Practicing policy and making myth: Applied anthropology and homeless service delivery in Glendale, California

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Content PRACTICING POLICY AND MAKING MYTH:
APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY AND HOMELESS SERVICE DELIVERY IN
GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA
Copyright 2003
by
Stacy Rowe
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(ANTHROPOLOGY)
August 2003
Stacy Rowe
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007
This dissertation, written by
S ta c y Rowe
under the direction of hex Dissertation
Committee, and approved by all its members,
has been presented to and accepted by The
Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re
quirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Dean owGraduate S tudies
Date .August .12, 2003
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
C hairperson
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures v
Abbreviations and Acronyms vi
Abstract viii
Chapter I: Introduction
I. Background 1
II. Organizing My Personal Perspective on Homelessness 4
III. Current Research 9
IV. Organization of the Dissertation 17
Chapter II: Conceptualizing Homelessness and Governance
I. Introduction 20
II. Defining Homelessness 22
A. Characterizing and Counting 22
B. Causes 23
C. Impacts of Welfare Reform 29
III. Federal Governmental Responses to Homelessness 32
IV. The Governance of Homelessness 35
A. Understanding Governance 36
B. Practicing Governance 40
V. Toward an Ethnography of Governance 41
A. Postmodernism and Anthropology 41
B. Constructing a Postmodern Ethnography of Homelessness 50
Chapter III: Understanding Homelessness in Los Angeles: At the Intersection
of Theory and Practice
I. Introduction 53
II. Conceptual History - Academic Beginnings 56
III. Conceptual History - Service Provision 74
IV. Conceptual History - Local Government 77
A. Background 77
B. My duties as the Homeless Coordinator
for the City of Glendale 79
C. Implications for Participant-Observation
and Data Collection 83
V. Theorizing Homeless Services: Necessary Myths and Inevitable
Discrepancies 86
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Chapter IV: The Policy Context of Homelessness
I. Introduction 89
II. History of Funding Sources 93
A. Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 93
B. The Stewart B. McKinney Act 95
C. HOME Funds 99
D. Section 8 101
E. Other Homeless Funds 102
III. Federal Policy Evolves: “Priority: Home!” 104
IV. Continuum of Care 112
V. Consolidated Planning 119
VI. Consolidation of Homeless Funds Never Authorized 121
VII. Conclusion 128
Chapter V: Public History of the Glendale Homeless Coalition
I. Introduction 133
II. Background: The Glendale Homeless Coalition is Created 140
III. The Glendale Task Force on Homelessness 153
IV. The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority and the
L.A. Homeless Initiative 158
V. The First “Super NOFA” 162
VI. Glendale’s Consolidated Plan 163
VII. 1995-1997: Funding Success and Implementation Challenges 174
VIII. Conclusion 181
Chapter VI: Case Study: The Public History of the Glendale Services Center
I. Introduction 184
II. Conceptual Origins of the Glendale Services Center 185
III. Funding for the Glendale Services Center 188
IV. Developing a Year-round Emergency Shelter 194
V. Programs Open at Fernando Court 208
VI. Super NOFAs Expand Services at the Access Center 220
VII. Conclusion 225
Chapter VII: Case Study: An Observed History of the Glendale Services Center
I. Background 229
II. The Glendale Services Center Pilot Program 232
III. Funding the Glendale Services Center 238
IV. The Emergency Shelter and Fernando Court 244
V. Public Health and Safety and Street Outreach 257
VI. Site Development 267
VII. Change of Provider 267
VIII. Opening the Programs 277
IX. The Shelter and the Beginnings of Conflict 287
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X. Street Outreach Begins 298
XI. Conflict Continues 301
XII. The Current Status of Programs 307
XIII. Conclusion 312
Chapter VIII: The Myths of Governance in Homelessness
I. Overview of Public and Observed Versions of
Homeless Governance 313
II. Federal Policy: The Role of Myths 316
III. Local Politics and the Role of the City 328
A. Federal Policy, Local Contract and Funding
Constraints 328
B. Local Politics - The Magnet Theory, NIMBY
and Local Law Enforcement 330
C. Local Control and Collaboration Among
Service Providers 339
IV. The Stakeholders 344
A. Religious Affiliation 345
B. Clinicians/Professionals 347
C. Social Justice and Past Personal Experience 348
D. Government Agencies 350
E. Individuals Do Make a Difference 353
V. The Anthropology of Governance: Conflicting
Positions and Postmodern Contributions 357
Chapter IX: Conclusion
I. Background 361
A. My Roles as Ethnographer and Public Official 362
B. Federal Policy on Homelessness 364
C. Glendale’s Continuum of Care -
Public Myth and Observed Tensions 366
II. Policy Implications/Future Research Questions 370
A. Federal Programs Lack Flexibility 371
B. Local vs. Regional Planning and Administration 377
C. Collaboration, Implementation and Federal Funding 384
D. Organizational Culture, Inter-Agency and Inter-
Personal Dynamics 389
E. The Magnet Effect and the Impact of Service Location 394
F. Public Health and Safety 397
III. Implications for Anthropology 400
Bibliography 404
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LIST OF FIGURES
1 The Phases of the Policy Process 12
2 HUD’s Continuum of Care 113
3 Glendale’s Continuum of Care in 1995 167
4 Depiction of Glendale Services Center
For City Council Presentation - 1997 210
5 Depiction of Project ACHIEVE for
City Council Presentation -1997 219
6 Flow Chart Depicting Glendale’s
Continuum of Care - 1999 227
7 Exterior of the “One Stop” at The Salvation
A rm y- 1995 234
8 “One Stop” Peer Counselor with Client at
The Salvation Army - 1995 235
9 Floor Plan - 437 Fernando Court 268
10 Exterior of the Glendale Services Center at
Fernando Court - 1996 281
11 Interior of the Glendale Services Center at
Fernando Court - 1996 283
12 Health Clinic at the Glendale Services Center at
Fernando Court - 1996 286
13 Dining/Lounge Area at Project ACHIEVE
at Fernando Court - 1996 288
14 Sleeping Area at Project ACHIEVE
at Fernando Court - 1996 289
15 Glendale’s Continuum of Care in 1999 325
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFDC - Aid To Families with Dependent Children
CDBG - Community Development Block Grant
CD&H - Community Development & Housing
CHAS - Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy
COPPS - Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving
DPSS - Department of Public Social Services
EDD - Employment Development Department
EFSP - Emergency Food and Shelter Program
ENA - Exclusive Negotiation Agreement
ESG - Emergency Shelter Grant
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFB&S - Food For Body & Soul
GAIN - Greater Avenues for Independence
HOME - Technically not an acronym but the actual name of a Federal program for
affordable housing development
HOPWA - Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS
HUD - U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
IURD - Institute for Urban Research and Development
LAHSA - Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority
LSS/SC - Lutheran Social Services o f Southern California
NAHRO - National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
NEPA - National Environmental Protection Act
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NIMBY - Not In My Back Yard
NOFA - Notice of Funding Availability
RFP - Request for Proposal
S+C - Shelter Plus Care
SHP - Supportive Housing Program
TANF - Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
TEFAP - Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program
TSA - The Salvation Army
VA - Veteran’s Administration
VMHC - Verdugo Mental Health Center
WHHO - West Hollywood Homeless Organization
YMCA - Young Men’s Christian Association
YWCA - Young Women’s Christian Association
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes how and why myths are generated around the
development and implementation of homeless policy and how the myths and patterns
of implementation are affected by Federal policy, local politics and the
organizational culture of the participating stakeholders. I also discuss the conflicting
roles of the practitioner-anthropologist, how this role has impacted this dissertation,
and my ideas for future research and policy implications.
Federal policy and regulations regarding homeless programs set the
parameters for the design and implementation of local service delivery systems.
They also create the conditions under which some of the myths regarding the
delivery of these services are created and promoted. This dissertation gives a history
of Federal funding for homeless programs and the evolution of Federal policies and
regulations governing the issue. It then provides a case study which compares
idealized (albeit technically accurate) accounts of program implementation, i.e.,
excerpts from documents created for submission to the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, with an observed account of program implementation
which highlights the challenges created, in part, by the Federal regulations.
Local politics—concerns about a “magnet effect”, difficulties with siting
programs, the need to exert local control—also affect homeless program design and
delivery. In addition, the organizational cultures of the various stakeholders—public
agencies, non-profit service providers, health and mental healthcare providers,
churches and community groups— also impact program design and present special
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challenges with implementation. Again, idealized versions presented in local media
and City-generated reports are compared with an observed account of program
implementation. This comparison provides insights to how conflicts are negotiated
in the public/political arena and within the context of day to day service delivery.
This dissertation also discusses how my roles as an applied anthropologist,
and as the City’s Homeless Coordinator— a key actor in the development of the
homeless continuum of care—presented unique challenges to the construction of an
ethnography. Finally, the dissertation presents specific suggestions for the direction
of future policy and research initiatives in the area of homeless service delivery, and
for the potential role of practitioner-anthropologists in such endeavors.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
I. Background
The problem of contemporary homelessness can be traced back to the end of
the American Civil War. Thousands of discharged soldiers wandered into cities
looking for employment and housing, many addicted to morphine or alcohol. The
newly establish rail lines and the rumors of opportunities on the frontier resulted in
the movement of these men across the country. In the 1900’s the Great Depression,
drought, and the idea that the future would be brighter elsewhere, prompted single
men and families to dislodge themselves from their homes and move to urban and
agricultural centers. In the 1940’s and 1950’s soldiers returning from World War II
and Korea found employment in shipping and manufacturing centers, and many took
up residence in downtown residential hotels, with The Bowery in New York City,
downtown Los Angeles, and Seattle’s “Skid Road” being the prototypical urban
areas housing these men who often cycled in and out of homelessness (Hoch and
Slayton, 1989; Miller, 1991; Spradely, 1970).
But in the 1980’s, a “new” homeless population began to become visible on
inner-city streets. Later in the decade, and in the 1990’s, the problem also began to
spread to suburban and even rural areas (Blau, 1992). These “new” homeless were
younger, better educated, more often consisting of women and families, and included
many Vietnam era veterans and minorities. Significant portions of this population
appeared to have chronic substance abuse or mental health issues (Baker, 1994;
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Bassuk, 1991; First, Roth, and Arewa, 1988; Kozol, 1988; Rossi, 1989; Takahashi,
1996).
There were many explanations for the emergence of this “new” homeless
population. Broadly characterized, these explanations either focus on the structural
causes of homelessness, or on the individual characteristics and behavior of homeless
persons themselves. Structural issues contributing to homelessness include the
restructuring of the economy — the decline in manufacturing jobs and rise in lower-
paying, service sector employment, and the increased competition among low-skilled
workers — that has made many individuals and households reliant on casual or
temporary employment or on public assistance (Ropers, 1988; Takahashi, 1996;
Wolch and Dear, 1993).
With so many households partially or wholly dependent on public assistance,
the restructuring of the welfare state, the tightening of eligibility requirements for
programs, and the new work requirements and time-limits spawned by the national
objective of welfare reform have pushed many precariously housed individuals and
families onto the streets (Hartman, 1986; Takahashi, 1996; Wolch et al., 1988).
At the same time, housing units which are affordable to low- and very-low
income persons have been declining in number and quality, in part because of shifts
in federal policy in the 1980’s, in part because of gentrification and urban renewal
and the resulting demolition of SROs and public housing, and in part because of
conversion of rental units into condominiums. (Baer, 1986; Burt, 1992; Hoch, 1991;
Shinn and Gillespie, 1994, Stoner, 1989; Takahashi, 1996).
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Massive demographic shifts also accounted for the large number of “new”
homeless, as well as contributing to the changes in the characteristics of the homeless
population. Significant changes in the structure of the family, the feminization of
poverty and rise in single-parent, female-headed households have marked
contemporary descriptions of the “new” homeless. The aging of the baby boom
generation has placed larger numbers of elderly adults on limited incomes, often
competing for a very limited number of affordable senior housing units (Jones and
Kodras, 1990; Keigher, 1991; Ringheim, 1990; Takahashi, 1996).
And finally, deinstitutionalization, or the shift in mental health care provision
from large institutions to community-based facilities, has left many mentally disabled
individuals without easy access to professional care. Often too ill for their families
to manage, and resistant to many treatment modalities, these individuals made their
way onto the streets in the early 1980’s and today still make-up the most visible of
the street population (Dear and Wolch, 1987; Mechanic and Rochefort, 1993; Smith,
1989; Takahashi, 1996; Torrey, 1988).
While much of the social science analysis of the cause of homelessness
focused on the structural causes of homelessness, many researches argued the
importance of recognizing that individual vulnerabilities or deficits constitute an
important, or even primary, cause of homelessness. Mental disability, substance
abuse, criminal history, spousal abuse, family instability, veteran status and other
personal vulnerabilities lead to, or substantially intensify, homeless episodes (Baum
and Bumes, 1993; Caton, Shrout, Eagle, and Opler, 1994; Drake, Osher, and
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Wallach, 1991; Gelberg, Linn, and Leake, 1988; Hartz, Banys, and Hall, 1994;
Robertson, 1991; Susser, Lin, Conover, and Struening, 1991; Takahashi, 1996;
Taylor, Elliott, and Kearns, 1989; Weitzman, Knickman, and Shinn, 1992; Wood,
Valdez, Hayashi, and Shen, 1990).
II. Organizing My Personal Perspective on Homelessness
The debate regarding the causes of homelessness -- be they primarily
structural, or individual — led many researchers to use ethnographic methodologies,
primarily participant observation and interview techniques, to try and understand the
relationship of homeless (or near-homeless) individuals to one another, and to the
front-line service providers with whom they interacted. The best of these accounts
were successful in demonstrating that the causes of homelessness were BOTH
structural and individual and that the causes and consequences for homelessness
were highly individualized (Buss, 1985; Dash, 1996; Dordick, 1997; Kotlowitz,
1991; Rosenthal, 1994; Snow and Anderson, 1993; Spradely, 1970; Vanderstaay,
1992).
This was the approach of my initial ethnographic research on homelessness as
well (Rowe and Wolch, 1990; Wolch and Rowe, 1992). After conducting over fifty
interviews with homeless men and women, I became more and more interested in the
individual causes of homelessness. This was because I felt that it was in this area
that homeless persons themselves had the most power to create change. A homeless
person might not, by him/herself, be able to address the affordable housing supply,
but he or she could deal with the personal issues that kept them homeless. But I also
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realized that there was a structural component that was needed to provide these
individuals with professional supportive services necessary for addressing individual
issues. My current thinking on this issue is really the backdrop for the research
questions that I ultimately have tackled in this dissertation:
I know that a large part of homelessness is the result of individuals’ inability
to manage their lives successfully. But, why are homeless people unable to manage
their lives? There are many reasons. First, they lack the skills to do it. The legacy of
dependence fostered, in part by the welfare system, drugs and alcohol, violence in
their family lives as youth, a lack of education on their own and/or their parents part,
have denied individuals the basic skills that allow adults to organize their lives
around the basics of employment and relationships. Second, a history of
psychological, emotional and/or physical abuse, as children or as adults, has led to a
deep-seated belief that they themselves are undeserving of measures of success that
the less fragile of us take for granted. This can compound the lack of skills
mentioned above, or it can be a factor on its own. Either way it leads to a pattern of
self-destructive, self-sabotaging behavior that may or may not manifest itself in
substance abuse and mental illness. Third, many homeless people experience mental
and/or physical disabilities that have not been addressed with the proper medical,
psychological and/or social support necessary to assist the disabled to adapt to adult
life.
This is not to say that I blame homelessness entirely on individual pathology.
I do not. In fact, I do not believe that while the combination of pathology and
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poverty can lead to homelessness, that the poor are necessarily more pathological that
the wealthy. The relationship between poverty and pathology is complex: the
wealthy have access to mitigating resources; can hide their pathology better and
longer; or manifest their pathology in ways that are socially acceptable, even
rewarded (e.g., workaholics). The poor do not have access to mitigating resources,
and in fact the stress of poverty can exacerbate or cause pathology, just as the
manifestation of pathology in ways unaccepted by society — substance abuse, self
sabotage — can lead to poverty. And when the combination of poverty and pathology
(or in some instances, the impact of either alone) results in the failure to maintain
stable housing (either through economic or social breakdown, or both) one becomes
homeless.
Thus in one sense homelessness is as simple as a failure to maintain housing,
and I can see how those who make the affordable housing argument base their
claims. But I have seen how some, for whom acts of self-sabotage are particularly
subtle and deeply rooted in a sense of self as completely undeserving, can manage to
lose even the most affordable of housing. Thus my argument is that for some, most I
might even say, affordable housing alone is not enough.
The same can be said for employment. It is in fact easier for you to self
sabotage yourself out of a job and be able to blame someone else for your
circumstances than to address the underlying personal issues which contribute to
your unemployment. For denial, and the ability to blame one’s position on the
“system” - government, the workforce, or social service provision — is a key barrier
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to overcoming homelessness. This is because denial inhibits persons from
addressing the real issues that cause homelessness (it is essentially a self-defense
mechanism, since many of the issues that must be faced may be excruciatingly
painful), and because denial, expressed by individuals and society as a whole, leads
in part to the ideological constructs that surround homelessness which allows society
to blame the victim.
I realize that at this point I could also be accused of blaming the victim. And
furthermore, similar observations about the individual pathologies and seemingly
inexplicable self-destructive behaviors exhibited by some homeless persons, made on
a more superficial and less sophisticated level by the public-at-large, are what result
in “victim-blaming” in our culture. I would argue, however, that one cannot blame
someone for lacking skills, or for enduring a history of abuse, racism, sexism,
homophobia, prejudiced, unequal access to education, employment, opportunity. But
one must also recognize that no matter how unfair it is, no matter how persons within
the social structure — the workforce, the housing market, the family, the educational
system, the healthcare system — have victimized an individual, it is only the
individual that can take responsibility for changing the results of the victimization,
for raising his/her own self-esteem, for stopping the pattern of self-sabotage. Thus, I
do subscribe to the idea that individualized approaches to homelessness, approaches
that hold individuals responsible for their futures, while at the same time
empowering them, are necessary adjuncts to structural solutions. Responsibility and
empowerment are two sides of the same coin, however. We cannot hold someone
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responsible for the skills they do not have -- they must be empowered in both
concrete and intangible ways. And we cannot empower people without holding them
responsible to the same standards of behavior that we (or society) hold for ourselves.
At the same time, the structural issues must be addressed. There must be
adequately paying jobs with the right skill-levels to allow persons to support
themselves and their families. Ideally, these will also be positions that will
encourage personal growth and upward mobility, thereby ensuring an enduring
supply of entry level positions and that employed persons move through these
widening skill and income opportunities, rather than getting stuck. There also needs
to be a commitment to affordable housing. More affordable housing can be
produced. Rents and/or housing costs can be subsidized. Alternative living
arrangements can be supported. Unfortunately I do not think that somehow the “free-
market” alone— in employment, education or housing — has mechanisms that can do
anything other than exacerbate the situation. In order for homelessness to be
addressed, support mechanisms must be developed that can create the contexts —
physical, emotional, educational, psychological, medical, social — in which persons
can begin to wrestle with the deep-seated issues which have led to their low self
esteem, where persons can begin to acquire the concrete life skills that they may not
have, where they can go through the process, at their own pace, of beginning to
manage their own lives, in concert with the people around them who are most
fundamental to their social networks.
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Of course, the creation of the context which will allow persons to address the
individualized root causes of their homelessness is also a structural question. This
necessary structural context is one that provides opportunities for education,
employment, childcare, adequate income assistance for those who cannot work, and
housing opportunities, including a continuum of care designed to move persons from
the street to permanent housing - transitional housing alternatives, affordable
housing, access to counseling that provides persons with support for addressing
substance abuse issues, histories of abuse and low self-esteem, working out
relationship issues, learning how to parent, adequate and on-going care for those with
mental health and physical health issues, assistance with legal and credit problems.
Of course this context of support services would benefit not just the homeless or
formerly homeless, or even the poor. Is there the political and social will to do what
needs to be done? Whose job is it (should it be) to create the necessary structures?
Who are the players? What division of labor makes sense in a perfect world? What
division of labor exists now? What ideological common ground do the players hold?
Where do they diverge? What common logistical goals to they share? What goals
differ?
III. Current Research
Even in my earliest days as a student-researcher in downtown Los Angeles, I
used to joke that if I really wanted to get at the heart of homelessness in Los Angeles,
I needed to study the County Board of Supervisors. Even when I was most immersed
in my work with the street population, I realized how closely what happened on the
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streets was tied to local, regional and federal policy decisions. I did not quite
understand the linkages, but I knew they were important.
Many of the writers on the structural causes of homelessness cited above do
attempt to explicate these links. The most notable and, I think, helpful in these
efforts are Dear and Wolch, (1987), Wolch and Dear (1993), Jencks (1994) and
Coates (1990). But these efforts are not ethnographic in their approach or analysis,
nor do they examine the details involved in the formation and implementation of
homeless policy in a particular locale over an extended period of time. In fact, I am
not aware of any ethnographic account of homelessness in the United States that
provides such a representation. This is one way that this dissertation represents an
original and unique contribution to the knowledge and research about this issue.
There are other questions raised by this research that are important to the
study of homeless policy, and to applied anthropology. One of those is how the
position of the researcher affects the quality of both the data and the analysis.
Related to this is the question of the contribution of applied anthropology and
ethnographic research to policy design and implementation.
By being aware of policy as a process, anthropologists can judge
when to intervene at any stage, including the prestage of defining or
setting the problem. We can do field work with a specific
theoretical framework that may involve the definition of a policy
need felt by the field community. Or, conversely, the community
may already present the field worker with a policy problem and ask
for a solution. (Moore, 1992, p. 528)
When I initially became employed by the City of Glendale, I felt both aspects
of Dr. Moore’s articulation of applied anthropology were relevant to my tasks and
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that I could simply apply his model of the "Phases of the Policy Process” (see Figure
1) to the situation in Glendale. The City of Glendale, with a population of
approximately 190,000 in an area of 30.6 square miles, is the third largest city in Los
Angeles County. It is located in the San Fernando Valley, north and east of
downtown Los Angeles. It is known as a politically and social conservative
community that has had to struggle with a changing identify over the last decade as
an influx of immigrants from Armenia, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and
Latin American have radically altered the demographics of the city, particularly in its
southern regions. This, among other factors, had led to an increased need for social
services, including services for homeless persons. It has also caused the local
government to rethink their role in the larger community vis a vis service provision,
including ways to partner with traditional providers in the community (see Chapter
V).
I naively viewed the City of Glendale, and the opportunity to develop a
continuum of care essentially from scratch, as a social laboratory where I could
implement the theoretical frameworks I had formed based on my prior research. For
example, I had done extensive research on how social networks and daily routines
impacted the relationship between homeless persons and service providers, and
enabled or constrained an individual’s exit from homelessness (see Chapter III). I
could now test these hypotheses. And, the community had already identified the
policy problems and had started articulating the broader outline of their vision for the
future of homeless programs in Glendale.
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FIGURE 1
THE PHASES OF THE POLICY PROCESS
(From Moore, 1992, pg., 528)
Awareness
Formulation and
Evaluation of
Policy Choices
Implementation of
One Policy
Choice
Evaluation of
Policy
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Suffice it to say, that as you read this dissertation you will realize the supreme
arrogance and naivete regarding this attitude. My job caused me to be so caught up
in the day to day logistics of policy formation and implementation, that thinking
theoretically or trying to apply my original theories about homeless service delivery
was simply a luxury that I did not have the time to pursue. I would occasionally stop,
and reflect on these issues, but the necessary scholarly process of removing oneself
from the immediate field scene to ponder one’s experience from all angles was not
available to me. Conversely, it also became apparent to me how much I, and other
public servants, would benefit from theory and reflection.
As the Homeless Coordinator for the City of Glendale, my daily routine in
time-space is influenced by an annual cycle that is in many ways an artifact of policy
decisions at the Federal level. The funding cycle for the Community Development
Block Grant and Emergency Shelter Grant, which comprised the majority of
homeless funding when I began in this position, determines many of the daily
activities for myself and my associates at the City. Our projected allocation for the
fiscal year (which begins July 1) is announced in the Spring (although it is not
formalized until the Federal budget is passed in the Fall). This begins a citizen
participation process which includes surveys and public hearings throughout the Fall.
Through the citizen participation process, funding priorities for homeless and other
social service projects are determined. In January, the Request for Proposal (RFP)
process begins, and continues through March. Individual non-profits respond to the
RFP, and a Community Advisory Committee selects what projects will be funded
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beginning July 1,1999. Overlapping this planning process for the upcoming fiscal
year, is the implementation of the current year's programs. This includes drafting and
executing subrecipient agreements in the Fall, monitoring programs in the Spring,
and reporting program outcomes to the Federal government in the Summer.
The nationwide competition for funding for homeless programs adds a
second layer of program planning and contract administration throughout the year.
An intensive needs assessment and service inventory process is conducted in the
Spring to identify homeless funding priorities; and the summer is spent writing the
extensive grant application required by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. In addition, the Winter Shelter program from November through
March, the ongoing activities of the Glendale Homeless Coalition, and the oversight
and coordination of on-going programs absorbs my attention year-round. Thus, I can
say that there is no set daily routine regarding this position, with each day presenting
a combination of meetings, paperwork and telephone calls, some devoted to long
term planning, some to program administration and some to handling the various
crises that arise frequently.
My experiences in Glendale raise key questions about whether a researcher
can indeed be a practitioner and participant, and still achieve the critical distance
necessary for social science research. To be honest, I do not think I have sufficiently
maintained this distance for this dissertation. I am too close to my own experience,
in both time and space, to be objective and sufficiently detached in my analysis to be
a good theorist. I do feel, however, that there is a second document that will arise
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from this dissertation, to be written after I leave Glendale and return there as a
researcher (rather than as a policymaker). I know my previous role and relationship
with the subjects will still impact my data, but I think once I am no longer a player,
we will be able to communicate more thoughtfully about our experiences which are
described in this dissertation.
I think the role of an applied anthropologist as an academic or as a consultant
is very different from my role as a practitioner and actor in Glendale. But as more
and more anthropologists find themselves in similar positions to mine in Glendale,
they should not have to choose between being a practitioner or being an
anthropologist, as I have often felt the need to do at times. This dissertation, and the
subsequent work that arises from my experiences in Glendale, represent my attempts
to contribute to a “working-out” of the pitfalls and shortcomings associated with
being such an active participant and an observer simultaneously. All ethnography
represents “partial truths”, and the position of the ethnographer always affects the
questions raised, the data collected and presented, and the analysis and conclusions.
Given this, all I can do is try as best I can to identify and reveal the biases unique to
my position, and to work to develop a new method of PARTICIPANT-observation
that aids in that process for PRACTITIONER-anthropologists. This, I hope, will be
my contribution from this ongoing work to applied anthropology.
There are several other research questions addressed by this dissertation. One
is an exploration of the role of myth in the articulation and implementation of public
policy. These myths — called “spin” in the current political vernacular — are
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generated to appease the ideological interests of many stakeholders in homeless
policymaking: the federal government, local government, service providers, and the
public. These myths, while not falsehoods, promote idealized notions and obfuscate
the problematic aspects of what is and what will be. But these myths not only affect
ideology and rhetoric, they also enable or constrain the efficacy of service delivery;
and as importantly, the ability to evaluate that efficacy. Currently, the U. S. is
spending millions of dollars on homeless programs in Glendale, with no REAL
method of measuring success.
I also hope that this rather intimate portrait of the trials and successes of
implementing a continuum of care at the local level will have some value to other
practitioners. One important research question addressed here is the relationship
between individuals and institutions, and how this affects attempts at collaboration.
In my informal discussions with persons in other parts of the County and the nation
regarding multi-agency endeavors at service provision (including job training and
welfare to work efforts) it seems the problems we experienced in Glendale are
endemic. The specific details and the actors may be different, but I hope that I have
identified enough general patterns that others will be able to recognize themselves.
While I may not provide many substantive solutions, just the recognition that the
problems are part of the process is a valuable insight. It does in some way place the
discourse about solutions back to a more structural level, although clearly I argue that
the role of the individual is very powerful.
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IV. Organization of the Dissertation
To address these varying research questions and theoretical points, the
remainder of the dissertation is organized into the following chapters.
Chapter II expands on the background provided in this Introduction regarding
the literature on homelessness and welfare reform. It also provides an overview of
recent scholarly thinking about governance. Chapter II concludes with a theoretical
treatment of the current social theory debates concerning postmodernism, and their
contributions to understanding complex social phenomena (such as governance and
homelessness) and to challenging dominant conceptual and methodological
frameworks in anthropology.
Chapter III provides my personal history as an ethnographic researcher
working on the issue of homelessness. It provides a more in-depth chronology of the
evolution of my roles and thinking with respect to the issues. I also touch on the
issue of “voice”. In my many roles surrounding homelessness, I have had the
occasion to write for many different audiences. I myself was struck by how my own
“voice” has altered with time, position and audience. This relationship to “voice”
and the role of the author is very interesting to me, and Chapter III is used to
document and assess the reasons for, and impacts of, these changing roles on my
theoretical and methodological approach to homelessness and policymaking.
Chapter IV is a detailed history and analysis of federal policy initiatives
regarding the issue of homelessness. This federal policy context, I go on to argue,
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greatly influences the highly manipulated representations of policy and program
implementation that are generated on the local level.
Chapter V is a “public” history of the Glendale Homeless Coalition. It is, in
essence, the creation myth that provides the historical and ideological foundation for
the case studies that follow in Chapters VI and VII. It is comprised of “official”
versions of homeless policy and programs in Glendale — newspaper accounts,
documents provided by service providers, government agencies, City staff reports,
and grant applications.
Chapter VI is a similar “public” history, but it focuses instead on the
processes and players who collaborated in the development and implementation of a
multi-agency, multi-service access center and emergency shelter in the city of
Glendale — the Glendale Services Center and Project ACHIEVE, respectively. It is
also comprised of “official” accounts, many of which are Glendale City staff reports.
It is important to note that almost all of the staff reports and grant applications cited
after October, 1994, were authored by me.
Chapter VII is the “observed” version of the development of the Glendale
Services Center and Project ACHIEVE. It is the product of my observations as a
PARTICIPANT-observer, and thus constitutes the ethnographic detail of the case
study. It is the comparison of the myths presented in Chapter VI and the observed
ethnographic detail presented in Chapter VII, that leads to the analysis and
interpretation presented in Chapter VIII.
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In Chapter VIII, I analyze how and why myths are generated around the
development and implementation of homeless policy. Key issues identified are the
role of federal policy, local politics and the desire for local control, the role of
institutional culture and of individual actors. I also discuss in more detail my role as
PRACTITIONER-anthropologist, how this role has impacted this dissertation, and
my ideas for furthering the methodology to mitigate these impacts.
Chapter IX summarizes the chapters and discusses future research questions,
policy implications and the implications for anthropology.
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CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUALIZING HOMELESSNESS AND
GOVERNANCE
I. Introduction
Homelessness remains a critical issue across the U. S. Even with a robust
economy, there remains a large segment of the population living in impoverished and
marginal conditions. Researchers have particularly since the mid-1980s focused on
describing and analyzing the nature and fundamental causes of homelessness,
creating a sophisticated and diverse literature across multiple disciplines and
theoretical perspectives. Scholars have also focused on policies at varying levels of
government that address homelessness; federal, state, and local policies have spanned
the political ideological continuum. At the federal level, funds have been provided to
cities to transition homeless persons to homed situations, while at the local level,
many municipalities have worked to develop ordinances to remove homeless persons
from jurisdictions and to further reduce funding for city and county homeless
programs.
This chapter focuses on the scholarly work describing homelessness and
governmental response to homelessness, and offers a set of conceptual issues for
developing an ethnography of governance and homelessness. The literature on
governance, which examines the relationship between governmental and non
governmental actors when it comes to translating policy initiatives to processes and
practices designed to generate desired outcomes, parallels the observed account of
the development of a homeless service delivery system in the City of Glendale. In
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particular, issues discussed in the literature: coordination, cooperation and
competition among and between differing levels of governmental and non
governmental organizations, the intersection of inter-personal and inter-organization
motivations and behaviors, and the ability to establish accountability and determine
effectiveness, are issues that arise repeatedly in the discussion of the implementation
of homeless programs in Glendale.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes the ways
in which researchers have defined, enumerated, explained the causes, and outlined
the solutions for homelessness. The second section outlines governmental responses
to homelessness at the federal level. Particular emphasis is placed on policies meant
to serve and support homeless populations, rather than policies at various tiers of
government that are meant to eject or penalize. The third section explores federal
polices and their implementation more closely through the lens of governance.
Governance has been defined in general as “any mode of co-ordination of
interdependent activities” (Jessop, 1998). In many ways, the implementation of
homelessness policies has required the cooperation and coordination of a fragmented
system of housing, health, and human service providers located in local jurisdictions.
The fourth and final section offers conceptual issues relevant for constructing an
ethnography of governance and homelessness. Postmodern contributions to
anthropology are outlined to provide a conceptual framework and a set of
methodological issues that guide the remaining descriptive, analytical, and
interpretive chapters of the dissertation.
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II. Defining Homelessness
This section seeks to outline the ways in which researchers have worked to
enumerate, describe, and explain the diversifying homeless population in the U. S.
The section is divided into three parts. The first part outlines the varied efforts to
estimate the size of the homeless population since the mid-1980s. The second part
describes the interconnected themes that have been used to explain the reasons for
the expansion of the homeless population across the US, particularly in central cities.
Finally, the third part assesses the potential impacts of recent welfare reform
legislation on the ability of homeless persons to cope with the daily struggle to meet
basic needs.
II. A. Characterizing and Counting
Researchers have estimated the scope of homelessness in the U. S. in varying
ways (Takahashi, 1996). Wolch and Dear (1993) calculated homelessness in terms
of episodes over a given year; in the U. S., by the 1990s, they estimated that there
were 840,000 homeless episodes across the U. S. Link, Susser, Stueve, and Phelan
(1994) also developed an estimate of homeless episodes, putting the number of
homeless episodes at 26 million over five years. Most recently, Toro (1999)
estimated that the lifetime prevalence of homelessness in the U. S. is over seven
percent.
The U. S. Census in its 1980 enumeration of the homeless population
estimated the size of the population to be approximately 228,400 persons. However,
researchers have roundly criticized this estimate. Cousineau and Ward (1992) for
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example argue that in Los Angeles alone Census enumerators overlooked between
59% and 70% of the homeless population. Whatever methods are used to enumerate
the number of homeless persons across the U.S., estimates have indicated an
expanding homeless population when compared to the early 1980s estimates of
between 250,000 and three million homeless persons (Hombs and Snyder, 1982; US
Department of Housing and Development (HUD), 1984). But more importantly, the
wide range of estimates about the size of the homeless population reflects the varying
definitions of homelessness used by scholars and policymakers.
A standard definition for homelessness remains an ongoing and seemingly
intractable problem in homelessness research. The challenge in developing a
standard definition for homelessness stems from both the wide variation in public
understanding of what constitutes homelessness and also the pragmatic difficulties in
counting for example those individuals living in overcrowded conditions.
Homelessness is often publicly understood as ‘living on the streets,’ with the lack of
physical housing on a given night and living in emergency shelters still guiding many
in their determination of who is homeless and who is not (Burt and Cohen, 1989).
Researchers have also advocated a broader notion of homelessness to encompass a
continuum of marginalization and deprivation, from living on the streets to living in
overcrowded housing conditions (Watson and Austerberry, 1986).
II. B. Causes
Scholars have increasingly argued that there is a combination of structural
and individual factors that lead individuals to the brink of homelessness (Susser,
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1996). Structural factors include economic restructuring, welfare state
reorganization, demographic shifts, and metropolitan restructuring. There are also
many researchers and pundits who place the primary blame for homelessness on the
individual who becomes homeless.
Structural Explanations. Researchers largely accept the notion that economic
restructuring has been linked to the expanding homeless population. The growth in
service sector jobs (in place of unionized and permanent employment opportunities
in manufacturing) and the decreasing influence of labor unions together have resulted
in reducing the income-earning capabilities of low-skilled workers in the labor
market (Law and Wolch, 1991). Although the recent economic boom has resulted in
some of the lowest unemployment rates in recent memory, many of these jobs in
low-skilled sectors do not provide medical benefits and other sorts of financial
support. Even with the significant body of research that has argued and illustrated
this bifurcation in wages and wealth, there remain ongoing efforts at multiple levels
of government, as reflected in welfare reform and workfare strategies, to address
poverty and homelessness through labor market participation (e.g., Peck, 1998).
Welfare reform and other changes to the welfare state particularly since the Reagan
administration have indicated the ongoing trend to reduce the role of the welfare state
in proactive measures to combat poverty and homelessness.
The welfare state has been linked to homelessness in two ways. First, the
significant contraction of the welfare state over the past two decades has been argued
to have exacerbated the fallout of economic restructuring, resulting in the denial of
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benefits to an expanding population needing income maintenance and other in-kind
services. Second, deinstitutionalization, or the shift in mental health care from large
institutional care to community-based facilities, has also been directly linked to the
rise in homelessness.
In terms of welfare state contraction, the 1980s saw reductions in income
maintenance and in-kind services, the elimination of housing constructed through
public sector funds, and tightening of eligibility requirements for entry into the
federal, state, and locally funded welfare systems (Hopper and Baumohl, 1994). The
late 1990s has seen a further contraction in the scope and purpose of the U. S.
welfare state through federally enacted ‘welfare reform’. In 1996, the federal
government passed a set of welfare reform policies, constituted under the rubric of
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act, which were meant to
shrink welfare caseloads while encouraging greater labor market participation among
former welfare recipients. This Act replaced Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), effectively
reducing the amount of monthly benefits and placing time restrictions on the aid that
families can receive (Wolch and Sommer, 1997). In addition, TANF families are no
longer guaranteed coverage for childcare and medical care that had been linked to
AFDC through the Medicaid program (in California, called Medi-Cal). The new
welfare legislation indicated that if adults were eligible for AFDC, their children
should qualify for Medicaid health benefits. However, potentially eligible families
must now apply for these benefits separately. The impact of welfare reform on the
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homeless population is unclear, however, given that many homeless persons do not
receive welfare benefits. In a study of homeless persons in Los Angeles, for
example, Schoeni and Koegel (1998) found that only about 58% of homeless adults
received government assistance in the past month, implying that approximately 40%
of homeless individuals did not access income maintenance programs. Koegel,
Bumam, and Farr (1990) indicate that homeless persons, particularly those who are
mentally disabled, tend to use a variety of resources as a subsistence strategy for
meeting basic needs.
Deinstitutionalization in contrast remains a highly debated cause of
homelessness in the late twentieth century. On the one hand, scholars believe that
because of a lack of funding and coordination in mental health care at the community
level, those individuals released from large institutional settings were not provided
with housing and mental health care options when they arrived in local communities.
This lack of community-based care meant that mentally disabled individuals were
drawn to existing services and housing opportunities in service ghettoes, such as skid
rows of large cities, and became homeless (Dear and Wolch, 1987; Torrey, 1988).
But there are also scholars who dispute this claim.
Demographic shifts have also been seen as a major contributor to
contemporary homelessness. There are three issues that have been particularly
relevant for understanding the growth and change in the U. S. homeless population:
feminization of poverty; aging of the baby boom population; international and
domestic immigration. The feminization of poverty stems from social relations of
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gender (resulting in lower wages for women), and the contextual factors of late
twentieth century social life, such as rising divorce rates and teenage pregnancies,
that have resulted in growing numbers of female-headed households (Jones and
Kodras, 1990). The aging of the baby boom generation has meant an growing elderly
population, many of whom live alone and who are reliant primarily on governmental
Social Security and other public benefits; about 40% of single person households in
1990 were over 64 years of age (Wolch and Dear, 1993).
Immigration has also impacted homelessness, especially in large metropolitan
areas serving as ports of entry to immigrants from Central and South America and
Asia. Recent immigrants often use overcrowding as a way to remain physically
housed, but the prevalence of this strategy indicates that there might be a largely
invisible population living in marginal housing conditions. Overcrowding is a
strategy in part used to combat the lack of housing that is affordable to the working
poor. An increasingly competitive housing market is one of the results of ongoing
metropolitan restructuring. The decreasing number and rising cost of housing units
have been traced to several trends in large metropolitan areas: gentrification and
urban renewal, demolition of single-room occupancy hotels, the conversion of low-
rent units into luxury apartments and condominiums (Baer, 1986; Hoch, 1991).
There remain researchers however who argue that homelessness is not a national
housing problem, but a problem based in a lack of programs addressing mental
disability, substance abuse, and other social ills and in the local allocation of units in
large metropolitan areas (Troutman, Jackson, and Ekelund, Jr., 1999).
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Individual Reasons for Homelessness. Some researchers have argued that the
root causes for homelessness lie in individual behavior. In terms of the homeless
individual her/himself, several behaviors are cited as causing homelessness. In
particular, alcohol and drug abuse, mental disability, and criminal history have been
argued to cause homelessness for individuals (e.g., Baum and Bumes, 1993). There
are also interactions with other persons that may cause an individual to become
homeless. In particular, for women, abusive relationships, domestic violence,
victimization, rape, and family instability have been identified as leading to, or
substantially intensifying, homeless episodes (Bassuk, 1993; Bassuk and Weinreb,
1993; Butler and Weatherley, 1995; Rowe and Wolch, 1990).
As this discussion indicates, individuals who interact with marginally housed
persons may affect to a significant degree those persons’ potential for becoming and
remaining homeless. Research on the social networks and social support of homeless
persons has explored the size, composition, and functions of homeless social
networks in attempts to understand how homeless persons cope with daily needs and
to search for causes of homelessness. This literature has indicated contradictory
findings. Some studies have shown that homeless persons have less access to social
support and smaller networks than comparable housed persons living in poverty
(Cohen and Sokolovsky, 1989; Solarz and Bogat, 1990). Smaller social networks
may be directly related to physical health problems for homeless persons (Bates and
Toro, 1999). However, other researchers have argued that homeless persons have
consistent contact with family and friends (e.g., Goodman, 1991), indicating that the
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relationship between social network interaction and homelessness may have both
enabling and oppressive aspects. That is, that social networks may provide material
and emotional support, but that these same networks may serve to oppress, abuse,
and control homeless persons.
II. C. Impacts of Welfare Reform
The potential for social networks to control and abuse has been of ongoing
concern to researchers interested in the interactions between homeless persons and
the service delivery system. Because homeless persons are often dependent on
particular service providers to meet daily needs, the potential of homeless persons to
cope with their ongoing circumstances is to a large degree determined by the non
profit and public service providers with whom they interact (Rowe and Wolch,
1990). Some researchers have argued that the emergency shelter system for example
is fragmented, does not serve those in greatest need, and because of potential threats
of robbery, physical and sexual assault, and daily regimentation, many homeless
persons avoid this housing option (e.g., Laws, 1992; Weinreb and Rossi, 1995). The
context within which service providers work has been significantly affected by
national legislation aimed at reforming the welfare system.
Researchers have paid increasing attention to the area of welfare-to-work
given federal welfare reform legislation’s emphasis on work requirements and time
limits (e.g., Hughes, 1996), and also to the general devolution of responsibility for
individual welfare from the federal government onto localities impacted by welfare
reform (e.g., Wolch, 1998). In general, while the federal government will be
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primarily responsible for determining priorities and funding the new welfare
programs (through block grants), state governments will have heightened flexibility
in implementation (through designing actual programs and implementing them with
local non-profit organizations and private industry councils). Given the severe
curtailing of federal and state welfare programs in terms of individual access to
benefits, in the long-term future, local-level General Relief programs may provide
the only remaining option for many indigent individuals (Wolch and Sommer, 1997).
But many state governments have eliminated or cut back their local level General
Relief/General Assistance programs over the past several years; even for those
programs that continue to be funded, resources have become increasingly scarce as
counties attempt to balance growing need against shrinking financial resources
(Moon and Schneiderman, 1995).
Mass media accounts of the impacts of welfare reform suggest that there has
been a significant reduction in the total number of recipients at the national level,
with almost two million welfare cases eliminated from the inception of the
legislation to 1997 (Alter, 1997). However, one of the major unanswered questions
of welfare reform concerns whether former recipients will (re)enter the labor market
after being terminated from TANF. Research suggests that the road to
(re)employment will likely be a difficult one. On the one hand, the recent surge in
the economy facilitated labor market (re)entry for many. For example, a recently
released national study by the bipartisan group Welfare-to-Work Partnership argues
that former welfare recipients (who had received Aid to Families with Dependent
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Children) are staying at entry-level positions longer than new hires who were not
former recipients (Healy, 1998).
On the other hand, there are numerous obstacles faced by former welfare
recipients, and especially for those on the brink of homelessness or who are already
homeless. Such obstacles are related to the potential for employment in the current
labor market, the employability of the population, and logistical problems in
remaining employed. Although the economy has enjoyed substantial recent growth,
a recent study in Los Angeles County indicates that there will not be enough jobs for
the number of recipients seeking work.1 According to Force, Flaming, Henry, and
Drayse (1998), over the next two years, and only counting those former recipients
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the number of persons seeking
work will outnumber available positions on average by a ratio of 2.5 to 1. This
figure does not include unemployed individuals, which expands the competition for
jobs to 5.4 individuals seeking work “for every new job opening within occupations
in which welfare recipients have had experience” (p. 6-7).
1 Among programs facilitating the move from welfare to work, one highly visible
program in California, the Riverside County Great Avenues for Independence
(GAIN) job assistance program, has often been held as a model for moving welfare
recipients from public benefits to the labor force. However, scholars disagree as to
whether this program has had significant impacts or not (see for example, Gueron,
1996). In addition, even when former welfare recipients enter the labor market, they
remain limited in their employment potential to job-poor areas and low-wage
positions (e.g., Accordino, 1998; Hughes, 1996).
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III. Federal Governmental Responses to Homelessness
Welfare reform comprises the most recent federal response to poverty and
homelessness. However, governmental responses to homelessness at varying
jurisdictional scales have ranged widely. At one end of the spectrum, policies and
programs have been developed to prevent impoverished individuals from becoming
homeless, in terms of income maintenance, housing subsidy, job training, and
providing in-kind services for other daily needs (such as transportation, child care,
food, and medical care). At the other end of the spectrum, governmental policies
have been more punitive. At the state and federal levels, ongoing efforts to reform
welfare has resulted in time limits for welfare benefits and tightened eligibility
requirements. At the local level, cities and counties have increasingly turned to anti
camping, anti-panhandling, and other local ordinances serving to criminalize
homelessness in attempts to coerce homeless persons from entering and staying in
particular jurisdictions (Takahashi, 1998). Goetz (1992) outlines similar tensions at
the local level; in Los Angeles, the city sought both to retain areas for social services
and affordable housing for low income persons while at the same time pursuing a
strategy of constraining the homeless population and services to a specified area of
skid row.
This section focuses on those federal programs and funding streams that
focus on income maintenance and in-kind services developed to prevent
homelessness or to transition homeless persons back into a domiciled housing
situation. (These federal programs and funding streams will be examined in greater
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detail in Chapter IV of this dissertation.) The Stewart B. McKinney Act is argued to
be a watershed legislation at the federal level concerning homelessness, and
therefore, provides a temporal benchmark in assessing the form and function of
federal policies, programs, and funding.
Prior to the Stewart B. McKinney Act of 1987, there were various programs
and funding streams aimed at reducing distress among the low-income and
impoverished populations in the U. S. that functioned as supportive programs for
homeless persons. During the 1980s, Burt and Cohen (1989) identify two programs
that provided aid to homeless persons primarily through food assistance. The
Emergency Food and Shelter Program (EFSP) within the Job Stimulus Act of 1983
and the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) of 1983 tended to
provide food assistance to a small proportion of homeless persons (that is, most of
the beneficiaries tended not to be homeless). Perhaps because of the growing
visibility of homelessness particularly in U. S. central cities, Congress passed the
Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act in 1986 that improved the access of homeless
persons to income maintenance programs. The Hunger Prevention Act of 1988 was
then passed to fill gaps experienced through the implementation of TEFAP by
providing direct federal assistance to soup kitchens and emergency shelters.
The Community Development Block Grant was established under the 1974
Housing Act and began operations in 1975. It is an entitlement program providing
block grant funds to participating jurisdictions. These include local governments,
with cities with populations over 50,000 or urban counties with populations larger
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than 200,000 people, and states that pass through these funds to small cities, rural
counties, or unincorporated jurisdictions with populations less than 50,000.
The purpose of the CDBG program is to provide decent housing, a suitable
living environment, and to expand economic opportunities. The program is
principally designed to meet the needs of very-low, (defined as households not
exceeding 30% of the median income of the area), low-income (defined as
households not exceeding 50% of the median income of the area) and moderate-
income (defined as households not exceeding 80% of the median income of the area)
households. Some groups are presumed to be low-income: the homeless, elderly,
victims of domestic violence, abused or runaway children.
All CDBG activities must meet one of three national objectives: benefit low-
and moderate-income people; aid to prevent or eliminate slums and blight; or meet
an urgent need. An urgent need is a locally declared urgent situation: e.g., an
earthquake or other natural disaster. Homelessness by this definition is NOT an
urgent need. A CDBG project must also meet one of four tests: The Housing Benefit
Test, The Job Creation or Retention Test, Limited Clientele Test, Area Benefit Test.
(National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), 1996, p. 11.2).
The Stewart B. McKinney Act of 1987 was passed to fund programs and
policies directed at short-, medium-, and long-term solutions to homelessness. The
Act aims to provide assistance to homeless persons, primarily through the direct
federal assistance to homeless emergency shelters, and making funds available for
medical and mental health care, substance abuse services, education and job training,
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and support for homeless veterans (Burt and Cohen, 1989). Large proportions of
funding however remain focused on emergency-type measures (including wet
weather and emergency shelters), and the McKinney Act experiences continual
underfunding (Blau, 1992).
IV. The Governance of Homelessness
There is no lack of suggestions and recommendations put forth by researchers
and policymakers to address the diversification and expansion of homelessness (e.g.,
Blasi, 1990; Kondratas, 1991; Toro and Warren, 1999; Wolch and Dear, 1993). But
there has been less attention paid to the ways in which legislation and official
policies act as much as myths or policy images as they do indicators of action
(Gatrell and Fintor, 1998). Indeed, Toro and Warren (1999) argue that “Attention to
the wide array of housing problems and cooperation among state and local
governments and community groups is essential if efforts to end homelessness are to
succeed” (p. 119). Federal legislation and policies frame in an abstract way the
means through which homeless services should be provided. Municipal grant
proposals seeking federal funds for supporting local homeless programs must adhere
to these abstractions about policy design and implementation. The actual ways that
policies and services are carried out however may deviate rather significantly from
the “mythology of practice” (i.e., the stated procedures and outcomes identified in
grant proposals, policies, and procedures).
In this section, three issues organize this overview of the research addressing
the linkage between the mythology of practice (as represented through legislation and
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policies) and local service provider action or implementation. The first issue
concerns the nature and definition of governance. The term has been increasingly
used by scholars and policymakers, however, there still remains much ambiguity
surrounding the term and its policy implications. The second issue centers on the
linkages between federal policymaking and local implementation of homeless
programs. Particular attention is paid to the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s (HUD) Continuum of Care, and how this Continuum frames policies
and procedures for local homeless programs. The third issue focuses on the ways
that written policy discourse (as represented through policies, legislation, grant
proposals, program reviews, and audits) relates to action at the local level.
Specifically of interest here are the ways that homeless service providers are
impacted by federal policy guidelines and mandates.
IV. A. Understanding Governance
Governance has become an increasingly popular term used by researchers to
describe the form and function of the state. Governance perspectives, in contrast to
existing state-centered or society-centered views, tend to focus primarily on the
coordination and conflict among interdependent activities and actors. Research on
governance, however, has tended to focus on economic development, where
partnerships (i.e., public and private), the creation of quasi-public agencies, and the
privatization of public activities have most clearly illustrated the linkages and
networks between the state and markets. Jones (1998) has described the literature on
governance as representing two distinct paradigms, both with the aim of identifying,
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characterizing, and critiquing “new urban governance structures” (p. 965):
regulation theory (e.g., analyzing changes in the state given uneven temporal and
spatial transitions) and “local sociologies of translation” (what Jones, 1998, describes
as “networked negotiation, agenda setting, interorganisational and intersystemic
steering” (p. 963). MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) depict the literature on urban
governance using a more land-use oriented approach organize the urban governance
literature into the following two groups: urban regime frameworks (e.g., “the
tendencies for regimes to emerge out of civic cooperation based on mutual self-
interest between governmental and non-governmental actors,” p. 701) and growth
machines analysis (e.g., where coalitions form because of the conflicts between the
use value of residents and the exchange value of capital).
Jessop (1998) describes a working definition of governance in this way (also
Rhodes, 1996):
First, governance can refer to any mode of co-ordination of
interdependent activities.. . . Its forms include self-organizing
interpersonal networks, negotiated inter-organizational co
ordination, and decentred, context-mediated inter-systemic steering.
The latter two cases involve self-organized steering of multiple
agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally
autonomous from one another yet structurally coupled due to their
mutual interdependence, (p. 29)
Although Jessop (1998) develops this conceptualization of governance for the
purpose of analyzing the challenges of economic development, the concept also
describes very well the increasingly inter-organizational context of homelessness
service provision. He outlines three factors that serve to challenge the effectiveness
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of governance: the economic and social coordination inherent in capitalism;
coordination within and between differing levels of the state, with possible temporal
constraints; problems in inter-personal, inter-organizational, or inter-systemic
coordination due to manageability, lack of communication, or other technological
impediments. Jessop identifies four dimensions where governance encounters
difficulties in terms of implementation: cooperation and competition (especially in
terms of needed cooperation and trust in a context where self-interested behavior
may provide more short-term gain to individual participants); openness and closure
(in terms of participants and membership in the relevant coordinated effort);
govemability and flexibility (in terms of guiding situations more fully or allowing
change at relatively short notice); and accountability and efficiency (in particular in
terms of responsibility for errors, decisions, and oversights in coordinated activities).
Research on governance tends to focus on the practice of organizations and
institutional agencies, Jessop’s (1998) second level of “inter-organizational co
ordination” (p. 29). Futrell (1999) for example focuses on the practices of city
commissions in his ethnographic analysis of city decisionmaking; his analysis of
governance emphasizes the “micro-level processes of interaction between local
officials and citizenry, emphasizing how claims making, citizen participation, and
decisions are carried out during the proceedings” (p. 494). Futrell’s objective is to
“understand the interactional arrangements and techniques of impression
management” (p. 495); he concludes that “Commissioners and administrators,
obliged to maintain at least the impression of open, participatory governance during
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the proceedings, use procedural practices, discursive techniques, and interactional
strategies relying on teamwork to contain conflict and quell disruptions” (p. 512).
Loveland (1991) explores the impacts of British legislation concerning
homelessness by using a “wide-ranging contextualization process” (p. 249). In his
analysis, Loveland assesses the development of legislation, and how that legislation
impacted housing and social service practices at the local level. He concludes that
the impact of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act of 1977 was influenced by four
factors: “within the legislative process; injudicial interpretations of statutory
formulas; within the administrative process; and finally in the growing inadequacy of
public sector housing supply” (p. 308).
All four of these failings have demonstrable roots in preexisting
constitutional traditions that regulated the political and legal
relationships between central government, local authorities, the
courts, and the consumers of locally administered services. It is
also clear that while such contextual constraints on the probable
efficacy of discretion-laden legislation in this field ought to have
been appreciated by the act’s proponents, the Parliamentary context
in which the bill emerged (a minority Labour government)
precluded enactment of a more “convention proof’ statute, (p. 308)
These concepts point to changing state responses at varying spatial scales to
the conflicts inherent in capitalism, however, they focus much less on the practice of
linkages and interorganizational steering. State responses to homelessness, however,
are articulated as much in the day-to-day negotiation between non-profit community-
based service providers and municipal government agents as they are in the
legislation and policies developed by bureaucrats and elected officials.
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IV, B. Practicing Governance
The actual practice of governing is focused more on how individuals use the
power inherent in institutions to control and manage populations and groups. For
Foucault, for example, the practice of government determines the character of the
state as an institution rather than the form and function of the state defining the
everyday practice of individual or groups of state agents (Burchell et al., 1991).
Funding streams become expressions of the power relations inherent within and
between federal agencies and their funding recipients. The lack of coordinated
funding and program prioritization often create a labyrinth of rules and regulations
under which cities and homeless service providers must navigate to obtain funding
resources. Conflicting program and funding priorities are common at the state and
federal levels across multiple arenas. Addonizio (1991) for example describes the
“offsetting economic incentives for recipients” caused by intergovernmental grants
(p. 209).
However, “new federalism” continues to permeate the political language and
actions at the federal level, under the presumption that “state and local governments
have become capable governing partners” (Anton, 1997, p. 691). But, many
researchers have pointed to the intergovernmental conflict that exists, especially
between state and local governments (e.g., Bollens, 1992), indicating that new
federalism may not constitute a panacea for homeless programs and service
provision. Conflict might be minimized and intergovernmental effectiveness
heightened given “smooth interaction between and among levels of government”
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through improved communication (Falcone and Lan, 1997). But beyond the inherent
conflict that accompanies intergovernmental interactions, there might be financial
issues driving either the inability of state and local governments to deal with
homelessness, or the diversion of federal funds to other arenas not necessarily related
to homelessness. In the recent past, for example, municipal financial distress has
precluded the significant participation of many cities, counties, and some states in
expanding services to meet the growing and diversifying need of local homeless
populations (following Cahill et al., 1994). A related issue is the question of whether
strategies such as block grants actually result in state spending on the intended target
populations and identified problems (Jacobsen and McGuire, 1996).
V. Toward an Ethnography of Governance
The postmodern turn and the ethnographic crisis have brought opportunities
to analyze concepts and practices such as governance using an anthropological
sensitivity. In this section, the contribution of postmodern and feminist thought to
the practices of contemporary anthropology are outlined, to provide a basis for
understanding governance not only as concept and practice, but also as myth.
V. A. Postmodernism and Anthropology
Contemporary writers who wrestle with the concept of postmodernism most
often define it in terms of its ambiguity. Dear (1986) suggests that one reason for
this is the application of the term postmodernism within a diversity of aesthetic and
literature disciplines. In the arts, architecture and literature, postmodernism is often
used in the sense of a genre, or style. As a style, postmodernism is marked by a
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reworking and blending of past stylistic motifs. This combination of disparate styles
represents unification under the label of postmodernism due to the attitude conveyed
towards conventional genres and motifs, as well as for the technical reworking of
those genres and motifs. The style of postmodernism is marked by the ironic
juxtaposition of historically and stylistically diverse motifs with one another, and
with the context within which the postmodern work is situated. The reworking and
combination of historically non-contemporaneous motifs becomes an ironic
commentary on the rigidity of the conventional genres which generated them and the
serendipitous dominance of these genres within their respective historical era.
Postmodernism also extends this ironic juxtaposition to the present contexts of the
work. The parodic pastiche of motifs embodied in the single postmodern piece
represents a microcosm of the styles depicted in the built environment or celebrated
by current artistic and literary trends. In addition to the challenges to past stylistic
hegemony, postmodernism also challenges the claims of dominance current counter-
trends may assert within respective disciplines. This ironic commentary, represents a
“dialogue for the initiated” (Dear, 1986, p. 370), however, as a knowledge of the
significance of the motifs represented and their historical influence and hegemony is
necessary in order to decode postmodern works as anything beyond a hodgepodge of
style.
Postmodernism as method was first articulated within the discipline of
literary theory and practiced in the process of deconstruction. Deconstruction
developed as a response to the disciplinary dominance of structuralism in the 1960’s.
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The roots of structuralism lie in the works of linguists such as de Saussure and later
Chomsky. Structuralists assert that meanings that are conveyed through systems of
signification, such as written and spoken language, reveal the processes of deep
mental structures that do not vary across cultural or historical contexts. Textual
representations of language, therefore, are useful as objectified projections of this
structure. The task of the literary theorist, or linguist, is to determine how style and
form correspond to the universal patterns of thought.
Deconstructionists, such as Derrida and de Man, challenge the assumption
that universal mental processes are embodied in language and text. Rather, they
argue that meaning is an interactive process between the text, the author, and the
reader. Variations in the historical and social contexts of authors and readers
constitute the potential for variations in the meanings of texts. Thus, deconstruction
challenges the possibility of any kind of universal interpretation of text or language
and emphasizes an examination of contextual variables which may influence
meaning. This emphasis on the context of interpretation presents the possibility that
deconstruction can (and perhaps must) include an analysis of the power relationships
which constitute the socio-historical context of interpretation and are embodied in
textual representations.
This challenge to the possibility of universal patterns of meaning and the
introduction of an overtly political component means that the analysis of text has
gained prominence beyond the field of literary theory. Academic disciplines such as
history, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, and the natural sciences have
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increasingly rethought the assumption that the goal of uncovering universal meta
narratives is a viable one. In addition, critique has been generated not only of the
texts produced by academics (and policymakers), but also the contexts within which
these texts were generated.
Anthropology’s historical tradition made the impact of postmodernism
especially relevant. First, the concept of cultural relativism espoused by the founder
of American anthropology, Frans Boas, is compatible with many of the concepts of
postmodernism. The traditional concern of anthropology with the representation of
the cultural “other” made the postmodern problematization of representation
especially relevant. And finally, the influence of structuralism was especially strong
in anthropology, especially in the works of Levi-Strauss, as was the subsequent
interpretive emphasis found on the works of Geertz, who developed the notion of
culture as text.
Cultural relativism was a concept developed by Boas to challenge the
hegemonic conception that culture and civilization was the sole province of Western
culture. Boas argued that culture and the social structures and behaviors associated
with it was a relative concept. A culture could only be fully understood from the
point of view of those indigenous to it. Practices which were viewed as irrational or
primitive by the outside (i.e., Western) observer could become rational and logical
when viewed from the perspective of those who lived in the ecological, social and
ideological contexts in which they evolved. Boas argued (as did Malinowski) that
the goal of anthropology was to represent the emic, or insiders’ point of view.
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In contrast to this was ethnocentrism, the idea that the worldviews and
practices generated by one’s own culture were superior to those of other cultures. In
practice, ethnocentrism was the hegemony of Western social and ideological
constructs in constituting representations of, and policies, for, distinctly different
cultural traditions. Such representations and the subsequent practices which resulted
from them were informed by an etic, or outsider’s, point of view. The notion of
cultural relativism challenged Western imperialism and was especially relevant to a
discipline that had often benefited from, and collaborated with, the imperialist
bureaucracies and policies of European governments.
In addition to the construction of culturally relative representations of culture,
anthropologists were concerned to ground their work in empirical observation and
scientific method. Many, including Malinowski (1944) felt that scientific rigor in the
investigation of cultural diversity would lead to predictive models based on universal
laws of human perception, cognition and behavior. Throughout the 1950’s and
1960’s theoretical and empirical work focused on defining salient aspects of culture,
and comparing these aspects cross-culturally (e.g., the community studies model
proposed by Arensberg and Kimball, 1965).
Given this emphasis on empiricism and the search for universals, it is
understandable that Marxist materialism, and French structuralism, Levi-Strauss’
attempt to synthesize the works of Marx and de Saussure would gain prominence.
Levi-Strauss concentrated on cultural texts and practices, such as mythologies and
the formation of kinship systems. His analysis of these cultural constructions
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attempted to show that universal patterns of cognition and signification, and relations
of production and exchange, were the underlying determinants of human behavior.
However, his reduction of diverse and richly detailed mythical traditions to an
algebra of symbol and syntax was not countenanced by some anthropologists. Nor
did his theory that the exchange of women between male kin groups was the primary
means to social solidarity withstand the criticism of some anthropologists, especially
those with a feminist orientation.
With the decline of structuralism in anthropology, Clifford Geertz first
proposed the hermeneutic method of “thick description” for examining cultures as
texts (1973). Geertz argued that cultures and social activities could be “read” by the
anthropologist, as they were by the indigenous social actors. The anthropologist, as
an outsider, could only approach the emic perspective, however. Thus her reading of
culture as text would be colored by her own biases. This imperfect reading of culture
was further translated into a written (or filmed) representation, which was viewed as
an authoritative text. Traditionally, written ethnography did not dispel this
perception of authority nor portray interpretations as idiosyncratic.
The strong descriptive and interpretive traditions of literary ethnography
suggest that deconstruction and postmodernism have closely related implications for
the field of anthropology. Indeed, many of the postmodern writers in anthropology
have focused on the “crisis of representation”. Stylistic strategies for conveying the
complexity of cultural knowledge and methodological processes in linear, written (or
visual) formats have been discussed. One of the key strategies developed in this
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debate is the concept of reflexivity, the acknowledgment of the influence of the
ethnographer on the process of data collection and a self-conscious rendering of this
in written ethnography (see Chapter III).
Marcus and Fischer (1986) proposed that “One response to [this dilemma is]
to say that cross-cultural understanding, like any social understanding, is but an
approximation, variably achieved through dialogue, that is, a mutual correction of
each party in conversation to a level of agreement adequate for any particular
interaction” (p. 29). This acknowledgment of the dialogic process of ethnography
has implications for both the methodological processes of data collection as well as
for written ethnography.
In the field, the anthropologist informed by postmodern critiques, must be
aware that the information she collects is co-constructed by herself and the cultural
experts who serve as their interlocutors. The anthropologist must be highly skeptical
of how her own preconceptions and perceptions shape the observation of the cultural
knowledge to which she is privy. In addition, she must also be aware of how
historically constituted power relations between Western culture and the indigenous
groups with whom she works shape the social actors’ perception of the
anthropologist and their responses to her. The ulterior motives of every participant in
ethnographic fieldwork, and the intended and unintended consequences of that work,
should be acknowledged in the construction of written ethnography.
One of the premier works in postmodern anthropology, Writing Culture: The
Poetics and Politics of Ethnographv (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), discusses stylistic
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strategies for conveying these complexities in written ethnography. A key issue for
Clifford and Marcus is how the ethnographer can be aware of the affect of macro and
micro level socio-historical processes on the ethnographic encounter and how these
simultaneous processes can be translated into written form. Again, the
anthropologist must be sensitive to the intended and unintended consequences of her
written representation of cultural knowledge, for the dialogic process of ethnography
goes beyond the anthropologist and those she observes. The reader, as the consumer
and interpreter of culture-as-text-objectified-in-writing, also enters into a dialogue
with the ethnographer, and through her, the cultural actors she represents.
The historically prior conception of “anthropologist as expert” is now
problematic. The authority of ethnographic discourse can no longer lie solely with
the academic anthropologist. Rather the authority for the construction and
representation of cultural knowledge must be shared by all the participants in the
ethnographic discourse.
No longer the in the role of ethnographic authority, the anthropologist is now
in the role of facilitating discourse between the co-producers and consumers of
ethnographic texts. But neither the co-producers, nor the consumers of ethnographic
texts are homogenous groups; and certainly the stylistic strategies the ethnographer
employs privilege certain sub-groups on each side of ethnographic discourse. Even
now, ethnographic discourse remains largely a “dialogue of the initiated” (Dear,
1986, p. 370). Ethnographies are still written primarily for other ethnographers, not
for indigenous readers or for the general population of the ethnographer’s culture.
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The practice of presenting drafts to informants, and reflexivity in representation, do
in some measure address the problems raised by the postmodern critique of
anthropology, but these alone do not fully address these issues.
A reliance on acknowledging the co-construction of cultural knowledge and
the reflexive representation of this process can have conservative and radical
implications for the politics of ethnography, and for constructing an ethnography of
governance. In the past, anthropologists have used their status as expert and the
shroud of scientific inquiry and method to obscure the power relations embodied in
the ethnographic process. The selective inclusion of reflexive strategies and
indigenous participation can also be used to mask the still hegemonic position of
Western culture, or other dominant cultural systems, as manifested in the
ethnographic encounter. As an emancipatory strategy, the anthropologist can alert
her interlocutor and readers to the possible ways these power relations affect her
work. But as an oppressive strategy, the anthropologist can also use these discursive
strategies to obscure these relations, albeit on a deeper level of abstraction. At the
extreme, these strategies can lead to a pernicious narcissism as the ethnographic text
becomes a means for the anthropologist to use the cultural knowledge provided by
her informants to explore her own subjective states.
Anthropology can also be a radicalizing force if the ethnographer goes
beyond the role of observer and facilitator and takes an active position of advocacy
on behalf of the cultural groups she represents. This is a difficult task. The
anthropologist must be certain that her political agenda is clearly that of those for
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whom she advocates, and not an etic interpretation of what their agenda should be.
The anthropologist as advocate must also bear the responsibility of the unintended
consequences of her actions, which no matter how conscientiously planned and
executed, can be unfortunate.
The politicization of anthropology is, in some manner, a return to the past.
As “the handmaiden of colonialism,” the origins of anthropology were explicitly
political. Anthropologists, self-conscious of this past, continue to remain skeptical of
an expressly political agenda in ethnography. This is reflected in a disciplinary bias
against applied anthropologists, who continue to be viewed by their academic
colleagues as outsiders in their own discipline. In this instance, the attitudes of
anthropologists have not kept pace with the rhetoric of postmodern anthropology.
Ironically, the practice of indigenous ethnography is one strategy cited by
postmodern anthropologists as a means of addressing some of the problems of
cultural representation. Resistance to this strategy in the West may be due, in part, to
the belief that the disciplinary boundaries between anthropology and other social
sciences will become blurred.
V. B. Constructing a Postmodern Ethnography of Homelessness
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III, this dissertation borrows
from these postmodern perspectives to construct an ethnography of the governance of
homelessness, based on the public documentation of local homeless policies and
program implementation and on the ethnographer’s observed version of the same
time-space events.
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The “crisis of representation” has encouraged anthropologists to seek
alternative methods and concepts to describe, analyze, and interpret social life. The
development of an ethnography of governance and homelessness both reflects and
benefits from such critique. In my early ethnographic endeavors with respect to
homelessness, it was the homeless community itself—a relatively powerless group—
that was the subject of my inquiry. My uneasiness in positioning myself as an
“expert” in the representation of their daily routines and social networks created
intellectual and ethnical dilemmas which paralyzed my efforts to write up the
findings of that research. Instead, I have chosen to “study-up”, to write an
ethnographic account of my own experiences, and my interaction with policymakers
and service providers in the construction of a service delivery system for the
homeless. I have also tried to be reflexive and explicit in the recognition of my own
biases vis a vis varied roles (e.g., as scholar, as volunteer, as expert) as I focus on the
everyday practices of individuals and groups and attempt an analysis and
interpretation of the ways that institutions and individuals interact to manage
homelessness.
This dissertation is explicitly about representation—it examines the idealized,
“partial truths” generated to present a politically and ideologically appealing
representation of specific policies and practices surrounding homeless service
delivery to Federal and local public officials, and to the residents of the City of
Glendale. This is then contrasted with the “observed” version of the problems
encountered in program implementation. In the interest of reflexivity, however, I
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must observe that while the “public” version of homeless service delivery in
Glendale is an obvious manipulation, my own claims that the “observed” version of
these same events represents something closer to “reality” should be met with
skepticism from the reader.
My explicit thesis also parallels the observations of postmodern
ethnographers: that public policy, like social theory, is a meta-narrative that is
incapable to representing (or directing) the complexities of day to day life. This is
because they are products of highly specific cultural, political and ideological
contexts which may or may not represent the contexts of every day life (or program
implementation). And because the linear forms through which policy and theory are
communicated, i.e., the spoken or written word, they are inadequate to represent the
multiple levels of contemporaneous social interaction which are to be represented in
descriptive (theory) or prescriptive (policy) abstraction.
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CHAPTER III: UNDERSTANDING HOMELESSNESS IN LOS ANGELES:
AT THE INTERSECTION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
I. Introduction
In this chapter I situate my argument within the contexts of ethnography and
applied anthropology, introduce the conceptual history of this dissertation, and
outline the conceptual framework for this analysis.
Contemporary ethnography has been increasingly concerned over the past two
decades with issues of representations and reflexivity. The difficulties with
representing the “other” have been clearly articulated in post-modern critiques of
ethnography (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) and have resonated in my personal field
experience. The clear and deliberate articulation of the position of the ethnographer
comprises one strategy to address the dilemma of representation. Thus, I have
decided to situate the ethnographic narrative in this dissertation in the three positions
that I have inhabited as a practitioner and as a participant-observer with respect to the
issue of homelessness: academic researcher, social service provider, and government
official. Writing from these positions of direct experience is consistent with
approaches to ethnography that take post-modern critiques seriously, as is placing the
ethnographic focus on actors in positions of some power, rather than on the
“powerless”. The data from which I draw for the dissertation’s analysis will include
my own work and experiences in each of these positions, however, the primary focus
will be on my role as the Homeless Coordinator in the City of Glendale, California.
My work also fits squarely in the field of applied anthropology; in my position as a
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practitioner, I focus on the practices and attitudes which directly affect the
implementation of services, and the specific conclusions I draw regard the roles of
academics, social service providers and government officials in the development and
implementation of effective public policy.
In all of the roles I have inhabited with respect to the issue of homelessness
over the past thirteen years— student/academic, service provider, government
official—I have been writing. I have written field notes, scholarly articles and
reports summarizing research findings, grant proposals to private foundations and
public agencies, reports to the Glendale City Council and other public policy
documents, letters, newspaper articles, and promotional materials. In each of these
roles, and with each type of document that I have created, I have adopted a different
“voice”. My voice as an academic as reflected in scholarly articles was thoughtful,
compassionate, yet detached in the presentation of the argument and supporting
narrative. My field notes were much more passionate as I navigated the intense
relationships I experienced in the field, and tried to sort through my thoughts and
emotions to arrive at a theoretical abstraction which would encapsulate the
experiences, frustrations and hopes of the homeless persons I had interviewed. As a
service provider, my voice began to change. I learned a clipped, terse style, designed
to clearly convey just the right amount of information without unnecessary detail, a
style that I would further develop as a public official. I also learned how to “spin”
information, not as academics do to filter their abstracted view of the complexity of
experience through a theoretical model, but as public officials do to serve a political
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agenda, and to market this agenda and the specific products of it — policies and
programs — to their constituency.
I find my ability to ventriliquate these social roles through my written work to
be both astonishing and troubling. Immodestly, I am astonished at my virtuosity and
my ability to easily move from one voice to another as the situation dictates. I also
believe that although I adopt these voices opportunistically to serve specific
communicative and political goals, I am sincere in my intent to work toward quality
service delivery to homeless persons. Still, I am troubled that none of these voices is
able to articulate the “truth”, or even the myriad of partial truths of which I am
consciously aware as I write at any given moment. Each voice through which I
articulate the analytical perspectives of this dissertation, and with which I provide the
supporting narratives and documentation for that analysis, is telling a different
version of my truth. And my truths about homeless policy are very much a function
of those roles from which I have experienced the issue. Throughout this dissertation
I have included many examples of writings that I have done at various times, and
from various positions that I have inhabited over the last thirteen years. I hope that
by using these multiple voices to construct my ethnographic narrative, that I can
better represent the complexity of my experience, thoughts and feelings around the
issue of homelessness.
This dissertation is not an explicit analysis of the voices of the ethnographer.
This dissertation is about how even in the “objective” domains of public policy and
government, myths about homeless policy and service delivery are constantly being
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created and recreated, and about the relationship of those myths to the
implementation of policy and the operation of programs at the local level. In my
field setting, the City of Glendale, many of those myths have been created by my
voice. And in this dissertation another of my voices articulates observations of the
day to day lived experience of the development and implementation of policy and
programs. A third voice presents an analysis of these contrasting representations. To
me, at times the voices I use sound remarkably dissimilar and unfamiliar, but I take
full responsibility for them. I only hope that taken as a whole, this dissertation
represents progress toward their integration into a cogent and useful articulation of
why homeless policies take the form they do, and how and why programs designed to
serve the homeless function as they do in Glendale, California.
II. Conceptual History - Academic Beginnings
I began my work with the homeless in 1986 in downtown Los Angeles as an
undergraduate anthropologist and photographer. My work was relatively
unstructured but my interaction intense. I formed close relationships with some
homeless persons, one couple in particular, Paul and Rita. I took over 1,000 black
and white photographs in Skid Row, homeless hotels and shelters. From December,
1985 through June, 1987,1 spent my time at homeless encampments at First and
Spring and on Sixth and Towne, and at a transitional shelter for women and children
a block from my home near Mac Arthur Park. The shelter, Casa Nuestra, was
managed by a friend of mine, Liz Brunner, who I greatly admired and who had also
graduated from, and later attended graduate school at, USC. I conducted my first
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interviews with women at the shelter for Joe Saltzman’s journalism class at USC,
part of the undergraduate Visual Anthropology curriculum at the time.
After the downtown encampments were relocated/disbanded in June of 1987,
I left town for 2 months due to the death of my father. When I returned in the fall, I
had lost contact with my social network on the street, and the shelter and my
relationship with Liz were in trouble. During this time Casa Nuestra was closed, and
in subsequent months, the shelter was badly burned in a fire. After a break, I began
fieldwork again the senior year of my undergraduate program when I enrolled
simultaneously in both the undergraduate and the graduate field methods classes at
USC. I worked out of Clifton’s Cafeteria, where I met two women whom I had
known on Towne street, Lisa and Pam. I reestablished my relationship with them
over the next months. My field work and ethnographic interviews with Lisa, Pam
and Rita and the women at Casa Nuestra were the basis of my Senior Thesis, which
in turn became the basis of my first publication (with Jennifer Wolch) “Social
networks in Time and Space: Homeless Women in Skid Row, Los Angeles” (Rowe
and Wolch, 1990).
The most important conceptual arguments made in this article were:
Homelessness can be characterized as the lack of time-space
continuity [or, the degrees to which successive daily paths resemble
one another and occur in the same locale, shaping personal identity
and its subjective connotation, self-esteem], or time space
discontinuity. Time-space discontinuity has important ramifications
for the development of social networks in time and space. . . . This
breakdown of traditional social networks and changes in daily/life
paths leads homeless people to develop ways to acquire resources
which do not depend on either a spatially-fixed home base or a job
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site.. . . [SJocial network relationships, which can occur at variable
point in urban space, appear to replace the role of locationally-fixed
stations in the daily path in creating time-space continuity and
providing material, emotional and logistical support.. . . Not
surprisingly, social networks and daily routines of homeless people
are used to meet their immediate survival needs. As a result, long-
range life goals are of necessity relegated to a low priority. . . . The
preeminence of short-term needs and a devalued locale can lead to
an altered assessment of life plans and priorities, and a transformed
sense of self. (Rowe and Wolch, 1990, p. 190-191)
The methodology for this fieldwork on homeless women consisted of the
following process:
The data collected and analyzed for this paper are based on
ethnographic research conducted in and around Skid Row. The
study entailed two phases. The first phase involved a lengthy period
of participant-observation in two homeless street communities in or
near the Skid Row district. This was followed by a small number of
formal and lengthy key informant interviews, the first of which were
conducted with homeless women who participated in these
communities or who lived in a nearby shelter. The participant-
observation phase began in January 1986. Initial contact with the
homeless was limited to “Justiceville,” a street community with a
semiformal organization.. . . No formal field notes were recorded
during this period, nor were formal interviews conducted. Presence
in the community was sporadic but on-going and participation
included casual conversations and the occasional provision of
transportation and food. Documentation of the community through
still photography was initiated in January 1987 and continued
throughout the research.
The primary location of the information participant-
observation and photographic documentation shifted in Spring of
1987 to the Love Camp on Fourth Street and Towne Avenue in
downtown Los Angeles.. . . Casual conversation with camp
members, photography and the provision of transportation and small
amounts of cash continued until the dispersal of the camp. . ..
A transitional residence for homeless and battered women
and their families in the downtown area was a third site of
participant-observation and photographic documentation.
Participation as a volunteer and founding member of the sponsoring
organization included direct involvement in the day-to-day
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operation of the shelter, talking with the women, playing with their
children, and providing services such as transportation, advice,
encouragement, and crisis intervention. Formal, tape-recorded
interviews were conducted at this shelter in the fall of 1987. Two
other interviews with women who were former members of
Justiceville were conducted in the same fall. All interviews
conducted in 1987 focused on the women’s experience with the Los
Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), but
a wide range of topics connected with Skid Row survival strategies
and social ties was also discussed.
Clifton’s Cafeteria, a popular restaurant in the downtown area
frequented by the homeless community, was chosen as a site for
further participant-observation in January, 1988. Contact was also
reestablished with former members of Justiceville and the Love
Camp. Two women who had lived in the Love Camp were located
and interviewed in this phase of the research. These interviews
were broad in scope and the topics of discussion were initiated by
the women, as well as by the researcher. In addition, formal
observations were made at a new encampment at First and
Broadway streets in downtown Los Angeles. Field notes regarding
these observations and the contexts of the interviews were recorded
and many still photographs documented the site and residents.
In accordance with standard ethnographic methods (Werner
and Schoepfle, 1987; Spradely, 1979), careful attention was devoted
to accurately transcribing the taped interviews in order to preserve
the grammar, structure, and flow of the conversation as it was
converted to written language with punctuation. However, subtlety
of inflection, the length of a pause, laughter, facial expression, and
body gestures (which often communicate meaning) have not been
captured. Since quotations are removed from the context of the
conversation, these excepts from the transcripts are subject to some
degrees of misinterpretation (both by reader and authors). All
interviews were conducted with the express knowledge and consent
of the women, but all names have been changed except for those of
public figures, such as the recognized leaders of the various
homeless communities. Also permission was obtained for all
photographs and in most instances the subjects received a copy of
the print.
Photography, and the distribution of prints to members of the
various informal communities, was an integral part of the process of
rapport-building throughout the research period. It provided a role
in the community for the investigator, who was often referred to and
introduced as “the camp photographer”. Also the process of taking
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photographs, and photography in general, often provided an initial
topic of conversation with unfamiliar individuals. When prints
were brought back to Skid Row and distributed, a relationship of
trust and reciprocity was established. Photographs were also used
in informal, untaped interviews documented in the field notes,
which aided in the data analysis (see Collier and Collier, 1986; and
Wagner, 1979 for expanded discussions of the role of still
photography in social science research). Thus, photography, and the
long duration of time spent becoming acquainted with the homeless
individuals and their lifestyle, allowed for a depth of mutual
revelation and understanding between field researcher and
informants that would have been difficult to achieve through other
means. (Rowe and Wolch, 1990, p. 187-188)
The second phase of my ethnographic research began in May, 1990. This
research was to have been the basis of a larger project on homeless social networks,
daily routines and social service delivery. The fieldwork consisted of the following
process1 : In the spring of 1990, Jennifer Wolch and I began to develop strategies for
ethnographic data collection, and to search for an appropriate field site. We decided
that both Dr. Wolch and I would work in the field, and that we would locate this
work at a formal, local social service provider. This was in contrast to the initial
fieldwork, as described in our 1990 article quoted above, which was not sited at, or
conducted in conjunction with, a homeless service provider. One reason for this
decision was concern for the safety of both the researchers and informants. We
intended to conduct very detailed interviews, which would require privacy, and we
felt that locating the research at a facility would make both the client and researcher
feel more at ease. We hoped to use a private room or office in the facility, or
alternative, we would notify staff when we would conduct interviews off-site, for
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example in a local park. As the project developed, it was the latter method that was
employed most often. In addition to safety, however, there were advantages to
basing our fieldwork at service facilities— for those people included within the
purview of formal social service providers, these facilities served as the geographical
and social hub of their daily routines and support networks. This choice to base
ourselves within the context of a formal service provider meant that the scope of the
project could extend only to that segment of the homeless community that used
social services. Thus, those among the homeless community who never or rarely
used services could not be represented in this research project.
We also decided that we would conduct our fieldwork in at least two distinct
geographic communities in order to study the effect of local urban geography on
social networks, daily routines, identity and self-esteem. Thus, the social service
facilities in these communities needed to be roughly comparable in the services
offered and the segment of the homeless population served, with the goal that the
segment be as broad as possible (that is, serving as many different subpopulations in
the homeless population as possible). We approached various agencies, including
the City of Los Angeles Mobile Ombudsman program, which at the time sited social
service trailers in various Los Angles neighborhoods. When on-going litigation
between the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles (see Chapter V for a
discussion of the resolution of this lawsuit), precluded working with this program,
we approached Union Station, a social-service meals program and shelter in
1 This description is based on notes from 1993.
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Pasadena, and St. Joseph Center, a drop-in center and restaurant for the homeless in
Venice.
We proposed in our initial letter that we work in the facilities as volunteers
and eventually interview a number of clients. After positive responses to our letter,
Dr. Wolch and I met with staff at each of these agencies to address any concerns or
questions that the staff had about the research project. Staff concerns revolved
primarily around the issues of client confidentiality and safety. We took a number of
steps to address these concerns. We guaranteed to respect the privacy of clients and
protect their anonymity. We developed a release form that described participants'
rights and provided a telephone number to call if they had any complaints. We also
agreed to consult with, and defer to, staff regarding any safety concerns. In
particular, staff persons were concerned that we not violate existing rules prohibiting
volunteer - client socialization outside of the facility. In return for permission to
conduct fieldwork at these facilities, we agreed that any information we gathered
would be made available to the providers to use in ways they deemed appropriate,
including fundraising, grantwriting and public relations.
We began the initial phases of the research after we selected Union Station in
Pasadena and St. Joseph Center in Venice as field sites and gained approval from
these agencies’ staff. We had decided that the initial phase of the research would
consist of participant-observation conducted from our (Dr. Wolch and myself)
perspectives as volunteers with the service facilities. After this initial period of
observation, we planned to conduct semi-structured interviews with a mapping
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component to document participants' daily routines. We decided we would transition
into this second phase of the research when we felt that we had an understanding of
the day to day operations of the facilities, and had established contacts and casual
relationships with members of the homeless community at each location.
We felt that this two-phase strategy would ultimately enhance the quality of
the interview data. We hoped that the rapport we established with staff and clients
would help to ensure their sincere cooperation with our efforts, in part because of
feelings of mutual reciprocity and/or an understanding of our research goals. We
also hoped that, as people began to know us, they would grow to trust us and would
thus feel safe in confiding with us in the interview process (especially since we
ensured participants' anonymity). But in addition, people also agreed to participate
because they liked and respected us and wanted to help us because of friendship,
rather than in return for our efforts as volunteers or because they believed our work
might affect public policy.
We believed that familiarity with the site and our on-going involvement
allowed some means for evaluating the veracity of interview data, since we could
observe first-hand some of the activities and situations described by participants.
Our on-going presence would also allow us to determine to some degree whether or
not a participant's responses to the interview questions were straightforward, or
clouded by an ulterior motive or perhaps a mental disability. Of course, we could
never be sure whether a participant was "truthful" in his/her interview, but we
believed that our on-going presence could make us aware of any history of deceptive
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or delusional behaviors. Also, from the point of view of the participant, the
continuity of our presence might have made it seem more likely that (or more
embarrassing if) a deliberate distortion would be identified.
Conversely, however, our on-going presence at the field sites and our rapport
with interview participants could also negatively affect the veracity of interview data.
As some people became more familiar with us, they might form desires and
expectations regarding the nature of their relationship with us. For many of the on
going, closer, relationships formed in the field sites, these expectations and desires
were for a level of friendship and emotional support which felt entirely appropriate
within the contexts of the service and research environments which framed these
relationships. But even in these cases, where the nature of the relationship seemed
appropriate, the mutual desire to protect and continue the relationship could affect
interview data as well as informal discussions.
In general, it is reasonable to assume that as one begins to fashion a
relationship, one may be less willing to confide past or present behaviors (e.g.,
engaging in prostitution or criminal behavior, or enduring abusive relationships)
which one feels will diminish his or her presentation of self to another. Thus, while
rapport might lead to trust and the sharing of intimate thoughts and experiences,
rapport also might cause one to be more guarded, for fear of being misunderstood or
judged by the researcher. This, of course, can be mitigated by the demeanor of the
researcher, and Dr. Wolch and I took great pains to remain non-committal in our
comments regarding many issues, especially the behavior and attitudes of those
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running or patronizing the service facility. Still, one's attitudes and beliefs can be
communicated in many indirect and subtle ways, cueing research participants into the
value system of the researcher.
In some cases, a participant's (or researcher's) desires and expectations for the
relationship may go beyond what is appropriate for the service and research context.
For example, a number of the male participants indicated that they would like to date,
or become romantically involved with, the female researchers. These expectations
were problematic because, as indicated above, they might provide a motive for
participants to distort their interview responses. But it was also problematic because
it complicated the already complex dynamic of the relationship between the
researcher/volunteer and the participant/client. Even though, more often than not, the
participants’ desire to date the researcher was revealed after the interview, it placed a
strain on the subsequent interactions. The participant sometimes felt hurt or even
angry after his advances were politely, but firmly, rejected. I often felt the need to be
guarded in my interactions not only with openly interested participants, but with all
male clients, for fear that my friendliness was misinterpreted. This was an on-going
source of difficulty and stress for me, but was less of a concern for Dr. Wolch,
perhaps because many people at the agency where she was conducting fieldwork
knew she was married. There are disadvantages and advantages in terms of gender
relations during ethnographic research among vulnerable populations. I was very
upset and hurt because I felt I could not be myself, for fear that I would be
misinterpreted and or manipulated. This was a constant dimension of my interaction
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in the field. In addition, this dynamic may, in part, account for our overly-male
sample of the interview-set, especially in Pasadena. I am sure that to some extent,
however, I unconsciously or consciously took advantage of this dynamic as well. I
began to be very troubled about the ethical dimensions of the research. I, of course,
attended graduate school during the height of the so-called “crisis in ethnography”, in
which critics and ethnographers themselves began to question the ability and
authority of anthropologists to present the “emic” view, to represent in any but the
most superficial ways, the meanings, emotions, and motivations behind observable
behaviors. I swallowed hard and continued my research.
Both Dr. Wolch and I volunteered at St. Joseph's Center in the Venice
neighborhood of Los Angeles starting in late June, 1990. We conducted our first
interview in December of that year. There was longer initial phase at St. Joseph's
because Dr. Wolch and I only volunteered there one day per week, while at Union
Station in Pasadena I volunteered 4 - 5 days per week. I, alone, conducted the
research in Pasadena. The initial phase of participant-observation began in late May,
1990 and the first interview was conducted on July 11, 1990. Thus, I was able to
become acclimated to the routines and the people much more quickly than in Venice.
At Union Station I interacted with the clients as a volunteer in two capacities:
as an overnight volunteer and as a kitchen volunteer. I became friendly with the staff
there, who knew about my research, but came to look upon me as a very reliable and
helpful volunteer. My access to clients was not mediated by staff in any way. As an
overnight volunteer I would help staff with serving the evening meal, do laundry, and
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"hang-out" with clients before lights-out at 11 p.m. I would sleep at the shelter,
starting the coffee, folding the laundry, and helping with clean-up in the morning. I
would leave the shelter with the clients around 7:00 a.m., as they got coffee and got
ready for their pre-breakfast, 7:30 a.m. Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. As an over
night volunteer I often spent 1 1/2-2 hours relaxing and chatting with the clients,
passing the time playing "Spades". This was a key time for initiating and building
relationships with potential interview participants and other shelter guests. I usually
volunteered overnight once or twice per week during the most intensive period of
fieldwork, the spring and fall of 1990.
In addition to working as an overnight volunteer, I also worked in Union
Station's kitchen three to four days per week. I would usually arrive just prior to the
first breakfast serving at 9:00 a.m. The usual fare was oatmeal and a sweet roll, with
juice, coffee and milk, and there was a later serving at 9:30 a.m. as well. I would
work in the kitchen peeling vegetables, washing dishes and I would also clean and
set-up the dining room between servings. Clients were allowed in the dining from
10:00 a.m. until about 11:30 a.m., when they would leave and line up for lunch,
which was served in three shifts— noon, 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. After lunch was
served, the kitchen would be cleaned and the volunteers would leave, usually by 1:30
p.m.
I would interact with clients by handing plates across the counter. But I
would also walk out into the dining room or go outside between 10:00 a.m. and
11:30 a.m. and speak with homeless persons, sometimes for quite a while before
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returning to the kitchen. After lunch, I would also hang-out, but since there was a
2:00 p.m. Alcoholics Anonymous workshop, there was not time for much but chit
chat. My second month as a volunteer I received permission from the substance
abuse counselor to attend any of the Alcoholics Anonymous meetings I wished, and I
usually stayed for the 2:00 p.m. workshop, and often hung-out afterwards until late
afternoon (4-5 p.m.). In addition to the 7:30 a.m. meeting and 2:00 p.m. workshop,
there was also a 6:30 p.m. meeting before dinner, which I attended on occasion as
well.
My presence at these meetings met with surprisingly little comment. Most
clients already considered me as an extraordinary volunteer, since I was there
everyday and interacted with folks to a much greater extent than most volunteers.
They seemed to take my presence at the meetings in stride. I explained to anyone
who asked, or with whom I spoke at length, about my research goals and motives for
volunteering. The responses were generally supportive, although many were
skeptical that tangible policy changes would come of my, or any, research on
homelessness. One woman, however, objected outright to my project, although she
took great pains to explain that I should not be personally offended by her opinion.
She felt (quite rightly) that people like me, along with journalists and other writers,
exploited the experiences of homeless persons for the writer's personal gain. Maggie
specifically felt that her own story had been adapted for the TV movie Stone Pillow,
starring Lucille Ball, and she was angry that she had not been compensated. Whether
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or not this was actually the case, Maggie nonetheless did have a grasp of the more
exploitative dimension of the ethnographic process.
The service context in which I volunteered and interacted with clients was
quite different at St. Joseph’s Center in Venice that at Union Station in Pasadena.
Dr. Wolch and I each volunteered one day per week at the drop-in center in Venice.
Our duties consisted mainly of running the shower and laundry programs. Early each
morning we accompanied staff along a line of clients who drew times for shower and
laundry slots. Folks were scheduled for 15 minutes in the shower, and laundry slots
were half an hour each for washing and drying. Often, there was a good deal of
trading slots, so people could work around their scheduled mealtime or any other
appointment, or so they could wash their clothes before taking their shower in order
to have clean clothes to wear.
After the schedule was set, we had to keep things on track, as well as hand
out to clients (and keep track of) a wide variety of toiletry items: toothbrushes,
razors, soap, shampoo, shaving cream, lotion, cotton swabs and balls, Vaseline, and
any other items that were collected by the Center. At times this became quite hectic
around the peak time period of about 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. Folks would line up at
the shower counter, but often people would break into the line, or several clients
would simultaneously compete for attention. Often those people were admonished
by other clients, and at times I myself would get a bit perturbed and tell someone to
"back o ff. Around 11:00 a.m. we would sign people up for their next day's meal.
One meal per day was served down the street at the Bread 'n Roses Cafe. Folks
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would assign themselves (and while against the rules, often a friend) a slot the day
before. If they had not made a prior "reservation", they could not eat, the only
exceptions being made for first-time clients or for those released from jail or the
hospital the day before. Signing people up was a helpful task for the researcher since
it really facilitated learning people's names, and gave me a chance to interact with
those who did not use the drop-in center, but did eat at the cafe. The center closed
from 12:30 p.m. to 2:00 p.m., and in the afternoon I continued with showers and
laundry. Activities were much more relaxed after lunch, as many folks embarked on
other facets of their daily routines. But some of the "regulars" hung-out until closing,
often sorting donated clothes for staff (and getting first pick), or cleaning up.
Thus, interaction with the clients at St. Joseph's in Venice was more intense
and constant than that at Union Station in Pasadena. But my presence at Union
Station was much more frequent than the weekly schedule followed by Dr. Wolch
and myself at St. Joseph’s in Venice. At both sites, our interaction with clients and
potential interview participants was complex and dynamic. At times, we represented
an extension of staff authority, especially when we were enforcing unpopular rules.
Speaking for myself, although I conformed to them, I was often ambivalent about
staffs seeming obsession for enforcing rules that seemed trivial and perhaps
demeaning (e.g., only giving someone a toothbrush once every two weeks, or not
allowing one to choose the kind of sweet roll they liked best).
One of the primary issues regarding service provision is the establishment
and maintenance of boundaries. These boundaries between the client and case
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manager, at best, ensure that the case managers are not projecting their own issues
onto the case management situation, and establishing in a “co-dependent”
relationship with the client. For example, the desire or need for a case manager (or
volunteer) to “help” may be motivated by many positive forces: compassion,
empathy, and kindness. But it can also be motivated by more problematic forces: a
need to be needed, a need to control or feel “superior” over the client (which at worst
can lead to a relationship in which the case manager “enables” the clients dependent
status through attempts to micro-manage the progress of their case management
strategy). Establishing and maintaining appropriate, professional boundaries is
important. However, balancing these forces in the complicated dynamic of the staff
- client relationship is very problematic, especially given the overwhelming
emotional needs of the clients. The seemingly “trivial” boundaries around the
procedures I witnessed were an extension of these more foundational boundaries, for
better or worse. They established ground-rules for behavior which everyone could
understand, and were important when dealing with a client population that, on a daily
basis, often subsisted through manipulation and the exploitation of their dependent
status (e.g., panhandling, prostitution). On the other hand, for some staff and
volunteers, foundational and trivial boundaries also represented a more negative
manifestation of the need to control and exert power over clients. This would make
clients angry, and their responses ranged from dirty looks to guilt-trips; "I'm
homeless, you’re supposed to be helping me," a man responded to my denial of an
untimely toothbrush. At times people pitched their complaints in terms of race.
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Almost without exception, other clients would admonish the offender, comfort me,
or both.
At other times and/or with other clients, we were viewed as acquaintances
and over time, as friends. For some, I believe our relationships were sources of
status and positive self-esteem, representing, as we did, a socio-economic and
education class background that many homeless persons aspired to, or felt drawn to
as their status of origin. Looking back now, I realize that I did cross boundaries with
the clients, and my relationships with a few were inappropriate. For one women at
St. Joseph’s Center, in particular, Dr. Wolch and I intervened and took her to Union
Station in Pasadena so she could receive the substance abuse counseling she needed.
She ultimately established her sobriety, obtained employment and housing, and
regained custody of her children. Dr. Wolch and I still maintain a relationship with
her today, ten years later. And while our relationship with Diane, and our assistance
to her, makes sense from a personal and human point of view (she was an
exceptional person of whom I am quite fond, and we felt that the “system” wasn’t
adequately serving her), from a service delivery and research point-of-view, we were
way over the line. I do not think this negatively impacted our work in Pasadena and
Venice, and if anything it gave me valuable insights that I took with me to future
positions. The situation merely demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining these
boundaries for everyone involved, and most case managers I know have a “favorite”
client with whom they identify. Problems arise when these relationships hamper the
client/friend from developing the full range of skills s/he needs for self-sufficiency.
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This field work became the basis of a second article published by Dr. Wolch
and myself: “On the Streets: Mobility Paths of the Urban Homeless” (Wolch and
Rowe, 1992). The primary arguments in this article centered on the notion that:
The relationships between homeless people and their daily
environments— both social and physical— profoundly structure their
immediate survival strategies, their coping abilities, their personal
identity and self-esteem, their short- and long-term goals, and their
changes to exit homelessness and construct a desired future.
Geographic mobility paths are structures so as to link or maintain
components of social support, thereby enhancing the possibilities of
successful coping with life on the streets and/or and exit from
homelessness. The social and spatial contexts of homelessness are
thus mutually reinforcing. (Wolch and Rowe, 1992, p. 118-119)
The article goes on to argue that:
Our research suggest a conceptual model of how the nature
of the urban fabric influences the extent of geographic mobility, the
formation of social-support networks, and the short- and long-term
coping strategies of homeless persons. At the center of the model is
the locale. The locale consists of specialized service facilities (for
those homeless who routinely rely on a formal service) and the
immediate urban environment of homeless daily routines. A service
facility often becomes a substitute home base for clients, around
which their daily paths revolve. The proximity of both homeless
and community and public facilities, as well as service philosophies
toward client autonomy and empowerment, influence the
development of supportive social ties among the homeless and the
daily path-life path dialectic. So too does municipal policy toward
the homeless, since policies e.g., regarding service-facility location
and the prosecution of vagrancy, panhandling, or beach-sleeping
laws) influence the types of resources available to homeless persons
as well as the extent of harassment faced by homeless groups.
Both the geographical context of the locale and the extent of
community among the homeless, in turn, shape mobility patterns.
Local contexts influence how far people must travel to obtain
needed goods and services as well as the probability of forced
mobility that can hinder effective coping. Homeless networks also
structure the daily path, and affect the stability of that path. Those
with a supportive network and a stable path appear to be better able
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to cope on the streets. Not only are their daily needs more apt to be
met, but they have more of an opportunity to reestablish some time-
space continuity in their lives. Their ability to establish a valued
social role in the community may shape their personal identity and
augment self-esteem. Resource sharing among network members
also facilitates desired periodic trips for entertainment, maintaining
ties with family or friends, or seeking jobs. These trips, in turn, can
serve to reassert prior social identity for some homeless individuals.
(Wolch and Rowe, 1992, p. 136-137)
As a result of this research, I became interested in homeless persons’ self-
identity and self-esteem, and the changing nature of homeless persons’ qualitative
assessment of their sense-of-self as they transitioned through phases of
homelessness: becoming homeless, being homeless and exiting homelessness. And
while I was (and still am) sure that my ideas about how homeless persons’ view of
themselves (shaped in part by their social networks and daily routines) affect their
ability to transition out of homelessness has great merit, I was troubled about writing
about homeless persons sense-of self from a position as a researcher/academic. I
took the post-modern critiques seriously and I was paralyzed and thought perhaps
taking a position as a social service provider would better qualify me to speak about
how homeless persons’ identity and self-esteem impacted their interaction with
service providers.
III. Conceptual History - Service Provision
I began working as a service provider in 1992 after moving to Pasadena.
Initially, I worked as overnight staff at a homeless shelter in La Puente, and later I
was staff at the San Gabriel Valley area office of Lutheran Social Services. While in
Pasadena, my occupation as a social service provider overlapped with my academic
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training in several ways. First, my experience in dealing with homeless persons had
been primarily that of an academic, and this knowledge initially informed my
dealings with clients and the shelter and area office. Like so many other academics,
even though my research focused on aspects of the individual as they related to his or
her homeless experience, I still firmly entrenched my perspective in a structural
explanation of homelessness (which I still do). In the extreme, this led me to view
homeless persons as victims of the “system”. While this may often be true for many
homeless persons, and a view that they themselves share, it is not very useful for one-
on-one service delivery, which must be focused on individual empowerment and
responsibility. It is through a homeless individual’s own actions (and interactions
with the “system”) that will affect any transition from homelessness. The view of
homeless persons as victims is also patronizing, and disables rather than enables
empowerment. Even if not explicitly recognized by either provider or client, the
implied inequality of social positions, control and power between them is
telegraphed. I learned that it takes a very skilled case manager to strike the balance
between coach, mentor, confessor and cop with each client, and to alter that
relationship as the client becomes more self-sufficient emotionally, psychologically
and materially.
But my academic training also brought advantages in the social service
sphere. For example, my training as an academic prepared me very well for my
duties as a grant writer. Obviously, my research, analytic, writing and rhetorical
skills translated into valuable skills as a grant writer, although the style is perhaps
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more akin to journalism than ethnography in that that goal is to convey the essence of
the proposed project in a straightforward (often terse) style, rather than with a richly
detailed narrative. Through the leadership of my supervisor at Lutheran Social
Services of Southern California (LSS/SC), Dr. Joseph Colletti, I was able to
participate in several projects where my skills as an academic overlapped with my
role as a service provider. These projects were also my first introduction to the role
that city staff can play with respect to homeless services. Dr. Colletti himself had an
academic background with a Ph.D. in Theology from the University of Birmingham.
Under his leadership LSS/SC took the lead role in organizing the Pasadena Housing
and Homeless Network and convincing the City of Pasadena to conduct the “1992
City of Pasadena Homeless Count”. The goal of those who participated in the count
was to produce “a scholarly and thorough document that gives Pasadena an in-depth
picture of our homeless community” (City of Pasadena and the Pasadena Housing
and Homeless Network, 1994, inside cover).
My research in Pasadena and Venice was valuable for this project in many
ways. I was involved in the initial phases of developing the methodology of the
Pasadena count. And my work on social networks and daily routines informed this
method, which used homeless persons extensively to facilitate the count: their
knowledge of homeless persons’ daily routines indicated where folks could be found
and counted, and their membership in the social networks of the street population
enabled the access to homeless persons. In addition, an extensive survey instrument
was developed, and a number of the questions explored homeless social networks
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and daily routines. The findings of the count resulted in concrete policy strategy
recommendations: homeless prevention, street outreach, an intensive intervention
program for the chronically homeless, a sobering station, and transitional housing for
families. Since 1992, many of these recommendations have been implemented in
Pasadena.
IV. Conceptual History - Local Government
IV. A. Background
In October, 1994,1 became employed as the Homeless Coordinator for the
City of Glendale. This was a new position formed because of the proposed
consolidation of federal homeless funds into a single block grant. It was anticipated
that this new grant would provide approximately $1 million in Stuart B. McKinney
funds annually to the City of Glendale (see Chapter IV). These funds were to be
used to implement strategy developed by the Glendale Homeless Task Force (soon to
be called the Glendale Homeless Coalition). The policy objectives of my new
position were: to develop a “continuum of care” of coordinated homeless service
delivery, to conduct community education and public relations activities, and to work
with the Coalition and other City departments to the address perceived public health
and safety issues relating to homelessness in Glendale.
I do not think the exact duties of the position were clear in the minds of my
superiors, Jess Duran and Madalyn Blake. Jess Duran, my direct supervisor, was the
Assistant Director of Community Development and Housing and administrator of the
“Block Grant” section of the Department. Madalyn Blake was the Director of
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Community Development and Housing. When Glendale City Manager Dave
Ramsay initiated the City’s participation in the Glendale Task Force on
Homelessness, Community Development and Housing (CD&H) was designated as
the lead department. This was because CD&H was charged with administering all of
Glendale’s federally funded programs (Community Development Block Grant,
Emergency Shelter Grant, HOME and Job Training Partnership Act programs) and
because the Department had experience working with federal agencies, implementing
citizen participation efforts and working with the local non-profit sector.
At the time, the Block Grant Section staff was small: two full-time persons
and an intern. When faced with the extra administrative burden resulting from an
influx of federal funds due to the Northridge earthquake and with the prospect of new
homeless monies, two new staff persons were added, one of whom was me. The City
had been recruiting for my position for quite a while with little success. They were
unable to find a candidate with both a knowledge of homeless programs and
administrative experience. Most of the applicants had been service providers, as I
was at the time. But my academic background suggested that I had the sufficient
analytic skills for the job. (My official starting title was Administrative Analyst). In
addition, I had references from Dr. Colletti, a service provider in Pasadena who had
been working with the Task Force, and from Pasadena City staff and staff from the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). I was hired
immediately and began my employment on October 4, 1994.
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The Block Grant section staff person who had been working with the Task
Force, Jackie Thompkins, was seven months pregnant and had other administrative
duties. Thus, the entire homeless project was essentially turned over to me on my
first day, and while Ms. Thompkins helped me as much as she could, she left on
maternity leave after my first month. To say I “hit the ground running” would be an
understatement. In Chapter VII of this dissertation, “Glendale Services Center: The
Observed Version”, I discuss specifically many of my activities in this position. In
the present chapter, I would like to discuss these duties more broadly, and say
something about how my position related to the process of participant-observation
and data collection.
IV. B. My Duties as the Homeless Coordinator for the City of Glendale
As the position has evolved, my responsibilities have become well-defined,
although there is a constant flux in how those duties are prioritized by myself and my
supervisors at any point in time. Initially, my duties focussed on providing staff
support to the Glendale Homeless Coalition. This included scheduling meetings for
the Coalition and its various working committees: housing, social services, public
relations and community education, public health and safety, and development. The
Coalition is the vehicle for citizen participation in the planning, development and
implementation of homeless policy and programs in Glendale. City officials place a
strong emphasis on the role of the service providers and members of the public in
directing the Coalition’s agenda and activities, however, the actual work of
coordinating these activities has fallen to City staff. This is in part because the non-
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profit representatives and volunteer members of the Coalition have their own
agencies to operate. It is also because, frankly, the City has an interest in controlling
the Coalition’s activities. (A more detailed account of the history and composition of
the Coalition is provided in Chapter V). My function as staff support for the
Coalition was most intense during the first two years of my tenure at the City. This
was because, at that time, the Coalition was intensely involved in developing the
policy and funding strategies for new components of the continuum of care. Once
funding for many of the programs was secured and the process of implementing the
programs took priority, there were fewer opportunities for the direct involvement of
Coalition members that were not service providers, and I had less time for the
coordination of the more peripheral (although not less important) activities of the
Coalition such as community relations.
Working closely with the non-profit service providers to coordinate and
oversee the services within the continuum of care and providing technical assistance
to them is my largest, and most complex, responsibility. This includes working with
the non-profits to secure funding for the programs deemed as the highest priority by
the Coalition. This has been accomplished mostly through the Super NOFA process
(see Chapter IV), through which HUD has awarded over $4 million to Glendale
programs since 1995. In addition to managing the complex annual grant application
process, I must provide technical assistance to the service providers regarding
program design and grantwriting. This is an enormous task, and as I describe in
Chapter VII, it is very difficult to determine what level of technical assistance is
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appropriate for a given circumstance. In my experience, service providers can rely
too heavily on the technical assistance provided by governmental agencies, rather
than developing their own capacity and abilities. At the same time, governmental
agencies provide technical assistance to agencies in order to bring funding for
programs into their jurisdiction, only to realize too late that the agencies may not
have the capacity to adequately implement the program. At that point, there are only
two solutions: choose another service provider to implement the project (often
politically difficult); or provide MORE technical assistance.
The evolution of my position has been greatly influenced by the City’s
success in the national funding competitions. My time has become increasingly
occupied with the details of program implementation, rather than with long-term
planning, community relations, coordinating the activities of the Coalition as a
whole, and working directly with providers to build their capacity, especially with
respect to diversifying their funding bases.
A large amount of the federal monies that support Glendale’s homeless
programs come through the City, and I am in charge of administering those
programs. In addition to managing the various Request for Proposal processes
through which the different pots of money are allocated to homeless program, for
each program I must also: obtain Housing Authority approval to execute the
necessary agreements; develop and execute those agreements; process requests for
payments; collect performance reports from the non-profits; and fulfill all additional
federal requirements, including environmental review and performance reports.
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When I began in October of 1994,1 was responsible for administering six programs.
Now there are eighteen. Fortunately, in August of 1997 a full-time Administrative
Associate was hired as my assistant. She now performs the majority of these
administrative duties under my supervision. I still handle all reports to and
interactions with HUD, however.
I am also responsible for preparing all the reports to the Glendale City
Council and the Glendale Housing Authority regarding homeless programs. In
addition to reports requesting authorization to submit grant applications and execute
agreements, I provide periodic updates to the Council and Authority. This includes
responding to various “crisis” situations that arise around homeless programs over
time (see Chapters VI and VII). The provision of homeless services in Glendale, as
in many cities across Southern California and the nation, is a highly controversial and
politicized issue, and one of my functions is to work with Director Madalyn Blake to
provide these governing bodies with accurate and timely information, while at the
same time “spinning” this information in such a way as to cushion any negative
political consequences and to promote the policy and programmatic objectives of the
Department and the Coalition.
I also work to promote the activities and programs of the Glendale Homeless
Coalition. This includes local efforts, such as last year’s “Homeless Awareness
Month” during which numerous Coalition providers and local businesses conducted
special events, including a “coffee-house” with live music, an arts festival, theater
performances and numerous open-houses to raise awareness of the issue of
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homelessness. Also, I have prepared numerous applications for national awards on
behalf of continuum of care projects. We have received recognition as a national
model from HUD as well as from the National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO).
In addition to these duties, I also have responsibilities that relate to the overall
operation of the Block Grant section and the Community Development and Housing
Department as a whole. I participate in the program planning activities for the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, including numerous public
hearings and other aspects of the citizen participation process. For example, this
year, I worked with Jess Duran and the Public Information Office to produce a 15-
minute video for broadcast on Glendale’s government access channel. The video
highlighted the numerous components of the City’s CDBG program and solicited
citizen input for the upcoming year. There are also numerous Department-wide
activities in which I am often asked to participate. For example, I worked closely
with the Workforce Development Section to analyze the potential impacts of welfare
reform and to develop the City’s response. This included organizing a half-day
“summit” which brought together public agencies, service providers and the business
community to educate them about the impacts of welfare reform and the solicit their
participation in a community-based response.
IV. C. Implications for Participant-Observation and Data Collection
My role as the Homeless Coordinator for the City of Glendale has mixed
implications for my role as a practitioner/ethnographer. On the positive side, I have
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been directly involved in all of the aspects of planning, developing and implementing
homeless programs in the City of Glendale. I am uniquely situated in my position to
observe and reflect on the interaction of, and issues faced by, service providers and
local and federal government. As such, I have learned a great deal about how and
why programs designed to serve homeless persons are implemented in the ways that
they are. The complexity of the issues which need to be addressed, even in a best-
case scenario, are staggering. Added to this are the inter-agency and inter-personal
dynamics that complicate any human endeavor. It is, frankly, in my opinion a
miracle that anything gets done. In my review of the literature I find very little which
communicates this complexity on both the organizational and personal levels.
But because of this governmental position, I am, sadly, more removed from
interactions with the homeless population. This is in contrast to my initial fieldwork.
Over the years, however, I have initiated various surveys designed to capture
information about the demographics and service needs of the homeless population in
Glendale, including a detailed survey containing over 100 questions that was
implemented across the continuum service providers last winter, and another survey
designed to assess the needs of the community related to access to food and the need
for a local food bank. Unfortunately, because of the limited time and capacity to
analyze the data, neither survey has been used to its full effect.
On the other hand, my role as a practitioner constrains my role as an
ethnographer. I did not anticipate writing a dissertation about my experiences in
Glendale when I started in this position, and as such I did not keep a journal or
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formal fieldnotes. But, as I mentioned earlier, a good part of my time in Glendale
has been spent writing. These documents and other sources I have collected as the
Homeless Coordinator have served as excellent primary source material in the
construction of this ethnography. But as I have pointed out, each comes from a
particular point-of-view, and thus speaks in different “voice”. The materials used to
construct the histories presented in Chapters V and VI speak with a “public voice”,
and present an idealized version of the continuum of care and activities of the City
and Coalition. They are inherently political in nature, not “objective” in the least.
In Chapter VII, I present a counter-narrative to the myth told with the public
voice. Chapter VII represents my voice not just as an ethnographer reporting her
observations, but as a direct participant in the situation, with her own agenda and
issues. As such, it is no more objective than the idealized version, and is my own,
personal myth. Even so, I feel the comparison between the accounts offers valuable
lessons about the impact of federal policy on the local level, and the pitfalls that well-
intentioned people experience when trying the engineer social programs to designed
to impact how (homeless) people live their lives and view themselves.
If I had written this dissertation from the position of the ethnographer alone, I
would have done things differently. In particular, I would conduct interviews with
the parties involved in developing the continuum of care in Glendale. I think their
voices would provide yet another set of counter-narratives to the public and private
myths I have constructed. But I feel that given my current position with the City that
this is untenable and inappropriate. As documented particularly in Chapter VII,
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tensions between myself and some of the service providers are already strained, and
conducting an ethnographic interview would no doubt complicate an already
complex professional relationship. At the same time, I have no doubt that my current
position would significantly affect their responses to my questions, rendering the
ethnographic value of any interviews problematic.
I feel strongly, however, about the value of taking the work begun in this
dissertation to its logical conclusion. For this reason, and other personal reasons, I
plan to leave my position in Glendale in early 2000. After that, I plan on conducting
ethnographic interviews with key participants. While my previous relationship to
them will still impact the data, I think having removed myself from being able to
impact the decisionmaking process in Glendale will lessen some informants’
motivation to “spin” their accounts. After conducting these interviews and
developing a draft of my poly-vocal ethnography, I plan to ask participants to read
and comment on relevant portions. I will then incorporate those comments into the
final ethnography. It is my hope that this methodology will begin to capture the
various perspectives and complexities that I am beginning to excavate in this
dissertation.
V. Theorizing Homeless Services: Necessary Myths and Inevitable
Discrepancies
There has been increasing attention across many social sciences about the
critique of universal meta-narratives and “idealized accounts” of observed behavior.
The practice of policymaking and program implementation requires that a myth of
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science and rational decisionmaking about the funding, design and implementation of
services for homeless persons exists side-by-side with a constant “massaging” of data
collection and evaluation on the front lines of service delivery. This myth of science
and rational decisionmaking is necessary to cope with the massive complexity
encountered by government officials and service providers in policy design and
implementation. The fragility of these myths, however, is constantly made apparent
to these same government officials, service providers and academics as they navigate
the individual, institutional, logistical and structural challenges of combating
homelessness. The fragility of these myths leads to inevitable challenges at various
levels of social organization and consistent conflict over the relevance of rational
“science” to service delivery (even though such methods have often been the basis of
the funding to provide services). These challenges lead to tensions at the local level
where service providers, government officials and academics struggle over what
services to provide and how best to deal with the ever-changing and seemingly
intractable issues or urban homelessness. This, in turn, affects the philosophy
governing the delivery of homeless services and the capacity and quality of those
services.
In the chapters that follow, I outline the myth created through policy
documents and grant proposals that represent federal government response to
homelessness. In my position as governmental official, I have constructed these
documents for political and material reasons. The primary reason for the
construction of these documents is the process for federal funding termed Super
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NOFA (Notice of Funding Availability) that cities participate in to obtain federal
funding support for local program provision. It is the Super NOFA process that both
mandates collaboration among service providers and the City, and requires a strategy
incorporating a continuum of care philosophy. But the actuality of this collaborative
decisionmaking process and the problematic nature of relationships within
implementing these funded programs belie the cooperative nature reflected in the
grant proposal texts.
The collision of the public and observed versions of homeless service
provision funded through federal funds illustrates the internal contradictions of
federal policy when it is implemented by cities and local service providers. But
through an analysis of these contradictions, I hope to outline possible ways to
understand and perhaps overcome these contradictions to enable an improved and
more effective public policy directed at homelessness.
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CHAPTER IV: THE POLICY CONTEXT OF HOMELESSNESS
I. Introduction
Federal policy and funding practices set the parameters for the design and
implementation of local homeless service delivery systems. But this same federal
policy creates some of the conditions under which the myths regarding the delivery
of these services are created and promoted. The parameters set at the level of federal
policy include: the rationalization and professionalization of homeless service
delivery through the continuum or care model; the expansion of the role of local
government in planning and delivering homeless services; an emphasis on
collaboration and coordination; the specific federal regulations dictating how funds
can and cannot be spent; the drive to create new or expand existing programs; and,
unfortunately to a lesser extent, the need to demonstrate the outcomes of service
delivery.
In 1994, Priority Home! (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1994) established the continuum of care as the model for local
homeless service delivery, attempted to consolidate and streamline federal funding
for homeless programs, emphasized the importance of local control in the
development and implementation of strategies for addressing homelessness, and
stressed the importance of regional and local collaborations in this development and
implementation. During this same time, federal funding for homeless programs was
increased, making more funds available for homeless programs at the local level than
ever before.
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The continuum of care model of local service delivery stressed a graduated
system of services, beginning with outreach, intake and assessment, through
successive residential components, that would move individuals and families from
the streets to permanent housing. Each step of the continuum of care was to meet the
changing needs of the population: initially short-term emergency needs, and then the
multi-layered, complex, deeply rooted causes of homelessness. One key to a
successful continuum of care was flexibility. First, that the components were
comprehensive and flexible enough to meet the diverse and changing needs of a
single household as it evolved through the continuum. And secondly, that
components were in place to meet demographic segments of the continuum of care,
especially those with special needs: substance abuse, mental illness, dually diagnosis,
veterans, victims of domestic violence, families with children.
As a result, the majority of the homeless funds that were made available at
the federal level were tunneled through existing federal programs that emphasized
housing and supportive services: the Supportive Housing Program, Shelter Plus
Care, and SRO Moderate Rehabilitation programs. Funding for services that meet
emergency needs, and for the operation of emergency shelters, were specifically
excluded from these programs. Funding under the Emergency Shelter Grant
Program, which was specifically designed to fund emergency shelters, did increase,
but not in anyway proportionate with the increase in the housing programs listed
above or for homeless programs overall.
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The continuum of care model of service delivery, and the consolidation and
streamlining of the federal funding process also contributed to significant changes in
the ways that homeless policy and service delivery were planned and delivered on the
local level. First, the federal government’s intention of creating one homeless
assistance block grant, gave local jurisdictions a very important role in determining
where homeless funds would actually be spent, and in monitoring and evaluating the
effectiveness of the programs. The “carrot” of the proposed block grant (which was
to have brought Glendale about $1 million annually, at present funding levels) was
complemented with the “stick” of the Consolidated Planning Process. HUD
mandated that jurisdictions which received popular CDBG and HOME program
funding (about $6-7M in Glendale annually) develop and implement strategies to
address homelessness. In the end, it was this mandate which motivated local
jurisdictions, because the block grant never materialized (although the concept has
been reintroduced in Congress every year).
What did materialize, however, is the Super NOFA process, by which HUD
attempted to do administratively what it could not do legislatively—compel units of
local government and service providers within a geographic area to develop and
submit one plan for homeless funding. This also, in many geographic areas, placed
local government in a key, coordinating position, since it was often the local
jurisdiction that had the staff, the capacity, the political pull, the infrastructure and
the perceived “neutrality” necessary to lead the process. The perception of a neutral
party and meeting ground was a necessary prerequisite in a process requiring each
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geographic locality to meet to conduct an annual needs assessment, service inventory
and gaps analysis. “Consolidated” applications — several projects, sponsored by
numerous agencies, but submitted under one applicant — were encouraged by HUD,
and by local jurisdictions that wanted to control the funds in their community. The
City, as the applicant and the grant administrator, was also responsible for contract
compliance, environmental review, program monitoring, and in some cases was the
source of matching funds or leverage. These functions gave local governments some
measure of control over the projects in their area.
More money for homeless programs, the increasing specialization of projects,
and the emphasis on collaboration created other problems. In some cases, the
increased expectation of professional, quality programs and the complexity of service
delivery in a multi-agency setting, have raised performance expectations that exceed
the capabilities of some service providers. Some just do not have the management
capability, the experience and knowledge, or the institutional culture or infrastructure
to successfully carry out the projects as they were proposed. The agencies with
greater professionalization and experience, on the other hand, were swamped. The
emphasis on collaboration and coalition building as incumbent to federal funding
forced agencies with different philosophical approaches to work together more
closely then ever before. Such collaboration purely for funding motivations often
leads to intractable conflict, miscommunication and the creation of mythical accounts
of homeless service delivery.
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II. History of Funding Sources
Prior to late 1994-1995, federal policy regarding the funding of homeless
programs focused on treating homelessness as an immediate, emergency situation.
The recognition of the complexity of the causes of and solutions to homelessness
evolved over time. The first direct aid for homelessness from the federal government
was created in 1983 and administered by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). That year $100 million was appropriated for the Emergency Food
and Shelter Program (EFSP). Also in 1983, the Department of Agriculture’s
Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) was funded. This
program provided staples: flour, butter, dried milk, canned meat and cheese to food
pantries and shelters. Other assistance for homeless programs in the early 1980's
came from the Health and Human Service Emergency Assistance Program and
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG). Although such programs were not
specifically directed toward homeless programs, emergency services and shelters
were eligible activities (National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) and
National Congress for Community Economic Development (NCCED), 1996).
II. A. Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
The Community Development Block Grant was established under the 1974
Housing Act and began operations in 1975. It is an entitlement program that
provides block grant funds to participating jurisdictions. These include the local
governments for cities with populations over 50,000 or urban counties with
populations larger than 200,000 people. States also receive CDBG funds. States
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pass these funds through to small cities, rural counties, or unincorporated
jurisdictions with populations less than 50,000.
The purpose of the CDBG program is to provide decent housing, a suitable
living environment, and to expand economic opportunities. The program is
principally designed to meet the needs of very-low, (defined as households not
exceeding 30% of the median income of the area), low-income (defined as
households not exceeding 50% of the median income of the area) and moderate-
income (defined as households not exceeding 80% of the median income of the area)
households. In addition, some groups are presumed to be low-income: the homeless,
elderly, victims of domestic violence, abused or runaway children (National Low
Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) and National Congress for Community
Economic Development (NCCED), 1996, p. 4.1).
All CDBG activities must meet one of three national objectives: benefit low-
and moderate income people; aid to prevent or eliminate slums and blight; or meet an
urgent need. An urgent need is a locally declared urgent situation: e.g., an
earthquake or other natural disaster. Homelessness by this definition is NOT an
urgent need. A CDBG project must also meet one of four tests: The Housing Benefit
Test, The Job Creation or Retention Test, Limited Clientele Test, Area Benefit Test
(National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) and National Congress for
Community Economic Development (NCCED), 1996, p. 11.2).
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CDBG funds can be used in a variety of activities.1 These include numerous
housing activities like rehabilitation and weatherization. Funds can also be used for
new construction, but only by a community-based development organization. Funds
can be used for public works, public services like day care or job training, economic
development as loans or grants to businesses, and for microenterprise activities.
These activities must either benefit a low- to moderate-income census tract, serve a
clientele of low- to moderate-income persons, or create jobs for low- to moderate-
income persons.
Every jurisdiction must have a citizen participation plan that describes the
involvement of lower-income persons in determining how CDBG monies will be
spent. A Consolidated Plan must be submitted by all CDBG jurisdictions (National
Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) and National Congress for Community
Economic Development (NCCED), 1996, p. 4.2).
II. B. The Stewart B. McKinney Act
In 1987, several events occurred to provide more comprehensive assistance to
homeless programs. The 100th Congress enacted an emergency appropriation
measure for FEMA’s EFSP and authorized the transfer of $50 million from FEMA’s
disaster relief program to EFSP. In addition, $5 million of the $50 million
transferred to EFSP was appropriated to the Department of Veterans Affairs for its
1 There is a 15% cap on the amount of money a participating jurisdiction can use to
fund public social services projects. Activities funded under CDBG can be
undertaken by the participating jurisdiction, or by non-profit organizations through
grants and/or loans.
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Chronically Mentally 1 1 1 Veterans Program, a community-based psychiatric
residential treatment program for homeless veterans. But it was the passage of the
Stewart B McKinney Homeless Assistance Act in 1987 that established a new
proactive role for the Federal government in assisting the homeless.
This legislation began as H.R. 558, the Urgent Relief for the Homeless Act,
but was later renamed in honor of the late Representative Steward B McKinney. It
was approved by the President on July 22, 1987. The McKinney Act authorized 17
assistance programs, administered by 5 departments—Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Veterans Affairs (VA),
Labor and Education— and one agency, FEMA. The programs authorized under
McKinney Act reflected the recognition, on the federal level, that solutions to the
issue of homelessness went beyond immediate food and shelter, and required a range
of supportive and residential services. McKinney Act programs provided funding for
health care, community-based mental health services, emergency shelter, transitional
housing, community services to provide follow-up and long-term services, job and
literacy training, permanent housing for handicapped homeless persons and grants for
groups to renovate, convert, purchase, lease, or construct facilities for the homeless.
In addition, the legislation expanded existing programs and program coordination
(U. S. General Accounting Office, 1994).
In response to concerns that responsibility for programs was spread among
several agencies, Congress created the Interagency Council on Homelessness, an
independent council to coordinate federal efforts. The law also authorized property
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disposition programs, and required state and local governments requesting assistance
for the homeless to prepare a comprehensive planning document. The legislation
also extended Agriculture’s TEFAP and expanded the range of commodities
available under this program. The law also amended the Food Stamp Act of 1977,
allowing federal funding for state outreach efforts to provide information to homeless
persons about applying for Food Stamps. McKinney was first authorized for fiscal
years 1987 ($490 million) and 1988. Funds were distributed through competitive
and formula grants. However some funds, such as FEMA and VA funds, have
specific distribution requirements (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1994).
One significant impact of the McKinney Act was the definition of
homelessness it provided (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1994). This definition would shape federal homeless policy well into the future.
This definition would identify target populations eligible for Federal funds and
define who would be counted as homeless in the 1990 Census. The McKinney Act
defined “homeless” to mean:
• An individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate night-time
residence; and;
• An individual who has a primary night-time residence that is:
• A supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide
temporary living accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate
shelters, and transitional housing for the mentally ill);
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• An institution that provides a temporary residents for individuals intended
to be institutionalized; or
• A public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, as regular
sleeping accommodation for human beings.
One of the new primary programs established by the McKinney Act in 1987
was the Emergency Shelter Grant Program (ESG). Under ESG, funds were allocated
to: help improve the quality of emergency shelters for the homeless, make available
additional emergency shelters and meet the costs of operating emergency shelters and
providing essential social services, including activities to prevent homelessness.
Funds provided through this program were used to: 1. renovate, rehabilitate, or
convert buildings into emergency shelter (not for acquisition); 2. pay for the shelter’s
maintenance, certain operating expenses, insurance utilities and furnishings.
However, not more than 30% of the aggregate amount of all assistance to a
jurisdiction could be used for activities to prevent homelessness. In addition, up to
30% of a grantee’s ESG funds could be used to provide essential social services,
including employment assistance, health care, drug abuse treatment, or education.
This could be waived if the grantee could demonstrate that costs associated with
renovating or rehabilitating and operating the emergency shelter were covered by
other resources. Each city or county receiving ESG funds had to match its allocation
dollar for dollar (the City of Glendale requires the service providers document the
match), each state has to match its allocation after the first $100,000. In addition,
each grantee was allowed to use up to 5% of the grant funds for administrative costs.
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In calculating the matching amount, the grantee could include the value of any in-
kind donations, such as buildings or materials, leases on buildings, staff salary and
time, and services contributed by volunteers.
The McKinney Act was reauthorized by Congress through succeeding fiscal
years. In 1992, McKinney was again reauthorized through 1994. This
reauthorization consolidated the Supportive Housing Demonstration Program and the
Supplemental Assistance for Facilities to Assist the Homeless into the Supportive
Housing Program. The law also authorized several new programs, such as a
demonstration program for “safe havens for homeless individuals” and a grant
program to assist the rural homeless. Finally, it incorporated language stipulating the
involvement and employment of homeless or formerly homeless individuals in
activities funded by the McKinney Act (U. S. General Accounting Office, 1994).
II. C. HOME Funds
In addition to McKinney Act programs which specifically targeted homeless
programs for funding, and like the CDBG program, other Federal funding sources
could be used at the local level to address homelessness. HOME program funds
could be used by a jurisdiction to fund the physical housing components of their
continuum of care through new construction, acquisition and rehabilitation and rental
subsidies.
The National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) was enacted in 1990.
(National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) and National Congress for
Community Economic Development (NCCED), 1996, p. 4.2). A principle
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component of NAHA was the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, a block
grant of federal housing funds to states and local jurisdictions. Roughly 500 local
jurisdictions and states received grants from HUD under the HOME program. Local
jurisdictions that are too small in population to receive direct HOME grants are
eligible through state allocations. There is a dollar for dollar match in non-Federal
and private funds required.
The four major purposes of the HOME program are:
1. Expand the supply of decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing, with
emphasis on rental housing for very low-income and low-income people;
2. Design and implement strategies which will enable states and local
governments to achieve an adequate supply of affordable housing;
3. Utilize all available resources effectively, through the development of
partnerships including the federal, state and local governments with
private industry and non-profit organizations; and,
4. Expand the capacity of nonprofit community housing development
organizations (CHDOs) to develop and manage affordable housing.
HOME program funds can be used for acquisition and/or rehabilitation of
existing rental housing, new construction, or tenant-based rental assistance. Monies
also could be used to finance acquisition of single family homes and housing
rehabilitation for existing homeowners. Another key component was the set-aside
for nonprofits. At least 15% of the HOME funds are for CHDOs (National Low
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Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) and National Congress for Community
Economic Development (NCCED), 1996, p. 4.2-4.3).
II. D. Section 8
Another Federal resource that could be used by local jurisdictions to address
homelessness was the Section 8 program. In 1974, the Section 8 New
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation program was passed by Congress as part of a
major restructuring of HUD’s and Farmers Home housing programs. The Section 8
program replaced the mortgage subsidy programs as the primary means of creating
federally assisted, affordable rental housing in the United States. These units
provided a “project-based” subsidy. A long-term contract for Section 8 rental
assistance allowed the developer to obtain private financing. HUD provided
insurance in many cases. Most of these contracts were for 20 year terms and expire
in the 1996-2000 time period. This program stimulated the construction or
rehabilitation of almost one million units between 1975 and 1983. By the mid-1990's
it became obvious to HUD and Congress that the project-based Section 8 program
was in trouble primarily because of lack of funding and administrative problems at
the local level. The costs of renewing subsidies for these project based units would
rise to 75% of HUD’s present budget by the year 2000. Other administrative
problems also existed.
Tenant-based Section 8 is of two types: certificates and vouchers. In the
certificate program, Public Housing Authorities (PHA’s) receive certificates from
HUD and distribute them to qualified tenants. Tenants can use the certificates to
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look for housing. Landlords must sign a housing assistance payment (HAP) contract
with the local PHA. The tenant pays 30 percent of income and the PH A pays the
difference up to the Fair Market Rent (FMR) for that area. Certificates are portable.
The tenant can move and use it for future housing. In the voucher program, tenants
are allowed to rent a housing unit for any amount of money. If a tenant rents a unit in
excess of the FMR, the tenant pays 30% of his/her income and the difference
between the FMR, and the actual rent (National Low Income Housing Coalition
(NLIHC) and National Congress for Community Economic Development (NCCED),
1996, p. 3.1-3.2).
II. E. Other Homeless Funds
In addition to the McKinney Act funds, other funds were made available
which targeted homeless populations. They included $100 million appropriated
under the Innovative Homeless Initiatives Demonstration Act and awarded to non
profits on a competitive basis, and additional funds for Housing Opportunities for
People With AIDS (HOPWA) 2. Seventy-five million was set-aside for six cities
under the Innovative Homeless Initiatives Demonstration Act: Washington, D.C.,
2 There are many other programs relevant to housing and services for low-income
individuals and families. These include the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
Program and other federal (non-HUD) programs such as: Community Service Block
Grant, Job Training Partnership Act, Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security, Food
Stamps, Home Ownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere, Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families. State and local funds include: CalWorks, General
Relief, Redevelopment Set-aside, Emergency Housing Assistance Program, and In-
Home Supportive Services. For a discussion of how welfare reform policies have
changed low-income families’ access to monetary benefits, see Wolch and Sommer,
1998.
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Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Denver, Miami, and the San Francisco Bay . Los Angeles
received $20 million in the Initiative Cities funding, which was administered by the
Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA). LAHSA and Shelter
Partnership developed the plan for the implementation of the continuum of care,
including funding for access centers in Long Beach, Glendale and Los Angeles. The
goal of the LA Initiative Plan was to:
. . . [RJemove people from the streets and stabilizing them in
permanent housing. Initiative funds will be utilized to fund either
new services that will serve to fill a gap in the existing Los Angeles
Homeless Service Delivery system, or existing services that will be
augmented to increase their availability to the many homeless
persons that have not yet been served.
The Los Angeles Area Homeless Initiative will include the
components of the [continuum of care] system: prevention,
outreach, assessment, emergency shelter and transitional housing, a
high tolerance drop-in center, access centers, health care access,
substance abuse rehabilitation, job training and placement, housing
placement assistance, long term case management, “no-fail”
communities for the mentally ill, SSI application assistance, and
permanent and supportive housing.
The top priorities of the Initiative are to 1) provide alternatives
for homeless individuals in order to eliminate encampment; 2)
establish a high tolerance center, including outreach to homeless
persons; 3) redesign the homeless delivery system to reflect new
approaches; and 4) provide dedicated, increased number of
transitional and permanent housing units. (Shelter Partnership,
1994a, p. 1-2)
Initially, the plans was to focus on four high-need areas within the City of Los
Angeles: Pico-Union, South Central, East Los Angeles, and Downtown (Los
Angeles Mayor Riordan, R., personal communication to U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Cisneros, January 5, 1994). Ultimately,
however, other areas within the City of Los Angeles, and throughout the County,
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were designated as special “service enhancement project areas” that would receive “a
very limited amount” of Initiative funds. At first, these areas were Glendale, Long
Beach, LA’s Westside and Pacoima. Hollywood was later added (Shelter
Partnership, 1994a).
The reasons for geographic targeting of the majority of the
Homeless Initiative funds . . . in order to make a real difference by a
focused attention on major intervention in a priority target area
rather than diffusing effort. Seven percent of the Homeless
Initiative fund [will be] divided among the .. . five homeless service
enhancement project areas.. . . These communities of special
concern have been identified through discussions with local elected
public officials. These projects will represent a small portion of the
Homeless Initiative funding but will have a very high impact as a
result of the many homeless people in each area, the major local
effort and investment in each community, and the enhancement of
the whole Homeless Initiative by tying together the targeted central
regional and outlying communities.. . . The ties will be literal:
these projects will all be linked together by LAHSA, by technical
assistance and training, and by the networked data based and client
information system.. . . Each of the service enhancement areas has
a local coordinating entity dealing with homeless services needs.. ..
Glendale will expand a very modest outreach program serving the
chronic mentally ill homeless people and will create an access
center. It will work with nonprofit homeless service provider to
improve case management targeted to homeless prevention for
families. With other funds, the city of Glendale is making major
commitments to temporary, transitional, and permanent housing
projects. . . . (Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 73-4)
III. Federal Policy Evolves: “Priority: Home!”
In May of 1993, Federal policy regarding homeless programs took a dramatic
turn with the signature of Executive Order 12848 by President Clinton. In order to
“provide for the streamlining and strengthening of the Nation’s efforts to break the
cycle of homelessness,” the president instructed federal agencies, acting through the
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Interagency Council on Homelessness, to develop a single coordinated Federal Plan
for addressing homelessness (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1994, p. vii). The plan was to recommend federal administrative and legislative
initiatives, and provide a schedule for implementing programs and presenting
legislation to Congress. Further, the plan was to recommend how current federal
funding programs could be redirected to link housing, supportive and educational
services, and to promote “coordination and cooperation among grantees, local
housing and support service providers, school districts, and advocates for homeless
individuals and families” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1994, p. vii). The plan was to support creative, cost-effective local efforts to address
and prevent homelessness, including tying homeless assistance to permanent housing
assistance, local housing affordability strategies, and employment opportunities. The
President directed the Council to consult not only with representatives of state and
local governments, but also with service providers, homeless advocates, and formerly
homeless individuals and families in the development and implementation of the
plan. The President gave the Council nine months to submit the plan.
The plan, entitled “Priority: Home!: The Federal Plan to Break the Cycle of
Homelessness” was released to the public on May 17, 1994. HUD Secretary Henry
Cisneros named homelessness as HUD’s number one priority. “'There can be no
higher priority for the Department whose name begins with housing - than housing
homeless Americans’” (Shelter Partnership, 1994, p. 1). “Priority: Home!” initiated
the Federal government’s recognition that the view of homelessness as an immediate,
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emergency situation would produce inadequate policy and programmatic responses
to the issue. Also, the report recognized that the structure and means of distributing
federal homeless funds up to that point could be more effective. Then Assistant
Secretary for Community Planning and Development, Andrew Cuomo stated, “’The
way we are now distributing dollars from federal programs doesn’t make sense if you
truly understand the nature and full extent of the problem of homelessness in
America today. Homelessness is about housing - not shelter - and it’s about mental
illness and substance abuse and poverty and education and jobs’” (Shelter
Partnership, 1994, p. 1) .
“Priority: Home!” presented a frank assessment of the complexity of the
issue of contemporary homelessness, its causes and consequences at the structural
and individual levels, and took a hard look at what was, and was not, working in
terms of policy and programs. “Priority: Home!” contributed four fundamental
points to the discussion of federal homeless policy: a frank assessment of the
complexity of the issue and acknowledgment of federal responsibility for the
problem; acknowledgement that current approaches were not working and the
reasons why; based on these two assessments of the nature of the problem, a model
for homeless services delivery at the local level (the continuum of care); and
recommendations for a dramatic overhaul of the federal system for funding homeless
programs, including a doubling of HUD’s budget for homeless services. The
methodology employed in this assessment was a harbinger of HUD’s future approach
to homeless planning: HUD solicited the input of representatives of state and local
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governments, non-profit service providers, homeless advocates and homeless
persons. This input was derived from participants in 17 interactive forums held
throughout the country, and from responses to questionnaires distributed to over
12,000 organizations and individuals.
The recognition that contemporary homelessness was the result of long-term
structural changes in American society was, in part, the basis for the argument that
homelessness must be addressed at the structural level, requiring significant federal
and local policy and funding initiatives. The report recognized that the evolution of
homelessness in the 1990’s was the product of several decades of social policy.
“Homelessness in the 1990’s reveals as much about the unsolved social and
economic problems of the 1970’s as it does about more recent developments” (U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 17). The 1980’s saw an
increase in the numbers of women and children in shelters and on the streets, as well
as the mentally ill. Crack cocaine and HIV/AIDS became “major afflictions” of the
homeless poor. “What America glimpsed on the streets and in the shelters in the
1980s was the usually hidden face of poverty, dislodged from its customary habitat”
(U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 18).
Homelessness was characterized in “Priority: Home!” as “crisis” and
“chronic” homelessness. “Crisis poverty” represented those persons and households
living in persistent poverty, often due to poor education and job skills, and
chronically marginally housed. Other factors, such as domestic violence, poor
parenting or household management skills, also contribute to episodes of
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homelessness for this population. “For such people, recourse to shelters or other
makeshift accommodations is simply another way of bridging a temporary gap in
resources” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 18).
For the “chronic homeless”, homelessness appears as a way of life. While
this group may represent the minority of the homeless population, they are often the
most visible to the public. Alcohol and other drug use, severe mental illness, chronic
health problems and long-standing family difficulties exacerbate the conditions
experienced in crisis poverty, resulting in a more persistent experience of
homelessness. Life on the streets further compounds the complexity of these
individuals’ challenges to acquiring housing and social services. “Those with
chronic disabilities require not only economic assistance, but rehabilitation and
ongoing support as well” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1994, p. 18).
The report also focused on the difficulties of ascertaining an accurate measure
of the number of homeless persons. Differing methodologies for measuring the
extent of homelessness were outlined: point in time and longitudinal counts.
“Priority: Home!” also discussed the demographic characteristics of homeless
persons, in part lying the foundation for the definition of “special needs” populations
that future funding applications would target: family status, age, race and ethnicity,
institutional history, health status, income and employment, foster care, children and
veterans. The report points out that persons suffering from chronic disabilities are
more likely to be captured in point-in-time surveys, as they do not transition in and
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out of homelessness. Harder to capture is a measure of the residential instability that
contributes to the episodic experience of homeless among the persistently poor.
“One conclusion is inescapable: for many Americans crossing the line between
extreme crisis poverty and homelessness has become largely a matter of timing—not
when, but how often. We must serve at-risk families and individuals in crisis
poverty” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 22).
Thus, “Priority: Home!” recognized that the at-risk population comprised a
potential expansion to the definition of homelessness expressed in the McKinney
Act. However, the report stopped short of actually adding the at-risk, in general, to
their discussion of the McKinney definition. Instead a narrower group, “people who
are at imminent risk of losing their housing, because they are being evicted from
private dwelling units or are being discharged from institutions and have nowhere
else to go,” were identified as “usually considered to be homeless for program
eligibility purposes” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p.
22). This group had been added to the definition of homeless in 1993.
“Priority: Home!” recognized that homelessness was the result of both long
term structural changes in society which were, in large part, the result of federal and
local governmental policies: poverty; changes in the labor market; income assistance,
including the failure of Aid for Families with Dependent Children; the lack of
affordable housing; changes in family structure; and drugs, disabilities and chronic
health problems. “In accounting for homelessness, it is useful to distinguish among a
number of levels of causation. Understanding the structural causes of homelessness
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is especially important when considering preventive strategies. When fashioning
measures to reach those who are currently on the street, personal problems that
contribute to a prolongation of homelessness must be addressed” (U. S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 25). In addition, “personal problems”
which may or may not be a secondary result of these same policies, were recognized
as an equal contributor to the problem, and thus deserving of the same attention in
the formation of federal policy.
This recognition of the structural and individual causes of homelessness
pointed to some of the reasons why past federal (and most local) responses to
homelessness were only partially successful. “For the most part, homelessness relief
efforts remain locked in an “emergency” register” (U. S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1994, p. 18). Specifically, the report pointed to several factors
that confirmed that while “emergency assistance measures may have proliferated. . .
the ledger of unfinished work remains daunting” (U. S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1994, p. 48). One large obstacle has been punitive community
responses to homelessness, for example, the passage of anti-panhandling ordinances,
“homeless proofing” benches, and the increase of police presence in areas frequented
by homeless persons have been increasingly used to coerce homeless persons to
migrate across jurisdictional boundaries.
The report also cited the failure of the community-based mental health system
to address the needs of deinstitutionalized homeless persons, as well as those
homeless persons who have experienced mental illness but have no history of
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hospitalization. Substance abuse services were also argued to be inadequate, both in
terms of capacity, and because “many treatment programs common discharge clients
into circumstances that offer very limited opportunities for preventing relapse” (U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 49). Homeless veterans
especially those dealing with the impact of the Vietnam experience potentially
resulting in mental health and patterns of substance abuse, were cited as an area or
need, as were the rural homeless. Finally, the “precariously housed, at risk of
homelessness” and the cost-efficacy of homeless prevention were cited as areas for
expansion. The public’s attitudes toward homelessness and government approaches
to the issue were also discussed. On the one hand the public has increasingly
expressed “compassion fatigue” and general skepticism regarding the efficacy of
government intervention, on the other hand, the view that government can and
should do more to address homelessness is often cited in public opinion surveys.
But the report also enumerated eight observations under the heading “What
We Know”, which would form a basis for policy recommendations to follow:
1. Outreach works, but it isn’t easy.
2. Supportive housing works, but no one model will suffice.
3. Creating a service system separate from mainstream
programs is inefficient and ineffective.
4. Prevention is indispensable to reduce the demand for
emergency relief.
5. Race matters and can no longer be ignored in efforts to end
homelessness.
6. Improving coordination and eliminating fragmentation in
programs should be a top priority.
7. Program services for homeless people must comprise a
continuum of care.
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8. Not-for profit organizations have demonstrated the capacity
to develop and deliver effective services and innovation
approaches in partnership with each other and with other
public and private providers. (U. S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 1994, p. 48-54)
The report cited the policy implications: “Government policy must provide
more than emergency shelter. It must address both the need for services and housing
for those with disabling conditions, at the same time as it meets the need for a
temporary way station en route to stable housing for others” (U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 54, emphasis original). In order to
achieve this goal, the report argues, prevention activities must equal those of
“remediation”; “makeshift” facilities such as emergency shelter and drop-in centers
should not be institutionalized into a parallel service system; and recognizing the
access to secure housing is an “indispensable requirement” to the success of
rehabilitation and reintegration efforts (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1994, p. 54-5).
IV. Continuum Of Care
Fundamental to the policy recommendations o f’’ Priority: Home!” was the
introduction of the Continuum of Care model of homeless service delivery (See
Figure 2: HUD’s Continuum of Care). The Continuum of Care was intended to
provide a rational model which would systematize homeless service delivery
nationwide, yet which would be flexible enough to provide communities leeway in
program design and implementation at the local level. “While the resources,
services, and needs vary from state to state, all systems must be based on the same
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FIGURE 2
HUD’ S CONTINUUM OF CARE
(From U. S. Department o f Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 73)
Continuum of Care
Outreach
intake
Assessment
Emerc
She!
jency
ter 1
Transitional
Housing
U P
Perm anent
Housing
Supportive
Housing
Mental Health
Jo b Training
Independent -
Living SMIla
Substance Abuse
Family Support
Education
H.I.V
As illustrated in the flow chart above, a continuum of care begins with a point of entry in which the
needs of a homeless individual or family are assessed. In most communities, the intake and assessment
component is performed by an emergency shelter or through a separate assessment center. To reach and
engage homeless persons living on the street, the homeless service system should include a strong outreach
component.
Once a needs assessment is completed, the person/family may be referred to permanent housing or to
transitional housing where supportive services are provided to prepare them for independent living. For
example, a homeless person with a substance abuse problem may be referred to a transitional rehabilitation
program before being assisted with permanent housing. Some individuals, particularly persons with chronic
disabilities, may require ongoing supportive services once they move into permanent housing. The goal of
the comprehensive homeless service system is to ensure that homeless individuals and families move from
homelessness to self-sufficiency, housing, and independent living.
premise” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 71). The
“system and philosophy” of the continuum of care is “predicated on the
understanding that homelessness is not caused merely by a lack of shelter, but
involves a variety of underlying, unmet needs-physical, economic, and social” (U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 1-3).
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To be effective, a homeless system must provide three distinct
components of organization. First, there must be an emergency
shelter assessment effort that provides and immediate alternative to
the street and can identify an individual’s or family’s needs. The
second component offers transitional or rehabilitative services for
those who need them. Such services include substance abuse
treatment, short-term mental health services, and independent living
skills. Appropriate case management should be accessed to ensure
that persons receive necessary services, for example, that children
attend school regularly. The third and final component, and the one
essential component for every homeless individual and family, is
permanent housing or supportive housing arrangements.
While not all homeless individuals and families in a
community will need to access all three components, unless all three
components are coordinated within a community, non will be
successful in combating homelessness. We refer to this approach as
a “continuum of care”. A strong homeless prevention strategy is
also key to the success of the continuum of care. (U. S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 71)
Again, local control and flexibility is key to the continuum of care strategy.
“While HUD’s continuum of care approach can serve as the catalyst to bring the
essential components together. .., only the community, with its unique expertise and
energy, can design a strategy that works best. That is why HUD has taken great
strides to provide the guidance some communities need and the flexibility all
communities require, to enable them to implement a customized continuum of care
strategy” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 3).
HUD recognized, however, that its own policies and that of other federal
agencies and departments, particularly regarding the application requirements for
McKinney Act programs, were often the greatest barrier for developing and
implementing a “comprehensive policy for homeless care that inspires cooperation,
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encourages innovation, provides local control, and demands coordinated action”
(U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 1).
The McKinney grant programs, as currently organized, require
providers of housing and services to apply to and interact with
numerous agencies, and to take account of diverse guidelines,
criteria, and reporting requirements to secure funding for a single
project. Time that could be more profitably spend on moving
people to permanent housing is currently spent on navigating a
fragmented patchwork of individual programs that emerged over
time as needs were detected. The current homeless service system
was not planned but rather evolved as the result of the
uncoordinated efforts of different levels of government, not-for-
profits and foundations. The outcome is a disjointed approach that
provides for some needs while ignoring others. (U. S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 71)
Too often, there is no strategic plan in place at the local level and no
clear assessment of the needs of the homeless population and the
dynamics of the current local structure. Therefore, providers find
themselves competing with each other for limited resources for
similar projects while other components, essential for addressing the
locality’s distinct homeless needs, simple go unmet. (U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 3)
Shelter Partnership (1994) described the situation from the perspective of the
service providers:
Providers consistently report that the competitive process creates
two big problems:
1. Because funds are limited and demand is high - the 1993
SHP (Supportive Housing Program) competition was only
able to award 42 grants out of 1,400 requests - the
application process wastes time and resources. Time that
could be more profitably spent on moving people to
permanent housing is currently wasted on navigating a maze
of individual programs.
2. This current competitive method results in funding decisions
made on individual applications irrespective of whether they
fit into a larger coordinated plan. Therefore, there is a
virtual inability to use HUD funds to help establish a
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comprehensive system in each locality or to rectify
imbalances in local delivery. (1994, p. 12)
The federal government’s response to this situation was a complete
reorganization of McKinney Act programs, and a doubling of the HUD budget for
homeless assistance from $823 million to $1.7 billion, and an increase in overall
homeless assistance funding to $2.15 billion. In addition, HUD repositioned the
responsibility for coordinating the continuum of care plan at the local government
level. In the division of labor suggested by HUD, non-profit organizations, not
government agencies, would deliver the direct housing and social services to the
homeless community. As HUD argued in “Priority: Home!”:
The Federal McKinney program currently contributes to the
scattered approach by offering twenty categorical programs
administered by six agencies and accessed by different parties. We
recommend a consolidation of some McKinney homeless assistance
programs under one administrative structure with a single
application process.
This comprehensive approach to homelessness should be
instituted and coordinated by localities. They are best suited to
assess community needs and coordinate funding so that each stage
of the continuum of care . . . can be lined with other points along the
continuum. Unlike not-for-profit providers, the locality can view
the entire system in the jurisdiction to ensure that transitional from
each stage can be smooth.
Under this rationalized system, not-for-profits would be able
to devote time to what they do best: providing and delivering
services. The experience of the past decade has shown that not-for-
profits are generally more effective than local government at
quickly and efficiently siting, constructing, and operating housing
and supportive facilities for homeless people. With the government
providing resources, not-for-profits could provide services. (U. S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1994, p. 72)
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For its part, HUD proposed restructuring its McKinney Act programs into a
single funding stream that would award funds based on a single plan to establish and
implement a continuum of care presented by local government to HUD. The
application process would contain a description of the homeless population and the
facilities and services currently available. A strategy for developing a continuum of
care, including all of the components and linkages between them, and a description
of the multi-year processes and resources necessary for implementation and
management of the continuum would also be required. A one-year action plan would
be required annually, including a proposed allocation of HUD funds. The plans
submitted to HUD would need to be certified by the local board mandated under the
reorganization, and certified as consistent with the CHAS/consolidated plan. For all
jurisdictions submitting an approved plan, HUD would allocate funds based on the
CDBG/ESG formula.
Based on this formula, the City of Glendale was scheduled to receive a
maximum of $1,453,000 for fiscal year 1995. Prior to that, the City of Glendale
received approximately $100,000 - $150,000 annually in Emergency Shelter Grant
funds. (Some CDBG funds were also used to support homeless programs.) Thus,
this strategy represented an almost ten-fold increase in annual funding for homeless
programs. Eligible activities would include: emergency shelters, transitional
housing, safe havens, single room occupancy dwellings, shelter plus care, and rural
homeless housing assistance (National Alliance to End Homelessness, 1994).
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Key to this proposed funding process was the local board mandated by HUD.
The local boards would: help decide who should administer the grant; help develop
the application; oversee the activities funded by the grants; evaluate performance;
and, sign all applications and performance reports. The local boards were to be
comprised of at lease one representative of: homeless individuals and families;
homeless advocates; individuals and entities that assist the homeless; business
community; and neighborhood advocates. Fifty-one percent of the Board must be
nominated by individuals and entities other than a governmental jurisdiction.
From HUD’s perspective the local board would ensure citizen participation
overall and the participation of key stakeholders in homeless service delivery. The
National Alliance to End Homelessness (1944) was more blunt in their assessment of
the function of local boards: “Because some localities are not responsive to the issue
of homelessness; because the issue maybe very politicized at the local level; because
local governments find it difficult or undesirable to service the difficult-to-service
(especially singles with illnesses); and in recognition of the key role of non-profits in
this issue, HUD has established local planning boards. We believe that these boards
are the key element to making this program work. They not only bring the necessary
information to the table in terms of designing the program, but they are the protection
in cases where states/localities are unwilling to participate in the process or proceed
in ways that do not really address the problem” (p. 4). However, an important
challenge lies in the possible cooperation and obstruction created by service
providers. A multi-layered network of individuals and organizations representing
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service providers, government officials, and homeless persons has made the
development and implementation of homeless services much more complex and
dynamic. I will return to this issue in the analytical chapters of this dissertation.
V. Consolidated Planning
Simultaneous to the development of HUD’s continuum of care model for
homeless service delivery, and the proposed consolidation of McKinney Act
programs, HUD was also working on a strategy to consolidate that application
process for its other block grant programs, notably the Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program and the HOME programs as well as ESG and Housing
Opportunities for People With AIDS (HOPWA). Prior to the implementation of the
Consolidated Plan final rule for fiscal year 95-96, jurisdictions were required to
submit separate plans as application for each of these programs: the Comprehensive
Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) was submitted for the HOME program, and
included a discussion of the jurisdiction’s strategy for meeting the needs of special
needs populations, including the homeless. Of course the jurisdiction’s application
for ESG funds addressed homelessness as did the application for CDBG, assuming
such funds were used for the homeless.
The Consolidated Plan proposed the consolidation of these applications into
one, comprehensive five-year planning document, with annual action plans and
performance reports that would enable jurisdictions to show how these funding
sources were used to meet the needs and objectives identified in the community. The
plan would be approved by HUD prior to approving the jurisdiction’s annual
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allocation of federal funds. Each strategic plan contains three parts: 1. A housing,
homeless, community and economic development needs assessment; 2. A housing
market analysis; and 3. Long-term strategies to meet priority needs. Thus, a local
jurisdiction’s strategy for assessing, developing and implementing a continuum of
care was tied not just to funds targeted for homeless programs, but also to their
CDBG and HOME program funds. These funds generally represent a significant
contribution to a jurisdiction’s annual budget, and so HUD effectively required all
communities who received any HUD funds to address the issue of homelessness in a
comprehensive way, even if they had not previously applied for homeless funding.
The consolidated planning process also forced jurisdictions in which the separate
HUD funds were administered by different units to coordinate their planning
processes and thereby allow the homeless to better access CDBG, HOME and other
mainstream funds (e.g., in the City of Glendale, Redevelopment Set-aside funds).3
Citizen participation is a key component to the consolidated planning process,
both in terms of determining the community’s needs and in evaluating performance.
The final rule required that a jurisdiction provide opportunities for citizen input
through public hearings and the publication of the plan for public comment. The
public must also be given the opportunity to comment on annual performance
reports. This aspect of the consolidated planning process was consistent with HUD’s
3 In Glendale’s Community Development Department, HOME funds were
administered by Housing Development & Preservation, and CDBG and ESG funds
were administered by the Block Grant section. In some cities, different funds are
administered by completely separate departments.
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mandate that a community’s strategy for allocating the new homeless block grant be
formed and evaluated with input from a local board. In fact, HUD envisioned the
development of the homeless strategy by the local board as part of the communities’
larger Consolidated Planning process.
With respect to homelessness, the Consolidated Plan asked for the following
information:
• The number of sheltered and unsheltered homeless individuals and
families at a point in time and the method for determining that number;
• Homeless sub-populations and the method for determining the proportion
suffering from: severe mental illness (SMI) only; alcohol/other drug abuse
only; SMI and alcohol/other drug abuse; domestic violence,
AIDS/Related Diseases;
• The number of homeless at-risk and their characteristics;
• Facilities and services that serve the homeless;
• The method for identifying the needs of the homeless population;
• The strategy for meeting those needs, including the establishment of
priorities and the identification of resources.
VI. Consolidation Of Homeless Funds Never Authorized
Again, a key component to HUD’s new homeless policy, consolidated
planning and streamlined “reinvention” approach, was the restructuring of the
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McKinney Act funds into one, consolidated block grant that would be allocated to
states and jurisdictions using the CDBG formula.
Initially, this strategy was received skeptically by the non-profit community,
which was accustomed to dealing directly with HUD with respect to the application
for, and administration of, competitive homeless grants. Under the Consolidation
Plan, non-profits would be required to work with state or local governments.
Providers were concerned that funds would not be passed on to them (HUD’s plan
mandated that 51% of the funds would have to go to non-profits); and that some local
jurisdictions who would be receiving the funds would not get “serious” about
addressing homeless issues. HUD’s remedy to these concerns was, again, the
Consolidated Plan which would tie a jurisdiction’s strategy for addressing
homelessness, and their progress in implementing the strategy based on annual
performance reports, to their eligibility for other important HUD funds—i.e., CDBG
and HOME. Also, HUD argued that the local boards would give non-profits,
homeless advocates and the homeless themselves a voice in how these funds would
be spent. HUD also placed a “maintenance of effort” clause in the proposed program
regulations which mandated that local jurisdictions could not use the homeless block
grant funds to replace funds already used or designated by the locality to serve
homeless persons. There was also a non-federal match requirement of 25%.
Other service providers argued that whether funds were distributed through a
block grant or not, what really mattered was the total amount of funding available.
Despite HUD’s proposal to double the budget for fiscal year 1995 some advocates
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feared that combining homeless programs into one block grant would make the funds
more vulnerable to future cuts. Nevertheless, the combination of local control and
increased funding generally won over many in the non-profit and advocacy
community (Bomemeier, 1994).
‘In the beginning we were opposed to it,’ said Nan Roman, a vice
president of Alliance to End Homelessness in Washington. ‘We
were apprehensive that the money that once came to us would go to
the city. And we didn’t know exactly what the local advisory board
would do’. But after helping to shape the legislation, the alliance
supports its goals. ‘It’s exciting to see how it will come out. It will
be stimulating to local (homeless) planners and local providers,’
Roman said. (Bomemeier, 1994, p. B-l)
Initially, the Consolidation Plan also enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress.
The budget and appropriations bill, containing $1.2 billion for the block grant and an
additional $500 million for five year Section 8 certificates for homeless families,
passed the House and Senate in 1994. The required, separate legislation authorizing
the consolidation of the funds passed the House, and while widely supported in the
Senate, was held up in committee. “The plan has broad bipartisan support in
Congress. But it is being held up by Senate Republicans who are trying to stall
virtually all business until after the November elections, which they expect will give
them more seats in Congress and greater clout in shaping legislation” (Shogren,
1994, p. A-5).
The Clinton administration responded by attempting to bolster support for the
authorization at the local level. The leadership of the U. S. Conference of Mayors,
for example, expressed support for the measure. “‘All of us—Republican and
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Democrat, metropolitan city and small town—share the firm commitment to reduce
the suffering of homeless children, women and men,’ the organization wrote in a
letter to Clinton” (Shogren, 1994, p. A-5).
Despite these efforts, the authorization remained in the Senate committee
until after the November, 1994 elections. That election significantly altered the
composition of Congress, creating a Republican majority in both the House and
Senate and ousting a number of senior Democratic incumbents. Suddenly, the very
existence of HUD, and several other federal departments came under challenge from
the newly elected Republican Congress. “With an annual budget of $27 billion, the
department [HUD] has become a favorite target of conservatives because of chronic
problems associated with urban housing projects and the agency’s origins in the great
society movement of the 1960’s.” (Shogren, 1994a, p. A-42).
In response to this, and a threatened $7 billion budget cut in 1996, HUD
Secretary Cisneros proposed deep cuts in the HUD budget— $13 billion over 5
years—along with an additional $800 million in administrative cuts to be effected
through downsizing. This “reinvention” of HUD, however, continued to emphasize
the consolidation of 60 disparate programs into three block grants: public housing,
community development and affordable housing, with homeless programs included
in affordable housing (Associated Press, 1995).
Again, the issue of local control remained a priority, in part because of its
appeal to Republicans who viewed “the less federal government the better” (Shogren,
1994a, p. A-42); because it was consistent with HUD’s move toward consolidated
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planning; and because the “devolution of federal authority to local governments” was
also a stated priority of the Clinton administration (Broder, 1994, A-l). Not
surprisingly, homeless advocates reacted with alarm, mostly because of the lack of
clarity and predictability brought by these new funding mechanisms. Advocates
argued that the greater flexibility created by block grants might divert funding from
needed programs for the homeless to other community development activities that
served a broader population (Shogren, 1994a).
Meanwhile, while top HUD officials were fighting to save the Department
and to keep the proposed cuts for fiscal year 1996 and beyond to a minimum,
Congress proposed a bill threatening to rescind fiscal year 1995 spending. More than
$1 billion appropriated for homeless funds for fiscal year 1995 was in jeopardy of
reallocation unless HUD could commit the funds to specific programs. HUD had
been waiting for the authorizing legislation, but now they moved forward quickly
under that existing authorizing legislation which would permit the funds to be
awarded under the old, competitive system. In early 1995 HUD released the 1995
Super NOFA (Notice of Funding Availability) through which over $900 million of
the $1.2 billion appropriated was to be distributed (ESG funds had been allocated
through the block grant process).
This was the second year for a “Super NOFA”. As in 1994, the 1995 NOFA
combined applications for the Shelter Plus Care, Single Room Occupancy (SRO)
Moderate Rehabilitation and Supportive Housing Programs. In 1995, however, there
were two crucial differences. One was that HUD was using the formula allocation
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projected under the consolidation as a “needs assessment”, a target amount that
would go to communities assuming their application met HUD’s scoring criteria.
Secondly, consolidated applications from local jurisdictions were being strongly
encouraged, instead of submissions from individual non-profits. These consolidated
applications needed to bring stakeholders to the table, to send funding priorities
through a community process, and to develop priorities that were consistent with the
continuum of care approach. Through the existing competitive process, HUD was
trying to achieve the goals of the consolidated block grant: local planning of a
coordinated continuum of care, coordination rather than competition of funding
within communities, the distribution of funds according to need (both demonstrated
in the grant application and via formula), and placing the primary administration of
the funding in the hands of local government.
This drive for consolidation was so pronounced, that on March 20, 1995, then
Assistant Secretary Andrew Cuomo called Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan and
warned that unless applications from Los Angeles were consolidated, the Los
Angeles area was in danger of not being funded. As a result, the newly formed Los
Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) was instructed to prepare the
application for the City and County of Los Angeles. Jurisdictions such as the cities
of Glendale and Long Beach, which had been planning to submit their own
applications, were strongly urged to submit under the auspices of LAHSA, which
they did. Pasadena was the only jurisdiction in the county to submit its own
application, under Pacific Clinics (it was subsequently funded by HUD). The
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original turnaround for the grant application process had been short—45 days—but
LAHSA staff and support staff from non-profits and local government literally
worked around the clock to prepare the application by the April 4th deadline (I was
one of them).
Mayor Richard Riordan’s office received a call from Andrew
Cuomo, a HUD assistant secretary who wanted that applications
from homeless agencies in the Los Angeles area were in danger of
losing out in a $900 million national competition. Rather than
consider individual applications from hundreds of nonprofit groups,
HUD wanted these agencies to work together in identifying their
most urgent needs as part of a comprehensive plan to address
homelessness.
On March 23, the LAHSA Commission met at the agency’s
Downtown offices, where [LAHSA Executive Director] Boutilier
explained that word from the major’s office was that it was time for
LAHSA to ‘step up to the plate’. . . . The commissioners voted
unanimously in agreement.
Racing against an April 7 deadline, LAHSA, working with
city and county staff along with representatives of local homeless
agencies, compiled a massive data base, conducted public meetings
and sent to Washington a 1,200-page, 21-pound applications for
$50.7 million to fund 52 projects. In a separate portion of the
competition, LAHSA also endorsed local housing authority
applications for another $37.5 million [in Section 8 funds].
(Noriyuki, 1995, p. E-l)
Service providers (and local jurisdictions) participating in the process were
nervous about placing LAHSA in the lead role with so much funding at stake.
Especially considering the situation in Washington at the time, many felt that this
might be a one-time increase in federal funds available to homeless providers. But
given the call from Cuomo to the Mayor, many felt they had no choice but to pitch in
and help LAHSA prepare the application, thereby being able to observe and
influence the process.
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In July, Cuomo visited Covenant House in Hollywood and announced that
$33.7 of the $50 million requested would be awarded under LAHSA’s application, as
would the $37 million to city and county housing authorities. “Cuomo said the key
to netting such a large award was cooperation” (Leeds, 1995, p. A-22). Despite the
success of LAHSA’s application, many viewed this award as a way for the Clinton
administration to compensate the City of Los Angeles for the loss of a large
Empowerment Zone grant the year before, and as a way of courting California voters
for the coming elections in 1996.
VII. Conclusion
Since 1995, HUD’s homeless policy has continued to be dominated by the
continuum of care model of service delivery, with an emphasis on local coordination.
After the failure of Congress to authorize the consolidation of homeless funds,
numerous attempts at consolidation have been initiated both by HUD and members
of Congress. All of these have failed to get out of Committee. Thus, the Super
NOFA process has continued as the mechanism by which the majority of homeless
funds are distributed to state and local governments while funding levels for the
Supportive Housing Program (SHP), Shelter Plus Care, and Single Room Occupancy
Moderate Rehabilitation have never reached the high of $1.2 billion for FY95.4
It is through the evolution of the Super NOFA process, and to a lesser extent,
the Annual Consolidated Plan Action Plan and annual performance reports, that
HUD has refined and reinforced federal policy regarding homeless programs. The
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reliance on the Super NOFA, and the existing Supportive Housing Program (SHP),
Shelter Plus Care, and Single Room Occupancy Moderate programs, had several
impacts due to the existing program regulations. The major sacrifice was that local
jurisdictions lost much of the flexibility that the consolidated block grant would have
produced. For example, the Supportive Housing Program originated as the
consolidation of the Supportive Housing Demonstration Grant, and was designed to
provide transitional housing to homeless families and individuals. The program
regulations specifically exclude as eligible support for emergency shelters and
support for permanent housing for non-disabled persons (U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 1998). This is, in part, because other HUD
funding sources are targeted to meeting these needs: ESG targets homeless shelters
and the HOME program provides funding for the development of affordable housing
for low-income persons.
The exclusion of these activities, however, is problematic for some
jurisdictions which do not receive the ESG or HOME block grants; or, for
communities such as Glendale which receive only a modest annual grant averaging
$150,000, which funds programs established before the jurisdiction’s emergency
shelter was implemented (and which would be insufficient to support it anyway).
Also, persons who are at risk of becoming homeless are specifically excluded from
this funding, despite Priority: HOMEI’s emphasis on prevention. Again, the only
4 ESG continues, as always, to be allocated as a block grant
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funding source for which prevention (that is direct eviction prevention rental or
utility assistance) is an eligible activity is ESG.
Eligible components of the continuum of care under the SHP program are:
transitional housing, permanent housing for disabled persons only, supportive
services not in conjunction with supportive housing, Safe Elavens, and innovative
supportive housing. HUD defines these components as follows:
Transitional Housing facilities the movement of homeless
individuals and families to permanent housing within 24 months.
This temporary housing is combined with supportive services to
enable homeless individuals and families to live as independently as
possible. Supportive services - which help promote residential
stability, increased skill level and/or income, and greater self-
determination - may be provided by the organization managing the
housing or coordinated by that organization and provided by other
public or private agencies. Transitional housing can be provided in
one structure or several structures at one site or in multiple
structures at scattered sites .
Permanent Housing for persons with Disabilities is long-term
housing for this populations. Basically, it is community-based
housing and supportive services as described above, designed to
enable homeless persons with disabilities to live as independently as
possible in a permanent setting. Permanent housing can be
provided in one structure or several structures at one site or in
multiple structures at scattered sites.
Supportive Services Only projects provide services designed
to address the special needs of homeless persons. Projects are
classified as this component only if the project sponsor is not also
providing housing to the same persons receiving the services.
Eligible activities for Supportive Services Only projects are
acquisition, rehabilitation, leasing and, of course, supportive
services. (Applicants cannot request funds for new construction or
operations.) Supportive Services Only projects may have one or
more structures at a central site or at scattered sites where services
are delivered; or services may be delivered independent of a
structure, such as street outreach.
A Safe Haven is a form of supportive housing in which a
structure, or a clearly identifiable portion of a structure, meets the
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following criteria: (l)serves hard to reach homeless persons who
have severe mental illness, are on the streets, and have been unable
or unwilling to participate in supportive services; (2) provides 24-
hour residence for an unspecified duration; (3) provides private or
semiprivate accommodations; and (4) has overnight occupancy
limited to 25 persons. A safe haven may also provide supportive
services to eligible persons who are not residents on a drop-in basis”
(U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1998a, p.
13).
Again, the Supportive Housing Program, the program through which the
majority of the McKinney funds are distributed, is a HOUSING program, and in
addition, will only fund new projects or project expansions (although once a project
is funded, renewals do not require an expansion). The housing emphasis of both the
funding applications and the annual reporting forms make both processes awkward.
Also, funding for the facilities in which these supportive services are provided can
only be requested for acquisition, rehabilitation leasing, and for the services
themselves. Funding for the on-going operation (utilities, supplies, maintenance,
insurance, and equipment, etc.) of the facility are not eligible, although HUD has
interpreted the regulations to allow operations costs directly tied to the funded
services to be covered under the supportive services category. This gets a bit tricky,
in that the utilities, supplies, equipment used by the supportive service staff can be
paid for by the grant, but that share used by other programs, supervisorial or
administrative staff cannot be. Agencies must develop cost-allocation plans to
rationalize these budget line items.
Thus, Federal policy contributes to descriptions of local systems for homeless
service delivery—to local officials, to HUD, to the press—that are spun to appear
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compatible with the parameters set by that policy. For example, in Glendale, many
of the social services at the Glendale Services Center, funded under the 1996,1997
and 1998 Super NOFA’s, do in fact, serve homeless persons in the emergency
shelter. In fact, under the current proposal to reorganize the Center under the
management of a lead agency, that is precisely how the funds available through SHP
will be redeployed to help alleviate the on-going funding shortfall faced by the
shelter. Technically, this is not breaking the rules, as long as SHP funds are not used
for shelter “operations”, and as long as the City stresses that the services are not
meeting emergency needs, but preparing clients for transitional or permanent
housing. But this is a gray area, and I get very nervous about the extent to which the
City is now planning to use SHP funded positions to staff the shelter, potentially
reducing the availability of those staff to clients in transitional housing. But in my
mind there is no choice, Glendale has supportive service programs in the Center
which are over-funded and under-utilized, and an emergency shelter which is under
funded and under-staffed. And without the emergency shelter, the potential efficacy
of the other programs will be severely curtailed. Without the limitations placed on
the funding by HUD, there would be plenty of funding to develop a sensible,
seamless Center and emergency shelter, and probably even enough funding to pay for
the much needed Center management. But as it is, the City needs to patch together a
less than optimal system and be sure to present it in a way that is palatable to HUD.
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CHAPTER V: PUBLIC HISTORY OF THE GLENDALE HOMELESS
COALITION
I. Introduction
Chapters V and VI represent the public history of the Glendale Homeless
Coalition and the development of the continuum of care, and the development of the
Glendale Services Center, respectively. I have constructed these histories from
public accounts: newspaper articles, reports, public relations materials, funding
applications. As such they represent an idealized depiction of the processes, policies
and programs that have developed in the City of Glendale’s efforts to address
homelessness. These public histories conform to ideals about how homeless services
should be provided that are promoted through broader ideological, political and
regulatory agendas. These broader agendas range from the concern about the
“magnet effect” voiced by local politicians, to the nationwide policy agendas of the
Clinton administration and regulatory requirements of the federal funding sources
discussed in Chapter IV. While these public accounts of homeless programs in
Glendale are not fictions (they are by and large accurate in the facts that they
present), they are “massaged” accounts that belie the complexity of the processes of
program planning, development and implementation.
The idealized account provided in Chapter VI of the development of the
Glendale Services Center and emergency shelter program (Project ACHIEVE) will
be contrasted with the “observed” version that is presented in Chapter VII. The
comparison of the idealized and the observed (albeit not entirely objective) accounts
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of the development of these key programs in Glendale’s continuum of care will
highlight fissures in the link between public policy and its outcomes: programs that
are designed to impact people’s lives. The current chapter is designed to provide a
picture of the historical, social and political context within which the Glendale
Services Center and Project ACHIEVE, as well as other homeless programs, evolved
in Glendale.
There are a number of different media through which the idealized versions
of program development and implementation are disseminated, and the public
official has various degrees of control over their content. Public officials exert the
least amount of control over the press, and in the City of Glendale, this is especially
true. In a relatively small media market, the local newspaper (the Glendale News
Press) often attracts young, relatively inexperienced reporters. Without a lot of
“breaking news” to report, they tend to focus on issues involving local government
and to highlight the controversial or potentially divisive elements of any particular
story. Alternatively, the press always wants to talk to a client/former client to get the
“human interest” bent. Some agencies are ambivalent about this: they feel it exploits
their clients, maybe even jeopardizing their progress/recovery. In addition, many
view even their best clients as “loose cannons” who may say something
unpredictable.
Public officials obviously have more control over the documents that they
produce. There are the reports to governing bodies: the City Council or Housing
Authority. Public presentations to the City Council are either periodic updates about
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the progress of programs, highlighting efficacy; requests for City financial
participation in a project; or, responses to complaints or perceived problems. In
Glendale, City Council support for homeless programs took some time to develop,
and the support of former City Manager Dave Ramsay was key to this development.
As a result the City has provided financial support to the emergency shelter, the
Glendale Services Center, and several transitional housing projects.
Also key in the development of the City Council’s support of homeless
programs was the federally mandated Consolidated Plan (see Chapter IV), which tied
the city’s receipt of popular block grant funds (CDBG and HOME) to its
implementation of homeless programs; and, the fact that almost all funds spent on
homeless programs in Glendale are federal funds, many of which must be spent on
homeless or low-income populations. But the City Council has an ambivalent
attitude toward these federal funds. They want the money, but they resent the
“strings”: environmental review, restrictions on whom and for what the money can
be spent. The City Council uses the presentation of reports regarding homeless
programs as an opportunity for political posturing (particularly now that meetings are
televised) and they ventriliquate the public’s concern about fiscal accountability,
local control and the encroachment of federal government into local concerns.
The Glendale City Council is still nervous about homeless programs. For
example, Council members are concerned about the magnet effect— that providing
homeless services will attract more homeless persons into the community. And they
are concerned that if and when Federal funds are cut, the local non-profits and the
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community will pressure the Council to continue to support homeless programs
through the City’s General Fund. In this dissertation, almost every staff report
quoted that was written after October, 1994, was written by me, and I have been very
influenced by these concerns of the City Council and Housing Authority.
The U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also
requires numerous annual reports. HUD now emphasizes performance based
reporting. Performance is measured by the timely expenditure of funds and by levels
of service and outcomes. These public versions are, in some ways, the most accurate
account of what’s going on in a jurisdiction. They are number based, and by and
large factual. But they are also idealized: positive accomplishments are highlighted,
and poor performance or delays are rationalized. And although these are public
accounts and there is a mandated public comment period, very few members of the
public ever bother to read them.
Another type of document created for HUD are applications for funding.
With respect to homeless programs, these are the most substantive and
comprehensive documents that the City of Glendale produces. The failure of the
Clinton administration’s attempt, in 1994, to consolidate all HUD homeless funds
into grants that would go directly to local jurisdictions based on a formula allocation
resulted in the current “SuperNOFA” process (see Chapter IV). This national
competition rewards applications that demonstrate the coordination of all service
providers within a particular geographic jurisdiction, so much so, that uncoordinated
applications from overlapping areas are disqualified through the scoring process.
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The format of the SuperNOFA application reveals HUD’s priorities/goals vis a vis
the awarding of these funds.
Glendale has been very successful in these applications, in part because of the
accomplishments of the City/Coalition in spite of difficulties, and in part because of
the partial fictions of inter-organizational cooperation that I have created in the
idealized accounts presented in Chapters V and VI. The information contained in the
annual funding application also becomes the basis for applications to other public
and private funding sources, and is also the basis of public relations and other
promotional activities.
While it is not a funding application, per se, the acceptance of a jurisdiction’s
Consolidated Plan by HUD is a prerequisite for the receipt of federal block grant
funds. As such, the nature of its content and orientation is very similar to a funding
application (although it is much broader in its scope). Again, the homeless
components of the Consolidated Plan, HUD reports, and funding applications to
HUD quoted in the dissertation that were written after October, 1994, were written
by me. (The 1996 and 1997 NOFA funding applications were co-authored by a
consultant, Karin Pally, and myself.)
Awards, such as the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials’ (NAHRO) Award of Excellence, the Helen Putnam Award, and the HUD
Best Practices Award, are important to local government and non-profits because of
they enhance the programs’ prestige, particularly at the local level. Department
Directors and agency Executive Directors receive accolades from their peers, and
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from City staffs perspective, it makes it somewhat more likely that local politicians
will support future funding requests as may private corporations and foundations.
The local press in Glendale has shown little interest in these accomplishments, but
does usually publish the information contained in the press releases that accompany
such awards. Of course, the applications for these awards are the most highly
idealized versions of program development and operation.
Finally, in Glendale, there have been community education and public
relations campaigns promoted by the Glendale Homeless Coalition to coincide with
the opening of major programs, or major fundraisers sponsored by a local agency.
Much of this work is done by the agencies themselves, many of which focus
exclusively on their own agency, while others take pains to highlight the broader
continuum of care.
Again, this dissertation examines the relationship between public policy and
the idealized accounts of program design and implementation that are produced in
support of policy initiatives, and the realities of program implementation which are
often much more complex and “messy”. In Chapter IV, I provided an account of the
idealized version of homeless policy at the federal level, and in this Chapter I present
the idealized history of the development of the Glendale Homeless Coalition and
political support for the implementation of homeless programs. This idealized
history provides the founding myths surrounding homeless service delivery that
continue to be promoted in Glendale by myself and others. These founding myths
include the following ideas, some of which are inherently contradictory:
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-That policy makers in Glendale are genuinely interested in addressing
homelessness, but only to the extent that they are NOT taking responsibility
for the issue beyond the local level. Homeless programs in Glendale should
focus on addressing the needs of Glendale’s residents. The City of Glendale
and local service providers are not responsible for solving the issue at a
regional level.
-That the balance between social services and law enforcement will help
combat the “magnet effect” and address the public health and safety
concerns that surround homelessness and generate complaints from the
general public.
-That local politicians have control over the programs that are implemented
in their community, and the quality of services that they provide.
-That addressing homelessness is a community problem, not just a concern
of local government. As such it is best addressed through a coalition of local
groups in which City government is just one player.
-That the stakeholders in the delivery of homeless programs: public officials,
service providers, the homeless and the public at large, can reach a
consensus about how services should be delivered and can develop on-going
collaborative relationships that draw in the strengths of each party. That
each of these stakeholders can put the good of the continuum of care above
the concerns of their individual organization; and, that each of the
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stakeholders has the capacity to perform adequately in the tasks assigned to
them in the continuum.
-That policy initiatives and inter- and intra-organizational structure can take
precedence over the behavior of individual actors in determining the
outcomes of service planning and delivery.
As we will see in Chapter VII, the myths that are presented in Chapters V and
VI belie the complexities that are faced by all of the actors involved in program
implementation on a day to day basis. Furthermore, these myths and the
contradictions embedded in them are translated into policy initiations which
constrain these actors from taking steps that might mitigate problems with
implementation. Thus, an unpacking of these myths suggests specific changes in
policy at both the federal and local level which would help mitigate the complexities
of program implementation. I addition, I feel that social science can contribute to an
understanding of how and why the differences between policy and implementation
play out the way they do. An analysis of these differences is provided in Chapter
VIII, and policy implications are suggested in Chapter IX.
II. Background: The Glendale Homeless Coalition is Created
The Glendale Homeless Coalition began as the Glendale Coalition to
Coordinate Emergency Food and Shelter in September, 1984. At that time, the City
of Glendale had been grappling with the changing demographics in its southern
region for over a decade. Recent immigrants from Latin America, Lebanon, Iran and
later, Armenia, Russia and other former Soviet Republics, and the demolition of
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single-family homes for the construction of multi-family housing, created the
perception that the southern area of the city was becoming ghettoized. As a result of
the changing demographics in the area, the City qualified for the recently created
federal Community Development funds which would later be used to fund homeless
programs.
From 1960 to 1970 the minority population in Southwest Glendale
grew from 5.5 percent. . . to 27 percent. The highest proportion of
the influx was of Spanish-sumamed families... [T]he average
income in Southwest Glendale was nearly 29 percent lower than the
city-wide average... In December, 1973, United Way published a
study which singled out South Glendale as an area with a high
proportion of needy, elderly residents. The agency researchers said
that 20 percent of the 10,864 seniors living in the area had an
income below the poverty level... Based on statistics gathered
through its studies, the city qualified for more than $7 million in
federal funds to be disbursed during the next seven years under the
Housing and Community Development Act. (Schipper, 1975, p.
A l)
Even then, controversy surrounded the use of federal funds to assist poor and
low-income persons. Even though the target population for housing and social
service projects at that time were seniors who were long-time residents of the city,
many in the community feared that subsidized housing and services would foster
dependency and draw undesirable elements to the community. “When Ms. Ong [a
City staffer] described programs being considered under the CDA grant. . . before a
group of senior citizens, some of them objected to the plans. ‘If you do that,’ they
told her, ‘then all ‘those’ (undesirable) people will come into Glendale” (Schipper,
1975a, p. Al).
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In the mid-1980’s, Glendale, like many urban areas in the nation, began to
grapple with the issue of homelessness. The responses in Glendale ranged from
direct service provision— at that time primarily through The Salvation Army Glendale
Corps, and Catholic Social Services, two social service agencies that had established
programs in southern Glendale—and denial of the problem. ‘“Homelessness has
never been a problem (in Glendale).’ He [then Mayor Larry Zarian] adds that he is
not blind to the street people who sometimes roam the city’s streets. ‘I don’t know
where they find shelter.. . . There are a lot of organizations that take care of those
people, and I’m satisfied with that’” (Braswell, 1986, p. A4).
Local churches were also a forum for the discussion of the issue of
homelessness in Glendale. Religious organizations collected food and clothing,
offering it directly to the city’s “transients” or funneling it through the community’s
non-profits. Churches also provided hot meals to the homeless through The
Salvation Army’s lunchtime feeding program, The Lord’s Kitchen, founded in 1984.
Many churches raised money to help support these non-profits. Glendale
Presbyterian Church gave $500 to The Salvation Army in 1984, an amount which
had increased to $3,000 in 1986. But one of the most important roles for church
leaders in Glendale, was that of advocacy on behalf of the poor and homeless.
Church leaders, most notably Dr. Greg Roth of Glendale Presbyterian Church,
persisted in bringing the issue of homelessness before the Glendale City Council.
They organized forums that addressed the issue for new Council candidates, and Dr.
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Roth and other church leaders in the community were featured in many local
newspaper articles on the issue of homelessness.
Dr. Roth was on of the founding members of the Glendale Coalition to
Coordinate Emergency Food and Shelter. Other members included the American
Red Cross, The Salvation Army, Catholic Social Services, and Verdugo Mental
Health Center. Expanding on a survey conducted by the United Way in June of 1986
that documented the number and characteristics of homeless persons in the San
Fernando Valley, the Coalition reviewed the records of service providers for 1986,
and estimated that between 200 and 300 persons were homeless in Glendale on any
given night. They categorized the population at that time as: Fragile (12%— on that
street less than one month, frequently elderly), Temporary (60%— Glendale residents,
homeless for 1 -6 months, largely due to unemployment, including families),
Chronic (20%— alcohol and drug dependent or mentally ill individuals who have been
on the street for more than one year), and Drifters (8%— ' “genuinely homeless but
move from city to city”, “sharks” who manipulate the system for their own benefit)
(Glendale Coalition to Coordinate Food and Shelter, 1987, p.4). At that time,
assistance to the homeless was limited to food, clothing and vouchers to local motels:
“Most weeks this averages ten rooms available per week. Each client is limited to
two nights stay every six months” (Glendale Coalition to Coordinate Food and
Shelter, 1987a, p. 2).
In 1987 the city of Glendale joined El Monte, Inglewood and Santa Ana in
not applying for Federal Emergency Shelter Grant funds to assist the homeless.
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Glendale would have received between $28,000 and $32,000: “Glendale’s housing
director, Madalyn Blake, said her office decided not to apply for homeless housing
assistance until an ongoing study of the problem is completed, if then. ‘We thought
the money would be better used’ in other cities. Glendale provides $20,000 annually
to two private agencies that help the homeless and passes another $15,000 in federal
money along, Blake said” (Kelley, 1987, p. Al).
In 1988, the County of Los Angeles funded a survey of homeless persons in
Glendale. The City of Glendale provided an additional $2,500 in CDBG funds to
cover the costs of “conducting field interviews to assess the status of homeless needs
in the City” (City of Glendale, 1988, p. 1). This survey was sponsored by Verdugo
Mental Health Center, with members of the Coalition participating in the Project
Technical Advisory Committee. The purpose of survey was (Verdugo Mental Health
Center, 1988):
[T]o provide new information about the homeless population of the
Glendale/Burbank area as related to the following key questions:
A. What kind of people are homeless?
1. Description.
2. What is their background? (Past)
3. How do they live? (Present)
B. What are their needs? (p. 4)
In addition, Verdugo Mental Health Center staff sought information about
how to: provide essential and valuable services; inform people that services are
available; and, establish a comfortable and stable connection with homeless
individuals, especially those in need of attention related to mental health, alcohol
and/or drug use (Verdugo Mental Health Center, 1988). The questionnaire was
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administered between March and June, 1988 to 57 subjects, and consisted of 172
items: “The items were written to elicit factual as well as perceptual information,
from both the interviewee and the interviewer” (Verdugo Mental Health Center,
1988). Significant statistical findings of the survey were:
• 77% of the population were male,
• 52% were between the ages of 31 and 50,
• 3 5 % of the population was white,
• 70% were in the Glendale/Burbank area for two years or more, with
an additional 21% in the area between 6 months and 2 years,
• 66% were unemployed for 1 year or more,
• 13% had a history of psychiatric hospitalization,
• 77% indicated that they had been incarcerated, of those, 66 were
incarcerated for 6 months or less; The majority of arrests were for
DUI,
• 74% reported having been childhood victims of physical or sexual
abuse,
• 45% lived in a temporary residents, 40% were on the streets all the
time,
• 50% had not had a stable residence for at least one year,
• 25% received SSI,
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• Interviews identified 11 alcohol abusers and 5 drug abusers, 13
interviewees acknowledged past alcohol dependency, while 7 stated it
was a current issue, 6 interviewees indicated past drug use but none
acknowledged that it was a current issue,
• 47% reported a need for dental care, 29% had obvious nutritional
deficiencies and 23% had hypertension or respiratory problems,
• Interviewers perceived 4% with psychiatric disabilities, 14% probable
and 19% unknown,
• The top five service needs were identified as: food, shelter, clothing,
shower/delousing, long-term housing. (Verdugo Mental Health
Center, 1988)
The report also included a qualitative section in which the project director
recalled her experiences with and the stories of several of the interviewees. The
survey report’s conclusions recognized the limitations of the survey: the
characteristics of persons who were non-responsive to interviewers were not
represented, nor were those of persons who did not obviously appear to be homeless,
all respondents were English-speaking, and persons who were currently receiving
services were over-represented.
The conclusions focused on issues regarding the prevention of homelessness
through education, job and interpersonal skills training, and the availability of
services for the at-risk population, and recommend that “long-term programs be
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established to provide shelter, food, clothing, washing facilities and on-going,
mandatory supplemental services, including medical assessment, psychological
counseling and substance abuse treatment” (Verdugo Mental Health Center, 1988, p.
30 emphasis in the original). The report suggested that the implementation of the
services relied on the “response and cooperation of the target population” (p. 30-1)
and on using volunteers and advocates to care for the homeless. The increase of
professionalized services were also recognized, however, the need for additional
funds was also cited.
In March, 1989, the Glendale Coalition to Coordinate Emergency Food and
Shelter invited City Council candidates to a “special election forum about the needs
of homeless men and women in our community” (G. Roth, personal communication
to Glendale City Council Candidates, March 2, 1989). The decision of the three
candidates, two of them incumbents, to attend a “meet-the-candidates” party instead
of attending the forum generated several articles in the Glendale News Press. Nine
candidates did attend the forum, and, of course, made issue with the other
candidates’ absence, indicating a lack of concern for the homeless: ‘“Their primary
concerns, despite the rhetoric, lie elsewhere,’ said Richard Seeley” (Hamilton, 1989,
p. A6). Substantively, the candidates who attended the forum criticized the current
council as indifferent to homelessness, citing the level of funding as inadequate.
Increasing the City’s involvement in homeless service delivery through the creation
of a city-sponsored agency was largely viewed as inappropriate, since service
provision was viewed as the domain of local non-profit agencies.
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“Giving $25,000 for this service.. .is laughable,” said candidate
Robin Westermiller... .Most of the candidates shunned the idea of
creating a city agency to address homelessness but favored giving
more money to private agencies at the forum .... ‘I don’t believe
the city needs another bureaucracy set up to address this problem,’
said candidate Richard Diradourian.. ..[Candidate Berdj Karapetian]
suggested the city lasso funds for homeless programs from federal
and state agencies. Karapetian also advocated creating a non-profit
housing authority to provide for low-income and homeless families.
(Martinez, 1989, p. A6)
Despite this attitude about the potential magnet effect of implementing
homeless programs, in June of 1989, the revised Housing Element of the City’s
General Plan called for a “transitional shelter.” Again, concerns about dependency
and attracting transients are raised by Council members, including Larry Zarian, “I
am not for transitional housing in Glendale.. .It is a federal problem. If the city
should fund these things, everyone in the world would come to Glendale” (Burry,
1989, p. A8). The City Council, however, unanimously approved the Housing
Element which included the recommendation for transitional housing: “Sacramento,
for the first time this year, has mandated that the city incorporate temporary housing
for the homeless into its five-year projections. However, the city is only required to
give permission to build the shelter, not to fund the project” (Burry, 1989, p. A8).
One year later, the City Council would approve $200,000 in CDBG funds to
The Salvation Army Glendale Corps for the acquisition of a 7-bedroom home for the
provision of transitional housing for small families. The staff report to the Glendale
City Council described the project as follows:
The Salvation Army is proposing a quality transitional home, Booth
House, for four (4) small families. Booth House would provide a
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temporary home environment in which young families can save
enough money to re-enter the local rental housing market. Booth
House would accommodate approximately sixteen people
(including an on-site supervisor). All screening of applicants would
be conducted in the existing Salvation Army facilities at 801 South
Center Avenue. Residents would be required to hold jobs in the
community, and a regular savings program would be instituted to
facilitate their eventual transition to independent living. The
Salvation Army would also be able to offer day care and after
school activities to the children of families at Booth House. (City of
Glendale, 1990, p. 1)
The Salvation Army purchased the property for $460,000, leveraging
$260,000 of their own funds with the $200,000 of City administered CDBG funds.
During this same time period, discussion of the development ordinances to
prohibit activities associated with the homeless population, and the police’s response
to homelessness began to be highlighted in the local press.
And it’s becoming what appears to be a serious problem. There’s no
questions these people are undesirable for business.” [Sgt. Dean
Duran, spokesman for the Glendale Police].. . . Residents are calling
for the passage of laws that prevent the homeless from sleeping in
doorways, defecating on the street accosting citizens, harassing
merchants, stealing shopping carts and living on public benches.
(Burry, 1989a, p. A l)
As the public’s awareness of homelessness increased across the country, and
in the city of Glendale, and with the perception that the number of homeless persons
in the city was rising, the City Council began to recognize that there might be a role
for the City in addressing homelessness. Also, court rulings on local ordinances to
address homeless had indicated that communities with a well-developed social
service network in place to assist homeless persons to develop viable alternatives to
living on the streets were more likely to have their anti-panhandling or camping
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ordinances upheld. Thus, City Council members asked the City Manager’s offices to
look into the problem. In the fall of 1991, the Glendale City Manager David Ramsay
scheduled a meeting with the Coalition.
The next two years saw a significant shift in the City’s approach to
homelessness. For the first time a Cold Weather Shelter Program for the Homeless
was initiated in the City during the winter of 1993-94. Funded by LAHSA and the
City of Glendale, the shelter had an advisory board including a Glendale City
Councilperson and the Chief of Police, as well as Dr. Roth and other members of the
Coalition. The shelter was hosted by Glendale Presbyterian Church, and staffed, in
part, by volunteers from local churches and service clubs. That year, the shelter
served 198 non-duplicated guests during 1,542 shelter bed-nights, averaging 25.7
persons per night. The public report of the program highlighted the role of
volunteers and the extent of community participation. With respect to the homeless
statistics regarding Glendale residency (75% were “Glendale residents”), gender
(25% female), age (59% were between 24 and 44 years of age, and ethnicity were
provided (70% were “Caucasian”) (Milley, 1994). The report also included quotes
from volunteers expressing non-stereotypical views of the homeless; and quotes from
guests emphasizing their gratitude:
These people are clean and nice. You wouldn’t even be able to tell
that they were homeless if you saw them on the street. - Volunteer
Marsha Neilsen, La Crescenta Presbyterian Church. (Milley, 1994,
p. 7)
This is paradise - Guest at intake table expressing thanks (p. 7)
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The year of 1993 also saw the release of a new report “on the numbers and
needs of the homeless in Glendale, and the agencies that serve them” (Roth, 1993, p.
1). “The State of the Streets” was written by the Glendale Coalition to Coordinate
Emergency Food and Shelter, in part in response to the 1990 U. S. Census which
estimated that there were 99 homeless people in Glendale, 82 sheltered and 17
unsheltered.
The method used by the Coalition to enumerate the homeless in that report
was based on demographic information on homeless individuals and family members
who presented themselves for service each day over a 60 consecutive day period.
Service providers cross-checked names to avoid duplication. During the same 60 day
period, a daily windshield survey was conducted to capture the number of homeless
individuals and families who were visible on the street but who had not presented
themselves for services. Notes on the location and appearance of individuals were
taken to avoid duplication. Duplication was also avoided by the fact that the service
providers responsible for this portion of the study had years of experience with the
Glendale homeless populations and were therefore familiar with many of the persons
enumerated. This familiarity also helped eliminate duplication between the
windshield survey and the service based enumeration (City of Glendale, 1995).
The report estimated that there were between 260 and 360 homeless in
Glendale on any given night, an increase from the previous estimates of 200-300.
The categories cited in the 1993 report were: Fragile Elderly (40 persons, 55 or older,
homeless 1-3 months); Transitional/Temporary (140-180 persons, families, homeless
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1-5 months, includes children); Chronic (60-100 persons, homeless 6 months or
longer, half mentally ill, half veterans); Non-Glendale Homeless (20-40 persons, no
historic tie to the community) (Roth, 1993, p. 2).
In addition, the report indicated that 100 were vouchered to local motels, 25
might spend the night in the YMCA, 50 in abandoned housings, 30 in parks, streets
and doorways, and 20 in cares parked on the street. The report also concluded that
80% have “historic roots in the community that go back five years of more” (Roth,
1993, p. 2-5).
The Northridge Earthquake struck the city in January, 1994. Some
earthquake victims initially stayed at the Cold Weather Shelter at Glendale
Presbyterian Church. They and a number of homeless persons subsequently moved
to the disaster relief shelters established by the Red Cross. The Northridge
Earthquake also substantially impacted homeless policy in the City through the non-
profits’ and City staffs’ experiences implementing the Disaster Assistance Center
(DAC) for earthquake victims. At the DAC, Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the Red Cross, The Salvation Army and other non-profits, along
with representatives from City departments provided “1-stop” disaster relief
assistance. This concept would later become a model for a multi-service “1-stop” for
homeless persons first introduced in the 1994 “Glendale Task Force Report on
Homelessness”.
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III. The Glendale Task Force on Homelessness
By early 1993, the Glendale City Manager had asked the Coalition to join
with City staff, staff from other public agencies and community members to form the
Glendale Task Force on Homelessness. A brief history, description of the
membership, and their goal was explained in the Introduction to the 1994 Report
issued by the Task Force:
The Glendale Coalition to Coordinate Emergency Food and
Shelter is a core group of six non-profit organizations and church
groups which serve the homeless and other at-risk persons. [They
were: The American Red Cross, First United Methodist Church,
Glendale Presbyterian Church, The Salvation Army Glendale Corps,
Catholic Charities, Loaves and Fishes, Glendale Adventists Thrift
Store]. For the past 10 years, this group has taken the lead role in
planning and coordinating homeless service in the community. In
an effort to obtain broader community input and participation in
developing solutions to homelessness, a community wide task force,
The Glendale Task Force on Homelessness was initiated by the City
Manager in March 1993. The Task Force is a 31 member group
consisting of Coalition members, representatives from social service
agencies, churches, businesses, developers, schools, local, state and
federal government agencies (DPSS, EDD and Social Security
Administration), City Department Heads (Community Development
& Housing, Parks, Recreation and Community Services,
Redevelopment, Library, Police and First) and a former homeless
individual who was assisted through the community’s existing Case
Management Program for the Homeless.
The Task Force was charged with identifying the issues
related to homelessness in Glendale, identifying needs of the
homeless and homeless at risk, evaluating] existing services,
identifying gaps in services, identifying strategies and resources to
meet the needs. A strong emphasis was placed upon not “re
inventing the wheel”, taking a look at policies and strategies
developed in other cities and considering their applicability to
Glendale. The Task Force was asked to develop a balanced
approach, considering the needs of the homeless, impacts on
business and the community’s economy, public safety for all people
in the community and advocacy for public/private partnerships in
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solving the growing crisis of homelessness in our community and
the nation.
The Task Force met together as one group for five months,
which were spent in clarifying issues and identifying needs,
resources, and coordination opportunities. This educational process
included developing a homeless needs/resources matrix, identifying
service gaps, presentations on homeless programs from leaders of
other communities and touring model homeless programs and
services. Following this five month educational process, the Task
Force divided itself into three sub-committees which met once
every other month over a six-month period, to study homeless
issues and develop strategies and recommendations in three key
areas: Housing, Social Services and Public Health and Safety.
(Glendale Task Force on Homelessness, 1994, p.l)
The findings of the Task Force Report were “both enlightening and sobering”
(Glendale Task Force on Homelessness, 1994, p. ii). The numbers and demographics
of the homeless population, the needs assessment and the specific strategy outlined in
the Task Force Report would become the first major public document generated by
what would become the Glendale Homeless Coalition. It was adopted by the
Glendale Housing Authority and would be the focus of policy, program planning,
fundraising, and community education for the next two years. It would be the basis
for the homeless components of the federally mandated Consolidated Plan and
Strategy for 1995-2000, submitted by the City’s Community Development and
Housing Department to HUD as a condition of the now almost $6 million received
by the City from HUD annually.
The report also touched on the on-going issues such as the “magnet theory”
and the issue of responsibility for addressing homelessness (e.g., non-profits, local
government, the community, the Federal government). The Task Force report set the
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stage for the philosophy that would be promoted by the City, the Coalition and HUD
well into the future: that partnerships between all of these participants were crucial
for addressing homelessness. The Task Force Report also began to promote an
approach to homeless service delivery that would become the cornerstone of national
policy on the issue: a continuum of care or services. Finally, the report addressed the
issue of the impact of homelessness on the community and approaches that might be
viewed as punitive (e.g., the arrest of homeless persons for public drinking or
trespassing), by promoting a “balanced approach”, balancing meeting the need for
social services with the need to enforce laws designed to address inappropriate
behaviors that were perceived to threaten public health and safety. Excerpts from the
Executive Summary summarize the findings (Glendale Task Force on Homelessness,
1994):
Considerable discussion centered around the so-called
“magnet theory”. Namely, if Glendale becomes more proactive in
dealing with the homeless issue, will it only serve to attract more of
the problem? We have concluded that it would not. This is based
both upon the experiences of other cities, and our estimates that
approximately 80% of the homeless in Glendale have roots in the
community that go back at least five years. Clearly, some homeless
are transient, but the vast majority consider Glendale their “home”.
As part of our study, we took a candid look at ourselves in
terms of current service provided to the homeless. While some
services seem to be near adequate (e.g., food and clothing), others
are significantly deficient (e.g., employment service training, mental
health and case management). Applying a letter grade to each of the
categories, the report card resulted in 1 B, 2 C’s, 4 D’s and 2 F’s.
We believe that we can do better than a D+ average ....
Throughout this process, a number of themes emerged that
served as guides. Fundamental to our approach is that homelessness
is a community-based issue. There is no one agency that is
responsible for the problem, and none that can solve it alone.
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Instead, a wide variety of public and private organizations must be
involved. While the homeless have real needs, so do businesses and
the general public. Special care must be taken to see that all these
perspectives are addressed. In doing so we must seek a balanced
approach.
A third theme stressed the regional (and indeed national)
nature of the homeless issue. We should not develop strategies in
isolation. Rather, we should be working with neighboring cities to
develop a more regional strategy that emphasizes collaboration and
avoids duplication where possible. Finally, there was a strong sense
of realism that ran throughout this process. Given the magnitude
and complexity of the homelessness issue, as are not going to be
able to solve all the problems. Instead, we should be committed to
doing the best that we can.
In addition to these themes, three basic strategies ran
throughout our work. These provided the framework for the
specific action recommendations. The concept of a “continuum of
service” was basic. In order to effectively deal with a variety of
issues facing a homeless person, he/she should move through a
process leading to a desired outcome. A case management
approach should guide this process. The person’s needs must be
comprehensively assessed, a coordinated service plan developed,
and responsibility assigned. All of this effort should be aimed at the
goal of independence. Our strategies must deal with long-term
solutions, not short-time maintenance.
The housing strategy recognized the continuum of housing
needs. Specific recommendations include the development of
emergency, temporary, transitional and independent living types of
housing. Each has unique design characteristics and serves a
distinct purpose.
The social services component emphasizes the case
management approach, and should be directly tied to the housing
strategy. Basic to this strategy will be the establishment of a one-
stop clearinghouse for the homeless with a wide variety of service
agencies participating. Through this vehicle a plan of service for
each individual will be developed. Public education will also play a
key role in gaining community support.
The public health and safety strategy focused on providing the
appropriate balance between individual needs and community
concerns. Legislative recommendations are included that would
deal with trespassing, camping and alcohol use. Business watch
programs would be encouraged. Using a community-oriented
policing approach, public safety personnel would receive both
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training and resource guides to assist them with their
responsibilities. In doing so the goal will be to be beyond just law
enforcement to solutions, (p. ii-iv)
The major social service recommendation of the Task Force Report was a
“One-Stop”, multi-agency, multi-service center for the homeless. In the Report, the
Center was described as “an entry-level component within a continuum of care social
service delivery system. The Center will provide centralized, coordinated and
comprehensive homeless and homeless prevention services to eliminate the existing
service fragmentation, duplication and inaccessibility” (Glendale Task Force on
Homelessness, 1994, p. Appendix A-3).
The management of the Center was proposed to be “a management board
comprised of five members; one member each from The Salvation Army, Catholic
Charities, Red Cross, a Church representative and a City representative. Catholic
Charities will be the lead agency. The management Board will meet regularity [sic]
to monitor the effectiveness of the Center and decide on any needed policies. The
Center will be designed in such a way that for the most part it will tun itself.
However, as problems and issues arise, the Management Board will address them”
(Glendale Task Force on Homelessness, 1994, Appendix A-3).
The Report emphasized that the Center be portable, must like the Disaster
Application Centers that operated during the Northridge earthquake. Initially, the
Center would operate one day per week from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. In 1994 City staff
wrote a funding application to HUD on behalf of the Coalition to obtain $100,000
per year to run the facility, include funds to implement a computerized case
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management network. This was the first national competition for homeless funding
that the City entered on behalf of the Coalition.
IV. The Los Angeles Homeless Service Authority and the L. A. Homeless
Initiative
The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA), formed in
September, 1992, when “the City and County of Los Angeles entered into a joint
powers agreement, as a result of a lawsuit settlement, which specified that both
entities would combine and leverage their resources using the LAHSA as its
delegatee” (City of Los Angeles, 1994, p. 2). The term of the joint Exercise of
Powers Agreement (JPA), was five years from the date it was executed, after which it
could continue at the will of the parties. The JPA created LAHSA (originally
LASA—Los Angeles Services Authority), and the County and the City each
committed to contributing approximately $2.5 million each year to the Authority for
existing programs, and $250,000 annually for the development and initiation of new
programs within the county (Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 17-8).
The mission of the LAHSA is to serve the residents of Los Angeles
City and County who are currently homeless, intermittently
homeless, or in danger of becoming homeless. This Authority
provides a framework for the County and City to work cooperative
to address such issues as homeless prevention, emergency services,
transitional stabilization services, and housing placement. The goal
of LAHSA is to reduce homelessness by increased efficiencies of
County and City efforts, to reduce unnecessary duplication of
efforts, to attract new resources, and to enable better coordination of
existing resources. (Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 18)
Then, on January 14, 1994, just three days before the Northridge Earthquake,
HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros announced the designation of Los Angeles as the
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second Comprehensive Homeless Initiative Region (Washington, D. C. was the
first). As a result, Los Angeles was to receive $20 million over three years to
“demonstrate methods of undertaking comprehensive strategies for assisting
homeless individuals and families... through a variety of activities, including the
coordination of efforts and the filling of gaps in available services and resources”
(Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 1). LAHSA was designated by the City and the
County as the agency responsible for the administration of these funds, including the
development of the funding plan, the selection of project sponsors, and program
monitoring.
During the past few months, while the Homeless Initiative was
being prepared, LAHSA has been developed as a vigorous new
entity ready to administer the Homeless Initiative programs. These
developments have included the appointments of the ten LAHSA
commissioners and the recruitment, selection and employment of
the Executive Director. The homeless services units of the City and
the County have been co-located and form a temporary staff to work
with the LAHSA Commission. Committees, advisory bodies,
bylaws, goals, operational procedures, budgets, personnel plans and
development of detailed plans for a sophisticated computerized
program of information sharing, data collection, and reporting on
the number of people served have all been developed. This phase is
now nearing completion, and LAHSA stands ready to carry out the
programs proposed in the Homeless Initiative. (Shelter Partnership,
1994a, p. 18)
The initial Executive Director of LAHSA was Gene Boutillier, formerly the
Director of FEMA’s Emergency Food and Shelter Board. Jay Glassman, formerly
the County’s homeless coordinator, was named Assistant Director. Dr. Greg Roth of
Glendale Presbyterian Church was named the LAHSA Commissioner representing
County Supervisor Michael Antonovich’s District: ‘“Mike (Antonovich) felt he
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would be really beneficial to the county as a whole,’ said Kathryn Barger. ‘Mike felt
he would bring new thoughts to the table” (Rodriguez, 1994, p. Al).
“I’m very excited,” said Roth, 38, of Burbank. “I think it is going to
be significant for our community to have representation of a
regional level like that.” Beside creating early intervention-tem
programs for the homeless, Roth said he also hopes to dispel myths
about the group. For example, he said many communities fear that
providing service for the homeless only will act as a magnet and
attract more into the cities.. . . He said to solve those fears, “It is
essential that cites work together as a cluster and look at facilities
each has so we can cooperate and start new innovative programs. If
we plan services on a regional basis... and every community offers
something, then the homeless won’t need to move to a new
community,” Roth said. (Rodriguez, 1994, p. A l)
Over the next several months, LAHSA and Shelter Partnership staff produced
several iterations of the plan for spending the $20M.
The goal of the Los Angeles Homeless Initiative Plan was to:
[Remove] people from the streets and stabilizing them in
permanent housing. Initiative funds will be utilized to fund either
new services that will serve to fill a gap in the existing Los Angeles
Homeless Service Delivery system, or existing services that will be
augmented to increase their availability to the many homeless
persons that have not yet been served.
The Los Angeles Area Homeless Initiative will include the
components of the [continuum of care] system: prevention,
outreach, assessment, emergency shelter and transitional housing, a
high tolerance drop-in center, access centers, health care access,
substance abuse rehabilitation, job training and placement, housing
placement assistance, long term case management, “no-fail”
communities for the mentally ill, SSI application assistance, and
permanent and supportive housing.
The top priorities of the Initiative are to 1) provide alternatives
for homeless individuals in order to eliminate encampment; 2)
establish a high tolerance center, including outreach to homeless
persons; 3) redesign the homeless delivery system to reflect new
approaches; and 4) provide dedicated, increased number of
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transitional and permanent housing units. (Shelter Partnership,
1994a, p. 1-2)
Initially, the plan was to focus on four high-need areas within the City of Los
Angeles: Pico-Union, South Central, East Los Angeles, and Downtown (Richard
Riordan letter to Henry Cisneros, January 5, 1994). Ultimately, however, other areas
within the City of Los Angeles, and throughout the County, were designated as
special “service enhancement project areas” that would receive “a very limited
amount of Initiative funds. At first, these areas were Glendale, Long Beach, LA’s
Westside and Pacoima” (City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, 1994, p.
2). Hollywood was later added (Shelter Partnership, 1994a).
Glendale will expand a very modest outreach program serving the
chronic mentally ill homeless people and will create an access
center. It will work with nonprofit homeless service provider to
improve case management targeted to homeless prevention for
families. With other funds, the city of Glendale is making major
commitments to temporary, transitional, and permanent housing
projects. (Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 73-74)
Thus, Glendale was slated to receive initiative funding for an “Access
Center”, a model of service delivery akin to the “one-stop” concept. Four other
access centers were also proposed. One in another “service-enhancement project
area” (Long Beach), and three within the target areas: Central, South Central, and
East Los Angeles. A total of $2.1 million was allocated to fund these centers that
were described in the Implementation Plan:
The largest center is proposed in the Center Los Angeles area,
mid-size centers will be located in South Central Los Angeles and
East Los Angeles, and smaller centers will be located in Glendale
and Long Beach.
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Access centers will serve as one of the entry points for
homeless individuals and families seeking assistance. These centers
will provide orientation, assessment, referral and access to various
services offered in the community. In addition... clients can
receive health services, substance abuse counseling, assistance in
finding job training and placement, housing placement assistance,
and follow-up.
Access centers will be action offices, not a ‘drop-in” day
program or a ‘high tolerance” facility. The differences in these two
types of facilities need to be distinguished by the community clients,
and staff. Access centers will be ‘high expectation/high demand.
(Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 37-8)
V. The First “Super NOFA”
LAHSA, the City of Glendale and the Glendale Homeless Coalition also
collaborated on another project in the spring of 1995. In mid-February, 1995, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development announced their first “Super
NOFA”, a nationwide competition of $600 million in Supportive Housing and
Shelter Plus Care funds. These were the funds that were supposed to have been
consolidated into the Homeless Assistance Block grant, but the elections of 1994
complicated Congressional politics and the authorization for the consolidation was
never passed. In addition, the new Congress was threatening to rescind the allocation
of funds for homeless programs for fiscal year 1995. In light of this, HUD was under
pressure to obligate these funds to specific projects as soon as possible. Still wanting
to keep the goal of funding consolidation, homeless funds that were not allocated by
formula (Emergency Shelter Grant program funds were awarded on a formula
allocation) were all rolled into one, “super” Notice of Funding Availability or “Super
NOFA”. Further, then Assistant Secretary Comoro urged that, to the greatest extent
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possible, jurisdictions work together to submit regionally coordinated applications.
Thus, the City of Glendale and the Coalition altered their plans to submit their own
application to HUD, and decided instead, to submit under the umbrella of a
countywide application being prepared by LAHSA. This change in strategy, together
with a tight timeline (45 days from the issuance of the NOFA to the due date) meant
that the City and the Coalition needed to act fast to gather information needed by
LAHSA regarding homeless needs, existing services and service gaps, and to develop
a project for submission to LAHSA.
The Coalition decided to submit one proposal, consisting of two family
transitional housing projects. Leverage provided by the City’s proposed financial
participation in the project would make the application more competitive at both the
local and Federal level. A staff report to the Housing Authority explained the
extraordinary situation, the proposed projects, and requested a letter of funding
commitment from the City. The motion to provide the letter was approved
unanimously. LAHSA was ultimately awarded $30 million in funding that year. The
Glendale Homeless Coalition projects were fully funded in the amount of $1.1
million.
VI. Glendale’s Consolidated Plan
In 1994 the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development announced
that local jurisdictions needed to submit a five year Consolidated Plan and Strategy
for 1995-2000. The Consolidated Plan replaced the Comprehensive Affordable
Housing Strategy (CHAS) that had been required since 1992. The CHAS was first
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created by the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990. The CHAS was a five-year
housing plan required of state and local governments as a prerequisite to receiving
federal housing funds including HOME, CDBG, and other homeless,
homeownership and housing program. Under an interim rule published by HUD, the
initial five-year plans were due in 1992, with an annual update in 1993. A full five-
year plan for fiscal year 1994 was required under HUD’s final rule.
The purpose of the Consolidated Plan was to establish a “streamlined
planning and application document” that would “eliminate existing disparate, and
often duplicative, reporting requirements” (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1994a, p. 5). Thus, the Consolidated Plan addressed issues such as
citizen participation, economic development, fair housing, homelessness, and
housing affordability, in contrast to the CHAS, which focused on housing
exclusively. One of the most important new aspects of the Consolidated Plan was an
enlarged emphasis on a jurisdiction’s strategy for addressing homelessness. This was
due in part, no doubt, to the publication of HUD’s “Priority: Home!-The Federal Plan
to Break the Cycle of Homelessness” in May, 1994 and the Clinton administration’s
proposed doubling of HUD homeless funds in the fiscal year 1995 budget.
Jurisdictions were required to conduct needs assessments and develop a
strategy for meeting the needs of homeless persons (as well as other special needs
populations such as seniors, persons with HIV/AIDS and the disabled). In addition
to the five year plan, annual Action Plans were required from each jurisdiction in
advance of the receipt of their annual block grant allocations. Annual Grantee
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Performance Reports (later CAPER) were required at the year’s end as a measure of
the jurisdiction’s progress toward implementing strategy.
In the Spring of 1995,1 wrote the Homeless Needs Assessment and
Strategy for the City of Glendale’s Consolidated Plan and Strategy (City of
Glendale, 1995). It included an assessment of the number of homeless
persons in Glendale at any point in time. These figures were based on the
1993 “State of the Street Report” issued by the Coalition, and also used in the
1994 Task Force Report.
The flaws in the methodology used by the service providers and myself were
quite obvious, and these numbers were qualified in the Plan (City of Glendale, 1995):
The total number of 360 determined in 1992 is biased toward
those homeless persons who use services in Glendale and who are
visible on the streets. Since Glendale did not have a fully developed
continuum of care at that time, it is fair to assume that some
homeless persons did not interact with service providers during the
enumeration period and were not subsequently enumerated during
the windshield survey.
While the method of checking for duplication between the
service-based and windshield surveys during the 1992 enumeration
was flawed (personal knowledge of service providers), it seems fair
to assume that the overall number of 360 was still an undercount for
the reasons stated above.
The method of estimating the daily average of homeless
persons used in the 1992 study does not account for seasonal or
other periodic variation, or other factors which cause fluctuation
and/or turnover in the homeless population, (p. 26)
In addition, the Consolidated Plan required that an assessment of the size of
special needs populations also be addressed, as well as the homeless-at-risk
population (City of Glendale, 1995):
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The method for determining homeless sub-populations .. . was
based on a survey of Glendale homeless service providers
conducted for the Consolidated Plan. The service providers
participating in this process were: Catholic Charities - Loaves and
Fishes, The Salvation Army Glendale Corps, Pacific Clinics,
Lutheran Social Services, the Employment Development
Department and a formerly homeless individual currently working
as a peer counselor. The service providers met and came to a
consensus with respect to subpopulations among the overall
homeless population (including children). The results are as
follows:
• Severe Mental Illness Only: 15%
•Alcohol/Other Drug Abuse Only: 15%
•SMI and Alcohol/Other Drug Abuse: 30%
•Domestic Violence: 35%
•AIDS/Related Diseases: 15%
•Elderly: 12%
Information regarding the ethnicity of homeless individuals in
Glendale is available from the Cold Weather Shelter data. Of the
401 unduplicated individuals that were sheltered from November
15, 1994 through February 28, 1995 58% were Caucasian; 24%
were Latino; 15% were African-American; 1% were Asian/Pacific
Islander; 1% were American Indian/Alaskan Eskimo; and ethnic
information was not available for 3%. Information regarding the
ethnicity of homeless families is currently not available, (p. 27)
The inventory of Glendale’s services was transposed onto an matrix depicting
the identified special needs populations (see Figure 3). This allowed for gaps in
services to be readily identified. The inventory was described in detail in the Plan
and is excerpted here to provider a description of the services that were in place at
the beginning of my tenure at the City of Glendale, and which formed the foundation
upon which future continuum of care programs would be grafted (City of Glendale,
1995):
Emergency Shelter
At this time Glendale does not have a shelter in operation
year-round to address the needs of homeless individuals and
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FIGURE 3
GLENDALE’ S CONTINUUM OF CARE IN 1995
C O D E S : A R C-A dult R ecreation C enter (City) G SC=GlendaIe S ervices C enter
CC=Catholic C harities PC=Pacific Clinics
CWS=Cold W eather S helter S ection 8=Section 8 w/ C a se Mgmt.
FSS=Family Self-Sufficieny/Section 8 (City) VMH=Verdugo Mental H ealth
] = S u f f ic i e n t { " 1 = S o m e S e r v i c e s j i P I P P P ||B B B B B | = N o S e r v i c e s
In d ependent
H ousing
Sub
Population
S tree t
O utreach
Emerg. S helter
1-5 Days
Em erg. S helter
1-60 Days
Transitional
H ousing
S upportive
H ousing
S upport
S ervices
Single
W om en
CA/SA CWS
V ouchers
Single
Men
CWS
Vouchers
Boom
H Q U S #
Section:# CA/SA 2 P arent
Families
CWS
Vouchers
B o o t f t
H o u s e
se c tio n 8 CA/SA 1 Parent
Families
CWS
Vouchers
-Booth
House
Section 8 D om estic CA/SA YWCA
(by phone)
CWS
V ouchers
YWCA
Violence
Youth
U nder 18
CA/5A CWS
V ouchers
Frail
Elderly
CC/SA
ARC
CWS
Vouchers
Medical
N eeds
CWS
Vouchers
Mentally
III
CC/SA
VMH/PC
CWS
V ouchers
S u b sta n c e
A buse
CWS
V ouchers
CC/SA v eteran s
All
CWS
Voters
On
O
families who are not victims of domestic violence. Currently, there
are three homeless emergency shelter programs in Glendale:
The Glendale YWCA Domestic Violence Project is operated
by the YWCA of Glendale. The shelter is a 17 bed, 45 day
emergency shelter for women and women with children who have
become homeless as a result of domestic violence. Clients are
provided with food, shelter, individual and group counseling, case
management, domestic violence education, self-esteem and support
groups, legal assistance, parent education, housing assistance and
referral. Through the Hotline, callers are provided with counseling
and information. Daily intakes are done through the Hotline,
including referral to other domestic violence shelters. The goal of
this project is to serve at least 2,400 clients on the 24-hour Hotline,
and at least 125 shelter residents with case management services
during 1995-96.
The Glendale Cold Weather Shelter is operated by Glendale
Presbyterian Church and Lutheran Social Services of Southern
California. The goal of this program is to offer homeless persons a
warm, dry, safe and secure place to sleep and two hot meals during
the winter months. The Cold Weather Shelter also provides clients
with an entry-point into Glendale's homeless continuum of care as
shelter guests are linked with other social service providers through
The Glendale Services Center.
In its second year, the program was in operation for 78
consecutive days from December 13, 1994 through February 28,
1995, regardless of the weather. The program was weather
activated from November 14 through December 12, 1994 and from
March 1 through March 31, 1995. As of February 28, 1995, the
shelter had provided 5948 nights of shelter to 401 unduplicated
individuals.
Motel/Hotel vouchers are provided to homeless persons
seeking shelter through Catholic Charities Loaves and Fishes and
The Salvation Army Glendale Corps social service programs.
Funding for the vouchers comes partly from the City's General
Fund. The vouchers provide for 1-5 nights at an average cost of $30
per night. Persons receiving vouchers are referred to any one of five
motels located in the central eastern part of the City, or to the
Glendale Family YMCA. In one twelve month period, these
agencies reported issuing vouchers to 455 families and 347 single
individuals, thereby providing shelter for a total of 1,999 people.
The Glendale Adventist Medical Center also has a motel
voucher program; however, assistance is limited to homeless
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patients discharged from the hospital. This program assists 50-60
persons annually.
Transitional Housing
Currently, there is one transitional housing program for
homeless families in Glendale. There is not, however, a transitional
housing program available for single men or women.
Booth House, operated by The Salvation Army Glendale
Corps, is the only transitional housing facility for homeless families
in Glendale. Booth House serves up to 19 people (4 to 5 homeless
families) for up to six months. Booth House excepts single-parent
and two-parent families. There is careful screening and intensive
case management of these families, including parenting skills, and a
mandatory savings program. Last year, Booth House provided
transitional housing for 19 families, representing 86 men, women
and children, and reported an 80% success rate. Success is
measured by families having a steady income and permanent
housing when they leave the program.
Permanent Supportive Housing
The Homeless Section 8 - Case Management Program is
operated by the Glendale Housing Authority and participating social
service providers such as The Salvation Army Glendale Corps and
Catholic Charities - Loaves and Fishes. Sixteen (16) Section 8
Certificates have been set aside for homeless families whose
housing needs are immediate and who demonstrate the potential for
participating in on-going case management aimed at achieving long
term self-sufficiency. Families accepted into the program receive
rental assistance through the HUD Section 8 program and case
management from a local social service provider. The case
management component includes needs assessment, living and
money management skills, assistance in securing housing, and on
going family support visits and budget monitoring. Participants are
encouraged to enhance their potential for self-sufficiency through
education, job training and employment assistance. Currently, two
families are participating in this program.
The Section 8 Family Self Sufficiency Program is operated by
the City of Glendale. It is anticipated that a number of families who
enter the Section 8 Program through the Homeless Section 8 - Case
Management Program will be appropriate for Family Self
Sufficiency. In exchange for monthly rent subsidies, families
participating in this program agree to pursue activities toward self-
sufficiency including employment training and education. The
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program links families with employment resources, child care and
transportation. As a family's income increases over the five year
program period, the amount of reduction in rent subsidy is deposited
in an escrow account which is turned over to the family when they
complete the program.
Permanent Housing
The Glendale Family YMCA provides rooms for rent at
approximately $20 per night or $400 per month. This facility has a
total of 83 rooms. They report a current vacancy rate of 1-2 units
per night. The YMCA limits its services to males only, but has no
limit to length of stay in rented rooms. This facility is not service
enriched at this time.
There are nine other low-cost hotel/motels, with a total of 239
units, that provide temporary and/or permanent accommodation for
homeless individuals and families in Glendale. A telephone survey
of these facilities completed in March, 1995, indicated that the
average rent was $30-$33 per night and $170 per week for singles,
with slightly higher rates for couples and families. Only one quoted
a monthly rate— $350-$400. While these hotel/motels may not be
cost effective for an individual or family on an on-going basis (with
an average monthly rent of $680), they do provide intermittent
housing for many, and permanent housing for some. Overall, the
vacancy rate for these facilities was 24% on the day of the survey.
The three facilities with over 35 units, however, had only two units
available among them.
Units in the City's general housing stock are available to some
homeless individuals and families able to make the transition to
stable income and permanent housing. A survey of renter units
affordable to lower income households reveals that there is a total of
1,122 affordable units available to the 8,942 extremely low-income
renter households whose income is 30% of median; there is a total
of 2,547 affordable units available to the 6,153 low-income renter
households whose income is between 31 and 50% of median; and
there are 20,390 affordable units available to the 7,191 moderate-
income renter households whose income is between 51 and 80% of
median.
At this time there is no government assisted permanent
housing programs for low or very-low income individuals or
families that are not elderly or disabled other than Section 8. There
are government assisted permanent housing programs for elderly
and disabled very low or low income persons that could provide
permanent housing for homeless persons who belong to those sub-
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populations. These are discussed in detail in the inventory for
special needs populations other than homeless later in the
Consolidated Plan.
Non-residential Services
In addition to the residential programs and housing resources
listed above, there are a number of non-residential services available
to assist homeless individuals and lower income families in
Glendale. These services can be divided into two categories:
programs which meet emergency and daily needs such as food and
clothing; and programs designed to provide on-going services that
link people to the continuum of care, including homeless prevention
services.
Assistance with emergency and daily needs is provided
primarily through community centers operated by The Salvation
Army and Catholic Charities.
Food - A hot lunch is served six days per week, Monday
through Saturday, at the Lord's Kitchen operated by the Salvation
Army. The Salvation Army provides the support staff and facility,
and meals are prepared and served by volunteers from eleven local
churches. The program serves 90 persons per day.
Homeless seniors can receive a hot lunch through the Adult
Recreation Center, a senior social services center operated by the
City’s Department of Parks, Recreation, and Community Services
Division.
The Salvation Army and Catholic Charities provide boxed
groceries every 60 days to poor and at-risk families. Homeless
individuals can get a "brown bag" meal three times per month at
Catholic Charities.
The Glendale Adventist Medical Center distributes U. S.
Government surplus commodities and other foods to low income
families referred by social service agencies.
Food for homeless individuals and families is also provided by
a number of local churches on a case by case basis, including First
United Methodist Church and Holy Family Catholic Church. First
United Methodist Church also provides a hot meal on Sundays,
when The Lord's Kitchen is closed. A number of these churches
also provide assistance with transportation, clothing, and motel
stays.
Clothing - Clothing for the homeless is mainly provided
through vouchers issued by local social service providers that can be
presented at thrift stores operated individually by Catholic Charities,
Glendale Adventist Hospital and The Salvation Army.
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On-going supportive services which link homeless people
with Glendale's continuum of care are provided through the
Glendale Services Center, a 1-stop access center for the homeless
and at-risk individuals and families that opened November 1, 1994.
The Glendale Services Center represents an innovative
approach to providing case management and supportive services to
people who are homeless and at-risk for homelessness.
At the Center a coalition of local social service agencies
provide coordinated, comprehensive services relating to income,
employment, housing, counseling, health and mental health issues.
The Center is designed as an entry-point into Glendale's continuum
of care and provides a means a tracking persons and ensuring that
they receive adequate and timely casework. The Center also
provides information and referral to off-site services. Clients have
been successful in using the Center to access case management,
shelter, public assistance, health care, psychological services, and
employment counseling and referral.
Participating agencies at the Center are The Salvation Army,
Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Services, the Department of
Public Social Services, the Employment Development Department,
the Social Security Administration, the American Red Cross (health
screening), Verdugo Mental Health Center (psychological services)
and Pacific Clinics (psychological services), (p. 30-4)
The Consolidated Plan also required that gaps in service delivery be
prioritized, thereby providing the basis for the jurisdiction’s five-year strategy (City
of Glendale, 1995):
In order to prioritize these gaps, a needs assessment survey
was conducted for the Consolidated Plan. Local homeless service
providers were provided a blank copy of the matrix and asked to
assign priorities based on type of service and sub-population. . . .
The top priorities identified were:
• Emergency shelter for individuals and families;
• Transitional housing for individuals and families;
• Outreach and assessment for the dually diagnosed;
• Substance abuse prevention; and,
• Domestic violence prevention.
The findings of this survey were consistent with the strategy
recommended by the Glendale Homeless Coalition and are the basis
for the assignment of priority homeless needs in Table 3. Based on
the resources available, the consensus of the Coalition is to
concentrate on providing outreach and assessment and emergency
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shelter to individuals, families and those with special needs. The
Coalition has also made transitional housing for families a high-
priority at this time. Transitional housing for individuals and those
with special needs is a medium priority not because of a lack of
need, but because of the recognition that resources are limited. The
City and the Coalition, however, will pursue all opportunities which
become available to meet the transitional housing needs of
individuals and special needs populations. The same is true for
permanent supportive housing and permanent housing. There is
clearly a need for these components, especially for special needs
sub-populations, and the City and the Coalition will endeavor to
meet these needs as comprehensively as possible, (p. 35-6)
The City’s five-year strategy for addressing homeless needs was described in
the Plan as follows (City of Glendale, 1995):
Using the Continuum of Care approach developed by HUD,
the following describes the City’s five year strategy for addressing
priority needs and programs for the homeless. The City will work
closely with the Glendale Homeless Coalition to develop a system
of homeless service delivery which is comprehensive, yet flexible
enough to accommodate the service needs of the entire range of the
homeless population. The coordinated system of services available
through the continuum of care should lead homeless families and
individuals through a succession of housing and social service
alternatives that are geared towards increasing self-esteem,
individual responsibility, empowerment and self-sufficiency. The
Glendale Homeless Coalition also works to ensure collaboration
among social service providers, and consistent, quality service
delivery. Community education is also a priority activity for the
Coalition.
The City is also working to address homelessness on a
regional basis by participating in the Arroyo-Verdugo Housing and
Homeless Committee. This Committee is comprised of service
providers and city staff from each of the five cities in the Arroyo-
Verdugo subregion: Glendale, Pasadena, La Canada-Flintridge,
South Pasadena, and Burbank.
The needs identified as a high priority are:
* Outreach and assessment for homeless families, individuals
and persons with special needs. This means continuing to support
and expanding existing support services and coordinating their
delivery through the Glendale Services Center, a one-stop access
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center for homeless and at-risk persons. This also means
developing an expanded street outreach component of the
continuum.
• Emergency shelter for homeless families, individuals and
persons with special needs. This means opening a year-round
emergency shelter that would serve these populations; and,
continuing to support the domestic violence and cold weather
shelters currently in operation.
• Transitional housing for homeless families. This means
developing three transitional housing projects that would provide
transitional housing and supportive services for families for a period
of 6 to 24 months; and, continuing to support the one transitional
housing program currently in operation.
• Homeless prevention. This means increasing the support
services and direct resources available to keep individuals and
families from experiencing a homeless episode. These service will
be available through the Glendale Services Center.
• Substance abuse and domestic violence prevention. This
means expanding and coordinating the community education
activities of the Coalition, social service providers, and other
agencies including the Glendale Unified School District and the
Glendale Police Department. The Glendale Services Center facility
can service as a site for community education workshops and
intervention programs.
The needs identified as a medium priority are:
• Transitional housing for individuals and persons with special
needs. This means developing new transitional housing programs
for these populations.
• Permanent supportive housing for homeless families,
individuals and persons with special needs. This means developing
new supportive housing programs for these populations; and,
expanding existing programs such as Section 8 Case Management
and Family Self-Sufficiency.
• Permanent housing for homeless families, individuals and
persons with special needs. This means developing new programs
targeting these populations; and, expanding access to the affordable
housing stock, (p.79-80)
VII. 1995 -1997: Funding Success and Implementation Challenges
In 1995, Dr. Greg Roth, who had been so instrumental in forming the
Glendale Homeless Coalition and keeping the issue of homelessness before the City
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Council and the press, left Glendale to accept a ministry in Fremont, California. Paul
Bandy, of The Salvation Army, replaced Dr. Roth as co-chairperson of the Glendale
Homeless Coalition, with City Manager Dave Ramsay.
. . . Roth is widely credited with opening the city’s eyes to a long-
ignored issues, and helping to establish a network of programs that
offer meals, shelter and job referrals. “Some of the old Glendale
folks still are very fearful. They feel if we provide services, it will
encourage the problem,” said Roth, 39. “What I’m saying is that
because we’re not providing appropriate services, people are getting
worse, not better” .... The City Council unanimously approve
plans for the new homeless program recently [the emergency shelter
deposit], marking a dramatic shift in policy compared to several
years ago when the issue was seldom discussed. Councilman Larry
Zarian said he has become more sensitive to the issue as he has been
confronted with the facts in recent years. ‘I’m not one of those
people you can categorize as a bleeding heat,’ he said. ‘On the
contrary, I believe people need to pick themselves up by their own
bootstraps. But then you realize there’s a segment out there that
want to, but they just can’t do it on their own’. . . . ‘Everything’s
coming together now because of Greg’s initial efforts,’ said City
Manager David Ramsay, co-chair of the homeless coalition. (Ryfle,
1995, p. B8)
The year 1996 began with the rehabilitation of the structure that would house
the Glendale Services Center and Emergency Shelter (See Chapter VI), the
development of three transitional housing projects, in addition to Booth House,
which was being run by The Salvation Army. The domestic violence shelter was
operating smoothly, and the Cold Weather shelter was in its third year (however, for
the first time the program was held in the Glendale National Guard Armory, greatly
increasing its capacity). In addition, the Coalition’s Public Health and Safety
Committee had been working with the Police and the City Attorney’s office to
examine existing ordinances, and develop new ones, that would address behavior
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deemed detrimental to the public’s health and safety, and that were associated with
homeless persons, as well as other groups. These issues included trespassing on
private property, closure of public facilities, the public consumption of alcohol,
camping in public areas, aggressive panhandling and Business Watch programs.
The summer of 1996 saw another significant accomplishment for the
Glendale Homeless Coalition: the submission of a Continuum of Care Homeless
Assistance grant application to HUD directly from the City of Glendale. As
discussed above, during the first year of the “Super-NOFA” process, two service
providers from Glendale submitted their application under LAHSA. In 1996,
however, the Coalition and the City decided to submit their own application directly
to HUD. The grant application called for the description of the process by which the
requisite needs assessment and service inventory were conducted and funding
priorities were established and sponsors selected. An excerpt from this description
provides an idealized (although factually accurate) account of the Glendale Homeless
Coalition as a functional, collaborative policy making body.
1. YOUR COMMUNITY’S PROCESS FOR
DEVELOPING A CONTINUUM OF CARE NARRATIVE.
a. Planning sessions and meetings held to date and
those planned fo r the future, including meetings held by any
homeless coordinating councils, networks or other organizational
structures.
The City of Glendale began planning for the 1996 Continuum
of Care strategy early in the year. At a meeting of the Glendale
Homeless Coalition in February 1996 City staff asked for volunteers
to serve on a NOFA Committee that would participate in the
process of determining Glendale's needs and priorities and oversee
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other aspects of preparing the Continuum of Care application.
Membership on the NOFA Committee was not limited to homeless
service providers, but included representatives from health and
mental health care agencies, the San Gabriel Valley Fair Housing
Council, a formerly homeless person, two members of the Glendale
Association of Realtors, a local financial planner and a psychologist
in private practice. To ensure coordination with regional planning
for the Continuum of Care, staff attended three meetings of the Los
Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) These meetings
took place on March 8, March 21 and April 9, 1996. . . .
At the March 18 meeting City staff explained HUD's Notice of
Funding Availability for Continuum of Care Homeless Assistance
to the NOFA Committee and suggested a methodology and timeline
for developing the required inventory, needs assessment and
priorities. A program survey designed to capture the annual
unduplicated number of homeless persons served by each homeless
program in Glendale was circulated for the Committee's comment.
The Committee approved the survey instrument and directed City
staff to send it to homeless service providers who were not in
attendance. Service providers were given one week to complete the
survey and return it to City staff who would compile the data for the
Committee’s Review. The Committee also discussed whether to
submit a local consolidated application to HUD, develop an
associated application or submit as a participant in LAHS A's
associated application. The committee decided unanimously that
the City of Glendale should be the applicant in a consolidated
application. . . .
The process, the gaps analysis and the priorities were
presented to the general membership of the Glendale Homeless
Coalition at the April 12, 1996 meeting. The Coalition agreed
unanimously with the priorities and advised the NOFA Committee
to proceed with the application.
Priorities for the 1996 Glendale Continuum of Care Strategy
approved by the Glendale Homeless Coalition are as follows:
1. Street outreach
2. Transitional housing for individuals with special
needs: chronic substance abuse, severe mental illness and dual
diagnosis
3. Transitional housing for individuals who are survivors
of domestic violence
4. Transitional housing for individuals who have
HIV/AIDS
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5. Permanent service-enriched housing for individuals
with special needs: chronic substance abuse, severe mental illness
and dual diagnosis
6. Permanent service-enriched housing for families with
special needs: chronic substance abuse, severe mental illness and
dual diagnosis
7. Transitional housing for families who have
HIV/AIDS
8. Permanent, service enriched housing for families and
individuals with HIV/AIDS
9. Separate emergency shelter facilities for individuals
and families
10. More independent, permanent housing (not service
enriched)
b. Organizational structure and entities involved such as
state and local government agencies, nonprofit organizations (such
as veteran service organizations, other organizations representing
persons living with disabilities, mental illness HIV/AIDS and other
groups serving homeless persons), banks, neighborhood groups,
housing developers, businesses, foundations, service providers and
homeless or formerly homeless persons.
Local Government
The Glendale Homeless Coalition provides an admirable
example of a community where public and private sectors have
entered into a cooperative effort to find solutions to the problem of
homelessness through the development of a coordinated Continuum
of Care. The Coalition, which is co-chaired by the City Manager of
the City of Glendale and Paul Bandy of the Salvation Army,
includes representatives of all major public agencies in Glendale:
the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services, The
California Employment Development Department, the Glendale
Unified School District, the Glendale Public Library, the City of
Glendale Department of Parks and Recreation, the City Planning
Department, the Glendale Community Development and Housing
Department, the Social Security Administration, the Glendale Fire
Department and the Glendale Police Department. Representatives
of three local political offices are also members of the Coalition:
the office of California Assemblyman James Rogen, the office of
Congressman Carlos Moorhead and the office of State Senator
Newton Russell. Members of the Glendale Homeless Coalition also
participate in the Arroyo-Verdugo Housing and Homeless Coalition,
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an organization comprising representatives of the cities of Burbank,
Glendale, La Canada Flintridge, Pasadena and South Pasadena, and
service providers in those cities. This coalition meets monthly to
"jointly develop a strategy among the Arroyo-Verdugo cities and
private sectors to meet the subregion's diverse housing and
continuum of care needs."
The Local Business Community
Representatives of the local business community who are
members of the Glendale Homeless Coalition include Gangi
Builders, SE Construction, three members of the Glendale
Association of Realtors, the Glendale Chamber of Commerce and
private citizens including a financial planner, an attorney and a
psychologist.
Churches
The Glendale churches who participate in the Coalition
include First United Methodist Church, Salem Lutheran Church,
Montrose Church of the Nazarene, L. A. Church of Christ, St.
Marks Episcopal Church, Glendale Presbyterian Church and Holy
Family Catholic Church. In November 1995, the Coalition
sponsored a community education workshop for local churches.
Nonprofit Organizations
All the Glendale-based nonprofit organizations providing
services to homeless persons in Glendale participate in the
Coalition. Also participating are representatives from several
agencies in neighboring communities and representatives of several
region-wide service organizations. The Glendale agencies are the
Salvation Army - operator of the Glendale Services Center, the
American Red Cross, Catholic Charities - provider of case
management at the Glendale Services Center, the Glendale YWCA
- operator of the domestic violence shelter, the Glendale
Community Foundation, Glendale Memorial Hospital, Glendale
Adventist Medical Center - sponsor of the Homeless Health
Project, the Adult Recreation Center and Lutheran Social Services -
operator of the emergency shelter and the Cold Weather shelter.
Nonprofit representatives from neighboring communities
include Pacific Clinics in Pasadena - the provider of mental health
services at the Glendale Services Center, Union Station Foundation
in Pasadena - a homeless shelter, and the West Hollywood
Homeless Organization.
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Representatives of regional organizations include the San
Gabriel Valley Fair Housing Council, and two nonprofit housing
developers, the Los Angeles Community Design Center and A
Community of Friends. (City of Glendale, 1996, p. 7-11)
Funding for in the amount of $1.7 million dollars was requested for four
projects: a street outreach team sponsored by West Hollywood Homeless
Organizations, transitional housing for individuals with substance abuse, mental
health issues or who are dually diagnosed which was sponsored by the City,
transitional housing for individual women who were survivors of domestic violence
sponsored by the YWCA; and transitional housing for persons with HIV/AIDS
sponsored by Homestead Hospice. The first three projects were funded by HUD in a
total award of almost $1.3 million.
The street outreach team was a significant request for several reasons. First,
it would represent the first program expansion of the Glendale Services Center to be
funded through the Supportive Housing Program (see in Chapter VI). And secondly,
an effective street outreach team was the program that was supposed to mitigate
concerns about the magnet theory, NIMBY issues around the Glendale Services
Center, and other public health and safety concerns that heretofore were solely under
the purview of the Glendale Police Department. In the idealized account of the
continuum of care promoted by myself and Glendale City Manager Dave Ramsay,
the street outreach team was not only an effective social service delivery program,
but also an adjunct to law enforcement and a community relations tool.
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The transitional housing project were significant in that the City was pledging
matching funds for rehabilitation for the YWCA, acquisition and rehabilitation for
Homestead Hospice and rental subsidy for the City sponsored project. Again,
promoting the myth of public-private partnerships between the City and the non
profits, as well as between the City and HUD. The City was sponsoring the “special
needs” transitional housing project because, frankly, there was no existing service
provider in the continuum that had both the mental health/substance abuse AND the
housing expertise necessary to sponsor the program. This lack of capacity among the
local non-profits would lead to fatal problems in the program implementation. After
the HUD award, the City would conduct a Request for Proposal process and select
Portals, Inc., a Los Angeles agency, to run the program. Ultimately, Portals would
back-out of this project and the City would return the money to HUD in 1999.
VIII. Conclusion
This chapter presented an idealized version of the founding of the Glendale
Homeless Coalition, and the evolution of the attitudes of policymakers towards the
development of a continuum of care of homeless services in Glendale. This account,
drawn from public documents, newspapers, City staff reports and funding
applications to HUD, demonstrates how many of the myths of homeless service
provision are deeply rooted in the City’s culture and history.
Concern about local control, traditionally conservative notions about the role
of government in social issues (less is better), and the “magnet effect” actually pre
date the rise of homelessness into the public conscious. As we have seen, these
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concerns really began to be expressed when the City first became eligible for Federal
block grant funds in the 1970’s. At that time, those “undesirable” people include
poor families and low-income seniors. It is not surprising the, that these same
concerns would be projected onto the homeless in the 1980’s. And, as in many
cities, the debate began over whose responsibility is was to serve the homeless. City
of Glendale officials argued it was other jurisdictions’ responsibility to serve “their”
homeless; and, that Glendale service providers could handle the “few” Glendale
homeless persons. At the same time, law enforcement was viewed as a necessary
adjunct to service provision, and as a governmental response to the issue of
homelessness that didn’t challenge conservative view of the role of local
government. While government’s role in service provision could be debated,
certainly the City’s responsibility for law enforcement was not in question.
In the 1990’s, in light of growing, incontrovertible evidence that there was a
significant homeless problems in Glendale, and faced with growing pressure to take
action, City leaders adopted a compromise position: they would participate in the
development of homeless services in partnership with the local non-profits. The
City, however, through its position as the administrator of the majority of funds
available for homeless programs really attempted to control many of the activities
around homeless service delivery. Still in the stages of planning and development,
the capacity of the service providers to implement programs effectively was
assumed. The City also adopted a “balance approach” which ideologically coupled
service delivery with law enforcement initiatives.
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Chapter V provides a broader account of the idealized history of Glendale
homeless service provision. In Chapters VI and VII, we will focus on the case study
of this dissertation, the development and implementation of services at the Glendale
Services Center—the combined access center and emergency shelter which
represents the entry-point into Glendale’s continuum of care. In Chapter VI, the
idealized version of the development of the Center will be presented, again
highlighting and promoting the founding myths about Glendale’s homeless delivery
system. In Chapter VII, however, I will present an account of my observations about
how and why the Center has developed as it has. As we shall see, the myths of
service delivery collide and conflict with the realities of implementation in numerous
ways. Chapter VIII will specifically analyze some of these dynamics, and concrete
policy recommendations will be provided in Chapter IX.
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CHAPTER VI: CASE STUDY: THE PUBLIC HISTORY OF THE
GLENDALE SERVICES CENTER
I. Introduction
This chapter represents the public history of the development of the programs
that will serve as the case study for this dissertation: the Glendale Services Center
and Project ACHIEVE. Like Chapter V, this public history has been constructed
from public accounts: newspaper articles, staff reports, public relations materials, and
funding applications. As such this account represents an idealized depiction of the
process and outcomes as City staff and non-profit service providers attempted to
collaborate in the development of the entry-point to Glendale’s continuum of care.
And, as an idealized account it was constructed around the founding myths
surrounding homeless service delivery in Glendale: local control and the containment
of responsibility at the local rather than regional level; the role of law enforcement
and the balance between social services and more punitive approaches to addressing
homelessness; the strength of public-private partnerships and cooperative
relationships between the stakeholders; and, the capacity of all the stakeholders to
fulfill their roles as a division of labor among them is developed.
As we will see in Chapter VII, these myths belie the complexities that are
faced in program implementation on a day to day basis. Furthermore, these myths
and the contradictions embedded in them are translated into policy initiations which
constrain these actors from taking steps that might mitigate problems with
implementation. Thus, an unpacking of these myths suggests specific changes in
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policy at both the federal and local level which would help mitigate the complexities
of program implementation. I addition, I feel that social science can contribute to an
understanding of how and why the differences between policy and implementation
play out the way they do. An analysis of these differences is provided in Chapter
VIII, and policy implications are suggested in Chapter IX.
II. Conceptual Origins of the Glendale Services Center
The major social service recommendation of the “Glendale Task Force
Report on Homeless ness” was a “One-Stop”, multi-agency, multi-service center for
the homeless. In the Report, the Center was described as “an entry-level component
within a continuum of care social service delivery system. The Center will provide
centralized, coordinated and comprehensive homeless and homeless prevention
services to eliminate the existing service fragmentation, duplication and
inaccessibility” (Glendale Task Force on Homelessness, 1994, p. Appendix A-3).
Proposed participants in the center were identified and their roles were also
outlined:
The Salvation Army will be responsible for dedicating one
caseworker from its existing staff. Catholic Charities will be
responsible for dedicating one caseworker from its existing staff.
This caseworker may specialize in prevention services. The Red
Cross will dedicate one volunteer caseworker and will provide
training on how to set-up and manage a One Stop Center. A peer
counseling station will be established. The basic concept is that
some persons may be more comfortable at least initially, talking to
peers about their needs, instead of social service workers.
The Department of Public Social Services will be responsible
for dedicating one intake worker. The Employment Development
Department will be responsible for dedicating one Job Counselor to
perform eligibility and job development. The Verdugo Mental
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Health Center will need to provide mental health counseling and
referrals. The Los Angeles County Free Clinic will be asked to
provide physical exams and preventive medicine. Glendale
Memorial Hospital will be asked to provide services to fill any
voids. Glendale Adventist Medical Center will be asked to provide
drug and alcohol counseling and detoxification services. Other
stations include Glendale Unified School District, City of Glendale
services and local church groups.
Another integral component of the One Stop Center is
outreach to the mentally ill homeless who otherwise would not avail
themselves to the services. There will be a link between Pacific
Clinics and the Center in that Pacific Clinic’s outreach services will
be expanded. Through the service, mentally ill homeless persons
can become stabilized and enter the continuum of services system.
(Glendale Task Force on Homelessness, 1994, Appendix A-3)
The management of the Center was proposed to be “a management board
comprised of five members; one member each from The Salvation Army, Catholic
Charities, Red Cross, a Church representative and a City representative. Catholic
Charities will be the lead agency. The management Board will meet regularity [sic]
to monitor the effectiveness of the Center and decide on any needed policies. The
Center will be designed in such a way that for the most part it will tun itself.
However, as problems and issues arise, the Management Board will address them”
(Glendale Task Force on Homelessness, 1994, p. Appendix A-3).
The Report also emphasized that the Center be portable, much like the
Disaster Application Centers that operated during the Northridge earthquake.
Initially, the Center would operate one day per week from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.
In 1994 City staff wrote a funding application to HUD under the Innovative
Project funding competition on behalf of the Coalition to obtain $100,000 per year to
run the facility, including funds to implement a computerized case management
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network. This was the first national competition for homeless funding that the City
entered on behalf of the Coalition. The funding application requested $100,000,14%
of which was to hire a part-time Center Coordinator to oversee the operation. Sixty
thousand dollars in operations funding was requested for the purchase of computer
equipment and software for the participating agencies. The application described the
project, to be held at the Glendale National Guard Armory one day per week.
Twelve agencies were slated to be at the Center, including: The Salvation Army,
Catholic Charities, the Employment Development Department, Verdugo Mental
Health Center, Glendale Memorial Hospital, the Los Angeles County Free Clinic, the
Social Security Administration, the Department of Public Social Services, the
American Red Cross, a Peer Counseling organization, and Pacific Clinics, (which
would conduct street outreach). Catholic Charities was to be the lead agency,
responsible for oversight of the Center, with overall management by a collaborative
Management Board, as recommended in the Task Force Report, “comprised of
representatives from the Catholic Charities, Salvation Army, Red Cross, a church
representative, a business representative and City representative (City of Glendale,
1994, p. V-l).
The application, submitted in January, 1994, indicated that the Center would
open in April, 1994. The application also indicated that the Homeless Task force
was planning to incorporate as a non-profit agency. While this grant was denied, the
“one-stop” Center was ultimately funded by the Los Angeles Homeless Services
Authority (LAHSA).
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III. Funding for the Glendale Services Center
Glendale was slated to receive Los Angeles Homeless Initiative funding
through LAHSA for an “Access Center”, a model of service delivery akin to the
“one-stop” concept. Four other access centers were also proposed. One in another
“service-enhancement project area”: Long Beach, and three within the City of Los
Angeles’ target areas: Central, South Central, and East Los Angeles. A total of
$2.1M was allocated to fund these centers that were described in the Implementation
Plan:
The largest center is proposed in the Center Los Angeles area,
mid-size centers will be located in South Central Los Angeles and
East Los Angeles, and smaller centers will be located in Glendale and
Long Beach.
Access centers will serve as one of the entry points for
homeless individuals and families seeking assistance. These centers
will provide orientation, assessment, referral and access to various
services offered in the community. In addition .. . clients can
receive health services, substance abuse counseling, assistance in
finding job training and placement, housing placement assistance,
and follow-up.
Access centers will be action offices, not a ‘drop-in” day
program or a ‘high tolerance” facility. The differences in these two
types of facilities need to be distinguished by the community clients,
and staff. Access centers will be ‘high expectation/high demand.
(Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 37-8)
For each Access Center, “a local, well-established service provider will be
selected as the operator. Municipal approval is an essential part of this selection”
(Shelter Partnership, 1994a, p. 40). The duties of the Center operator included:
operation and management of the space, security, reception, meals, and a mail and
message pick up. In addition, operators were to promote volunteerism, promote the
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center to the community, provide a match of local resources, and provide limited on-
or new-site child care while parents were receiving services. In addition, each center,
through the cooperation of local agencies, was to provide the following services:
casework advocacy, outreach, and on-and off-site human services, i.e., housing,
welfare, health, mental health, counseling, substance abuse, legal and employment
services. A final requirement was participation in a county-wide information and
referral service. One agency was to be appointed to manage the client intake, data
collection, assessment, at all centers (Shelter Partnership, 1994a).
Several items in the plans developed by LAHSA and Shelter Partnership
caused Glendale to pay close attention and advocate for their programs. First, the
access centers in Glendale and Long Beach, were characterized as “smaller” in the
Implementation Plan, indicating that the division of the $2.1 million budget might
split unevenly among the five centers. Also, City of Glendale officials were
uncertain whether or not the funding for the single-agency to manage the information
and referral process was going to be carved from the $2.1 million, leaving less for the
actual operation and staffing of the centers.
Thus, on November 17, 1994, Glendale Mayor Eileen Givens, the City of
Glendale’s Community Development & Housing Director Madalyn Blake, and The
Salvation Army Corps Director of Social Services Paul Bandy, spoke before the
LAHSA Commissioners. The Glendale Mayor’s visit was the lead article in the
second edition of LAHSA’s newsletter in November, 1994:
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Glendale Mayor Eileen Givens believes in LAHSA’s mission
of cooperation between social service agencies, private sector
support, and local government.. . . She cleared up misconceptions
that her city has no homeless populations. She also dispelled the
thought “that if we have (homeless) we don’t care about them.”
The Mayor personally delivered good news about Glendale’s
new short-term homeless Access Center. The pilot project was
officially opened November 1, 1994. The program operates two
days per week, three hours per day on a budget of only $4,000.
“Already we have a line of people waiting for the doors to
open.” .... The city has also filled a newly created position of
Homeless Coordinator [Stacy Rowe]. (Los Angeles Homeless
Services Authority, 1994, p. 1)
Mayor Givens also listed other accomplishments for the City of Glendale:
becoming a LAHSA winter shelter site, increased funding for homeless programs by
90%— amounting to $4 for every $1 of Homeless Initiative money to be received,
developing a Family Self-Sufficiency program and allocating Section 8 Certificates
for homeless persons, moving forward on two transitional housing projects, and
developing over 500 units of affordable housing for very low and low income
households (Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, 1994, p.l). By the time the
Request for Proposal for the access centers was issued by LAHSA in March, 1995,
Glendale was to receive the full $420,000 (1/5 of $2.1M) for the Glendale Service
Center. The information and referral component was reduced to the incorporation of
case management and tracking software that would be provided by LAHSA free of
charge.
As the Mayor indicated to LAHSA, on November 1, 1994, a pilot Glendale
Services Center (Center) was opened two afternoons a week at The Salvation Army
Glendale Corps, using a small CDBG grant had been set-aside in anticipation of
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opening the Center. The lead agency for the project was The Salvation Army
Glendale Corps, replacing Catholic Charities in that function, which was still
participating in the project by providing a case manager. Pacific Clinics, the
Employment Development Department, the Department of Public Social Services
and a volunteer peer counselor staffed the pilot project. The Glendale Homeless
Coalition and the City viewed this as a show of the non-profits’ commitment to the
project, its value as a model, and a way of advocating for more funds for expansion.
An open house, celebrating the project, was held in February, 1995.
“The One Stop Glendale Services Center is unique because it
offers several services under one roof,” said Paul Bandy, director of
social services at the Salvation Army Glendale Corps, one of the
agencies participating in the effort.. . . Glendale Mayor Eileen
Givens said the center serves as a model to other community for
making services accessible to those in need. “Other cities are real
intrigued by our progress,” she said. “This represents a long-term
solution to the problem (of homelessness)”. The center... is being
run by the Glendale Homeless Coalition in cooperation with the city
of Glendale. It is being funded through a $20 million grant from the
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, said Stacy
Rowe, homeless coordinator for Glendale. . . . Although the federal
grant money hasn’t arrived in the hands of Glendale officials, Rowe
said the city has used about $5,000 from community development
money to start up the homeless center. Of the federal money,
Glendale is expected to get about $400,000, she said. “Once that
money comes down, we will be able to expand the services and
possibly move to another location,” Rowe said. (Rodriguez, 1995,
p. 3)
On April 21, 1995, The Salvation Army Glendale Corps submitted its
proposal to LAHSA for $420,000 for the full-time operation of the Glendale Services
Center, as the “One Stop” was officially named. The funding was to support 36
months of operations and personnel costs, including: a full-time Site Manager, Peer
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Counselor and Information and Referral Specialist. Pacific Clinics was to receive
funding for mental health consultation, and The Salvation Army would pay rent,
utilities and other operating costs for all the agencies participating in the Center. A
site for the Center had not been identified, but the proposal indicated that “the
Glendale Homeless Coalition has reached a consensus on the location of the
permanent site for the expanded Glendale Services Center... the primary social
service corridor in the City of Glendale.. . . The western boundary of San Fernando
Road and the eastern boundary of Central Avenue merges together to form the
southern boundary of the corridor. The corridor is bound on the north by Broadway”
(The Salvation Army Glendale Corps, 1995, 34).
[The goal of the Center was] as the primary point of entry for
individuals and families who are chronically homeless,
intermittently homeless or at-risk for becoming homeless.
Specifically, the primary goal of the Center is to bring the expertise
of the local social service community together under one roof, in
order to provide effective, efficient, comprehensive and coordinated
services to Center participants. The ultimate goal of the Glendale
Services Center is to promote individuals self-sufficiency, positive
self-esteem, dignity and personal growth that will load people to
achieve and maintain stable sources of income, housing and health,
meaningful social relationships.. . . The Center will also be the
focal point of community-wide Coalition sponsored activities
designed to raise public awareness and education regarding the
issues surrounding homelessness and appropriate community
responses. In addition to serving as a gather place and community
facility, the Center will provide opportunities for the public to
volunteer and interact with homeless and at-risk individuals in an
environment the promotes mutual respect and dignity. (The
Salvation Army Glendale Corps, 1995, p. 17-8)
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The Center proposed serving 30 households each day, including a significant
proportion of households who were at-risk for homelessness. A range or specialized
services were proposed, including health care, mental health care, peer counseling,
legal/credit assistance, domestic violence counseling, money management public
assistance advocacy, substance abuse counseling, literacy tutoring, parenting skills,
child care assistance, veteran’s assistance and transportation assistance. But the
cornerstones of the full-time services that were to be offered were information and
referral, peer counseling and case management.
[The Information and Referral (I&R) staff persons will] do an
intake/needs assessment interview with all clients; and [will] be
responsible for using the . . . computer network to update county-
side service availability information and enter all client data.. . .
When a client enters the Center they will, with the assistance of a
hospitality volunteer or Peer Counselor, complete a self-report
intake form that provides basic demographic information and
service history.
Peer counseling is a crucial component of the Glendale
Services Center. The peer counselor will be a formerly homeless
individual who is familiar with, and/or has personal experience
with, the range of issues that comprise the experience of
homelessness. Outreach will be an important component of peer
counseling. The peer counselor will focus on those clients who just
come to the Center to “check it out” or for immediate assistance.
The peer counselor will encourage them to move on to more
intensive case management.
[C]ase managers will work with clients to develop an
individualized case management plan with short and long-term
objectives. Case Managers will support, motivate, reassure and
inspire clients to address the complex issues that contribute to
homelessness or near homelessness. In addition, case managers will
consult with one another and with off-site service providers to take
advantage of one another’s expertise and to coordinate resources.
(The Salvation Army Glendale Corps, 1995, p. 19-20)
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The Salvation Army was awarded $420,000 of LA Initiatives funding in May
of 1995.
IV. Developing a Year-round Emergency Shelter
During this same time period in early 1995, the Glendale Homeless Coalition
was also examining ways to provide emergency shelter to homeless individuals and
families who were not victims of domestic violence, and who were therefore not
eligible for the YWCA of Glendale’s domestic violence project. Lutheran Social
Services of Southern California, which in partnership with Glendale Presbyterian
Church, operated the annual winter shelter program, submitted proposals to the City
of Glendale’s CDBG and ESG programs for a seven-month emergency shelter
program that would fill the period of the year not covered by winter shelter program.
Over the next several months, City staff, service providers and members of the
Glendale Homeless Coalition conducted a search for buildings that could house the
continuous, expanded operation of the Glendale Services Center, and the operation of
the emergency shelter. The idea of co-locating these facilities was raised by Dr.
Joseph Colletti, regional director of Lutheran Social Services, and the Coalition
concurred that this would enhance the coordination of entry-level supportive and
residential services. Eventually, a site was located at 437 Fernando Court that would
meet the needs for the Glendale Services Center and the emergency shelter. Over the
period of the search for an appropriate site, and in part because of the capacity and
configuration of the potential buildings, and because of the evolution of thinking on
program design, Lutheran Social Services, The Salvation Army (the lead agency for
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the Glendale Service Center), the City and the Glendale Homeless Coalition
determined that the emergency shelter that would be co-located with the Glendale
Services Center would be a 40-bed, year-round shelter and that the winter shelter
program would continue at a separate site. A staff report to the Glendale City
Council explained:
The proposed Emergency Shelter program will provide up to
40 homeless men, women and children with food and shelter for up
to 60 days. This program will differ significantly from the Cold
Weather Shelter program in that the shelter will be open 18 hours
per day and staff will provide intensive case management to address
the full rang of issues which have contributed to an individual’s or a
families’ homelessness. Shelter staff will work closely with the
Glendale Services Center to identify potential shelter guest and to
ensure that they are linked with the continuum of services available
in Glendale.
One site under consideration for the combined Glendale
Services Center/Emergency Shelter is 437 Fernando Court. It is a
7,500 Square foot building located in the south-western area of the
City. It is a desirable site in that it is located within the target area
and offers man features compatible with the proposed use, including
size, costs, parking and showers. (City of Glendale, 1995a, p. 2)
In June, 1995, the Glendale Housing Authority agreed to provide $15,300 in
Redevelopment Set-Aside funds as a security deposit for the lease on the building at
437 Fernando Court. Initially, additional funds ($189,700 for rehabilitation and start
up, and a $250,000, five-year, operating subsidy) were included in the Exclusive
Negotiation Agreement signed between the Housing Authority and Lutheran Social
Services which also authorized the deposit. A staff report to the Glendale Housing
Authority described the City’s Assistance to the project, and addressed concerns that
had been raised by the City Manager and Authority members:
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The program will provide up to 14,600 shelter bed nights
annually, or 73,000 shelter bed nights over the five years of the
lease period. Lutheran Social Services of Southern California
estimates that the operating budget for the Emergency Shelter
Program is $200,000 annually, including staff, rent, utilities, office
expenses, insurance, maintenance, and food costs.. ..
A preliminary walk-through of the facility with a contractor
has been conducted. A preliminary estimate of the construction
costs for the rehabilitation necessary for both the Emergency Shelter
program and the Glendale Services Center is $150,000. The
majority of this will be spent meeting the requirements for the
Emergency Shelter program, including heating and air conditioning,
the installation of bathrooms, showers, laundry and kitchen
facilities, and the building of offices and sleeping bays. The
rehabilitation required for the Glendale Services Center is less
extensive, including the installation of some plumbing and electrical
lines and the removal of existing office walls.
The proposed structure of City assistance for this project is in
the form of a subsidy to be paid for the provision of shelter beds at
the Emergency Shelter program located at 437 Fernando Court.
This subsidy would use Redevelopment housing set-aside funds to
provide for 35 shelter beds per night for five years, or 63,875 shelter
bed nights total (12,775 shelter bed nights annually). A maximum
subsidy of $7.12 per shelter bed night is proposed. This maximum
figure compares favorably with the rate of $10-$ 12 per shelter bed
night which is standard for the Los Angeles area, and would provide
a maximum of $455,000 over five years.
Upon execution of the exclusive negotiation agreement, staff
anticipates the project will proceed as follows: 1) staff and LSS/SC
will work toward the development of a subsidy agreement for
approval by the Housing Authority; 2) initiate pre-development and
site-design, including application for Use Variance and all required
permits; 3) the Glendale Services Center will move into the
building; 4) construction; 5) the Emergency Shelter program will
open at the site in early 1996. (City of Glendale, 1995b, p. 3-4)
The staff report also outlined the nature of the collaboration with respect to
future fundraising, investment, implementation and neighborhood impact:
1. Value of Project
The City, the Glendale Homeless Coalition, LSS/SC, and The
Salvation Army Glendale Corps are committed to securing
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operating funds for these programs for the entire 60 month lease
period, and beyond if necessary and desirable. It is crucial that the
high-quality services available through the Emergency Shelter
program and the Glendale Services Center continue in order to
assist homeless men, women and children to make the transition
from the streets to independent, self-sufficient living; and to keep
those who are at-risk from ever experiencing homelessness.
2. On-going Operating Capacity
It is also crucial that these services continue given the
proposed investment of Housing Authority funds in the facility
rehabilitation. To help ensure the continued operation of these
programs, City staff and the Coalition will work with all of the
agencies involved to locate on-going sources of funding, in-kind
contributions, and volunteer resources. In addition, any proposed
funding agreement between the Housing Authority and/or the City
and LSS/SC will ensure that if LSS/SC cannot continue to operate
the Emergency Shelter, the Housing Authority and/or the City and
the Coalition can designate another qualified social service agency
to take over the program. A similar agreement will be made with
The Salvation Army Glendale Corps regarding the Glendale Service
Center.
3. Public Participation
Finally, CD&H staff, the Glendale Homeless Coalition,
LSS/SC, and The Salvation Army Glendale Corps are committed to
ensuring that the combined Emergency Shelter/Glendale Services
Center is an asset to the immediate area, as well as to the
community as a whole. The Glendale Homeless Coalition will
initiate a public participation program that will solicit the
involvement of the surrounding businesses in the planning and day-
to-day operation of the facility. Thus, neighboring businesses and
any concerned citizens will become educated about these programs
in particular and about issues concerning homelessness in general.
This may help to mitigate any apprehension neighbors may feel
about the location of these programs prior to the Use Variance and
subsequent Housing Authority hearings. (City of Glendale, 1995b,
p. 6)
The execution of the Exclusive Negotiation Agreement between the Housing
Authority and Lutheran Social Services received extensive attention in the local press
in June, 1995:
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In a victory for Glendale’s homeless, the Housing Authority
agreed this week to put up money for a shelter in a San Fernando
Corridor industrial area. (Turner, 1995a, p. 2)
“It’s an incredible addition to the community,” [Rev. Greg]
Roth said. . . .
The center assists homeless people with income, employment,
housing, counseling, health and mental heal care and development
of skills for independent living.
Once it’s combined with the 40-bed emergency shelter, the
center will often refer people to the shelter. To be accepted,
homeless men, women and children will have to agree to a
‘program’ where they work to get back on their feet.
“It’s definitely not a flop house,’ Roth said”. (Turner, 1995, p.
3)
After the approval of the $15,300 deposit, the execution of the lease, and the
Exclusive Negotiation Agreement between the Housing Authority and Lutheran
Social Services, a request for proposal process was held to select an architect to
design the rehabilitation of the warehouse to house both the Glendale Services
Center and the emergency shelter. In addition, the facility would require a “Use
Variance” from the Glendale Board of Zoning Adjustments, since residential uses are
not permitted in the “Light Industrial” zone in which the building was located. State
and Federal environmental review processes also went forward during the fall of
1995.
Also during the fall, in my role as City staff, I began outreach to local
businesses in the area of the proposed access center/shelter to combat any NIMBY
(Not In My Back Yard) responses. I personally visited every business owner in the
area to answer questions about the shelter. A few neighbors were very vocal about
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their opposition to the program. They spoke to the press, and appeared at the
Housing Authority meeting Tuesday, January 23,1996 where the Authority approved
the contact for services with Lutheran Social Services, and appropriated a total of
$615,300 for the project. The October, 1995 staff report explained the process to the
Housing Authority:
CD&H and LSS/SC staff have been working on outreach to
business and property owners proximate to the shelter site. In
addition to initial telephone and door-to-door outreach, staff has met
twice with property and business owners who have concerns about
the project. Staff has enlisted the assistance of other City
departments in addressing public health and safety issues that
currently exist in the project area. Staff plans to continue to work
with the project area property and business owners to develop a
comprehensive Fernando Court Neighborhood Improvement
Program which adequately addresses the public health and safety
issues that are identified, including the management of the
Emergency Shelter. (City of Glendale, 1995c, p. 3)
The Glendale New Press aired the neighbors’ complaints during January,
1996:
Property values will decrease because of the shelter, said
Gerald Me Cann, who owns three buildings in the area.
“If I rent (out my) building, who’s going to want to be next to
a homeless shelter?” he asked. “It’s going to effect rents, and if I try
to sell that building, it’s going to be lower.” (Berthelsen, 1996, p.
A5)
William Narez, an administrator at the nearby Gateway
Veterinary Clinic, has complained homeless people sleep and
trample in a flower bed the hospital put in to make the area more
pretty. (Berthelsen, 1996a, p. Al)
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The City’s response to these concerns included a justification of the program
based on need, and a neighborhood improvement plan that would address some pre
existing concerns in the area:
“If we don’t commit ourselves to (the rehabilitation project),
everything we do to help the homeless will not be the complete,
long-lasting approach,” said Jess Duran, a project advocate from the
city’s Community Development and Housing Department. “We
will not be able to get these people back on their feet.”
. . . Duran also said the project will not create the problems
surrounding property owners fear, and that concerns such as street
lighting would be addressed as it is being developed. (Berthelsen,
1996, p. A5)
Neighbors also criticized the siting process, claiming that they had not been
notified of the proposed project until the public notices for the variance hearing were
mailed to them:
“They’re forcing this thing down our throats,” Narez said.
“They didn’t notify us before signing the lease. This is not the right
place for it .. . . We’re fighting City Hall here.” (Berthelsen, 1996,
p. A5)
“I think it stinks,” said Anthony Randazzo, who owns a
nearby building. “They’ve just pushed this whole thing through like
Grant took Richmond. They’ve just forced this thing down
everybody’s throat like it or not.” (Berthelsen, 1996c, p. A l)
“We feel this whole thing wasn’t democratic at all,” Narez
said, adding the neighborhood already suffers from a parking
shortage. “This is just going to make it worse.” (Berthelsen, 1996c,
P- A l)
In response, City staff explained the process by which citizen participation
was solicited about the project, and about proposed improvements in the area.
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Housing Authority Chairman Larry Zarian, also supported the process and the
project:
[But] Jess Duran, who has supervised the plans for the city’s
Community Development and Housing Department, described a
comprehensive series of meetings with Fernando Court Neighbors
to address concerns. As a result of those meetings, Duran said the
city is planning to fix inadequate lighting, problems associated with
speeding cars, parking shortages, trash and debris in the area and
public drunkenness.. . .
Housing Authority Chairman Larry Zarian said he was
“perplexed” residents said they had not received notice, since the
city has held five meetings on the plans since June. Duran said 30
area property owners were contacted, and 15 had regular input into
the shelter plans.. . .
“If we don’t do these kinds of project, we’re going to see
homeless people spill out into the community,” Zarian said during
the meeting. “If we work with the agency and try to do the best we
can it’s going to be good for our community.” (Berthelsen, 1996b,
p. Al).
Despite the public complaints, the Housing Authority unanimously approved
the plans and funding for the project, and the neighbors did not appeal the decision of
the Zoning Administrator to permit the project, as they had threaten to do. The
agreement approved by the Housing Authority was $160,300 higher than the original
estimate of $ 189,700. The staff report to the Authority explained the reasons for the
revised cost estimate, how it affected the structure of the City’s assistance for the
project, and explained public participation in the project:
The estimated costs of 435,000 for the predevelopment,
construction, furnishings and equipment, and start-up is $160,300
higher than the original estimate of $189,700. This is because the
total costs for converting an industrial/commercial, warehouse
facility to a residential use was under-estimated. The residential
standards which added significantly to the costs of the rehabilitation
include: City codes regarding the building fire sprinkler system, fire
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separation walls, and the solid-waste enclosure; and, Los Angeles
County codes regarding the kitchen and bathroom areas, which
necessitate an upgrade to the building electrical system.
Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act has also
added to the construction costs.
The proposed structure of City assistance for this project is in
the form of a subsidy to be paid for the provision of shelter beds at
the Emergency Shelter program located at 437 Fernando Court.
This subsidy would use Redevelopment housing set-aside funds to
provide for 35 shelter beds per night for 51 months, or 54,250
shelter bed nights total (12,775 shelter bed nights annually). A
maximum subsidy of $11.43 per shelter bed night is proposed. This
maximum figure compares favorably with the rate of $12 per shelter
bed night which is average for the Los Angeles area. Currently,
Glendale Homeless Coalition social service agencies provide
emergency shelter for homeless individuals and families through
hotel/motel vouchers at the rate of $30.00 per night. It is also
important to note that an additional 7,800 persons each year will be
served by the Glendale Services Center, which will also benefit
from this subsidy.
The Glendale Homeless Coalition, LSS/SC, The Salvation
Army Glendale Corps and CD&H are committed to ensuring that
the combined Glendale Emergency Shelter Program/Glendale
Services Center is an asset to the immediate area, as well as to the
community as a whole. Staff and LSS/SC have initiated a public
participation program involving the surrounding property and
business owners, as well as staff from City divisions such as
Development Services, Traffic and Transportation, Public Service,
Police, Neighborhood Services and the City Attorney’s office. In a
series of meetings, neighboring property and business owners and
concerned citizens have become educated about these programs in
particular and about issues concerning homelessness in general.
Based on the input provided by neighboring property and business
owners, a proposed Neighborhood Improvement Plan, which
addresses existing public health and safety, traffic and parking
issues in the area, as well as potential impacts of the emergency
shelter/access center, has been drafted and circulated to over 30
property and business owners for approval. Staff and LSS/SC will
continue to work with the public to implement desired components
of this plan.. . .
During the pre-development phase of the project, CD&H staff
and LSS/SC initiated a public participation program involving the
surrounding property and business owners, as well as staff from
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City divisions such as Development Services, Traffic and
Transportation, Public Service, Police, Neighborhood Services and
the City Attorney’s office. Based on the input provided by
neighboring property and business owners, a proposed
Neighborhood Improvement Plan, which addresses existing public
health and safety, traffic and parking issues in the area, as well as
potential impacts of the emergency shelter/access center, was
drafted and circulated to over 30 property and business owners for
approval. At this time, seven additional street lights have been
installed by Public Service and increased parking enforcement has
commenced. CD&H is working with the Metropolitan Transit
Authority on the installation of a 8’ wrought iron fence at the west-
end of Fernando Court. Traffic and Transportation staff is nearing
the completion of their analysis of traffic and parking control issues
such as street signage, curb repainting and curb, street and sidewalk
repair. A meeting to update the property and business owners on
the progress of the Neighborhood Improvement Plan has been
scheduled for May 14,1996. (City of Glenale, 1996, p. 3-7)
In February, 1996, a bid process was initiated for the selection of the
construction contractor. Ten contractors responded to a public bid notice, however,
only four submitted final bids on the project: Cole Pacific, Gangi Builders, Inc.,
Maddox-Stabler Construction, Inc. and Stillion Construction. Of these, Stillion
Construction, Inc. was selected as the lowest, responsible bidder. The proposed cost
of the interior rehabilitation, not including furnishings, is $271,874.
Then in June of 1996, Dr. Joseph Colletti, who was the Regional Director for
Lutheran Social Services of Southern California, and instrumental in the
development of the emergency shelter, the Cold Weather Shelter, and the 1995 SHP
transitional housing projects, announced that he was leaving Lutheran Social
Services to establish his own private, non-profit corporation. Subsequently, Lutheran
Social Services elected to downsize, close their office in Pasadena, and scale back
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their participation in Glendale projects. A reading file staff report to the City
Council summarized the issues raised by this development:
Background
Lutheran Social Services of Southern California (LSS/SC) has
notified CD&H staff that they are downsizing, and are interested in
disinvesting in their Glendale projects. With the resignation of the
Area Director, Joe Colletti, LSS/SC has decided not to replace him
and to close their local office in Pasadena. They have also closed
their Kern County offices.
The three Glendale Homeless Coalition projects in which
LSS/SC is a participant are: 1) the Emergency Shelter (Fernando
Court); 2) the 1995 Supportive Housing Program Family
Transitional Housing Project with the YWCA (Mariposa); and 3)
the Cold Weather Shelter Program. LSS/SC is committed to
ensuring a smooth transition regarding these projects.
Emergency Shelter
LSS/SC will see the rehabilitation of the shelter through to
completion, and are subcontracting with Joe Colletti to oversee the
process. They are interested, however, in the City’s choosing
another program operator. At this time, CD&H staff are
recommending that, with your approval and the approval of the
Coalition Steering Committee, a Request for Proposal (RFP) be
issued immediately. The RFP would be circulated to Coalition
members and to agencies in the surrounding area who have
demonstrated experience operating emergency shelters. Proposals
would be reviewed, and an operator selected, by a review committee
comprised of Coalition members. It is anticipated that the RFP
process would take approximately 6 weeks. A meeting for the
Steering Committee to address this issue has been scheduled for
Monday, July 15,1996 at 11:00 am.
The selection of a new program operator will present a
challenge with respect to the technical aspects of transferring the
lease, the Contract for Services between LSS/SC and the Housing
Authority, CDBG and ESG agreements between LSS/SC and the
City, as well as various permits and variances. It is anticipated that
this process will take an additional 6 weeks. Allowing two weeks
for shelter start-up, this would place the opening date of the
emergency shelter program at mid-October. At this time, the
rehabilitation of the shelter is proceeding on-schedule, with
completion anticipated for August 26, 1996. Thus, the selection of
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a new operator represents a one-month delay in the opening of the
program (again, allowing two weeks for shelter start-up).
CD&H staff is aware that this presents a sensitive public
relations issue. CD&H staff will meet with the Fernando Court
neighbors to inform them of the change in shelter operator and
address any concerns they may have.
Another significant impact of this is on fundraising efforts;
however, development consultant Susan Scribner, Joe Colletti and
Kitty Galt are moving forward to establish a Community Advisory
Committee to head community education and fundraising efforts.
At this time, donations will be sent to the Glendale Homeless
Coalition’s fund at the Glendale Community Foundation.
Originally donations would have been directed to LSS/SC.. . .
CD&H staff will continue to work with LSS/SC, members of
the Glendale Homeless Coalition, City staff, and the designated
program operators to ensure the smooth transition of program
operations, and the delivery of coordinated and quality services to
homeless persons in Glendale. (City of Glendale, 1996b, p. 1-3)
The result of the Request for Proposal process held by the Coalition to
identify a new service provider for the Glendale Emergency Shelter was the selection
of the Institute for Urban Research and Development (IURD) as the shelter operator.
The IURD was the non-profit corporation established by Dr. Colletti. During the
fall, Dr. Colletti was continuing to oversee the rehabilitation of 437 Fernando Court
for use as the access center/emergency shelter, under a sub-contract with Lutheran
Social Services, who agreed to see the process through to completion.
On November 19, 1996, the Glendale Housing Authority unanimously
approved the assumption and assignment of the operating agreement which provided
Redevelopment funding for the project. The staff report also described how, because
of costs overruns in the rehabilitation and furnishing for the shelter, that there would
be an operating shortfall for the first program year. Staff recommended, and the
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Authority approved, the restructuring of the subsidy to allow funds from the fifth
year, to be used during the first year of shelter operation to lessen the shortfall:
In July, however, LSS/SC notified CD&H staff that they were
downsizing and needed to disinvest in their Glendale projects.
CD&H staff consulted with the Glendale Homeless Coalition
Steering Committee, and under their direction, issued a Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the selection of a shelter operator. A mandatory
Bidder’s Conference was held Monday, July 29 and was attended
by: Verdugo Mental Health, Union Station Foundation, L. A.
Family Housing Corporation, the Institute for Urban Research and
Development, and Food for Body and Soul. Two organizations
submitted proposals: the Institute for Urban Research and
Development, and Food for Body and Soul.
On September 4, 1996 a Proposal Review Committee
comprised of members of the Glendale Homeless Coalition met to
review the proposals and interview the applicants. The Committee
determined that the proposal submitted by the Institute for Urban
Research and Development (Urban Institute) scored highest, and
was most consistent with the Coalition’s continuum of care
approach to homeless service delivery. The Committee
subsequently recommended the Urban Institute to the Coalition’s
Steering Committee, which concurred with their findings. On
September 18,1996, the full Glendale Homeless Coalition voted to
recommend the Urban Institute as the operator for the Glendale
Emergency Shelter.
PROGRAM OPERATOR
The Institute for Urban Research and Development (Urban
Institute) is a non-profit corporation which has been established by
Dr. Joseph Colletti. Previously, Dr. Colletti was the Glendale Area
Director for Lutheran Social Services, and was the primary person
responsible for developing the initial proposal for the emergency
shelter and for overseeing the rehabilitation of 437 Fernando Court.
Thus, the selection of The Urban Institute as the shelter operator
provides continuity of personnel in the development and
implementation of the shelter.
The Urban Institute has developed a Glendale-based Board of
Directors who will be responsible for overseeing the operation of
the Glendale Emergency Shelter, including the development of a
long-term fundraising strategy for the program.
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ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT AND
AMENDMENT OF CONTRACT FOR SERVICES
The proposed Assignment and Assumption Agreement and
Amendment of the Contract for Services between the Housing
Authority and Lutheran Social Services of Southern California
would transfer the remaining rights and obligations under the
contract for services to the Urban Institute. This would mean that
the Urban Institute would assume all obligations outlined in the
operating agreement, including the provision of 49,150 shelter bed
nights.
The proposed Amendment of the Contract for Services would
restructure the payment of the operating subsidy for Years 2 through
5 (FY96-97 through 99-00). Currently, the operating subsidy for
Years 2 through 5 is the lesser of: 25% of the annual operating
expenses or $50,000 per year, payable at the end of the year. The
proposed restructuring would allow for semi-annual, rather than
annual payments; and, would allow for an additional subsidy to be
paid in Year 2, which would subsequently be deducted from the
Year 5 subsidy. All subsidy payments would still be subject to the
adequate documentation of a shortfall in the operating budget.
The maximum payments under the proposed subsidy
restructure are summarized below:
Year Max. 1st Disbursement Max. 2nd Disbursement
5 (99-00) Disbursements in Year 5 will equal 50% of
difference between $250,000 and all previous
Subsidy disbursements.
If previous years’ payments are at the maximums shown
above, disbursements in Year 5 would be $0. In any case, the
disbursements in Year 5 would not exceed $50,000 nor would the
total disbursements in Years 1 through 5 exceed $250,000.
The proposed restructuring of the subsidy significantly
reduces the funding gap for shelter operations through June, 1997:
1 (95-96) $25,000
2 (96-97) $50,000
3 (97-98) $25,000
4 (98-99 $25,000
$25,000
$50,000
$25,000
$25,000
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Eight Month Operating Budget (11/96-6/97-includes start-up)
$229,416
Less Budget Reductions
Revised Eight Month Operating Budget
Total Funds Available
Funding Gap
Additional Funds Available through
Subsidy Restructure
Funding Gap if Subsidy Restructured
$ 20,000
$209,416
$124,000
$ 85,416
$ 50,000
$ 35,416
Reducing the funding gap in the initial year of the shelter’s
operation will help ensure the project’s viability through June, 1997.
More significantly, however, it will allow the Urban Institute to
concentrate on fundraising efforts that will ensure the financial
viability of the shelter for FY97-98 and beyond. The Urban
Institute estimates a typical annual operating budget of $300,000.
At current funding levels, approximately 50% of the this budget will
need to be raised from private funding sources. This is not
inconsistent with the funding patterns of other emergency shelter
programs in the area, however, it is essential that the Urban Institute
begin implementing their long-term fundraising strategy now. (City
of Glendale, 1996d, p. 2 - 6)
V. Programs Open at Fernando Court
Also during this time, The Salvation Army was experiencing delays in
executing its operating agreement with LAHSA. So even though the rehabilitation to
Fernando Court was completed in September, 1996, and the access center could have
begun operation before the shelter, there was a delay. According to an October staff
Because of delays in the approval and execution of a service
agreement between LAHSA and the Salvation Army, the expansion
of the service center was delayed. In mid-September, however, a
contract between these parties was executed. The Salvation Army
staff is now working with LAHSA to initialize the draw-down of
funds. The Salvation Army has already hired one of the three staff
positions funded by the grant, and will hire remaining staff within
the next several weeks.
report:
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The Salvation Army is also working to procure furnishings
and equipment for the portion of 437 Fernando Court that will be
used as the access center. Currently, The Salvation Army is sub
leasing approximately 25% of the building from Lutheran Social
Services. Once the lease is transferred to the Urban Institute, The
Salvation Army will sign a sub-lease with that organization.
It is anticipated that the Glendale Services Center will move to
437 Fernando Court and expand their services to full-time within
the next several weeks. Participating agencies at the Center include:
Catholic Charities, the Department of Public Social Services,
Pacific Clinics, the Survival Support Group (a peer counseling
organization founded by formerly homeless individuals). The
Employment Development Department and the Social Security
Administration work closely with Center staff on a daily basis.
Center staff will also work closely with the staff of the Glendale
Emergency Shelter and the Glendale YWCA to link homeless
persons with shelter services. The recently funded street outreach
program will also be based at the Center. On March 19, 1996,
physicians and residents from Glendale Adventist Family Practice
Residency began providing limited health services to Center clients.
These health services, which are linked with comprehensive case
management, fill a crucial need for Glendale’s homeless
community. Since the Center opened in November, 1994, over 800
unduplicated clients have received services.
Staff from both the Glendale Services Center and the Glendale
Emergency Shelter will conduct an intensive community education
and marketing campaign to educate the public about homelessness
and homeless services, and to reach out to the homeless community.
Business cards and fliers will be distributed to social service
agencies, churches, public agencies and City divisions. A training
program for police, fire, code enforcement and other City staff who
interact with homeless persons is being developed to update them
about new and existing homeless services. (City of Glendale,
1996c, p. 2-5)
Ultimately, the contract with LAHSA was executed, and the Glendale
Services Center opened full-time operation on November 5, 1996 (see Figure 4). An
article for the City of Glendale’s community newspaper, “Cityviews” marked the
event:
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FIGURE 4
DEPICTION OF GLENDALE SERVICES CENTER FOR CITY COUNCIL PRESENTATION-1997
ONE
G L E N D A L E I N T E R
STOP
r— '
O utreach
Intake
A ssessm ent
Case M anagem ent
Health Care
Psychological Services
Catholic Charities
The Salvation Army
VerdugD Mental Health Center
Dept, of Public Social Services
Community Health Center of Glendale
YWCA
Early this November, the Glendale Services Center, a “one-
stop” social service center, expanded its operations to 40 hours per
week and moved to 437 Fernando Court in Glendale.
The Center provides services for persons who are homeless or
at-risk for homelessness in Glendale, including employment
assistance, case management, health screening, benefits counseling,
housing assistance, psychological services and peer counseling.
The Salvation Army Glendale Corps is the lead-agency for the
Center, which is funded through a Federal Homeless Initiatives
grant. Partnering with The Salvation Army are Catholic Charities,
the Department of Public Social Services, Pacific Clinics, the Urban
Institute, the Glendale YWCA and the Community Health Center of
Glendale.
“The Glendale Services Center represents a team approach to
homeless service delivery. Professionals from different agencies
work together with clients to develop a comprehensive plan that
will meet their short and long-term needs,” said Paul Bandy,
Director of Social Services for The Salvation Army. “The Center is
the entry-point to Glendale’s system of homeless services, which is
designed to help individuals and families develop the tools they
need to live independent, self-sufficient lives.”
The Center has been operating on a part-time basis since
November, 1994. Since that time, 800 persons have received
services. The Center is an important part of the comprehensive
strategy for homeless service delivery developed by the Glendale
Homeless Coalition, an alliance of community agencies,
organizations, businesses, City staff and Glendale residents. (City
of Glendale, 1996e, p. 6)
Meanwhile, the Institute for Urban Research and Development faced their
opening year with a funding shortfall, and a need for additional funds to secure all
the items needed for shelter start-up. The Institute published a report in November,
1996, designed to educate the community about homeless services in Glendale and to
raise funds for the shelter. “The Glendale Emergency Homeless Shelter: Overview
and Concepts” described the continuum of care concept and components, as well as
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the services and providers at the Glendale Services Center. This report laid out the
mission of the program, its relationship to the Center, and the funding needs:
The Emergency Shelter functions as an emergency housing
facility with full provision of food, cooking, dining, bathing,
washroom, and sleeping arrangements. It is physically attached to
the Access Center, occupying about 2/3 of the floor space of the
building in which both are housed. The facility is designed to
accommodate up to 40 residents at a time. Residents are able to
stay for up to 60 days. Limited extensions may be granted on a case
by case basis.
Case Management is a key part of the entire program. The
goal is not to foster band-aid assistance only to have people go back
onto the streets and have the process repeat endlessly, but to take in
only homeless persons who are truly interested in getting healthy,
cleaned up, and back into the work force as independent citizens
once again. It should be noted that not all of the homeless
population is initially willing to make this commitment, and it is up
to the intake Case Manager to determine whether the applicant will
truly take on this responsibility.. . .
The doors of the Emergency Shelter are scheduled to open on
December 16 , times to coincide with enforcement of the recently
adopted Camping Ordinance which will allow the arrest of removal
of unauthorized campers on public property or persons living in
vehicles here in Glendale. A Public Drinking Ordinance has also
been adopted recently, which will allow the Glendale Police
Department to arrest anyone in violation, homeless or not. These
carefully drafted Ordinances were essential to enable our Police to
preserve the quality of our community, and while not specifically
directed at the homeless populations, certainly have an effect upon
it. The intent has been to offer the homeless of Glendale a
constructive solution and alternative to the effects of these
ordinances, namely to get themselves enrolled in the rehabilitation
program which starts with the Access Center and Emergency
Shelter.
Administration and Funding
As you are all aware, the availability of public monies for such
programs is steadily dwindling, creating a greater need for financial
reliance upon the private sector. Substantial public dollars have
already been expended in the rehabilitation of the Shelter structure,
and its successful opening by year end id directly dependent upon
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the successful funding of monies needed for initial Shelter
equipment outlays, as well as ongoing annual budget needs.
What are these needs? The annual operating budget is
approximately $350,000, $170,000 of which has been identified and
funded via public money administered by the City of Glendale and
other regional government agencies. This leaves an annual short
fall of some $180,000 which must be funded entirely through
donations from the private sector. This has been accomplished
successfully in many other parts of the country, including the
successful private funding of a large portion of the “Union Station”
shelter (Pasadena) annual budget for over 12 years. So, we can do
it! It will require the diligent fund-raising efforts of conscientious
and concerned members of our community in contact our Glendale
and surrounding area individuals, small businesses and
corporations, as well as public benefits organizations. We are
confident that Glendale and surrounding communities will rise to
the occasion in supporting in whatever manner possible this
landmark and exciting opportunity to take our place among the
many other community who have taken the lead in a constructive
and effective solution to the problem of homelessness in their
regions.
We have an urgent and pressing need, in addition to the annual
budget needs, for approximately $50,000 for the Shelter capital
equipment which is needed just to get the doors open. To date, we
have been forced to dip into part of the $170,000 ear-marked for
annual budget needs in order to purchase the most essential of this
equipment until our private donor sources can be identified.
Obviously this money must be replaced.
The following is a list of the actual equipment items needed1 ,
all of which have been carefully shopped for. In reading this list,
please keep in mind that the pricing is based upon new and
commercial equipment. While many readers may have older
unwanted items which might be thought of as appropriate for
meeting these in kind needs, please bear in mind that what is needed
is commercial grade and long lasting, and in most cases is probably
best purchased new. We need to make sure that this Emergency
Shelter is something of when the community, residents, and donors
can be proud. It will be scrutinized by many other community
officials over the years and while budgets are tight for such
programs, it is important that the facility not be an eyesore, but a
1 The list of times included tables, chairs, televisions and VCR, kitchen equipment,
commercial washer and dryer, beds, bedding and linens.
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clean, modem, and attractive furnished facility which will serve as
an inspiration and model to both the residents which it serves, the
donors which make it all possible, as well as the other local and
federal agencies which will be looking at and learning from the
example which we set. (Institute for Urban Research and
Development, 1996, p. 2-6)
The Glendale Emergency Shelter opened its doors on December 16, 1996.
Despite this achievement, however, the shelter operator (IURD) was receiving
substantial criticism for their operation of the Cold Weather Shelter at the Armory in
November, 1996. Delays in executing their contract with LAHSA resulted in the
shelter not opening during several rainy days. The Glendale New Press reported the
story, and later in the week, ran an editorial:
Red tape doesn’t make for a very good umbrella.
Most of Glendale’s homeless spent Thursday night out in the
rain, unaware of the bureaucratic breakdown the kept doors closed
at the cold weather shelter and California Army National Guard
Armory, 220 E. Colorado Street... .
Glendale’s shelter was one of three in Los Angeles County
that did not open Thursday said Marlene Singer, program manager
for the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority.. . .
“The reason the three sites aren’t open is because the agencies
haven’t given us executed contracts,” Singer said.
The armory was also unable to open during the rain because of
a leaky roof, said Stacy Rowe, administrative analyst for the city’s
department of community development and housing.
“The provider’s not ready and the facility’s not ready,” Rowe
said.
The reason the armory couldn’t open was because the Institute
for Urban Research and Development has not yet come to terms
with the National Guard, said Joseph Colletti, the institute’s
executive director.
“I think everybody wishes it could be open tonight,” Colletti
said Thursday. “Historically, we haven’t had to be open this early.
I think we were all trying to buy some time.” The closed armory
doors came as a surprise to the homeless and Richard Davis, a
volunteer with Food for Body and Soul.
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”My question is the same as the people we’ve been providing
information to,” Davis said. “Why isn’t it open?”
“We feel foolish and we would like to know why.”
. . . Food for Body and Soul volunteers were working late
Thursday with First United Methodist Church . . . to open up its
meeting hall. It was an 1 l th -hour decision, one volunteer said, but
didn’t know fi it would be open Friday night. (Lyman, 1996, p. A5)
The News Press’s editorial was critical of Dr. Colletti’s rationale:
Joseph Colletti. . . did not count on having to be open so
early.
What on earth are the opening dates for then? . .. Food for
Body and Soul, an organization that feeds the homeless, even said
the shelter would be open in its November newsletter... .
“Trying to buy some time,” as Colletti put it, to prepare for the
center’s opening is foolish when you’re dealing with something as
unpredictable as the weather. (Glendale News Press, 1996, p. A7)
The situation continued to deteriorate, and a group of “homeless advocates”
came to a meeting of the City Council to protest the conditions at the shelter. An
article in the Glendale News Press in January, 1997 praised the new shelter at
Fernando Court, but labeled the Cold Weather Shelter “shoddy”.
Some of Glendale’s more than 500 homeless can try getting
off the streets through a new 40-bed shelter and counseling
program. The alternatives, including the old cold weather shelter,
aren’t pretty, say some who stay there.. . .
Tony Miranda, one of Glendale’s homeless, told the City
Council of poor conditions at the cold weather shelter this week.
“It’s just really miserable” ....
Miranda said blankets at the shelter were not being washed
after use and “one hot dog with one thing of mustard” was served
for dinner.
“It frightens me to see this,” Miranda told the council. “Please
do something or look into the matter”.
Miranda also discussed the armory’s leaky roof, which needs
to be replaced, according to City Manger Dave Ramsay, who is also
co-chair of the city’s Homeless Coalition.. . .
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Both the armory shelter and the new emergency shelter, 437
Fernando Court, are run by the Institute for Urban Research and
Development.
The problems at the cold weather shelter occurred only during
the first few nights of its operations, said Joseph Colletti, the
institute’s executive director.. . .
Colletti said the institute has since hired a cook for the armory
and from what he’s seen, the meals being served include chicken
and submarine sandwiches.
Colletti said the shelter’s blankets are washed on a regular
basis.
Still Miranda said his complaints . . . have gone unheard.
“Nothing was done. That’s my concern,” he said. (Lyman,
1997, p. A l)
The Glendale City Council ordered an investigation of the conditions
at the Cold Weather Shelter, and ultimately several Councilmembers
personally visited the facility. I wrote a detailed staff report that addressed
issues including the quality of the food, the leaking roof, the cleaning of
blankets, transportation, security and staffing, outreach and service provision.
The report concluded:
CD&H staff has concluded that the Cold Weather Shelter
program is providing an adequate level of services. It is true that
there are on-going problems with the Armory facility; and, that from
time to time circumstances arise which may complicate the
operation of the program. It is also apparent, however, that the staff
and management of the Institute for Urban Research and
Development are committed to providing quality and professional
services within a continuum of care model of service delivery.
(City of Glendale, 1997, p. 4)
Ultimately, press coverage of both shelters took a more positive turn. A
Glendale News Press article on January 27,1997 covered the early opening of the
cold weather shelter to allow residents to watch the Super Bowl.
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As rain fell steadily outside, Patriots and Packers fans alike sat
together, occasionally cheering - or jeering.
“Look at the smiles on these people,” said Chuck Veader.
Veader, 42, stopped watching the game near halftime to start
heating up the fried chicken, green beans, mashed potatoes and
gravy dinner that was on the menu. (Bridges, 1997, p.l)
An article in February, 1997 in the Glendale News Press highlighted the
City’s homeless population and the new shelter, explaining why homeless persons
choose to come to, or remain in Glendale.
They may not own homes or rent apartments, but Glendale’s
homeless tend to stay in the city for the same reason as those who
do: safety... .
In addition to safety, Glendale has a Homeless Coalition, a
group of volunteers who meet every other month or so to discuss the
problems of homelessness and ways to help....
[City manager Dave Ramsay] said the group, which consists
of approximately 50 members, tries to balance the needs of the
homeless with public health and safety issues.
“To deal with one set of issues without the other is
shortsighted,” Ramsay said.
The beauty in the Homeless Coalition is that even if different
service agencies and volunteers don’t agree on a detail, they still
have the same goal: helping the homeless, said Richard Davis, a
coalition member and volunteer for Food for Body and Soul.
. . . “Glendale is a volunteer city. The fact that volunteers
have a place with a direct conduit to do their work and advance their
priorities in homeless issues, that is a major positive” [Davis said].
. . . “Most of these folks are Glendale residents,” said George
Bolden, who oversees the 40-bed emergency homeless shelter.
Before they can get a place to sleep at the shelter, clients must
agree to a “moral contract” designed to get them off the street.
. . . “We’re able to determine who wants to break the cycle of
homelessness and who just wants a place to stay with a two-step
process.”
. . . Of the current clients, two people have secured permanent
housing and 8 have found jobs, Bolden said (Lyman, 1997a, p. 16).
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Even with the shift in press coverage, the advisory board of the emergency
shelter, faced with an enormous fundraising effort, feared that the negative publicity
would hamper its efforts. Thus, to distance itself from the Cold Weather Shelter, the
name of the Glendale Emergency Shelter was officially changed to Project
ACHIEVE (see Figure 5).
In February, 1997, despite the newness of the programs, the City of Glendale
submitted the Glendale Services Center/Project ACHIEVE to a national competition
sponsored by the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials
(NAHRO). In August, 1997, the City’s Director of Community Development of
Housing, Madalyn Blake, and myself traveled to New York City to accept the Award
of Merit for this program. At the annual convention in San Diego in October, 1997,
the Glendale Services Center/Project ACHIEVE won the National Award in the
Program Innovation: Resident and Client Services Category. An article in Citwiews
highlighted the accomplishment:
Two programs for homeless persons in Glendale are the
recipient of the National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials’ (NAHRO) Merit Award for Resident and
Client Services. The Glendale Services Center and Project
ACHIEVE were one of four programs in the nation to receive this
honor.
The Glendale Services Center is the city’s “1-stop” multi
service center for the homeless. The Center is operated by The
Salvation Army Glendale Corp, and staffed by agencies such as
Catholic Charities, Verdugo Mental Health Center, YWCA of
Glendale, the Community Health Center of Glendale, and the
Department of Public Social Services. At the Center, persons who
are homeless or at-risk for homelessness can have an array of social
service needs met under one roof, including health and mental
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FIGURE 5
DEPICTION OF PROJECT ACHIEVE FOR CITY COUNCIL PRESENTATION- 1997
Project ACHIEVE
to
I — 1
VO
Case Management
Counseling
Living Skil s
Parenting
Employment
Project ACHIEVE
health care, employment assistance, and housing placement. The
Center is located at 437 Fernando Court in Glendale.
The Center is also the entry-point to Project ACHIEVE,
Glendale’s first year-round shelter for the general homeless
population. Project ACHIEVE, located adjacent to the Glendale
Services Center, provides shelter to 40 men, women and children on
any given night. The program is designed to provide intensive case
management and counseling to assist residents with issues such as
employment, education, health and mental health, independent
living skills, parenting and child development, child care, legal and
credit problems, and ultimately, housing placement. The Project
has successfully placed 84% of residents in transitional or
permanent housing.
“NAHRO is proud of those agencies which are setting
examples through innovative programs and an ongoing commitment
to excellence,” said NAHRO President Richard C. Gentry.
“Programs such as the Glendale Services Center/Project ACHIEVE
are setting standards to be followed by other agencies around the
country.”
NAHRO is a 63-year-old professional membership
organization of housing and community development officials
throughout the United States. Its 9,000 members have long
participated in the creation of national housing and community
development policies and programs. (City of Glendale, 1997a, p. 5)
VI. Super NOFAS Expand Services At The Access Center
Glendale’s application to HUD under the Continuum of Care Super NOFA’s
in 1996 and 1997 significantly altered the provision of services at the Glendale
Services Center. In 1996, $462,983 in funding was requested and received for 36
months of operation for a full-time street outreach team. This project was sponsored
by West Hollywood Homeless Organization (WHHO). In 1997, $749,754 in funding
was requested and received for 36 months of supportive services only funding for
four projects that would be based at the Center: 1) Homeless job training sponsored
by the City of Glendale/Verdugo Private Industry Council; 2) Outreach to homeless
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veterans sponsored by LA Veterans Initiative, Inc. (LA Vets); 3) Housing placement
sponsored by the City of Glendale; and, 4) Substance Abuse Services sponsored by
Verdugo Mental Health Center.
WHHO was selected by the Coalition to sponsor the Street Outreach
Program, that year’s top priority. WHHO was selected through a Request for
Proposal process, however, they were the only applicant for the street outreach
component. Excerpts from their program description are provided below:
How services will be provided: The services of the Glendale
Outreach Program in Glendale will be based on the highly
successful outreach program that WHHO is currently operating in
the Hollywood area. Outreach workers will be on the streets every
day making new and repeat contacts with persons living in
encampments, abandoned buildings, freeway underpasses, and
parks. They will engage homeless persons in conversation and offer
sack lunches as an icebreaker. As trust builds through repeated
contacts, homeless persons become more interested in available
services and are willing to share personal information such as
veteran status, health and legal needs, and substance abuse/mental
health issues. Engaging homeless persons into service can take
anywhere from one or two contacts to many contacts over periods of
several months.
The outreach team will target areas that have attracted clusters
of homeless persons: along Brand and Central Boulevards; in and
around the central library and the armory; at the south end of the
San Fernando Road corridor; in and around the Galleria; the adult
recreation center; in the Broadway-Kenwood-Louise-Wilson areas.
In addition, the outreach team will seek out more hidden clusters of
homeless persons. During the winter, outreach workers will also
visit the Glendale Cold Weather emergency shelter on a regular
basis. This is an efficient and highly effective way of providing
access to services because homeless persons are congregated in one
place. They have already accepted a minimum amount of help and
are likely to be open to further services.
Outreach workers have a friendly, non-judgmental, and non-
intrusive approach. They will encourage people to make use of the
Glendale Services Center or other available services. The outreach
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team targets homeless persons living in the pockets and crevices of
the city (i.e., under the freeway, in alleys and cul-de-sacs). They
scout for evidence of habitation— food trash, clothing, or makeshift
shelters— in places not normally frequented by most people. Once
they have identified a location, they return daily and build
relationships with the people living there.
The outreach team will also make regular contacts with local
businesses, residents, and other community members for the
purpose of educating the community about homelessness and the
availability of assistance from the Glendale Outreach Program and
the Glendale Services Center.
Through a subcontract with Verdugo Mental Health, a
licensed mental health counselor will be part of the outreach team
approximately three days per week. The mental health counselor
will respond to the mental health needs of homeless persons by
assessing for mental stability, volatility, substance abuse, and need
for hospitalization. The mental health counselor will implement the
necessary procedures if hospitalization is required, provide mental
health counseling as needed or requested, provide appropriate
referrals for support and treatment based on individual assessments,
and provide case management, linkage, and benefits advocacy as
needed.
Coordination w/law enforcement, businesses, and residents:
The outreach team will establish and maintain relationships with
local businesses, law enforcement, and residents through frequent
and informal contact. The contact phone number at the Glendale
Services Center will be distributed to members of the community.
People will be encouraged to call this number if there is a situation
involving a homeless person(s) that they would like mediated. The
outreach team carries a cellular telephone for quick access, and will
be available to intervene and mediate disputes between homeless
persons and local businesses, residents, and the police/sheriffs
department in non-law enforcement cases. In addition, outreach
workers will do monthly ride-alongs with police officers. (City of
Glendale, 1996a, p. 55-6)
HUD awarded the full amount of the request to the City (along with two
transitional housing projects, see Chapter V). WHHO and the City submitted the
Technical Submission (the second phase of the SHP program application process)
which was approved by HUD, and by August 1997, the City was ready to execute the
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grant agreement with HUD and the Sub-recipient agreements with WHHO (which
had recently changed their name to Foundation House Transitional Group). WHHO,
which had also received SHP and LA Initiatives funding under LAHS A, decided at
the last minute, however, that it no longer wanted to expand its services into the
Glendale area. Thus, City staff asked Verdugo Mental Health Center if it would be
interested in administering the outreach program. Verdugo Mental Health Center
agreed, especially since it had received funding under a 1995 SHP grant submitted
under LAHS A by Hillviews, Inc., a mental health provider in the west Valley, to
conduct outreach in Glendale. Verdugo Mental Health’s Mobile Outreach Program
began operation in November, 1997.
The 1997 Super NOFA dramatically expanded services at the Glendale
Services Center. The funding priorities for 1997 were: 1) the renewal of the grant
for The Salvation Army’s Nancy Painter Home (formerly Booth House); 2) homeless
job training; 3) veterans outreach; 4) child care for families in transitional housing; 5)
housing placement assistance; 6) substance abuse counseling; and, 7) Shelter + Care
(S+C) certificates for 60 months of rental assistance for disabled homeless persons.
Four of these positions would be located at the Glendale Services Center, and the
housing placement position was to administer the S+C certificates. This would
significantly increase the full-time staff at the Center, now comprised of four staff
from The Salvation Army and one from Catholic Charities, and part-time staff
included the YWCA, DPSS, Pacific Clinics, and the medical clinic (the street
outreach team from Verdugo Mental Health did not begin until November, 1997).
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The City was awarded funding for all of their priorities (except Shelter Plus Care), a
total of $969,664 in funding over 36 months. City staff worked with funded
providers to receive HUD approval of the Technical Submission and implement
these programs.
The major priority for the 1998 Continuum of Care application was Shelter
Plus Care, the unfunded priority from 1997. One additional program for the
Glendale Services Center, Life Skills Training for Homeless Persons, was funded.
The report explains the community strategy, or vision to combat homelessness in its
most idealized form:
The community strategy or vision to combat homelessness,
including specific goals and action steps.
Through the Glendale Homeless Coalition, the City of
Glendale has engaged the cooperation of all the area’s social service
providers along with many churches, local business people and
private citizens in the Glendale Homeless Coalition. The high level
of cooperation and exchange of ideas and information made
possible by this unprecedented collaboration have led to the rapid
development of an excellent system of housing and services for
homeless persons.
The mission statement of the Glendale Homeless Coalition
states that no one should be homeless in our community, and that
public and private partnerships are the key to addressing the issues
surrounding homelessness in Glendale. As early as May, 1994, the
Coalition, at that time under the leadership of the Glendale City
Manager, conducted a needs assessment and service inventory. The
community found itself lacking in all areas of homeless service
provision except in the provision of food and clothing. Viewing the
situation as unacceptable, the City and the Coalition took specific
steps to expand the services available. Their strategy was based on
two premises: 1) that all services provided must be designed to lead
persons to increasing levels of self-sufficiency; and, 2) that the
services offered needed to be comprehensive enough to meet the
needs of the various subpopulations within Glendale’s homeless
community.
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The first step taken toward the realization of this goal was to
build the capacity of both the City and the local non-profits to
address the issue of homelessness. The City now has two, full-time
staff persons with the primary responsibility of developing
resources to make the vision of a fully realized continuum of care a
reality. Service providers, too, have added staff, availed themselves
of training and enrichment opportunities, and learned from one
another in their collaborative endeavors.
Next, the Coalition established priorities in the development
of their continuum of care: 1) a multi-service center including street
outreach and supportive services; 2) emergency shelter; 3)
transitional housing; 4) permanent supportive housing; and 5)
homeless prevention. The Coalition recognized that within each
priority, components that could address the issues faced by special
needs populations needed to be implemented. If Glendale’s
continuum couldn’t assist the “hardest to serve” populations,
homelessness would continue to rise in the City.
Based on these priorities, the City and the Coalition began to
develop resources and pursue funding opportunities. Since 1994,
funds from many sources have been brought to Glendale and
applied to homeless programs, including, but not limited to: CDBG,
ESG, SHP, LA Homeless Initiatives, HOME, City of Glendale
Redevelopment Set-Aside, FEMA, homeless and domestic violence
funding through the State of California, funds from private
foundations, and of course, monies raised through private
fundraising.
Now the City and the Coalition are in the process of
implementing programs that have received funding. Equally
important, however, is the constant monitoring and adaptation of
existing programs to the ever-changing contexts within which
homeless services are delivered, including changing needs within
the homeless population, new services within the continuum, and
the challenges of welfare reform. This on-going process, managed
by the various Committees and working groups within the
Coalition, is the site of effective coordination and collaboration, and
of the vision and creativity needed to combat homelessness. (City
of Glendale, 1998, p. 2-3)
VII. Conclusion
As the entry-point to Glendale’s continuum of care, the successful
development and implementation of both Glendale Services Center (including the
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street outreach component) and Project ACHIEVE were crucial to the success of the
continuum as a whole. The Center was to provide the initial contact and assessment
for homeless individuals and families, identifying their needs and linking them to on
site services that would begin to address the root causes of their homelessness.
Project ACHIEVE would provide an initial residential component, until clients could
demonstrate sufficient progress in their case management plan to warrant
“graduation” to the transitional housing project (also funded under the Supportive
Housing Program) or permanent housing (see Figure 6).
In theory, the multi-agency, collaborative structure of the Glendale Services
Center/Project ACHIEVE would combine the expertise and resources of all the
homeless service providers in the community (including the City) in a rational,
seamless approach to service delivery. But as we shall see in Chapter VII, the multi
agency structure of the Center also proved to be the continuum of care’s greatest
challenge as agencies with radically different organizational structures and cultures
failed to live up to the idealized account of the Center proclaimed in staff reports,
award applications and funding requests. As we will also see, individual players also
positively or negatively affected the outcomes of service development,
implementation and fundraising in ways that public policy documents (and most
social science accounts) regarding service provision never even acknowledge.
Chapter VII will also provide a description of how the NIMBY conflicts around the
siting of the Center and shelter were resolved and the ambiguous role of law
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FIGURE 6
FLOW CHART DEPICTING GLENDALE’ S CONTINUUM OF CARE -1999
CONTINUUM OF CARE
Homeless
Prevention
Catholic Chanties
Permanent and
Permanent, Supportive
Housing
W est Hollywood Community
Housing Corporation
Outreach
Intake
Assessm ent
Verdugo Mental Health Center
The Salvation Army
Catholic Charities
Emergency Shelter
(Short & Long Term)
Institute for Urban Research
and Development
YWCA of Glendale
The Salvation Army
Catholic Charities
Transitional
Housing
YWCA of Glendale/
Verdugo Housing Alliance
Union Station/
Pacific Housing Alliance
The Salvation Army
Supportive
Services
Verdugo Private Industry Council
LA Vets, Inc.
Verdugo Mental Health Center
Community Health Center of Glendale
Glendale Adventist Medical Center
YWCA of Glendale
Catholic Charities
t o
t o
- o
enforcement in the development and implementation of a community-wide strategy
to address homelessness.
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CHAPTER VII: CASE STUDY: AN OBSERVED HISTORY OF THE
GLENDALE SERVICES CENTER
I. Background
The observed version of the history of the Glendale Services Center and
Project ACHIEVE, like everyday life, is much more complicated and elusive than the
public version. It is, of course, also much more susceptible to multiple
interpretations (the public version is but one of these). This observed version can be
compared to the public versions presented in Chapters V and VI to see the necessary
overlap and discrepancies in the public accounts and day to day processes of program
development and implementation. An analysis of these overlaps and discrepancies,
the reasons for them and their consequences, will be discussed in Chapter VIII and
the potential policy implications will be discussed in Chapter IX.
Necessarily, this observed version is my subjective account of what
happened. Much of what happened after October, 1994,1 observed and/or
participated in directly, often exerting as much influence as I could on the process
and outcomes. I have not conducted formal interviews for this history, as I feel to do
so given my current position with the City would place both myself and the
interviewee in an awkward position and possible create a conflict of interest. I am
also relying on the recollection of a few key persons, most notable Dr. Joseph
Colletti from the Institute of Urban Research and Development (and formerly with
Lutheran Social Services). Working with Dr. Colletti on this manuscript is less
awkward only in degree, but in my opinion to a substantial degree, because of our
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relationship. Dr. Colletti and I have had a close personal relationship since 1992, and
I worked for him at Lutheran Social Services in 1993-1994. We have collaborated
on many projects involving homelessness in Pasadena and Glendale, and it was Dr.
Colletti who recommended me for my position in Glendale. So my relationship with
Dr. Colletti has always been closer than the relationships I have established with
other service providers in Glendale, although I feel close to a number of other
persons in the Coalition. The nature of my relationship with him, and his subjective
impressions and recollections, no doubt impact this observed version as well.
Dr. Colletti was very involved in the development of the continuum of care
early on. A student of Dr. Colletti’s in a course he was teaching at Fuller
Theological Center was a member of the Glendale Presbyterian congregation, where
Dr. Roth was pastor. For his class project, the student Jim Milley, wrote a proposal
to operate a Cold Weather Shelter in Glendale. That following year, Glendale
Presbyterian Church and Lutheran Social Services submitted an application to
LAHSA for the first 1993-94 Cold Weather Shelter (see Chapter V). Also, while Dr.
Colletti was not a member of the team who produced the Glendale Task Force on
Homelessness Report, the first articulation of Glendale’s homeless strategy and the
first articulation of the intent and design of the “One Stop”, it was to Dr. Colletti that
City staff turned when they were developing the Task Force Report and looking at
models in other communities. City staff and members of the Glendale Task Force
toured facilities in Pasadena with Dr. Colletti (see Chapter V). Dr. Colletti was also
well acquainted with the Executive Director and Assistant Director of LAHSA, Gene
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Boutillier and Jay Glassman, respectively, and lobbied LAHSA for the appointment
of Dr. Greg Roth to the original LAHSA Commission and for the inclusion of
Glendale in the LA Initiative (see Chapter V). In early 1994, Dr. Colletti arranged a
meeting with key Glendale City staff and service providers with LAHSA Assistant
Director Glassman at Glendale Presbyterian Church. This meeting marked the
beginning of the collaboration of LAHSA and the City with respect to the LA
Initiative and helped to solidify Dr. Roth’s nomination to the LAHSA Commission.
While certainly the input of others, most notably County Supervisor Michael
Antonovich also influenced those decisions, Dr. Colletti’s strong support was no
doubt a factor as well. Also, as I mentioned, it was Dr. Colletti who recommended
me, at that time his Special Projects Coordinator at Lutheran Social Services, to
Glendale to fill their newly created position as a homeless coordinator.
At this time, mid-1994, The Glendale Task Force Report on Homelessness
had been released, as had “Priority: HOME!”, and Glendale was anticipating
receiving a homeless block grant of over $1 million in fiscal year 1995-96 (see
Chapter IV). It was decided that a staff person should be hired to administer the
CDBG and ESG funds already going to homeless programs, to implement the
strategy outlined in the Task Force Report, to provide staff support to the Coalition,
and to administer the new block grant monies. They had advertised the position for a
number o f months, but were unsatisfied with the applicants, who were either service
providers with no administrative experience, or administrators who were not familiar
with homelessness. The position was an hourly, at-will position with no paid leave
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or benefits. After having no success, Glendale staff contacted Dr. Colletti, who
recommended me. While I had been reluctant to apply for the job when I had first
heard about it months earlier, (I though it would interfere with my dissertation, and I
felt I lacked government experience), I decided to apply. I needed the money (even
without benefits, this was the best paying job I had ever had), and I realized that the
experience would contribute to my value as an academic committed to understanding
the relationship between theory and policy. After my initial interview with the
Assistant Director and Administrator for the Block Grant Section of Community
Development and Housing, Jess Duran, and with the Administrative Analyst who
had been handling homeless programs, Jackie Thompkins, I was offered the position,
which I began in October, 1994.
II. The Glendale Services Center Pilot Program
My first assignment was to implement the pilot phase of the Glendale
Services Center, which had now been turned over to The Salvation Army as the lead
agency. Catholic Charities has originally been designated by the Task Force as the
lead agency, and wrote a proposal for a modest amount of fiscal year 1994-95 CDBG
funding for the project. However, at this time the City was spending CDBG funds to
build a new community center to house all of Catholic Charities’ Glendale programs.
This construction project had been complicated by legal and site issues, and had
taken on a complexity and duration which had not been anticipated. It was for this
reason, and because a key staff member at Catholic Charities was leaving, that
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Community Development & Housing staff and Catholic Charities agreed that
leadership of the One Stop should be given to The Salvation Army, which
resubmitted Catholic Charities’ CDBG proposal under its agency. (This all happened
in early 1994, before I arrived.)
The pilot Center was to be located initially in the dining room of The
Salvation Army’s Lord’s Kitchen two afternoons per week (see Figures 7 and 8).
Staffing for the Center was The Salvation Army’s CDBG funded case manager and
Catholic Charities’ ESG funded case manager, a formerly homeless peer counselor—
Thomas Daugherty, mental health staff from Pacific Clinics, and staff from the
Employment Development Department, and the County Department of Public Social
Services1 . Each agency signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Facility Use
Agreement with The Salvation Army and furnished The Salvation Army with
an insurance certificate. The Social Security Administration was unable to execute
these documents, and so promised to work with Center staff at the Social Security
Administration’s offices, which were located across the street. In my capacity as the
City’s new homeless coordinator, I developed all the original forms for the Center
(intake, referral, case notes, client log), and worked out the client flow (from the Peer
Counselor at intake to a general case manager for assessment, before referral to
1 Verdugo Mental Health, which was a founding member of the Coalition, felt that
the presence of Pacific Clinics, which had County funding to do outreach in the
Glendale area, made VMHC's presence at the Center redundant. The Executive
Director at the time, Wayne Jones, however, pledged that his agency would
cooperate in whatever way it could, and it continued to be involved in the other
activities of the Coalition.
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FIGURE 7
EXTERIOR OF THE “ONE STOP” A T THE SAL VA TION ARMY - 1995
Pacific Clinics, DPSS or EDD). Fliers and cards were printed and distributed to the
homeless community. The One-Stop was officially named the “Glendale Services
Center”, and opened its doors on November 1, 1994 (see Chapter VI).
Initially, I spent my Tuesday and Thursday afternoons at the Center. The
flow of clients was erratic; some days 10-15 persons would be waiting to see a case
manager, other days only 1 or 2 clients would show up. The formerly homeless peer
counselor position, at that time held by volunteer Thomas Daugherty, was key to the
Center. In addition to the intake (which was soon turned over to volunteers from
Glendale Community College whenever possible), the peer counselor was to interact,
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FIGURE 8
“ONE STOP” PEER COUNSELOR WITH CLIENT A T THE SAL VA TION ARMY - 1995
informally, with clients while they were waiting for a case manager. The peer
counselor was to essentially conduct outreach, gather information which might be
meaningful for the case manager, and when appropriate, make suggestions regarding
referrals.
The goal of the Center was to provide as many services as possible on-site, to
dispense with the fragmentation of delivery and to keep clients from having to go
from office to office, thereby increasing the possibility o f their falling through the
cracks due to inaccessibility, frustration, or self-sabotage. The location of different
agencies with different areas of expertise (general case management, mental health,
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employment, public benefits) was also supposed to foster an atmosphere of
teamwork and build capacity among the frontline staff. The One-Stop was
intentionally designed to be in one room, so that case managers from different
agencies with different skills could “huddle-up” around a desk with the client to
workout an effective and realistic case plan with clearly defined goals and steps
toward measurable progress. Also, the goal was to link clients to other programs in
the continuum and the community, and to follow-through to make sure that those
linkages were as “seamless” as possible, i.e., to provide advocacy rather than just
referrals. Unfortunately, the only residential components of the continuum in place
at the time, to serve as the vital “next step”, were the YWCA’s crisis shelter for
battered women, The Salvation Army’s Booth House transitional housing program
for families, and hotel/motel vouchers. The opening of the Cold Weather Shelter at
Glendale Presbyterian Church for the second year provided some residential stability
for single men and women. And Thom Daugherty and the Catholic Charities case
manager did conduct outreach for the Center there, as did I. Still it became
increasingly apparent to me that the City of Glendale needed a year-round emergency
shelter, and I committed myself to the goal of seeing that one was developed before I
left the City.
In retrospect, these first several months in Glendale would establish patterns
in my relationship to certain service providers and to my job that would prove to be
very dysfunctional. Under the direction of my superiors at the City, and with their
blessings, I essentially did work that was more properly the purview of the service
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providers, especially the lead agency. The rationale, I think, from the City’s
perspective was that: 1) the providers already had their hands full running their
current programs, and until there were funds for them to hire new staff, they could
not be expected to take on this extra administrative burden; 2) since the One Stop
was a Coalition sponsored project, and was multi-agency in its design, and the City
was one partner among others, this “coordinating” role was appropriate; 3) technical
assistance is viewed as part of any jurisdiction’s administrative responsibility for
grantees of Federal funds; and, 4) frankly, I think there was some concern that the
agencies involved, including the lead agency, might not have the capacity to do what
was necessary in as timely and comprehensive a fashion as the City (and the
Coalition) desired.
I now see the fallacy of these rationales: 1) if agencies cannot handle the
initial design of a program, they probably will not be able to handle the
implementation and ongoing management of the program into the future; 2) the City,
from the Councilmembers and the City Manger down to my supervisors and myself,
was very schizophrenic regarding its role in the Coalition, the continuum, and in
service provision. On the one hand, the City wanted to control the process of design
and implementation, both to ensure quality, efficacy and contract compliance; and, to
be able to foresee and intervene in any potentially sensitive local politics that might
arise. On the other hand, the City definitely did not see itself or want itself to be seen
as a service provider, but as a facilitator, coordinator and administrator, and City staff
wanted the City Council and the public to view the Coalition as the body in charge of
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the continuum, with the City as one partner among others. This was because of a
genuine commitment to, and HUD mandate for, citizen participation. It was also,
however, a way for the City to take political cover if things should get controversial:
“it was the community’s (i.e., the Coalition’s) decision, we (local government) are
just implementing the will of the community.” On the positive side, however, the
original working group of the agencies that were participating in the Center (The
Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, Pacific Clinics, LA County Department of
Public Social Services, the State Employment Development Department, Social
Security Administration and the City) continued to meet regularly and fine-tune the
operation of the Center and to plan the very successful open house in February (see
Chapter VI).
III. Funding The Glendale Services Center
In the meantime, I was concerned about what was going on with the
Initiatives funding at LAHSA. The $2.1 million that had been set-aside between the
five “Access Centers” had not been allocated equally between them, and the Centers
in Glendale and Long Beach were often referred to as “smaller” than those slated to
be located in the City of Los Angeles, causing concern on my part that there was
going to be something other than an even split of the funding (see Chapter V). It was
this concern which prompted my recommendation (based on a suggestion from Dr.
Colletti), that the Mayor speak before the LAHSA commission (see Chapter VI).
This was a very successful strategy, as the newly formed and struggling LAHSA
promoted this appearance of countywide (not just citywide) collaboration. We also
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invited Dr. Boutellier to a meeting of the Glendale Homeless Coalition, where he
spoke of LAHSA’s mission and praised the efforts in Glendale.
Still the issue of how the funds were to be distributed had not been decided.
In addition, $500,000 of the Access Center funding was to go to a service provider
that would provide the centralized intake and referral component, and the computer
database that would link that centers together with LAHSA. This provider was to be
chosen through an Request for Proposal process, but of course the obvious candidate
was INFOLINE, a non-profit which uses their extensive computer database of
services to operate a county-wide information and referral service to homeless and
low-income persons . From my perspective, this meant that whatever funds were
allocated to Glendale would be reduced by a share of the monies to support this
centralized information and referral service. While a centralized, automated case
management system was a long standing goal of the Coalition, the efficacy of a
countywide system was of concern, as was the allocation of a large portion of each
center’s funds to the implementation of the system. I discussed this issue with staff
from the proposed lead agencies of the access centers for Long Beach and West
Hollywood, and all concurred that a more local database would be of greater use and
more cost effective. Also, LAHSA’s insistence on this matter flew in the face of the
“local control” which was supposed to be granted to the participating jurisdictions,
2 InfoLine Executive Director Burt Wallch was so certain that the centralized
information and referral system was a “done deal” that he had actually rented office
space next to the LAHSA offices to accommodate the necessary expansion of
InfoLine.
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and this basically played into existing fears among local governments and service
providers that LAHSA would become an unresponsive “super-agency”. Also, there
were private concerns in Glendale that linking these Centers countywide would
contribute to a “magnet effect” as clients might travel from Center to Center. These
were concerns that I shared, not just because of the local paranoia about the magnet
effect, which had been the predominant argument against the implementation of
homeless programs for over a decade, but also because this made it easier for
overwhelmed or incompetent providers at other Centers to simply refer clients
somewhere else, and because I believed that more often then not, homeless persons
are best served in the area which they consider to be their “home-base”.
Of course, I consulted with LAHSA Commissioner Rev. Greg Roth on this,
as well as the LAHSA Commissioner from Long Beach, Pam Briley. Assistant
Director Jess Duran and I attended several LAHSA hearings on the matter and it was
ultimately decided that an even division of the funds— $420,000 for each access
center—was the most appropriate. This was, no doubt, influenced by
Commissioners Roth and Briley who argued persuasively for such distribution, and
perhaps by the input of County staff and Supervisors. Dr. Boutillier was more
reluctant to give up the plan for centralizing the intake and referral, but in the end
arguments of local control won out and each center was mandated to provide their
own Information and Referral specialist, who would be trained on software that was
to be provided by LAHSA which would facilitate centralized statistical gathering and
tracking of clients. In the end, staff from each of the access centers attended
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trainings on the PRISM software system, but an on-line countywide information and
referral and statistical reporting network was never implemented.
In March, 1995, LAHSA released the Request for Proposal for the access
centers. Although any agency could apply to operate the Glendale access center,
LAHSA had made the approval of “the local community” a selection criteria. Thus it
was pretty much up to the Coalition/City to choose a provider. Jess Duran and I
discussed how we should do this. We could have held our own Request for Proposal
process to choose the provider we would recommend. Instead, it was decided that
since the Coalition itself had participated in the development of the pilot project, and
had already selected The Salvation Army to be the lead agency after Catholic
Charities had stepped aside, that The Salvation Army should be given first refusal
rights. In a meeting with Paul Bandy and Capt. Floyd Bacon, we confirmed that The
Salvation Army was interested in accepting the role as the lead agency and applying
for the funding. Members of the Glendale Homeless Coalition unanimously
concurred at a general meeting, and thus the lead agency for the Center was selected.
At the time, I by and large concurred with this decision, although I had
already come to realize that the quality of case management provided by Catholic
Charities was superior to that offered by The Salvation Army. Still I thought The
Salvation Army had the management ability to implement the program once it was
able to recruit the additional staff. In addition, The Salvation Army had good public
relationship skills. So I thought they would do fine.
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In yet another example of the City’s (and my) blurring the boundaries
between Technical Assistance and co-dependence, I wrote the majority of The
Salvation Army’s proposal (see Chapter VI). The Salvation Army’s Director of
Social Services, Paul Bandy, provided the sections on agency capacity and history,
and wrote the positions descriptions. The rest of the proposal, including the
substantive sections on program design, service delivery, program goals, and the
budget, were authored by me. Paul Bandy and I completed and assembled the
proposal together, and it was approved by The Salvation Army command before
submission to LAHSA. The budget provided funds for 36 months for the operation
of the Center, as well as full-time salary for a Center Manager, Peer Counselor and
an Information and Referral Specialist, and a $2,000 a month subcontract with
Pacific Clinics that would allow an increase in its service level at the Center. In
addition, Paul Bandy would receive $300 per month in salary in compensation for his
oversight responsibilities, and The Salvation Army accounting and administrative
support would draw a small percentage of salary from the grant to cover
administrative costs related to the Center.
These last items, as well as some of the Center’s operations budget, were
actually a way for the local Corps to offset the fact that they need to pass on 11% of
all funds that they receive to their territorial office for administrative costs. This is in
fact one of the key issues facing non-profits, grant funding and service delivery
today. Almost all of the major, nationwide, service providers require their local
offices to pass along a portion of all funds they receive to the parent agency to cover
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administrative costs. This percentage can range from 10 - 30%, depending on the
agency. However, many funding sources do not allow administration costs as
eligible activities, and if they do they limit either the amount (all McKinney funds are
limited to 5%). The kinds of things that can be charged as administrative costs are
limited as well. HUD limits “administration” to the “costs associated with grant
accounting and reporting”, which can be charged either as direct costs (a percent of
staff time) or based on an approved cost allocation plan (most agencies choose the
former method). I have literally had agencies refuse hundreds of thousands of dollars
in grant funding because they could not come up with the tens of thousands in
administration for their parent agency. This is actually one advantage the smaller
grass roots agencies have over the larger non-profits (although they also have
numerous disadvantages too, such as poor name recognition, and inadequate
infrastructure which affects their capacity for public relations, fundraising, legal
services, and maintaining cash flow, the later be a key limitation to program
expansion).
In May, 1995, The Salvation Army was awarded $420,000 for 36 months for
the Glendale Services Center. Unfortunately, there were delays in the execution of
the grant agreements between HUD and LAHSA, and LAHSA and The Salvation
Army (see Chapter VI). The 1995 Super NOFA had taxed both LAHSA and HUD,
and there were administrative problems with the Initiatives. The $2.1 million for the
access centers was only one portion of the $20 million Initiative, which was a multi
faceted and complex endeavor for both HUD and LAHSA. In addition, LAHSA was
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a new agency of both the County and the City of Los Angeles, that had not yet
developed the capacity to carry out all of its administrative responsibilities, and was
saddled with daunting procedural, logistical and political difficulties. LAHSA was in
a difficult position, as an agency of both the City of Los Angeles and the County of
Los Angeles, all agreements had to be approved by both the Los Angeles City
Council and the County Board of Supervisors. The logistics alone were intimidating,
the timing tricky, and that did not even consider the politics.
The grant agreement between LAHSA and HUD was finally executed
December 12, 1995, starting the clock on all of the grants. However, by this time,
only 21 months were left on the grant agreement between LAHSA and HUD.
Program budgets, originally planned for 36 months, were reconfigured to reflect 21
months of service, but they were purposefully heavy at the end, as everyone hoped
for an extension. The agreement between LAHSA and The Salvation Army would
not be executed until September, 1996. (In the end, the funding paid for Center costs
to April 1, 1999, 39.5 months).
IV. The Emergency Shelter And Fernando Court
In the meantime, discussions were initiated regarding the development of a
year-round emergency shelter. Dr. Colletti proposed the funding of a 7-month
emergency shelter program that would operate during the period of time when the
Cold Weather Shelter was not operating. One reason for this approach was
budgetary: there would be a savings of approximately one quarter of the program’s
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budget by running only a seven month program. A proposal was submitted to the
CDBG proposal review board, and received ESG and CDBG funding for fiscal year
95-96 (see Chapter VI).
There were two problems with this approach. First the site proved a major
challenge as there were no existing buildings in Glendale that met the criteria for the
project (around 5000 sq. ft., with showers and restroom facilities, kitchen and office
space). Thus, some rehabilitation would need to be done. But this configuration
would be inadequate for the Cold Weather Shelter, which would need to be much
larger. Even if the Cold Weather Shelter could be held at the National Guard
Armory for no cost, the cost of maintaining the second site during the five months
each year it would not be used would minimize any program savings (not to mention
the political fall-out).
The second problem was even more substantive, and it was the differing
philosophies of the kinds of shelters these two programs needed to be. The Cold
Weather Shelter, after all, was a hypothermia-prevention shelter, designed and
funded to provide minimal services: shelter, food, showers, and safe sanitary
conditions. And although LAHSA was beginning to recognize the need for some
case management, it still insisted (and rightly so) that the Cold Weather Shelters
must take all comers, unless they were unwilling or unable to abide by the shelter’s
basic rules. The proposed 7-month program was a case management program for up
to 40 individuals for up to 60 days. It was designed to accept only those persons who
were willing to abide by a case plan, including staying sober and working toward
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establishing income from public assistance or work So these two shelters were really
separate components of the Continuum of Care, with different target populations.
It did not take long before it became clear to City staff and Dr. Colletti that
the proposed emergency shelter needed to be year round. In addition, Dr. Colletti
suggested that perhaps the emergency shelter and the Glendale Services Center could
be co-located, thereby maximizing the opportunity for coordination (see Chapter VI).
The Salvation Army, the Center Working Committee, the Glendale Homeless
Coalition, my supervisors at the City and the City Manager agreed.
A suitable site was finally located at 437 Fernando Court. The considerations
on finding a site went beyond programmatic criteria and cost per square foot,
although these were important. There were also locational issues as well. Locating
the shelter near residential or retail commercial districts was considered risky,
because of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard). Fernando Court was located in a light
industrial zone at the very south west edge of the city. It was a 7,500 sq. ft. concrete
tilt-up building, with a warehouse in the back and office in front. There was already
a shower on-site (although this would be relocated). And the cost was affordable. It
was owned by Pacific States Box and Basket Company, which also owned proximate
properties. It had housed a carpet company and was currently vacant. I took the City
Manager myself, and he said “perfect”.
Negotiations began on the terms of the lease. A meeting between Dr. Colletti
of Lutheran Social Services and Paul Bandy and Captain Bacon was held with Jess
Duran and myself. The topic was who should sign the lease with Pacific States Box
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and Basket and who would oversee the rehabilitation. This decision would
subsequently determine with whom the Glendale Housing Authority would
ultimately execute any of their agreements. City staff decided it would be cleaner if
just one agency stepped forward to be the leasee and the primary manager of the
rehabilitation project. Both The Salvation Army and Lutheran Social Services said
they would be willing to take the lead. Since the shelter would take up the majority
of the space (6,000 of the 7,500 sq. ft.), and because the majority of the rehabilitation
was related to the portion of the building housing the shelter, it made more sense for
Lutheran Social Services to be the lessee and take the lead in managing the
rehabilitation. It was also decided that in any case, a provision needed to be added to
the lease to allow the agency to “buy-out” if a lack of funding forced either or both
the Glendale Services Center or the emergency shelter to shut down. The term of the
lease was to be the standard 60 months for a commercial lease, however, the
Glendale Services Center was only funded for 21 months, and the shelter only had
operations funded for 7 months, and would probably be, at best, year to year in the
future. (We already knew that emergency shelter operations were specifically
excluded from the Super NOFA programs). Thus, in addition to a 1 month security
deposition, an additional 6-month deposit (a total of $15,300) was to be placed with
the landlord, which would be forfeited in the event the lease was terminated prior to
the 60 month term. These were the condition placed in the Exclusive Negotiation
Agreement (ENA) presented to the Housing Authority (see Chapter VI).
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The ENA with Lutheran Social Services proposed to provide $455,000 in the
form of a subsidy for the program. This is because the funding source,
Redevelopment Set-aside funds, could not be used to pay for the rehabilitation
outright, and could not be used to pay for non-housing programs such as the Center.
Under redevelopment law, “substantial” rehabilitation of a structure (more that 75%
of the structure’s current value) requires that the structure be used for affordable
housing for no less than 10 years. Obviously, this was not feasible given the
structure of the lease. So the City’s Housing Administrator Beth Stochl and I
contacted Glenn Wasserman, a lawyer who specializes in Redevelopment law and
who often consulted for the City. His solution was that we grant the entire amount to
Lutheran Social Services as an operating subsidy for the shelter, which was
completely legal. Lutheran Social Services could, in turn, use that subsidy to
rehabilitate the entire building, including the portion to be used by the Center. This
was, in fact, a creative (and legal) way to get around the 10-year housing affordability
restriction. It was also, we all felt, well within the spirit of the intended use of
Redevelopment funds, which can be used by law to subsidize shelter operations. The
ENA also included funds that Lutheran Social Services could use as an actual
subsidy for the operation of the shelter—up to $50,000 annually for the first five
years—providing that Lutheran Social Services could document that they had sought
other funding sources and still had an operating shortfall. This was a way to close
the funding gap created by converting the program from a 7-month to a year-round
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program. The Housing Authority approved the ENA and the lease was executed July
1,1995.
There were, of course, problems with the site. For example, residential uses
are not permitted in the M-2 Light Industrial Zone in which the building was located.
Fortunately for the project, Glendale is one of the few cities which continues to allow
a use variance. So I began discussions with the City’s Zoning Administrator to
initiate this process. Glendale’s zoning code does not include a use designation for
homeless shelters. After reviewing the use classifications with planning staff, we
determined that the classification of “sanitarium” made the most sense. This
classification was important because, among other things, it impacted the use
variance and the parking requirements (we were two spaces short and thus required a
standards variance for that as well).
The variance process would take several weeks at a substantial cost. It also
presented one of the best opportunities for neighbors who opposed the shelter to
challenge the location. Fortunately, Paul Novak, a planing consultant who was a
Glendale resident, heard about this project and contacted me. He volunteered to
prepare the variance application and the State Environmental Impact Review form
pro bono. While the application is not difficult, it was time consuming since there
are a number of detailed attachments, e.g., floor plans, title search, and photographs.
Novak’s assistant also came up with a rationale for approval of the use variance:
since Glendale’s zoning code contained no use classification for homeless shelters,
then technically shelters would not be an allowed use ANYWHERE in Glendale.
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This would be a clear violation of both State housing law and Federal fair housing
law. Thus, granting the use variance was a necessary remedy.3 This was a strong
argument in favor of the variance, and my discussions with Planning staff made me
confident that it would be granted on it’s merits. However, the project remained
vulnerable to challenge from community opposition.
The other problem was environmental review. Even though we had decided
to use Redevelopment Set-aside funds for the rehabilitation, Federal funds were
going to be used for the operation of the various programs there.4 Since the rules of
aggregation are that basically, one Federal dollar used anywhere in the program
triggers the National Environment Protection Act (NEPA) review process, a Federal
NEPA review was required, in addition to the State CEQA review (California
Environmental Quality Act). Complicating things was the change of use of the site,
and its location in a light industrial area.
Thus, serious environmental issues might exist if some of the neighboring
businesses used or stored toxic chemicals. The noise level from the railroad
approximately 200 yards from the shelter also presented a problem, as did the
location of the site in a non-residential area. The location raised questions about the
3 Of course the real remedy would be amending the zoning code to include such uses,
a recommendation made in the Federally mandated Fair Housing Analysis of
Impediments to Fair Housing conducted for the City by the San Gabriel Valley Fair
Housing Council. This has not happened yet.
4 Using Redevelopment funds meant avoiding Federal Davis-Bacon prevailing wage
requirements which would have applied if we had used CDBG funds, adding as
much as 30% to the construction cost. McKinney funds (Emergency Shelter Grant
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City’s intent to locate a facility for the homeless in a less desirable part of town. This
was my first project, and I was not aware of how serious these concerns really were.
I hired an environmental consultant to conduct a Phase I environmental review,
which is basically document-based research regarding the past uses of the subject
property, and the past and currently uses of surrounding properties within .5 miles.
Fortunately, no environmental hazards were found. Another CD&H staffer
researched all of the activity on the nearby rail lines and street traffic on the nearby
thoroughfares to gather data to determine if we meet the NEPA noise standards for a
residential facility. Fortunately, our site had a very narrow direct sight-line to the
railroad, and no direct sight-line to the street, and it was a one-story building (street
noise is often louder on higher floors because of fewer barriers), therefore, the site
was just under the level allowed for a residential facility. Amazingly we had passed
the NEPA review with no mitigations. I had learned my lesson, you can never
investigate these environmental issues too soon5.
But the major barrier to siting the Center and shelter at 437 Fernando Court
was neighborhood opposition (see Chapter VI). Just after signing the lease, in
August, 1995,1 began outreach to neighboring businesses and property owners.
and Supportive Housing Program) are exempt from Davis-Bacon, a real plus when
using them for new construction or rehabilitation.
5 Although there are substantial costs involved in completing a Phase I
environmental review, so you need to be committed to single site before beginning
the process. However, the problem of how to “tie it up” without obligating any funds
is always tricky, since sellers or landlords are free to accept another offer. Also,
some components required for some reviews (e.g., asbestos or lead-paint
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First, Dr. Colletti and myself met with Bob Deal, who owned the property
immediately adjacent, and across the street from the site. We explained the programs
to Mr. Deal, and he expressed concerns, but was ultimately supportive of the project.
Unfortunately, the other neighbors were not so flexible. I tried to contact every
property owner by telephone, using the county tax assessor’s records. Unfortunately,
I was unable to reach some via telephone or mail.
Next, I personally visited all of the businesses on Fernando Court. Most of
the people I spoke with voiced concerns about ongoing problems: inadequate street
lighting, transients and juveniles cutting the fence at the end of the street to access
the railroad track6 , trash being dumped at the cul de sac, traffic, parking, litter and
vandalism. Some felt that these problems might be exacerbated by the shelter, some
felt that the presence of the shelter and the City’s participation in the project might
make things better. For a few, the Center and shelter were the last straw in what they
perceived to be the City’s lack of concern for them, their businesses, and their
neighborhood. One gentleman, a plumbing contractor diagonally across the street
from the shelter, threw me off of his property after haranguing to me about how the
City (actually the Redevelopment Agency) had forced him to move his business
once, ten years ago, and now this would cause the value of his current property to
plummet. The administrator for a veterinary practice one block away on Los Feliz
assessments) require access to properties that are occupied by tenants, often
impacting delicate negotiations.
6 The other side was undeveloped land in the City of Los Angeles. Now Costco and
Toys R Us occupy the site.
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was adamant that the homeless would vandalize his facility. They had already ruined
flowers he had planted and vandalized his electric meter, shutting of the air
conditioning over a hot weekend and jeopardizing the lives of puppies. The co
owners of a frame shop were convinced that their lives would be jeopardized by
transients waiting in their parking lot after dark. Two other property owners, who
did not operate a business in the area but leased to tenants who did, were concerned
about their property values as well. After fielding a number of phone calls myself,
and after Mayor Rick Reyes received complaints as well, Councilmember Larry
Zarian addressed the issue on his weekly cable show. This merely inflamed the
opposition, so the Mayor called a meeting with the neighbors for the following week:
September 21, 1995. For me, this was the apex of the NIMBY opposition.
At that meeting, eleven neighbors attended. Also in attendance was the
Mayor, the City Manager, a representative from the City Attorney’s office, City Code
Enforcement, Public Services, Neighborhood Services, Traffic and Transportation,
Redevelopment and Management Services staff. Three police officers were in
attendance— the Community Policing (COPPS) Sergeant and the COPPS officer
responsible for Fernando Court, and their Captain. In addition, Jess Duran, Beth
Stochl and I attended, as did Dr. Colletti. We began by once again explaining that
the programs at Fernando Court would be designed to provide services only to those
individuals who were interested in abiding by a case management plan, taking
responsibility for their lives, and acquiring the skills toward self-sufficiency. It
would NOT provide services that would enable homeless persons to live on the
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streets (e.g., food, clothing, showers), those were available elsewhere in the
community. There would therefore be no incentive for persons to hang-out or camp-
out in the area. The new anti-camping ordinance would be a useful tool in this
respect as well. City staff acknowledged the on-going issues in the area, and staff
from the various departments were present, to assist the residents in a plan to
improve the ongoing issues in the neighborhood. The police spoke to the fact that
the 24-hour presence that the Center and shelter would provide would greatly assist
security in the area, and that the area’s COPPS officer would continue to be
responsive to any concerns that would arise, and would work closely with both
CD&H and Center/shelter staff.
The neighbors, however, were not buying any of this. This was, in part,
because all of the reasonable neighbors who were likely to buy rational arguments
were either unconcerned, or had adopted a “wait and see” attitude, and were not at
the meeting. What we were left with were those people, who in my opinion, for
some personal reason were reacting to the siting of this facility on an emotional level.
I think often the issue of homelessness and what they stereotypically represent, brings
up people’s unresolved issues around persons in their own lives, perhaps persons
who had a substance abuse or mental health issue and who were abusive. I think
often people themselves are unaware of the source of their fear, but it is indeed fear,
which motivates their opposition. At Fernando Court, at least, for some it was a
long-standing distrust and dislike of government in general, and the City in
particular, that fed their anger. In any case this process taught me that once you get
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to this point in the process, when the folks who can be persuaded by rational
arguments are no longer active, and you are left with a highly emotional, vocal
minority, the only thing you can do is let them talk. After you have stated you
position, BY NO MEANS DEFEND YOURSELF. If you engage in a defense of
your position, you only prolong an argument you cannot win. It is far better to let the
opposition talk, because sooner or later one of them will make a particularly
offensive statement (the real tip-off that their position relates to a deeper, personal
issue), and the more moderate even among this group will distance themselves from
the extreme. At this point, you have won, and hopefully, the group will have spent
their energy BEFORE you get to a public forum, such as a Housing Authority
meeting. And even if the most extreme remain, by that time they will not make a
credible case for themselves.
This, by and large is what happened. Interestingly, the neighbors’ new tactic
was, of course, they were not against homeless programs, and ours sounded like a
good one. But the same conditions they had been citing as unsafe for the business
owners, were also unsafe for the homeless people who would be coming to use the
facility; they were opposing the location of the shelter out of concern for the
homeless. Well, of course the City’s response was that neighborhood improvements
would be developed would mitigate these issues. So at that point in the meeting, the
previous arguments came up (property values, safety, loitering, parking, littering),
and as time went on, their points became repetitive, contradictory, and more and
more extreme. This all came to an end when in response to one of the neighbors,
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who by this time was complaining that he would be bothered by all the shelter
residents stopping by his business to look for a JOB, the City Manager turned to him
and with a look that would have cowed me, said “Because we have determined that
this is the best place for it, and that this is where it is going to go.” Opposition to the
shelter continued, and peaked again in January prior to the final Housing Authority
approval of the funding for the project (see Chapter VI), but the neighbors never
opted to do anything beyond vocalizing their concerns. They did not take actions to
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challenge the Variance or Environmental processes .
From September through May of 1996, we held half a dozen more meetings
with the neighbors to develop and implement the Neighborhood Improvement Plan
for Fernando Court. Ultimately, this process was given to another CD&H staffer,
which was good because she could be the “good guy” foil to me. Everyone still
opposed to the shelter had (rightly) identified me as its biggest supporter at the City.
In the end, the City made the following improvements to the neighborhood, much of
it paid for with CDBG funds (these improvements, and the “citizen participation
process” were also helpful in making the case for the environmental review):
• 8 additional street lights were added and existing lights were increased in their
wattage. Malfunctioning lights were repaired;
7 The variance challenge would have cost the group $485 for the appeal; a letter to
HUD would have been free. These actions would probably only delayed the process,
however, since the City Council was the body who would hear the appeal; and,
because our environmental review was, in the end, strictly by the book.
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• The chainlink fence at the cul de sac at the west end of Fernando Court was
replaced by an 8 ft. wrought-iron like fence with outriggers (this required
coordination with Metropolitan Transportation Authority);
• Parking zones were changed at the request of neighbors, and new signage
prohibit parking from 2 - 6 am was provided;
• Neighborhood services responded to litter-abatement calls;
• The COPPS unit worked with neighbors on crime prevention strategies and
requested extra night ticketing patrols;
• The curb and the end of Fernando Court were replaced and drainage improved:
• Sidewalks were repaired.
By the time the shelter opened, only one of the neighbors came to the meeting
to tour the facility, and was very complimentary. By and large I think the neighbors
found that conditions in the neighborhood had improved, and the Center/shelter’s
major impact was pedestrian traffic and people asking for directions. Some
grumbled that it took the project to get the City to pay attention to them. The
neighboring business owner who threw me off of his property later hired a shelter
resident, who moved into permanent housing nearby.
V. Public Health And Safety And Street Outreach
Another key to understanding the development of the continuum of care, and
the development of the programs at Fernando Court, is the other side of the
“balanced approach” articulated in the Task Force Report (see Chapter V). One side
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of the approach was the development of a system of homeless service delivery to
address the needs of homeless persons in the community. The other side was the
development and enforcement of strategies, including ordinances criminalizing
particular behaviors, that would address public health and safety issues that were
associated with the homeless population: panhandling, encampments, public
drinking, loitering, etc.
In my opinion, it was the desire of City management to develop and enact
such ordinances, and to respond to complaints from residents and business owners
about the increasing presence of homeless persons, that was at the root of City
Manager Dave Ramsay’s initial overture to the Coalition. The recent court decision
regarding the anti-camping ordinance in Santa Ana had been researched by the
Glendale City Attorney, and the finding was that court challenges to such ordinances
were likely to be mitigated by 1) well written ordinances which were not overly
vague and which clearly addressed behavior, rather than status; and 2) a viable
alternative to the behaviors which, without such an alternative, could be construed as
the exercise of either free speech (panhandling), or necessary to the pursuit of daily
life and travel (sleeping in public).
It was pretty clear back in the early 1990s that Glendale really could not argue
that such viable alternatives to behaviors such as camping or sleeping in public
existed in the community, and thus in order to avoid having any ordinances be
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overturned in court, social services needed to be developed8. However, the City
Manager and the City Council were very concerned about two things: 1) the magnet
effect—the fact that increased services would draw homeless people from other
communities into Glendale, thereby exacerbating the homeless problem (another
reason why a low-tolerance for certain behaviors such as panhandling, public
drinking, and encampments, was an important part of the equation, as this would
perhaps discourage an increased presence of the street of persons who come to
Glendale from other communities for services); and, 2) that when and if the current
largess of Federal funding for homeless programs ran out, that service providers and
the public would look to the City to continue funding these programs out of the
General Fund.
I myself was ambivalent about the balanced approach. I certainly was not in
favor of criminalizing homelessness, and I worried that the approach of some
individual police officers toward the homeless might border on harassment. On the
other hand, I had come to realize that programs and attitudes that enable homeless
persons to live relatively “comfortably” on the streets perpetuate homelessness. I had
come to realize that for the most chronic homeless persons, (those with the most
devastating personal experiences and psychological issues which made living on the
streets preferable to addressing those issues), things had to get very uncomfortable
8 While I do think addressing the public health and safety issues was a significant
motivator for Dave Ramsay and the City Council to support homeless programs, 1
also believe that for Ramsay and some of the Council, providing services was also
viewed as the right thing to do.
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for them before they would even consider seeking services. The problem with many
punitive approaches to homelessness was that they would attempt to place persons in
that “uncomfortable” position through constant enforced mobility and interaction
with authorities, yet not offer them a viable, and professional social service
alternative. The worst thing, I thought, was to convince the chronic homeless to give
services a try, and then only be able to take them so far, in which case, they would be
out on the streets, and much less likely to try services again when they “bottomed-
out” the next time. In Glendale, I thought, maybe we could do both: develop a
comprehensive system of services that would really represent a viable alternative;
and, adopt a low-tolerance for behaviors that were unacceptable from any community
member. It was also , in my opinion, demeaning to homeless persons (or any group)
to hold them to a lower standard than anyone else. So I decided to support the public
health and safety components of the strategy, although I also realized that I did not
have a choice. It was what the City Manager wanted. And I also knew instinctively
that it was politically unwise to go against the police (unless you really have to). No
only is it unlikely that you can win, the police can, in fact, be your biggest ally as
they were with the neighbors at Fernando Court. (But their support was also
motivated by the knowledge that the Center and shelter were necessary to get the
ordinances that they wanted passed.)
The first municipal ordinance to be passed with the support of the Glendale
Homeless Coalition was an obvious choice. Glendale did not have an ordinance
banning drinking in public, except in the public parks. Even I could support whole-
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heartedly an ordinance which made drinking in public view anywhere in the City an
offense (with some exceptions for outdoor restaurants). The Public Health and
Safety Committee of the Coalition, which was chaired by Police Chief, and of which
Dave Ramsay was a member, presented that ordinance to the Council. Members of
the Coalition sat in the audience in support, and the collaboration was stressed in the
presentation by police.
The next ordinance was a bit more difficult for me to support, and that was
the anti-camping ordinance. Many meetings took place to draft this ordinance. A
working committee including myself, the COPPS officers, the City Attorney, Dr.
Colletti, Thom Daugherty and others met several times to hammer out the language.
In the end, the ordinance banned “camping”. Not coincidentally, although the
ordinance was ready in the Fall of 1996, and received Council approval in October,
1996, it was not to go into effect until January, 1997, after the emergency shelter and
Center opened.
The other key to the public health and safety strategy was the Street Outreach
program. I was a great believer in the efficacy of a really good street outreach
program. As I saw it, the team would be comprised of a formerly homeless person
who had received training in case management, mental health and/or substance abuse
services; and a professional case manager, similarly trained. They would patrol the
streets, going to areas where homeless persons congregated, and would begin to build
rapport. The goal, of course, was to literally transport homeless persons to the
Glendale Services Center, where they would begin to develop a plan which would
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effect their entry into the continuum of care. The street outreach team would also
work closely with the police. My intention was that before persons were charged
with ordinances, street outreach could intervene, either connecting the person with
services, or convincing them it was in their best interest to stop behaving in an illegal
manner, or to do it somewhere else for a while.
The police really bought into this. They knew it was true, as I had pointed
out in many talks before patrol officers at roll-call or trainings, that the police were
often called to interact with homeless persons in situations that called for social
service intervention, and not law enforcement. The police are not equipped for this,
and their time is better spent elsewhere, so even the most empathetic amongst them
would often become frustrated with chronic offenders and opt for the arrest, or at
least exerting pressure for people to move on. Street outreach, I argued, could be
called instead of the police in these situations, or could be called by the police to
relieve them.
I also felt that street outreach could do a lot for community education and
public relations. For example, they could educate businesses about how to prevent
problems with homeless persons (often, people who complain about loitering are
actually doing something to encourage it: providing food, leaving recyclables in an
unlocked trash bin, etc.); and, how to appropriately handle what problems might
arise. I felt in this way, street outreach could be a real asset to local, private
fundraising for Coalition activities (something that Dave Ramsay was also always
pushing).
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I was always careful to point out that a street outreach team did not have a
magic wand: they could not make homeless people disappear, and they had no way of
forcing people to interact with them or with other programs in the continuum. But
they were, “a visible and appropriate response” to the most visible homeless
population on the streets, often the most difficult to serve. These visible, chronically
homeless persons were the segment of the homeless population that the public
wanted to see something done about. And even if a street outreach team could not
make them go away, they would give the public and the police someone to call, and
the public could then see that something was being done, even if it was just the
process of building rapport or temporarily moving people along. And as I pointed
out, for the most chronic and complicated cases, the consistent contact and rapport
with the street outreach team was the only hope we ever had of connecting them with
more substantive services.
Initially, Joe Colletti and I wrote a grant to the Homeless Innovative
Programs grant in 1994 for a team that would serve the cities of Pasadena and
Glendale. When this grant was not funded, the Glendale Homeless Coalition made
street outreach the number one priority for the 1996 NOFA, the first submitted by the
City (see Chapter VI).
The program was to be sponsored by West Hollywood Homeless
Organization (WHHO), and even though some of the Glendale providers were
concerned that an outside agency was coming in, WHHO’s experience in doing
outreach in the West Hollywood and Hollywood area (the territory of their current
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program reached to Los Feliz, almost to the Glendale border), and the fact that the
Executive Director and Program Manager of WHHO were both Glendale residents
helped.
Providers were concerned about an outside agency for several reasons: 1) that
they would not know the programs and clients in Glendale and therefore would not
do as good a job providing services as a local agency9; 2) that an outside agency
wouldn’t have the commitment to Glendale that a local agency, that had been here a
long time, would; and, if things didn’t go right, they could just pick up and leave1 0 ;
and, 3) that another agency involved in Glendale’s continuum would mean that yet
another piece would need to be sliced from the funding pie1 1 .
I worked with WHHO in developing its proposal, and its program manger
Daniel Millar was terrific to work with. WHHO’s Executive Director had been the
Vice President of Lutheran Social Services while I had worked for Joe Colletti in
Pasadena. WHHO wrote a great proposal which included partnering with Verdugo
Mental Health Center to serve the chronically mentally ill. By the Fall of 1996, we
were notified that the street outreach programs was one of three Glendale programs
to be funded under the 1996 NOFA. I was thrilled, I felt with a good street outreach
9 Food for Body & Soul and Thom Daugherty in particular felt this way. They
actually considered applying. When asked I explained that I thought the major
problem was whether their newly formed agency would be able to answer the
capacity questions in a manner that was appropriate for a nation-wide competition.
They actually concurred that this was a problem.
1 0 This was Sylvia Hines of the YWCA’s concern, she turned out to be prescient.
1 1 The fact that the pie was getting noticeably larger through the NOFA monies,
temporarily quelled these concerns.
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team, an access center and an emergency shelter, we were developing the beginnings
of an effective entry-point to the continuum of care. I continued to work for WHHO
during the Technical Submission process. Unfortunately, Daniel Millar moved out
of state, but I continued to work directly with Executive Director Frank Paradise on
implementing the program.
Complicating things, was that, unbeknown to me, Verdugo Mental Health
had received some 1995 Super NOFA money through a program in the west valley,
Hillviews, that had applied under LAHSA to do outreach to the mentally ill. Pacific
Clinics was also receiving County funds to do outreach in Glendale, which I did
know. I was hoping that they would continue to provide their services at the Center,
but they were still intent on working on the streets. As a result, somehow we had
ended up with three street outreach programs, two part-time and one full-time. We
had a planning meeting, and cobbled out a coordination plan, but I was very
concerned about the duplication of services and confusion among the homeless and
the public about who was doing street outreach.
Then, just as we were getting ready to get Housing Authority approval to
execute the necessary agreements with HUD and WHHO, Frank Paradise, the
Executive Director of WHHO, dropped a bombshell—he wanted to pull out of the
program. WHHO had received funding from LAHSA under the LA Homeless
Initiatives to operate the Hollywood access center, and 1996 NOFA funding for
transitional housing. As a result, the organization’s capacity was stretched.
Furthermore, WHHO had, like The Salvation Army, experienced long delays in
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receiving its reimbursements from LAHSA, creating a cash flow burden at the
agency. Frank had insisted that under the contract with Glendale, that WHHO
receive its funds in advance. Unfortunately, that is against Federal regulations,
which require that all funds be paid on a reimbursement basis. I called HUD and
discussed it with them, and they said, absolutely not. I met with our grants
administrator in the Finance Department, and she was willing to bend a bit to allow
WHHO to submit bi-monthly billings (some of the costs would be projected by a
couple of days, but the check technically would not be cut until after the billing
period), meaning that WHHO would only be fronting two weeks of expenses at any
point in time. I explained this to Frank, and personally guaranteed that we would
work out a process to ensure that they were paid in a timely matter. Frank, at first
agreed, but then said his Board of Directors would not go along with it. I think Frank
just changed his mind and did not want to do the project, especially now that Daniel
Millar was gone. So the day we were to go to the Housing Authority to get
authorization to execute the agreement, Frank pulled out. I was angry. We pulled
the item from the agenda.
The obvious choice, at this point, was to offer Verdugo Mental Health Center
the opportunity to run the program. They were partners in the original grant, had the
Hillsides money, and they were a local mental health provider that was a founding
member of the Glendale Homeless Coalition. After meeting with them and
reviewing the program, they agreed and I worked with them to submit a revised
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Technical Submission to HUD. Upon approval by HUD, we received authorization
to enter into the necessary agreements from the Housing Authority.
VI. Site Development
Really, the rehabilitation of Fernando Court, once we dealt with HUD and the
neighbors, was like most other rehabilitation projects: full of changes and all of them
costing money (see Figure 9). And, at an initial estimated cost of $189,700, the
budget was relatively modest. But that was only the first estimate provided by a
general contractor, after we hired an architect the estimate rose to $350,000,
including $50,000 for furnishings. This upped the total subsidy to $615,300, a
$160,300 increase. We had all suspected the cost would rise once the architect came
on board (we had considered design-build, but decided the project was too
complicated for that). The Housing Authority approved this increase (see Chapter
VI), but in the end the project was even more expensive, due to change orders and
higher than anticipated furnishings costs. This caused Lutheran Social Services (and
then IURD) to spend CDBG and ESG funds earmarked for shelter operation on
rehabilitation and furnishings. The access center was furnished through Los Angeles
Initiatives funding. The budget was not helped by the fact that construction did not
start until the summer of 1997, and Lutheran Social Services was, and would
continue to, pay rent on an empty building.
VII. Change Of Provider
When Dr. Colletti announced that he was leaving Lutheran Social Services in
June of 1996 to form his own non-profit corporation, I was deeply concerned. I
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FIGURE 9
FLOOR P L A N - 437 FEN ANDO COURT
REF. FR
C
_ O D
437 Fernando Court
1. Dormitory (Project ACHIEVE)
2. Common Area (Project ACHIEVE)
13
14
to
o \
oo
3. Men's Restroom/Showers (Project ACHIEVE) 15
4. Women's Restroom/Showers (Project ACHIEVE) 16
5. Laundry (Project ACHIEVE) 17
6. Kitchen (Project ACHIEVE) 18.
7. Case Management Office (Project ACHIEVE) 19.
8. Case Management Office (Project ACHIEVE) 20
9. Children's Play Area (Project ACHIEVE and Center) 21
10. Staff Lounge (Project ACHIEVE and Center) 22.
11. Catholic Charities Office 23.
(Project ACHIEVE and Center) 24.
12. Verdugo Mental Health Center Office (Center)
Verdugo Mental Health Center Office
(Center)
Verdugo Mental Health Center Office
(Center)
Waiting Area (Center)
Health Clinic (Center)
Men's Restroom (Center)
Women’ s Restroom (Center)
Employment Specialist-City Office (Center)
The Salvation Army Office (Center)
Housing Placement - City Office (Center)
Reception (Center)
Client Phone/Work Area (Center)
Street Outreach-VMHC Workstation (Center)
knew this was going to happen because Dr. Colletti had shared with me his
dissatisfaction with Lutheran Social Services for a long time. And while the
organization was generally supportive of Dr. Colletti, particularly of his efforts in
Glendale, there was a lot of pressure on Area Directors to raise all of the funds in
support of their local projects, in addition to providing a portion of the funds raised
by in the area to the corporate headquarters to pay for administrative costs. In return,
Lutheran Social Services provided infrastructural support, but Dr. Colletti was
growing increasingly dissatisfied with the services he was receiving from the
corporate offices. If he was going to have to raise all of this money anyway, why not
do so for his own organization? Thus, he began the process of beginning his own
non-profit corporation: the Institute for Urban Research and Development (IURD),
which he viewed as having a mission beyond just service provision: an arena to
combine academic research, public policy analysis, citizen participation and
empowerment through internships, a non-profit incubator, with direct service
provision.
Dr. Colletti’s leaving Lutheran Social Services was such a concern to me
because it was he, as the Area Director, who had initiated and directed LSS’s
involvement with Glendale’s continuum. I had also worked for Lutheran Social
Services, and I worried that LSS would not hire an Area Director who shared Dr.
Colletti’s vision of the future of homeless programs. Dr. Colletti was a leader among
the service providers when it came to promoting the view that homeless services
needed to be rethought, professionalized, and adapted to put the clients first. He also
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thought that services that enabled the homeless to live on the streets actually
benefited the providers and volunteers more than clients, and that the bar needed to
be raised as agencies became more professional in their management and delivery of
services (the City, Catholic Charities and the YWCA also shared a similar vision for
the continuum). After Dr. Colletti’s resignation, Lutheran Social Services decided to
close down its office in Pasadena, and to scale back its participation in homeless
service delivery not only in Glendale, but also in Pasadena, where they had been for
quite a number of years. As a result, we needed to find a new provider for both the
emergency shelter and the 1995 transitional housing project funded through LAHSA.
Lutheran Social Services was willing to hire Dr. Colletti as a consultant to continue
to manage the rehabilitation at Fernando Court, and assist with the transition to
another operator (see Chapter VI).
The City decided to hold a Request for Proposal process to select the shelter
operator. A number of agencies attended the Bidder’s conference: Verdugo Mental
Health Center (VMHC), Union Station Foundation, L. A. Family Housing
Corporation, IURD and Food for Body and Soul. I was pleased with the turnout:
Union Station and L. A. Family Housing Corporation were both large non-profits
from adjacent communities having experience running emergency shelters; Verdugo
Mental Health Center was the local mental health service provider and a founding
member of the Coalition; Food for Body and Soul (FFB&S) was a local, all
volunteer non-profit originally formed to cook meals and offer a church service on
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Sundays, the only day that The Lord’s Kitchen (at The Salvation Army) was not
available to homeless people for a meal.
FFB&S was founded by David Earle, a local attorney, and Kitty Galt, a
volunteer who had been hired by Dr. Colletti and Lutheran Social Services to manage
the Cold Weather Shelter in the 1994-95 and 1995-96 seasons. During the 1995-96
season, Dr. Colletti had begun to be concerned about the management of the Cold
Weather Shelter, particularly with how Ms. Galt was handling the program’s
relationship with the National Guard staff at the Armory. The National Guard
Sargent, frustrated by what he perceived as Ms. Galt’s attempts to avoid any
discussion of the Guard’s concerns, would repeatedly call Dr. Colletti and me. Other
concerns about Ms. Galt’s management of staff and finances were also voiced by Dr.
Colletti. Prior to this, there had been some discussion about Ms. Galt managing the
new, year-round emergency shelter under Dr. Colletti and Lutheran Social Services.
The concerns about her management of Cold Weather Shelter and the withdrawal of
Lutheran Social Services from the project, however, made that possibility appear
unlikely. Thom Daugherty, the Peer Counselor at the Center, was also a volunteer
and board member of FFB&S, and was its representative at the Bidder’s Conference.
Unfortunately, the funds available from the City for the operation of the first
year of the shelter totaled $124,000. Union Station and L. A. Family Housing Corp.,
in particular, expressed concern that this was not enough to operate the program
(which we knew), and pressed for the City’s position on committing more funds for
the program. I stuck with the party line: that the City was funding approximately
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50% of the shelter’s operation, which was actually an unusually high percentage.
Local government was not financing anything like that kind of percentage to these
agencies’ existing shelter programs (which they had to admit was true). The City, I
said, expected this program to be a public-private partnership and thus was relying on
the service provider to do their share in fundraising. Needless to say, Union Station
and L. A. Family Housing were not impressed. They had both received money for
non-emergency shelter program expansions in the 1995 Super NOFA and had
applications in the 1996 competition. These programs, if funded by HUD, would
receive full funding for three years, therefore placing much less of a fundraising
burden on these agencies than running our emergency shelter would. Thus, theses
agencies’ desires to expand were already being met, and neither agency wanted to
increase the already daunting amount of private money they had to raise on an annual
basis. Verdugo Mental Health Center, as staff explained to me later, had no
experience with operating a housing program, and while they were interested in
helping out, they were not ready to venture into the residential arena at this time.
That left IURD and FFB&S. While Jess Duran, Madalyn Blake and I
believed that Dr. Colletti had the personal vision, talent and commitment to run the
shelter program, there were concerns about giving the program to a new agency.
There was no funding or management history, the Board of Directors was newly
formed, and there were questions about infrastructure and operational issues such as
cash flow and accounting systems. These were also concerns that Dr. Colletti shared,
and really he was looking to broaden his horizons beyond straight service provision.
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Nevertheless, Dr. Colletti had a personal commitment to this project, as he had
initiated it, and he and I had agreed that if no other qualified agency submitted a
proposal to operate the shelter, his agency would, shortfall and all.
I had spoken with Union Station, L. A. Family Housing and VMHC and I
knew they were not going to submit proposals. The weekend before the proposals
were due I though that the IURD was going to be the only submission, and worried
about how we were going explain to the Housing Authority the wisdom of giving
such a controversial and costly project, with a funding shortfall, to a brand new
agency. That Sunday night I received a phone call, at home, from Kitty Galt,
wanting to know if IURD was going to submit a proposal to operate the shelter. I
told her that I thought so. She told me that FFB&S had not planned to submit a
proposal, but at a “Days of the Verdugo” parade in Glendale over the weekend, she
had run into City Manager Dave Ramsay who had asked her if FFB&S was going to
apply, and suggested that they should. Now I do not know if Dave Ramsay was
trying to be polite, if he wanted to ensure that there were two applications for
appearances, or if he thought FFB&S actually had the capacity to operate the shelter.
In any case his remark was the catalyst for FFB&S to initiate a last minute response
to the Request for Proposal.
As I was told by FFB&S, they spent all day Monday writing the proposal at
David Earle’s law office. Thom Daugherty and Tracy Fletcher who were The
Salvation Army employees but also Advisory Board members of FFB&S, helped out.
FFB&S turned its proposal in just before the 5:00 p.m. deadline. I was floored.
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First, I was irritated by FFB&S’s cavalier attitude toward the Request for Proposal
process— Dr. Colletti had been working for two weeks on his proposal and FFB&S
had cobbled their response in a day. But when I read the proposal I knew how they
had managed their rapid response: the proposal was, almost word for word, a cut and
paste from Lutheran Social Services’ original proposal for the 7-month shelter, of
which Kitty obviously had a copy. There was one important difference, however. In
order to close the funding shortfall, they suggested that the emergency shelter be run
with minimal staff, mainly volunteers, and that all of the case management functions
be handled at the Glendale Services Center.
I was outraged. I argued to Jess Duran that FFB&S’s proposal should be
disqualified, as it had plagiarized Dr. Colletti’s proposal. Jess demurred, saying
FFB&S could argue that it did not need to “reinvent the wheel”, and that we had to
consider its proposal. I was genuinely outraged, I argued that I had failed students in
my Freshman Writing classes for less flagrant violations than this. Still, we could
not exclude them from the process; and, Jess and I both felt that their proposal had
another fatal shortcoming: the lack of professional staffing and case management at
the shelter. If the process worked as it should, they would be disqualified on that,
substantive, basis.
The proposal review committee consisted of Maria Melchor of Catholic
Charities, Paul Bandy o f The Salvation Army and Jess Duran. The committee
interviewed both agencies, and FFB&S’s response to the question (posed by Maria)
about the similarity of the proposals was precisely: “we didn’t feel a need to reinvent
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the wheel”, the concept for the emergency shelter had been approved by the
Coalition, and so they responded in-kind. They also justified their staffing as
realistic given the funds available. IURD provided a more substantive staffing and
case management plan for the shelter, albeit with a funding shortfall of over
$100,000. Dr. Colletti claimed he would raise as much of that shortfall as possible,
and he vowed he would keep the shelter open until the last penny was spent. In the
end, Maria and Jess felt that the FFB&S proposal did not represent the kind of shelter
and the professional level of services that had been envisioned by the Coalition and
that was consistent with the continuum of care. Paul was more ambivalent because
of the cost savings, but in the end concurred with Jess and Maria. The committee
voted to recommend the IURD to the whole Coalition, and with its approval, to the
Housing Authority as the new shelter operator.
At the September 18, 1996 meeting of the Glendale Homeless Coalition, the
recommendation of the proposal review committee was reported to the Coalition.
David Earle raised questions about the process, claiming that the general Coalition as
a whole had not been involved enough and was being asked to rubber-stamp the
decision of a few persons. Other Coalition members observed in response that this
was how the Coalition was supposed to work, that certainly the whole Coalition
could not review the proposals, and that the larger Coalition had to trust those who
were appointed to the proposal review committees to keep the overall vision of the
Coalition and the continuum in mind. The discussion then turned to the relative
merits of the proposals, with Jess and Maria trying to explain the rationale for their
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decision, which I think was lost on many of the non-service providers. But Sylvia
Hines, the Executive Director of the YWCA, understood their concerns and made an
articulate distinction between a volunteer-based organization, like FFB&S, and one
based on professional service delivery. While she argued that both were important,
for the emergency shelter it was the latter which was most appropriate. The
Coalition then took a vote, with only four people (all FFB&S and one COPPS
officer), voting against recommending IURD to the Housing Authority.
While I certainly agree with the outcome, and feel that the situation was
handled as well as possible given the circumstances, David Earle’s contentions did
raise important issues. I think he felt that the committee had been stacked against
him, which was in part, true. But it was not in any personal way (even though I,
personally was angered by the way FFB&S had approached the Request for Proposal
process). The process was manipulated to the extent that it was because City staff
(Jess Duran and myself) truly believed that FFB&S proposal did not represent an
approach that was in line with the Coalition’s vision of the continuum and the shelter
program. And I did know that Maria Melchor from Catholic Charities felt the same
way and this was why she was on the committee. Although Paul Bandy was friendly
toward FFB&S, I also knew that Maria and Jess would be able persuade him of the
merits of their argument in the end.
The Housing Authority approved IURD as the new shelter operator at a
meeting held November 19,1996 (see Chapter VI). Because the costs of the
rehabilitation were eating into the operations funds, and because of the funding
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shortfall, I proposed that we restructure the operating subsidy to allow IURD to
spend some of the fifth year Redevelopment operating subsidy during what was now
the second year of the subsidy period (the first year’s funds were spent on rent and
utilities), thereby closing the funding shortfall. Even though the Housing Authority
unanimously agreed to both the approval of IURD and this restructuring of the
subsidy, behind the scenes Authority members were concerned about the Institute’s
capacity to raise the funds, given its newness. City Manager Dave Ramsay was a big
supporter of the continuum of care and of the shelter program, and I believe he had a
big influence behind the scenes in orchestrating the authorization of the IURD as the
shelter operator, as did CD&H Director Madalyn Blake. One condition of the
Authority’s approval was that IURD form a local advisory board to assist them in the
fundraising, which frankly, IURD had planned to do anyway. Dave Ramsay
suggested several persons for that advisory board, in part so he could have inside
information about the financial status of the program as time went on.
VIII. Opening The Programs
The Center — After the execution of the grant agreement with LAHSA, The
Salvation Army hired the Center Manager, Tracy Fletcher, who had formerly worked
for the American Red Cross (see Chapter VI). The Center continued to operate on a
pilot basis at The Salvation Army, and a health clinic sponsored by Glendale
Adventist Family Practice Residency and other health care providers, began
operation one afternoon a week on March 19,1996. I was relieved that the Center
Manager had been hired, because both Paul Bandy and I had become too busy to
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monitor the operation of the pilot program and to plan for the expansion of the
Center’s operations once the rehabilitation of Fernando Court was completed.
During the pilot phase there had already been some conflict between Catholic
Charities and The Salvation Army staff, and it seemed clear to me that the Center
working group needed to begin meeting again in order to plan for the Center
expansion, and to develop written policies and procedures. I decided, however, in
order to streamline the process, that Maria Melchor from Catholic Charities, Tracy
Fletcher, Paul Bandy and I should meet initially to begin the planning process and
develop a draft of policies and procedures that could be presented to the larger
working group. To this end, the four of us met over lunch in August, 1996, and spent
several hours brainstorming the outline for draft policies and procedures. When we
left that meeting, Ms. Melchor and I both thought it was clear that The Salvation
Army would begin the production of a draft based on the notes from the meeting.
We scheduled a follow-up meeting for a week later.
At this follow-up meeting, I was shocked to find that nothing had been done
by The Salvation Army, and I subsequently called Paul Bandy and expressed my
concern that no progress had been made. He explained that he had not realized that
Maria and I had expected Tracy to do the work, and apologized. I explained that I
thought that developing these policies and procedures was clearly under the purview
o f the lead agency, however, Maria, the working committee, and I were happy to
help. I ended the conversation by telling him he should call me when he and Tracy
had made progress based on our initial meeting. Paul never called. At the time, I
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was completely overwhelmed working on the change of shelter operator and the
rehabilitation at Fernando Court, and I was very frustrated by The Salvation Army’s
non-response. I had come to realize that I had developed a pattern of doing their
work for them, and I already had too much on my plate to take responsibility for
drafting the policies and procedures. Besides, I felt that now that the Center Manager
had been hired, developing the policies and procedures for the full-time operation of
the Center was the responsibility of the lead agency. Indeed, not only was the Center
Manager being paid from the LA Homeless Initiatives funding, but Paul Bandy's
salary was also being augmented from those funds to cover his increased
responsibilities vis a vis the Center.
Yet, as time progressed, it became clear that no policies procedures were not
being developed by The Salvation Army staff. In a telephone conversation I
expressed my frustration to Dr. Colletti, telling him that I had decided that I was just
going to let the development of the policies and procedures go until the rehabilitation
was done and the Center opened full-time at Fernando Court. I was simply to
overwhelmed by my other responsibilities (including overseeing the development of
Glendale's first Super NOFA submission, see Chapter VI). Dr. Colletti agreed that
that sounded like a reasonable strategy, given my workload.
By September, The Salvation Army and LAHSA had finally executed a sub
recipient agreement, however there was additional paperwork involved in drawing
down reimbursements for costs incurred by The Salvation Army since December
1995. The construction at Fernando Court had been deliberately phased, in
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anticipation that the Center would be able to open before the shelter, and could do so
even while work continued in the back of the building. The front of the building was
ready to go in September, 1996, but The Salvation Army delayed the move and
expansion because of the cash flow problems caused by the delayed execution of the
12 *
grant and the processing of their first, large reimbursement. The Salvation Army
was unwilling to put out the additional funds necessary for start-up, which were
substantial and included furnishings and equipment, until it received payment from
LAHSA. Tracy was handling these aspects of the program, with the assistance of
Thom Daugherty, who was hired as the Peer Counselor (he had been working for the
pilot program as a volunteer since November, 1994). Finally, Madalyn Blake
pressured Paul Bandy to have the Center open by November 1, 1996. And sure
enough, on November 4, 1996 the Center opened, albeit with tables and folding
chairs borrowed from the Lord’s Kitchen (see Chapter VI).
In anticipation of the Center opening, I met with Paul Bandy, Tracy Fletcher,
Thom Daugherty, Maria Melchor and The Salvation Army and Catholic Charities
case managers to discuss the plan for opening the Center and finally, the policies and
procedures for operation. Unfortunately, the majority of our conversation revolved
around the Center's operating hours! Tracy proposed that the Center open from 9:00
to 3:30, and close for lunch between 12:30 and 1:00. I was floored. This meant that
1 2 LAHSA was having serious administrative problems, including a lot of staff
turnover, and providers throughout the County were complaining. Ultimately, a
completely new executive/management team would be brought in to take over,
largely Los Angeles City Housing staff.
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FIGURE 10
EXTERIOR OF THE GLENDALE SERVICES CENTER AT FERNANDO COURT- 1996
the Center would only be open 6 hours each day, and I feared that closing for lunch
would cause clients to loiter outside of the building. (This was after Jess and I had
gone through the meetings with the neighbors and had personally assured them that
loitering would be discouraged - see Chapter VI). I raised my concerns. Tracy
explained that she did not think clients would arrive before 9 a.m., and that even
though the Center would close at 3:30 p.m., there would still be clients in the Center
waiting to see case managers who would continue to provide services until 4:30 p.m.
One-half hour prior to opening and from 4:30 - 5:00 p.m. would be used for
paperwork. While I did not agree with this at all, I was in a difficult position since I
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was not administering the program. Besides, I figured the hours might change after
the shelter opened anyway, and my real concern was the lunch closure. So, I
compromised on the overall schedule, but I argued stridently that the Center should
not close for lunch. Staffs (including the part-time staff) lunches could be
staggered, allowing sufficient people on-site for security, and even if homeless
clients were not able to see their case manger, they could wait inside. I explained
once again the community process we had gone through with the neighbors, and I
stressed that we did not want to start off on the wrong foot by having clients loitering
outside of the building. Finally, Tracy and Paul agreed that the Center would stay
open for lunch.
I left the meeting relieved, but disturbed about what I saw as an attitude that,
on the surface, was logical but which also represented what I saw as a problematic
and long-standing attitude toward homeless service delivery. To put it simply, it is
not a “customer-service” oriented approach. Compounding my uneasiness, I learned
several weeks later that The Salvation Army and Center staff had decided to close for
lunch despite our agreement. The Center hours may seem like a minor point, but for
me it raised larger issues about (some) non-profit organizations' attitudes toward
service delivery; and, about The Salvation Army's attitude in particular. While I
believe that all of the staff involved in the Center sincerely desire to help the
homeless, they are not willing to sacrifice their own convenience nor deviate from
their perception of the standard way of doing things to better serve the clients. I am
not suggesting that staff should extend themselves beyond their professional duties,
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FIGURE 11
INTERIOR OF THE GLENDALE SERVICES CENTER AT FERNANDO COURT - 1996
CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
but with flexibility and creativity adjustments can be made to better serve the clients.
These kinds of adjustments are made all the time in the public and private sectors.
Local government and businesses schedule staff for coverage, and make the
adjustments necessary to give their customers access to the services they need and
desire. The reasons for this different attitude among non-profits, I think, point to
some of the fundamental ideological and structural problems with homeless service
delivery, foremost among these: staff are not paid a “professional” wage; the long
standing cultures and missions of some agencies focus on charity rather than
“customer service” (see Chapter VIII and IX).
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In addition, controversy surrounding the Center's hours and the unilateral
decision that was made to close for lunch by The Salvation Army staff pointed to
bigger, on-going problems with program implementation, and the City's impotence
when it came to holding The Salvation Army accountable as the lead agency of the
Center. Unfortunately, I now feel the decision to postpone the development of
policies and procedures for the full-time operation of the Center was the single,
biggest mistake of my career at Glendale. I should have never allowed the Center to
open full-time without written policies and procedures in place. I should have
pushed The Salvation Army to take responsibility as the lead agency, and I should
have reactivated the Working Committee. I did not realize until too late that perhaps
the reasons that The Salvation Army staff were behaving the way they were was
because they did not know how to develop the policies or procedures. Both Paul and
Tracy did have background in management, but they did not know that much about
homelessness, and I think that they were reluctant to accept the help that was offered
by those who did, because it would reveal their lack of knowledge and experience.
Also, without written policies and procedures, obviously, accountability for Center
management and the quality of service delivery would remain vague, and
responsibility for any problems with implementation harder to pin down.
I must also say that I was further hampered in my half-hearted efforts to hold
The Salvation Army accountable by the fact that the Homeless Initiatives funding
was coming through LAHSA, and was not administered by the City. Technically,
The Salvation Army was not accountable to the City, was not required to provide any
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reports on the quantity or quality of service delivery to the City. Since the City did
not control the money, there was no leverage to persuade The Salvation Army to do
anything, besides good faith. The City did administer the monies for the CDBG
funded The Salvation Army case manager position at the Center, but as long as that
particular component met the service goals outlined in the contract, I could not use
those funds as leverage to affect the overall management of the Center. The City
could have threatened to go to LAHSA with our complaints about The Salvation
Army's inability to accept full-responsibility for the management and implementation
problems at the Center, but that would have been considered a drastic action, and it
might have undermined our relationship with LAHSA (we would be basically telling
LAHSA how to administer their grant). And while I advocated for this response, my
superiors Jess Duran and Madalyn Blake did not agree. Jess and Madalyn felt that
the best response was more technical assistance. I was beginning to feel, however,
that providing technical assistance to an agency that did not have the underlying
capacity to implement and manage the program was what had started this problem,
and by continuing to bail them out, I was only making things worse. In addition, it
soon became clear that once the Center opened it was too late, and by not pushing
things earlier I had undermined my own influence and authority, and I realized The
Salvation Army staff was willing to ignore me and the suggestions of other service
1
providers m a very passive-aggressive way.
1 3 This all confirmed the wisdom of the decision to submit the 1996 NOFA under the
City rather than LAHSA (see Chapter VIII and IX).
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FIGURE 12
HEALTH CLINIC AT THE GLENDALE SERVICES CENTER AT FERNANDO COURT- 1996
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IX. The Shelter and the Beginnings of Conflict
The shelter opened on December 16, 1996, the same night that the Cold
Weather Shelter, also run by IURD, went to continuous activation (see Chapter VI).
Despite its long-awaited opening, there really was not a lot of initial fanfare. Greater
attention focused on the Cold Weather Shelter. There had been some negative
publicity early in the season because the Cold Weather Shelter (CWS) was not able
to open the first nights of weather activation. IURD had not executed their
agreement with LAHSA, and I had not gotten the roof fixed at the Armory (see
Chapter VI).
This was the second year that the CWS was held at the Glendale Armory.
The Armory was much larger than Glendale Presbyterian Church, had a kitchen and
showers, and logistically worked acceptably well as a mass shelter. The major
problems were the National Guard and the roof. Dr. Colletti had hired a new
manager to replace Kitty Galt. Kitty was a founding member of Food for Body and
Soul (FFB&S) and there were hard feelings about her replacement as the Cold
Weather Shelter manager, But the relationship between IURD and the National
Guard improved with the new management. This was also the second year that the
roof had leaked. I had it repaired numerous times the year before, but each repair
would incite an new leak. (And these were serious leaks-miraculously, in the two
years the roof was a problem, no one slipped and fell. The next spring the State
Military Department replaced the entire roof.)
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FIGURE 13
DINING/LOUNGE AREA AT PROJECT ACHIEVE AT FERNANDO COURT - 1996
The negative press coverage of the situation at the Cold Weather Shelter was
clear evidence that FFB&S was hurt and frustrated by the shelter competition
process, and that they were perhaps going to demonstrate those feelings through
criticizing IURD. A FFB&S volunteer wrote a critical editorial in the Glendale
News Press. However, things went further when, after both shelter programs had
opened, a client complained to the City about the food at the Cold Weather Shelter.
IURD did have their hands extremely full opening two shelter programs on one day,
and some details were left to the last minute. I had personally bought and delivered
the hot dogs that were served the first night at the CWS. The client complained
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FIGURE 14
SLEEPING AREA AT PROJECT ACHIEVE AT FERNANDO COURT- 1996
again weeks later that the food and blankets were still inadequate and ultimately a
group of homeless persons, including “advocates” from Santa Barbara appeared
before the City Council and spoke about the Cold Weather Shelter conditions, and
about the camping ordinance which was scheduled to go into effect with the opening
of the shelter at Fernando Court. FFB&S had sent me an angry letter complaining
about the failure of the Cold Weather Shelter to open on time in November, and
when FFB&S heard of the complaints regarding the conditions there, they demanded
copies of all of the contracts between IURD and the City (I referred them to LAHSA
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for a copy of the Cold Weather Shelter contract). There were also several letters,
protesting the ordinance, received from homeless advocates throughout the state.
It was a relatively mild protest, and the Council had been briefed about the
issue. Several members, in fact, had visited both shelters to inspect the validity of
the allegations for themselves and had concluded that the quality of service delivery
was adequate. The newly formed advisory board of the Glendale Shelter, perhaps a
bit intimidated by its fundraising responsibilities, was so concerned about the
negative publicity surrounding the Cold Weather Shelter and the perceived confusion
among the public about the two different shelter programs, that it decided to rename
the Glendale Emergency Shelter to Project ACHIEVE. One of the most troubling
aspects of the Cold Weather Shelter controversy, however, was the strong evidence
to that Thom Daugherty (the Peer Counselor at the Center and a Salvation Army
Employee as well as a founding member of FFB&S) had been involved in organizing
the protest.
The Catholic Charities case manager, Jorge Salcedo, and Thom Daugherty
had gone to a training sponsored by the Coalition to End Homelessness. There,
discussion turned to local anti-camping ordinances, and Thom volunteered that
Glendale was getting ready to enact one. According to Jorge, Thom and the group of
advocates typed up a flier, which was later found on cars at local Glendale churches,
protesting Glendale’s camping ordinance and advising folks to “bring a friend and a
blanket” to the City Council meeting January 21, 1997. I was appalled, but I had no
idea of Thom’s involvement. The fliers were signed by an organization I had never
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heard of— “Glendale Homeless United” and had considerable detail about the
camping ordinance, and about another proposed ordinance regarding the use of
public facilities that had been discussed in the Coalition's Public Health and Safety
Committee. There was a telephone number and P. O. Box for the group, and the
City’s fax number. When Jorge called me and told me about Thom Daugherty
participation in creating the flier that he had witnessed, Jorge pointed out that the
P. O. Box and telephone number on the bottom of the flier were Thom Daugherty’s
personal phone and mailing address. I called Paul Bandy and let him know that his
staffs telephone number was on the bottom of a flier protesting the camping
ordinance and advocating a protest at a Glendale City Council meeting. He was
shocked. This was definitely against The Salvation Army policy.
Thom was interviewed by Paul Bandy and Major Bacon. He confessed he
had spoken to the group who produced the flier, and claimed to have naively given
them his phone number. He denied overtly encouraging the group, however. Paul
explained to me that Thom was acting as an individual and not as a The Salvation
Army employee, that he had been “written-up” by Paul and told never to do this
again. The next week, another flier with Thom’s telephone number was circulated
urging clients to contact the City Council, attend Council meetings and protest the
camping ordinance. The tone of the flier was ugly, accusing the City of Glendale of
“persecuting” the homeless. The flier’s headline was “Glendale City Council Why
Must You Crucify Christ”. I called Paul. Thom explained that the “advocates”
(themselves homeless persons from Santa Barbara) had come to Food for Body and
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Soul’s Sunday meal and had discussed the situation with him, but that he had not
given them permission to use his number. He and Kitty Galt, in fact, had tried to
persuade the group not to go before the Council. A third flier was also sent out,
which urged advocates to write in protest of ordinances in Glendale, Santa Cruz and
Palo Alto. This had Thom’s P. O. Box and the City’s fax number. Then finally,
Thom sent a letter to me, expressing his concern that he and organizations he was
affiliated with were being branded as “trouble-makers”; and that as an advocate for
the homeless he felt he was acting appropriately, making his number available so he
could provide accurate information to advocacy groups. Also, he expressed concern
that a City representative (me) had tried to collect slanderous information on the
client who complained about the Cold Weather Shelter1 4 . The letter was also sent to
Tracy Fletcher, Paul Bandy and Dave Ramsay.
This time Paul called me and apologized. At one level, this letter did not
bother me because I felt I had acted completely appropriately. My superiors basically
shook their heads, and Dave Ramsay’s only comment to me was a sarcastic reference
to a “fan letter.” The more salient issue on everyone’s mind was the fracture of
relationships at the Center. Thom’s letter also referred to an incident where Dr.
1 4 I had, in fact, asked Thom for his impressions about the client. Thom had been
very negative, branding him as an angry, irrational, trouble-maker who had
threatened Pacific Clinics staff, and had been temporarily banned from the Glendale
Service Center. My inquiry was, I feel, a perfectly appropriate action on my part, as
I did not intend to release this information to the public in any way. But the report I
received regarding the client’s erratic behavior (and which I had picked-up on in my
discussions with him), did prompt me to notify my superiors; and a single, uniformed
police officer did attend the January 21, Council meeting.
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Colletti had raised the issue of “trust”, between himself and Thom. In the coming
months this conversation would be raised many times as an example of Dr. Colletti’s
inappropriate and divisive behavior. But for me, the real issue was that The
Salvation Army’s staff was completely out of control. Tracy Fletcher, the Center
Manager, was making unilateral decisions about the operation of the Center which
were contrary to the original intent and mission of the Center, whereas crucial
functions like policies and procedures, were not being addressed. Another staff
person, Thom Daugherty, was repeatedly criticizing the emergency shelter program
and its staff (especially Dr. Colletti), inciting protests at City Council meetings and
writing letters criticizing City staff. More troubling, in my opinion, was The
Salvation Army’s non-reaction to the situation. I felt The Salvation Army needed to
be very firm with Thom, either he was a Salvation Army employee, the Peer
Counselor at the Center and behaved in a professional manner consistent with that
position, or he could return to his function as a volunteer homeless advocate. Thom,
a recovering alcoholic, needed very firm boundaries and I realize now that his
success in the Peer Counselor position would have required firm management and
on-going therapy. He had trouble maintaining boundaries with clients, and with
other staff. I knew this from my own personal experience with him. Thom was a
very talented, but still troubled individual. He had at various times in the past
indicated that he was still having trouble with maintaining his sobriety and
appropriate behavior toward his associates. He had seriously relapsed the summer
before, and I had advocated to Paul that he be given another chance. Thom had also
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developed a serious crush on me, which he had communicated to me when he had
been drinking. (I never told Paul or Jess about this, Kitty Galt and Maria Melchor
were the only ones who knew). Unfortunately, The Salvation Army management did
not provide the necessary counseling for Thom, and in fact, because Thom knew
more about homelessness than Paul or Tracy, The Salvation Army actually
(unconsciously) encouraged him to step over the boundaries of his position and take
over some of the management and case management tasks at the Center. This would
continue to add the inter-agency tensions there.
In the meantime, Dave Ramsay asked for a meeting with Jess, Madalyn,
myself and Joe Colletti to discuss Dr. Colletti's divisive behavior. During this
meeting Dave Ramsay explained that in Glendale, things were done in a very
“passive-aggressive” (his own words) way, and whether that was good or bad,
perhaps Dr. Colletti could alter his style to be more in-line with it. Dr. Colletti was
very polite, but troubled, as was I because in my mind the real problem at the Center
was the poor management that was being provided by the lead agency The Salvation
Army. Things continued to escalate, and I began to hear daily complaints from
Maria Melchor about Thom and FFB&S undermining the reputations of the shelter
and Dr. Colletti. Finally a meeting was called between The Salvation Army, FFB&S,
IURD and the City. I wanted Catholic Charities to be there, but Madalyn vetoed this.
I told Jess and Madalyn that I felt focussing on Dr. Colletti’s behavior was not the
issue. This issue was that The Salvation Army was not doing its job as the lead-
agency of the Center, and that FFB&S was sabotaging the shelter. Why were we not
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looking at that behavior? The Salvation Army still had not paid IURD any of the
rent it owed since January 1, 1997, and IURD, the most financially vulnerable of all
the programs, was carrying the full financial burden of the building lease.
The meeting between these agencies was polite, with the decision being that a
process for interagency conflict resolution needed to be developed. After this
meeting, for the first time, I went into Jess Duran’s office and cried. I told him that
we had let The Salvation Army off the hook again, that they were not doing their job,
that they would consistently agree to things in meetings, and then either not
implement them or do something completely different, and that I felt completely
disempowered in my position as the City's Homeless Coordinator. I also suggested
again that we should consider going to LAHSA. As far as FFB&S was concerned
(which did not receive any government support for its programs, in part, because of
the religious nature of its services), somebody (Dave Ramsay, I thought), should tell
them to knock it off. Jess did not agree, he believed that process and structure were
the answer to the problem. I said that no amount of structure would suffice if people
constantly undermined it. But I did agree with his point that, without formal, written
policies and procedures, it was impossible to hold the service providers at the Center
accountable. Even if I was skeptical about policies and procedures being the magic
solution to the increasing problems with program implementation at the Center, they
still needed to be developed. Further, Jess opined, if The Salvation Army would not
do it, then it was up to us.
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Meanwhile, the situation at Fernando Court continued to deteriorate. Front
line staff from the agencies present at the Center and Project ACHIEVE, primarily
The Salvation Army and Catholic Charities, were bickering. Catholic Charities and
Project ACHIEVE staff were complaining about Thom Daugherty interfering in case
plans, and his criticizing other agencies and staff in front of clients. Tracy Fletcher
had began reviewing the case files of the Catholic Charities’ case managers, and
tensions between those two agencies were high. In April, 1997, Jess Duran and I
decided to have a meeting with the Executive Directors, supervisors, and case
managers at the Center to address these outstanding issues. This meeting included
The Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, Project ACHIEVE, and the YWCA, which
now had a part-time case manager at the Center. I had told Paul prior to the meeting
that there were many concerns about the management of the Center, and that some
people including myself, felt that neither Paul nor his staff were addressing issues
that were repeatedly being brought to their attention. Dr. Colletti's frustration with
The Salvation Army was compounded by the fact that The Salvation Army had not
paid any rent or utility costs to IURD since January and IURD was struggling
financially to keep the shelter doors open.
The level of frustration at the meeting was extremely high and tempers
exploded. Paul Bandy was especially singled-out for criticism, and at one point Dr.
Colletti raised his voice and pounded his fist on the table while expressing his
dissatisfaction with The Salvation Army’s management of the Center. Sylvia Hines
from the YWCA suggested dismissing all staff present but the Executive Directors,
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and we continued to discuss the problem in a slightly calmer environment. The
decisions made at the meeting were that The Salvation Army needed to firmly set
boundaries for Thom Daugherty or terminate him. An Executive Management
Committee was formed to meet to develop the much needed policies and procedures.
The next day Thom Daugherty resigned from The Salvation Army.
We spent the next year trying, through the Executive Management
Committee, to establish policies and procedures for the Center. We developed a
client and staff grievance procedure, and worked on revising the paperwork that was
being used. The process of working together on these issues, appeared to help, at the
executive and supervisorial level, to ease tensions on the surface. However, it
appeared clear to me that the real problems at the Center were emotional and
philosophical, in addition to organizational and procedural. However since my
superiors did not necessarily agree, because I did not know how to fix the emotional
issues, and because I figured policies and procedures could not hurt and might help,
this is where I threw my energies.
During that summer, the 1997 NOFA was submitted to HUD. The priorities
of this NOFA were aimed at increasing the supportive services staff at the Center
(see Chapter VI). In addition, in anticipation of the expiration of the Initiatives
funding and because The Salvation Army has stated that it would not be responsible
for raising the funds necessary to keep the Center going, funds were built into the
proposed programs to help cover the operations costs of the Center. The projects
which were ultimately funded by HUD included: veteran’s outreach sponsored by LA
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VETS; employment training and counseling sponsored by the City and Verdugo
Private Industry Council; substance abuse counseling sponsored by Verdugo Mental
Health; and housing placement assistance sponsored by the City.
X. Street Outreach Begins
It was in this environment in October and November of 1997 that Verdugo
Mental Health began operating its street outreach program (see Chapter VI). Dr. Dan
Sherman was hired as the Director of this program, and was based at the Center. Dr.
Colletti, suggested that, with the start-up of the Cold Weather Shelter, IURD would
employ members of the street outreach team so that they could take advantage of the
outreach opportunity that the shelter provided, without taking the team off the street
during the day, and the staff would have the opportunity to make additional salary.
Dr. Sherman and the outreach team concurred, and the team began full-time
operations in November, 1997. Two team members were also employed at the Cold
Weather Shelter.
While I felt this was an excellent collaboration, unfortunately, it did not work
out. The manager at the Cold Weather Shelter felt that the outreach workers working
for her were not part of the team. The outreach workers balked at having to help
with the more menial chores related to the operation of the program (e.g., helping
with dinner and showers). The outreach workers’ contention was that they were
there to do outreach. However, since they were being paid out of the Cold Weather
Shelter budget, IURD felt that they needed to perform the tasks that were necessary
to operate the shelter and that were expected from other shelter staff. Ultimately, the
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outreach staff resigned as Cold Weather Shelter staff, but continued to outreach there
several times a week (paid for out of the street outreach budget). This, however, was
the beginning of tensions between the outreach team and shelter staff that would
continue until today. It is also, I think, symptomatic of an ongoing problem with the
outreach team and provider, which I have noticed in other communities as well.
It seems to me that mental health providers who work with the homeless
community have an internally contradictory attitude toward homeless service
delivery that manifests itself in several ways. It has to do, I think, with mental health
providers' attitudes toward their own status and the status of other service providers.
In general, mental health service providers have more education and training than
other homeless case managers, they are often have advanced degrees: Masters of
Family and Child Counseling, Masters of Social Work, Licensed Clinical Social
Workers, or even Ph.D.’s. And mental health case managers are often more highly
paid than other homeless case managers. I think this distinction is very important to
the mental health providers, who view themselves as clinicians, and want their level
of professionalization to be recognized. This leads to behaviors which are
problematic for homeless service delivery.
One of these behaviors was evidenced in an obvious way at the Cold Weather
Shelter, but I have seen it many times, and that is in the context of case management,
the mental health providers construe their function as very narrow, to deal with the
mental health aspects of their clients' cases exclusively. While this is their expertise,
and is the basis of a division of labor in case management that I support (and which
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HUD policy encourages), when taken to the extreme, it has several consequences.
First, the mental health providers tend to view their work in isolation from a more
holistic approach, and while they themselves would argue that all aspects of their
clients’ lives are integrated, issues such as housing, employment, public assistance,
and so forth, are viewed by them as the responsibility of other case managers.
Mental health providers, because of confidentiality issues, keep their own files on
clients. This can also lead, rightly or wrongly, to the mental health staff to be
perceived by the other service providers as less than team players.
This leads to the most significant outcome, and that is that mental health
professionals tend to define their target client population very narrowly. I have
discussed with Dr. Sherman many times what I view as a significant philosophical
difference between VMHC, myself and most of the other "homeless" service
providers. Specifically, VMHC views their proper client population to be these with
significant, diagnosable and chronic mental health conditions— those persons that are
best treated through the use of psychotropic medications. They are less interested in
dealing with what I consider to be a significant majority of homeless clients— those
who are in serious need of intensive therapy, but for whom medical interventions
might be less appropriate. I cannot understand why VMHC will not err on the side
of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness when it comes to defining their target
population. The argument would be because of their capacity to provide services.
However, the statistics for VMHC’s program show that they are not meeting their
quantitative goals, and often the mental health staff at the Center see only 3 or 4
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clients a day. Even with the intensiveness of mental health services, it seems clear to
me that more clients could be seen by them without the quality of their services
suffering. I am extremely frustrated by this attitude, which I also observed with
Pacific Clinic and other mental health service providers.
I think the reasons for this are: again, their desire to be perceived as
professionals, which is enhanced by taking on only the most difficult of cases; and,
that they are not really sure how to effectively serve those folks for whom
psychotropic drugs (and the often dramatic results that can be achieve once the
regime is adhered to) are inappropriate. I think the prospect of on-going therapy with
clients who have complex emotional and psychological problems, and the potential
lack of clear, quantifiable results in the relative short-term, both frustrates and
intimidates the VMHC staff.
XI. Conflict Continues
Shortly after VMHC arrived on-site at the Center, tensions escalated between
The Salvation Army and Catholic Charities staff, ultimately leading to the
reassignment of the Catholic Charities case manager. Kitty Galt of FFB&S, had
taken a position as a street outreach working for Pacific Clinics in Pasadena. She
reported that a client came to her there and claimed that the Catholic Charities case
manger was soliciting payment for motel vouchers, and indeed, the case manager had
apparently accepted a check for $75 from one of the clients. David Earle sent a very
caustic letter regarding the allegations to myself, my superiors, and the involved
agencies. Now, I do not know exactly what happened, and I suspect that at the very
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least there was inappropriate, if not criminal, activities committed by case managers
for both Catholic Charities and The Salvation Army. But what is more revealing is
the way each agency handled the situation.
Catholic Charities launched an immediate investigation, bringing in Human
Relations staff from their downtown office, and interviewed all of the clients
involved, as well as its case manager, Jorge Salcedo, who claimed the check was
repayment on a “loan”. But information was uncovered that pointed to the
involvement of The Salvation Army case manager Robert Freeman, and that he was
the person who was actually soliciting the payment for vouchers. Ultimately,
Catholic Charities decided to reassign Jorge Salcedo to another office in Van Nuys,
where he has continued to work to this day, with no further problems. Paul Bandy,
Major Bacon and Tracy Fletcher interviewed Robert Freeman about the incident,
who admitted that his choice to loan a client money was “a poor decision”. A
“strong written warning was given to Robert”, and he was told that further actions
could result in his dismissal. Robert remained employed by The Salvation Army at
the Center until 1999.
In the face of all this, the Executive Management Committee continued to
meet, and they discussed the above situation at length. This was, in fact, the first test
of the newly developed inter-agency conflict resolution procedures. In the
Committee, the agencies continued to work together, and things were usually polite.
I was frustrated, however, because I felt several of the decisions that were made (e.g.,
to conduct structured outreach to local agencies to increase referrals to the Center,
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which I felt had inadequate numbers of people served) were not being implemented
by The Salvation Army. The group decided to hold an all-day retreat in May, 1998,
to discuss long-term plans for the Center, to further the development of policies and
procedure to ensure its effectiveness, to plan for the expiration of the Initiatives’
funding in 1999, and to discuss the transition from the lead agency model of Center
management to some other structure. I felt we needed to formalize the recognition
that the Center and the shelter needed to be viewed seamlessly, as one entry-point to
the continuum of care, in hopes that some of the divisiveness could be ameliorated.
Unfortunately, the conversation turned away from these issues, initially.
Sylvia Hines of the YWCA expressed concern that the domestic violence programs
were viewed apart from the Center, even though in function, they were also an entry
point to the continuum of care. Others expressed concern about competition for
funds, and whether their agencies would be required to directly support the
emergency shelter with its funding shortfall. Or, if they would support the shelter
indirectly by losing community-based funds to that would now go to the shelter
instead of their agency. These were old issues that had been discussed at length in
various forums, but never resolved to everyone’s satisfaction.
By the end of the afternoon, when discussion turned back to the current
situation at the Center, frustrations were high. Many of the providers looked to the
City to lead the process of developing policies and procedures at the Center, which
we really had been doing. I was angry, however. I felt that I had been doing other
people’s work for them (especially The Salvation Army), to the exclusion of some of
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my other duties. And as I have already observed, this blurring of boundaries between
technical assistance and enabling agencies to hide the fact that they do not have the
capacity to fulfill their programmatic responsibilities is a fundamental dilemma with
respect to the City's role in coordinating services. I also felt that there were real
problems with implementation of new policies and procedures. Even if I did oversee
their development, I could not be at the Center everyday (nor could my assistant),
and it had been my experience that when I complained to an agency about decisions
not being implemented (e.g., The Salvation Army), nothing happened. I told the
Executive Directors and Managers at the retreat that I would appreciate it if they
would back me up in the future, and hold one another more accountable.
Shortly after the retreat, Tracy Fletcher resigned as the manager of the Center.
Frankly, I was relieved, although it did leave a management vacuum at the Center.
The Executive Management Committee decided that The Salvation Army should not
recruit a new manager, since the group had come to believe that such a manager
needed to be hired by an “outside” agency. Some wanted that agency to be the City.
Others, including the City, looked for another solution. The possibility of using a
non-profit incubator, such as Community Partners, to provide the infrastructure for
the position, with the Executive Management Committee providing the day to day
oversight, was a possible solution. The problem was, without the Initiatives funding,
we needed a source of money to pay for Center management. The primary duties of
the Center manager did not involve providing direct assistance to clients, therefore
making the position ineligible for SHP funding. It was determined that a grant
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should be written to private foundations to get the initial funding for the Center
Manager position. That job was left to me, but I never did it.
Instead, I focussed my efforts on working with the Executive Management
Committee to develop detailed policies and procedures, and to completely revamp
the case management and intake process. Over the next six months, we met
regularly. I felt that one problem was that special needs clients (mental health,
substance abuse, domestic violence, etc.) were not being identified by the initial case
managers. Also, the population of the emergency shelter was very low over the
summer, dropping at one point to nine persons. Yet, some Center case managers
were referring clients to shelters in other communities. They complained the Project
ACHIEVE’s criterion was too strict, that they had few clients who met the criterion.
Project ACHIEVE was in a serious financial crisis, even in their second year
there was a large funding shortfall to overcome. There was not enough funding for
case management staff. As a result, Catholic Charities changed the shift of their case
manager to 1 to 10 p.m., in order to assist the shelter. The Salvation Army and
especially VMHC objected to this, fearing they would be over-burdened with the
case management demands at the Center in the mornings. But even with two case
managers, Project ACHIEVE argued that it still needed the support of the specialized
case managers in the Center for the special needs clients.
When some of the 1997 SHP funded specialized case mangers for veterans,
substance abuse, and the City sponsored employment and housing specialists, were
hired and started to work at the Center, a new client flow and division of labor was
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developed. Project ACHIEVE, in turn, relaxed its admission criteria. VMHC was to
remain the lead case manager for clients placed in Project ACHIEVE who were
substance abusers and mental health clients, and LA Vets would lead with veterans.
Project ACHIEVE staff would provide support to these specialists, and act as the
“traffic cop” to make sure that the case management plan developed by the
specialized case manger was implemented by the client. Project ACHIEVE case
managers were to be the lead case mangers with the general population clients. Very
detailed instructions and explanations were provided to case managers at a half-day
training conducted by all of the program managers in October, 1998.
Once again, however, implementation of the policies and procedures was
hampered by the lack of a Center manager, and either the differing philosophies, lack
of skills, or lack of motivation from agencies and their case managers. In particular,
Project ACHIEVE case mangers complained that they had implemented the agreed
upon changes— they were allowing more difficult mental health and substance abuse
cases into the shelter. But Verdugo Mental Health in particular was not holding up
their end of the bargain. VMHC case managers would claim that mental health or
substance abuse was not a particular client's primary barrier to housing, and that
therefore VMHC should not be responsible as the lead case manager. I attempted to
address this with VMHC's Dr. Dan Sherman, and he often agreed with my
observations, but was never quite able to sufficiently motivate his staff to err on the
side of inclusion when it came to defining their target population. (Again, this was
particularly frustrating to me because VMHC's quantitative goals were not being met,
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either). Without an on-site manager to constantly negotiate who should be
responsible for a particular client, I felt that many clients were either not being
identified as a special needs client, or not getting sufficient and appropriate levels of
specialized services. When I complained to my Director, Madalyn Blake, and
suggested that we take corrective action with VMHC, she demurred, claiming we
didn't have a strong enough case.
XII. The Current Status of Programs
This year, 1999, several significant events occurred with respect to the
implementation of programs at the Glendale Services Center/Project ACHIEVE.
First, Madalyn Blake realized that she needed to take a more active role in planning
for the future of the Center. I welcomed this, because I felt that I did not have the
political influence to persuade service providers, especially Verdugo Mental Health
and The Salvation Army, to approach their service delivery in ways that were
consistent with the continuum of care model. Yet at the same time I felt that the
need for her involvement represented a failure on my part. Whether true or not, I was
for anything that might advance progress at the Center. We held a serious of
planning meetings in the Spring, with the Executive Directors and supervisorial staff
of all the agencies at the Center. At that time everyone agreed that there needed to be
a centralized management structure and fundraising effort for both the Center and
Project ACHIEVE. The group considered three options for the Management of the
Center: 1) creating a new non-profit to manage the programs; 2) selecting an agency
from among the existing agencies to run the Center; and 3) selecting an agency from
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outside of Glendale. The group felt that creating a new non-profit would be too time
consuming, instead they agreed that perhaps an existing agency could manage the
Center if mutual expectations were clearly articulated. The Salvation Army, pointed
out how they were set-up for failure because they did not have the authority to really
manage the staff from other agencies. And they had a point, however, what no one
pointed out was that the Army didn’t have the capacity to manage such a complicated
Center, nor did they have the inclination or ability to raise the funds necessary to
keep it going. The group also decided that the search for a management agency
should first be conducted among the agencies that were currently at the Center
through a Request for Proposal process. If no one came forward with a viable
proposal, then we would widen the scope of the process to throughout the region.
Everyone realized that, because of the fundraising burden, it made sense for no one
to apply for the lead except the Institute for Urban Research and Development. Most
of the agencies at the Center had their programs fully funded, but Project ACHIEVE
was still running a $60,000 program deficit annually. IURD was able to make up this
deficit because other programs it managed (primarily the Cold Weather Shelter)
created an operating surplus. The City also helped IURD out with unspent CDBG
funds at the end of the fiscal year. Any agency besides IURD that applied to be the
lead management agency would take on responsibility for the shelter’s operating
shortfall, meaning that there was no incentive for anyone but IURD to apply. As for
IURD, Dr. Colletti wasn’t sure if he would apply or not, he needed to study the
situation carefully and determine if and how filling the role as lead management
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agencies would decrease IURD’s operating shortfall. In light of this uncertainty, the
Housing Authority authorized the release of an RFP. The RFP was release in
August, 1999.
During this same time, discussion of an evaluation of the continuum of care
arose. First, it was in part a response to changes in local politics. Dave Ramsay, the
Glendale City Manager who was so supportive of the continuum of care had left in
the Fall of 1997. New Councilmembers, one of who actively opposes funding for the
continuum, took office. The success of the Coalition in the Super NOFA
competitions (another $900,000 was awarded in 1998), and the problems at the
Center, had caused Councilmembers and the Housing Authority to ask appropriate
questions about the efficacy and cost effectiveness of the programs. I initially
approached a colleague of mine who does program evaluation as a consultant and
asked her opinion regarding the specifications of a program evaluation. After
explaining the situation to her in detail, she opined that while a program evaluation
might be useful, it was the underlying emotional issues that needed to be resolved
first, before any real progress on program implementation could be realized. This
was a position that I had always held, but which had been dismissed by my superiors.
Ultimately, I convinced by boss that conflict resolution would be an important part of
resolving the issues at the Center.
I began an Request for Proposal process and the Loyola Law School was
selected to mediate a process which ultimately involved Dr. Dan Sherman from
VMHC, Dr. Joe Colletti from IURD, Maria Melchor from Catholic Charities, Paul
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Bandy and Tracy Fletcher from The Salvation Army and Jess Duran, my assistant
Delia Barreto and myself from the City. I cannot reveal the substance of this process,
which lasted four months, as we all literally signed a non-disclosure agreement. But
I can say that many misunderstandings were cleared up. I think many people gained
a new understanding of Dr. Colletti’s problems and motivations. And I think his
relationship with Dr. Sherman was significantly improved. Unfortunately, I do not
think Paul Bandy will ever recover from what he viewed as a direct attack from Dr.
Colletti at the April, 1997 meeting. I also think some people, especially Dr. Sherman
and Tracy Fletcher, gained new understanding of my own motivations, as I did of
theirs. In particularly, I feel the relationship between Tracy Fletcher (who is now
Assistant Director of Social Services for The Salvation Army) and myself
significantly improved.
The conflict resolution process will perhaps make the shift in the
organizational structure of the Center/Project ACHIEVE to one under the
management of IURD possible. In October, IURD was the only response to the RFP
for the lead management agency for the Center/Project ACHIEVE. Nevertheless, we
held a proposal review so IURD’s plan for restructuring the organization would be
reviewed by local businessmen, the Executive Director of the YMCA (a member of
the Homeless Coalition) and the manager of Pasadena’s access center. While the
panel was skeptical of IURD’s ability to raise all the funding necessary, they felt that
this was really the only viable option for the management of the Center/Project
ACHIEVE. Everyone concurred that the key to the restructuring would be to give
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IURD the authority it needed to replace agencies who’s staff members were not
providing services in a manner deemed necessary for the good of the clients. A
strong Center Manager would be the key to this. Another key is that all of the sub
recipient agreements between the City and the agencies providing the services will be
assigned to IURD, who will in-tum subcontract with the participating agency for
specific services. While this does create an extra organizational layer, it was felt by
IURD and City staff that this is necessary to give IURD the ability to cancel a sub
contract with an agency who is reluctant to follow the service delivery plan. This
will require an onerous process of securing HUD’s approval for the substitution of
the project sponsors for all of the Supportive Housing Program funds. Initial
discussions with them have indicated that they are open to our restructuring plan, but
it will provide to be a best a time-consuming hurdle, and I have not expressed to
anyone my concerns about the regulatory barriers we may encounter with respect to
using the existing funds to carryout our restructuring plan.
IURD is currently in the planning stages of a complete reorganization of the
Center staff. They are with the City and Catholic Charities regarding the initial draft,
which will then be presented to the other agencies at the Center. It is the sincere
desire of both Dr. Colletti and myself that VMHC and The Salvation Army both stay
involved at the Center. But if these agencies resist making the changes necessary to
ensure the effective operation of the Center, either IURD will assume their functions
itself, or they will contract with another agency to provide the service.
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XIII. Conclusion
As we can see, the observed version of the implementation of programs at the
Glendale Services Center challenges the founding myths surround homeless service
delivery in Glendale. Local control is affected by policymakers at the Federal and
regional level. And at the local level the stakeholders in the homeless issues do not
always agree in the philosophical, logistical or programmatic approaches to
homelessness. And these conflicts are not just between governmental and
community-based organizations or between service providers and law-enforcement.
These conflicts are often most divisive, and have the greatest impact on service
delivery, when they occur at the same level of organization, i.e., between non-profits
or between or within public agencies. The myths of collaboration and cooperation
are severely challenged by the capacity of agencies and their individual staff
members to envision alternative methods of service delivery, to challenge the
organizational cultures of their own institutions, and to transcend personal history
and differences for the good of a larger collaborative. The ability of public
administrators to lead local service providers, to creatively negotiate public policy
and local politics, and to view policy and program implementation from an intuitive
and emotional perspective, as well as from a structural and procedural point of view,
are also factors in the success or failure of a system of service delivery in
approaching its idealized form. These themes will be discussed further in Chapter
VIII and the policy implications will be discussed in Chapter IX.
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CHAPTER VIII: THE MYTHS OF GOVERNANCE IN HOMELESSNESS
I. Overview of Public and Observed Versions of Homeless Governance
This dissertation examines the relationship between public policy and
program implementation regarding homelessness. In addition, problems with
implementation on the local level lead to the generation of myths about the genesis
and effectiveness of those programs. The relationship between public policy and the
realities of program implementation mirrors the “messy” relationship between social
theory and the observed reality of day to day life as lived by the “natives”. “Public
policy” is the public servant’s theory, the meta-narrative about how and why things
work the way they do, and a road-map for the processes by which government
officials do their work. And while public policy may be acknowledged as more
overtly political than social science theory, policy and theory are both portrayed as
rooted in objectivity, abstractions of social structure and processes that have as their
base a rational, scientific analysis. But the post-modern critique of universalizing
meta-narratives has taught us that “reality” is far too “messy” to be amenable to such
elegant representations. And while social theorists who take this critique seriously
can experiment with “reconstruction” and “pastiche” as they construct alternative
accounts of the social world in the academic milieu, the public servant is under
intense pressure to “do” something, to make it work somehow, NOW. Time is often
of the essence since a shift in who commands political dominance at any point in
time will create a shift in policy, evoking new, potentially oppositional meta-
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narratives that also claim a strong “rational” basis. As a result, the process of
creating idealized versions of programmatic outcomes begins anew.
Unfortunately, the conceptual models which are supremely useful for the
strategic planning of social programs, and which gamer political support at both the
federal and local level, are often less helpful when it comes to resolving the conflicts
that arise at the level of program implementation. Federal policy and funding
practices set the parameters for the design and implementation of local homeless
service delivery systems. But this same federal policy creates the some of the
conditions under which the myths regarding the delivery of these services are created
and promoted. The parameters set at the level of federal policy include: the
rationalization and professionalization of homeless service delivery through the
continuum or care model; the expansion of the role of local government in planning
and delivering homeless services; an emphasis on collaboration and coordination; the
specific federal regulations dictating how funds can and cannot be spent; the drive to
create new or expand existing programs; and, unfortunately to a lesser extent, the
need to demonstrate the outcomes of service delivery.
Problems with implementation at the local level arise for a variety of reasons.
First, there are the constraints and demands made by those public and private funders
who provide the monies for program operation. Local politics, of course, also affects
implementation on the local level. Local politicians are concerned with keeping their
voting constituents happy by addressing homelessness without appearing to
exacerbate the problem or enable the population. Issues such as the “Not In My Back
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Yard” (NIMBY) attitude, the fear that implementing services will draw more
homeless persons (the “magnet theory”), and the role of law enforcement are under
constant debate.
Then, there are the stakeholders, various non-profit service providers,
community organizations and public agencies that have a role in homeless service
delivery. These stakeholders each bring with them specific institutional cultures that
are often rooted in years of historical development. These institutional cultures arise
from and create different organizational structures at both the regional and local
levels, as well as different areas of specialization, levels of competency, and pay rates
among their staff. Thus, these agencies attract individuals with different perspectives
on homelessness and different approaches to service delivery, collaboration and
conflict.
Given this environment, several questions arise which are crucial at the level
of implementation. In an era of collaboration, how does an agency balance their self-
interest as a corporate identity with the good of the continuum of care as a whole?
How does the local jurisdiction, encourage agencies and individuals to be “team
players” and what do they do with those who are not? Are their organizational
structures that can help mitigate these issues, or in the end do things work or not
largely because of the efforts of key individuals? How can programs be evaluated?
How can you effectively measure what works and who is doing an adequate job?
While I think there are some answers to these questions, I also believe that the best
response is highly dependent on the specific locale of service delivery. The culture
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of the local jurisdiction and the local stakeholders is key, as are the specific
individuals that inhabit key positions in the continuum of care and in local
government. Federal policy, with its constraints on local flexibility, and its failure to
adequately address problems on the local level or effectively monitor program
effectiveness, has devolved the responsibility for implementation to the local
jurisdictions.
II. Federal Policy: The Role of Myths
As observed above, federal policy regarding homeless programs sets the
parameters for the design and implementation of local services delivery systems. It
also creates the conditions under which some of the myths regarding the delivery of
these services are created and promoted.
In 1994, Priority HOME! established the continuum of care as the model for
local homeless service delivery, attempted to consolidate and streamline federal
funding for homeless programs, emphasized the importance of local control in the
development and implementation of strategies for addressing homelessness, and
stressed the importance of regional and local collaborations in this development and
implementation. During this same time, federal funding for homeless programs was
increased, making more funds available for homeless programs at the local level than
ever before.
The continuum of care model of local service delivery stressed a graduated
system of services, beginning with outreach, intake and assessment, through
successive residential components, that would move individuals and families from
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the streets to permanent housing. Each step of the continuum of care was to meet the
changing needs of the population: initially short-term emergency needs, and then the
multi-layered, complex, deeply rooted causes of homelessness. One key to a
successful continuum of care was flexibility. First, that the components were
comprehensive and flexible enough to meet the diverse and changing needs of a
single household as it evolved through the continuum. And secondly, that
components were in place to meet demographic segments of the continuum of care,
especially those with special needs: substance abuse, mental illness, dually diagnosis,
veterans, victims of domestic violence, families with children.
As a result, the majority of the homeless funds that were made available at
the federal level were tunneled through existing federal programs that emphasized
housing and supportive services: the Supportive Housing Program, Shelter Plus
Care, and SRO Moderate Rehabilitation programs. Funding for services that meet
emergency needs, and for the operation of emergency shelters, were specifically
excluded from these programs. Funding under the Emergency Shelter Grant
Program, which was specifically designed to fund emergency shelters, did increase,
but not in anyway proportionate with the increase in the housing programs listed
above or for homeless programs overall.
At the federal level, the rationale for this approach makes sense. It is both an
artifact of, and a catalyst for, the shift in philosophy in homeless service delivery,
shifting away from focusing on emergency services (the model in the 1980’s), and
toward longer-term, professional supportive services and increased housing
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opportunities. And for many local jurisdictions it made sense as well. By and large
if a community had any residential programs for the homeless, it was an emergency
shelter. Emergency shelters in many communities had been established in the
1980’s, and without a large amount of federal funding available, what had developed
was a fragmented community-based network of financial and volunteer support that
was sustaining their operations. Thus, HUD’s funding emphasis would push
communities toward developing other kinds of supportive housing—transitional,
permanent and permanent supportive—and would also insure that the new monies
would not be redirected to replace local government subsidies of the existing
emergency shelters.
The continuum of care model of service delivery, and the consolidation and
streamlining of the federal funding process also contributed to significant changes in
the ways that homeless policy and service delivery were planned and delivered on the
local level. First, the federal government’s intention of creating one homeless
assistance block grant, gave local jurisdictions a very important role in determining
where homeless funds would actually be spent, and in monitoring and evaluating the
effectiveness of the programs. The “carrot” of the proposed block grant (which was
to have brought Glendale about $1 million annually, at present funding levels) was
complemented with the “stick” of the Consolidated Planning Process. HUD
mandated that jurisdictions which received popular CDBG and HOME program
funding (about $6-7M in Glendale annually) develop and implement strategies to
address homelessness. In the end, it was this mandate which motivated local
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jurisdictions, because the block grant never materialized (although the concept has
been reintroduced in Congress every year).
What did materialize, however, is the Super NOFA process, by which HUD
attempted to do administratively what it could not do legislatively—compel units of
local government and service providers within a geographic area to develop and
submit one plan for homeless funding. This also, in many geographic areas, placed
local government in a key, coordinating position, since it was often the local
jurisdiction that had the staff, the capacity, the political pull, the infrastructure and
the perceived “neutrality” necessary to lead the process. The perception of a neutral
party and meeting ground was a necessary prerequisite in a process requiring each
geographic locality to meet to conduct an annual needs assessment, service inventory
and gaps analysis. “Consolidated” applications — several projects, sponsored by
numerous agencies, but submitted under one applicant -- were encouraged by HUD,
and by local jurisdictions that wanted to control the funds in their community1 . The
City, as the applicant and the grant administrator, was also responsible for contract
compliance, environmental review, program monitoring, and in some cases was the
source of matching funds or leverage. These functions gave local governments some
measure of control over the projects in their area.
The emphasis on funding strategies produced through collaborative efforts,
with all parties at the table, also led to the creation of regional and local public and
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private coalitions. Interestingly, many or even most of these coalitions were
developed in response to judicial or legislative mandates. LAHSA, of course, is the
most prominent of these in Los Angeles County. LAHSA was not a direct result of
federal policy, but was in fact, the product of a court order. But the creation of
LAHSA put the City and the County of Los Angeles in a very competitive position to
compete for homeless funds under the parameters set by federal policy. Its most
extreme and early manifestation was that of the LA Homeless Initiatives and the
1995 Super NOFA, under which a county-wide strategy was developed and all local
jurisdictions (except Pasadena under the 1995 NOFA) had to apply under, or to
LAHSA. Even with the spin-off of larger jurisdictions over subsequent years,
Glendale, Long Beach, Pomona, LAHSA still remains the coordinating body for the
continuum of care in all of the City of Los Angeles, and most of the County.
And, at the more local levels, coalitions comprised of service providers, local
governments, public and private agencies, churches, business owners, residents and
formerly homeless person were either developed or empowered by the Super NOFA
process. HUD’s funding application requested detailed information regarding the
annual Super NOFA Process for determining needs, filling gaps, and establishing the
funding priorities. It was incumbent on local jurisdictions to bring as many
stakeholders to the table as possible, not just because it was good planning practice,
but it also meant a higher scoring application. And once agencies were at the table,
1 In fact, the scoring system devised by HUD, makes it virtually impossible for
applications that are submitted under an “alternative” continuum of care strategy for
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they could advocate for those programs which they felt were truly needed in the
continuum, or, which the agency might be best positioned to sponsor.
The annual Super NOFA process also changed how funding priorities were
developed in several ways. First, particularly in the early years, there was an
emphasis on filling gaps in the continuum with new programs or expanded efforts.
Support for an existing programs at current service levels was not a competitive
project2. This, and the structure of the continuum of care itself, with an emphasis on
special needs, led to increasingly specialized programs with narrowly defined target
populations—substance abuse, mental health, veterans. HUD further emphasized
this by explicitly making some populations and programs a priority for specific years
(e.g., transitional housing for families in 1995, veterans in 1997, new permanent
housing in 1998 and 1999).
More money for homeless programs, the increasing specialization of projects,
and the emphasis on collaboration created other problems. In some cases, the
increased expectation of professional, quality programs and the complexity of service
a jurisdiction to be funded.
2 Now, however, that programs funded through the initial Super NOFA in 1995 and
subsequent years are up for renewal, this has changed. Now HUD talks of “renewal
burden” and is trying to provide extra funds to applicants so they can both meet the
need of renewing existing programs and continue to fill gaps with new programs.
This is a very tricky situation for both HUD and local governments. Shutting down a
program is never popular, and very few if any programs have become self-
supporting. HUD has tried various strategies, e.g., upping the required amount of
matching funds for renewals, providing additional funds specifically for new
programs, to keep this balance manageable. In Glendale, this means that from this
year forward, almost all of the NOFA application will be for renewal programs,
unless something unforeseen happens.
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delivery in a multi-agency settling, have raised performance expectations that exceed
the capabilities of some service providers. Some just do not have the management
capability, the experience and knowledge, or the institutional culture or infrastructure
to successfully carry out the projects as they were proposed. The agencies with
greater professionalization and experience, on the other hand, were swamped. The
emphasis on collaboration and coalition building as incumbent to federal funding
forced agencies with different philosophical approaches to work together more
closely then ever before (see below). Such collaboration purely for funding
motivations often leads to intractable conflict and miscommunication.
Adding an additional strain, is the set of statutory and regulatory restrictions
on fund expenditures. In addition to the bulk of homeless funding being restricted
from use as emergency shelter or homeless prevention funds, almost all operating
funds from the Supportive Housing Program (SHP) must pay for the costs of
providing essential services — staff and operations — or for the operation of housing.
Very little (hardly any for supportive service only projects) can go for the costs of
supervising staff, or more importantly, for professional managers to assist with the
day-to-day coordination of multi-agency, multi-service settings. Administrative
funds for these grants is also very limited — SHP is limited to 5% and administration
is defined very narrowly — the costs of grant accounting, reporting and audits.
Changing the kinds of services provided, or for example, the job description of a
funded staff position is very difficult, as programs are funded based on what was
originally proposed and substantive changes mean that they must be “rescored”.
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Except for adjustments between budget line-items or programs years, changes to
programs require the approval of HUD’s Washington office which is a best, time
consuming, and at worse, risky as it may raise larger questions about the continuum
of care strategy and planning processes that local jurisdictions would rather avoid.
Federal policy and policymakers now focus more extensively on the
outcomes evaluations of programs. Such emphases of course require that service
providers and city fiscal agents maintain substantial amounts of data, tracking the
numbers of unduplicated clients served, the ways in which services match proposals,
and how funding is being spent. Consequently, built into the funding and evaluation
mechanisms are requirements for fictions about how programs and services are
actually delivered. Tracking clients and maintaining data banks are not the central
focus of service providers, nor are there often skilled workers who can, or want to,
enter and analyze client data. In addition, federal funding, which often calls for
outcomes evaluation, seldom provides for financial support or for administrative
staffing to meet this requirement. Front-line program staff are thus required to
develop and maintain these data, which may often be as fictional as the city’s claim
of maintaining and expanding smooth relationships within the coalition.
Thus, Federal policy contributes to descriptions of local systems for homeless service
delivery—to local officials, to HUD, to the press—that are spun to appear compatible
with the parameters set by that policy. For example, in Glendale, many of the social
services at the Glendale Services Center, funded under the 1996, 1997 and 1998
Super NOFA’s, do in fact, serve homeless persons in the emergency shelter. In fact,
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under the current proposal to reorganize the Center under the management of a lead
agency, that is precisely how the funds available through SHP will be redeployed to
help alleviate the on-going funding shortfall faced by the shelter. Technically, this is
not breaking the rules, as long as SHP funds are not used for shelter “operations”,
and as long as the City stresses that the services are not meeting emergency needs,
but preparing clients for transitional or permanent housing. But this is a gray area,
and I get very nervous about the extent to which the City is now planning to use SHP
funded positions to staff the shelter, potentially reducing the availability of those staff
to clients in transitional housing (see Figure 15). But in my mind there is no choice,
Glendale has supportive service programs in the Center which are over-funded and
under-utilized, and an emergency shelter which is under-funded and under-staffed.
And without the emergency shelter, the potential efficacy of the other programs will
be severely curtailed. Without the limitations placed on the funding by HUD, there
would be plenty of funding to develop a sensible, seamless Center and emergency
shelter, and probably even enough funding to pay for the much needed Center
management. But as it is, the City needs to patch together a less than optimal system
and be sure to present it in a way that is palatable to HUD.
So this begs the question of how much local control cities really have over
their continuum of care. On the one hand, staff assures local elected officials that the
City does have control over the type and quality of the programs in the continuum.
Yet on the other hand, HUD often makes a convenient “straw man” for staff when
things are delayed, or there are problems with implementation. And while the City
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CODES: ARC=Adult Recreation Center (City)
CC=Catholic Charities
CWS=Cold W eather Shelter
GAMC=Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr.
GSC=Glendale Services Center
] = Sufficient
FIGURE 15
GLENDALE’ S CONTINUUM OF CARE IN 1999
GYA=Glendale Youth Alliance (City)
HA=Glendale Housing Authority
IURD=lnst. for Urban Research & Dev.
LAV=LA Vets
SA=The Salvation Army
]= Some Services
S+C=Shelter Plus Care (City)
US=Union Station
VMHC=Verdugo Mental Health Center
VPIC=Verdugo Private Industry Council
YWCA=YWCA of Glendale
1= No Services = Proposed
u>
N >
Ch
Independent
Housing
Emerg. Shelter
1-5 Days
Emerg. Shelter
1-60 Days
Transitional
Housing
Supportive
Housing
Sub
Population
Support
Services
Employment Housing
Placem ent
Street
Outreach
HA@GSC VMHC CWS/IURD
Vouchers
Single
Women
VPIC@
GSC
P roject ACHIEVE
IURD
HA@GSC VMHC CWS/IURD
Vouchers
P roject ACHIEVE
IURD
Single
Men
VPIC@
GSC
US/TSA CWS/IURD
Vouchers
CC/SA/GSC VPIC@
GSC
HA@GSC VMHC Project ACHIEVE
IURD
2 Parent
Families
US/TSA/YWCA HA@GSC CWS/IURD
Vouchers
CC/SA/GSC VPIC@
GSC
VMHC Project ACHIEVE
IURD
1 Parent
Families
YWCA YWCA
CC/SA/GSC
YWCA
VP1C@GSC
YWCA
HA@GSC
YWCA
YWCA
(by phone)
YWCA@GSC
YWCA
CWS/IURD
Vouchers
Domestic
Violence
CC/SA@GSC VMHC Youth
Under 18
CC/SA
ARC
VMHC CWS/IURD
Vouchers
P roject ACHIEVE
IURD
Frail
Elderly Applicable
HA@GSC VMHC CWS/IURD
Vouchers
Vouchers
GAMC
Medical
Needs
CC/SA
GAMC/GSC
Not
Applicable
VMHC@GSC CWS/IURD
Vouchers
P ruject ACHIEVE
IUR0
CC/SA
VMHC/GSC
VPIC@
GSC
HA@GSC VMHC Mentally
III
HA@GSC VMHC@GSC CWS/URD S ubstance
Abuse
CC/SA
VMHC/GSC
VPIC@
GSC
VMHC Project ACHIEVE
fURD Vouchers
CWS/IURD
Vouchers
CC/SA
LAV@GSC
HA@GSC
LAV@GSC
VMHC LAV@GSC P roject ACHIEVE
IURD
V eterans
All
LAV
VPIC@GSC
does staff the Glendale Homeless Coalition, controls the Super NOFA process and
administers all of the grants, the service providers are pretty much immune to any
real punitive actions if they do not fulfill their mission. This is in large part because
of local politics (see below), but also because the City, wittingly or unwittingly,
collaborates in the myth that the programs are doing just fine. And so does HUD. In
the annual reports I submit to HUD, rational explanations are provided for programs
that have not met their goals, which HUD accepts. These rationalizations are not
untrue, but what is left unstated are other causes for inadequate performance:
incompetent staff, poor management, and interpersonal or inter-agency conflict.
After all, the City does not want to give the money back, and HUD does not want to
take it back.
Then there are the myths that are promoted about collaboration. First, there is
the issue of regional collaboration. LAHSA and the jurisdictions that do their own
Super NOFA applications: currently Glendale, Pasadena and Long Beach, have long
argued (particularly in their NOFA applications) that there is a high-level of
coordination and cooperation between the programs under LAHSA and those in the
three cities. And this is true to the extent that, on the front line, programs in these
jurisdictions work together, referring clients between programs in different areas.
But at the administrative level, City and LAHSA staff communicate very little, in my
case the exceptions being the 1995 SHP projects still funded under LAHSA, the
Winter Shelter Program, and special issues like the 2000 Census. But we really do
not participate in any regional, county-wide planning activities conducted by
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LAHSA. And until recently, I too bought into the myth that this was just fine.
LAHSA was content that these jurisdictions were taking responsibility for their
communities, and Glendale, Pasadena and Long Beach were happy to be left alone,
by and large. But just last August, LAHSA tried to specifically exclude sites in
Glendale, Pasadena and Long Beach as sites for the Winter Shelter Program, based
on the fact that since Glendale did not participate in the Super NOFA, Glendale
should also be excluded from other LAHSA funded activities. There has been a
LAHSA funded Winter Shelter in Glendale since 1993, and Glendale has not been
participating in LAHSA’s Super NOFA since 1995, so this pronouncement seemed
rather abrupt. Of course the service providers and City staff in these three cities
reacted and the LAHSA Commission reversed their decision. But this event was
revelatory about the struggle for defining “local control” in Los Angeles County, and
about the level of denial those of us in Glendale have been in regarding our
relationship with LAHSA. Rumors that other jurisdictions may be planning to
submit their own Super NOFA applications next year have no doubt contributed to
the “warning shot” just fired by LAHSA. Just under the veneer of the myth of
collaboration, lies a struggle for control. In this case, LAHSA wants to be the only
administrator of homeless programs for Los Angeles County, and the other
jurisdictions want to control the planning and implementation of programs in their
communities (but also tap into LAHSA’s resources when convenient — we do want
to have it both ways). Clearly, there are many meetings with LAHSA ahead over the
next several months to more clearly define our relationship, although ultimately, I
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think this question will be determined based on politics and not policy. Supervisor
Antonovich’s position will be the key.
III. Local Politics and the Role of the City
III. A. Federal Policy. Local Control and Funding Constraints
Maintaining local control with the appearance of collaboration is the theme
with respect to local politics and the role of the City in homeless service delivery.
The City wants to control what services are provided by who, to whom, where, via
the administration of the funding, without appearing to take responsibility for the
causes and consequences of homelessness, or for being the sole entity charged with
addressing the issue.
The Federal government’s recent homeless policy — using the Consolidated
Planning process as a mandate for local jurisdictions to address the issue of
homelessness, yet devolving responsibility for the planning, administration and
monitoring of the programs to the local community — is really a stroke of political
genius (that was also replicated in the strategy for welfare reform). As we have seen,
Federal policy really does constrain the types of activities, exactly, for which funds
can be used. And, there are other mandates attached to Federal funds that must be
followed: environmental review, fair housing law, and Federal prevailing wage
(Davis-Bacon, however, McKinney funds are exempt).
The Federal government’s emphasis on funding for programs other than
emergency shelters has been one of the single, largest constraints on the rational
deployment of funding resources in Glendale. Unfortunately, Glendale was an
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exception to the traditional development of a continuum of care. Local officials
actively resisted the development of homeless programs, and until 1993 and the first
Winter Shelter, the only residential programs were an emergency shelter for victims
of domestic violence3, and The Salvation Army’s Booth House4, funding directly by
HUD through the Supportive Housing Program. (The City granted The Salvation
Army CDBG funds to pay for the acquisition and rehab). So when Glendale began to
plan for the development of its continuum of care in the mid-90’s, emergency shelter
was a high priority, but none of the new monies available from HUD could pay for it.
Plus, homelessness did not enjoy popular attention and support from the media, or
from private foundations and private individuals, making the development of a non
governmental, local funding-based a difficult and time-consuming process. Since
1996, the Institute for Urban Research and Development has managed to close the
funding gap via private foundation support. But this grows increasingly difficult to
maintain as private foundations generally do not want to fund on-going, operational
costs. And while some were will to support Project ACHIEVE when it was a new
program, they are not will to repeat their largess. And the number of private
•2 t
It is worth noting that domestic violence programs have a broader funding base to
draw from than other homeless programs—federal, state and local funds for domestic
violence, homelessness, and children and families often support domestic violence
programs. In California, this is especially true since the OJ Simpson case, and
because of the provisions of CalWorks.
4 Later the Nancy Painter Home. The irony is, that by funding a transitional housing
program without a local emergency shelter, the City and The Salvation Army actually
created conditions which would draw families from other communities into
Glendale’s homeless programs. For years thereafter, the program accepted referrals
from outside the area, especially programs in the Valley and Long Beach.
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foundations even willing to support homeless programs is by no means infinite.
Glendale’s Emergency Shelter Grant (ESG) allocation ranged between $100,000 -
$150,000 a year, not enough to fund a shelter.
In addition, other local agencies had traditionally received these ESG funds
and developed quality programs around them, most notably the Catholic Charities
Homeless Prevention Program. This is an excellent program that provides a one
time cash grant to families at-risk of homelessness who have received an eviction or
utility shut-off notice. The case manager for this program, Maria Melchor, is
excellent, and she ensures that funds are used for households that will avoid
homelessness (i.e., that will not be in the same situation the next month). Clearly,
preventing a homeless episode is the most humane, cost-effective, and politically
popular strategy for addressing homelessness. In addition, in enjoys broad-based
support from even the most conservative elected officials and their constituents.
Unfortunately, despite the Federal rhetoric emphasizing the important of prevention,
only limited funds are available for that activity—no more than 30% of a
jurisdiction’s Emergency Shelter Grant, annually.
III. B. Local Politics - The Magnet Theory, NIMBY and Local Law Enforcement
The magnet theory is the flip-side of NIMBY — and a rationale for it. Briefly,
the “magnet effect” is that if you provide services for homeless persons, you will
attract homeless people from other regions and actually increase your homeless
problem. From the perspective of local government, this is a big problem, as it
places you precisely in the middle between constituencies. First, those who are
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concerned with homelessness will exert pressure for you to do something about it.
For some, the something is anything that gets the homeless out of sight. For others,
it is providing quality services that help persons transition out of homelessness. The
other actor in this is the Federal government, which required local governments to
address homelessness directly in the Consolidated Plan. Thus, having a plan for
dealing with homelessness and INCREASING homeless programs is not just a
criterion to receive ESG funds, but CDBG and HOME funds as well. The judicial
court system is a player in this as well, for it has found that in order for the more
draconian measures of control to be upheld — anti-camping ordinances, panhandling
ordinances — a jurisdiction must provide homeless persons with a viable alternative
to life on the streets, that being social services and shelters.
The magnet effect, as I have seen in Glendale, was used as the argument for
not developing homeless programs for over a decade. The perception of a magnet
effect allows for the jurisdiction to, on the surface, agree to take responsibility for
“their” homeless, but to argue that homeless persons from other areas are not its
responsibility. It is a good argument on many levels, because in fact it is true that
services do draw clients (they are supposed to!). And it is true that “fair share”
between neighborhoods and jurisdictions is the ideal when it comes to siting various
types of services and land uses.
So local governments find themselves pressured on many sides to provide
services for homeless persons and/or pass legislation that does not enable their daily
routines on the city streets. On the other hand, there is a constituency that denies that
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there is a homeless problem, or that local government should have any role in solving
it, and who maintain that social services only make the problem worse, not better, as
they attract homeless persons from other locales, making homelessness worse, not
better. You create, or exacerbate a problem, precisely as you attempt to solve it.
This also places service providers in a awkward position. First, they must,
publicly at least, maintain a posture which is empathetic to the public’s concern
about the magnet effect. In fact some of the larger agencies, The Salvation Army,
Catholic Charities, have prohibitions against providing services to persons outside of
a certain region (although this has more to do with their concern about the division of
territory within their regional offices than it does with the magnet effect).
This leads to the creation of a lot of myths. In terms of the client population,
and the communities to which they “belong,” I have to balance delicate myths. At
the City, I find myself stressing to decisionmakers that over 50% of the persons
served by Glendale programs are Glendale residents (defined by last address, city
first homeless, city of birth). We in Glendale take the federal money, but do
everything we can to convince residents that we are serving “our” community and
not drawing outsiders.
One argument I have used to mitigate concerns about the magnet theory in
Glendale has centered around the kinds of services to be offered. I would make the
argument that there are two kinds of services: those that enable homeless persons to
maintain their life on the street; and, those that require homeless persons to follow
case management strategies designed to address the root causes of their homelessness
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and facilitate their transition to the greatest level of self-sufficiency possible. The
former types of services: soup kitchens, showers, lockers, drop-in center, cold
weather shelters, are the most likely to have the magnet effect, in that they do not
require any commitment on the part of the service recipients to address the causes of
their homelessness. Other services which are tied to a continuum of care and which
require individuals to make substantial changes in their behaviors, e.g., maintain
sobriety, take medication, address self-sabotaging behavior, are less likely to attract
persons from other regions. And, to the extent they do attract clients from across the
region, the persons they are attracting are those who are ready and willing, (or at least
feel that they are ready and willing) to change their lives.
But decisionmakers and residents remain concerned about serving Glendale’s
homeless population. How do you determine if a homeless person is a Glendale
resident? In Glendale we have been asked to track “Glendale residency” so we can
determine to what extent the magnet effect is in operation. This is pretty clear when
you can determine that the person’s last permanent address is Glendale. But it is not
so simple when a person was first homeless in another jurisdiction and came to
Glendale after becoming homeless. At what point in time does this person become a
Glendale resident? This is an excellent question that the Glendale Homeless
Coalition is attempting to deal with. Many of the social service providers (and
indeed the Federal government) argue immediately.
With respect to this, Glendale is attempting to ascertain homeless persons’
(especially non-residents, however that is ultimately defined) other ties to the
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community and their motivation for coming, other than, and including social service
delivery. This would be done through a series of questions designed to determine if
homeless persons had ever lived or worked in Glendale, had friends or family in
Glendale, had attended school or church in Glendale, where they were prior to
Glendale (Eagle Rock vs. Santa Monica), and why they came to Glendale, if it was
because of services, who referred them. All these efforts are meant to provide
empirical evidence for bolstering the myth that homeless persons “belong” to specific
communities and jurisdictions and that cities, once they are able to determine where
homeless people “belong,” that they can divide up the funding and implementation of
services and shelters (and consequently exclude some homeless persons from
accessing services).
But there are also occasions when I construct myths indicating the exact
opposite outcome. When LAHSA tried to exclude us from the Winter Shelter RFP,
for example, I found myself stressing to LAHSA that almost half of the persons
provided services by the program were from other jurisdictions in the County. This
issue is another manifestation of the balance between Federal policy and local
control. Almost all of the public funds in homeless programs in Glendale are
Federal, and the City has no right to restrict the use to those Federal funds to
Glendale residents (leaving aside, for the moment, the difficulty of determining when
a homeless person is a Glendale resident). The federal government says, if we want
to use the money, we must serve everyone. Since funding sources for homeless
programs are often based on numbers, it is often in the service providers’ interest to
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serve anyone who presents themselves for services, whether they are local or not.
And, finally, Federal funds (which many, many service providers receive) prohibit
withholding services from persons based on residency. I am thankful that the
members of the Glendale City Council do not attend the LAHSA Commission
meetings and vice versa. In each case, the myth I am spinning is completely true, but
it makes me very nervous to so baldly spin the facts, mediating the truth to the
situation and the particular stakeholders. But it is necessary and it is my job.
The magnet effect does not just apply across jurisdictions, but across
neighborhoods as well. The fear that homeless facilities will attract homeless
persons into a neighborhood is one of the most commonly articulated reasons for the
NIMBY syndrome. In Glendale, we attempted to address this by physically
separating “enabling services” — food, clothing, showers — from the entry points to
our continuum of care-the access center and emergency shelter. The magnet effect,
particularly on the neighborhood level but also on the regional level, does not just
apply to the influx of homeless persons, but to the concentration of facilities. Again,
this is a double bind for local government and service providers. On the one hand, it
does make sense to locate social services proximate to one another in order to
facilitate access for the homeless and at-risk populations (i.e., the creation of “service
hubs”). On the other hand, one runs the risk of creating a service ghetto, or a
situation where there is the perception at least if not the reality of over-concentration
of services. This has not really been a problem in Glendale.
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One of the ways the City tries to balance the need to provide homeless
services without looking like they are too liberal, taking on neighboring jurisdiction’s
problems, or “knuckling under” to HUD, is through the implementation of local
ordinances that, while not technically criminalizing homelessness, are meant to
control homeless persons’ behavior, satiate the public’s fears, and drive the homeless
either into services or out of the City. In fact in Glendale, I suspect that one of City
Manager Dave Ramsay’s motivations in joining the Coalition was the recognition
that, without a real system of homeless service delivery (which Glendale did not have
prior to 1994), some of the ordinances that he desired to enact, particularly regarding
camping and panhandling, might not stand up to a court challenge. Similar
ordinances in other jurisdictions (most notably Santa Ana) had been upheld on the
basis that the jurisdiction had made viable alternatives to camping in the park
available to the homeless there.
In Glendale, a number of such ordinances have been passed, with the support
of the Glendale Homeless Coalition: public drinking, anti-camping, and a use of
public facilities ordinance will go before the Council this fall. Now there are many
myths that surround these activities. The most prevalent one, and one to which I too,
somewhat, subscribe, is that “tough love” works. This is based, at the deepest level,
on the age-old distinction between the “good” homeless — those that are homeless
through no fault o f their own and who “want” help — and the “bad” homeless — those
who appear unwilling to conform to society’s notions, get a job, and who choose to
be homeless. The “good” homeless, of course, will use the services that are available
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to them through the continuum of care and make themselves into productive citizens.
(Would that it were so easy. But it is a myth that I have used to counter the magnet
effect - 1 have made the argument that by providing those services which will attract
those who are serious about turning their lives around, we insure that if we are a
magnet, we are only attracting the “deserving” homeless who will be good Glendale
residents in the end.) The “bad” homeless, on the other hand, will continue to hang
out at the library and drink, harassing patrons and staff. For that most visible and
intractable element of the homeless, the ordinances can be viewed positively as a
community’s unwillingness to “enable” such self-destructive and intolerable
behavior. Cracking down and making life on the streets uncomfortable may be just
what it takes to cause a person to “bottom-out” and finally seek assistance (and
thereby transforming them into “good” homeless people).
Again, this is a myth with which to some extent I agree. I do think that some
services, for example drop-in centers, do enable homeless persons and may prolong
homelessness in some cases. I also believe that illegal and offensive behavior is
unacceptable regardless of who is doing it, and that homeless persons should not be
given special consideration. (I know too many homeless persons who took great
pride in being positive members of their community, even when they were on the
streets, to buy the argument that the reason people defecate in the bushes is because
they do not have a choice). But my main reason for supporting the ordinances in
Glendale was political as the cost of getting support for the services. It is clear to me
that these ordinances have not gotten one person off the streets and into services.
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This highlights another myth: that despite what they say, that the Police
really want the responsibility of using law enforcement as part of an overall strategy
to get homeless persons into quality services. The reason for this is actually quite
simple; with a few zealous exceptions, I have found that the majority of the police
officers on the street really do not want to be bothered with dealing with homeless
persons. They will respond to complaints, but they do not want to arrest them either
because they are compassionate or because in the case of minor infractions, they do
not want to do the paperwork. This is especially true if the homeless person has a
large amount of “stuff’. His/her property must be systematically booked, and
accounted for. Also, it IS more difficult to arrest a homeless person then the average
person thinks. For many of the crimes — public drinking, public urination — the only
evidence is the eye-witness account. For the charge to stick, the officer has to see the
crime being committed, and often s/he is not called until after the fact. In that case,
police need a member of the public, such as a library staff person, for example, to act
as the complainant. One of my biggest frustrations in Glendale has been that City
staff complain the most about the homeless at their programs, yet they do not want to
be the “bad guy” and file a complaint. (To be fair, some may be intimidated, but
again, I think they just do not want to bother - it is easier to play the victim and
complain).
Sometimes, however, officers are compassionate and take an interest in
homelessness or in a particular homeless individuals and they can be of great help,
except they then tend to “enable” rather than judiciously enforce the appropriate
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ordinance. And a few officers resent homeless persons and do, in fact, harass them.
That these ordinances are really for “show”, a myth of control, is demonstrated by the
fact that the minority of homeless persons that are really a threat to public health,
safety and the enjoyment of public space, are at any point in time, guilty of violating
a number of existing ordinances, and that anti-camping, panhandling and other such
ordinances are really superfluous. There main function, again, is to perpetuate the
myth that the City can control the homeless population through law enforcement and
services, and that everyone is working together to solve the problem.
III. C. Local Control and Collaboration Among Service Providers
Then there are the myths of collaboration on the local level which are
comprised of the following themes: that all of the agencies are team-players and
what is best for the continuum needs to take precedence over what is good for each
individual agency; that there is a necessity to drive toward new or expanded services;
and that there are roles for specialization.
While federal policy compelling collaboration among all the players in
homeless service provision is sound policy, and an end definitely worth pursuing,
implementation on the ground is hampered by each agency’s need, understandably in
some cases, to look after itself, to define its particular, and indispensable, role within
the continuum and the community, and to ensure the viability of the organization.
Yet for the collaborative continuum of care process to really work, the stakeholders
must be committed to objectively examining their own data to determine what are the
unmet needs of the homeless community and how resources should best be deployed,
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without narrow concern for their own agency. In Glendale, agencies handle this
tension between looking out for their own agency and for the continuum as a whole
in different ways. Some, like Catholic Charities, have been loathe to take on
additional commitments for fear of overextending themselves, but have been flexible
in deploying their resources where they will do the most good. Other agencies have
been quick to capitalize on their “specialty” to gamer new funding and programs, and
are ambivalent about collaboration (although publicly they are all for it), for
example, the YWCA and Verdugo Mental Health. Both of these agencies have used
their specialization (domestic violence and mental health, respectively) to carve out
new and expanded programmatic and funding niches for their agencies, arguing
successfully, that these issues are predominant among the homeless population. Yet
in the end, both agencies try to circumscribe, rather than extend, their role in the
continuum when it comes to what services or clients they are responsible for. And
they have each done this in different ways.
The YWCA, for example, has basically set-up a separate continuum of care
for victims of domestic violence with its own entry-point, emergency shelter and
transitional housing programs. Welfare to work funding has also provided additional
counseling and employment services. The majority of the YWCA’s clients come
from a county-wide system for domestic violence referrals. (Domestic violence
programs have always gotten around the “magnet effect” because of safety-issues,
that is, women need to be removed from the community in which the batterer lives.
The idea is that Glendale women are best served by programs outside of Glendale,
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and Glendale programs best service non-Glendale residents). The YWCA used to
have a part-time representative at the Glendale Services Center, but that has been
discontinued. Yet the YWCA complains bitterly that it is viewed apart from the
continuum, separate and unequal. It is worth noting, however, that the YWCA has
received more SHP and City funding for its programs since 1995 than any other
agency.
Verdugo Mental Health Center, on the other hand, is intricately involved in
the day to day operation of the Glendale Services Center, and has more staff on site
than any other agency. Yet it are so concerned that it will end up “babysitting” for
other agency’s clients (particularly the shelters), that it defines its target population
very narrowly. I have gone around and around with the project director, Dr.
Sherman, on this point. Personally, I feel that far more homeless persons could
benefit from mental health care than are presently receiving it at the Center, yet
Verdugo Mental Health Center wants only to be responsible for the most severely
debilitated. I could be convinced of the wisdom of this approach IF they were
meeting their numbers and could convince me that their staff were working at their
capacity. But even Dr. Sherman admits that this is not the case. The real issue is that
he does not want to take responsibility for all the clients in the continuum. This issue
of whose clients are whose is understandable, but frustrating. Ideally, the success or
failure of any client is the collective responsibility of every provider in the
continuum, but this is not an attitude that is shared by all the frontline staff of their
supervisors. The control issue underlying the myth of collaboration here is who gets
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blamed. Recently, since the conflict resolution process, Dr. Sherman has begun to
understand the dire financial situation surrounding Project ACHIEVE, and he
understands that if the shelter goes away, his programs will be severely affected. He
has, on the surface, adopted a more flexible and cooperative attitude.
In some ways, Glendale was ideally suited to perpetuate a myth of
collaboration between the service providers and the City when it came to homeless
programs. People were working together, and continue to do so to this day, despite
problems. Also, I think the service providers believe, correctly, that the City is on
their side whenever it can be, as all share a common goal. In fact, I think in Glendale
that the relationship between the City and the service providers is better than in some
jurisdictions. It is not openly combative, but is on the surface very polite. I attribute
this to the Glendale City culture, former City Manager Dave Ramsay, and to
Community Development and Housing Director Madalyn Blake. The City has been,
and continues to be, very supportive of social services in general, and supportive of
the agencies that now provide homeless programs (most of which have been in
Glendale for decades). The problem arises, however, when this myth is perpetuated
at the cost of healthy conflict and in the City’s reticence in holding providers as
accountable as they might.
The City of Glendale, despite its size, operates on a system of social networks
that are very close-knit, and that revolve around a number of key service clubs. As
part of this system, the Executive Directors of the non-profits speak in person to
elected officials with a greater frequency than in a larger jurisdiction. Under this
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system, and a City Council where every member is “at-large”, a key Glendale
cultural value is consensus and cooperation. (It would be interesting to note the
proportion of Council motions when the vote has either been unanimous or with only
one opposing. I bet it is unusually high compared to jurisdictions of a similar size.)
The City has also had a paternalistic attitude toward the service providers,
assuming that they need the City to assist them in order to accomplish their goals.
This culture-of-consensus-at-all-costs (the negative dimension of the myth of
collaboration) has permeated into the very front-line of homeless service delivery,
and was to my mind the largest, fundamental, problem that impacted the
development of Glendale’s continuum of care. An interesting by-product of this is
my observation that those providers who are best suited to Glendale’s culture, who
are the most passive-aggressive in their approach to collaboration, and who perhaps
need to be monitored more closely regarding their service delivery, are also those
who are the most “well-connected” with the Council.
Another by-product of Glendale culture is that when conflict arises, for
example, if homeless advocates forcefully raise issues, people overreact (including
me). Food for Body and Soul (FFB&S), for example, managed to incite major
reactions from the City on several occasions, thereby magnifying the importance of
FFB&S’s message. The City’s response also often rewards this type of behavior by
trying to co-opt the offending agency. One of Dave Ramsay’s last act before leaving
the City was to call a meeting of City staff to discuss how FFB&S could be assisted
in their efforts to establish a local food bank. I ended up doing a “food needs survey”
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to assist FFB&S in documenting the community need so it could apply for CDBG
funds. The agency never did. (And the responses to the survey, over 700, have been
coded and run. No real analyses of the findings have been made, however.)
IV. The Stakeholders
In this section, I analyze the types of participants in the process of decision
making in homeless services in Glendale. My experiences in Glendale has lead my
to develop this typology to begin to understand the role or institutional cultures in the
implementation of homeless programs there. Of course, like all typologies, there is a
great deal of overlap between the categories and many agencies, and to a greater
extent the individuals that work for them could be placed in more than one category.
In addition, within categories there is variation as to the degree to which a particular
agency or individual exhibits that categories defining attributes. While I believe
these categories are quite appropriate to describe the service providers in Glendale, as
illustrated by their behaviors described in previous chapters, the general application
of these categories across locales may be more problematic. I first outline the groups
and describe their varying missions, motivations, and goals, and then I discuss how
individuals working within these organizational structures and political alliances
used existing power relations (and tried to alter them) to both reinforce and challenge
myths about homelessness and homeless service provision in Glendale. There are
four primary groups: those with religious affiliations, clinicians and professional
service providers, those interested in social justice or driven by personal experiences
with homelessness or an associated set of circumstances, and government agencies.
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IV. A. Religious Affiliation
These service providers are organizations founded by, or affiliated with, faith-
based communities and/or churches. Their orientation is based ultimately on Judeo-
Christian biblical teachings advocating the sanctity of ministry to the poor (which
also includes a problematic romanticization of poverty and the poor as more “moral”,
“closer to God/Jesus” than the affluent). At the same time, economic poverty is also
viewed as associated with spiritual poverty. Thus, these groups are also motivated by
a desire to proselytize the poor, convert them to (in most cases) Christianity5. The
kinds of services that have traditionally been provided by these agencies in Glendale
are food, clothing and shelter. With some notable exceptions (e.g., Catholic
Charities) case management has often been limited to information and referral.
The largest and most well established of these agencies (The Salvation Army
and Catholic Charities) are nation-wide (or international) organizations with
relatively rigid institution structures and hegemonic institutional cultures. The
Salvation Army, for example, is a para-military organization in the truest sense with
a clearly articulated hierarchy through which regional commanding officers control
the local Corps. Catholic Charities, on the other hand, replicates the hierarchy of the
Church, with a Monsignor as the chief operating officer in charge of regional areas of
5 This last desire is somewhat problematized by the prevalence of public money in
financing homeless service provision. Federal funds place very clear restrictions on
what religious service providers can and cannot discuss with clients. Funding for
capital improvement and the acquisition of property are also very limited with
respect to religious organizations. Often, separate non-profits, with a more secular
mission statements, are established to handle publicly funded development projects.
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service delivery within the diocese. Service delivery is also impacted by their
relationship to the Church: Catholic Charities will not engage in any services
supporting family planning or reproductive choice. Needless to say, these structures
and ideological underpinnings affect the flexibility of those in charge of local service
delivery. Still, like local government, the local officials often try to employ creative
means and persuasion to convince their superiors to cede as much control to the local
level as possible.
I have also noticed that the larger of these agencies are extremely concerned
with their status in the community, particularly with how they are portrayed in the
media. The Salvation Army, in particular, are masters of public and community
relations. This, in part, may explain another observation: that these two agencies, in
particular, are extremely conflict-avoidant. Thus, they will often agree publicly to
policies and procedures that individuals within the organizations might not be
comfortable with, thus leading to problems with implementation. Also, by and large,
these agencies have a relatively low pay-rate for their staff. This, combined with the
rigid organizational and ideological structure, often attracts persons who are often
young and/or inexperienced. This often leads to relatively high staff turnover in the
front-line service provision positions.
In Glendale, the grass-roots Food For Body and Soul is in stark contrast to the
large, established agencies. Newly formed and completely volunteer based, they
view themselves as advocates for the homeless, and are willing to create controversy
if they feel it is needed. They are no funding ties to the City and a modest annual
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budget raised solely from contributions. Their services are limited to one meal each
Sunday and ad-hoc religious counseling and case management.
The following groups in Glendale fit this category:
The Salvation Army Glendale Corps
Churches: Holy Family Catholic Church, First United Methodist Church,
Glendale Presbyterian Church, Salem Lutheran Church
Food for Body & Soul
Catholic Charities
IV. B. Clinicians/Professionals
These are professionals: psychiatrists, psychologists, professional counselors
(MFCC, MSW, LCSW, Drug & Alcohol Counselors), physicians, and nurses who
apply their professional/clinical training and expertise to the homeless. Many are
also doing something else: private practice, or work for agencies/hospitals that serve
the mainstream community. Many have also chosen to specialize in homeless issues
out of religious or social justice concerns. In any case, however, they approach
homeless persons as patients, who may or may not meet specific treatment criteria
and protocols. Unfortunately, they often choose not to “treat” the homeless folks
who are not “diagnosable” — who are merely “depressed” or “traumatized” by their
homeless experience but not technically mentally ill. I have found the clinicians to
be a very defensive group, who really have problems dealing with the most
profoundly disturbed and uncooperative folks in the homeless population.
Unfortunately, non-mental health case managers usually do not have the
therapeutic skills to really help this group, thus creating a significant gap in services.
Adding to this major problem is that these groups do not fully appreciate the
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importance of more peer-based models for therapeutic intervention. This may be
because this threatens their role/status as highly trained professionals who do not
have the life experience to relate to their clients. It also because (rightly so) the
clinicians worry that the “peers” are too close to the clients, and may relapse
themselves.
The structure of the organizations which employ the clinicians are often very
hierarchical— clinics or hospitals—that rely very heavily on public funds for their
support. As such, the institutional cultures are rigidly based in diagnostic and
treatment protocols, and performance measures are very quantitatively based (e.g.,
billable hours in 15 minute increments). These organizations are very sophisticated
in their ability to manipulate these protocols and performance measures to obfuscate
the validity of qualitative measures of their service delivery (e.g., the opinion of
clients and other service providers). These tend to be the highest paying positions
within Glendale’s continuum of care for frontline staff positions. Organizations in
Glendale that fall into this category are:
Verdugo Mental Health
Pacific Clinics
Hospitals: Glendale Adventist Medical Center, Glendale Memorial, Family
Practice Residency
Visiting Nurses, School District nurses, LA County Health Department.
IV. C. Social Justice and Past Personal Experiences
This includes those who have a strong, personal commitment to issues
relating to equity for marginal groups, whether it be economic, racial/ethnic, gender,
the mentally ill, youth, battered women, immigrants. This is often rooted in, and
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overlaps with, religious conviction, political orientation, and personal experience and
includes feminists, survivors of domestic violence, people recovering from
drug/alcohol addiction and formerly homeless persons. Examples in Glendale would
be the Institute for Urban Research and Development and the YWCA of Glendale.
The organizations tend to be locally-based or, as in the case of the YWCA, national
organizations in which local chapters are very autonomous. This allows these
organizations to be extremely flexible, relying largely on a local Board of Directors
for policy and programming over site. Thus, the local Executive Directors generally
drive these organizations, and in Glendale they tend to be the individualists in the
crowd, strong-willed and at times polemic, fierce advocates for “their people” and for
their organizations. They are often willing to take an extreme role in order to make
their views heard. At times, this causes these organizations to see government as an
impediment to their mission6. The staff of these agencies are often attracted to the
charisma of the leadership and to the organization’s specific mission or target
population (e.g., survivors of domestic violence, veterans). And although locally-
based, these agencies do tend to pay better than the faith-based organizations,
particularly at the management level.
6 Ironically, those who are most comfortable with government are the religious folks,
perhaps because both church and state are inherently conservative institutions, and
once the constitutional issues are worked out - it is quite simple, really - do not
mention God while providing services, do not make participation in religious
activities a condition of services, and do not discriminate in service provision or
hiring on the basis of religion - then there is no real hassle.
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I have included in this group concerned individuals who regularly participate
in the Glendale Homeless Coalition. These are of two general types: individuals who
are themselves formerly homeless, or have been touched in their personal lives by an
issues associated with homelessness—e.g., mental illness or substance abuse; and,
concerned members of the business community who are motivated by social
conscience, by the desire to mitigate a problem which they feel directly affects them
or their community (e.g., panhandling), or both. Both of these categories of
individuals are very important in legitimizing the positions of the Coalition to local
politicians and to HUD. Often, however, these individuals have a simplistic or
unrealistic view of the issues relating to service delivery and the administration of
federal monies. They tend to get very frustrated with the pace of program
implementation. Organizations and individuals who fall into this category are:
The Institute for Urban Research and Development
YWCA
YMCA
Survival Support Group
LA Vets
Fair Housing Council of the San Gabriel Valley
Pacific Housing Alliance
West Hollywood Housing Corp
Mark Evans, Thom Daugherty, Henry Schoessler— formerly homeless persons
This category also includes concerned residents and civic organizations:
Association of Realtors-John Patrick Kearney
Chamber of Commerce- Pat Liddell
IV. D. Government Agencies
Government agencies are charged to deal with homeless issues. They are
enabled and constrained by law, policy, regulation and politics. Of course, the
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structure of government organizations is very rigid and bureaucratic. It is ironic,
however, that in some ways the guiding policy initiatives of government
organizations is more subject to flux than the other groups listed above because of
changes in elected officials and administrations at the federal, state, and local levels.
That may explain why the motivations of the individual actors in the government
settings may be more broad-based than the other groups previously described, people
are attracted to the idea of public service, to the technical aspects of their work, to the
dynamics of the political arena, or to the pay rate and benefits available to those who
work in government which tends to be relatively high (when compared to service
providers, at least). What is less flexible, I think, are the institutional cultures of
particular jurisdictions and even of departments within jurisdictions. This is less
flexible because I think (less than policy) institutional cultures are cultivated and
promoted as much by staff as by elected officials, and thus it is more deeply rooted
and immutable. These institutional cultures can vary widely, but in Glendale I have
described the culture as consensus-at-all-costs. It is an institutional culture which is
predicated on behind-the-scenes manipulation to achieve the appearance of
consensus. Public conflict is viewed as a failure on the part of staff. This, to my
mind, is a very unhealthy dynamic that contributes to the creation and maintenance of
myths of service delivery that are not in anyone’s best interest, expect perhaps the
short-term interest of elected officials.
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Many government agencies have directly participated in the development of
Glendale’s continuum of care, either as members of the Glendale Homeless
Coalition, or as funding and/or over-site agencies:
City of Glendale
Community Development &Housing
Parks
Police
Library
Planning
City Manager
City Council/Housing Authority
City Attorney
PIO
Transportation
Public Services
Finance
Glendale Unified School District
Glendale Community College
LAHSA
State of California
Employment Development Department
National Guard
LA County
Department of Public Social Services
Department of Public Health
HUD
Community Planning and Development
Labor Standards
Environmental
Representatives from local officeholders
Antonovich
Rogan
Wildman
Scott
Schiff
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IV. E. Individuals Do Make a Difference
The relationship between these institutions and the individuals within them
will be discussed for two points: 1. that institutions tend to attract and keep folks
who are comfortable with their culture, and that this impacts and perpetuates the
culture; and, 2. that particular individuals in the right place at the right time can, for
better or worse, make a difference.
Is it trite to say that the YWCA, a women’s organization based on a
philosophy of promoting physical, spiritual and psychological health and dedicated to
the issue of domestic violence, attracts feminists? And that The Salvation Army,
which is truly a para-military organization in both its structure and function, attracts
persons who are comfortable in such a structured environment, who value conformity
in attitude and behavior, and who are excellent at mounting and maintaining
defensive postures? That mental health service providers who long to be viewed as
professionals, who see themselves (and their clients) as apart from the general
population, individually and as a group have a difficult time with integration? And
certain individuals can create an enormous shift in the group dynamic, and greatly
affect the outcome of social processes. This challenges the myth, particularly
cherished by the public sector and by academics, that it is structure — policies and
procedures — that determines the outcome of policy initiatives. I have provided a
brief profile of individuals from three of the categories of stakeholders described
above that have, for better or worse, had a huge impact on homeless service delivery
in Glendale.
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Greg Roth, a pastor with Glendale Presbyterian Church represents the faith-
based service providers. Dr. Roth was the founder and leader of the Glendale
Homeless Coalition for years before the political climate in Glendale was friendly
toward his perspective. He persevered, and kept the issue on the forefront. He was
the first LAHS A Commissioner every appointed by Michael Antonovich. He was a
thoughtful man who was skilled at building consensus, but who could create conflict.
I have often thought that if Greg Roth would have still been leading the Coalition,
that much of the conflict that happened at the Center could have been avoided. He
was our spiritual-elder, and I think everyone understood that he was always
motivated by the greater good. This gave him the true persuasive power of a “big
man”.
Dave Ramsay, the former Glendale City Manager, recognized that in order to
attract more commercial business to downtown Glendale, something needed to be
done about the homeless problem there. In order to enact the necessary ordinances,
services would need to be developed. And there was the Consolidated Plan and the
rumor of a sizeable block grant for homeless programs. If the City were an active
player in the Coalition, then it could exert more positive influence on what would
happen. Thus, Dave Ramsay called Greg Roth and asked for a meeting. But Dave
Ramsay was also a compassionate man as well. It just so happened that doing the
right thing was also doing the smart thing. He led the Coalition, but most
importantly, he rallied the Council’s support. He turned Larry Zarian and the other
Council members around, in part through education, in part through politics. And
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although he was a master of Glendale city culture, he took a stand with the neighbors
at Fernando Court. When he left the City of Glendale in the Fall of 1997, support for
homeless programs at the Council level eroded. This was compounded by the
election of a former Councilmember who was overtly opposed to homeless
programs, and by the retirement of Councilmember Eileen Givens who had strongly
supported the Coalition and its efforts. Fortunately, by this time, the majority of the
City administered funds that were to be used as leverage for the Supportive Housing
Program monies awarded through the Super NOFA had already been committed by
the City Council.
Joe Colletti, a service provider motivated by social-justice issues, was the
conceptual architect of the Glendale continuum of care. He was also well-connected,
politically, in the early 1990’s. He lobbied for Greg Roth’s appointment, and for
Glendale to have an Initiative’s funded access center. The first Winter Shelter was
initiated by his student, in partnership with his agency. He introduced Glendale to
me and encouraged me to apply for, and accept the position. But his position in the
City changed drastically once he became the operator for Project ACHIEVE, and
particularly after he left Lutheran Social Services and started his own agency. Before
then, he had a status akin to that of Greg Roth’s. He was more of a consultant, a
disinterested expert, an outsider. He was not in direct competition for funding. The
moment the shelter was proposed, some agencies saw it as a threat. And Joe
Colletti’s personality was not compatible with Glendale’s consensus-at-all-costs
culture. He caused conflict.
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Thom Daugherty is a formerly homeless individual who was a client of Maria
Melchor of Catholic Charities. And in 1994, the Task Force recognized the need for
the participation of a formerly homeless client in the process (and HUD was
mandating it). Thom was enormously articulate. He could speak compassionately
about the difficulties of living the homeless life. And he would denounce enabling
behaviors and poor conduct on the part of the homeless. But Thom’s role in the
Coalition became an important part of his self-identity, and more and more of his
time was taken up “volunteering”. Thom ran the pilot Center for no pay, and did
outreach on the streets and in the Winter Shelter. Maria warned me that he was
becoming obsessive. She argued that he should not be given the Peer Counselor
position as a paid position because he could not handle it. I felt we were exploiting
Thom already, and The Salvation Army was glad to hire him as he had more
expertise in homelessness than anyone else on its staff. But Thom did begin to
behave in destructive and self-sabotaging ways. HUD has always, and rightly so,
promoted the participation of homeless persons in service delivery, and liberal
academics insist on it. But I have never seen a constructive discussion of the
difficulties involved with that. I have seen Peer Counseling work out beautifully,
and I think it is crucial. But I also know it is often difficult for former clients to walk
that balance between past and present behaviors in their own lives. The myth of “just
give folks a chance” is a complicated one. Formerly homeless staff need additional
support and better quality management if they are not to jeopardize their own
recovery.
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IV. The Anthropology of Governance: Conflicting Positions and
Postmodern Contributions
Applied anthropology still has the goal of demonstrating and creating
theoretical frameworks, especially if the anthropologist is situated in an academic
environment at the time of the work. This is, I believe, a very useful pursuit, and
ultimately represents the cutting edge, and future of academic anthropology.
Anthropology needs to be relevant to students, and closer to home-the costs, in time
and money, of doing research overseas is also a problem to the health of graduate
programs in anthropology into the future. It is one thing to be an “applied
anthropologist” and to be associated with a consulting firm or academia. It is a
different thing to be an active participant in the field, essentially one of your own
subjects.
Moore (1992) responded to this issue in this way: “By being aware of policy
as a process, anthropologists can judge when to intervene at any stage, including the
prestage of defining or setting the problem. We can do field work with a specific
theoretical framework that may involve the definition of a policy need felt by the
field community. Or, conversely, the community may already present the field
worker with a policy problem and ask for a solution” (p. 528). Moore (1992)
continued: “Thus, the process of open group deliberation at all levels is one to be
nurtured. It has its pitfalls, and many failures shall surely continue to happen.
Rational deliberation, wherever its arena, and whether or not it is formally
constituted, is everywhere to be encouraged” (p. 535).
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How did anthropology affect my job - and how did my job affect my ability
to be an applied anthropologist? In many ways, the academic pursuit of
anthropology was well suited to training me to become an effective policymaker in
homelessness programs. Academia provided me with the following skills and
insights. I was trained to analyze individual patterns of behavior and group dynamics
to see patterns and to appreciate the importance of social structure and culture. The
study of anthropology gave me the tools and theoretical models with which to
analyze structure and meaning and to deal with persons from diverse backgrounds.
As an anthropologist I went into the field to put these tools in practice. My initial
fieldwork and writings formed the basis of what would evolve into, I think, a
complex and sophisticated understanding of homelessness (if not the answers to
solve it!). No other discipline would have forced the deep focus that I developed,
and that has carried me through all these years. And the practical knowledge I
acquired in the field was invaluable and much of it was translated directly into
policy. The process of studying the ethnographic works of other authors gave me an
understanding of the importance of myth and ritual and how to deploy them to my
own best advantage. And constructing my own ethnographies as a student gave me
confidence in my skills as a writer and in my ability to use my many voices, and be
self-aware of the affects of my position and biases on my attempts at representation.
But working in the field of homeless policy also affected my skills and
abilities to practice applied anthropology. As a participant I have been entirely
immersed in the project, too close, not objective, my account is flooded with
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emotion. The responsibilities of my job often cause me to be so caught up in day to
day tasks and crises, that thinking theoretically, or trying to apply my original
theories about how homeless services should be delivered, has become completely
subsumed by a survival mentality. I spend most of my intellectual energies on just
keeping the projects going, and being grateful that anything at all got accomplished.
This focus on crises and day-to-day tasks has alienated me from theory.
On the other hand, my job has showed me first hand that the reasons why
things happen as they do are so complex and interdependent that any attempt to
describe them, or abstract them, is partial at best. When applied to policy the
creation of public policy, the limitations on our abilities to fully account for the
complexity of day to day life and program implementation often means that emphasis
is placed on an issue or component that in another, local, context is completely
irrelevant. It confirmed me as a post-modernist. At the same time, my job led me to
the realization of how little policy is impacted by theory, and how much policy
makers could benefit from theory, and from ethnographic research.
In terms of constructing this dissertation, my job limited me in terms of what kind of
data I can collect. If I had written this dissertation from the position of the
ethnographer alone, I would have done things differently. In particular, I would
conduct interviews with the parties involved in developing the continuum of care in
Glendale. I think their voices would provide yet another set of counter-narratives to
the public and private myths I have constructed. But I feel that given my current
position with the City that this is untenable and inappropriate. As documented
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particularly in Chapter VII, tensions between myself and some of the service
providers are already strained, and conducting an ethnographic interview would no
doubt complicate an already complex professional relationship. At the same time, I
have no doubt that my current position would significantly affect their responses to
my questions, rendering the ethnographic value of any interviews problematic.
I feel strongly, however, about the value of taking the work begun in this
dissertation to its logical conclusion. For this reason, and other personal reasons, I
plan to leave my position in Glendale in early 2000. After that, I plan on conducting
ethnographic interviews with key participants. While my previous relationship to
them will still impact the data, I think having removed myself from being able to
impact the decisionmaking process in Glendale will lessen some informants’
motivation to “spin” their accounts. After conducting these interviews and
developing a draft of my poly-vocal ethnography, I plan to ask participants to read
and comment on relevant portions. I will then incorporate those comments into the
final ethnography. It is my hope that this methodology will begin to capture the
various perspectives and complexities that I am beginning to excavate in this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION
I. Background
This dissertation analyzes how and why myths are generated around the
development and implementation of homeless policy. I also discuss the conflicting
roles of the PRACTITIONER-anthropologist, how this role has impacted this
dissertation, and my ideas for furthering ethnographic methodology to mitigate these
impacts. In this concluding chapter, I first provide an overview of the contents of
this dissertation, then move into the impacts of my role as practitioner-anthropologist
on this research, and implications for developing other ethnographies of governance.
Homelessness remains a critical issue across the U. S. Even with a robust
economy, there remains a large segment of the population living in impoverished and
marginal conditions. Because homeless persons are often dependent on particular
service providers to meet daily needs, the potential of homeless persons to cope with
their ongoing circumstances is to a large degree determined by the non-profit and
public service providers with whom they interact.
There is no lack of suggestions and recommendations put forth by researchers
to policymakers to address the diversification and expansion of homelessness (e.g.,
Blasi, 1990; Kondratas, 1991; Toro and Warren, 1999; Wolch and Dear, 1993). But
there has been less attention paid to the ways in which legislation and official
policies act as much as myths or policy images as they do indicators of action
(Gatrell and Fintor, 1998). Indeed, Toro and Warren (1999) argue that “Attention to
the wide array of housing problems and cooperation among state and local
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governments and community groups is essential if efforts to end homelessness are to
succeed” (p. 119). Federal legislation and policies frame in an abstract way the
means through which homeless services should be provided. Municipal grant
proposals seeking federal funds for supporting local homeless programs must adhere
to these abstractions about policy design and implementation. The actual ways that
policies and services are carried out however may deviate rather significantly from
the “mythology of practice” (i.e., the stated procedures and outcomes identified in
grant proposals, policies, and procedures).
The theoretical and empirical research described as “governance” addresses
many of these issues. Governance has become an increasingly popular term used by
researchers to describe the form and function of the state. Governance perspectives,
in contrast to existing state-centered or society-centered views, tend to focus
primarily on the coordination and conflict among interdependent activities and
actors.
I. A. My Roles as Ethnographer and Public Official
But how would ethnographers assess the issues underlying governance in the
context of homeless policy design and implementation? Contemporary ethnography
has been increasingly concerned over the past two decades with issues of
representations and reflexivity. The difficulties with representing the “other” have
been clearly articulated in post-modern critiques of ethnography and have resonated
in my personal field experience. The clear and deliberate articulation of the position
of the ethnographer comprises one strategy to address the dilemma of representation.
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Thus, I have decided to situate the ethnographic narrative in this dissertation in the
three positions that I have inhabited as a practitioner and as a participant-observer
with respect to the issue of homelessness and governance: academic researcher,
social service provider, and government official.
I began my work with the homeless in 1986 in downtown Los Angeles as an
undergraduate anthropologist and photographer. The second phase of my
ethnographic research began in May, 1990. This research was to have been the basis
of a larger project on homeless social networks, daily routines and social service
delivery. I began working as a service provider in 1992 after moving to Pasadena.
In October, 1994,1 became employed as the Homeless Coordinator for the City of
Glendale. As the position has evolved, my responsibilities have become well-
defined, although there is a constant flux in how those duties are prioritized by
myself and my supervisors at any point in time. Initially, my duties at the City of
Glendale focussed on providing staff support to the Glendale Homeless Coalition.
Working closely with the non-profit service providers to coordinate and oversee the
services within the continuum of care and providing technical assistance to them is
my largest, and most complex, responsibility.
My role as the Homeless Coordinator for the City of Glendale has mixed
implications for my role as a practitioner/ethnographer. On the positive side, I have
been directly involved in all of the aspects of planning, developing and implementing
homeless programs in the City of Glendale. I am uniquely situated in my position to
observe and reflect on the interaction of, and issues faced by, service providers, and
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local and federal government. As such, I have learned a great deal about how and
why programs designed to serve homeless persons are implemented as they are, or
not. The complexity of the issues which need to be addressed, even in a best-case
scenario, are staggering. Added to this are the inter-agency and inter-personal
dynamics which complicate any human endeavor.
If I were able to have written this dissertation from the position of the
ethnographer alone, I would have done things differently. In particular, I would
conduct interviews with the parties involved in developing the continuum of care in
Glendale. I think their voices would provide yet another set of counter-narratives to
the public and private myths I have constructed. But I feel that given my current
position with the City that this is untenable and inappropriate. As I have discussed in
previous chapters, tensions between myself and some of the service providers are
already strained, and conducting an ethnographic interview would no doubt
complicate an already complex professional relationship. At the same time, I have
no doubt that my current position would significantly affect their responses to my
questions, rendering the ethnographic value of any interviews problematic.
I. B. Federal Policy on Homelessness
Prior to late 1994-1995, federal policy regarding the funding of homeless
programs focused on treating homelessness as an immediate, emergency situation.
The recognition of the complexity of the causes of and solutions to homelessness
evolved over time. It was the passage of the Stewart B McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act in 1987 that established a new proactive role for the Federal
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government in assisting the homeless. McKinney Act programs provided funding for
health care, community-based mental health services, emergency shelter, transitional
housing, community services to provide follow-up and long-term services, job and
literacy training, permanent housing for handicapped homeless persons and grants for
groups to renovate, convert, purchase, lease, or construct facilities for the homeless.
In addition, the legislation expanded existing programs and program coordination.
In May of 1993, Federal policy regarding homeless programs took a dramatic
turn with the signature of Executive Order 12848 by President Clinton. The plan,
entitled “Priority: Home!: The Federal Plan to Break the Cycle of Homelessness”
was released to the public on May 17,1994. HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros named
homelessness as HUD’s number one priority. Priority: Home!” presented a frank
assessment of the complexity of the issue of contemporary homelessness, its causes
and consequences at the structural and individual levels, and took a hard look at what
was, and was not, working in terms of policy and programs. Fundamental to the
policy recommendations o f ’’ Priority: Home!” was the introduction of the Continuum
of Care model of homeless service delivery. The Continuum of Care was intended to
provide a rational model which would systematize homeless service delivery
nationwide, yet which would be flexible enough to provide communities leeway in
program design and implementation at the local level. HUD wanted local coalitions
to help decide who should administer the grant; help develop the application; oversee
the activities funded by the grants; evaluate performance; and, sign all applications
and performance reports. The local boards were to be comprised of at least one
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representative of: homeless individuals and families; homeless advocates; individuals
and entities that assist the homeless; the business community; and neighborhood
advocates.
Simultaneous to the development of HUD’s continuum of care model for
homeless service delivery, and the proposed consolidation of McKinney Act
programs, HUD was also working on a strategy to consolidate that application
process for its other block grant programs, notably the Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) program and the HOME programs as well as ESG and Housing
Opportunities for People With AIDS (HOPWA). The Consolidated Plan proposed
the consolidation of these applications into one, comprehensive five-year planning
document, with annual action plans and performance reports that would enable
jurisdictions to show how these funding sources were used to meet the needs and
objectives identified in the community. Thus, a local jurisdiction’s strategy for
assessing, developing and implementing a continuum of care was tied not just to
funds targeted for homeless programs, but also to their CDBG and HOME program
funds.
I. C. Glendale’s Continuum of Care - Public Myth and Observed Tensions
Chapters V and VI presented the public history of the Glendale Homeless
Coalition and the development of the continuum of care, and the development of the
Glendale Services Center, respectively. These histories were constructed from public
accounts: newspaper articles, reports, public relations materials, funding
applications. As such they represented an idealized depiction of the processes,
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policies and programs that have developed in the City of Glendale’s efforts to
address homelessness. These public histories conform to ideals about how homeless
services should be provided that are promoted through broader ideological, political
and regulatory agendas. These broader agendas range from the concern about the
“magnet effect” voiced by local politicians, to the nationwide policy agendas of the
Clinton administration. While these public accounts of homeless programs in
Glendale were not fictions (they are by and large accurate in the facts that they
presented), they were “massaged” accounts which belie the complexity of the
processes of program planning, development and implementation.
On the “front-lines” of public agencies, public policy functions as the public
servant’s theory, in that it serves as the meta-narrative about how and why things
work the way they do, and provides a road-map for the processes by which
government officials do their work. And while public policy may be acknowledged
as more overtly political than social science theory, policy and theory are both
portrayed as rooted in objectivity, abstractions of social structure and processes that
have as their base at least a rational, if not a scientific, analysis. But the post-modern
critique of universalizing meta-narratives has taught us that “reality” is far too
“messy” to be amenable to such elegant representations. And while social theorists
who take this critique seriously can experiment with “reconstruction” and “pastiche”
as they construct alternative accounts of the social world in the academic milieu, the
public servant is under intense pressure to “do” something, to make it work
somehow, NOW. Time is often of the essence since a shift in who commands
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political dominance at any point in time will create a shift in policy, evoking new,
potentially oppositional meta-narratives that also claim a strong “rational” basis. As
a result, the process of creating idealized versions of programmatic outcomes begins
anew.
There are a number of different media through which the idealized versions
of program development and implementation are disseminated, and the public
official has various degrees of control over their content. Public officials exert the
least amount of control over the press, and in the City of Glendale, this is especially
true. In a relatively small media market, the local newspaper (the Glendale News
Press) often attracts young, relatively inexperienced reporters. Without a lot of
“breaking news” to report, they tend to focus on issues involving local government
and to highlight the controversial or potentially divisive elements of any particular
story. Alternatively, the press always wants to talk to a client/former client to get the
“human interest” bent. Some agencies are ambivalent about this: they feel it exploits
their clients, maybe even jeopardizing their progress/recovery. In addition, many
view even their best clients as “loose cannons” who may say something
unpredictable.
Public officials obviously have more control over the documents which they
produce. There are the reports to governing bodies: the City Council or Housing
Authority. Public presentations to the City Council are either periodic updates about
the progress of programs, highlighting efficacy; requests for City financial
participation in a project; or, responses to complaints or perceived problems. In
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Glendale, City Council support for homeless programs took some time to develop,
and the support of former City Manager Dave Ramsay was key to this development.
As a result the City has provided financial support to the emergency shelter, the
Glendale Services Center, and several transitional housing projects.
Also key in the development of the City Council’s support of homeless
programs was the federally mandated Consolidated Plan (see Chapter IV), and the
fact that almost all funds spent on homeless programs in Glendale were federal
funds, much of which must be spent on homeless or low-income populations. But
the City Council had an ambivalent attitude toward these federal funds. They want
the money, but they resent the “strings”: environmental review, restrictions on whom
and what the money can be spent. The City Council used the presentation of reports
regarding homeless programs as an opportunity for political posturing (particularly
now that meetings are televised) and they ventriliquated the public’s concern about
fiscal accountability, and the encroachment of federal government into local
concerns.
The Glendale City Council is also still nervous about homeless programs.
They are concerned about the magnet effect, that providing homeless services will
attract more homeless persons into the community. And they are concerned that if
and when Federal funds are cut, the local non-profits and the community will
pressure the Council to continue to support homeless programs through the City’s
General Fund.
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The observed version of the history of the Glendale Services, like everyday
life, is much more complicated and elusive than the public version. It is, of course,
also much more susceptible to multiple interpretations (the public version is but one
of these). The idealized account provided in Chapter VI of the development of the
Glendale Services Center and emergency shelter program (Project ACHIEVE) was
contrasted with the “observed” version presented in Chapter VII. The comparison of
the idealized and the observed (albeit not entirely objective) accounts of the
development of these key programs in Glendale’s continuum of care highlighted
fissures in the link between public policy and its outcomes: programs which are
designed to impact people’s lives.
II. Policy Implications/Future Research Questions
Federal policy regarding homeless programs sets the parameters for the
design and implementation of local service delivery systems. It also creates the
conditions under which some of the myths regarding the delivery of these services
are created and promoted. In 1994, Priority HOME! established the continuum of
care as the model for local homeless service delivery, attempted to consolidate and
streamline federal funding for homeless programs, emphasized the importance of
local control in the development and implementation of strategies for addressing
homelessness, and stressed the importance of regional and local collaborations in this
development and implementation.
Jessop's conceptualizations of governance (although developed to analyze
economic development) fit the situation I have described in Glendale. Of particular
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interest are the four areas of difficulty he identifies in terms of implementation:
cooperation and competition (especially in terms of needed cooperation and trust in a
context where self-interested behavior may provide more short-term gain to
individual participants); openness and closure (in terms of participants and
membership in the relevant coordinated effort); govemability and flexibility (in terms
of guiding situations more fully or allowing change at relatively short notice); and
accountability and efficiency (in particular in terms of responsibility for errors,
decisions, and oversights in coordinated activities). Each of the policy implications
discussed below represents an attempt to mitigate one or several of these dimensions.
II. A. FEDERAL PROGRAMS’ LACK OF FLEXIBILITY CONSTRAINS A
JURISDICTION’S ABILITY TO BE CREATIVE IN CONSTRUCTING A
CONTINUUM OF CARE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD LOOK TO
PERFORMANCE REPORTING AS THE KEY OVERSIGHT TOOL.
During the time this research was conducted, federal funding for homeless
programs was increased, making more funds available for homeless programs at the
local level than ever before. The majority of the homeless funds that were made
available were funneled through existing federal programs that emphasized housing
and supportive services: the Supportive Housing Program, Shelter Plus Care, and
SRO Moderate Rehabilitation programs. Funding for services that meet emergency
needs, and for the operation of emergency shelters, were specifically excluded from
these programs. Funding under the Emergency Shelter Grant Program, which was
specifically designed to fund emergency shelters, did increase, but not in proportion
to the increase in the programs listed above or for homeless programs overall.
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At the federal level, the rationale for this approach makes sense. It is both an
artifact of, and a catalyst for, the shift in philosophy in homeless service delivery— a
shift away from focusing on emergency services (the model in the 1980’s), and
toward longer-term, professional supportive services and increased housing
opportunities.
Adding additional constraints are the statutory and regulatory restrictions
regarding for what the funds awarded can pay. In addition to the bulk of homeless
funding being restricted from use as emergency shelter or homeless prevention funds,
almost all funds from the Supportive Housing Program (SHP) must pay for the costs
of providing essential services—staff and operations, or for the operation of housing.
Very little (hardly any for supportive service only projects) can go for the costs of
supervising staff, or more importantly in the case of the Glendale Services Center, for
professional managers to assist with the day-to-day coordination of multi-agency,
multi-service settings. Administrative funds for these grants is also very limited,
SHP is limited to 5%, and administration is defined very narrowly as the cost of grant
accounting, reporting and audits.
In addition, federal funding is not flexible enough to allow programs to adapt
to the changing needs of clients over time. Changing the kinds of services provided,
or for example, the job description of a funded staff position is very difficult, as
programs are funded based on what was originally proposed and substantive changes
mean that they must be “rescored”. Except for adjustments between budget line-
items or program years, changes to programs require the approval of HUD’s
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Washington office which is at best, time consuming, and at worst risky, as this may
raise larger questions that local jurisdictions would rather avoid about the existing
continuum of care strategy and planning processes.
Thus, Federal policy contributes to descriptions of local systems for homeless
service delivery—to be consumed by local officials, HUD, the press—that are spun
to appear compatible with the parameters set by that policy. For example, in
Glendale, many of the social services at the Glendale Services Center, funded under
the 1996, 1997 and 1998 Super NOFA’s, do in fact serve homeless persons in the
emergency shelter. Under the current proposal to reorganize the Center under the
management of the Institute for Urban Research and Development as the lead
agency, this is precisely how the funds available through SHP will be redeployed to
help alleviate the on-going funding shortfall faced by the shelter. Technically, this is
not breaking the rules, as long as SHP funds are not used for shelter “operations”,
and as long as the public versions submitted to HUD stress that the SHP funded
services are not meeting the emergency needs of clients, but preparing them for
transitional or permanent housing. But this is a gray area, and I get very nervous
about the extent to which IURD and the City are planning to use SHP funded
positions to staff the shelter, and thereby potentially reducing the availability of those
SHP funded staff to clients in transitional housing. But in my mind there is no
choice, the City has supportive service programs in the Center which are over-funded
and under-utilized, and an emergency shelter which is under-funded and under
staffed. And without the emergency shelter, the potential efficacy of the other
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programs will be severely curtailed. Without the limitations placed on the funding
by HUD, there would by plenty of funding to develop a sensible, seamless Center
and emergency shelter, and probably even enough funding to pay for the much
needed Center management. But as it is, the City needs to patch together a less than
optimal system and be sure to present it in a way that is palatable to HUD.
But advocating for a flexible block grant for homeless programs, in which
HUD truly devolves decisions on how funds should be spent to the local level, is an
overly simplistic recommendation. First, there is the issue of Congressional politics,
which derailed the homeless block grant in 1994. Even today, Congress continues to
debate a homeless block grant, but the versions being circulated now want to move
the funding priorities away from the provision of supportive services and toward the
production of new, affordable housing units. While the production of new,
affordable housing is certainly a laudable goal, there are some problems with this
approach when it comes to the homeless block grant. First, there are existing Federal
programs which provide for the construction of affordable housing: most notably the
HOME program. It would seem that efforts aimed at using Federal funds to increase
the housing stock might be best targeted at streamlining and expanding that program,
rather than turning the homeless block grant into another program for bricks and
mortar. But it is apparent the elected officials feel more comfortable funding the
construction of affordable housing than paying for supportive service programs for
homeless persons. In part, it is because the construction of housing provides a
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visible product in their home district. And there is no question regarding program
efficacy— you can count the number of units produced.
Supportive services, on the other hand, have no tangible product like a
building, and are viewed by many as temporally indefinite. Supportive service
programs create a need for funding to sustain them indefinitely, ESPECIALLY if
they are effective. And HUD does not want to be responsible in perpetuity for these
funds anymore than does local government. In addition, what Congress has failed to
recognize is that many homeless persons will not be able to stay in even the most
affordable of housing without supportive services, at least as they initially transition
from the streets, and for some people, for their lifetime. Fortunately, HUD does
recognize this and has opposed the versions of the homeless block grant proposed by
Congress over the last several years. As a result of threatened Presidential vetoes,
these bills have died in committee.
Another problem with providing greater flexibility in HUD funding is that
local jurisdictions (and service providers) may not always “do the right thing”.
Greater flexibility would allow some jurisdictions to give the appearance of meeting
the mandate to address homelessness without really making the commitment
necessary to fully tackle the issue. For example, jurisdictions could choose only to
open programs which served “empathetic” homeless persons: mothers with children,
or the homeless at-risk, leaving those who are hardest-to-serve (and neediest) without
services.
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And loosening the restrictions on what staff positions and functions federal
funds can pay for opens the door to abuse by service providers. Recent media
accounts of agencies which spend a disproportionate share of their revenues on
management and administration fuel a pathological fear on the part of the public and
government that funds will not be used to directly benefit clients. But what the
public fails to recognize is that, extreme examples aside, an organization’s
administration and management is often the key ingredient in the development and
implementation of the highest quality services. This, in fact, is a potential question
for future research—an analysis of the relationship between non-profit management
and administrative structure, pay-rates, and the quality of services provided to clients.
The key component to increasing the flexibility of federal funds at the local
level and yet mitigating against abuse by jurisdictions or service providers is for
HUD to develop a performance-based approach to funding homeless programs. The
current reporting requirements for SHP funded programs are confusing, completely
susceptible to manipulation, and really not substantive. The question is, what would
a more substantive performance evaluation look like? And how could HUD handle
the task of reviewing more detailed reports in order to detect problems? In Glendale,
the City has agreed to pay $30,000 to conduct a program evaluation and a cost-
benefit analysis for the entire continuum of care. One of the products anticipated is a
better system of evaluating program efficacy that can be implemented at the local
level, including a better ability to track clients through the continuum. HUD could
easily make such an evaluation process a funding priority under a future Super
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NOFA, and require the submission of a homeless continuum of care evaluation plan
with the next Consolidated Plan (2005). Of course, it might have the same fate as the
Fair Housing Analysis of Impediments—no real enforcement strategy would be
developed.
HUD has funded evaluations of the continuum of care system of service
delivery, most notably a study done by Bamard-Columbia Center for Urban Policy in
1996 (HUD, 1996). But this study only documented the PROPOSED changes in the
number of beds or persons to be served in specific jurisdictions around the nation, it
did not actually look at who was being served. But the most important question, and
the most difficult to answer, is what are the actual experiences and outcomes for
those who do receive services? The development of performance-based evaluation
strategies that make sense for a particular local jurisdiction, and yet which can be
used for comparison and sampling at the national level, would to my mind, be one of
the most significant contributions that academics and policy analysts could make to
homeless service delivery today.
II. B. LOCAL CONTROL IS A GOOD THING IN THAT IT GIVES LOCAL
JURISDICTIONS FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVERSIGHT.
BUT FOR LARGE URBAN AREAS SUCH AS LOS ANGELES COUNTY.
REGIONAL COORDINATION WITHIN AND BETWEEN JURISDICITONS
RENDERS THE SITE OF LOCAL CONTROL PROBLEMATIC. HOW COULD
LAHSA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER JURISDICTIONS IN LOS
ANGELES COUNTY BE RESTRUCTURED IN A WAY TO SERVE AS A
NATIONAL MODEL FOR COORDINATION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL?
Maintaining local control with the appearance of regional collaboration is the
theme with respect to local politics and the role of the City in homeless service
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delivery. The City wants to control what services are provided by whom, to whom,
and where, via the administration of the funding. On the other hand, the City does
not want to take responsibility for the causes and consequences of homelessness, or
for being the sole entity charged with addressing the issue within their jurisdiction or
throughout the surrounding region.
But this begs the question of how much local control cities really have over
their continuum of care. On the one hand, staff assures local elected officials that the
City does have control over the type and quality of the programs in the continuum.
Yet on the other hand, HUD often makes a convenient “straw man” for staff when
things are delayed, or there are problems with implementation. And while the City
does staff the Glendale Homeless Coalition, controls the Super NOFA process, and
administers all of the grants, the service providers are pretty much immune to any
real punitive actions if they do not fulfill their mission with respect to program
implementation. This is in large part because the City, wittingly or unwittingly,
collaborates in the myth that the programs are doing just fine. And so does HUD. In
the annual reports I submit to HUD, rational explanations are provided for programs
that have not met their goals, which HUD accepts without question. These
rationalizations are not untrue, but what is left unstated are other causes for
inadequate performance: incompetent staff, poor management, and interpersonal or
inter-agency conflict. After all, the City does not want to give the money back, and
HUD does not want to take it back.
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Then there are the myths that are promoted about regional collaboration.
LAHSA and the jurisdictions that submit their own Super NOFA applications:
currently Glendale, Pasadena and Long Beach, have long argued (particularly in their
NOFA applications) that there is a high-level of coordination and cooperation
between the programs under LAHSA and those in the three cities. And this is true to
the extent that, on the front line, programs in these jurisdictions work together,
referring clients between programs in different areas. But at the administrative level,
City and LAHSA staff communicate very little, in my case the exceptions being the
1995 SHP projects still funded under LAHSA, the Winter Shelter Program, and
special issues like the 2000 Census. But the City really does not participate in any
regional, county-wide planning activities conducted by LAHSA.
And until recently, I too bought into the myth that this was just fine. LAHSA
was content that these jurisdictions were taking responsibility for their communities,
and Glendale, Pasadena and Long Beach were happy to be left alone, by and large.
But just last August, LAHSA tried to specifically exclude sites in Glendale, Pasadena
and Long Beach as locations for the Winter Shelter Program, based on the rational
that these cities did not participate in LAHSA’s Super NOFA, and thus should also
be excluded from other LAHSA funded activities. There has been a LAHSA funded
Winter Shelter in Glendale since 1993, and Glendale has not been participating in
LAHSA’s Super NOFA since 1995, so this pronouncement seemed rather abrupt. Of
course the service providers and city staff in these three cities reacted and ultimately
the LAHSA Commission reversed their decision. But this event was revelatory
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about the straggle for defining “local control” in Los Angeles County, and about the
level of denial those of us in Glendale have sustained regarding our relationship with
LAHSA. Rumors that other jurisdictions may be planning to submit their own Super
NOFA applications in 2000 have no doubt contributed to the “warning shot” just
fired by LAHSA. Just under the veneer of the myth of regional collaboration, lies a
struggle for control. In this case, LAHSA wants to be the only administrator of
homeless programs for Los Angeles County, and the other jurisdictions want to
control the planning and implementation of programs in their communities (but also
to tap into LAHSA’s resources when its convenient—we do want to have it both
ways). Clearly, there are many meetings with LAHSA ahead over the next several
months to more clearly define our relationship, although ultimately, I think this
question will be determined based on politics and not policy—Supervisor
Antonovich’s position will be the key for Glendale.
Obviously there are pros and cons to siting the control of the planning and
administration of homeless programs (and the receipt of any block grant funding) at
either the local community or regional level. Local jurisdictions can have a greater
understanding of the characteristics and needs of their local homeless populations, as
well as a greater knowledge of the capacity of the local service providers. In
addition, the administration of funds by the local jurisdiction increases the likelihood
that the quality of the services provided, and other programmatic and contractual
obligations, will be monitored and that any deficiencies will be addressed.
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But as we have seen in Glendale, that is not a straightforward process. While
the fact that LAHSA administered the Los Angeles Initiatives funding did complicate
the City’s efforts to hold The Salvation Army accountable for their management of
the Center, I wonder if things would have happened much differently if the City had
administered the funding. But in the case of Glendale it may have more to do with
the institutional culture of the City and service providers than with the structural and
functional mechanisms themselves.
On the other hand, there is a tendency for the local jurisdiction to only look as
far as its own boundaries when planning and implementing service delivery. This is
in part, simply because of the logistical difficulties of regional coordination; and, in
part because of political and ideological concerns, such as the magnet effect and the
need to perpetuate the myth of local control. But in an urban region such as Los
Angeles County, this localized view of service provision ignores the mobility of the
homeless population, and it impedes the most effective deployment of resources
across the region. Neighboring areas may not all need to develop every component
of the continuum of care, and some cities may not have the numbers to justify a
broad range of services. Regional planning mechanisms could ensure that a full array
of services would be available within a geographic area that would be accessible to
most homeless persons. It would also minimize the duplication of services and
enhance coordination.
To my mind, this should be the mission of LAHSA—to provider the technical
assistance and leadership needed to ensure that neighboring areas and jurisdictions
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communicate and collaborate around the delivery of homeless services. But in order
to motivate the local jurisdictions to participate in this process, LAHSA would need
to recognize these jurisdictions’ political and administrative needs for local control.
A model of regional collaboration needs to be developed that exploits both the
positives of siting the planning and administration of funding at the most local level,
yet which facilitates regional coordination. Implementing such a model, however,
would mean that regional agencies would need to relinquish much of their
administrative control and instead focus on becoming facilitators of the coordination
process.
This would be a challenge for LAHSA and many other such agencies which
tend to want to consolidate this control, and view these administrative functions as
the reason and justification for their existence. They measure their success based on
the number of programs and funds administered, as well as the program outcomes,
which can all be quantified. The effectiveness of facilitating a process that ensures
that monies going to OTHER jurisdictions are well-spent, however, cannot be as
readily quantified and measures of success are more subjective. Yet, if agencies such
as LAHSA would be able to make the adjustments necessary to redefine their
mission, they would perhaps exert MORE control over the development of the
continuum of care across the region, albeit indirectly.
I believe, however, that the likelihood that LAHSA will make (or will be
compelled to make) these adjustments is very small. Even so, there are changes that
could be made that might improve regional coordination. One example would be a
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redesign of the service planning areas currently used by LAHSA to allocate funding
across the county. Currently there are eight service planning areas that span vast
areas of the County and include both City and County areas. Glendale is included in
Service Planning Area 2, along with the San Fernando Valley. From the City’s
perspective, this does not represent the reality of either the movement of homeless
persons or the limited inter-jurisdictional coordination that does occur. Homeless
persons often migrate along the Colorado Street corridor between Glendale and
Pasadena, and in fact, the service providers in both of these jurisdictions do
coordinate frequently. The most striking example of this is Euclid Villa, a
transitional housing project for families located in Pasadena, but jointly funded by
both the Cities of Pasadena and Glendale. There is much less coordination with
providers in the Valley, and homeless persons from the City of Los Angeles who
come to Glendale usually come via Los Feliz, from Hollywood and areas east, rather
than from the Valley.
Glendale and Pasadena also joined with the cities of Burbank, South
Pasadena, and LaCanada-Flintridge in developing a regional assessment of the
homeless population and service inventory in the Arroyo-Verdugo Subregion, as
these cities are defined by the Southern California Association of Governments. For
several years, staff from Glendale and Pasadena (who are in the San Gabriel
Valley— Service Planning Area 3) have lobbied LAHSA to recognize this reality and
to designate the Arroyo-Verdugo Subregion as a separate planning area. LAHSA
staff has acknowledged that this does make sense from a logistical view, but it seems
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they are daunted by the ramifications of redefining the service areas. Of course other
areas and jurisdictions would have ideas about how their service planning areas
should be redefined, opening up the real possibility of a long and contentious
process. And once the service planning areas were redrawn there would undoubtedly
be a substantial increase in the number of areas, which from LAHSA’s perspective,
means more work. But again, if LAHSA could find a way to focus on the actual
process of coordination, rather than on the administration of a nominally coordinated
continuum of care, and find a way to empower the local jurisdictions to take on their
share of the planning and administrative burden, the agency could serve as a national
model for facilitating coordination among jurisdictions within an urban region.
fi. C. COLLABORATION IS AN IDEAL WORTH PURSUING. BUT THERE
WILL BE PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION ON THE LOCAL LEVEL.
AGAIN. FLEXIBILITY IN FEDERAL FUNDING PROGRAMS WOULD HELP
AS WOULD THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TOOLS FOR TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE AND STRICTER ENFORCEMENT OF PERFORMANCE
EXPECTATIONS.
The continuum of care model of service delivery and the consolidation and
streamlining of the federal funding process contributed to significant changes in the
ways that homeless policy and service delivery were planned and delivered on the
local level. First, the federal government’s intention of creating one, homeless
assistance block grant, gave local jurisdiction’s a very important role in determining
where homeless funds would actually be spent, and in monitoring and evaluating the
effectiveness of the programs.
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In addition, coalitions comprised of service providers, local governments,
public and private agencies, churches, business owners, residents and formerly
homeless person were either developed or empowered by the Super NOFA process.
HUD’s funding application requested detailed information regarding a local
jurisdiction’s annual process for determining needs, filling gaps, and establishing the
funding priorities. It was incumbent on local jurisdictions to bring as many
stakeholders to the table as possible, not just because it was good planning practice,
but it also meant a higher scoring application. And once agencies were at the table,
they could advocate for those programs which they felt were truly needed in the
continuum, or, which a particular agency might be best positioned to sponsor.
More money for homeless programs, the increasing specialization of projects,
and the emphasis on collaboration created problems, however. In some cases, the
increased expectation of professional, quality programs and the complexity of service
delivery in a multi-agency setting, raised performance expectations beyond the
abilities of some service providers. Some just did not have the management
capability, the experience and knowledge, or the institutional culture or infrastructure
to successfully carry out the projects as they were proposed. The more competent
agencies, on the other hand, were overwhelmed with the burden of implementing
numerous, newly funded projects. The mandate to collaborate also forced agencies
with different philosophical approaches to work together more closely then ever
before, and challenged them to put the interests of the continuum as a whole over the
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interests of their individual agencies. A challenge that many service providers were
unable to meet.
Then there is the myth of collaboration between the City and the service
providers which is based on the notion that it is the Coalition that drives homeless
policy and service delivery, rather than the City, which is just one player among
others. I have commented previously on the City’s ambivalent relationship with the
Glendale Homeless Coalition. On the one hand, it is the City that drives the
activities of the Coalition and sets policies and priorities that are largely adopted by
the Coalition and thereby validated. The City has an interest in controlling the
planning and implementation of homeless services beyond its administrative duties.
It needs to appear sensitive and humane with respect to service delivery, but not
overly generous with public funding. It wants to appear to be taking responsibility
for its neediest citizens, but the City is also concerned about drawing homeless
persons from other areas. By setting the tone for homeless services—in Glendale it
is the “balanced approach” between social services and law enforcement—the City
can mitigate these concerns, if not in reality then at least in appearance. The
Coalition represents a vehicle for citizen participation, and a way for the City to
genuinely gain its constituents’ input. But it also provides a means of deflecting
criticism from public officials and staff should programs become problematic. In
addition, the City has concerns about the on-going funding of homeless programs—if
Federal funds are cut, will there be an expectation that City general funds can be used
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to support homeless programs? In a conservative community like Glendale, this
carried ideological and political, as well as fiscal implications.
But despite the City’s ability to control and manipulate the Coalition, service
providers have their own mechanisms for exerting influence at the policy level. In
Glendale, as elsewhere, agencies strive to place influential residents on their Boards
of Directors, including City Councilmembers. These connections definitely
influence policy decisions, and are certainly a reason for staffs reluctance to hold
service providers fully accountable for their shortcomings with respect to
implementation. As I have observed before, it is often the agencies that have the
greatest difficulty programmatically that are the most skilled in wielding influence.
While these observations are not particularly unique to Glendale or homeless
policy, and represent fairly typical dynamics of local politics, I think the Glendale
case does hold some implications for rethinking the relationship between local
jurisdictions and coalitions of homeless service providers. For example, the City is
considering a restructuring of the Glendale Services Center/Project ACHIEVE that
would make the Institute for Urban Research and Development (IURD) the lead
agency, and which would funnel funds through them to sub-contracting agencies.
This would give IURD the ability to hire and fire agencies for specific functions in
the continuum of care. In essence, the City is looking to place IURD in a position to
do what it has failed to do: play the heavy with providers who are not meeting
expectations with respect to implementation. On the other hand, this restructuring
could eliminate the current fragmentation among the service providers, which has not
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gone away even though they are spatially proximate. And IURD can raise private
funds with much greater effectiveness than can a local jurisdiction.
Whether this new structure will have a dramatic positive impact on the actual
delivery of services remains to be seen. But research which examines how local
jurisdictions are coping with the mandate to centralize homeless programs (as well as
job training and welfare to work programs), and the effect of alternative models of
organization on the efficiency and quality of service delivery, would be extremely
useful for both local jurisdictions and service providers.
In addition to being willing to experiment with alternative structures for
organizing service delivery on the local level, I think local jurisdictions could benefit
from rethinking the kinds of technical assistance they provide to service providers.
Models of technical assistance that really help to build providers’ capacities, both
programmatically and administratively (particularly with respect to fundraising)
could alleviate some of the fundamental stressors on effective collaboration:
competition for funding, the drive to expand services and meet quantitative goals. It
would also make non-profits less reliant on the City (and less subject to their
control).
In addition, jurisdictions could try innovative approaches that deal with the
interpersonal strains that come with centralization and collaboration. It took me two
years to convince my boss that conflict resolution was a legitimate activity for the
City to sponsor. In part because the recognition that it is personality, as much as
policy and procedure, that affect the implementation of policy challenges “rational”
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models of public administration. But, to my mind, this was one of the most effective
actions that the City has taken with respect to addressing the issues at the Glendale
Services Center. Hiring a professional mediator did not represent a failure of local
government, but rather a progressive approach to building the capacity of individuals
and organizations to communicate and collaborate in a political and social
environment that demands increasing inter-organizational cooperation.
II. D. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE. INTER-AGENCY AND INTER
PERSONAL DYNAMICS MATTER AS MUCH AS POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES IN THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS.
The City of Glendale, despite its size, operates on a system of social networks
that are very close-knit, and that revolve around a number of key service clubs. As
part of this system, the Executive Directors of the non-profits get to speak in person
to elected officials with a greater frequency than in a larger jurisdiction. Under this
system, and a City Council where every member is “at-large”, a key Glendale
cultural value is consensus and cooperation. (It would be interesting to note the
proportion of City Council motions where the vote has either been unanimous or
with only one opposing vote. I suspect the proportion in Glendale is unusually high
when compared to jurisdictions of a similar size.)
So in some ways, Glendale was ideally suited to perpetuate a myth of
collaboration between the service providers and the City when it came to homeless
programs. People were working together, and continue to do so to this day, despite
problems. Also, I think the service providers believe, correctly, that the City is on
their side whenever it can be, as all share a common goal. The problem arises,
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however, when this myth is perpetuated at the cost of healthy conflict, and in the
City’s reticence in holding providers as accountable when they fail to fulfill their
mission with respect to program implementation. The City has also had a
paternalistic attitude toward the service providers, assuming that they need the City
to assist them in order to accomplish their goals. This culture-of-consensus-at-all-
costs (the negative manifestation of the myth of collaboration) has permeated into
the very front-line of homeless service delivery, and is to my mind the largest, most
fundamental problem that has impacted the development of Glendale’s continuum of
care. An interesting by-product of this is my observation that it is the service
providers who are best suited to Glendale’s culture, who are the most passive-
aggressive in their approach to collaboration, who are the most “well-connected”
with the Council, are those who need to be monitored most closely regarding their
service delivery.
Another by-product of Glendale culture is that when conflict arises, for
example if homeless advocates forcefully raise issues, people overreact (including
me). Food for Body and Soul (FFB&S), for example, managed to incite major
reactions from the City on several occasions, thereby magnifying the importance of
FFB&S’s message. The City’s response also often rewards this behavior by trying to
co-opt the offending agency. One of Dave Ramsay’s last acts before leaving the City
was to call a meeting of City staff to discuss how FFB&S could be assisted in their
efforts to establish a local food bank. I ended up doing a “food needs survey” to
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assist FFB&S in documenting the community need so they could apply for CDBG
funds1 . They never did.
Also important is the relationship between the institutions participating in the
continuum of care and the individuals within them. I have concluded that this
relationship is key based on two observations: 1. Institutions tend to attract and keep
employees who are comfortable with the institution’s culture, and this in turn
perpetuates the institutional culture; and, 2. Particular individuals in the right place at
the right time can, for better or worse, make a difference in service delivery and
implementation.
Is it trite to say that the YWCA, a women’s organization based on a
philosophy of promoting physical, spiritual and psychological health and dedicated to
the issue of domestic violence, attracts feminists? And that The Salvation Army,
which is truly a para-military organization in both its structure and function, attracts
persons who are comfortable in such a structured environment, who value conformity
in attitude and behavior, and who are excellent at mounting and maintaining
defensive postures? That mental health service providers who long to be viewed as
professionals, who see themselves (and their clients) as apart from the general
population, individually and as a group have a difficult time with integration? And
1 The responses to the survey, over 700, have been coded and run. No real
analyses of the findings has been made, however. This data is now old, but it is pre
welfare reform and could be used as a base-line to compare with a new sample
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that certain individuals can create an enormous shift in the group dynamic, and
greatly affect the outcome of social processes?
These observations challenges the myth, particularly cherished by public
sector employees and by academics, that it is organizational structure, policies and
procedures that determine the outcome of policy initiatives. I have discussed above
how local jurisdictions can provide new kinds of technical assistance to address these
issues. But I also think researchers, anthropologists in particular, could pay more
attention to the role of individual players in the implementation of policy, and on the
impact of institutional culture on the philosophy and mode of service delivery. It is
not enough to describe institutional cultures in a historical and social context, as
much of the existing scholarship does. Connecting these institutional cultural
contexts to specific patterns in administration, hiring, program design, public
relations and attitudes and interactions with the target population are key to
understanding this complex and often subtle dynamic at the various levels of agency
organization. Examining the relationship between institutional cultures and the
experience and attitudes of the staff that choose to work for particular organizations
would also be helpful. If this information could be gathered and analyzed in a
meaningful way, organizations that truly wish to build their service delivery capacity
could learn how to market themselves more effectively to attract qualified staff to
their agencies. In addition, an understanding of the relationship between
organizational culture and service delivery might help planners to more effectively
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divide the labor within systems of social service delivery to assign tasks to agencies
which are best suited to perform them.
In addition, explicitly recognizing the influence of key players in the outcome
of the development of complex systems of social service delivery might provide
insight to the relationship between system organization and the individual.
Identifying key positions of potential influence would be one research strategy. This
would be particularly useful if key positions at all levels of organization were
identified. What individual characteristics make an individual in a particular position
particularly effective or ill-suited? How can agencies attract and assign the right
person to the right position in the context of social service delivery? How does this
differ from human resource strategies in other sectors of the economy?
While certainly the role of City Manager Dave Ramsay was key in Glendale
to the development of the Glendale Services Center, so was the role of Peer
Counselor Thom Daugherty, in completely unexpected ways. Was the significant
role of the peer counselor (or other key, line staff) idiosyncratic to the situation in
Glendale, or is this a position which is always key because of the structure of systems
of service delivery and the need to communicate to the homeless community? And,
in the case of the Peer Counselor, I think there is a good deal of research that could
be conducted on the success and failure of integrating formerly homeless persons
into the service delivery system. HUD explicitly mandates that homeless and
formerly homeless persons participate in the planning and implementation of the
continuum of care. And a formerly homeless individual CAN be an extremely
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effective service provider, as they carry experiential knowledge of, and authority
with, the homeless community. But integrating former clients into the service
delivery system can be perilous for both the system and the former client, at times
compromising their individual recovery. Clearly, formerly homeless persons need
specialized management and support as they interact with their former peers.
Research documenting the pitfalls and successful approaches would be extremely
important for non-profit organizations that wish to develop this means of reaching
out to homeless persons.
II. E. RESEARCH ABOUT THE MAGNET EFFECT AND POST-SITING
SURVEYS ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF HOMELESS PROGRAMS THAT
WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HOMELESS ADVOCATES SHOULD BE
CONDUCTED AND MADE WIDELY AVAILABLE.
The magnet effect, as I have discussed in Glendale, was used as the argument
for not developing homeless programs for over a decade. The magnet effect is the
belief that homeless programs draw homeless persons from other areas and can
therefore actually exacerbate a community’s homeless problem. It allows for the
jurisdiction to, on the surface, agree to take responsibility for “their” homeless, but to
argue that homeless persons from other areas are not their responsibility. The fear
that homeless facilities will attract homeless persons into a neighborhood is one of
the most commonly articulated reasons for NIMBY. In Glendale, we attempted to
address this by physically separating “enabling” services— food, clothing, showers,
etc., from the entry points to our continuum of care— the access center and emergency
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shelter. And NIMBY does not just apply to the influx of homeless persons, but to
the concentration of facilities.
There are several implications for future research with respect to the magnet
effect and NIMBY. The first is to ascertain the extent to which those who argue that
services do draw homeless people from other communities are correct. Because
despite my public protestations to the contrary, people DO come from other
jurisdictions because they have heard about the services provided in Glendale. But a
more in-depth examination of this phenomenon would be very useful to separate the
reality from the myth, thereby forming a sound basis for policy. Where do clients
come from? Do they use the continuum and become Glendale residents? Do they stay
on the streets? Also, we are trying to document the other reasons why homeless
persons come to Glendale for homeless services—other ties they may have (friends,
family, etc.), Glendale’s reputation for being a “safe” city, access to transportation,
commercial areas and other amenities. My own past work began to examine the
regional mobility paths of the homeless, but it was never analyzed or contextualized
in a way to explicitly address the magnet effect.
Other potential research contributions to policy regarding the magnet effect
and NIMBY would be comprehensive post-siting surveys which would interview
residents and business owners surrounding various kinds of homeless programs, and
objectively analyze their perceptions of program impacts one to five years after the
implementation. Did property values go down? Do people hang-out? What are
some of the other impacts that neighbors face on a day to day basis? I suspect the
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results of such surveys would be mixed, and that many of the negative impacts would
be minor aggravations which could be easily addressed. Another question might be:
which programs have developed effective and mutually supportive relationships with
their neighbors? Most programs have a strategy for such a mechanism, but in my
observation the implementation has been spotty.
Finally, in Glendale we have developed a Request for Proposal to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis of homeless programs when compared to the costs to the
community of NOT providing homeless services. Such an analysis would compare
the costs of moving various kinds of households through the continuum of care with
the costs of providing increased law enforcement, public health and safety, and other
kinds of social services to mitigate the impacts of an unassisted street population.
Frankly, I am concerned about the difficulties of conducting such an analysis with the
kind of substantive detail necessary to make a valid comparison (especially for the
funding the City has agreed to commit to the project), but if such an analysis is
completed and well-done, I have no doubt that the fiscal arguments for implementing
a continuum of care will be just as strong as the moral arguments. This is precisely
the combination that staff and public officials of local jurisdictions want and need to
advance and defend controversial projects. It is why we create myths and it helps if
we actually know that they are true.
I am aware that there is quite a body of research regarding the magnet effect
and NIMBY that is available to academics. But I question if much of this work is in
a format, or is distributed, in a way that is readily accessible and useful for staff at the
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level of local government or non-profit service providers. To my mind, this is one of
the single biggest obstacles to the effective collaboration of academics, local
government and service providers. The information is too hard to find, too esoteric
and abstract, and various similar works are not compiled in a way that is readily
useful for local government or service providers who do not have the time to do
research and who need the answers NOW.
n. F. PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY INITIATIVES AND LAW
ENFOCEMENT MUST NOT FOCUS ON “CONTROLLING” THE HOMELESS.
BUT ON ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES THAT WILL MOVE PEOPLE INTO
SERVICES.
One of the ways the City tries to balance the need to provide homeless
services without looking like it is too liberal, taking on neighboring jurisdiction’s
problems, or “knuckling under” to HUD, is through the implementation of local
ordinances that, while they technically might not criminalize homelessness, are
meant to control homeless persons’ behavior, satiate the public’s fears, and drive the
homeless either into services or out of the City. In Glendale, a number of such
ordinances have been passed with the support of the Glendale Homeless Coalition:
public drinking, anti-camping, and a use of public facilities ordinance.
But the passage of these ordinances reveals another myth: that law
enforcement really wants the responsibility of using ordinances as part of an overall
strategy to get homeless persons into quality services. The reason for this is actually
quite simple: with a few zealous exceptions, I have found that the majority of the
police officers on the street really do not want to be bothered with dealing with
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homeless persons. The officers at each end of this continuum represent a problem:
the “zealous” officers often harass homeless persons, reinforcing their self-image as
“victims” and, I would argue, lessen the likelihood that they will turn to established
service providers who they see as part of the same “system”. The officers who look
the other way, and who try to be compassionate, actually enable homeless persons
and exacerbate siting difficulties by not addressing legitimate complaints from the
public about the behavior of a minority of homeless persons.
Clearly, solving the problems inherent with law-enforcement in general are
beyond the scope of this paper. But many of the issues are the same, particularly
when it comes to institutional culture and its impact on the individuals that are
attracted to law enforcement. With respect to this, I offer the following observations
based on my experiences in Glendale.
When I started in Glendale, in 1994, the concept of community policing was
very “hot” in the media, and there was a good deal of Federal funding available to
police departments to fund the start-up of these specialized units. Officers were
selected and sent to national conferences and trainings where they were introduced to
the community policing model. Basically, as it was explained to me by the initial
Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (COPPS) Sergeant in Glendale,
Leif Nicholieson, COPPS officers were relieved of their normal patrol
responsibilities—responding to calls for service—and instead were expected to
interact with the people who lived and worked in their service area to identify
problems and work with them to develop creative solutions. This would include
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implementing Neighborhood and Business Watch programs, but it would also
include interacting with other City Departments and public agencies to ensure that all
the resources the community could marshal to solve a particular problem would be
identified and used.
Sergeant Nicholieson and the other initial COPPS officers told me numerous
times that their biggest problem was not “selling” the concept of community policing
to the residents of Glendale, but to their fellow patrol officers. Many patrol officers
were hostile to what they saw as "social work” and really wanted no part of it. As a
result, the initial officers that were attracted to community policing were those whose
individual temperaments and personal values were consistent with an approach to
policing that was less concerned with “catching bad guys”, and more concerned with
community service in the broadest sense. In other words, these officers truly
believed in community policing as an appropriate mode of law enforcement and saw
it as the future of the profession. They understood the hard-nosed perspective of
their fellow officers, but were concerned (and even embarrassed) by them in their
extreme manifestations. And in my experience, these officers were great to work
with. They were articulate, creative, politically savvy, and carried an authority with
the public that no City staffer without a gun or uniform could ever hope to exert. I
can honestly say that without the participation of the COPPS unit, particularly in
dealing with the NIMBY reaction, the programs at Fernando Court would have never
been implemented.
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Since 1994, community policing has gained wider acceptance among the rank
and file patrol officers, among police administrators and with elected officials. As a
result, doing a rotation in the COPPS unit as become important for the resumes of
officers who have ambitions of advancing out of patrol and into the administrative
hierarchy. I have observed, as a result of this, that the COPPS unit is now staffed by
some officers who can clearly articulate the goals of community policing, but who by
their actions cause me to wonder about the sincerity of their commitment to the
tenets of the method. This has had the sad consequence, in my opinion, of diluting
the spirit, intent and efficacy of the COPPS unit. Community policing used to be an
example of how an alternative institutional culture could draw particular individuals
to it and become a possible model of change. Now it is an example of how such an
alternative is co-opted, undermined and reconstructed as an artifact of the status
quo—at least in Glendale.
III. Implications for the Practitioner-Anthropologist
I think the role of an applied anthropologist as an academic or a consultant is
very different from my role as a practitioner and actor in Glendale. But as more and
more anthropologists find themselves in similar positions to mine in Glendale, they
should not have to choose between being a practitioner or being an anthropologist, as
I have often felt the need to do. This dissertation, and any subsequent work that
arises from my experiences in Glendale, represents my attempt to contribute to a
“working-out” of the pitfalls and shortcomings associated with being an active
participant and an observer simultaneously.
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It occurs to me that alternative methodologies for the practitioner-
anthropologist involve a reordering of the time-space dynamics of the “traditional”
fieldwork experience. Broadly put, the “academic-anthropologisf ’ typically devotes
a discrete portion of his or her time to field study, often geographically distant from
her home-base. There is often a relatively clear-cut end to this initial phase,
sometimes marked by her return home from the field. This time-space distance, and
a return to an academic environment where the daily routine is structured to
encourage research and contemplation, is key to achieving the emotional and
psychological distance to her subject which I believe is essential for thorough
scholarship (not to mention have a schedule that allows hours in the day to be
devoted to the process). Of course this does not make the process of analysis and
write-up easy or straightforward. The “traditional’Tieldwork experience also allows
for on-going contact and/or additional visits to the field site, and the other
responsibilities of the academic environment encroach and compete for attention and
energy. Still, this experience represents nothing like my experience in Glendale,
where I am simultaneously and integrally shaping the structure, behavior and cultural
norms that I am studying.
I think that my experience, completely removed from academia and totally
immersed as a key participant in the process I have decided to study, represents
another extreme, and there are infinite permutations in between. But thinking back
on my own process, the issues really are related to time-space, and emotional,
psychological and in some cases, political and organizational distance. In the field,
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in my job at Glendale, I never had the luxury of time to contemplate either the
theoretical implications of my experiences as they were unfolding, nor how theory
could readily assist me in the moment. I was only able to write this dissertation by
literally devoting every hour of my vacation for the last two years, and even then it
would take me several days to make the adjustment and gain the psychological and
emotional distance necessary to write. Finding ways to free your schedule and
devote your energies to really working out the relationship of your unfolding
experiences to theory is complicated and difficult, but ultimately possible. But the
much more difficult task, I think, is creating the psychological and emotional
distance necessary to make the personal transition from the role as practitioner to the
role as academic.
Yet, the process of writing this dissertation has allowed me to clearly identify
some areas for future research, as articulated earlier in the chapter, and the
ethnographic method is well-suited to addressing many of them. I am encouraged
that future relationships can be forged between public officials and academics that
will allow for constructive dialogues that will increase trust and mutual benefit
between these sectors of society. Perhaps here is where the dual roles of the
practitioner and the academic will be most useful—as a broker between public and
academic institutions.
In light of the benefit of my dual role as a practitioner and academic, I would
like to offer a few observations that both parties must keep in mind when entering
into policy-oriented, research partnerships. First, academics must understand the
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political realities within which public employees operate. This does not mean that
academics must mute criticism or unfavorable findings or analysis. But it does
means that the process cannot end there and must continue to include concrete
suggestions for corrective action or alternative strategies, including the outlines for
funding and implementation.
Most public institutions are woefully understaffed, and as such, are often
forced to expend most of their efforts on meeting short-term goals driven by
immediate needs and, often, superficial understandings of the situation. Long-term
planning based on methodologically rigorous needs assessment and in-depth research
is a luxury for most public agencies, especially those charged with human and social
service delivery. Today in Glendale, I can think of at least a dozen areas for
substantive research, in additional to those citied earlier in this chapter, each of
which could support a Master’s Thesis or Dissertation. Why have local academic
institutions been asked to help out? A lack of trust, a concern on the part of local
officials that the result of the academic research will merely be a summary of short
comings and problems (many of which the public officials are privately aware). In a
context where public officials could trust that real-world solutions would also be an
outcome of collaboration with academic institutions, I think there would be more
willingness to collaborate on many important governance issues facing society,
including homelessness.
403
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Asset Metadata

Creator Rowe, Stacy (author)

Core Title Practicing policy and making myth: Applied anthropology and homeless service delivery in Glendale, California

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Anthropology

Degree Conferral Date 2003-08

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag anthropology, cultural,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science,public administration,public welfare,social welfare,sociology

Language English

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-649913

Unique identifier UC11340061

Identifier 3116778.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-649913 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3116778

Dmrecord 649913

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Rowe, Stacy

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA