The Japanese invasion of China and attempt to turn the entire nation into a colony has created a special period where all Chinese classes share a common interest in preventing the loss of the state and extermination of the race’ (wingguo 3 2 Gted in McLane, Sauet Pdicy and the Chinese Conrmmts, 160. 3 3 “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui he Zhonghua suweiai zhongyang zhengfu wei kangri jiuguo gao quanti tongbao shu” (The declaration of the CCP’ s Central Committee and the government of the Central Zhonghua Soviet to all compatriots about resisting the Japanese and saving the country^, 1 August 1935, in MZW T, 301-304. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 1 8 niezhon^.” In the struggle against the Japanese invaders, “the interests of a certain class must be subordinated to the interests of the entire ninzu... because the ninztis interest includes the interest of each class within society.”3 4 In other words, “in a struggle that is national in character,” Mao stated in 1938, “the class struggle takes the form of national struggle, which demonstrates the identity between the two.”3 5 In order to withstand the onslaught of Japanese imperialism, Mao and the Chinese Communists stressed the importance of fostering a new “national consciousness” (ninzu yishi) that would bind the sentiment of all nationalities and classes into a single national identity. The Japanese, as Mao pointed out in a June 1938 lecture, were not only physically plundering China but also “robbing the Chinese people (Zhonggtomi) of their national consciousness,” forcing them to become nothing but “docile subjects, beasts of burden forbidden to have the least bit of Chinese national spirit. (Zhonggtoqi)” % Mao’ s appeal for the “education of a new generation in the national spirit” dovetailed closely with Chiang Kai-shek’s “national spiritual mobilization” movement, as both parities attempted to shore up Chinese morale and unity in the face of repeated Japanese advances. In the minds of Mao and Chiang alike, the desperate struggle for survival seemed to require the development of a new, collective sense of identity, one that would transcend both national and class divisions and unite all Chinese in a single composite and indivisible Zhon$tua ninzu. 3 4 “Miuzu tongyixian de jiben yuance” (The fundamental principle of the national united front), 20 November 1936, va.MZWT’ . 525. 3 5 Mao Zedong, “The Question of Independence and Initiative within the United Front,” 5 November 1936, in Selected W oks cfMao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1964), 2:215 (Hereafter cited as SIP). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 319 Unlike the Nationalist Party, this new emphasis on Chinese national identity presented Mao and other self-professed proletarian internationalists with a unique problem. By calling for the urgent preservation of the “Chinese state and race,” Mao presupposed the existence of a distinct and peculiar Chinese “people” (verm in), “nation” (ninzu) and “culture” (w znhua) worthy of protection and preservation. The Chinese Communists, however, like Communists the world over, were supposedly committed to the cause of trans-national class revolution, and not the preservation of a single national culture or people. Marx, after all, had taught that scientific, cultural and universal “laws” rather than the peculiarities of a single national identity guide historical development. While nearly everyone within the Party accepted the need for anti-Japanese resistance, some of Mao’ s colleagues— especially the so-called “28 Bolsheviks” or “Return Students” who were educated in Moscow under Pavel Mif— felt uncomfortable with Mao’ s blatant use of nationalist rhetoric. They feared not only his growing hegemony within the Party but also his attempt to undermine the ideological foundation of the Party. In order to bridge this contradiction and consolidate his power within the Party, Mao drew on the theories of his personal secretary, Chen Boda, and others concerning the need to “sinify” (Zhangpchua) Marxism. In his excellent study, TheEmzrgnszcf Maoism, Raymond Wylie demonstrates how Mao used the “sinification” of Marxism to simultaneously strike a blow to the theoretical authority of the 28 Bolsheviks (especially his main rival Wang Ming), while also shedding Marxism’ s tag as an “alien ideology,” 3 6 Mao Zedong, “On a Protracted War,” June 1938, in S W ,2 :113-94. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 2 0 insufficient for the revolutionary needs of the Chinese people. Mao and Chen Boda criticized the “formalism” and dogmatism” of the 28 Bolsheviks, arguing that they ignored China’ s unique cultural traditions in their application of Marxist theory, and called instead for the creation of a new strain of Marxism particular to China and its national form.3 7 The Party’ s 6th Plenum in October 1938 (the first since 1934) served as the venue for Mao’ s bid for ideological preeminence within the CCP. In his long, three-day report before the Central Committee, Mao boldly declared: There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we refer to as concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in China’ s concrete environment, and not applied abstractly.”3 8 Mao put forward Marxism as a methodology rather than a rigid dogma. In other words, this scientific and universal methodology, like any ideological formula, had to be applied within a specific context. Just as Lenin and Stalin had adapted this methodology to fit with the specific conditions of the Russian revolution, it was the responsibility of the Chinese Communists to do the same for their national revolution. In China, Mao argued, Marxism was a meaningless and empty set of concepts and principles unless applied to the individual characteristics and historical conditions of the Chinese nation and people. “For the Chinese Communists who are part of the great 2hon$>ua ninzu— 3 7 Raymond F. Wylie, The Emergme <f M adsm Mao Tse-tung Ch’ en Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory, 1935-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980). 3 8 Gted in Wylie, The EnergnoecfMaoism, 90. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 321 flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood— any talk about Marxism in isolation from China’ s characteristics is merely Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum.”3 9 The sinification of Marxism, Mao was quick to point out to his detractors within Party, did not mean however the abandonment of the scientific truths of Marxism- Leninism. In his important 1940 tract “On New Democracy,” Mao Zedong set out to demonstrate how in applying Marxism to China: Chinese Communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truths of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula.4 0 China’ s struggle, in other words, was more than just another indiscriminate bourgeois- democratic revolution against the faceless forces of feudalism and imperialism; rather it was the culmination of the historic struggle of Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese revolutionaries to build a “new society and new state for the Zhon^jua rrirtztT free from British, American, Japanese and Russian hegemony. Similarly, the goal was not the implementation of a formless, international proletarian culture but rather the building of a new “national culture” [ninzu mrhua) that “belongs to our own ninzu and bears its national characteristics.”4 1 In short, Mao appealed for the creation of what Stalin himself had termed “socialism in one country.” 3 9 Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo gongchandang zai minzu zhanzheng zhong de diwei” (The position of the Chinese Communist Party-within the national struggle), October 1938, in M ZW T, 603; For an English translation see SW, 2:209. 4 0 Mao Zedong, “Xinminzhuzhuyi lun” (On New Democracy, January 1940, in M ZW T, 641; For an English translation see SW, 2:339-384. 4 1 Ibid., 633 & 640. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 2 2 When it came to applying universal truths of Marxist theory to the concrete praxis of China's own national question, Mao stressed the need— above all else— for national unity. The protection of the “fatherland” (z & g w o ) required the “unity of the Xhon^m ninzu to jointly resist the Japanese.” Because of their strategic location along the front lines of the “War of Resistance” and the Japanese plot to splinter Chinese unity by inciting racial and ethnic discord, the national minorities had a special responsibility to unite with the Han majority in defending the fatherland. Towards this aim, Mao outlined a new, indigenous nationality policy for the Party in his report before the Party’ s 6th Plenum. First, under the principle of jointly opposing the Japanese, the Mongols, Hui, Tibetans, Miao and other national minorities shall enjoy “equal rights” (pvngkngquadi) with the Han majority, namely “the right to manage their own affairs” {ziji g n rii ziji shim zUquan) while uniting at the same time with the Han nationality in establishing a unified state (tongyi de guqia)” * 2 Mao outlined a series of vague and general proposals for the maintenance of minority autonomy. In all areas where the national minorities lived intermixed with the Han, the government must establish a special political committee comprised of minority leaders, which will be responsible for advising the local and provincial governments on policies affecting the national minorities. Mao also called for the respect of each nationality’ s culture, religion and customs. Not only should the state prevent the forced study of the Han language, it should also support the minorities in developing a cultural education that utilizes their own written and spoken languages. Finally, Mao encouraged the Han majority to adopt 4 2 Mao Zedong, “Lun xin jieduan” (On a new stage), 12-14 October 1938, in M ZW T, 595. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 323 an attitude of equality when dealing with the minorities, in order to combat “Han chauvinism” ( Dahamhuyi) and foster greater intimacy and friendship among the various nationalities of the Chinese nation.4 3 Mao’ s new nationality policy represented a clear departure from the earlier Comintem-iiispired programme. The Leninist principle of “national self- determination,” with its explicit right of political secession, had been removed and replaced with the more enigmatic promise of the “right to manage one’ s own affairs.” Gone too was the previous aim of minority “ national liberation,” which was now supplanted by the goal of “uniting all the [Zhonghua] ninzu into a single body in order to jointly resist the Japanese invaders.” Finally, the Party no longer spoke of the eventual creation of a “Zhonghua Federated Republic” following the individual liberation of all frontier nationalities, but rather the immediate and urgent establishment of a “unified state” to combat Japanese imperialism. In short, the dissolution of the Comintern and the sinification of Marxism provided the “ideological breathing room” the Chinese Communist Party needed to develop its own nationality policy— one that took into consideration the “special characteristics” of Chinese cultural, ethnic and political unity. The Northwest Work Gomnittee& the Development c f the Maoist Nationality Policy Apart from supplying a new ideological framework and broad policy principles, Mao left the details of working out how China’ s “specific conditions” should affect the Party’ s nationality policy to a group of trusted cadres. Immediately following the 6th 4 3 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 2 4 Plenum, the Central Committee created several regional work committees to better coordinate its work outside the central Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. With authority over all Party activities in the frontier regions of Sha’anxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Mongolia, the new “Northwest Work Committee” {Xibei gwigzm 'imymnhiu) (NWQ assumed responsibility for developing Party policy towards the large Hui and Mongol communities bordering the Shaan-Gan-NIng Border Region. Zhang Wentian, a veteran Return Student and Party secretary-general since siding with Mao at the 1935 Zunyi Conference, was named head of the new Committee, with daily operations and the Committee’s national minority work handed over to Li Weihan. Since jointly establishing the New People’ s Study Society (Xim rin xuehui) in Changsha around 1918, Mao and his fellow Hunan native Li Weihan had been close friends. Unlike Mao, however, Li’ s experience studying overseas in France lead to his rapid rise through the Party hierarchy, becoming a Politburo and Secretariat member in 1927. Li’ s time at the top was brief. At the Party’s 6th Congress in 1928, he was accused of botching the Nanchang Uprising and was removed from the Politburo; three years later at the Party’ s 4th Plenum, Li was also stripped of his position on the Central Committee after being accused by Pavel Mif and the 28 Bolsheviks as a supporter of the “Li Lisan line.” Li’ s fortune reversed however during the Long March. After siding with Mao at the Zunyi Conference, Li Weihan rode Mao’ s coattails back into power, becoming first the director of the Party’s powerful Organization Department and then the chancellor of the Central Party School in Yan’an.4 4 4 4 See entry on Li Weihan in Donald Klein and Anne B. Clark, comp., BiograpfmdDktkmry cf R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 2 5 In order to more systematically analyze the peculiarities of the Chinese national question, the NWC established a “National Question Research Office” (Minzu isenti ymjiushi) in early 1940.4 5 Li Weihan selected twenty-eight year-old Jiangxi native Liu Chun as the director of the Office. After joining the Party in 1936, Liu Chun studied under Li at the Central Party School and then worked for him in the Organization Department. Despite his early training as an instructor at Shanghai’ s Mongolian and Tibetan Academy, Liu appeared to have had few qualifications for the important task handed to him.4 6 Yet, his familiarity with minority issues and Li Weihan’s mastery of the Russian language and Bolshevik theory combined to create the intellectual fountainhead from which the new nationality policy of China flowed. Before its reorganization as a part of the Central Committee’s Northwest Bureau in April 1941, the NWC and its National Question Research Office published a series of in-depth articles examining the unique conditions of China’ s national question. The Committee also presented two important policy outlines on the Hui and Mongol questions to the Central Committee in 1940. In addition to receiving Central Party approval and thus becoming the foundation of Yan’an era nationality policy, these two position papers were selected by Chinese Ccmmrnsm, 1921-1965 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 1:534-40. 4 5 On the NWC and the National Quesdon Research Office see Li Weihan, “Zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui he shaoshu minzu gongzuo” (The Central Committee’s Northwest Work Committee and National Minority Work), in Huiyiyu Yanjiu (Research and Reninkeems) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1986), 2:451-59. 4 6 On Liu Chun see the short biography in preface to Liu Chun, Minzu Wend Wenji {CollectedEssays cntheNadonal Question) (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 1996), 1-2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 2 6 Mao for inclusion in the collection of Party documents which served as the ideological basis for the Party’ s 1942 Rectification Campaign.4 7 The interconnected destiny of all “Chinese nationalities” {Z h a ^o n in zu s or Zhon^mt ninzti) became one of the central themes of the NWCs articles and policy papers. Claiming that all nationalities within China suffered equally from Japanese subjugation, Li Weihan and Liu Chun argued that the “fate” {ningyuri) of all these nationalities hinges upon their joint resistance and eventual defeat of Japanese imperialism. “If the Hui nationality splits and isolates itself from other nationalities rather than uniting to resist the Japanese and joindy establish a unified state,” the NWCs 1941 pamphlet on the “Huihui Question” argued, “they will contravene their own national interest and only benefit the Japanese invaders in destroying China and the Hui nationality.”4 8 This belief in the common national interests of all Chinese nationalities led the Committee to conclude in its Central Committee policy paper that “the destiny of the Hui nationality is the same as the entire Zhcn^yua ninzu,”4 9 As one might suspect, the destiny of the Mongolian nationality was no different. A similar pamphlet drafted by Liu Chun on the “Mongolian Question” stated that “the fate of the 4 7 See Li, “Zhongyang xibei gongzuo ■weiyuanhui he shaoshu minzu gongzuo,” 2:455. The collection of documents was entitledDaliu Yilai {Since the 6* Party Congress). According to Liu Chun, Mao personally read and made some revisions to both documents before stating that he “agreed with its principles” and having the Party Secretariat distribute it among Central Committee members for their approval. See Liu, Minzu Wend Wenji, 296 & 307. 4 8 Minzu wenti yanjiushi, ed., “Huihui Minzu Wenti” (The Hui Nationality Question), 15 April 1941, in M ZW T, 910. According to M ZW T the pamphlet was first published on 15 April 1941, yet both the version in M ZW T and the one published by the Nationalities Publishing Bureau in 1980 are based on a 4 October 1946 reprint published by the CCP’ s Southern Shandong Hui Advancement Society. 4 9 “Zhonggong zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui guanyu Huihui minzu wenti de tigang” (The policy outline of the Northwest Work Cbmmittee’s on the Hui nationality question), April 1940, in MZW T, 652. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 2 7 Mongolian nationality cannot be separated from the fate of all Chinese nationalities.” Liu contended that since the Japanese invasion, it had become “impossible for the Mongolian nationality to lead their own independent existence, depart from the general direction of the Chinese liberation, and leave the common road of all Chinese nationalities towards liberation.”5 0 This congruent destiny, however, did not mean that all Chinese nationalities were equally endowed with the ability to act out their fate. Just as the peculiar conditions of the Chinese revolution bonded the various nationalities together, the “special characteristics” of the frontier minorities prevented them from pursuing their own national liberation without the assistance of their Han “elder brother” nationality. In the NWCs Mongolian policy outline, for example, the Mongolian people’ s cultural dependence on Lamaism, political disunity and “extremely complex and unequal” socioeconomic structure were listed as those “special characteristics” {ted iar i) which determined their historical “backwardness” (luohou). Consequently, the NWC reached the paternalistic conclusion: Based on the above conditions, the Mongols lack confidence in their own future and feel that there is no solution to their problems, resulting in a dispirited and dependent nature. These conditions also help to explain why the liberation of the Mongolian people must receive the assistance of an outside revolutionary force. Mongolian liberation must be conjoined with the Chinese revolution in order to succeed.5 1 5 0 Minzu wenti yanjiushi, ed., Mengzu Minzu Wend (TheMongi Nationality Question), 1941?, (Reprint Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 1993): 29-30. Liu Chun drafted this pamphlet sometime during early 1941, but for reasons that are not exactly clear, the manuscript was not printed until 1946 when it was published by the Inner Mongolian Printing Press in Zhangjiakou. 5 1 “Zhonggong zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui guanyu kangzhan zhong Menggu minzu wenti dgang” (The policy outline of the Northwest Work Committee on the Mongolian nationality question during the War of Resistance), July 1940, in M ZW T, 659. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 328 The burden of impelling the Mongols, Hui and other “backwards nationalities” (kuhau ninzu) towards their own liberation fell upon the shoulders of China’s most advanced nationality, or what Li Weihan and Liu Chun labeled the “Han ruling nationality” (tongzhi ninzu deHanzu). Furthermore, as the Han nationality’ s most progressive class, the proletariat and its political party the Communist Party assumed ultimate responsibility for propelling the reluctant minorities towards their own national liberation5 2 In its analysis, the NWC pointed to the revolutionary immaturity and inchoate national consciousness of the ethnic minorities in explaining their apparent apathy towards the Japanese invaders, arguing that only the advanced Han proletarian class (read here the Chinese Communist Party) could spur the toiling masses of the Mongol, Hui and other minorities into action. In short, like Sun Yat-sen’s discourse of ninzmhuyi, the NWCs own theory of the “Han man’ s burden” denied the minorities revolutionary agency of their own. As one might suspect, the Leninist principle of national self-determination was deemed no longer relevant to the special revolutionary situation of collective “Chinese” subjugation and destiny. As early as 1937, the Party Center suggested that the Japanese invasion required a temporary postponement of the right of minority self- determination. An internal directive on “The Principle of Independence and Self-rule among the National Minorities,” for example, stated: We should indicate to the Mongolian people that the special steppe region north of the Great Wall shall be handed back to their administration following the victory of the Mongolian liberation; however, under the present period of 5 2 Minzu wenti yanjiushi, Menggt Minzu Wenti, 27; Luo Mai [Li Weihan], “Huihui wenti yanjiu” (Research on the Huihui question), 16 June 1940, in M ZW T, 851. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 329 Japanese, KMT and warlord control and extermination in Mongolia, the handing over [of authority] is not beneficial to any of the Mongolian and Han classes.5 3 The significance of this new revolutionary situation was made even more explicit in the work of Li Weihan and Liu Chun. In an important article on the “Huihui Question,” published in the 16 June 1940 issue of the Party's theoretical journal Jiefang \L iberatiori\, Li Weihan admitted that the right of national self-determinadon was a fundamental component of the Bolshevik solution to the national question. He also acknowledged that this included the prerogative to break away from China and establish one’ s own independent state. Quoting however from Stalin’ s 1913 tract M arxismard the National Question, Li argued that: “this is not to say that under any condition should they act in this way, nor is this to say that at every time and in every situation it is advantageous for a nationality to rule itself or split away.”5 4 Under the special “historical condition” of Japanese occupation, it was only advantageous for the Han and Hui to unite together with all the other national minorities in resolutely resisting the imperialist invaders. “After all,” Li Weihan rationalized, “under the condition of Japan’ s wide-scale invasion of China, doesn’ t the recognition of the Huihui’ s right to national self-determination visibly assist the Japanese imperialists in their plot to split apart the Ihon^m t ninzuZ” ' * 5 It was not until the publication of Mao Zedong’ s 1940 essay “On New Democracy,” however, that the Chinese Communists made a firm theoretical break with 5 3 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shaoshu minzu duli zizhu de yuanze de zhishi” (Party Center directive on The Principle of Independence and Self-rule among the National Minorities), 1937, in M ZWT, 579. 5 4 Luo, “Huihui wenti yanjiu,” 852. 3 3 Ibid., 851. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 3 0 the Leninist concept of national seh-determination. Sensing that China’ s wartime conditions were insufficient to nullify the “scientific” and “universally accepted” Marxist principle of national self- determination or fearing perhaps the revival of the principle following the defeat of Japan, Mao scoured the writings of Stalin and Lenin for some textual authority demonstrating its inappropriateness to the Chinese revolution. He found his “evidence,” ironically, in an obscure 1920’ s debate between Stalin and the Yugoslav Communist Semich Markovic, which had been included by chance in the heretofore little known work of the Chinese translator Zhang Zhongshi, entitled Stalin on the National Question [Sidalin lun ninzu wenti].5 6 Drawing on Lenin’ s ideas on national and colonial questions, Mao argued that the “historical peculiarities” of the Chinese revolution divided into two distinct stages: a democratic and socialist phase. The aim of the first stage, whose unique Chinese variant Mao termed “New Democracy,” was the initiation of a bourgeois-democratic revolution aimed at overthrowing foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism while also establishing an independent, democratic Chinese society. Only after the victory of the first revolution could China proceed to the next stage of a proletarian-socialist revolution.5 7 With this important point established, Mao moved onto the right of national self-determination and the debate between Stalin and Markovic. In the early 1920s, Markovic and other right-wing members of the Yugoslav Communist Party repeatedly ignored Comintern directives and refused to afford the Croats, Macedonians 5 6 On the debate between Markovic and Stalin see Walker Connor’ s chapter on the Yugoslav Communist Party in Connor, The National Question, 128-171, especially pp. 131-141. 5 7 Mao, “Xinminzhuyi lun,” in M ZW T, 633-36. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 331 and other ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia the right of national self-determination. Gting Stalin’s argument in Marxismand the National Question that the national question was a “struggle of the bourgeois classes amongst themselves” under the condition of “rising capitalism,” Markovic argued that the principle did not apply to the current struggle of the proletarian class in Yugoslavia. Ironically, in Stalin’s 1925 article criticizing Markovic’s understanding of the right of national self-determination, Mao discovered the evidence he needed to prove its irrelevance to China: But my [1913] pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists’ fundamental demand for the right of national self- determination was not yet regarded as part of the proletarian revolution but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, tr ansformed, the national question fkm a p a rt c f the bour^m-demxratk reuiutim into a pan (fthepnhetarianrsodalist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article, “The Discussion of Self Determination Summed Up”, Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right of national self- determination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution.5 8 Having already established the fact that China’ s revolution was “fundamentally bourgeois-democratic in its social character,” Mao’ s inference was clear: if the Chinese Gommunists were to grant their ethnic minorities the right of national self- determination, they would be guilty (like Markovic) of, in the words of Stalin, “ignoring the fact that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another 5 8 Ibid., 636-7. The translation is adapted from SW , 2:346. For the original text see J.V. Stalin, “The National Question Once Again: Re Comrade Semich’s Article,” 30 June 1925, in Marxismand Natioml, Colonial Question (New York: International Publishers, 1947), 222-29. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 3 2 historical situation”5 9 The right of national self- determination might apply to the second stage of the Chinese revolution, but it was certainly irrelevant to this current struggle. The emphasis on the congruent nature of minority-Han liberation was reflected in two subtle, but important, changes within the Party’ s national question discourse. First, the Communists began employing, for the first time, the neologism Zhon^jua ninzu (Zhonghua nation/race). This brilliantly ambiguous term, which was originally popularized in Sun Yat-sen’ s principle of ninzuzhuyi, served as a powerful conjugate for the imaged unity of all Chinese nationalities into a single composite and indivisible nation-state. First used by Mao in his November 1935 declaration calling for an anti- Japanese national salvation movement, the term Zhongjwa ninzu— along with others such as “the five Zhonghua nationalities” (Zhan$jua wezu), “the Zhonghua fatherland” (Zhon^rua zugpd) and the “mighty Zhonghua nation” {mda de Zhon$m ninzu!)— became a regular part of the Party’ s discourse throughout the Yan’an period.6 0 If the Communists were troubled by the similarity of their use of the term Zhon^pm ninzu with the “reactionary” Kuomintang’ s “one race” theory, it was not reflected in their popular propaganda. Second, Li Weihan, Liu Chun and other CCP nationality experts began 5 9 Ibid., 637. 6 0 See, for example, “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhongyang zhengfu, Zhongguo gongnong hongjun geming junshi weiyuanhui kangri jiuguo xuanyan” (Declaration of the Military Affairs Committee of the Chinese Worker-Peasant-Solider Revolutionary Army and the Central Government of the Zhonghua Soviet Republic on a anti-Japanese national salvation movement), 28 November 1935, in M ZW T, 320; “Zhonghua suweiai zhongyang zhengfu dui Huizu renmin de xuanyan” (The declaration of the Central Government of the Zhonghua Soviet to the people of the Hui nationality), 25 May 1936, in M ZW T, 366; Yang Song, “Lun minzu” (On rrinzii), 1 August 1938, in M ZW T, 766; “Zhonggong zhongyang wei gongbu guogong hezuo xuanyan” (Declaration of the Party Center calling for a KMT- CCP united front), 17 July 1937, in M ZW T, 548. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 333 speaking about China’ s “internal national question” (gpond ninzu wsnti).a By redefining the henceforth universally applicable “national question” as an “internal” Chinese question, the Chinese Communists were attempting to de-link their handling of the problem from Bolshevik and Comintern policy. In fact, the Party’ s adoption of the term “internal national question,” much like its subtle replacement of the Leninist term “small and weak nations” (ruaxiao ninzii) with the less ambiguous appellation “national minority” (shaoshu ninzu) during the late 1920’ s and early 1930’ s, marked a conscious effort to place the problem of ethnic identity securely under the framework of a larger “Chinese” nationalism. In other words, the Party hoped to recast the national liberation struggles of the various frontier minorities against Han colonial oppression as the struggle of a single Zhon^jua ninzu to overthrow “foreign” imperialism and “domestic” feudalism while establishing a free and united “Chinese” state. The objective of the new Maoist nationality policy was the mobilization of all minority classes (especially the so-called “upper strata”) under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Towards this end, the Party drew on the united front tactic in implementing a new policy of limited regional autonomy for the frontier minorities. In a speech before the Party’ s 6th Plenum, Zhang Wentian stressed the importance of placing work among the minority upper strata at the “core” of the Party’ s nationality work. While working to educate and train minority youths, the Party should also “do 6 1 See Minzu wenti yanjiushi, “Huihui Minzu Wenti,” 913; Minzu wenti yanjiushi, Menggi Minzu Wenti., 29. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 3 4 everything humanly possible” to win over their internal traitors and reactionaries.6 2 All Party work among the frontier people, Zhang stressed, must begin with the upper strata. “In carrying out our united front work,” a Central Party directive on work among the Mongols of Suiyuan province stated, “regardless if it is among the Mongols or the Han, we must give an important position to our work among the upper strata; for unless we handle our work among the upper strata correctly, our work among the lower strata will not develop.”6 3 The further extension of the united front tactic beyond its expedient uses during the Long March produced some concrete policy changes. Take, for example, the Party’ s attitude towards the Inner Mongolian nationalist Prince De (De Wang). In the past, the Party, like their KMT rivals, held an extremely critical view of De Wang and his Inner Mongolian autonomous movement. Following De Wang’ s open collaboration with the Japanese in April 1936, both political parties branded him a “national traitor,” with the CCP claiming that “De Wang and those who have organized the Inner Mongolian independence movement have little relation to the Inner Mongolian people’ s genuine independent liberation In a July 1936 article, Politburo member Wang Jiaxiang singled out De Wang as one of the biggest Japanese collaborators, declaring his so-called “Independent Mongolian Government” a mere puppet administration of the 6 2 Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian], “Guanyu kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian yu dang de zuzhi wenti” (On the problem of Party organization and the anti-Japanese united front), 15 October 1938, in MZWT, 605- 6. 6 3 “Guanyu Sui-Meng gongzuo de jueding” (Decision on our work among the Mongols of Suiyuan Province), 22 November 1938, in MZW T, 612-3. 6 4 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Neimeng gongzuo de zhishixin” (Central Party directive on Inner Mongolian work), 24 August 1936, in MZWT, 416. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 3 5 Japanese imperialists.6 5 Yet, in another article written the same month, Liu Xiao warned that De Wang still possessed a good deal of support among the Suiyuan Mongols. Drawing on his research among the Inner Mongolian masses, Liu warned that the Party needed to take the problem of De Wang’ s appeal among ordinary Mongols seriously if it hoped to re-direct their loyalty back towards China and the Communist Party.6 6 The revolutionary situation changed, however, following the successful defense of Suiyuan province and the partial defeat of De Wang’ s Japanese trained and supplied cavalry during the winter of 1936-37. Citing a “rising tide” in the struggle to win over the Mongolian people, the Party sensed a new opportunity to pull De Wang and his follows over to the side of the Chinese revolution. In a July 1937 directive on Mongolian work, De Wang was recast as a Mongolian nationalist who possessed “a relatively strong national consciousness against Han chauvinist oppression.” His support for the Japanese was described as conditional and wavering following the Suiyuan defeat; thus the Party should adopt a new policy aimed at “winning over De Wang” and establishing a patriotic united front with the Mongolian upper strata. Towards this aim, the directive called for the previous slogan of “Strike Down the Mongolian traitor De Wang” to be altered to “SeekDe Wang’ s Resistance of the Japanese.”6 7 6 5 Wang Jiaxiang, “Fandui Riben diguozhuyi zhanling Neimeng” (Oppose the Japanese imperialist occupation of Inner Mongolia), 22 July 1936, in M ZW T, 506. 6 6 [Liu Xiao], “Liu Xiao tongzhi dui Menggu gongzuo de yijian” (The ideas of Comrade Liu Xiao towards Mongolian work), July 1936, in MZW T, 511-13. 6 7 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Menggu gongzuo de zhishixin,” 545-47. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 3 6 In its analysis of the Mongolian question, Li Weihan’ s NWC placed the blame for Mongolian collaboration firmly upon the Han chauvinist policies of the Kuoxnintang. Chiang Kai-shek’ s failure to take De Wang’ s earnest request for Inner Mongolian autonomy seriously “forcefully shoved the Mongols into the bosom of the Japanese invaders,”6 8 Rather than consenting traitors, De Wang and his followers were described as “accomplices under duress” (xiecong). Optimistic about the prospects for winning over the Mongolian upper strata, the NWC called for a broad united front comprising “all anti-Japanese personal— regardless of their class, party affiliation, religion, and beliefs and irrespective of whether they are princes, lamas or common folk.”6 9 The Party replaced its previous call for internal class struggle with a new plea for Mongolian unity, claiming that “its internal conflict— like all disputes among the nationalities— should be settled according to the principle that ‘brothers that quarrel at home should join forces against an attacker from without’.”7 0 The policy of “regional autonomy” (difartgzizhi) was central to the Northwest Committee’ s plan for unifying the Mongols and other frontier minorities under the leadership of the Communist Party. In granting the minorities limited regional autonomy, the Party hoped to win them over to the side of the Communists by ensuring their political, economic and cultural equality with the Han majority. Take, again, the example of Inner Mongolia. In the spirit of Mao’ s 6th Plenum speech, the NWC proposed the creation of a Mongolian local government and anti-Japanese base 68 See “Zhonggong zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui guanyu kangzhan zhong Menggu minzu wenti tigang, 663; Minzu wenti yanjiushi, Menggu Minzu Wend, 38. 69 Minzu wenti yanjiushi, Menggu Minzu Wenti, 57. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 3 7 area within the nomadic regions already under Japanese occupation. In the non occupied sedentary areas, where the Mongols lived closely intermixed with Han migrant-farmers, provincial administrations should set up a special committee of Mongolian leaders to manage all Mongolian affairs and their interaction with the Han people. In accordance with Mao’ s new principle of “the tight to manage one’ s own affairs,” provincial and county administrations were not to interfere with the Mongolian people’ s political, economic and cultural affairs, and in particular, the Han chauvinist policy of establishing counties and forcefully occupying Mongolian pastureland was to cease immediately. Finally, according to the principle of “voluntarism and acting on one’ s own” (ziyw nyuzizhu), the Party was to assist the Mongols in carrying out democratic reforms— such as land reclamation, the abolition of exorbitant taxes and levies, and the reduction of rent and interest rates— in order to improve Mongolian livelihood.7 1 To more effectively mobilize the Mongols in support of the Chinese Communist Party and its struggle against Japanese imperialism, the NWC called for the creation of Mongolian militias, mass organizations and training academies. The Red Army’ s limited contact with the Mongols made the first task difficult. Yet, according to Mongolian scholar Hao Weimin, the Red Army did set up a “Mongolian Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force” {Menggt kan^youjuhd) within the Daqingshan region of the Suiyuan- Sha’ anxi border. This small group of Mongols is credited with raising supplies; winning 70 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Menggu gongzuo de zhishixin,” 545. 71 See “Zhonggong zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui guanyu kangzhan zhong Menggu minzu wenti tigang,” 664-67. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 338 over Mongolian collaborators; and protecting Parly organizations behind enemy lies in Suiyuan and Chahar provinces.7 2 In order to promote and reform the Mongolian culture and language, the Party set up the “Mongolian Cultural Advancement Society" (Menggi ' W E r h m adjmhm) in Yan’an during the spring of 1940. Over a thousand Mongolian and Han delegates are reported to have gathered for its opening Congress, where Mongolian intellectual Ai Siqi called for an “enlightenment movement” using popular Mongolian cultural forms. Two of the Society’ s biggest achievements, according to executive council member Li Weihan, were the establishment of a Genghis Khan Memorial and Mongolian Cultural Exhibit in Yan’ an.7 3 The Party’ s most important avenue in mobilizing the Mongols and other nationalities came in the area of education. Building on the national minority classes created by Li Weihan at the Yan’ an Party School in 1939, the Party established the “Nationalities Institute” (Minzu xueyuari) during the summer of 1941. During its first year over 200 minorities, representing seven different nationalities, enrolled in the Institute’ s three departments (Hui, Tibetan and Mongolian). By the summer of 1942, enrolment had grown to 300 students (40% Mongol, 20% Hui and 40% others), creating a valuable store of minority cadres for the Party to draw on in implementing its nationality policy.7 4 The Chinese Communist Party’ s break with the Bolshevik nationality policy represented an unabashed return to the 1924 ninzuzhuyi platform of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Unlike the nationality program originally prescribed by the Comintern, with its 7 2 Hao, Ndrmnggi Ckninghi, 391-2. 7 3 Li, “Zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui he shaoshu minzu gongzuo” 2:462-64. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 339 emphasized on class struggle, minority political secession and the eventual creation of a Federated Zhonghua State, the CCP’ s new policy of “national equality and autonomy” {ninzu pingkng zizh i) remained consistent with the Reorganization Manifesto of the Kuomintang’s 1s t National Congress. Mao declared in his 6th Plenum report that there was basically no incompatibility between Marxism-Leninism and the “revolutionary three people’s principles” reinterpreted by Sun Yat-sen during the last years of his life.7 5 Mao went a step further in his 1940 essay “On Democracy,” claiming that the revolutionary three people’s principle were “what China needs today” and that the Chinese Communist Party was “ready to fight for their complete realization,” because they were “basically similar to the Communist political programme for the stage of democratic revolution in China.”7 6 The Party’s desire to moderate its political programme in the hope of encouraging the Nationalist Party and its allies to join them in an anti-Japanese united front is one possible interpretation of this return to the political discourse of Sun Yat- sen. As I have argued earlier, the GCP’ s nationality policy must be viewed within the context of its struggle with the Nationalist Party and other political organizations in China for the patriotic legitimacy to speak on behalf of the entire Chinese nation. At the same time, however, I would argue that the Party's attitude towards the frontier minorities never differed significantly from those of Sun Yat-sen. Like Sun’ s discourse of rrinzuzfacy., the ultimate aim of the Party’s nationality policy was the equitable fusion 7 4 On the Nationality Institute see both Hao, Neimenggi Genir^hi, 387-89 and Li “Zhongyang xibei gongzuo weiyuanhui he shaoshu minzu gongzuo,” 2: 459-61. 7 5 Mao, “Lun xin jieduan,” 227. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 4 0 of all Chinese rrinzu into a strong, independent, and most importantly, ethnically unified, Zhon^mt rrinzu. At times during its development, the Party was not in a position— either due to its reliance on Comintern ideological and financial support or the need to highlight its differences with the reactionary Kuomintang— to fully articulate Sun’ s principle of ninzuzhuyb, yet, the anti-Japanese united front and Mao’ s sinification of Marxism-Leninism presented a new opportunity for the Party’s return to the discourse of rrinzuzhuyi. It was within the context of Sun’ s “ revolutionary three people’s principles” that Mao Zedong carefully re-introduced the concept of national self-determination. In his report before the 7th Party Congress in April 1945, Mao repeated the formal pledge of the Kuomintang 1s t National Congress to recognize “the right of all rrinzu in China to self-determination and the organization of a free and united Zhonghua Republic (upon the voluntary union of all nationalities) as soon as the revolution achieves victory over the imperialists and warlords.” “The Chinese Communist Party,” Mao continued, “is in complete agreement with the nationality policy stated by Mr. Sun above.”7 7 By resurrecting the principle of national self- determination, the Party could simultaneously avoid the appearance of having reneged on a former promise while promoting its nationality programme as more progressive than the Kuomintang’s reactionary Han chauvinism, and the true inheritor of the revolutionary mantle of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 7 6 Mao, “Xinminzhuzhuyi lun,” 638. 7 7 Mao, “Lun lianhe zhengfu,” 3:1084. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 341 To avoid any confusion over the Party’s renewed usage of the term, Zhou Enlai lectured Party members on the proper interpretation of Sun’s revoluuonary discourse. Speaking at a Yan’an ceremony marking the 19th anniversary of Sun’s death, Zhou went through Sun’ s Reorganization Manifesto line byline to ensure that Party members understood its “revolutionary meaning.” The “equality of all nationalities within China,” for example, meant “providing complete equal treatment to the Mongols, Hui and other nationalities in China and recognizing their right to autonomy.” With regards to the more controversial pledge of national self-determination, Zhou interpreted it to mean, first, the recognition of the existence of the Han, Hui, Tibetan, Mongol and other nationalities “within the confines of the Chinese people or the Zhon$rua rrinztT; and second, the “acceptance that in accordance with the principle of national self- determination, only by uniting together without distinction, can we ‘organize a free and united Zhonghua Republic (upon the voluntary union of all nationalities)’ .”7 8 In other words, the concept of self-determination represented nothing more than the equitable union of all Chinese nationalities in the formation of a free and united Zhonghua state. It was the national self- determination of the entire Zhon$rua rrinzu that represented the ultimate aim of both Sun Yat-sen’ s discourse of rrinzuzhyi and the Communist Party’ s nationality policy. Maoist Nationality Policy in the Postmr E ra At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, it would have been difficult for the Communists to claim that their so-called Zhonghua Soviet Republic was 7 8 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu xianzheng yu tuanjie wenti” (On the question of constitutional R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 342 truly a multi- ethnic nation-state. According to their own estimates in 1941, no more than 2000 minorities lived within the borders of Shaan- Gan-Ning Border Region while other Soviets had even fewer.7 9 Mao’ s new ethnic minority policy, it is fair to say, remained largely untested and limited to the realm of theory throughout the Yan’ an period. This changed, however, with the collapse of the Japanese Empire, and the renewed struggle between the KMT and CCP for control over the extensive frontier regions of the former Qing dynasty. This section focuses on the successful, yet fitful, implementation of the Maoist nationality policy in eastern Inner Mongolia following the Japanese surrender. For the first time, the Communists came face to face with a well-organized secessionist movement located along the rear flank of their vulnerable positions in Manchuria. In sharp contrast to the failed efforts of the Kuomintang Central Government, which was continually hindered by the frontier warlords in implementing its policy of self-rule, the Communists were able to gradual infiltrate and then incorporate the Eastern Mongols under CCP control. The key to their success was tight Party organization, Lenin’ s united front tactic and a sincere promise of regional autonomy. By granting the Eastern Mongols’ desire for autonomy and uniting all “patriotic classes” under firm Party control, the Communists were able to gradually isolate those elements intent on freeing the Mongolian people from Han authority while rallying the vast majority of the people government and unity), 12 March 1944, m M ZW T, 730-1. 7 9 “Shaan-gan-ning bianqu zhengfu minzu shiwu weiyuanhui xiang erceng bianqu canyihui baogao yu jianyishu” (The report and suggestions of the Shaan- Gan-Ning Border Government’ s Nationalities Affairs Committee before the border region’s 2n d Consultative Congress), November 1941, in MZWT, 941. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 343 against the Kuomintang reactionaries. On the Inner Mongolian steppe, at least, the Maoist minority policy proved the importance of the national question over the class question in the CCP’ s rise to power. Manchuria, with its rich industrial infrastructure and 700,000 heavily armed Kwantung Army soldiers waiting to surrender, quickly transformed into ground zero of the post-war GCP-KMT struggle. With the assistance of the United States Air Force, hundreds of thousands of Chiang Kai-shek’s best troops were transported into the region, while elements of the Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies marched into Manchuria under the protection of Russian and Outer Mongolian troops which had occupied Northern China as a part of the Yalta Agreement. Mao and the CCP Party Center were quick to realize the “strategic importance” of the Inner Mongolia steppe in the impending battle for Manchuria. The steppe represented not only the vulnerable rear flank of Communist positions in Manchuria, but also a valuable direct link with their Soviet and Outer Mongolian allies to the North. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, Kuomintang warlord Fu Zuoyi began marching his large army eastward from his base in Suiyuan province, threatening to occupy all of Inner Mongolia and isolate the Communists in Manchuria. The Communists had a potential ally in the Mongols who viewed Fu Zuoyi as their archenemy having suffered under his oppressive, Han chauvinist regime throughout the war years. Thus, for the Communists a solution to the “Inner Mongolian question,” namely how to place its ethnic population under Party control, became fundamental for their hopes of securing a revolutionary base area in Manchuria while strengthening the Red Army for a future R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 4 4 bid for national power.8 0 As such, Inner Mongolia became the first proving ground for the Party’ s newly crafted nationality policy. The cornerstone of the Party’ s strategy for solving the Mongolian question was the implementation of “territorial autonomy” {cpqu zizhi) on the Mongolian steppe. Using the existing political framework of the Mongolian banners and leagues, the Party called for the initiation of individual “local autonomous movements” (phfangzizhi y m dan^ within the banners and leagues, which would lead to the establishment of several autonomous governments under CCP control. In the purely nomadic regions, as Mao and the Northwest Committee had dictated, these governments were to be organized solely by the Mongols; while in the multi-ethnic sedentary regions, Han- Mongol coalition governments were to be established.8 1 The Party handed the crucial task of overseeing the implementation of this policy to the veteran Inner Mongolian cadre, Yun Ze, who was better known in the post-1949 era by his Mongolian name Ulanfu.8 2 Bom into an acculturated Turned Mongol family, Yun Ze joined the Chinese Communist Party during the 1920’ s when Li Dazhao and other early Communists recruited him from amongst the student body of the Mongolian- Tibetan Academy in Beijing. Yun Ze’s revolutionary credentials were beyond reproach. In addition to having 8 0 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Neimeng gongzuo fangzhen gei Jin-Cha-Ji zhongyangju de zhishi” (GCP Central Party directive to the Jin-Cha-Ji Bureau concerning Inner Mongolian work principles), 23 October 1945, mMZWT, 964; Hao, Nemvnggi Gemmghi, 436-7. 8 1 Ibid., 964-65. 8 2 See Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican Cbim, 3:349-53 and Min Yang, “Wulunfu shilue” (A biographical sketch of Ulanfu), Thon^ngyar^iu 8.9 (10 September 1974): 99- 106. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 345 studied at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, he also played a leading role in the Comintern-backed Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement of the 1920s and 1930s. Yet, it was his years of service as an instructor at the Nationalities Institute in Yan’an and active participation in the Rectification Campaign that molded him into the type of loyal party cadre Mao fully trusted with the future direction of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement. While Yun Ze’ s years of work in the region lent both him and the CCP instant credibility among Mongolian progressives and youths, his allegiances remained solidly with Mao and the Party Center. Yun Ze was deeply committed to the pursuit of Inner Mongolian liberation and self-rule, yet only within the framework of a unified, multi-ethnic Chinese state under CCP control. Following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Party Center’ s initial focus of attention was, ironically, on the activities of the supposedly friendly Mongolian People’ s Republic (MPR) troops rather than the advancing armies of Fu Zuoyi and Chiang Kai-shek. Pan-Mongolian sentiments— temporarily suppressed under Japanese occupation— quickly resurfaced following the region’ s liberation at the hands of their northern brethren. Rather than looking towards China for assistance, Inner Mongolian progressives called for re-unification with the MPR, and seemed, initially at least, to receive encouragement from the occupying Outer Mongolian army and Choibalsang’ s regime in Ulan Bator.8 3 The first of these irredentist movements that came to the attention of Yun Ze and the CCP was located in the West Siinid homeland of De Wang. 8 3 Christopher Atwood, “Sino-Soviet Diplomacy and the Second Partition of Mongolia, 1945-46,” in M ongiia in t he Twent i et h Cent ury Landl ocked Cosrmpdi t an, eds. Stephan Kotkin and Bruce A . Elleman (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 146. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 4 6 While De Wang was in Chongqing meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and appealing for KMT support for Inner Mongolian self-rule, his personal secretary, Buyandalai, was looking elsewhere for assistance. With the support of a small group of progressives, Buyandalai set up the “Provisional Government of the Republic of Inner Mongolia,” and sent a mission to Ulan Bator seeking military and financial support for the region’ s independence from Chinese hegemony and continued encroachment on Mongolian pastureland. Yun Ze and his Mongolian associates rushed to the region, where they attempted to persuade the activists that Inner Mongolian independence was not presently in the interest of the Mongolian people. The region’s destiny, they argued, lay with China and not Outer Mongolia or the Soviet Union. Several weeks of persuasion and lecturing on the Party’s nationalities policy met with litde success until word came from Ulan Bator that Choibalsang— apparently under pressure from Stalin— was now claiming that Outer Mongolia was not in a position to assist them. “Outer Mongolia, due to reasons of international relations, cannot assist Inner Mongolia in splitting from China and establishing its own independent state,” Choibalsang is reported to have told the Inner Mongol representatives, “thus, at present, all the political parties in Inner Mongolia should unite together with the Chinese Communists and seek their national liberation under the leadership of the CCP.”8 4 Denied MPR backing and desperately short of food and other supplies, the Mongolian youths finally agreed to throw their lot 8 4 “Chaheer ge mengzu jinkuang ji Cha-Xi liang meng de gongzuo jingguo” (Recent conditions in the banners and leagues of Chahar and the course of our work in Chahar and Silinghol Leagues), 27 October 1945, 'mMZWT, 966-71. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 4 7 in with the Chinese Communists and followed Yun Ze back to his Zhangjiakou headquarters in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. There they joined other Western Mongolian parties recently brought under CCP control.8 5 In the wake of Yun Ze’ s success in West Siinid, Yun Ze received approval from the Party Center for the creation of a new political organization aimed at more effectively organizing and controlling this disparate group of Mongolian activists “in the spirit of an extensive united front.”8 6 The founding congress of the “Federation of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movements” (Nebrmg zizhi ymdang liarhehid) (FIMAM) opened in Zhangjiakou on 29 November 1945 with a mere 79 delegates claiming to represent the nearly two million Inner Mongolian people. Yun Ze was selected chairman and the executive committee was stacked full of loyal Mongol and Kan party cadres.8 7 In an interview with the Jin-Cha-Ji Daily on the eve of the Federation’ s establishment, Yun Ze claimed that the recent creation of the Chahar and Silinghol autonomous league governments was merely the first step towards the eventual creation of a single, unified Inner Mongolian autonomous government.8 8 Yun Ze hoped to use the Federation and the party’ s united front policy as a base for slowly and carefully 8 5 Christopher Atwood, “The East Mongolian Revolution and Chinese Communism,” M angiian St udi es 15 (1992): 58-59. 8 6 “Zhonggong Jin-Cha-Ji zhongyangju guanyu chengli Neimeng zizhi yundong lianhehui de baogao” (GCP Jin-Cha-Ji Bureau report concerning the establishment of the Alliance of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movements), 8 November 1945, in MZWT, 974. 8 7 On the founding of FIMAM see Atwood, “The East Mongolian Revolution,” 60. 8 8 “Sui-Meng zhengfu zhuxi Yun Ze tan Neimeng zizhi wenti” (Chairman of the Suiyuan Mongolian Government Yun Ze talks about the question of Inner Mongolian autonom}), 16 November 1945, in N eitm ggi Z izhi YundongL iarhdm : D angin Shiliao Xm nbian (The Federation of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movements: A Selection of Historical Archival Materials), comp. Neimenggu zizhi yundong lianhehui dang’ an shiliao (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1989), 8-11 (Hereafter cited as NZYL). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 4 8 building up party authority within the Mongolian banners, and then, after CCP control had been assured, reorganizing these various autonomous governments into a single, unified Inner Mongolia government. Signaling a more cautious note, Party leaders working among the Han migrant farmers of the sedentary regions of Inner Mongolia warned that before a unified government could be formed, the Party must first raise the economic and cultural level of the Mongolian nomads. In the meantime, FIM AJNTs autonomous governments must accept the leadership of the Han-dominated Rehol, Chahar and Suiyuan provincial governments.8 9 It appears that the Communists, initially at least, encountered the same tension as the Kuomintang Central Government did between Han provincial administrators and the Inner Mongolian activists. Yet the OCP’ s superior organization skills and tight Party discipline ensured that these problems were dealt with quickly and effective before they threatened to undermine overall Party policy. The E astern Mongiian Question: The Triumph cfthe United. Front Tactic While Yun Ze and the Chinese Communist Party were organizing the rag-tag activists and youths of Western Mongolia, a political storm was brewing in Eastern Mongolia that would severely challenge the Party’ s united front tactic and nationality policy. Between 16-20 January 1946, more than 2000 Mongolian delegates from the four Xing’ an Autonomous Provinces, which comprised part of the former Japanese puppet- 8 9 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi chengli Neimeng zizhi yundong lianhehui fu Jin-Cha-Ji zhongyangju dian” (GCP Party Center reply cable to the Jin-Cha-Ji Bureau agreeing to the establishment of FIMAN), 10 November 1945, mMZWT, 976; “Muqian duiNeimenggu zhengce de jige yaodian” (Several important points about our current policy in Inner Mongolia), 23 November 1945, in MZWT, 981. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 4 9 state of Manchukuo, gathered in the region’ s administrative capital Wang-un Siime to declare the establishment of the “Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government” (EMAG).9 0 This well-organized political movement was led by a group of seasoned Xing’an administrators, revolutionary youths and progressive intellectuals who claimed to have inherited the revolutionary mantle of the old Comintern-backed “People’ s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia” (Neimsnggi spring mrindang) (PRPIM). Many of these activists— including Buyanmandukhu, the new head of the government, and Khafungga, the PRPIM party secretary— had participated alongside Yun Ze at the First Congress of the PRPIM in October 1925.9 1 Following PRPIM’ s dissolution by the Comintern in 1931, Khafungga and other Eastern Mongolian revolutionaries joined the Japanese puppet government in Xing’ an where they operated a MPR-backed espionage ring throughout the war years. Following Japan’ s defeat, they resurrected the PRPIM and declared their intention to re-unite Eastern Mongolia with the Mongolian People’ s Republic. The Eastern Mongolian revolutionaries closely identified their struggle with the Outer Mongolian revolutionary movement of the 1920’ s, and felt that the common struggle of the Chinese and Mongolian people against feudal and imperialist oppression should be led by ethnically distinct revolutionary parties. Yet, when Buyanmandukhu and Khafungga returned from Ulan Bator with the same disappointing message Choibalsang had delivered to the West Siinid activists, PRPIM decided to set up their 9 0 See Atwood, “The East Mongolian Revolution,” 45 and passim. 9 1 On PRPIM and its founding see Nozu Akira, “Neimenggu chihua yundong de bianqian” (The vicissitudes of the Inner Mongolian red movement), March 1942, in N eitm igziio Jindai shi Yi cong ( Col l ect i on c f Transl at ed M at eri al s on Modem Inner M ongiian H istor^, trans. into Chinese by Jin Hai and ed. Neimenggu daxue (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1986), 1:118-20; Hao, Ndrmrt gcu G enirghi, 118-24. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 0 own “autonomous” Eastern Mongolian state under the nominal suzerainty of China- hoping that a future re-alignment of the international political scene would permit re unification with Outer Mongolia. Despite Ghoibalsang’ s appeal for the Eastern Mongols to unite under the leadership of the Chinese Communists, the delegates who gathered at Wang-un Siime for the founding EMAG Congress remained wary of renewed Chinese encroachment on the steppe.9 2 To protect themselves from the Han frontiersmen, the “Autonomous Law” passed by the Congress outlined a programme of dtfado political, cultural and economic independence from China. The Congress’ Manifesto justified the creation of the new government in terms of the principle of national self-determination and self- rule adopted by the First Congress of the Kuomintang, the Atlantic Charter and the new United Nations’ mandate for the protection of small and weak nationalities from foreign aggression. To safeguard their autonomy, the new government created a 2000- strong cavalry armed with the latest Soviet and Japanese weaponry. Realizing at the same time, however, that the new government could not survive without the establishment of amiable relations with China, it dispatched two separate diplomatic missions to meet with the Communists and Nationalists parties. Sensing perhaps that the loyalties of the new government did not lie firmly with the “Chinese” revolution, the CCP Party Center reacted unfavorably to news of the Eastern Mongolian government’ s formation. In a late December 1945 directive it 9 2 Qn the first EMAG Congress see Zhang Ce, “Guanyu dongmenggu diqu (xing’ an) de gongzuo qingkuang he jingyan” (Concerning the experience and conditions of our work in the Eastern Mongolian R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 351 warned that “the Mongols in Western Manchuria and Rehol have a very bad attitude towards us,” and called on the entire Red Army to adopt an “extremely cautious policy” towards the Mongols while bringing an immediate end to any attacks on the Mongolian upper strata.9 3 The concern of the Party Center appears to have been twofold: First, the new regime’ s Pan-Mongolian sentiment and clear alignment with the MPR threatened the unity of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Despite Choibalsang’ s refusal of assistance, the EMAG Manifesto still declared its willingness to accept direction from the Soviet Union and enter into the Outer Mongolian People’ s Republic. In early meetings with the CCP, Eastern Mongolian officials rejected Choibalsang’ s advice to place themselves under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, claiming this would “strip them of their autonomy.”9 4 Second, news of the EMAG Congress created quite a stir within the Chinese media, threatening to derail the US-brokered KMT-CCP peace talks. The KMT-controlled media painted the new government as a tool of “red imperialism,” and in a “Circular Telegram Opposing Xing’an Independence,” a group of leading KMT officials from the Northwest claimed that the CCP was once again attempting to “split up the country.”9 5 Its growing concern over the nature of the EMAG caused the Party Center to issue a second, even stronger, internal directive in (Xing’ an) region), 15 September 1946, in MZWT, 1315-6; Atwood, “The Eastern Mongolian Revolution,” 46-7. 9 3 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dui Mengzu zhengce wenti gei Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng, Li Fuchun, Cheng Zihua deng tongzhi de zhishi” (CCP Party Center directive to Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng, Li Fuchun, Cheng Zihua and other comrades about the problem of our policy towards the Mongolian nationality), 25 December 1945, mMZWT, 984. 9 4 “Dongbei kangri lianhejun zhihai budui diqishi guanyu Neimeng qingkuang xiang Dongbeiju de baogao” (The report of the 7th Battalion of the Manchurian Anti-Japanese United Army to the CCP’s Manchurian Bureau about the conditions in Inner Mongolia), 29 January 1946, in MZWT, 996-97. 9 5 Hao, N drrm giii Get ri mghi , 497. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 2 February condemning the political programme of the PRPIM as “excessively left” and in need of correction. The Party Center was particularly troubled by its use of the slogan “independent self-determination” (ddi zijufy and called on Party cadres to “urge them to alter their principles” in the hope of exposing the baseless KMT rumors about Communist support for Eastern Mongolian independence.9 6 During early 1946, a consensus clearly did not exist, however, among CCP leaders on the revolutionary nature and potential of the Eastern Mongolian government. The powerful Manchurian Bureau of the CCP, for example, held a much more positive appraisal of the new regime. The Bureau, established in early autumn 1945 with Peng Zhen as its secretary and Lin Biao as deputy secretary and commander-in-chief of Communist forces in Manchuria, functioned as the Party’s cbfacto military and political headquarters in the Northeast.9 7 In late December 1945, PRPIM representatives met with Manchurian Bureau standing committee member Li Fuchun at a Harbin labor conference, where they discussed possible cooperation between the CCP and the EMAG. Two months later, Manchurian Bureau Secretary Peng Zhen alleged that the PRPIM was beginning to lean towards China and the CCP. After reviewing several drafts of the resolutions passed at the EMAG’ s January Congress, he declared them to be “basically correct,” and noted particularly the new government’ s acceptance of 9 6 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Neimeng minzu wenti yingqu shenzhong taidu de zhishidian” (CCP Party Center telegram directive concerning the need to adopt a cautious attitude towards the Inner Mongolian national question), 18 February 1946, mMZWT, 1000. 9 7 On the Manchurian Bureau and the CCP’ s organizational structure in the region see Steven I. Levine, A m il <f V ictory The Conwumst R eidutim in Manchuri a, 1945-1948 (New York Colombia University Press, 1987), 107-109. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 353 Chinese “suzerainty’ ( : zongzhu).9 8 In a separate directive, Peng Zhen went a step further in declaring that “currently the autonomous movement of the Eastern Mongolian people is fundamentally under our influence and its over 2000 strong militia (which is under the leadership of the Mongolian youths) is willing to accept our command.”9 9 As a gesture of good will, Peng Zhen urged the Party Center to accept the PRPIM proposal for the return to Mongol control of those parts of Xing’an Province currently under the Peng Zhen and others within the Manchurian Bureau were more optimisdc than the Party Center about the revolutionary and patriotic potential of the PRPIM and its Eastern Mongolian government. In an internal Manchurian Bureau document, for example, which was written most likely by Peng Zhen or his administrative assistant Lti Zhencao, the Bureau called for a “broad Mongolian united front” that would unite all Mongolian people, including the upper strata vacillationists, under the leadership of the progressive Mongolian youths, whom it now claimed represented the core of the PRPIM1 0 0 It also referred to the PRPIM as the “vanguard of the Mongolian people” and argued that “it cannot help but shoulder its historical responsibility to liberate the Inner Mongolian people from Han chauvinism and foreign imperialism. In short, Peng 9 8 “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju guanyu Menggu wenti gei zhongyang de baogao” (CCP Manchurian Bureau report to the Party Center concerning the Mongolian question), 20 February 1946, in MZWT, 1002-3. 9 9 [Peng Zhen and Lu Zhengcao], “Peng Zhen, Lu Zhengcao guanyu dongmeng zizhi fanwei wenti xiang zhongyang qingshi” (Peng Zhen and Lu Zhengcao request for instructions from the Party Center concerning the scope of the Eastern Mongolian autonomous movement), 20 February 1946, in MZWT, 1004. 1 0 0 “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju guanyu dongmeng gongzuo fangzhen de yijian” (CCP’s Manchurian Bureau’ s ideas about principles for party work in Eastern Mongolia), 17 April 1946?, in MZWT, 1042-43. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 4 Zhen was confident that the Mongolian people and their own political party, the PRPIM, were sufficient to lead Inner Mongolia towards national liberation, and thus did not require the direct leadership of the Han- dominated CCP. To some within the Party, it appeared that Peng Zhen was attempting to expand the united front tactic beyond its original Maoist scope, transforming a class coalition into a national alliance between two ethnically distinct political parties. Unlike Peng Zhen, Mao and the Party Center worried that the Inner Mongolian revolution could potentially be lead astray (namely in the direction of Outer Mongolia) if it was not placed under the firm CCP control. In a 24 February directive issued to the Manchurian Bureau, the Party Center argued: After having studied the proclamations and actions of the East Mongolian Autonomous Government, we believe that under today’ s entire national and international situation the establishment of an autonomous, republic-style government remains excessively left (gjazuodfy. It runs counter to the interests of the Mongolian nationality, the Chinese people and the foreign affairs of the Soviet Union and the MPR, and can only provide an excuse for the reactionary, anti-Soviet, anti-CCP faction to manufacture the fear of narrow nationalism among the Chinese people.1 0 1 The Party Center repeated its call for the development of “local autonomous movements” and the creation of individual Inner Mongolian “autonomous regions” (zizhiqu) under the direct administrative supervision of the provincial governments. In the eyes of the Party Center, the EMAG’ s adoption of a separate currency, flag and other trappings of an independent, republican-style government threatened to 1 0 1 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu buyi chengli dongmeng renmin zizhi zhengfu gei Dongbeiju de zhishi” (GCP Party Center’ s directive to the Manchurian Bureau about the inappropiiateness of establishing an Eastern Mongolian Autonomous People’s Government), 24 February 1946, in MZWT, 1011. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 5 undermine Chinese territorial and revolutionary unity. More to the Party Center’ s concern, the directive argued that unless the region was placed firmly CCP control in the form of the liberated (and Han-dominated) provincial governments to the South, the success, and more importantly direction, of the Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement could not be ensured. The Party Center called on the Manchurian Bureau to explain these principles to the PRPIM while urging them to reform their ways. Finally, it warned that if they continued to “adopt these types of methods” and “issue these type of declarations,” “we will not have anything to do with them.”1 0 2 In its criticism of the PRPIM, Mao and the Party Center received strong support from Han party cadres stationed in the provinces bordering the new Mongolian government. Rather than echoing the Party Center’ s concern about the PRPIM’ s “excessively left” political programme, however, these cadres redirected attention to the “rightist” class background of its leaders. Hu Xikui, the party secretary of the CCP’ s Rehol Provincial Committee, contended in early March that EMAG leaders were all former officials within the Japanese puppet governments of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Instead of inheriting the progressive legacy of the early Inner Mongolian revolutionary movement, EMAG leaders were pursuing the “rightist policies of the Mongolian traitors Bai Yundi, De Wang and Li Shouxin.”1 0 3 Hu Xikui argued that the regime’ s proposal for extending its control over northern Liaoning and Rehol provinces was “unreasonable” given that the Han, and not the Mongols, represented a majority in 1 0 2 Ibid. 1 0 3 [Hu Xikui], “Hu Xikui guanyu dongmeng wenti ziliao ji yijian” (Hu Xikui’ s materials and opinion on the Eastern Mongolian Question), 3 March 1946, in MZWT: 1013-4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 6 these completely sedentary regions. Finally, Hu Xikui called on the Party Center to dispatch Yun Ze to the region so that he could personally assume leadership and control of the autonomous movement of Eastern Mongolia. In a similar vain, the Party’ s Ji-Re-Liao Sub-Bureau declared its “complete agreement” -with the Party Center’s February 24th directive, asserting that the EMAG was run by a group of “upper strata bureaucrats” who did not represent the “real interest of the Mongolian people.”1 0 4 As evidence, the Bureau claimed that the new regime was blocking the CCP’ s “settling- accounts campaign,” which aimed at mobilizing the Mongolian and Han masses against the feudal and imperial oppression suffered during the Japanese occupation. Highlighting the lack of consensus within the Party on the Eastern Mongolian question, Hu Xikui and the Ji-Re-Liao Sub-Bureau both called for the immediate adoption of a “unified set of principles” for dealing with the EMAG. The strong support Mao and the Party Center received from Han provincial cadres— most falling under the direct administrative authority of the Manchurian Bureau— appeared to have contributed to a split within the leadership of the Manchurian Bureau. By the time the Party Center decided to dispatch Yun Ze to the region in early March, it was still waiting to hear from Peng Zhen and other Manchurian Bureau leaders on the controversy, urging the Bureau to “quickly send its ideas [on the Eastern Mongolian question] to the Party Center.”1 0 5 Around the same time, Li Fuchun 1 0 4 “Zhonggong zhongyang Ji-Re-Liao fenju guanyu Rehol Menggu gongzuo wenti gei zhongyagn de baogao” (The report of the CCP’ s Ji-Re-Liao Sub-Bureau to the Party Center concerning Mongolian work in Rehol Province), 7 March 1946, in MZWT, 1021-22. 105 “Zhonggong zhongyang dui dongmeng wenti de zhishi” (Directive of the CCP Party Center on the Eastern Mongolian question), 10 March 1946, mMZWT, 1023. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 7 cabled Peng Zhen and Manchurian military commander Lin Biao for assistance in instructing the Bureau’s field officers, who were continuing their work with the PRPIM, to hand over all authority to Yun Ze.1 0 6 In late March, the silence broke when Lin Biao openly split with Peng Zheris support for PRPIM and the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government. In a 21 March cable to the Party Center, Lin Biao stressed that while a consensus still failed to exist among Party leaders in the Northwest he was personally opposed to Peng Zhen’ s policy of working with the “Mongolian upper strata” (ie. the PRPIM): I believe that the principle of only winning over the upper strata and only carrying out an independent autonomous movement is inappropriate. Presently, this type of autonomy is actuallycausing the Mongols to adopt a closed-door and isolationist attitude towards us, while at the same time, providing the KMT with an excuse [for attacking us]. Only winning over the upper strata and not working with the lower strata will cause us to lose both. The upper stratum is a feudal force; we already have enough experience within our Bureau to prove this. Working with them has produced nothing, while our work among the lower strata has produced results. Thus, my view towards the Mongolian movement is that orally we do not oppose their autonomous movement but adopt a perfunctory manner in our dealings with the upper strata, while paying careful attention to our mass work among the lower strata.1 0 7 Lin Biao’ s criticism of Peng Zhen’ s Eastern Mongolian policy coincided with a larger split between the party veterans on the appropriate revolutionary strategy for the Northwest. At the important Meihekou Conference of Manchurian Bureau leadership in February 1946, Lin Biao blamed Peng Zhen’ s conservative united front strategy for the 1 0 6 [Li Fuchun and Huang Kecheng], “Li Fuchun, Huang Kecheng guangyu dongmeng zizhi wenti ge Peng Zhen bing zhongyang de baogao” (Report of Li Fuchun and Huang Kecheng to Peng Zhen and the Party Center concerning the Eastern Mongolian autonomous question), 6 March 1946, 'mMZWT, 1020. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 8 recent series of military defeats suffered at the hands of the Nationalist armies. Lin called for an intensification of the Party’ s land policy in order to mobilize the Han peasant in the struggle against the KMT reactionaries.1 0 8 Faced with renewed KMT attacks and the festering Eastern Mongolian question, the Party Center moved quickly to resolve the leadership crisis. In June, Lin Biao was ordered to replace Peng Zhen as secretary-general of the Manchurian Bureau while retaining his position as commander- in-chief of all Communist forces in the Northwest.1 0 9 With the Party Center now firmly behind him, Lin Biao convened an expanded conference of the Manchurian Bureau in early July to criticize Peng Zhen’ s “rightist mistakes.” The Bureau’ s so-called “7 July Directive” contended, among other things, that class rather than national contradictions were of primary importance in the Party’s current struggle against the KMT reactionaries.1 1 0 The leadership change in the Northeast produced a noticeable shift in the Party’ s handling of the Eastern Mongolian question. Lin Biao stressed the importance of class struggle in solving the national question, abandoning the united front, which he claimed was an expedient revolutionary tactic suited only to the War of Resistance period. Lin believed that the mobilization of the Mongol and Han masses was the key to 1 0 7 [Lin Biao], “Lin Biao guanyu Menggu wenti zhengce de yijian” (Lin Biao’s ideas on the question of Mongolian polfc}), 21 March 1946, in MZWT, 1032. 1 0 8 On the Meihekou Conference and the dispute between Lin Biao and Peng Zhen see Levine, A m il c f Vi ct ory, 96-99. 1 0 9 Liu Tong, Dongbei Jifang Zhanzhengjishi (A Record c f the Northeast Liberation War ) (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1997), 208. 1 1 0 Ding Zhaochun et al, ed., Dongbei Jifang ZhanzhengDashi j i { Chr onol ogy f the Nort heast Li berat i on War) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987), 69-70. For a copy of the “July 7th Directive” see Chen Yun, “Dongbei xingshi he renwu” (The Situation and Tasks in Manchuria), in Chen Yun We r r xuan {Sel ect Col l ect i on c f Chen Yuris Work) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 1:307-313. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 5 9 revolutionary success in the postwar era and refused to treat Inner Mongolia as an exception due to the so-called “special conditions” of its people. In order to redirect Party work among the Mongolian nationality, the Manchurian Bureau organized a series of Inner Mongolian work conferences during the summer of 1946. As the official report from an eight-day meeting held in the Jermin League of Eastern Mongolia demonstrates, the shortcomings of Peng Zhen’ s Inner Mongolian policy was the focus of these meetings. In particular, Peng’ s policy of cooperation with the PRPIM and the encouragement of a broad, anti-KMT united front was criticized for its “rightist tendencies.”1 1 1 According to the Jermin League report, the primary manifestations of these rightist tendencies were in the Party’s handling of the “question of revolutionary essence” and the “question of the core revolutionary force and leadership” in the Inner Mongolian liberation movement. On the first question, party cadres were criticized for their failure to realize that the current revolutionary situation differed from that of the War of Resistance. Under the slogan “expand the Mongolian united front so that the princes and nobles can participate,” party cadres “only stressed special national characteristics {rrinzu tediarz ), national peculiarities {rrinzu teshuxin^ and the fear of national estrangement {rrinzugah?), while overlooking the class basis of Eastern Mongolian autonomy, paid insufficient attention to the reactionary nature of its landlord class and harbored illusions [about its 1 1 1 “Dui guoqu Menggu gongzuo de jiantao yi jinhou gongzuo fangzhen, renwu de baogao” (Report criticizing past Mongolian work and outlining future work principles and responsibilities), 31 July 1946, in MZWT, 1305-1312. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 36 0 revolutionary potential].”1 1 2 Echoing previous criticism about the class background of PRPIM leaders, the reported labeled the Eastern Mongolian leadership as members of the “pro-KMT landlord and feudal prince class.” In their Mongolian work Party cadres were instructed to replace the Yan’ an era policy of uniting all the Mongolian classes in a broad, anti-imperialism united front with an intensification of class struggle and land redistribution. With regard to the question of revolutionary leadership, Peng Zhen was criticized for failing to recognize that the Han and Mongol toiling masses and their single political party, the Chinese Communist Party, represented the core leadership of the entire “Chinese” revolutionary movement. In short, the Han dominated-CCP rather than the Mongolian PRPIM must be in firm control of the Inner Mongolian liberation movement. “Prior to the maturation of our work among the Mongolian masses (chiefly the workers, peasants and nomads),” the report stated, “an excessive emphasis upon the slogan ‘ the Mongols do their own work’ only hinders and limits the leadership role of the Party in its Mongolian work.” Under Lin Biao’ s leadership, the Manchurian Bureau called for the “vigorous recognition that only by destroying feudal forces can we realize ninzu equality; the contradiction between the Mongolian and Han nationalities is not a problem of the Han and Mongolian people, but rather a product of the ruling class’ attempt to consolidate its rule.”1 1 3 The national question, in other words, was fundamentally a question of class. 1 1 2 Ibid., 1306. 1 1 3 Ibid., 1312. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 361 Yet, -within a few short months, Lin Biao’ s new policy proved disastrous. Around the same time that Lin Biao took full control of party and military activities in the Northeast, the KMT-GCP peace talks collapsed and the Nationalist armies launched a major offensive against CCP position in the Northeast. As Chiang Kai-shek’s American armed and trained troops drove the Communists from the towns and cities along the Mukden-Harbin railway corridor, the Red Army was forced to carryout a “strategic retreat” over the Sungari River into the Heilongjiang forest and westward onto the Eastern Mongolian steppe. In marked contrast to the years the Party spent nurturing itself among the Chinese peasants, the Communists received little support from the Han and Mongolian masses of Eastern Mongolia. Lin Biao’s aggressive land policy had thrown the entire region into chaos, leading to what one Manchurian Bureau official termed a “grave” economic and political situation.1 1 4 Rather than uniting the Han and Mongolian masses against their common feudal oppressors, the Bureau’ s land policy caused thousands of Mongols (princes and nomads alike) to flee northward into the territory of the EMAG, severely disrupting the frontier economy and causing ill will towards the Communists. Other Mongols openly joined forces with Nationalists where they assisted the KMT in rooting out and attacking the Communists. Yun Ze, in assigning blame for this disaster, accused the Manchurian Bureau of incorrecdy handling the national question. In a sharply worded report, written under the 1 1 4 “Zhonggong zhongyang ximan fenju guanyu Menggu gongzuo de buchong zhishi” (Supplemental directive of the West Manchuria Sub-Bureau on Mongolian work), 21 September 1946, in MZWT, 1073. Also see “Zhonggong Liao-Ji shengwei guanyu Mengqu gongzuo de yijian” (Ideas of the Liaoning-Jilin Provincial Party Committee on work in the Mongolian region), 15 September 1946, in MZWT, 1072. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 2 designation of the Jin-Cha-Ji Bureau, Yun Ze criticized the “residual Han chauvinist thought” of party cadres working in the Northeast. He provided three concrete examples of this reactionary thought: First, the failure to recognize the primacy of the national question over the class question in the sedentary and semi-nomadic regions of Inner Mongolia. The chief desire of the Mongolian people was not land re-distribution but rather the cessation of Han migration and administrative control over the Mongolian pastureland. Second, the misguided belief that the Party's work on the steppe should proceed along the same lines as its work in purely Han areas, and the failure to significantly appreciate the backwardness and special characteristics of Mongolian society. Finally, the false opinion that, due to their backwardness, the Mongols were incapable of managing their own affairs. Yun Ze concluded that “these phenomena are serious and must be overcome,” and called for an intensification of party education to correct these dangerous and reactionary attitudes.1 1 5 In another 1 August report to the Party Center, Yun Ze offering a concrete alternative to Lin Biao’ s disastrous land policy. He called for the implementation of a three-point plan that would take into consideration the varying economic conditions of the Mongolian steppe. In the sedentary zone of Han migration, Yun Ze called for a cautious program of land redistribution with, importantly, the ultimate goal of “preserving Mongolian land ownership,” while arguing that “in the nomadic regions, land redistribution should not 1 1 5 “Zhonggong Jin-Cha-Ji zhongyangju guangyu Menggu gongzuo de zongjie” (CCP Jin-Cha-Ji Bureau’ s summary of Mongolian Work), 1946?, in MZWT, 1087-92. The original document was not dated but the editors of M ZW T believe it was written in either April 1946 or perhaps sometime after May 1946. From my reading of the material, it would appear that Yun Ze wrote this document during the summer of 1946. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 3 be carried out nor should it generally be carried out in the semi-nomadic regions.” Finally, Yun Ze called for the return of all the public lands— such as forests, mines, and pastureland— to the public use of the Mongolian people.1 1 6 Attempting to reverse the damage of Lin Biao’ s policy, Mao and the Party Center sent a circular directive to each Party bureau and sub-bureau backing Yun Ze’ s land policy. This 10 August directive stated that “it is currently inappropriate to carry out land redistribution in the nomadic and semi-nomadic region, while in sedentary areas— besides redistributing the land of those guilty of the most heinous crimes against the Mongolian and Han people— it is not in our interest to touch the land of the Mongolian landlords.”1 1 7 Accepting the failure of their previous policy, Lin Biao’ s Manchurian Bureau and Li Fuchun’ s Western Manchurian Sub-Bureau issued their own directives calling for the “correction and prevention of leftist tendencies,” admitting that due to the existence of a strong Mongolian national consciousness— forged through years of Han chauvinist oppression— the policy of forced land redistribution had backfired. Arguing that “our party’ s policy in the Han liberated areas cannot be mechanically applied [to the Mongolian areas],” Li Fuchun stressed that the Party “must pay close attention to special national characteristics and make every effort to overcome national estrangement; otherwise, our Mongolian work will meet with difficulties, setbacks and even temporary loses.” Both bureaus called for an immediate end to land 1 1 6 [Yun Ze], “Yun Ze guanyu Neimeng tudi he zizhi wenti gei zhongyang de baogao” (Yun Ze’ s report to the Party Center on the question the land and autonomy question in Inner Mongolia,” 1 August 1946, in MZWT, 1057-8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 4 redistribution among the Mongolian landlords and the implementation of “a revolutionary reformist policy” of rent and interest rate reduction in order to improve the livelihood of the Mongolian people. “Currently, in the Mongolian areas, our goal is not the elimination of feudal oppression,” Li Fuchun argued, “but rather its weakening.” Yun Ze’s moderate land policy was coupled with a return to the Party’ s united front strategy. Quoting from Peng Zhen’ s previous directive calling for the establishment of a broad united front among all Mongolian classes, Li Fuchun now declared that “experience has proven this principle correct.” The failure of Lin Biao’ s revolutionary experiment in Eastern Mongolia forced the Party to realize that under the current revolutionary situation the national question must take precedence over the class question. The tension between the national and class questions continued however throughout the Civil War period. During the summer of 1948 and then again in 1949, Party leaders issued new directives warning against “excessive leftism” in the implementation of the Party’ s land policy in the national minority regions.1 1 8 In explaining and justifying this apparently unrevolutionary policy, Party leaders stressed that this: 1 1 7 “Zhongyang guanyu Menggu tudi wenti gei Yun Ze, fenju, zhongyangju dian” (Party Center cable to Yun Ze, all Party Bureaus and Sub-Bureaus concerning the Mongolian land question), 10 August 1946, in NZYL, 106. 1 1 8 See “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju guanyu shixing zhongyang tugai yu zhengdang zhishi jihua xiang zhongyang de baogao” (Report of the OCP’ s Manchurian Bureau to the Party Center concerning its plan to issue a directive calling for the implementation of the Party Center land reform and party rectification policy), 23 June 1948, in MZWT, 1139; “Zhonggong zhongyang xibeiju zhi erfenqu ji yidong gongwei dian” (Cable from the CCP’ s Northeast to the Second Area and East Ikhchao League work committees), 18 July 1949, in MZWT, 1249. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 5 ... certainly does not mean that land reform in Inner Mongolia will never be carried out. After the thorough defeat of the Han chauvinist rule of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang, the [Inner Mongolian] Autonomous Government, under the leadership of our Party, will adopt the necessary measures and education to increase the basis of Han and Mongolian unity, and then when enough Mongols take up farming and desire their own land, our implementation of land reform will meet with success and support among the Mongolian people.1 1 9 As one would expect, the tension between the national and class questions did not disappear with revolutionary success in 1949. This inherent contradiction helps to explain, at least partially, the radical shifts in the PRCs national minority policy during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and its subsequent reversal following the death of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’ s reform movement.1 2 0 The later half of 1946 witnessed a return to Peng Zhen’s moderate policies in Eastern Mongolia and a renewed emphasis on the construction of a broad Han- Mongolian revolutionary alliance including all patriotic classes and revolutionary interest groups. Yet the Party Center continued to resist the previous attempts of Peng Zhen to hand autonomous political authority over to the PRPIM, forming of a truly national united front. Mao had always maintained that the success of the united front strategy hinged on firm Party control over all revolutionary alliances. By preserving its autonomous authority and dominance over all minority political organs, the Party hoped to isolate and then liquidate (with force if necessary) their enemies, while gradually winning over the vast majority of the people. Yun Ze’ s Federation of Inner Mongolian 1 1 9 “Zhonggong zhongyang xibeiju dui yimeng dangqian zhengce wenti de zhishi” (CCP Northeast Bureau directive concerning the question of current policy in Ikhchao League), 19 November 1948, in MZWT, 1202. 1 2 0 Dreyer, C bim ’ s Forty M il l i on. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 6 Autonomous Movements (FIMAM) was handed responsibility for implementing the Party’ s united front tactic in Eastern Mongolia and bring the PRPIM directly under CCP control. Shortly after arriving in Eastern Mongolian with a team of Mongolian Party cadres, Yun Ze convinced PRPIM leaders to sit down with him in Chengde to discuss the EMAG’ s future relations with the GOP. During an intense series of closed-door meetings between 30 March and 3 April 1946, Yun Ze successfully employed a carrot- and-stick method to whip the Mongolian activists into place. First, Yun Ze threatened military action against the Eastern Mongols, and then offered to protect their autonomy and positions of authority within the region if they agreed to disband the EMAG and place their political and military organizations under the nominal control of his Federation. Sensing perhaps a turning of the revolutionary tide with the imminent withdrawal of Soviet and Outer Mongolian troops, the Eastern Mongols reluctantly acquiesced to Yun Ze’s demands.1 2 1 At a carefully orchestrated Second Eastern Mongolian Delegates Congress held in late May, the PRPIM pushed through a resolution calling for the formal dissolution of the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government and its replacement with the “Xing’an Autonomous Province” under the jurisdiction of the CCP’ s Manchurian Bureau. PRPIM party veteran Temiirbangana was named chairm an of the new province with Zheng Ce representing the Manchurian Bureau as vice chairman. Around the same time, PRPIM was also quietly disbanded and its leadership incorporated into Yun Ze’ s FIMAM. Former EMAG chairman, 1 2 1 On the Chengde Conference see Atwood, “The East Mongolian Revolution,” 57-67. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 7 Buyanimndukhu, was selected as vice chairman under Yun Ze and the former PRPIM party chairman, Khafungga, now headed up FIMAN’s East Mongolian branch. Finally, the Eastern Mongolian militia agreed to merge with Yun Ze’ s small Inner Mongolian Self Defense Army and was placed under the operational command of the OCP’ s Northeast military region.1 2 2 The Chengde conference, despite its window dressing, did little to alter the balance of power in Eastern Mongolia. Former PRPIM leaders remained in firm control of the region’s political and military organs and continued to command the loyalty of the Eastern Mongolian people. If anything, it appears that the Eastern Mongolian activists attempted to use the authority of the CCP to extend their influence throughout the rest of Inner Mongolia. Emboldened by Yun Ze’ s promise about the eventual creation of a unified Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government and frustrated by the PartyCenter’ s repeated foot-dragging, Khafungga and other former PRPIM leaders threatened in November 1946 to convene their own Inner Mongolian People’s Congress to prepare for reunification.1 2 3 When these pleas became public and attracted the widespread support of Mongolian politicians affiliated with both the Kuomintang and CCP, Mao felt he could no longer afford to ignore the call for unified Inner Mongolian self-rule. In March 1947, the Party Center agreed to the creation of a single, 1 2 2 Ibid., 66-68; Yuan Jiahe, “Zhonggong kongzhi xia de wei Neknenggu zizhiqu” (The false Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region under the control of the Chinese Communists), Faqmgycmj i u 1.11 (30 November 1967): 83; “Dongmenggu renmin daibiao linshi dahui xuanyan” (Manifesto of the temporary congress of the Eastern Mongolian delegates), 27 May 1946, in NZYL, 68-9. 1 2 3 See “Zhonggong zhongyang ximan fenju guanyu queding Neimeng zizhi zhuzhang -wenti de qingshi" (A Western Manchurian Sub-Bureau request for instructions on the question of whether or not to advocate Inner Mongolian autonomy), 18 November 1946, in MZWT, 1082. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 368 “high level” Inner Mongolian autonomous government under the conditions, importantly, that the new regime “make allowances for the Han people in the mixed Han-Mongol regions and does not adopt the form of an independent state.”1 2 4 The Chinese Communist Party could ill afford to publicly oppose the creation of a unified Inner Mongolian government. Not only had the Party repeatedly blamed Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime for the failure of Inner Mongolian autonomous movement of the 1930s, the creation of a united Inner Mongolian government had been central to the Party’s proposed solution to the Mongolian question in 1935, if not earlier.1 2 5 Yet, at the same time, Party leaders understood that firm CCP control over its autonomous government was essential for maintaining the unity of the Chinese revolution and any future Communist state. In Eastern Mongolia, this concern was reflected in the Manchurian Bureau’ s reaction to the Party Center’ s hastily drafted proposal for Inner Mongolian autonomy. The Bureau was particularly alarmed by the suggestion that a new Inner Mongolian political party should be formed to replace Yun Ze’ s Party-controlled FIMAM. It urged the Party Center to “carefully consider” this question, arguing that the CCP should wait until “the Eastern Mongolian leadership suffers a set back or two and takes a step closer to our Party” before contemplating the creation a new political party. In the meantime, the Party should establish an “Inner 1 2 4 See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu kaolu chengli Neimeng zizhi zhengfu de zhishi” (CCP Party Center’ s directive calling for the consideration of establishing an Inner Mongolian autonomous government), 26 November 1946, in MZWT, 1083; “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Neimeng zizhi wenti de zhishi” (CCP Party Center’ s directive concerning the question of Inner Mongolian autonomy), 23 March 1947, in MZWT, 1094. 1 2 5 See, for example, “Zhonghua suweiai zhongyang zhengfu dui Neimenggu renmin xuanyan” (Proclamation of the Zhonghua Central Soviet Government to the Inner Mongolian People), 20 December 1935, in MZWT, 323. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 6 9 Mongolian Work Committee” aimed at drawing Mongolian activists, youths and progressives into the CCP while increasing Party education and organizational work within the region.1 2 6 The question of whether the Inner Mongolian people should have a “People’ s Revolutionary Party” of their own sparked “intense debate” at an important FIMAN executive committee meeting held in Wang-un Siime. Between 3-21 April 1947, Federation leaders met to iron out the details for the convening of an Inner Mongolian Delegates Congress and the establishment of the new autonomous government. At the meeting Khafungga and other Eastern Mongols, who now comprised a sizeable portion of Yun Ze’s Federation, seized the podium to demand the revival of an autonomous Inner Mongolian political party. They were opposed by Li Fuchun, Yun Ze and other Communists who contended that due to its multi-ethnic nature, the Chinese Communist Party represented not only the Han majority but all “Chinese national minorities,” such as the Mongols. In a nervous cable back to the Manchurian Bureau headquarters, Li Fuchun contended that Temiirbagana, Khafungga and other Eastern Mongolian leaders were “pure nationalists,” and despite having recently joined the CCP, they were colluding with the Mongolian “right wing” to revive the PRPIM and break with Communist leadership. In order to neutralize this serious threat, Li Fuchun urged the Party to consider the following: Rather than getting bogged down in this issue and acting passively, it would be better if we took the lead in endorsing the creation of a People’ s Revolutionary 1 2 6 “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju guanyu dui Neimeng zizhi wenti de yijian xiang zhongyang de qingshi” (CCP Manchurian Bureau directive to the Party Center concerning its ideas about the question of Inner Mongolian autonomy^, 1 April 1947, inM ZW T, 1097-8. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 7 0 Party. The party should be initiated by Yun Ze and unite the nationalists and the communists together so that we can win over the majority while isolating the reactionaries.1 2 7 The Manchurian Bureau immediately forwarded Li Fuchun’s suggestion to the Party Center with its own plea for the urgent recognition of an autonomous Inner Mongolian political party to prevent an open rift within the united front. Importandy, however, it suggested that: The details concerning the formation of the party should be discussed after the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. This discussion should be initiated and presided over by Yun Ze and the party constitution and programme should be drafted beforehand in order to ensure the party’s organizational purity and the acceptance of CCP leadership. In order to facilitate the struggle for the thorough liberation of the Inner Mongolian people, CCP members should not only be allowed to enter this [Inner Mongolian] party but we should also strive to ensure that we comprise its nucleus. Yun Ze should be made party secretary and someone else deputy 128 party secretary. In order to distance itself from the PRPIM, the Manchurian Bureau suggested naming the new party either the “Inner Mongolian Democratic Party” or the “Inner Mongolian Democratic-Revolutionary Party.” Concerning those former PRPIM members who continued to resist Party control, the report called for internal criticism aimed at exposing their anti-party and reactionary thought. In late April, the Party Center accepted the Manchurian Bureau’s proposal as the “best method” for dealing with the Eastern Mongolian question and ensuring Party control over the Inner Mongolian 1 2 7 “Zhonggong zhongyang ximan fenju guanyu Neimeng renmin gemingdang wenti de xin” (Eastern Manchurian Sub-Bureau letter about the question of the PRPIM), 10 April 1947, in MZWT, 1099. On the founding congress of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government see also see Atwood, “The East Mongolian Revolution,” 69. 128 “Zhonggong zhongyang dongbeiju guanyu Neimeng zuzhi renmin gemingdang wenti de qingshi baogao” (GCP Manchurian Bureau report concerning the question of the Inner Mongols organizing a people’ s revolutionary party^, 18 April 1947, in MZWT, 1100-1101. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 371 revolutionary movement. Slimming up the principle lesson of the entire incident, the Party Center stressed that “we must understand that the crux of the Inner Mongolian question is the need to ensure that its militia is under the control of our Party and that its autonomous government follows the leadership of our Party.”1 2 9 The struggle for control over the Inner Mongolian revolution continued at the Mongolian Delegates Congress, which finally got under way in Wang-un Siime on 23 April 1947. The Eastern Mongolian activists first attempted to block the selection of CCP cadres and youths from the provisional assembly by adopting a “three no votes” {sanbuxuari) policy no cadres from Yan’ an; no revolutionary youths who joined after the defeat of the Japanese; and no Han delegates. Next, the activists raised the issue of the definition of self-determination, arguing that it meant the creation of a Soviet-style autonomous republic rather than an autonomous region within a unitary state structure. Finally, the Eastern Mongols sparked an intense debate over the pace and direction of democratic reforms in the region, highlighting the need to protect at all costs the nomadic economy from renewed Han encroachment. According to Mongolian historian Hao Weimin, the Party faced this serious challenge to its leadership through “a frank and sincere excharge of ideas.” By systematically refuting each of these points, the Party was able to gradually win support from the majority of the delegates and successfully establish the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government on 2 May 1947.1 3 0 The reality of the matter appears, however, more ambiguous. Rather than forcing their own 1 2 9 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dui Neimeng renmin gemingdang de duice gei dongbeiju de zhishi” (CCP Party Center directive to the Manchurian Bureau concerning its opposition to the PRPIM), 23 April 1947, in MZWT, 1103. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 7 2 political agenda, the Chinese Communists bided their time, postponing any decision on the issues of contention in order to preserve the Han-Mongolian united front and its nominal control over the new government. For example, the seventeen-point Administrative Program for the new government was intentionally vague on the disputed issues of federalism and land reclamation.1 3 1 The Party did manage, some how, to secure its position of leadership over the new assembly. After all the ballots were cast, Yun Ze was selected chairman of the new government with 24 Han CCP cadres elected to the 121 person provisional assembly. Realizing that the united front tactic took time to work, the Party was content to gradually strengthen and consolidate its control over the region. In the end, however, it was Mao’ s adage about “power growing out of the barrel of the gun” that proved the final lesson for the Party in Eastern Mongolia. During the summer of 1947, Communist forces launched a massive counter- offensive against Kuomintang military positions. In Manchuria, Lin Biao’ s troops successfully isolated the Nationalist armies in the major cities and then one-by-one encircled and destroyed them. This sharp reversal of tides strengthened the Party’ s position within Eastern Mongolia, allowing it to shift more resources to the region. With its military control over Manchuria consolidated, the Communists used the pretext of a small revolt led by the independent Mongolian militarist Manibadara to arrest eleven Eastern Mongolian members of the new Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government. Claiming that they 1 3 0 Hao, N rnm tggi Gerri mghi , 555-57. 1 3 1 “Neimenggu zizhi zhengfu shizheng gangling” (Administrative Programme of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government), 27 April 1947, mMZWT, 1111-2. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 373 had foiled a counter-revolutionary plot, the Communists summarily executed the eleven Mongols before a large crowd of onlookers in the public square of Wang-un Siime. The extensive political purge that followed the incident destroyed the last remnants of PRPIM authority and ensured the peaceful incorporation of the entire region and a now thoroughly CCP-dominated “Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region” into the People’ s Republic of China upon its founding on 1 October 1949.1 3 2 In short, the Eastern Mongolian question represented the first direct challenge to the Maoist national minority policy. It helped to demonstrate to the Party the importance of tailoring its policies to the special circumstances of the minority regions and their revolutionary movements. Flexible praxis rather than ideological dogma was the key to gaining political power. More importantly, the implementation of Party policy in Inner Mongolia demonstrated the importance of the united front tactic in first mobilizing and then gaining control over the individual nationalist movements along the Chinese frontier. Finally, the Eastern Mongolian question demonstrated quite clearly that the Chinese Communist Party valued national unity and political control above all else, and contrary to any of its earlier promises, it had no intention of allowing the Inner Mongols or any other national minority the right to determine its own fate outside the scope of a unified, CCP-dominated Chinese state. 1 3 2 On the executions and subsequent purges see “Confidential American Peiping Consulate General Dispatch: Eastern Mongolian (Wangyehmiao) Autonomous Government,” 24 June 1948, in CSDF, 229-236. Also see Atwood, “The East Mongolian Revolution,” 68-9; Sechin, M enggizhiJinxi, 2: 286. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 7 4 Conducting Remarks On the eve of the Communist victory, Mao listed the development of “a united front of all revolutionary classes and groups under the leadership of the Party,” as one of the “three principle weapons of the Party,” which were responsible for the success of the Chinese revolution.1 3 3 In its struggle to mobilize the inhabitants of China against the Japanese imperialists and Kuomintang reactionaries, the Party attempted to cast the revolutionary struggle in broad and ambiguous terms of “us” versus “them.” It was political loyalty rather than class or ethnic identity that determined membership within the “us” group. Thanks to its superior military and organizational tactics, the CCP was able to gradually incorporate the frontier minorities and their territory under its central control. Using Lenin’s united front tactic, the Party mobilized the Mongols to participate (or at the very least remain neutral) in their struggle with the Kuomintang for control over the strategic Manchurian region. Intentionally downplaying ethnic and class identity, the CCP stressed the unity and common destiny of all “Chinese people” in their struggle for liberation from foreign imperialism and Kuomintang chauvinism. Rather than manipulating ethnic aspirations with the promise of political independence, as Walker Connor and others have argued, the Communists stressed the incorporation of all “patriotic citizens” (regardless of class, gender or ethnicity) under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. These superior organizational tactics help us to explain, at least partially, why the CCP’s national minority policy succeeded where the Kuomintang had failed. In the rich 1 3 3 Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” 30 June 1949, in SW , 4:422. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 7 5 secondary literature examining the nature and causes of the Chinese revolution, Western analysts have pointed to a variety of factors which contributed to the CCP’ s 1949 victory. In his now classic Peasant Nationalismand Communist Power, Chalmers Johnson highlighted the role of the Japanese invasion in fashioning a sense of national community among the peasants of Northern China and the ability of the CCP to exploit their nationalistic resentment in building a popular base.1 3 4 In sharp contrast to Johnson, Mark Selden and others have pointed to socioeconomic factors as decisive, arguing that it was the ability of the CCP to address the socioeconomic grievances of the peasants that garnered them the mass support they needed to seize power throughout the country.1 3 5 In the case of the CCP’s minority policy, however, it is difficult to say that either of these factors contributed to the CCP’ s ability to bring the Mongols and other frontier minorities under Party control. Neither the Japanese invasion nor the subsequent Chinese civil war were able to bridge the divergent national interests of the minorities and the Han revolutionaries— if anything, it caused the ethnic boundaries to harden. We have also seen how Lin Biao’ s radical land reform policy threatened to undermine, rather than strengthen, the CCP’ s grip over the Northwest countryside, causing the Party to realize the importance of working within the existing socioeconomic structure on the Mongolian steppe. While neither Johnson’ s wartime nationalist community thesis nor Selden’ s socioeconomic reform thesis seem particularly helpful in addressing the CCP’s national 1 3 4 Johnson, Peasant Nat i onal i smand, G m rw dst Power 1 3 5 Mark Selden, The Yenan W ayin R ew kdm n yC h im (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 7 6 minority policy, I do find the organizational thesis advanced by Robert North, Steven Levine, Chen Yung-fa and others helpful in explaining the relative success and failure of CCP and KMT national minority policy.1 3 6 As I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter and the last one, since little ideological distinction existed between the two parties’ national minority policies, the source of their distinction needs to be found in the ability of the two parties to implement their policies. While the factional nature of Kuomintang politics inhibited the implementation of Chiang Kai-shek’ s frontier policy, the tight ideological discipline and organizational structure of the CCP appeared to have allowed Yun Ze and other CCP minority policy cadres to thoroughly penetrate Mongolian society and gradually set up the military and Party apparatuses necessary for COP control over the steppe. The GCP’ s success in Inner Mongolia, much like Chen Yung-fa demonstrated for Eastern and Central China, lay in success in balancing two contradictory policies: the ability to build and maintain a broad coalition of classes and nationalities which incorporated local elites into the Party structure, while at the same time exploiting various ethnic and socioeconomic tensions within society to split the “atoms” of local society in a kind of controlled “fission reaction” whose released energy powered the expanding revolutionary movement. Finally, it is also important to stress the role of political violence and military power in the ultimate success of the CCP’ s united front tactic. As the Eastern Mongolian question clearly demonstrated, either the threat or actual use of violent coercion was crucial in splitting the minority “ atoms,” and 1 3 6 Robert G North, Mcscowand Chi nes e C am rn ist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953); Levine, The A m il <f Victory, Chen Yung-fa, M ak i ng Revol ut i on: The Ccm m m st M om rent inE astem and Cent ral Chi na, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 7 7 dividing those elements deemed “patriotic” to the Party and the nation from those who threatened to undermine the Party's control and the Zhongjyua rrinzils territorial integrity. During the 1950s, military power was to prove crucial in the CCP’ s “peaceful liberation” of Tibet, Xinjiang and other minority regions. The CCP’ s success in infiltrating and mobilizing frontier minorities should not obscure, however, the fundamental similarity between the Kuomintang and CCP approach to the national and frontier questions. Following their break with the ideological prescripts of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists forsook the Bolshevik policy of national self-determination and offered the minorities equality and autonomy within a unitary Chinese state. The Kuomintang, despite its inability to implement its frontier policy in the face of resistance from its militarist allies, offered the minorities, on paper at least, the same right of equality and self-rule. The policies of both political parties stressed the incorporation of all “Chinese” rrinzu into a single, unified Zhonghua rrimic, yet, for strategic political reasons, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek agreed to extend the right of self-rule to the Mongolian and Tibetan people in order to, at the very least, neutralize or, ideally, mobilize the frontier minorities in their respective struggles for national power in China. Both the CCP and the KMT viewed minority autonomy as an expedient political strategy for gradually securing firm Han control over the territory and peoples of the former Qing empire. In short, I suggest that the success of the CCP’ s national minority policy is best found in its superior organizational methods, when compared to the Kuomintang Central Government, rather than in any unique ideological commitment to ethnic freedom and equality. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONSTRUCTING THE ZHONGHUA M INZU: THE FRONTIER AND NATIONAL QUESTIONS IN EARLY 20™ CENTURY CHINA VOLUME II by James Patrick Leibold A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (HISTORY) December 2002 Copyright 2002 James Patrick Leibold R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 1 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It has been nearly fifteen years to the day that I first set out to learn more about China, its language, culture, history and peoples. A journey that has been equal parts intellectual discovery and emotional growth. Along the way, I have acquired quiet a few debts, without which, this study would never have come to fruition. Eugene Swanger, Stan Mickel, James Huffman and my other professors at "Wittenberg University set me firmly on the path of academic learning— serving as my first guides to China and the rest of Asia. Their passion for teaching and love of the region sparking an unquenchable thirst for more, and propelled me to first visit Mainland China in 1988-89 and Taiwan in 1990-91. At Washington University, Laurence Schneider’ s graduate seminar on Republican era historiography introduced me to China’ s tumultuous transition from empire to nation-state and its rich, yet highly politicized, historiography in the West, while Isenbike Togan helped to transform my curiosity about the minority cultures and peoples of China into one of the central research questions that would guide my dissertation research: The nuodm or contradiction between a Chinese nation-state which claims a homogenous and unbroken history of cultural and racial unity and the powerful historical memories of the Tibetan, Mongolian, Manchu and other non-Han peoples who used to rule, if not dominate, much of what we now call “China.” My training as a historian began in earnest when I arrived in Los Angeles and came under the careful intellectual guidance of the University of Southern California’ s excellent humanities faculty. Gordon Berger and Michael Robinson provided me with a R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. iii comprehensive introduction to modem Japanese and Korean historiography, while other members of its history, political science and anthropology departments provided their time and helpful questions. My dissertation committee— Charlotte Furth, John Wills and Eugene Cooper— helped shape this final product through countless hours of discussion, long emails and several careful reads of previous drafts. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my mentor Charlotte Furth, who continued to show great interest in my research even after her own interests shifted backwards in time from the Republican period towards the Ming and Qing and away from politics towards culture, medicine and gender. Her probing questions, sharp acumen and inspiring command of social theory and academic literature helped me carefully pull together my diverse and jumbled research findings into a single coherent— I hope— argument about the cultural and political construction of the Zhon^yua mmzu during China’ s incomplete transition from a multi-ethnic empire to a unified nation-state. I own a special thanks to the archivists and librarians of the many institutions where the actual research for this study was conducted: the East Asian libraries at Washington University and the University of California at Los Angeles and Berkeley, the University of Southern California libraries; the Harvard-Yenching library, the Hopkins-Nanking Center library the Nanjing University library the Nanjing Municipal Archive; the Shanghai Municipal Library, and most importantly the excellent collections held by the University of Hong Kong— especially its Fu Ping Shan Chinese language library, where countless hours were spent hunting for obscure references with the complete confidence that they would be found. The Centre of Asian Studies at the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. IV University of Hong Kong served as my institutional base for the five plus years I spent in Hong Kong and Shanghai researching and writing this thesis. I am especially grateful to its staff and faculty for their assistance, guidance and encouragement. This project could not have been completed without generous financial assistance from Washington University, the Hopkins Nanjing Center, several Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships, the National Resource Foundation Fellowship, an Abe Fellowship and a NSEP Graduate Research Fellowship. Along the way numerous people contributed to this project in different ways— from proofreading to encouragement or with a cold beer or random reference— without which the years would not have passed as quickly as they did: John Fitzgerald, Bruce Jacobs, Ken Richter, Pete Ditmer, Linda Tassera, Joe Allen, Hong Lianjing, David Bello, Jeanette Barbarier, Paul Van Dyke, Charlie Musgrove, Anna Bernstein, Yang Jieshi, Li Liangyu, Rob Culp, P.T. Lee, and Geoff Wade. Terrance “Saul” Thomas deserves particular thanks for not only reading several of my chapters in meticulous detail and finding many a useful sources, but more importantly for helping me to craft the scope, outline and argument of this study over many a lingering dinner in Nanjing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. I would not be where I am today without the tremendous love and support of my parents— Frank and Danielle— and my three sisters— Lori, Debbie, and Liz— and their families. They were a constant source of emotional, and at times financial support, over the years that this dissertation took shape. Finally, no one, besides myself, knows the inner workings of this thesis and my cluttered mind more than my beloved R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. ■ w ife Kate. From the day we first meet in Nanjing in 1996 and she learned that I was “completing” my dissertation, she has been nothing short of a solid rock of support. Through numerous moves back and forth between the Mainland and Hong Kong, chapter after chapter, footnote after footnote and rewrite after rewrite, she has served quietly as my chief editor, intellectual sounding board, emotional consoler, financial supporter, and now the proud mother of our first child, Bridget Danielle Leibold. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vi CONTENTS VOLUME 1 Ac k n o w l ed g e m e n t s: ii List o f F ig u r e s: ix Ab b r e v ia t io n s: x Abstract: xiii In t r o d u c t io n : 1 FnrnE mpim to Nation 1 The Cultural O r i g i n s cfthe Nation 4 The Frontier and National Q u e s ti o n s in ea rl y 20t h C en tu ry China 7 Minzu as a Soc ial E wlutionary D is c o u r s e cf National In c o r p o ra ti o n 1 2 Literature Redew & S o u r c e s 17 Chapter O v e r v ie w 25 P art O n e : Co m p e t in g Paradigm s o f N a t io n -B u il d in g 1 . The Positioning of Chinese “Minzus” within Sun Yat-sen’s Discourse of Minzuzhuyi 34 Anti-MandbuismU the Invention of Minzuzhuyi (1895-1911) 38 Minzuzhuyi and the C h i n e s e RepuUic (1911-1920) 59 Minzuzhuyi and C h i n e s e A nti-Imperialism (1923-1925) 74 G ond u d in g Remarks 95 2. The Failure of the Bolshevik National Question Discourse: 102 The United Front & The B ol sh ev ik National Q u e sti on D is c ou r se 105 The CCP’ s Bo lsh e v ik Frontier P m g r a r m m 112 National Sdf-determnaim& The “ Monsgiian Q ue st io n ” 116 The Anti-Red Mcnement& the S tr u g g le to Interpret Sun Yat-sen’ s L e g a c y 131 A nti-Red C rit iq ue s cfMangiian I n d e p e n d e n c e & “ Red Imperidisni’ 145 Dtfending the CCP’ s Patriotic C r e d e n ti a l s 151 S tra ins within the CCP’ s Frontier P r o g r a m m e & the National Socialist A Itermtke 159 The Gdlapse cf the United Front & the Nationalization cfthe National Q u e s ti o n 174 C o n d u c l in g Rermrks 193 P art T w o: Strateg ies o f P olitical In t e r v e n t io n 3. The Kuomintang Central Government & the “Frontier Question” 197 Frontier Wa rlordi sm& C h i n e s e E n cr o a e h m m t on the Inner Morrgikn Frontier 202 The Failed Irm erM o ng p H a nA utormms Moiement, Part I 215 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. vii LiuWenbui& ChineseEncroadTmMahngtheXikangFrontiercf Tibet 237 The Disputed Xikang Tibetan Bonier 244 HuangMusongs Mission & the Failure of Sim- Tibetan R a p p r o c h e m e n t , Pan I 249 Wu Zhangciris Mission & the Failure cfSinoTibetanRappnxhement, Part II 257 Kuonintang Frontier Po lic y in the Pcstwr E r a 265 The Failed Inner Mo ng olia n A utcmmus M o v e m e n t , Part II 280 CondudingRemarks 288 4. The Chinese Com m unist Party & the “National Question” 293 The Cmumcnbing cf National Sdf-deternination 297 TheLangManh& the O ri g j n s cf the UnitedFmnt Took 307 The SinfkntioncfMarxism& the Rise cfthe Maoist Nationality Policy 315 The Northwest Work Qmrittee & the D e v e lo p m e n t cf the Maoist Nationality P ol ic y 324 Maoist Nationality Pdicy in the P ostwar E ra 341 The Eastern M on gpl ian Q u e s ti o n : The Triurrph cfthe UnitedEmnt Tac tic 348 G on d u d in g R.enurks 374 VOLUME II P art T h r e e ; N arratives o f H istorical In n o v a t io n 5. The Kuomintang & the Construction of the Zhonghua minzu 378 O r ig i n s , Unity and Continuity: The Roots cfTw> C o m p e t in g Narratizes 381 LiangQichao& the Scientific Qu est for Zhongfua ninzu Oigrs and Unity 394 The May Fourth Incident & the Rising Tick fKitonmtang Cultural Nationalism 401 ThePnHemcfSun Yat-sen Enter the YdlowErnperor 409 Gu Jiegingand the “ Doubting cfA ndquity” 413 The Manchurian Incident & J a p a n e se Imperialism 428 The PnHemcfGu Jiegtngand d o e J a p a n e s e : E nter PekingMan 439 Re-thinkingMinzu: Gujiegtng& the An thropologists 452 The J a p a n e se Invasion & The D i s c c n e r y cfE thmc Dizersity 459 The 1939 Debate E rdightenmnt P o st p o n e d 474 China’ s Destiny. The New C o n s e n s u s ? 503 Gondudirg Remarks 509 6. The CCP & the Construction of the Zhonghua minzu: 514 The Z h o n g h u a minzu and the PnHemcf “ Minzu” 517 The Zhongfua minzu & thePrcHemcf History 533 Fan Werian & the C o n c i s e G e n e r a l History c f China 538 A r c h a e o lo g y & theMonoplpietk Origin cf the Zhcrnfnia mnzu 548 The Zh o n fjp u a ninzu & the PnHemcf “ Zhongzu” 562 Re-mxdmgtheHistoricHandAnhaeologitd Evid enc e 568 C o n st r u c tin g a G e n e a l o g y cfthe Zhonyfua ninzu Unity 576 The Z h o n g j r u a rrirtzu & its HanNudeus 586 C o n d u c t in g Remarks 590 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Co n c l u sio n : Political Int er v e nt io n s & Han D e m o g r a p h i c Hegarmy Historical Imcrwtion & the S coal Scientific C o n st r u c tio n cfthe Zhonfifiua ninzu Character Glossary: B iblio g ra ph y: R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. IX LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Republican Era Images of Peking Man and the Yellow Emperor 442 Figure 2: Jian Bozan’ s 1943 Chart “The Chinese Racial Family” 575 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. CCP CDZX CEC CER CFASS CMTA CSDF CYL czzx EH S EMAG FIMAM FSXJ GFQf GFWJ GMWX GSB IMAG x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Chinese Communist Party {Gonghandan^ ChenDuxiu Zhuzm xm n Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (Kuonintang Zhongyang zhixing isEcy ua rhm ) Chinese Eastern Railway Chinese Frontier Administration Study Society (Zhongyio bianzheng xuehw!) Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (Mengpang 'zmymnbui) Paul Kesaris, ed., Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: China [M ienftnj: Internal Affairs, 194X1949 Chinese Communist Youth League (Zhongguo Gongphanzhryi Qr^nantmn) Ren Jianshu et. al, eds., ChenDuxiu Zhuzuaxmn Zhongguo gongchandang, comp. Frda he Sanda: Zhonggpo Gongchandang Dier-sand Daihiao Dahui ZiliaoXm n Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government Federation of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement (Neineng zizhi yundang liarhdm) Fu Sinian, Fu SiraanXuanji Sun Yat-sen, Guffu Quaffi Zhonghua minguo gejie jinian guofu bainian danzhen shoupei weiyuanhui et. al., ed. and comp., Guffu SixiangLumsenji Luo Jialun, ed., Geming Wenxian Gujiegang, ed., Gnshihian Inner Mongolian Autonomous Gov’ t (Neimenggp zizhi zhengfu) R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. KMT L S W L D X LDZW J L G 1 Y N ZYL NWC N W Z MLAPC MPR MPRP MZDJ M ZXJ M ZW T PRC PRPIM SW sw pc SWZJ xi Kuomintang (Guonirdang) Li Dazhao Wenji L i Dazhao X m nji Zhongguo I i Dazhao yanjiuhui, comp. L i Dazhao Wenji L i a n g p m g (bu), (Mngfhanguaji yu Zhongguo Guonin Gening Yudong (1920- 1925) Neimenggu zizhi yundong lianhehui dang’ an shiliao, comp. Neimenggu Zizhi Yundong L iarioebui; Dangin Shiliao Xmnbian CCP’ s Central Committee Northwest Work Committee (Xibei gpngzuo wdymrl'mi) Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, ed. Neimenggu Wenshi Ziliao Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council (Menggi difang zizhi zherigpumiymrbw) Mongolian People’ s Republic Mongolian People’ s Revolutionary Party Takuechi Minoru, e d , Mao Zedongji Mao Zedong, Mao ZedongXuanji Zhonggong Zhongyang Tongzhanbu, comp. M inzu Wend Wenxian Huibian, 7.1921 - 9.1949 People’ s Republic of China {Zhongj-mi rernrin gpn gh e g u b ) People’ s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (Neinznggu gpring renmdar^i Mao Zedong, Selected Works cfMao Tse-tung Southwest Political Council Sichuansheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed, Sichuan Wenshi Zilioa Jim Dvmguan Minzu Zongjiao Huajiao Bian R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. S Y X W Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, comp. Shao YuandoangXiansheng Wenji SZSQ f Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhonghan Quanji xcw Xiao Chum Wemm XM W Z Gansu sheng tushuguan shumu cankaobu, comp. X ibd Minzu Zangiao Shiliao WenzhaiGansu Fenoen Y B SQ Yinbinshi Quanji, Liang Qichao YCP Yoimg China Party (Zhongguo Qngniandang) ZGQZ Rong Mengyuan, ed. and Sun Caixia, comp., Zhongguo Guanrnkng L id Daibiao Dahmji Zhongyang Q m hrn Ziliao 2/G2 Zongtong Jiang GongSixiang Yadun Zongji ZMKS Kuomintang Dangshi Weiyuanhui, ed., Zhort^jua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliao ChubianrDui R i Kangzhan Shiqi ZMSD Zhon$rua M v n g g to Shi Dang'an Ziliao HuUdan, comp. Zhongguo Dier Lishi Dang’anguan ZMSS Zhon^yua ninguahi Shijiyao (c hug ao) ZMWL Ru Yifu, Zhongg40MinzuJiqi Werhua Lunkao ZSP Chen Qingquan et al., Zhongguo Shixuejia Pingzhuan R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. xiii ABSTRACT This study examines the attempts by China’s Han ethnic majority to politically and culturally incorporate the ethnically heterogeneous polities of the former Qing empire (1644-1911) into a new national imaginary during the Republican Era (1911- 1949), or what Sun Yat-sen first called a single, pure Zhonghua ninzu (Chinese nation/race). In their attempts to fashion this new sense of corporate identity, Han political elites used a series of political and cultural strategies aimed at reifying the fluid political relations between the ethnically diverse citizens of the new Chinese Republic. The state’ s goal was not only the allegiance of the Tibetan, Mongolian and other frontier minorities towards the political center, but the construction of a myth of national belonging rooted in the perception of a common history, soil and blood. My treatment of Chinese nation-building attempts to demonstrate how, in many ways, the frontier and its ethnic minorities were central rather than peripheral to the process of “revolution” in modem China. Despite their relatively small numbers, the frontier minorities inhabited roughly sixty-percent of the Republic’ s national territory, most of which was located along the remote yet resource-rich borderlands crucial to the state’ s economic modernization yet also coveted by the imperialist powers. In the days following the collapse of the Qing empire in 1911, Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria and other frontier regions broke with the Han political and cultural center. Faced with the possibility of losing much of their national territoiy and wealth to the foreign imperialists, Han elites stressed the urgent need for both the rhetorical and physical absorption of the frontier minorities into a thoroughly unified and ethnically pure R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. XIV Chinese Republic. By uncovering the complex process of nation-building in early 20th century China, my study attempts to shed new light on the Chinese state’s attempts to homogenize (if not erase) ethnic and cultural diversity from its political and historical landscape. In short, the national and frontier questions in Republican China was fundamentally about the construction of a united, monoethnic and modem Zhon$m ninzu— an “imagined community” capable of naturalizing the heterogeneous polities of the Qing empire into a single homogenous Chinese nation. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 378 CHAPTERS The Kuomintang & the Construction of the Zhonghua minzu: This chapter traces the development of several competing narratives of national unity and origin in Republican China. Faced with the difficulty of incorporating the heterogeneous population of the late Qing empire into the new Chinese nation-state, Han Chinese intellectuals looked to their past for answers to the problem of Chinese national unity. In particular, this chapter focuses on the tension between on the one hand, a racial formulation which rooted the source of Chinese unity in the “common origin” (tonQuari) of its people and, on the other hand, a cultural formulation which located this unity in the gradual, evolutionary “melding” (tvngfie) of several distinct cultures and races into a new national consciousness. I will argue that these competing narratives arose out of two fundamentally different conceptualizations of historical continuity among turn of the century Chinese intellectuals. Against, the backdrop of the late imperial debate on Manchu identity, Chinese scholars like Zhang Binglin and Liang Qichao began to re-examine the origins and ethnic composition of the Chinese n in zu . In his search for the original purity and strength of the Hanzu or “Han race-lineages,” Zhang Binglin and other conservatively inclined scholars associated with the National Essence Journal {Guoadxuebad) constructed a racial genealogy aimed at demonstrating the suprahistorical continuity of the Chinese people through their unbroken line of descent from a single ancient ancestor— the Yellow Emperor. In contrast, another group of nationalist historians, centered around the prolific Liang Qichao, chose to locate the source of Chinese unity and origins in the R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 379 evolutionary melding of its multi-ethnic population. In the first narrative, cultural continuity was defined as the urstdlied persistence of a pure national essence and race, while in the second narrative, it was defined as the crgmic c o n c r e s c e n c e s of a composite national people. The rising tide of foreign imperialism in early twentieth century China heightened the importance of these initial inquires into the origins and unity of the Chinese nation. Foreign encroachment was threatening to tear the nation asunder and seemed to require urgent action to shore up China’ s fragile national unity. In particular, the Japanese imperialists seemed set upon the ethnic unraveling of the Chinese Republic, claiming that the Manchus, Mongols and other frontier minorities were distinct, non-Chinese races which deserved their own independent states under Japanese patronage. This potential “loss of the state and extermination of the race” (wirggto niezhon^ caused Chinese nationalists to contemplate various methods for unifying the heterogeneous peoples of the former Qing empire into a single national people. Quite naturally, many of them turned to their own history, calling for a re-examination of the role of ethnic diversity within Chinese society. In their own search for Chinese national unity, a new generation of professional trained academics drew on a whole range of new scientific concepts from the budding academic disciplines of history, archaeology, and ethnography. These new social sciences altered not only the landscape of the original debate but also introduced new conceptual categories for analyzing diversity within Chinese society. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 0 More specifically, this chapter focuses on the intellectual struggle between two groups of autonomous, yet Kuomintang affiliated, scholars to position the heterogeneous polities of the former Qing empire within the historical and cultural space of the new Chinese Republic. Drawing on the ideas of Liang Qichao, a group of enlightenment scholars, centered around the historian Gujiegang, viewed China’ s past history of ethnic diversity as a source of national strength. They argued that, as a result of the long history of evolutionary mixing among the different cultures and races of China, a composite national consciousness was unfolding in China, giving rise to a new national people, or what Liang Qichao had first called the Ihon^jua ninzu. Not content to wait for a future state of national unity, a group of cultural nationalists projected a state of racial purity backward onto the heterogeneous citizens of the new Republic, claiming to have located the original source of their racial consanguinity in the 500,000 year-old Peking Man. Finally, this chapter examines the increased tensions between the concepts of qwvng (enlightenment) and jiu^io (national salvation) following the outbreak of war with the Japanese. Japan’ s rapid series of victories in 1937 and 1938 and its continued manipulation of ethnic sentiments in China fostered a mood of national emergency in China. Now, more than ever, the need for collective identity seemed to overshadow the struggle for individual consciousness. Increased patriotism and the relocation of universities and the Kuomintang government to the southwest also brought a series of new pressures to bear on Chinese academics, causing many to call for a temporary postponement of the enlightenment project. Consequently, enlightenment scholars like R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 381 Gu Jiegang finally acquiesced to the rhetoric of the cultural nationalists and actively joined forces with the Kuomintang government in seeking a quick solution to the frontier question. Yet, despite the constraints of the new official discourse, there remained considerable room to maneuver, and scholars like Ruey Yifu continued to highlight, although subdy, the diversity of China’ s national unity. Origins, Unity and Continuity: The Roots c fT m Competing N anatim Sima Qian was the first Chinese scholar to provide a systematic account of Chinese origins. While China’ s non-canonical texts contain numerous creation myths, such as the creation of Heaven and Earth through Pan Gu’ s birth from the Egg of Chaos, Sima Qian’ s first century l&CShiji (R e o o rd s cfthe Historian) marked the first rational philosophy of history aimed at explaining the origins and continuity of the universe. Following the centuries of political division associated with the Warring States period and Qinshi Huangdi’ s violent reunification of China, Sima Qian set himself the task of “ordering” the past and restoring a moral continuum upon which the ruling Han dynasty could establish their political legitimacy. Sima Qian began his history of the Chinese universe with the Yellow Emperor and then traced the transmission of virtue (c fe ) and rites (li) seamlessly through the Five Emperors (Wudi) and “Three Dynasties” (Sandai), creating an unbroken “Golden Age” genealogy for the Flan court to inherit.1 Sima Qian’ s narrative centered around two complimentary ideas: a series of charismatic leaders whose acts of creativity and innovation drove history forward and the diffusion 1 Burton Watson, Ss»M a Ch’ i en Grand H istorian c f Chi na (New York Columbia University Press, 1958); A.F.P. Hulsewe, “Notes on the Historiography of the Han Period,” in W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank, eds. Hi st orians c f Chi na and Japan (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 31-43. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 2 of these traditions through a single uninterrupted lineage. As Larry Schneider has pointed out, political authority within Sima Qian’ s philosophy of history “stood on two legs— sacred origins and continuity of transmission.”2 Despite periodic criticism from a heterodox historiography, Sima Qian’s Golden Age genealogy survived intact and continued to influence Chinese historical writing well into the nineteenth century. Liang Qichao was the first modem Chinese historian to completely break with this Confucian philosophy of history and begin writing “national history” (g uashi). Liang, like other modem historians, privileged what Prasenjit Duara has called “the grand narrative of the nation as a collective historical subject,” arguing that historical development was essentiallythe story of the evolution of distinct and definable ninzus, which for Liang and others simultaneously denoted the Western concepts of “race,” “nation” and “people.”3 Liang placed the development of the ninzu within a social evolutionary framework of “racial competition” {ymzhcr^jin^hen^ , arguing that the Darwinian struggle for survival among the world’ s ninzus served as the motor of historical progress. In his 1902 call for a “New Historiography,” Liang defined history as “simply the story of the development and competition among human races (renzhong)— without human races, there would be no history.” 4 With group solidarity identified as the key to survival, Liang described the inevitable organic growth of social 2 Laurence A. Schneider, Ku Chieb-kangand Chi na’ s N ew Hi st ory: N ationdism ard t he Quest f ir A hem ahe Tradi t i ons (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1971), 191. 3 Duara, “De-Constructing the Chinese Nation,” 33. 4 Liang, “Xin shixue,” 11. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 3 groups from small “family lineages” (jiazu) to larger “tribal lineages” (buzu), and then finally massive, truly global “state/national lineages” (gw ce«). With regards to China’ s own guazu, Liang lamented the lack of a consistent historical name, pointing out that in the past the Chinese have been identified by various dynastic designations— such as Zhuxia, Han or Tang. To correct this shortcoming and lend a sense of continuity to the evolution of the Chinese people, Liang began employing the term “Chinese niru.iT (Zbongpo ninzuj), a term that gradually evolved into the neologism which became synonymous with an organic and corporate sense of Chinese national identity throughout the 20th century: the “Zhon$7ua ninzu.” In his 1901 “Introductory Essay on Chinese History,” Liang followed Sima Qian in locating the origins of the Chinese people with their “first ancestor” { d r u z u ! ) the Yellow Emperor.5 The widespread familiarity with the Yellow Emperor and Sima Qian’ s chronology of ancient Chinese history contributed to the popularity of the Yellow Emperor as the “father” of the Chinese people among turn of the century Chinese intellectuals.6 Yet, onto Sima Qian’ s seamless Golden Age continuum Liang superimposed a layer of racial conflict. Liang rejected the monogenesis thesis of human origins, asserting instead that “all races (zhon$ and lineages (zu) are of independent origins.”7 Yet, due to the mixing of their individual bloodlines during the evolutionary struggle for survival, one can no longer clearly discern the boundary races. Thus, Liang 5 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo shi xulun” (Introductory Essay on Chinese Histor^, 1901, in YBSWJ, 3:9. 6 Chow, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood,” 48. 7 Liang, “Zhongguo shi xulun,” 6. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 4 contended, it was the possession of a written history (that was a historical record on past actions and deeds) rather than an unsullied bloodline that enabled the historian to distinguish between one race and another. In his own systematic inquiry into Chinese origins, Liang claimed to have located six historically-distinct races: the Miao, Han, Tibetans, Mongols, Xiongnu (who were the ancestors of the Huihui people of Xinjiang) and Tungus (who were the ancestors of the Manchus). The Chinese ninzu, in short, was the product of a complex and centuries-olds Darwinian struggle between these six historical races inhabiting the toponym “China.” While both Liang Qichao and Sima Qian stressed the continuity of “China” through narratives of the past, the nature and conceptualization of that continuity differed. For Sima Qian, Chinese continuity lies with the universal emperorship (Jumxia) and the transmission of moral authority (Dad) down through an unbroken lineage of Chinese rulers. Sima Qian’ s Shiji highlights the transmission of a suprahistorical, unchanging “essence,” passed down seamlessly from one ruler to another from time immemorial. It is the ninzu and not the Dao that was the subject of Liang’ s social evolutionary historiography, with the emphasis placed on racial struggle as the motor of historical change. Liang re-imagined China as a spatially and temporally finite ninzu rather than a boundless Tianxia, marking what Joseph Levenson has identified as the shift from “Gonfucian culturalism” to “Chinese nationalism.”8 By locating “Chinese” continuity in the gradual, evolutionary and organic unfolding of the Chinese nation or Zhon$m ninzu, the focus of Liang’ s historiography became the 8 Levenson, Corfudan O nm and Its M odem Fate, 95-116. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 385 enveloping concrescence and expansion of the Chinese people rather than their sacred origins and unchanging essence. These two contrasting notions of continuity came to underpin the competing intellectual narratives of Ihon^ma ninzu origins and unity during the Republican era. Yet, in sharp contrast to Liang’ s ethnic inclusionism, Zhang Binglin’s anti- Manchu historiography explicitly excluded the non-Chinese “barbarians” from the narrative of Chinese origins. In his attempt to justify the overthrow of the Manchu Qing dynasty, Zhang invented the notion of a pure, consanguineous Hanzu, or “Han race- linage.” Like Liang Qichao, the origin of the Chinese people was traced back to the Yellow Emperor but the Manchus and other non-Han races were consciously excluded from the Yellow Emperor’ s agnate. In the initial debate between the reformers who wished to preserve the Manchu monarchy and the revolutionaries who called for its replacement with a Han Republic, the focus was on whether or not the Manchus had already adopted Chinese cultural practices, and as such, had in fact already “become Chinese” ( Harhua). Zhang Binglin’ s invention of the term Hanzu in his revised 1902 version of Qiushi (Book c f Persecution marked a dramatic shift in the nature of the debate away from culture and towards the helpfully ambiguous, yet supposedly more “scientific,” discourse of race. Building on Wang Fuzhi’ s assertion that the Manchus and the Chinese were of a fundamentally different “substance” (zbi)— like man and horse or snow and jade— and thus could not be mixed together, Zhang superimposed a R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 6 modem Western notion of “blood” (xue) in constructing the two distinct and immutable categories of Hanzu (Han race-lineage) and Manzu (Manchu race-lineage).9 It is important to point out, however, that throughout the 20th century Chinese “discourse on race,” Western ideas of blood, physical and biological difference were continually conflated and often interrelated with “lineage” (zu), “nature” (xin$, “substance” (zbi) and “psycho-physical energy” (qi) and other premodem categories of social difference.1 0 When an individual like Zhang Binglin used the term Hanzu, his audience could read into the term either a biological notion of physical difference or a genealogical notion of common descent, or both, depending on their exposure to Western ideas. Their common semantic source, Duara points out, is the signifier zu, which can simultaneously denote a descent group and a race or kind.1 1 What made the term so powerful to the Anti-Manchuists was its clear connotation of an immutable and essential divide between Han and Manchu identity. Yet, as Chow Kai-wing has astutely pointed out, due to the fact that there were few markers of physical differences between the Manchus and the Han, the revolutionaries “looked instead to myths of historical origin to establish boundaries with which to differentiate ‘race’.”1 2 As the debate over Manchu identity intensified during the winter of 1902-03, both sides constructed fictitious historical genealogies to substantiate their claims. In defining 9 Li, “Zhongguo jindai minzu s ix ia n g 21-22; Chow, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood,” 38-40; Crossley, zl Tr ans l ucent M i rmr, 67-70 and passim 1 0 On premodem Chinese conceptualizations of human diversity see Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modem China,” 1-35; Crossley, A Tr ans l ucent M irror, Hanson, “Robust Northerners and Delicate Southerners,” 515-50; Dikbtter, T lx Di scourse c f Race i nM ockm Chi na, 1-96. 1 1 Duara, Res cui ng H istory From tlx Nation, 75. 1 2 Chow, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood,” 46. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 7 the origins of a ninzu, the reformers and the revolutionaries shared a common definition of identity rooted in the kinship language of Qing literary circles. A ninzu, Pamela Crossley has stated, “had to be distinguished by identifiable and continuing lineages, and it had to have a history.”1 3 In late 1902, Kang Youwei traced the Manchus back through Chinese history to the Han dynasty nomadic Xiongnu tribe. From there he cited Sima Qian’ s Shiji as evidence of a shared lineage between the Xiongnu and the proto-Han people of the Xia dynasty. In his “Genealogy of the Xiongnu” (Xiongm luczhmrz ), Sima Qian claimed that the progenitor of the Xiongnu was Chun Wei, a member of the ruling clan of the Xia dynasty. With the weight of the authoritative Sbiji on his side, Kang Youwei confidently concluded that the Han and the Manchus were “like brothers of the same father with different mothers.”1 4 In reply, Zhang Binglin marshalled extensive non-canonical evidence in claiming that the Manchus were actually the direct descendants of a people labelled the Donghu or “Eastern Barbarians” in Qin and Han texts and not the Xiongnu. The Donghu were never assimilated by the Han people and today are identified by Western scientists as the “Tungus race”; as such, the Manchus comprised a different race (zhongpu) from the Hanzu, who were the unsullied progeny of the Yellow Emperor.1 5 In Zou Rong’ s 1903 taxonomy of the Yellow Race, he carefully placed the Han— along with the Korean, Japanese, Tibetan and other peoples— under the “Chinese Race” (Zhongguo rmzhon^ sub-branch which were clearly distinguished from the Manchu, Mongol, Tartar, Turk and others nomadic peoples who 1 3 Crossley, A Tr ans l ucent Mi rror, 359. 1 4 Kang, “Bian geming shu,” 216. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 8 8 belong to the “Siberian race” (Xihdiya venzhong) sub-branch.1 6 In order to discredit this notion of a pure Han or Chinese race, Liang Qichao carried out his own detailed historical investigation of Han origins, which he claimed proved that the Han people were themselves an amalgamation (bunhi) of several different lineages (zu). Drawing on the work of German theorists, Liang contended that language was a better criterion of racial difference than either blood or physical difference. Finally, he claimed, through a careful reading of Chinese historical sources, to have identified seven hoary lineages which, along with the “Yellow and Fire Emperor lineage” (HuangYenzti), combined to create the Han core of the Zhorqfrua ninzu.1 7 This debate between the reformers and the revolutionaries needs to be understood within the context of the search for a historically- rooted, autochthonous alternative to replace the crumbing imperial cosmology of the late Qing dynasty. As Tang Xiaobing has recently pointed out, Liang Qichao’ s early historiography was firmly rooted in the “discourse of modernity.”1 8 In his validation of the modem nation state system, Liang tended to view China as a new spatiotemporal regime, or what Tang called a “global imaginary of identity,” which emphasized China’ s participation and equality with other nations in modem, world civilization. For Liang, China and its history were fundamentally the story of the evolution of a collective Zhorqfrua ninzu and 1 5 Zhang, “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu,” 173-84. 1 6 Tsou, The Revol ut i onary A m y, 107 & 31-32. 1 7 Liang Qichao, “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guancha” (Inquiry into the Chinese minzu in his tor}), 1907, in Liang Qichao, Y vixnghi hqi (Compl et e Works from the Ice D rinker’ s St udifr (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1941), 11:1-13. (Hereafter cited as YBSH j). 1 8 Tang, Gl obal Spate ard the Nationalist Di soomse c f Moderni t y, 11-45. R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 389 the expansion of its national space on the contemporary world map. On the other hand, Zhang Binglin and a group of classically trained revolutionaries associated with the G uoadXudm (Journal c f National EssencJ) stressed the nativist roots of China’ s national identity. In place of Liang Qichao’ s historical, progressive time, the National Essence Clique sought a particular, uneven space on which they could locate the unchanging, transhistorical continuity of China’ s “national essence” (gicaa). In their search for an untainted and immutable form of Chinese national identity, they drew not only on Western theories of race to emphasize the biological purity of the Han race but also Qing evidentiary methods to seek out the origins of Chinese national values— in the ultimate hope that one of these elements might, in the words of Charlotte Furth, “provide the key to the restoration of polity and culture today.”1 9 In spite of these quests for the nativist origins of the Hanzu and its culture, the National Essence Clique joined Liang Qichao and nearly all turn of the century Chinese intellectuals in acknowledging the non-native origins of the Han people. All were in agreement that the Yellow Emperor and his descendants migrated into China from Central Asia or the Middle East around the third millennium B.G Take, for example, the account provided in China’ s first modem history textbook written in 1904. Of the three ancient races (zhongpu) author Xia Gengyou placed at the dawn of Chinese history only the Yellow Emperor’ s agnate— the so-called Zhuxia people— were described as 1 9 Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895-1920,” in The Gmbridge H istory c f Chi na: Vol ume 12: Republ i can Chi na, 1912-194% Part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 356; Laurence A. Schneider, “National Essence and the New Intelligentsia,” in The L in ks fC h a n g : Essays on Consenat vw A It emat hes in RepM oxn Chi na, ed. Charlotte Furth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 57-89. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 390 non-native. Prior to the migration of the Zhuxia people into the Yellow River Valley from their ancestral home west of the Kunlun Mountains (the current day border between Pakistan and China), China contained both a northern Hunzhou race (whose descendants included the Xiongnu) and a racially-Malay Lizu people who were living in the Yangtze River Valley.2 0 In his 1905 YdlowHistory (H m ngbi), National Essence historian Huang Jie conveyed a similar story of Han origins. Huang admitted that the Yellow Emperor's Western migration into the Yellow River Valley was supported by legends found in the Chinese historical cannon. He described the “four barbarian tribes” (si$ as the original inhabitants of China, but argued that the Yellow Emperor was responsible for “rectifying names” {zhengrin^ and bringing order and civilization (wzming) to society. The Yellow Emperor put an end to the intermingling of races (zhong;u), prohibiting marriage outside one’ s clan (xtng) and giving rise to different racial types (zhongfei), religions, customs and languages. Thus, despite their Western origins, the Hanzu and other races in China began with the Yellow Emperor’ s “demarcation of the races” (zhongii).2 1 The obscure and marginal scholarly work of the French Sinologist Terrien de Lacouperie greatly influenced turn of the century Chinese intellectuals. Following an early missionary education in the Chinese classics in Hong Kong, Lacouperie took up a professorship in Indo-Chinese philology at University College in London, where he began to advance a derivative theory of Chinese origins. While Western Orientalists had 2 0 Xia Cengyou, Zwxin Zhongcue Jiaokeshu ZbongspoLishi (Most Recent Middle Scbod Textbook: Chime Histor$) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1908), 1:15-17. 2 1 Huang Jie, “Huangs hi: xunzhi” (Yellow History: Introduction), Guoadxudm , 1.1 (1905): 1-11. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 391 been speculating about the Western source of Chinese civilization as far back as the early days of the Renaissance, these ideas were largely unknown in Asia until Japanese scholars encountered Lacouperie’ s 1894 book Western Origins c f the Early Chinese Cvulizatioru Thereafter the large community of Chinese intellectuals studying in Japan became fascinated with the ideas of this marginal figure within Western academic circles.2 2 In Western Origjns f the Early Chinese CmLizaticn, Lacouperie argued that the ancient ancestors of the Chinese— “a blue-eyed, ruddy faced and not black haired race” called the “Bak Sings” (from the Chinese baixing meaning “100 clans”)—originated in the towns of Elam and Chaldea near Babylon in Central Asia. Following a dispute with a neighboring race, the leader of the Bak Sings, the Yellow Emperor, lead his people on a great westward migration which eventually brought them to the south-east comer of present-day Gansu in 2282 BG Due to the superiority of their Western “Chaldeo- Elamite culture”— which included everything from the ability to build canals to shoes and sandals— the Bak Sing were able to conquer and pacify the native lininox “black headed people” of China and establish their leadership throughout the Middle Kingdom2 3 2 2 Martin Bernal, “Liu Shih-p’ei and National Essence,” in Furth, ed., Links ( f Chang, 96-97; Dikotter, The Discourse c fRace in Modem China, 119-120. 2 3 Tenien de Lacouperie, Western Origins cftheEady Chinese Ckilizatkmfrom2300 B.C. tolO O A.D ., or, chapters ontheelermits deriwdfhmtheM chilizaticns t f West Asia in thefam vtim cfthe andent Chinese culture (London; Asher, 1894). With regards to the racial origins of the Bak Sings, Lacouperie wrote: “If they belonged to the yellow race, which seems more than doubtful, they had none of their exaggerated characteristics. We know that they had blue eyes, not turned up, and no black hair, moreover they used to taper their heads. Their language was connected with those of the Sumero-Akkadians, and of the Turano- Scythian stock of languages at large.” See p. 318. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 392 Ironically, it was one of the leaders of the National Essence Clique who first popularized Lacouperie’ s thesis among the Chinese intelligentsia. In his 1904 anti- Manchu tract Bock < fExpulsion (Rangbu), Liu Shipei not only outlined the Frenchman’ s theory in detail, he also went to great lengths to provide textual support for the theory from the Book c f Mountains and Seas {Shanhaph^ , Journey to the West {Xiyouji) and other non-canonical texts.2 4 The Western origins thesis was judged so interesting by both sides of the Chinese intellectual divide that Jiang Zhiyou translated large portions of Lacouperie’ s 1894 book and serialized it in Liang Qichao’ s NewPeople’ s Journal (Xintrm oo n g fn d ) between 1904 and 1905 2 5 How do we explain what Martin Bernal has called the “strange” contradiction between the National Essence Clique’ s obsession with Chinese cultural and racial continuity and Lacouperie’ s derivative theory of Chinese origins? First, I find Tang Xiaobing’ s discussion of the inescapable tension between time and space in Chinese nationalist discourse helpful. Despite their different conceptualizations of continuity, both the reformers and the revolutionaries struggled with “the perpetual tension between nationalist ideology and national history, namely, nationalism as a universal idea and national revolution as a singular historical event.”2 6 On the one hand, Liu Shipei and Zhang Binglin found Lacouperie’ s theory of Western origins useful for “proving” the equality and similarity of Western and Chinese civilizations, with Liu Shipei, for example, boastfully stating that “the Chinese race came 2 4 Liu Shipei, “Rangshu” (Book of Expulsion), in Liu Shipei, L iu Shipd xinhd qian nave nan [Selected Works tfL iu Shipei before the 1911 Rewbtiim), ed. Li Miaogen (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1998), 8-12. 2 5 Bernal, “Liu Shih-p’ ei and National Essence,” 372n36. 2 6 Tang, Glokd Spaas and the Nationalist Discourse c f Modernity, 81. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 393 from Chaldea... .Early Greeks were from Chaldea as were the Romans, Saxons and Slavs.” On the other hand, the group also found creative ways to highlight the autonomous and superior nature of Chinese civilization. Zhang Binglin, for example, suggested that it was perhaps the Yellow Race that begot the White race rather than the other way around. In a 1905 essay on Chinese history, Liu Shipei shifted his narrative strategy away from race and towards culture, contending that regardless of their racial origins, European and Chinese cultures clearly had different points of origins: the former in the Middle East and the latter in the Yellow River Valley. The contradiction between the desire to participate in Western modernity while at the same time maintaining an autonomous space for the construction of a distinct national identity— what Joseph Levenson once termed “patriotic schizophrenia” — runs throughout the modem Chinese discourse on identity.2 7 At the same time, I also think we need to understand the textual authority Lacouperie’ s ideas held over the turn of the century Chinese nationalists. It was the “aura of sciences” that distinguished Lacouperie’ s work from previous speculation about the Western origins of Chinese civilization. Lacouperie’ s use of “evidence” from the budding Western academic disciplines of philology, linguistics, archaeology, astronomy and geography elevated this age-old Orientalist theoiyto a level of, what Edward Said has called, “ontological, empirical truth.”2 8 In Western Origns c f Chinese Ckilization, Lacouperie contends that Chinese historians like Sima Qian failed to 2 7 Joseph Levenson, Liang Ch’ ich’ ao and the Mind c f Modem China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 136. 2 8 Said, Orantalism, 233. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 394 comprehend the obvious connection between their civilization and the West due to their blind “patriotism,” “ignorance of ancient geography” and “lack of historical criticism.” Yet, where the Chinese had failed Lacouperie succeeded. Why? His command, so he claimed, of the “science of history.” In the age of unquestioning faith in the omnipotence of science to reveal laws of nature— what Daniel Kwok has termed the era of “scientism” in China— Chinese intellectuals would have found it difficult to discount Lacouperie’ s presentation of what he called “historical facts” and “convincing evidence.”2 9 Prior to the development of their own indigenous tradition of scientific research and inquiry, the Chinese could choose to accept, ignore or modify the Frenchman’ s thesis, but were largely powerless to “scientifically” refute it. Liang Qichao & the Scientific Quest for Zbonghm ninzu Origins and Unity One of the central aims of the National Studies Movement of the 1920s was the development of an indigenous scientific historiography capable of reconstructing a viable cultural alternative and perpetuating Chinese civilization in the face of growing Western imperialism. Inspired by the New History School in the United States, the National Studies Movement took the western scientific method, that is the systematic collection of empirical knowledge verified by observation and experimentation, as central to its search for Chinese identity.3 0 The body politic in China rapidly disintegrated following the 1911 Revolution. Chinese warlords fought amongst 2 9 Kwok, Scientism in Chime Thou^t. 3 0 Q. Edward Wang, Imenting Chim Throng} History: The May FourtbAppmath to Historiography (Albany; State University of New York Press, 2001), 63; Schneider, Ku Chieh-kangand China’ s NewHistory, 53-84. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 9 5 themselves for political control while the frontier minorities looked towards the imperialist powers for protection from Han political hegemony. The participants of the National Studies Movement attempted to steer a middle course between the cultural conservativism of the National Essence Clique and the radical iconoclasm of the May Fourth intellectuals. Unwilling to accept either an unchanging Chinese essence or the wholesale westernization of Chinese society, Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Gujiegang and other participants turned towards their own history and the instruments of science in the search for the fountainhead of Chinese identity and meaning. Returning from a tour of Europe disenchanted by what he saw as the decline of Western civilization in the wake of the First World War, Liang Qichao refocused his pen upon the importance of the past for China’ s national future. In his highly influential lectures on Methods for the Study c f Chinese History, Liang called for a through reorganization of Chinese history and its restructuring as an objective and scientific academic discipline.3 1 First, he proposed that scholars approach the Classics as historical documents rather than historical truths. As such, the job of the historian was to employ a scientific method to first verify and then reassemble those truthful and useful facts from the past into modem histories. Echoing his earlier 1902 appeal for a “New Historiography,” Liang stressed that the aim of history was to explain the origins and development of the Zharqfm ninzu and its culture so as to define its place within the 3 1 Liang Qichao, ZhongpoLishi YanjiuFa (Methodsf ir dx Study ( f Chinese Histor^) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1930; reprint Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1998). The lectures were originally given at Tianjin University during 1922-23 and were reprinted in various journals before being compiled in one volume for publication by the Commercial Press in 1930. According to Q. Edward Wang, Liang’s book sold thousands of copies by the 1940s and is widely credited with introducing new historical R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 3 9 6 totality of the human world. To achieve this goal, one needed to not only employ a new scientific method but also greatly expand the field of inquiry. First, all aspects of the past, not just a single class, were to be opened to historical investigation; and second, the scope of historical data needed to be stretched beyond the Classics to include a plethora of literary and non-literary materials which would include everything from folk songs to prehistoric oracle bones. Liang’s new concept of “total history” and the importance of the scientific method inspired not only a new generation of historians, like Gujiegang and Fu Sinian, but also contributed to the development of other social scientific disciplines in China. Several months after Liang’ s essay was published, his close friend and European travel companion Ding Wenjiang, who had studied zoology and geology at Glasgow University, founded the first fully Chinese initiated scientific association, the Geological Society of China. Geology was perhaps the first western science to reach maturity in China, with the society conducting extensive geological surveys throughout China and publishing their findings in the internationally respected Bulletin c f the Geokgad Sodety c f China?1 "W hile the roots of sociology in China date back to Yen Fu’ s 1897 translation of Herbert Spencer’ s The Study rfSrxiology and the classes in “sociology” {shdomxu^ taught in American missionary schools, the discipline did not come of age as an independent intellectual discipline in China until the 1930s. Following the establishment of the Chinese Sociological Society in 1930 by Sun Benwen, Wu Wenzao and other largely thinking in China. See Wang, Inventing China Through History, 111. 3 2 Charlotte Furth, Ting Wenchiang Science and China’ s New Culture (Harvard University Press, 1970), 52. Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 397 American educated sociologists, the number of courses offered and sociology professors in China skyrocketed, reaching 114 native Chinese professors of sociology in 1948.3 3 An indigenous strain of Western cultural anthropology and ethnology can be traced back to Cai Yuanpei’ s famous 1926 essay “On Ethnology.” Cai, who had studied ethnology under T. W. Danzel at Hamburg University, described ethnology, or literally “the study of ninzus,” (pm zm uty, as a broad science encompassing raciology, archaeology and history while also drawing on the theories of sociologists, linguists, and psychologists. This new academic discipline, which Cai insisted should focus on the study of primitive non-Han peoples in China through the use of anthropological fieldwork, was institutionalized in 1928 with the establishment of an Ethnology Section under the Kuomintang government’ s new research institute Academia Sinica.3 4 Archaeology (kaogaue) and paleoanthropology {gdiengpzwcufy were perhaps two of the last scientific disciplines to rise out of the shadows of foreign authority in China. Despite the active participation of Chinese students, the Chinese Paleontological Society remained dominated by foreign scholars like Johann Gunnar Anderson, Davidson Black and Franz Weidenreich well into the 1930s, leading one of the pioneers of Chinese archaeology Li Chi to lament in 1934 that “of the several important archeological [sic\ discoveries in China recently, the majority are ones that foreigners initiated.3 5 Yet, the 3 3 Wong Siu-lun, Sociology and Socialism in Contemporary China (London: Roudedge &Kegan Paul, 1979), 1-36. 3 4 Wang Jianmin, Zhongs uo Mmz uxues M. • shangun ( I903-1949) (The H istory cfE t hndcgy in Chi na: Part One (1903-1949) (Kunming: Yunnan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997), 73-122; Gregory Eliyu Guldin, The S ag cf A nt hmpdogy in Chi na; Fnm M alinom ki toM cscowtoM ao (Annonk, NY: MJE. Sharpe, 1994), 23-49. 3 5 Li Chi, “Second Preface,” 1934, in Chergtzu-yai; The Blade Pottery Culture Site at L ungshan d m in Lirdr'enghsien, ShartarngPruunae, eds. Li Chi et al. and trans. Kenneth Starr (New Haven: Yale University R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 398 gradual establishment and sinification of Western social sciences in China gave rise to a new generation of academic specialists who would greatly alter the way in which the Chinese conceptualized and talked about diversity within their society. Liang Qichao was a strong proponent of employing these new academic disciplines to examine what he believed to be one of the most important questions of China’ s past: the origins and development of the Zhon$rua rrirrzu. In a 1922 essay on the role of rrinzu within Chinese history, Liang put forth a new subjective conceptualization of rrinzu identity. Blood, language and religion, Liang admitted, were all factors which contribute to the formation of a rrinzu; yet they were not essential as Zhang Binglin and other members of the National Essence movement insisted. “The only essential factor for the establishment of a rrinzu? Liang wrote, “is the realization and establishment of ''rrinzu consciousness’.”3 6 While Liang had argued as far back as 1902 that a written history rather than a common bloodline distinguished one rrinzu from another, he now went a step further in positing a subjective definition of ethnic identity, one which would greatly influence the way a new generation of Chinese ethnographers viewed ethnic diversity and contributed to a significant expansion in the discourse on human diversity within Chinese society. In sharp contrast to previous formulations, Liang contended that one became part of a rrinzu, when one recognized his or her membership within a specific rrinzu. Liang, for the first time among Chinese Press, 1956), 16. On the rise of Chinese archaeology also see Chen Xingcan, 2hon^4oShnqianKao§ecueShi Yanjiu, 1895-1949 (Research on the History cfPrehistoric A nhaeobgy in China, 1895-1949) (Beijing: SanUan shudian, 1997). 3 6 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo lishi shang minzu zhi yanjiu” (Research on the role of rrinzu in Chinese history), 1922, in YBSHJ, 11:2. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 399 intellectuals, stressed the importance of understanding the analytical difference between the concepts of rrinzu, zhongzu (race), and gm rin (citizen). Those who studied human races use the concept of zbong,u to divide humanity into different groups according to physical features and other biological differences. While a single zhcngu could be divided into numerous rrinzu, a single rrinzu could also contain numerous zhongzu. Those that studied law employed the concept of gm rin in referring to those people who lived in a common territory and shared a similar nationality. Yet, despite the usefulness of these two terms, it was the concept of rrinzu that functioned as the subject of inquiry for the historian. Equipped with this new discursive framework, Liang turned his attention to the origins and composition of the Zbongftua rrinzu. Liang listed the question of whether the Zhon$rua rrinzu was native to China or migrated into the region as one of the major unresolved questions of the National Studies Movement. Displaying a newly heightened sense of patriotism, Liang expressed, for the first time, some doubts about Lacouperie’ s western origins thesis, stating that while he “wholeheartedly accepted this theory in the past,” he no longer desired to look at this question from a “conservative point of view.”3 7 Despite admitting the existence of textual evidence within the historical record supporting the non-indigenous origins of the Han people, Liang found comfort in the recent discovery of 50,000-year-old human remains in Inner Mongolia and Henan by Western archaeologists and geologists. “At the very least,” Liang wrote, “no one can refute the fact that these bones are the remains of our rrinztis distant ancestors and that 3 7 Ibid., 3. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 0 they inhabited our native land over 50,000 years ago.”3 8 Yet, despite his new sense of optimism, Liang was forced to admit that “based on all the evidence currently available, this question can only be considered unsettled.” Next, Liang turned to the question of “whether the bloodline { x u e y e > $ of the Z h o n g fr u a rrinzu Hows from a single ancestor.”3 9 Here Liang answered more confidently. While the Classics, like Sima Qian’ s Sbiji, seem to establish that our rrinzu was formed from “a single pure bloodline” (chu nyi xueyuari), Liang contended that a closer look at the historical record— especially documents not originally considered part of the historical canon— revealed a more complex mosaic, in which one can trace the separate origins of each of the ancient dynasties and its people. If one investigates and considers this question from the standpoint of reason, Liang told his readers, it becomes clear that the different dynasties actually arose from several “small tribes” (xiao b u l u c l ) who established a tribal alliance to form the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties. Yet, it was through the process of gradual historical evolution that these originally heterogeneous peoples came to constitute the “backbone” (gJgtn) of the unitary Zhon$rua rrinzu. Liang traced the origins of China’ s “ rrinzu consciousness” to the usage of the neologism “Zhuxia,” meaning “the various Xia people” during the reign of Yu the Great. In addition to this Zhuxia, or “Han” core, Liang identified five other ethnic components that he claimed comprised an integral part of the Zhan^rua rrinzu. the Mongols, Hui, Manchus, Tibetans and southern barbarians {rmnyueztfy. Liang was quick 3 8 Ibid. 3 9 Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 1 to stress, however, the interrelated nature of the Zhon^rua rrinzils ethnic components, claiming that their blood had been mixed together to the point that they were now racially indistinguishable. In explaining why the Zhuxia people formed the core of the Zhanfm i rrinzu, Liang pointed to their “superior culture” and “power of assimilation,” which through time “engulfed and stained” (xunrari) neighboring peoples in creating “an extremely complex and consolidated rrinzu.” i0 In sum, Liang Qichao viewed the Zhorqfua rrinzu as a racial and cultural composite. Starting from a single, mixed race Zhuxia core, the Zhonfrua. rrinzu slowly grew— like a rolling snowball or a living organism— into one of the world’ s largest and most complex ninzus. This natural and evolutionary concrescence, Liang argued, continued today with the Mongols and the Hui not yet fully assimilated and the Zhonfm i rrinzu still expanding. As already discussed in chapter one, Liang’ s thought greatly influenced Sun Yat-sen’ s own discourse of rrinzuzhuyi In this chapter and the next, we shall examine how Liang’s evolutionary formulation of Zhorqfm rrinzu origins and composition served as the starting point for the academic research of a new generation of Chinese historians and ethnographers. The May Fourth Incident & the Rising Tide c f Kmrrirtang Cultural Nationalism In contrast to Liang Qichao’ s new historiography, a group of cultural nationalists closely associated with Sun Yat-sen’ s Kuomintang or Nationalist Party were developing an alterative reading of Chinese origins which stressed racial unity over racial conflict. This renewed emphasis upon the historical unity of the Chinese people needs to be 4 0 Ibid., 11 & 31. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 2 understood within the context of foreign, and especially Japanese, imperialism in China. The series of violent Chinese demonstrations in Beijing on May 4,1919, which became known as the “May Fourth Incident,” were sparked by the decision of the Western powers at the Versailles Peace Conference to hand over Germany’ s concessions in Shandong to Japan. In protest to this affront to Chinese national pride, a group of Beijing University students held a mass demonstration at Tiananmen, the gateway to the imperial palace in Beijing, where they burned the house of a pro-Japanese cabinet minister and called for a nationwide boycott of Japanese goods. The May Fourth Incident and the growing sense of national emergency that developed in its wake elicited a series of contradictory responses from the Chinese intelligentsia. Many intellectuals looked towards the West and the future in their call for an “enlightenment movement” (qimzngyundon^, convinced that only Liang Qichao’ s call for an objective scientific knowledge could rebuild China’ s battered national unity.4 1 Others, however, followed Zhang Binglin and the National Essence Clique in looking inward and backwards toward traditional Chinese culture, convinced that China lacked the moral fiber and national identity necessary to withstand foreign imperialism. In their urgent call for a “national salvation movement” {ju^ioyimkmg), many cultural conservatives rallied behind Sun Yat-sen’ s call for a revival of China’ s lost ninzuzhu^L Writing less than a month after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, conservative Kuomintang ideologue Shao Yuanchong claimed that the Japanese 4 1 On China’ s enlightenment project and the May Fourth intellectuals see Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese E rliphtemmnt: Intdlatnds and the L egxy c f the May Fourth Movement c f 1919 (Berkeley. California University Press, 1986). R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 403 invasion provided China with a historic opportunity to cultivate a new “ rrinzu spirit” ( ; rrinzu jmgberr^. “We have met with this danger and difficulty,” Shao wrote, “because our entire rrinzu lacks sufficient training and preparation in rrinzu spirit.”4 2 Shao pointed his finger at the excessive self-indulgence of the May Fourth Movement, arguing that patriotism rather than individualism, and spiritualism rather than materialism was China’s only road towards national salvation. The process of “ rrinzu psychological regeneration,” Shao contended, needed to be firmly rooted within China’ s own unique Confucian heritage. If the Chinese people could once again take pride in their glorious past and understand the importance of traditional morality, their national inferiority complex could be overcome, freeing the way for the Chinese people to finally stand up to the Japanese imperialists. The rising tide of cultural nationalism needs to be placed not only within the context of Japanese imperialism, but also the patriotic backlash against the cultural iconoclasm of the May Fourth Movement. According to a growing number of academics and propagandists, the May Fourth generation’ s ethic of “self-doubt” (buaiyi ziji) had degenerated, in the words of Kuomintang leader Chen Lifu, into an unhealthy and exceedingly pessimistic “loathing of the past,” “lack of interest in the present,” and “lack of concern for the future.”4 3 Because the Chinese people were what Sun Yat-sen 4 2 Shao Yuanchong, “Jiuguo yuwu yu fayang minzu jingsheng” (Saving the country from foreign aggression and fostering nim u spirit), 10 October 1931, in Shao YuanchongXiansheng Wenji (G oU ected Works (fM r. Shao Yuanchong), comp. Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui (Taipei: Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi weiyuanhui, 1983), 1:235 (Hereafter cited as SYXW ). 4 3 Chen Lifu, “Sanminzhuyi yu jiaoyu” (The Three People’ s Principles and Education), July 1934, in ChenLfuXiansheng Yardunji (Collated Speeches (fM r. Q xn L fdj (Privately Printed?, 1935), 177. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 4 called a “loose sheet of sand” (yqmnsanshd), they were easily set asunder when faced with a solid and unified Japanese attack. In his 1924 lectures on ninzuzhuyi, Sun Yat-sen stressed that the key to restoring national self-confidence and national unity was the revival of China’ s unique cultural tradition. If the Chinese wanted to regain their “ rrinzu spirit,” Sun argued that it was crucial to first “reawaken the learning as well as the traditional morality that we once possessed.” 4 4 Following Sun’ s death in 1924, conservatives within the Kuomintang straggled to keep his legacy of cultural nationalism alive, repeatedly calling for the arousal of China’ s lost “rrinzu sprit” {rrinzu jrngh&i) through the promotion of “ rrinzu thought” {ninzusixian^ and “ rrinzu liberation” {rrinzu ji^a r^. The cultural conservatives stressed that Japanese imperialism required a shift of attention away from personal enlightenment and towards the troubled fate of the entire rrinzu. Only by fostering a single national identity from amongst China’s numerous parochial, local, class and ethnic identities could the Chinese nation ensure its continued existence in the Darwinian struggle among the world’ s nation-states for the “survival of the fittest.” In other words, China did not need an awakened, enlightened and atomized citizenry as the May Fourth intellectuals claimed, but rather an army of patriotic, politicized and disciplined foot soldiers that would work together within the great machinery of “ rrinzu reconstruction” {rrinzu jianshi) like the proverbial cog-in-a-wheel. In 1935 ten conservative academics, including Tao Xisheng, Huang Wenshan, Sa Mengwu, He Pingsong and others, captured public attention when they issued a high- 4 4 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - diliujiang,” 9:247. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 5 profile attack on the May Fourth intellectuals. In their “Declaration for Cultural Construction on a Chinese Basis,” which was reportedly drafted by KMT Organization Department chief and arch-conservative Chen Lifu, the academics criticized the excessive iconoclasm of the May Fourth Movement, contending that it had become detrimental to public morale and national unity. Rather than “wholesale Westernization,” they called for a synthesis of Oriental and Occidental thinking around a distinctly Chinese cultural core.4 5 Two of the cultural conservative’ s greatest propagandists were Zhejiang natives Shao Y u an c h o n g and Daijitao. As editor of first the Kuomintang’ s Central Propaganda Bureau’ s Ihongyang zhoukan {Central Weekly] and then beginning in 1933 the important Jiangjo yuekan (Reoonstmction Monthly], Shao Yuanchong’ s work focused on the nexus between culture, identity and education. Shao viewed human evolution through the same Darwinian glasses as Sun Yat-sen. Human history was the story of “ rrinzu competition” ipirtzu jingzhenf), with different social groups struggling for evolutionary survival. Because of this struggle, people with similar blood, language, religion and customs needed to unite together in forming the largest and healthiest rrinzu possible.4 6 The Japanese invasion of Manchuria demonstrated that the Chinese rrinzu was debilitated and divided and in desperate need of national reconstruction; if China hoped 4 5 Gted in Wm. Theodore de Bary et aL, comp., Sources c f Chinese Tradition (New York Columbia University Press, 1964), 2:192-194; Also see Lloyd Eastman, “The Kuomintang in the 1930s,” in Furth, ed., Linds of Change, 197. In 1936 Chen Lifu gathered a collection of these professor’ s essays together in Chen Lifu, ed. Zbonggto Bemsd Wenhm Jianshe Tadunji (Essays Discussing the Construction <f China on a Cultural basis) (Shanghai: Wenhua jianshe yuekanshe, 1936). 4 6 Shao Yuanchong, “Minzu jianshe yu minzu shengcun” (Minzu reconstruction and rrinzu survival), October 1933, in SYXW , 1:365-69; Also see Shao Yuanchong, “Renlei jingzheng zhi yinxiang” R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 406 to reverse its slow walk toward “the death of the state and the extinction of the race” {mngyio rriezu) it needed to follow Sun’ s advice in restoring its national wellbeing. What constituted an evolutionarily healthy rrinzut Shao and the writers of Jiangio yuekan argued that it took more than a common bloodline, language, and set of customs for a group of people to be united together into a strong and cohesive nrinziv, rather a common elan centered on a single “national culture” {rrinzu wnhua) and “national education” (rrinzu jiaoyu) was crucial to national unity. Shao Yuanchong argued that each rrinzu possessed its own unique culture, and China’s was located in the suprahistorical Confucian values of “benevolence” (rerc), “knowledge” (zhi), “courage” (ycn$, and “loyalty” {zhon^. The cultivation of these timeless virtues among the Chinese people would provide them with the necessary self-confidence to face their current national crisis.4 7 The key to inculcating these values was the implementation of a rrinzu education.” Shao argued that the purpose of education was to “discipline and cultivate the masses, so as to provide them with a rich national spirit and morality, and the appropriate knowledge and abilities needed to undertake the responsibility for reconstructing their rrinzu.”4 8 It was crucial, however, that a country’ s educational system had a central focus: the rrinzu. The ultimate goal of education was to cause a person to “understand their own position, their own country, and their own (Influence of human competition), 1932, in SYXW , 1:254 ff. 4 7 Shao Yuanchong, “ Jianguo de liang zhong jichu” (The two basis for building the country), 1 January 1930, in SYXW , 1:211-18; Shao Yuanchong, “Minzu wenhua de lilun yu shiji” (Theory and practice of rrinzu culture), 20 November 1936, in SYX W , 2:421-7. 4 8 Shao Yuanchong, “Minzu jianshe yu jiaoyu zhengce” (Education Policy and Minzu Construction), March 1934, in SYXJ, 1: 392. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 0 7 ancestors.”4 9 In short, the purpose of education in China was to foster an understanding of one’ s “Qhineseness,” its unique culture, long historical tradition and common destiny. In many ways historical memory was at the center of both “national culture” and “national education.” Without a correct understanding of one’s past, it was impossible to resist the present oppression: “If a majority of [a country’s] people do not understand that they have a fatherland (z& g w o ); do not know they have a history, do not know the spirit of hardship with which their ancestors built upon; and do not know the beauty of their own culture” Shao wrote in 1933, “it becomes easy for country A to look down on country B as their slaves and for country C to have their land occupied and have to follow the orders of country D.”5 0 While Shao Yuanchong focused on the reconstruction of China’ s national spirit, Daijitao attempted to draw the nation’ s attention towards its threatened frontier regions. Dai, who once served as Sun Yat-sen’ s personal secretary, had always had a keen interest in the former Qing frontier, and following the establishment of the Nanjing Central Government in 1927, became one of its top policy advisors on the “frontier question” (biargiangwnd). Echoing his mentor Sun Yat-sen, Dai argued that it was in the frontier regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang, where China’ s authority was weakest, that the struggle against foreign imperialism was destined to be won or lost. It was pointless to “save the country” (jiugud) while losing the nearly 60% 4 9 Shao Yuanchong, “Minzu jiaoyu de yaodian” (The essentials of rrinzu education), 23 April 1934, in SYXJ, 3:218-19. 5 0 Shao Yuanchong, “Minzu xing zhi hanyi yi fahui” (Giving play to and the significance of minzu character), November 1933, in SYXJ, 1: 376-83; Also see Shao Yuanchong, “Minzu jiaoyu de yaodian,” 3: 220. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 0 have included many rrinzu within a single state.”5 5 In other words, the Chinese comprised, what Sun termed, a single, homogenous gtazu (state/national lineage). What about the Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus and other former Qing dynasty frontier peoples that Sun admitted did not share the same rrinzu characteristics as the Han majority? He dismissed them as numerically insignificant and evolutionarily unfit, arguing that despite the less than ten million “non-natives” (wtilai), “we can say that the four hundred million Chinese people are entirely Hanzuz sharing a common bloodline, common language, common religion, and common customs-a single, pure rrinzu.”5 6 Given Japan’ s occupation of Manchuria and parts of Mongolia, and the continued Russian and British meddling along other parts of the Qing frontier, Kuomintang cultural nationalists were more reluctant than Sun Yat-sen to dismiss the minority peoples as insignificant to the Chinese nation. Their numbers might be small when compared with the Han majority but the land they occupied contained many of the important natural resources necessary for the national development of China. It was no longer sufficient to simply claim that all the peoples of the Qing dynasty were citizens of the Chinese Republic; rather the state need to foster a sense of common rrinzu spirit among its heterogenous polities in order to counter Japanese propaganda which claimed that the Manchus and other minority peoples did not comprise part of China.5 7 Sun Yat-sen’ s definition of rrinzu did not appear to work. Shao Yuanchong, 5 5 Ibid., 184-5. 5 6 Ibid., 188. 5 7 See Hu Boxuan, “Dongbei sisheng zhi jianzhi lishi yu minzu yuanliu— wei bi Riren ‘ Dongbei fei Zhonguo lingtu’ shuo er zuo” (Establishing the historical and national origin and development of the four Northeastern provinces— refuting the Japanese claim and actions that ‘ Manchuria is not part of Chinese R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 411 Dai Jitao and others tried, rather unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that all Chinese people shared Sun’ s five criteria for nationhood;5 8 yet others, like Chen Kuofu, were completely forthright about the fact that the various rrinzu of China lacked a common livelihood, language, religion and customs.5 9 The cultural nationalists found themselves in a quandary; they had elevated Sun Yat-sen’ s thought to the point of ideological dogma and claimed that China’ s salvation rested solely with his Three People’ s Principles; yet they were unable to use his own theory of national identity to prove that the polyglot frontier peoples of the former Qing dynasty comprised a single, homogeneous Zhongbm rrinzu. The cultural conservatives found a solution to this problem in Sun’ s fascination with blood kinship. In his 1924 lectures, Sun claimed that among the five forces involved in the formation of a rrinzu, common “bloodline” (xueton^ was the most important. “Since the blood of one’s ancestors is always transmitted by heredity down through the rrinzu? Sun stated, “bloodline is the greatest force.”6 0 Zhou Kuntian, a member of the Nationalist Government’ s Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, argued that among Sun’ s five criteria only blood was “innate” ( xiarrtiatz ) while other criterion altered with changes in the natural environment. Extrapolating further, Zhou contended that only a common bloodline was essential for the formation of a territory’ ), Xinyaxiaya hinyuekaniA 0anuary 1932): 39-56. 5 8 See Shao Yuanchong, “Minzuzhuyi yu minzu shengcun” (Minzuzhuyi and rrinzu survival), 27 June 1932, in SYXJ, 3:23-32; Dai Jitao, “Zhongguo zhi tongyi yu fuxing” (The unity and revival of China),Xinytxzya banywskanlh (September 1931): 1-10. 5 9 Chen Kuofu, “Minzuzhuyi de jianshe” (Reconstruction of Minzuzhuyi), February 1941, in Guju SixiangLummyi (Collection of Essays on the Thoujjtt c f the National Father) (Taipei: Zhonghua minguo kejie jinian guofu bai nian dan zhenzhoupai weiyuanhui, 1965), 1: 563-66. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 2 rrinzu. Differences in lifestyle, language, religion and economic way of life were temporary and would gradually disappear with increased communication and transportation.6 1 Dai Jitao and others went a step further in claiming that the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people belong to a single, prehistorical race {zhongu). As Dai stated in a 1934 public letter to his “Qinghai compatriots: Today, the five big rrinzu and other rrinzu living within China were, all originally a single race (zhw$z«). It is only because they have lived in different places and migrated at different times that they have dissimilar languages and religions. The reason why different regions have produced their own sages and religions during the last two to three thousand years has nothing to do with whether or not they belong to a single race. It all makes sense when one thinks about it. Not only are all the rrinzu within our country a single family, our Qinghai compatriots are actually brothers from our ancestral home and relatives living within our ancestral land.6 2 Where was the proof for Dai Jitao’s claim? Why was he so confident that all the various rrinzu of China were fraternal brothers belonging to a single race? In a 1933 article, Shao Yuanchong claimed that “there was almost no doubt that the Yellow Emperor was our rrinziis progenitor (shizu).” 6i Drawing on Sima Qian’ s Shqi [Historical Reoonk] and the past research of the National Essence scholars, Shao contended that the Yellow Emperor, who was purported to have been bom in 2704 BQ was not only the “the first ancestor of the Zhongjrua rrinzu? but also the creative genius behind the creation of the Chinese state and culture. Shao was confident that if only the 6 0 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - diyijiang,” 9:187. 6 1 Zhou, “Sanminzhuyi zhi bianzheng jianshe,” 10. 6 2 Dai Jitao, “Xiaoyuan zhiqiao” (Sketches from the garden of filial piety), Xmyctxiyu kmyuekan 7.5 (May 1934): 89. 6 3 Shao Yuanchong, “Qiaoshan Huangdi lingkao” (Investigation of Huangdi’s Qiaoshan tomb), October 1933, in SYXJ, 1: 369. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 413 various peoples of China understood their direct racial and historical relationship with the Yellow Emperor, they would naturally unite into a single, indivisible body politic. “If we want to cultivate a national spirit and glorious national culture,” Shao wrote, “we must begin by fostering the glorious spirit of the Yellow Emperor; and to accomplish this, we must bear in mind, that we must start by eulogizing and exalting the Yellow Emperor.”6 4 During the 1920s and 1930s, Kuomintang cultural nationalists transformed the ancient saying about the Chinese being the “children of the Yellow Emperor” (HrnngR zisun) into a systematic theory of Zhonghua rrinzu antiquity and consanguinity. In its popular propaganda, the conservatives stressed the linear and unbroken genealogy of Zhonghua racial provenance, arguing that all the peoples of the former Qing empire could trace their ancestors back through the various Chinese dynasties to the inhabitants of the ancient “Three Dynasties” (Sandal) and then ultimately through the “Five Rulers” (Wudi) directly to a single, hoary progenitor—the Yellow Emperor. Gu Jiegmg and the “ D obing cfA ntiquity” The attempt by the cultural nationalists to manipulate Chinese historyin the service of the State’ s contemporary political needs did not go unchallenged by a new generation of professional historians educated in the spirit of Liang Qichao’s call for an objective and scientific “historical discipline.” "W hile the cultural conservatives were using the Yellow Emperor to construct a myth of Zhonghua racial propinquity, a group of enlightenment intellectuals were deconstructing China’s historical past. One individual in particular, Beijing University graduate and National Studies Movement < * Ibid., 369. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 4 participant, Gujiegang, fiercely opposed the attempts of the Kuomintang State to create a myth of common origins based upon the traditional Golden Age chronology. As early as 1923, Gujiegang began questioning the reliability of the hoary legends used in the construction of Sima Qian’s “Golden Age” chronology of ancient Chinese history. Building on Liang Qichao’s argument that the Classics should be treated as historical documents rather than historical truths, Gujiegang advanced a “stratification theory” (jild de oengi) for explaining the limited and contingent knowledge contemporary historians have about China’s distant past. He argued that with the passage of time, historical myths become longer and more elaborate while mythical figures take on increasingly heroic and superhuman features. Because of this natural process of myth building, it is impossible for contemporary historians to know the actual truth of ancient historical events and people; rather historians were only capable of knowing the situation relating to the most recently written examples of these legends. In short, ancient history was not an accurate record of past events but rather a historical representation of the political concerns under which it was written. For Gujiegang and other “doubting antiquity” (yigishi) historians, the essential question was not “What really happened in ancient China?” but rather “Why did past historians write what they did?” 6 5 6 5 Schneider, Ku Cbieb-kang, 188-217; Tay Lian Soo (Deng Liangshu), “Lun Gujiegang zhi xueshu licheng jiqi gongxian” (Discussion of the course and contribution of Gu Jiegang’ s academic work,” in Gu JkgangXueshu Nianpu Jiarinan (Chmndogy cftheAauknicA ctmties c f Gu Jiegtrf) (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chubanshe, 1987), 3-7; Hon Tze-ki, “Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism: Gu Jiegang’ s Vision of a New China in His Studies on Ancient History,” Modem Chim 22.3 (July 1996): 323-26. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 5 In a public letter published in the 1 July 1923 issue of Dushu zazhi, Gu outlined a provocative research agenda for ancient Chinese history. The goal of studying high antiquity, Gu argued, should be the destruction of a set of commonly held misperceptions: 1) that the Chinese originated from a single race {ninzii)\ 2) that the scope of Chinese territory has remained unified and unchanged throughout the ages; 3) that it is necessary to rationalize hoary myths and historical figures in the quest of a better life; and 4) that China possessed a Golden Age of antiquity. Gujiegang spent the next ten years gathering the necessary philological and historical evidence to topple this traditional conception of ancient Chinese history.6 6 In 1926 Gujiegang began publishing his findings and those of his supporters and detractors in the multi-volume GusMxan [Critiques o f A nrient Histary\. In the first volume, Gu stunned China’ s intellectual establishment by declaring that “properly speaking, there is no history [in China] before the Eastern Zhou dynasty,” and claiming instead that all historical documents written prior to this period were of spurious origins.6 7 Gu contended that “Yu the Great” was the oldest historical figure portrayed in the non-spurious records while all the other ancient rulers mentioned in Sima Qian’ s Golden Age chronology were simply invented by later generations of Chinese historians. Finally, in a move that clearly disturbed the cultural nationalists, Gujiegang argued that all the stories about the Yellow Emperor, the so-called “progenitor of the 6 6 Gujiegang, “Taolun gushi da Liu Hu liang xiansheng shu” (Discussion of ancient history: a rely to Mr. Hu and Mr. Liu), 1 July 1923, in Gushibian (Critiques cfA merit History), ed. Gujiegang (Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, 1926-1941), 1:99-102 (Hereafter cited as G5£);Tay, Gu Jw^mgXueshu Nianpu Jianbian, 8-9; Hon, “Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism,” 321. 6 7 Gujiegang, “Zishu zhengli Zhongguo lishi yijianshu” (Letter expressing my own opinion on R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 6 Zhon$m nirnu,” were baseless historical myths manufactured sometime during the Qin dynasty.6 8 Gu did not stop there, but rather, proceeded to deconstruct the myths surround the one remaining Sage King, Yu the Great. Central to Gu Jiegang’s attack on the myth of Chinese racial homogeneity was his attempt to demonstrate the non-Chinese origin of Yu the Great. Gu used a meticulous comparison of the various accounts of the Yu in the Classics to undermine the neat, untarnished historicity of this legendary tamer of the flood-prone Yellow River and the founder of the Xia dynasty. First, Gu argued that while Yu was described as a supernatural deity in Western Zhou texts, increasingly human-like features were attached to him in later historical records. In fact, it was only after the “Three Emperors” {sanhuan^ myth was created during the Spring and Autumn period that Yu metamorphosed into a human-like figure to correspond with the legends surrounding the two model Confucian rulers Yao and Shun.6 9 After challenging the historicity of the Sage King mythos, Gu attempted to demonstrate that the myths surrounding Yu the Great could be traced directly to a lizard totem worshipped by one of the primitive non- Chinese tribes in ancient China. Using the ancient Shuoum dictionary, Gu traced the etymology of the character “Yu” back to an insect (doon^ totem first appearing on bronze sacrificial vessels. While the Chinese academy found Gu’s arguments about the reorganising Chinese history), 9 June 1921, in GSB, 1:35. 6 8 Gujiegang, “Yu Qian Xuantong xiansheng lun gushi shu” (Letters discussing ancient history with Mr. Qian Xuantong), February-April 1923, in GSB, 1: 59-60. 6 9 Arthur W. Hummel, ed. and trans., The A tiobiography c f a Chinese Historian; Bang the Preface to a Symposium on A nciert Chime History (Ku Shih Pien) (Taipei: Ch’ eng-wen Publishing Company, 1966), 96-98 & 120-21 & 133; Gu, “Taolun gushi da Liu Hu liang xiansheng,” 119-120; Schneider, Ku Qruh-kang 223- 26. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 7 spurious origin of the Golden Age chronology provocative, they were utterly shocked, if not outraged, by his claim that “Yu was a lizard (xiyi)”7 0 Gu’ s iconoclasm had finally gone too far. Criticism about his claim that the founder of the first Chinese dynasty was a type of “Lizard King” came from nearly every segment of society. Classical scholars like Liu Shanli attempted to call into question Gu’ s philological methodology by undermining his claims about Yu’ s supernatural and non-human characteristics,7 1 while Southwest University history professor and Shuoum expert, Liu Yizheng, and others claimed that Gu had failed to appreciate the original intent of the Shuoum This ancient dictionary was never meant to be used as a biographical dictionary, rather its use was limited to character etymologies and definitions. One cannot conclude, they argued, that because the Shuoum does not list Yu as the founder of the Xia dynasty, he never existed, let alone that he was some type of “Lizard King.”7 2 Hujinren pointed out that in the Shuoum even the character for Emperor Shun is listed as a type of viny plant and not that of an emperor.7 3 Similarly, the great fiction writer and fellow May Fourth intellectual, Lu Xun, suggested calling Gujiegang “Mr. Bird-head” (raaotm xiansheng since the character for his own surname could be traced back to an archaic bird in the Shuoum, More importantly, Lun Xun believed that whilst China was struggling to maintain her national dignity in the 7 0 Gu, “Yu Qian Xuantong xiansheng lun gushi shu,” 63. 7 1 Liu Shanli, “Taolun gushi zaizhi Gujiegang” (Discussion of ancient history; questioning Mr. Gu once again), 15 August 1923, in GSB, 1; 165-86. 7 2 Liu Yizheng, “Lunyi Shuoum dengshi bixian zhi Shuoum zhi yili” (One must understand the scope of the Shuoumbeiovt using it to document history), 1 April 1924, in GSB, 1:217-18. 7 3 Hujinren, “Du Gujiegang xiansheng gushishu yihou” (After reading Mr. Gu Jiegang’ s letters on ancient history), 2 June 1923, in GSB, 1; 94-95. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 1 8 face of Western and Japanese imperialism, it was harmful to public morale and thus inappropriate to describe the founder the first Chinese dynasty as an insect; rather, a proper nationalist education was crucial for the development of a competent and patriotic body politic.7 4 In the wake of Gu’s argument, Dai Jitao led other cultural nationalists in creating the “Veneration of Yu Study Society” (ZmYuxuehui) in Nanjing, with the purported aim of promoting “respect for the existence of religious meaning over science.”7 5 Even Gu Jiegang’s mentors, Hu Shi and Qian Xuantong, criticized him for the flimsy and untenable nature of his linguistic argument.7 6 In the preface to the second volume of Gushibian, published in 1930, Gujiegang admitted feeling “quite disconsolate” over the intense criticism surrounding his characterization of Yu as a lizard totem. He claimed that this statement was only an initial “hypothesis” which he soon discarded. His critics had either overlooked or ignored his clarification about the significance of the insect radical in Yu’ s name in a later essay contained within the first volume of Gushibian.7 7 More to the point, Gu argued that his detractors had missed the point of his argument entirely, becoming hung up on his characterization of Yu as a “Lizard King” while missing his argument about the non-Chinese origin of the entire myth of Yu the Great. It was well known that the proto-Chinese people of the Yellow River Valley attached either the animal or insect 7 4 Gted in Fang Xiangdong, Lu X nnyuta M a’gjock Ren (Lun Xun and the People he ‘ Criticized) (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 1996), 176-78. 7 5 Gted in Lin Yutang, “Zun Yu lun” (Talk of •worshipping Yu), 1 November 1932, in Lin Yutang Ming.hu Quanji (Complete Collection c f L in Yutangs Famous Works) (Beijing: Beijing shifan saxue chubanshe, 1994), 101-03. 7 6 Schneider, Ku Cbieh-kang, 227. 7 7 Gujiegang, “Ziyu” (Preface), 10 August 1930, in GSB, 2: 3. Gu admitted his mistake in Gu R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 419 radicals to the names of the barbarian tribes surrounding them. Gu argued that the lore of a flood- controlling deity suited the conditions of the non-Chinese barbarians living in the previously marshy area of present-day Sichuan and Hubei provinces. Unlike the Central Plains, the water in this region needed to be drained and then controlled before the land could be cultivated. Using extensive textual evidence, Gu demonstrated how both the figure of Yu and the myths surround his superhuman exploits originated among a Southwest minority community before being carried northward during the Kingdom of Chu. The lore was not only adopted by the people of the Yellow River Valley but somehow the figure of Yu also became “mixed up with the ancestors of Zhou,” ultimately leading to the association of this barbarian deity with the very foundations of Chinese culture and national identity.7 8 The larger point behind Gu’s research on Yu the Great was to demonstrate the important role non-Chinese barbarians played in the genesis of the supposedly homogeneous Zhonghua rrnizu. Gujiegang believed that the apologue of Zhonghua racial homogeneity was not only historically inaccurate but also detrimental to the current government’s goal of fostering national unity among the Han majority and the frontier minorities. In the 1933 preface to the fourth volume of Gushibian, Gu referred to the factitious consanguinity of the Sage Kings as a prime example of what he called the “idol of race” (zhorqpu de ouxian^P Gu argued that this idol of race was responsible for the erroneous belief in the existence of a racially pure “Huaxia” people in high antiquity. Historical documents Jiegang, “Da Liu Yimo xiansheng” (Reply to Liu Yiwei), 28 November 1925, in GSB, 1:222. 7 8 Gu, “Taolun gushi da Liu Hu liang xiansheng,” 117-124; Schneider, Ku Chieh-kcmg 227-28. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 0 reveal that the so-called Huaxia people and their neighboring ethnic minorities all possessed their own blood lineages. During the Zhou dynasty, for example, each of the various ramus, worshipped their own ancestors. It was recorded in the Bock c f O de s that the Shang and Zhou rrinzu considered themselves descendants of two different progenitors. Gu claimed that the idol of race only arose following the forced political unification of the various Zhou kingdoms under the Qin and Han dynasties. Instead of using force to eliminate the strong sense of non-Huaxia “racial consciousness” {zhongpu ^amnan) among the barbarian kingdoms like Chu and Yue, court historians like Sima Qian began replacing the “horizontal system” of ancestors and spirits with a single “vertical system,” making the ancestor of “kingdom A” the father of the ancestor of “kingdom B,” and the founder of “kingdom C” the father of the ancestor of “kingdom A ” Consequently, Qin and Han officials began declaring: “We are all the sons of the Yellow Emperor; despite differences in sentiment and custom, we are now united into a single country and should eliminate regional prejudices.”8 0 Gujiegang was also highly critical of the attempts by the Kuomintang regime to use the myth of racial consanguinity to buttress its political agenda of national unification. In a 1932 letter to fellow Yanjing University history professor, Hong Weilian, Gu referred to the state’ s ideological project as the “manufacturing of ancient history” (jiazaogcshi) and argued that a myth claiming all Chinese are the “children of the Yellow Emperor” was insufficient for fostering a “new conviction of national 7 9 Gujiegang, “Guyu” (GuJiegang’ s preface), 12 February 1933, in GSB, 4: 5-7. 8 0 Ibid., 6. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 1 unity.”8 1 Gu’ s point here, as Larry Schneider has pointed out, was not that he disagreed with the state’ s attempts to unify the Chinese people into a single national body or its efforts to improve relations between the Han majority and the frontier minorities. Gu believed, after all, that the very evolutionary survival of the Chinese people depended upon their unity in the face of the West’ s superior material force. Gu did disagree, however, with the state’ s method for achieving this important goal of national unity.8 2 He was convinced that the dissemination of lies about the historical relationship between the minority peoples and the Han majority would hinder rather than help the natural, evolutionary melding of sentiments and cultural practices: Since we are all Chinese, we have many common interests. If we develop a good method of unifying the nation, we shall have no difficulty in staying together. The government does not need to lie, telling us that we have descended from the same ancestor. Even if the government is successful in unifying the country with lies, this unity will be flimsy. Once the people become intelligent, can this trick still deceive them?8 3 In short, Gu believed that the actual story of minority peoples ’ participation in China’ s past would help foster the self-confidence and mutual understanding necessary for the development of a truly unified body politic. Gu Jiegang’ s theories about the importance of ethnic and cultural pluralism in ancient China inspired other historians to examine the role of diversity in the formation of the Zhon$m ninzti. In addition to Lii Simian, Yang Xiangui and the Communist 8 1 Gted in Gu Hong, comp., Gu Jieging Xueshu Wenhua SuM {Gu Jkgings Irfonral A cadertic and Cultural Writings) (Beijing: Zhongguo tiedao chubanshe, 1998), 3. 8 2 Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang 261. 8 3 Gujiegang and Yang Xiangui, SarbuangKao {Studies tfthe Three Emperors) (Peiping: Harvard- Yenching Institute, 1936), 25-26; Translation from Hon, “Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism,” 323. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 2 historian Lu Zhenyu, one of the more famous historians associated with the Gusbibian movement was Fu Sinian. While Fu Sinian was studying at Berlin University in 1923, Gu mailed him several copies of GusMnan articles challenging the Golden Age narrative and the myth of Chinese racial homogeneity. These articles greatly inspired Fu’s own budding historical scholarship.8 4 In a long letter mailed from Berlin to his former Beida roommate in 1928, Fu Sinian expressed sympathy with Gu’ s quest to destroy the “idol of race” in Chinese antiquity. “Prior to the Qin dynasty, it [Chinese culture and m nz w ] was not homogeneous, but naturally possessed numerous differences...,” Fu Sinian wrote, “as soon as one person recognizes that China was not a single race and culture, the concept will become unpopular with other people and eventually these differences will become natural.”8 5 When it came to defining his own research agenda, however, Fu Sinian’ s strong sense of patriotism did not suit Gu’ s radical deconstructionism. Fu instead preferred to work from amongst Gu’ s scattered fragments of history in reconstructing a more positive and syncretic history of Chinese origins. In particular, Fu found the renewed emphasis upon ethnic diversity in ancient Chinese history useful in challenging Western claims about the non-indigenous origins of Chinese civilization. During the 1920s, Western archaeologists working in China breathed new life into Lacouperie’ s turn of the century theory about the Central Asian origins of Chinese civilization. In 1920, Swedish geologist and amateur archaeologist Johann Gunnar 8 4 Wang Fan-sen, Fu Ss u- r de n: A L ife in O nnse H istory and Pol i t i cs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 98-99. 8 5 Fu Sinian, “Yu Gu Jiegang lun gushi shu” (Letter discussing ancient history with Gu Jiegang) (1 February 1928), reprinted in Fu S im m jm n (Col l ect ed Works cfFu Siniari), comp. Lei Yin (Shijiazhuang: Henan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1942), 419 R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 3 Andsersson unearthed fossilized traces of an advanced Neolithic assemblage outside Yangshao village in the Henan stretch of the Yellow River Valley. Andersson termed its signature “painted pottery” and other distinguishing features “Yangshao culture.”8 6 In a 1922 summary of his findings, Andersson remarked on the similarity between Yangshao pottery and other forms of polychrome pottery discovered byPumpelly and other Western archaeologists working in the Central Asian cities of Anau and Tripolje in Southern Russia.8 7 Three years later, following the discovery of Yangshao painted pottery in Gansu, Andersson’ s colleague T.J. Arne argued that the fact that recently discovered pottery “exhibited still closer accordance with that of western Asia in the matter of form and pattern” lends strong scientific evidence to the Western provenance of C hinese civilization.8 8 Among many Chinese intellectuals, Andersson’ s discoveries seemed to provide “scientific verification” of Lacouperie’ s original thesis. In his first lecture on Mvrqmnzhuyi, for example, even arch-nationalist Sun Yat-sen admitted that “because the inhabitants of both banks of the [Yellow] River came from elsewhere, the civilization of Mesopotamia antedates that of China by more than 10,000 years; before the time of the “Three Sovereigns” {Sanhuang) and the “Five Rulers” (Wudfy of China, 8 6 See J. Gunnar Andersson, Osi l cbm c f the YeUowEart h: St udi es in Prehi st ori c Osi na (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1934); Li Chi, The Beam ing cfO sinese C h ilizatim Thr e e Lect ures Illustrated wi t h Fi nds a t Anyang{Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957), 12-18. 8 7 J. Gunnar Andersson, “An Early Chinese Culture,” Bulletin o f t he G edogad Survey e f Osi na, 5 (1923): 1-56. 8 8 T.J. Arne, “Painted Stone Age Pottery from the Province of Honon, China,” Pal aeont doga Si ram, Ser. D, VoL 1, Fasc. 2 (Peking: 1925): 34. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 4 the [inhabitants] of Mesopotamia emigrated into the Yellow River Valley and gave birth to Chinese civilization.”8 9 Fu Sinian felt that he had discovered a weakness in the Western origins thesis in its failure to consider the role of race and geography in ancient Chinese civilization. “History,” Fu Sinian wrote in 1919, “is the product of race {zhon^ti) multiplied by geography. Race is the most dominant element. When racial groups change, then history changes immediately.”9 0 In his 1934 monograph East-West Theory a fY i andXia, Fu Sinian used the recent discovery of a distincdy non-Yangshao “Black Pottery” culture in the Shandong village of Longshan, to postulate the plural origins {daoymn) of Chinese civilization.9 1 Without completely discounting a non-indigenous cultural influence in ancient China, Fu claimed that Western scholars had “prejudge[d] the direction of their transmission as being from west to east,” and went on to argue that “westerners who carry on Chinese archeology [sic] generally place major emphasis on the relationship of external causation and often neglect important internal features,” such as race and geography.9 2 In his 1934 monograph, Fu made a strong case for the existence of a “horizontal interrelationship” between the three Golden Age dynasties of Xia, Shang and Zhou. Breaking with conventional wisdom, Fu contended that these three ancient 8 9 Sun Yat-sen, “Minquanzhuyi diyijiang” (The Principle of Minqmn - Lecture Number One), 9 March 1924. In SZSQf, 9:259. 9 0 Fu Sinian, “Zhongguo lishi fenqi zhi yanjiu” (Research on the Periodization of Chinese History), 17 April 1919, in Fu Simon Qrnnji (Compile Works cfFu Simon) (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1980), 4:1230 (Hereafter cited as FSQf). 9 1 Fu Sinian, “ Yi Xia dong xi shuo” (East-West Theory of Yi and Xia), 1934, in FSQf, 3: 823-93. Also see Wang Fan-sen, FuSsu-men, 101-114. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 5 dynasties represented distinct races (zhongptt) and cultures (wmhud), and co-existed in and around the Central Plain region at roughly the same time in history. Fu Sinian argued that the struggle between different racial groups played a fundamental role in the origins of ancient Chinese civilization. The Shang rrinzu of Manchuria migrated south where they struggled and intermingled with the barbarian Yi rrinzu who were living along the mouth of the Yellow River delta. In founding their own dynasty, the Shang overthrew the Xia rrinzu living along the upper reaches of the Yellow River in modem day Henan and Shanxi provinces. Finally, the Shang were defeated by the militarily superior, yet culturally inferior, Zhou rrinzu, who had replaced the Xia people as the dominant force in the western Yellow River Valley region. The East- West Theory c fY i andXia marked a subtle and well-argued attempt to relocate the locus of Chinese cultural origins away from the polluting influences of the West and towards a more indigenous origin in the East. Fu Sinian contended that due to the more fertile environment and efficient transportation networks, the culture of the Yi and Shang peoples along the mouth of the Yellow River valley was superior to that of the Zhou and Xia peoples located in the arid far West. Nationalist pride undoubtedly played an important role in Fu Siniaris desire to shift the center of Chinese civilization away from the western Yellow River valley and towards the Shang and Yi cultures centered in and around his native Shandong province. In doing so, Fu asserted that Eastern China, and not northwest China or Central Asia as the foreign scholars 9 2 Fu Sinian, “First Preface,” 1934, in Li Chi et al, eds., Ch’ engtzurYai, 11. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 6 contended, had always been the cradle of Chinese civilization,9 3 While Fu Sinian sympathized with Gu Jiegang’ s attempts to destroy the apologue of Chinese racial and cultural homogeneity, his own nationalist proclivities and close relationship with a budding field of Chinese archaeology lead him to stress the indigenous origins of the Chinese culture and people. While Fu Sinian was focusing on the Eastern and indigenous origins of Chinese civilization, Gu Jiegang was exploring the role of the non-Chinese barbarians in the birth and revival of Chinese culture. Gu spent much of the 1930s demonstrating how many of the legends and customs traditionally associated with “Chinese” or Huaxia culture during high antiquity actually originated with the non-Chinese Rong barbarians living in what is today western Henan and central Shanxi provinces.9 4 The concept of Tum id (All under Heaven), for example, evolved from the Rong tribe’s jm zhm (Nine Realms) while the Rong’s Four Mountains became China’ s Five Sacred Mountains and their heavenly spirit of Yu became a great Sage King of China’ s Golden Age and the founder of the Xia dynasty. “Thus,” Gu concluded, “all these things that are considered part of a purely Chinese culture...actually originated with Rong barbarian culture; if the [supposedly Chinese clans of] Ji and Jiang are considered the center of the Huazu (Hua or Han race), then [the barbarian deities of] Yu, Ji and Boyi can be considered the 9 3 Wang, Fu Ssu-nian, 105-108. 9 4 This research culminated with the publication of Gu Jiegang, “Jiuchou zhi Rong yu Rong Yu” (The Nine Realms of Rong and the Yu of the Rong), April 1937, in Gu JiegmgJuan (Works <f Gu eds. Gu Chao and Gu Hong (Shijiazhuang: Henan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 586-609; Also see Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang, 229-231. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 7 creators of the H uaziis culture.”9 5 The purpose of this intentionally provocative statement was to shatter the myth that a pristine Chinese culture existed along side China’ s supposedly pure race. This, Gu argued, simply was not true. What is today considered the “Chinese race and culture” and what was considered the “Huaxia race and culture” during antiquity were both the result of the intermixing between several racially and culturally distinct peoples. Gu Jiegang used his understanding of the importance of the barbarians in Chinese history to provide an alternative and more optimistic spin on the popular May Fourth view of the Chinese rrinzu as “old and decrepit” (sbuailao) and on the verge of “extermination” (mezhong). Gu argued that once the evolutionary youth and virility of the frontier minorities and the Han peasants were taken into account, “a ray of hope” would replace this pessimistic view of China’s future; it was China’ s diseased and obscurantist High Culture, Gu argued, rather than its “race” that was old and decaying. Because of their virility, the non-Han minority peoples had a special role to play in the revival of the Chinese rrinzu. In Gu’ s mind, even a cursory look at Chinese history revealed the importance of the non-Chinese barbarians to the development of the nation: During the period of the Warring States (403-255 BQ, when there was an influx of many new rrinzu elements, China was unusually vigorous and powerful, but in the Han dynasty that arbitrary power of the monarchy, and the exclusiveness of Confucian teaching, brought Chinese culture to the verge of extinction. The reduced physical stamina of the people, their intellectual mediocrity, their lack of enthusiasm and will power, all signified that the rrinzu was old and decrepit (shmilao). Had it not been for the infusion of new blood 9 5 Gu, “Jiuchou zhi Rong yu Rong Yu,” 608. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 2 8 from the m hu or Five Barbarian Tribes of the Jin Dynasty (265-419 AD), from the Khitan (eleventh century), from the Jurchen (twelfth century), and the Mongols (thirteenth century), I fear that the Hanzu could not have survived.9 6 Similarly, today, the Republic’ s frontier minorities were crucial for the “national salvation” (jiugio) of the Zhorqjmz rrinzu. In Gujiegang’ s mind the very survival of the Chinese rrinzu depended upon the literal “infusion of fresh blood” (dedaayidianxinxueyty into the veins of the Han majority. Consequently, he frequently advocated intermarriage between the Han majority and the Tibetans, Mongols and other minority peoples as one of the best methods for solving the frontier question in China.9 7 To Gu Jiegang, the fusion of a virile minority people and their culture with the decrepit Han majority would breathe new life into the Zhonphua rrinzu, producing the more evolutionary-fit rrinzu that Sun Yat-sen and others believed was necessary for the survival of the Chinese The Mamhtman Incident & Japanese Imperialism Within the context of rising Japanese imperialism, it should not surprise us that Gujiegang’ s violent tearing down of the linear Golden Age chronology elicited a strong response from conservative politicians and academics in China. Historians trained in the Classics questioned Gu’ s evidence while other academics highlighted the movement’ s 9 6 Gu Jiegang, “Ziyu” (Preface), 12 January 1926, in GSB, 1: 89; the translation has been adapted from Hummel, The Aut obi ography c ja Qnmse Historian, 166-67. Gujiegang’ s “fresh blood theory influenced a number of other May Fourth intellectuals. Take, Lin Yutang, for example. In his popular and influential English language book, M y Count ry and M y Peopl e, Lin included a section entitled “Infusion of New Blood,” in which he wrote: “The infusion of new blood must explain to a large extent the racial vigor that the Chinese people possess today.” See Lin Yutang, M y Count ry and M y Peopl e (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1942), 27. 9 7 See, for example, Gu Jiegang, “Zhongguo bianjiang wenti ji qi duice” (China’ s frontier question and policy), December 1938, in Xihei M inzu Zorpj i ao Shi l i ao Wenzhav Gansu Fencm (Codect kn <fHistorical Mat eri al s an N ationality and Rel i gi on in tlx N arthm sf Ganzu Vdurrd), comp. Gansusheng tushuguan shumu R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 429 shoddy methodology. Despite welcoming the critical and skeptical spirit behind Gushibian, large portions of the Chinese academy remained unsatisfied and unconvinced by Gu’s findings, or more to the point, worried about the effects of “doubting antiquity” upon China’ s already battered national spirit. Gassics experts, like Hujinren and Liu Shanli, provided alternative textual evidence to challenge the validity of Gu’ s findings; yet, the fact that Gu had already called into question the authenticity of many of their sources rendered their criticism largely ineffectual.9 8 Other scholars questioned what they believed to be the unscientific methodology behind Gujiegang’s conclusions. One author writing in the Tianjin newspaper Yishibao, for example, argued that Gu’ s entire research method violated the basic principles of scientific logic; in reaching his controversial conclusions about ancient history, Gu violated the principles of logic governing deductive and inductive reasoning and analogy." Similarly, Qinghua University student Zhang Yinlin contended that the entire basis of Gujiegang’ s conclusions rested upon a scientifically flimsy and evidentially unsubstantiated “argument from silence” (tmzhen^. One cannot conclude, Zhang argued, that something never existed (Le. China’ s Golden Age) simply because there does not exist any evidence to prove it.1 0 0 Even Fu Sinian, who had recently been named the director of the Institute of History and Philology attached to the Kuomintang new central research cankaobu (Lanzhou: Gansusheng tushuguan, 1984), 1:21 (Hereafter cited as XM W Z), 9 8 Hu, “Du Gu Jiegang xiansheng gushi shu yihou,” 93-96; Liu, “Taolun gushi zaizhi Gu Jiegang,” 151-86. 9 9 Shaolai (pseud.), “Zhengli gushi yin zhuyi zhi tiaojian” (The factors one must pay attention to in the reorganization of ancient history), 3 December 1928, in GSB, 2:271-88. 1 0 0 Zhang Yinglin, “Ping jinren duiyu Zhongguo gushi zhi taolun” (Critique of recent discussions of Chinese ancient history), April 1925, in GSB, 2:271-88. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 430 academy, Academia Sinica, in 1928, felt uncomfortable with Gu’ s radical historical scepticism, writing in 1930: “It is a gross fallacy on the part of the historian to mistake what we do not know for what never existed.”1 0 1 Fu and other nationalist historians believed that it was all too easy during times of cultural insecurity to incorrectly conclude that because we do not know something, it never actually existed. An element of historical faith was required in restoring the national self-confidence of China. Kuomintang officials were far more outspoken in their criticism of Gu’ s “idol smashing.” Cultural nationalists within the Party worried about the ill effects of the Gushibian movement on the State’ s efforts to counter Japanese propaganda and shore up the fragile state of national unity in China. Gu’ s questioning of the Golden Age narrative threatened to undermine the apologue of racial and cultural homogeneity which was central to their attempts to construct a single, unified Zhonghm rrinzu. While there was little they could do to curtail the environment of academic freedom in the private institutions in and around Beijing, government officials did attempt to ensure that Gu’s “doubting antiquity” spirit did not spill over into the public realm where it could influence the naive masses. In 1929, at the insistence of conservative leader Dai Jitao, the Central Government banned the high school textbook Gu Jiegang had written for the Shanghai Commercial Press.1 0 2 Dai disapproved of the way Gu’ s Elementary National History [Bengaxhi jiaokeshu\ questioned the orthodox chronology of the “Three 1 0 1 Gted in Wang Fan-sen, “Fu Ssu-nien: An Intellectual Biography” (Ph.D dissertation, Princeton University, 1993), 183. 1 0 2 See Gu Chao, GuJiegtngNianpu (ChronidecfGuJiegang (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1994), 172; Hon, “Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism,” 321-23; Schneider, Ku Chiebkang, 107-08; Gu and Yang, SanbuangKao, 25. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 431 Dynasties and Five Rulers” (Sandai Wudi) and called into question the authenticity of the entire Golden Age narrative. In justifying his decision to ban the book, Daijitao is reported to have said: "W hile we should allow academic debate, these various theories should not be permitted in our textbooks; otherwise, the self-confidence of the nation will be shaken, which is, of course, harmful for the State. China’ s ability to unify itself into a single entity depends completely upon the people’ s belief that they come from a single progenitor.1 0 3 Dai was apparently so outraged by the fact that the Commercial Press had already published a quarter-of-a-million copies of Gu’ s textbook that he insisted the government fine the company one million yuan. Although the fine, for one reason or another, was never meted out, Dai did succeed in having the textbook removed from distribution and replaced with texts approved by the Ministry of Education. Following the textbook incident, Dai Jitao rallied other cultural nationalists in attacking the Gusbibian movement and its iconoclastic approach to ancient Chinese history. The Kuomintang cultural conservatives also placed direct pressure on Gu Jiegang to alter his historiographic research agenda. Chen Lifu, then head of the KMT’ s powerful Organization Department, began accusing Gu Jiegang and his associates of being members of the Communist Party due to their involvement with the grass-roots “Popular Readings Publication Society.” Party conservatives deemed much of the anti- Japanese propaganda published by the society as “pornographic” and potentially harmful to public morale and unity.1 0 4 When Gu traveled to Nanjing to seek the 1 0 3 Both quotes by Dai Jitao are cited in Gu, Gu JiegtngNianpu, 172. 1 0 4 Gu, Gu JiegmgNianpu, 247; Schwarcz, The Chime Eriid%enment, 181; Schneider, Ku Chido-kang, 280-81. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 432 assistance of Chen’ s close associate, Zhu Jiahua, in January 1936, he was instructed to join the Kuomintang party if he wanted to be trusted by KMT leaders. Despite agreeing to join the Party in front of Zhu, Gu never carried out the necessary procedures upon his return to Beijing and it is doubtful he ever seriously contemplated joining.1 0 5 Gu’s search for public funding to finance his various academic and social activities did bring him into frequent contact with Kuomintang officials; and, following the outbreak of war in 1937 and the virtual collapse of independent academic funding, the importance of state funding eventually would force Gu Jiegang into a much closer alliance with the Kuomintang than he desired. In challenging Gu’s historical skepticism, many of his critics looked towards the new “hard science” of archaeology. They claimed that Gu had intentionally overlooked or slighted “mute materials,” namely non-textual prehistoric evidence, preferring instead the deconstruction of Chinese history over its positive reconstruction. In an effort to foster the search for prehistoric artefacts and nurture an indigenous tradition of Chinese archaeology, Fu Sinian oversaw the establishment of an Archaeology Section at the Institute of History and Philology in 1928.1 0 6 The new director of the Archaeology Section, the Harvard-trained anthropologist Li Chi, shared many of the concerns of the Kuomintang cultural conservatives about the effects of Gujiegang’ s antiquity doubting on national morale. With archaeology, it was possible, Li argued, to conduct scientifically valid, yet nationally sensitive, research on ancient Chinese history. Li 1 0 5 Gu, Gu JiegmgNianpu, 247. 1 0 6 On the establishment of the Archaeology Section and its early activities see Chen, Z hongguo slnqian kaoguxue shi yaijiu, 103-05. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 433 contended that not all ancient myths were a “smoke screen,” and stressed the importance of recently unearthed artifacts and oracle bones in discriminating between myth and “true historical facts” so that historians could rebuild a more positive image of the past through the “reconstruction of China’ s ancient history.”1 0 7 Li Chi’ s boss at the Institute of History and Philology, Fu Sinian, was also critical of Gujiegang’ s historical scepticism, stating in a 1929 lecture that “in our study of ancient history, it is obviously wrong to doubt everything, just as it is wrong to believe everything.”1 0 8 Instead, Fu Sinian joined other nationalist historians in suggesting that the empirically based, scientific discipline of archaeology was the most appropriate tool for reconstructing ancient Chinese history while also reaffirming Chinese national pride in the fact that their culture was one of the oldest and most civilized in the world. Lu Maode raised a similar point in his extensive review of Gushibian published in the December 1926 issue of the Qirqjtm xuebao Umersity Journal].1 0 9 Lu began by rejecting Hu Shi’ s claim that dire to the untrustworthiness of the ancient Classics we can only say that Chinese history began 2000 to 3000 years ago. According to Lu, this statement overlooked the ability of archaeologists to provide scientific evidence about “pre-historic” (lishi qiandd) man. Archaeological research in Egypt, for example, had uncovered numerous details about its pre-historic civilization, while also enabling scholars, in the words of English Egyptologists A.H Keane, “to push Egyptian culture 1 0 7 Li Chi, “Second Preface,” 17-19. 1 0 8 Fu Sinian, “Kaoguxue de xin fangfa” (New Methods in Archaeology, 19 November 1929, in F S Q ,4 :1340. 1 0 9 Lu Maode, “Ping Gu Jiegang Gushibiarf (Gitique of Gujiegang’s Guskibiari), December 1926, in GSB, 2:369-88. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 3 4 back further and further, so that it now reaches back over 8000 years.” By failing to take into consideration recent archaeological finds in Asia, Lu questioned whether Gu Jiegang and his fellow Gushihian scholars were really employing a “scientific historiographic method.” If Yu the Great and other mythical figures in ancient Chinese history were “pre-historic figures,” as Gu Jiegang claimed, what was the point of using the Shang Hymns, the A nakcts, the Shuoiem dictionary and other “historical documents” to either prove their existence or challenge their validity? “Shouldn’ t all these questions be handed over to the archaeologists,” Lu queried, “who can use the results of their excavations to draw final conclusions [about China’ s pre-histoiy]?”1 1 0 In his argument that the various rrinzu of ancient China “all possessed their own origins and progenitors,” Lu claimed that Gu Jiegang overlooked recent archaeological evidence supporting the monogenesis of mankind. In fact, Lu asserted, China’ s ancient people all descended from a “single race” (yizhon$ and then evolved into “different varieties” (g a5 a) under different environmental conditions. The various creation stories discussed by Gu Jiegang were simply invented by these different varieties and then passed down orally from generation to generation. It was these myths, Lu claimed, and not the Golden Age mythology, that was spurious in nature. Without the benefit of archaeological evidence, Lu Maode concluded, nearly all of Gujiegang’ s findings in GusM mnmust be considered “unscientific” (feikexue) and open to questioning.1 1 1 One 1 1 0 Ibid., 375. 1 1 1 Ibid., 373 & 380. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 3 5 day, Lu and other nationalists historians believed, archaeologists would prove Gu Jiegang and his fellow doubters of antiquity wrong. The 1931 Manchurian Incident greatly intensified the sense of urgency among the cultural nationalists for locating scientific proof of the common racial and cultural origins of the inhabitants of the former Qing empire. The incredible speed and ease with which the Japanese imperial army invaded China’ s four northeastern provinces rocked the national mood in China. The event was a large source of embarrassment for the Chinese people as they watched the Kwantung Army occupy the former frontier tributary, which now represented nearly one-fifth of the Republic’ s territory and much of her industrial wealth. The cries for armed resistance increased as the Japanese army advanced to within thirteen miles of Beijing in May of 1933. Yet, as discussed in chapter three, the attention of Chiang Kai-shek’ s regime was on defeating the Chinese Communists and consolidating Kuomintang authority over the regional warlords, rather than imperialist encroachment on the Chinese frontier. Seeking to appease the Japanese, Nanjing agreed to the humiliating terms of the Tangku Truce, which granted Japan almost complete control over the northern provinces of Hebei and Chahar and opened the way for the creation of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. The battle for Manchuria was fought not only on the battlefield but also in the intellectual realm. Chinese intellectuals and politicians were sensitive to the fact that the Japanese military was drawing upon the academic research of the Kokushi-ha, the clique of nationalist Japanese historians closely associated with the Research Division of the South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu Chosabu), in justifying their political stake R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 3 6 over parts of the former Qing empire.1 1 2 In the wake of the Manchurian Incident, conservative Kuomintang historian Tao Xisheng sent an impassioned plea to Fu Sinian, claiming that the Japanese occupation of the Northwest represented the first move in an impending “cultural war” between Japanese and Chinese intellectuals.1 1 3 Japanese historians like Yano Jinichi and Asano Risaburo had been claiming for several years now that Manchuria, Mongolia and other parts of the Qing frontier were never part of “historical China.” In justifying Japanese patronizing influence over these regions, the Kokushi-ba historians argued that the so-called “Republic of China” was a modem political construct, which was being used to forcefully subjugate the legitimate national aspirations of the former Qing frontier peoples who now desired self-determination and independence from China. By helping to establish the independent state of Manchukuo, with the last Qing emperor as its monarch, the Japanese were unselfishly aiding the small and weak races of Asia in resisting traditional Chinese hegemony.1 1 4 Tao Xisheng argued that these false accusations could not go unanswered, and urged Fu Sinian and other patriotic historians to compile their own national histories to counter those of the Japanese. In answering Tao’ s plea, Fu Sinian and other historians at the Institute of Histoiy and Philology originally intended to compile a new, systematic general history of 1 1 2 On the Kokushi -ba and their relationship with the South Manchurian Railway Company see Hyung IlPai, Const ruct i ng 'K om ri Ori gi ns : A Critical R euew cf A nbaedcgy, Hi st ori ography, and Racial M yth in Korean St at e-Format i on T h e o r i e s (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), 23-24. 1 1 3 Cited in Wang, Fu Ssu- ni en, 149. 1 1 4 See, for example, Yano Jinichi, “Man-Mo-Zo wa Shina no ryodo ni arazu” (Manchuria, Tibet and Mongolia were not originally part of Chinese territory, Gaiko jiho 35.412 (1931): 51-71; Asano Risaburo, Manrm no Rek ishi Chi ri t ek i Kenkyu (Res ear ch on Manchuri an and Mongol i an H istory and Geogr aphy R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 3 7 China. Yet, the exigencies of time led them to instead quickly compile a brief outline of Manchurian history. Yet, in their haste to complete their Outline History ( f Northeast O nm [Dongbei ShigtrgJ for submission by the Kuomintang to the Lytton Commission investigating the Manchurian Incident, the editorial committee lead by Fu Sinian consciously distorted the historical evidence in order to “prove” that the northeast had been governed by a Chinese bureaucratic system since the beginning of recorded histoiy and that the Manchus were in fact racially Chinese.1 1 5 Their blatant disregard for historical facts garnered harsh criticism from not only the Kokushi-ha historians, but also the academic community in China, with one critic, Meng Fenglin, claiming that despite its short length, the number of historical errors in the book would almost certainly break a record. It was ineffective, the book’ s Chinese critics argued, to counter the solid scholarship of Japanese historians with bogus and hollow propaganda.1 1 6 Fu Sinian, however, saw things differently. He believed that during times of national emergency, the need for nationalist historiography sometimes outweighed the importance of carefully researched historical scholarship.1 1 7 Yet, one of the principle problems Chinese nationalist historians faced in their attempts (Tokyo: Sekai Kaizo Sosho Kankokai, 1928). 1 1 5 An abridged English translation Donibei Shi gzrqywas completed by anthropologist-cum- archaeologist Li Chi and sent to the Lytton Commission. See Li Chi, M andm ia in Hist ory: A Sum rury (Peiping: Peking Union Bookstore, 1932). It is unclear whether a full Chinese version of Dongbei Shi gmg was ever published. Because of the criticism, the work was never included in Fu Sinian's coEected works, and some scholars have even argued that Fu never wrote the book, attributing it to other Chinese historians. On the colophon of Li Chi’ s abridged version, however, the authors are listed as Fu Sinian, Xu Zhongshu and Fang Zhuangchiu. 1 1 6 Miao Fenglin, “Ping Fu Sinian jun Dongbei Shiging quanshou” (Critique of Out l i ne H istory c f Nort heast Q xm byFu Sinian and others), Wenyi C onran 2.2 (1934): 131-163 as cited in Wang, “Fu Ssu- nien,” 245-49. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 3 8 to counter the claims of their Japanese counterparts was the fact that few Chinese dynasties had consistently and fully controlled the frontier regions of Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria. In the case of Manchuria, Japanese historians were able to argue rather convincingly that Chinese administration only extended to Manchuria during the Han and Tang dynasties, and then only in the form of a loose coalition with native rulers.1 1 8 Fu Sinian’s claim that the original inhabitants of Manchuria were racially and culturally identical to the proto-Chinese people of northern China also seemed at odds with the research findings of Japanese archaeologists and ethnographers. In addition to highlighting the close historical relationship between Japan and Manchuria, the Kokushi- ha scholars also aimed to demonstrate the common, non-Chinese ancestral origins of the Manchu, Korean and Japanese people.1 1 9 Through his over twenty years of archeological and ethnographic research in Korea, Manchuria and the Russian maritime provinces, the doyen of Japanese archaeologists, Torii Ryuzo, claimed to have discovered the origins along the Amur River of a single, prehistoric “Paleo-Siberian race” which at some point in ancient history split to form the Tungus and Japanese races.1 2 0 In a 1933 monograph published simultaneously in Japanese and Chinese, Torii stressed that the current inhabitants of Manchuria were not the territory’s native 1 1 7 Wang, Inverting China Tbouglj History, 173; Wang, Fu Ssu-nien, 248. 1 1 8 See the rather convincing argument, especially when compared to Fu Sinian’s Dongbd Skiging, of Kokugakuin University professor Matsui Hitoshi in Toa-Keizai Chosakyoku, comp., TheMandmian Year Book, 1932-1933 (Tokyo: Japan Times Printing Office, 1932), 16-38. 1 1 9 Pai, Constructing ' ’ Korean” Origins, 36. 1 2 0 Ibid., 437n49 and MarkJ. Hudson, Ruins tfldertity: Ethnagnensis intheJapanese Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii’i Press, 1999), 39-44. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 439 population but rather Han Chinese who had migrated into the region from Shandong during the Han dynasty. Toni argued that based on his archeological research in Manchuria he had been able to prove that the original inhabitants of Manchuria were the Tungus offshoot of the Paleo-Siberian race.1 2 1 The meticulously researched and thoroughly argued work of Torii Ryuzo, Yano Jinichi, Asano Risaburo and other members of the Kokushi-ha placed a new level of patriotic pressure on Chinese nationalists. In order to challenge these supposedly scientific theories, Chinese scholars needed more than the empty propaganda of Fu Sinian’ s Outline History c f Northeast China. Rather alternative historical “evidence” was needed to scientifically demonstrate the common origins and fundamental unity of the Han majority and the Manchu, Mongol and other frontier minorities of the former Qing empire. TbePnMemqf Gu Jiegang and the Japanese: Enter PekingMan As Lu Maode and others had predicted, the cultural nationalists found the “scientific evidence” they were searching for buried deep within the arid loess soil of an underground cave west of Beijing. On 2 December 1929 archaeologists digging near the village of Zhoukoudian discovered a nearly intact fossilized skullcap belonging to what appeared to have been a 500,000 year-old hominid. Over the next seven years, archaeologists unearthed other hominid remains at Zhoukoudian, enabling foreign and Chinese scientists to gradually reconstruct the early life and origin of prehistoric “Chinese” man.1 2 2 It was the discoveryof these ancient human remains— more than any 1 2 1 Torn Ryuzo, ManMeng Guji Kao (Imestigztim cfAncient Races c f Manchuria andMorqplia), trans. Chen Manben (Shanghai, 1933; reprint, Taipei: Nantian shuju, 1987), 98-99. 1 2 2 Jia Lanpo and Huang Weiwen, The S tory fP e k ingManfrom A nhaedogy to Mastery, trans. Yin Zhiqi R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 4 0 other 20th century archaeological discovery— that provided the “scientific evidence” Kuomintang cultural nationalists needed to challenge Gujiegang’ s historical skepticism and “prove” to the Japanese imperialists and the world community at large that the Zhon^ua rrinm was a single nation and race. Ironically, the location of the Zhon$m rrinztis “progenitor” was not discovered by the Chinese themselves but rather the Swedish archaeologist Johann Gunnar Andersson. Early in the 1920s Andersson was told about the existence of animal fossils, or what the locals called “dragon teeth,” among the loess covered hills outside the sleepy town of Zhoukoudian, some 30 miles southwest of Beijing. Due to the unique nature of the soil deposits, Andersson was convinced that the site would contain pre historic human remains. After securing funding from the Swedish Geographical Society for a full scale archeological dig at the site, Andersson persuaded the young Austrian paleontologist Dr. Otto Zdanskyto supervise the excavation work at Zhoukoudian.1 2 3 Andersson’ s suspicions were proven right when Zdansky began unearthing what appeared to be ancient hominid teeth at Zhoukoudian. Comparison with fauna found side by side with the teeth indicated that they were at least as old as the Early Pleistocene Age (ca. 500,000 BQ, making Zdansky’ s discovery one of the oldest hominid remains thus far discovered by archaeologists. Dr. Davidson Black, a young Canadian professor of anatomy at Beijing Union Medical College, made an even bolder claim following a detailed examination of the teeth’ s unique morphology. In a 1927 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1990); Chen, Zhonggio ShiqianKaogrxue Shi Yarjiu, 76-263 and passim. 1 2 3 Andersson, Children cf the YdhwEarth, 94-99. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 441 article published in the British journal Nature and summarized in the Bulletin c f the Gedogod Suney c f Chim, Black contended that the fossils discovered by Zdansky represented a new “hominid genus,” which he dubbed Sinanthropus pekimnsis, or as it became more commonly known, “Peking Man.”1 2 4 While Andersson was anxious to continue the excavation work at Zhoukoudian, his Swedish funding had run dry. Sensing the great excitement the discovery had created among the budding Chinese scientific community, Andersson approached the newly founded Geological Survey of China (Zhortggjo D izhi Diaodhasud) which agreed along with the Rockefeller Foundation to help fund a new round of digging at the site. As a concession to his Chinese partners, Andersson agreed to appoint Beijing University graduate Pei Wenzhong as the director of excavation work at Zhoukoudian while Davidson Black was to head up the newly established Cenozoic Research Lab (Xmshengdai Gushengm Yarymhi) in Beijing.1 2 5 Late in 1929, Pei Wenzhong made history, when he discovered an almost complete Simnthwpus cranium embedded in some loose sand of the Zhoukoudian cave. The discovery created quite a buzz among the scholarly community in Beijing, with over 150 people packing the small auditorium of the Chinese Geological Survey on the afternoon of 28 December 1929 to hear about the discovery and its significance.1 2 6 After a thorough examination of the skullcap in Beijing, Black concluded that, due to its 1 2 4 Davidson Black, “Tertiary man in Asia: The Chou Kou Tien discovery,” Nature 118 (1927): 733-734 and summarized in Bul l et i n c f t he Ge ol ogi c al Suruy o f Chim, 5 (1927): 207-208. 1 2 5 Andersson, Chi l dren o f tlx YeUowEart b, 104-06; Jia and Huang, The Story rtf Peki ng Man, 29-60. 1 2 6 [Editors], “Zhoukoudian yuanren tougu faxian zhi jingguo: Beiping dizhi diaocha suo gongkai yanjiang” (Discovery of the skull of a primitive man at Zhoukoudian: a public lecture at the Geological Survey’s Peking office), Kexue 14.7 (1930): 1046-49. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 4 2 unique combination of highly original and purely modem features, Sinanthropus appeared to be an older and more generalized type of hominid than either Pithecanthropus (Java Man) or H am Neankrtbakmis (Neanderthal Man), the two oldest hominid remains discovered to date. Black also argued that the Sinanthropus skull appeared closely related to the original type of hominid that led not only to the evolution of Java Man and Neanderthal Man but to all ham sapiens.1 1 7 Figure 1 : Republican Era Images of Peking Man and the Yellow Emperor Source: Huangli Him {Spirit fth e YdlowEmpemi) (1903) & Zhoukoudian Dongcue Cengmjue Ji ( . Record cf the Stratified Excoriation cfthe Zhoukoudian Cad) (1937) 1 2 7 Davidson Black, On an A ddesoent Skull fSimntbropus pekinensis in Comparison mth an Adult Skull cf the sane Species and with other Homnd Skulls, Reoent and Fossil (Peking: Geological Survey of China, 1931), 104-05. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 443 Interestingly, Chinese scientists were much more cautious in their conclusions. Writing in 1930, eminent Chinese scientist and director of the Chinese Geological Survey, Weng Wenhao seemed uncomfortable with the idea that this “ape-man” (yuarmi) might prove to be the actual progenitor of the Chinese people, let alone all harm sapiens. The early drawings and anatomical reconstructions of Peking Man by Black and others, depicted the ancient hominid as a hairy savage, sharply contrasted with the traditional images of the Yellow Emperor as sagacious, cultivated and resplendent. While Weng was clearly proud of the fact that Peking Man provided scientific evidence for the existence of primitive man in Asia if not the actual Chinese source of mankind, he was also quick to point out: We should not misunderstand that Peking Man is the direct ancestor of the Chinese race (renzhong); actually, the difference between Sinanthropus and modem man is far greater than the variation among different races today. Thus, there is only a slight relationship between Simnthnpus and the Chinese race or any other race. Based upon reconstructions [of Peking Man], the most we can say (although we are currently lacking evidence of this) is that Peking Man and contemporary races seem to share a common ancestor (which has yet to be discovered); however, Simnthnpus and our genuine ancestors (who still have not been found) evolved separately: with Simnthnpus evolving to the point when it became extinct while our race gradually advanced until it reached its current form.1 2 8 With regards to the relationship of Simnthnpus and the Zhon^tua rrinzu, Weng Wenhao was only willing to state that “at most we can call Peking Man a very, very distant younger cousin sharing the same father and certainly not our direct lineal ancestor.”1 2 9 1 2 8 Weng Wenhao, “Beijing yuanren xueshu shang de yiyi” (Academic significance of the Simnthropiis pekinensis), April 1930, in Weng Wenhao xuanji (S e le c te d , Works cfWeng Wenhad), comp. Huang Jiqing and ed. Pan Yuntang (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1989), 270. 1 2 9 Ibid. Pei Wenzhong expressed a similar opinion in 1936 see Pei Wenzhong, “Zhongguo yuanren huashi zhi faxian” (Discovery of Sinanthropuspekirensis fossils), Kexue 14.8 (1936): 1127-33. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 4 4 In other words, Peking Man represented an offshoot from the main line of human evolution and thus could not possibly be the progenitor of the modem Chinese race. The idea that the sagacious Zhan$3ua ninzu somehow evolved from a primitive group of “ape-men” seemed shocking to most Chinese intellectuals during the 1930's. The excessive hair, dark skin, flat nose and other ape-like features associated with Peking Man had long been signifiers of the non-Chinese barbarians and not “the children of the Yellow Emperor” (see Figure l).1 3 0 Western scientists working in China, on the other hand, seemed more willing to highlight the morphological relationship between Peking Man, modem man and the Chinese race. Following the death of Black in 1934, Franz Weidenreich, a Jewish emigre from Germany, was named the new director of the Cenozoic Research Lab in Beijing. The discovery of additional Peking Man remains lead Weidenreich to conclude in 1935 that “ Simnthnpus is the ancestor of recent man” or at the very least, “nothing [in the evidence] contradicts the assumption that Simnthnpus is a direct ancestor of recent man.”1 3 1 The fact that Peking Man was both older and had a larger cranial capacity than Java Man and Neanderthal Man seemed to suggest that he was Darwin’ s “missing link” between primitive ape and modem man. More importantly for the cultural nationalists in China, Weidenreich claimed to have discovered two unique features— a thickening of the jaw and shovel-shaped incisors— which when compared with modem northern Chinese revealed a similar racial morphology. “ Simnthnpus and the Mongoloid of 1 3 0 See Dikotter, T lx Di scourse cfRace in Modem Chi na, 138-42. 1 3 1 Franz Weidenreich, “The Si rmthmpus Population of Choukoutien (Locatlity 1) with a Preliminary Report on New Discoveries,” BtH & inrfthe Ge ogr aphi c Soci et y <fChim 14 (1935): 467. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 445 today,” Weidenreich wrote in 1936, “must have a direct relationship which can only be the case when Sinanthropus is a direct ancestor of that race and, therefore, also of mankind of today.”1 3 2 Weidenreich’ s findings seemed to provide the type of irrefutable scientific evidence that Kuomintang cultural nationalists need to prove the common origin of the Zhon$m ninzu. In their important volume examining the link between archaeology and politics, Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett argue that a close relationship exists between archaeology, nationalism and the construction of national identities. They point to a shared histoiy between the development of archaeology as a scientific discipline in the 19th century and the formation of the nation-state. Archaeological evidence has long played, they contend, an important role in the construction and legitimization of national and racial identities; and, moreover, the inherent ambiguity of archaeological and prehistoric data “paradoxically strengthens this role or, more accurately, enhances the potential for abusing it.” 1 3 3 The attempt of Nazi Germany’ s SS-Ahnenerbe to use archaeological evidence in the formulation of a myth of Aryan superiority is just one notable example of archaeological knowledge in the service of the state.1 3 4 Ironically, in China, it was the foreign archaeologists and anatomists, like Andersson, Black and 1 3 2 Franz Weidenreich, “Si mndrmpus pekivensis and its Position in the Line of Human Evolution,” Pek i ng N a tu rd H istory Bul l et i n 10.4 0une 1936): 38. 1 3 3 Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett, “Archaeology in the service of the state: theoretical considerations,” in Nat i onal i sm, Poli t i cs, and t he Pract i ce cf A nhae ol ogy , eds. Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13. 1 3 4 See Bettina Arnold and Henning Hassmann, “Archaeology in Nazi Germany, the legacy of the Faustian bargain,” in Kohl and Fawcett, eds. Nat i onal i sm, Pol i t i cs, and t he Pract i ce cfA r c h a e c i q g y , 70-81; W .J. McCann, “’Volkund Germanentum’: the presentation of the past in Nazi Germany,” in The Pol i t i cs cfthe Past, eds. Peter Gathercole and David Lowenthal (London: Routledge, 1990), 74-88. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 4 6 Weidenreich, who provided the raw, if not murky, evidence for Chinese cultural nationalists to reinforce the myth of Zhonghua racial consanguinity. In particular, Chinese cultural conservatives attempted to use the discovery of Peking Man to breathe new life into the myth of Zhonyfua rrinzu antiquity and consanguinity in the face of the challenge of Gujiegang’ s historical skepticism and Japan’ s own nationalist archaeology. Kuomintang cultural nationalists began to highlight the significance of Peking Man to the indigenous and singular provenance of the Chinese race during the late 1930s. In his 1939 History cfthe Chinese Race [Zhon&m Minzushi), Academia Sinica anthropologist Lin Huixiang argued that the discovery of Peking Man provided irrefutable scientific evidence of the indigenous provenance of the Chinese people. Lin and other Chinese scholars began publicly challenging the “Western Origin Thesis,” contending that evidence of early man in China invalidated the claims of Lacouperie and other Western cultural imperialists.1 3 5 In his 1943 Historical Outline c f the Zhonghua rrinzu s Deidoprrmt [Zhorqfm M inzu Fazhan Shigzng\, historian Zhang Xuguang argued that the unearthing of Peking Man provided “sufficient evidence to prove that, first, the Zhonfrua rrinzu was the original inhabitant of Chinese territory and, second, that today’ s Zhon^jua rrinzu can be traced back through ancient history to a single progenitor.”1 3 6 Zhang contended that today the cultural differences among the various “lineage 1 3 5 Lin Huanxiang, Zbongsuo Minzitshi (History (fthe Chinese rrinzu) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1939), 45-67. 1 3 6 Zhang Xuguang, Zhonfma Minzu Fazhan Shiging (Historical Outline c f the Development c f the Zhonfrua rrinzu) (Guilin: Qiji xinan yinkeshi, 1942), 4. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 4 7 branches” (zhizu) of Peking Man were the result of diverse environment conditions rather than differences in blood. More than anyone else the largely obscure neo-Confucian scholar Xiong Shili was responsible for directly linking the discovery of Peking Man with the ancient consanguinity of the Zhon^tm rrinzuP7 After joining the Kuomintang during the early years of the Republic, Xiong focused his life upon classical scholarship and was eventually appointed a Professor of Philosophy at Beijing University in 1922. In contrast to the popularity of Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu and other iconoclastic teachers at Beida, Xiong’s call for cultural regeneration through traditional Confucian ethics attracted few followers among the student body. Following the Japanese invasion, Xiong followed the Nationalist Government to Chongqing, where he began lecturing on Chinese history at the Kuomintang Central Military Academy.1 3 8 The content of Xiong’ s lectures on ancient Chinese history became the foundation of a new, “scientific” theory of Zhon^tm ninzu consanguinity, one which in the minds of the cultural conservatives proved both Gujiegang and the Japanese wrong. Xiong began his lectures on Chinese history by admitting that the Zhon$m ninzu had been formed through the non-violent melding of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, 1 3 7 For a discussion of the continued use of Peking Man in constructing a myth of Z h c m^ ma ninzu consanguinity after 1949 see Barry Sautman, “Myths of Descent, Racial Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in the People’s Republic of China,” in Dikotter, ed., The Const ruct i on c f Racial Ident i t i es in Chi na andJapan, 84-89 and Barry Sautman, “Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropological Nationalism in China,” Journal c f A sian St udi es, 60.1 (February 2001): 95-124. 1 3 8 On Xiong Shili see Ren Jiyu, “Xiong Shili xiansheng de weiren yu zhixue” (Xiong Shili’ s conduct and political philosophy), in Xuart pu Lum ueji ( Col l ect i on c f Papers fnm X uanpu) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian chuban, 1990), 37-42; Xun, M ingpoRenw Daddian, 1351; Tu Wei-ming, “Hsiung Shih-li’ s Quest for Authentic Existence,” in Furth, ed., The U n its c f Chang: , 242-275. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 4 8 Hui and Tibetan peoples. Yet, he was quick to stress that these five groups represented genealogically interrelated zangpu (“lineages”) with a common progenitor rather than five distinct ninzu as Liang Qichao, Gujiegang and others argued following the 1911 Revolution. Irrespective of the continuing debate over the monogenesis versus polygenesis of mankind, Xiong claimed that, when it came to the so-called “five lineages” (ztuzu) of the Zhongfrua ninzu, “logic determines that they all share a common bloodline (xuetorg)”1 3 9 The source of Xiong’s “logic” and confidence was the discovery of their common ancestor— Peking Man. For Xiong this discovery provided irrefutable evidence that the Zhon^ma ninzu originated from a single progenitor, who lived in the Yellow River valley some 500,000 to one million years ago and then spread out in all four directions, populating China and possibly the rest of the world. “If among the five lineages there were a few ninzu who migrated into China from other regions and did not disseminate outward from mighty China,” Xiong asked his students, “then where are the ancestors of these other people?”1 4 0 In other words, until archaeologists discover evidence of an older fossil man outside the Yellow River Valley and China, it is safe, and more importantly scientific, to conclude that all China’ s people, and possible homo sapiens, originated from a single progenitor— Peking Man. Xiong Shili argued in his lectures that any differences among the five lineages were temporary and insignificant. “If the five lineages share a common bloodline {x u e to r,g),” Xiong asked his students the question they were inevitably wondering, “then 1 3 9 Xiong Shili, “Zhonghua zhongzu tuiyuan” (A hypothesis on the origin of the Zhonghua race, 1939, in Zhanjguo Lishi {Lectures on ChineseHistorf) (Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1984), 33. m o Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 449 why do their customs (xz) and dispositions (xin$ so obviously differ?”1 4 1 Like Sun Yat- sen and many other Chinese cultural nationalists before him, Xiong turned to the analogy of the family in explaining these differences: Mother and father gave birth to many sons and daughters— some wise, others foolish; some strong, others weak Is it possible for them all to be equal without any difference? Everyone knows that every person’ s natural endowment (tianxing ) differs and that the natural environment influences different communities. Yet, today thanks to advances in science and the development of modem technology, man can now control his environment and make his people equal.1 4 2 Prior to this great process of equalization, however, Xiong left little doubt in the minds of his students that the Han majority was the wisest, strongest and most fecund of the Zhonghua lineages. He referred to the Hanzu as the “grandchildren of the three sage kings and five virtuous emperors” and argued that they have not only spread throughout China but also Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, the Ryukyu Islands, the Spratley Islands and even the Americas via the Bearing strait. Because of their long and glorious culture, “one often refers to the Hanzu when they are speaking about the Zhon^oua ninzu.”1 4 3 The bulk of Xiong Shili’ s lectures were spent demonstrating that four minority lineages of the Zhonghua ninzu (the Manchus, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans) were actually “branches” (fenzhi) of the Han majority. Xiong used a series of carefully selected quotes from the Chinese historical cannon to construct an intricate ethnogenealogy linking each of the minorities to the very origin of the Hanzu. Xiong began by tracing the 1 4 1 Ibid., 35. Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 0 contemporary Manchu, Mongol, Hni and Tibetan peoples back to the so-called “five northern barbarians” { w < h u ) of the Jin Dynasty. After demonstrating that there were actually only four northern barbarians, Xiong linked each of the four lineages to one of the barbarians tribes— claiming that the Xiongnu were the ancestors of present-day Mongols; the Xianbei the forerunners of the Manchus; the Di the ancestors of the Hui people; and the Qiang the forebears of the Tibetans. Next, Xiong traced these 12th century nomadic tribes back to even earlier barbarian ethnonyms mentioned in the Classics, which in turn were linked directly with specific Hanzu clans. Xiong claimed that the Manchus were actually the direct descendants of Suzhen clan of the Hanzu, who migrated to the Northwest frontier during the Zhou dynasty. Xiong uses Sima Qian’ s Shiji to demonstrate that the Xiongnu were actually the direct descendants of the Chunwei clan of the ancient Xia dynasty. The Muslim Hui people were traced back to a Han princely clan named Hu that lived in present day Nanling country in central Sha’anxi province before being banished to the Western region by Emperor Qi of the Xia dynasty. Finally, Xiong claimed that the Tibetans were the blood descendants of a Hanzu clan called Jiang who originally lived in Baoji country in Shanxi province before migrating into the Western region around the time of the legendary ruler Shen’ nong.1 4 4 Up to this point, Xiong’ s methodology differed little from that of other Chinese historians. There existed a long tradition in China of fictive ethnogenealogies. Since Sima Qian first pioneered the method in his first century BC Shiji, Chinese historians Ibid., 2. 1 4 4 Ibid., 5-28. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 451 had been constructing historical genealogies aimed at incorporating the recalcitrant frontier barbarians into the heavenly cosmology (Tiawcia). Xiong Shili, however, attempted to add a new layer of “scientific rigor” to his inflated claims about the heterogeneous peoples of the former Qing empire: From the distribution of our H rnzu, we can infer that our prehistoric ancestor was Peking Man (this is based upon the similar racial morphology of Beijing people and Smmthrvpus). Among the descendants of Peking Man, one branch remained in China and became today’ s Han lineage (Hanzu); another branch moved north-eastward where they propagated rapidly and are today know as the Manchu lineage (Manzu) or the ancient Eastern Hu barbarians; another branch propagated and moved to the extreme north in the region of what is today called Inner and Outer Mongolia and are today the so-called Mongols who originally comprised of the Xiongnu and other peoples; another branch propagated in the direction of the Northwest provinces of Gansu and Xinjiang and then into Central Asian and other regions and are today known as the Hui lineage (Htdzu) or what was originally called the Di people; and another branch propagated in Tibet, Qinghai and other locations and are today known as Tibetan lineage (Zaugii) or the ancient western Qiang people. It is fixm the discovery cfPeking Man by arch ae olog ists that we now k now owrfive lirmggs originally o o m s from a single s o u r c e . Simply put, the five lineages share a common bloodline with Peking Man. This evidence is solid and cannot be disputed.1 4 5 'While much of Xiong Shili’ s historical evidence was flimsy and based upon texts that Gu Jiegang claimed were spurious, his archaeological evidence carried with it a new scientific aura. After all, Pei Wenzhong had physically removed a 500,000 year-old hominid skull from the soil of Zhoukoudian and Franz Weidenreich had proved its racial link with the modem Chinese. Perhaps archaeologists would discover an older hominid in China, but would not the same scientific logic still apply? As Xiong concluded in lectures: 1 4 5 Ibid., 18-19; emphasis added. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 2 I firmly believe that the Zhon^tua ninzu (which includes the five lineages) is monolithic (yzyuande) and monophyletic (t anggendt). Those who are inclined to doubt this need only look at the origin of the Zhon^ma ninzu. There is no shortage of evidence with which to make out the basic pattern. Moreover, since the discovery of Peking Man by archaeologists, it has become even more certain that this hominid was the ancient ancestor of all our five lineages, who only later split into different branches and are today known as the so-called five lineages.1 4 6 Even if one did not trust the basis of Xiong’ s textual evidence, it was another thing entirely to challenge his use of archaeological and anatomical evidence. This seemed to require a radical rethinking of the very concepts of ninzu and zbongzu. RethinkmgM inzu: Gu Jiegang& the Ethnologists While Xiong Shili and the cultural nationalists were using archaeological evidence to reconstruct the myth of Zhon$rua ninzu consanguinity, Gu Jiegang and a group of professional ethnographers were looking towards Western anthropological theory for help in questioning the scientific validity of race as an analytical category. Uncomfortable with this myth of racial unity, these scholars began searching for a new theoretical language— one that was capable of preserving China’ s ethnic diversity while also unifying her people into a single body politic. The new field of anthropology, in particular the American school of “historical particularism” and Franz Boas’ new dynamic category of “culture,” seemed a promising avenue. Beginning in 1934, Gu Jiegang drew together a new generation of foreign-trained anthropologists, sociologists and cultural historians into the Yugong Study Society (Yugongxuehufy as his attention and that of the independent academy shifted away from pedantic intellectual inquires 1 4 6 Ibid., 34-35. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 453 towards the more immediate concerns of China’ s “frontier question” (biargiaf^w ti). The Society’ s bimonthly journal Yugyng— which had a subscription rate of nearly two thousand copies— served as the theoretical center of this movement, while Gu also established the Frontier Study Society {Biargiangyarguhd) in 1936 to provide a more informal setting for discussing the application of new academic theories towards the actual process of incorporating the frontier and its people into the nation-state.1 4 7 The constricting nature of Sun Yat-sen’ s narrow definition of ninzu became one of the central concerns of Yugong scholars. As mentioned earlier, in his 1924 lectures on ninzuzhnyi, Sun Yat-sen set forth a rigidly formalistic definition of ninzu as a group of people who shared a set of five common traits— blood, religion, language, economy, culture, customs— of which common bloodline was the most important. Sun, however, left an ambiguous legacy on the position of the ethnic minorities within the Chinese nation-state. On the one hand, he begrudgingly accepted, according to his own criterion, the multi- ninzu basis of the Chinese Republic, recognizing the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibet and Hui as distinct peoples or ninzm . On the other hand, however, he also argued that “since the Qin and Han dynasties China had been developing a single state (gajia) out of a single ninzu ” creating what Sun claimed was a homogeneous guozu (state/national lineage).1 4 8 In spite of this contradiction, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang elevated Sun’ s discourse of ninzuzbuyi to the level of intellectual dogma 1 4 7 On the establishment of the Yugong Study Society, the Frontier Study Society and Yugmg banyuekan see Tay, GuJiegmgXueshu NianpuJianbian, 13-17; Liu Qiqian, Gu JiegangXiamhengXueshu (A caderricReseardo cfMr. Gu Jieging) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 221-48; Gu, GuJiegmgNianpu, 214-77 passim; Gu Chao and Gu Hong, Gu JiegingPirgzhuan (Critical Biography c f Gu Jiegang) (Nanchang: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 1995), 122-133; Schneider, Ku Cbieh-kang, 272-74. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 4 following his death in 1925. Cultural nationalists in the Party latched on to Sun Yat- sen’ s claims about blood, arguing that the entire Zhan$7ua ninzu shared an objective and innate unity in its common bloodline. By offering a more subjective, and they believed more scientific, definition of ninzu, the Yugong scholars hoped to promote Chinese political unity without neglecting the importance of ethnic and cultural pluralism within both China’ s past and present. In their rethinking of ninzu, the Yugong scholars drew on both Western anthropological theories and Liang Qichao’ s 1922 attempt to redefine ninzu as a subjective state of “national consciousness” rather than an objective criterion of biological consanguinity. During the inaugural seminar of the Chinese Frontier Study society in May 1936, sociologist Fei Xiaotong spoke about his ethnographic field research among the Yao people of Guangxi. In place of Sun Yat-sen’s rigid definition of ninzu, Fei suggested that the concept of an “ethnic unit” (zutuan), first developed by his Russian mentor S.M. Shirokogoroff, was a more effective category for analyzing ethnic diversity in China. Fei told his audience that, according to Shirokogoroff’ s theory, all communities that shared a common culture, language, consciousness and endogamous marriage practices comprised a distinct ethnic unit. Fei stressed, however, that the subjective and situational nature of ethnic identity meant that Shirokogoroff’ s concept needed to be applied flexibly depending upon specific, local conditions. Ethnic identity was not based upon a static set of objective criteria, as Sun Yat-sen’ s theory of nimuzhuyi would have us believe, but rather a constantly evolving network of 1 4 8 Sun, “Minzuzhuyi - diyijiang,” 9:184-96. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 5 relationships. During his research in Guangxi, Fei discovered a growing sense of common identity among the geographically isolated and culturally distinct Yao communities of Guangxi. He also argued that rather than fostering a sense of common 2 hon$m ninzu identity, the state’s civilizing mission had actually banded the different Yao communities together, creating for the first time a single Yao language, culture, consciousness and marriage network In short, the encroachment of Han officials and merchants on Yao territory had actually fostered, rather than undermined, a distinct Yaazu ethnic identity. Instead of viewing ninzu as a set of unchanging, objective characteristics, Fei argued that ethnic and cultural identity were in a state of constant flux and had as much to do with extra-group relations as they did with internal cultural practices.1 4 9 A year later, the Harvard University graduate and Yugong Study Society member, Qi Sihe offered an even stronger critique of Sun Yat-sen’ s definition of ninzu. In an essay written in honor of the twelfth anniversary of Sun’s death and published in the April 1937 issue of Yugmg, Qi echoed Liang Qichao in stressing the importance of d istin gu ish in g between the concepts of “race” {zhon&u) and “nation” (ninzu). Since the late Qing dynasty, an entire generation of scholars had been using the Chinese terms zhon&u and ninzu interchangeably without distinguishing between their distinct English correlates of “race” and “nation.” Qi acknowledged the important shift within Sun Yat- sen’ s thinking from the “narrow racism” (xia’ ai dezhor^uzhuyt) associated with pre- 1 4 9 Fei Xiaotong, “Hualan yao shehui zuzhi— shehui renleixue diaochao de chuci changshi” (The organisation of Hualan Yao society; a preliminary experiment in social anthropological field research), June 1936, in F d XiactongXuanji (Fvzhou xinhua shudian, 1996), 131-44; R. David Arkush, Fei Xiaotong R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 6 revolutionary anti-Manchuism, towards the call for the assimilation of the “five races” (weu) of the Republic into a single Zhon^ma ninzu. While this aspect of Sun’s theory reveals “enormous foresight,” Qi warned his readers, “it is not necessary for us to conceal his shortcomings.”1 5 0 Qi believed that the major fault-lines in Sun’ s theory of ninziczhuyi was his formal 1924 definition of ninzu and its insistence that a common “bloodline” (xuetong) was the dominant force in the creation of a ninzu, “Viewed from today’ s perspective,” Qi wrote, “the biggest shortcoming of Sun Yat-sen’ s ninzuzhuyi is his obsolete view of ninzu and his failure to distinguish between ninzu (nation) and zhongzu (race).”1 5 1 Qi claimed that Sun’ s understanding of ninzu was based on the outdated ideas of an “older sect” of Western political scientists and anthropologists (like Burgess and Gobineau) who stressed the importance of consanguinity in group formation. A new generation of American scholars, such as Charles Hayes and Franz Boas, had demonstrated that human characteristics once thought to be inherited, were actually the result of differences in environment rather than blood. Qi contended that due to years of racial mixing and interbreeding it was impossible to use scientific methods to distinguish between one group of people and another using the category of race. In other words, since “pure races” (chwxui zhangzii) no longer existed, the entire concept of race was a meaningless and unscientific. “From the perspective of anthropology,” Qi argued, “so- called race (z& azgz#) was originally a type of superstition and thus cannot be scientifically and SockioQ! in Reidutianary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 62-68. 1 5 0 Qi Sihe, “Minzu yu zhongzu” (Nation and race), Yugmgbanjuekan, 7.12-13 (April, 1937): 27. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 7 analyzed.”1 5 2 From the perspective of biology, race has to do with the “innate” (xiaitian) characteristics of skin color, physical make-up and bone structure while the characteristics of language, religion, and customs are “acquired” (houtian) and relate to changes in environment and culture. The idea that there somehow exists “pure races” is a myth, which cannot be established scientifically due to the several hundreds of thousands of years of racial melding. Despite the fact that all humans descended from the same pair of primates, environmental differences have produced innumerable differences in culture and habits. Qi not only called into question the importance of common blood in ninzu formation but also the other four criterion used by Sun Yat-sen in his formal definition of ninzu. How could it be claimed, Qi asked, that the overseas Chinese were not Chinese because they spoke a different language? Does it mean that because the various peoples of China and America worship different religions that they do not belong to the same nation (rrinzii)} In place of Sun’ s objective and racial definition of identity formation, Qi echoed Fei Xiaotong in calling for a more dynamic and situational understanding of ninzu. He argued that membership in a ninzu, or “nation,” was based on a subjective sense of unity and difference and not a laundry list of objective criteria. A ninzu, Qi argued, was based on “consciousness” (jinghen) rather than “substance” (wezhi); was a “mental” rather than “physical” phenomena; was based on “political” rather than “biological” factors; and was formed through “acquired” characteristics that are in a constant state Ibid., 28. Ibid. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 8 of flux rather than “innate” and unchangeable physical attributes. Where did Qi Sihe locate the source of this common elan? Internally, Qi stressed, it was a common history of past calamities and achievements, while externally, it was the suffering at the hands of a common foreign oppressor. In short, the nation, as defined by Qi Sihe and other Yugong scholars, was a group of people who possessed a sense of common history and shared destiny. The formation of what Sun Yat-sen had called a “country with a single ninzuzhuyF could only proceed upon the basis of a common feeling of national belonging rather than unscientific myths of racial consanguinity.1 5 3 In sum, the group of largely foreign-trained academics that gathered around Gu Jiegang’ s Yugong Study Society offered a systematic and scientific critique of the State sponsored narrative of Chinese racial homogeneity. These scholars shared the Kuomintang party’s desire to unify China’s heterogeneous peoples and cultural traditions into a modem and unified nation-state capable of withstanding the encroachment of Japanese and Western imperialism They were not willing however to see the goals of the May Fourth project of intellectual enlightenment {qmsn$ trampled upon in the quest for national salvation (jiugw). They were firm believers in the ability of scientific truths to lead the Chinese nation into the modem world. Furthermore, they tended to view China’s historical and contemporary diversity as a positive rather than negative attribute. By drawing upon the superior attributes of each ethnic group, China could revitalize its stagnant and aristocratic culture and create a new national culture comparable to that of the West. Rather than building national unity upon an illusion of Ibid., 30-34. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 5 9 common ancestry and culture, the historical truth about the crucial role of non-Han barbarians in China's glorious past and their common suffering with Han people at the hands of foreign imperialism held the key to unlocking China’s latent virility and constructing a single, unified Zhonghua nation. The Japanese Imasion & the DisoonaycfEthnic Diversity The Japanese invasion of northern China during the summer of 1937 upset the delicate balance of power between the liberal academic establishment and the Kuomintang National Government. A tenuous spatial and intellectual disjuncture existed between the worlds of the Sino-liberal academy and the Kuomintang Central Government prior to the Sino-Japanese War. Generally speaking, Western-trained or influenced intellectuals pursued personal “enlightenment” {qmen^ from within the walls of their universities and research institutes in Beijing and Tianjin, while politicians in Nanjing, and their business compradors in Shanghai and Canton, worked towards the consolidation of Kuomintang authority in the quest for “national salvation” ( j i u g 4 Q ), namely political and economic independence from the growing threat of Western and Japanese imperialism. The boundary between the pursuits of qimeng and jiug40 was never, of course, completely hard, and the outbreak of war tore them down completely, forcing both the academics and the politicians to abandon their comfortable homes for the primitive conditions of the southwestern frontier. After first retreating to Wuhan, the Nationalist Government transferred its offices to Chongqing in October 1938 and began mobilizing the nation in the struggle to resist the Japanese from its new Sichuan capital. In the spring of 1938 the three great academic institutions of northern China- R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 6 0 Qinghua University, Beijing University and Nankai University-retreated to Kunming, the capital of neighboring Yunnan province, were they merged into the Southwest Union University (Xirnn lianhe daxue) or Lianda as it was commonly known. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Yanjing University and other Christian institutions moved to Chengdu where they established the West China Union University {Huaxi daxud) or Huada. Sharing a common sense of alienation and need for survival, both the academics and politicians focused their attention on the defeat of the Japanese and Chinese reconstruction.1 5 4 The mass migration to Sichuan and Yunnan brought many Chinese intellectuals into direct contact with some of the non-Han frontier peoples and their cultures for the first time, causing ethnographic research to flourish during the early years of the war. In order to take advantage of this unique cultural laboratory, academic institutions created new units dedicated to frontier and ethnographic research. Lianda in Kunming, for example, set up the “Southwest Frontier Cultures Research Section” (Xinanbianjiarg tmhua ym jm hi), where Wen Yu, Wu Han, Tian Rukang, Luo Changpei and other ethnographers carried out research under the leadership of Naxi sociologist Fang Guoyu. After arriving in Kunming, Wu Wenzao, the chairman of the sociology department of Yanjing University, founded the “Research Station for Sociological Research” {Shehukue shidi diaocha grngpuazhari) with Rockefeller Foundation funding. With well-known researchers like Fei Xiaotong, Zhang Ziyi, and Xu Languang, the 1 5 4 On the migration of Chinese academic institutions to the southwest see E-tu Zen Sun, “The growth of the academic community 1912-1949,” in The Canimdg History <f China. Volume 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2, eds. Denis Twitchett and John Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 461 Station became another hotbed of ethnographic research during the early war years. In Chengdu, Xu Yitang, a member of the sociology department at Jinling University, set up the Chinese Ethnographic Study Society (Zhongguo ninzu xuehui) in November 1938 and began editing the journal X irnn bianjiang [Southwest Frontier]. Xu’ s journal soon became the single most important medium for ethnographic research on the southwest frontier and before long the target of Kuomintang suspicions.1 5 5 The professionalization of ethnology and anthropology as academic disciplines combined with the mass migration of Chinese universities to the southwest frontier in 1938 momentarily expanded the scope of the Chinese discourse on ethnic diversity. During the Qing and early Republican period, the discourse had been limited to the w ait, the Han and Manchu peoples plus the northern and western frontier dependencies of Mongolia, Tibet and the Hui peoples of the Northwest who were ruled through the Qing court’ s Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifayuan). As discussed previously, turn of the century and early Republican intellectuals focused almost exclusively on what Liang Qichao had identified in 1902 as the “five historical races of China,” Sun Yat-sen begrudgingly accepted in 1912 as the w tzu gyngjx or the “Republic of Five M in z u and Xiong Shili redefined in 1939 as the “five lineages” of a consanguineous Zhor$ua ninzu. To the extent that ethnic diversity in Southern China was discussed, it was largely collapsed into the blanket categories of “Miao” and/ or “Yao,” with nearly Press, 1986), 412-17. 1 5 5 On the migration and development of various ethnographic institutes during the Sino-Japanese war see Wang, ZhonggmMi nzux. ueshi : shangun, 215-56; Guldin, The S a ^ cfA ndnvpol cQ! in Chi na, 57-62; and Wong, Sazofcgy and S ari al i sm in Gort enporary Cbim , 19-36. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. 4 6 2 everyone following Sun Yat-sen’s social evolutionary logic in declaring them “assimilated” (tongfcud). Yet, after arriving in the southwest frontier, Chinese ethnographers proceeded to complicate this neat ethnic taxonomy, much to the consternation of the cultural conservatives within the Kuomintang. Equipped with a new subjective definition of ninzu and the scientific method of ethnographic field research, Chinese ethnographers uncovered a complex mosaic of human diversity along China’ s Southwest frontier, one that defied simple categorization as “Miao” or “Yao,” and forced one to reconsider the meaning of “assimilation.” Deep in the Yunnan forest and high upon the Xikang plateau, they discovered numerous isolated and distinct peoples who spoke mutually exclusive languages and observed a multiplicity of cultural, economic and religious practices. The pages of X im n hnanjiang were filled with literally scores of new ethnonyms— Bai, Li, Dong, Yi, Luoluo, Maxie, Baiyi and Va to name but a few— as Chinese ethnologists attempted to ident

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Creator Leibold, James Patrick (author)

Core Title Constructing the Zhonghua minzu: The frontier and national questions in early 20th century China

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School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program History

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, ethnic and racial studies

Language English

Advisor Furth, Charlotte (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), Wills, John (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-372787

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Identifier 3103934.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-372787 (legacy record id)

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Document Type Dissertation

Rights Leibold, James Patrick

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Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

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