Gendering just war: Feminisms, ethics, and the wars in Iraq, 1990--2003

PDF

Download

Open document

Flip pages

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Request accessible transcript

Transcript (if available)

Content GENDERING JUST WAR: FEMINISMS, ETHICS, AND THE WARS IN IRAQ, 1990-2003 VOLUME 1 by Laura E. Sjoberg A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) December 2004 Copyright 2004 Laura E. Sjoberg Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 3155480 Copyright 2004 by Sjoberg, Laura E. All rights reserved. INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. ® UMI UMI Microform 3155480 Copyright 2005 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. D e d i c a t i o n First, To those who I do not and will never be able to know; to those whose lives are deeply affected by the international politics though they do not have the luxury of spending their time analyzing these situations; to the wymyn of the world whose identities and lives are constantly under attack ‘from both sides;’ to those who I have, despite my efforts, marginalized by the very existence of this work o f scholarship; to those who international politics omits, leaves behind, ignores, steps on, and lets go; to those who this is really all about but who will never either get the opportunity to or care to read it. Also first, To Dave Andrus, without whom I would not have survived graduate school; I will always love and miss you. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s That this dissertation exists is the product of the inspiration, guidance, motivation, and love of so many people it is impossible to document all of them. I am who I am and this work is what it is because there are people in my life, personally and professionally, who believe in me more than I ever could. First and foremost, my thanks are owed to Dr. Ann Tickner, my advisor and mentor in what seems like too little time in graduate school as I wrap up this dissertation. When I came into graduate school, I had expectations, which, like others, were inaccurate and unrealistic; the reality of Dr. Tickner as an advisor was far superior to any of them. She was at once my biggest critic and my biggest fan, both of which I desperately needed. I have only the deepest gratitude, personally and professionally, for getting to work with her, a privilege which I cannot imagine being qualified for but nonetheless enjoyed immensely and learned from intensely. Dr. Hayward Alker spent my graduate school career challenging me to explore things I did not understand, forcing me to become better-read to keep up in a conversation, and inspiring me to use the diversity of my interest for focus rather than distraction. Our office conversations made my work immeasurably better, and made my experiences in graduate school immeasurably more worthwhile. Dr. Alice Gambrell brought to me a fresh perspective, outside of the boundaries and parochialisms of political science; she asked questions that I had never thought about, she interrogated conventions I come to accept, and she taught me about the interdisciplinary nature of feminist thought. I am in debt for her creativity, her scope, and her support. Dr. Nicholas Onuf, who I met in the year that he was a visiting scholar at the Center for International iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Studies at the University of Southern California, has been a friend and confidant as well as a critic/advisor to me both on this project and on others that I have worked on. His perspective, his brilliance, and his experience have on more than one occasion completely saved me, both academically and personally. I further owe debt to those people who I love who have supported me throughout the sometimes-tense process of getting my Ph.D. I am thankful to Chris Marcoux, whose intellectual contribution to this project takes a backseat only to his personal contribution. Chris has been my intellectual conscience, my spell-checker, my cite-database, and my sounding board from start to finish; an accomplishment only overshadowed by his love and support. I am also thankful to Matthew Gealy, with whom and because of whom I came to graduate school. His love and support for me made me better, stronger, and smarter. My family, in good times and bad, played an integral part in making me who I am today. And who I am today is finished with my dissertation, so I suppose they did a good job. Thanks, Mom and Dad. Last, but certainly not least, are the remainder o f my academic support team. Dr. Geoffrey Wiseman and Dr. Rob English served on my guidance committee despite little interest in the project as formulated, and were excellent advisors both in that capacity and as they guided me through graduate school. My interest in this topic started as a college debate case, so I owe debt to the CEDA/NDT Debate community as a whole, and to the people on the University of Chicago Debate Team with whom I had many long and late- night conversations about feminism, war, and ‘rogue nations’ - specifically, Lea Bishop, Bill Brayer, and Andrew Brokos. The graduate student community, support, and iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. criticism at the University o f Southern California has made my work stronger and increased my enthusiasm for doing it. Specifically, I am grateful for their criticism and inspiration to Paul Levin, Pak Tang, Eric Blanchard, Sinan Birdal, Yong Wok Lee, Lyn Boyd, Catia Confortini, Brad Meyers, Sara Sulaiman, John Williamson, Chris Liu, and Pavel Nitkin. A number o f members of the academic political science community have contributed discussions, notes, readings, advice, or critique to this project in a way that has been indispensable to its development. These scholars include Clifton Morgan, Daniel Drezner, George Lopez, Lucinda Peach, Spike Peterson, Iris Young, Peter Rosendorff, Charles Lipson, Todd Sandler, Dave Andrus, Carol Cohn, Steve Lamy, Richard Ashley, John Odell, Carolyn Cartier, and David Dessler; to all of whom I owe substantial debt. Finally, I owe thanks to those who have been overwhelmingly negative about the subject-matter of my academic work. While it would be in poor taste to list them by name, the people who called my work “an example of incommensurability” or “not political science” reminded me why this project was worthwhile, and were ultimately the fuel for its completion. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C o n t e n t s Dedication ii Acknowledgments iii Abstract X Volume 1. Introduction 1 Project overview 5 Chapter I. Feminist foundations 14 I. Ontologies for feminisms 15 A. Gender as a complex social construction 15 B. Multiplicity o f feminisms 26 II. How we know: insights from feminist epistemologies 29 A. Political and interested knowledge 30 B. The politics of marginalities in knowing 32 C. Constructive knowledge 37 III. Feminist methodological journeys 38 IV. The journey to just war 42 V. Conclusion 44 Chapter II. The theories of just war 46 I. Why just war? 48 A. The pacifist attack 50 B. The problems with peace 52 C. Bellicose feminisms: an alternative to just war? 56 II. The trails of just war 58 III. Motivating moralities for (just) wars 64 IV. Empathetic cooperation as feminist security ethic 72 V. Is there feminist justice? VI. Conclusion Chapter III. Feminisms go to war I. Classifying war II. Who can play authority? A. Right authority and state sovereignty B. A feminist understanding of authority 78 90 92 93 98 99 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. III. Just cause for violence? 111 A. Self-defense 112 B. Punishment 114 C. Intervention 115 D. Holy wars 117 E. Feminist just cause? 119 IV. (Im)moral intentions 122 V. Last resort(s)? 124 VI. Victorious successes? 128 VIII. Conclusion 131 Chapter IV. Feminisms fight wars 133 I. Gendered roles 134 A. Just warriors 135 B. Beautiful souls 137 C. Dirty whores 140 II. Abstract violence 141 III. Gendered immunity 148 A. Meaning of immunity 149 B. Effectiveness of immunities 154 C. Feminist critiques and reformulations 158 IV. Attacks on wymyn 169 A. Wartime rape: an example of war’s impacts on wymyn 172 B. Heinous means 175 V. Conclusion: appearances of just war 179 Chapter V. Context: Iraq 182 I. Historical methodologies 186 II. Histories around Iraq 192 A. Oil in Kuwait 194 B. Internal unrest in Iraq 195 C. Israel, Palestine, and Iraq 199 D. The United States’ role in the construction o f Iraq 201 III. The Iran-Iraq War 202 IV. Iraq and Kuwait, immediate context, 1990 206 V. Gendered critiques of political context(s) 207 A. Empathetic cooperation I 209 B . Empathetic cooperation II 213 C. Feminist consciousness 215 VI. Conclusion 216 v ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter VI. The gendered gulf (war) 218 I. Gendered tales 222 A. Just warrior states and beautiful soul states 223 B. Just warriors defend beautiful souls 226 C. Insidious abstraction 229 II. Gendered war-making 232 A. Who played authority? 232 B. Just cause? 237 C. (Im)moral intentions 242 D. Resorting to coercive force 243 E. Victorious successes? 246 III. Gendered war-fighting 248 A. New gendered roles 250 B. Gendered impacts 254 C. Gendered (non)immunity 259 IV. Feminists (re)write wars 265 A. Interruptions 266 B. Power-with 267 V. Conclusion 272 Chapter VII. the war of sanctions 274 I. Warrior sanctions 278 A. IR theory calls sanctions war 279 B. Sanctions as situational warfare 282 C. War in feminisms’ eyes 283 II. Gendered coercion between states 286 A. Gendered coercive diplomacy 287 B. Gendered sanctions 289 III. Warrants for gendered sanctions 294 A. Absent authority? 295 B. (Un)just cause 297 C. Last resort? 299 IV. The humyn implications of sanctions 302 V. Feminists (re)write sanctions metaphors 307 VI. Conclusion 316 Chapter VIII. the (gendered) wars continue 317 I. Foregrounding (invisible) wymyn 320 II. (Gendered) just causes in the post-9/11 world 326 A. Terrorism as just cause? 326 B. Prevention as j ust cause? 331 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. III. Aiming at sites unseen 334 A. Who is the enemy? 334 B. Just occupation? 336 C. Just proportions? 338 IV. Gendered futures 341 A. Iraq and cycles of violence 341 B. De-gendering of international politics around Iraq 343 V. Conclusion 345 Chapter IX. the future? weak ontologies of a feminist ethics of war 346 I. Contributions o f a feminist ethics of war 346 II. The utility of (feminist) political theory 350 III. Weak ontologies of feminist just war 351 IV. Suggestions for further research 353 V. Concluding thought 354 Sources referenced 355 Volume 2. Sources used 397 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A b s t r a c t The last fifteen years have been a time of upheaval for Iraq: the end of the Iran- Iraq war, the Gulf War, a twelve-year sanctions regime, a repressive government, and the United States-led takeover have been sources social, political, and economic distress. This project seeks a moral framework for the analysis of the international relations of the crises surrounding Iraq. Towards this end, it performs a theoretical marriage of age-old theories of just war and recent feminist theories of International Relations (IR). I begin by laying out epistemological and ontological assumptions carried by feminisms in IR. I then engage in a feminist theoretical journey of observation, critique, revealing, and reformulation just war theories. I identify and critique the gendered biases of traditional notions of just war. I propose that feminisms rely on empathetic cooperation as a motivating morality for a new theory of ethics in war; a foundation that revises the meanings o f security, power, and justice. I outline feminist reinterpretations of the principles ofjus ad bellum (just war-making) and jus in bello (just war-fighting). I contend that these new just war principles, now ‘chastened by feminisms,’ provide a more comprehensive, focused, and just formulation of the ethics o f war. I proceed to apply this reformulated just war framework to the wars in Iraq since the end of the Cold War. After introducing the context of the wars in Iraq, I analyze three continuous conflicts involving Iraq: the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime of Iraq from 1990-2003, and the United States-led takeover of Iraq which began in 2003. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Through this empirical application, I contend that a feminist ethics of war provides unique insights, offers productive reformulative suggestions, carves a path for international gender justice in war, and begins a process of deconstructing international cycles of violence. I suggest that feminist just war theory be promoted as a weak ontology of the ethics of war: certain of its benefits, but not a definitive statement on the issues that it addresses; confident in its contributions, but always looking for theoretical dialogue to broaden its horizons. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. introduction, feminisms, ethics, and wars The Cold War was barely over in August of 1990 when the Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the Iran-Iraq war had not officially been settled. Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing oil, of being ungrateful of the defense it had been provided in the Iran-Iraq war, of setting oil prices, and of being generally economically unjust to its poorer neighbor. In a time of international uncertainty, Iraq became the first United Nations (UN) member state to conquer another UN member state. Led by Saddam Hussein, Iraq invaded Kuwait in a surprise attack, afterward claiming that the attack had been a humynitarian intervention against a Kuwaiti government that violated the humyn rights of its citizens.1 Iraq’s takeover was swift and successful, the entire offensive lasting less than a day. Despite Iraq’s claims that the invasion was a humynitarian intervention, it was answered quickly by a United Nations lull import and export embargo of all of the territory controlled by Iraq, including Kuwait. This embargo required Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Months into the embargo, Iraq had still not agreed to such an unqualified departure. The Soviet Union served as a mediator negotiating a conditional withdrawal, but Iraq’s conditions for withdrawal were unacceptable to leading nations in the Security Council, so negotiations for a conditional surrender ultimately failed. Declaring the embargo a failure, the Security Council looked for alternative ways to end the occupation. A UN-authorized military coalition forced the Iraqi military out of Kuwait in January o f 1991. At the end o f the fighting, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) set the terms of the settlement. The Security Council made the Iraqi government agree to a 11 spell the words ‘womyn’ (woman), ‘wymyn’ (women), ‘humyn’ (human), ‘humyne’ (humane), and ‘humynitarian’ (humynitarian) differently as discursive erasure o f the dependence o f the terms for those gendered feminine and those species humyn on the term ‘man’ and the gender masculine. It is meant to serve as a reminder o f gender subordination, as a protest against the essentialism o f dichotomous biological sex and social gender, and as a transgression against heterosexism. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. comprehensive conditional sanctions regime. The sanctions put in place by UNSC Resolution 687 required Iraq to comply with a number of Security Council demands. These demands included Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait; recognition of Kuwait’s borders; respecting a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait; ceasing all chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range weapons production and use; paying reparations for the Gulf War; returning prisoners of war from the Gulf war; returning stolen property to Kuwait from the Gulf War; ending state sponsorship of terrorism; and ceasing governmental repression of the civilian population. Legal disputes as to which of these demands had to be met in order for sanctions to be lifted occurred often through the duration o f the sanctions regime; the United States insisted that all demands be met. UNSC economic sanctions on Iraq went in and out of style as an issue of international political contention after the Gulf War; at times, there was heated argument between member-nations of the Security Council about the content and duration o f the sanctions regime, and at other times little debate (Bennis 2000b; Hollis 2000; Graham- Brown 1999). David Cortright and George Lopez’s “Sanctions Decade” came and went, and Iraq remained under one o f history’s longest and most strict economic sanctions regimes (2000; Selden 1999).2 The UN and Iraq debated the sanctions’ validity and Iraq’s compliance for more than a decade, with hundreds of UN inspections and negotiations. More than a dozen times, the United States and the United Kingdom found Iraq to be in such serious violation o f Security Council mandates that they believed it necessary to engage in air raids of Iraqi targets. All the while, Iraq insisted that it was fully complying, despite 2 This was a reference to the 1990s, which Cortright and Lopez identify as the time in which sanctions were most prevalent in world history. This sanctions prevalence was led by the longest and most severe sanctions on record: those by the Security Council towards Iraq, which lasted for 13 years, until the United States overthrew the Iraqi government. 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. some evidence to the contrary. Inspections took place in a stop-and-go fashion, as did the flow of humynitarian supplies to (and within) Iraq. These sanctions stayed in place until the United States forced a regime change in Iraq in 2003. This regime change was justified in part by the claim that Iraq was a threat to international peace and security. The United States claimed that the government of Iraq possessed, and was willing to use, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons. The language o f ‘a threat to international peace and security’ is a contention that the United Nations has a cause for coercive action against a state, through Article 41 of the Charter. This claim is that Iraq was in violation o f UNSC resolutions demanding its compliance with international laws and norms. The question of whether or not Iraq was a threat to international peace and security is bound up in a number o f issues related to Iraq’s compliance with UNSC demands at the . end of the Gulf War. The Security Council’s requirements and decisions became increasingly relevant as international attention centered on the situation in Iraq in early 2003. The United States’ claim about Iraqi weaponry, on the heels of a United States war in Afghanistan to find the terrorists who perpetuated the 9/11 attack on New York City, was a homeland security rallying cry for Americans and their government. The question of whether or not Iraq ought to be invaded revolved around the question of whether or not there were WMD in Iraq, which were prohibited by the sanctions resolution. The international community became embroiled in debate about whether or not Iraq had complied with UNSC demands, and whether or not Iraq was a threat to international peace and security. The debate about the degree to which Iraq threatened international peace and security was muted by the fighting o f the war started by “Operation Shock and Awe” - what 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I contend was the third war in Iraq after the end of the Cold War. Also called “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” this conflict began in March o f 2003. The United States and its “coalition of the willing” expressed a fear that Iraq possessed WMD and a willingness to use those weapons on its neighbors. This coalition invaded Iraq from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and air bases in Turkey; taking control of the territory. The Coalition took control of most of Iraq in late March and early April o f 2003, and remain a strong militaiy presence there a year later despite formally returning Iraq to Iraqi control. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who had been criticized as a brutal dictator, was overthrown and went into hiding. He was later captured by the United States marines, and as this is written being held awaiting trial. The United States has been constructing a provisional government in Iraq, which lost its old governmental structure in the totalizing invasion. The story of the post-Cold War wars in Iraq is in the context of the colonial history o f the area, a number o f previous wars, and, most immediately, the Iran-Iraq war. This project, however, focuses on the wars after the Cold War. Accordingly, it begins with a tale of Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait. It moves on to a long decade of sanctions, bombings, and discipline by some members o f the international community to attempt to keep Iraq “in line” with international norms. It ends with certain members of the international community declaring Iraq’s leadership hopeless, and invading in order to set up a new government. This project follows just war analyses of these wars, as well as the actual events. I argue that just war analysis is an inadequate moral framework for the evaluation of the wars in Iraq since the end o f the Cold War. I further contend that just war theory’s weaknesses can be compensated for by feminist reformulations — that a ‘feminist just war theory’ can serve as a fruitful framework for the ethical evaluation of decisions of war-making and war-fighting. I 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contend that gender analysis is the key to understanding both the ethics of war and the international politics surrounding Iraq since the end of the Cold War. PROJECT OVERVIEW Jean Elshtain argues that just war theory has been stretched to the breaking point where it can no longer make a clear picture, and therefore constitutes “an inadequate frame for a compelling feminist anti-war alternative” (1992b, 268; 1983, 343). On the other hand, John Howard Yoder argues that we can define just war theories by what they are not. Yoder goes over arguments that just war theories are not realist, pacifist, or crusading traditions. Finally, Yoder argues that just war theories are not macho, or male-validating, because just war is about morality, not male heroism (Yoder 1996, 1). There are those feminists who see just war as an inadequate starting point for a feminist ethic of war, and those just war theorists who see no gendered implications of just war theory. At first glance, the divide seems irreconcilable. I take up the argument that both sides of this divide have erred, and that a feminist reformulation of just war theories contributes to feminism, to just war, and to the practice and analysis of international politics more generally. Feminisms’ insistence on recognizing gender subordination in social and political relations draws attention to the gendered nature of the ad bellum (war-making) and in bello (w ar-fighting) arguments and decisions of just- war thinkers. Just war theories need not only to come to terms with the gendered constructions that they rely on and perpetuate, but also with gendered events, occurrences, roles, and perceptions in war. Feminisms, on the other hand, could do a better job of presenting ethical viewpoints concerning the making and fighting of wars. This project engages just war theory through gendered lenses, critiques it, and reformulates it with the aid 5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of feminist insights. It then tests this reformulation with an analysis of the wars that have been fought in and around Iraq since the end of the Cold War. Chapter I, ‘feminist foundations,’ introduces the concept of ‘gender’ analysis. First, this chapter provides understandings of the terms gender, feminisms, and feminist theory that will be used throughout this project. I continue on to lay out the worldviews associated with various feminisms as groundwork for the claims that I will make in this project. Any claim “a gendered worldview might assert. . . ” in my opinion needs to be preceded by a detailed idea o f what a gendered worldview might be and how it comes to such assertions. Accordingly, Chapter I makes the methodological choice to give a “rich description” or short ethnography o f feminist ideas - not as a history, or as an inclusive forum for the recognition o f all feminist thought; instead as context. Here, I use context as (necessary) provisional foundation for (not necessarily linear) thought progression. After providing context, this chapter moves on to deal with the methods that feminisms in IR can use to construct “gendered lenses” through which to analyze policy situations. I begin this discussion by highlighting some of the ontological assumptions that feminisms hold and debate. These include interpretations o f the meaning of gender, and multiplicity in theory and practice. Next, I discuss how these ontologies influence feminist knowledges, or epistemologies. I contend that feminist theory, like all theory, is political and contains interested knowledge. I embrace this politicization o f knowledge, and, drawing from the context laid out earlier, explain some o f the directions of feminist political knowledge. Specifically, I argue that feminisms hold a political interest in prioritizing the gendered and the marginal in political relations. Recognizing these political priorities, I claim that the next step is to set out a methodological roadmap for a feminist study that combines political theory and empirical analyses. The roadmap that I suggest is a feminist methodological journey of observation, 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. critique, revealing, reflexivity, reconstruction, and action in policy analysis. I explain that my project will follow such a path as it evaluates just war theories with self-conscious meticulousness. Finally, I discuss the specific methodological choices made along that journey in this project. Chapter II, ‘the theory of just war,’ begins the feminist critique and reconstruction of just war theories. First, I provide a brief historical introduction to the theories of just war. In this introduction, I use just war to describe the theories o f both the Western religious/secular traditions commonly identified as Just War and other traditions of thought on justice in and of war. Second, I discuss the conceptual foundations of various just war theories, or what I call ‘motivating moralities.’ Just war theories’ diverse motivating moralities include religion, ethnic identity, pacifism, and political interests. These various ethical foundations create a lack o f conceptual clarity concerning what justice is and how it is applied in war. Even though these theories suffer from a lack o f clarity, I contend in the third part o f this chapter that they provide an appropriate starting point for feminist critique and reformulation. The fourth task of this chapter is to take a step back to deal with the feminist pacifist contention that war cannot possibly be just or permissible. I contend that, while there are ethical problems with any war, a feminism that a priori rejects war is internally contradictory because it implies that there is nothing more morally offensive than the least morally offensive war - a claim that is unsustainable. I present a way of looking at ‘ just war’ that neither valorizes nor rejects war-making or war-fighting. Integral to this presentation is the concluding section of this chapter, which presents a feminist motivating morality for just war — empathetic cooperation. I argue that empathetic cooperation is the right combination of contingency, context, and priority to serve as the foundation for a feminist ethics of war. After outlining this motivating morality, I allow it to inspire a 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. feminist understanding o f justice, which will serve as the grounds for interpreting specific jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards. Chapters III and IV move from the foundational principles o f just war theories to deal with the specific issues in the ethics of war. Specifically, given guiding principles, these chapters address the specific criteria that might be seen as conditions by which a war might be judged just or unjust. Theories of the ethics of war deal with when it might be right to make war (jus ad bellum), what might be right and wrong to do during the fighting o f a war (jus in bello), and issues of politics before, during, and after wars. These issues, then, need to be addressed by a feminist reformulation of just war theories. Chapter III, ‘feminisms go to war,’ critiques and reconstructs just war theories’ understandings of what makes it just to go to war, or jus ad bellum. First, this chapter attempts to classify what counts as “war” for the purpose o f applying just war theories. Second, it deals with a number of the questions conventionally addressed by jus ad bellum just war theories. The issues that jus ad bellum traditionally deals with are right authority, just cause, right intent, declaration, last resort, and reasonable chance o f success (Walzer 1977). This chapter poses feminist inquiries into traditional interpretations of these categories, as well as their overall adequacy. A feminist critique o f the traditional understanding of the concept of sovereignty interrogates just war’s understandings of authority, re-presenting an understanding of authority based on moral license as opposed to national sovereignty while still preserving capacity to deal with the realities o f the current workings of international politics. Next, I incorporate the understandings o f justice discussed in the previous chapter to inform a discussion of reformulations of ‘ just cause.’ ‘ just.’ It then uses that foundation to look at what might constitute ‘ just cause’ in feminisms’ terms, prioritizing political marginality, gendered oppression, and humyn security. Third, I 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. specify and broaden ‘right intent’ in two steps of feminist critique and reformulation. I deal with the importance of intent in the context of a feminist just war theory, then I move on to address if there are identifiable intents that feminisms would find acceptable. Fourth, I use a feminist method of ‘searching for silences’ to critique the concept o f ‘last resort’ - questioning the adequacy of the policy moves that are considered before last resort is declared. This section incorporates a critique the focus on coercion and force in foreign policy, and points out alternatives that could be ‘resorted to’ instead of going to war which are revealed by an analysis through gendered lenses. Fifth, I discuss what ‘success’ might mean - does it mean winning the war? Does it mean remedying the original problem? Or are there more broad (humynitarian) considerations that must factor in? This discussion of success provides a transition into Chapter IV, which deals with questions of appropriate moral choices in war-fighting. Chapter IV, ‘feminisms fight in war,’ addresses the standards o f jus in bello, or the standards o f justice in the fighting of wars, through gendered lenses. It addresses the gender bias the standards o f jus in bello, in the roles that those standards assign, and in the impacts of wars on people. The first section discusses the gender roles that just war theories construct and impose when they tell glorified stories of how just wars should go. It talks about men constructed as heroes and wymyn constructed as needing to be saved by those heroes from evil enemies. The second section criticizes the insidious abstraction of the discourse o f clean war, demonstrating the negative impact of jus in bello rationalizations on people’s lives. The third section carries over this critique to the specifically gendered nature of the norms of non-combatant immunity. This section starts by reviewing different formulations o f the non-combatant immunity, or discrimination, principle in theories of just war. It brings a number of criticisms of both the structure and ideology of the discrimination 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. principle. These critiques suggest a feminist critical reconstruction of the non-combatant immunity principle, focusing on gendered responsibility and gendered impact when choosing targets. The fourth section examines gendered and sexual violence in war. Here, I argue that just war standards do little to prevent either the sexualized mentality o f violence in war. These standards are also largely ineffective against sexual violence. As a part of a reformulated feminist ethic of war, I insist that a theory of morally appropriate war-fighting must include standards that prohibit sexual violence in war. I propose relevant guidelines. The fifth section discusses proposition that some means of war-fighting should be considered necessarily unjust because of their destructive power. Just war theorists have proposed that weapons of mass destruction, air wars, and landmines are unjust means. I address these discussions, and add to them feminist observations of the unjust nature of war- fighting means that are gendered in their impacts. I conclude this chapter an epilogue to the theoretical discussion of feminist just war theories that paints a picture of what a feminist ethics of war might look like when these observations are synthesized. Chapter V, ‘context: Iraq,’ introduces the empirical part o f the project by providing histories of the political situations surrounding Iraq leading up to the ‘Gulf War.’ First, I address what a ‘history’ means and how the histories in this project are constituted. I recognize discursive contingency and subjectivity, but contend that a stylized empiricism is still a useful tool for the study of international politics generally, and the wars in Iraq specifically. Second, I introduce the political entity known as ‘Iraq,’ which is the chief geographical area of study in the empirical part of this project. I discuss the origins of the Iraqi state, and its early relationships with other states. Third, I talk about the immediate political context of the Gulf War: the Iran-Iraq war. I discuss the history of the war and its impacts on Iraq’s political positions and ambitions. Fourth, I discuss the political situation 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in and of Iraq in 1990, immediately preceding Iraq’s choice to invade and occupy Kuwait. I conclude this chapter with gendered critiques of the political context, contending that an unjust political context sets the stage for unjust wars. Chapter VI, ‘the gendered gulf (war),’ examines the Gulf War through the gendered lenses of the feminist theory of just war. First, I recount gendered stories o f just war in the Gulf. I observe the gendered narratives of just warrior states saving beautiful soul states and of just warriors saving beautiful souls. Second, I take up the issues o f genderings ofjus ad bellum justifications for the Gulf War, both for Iraq and for the Coalition. I interrogate each actor’s claims to right authority, just cause, right intent, last resort, and reasonable chance of success from feminist perspectives. Third, I address issues of the gendered impacts of war through my feminist reinterpretation of the jus in bello rules of just war. I discuss issues of discrimination and means in the fighting of the Gulf War. Finally, I propose a feminist counterdiscourse to the Gulf War. I discuss the possibility of a power-with model of relations between the Gulf War belligerents, which would make their political conflicts look substantially different. This chapter concludes with a question o f the justice of the end{l) of the Gulf War, which sets the stage for Chapter VII concerning the economic sanctions regime in place in the interwar years in Iraq. Chapter VII, ‘the war of sanctions,’ picks up where Chapter VI left off, at the end of the Gulf War. It focuses on evaluating the United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq. First, it looks to define sanctions as an act of war. I present an IR theory interpretation of sanctions as war, complemented by a situational argument that this particular sanctions regime constituted war and a feminist theoretical evaluation of economic sanctions as war. Second, I argue that coercive diplomacy generally, and economic sanctions specifically, are necessarily gendered practices in the international political arena. Third, I look to my 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reformulations o f jus ad bellum to inquire about the justice o f the decision to engage in the war of sanctions by the UN Security Council. Fourth, I ask questions about the impacts of sanctions, holding the economic embargo on Iraq to the jus in bello standards outlined in the theoretical portion of this project. Finally, I present a(n) (activist) feminist strategic intervention in the dominant discourses concerning the economic sanctions regime. This intervention comes in the form of a metaphor construction comparing coercive diplomacy to sexual violence. I contend that such interruptions could carry the force to make a difference in international politics. Chapter VIII, ‘the (gendered) wars continue,’ addresses the changing faces of the gendered nature of the conflict in Iraq. It begins by recognizing that, in the 2003 war in Iraq, gender was an issue that received a substantial amount of attention. This foregrounding gender, however, is not necessarily the same as seeing politics through gendered nature. I tell a story o f gender in the spotlight but still marginalized through the stories of two wymyn combatants in the most recent Gulf War: Jessica Lynch, a POW, and Sabrina Harman, who faces charges for war crimes. Second, I go over the new claims to just cause that arise against Iraq at the beginning o f this war. war against terrorism and preventative self-defense. I contend that these United States’ presentation of these causes was without basis in fact, but evaluate the theoretical basis of the United States’ claims were they to have been true. Third, I address the complexities of in bello rules in a war where the enemy is neither seen nor known. Finally, I discuss the possibilities for the future in Iraq. In this section, I address the potential for peace, the potential for de-gendering, and the potential for long-term stability. I conclude that, because of the gendered international politics surrounding Iraq over the last thirteen years, there is little hope for a peaceful Iraq. I propose a number of steps, however, to begin the healing process. 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter IX, ‘the future? weak ontologies of a feminist ethics of war,’ serves as the conclusion to this project. In it, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the feminist ethic of war as demonstrated in these empirical explorations. I begin by putting together an argument for the utility of political theory in making and changing policies in international relations. I move on to contend that the feminist reformulation o f just war theories that I have presented is a useful update, alternative, reappropriation, and redeployment of traditional understandings of the ethics of war. Still, I argue the framework that I have presented and the observations that it has brought ought not to be absolute, but instead, guiding; principles for the evaluation of the ethics of war. Employing Stephen W hite’s idea of weak ontologies, I explain that knowledge in a contingent world is always uncertain (2002). Still, a dialogical understanding of the evolution and revolution of knowledge allows us to ‘know’ without ‘KNOWING’ so certainly as to neglect context and contingency. Advocacy can therefore be formed even in a political world without complete certainty. This, I contend, is where a feminist ethics of war is both comfortable and appropriate. I argue that this feminist reformulation of just war theories contributes substantially to both the theory and practice of international politics; it provides observations without governance, guidelines without rule, and a framework for the improvement of the lives of those affected by international violence. I conclude with some suggestions for future (theoretical and political) inquiries; with an eye towards the continued development of (feminist) theories of the ethics of war. 13 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 1. feminist foundations Feminist theories begin with a different perspective and lead to further rethinking. They distinguish ‘reality’ from the world as men know it. They not only add women but also ask how gender - a structural feature of social life - has been rendered invisible. (Peterson and True 1998,23). This project evaluates just war theories through the lenses of feminist understandings of international politics. One of the first questions it must answer, then, is what it means by “feminisms” for the purpose of analysis. The first section of this chapter, ‘ontologies for feminisms,’ deals with this question - laying out in descriptive fashion feminist self-definitions and self-impressions to get a sense of the worldviews held by various feminisms. This section begins with feminisms’ common political concern, gender subordination. I address gendered power and discursive construction as mechanisms for the colonization of gender categories. Feminisms, though, do not have a single impression of either gender subordination or feminist goals. Instead, different interpretations of gender, power, and politics lead to different ideas about feminisms. I collect these ideas into a solidarist impression of ‘feminisms’ missions’ for the purpose of analyzing international politics. Having a mission, however, is only one crucial step in research design. It is also essential to define how we know what has been discovered in pursuit o f that mission. The second section, ‘how we know: insights from feminisms for epistemologies’ addresses how the ontological commitments of feminisms can be translated into epistemological observations. In this section, I make three epistemological observations. My interpretation of feminist knowledge is as interested and political, it is involved in the politics o f the margins, and it is constructive (hooks 1996). In addition to understanding what knowledge is, the project needs a procedure to follow to find that knowledge. The third section, ‘feminist methodological journeys,’ proposes a comprehensive revision o f feminist 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. methodology in line with the ontological and epistemological commitments discussed in the first two sections. Finally, a specific plan for the steps to be taken is important. A fourth section ‘the journey to just war,’ discusses specific methods involved in the feminist journey of this project. I. ONTOLOGIES FOR FEMINISMS I do not attempt to ‘define’ feminisms, but rather to string together their ontologies to paint a picture of the ways that different feminisms see the world; what feminisms might ‘mean’ in an ontological rather than definitional sense. Betty Reardon begins the explanation of what feminism might mean in the context of political analysis. She explains that ‘ feminism is the belief that women are of equal social and human value with men, and that the differences between men and women, whether biologically based or culturally derived, do not and should not constitute grounds for discrimination against women” (Reardon 1985, 20). In Reardon’s conception, then, feminism is a political theory that prioritizes protecting wymyn from harmful differential treatment. Sara Ruddick adds a politically activist dimension to the definition of feminism, explaining that feminist politics is a movement dedicated to eradicating the problems that wymyn experience because of their sex (Ruddick 1989, 234). In the following section, I examine three components of feminist ontologies: gender as complex social construction, and feminisms as not singular but multiple in theory and practice (Chodorow 1995). A. GENDER AS COMPLEX SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION I indicated above that many feminists see feminisms as having to do with wymyn, and with gender. The question of what those words mean, however, has been the subject of much discussion and disagreement among feminists. Borrowing from a number of feminist perspectives, I present gender as a complex social construction, contending that gender is at 15 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. once social fact and social process, embedded in political practice. This argument begins with an interrogation of traditional definitions of ‘women’ and o f gender categories. Feminists have questioned the assertion that gender differences (and thus discriminations) are based in biological differences between those people categorized as wymyn and those people categorized as men. In other words, feminists question the naturalness of the categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ that are deployed in humyn social interaction. Spike Peterson explains that, “given the significance of gender identities in every domain o f human endeavor, feminists have criticized biological explanations that essentialize maleness and femaleness and have developed alternative explanations of gender identity formation and its effects” (1999, 38). Peterson is warning against assuming that biological sex is indicative of innate social characteristics. In other words, just because a ‘man’ has a ‘penis’ does not mean that he has any social characteristics necessarily exclusive to someone who is not a ‘man’ and does not have a ‘penis’ or vice versa. Biological differences (insomuch as they are detectable) between people classified as men and people classified as wymyn can be understood as sex, and socially constituted differences between these categorized groups (or people understood to be members o f these groups) can be understood as gender.1 Feminists study sex, gender, and the ways that they interplay in gender relations. The analysis of gender relations is more complex than dichotomous analysis of sex subordination; gender is social, fluid, and complex. Gender is at once related to sex and transcend it in a way that ‘genders’ even relations which areprima facie ‘unsexed.’ Jane Flax contends that feminisms generally look at gender more than they study 1 Still, sex is not limited to those people classified/classifiable as biologically ‘male’ and biologically ‘female,’ as there are persons who fall into biological categories o f asexuality, intersexuality, hermaphoditism. Social construction o f gender is generally divisible into masculinities and femininities - stereotypes, behavioral norms, and rules assigned to those seen as men and wymyn. Socially constructed gender categorizations generally rely on the male/female dichotomy, instead o f allowing for multiple sexes to translate to multiple genders. The multiplicity o f sexes is generally marginalized in both sex and gender discourse. 16 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sex. She argues that “the fundamental goal of feminist theory is (and ought to be) to analyze gender relations: how gender relations are constituted and experienced and how we think, or, equally important, do not think about them” (Flax 1987, 622). Flax’s argument implies a commitment common to many feminists: to analyze gender as a changing, instead of static, social fact and process. Steve Smith asserts that “gender roles are socially constructed and defined by their relationship with one another” (1998, 7). In other words, gendering is a relational process. Social institutions of gender change over time, and feminists study the continual construction o f gender, and of gender relations. Genderings are diverse, as are their mechanisms. Charlotte Hooper explains that most of the complexities of gender are not “fully explained by accounts of institutional structures, conditioning, and coercion” (Hooper 2001, 25). In Hooper’s understanding, gender is not only a social construction, but a complex, multidimensional process. R. W. Connell contends that a feminist analysis of constructed gender relations should be complex, explaining gender as “both a product and producer of history” (Connell 1995, 81). Seeing gender as both a product and producer of history gives feminisms a unique outlook on social constructivism (Prugl 1999, Haslanger 1996). By social constructivism, I mean the understanding that ideas about gender are the complex result o f social power, social forces, and social mores formed by the historical interactions between humyn beings and the particular social context in which the relations exist.2 Interaction is generative of 2 Francine D ’Amico and Peter Beckman discuss two typologies for gender relations, gender-as-difference and gender-as-power (1995). In gender-as-difference, gender is socially constructed by cultural context as characteristics o f those who are a member o f gender groups. Here, “gender refers to characteristics linked to a particular sex by one’s culture” (D ’Amico and Beckman 1995, 2-3). Personality traits are seen as delineated by sex. Men are constructed to be rational, resolute, aggressive, competitive, assertive, domination-oriented, calculating, restrained, physical, and detached (D ’Amico and Beckman 1995, 3). As opposed to these characteristics seen as masculine, wymyn are seen as emotional, flexible, fickle, passive, cooperative, compliant, relationship-oriented, instinctive, expressive, verbal, and caring (D ’Amico and Beckman 1995, 3). Peterson and Runyan explain that, here, “gender refers to the socially learned behavior and expectations that distinguish 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interhumyn rules for gender relations, and those rules are generative of a situation of rule where gendered power is (formally or informally) institutionalized.3 Two mechanisms of the social construction of gender can be touched upon: power and discourse. Gendered power is the victory of certain ideas over others in social interaction because they are associated with valorized gender. Charlotte Hooper explains gendered power in terms o f masculinism, commenting that “masculinism is the ideology that justified and naturalizes gender hierarchy by not questioning the elevation of ways of being and knowing associated with men and masculinity over those associated with women and feminism” (Hooper 1998, 3 1).4 Note, here, that we are talking about the values socially associated with femininity and masculinity, rather than about the values of specific men and wymyn or of men and wymyn as groups. The importance of this observation is that ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are not terms that stereotype men and wymyn but terms which between femininity and masculinity (1999, 5). These stereotypes become pictures in our head that filter how we see both individuals and social relations (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 35). D ’Amico and Beckman’s second model o f analysis o f constructed gender is that of gender-as-power. This model acknowledges the social construction and understanding o f different personality traits as a result o f (real or perceived) sex difference, but moves gender analysis deeper than an understanding o f overt characteristics in persons assumed to be different for the purposes o f explaining gender relations. The authors explain that “the concept o f gender-as-power sees gender as a socially constructed relationship o f inequality” (D ’Amico and Beckman 1995, 5). What the gender- as-power interpretation adds, then, is recognition that the understanding o f gender differences is a part o f the understanding o f gender inequality and subordination. The very labels o f ‘woman’ and ‘man’ have unequal power in social and political relations (D ’Amico and Beckman 1995, 5). 3 This idea comes from Onuf (1989) and personal conversations with him about his work. While a detailed explication o f social constructivisms is not appropriate here, for the purposes o f genealogy, my introduction to constructivism was Alexander Wendt teaching classes at the University o f Chicago, but my ideas have come to be shaped by Onuf, Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Giddens (1979), Baudrillard (1976), and Arendt (1970). 4 Hooper is influenced substantially by R. W. Connell, who explains a number o f different hegemonic and subordinated masculinities in relation to each other (1995). A hegemonic masculinity, then, is not stable - instead, different hegemonic masculinities are articulated in different ways in different times, but are always concerned with the subordination o f other masculinities and femininities (which will be addressed later). Differences between hegemonic masculinities and subordinated masculinities play a role in the ordering of the social process o f gendered power (Hooper 2000, 70). For example, heterosexual (hegemonic) masculinities must subordinate homosexual masculinity to maintain identity for the masculine ideal (Hooper 2001, 55; Connell 1995, 99). This is self-sustaining - Hooper explains that “as long as masculinity is perceived as a relatively unitary, stable, and coherent phenomenon that corresponds to the experiences o f all men, dichotomous thinking remains either obviously or secretly at the core o f these solutions, compromising their radical potential” (Hooper 2001, 48) - in other words, failure to see gender as a multiple, constitutive social power process would be damning to the feminist project o f emancipation. Using the word ‘emancipation’ here might be misread as a product o f Enlightenment thought - but it should be read as a quest for contingent betterment - not absolute, but directed. 18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. address social values in perceived gender difference. Not only are gendered characteristics perceived to be different, those characteristics assumed to be masculine are valued over those assumed to be feminine even outside of direct gender relations. Social processes, then, “select” for values and behaviors that can be associated with masculinity. Hooper explains that this is an idealized, or hegemonic, masculinity in social construction of gender that governs social discourse (2001; Connell 1995). Hegemonic masculinity is not the only gendering in social power relations. It is the dominant ideology, but it subordinates other ‘genderings.’ Hooper details that “hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to a range of subordinated masculinities as well as in opposition to femininity” (1998, 34).5 Though a number o f masculinities exist in different power relations with each other, feminisms explain that there is no such ‘hegemonic’ femininity, as femininities are subordinated to masculinities in social relations. The gendered power continuum relates different masculinities, but places femininities as invariable subordinate to masculinities. Hooper explains that “the concept of hegemonic masculinity has no female equivalent. All varieties of femininity are subordinate” because hegemonic masculinity holds social authority (1998, 35; Connell 1995, 156).6 This distinction is particularly salient in international politics. Hooper argues that international politics is a primary site for the production of masculinities; both as ethos and as strategy 5 Hooper contends that this hegemony is achieved through social process - moral persuasion and consent, as well as through social fact - entrenched ideological ascendancy, and through physical process - an ethos o f coercion (1998, 34). In the social process o f the institutionalization, the hegemonic masculinity is at the top o f the social pyramid, governing (indirectly o f course through socialization) both its members and its subordinates. 6 The political implication here is clear: to feminize something or someone is to directly engage in subordination o f that person, political entity, or idea, because things which are feminized are lower on the social hierarchy of gendered power than things which are seen to be neutral or masculine. This is not to say that, in the face of multiple masculinities, femininities are singular - quite the opposite, the existence o f multiple feminisms necessarily reflects the existence o f multiple femininities - here, multiple masculinities simply continue to trump femininities in a number o f arenas o f social power. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Hooper 1998, 38, 7 1).7 The social process of gendered power, then, works as “masculinism can privilege elite males at the expense of feminized Others, regardless of sex or gender” (Hooper 2001, 74). In this way, feminisms see gender as complex, but also recognize the salience o f the social process o f gendering o f power. The second element o f gendered social construction that merits mention is discursive construction. The question of the structure of these social processes matters - clearly, from the example o f gendered power - social processes include direct physical interaction and direct social interaction. I contend that feminisms’ insights into the discursive interactions inherent in the social processes of international politics are important. This argument is formed around the contention that gender relations specifically and social construction more generally has discursive and performative dimensions. J. K. Gibson-Graham contends that gender is one of the most pervasive discourses in social life (1994, 214).8 A discourse is an entity which constructs, changes, and enforces meaning in conversation and command. Nira Yuval-Davis helps to introduce the argument that gender can be seen as at least partly a discursive construction. She discusses gender as a set of discourses manifested in social relations: 7 A number o f feminists have criticized international politics as an arena for masculine show-boating and power - Connell (who does not focus on IR) contends that not only does gender permeate politics, but politics is inherently gendered. He argues that politics as usual is masculine politics (Connell 1995, 204). Elisabeth Prugl translates this observation into the analysis o f international politics, stating that the evidence is sufficient “to affirm a contention that feminists in International Relations have made for some time: that gender politics pervades world politics” (Prugl 1999, 3). Ann Tickner fleshes out this argument. In her view, the discipline of IR was a decade ago and still is largely synonymous with maleness. (2001). This maleness is not based on individual masculinities, but in the (constructed) social power o f the hegemonic masculinities described in the text (Tickner 2001, Connell 1995). The maleness in the theory and practice o f International Relations is hidden by purported ‘gender neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ (Tickner 1992, 2001). 8 In recent attendance o f the ISA distinguished scholar panel for Spike Peterson, I found out from Anne Runyan that J. K. Gibson-Graham is actually two people writing as a single writing-identity - which I share because such a construction in itself is clearly a discursive production o f the interaction o f social more and social statement within the field o f academic inquiry. 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gender should be understood not as ‘real’ social difference between men and women, but as a mode of discourse which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined by their sexual/biological difference as opposed to their economic positions or their membership in ethnic or racial collectives. (Yuval-Davis 1997, 8) Feminists who contend that there is a discursive element to gender recognize the importance o f naming and definition both to the understanding o f gender categories and to the practice of gendered behavior and subordination. Chris Weedon contends that discourses produce understandings o f and actualities of wymyn’s bodies; a production which is central to the norms of femininity (1987, 108; Butler 1990; 1993; 1997). As a result of the recognition of the discursive nature of gender, a number of feminists talk about gender roles, categories, and behaviors as discursively constructed. In other words, the talk of gender is the combination of performance and definition, which creates and reifies gendered understandings and gender roles. Cynthia Weber contends that subjectivity is performative, and that this realization means that gender analysis must take account of talk and performance in political and social (and international) relations (1998, 77). Explaining and expanding upon the work of Judith Butler, Weber questions the natural foundation of the distinction of ‘sex.’ She explains that “sex is not nature as gender is to culture. Sex and gender, she claims, are both discursive constructs” (Weber 1998, 79; Butler 1990).9 In this discursive construction, masculinities dominate femininities. Discursive dominance is not set in stone, however - intervention and interference can disrupt and 9 Some see gender as purely discursive, but more often it is understood as a combination o f discursive, social, and material construction. Still, purely discursive interpretations o f gender have argued that the dichotomy between nature and culture which this distinction employs is also the product o f discourse as opposed to some sort o f objective reality (Hooper 2001, 29). In other words, they argue that both biological sex and social construction are gendered. 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. change it.1 0 Still, the recognition of a discursive element is important to this act of change. In other words, discourse is key to social construction more broadly and to the construction of gender specifically. Anne Phillips notes that the integration of wymyn into society has left in place the discursive structures of gender subordination, because integrationists have not been cognizant of the discursive and performative nature of gender dichotomies (1987, 5; Hooper 2001, 31; Butler 1990). In order to change gendered discourses, we must come to some understanding about how discourses work. Feminisms have long been familiar with the argument that traditional narratives of the ways that politics work are both explicitly and implicitly gendered. For example, Nancy Huston argues that a dominant narrative is an indispensable part of a war (Huston 1983, 271). This narrative is the story that the powerful speak, which, when accepted by its audience, becomes the story o f a given war. The plot includes ‘the good guys’ fighting ‘the bad guys’ for valorous reasons, and, after overcoming extreme hardship and personal suffering, winning ‘the good fight.’1 1 Huston explains that “war imitates war narrative imitates war” (Huston 1983, 273). In other words, stories of war both make war possible and serve as models for war, while wars provide material for more war stories. The ‘moral’ of a war story is, of course, winning the war which the story has shown to be justified. In war stories, then, “the actual number of victims - and a fortiori their innocence and guilt, are secondary considerations; what counts is the capacity to kill 1 0 Many options are available, “but they exist in a hierarchy o f antagonisms where certain versions have more institutional power than others” (Weedon 1987, 125-6). While there is a possibility that domination can be overcome by reclaiming the language o f the victim in international discourse for subject wymyn, there are a number o f implications for gendered power relations that come out o f the interpretation o f gender as discourse (and discourse as gendered) (McLeer 1998, 52). 1 1 Huston details: “In war narrative as in high school drama classes, two figures are o f capital importance: the protagonist and the antagonist: the hero and the enemy. It is no accident that whereas there are reams and reams o f ‘heroic’ verse, there is no such thing as ‘enemic’ verse: in war narrative it is rare that anyone refers to himself as the enemy” (1983, 273). This demonstrates both gendering (the story is male) and dichotomization (male/female, hero/enemy). 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the triumphal narrative of the enemy” (Huston 1983, 273). This neglected spot in war stories often turns into a neglected spot in war, which needs and wants the victory to end the story. The physical violence and the linguistic narrative are thus inseparable, and must be understood as distinct parts o f the war instead of as “the war” and “the story about the war” as if they were discrete. Huston confirms that “it is crucial to conceive of these physical violences as being linguistic as weir (Huston 1983, 278). What Huston is telling us is that “what we say” and “what we do” in international politics are inseparable. Still, “what we say” is a contentious battle rather than a singular theme. Baudrillard argues that “we live in a world of referendum where all signs and messages present themselves in question/answer format” (1976). John Hall provides a similar understanding, as he asserts that political and social “research cannot be carried out wholly within the unalloyed logic o f a single, ‘pure’ formative discourse. To the contrary, actual inquiries depend on hybrid practices that involve extra-logical mediations among different formative discourses employed in relation to one another” (1999, 3). In other words, we live in a world not of objective truth, but of competing stories in a collage of ‘truth.’1 2 In a world o f competing stories, there are necessarily ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ Spike Peterson contends that gender subordination on the international level is “dependent on hierarchical dichotomies naturalized through discourses to collective meaning systems into 1 2 In a world o f competing stories, the study o f which story wins has a place. The idea o f competing stories seems egalitarian enough until we begin to try to uncover which stories compete, who tells the stories which are competing, and whose stories remain unheard. Participating in discourses and arguments o f political significance is a matter o f license. John Thompson, in explaining the work o f Pierre Bordieu, explains that the recognition of the presentation o f speech is a privilege which has many complexities: “Hence the efficacy o f the performative utterance presupposes a set o f social relations, an institution, by virtue o f which a particular individual, who is authorized to speak and recognized as such by others, is able to speak in a way that others will regard as acceptable under the circumstances” (Thompson 1991, 8-9). Deleuze and Guattari agree on this point, contending that “linguistics is nothing without a pragmatics (semiotic or political) to define the effectuation o f the condition o f possibility language and the usage o f linguistic elements (1987, 85). In other words, discursive contest is related to social license which is in turn related to discursive contest. 23 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. symbolic order” (1999, 40).1 3 Feminisms recognize the governance of dominant discourses in a system where discursive rules engender actual rule which affects peoples’ lives (Prugl 1999, 12; Onuf 1989; Sylvester 1994; 2002).1 4 These discourses have been described in feminist terms as “imperial hermeneutics” which are “the kind o f reading that attempts to control, govern, regulate, or discipline text(s) in terms o f policing the boundaries of meaning” (Hussain 2000, 29). Feminisms see the patriarchal state, the war system, the rational man, and international anarchy as constructs of imperial hermeneutics which police meaning in global politics; meaning, in turn, controls the content o f international relations stories; which, in turn, limits policy choices. Against these dominant discourses, then, feminisms engage in projects of discursive destabilization, looking for and pointing out the 1 3 The word inequality is used by many feminists to discuss the situation o f wymyn throughout the world. It has a negative connotation: wymyn’s situation is inferior to that o f men. But it is also somewhat confusing for a number o f reasons. First, it leaves unclear whether that inferior situation is a result o f biological difference. Second, it assumes liberal analyses o f rights and duties in political organization, using equality instead o f needs or care as the cornerstone value. Third, interpretations o f equality are divided into equal opportunity and equal situation, where the appearance o f equal opportunity excuses unequal situation (MacKinnon 2001). Looming in the equality debate are questions o f which men wymyn want to be equal to (Phillips 1987, 10). These problems with equality rhetoric and practice often turn feminisms from questions o f equality to questions o f subordination, a turn this project takes (Phillips 1987, 10). Subordination has a universally negative connotation, intimating as a lack of choices and a deprivation o f agency for the oppressed (Schutte 1998, 67). The terms ‘subordination’ and ‘subordination’ also remove the connotation that legitimate differences might justify discriminatory treatment. Further, these words make is possible to pay attention to the specific things that people need to survive and prosper, as opposed to a universality o f a notion o f equality, which could not understand either individual or group difference in the context o f providing for those needs. Still, ‘subordination’ denies wymyn social and political agency. The term “subordination” deals with agency along with inferior opportunity and inferior situation. 1 4 Christine Sylvester talks about voices unheard in international politics. She explains that “fictional and postcolonial narratives, which purport to tell us about the lives o f local people sandwiched in-between imperial motives and statist international politics, are out o f view in conventionally constituted social science in general” (Sylvester 1999, 250-1). Extending on the feminist argument that abstractions can be materially insidious, Sylvester contends that the discipline o f international relations “needs to travel physically into the societies it purports to paint away with a brush labeled ‘the state’ or ‘the international system.’ . . . to notice and appreciate its own capacity for the hybridity that postcolonialism discovers” (Sylvester 1999, 259). Feminists contend that, in the international arena, wymyn’s voices go unheard, and wymyn’s narratives go unconsidered, in the formation of international policy (Tickner 1992). Even when gendered ‘feminine’ voices are heard, they are incorporated into dominant discourse (if at all) in a partial way which leaves the international political discourse community largely gendered male. 24 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gendered silences and subordinations inherent in the stories that get told (Gibson-Graham 1994,216).1 5 The discursive gendering of international politics has tangible effects. First, it must be considered in combination with the material gendering of international politics in order to get a full picture of gender subordination. Second, it must be seen as a barrier to ‘solving’ material gender subordination, as the dominant discourses which shape political understandings are reliant on oppressive constructions. Third, it is to be seen as a material harm in itself. Nancy Isenberg reminds us that discourses affect social practices. She explains that “discourse theory examines how narrative codes and conventions used in speech and writing not only transmit ideology but mediate and create social and cultural practices” (Isenberg 1992, 450). A discursive frame, or paradigm, consists of “intersubjective systems of representations and representation-producing practice” (Laffey and Weldes 1997). Discourses can thus be seen as a feature of reality, as constitutive of reality, and as representative of reality; so long as it is understood that discourses exist not in egalitarian community, but in hierarchical competition. As Isenberg explains, there have been problems understanding the relationship between language and reality when these contingencies are not understood together. 1 5 Ann Tickner explains that feminisms recognize relativism, contingency, and competition in language (1992). June Lennie expands on this point, explaining “language as a site o f struggle, rather than being a neutral means of expression” (1999, 100). Lennie is observing that words, even when uttered as neutral, carry political content. That gender is often seen as irrelevant is a public (linguistic) phenomenon and a public problem (Jaggar 1998). Frame distortion is when “normative debates fail to meet basic standards o f communicative rationality” which “imagine actors’ reciprocally challenging one another’s validity claims to find shared truth” (Payne 2002,46-7). Feminisms argue that politics’ traditional discursive frames do not meet standards o f communicative rationality, when communicative rationality is read inclusively, instead o f with unrepresentative neutrality. Lennie suggests discursive deconstruction to “illustrate the gaps, silences, ambiguities, and paradoxes in the discourse” (1999, 101). Pointing out silences is a step towards eliminating them. This project recognizes language as rule-creating, as a system o f signification, and as a location o f the productivity o f meaning. 25 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. B. MULTIPLICITY OF FEMINISMS The section on ‘gender’ talked about gender in a singular sense; this was a parsimonious but misleading choice. The diversity of genderings means that ‘wymyn’ and ‘femininities’ are not synonymous, and often represent different subsets of the population of social and political actors. Spike Peterson brings a feminist perspective to diversities among femininities as well, critiquing, as many feminists do, the universality o f the category of ‘woman.’ In other words, there is not a single definition of ‘woman,’ or of ‘feminine,’ either in nature or in social construction. Peterson explains that “feminist identity itself is a problem for feminism. If a universal category of ‘woman’ is a necessary condition of the feminist movement, than the actual diversity among women contravenes that condition” (Peterson 1999, 38).1 6 Feminisms, then, need to be both multiple and operating under some mandate that groups them. Betty Reardon, in the first paragraph of this chapter, provided a mandate that groups feminisms - wymyn’s subordination. Still, many feminists interpret this mandate in diverse ways; these interpretations produce numerous moral perspectives informed by feminisms (Robinson 1999, 11; 2001; Marchand and Runyan 2000, 225). Feminisms, then, contain a multiplicity of approaches “constructed out o f the experience of women in their many and varied circumstances, experiences that have generally been rendered invisible by most intellectual disciplines” (Tickner 1992, 14). Jill Steans explains that feminisms are “frequently concerned with women while recognizing that women’s lives can only be fully understood in terms of gender relations” (1998, 4). 1 6 Recognizing the diversity among wymyn is important; Sylvester argues that there is danger in failing to problematize the category o f ‘woman,’ as there is diversity in the experiences o f those who are classified as wymyn (Sylvester 2002, 281, 279; Barker 1998, 204). 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Specific feminisms examine problems from specific intellectual and personal places, and thus provide varied, and sometimes conflicting, insights into problems (Connell 1995, 5; Tickner 1992, 2001). Scholars and activists often talk about the experiences of wymyn as if there were some monolithic standpoint, experience, or place for those gendered ‘female.’1 7 Many feminists are uncomfortable with this idea. Chandra Mohanty argues that this interpretation of feminism as singular and wymyn as having commonalities is parochial, and privileges Western feminist interpretations of both gender and social relations (1988). Spike Peterson and Jacqui True contend that the scope of feminisms is such that they are capable of dealing with differences among wymyn in complex understandings of gender. They explain that “contemporary feminisms analyze not only patterns of difference constituted by dichotomies of maleness and femaleness but also patterns o f difference among women” (Peterson and True 1998, 15).1 8 Gender complexity need not be confounding - feminisms can study ‘wymyn’ and ‘gender’ without being able to categorize firmly either meaning; the complexity itself can inform scholarly ontology and methodology. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland flesh out what feminisms that do not rely on gender unity look like. They argue that gender analysis does not rely on the validity of the category of ‘woman’ but instead is relative to the social treatment of those classified as wymyn on the basis of their gender (Grant and Newland 1991, 5).1 9 Feminisms, then, are both multiple and contingent. 1 7 Even Nancy Hirschmann, who works on feminist standpoint theoiy, concedes that there is not a natural standpoint for all wymyn (1989). Still, some assume that there is a standpoint wymyn can find. 1 8 Perhaps this could be seen as “solidarist feminism.” Anne McLeer also proposes the reconciliation of wymyn’s difference and feminist concern for wymyn’s lives. She contends that it is possible “to reclaim the idea of global sisterhood and to make a case, if not for the existence o f a monolithic subordination o f women, then for a repeated pattern o f patriarchy that affects different women in similar ways and through similar strategies and structures” (McLeer 1998, 42; Ackerly 2000). In other words, feminisms can understand similarities in gendered subordination. 1 9 Mary Hawkesworth argues that there is no uniform women’s reality to be known (1989, 537). Gender is an epistemological starting point for feminist analyses, seen as both a thought construct and a social relation (Grant and Newland 1991, 5; Flax 1987, 630). Catherine MacKinnon argues that the problem o f sexism will not be solved in an infinitely regressive attempt to understand difference between those categorized as wymyn, but 27 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Given multiplicity, IR feminisms can coexist and contribute to critique and reformulation of research and policy without being considered as a single theory in universal agreement.2 0 Instead, feminisms can be seen as multiple viewpoints, growing out of both the experience of wymyn and the use of gender as a category of (academic, personal, or political) analysis. I contend that there is a potential to understand a concept of ‘feminisms’ without reifying a ‘feminist standpoint.’ In this way, feminisms see gender as complex, but also recognize the salience of the gendering of power. Spike Peterson explains that a social constructivist view o f gender categories and gender subordinations is not incompatible with feminisms’ concern for wymyn’s lives. She observes “feminists insist that gender be acknowledged as systematically affecting social relations and their ideological expressions” (Peterson 1992, 201). In this way, feminists are making the argument that gender categories constitute a Wendy Brown criticizes MacKinnon for her ahistorical and non-dialectical understanding o f the social construction o f sex (MacKinnon 1987; Brown 1995; 2002). Anne McLeer contends, more moderately, that feminisms should embrace sisterhood without erasing difference (1998, 46). Heckman echoes this sentiment, contending that feminisms can accommodate difference without losing theoretical strength (1997, 349). Liz Philipose argues that wymyn do have something in common, related not to their essence but to their political situation. She explains that, “transcending the boundaries o f public and private, home and neighborhood, rich and poor, North and South, war and (so-called) peace, it is argued that violence against women is evidence of universal discrimination and misogyny, manifested in particular ways and in particular contexts” (Philipose 1996, 50; Boyd 1997). Charlotte Hooper argues that the category o f ‘woman’ exists whether or not it is a valid distinction because it is employed in social relations (2001, 34). Some kind o f solidarist conclusion seems to me to be the most functional and perhaps even the most sensible; that is what this project lays out. 2 0 John Hoffman provides a framework through which we can see feminisms as diversity within commonality. Hoffman introduces the idea o f a ‘momentum concept,’ which can accommodate difference, interpretational gaps, internal conflict, and change, while still holding conceptual validity in a way that makes analysis possible (Hoffman 2001, 8). “Momentum concepts are concepts which have an egalitarian and anti-hierarchical ‘logic’” (Hoffman 2001, 23). In other words, dialogue between definitional interpretations is assumed, instead of definitional hierarchy. A momentum concept, to Hoffman, is one where the boundaries are constantly changing both size and shape to accommodate new interpretations, internal disagreement, and change over time. This flexibility, Hoffman contends, means that “momentum concepts are therefore inherently subversive. They demonstrate an inner movement which transcends the formulations o f their creators” (2001, 25). This means that feminisms, if they are seen through the ‘momentum concept’ lens can mean different things to different scholars, activist, and analysts at different times, but still be considered in the same conceptual framework. Hoffman asserts that this flexibility is also commensurate with a feminist concern for reflexivity (Hoffman 2001, 25). Hoffman argues that “if feminism is to be coherently defined, then, in my view, it needs to be conceived as one river with numerous currents rather than as a series o f rivers flowing in different and even contradictory directions” (Hoffman 2001, 48). 28 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. source o f subordination even across diversity. There are a number of subversions to gender categorization that hold political salience.2 1 Spike Peterson clarifies that “feminists argue that the domination of women, nature, and all who are constructed as ‘other’ is not a matter o f ‘essential,’ atemporal qualities but of socially constructed, historically contingent” (1992, 203; Aafjies and Goldstein 1998). In other words, while wymyn may not have any essential commonalities, the social experience of subordination is a commonality between wymyn. I contend that, in their search for the emancipation of wymyn, feminisms run into diversities between wymyn, which beg other political questions. These questions include but are not limited to issues of racial inequality, cultural discrimination, economic subordination, ‘North-South’ relations, and gendering of political actors. These issues in feminisms were not located by explicitly looking for, say, race inequality; instead, they were located by looking for gender and finding its complexity. These diverse questions are not, then, homeless in feminisms - quite the opposite; they are a necessary part of complete understandings of feminisms. II. HOW WE KNOW: INSIGHTS FROM FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES I am a philosopher, a woman, and a feminist. My identity as a philosopher is certified by training, diplomas, and a university appointment. My identity as a woman was not similarly earned: depending on the aspects you focus on, and how you think about them, it may be, among other things, a biological fact, or an always elusive goal, or an ineluctable liability to sexual assault. My identity as a feminist has come in large part from my attempts to make sense of those other two identities, particularly as they occur together - (Scheman 1993, 185). 2 1 Susan Heckman realizes that there is a middle ground between the idea that there is a way in which wymyn see the world and the idea that wymyn have nothing in common binding them as a categorical group. She explains that the problem “is not to replace the absolutism implicit in the claim to the feminist standpoint with a relativistic stance but to deconstruct the dichotomy, to articulate a method, and, hence, a politics, grounded in different epistemology” (Heckman 1997, 359). In such an understanding of gender, knowledge can be situated based on experience, and gender can still be seen as an essential category o f analysis (Heckman 1997, 357). Views traditionally assigned to womanhood can be held by men, and vice versa, because gender is politically, not biologically, grounded (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 32). Still, gender categories have meaning. In fact, Jill Steans argues, in such a social situation, it is insidious to give up completely on the category o f ‘woman,’ as it forces feminism both to ignore social realities and to become a politics o f negativity (1998, 29). 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The question ‘who wants to know’ is a gangster movie staple: it signifies the value of knowledge, the ways in which having it or withholding it are forms of power, and the dangers o f it falling into the wrong hands .... the academy thrives on theories and rewards those who produce them .... but we need also recognize that we come to them differently because o f how we are placed in the world (Scheman 1993, 218-220). This short adventure into feminist ontologies demonstrated that ontological commitments - both locational and theoretical - influence epistemological commitments in political endeavors (Kirsch 1999). Scheman correctly makes two observations here: that worldview influences knowledge, and that epistemology has power in knowledge production and distribution. I contend that feminisms’ ontological observations necessarily bring epistemological observations: how we see the world dictates how we can know it. I argue that the ideas o f feminisms about how the world works necessarily make feminist knowledge interested and political. I further argue that feminisms’ politics are intimately tied to the margins of political life. Finally, I assert that it is most suitable to feminisms’ ontologies that feminist knowledge be a constructive and collaborative solidarist academic and activist project. A. POLITICAL AND INTERESTED KNOWLEDGE Earlier in this chapter, I contended that feminist ontologies are inherently political - with a political interest in gender subordination. If feminisms are political, feminist knowledge is politicized. I argue that all knowledge is in some way politicized, and feminisms embrace rather than ignoring this political element. Political interest of knowledge is acceptable to feminisms because feminists critique the possibility of objective knowledge as they study epistemology. Feminisms see scholarship as activism in a way that allows them to produce academically sound analysis while fulfilling political commitment in 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that analysis (Zalewski 1996; Fonow and Cook 1991).2 2 Theory itself seems necessary, but insufficient, for feminist purposes (Weedon 1987, 9). Feminisms theorize what is wrong with the world, and act to correct those wrongs™ This activism starts with the individual, where self-reformulation leads to reformative politics, which lead to change.2 4 The argument of this section, then, is that feminists ought to apply an epistemology (a way of knowing) based on a political interest in emancipation. This argument has several steps. First, feminisms critique the idea that objective knowledge is either possible or desirable.2 5 Knowledge which is purported to be objective is 2 2 Feminist theory is bound up in activism. Feminisms’ activisms, from an individual to an international level, are key to understanding gendered international politics. Feminisms see theory as explanation, as critique, and as practice (Zalewski 1996; Tickner 2001). Theory-as-practice means both that theory in itself is an activism and that theory and political action are interconnected. June Lennie describes feminisms as “critical, emancipatory, and action-oriented” (1999). J. K. Gibson-Graham agrees, explaining that research projects can be used to create new political space (1994, 214). Jane Flax clarifies that both theory and action are necessary to clear political space: each is alone insufficient (Flax 1987,623). Here, think o f Robert Cox: if problem-solving theory is an attempt to explain international interaction in the context o f and within the acceptable limits o f the current framework o f the international system, and critical theory is theory which is capable o f envisioning both realities that fall outside o f the domains o f analysis o f the current framework and a world in which an alternate framework could replace the current framework (Cox 1986). Theory-as-critique and theory-as-action lead feminists into activism on behalf o f feminist causes. 2 4 Activism, Betty Reardon argues, starts at the individual as the “central transformational task is psychological in nature” (1985, 5; Ferguson 1996,122). Individual action, however, does not stop at self-transformation. Social construction means that activity can move into epistemology. Susan Heckman explains that “activity is epistemology: women and men create their own realities through their different activities and experiences” (Heckman 1997, 343). If self can reshape meanings, then self can (if minimally) self-emancipate, and then move on (if incompletely) to communicate emancipation. Marilyn Frye calls this self-reformulation crucial to feminist emancipation (1996, 36; Keller 1983). This individual capacity to reform is not a privilege but a responsibility, because, “to break the cycle o f domination with its devastating consequences, both women and men must be willing to see the unconscious forces operating in human relationships, and women must claim their subjectivity” (Aslaksen 2002, 125). Feminisms’ concerns with emancipation are linked to activisms on behalf o f emancipation, from interventionist discourse to other forms o f protest and reformulation; in NGOs, advocacy groups, and governments (Ruddick 1989, 222; Tinker 1999, 88; 1990; Meyer 1999, 108; Keck and Sikkink 1998, Carpenter 2003b; Tickner 1991). 2 5 Feminisms have a unique critique o f the possibility o f objective knowledge, but are by no means the first to deny the possibility o f objective science. The feminist critique is unique because o f its grounding in wymyn’s subordinations. Sarah Brown notes that, “in social science generally, the move towards science has excluded women as subjects, silenced women as theorists, and naturalized the world as a world o f gender inequality” (1988, 467). Claimed objectivity encapsulates gender subordination. “The discovery o f pervasive androcentrism in the definition o f intellectual problems as well as in specific theories, concepts, methods, and interpretations of research fuels efforts to distinguish between knowledge and prejudice” (Hawkesworth 1989, 534). It is Habermas’ contention that knowledge is necessarily interested, as “the ontological illusion o f pure theory behind- which knowledge-constitutive interests become invisible promotes the fiction that Socratic dialogue is possible everywhere and at any time” (1968, 314). Habermas sets up three typologies o f knowledge-interest: technical, coming from the empirical-analytic sciences; practical, coming from the historical hermeneutic sciences; and 31 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. often the subjective knowledge of privileged voices (Harding 1998; Keller 1985; Goetz 1991). Scheman explains that knowledge ought to “always be seen as especially problematical when it was constructed only be those in positions of privilege that afforded them only distorted views about the world” (1993, 211-2; Garry and Pearsall 1996; Harding 1998). In other words, knowledge claimed to be objective is often unrepresentative and biased towards political, social, and material privilege, yet hides that bias through claimed objectivity. Feminisms recognize that “whatever knowledge may ostensibly be about, it is always in part about the relationships between the knower and the known” (Scheman 1993, 214). In other words, knowledge is necessarily both contingent and interested (Acker, Barry, andEsseveld 1991). It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge - yes, this is the way! - only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) If knowledge outside of interest is not possible or meaningful, feminisms’ ontologies then become the basis for the development of feminist epistemologies. This means that feminist knowledges are necessarily political. Feminist knowledge, then, is political, social, discursive, activist.... it must, however, have a politics to hold these characteristics. The politics of feminist knowledge, I argue, is that of marginalities. B. THE POLITICS OF MARGINALITIES IN KNOWING If we have determined that knowledge is political, the fact of political knowledge is only the beginning o f an epistemological framework. The political content of that emancipatory, coming from the critically oriented sciences and from the root o f traditional theory more generally (1968, 308). Feminisms, it seems, are in the business o f emancipation. 32 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. knowledge is equally crucial to understanding how to gather and how to evaluate knowledge. I contend that the political content of feminist knowledge-building and knowledge-seeking is interest in marginalities. I briefly discussed the ‘home’ that feminisms provide for marginalities to come together, by virtue of these inquiries arising in feminist academic and political interaction. Feminisms, then, become multiple. This multiplicity of feminisms is not simply theoretical but political. Christine Sylvester explains that feminism is “non-uniform and nonconsensual; it is a complex matter with many internal debates” (2002, 269). She contends that, by considering factors and holding ethical views which are generally not seen in political study or practice, feminisms add disorder to orders which look tidy because o f their exclusiveness (Sylvester 2002, 275). The feminist political IR project, then, is about seeing and understanding gender in global politics without reifying genderings or essentializing wymyn. Jill Steans explains that this political project walks a tightrope: Feminist critical theorists are trying to find a way forward which retains both gender as a category of analysis and retains the historical commitment to the emancipatory project in feminism, but which takes on board the postmodern and postcolonial critique o f the exclusionary practices of Western feminism. (Steans 1998, 29) Steans is arguing, as a number of feminists do, that seeing feminisms as multiple will allow for an understanding both of the meaningfulness of the category designation ‘women’ and the necessity o f understanding diversity therein.2 6 The provision for diversity within feminisms provides space for feminisms to consider diversity more generally. 26 Failing to recognize difference is impossible; it exists everywhere. Yet conceding to infinitely regressive difference is also an error. Anthias explains that cultural relativism fails to note that social and cultural contexts are not univocal themselves (2002, 276). No analysis will be perfectly representative, but social lives are governed by assumed representation in categories, and thus those categories must be analyzed in the study of social lives. Anthias explains that “a transnational positionality is one structured by the interplay o f different 33 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I contend that feminist politics contain more than a provision for diversity, however; they contain a direct political concern for marginalities. This commitment is one that grows out o f a feminist concern for the marginalization of wymyn and of feminine values. One of the central goals of feminisms is to try to understand the ways in which gender (however understood) becomes a factor in humyn treatment. Feminisms recognize that those understood to be wymyn are often treated poorly, and that such poor treatment is related to gender roles. Wymyn are often invisible in the international political arena, and wymyn’s plight in a sociopolitical world ruled by masculine values is silenced. International Relations’ neglect o f the study of wymyn’s lives and gendered perspectives could not be for a lack o f issues which affect wymyn, either globally or locally (Jaggar 1998, 24; 1996). Instead, wymyn are “at the vortex of contending social forces in the international arena” in a way that not only merits but demands social and political analysis (Jaggar 1998, 31). It is in this context that feminisms in International Relations have focused on the need for recognition of gender inequality and subordination in the international arena. The recognition of gender subordination in the international arena is accompanied by an understanding of subordination unique to the lenses (or worldviews or standpoints or experiences) of the oppressed (Tickner 2001, Pettman 1996). This is not to say that wymyn (or even feminists) understand (or can even fathom) other subordinations because of their (non-universal) experience with gender subordination. Instead, it is to say that, feminist understandings of gender subordination inspire feminists to look for and find solidarity with political and social subordination. Spike Peterson explains that feminisms’ concerns with recognizing and upending gender subordination are important to feminist political analysis. locations relating to gender, ethnicity, race, and class (amongst others), and their at times contradictory effects” (2002, 275). 34 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. She discusses the gendering of experience, and its far-reaching impact on social and political existence: Feminists have a number of reasons for turning to political identity and the politics o f identification. First, constructions of femininity and masculinity that inform our identification as women and men have pervasive implications for the lives we lead and the world(s) in which we live .... if all experience is gendered, analysis of gender identities is an imperative starting point for the study o f political identities and practice. Bound up with constructions of sexuality and desire, the implications of gender extend from the most intimate to the most global social dynamics. (Peterson 1999, 37). In other words, gender subordination is a major factor in international politics. Feminisms pay attention to gender subordination, which helps them to see a number of things about gender subordination that would otherwise go unseen. It also leads them to address other situations of humyn subordination at the margins of international politics. Feminisms, then, pay attention to marginalities because they see that wymyn occupy many margins in international politics. Here, ‘marginalities’ are not discussed as absolute. There can be some wymyn at the margins and some wymyn in the center - and feminisms’ concern for marginalities will remain; feminisms’ political purposes were borne out o f incomplete yet significant political and social subordinations. It is these sort of subordinations that feminisms look towards when expressing concern for the margins; a feminist concern for marginalities can also be described as a social conscience inspired by political genderings. Ann Tickner lays out the argument that feminist IR scholars are divested with a political commitment to illuminating the world from points of view of marginalized peoples and actors, whether or not they are wymyn (2001). I argue that, loosely, this is an accurate representation of feminisms - which take their concern for wymyn and apply it to other (interrelated) facets of the sociopolitical situations. Sarah Brown explains that “the conception of a feminist critical theory of international relations is fundamentally a political 35 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. act of commitment to understanding the world from the perspective o f the socially subjugated” (Brown 1988, 472).2 7 There are a number of arguments that support this view of feminisms as solidaristic. First, feminisms are critical of the personal/political divide which makes the suffering of a number of marginalized groups categorized as non-political problems (Elshtain 1987a).2 8 Second, feminisms stand at a place where they observe subordinations of wymyn; and thus stand at a position where some kind of solidarity with other subordinations necessarily follows.2 9 Third, feminisms reject the self/other dichotomy on which much political marginalization relies.3 0 These tenets of feminist theories give feminisms a political interest not only in the critique of the marginalizations of wymyn, but in a solidarist critique of political marginalizations more generally. 271 think that this statement is probably too sweeping, as it would be an unjust essentialism in itself to group people as “the socially subjugated” - but the idea seems to fit - feminisms, in their concern for political subordination o f wymyn, find concern for political subordination more generally. 2 8 Susan Okin observes it is hard to get some rights recognized because they have been dismissed as a part o f the ‘private’ sphere (1998, 39). The division o f the political and social world into ‘public’ and ‘private’ marginalizes those interests which are in ‘private’ places, like inside the home. Spike Peterson contends that the ‘private’ is always public, as “to the extent that personal gender identities constitute a ‘core’ sense o f ‘self,’ they fundamentally condition our self-esteem and psychological security” (1999, 37; Youngs 2000, 45). The classification o f ‘se lf as ‘private’ is insidious in political interaction. Cynthia Enloe applies this critique to international relations. She begins with the transformation o f the popular feminist phrase ‘the personal is political’ into ‘the personal is international’ (Enloe 1990,195; Hooper 2001, 93). Enloe explains that, “to make sense o f international politics we also have to read power backwards and forwards. Power relations between countries and their governments involve more than gunboat maneuvers and diplomatic telegrams” (1990, 196). Instead, international relations is about everything from a Campbell’s soup can to a nuclear bomb. Enloe describes the relationship between public and private (and personal and international) as hybridized and complex. Gillian Youngs concludes that feminisms need “multi-locational perspectives on patriarchal forces in terms of state and market, to recognize that the public/private social and spatial constructions are, in certain senses, mobilized and reconfigured in this globalizing world” (Youngs 2000, 56). In other words, the margins are both important to see and constantly changing, negotiating the boundaries o f public and private. 29 Feminisms understand that often those excluded from policy debates and decision-making are those who are materially least fortunate or least free. Feminisms, then, in searching for missing voices, foreground poverty and exclusion (Robinson 1999, 146). “Feminist scholars have repeatedly shown that gender operates at various levels at which it intersects with class, ethnicity, race, nationality, and sexuality to produce and reproduce an intricate web o f inequalities between and among men and women” (Marchand and Runyan 2000, 8). . 3 0 We can take as an example the “anarchy outside the state/order inside” dichotomy, which insists on the separation o f domestic and international politics. I f ‘se lf state is completely distinct from ‘other’ state, (self state does not see an inherent relation with the other state), then ‘se lf state can treat the ‘other’ state as inferior with impunity. Feminisms, on the other hand, see this as yet another insidious dichotomy based in gendered social hierarchy. Feminisms often emphasize humyn interconnectedness in the context o f particularity, as opposed to only seeing particularities (Scheman 1993, 211; Halliday 1991, 159). To feminisms, the ‘se lf is interconnected with the ‘other’ in indispensable ways (Scheman 1993). 36 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C. CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE The third epistemological assertion that I make is more controversial among feminisms. It is an ontological, epistemological, and methodological choice of this project that the process of knowledge-acquisition be constructive in nature. I contend that feminisms should seriously consider including constructive knowledge in any understanding of feminisms’ general characteristics, but that claim is not explicitly necessary to this study, which is willing to be an independent example rather than a general rule.3 1 This study has explicitly chosen not to emphasize debates between or among feminisms and instead to focus on the contributions of different feminisms to the questions at hand. Where feminisms disagree is often noted in the text or in the footnotes of this project. Still, I normally provide an understanding of how those disagreements can be seen as contributing to rather than confounding knowledge.3 2 Feminisms’ critiques of other feminisms are often harsh or defensive; they can emphasize disagreement. A chilly atmosphere hurts feminist research (Martin 1994, 630-1). That is not to say that this study is explicitly or implicitly non-critical, or even that it attempts to find agreement where there is none. On the contrary, it recognizes serious disagreements between feminisms, seeing that a substantial number of the core issues to 3 1 The argument for a constructive feminist epistemology as a general rule goes something like this: feminists argue that the power o f masculinity over femininity (patriarchy) is destructive, and search for ways to destabilize, interfere with, or end this destructive institution. However deconstructive those methods are, they are bound by constructive purpose o f some sort o f emancipatory principle. Feminisms, no matter how critical, generally share the goal o f positive change. I contend that the goal o f positive change is aided by critical deconstruction, but only when wedded to critical reconstruction and redeployment. I further contend that positive change is best achieved when we focus on contribution rather than conflict in academic disagreement. That argument is in the text. 32 That is not to say that this project is inclusive o f all feminist viewpoints, which would be both impossible and silly. Instead, it collects from feminisms known and understood by its author; the knower in its study. I can only promise that any exclusion is not purposeful marginalization but rather the combination o f a lack o f space for relevant detail and background were one to give a full genealogy o f every idea and a lack o f perfect comprehensiveness o f knowledge. Finally, this project is meant to include even those it inadvertently excludes - as I will talk about in the conclusion, it is meant to be a contribution to a conversation rather than a definitive statement; a weak ontology suggestive o f a suitable way o f thinking about the world rather than a strong ontology about how the world is. 37 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. feminist theory (what gender means, if it exists, what political commitments feminisms should have) are not only ‘unsolved’ but ‘insoluble’ between feminisms. By pluralizing feminisms here, I am acknowledging difference, disagreement, and dissonance among feminisms, but understanding them to be momentum concepts in dialogue (Hoffman 2001). III. FEMINIST METHODOLOGICAL JOURNEYS The search for knowledge, then, is a multiple and contingent political journey, instructed by feminist epistemologies and ontologies. I contend that these foundations give feminisms a certain methodological ethos, though they do not dictate the exact methodological tools that feminist scholars choose. Feminist scholarship looks to subvert dominant discourses by finding the voices that are barred from participation (Peterson and Runyan 1999). Feminists who research international politics are looking to understand it; but they are not looking to stop there. They are looking to understand international politics, to find its injustices, and to change those injustices, while recognizing a pluralism concerning the definition and appraisal of injustice. This makes feminist method not an event, but a journey - a journey of observation, critique, revealing, reformulation, reflexivity, and action, guided by feminisms’ principles.3 3 I contend that this journey is open to multiple questions and multiple methods, as preoccupation with choosing a single method distracts from the ontologically interesting implications o f feminisms and IR, both which would perhaps be compatible with any and all social science methodologies.3 4 Different questions, of course, require different 3 3 Some o f this is reflected in Tickner (2003) - constructing what I see as a “methodological journey” has been a journey o f quite a few years for me, and this article was important to cementing my ideas in the latter stages of formulation. I am not arguing that some who decide to take pieces o f feminist thought, or feminism-as- inspiration, without engaging in a feminist journey per se are wrong; I am presenting my impression o f the most effective route to feminist knowledges, which provide practical gendered insights. 341 mean to argue that there is not a methodological choice which fundamentally incompatible with the ontological commitments o f feminisms. I do not mean to argue that there are not both ontological and 38 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. methodologies, just as different words require us to hit different keys on the keyboard. Often, selecting a number of methods is not only good feminist research, but the optimal choice (Maynard and Purvis 1994). Still, these multiple methods must be guided by a feminist methodological ethos; they are inspired by feminist principles. This is where gendered lenses clearly become an essential methodological tool. Jill Steans introduces the method, and its relation to feminisms: To look at the world through gender lenses is to focus on gender as a particular kind o f power relation, or to trace out the ways in which gender is central to understanding international processes. Gender lenses also focus on the everyday experiences of women as women and highlight the consequences o f their unequal social position. (Steans 1998, 5) . Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan explain that lenses serve as fdters; choosing, sorting, and ordering what we see and understand (1999, 1). These lenses are used, consciously or unconsciously, “to foreground some things, and background others” (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 21). The question of gendered lenses can be seen as a question of framing. Frames are “intersubjective systems of representations and representation- producing practices” (Laffey and Weldes 1997). Frames, which are present across political, social, and academic discourses, guide the way that actors understand events and relations. Ferguson explains that “engaging feminist questions at the level o f metatheory enables us to ask what Heidegger and others have called the question of the frame. The questions we can ask about the world are enabled, and other questions disabled, by the frame that orders the questioning” (Ferguson 1993, 7). epistemological frameworks under which methods could be used that make those uses incompatible with the commitments o f feminisms. On the contrary, the ways that many methods are employed and deployed in the field o f IR do limit out the concerns o f feminisms. I only argue that this is the fault o f the ontological and epistemological commitments behind the methods, not the methods themselves. 39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gendered lenses, then, serve as the frame through which a feminist methodological journey is to be performed and viewed. This journey ventures through observation, critique, revealing, reformulation, reflexivity, and activism. First, observation is essential to a feminist empirical inquiry. Good scholarship necessitates observation o f the political status quo, insomuch as such a mission is fathomable. Second, feminist critiques of observations of the “world as it is” often bring about feminist critiques of the political situations that feminists qua international relations scholars come to study. Third, these critiques include searching for the problems that International Relations generally glosses over; those searches often reveal new political information.3 5 Fourth, I contend that reformulation is an essential part of a feminist research project. Reformulation is explored less often (though sometimes) by feminist scholars. My view of reformulation as an essential step in feminist methodological journeys stems from the earlier argument of the importance o f constructive scholarship. I argue that reformulation is a way that feminists can contribute to a constructive project of re-understanding and re-deploying both the study and practice of international politics.3 6 In other words, feminists find gendered problems with current 3 5 Feminists analyze the content o f what is said in politics to find what is neglected. Hilary Charlesworth calls this method “searching for silences” (1999). Charlesworth understands that “all systems o f knowledge depend on deeming certain issues irrelevant, therefore silences are as important as positive rules” (1999, 381). Feminisms, then, search for the things that the traditional study o f political science does not see (Maynard and Purvis 1994). In the context o f feminism, texts that do not mention gender are making a statement about gender as clearly as those that are focused on gender - it is a statement that gender is unimportant. 3 6 John Hoffman argues that feminisms that critique and leave the potential for reconstruction implicit are doing both feminist theory and international politics a disservice. He explains that, while a critique o f the past is important, “the projection o f the future is necessary if this critique is to be plausible and sustained” (Hoffman 2001, 29). Arguing that feminisms have a necessary concern for the future, Hoffman states that “deconstruction must be tied to reconstruction so that concepts are developed which are able to chart the development o f post- patriarchal society” (Hoffman 2001, 29). Jill Steans notes that feminisms highlight biases, and, in doing so, they necessarily ask the question o f whether or not it is possible to do better (Steans 1998, 159; Cohn 1987, 715; Haslanger 1996, 103). I agree. Still, postmodern feminisms (and perhaps even the postmodern feminist in me) are skeptical o f the project o f reconstructions because o f a fear o f inevitable marginalization o f some groups and viewpoints (Steans 1998, 36). Further, these feminisms bring up questions about the oppressive potential of purported unities, the impossibility o f coherent conceptual definitions, and the problems with reason and logic. These points are well-taken as well. The question for these strands o f nihilist-tending feminisms is - then what? The unsatisfactory answers to this question bring this project back into critical feminist reconstructions. Like I 40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political realities and scholarly analysis - they look to fix them. The fifth element of a feminist methodological journey, I contend, is reflexivity. Reflexivity, in this interpretation, is the self-reflection of scholars as to both the political and scholastic content of their work as a source of understanding the ways that gender relations assumptions underlie the conduct of the inquiry within a certain project. In other words, feminisms tell scholars to analyze the ways in which their study and their own understandings interact, and the ways that these shaped the study’s questions, results, and implications (Charlesworth 1999; Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright 1998). Finally, as I have implied when including politics in reflexivity, I extend here the argument that I made earlier that feminist scholarship necessarily has an activist component. Because the ontology of feminist scholarship is based in gender subordination, the work o f feminist scholars in necessarily involved in gender emancipation. In this understanding, this study has chosen to juxtapose multiple feminist frames as a way o f understanding just war theories, contending that gendered lenses and the feminist frames that they produce have real advantage over traditional understandings of the ethics of war. From an understanding of knowledge as multiple, political, and interested in the concerns of feminist ontologies, this study engages a number of feminist lenses for the purposes of engaging a reformulation of just war theory. It finds feminisms which observe, critique, and reveal the genderings o f just war theories - and then uses those gendered lenses to re-think, re-write, and re-deploy a feminist ethics of war. It does so with the necessary component o f self-evaluation, and an ever-present concern for not only understanding the political world, but for changing it. am looking for a just war theory “chastened” by feminisms, I am looking for an interpretation o f feminist principles “chastened” by postmodemisms. Reconstruction represents strategic intervention in the discourse and behavior o f international politics and its students in order to reveal silences and revision political worlds (Runyan and Peterson 1991, 68). 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IV. THE JOURNEY TO JUST WAR This project, then, begins with the foundational frame of gendered lenses, and carries them along a methodological journey of observation, critique, revealing, reformulation, reflexivity, and activism. This methodological journey in this project is two fold: it is embarked upon in a political theory sense, evaluating just war theory; it is then the road taken to evaluate the empirical case in this study, the wars in Iraq since the end of the Cold War. In political theory, observation, critique, revealing, reformulation, reflexivity, and activism can be abstract and discursive. The ‘observation’ of just war theory here uses two tools: content analysis of the theory and content analysis of its uses in political action and interaction. The critique of just war theories brings feminisms and just war theories into a dialogue: feminisms interrogate just war theories using gendered lenses. This interrogation through gendered lenses necessarily asks questions that just war theories are not used to answering; I search for answers using Hilary Charlesworth’s method of ‘searching for silences.’ Searching for silences uses questions, discourse analyses, and histories to see what is not talked about in the theory and practice of just war. Armed with critiques and revealings, I then move to re-write just war theory incorporating feminist insights. This theory-building is two-fold: inductive (given desired results) and deductive (from premises). The inductive portion looks to the material injustices that occur in wars as a result o f the distributional effects of just war theories and practices, proposing theoretical solutions that would minimize these injustices. The deductive portion takes the principles that feminisms value, brings them into conversation with the ethical questions that wars suggest, and finds instructive guidelines for reconstruction of just war theories. Once the theory is built, the feminist journey moves to activism: first, discussing discursive activism; second, promoting 42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. activism through the presentation of an empirical case study; and finally, suggesting other activist avenues inspired by the results of this research. The second application of a feminist methodological journey, then, is in the empirical case study portion of this project. While it in itself is an activist manifestation of theoretical claims, it is also a research project. First, there is a chapter presented almost purely for the purpose of providing context, or an idea of the political situations that precede the time periods under study in this project. The context is provided because feminisms understand politics as a continuum, as opposed to as an abrupt series of independent events. Then, each chapter has a number of types of observations, collected for the purpose of critique, revealing, and reformulation. These observations come in three main forms: histories, discourse analyses, and narrative presentations (Gulich and Quasthoff 1985). Histories give a sense of the macropolitical situations and actions taken in response to those situations. Discourse analyses give insight into political priorities, political opinions, and what problems were taken into consideration in policy-formation and policy-judgment processes. Narrative presentations add a humyn element to the macropolitical evaluation - they give insight both into how these political situations affected individual materialities and what emotional reactions they invoked. The critique sections of the empirical part of the project use the reformulated feminist ethic of war presented in the theoretical portion of this project as foundational. This theory, then, is used as a standard against which empirical actions that occurred during the wars in Iraq are measured. This measurement finds shortcomings, which serves as critiques. The feminist ethic of war also brings up questions previously neglected in academic and policy conversations about the wars in Iraq - discussing these questions is revealing of additional elements of the political situations that were not previously evident. Reformulation of a political situation that happened in the past 43 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (like the Gulf War, ch. VI, and sanctions, ch. VII) is difficult, but suggesting alternative pathways in past political situations demonstrates three useful things: first, that a cycle of ‘politics as usual’ can be broken; second, similar ideas may be applicable in other situations; and third, a transgressive idea may inspire another transgressive idea. Finally, Ch. VII focuses on a war which, at the time of this project’s writing, is still going on. Reformulations suggested for that situation can provide alternative discursive space to the political status quo. In addition to serving as an act of activism and a historico-theoretical research project, however, the empirical case in this study serves as a narrative test of the theoretical innovations that it presents. It is not so much a ‘strict test’ where there are standards for passage and failure; rather, it asks the question - does a feminist just war theory add something new to the analyses of these empirical situations? If so, is that addition valuable? V. CONCLUSION This chapter has presented the “gendered lenses” through which this project will look both at just war theory and at the wars in Iraq since the end of the Cold War. It has introduced as feminist ontologies an outlook on gender and a politics of multiplicity. I then bridged ontology and epistemology, explaining that feminist worldviews influence how feminists see and construct knowledge. This brought about three epistemological observations: knowledge as political and interested, feminisms’ political interests being in marginalities, and knowledge-building as a constructive mission. Armed with these ideas about how we know, I layed out a feminist methodological journey to find knowledge. I did so with the assumption that political theory serves multiple purposes: critique of political actualities, formulation of political possibilities, and political communication. This journey includes observation, critique, revealing, reformulation, reflexivity, and activism. Finally, I 44 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. described how this methodological journey is embarked upon in this project. These are the underlying assumptions o f this study, made explicit for three reasons: reflexivity, intellectual depth, and a belief in the importance of tracing the origins and inspirations of academic work. With those foundations laid out, I move in Chapter III to an exposition of just war theory, and begin the critique phase of the project. 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 2. the theories of just war The doctrine o f just war is a clear example of an alternative cognitive schema at work in the formulation of foreign policy . . . public speakers articulate and evoke these narratives in public discourse to reflect and shape public consciousness of political issues .... the rhetorical use o f just war is talk, but it is also more than that. One can never be certain that words accurately reflect the real thoughts of the speakers, nor that all important motivations for action are spoken; yet, one can safely assume that the public rhetoric reflects what is in somebody’s mind. Speakers would not say the words if they did not believe that an audience would properly receive and appreciate them (Beer and Hariman 1998, 8, 10). Beer and Hariman correctly point out that the rhetoric of just war is all over international politics. While just war discourses may not be directly reflective of the motivations for policy decision-making, just war claims are influential in either in the production or publication of politics. I argue that the overwhelming volume of thought on just war, combined with the saturation of the international political arena with just war claims, demonstrate the importance of just war theories. I contend, however, that importance is not synonymous with correctness or appropriateness. Just war theories have a lot to contribute to the ethics of war; they encompass many careful considerations that span thousands of years. That theories of ethics of war exist throughout history - regardless of time, culture, or situation - is an observation that inspires a number of the questions this study finds important. The existence of these theories mean that a feminist formulation of ethics of war is necessarily a reformulation, and that past thought must be taken into account when considering what ‘ just war’ might mean. I present evidence that even millennia of just war considerations are incomplete without re-visioning their tenets through gendered lenses. Just war theories may be relevant, and useful, but they are also insidious - the silences that they carry in relation to gender have the effects of discursive and material subordination, limiting their effectiveness, and creating confusion. This chapter begins a three-chapter 46 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. critique and reformulation of just war theories, aimed at bringing them to a place where they are effective, gender-conscious, and ethical forces in international theory and politics. This chapter begins a justification of the choice of just war theories as a context for the study of the ethics o f war embarked upon by this project. The first section, ‘why just war?,’ defends the choice of the set of traditions loosely identified as ‘ just war theories’ as the appropriate starting point for a feminist critique and reformulation of ethics in war. This section also takes the opportunity to confront feminist pacifist arguments that war is never permissible. It responds that, while war will always entail ethical problems, a feminism that contends that nothing is morally worse than war is internally contradictory. It concludes by addressing the opposite end of the spectrum: feminist bellicose claims for war for wymyn. I defend a relational schema which permits war without valorizing or accepting it, for the limited purposes of fighting a war that might meet strict standards o f justice. The second section, ‘the trail o f just war,’ takes up just war directly with a brief historical introduction to just war theories. This section gives a glimpse into the diverse cultural, political, and temporal roots of the theories o f the ethics of war. It discusses briefly variations in just war theories, breaking points in their histories and institutionalizations, and the status quos of thinking on justice in war. I close this section with an attempt to explain what I mean by ‘ just war theories,’ a term I use in the lower-case plural in order to include both the Western religious/secular ideas traditionally classified as ‘Just W ar’ and other traditions of thought concerning proper behavior in war-making and war-fighting. The third section, ‘motivating moralities for (just) war,’ discusses in more detail the various conceptual foundations of just war theory. These are the ethical frameworks that underlie ideas about ethics in war. They include, but are not limited to religion, pacifism, ethnic identity, and political interests. I finish this section by observing the difficulty in identifying conceptual clarity in what 47 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ‘ justice’ might mean in just war theories, owing to multiple ethical foundations. The fourth section, ‘empathetic cooperation as a feminist security ethic’ identifies a motivating morality for a feminist re-vision of the ethics of war. It explains the concept of empathetic cooperation, and how it can be understood as a foundational ethic for a new just war theory. Finally, the chapter concludes with ‘is there feminist justice,’ a fifth section that employs the ideas o f empathetic cooperation to sketch a feminist conception o f justice for the purpose of identifying what justice in war might look like. Armed with these tools, Chapters III and IV will explore the specific tenets of ad bellum and in bello justice in war. I. WHY JUST WAR? As Beer and Hariman noted to open this chapter, just war rhetoric still plays an important role in international politics, thousands of years removed from the first ‘ just war theory.’ Michael Walzer, in introducing his interpretation of the tradition, comments that “just war theory has always played a part in official arguments about war” (1992, 2). Walzer contends that, even when the members of the international community break the rules of just war, they do so under the guise that they are complying with those rules, and while pretending that those rules are of ultimate importance (1993, 171). In addition to the direct political implications, the volume, complexity, textuality, and depth of just war theories make them an indispensable research tool, or starting point, for evaluations of the ethics of war. Further, as I noted in introducing this chapter, the existence of just war theories means that any feminist interpretation of the ethics of war is necessarily a reformulation o f the ethical thought that precedes it. Just war theories are used in politics, contemplated in academia, and, in some ways, are representative of humyn thought on the ethics of war. All of these things make just war theories important. 48 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Still, just war theories’ roles in politics are not uncomplicated. Legitimate critiques of just war theories abound. Jean Elshtain contends that just war theory is hopelessly outdated (1992b, 268). Some argue that just war cannot deal with modem weaponry (Welch 1993) or postmodern warfare (Crawford 2003a). Chris Cuomo argues that just war theories “cannot address some o f the most pressing ways in which militarism and war involve and affect women” (1996, 38). Robert Phillips contends that “the principles of just war theory still seem to many people today to be quite reasonable, which is precisely why the theory is so dangerous” (1984). Phillips is warning that just war standards can be insidiously used in political interaction precisely because they seem so reasonable. The appearance that just war standards are benign removes suspicion for misuse, clearing the way for that misuse. Misuse can be manifested in manipulation of the population of a belligerent nation, in deception of its citizens or its opponents, and in bellicose foreign policy-making. Laurie Calhoun goes further, arguing that that just war theory has always been propaganda (2002, 50; Smith 2002, 357). She contends that acknowledging legitimacy in just war ideas serves to support the underhanded use of just war rhetoric in international politics. Sari Nusseibeh gives this critique material impact as he explains that “such cynicism about justifications o f war and violence stems from being a witness to how much cruelty can be inflicted behind the masks of religion and morality” (1992, 62). These admonitions are more than enough to cast some doubt on the utility of just war theories as a basis for evaluating the ethics of war. But the conundrum is not that simple. Many o f these problems seem ‘fixable’ with a fresh outlook. The argument that just war is necessarily insidious seems to be a slippery slope to the argument that considering any war just leads to a permissibility that makes all war just. As I will argue below, however, it is necessary to permit some war-making and war-fighting. It is a weakness of 49 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. theories of just war that they can be exploited, but that weakness alone does not warrant their outright rejection. The utility of just war theories as a starting point for the analysis of ethics of war remains. First, just war is an age-old tradition which has been employed in war- making and war-fighting for centuries. Second, it is an articulation o f principles of war that have been commonly held in international society for as long as international relations have existed. Third, this project does not take just war theories as authoritative, or as the final judgment on morality and war. Instead, it uses them as a starting point to begin a reconstruction and reformulation of commonly understood ethics of war. It does so with the real and possible misuse o f these theories in mind, as one of the many difficulties that just war theories encounter that a feminist critique and reformulation might tend to fixing. Finally, the insidious employment o f just war theories is not as clear-cut as some scholars argue. Others see the relationship as somewhat hybridized. Richard Falk argues that uses of just war theory are more confusing and complicated than critics might imagine (2003, 88). Some point out that the justice motive is actually salient for some state actors in some situations (Welch 1993, Weigel 1992, 41). Kalshoven paints a complicated picture - arguing that states behave in coordination with just war standards out of self-interest, fear of supervision, public conscience, instruction, and a sense o f responsibility (1973, 107-22). A. THE PACIFIST ATTACK The final complaint to overcome in justifying the use of just war theories in this project is a more fundamental one - the question of whether or not there ought to be a concept of just war or theories of the ethics of war. Pacifist understandings of humyn social and political interactions claim that there is no such thing as a just war, because in som e way or another war ought to be completely morally prohibited. There are a number of strands of 50 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pacifist thought, including one within feminisms. I will rebut that particular argument in feminist terms answer to pacifist arguments against just war theory. The feminist pacifist argument against just war claims that there is a fundamental link between any type of violence, sexism, and humyn subordination: that therefore violence is necessarily both sexist and oppressive. Betty Reardon explains: . . . The need for an integration o f feminist scholarship with peace research in order to overcome the inadequacies of each in their separate attempts to abolish respectively sexism and war. This argument is grounded in the contention that both phenomena depend on violence (Reardon 1985, 1). Reardon’s argument is that feminisms and pacifisms are intrinsically intertwined because the roots of violence and sexism are connected. Karen Warren and Duane Cady lay out a number of connections that they see between feminisms and peace.1 First, they discuss conceptual relations. They observe that, like sexism, war is an oppressive conceptual framework, based on the logic of domination (Warren and Cady 1994, 5). Further, feminisms and pacifisms are both critical of coercion enacted by wielding power over other actors considered to be opponents (Warren and Cady 1994, 6). Warren and Cady move from conceptual to empirical links between feminisms and pacifisms. Empirically, they note that war is an overwhelmingly negative experience for wymyn, and that wymyn’s disempowerment means defenselessness; defenselessness means that wymyn are hurt more by war than men are (Warren and Cady 1994, 7, 9). In addition to empirical evidence of the connection between feminisms and pacifisms, Warren and Cady argue that, historically, rape 11 use Warren and Cady here, despite that their work is somewhat outdated and somewhat oversimplified, because they make most o f the major points o f “feminist peace” arguments succinctly and in clearly understandable categories. For a sophisticated and complex argument concerning the connection between feminism and peace, see Confortini (2004). Confortini makes the argument that there ought to be an alliance, if not an essential connection, between feminisms and pacifisms, as they have many essential features in common, such as a normative approach to international politics and a concern for structural violence (2004). Confortini contends that there are a number o f places where feminisms and peace studies can engage in crucial dialogue and reflexive critique, such that an alliance would strengthen both understandings o f global politics. 51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. has become a naturalized part of war (Warren and Cady 1994,10). The authors document the existence of many wymyn’s peace movements as evidence of a connection between feminisms and peace (Warren and Cady 1994, 11; Berkman 1990, 146). The authors discuss a linguistic relationship between sexism and war. They discuss war as self-deceptive, symbolic masculinism (Warren and Cady 1994, 12-3). Finally, Warren and Cady find a psychological connection between feminisms and pacifisms, as they identify patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system that loses control of humyn interaction, a cause of violence (1994, 15). There is also an argument that wymyn’s maternal perspectives instruct peaceful politics. Sara Ruddick contends that there is a link between feminism, motherhood, and pacifism. She documents that mothers who acquire feminist consciousness become non violent (Ruddick 1989, 242). From a number of understandings o f the propensities related to motherhood, Ruddick constructs a feminist maternal politics of peace. Within this framework, she points out that these positions share a communal suspicion of violence, climate of desire for peace, and a desire to create society in which these values grow (Ruddick 1989, 244). This shared ground constructs a place for feminist pacifism. B. THE PROBLEMS WITH PEACE Pacifisms, in their many variants, find war to be morally objectionable in all situations. While the idea that there should not be any wars is an appealing one, pacifisms run into a number of problems both in theory and in practice which justify the existence of theories of ethics in war. The first problem with peace is one of definition. Even among feminist pacifists, there are many interpretations of peace. Brigit Brock-Utne, a feminist pacifist, recognizes that, even were peace a value which feminisms could universally espouse, the meaning of the word differs widely by culture, context, or some other 52 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. particularity (Brock-Utne 1989, 39). Feminisms, taking from peace researchers, often distinguish between peace in the negative and positive senses (Galtung 1981). Peace in the negative sense is the absence of armed conflict; whereas peace in the positive sense is the affirmative fulfillment of security and justice in politics.2 Reardon introduces the concept of positive peace, explaining that “positive peace, the conditions of justice and equity necessary to achieve the absence of war, is a concept profoundly infused with feminine values” (Reardon 1985, 63). Brock-Utne explains that positive peace also requires the absence of structural violence (1989, 44).3 Still, some feminists argue that the dichotomy of positive and negative peace is not productive. Lepard contends that all of the issues included in feminisms’ conceptions o f positive peace should be considered as a part of peacefulness, but in a less absolute fashion. As a result, he proposes reading peace on a sliding scale from minimalist to maximalist (Lepard 2002, 150). These complex readings of peace are important, but should not be the sum total of a feminist ethics of war. The second problem with pacifism is that its association with feminisms deny wymyn’s agency in choosing between political alternatives. As Tickner explains: The association o f femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need o f protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naive in matters relating to international politics (Tickner 1992, 59). 2 As Elshtain remembers, “women’s stake in the problem with peace is great” (1988,447). Elshtain points out that one o f the specific strengths o f a gendered ontology o f war is that “its adherents frequently assess what the world calls peace and find it wanting (1992b, 265). 3 Brock-Utne lays out a number o f necessary conditions for the existence o f positive peace, specifying the concept. These include: absence o f unorganized, personal, physical, and direct violence (wife beating); absence o f organized, personal, physical, and direct violence (war); absence o f unorganized, indirect violence which decreases lifespan (unequal working conditions on the basis o f gender); absence o f organized, indirect violence which decreases lifespan (nuclear dumping); absence o f unorganized indirect violence which decreases quality o f life (inequality o f leisure time and freedom o f speech); and absence o f organized, indirect violence reducing quality o f life (mass media oligopoly) (Brock-Utne 1989, 44-50). Structural violence is a term that originated in Galtung: he describes violence as any influence that stops an individual from living up to their potential (1975, 110- 111). 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In other words, feminist pacifism reifies understandings of wymyn as weak, which reifies gender subordination. In addition to this indirect relationship with violence, pacifism has an intrinsic, direct relationship with violence. Jean Elshtain explains that peace is not the opposite of war, but a concept that can only be understood inside the frame of war; peace and war are not antonyms, but interdependent concepts. She describes peace as “an ontologically suspicious concept. Peace never appears without its violent doppelganger, War, lurking in the shadows. Peace is inside, not outside a frame with war - most especially in the most powerful and absolute (utopian, if you will) expressions of desirability” (Elshtain 1992b, 258; see also Ruddick 1989, 137; Elshtain 1987b, 53; Peach 1994, 153). Conceptual problems may not be the only difficulties relating feminisms to pacifisms. A number o f scholars problematize the relationship between wymyn, feminisms, and peace as causing problems for all three (Blanchard 2003). Elshtain argues that peace is a part of the very binary system that feminisms fight against when they critique dichotomies of personal and political, of public and private, or of man and womyn (1988). She recognizes that “peace traffics in binary opposites” that “have long relied on particular constructions of the feminine,” reifying gender subordination in international politics (Elshtain 1988, 447, 448).4 The impact of this dichotomization is that peace “requires various ontological endorsements that cover-up difference and project a world of ongoing equilibrium” in a way that hides conflict and even gender subordination (Elshtain 1988, 447). In addition to hiding conflict and gender subordination, pacifism may well permit it. The assertion that there is no 4 Lucinda Peach supports this point, questioning the gendered nature o f pacifism. She claims that “peace and pacifism need to be questioned as a product o f the gender system that serves to maintain men as strong warriors and women as weak and passive peacemakers, thereby perpetuating war rather than bring peace” (Peach 1994, 153). Cuomo brings this inquiry into dichotomies one step further, commenting that “though Peach rejects several relevant dualistic hierarchies, a stark ontological distinction between war and peace remains basically intact” (1996, 36). 54 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. war that might be morally justifiable requires belief in the assertion that there is no occurrence in international politics that could be found to be more morally reprehensible than war. Feminisms point out that this simply is not true: there are a number of gross subordinations throughout the world that may meet the standard o f being somehow worse than a war fought justly to stop them. For example, feminisms might determine the systematic (genocidal) rape and torture of a large number of people worthy of consideration for a ‘ just war’ to stop it. Because this possibility exists, some kind of just war theory seems preferable to pacifism. Finally, pacifisms rely on the assertion that they are tenable - which I dispute. If positive peace is the absence of violence (structural or physical), it is an attitude that happens rarely and a situation that happens even more rarely. More often, feminists (and political participants) are asked to choose between violences as opposed to choosing between ‘violence’ and ‘peace.’ Certainly, the conclusion that there are only violent options in politics is an extreme one. Still, there are situations where positive peace is (at least immediately) unattainable, and where approximating either peace or justice requires (at least complicity in some kind of) violence. While positive peace is an important goal or ethos, it would constitute denial to act as if it were immediately achievable in any given political situation. These critiques o f feminist pacifism lead non-violence oriented feminist to look for a different angle from which to understand the ethics of war. They seek positive peace but recognize that sometimes violent means will be necessary to that peace. Here, a series of imperfect peaces will arise: they will be understood in the context of improving positive peaces (Galtung 1975). A series of unacceptable violences will also arise: these will need to be dealt with in the context of an ethics o f violence and war. Lucinda Peach explains that 55 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. just war theorists, like pacifists, see war as morally wrong; unlike pacifists, they think it can be justifiable sometimes (Peach 1994, 152-3).5 Still, ethical permissibility about war is unacceptable to many feminisms; if they are to move on, feminisms will need to do so in some middle ground. It is in this spirit that just war theories are used as context for this project. Feminisms often emphasize context - the context of subordination of wymyn, the gendered context of political interaction, and the contexts of meaning in international politics. Just war theories, in this project, serve as context for the building of a new (reformulated) political theory. This context need not be flawless; were it, reformulation would not be needed. The richness and continued relevance of this tradition justify its use as foundational to a feminist reformulation of the theories o f the ethics of war. C. BELLICOSE FEMINISMS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO JUST WAR? But there is one fundamental issue at stake that dares not speak its name. This war is also about -- deeply about — sex. For the jihadists, at stake in the war against the infidels is the control of women. Western freedom means the end of women's mastery by men, and the end of dictatorial clerical control over all aspects of sexuality. (Krauthammer 2004). MANY VOICES-from pro-war Republicans to mainstream feminists-are applauding the U.S. war in Afghanistan for supposedly putting an end to the horrible conditions that women suffered under the Taliban. . . . The warlords of the Northern Alliance have a miserable record o f human rights abuses, especially against women. . . . That’s why it’s infuriating to see many liberals, and even radicals, backing Bush’s campaign-in the name o f liberating women. The liberal group Feminist Majority has asked members to circulate a petition thanking Bush and his administration for its commitment to restoring the rights o f Afghan women. "We have real momentum now in the drive to restore the rights o f women," Feminist Majority President Eleanor Smeal told Congress last week (Schuette 2001). 5 Elshtain clarifies that, while there are just war theories with different priorities (from bellicose to non-violent), just war doctrines are by no means pacifist discourses (1985, 44). In other words, Peach is wrong that just war theorists all think war is morally wrong. However, I used her words because I see it as possible to be a just war theorist who sees war as morally wrong. The paradox goes away when we acknowledge that there are some situations in which we must pick the lesser o f two 'evils' and there are some situations in which war will be that lesser ‘evil.’ 56 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Schuette mentions the Feminist Majority’s advocacy for the war in Afghanistan for the purpose o f restoring wymyn’s rights. Some (feminist and non-feminist) arguments insist that wars fought fo r wymyn’ s rights are just and justifiable. This section addresses the question o f whether or not there is ethical space for pro-war feminisms in the case that those wars are fought for the rights of wymyn. The argument that I made when discussing pacifism was that it is possible to imagine an offense more morally reprehensible than a war; and that such an offense might justify a war en route to positive peace. The first such cause that occurs to a feminist thinking through gendered lenses is that of combating the subordination (and oppression) of those understood to be (and treated like) wymyn in domestic or international politics. It is possible to imagine violations of ‘wymyn’ so grave as to be less morally reprehensible than a justly fought war in order to correct those violations. Still, a feminist ethics of war governed by such a principle is too general, too loose, and ultimately counterproductive both to the search for justice and to the search for gender parity. The first danger is that a war for other purposes will be justified as a war for wymyn’ s rights and the other issues relevant to the war’s purposes and effects will be ignored. The Feminist Majority’s support o f the war in Afghanistan is an example of this danger coming to fruition. However much after-the-fact attention was paid to wymyn’s rights by the United States government, the war was not fought for wymyn, but to find the persons responsible for attacks on the United States and avenge those attacks. The second danger is that a war might be fought for wymyn without their permission or against their will. As Schuette documents, there is at least a real question as to whether or not wymyn in Afghanistan desired the overthrow of the Taliban government, especially given the alternatives (2001). A war fo r wymyn that those wymyn are not involved in choosing wields 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. power over them instead of empowering them, even if it is ultimately in their interest. The third danger is that the war is not actually in the interests of the wymyn it is being fought ostensibly for. A choice to fight a war for (other) wymyn assumes universal values and universal understanding of what benefits are obtained by the war. In the absence of such shared values, mistakes and miscommunications could be dangerous for the people involved in the war. While a war for wymyn should not be excluded a priori from guidelines justifying war, the idea needs to be complimented and contained by a broader structure of ethical understandings of proper choices to make war and proper choices to make in war. II. THE TRAILS OF JUST WAR Just war theories have evolved and grown throughout the thousands of years of recorded thought on issues of justice, ethics, war-making, and war-fighting. The just war theories of the Greeks and Romans are normally the starting point for Western civilizational histories o f just war theories looking to trace the theoretical and empirical roots of conceptions of justice in war. Plato addresses the seriousness of decisions about who should fight in war and how those people ought to fight. Plato labels war as an art or profession, like any other, and accordingly writes a set of professional rules (Republic 2.374b). He delineates rules for the art of strategy, the art of diplomacy, and the art of fighting (,Statesmen 304e). Plato explains that Zeus developed rules for war in order to stop the humyn race from extinction due to infighting (Protagoras 322c). In Plato’s interpretation, war is inevitable, and the only thing that people can control is who dies during the fighting (Phaedo 66c). In dialogue, he explains reasonable limitations on wartime violence: 58 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. And they will conduct their quarrels always looking forward to a reconciliation? By all means. They will correct them, then, for their own good, not chastising them with a view to their enslavement or their destruction, but acting as correctors, not as enemies. They will, he said. They will not, being Greeks, ravage Greek territory nor bum habitations, and they will not admit that in any city all the population are their enemies, men, women, and children, but will say that only a few at any time are their foes, namely, those who are to blame for the quarrel. And on all these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste to the soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the point of compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the suffering o f the innocent (Republic 5.471a, b). The classical authors introduce for just war ideas about what constitutes just cause for war, how and why to declare war, how to treat enemy combatants and non-combatants, and how to see interhumyn conflict in relation to other social and political relationships. Cicero discusses the deadliness of war, and presents standards for the acceptability of the choice to go to war (De Officiis, 2.5.16). These concepts, and the common laws of war which they created and exemplified, were influential both then and in later ideas about just war.6 Joachim von Elbe argues that the Greek and Roman conceptions of the laws of war would deeply influence the European concept of just war, because these older works provide a model of how to understand war to please deities and achieve righteousness (1939, 666). Just war theory’s ancestry is from the Greeks and Romans, but it got its name from Christians attempting to grapple with the combination of religious pacifism and the need for state defense.7 When Augustine wrote, the Christian church was trying to accommodate the 6 The writings o f Greeks and Romans are taken to be foundational in the worlds o f political science and philosophy for Western and Mediterranean civilizations; their discussions form the framework for discussions to the current day. Issues o f ethics in war are no exception. The foundations o f current thought on moral decisions in wars are reflected in these early writings (Hartigan 1982). 7 In Christianity’s political relationship with states and wars, a powerful Christian church has had much say in social ethics, but “there was ample room for confusion about Jesus’ attitude toward violence, killing, and obedience to public authority” (Hartigan 1982,23). Christian ideas on war are hybridized and complex. First, 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. needs of statecraft into the ethics Christianity, because the Roman Empire has just become a Christian state, and required self-defense (von Elbe 1939, 668; Adeney 1988, 36; Clouse 1981, 14; Ramsey 1992; 1968; Russell 1975, 13). Augustine wrote in order to make sense of the possibility for faith in Rome and God to coexist when faith in Rome meant taking up arms and faith in God meant strict moral codes (Ramsey 1992; 1968; Russell 1975, 13).8 Early Christian just war theories, then, dealt with everything from the necessity of holy wars to the ways in which non-combatants ought to be treated; linking war decisions to the will of God. The Middle Ages told what Peter Partner calls a story of two great war-like religions fighting out of religious duty (1997, 133). The existence of just war theories generally governed both the ideals o f making and conducting wars, but the Crusades had been holy wars, and it was a conflictual age. Looking back, it looks harsh when we observe Machiavelli had armed and militarily prepared virtuous republics around the world as his ideal (The Prince, The Discourses o f Livy, Elshtain 1987b, 57). In the context of his time, however, Machiavelli felt war to be inevitable (Elshtain 1987b, 59). Holy wars incorporated some of the ideas of ‘ just war,’ and just war theories provided some o f the justifications for holy wars. Despite this atmosphere of conflict, there were a number of people in the Middle the Christian Church maintains loyalty to the Old Testament as a foundational. The Old Testament carries with it a tradition o f holy wars, fought on behalf o f or even by a deity, which are not only just but righteous. This ideology o f war has resurfaced a number o f times in the history o f Christian teachings on war, and manifested itself in international political relations numerous times. Early Christians, unlike their holy warrior predecessors, mostly felt their deity calling them to abstain from participation in the violent conflicts o f the state. This position, often referred to as Christian pacifism, remains salient in some parts o f Christianity, and has been revived a number o f times. However, with the evolution o f the Christian state came the evolution o f theories o f Christian statecraft, and, inevitably, Christian war. Christian just war theories, then, attempt to reconcile Christian social ethics with perceived political necessity. 8 Some early Christians saw war as a consequence o f original sin and forbade Christian participation on the grounds that Jesus had come to eliminate the need for such sins (von Elbe 1939, 667; Wunsch 1936; Beaufort 1933; Adeney 1988, 28; Regan 1996, 5; Teichman 1986, 10; Homus 1960, 14). Other early Christians saw pacifism as an imitation o f Jesus, who forgave his enemies, silently submitted to violence, and refused to participate in revolt against an oppressive Roman government (Helgeland, Daly, Bums 1985, 22-3, 76-82; Vaux 1992, 95; Phillips 1984, 9). 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ages who continued to innovate in the area of thought concerning ethics of war. War- making changed substantially in early modem Europe, both in theory and in practice. Still, many of the issues of just war theories remained relevant, evolving, and of interest in the discourse of the ethics of war. James Turner Johnson marks the end of the Middle Ages as the time when coherent, lasting theories of just war came to emerge (Johnson 1991, 75). The reformation changed the political dynamics of Europe immensely. The area went from having one Christian church, which, though it was normally in some sort of turmoil, stood alone, to having as many churches as states. John Howard Yoder claims that this was a bad time for theories of just war for exactly that reason. He observes “the reformation decreased the potential for the application of just war because the new religions were tied to states, and because the diversity o f Christian religions provided new occasions for righteous violence (Yoder 1996, 20). In other words, the reformation both produced a confusing number of new sources contributing to just war theory and made it easier to discard in favor o f fighting holy wars for religions (this time between Christian denominations instead o f on behalf of Christianity as a whole). In contrast to the reformation, the Enlightenment is generally understood to be a time when violence on behalf o f religious values was rejected, and both the making of statecraft and war became distinctly secularized in the Christian world. As a number of scholars recount, Enlightenment-era rethinking of the theory and practice of Christianity led to the rejection of crusading as a method of conversion or political gain (Partner 1997, 276; Johnson 1997, 1). James Turner Johnson goes so far as to conclude that modernity, beginning in Enlightenment times, included a full cultural rejection of wars for religion (Johnson 1997, 12). Johnson claims that this created problems for both Christian and Islamic theories of just war, because neither tradition anticipated states where religion is 61 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. functionally meaningless, which Johnson understands as a property o f the modem state (Johnson 1997, 127). Here, though, Johnson’s understanding of the modem state is limited: religion manifests itself directly in the international politics o f war (Islamic declarations of jihad against the United States in the recent wars in Iraq) as well as indirectly through moral claims about the justification of war (George W. Bush’s claims about the moral rightness of his choice to go to war against Iraq). While Johnson’s assessment seems extreme, the development of secular theories of what constitutes justice in war did begin in the Enlightenment era. Kenneth Vaux classifies Vitoria and Suarez as the first modem theorists of just war (1992, 111). These theorists were the first to study just war and to argue that religion did not constitute just cause for the prosecution o f war (Adeney 1988, 21). Suarez’s work represents a break between just war theories and religious warfare which will never be fully repaired, but does not represent an end to the use of just war theories to justify religious wars, or an end to religious wars more generally. Still, secularists like Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes, and Kant began a western tradition of just war theories which can best be called ‘scholarly.’ Thought about questions o f ethics of war-making and war-fighting is not unique to the West. Thought it is not called ‘ just war,’ a number of other traditions contribute indispensably to the development of the ethics of war-fighting and war-making. A look at the Western origins of theories of ethics in war necessarily only scratches the surface of the material concerning these issues. While it would be a Herculean project to find all strands of thought which deal with issues of justice in war throughout history (and at that, a Herculean tangent for this project), it is important here to give insight into the diversity of theories of just war, and to introduce other ways of thinking about ad bellum (war-making) and in hello (war-fighting) ethics. 62 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For example, Taoist texts explain virtuous warfare as calm, and guided by grief for the vanquished.9 Hindu texts label war as a forgivable sin, the condition o f penitence.1 0 Perhaps most important to the project at hand, Islamic religious texts explain the situations in which war-making could be considered right and wrong. The Islamic concept of Jihad is not called “just war,” but functions as a social and political equivalent: defining the situations in which war is the appropriate reaction to a given political situation (Johnson 2002).1 1 Islamic and Western/Christian traditions have much in common: they both justify war in religious/ethical terms; they both discuss times in which armed force should be used for the common good; and they both justify cause for war in terms of deontology of morals as opposed to consequentialism of subordination and violence (Johnson 2002). Both traditions provide ground for reconciliation of the state with their value systems.1 2 Still, they 9 Taoism, a religion which seems to prima facie reject war-fighting, actually makes scriptural provisions for the eventuality. In the following passage from the Tao Te Ching, it is evident that the ethos is a general disapproval of the existence o f war. Still, there is an acknowledgment that there is a possibility that war-fighting will be unavoidable. A passage from Chapter 31 o f the Tao Te Ching instructs Taoists on how they can ethically reconcile their non-violent understanding o f the world with participation in war. It explains that fine weapons are the instruments o f evil, but they might need to be used ‘unavoidably’ for the purposes o f defense. A Taoist who must use weapons should exercise calm restraint, and fight only with the knowledge that fighting is in itself tragic. Because fighting is tragic, it is important anyone who dies be mourned, regardless o f what side they fight on. Victors are instructed to moum at the funerals o f the vanquished (Tao Te Ching 31). 1 0 In a number o f Hindu traditions, war is classifiable as a venial sin (Bhikkku Yen-Kiat, Mahayana Vinaya; Teichman 1986, 108). A venial sin is a sort o f sin which results in partial but not total loss o f grace and standing; in other words, it is a sin, but not a mortal one. Further, unlike a mortal sin, a venial sin is pardonable, thus, can be excused and forgiven. While a strong Hindu pacifist tradition exists, there are also Hindu justifications for war-making and war-fighting which allow Hindu groups and nations to be militaristic with the permission of their religions. 1 1 This interpretation is held be a number o f Sunni Muslim theorists, who “understand force to be a possible and useful means o f extending the territory o f Islam and thus a tool in the quest for peace (Kelsay 1993, 35). The word ‘jihad’ is generally translated in popular media to mean ‘holy war.’ While the jihad tradition certainly includes both thought about and advocacy o f war-making, both the term and the history o f jihad are more complicated. Translated faithfully, jihad means struggle or effort not war or holy war; it can and does include both violent and non-violent struggle (Kelsay 1993, 34). Peter Partner reminds us that the theory and practice of jihad has a meaning outside o f violence, where Christian holy war does not (1997, 297). 1 2 Kenneth Vaux traces some o f the historical details surrounding the formation o f Islamic jihad theory. Like Christian just war theory began in coincidence with the founding o f the Christian state, Islamic jihad theory came in coincidence with the founding o f the Islamic state. The founding o f the Islamic state, however, was earlier in the history o f the religion, and marked by more turbulence. Vaux generalizes that Islamic theories on war are made in the context o f poverty, suffering, and political repression (1992, 64). He claims that jihad has become about defense against economic injustice and subordination (1992). Tracing the history o f Islam lends evidence to this claim. 622 AD is year one to Muslims, when Muhammad moved the religion and its followers to Medina 63 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. provide widely different prescriptions for when and how force is called for in international politics. These two traditions, along with many other important works, form a category loosely identifiable as ‘ just war theories’ - diverse backgrounds, diverse foundations, diverse motivating moralities - that address similar questions about the choices that states, states’ leaders, fighters, and civilians make about going to and fighting in wars. III. MOTIVATING MORALITIES FOR (JUST) WARS Just war theorists have produced scholarship of enormous breadth and enormous variance. The contemporary debate on the principles of just war is broad and reaching, with contention on every level. Scholars argue over whether justice in or o f a war is more important, or if both are required, when examining the big picture of just war theories. They also debate the details, from understandings of what it means to be a non-combatant to whether every alternative to war must be thought of only or enacted in practice. In these theories, assumptions about how the political world works underlie standards of acceptable behavior. Most theories of just war include sets of instructions for (potential) belligerents about when making war is just and what just behavior in war constitutes. These instructions normally deal with issues of grievances, procedures, and feasibility, from the classics to contemporary international law (McKenna 1960, 651; Wells 1969, 821; Yoder 1996, 2). The content of these standards, and their interrelations, are heavily debated in academic, (Kelsay 1993, 21). The early Islamic community was forced to defend itself by means o f war (Partner 1997, 34). Vaux remembers that Mohammed was politically persecuted for writing the Qa’ran, so he started his own state, by force (1992, 66). In the 8th century, Islam continued to be a “political and militant faith, a fusion o f the sublime and the secular” (Vaux 1992, 67). The political nature o f Islamic religion linked it to the state from its very inception; this link made Islam a combination o f religion and statecraft, instead of, like Christianity, a religion trying to understand statecraft. Muslim Arabia became a conquering empire, “for a millennium, that militant faith and faith-infused militancy fueled a war ethic that our generation has come to know through the mujahidin (holy warriors) o f the Iranian revolution and in a somewhat anemic version in Iraq” (Vaux 1992, 67- 8). Many jihadic wars have been recorded over the history o f Islam for diverse reasons, such as the number of Islamic holy wars that have been fought against colonization (Partner 1997, 175). Peter Partner claimed that holy war became a characteristic o f Islamic life, though rulers were hot and cold on the idea dependent on the war in which they were involved (Partner 1997, 58). The political and theological elements o f Islam have always been intertwined. 64 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. theological, and legal circles. Underlying these debates are different conceptions o f how politics works, what foundations ethical conceptions of politics ought to be based on, and how people ought to treat each other, socially and politically. These ‘motivating moralities’ have been based on religious beliefs, ethic identity, pacifism, lawfulness, and some combination o f all of the above with political interests. The term “just war” was itself a product of a religious tradition, as Christians attempted to reconcile religious pacifism with statecraft. Just war, in this inception, was a way to limit the brutality o f war when it was necessary that it occur. Christian ethics of war has a number o f variants: Christian pacifism, Christian-tempered just war ethics, and Christian holy war.1 3 Christian pacifism remains vital in Church protests to wars and the United States Catholic Bishops continue to write instructional literature concerning Catholic just war theory. The question of whether or not holy war in the Christian tradition continues to affect just war is a dicey one.1 4 There are those who contend that the world is rife with 1 3 There simply isn’t time to go into a long discussion o f the place o f “holy war” in just war in the text. However, this footnote seems important, because I want to clearly place holy war within as opposed to outside of configurations o f just war theories. While holy war may seem like a violation o f ethical theories o f war, close exploration shows that it is an ethical interpretation o f war-making, simply with different ethical foundations. Richard Regan explains that holy wars are wars where god has communicated through revelation with those who are fighting the war - but “the burden o f proof is on those who claim that God wills a particular war” (1996,9). Johnson gives ten meanings o f holy war in the history o f Judeo-Christian thought: war at God’s command, war on God’s behalf with his permission, war fought by God, war fought to defend religion against its enemies, war to propagate the right religion, war to enforce religious conformity, war in which participants are themselves holy, war which is a militant struggle o f the faithful, war which is religion-inspired (charismatic), and war which is endowed with miracle (Johnson 1997, 37). All o f these types o f holy wars represent (various) ethical, as opposed to anti-ethical, choices. 1 4 While just wars are those which can be morally justified, holy wars are those which are morally obligatory and demanded by a deity. Robert Clouse argues, though, that the time for holy war ended at the founding of Christianity (Clouse 1981, 10). Since there are no longer any such theocratic states, the mandate for holy war is gone. Within and outside o f Christianity, I have taken issue with this contention. Additionally, Peter Partner uses empirical data to take issue with Clouse’s conclusion, arguing that Christian holy war survived both the New Testament and two millennia o f Christianity. He begins by arguing that the fiery end o f the world predicted in Revelations shows a god still committed to holy war (Partner 1997, xvi). Partner goes on to argue that, since the early middle ages, Christianity has been a warrior-religion (1997, xviii). He marks the beginning o f warrior- Christianity at the point where Charlemagne and future monarchs were crowned by the pope, which gave the church protection by the sword (Partner 1997, 64). Partner then goes on to explore a time in Christianity which is generally agreed to be the climatic era for Christian holy war, the Crusades. He describes a picture o f a religion which was entirely consumed by fighting for its survival and propagation. Envisioning the holy land as the 65 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Christian holy wars, and others who argue that the Crusades and the Reformation combined to scare the holy war urge out of Christian churches. Christian religion undoubtedly plays a part both in the history of what is understood to be “just war theory” and in its current incarnations; Christian religion is not the sum total of ‘ just war’ but is an integral inspiration if not an integral part. Islamic theories of justice in war are another example of a religious basis for ethical understandings of war. Islamic theory ties religion and politics closely. As a prophet, Muhammad perceived that his mission was not just to preach but to govern, which required the use of force (Kelsay 1993, 22). Kelsay identifies the distinct property o f jihad theory and Islamic thought as the claim that the only just reason to fight wars is for religion (1993, 2). In Islam, Islamic religion is the only legitimate reason for ajihadic war. In jihad theory, dar al-Islam is the abode of Islam, and dar al-harb is the remainder of the world: the abode of war. This distinction comes from an Islamic understanding that people have two choices of how to live: they can live either in heedlessness {al-harb) or in submission to the will of God (al-Islam) (Kelsay 1993, 24-5). Those who live in heedlessness are to be converted, or their lives are without worth to God.1 5 property o f Christ gave Christian people a reason for war, and they took advantage o f that reason to fight wars they claimed had divine license (Partner 1997, 82). Partner argues that the motivation for the Crusades was religious fervor, stating that the crusades were “borne out o f a primitive religious nostalgia and violence no one can explain” (1997, 80-1). Kenneth Vaux disagrees, seeing the Crusades as a battle that was part political, part religious, and all strategy (Vaux 1992, 107-8). While holy war may be outdated, it continues to be practiced all over the world. 1 5 The Muslim law o f nations recognizes no non-Islamic states, so those in dar al-harb are not recognized as under legitimate governance, or as legitimate members o f the international community (Khadduri 1955, 45). Dar al-Islam is the territory o f Islam, which signifies a physical and political entity that acknowledges the supremacy o f Islamic values; there is no middle ground between the territory o f Islam and the territory o f war (Kelsay 1993, 33; Johnson 1997, 52). In dar al-Islam live the Umma Muslima, “community o f Muslims,” which the Islamic state governs and protects (Kelsay 1993, 22). Like Judaism, Islam identifies people and faith with land (Vaux 1992, 76). Jihad is called upon when dar al-Islam is attacked by dar al-harb in a way that presents dar al-Islam no choice but immediate and emergency self-defense; or when the legitimate government o f dar al-Islam elects to engage in violence in order to make the world safer for its peaceful society. 66 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Instead o f religions, some theories o f justice in war are motivated by ethnic identification. For example, Plato bases his theories of the ethics of war mostly on a sense of ethnic identity. He explains that ethical obligations differ among Greeks, and outlines a theory of justice in war that emphasizes how Greeks ought to treat each other as an ethnic group. Plato argues that there are certain ways that Greeks ought to treat Greeks, even when they are at war. Greeks cannot enslave other Greek prisoners, and Greeks cannot engage in the plundering of Greek corpses {Republic 2.466-70). The message of Plato’s rules is that Greeks ought to treat other Greeks with respect and dignity, even on the battlefield. Plato’s discussions o f war against non-Greeks hold no such standards. Theories of ethnic justice in war are often implicit in war-making - ethnic wars in the Congo, Rwanda, and Serbia showed evidence of a war-fighting mentality that included restraint towards one’s own ethnicity and lacked restraint towards the ‘other’ ethnic group. While this could be characterized simply as ‘racism,’ there is more going on. This type of ethics of war values some types o f people more than others explicitly, and uses those values as a foundation to determine justice. Pacifism is another ‘motivating morality’ for theories of ethics o f and in warfare. Here, ‘pacifism’ means a strong moral objection to conflict that allows conflict to occur to instill peace.’ In Aristotle, “the object of war must be peace” {Ethics 10.7; Politics 8.14.14). Aristotle makes it clear that war must only be a means to a more just and noble end {Politics 7.14.13, 3.9.6). To Aristotle, war must seek peace, but peace is not necessarily associated with non-interference.1 6 Cicero contends that the attainment of peace is the only justifiable 1 6 Nations which are superior in Aristotle’s world ought to govern those who are inferior, and war to achieve that end is just, and seeking peace. For example, Aristotle’s art o f war can be practiced “against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war o f such a kind is naturally just” (Politics 1.3.8; von Elbe 1939, 666). 67 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. excuse for going to war (De Officiis 1.11.35; 1.23.79). Some scholars contend that Kant’s yardstick o f moral progress is eliminating war (Bohman and Bachmann 1997, 1; Orend 2000).1 7 This commitment is demonstrated by his strict interpretation of the rules of war, which are geared towards decreasing the need for the cycle of violence. Kant explains that, were his rules of international politics implemented, perpetual peace would become a self- fulfilling cycle.1 8 Kant’s impression is that rules of war will not only decrease the harshness of any given war, but help to create an international atmosphere where war is no longer necessary. Another motive that underlies some interpretations of the ethics of war is that of lawfulness. Hugo Grotius is often seen the bridge between religious and secular theories of just war because he put religious just war principles into the terms of ‘principles of humanity’ in law, which allowed for their secularization (Vaux 1992, 121, 126).1 9 Grotius is working out of being horrified by wars of religion, which is why he introduces just war as a matter of international law (von Elbe 1939, 678). Grotius devoted substantial time to the analysis o f moral authority in war in an attempt to temper the massive fighting of his time (Grotius [1604] 1950, [1625] 1925; Forde 1998; Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts 1990). 1 7 Bachmann sees Kantian ideals o f just war as pipe dreams o f a legal, non-violent international community and an international law based on reason (Bachmann 1997, 59). The hundreds of years between Kant’s work and our reading it means that the historical distance makes direct application untenable (Bachmann 1997,61). 1 8 Martha Nussbaum recognizes a Stoic pacifist in Kant. In her view, Kant shares with Roman stoics the contention that “the attitude o f world citizen is held to be strategically valuable in social life” for the purposes of creating just political orders (Nussbaum 1997, 31). It is Nussbaum’s contention that there is a necessary link between just and sensible politics and theories o f justice in war. A unifying factor between Kant, the Stoics, and contemporary politics is the analysis o f the need to end domestic and international violence by addressing issues o f deep structure rather than dealing with surface prohibitions. It is here where we find peace to be the foundation. Nussbaum expresses satisfaction with Kant’s decision to stress that the community of all human beings in reason entails a common participation in law” based in understanding instead o f prohibition (1997, 37). She worries that currently, cosmopolitanism is in grave jeopardy, but explains this as all the more reason for belief in the continuing relevance o f Kantian scholarship (Nussbaum 1997, 50). 1 9 Richard Falk argues that the genesis o f modem international law is divided between the work o f Grotius and the Peace o f Westphalia (Falk 2003, 83; Clouse 1981, 21). It is Grotius’ argument that international law is formed by the combination o f convention and common ethical standards and understandings (Teichman 1986, 59). 68 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Steven Forde explains that Grotius combines the moral authority o f natural law with the flexibility of human law to deduce a hybridized just war theory to deal with human contingencies and suggest alternative conceptions (1998). A number o f ‘theories of just war’ draw from all of these ethical traditions, and others - chivalry, nationalist pride, and political interests - to name a few. Many explanations of just war theory hybridize these foundations, both among each other and with motivations of political interest (Morgenthau 1948; Carr 1939; Mearshimer 1990; Waltz 1959; Wight 1978). With all of these combined, hybridized, and blurred ‘motivating moralities,’ just war theories become laundry lists of standards with multiple foundational principles. I contend that this leads to a lack of conceptual clarity concerning the idea of justice in just war. It seems that understanding what ‘ justice’ means is key to understanding ‘ just war.’ Still, because of their multiple foundations and directions, just war theorists have a difficult time understanding justice, inside or outside of the context of war-making and war-fighting. Jean Elshtain observes that the problem of defining justice is more frequently ignored in just war theories than it is dealt with. From a complex understanding o f humyn ethical relations, Elshtain claims that just war has devolved into an itemized list of rules. She explains that “canalized as just-war doctrine historically and theory currently, just-war teaching is sometimes presented as a cluster o f ‘Thou shalts’ and ‘Thou shalt nots’” without any real understanding of what justice means (Elshtain 1987b, 150). Maarten Hajer warns about the problems with this sort of avoidance of the core definitions of a problem. He contends that approaching a problem w hile ignoring the essence of its core concept is a losing strategy that will necessarily fall short of an acceptable operational framework. Hajer explains that, often, “the political conflict is hidden in the 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. question of what definition is given to the problem, which aspects o f social reality are included and which are left undiscussed” (1995, 43). In other words, definitional understandings of core concepts matter in the substantive political actions surrounding those concepts. Therefore, it is important to know what justice means in order to know what just war means. The concept of justice is one of the most debated ideas in philosophical history; it boasts as many interpretations as analyses. Justice is generally interpreted to include equitable distribution o f goods and evils, including reward and punishment. What it means to ‘equitably distribute,’ along with what ‘goods and evils’ constitute, however, is heavily debated. There are positive and negative understandings of justice. A negative interpretation of justice talks about retribution, the justice given to one who breaks the laws. A positive interpretation of justice is about fairness, and the ways that one’s life would work if one lived in a society in which people were treated justly. In the Republic, Plato defines justice positively, as “rendering each his due” (1:331-3). As Plato states, “justice takes vengeance on the wicked” (Epinomis 988e). In Politics, Aristotle associates justice with political order. He states that “justice [which is his salvation] belongs to the polis; for justice, which is the determination of what is just, is an ordering o f the political association” (1.2.16).2 0 Justice, to Aristotle, is about equitable distribution in political relationships, with 20 In other words, there cannot be politics without an idea of justice and there cannot be justice without politics. Aristotle explains, “The good in the sphere o f politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest” {Politics 3.12.1). This justice is dialectical, but not divorced from ethical foundation. Aristotle warns that a person is incapable o f coming to a conclusion about his or her own justice, which is why interaction is necessary. Inside o f the context o f the social, the just, then, is “the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair” {Ethics 5.1). Aristotle likens his concept o f political justice to rational friendship, as it has many o f the same qualities and dictates many similar behaviors {Ethics V.8-9; Regan 1996, 14). This virtue of justice/friendship, to Aristotle, is built around fairness and proportional distribution o f rewards and punishments {Ethics 5.3). Aristotle allows for the possibility that an injustice performed was not done with unjust intent, but blames those who are unjust voluntarily for their actions, setting the standard that, “if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these are the acts o f injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust man, provided that the act violates proportion or equality” (Ethics 5.8). Aristotle’s concept o f appropriate behavior in war, then, 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. two facets: retributive and distributive. Retributive justice is punishment: how one is treated after one has wronged. Distributive justice is bound up in the just distribution of goods in society, whether by merit or by utilitarian standards, dependent on who is making the argument. According to Augustine, the root of “justice is the form of men’s loves;” a product of negotiated priorities for love, following the will of God (Ramsey 1992, 17). John Rawls’ understanding of justice, which has gained many converts in contemporary philosophy, is built around the idea of justice as redistributive fairness for the disadvantaged, regardless of national borders (1971).2 1 Whether justice is understood distributively, retributively, redistributively, positively, or negatively depends on the context in which it is being discussed. Hedley Bull recognizes correctly that justice is a term that can only be given some sort of subjective definition dependent on context (1977, 75). Some of the issues to be considered, according to Bull, are materiality (impact), substance (meaning), proportionality, distributiveness, retribution, generality, and particularity. All of these are complicated questions o f what constitutes fair interhumyn treatment, or if such a norm is discemable at all in an international society of diversity and disagreement. has to do with just motivation, brave behavior, and just judgment. His standards o f justice are built around humyn political organization and negotiation. These ideas are reflected in this project. 2 1 Rawls describes justice as a principle which exists to assure political fairness to society’s least advantaged members. In fact, he argues that social inequalities which benefit ‘the disadvantaged’ are just. This rejection of utilitarian concepts o f just distribution has implications for the ways in which states relate, in addition to the ways in which individuals relate, and is not incompatible with feminist interests in seeing the world from the viewpoints o f those marginalized by traditional politics. In fact, Rawls argues that the domestic/international borderline does not matter when we are talking about justice as fairness. He contends that “accidents o f birth or natural endowment are morally irrelevant. . . society should seek to maximize the interests o f its least advantaged members. On an international scale, the starving, poverty-stricken masses o f the third world are the least advantaged” (Rawls 1971, 32). Under the logic o f Rawlsian justice, then, “their interests should be weighed more heavily” (Rawls 1971, 32). Rawls explains that this idea o f morality can be balanced with practical concerns in foreign policy (2001). Susan Okin takes this theory and applies it to individual wymyn’s lives (1987). 71 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Still, when it comes to what justice means within the context o f just war theory, many of these issues are not explicitly considered. Just war theories generally fail to provide an explicit account of what justice means outside of the context of its applicability to war - in other words, just war theories’ definitions of justice are tailored to a preconceived notion of war.2 2 The foundations of justice in just war are often varied, multiple, and implied rather than specific. In the following sections, I propose empathetic cooperation as a feminist foundation for the reformulation of just war theories, and contend that this ‘motivating morality’ provides more conceptual clarity and conceptual utility than the existing multiple ‘motivating moralities’ within just war theories. IV. EMPATHETIC COOPERATION AS FEMINIST SECURITY ETHIC Lucinda Peach envisions a feminist endorsement o f a just war theory “chastened by pacifism” (Peach 1994, 165). I employ empathetic cooperation as foundation for a just war theory “chastened by feminism.” This will provide a reformulation of just war theory, from foundational principles to specific tenets. In this section, I present empathetic cooperation as a feminist security ethic. I reach this point by examining feminisms’ ontologies to get a general sense of what values feminisms prioritize. Then, I look to ideas about humyn consent to find the scope of ‘morality’ and how it is reached. Finally, I make observations about the relational nature of humyn interaction. I propose empathetic cooperation as a feminist ‘motivating morality’ for a re-visioned just war theory. Feminisms have an interest injustice, in wymyn’s subordination, in marginality, and in context. These ontological concerns, to instruct just war theories, must be formulated into an ethical instructive idea or group of idea that can then be applied to questions of 2 2 Many critics o f just war theories, in feminisms and outside, worry that just war theories are used by the powerful in the interest o f ‘selling’ foreign policy choices to the general population. Decontextualized just war theories are most susceptible to manipulation. 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. justice in war-making and war-fighting. Ideally, this foundation will be an understanding of what constitutes an actor’s (humyn) security and how it is best achieved (Sucharov 2003, 2). We call this a ‘security ethic’ - or an ethical understanding of what security is, how it is achieved, and to whom it should belong. A security ethic is a choice (or series of choices) of defining military and strategic goals, which develops into strategic culture (Sucharov 2003, 2, 5; Johnston 1995, 37). Most security ethics employed in international politics are conflictual in nature, concentrating on entitlement and conflict. Feminisms critique conflictual politics, noting the harm that constant political competition causes at the margins of social and political life. Therefore, feminist security ethics move away from this conflictual understanding. Vivian Jabri explains that a feminist security ethic is impossible, because it must simultaneously rest in “a dualism between what Gilligan refers to as an ‘ethic of justice’ identified with a Kantian ontological project o f autonomous personhood” and a contradictory “‘ethic of care,’ the ontological project of which is centered on the relational self’ (1999, 41). I argue that an ‘ethic of justice’ can be formed from, and not in opposition to, feminist understandings of relationality and care. Nancy Hirschmann’s understandings of political and moral obligation are a useful starting point for the construction of this argument. She explains that obligation, in the liberal sense, is generally discussed as a limit on behavior, a requirement o f non-action (Hirschmann 1989, 1227). Most theories of obligation are, then, based in the idea of having consented to those behavioral limitations in some (implicit but) voluntaristic way, like, for example, a social contract (Hirschmann 1989, 1228). Voluntary consent doesn’t work practically - it has never happened. Feminisms help reach this insight because they see the 73 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gender bias in this understanding of how obligation works (Hirschmann 1989, 1228-9).2 3 In other words, the nature of the epistemology of political obligation is such that it is gender biased. In discussing gender bias in obligation, Hirschmann asserts the “claim that freedom is central” to traditional understandings (1989, 1233). She loosely explains the purposes of civil society as the protection of natural freedom and ensuring that the individual can act rationally (Hirschmann 1989, 1234). But freedoms perceived to be natural are not always gender-neutral. Psychoanalytically, the girl is more likely to learn sameness from mothers and the boy is more likely to learn difference, so the boy develops conflictual tendencies and the girl peaceful ones (Hirschmann 1989, 1235). Boys’ freedom is reactive autonomy; girls’ is relational autonomy (Hirschmann 1989, 1235). This has a twofold effect, according to Hirschmann - both in the ways that gendered lives play out and in the struggle for discursive recognition. Hirschmann explains the latter, as she talks about the relationship between freedom, recognition, and violence: If the conception of freedom as negative is premised on the struggle for recognition, particularly on the ability to be recognized without reciprocation - if non-recognition is (as it is for the Oedipal boy and Hegel’s master) a form of power and violence - freedom, too, must be at least in part an expression of that same power and violence. (Hirschmann 1989, 1238). She explains that, in an obligatory relationship, the obligated must recognize the obligor but not vice versa (Hirschmann 1989, 1239). Often, wymyn are the obligated and men the obligor, in a cycle which has self-perpetuated for much of history. Hirschmann understands that the feminine is obligated to recognize the masculine and the masculine is not obligated 2 3 Hirschmann is not talking about a gender bias in the application o f obligation, like disparate impact. Instead, she is talking about a structural gender bias in how societies understand and treat obligation. She defines structural gender bias as “the bias o f the very structure o f obligation (its being defined solely in voluntarist terms, and the fact that nomoluntary obligation is an oxymoron) toward a masculinist perspective which automatically excludes women from obligation on an epistemological level” (Hirschmann 1989, 1229). 74 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to recognize the feminine. Assumed consent to obligation thus becomes insidious and counterproductive, as Hirschmann explains that “consent thus seems to save us from authoritarian coercion. But in reality it merely masks it” (Hirschmann 1989, 1239).2 4 Femininities come to an unfair bargaining table with an unfair bargaining position. Hirschmann explains it as a trap where “even acts o f dissent are interpreted as acts of consent, and unfair bargaining positions belie the freedom implicit in free choice” (Hirschmann 1989, 1239). In this way, voluntarist theories of obligation lead to gender subordination and totalitarianism (Hirschmann 1989, 1240). Hirschmann explains that feminisms can help sort out the conceptual mess of political obligation. She explains that a feminist understanding of the function of consent would not be based in the assumption that all choices made are made from a perspective of freedom (Hirschmann 1989, 1241). Instead, feminisms see and understand (mostly because they have experienced) “responsibility in the sense of response, or even obligation itself; that is, from a ‘feminist standpoint,’ perhaps obligation needs to be taken as given” (Hirschmann 1989, 1241).2 5 She explains that “one cannot merely add women’s experience to the dominant discourse because the two utilize different ontological and epistemological frameworks” (Hirschmann 1989, 1242). Instead, “a fully consistent consent theory would have to include (perhaps paradoxically) the recognition that not all obligations are self assumed” (Hirschmann 1989, 1229). Feminist understandings of obligation see obligation as sometimes forced, and always relational. 2 4 Instead o f a general social norm, we assume that consent exists despite "that such consent is non-existent for all but a select few” (Hirschmann 1989, 1239). The struggle for discursive recognition here interacts with the gendering o f social norms. 5 In other words, it is not an issue o f making wymyn ‘free’ in order to accept obligation; wymyn’s experience proves that freedom to choose and obligation are both not necessarily related and not a one-to-one map even if they are related. 75 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Many feminisms do not agree with the psychoanalytic way that Hirschmann reaches her point, but agree that feminisms understand politics relationally as opposed to autonomously. A number o f other feminists reach similar conclusions about the impossibility of a voluntaristic model of consent.2 6 Feminisms’ understandings of consent, then, operate in international politics by “revealing concealed elements of reactive man in realist state-centric international relations, and sites of struggle by women for and against and around those elements” (Sylvester 1990, 31). The current international political world is understood by feminists in terms of reactive autonomy. Sylvester characterizes reactive autonomy as “independence gained by pitting oneself against, as in putting up boundaries and establishing separateness from, another,” which is a masculine concept (2002, 119). Sylvester contends that feminisms should not attempt to play the ‘reactive autonomy game’ when the odds are stacked against them by gendered ideas and impacts. Instead, Sylvester envisions a world where “women give up on anti-hegemonic outcomes and embrace post-hegemonic international relations, understood as processes which promote a transformed rather then reciprocated form of autonomy and obligation” (1990, 24). Feminisms might begin to see autonomy as relational rather than reactive. Sylvester explains that “relational autonomy establishes identity independence for oneself in and while maintaining relationships with difficult others,” keeping in mind power relations and choice (2002, 119). From relational autonomy, Sylvester argues that empathetic cooperation is a 26 Peterson and Runyan advocate that feminisms move towards a relational autonomy view o f world politics (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 216). Christine Sylvester elaborates on this point. She starts by generalizing Hirschmann’s point to international political interactions, explaining that “realist international relations depend on but are presented as autonomous from obligations to women” (Sylvester 1990, 2). Wymyn’s consent is often both not possible and not obtained. This recognition leads Sylvester to understand that the ideas o f consent, autonomy, and obligation in international politics need to be revisited. She contends that “a different approach to knowledge-power emerges from recognition o f women’s different gender lessons on autonomy and the customary obligations women take on ‘to which consent is not only often unavailable but often o f questionable relevance,’ such as child care” (Sylvester 1990, 5). 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. way of dealing with interaction and obligation. She explains that “empathy rests on the ability and willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit o f something and appreciate it fully. It is to hear what the nativized say and be transformed in part by our appreciation of their stories” (Sylvester 1994, 96; Bystudzienski 1992). In other words, empathy can be, at least in part, understood as feminist solidarity (Ruddick 1989, 239; Arendt 1970). Empathetic cooperation can thus be understood as relational autonomy with the ‘other’ (Sylvester 2002, 119). Sylvester provides a definition of empathetic cooperation and expands on the political implications of this understanding: To be empathetically cooperative is to become relationally rather than reactively autonomous with those we have defined as unmistakably other, with those who are not inside ‘our’ community, our value system . . . . One does not take up permanent domicile in the other when one has empathy; one does not universalize her experience as something ‘I’ can know absolutely, thus cannibalizing her. Rather, one appreciates the similarities that are echoes of one’s independent experience .... Empathy enables respectful negotiations with contentious others because we can recognize involuntary similarities across difference as well as differences that mark independent identity. There is no arrogance o f uniqueness. Precious little committed defensiveness. (Sylvester 2002, 119-20). Empathetic cooperation, then, starts at feminisms’ understandings of connectedness (Sylvester 1994; Goldstein 2001). Feminisms’ understanding of that connectedness is intimately tied to understandings of subordination, as feminisms’ political concern for the marginalized manifests. Fiona Robinson explains that “It is crucial to examine how structural features o f institutionalized relations combine with typical situations to enable or deform the abilities o f all concerned to hear and be heard’ (Robinson 1999, 49). In other words, feminist empathy is performed with eyes and ears focused towards subordination (Hartung et al 1988). Jan Jindy Pettman envisions such a political understanding as an alternative strategy o f collaborative empowerment (Pettman 1996, 179). 77 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. June Lennie contends that feminist empowerment discourse combined with empathy leads feminisms to political and security ethics of care without neglecting justice (1999, 107; Jones 1993). An ethics of care, according to Lennie, is inclusive of diversity, emphasizes ethics, considers equity in participation and empowerment, acknowledges and accommodates subjectivity and value differences, focuses on balance, values local knowledges, and encourages the involvement of wymyn (1999, 107).2 7 Care does not, at first sight, do well with difference, because it appears to dictate needs. Still, feminist reconsiderations can fix this dialogical problem by thinking about context, relationality, and particularity (Robinson 1999, 43; 38-9). Robinson suggests that a critical, politicized ethics of care will be useful in international relations (Robinson 1999, 47; Logan and Huntley 2001). Such an ethics of care combines relationality, empathy, concern for the margins, and dialogue for the purposes of international political theory and practice. I contend that care based in empathetic cooperation meets the ontological commitments of many feminisms, and provides an ethically acceptable and intellectually useful basis for reformulating (and redeploying) the ethics of war. V. IS THERE A FEMINIST JUSTICE? One of the major tests for empathic cooperation as a ‘motivating morality’ for a new feminist reformulation o f just war theory is the insight that it provides into conceptual interpretation of the major themes associated with justice and war. Through gendered lenses, and using empathetic cooperation as the model o f the political ideal, I engage in 27 Feminisms see relational interdependence among humyn beings, and care deals with that interdependence. As Dahl documents, “care in my view is an activity that presupposes needs that a person cannot meet by him- or herself where needs are conventionally defined” (Dahl 2000,477). Fiona Robinson sees this operative interpretation o f care, but also understands it as a behavioral and epistemological framework for policies made outside o f the realm o f direct caring. She explains that “care can be both moral principle and practice in global politics” (Robinson 1999, 31). Robinson argues that such a worldview is important, and holds transformative potential (1999, 23). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. feminist critique and reformulation of the concept of justice. This section reformulates justice to the standards o f a feminist ethic of war. The feminist critique of justice starts with the assumed universality of many interpretations of justice, which assume or discard the consent of those governed by the standards assumed to be universal. Many interpretations of justice (and of the standards of just war) in international politics rest on an understanding of justice that is believed to apply to the entirety o f humynity. For example, when the European Union makes the claim that the death penalty is unjust, they are making a universal claim about justice. However, this claim to universality is not accepted by all other political institutions in the world - the United States government, for example, maintains strongly that the death penalty is not only acceptable but just. Either the European Union is mistaken when making a universal claim to the justice of its interpretation, or the United States is mistaken in failing to comply with this universal standard of justice. Universal standards of justice have more insidious impacts than simply declaring those who disagree to be wrong, however. Ann Tickner argues that “Western theories of universal justice, built on an abstract concept of rationalism, have generally been constructed out of a definition of human nature that excludes or diminishes women” (2001, 30). In other words, whether or not there could be such a thing as universal justice, theories which portend to universal justice are often gendered. Jill Steans contends that feminists should fight against these understandings instead of trying to fight within them. She suggests that maybe we should criticize ‘male values’ instead of fighting for our rights under them (Steans 1998, 86). Feminisms see that men’s values often speak for wymyn who are not asked to speak for themselves, and can thus enter into a reformulation of just war theory with a sensitivity to the problems with a universal (male) moral voice that current just war theory does not deal with adequately. The goals of 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. feminist justice, James Sterba explains, “cannot be achieved on m en’s terms. It is not an equality in which men’s values prevail and women’s values are lost” (1994, 180). Jean Elshtain argues that the doctrine of just war assumes universality of moral convictions and assumes a need for moral judgment when such universal standards are not met (1987a, 151). The assumption of the potential for universality of moral judgment has been one that feminisms have dealt with in some detail (Mohanty 1988). The assumption of the universality of one ethical tradition de facto assigns less value to other traditions and those holding those beliefs and values. The idea that there is one ethics of war is in itself problematic, as it assumes the ability of one tradition to either reflect or dictate the values of a world which is very diverse. I contend that a universal notion o f the substantive character of justice is not possible - the complexities, fragmentations, and contradictions both in gender and in social life more generally prevent such possibility.2 8 In other words, making the decision that ‘I’ am capable of making decisions for someone else is problematic, as it assumes (without so much as contestation) that ‘my’ worldview is superior or that I have some way of determining the result o f a contest of worldviews. At the same time, we cannot be paralyzed by relativism in such a way that action and interaction become impossible. As Mary Hawkesworth notes, we must find some compromise that allows both for difference and decision-making. She explains that “a critical feminist epistemology must avoid both the foundationalist tendency to reduce the multiplicity o f reasons to a monolithic ‘Reason’ and the postmodernist tendency to reject all 2 8 Anthias points out the “danger o f cultural imperialism found in arguments that Western universalist notions of human rights are able to yield principles o f justice that should apply everywhere” (2002, 279). Caroline Schutte expands on the problems inherent in determining a universal understanding of the substance o f justice (even if it is a feminist universal understanding): “postcolonial feminisms, problematizing the Western concept o f self, question the regulative use o f gender in national and postnational narratives, but also the Enlightenment concept o f individualism which fails to notice the complex, multilayered, fragmented, contradictory aspects o f the self (Schutte 1998, 55). 80 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reasons tout court” (Hawkesworth 1989, 555-6). Feminisms see that it is necessary to deconstruct interpretations of justice to analyze their exclusionary effects, but that such deconstruction necessarily involves a reconstruction that allows for operational action in sociopolitical relations (Gibson-Graham 1994, 208). Tickner begins the project of feminist reconstruction of the concept of justice by providing navigable guidelines. She explains that feminist theories o f justice need to steer between the pitfalls of an insoluble universalism and a nihilistic relativism to construct a “community of conversation across cultures” tolerant of other values and needs (1991). Justice could then be seen as a project of interactive dialogue. Lucinda Peach suggests that “the emphasis on collaboration in much feminist theory could also be creatively applied to the development of new international or multinational frameworks for assessing if and when the resort to armed force is morally necessary” (Peach 1994, 165). Peach’s suggestion could be implemented in a dialogical understanding of justice informed by feminist values. Feminisms are not critiquing the idea of justice per se but its manifestations in parochial and imperial readings o f what constitutes just political interaction. Fiona Robinson explains that feminisms do not problematize “the idea of ‘ justice’ as such, but the individualist, atomistic ontology, the liberal-impartial view of persons as ‘generalized’ rather than ‘concrete’ and the concomitant reliance on abstract moral principles” (Robinson 1999, 25).2 9 This view creates a categorical imperative that deems certain behaviors acceptable and unacceptable on inadequate foundation. 2 9 The conceptual bases o f justice matter to just war. Kimberly Hutchings provides alternative interpretations of those values held to be most sacred in an understanding o f justice, and explains how these differences bring about substantively different results. She explains: “If it is known that the source of moral value is the nation-state, then killing to defend it becomes a moral duty; if it is known that respect for individual human life is a categorical imperative, then it appears that there must be moral limits on killing in defense o f the state. If it is known that all human beings have an inalienable right to bodily integrity, then both torture and female 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In other words, the values that an international political actor sees as most important in determining justice affect the ways that such an actor chooses to interact with other international actors. Tickner contends that the result of such a process cannot be left up to chance, as would be the case with moral relativism. Moral relativism leaves no room for accountability and responsibility, which is important in efforts to humynize war. Tickner contends that there is a line to be walked between universalism and relativism, and that paying attention to it has indispensable reward. She explains that “while recognizing that the moral aspirations of particular nations cannot be equated with universal moral principles,” feminisms look “to find common moral elements in human aspirations which could become the basis for de-escalating international conflict and building international community” (Tickner 1991, 37). Hutchings suggest that this goal could be fulfilled by the “rejection of moral universalism and the embracing of concrete particularity as the proper ground for moral judgment” (1999, 22). Even the concretely particular can be treated in a manner which would be antithetical to feminisms’ goals, however. Anthias remembers the critique of gender essentialism, and questions whether or not common meanings exist as the basis for determining boundaries o f particularities.3 0 Martin makes the observation that “a pluralistic conception of understanding is certainly more consistent with feminisms’ respect for diversity than an essentialist one” (1994, 643). Pluralism is important because feminisms’ concerns for misrepresentations reach outside of the immediate categories of gender.3 1 If circumcision should be stopped; if values are derived from culture, then tradition determines the validity o f such practice” (Hutchings 1999, 19). 30 She explains that, often, “much o f Western feminism ignores the ways in which cultural practices may have different meanings for ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’” (Anthias 2002, 279). Feminist understandings o f international politics help us to talk about the social construction o f meaning and historical variability (Whitworth 1989, 266). 3 1 This multiplicity is addressed in chapter one. Its implication here is about dissent - pluralism allows for dissent. Vivian Jabri explains that “as sex and gender are multiply contested sites o f meaning that open out of the 82 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pluralism is the route to conceptual understanding, feminisms have a threefold mission: to acknowledge differences in morality without reifying stereotypes, to understand the power relations between those different understandings of morality, and to create a dialogue between those understandings which allows for conversation and action rather than giving into paralysis. What we need, then, is a feminist ethic of politics and justice that takes account of difference without denying difference as its moment of emergence (Jabri 1999, 51). A ‘multicultural’ dialogue is the path to this goal.3 2 Anne Marie Cudd explains the necessity of multiplicity. She tells us that, “in short, multiculturalism is a cognitive virtue (not to mention a requirement of justice) for science” (Cudd 1998, 43). The first step to setting up an effective discussion of the meanings of justice is to understand knowledge as situated, and thus as an unfinished (and unfinishable) process (Anthias 2002, 281; Harding 1983; Yuval- Davis 1997, 1; Haraway 1990). The second step is to understand knowledge-creation as a (multiple) dialectical process.3 3 The third step is the construction o f the dialogue. Anthias explains that this process is difficult and fragile, with substantial contingency. She describes the dialectic of ethical discussion: possibility o f dissent, so too any singular or originary constructions o f cultural identity become the sites through which the self retraces her mode o f being” (1999,49). Martin concurs, explaining that “to go along with the trap o f false generalization is the trap o f false difference through the use o f pre-determined categories” (Martin 1994, 644). Martin explains that it is important to inquire into the relationships between knowledges, generalizations, and power. She contends that “before we put the discussions o f essentialism behind, it behooves us to find out whether, and to what extent, they may have functioned as one more form o f resistance to the sharing o f our power and privilege” (Martin 1994, 644). 321 put the word ‘multicultural’ here in quotes because it is not a direct reference to the word ‘culture’ as used in anthropology/some o f IR - instead it is a way to capture multiplicity in traditionally understood terms. This footnote is not an affront to the term culture, only a note that in depth discussion o f its contents can likely be avoided for present purposes. 3 3 Jill Steans describes the process o f dialectical knowledge creation as she explains that “conceptualization and conceptual frameworks are produced by concrete understanding o f the significance o f social facts generated by the process o f reflection and thought [a dialectic between subjective and objective]” (Steans 1998, 30). 83 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. One o f the most pressing theoretical and political issues o f the present moment is to consider the potential found in the dialogical moment that moves beyond collective imaginings. This involves thinking about ways that on the one hand validate and respect differences o f location and positionality (as well as the validity of the collective imaginings that inform peoples valued and cherished beliefs, cultural practices, and self-identities), without neglecting the important issue of equality for individuals and groups. (Anthias 2002, 2 8 1)3 4 The question of who is included in such dialogues becomes a difficult one. It is Nira Yuval-Davis’ contention that a dialogue on the meaning of moral principles does not need universal participation, only participation of those with whom a group ought to be working in order to achieve its goals. Alison Jaggar is suspicious o f this contention. She argues that exclusion of outsiders and moral closure of agendas is not incompatible with feminist interests, which critique the closed nature of dominant moral discourses (1998, 9). Still, Jaggar admits that closed communities are sometimes epistemologically indispensable, though they contain some hazards, because of power dynamics wielded by dominant knowledges (Jaggar 1998, 11). Jaggar clarifies that, in putting inclusiveness in practice, sometimes it is okay to exclude members of more powerful communities (Jaggar 1998, 21). This does not make outsiders’ concerns illegitimate; it just levels the proverbial 'playing' field for those whose voices would otherwise not be heard. Brooke Ackerly presents a typology o f points of view on a political issue: the insiders’ view, the outsiders’ view, and the view from multiple perspectives (2000). This typology is a good starting point, but I do not think that it adequately deals with the power embedded in any ‘multiple perspective’ view. While it is not acceptable to a priori exclude voices from a dialogue, exceptions can 3 4 Nira Yuval-Davis calls such a dialogue ‘transversal.’ She claims that transversal politics aims “to be an alternative to the universalism/relativism dichotomy” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 136). Yuval-Davis describes not only a dialogue, but a structured one which attempts to understand the ways in which ideas relate both conceptually and in power terms. She explains that transversal politics “aims at providing answers to the crucial theoretical/political questions o f how and with whom we should work if/when we accept that we are all different as deconstructionist theories argue” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 135). 84 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. be made in order to exclude powerful voices that are silencing disempowered voices by their very presence in the conversation. We can now begin to understand what a dialogic meaning of justice will look like. Anthias contends that “effective dialogue requires an already formulated mutual respect, a common communication language, and a common starting point in terms o f power. It also assumes good will o f partners in dialogue” (2002, 282; Misra 1999).3 5 Conversations can produce alternative discourses that entail new subject positions (Gibson-Graham 1994, 219). In fact, Gibson-Graham contends that conversations about values can constitute international action and international politics (1994, 220). Still, there is no way to guarantee that a conversation between radically different viewpoints will be productive, even given respect, communication, good will, and power equality. Hannah Marie Dahl contends that the way to guarantee productivity in such a conversation is through Benhabib’s idea o f interactive universalism (Dahl 2000, 485). Dahl’s interpretation requires conversational empathy. She explains that she advocates a “modified form of interactive universalism with its element of empathy” in the context of a “perceptive and reflective state” (Dahl 2000, 491). Evelyn Fox Keller discusses the product of a multi-sited conversation about values as ‘dynamic objectivity’ based in empathy. She explains that: 3 5 This in itself requires the radical reformulation o f the international political atmosphere, which is not currently full o f either respect, communication, or common power - creating this conversation will be infinitely more difficult than it seems ‘on paper’ - this note is an attempt to ‘speak to the powerful’ who can do something about these dynamics. Hajer discusses the dialogue as a discussion, or way o f communicating, much like any interpersonal conversation. He contends that “discourse is seen as synonymous with discussion, or is at best understood as a ‘mode o f talking’” (1995, 44). Talking requires both a communicative atmosphere and communicative skills. 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dynamic objectivity aims at a form of knowledge that grants to the world around us its independent integrity but does so in a way that remains cognizant of, indeed relies on, our connectivity with that world. In this, dynamic objectivity is not unlike empathy, a form o f knowledge o f other persons that draws explicitly on the commonality of feelings and experience in order to enrich one’s understanding o f another in his or her own right (Keller 1995, 117). Empathy, however, does not alone insure a productive conclusion to a dialogue meant to understand justice (or a conclusion at all for that matter). The participants in a conversation could behave empathetically (even under the conditions described above) and empathy may not solve a complex disagreement. At heart, disagreements are arguments, and dialogical values will not be produced without engaging in argumentation (Hajer 1995, Risse 2000, Moulton 1996; Alker 1996). Feminist dialogues are not interested in arguments that engage in showmanship, pride, or battles of wits. Instead, they are interested in discussions to tease out and then reconcile conflicts between value systems, worldviews, and opinions. Maarten Hajer understands that international politics is currently enmeshed in the former sort o f argumentation. He explains argumentative “politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors try to secure support for their definition of reality” where discourse has a constitutive role (1995, 59, 58). Feminisms, then, do not desire to stop the arguing per se, but to transform the format of argumentation, the motivation for argumentative engagement, and the content of arguments. Feminisms envision arguments about the nature of justice both generally and in specific situations to be grounded loosely in feminist knowledges; receptive to radical inclusiveness of perspective (voiced and unvoiced); in an atmosphere of respect, good will, and negotiating intent; and cognizant of the existence and validity of different claims to the meaning of justice. Anthony Giddens contends that disagreements can be solved in argumentative hermeneutics; I see this as an operative framework of an argumentative hermeneutic (1976,148). 86 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Some feminisms are skeptical of even such an open and dialogical project. There are those who think that such a framework is necessarily too permissive, because it allows for negotiation on the basis of difference, which can lead to the perceived acceptability of universally unethical actions and beliefs. Susan Okin is critical of a dialogical approach to wymyn’s rights because the permission to discuss those rights means that they may well be marginalized.3 6 Without an attempt at dialogue, however, one is left with the choices of relativism and universalism. Relativism is the ultimate in permissiveness, and universalism has its pitfalls as well, as described above. Okin’s critique should be noted as an operational problem, but with caution: Okin is assuming that the values that she holds are universally applicable. At the very least, those who disagree should be given the ability to argue and to express disagreement. Some feminists also critique this dialogical understanding o f value-formation as unworkable. Schutte points out potential problems of prejudice in cross-cultural dialogue, power relations in knowledge-creation and argumentation, and communicational difficulties (1998). She explains that the self/other relationship is one that will make genuine value dialogue difficult and skewed if not altogether impossible.3 7 Further, Schutte contends that there are difficulties in translatability from one [actual or symbolic] language into another (1998, 56). If a dialogue gets past those difficulties in translatability, there are communicative problems dealing with “a dominant culture’s understanding o f cultural 3 6 She contends that “the continuing and rising influence o f cultural and religious justifications for women’s inequality is one important reason why it is so significant for women’s rights to be recognized as human rights” (Okin 1998, 37). In other words, Okin is arguing that wymyn’s subordination is perpetuated unwittingly by those who permissively recognize cultural difference as a legitimate claim to ethical differences. 37 In failed dialogue, the ‘other’ is seen as “one who passively confirms what I am predisposed to think about her” and “acts as the mirror to my self or the one whose image justifies my existing ego boundaries” (Schutte 1998, 54). Instead o f seeing ‘others’ in this diminutive light, Schutte argues that the other should be seen as “that person or experience which makes it possible for the self to recognize its own limited horizons” (1998, 54). 87 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. differences” which generally includes “splitting and superimposition marking o ff’ those differences (Schutte 1998, 55; Bhabha 1994, 177; Schuette 1998, 57). Schutte elaborates by explaining that there are two parts to cultural communication. I discussed the first part, (linguistically) understanding what is being said. Second, “one must relate what is being said to a complex set of signifiers, denoting or somehow pointing to what remains unsaid” (Schutte 1998, 61). In other words, one must understand. It is in understanding that Schutte worries about incommensurability. She explains: “it is because of this very important (open-ended) dialectic between the said and the unsaid that the principle of incommensurability in cross-cultural communication assumes considerable importance” (Schutte 1998, 61-2). Schutte sees that it is here that the power-dynamic between dominant and subordinated cultures ends up wrecking the potential for fair dialogue (understood to be a dialogue where divergent voices can be heard, regardless of position in traditional power structures). She explains the degeneration: The speaker from the dominant culture is basically saying: communicate with me entirely on the terms I expect; beyond this, I am not interested. The ethical principle o f cultural alterity must point out the inadequacy of such a speaker to engage in cross- cultural as well as interpersonal dialogue and conversation. Yet by the conventional norms of his own culture, the dominant speaker may never understand that he is silencing the culturally differentiated other because it never occurred to him to think that cross-cultural communication contains important, yet incommensurable, elements (Schutte 1998, 62). Something more than sensitivity is necessary to make this dialogue work, then, as Schutte is contending that silencing based on power can be unconscious in the actions of the powerful. Empathy is probably a good starting point, but that too runs the risk of becoming patriarchal 88 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in a power-ridden discourse.3 8 The solution that allows the dialogue to proceed, I contend, is a reinterpretation o f power (both by the powerful and the disempowered) on feminist terms. A final critique of this attempt at dialogue comes from outside of the perceived feminist discourse community. This is the critique advocating radical relativism, and arguing that dialectical attempts to discover value reconciliations are fundamentally counterproductive. In Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard argues that the terrorism of signification makes linguistic communication over difference both impossible and insidious. He explains: As the functional and terrorist organization of the control of meaning under the sign of positivity o f value, signification is in some ways kin to the notion o f reification. It is the locus on an elemental objectification that reverberates through the amplified systems o f signs up to the level of the social and political terrorism o f the trap o f meaning. All the repressive and reductive strategies o f power systems are already present in the internal logic o f the sign, as well as those o f exchange value and political economy. Only total revolution, theoretical and practical, can restore the symbolic in the demise o f sign and of value. Even signs must bum (Baudrillard 1979). The impact of Baudrillard’s critique is that “all that is left is theoretical violence. Speculation to death, whose only method is the radicalization of all hypotheses” (Baudrillard 1976). My defense of my concept of dialogical justice against such a critique is two-fold. 38 UmaNarayan worries about stereotyping going on in inter-group relations, or cultural essentialism (1998, 87). She explains that while we usually understand cultural imperialism to be about forcing sameness, it can also be about reifying sameness within an interpreted or perceived notion o f difference (Narayan 1998, 89). A cross- cultural dialogue necessarily involves an assumption o f representation o f certain cultural elements, she contends. Narayan argues that there is real harm to cultural essentialism, much like there is in gender essentialism. She contends that “essentialist definitions o f culture are often deployed in ways that are detrimental to the interests of many members o f the national community, including various groups o f women” (Narayan 1998, 91). In cross- cultural dialogue, there is a risk that selective labeling takes place. Narayan explains that selective labeling is when the dominant choose what preserves a subordinated culture and what betrays it discursively (1998, 95). Narayan’s critique is valuable, and a dialogue must answer it rather than avoiding it to be successful. Still, I contend that portraying the proposed dialogue as cross-cultural is unnecessarily limiting. Cross-cultural dialogue assumes that it will take place between viewpoints assumed to be representative o f different cultures. The dialogue that I envision is substantially less constraining. It takes place between both participants and non participants in a given political situation, and between viewpoints which are voiced and unvoiced. This radical openness provides a workable (if a little messy) answer to Narayan’s critique. Sharon Clough agrees, explaining that the repudiation o f the representationalist metaphor allows us to take down the barriers between speech and truth (1998, 108). 89 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. First, I ask Baudrillard the same question addressed to radical postmodern feminists - then what? Assuming an unsatisfactory answer to that question, I express an unwillingness to get (and remain) stuck in an unjust status quo because I cannot perfectly remedy it (or even because I cannot perfectly understand what it would mean to remedy it). One thing that a dialogical concept of justice instructs is that it is possible to understand justice both in absolute and relative terms. If it is not possible to find absolute justice, I go looking for relativistic approximations, and I contend that I have found one in this understanding of justice. Alison Jaggar hopes that “imagining a global feminist discourse community that seeks constantly to be more inclusive, open, and equal may serve as a heuristic for feminist moral discourse and a basis for feminist political action,” and I argue that this is not only a feasible hope, but an optimal solution to international differences concerning the substantive content of justice (Jaggar 1998, 27-8). In interpreting justice, feminists should prioritize paying attention to subjugated knowledges, and within that attention, “avoid substituting one tyrannical truth for another, even if the latter arises out of heretofore subjugated knowledges” (Sylvester 2002). This dialogical concept of justice at the very least accomplishes those goals, strives towards the fulfillment of the feminist knowledge-interests outlined in chapter one, and merits evaluation as a foundation for a feminist understanding of just war theories. VI. CONCLUSION This chapter started out justifying just war theories as a starting point for a feminist reformulation of the ethics of war-making and war-fighting. It proceeded to give a brief introduction to just war theories, both by detailing the historical contexts of different theories of just war and by exploring theories’ ‘motivating moralities,’ or underlying ethical mandates. I explained how the diverse motivating moralities behind ideas of just war 90 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. theories weaken their conceptual clarity, devolving just war theories into laundry lists of standards with little (and at that manipulable) meaning. I moved on to defend empathetic cooperation as a ‘motivating morality’ for a feminist reformulation of just war theories, and to produce an understanding of justice based on that foundational principle of empathetic cooperation. These conceptual reformulations will serve as the foundation for the reformulations of the standards ofjus ad bellum (chapter III) and jus in bello (chapter IV), as a comprehensive reinterpretation o f the ethics of war is comes to be through gendered lenses. 91 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 3. feminisms go to war Feminist criticisms of just-war theory are clustered around several concerns: its relation to realism; its failure to insist that all criteria have been satisfied in accordance with rigorous standards, especially in relation to attempting non-violent alternatives; its tendency to abstraction and to dichotomize reality in accordance with gendered distinctions; and the priority it accords to the state and state authority vis-a-vis the individual (Peach 1994, 155-6). Lucinda Peach talks about a number of problems that feminisms have with just war theory, focusing mostly on the limited policy choices these theories discuss. Jus ad bellum, or just war-making, is the philosophy (or theology) that provides justification for the choice that an international actor (normally a state or coalition of states) makes to go to war. This chapter provides a critique and reformulation of traditional jus ad bellum standards. The first section, ‘classifying war,’ addresses what actions constitute going to war. I give a loose definition of ‘war’ in order to determine the relevant decision-situations for the application of the jus ad bellum portion of a reformulated just war theory. Section two, ‘who can play authority?’ is the first of five sections addressing specific issues dealt with in traditional jus ad bellum debates and discussions. These issues include right authority, just cause, right intent, last resort, and reasonable chance of success (Beach 1990; Hauerwas 1992b; Falk 2001; Harries 1990; O ’Brien 1969; 1992). ‘Who can play authority?’ introduces the just war dialogue on right authority to a feminist critique of sovereignty, rewriting the standard to find authority based in moral license. The third section, ‘knowing evil when you see it,’ introduces the just war theory concept of just cause. It considers individually a number of reasons to go to war asserted as just by various just war theories. In response, I propose a feminist dialogical framework for recognizing just cause in a comparative ethical sense. The fourth section, ‘(im)moral intentions,’ revives the feminist critique of consent, pairs it with a feminist critique o f universalizing parochial moralities, and asks if there is a such thing as a 92 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. meaningful intent that could make the choice to go to war more ethical than other intents. It concludes that right intent can be determinate if the intent is limited to but inclusive of the just cause. The fifth section, ‘resorting to . . . not war?’ discusses the issue of last resort. Here, I use the feminist method of searching for silences through gendered lenses to question the adequacy of the policy options traditionally considered before war is determined to be the last resort. I suggest alternative policy choices that feminisms inspire that might avert the need for war as a ‘last resort.’ The final section, ‘victorious success,’ addresses the meaning of and standards for success in war, using humyn security as a measuring stick for justice. This question o f success deals with issues of the humynitarian effects of war, an area of analysis that provides a bridge into the subject matter of Chapter IV, jus in bello. I. CLASSIFYING WAR In order to begin to judge when ‘going to war’ is the right decision, we have to know what ‘war’ is and how we can tell that we might be ‘going to war.’ Feminist theories’ gendered lenses provide unique understandings of what violence is, how it is constituted, and how it is acted. These understandings ‘spill over’ into interrogations o f the typical meanings assigned to the word ‘war.’ Feminisms recognize that ‘war’ takes place on the individual, state, and global levels, and ought to be considered at all of those levels simultaneously, without privileging the state over the needs of individuals. I further argue that an interpretation of war that does not include social/structural violence becomes untenable at the individual level, and therefore social/structural violence must be included in what we understand as a means of war-fighting. Ann Tickner argues that feminists understand security “broadly in multidimensional and multilevel terms - as the diminution of all forms of violence, including physical, structural, and ecological” (2001, 62; Peterson and Runyan 1999, 56). Here, security is a constructed concept of what humyn 93 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. safety constitutes (Campbell 1998; Krause and Williams 1997). If security is multidimensional, and war-making is an intentional threat to the security o f another actor (for the purposes either of destruction or of obtaining concessions), then coercive structural or ecological violences should be understood as war. For example, if security includes wymyn’s sexual security, and mass rape is being used for the purposes of destruction, that mass rape is war. I contend that such a broad definition of the violence constitutive of war is essential to a feminist understanding o f the ethics of war-making and war-fighting. Traditional notions of security as a right of a state leave wymyn and femininity out o f the equation (Sylvester 2002, 116). John Hoffman explains that “feminizing security means refusing to see the concept as a zero sum game in which one person or group or nation’s security has to be exercised at another’s expense” (Hoffman 2001, 122; Tickner 1992, 54). Instead, feminists can look for security through disarmament, development, and respect for humyn rights (Steans 1998, 107). Eric Blanchard explains that, if theorists of international politics took feminisms seriously, a normative re-vision of security would result (2003). Wade Huntley discusses feminist interpretations of security in Kantian terms (Huntley 1997, 300). He contends that feminisms and Kantians share a definition of security which is substantially more inclusive than traditional, state-based and war-centered understandings. He explains that “both within and among states, the aim [of security] is not merely ‘protection,’ but establishment of conditions that enable individuals to act in accord with moral imperatives” (Huntley 1997, 300). Like feminisms, Kantians are concerned with the validity of political boundaries. Kant’s sovereignty “focuses on the arbitrariness of segregating domestic and international political realms” (Huntley 1997, 302). Feminist insights into security talk about security in humyn terms, discussing the ways that security 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. issues affect people’s lives. War, then, becomes an individual issue as well as a state issue; the stark divide between political realms disappears. Jill Steans explains that “inequality, structural violence, militarism, mal-development, and human rights abuses are not only relevant to our understanding of the multiple insecurities which people face, but profoundly affect the process o f conceptualization and theorization too” (1998, 128-9; Aafjies and Goldstein 1998; Barstow 2000). Feminist understandings o f humyn security are linked to ideas of justice and emancipation, recognizing the scope o f security in individual life (Tickner 2001).1 Feminisms share a number of these understandings with others; feminisms uniquely bring the perspective of how individual wymyn’ s lives demonstrate the violence in events not traditionally understood as “security threats.” The resulting understanding of war is better understood as a continuum, or a process, then as a discrete event (Cuomo 1996, 31; Reardon 1985). Betty Reardon identified ‘the war system’ in international politics, a continuum o f physical and structural violence resulting from the masculine nature of the international political arena (1985). Chris Cuomo describes “the spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life” (1996, 30). Cuomo explains that it is insidious to think o f war as an isolated crisis. He contends “crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems o f domination and subordination that so often function as givens in most people’s lives” (1996, 31). In fact, seeing war as an isolated event can actually be counterproductive for feminisms’ goals of 1 Tickner lists a number o f issues included in a feminist interpretation o f security issues: safe working conditions, freedom from the threat o f war, freedom from unemployment, freedom from the financial squeeze o f foreign debt, end to structural violence (militarism, imperialism, racism, and sexism), ethnic conflicts, freedom from poverty, and freedom from family violence (1992, 2001). 95 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opposing gendered militarism, because crises keep resisters complacent (Cuomo 1996, 31). This is not to be read as a claim that all violence on the continuum is equally bad, but only as a claim that there are no clear delineating points between events o f violence because there is violence is a continuum, not a game of connect-the-dots. Cuomo’s argument that war should not be seen as an isolated event forms a powerful critique o f just war theories’ traditional definitions of war. He explains that “just- war theory is a prominent example of a philosophical approach that rests on the assumption that wars are isolated from everyday life and ethics” (Cuomo 1996, 33). Cuomo contends that just war theories, as generally composed, are inadequate to theorize violence which is structural and continuous instead of isolated and minimal. He explains: Because the application o f just-war principles is a matter of proper decision-making on the part of agents o f the state, before wars occur, and before military strikes are made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct events. In fact, declarations o f war are generally overdetermined escalations of preexisting conditions. Just-war criteria cannot help evaluate military and related institutions, including their peacetime practices and how these relate to wartime activities, so they cannot address the ways in which armed conflicts between and among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state militarism. The remarkable resemblances in some sectors between states of peace and states o f war remain completely untouched. (Cuomo 1996, 33) Cuomo explains that just war theories, as currently formulated, can even be insidious to feminist understandings of war. He worries that applications of “just-war criteria actually help create the illusion that the ‘problem of war’ is being addressed when the only considerations are the ethics of declaring the wars and of military violence within the boundaries of declarations of war and peace” (Cuomo 1996, 33). These problems have a specifically grave impact on attempts to find gendered justice in war. Cuomo explains that such “a just-war approach cannot successfully theorize women’s roles in these events because formal, declared wars depend upon underlying militaristic assumptions and 96 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. constructions of gender that make women’s participation as leaders nearly impossible” (Cuomo 1996, 34). Feminisms’ understandings of just war cannot be limited to an understanding of large-scale military conflicts; instead, they must reach other forms of violence (Cuomo 1996, 35). The critique brings us back to Betty Reardon’s understanding of the ‘war system’ which is the manifestation of masculine coercive force in social and political situations, from the home to the international arena. Here, ‘masculine’ is used in an encompassing way to talk about all forms of violence that have their root in competition and domineering. While there is a gendered content to competition and domineering, not all violence is necessarily gendered. Instead, gendered violence is violence that needs gendered assumptions to make it possible. Much of contemporary war-fighting, Reardon claims, meets this criterion. In her definition, “war” is competition where the competing happens through the use of coercive force. She defines “coercive force” as “threat, intimidation, and when necessary, violent coercion” (Reardon 1985, 11). This idea of the war system reflects feminisms’ conviction that violences are continua, which run through different levels of interpersonal interaction as well as different levels o f analysis. War, then, in a feminist interpretation, can be seen as a spectrum of violence: structural, physical, and ecological. Competitive use of coerce force generally relies on the emasculation of self and the feminization of the enemy. This cycle of gendering is not a series of events but a social continuum. A ‘decision to go to war’ is at first appearance somewhat paradoxical: if a ‘war system’ is always around us, does going to war have meaning? But a ‘war system’ has to be distinguished, if not distinct, from a ‘war,’ as an individual war is intentional violence for the purpose of obtaining something from or related to an adversary, while the war system is the norm of using violent means to obtain things. Then the ‘decision to go to war’ is a decision to engage in violence (military, 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. physical, or structural) for the intentional purpose of obtaining something (tangible or intangible) from or related to an adversary. This working interpretation will suffice when examiningyws ad bellum standards. II. WHO CAN PLAY AUTHORITY? One of the issues traditionally considered by just war theories is the question of right authority, or who has the power to authorize war. Aquinas states that war must be waged with the proper authority of a prince (Hartigan 1982, 47; Holmes 1989, 200; von Elbe 1939, 669; Wells 1969, 820). A prince (or head of state) does not constitute right authority in some just war theories, however. In the Middle Ages, there were often rival claims to the authority to fight just and holy wars coming from a pope or an emperor (Johnson 1999, 79, 81; Esposito 2002; 1992; 1998). Old testament writers saw God as the only legitimate authority to declare war. Some Christian and Islamic doctrines contend that God appoints representatives on earth vested with the authority to declare war (Khadduri 1955, 23; Kelsay 1993). Secular just war theories refer to states and international institutions sanctioned by international law as proper authority to declare war (Grotius 1604). Contemporary theorists of just war are divided on both the relevance and the content of the question of right authority. Some argue that most entities that have the capacity to engage in war to begin with are legitimate governments o f recognized nation-states, so the standard is moot.2 Others claim that the question of right authority is important, but tautological because it is bound up in the question of political authority. Laurie Calhoun argues that possessing governing authority means possessing right authority to declare war, 2 This argument has lost some steam since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, which were an act o f war perpetuated by someone other than the legitimate government o f a recognized nation-state. While this event could have been classified as a crime, or as an act o f ‘terrorism’ - the validity o f those interpretations is not at issue here. I mention 9/11 because o f the increased fuzziness that it has caused to just war theories. Also, it is unclear whether being a legitimate government o f a recognized nation-state constitutes right authority; but that possibility will be addressed later in this section. 98 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and that the possession of this authority renders all other standards of just war moot because a leader’s choices are necessarily reflective of the desires o f her charges, as her charges have chosen her to lead (2002).3 A. RIGHT AUTHORITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY While there are a number of different interpretations of the content o f ‘right authority’ in just war theories, most of them center on (consensual) governing authority in a recognized nation-state. I argue that a feminist critique of sovereignty sheds light on the problems with this interpretation. A feminist critique of sovereignty necessarily starts in a more general critique of the gendered nature of the state. Feminist scholarship in IR recognizes and explores the gendered aspects of states and international institutions. As Katharine Moon points out, the institutional cultures of states and intergovernmental organizations are “neither gender neutral or value-free” despite assumptions to the contrary (1997, 54; Peterson 1999; Brown 1988; Connell 1995, 73; Steans 1998, 39; Tickner 2001, 2 1).4 R. W. Connell clarifies that the masculinity of the state is more complicated than being governed by those who are identified as men and masculine. He explains that “this is not to imply that the personalities of the top male office-holders somehow seep through and stain the institutions. It is to say something much stronger: the state organizational practices are 3 Laurie Calhoun contends that the standard o f right authority is the sum total o f the meaning in o f ju s ad bellum requirements. She asserts that, though just war theories appear to contain a complex set o f requirements for the decision to go to war, they actually depend solely on the question o f what constitutes legitimate authority, practically (Calhoun 2002, 39). Calhoun explores how wars are started. She recounts that what happens is that there is a commander-in-chief o f armed forces, who decides whether or not there will be a war by deciding whether or not to deploy the troops (Calhoun 2002,46). Fulfillment o f the other standards related to just war is directly reliant on their being a commander-in-chief o f the military forces who prioritizes similar values as just war theories do. 4 Joshua Goldstein explains that the analysis o f gendering in the international political arena is complex, as it requires examination o f individuals, states, and international institutions (2001, 407). Rebecca Grant, however, gives a number o f locations o f gender bias in international politics: our understanding o f the state o f nature, our concept o f the state, our visions o f the security dilemma, and our faith in radical but non-feminist solutions in global politics (1991, 9-11). Spike Peterson adds to that list models o f human nature, citizenship, the knowing subject, the rational actor, economic man, and political agency (1999, 38). 99 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. structured in relation to the reproductive arena” (Connell, 1995, 73).5 Feminists recognize negative material impacts resulting from the assumption that states are gender-neutral. Sarah Brown explains that “most immediately, the danger lies in the uncritical acceptance by feminists of objects, methods, and concepts which presuppose the subordination o f women” (1988, 470). Feminist security theories question the irrelevance o f wymyn in traditional accounts o f the state, the efficacy of the state as a protector of wymyn, and the discourse of wymyn and peace used by state actors (Blanchard 2003). These feminists are not arguing that political organization itself is necessarily gendered, instead that current institutional structures manifest gender subordination (Connell 1990; Pringle and Watson 1992).6 This manifestation of gender subordination is not singular, but a matter of degree and type - genderings appear all over international relations. Feminisms critique the gendered nature of the institution of the state, observing: the gendered unrepresentative face o f the state as an institution, the romantic fiction of the construction of the state, the gendered nature of the ethnonationalism that state sovereignty can promote, the militarization o f individual lives caused by considering states sovereign, gendered baiting in interstate relations and the gendered nature of state power. The first critique that feminists make of the ‘state as legitimate authority’ argument is that the state is not a monolithic entity. Instead, gendered lenses reveal “people as actors, the system as multiple hierarchies, and as characterized by multiple relations” (Goldstein 5 Connell is not denying that most people in power are men; he is simply arguing that men being in power is a circular result o f the function o f a masculine institution. Most people in power “are men because there is a gender configuring o f recruitment and promotion, a gender configuring o f the internal division o f labor and systems o f control, a gender configuring o f policymaking, o f practical routines, and ways o f mobilizing pleasure and consent” (Connell 1995, 73). 6 To see the state as not necessarily but currently patriarchal is to see the state as an ongoing social construction process. Jill Steans explains that feminisms can see statehood “as a process. That is, the state is not seen as a ‘thing,’ an entity with independent existence, but actually a dynamic entity which is constantly being made and remade” (1998, 13). She explains that a static understanding o f the state is reductionist, reifying, methodologically individualist, and fails to recognize the union o f theory and practice. Instead, the state can move from patriarchal to non-patriarchal or along a continuum o f patriarchy. 100 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2001, 53).7 The state, then, instead of having monolithic agency, is a composition of agents. If the state is not monolithic, it cannot be the ultimate answer to the question o f right authority to declare war. Most just war theories answer this critique with some kind of claim about individual rational actors being represented by a government that they permit to make decisions for them. But Charlotte Hooper contends that the dominant model of the individual’s relationship to the state and international politics needs to be questioned both for internal validity and representation (2001). The critique of consent in Ch. I demonstrates that an individual’s consent to governance is never complete; therefore even ‘rational individuals governed democratically’ are a paradoxical model for right authority. Some feminists question the existence of a ‘rational subject governed democratically.’ Spike Peterson calls on feminists to interrogate the sovereign rational subject both for its artificial boundaries and its false objectivities (1992, 197).8 The feminist interpretation of the individual as politicized blurs the distinction between civilian pain and political aims, making individual pain a political problem. The politicized individual provides a model for a feminist inquiry into subjectivity. The privileging of statist authority over the value of individual life risks that “individuals will be viewed only instrumentally as means sacrificed to the end of the state’s winning the war” (Davis 1987, 145; Peach 1994). 7 The most sophisticated understanding o f this point is Cynthia Enloe’s observation that the personal is international and the international is personal (1993). Katherine Moon provides an empirical example o f the interplay o f international politics and personal lives as she studies military prostitutes in South Korea, where lives are international politics and international politics are lives (1997, 53). Moon argues that recognizing the individual as a part o f security politics is not only more inclusive, but necessary to understand global politics. Moon recounts that, in this case, the “rationale for people-to-people diplomacy was the government’s belief that private citizens do and can make a contribution to foreign relations, that given the country’s dire situation, people could not divorce their personal lives from the political needs o f the nation” (Moon 1997, 126). By people-to- people diplomacy here, Moon means prostitution, which the South Korean state gave (gives) in exchange for defense (Moon 1997, 126). 8 She argues that the androcentric contemporary accounts o f the individual and o f the individual’s relationship with the state are unrepresentative and dangerous. 101 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Instead, individuals’ agency should be understood in a more complicated manner.9 Katharine Moon explains that “without jumping back and forth from two opposite poles of self-agency and victimhood, a middle ground must be found” that sees the individual and state as hybridized agents (1997, 52). The second critique that feminisms make of the gendered nature of the state is one of the mythological nature o f state sovereignty. Cynthia Weber describes sovereignty as “the discursive means by which states appear to be” in a world where “state and sovereignty are both discursive effects of performative practices” (1998, 89, 90). It is Weber’s understanding that the state, and its sovereignty claim, is a story told by ‘the state’ to its citizens and to other ‘states,’ which is believed, and therefore real. Christine Sylvester characterizes this storytelling as romanticized fiction (1990, 10). She contends that the sovereign state is “an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse domestic interests he-it allegedly exists to protect” (1990, 11). State sovereignty, like hegemonic masculinity, is a gendered male story that is told in political and social interaction; a story that has the effect of obtaining mimicry, and thus becoming true. The third critique that feminisms make of state sovereignty is a gendered critique of the ethnonationalism sometimes inspired by sovereignty. Jill Steans explains that “the rhetoric of ethnonationalism is heavily sexualized and gendered” which results in genderings in its manifestations. In fact, nationalism affects wymyn’s lives in a number of material ways. Spike Peterson observes that “identity groups that have been most associated with 9 Nancy Isenberg instructs feminists to look even deeper than the recognition o f individual subjectivity in international politics. She contends that the “study o f subjectivity is far more than a simple celebration o f the personal-subject position” (Isenberg 1992). She warns that failure to interrogate subjectivity is a concession to masculinist understandings o f the proper relationship between the individual and the state. 102 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (state-centric) political power also have been based on (heterosexist) gender inequality” (1999, 38). In addition to this correlation, a nationalist ethos often causes wymyn to be treated as: biological reproducers of group members needed for defense, signifiers of group identities, agents in political identity struggles, and members of sexist and heterosexist national groups (Peterson 1999, 44-52). Many of these roles are assigned to wymyn are specifically gendered female in a way that makes the process of nationalism another marker of the institution of the gendered state. Militarism is the fourth marker of the institution of the gendered state. Cynthia Enloe discusses the effects of militarization on the gendering of individuals’ (especially wymyn’s) lives (1990). She discusses the militarized culture both around military bases and permeating societies more generally, privileging masculinities and subordinating femininities (Enloe 1990, 202). Enloe contends “the militarism o f the United States and other countries needs us all to behave as women” in order for it to function properly (Enloe 1990, 204). In this understanding, the state is both gendered and gender-constitutive. Enloe observes that maleness, statism, and capitalism contribute to the gendered process of militarization (Enloe 1993, 51). The connection between masculinities and militarism is deep, she argues, as militaries need a concept of manliness to function (Enloe 2000, xiii).1 0 Enloe further observes that militarization is a place where the effects of gendering masculine hurts men as well as wymyn, resulting in deaths in the process of war-fighting (1993, 69). The state engages in militarization and sexualization o f personal lives and political relations, a result of its gendered processes (Tickner 2001, 51). State sovereignty, by giving states 1 0 Betty Reardon contends that militarism is upheld by patriarchy, the foundation o f the nation-state system (Reardon 1985, 15). Enloe explains that “masculinity has been so connected with militarism that we wonder if the two are analytically separable” (1993, 52). Militarism has the effect o f both militarizing and gendering the lives o f citizens and the relationships between wymyn and men (Enloe 1993,61). 103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. license to militarize their institutional cultures, encourages the gendering of humyn interaction. The fifth element o f the gendered nature of state sovereignty is what I call ‘gendered baiting’ in the interstate arena. Both scholars and practitioners in international politics used gendered words and expressions to describe how states relate. Within the academic study of international politics, Ashworth and Swatuk point out that the debate about how states relate is bound up in masculinities. They contend that liberalism and realism constitute an all masculine debate, where realism is based on violence and liberalism based on domination (Ashworth and Swatuk 1998, 86). While this claim is certainly an oversimplified exaggeration, the argument that domination permeates international relations is not. In the practice of international relations, the masculinism o f understandings of how the world works makes the international arena one big game of ‘chicken,’ where posturing is the only way to win. Here, ‘masculinism’ refers to the competitive values, the interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game, and the emphasis on material gratification characteristic of interstate relations. In short, states do not take morality seriously. Instead, states and the system in which they function is steeped in amoral competition and violence. This atmosphere can be described as “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” where “force is used to checkmate force” (Elshtain 1992a, 263). Ashworth and Swatuck explain that “to take morality in international theory seriously is to portray a feminine characteristic” (1998, 75). Though this too is likely an overstatement, the idea that morality (and even a specifically gendered morality) should be the basis of international policy-making is unique. The final marker of the gendered nature of state sovereignty is the gendered nature of power in the international arena. Feminisms point out that power is normally interpreted 104 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as the ability to wield (usually military but potentially also economic) coercive force over other international actors.1 1 Amy Allen describes this interpretation of power as power-over. In Allen’s explanation, power-over is the “ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices available to another actor or set o f actors in a non-trivial way” (1998, 33).1 2 This idea of power is gendered both in theory and in practice. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan insist that gendered power is behind gendered international politics.1 3 They explain that “to ungender power and politics we must alter the gendered division of power that established and had continued to reproduce masculinist politics. The latter privileges an androcentric definition of power - as power-over - and discriminates against women as political actors” (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 213). Gendered lenses must reevaluate power because “gender is about power, and power is gendered (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 7). They explain that this relationship has both a substantive aspect (the relatively disempowered position of wymyn) and a conceptual aspect (the power of gender) (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 31). Peterson and Runyan talk about the real gendered impact of power-over, as they explain that “ideologies are reconfigured to suit the changing interests of those in power, not those whose lives are controlled by them” (1999,42). This power-rule is inescapable so long as power is seen as power-over, feminisms contend. In order to understand this constancy, one must see political and social relations as existent in a Foucauldian universe: a world in which power is everywhere inscribed and produced. In this framework, process 1 1 Elshtain contends that power is often conflated with “the crude instrumentalism o f violence” that is usually ‘force’ (1985, 51). 1 2 Another understanding recounts that “power-over” is “the ability o f A to get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 69). Many o f these interpretations o f power are heavily influenced by Weberian interpretations o f political relations. 1 3 Elisabeth Prugl’s words are useful here: she explains gender as a social construct that codifies power (1999, 41). 105 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and outcome are understood in a way that is focused on seeing those realities in the social world that are usually unstudied. Gendering, in policy and academic worlds, is constitutive of a Foucauldian inscription of power; feminist strategic intervention is a counter inscription. Catherine MacKinnon argues that gender is an inequality of power which is only derivatively a difference; reformulation then becomes counter-inscription to power and difference (Brown 1988, 469). Feminisms, inside and outside of IR, are about changing the essence and dynamic of power between wymyn and men.1 4 Feminisms, then, must change power in international politics en route to changing the idea of ‘right intent’ in feminist just war theories. A feminist reformulation o f power begins with the recognition that power is a concept which cannot have a universally valid meaning (Tickner 1991, 33). Gendered lenses are interested in exploring power in order to see domination, empowerment, and power relations within feminist movements and in international politics (Allen 1998, 32). With that recognition, feminisms can make suggestions as to reformulations of power consistent with their understandings of the ways that politics works and/or the ways that politics ought to work. Amy Allen explains that power-to is “the capacity of an agent to act in spite of or in response to power wielded over her by others” (1998, 34). Here, power is defined as action in opposition to power-over, as rebellion. Dahl agrees with this interpretation, explaining that “power in their view is procedural, circulating, and simultaneously restraining and producing new realities” (Dahl 2000, Bartky 1988). She explains that feminisms must “theorize power as both power-to and power-over to avoid a static and one-dimensional view of power” (Dahl 2000, 478). As Enloe affirms, “a feminist analysis o f power is particularly 1 4 Chris Weedon recognizes that “feminism is a politics. It is a politics about changing existing power relations between women and men in society” (1987, 1; Peterson and Runyan 1999, 31). 106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. persuasive when it reaches beyond an approach which looks only at consequences, not causes” (1993, 47). Feminisms are not only interested in power but in empowerment, which is a key concept in the logic of emancipation (Lennie 1999, 103). According to June Lennie, empowerment discourse includes: social justice principles; open, honest communication; getting understanding through using ordinary language; developing trust and legitimizing and validating community issues; letting everybody ‘have their say’ listening to the community without judgment; using consultation to ‘break down barriers’ between experts and non-experts with the goal of empowerment; aim for common understandings (1999, 104). Empowerment discourses lead feminisms to an additional, creative interpretation of power (Huntley 1997, 300). Amy Allen introduces the concept o f power-with, or solidarity used to act in concert (1998, 35). Many feminists employ Hannah Arendt’s understanding of power (Elshtain 1985, 1992a; Tickner 1992). Arendt defines power as “human ability to act in concert and begin anew” (Elshtain 1985, 51; Arendt 1970). John Hoffman explains that “by emphasizing plurality and community, Arendt consciously seeks to distance power from domination” and to understand power collaboratively (Hoffman 2001, 151). Arendt’s understanding makes power the true opposite of violence (Elshtain 1992b, 273). Elshtain explains that “Arendt’s perspective invites us - as a strong and dominant nation of awesome potential force - to take unilateral initiatives in order to break symbolically the cycle of vengeance and fear” (1985, 54). Power, here, can be seen as the deconstruction of force, rather than the use thereof. Amy Allen contends that feminisms should look for an integrative approach to power, seeing it as not a mutually exclusive ideal-types but a complex web which we can understand and make choices about (1998, 26). 107 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. B. A FEMINIST UNDERSTANDING OF AUTHORITY The answer to conflict is not always to unilaterally break the cycle of violence, but Arendt’s conception of power still aids in the reformulation of just war understandings of right authority. Feminist theories caution against prioritizing the needs of the state over those of individuals or the needs of certain individuals over other individuals. They question the de jure and de facto authority awarded to the state and international institutions on the sole virtue o f their existence and legitimation within in a global political arena which is based in masculine values. Feminist theories also caution against invoking universal morality claims such as religious absolutes. In this interpretation, no deity or government claim to authority is de jure right authority. Instead, feminisms lead to two observations about authority: first, that disruptive discursive intervention into traditional notions of authority is not only welcomed but obligatory; second, that de jure right authority needs to be bound up in moral license and dialogue. Discursive intervention serves the purpose of deconstructing the insidious implications of preconceived notions of authority. Chapter II discussed the radical potential for feminist discursive reconstructions to influence politics and political decision-making. Runyan and Peterson remind us of discursive strategic interventions as political methodology. They explain that “we use the term ‘displace’ because we do not present feminist strategies as rival theories to realism or to ‘reality,’ but rather as ‘strategic interventions’ that expose what realism is inherently unable to ‘represent’ or deem as ‘real’” (1991, 68). Disruption of hegemonic discourses of authority is both possible and productive, R. W. Connell argues. He contends that “hegemony, then, does not mean total control. It is not automatic, and may be disrupted - or even disrupt itself’ (Connell 1995, 37). Charlotte Hooper explains that feminisms have both the allies and the means to enact such disruption. 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. She explains that there is a possibility for “alliances between femininities and subordinated masculinities against hegemonic masculinities’ subordination” (2000, 71). The means for this sort of discursive intervention would be the discussion and contention within an international feminist discourse community. Alison Jaggar describes this community as fluid and heterogeneous but nonetheless existent (1998, 26). The discourse community is not singular but multiple; still, it is capable of carrying on conversations, and ever more capable of making these conversations a valid part of international public discussion (Jaggar 1998, 27). Jaggar explains that “imagining a global feminist discourse community that seeks constantly to be more inclusive, open, and equal may serve as a heuristic for feminist moral discourse and a basis for feminist political action” (Jaggar 1998, 27-8). Maarten Hajer imagines the transformation o f discourse- community to politicized discourse-coalition.1 5 Feminisms, then, could tell alternative stories about what the ‘right authority’ to choose a war should have been. This discourse community is a part of, but distinct from, activist engagement, as discursive interference is both activism in a general sense and activism in a specific sense. Jill Steans suggests that this international feminist discourse community mobilize discourses of life-affirmation to engage discourses o f state license to violence (1998, 118). Such a strategic intervention in the concept of ‘authority’ suggests that a feminist reformulation of ‘right authority’ directly recognizes that its authority (and therefore authorization) is bound up in moral license and dialogue. Moral license is based in some kind o f moral deliberation that gives not only authority but moral authority. The ‘right 1 5 He envisions that “discourse-coalitions are defined as the ensemble o f (1) a set o f stoiy-lines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based. Story-lines here are seen as "the discursive cement that keeps a discourse-coalition together” (Hajer 1995, 44). Hajer explains the discourse coalitions differ from traditional coalitions, because they include an “emphasis on the linguistic basis of the coalition: story-lines, not interests, form the basis o f the coalition, whereby story-lines potentially change the previous understanding o f what actors’ interests are” (1995,66). 109 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. authority’ to make decisions about the ways that an individual’s life is affected starts at that individual (insomuch as she has the capacity); consent of those who are affected by the existence of the war is key. While feminisms stop short of demanding that there be a consensus o f all individuals in a political entity for a war in order to start one, they do maintain that political decision-making should be open and participatory. Feminisms propose to accomplish this through the framework o f consent - but of affirmative consent. Going back to our discussion on relational autonomy, consent cannot be seen as every individual raising their hand in assent. Some people who consent will not raise their hands; some people who raise their hands will not have consented. Consent must be seen as a complex matrix of dialogical result, participatory governance, and political understanding. Consent needs to be interpreted separately as voluntaristic and involuntary; voluntaristic in that a choice is made about the war, and involuntary in that to a greater or lesser degree dependant on the situation that choice is not completely ‘free.’ Consent should therefore be evaluated in terms both of the opinion of the actor consenting and of that actor’s power to consent. In addition to the consent of those who are affected, right authority is based on the same dialogical morality that governs feminisms’ interpretations o f justice. This fulfills the needs o f just war theory to have some determination of right authority, as well as the political commitment to the marginalized by including all who are involved in the potential war in the constitution of right authority. A traditionally defined international actor, such as a nation-state or the United Nations, can be seen as having right authority if it meets these requirements. Still, this interpretation of right authority broadens the playing field - it means that states and intergovernmental organizations do not automatically have right authority to make wars, and that other actors in international politics, from non- 110 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. governmental organizations to groups internal to states to individuals may possess right authority to wage war. 1 6 The ‘right authority’ standard envisions a decision to go to war as the result of a dialogue of divergent perspectives which culminates in a decision made collectively (and based on agreed-upon norms). It is this sort of argumentation that I envision when I discuss right authority as bound up in issues of moral license. III. JUST CAUSE FOR VIOLENCE? If an entity has the ‘right authority’ to choose whether or not to go to war, just war theories explain that part of that choice is a determination o f the justice of the cause. ‘Just cause,’ is the just war standard normally used to describe the question of whether or not an international actor has a complaint with another actor which is a good enough reason to fight a war. This standard is usually held to be an important one, because the just cause becomes the measure o f a number of other standards, such as proportionality and reasonable chance for success.1 7 There is, however, much disagreement when it comes to identifying what sorts of grievances constitute just cause, and how severe such grievances have to be to meet the standard. James Turner Johnson asserts that there are four different ways of thinking about just cause in the just war literature. He recounts understandings of just cause as defensive, punitive, interventionist, and holy (Johnson 1992, 19). I summarize the just war arguments for and against the justice of these types of wars. Then, I proceed to propose a 1 6 Still, a cautionary note should apply. The spirit o f this standard is not that we should look for groups small enough to find internal moral consensus for war-fighting for a certain cause and then go about calling them ‘right authority’ to make war. This encourages factionalism, which is the opposite o f the dialogical understanding of politics that we have been advocating thus far. While feminisms are not universally comfortable with either the existence o f the nation-state or its boundaries, they maintain the principle o f politics as working together rather than working in factions. 1 7 In other words, often the degree o f justice o f the cause determines what reasonable expenses are and what reasonable success would mean. This interpretation is also salient in international politics, as just cause is used as a way to motivate citizens to go to war and as a way to assign blame for wars after the fact. Joachim von Elbe sees the end o f World War I as a time o f revitalization for theories o f just war, because the settlement focused on finding which side had just cause for the war, and assigning the blame to the aggressor (1939, 687). Most theorists o f just war agree that an international actor’s having just cause is an integral part o f that actor’s justness in making the choice to fight a war. I l l Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. feminist framework forjudging the justice of a reason to go to war. This framework is based on (dialogical) empathetic cooperation and prioritizes those humynitarian abuses that gendered lenses reveal. A. SELF-DEFENSE Traditionally, the most fundamental just cause is a defensive one.1 8 There are a number o f just war theorists who see self-defense as the one and only just cause for war. This strand of just war theory sees aggressive wars as unconditionally wrong, and contends that fighting becomes acceptable when and only when an actor is attacked. Being attacked gives permission to fight responsively. The perceived justice of a defensive cause has been institutionalized in the UN Charter and other documentation. Judith Gardam summarizes that “Article 51 [of the United Nations Charter] prohibits the use of force other than in individual and collective self-defense in response to an armed attack” (1993b, 403).1 9 Michael Walzer comments that international aggression is remarkable because “it is the only crime that states can commit against other states: everything else is, as it were, a misdemeanor” (1977, 51). What Walzer means, of course, it that aggression is both the only 1 8 Understanding defense as just cause is almost universal to just war theories. Though Augustine contended that self-defense did not constitute just cause because Jesus set a standard o f defending others but not self, most just war theorists, starting at Aquinas, have disagreed with this pronouncement. Even Augustine, while not explicitly endorsing self-defense, was writing about a way to justify it, as he was writing for the benefit o f the Roman Empire’s statecraft, which was bound up both in aggressive and defensive wars. 1 9 The words ‘collective self-defense’ address the defense o f others who left to their own devices would lose the war. This is one o f the questions o f the Gulf War - was the international community in the right in its choice to defend Kuwait? Certainly, Kuwait had the right to defend itself, but that went very poorly, so Kuwait’s only chance at ‘defense’ was being defended by outside assistance. The United Nations Charter is unequivocal in its endorsement o f rebuffing international aggression. Articles 2, 47, and 51 o f the Charter all make specific and clear mention o f the illegality o f violations o f the territorial integrity o f sovereign states (Johnson 1984, 16). The question o f whether a state can or ought to come to another’s defense has permeated international relations since alliances o f Greek city-states. The current international consensus is that a state can indeed defend another state from aggression. Collective security, in current international politics, takes a number o f forms. 112 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. thing that the United Nations Charter makes explicitly international just cause for war, and that it is the most universally agreed upon just cause for war in international society.2 0 While self-defense seems like an obvious reason why fighting a war would be just, there are those just war theorists who disagree. Self-defense, when it inflicts more suffering and pain than concession, may not be justified.2 1 Self-defense of an illegitimate governing structure may entail similar problems. Self-defense by a group of people internal to a state who have elected to disobey the laws of that state could also be problematic. Finally, there is a group of wars that is classified as ‘defensive’ when discussing just cause, but are still on shakier ground moral ground. These wars are preventive. Some just war theorists take the argument that aggression constitutes just cause and ask if the aggression must be actual or simply expected. A number of self-proclaimed practitioners of just war (most notably and recently the Bush Administration(s) in the United States) claim that potential threats of aggression, when severe enough, constitute just cause for war. Many theorists disagree, arguing that this sort of war is not defensive at all. Michael Walzer has a problem with the question of determinacy as it relates to the purported threat. He argues that preventive war presupposes a standard of danger which doesn’t exist (Walzer 1977, 76). Nonetheless, he envisions the possibility of a just preemptive war, so long as the danger is certain and immediate.2 2 Even this rare situation is not popular with many just war theorists, 2 0 The interpretation o f aggression as just cause o f course comes from a presumption against starting wars, as any nation that starts a war can be thought to be justly rebuffed not only by the party who is attacked, but by any other international actor who feels the need to come to the defense o f the party that has been attacked. 2 1 Relatedly, there are means o f warfare which are intolerable for use in self-defense, such as nuclear weapons. If an international actor cannot engage in self-defense without such weapons, that actor might need to go back and weigh the pain o f war against the pain o f concession. Joseph McKenna acknowledges that the state’s highest moral obligation is to seek the good o f its members, which means that the right o f self-defense necessarily cannot be absolute, because there is a possibility that the good o f a state’s members is better served by the dissolution of that state then by its defense (1960, 649-50). 2 2 He contends that it is not prevention, but preemption, which should be found to be just; and even then preemption should only be acceptable when the anticipated injury is clear and real (Walzer 1977, 80). Though he does not see many cases o f just anticipation, Walzer defends the Israeli 1s t strike in the 1967 Six-Day War as one 113 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. however. Richard Falk argues that preventative war is at odds with just war thinking and a denial of sovereignty (2003, 125). Richard Betts argues that preventative war is never a good idea, regardless o f the situation (2003, 2).2 3 The contention that prevention constitutes just cause for war is asserted, both in just war theories and in political practice, but is both less popular and less salient than the claim that defensive wars (in the traditional sense) are just. B. PUNISHMENT Punishment was a popular ‘ just cause’ in early just war theories (Johnson 1992, 57). Punitive just cause came out of a sense that the ‘good’ had the right to inflict punishment on the ‘evil.’ The Greeks talk about reprisals as just cause, as do a number of early Christian just war theorists. In these theories, punishment is a combination of deterrence and retributive justice. The idea of war as pure punishment is generally considered to be outdated. Contemporary war-makers and war-analysts generally claim some reason other than punishment for wars. Still, there is an air of punishment in international discourse surrounding a number of twentieth century wars.2 4 Punishment, however, is rarely if ever directly spoken o f as a motivating factor, or claimed as a just cause, in contemporary warfare. James Turner Johnson, for one, thinks that the waning o f punishment rhetoric is a (1977, 85). He explains that the Israelis were able to be one hundred percent certain that they were about to be attacked, and acted to counteract that attack literally hours before it was going to happen. 2 3 Neta Crawford begins at openness to the possibility o f a just preventive war, but finds a number o f confounding problems with such a position (2003a). She lays out (and I paraphrase) the following problems: 1) If preventive war should be about self-defense, what is self? 2) How much evidence makes preemption acceptable? 3) How does preemption deal with the tension between tenets and those o f last resort? 4) Especially if prevention is allowed, just war theory can be used to promote extremism 5) If the preventive war is against terrorism, what is the definition o f terrorism? 6) Once non-war acts justify war, self-defense is a slippery slope. 7) The question o f success calculus becomes muddled. 8) Discrimination is more difficult when the strategy is preventive. 9) The consequences o f a not-yet-materialized threat are difficult to be proportional to. 10) It is difficult to decide what the rules o f a conflict which hasn’t formally been declared entail. 11) There are no laws to govern such an attack. 24 A punishment motive can be seen in the brutal fighting between the Hutus and the Tutsis in the Great Lakes region in Africa; each side attempted to exterminate the other in a combination o f perceived retaliation and self- defense. Many scholars see the cease-fire at the end o f the Gulf War as a severe punishment o f the Republic o f Iraq, which was simultaneously being scolded for and deterred against repeating its aggression. 114 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. positive development. He is concerned that a punishment motive takes a sort of moral superiority that could become dangerous in the international community, where the powerful take on punishing those international actors who they can defeat for issues of subjective offense, such as belief differences (Johnson 1992, 59). C. INTERVENTION Intervention can be seen as ‘the new punishment’ in just war. While punitive wars are frowned upon, wars that intervene to stop the unacceptable behavior of another international actor are gaining ground - humynitarian interventions, interventions to stop weapons production, and interventions to stop civil wars. Still, the question of just intervention is also one that many scholars see as a slippery slope. The question of whether or not ‘ just intervention’ exists has been framed as a question of whether or not a grievance about the internal affairs of a sovereign state can trump the international norm o f state sovereignty sufficiently violation of sovereignty in the form of war. While sovereignty is a robust norm, recent international debates press the limits of and warrants for sovereignty in cases where governments seem to be using their sovereignty to ‘get away with’ atrocious behavior inside state borders.2 5 There are a number of ways that interventionist wars differ from traditional wars; still, just war theorists make the case for and against just cause for ‘humynitarian war.’ In making the case for (feminist) interventionist wars, Jean Elshtain argues that there are some things which are worse than a just war. She observes that there are some injustices which merit a violent response based on the nature of the act. She explains that “all 2 5 Richard Falk notes that this new debate about sovereignty is marked by the “controversial appearance o f the puzzling phenomena o f humanitarian war” (2003, 90). Humynitarian wars are usually wars started by an outside actor in violation o f the sovereignty o f the state in question for the purpose of correcting some sort o f great humynitarian ill being perpetuated either by or against the government o f that state. 115 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. violence, including rule-governed violence, is tragic. But it is what is even more tragic is permitting gross injustices and massive crimes to go unpunished” (Elshtain 1992a, 54). This logic, however, is deontological - most arguments for humynitarian intervention are consequentialist. David Luban specifically addresses the issue of humynitarian intervention. He argues that dominant definitions of just cause ignore the morally crucial dimension of human rights (Luban 1980; 160). In this interpretation, a principle of non-intervention is nothing more than an extension of the idea that might makes right (1980; 164).2 6 State sovereignty is the equivalent of ‘might.’ Therefore, Luban argues that, instead of just being sovereign, states need to be legitimate to merit non-intervention (1980, 165; Atack 2002, 280-1).2 7 Though Richard Regan argues that both the framers’ intent and the language of the United Nations Charter prohibit interventions based on humyn rights and social values, Iain Atack disagrees (Regan 1996, 34; Atack 2002, 283). Atack argues that the provisions in the Charter which call for the protection of international peace and security can (and should) also be read to include violations of humyn rights (Atack 2002, 283). Still, Atack’s interpretation is necessarily oversimplified.2 8 Choosing to value humyn rights over 26 Iain Atack explains that the question o f humynitarian intervention is really a question o f whether one is to weight humyn rights or sovereignty more heavily (2002, 279).This argument relies on the interpretation of sovereignty as an issue o f power, where a state government can be in power because and only because it is the strongest military power within the borders of the given state. This makes sovereignty a problematic standard for deciding when to engage in and when to refrain from transgressing that state’s borders for humynitarian purposes. Robert Phillips supports this interpretation, endorsing international acceptance o f intervention when states fail to justify their own existence (1984, 21). Luban uses social contract theory as a measure o f legitimacy, where affirmative consent o f the government is needed for legitimacy (1980; 167-8). This interpretation does not, however, account for issues o f mob mentality and tyranny o f the majority. Still, Luban’s contention is that internal legitimacy needs to be taken more seriously in international understandings o f just cause to go war hold water. He supposes that questioning legitimacy would allow the international community to stop ‘watching genocides’ because they were internal and interfere to save lives. Therefore, he defines just war “a war in defense o f a socially basic human right or a war o f self-defense against an unjust war” (1980; 175). 2 8 The question o f whether one is to weight humyn rights or sovereignty more heavily is one part o f the question o f humynitarian intervention. This question does not even come up unless one has a firm grasp on what humyn rights might entail in different nations or cultures. Further, the question o f what humyn rights might entail does 116 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sovereignty does not define humyn rights, situationally or generally (Nusseibeh 1992, 76). Further, the question o f whose rights are more important is a difficult one. For example, Michael Walzer is interested in when it is just to defend another government’s sovereignty against its own people. Walzer instructs that in a civil war, an international actor should understand license to help an established government, so long as it only faces minor insurgency; when the rebellious group acquires territory and influence, intervention becomes less justified (Walzer 1977, 96). He explains that: A legitimate government is one that can fight its own internal wars. And external assistance in those wars is rightly called counter-intervention only when it balances, and does no more than balance, the prior intervention of another power, making it possible once again for the local forces to win or lose on their own .... the outcome of a civil war should reflect the local alignment o f forces (Walzer 1977, 101). Walzer sees international intervention in civil wars on the part of a nation on behalf on an insurgent group as tantamount to international aggression, and thus sees just counter intervention as a possibility to rebut that aggression. D. HOLY WARS The question of whether or not war for religious purposes is justified has filled the pages and conversations of just war theories for centuries. War for and by god(s) seems as old as war itself. Christians have crusades, Muslims have jihad, and even now, wars are being fought for religion all over the world. Still, contemporary just war theories generally reject religion as a sole reason to start a war, though defense of a state based in religion is certainly a tenable just cause argument. Wars for the spread of a religion, or at the command of a god, have gone out of favor in international common and conventional law. This leads many just war theorists to pay less attention to the question of holiness as relates to just war. not come up unless one has established some sort o f communication and understanding with the people whose rights are to be championed in a humynitarian intervention. 117 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Peter Partner argues that this is a mistake, however, because holiness permeates war decisions, even if they generally are not about god with a capital “G.” Partner argues that we [the United States] are a people o f Christian crusade heritage even if the crusades are not explicitly for God anymore (1997, xix). The idea of crusading, Partner argues, can be rather easily turned secular. Holy wars are wars in which a belligerent considers itself and its cause to be good, and its opponent to be evil, to the point where its goodness gives it warrant to correct its opponent’s evil or exterminate its opponent. Partner supports his contention by alluding to the demonizing language used in characterizing opponents in contemporary warfare (1997, xxv). George Weigel notes that the “good against evil” rhetoric of contemporary warfare mirrors the “believer versus infidel” rhetoric of past holy war and/or crusade traditions (Weigel 1992, 49). The question of holiness as just cause, then, is still very much relevant to international decisions concerning just cause for war-making. James Turner Johnson rephrases the question to consider whether or not defending or propagating values by force maintains legitimacy in the international community (Franck 1988). Johnson recognizes that the strength of “the moral tradition of pacifism has resulted from a negative response to this question [of whether defense of values by force remains a moral possibility]” (1992, 55). Still, Johnson argues that the very existence of just war theories depends on a priority ranking of values that allows for the construction o f standards by which to judge war-making and war-fighting (1992, 61). Because they are value-based, just war theories cannot unequivocally reject war for values. Instead, just war should handle questions of war for values as contingent and contextual. He explains that just war is “a moral response to the question of value and force that is not only historically deep but is a 118 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. product of reflection and action across the whole breadth of this culture’s experience” (1992, 55).2 9 Still, such just wars have limits. “Transgression of value in the service of value must be approached through general recognition that value conflicts are the stuff with which human moral agency has to deal” (Johnson 1992, 71). In other words, value hierarchies must be carefully constructed. Even this interpretation, however, leaves some critics unconvinced. Those critics talk about a lack of universality of values and the totalizing potential of violence. E. FEMINIST JUST CAUSE? A feminist reformulation of just war theories necessarily avoids making a laundry list of just and unjust reasons to go to war. While there are some causes that feminisms will find to be inherently unjust (for example, enslaving wymyn), many causes will be seen as just or unjust dependent on the specific (moral and political) situation. Because of this contingency, a feminist framework for determining the justice of a given reason to go to war is more useful than an evaluation of the justice or injustice of a specific type o f cause. The standard of just cause is closely bound up with the meaning of justice. Feminisms advise that justice ought to be interpreted dialogically, and with eyes and ears focused towards feminist critiques of international justice and international politics more broadly. As such a dialogue has yet to be established, this study can only speculate as to how that dialogue would work and some of generalities that it will bring. One observation is that political discussions concerning the justice of a cause to go to war should take place 29 In other words, the just war tradition is in itself a value that its adherents defend every time they make choices about whether or not to go to war. Johnson contends that just war theories are the best way to get at other questions o f war for values as well, as they preserve “not one but two kinds o f moral response to the question of value and force: limitation always accompanies justification” (1992, 56). Johnson is arguing that war based on values, in the just war tradition, while it has holiness as its just cause, is accompanied by the limitations o f the other standards inherent to just war, rather than unruly like the holy wars o f yore. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. under more participatory, creative, and holistic approaches to planning based on social justice (Lennie 1999, 9 7 ).3 0 An appropriately open dialogue would require “innovative and empowering alternative methodologies for community participation,” which have demonstrated some success in the development arena (Lennie 1999, 97). These include but are not limited to social gatherings that include political components, focus groups that pay attention to those disenfranchised in traditional political proceedings, and learning about the ‘enemy’ in order to understand his or her action choices. Inclusive dialogue on the justice of a cause for war, then, has potential to produce more just consideration of the decision to engage in international political violence. Feminisms can shed some light onto what a dialogically-arrived-at interpretation of just cause might look like. First, if justice is interpreted in a material sense, any determination of just cause must include a determination that such just cause is against the people that will be affected by the war.3 1 This priority comes from feminisms’ concerns for the material subordinations of wymyn (and for the political situation at the margins), as those persons are normally both least culpable for the ‘ just cause’ and most affected by traditional ‘ just wars.’ Second, if the proportionality of justice is determined to be important, then any determination of the justness of war must have some reflection of the justness of the end of the war - thus jus ad bellum is intimately wrapped up in the justice o f the contextual political situation and the potential justice of the post-war political situation. Third, if justice is distributive fairness, it cannot be used in the interest of the powerful (in the sense of power- 30 Lennie reminds us that planning is not neutral but ideologically based. In such an atmosphere, the masculinism o f theory and practice can only be defeated through inclusive dialogues. Successful projects o f dialogue and action address gender issues head-on. Inclusive dialogue, then, can produce more just political results. 3 1 In other words, understanding just cause as related to the effects o f the actions that the cause justifies is the only way to control for the war’s specific consequences. Not only must a nation have just cause against the nation with which it is going to war, it must have just cause against the constitutive parts o f that nation which are to be affected by the war. 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to or power-over) in the international arena. The common good standard here is a utilitarian one that values the needs and desires of all people and all entities equally. Therefore, having just cause for war is bound up not only in how the war will impact the political entities at war, but the humyn population more generally. Fourth, if justice is gender equality, political subordination of those understood to be wymyn would be seen as wrong, and, in extreme cases, just cause. Gendered and sexual violences are unjust. Finally, if it is seen as important to include the particularities of justice in an analysis of just cause, it means that it is enacted with right conduct among others. For just warriors, this means that they must conduct their war declarations, war-fighting, and war-ending in right conduct in order to maintain their just cause. Some argue that the cause for each war is unique; others argue that all wars are caused commonly by the existence of a war system. A useful theory of the ethics of war navigates between these two positions. Such a theory o f the ethics of war understands the existence of a war system in international politics. It recognizes that, as some realists argue, nations often treat the international arena as one in which anarchy and competition are the dominant ethos in international interaction. The war system is inherently unjust in both discursive implication and material affect. Because all causes of all wars include a reliance on the war system, each possible war enters into analysis of just cause at a deficit. This deficit, however, is not insurmountable. With the interpretation of justice employed above, just cause can exist when and only when it meets the dialogical interpretation of justice arrived at by international political interaction, when it comes out of a just political context on the part of the international actor choosing to ‘go to war,’ and when it is not resolvable in the context of just politics. Such a dialogical interpretation of just cause for war serves as 121 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. discursive transgression against the ‘war system’ while stopping short of forbidding people from fighting against structural violence or injustice. IV. (IM)MORAL INTENTIONS ‘Right intent’ is a just war standard that is related to but different from just cause. ‘Right intent’ means that a party is looking to do the right thing when getting involved in a war (Farrell 1992). The determination of the existence o f just cause is a part o f the determination of just war. Still, I can have a good reason for doing something, and still do it for the wrong reason. When I do it for the wrong reason, I may do it wrongly, and then it become a wrong act. For example, I may have ‘ just cause’ to engage in love-making with my spouse: to show how much I love my spouse. Still, I may do it for some other reason, like acting out a fantasy about someone else. My ‘other intent’ may mean that I am less affectionate towards my partner, and the experience is less enjoyable (or even downright unpleasant) for my partner. Likewise, a war may be just in order to save people from political brutality. But it may be fought for economic reasons. The economic reasons that the war is actually being fought fo r will be the main concern of the fighters, who will then prioritize economic gain over humyn lives. The choice to go war would in that situation be unjust, despite just cause. This other motivation, or wrong intent, both corrupts the moral force of the war and the justice o f the result.3 2 Too often, in just war theory, right intent is confused with righteous intent (Philips 1984). Righteous intent is associated with piousness, and with crusade to bring the values of 3 2 Feminisms’ emphasis on the just end to a war relies on right intent, as a belligerent must be fighting for a just cause in order to succeed in establishing post-war justice. In other words, a just cause being used as a cover story for another reason to go to war will have a very different result than the war actually fought for the just cause, and questions about right intent will become obvious in the post-war settlement, were the party in question to win the war. 122 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the opponent into concert with the values of the righteous warrior.3 3 Righteous intent is a part of the universalistic moral parochialism feminists critique in some applications of the theories of just war. A war fought because of an impression of moral superiority is a war fought unjustly, feminisms argue. This judgment is based on the assumption of both moral and material inequality in the value of persons, an assumption which is unjustified ethically and unrepresentative practically. In classical just war theories, right intent centered on intending love of God or love of neighbor. In current usage, it is more about the relationship between the just cause, any hidden unjust motivations, and the decision to go to war. In other words, if nation A has a just cause against nation B, the question of right intent is a question of whether nation A is fighting the war for that just cause or for some other insidious reason.3 4 I argue that a modified sense of just-cause-related ‘right intent’ is important to feminisms’ understandings of justice in war-making. Right intent is acting because and only because of the determined just cause for war, with certain priorities that guide behavior. These priorities include focuses on actual, institutional, and discursive gender subordination; preferences for reality over abstraction; political interests in emancipation of marginality; relationality, empathy, and caring; and collaboration with the needs of those traditionally understood as ‘other.’ These intents will govern how a war is fought in addition to whether or not it is fought in the first place. Right intent, though difficult to measure, is thus crucial.3 5 Detection is certainly 3 3 In other words, righteous intent is a belief that one’s moral matrix is correct, where another’s is wrong, such that this difference merits correction by violence. 3 4 This is the question that came up when he Clinton Administration chose to bomb Sudan; assuming that the government o f Sudan had some (passive or active) role in bombing o f American embassies in the early summer o f 1998. Did the United States bomb Sudan for that reason, or to detract from the impeachment vote going on in the House o f Representatives? Or both? These questions are asked in part to determine whether a war is just both in theory and in practice, but also to predict the justice o f the outcome. 3 5 There are some ways to account for right intent. First, in hindsight, by looking at in bello choices as well as how parties choose to behave when the war comes to an end. Second, one can detect intent in the belligerents’ 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. subjective, individualistic, and indeterminate; still, the standard is directly related to just cause, which is more concrete. A just cause and a feminist action ethos together form right intent. V. LAST RESORT(S) Many theories of jus ad bellum argue that war ought to be a last resort for a party which feels that it has just cause to go to war. The standard of last resort is usually interpreted to mean that all other options have been exhausted, and war is the only way that the issue which creates just cause for war will be properly addressed. There are, however, many interpretations of exhausting other options, disagreeing on what the other options might have been and how exhaustion is detected. The question of exhaustion is one focus within the just war literature. Michael Walzer claims that, taken literally, the standard of last resort would make war morally impossible (Walzer 1973, 5). In other words, an actor would never be able to fully exhaust the infinite number of political choices which could be seen alternative to war, from ‘give the opponent a puppy,’ to ‘change your mind,’ to ‘exchange a few citizens,’ to ‘cede your government to theirs’ to ‘meditate for a thousand years and see if it changes; no? try one more.’ Therefore, according to Walzer, it is not morally obligatory to adopt (rather than just consider) alternative strategies to be last resort (Walzer 1992, 5). discourses related to the war; both the choice o f words will hint at the reasons why an actor chose to go to war. Third, one can use International Relations theories to understand why international actors are choosing to go to war. Still, even if intent were indeterminate, it would matter in a feminist understanding o f just war theories. The standard is prim a facie necessary to justice, so it should be included in an understanding o f justice in war-making even if it is not enforceable. Further, the standard can serve as a guide and reminder to those making war-related decisions o f the importance o f right intent, which may affect policymaking. Lastly, the standard can serve as the basis for a counter-discourse in an argument about whether or not a choice to go to war would be ethically appropriate. In other words, an actor could interrogate the rightness o f the intent to go to war as a part of interrogating the war more generally. 124 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Infinite regression is not the only difficult question for exhaustion of alternatives: truly defensive ‘ just wars’ are confounding as well. When an international actor comes under military attack, there may be some space for alternative policy choices to war, but that space is narrow and rarely considered. It is not even clear if there is any warrant for demanding that an attacked actor consider other policy options than fighting back. Though other jus ad bellum standards still apply, last resort may not in a situation where a country has been attacked (Calhoun 2002, 45). Despite these complications, there are those who argue that the standard of last resort needs to be taken more seriously and interpreted more strictly.3 6 These scholars and activists argue that the standard of last resort cannot possibly be met by considering the alternatives; as such consideration is necessarily both incomplete and biased. Predicting the other party’s reaction to hypothetical scenarios is difficult, and bound to be riddled with error. Lucinda Peach contends that last resort could be taken to mean exhausting all feasible policy options (1994). The argument that not-war is given much less leeway for error than war is when it comes to choosing policy options is a compelling one. John Howard Yoder writes of the irony that we give peace (or not-war) a very short leash, but after centuries of failure and utter disaster, international violence is not considered an untenable policy option (1996, 76). Richard Regan proposes the compromise that the standard for last resort ought to be reasonableness, defined as probable cause to believe that no other course o f action will be effective (Regan 64). 3 6 Peach documents that the last resort standard in just war dialogue has for the most part become an obsolete formalism. She contends that “among many contemporary just war theorists, the last resort criterion is often ignored, or viewed, as Walzer does, as a ‘prudential’ matter to be left to the discretion o f government officials” (Peach 1994, 157). She complains that many just war theorists, and many politicians who are looking to justify their behavior in just war terms, ignore this standard which is o f ultimate importance. 125 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The use o f the standard of last resort is consistent with a feminist ethics of war, but, like a number o f other just war standards, its definition needs to be clarified and its content sharpened. Strict understandings that require actual exhaustion of other policies, loose understandings that require only consideration of other options, and middle interpretations that use some kind o f rationality standard all need to be supplemented (Peach 1994; Johnson and Weigel 1991). Lucinda Peach argues that feminisms should fall on the side of strict understandings. I generally agree, but believe a feminist reinterpretation of last resort can offer more than simply choosing a strict interpretation of last resort. The first element o f a feminist reformulation o f the standard of last resort must be an open dialogue on how things that must be ‘resorted to’ are chosen. If coercive alternatives to war are not considered adequately, non-violent and non-coercive alternatives are ignored almost completely. Lucinda Peach comments that “the United States Catholic Bishops are distinctive among contemporary just-war theorists in seriously considering the possibility of nonviolent alternative to war and the escalation of conflicts” (Peach 1994, 157; United States Catholic Bishops 1992). If ‘last resort’ were not believing any other policy option might work, then actors can claim to have met the standard even when war is the first policy choice. Their lack o f belief in the feasibility of another policy option can be seen as operational bias - if policymakers place their faith in war, it will be the first (but in theory last) resort. If policymakers believed that only giving everyone sunflowers would automatically solve international problems, sunflower distribution would be the first (but in theory last) resort. In other words, actors can make the noble claim that they are fighting a war as a last resort, even when war is the first means that are chosen. Peach recognizes this as a dangerous permissibility for war-making, as it does not actually stop any wars from 126 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. being fought. If last resort is ‘all in your head’ then your head can always say that it is fulfilled.3 7 Feminisms, then, fall on the side of the more strict interpretation of last resort because they have an interest in preventing as many wars as possible in order to stop cycles of violence. Feminisms recognize the contingencies of interpretation. Coming ontologically from the assumption that war is wrong but pacifism untenable, a feminist just war ethics sees war as rarely justifiable. When the decision to go to war is justifiable, it is because it both meets all o f the other ad bellum standards and because all other (and more humane) means have been exhausted in practice. The problem with the concession that these other options can be exhausted in theory rather than in practice is that the policy estimator always has imperfect understanding and partial knowledge of the situation, and risks an inappropriate determination that war is the only solution to the problem that will work. Because feminisms recognize the contingency of knowledge, the commitment to experienced knowledge rather than derived knowledge is most appropriate to make the conclusion that the use of force is indeed the only means possible. A feminist re-visioning of last resort, then, includes two elements: first, a broadening of the policy options that must be considered as resorts before arriving at war as a last resort; second, a strict interpretation of experiencing the failure of alternative policy options before resorting to war. Neither of these reformulations need o be infinitely regressive; each simply 37 In fact, quite the opposite o f this interpretation o f last resort preventing wars, it empowers the possibility of war-fighting. Because any war can make a claim to last resort, and a claim to last resort holds discursive power, this standard can be used as ammunition to encourage agreement with and support o f war without having any real ethical power. It is in this spirit that Peach criticizes Walzer, contending that “thus, despite his purported opposition to realism, Walzer ultimately does not take the possibility o f alternatives to war any more seriously than Augustine or Niebhur” (1994, 157). In other words, a last resort standard which does not require action outside o f the choice to go to war is contrary to rather than supportive o f the aim o f a feminist ethics o f war. 127 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opens space for the policy process to be more creative, more reflective, more empathetic, and less adversarial. VI. VICTORIOUS SUCCESSES? Reasonable chance of success is another standard for which the choice of measurement makes a substantial difference in the judgment that is made. Some scholars see a reasonable chance of success as a reasonable chance of winning the war. Others argue that this standard is inappropriately permissive. They argue that a strong nation would meet this criteria every time, regardless of what would happen after the war. The sort of international society in which such standards reigned would risk turning into a place where might makes right. Laurie Calhoun warns of the danger of the other extreme, however. She explains that success could be seen as relative to the price which a belligerent is willing to pay for their goal in the war (Calhoun 2002, 41). Under this interpretation, almost every war is embarked on with a reasonable chance of success, as some actors are willing to pay the ultimate price for their war aims. Alternately, success can be interpreted as a reasonable chance o f achieving the political objective for which the war is being fought. This links the reasonable chance for success standard to the issue of just cause. For example, if the purpose of the war were reclaiming property, a reasonable chance of success would be a reasonable chance of reclaiming the property. If the purpose of the war were stopping a government from engaging in genocidal practices against its own people, a reasonable chance of success would be a reasonable chance to control or overthrow that government in favor o f a better humynitarian situation. This interpretation can be preferred because it takes into account the humynitarian situation o f the nations involved in the war even after the war ends. Some object to this understanding as fundamentally impractical, however. James Turner Johnson 128 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. argues that success should be about order, not peace, because peace is beyond the means of military force (Johnson 1984, 28-9). In other words, expecting a goal to be achieved by the war that is fought for it is unrealistic, since most goals are political and wars are military/strategic. The rebuttal to this argument is that war is a means to a political end, so it is not unreasonable to expect a war to set up a desired political result. A war that achieved the political end, though, would have to combine fighting and political reform. Just war theorists also take the opportunity to quality that success does not entail destruction o f the opponent’s territory, infrastructure, economy, or government. Walzer concedes that it is important, indeed, morally urgent, to win a just war (1977, 110). However, even in this situation, he sees that the zeal for attacking should be tempered by reasonableness, fairness, and an understanding that war should be about fixing things, not destroying them. He clarifies that winning, or success, means achieving the goals associated with fighting the war, not engaging in a process of complete destruction (Walzer 1977, 110). As an extension to this understanding, Walzer discourages emphasis on unconditional surrender policies and encourages the use of just settlements to end wars where the war aim can be accomplished short o f total destruction (1977, 117). Despite this variety o f interpretations, the question of ‘reasonable hope for success’ in just war theory is often interpreted as a reasonable hope for winning the war. This interpretation is statist, short-sighted, and actually at odds with the ethics of war. If the ‘reasonable hope for success’ standard permitted war when the aggressor thought that they could win, global politics could easily revert to the arena that Thucydides pictured in the Melian Dialogue, where the strong do what they can, and the weak, what they must. Even tempered by perceptions of meeting the other standards necessary to just war, this standard is too loose. The side that is fighting the war justly does not have to win the war for the 129 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. outcome to be just. In fact, that side winning is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the outcome of justice. Instead, the “reasonable chance of success” standard must be related to the possibility of just politics after the war; the war-fighting party must have a reasonable expectation of the capability o f establishing such justice. If the war is fought for justice, then it follows that said war must have a reasonable chance of achieving that justice in order to be reasonably defended as a policy choice. Further, the interpretation of justice after the war must not be a justice solely determined as the ideas o f the victor imposed on the vanquished. Instead, they must be based on dialogical consensus o f justice, and on standards which are not immediately repulsive to the basic moral understandings o f those on whom they are being imposed. Success, then, is not interpreted as victory in battle, or of victory in discourse, or of victory in politics. Instead, success is the establishment of a just political order at the end of the war. This means that success is not bound up in how quickly surrender occurs, or how decisively a war is one, except insomuch as those factors either hurt or help the development of just political relations after the conclusion of the war. An actor looking to estimate reasonable chance o f success, then, must look at the chances of winning the war, the chances of winning the war humanely, the ways in which the war can be fought such that it is not humiliation but induction into the rules and norms of international society which is sought, and the real possibilities of that induction. In other words, the actor looking to estimate possibilities for success must not only estimate whether or not the opponent will lose the war, but whether or not fighting (and losing) the war would make it more likely that the opponent will behave in a way more conducive to justice in politics in the future. This part of success is crucial; in a feminist ethic of war, war is not punishment, or show, but a way to try to fix a problem. Insofar as that is true, success is bound up in the ability to fix the 130 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. problem, and the estimation of a reasonable chance of success is bound up in the estimation of ability to fix the problem. This interpretation has several benefits: first, it pays attention to the justice of politics and the continuum of politics and the war system, trying to tip the balance towards politics. Second, it makes it more likely that an ethos of humynity will carry through war- making and war-fighting, because humynity will be considered to be a part o f the establishment of just politics which is crucial to success. This bolsters the likelihood that in bello criteria will be met. Third, it is a way to deter wars fought for a just cause which do not solve any problems. In other words, state A has a legitimate cause against state B; state A is stronger than state B; state A goes to war with and wins the war against state B. State B then does not alter its behavior in the international arena at all. These sorts of wars have ‘ just cause’ and the traditional interpretation of reasonable chance of success; but they lack any real problem-solving potential. Fourth, this interpretation of success brings gender into the picture in a substantive way: it requires that decisions about the possibilities for success use gender as a category of analysis. Finally, this standard affirms feminisms’ attempts to understand international politics from the perspectives of the margins. It demands that the justice of politics be included in the question of whether or not a war is likely to succeed - this means that it is necessary to consider the effects on individual lives, both ‘at home’ and in the political domain of the opponent. Its very constitution requires the consideration of those traditionally left out of international political analysis; a principle feminisms see as fundamental to the reformulation of the justice of politics. VII. CONCLUSION The issues traditionally discussed in the jus ad helium theories of just war bring up important issues related to the ethics of a choice to go to war. The authority that an actor has 131 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to go to war, the cause that an actor has to go to war, the reasons that actor is going to war, the other options that have been employed by that actor before resorting to war, and the chances of success for that actor’s war are all important considerations in whether or not going to war is an appropriate moral choice. Still, feminisms reveal that previous considerations of these issues in just war theories are inadequate - they mask gendered conceptions of the state, of international political actions, and o f the international political arena. Feminisms suggest that critiques of sovereignty and universal judgment reveal the gendered nature of the jus ad bellum standards of just war. These revelations inspire dialectical and transgressive reformulations of authority, cause, intent, last resort, and success. These reformulations, I argue, provide a more comprehensive and more appropriate matrix of values for the evaluation of a decision to go to war than current just war theories do. ‘Armed’ with these standards, international actors can make more just decisions about whether or not to go to war. Feminist revisions of ad bellum standards also affect the in bello ways that a war is fought. This ripple effect, along with feminist reformulations of specific in bello standards, is the subject of Chapter IV. 132 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 4. feminisms fight wars How is it possible to represent events that should never happen, and perhaps should not be spoken about - e.g., the event o f a woman who was seven or eight months pregnant being tied to a cross, her belly being ripped open, both fetus and woman dying within fifteen minutes while her husband was forced to look on? The witnessing and recording of these events raises a number of questions: how should these horrors be described? Is any description a form of complicity and voyeurism? Or is the greatest form o f complicity silence? Are here some people who can speak ‘truly’ or ‘authentically’ about these events? Why are women attacked so sadistically and persistently in their sexuality? (Schott 1996, 23; MacKinnon 1993, 30). This chapter addresses the standards of the just conduct of war, or jus in bello, through gendered lenses. It addresses gender bias in the standards of jus in bello, in the roles that those standards assign, and in the impacts of wars on people. The first section, ‘gendered roles,’ discusses the gender roles that just war theories construct and impose when they tell glorified stories of how just wars should go. The second section, ‘abstract violence,’ criticizes the insidious abstraction of the discourse of clean war, demonstrating the negative impact of jus in bello rationalizations on people’s lives. The third section, ‘gendered immunity,’ carries over this critique to the specifically gendered nature of the norms of non-combatant immunity. This section starts by reviewing the different interpretations o f the discrimination principle in theories of just war. It introduces a number of theoretical and practical problems with these understandings o f who ought to be targeted in wars. Finally, it presents a feminist critical reconstruction of the non-combatant immunity principle, focusing on gendered responsibility and gendered impact when choosing targets. The fourth section, ‘attacks on wymyn,’ examines gendered and sexual violence in war. Here, I argue that just war standards do little to prevent the sexualized mentality of violence in war. These standards are also largely ineffective against sexual violence. As a part of a reformulated feminist ethic of war, I insist that a theory of morally appropriate war-fighting 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. must include standards that prohibit sexual violence in war. I propose relevant guidelines. The fifth section, ‘heinous means,’ discusses the proposition that some means o f war- fighting should be considered unjust a priori because of their destructive power. Just war theorists have proposed that weapons of mass destruction, air wars, and landmines are unjust means. I address these discussions, and add to them feminist observations o f the unjust nature of war-fighting means that are gendered in their impacts. I conclude this chapter with section six, ‘appearances of just war;’ an epilogue to the theoretical discussion of feminist just war theories that paints a picture of what a feminist ethics o f war might look like when these observations are synthesized. I. GENDERED ROLES In a world where gender is socially salient, identified gender brings about certain expectations about both social behavior and innate character. Jean Elshtain argues that just war theory is a constitutive force of and constituted by the cultural images of male and females that are predominant in the contemporary world (1992a; 1987b). Elshtain understands that “cultural images of male and female [are] rooted, at least in part, in just war discourse,” with the constructions of male just warriors and female beautiful souls.1 In many conceptions of just war, men are seen as “just Christian warriors, fighters, and defenders of righteous causes” while wymyn are “beautiful souls” who are “frugal, self-sacrificing, and, at times delicate” and work to “preserve the purity of the heart” by fleeing “from contact with the actual world” (Elshtain 1992b, 266; Peach 1994, 152). Finally, Katharine Moon 'Donald McCloskey reminds that “regardless o f what men and women actually do statistically speaking, the claims about what they do exist as cultural objects” which matter in social relations and define social interactions (1993, 69). Irene Visser confirms that “unconsciously held conceptions o f gender are extremely influential in our personal and social lives, proving implicit standards o f comparison, and consciously and unconsciously affecting our self-image and interpersonal attitudes” (2002, 529). The gendered lenses o f feminist explorations o f international politics shed light on the gender role expectations inherent in just war theories, and the implications therein for men, wymyn, and the relationship between ‘the sexes.’ 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. points out that there is also a less-dignified just war stereotype for wymyn: as whores (1997). Expectation of gender role fulfillment leads to gender-bias in conceptual, empirical, and actual understandings of political phenomena. A. JUST WARRIORS Judith Gardam confirms Elshtain’s understanding of the gendered nature of roles in just war theories as she explains what ‘war masculinity’ looks like. She contends that “the social construct o f what it is to be male in our society is represented by the male warrior, the defender o f the security o f the state. Those who do not take up arms are equated with female” (Gardam 1993b, 348). Traditionally, maleness is associated with war-fighting and femaleness is associated with the need for protection that brings up the necessity to fight the war to begin with. These gendered expectations affect the ways that people behave, as few men are pacifist, and many are militant (Elshtain 1987a, 194).2 The image o f the just warrior as the idealized masculinity moralizes collective violence in a way which “continues to exert a powerful fascination and inspire respect (Elshtain 1992b, 266). Idealized masculine roles in war include: good soldier, civilian strategist, military son, and good comrade (Murphy 1998, 95-99; Hooper 1998). In these models, “masculinity, virility, and violence have been linked together in political thought through the concept of the warrior-hero” (Steans 1998, 81; Hartsock 1983; Murphy 1998; Goldstein 2002). Historically, citizenship has been linked to taking up arms in defense of the polity, and taking up arms in defense of the polity has been linked to masculinity (Steans 1998, 81). In other words, the warrior-hero is an embedded idealized masculinity that receives both cultural and political privilege over other masculinities and over femininities. 2 Elshtain describes the just warrior as a ‘man’ with a ‘mission’ o f protection. She asserts that “the Just Warrior himself is regarded as a human being engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task o f collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong (1983, 343). 135 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In this interpretation, some men fight wars while other men could fight wars; war- fighting is always tied to the image o f masculinity. As Judith Stiehim recounts, “some men have become actual protectors; the rest remain potential protectors” but potential-protector ability is key to masculinity, which is privileged and empowered for this role and expectations (1983, 367). The gendered role-assignments in just war are crucial to producing an army that will fight. Connell argues “the image o f masculine heroism is not culturally irrelevant. Something has to glue the army together and keep the men in line, or at least enough in line for the organization to produce its violent effects” (1995, 214). Connell supports his claim by recognizing that a number of challenges to the masculinity of a man are voiced in order to obtain participation in war-fighting, and that those challenges usually link masculinity to a positive obligation to wartime violence (Connell 1995, 83, 95). Joshua Goldstein extends Connell’s point, contending that the linking of masculinity to war-fighting is crucial to getting men to fight, enabling war (2001, 251). He explains: Contrary to the idea that war thrills men, expresses innate masculinity, or gives men a fulfilling occupation, all evidence indicates that war is something society imposes on men, who often need to be dragged kicking and screaming into it, constantly brainwashed and disciplined once there, and rewarded and honored afterwards .... Psychological trauma in wartime is not gendered (Goldstein 2001, 253, 262). In this interpretation, ‘men’ are made and not bom - manhood is something to be achieved (Goldstein 2001, 64). Just war then becomes a way of proving masculinity and heroism (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 119). Heroic masculinities become hegemonic in war-fighting, and subsume other masculinities and femininities (Halberstam 1998, 2). In fact, “shame is the glue that holds man-making together. Males who fail the test o f manhood are publicly 136 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. shamed, are humiliated, and become negative examples for others” (Goldstein 2001,269).3 This shame serves as fuel for the continued association o f masculinity and war-fighting, even as wymyn join militaries. Just war theories, then, cast men in roles where war-fighting is essential to their identities, and thus enable war. B. BEAUTIFUL SOULS The prototypical figure of a woman peacemaker is, ironically, the product o f a man’s imagination. The Athenian playwright Aristophanes wrote a political comedy, Lysistrata, critical o f the costly and unpopular Peloponnesian War. In the play, a young woman named Lysistrata organizes the Athenian and Spartan women to withhold sex from the men until the men stop the war. (Goldstein 2001, 44) Expected gender roles for those understood to be wymyn are often represented negatively, as opposed to what men are or are perceived to be (Barker 1997, 187). A womyn’s role in just war conforms to these expectations. As opposed to men’s role as ‘Just Warriors,’ wymyn are expected to play the role of ‘Beautiful Souls’ for whom the war is being fought. Elshtain takes the concept of a beautiful soul from Hegel, who describes them as fragile, removed from reality, and in need of protection in a way that the protector receives substantial honor for success. The beautiful soul/womyn is expected to be anti-war and anti-violence, yet to cooperate with wars fought to protect her political innocence/virginity. Elshtain observes the characteristics o f the gendered expectations of wymyn’s roles in politics and war. She explains that “first, women historically, though neither uniformly nor exclusively, have been cast as society’s beautiful souls. That is, they have served as the collective project of a pure, rarified, self-sacrificing, otherworldly and 3 Goldstein contends, however, that it is not only men in power who enforce these standards o f masculinity and their link to participating in war. He asserts that “women are often active participants in shaming men to try to goad them into fighting wars” (Goldstein 2001, 272). The question Goldstein leaves, however, is whether this manifestation o f femininity is any more voluntary than the masculinities he describes as constructed by coercion (or even, possibly, less voluntary). 137 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pacific Other” (Elshtain 1983, 342). This image of a womyn expects her pacifism but discards it as unconnected to the ‘real world’ where men must fight wars to protect her. Elshtain details that, in the narrative of wymyn’s roles, the story is recounted that “in the long history o f struggle around questions of war and peace, Beautiful Souls who ‘pre-judged all war as immoral’ have asked for and received ‘the protection of government in exchange for political passivity’” (Elshtain 1983, 342). Nancy Huston explains that this subordinating image of womynhood both defines wymyn’s roles and serves as a lynchpin holding warriors and wars together. She sees this gender-role construction as a transcendental value in society, for which men will fight, even if they have no other reason. She explains: But there always remains at least one good reason to make the supreme sacrifice, at least one transcendental value that justified rushing headlong into as insane an undertaking as war; very often it is Woman; the virtue she represents for the warrior, the love she bears him, the tears she will shed when he is slain (Huston 1983, 279). The image of wymyn as ‘the protected’ in warfare reverberates in wymyn’s social lives as well. Elshtain explains that “certain social divisions got sealed as historical preliminaries to bourgeois beautiful souldom: between home life and public life; peace and war; family and state; the immediacy of desire and the self-conscious power o f universal life” (1987a, 142). These divisions play a role in gendered oppression both inside and outside of warfare (Elshtain 1987b, 4). Elshtain further explains that it is not that wymyn do not matter to warfare, in fact, their presence is crucial. Instead, they matter in ways that are passive, subjected, and devaluing of their personhood. The first way, described above, is that wymyn serve “symbolically and literally, as that which requires protection” (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 138 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116-7). Second, wymyn’s roles as mothers are crucial to war-making and war-fighting. Femininity is crucially tied to “bearing and rearing children on the homefront” (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 116).4 These expectations are institutionalized in international law and international legal discourse related to non-combatant immunity in war. Because wymyn need to raise soldiers, they need to be protected from the soldiers who are fighting around them.5 Wymyn are seen as ‘bearers of the collective’ who pass on us/them boundaries and serve as biological and cultural reproductive agents; peaceful, but producing war (Yuval- Davis 1997, 22-3, 26). This leads to the exploration of a third element of wymyn’s expected gender roles in warfare: as the [wrong and ignored] pacifist force (Elshtain 1987b, 4). Virginia Conover and Michael Sapiro explain the salience of the understanding o f wymyn as pacifists. They recount that “for centuries the dominant gender images of war have been limited and relatively stable. Men are the militarists and perpetrators; women are the pacifists and victims. Men start the wars; women try to stop them” (Conover and Sapiro 1993, 1079). Wymyn are believed to be less competitive and more focused on equality and interdependence, and thus more interested in peace (Gidengil 1995; Welch and Hibbing 1992; Miller 1999).6 Beautiful souls’ peacefulness, then, is a quality to be respected, but one 4 Elshtain explains that “mothers figure centrally in this dream o f civic unity, but not as citizens; rather as mothers o f citizens-to-be and mothers-to-be o f citizens (1987b, 69). Wymyn, then, are important to wars, but only secondarily, in their role o f reproductively producing men to fight in those wars. Sara Ruddick explains that wymyn are expected to shape men who are capable o f and interested in fulfilling their expected roles as warrior- heroes (1989, 18). 5 A number o f scholars have documented that there is an emphasis in the non-combatant immunity campaigns on mothering (Beigbeder 2001; Goonsekere 1992; Save the Children 2002). In the laws o f war, the rights o f women and children to be protected from the fighting are often in practice (and in foundation) reliant on motherhood; the rights o f women and children are often the rights o f women with children (Save the Children 2002, 12). Charlotte Hooper explains that this image is part o f a symbolic dimension o f war which perpetuates gender dichotomies; that it supports the image that men take lives as soldiers while wymyn give lives as mothers (2001, 81). 6 Berkman that the womyn-pacifist gender role expectation has always been present, but is more dominant in modem times than previously, when images o f motherhood and fertility dominated the gender-role expectations 139 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. which cannot be sustained without warriors fighting for it. According to the gender roles assigned by just war, wymyn must be both peaceful and cooperative with the wars fought to protect their peacefulness. The story of these expectations, however, is one not of a biological tendency towards peacefulness, but of the social construction of and indoctrination into gender roles. This construction seems to work, research shows. There is a ‘gender gap’ in support for most contemporary wars. Conover and Sapiro recognize that wymyn were less supportive of the First Gulf War than were men, if narrowly so (1993, 1089). Scholars document a consistent fifteen to twenty percent ‘gender gap’ in opinions about twentieth century wars, though research show that gap narrowing in contemporary times as more men object to war and more wymyn favor it (Peach, 1994; Branscombe and Owen 1993; Baxter and Lansing 1983, 56-7). There is evidence that demonstrates substantial conformity to gender-role expectations, even in societies with reasonably high feminist consciousness (Branscombe and Owen 1993). Wymyn, constructed as objectors to war, objected. As discursive possibilities for non-objector roles open up, however, more wymyn favor war (Conover and Sapiro 1993). C. DIRTY WHORES There is one last gender-role expectation for wymyn in war which is not discussed nearly as openly as the others. While the expectation that wymyn serve as the ‘protected’ in war is generally openly discussed (or at the very least implied) in discourses of wymyn’s roles in warfare, other expectations of wymyn’s service are every bit as real. The ‘good wymyn’ serve as beautiful souls and mothers, but the masculinist war machine relies heavily for wymyn (1990,142). Still, Joshua Goldstein traces the image o f womyn-as-peacemakers into ancient times, noting the masculine creation o f this feminine stereotype and expectation. 140 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on the existence of ‘bad wymyn’ to serve as men’s prostitutes in times of warfare. Katherine Moon engages in what she characterizes as an attempt to improve “feminist analysis of foreign policy by asking when, how, and why governments use women, not just gendered ideology, as instruments of foreign policy, how specific uses affect women’s lives, and if participation in the political process politicizes women’s self-identities” (1997, 12). Studying the lives of wymyn who ‘work for’ United States military encampments in South Korea, Moon argues that military prostitution ought to be included in scholars’ (and activists’) understandings of expected gender roles in times of war and peace, and seen as relevant to international security theory (1997, 11). Moon contends that “there are explicit connections between guns and bombs (or spears and canons) and women and that to a great extent, the relationship has been sexually defined” (1997, 49). Not only are wymyn from the soldiers’ countries expected to be of sexual service to those soldiers, military prostitutes are recruited as an army conquers a ‘foreign’ land. In this atmosphere, “conquering nations and colonizing nations imposed their sexual demands on colonized women” (Moon 1997, 50). Moon argues that the role of womyn-as-whore is an expectation of femininity which values wymyn even less than that of the beautiful soul, and receives even less attention, yet is still a very real part o f militarism and war, as well as gender role expectations therein. She contends that, in addition to understanding ‘normal wymyn’ as political beings, “we need to begin viewing even the most dispossessed women as ‘players’ in world politics” (Moon 1997, 52). II. ABSTRACT VIOLENCE Feminisms argue that the most gender-insidious aspects of political life (and in this case of just war) are those that are omitted from discussion. Silence eliminates possibilities for argument, consideration, and critique. In this spirit, feminisms criticize the abstraction 141 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that plagues both the theoretical tenets and the empirical use of jus in bello standards. Just war theories presuppose their own externality, but that presupposition leads to vagueness and ambiguity (Hauerwas 1992a, 99). Jean Elshtain explains that “alas, much just war argumentation is enormously abstract, featuring recondite discussions about double effects, collateral damage, and so on” (1992b, 45). Lucinda Peach explains that just war theories have a “tendency to abstraction and to dichotomize reality in accordance with gendered distinctions; and the priority it accords to the state and state authority vis-a-vis the individual” (1994, 155-6). Current scholarship is embedded in Cartesian objectivity, “based on dispassion and detachment,” which abstracts suffering (Nelson 1993, 25). Betty Reardon contends that the values that are associated with femininity, and the moral principles associated with feminisms, as a general rule “tend to be more personal and less abstract than masculine values” (1985, 31). Her argument opens up space for the exploration of feminisms as corrective to just war theories’ abstractions. There are a number of ways in which just war theories betray harmful abstraction, involving the abstraction of war, the dehumynization of those who suffer in war, and the depersonalization of the ethical standards of just war theories. First, just war theories are rarely employed to analyze wars that are actually going on; instead, they is employed either to analyze wars that have happened in the past, to analyze hypothetical situations, or to justify political decisions that have already been made. Lucinda Peach explains that “just-war theorists tend to couch their analyses in terms of hypotheticals rather than with reference to actual conflicts” (Peach 1994, 158). Carol Gilligan suggests that not dealing with current wars causes “denial of suffering because it replaces actual lives with hypothetical people” (1977, 511; Peach 1994, 159). Feminisms recognize the importance of context in order to identify and account for the needs of 142 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. individuals and collectives. Lucinda Peach argues that just war theorists’ ‘abstracting out’ real war leads to three identifiable harms: “a neglect of the horrors of war and its effects on individual bodies,” “a perception of the enemy as ‘Other’,” and a fixation on the principle of justice over the actuality of need (1994, 148). In other words, talking about war without directly addressing its potential to destroy millions of lives is harmful because it allows those lives to be destroyed in an intellectual and policy forum that has the privilege of ignoring the suffering. In these abstract narratives, the state becomes “the symbolic substitute for the individual (Steans 1998, 49; Cohen 2001). The state is built on a model of abstract masculinity “characterized by a need for a singular identity, for a separation and denial of relatedness” (Steans 1998, 57). Feminisms contend that scholars and practitioners need to pay attention both to the structure and the status of dichotomies in rhetoric and action, instead of allowing abstraction to continue (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 39). The perpetuation of denial of relatedness allows wars to be talked about as games, or exercises, or stories, rather than as immediate humynitarian disasters. It further allows an ‘act now, think later’ mentality about justice in war, which is both ethically questionable and potentially materially harmful. As Chris Cuomo documents, “the abstraction o f the particularities of war depends on the abstraction of war itself’ (1996, 36). Feminisms pay attention to continuity and relational understandings. Instead of abstraction, “the lesson of feminist institutionalism is that cultural reality must be reinterpreted according to the principles of continuity, antidualism, and historical substance” (Jennings 1993, 125). This reinterpretation will allow for concrete implementation. Second, failing to talk about the suffering of the ‘enemy’ in frank terms abstracts it in a way that makes that suffering politically acceptable (Cohn 1993; Der Derian 2001). For 143 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. example, the term ‘collateral damage’ is a cold and sterile one, but refers to civilian losses inflicted accidentally in war. Instead of saying “a bomb just [accidentally] blew seven people to bits and then bombed their houses fifteen feet into the ground while their relatives watched the remains of their bodies spatter over their former homes,” just war discourse says, “collateral damage was inflicted.” This abstraction allows the perpetrator o f the damage not to acknowledge the humyn suffering involved. Instead o f talking about people, just war theories talk about targets. Jean Elshtain explains “one basic task of a state at war is to portray the enemy in terms as absolute and abstract as possible in order to distinguish as sharply as possible the act o f killing from the act of murder” (1985, 50; Peach 1994, 159; Ruddick 1989, 150). Baudrillard provides a detailed account of the implications: There is a profound scorn in the kind of ‘clean’ war which renders the other powerless without destroying its flesh, which makes it a point o f honour to disarm and neutralize but not to kill.... In this manner, the Americans inflict a particular insult by not making war on the other, but simply eliminating him, the same as one would not by bargaining over the price o f an object and thereby refusing any personal relationship with the vendor. The one whose price you accept without discussion despises you. The one whom you disarm without seeing is insulted and must be avenged. There is perhaps something of this in the presentation o f those humiliated captives on television. In a sense it says to America: you who do not wish to see us, we will show you what you are like .... The idea o f a clean war, like that of a clean bomb or an intelligent missile, this whole war conceived as a technological extrapolation of the brain is a sure sign of madness .... A war enclosed in a glass coffin, like Snow White, purged o f any carnal contamination or warrior’s passion. A clean war which ends up in an oil slick (Baudrillard 1995). Instead, feminisms insist on talking about the suffering that war causes. Kathy Ferguson explains that “praxis feminisms focus on affirmative intersubjective connections between persons rather than on autonomous or combative selves,” which would cause them to suggest that the harms of war be talked about in relational, rather than abstract, terms (1993, 69). Feminisms also have a concern that the voices of those disempowered by 144 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. particular political situations be heard. An individual who suffers as the result of a war is generally not heard or recognized as such; casualties are numbers, or, at the very best, laundry lists. Feminisms’ concern for humyn security and personal politics critique this practice, and asks just war theories to ‘humynize’ discussions about enemies and casualties. Elshtain explains that just war should be less available for the purpose o f wielding abstract hatred, and more focused on the limitation and bounding o f international conflict (1985, 50). The rhetoric of traditional just war is riddled with “us v. them,” “inside v. outside,” and “public v. private” dichotomizations, which reify abstractions and leave little room for humyn contingency (Tickner 1991; Peach 1994). Many o f the standards of just war theories, and the values which support the existence of these standards, are depersonalized such that they talk about states, their weapons, their military choices, and their strength, but often gloss over talking about their people, individually or collectively. Robin Schott expresses concern that, in just war theories, “concerns and feelings that express an emotional awareness o f the human reality behind the sanitized abstractions o f death and destruction become marked as feminine, and thus are difficult to both speak and hear” (Schott 1996, 24). Yet these concerns are the core of a feminist approach to the understanding o f (just) war, which this project contends is a more productive way to see ethics in war. IR feminisms can put just war theory in touch with issues of impact and justice in a way that it currently is not, by updating it and calling its attention to gender and marginalization. Tickner explains that feminisms in IR are grounded in humynistic accounts of social relations (2001). This humynism is both ‘humanism’ in the traditional sense and humynism in the sense of ‘humynizaton’ or of bringing a ‘hum yn’ dynamic to a field preoccupied with states and other abstractions. 145 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The abstractions o f just war theories are those that Baudrillard would classify as ‘operative,’ abstractions which promote fictionalization and the alienation o f the operative from the real and referent-based existences in political and social interactions (1976). These operative abstractions substitute for realities in a way that realities can no longer be said to exist (or matter) in the process of making policy choices, considering options, and seeing the world (Baudrillard 1976). Instead, abstractions operate as if they are reality, influencing decision-making and appearing to be factual, such that we lose touch with even the very notion of distinction between abstraction and reality (Baudrillard 1976). This is what feminisms fear may happen if the abstractions of hypothetical wars, victimless battles, and ungrounded values maintain the operative understandings used as factual for the purposes of international decision-making as regards violent conflict. Instead, feminisms point out the complexities of self-other relationships, the realities of humyn (in)securities and sufferings, and the necessity for values grounded in humyn (as opposed to hegemonic masculine) experience. Carol Cohn points out that it is not only the abstraction of just war rhetoric that is gendered, but the language itself. Cohn is a feminist security theorist who works, partly, on understanding the gendered nature of the discourse of the community of defense intellectuals, or academics and practitioners who plan the military strategy of the United States. She spent time immersed in the everyday practices of these defense professionals, learning their language and its meanings. She sees genderings o f defense discourses on a number o f levels. First, there is a language of manliness in war. She talks o f weapons sexualization, from discussions o f ‘deep penetrating’ missiles to the opponents’ ‘inner sanctum’ (Cohn 1987). Further, Cohn describes the language of missile construction and invention as a language of male birth and creation (1987, 700). A second gendered property 146 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the discourse o f defense intellectuals is a discourse of femininity, used to make war seem masterable. Cohn talks about the language of cleanliness in war as an example. First, she explains that the discourses of cleanliness is pervasive in defense language: Such phrases can even seem healthful/curative/corrective. So that we not only have ‘clean bombs’ but also ‘surgically clean strikes’ (‘counterforce’ attacks that can purportedly ‘take out’ - i.e., accurately destroy - an opponent’s weapons or command centers without causing significant injury to anything else). The image of excision o f the offending weapon is unspeakably ludicrous when the surgical tool is not a delicately controlled scalpel but a nuclear warhead. And somehow it seems to be forgotten that even scalpels spill blood. (Cohn 1987, 692). Cohn explains that terms of cleanliness serve as a path to mastery for defense intellectuals, and that she unwittingly adopted the same test-vocabulary. She explains that these terms function “to domesticate, to tame the wild and uncontrollable forces o f nuclear destruction” (Cohn 1987, 707). Domestication of bombs, like domestication of wymyn, is associated with controllability. Cohn explains that these modes of discussion are “a way to make phenomena that are beyond what the mind can encompass smaller and safer, and thus they are a way o f gaining mastery over the unmasterable” (Cohn 1987, 707). The gendered sanitization of war discourses then at once depersonalize and shrink the impacts of war to the speaker, allowing abstract thought about warfare without personal fear, either of destruction or of monstrousness. Cohn explains that “the fire-breathing dragon under the bed, the one who threatens to incinerate your family, your town, your planet, becomes a pet you can pat” (Cohn 1987, 698). The gendering o f defense language has impacts outside o f the language’s existence, Cohn claims. First, she documents that the insidious discourse is contagious: she found herself speaking the languages she was critiquing as she learned them (1993). Second, she speaks of the experience of marginalization, if the language seems foreign or wrong. She 147 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. explains that if you do not speak the language, you are feminized and stupid in the eyes of the defense professional community (Cohn 1987, 707). Though she sees no evidence that defense professionals had ever heard feminist critiques o f warfare, she senses that they are discursively excluded from consideration (1987, 693). Third, she sees power in naming which leads to control; to the degree that she argues that current military naming should be delegitimized (Cohn 1987, 718). Finally, Cohn describes the harms of abstraction of military discourse. She explains that “for two weeks, I listened to men engage in dispassionate discussion of nuclear war. I found myself aghast, but morbidly fascinated” (Cohn 1987, 688). Cohn’s fascination was with “the extraordinary abstraction and removal from what I knew as reality that characterized the professional discourse” (Cohn 1987, 688). Discursive abstraction of the terms of warfare spreads past the defense community’s understandings of surgical warfare, as do its harms. III. GENDERED IMMUNITY Despite the abstraction inherent in just war theories, they have generally specified rules for combat engagement that include which weapons to use and who to target with them (Walzer 1977, 41). These questions are questions o f moral means (McKenna 1960, 651; Wells 1969. 821). Limited targeting in some form or another has been a part of the just war tradition since its beginnings. The utility of limited targeting is both limited suffering and an increased potential for peace (Walzer 1977,132; Giossi 2001). If jus in hello is about how to fight and who to target, the non-combatant immunity (or discrimination) principle is the part about who to target. Just war theories presuppose a distinction between those who are somehow innocent of the enemy offence, and those who are guilty of the enemy offense 148 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Gorry 2001,181). Different theorists and practitioners have different ideas about how to draw the line between innocent and guilty, and what to do with it once it is drawn.7 George Mavrodes contends that non-combatant immunity is not an independent rule but a part of a convention that limits violence, so its exact standards fluctuate with the laws governing a specific war (1975, 130). Fritz Kalshoven thinks that this interpretation is too complex, because “the combatant/non-combatant distinction means no more and no less than civilians get spared whenever war permits” (1973, 46). Robert Holmes sees a confounding problem with these standards, however - they ignore that killing in war is morally equivalent to murder.8 Even Holmes’ interpretation, however, is far from uncontroversial. Controversies about the meaning and effectiveness of the discrimination principle carry through just war theories. A. MEANINGS OF IMMUNITY The first step towards protecting those who are innocent in a time of war is the ability to tell the difference between the innocent and the guilty by making a distinction.9 While making such a distinction is important, there is much debate on how to identify innocence (Marvrodes 1975, 121; Hartigan 1982, 35). Jenny Teichman proposes that it is acceptable to equate innocence with harmlessness and guilt with danger (1986, 66). Richard 7 Walzer draws the general guiding principle that “a legitimate act o f war is one that does not violate the rights of the people against whom it is directed” (Walzer 1977,135). But the question o f what these rights are remains somewhat perplexing. Walzer explains “belligerent armies are entitled to try to win their wars, but they are not entitled to do anything that is or seems to them necessary to win. They are subject to a set o f restrictions that rest in part on the agreements o f states but also have an independent foundation in moral principle” (Walzer 1977, 131). 8 He contends that the civilian/combatant distinction makes it almost impossible to wage war. He argues that, in order to kill someone in war, one must find murdering that person to be morally acceptable. While there are times that it is possible to justify murdering soldiers, there are not times when it is possible to justify murdering civilians, and “unless one can justify the actions necessary to waging war, he cannot justify the conduct o f war and the pursuit o f its objectives; and if he cannot do this, he cannot justify going to war” (Holmes 228). 9 Richard Regan contends that the distinction should be rather easy to make, between those who are and are not involved in the war. He argues that “enemy nationals not engaged in the war or contributing to waging the war are committing no wrong against the victim nation, and so the victim nation has no just cause to target such nationals” (Regan 1996, 87). Regan’s certainty is deceptive, however, as a standard to determine who is engaged in or contributing to waging a war. 149 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hartigan provides an act-based model, where guilt is based on acting guilty and innocent is judged by resistance (1982, 50, 118). These interpretations entirely avoid the question of consent, and have some internal problems as well - such as the question of what acts constitute guilt. A narrow conception would say that only fighting in the war would make guilt, while a broad conception might include those who work in war-supporting industries. Also, act-based guilt is necessarily taken out o f context: The utilitarian answer, that the life of an innocent party is of more social value than that o f a guilty party, will not do, first because it is not always true, second because anyway the social value of a whole life cannot be known before it is over, and third because that which is inalienable cannot be overridden (Teichman 1986, 73). Act-based models o f guilt ignore intent as well, Teichman argues.1 0 Still, Kalshoven observes that international consensus often assigns combatant status to all who take part in the hostilities, whether they do so on the battlefield or in a supporting role like advertising, industry, or government (1973, 35). Some argue that the working class ought to be counted as combatants because they make the war possible for the enemy (Calhoun 2002, 44). This is problematic, though, because people who work for war-supporting industries may be doing so in the normal course of making a living (Kalshoven 1973, 38-9). In this case, there is a question whether their acts count as belligerent because they did not specifically consent to the war. Michael Walzer takes breaches of consent that create combatant status as particularly grave. He observes that “war is hell whenever men are forced to fight, whenever the limit of consent is breached” (Walzer 1977, 28). He argues that in situations where 1 0 Teichman also explores an analogy between guilt and innocence in the law o f war and in the law o f criminal courts. She explains that, in criminal law, guilt requires not just the deed but either intent or negligence (Teichman 1986, 44). In the criminal law interpretation, guilt means both objective injury and guilty mind, she notes; translation to war means that most people fighting wars are innocent, because their mind holds the belief that they are doing right, not wrong (Teichman 1986, 64). 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. combatants have not consented to their combatant status, their moral status resembles that of innocents. Walzer suggests: The moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the same: they are led to fight by their loyalty to their own states and by their lawful obedience. They are most likely to believe that their wars are just, and while the basis o f that belief is not necessarily rational inquiry but, more often, a kind of unquestioning acceptance of official propaganda, nevertheless they are not criminals, they face one another as moral equals” (Walzer 1977, 127). The question of who qualifies as ‘innocent’ or ‘non-combatant’ for the purposes of immunity from war-fighting is a complex one, which is heavily debated among just war traditions. This is not the only question of meaning, however. The second question o f meaning is one of the meaning of ‘immunity.’ Michael Walzer’s theory of non-combatant immunity is based on the argument that there are rights inalienable to humyn beings; these cannot be taken away without active participation in war on the part of the individual. In other words, people have positive rights that they must actively cede by going into battle. Here, noncombatants are “men and women with rights and they cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate purpose” (Walzer 1977, 137). Here, immunity means the right not to be used for a military purpose. To George Mavrodes, immunity means that civilian deaths can never morally be an intended consequence of a military action (1975, 119). Here, even military advantage is not a legitimate reason to involve the innocent in the horrors of war (Walzer 1977, 114; Hartigan 1982, 50). Most jus in bello theories agree that civilians cannot be attacked, but disagree on accidental or inadvertent harm of civilian lives and/or property. Jeff McMahan deals with the issue o f refusing to save the lives of enemy civilians, arguing that to let die and to kill 151 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. have different moral qualities.1 1 Still, an army engaging in activities that indirectly end the lives of civilians is morally culpable in McMahan’s eyes. Others are not so black-and-white about the occasions when military action injures innocents, despite those innocents not being targeted. The foundational just war principle to deal with this issue is ‘double effect.’ Thomas Smith introduces the principle, explaining that it hails from as far back in history as Aquinas, and “holds that even foreseen bad consequences are acceptable so long as they are unintended” (2002, 360; Johnson 1984, 32). The most basic requirement of the double effect principle is intent. An action with a double effect in this context has both a morally defensible (military target) effect and a morally questionable (usually civilian) effect. The intent must always be focused on the morally defensible target. Hare and Joynt lay out the principle of double effect in one of its more basic forms: The principle of double effect sets to separate the intended effect of an action from the anticipated effect that may result as consequences o f that action. Hence, ‘unintended side effects are permissible even if they are foreseen, as long as the intention is good in itself and the permitted evils are not disproportionate to the intended benefits (Hare and Joynt 1982, 6). This is the very interpretation that Baudrillard is attacking above. O f course, in this understanding, the just-war fighter would intend death proportional to the threat, and would only target and intend to kill combatants (Wells 1969, 826). According to the doctrine of 1 1 McMahan gives examples o f a firefighter who chooses to save two lives at the expense o f letting one person die, which is not killing, but prioritizing. Still, he explains that the barrier between killing and letting die is not complete and self-sustaining, but hybridized and situational (McMahan 1993, 256). If an army is in an occupied territory and a civilian who was sick before the occupation dies o f cancer without the army’s health care assistance, the army has moral culpability, but not equivalent to the moral culpability it would have had it attacked that civilian. But if an army is targeting a munitions factory, and knows it will also hit the house next door with civilians in it, and does it anyway, McMahan contends that is killing. He gives the guideline that “when one takes positive action which indirectly causes death but is known to, its killing” (McMahan 1993, 259). An army engaging in activities which indirectly end the lives o f civilians is morally culpable for killing in McMahan’s eyes. 152 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. double effect, “the killing o f non-combatants incidental to the prosecution of a necessary military operation in a justified war may also be morally acceptable (Philips 1984, 30). The standards o f double effect are explicitly laid out in a number o f works on just war. Generally, they include that the intent must be only directed towards the morally good consequence, that the evil effects are not intended means to a morally good end, and that on balance the effects ware more good than evil (Phillips 1984, 31; Gorry 2000, 179; Regan 1996, 96; Walzer 1977, 153; Yoder 1996, 59).1 2 John Howard Yoder adds a final standard to the principle of double effect: that the act which causes the double effect cannot itself be morally wrong.1 3 There is substantial controversy among just war theorists about the validity of the principle of double effect. Yoder sees it as a dangerous precedent because the logic can be used to defend just war theories, or to defend breaking the rules of just war.1 4 If one were to look at the entirety of just war theories through the in bello principle of double effect, war would never be morally permissible. Certainly, a war could be fought where the intent was morally acceptable and the good outweighed the evil. It is the intermediate standard that the existence of war necessarily fails. The evil (war) cannot be used as a means to the good (the just cause/right intent). This contradiction weakens the internal validity and external applicability o f any theory of just war. 1 2 Robert Phillips provides an example, using the case o f drilling teeth. He explains that drilling teeth for medical reasons is painful, but the pain is a collateral effect (Phillips 1984, 45). This action passes the double effect test. On the other hand, drilling teeth as torture for the purposes o f extracting information fails the double effect test (Phillips 1984, 45). Here, the pain is a means to the (possible morally defensible) ends, which is in direct violation o f the idea that the evil must be collateral effect, instead o f means. 1 3 The other standards about double effect are wrapped up in a combination o f intent and consequentialism, while this standard adds an element o f deontological judgment to the equation. Here, one must evaluate the action in question not only for its intent and consequences, but for its independent moral worth. This adds an additional restriction to standards for harming civilians, which makes the standard more difficult to meet. 1 4 He sees it as a downward spiral into in bello and ad bellum moral permissibility, which directly contradicts the intent ofju s in bello rules to limit the horrors o f warfare (Yoder 1996, 59). John Gorry argues that misuse o f the principle o f double effect can cause a severance o f the relationship between means and ends in warfare, which would also lead to a dangerous atmosphere o f a lack o f moral accountability (Gorry 2000, 180). 153 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Still, there are those who defend the double effect standard as an appropriate way of looking at how to deal with the potential for civilian casualties in war situations. Smith reminds us that the principle of double effect is a stricter standard than existing international law concerning the immunity o f non-combatants. He recounts that, “as it stands, the International Criminal Court poses no obstacle to modem warfare as long as civilian casualties are unintentional or indirect” (Smith 2002, 359). He clarifies that international law makes it illegal to target civilians, but not to harm them without targeting them, regardless of intent or means. On this standard, Smith argues, any further strictness would be an improvement. B. EFFECTIVENESS OF IMMUNITIES Some scholars argue that all of this consideration about standards of in bello discrimination comes to naught because the principles of non-combatant immunity are either ignored or impossible to follow in practice. This is the argument that, while the protection of innocents in a time o f war is a nice standard or idea, it is either outdated, fuzzy, unclear, or impracticable (Brudelein 2001; Greenwood 1993; Slim 2003). Richard Hartigan argues that the question of non-combatant immunity is often ignored or directly violated in war, and that common and conventional legal provisions are often disregarded.1 5 The argument that the commitment to non-combatant immunity is not real or complete is evident in the work o f international lawyer Judith Gardham. She contends that standards for the protection of innocents in war have never been absolute. She explains that “the immunity of noncombatants from the effects of warfare is not, and has never been regarded as, absolute. Some civilian casualties have always been tolerated as a consequence 1 5 He contends that this poses a fundamental problem for non-combatant immunity both in theory and in practice, as “it is obvious that if practice does not coincide with theory, something is wrong, either commitment to norms is not real or is not possible” (Hartigan 1981, 7). 154 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of military action” (Gardam 1993a, 398).1 6 Nonetheless, Yoder points out that there is a strong drift towards the permissive use of necessity, which demonstrates a lack of honest commitment to the principles of discrimination. Another situation in which belligerents have shown a less-than-firm commitment to the standard of in bello discrimination is when they have an argument that the opponent acted in a way that was in violation of the rules of discrimination, so the side which has yet to violate those rules is no longer obligated to them. Regan notes that “belligerents have a self-interest in observing international conventions governing war conduct; their failure to do so would invite enemy retaliation in kind,” but it becomes cyclical when one party breaks the perceived rules (1996, 99). All of these situations seem to bring into question actors’ commitments to the standards o f jus in bello. Even were belligerents committed to the principle of discrimination, a number of scholars question whether or not they would be able to protect non-combatants from the horrors of war. Higher degrees of immunity in theory are difficult to reach in practice (Kalshoven 1973, 85; Gardam 1992, 814; Clouse 1981). Judith Gardam explains the evolving impracticality of discrimination because of the evolution of total warfare: The practices of the First World War caused disquiet about the protection of civilians in future armed conflicts, but it was the Second World War that led to intense pessimism on the part of many commentators, some of whom claimed that the distinction between combatants and noncombatants had disappeared (Gardam 1993b, 401). 1 6 Thomas Smith supports this claim, observing that “distinctions between military and civilian targets are notoriously malleable” (2002, 361; Wells 1969, 827). Further, a number o f scholars contend that those who feel their war is ad bellum just often ignore the standards o f in bello behavior. Specifically, John Howard Yoder argues that claims o f non-combatant immunity are often ignored in the face o f the strong claim o f ad bellum justice combined with military necessity to achieve an ad bellum goal. He explains that, “often, ‘military necessity’ means that an otherwise-applicable rule can be discarded because it would be disadvantageous to the goal o f winning the war (Yoder 1996, 27). 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Richard Regan goes so far as to argue that the existence of modem warfare makes the principle of discrimination not only difficult but impossible to implement, despite the best intentions o f departments of defense. (1996). The risk comes either from the impossibility or strategic impracticality of distinguishing civilian and military targets in a war where whole societies (instead of just professional soldiers) are involved (Gardam 1993b, 355). William O ’Brien contends that, in a world where there are nuclear weapons and aerial wars, non-combatant immunity is impossible and therefore “tantamount to pacifism” and should be discarded (1969, 248ff). In order to discriminate effectively, soldiers would have to meet each other in combat, which is outdated in the practice of war-fighting (Wells 1969, 827). Many o f the wars in the 20th century were aerial wars, making discrimination substantially more difficult.1 7 Kenneth Vaux notes the impossibility of following rues of engagement in guerilla war, as it is difficult if possible to distinguish combatants from non- combatants, and even more difficult to make sure that the combatants are the only ones injured (1992, 137).1 8 James Turner Johnson notes that ideological warfare has become more popular, which makes in bello discrimination less influential (1999). Ideological wars against civilians multiple, and combatants see their moral cause as more valuable than the lives of the opponents. Still, the principle of discrimination has not disappeared; it has evolved interpretively. Technological advances of the 1990s led to an increased potential for 1 7 Gorry characterizes aerial warfare as technologically advanced hostage-holding, where the captor shoots some of the hostages (2000, 182). Haritgan shares Gorry’s concern, worrying that the airplane destroyed the conventional notion o f no interfering with civilians. 1 8 This sort o f war, Michael Walzer contends, necessarily endangers civilians, and we can only ask soldiers to minimize, not eliminate, that risk (1997,156). Richard Hartigan blames this in bello difficulty for the unprecedented proportion o f civilian deaths in the Vietnam war (1981, 130). Judith Gardam laments the degree to which guerilla warfare necessitates civilian involvement in war. She explains that “modem warfare, particularly the expansion o f guerilla warfare, has exposed the civilian population to the effects o f warfare to an unprecedented extent, and has proven extremely difficult to regulate” (Gardam 1992, 815). 156 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. discrimination based on smart weapons and surveillance technology. Johnson argues that “wars can be waged while avoiding means and methods that are grossly and disproportionately destructive” (Johnson 1984, 19; Smith 2002, 355). George Wiegel also notes that more sophisticated weapons are capable of reviving discrimination through precision targeting (Wiegel 1992, 28; Tucker 1985, 470). Bryan Hehir introduces some problems with the assumption that precision targeting resolves discrimination problems. He explains that “the Pentagon’s legal narrative is certainly detached from the carnage on the ground, but it also oversimplifies and even actively obscures the moral choices included in aerial bombing” (1996, 370). In other words, the assertion that a battle was fought with precision targeting tends to end the analysis of whether or not that battle was fought with just means, though the reality is not that simple. Instead, precision weapons may still miss, may have side effects, or may be targeted immorally. Tucker admits that precision-guided munitions are indeed a “double- edged sword” because they give the illusion of having solved problems of fairness, discrimination, and security when indeed they have not (1985,470).1 9 A precision-guided missile targeted to hit a power-producing plant will not immediately kill very many civilians, but depending on dependency on that source, will have long-term effects on civilians’ lives. These effects range from inconvenience to mass death. Likewise, bombing a railway may not directly kill civilians, but it may stop them from getting to their jobs or getting their food. Finally, precision-targeting industry in an enemy territory may have long-term economic or health effects which amount to or surpass the 1 9 Kenneth Vaux describes that the technology o f precision warfare creates challenges for just war, as “the cleanliness o f a surgical attack has proved to be more like obstetrical care,” yet the discourse o f cleanliness appears to be an open-and-shut answer to questions o f just war (1992, 28). 157 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. harm that could be caused by the direct targeting of civilians in war.2 0 These targets, called dual-use targets, are often treated as unambiguously military.2 1 Even following the discrimination principle, civilians may be hurt severely. C. FEMINIST CRITIQUES AND REFORMULATIONS This section begins with a partial and rather controversial (even within the feminist community) critique of the non-combatant immunity principle. It takes this critique as a springboard to draw out a deeper feminist analysis of the immunity principle. Finally, it reformulates non-combatant immunity through gendered lenses. Charli Carpenter documents that understandings of non-combatant immunity reify expected gender roles in conflict situations, while failing to adequately achieve their goals. “Specifically, ‘protection of civilians’ as an international issue has been framed in such a way as to reproduce the notion that ‘women and children’ are ‘innocent’ and ‘vulnerable’” (Carpenter 2003b, 3).2 2 Carpenter contends that the first problem with this understanding of the category o f civilians is that it is inaccurate. She explains that “the ‘civilians’ frame has been distorted by reliance on proxy - ‘women and children’ - that both encompasses some combatants (female and child soldiers) and excludes some non-combatants (adult civilian men)” (Carpenter 2003b, 3).2 3 This unrepresentative discourse has real harms, Carpenter 20 Richard Regan documents that, in the era o f precision-targeting, it has become acceptable to target the infrastructure in enemy territory, which goes to the heart o f social welfare (1996, 90). 2 1 Fritz Kalshoven notes that the Institute du Droit International defines military targets as having specific military uses, as opposed to playing a general supporting role. He explains that military targets “make an effective contribution to military action, or exhibit a generally recognized military significance, such that their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances gives a substantial, specific, and immediate military advantage” (Kalshoven 1973, 54-5). Kalshoven argues that this interpretation o f acceptable targets is much more humane and loyal to the principle o f discrimination than a more permissive one. 2 2 This can be seen as a specific extension o f Elshtain’s idea that wymyn are classified as beautiful souls to the work on non-combatant immunity. The innocent civilian has been a gendered construction since the at least the Enlightenment, and likely further back in history (Elshtain 1987b; Kinsella 2003; Carpenter 2003a; Gardam and Charlesworth 2002; Gardam and Jervis 2001). 2 3 There is substantial evidence that wymyn and children sometimes fight in wars as combatants, mostly outside the United States (Carpenter 2003b; Bennett et al 1995; Lindsey 2001; Smith 1997). There is also evidence that 158 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contends. A strong history of civilian protection means that these norms are often taken seriously, and that the gender of civilians is taken for granted (Roberts 2001; Rummel 1994; Chalk and Johnasson 1990; Carr 2002). Carpenter points out that “a discourse that [unrepresentatively] promotes the use o f ‘woman’ as proxy for ‘civilian’ encourages belligerents to act contrary to the immunity norm itself’ (Carpenter 2003b, 3). This results both in ineffective enforcement of non-combatant immunity generally and in inadequate protection for civilian men, ‘men’ are conflated with combatants, and it is acceptable to kill combatants (Bruderlein 2001; Carpenter 2003a; Jones 2002; McKeogh 2002, Palmer- Femandez 1998).2 4 There is more (and less) going on here than the neglect of civilian men, however. Carpenter acknowledges a claim which will be discussed later in this section, that those understood to be wymyn are disproportionately affected by the long-term effects of armed violence (Carpenter 2003b; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003). Wymyn are also often disproportionately affected by the short-term results of wars, despite largely abstaining from participation therein (Karam 2001; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). Organizations campaigning for the enforcement of non-combatant immunity show wymyn in compromised positions and as the primary civilian victims of warfare, a representation that has some validity but is necessarily incomplete (Moeller 1998). Still, as Elshtain documented, the preponderance of wymyn in any given population are non-participants in war, and many of them object, while the preponderance of men in such a population are actual or potential fighters, protecting there exist civilian men, who do not participate in (or even often espouse) war-fighting, yet are at the risk in war, as often opponents perceive all men as potential combatants (Carpenter 2003b; Lindsey 2001; Jones 2000). 2 4 The Geneva Conventions specifically spare pregnant women and mothers o f children under five, but not fathers (Additional Protocol 1.76.3; II.6.4; Carpenter 2003b, 9; Lindsey 2001, 158). The disappearance o f men is assumed as a part o f the plight o f wymyn instead o f as a civilian protection issue in itself (Carpenter 2003b, 10). The purported protection o f vulnerable populations is gendered, and includes everyone except adult civilian men (Caversazio 2001; Carpenter 2003b). 159 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. non-participant wymyn (1987a). Wymyn’s non-participation has been throughout history mostly structural; men’s has been occasional. To look at the gendering of warfare, we must study it in a manner that looks at the entire ‘war system’ - the ways in which not only men and wymyn but masculinities and femininities are implicated in the war-making and war- fighting processes. It is here where Carpenter’s analysis could benefit from dialogue with other feminist perspectives. Carpenter laments that “’framing’ civilians as ‘women and children’ allows some non-civilians into the frame (female and child combatants) and pushes some civilians (adult civilian men and adolescent boys) out” (Carpenter 2003b, 11). She correctly points out that there are important exceptions to the gendered assumptions of the jus in bello standards in the theory, law, and practice of international conflict. It is not unreasonable for scholars to recognize that “the juxtaposition of men as fighters and women as civilians, both in text and photos, fails to recognize the danger to which male members of the civilian population are exposed and the role women play in the military” (Lindsey 2001, 64). Carpenter also correctly observes the strategic employment of gendered discourse to achieve prominence for non-combatant immunity priorities and rules (Risse 2000; Habermas 1986; Barnett 1999, 7; Carpenter 2003b, 4; Joachim 2003, 249; Snow et al 1986; Tarrow 1996; 1994; McAdam et al 1996; Swidler 1986).2 5 Still, there is more to these categories than (effective if not particularly representative) strategy. 2 5 Carpenter claims a number o f motivations for international actors, both in NGOs and IGOs, to oversimplify frames form non-combatant immunity discourse. She provides evidence that organizations distort these frames for the purposes of: insuring access to targets o f influence (Cutts 1999; DeMars 1997; Darst 2002; Carpenter 2003b; Minear 2001; Caversazio 2001); maintaining media alliances (Brauman 1993, 149; Carpenter 2003b; Moeller 1999; Rosenblatt 1996,130; Shiras 1996; Sudetic 1998,175; Reiff 1995, 201); appealing to donors and transnational publics (Joachim 2003; Carpenter 2003b; Snow et al 1986; Moeller 1999); and cultivating network partnerships (Carpenter 2003b; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Khagram et al 2002). 160 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gender roles within the fighting of a war cannot be understood isolated from the context of warfare more generally, the war in particular, and gender roles as they relate to both political situations (Stiehm 1999; 1982). In other words, an adequate understanding of the ways that those classified as men and those classified as wymyn both behave on the battlefield and are treated in battle cannot be obtained by looking at in bello behavior alone. Instead, the meanings o f these behaviors and their related categories must be seen as a result of the combination o f the construction of intersubjective meaning at the international level and of expected and actual gender roles in bringing about (and fighting) the particular war (Joachim 2003, Florini 2000, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Khagram et al 2002, Smith 1997). Gardam understands that the larger gendered context of warfare means that, not only are gendered constructs of non-combatant immunity not biased towards wymyn, they are biased against wymyn. She contends that non-combatant immunity norms have to point out that they protect wymyn because dignity between men is assumed, and because wymyn are seen as incapable of protecting themselves. She contends that wymyn are not protected by the current assumptions of civilian immunity norms and laws; instead, wymyn are generally oppressed by both their content and their implementation. She explains: Although in practice non-combatant immunity is the rule most relevant to the protection o f women, it would be a mistake to assume that the origins of the rule and its theoretical underpinnings are consistent with feminist concerns. Non- combatant immunity is a means o f containing or limiting violence. Although it can be regarded as based on principles of humanity, in reality it serves the purposes of the patriarchal State by keeping society stable and allowing the fighter to return to the hearth once the battle is finished. Its derivations are all gendered: from the chivalric tradition, based on the patronizing o f women, to the canonical doctrine which primarily protected the Church’s own to the exclusion o f women (Gardam 1993b, 355). These observations are reminiscent o f Elshtain’s assertion of the confining gender-role expectations assigned to those understood to be wymyn in a time o f conflict. This 161 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. understanding is evident in direct and indirect just war discourse coming out of global politics. For example, the issue of discrimination of targets has become a pressing concern in both popular and military discourse. Bombs ought to be built to avoid, and armies ought to be chastised when they do not avoid, injuring ‘womenandchildren,’ or innocents in conflict. In this situation, wymyn and children are seen as the weak and vulnerable, and men are fighting wars to protect them. The understanding of war that sees the just-warrior man defending the beautiful-soul womyn both relies on and perpetuates gender-oppressive social relations. When these understandings are taken into account, feminisms begin to see that the problem is not with non-combatant immunity’s neglect o f civilian men, but rather with the gendered assumptions behind both just war theory generally and non-combatant immunity specifically. This revelation begins a feminist deconstruction of the content o f jus in bello standards o f non-combatant immunity, as well as of the gendered assumptions of just war theories more generally. Eleanor O ’Gorman insists that feminisms begin to “challenge the binary logic of representations o f the relationships between wymyn and war” in a way that not only critiques the impacts of the dichotomies but also problematizes the ideal (O’Gorman 1999, 95; Lloyd 1996, 164; Ashworth and Swatuck 1998, 76). I contend that a feminist revision of the non-combatant immunity principle is a necessary step on the path to such a challenge. I propose this reformulation: In the conduct of war, before and regularly during the fighting, political entities must engage in critical reconstruction of the combatant/non-combatant dichotomy, using the combination of responsibility-for and impact-on approaches in order to choose targets and understand damages. A number o f feminists criticize how the non-combatant immunity principle is applied, but argue that the principle itself is valuable. This project argues that it is actually 162 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. problems with the way that the principle is framed that contribute to these insidious applications. I contend that the very assumptions on which the non-combatant immunity principle is based are flawed and problematic, and require reformulation. The immunity principle’s genderings are a continuing feature of a principle which holds an inadequate understanding of the complexities o f the ethics of who is targeted in and who dies in warfare. There are three parts of the non-combatant immunity principle which require reconstruction: first, the labels of combatant and non-combatant; second, interpretations of immunity from warfare; third, the gendered bases on which amnesty is determined. The first problem to be addressed the implications of the inaccuracy of the labels ‘combatant’ and ‘non-combatant’ (or their close parallels of ‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’ in just war discourses). The term “combatant” is negative distinction; it is generally defined by what one is not, as opposed to what one is; by appearances rather than queries into meanings. This reformulation argues that someone considered a combatant for the purpose of targeting them in a war should at the very least be someone who is active in that war with affirmative consent to the cause of the side on which they are fighting.2 6 The identification of combatants thus seems to have two parts: participation and affirmative consent. The standard o f affirmative consent also demonstrates that someone can cease to be a combatant in a war by withdrawing their consent to the fighting. Withdrawal of consent means withdrawal of combatant status. Still, there are complications to the question of combatant status that feminisms must address. Most clearly, the question of tacit consent in democracy arises. Is a citizen of a democracy a 26 In other words, someone is not a combatant because they fail to take up arms against the side o f the war opposite the just warrior. Someone is not a combatant because they continue to function in their everyday lives despite the existence o f the war. Further, someone is not a combatant if they are being forced to fight in the war. This may be difficult to implement exactly in practice, when faced with a war fighting against a conscripted military. Still, the existence o f the principle itself creates more hope for its implementation. 163 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. combatant in a war she opposes because she pays her taxes and participates in the political workings of that nation? These questions are best answered with reference to the position of individuals in those societies. No nation is truly democratic, and there are those ‘citizens’ in a democracy whose voices do not count, who dwell, in some way or another, in the margins. Those people cannot be classified as combatants for paying their taxes not to go to jail, despite opposition to a war that they are not participating in. The lines become more blurry, however, as we see citizens with more influence in the political process. Feminisms prioritize the situation of the marginalized, and of the domestic, because of that, they generally err on the side of caution in the classification of combatants and non-combatants. Still, I understand the very terms ‘combatant’ and ‘non-combatant’ imply ‘those with weapons’ and ‘those without weapons’ in a way that it is not possible to get past when attempting to construct a fair interpretation of just targeting in wartime. These dichotomies (and the corresponding dichotomy of wymyn and men) are unrepresentative enough to be insidious. They do not take into account the complexities of consent, relational autonomy, and political choice in a way that allows true distinction between ‘those who ought to be held liable for the war’ and ‘those who ought not be liable for the war.’ The non-combatant immunity principle fails to make the distinctions that it is created to distinguish; the result is that wartime effects on ‘non-combatants’ are often ignored, or considered under the principle of double effect.2 7 2 7 The principle o f double-effect allows for the (near-complete) side-stepping o f the promise o f limited damage to those not culpable for the war. It does so by allowing damage to non-combatants if and only if it is a side effect of actions which are otherwise intended to deal with military targets. Expediency often allows this principle to win out, meaning that the only real restriction on damage to non-combatants is that it is unintentional, and that is not grossly outweigh any military benefit o f the action. This is an inadequate standard which allows for substantial harm even to those who are classified as non-combatants. 164 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants pretends that we can tell who is fighting a war and who is not; it pretends that we can make those distinctions; and it pretends that classifying combatants and noncombatants will ‘protect’ those who are not fighting in a war from the war. It further pretends that deeply flawed attempts to protect non-combatants can be remedied - that the distinction and (non-continuous) compliance with the norm not to intentionally target civilians would be enough to give non-combatants the shelter that they need. Instead, the distinction makes it seem like it is possible to figure out who goes on each side of it, which makes the problem of who gets hurt in war seem like it is easier than in actuality it could be. The distinction between combatant and non- combatant then, in its own way, abstracts decision-making about suffering (and the suffering itself) in war time. Another way in which the non-combatant immunity principle demonstrates insidious abstraction is in the use of the term ‘immunity,’ which is false and misleading. First, most just war theories do not recognize the full immunity of those classified as non-combatants. The double-effect principle is usually adhered to; civilian ‘collateral damage’ is tolerated. Attempts to minimize direct attacks against civilians have been hybridized in the wars of the late 20th century: direct ground attacks on civilians have been infrequent, but many worry that air wars are wars generally against civilians, and that civilian casualties could be lessened if ground wars were fought instead. The argument is that the strategic decision of air war-fighting is a decision to value military lives over civilian lives, and that any attempt to protect civilians within that context is necessarily handicapped by the context. Second, the bestowing of ‘immunity’ on non-combatants is false pretense even when they are neither directly targeted in or ‘collateral damage’ of war-fighting. This argument relies on the explained long-term health and economic effects of wars on civilian populations. 165 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Infrastructural damage, economic destruction, and destruction of trade routes for essential supplies can be enacted while still touting the principle of ‘non-combatant immunity’ because these activities do not directly target (or directly kill) civilians. Still, they do substantial damage to peoples’ lives in a way that means that these tactics ought to be recognized as unjust. This leads us to the third point about the word ‘immunity’ - its self contradictory impossibility. I contend that the humynitarian impacts of war are so far reaching that it is not possible to be immune to them - these impacts will affect the lives of those in an area in which a war is occurring. Feminisms realize this when they look to the reaching effects of war - from fear and emotional trauma to problems with the environment to political unrest. No person in a war zone, then, is truly immune from the fighting of a war. The perception of immunity makes war look cleaner than it is, and makes it easier to ignore the long-term and gendered effects. The last criticism feminisms have, then, is the gendered nature of the non-combatant immunity norm. We discussed how this norm classifies wymyn in chivalric terms as Beautiful Souls who merit protection by heroic just warriors. The non-combatant immunity norm then implies a number of suspicious things about those understood to be wymyn: that wymyn are peaceful, that wymyn are withdrawn from the sphere o f politics, that wymyn cannot participate in either the choosing of or the fighting of wars, that wymyn are defenseless to acts of war, and that wymyn need heroic men’s protection even when it is heroic men that are putting them in danger. While these insidious assumptions certainly are not necessary to the principle of non-combatant immunity, they have become attached in a variety of ways that makes them difficult to separate. That problem, combined with some of the conceptual problems with non-combatant immunity, calls for a radical reformulation of the in bello rules about targets and damages. 166 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A reformulation on feminist terms would pay attention to the impacts of in bello decision-making on real people’s lives, both short and long term. Focusing on humyn security, it would be concerned not only with the direct targeting of civilians but also with the effects on the economic livelihood, health capacity, and social existence of people within a society involved in a war. It would recognize the implications of war for the perpetuation of violence in international politics, domestic politics, and social relationships. It would further take special note of those impacts of war least likely to be noticed: the health effects on the state’s poorest citizens, for example. The first element of a feminist ethics of in bello targeting, then, is an impact-on approach (Steans 1998). The impact-on approach asks who will be affected, and how, in any in bello decision, and holds the deciding party responsible for those impacts. If decision X leads to winning a minor but not inconsequential battle, and it also cuts off the water supply to a small village, both effects would have to be considered as primary. Feminisms teach about the value of the micropolitical - then effects such as the livelihood of a town should matter in international political calculus. The second element of a reformulated feminist ethics of targeting is the way that it treats mistakes. Belligerents miss in war, and it is often considered to be a part of the fighting that sometimes civilians are inadvertently hit in battle as a result of those misses. There is no way to stop misses, the argument goes, so minimizing them is a fulfillment o f the moral obligation of non-combatant immunity. The principle is then bound up in trying not to hit civilians. Feminisms dig a little deeper, recognizing that civilians die in these misses. A feminist ethics of targeting acknowledges that mistakes are not targeting per se, but that they also cannot be considered to be ethically neutral. A feminist ethics of war might suggest that the possibility of mistakes (and thus of the unintentional harm of people who are not involved in the war) is a part of war, and should be weighed as a part of the moral 167 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. calculus in the decision of whether or not war is the right choice to make. In other words, the idea that those not implicated in the war might die as a result of it should be considered as a part o f the question of the justice of the cause to go to war. This observation can be drawn a little bit deeper, to reverse the logic o f non- combatant immunity. Non-combatant immunity claims that, to the extent possible, a war should be fought against those towards whom the war-fighting party has just cause and legitimate grievance. Perhaps a feminist reformulation would argue that in order to choose to fight a war, a party must have just cause and legitimate grievance towards those whom the war will affect. This is the responsibility-for aspect of a feminist reformulation of non- combatant immunity. The argument is that the pretension to be affecting only those who are responsible for the war is unrealistic, and allows wars to be fought under its auspices which have horrible (but covered up) humynitarian effects. The addition of the reflexivity of the statement that wars must be fought with just cause against those who they will affect increases the rigor of the in bello standard, and offers substantial protection for those who would otherwise be subjected to war situations against their will or interest. Finally, a reformulation of the immunity principle should retain gendered lenses while abandoning gender essentialism. It should recognize gendered impacts o f war, and the gendered impacts of gendered role expectations related to just war, while not reifying those gendered role expectations. It should recognize the sexualization o f in bello tactics without reifying the sexualization of those understood to be wymyn. It should condemn the production and reproduction of gender oppression in the fighting o f wars without understanding those classified as wymyn as powerless. It should see genderings without resigning to their inevitability; it should critique the gendered nature of the concepts and 168 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. impacts of war-fighting without seeing them as a necessary part o f the structure of international politics. In short, I suggest that a feminist ethics of war-targeting decisions requires that the war be against those whose humyn security is threatened by the fighting. In other words, we must consider a war to be fighting the people it is going to hurt. It suggests assigning moral culpability for targeting mistakes as a part of the choice of having gone to war. It further instructs that in bello decisions should be made with an eye towards those people that they will affect as a primary consideration in targeting; with especial attention towards those individuals and groups of individuals whose voices have difficulty being found and heard in domestic and international politics as well as in wartime, or a political interest in the margins. A feminist ethics o f war-fighting tries to move away from abstracting humynitarian damage in war and towards taking responsibility for all of the effects of war- fighting; immediate or long-term, traditionally considered or invisible. I have reconstructed the ‘non-combatant immunity’ principle to be more realistic, more responsible, and less gendered by dealing with the effects of wars in a hybridized and contingent manner, with humyn security always in the forefront. IV. A T T A C K S O N W Y M Y N 28 The gendered nature of the principle of non-combatant immunity, for all of its essentializing wymyn, fails to make them immune from the impacts of war. In fact, research 2 8 These roles and experiences are certainly not universal to all of the people understood to be wymyn. Still, they are pervasive. Robin Schott considers the risks o f categorizing wymyn’s experiences in war. She explores whether a more hybridized understanding o f war would better accommodate the exceptions to the ways that war generally affects wymyn. She explains that the concept o f postmodern war “debunks myths o f rigid gender patterns during wartime” but “risks overlooking the way that gender may not be primarily fluid, but may be a predetermining factor in how war becomes carved on women’s bodies” (Schott 1996, 21, 22). It is Schott’s contention that a concern for wymyn’s experiences in war, while it sometimes essentializes the exception, still has a place as a rule. She explains that “women may play a variety o f roles during wartime - as guerillas, terrorists, soldiers, doctors, nurses, volunteer workers. But most prevalently, it is as civilians that women experience war” (Schott 1996, 22). 169 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. demonstrates that wymyn experience war differently than men - the impacts of war-fighting are gendered as well. These impacts are gendered because wartime violence is gendered. A number of scholars provide surveys of some of the ways that wymyn experience war. These observations are diverse, from laundry-list approaches to the broad generalization that “male soldiers use gender to represent domination. Psychologically, they assume a masculine and dominant position relative to a feminine and subordinate enemy” (Goldstein 2001, 356). In Goldstein’s understanding, the ethos of (even just) war is based in insidious gender oppression. War also has been documented to have a number o f tangible effects on those understood to be as wymyn, separate from, different from, and often disproportionate to the effects that it has on those understood to be men. Judith Stiehm begins explaining the effects of war on wymyn by describing how war forces wymyn to become passive observers rather than active participants. Because of the gendered roles that are dictated to wymyn, they are placed differently in relation to war than men are. First, Stiehm recognizes that wymyn are generally left out of the choice made of whether or not to go to war as well as the choices made about the means with which the war is being fought. She observes that “it is men who plan, prepare for, conduct, conclude, describe, and define war. Women are affected by war but mostly they react to rather than manage it” (Stiehm 1983, 245). Wymyn react to wars in different ways, but even those options are often limited. Men learn that they can make the choice of fighting in a war. Wymyn, on the other hand, mostly do not have military training, and therefore have fewer options in reacting to war (As 1983, 355). The result is that “there is no such alternative for women. Women are only victims of war, and, naturally enough, they concentrate on working primarily to prevent warfare” (As 1983, 360). While As’ identification of wymyn as only victims is too strong, wymyn are often victimized by war in a gendered manner. 170 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Jill Steans begins a material documentation o f the effects of war on wymyn. She explains that wymyn are subject to displacement, additional responsibilities, and sexual violence, among other impacts (Steans 1998, 100-1). Nira Yuval-Davis is careful not to universalize the impacts of war on wymyn. She contends that wars can affect the homefront in different ways - from barely to completely, but that there are some impacts which are clearly gendered (Yuval-Davis 1997, 109). In wartime, wymyn often experience a sudden accession to household head with limited resources, which they must manage in addition to other duties in times of financial hardship (Karam 2001, 3-4; Vickers 1993, 16).2 9 Wymyn are sometimes either given the choice to join or be forced to join patriarchal militaries which devalue femininity and are often oppressive to wymyn members (Karam 2001, 4; Enloe 1989, 1993, 2000). Wymyn are often subject to increased medical and social vulnerability, resulting from infrastructural attacks on their homes and communities (Vickers 1993; Karam 2001). As mentioned above, wymyn are confronted with increased sexual violence, as rape in wartime is higher than in any other political situation (Reardon 1985; Enloe 1993, 2000; MacKinnon 1993; Steans 1998; Karam 2001). Wymyn are oppressed and discriminated against in refugee camps, as camp managers often feed men first to prepare them for fighting, and turn a blind eye to sexual abuse (Karam 2001; Schott 1996, 24; Joachim 1999). Many wymyn are subjected to war-structured sex work, serving as prostitute (voluntarily, involuntarily, or semi-voluntarily) for ‘their own’ or ‘enemy’ soldiers (Karam 2001; Enloe 1993). While there is little evidence that wymyn are specifically targeted for the majority of 2 9 Wymyn are also faced shouldering increased security risks in disintegrating polities, which make the protection o f their families and communities more difficult and their access to necessary supplies more vulnerable (Karam 2001, 5). Wymyn are forced to negotiate family disruptions related to men who go to or die in the war (Karam 2001, 5). Instances o f domestic violence also go up during wartime, as wymyn who still have men in their homes are on the receiving end o f the militarization o f social forces. 171 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. deaths in armed conflict, target misestimation and indiscriminate warfare often cause substantial female casualties (Carpenter 2003b; Goldstein 2001). A. WARTIME RAPE: AN EXAMPLE OF WAR’S IMPACT ON WYMYN Wartime rape is an experience which is almost exclusively reserved for those persons biologically classifiable as female, and exclusively for those who are gendered female (and feminized) in political and social relations. Judith Gardam documents rape as a site where wymyn’s oppression can be undoubtedly documented. She contends that “nowhere is women’s marginalization more evident than in the attitude of the law of armed conflict to rape, an experience limited to women” (Gardam 1993b, 358-9; Buchanan 2002). While wartime rape is not per se limited to wymyn, it both disproportionately affects wymyn and feminizes those who are not wymyn but are rape victims. Wartime rape is an ultimate threat to wymyn’s personal security (Hansen 2001, 59; Blanchard 2003). Gardam continues, observing that rape remains a part of a (connotative and covert) air o f permissibility in the treatment of wymyn in war. Claudia Card traces passive permissiveness about wartime rape back through ancient times (1996, 5; Elshtain 1994). Gardam documents that “it is difficult to find any support for the view that non-combatant immunity at any time in its development has included [effective] protection from rape” (1993 b, 359). Liz Philipose supports Gardam’s conclusion that the laws o f war do little to prevent (or even take a stand against) wartime rape. She discusses a widespread perception among wymyn and feminists that the criminalizing of wartime rape that happened in Bosnia was a watershed for gender justice (Philipose 1996,47). Unfortunately, the law is a prohibition only insofar as rape is used for ethnic cleansing, not in other situations (Philipose 1996, 47). The laws o f war still remain a place where military needs, not humynitarian ones, govern, and where sexual conquest is implicitly condoned as a military need (Philipose 1996, 47). It 172 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. is under this impression that Schott observes that “whatever account is given to explain sexual violence against women in wartime, the persistence of this violence is one indicator that gender identity is a pivotal factor in women’s fates both during and after war” (1996, 23). Philipose documents that, even when there are laws against abusing wymyn in war, these laws will not necessarily transcend the specific context in which they are made, causing gender justice in war to be a slow process with no foreseeable end (1996, 52). For now, she laments, “the ICTY is not an absolute prohibition against the act o f rape in war, and is thus not a statement of women’s human rights” (Philipose 1996, 53).3 0 Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan argue that there are a number o f different types of institutionalized wartime rapes, all of which are steeped in gender oppression. The three types of institutionalized rape that they specify are recreational, national security, and genocidal (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 127).3 1 Wartime rape has been characterized by feminists as terrorism (Card 1996, 6), aggression (Goldstein 2001, 364), dominance (Card 1996, 7), genetic imperialism (Card 1996, 7), strategy (Hansen 2001, 59), torture (Schott 1996, 23), and gender oppression (MacKinnon 1993, 38; Gardam 1993b, 363). Lene Hansen observes that rape in war can and should be seen as a national security problem, even when 3 0 The context o f the discussion o f wymyn’s experiences in war can be seen within international humyn rights and wymyn’s rights campaigns and discourses (Thompson 2002). Campaigns against violence against wymyn are often framed in liberal humyn rights terms (Philipose 1996, 50; Pateman 1987, 103). After all, it is feminisms’ contention that wymyn should be treated like humyns, which necessitates a humyn rights discourse (Hoffman 2001, 4). Still, a number o f feminists offer criticisms o f wymyn’s rights discourses as context for putting an end to gender oppression. First, there are some problems with implementation. Coomaraswamy discusses difficulties with cultural disagreements, international enforcement, and support structure (1997, 1). Spike Peterson argues that humyn rights are gender-specific because they were created with men in mind (1990, 305; Kaufman and Linquist 1995, 121-2). The gendering o f humyn rights means that a discourse (and policy) arena which appears to be gender-neutral is actually menacing to and oppressive o f wymyn. In fact, “although the principle o f equality is enshrined in the drawing up o f human rights instruments, in practice women’s rights are relegated” (Peterson 1990, 305; Okin 1998, 33). Liberal thinking isn’t enough, especially when masculine ontology is generic (Peterson 1990, 306). Also, ‘humyn rights’ abuses which are unique to the experiences of those who are gendered as wymyn generally do not appear either in the letter or the spirit o f international humyn rights law or norms. Rights discourse, then, ought be approached by feminists with caution. 3 1 Rape for the purpose o f ethnic cleansing in a recurrent phenomenon in war, as was evidenced by the recent conflict in Bosnia. Claudia Card characterizes the mass rapes in Bosnia as strategic warfare for ethnic cleansing, found at the level o f authority and command. Still, wartime rape extends beyond rape-as-ethnic cleansing. 173 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the goal is not ethnic cleansing. She contends that “wartime rape is, on the other hand, constructed as a collective security problem. Rape happens, not as a question of thoughtlessness, provocative or unfortunate behaviour, but as a question of national warfare” (Hansen 2001, 59; Gardam 1993b). Gardam explains that, “indeed, feminists have argued that in one sense, rape is never truly individual, but an integral part of the system ensuring the maintenance of the subordination of women” (Gardam 1993b, 363-4). Because wymyn are interpreted as passive in times of war, they are seen as easy targets for violence in war, as direct retaliation is not expected and indirect retaliation is unlikely. Claudia Card explains that “women who lack martial training are an easy mark for those who would communicate the message of domination” (1996, 11). Men who are soldiers, as is claimed above, are in the habit of domination. Wymyn are at a disadvantage. To add to their lack o f training, “women in patriarchies are commonly unarmed and untrained for physical combat. Perpetrators need fear little direct reprisal” (Card 1996, 11). In order to effectively address this problem, it is necessary for wymyn to be able to defend themselves and for social attitudes about war-fighting to change (Card 1996, 12-3). Card discusses what she calls a punishment fantasy, that men would actually suffer for the rapes they commit in wartime. She explains that she calls “this a fantasy because until women have more political power, including military power (by which I mean martial power, the power to engage in war), such penalty has no chance o f being implemented” (Card 1996, 16). Wartime rape is a frequent (and vile) gendered impact o f war which affects those classifiable as wymyn. An analysis of just war theories through gendered lenses shows a tradition (or even traditions) fundamentally ill-equipped to deal with. Not only do just war theories fail to provide a paradigm that is effective to make and understand rules about the 174 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. treatment (and oppression) of wymyn in war, they also fail to provide appropriate understandings of gender roles, gender relations, and gendered impacts of war. Further, just war theories fail to provide a language for talking about the gendered horrors of warfare. Gendered lenses are required to see sexual and sexualized violence in warfare, to call it out, and to prohibit it. A reformulated feminist ethics of war prohibits rape specifically (as a weapon or as entertainment) as well as other aspects of gendered (and sexual) violence. B. HEINOUS MEANS The question of appropriate means for warfare is one of the main issues that theorists o f jus in bello consider. Discussions of in bello proportionality address whether the force used is either necessary or warranted to combat the offense that the enemy committed to get into the war in the first place.3 2 This standards links ad bellum and in bello standards, as the goal of the war and the qualities of the just cause matter to determine what means are necessary or sufficient. In jus in bello theory, Judith Gardam explains that proportionality generally refers “to the balance to be struck between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms o f lives” and suffering (1993, 391). Here, the means used in battle must be proportional to the goals which one hopes to attain in that battle (Audoin-Rouzeau 2002). Gardam expands on the idea further, explaining that a war is acceptable when and only when the good that the war accomplishes far outweighs the evils that it perpetuates on the battlefield (1993a, 395; Vaux 1992, 30). Kenneth Vaux sees an additional dimension to proportionality, claiming that it also involves the use of means proportional to those which 3 2 Fritz Kalshoven, an international lawyer, argues that proportionality is a fundamental tenet o f the law of warfare (1973, 27). He interprets the standard more broadly than most - he argues that the standard of proportionality is the encompassing standard for ju s in bello guidelines. Kalshoven argues that proportionality requires: discrimination between civilians and combatants, refraining from attacking civilians, avoiding unreasonable damage to civilians, and refraining from using weapons o f unnecessary suffering (Kalshoven 1973, 28-9). While these are all issues that in bello theories o f just war cover, this project will wait to deal with them in their more traditional classifications. 175 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. an opponent is capable o f using.3 3 It is Vaux’s contention that a war in which the casualties are sure to be grossly uneven is a war which will fail the in bello proportionality test; that such a war can be spotted beforehand; and that said war ought not be fought. This is the foundation for the heinous means standard. Proportionality is an inclusive standard in just war theories, but it also stands on its own, as Gardam argues. This uniqueness is a standard that belligerent actors must keep in mind the parallels between the goal of the war, the damage to the enemy, and the enemy’s capacity to fight back. Theorists who emphasize the proportionality standard see just war theories as tools to limit the horrible violence of warfare. In this interpretation, war is morally unacceptable without jus in bello rules humynizing it. Fritz Kalshoven agrees, explaining that “the international humanitarian law of armed conflict, rather than being an end in itself, constitutes a means to an end: the preservation of humanity in the face of the reality of war” (1987, 159). If the intent is to humynize war, a prohibition against a priori unjust means seems to be a necessary part of the proportionality standard. This principle is that no means should be used in war that are so abhorrent they hurt or destroy chances for future peace and humynity between the warring parties. This covers for omissions or selectiveness in the application of the concrete standards o f jus in bello. Yoder explains that some belligerents consider in bello standards to apply like good manners between social equals, and therefore not to most opponents in war, who are considered to be 3 3 In other words, a clearly one-sided war is not just. Vaux explains that “a bully pushes his or her way around with a weaker opponent. A just person recognizes the inherent injustice o f such a path and either levels the playing field or seeks resolution o f the conflict without recourse to force” (Vaux 1992, 22-3). 176 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inferior (1996, 55). A standard which prioritized dignity and a future goal of peace would eliminate the perception of the permissibility of such war treatment.3 4 I propose that such a standard read something like this: In the (tactical) conduct of war, political entities must use force proportional to the ends of both the particular strategic aim and larger goals of conflict. Further, in the conduct of war, political entities must refrain from using force in a manner so heinous as to be prohibitive of obtaining the desired result of the war or of obtaining a peaceful relationship between belligerents after the war. The beginning of this standard reads a lot like the proportionality rule in traditional just war theories. The nuance is in the acceptable goals o f the specific action and of the larger conflict - both revised earlier in this theoretical reformulation. Just war-fighting then is only what is necessary to achieve the just cause, leaving out both gratuitous violence and heinous means. Further, I contend this standard provides a prohibition against using more force than what the cause is worth - in other words, if correcting the problems which constitute just cause creates a more substantial (humynitarian or ethical) burden than allowing the problems to remain unsolved, the proportionality standard forbids war-making and war-fighting. While there is a lot about the traditional proportionality standard that feminisms can get on board with, the remainder of my proposed language demonstrates the need for feminist modifications for the purposes of the pursuit of peace and the pursuit of the welfare of the marginalized in war. The modification here is an explicit prohibition of heinous means. This standard is not new to feminisms, but has not been emphasized in the history of the laws of and philosophy about the fighting of wars. From time to time, the use of particular weapons has been declared a violation of international law because of the cruelty associated with the use 3 4 Yoder concludes that, “if the only way not to lose a war is to commit a war crime, it is morally right to lose that war” (1996, 63). Very few belligerents agree, however, and this leads to problems for the credibility o f the ju s in bello guidelines in theories o f just war. 177 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of those weapons. This standard supports that trend, but broadens its reach. This standard not only talks about the weapons which may be used but the manner in which force may be employed. Traditional bans, like those on biological weapons, fall under this standard. But it encapsulates a radically different vision as well. It would reach over to the prohibition of genocidal tactics, which provoke retaliation and entrench hatred. It would also cover areas that traditional international laws do not spend so much time on, like landmines, as well as areas which they neglect completely. What I am envisioning here is the use of traditional weapons or tactics for heinous purposes - Sherman’s burning Georgia, or the United Nations Coalition in the Gulf War burying a substantial part of the Iraqi army alive by running over them with tanks. Feminisms’ interest in this standard is two-fold: to decrease the inhumynity o f war in whatever way it might be possible to do so, and to act with an eye towards the deconstruction of international conflicts. In order to have an eye towards ending conflicts, belligerents must not, in a war situation, behave in ways which ‘win the battle’ but ‘lose the war’ - in this context meaning that they must not engage in tactics which contribute to their immediate needs to have victories in the current conflict, but prolong either the war or the conflict even after the war by encouraging bitterness and inspiring resentment. The cruelty o f war in itself is difficult to overcome for the purposes of forming a working political relationship, feminisms contend - and true dialogue is difficult to produce even in the best of situations - such that the use of cruel tactics might make peace impossible. Since the goal of legitimate war is just politics, war’s goals are wrapped up in deconstructing the cycles of (gendered) violence and (gendered) oppression. Orend explains that certain forms o f heinous violence are prohibitive to solving the problem which has caused the war. Instead, these forms of violence perpetuate hatred between the warring parties in a way that places the parties in perpetual 178 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conflict. As Orend explains, the justice in just war is largely in the result o f that war, and any means that are counterproductive to the justice of the result are thus unjust, even were they not independently morally repugnant (2000). V. CONCLUSION: APPEARANCES OF JUST WAR Laurie Calhoun introduces a potential conflict in just war theories when she notes that justice o f the cause and justice of and in the war are not the same thing, and that it takes more for a war to be justly made and fought than being on the right side of the argument (Calhoun 2002, 48). The relationship of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards are debated in the just war literature. Robert Holmes argues that the damning problems of just war theories involve questions concerning whether or not jus ad bellum can trump jus in bello should the two conflict (Holmes 1992).3 5 Richard Regan worries that “the public’s war spirit, once aroused, can and often will overwhelm the public’s ability or willingness to reason rightly about war conduct and in terms of peace settlement” (Regan 1996). Judith Gardam sees empirical evidence of international actors who feel that they have met jus ad bellum criteria using this license to ignore in bello rules o f war. She observes that, “although the exact relationship between the two is not easy to discern at any stage, the justness o f the resort to war historically determined to a large extent the limits on the conduct of war” (Gardam 1992, 818; Claude 1980, 91). Michael Howard is concerned 3 5 Donald Wells argues that, in the practice o f ‘ just war,’ belligerents who feel satisfied that they have attained jus ad bellum entitlement rarely pay attention to the issues o f just means, or ju s in bello (1969). John Howard Yoder recognizes this trend, and warns that the idea that having the ad bellum rules on your side justifies anything in bello is a dangerous category slide with a slippery slope problem (1996, 64, 67). Wells provides an example of what he determines to be the problem with international actors who feel they have ad bellum license fighting wars which are considered to be just. Wells uses potential interpretations o f just war theories as lenses through which to see the Holocaust. Wells observes that the German cause for the Second World War could be understood to live up to the ju s ad bellum criteria (and was by many Germans)(1969). Wells contends that the in bello license taken by the Germans in the Second World War which led to the Holocaust was taken because the Germans felt that they were fighting a justified war (1969). Using this example, Wells argues that just war justifies too much. He explains that, “in the Middle Ages, just war was less tragic than the alternatives. Today the just war justifies Armageddon if our hearts be pure, and this is to justify too much” (Wells 1969, 828). 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that no laws or rules about the conduct of war will stop the quest for victory, if the quest for victory is made a priori, from leading to the existence of total war (1992). In other words, even though the jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards coexist in theory, in practice the ad bellum standard gives belligerents a blank check for in bello behavior. Others argue that it is possible to mitigate this problem. These scholars contend that a ‘ just war’ is one that meets both ad bellum and in bello standards, and that such a war is indeed possible (Holmes 1992). Robert Holmes contends that both sets of standards are crucial to the justification of war. He argues that “these two considerations - the conditions under which one may have recourse to war and the manner in which war may be conducted - are components of any complete just war doctrine” (Holmes 1992, 197). Because of this conflict within just war theories, it seems essential to lay out a holistic view of a reformulated feminist ethic o f war. First, feminisms, looking to provide as many checks and balances on the horrors of war as possible, insist that both in bello and ad bellum standards be applied - unconditionally. Both sets of standards are essential to the justice of a war. Feminisms begin with conceptual reformulation - of dialogical justice, of consent, and o f the nature of sovereignty in the international arena. A reformulated understanding emphasizes context, contingency, dialogue, relationality, and care for the humyn collective. With empathetic cooperation as a guiding principle, feminist insights into just cause narrow and focus the just reasons to go to war, while making them inclusive of the gendered violence that is often invisible to just war theories. Feminisms reformulate authority to question assumed (gendered) legitimacy, and to include the people whose lives are affected by the war in the decision to go to war. Finally, feminist re-visions of the last resort and success standards require that non-conflictual policy options be ‘resorted to’ and that the war be fought with the knowledge that it will produce peace, solving the ‘ just cause’ 180 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and making the lives of the people who are members of both belligerent groups ultimately easier. This interpretation reconstructs the ‘ just warrior-hero’ story as well, however, making sure that the ‘happily ever after’ at the end is not a gendered construct. This includes re-telling stories so that they are not about just warriors and beautiful souls (while omitting dirty whores) but are instead about real people in real wars. I critically interrogate the gendered nature of the non-combatant immunity principle, focusing on responsibility and impact. A ‘feminist’ just war theory also prohibits both sexual violence and heinous means. These standards are reformulated to include political marginalities, care, dialogue, humyn security, quality o f life (both for wymyn and more generally), and restraint. I contend that this lens on just war theories provides a superior way to look at the ethics of war than the just war theories that came before it. The application of my reformulated theory to the wars in Iraq since the end of the Cold War is an effort to demonstrate some of the benefits that this theory provides. 181 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 5. context: Iraq The empirical section of this project applies the (re)formulated feminist just war theories of the first four chapters to the ‘empirical case’ of the wars in Iraq since the end of the Cold War. This application has a number o f purposes: to ‘test’ the ability o f a feminist just war theory to come up with useful observations for ‘real political’ situations, to demonstrate the unique observations inspired by a feminist just war theory, and to provide particular insights into a difficult political situation. Earlier in this project, I made the argument that ‘wars’ should not be seen as discrete events that have a beginning and an end; instead, they should be seen as a process taking place across a spectrum of international conflict and violence, where some violences are ‘worse than’ other violences, but violences cannot be seen as entirely ‘separate.’ I argue that the conflicts in the Gulf since the end of the Cold War (and perhaps even before) are a prime example: between the ‘beginning’ of the Gulf War (or even the ‘beginning’ of the Iran-Iraq war) and the present day, there has not been a full halt to either physical or structural violence either inside of or towards the political entity understood as Iraq. The ‘wars’ are a state of conflict in the area that has been ceaseless; some participants have changed, political situations have changed, violent conflict has remained. Still, there is simply too much material to treat the ‘wars in Iraq since the end of the Cold W ar’ as a single analytical construct. Depth would be sacrificed, as would reflection of the ‘real world’ political dialogue.1 Therefore, the traditional labels for the conflicts in and 1 In other words, there is some value here to mimicking the distinctions made in the everyday practice of international politics with regards to the conflicts in Iraq: the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, the sanctions regime, and Gulf War II. The value lies in the utility it provides: talking back to the world o f international politics is by definition easier if we are speaking the language that international politics is practiced in. Further, a frequent ‘answer’ to feminist reformulations o f international political situations is something to the effect o f ‘okay, we know that you are right that we should have behaved differently way back then, but it is now, and we have 182 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. surrounding Iraq will be used in this project, with a view of the surrounding ‘war system’ never far away from the surface of the analysis. The ‘conflicts’ being examined, then, will be classified as they are normally in international politics, as: the [First] Gulf War, the UN economic sanctions regime on Iraq, and the ‘Second Gulf War.’ The analyses, however, should be seen as flowing through these events and recognizing their interconnectedness. The label ‘the Gulf War’ is generally used to describe the time period from Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait in August of 1990 to the cease-fire agreed to by Iraq in April o f 1991. The military operations within this war included Iraq’s invasion and subsequent occupation of the Republic of Kuwait and a Coalition (air then ground) attack to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Instead o f being considered a part of the ebb and flow of a war system, the Gulf War stands out in most historical accounts. The Gulf War has been marked as a milestone: as the first time a UN member state conquered another UN member state, as unprecedented cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and as a demonstration of restraint on the part o f the Arab League in relation to its collective defense pact. Jean Elshtain contends that these are not the only things about the Gulf War which stand out in an international political context. She points out that “what is remarkable about subsequent response to Iraqi aggression is the way that just war considerations framed so much o f the debate” (Elsthain 1992b, 47). George Weigel agrees, observing that “rarely has there been such a sustained political grappling with the moral issues of war than in the Gulf War” (Weigel 1991, 49). This observation highlights the timeliness of study (and reformulation) o f theories of the ethics of war. In fact, it is evident that George Bush Senior put substantial thought into the already gone down a different path.’ The (traditional) delineation of these conflicts here helps feminisms answer that critique at every turn. Further, talking about these conflicts as if they ‘started’ and then ‘ended’ allows us to put forward some ideas about how to stop the cycle o f violence. Delineating conflicts here, however, is known proxy - and that will never be far out of the view o f the analyses presented. 183 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. justice or lack thereof of the Gulf War, and the rhetoric o f just war (Bush 1991b; Vaux 1992, 88-91). He, in fact, made the explicit argument that the war in the Gulf was not a holy war but instead a just war (Bush 1991a; Vaux 1992). The proliferation o f just war discourse concerning the situations in Iraq matters: it means that, for whatever reason, moral language has a place in the making o f policies o f war. If moral language matters, than there may be space for a debate about what might be the appropriate moral language. The economic sanctions regime on Iraq that followed the Gulf War was also steeped in moralistic dialogue. Parties on both sides of the sanctions regime characterized their opponents as tyrants, destroying the lives of innocent people. The sanctions regime began when the Gulf War ended. The cease-fire of the Gulf War made a number o f demands on Iraq, mostly concerning disarmament and taking responsibility for the Gulf War. If Iraq were to escape economic embargo, Iraqi government would need to comply with these demands. The demands were made explicit in UN Security Council Resolution 687. As Iraqi government found out during the decade-long sanctions regime, failure to comply also risked aerial bombardment by the United States and the United Kingdom. The sanctions held Iraqi economy at a standstill, often depriving Iraq and Iraqis of critical survival and infrastructural supplies. A litany of inspections by UN task forces found Iraq to be non- compliant with UN demands throughout the 1990s, and the sanctions regime remained in place throughout the decade. Iraq removed UN inspectors for the last time in 2000, and sanctions remained in place so long as the Saddam Hussein government remained in power. The government o f Iraq, led by President Saddam Hussein, was removed from power by military force in 2003. An international Coalition, led by the United States, saw the government o f Iraq as a threat to international peace and security because of its ostensible possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and relationships with 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. terrorist entities. Coalition air attacks were followed by a ground war. This ground war, unlike the short [First] Gulf War, resulted in the occupation of Iraq, the overthrow of the government, and the eventual capture of the (former) Iraqi leadership. The Coalition set up a temporary Iraqi government, which has at the time of writing yet to gain control of Iraq. Coalition troops remain in Iraq. These ‘wars,’ however, are not without political context. Feminisms understand that context is key to the analysis o f a political situation. This chapter begins the empirical part of this project by providing context for the ‘wars’ since the end of the Cold War. This context consists of a picture of the political situations, international events, and international climate preceding the start of the ‘Gulf War.’ It reads the politics surrounding wars and the wars themselves as continuous. If war is an extension of politics by other means, and if cause for war comes from political aims, then the political situation that surrounds and leads up to war (or does not) is not irrelevant to a theory of just war. If war is an extension of politics by other means, then just war is a (sometimes appropriate) extension of just politics. The question of a feminist evaluation of the political situation leading up to the Gulf War, then, is not an idle one, but a necessary one to the success of a(n) (feminist) evaluation of the Gulf War. That is the task o f this chapter. The first section, ‘historical methodologies,’ expands on the methodological statements in Chapter I about the nature of the histories in the empirical part o f this project. There, I introduced empirical analysis by history, by discourse analysis, and by narrative presentation. Here, I explain the type o f empirical analyses these tools are used to perform. While recognizing discursive contingency and necessary subjectivity, I contend that a stylized empiricism still holds value for the particular needs of this inquiry - reconsidering relational political choices and actions. The second section, ‘histories around Iraq,’ 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. introduces the political entity known as Iraq, which is the chief geographical area of study in the empirical part o f this project. It paints a brief picture of the origins of Iraqi state, and of its early relationships with other states. The third section continues where the second left off, discussing the Iran-Iraq war as both constitutive of and an example o f the ways that Iraq related to other states in the international arena. This section, ‘conflict in the Gulf,’ discusses both the specifics of the war between Iran and Iraq and how that conflict influenced Iraq’s political relationships around the world. The fourth section, ‘immediate contexts,’ addresses Iraq’s international position leading up to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It discusses Iraq’s relationships with Iran, Kuwait, Israel, and the United States as well as the internal domestic and political problems that Iraq was having at the time. The final section, ‘gendered critiques of political context,’ explores with gendered lenses the histories related in this chapter. It suggests that a gendered critique of the following wars is not complete without such a critique of the political situation leading up to these wars. Accordingly, these gendered critiques provide foundation for subsequent gendered analyses and reconstructions of the Gulf War, the UN sanctions regime, and the Second Gulf War. I. HISTORICAL METHODOLOGIES The following analysis is thus my attempt to account for my construction o f "woman artist" as a social identity, not only from the stories and experiences o f the women artists who participated in my study, but from our relationships developed and expressed in part through negotiations over how the research would proceed. It is also a story about how those negotiations called me to account for where I stood as a woman and feminist scholar and the consequent gender politics of my research (Kauffman 1992). Throughout the theoretical section of this project, I discussed histories as contingent compositions of traditional history, discourse analysis, and narrative presentation. I contended that histories were always contextual and never complete - and that feminist 186 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. histories recognize this but still find some value in empiricism. In this section, I sketch an understanding o f empirical history that includes and allows for these uncertainties. I then defend empirical inquiry, and propose methodologies for historical analysis consistent with such a view of histories. I use these methodological insights in the presentation both of the historical context for this project and in subsequent chapters which address the wars in Iraq. Documentations o f the histories of or political situations in Iraq are too numerous to locate, much less to count. Even a Google search locates several million documents in several hundred languages. It would neither be possible nor desirable here to chronicle that work. Focusing on what is traditionally considered ‘important’ is susceptible to the feminist critiques of IR made in Chapter I. Delineating ‘importance’ privileges some narratives over others in value-judgment, a problem feminists are acutely aware o f as wymyn’s narratives have often been left out o f the history books. Instead of such a straight-on approach, then, this project will be looking for discussion and dialogue both within and outside the large volume o f work understood as ‘Iraqi history.’ Such an approach moves from dry history to dynamic argument, which has several advantages. First, this approach forefronts controversies to be addressed by the feminist theoretical analyses o f this project. Second, this technique particularly suits feminist research, as it allows the inclusion o f traditionally marginalized voices.2 Third, even were one somehow to find a macronarrative history representative of the volume of thought concerning Iraq, such representativeness would not necessarily indicate ‘truth’ in inquiry or explanation. Jean Baudrillard explains how it is 2 In a chronicling effort, inevitably, unpublished work, wymyn’s work, work from places outside o f the West, or work which comes from minority religious or ethnic groups will be marginalized for accessibility reasons. I make the argument that any history will necessarily be unrepresentative; such a shortcoming ought to be dealt with upfront. Certainly, there are degrees o f unrepresentativeness, and (imperfect) ways to measure that unrepresentativeness. I deal with it by collage: interspersing viewpoints in a dialogue about histories rather than a representation o f histories. 187 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. possible to perceive a prevalent discourse as truth despite its untruthfulness through discursive seduction. He explains that: Seduction is that which extracts meaning from discourse and detracts it from the truth .. . . it is somehow the manifest discourse, the most ‘superficial’ aspect o f discourse, which acts upon the underlying prohibition (conscious or unconscious) in order to nullify it and substitute it for it the charms and traps of appearances .... This is what happens initially when a discourse seduces itself, the original way in which it absorbs meaning and empties itself of meaning in order better to fascinate others: the primitive seduction of language (Baudrillard 2001 [1979], 152- 3). In Baudrillard’s conception, I cannot be assured of my own objectivity for the purposes of historical observation, and I cannot pretend to approximate it - lest I be seduced by discourse(s) between which I cannot (objectively) discriminate.3 I cannot speak for a group that about thinks the content or history of Iraq, as it is not possible to determine whether either my intent or my result is approximate representation, were there even a group to represent.4 I cannot allow such a group to speak through my writing, even could I find ‘their’ words to put onto my pages, because I would neither be assured of fair characterization or representative balance (Spivak 1988). I cannot speak about specific perspectives, because that would presuppose my knowing something meaningful about their lives, which is an assumption which it would be arrogant for me to make. This project takes contingent knowledge as a given, and recognizes a fundamental inability to discriminate ‘reality’ from ‘hyperreality’ in interpersonal interaction and international politics (Baudrillard 1976). Following Baudrillard, I explore the position that 3 Really, the question is what to do, how to act, and how to know in a world o f subjective and contingent knowledge (Harding 1998; 1987; Antony and Witt 1993; Clough 1998). My feminist dispositions are seduced by the possibility o f acting for the political purpose o f understanding the world from the point o f view o f the marginalized. My postmodern dispositions are interested in nihilism. The activist in me is interesting in acting, even absent a framework in which to do it. These are all, according to Baudrillard, discursive seductions that I must be aware o f (1979; Pefanis 1991). 4 Brooke Ackerly (2000) disagrees: she paints a picture o f multiple positionalities hybridized for representational ability. 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political interaction happens through a filter o f discursive seduction, which influences what we understand as truth. I begin by setting up a short understanding o f the process of being seduced by discourses o f hyperreality. I then use this lens in talking about seductive discourses of just war as they relate to the wars in Iraq. A revolution separates each order from the next one: these are the true revolutions. We are in the third order, no longer the order of the real, but o f the hyperreal, and it is only in the third order that theory and practice, themselves floating and indeterminate, can catch up with the hyperreal and strike it dead (Baudrillard 2001, 194). We live in a world o f discursive referendum, where there is no such thing as objective truth, and where discourses present themselves in the form o f questions (Baudrillard 1976; Hall 1999; Dickens and Fontana 1994; Jay 1973; White 2000). In other words, we as people ‘choose’ ‘the truth’ from competing narratives, instead of being certain of what is ‘true’ or ‘real.’ In this world, inquiry into reality forms a discourse with itself. This circular discourse of inquiry into the real in turn creates discourses, languages, and activities; ‘realness’ becomes less discemable in the dialogue. This creates a state of hyperreality in social and political life. As the passage above suggests, hyperreality is a hybridizing influence on social and political existence. Hyperreality is the penetration of fantasy into the real. This penetration is complete when “unreality no longer resides in dream or fantasy, or in the beyond, but in the real’ s hallucinatory resemblance to itself and “reality loops around itself in pure repetition” (Baudrillard 1979). In other words, reality has become fictionalized by the separation of sign and referent. What Baudrillard is saying is that words, discourses, and dispositives have lost their tie to material meaning, but are used by people unaware of this ‘fictionalization.’5 5 Words: traditional usage; Discourses: narratives and languages which tell stories o f some perceived phenomena, speech act chains; Dispositives: images, physical activity, or other media that are a part o f a ‘discourse’ in 189 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Discourses lose their tie to material meaning through a process of simulation which happens in successive phases. First, an image or discourse is reflective of a basic reality. Then, the image moves into “masking and perversion of basic reality” through the seduction of humyn self-deception to see something as more interesting than it is (Baudrillard 2001, 173). The masking discourse replaces the reality, as it is more compelling than the reality, and believed and acted on over the reality. Instead of masking the reality, then, it becomes simulation, masking the absence o f reality, which has been supplanted. Finally, when the reality has become unimportant to the perception of reality, the representation begins “bearing no relation to basic reality whatsoever, it is its own simulacrum” (Baudrillard 2001, 76). These representations, then, compete in a world where there is no clear relationship between representation and referent. Their competition happens through discursive seduction. Baudrillard describes the process of discursive seduction in terms o f Lacanian psychoanalysis. There, latent (underlying) discourses lead manifest (surface) discourses to true meaning through interpretation (Baudrillard 2001, 173). Baudrillard describes seduction as a process whereby the manifest discourse acts on the latent discourse to nullify it and distract it from the truth (2001, 173). The manifest discourse has this capability because of its seductive power (in the literal sense). Its appeal is “its very appearance: the aleatory, meaningless, or ritualistic and meticulous, circulation of signs on the surface; its inflections, and its nuances. All of this effaces the content value o f meaning, and this is seductive” (Baudrillard 2001, 173). In the paragraph which opens this section, Baudrillard talks about discourse as a competition of absorbing and deflecting meaning in order to hold relation but not generally defined thereas; from this point on, I mean the term ‘discourses’ to include ‘dispositives’ as well. 190 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fascination. This notion is expanded with its application to appearances: “all appearances conspire to combat meaning, to uproot meaning, whether intentional or not, and to convert it into a game, according to some other rules of the game, arbitrary ones this time, to some other elusive ritual, more adventurous and more seductive than the mastery of meaning” (Baudrillard 2001, 76). If this argument were applied to discourses about Iraq, there are a number of implications. Those discourses are in tenuous and uncertain relation to the reality of how people fare living in a nation-state called ‘Iraq.’ These discourses are seduced by the appeal of the fascinating (whether that is narrative of poverty, rape, torture, or the law of war, or some combination) away from the core of a basic reality which then becomes unknowable. Discourses that originally reflect reality come to be masking of reality as they are distracted by the seductive nuances of these fantastic concepts and ideas. In other words, the fictionalizing descriptions of situations in ‘Iraq’ get more attention than the situations themselves because o f their seductive power. These discourses then come not to mask reality, but to mask unreality (as they are detached from the referent, ‘Iraq,’ and do not reflect changes in the referent’s conditions). In other words, what we hear about ‘Iraq’ loses relation to the realities that it once reflected. Finally, these discourses come to bear no relation to the basic reality they once reflected, but instead constitute lived hyperreality (a story or dramatization about ‘Iraq’ separate from experience, which is again unknowable). Ultimately, unreality piles on more unreality in political decision-making. This makes history itself indeterminate. Still, current political decision-makers rely on the stories o f histories in order to create context for making current decisions. In other words, a political decision-maker has an idea of what Iraq is from the produced histories of the political situations in and around Iraq; this idea inspires policy-making. This project, 191 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. then, tackles histories close enough to current politics to have a bearing on current decision making; what is important, then, is the kind of action that the histories inspire rather than their internal consistency or external objectivity. This feminist-activist view allows for the (re)construction of histories of this area to (re)count inspirations for past policy choices and the lessons drawn from them and to create inspirations for policy reformulations. Such historical (re)construction takes place through the collection of historical observations, discourse analyses, and narrative presentations. The historical observations are of two kinds: historians’ documentations and silences that are searched for. This covers both traditional concerns and the exclusion of issues to which historians do not generally give substantial attention. As used here, discourse analyses look for stated and underlying policy priorities. Presented narratives give (either ‘important’ or ‘normal’) individual accounts of policy situations. These accounts include marginalized voices, and present (re)views of traditional histories in order to disrupt dominant discourses and create unique understandings. These hybrid histories, or stylized empiricisms, can be used to further both theoretical and ‘factual’ understandings of political situations. II. HISTORIES AROUND IRAQ They came as liberators but were met by fierce resistance outside Baghdad. Humiliating treatment of prisoners and heavy-handed action in Najaf and Fallujah further alienated the local population. A planned handover of power proved unworkable. Britain's 1917 occupation o f Iraq holds uncanny parallels with today .... Our story begins in March 1917 as 22-year-old Private 11072 Charles Dickens o f the Cheshire Regiment peels a poster off a wall in the newly captured city o f Baghdad .... It is filled with noble aspirations and presentiments o f future tragedy; with the false promises o f the world's greatest empire, commitments and good intentions . . . (Fisk 2004) The history o f Iraq is necessarily tied into the histories of the surrounding areas, as the territorial and actual distinctions between these states have been varied and uncertain for 192 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a long time.6 The macropolitical history is fairly muddled, and the micropolitical histories recorded are generally only o f ruling elites, rarely of women. Throughout history, the inhabitants of these territories conquered each others’ lands and peoples on a regular basis (Dodge 2003; Tripp 2002). Foreign invasion complicated the political situation in the area now known as the ‘Middle East’ even further.7 For centuries, until the First World War, both Iraq and Kuwait were a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was already crumbling when the Ottoman Turks joined the Germans against the Allies in World War I, and Ottoman dominion over the area was coming to an end. The victorious Allies of the First World War partitioned the territory that had formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Both Iraq and Kuwait became British protectorates in 1919; Kuwait remained a protectorate while Iraq obtained formal independence in 1932 (Marr 2003). Geyer and Green explain that Iraq has since been an artificial state, with British-drawn boundaries constructed in a way not at all related to the relationships of the people living there (1992, 34). The region’s borders were drawn and redrawn by non-residents, resulting in a constellation of unnatural states bickering with their borders (Dodge 2003). Trying to end bickering between the Middle Eastern states, British High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox redrew the map of the area in the 1940s (Marr 2003). In this redrawing, Iraq benefited - getting territory in what had been called Kuwait and in what had been called Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia also got territory from Iraq. The final border arrangement left Iraq’s territorial concerns and demands 6 What I mean here is to talk about the interrelated histories o f the ‘states’ in the area, as their stories are always overlapping and sometimes indistinguishable. Borders, citizens, and content o f these states has been less than clear at a number o f points in (recent and distant) history. 7 The area was ruled by the Ottomans for several centuries, after several centuries o f war-fighting both internally and with Christian Europe. The area is among the most diverse in the world, and also among the most nationalist (Rich 2001). 193 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unsatisfied, Saudi Arabia angry at Iraq, and Kuwait upset and uncertain - setting the stage for conflict.8 A. OIL IN KUWAIT It is in the history o f our peoples . . . that one Muslim does not go hungry while another is very rich. Muslims are a community, a group, a people, a faith - a community is dishonest to Allah when it neglects its own. Kuwait prospered while Iraqis could not find food, and they did it at the expense of other Muslims’ slave labor. This is a betrayal o f Islam, and why Kuwait had to be stopped. All Muslim peoples should be taken care o f before we look to sacrilegious excess (Anonymous).9 In 1938, drillers discovered oil in Kuwaiti desert (Crystal, Owen, Burke, Hudson, Kazziha, Khalidi, and Mardin 1995). When oil production started at the end of the second World War, it was a source of substantial wealth for Kuwait. This discovery quickly transformed Kuwait from poverty-ridden and backwards into financially well-off and modem (Al-Dekhayal 2000). In June o f 1961, Great Britain declared Kuwait free and independent (Anscombe 1997). Almost immediately, Iraq, desiring from Kuwait both oil and the port land it possessed, claimed the newly independent country as part of Iraq. Iraq then lined up its troops along Kuwaiti border, threatening invasion of Kuwait in enforcement of its claim to the territory (Schoeman 1992). The leader of Kuwait, the emir, requested the aid of its former colonial protector, the United Kingdom, and the British assisted Kuwait (Schoeman 1992). British assistance gave Kuwait the stature to join the Arab League, which recognized Kuwait as a sovereign state (Joyce 1998). Upon this recognition, Iraq withdrew 8 David Luban makes the argument that there are a number o f 3r d world nations whose boundaries are largely of historical accident and others’ political convenience. When relating to those nations, he claims, the ju s ad bellum standards and the principle o f non-intervention fail to reflect moral reality (1980; 172-3). Here, ‘setting the stage for conflict’ is a little misleading - there had been many important conflicts between these peoples in history. Those only added to the tension that uncertain borders created. Perhaps ‘setting the immediate stage for conflict’ or ‘contributing to conflictual relations’ would be better phraseology. 9 Rather than re-naming those who prefer to be anonymous, I will simply take their words as contribution (with permission, o f course). 194 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. its military forces, but continued to assert its entitlement to the territory that constituted Kuwait.1 0 Independent and supervised, Kuwait became a rich country in the 1960s and 1970s (Crystal et al 1995). Kuwaitis became wealthy both as individuals and as a nation, having adequate access to jobs, homes, education, and medical care, unlike many neighboring Arab nations (Beaver 1998). In addition to garnering resentment from much o f the Arab community for being better off than most of its neighbors, Kuwait’s employment practices attracted negative attention (Crystal et al 1995). Kuwaitis could afford to hire menial labor so that they did not have to do hard labor themselves. As a result, many foreign workers were employed in low-wage, menial jobs in Kuwait (Longva 1997). Many of these marginalized foreign workers were Arabs, specifically displaced Palestinians (Longva 1997). There is a strong aura of economic interdependence and sharing in the theology (those less often in the practice) of Islam (Yusoff and Noor 2004). This principle, along with the economic disparity in the Middle East and the perceived demeaning of already-troubled Palestinians, provoke both envy and resentment o f Kuwait and its citizens around the Middle East (Lewis 2003). B. INTERNAL UNREST IN IRAQ Women have played important roles throughout Iraq's history. It was in the early years of secular Baathist socialism and early in Saddam Hussein's rule that women's status and rights were formally enshrined in legislation and treaties. In 1970, a new constitution nominally made Iraqi women and men equal under the law (although family law continued to favour men). Under Saddam Hussein, women's literacy and education improved, and restrictions on women outside the home were lifted. Women won the right to vote and to run for political office, and they could drive, work outside the home and hold jobs traditionally held by men. (UNIFEM, womenwarpace.org, 2004). 1 0 Iraq held that claim for two years at the time. Iraq has renewed this claim a number o f times since the early 1960s, threatened military activity a handful o f times, acted on it a few times, and conquered Kuwait once. 195 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Some women have been raped in custody. They were detained and tortured because they were relatives o f well known Iraqi opposition activists living abroad. The security authorities use this method to put pressure on Iraqi nationals abroad to cease their activities. For example, on 7 June 2000 Najib al-Salihi, a former army general who fled Iraq in 1995 and joined Iraqi opposition, was sent a videotape showing the rape o f a female relative. Shortly afterwards he reportedly received a telephone call from Iraqi intelligence service, asking him whether he had received the “'gift”' and informing him that his relative was in their custody (Amnesty International 2001). It is impossible to determine the exact political situation of wymyn (or of any Iraqis) in the Ba’ath era. It is, however, possible to look to various stories about Iraq to obtain a general sense o f the social and political climate within Iraq in the post-colonial area. Such research locates a general sense of social and political unrest. Like Kuwait, Iraq has a large amount of oil reserves. Still, Iraq’s economic development was hung up by a number of economic and political instabilities (Alnaswari 1994). Due to its ethnic and religious diversity, as well as a number of difficulties in governing, Iraq needed to focus substantial economic attention on consolidating and maintaining a central government (Crystal et al 1995). Internal dissent led to less economic productivity and more military spending (Alnaswari 1994). From 1961 to 1968, internal dissension, including coups, counter-coups, and war against the dissident Kurds preoccupied Iraq. In 1968 the Ba’ath Party seized control o f the government (Baram 1991). Family and tribal ties molded the party's leadership into a close-knit unit, based in military-style governmental control, extreme nationalism, and a lack of tolerance for dissent (Baram 1991). The leaders o f the Ba’ath party were almost all men o f military background and militaristic ethos. The party fought a series o f coup attempts militarily, sending a substantial amount o f Iraq’s budget into defending its existence, rather than the commodities that those in Kuwait had available (Baram 1991). 196 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In addition to further souring the relationship with Kuwait, these developments turned Iraq into a state constantly exposed to and dealing with political violence. For about ten years, Ahmad Hasan al Bakr served as President of Iraq, governing with Saddam Hussein, who did most of the clandestine governing and used brute force to obtain cooperation (Makiya 1998). Bakr worked for the government’s legitimacy through politics, and Hussein attained it by force if politics did not work. In response to a failed coup attempt in the late 1960s, Saddam Hussein directed a series of mock trials, executions, and other politically intimidating measures, which consolidated the party’s power (Makiya 1998). The early 1970s was a time o f relatively little active fighting within Iraq, but more due to an atmosphere of fear than an ethos of cooperation and good government (Makiya 1998). The Ba’ath government both established the capability to and showed a willingness to use force against its own residents for the purpose of maintaining governmental power (Karsh and Rautsi 2003). This atmosphere of fear and militarism within Iraq served both to consolidate its governmental power and to associate violence with political goals (Makiya 1998). As Bakr became increasing ill during the 1970s, Hussein gained more governmental authority. On 16 July 1979, Bakr resigned and Saddam Hussein replaced him as president of Iraq, commander of the military, Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party Regional Command, and chairman of the party's Revolutionary Command Council (Munthe 2002). Feeling insecure in the Cold War Middle East, Iraq turned attention to Bubiyan and Warbah, two Kuwaiti islands guarding Iraq's 26-mile coastline and only port (Tripp 2002; Schoeman 1992). Iraq demanded that Kuwait either sell or lease the islands to its control, as they were essential to its security. Kuwait refused, which led to further degeneration of relations between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq invaded Kuwait in response in 1973, occupying a border town called As Samitah, in a northeast Kuwait in March. The Arab League came to 197 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kuwait’s aid, and Iraq’s military forces withdrew from Kuwait. While temporarily withdrawing its claim to sovereignty over part or all o f Kuwait, Iraq maintained an aggressive stance, both at home and abroad (Cordesman 1997). The government of Iraq turned from force to economics in order to strengthen Iraq and solidify its hold on the country (Alnaswari 1994). A state-sponsored industrial modernization plan increased Iraq's manufacturing output and tied the industrial sector to Saddam's central government (Langley 1967; Alnaswari 1994; Tripp 2002). Other programs gave the average Iraqi greater access to education and land, improved her social mobility, and increased her income by redistributing part o f the nation's wealth (Tripp 2002). The changes also converted many former enemies o f Saddam and his party to loyal supporters (Mackey 2003). A quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 helped finance the reforms (Amuzegar 2001). For the first time in modem history, there was relative peace among Iraqi factions (Dodge 1995). Internal (relative) harmony allowed the government o f Iraq to look outside Iraq to address its role in the community of Arab states (Tripp 2002). In its international relations, the government of Iraq maintained much of the domineering and militaristic spirit that had been necessaiy to obtain internal harmony (Kechichian 2001). The government of Iraq believed that Iraq was ready to become a leader in the Arab world (Tripp 202; Alnaswari 1994). This belief coincided, however, with international events that threatened the political stability of Iraq. The Iranian revolution on behalf of a radical Shiah Islamic cleric, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, was successful (Kurzman 2004; Tripp 2002). This had negative impacts on the domestic stability of Iraq. First, the government o f Iraq had expelled Khomeini from Iraq a few months earlier, paving the way for his return to Iran and his ascendancy to governance (Hiro 1991; Karsh 2002). Saddam Hussein and Khomeini had 198 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a pre-existing negative relationship, which put an atmosphere of fear, distrust, and violence between the states (Hiro 1991; Moin 2000; Aburish 2000). Further, Shiite Muslims in Iraq, whose number exceeds than half the country's people who possess little political power, cheered Khomeini's success and the purges that followed (Keddie 2003; Nakash 2003). The Iranian revolution offered the impoverished sharecropping peasants and slum-dwelling Iraqi Shiites hope, but posed both internal and external threats to the stability of the government of Iraq (Khadduri 1988). These threats increased the salience of the need for militarism in Iraq to protect its existence from internal coup or external takeover (or some combination of the two).1 1 In an attempt to regain control, the government of Iraq resorted to violent tactics, both against its own citizens and externally (Makiya 1998).1 2 C. ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND IRAQ In the Middle East conflict, people are competing to see how many people they can kill or injure in order to solve something violence put in place and no violence can solve - its like an expression of frustration of the political injustice that was imposed. Violence starts but cannot solve oppression. This might be the root o f the cyclical frustration reaching from Israel to Iran and back again; and the violence just hurts those who caused it least, busriders, caf6 diners, babies, wymyn . . . (Bill Brayer, in a policy debate round at Washington University of St. Louis, 1999). It was 14 years ago, on June 7, 1981, that 16 U.S.-made Israeli warplanes bombed and destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear research facility near Baghdad, more than 600 miles from Israel's borders. Prime Minister Menachem Begin claimed the reactor was about to go into operation and was a threat to Israel because it could produce nuclear weapons . . . Thus the deeper meaning o f the attack was that it amounted to a declaration o f war against the Arab world's efforts to enter the atomic age (Neff 1995, 82). 1 1 Indeed, this fear was not unfounded. In July 1979, after bloody riots in two Iraqi cities, the government of Iraq discovered that a group called Ad Dawah was responsible for inciting the riots. This group was a secret Shiite group with financial and political ties to the new government o f Iran. A few months later, in April 1980, Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Iraqi foreign minister. This, along with a number o f other high- profile assassination attempts, threatened the solvency o f the government o f Iraq. 1 2 It arrested Ad Dawah members and their supporters, it deported thousands o f Iranian-born Shiites, and it executed the group’s leaders. The government o f Iraq saw the new government o f Iran as a threat to its capacity to govern. Simultaneously, the presumed military weakening o f Iran as the result o f revolution made it an attractive target for the redress o f border disputes. 199 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Israel's self-imposed silence on Iraq has become glaring in recent days, as the world's attention is riveted on American efforts to build support for military action. . . . Israel does not need to be convinced o f Iraq's threat. It is on Israel, top Israeli defense officials say, that Saddam will seek to try out his non- conventional weaponry as soon as he achieves that capability (Shalev 2002). The political situation around Iraq is contextually reliant on the other ‘Middle East conflict(s)’ between Israel, the former Palestine, and surrounding Arab nations. Iraq contributed forces to military attempts to take over Israel in 1948, again in 1967, and again in 1973 (Beilin 1993). Technically, Iraq and Israel have been in a constant state of war since the establishment o f the state of Israel (Tripp 2002; Beilin 1993; Graham-Brown 1999). Iraq is the only Arab Middle Eastern nation that has never signed an armistice with Israel or formally recognized its existence as a state (Alnaswari 1994). In fact, Iraq has not sat down to the negotiation table with Israel. Iraq closed an oil pipeline to Israel on its establishment, which it never reopened (Claire 2004). Iraq has sponsored, both financially and with military technology, the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli government (Eppel 1994). Israel bombed Iraq in 1981 when it suspected Iraq’s developing nuclear weapons technology (Claire 2004). Iraq expressed fear and discomfort over Israel’s possession of a nuclear arsenal as the only nuclear state in the Middle East. Further, Iraq has accused Israel of taking advantage of UN inspections of Iraq in order to gather intelligence (Ritter 2002). Iraq’s military buildup was at least in part a response to the overwhelming military power of Israel, and a perceived Israeli military threat (Ritter 2002). Iraq and Israel have been perpetual enemies, seeing each other as both ideological enemies and security threats (Bengio 1998). This tension directly between Iraq and Israel, as well as the more general tension in the Middle East as a result of the (existence and) strength of the state of Israel, 200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contributes to a security ethic in the region influenced by (real or imagined) international violence. D. THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ The war would make Iran — whose weapons had all been U.S.- supplied in the past — desperate to obtain U.S. equipment and spare parts. The exigencies o f war might make both nations more willing to restore their relations with Washington. When the war first broke out, the Soviet Union turned back its arms ships en route to Iraq .... Washington extended a $400 million credit guarantee for U.S. exports to Iraq. In November 1984, the U.S. and Iraq restored diplomatic relations, which had been ruptured in 1967. As a proclaimed neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States was not supposed to supply weapons to either side. Nevertheless, U.S. allies kept the combatants well-stocked. Israel transferred vast quantities o f U.S.-origin weapons to Iran (Shalom 1993). Iraq is not the only participant in the Gulf War that carries a legacy o f political violence. The United States, throughout the Cold War, provided arms, fighting strategies, and often troops that fueled domestic, regional, and international conflicts. These conflicts were often brutal, and served as proxy wars between the United States and the USSR. The United States funded and assisted both sides of the Iran-Iraq war, as well as a number of other political groups throughout the world: in South Korea, in South Vietnam, in Cuba, in Chile, in Israel, etc. (Bulloch and Morris 1991). The United States’ sponsorship of these groups cannot be interpreted as isolated events; instead, it can be seen as a part of an international security ethic that included in its repertoire the weapon of political violence (Whitfield 1996). In addition to these proxy war conflicts, the United States was the largest arms exporter in the world, outselling its next ten competitors combined (Cusack and Ward 1981; Russett 1982). The United States was engaged in the Cold War, as well. While the Cold War officially ended before the Gulf War began, it shaped a substantial amount of 201 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. United States foreign policy, both in ethos and in practice.1 3 The United States classifies its ‘national interest’ in terms of many political situations around the world, a categorization which often justifies military intervention (Rostow 1995). As Cynthia Enloe documents, this military ethos penetrates both foreign policy and domestic life inside the United States (1990).1 4 Militarism also penetrated the United States’ relationship with Iraq: when Iraq was on the ‘same side’ as the United States’ ever-changing opinion about Iran, Iraq was in the United States’ favor and gifted with military supplies to fight Iran. When Iraq was on the ‘other side’ against the United States’ ideas about Iran, it was isolated from the United States, and sometimes its enemies were supplied with arms. III. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR The immediate context of the Gulf War is in another event which could by itself be understood as a war in the traditional sense, the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988 (Khadurri 1988). This war is relevant to the study of the making and fighting o f what is now understood to be ‘the Gulf W ar’ in international politics. Women's vulnerability is further increased by the loss of men and boys, disruptions o f the social structure, and other conflict factors. This is especially true in Iraq, where many households are headed by women due to the deaths o f male family members during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s and the Gulf War of 1991 (UN Population Fund, 1990). The war between Iran and Iraq affected the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait, the domestic politics of Iraq, the relationship between Iraq and the United States, and the relationship between Iraq and the UN. 1 3 The Cold War set up an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ mentality in United States foreign policy which led the United States to keep both the world’s largest military and enough nuclear-destructive capacity to destroy the world several times over (Friedman 1991). 1 4 United States militarism has effects all over the international arena - from the sponsorship o f other international conflicts to the power to perpetuate conflictual relations to the effect on individuals’ lives. Like it can be made for Iraq, the case can be made that the United States’ foreign policies are entrenched in international conflict, and a part o f (and representative of) a war system. 202 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Iran’s Arab and Iraq relations are lull of mutual hate having their roots in both history and religion. They need very wise, broad minded and courageous leaders to make foil use o f the new situation. For the time being, we don’t see any personality of the calibre o f a (Charles) De Gaulle or (Konrad) Adenauer pointing in the horizons, at least in Tehran, where the present clerical leaders are too short sighted of Lilliputians and in Baghdad, we don’t know who might emerge and which direction the country might go,” one analyst told us, referring to the French and German leaders that signed the Franco-German Pact of Friendship more than fifty years ago (Haeri 2004). Iran and Iraq competed for supremacy in the Middle East/the Arab World during the Cold War. This competition, along with ideological differences in religion and governance, created tension between the two. In 1969 the Shah abrogated the 1937 treaty that set the border between the two countries. Iraq sent people to Iran to rebel against the government there, hoping to topple to shah in punishment for the difficulties he was causing Iraq (Kleichichian 2002). In response, the government o f Iran sponsored Kurdish rebels in Iraq, against the government o f the Ba’ath Party. Relations between Iraq and neighboring Iran deteriorated even further after the Iranian Revolution (Karsh 2002). The revolution in Iran caused Iraq concern about the violent unrest occurring in a neighboring state (Walt 1996). Further, as explained earlier, secularist Iraq and radical Islamic Iran (intentionally and unintentionally) inspired revolutionary hope in each others’ minority-group populations (Aburish 2000; Helms 1984; Hiro 1991). While the Ba’ath party was investing time, resources, and violence in gaining governmental control of Iraq, its foreign situation was delicate at best, and its foreign policies often conflictual (Moin 2000). The competition between Iran and Iraq intensified, spilling over both into political ethos and into relations with other states in the region. On 22 September 1980, without warning, Iraqi jet fighters struck Iranian airfields near Teheran and other bases throughout the country (Aburish 2000). Protected by 203 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reinforced hangars, the Iranian aircraft survived the attack and immediately retaliated against Iraqi cities. But Iraqi ground forces met little resistance as they drove nearly fifty miles into Iran (Maull nd Pick 1990). Besides conventional weapons, Iraq used mustard gas and nerve gas on the Iranians, inflicting about 10,000 casualties (Dekker and Post 1992). Slowly Iran regrouped and repelled the invaders, driving to Iraqi border. By 1984, the two sides were essentially at a stalemate, but the fighting continued until August 1988, when Iran signed a UN-mandated cease-fire favorable to Iraq (Chubin and Tripp 1988). A ‘peace’ was not reached in the Iran-Iraq war until the mid-1990s, because this conflict began to take a backseat to Iraq’s other international problems during the Gulf War. This decade-long war affected Iraq long after it ended. A variety o f unresolved humanitarian issues from the Iran-Iraq war include a failure to identify combatants killed in action and to exchange information on those killed or missing. Iran agreed to the release o f 5,584 Iraqi POW's in April 1998. The Iranian government pledged to settle the remaining POW issues with Iraq in 1999. And joint Iran-Iraq search operations were initiated to identify remains o f those missing in action (Iran Chamber Society, 2004). The Iran-Iraq war reverberated in a number of important ways. First, the war between Iran and Iraq affected the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. The two states had never had a stably friendly relationship, but the war between Iraq and Iran brought them into closer contact, and made room for substantial differences. Kuwait, like Iraq, saw Iran as a security threat (Chubin and Tripp 1988). Unlike Iraq, Kuwait was incapable of mounting either military attack or defense against Iran. Kuwait had loaned Iraq money for the war, but had largely left both economic and battle-related suffering to Iraqis. In other words, the Iran-Iraq war exacerbated political tensions between Iraq and Kuwait, and highlighted economic disparities (Murden 1995). 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Highlighting economic disparities between Iraq and Kuwait caused domestic political tension in Iraq - where Iraqis felt entitled to the same economic privilege held by their Kuwaiti neighbors. This tension was exacerbated by the extreme economic hardship that fighting a sustained war with Iran caused Iraq, the degree to which the economy of Iraq became a war economy, and the degree to which war-fighting became a norm in civil society. In addition to these effects on domestic politics in Iraq, the war between Iraq and Iran affected the relationship between Iraq and the United States. During the war, the United States was an ally o f and an arms supplier for the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq against Iran. The total arms sales from the United States to Iraq were around 20 billion dollars (Geyer and Green 1992, 49). These arms were, at least in part, used by Iraq against Kuwait in the 1990 invasion (Geyer and Green 1992, 50). Further, this arms-sales relationship between the United States and Iraq created an air of permissibility and freedom in the diplomatic impressions of Iraq (Bodansky 2004). Many scholars have documented that Iraq miscalculated the United States’ reaction to an invasion of Kuwait, assuming an ally’s non interference. Because of its pre-existing relationship with the United States, the government of Iraq was under the impression that it would be allowed to invade Kuwait (Cerf 2003). In addition to setting the stage for Iraq’s impression of its relationship with the United States, the Iran-Iraq war was a part of the context for Iraq’s relationship with the UN and its foreign policy goals more broadly. The UN had not taken the opportunity to condemn Iraqi aggression against Iran, nor had it hinted at punishing Iraq for invading Iran (Dekker and Post 1992). The UN had been a part of securing a cease-fire to the Iran-Iraq war favorable to Iraq. Iraq’s aggressive foreign policy seemed vindicated by international reaction to the Iran-Iraq war, as Iraq gained territory from the conflict and had international 205 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. public opinion on its side. This (quite recent) memory cannot be considered as irrelevant to Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait over a territorial dispute in 1990. The final effect of the Iran-Iraq was a more direct one on the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait - a tense cooperation that fell apart at the end of the war. IV. IRAQ AND KUWAIT, IMMEDIATE CONTEXT, 1990 The Iran-Iraq war provided a unique mandate for Iraq and Kuwait to cooperate, as Iraq had the military to fight the war, Kuwait had the money, and neither could sustain the conflict alone. Kuwait, fearing a Khomeini-led fundamentalist Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East if Iran won, had lent the government of Iraq between twelve and fifteen billion dollars to modernize the military and fight Iran. By August 1990 Iraq's army, with 900 thousand troops in uniform and another million in civilian reserves, was the fourth largest in the world (Byman and Waxman 2000). It was well-equipped with 5,700 tanks, including Soviet- made T-55s and T-62s, and 3,700 artillery pieces (Ekeus 1995). Iraqi Air Force, the sixth largest in the world, possessed 950 combat aircraft, including MIG-2 Is and MIG-23s (Pelletier, Johnson, and Rosenberger 1990). At the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, the forces that had been a benefit to Kuwait became a substantial liability. Iraq emerged from the war with Iran with greater relative power and prestige, and was looking to use it to solve internal problems (Murden 1995, 155; Pelletiere, Johnson, and Rosenberger 1990). In 1990 Iraq had a formidable fighting force; but the war had left a forty billion-dollar debt to Kuwait. Unable to decisively defeat Iran, and feeling inadequately supported by Kuwait for the protection, the government of Iraq renewed many of its grievances towards Kuwait. In July 1990, Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of ruining Iraq's economy by overproducing oil and demanded Kuwaitis decrease production. He also claimed Kuwaitis 206 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were “slant” drilling in the Rumaila oilfield near Iraq-Kuwait border and stealing Iraqi oil. The government of Iraq also insisted that Kuwait lease Bubiyan and Warbah to Iraq and forgive the billions in war loans. To emphasize its demands, the government o f Iraq moved about 100,000 troops to Kuwaiti border. The intense negotiations which took place in the following days appeared to have averted an invasion of Kuwait, but this was not the case. Lawson lists Iraq’s motives for invading Kuwait as a quest for regional hegemony, an economic problem Kuwait could solve, and a search for changes in the power structure of the Arab state system (1997; Clawson 1993; 2001; Parasiliti 2003). Halliday argues that the fall of oil prices, the impasse in Iran, the end of the Cold War, real dispute with Kuwait, and stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict were all motivating factors (1991, 226). As Ch. VI addresses, all of these contexts matter to understanding Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. V. GENDERED CRITIQUES OF POLITICAL CONTEXT(S) On Iraqi side, Saddam Hussein called on women to defend the nation. The available information suggests that owing to repression, both Iraqi women and men lived in fear o f the state before and during the wars .... Not only were women mobilized by the state, they were actively recruited and trained by the only women’s organization, the General Federation of Iraqi women (Beckman and D ’Amico 1994, 99-100). The constant state o f structural violence between [Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran] emulates a household - the weak get abused while the strong continue to try to prove their masculinity. In this way, governments are like rich, powerful men - ignorant o f others’ needs, forging ahead for their own good. Even when not a single shot is fired, constant violence occurs (Notes from a conversation among members o f Voices in the Wilderness Chicago, 1999). If the context is relevant to the political situation, a feminist understanding of the context is relevant to a feminist understanding of the political situation. The question then becomes one of disaggregating the political context preceding the Gulf War and making observations concerning its justice. Jean Elshtain begins by equating just politics with 207 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. peace, and explaining that this was not the case in the Middle East generally or in Iraq specifically before the Gulf War. She explains that “peace is just order, the Middle East was not at peace before the Gulf War (Elshtain 1992b, 46). ‘At peace’ seems to be a good measuring stick for just politics: it provides a foundation for a critique of political violence. Elshtain’s observation that the situation surrounding Iraq was anything but ‘at peace’ strikes home. I have told a story o f (some of) the multiple political contexts that provide foundation for understanding the 1990 Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait, and for the subsequent responses from the international community. The contexts involving Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, the colonial powers, and the United States should not be understood as history in the sense of certainty that the events happened the ways that they were told in this juxtaposition of my narratives, my research, and others’ narratives. Instead, as Huston and Baudrillard discussed, these histories are a part of the contested discourses that constantly create and re create (historical and current) politics. If we live in a world of discursive referendum, this chapter on contexts has attempted to ‘referee’ that ‘referendum’ and provide (some of many) stories about the political situations surrounding Iraq, in order to lay foundation for the studies of the wars surrounding Iraq that follow. Those studies, like the study o f the context, will be presented as arguments about what might have happened, reflected in real-world discourse. Those discourse, however, are not “just talk” - constructed histories and characterizations of current politics affect the way that politics happens. The political context of the Gulf War, then, is long and storied: the Iran-Iraq war, the conflict between Israel and Iraq (and the Middle East more generally), the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, the mandate system, colonialism, the economic context o f oil, economic inequality in the Middle East, the history of difficulties between Islam and 208 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Christianity, the travails of the Ottoman Empire, the Cold War, the attempts to define and redefine the United States’ role in the post-Cold War world . . . the list goes on. It is impossible for this project (or any project) to capture the entirety of the meaningful contexts in which the Gulf War is situated. Instead, we can understand the general scope of this context, and try to evaluate specific dimensions o f it, or even engage those dimensions in a dialogue to increase our understanding of the conflict. When it comes down to it, there are certainly parts of the political context which meet standards o f justice and parts of the political context which are unjust to the core. The political context, then, is at best, partially just; as is any political context. The reformulation of just war standards in the theoretical section of this project hints at some standards for just politics: First, that there is no assumption o f universal moral disposition or conviction, but instead a dialogical understanding of values, which is based on inclusive, non-confrontational argumentation (Empathetic Cooperation I); second, that the strong take unilateral steps to break the cycle of violence (Empathetic Cooperation II); third, that gender be taken into consideration (Feminist Consciousness). I use these as guidelines to evaluate the political context.1 5 A. EMPATHETIC COOPERATION I The ethos of empathy expects Kuwait to be empathetic with Iraq’s material difficulties; Iraq to be empathetic with Kuwait’s insecurity; the Coalition to be empathetic with the difficulties of living under and governing with colonially constructed borders in a 151 use these as guidelines to deal more with the immediate political context than with the history o f political contexts. This is for two reasons: first, because o f the near-impossibility o f encompassing the history o f contexts, and second, out o f an attempt to carefully navigate the line between awareness o f past injustice and license for future aggression. The empathy part o f a feminist ethic o f security and war is meant to compensate for the lack o f ‘deep history’ in the standards o f just politics. In other words, the material and social inequalities and injustices o f the political contexts o f conflicts ought to be seen, instead of ignored; when they are seen, they should be seen with empathy, and with understanding, instead of with patemalistically, or without understandings responsibility, or as irrelevant. 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tense international atmosphere; the international community to be empathetic about the confusion that its multi-sided and often contradictory contributions to the Iran-Iraq war; Iraq to be empathetic to an international community attempting to construct norms and rule of law (contributing to rather than intervening against such dialogue); international empathy to extend to the situation surrounding Israel; and the international community to be empathetic with the hybridized and difficult road to colonial recovery. It asks for empathy between religious, political, and philosophical positions as well. By empathy, I mean respect for different values, combined with understanding of the (political and social) difficulties encountered by those who cannot be directly identified with. The short of it is that such empathy would require a complete reformulation of international political relations. Glimmers of empathy in international politics generally, and in this political dynamic specifically, are few, far between, and normally tainted by some other political interest. A relationship dominated by power-over (coercive power) is not open to the ideas o f power-with (cooperative power) that create empathy; competition and deep cooperation do not coexist. Rather than showing empathy for Iraq’s material difficulty, Kuwait supported Iraq when and only when it was serving as a proxy military for Kuwait. Rather than showing empathy for Kuwait’s insecurity, Iraq either invaded or threatened to at the hint o f political disagreement between the two. Rather than being empathetic with the problems caused to both the internal situations of Iraq and Kuwait and the relationship between them by artificially constructed colonial borders, the Coalition hailed national sovereignty as if nations (and their current borders) were as natural as the humyns who exist within them. This lack of empathy is not only bad ethics, it is bad politics: as a result, many o f the deep political problems that led to the Gulf War were not addressed. Further, the international community was not generally empathetic about the contradictory nature of its 210 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contributions to the Iran-Iraq war. The United States contributed to both sides of the war (sometimes even at the same time), and the war was caught in the middle o f the confusing waning years of the Cold War. These confusions inevitably led to some o f the miscommunications that started the Gulf War; few members of the international community made any sustained effort to be clear with Iraq. Nor was Iraq particularly interested in international norms and laws; the lawless spirit of the Cold War had carried over past the end of the Cold War in the Iraqi government. Other nations were also generally not empathetic about the relationship between Iraq and Israel for Iraq’s perspective; that Iraq felt pressured to compete with Israel was seldom acknowledged in considerations of questions of justice and the Coalition invasion. Nor was colonial recovery seen as a tribulation to be empathized with - the ‘oil economies’ were the primary thing that identified these states for other nations outside of the region, as opposed to deep historical and political context. Perhaps ironically, the debate between Iraq and Kuwait often referenced deep history, while the international community floated above that history, making war-related decisions with the context o f (at best) a few years while Iraq and Kuwait were feuding over centuries of disagreement. This lack of demonstration of empathy is a problem for the justice of the political context in which the conflicts which led to the Gulf War were considered. An examination of the political relations immediately preceding the Gulf War shows further questions about the justice of the political situation. Even were the ‘deep historical context’ considered with empathy, and thus materially and ideationally just, the ‘immediate context’ appears lacking in the eyes of the constructed just politics standards. Universal claims to moral superiority were made on all sides of the Gulf War, however, and often with the result feminisms are concerned about when they construct this 211 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. standard. The United States (and the UN-based Coalition) asserted universalistic claims to the naturalness of national borders, the sovereignty of states, the proper use of military force, the alleged illegitimacy o f the Saddam Hussein government, and the form of government that states ought to have, and the value of Americans’ ‘way of life.’ While there are not universalistic moral claims evident in the war discourse of Iraq, there are evident claims of moral superiority - claims about what Muslims should be and what an Islamic state should be, couched in terms of a critique of the domestic and international operation of Kuwaiti state. As Sari Nusseibeh argues, this is something that all sides of the Gulf War have in common; they generally employ parochial understandings of morality. He explains that “two common themes pervade Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and the U. S. liberation of it: the application o f force in the pursuit of self-interest and the resort to an internal code of political and moral values as justification for this” (Nusseibeh 1992, 77). This effort to impose of internal codes of morality is not acceptable to a feminist ethics of war and peace, which demands dialogical examination across value-systems. In practice, the application of de-universalizing values would demand either inaction on a particular issue or securing a moral understanding where the conviction which a nation desires to enforce is voluntarily shared. In other words, politics would need to be conducted either by dialogical moral consensus or by moral non-intervention. This would mean that the value differences between the United States (and Coalition members) and Iraq, and between Iraq and Kuwait, would need to be brought into a public value discourse where they are examined for their commonalities and then considered for their worth vis-a-vis the goals of gender and humyn emancipation. In other words, before having a war, the Gulf War belligerents ought to have had an argument; not an argument in the sense of a disagreement, but an argument in the Socratic sense, where value differences are understood, tested, and 212 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. when they can be, worked out. The dialogue here would be about the problems experienced by the different actors in operating in the status quo of international relations, about what those actors saw as just solutions to their problems, and about ways in which both values and material interests could be compromised in order to provide answers to these problems. Iraq could have expressed its difficulties with Kuwaiti lack o f support, with its port insecurity, with oil price fixing, and with oil theft in an international arena capable o f listening to (and maybe even addressing) these difficulties as valid. Kuwait could then have explained the difficulties it has with meeting Iraq’s perceived needs, and an international dialogue could ensue. Even if this dialogue failed (and thus led to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), it could be resumed to prevent an expansion of the hostilities. Fulfillment of this just politics guideline, then, sets up a global political discourse centered on tolerance and respect for diversity, but maintains accountability checks that discourage rampant violations of agreed-upon standards. It creates an international ‘higher authority’ for issues of ethics in politics, without basing that authority on hegemony, universalism, or power. The lead-up to the Gulf War failed this test at every turn; a re- visioning of that political process by these standards creates discursive space for imagining a radically different result. This different result includes the possibility o f a non-violent (or even non-conflictual) resolution that would look radically unlike the real political result. B. EMPATHETIC COOPERATION II Unilaterally deconstructing the cycle of violence is a way that the strong can engage in empathetic cooperation with the weak. Unilateral non-violence can begin to deconstruct an international system based on violence, strength, and weakness. Feminisms’ understandings of the political influence of unilateral action combine with understandings of the undesirability of international contest and violence. While understanding that there will 213 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. be some times when international violence is justified, feminisms suggest that unilateral attempts to deconstruct the violent ethos of the international system would be a useful tool for the purpose of decreasing violence between states. The principle involves the strong parties in international politics taking unilateral steps to stop violence. By ‘unilateral steps,’ I mean choosing not to act violently in a situation in which it might be just to act violently. Instead, an actor could choose a non-violent alternative policy to demonstrate that the cycle of violence is not necessary. In the politics leading up to the Gulf War, Iraq failed to take steps to stop violence - it elected to invade Kuwait. The United States failed to take steps to stop violence - it elected to retake Kuwait and invade Iraq, some contend, immediately upon Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait. Geyer and Green indicate that, far from breaking the cycle of violence, the United States and Iraq engaged in discourses unconducive to diplomatic solutions (1992, 95). In fact, the United States before the Gulf War engaged in diplomacy not as negotiation but as communication of ultimatums o f violence (Geyer and Green 1992, 99). The Soviet Union attempted to intervene to stop the cycle of violence, but did not have a position of power in the situation, and did not intervene strongly enough to put itself in a place of power. The standard of unilateral steps to break the cycle o f violence would instruct the United States to resist military solutions to the problem o f Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; it would further instruct Iraq to resist military solutions to the problem o f Kuwaiti resistance to Iraqi demands. The Gulf War was violent in part because violence is a norm in the international arena; it is a cyclical way of dealing with conflicts. Each individual act of war and violence, like the Gulf War, is a part of and a result of a number of other violent events; which are a part o f a system of international relations based on competitive violence. The Gulf War was a part o f a violent international culture in the Middle East, and a part of a 214 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. larger violent culture in global politics. Peaceful resolutions to even small parts of the conflict could have served as discursive deconstructions o f the international cycle of violence. C. FEMINIST CONCIOUSNESS The question ‘where are the wymyn’ is one that feminists ask about international relations generally, and the practice of war specifically, frequently and to little avail. The relative invisibility of wymyn and gendered oppression in and around conflict is related to the relative invisibility of wymyn outside of conflict in the relations between nations and intergovernmental organizations. I have inserted wymyn into the opening quotes o f several sections of this chapter, but they have been notably absent from the recounting of both dominant and conflicting histories of the international political situation surrounding Iraq. I juxtaposed these stories about wymyn in order to raise feminist consciousness: to provoke the question o f where the wymyn were in the real text. Largely, wymyn are omitted from histories of the Gulf War when they were both its actors and its victims. Just politics (and just history) takes account o f where the wymyn are in political relations. While many of the Gulf War belligerent states showed some gender consciousness in (domestic if not international) politics, they do not meet this standard. This standard envisions something different than some laws on the books dealing with sex equality. It pictures an international society in which actors consider the gendered implications and gendered impacts of every decision as a part of making that decision. This is much more comprehensive coverage, and will serve a number o f major functions. First, it brings those people identified as wymyn into the analysis of political relations in a way that wymyn’s needs and wymyn’s lives could possibly be adequately and fairly addressed in diplomatic discourse. Second, like feminist consciousness, consciousness of wymyn’s oppression brings into the discourse of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. international politics an identification with oppression that allows for increased empathy with the points of view of those most affected by and most silenced by the dominant masculinities in political relations. Third, this consciousness of gender oppression in times of ‘normal politics’ will create a norm that spills over to ad bellum and in bello decision making concerning the treatment o f and concern for wymyn’s rights. Finally, the evidence shows that gender relations in domestic politics are an excellent reflector of states’ propensity to violence. Gender consciousness in the political situation surrounding the Gulf War would have meant a consideration of the gendered roles, gendered concepts, and gendered impacts of the conflict discussed in this chapter would have been a part of the political discourse and decision-making process which led up to the choices which picked the Gulf War as a course of action. It would have meant that the governments of Iraq, the United States, and Kuwait would have taken gender into consideration (both gender in terms o f wymyn and in terms of political relations) at every turn in policy-choosing. There is no evidence that gender was a consideration in the international relations between these actors leading up to the Gulf War. VI. CONCLUSION This chapter serves a number of purposes: introducing the empirical cases to be evaluated in this study, introducing in some depth the historical methodology {stylized empiricism) used in those evaluations, describing the context in which the wars in Iraq in the last decade and a half came to be, and critiquing that political context for feminisms’ problems with the ways that states treat each other even when not technically ‘at war.’ As Elshtain observes, in the late 1980s, Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, and the United States were not ‘at war,’ but neither were they ‘at peace.’ This lack of peacefulness between the states was full of injustices; those injustices necessarily ‘spill over’ to the ad bellum implications of 216 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. choosing to start the Gulf War. Going into the Gulf War, we see discursive conflict over the historical context flow into discursive conflict over the justice o f the Gulf War. These implications will introduce Chapter VI, which applies my reformulated feminist just war theory to the [First] Gulf War. 217 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 6. the gendered gulf (war) In January 1991, as the US Congress debated on whether or not to go to war, there were some small signs that feminist discourse had filtered throught to the corridors of power. For example, on January 1 1 , 1991, Congressman Joseph Kennedy II o f Massachusetts made an impassioned speech from the floor of the House, stating that “There's a misguided machismo mentality in America now, a John Wayne attitude, that says some how or another, this is the way we should conduct foreign policy. We ought to be the bully boy” (Roach 1991). Because Iraq fought against such incredible odds ostensibly for the defense of the lands o f Islam, in many eyes Saddam is seen as having performed a service to Islam. In this way, it is possible for jihad theory to make the case that the Gulf War was not just about oil or territory but a war over values (Kelsay 1993). Chapter V emphasized continuity and constructed history; the [First] Gulf War continues (and stems from) a number of political conflicts that the area was embroiled in before and throughout the 1980s. Still, we delineate the ‘Gulf W ar’ as a historical event. The ‘gulf war’ can be seen as two separate but related offensive military campaigns: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the UN Coalition’s repelling of that invasion. The histories of how these campaigns came to exist, why they did, and what they accomplished are matters of argument in international politics. Stories of the chronology of events, however, are fairly uncontroversial. Iraq’s invasion took all of one night; they occupied Kuwait for more than six months. The allied effort included some 180 days of complete maritime interception (blockade), 38 days of aerial bombardments, and three days of ground-fighting.1 It has been said that this war was the subject of the highest volume of ethical claims in humyn history 1 The participants in the Coalition in the 1991 Gulf War were: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I often use ‘the United States’ as proxy, not because I am implying a lack o f agency on the part o f the other members o f the Coalition, but because I am making the argument that the Gulf War was inspired by United States policies. I look to United States policies and actions, then, focusing my feminist reformulations on the foreign policy o f the most powerful nation in the world (Rowe 1993; Travers 1993). 218 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Elshtain 1995). While such a claim will never be verifiable, its spirit is well-taken: the [First] Gulf War is talked about in the moral terms of just war theories frequently. Iraq justified its invasion of Kuwait in a number o f ‘ just war’ declarations: as a humynitarian intervention, as a defense of religion, and as a defense of its people. Kenneth Vaux reminds us that the textual standards for Islamic warfare against unbelievers and failed Muslims are met in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1992, 71). Iraq often proclaimed the justice of its invasion in these terms. The [Kuwaiti] enemy was seen as destroying the life, property, and values of the Islamic members of the state of Iraq, Iraq held back in the means o f warfare, and soldiers were led by the promise of paradise (Vaux 1992, 71). The Gulf War could thus be seen as defensive and ideological on the part of Iraq. In fact, “In Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric, this was a war of Islamic faithfulness against demonic materialism” (Vaux 1992, 75). This rhetoric was followed up by action as well. Vaux remembers that, “in the end, when Iraq opened the valves to let the oil flow into the sea and set the wells afire, Saddam Hussein showed clearly that his primary ambitions were not economic, but ideological” (1992, 75). Faith in the justice of these ideological goals made a difference in Iraq’s behavior leading up to, during, and after the Gulf War. Heather McCoubrey claims that this faith was misguided. She explains that, in the standards of just war, conquering territory by force is not acceptable even if a state has just cause and a good claim to the territory (McCoubrey 1993 a, 207). Modem jus in bello says that the occupied owe no allegiance to the occupant in that situation, as they are unjustly occupied (McCoubrey 1993b, 213). Kenneth Vaux claims that the religious overtones of the Iraqi side o f the Gulf War were not genuine, but irresponsible (1992, 75). Those who argue that Iraq’s invasion was unjust rely on three principles: that aggressive warfare is in itself 219 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unjust, that the oppressive measures used against the Kuwaiti people were unjust, and that Iraq did not have just cause against Kuwait. James Turner Johnson and George Weigel argue that the Coalition side of the Gulf War was a just war (1991). They argue that there was just cause (the unprovoked invasion of Kuwait) as well as right authority (the UN Security Council and governmental permission for the attacks). Additionally, Johnson and Weigel contend that the intention to free Kuwait qualifies as right intent, and the goal of peace was evident in the actions o f the allies against Iraq. They further explain that proportionality is a moral judgement, not a numbers game; therefore, the Gulf War was proportional even if there were a skewed number of casualties on the Iraqi side. Finally, the authors argue that last resort is a standard which is judged not by trying other means, but by a robust determination of appropriateness by the war-making nations. They argue that such a determination of appropriateness was present in the Gulf War, and that the Gulf War shows the possibility of a just war (Johnson 1984, 35; Weigel 1992 19, 29). Kenneth Vaux, on the other hand, makes the case that the Gulf War was not a just war (1992). Vaux asserts that the war was about resources, not sovereignty, and that resources do not meet the standard of just cause. Disagreeing with Johnson and Weigel, Vaux argues that the last resort standard needs to be rigorously upheld, and that there was no interest in peace that allowed the allies to wait for the last resort. The Coalition, he argues, had ulterior motives, failed to exhaust other resorts, used disproportionate power, and exhibited a lack o f desire for permanent peace (1992, 29).2 Finally, Vaux contends that the United States violated the ethics of just war by not minimizing the force that it used when 2 In fact, Vaux documents that the allies had on their side Iraq’s unjust aggression towards Kuwait, legitimate authority in the UN, and a high probability o f success, yet still managed to come out on the losing side o f the ju s ad bellum evaluation (1992, 29). 220 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fighting against Iraq. Vaux asserts that scholars and policy-makers do not go about asking the just war questions in a war that they are sure is just. By extension, people ask just war questions about the Gulf War precisely because they worry that it was unjust. The arguments of Johnson and Weigel, and o f Vaux against them, are representative of stories told for and against the justice of the [First] Gulf War. This chapter explores justice and the Gulf War through the gendered lenses o f a feminist theory o f just war. The first section, ‘gendered tales,’ recounts gendered stories of just war in the Gulf. It tells a story of just warrior states saving beautiful soul states from aggressive outsiders. It then recounts stories o f the humyn just warriors and beautiful souls that the Gulf War was ostensibly fought for and by. Finally, it discusses the insidious sexualization and abstraction of just war claims around the Gulf War more generally. The second section, ‘gendered war-making,’ discusses the gendered choices belligerent states made in choosing the Gulf War. It interrogates both the Iraqi government’s and the Coalition’s claims to right authority, just cause, right intent, last resort, and reasonable chance o f success from feminist perspectives. The third section, ‘gendered realities,’ deals with the gendered nature o f the fighting o f the Gulf War. It locates the roles that wymyn played in the Gulf War. Then, it discusses the gendered impacts o f the war: both impacts directly on wymyn and gendered impacts with wider direct and indirect effects. I discuss the implications of these effects in terms of a feminist reformulation o f the discrimination principle. I finish this section with a discussion of weapons choices and the question of ‘heinous means’ on both sides of the Gulf War. The fourth section, ‘feminist (re)wars’ presents critical fem inist reformulations o f the G ulf War dynamics. In this section, I present disruptive discourses counter to the dominant stories of the Gulf War. I propose a power- with model for solving deep international conflicts like the political situations surrounding 221 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Iraq. This chapter concludes with a question of the justice of the end{?) of the Gulf W ar, which will set the stage for the discussion of economic sanctions in the next chapter. I. GENDERED TALES Sexually demeaning terms for Saddam Hussein are everywhere. Most notably, Thomas Friedman, a respected journalist, wrote a New York Times editorial discussing ‘Sodom’ Hussein’s violations, connoting a relationship between Saddam Hussein and those who, in old testament lore, God punishes for homosexual hedonism. Saddam, then, is a sinner; and the worst kind, a sexual sinner. Exactly what about this war, I ask Friedman, reminds him of being fucked up the assl Or is it simply sensationalist rhetoric? Certainly, we use analogies to understand politics. For some political purposes, sexual analogies may even be appropriate. Then we turn to the purpose for Friedman’s heterosexist rhetoric - to encourage military attack. It seems like he may be returning ‘Sodom’s’ favor; but it is the Iraqi people who suffer the most in this show of phallic force (Sjoberg 2002a). A number o f feminists talk about war narratives as an important part o f war - both discursively and substantively. The Gulf War was no exception; it was told as a story before and during as well as after the actual fighting. Before the war, Iraq told it as a story of reclaiming what was rightfully its entitlement; the Coalition told it as a story o f moral beneficence, of putting Iraq in its place, and of the strong protecting the weak. During the war, the Coalition told the story of a war which was fought precisely and cleanly, while Iraq presented the story o f a war fought with extreme cruelty. After the war, the Iraq told the story of a moral victory, o f survival, and o f making headway against the dominant and the imperial by the oppressed. The United States explained the Gulf War as a military victory on behalf of both weaker Kuwait and international principles of law and order. Throughout these war stories, feminisms see specific discourses which make it clear that the narratives of the Gulf War included many gendered stories, concepts, and assumptions. I discusses these narratives in three parts: stories of ‘ just warrior states’ defending ‘beautiful soul’ states; 222 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stories o f ‘ just warriors’ defending ‘beautiful souls,’ and insidious gendered abstractions within Gulf War stories. A. JUST WARRIOR STATES DEFEND BEAUTIFUL SOUL STATES Tickner explains that masculinized state-story-telling was a part of the Gulf War through and through. She recounts that “the 1991 Persian Gulf war was frequently depicted as a personal contest between Saddam Hussein and George Bush and described in the appropriate locker-room or football language,” where the war sounds like a football game or a wresting match instead of a deadly act o f political violence (Tickner 1992). The winner’s masculinity is validated while the loser’s masculinity is questioned. Geyer and Green explain that the United States became involved with the Gulf War at least in part because of President George Bush’s need to overcome the ‘wimp factor’ reputation that had plagued his political career (1992, 85). Inconsistency in foreign policy had made Bush look like a ‘wimp,’ or like he was not manly enough to handle the international relations of the strongest country in the world aggressively. Geyer and Green contend that the United States’ participation in the Gulf War was bound up in the president’s attempts to prove his manhood through the aggressive use of military force (1992, 86). As Steve Niva argues, the Gulf War was a forum for the revitalization of manliness through competitive territorial conquest. More than that, however, it was a competition between masculinities. Connell discussed the distinction between hegemonic masculinities and subordinated masculinities, where hegemonic masculinities feminize other masculinities in conflict, maintaining their power and control. This story-telling increases the violence in war-fighting and creates abstraction that allows the other side to be considered as less than humyn (Vaux 1992; Elshtain 1992b). Niva sees this process occurring in the context of competition between American and Iraqi masculinities in the Gulf War. He explains that 223 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. American masculinity here is the “standard,” which is to be met by or enforced on subordinated masculinities in Iraq. In this situation, “the contrast between the tough but tender and technologically sophisticated Western man and the hypermacho Arab villain from an inferior civilization owes its considerable pedigree to the discourse of Western superiority that Edward Said called Orientalism” (Niva 1998, 119). In other words, the story of the conflict was not only told in terms of American manliness, but in terms of the victory of American manliness over the mistaken and inferior masculinities o f the opponent. In this understanding, then, the Gulf War was a part of a larger effort, both conscious and sub conscious, of American men, particularly of American men in political leadership, to prove and defend their masculinities. The American story of the Gulf War was not simply of American manliness, but of (masculine) America’s ability to save (feminine) Kuwait - the strong, powerful (manly) state(s) defend(s) the powerless, defenseless, and innocent (feminine) state from the aggression of the mean (manly) state which has attacked it. In international dialogue about the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait, there was very little discussion of the possibility that Iraq may have had some legitimate grievance with Kuwait. Instead, the immediate reaction was condemnation o f Iraq’s aggression against its smaller neighbor. Kuwait’s defenselessness and the unprovoked nature of the attack were emphasized in international reaction to the Iraqi invasion. The Security Council condemned the Iraqi occupation immediately, and Iraq’s claim to a humynitarian license to be in Kuwait was summarily dismissed.3 I contend that the story that the Coalition told and acted put in the Gulf War between states has 3 At no point in the international dialogue about solving the problem o f Kuwaiti occupation was the ceding of Kuwaiti territory, or the discussion o f Iraq’s grievances, seriously discussed. This is not to say that Iraq made an appropriate, mature, laudable, or even worth-recognizing decision to invade Kuwait - only to show that Kuwait was treated as so fem inized that it cannot be considered as an actor in international politics at the same time. 224 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. substantial similarities to the stories that just war theories tell about the relationships between men and wymyn in war. In just war, just warriors go to war when the wymyn’s (beautiful souls’) honor, safety, innocence, or livelihood is threatened. The just warriors defend the beautiful souls through tough strategy and tactics of war, which the wymyn are not either complicit in or witness to, as it would be both dishonorable and impossible for them to defend themselves. The stories told about Iraq and Kuwait reflect this dichotomy. Iraq attacked Kuwait, threatening its honor, safety, innocence, and livelihood. Kuwait, an innocent country (beautiful soul) incapable of defending itself, was in need of the (unconditional) protection from a just-warrior state with the capabilities to exact substantial enough damage on Iraq to secure its withdrawal, and an end to its threats. Kuwait, then, is not an actor to be interrogated, included, considered, or concerned with - it is a passive ‘innocent’ whose honor is being fought over by the ‘men’ in the battle which it sits by and watches. In this story, it would be inappropriate (and indeed absurd) to ask questions about Iraq’s justifications for invading Kuwait, potential concessions that could be made by Kuwait, or the appropriateness/legitimacy of Kuwait’s existence. Kuwait, in the Gulf War, is a beautiful soul; an innocent to be acted on instead of acting; to be acted for instead of towards. As Cynthia Enloe comments, “U. S. intervention in the Gulf would be harder to justify if there were no feminized victim,” so the feminization of Kuwait contributes to the just war discourse surrounding the Gulf War (Enloe 1993, 166). The United States was not the only actor in the Gulf War to tell a war narrative about manliness. In wartime Iraq, the discourse of the government and the media was highly bound up in manliness. First, men were encouraged to behave in the tradition of the Islamic citizen-warrior interpretation of manliness. Terms like honor (sharaf) and manliness (rujala) 225 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were given as guidance for how the country should behave itself during war. The government of Iraq frequently criticized the United States’ apparent lack o f manliness in attacking (or failing to put forth the effort to miss) Iraqi wymyn and children, contending that the United States lacked the masculinity and chivalry to behave in war as ‘real men should.’ Further, the government of Iraq baited its enemies by insulting their masculinity. Days before the ground war started, Saddam Hussein could be caught explaining to Americans what it meant to be a real man in terms of combat. He claimed that, in the coming war, Americans would “be taught a lesson in manliness and real combat, and certificates of this lesson will be their blood, shed in rivers in which they will swim as floating corpses” (AP, 1.17.91). The government of Iraq framed the Gulf War in terms of competitive manliness, much like the United States did. Iraq described itself as a just warrior state, providing for its people both distributive and retributive justice. The Coalition described itself as a just war, defending innocent Kuwait. B. JUST WARRIORS DEFEND BEAUTIFUL SOULS The Gulf War was a time when wymyn were discovering new roles in war: American wymyn as soldiers, Iraqi wymyn as subjects o f international political debate . . . but it was also a time when hybridization kept the just war image o f ‘beautiful soul’ wymyn needing protection alive. On the American/Coalition side of the Gulf War, Western, Iraqi, and Kuwaiti wymyn served as emblematic signifiers of the justice of the cause against Iraq. Cynthia Enloe explains that, “if there is an image that defines television’s Gulf Crisis, it’s a disheveled white woman coming off a Boeing 747, an exhausted baby on her shoulder” (Enloe 1993, 166). She contends that such an image is key to the justification of the Gulf War. Watching a tired, disheveled, and abused womyn is a signifier of national failure (and the failure of nationalized masculinity) to protect those in need of protection. She continues 226 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to explain that “states exist, this media story implies, to protect womenandchildren” (Enloe 1993, 166).4 These wymyn’s insecurity served as a call to war, as a reminder of what the world would be like if wymyn were not fought for and protected, and as a call to male honor for the purposes o f protection. Not only was Western wymyn’s physical safety a claim to just cause for the war, but also their roles in social and political interactions. To the United States Gulf War was [in part] about preserving Western wymyn’s way o f life. President Bush and a number of other Western leaders talked about free access to Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil as a question o f defense of the way o f life that citizens had become accustomed to.5 Lack o f access to oil would hinder wymyn from effectively serving as mothers and wives, and this was a part of the justification for going to war. A common image for the ‘way of life’ argument justifying United States involvement in the Gulf War was that o f a womyn unloading her children out of a car in front of a house with a yellow ribbon. She feeds her children, waters her flowers, and conveys the message that her husband is in Iraq, fighting so that they can keep this way of life. Here, a womyn’s role as a mother is paid particular attention. Motherhood in war serves a number of functions: physical creation of soldiers, social creation of those soldiers, support of the soldiers from back home, an individualized purpose for each soldier to fight, and a comfort for soldiers in the event that they are wounded in battle. In the Gulf War, 4 The Western wymyn who were trapped or taken hostage in Iraq and Kuwait at the outset o f the Gulf War were a call to arms to their governments (and to the people ‘back home’) to protect their honor and ensure their safety. Womenandchildren is used as one word here to connote wymyn being seen as helpless, and in a group without agency, or like children. Also ‘womenandchildren’ are often grouped as the innocent and helpless times o f war - for example, someone accusing a belligerent o f being unjust in bello may accuse them o f bombing the womenandchildren residing in opponents’ cities. 5 Discussion o f oil as key to mothers’ driving their children to soccer practice, or heating their homes, or performing other household functions reliant on access to oil dominated the part o f the Gulf War justification rhetoric which talked about Western interests. 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. soldiers were cast as fighting for their ‘wives and mothers’ and for ‘freedom for their children’ and a ‘new world order’ where ‘all fathers, mothers, and children’ will be able to live without fear for their lives. The pageantry of the war included videotaped messages from soldiers in Iraq ‘back home,’ saying hello to their mothers, and to the mothers of their children. This created the double image that mothers were being fought for, and that the soldiers fighting were tough, but focused on what they were protecting, Beautiful Souls at home. Beautiful Souls at home were not the only protective purpose o f the Western soldiers who spent 1991 in Iraq. One of the arguments made for the defense of Kuwait was the protection of Kuwaiti wymyn and children from the horrors inflicted by Iraqi soldiers. Much abuse of Kuwaiti ‘womenandchildren’ is documented during the Iraqi occupation; at the time it was argued that the abuse of wymyn in Kuwait by the Iraqi military was a part of the reason why Kuwait must be liberated (Enloe 1993). Advocacies o f continuing the Gulf War to overthrow the government of Iraq were peppered with narratives and claims about the repressive nature of the government of Iraq, including its offenses against Iraqi wymyn.6 This discourse fails to mention the (often horrible) effects of war on wymyn. The claim, instead, is that the violation of wymyn is an international security issue. In this situation, American men and women must protect Iraqi women from Iraqi men (specifically, from an Iraqi man, Saddam Hussein) by force, lest the security of the international community break down. The wymyn who are being protected are omitted on a number of levels: their agency, their preferences, their choices, and their ultimate fate. 6 Saddam Hussein was accused o f sponsoring rape, severe psychological trauma, politicized sexual violence, imprisonment as hostages, torture o f mothers for children’s activities, and decapitation (Coughlin 2002). 228 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C. INSIDIOUS ABSTRACTION I earlier noted a number of trends of insidious abstraction in presentations of ‘ just war theories’ and their ‘ just wars. A number of these trends can be seen in the Gulf War. Feminisms express concern that those who use just war rhetoric restrict themselves to thinking about the justice of their side of the story, without coming to see the whole picture. This was a problem during the Gulf War - though both Iraq and the United States spent some time talking about the justice of their cause as relates to the other side, this discussion reflects a myopic interpretation of the war rather than a genuine attempt at understanding the other’s point of view.7 This oversimplification is in itself an insidious abstraction: simple war stories lead to harsh war behaviors. The United States adopted a simple story of the invasion as aggression against a sovereign state with one (and only one) solution: unconditional withdrawal. This turned the Gulf War quickly from a humynitarian disaster with many complexities to a game which appeared very simple. Iraq, on the other hand, did a little more talking about the justice of Kuwait’s interest in not being invaded, arguing that both Islamic law and Iraq’s right to the land trumped this interest. Where the abstraction comes in, however, is in Iraq’s claims to the international community that Kuwait benefited from the occupation. If front of the UN Security Council, Iraq claimed that the invasion of Kuwait was a humynitarian intervention against a repressive government. While the government of Kuwait was somewhat repressive, the Iraqi invasion did not lead to more peace and order, nor is there any indication that it was intended to. By talking about the war in terms of the benefits to 7 The United States, as was mentioned early, never discemibly considered whether or not Iraq may have a just cause in invading Kuwait, or whether Iraq’s claim to the principle o f non-interference might be applicable. Only after the war (and then not very seriously) did the Coalition ask questions about the misdirections in diplomacy and the sales o f weapons which might indicate complicity in Iraq’s actions. 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Kuwaiti people, the government of Iraq has abstracted their realities out of the discourse of the war. Another overly-simple just war story told about the Gulf War was the narrative of the war as a personal fight between Saddam Hussein and George Bush [Sr]. Neither Saddam Hussein nor George Bush were injured or killed in the Gulf War, while there is an indication that more than two hundred thousand people were. The war may have been a decision made largely by Saddam Hussein and George Bush (though this too is an oversimplification), but the contest extended much further and affected many more people. Talking about Saddam Hussein as ‘evil’ served as license to do violence to those people in a military serving the Saddam Hussein government, or to those people operating railroads and electric plants within Iraq, or even those people who just happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time in Iraq. The individual, here, is proxy for the state. In the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein and George Bush, as proxies for their states, became symbolic substitutes for the unnamed and abstracted individuals who actually died in the war. This trivializes the deaths of the (now)anonymous. A closer look at dominant Gulf War narratives shows that they focus on everything but the people who were actually suffering in the war. The (failed) negotiations leading up to Coalition military interference focused more on Saddam Hussein’s backing down than on the plight of the people in Kuwait, who had been living both under hostile occupation and an economic embargo for months. By focusing on the exhausted white womyn getting off the airplane, how soldiers adjusted to life in the desert, how womyn soldiers fit in to combat situations, or how Saddam Hussein was talking towards the United States, the discussion of the war was able to point its focus away from the large amount of Iraqi casualties and the even larger infrastructural damage to Iraq. Casualty estimates were reported in Coalition 230 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. countries only for the Coalition. Estimates of Iraqi casualties, when reported, often arrived upon using statistical techniques which kept the numbers unrealistically low (Human Rights Watch 1991). In a televised war, instead o f watching suffering and dying, Americans saw yellow ribbons for soldiers who played football in the desert and watched Dick Cheney autograph bombs. When the damage that the war did cause was talked about, it was discussed generally in terms of the war’s ‘cleanliness,’ or the precision with which the Coalition hit the targets it was looking for, as opposed to other targets. This discourse, discussed briefly by Carol Cohn, is about sanitizing, ‘cleaning up,’ and seeing as surgical massive attacks and numerous deaths (1993). Feminisms explain that “one basic task of a state at war is to portray the enemy in terms as absolute and abstract as possible in order to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of murder” (Elshtain 1985, 50; Peach 1994, 159; Ruddick 1989, 150). Sure, but the double-edge o f this sword is to pretend that the enemy is not really dying to begin with. While the names, pictures, and life histories of every American who died in the war were on the nightly news, the deaths o f Iraqis were talked about in terms o f ‘progress made’ or of ‘collateral damage.’8 The talk about the Gulf War as ‘clean’ was unrepresentative both in theory and in practice (a claim which will be discussed in more depth in the jus in bello section). In addition to being unrepresentative, it allowed for harmful abstraction. Because the war was characterized as ‘clean,’ it was seen as meeting in bello standards of justice in war. Because it was seen as meeting these standards, the war was considered to be acceptable in humynitarian terms. This acceptability was constructed, then, as a storied version of history without the consideration of any real 8 By the way, more Americans died from ‘friendly fire’ (being accidentally killed by other Americans or by members o f the Coalition) than from ‘enemy fire’ (being attacked by Iraq). 231 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. suffering going on in Iraq (whether or not that would have changed the final understanding of humynitarian acceptability). This storied version became the dominant history, and is told when stories of the Gulf War are called for. II. GENDERED WAR-MAKING In the theoretical section of this project, I presented feminist reformulations of the traditional standards of jus ad bellum - or just war-making. This section briefly addresses the discussion about these standards that surrounded the Gulf War, then applies feminist reformulated standards to the political situation. I consider whether or not there is justice to be found in either Iraq’s or the Coalition’s claims to right authority, just cause, right intent, last resort, or a reasonable chance for success. I find that there are places where each side has something resembling a legitimate claim to justice, however, when compared to the comprehensive requirements of jus ad bellum in feminist just war theories, both sides come up woefully short. A. WHO PLAYED AUTHORITY? Analyses of the Gulf War differ substantially in accounts of whether the Coalition in Gulf War possessed right authority to choose to go to war. There is little discussion of whether or not Iraq had right authority to choose to go to war, mainly because Iraq’s claims to justice in the Gulf War are generally rejected on the ‘ just cause’ level.9 Kuwait was a legitimate nation-state, and that was the end of the argument for Iraq’s justice. On the other side, however, both international political actors and scholars weighed the intricacies of what might constitute right authority to intervene in the Iraq’s war of conquest. 9 The dearth o f discussion on the Iraq’s authority was probably bound up in the rejection o f Iraq’s cause for action. In other words, the war waged by Iraq was determined to be unjust by international consensus, and the specifics o f this injustice were not inquired into rigorously. It was assumed that no nation-state could possess the authority necessary to take over another nation-state, because such authority did not exist in a world were national sovereignty ruled. 232 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The argument that the Coalition had right authority was fairly straight-forward: the UN had sanctioned all necessary means, and the governments of the individual participant nations had approved of their participation in the Coalition, most with the favor of their populations.1 0 After all, the UN Security Council is vested in its Charter with a mandate to protect international peace and security. The Charter authorizes the Security Council to choose to use force in a situation where it is necessary to preserve such peace and security. Throughout the Cold War, the Security Council had consistently refused to take advantage of this power: the United States and the Soviet Union had threatened to veto Security Council proposals for the use of force (or even, for the most part, for the condemnation of others’ uses o f force). The ‘big five’ members of the Security Council (United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France) must agree not to veto a particular resolution in order for it to become Security Council policy. Throughout the Cold War, this consensus was almost impossible to achieve, and the Security Council often found itself unable to act to rebut threats to international peace and security. Supporters o f the Gulf War contended that, for the first time, the UN Security Council served its intended function, making hard decisions about the control o f international relations. The Security Council debated the merits of condoning military action, and in the end came to the aid of Kuwait in response to Iraq’s takeover, which was characterized as a violation of international peace and security. Nonetheless, Judith Gardam contends that the Gulf War represents a peek into the dark side of the constructed format o f the UN Security Council, instead of a shining moment, 1 0 For example, for the United States, Johnson explains that the combination o f the UN and the War Powers Act made up right authority (Johnson 1984, 23). George Weigel agrees, contending that the Gulf War was authorized by not one but several competent authorities in international politics, such that asking right authority questions was ridiculous (Weigel 1992 22). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. because the Security Council has too much power when it can begin to authorize wars. She warns of the danger o f a Security Council with such unrestrained powers: It was clearly not anticipated that the Security Council, when dealing with a threat to international peace and security, breach of peace, or act o f aggression, must consider all possible rules of international law before it acts. This suggestion is not only negated by the terms o f the Charter itself but is politically unworkable (Gardam 1996, 298, 305).1 1 Despite this potential difficulty, Mark Weller explains that UN Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized all necessary force, was legally adopted (1993, 39). Weller contends that a legally adopted choice by an international governing body sanctioned by the overwhelming majority of states in the world is by definition legitimate. Certainly, this claim has some merit: the Gulf War was not a unilateral action taken on by one state against another, or even a handful of states against each other. Jeanne Vickers is not willing to stop there, however. She argues that the United States ignored its own legal process and manipulated both international legal practices and the UN Security Council to start the Gulf War (Vickers 1993, 51).1 2 She contends that it is not the fact of Security Council consent that is important to determine legitimacy, but how it was obtained. This atmosphere of creating law to go along with the war is a permissive and problematic understanding of just war. Legitimate authority stretches beyond the letter of the law, and here was a place where the letter of the law was not solvent in preventing injustice (Geyer and Green 1992, 115). 1 1 Iraq recognized some o f the weaknesses o f the UN Security Council as right authority, and attempted to inflame international public sentiment against the potential war as well as to split the international community with a General Assembly vote (Weller 1993, 38). 1 2 By manipulating international action, I mean altering other nations’ behavior by bribery or force. Geyer and Green expand on Vickers’ claim, explaining that the United States forgave billions o f dollars o f Egyptian debt and gave Syria military license in Lebanon to secure their participation and to make it look like the region was on the Coalition’s side (Geyer and Green 1992,103, 117). In fact, the regional reaction was quite mixed. The Arab League condemned the invasion but denied Kuwait’s request to invoke the defense pact (Geyer and Green 1992, 100). In other words, the region formally condemned Iraq’s invasion o f Kuwait, but was not particularly interested in reversing it. 234 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. What Geyer and Green are implying is that Security Council decisions in international politics are reliant on the preferences of the Security Council’s strongest members because they can make and veto Security Council policies. The Security Council’s strongest members can obtain the policies that they feel necessary through persuasion, through bribery, through intimidation, and through the veto power. Geyer and Green see this process as power-laden, which means that it will never constitute an objective source of right authority.1 3 Nonetheless, UN Security Council endorsement means something in international political interaction; it confers legitimacy, even if improperly so. Herein lies a difference between ‘right’ authority and ‘internationally legitimate’ authority - the UN can confer the latter and not necessarily the former. Feminisms observe that no institution can have de jure license for the right authority to declare war. In fact, the gendered nature of states and international institutions gets in the way of determining a ‘litmus’ test for defining right authority. Instead, right authority is contextual, dialogical, and based on moral license.1 4 Right authority, then, is not wrapped up in the authorization of the governmental structure of the United States, the UN, Iraq, or Kuwait, or the success or failure of their political processes to choose to go to war. Instead, right authority can be attained when and only when a political entity which desires to go to war has the (affirmative) consent of those that it governs, using consent in the sense of the discourse-community’s belief that the war is a morally correct choice to make. As a check, the process o f consent of this discourse community should be recognized both internally and 1 3 The authors find an unlikely ally in the Secretary-General o f the UN at the time, who explicitly explained that the Gulf War was not a UN war, but a war o f dubious legality with questionable authorization from the Security Council (Geyer and Green 1992, 109). 1 4 Here, moral license is a product o f a discourse-community o f values determining an set o f values that can be agreed upon. 235 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. externally. ‘Consent’ does not mean bribery, but empowerment - actual choice. Given this, the right authority of any actor in the Gulf War is dubious at best. It is unclear whether either Iraq or Kuwait have the consent o f the governed to govern, much less to go to war. It was anything but clear that the governments of all Coalition nations had popular consent - the war did not even go through the United States Congress. Absent from the making of the Gulf War was any internal or external debate on the political legitimacy o f the actors involved (with the possible exception o f Iraq’s contention that Kuwait was an illegitimate state to begin with). When feminisms address legitimacy, they are talking about provisions for humyn security and against structural violence in a political entity that takes care of (its) margins. Feminisms ask these questions of legitimacy not to talk about state-legitimacy, but instead to talk about dialogical communication, representation of marginalized viewpoints, and moral license. With this interpretation of legitimacy, ‘legitimate’ and ‘right’ authority could once again merge. Within the current international legal system, each of these states likely had (at least a credible story to tell about) legal license to make the decisions that they did. Were the international consensus on justice in war-making to conform more to a feminist understanding of just war, the process that the actors would have had to go through to get ‘right authority’ would have been substantially different. Internal and external discourse- communities would have needed to agree that Kuwait had egregiously wronged Iraq, that such a wrong constituted just cause, and that such just cause was so grave that an offensive war was proportional. On the Coalition side, discourse-communities would have had to determine that a war would not be more harmful to the populations of Iraq and Kuwait than allowing the takeover, and that a war was being fought for the right reasons with the right strategies. What justificatory claims there were for the appropriate authority to start the war 236 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were within the traditional forum of the Security Council, thus appealed to international legal sense (as proxy for moral authority) instead of to moral authority. B. JUST CAUSE? For decades, Iraqis generally have believed they had a just cause against Western imperialism and its outposts in Kuwait and Israel. No doubt they have believed just as passionately in their cause as Americans who believed their war against Iraq was a just cause (Geyer and Green 1992, 37). This is not a ‘holy war’ but a ‘ just war’ (Bush 1991a). As we discussed in the ‘immediate context’ section of the previous chapter, Iraq made a number of claims for the justice of its cause against Kuwait: humynitarian intervention, manipulation o f oil prices, difficulties for Iraq because Kuwait’s island territories block Iraq’s only port, Kuwait’s unwillingness to negotiate about the forgiveness of loans for the Iran-Iraq war, and Kuwait slant drilling (an accusation of Kuwait’s stealing oil from Iraq) (Vickers 1993, 55; Weller 1993). Iraq’s official contention to the UN Security Council was that it had just cause to invade Kuwait as a humynitarian intervention on behalf of the free provisional government of Kuwait (Weller 1993, 30).1 5 The group of arguments for Iraq’s just cause is bound up in the critique of economic injustice between the rich and poor within the Arab world (Vaux 1992, 8).1 6 The government o f Iraq argued that Islam has always been governed by an ethic of economic communitarian relations that Kuwait was violating flagrantly, to the benefit o f Kuwaitis and at the expense o f other Arabs generally 1 5 While most are quick to discard this as an unreasonable argument, Vaux lends some credibility to the contention that there were severe humynitarian problems in Kuwait, whether or not this constituted a just cause for invasion (or whether or not it was Iraq’s intent to solve them) (1992). 1 6 Jeanne Vickers explains the saliency o f the economic disparities that plagued the Middle East at the time. She contends that “poorer Arab nations had long been appalled at the conspicuously high consumption levels o f the Kuwaitis in a region o f great poverty and underdevelopment, especially since the Islamic religion clearly indicates that the rich must share with the poor” (Vickers 1993, 56). 237 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and Iraqis specifically.1 7 Further, Kuwait’s response to Iraq’s difficulties was less than charitable. Geyer and Green explain that, “in a bitter exchange with Saddam Hussein, the Emir o f Kuwait refused to cut oil production, or forgive war loans, or extend further grants to Iraq, or make territorial concessions” (Geyer and Green 1992, 39; Cooley 1991, 25).1 8 Many participants in the practice of international politics and in the study of just war contend that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was unjustified because it was an aggressive invasion, which is illegal and punishable in international legal and normative circles (Johnson 1984, 16, 21). Not only does this understanding invalidate Iraq’s claim to justice in invading Kuwait, it provides the Coalition with a story for their justice in using force to remove Iraqi military presence from Kuwait. Richard Regan confirms that there is a “contemporary consensus against initiating wars to acquire or recover disputed territories” (1996, 59). Because Iraq was clearly aggressive, Johnson labels this “as clear and unambiguous a case as one could hope to find in the real world” of just cause for repelling aggression (Johnson 1984, 22; Geyer and Green 1992; Weigel 1992, 21). Another school o f thought contends that neither side in the Gulf War had just cause. Kenneth Vaux contends that “in the Gulf War, though just war and holy war rhetoric abounded, justice was thrown aside to interests” (1992, 115). Iraq was seen as unjust because it had engaged in an aggressive war, and the Coalition was seen as unjust because its motives had been less than entirely pure. The first argument for the Coalition’s injustice is 1 7 This is not a cause that was manufactured in the wake o f a desire to use it as post-hoc justification o f the invasion o f Kuwait. While many Iraqis, including exiles who have fled Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime, opposed the cruel invasion o f Kuwait, they are nonetheless inclined to share Iraq’s claims to at least portions o f Kuwait” (Geyer and Green 1992,36). 1 8 Richard Regan argues that the UN Charter could see Iraq as having just cause against Kuwait (1996). He contends that the UN Charter’s provisions for the maintenance o f international peace and security might allow for world action to protect itself from oil cartel price-spiking, which might give Iraq just cause against Kuwait (Regan 1996, 57-8). Some doubt this contention, though, asserting that Kuwait’s oil theft against Iraq fell short o f the magnitude necessary to justify military retaliation and could have been solved peacefully (Johnson 1984, 22-3; Vaux 1992, 12). 238 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the contention that it had ulterior motives to go to war - to free up the oil resources of the Persian Gulf region.1 9 The second argument against the Coalition was the complicity of the United States, the leader of the Coalition, in Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Vickers explains that “ironically, it was largely due to aid from the United States during the Iran-Iraq war that Saddam Hussein was able to launch his attack on Kuwait” (Vickers 1993, 54).2 0 The third argument against allied just cause was that it was neither oil nor Kuwait provoking the United States into war with Iraq, but the desire to weaken an Iraq which had become too strong.2 1 While then-President Bush argued that the Coalition cause ‘could not be more noble’ as there was no selfish intent, evidence to the contrary puts his claim in doubt (Geyer and Green 1992, 65). Last, there is a group that contends that, though Iraq was unjust in fighting Kuwait, it was just in fighting the Coalition. Saddam Hussein’s declaration of war against the United States was a jihad against the oppressive embargo on Iraq and Kuwait (Vaux 1992, 12). This jihad was seen as a counter-attack for the demeaning o f Islamic people and the attempts to deny the primacy o f Islamic values which the embargo represented. Nonetheless, the Coalition took little notice o f the moral complexities of these claims, the underlying 1 9 Kenneth Vaux contends that the whole war was about oil anyway, and resource wars are unjust (Vaux 1992, 9). Geyer and Green agree, documenting that the government’s disavowal o f U. S. oil interest as the cause for war was contradicted by appeals to the public about energy policies and ‘ways o f life’ (Geyer and Green 1992, 30). 20 Geyer and Green document that American and allied arms sold to Iraq in the 1980s and early 1990s totaled 20 billion dollars, and enabled Iraq to have the world’s fourth largest military force (1992, 49). The last arms sale took place the day before the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait (Geyer and Green 1992, 49; Cooley 1991, 25). Though the Saddam Hussein government had been in power for more than a decade at the beginning o f the Gulf War, it had never been seriously challenged because its rule was advantageous to US economic and security interests (Geyer and Green 1992, 50). Sources even suggest a more direct connection between the making o f the Gulf War and United States complicity. April Glaspie, the United States ambassador to Iraq, told Saddam Hussein “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” (Geyer and Green 1992, 60). Some observers question whether or not that statement could have been interpreted by Iraq to be a blank check for the invasion o f Kuwait. 2 1 This is where claims that Iraq was becoming a nuclear power fit into the equation. Geyer and Green characterize that the nuclear weapons claim was a case o f rhetorical excess (1992, 81). Still, much (not particularly well-evidenced) talk about the danger posed by the Iraq to the international community stood behind Coalition claims o f the justice o f their cause. 239 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. possibility for legitimacy o f Iraqi grievances, or of the horrible damage done by the embargo. The gender-based reconstruction of just cause that I presented outlines four guidelines for justice of the cause: dialogue, that the war must be against the people are likely to be injured by it, that it be aimed at a just end result, and that it prioritize distributive fairness. The belligerents’ interpretations of the justice of their causes in the Gulf War were recalcitrant, not dialogical. The question of what a just political situation would look like was determined by the UN Security Council less than 48 hours after the Iraqi invasion. While there was some dialogue between members of the Security Council, it was short-lived, and Iraq was heard but not included in the determinations that the Security Council made. No negotiations for partial redress of Iraqi grievances are on any diplomatic record. Iraq, on the other had, went through some negotiations with Kuwait before resorting to military force. Still, these negotiations more resembled shouting matches than dialogue. Further, Iraq failed to engage the international community in a dialogue aimed at determining the appropriate result of its disagreements with Kuwait. The lack of dialogue on what justice would look like before the war is at the heart of a number of feminisms’ critiques of just war theories’ application: justice is seen as something that we know, and as a justification for going after our aims; it ought to be seen as something we can negotiate, and a justification for humyne treatment of others. The second element of ‘ just cause’ is that the just cause is the result of the actions of (and the responsibility of) the people who will be affected by the war. Iraq claimed just cause against the Kuwaiti government, which it overthrew in short order and with little distraction. Still, the question o f whether or not Iraq’s just cause (were there one to begin with) was against the Kuwaiti people who were affected by the invasion is less clear. 240 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Likewise, the Coalition’s cause was against the Iraqi government which had chosen to invade Kuwait. It is less clear that the Coalition, or the United States as its leader, had any cause against the Iraqis who were hit by the ‘misses’ of the air war or whose lives were profoundly affected by the its infrastructural damage. If each party had been held to the standard of claiming just cause against those who would be most affected by their war effort, the Gulf War (as fought) would not have held just cause. Neither side had (or claimed) any legitimate complaint against the majority of the victims of the war. The third element of just cause is that the parties can imagine a just result of the war fought for the just cause - in other words, that the parties see that the war can resolve the grievance that is the subject of the ‘ just cause.’ If indeed Iraq’s causes against Kuwait were valid, it is questionable that annexation was the most just end result. Likewise, if indeed the Coalition’s cause against Iraq was valid, my discussion of sanctions will leave substantial doubt about the interest in or achievement of a just end result by the Coalition. This standard is certainly more useful to parties as they attempt to discern the justice of the cause of a war that might happen then it is in hindsight, however. The stories that belligerents tell before, during, and after the war of the imagined correction of the grievance that constituted the cause may or may not be representative of how they saw the situation - and discerning that information is next to impossible. Still, this standard is important as a guideline, and its employment can be speculated as to by looking at the standards of right intent and of justice of the end result of the war. The final element of just cause is distributive fairness. Iraq claimed to be going to war in part for distributive fairness, in order to create economic justice between Iraqis and Kuwaitis. The United States claimed to be going to war in part for distributive fairness as well, concerned about losing access to most of the world’s oil supplies. But this is not the 241 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sort of distributive fairness that feminisms are referring to: feminisms are looking for concern about others (even the enemy), for empathy with difficult political situations, for an eye to the margins of international politics, and for attention to gender disparities. Distributive fairness questions the legitimacy of sovereignty but respects legitimate institutions. There is little evidence that the belligerents in the Gulf War reached this level of depth in considering the justice of their causes and the fairness associated therewith. C. (IM)MORAL INTENTIONS? There is little skepticism in international politics that Iraq’s open complaints with Kuwait were the reason for Iraq’s invasion, and their redress constituted Iraqi intent. Iraq itself rarely denied this, and the testimony to the Security Council in which it did is generally seen as disingenuous (Cordesman 1997). The questions of the Coalitions’ intents generally, and of the United States’ intent specifically are not as clear. Some saw the Coalition’s intent to be linked to its perceived just cause (the liberation of Kuwait). Johnson explains that, while “critics sought to portray U. S. involvement in terms of ‘blood for oil’ or as an effort to secure American hegemony in the Gulf region, such charges ignore the naked act of military aggression that brought the war into being” (Johnson 1984, 24). In other words, Johnson is arguing that the very justice of the cause streamlined Coalition intent.2 2 Others are not so sure either of the single-mindedness or o f the rightness of Coalition intent. Geyer and Green contend that American intentions included: a ‘new world 2 2 In fact, Johnson goes further to argue that right intent would not have been limited to the reclaiming o f Kuwait, but that an intent to overthrow the Iraqi government would have been just. He contends that turbulence in post war Iraq proves that an overthrow intent would have been just (Johnson 1984, 25). He argues that international law actually served to restrict the just and clear-minded intent o f the United States in fighting the Gulf War. He explains that U. S. reluctance to get more involved comes from an interest in compliance with international law (Johnson 1984, 40). 242 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. order’ of collective security against aggression, a Pax Americana in the Middle East, protection of oil interests, the destruction of Iraq’s chemical and nuclear capabilities, the defeat of Israel’s prime adversary, and the personal and political motives o f George Bush (Geyer and Green 1992, 69). The rest of the Coalition members’ intents, they argue, were bound up in pleasing the United States, which was subtly coercing other states. Geyer and Green’s claim looks more likely than Johnson’s - the United States often admitted mixed motives in going to war against Iraq. The United States government simply insisted that all of its motives were just (Walzer 1977, 11). My reinterpretation of right intent in Chapter III argues that mixed motives make a belligerent’s case for right intent. It contends that right intent exists when and only when that intent is related to just cause, and guided by a feminist action ethos. This would require the Coalition’s war-making intent to be its [potential] just cause, which here would likely be the restoration of the Kuwaiti state. The other motives would have to constitute ‘ just cause’ to pass as ‘right intent.’ There are substantial questions about the justice of the Coalition’s economic and political ambitions in the Gulf War other than reestablishing the Kuwaiti state. Further, feminisms see empathy, relational thinking, political interest in marginality, and impact-on political thinking as necessary parts of right intention in international policy-making. None of these principles is evident in the pre-war discourse which led up to the start of the Gulf War; many actors had mixed motives, and there is no evidence any of them were guided by the principles that feminisms recognize as essential to justice in international politics. D. RESORTING TO COERCIVE FORCE There are differing opinions among theorists of just war on the question of whether the last resort standard was fulfilled by the Coalition side. There are those who contended that the Coalition should have let the economic embargo work in 1990-1 before the Gulf 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. War (Falk 1999, xiii). They contend that, had the well-enforced economic embargo been left in place, Iraq would have left Kuwait, as the consequences would have become both economically and politically unbearable (Falk 1999, 51; Weller 1993, 33; Vaux 1992, 3; Geyer and Green 1992, 90). Vaux contends that the embargo should have been give nine months to a year to work, instead of just under four months (1992, 14). If the embargo did not have adequate opportunity to work, some contend that the Coalition was in direct violation of the last resort principle in choosing to go to war (Geyer and Green 1992, 92-3). Others argue that military engagement is actually more humyne than the embargo, and should have been before the embargo on the list of ‘last resorts.’ Michael Walzer explains that “those opponents of the Gulf War who advocated a prolonged blockade o f Iraq seemed not to have realized what they were advocating was a radically indiscriminate act of war, with predictably harsh consequences” (Walzer 1973, 3). George Weigel asserts that the question of whether not embargoes work ignores that they attack non-combatants (Weigel 1991, 60). The argument here is that sanctions are indeed less just means than ‘war proper’ and should thus not be seen as an alternative for the purposes of last resort calculus. For now, we will consider the embargo as a part of the war, and look to see if these coercive choices were indeed the last resort for the Coalition.2 3 The two elements o f my feminist reformulation of last resort are a change in the way that the alternatives are chosen and a strict interpretation of last resort. Both of these seem particularly salient in critiquing the Coalition’s war-making choices. The first requirement would demand looking for non-coercive and non-violent alternatives like dialogue, compromise, and empathy. Instead of focusing on force, potential belligerents should resort 2 3 The justification for the assumption that the embargo is a part o f the war will be laid out in the first section of Chapter 7, which argues that sanctions on Iraq should be considered an act o f war for the purpose o f a feminist just war analysis. 244 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to seeing the problem from different perspectives in order to have a better chance at making communicative progress. There is no evidence that any of the belligerents resorted to such non-conflictual policies. These attempts are completely absent from the political situations leading up to and including the Gulf War. The second standard makes the United States’ Coalition look weak as well. A strict interpretation of last resort requires that other policies are actually tried. In the Gulf War, Johnson explains that last resort was treated as a matter of judgment, not tests (Johnson 1984, 29). These thought experiments are intangible and unaccountable for error, and thus inadequate for the purposes of meeting a strict interpretation of last resort. In addition to the feminist standards of last resort, it appears fairly clear that the United States (perhaps inadvertently) failed the traditional last resort test. There is substantial evidence that the United States did not take advantage of other ‘resorts’ even when they became available. Kenneth Vaux records that Iraq backed down and wanted a face-saving way out o f Kuwait (like a partial concession somewhere); and United States would not allow it, calling (some say unnecessarily) for an unconditional withdrawal (Vaux 1992, 140). Further, as a result of the Soviet role in the negotiations, there is evidence that Iraq agreed to withdraw unconditionally in February directly before the ground war, but that the United States refused to extend the withdrawal deadline in order to make an Iraqi withdrawal practically possible (Geyer and Green 1992, 110-1). Historical research demonstrates that the ground war started in the midst of Iraqi attempts to withdraw (Geyer and Green 1992, 111). Not only does such conduct fail the test o f last resort, it risks turnbacks of any inroads that the Coalition had to proving just cause and right intent. There is little discussion of whether or not Iraq fulfilled the last resort standard in the invasion of Kuwait. There is evidence that Iraq tried diplomatic channels first, but the 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. seriousness of those attempts is questioned. Even if Iraq tried traditional ‘other alternatives’ seriously, however, they neglected the more radical alternatives that feminisms suggest. There is no direct evidence that anything other than an invasion would have worked for Iraq; there is evidence bilateral negotiations did not. Other alternatives, however, went untested - Iraq then fails the last resort test as well. None of the Gulf War belligerents exhibited the ability to think outside the cycle of violence; therefore, none of those states pass the feminist test of last resort, which requires potential belligerents to consider non-conflictual alternatives before resorting either to conflict or to violence. E. VICTORIOUS SUCCESSES? Like many other standards, there is substantial disagreement among just war analysts about the prospects for success that each side in the Gulf War could have reasonably expected, even when success is interpreted only as winning the war. Analysts disagree on the prospects for success that each actor could have reasonably expected.2 4 Some contend that Iraq had a high ‘reasonable chance for success’ as it had a much stronger military than Kuwait.2 5 The second factor that Iraq would have needed to expect to win the war, however, was the impression that the United States (and other members of the international community) would not interfere in the conflict. Iraq held this impression; whether or not it was reasonable is less clear. On the Coalition side, George Weigel makes the simple argument that reasonable chance o f success was vindicated by future success (Weigel 1992, 22-3). In other words, the Coalition thought that they would win, and they were right that they could win, and this is 2 4 The constant conflict on almost every issue in just war is demonstrative o f the indeterminacy that I earlier critiqued just war theories for: multiple conflicting and confusing ethical bases lead to many different interpretations both o f the standards o f just war and o f how they ought to be enforced. 2 5 Indeed, Iraq completely conquered Kuwait in less than a full day’s time. 246 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. demonstrated by the fact that they did indeed win. The Coalition did indeed decisively win the fighting o f the Gulf War (Freedman and Karsh 1991). Whether or not the United States leadership o f the Coalition was (or could have been) aware of how decisive the victory would be is a question that only someone with access to classified defense documents could begin to conquer. Even were both sides able to reasonably predict winning the wars that they engaged in, the analysis of ‘reasonable chance of success’ cannot stop at the understanding an actor will win the war. Power cannot be equated with success in the international arena. Even when power succeeds in obtaining concessions, concessions obtained by the wielding of power are not always just. Adding political justice to the standard of reasonable chance of success makes the issue more complex. For example, it was not clear that Iraq could be ejected from Kuwait without the destruction of Kuwait in the process, which would have meant that an intervention could have been worse for the Kuwaiti people than a continuation of Iraqi rule. At the very least, this calculus would have needed to be made in a nuanced estimation of the possibility for the Coalition’s success (Geyer and Green 1992, 130). Instead, success should be interpreted as the possibility o f a measurably more just political situation after the war, feminisms argue. Earlier, we talked about the standard that fighting the war would have been, on balance, a better idea than not fighting the war. Feminisms see success as fixing the problem which constituted the just cause and about leaving a more just political order than before the war was fought. Success, then, is about winning the war, but it is also about the political situation which ensues after the war is won. Assuming Iraq won the war, the Iraqi government saw the political situation following the war as just: Iraq would no longer have difficulties using its port, Iraq would no longer be victim o f oil theft or oil-price fixing by Kuwait, Iraq would no longer owe Kuwait 247 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. massive amounts o f money for a war which it interpreted as being in Kuwait’s interest, and Iraq would be able to correct the economic and political injustices o f the Kuwaiti political system at will. Still, Iraq’s interpretation of the justice of the result does not create justice: there is little if any concern shown here for the just political situations of Kuwaitis. Here, Iraq makes a(n) (unjust) distinction between Iraqis and Kuwaits and chooses to value Iraqis’ lives and welfare more than the lives and welfare of Kuwaitis. The United States also had a(n) (recalcitrant) idea what a just result would look like from its perspective: unconditional Kuwaiti independence. The United States’ refusal to acknowledge that there could be some legitimacy to Iraqi grievances against Kuwait shows a lack o f dialogue in determining the meaning of justice. Also, the United States contributed very little to the discussion on the just reconstruction of Iraq after the war. The United States, as leader of the Coalition, had a responsibility to have a more far-sighted understanding o f what success in the Gulf War would mean, feminisms contend, because as it was the Coalition had very little idea (and even poorer implementation) of what a just political situation at the end of the Gulf War would look like. In that context, the United States could not have fulfilled the standard of a reasonable hope for success, because the success they were striving for was at best partial and at worst unjust. III. GENDERED WAR-FIGHTING This Iraqi regime has invented false pretexts and untenable claims against my peaceful and peace-loving country .... In fact, Iraq was bent on sweeping through the entire territory of Kuwait, violating its sovereignty and violating the sanctity o f Kuwaiti citizens’ lives and property. As a consequence, rape, destruction, terror and torture are now the rule of the day in the once peaceful and tranquil land of Kuwait. Hundreds o f thousands of Kuwaiti citizens along with nationals of various other countries who were our guests have been made homeless and many of them have had their life savings robbed. Hundreds have lost their lives. Others have been held hostage. Indeed, at this very moment, an intense campaign o f terror, torture and humiliation continues unabated in 248 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that dear land. We receive daily reports o f massacres and continuing systematic armed looting and destruction of state assets and individual property (Sheik Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah 1990) (emphasis mine). The evaluation of the in bello justice of the Gulf War starts at the debate discussed earlier about the relationship between ad bellum and in bello standards of justice in war. A number o f scholars observe that belief in the justice o f one’s own cause makes political actors less careful about in bello standards of the just conduct of war. Judith Gardam argues that the Gulf War is an example of this problem (1992). She claims that “it seems unlikely that the international community would have tolerated the scale of civilian casualties in the conflict if it were not for the consensus that Iraq’s action had no legal or moral basis” (Gardam 1993, 413). Smith supports this argument, contending that “Iraq’s prior disregard for the laws and customs of war placed the Coalition campaign in sharp legal relief’ (2002, 364). Iraq’s perceived disregard for generally accepted ad bellum principles created an air of in bello permissibility for the Coalition opposed to Iraq. As a result, there were humynitarian horrors caused by both sides of the Gulf War. Feminisms critique this trend in the Gulf War, contending that there is no cause which allows for unlimited means. They argue that the justice of a declaration of the war and the justice of the fighting of a war are both necessary but individually insufficient to determine a war to be just. Therefore, feminisms see it as necessary to evaluate the moral worth of the in bello decisions of belligerents, regardless of the ad bellum standing o f justice of the war. This section examines the participatory roles played by wymyn in the fighting of the war. It then addresses the gendered effects of war, both directly on wymyn and indirectly gendered implications. After dealing with these questions o f where wymyn are, it revisits 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the reformulated discrimination principle presented in Chapter IV. It concludes with an examination of the heinous means employed by those belligerents, and the ethical implications thereof. A. NEW GENDERED RO LES As the image of the silenced, controlled Arab woman proves to be ever less accurate, so does the picture of the liberated female US soldier. Yet, for women, military service is not much different than domestic employment: 64 percent o f the women in the US military have been sexually harassed on the job, according to a recent Department of Defense report. Shortly after troops were deployed to the Gulf, women soldiers became a standard human interest story (Points 1991). Though the expected role for wymyn as ‘beautiful souls’ remained alive and well in the Gulf War, new, more active assigned roles for wymyn evolved as well. These roles cast wymyn as political and military participants, both in Iraq and in the United States. Stories about wymyn departed from past generally accepted roles in important ways, but also reflected continued gender subordination. The Ba’ath government o f Iraq saw an important political role for wymyn in the establishment, security, and preservation of the Iraqi state. A group called the Iraqi Women’s Federation is sponsored by the government of Iraq in order to improve the political and social situations of Iraqi wymyn (and to encourage wymyn’s support for the government). Saddam Hussein encouraged Iraq’s Women’s Federation to put wymyn into non-traditional jobs and work out rationing programs (Enloe 1993, 169; Kandiyoti 1991, 11- 12; Joseph 1991, 177). Iraq’s liberal gender policies were intended both for the purpose of promoting gender equality and for the purpose of changing the political composition o f Iraq. Goals of political composition were goals of state construction including but not limited to producing labor and re-aligning the allegiances of the population towards the Ba’ath 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government (Joseph 1991,179).2 6 The Iraqi government tried to win wymyn’s loyalties by “providing them organizational alternatives” and “by extending rights and services to them” (Joseph 1991, 184). Social programs bettered wymyn’s lives at least in part so that the Iraqi government could manipulate wymyn for political purposes. It is these wymyn, who “walk a tightrope” politically anyway, who “have the most to lose when international crisis polarizes internal debate” (Enloe 1993, 169; Kandiyoti 1991, 10). Their lives are being bettered by the social policies that are the first to go in rough times. Like Iraqi wymyn, American wymyn were characterized as key political participants during the Gulf War. The Gulf War was less popular with wymyn than men in the United State, as most wars are (Enloe 1996, 173; Wilcox, Hewitt, and Allsop 1996, 67; Baxter and Lansing 1983; Fite et al 1990; Holsti and Rosenau 1981; Togeby 1994).2 7 This ‘gender gap’ has been explained as essential to wymyn (Reardon 1985), tied to wymyn’s experiences as wymyn (Ruddick 1989), or a result of socioeconomic disadvantage because of gender (Smeal 1984, Walzer 1977). The United States government considered the ‘gender gap’ malleable, because it coordinated [successful] media efforts to get wymyn on board with the war. Wymyn’s ability to fight in wars, wymyn’s ability to choose to go to war, wymyn’s ability to choose a president capable of going to war, and wymyn’s responsibility to support fighting men were all at issue in this first major war in the post-Cold War era. 2 6 By re-aligning the political allegiances o f the population, Joseph means to talk about the ethnic factionalism which was a constant threat to divide Iraq. He documents that a majority o f Iraqis are Muslim, that there is a Shi’ite majority within Iraqi Muslims, but about 25 percent o f the population is non-Arab (Joseph 1991, 178). What this translates to are political tensions between different Islamic groups, and between those Islamic groups and non-Islamic groups within Iraq. That analysis does not even include a number o f internal conflicts within groups for power or about strategy. The Iraqi government’s goal was to divide the loyalties o f these groups by obtaining wymyn’s loyalty to the state by using the state as a vehicle to bestow rights on wymyn. 2 7 This ‘gender gap’ became smaller after the war started, as wymyn were less likely to speak out against a war where the lives o f those they knew, cared about, or were related to were directly at stake (Conover and Sapiro 1993). The ‘gender gap’ widened again as people were asked to look at the war in retrospect (Bendya et al 1996). In the [First] Gulf War, overall, wymyn were less likely to support the use o f force than men, a result which is statistically significant if substantively modest (Wilcox et al 1996, 76). 251 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The story o f a womyn as a political actor portrays her as more dynamic than, and as having more choices than, the passive beautiful soul. Still, in the case of the United States, wymyn’s political activity was limited to support (or lack thereof) o f the government’s decision to have gone to war - wymyn were not expected to be the decision-makers in choosing whether or not to go to war (or, for the most part, the soldiers who fight the war). In Iraq, wymyn’s newfound importance was produced for the purpose of favorably altering political dynamics within the country; wymyn were political participants, also manipulated political subjects. These expected passivities dovetail with the former expectation that wymyn should be passively protected by war, innocent o f it but supportive o f and grateful for the fighting. Still, the passive political participant image of a womyn in the Gulf War was not the only new model o f participation. In Iraq, in Kuwait, and less so but still in the United States, a gender-role expectation of wymyn-as-soldiers was introduced in the Gulf War. In Iraq, the development program o f the Saddam Hussein government had put wymyn in non-traditional jobs, including but not limited to jobs in military service, both inside and outside of combat. Wymyn did not constitute a substantial portion of the Iraqi military, but their sex-segregated battalions were touted by the Iraqi government. One of the images o f the Gulf War is that of a female battle group marching in a parade in Baghdad, dressed in traditional Islamic wymyn’s attire, carrying automatic weapons. Wymyn soldiers’ faces were also evident in Kuwait, where one in nine wymyn were a part of a combatant fighting force to repel Iraq’s invasion. For the first time, the United States deployed a non-trivial number o f wymyn to go to war. In the past, wymyn in the United States military had been limited to off-field nurses and a few support personnel, less than one percent o f the deployed force. The number of 252 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. female troops went up from less than one percent in Vietnam to seven percent in the Gulf War (Goehring and Woo 1997). While these wymyn were still formally barred from combat participation, they served combatant functions like flying spy helicopters and riding in battle tanks. These semi-combat roles were even considered in American popular culture. Soon after the Gulf War, the movie Courage Under Fire dealt with questions of the appropriate standard o f conduct for wymyn in technically non-combatant roles when they are forced into a situation which requires combatant behavior. It explores the stereotyped passive womyn, and contrasts that with the potential for extraordinary bravery in combat. It pictures the main character (a female soldier) as a new type of soldier: tough as the men, but maternal to them at the same time. There is no gender-disaggregated death toll for the wymyn soldiers of Iraq, Kuwait, or other Coalition forces. From the United States, fifteen wymyn were killed, five by enemy fire; two were taken prisoner (Walton 2001). Still, the Gulf War called attention to wymyn’s presence in the military, and to the new image of woman-as-soldier which was being introduced in the United States (Walton 2001). The female fighters for allies and enemies went largely unnoticed in United States media, but American wymyn soldiers were extremely popular. Media images of wymyn soldiers proliferated throughout the Gulf War, in part to attempt to close the gender gap and in part to provoke questions about changing wymyn’s role. Still, the seven percent of United States forces who were female did not operate in a military which has suddenly been de-gendered to accept their presence (Cockbum 1991; Cockbum and Zarkov 2002). Instead, these wymyn were ‘allowed to participate’ in a military force still dominated by masculinities. The language of sport and sexual domination of the enemy continued, along with the practice o f sexualizing warriors (for example, by 253 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. showing pornographic movies before missions are to be executed). Twenty-five American wymyn were sexually assaulted by their fellow soldiers in the Gulf War (Enloe 2000, 184). Wymyn became American soldiers in the Gulf War, but they became members of a military that was a men’s world, governed by men’s behavioral norms, and an ethos of masculinity (Decosse 1992). A womyn soldier, then, is a womyn who can make it as a man; not because masculine values have been questioned or changed, but instead because she adopts those masculine values and participates with them, becoming ‘masculine.’ Here, masculinity is based on social norms and behaviors more than on biology; if a womyn can be a soldier and meet the traditional requirements of masculinity, she is allowed to be a part of fighting a war. Still, her fighting cannot be on the front lines, which are reserved for ‘real men’ as opposed to impostor men; and her fighting is participation in a system she was not invited to help create. As Cynthia Enloe documents, the increased welcome for wymyn’s participation in international politics does not come with an invitation to reformulate the ideas of the ‘international system,’ but instead to participate in a masculinized forum (Enloe 1990, 15). The ‘woman’ soldier, then, is a womyn who has found herself in masculine values - she is the victory of gender socialization over gender biology; o f masculine values over feminine values or female social conditioning, and of aggressiveness and strength over passivity, regardless of biological gender. B. GENDERED IM PACTS A concept o f national security which gives priority to military threat rather than to dangers in the economic and social sectors of society can be bought only at the cost of poverty and misery and the violation of human rights - a cost bome by all poor people but especially by women and future generations. (Vickers 1993, 68). 254 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Amariyah shelter, in a Baghdad suburb, is one o f the first places international visitors are taken when they visit Iraq. It is the site where 394 Iraqi women and children were killed as they hid in a reinforced shelter on 16 February 1991, during the height o f the Gulf War. The shelter has been cleaned up for the most part, but the gaping hole in its six-foot thick ceiling and the huge crater in its floor remain a vivid testament to the two bombs dropped upon it that fateful night. The building has been turned into a shrine where family members, friends, as well as visitors, come to pay their respects to the dead (Carpenter 2003b). The casualties include not only Iraq’s modem, secular society, with its advanced medical and educational systems, self sufficiency, university research, and child vaccination programs, but also the progressive lives o f eight million Iraqi women. Before 1990, Iraq had an exemplary policy of educating women and opening the professions to them. Before the Gulf War, women were found in all sectors of life. But in the years since then, those gains have been reversed (Aziz 1998). The major victims o f the [First] Gulf War were wymyn, Jeanne Vickers contends (1993, 59). In Chapter IV we discussed wars’ gendered impacts as forced passivity, direct material harm, and infrastructural harm. All three impacts are evident in the Gulf War. This section concentrates mostly on the humynitarian situation in Iraq and Kuwait, as their populations were most affected by the war. The first major impact on wymyn is forced passivity in choosing their roles in war. Judith Steihm told us that war forces wymyn to become passive observers rather than active participants. This passivity is a result of a lack of decision-making power. In the Gulf War, it was men who planned the war, who prepared for the war, who by overwhelming majority conducted the war, who decided when the war was over, and who told the stories o f the war.2 8 Wymyn were either given the choice to join (the United States) or forced to face mobilization as soldiers in (Iraq and Kuwait) patriarchal militaries, which devalue femininity and are often oppressive to wymyn members (Karam 2001, 4; Enloe 1989, 1993, 2000). As 2 8 While Margaret Thatcher was an exception, every other major decision-maker around the Gulf War was a man. And Margaret Thatcher’s political behavior reflected masculine values every bit as resoundingly as any ‘man’ who made policy surrounding the Gulf War. 255 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cited previously, many wymyn were abused as they served in the militaries fighting the Gulf War. The second major gendered impact is direct material harm. Gulf War belligerents prioritized strategic decisions and militarized security over humyn impacts. The abstract treatment of the war exacerbated this problem, as light military casualties on the Coalition side of the war made it seem as if it were a relatively harmless and precise war. It could only seem harmless because the Coalition members did not see the extreme damage on the ground in Iraq and Kuwait.2 9 They also did not have to live through the recovery of the infrastructural damage. The direct material harms in the Gulf War cannot be precisely calculated, but some estimates can give us an idea o f the war’s effects on the people of Iraq and Kuwait. Less than 1000 Americans were injured during the Gulf War, and the United States suffered around 150 battle casualties (Geyer and Green 1992). Few of these were wymyn, as wymyn were given less dangerous jobs within the military, and no non-military Americans were directly exposed to the fighting. There are no official estimates of Kuwaiti casualties, but the majority of Kuwaitis who died during the Iraqi occupation were victims o f one-on-one political torture or starvation from the embargo (Geyer and Green 1992). Tales of mass rape in Kuwait during the occupation abound. In Iraq, massive casualties are documented. Around 40,000 Iraqi soldiers died in the war (Carpenter 2003b).3 0 There is little evidence that non-militaiy wymyn were specifically targeted, but target misestimation and 29 Vickers explains that “the allies glossed over the thousands o f Iraqi dead and injured, the terrible devastation of their country, and the floods o f refugees and displaced persons, the majority of them women and children” (1993, 57). 3 0 So many different estimates vary so widely - these numbers are the result of critically comparing those estimates -including estimates from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States Congress, the United Nations Security Council, the government o f Kuwait, the government o f France, the government o f the Soviet Union, the government o f Iraq, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. 256 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. indiscriminate warfare often cause substantial female casualties (Carpenter 2003b; Goldstein 2001). In all, Iraqi casualties were about seventy five percent civilian, and civilian casualties were more than two-thirds wymyn and children (Carpenter 2003b). In addition to direct injury and death resulting from the fighting o f the war, wymyn suffered from the indirect gendered harms, in the form o f economic, medical, social, and environmental losses. The most obvious economic loss o f the war was the money that it cost to fight the war. The war’s total cost was close to one trillion dollars, two hundred billion of it coming directly out of the pockets o f Iraqis. Every dollar spent on a war is a dollar not spent on education, health, welfare, or wymyn’s programs. The second economic impact is the infrastructural damage to Iraq and Kuwait. The infrastructural damage caused shortages in electricity, clean water, goods deliveries, export technology, and transportation. These shortages hurt the economy generally and wymyn’s abilities to run their households specifically.3 1 The medical impacts o f the Gulf War were also gendered. Wymyn are often subject to increased medical and social vulnerability as a result of a war being fought (Vickers 1993; Karam 2001). In the Gulf War, hospitals were destroyed, medical technology was decimated, and doctors fled Iraq. Food and medicine became scarce, and food security became an issue for wymyn running households. In addition to these everyday health 3 1 Wymyn’s duties in running households included but were not limited to cooking, providing clean water, nourishing children, protecting the household’s health, and running household errands. Infrastructural damage makes all o f this more difficult. It also hurts wymyn who have jobs - they are the first to lose their jobs, as they are considered secondary to household support, are less secure in their jobs, and have gotten them more recently. In addition to losing jobs, wymyn’s wages (which were already lower than men’s) were devalued in a time of crisis. 257 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. concerns, pre-natal care in Iraq deteriorated rapidly after the Gulf War.3 2 Even if wymyn found adequate pre-natal care, nourishing, finding medicine for, and keeping alive children became increasingly difficult. Shortages and sanitation difficulties led to much illness and death as a result of the Gulf War. The social impacts of the Gulf War were long-reaching. In the United States alone, the Gulf war left 17 500 children without one or both custodial parents for more than a month (Elshtain 1992b, 58). Its social impacts on Iraq and Kuwait were exponentially more severe. In Iraq, they included decreased provision for education, displacement, increased sexual violence, political instability, and increased crime (Steans 1998, 100-1; Karam 2001, 3-4; Vickers 1993, 16). Wymyn dealt with a number of family disruptions, as men left for and came back from (or did not come back from) the battlefield (Karam 2001, 5). Observers note that in the years following the Gulf War, Iraq went from a middle-class nation to one of the poorest and most deprived places on earth; the social fabric of the society was ripped apart (Gordon 1999c). In Kuwait, 27 percent of the population was Kuwaiti before the Gulf War; 53 percent was afterwards, as Kuwait did not invite non nationals to return. This massive dislocation profoundly affected individuals’ security, as did the infrastructural damage that made temporarily inaccessible Kuwait’s major source of revenue: oil. Famine, poverty, and unrest characterized Kuwaiti political life following the Gulf War. Environmentally, Iraq intentionally caused oil slicks “plainly contrary to the laws of war” and burned oil fields both in Iraq and Kuwait (Roberts 1993, 135, 138). The Coalition bombed radioactive material in Iraq (Roberts 1993, 140). In Iraq, the Gulf War left a 32 Before the Gulf War, Iraq was known to have one o f the lowest infant-mortality rates in the world, and high quality pre-natal and infant care. Much o f the technology that provided this standard o f care was destroyed in the Gulf War. 258 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. number of hazards, such as spilled oil, half a million mines, and tens of thousands of tons of Coalition bombs which failed to detonate (Roberts 1993, 141). C. GENDERED (NON)IMMUNITY? The analysis of the in bello targeting in the Gulf War is substantially less controversial than other debates surrounding the justice of the Gulf War. The majority of analysts agree that both sides’ in bello tactics were substantially unjust. Just war theorists level four critiques towards the allies’ war practices. First, there is the argument that the Coalition privileged friendly combatant lives over those of Iraqi civilians (Scheer 1991, 454). The massive aerial bombardment spared fighters but could not spare civilians, a choice characterized as tantamount to terrorism (Gardam 1993b; Geyer and Green 1992; Scheer 1991). The logic of the claim of terrorism is this: indiscriminate targeting that kills civilians out o f (knowing) carelessness can be equated to intentionality. While some disagree, this critique has been leveled towards the allies a number of times. The second critique of Coalition war practices is a critique of their indiscriminate targeting. While there is no evidence of direct targeting o f civilians (Hampson 1993b), daytime attacks on urban areas, unguided bombs in cities, and poor intelligence about targets are all problematic (Human Rights Watch 1991). The use of ‘smart bombs’ was seen as the answer to indiscriminate targeting - but they were used too infrequently and were not as precise as they sounded: the air war caused massive losses o f civilian lives.3 3 While Bush 3 3 Geyer and Green observe that o f 88,500 tons o f bombs that were dropped on Iraq, seven percent were smart bombs, capable o f determining and following a target (1992, 137-8; Smith 2002, 363). Seventy-five percent of dumb bombs missed their targets (Geyer and Green 1992, 138). Despite this substandard record, “reportedly, ‘dumb’ or unguided bombs were used extensively in attacks on urban areas” (Gardam 1993a, 409). Precise targeting in an air war o f dumb bombs is almost impossible. Even the smart bombs didn’t necessarily solve the problem, Gardam contends. She explains that “there are also reports that the imprecision o f so-called smart bombs resulted in significant civilian casualties” (Gardam 1993a, 409). 259 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. claimed, “fantastic accuracy,” in reality much of the Coalition’s targeting was either imprecise or failed, causing measurable civilian casualties (Atkinson 1991). The third critique leveled against the Coalition is that even when the bombs hit their targets, the targeting choices were not ethically acceptable. Human Rights Watch documents the targeting of food, water, and agricultural facilities; electrical systems; and railroads (Geyer and Green 1992). Jeanne Vickers explains: [The Gulf War] led to huge loss o f life, massive dislocation of peoples, separation of families, loss of land and livelihoods, exile for many, a rapid deterioration in the quality o f life, and environmental catastrophe. The number o f civilian casualties - referred to by the Pentagon and the media as ‘collateral damage’ - was immense, as was the impact on hospitals, health-care services, schools, and the entire infrastructure. (Vickers 1993, 50). Vickers also observes that the Coalition once bombed a baby milk refinery (1993, 51). Richard Regan explains that the net result of Coalition infrastructural attacks against Iraq was devastating. He describes that “allied bombing inflicted heavy damage on the Iraqi infrastructure and resulted in large-scale civilian casualties” as well as environmental damage (Regan 1996, 173; Weller 1993, 34). Thomas Smith contends that “the public health fallout of the Gulf War was largely foreseen” (2002, 363).3 4 The humynitarian results of infrastructural damage in Iraq were awful, observers contend, yet were disguised under the guise o f a war which was talked about as ‘surgically clean.’ Heather McCoubrey explains that, ironically, the surgical Coalition attacks caused severe collateral medical 3 4 Despite this horrible humynitarian damage which infrastructural bombings inflict, international law says nothing about this practice and just war says little (Smith 2002, 365). Judith Gardam explains that the infrastructural bombings in Iraq in the Gulf War bring into question the utility o f ju s in bello laws. She determines that “state Practice in the recent Gulf conflict demonstrates that the existing customary and conventional laws o f armed conflict failed to prevent the appalling devastation to the civilian population” (Gardam 1992, 813). Michael Walzer, however, sees infrastructural bombing as an unethical mistake that the Gulf War could have been fought without - so the Gulf War should be considered just while this tactic is considered unjust (Walzer 1992,15). 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. damage (1993a, 179). The infrastructural bombings of the Gulf War are still being felt, and will have long-term physical and social effects (McCoubrey 1993a, 186). The final critique of Coalition targeting addresses relentless attacks on the Iraqi army as it withdrew from Kuwait and retreated into Iraqi territory. Some suppose Iraq was withdrawing when the ground war commenced; if not, they began to withdraw almost immediately. Still, the Coalition attacked withdrawing troops. Geyer and Green describe the United States’ behavior towards the retreating Iraqi military as a “turkey shoot” (1992, 140; Walzer 1992, 14; Weller 1993, 48). The attack was not just from the air, either, as Smith explains that “in perhaps the lowest-tech tactic employed, Iraqi troops were entrenched along the ‘Saddam line’ on the border with Saudi Arabia were buried alive by allied tanks” (2002, 363). Weigel, however, contends that an army that has not surrendered is fair game (Weigel 1992, 27). Still, attacking people who are not fighting with you is always suspicious. Kenneth Vaux explains that the allies attacking the retreating ground troops will result in the “burdening the conscience of the world as the war’s lasting disgrace” (Vaux 1992, 33). Iraq also engaged in violations of the discrimination principle and improper targeting (Geyer and Green 1992, 143). First, the Iraqi government positioned civilians outside of known infrastructural targets, trying to discourage destruction of necessary resources (Geyer and Green 1992, 143) This tactic, Fritz Kalshoven explains, is unacceptable. He contends that “a party to the conflict which deliberately exposes its civilian population to enhanced risks of warfare will have to suffer the reproaches of world public opinion. Its attitude moreover will diminish or even nullify the responsibility of the attacker” (Kalshoven 1987, 68). 261 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The second critique of Iraqi treatment of the discrimination principle is about Iraq’s behavior in Kuwait. McCoubrey explains that Iraq and its military engaged in economic exploitation, repression, looting, and forced recruiting of Kuwaitis into the Iraqi military (McCoubrey 1993b, 216-222). Iraq looted Kuwaiti medical equipment, causing the disruption of services; they failed to let the Red Crescent in to fill the gap (McCoubrey 1993a, 175). Iraq further failed to set up a provisional government to look out for the needs of Kuwaiti citizens. While there are not credible reports of excess violence towards Kuwaitis during the Iraqi occupation, there is evidence that Iraq kept control of Kuwait through the threat of force. The Gulf War is an example of what feminisms critique in the discrimination principle. It was considered salient by all sides of the war, yet more than 100 000 civilians were casualties in a war that lasted a long month. These people were ‘immune’ to the war - after all, what is more harmless than immunity? There is no evidence that they were directly targeted, which, according to the discrimination principle, makes their deaths potentially acceptable. Feminisms contend that these sorts of excuses ‘slip by’ the non-combatant immunity principle frequently; rendering it insolvent. This is why feminisms contend that belligerents should have just cause against any party (say, a family of four that happens to live by a power plant) in order to go to war against them. A bomb that hits them constitutes war against them. This is the emphasis on the relationship between responsibility and impact. Feminisms also emphasize empathy and interconnectedness in the choices of and in war. There is no evidence that an ethos of interconnectedness either guided or chided any of the targeting choices in the Gulf War. Had it, perhaps there would not have been so much damage to the infrastructure which was key to the sustenance of everyday life in Iraq. The 262 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gendered impacts of the Gulf War, as laid out earlier in this Chapter, were not prohibited by a gendered non-combatant immunity norm; some might even say they were perpetuated that way. Feminisms encourage a reformulation of the ways that belligerents look at non- combatant immunity in the interest of emancipation, humynitarian care, and appropriate direction of violence; not considering gender but not essentializing by it; considering people but not abstractly; fighting to win but not brutally. D. HEINOUS MEANS In our (re)formulative discussion, the discussion o f heinous means was one of proportional force and a priori morally unacceptable tactical choices. Given the immense disparity in casualties between the Iraqi side and the Coalition side of the Gulf War, questions of proportionality have been raised. Kenneth Vaux contends that the force used by the Coalition was not proportionate to Iraq’s offense or to the force that Iraq was capable of applying; the Coalition’s choices constituted overwhelming force (1992, 5; Elshtain 1992b, 53). He characterizes overwhelming force as the war alternative to ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ as there was no way that Iraqis could have engaged in adequate defense. Thomas Smith explains that, far from being proportional, the Gulf War “was probably the most unbalanced use o f military force in history” (2002, 363).3 5 3 5 This argument about lack o f proportionality is not universally agreed upon. James Turner Johnson argues that proportionality should not be seen in terms o f numbers but in terms o f goals and ideas; “much more inclusive and objective weighing o f good versus ill” (Johnson 1984, 27). In other words, it is acceptable to kill people who either are bad or are engaged in bad behavior, if you are good. Michael Walzer argues that there are some principles for which proportionality is meaningless; in the Gulf War, you cannot put a price on freedom (Walzer 1992, 7). These arguments, however, are dangerous - they are reliant on the claim that it is acceptable to fight a righteous war for a cause which is deemed to be morally worthy by one adversary and not the other. This brings up three major problems. First, conviction overriding in bello principles leads to humynitarian disaster. Second, it assumes that ‘good’ and ‘ill’ are both universal and determinate. This relies on the assumption that the values that I hold are better than the values that someone else holds, without critical reflection or dialogue; it constitutes parochial moral universalism. Finally, this interpretation places unequal value on humyn lives by the place that they happen to live. Here, Kuwaiti and American freedom is valuable; Iraqi freedom does not enter into the equation. 263 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Proportionality needs to be seen as doing only what it takes to achieve the just goal of the war. In other words, the proportionality rule could be read as ‘the war must be a solution, and only a solution, to the problem which constitutes just cause.’ In this interpretation, were we to assume for counterfactual purposes that each side had a just cause (Iraq’s redress of grievances and the Coalition’s desire to restore territorial integrity), we could evaluate proportionality in terms of what was necessary to achieve the just cause. Iraq’s proportionality, then, depends on if invasion was necessary to achieve their goal. The question is then if it was necessary to invade to get Kuwaiti concessions; a question that we cannot answer given its counterfactual nature, nonetheless we can say that there was not overwhelming evidence that invasion was the only option at the time. The Coalition’s proportionality would depend on the tactics necessary to get Iraq out of Kuwait. There is some evidence that war was not necessary at all, should negotiations have been pursued. An air war over Iraq was necessary to minimizing United States and Coalition casualties, but was not necessary to recapturing Kuwait. Further, fighting Iraqi troops after they crossed the border back into Iraq would be seen as non-proportional in these terms. While proportionality is not only a numbers game, the numbers point to disproportionate actions which led to disproportionate casualties on the Iraqi side of the war. The second element o f the discussion of heinous means was a question o f means that are a priori unacceptable, if acceptability is judged in terms of the possibility for long-term peace between the belligerents. It is difficult to judge Iraq’s actions in these terms, because Iraq’s intent was specifically against peace with Kuwait; still, the standard can be used for evaluation even w ere it not the intent. The Coalition, in theory acting on behalf o f the UN, was acting with a mandate for international peace and security; its means, then, should have corresponded to a positive possibility for making peace with (and between) Iraq and Kuwait. 264 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The resentment between Iraq and Kuwait neither started nor ended with the Gulf War. Still, Iraq did engage in some tactics that increased Kuwaiti resentment - the destruction of a non-trivial part of the Kuwaiti oil supply and taking Kuwaiti hostages (many of which were never returned). The Coalition’s use of heinous means was in weapons and targeting choices (Smith 2002, 363; Opeskin and Wright 1991). Cluster and asphyxiation bombs, unguided missiles, and tanks used as plows for people are means used that provoked substantial resentment (Smith 2002, 363; Hampson 1993a, 105). Further, the disproportionately low number of allied casualties provoked the resentment of Iraqis who suffered for years under a damaged essential infrastructure (Vaux 1992, 23). Feminisms add to this analysis by considering peace in positive terms. Even were Iraq to recover the humiliation of the tactics used which would make it difficult for them to ever trust the Coalition again, that would not be the end to debate on this standard. Peace in the positive sense is tied into security, security is tied into humyn security. The Gulf War erected a lasting barrier to Iraqi humyn security, and thus a barrier to peace in Iraq. Vaux reminds that the lasting stigma of the war will be eco-crisis and health crisis, which will directly affect humyn security (1992, 146-7). Lasting effects on humyn security are prohibitive to positive peace, and thus heinous means. IV. FEMINISTS (RE)WRITE WARS The task o f counterfactually reconstructing the Gulf War in an ungendered fashion is both impossible (as there is no starting point where the gendering began to occur) and unfruitful (as the political events cannot be undone or redone). Still, counterdiscourses to the conduct of the Gulf War can be useful: they can intervene in dominant histories and provide insights for how politics could be dealt with in the future. This section presents 265 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. some disruptive discourses as interventions, and then presents a power-with model to propose an alternative frame for dealing with the conflict that became the Gulf War. A. INTERRUPTIONS Feminisms present a number of ‘interruptions’ in the Gulf War discourse an action throughout this chapter - criticisms of the justice of the cause for the war, o f the belligerents’ lack of moral authority, and o f their tactics and means, of their treatment of wymyn specifically and people generally, and of their provisions for positive peace. These criticisms serve as counter-stories to the dominant histories which valorize war and obscure suffering. An interruption, or a counter-metaphor, can be as simple as a phrase that provokes a moment’s thought or as complicated as a detailed (Fairclough 1995; 1989). A section title ‘attacks on wymyn’ provokes a second’s thought - did the Gulf War really directly attack wymyn? A wording choice like ‘fucked up the ass’ (as opposed to anal sex, or even omitting it altogether) pulls attention to a point about the sexualization of war- fighting. W ymyn’s groups nationally and internationally during the Gulf War protested, and presented counterdiscourses. Wymyn’s groups in the United States used ‘support our troops,’ normally a pro-war argument, to contend that supporting the troops meant removing them from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait (Vickers 1993, 53). Mothers against the war argued that the United States was ‘losing its sons’ to the war. These and other counterdiscourses existed during the Gulf War; many of them, however, did not make it to the policy-making level. If history is constructed, and one story becomes the dominant story, feminisms offer counter-constructions to interrupt and talk back to gendered dominant stories. I argue that effective counterdiscourses combined with a feasible counterstrategy 266 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. needed to be pushed to the policy level. I propose a power-with understanding of the world as a feasible counterstrategy. POWER-WITH Saddam Hussein’s legacy will be that there is a double standard in world politics. For the West and its friends, the present international order provides freedom, security, and dignity. But for Arabs, Muslims, and developing nations, there is only oppression, exploitation, and dishonor (Kelsay 1993, 8) The government of Iraq claimed some real victory in the Gulf War in the eyes of many Islamic people for acting with courage on behalf of the oppressed (Kelsay 1993, 11). In the context of fighting for the oppressed, jihadic references to Arabic pride are a powerful persuasive tool (Kelsay 1993, 14). The power inequities between belligerents in the Gulf War were salient in international politics before the war and continued to be after the war, creating an atmosphere where conflictual relations were unavoidable. As the more powerful actor, the United States was attempting to ‘communicate to’ rather than ‘communicate with’ or ‘negotiate with’ Iraq. The dialogues that did occur, then, were both handicapped from the outset and generally pointless. Amy Allen explains that states see power as power-over, or the “ability of an actor or set o f actors to constrain the choices available to another actor or set of actors in a non-trivial way” (Allen 1998, 33; Arendt 1970). In other words, power is seen as coercive force. This understanding of power is demonstrated by most of the key actors throughout the course o f the Gulf War. First, Iraq threatened invasion of Kuwait, using its power over Kuwait to get concessions. When the threat o f inflicted power failed to obtain concessions, Iraq exercised its physical power over Kuwait by invading. Next, the UN Security Council used its economic power over Iraq to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait because its position was economically untenable. When economic force failed, the Coalition issued a threat to use military power over Iraq. Iraq, not 267 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. believing that the international community would use force, ignored the threats. The Coalition, in turn, solidified its intent to enforce its will, and began an air war, using its superior military force to exercise power over Iraq. The Coalition’s power over Iraq was exercised with overwhelming force in the ground war - it has been said that it took less than three days to turn the Iraqi military from the fourth-largest army in the world to the second- largest in Iraq. Power over on all sides of the Gulf War was talked about in explicitly masculine terms of force and coercion. As Chris Weedon reminds us, feminisms are a politics of the reinterpretation and redistribution of power (1987; Habermas 1986; Lukes 1983). Feminisms urge a reinterpretation of power on all sides of the Gulf War. First, they reiterate that might does not make right - that Iraq was no more right for being more powerful than Kuwait and that the Coalition was no more right for being more powerful than Iraq. The inverse also holds - that Kuwait was no more right for being weaker than Iraq and that Iraq was no more right for being weaker than the Coalition. It is how these power differentials are seen, interpreted, and used in international politics that determines their moral worth, not their existence. Feminisms see that power does not have a universally valid meaning, but that it can be seen in domination, in empowerment, in moral universalism, and in social role assignment. The Gulf War shows much power-as-domination: Iraq dominating Kuwait, the Coalition then dominating Iraq. This cycle of domination (and cycle of violence) is in part due to an understanding of power which sees this sort of behavior as acceptable and commonplace in international politics. Amy Allen reminds us that there are alternative possibilities. She explains that power-to is “the capacity o f an agent to act in spite of or in response to power wielded over her by others” (Allen 1998, 34). This sort of power is rebellion; the weak finding a way 268 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. around the oppressive demands of the strong. This idea of power can be seen in Iraq after the war. The Saddam Hussein government talked about the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent survival o f the Coalition invasion as a victory over Western imperialism. He talked about Iraq’s successes, however small, as interference in the dominance of the West, or as power-to. This story was one that allowed Iraq to declare some victory in the Gulf War by reinterpreting power in the context o f the conflict to mean that Iraq had shown power rather than losing power. Still, the idea of power-to is one that is essentially bound up in a conflictual understanding of interhumyn relations and international politics. Allen’s third interpretation,power with, is one that feminists in international relations often emphasize as the most promising path for reconstruction o f global sociopolitical relations. The idea of power-with is linked to collaboration, coordination, empowerment, and emancipation. It is the power to act with people to accomplish common goals, goals of solidarity, or goals of finding common ground. The discourse of empowerment was generally absent from the international politics of the Gulf War - cooperation for peace and prosperity was not taken seriously by any party (Kuwait refused to negotiate, Iraq refused to withdraw, the United States refused to negotiate with Iraq, the UN Security Council basically fell in line).3 6 Feminisms suggest that Gulf War belligerents could have envisioned power (and thus the conflict) differently - by looking to find common ground, collaboration, sharing, and compromise with other participants instead of engaging in a competition of fear and 3 6 The possible exception here is the late diplomatic interference on the parts o f the USSR and the Secretary- General o f the UN. Both parties staged 11 hour negotiations with Iraq (the UN before the air war and the USSR before the ground war) in order to find some way around the violence o f war. Both parties were under the conviction that it was possible to work with Iraq to find some solution acceptable enough to the United States to reverse the inevitability o f the violence o f an all-out war. Both parties offered Iraq assistance in making an acceptable offer to the United States, and engaged in solidarity discourse with Iraq in order to prevent the war. Still, neither attempt was successful in staving off war, mainly because the majority o f the actors involved in the Gulf War were uninterested in collaborative interpretations o f power. 269 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. violence. They criticize the effect that a myopic power-over interpretation of international politics has on interhumyn social and political relations, by pointing out the neglect of those who do not have ‘power-over’ to wield in competitive power situations, or those at the margins. Feminisms have a knowledge-interest in the margins; the actors in the Gulf War had a knowledge-interest in domination and political bravado. That knowledge-interest influenced the ways that they saw and talked about the conflict. The Gulf War actors made ‘objective’ statements - claims to land, national sovereignty, and the like, based in historical ‘fact’ and in terms of an understanding of both international ethics and international political interaction which could be understood objectively, where objectivity is interpreted as ‘with a consensus for the moral correctness of a specific point of view.’ Feminisms teach us that this is not objectivity at all, but knowledge-interest hidden under the parochial guise of objectivity. Iraq engaged in spreading interested knowledge as it talked about this historical story of Kuwait as a part of Iraq, as well as when it talked about the humynitarian abuses in Kuwait. Both had some basis in fact but were far from ‘objectively known.’ Such interested knowledge was also evident on the part of Kuwait, which characterized Iraq’s aggression as if there had been no political context, as ‘unprovoked’ as if there had not been accusations of theft, of money owed, o f oil illegally drilled, or of price-controlling. Finally, the United States engaged in similar propagation o f interested information as the United States government discussed Kuwait’s national sovereignty as something sacred, which there was no excuse for the violation of, as if it had not engaged in the violation of national sovereignties on countless occasions in the past. The point here is not to ‘point fingers at’ Gulf War belligerents for the partiality of their knowledge, but instead to make a note that knowledge is partial, and the Gulf War belligerents demonstrate this convincingly. 270 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The partiality of knowledge leaves feminisms with the realization that the worldview of one actor is not representative of the worldviews of other actors, even if the actor has the preponderance of political power in a situation. Feminisms see this when they look at gendered worldviews; they understand that the purportedly ‘neutral’ masculine understandings of the world are not accurate just because men are more powerful in the political arena. Instead, dominant ‘masculine’ worldviews use their power (intentionally or inadvertently) to silence marginal worldviews. This gendered analogy is translatable to the situation of the Gulf War. The dominant (Coalition) story of the conflict is a partial one, as are all other accounts of the war, by virtue of the partiality of knowledge. These partialities, as feminisms recognize, tend to go to the political benefit of the powerful and the political harm of those at the margins. Feminisms, then, have an interest in providing corrective instruction to such partialities of knowledge. Still, this task presents some difficulties, because feminisms recognize the inevitable tie between knowledge, power, and interests - that objectivity is not individually possible (and may not even be dialogically possible) and that humyn thought and communication is based on a self-other dichotomy that makes relational knowledge difficult to obtain. Yet it is relational knowledge that feminisms urge political actors to seek. Feminisms, armed with a knowledge-interest in emancipation, ask political actors to see their interactions inherently relational. They ask the powerful and the privileged to feel a relation to the margins, and in that relation to act in genuine (as opposed to paternalistic) solidarity. Such relational understanding of humyn political interaction could be achieved by the security ethic of empathetic cooperation. Vivian Jabri suggests that such a security ethic is based in empathy and relational thinking, as opposed to reactivity, conflict, and competition. Gendered knowledges, Peterson and Runyan contend, can lead to the 271 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. realization that traditionally marginalized persons, issues, and value claims should be recognized in international political interaction. The implementation of these values in security ethics would have substantially re imagined the political situation that was the Gulf War: the potential belligerents would have looked for power with ways of achieving security goals, lending an empathetic ear to the needs and understandings o f those who would otherwise be constructed to be enemies. A dialogue on what a just resolution to the conflicts and misunderstandings present would look like would ensue; this dialogue would include the voices both of the traditional actors in international politics and o f those who are normally marginalized from international political decision-making (like wymyn, and poor people). This dialogue would be framed by an atmosphere of solidarity, mutual respect, and assistance rather than conflict and violence; with the understanding that international politics is full of both moral and political contingency; and with an air of cooperation rather than conflictual competition. Under such an ethos, the Gulf War would have been in no way inevitable - its issues may have been resolved in political dialogue. V. CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have discussed gendered roles, gendered impacts, and gendered application o f just war standards in the choice to go to war in the Gulf War as well as in the fighting of the war. Everywhere we turn, there are gendered implications both of the war and of the just war standards used to evaluate it. The feminist reformulation of just war theories that I present reveals and critiques these genderings, and reformulates the policy and the policy-intent in a more just manner. What this chapter paid very little attention to, however, was the end o f the Gulf War. Early in the chapter, I explained that the fighting in the ground war lasted just a few days, with Iraq’s speedy withdrawal deep into Iraqi 272 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. territory. The Iraqi military became disorganized and ineffective in this withdrawal, and the fighting ceased. The [First] Gulf War was unjust in a number of important (gendered) ways. A feminist reformulation o f just war not only points out these injustices but offers reformulations and alternatives. If history is a constructed argument, where discourse conflict and one ‘wins,’ feminist interjections into the stories of the Gulf War serve a potentially liberating purpose. This purpose is to participate in the re-telling of the Gulf War in a way that is more gender-sensitive than the events were at the time. Such a feminist re telling can serve two purposes: promoting reflection and promoting gender awareness in future conflicts. The (gendered) Gulf War ended with UN Security Council resolution 687 serving as a cease-fire between Iraq and the Coalition. The Resolution, passed in April, instructed Iraq how it needed to behave to come into compliance with UN ideas o f international norms. This resolution was a comprehensive economic sanctions regime on Iraq, conditional on the Iraqi government’s taking responsibility for the Gulf War, paying for it, abandoning all weapons of mass destruction, and behaving peaceably towards Kuwait. In the next chapter, I contend that this sanctions regime both in itself constituted war and continued the political event known as the ‘Gulf War.’ I apply my reformulated feminist ethics of war to the sanctions regime, arguing that its thirteen-year conduct was gendered, unjust, and in need of feminist reformulation. 273 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter seven, the war of sanctions In summary, the sanctions continue to kill children and sustain high levels o f malnutrition. Sanctions are undermining cultural and educational recovery. Sanctions will not change governance to democracy. Sanctions encourage isolation, alienation, and possibly fanaticism. Sanctions may create a danger to peace in the region and in the world. Sanctions destroy Islamic and Iraqi family values. Sanctions have undermined the advancement of women and have encouraged a massive brain drain. Sanctions destroy the lives of children, their expectations, and those of young adults. Sanctions breach the Charter o f the UN, the Conventions o f Human Rights, and the Rights of the Child . . . Sanctions lead to unacceptable human suffering, often the young and the innocent. As I have said already, I can find no legitimate justification for sustaining economic sanctions under these circumstances (UN Assistant Secretary General Dennis Halliday 1998). The UN (UN) embargo on Iraq was implemented in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, and altered during the cease-fire of the Gulf War in April of 1991.' Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait survived a months-long total economic embargo, but was routed by military force. Facing defeat and the dissipation of most o f its military, Iraq signed a preliminary cease-fire which permitted the UN Security Council to develop a permanent cease-fire agreement. This cease-fire agreement came in the form o f UN Security Council Resolution 687, which exacted a number of demands on Iraq combining punishment and future containment. The Security Council demanded that Iraq recognize and respect Kuwait’s independence; allow a De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) between Iraq and Kuwait; surrender all nuclear, chemical, biological, and long-range weapons, weapons research, and weapons-related material; accept liability for the Gulf War in its entirety; return all possession of Kuwait removed during occupancy; repatriate Kuwaiti prisoners o f war; and 1 UN Security Council Resolution 661 S/Res/661 (1990), 6 August 1990 and UN Security Council Resolution 687 S/Res/687 (1991), 3 April 1991. 274 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. renounce terrorist activity as legitimate politics.2 A further Resolution demanded that Iraq “cease repression” o f its civilian population.3 Until these demands were met, the UN Security Council would continue an oil-export embargo on Iraq and a total import embargo (food and medicine were later mostly excluded).4 The legal requirements placed on Iraq were not clear from the letter o f the UN Resolutions, and were hotly debated among Security Council members over the duration of the sanctions regime. The text of Resolution 687 takes its legal mandate from Chapter 7, Article 41 o f the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to deal with threats to peace by suspending economic relations (Niblock 2001). In this resolution, eight demands are made o f Iraq; two dealing with weapons, two dealing with military confrontation, one about POWs, one about stolen property from war, one about war liability, and one dealing with terrorism. One legal interpretation of the Resolution reads paragraph 22 literally: 22. Decides also that upon approval by the Security Council o f the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in Resolution 661 (1990), shall have no further force or effect. Paragraph 19 demands a payment system be established for war liability, and paragraphs eight through thirteen deal with the elimination of nuclear, biological, chemical, and long- range weapons and weapons capabilities from Iraq, subject to monitoring and verification. This interpretation, held by Iraq and some other member nations o f the Security Council, 2 UN Security Council Resolution 687 S/Res/687 (1991). 3 UN Security Council Resolution 688 S/Res/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 4 Let no statement in this chapter be interpreted as a personal endorsement o f the humynitarian effects o f economic sanctions on Iraq; only as the recognition that the political conflicts in the name o f which sanctions are imposed can and should be dealt with as a separate issue than the humynitarian effects o f sanctions; though no thorough study o f economic sanctions would be complete or meaningful without reference to these effects, which will be dealt with in a separate chapter o f this ongoing study. 275 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. holds the understanding that Iraq needed only to end its proscribed weapons programmes and set up a system to pay for the Gulf War to have the sanctions removed. A second legal interpretation, held by other members of the UN Security Council, is that Resolution 687 must be fulfilled in its entirety to warrant the removal o f sanctions on Iraq. In a number o f subsequent resolutions, the Security Council reflects the interpretation Iraq needed to have met all eight demands contained in Resolution 687 as a condition of lifting sanctions. This interpretation comes from seeing paragraph 22 as Security Council discretion rather than a promise to Iraq, a caveat in paragraph 28 that allows for review of the decision made in paragraph 22, and a general view that the demands in Resolution 687 are both interdependent and unconditional. There are also other interpretations of the requirements for the lifting of the sanctions regime. A number of these concern Resolution 688, which demands that the government o f Iraq treat its civilian population in accordance with internationally accepted standards o f humyn rights. While a number of phrases in the Resolution refer to issues covered in Chapter VII of the Charter, this resolution does not have or claim UN authority to interfere in the domestic situation in Iraq. Like a number of other UN resolutions about humyn rights, UN Security Council Resolution 688 can legally request that the government of Iraq behave in certain ways, but cannot give official UN sanction to enforcement of such a resolution. Nonetheless, humyn rights were attached to a number o f statements conditioning sanctions on Resolution 688, both from the UN Security Council and from decision-making member-state governments (Graham-Brown 2000; 1999). Additionally, a number of statements from the United States, which holds veto power on the UN Security Council, attached conditions to sanctions not mentioned in the relevant resolutions, including the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Khadduri 2000). The multiplicity of legal 276 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interpretations made the sanctions regime more confusing, both for the target state and its many sanctioners. A sanctions regime that was only meant to last about a year (Conlon 1995, 634) ultimately stretched over thirteen years. Confusion, fits and starts, ulterior motives, partial compliance, and unrelenting demands extended the sanctions regime seemingly indefinitely. Throughout the 1990s, Iraq remained under one of history’s longest and most strict economic sanctions regimes (2000; Selden 1999). In 1995, a humynitarian program called oil-for-food program was instituted in order to mitigate the massive humynitarian disaster in Iraq caused by the sanctions regime. This program allowed Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil and to use about half of the revenue to buy food and medicine approved by the UN Sanctions Committee. The remainder of the revenue went to funding UN programs in Iraq and to paying for liabilities remaining from the Gulf War. The oil-for-food program continued until the sanctions were lifted in the summer o f 2003. A December 1999 resolution offered Iraq a suspension of sanctions were it to cooperate with the weapons demands o f Resolution 687, but did not lift, suspend, or lighten the import or export embargo. With these exceptions, the UN sanctions regime implemented in 1991 remained intact until the 2003 United States-led takeover of Iraq. Many questions about this sanctions ‘episode’ remain unanswered in the academic literature. Ethical analyses o f the sanctions regime are common in both academic and activist literatures: the debate over the humynitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iraq was quite visible over last half of the 1990s. Still, the question of the appropriate ethical framework to analyze the horrors that filled the ‘interwar years’ in Iraq is an open one. I argue that my reformulated feminist ethics of war is the appropriate framework for the evaluation of this sanctions regime. This chapter, then, looks at the sanctions on Iraq 277 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. through gendered lenses. The first section, ‘warrior sanctions,’ argues that economic sanctions on Iraq can be classified as an act of war. Justification for this definition comes from three different sources. I present a traditional IR theory classification of sanctions as war, an empirical classification o f this sanctions regime as war, and a feminist theoretical understanding o f sanctions as war. The second section, ‘gendered coercion between states,’ argues that coercive diplomacy is necessarily a gendered practice. The third section, ‘warrants for (gendered) sanctions,’ examines the ad bellum justifications claimed by the sanctioning powers for their sanctions regime, and rebuts them both with evidence and with feminist (re)interpretation of just war standards. The fourth section, ‘the humyn implications of sanctions,’ discuss the in bello implications of sanctions, arguing that sanctions effects are both massively gendered and a humynitarian disaster. The final section, ‘feminists re-write sanctions,’ presents a feminist strategic intervention in dominant discourses on the sanctions regime. This particular intervention is in the form of a metaphor construction, creating a counter-metaphor to ‘talk back to’ traditional interpretations (Lakoff and Johnson 1981; Milliken 1999). In this counter-discourse, I compare coercive diplomacy to rape, examining the gendered implications of international coercive force. I. WARRIOR SANCTIONS The assertion that economic sanctions qualify as war may at first seem not to belong in the scholarly (inter)discipline o f IR; it may seem as if it is an activist label to inspire political fervor. I present an argument is that economic sanctions on Iraq do indeed qualify as war for the purposes of academic analysis. How international political events are labeled is important. As Baudrillard told us in Chapter V, the ways that international political events are identified and characterized affects both perceptions of the content of international politics and the actual content. The language that we use constitutes the properties that we 278 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. understand to be a part of an event or policy; the name that we give an event or policy in IR determines both what it means and the tools that we can use to analyze (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Histories tell stories o f fights over labels for political events and entities as much as they tell stories of disputed land or disputed property ownership. There are a number of arguments that lend legitimacy to the claim that the specific economic sanctions regime on Iraq from 1990-2003 constituted a war against Iraq. Here, I present three justifications for the classification o f this sanctions regime as war. These interpretations come from the traditional scholarship in International Relations theories, from empirical accounts of the situation between Iraq and its Gulf War opponents, and from the unique observations of feminist theories o f International Relations. A. IR THEORY CALLS SANCTIONS WAR Carl von Clausewitz defines war as an act of [physical] force to compel the enemy to do our will. He elaborates that “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose” (Clausewitz 1989 [1830], 87). Clausewitz understands that “there is only one means in war: combat. But the multiplicity of forms that combat assumes leads us as in many different directions as are created by the multiplicity o f aims” (1989 [1830], 96). Clausewitz’s definition is used here because of its clarity, and because it is a greatly respected work among scholars of IR. I ask, then, could economic sanctions on Iraq be considered a ‘war’ in Clauzewitz’s terms? The first element of the Clausewitzian definition of war is the existence of political objects for which the force is being employed. In implementing the economic sanctions regime on Iraq, the sanctioners had a number of clear political objects. Scholars understood the political aims as one or more of the following: Iraq’s disarmament or nonproliferation, achieving or maintaining regional or international strategic balance, obtaining reparations for 279 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Gulf War, improving the humyn rights situation in Iraq, instigating regime change ending the rule o f Saddam Hussein, discouraging Iraq’s participation in state-sponsored terrorism, obtaining and preserving the sovereignty o f Kuwait, and protecting the Kurdish population of Iraq from the government.5 The UN Security Council formalized political aims in their resolutions instituting the economic sanctions regime. These aims included: the sovereignty o f Kuwait; acceptance of a De-Militarized Zone between Iraq and Kuwait; an end to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs; Iraq’s taking responsibility for all losses and damages related to the Gulf War; return of all property and hostages related to the Gulf War; monitoring transparency; and an end to state-sponsored terrorism. These reasons, stated and deduced, identify political ends of the economic sanctions policy. Still, the existence of political ends is not sufficient to determine the existence o f a war in Clausewitz’s interpretation. He argues that war is an extension o f politics by other means - thus the means o f the operation are key to determining the existence of war. Clausewitz understands that the sole means of war is combat, but that there are many different forms of combat. His extensive treatment of a number of those forms shows no evidence that economic coercion (without accompanying military force) qualifies as combat in his interpretation. However, Clausewitz lived in a time when economic coercion generally accompanied some sort o f violence, as opposed to a time in which globalized economics and a coordinated intergovernmental organization make economic coercion possible outside the use of military means. Because times have changed, it seems appropriate to consider whether or not economic sanctions on Iraq qualify under 5 On disarmament, see Deaver (2001), Zunes (1998); Cordesman (1999); Byman and Waxman (2000); Rogers (1996). On regime change, see Alkadiri (2000). On reparations for the Gulf War, see Niblock (2001). On humyn rights, see Cortright and Lopez (2000); Graham-Brown (1999). On terrorism, see Richard Haass (1998a). On Kuwaiti sovereignty, see Melby (1998). 280 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Clausewitz’s definition of combat even though he does not explicitly consider the possibility. Clausewitz sees combat as the use of physical force for the purpose of making the opponent incapable of further resistance to the intended political purposes. There are two elements, then, of combat: physical force and disabling intent. Economic sanctions on Iraq are not physical force in the narrowest of interpretations: military force is not used in sanctions, and therefore it does not appear that the UN Security Council is holding Iraq by the jugular and demanding cooperation. A closer look, however, shows that this is exactly the situation. The UN Security Council’s food embargo during the Gulf War and continuous import embargo are physical force - the extreme deprivation that these sanctions place on Iraq is a physical one (Hoskins 1997; Weiss et al 1997). My argument here is that physical force does not necessitate direct military interaction, but that the there is both physicality and coercion for the target of that force. The economic sanctions on Iraq are physical in means: the sanctions regime deprives Iraqis of physical goods which were previously in their lives, from compact discs to pain killers. They are also physically coercive: there are a stated set of conditions which Iraq must meet in order to have these physical goods returned to accessibility for the people of Iraq. Economic sanctions on Iraq also meet the standard of having disabling intent. To have disabling intent, physical force must be employed with the aim of making the enemy incapable of further resistance to the stated aims. Economic sanctions on Iraq were instituted with this purpose. Thomas Weiss, David Cortright, George Lopez, and Larry Minear claim ed that econom ic sanctions policy “w ill exercise sufficient ‘bite’ that the citizens in a targeted country will exert political pressure to force either a change in the 281 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. behavior o f the authorities or removal altogether . . . inflicting civilian pain in order to achieve political gain” (1997). Economic sanctions are an indirect tool to weaken the target country’s ability to resist the sanctioning powers. Economic sanctions against Iraq were thus an indirect tool to disable Saddam Hussein’s resistance to international norms and UN Security Council demands. This interpretation qualifies economic sanctions as having disabling intent. However, there is also discourse o f economic sanctions as a more direct tool of deprivation - the intent that sanctions take away the physical capability for developing weapons programs (Niblock 2001; Selden 1999). The economic restrictions placed on Iraq were intended to deprive the government o f the money necessary to pursue resistance to the stated aims of the Security Council - to deprive him of the money to build Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Thus, economic sanctions on Iraq meet all three requirements of Clausewitz’s definition of war. The sanctions regime has clear political ends, it is enacted by physical force (physicality and coercion), and it is enacted with disabling intent. B. SANCTIONS AS SITUATIONAL WARFARE A simpler interpretation of the economic sanctions regime on Iraq as war is possible, however. Recounting the chronology of the beginning and the end o f the [First] Gulf War reveals that it never ended', that sanctions are a continuation of the Gulf War by other means. The Gulf War was permitted by the Security Council in its pre-war resolutions under Article 2(4) and Article 41 of the UN Charter (Schacter 1991). War was then declared by a number of member-states on 18 January 1991, and fought for the next month and a half. George Bush, Sr. declared a cease-fire in the Gulf War on 28 February 1991. This temporary cease fire allowed for the implementation of a more permanent cease-fire, the UN Security Council Resolution 687. Still, this resolution constituted a cease-fire, not a peace treaty or 282 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the end of the war. Technically speaking, the Gulf War continued as long as there was an Iraqi state to be party to the war. During the sanctions regime, the Gulf War was indeed still going on; both the spirit and the letter of the cease-fire were being violated. Iraq was on the receiving end of a string of bombing campaigns that stretched almost the entire length of the cease-fire (Byman and Waxman 2000; Damroch 1993). These bombings were ‘provoked’ by non-compliance with weapons demands or requests for weapons inspections, violations of no-fly zones around Iraq, and military buildup on Kuwaiti border (Ekeus 1995). Iraq sometimes responded to this violence, perpetuating a state of combat between Iraq and (at least some of) its Gulf War opponents. Depending on whose count is accurate, these bombings killed as many or more Iraqis than were killed during the Gulf War; and continued the decimation of Iraq’s infrastructure.6 Thus, the cease-fire has been violated by both the Gulf War allies and Iraq, leaving the parties at war. The spirit of the cease fire is also violated, both by open conflict and by hostilities in the form of the economic sanctions regime. Both de jure and de facto, Iraq and the Gulf War allies remained at war throughout the sanctions regime. C. WAR IN FEMINISMS’ EYES I argued in the theoretical section of this project that feminisms understand violence more broadly than some traditional interpretations.7 Violence can be seen as those acts and structures that threaten humyn security; these are actions that cause physical, structural, and 6 1 examined the counts o f the UN, the United States, Great Britain, Iraq, Iraq Center, the Stimson Foundation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Gordon 1999a). Counts differ, but none deny a massive loss o f life and o f quality o f life for Iraqis. 7 Critiques o f earlier drafts o f this work brought from some a harsh criticism o f this section: feminisms have a more broad interpretation o f violence than some traditional interpretations; still, fields like peace research (specifically Galtung) have set forth very broad and principled interpretations o f structural violence. This is true, however, I have chosen not to edit the original text. I have chosen not to do so because o f my analysis o f the way that arguments play out in political theory. My original claim is true, in so much as the overwhelmingly dominant theories in IR do have very narrow interpretations o f violence. Insomuch as it is those claims I am trying to reverse, rebut, and seduce an audience from, my original (overstatement is activist performance. 283 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ecological peril (Tickner 2001, 62). In these terms, economic sanctions on Iraq were a security issue - these sanctions constituted physical, structural, and ecological violence at the macropolitical level (Hoskins 1997; UNICEF; Human Rights Watch). The physical violence came at the level of deprivation of nutrition and health care. The structural violence was the destruction of economic infrastructure and social programs that sustained Iraqi’s quantity and quality of life. The ecological violence was in the lack o f provision for safe care of Iraqi oil fields and reserves during their period of inoperability during the sanctions regime. In addition to structural humyn security, feminisms are also interested in individual security, as previously recorded (Tickner 1992, 35). The feminist contention that the personal is political (or that the personal is international) blurs the distinction between individual citizens’ lives and national political aims, thus making it possible to consider sanctions as a war against individual Iraqi men and wymyn. If war against individuals is a valid concept, we need to revisit the definition o f war to understand how sanctions may or may not fit. A first reading of Clausewitz’s definition is that war is a use of physical force against the opponent in order to place her in a situation where she has no choice but to concede to the strength of your force and thus your cause. If ‘he’ here is read as an individual, war as the use of physical force to render the enemy incapable of resistance must be seen literally - the end of the individual’s life is the end of her capability for resistance. Thus, the impact o f this kind of war is such that the individual is rendered incapable of resistance through a deprivation of her security and life. Sanctions deprived individual Iraqis of their lives and livelihoods, removing capacity for resistance. In this way, the sanctions regime was a war on individual Iraqis. Further, moving security discourse to the 284 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. level where humyns matter deprives IR of the ability to ignore the similarities between the use of moral coercion and war. If individual inoperability is seen as key, than the social and moral force imposed on or enacted within the environment in which individuals live would be effective force. In other words, any force that causes individual inoperability can be seen as violence; any violence enacted intentionally, purposively, and with mass scope can be seen as an act o f war. The blurring o f the distinction between personal, political, and international raises another way that feminists could explain sanctions as war. Not only are the sanctions war against individual Iraqis insofar as they constitute purposive violence, but also insofar as they directly attack individuals. The sanctioning powers, in their attempt to negatively impact the personal lives of citizens to affect political change, actually attacked political beings for political purposes with violent means (on an individual level). Individuals become political beings at the point where their interests and welfare matter in national and international security calculus. Manipulation of individual political behavior, then, is manipulation of political behavior, with political aims. The enforcement of this manipulation through threats to individual security (physical, social, environmental, or otherwise) is then equivalent to the enforcement o f international political will on states through threats to state security. This means that the sanctions regime can properly be understood as war, even in a more conventional sense. Feminist IR, then, offers a reinterpretation of the levels at which international relations is analyzed that leads to a reinterpretation of the location of war. Still, feminists reformulation more than the location in the idea of war. Feminists question not only the content of international violence, but also its context (Tickner 1992; Reardon 1985; As 1983; Cohn and Ruddick 2002; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Sylvester 2002). If politics is 285 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dominated by hegemonic masculinity, hegemonic masculinity’s salience legitimates and perpetuates a patriarchal social order from the individual level through to the international system level (Connell 1987; 1995; True 1996; Hooper 1998). This patriarchal social order, or war system, is authoritarian, competitive, and assumes unequal value between humyns (Reardon 1985,10). In such an international environment, “war” is competition where the competing happens through the use of coercive force. In this understanding, war is a conflictual state of existence as opposed to an individual event; that war is inherent to a competitive social system in which humynity exists. The ‘economic sanctions war,’ then, is not an isolated event outside o f the system of normal politics. In the competitive social system between states, there exist conflicts between Iraq and member-states of the UN Security Council. The order that the Security Council desires was held in place by their sanctions on Iraq with the assumption that the order desired by Iraq was inferior to the order desired by the Security Council. Authoritarian acts of coercive force put in place to win international competitions quality not only as war but as a perpetuation of the war system. The sanctions regime, then, can be seen both as a war proper, and as an extension of the war system. II. GENDERED COERCION BETWEEN STATES This section deals with the gendering of coercive diplomacy generally and of economic sanctions specifically. I contend that the gendered nature of coercive diplomacy can be seen in two areas: errors of omission and errors of commission. Coercive diplomacy is gendered by its omission o f concerns about gender and concerns about the individuals affected by the means of coercion. It actively genders international political relations through its motivating moralities and its means of implementation. I specify these 286 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. genderings, and then discuss the policy logics of economic sanctions specifically. I present four theories of the policy logic of economic sanctions and reveal each as gendered. A. GENDERED COERCIVE DIPLOMACY The theory and practice of coercive diplomacy generally omits gender analysis. Diplomatic force is framed as a goal to be obtained and the means of obtaining that goal; rather than in terms of the (gendered or humyn) effects of a choice to inflict hardship to obtain concessions (Martin 1994). Gender is absent from discussions of the intents or effects of coercive diplomatic efforts. The example of sanctions on Iraq is illustrative here: in the examination of 1,700 communicative documents between Iraq, the Security Council, and the Security Council’s member-states during the sanctions regime, the lives o f wymyn and the impact of wymyn’s subordination are not mentioned once. As Hilary Charlesworth contends, what is not said is as important as what is said (1999). The omission of gendered analysis shows that wymyn’s subordination was not near the top o f the Security Council’s priority list, or of Iraq’s. The belligerents in the war of sanctions saw gender subordination as less important than the macro-strategic political issues that the war of sanctions was actually meant to fix. Another gendered omission in coercive diplomacy is the effect of the coercive means on the humyn lives that are impacted by the use o f (and implementation of) threats to obtain diplomatic concessions. Coercive diplomacy generally takes place at the governmental level in the form of some kind of explicit threat (“if you(r country) do(es) not do this, I(my country) will hurt you(r country) this way”). John Odell records that, in coercive diplomacy, the parties look to their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) (2000). In other words, they consider what the other party will do to them if they do not agree to the demands being exacted. The ‘punishment,’ like the demand, is normally 287 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. some kind o f macropolitical good, described in clean terms. In sanctions on Iraq, if Iraq did not comply with UN demands, the Security Council would deprive Iraq of the ability to import or export goods. Still, ‘the ability to import or export goods’ is an abstraction that obscures humyn suffering. Were the suffering not omitted from the description o f coercive diplomacy, ‘the ability to import and export goods’ would be translated ‘the ability to adequate feed, clothe, provide healthcare, provide education, and provide adequate crime control to the people of Iraq.’ Coercive diplomacy is normally treated as a macropolitical game of chess where the micropolitical (humyn) consequences go unaddressed. Additionally, the practice of coercive diplomacy commits gendered errors. The motivating moralities of coercive diplomacy leave something to be desired from a feminist perspective. Whatever motivates a state or international organization to desire the good it is trying to abstract from the other actor is not being addressed here; instead, the motivating morality that leads that actor feel entitled to the good and to see coercion as the means to obtain the good is the problem. If a state wants something, and has the power to take it by force, that does not mean that said state has moral license to take the good that they want against the will of a weaker state. Still, coercive diplomacy rests on the assumption that direct wielding of might for the purpose of attaining a political good is not only acceptable, but reasonable common practice. The sense of entitlement to the good through force fits a political realist interpretation of international political relations (Beckman 1994). Political realism tells a story o f international social Darwinism, or the survival o f the fittest, where actors go after their interests knowing that they will obtain them only by force, and that their obtaining those goods will be at the expense of others’ interests. Feminisms contend that this worldview is fundamentally flawed: the international arena ought to be viewed as a forum of relational autonomy where ‘our’ interests are dependent on ‘others’ well-being, so 288 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. empathetic cooperation (rather than competition) is key to mutual survival (Tickner 1991; Sylvester 1994). Coercive diplomacy relies on competition, and on force to ‘win’ those competitions. It comes from an understanding of power as power-over, or the ability to force someone else to do what you desire. This particular understanding of power-over assumes that ‘m y’ desires are ‘right’ while ‘their’ desires are ‘wrong’ - parochial universalism that feminisms reject. Feminisms look to international policy choices based in communication, motivated by empathy, and engaged in through cooperation as alternative discourses and actions. The means of coercive diplomacy, threats, also generally reflect gendered social mores. In coercive diplomacy, intimidation is the currency o f international policy. This intimidation occurs when a powerful actor attempts to communicate to a less powerful actor in the international arena. This ‘communicating to’ is not dialogue, or constructive critique. Instead, it is a statement that the other actor functionally has no choice but to fulfill the wishes of the more powerful actor. Having no choice is the political equivalent to the feminist understanding o f emasculation; the coerced party becomes (discursively if not actually) powerless. International threats cause emasculation and humiliation between gendered states; these states then retaliate to reclaim their substance, recognition, and pride; this creates a cycle of violence. Feminisms critique the entire process of coercive diplomacy as akin to an abusive relationship. Feminisms see that empathy is a preferable policy option to power-wielding. Instead, feminisms suggest that actors interpret power as empowerment, where actors pool their resources for common benefit. B. GENDERED SANCTIONS I identify four understandings of the ways that economic sanctions are employed as policy choices in international relations: as direct force, as institutional constraint, as 289 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. socialization, and as argumentation. I recognize that these four understandings of sanctions combine to give a picture of the different motivations for sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War. I contend that each of these four typologies is both representative of and constitutive of the gendered macronarratives common to the international political system. The first understanding o f sanctions is that of economic coercion as a direct enforcement mechanism. David Baldwin explains sanctions as a tool o f power and statecraft, forcing a target state into submission (1985; 1999/2000; Chan and Drury 2000). Sanctions, here, are a (discursive and physical) weapon employed to obtain an actor’s goals in international politics (Baldwin 1985; 1999; Knorr 1975). Exercising power with sanctions is like inflicting power with guns: it is a way to raise the cost of non-compliance to the target until it becomes unacceptable. If an actor can cause substantial enough pain to force an opponent’s compliance, sanctions have been successful (Pape 1997; 1998; Elliott 1998; Hirschmann 1945). Daniel Drezner expands on this understanding, presenting the conflict expectations model of sanctions (2000; 1999). He argues that actors’ previous relations are a factor in the success of the power projection of sanctions. Between adversaries, willingness to sanction is high, and effectiveness of sanctions is low, because the target is not generally dependent on the sanctioners. Between allies, senders are reluctant to sanction, and sanctions are more effective, because allies are more power-interdependent. Feminisms offer three critiques of this understanding of sanctions. First, feminisms critique the power-over mindset that allows actors to attempt to force other actors to concede through deprivation. Instead, feminisms suggest that actors cooperate to reach a common understanding both o f goals and of how to obtain them. Second, feminisms critique the competitive ethos in the international arena that allows actors to see political gain as a zero- sum game. In a competition, those who cannot compete are left helpless. In a cooperative 290 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. atmosphere, weakness does not result in resource deprivation; instead, pooled strength helps to pool resources. Finally, feminisms critique the separation between allies and adversaries. The idea that one has ‘allies’ and ‘adversaries’ where one accommodates the allies to a greater degree than one accommodates the adversaries is difficult to reconcile with feminisms’ principles. This is because one’s values cannot be considered universally salient, and there is no warrant for valuing one group of people’s lives and well-being over other groups. To feminisms, power-projection sanctions constitute competitive attack, which has no place in a feminist ethics o f war. A second generally accepted understanding o f sanctions is that they function as international institutional constraints. Lisa Martin studies sanctions from the point of reference o f international institutions (1993; 1992). Internationally, multilateral cooperation institutes sanctions that attempt to bring the target state into that cooperation (Martin 1992). In the case of Iraq, the sanctions were not unilateral (from one country towards a target); instead, they were the product of international cooperation. Under a unilateral sanctions regime from the United States, Iraq would have been able to trade with any country that was not the United States. Under a multilateral sanctions regime from all UN member-states, Iraq was almost completely restricted from engaging in any international trade. Multilateral sanctions are more powerful than unilateral sanctions because of the scope of their effects. Martin tackles the problem of why states cooperate in multilateral enforcement of economic sanctions on certain target states and not others, concluding that it is a combination of coercive pressure to cooperate and salience of the reason that sanctions are in place. In this model of sanctions, institutional cooperation on the part o f sanctioners creates institutional constraint for the target, leading to compliance with the desired behavior. Again, ‘desired behavior’ is determined without the input o f the target actor, by its sanctioners. Here, the 291 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. target is not directly forced to cooperate by the degree o f suffering, but indirectly forced by the removal o f the capacity to engage in the undesirable behavior. The desired result is again obtained not willingly or through negotiation but by force, where the sanctions make the target actor unable to commit the non-compliant behavior. The target’s inability to commit the violation of international will teaches a lesson that the behavior was not acceptable in the first place. Sanctions disable and communicate futility. This is far from the dialogical approach to justice in international politics that feminisms advocate. Feminisms argue that dialogues between values can be used to reveal a compromise, where all parties can get not what they want but a just result of empathetic dialogue. Neither suffering nor incapacitation is a part of a feminist model of dialogical justice; discussion, debate, argumentation, and willingness to compromise are all essential parts of how feminisms envision just international relations. A third understanding of sanctions is as a socializing phenomenon. Here, sanctions are not understood as direct or indirect physical force, but as coercive social pressure. Neta Crawford and Audie Klotz explain sanctions as social force (1999; Crawford 2000). In their view, sanctions communicate unacceptability to the target actor by a combination of negative consequences and international shame. Sanctions, then, are normative communication. Crawford and Klotz argue that the normative communication model is the one through which economic sanctions worked on South Africa; the international community successfully communicated a norm against apartheid to the South African government through sanctions. An extension of the normative communication model of sanctions is the idea that sanctions can be seen as punishment, both for the purposes of retribution and for the purposes of social learning. 292 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kim Richard Nossal describes economic sanctions as international punishment, aimed towards shaming into changing behavior in international politics (1989). Sanctions as punishment communicate disapproval of certain policy choices and invoke suffering for behavior seen as inappropriate by the sanctioners (Doxey 1987, 4; Hoffman 1967, 144; Leyton-Brown 1987). This ‘communication,’ however, has two problems: first, that of moral universalism; second, that of the negative effects that the ‘communication’ (though it sounds innocuous) has on people’s lives. Bentham puts a different spin on sanctions as socialization, however. Bentham defines sanctions as forces that tend to draw the interests of the target into coincidence with public interests through pulling the target’s greatest happiness into coincidence with the public greatest happiness (1948 [1780]). Bentham argues that this socialization is accomplished through effects on the pleasures of sense, wealth, acquisition, possession, skill, amity, good name, power, piety, benevolence, ill-will, memory, imagination, relief, and expectation (1948 [1780]). In other words, Bentham argues that sanctions use material and ideational forces in order to socialize the target into the belief that its greatest happiness coincides with the behavioral choice that creates the senders’ (the public’s) greatest happiness. Sanction, in this interpretation, is a socialization process of creating coincidental preferences. Still, ‘creating coincidental preferences’ by force is, in feminisms’ eyes, inferior to ‘negotiating mutual preferences’ through dialogue. Finally, the fourth interpretation of economic sanctions is as tools o f bargaining and argumentation between nations looking to come to a mutual agreement on the best policy equilibrium. T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie Schwebach see economic sanctions as often- successful bargaining tools, where only foolish nations refuse to com e to a negotiated settlement (1997; Morgan 1994). David Cortright and George Lopez, prolific policy analysts in the area of economic sanctions, also understand economic sanctions as a tool of 293 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. leverage to be used in situations of bargaining and argumentation (2002, 2000, 1999). Bargaining, however, makes it sound like no one is hurt in a process of ‘finding an agreement.’ The case of Iraq shows the danger of this interpretation. First, this interpretation characterizes bargaining as an abstract game among equal elites, but fails to recognize power disparities between the sanctioned and the sanctioner. For example, if Iraq had sanctioned the UN (which, in fact, it attempted to do a few times during the 1990s), the UN would not have suffered under sanctions from Iraq as much as Iraq suffered under UN sanctions. Iraq, then, had less say because it had less power. Second, people actually do get hurt in the ‘bargaining’ process of sanctions - sometimes the effects are slight, sometimes more dramatic, but people are always affected. A model of sanctions as bargaining ignores that (Haass and O ’Sullivan 2000). Feminisms, on the other hand, see inequalities and marginalities in politics first, and therefore see the gender in this hierarchical and harmful understanding o f argumentation. III. WARRANTS FOR (GENDERED) SANCTIONS The ad bellum evaluation of the sanctions regime on Iraq necessarily has two parts: the justification for placing the sanctions regime in 1991, and the justification for keeping it in place until 2003. In 1991, the Security Council (and its member-states) were the actors making the decision to put the sanctions regime in place. Iraq had withdrawn from Kuwait, and had agreed to a preliminary cease-fire allowing the Security Council to dictate the terms of the final cease-fire. Iraq was in no military condition to continue fighting the Gulf War. The Security Council then made the choice to continue the war through the implementation of the economic sanctions regime. Throughout the tenure of sanctions, however, it is less clear whose choice sanctions were - except that no one claimed responsibility for the 294 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. choice.8 Still, I will talk about sanctions as a Security Council choice, as the Security Council implemented them and only the Security Council could lift them; any complicity that Iraqi government had in keeping sanctions in place will be discussed as warrant for the policy.9 I argue that the Security Council’s choice(s) to implement and continue the sanctions regime on Iraq is unjust ad bellum. The Security Council lacked right authority, just cause, last resort, or a reasonable chance of success. A. ABSENT AUTHORITY? That right authority was absent in the sanctions on Iraq may at first may seem like an outlandish claim to make, as the UN Security Council and all o f its member-states voted to approve and enforce the sanctions regime in what was likely the broadest use of UN power in the history of the intergovernmental organization (Munro 1996). One could argue that the UN member-states (including Iraq) gave the Security Council moral authority when they consented to join the organization, but the history of the Security Council shows that its moral license is constantly in question and can only be determined on a case-by-case basis (Cortright and Lopez 1999). In this case, the Security Council voted by sweeping consensus to place the sanctions regime on Iraq, and the General Assembly refused to contradict this policy prescription (Graham-Brown 1999). There is little evidence of objection on the part of the governments or peoples of the Security Council members at the time of origination of the sanctions. The Security Council went through all the processes that ought to constituted 8 The United States was adamant that it was Iraqi government’s choice to remain under the sanctions regime, as it could easily choose to comply with Security Council resolution 687 and have the sanctions removed; failing that, the United States made it clear that a regime change in Iraq would lift the sanctions, if the regime had just been willing. The government o f Iraq, on the other hand, insisted both that it should not have to comply with UN resolutions and that it had done so, blaming the United States for the sanctions. Various members o f the Security Council talked about lifting sanctions, but blamed a potential United States veto for their inability to do so. 9 At least formally - at times during the sanctions regime, states that disapproved o f the sanctions engaged in flagrant violations o f the sanctions regime in demonstration that they were not bound by Security Council dictates with which they disagreed (and, o f course, for whatever reason they disagreed in the first place). 295 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. right authority. However, the manifestation of authority through ascension is only a part of the battle: authority must both be actual and voiced', both legitimate and recognized. The standard o f ‘right authority’ as I reformulate it says that consensus among the actors choosing to go to war is only one of the necessary elements of right authority. The other element of right authority was the consent of those affected by the conflict to a conflict occurring. The people most affected by the war of sanctions were the citizens of Iraq, who were deprived of the resources important to everyday survival by the sanctions regime. The people affected by the sanctions regime, even when they had political sympathies for the Security Council’s policy priorities, largely objected to the tactic of economic sanctions (Bennis 2000a; Graham-Brown 1999; Hollis 2000). This element throws the Security Council’s license to authority in doubt: as opposed to engaging in dialogue with the values of those affected by the war of sanctions to obtain moral license, it choose its means irrespective of their wishes. If the Security Council’s relationship with right authority was in doubt at the beginning of the sanctions regime, it only became more difficult for the body to claim authority as the sanctions regime continued. International popular opinion turned against sanctions, citing the massive humynitarian consequences. Even those who favored a disposal of the Saddam Hussein regime generally objected to the sanctions towards the end of the 1990s (Mueller and Mueller 1999). A number of Security Council member-states turned against the sanctions, rhetorically denouncing them and violating them at will (Hoskins 1997). Pictures of malnourished children (as a result of sanctions) covered web pages, bulletin boards, and political activist organizations fighting against the sanctions. This moral protest to the sanctions was met not with dialogue but with intransigence: the 296 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sanctions regime would remain.1 0 It would remain for thirteen years, and do so (for at least the majority of that time) without the moral license that constitutes right authority. B. (UN)JUST CAUSE In the reformulation of just cause, I argued that a just cause is one dialogically arrived upon, with just end in sight, used not in coercion, enacted with right conduct. The Security Council did not have just cause to implement or continue sanctions against Iraq (Haass 1997; 1998b). The Security Council was not defending itself by sanctioning Iraq, at the very best, it was preempting the need to defend itself in the future.1 1 The Gulf War was premised on the claim that the allies were fighting against Iraq for the purpose of defending Kuwait. The merits of this claim, however, are not germane to the economic sanctions regime’s claims o f just cause. This is because Iraq withdrew from Kuwait in 1991, recognized Kuwait in 1994, has not acted militarily towards Kuwait since the end of the Gulf War fighting, and signed a non-aggression pact with Kuwait in 2002. If a continued threat to Kuwait does not constitute just cause for economic sanctions, then, the Security Council has three other main issue-areas from which to formulate just cause. First, the UN Security Council could justify sanctions because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, or was attempting to get those weapons. There are a number of problems with weapons as just cause for war. First, prohibiting Iraq from having WMD is not a value 1 0 Perhaps intransigence is too strong a word here: after all, the Security Council did implement the oil-for-food program, which (at least in theory) catered to the concerns o f international humynitarian advocates. Still, sanctions remained a humyn rights disaster, and they remained in place despite the protests o f actors as diverse as the French government, Iraqi political groups, and American individuals. The main point to emphasize here, though, is the lack o f dialogue being engaged in - if dialogue is essential to moral license which is essential to right authority, the continuation o f the sanctions regime fails. While it was heavily discussed, dialogue assumes that one side listens to another, which in turn listens back, trying to find a mutually acceptable agreement to their moral differences. 1 1 Discussions on the justice o f preemptive warfare will be saved for the chapter on the 2003 war in the Gulf. Here, the supposition that the war o f sanctions is preemptive is actually giving the Security Council the benefit of the doubt, as it is unclear what would have been preempted, or how that preemption would have been functional or warranted. The focus o f this section will be on the Security Council’s more credible claims to just cause. 297 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dialogically arrived upon by the international community. In ethical terms, the UN Security Council is making a judgment of inequality when banning Iraq from possessing those weapons. Many states in the international arena find the division of the world into ‘WMD’ and ‘non-WMD’ states to be unfair and imperialistic. Second, even were the prohibition against WMD in Iraq a dialogically-produced value, there is not solid evidence that Iraq possessed any o f those banned weapons at any time during the sanctions regime. The weapons demands are inflicted by the powerful against the less powerful in the interest of preserving the dynamics of power. Materially, even assuming that Iraq possessed those weapons for the entire duration of the sanctions regime, there was no consequence of that possession (Hoskins 1997). On the other hand, there were massive material consequences to the sanctions, comparable to the use of WMD (Mueller and Mueller 1999). The second justification that the Security Council could use was that it was perpetrating a war o f economic sanctions in order to obtain apologies and reparations for the Gulf War. Even ceding Iraq’s responsibility for the Gulf War as (dialogically agreed upon) fact, there is little justice in the planned result of a war fought for an apology for another war. This specific situation makes that catch-22 clearer, as Iraq was in no position to give reparations for the Gulf War. Instead, Iraq was severely economically and politically handicapped. Trading humyn lives and humyn quality of life for monetary gain is materially unjust (the impact outweighs the gain), proportionally unjust (there is nothing intrinsically just about the obtaining of monetary gain), distributionally unjust (taking from the poor to give to the rich does not serve the common good, whatever the reason the money is owed), and particularly unjust (as it is not right conduct with others to force them to negotiate with oneself). 298 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Finally, the Security Council could call on the prevention o f terrorism as just cause. Here, too, however, they would be losing an evidentiary battle. While there is substantial discussion of the possibility of a relationship between Iraqi government and a number of terrorist organizations, that discussion has proven to be pure speculation. There is no conclusive evidence that Iraq engaged in state-sponsored terrorism at any time after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Further, even were terrorism related to Iraq a problem, it would not be either the terrorists or their contacts in the government that the war o f sanctions hurt. A just cause must be against those who will suffer in the war: here, that means that the just cause must be against the citizens of Iraq. The overwhelming majority of citizens of Iraq are not direct participants in any possibility of WMD collection, recalcitrance about reparations for the Gulf War, or state-sponsored terrorism. Instead, the Security Council has no discernable just cause against the citizens of Iraq that sanctions targeted.1 2 C. LAST RESO R T? The economic sanctions regime on Iraq was not put in place as a last resort after other diplomatic or coercive means failed. The relationship between the Security Council and Iraq simply transitioned in 1991 from one war to another. The comprehensive nature of the Security Council requirements in Resolution 687 demonstrates that diplomatic means were not tried as an alternative to sanctions; while they likely would not have solved all of the problems, perhaps some o f the dozen demands would have been resolved. The chances that the exploration of more peaceful options were explored seriously even in discourse is low. In fact, the economic sanctions war is in some ways a “first resort” - it was the immediate framework of the cease-fire of the Gulf War, before any non-war means were 1 2 Some argue that the just cause against the citizens that sanctions targeted was that they refused to overthrow their own government. This, however, assumes their capability (which sanctions may have handicapped) as well as their moral obligation to do so (which is anything but clear). 299 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. attempted. The sanctions regime is necessarily not a ‘tool of negotiation’ - in thirteen years of sanctions, the Security Council demands did not change once (Sjoberg 2002b). That the demands did not change shows that negotiation did not take place in any serious manner. Even lacking negotiations, though, other means ought to have been tried in response to the international community’s difficulties with Iraq. While other means may have been considered and rejected as infeasible, the ‘last resort’ standard in the feminist reformulation of just war theories requires that these means be considered and attempted. It also requires that non-coercive alternative policy frames be considered - there is no evidence that such considerations occurred in the case of sanctions against Iraq. Instead, sanctions were chosen as the policy towards (against) Iraq at the end of the Gulf War, and then re chosen for more than a decade after that, without serious consideration o f resort to any other policy except military confrontation. D. SUCCESSES O F SANCTIONS? The Security Council did not have a reasonable chance o f success in the war of economic sanctions against Iraq. First, the Security Council did not have a reasonable chance o f winning the war. Iraq had survived a months-long total economic embargo leading up to the Coalition military action in the Gulf War. The authoritarian government of Iraq had demonstrated resolve, staying power, and unwillingness to be humiliated into concession. Certainly, the Security Council had every reason to expect that the sanctions would be extremely effective at economic deprivation (and, in fact, they were). What is less clear is whether the Security Council could have expected such extreme deprivation to force Iraq to give in to its demands (Drezner 1999). The government of Iraq always came back against the sanctioners, complaining of Western imperialism, of the impossibility of the sanctioners’ demands, and o f the humynitarian disaster the sanctions inflicted on Iraq. 300 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. While Iraq was extremely deprived, the rhetoric of Iraqi government remained strong, and it remained capable of governing its people. While Iraq complied with some o f the Security Council’s demands some of the time, it never reached full compliance (Sjoberg 2002b). The sanctions were enough to motivate efforts, but not to obtain complete compliance. The Iraqi government had demonstrated recalcitrance in the face of overwhelming odds a number of times during the 1980s (and even in the choice to invade Kuwait): it did so again throughout the sanctions regime. Whether or not it was reasonable to expect complete compliance rests on two factors: whether or not it was reasonable to expect Iraq to ‘give in,’ and whether or not it would have been possible for Iraq to ‘give in’ if Iraq had made the decision to do so. I contend that it would have been impossible for Iraq to ‘give in’ completely to the Security Council demands, even had Iraqi government determined that complete compliance was the appropriate policy. This is perhaps because complete compliance with the Security Council’s political aims was impossible - the political aims were themselves unreasonable. The ends were scattered and unclear; some were impossible to meet and some were politically infeasible to demand. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 687 demands that all goods stolen from Kuwait during the Gulf War be returned (not compensated for, but returned). The list o f goods includes a coffeemaker and three pairs of socks stolen more than a decade ago by individual members of Iraqi military who could not possibly be tracked down even by a central command as organized as that o f the United States. The government of Iraq did not have the resources or the control over the people of Iraq to round up all of the possessions, or even people, removed from Kuwait in 1990-1; yet they were required to do so. Such demands could never have been met. Even if the Security Council had succeeded in obtaining compliance with the political ends o f the economic sanctions regime, it could not have succeeded in obtaining a 301 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. result that pursued the common good of the humyn collective. This is because the humynitarian costs of the sanctions would have always outweighed any material benefit that could have been obtained. IV. THE HUMYN IMPLICATIONS OF SANCTIONS When asked on US television if she [Madeline Albright, US Secretary o f State] thought that the death o f half a million Iraqi children [from sanctions in Iraq] was a price worth paying, Albright replied: “This is a very hard choice, but we think the price is worth it.” (Pilger 2000). “The change in 10 years is unparalleled, in my experience,” Anupama Rao Singh, Unicefs senior representative in Iraq, told me. “In 1989, the literacy rate was 95%; and 93% of the population had free access to modem health facilities. Parents were fined for failing to send their children to school. The phenomenon of street children or children begging was unheard of. Iraq had reached a stage where the basic indicators we use to measure the overall well-being of human beings, including children, were some of the best in the world. Now it is among the bottom 20%. In 10 years, child mortality has gone from one o f the lowest in the world, to the highest” (Pilger 2000). As Cold War threats have diminished, so-called weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles — have become the new international bugbears. The irony is that the harm caused by these weapons pales in comparison to the havoc wreaked by a much more popular tool: economic sanctions. Tally up the casualties caused by rogue states, terrorists, and unconventional weapons, and the number is surprisingly small. The same cannot be said for deaths inflicted by international sanctions. The math is sobering and should lead the United States to reconsider its current policy of strangling Iraq (Mueller and Mueller 1999). To say that sanctions on Iraq were an unprecedented humynitarian disaster would be an understatement. Economic and demographic statistics, humyn rights reports, narratives of people living under sanctions, and policy reports all show an Iraq that declined uncontrollably throughout the 1990s (Amove 2000). Who is to blame is debated - some say the sanctioners, and other say the government of Iraq for making the sanctions less bearable for its people. What is less controversial is that the deprivation during the sanctions affected 302 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the most vulnerable Iraqis - “the poor, elderly, newborn, sick, and young” (Voices in the Wilderness 2000). These effects are recognizable in a number o f categories - economic, material, medical, and social. The economic impacts of a thirteen-year sanctions regime were extensive. Iraq before the Gulf War was an export-based economy; it exported oil. Iraqi GNP fell by fifty percent in the first year of sanctions, and continued to decline to almost nothing (Rogers 1996, 60). The currency value also plummeted (Byman 2000-1). The falling GNP led to massive job losses, and the currency decline caused a decline in real wages (Bennis and Halliday 2000). Wymyn were less secure in their jobs (and with their wages) then men were, because they had acquired their jobs more recently and were not seen as dispensable income for families by employers (Bennis and Halliday 2000). These economic impacts caused material problems. Iraq had neither the means to produce, nor the money to buy, nor the market to buy essential supplies. Iraq had imported most of its food prior to the Gulf War. With no money, destroyed infrastructure, and an international law against both exports and imports, Iraq had a difficult time acquiring food (Garfield 2000; Simons 1999; 1996). The result was massive malnutrition throughout Iraq, which affected the most vulnerable Iraqis the most deeply (Kelly 2000). Wymyn were the last to eat, and few households had enough food. In addition to lacking food, Iraqis lacked clean water, baby milk, vitamins, and adequate electricity. The oil-for-food program ostensibly allowed these supplies to enter Iraq, but it did so too late, with too little Iraqi support infrastructure, and in too little quantity (Garfield 2000). These deprivations had medical impacts (Fisk 2000; Pellet 2000; Selden 1999; Graham-Brown 1999). Finding adequate prenatal care was next to impossible for Iraqi wymyn; even if their children were bom healthy, child mortality rates skyrocketed. The 303 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cancer rate in Iraq rose by 400 percent (Fisk 2000). It is estimated that sanctions led to the deaths of about 1,000,000 Iraqis - half of them children (Mueller and Mueller 1999). Curable diseases and starvation were tied for the leading cause of death in a country that, previous to the sanctions, had been considered developed (Gordon 1999b). Medical technology was not the only economic development that Iraq lost during the sanctions regime. The social impacts of the sanctions regime were far-reaching. The educational systems plummeted; crime rates and unemployment skyrocketed. Many young adults in Iraq, with nothing else to do, took to the streets (Mueller and Mueller 1999). Prostitution rose (Simons 1996). Involvement in culture, the arts, and religious activity decreased (Simons 1999). Sanctions, it has been argued, “sent Iraq back to the stone age” (Gordon 1999a).1 3 The humynitarian situation in Iraq during the sanctions regime is not as contested as who was responsible for the humynitarian disaster. Some claim that the sanctioners were responsible (Alnasrawi 2001), while others like Madeline Albright claim that the recalcitrant target government was to blame (Kelly 2000). I contend that a feminist understanding of just war practices is not so interested in whose fault this horrible humynitarian disaster is as in why no one was fixing it. It assigns liability to cause, but also to those with the capacity to stop the humynitarian suffering who failed to. By prioritizing humyn security, feminisms understand that the fulfillment o f basic needs should be a first priority for international 1 3 The Iraqi government still engaged in a number o f the excesses during the sanctions regime that it had engaged in prior to the sanctions regime, when Iraq was in better economic shape. Some proponents o f the sanctions regime point to the argument that Saddam Hussein built palaces during the sanctions era. This is true, and it is likely that the Iraqi government could have managed the resources it did have access to under the sanctions regime better. The fact remains, however, that the sanctions decreased the resources that Iraq had access to by almost 95% (Hoskins 1997). It is with this recognition that I talk about the economic harms Iraq suffered in die 1990s as the result o f the sanctions regime. I am not contending that the Iraqi government performed well under these adverse circumstances, or had no culpability in the suffering. I am, however, contending that optimal financial management still would likely not have been able to prevent suffering in Iraq, given the sanctions’ length and depth. 304 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. actors. Actors who get in the way o f the provision of basic needs, or who do not help to provide those needs when they are able to, are morally culpable for humyn suffering caused by lack o f those basic needs. In analyzing in bello justice, feminisms argue that the war should hurt those who the belligerent has just cause against; that heinous means should be avoided; and that impacts should not be gendered. I contend that the sanctions regime placed on Iraq by the Security Council fails to meet these standards, despite their applicability. Madeline Albright, in opening this section, implies that the standards of jus in bello are related to the justice of the cause. She contends that the costs of the sanctions regime are worth fighting for its causes. I argued in the theoretical section o f this project that both war-making (ad bellum) and war-fighting (in bello) need to apply. Even supposing that the Security Council had the most just cause possible, flagrant violations of in bello standards would not be acceptable. Destruction of Iraqi infrastructure and civil society is a violation of a feminist understanding o f in bello justice. The sanctions regime hurt people that ‘the war of sanctions’ was not against. Often, sanctions are discussed as either punishment, force, or motivation against the government of Iraq (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Lopez 2002; 2001). The sanctions regime on Iraq hurt people towards whom it was not (and should not have been) targeted. In reality, they were meant as indirect punishment for Iraqi government. Sanctions made Iraqis lives more difficult, so Iraqis would dislike their government, so Iraqi policies would change (or, even better, Iraqi government would change (Hoskins 1997). In reality, Iraqis were so profoundly affected by the sanctions that they were rendered ineffective against their government (Simons 1996), and the sanctions regime made the government more popular with Iraqi people (Zunes 1998; Alkadiri 2000). The sanctions, then, were aimed at individual Iraqis 305 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with whom the Security Council had no complaint; a direct violation of the in bello standards outlined in the theoretical section of this project.1 4 I contend that sanctions are also heinous means - they use suffering and starvation as a way to achieve political goals (Dreze and Gazdar 1992). First, the very idea of sanctions is a direct violation of any principle of double effect: the civilian effects of the weapon are a means to the end of the achievement of the moral good (assumed just cause). Second, the means are prohibitive o f long-term peace: in a world where there is a salient norm o f non- combatant immunity, Iraqis will long discuss the sanctions that targeted wymyn and children as fuel against the West. The humynitarian disaster caused intense hatred for the United States and the UN among Iraqis (Simons 1999). Third, sanctions destabilized the social and political fabric of Iraq; an unstable Iraq is less conducive to peace.1 5 Finally, the economic impact on Iraq will be felt both by Iraq and by the region for a long time to come (Capaccio 2000). Iraq, which had been a middle-class state, was the third poorest nation in the world at the end of the sanctions regime (Gordon 1999b). The in bello impacts of sanctions are also gendered. Third, sanctions’ impacts are gendered in that the sanctions affected wymyn most heavily (Graham-Brown 1999). Also, feminisms express concerns for the margins in political relations; sanctions affected all of the most vulnerable Iraqis - young, old, wymyn, political minorities - most deeply (Al- Ansary 2003). This runs directly contrary to an ethos o f empowerment - a policy of sanctions, couched in terms of protection, that disables society’s weakest members (Tickner 141 contend that this clarity is one o f the unique benefits o f the interpretation o f just war theories presented in the theoretical section o f this project: it can delineate the ethical problems with the effects o f wars with substantially more precision and effectiveness than traditional theories with less clear ‘motivating moralities.’ 1 5 Pretending for a moment that this is relevant, as opposed to there being an intervening war. 306 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2001, 49-50). Borrowing the words of George Weigel, “there has never been a more clear case” of in bello injustice. V. FEMINISTS (RE)WRITE SANCTIONS METAPHORS This section constructs a critical feminist discursive alternative to the dominant economic sanctions discourses about the ‘evil’ Iraqi government and the ‘good’ Security Council protecting ‘us’ from ‘Saddam.’ Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan describe feminist theories as strategic interventions in dominant discourses in order to demonstrate the incapacity o f traditional theories to deal with the real (1999). In other words, feminists use words in order to show others what they are missing in the making of and study of politics. Nancy Huston argues that dominant narratives are an indispensable part of understanding politics because politics happen like stories tell them to (1983, 271). If ‘what we say’ affects our worlds, and there is a discursive competition for and with the ‘dominant discourse,’ feminisms need to interrupt and intervene on both discursive and operative levels (were they to be separable). In this world of competing stories, the stories that often “win” omit wymyn; dominant discourses are often gendered, statist, and colonizing (Peterson and Runyan 1999; Hussain 2000). Against these dominant discourses, then, feminisms engage in projects of discursive destabilization, looking for and pointing out the gendered silences in the stories that get told (Gibson-Graham 1994, 216). Here, I present an alternative story of sanctions against Iraq, inserting it into the ‘conversation’ about coercive diplomacy. Feminists, then, are not only engaging in their own dialogue, but interjecting, interrupting, and contributing to others’ dialogues. Feminisms intervene in dominant discourses in a number of ways. First, feminists interject counter-dominant narratives. For example, Katharine Moon studies the voices that 307 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. can be heard if one listens to South Korean prostitution communities about the effects ‘international security’ has on people’s lives (1997). Second, feminists analyze the content of what is said in politics to find what is neglected, “searching for silences” (Charlesworth 1999). Hilary Charlesworth understands that “all systems of knowledge depend on deeming certain issues irrelevant, therefore silences are as important as positive rules” (1999, 381). Feminisms, then, search for the things that the traditional study of political science does not see (Maynard and Purvis 1994). For example, my study includes a content analysis that (largely unsuccessfully) tried to find mentions of wymyn in official policy discourse concerning economic sanctions on Iraq. I argue that metaphor reconstruction is a third way of feminist scholarly intervention in dominant discourses. This argument has two parts: that metaphors are key political tools and that feminists’ reconstructions of metaphors can make a difference. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson explain that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind o f thing in terms of another” (1980, 5). They contend that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 3). J. K. Gibson-Graham agrees, pointing out the importance of metaphors in conversation and performance (1994, 217). Politics is governed by metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Seeing Saddam Hussein as “evil” hides other roles and forecloses other choices. Characterizing Saddam Hussein as ‘Hitler’ meant that negotiation was to be considered appeasement, and that war needed to be a first resort since appeasing Hitler did not work, so appeasing Hussein would not work either. The representation of bombs as ‘clean’ and ‘surgical’ hides extensive humyn damage. Insidious metaphors, especially gendered ones, plague understandings of the nature of political actors and conflicts between them. How we 308 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. understand conflict constructs the nature of conflict and dictates what happens in the conflict; metaphors for understanding conflict are thus important. I contend that feminisms can construct counter-metaphors in order to critique of the dominant discourses that they are interested in questioning. The first step is to discuss the process and effects o f the creation of metaphors. Anthony Giddens explains a linguistic creative effect where a “new word or phrase can have upon the web of public contrasts that preceded it, revealing an absence retrospectively where none had been experienced by most before” (1976, 73). The creation of a new metaphor can demonstrate a silence that linguistic expression had before its creation. A second property of emergent discourse is expression, the ability to communicate something different than what was being communicated before (Giddens 1976, 73). The third property of an emergent metaphor is its integration into the language. In addition to being expressive it can be expressed', “an object o f representation’ ’ ’ which, “in turn, can now be examined, refined, criticized, and revised in public discourse because of its new status” (Giddens 1976, 73). “That is, it can itself become an object of thought, thus sending thought off in new directions” (Giddens 1976, 73-4). Finally, a new metaphor can give what Giddens calls “the self-tactical or self-organizational dimension o f linguistic expression” to creator or creating group - the empowerment that comes from more accurate and self-defined linguistic representation” (1976, 74). New metaphors can then contribute to the formation of what Searle discusses as institutional facts, or commonly held understandings of the world (1969, 51). The utterance of a new metaphor is a speech act, which engages language as complex and rule-governed behavior (Searle 1969, 12). These speech acts matter in discursive and political interaction, and enter the realm of argumentative truth discussed above. It is my contention that feminist metaphor-critique is worth considering, both as discursive and political strategy (Zehfuss 309 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2002). Its intervention in dominant discourses offers political alternative, creates space for emancipatory advocacy, and provokes consideration of commonly held interpretations. I argue that there is use in assigning a metaphor to ‘coercive diplomacy’ (the action of one international political body forcing another to alter behavior through threats). Without a constructive metaphor, coercive diplomacy is often seen as neutral or even peaceful in international politics; an understanding which only tells part of the story, if that. What follows is a generative attempt at a politicized and gendered metaphor in critique of the ways that dominant discourses delineate states of war as clean and separate events from other coercive violence. I do not contend that this metaphorical understanding is “true,” instead, that it is communicatively rational and holds potential political value. This ‘test’ example should not be the determinant for the worth of feminist metaphor-critique; it is simply an exposition of what I see a new direction for feminist discourse-methodology. What follows is a short exploration of the implications o f the metaphor economic sanctions on Iraq are rape, relying on the economic sanctions regime on Iraq as a specific performance of coercive diplomacy. Rape metaphors are used frequently in politics for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; this reconstruction dovetails with those characterizations to voice concern for Iraqis as well. 1) Coercive diplomacy defined. The threat of force or the use o f ‘non-war’ force in order to obtain specific political ends without the resort to war proper. la) Economic sanctions against Iraq defined. The use o f economic force and the threat of military force in order to obtain Iraqi compliance with Security Council demands. 1) Rape defined. The threat or use o f physical force in order to obtain non-consensual sex. 310 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Coercive diplomacy, like rape, rests on a threat that “if you don’t, I will destroy you . . or some similar unpleasantness that is even less desirable than what is being requested of/forced on the person making the (loosely defined and generally non-existent) ‘choice.’ Is a rape metaphor useful? The assertion (above) that the process is analogous argues that both rape and coercive diplomacy employ coercive force (physical or otherwise) for desired ends, causing real harm both in the process and in the ends. In the international arena, the threatened force is less often (though sometimes) as ‘fatal’ or ‘completely unacceptable’ as the threatened force in the act of rape. The process analogy, then, can be seen as loosely fitting if exaggerated. The process may be similar, but it is also necessary to compare the ends of the force. The goal o f coercion in rape is to (forcibly) get sex; The goal o f coercion in diplomacy is to (forcibly) get concessions; The goal of coercion towards Iraq was to (forcibly) get disarmament and repayment; The sentences can be put in the same order, but that does not immediately provide an answer to the question of the commensurability of the goals. There does not seem to be any a priori moral judgment to be made about either ‘goal’ in itself - sex and concessions could both be circumstantially judged either to have or to lack moral worth as an end. The question of how to determine moral worth here is a salient one. If not some moral universalism, how can one judge the moral worth of concessions requested in coercive diplomacy? For the purposes of the analogy at hand, we could decide that there are some concessions which (outside o f the means that are used to obtain them) are morally worthy to seek, and some which are not. The question then becomes one of means, and comparative means-ends evaluation. Some further exploration of the content of coercive diplomacy seems necessary before proceeding. Some feminisms see coercive diplomacy as a contest between 311 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hegemonic and subordinated masculinities; force used by ‘strong men’ against ‘weak men’ - an act of feminization. Here, there is a direct link with gendered violence, and, again, an analogous sentence can be structured. Rape can be seen as an act o f violence either inflicted by hegemonic masculinities on subordinated masculinities or (far more commonly) inflicted by any masculinities on femininities. The difference in statement-structure here is a question of whether or not coercive diplomacy can be seen as violence. The threat o f violence itself can be seen as discursive violence. Many of the means of coercive diplomacy (economic sanctions, embargoes, denial of aid, denial of participation in international organizations) constitute structural violence. Rape is physical violence. That’s where the metaphor appears to break down . . . “Rape culture” and “coercive international culture” seem analogous - a place where violence o f the strong against the weak is generally in the atmosphere, often threatened, and often acted on . . . Goal of rape: sex/power Goal of coercive diplomacy: political ends/power Goal of sanctions on Iraq: Iraqi submission/power If it is wrong to coerce just to show power plus - ends are morally comparable. But the goal of rape isn’t just sex, it is forced sex, which holds moral difference from “just sex” even outside of rape as an act o f physical force. The point of coercive diplomacy is a political end - and coercive diplomacy might ‘get o ff on power and on the fact that the end was force. Maybe the act o f force is salient in changing the meaning o f the behavior in some political situations; acting as a constitutive factor in the properties of some political ‘choices.’ Using the example of the Security Council sanctions on Iraq for disarmament, we can evaluate this part of the metaphor. The sanctions constitute an ultimatum to Iraq: disarm, or face the consequences. The UN tells Iraq that failure to surrender all weapons of mass destruction 312 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. will result in a complete economic embargo, and further failure will result in a war. This threat of use of force is interpreted as credible by Iraq. Disarmament to Iraq pre-ultimatum: humiliating, not in interest Disarmament to Iraq post-ultimatum: humiliating, not in interest, a sign o f capitulation to the US/West, a sign that perceived double standards have won, a sign of weakness, of diplomatic inequality. Sex pre-ultimatum: humiliating(?), not interesting, a violation of self, torture Sex post-ultimatum: humiliating, not interesting, a violation of self, torture, a sign of weakness and lack o f choice, violent, a sign of sex inequality The difference in these structures is a question of violation of self. Is coercive diplomacy (sometimes) a violation o f a national self? If so, is a national self credibly morally defensible/analogous to the individual self in terms of a prohibition against violation? On one hand, to the extent that coercive diplomacy inflicts physical harm, it can be construed as a violation of a national self. But what if it did not inflict physical harm? There seems to still be a warrant for answering this question affirmatively. Communitarian ethics say the collective self is actually more defensible than the individual self. But the other half of this analogy throws that assumption into question. In this analogy, the privileging of the collective self is clearly possible if and only if we see rape as a violation of the collective self of wymyn (which, sure) and not an intrinsic wrong against an individual self. Shaky. Rape makes us more cognizant o f ethical value of the ‘territorial integrity’ of the individual self. Perhaps a more moderate argument suffices. The English School in IR talks about an international society o f states, where states are individuals, which seems representative of international politics whether or not it is an ethically justifiable order (Bull 1977). Insofar as it is a representative understanding, employing it to justify states’ integrity (and right against violation) contingently acceptable with that caveat. 313 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. So rape = the threat o f ‘worse’ violence to enact sexual violence plus real violence plus (to obtain) real violence in violation of the self; Coercive diplomacy = the threat of ‘worse’ violence to enact discursive violence plus (to obtain) the policy goal (possibly) in violation of the self; Sanctions = the use of structural violence and the threat of ‘worse’ violence plus (to obtain) policy goals (possibly) in violation of the integrity of Iraq. The metaphor cannot be understood as a ‘tight’ representation of a definitional similarity between the two action-processes under consideration. However, it can be understood as an exposition of some o f the commonalities between two phenomena that relating has some political benefits. In other words, this metaphor is not (as most metaphors are not) claiming strict (or even perhaps loose) ‘truth.’ Still, it might have something to say about the nature o f the behavior in question - coercive diplomacy - which has yet to be understood in any other (currently available) form of communicative interaction. After evaluating the content of a new metaphor, we need to see what it is communicating. If feminisms create metaphor-critiques in order to say something new; the question of what they ‘say’ is a crucial one. It is possible that the public reception of such a metaphor-critique will be so negative that its deployment will be a setback for the presumed political purposes of problematizing gendered behavior in international coercion, provoking backlash against wymyn seen as ‘sensationalist’ using ‘bad analogies’ and whining about sex inequalities where they do not exist. If the initial reaction to the metaphor were so stark, the only responsible thing to do would be to stop sharing it. Still, if the metaphor communicates what is embodied in its communicative intent, it has a number of creative things to say about coercive diplomacy. First, this metaphor calls coercive diplomacy unconditionally morally abhorrent in public; it questions the content of the political debate on how to obtain interstate 314 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. concessions. Second, it serves as a strong (and disgusting) illustration of the gendered nature of even apparently gender-neutral institutions in international politics. Third, it gives a clear impact to feminist criticisms of gendered injustice between states in the international political system. While it is not meant to imply that war is rape because sanctions are war and sanctions are rape, it is meant to bring up a possible conceptual association between war, sanctions, and gendered violence - a radical re-telling of traditional stories of sanctions either as discipline or as unfair punishment. Fourth, this representation classifies international coercion as a gender issue, mobilizing feminists into solidarity (though possibly alienating progressive men). Fifth, it brings up questions of interpersonal justice in international politics - the personal becomes international in a more complicated sense than even Enloe envisioned. Sixth, the metaphor poses a question of the legitimacy of international force in terms o f gender. Finally, it acknowledges of the physical harms of coercive diplomacy. The exploration o f the metaphor of coercive diplomacy as rape is an example of metaphor-reconstruction as feminist methodology in IR. Here, I am implying that what we label a political event matters; that discourse influences political activity. I am further implying that the spread of counter-discourses can have an impact on politics and policies in the international arena. If discourse influences political activity, those who see the dominant political discourse as in err have a responsibility to construct counter-discourses. Feminisms see international policies as gendered; the construction of counter-metaphors can both point out that gendering and give feminists different ways to talk about international policies. This is a method that can make a contribution to both the feminist methodological toolbox and to IR scholarship more generally. In this particular account, the metaphor tells an ‘unjust war’ 315 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. story about sanctions on Iraq to counter the ‘ just war’ stories told by the sanctioning powers throughout the sanctions regime. VI. CONCLUSION In this chapter, I make the argument that gendered lenses are the appropriate moral framework for the evaluation o f the thirteen-year economic sanctions regime that the UN Security Council placed on Iraq. I contend that feminisms help to see sanctions as war, a classification that aids in the evaluation of many o f the warrants and means of the sanctions regime. I move on to explain the gendered nature of coercive diplomacy generally, and of economic sanctions specifically. I then revisit the feminist reformulation of just war theories in the theoretical section of this project. This visit produces analyses of the ad bellum and in bello claims to justice that the Security Council and its member-states made about the economic sanctions regime on Iraq. To the question of the justice o f this war, a feminist just war theory answers a resounding ‘no,’ pointing to issues o f humyn security, dialogical communication, coercive force, and power-wielding. The chapter ends with another feminist interruption of dominant discourses; this time in the form o f a metaphor (re)construction, characterizing coercive diplomacy as rape. This metaphor brings gender into the forefront of the policy analysis; a move that I argue would have made the sanctions regime from the UN (and the reaction from Iraq) substantially different. Sanctions, however, remained a gendered conflict as a part of a larger gendered conflict around Iraq - a continuation o f the Gulf War, and continued in the recent conflict that will likely come to be called ‘Gulf War II.’ It is on the gendered implications o f that conflict that the attention of Chapter VIII focuses. 316 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 8. the (gendered) wars continue Gendered ways of thinking do not allow us to understand the complexity o f the situation, or to devise long-term solutions to the current morass. They make some options seem unthinkable - for example, that the United States could abandon the bombing campaign and instead work with multinational arms manufacturers to cut off all arms supplies to the Taliban, or fund sophisticated long-term education programs in the Middle East. Crises can have the effect o f reaffirming the traditional distribution of power between women and men. Taking sex and gender seriously in the analysis of major tragedies allows us to see the limited way that we read and react to them. If we try to identify and destabilize the unspoken gendered assumptions of international law and politics, we will begin to be able to imagine the broader and more durable solutions to our most pressing problems (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2002). As someone whose work deals substantially with Iraq, I collected the headline pages of the Los Angeles Times every day beginning 12 September 2001. I put them in a plastic storage sheet, organized them by date, and put them in a (set of) binder(s). At the time, I could not bring myself to read these headlines. I knew about the plans for and the start of the war in Iraq. I heard about it on the television, on the radio, in my music, in my conversations - the war was omnipresent. But I could not read about it. I could not read about it because I had become acquainted with some of the victims o f the war, through their narratives, through correspondence, and through research. I could not read about it because there were pictures o f massive destruction for reasons that, even as a scholar in political science, I could not fully understand. The gendered claims around the war spun around me and made me (both literally and figuratively) dizzy. I could not think about it while it was going on; the tragedy overwhelmed me. It was just as I sat down to write the first draft of this chapter that I began to read the newspaper stories about the most recent war in Iraq. The March 22 2003 edition announces ‘Operation Shock and Awe’ and characterizes the aerial assault as ‘rocking’ Baghdad as if it 317 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were a concert.1 The 6 May 2003 edition has a front page story about a soldier who will forever regret being wounded only seven minutes into his combat experience, because “he was so ready to fight” as “he’d watched his favorite war movies over and over, memorizing scenes of heroism played out to the sounds of an epic score” as if Sargeant Horgan was the real tragedy o f the war (Tizon 2003, A l). The 18 May 2003 edition announces nearly 10,000 civilian casualties in the first two months of the conflict (King 2003, A l). The 26 May 2003 edition notes that Iraqi wymyn are so afraid of rape that they will not go outside in occupied Iraq, but that the United States finds no reason to add extra protection for wymyn (Moaveni 2003, A l). In June, the possibility that the war was fought on false pretenses comes up: a weapons expert insists that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (Drogin 2003a, A l; 2003b, A l; Miller 2003, A l; Reynolds 2003, A12). This causes me to flip back to March and finally look at the pictures of bodies strewn about, houses destroyed, and massive fire all around Iraq. The March 21 2003 edition shows Baghdad lit up like fireworks (A l). The March 30 2003 edition shows a US soldier holding a wounded little Iraqi girl whose family’s truck was hit by a bomb (A l). In late May, the war seems to have been an easy victory; in late June, fears of individual Iraqis fighting back increase (Rubin and Hendren 2003, A l). The possibility of Americans being hurt en masse in this war is the source of some alarm. A year later, in the summer o f 2004, some fighting continues, as Iraqis resist American occupation. Still, the majority of the ‘big questions’ of the war are over: the Iraqi government was overthrown, Saddam Hussein was captured, and no weapons of mass destruction have been found. Iraq continues to be a violent place - attacks on United States troops continue (Chu 2004, A l). 1 The name o f the attacks on Iraq later changed when it was discovered that this was a name that Adolf Hitler used in one o f his campaigns in Europe in the Second World War. 318 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This chapter attempts to use the gendered lenses of a feminist just war theory to analyze a conflict that is, in many ways, still going on. Its major purpose is to introduce new themes that have arisen as a result of the ‘most recent war’ in the series o f wars in and surrounding Iraq. First, remembering feminist work on gender roles in just war, it looks to the changing nature of gender roles in the 2003 [Second] Gulf War. This first section, ‘foregrounding (invisible) wymyn,’ notes that wymyn were in the spotlight in the reporting of the most recent Gulf War. It follows two stories: that of Jessica Lynch, POW-tumed- heroine that the United States lost and then rescued early in the war; and those of Sabrina Harman, one of the young wymyn accused of war crimes in Abu Ghraib. Each womyn was a teenager; each story says something about gender in the war in Iraq. Jessica Lynch’s story is one o f foregrounding gender in masculine discourse. Sabrina Harman’s is one of ignoring gender when it does not fit prescribed roles. The second section in this chapter, ‘(gendered) just causes in the post-9/11 world,’ addresses the new reasons the United States and its allies claimed that war against Iraq was just. It addresses the validity both of preemptive wars and of wars against terrorism in feminist terms. The third section, ‘aiming at sites unseen,’ addresses the questions of responsibility for collateral damage in a war against an enemy that cannot be identified. It interrogates the United States’ wide interpretations of jus ad bellum standards but narrow deference to in bello standards (Ratner 2002). This section argues that traditional jus in bello standards are incapable of addressing this war, and examines whether the jus in bello standards o f a feminist understanding of just war are more suited to the task. Finally, the fourth section, ‘gendered futures,’ discusses outlooks for post-conflict Iraq. Here, I trace the conflict(s) in Iraq as a cycle, which looks to be unbroken. I discuss current unrest and future challenges in Iraq, showing a society still steeped in both violence and gender subordination. I suggest that only when we stop seeing politics through masculine 319 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. lenses will we arrive at the dialogical understanding of international relations that will produce just wars, and, eventually, just peaces. I. FOREGROUNDING (INVISIBLE) WYMYN Jessica Lynch became an icon of the war. An all-American heroine, the story o f her capture by the Iraqis and her rescue by US special forces became one o f the great patriotic moments of the conflict. It couldn't have happened at a more crucial moment, when the talk was of coalition forces bogged down, o f a victory too slow in coming. Her rescue will go down as one of the most stunning pieces of news management yet conceived. It provides a remarkable insight into the real influence o f Hollywood producers on the Pentagon's media managers, and has produced a template from which America hopes to present its future wars. (Kampfher 2003, A l) Her face is familiar to millions of people around the world as one o f two smiling American soldiers seen in a picture standing behind a group of naked, hooded Iraqis stacked in a pyramid. According to a charge sheet obtained by the Post, Hannan is accused by the Army o f taking photographs o f that pyramid and taking pictures and videotape o f Iraqis who were told to strip and masturbate in front of other prisoners and guards (AP, 5/10/2004). The story o f Private Jessica Lynch is one that was all over every news source in the United States through the first weeks of May of 2003. Lynch was the first American prisoner of war to be taken by the Iraqi military. At the young age of 19, she ostensibly went down fighting, was injured in battle, and tortured in captivity (LA Times, 24 March 2003). The military’s story is o f a daring rescue, where a battle was created for diversion and gunfire erupted in a hospital. Lynch was taken out of the hospital a hero, “just a country girl” that became a “hero” and a household name (Time, 17 November 2003). Lynch was characterized at once as brave beyond her femininity (shooting at Iraqi soldiers) but limited to it (in need of a massive rescue operation that would likely not have been put together or promoted for a male POW). She became a symbol of the new roles that war had for wymyn. I argue that the forefronting of Jessica Lynch’s story, however, was not 320 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gender liberation but gender marginalization with different means. Certainly, the portrayal of Lynch in the media was far from Jean Elshtain’s understanding o f wymyn’s role of Beautiful Souls. After all, Beautiful Souls are passive in regards to the choice to go to war, fought fo r instead of fighting, and helpless in the face of actual warfare. Lynch was different. Jessica Lynch was a soldier and a fighter. She went down fighting, was brave through interrogation, and endured torture and rape. Still, a number o f similarities between the portrayal o f Jessica Lynch and the traditional just war understanding of Beautiful Souls emerge. Jessica Lynch’s having gone down fighting was seen as remarkable; most soldiers would be expected to continue fighting until either captured or killed. That a girl fought was seen as anomalous in accounts of Lynch’s capture. Lynch, like many reservist, was said to have “joined the army to see the world” (Bragg 2003). Her choice, then, was not to fight, or to go to war, but to be a tourist. Jessica Lynch was not portrayed as having a choice to go to war (either personally or in national politics). Instead, she was a girl who wanted some adventure and just happened to end up in an army supply tank with a gun in the desert in Iraq. Lynch was also fought for instead o f fighting in most o f the story about her rescue - she was helpless, a captive in an Iraqi hospital. The soldiers needed to go save her. In fact, her rescue was so intricate that it required faking a battle in order to complete. The most publicized rescue mission in military history followed. O f course, Lynch had to be saved - war is about protecting innocent wymyn. She needed to be saved not just because she could be tortured, but because her being a womyn meant that she was vulnerable to sexual violence. Iraqis could not get away with inflicting sexual violence on American wymyn. Jessica Lynch was at once presented as a glorified war hero and an innocent womyn - a Beautiful Soul who could not escape the mold, even with a gun and a uniform. 321 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. As if this story about Lynch were not gendered enough, it turns out that the majority of the story was a contrivance, presented by the United States military to obtain the image of Lynch that they desired. As John Kampfner documents, the coverage of the Jessica Lynch story was a feat o f news management by the Pentagon. In fact, Lynch had not gone down fighting - her gun had malfunctioned (Bragg 2003). She had not been shot at; she was injured by an automobile accident in her Humvee (Bragg 2003). Injured by that accident, she surrendered to Iraqi troops, and begged for her life (Bragg 2003). Iraqi troops took her to a hospital, where her injuries were treated, and she was assigned one o f only two nurses in the hospital (Kampfner 2003). By her own account, Lynch was injured, sick, and delirious, but well-cared for (BBC News 2003). The Iraqi military abandoned the hospital that Lynch was being kept in, and left her there with the medical staff (Bragg 2003). She has no memory and no evidence o f rape; instead, a nurse sung to her and talked about her boyfriend (Kampfner 2003). The medical staff at the hospital attempted a daring rescue o f their own, putting Lynch into an ambulance and sending it to the United States checkpoint (Kampfner 2003). The United States, unaware of the ambulance’s contents, fired on it. The next day, United States troops entered an unguarded hospital and recovered Lynch (Bragg 2003). The ‘rescue’ was filmed; though no violence is ever shown, it is implied in the edited tape. Lynch herself objects to this portrayal of her rescue. She denies bravery in the face o f capture, characterizing herself as just another soldier and then just another prisoner of war (Bragg 2003). She also denies being tortured, remembering that she was treated well by her Iraqi captors (Bragg 2003). Lynch calls the elaborate rescue attempt unnecessary, and complains about being used as a symbol of American gender roles. She explains that “they use me as a way to symbolize this stuff. Its wrong” (Bragg 2003). The portrayal o f Lynch as a womyn o f extraordinary bravery; as a victim of Iraqi cruelty; as a victim of sexual 322 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. violence; and as an innocent womyn in need of saving were all constructed by the United States military and the media that published its press releases. The effects o f this construction were reaching: they produced news headlines that were no longer about the massive damage done to Iraqi cities, or the Iraqi civilians killed in the war. Instead, the United States had a hero(ine) and a cause to continue to fight the war all at once. After all, the United States needed to keep fighting to save Jessica Lynch. She became at once ad bellum cause, in bello justification, and humyn interest story. The war was no longer a story o f the United States and its allies conquering Iraq, instead, it was a story of six courageous men who went deep into ‘enemy territory’ to save one helpless womyn(soldier). The 2003 war in Iraq gave a name and a face to the ‘Beautiful Soul’ - a liberated womyn, fighting in the war; still feminized, still helpless, still a victim, and still marginalized. The marginalization here may be more subtle, but that subtlety could in itself be insidious. After all, Jessica Lynch at first sight looks like a womyn who is being held equal to (and even above) men. It is only after investigation through gendered lenses that it becomes obvious that this is a twenty-first century reformulation o f the age-old understanding o f wymyn as both the victims and the cause of just war. The appearance of everything being fine in gender categorization encourages complacency; complacency allows marginalization to continue. The other womyn’s story this section examines is that of Sabrina Harman. Harman’s story, unlike Jessica Lynch’s, has barely reached the media surface in the United States. Harman is a 26-year-old military police private accused of sexually torturing Iraqi prisoners and taking pictures of the torture. She is one o f the two wymyn who were accused of sexual torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. A brief interview with Harman after she was charged was published, where she claimed that she was not responsible for doing the things 323 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that her commanding officers demanded that she do (CNNnews.com 23 May 2004). She was just following orders and submitting to authority. After that, very little mainstream publicity has been focused either on Harman or on the crimes with which she has been charged. It is Harman’s photographs that are being published all over the world as proof of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. Yet Harman’s role is generally not the subject of reporting or conversation. Assuming that Harman took most of the pictures taken with her camera, she was witness to massive sexual abuse and physical torture of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib. She photographed Iraqi prisoners being forced to masturbate as performance for American soldiers including herself. She forced soldiers to strip and to masturbate (she claims, as a way of keeping them awake). There are pictures of multiple forced sex acts. There are two pictures, however, which are particularly disturbing: one of Harman leaning over a pile (pyramid?) of naked, hooded Iraqi prisoners with a suggestive smile, and a second of Harman smiling over the corpse of an Iraqi prisoner who was delivered to the prison healthy. The extent to which Harman was involved in the torture of these prisoners is unclear, but that she had some agency in her actions is undeniable. Harman chose to smile for the camera while sexually abusing Iraqi prisoners. Harman claims that she did not see the Geneva Convention until months after she was charged, and that now she sees what the problems were with the things she still claims she was only instructed to do. I am not writing these things to convict Sabrina Harman. I am telling her story as a background to some observations about gender roles in the most recent war in Iraq. Jessica Lynch’s Beautiful-Soul hero story was plastered on the television, in newspapers, and even in a made-for-television movie; her gender-role story could be made to fit something print-worthy. Sabrina Harman is being swept under the 324 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. carpet. I am not arguing that Sabrina Harman’s conduct is typical o f wymyn soldiers, or even that it has anything to do with her having been a womyn. What I am arguing is that the media, the United States, and a world full of false gender stereotypes were not ready for the reality of Sabrina Harman. Private Harman was a soldier who sexually abused prisoners, and who appeared to get great joy out o f that abuse. Were she a he, she would be vilified in national and international media. I contend that this is because the ‘Beautiful Soul’ role for a womyn in a just war is so salient that we are incapable of understanding that a womyn could have agency in sexual violence in war (Burke 2004). Harman, however, did. Sabrina Harman interrupts gender stereotypes about war: she is not the peaceful, war resistant, conservative, virtuous, and restrained womyn that just warriors protect from enemies. She is a womyn who likely committed war crimes; she is the prisoners’ enemy from whom they (men) need protection. Her story would be an interruption of dominant discourses about wymyn’s roles generally and about wymyn’s roles in wars specifically; this interruption would shake inherited images of wymyn. Her story, then, is marginalized in political discourse. Sabrina Harman’s story just might change the way that we see wymyn, so we cannot hear her story; when we do, we have to hear it in a way that does not include her agency. Whenever Harman’s story is presented in mainstream media, it is as a way to explain away the possibility that she made a conscious choice to abuse prisoners and photograph it. In these accounts, Harman was photographing either because her father was a homicide detective, or to report the atrocities after the war. No accounts of the possibility of Harman’s guilt appear in mainstream media. This is because current gender stereotypes are incompatible with Harman’s existence, so her story is marginalized and her realities are buried even deeper. 325 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. II. (GENDERED) JUST CAUSES IN A POST-9/11 WORLD The question of the justice of the cause for the 2003 takeover of Iraq was perhaps the most debated aspect of the war. Nineteen months after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, a United States-led coalition invaded Iraq. Two months later, that Coalition controlled the majority of Iraqi territory. A year after the occupation, Iraq remained an occupied nation. There are two stories of the justification for the war against Iraq. The first is a story o f a continuation of the war on terrorism that started in Afghanistan. The second is a story of prevention warfare, where the Coalition was engaging in collective prevention of future Iraqi attacks outside of the borders of Iraq. Each is unconventional to the generally understood just causes in just war theories, yet the United States’ justification for the war was framed almost entirely in just war terms. A. TERRORISM AS JUST CAUSE? The new Bush administration in the United States referred to its cause against Iraq as “just,” “tough,” and “fair” (Rumfield 2001; Bush 2001). The war in Afghanistan had unseated the Taliban government, which had been accused of harboring terrorists. Still, the elusive terrorists had not been captured in Afghanistan. The United States broadened its scope of investigation, looking for other governments that funded or harbored terrorists. President Bush thought that he had found them in what he characterized as the “axis of evil” (2002). In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an axis of evil that harbored terrorists and perpetuated international unrest. The United States implied on a number of occasions that the government of Iraq both had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was prepared to supply them to terrorists. There was very little substance to this claim, however. Iraq had in the past been guilty of sending money to Palestinians who used it to fund terrorist actions against the government of Israel. This 326 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sponsorship, however, had all but dried up with Iraqi economic troubles. The Bush Administration was not implying that Iraq sponsored Palestinian terrorists, anyway. It was implying that there was some positive relationship between the Saddam Hussein government of Iraq and Al Qaeda. There is no evidence of such a connection (Benjamin 2003). Even were Iraq connected to Al Qaeda, there is a question about whether such a relationship would constitute just cause to go to war against Iraq. Jonathan Chamey argues that war against states that harbor and assist terrorists is acceptable, because complicity constitutes guilt (2001). Still, he contends that, because war is such a serious choice, evidence to prove the claim of an association is crucial (Chamey 2001). Thomas Franck, however, contends that abetting terrorism constitutes just cause for war because a state that harbors terrorists is already fighting an in bello unjust war (2001). In other words, the state that assists the terrorists is attacking the state that is the victim of the terrorist attacks, but doing so in such a way that it cannot be held accountable for the attack. In this situation, Franck argues that the sponsoring government should be held accountable as if it had been a direct attack (2001; Bush 2001). Jean Elshtain sees terrorism as a just cause for war in a much more stark way. She argues that governments that sponsor terrorism are evil, not just in their sponsorship of terrorism, but also in their other international affairs. She explains that it is the responsibility of good governments to stop that evil, both for their own sake and for the sake of the peoples living under those governments (Elshtain 2003a; 2003b). Still, Neta Crawford identifies some problems with terrorism (and the sponsorship of terrorism) being considered as just cause for war. The question o f whether terrorists ought to be dealt with as international actors to be fought or as the subject of the enforcement of international law is a difficult one (Crawford 2003b, 16). Further, if terrorism is one o f the 327 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. things that self-defense covers in the list of just cause, Crawford worries that the idea of self- defense will be stretched to near-infinity (2003b, 16). In this particular war, the lack of factual basis of the claim to a just war against terrorism makes the argumentative nuances of the possibility o f a just war against terrorism moot. Still, a feminist understanding of just war theory inquires into the possibility o f a just war against a state that harbors terrorists, were the state to be proven to harbor those terrorists as a theoretical inquiry into the ethics of war. First, feminisms are obliged to consider a critique of the label ‘terrorist’ before considering the question of terrorists as a legitimate cause for war. Edward Herman calls the word “terrorism” a “semantic trick contingent on the cooperation of academic and journalistic institutions in the United States” (1993, 57). Milan Rai discusses the label ‘terrorist’ as a xenophobic projection of otherness (1995). In other words, we distribute the label ‘terrorist’ on the basis not only of conduct but of race, religion, and nationality. Richard Leeman worries that the label ‘terrorist’ is a self- fulfilling prophecy; otherizing those seen as terrorists reifies the cycle of violence (1991, 73- 4; Der Derian 1992; Zulaika and Douglass 1996). In this understanding, discourse that obsesses over terrorism perpetuates its existence, while calculated reactions to individual events qua individual events would be less alienating and more capable of solving political problems (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, 26). Identifying people as terrorists and states as terrorist states, then, stigmatizes members of the ‘third world’ as culturally inferior and subhumyn, perpetuating violence (Zulaika and Douglass 1996, 126-7). The cyclical fear of terrorists causes both ‘terrorist violence’ and ‘preemptive violence’ (Brown and Merrill 1993). The crux of this critique is that ‘terrorism’ is at least in part discursively constructed by the utterance o f the word and the presumed definition o f the concept. Such a critique is 328 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not unprecedented in the feminist literature: feminisms often argue that wymyn’s roles are a product of the combination o f social action and social construction - a combination o f real political forces and of political prescriptions. The word ‘terrorist’ is often used as a diminutive proxy for those o f Middle Eastern dissent.2 It also at once delegitimizes both the actor and the cause, in addition to the means that were (or might be) used to obtain that cause. The degree to which the label affects the conduct of the actions that are known as terrorism is unclear, but possibility of discursive entrenchment should be kept in mind. Discursive critique aside, a non-governmental actor engaged in violence towards the United States on 11 September 2003 that caused a loss of close to 5,000 lives in the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. The counterfactual question that feminist just war theories need to answer is: If Iraq had been responsible for that terrorist attack, would a war in response have been warranted? Feminisms, I contend, have three answers to this question; they are all “no.” First, I have argued that feminisms rely on the strong to unilaterally break the cycle of violence. In the relationship between the United States and Iraq, there has certainly been a cycle of violence: United States weapons sales to Iraq, United States’ military lead in ejection of Iraq from Kuwait, and several aerial attacks by the United States on Iraq. The United States, as the strong actor, could break the cycle of violence. Opening this chapter, Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin contended that the masculine discourse of international politics eliminated non-violent policy responses to terrorism from the choices that the United 2 This summer, I took a job working in a car dealership (selling cars) for a number o f reasons including an interest in the gender and race dynamics o f a workplace reputed to be one o f the most base possible. I had a customer o f East Asian descent who was waiting out in front o f a building for his (new) car that we had to fix because we had not delivered it properly. One o f the used car salesman (literally, not figuratively; though possibly both), complained about ‘bin Laden’ strolling out in front o f his dealership. I was aghast - I suppose that in the politically correct world o f academia, w e’ve learned that those types o f things just don’t fly. Anyway, the term “terrorist” has come to be a racial slur in addition to a perceived-legitimate label o f those who engage in violence for political purposes. 329 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. States government considered (2002). I argue that a number of non-violent responses, including law enforcement, negotiation, education, and aid were available to the United States in response to 9/11; none of them were considered because a warrior-discourse dominated international relations and United States foreign policy. The second answer that feminisms offer to the question o f the legitimacy of terrorism (or the sponsorship o f terrorism) as just cause is the repetition of the feminist demand that the war affect the people who the ‘ just cause’ is against. In other words, to be just, a war against Iraq would affect those complicit in the sponsorship of Al Qaeda terrorism (if they existed) and Al Qaeda terrorists. A war against terrorism, then, would have to affect the terrorists. This would require: proof that the terrorists and their aides were in Iraq, a location where they are known to be residing or frequenting, and a targeting plan that affects (only or mostly) those terrorists against whom the war is being fought. In no situation, then, would a full-scale invasion be justified: that war affects people who could not possibly have had anything to do with Al Qaeda, and risks not finding the responsible parties, like the war in Afghanistan. This makes a war against terrorism (even were terrorism strictly speaking a just cause for war) infeasible. If a war were to be justified against terrorism at all, it would have to be against the perpetrators of a specific act, with the knowledge of whom they were and where they could be found. These standards were not met in the invasion of Iraq. The third answer that feminisms have to the question of the possibility of just war against terrorism is a critique o f the self/other dichotomy, set up by the critique of the word ‘terrorism’ above. A ‘terrorist’ is necessarily someone other to the ‘good guys’ who engages in an act o f (political) violence. As mentioned above, the label delegitimizes both actor and political cause, at the same time legitimizing the attacked party and their political cause. 330 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This dichotomy relies on the understanding that we can judge and categorize them in a way that makes ‘them ’ less than ‘us.’ Feminisms are wary of these kinds o f stark separations in categories o f humyn beings; gender is such a stark separation, and it causes those on the ‘losing’ side of the separation much pain. The United States military engaging in similar actions to, say, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), would be considered ‘counterterrorism’ despite the similarity o f the actions to ‘terrorism’ because the United States is assumed to be legitimate and the IRA is assumed to be illegitimate. Feminisms interrogate legitimacy more deeply, and thus express concern about the choice to go to war on the basis of a claim of being on the legitimate side of a cycle of retaliatory violence. Feminisms, then, address the question of ‘terrorism’ as a just cause for war from a number o f angles, concluding that, had Iraq been responsible for the 9/11 terrorists, this responsibility would not have constituted just cause against Iraq for the United States. This point, o f course, is irrelevant - as there is no evidence Iraq had any association with any of the 9/11 perpetrators or their organization. B. PR EV EN TIO N AS JUST CAUSE? The second claim of just cause that the United States made against Iraq before leading the March 2003 takeover effort was a preventative one. The United States expressed its confidence that Iraq possessed WMD, and would at some point use those weapons. The scenarios described ranged from selling them to terrorists to using them against Israel. Iraq had, a few times during the 1990s, used conventional military force to quell internal rebellions. It had not engaged in military aggression past its borders since the end of the Gulf War. Repeated UN inspections showed no WMD in Iraq, but the UN was afraid that it had not uncovered all possible hiding places. Iraq had ejected UN weapons inspectors in 1998, and did not allow them back in until after September 11th , under the threat o f military 331 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. attack by the United States. International consensus at the time understood Iraq to be rebuilding its weapons arsenal. Still, there is not certain evidence Iraq had rebuilt their weapons: weapons inspections o f Iraq in 2002 found only the (objectionable?) weapons that Iraq had admitted to possessing. Iraq agreed to destroy those weapons. Iraq had allowed the weapons inspectors back into Iraq because it feared an American attack in 2002; this fear caused the government to show a renewed interest in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions (Richter, Wright, and Farley 2003). Iraq’s interest in compliance may have been borne of fear, but nonetheless should be considered as mitigating the legitimacy o f a claim to the need for a preventative war against the government of Iraq. There are other factors that mitigate the legitimacy of a claim for the need for preventative war against Iraq as well. First, there was no evidence that Iraq possessed any weapons that are classifiable as WMD. Second, there was no evidence that Iraq had any (concrete or fantastic) plans for military attacks on another country. Third, there was no evidence that, even if Iraq had those plans, they would have had the military capacity to do anything about them any time in the near future. What the United States was “preventing” by going to war against Iraq in 2003 is anything but clear - the scenario, the plan, and the target of Iraqi aggression were non-existent (Cordesman 2003 d). Still, this claim brings up another challenge for a feminist theory of just war: were an actor to become a legitimate threat for aggressive warfare, would another country capable of doing so be just in disabling that threat? This question could turn into an infinitely regressive feminist critique of politics: if countries engaged in appropriate, gender sensitive political dialogue and negotiation, no country would become such a threat to international peace and security, and no preventative warfare would be needed. This is a good point: one 332 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. o f the purposes of the comprehensive nature of my feminist ethics of war is to use ethics in war to decrease the need for future wars. Still, the international arena is far from a place where such deconstruction would even begin to make a dent in international violence. The conflictual nature of interstate relations, the war system, and the frequency o f international violence all combine to mean that it is likely that at some point in the future, an attack by one or more actors on one or more other actors may be imminent. In order to need to address the question of the need for preventative warfare, however, that actor must not be the strongest. In other words, a risk that the United States would attack North Korea would not bring up questions of preventative warfare; there is no combination of actors that could politically feasibly use military force to stop the United States from such an attack. If North Korea were known to be about to attack South Korea, however, there are a number of international actors militarily capable of engaging in a preventative war. The question becomes when, if ever, does a preventative war become just (Brown 2003)? Some argue that a preventative war can be seen as defensive - defending from future attacks (Nichols 2003). Most just war theories see most scenarios of defensive war as a place where the attacked has the right to fight back. The question is, does the (soon-to-be) attacked or another actor acting on the behalf of the (soon-to-be) attacked have the right to fire first, if it might save lives? The answer to this question seems to be yes; if a war is inevitable, the party that is going to be attack should do what it can to protect itself, regardless of the timing. In other words, a preemptive war is not morally distinguishable from a defensive war. This argument becomes a slippery slope, however, when we try to apply it to preventive wars as well. The United States did not claim that Iraq was a specific threat for a military attack on X country at Y time. Instead, it claimed that Iraq was both 333 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. capable of and willing to engage in military aggression. The war was not even claimed to preempt Iraq, rather to prevent it from future attacks. Assuming Iraq had been a threat, is prevention a strong enough reason for military attack? To give anything but an unconditional no as answer to this question would require playing a numbers game o f the probability of aggression; a game that is never determinate. When a war is uncertain, starting one makes it certain. A preventative war is the moral equivalent of ‘hurting them now to ensure that we are protected later.’ This logic values ‘us’ over ‘them’ (and even ‘the possibility of us getting hurt later’ over ‘the certainty of them getting hurt now’). This very logic is what allows for massive economic inequality all over the world - selfish provision for all current and future needs while allowing the needs of others to go unmet. Feminisms’ security ethic based in empathetic cooperation rejects this way of understanding the world. Instead of engaging in power-over to maximize individual interests, feminisms attempt to engage in empathetic pooling of power to deal with collective needs. III. AIMING AT SITES UNSEEN The 2003 war in Iraq brought up three in bello issues that a feminist theory of just war needs to address. The first is the question of legitimate targeting in a war where the precise enemy is less than clear. The second is a question o f the means of just occupation', of what constitutes justice in the treatment of the residents o f a justly occupied territory (if there were such a thing). The third is a question of what proportionality looks like in a war of indeterminate purpose. A. WHO IS THE ENEMY? The war against Iraq was described from the beginning as an effort to unseat the government o f Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was seen as a clear enemy of the United 334 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. States and the Coalition. Who the other enemies were, however, was less clear. If the war in Iraq was one against terrorists, where the terrorists were and who counted as a terrorist was never made public. What measures would be taken to locate either the Iraqi government or the terrorists was also less than clear. A United States-led war against Iraq appeared inevitable through the last half of 2002 and the beginning of 2003. How such a war would be fought, however, was only implied. The United States asked Turkey for the ability to use their airbases, and moved massive amounts o f ground troops into the Persian Gulf area. A full-scale takeover was imminent. So the war was against the government of Iraq. The government o f Iraq would be removed by a successful invasion. Still, the invasion affected the people between the border and the government - roads, houses, infrastructure, and supply chains. The war caused about ten thousand Iraqi civilian casualties, instilled fear into the daily lives of the Iraqi people, and inspired political radicalism (Russell 2003). The war affected Iraqis in another way as well - their governmental structure changed radically. This has both positive and negative effects. The government of Iraq was known to be oppressive toward its citizens; it has been unseated. Still, many Iraqis fear the humynitarian situation after the withdrawal o f United States troops. Wymyn enjoyed a number o f rights under Saddam Hussein’s government that many wymyn in the Arab world do not enjoy: the ability to dress as they choose, the ability to hold jobs, equal pay, maternity leave, divorce rights, and property rights. A number of Iraqi wymyn have expressed fear that the United States occupation will result in a more conservative government that will deprive Iraqi wymyn of the rights that they had under the old regime (Ratna 2004). Iraqis were affected in two ways by the war that was (ostensibly) not against them: the bombs of war and the political 335 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. aftermath. Such a war fails a feminist test of just war: its effects are mostly on the people that it is not, strictly speaking, against. Some argue that the fact that the war was on terrorism widened the spectrum of legal targets from ‘combatants’ to those complicit in sponsoring or hiding terrorists (Aldrich 2002; Bush 2001). Chipman compares terrorism to guerilla warfare, in which all means become permissible (2003). Still, there are a few problems with this logic for the war in Iraq. First, it is not clear that the war was actually against either terrorism, or terrorists in Iraq. Second, feminists have a problem with hurting people who did not do anything wrong en route to hurting those who did when there exist alternatives that would avoid those injuries. If nothing else, the claim that a war against terrorism justifies all means needs to be held to a proportionality standard (which it would fail). As Nicholas Wheeler instructs, the United States needed to take responsibility for ‘collateral damage,’ even in wars against terrorism (2002). This ‘collateral damage’ included Iraqi citizens, governmental institutions, and infrastructure. B. JUST OCCUPATION? Traditional jus in bello standards frequently address the question of what would be seen as right conduct in the fighting of a war: what weapons to use, whom to point them out, and how much force to use. Fighting a war, however, requires a different set of tools than engaging in an occupation. The justice of the operation of the Coalition in Iraq needs to be seen in two phases: the justice of the war-fighting, and the justice of the occupation after the fighting (more or less) stopped. The question of what legitimate treatment by the occupiers of the occupied might be is something that the theoretical section of this project, like much of just war theory, does not directly address. An occupation does not only require justice of 336 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. means in the process of the war, but also justice of means in reconstructing the government and civil society of the occupied nation. The occupation of Iraq cannot be considered a ‘ just occupation,’ as the Coalition did not have just cause to engage in the war-fighting or the occupation. Still, it is useful to consider the justice of the tactics in the occupation independent of the justice of the making of the war. The war cannot be judged ‘ just’ at this point, but can be understood to have varying degrees o f injustice in various categories of analysis. One category of analysis that is essential, I contend, is the question of the justice of the means of the occupation. The United States’ occupation of Iraq is held in place by force. The war is officially over, but the fighting continues between Coalition troops and Iraqi insurgents. Civil unrest has been met with strict standards of conduct that limit Iraqis’ freedoms. Stories of prisoner abuse by American soldiers who are not trained in nation-building abound (Codesman 2003a). American soldiers have been accused of raping, beating, and unlawfully detaining Iraqis to maintain order. The force employed to enforce the occupation o f Iraq perpetuates the cycle of violence in Iraq, and constitutes unjust means. The population of Iraq is generally unreceptive both to the presence of the Coalition militaries and to the means by which their presence is enforced. These problems beg a new set of questions for a feminist theory of the ethics of war: if an occupation is called for by the ad bellum standards of just war, what would a just occupation look like? Some o f the factors that would need to be considered include the means of keeping order and the means of governance. The means of keeping order would need to be non violent if possible, sustained by a political dialogue with the residents of the occupied country to construct a political order that they believe to be just. An order agreeable to all residents of the occupied territory, an end in sight to the occupation, and transparency in 337 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government processes is also important. Feminisms contend that any just order established by an occupying force would need to find a way to separate ‘military occupation’ and sexual violence, as well as from structural and physical violences. The role of gender in political life would also need to be directly considered when constructing a means of enforcement of the occupation. Gender being considered would mean that wymyn’s specific needs would be attended to, wymyn’s subordination would be minimized, and the occupying troops would not engage in the feminization of the citizens of the occupied territory. Less than five percent o f the officials named by the United States to run Iraq during the occupation are female. Sexual violence is a constant threat. It is too soon to tell whether the United States’ occupation of Iraq will end with a more just political order than the one present in Iraq before the war. What is clear, however, is that the United States-led Coalitions’ tactics, both in war-fighting and in state-building, have been substantively unjust to Iraqis. C. JUST PROPORTIONS? Finally, the in bello practice of the takeover of Iraq in early 2003 brings up issues of proportionality. Usually, a proportionality analysis has three parts: a comparison of the damage in the war to the overall worth of the cause of the war, a comparison of the damage done by side A to the military capacity of side B, and an interrogation o f the use of heinous, or a priori unjust means. I contend that the 2003 war in Iraq brings up problems that this interpretation of proportionality is ill-equipped to address. The first element of a standard of proportionality, the comparison of the damage done in the war to the overall worth of the just cause that inspired the war, is difficult to apply to this war. Many Iraqis died and continue to die as a result o f the war that overthrew the Saddam Hussein government and resulted in the United States’ occupation of Iraq. The question of whether or not that suffering was proportional to what Iraq did to merit the war is 338 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unclear, because it remains unclear what Iraq did to merit the war. The quandary caused by a war that lacks a clear, evidenced, principled cause is that the resulting uncertainty can ‘trickle down’ into other areas of war where ethical evaluation would otherwise be possible. In other words, the absence of a(n) (ostensible) just cause that can even be used as proxy to understand proportionality is detrimental to a just war theory’s ability to evaluate in bello just conduct. While a just cause cannot write an in bello permission slip, an unjust cause can make a war in bello as well as ad bellum unjust. The proportional response to no tangible damage is no fighting. Still, it is useful to imagine a just cause for the United States in order to understand what proportional fighting might have looked like. If the purpose of the war was to overthrow the government o f Iraq, the war damage needed to be proportional to the damage that the government of Iraq was doing to the international community (or would do in the future?). If the purpose of the war was to capture terrorists and retaliate for the sponsorship of terrorism, then the war needed to be proportional to the acts o f terrorism committed by the terrorists that the Coalition was retaliating against. If the purpose was to disarm Iraq, then the war needed to be proportional to the (future) damage (to be) done by those weapons. The Iraqi government did nothing to merit overthrow; there were no detectable A1 Qaeda cells or associates in Iraq; and Iraq neither had nor used weapons of mass destruction. This means that the proportional response to Iraqi politics did not need to involve violence at all; that fighting a war at all violated principles of proportionality and that fighting such an extensive war constituted flagrant violations. The second standard usually used in evaluating proportionality is a comparison of the destruction inflicted by side A as compared to the military capacity of side B. In other words, did the Coalition use overwhelming force on Iraq? The answer to this question 339 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. appears to be yes. The casualties on the Iraqi side of the war far outnumbered the Coalition casualties; the Coalition technology and organization bested Iraq’s. The Iraqi military spent the war in retreat and disorganization, and only held control of any territory for a couple of days. The war was not fought with anywhere near even force; Iraq was overpowered from the beginning. While I am not suggesting that the side capable o f winning the war give the other side a chance to compete, I am suggesting that the motive for overwhelming force is involved in prioritizing the lives of your military over the lives o f enemy military and enemy soldiers. This choice entrenches a divide between ‘se lf and ‘other’ where the relationship is competition rather than empathy, which runs counter to a feminist understanding of ethical choices in war. The final standard to judge the proportionality of a military effort is the question of the use of a priori unjust means. The United States-led Coalition has been a participant in a number o f activities that could be classified as heinous means. The massive aerial attack on Iraq that cleared the way for the ground war did a substantial amount o f damage to non military targets; that the bombing could have been more discriminate is an argument that the means used by the Coalition were both careless and heinous. Once the Coalition occupied Iraq, it engaged in strict enforcement of curfews and speech standards.3 It is now known that the United States military engaged in extensive torture o f prisoners in the Abu Ghrair facility. Prisoner abuse is also an a priori heinous means: it is attacking someone who has already become disarmed; tantamount to attacking someone who never had anything to do with the war. A feminist understanding of just means prioritizes the margins of political 3 The Coalition, during the occupation, attacked a celebration o f Saddam Hussein’s birthday (that Saddam Hussein never attended). 340 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relations and instructs that the Coalition should have paid more attention to the quantity and quality of life of individual Iraqis in the invasion and occupation of their state. IV. GENDERED FUTURES The 2003 invasion o f Iraq differs from the others in this empirical analysis in that it is still going on: what comes next is indeterminate. Some situational factors have been determined. Saddam Hussein is no longer the President of Iraq. Instead, he is in the joint custody o f the United States and the provisional government of Iraq set up by the United States. The United States successfully attacked, invaded, and occupied Iraq. A new Iraqi government is in existence and will gradually assume control of Iraq (Crocker and Bathsheba 2003a). There are important issues, however, that remain undecided and unclear in the picture o f the future of Iraq. Whether or not the war is over, the stability of the new Iraqi government, and the future relationships between Iraq and its neighbors are all not yet clear. I contend that feminisms raise some questions about the future of Iraq unique to gendered lenses in international politics. Feminisms inquire about the ability to stop the cycle of violence in and surrounding Iraq and about the ability to de-gender international political relations concerning and surrounding Iraq A. IRAQ AND TH E CYCLE O F VIOLENCE For most of the last twenty years, Iraq has been involved in some type o f military conflict. These conflicts include domestic unrest, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, the war of sanctions, and, most recently, the 2003 United States-led takeover. These wars have been associated with physical violence towards both Iraq and its neighbors: Iraq invaded Iran and Kuwait, the United States and the United Kingdom engaged in almost constant bombing of Iraq, and a United States-led Coalition invaded Iraq twice, conquering it once. Since the most recent invasion, Iraq has been a site of consistent political violence, mostly aimed at the 341 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. occupying troops either directly or indirectly (Cordesman 2003b; 2003d; Crocker and Bathsheba 2003b). Iraqi rebels have attacked coalition troops; coalition troops have retaliated. Iraqi insurgents have taken civilian hostages in order to coerce those civilians’ home countries to remove their troops from Iraqi territory. The physical violence is not the only violence in Iraq, either, feminisms note. Structural violence in the form of the disruption of social order, the destruction of needed infrastructure and the destruction of the environment has also been a constant trend throughout the last decade in Iraq. Feminisms recognize the situation surrounding Iraq as a ‘war system’ where violence abounds. In a war system, violence is the norm and not the exception. Violence is the accepted way of solving problems instead of an anomaly or a last resort. Violence is the oil that keeps the machine of political and social life moving: in a war system, if a party does not cooperate with the norm of behavior, violence is a first resort, not a last resort. In other words, in a war system, violence is how problems get taken care of; and problems arise frequently due to an ethos of violence. War systems do not just end. All of this violence around Iraq will not just disappear now that Saddam Hussein is gone, or now that the United States is in charge, or even once the United States leaves. The violent government of Iraq was overthrown by violent invasion, and the occupation is being enforced by violent policing in a society accostumed to violence in everyday life. Feminists see that this cycle of violence must be broken, lest Iraq remain in a cycle of perpetual violence and injustice. Understanding the necessity of stopping the cycle o f violence should not be simple for the United States as it occupies of Iraq. The cycle of violence it cannot be broken by enforcing domestic order. Instead, the justice of the political situation in an extremely diverse state must be constructed by its members in dialogue. This may well be extraordinarily difficult because of the violence that 342 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Iraq has experienced, both internally and externally, to this point. Nevertheless, it is essential, because the perpetuation of violence is destroying Iraqi society (Simons 1999). An Iraq in which the cycle of violence could be broken would look like be one in which the diverse parties that have an cause political problems for Iraqi domestic politics (from inside and outside of Iraq) sat down and talked about their differences, reaching some kind o f mutually agreeable understanding about how a new Iraq should be politically constituted and politically operated. A forum for the resolution of domestic and international disputes would need to be constructed. Finally, these disputes would need to be brought to the table with an eye on fixing them non-violently; with empathy for those in disagreement; and with willingness to compromise in order to solve domestic and international political problems. THE DE-GENDERING OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AROUND IRAQ The idea of willingness to compromise in order to solve domestic and international problems brings us to the next concern about Iraq’s future. The international arena is generally, and Iraq is specifically, involved in a cycle of violence where disagreements are solved by competition and force rather than dialogue and understanding. The root of this competition, I argue, is in the masculinity of the international political arena. The largest problem in the international political cycle of violence, feminisms argue, is the masculinity of states in the international arena. The feminist critique of state sovereignty in international politics in Chapter IV listed a number of problems that result from the masculine construction o f the international political arena: the myth of the monolithic nature of the state, the myth o f the existence of rational democracy, the discursive construction of authority, the violence of ethnonationalism, the violence of a militaristic ethos, and gendered competition. All of these 343 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. are evident around Iraq. We talked about ‘Iraq’ before the invasion as interchangeable with its leadership, where Iraq is a very diverse country, some of which supported its government and some did not. We still talk about Iraq as a monolithic entity, while some Iraqis participate in the provisional government and others take Coalition hostages in order to try to get the Coalition to leave Iraq. Some Iraqis are Kurds, some are Shiites, some are Palestinians. Further, we talk about the ‘democratization’ of Iraq as if it was something that magically happened when the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein. At that time, Iraq was an occupied territory, not a democracy. Now, there is a provisional government of Iraq. This government was not elected by or even chosen by the people o f Iraq. Elections are not planned for the near future. Iraqis currently have very little say in their governance. Yet the governance of Iraq is assumed legitimate because it has “been given sovereignty” by the United States. Iraqi rebel groups still take hostages in order to force withdrawal; Coalition troops still fire at Iraqi rebels. Iraq is no longer considered a threat for the purposes on international competition; it has been conquered and subdued. Still, microcosms of gendered international political competition exist within and around Iraq. The ‘new Iraq’ does not yet hold competitive political relationships with its neighbors, but it does reside in an international political arena generally and in an area specifically that is prone to competition, violence, and unjust political relations. The Iraqi government has been given a new face and a new structure in an international political climate that remains competitive and violent. Iraq has a ‘new government’ that plays by the ‘old rules’ of international relations and war: there is no evidence of gender consciousness, or of feminist consciousness that inspires both that gender consciousness and other ideas for the peace-orientation of international political relations. 344 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V. CONCLUSION The implications o f the current war in Iraq are far from clear: there is not enough hindsight to give us an adequate picture either of what happened during the war or of what the aftermath o f the war will look like. Gendered stereotypes in just war continued through this war in Iraq: ‘good girls’ like Jessica Lynch became national heroes while ‘bad girls’ like Sabrina Harman got swept under the rug. A host of new ostensible just causes against Iraq left the United States and its Coalition less justified in pursuing this war than in pursuing either the Gulf War or the war o f sanctions. The feminist framework for just cause proposed in this project presents operative standards to address both war against terrorism and preventative warfare, but points out that the Coalition decision to go to war meets neither of these standards. Next, this chapter dealt with new issues of in bello just practices: questions of the identification of the enemy, just operation of an occupation, and proportionality calculations in a war that is unjust ad bellum. It concluded with a (brief) gendered look into the future of the political situation in Iraq. I look at the possibilities for breaking cycles of international violence and of competitive international relations. I conclude that constructing a just peace in Iraq will be a difficult and uphill battle, but that there is both discursive and real potential for such a result. 345 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapter 9. the future? weak ontologies of a feminist ethics of war I began this project looking to rework, revitalize, and recast just war theories through gendered lenses in order to create a framework capable of handling today’s complex international catastrophes ethically. In my analysis, the cornerstone of the injustice of current ‘ just war theories’ is the combination of their lack o f clarity and their lack of attention to the gendered nature of international politics. I looked to insert gender into just war, creating an ethics o f war guided, shaped, and chastened by awareness of gender injustice in personal and international politics. In the conclusion, I address what I see as the contributions of a feminist ethics of war. I move on to discuss the utility o f political theory more generally (and thus the perceived utility of this political theory project). I continue by situating this project in a greater search for knowledge - by presenting it as a weak ontology of the ethics of war (White 2000). I finish by suggesting some directions for future research. I. CONTRIBUTIONS OF A FEMINIST ETHICS OF WAR En route to the goal of a feminist just war theory, I divided the project into two parts: a political theory reformulation of the assertions of just war and an empirical case study that employed that new theory. I began the theoretical part of the project looking to bring definitional clarity to some concepts in feminisms and in international politics that can be understood in multiple and competing ways. I described feminisms as multiple political movements united by an interest in ending the oppression o f those constructed as feminine in political relations. Feminisms’ common interests, then, are in the interests of those understood to be wymyn and in political marginality. Feminisms are necessarily a political and interested grouping that see knowledge as politicized. I embraced this politicization of 346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. knowledge throughout this project, engaging in academic discourse, political discourse, and activism, disbursed through the project. I set out a methodological roadmap for feminist political scholarship that describes a journey o f observation, critique, revealing, reflexivity, reconstruction, and action in policy analysis. I attempted to live by that roadmap throughout the process and performance of this analysis. The first journey this project embarked upon is the introduction of feminist theories and just war theories. I provided a brief historical insight into the sources and content of the theories of just war, followed by a critique of what I see as the confused motivating moralities for just war theories. I then looked for a feminist motivating morality for the ethics of war. The first motivating morality that I considered was that of pacifism, but I found it to be morally untenable and a weak basis for a theory of the ethics of war. The motivating morality that I settled on was empathetic cooperation, which combines understanding and cooperation with giving in a way that creates positive dialogues for positive political relations. I showed how an understanding of the concept of justice inspired by empathetic cooperation is clearer than and preferable to the muddled understandings of justice in traditional just war theories. After the initial introduction of just war theories to feminisms, I went on to use gendered lenses to reformulate the ad bellum and in bello standards of just war theories. I critiqued sovereignty to repair the concept of right authority. I forefronted gendered concerns to repair the concept of just cause. I streamlined the cause and intent to repair the concept o f right intent. I searched for the silences in policy choice options to repair the standard of last resort. I inquired into long-term gendered effects of warfare to repair the standard o f reasonable chance for success. 347 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I begun to address the jus in bello standards of just war by critiquing the gendered roles that just war stories cast men and wymyn in. I talked about men being constructed as heroes and wymyn being constructed as needing to be saved by those heroes. I criticized the insidious abstraction o f these gendered roles, and other ‘clean’ discourse surrounding wars that are necessarily gruesome. From there, I reformulated the concept o f non-combatant immunity, focusing on gender, on the people that war impacted, and on the people responsible for the just cause that provoked the war to begin with. Finally, I reinterpreted the just war standard against heinous means to include gendered and sexual violence. Having set up this theoretical reformulation of just war theories, I was interested in its effectiveness when addressed to specific political situations. I had long been a student of the international conflicts in and around Iraq, and been fascinated by the moral complexity of the political problems there. Issues of territorial dispute, religious diversity, and domestic injustice came loaded as baggage onto Iraq’s international political relations, which were themselves messy at best. I began the empirical section of this project by prioritizing context: arguing that a political event cannot be seen as discrete, and instead must be seen as coupled with the political contexts that shaped it. I talked about both the distant and immediate political contexts in Iraq, characterizing Iraq as a diverse nation thrown together by colonial breakdown and in constant conflict with its neighbors. I contended that the political context that constructed and sustained Iraq was in itself both gendered and unjust. I pointed out that an unjust political context lays the groundwork for unjust wars. The relationship between political context and war(s), I contend, is the first major contribution of my theoretical reformulation of just war theories. The second major contribution of this feminist reformulation of just war theory appears in the discussion of the Gulf War. I explained the Gulf War as a story o f gendered 348 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. states - where the Just Warrior State (the United States) protected the Beautiful Soul State (Kuwait) from the aggressive, bad-manly state (Iraq). My reformulation of just war theories is demonstrates the gendered nature of states, the gendered nature of war, and the gendered nature of traditional just war theories. The third major contribution is in the evaluation of claims to right authority in the Gulf War. The question of how the United Nations could not have right authority to declare war on Iraq has been discussed in the just war literature. I provide an answer in the reformulation of authority as moral license. My fourth major contribution is a counterdiscourse to the Gulf War: an empowerment framework for international politics that traditional, conflictual understandings of just war could not provide. The discussion of economic sanctions on Iraq brings three other major contributions to the table. First, it contributes a comprehensive understanding o f sanctions as an act of war, providing a classification for a political atrocity that had yet to receive an appropriate classification in the international political arena. Second, it contributes an appropriate moral framework for analysis of the sanctions regime. International political analysts had difficulty finding an ethical framework to deal with and classify this sanctions regime; my feminist just war theory finds the tools to deal with the moral issues involved. Finally, this chapter shows that a feminist reformulation of just war theories is capable of building feminist countermetaphors to international coercive violence that have political impacts. The discussion o f the recent United States-led invasion o f Iraq shows that gendering in international politics is more than skin deep. The changing nature o f the face of gender in war did not change many of the gendered role expectations and gendered implications of war. A feminist theory of just war is able to reveal and critique even subtle genderings in war-making and war-fighting. The last major contribution of this reformulation of just war 349 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. theories is insight into the potential for de-gendering politics and breaking cycles of violence between nations. II. THE UTILITY OF (FEMINIST) POLITICAL THEORY I attempt in this project to explore multiple aspects and uses o f political theory. Some of these purposes I make explicit, others, I allow to run below the surface. Here, I will present them as goals of this research project. The first interpretation o f political theory that I rely on is o f political theory as a good in itself. In this interpretation, political theory (qua thought about politics) contributes to some knowledge base about how the world works which is important on its own merit. Exploring potential improvements in political theory, then, is tantamount to exploring improvements in knowledge, which is a priori beneficial. In other words, a feminist just war theory make just war theories more accurate; this accuracy is an improvement in knowledge; improvements in knowledge are beneficial. A second interpretation pushes the envelope a little bit further. Here, political theory is useful because participants in politics rely on political theory in order to make political choices. More accurate or more inclusive political theory, then, may serve as a guide to some participants in politics. If better theory serves as a better guide to some participants in politics, better politics result. Better politics benefit the subjects of politics: people. Still, this interpretation leaves something wanting, and room for a third complication. Political theory may not only serve as a guide for politics, but it may be politics in itself. This observation stems from Baudrillard’s understanding of politics as discursive referendum. If politics is an argument between political theories, then additional voices in the argument provide additional viewpoints valuable to fair politics. In other words, if we live in a world where discourse not only influences but creates and is reality, political theory like a feminist reformulation of just war theories is political action. 350 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Feminists recognize discursive intervention and reconstruction as political action (Peterson and Runyan 1999). This political activism interferes with, disrupts, and re-writes dominant discourses. In the introduction to this project, I suggested that political theory critiques political actualities, forms political possibilities, and serves as political communication. This project is intended to fulfill those purposes. III. WEAK ONTOLOGIES OF FEMINIST JUST WAR One aspect of constructing such contestable foundations involves the embodiment within them of some signaling of their own limits. Felicitous weak ontologies cannot simply declare their contestability, fallability, or partiality at the start then proceed pretty much as before. The reason for this is that an ontology figures our most basic sense of human being, an achievement that always carries a propensity toward naturalization, reification, and unity, even if only implicitly. A weak ontology must possess resources for deflecting this propensity toward naturalization, folding of its dimensions. Its elaboration of fundamental meanings must in some sense fold back upon itself, disrupting its own smooth constitution of a unity. In a way, its contestability will be thus enacted rather than just announced (White 2000, 8). I contend that a feminist reformulation of just war theory makes important contributions to just war, to international security theory, and to international politics. Still, I cannot see the scope of my theoretical observations as necessarily universal or even reaching. I see this work as valuable but contingent. Stephen W hite’s work on weak ontologies provides a framework through which to see the accomplishments o f this project. White claims that a weak ontology is affirmative (it encourages actors to do things in politics), but both acknowledges in and participates in its own contestability. The functional application o f weak ontology here is to map a world where experience is seen as contested truth, yet essential to political interaction. The latter insight demands from us the affirmative gesture o f constructing foundations, the former prevents us from carrying it out in a traditional fashion. Like feminists, White understands that keeping contingency in mind is 351 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. essential to political theory and practice. He comments that “a strength bom of an unwarranted rejection of contingency is its own kind of atrophy: a moral-intellectual couch- potatoism that stands in contrast to the active qualities he associated with true ‘individuality’” (White 2000, 15). Instead of using the disengaged subject as absolute foundation, White proposes understanding political relationships as contingent and changing foundations. He explains humyn interrelation in this interpretation: “one remains self- reliant, then, precisely in order to become available to others; in order to vivify the connectedness o f souls” (White 2000, 31). The result is a sort of foundationalism that allows itself to be constantly improved and overruled, but still utilized: An agent is always reacting to and evaluating situations that confront it, and doing so against an implicit set of background commitments. The character or this background or lifeworld [Baudrillard’s term] cannot be illuminated by considering it as a possible object to be comprehended in an attitude of full disengagement. Rather the background is partially constitutive of oneself. Gaining clarity here requires trying to reconstruct, from within the agent’s perspective, how this background structures one’s reactions and evaluations. (White 2000,45). This presentation of an ethical foundation for the making and fighting o f wars is both suggestive o f and constitutive of international action. It suggests that actors behave in certain ways towards each other in international politics, and it engages in discursive reconstruction as a political act. It also acknowledges and participates in its own contestability in a number of ways. First, it proposes that the standards o f a feminist theory of just war be dialogically deduced, a check against assuming a constant form. Second, it proposes a general set of categories to be considered, and leaves their consideration to the actors in the specific political context. Finally, it suggests that its own knowledge is political and interested, and subject to alternative politics. 352 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. It is under this framework that I present a feminist ethics o f war as a weak ontology; as knowledge, but not knowledge; as learning but with something new always to be learned. Such a project is always open to contributing voices that it has neglected; to ideas that it has forgotten; and to political events that change its tenets. Still, it provides a framework for political action rather than engaging in constant doubt; it provides a way to see the world without deciding what the world is decisively. IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH In the course of formulating a feminist ethics o f war, I learned a number of useful things. I learned about the richness and complexity o f the just war traditions inseide and outside of western political thought. I also learned that there is little dialogue between those diverse traditions. Intercultural research comparing just war warrants and standards would be both independently interesting and a potential facilitator of international and intercultural communication. I learned about what a feminist understanding o f international politics contributes to the theory of the ethics of war. I also learned how inseparable theories of the justice o f politics are from theories of the justice of war. As I engaged this project, I often found myself sympathizing with a political actor’s injustice as I observed that, from the particular position that actor occupied, justice was nearly impossible. A feminist understanding of what just political relations between international actors might look like would both complement and strengthen a feminist theory o f justice in war. I learned about the inseparability o f scholarship and activism. Throughout this project, I was inspired by a certain political situation to engage in some act of political performance or political activism. The construction of this project itself constitutes political activism, but is only a part of a whole activist structure that could be initiated. I found myself in this project questioning the feasibility of my ambitions to get the international 353 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. community to hear my suggestions for revising ethical thought on making and fighting wars. An action plan for inserting feminist ideas about just war into the practice o f politics is also essential to this research agenda. V. CONCLUDING THOUGHT Feminism and war are not often thought of in the same plane of academic analysis or political action. After all, wymyn and feminism are perceived to be peaceful. It is true that my feminist ethics of war is meant to deconstruct the war system and ultimately eliminate the need for wars. But it is also true that it gives license to actors to fight wars. The titles of those theoretical chapters, ‘feminisms go to w ar’ and ‘feminisms fight wars’ are only meant slightly ironically. Just war is restraining, but it also provides guidelines of what to when wars are being fought. Previous to now, feminisms were excluded from that conversation because they did not provide specific and concrete suggestions for making and fighting wars. Certainly, a comprehensive feminist statement on how to make and fight wars requires further research, further tailoring, and further thought. Still, this project lays the groundwork for a feminist contribution not only to the study of wars, but to the policymaking of making war-related choices and decisions. This very insertion interrupts the just war system and inserts previously silenced contribution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 354 Sources Referenced Aafjies, Astrid and Ann Tiemey Goldstein. 1998. Gender violence: the hidden war crime. Washington, DC: Women, Law, and Development International. Aburish, S. K. 2000. Saddam Hussein: the politics o f revenge. London: Bloomsbury. Acker, Joan; Kate Barry; and Johanna Esseveld. 1991. Objectivity and truth: problems in doing feminist research. In Beyond methodology: feminist scholarship as lived research, edited by Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Ackerly, Brooke A. 2000. Political theory andfeminist social criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adeney, Bernard T. 1988. Just War, political realism, andfaith. Metuchen, NJ: The American Theological Library Association and the Scarecrow Press. Al-Ansary, Sarah. 2003. Women are the victims of sanctions. Aljazeera special report 10 August 2003. Accessed on English.aljazeera.net. Al-Dekhayal, Abdulkarim. 2000. Kuwait: oil, state, and legitimation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Aldrich, George H. 2002. The Taliban, A1 Qaeda, and the determination of illegal combatants. The American Journal o f International Law 96, n.4:891-98. Alkadiri, Raad. 2000. Iraq: the dilemma of sanctions and confrontation. In Managing new developments in the Gulf edited by Rosemary Hollis. London: The Royal Institute o f International Affairs. Allen, Amy. 1998. Rethinking power. Hypatia 13, n. 1:21-40. Alnasrawi, Abbas. 2001. Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990-2000. Third World Quarterly 22, n.2:205-218. Alnasrawi, Abbas. 1994. The economy o f Iraq: Oil, wars, destruction o f development, and prospects: 1950-2010. New York: Greenwood. Al-Sabah, Sheikh Jabar Al-Ahmad. 1990. Address of the Amir o f Kuwait to the United Nations Security Council. 27 September. Amnesty International. 2001. Systematic torture o f political prisoners MDE 14/08/2001, 15 August. Amuzegar, Jahangir. 2001. Managing oil wealth: OPEC’ s windfalls and pitfalls. London: IB Tauris. 355 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Anthias, Floya. 2002. Beyond feminism and multiculturalism: locating difference and the politics of location. Women’ s Studies International Forum 25, n.3:275-86. Antony, Louise M., and Charlotte Witt, eds. 1993. A mind o f one’ s own: feminist essays in reason and objectivity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1970. On Violence. New York: Harvest Books. Aristotle. 1998. Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross. London: Oxford University Press. Aristotle. 1946. Politics, translated by Ernest Barker. London: Oxford University Press. Amove, Anthony, ed. 2000. Iraq under siege: the deadly impact o f sanctions and war. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. As, Berit. 1983. A materialistic view of men’s and women’s attitudes towards war. In Women and m en’ s wars, edited by Judith Stiehm. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Ashworth, Lucian and Larry Swatuck. 1998. Masculinity and the fear o f emasculation in International Relations theory. In The “ man ” question in International Relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Askin, Kelly. 1997. War crimes against women: prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals. The Hague: Mamus Nijhoff Publishers. Aslaksen, Iluie. 2002. Gender constructions and the possibility of the generous economic actor. Hypatia 17, n.2:l 18-32. Atack, Iain. 2002. Ethical objections to humanitarian intervention. Security Dialogue 33, n.3:279-292. Atkinson, Rick. 1991. Gulf ground war not felt imminent. The Washington Post, 1 February. Audoin-Rouzeau, Stephane. 2002. Extreme violence in combat and willful violence. International Social Science Journal 174:491-497. Aziz, Barbara Nimri. 1998. Back to the margins. Toward Freedom March. Baldwin, David. 1999/2000. The sanctions debate and the logic of choice. International Security 24, n.3:80-107. Baldwin, David. 1985. Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 356 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Barker, Drucilla K. 1998. Dualisms, discourse, and development. Hypatia 13, n.3:83-94. Baram, Amatzia. 1991. Culture, history and ideology in the formation o f Ba ’ athist Iraq, 1968-1989. Oxford: Macmillan. Barnett, Michael. 1999. Culture, strategy, and foreign policy change: Israel’s road to Oslo. European Journal o f International Relations 5, n. 1:5-36. Barstow, Anne, ed. 2000. War’ s dirty secret: rape, prostitution, and other crimes against women. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press. Bartky, Sandra L. 1998. Foucault, femininity, and the modernization o f patriarchal power. In Feminism & Foucault, edited by Irene Diamond and Lee Quimby. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Barton, Frederick and Bathsheba N. Crocker. 2003a. A wiser peace: an action strategy fo r post-conflict Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Barton, Frederick and Bathsheba N. Crocker. 2003b. Post-war Iraq: Are we ready? Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Baudrillard, Jean. 2001. Selected writings. Edited by Mark Poster. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Baudrillard, Jean. 1995. The Gulf War did not take place, translated by Paul Patton. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Baudrillard, Jean. 1993. Symbolic exchange and death. NY: Routledge. Baudrillard, Jean. 1983. De la croissance a l’excroissance. Debat. 23:2-8. Baudrillard, Jean. 1979. De la seduction. Paris: Editions Galilee. Baudrillard, Jean. 1976. LFchange symbolique etlam ort. Paris: Gallimard. Baxter, Sandra, and Marjorie Lansing. 1983. Women and politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Beach, Hugo. 1990. What if deterrence fails? In Just deterrence: morality and deterrence into the 21st Century, edited by Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham. London: Brassey’s, 1990. Beaufort, L. J. C. 1933. La guerre comme instrument de secours. La Haye: Diss. Amsterdam (#22577). 357 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Beaver, William, 1998. Wealthbuilding secrets as practiced by the world’ s richest people: what Kuwaitis can tell you about getting rich and staying rich. Boulder, CO: Paladin Press. Beckman, Peter R., and Francine D ’Amico. 1994. Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects. Westport, Connecticut: Bergin and Garvey. Beckman, Peter R. 1994. Realism, women, and world politics. In Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects, edited by Peter R. Beckman and Francine D ’Amico. Westport, Connecticut: Bergin and Garvey, 1994. Beer, Francis, and Robert Hariman. 1998. Post-realism, just war, and the Gulf War debate. In Politically speaking: a worldwide examination o f language use in the public sphere, edited by Ofer Feldman and Christ’l de Landsteer. Westport, CN: Praeger. Beigbeder, A. 2002. New challeneges for UNICEF: Children, women, and human rights. New York: Palgrave MacMillian. Beilin, Yossi. 1993. Israel: A concise political history. London: Trafalgar Square. Bendyna, M.E. and T. Finucance. 1996. Gender differences in public attitudes toward the Gulf War: A test of competing hypotheses. Social Science Journal 33, n .l: 1-22. Bengio, O. 1998. Saddam’ s word: political discourse in Iraq. New York: Oxford University Press. Benjamin, Daniel. 2002. Saddam Hussein and A1 Qaeda are not allies. New York Times. 30 September. Bennett, Olivia; Jo Bexley and Kitty Wamock, eds. 1995. Arms to fight, arms to protect: Women speak out about conflict. London: Panos. Bennis, Phyllis. 2000a. And they called it peace. Middle East Report 215. Bennis, Phyllis. 2000b. U. S. policy triumphs in the Security Council: the ‘Lift the Sanctions’ Resolution that doesn’t. Institute fo r Policy Studies. www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraql/bennis.htm (14 April 2002). Bennis, Phyllis and Dennis Halliday. 2000. Iraq: The impact of sanctions and U.S. policy. In Iraq under siege, edited by Anthony Amove. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Bennis, Phyllis; Stephen Zunes; and Martha Honey. 2001. The failure of U. S. policy toward Iraq and proposed alternatives. Middle East Policy 8, n.3:101-109. 358 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Bentham, Jeremy. 1948 [1780]. Introduction to the principles o f morals and legislation. New York: Hafner. Berkman, Joyce. 1990. Feminism, war, and peace politics: the case o f World War I. In Women, militarism, and war, edited by Jean Elshtain and Sheila Tobias. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Betts, Richard K. 2003. Striking first: a history of thankfully lost opportunities. Ethics and International Affairs 17, n. 1. Betts, Richard K. 1996. The delusion of impartial intervention. In Managing global chaos: sources o f and responses to international conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson, with Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute o f Peace Press. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The location o f culture. London and New York: Routledge. Blanchard, Eric. 2003. Gender, International Relations, and the development of Feminist Security Theory. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 28, n.4:1289-1313. Bleifuss, Joel. 1991. On the first stone. In these times 20-26 March. Bohman, James, and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann, eds. 1997. Perpetual peace: essays on K ant’ s cosmopolitan ideal. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Boyd, Susan B., ed. 1997. Challenging the public/private divide. Toronto: University of Toronto. Branscombe, N.R. and Owen, S. 1993. Handgun ownership among American women and its consequences for social judgment. In Women and the use o f military force, edited by R. Howes and M. Stevenson. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 53- 66. Braumann, Rony. 1993. When suffering makes a good story. In Life, death, and aid: the Medicines Sans Frontieres Report on world crisis intervention, edited by Jean Francois. London: Routledge. Brock-Utne, Birgit. 1989. Feminist perspectives on peace and peace education. New York: Pergamon Press. Brown, Chris. 2003. Self-defense in an imperfect world. Ethics and International Affairs. 17:1. Brown, Sarah. 1988. Feminism, international theory, and international relations of gender inequality. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 17, n.3:461-75. 359 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Brown, Wendy. 2002. Manhood and politics: a feminist reading in political thought. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Brown, Wendy. 1995. States o f injury. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brudelein, Claude. 2001. The end of innocence: humanitarian protection in the 21s t century. In Civilians at war, edited by Simon Chesterman, 221-36. Buchanan, Allen, and Robert Keohane. 2004. The preventative use of force: a cosmopolitan international proposal. Ethics and International Affairs 18, n.l. Buchanan, David. 2002. Gendercide and human rights. Journal o f Genocide Research 4, n.l:95-108. Buck, Lori; Nicole Gallant; and Kim Richard Nossal. 1998. Sanctions as a gendered instrument of statecraft: the case of Iraq. Review o f International Studies 24:65- 84. Bull, Hedley. 1977. The anarchical society: a study o f order in world politics. London: Macmillan. Bull, Hedley; Benedict Kingsbury; and Adam Roberts. 1990. Hugo Grotius and international relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris. 1991. The Gulf War: its origins, its history, and its consequences. London: William Heinmann Ltd. Bush, George H. W. 1991a. Remarks by the President in Address to the National Religious Broadcasters’ Convention, 28 January 1991. Bush, George H. W. 1991b. Bush’s War Doctrine. US News and World Report 4 February 1991, 52-3. Bush, George H. W. 1990. Public Papers o f Presidents (PPP). Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. Bush, George W. 2003. State of the union address. Los Angeles Times. 29 January. Bush, George W. 2002. The national security strategy o f the United States. Washington, DC: The White House, September 17. Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable speech: a politics o f the performative. New York: Routledge. Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies that matter: on the discursive limits o f ‘ sex. ’ New York: Routledge. 360 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion o f identity. New York: Routledge. Byman, Daniel L. 2000/2001. After the storm: U.S. policy in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 115, n.4:493:516 Byman, Daniel and Jerrold Green. 1997. Political violence and stability in the states o f the Northern Persian Gulf Washington, D.C.: Rand. Byman, Daniel L., and Matthew C. Waxman. 2000. Confronting Iraq: U . S. policy and the use o f force since the Gulf War. Washington, D.C.: RAND National Defense Research Institute. Bystudzienski, Jill M., ed. 1992. Women transforming politics: worldwide strategies for empowerment. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Calhoun, Laurie. 2002. Legitimate authority and ‘Just W ar’ in the modem world. Peace & Change 27, n. 1:37-58. Campbell, David. 1998. Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Card, Claudia. 1996. Rape as a weapon of war. Hypatia 11, n.4:5-17. Capaccio, George. 2000. Sanctions: killing a country and a people. In Iraq under siege, edited by Anthony Amove. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Carpenter, Charli. 2003a. ‘Women and children first’: gender, norms, and humanitarian evacuation in the Balkans 1991-95. International Organization 57, n.4:428-77. Carpenter, Charli. 2003b. ‘Women, children, and other vulnerable groups’: gender, strategic frames, and the protection of civilians as a transnational issue. Paper presented at the International Studies Association-West Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada. Carr, Caleb. 2002. The lessons o f terror: a history o f warfare against civilians. New York: Random House. Carr, E.H. 1939. The twenty years’ crisis, 1919-1939. New York: Harper & Row. Caversazio, Sylvie. 2001. Strengthening protection in war: a search for professional standards. Geneva: ICRC. Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Johnnasson, eds. 1990. The history and sociology o f genocide. New Haven: Yale University Press. 361 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chan, Stephen, and A. Cooper Drury. 2000. Sanctions as economic statecraft: theory and practice. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Charlesworth, Hilary. 1999. Feminist methods in international law. American Journal o f International Law 93, n.2:379-394. Charlesworth, Hilary, and Christine Chinkin. 2002. Sex, gender, and September 11. American Journal o f International Law 96, n.3:600-5. Charlesworth, Hilary; Christine Chinkin; and Shelley Wright. 1998. Feminist approaches to international law. American Journal o f International Law 85, n.4. Chamey, Jonathan. 2001. The use of force against terrorism and international law. American Journal o f International Law 95:, n.4:835-9. Chipman, Don D. 2003. Osama bin Laden and guerilla war. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26:163-70. Chodorow, Nancy J. 1995. Gender as a personal and cultural construction. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 20, n.3:516-544. Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp. 1988. Iran and Iraq at war. London: IB Tauris. Cicero. 1974. De Officiis/On Duties, translated by Harry G. Edinger. NY: Bobbes- Merill. Claire, Rodger. 2004. Raid on the sun: inside Israel’ s secret campaign that denied Saddam the bomb. New York: Broadway Press. Claude, Inis L., Jr. 1980. Just War: doctrines and institutions. Political Science Quarterly 9 5 ,n .1:83-96. von Clausewitz, Carl. [1830] 1989. On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Clawson, Patrick. 2001. Inspections in Iraq: A test for Saddam, not a good solution for WMD. Washington Institute for Near East Politics, Policy Paper #590. www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/clplO.html (14 November 2002). Clawson, Patrick. 1993. Iraq’s economy and international sactions. In Iraq’ s road to war, edited by A. Baram and B. Rubin. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Clough, Sharyn. 1998. A hasty retreat from evidence: the recalcitrance of relativism in feminist epistemology. Hypatia 13, n.4:88-l 11. Clouse, Robert G, ed. 1981. War: Four Christian views. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. 362 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Cockbum, Cynthia. 1991. In the way o f women: m en’ s resistance to sex equality in organizations. London: Zed Books. Cockbum, Cynthia and Dubravka Zarkov, eds. 2002. The Post-war moment: militaries, masculinities, and international peacekeeping. London: Zed Books. Cohen, Stanley. 2001. States o f denial: knowing about atrocities and suffering. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Cohn, Carol. 1993. Wars, wimps, and women: talking gender and thinking war. In Gendering war talk, edited by Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cohn, Carol. 1987. Sex and death in the world of rational defense intellectuals. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 12, n.4:687-718. Cohn, Carol and Sara Ruddick. 2002. A feminist ethical perspective on weapons of mass destruction. In Ethics and Weapons o f Mass Destruction, edited by Steven Lee and Sohail Hashmi. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cole, Darrell. 2002. When God says war is right. Colorado Springs, CO: Waterbook Press. Cole, Darrell. 1999. Thomas Aquinas on virtuous warfare. Journal o f Religious Ethics 27, n. 1:57-80. Confortini, Catia. 2004. Galtung, violence, and gender: the case fo r a feminism-peace studies alliance. Paper presented at the 45th annual meeting o f the international studies association, March 2004, Montreal, Quebec. Conlon, Paul. 1995. Lessons from Iraq. Virginia Journal o f International Law 35, n.633:633-668. Connell, R. W. 1995. Masculinities. Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press. Connell, R. W. 1990. The state, gender, and sexual politics: theory and appraisal. Theory and Society 4 1:507-44. Connell, R. W. 1987. Gender and power: society, the person, and sexual politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Virginia Sapiro. 1993. Gender, feminist consciousness, and war. American Journal o f Political Science 37, n.4:1079-1099. Cooley, John K. 1991. Pre-war Gulf diplomacy. Survival March/April. 363 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Coomaraswamy, Radhika. 1997. Reinventing international law: women’s rights as human rights in the international community. Visiting Lecture at Harvard Law School by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/Publications/radhika.html (15 April 2002). Cordesman, Anthony. 2003a. What is next in Iraq? Military developments, military requirements, and armed nation-building. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony. 2003b. Iraq: Is this the beginning o f a third Gulf War? Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony. 2003c. Victory in Iraq andfracture lines o f Iraq/M iddle East. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony. 2003d. The war after the war. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony. 2003e. The lessons o f the Iraq war. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony. 1999. Weapons o f mass destruction in Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cortright, David, and George Lopez. 2002. Sanctions and the search fo r security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cortright, David, and George Lopez, eds. 2000. The sanctions decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez. 1999. Are sanctions just? The problematic case o f Iraq. Journal o f International Affairs 52, n.2:735-755. Coughlin, Con. 2002. Saddam: King o f terror. New York: Ecco Publishers. Cox, Robert. 1986. Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory. In Neorealism and its critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press. Crawford, Neta C. 2003a. The slippery slope of preventative war. Ethics and International Affairs 17, n.l. Crawford, Neta C. 2003b. Just War theory and the U. S. counterterror war. Perspectives on Politics 1, n. 1:5-25. Crawford, Neta C. 2002. Argument and change in world politics: ethics, decolonization, and humanitarian intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 364 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Crawford, Neta C. 2000. The passion of world politics: propositions on emotion and emotional relationships. International Security 24, n.4:116-56. Crawford, Neta C., and Audie Klotz. 1999. How sanctions work: lessons from South Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Crystal, Jill, Roger Owen, Edmund Burke, Michael Hudson, Walid Kazziha, Rashid Khalidi, Serif Mardin, eds. 1995. Oil and politics in the Gulf: rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cudd, Anne. 1998. Multiculturalism as a cognitive virtue o f scientific virtue. Hypatia 13, n.3:43-61. Cuomo, Chris J. 1996. War is not just an event: reflections on the significance of everyday violence. Hypatia 11, n.4:30-45. Cusack, Thomas and Michael Denward. 1981. Military spending in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 25: 429-69. Cutts, Mark. 1999. The humanitarian operation in Bosnia, 1992-1995: dilemmas of negotiating humanitarian access. Journal o f Humanitarian Assistance. D’Amico, Francine and Peter R. Beckman. 1995. Women in world politics: an introduction. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Dahl, H.M. 2000. A perceptive and reflective state? The European Journal o f Women’ s Studies 7, n.4:475-494. Damrosch, Lori. 1993. Enforcing restraint: Collective intervention in internal conflicts. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Darst, Robert. 2002. The Samaritan’s dilemma in international environmental politics. Paper presented to the annual meeting o f the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon. Davis, G. Scott. 1987. Warcraft and the fragility of virtue. Soundings 70:475-93. Deaver, Michael. 2001. Disarming Iraq: monitoring power and resistance. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Decosse, David E., ed. 1992. But was it just? reflections on the morality o f the Persian G ulf War. N Y : Doubleday. Dekker, Ige F and Harry H. G. Post. 1992. The Gulf War o f1980-1988: The Iran-Iraq War in legal perspective. London: Martinus Nijoff. 365 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. 1987 [1980]. A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia, translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. DeMars, William. 1997. Contending neutralities: humanitarian organizations and war in the Horn o f Africa. In Transnational social movements and global politics, edited by Smith et al. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 101-122. Der Derian, James. 2001. Virtuous war: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media- Entertainment Network. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Der Derian, James. 1992. Antidiplomacy: Spies, terror, speed, and war. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Dickens, David and Andrea Fontana. 1994. Postmodernism and social inquiry. New York: Guilford. Dodge, Toby. 2003. Inventing Iraq: the failure o f nation-building and a history denied. New York: Columbia University Press. Dreze, Jean, and Jarod Gazdar. 1992. Hunger and poverty in Iraq, 1991. World Development 20, n. 7:921-945. Drezner, Daniel. 2000. The complex causation of sanctions outcomes. In Sanctions as economic statecraft: theory and practice, edited by Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Drezner, Daniel. 1999. The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ekeus, Rolf. 1995. The U. N. and Arms Control in Iraq. Journal o f International Affairs 49, n.l. von Elbe, Joachim. 1939. The evolution o f the concept of just war in international law. American Journal o f International Law 33, n.4:665-88. Elliott, Kimberly. 1998. The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty? International security 29, n. 1:50-65. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2003a. Just war against terror: the burden o f American power in a violent world. New York: Basic Books. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2003b. Will it be a ‘Just W ar’ or just a war? Los Angeles Times 19 February, B10. 366 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1994. Thinking about women and international violence. In Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1992a. Just War as politics: what the Gulf War told us about contemporary American life. In But Was It Just? Reflections on the Morality o f the Persian Gulf War, edited by David E. Decrosse. NY: Doubleday, 43-60. Elshtain, Jean Bethke, ed. 1992b. Just war theory. New York: New York University Press. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1988. The problem with peace. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 17, n.3:441-49. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987a. Against androgeny. In Feminism and Equality, edited by Anne Phillips. New York: New York University Press, 1987. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987b. Women and war. Washington Square, New York: New York University Press. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1985. Reflections on war and political discourse: realism, just war, and feminism in a nuclear age. Political Theory 13, n.l :39-57. Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1983. On Beautiful Souls, Just Warriors, and feminist consciousness. In Women and men’ s wars, edited by Judith Steihm. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983. Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. Maneuvers: the international politics o f militarizing women’ s lives. Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 1993. The morning after: sexual politics at the end o f the Cold War. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. Bananas, beaches, and bases: making feminist sense o f international politics. Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 1989. Does khaki become you? The militarization o f women’ s lives. London: Pandora Press. Eppel, Michael. 1994. The Palestine conflict in the history o f modern Iraq. London: Frank Cass. Esposito, John L. 2002. Unholy war. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esposito, John L. 1992. The Islamic threat: myth or reality? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 367 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Esposito, John L. 1988. Islam: the straight path. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fairc lough, Norman. 1995. Critical discourse analysis: the critical study o f language. London: Longman. Fairclough, Norman. 1989. Language and power. London: Longman. Falk, Richard. 2003. The great terror war. New York: Olive Branch Press. Falk, Richard. 2001. Defining a just war. The Nation, 29 October, 11-15. Falk, Richard. 1999. Kosovo, world order, and the future of international law. American Journal o f International Law 93. Farrell, Daniel M. 1992. Immoral intentions. Ethics 102, n.2:268-86. Ferguson, Ann. 1996. Can I choose who I am? And how would that empower me? Gender, race, identities, and the self. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Ferguson, Kathy E. 1993. The man question: visions o f subjectivity in feminist theory. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization 52, n.4:887-918. Fisk, Robert. 2004. Iraq, 1917. The Independent. March. Fisk, Robert. 2000. The hidden war. In Iraq under siege, edited by Anthony Amove. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Fite, David; Marc Genest; and Clyde Wilcox. 1990. Gender differences in foreign policy attitudes: a longitudinal analysis. American Politics Quarterly 18, n.4:492-512. Flax, Jane. 1987. Postmodernism and gender relations in feminist theory. Signs: The Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 12, n.4:621-43. Florini, Ann, ed. 2000. The thirdforce: the rise o f transnational civil society. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Fonow, Mary Margaret and Judith A. Cook, eds. 1991. Beyond methodology: feminist scholarship as lived research. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Forde, Steven. 1998. Hugo Grotius on ethics and war. American Political Science Review 92, n.3:639-648. 368 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Franck, Thomas M. 2001. Terrorism and the right of self-defense. American Journal o f International Law 95, n.4:839-43. Franck, Thomas M. 1988. Legitimacy in the international system. American Journal o f International Law. 82, n.4:705-759. Franklin, David. 2001. A peace to end all peace: the fall o f the Ottoman Empire and the creation o f the modern Middle East. New York: Owl Books. Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh. 1993. The Gulf conflict 1990-1: Diplomacy and war in the New World Order. London and Boston: Faber and Faber. Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. 1991. Saddam Hussain: A political biography. London: Brassey’s. Friedman, Norman. 1999. The fifty year war: conflict and strategy in the Cold War. Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press. Friedman, Thomas L. 2002. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Op-ed, The New York Times, 12 January, A25. Friedman, Thomas L. 2001. World War III. Op-ed, The New York Times, 13 September, A27. Frye, Marilyn. 1996. The possibility of feminist theory. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Gardam, Judith G. 1996. Legal restraints on Security Council military enforcement action. Michigan Journal o f International Law 17, n.2:285-315. Gardam, Judith G. 1993a. Proportionality and force in international law. The American Journal o f International Law 87, n.3:391-413. Gardam, Judith G. 1993b. Gender and non-combatant immunity. Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 3:345-370. Gardam, Judith G. 1992. Non-combatant immunity and the Gulf conflict. Virginia Journal o f International Law 32, n.4:813-36. Gardam, Judith, and Hilary Charlesworth. 2002. Protection of women in armed conflict. Human Rights Quarterly 22, n. 1:148-66. Gardam, Judith, and Michelle Jervis. 2001. Women, armed conflict, and international law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 369 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Garfield, Richard. 2000. Changes in health and well-being in Iraq during the 1990s. In Sanctions on Iraq: background, consequences, strategies. Cambridge: Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. Garry, Ann and Marilyn Pearsall, eds. 1996. Women, knowledge, and reality. New York and London: Routledge. Gause, Gregory F. III. 1999. Getting it backward on Iraq. Foreign Affairs 78, n.3:54- 65. Geyer, Alan, and Barbara G. Green. 1992. Lines in the sand: justice and the Gulf War. Louisville, KY: Westminister/John Knox Press. Ghobarah, Hazem; Paul Huth; and Bruce Russett. 2003. Civil wars kill and maim people long after the shooting stops. American Political Science Review 97, n.2:189-202. Gibson-Graham, J. K. 1994. ‘Stuffed If I Know!’: Reflections on post-modern feminist social research. Gender, Place, and Culture 1, n.2: 205-224. Giddens, Anthony. 1979. Central problems in social theory: action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Giddens, Anthony. 1976. New rules o f sociological method. New York: Hutchinson. Gidengil, Elisabeth. 1995. Economic man - social woman? The case of the gender gap in support for the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. Comparative Political Studies 28:384-408. Gilligan, Carol. 1977. Concept o f the self and o f morality. Harvard Educational Review 47, n.4:481-517. Giossi, Sylvie. 2001. Strengthening protection in war: a search fo r professional standards. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. Goehring, Dwight and Wayne Woo. 1997. Comparison o f service populations of the Vietnam conflict and the Persian Gulf war. DMDC Data Request Archive. www.dmdc.osd.mil/ids/archive/vietnam/body.htm Goetz, Anne M. 1991. Feminism and the claim to know: contradictions in feminist approaches to Women in Development. In Gender and International Relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Goldstein, Joshua S. 2002. John Wayne and GI Jane. Christian Science Monitor 10 January. 370 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Goldstein, Joshua S. 2001. War and gender: how gender shapes the war system and vice versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goonsekere, Savitri. 1992. Women’ s rights and children’ s rights: the U . N. Conventions as compatible and complementary international treaties. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Centre. Gordon, Joy. 2002. When intent makes all the difference in the world: economic sanctions on Iraq and the accusation o f genocide. Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 5:57-84. Gordon, Joy. 1999a. Sanctions as siege warfare. The Nation 268, n. 11:18-20. Gordon, Joy. 1999b. Economic sanctions, just war doctrine, and the ‘Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian Dead. Cross Currents 49, n.3. Gordon, Joy. 1999c. A peaceful, silent, deadly remedy: The ethics o f economic sanctions. Ethics and International Affairs 13:123-42. Gorry, Jon. 2000. ‘Just W ar’ or just war? The future(s) of a tradition. Politics 20, n.3: 177-183. Graham-Brown, Sarah. 2000. Sanctioning Iraq: A failed policy. Middle East Report 215:8-13. Graham-Brown, Sarah. 1999. Sanctioning Saddam: The politics o f intervention in Iraq. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers. Grant, Rebecca. 2001. The sources of gender violence in international relations theory. In Gender and international relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Grant, Rebecca and Kathleen Newland, eds. 1991. Gender and International Relations. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Greenwood, Christopher. 1993. Customary international law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf conflict. In The Gulf War 1990-1 in International and English Law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 63-88. Gresh, Alain. 2000. Oil for food: the true story. Le Monde Diplomatique. www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq 1 /oilforfood/OOgresh.html (17 April 2002). Grotius, Hugo. 1952 [1625]. Deiure belli acpads. Dordecht: Martin Nijoff Publishers. 371 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Grotius, Hugo. 1950 [1604]. Commentary on the law o f prize and booty, translated by Gwladys L. Williams and Walter H. Zydel. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Gulich, Elisabeth and Uta M. Quasthoff. 1985. Narrative Analysis. In Handbook o f Discourse Analysis v.2, edited by Teun A. van Dijk. London: Academic Press: 169- 97. Haass, Richard. 1998a. Economic sanctions and American diplomacy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Haass, Richard. 1998b. Economic sanctions: Too much of a bad thing. Columbia Haass, Richard. 1997. Sanctioning madness. Foreign Affairs 76, n.6. Haass, Richard and Megan O ’Sullivan. 2000. Honey and vinegar: incentives, sanctions, and foreign policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1986. Hannah Arendt’s communications concept o f power. In Power, edited by Steven Lukes. New York: New York University Press. Habermas, Jurgen. 1972. [1968]. Knowledge and human interests, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. New York: Beacon Press. Haeri, Safa. 2004. Iran and Iraq, future leaders o f the Middle East or bitter enemies? Iran Press Service 5 July. Hajer, Maarten. 1995. The politics o f environmental discourse: ecological modernization and the policy process. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Halberstam, Judith. 1998. Female masculinity. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Hall, John R. 1999. Cultures o f inquiry: from epistemology to discourse in sociohistorical research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Halliday, Fred. 1991. Hidden from international relations: women and the international arena. In Gender and International Relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991. Halliday, Dennis. 1998. Sanctions on Iraq. Speech delivered at Harvard University, 5 November. Hampson, Francoise J. 1993a. Means and methods o f war in the G ulf conflict. In The G ulf War 1990-1 in international and English law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 89-110. 372 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hampson, Francoise J. 1993b. Liability for war crimes. In The G ulf War 1990-1 in international and English law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 241-60. Hansen, Lene. 2001. Gender, nation, rape: Bosnia and the construction of security. International Feminist Journal o f Politics 3, n.l:55-75. Haraway, Donna. 1990. A manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology and socialist feminism in the 1980's. In Feminism/Postmodernism, edited by Linda Nicholson. New York: Routledge, 190-233. Harding, Sandra. 1998. Is science multicultural? postcolonialisms, feminisms, and epistemologies. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Harding, Sandra, ed. 1987. Feminism and methodology: social science issues. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Harding, Sandra. 1983. Why has the sex/gender system become visible only now? In Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy o f science, edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Harding, Sandra, and Merrill B. Hintikka. 1983. Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy o f science. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Harding, Sandra, and Uma Narayan. 1998. Border crossings: multicultural and postcolonial feminist challenges to philosophy. Hypatia 13, n.3:1-5. Harries, Richard. 1990. Introduction. In Just deterrence: morality and deterrence into the 21st Century, edited by Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham. London: Brassey’s. Hartigan, Richard Shelly. 1982. The forgotten victim: a history o f the civilian. Chicago: Precedent Publishing. Hartsock, Nancy. 1987. The feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism. In Feminism and methodology: social science issues, edited by Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hartsock, Nancy. 1983. The barracks community in Western political thought: prolegomena to a feminist critique of war and politics. In Women and m en’ s wars, edited by Judith Stiehm. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 373 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hartung, Beth; Jane C. Ollenburger; Helen A. Moore; and Mary Jo Deegan. 1988. Empowering a feminist ethic for social science research: the Nebraska Sociological Feminist Collective. In A feminist ethic for social science research, by the Nebraska Sociological Feminist Collective. Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press. Haslanger, Sally. 1996. Objective reality, male reality, and social construction. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Haslanger, Sally. 1993. On being objective and being objectified. In A mind o f one’ s own: feminist essays in reason and objectivity, edited by Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hauerwas, Stanley. 1992a. On surviving justly: ethics and nuclear disarmament. In Just war theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. Hauerwas, Stanley. 1992b. Whose just war? Whose peace? In But was it just? Reflections on the morality o f the Persian Gulf War, edited by David E. Decrosse. New York: Doubleday, 83-106. Hawkesworth, Mary E. 1989. Knowers, knowing, known: feminist theory and claims of truth. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 14, n.3:533-557. Heckman, Susan. 1997. Truth and method: feminist standpoint theory revisited. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 22, n.2:341-365. Helgeland, John; Robert Daly; and J. Patout Bums. 1985. Christians and the military: the early experience. Minneapolis: Augsburg fortress publishers. Hehir, Bryan. 1996. The use of force in the post-Cold War world. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Foundation Press. Helms, C. M. 1984. Iraq: Eastern flank o f the Arab world. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hiro, D. 1991. The longest war: the Iran-Iraq military conflict. New York: Routledge. Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. National power and the structure offoreign trade. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hirschmann, Nancy. 1989. Freedom, recognition, and obligation: a feminist approach to political theory. The American Political Science Review 83, n.4:1277-1244. Hoffman, Frederick. 1967. The functions of economic sanctions: a comparative analysis. Journal o f Peace Research 4. 374 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hoffman, John. 2001. Gender and sovereignty: feminism, the state, and international relations. New York: Palgrave. Hollis, Rosemary. 2000. Managing new developments in the Gulf. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Holmes, Robert. 1992. Can war be morally justified? The Just War theory. In Just War Theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. Holmes, Robert. 1989. On war and morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Holsti, Ole R., and James Rosenau. 1981. The foreign policy beliefs o f women in leadership positions. Journal o f Politics 43, n.2:326-48. Holzgrefe, J. L. and Robert Keohane, eds. 2003. Humanitarian intervention: ethical, legal, and political dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. hooks, bell. 1996. Choosing the margin as a space o f radical openness. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Hooper, Charlotte. 2001. Manly states: masculinities, international relations, and gender politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Hooper, Charlotte. 2000. Masculinities in transition: the case of globalization. In Gender and global restructuring: sightings, sites, and resistances, edited by Marianne H. Marchand and Anne Sisson Runyan. London and New York: Routledge. Hooper, Charlotte. 1998. Masculinist practices and gender politics: the operation of multiple masculinities in international relations. In The “ Man ” question in international relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Prapart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Homus, Jean-Michel. [1960] 1979. Its not lawful for me to fight: early Christian attitudes toward war, violence, and the state, translated by Alan Kreider and Oliver Cobum. Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press. Hoskins, Eric. 1997. The humanitarian impacts o f sanctions and war on Iraq. In Political gain and civilian pain: humanitarian impacts o f economic sanctions, edited by Thomas G. Weiss, David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Larry Minear. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Howard, Michael. 1992. Temperamenta belli: can war be controlled? In Just War Theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. 375 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hufbauer, Gaiy C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. 1990. Economic sanctions reconsidered: history and current policy. Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics. Human Rights Watch. 1991. Needless deaths in the G ulf War: Civilian casualties during the air campaign and violations o f the laws o f war. New York: Human Rights Watch. Huntley, Wade. 1997. An unlikely match: Kant and feminism in IR theory. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 26, n.2:279-320. Hussain, Azfar. 2000. Joy Harjo and her poetics as praxis. Wicazo Sa Review. Fall, 27- 61. Huston, Nancy. 1983. Tales of war and tears o f women. In Women and men's wars, edited by Judith Steihm. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Hutchings, Kimberly. 1999. Feminism, universalism, and the ethics of international politics. In Women, culture, and international relations, edited by Vivienne Jabri and Eleanor O ’Gorman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Iran Chamber Society. 2004. Webpage archives, www.iranchambersociety.org. Isenberg, Nancy. 1992. The personal is political: gender, feminism, and the politics of discourse theory. American Quarterly 44, n.3:449-458. Jabri, Vivienne. 1999. Explorations of difference in normative international relations. In Women, culture, and international relations, edited by Vivienne Jabri and Eleanor O ’Gorman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Jabri, Vivienne and Eleanor O ’Gorman, eds. 1999. Women, culture, and international relations Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Jaggar, Alison. 1998. Globalizing feminist ethics. Hypatia 13, n.2:7-31. Jaggar, Alison. 1996. Love and knowledge: emotion in feminist epistemology. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Jay, Martin. 1973. The dialectical imagination. Boston: Little, Brown. Jennings, Ann L. 1993. Public or private? Institutional economics and feminism. In Beyond economic MAN: feminist theory and economics, edited by Marianne Farber and Julie Nelson. Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press. Joachim, Jutta. 2003. Framing issues and seizing opportunities: the U. N., NGOs, and women’s rights. International Studies Quarterly 47, n.2:247-274. 376 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Joachim, Jutta. 1999. Shaping the human rights agenda: the case of violence against women. In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Johnson, James Turner. 2003. Aquinas and Luther on war and peace. Journal o f Religious Ethics 31, n. 1:3-20. Johnson, James Turner. 2002. Jihad and just war. First Things 124:12-14. Johnson, James Turner. 1999. Morality and contemporary warfare. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Johnson, James Turner. 1997. The holy war idea in Western and Islamic tradition. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Johnson, James Turner. 1992. Threats, values, and defense: does the defense of values by force remain a moral possibility? Just war theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. Johnson, James Turner. 1991. The Just War tradition and the American military. In Just War and the G ulf War, edited by James Turner Johnson and George Weigel. Lanham, MD: Ethics and Public Policy Center and University Press o f America. Johnson, James Turner. 1984. Can modern war be just? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Johnson, James Turner and George Wiegel, eds. 1991. Just War and the Gulf War. Lanham, MD: Ethics and Public Policy Center and University Press of America. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. Cultural realism: strategic culture and grand strategy in Chinese history. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jones, Adam. 2002. Gendercide and genocide in Rwanda. Journal o f Genocide Studies 4, n. 1:65-94. Jones, Adam. 2000. Gendercide and genocide. Journal o f Genocide Studies 2, n.2: 185-212. Jones, Kathleen B. 1993. Compassionate authority: democracy and the representation o f women. New York and London: Routledge. Joseph, Suad. 1991. Elite strategies for state-building: women, family, religion, and the state in Iraq and Lebanon. In Women, Islam, and the state, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 377 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Joyce, Miriam. 1998. Kuwait, 1945-1996: an Anglo-American perspective. Washington, D.C.: Frank Cass Publishers. Kalshoven, Fritz. 1987. Constraints on the waging o f war. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. Kalshoven, Fritz. 1973. The law o f warfare: a summary o f its recent history and trends in development. Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff. Kandiyoti, Deniz, ed. 1991. Women, Islam, and the state. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Karam, Azza. 2001. Women in war and peacebuilding: the roads traversed, the challenges ahead. International Feminist Journal o f Politics 3, n.l:2-25. Karsh, Efraim. 2002. The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988. London: Osprey’s. Karsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi. 2003. Saddam Hussein: a political biography. Berkeley, CA: Grove/Atlantic. Kauffman, Bette J. 1992. Feminist facts: interview strategies and political subjects in ethnography. Culture 2, n.3:187-206. Kaufman, N. and S. A. Linquist. 1995. Critiquing gender-neutral treaty language: the convention on the elimination of all forms o f discrimination against women. In Women's rights, human rights: international feminist perspectives, edited by J. Peters and A. Wolper. London: Routledge. Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keddie, Nikki R. 2003. Modern Iran: roots and results o f the Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1995. Refiguring life: metaphors o f twentieth century biology (The Welleck Lectures). New York: Columbia University Press. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1985. Reflection on gender and science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1983. Gender and science. In Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy o f science, edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintakka. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Kelly, Kathy. 2000. Raising voices: the children of Iraq, 1990-91. In Iraq under siege, edited by Anthony Amove. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. 378 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kelsay, John. 1993. Islam and war: a study in comparative ethics. Louisville, KY: Westminister/John Knox Press. Keohichian, Joseph. 2001. Iraq, Iran and the Arab Gulf states. London: Palgrave. Keohane, Robert O. 1998. Response to J. Ann Tickner. International Studies Quarterly 42, n.l. Khadduri, Majid. 1988. The Gulf War: the origins and implications o f the Iran-Iraq conflict. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Khadduri, Majid. 1955. War and peace in the law o f Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Khadduri, Walid. 2000. U. N. sanctions on Iraq: 10 years later. Middle East Policy 7, n.4. Khagram, Sangees; James Riker; and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 2002. Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. King, Ynestra. 1999. Towards an ecological feminism and a feminist ecology. In Debating the earth: the environmental politics reader, edited by John S. Dryzek and David Schlosberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kinsella, Helen. 2003. Securing the civilian: gendering Grotius. In Power and global governance, edited by Michael Barnett and Robert Duvall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kirsch, Gesa E. 1999. Ethical dilemmas in feminist research: the politics o f location, interpretation, and publication. Albany, NY: State University o f New York Press. Klotz, Audie. 1995. Norms reconstructing interests. New York: Columbia University Press. Knorr, Klaus. 1975. The power o f nations: the political economy o f international relations. New York: Basic Books. Krause, Keith; and Michael C. Williams, eds. 1997. Critical security studies, concepts and cases. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Kurzman, Charles. 2004. The unthinkable revolution in Iran. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 379 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes. 1997. Beyond belief: ideas and symbolic technologies in the study o f international relations. European Journal o f International Relations 3, n. 2:193-237. Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Langley, Kathleen. 1967. Industrialization o f Iraq. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lawson, F. H. 1997. Rethinking the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Working Paper 91 (Y) January. Los Angeles: Center for International Studies, the University o f Southern California. Leeman, Richard. 1991. The rhetoric o f terrorism and counterterrorism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Lennie, June. 1999. Deconstructing gendered power relations in participatory planning: towards an empowering feminist framework of participation and action. Women’ s Studies Internatonal Forum 22, n. 1. Lepard, Brian. 2002. Rethinking humanitarian intervention: a fresh legal approach based on fundamental ethical principles in international law and world religion. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Lewis, Bernard. 2003b. What went wrong? The clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. New York: HarperCollins Perennial. Leyton-Brown, David. 1987. The utility o f economic sanctions. London: Helm. Lindsey, Charlotte. 2001. Women facing war. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. Lloyd, Genevieve. 1996. The man of reason. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Lloyd, Genevieve. 1993. Maleness, metaphor, and the ‘crisis’ of reason. In A mind o f one’ s own: feminist essays in reason and objectivity, edited by Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Logan, Mary Ellen and Helen Huntley. 2001. Gender and power in the research process. Women’ s Studies International Forum 24, n.6:623-35. Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls built on sand: migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait. New York: Westview. 380 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Lopez, George A. 2002. Ethics and law in a new type of war. Peace Colloquy 2:9-11. Lopez, George A. 2001. Toward smart sanctions on Iraq. Columbia International Affairs Online Policy Briefs and Economic Indicators, April 2001, accessed 3/26/2002 at www.ciaonet.org/pbei/kroc/log01.html. Luban, David. 1980. Just War and human rights. Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, n.2: 160-81. Lukes, Steven, ed. 1986. Power. New York: New York University Press. Mackey, Sandra. 2003. The reckoning: Iraq and the legacy o f Saddam Hussein. New York: W.W. Norton. MacKinnon, Catherine. 2001. Sex equality. New York: Foundation Press. MacKinnon, Catherine. 1993. Only Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. MacKinnon, Catherine. 1987. Feminism unmodified: essays on life and law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McAdam, Doug. 1988. Gender implications of the traditional academic conception of the political. In Changing Our Minds: Feminist Transformations o f Knowledge, edited by Susan Aiken et al. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. McAdam, Doug; John McCarthy; and Meyer Zald. 1996. Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. McCall, Malcolm, and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds. 1990. Just deterrence: morality and deterrence into the 21st century. London: Brassey’s. McCloskey, Donald N. 1993. Some consequences of a conjective economics. In Beyond Economic Man, edited by Julie Nelson and Marianne Farber, 69-93. McCoubrey, Heather. 1993a. The wounded and sick. In The Gulf War 1990-1 in international and English law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 171-187. McCoubrey, Heather. 1993b. Civilians in occupied territory, In The G ulf War 1990-1 in international and English law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 205-223. McKenna, Joseph C. 1960. Ethics and war: a Catholic view. The American Political Science Review 54, n.3:647-58. 381 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. McKeogh, Colm. 2002. Innocent civilians: the morality o f killing in war. New York: Palgrave. McLeer, Anne. 1998. Saving the victim: recurperating the language of the victim and reassessing global feminism. Hypatia 13, n.l:41-55. McMahan, Jeff. 1993. Killing, letting die, and withdrawing aid. Ethics 103, n.2:250- 279. Machiavelli, Nicolo. 1950. The Prince and the Discourses, edited by Max Lerner. New York: McGraw-Hill. Makiya, Kanan. 1998. The republic offear: the politics o f modern Iraq. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Marchand, Marianne H. and Anne Sisson Runyan, eds. 2000. Gender and global restructuring: sightings, sites, and resistances. London and New York: Routledge. Marr, Phoebe. 2003. Modern history o f Iraq. New York: Westview. Martin, Jane Roland. 1994. Methodological essentialism, false difference, and other dangerous traps. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 19, n.3:630-657. Martin, Lisa. 1993. Credibility, costs, and institutions: cooperation on economic sanctions. World Politics 45, n.3:406-432. Martin, Lisa. 1992. Coercive cooperation: Explaining multilateral economic sanctions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Maull, Hanns W. and Otto Pick. 1990. The Gulf War: regional and international dimensions. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mavordes, George R. 1975. Conventions and the morality of war. Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, n.2:117-131. Maynard, Mary. 1994. Methods, practice, and epistemology: the debate about feminism and research. In Researching women’ s lives from a feminist perspective, edited by Mary Maynard and June Purvis. London: Taylor and Francis. Maynard, Mary and June Purvis, eds. 1994. Researching women’ s lives from a feminist perspective London: Taylor and Francis. Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security 15, n.l. Mearshimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. 2003. An unnecessary war. Foreign Policy 134:50-59. 382 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Melby, Eric D. K. 1998. Iraq. In Economic sanctions and American diplomacy, edited by Richard Haass. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Member States o f the United Nations. Charter o f the United Nations. 26 June 1945. Meyer, Mary K. 1999. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom: organizing women for peace in the war system. In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Meyer, Mary K. and Elisabeth Prugl, eds. 1999. Gender politics in global governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Miers, Ann, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2002. Multilateral sanctions and foreign policy success: Can too many cooks spoil the broth? International Interactions 28, n. 2:117-36. Miller, Alice M. 1999. Realizing women’s human rights: nongovernmental organizations and United Nations Treaty Bodies. In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Milliken, Jennifer. 1999. The study of discourse in International Relations: a critique of research and methods. European Journal o f International Relations 5, n.2:225-54. Minear, Larry. 2001. The humanitarian enterprise: dilemmas and discoveries. San Francisco: Kumarian Press. Misra, Joya. 1999. Gender and the world-system: engaging the feminist literature on development. In Cases, places, and people: world-systems studies, edited by Thomas Hall. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. Moeller, Susan. 1998. Compassion fatigue: how the media sell feminine, disease, war, and death. New York: Routledge. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1988. Under Western eyes: feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. Feminist Review 30:61-88. Moin, Bager. 2000. Khomeini: the life o f the Ayatollah. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. Moon, Katharine. 1997. Sex among allies: militarized prostitution in U.S.-South Korea relations. New York: Columbia University Press. Morgan, T. Clifton. 1994. Untying the knot o f war. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 383 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach. 1997. Fools suffer gladly: The use of economic sanctions in international crises. International Studies Quarterly 41:27- 50. Morgenthau, Hans J. [1948] 1995. Politics among nations (Brief Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. Moulton, Janice. 1996. A paradigm of philosophy: the adversary method. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Mueller, John, and Karl Mueller. 1999. Sanctions of mass destruction. Foreign Affairs 78, n.3:43-53. Munro, Alan. 1996. An Arabian affair: politics and diplomacy behind the Gulf War. London: Brasseys. Munthe, Turi. 2002. The Saddam Hussein reader. Berkeley, CA: Thunder’s Mouth Press. Murden, S. 1995. Emergent regional powers and international relations in the Gulf, 1988-1991. Reading, PA: Ithaca Press. Murphy, Craig N. 1998. Six masculine roles in international relations and their interconnection: a personal investigation. In The “ Man ” question in international relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Prapart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Nakah, Yitzhak. 2003. The Shi’ is o f Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Narayan, Uma. 1998. Essence of culture and a sense of history: a feminist critique of cultural essentialism. Hypatia 13, n.2:86-106. Narayan, Uma. 1997. Dislocating cultures: identities, tradition and Third World feminism. New Brunswick, NJ: Routledge. Neff, Donald. 1995. Israel bombs Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research facility. Middle East History June 1995. Nelson, Julie. 1993. The study of choice or the study o f provisioning? Gender and the definition o f economics. In Beyond economic man, edited by Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Niblock, Tim. 2001. Pariah states & sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Nichols, Thomas M. 2003. Just War, not prevention. Ethics and International Affairs. 17, n.l. 384 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Niva, Steve. 1998. Tough and tender: new world order masculinity and the Gulf War. In The “ man ” question in international relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Nossal, Kim Richard. 1989. International sanctions as international punishment. International Organization 43, n. 2:301-322. Nussbaum, Martha. 1997. Kant and cosmopolitanism, in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’ s Cosmopolitan Ideal, eds. James Bohmann and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 25-58. Nusseibeh, Sari. 1992. Can wars be just? A Palestinian viewpoint on the Gulf War. In But was it just? Reflections on the morality o f the Persian Gulf War, edited by David E. Decrosse. New York: Doubleday, 61-82. O ’Brien, William V. 1969. War and/or survival. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday. O ’Brien, William V. 1992. The challenge of war: a Christian realist perspective. In Just War Theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. Odell, John. 2000. Negotiating the world economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. O’Gorman, Eleanor. 1999. Writing women’s wars: foucauldian strategies of engagement. In Women, culture, and international relations, edited by Eleanor O ’Gorman and Vivienne Jabri. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. O ’Gorman, Eleanor and Vivienne Jabri, eds. 1999. Women, culture, and international relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Okin, Susan Moller. 1998. Feminism, women’s human rights, and cultural differences. Hypatia 13, n.2:32-52. Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. World o f our making: rules and rule in social theory and international politics. Columbia, SC: University o f South Carolina Press. Opeskin, Brian, and Shelley Wright. 1991. War crimes and the Gulf War. Current Affairs 68, n.12. Orend, Brian. 2000. War and international justice: a Kantian perspective. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Palmer-Femandez, Gabriel. 1998. The targeting of civilian populations in war. In Encyclopedia o f applied ethics. San Diego: Academic Press, 509-25. 385 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Pape, Robert. 1998. Why economic sanctions still do not work. International Security 23, n. 1:66-77. Pape, Robert. 1997. Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security 22, n.2:90-136. Parasiliti, Andrew T. 2003. The causes and timing of Iraq’s wars: a power cycle analysis. International Political Science Review 24, n. 1:151 -65. Partner, Peter. 1997. God o f battles: holy wars in Christianity and Islam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pateman, Carole. 1987. Feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy. In Feminism and equality, edited by Anne Phillips. New York: New York University Press. Payne, Rodger. 2002. Persuasion, frames, and norm construction. European Journal of International Relations 7, n. 1:3 7-61. Peach, Lucinda J. 1994. An alternative to pacifism? Feminism and just-war theory. Hypatia 9, n.2:152-171. Pefanis, Jullian. 1991. Heterology and the postmodern: Bataille, Baudrillard, Lyotard. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Pellet, Peter. 2000. Sanctions, food, nutrition, and health in Iraq. In Iraq under siege, edited by Anthony Amove. Cambridge, MA: South End Press. Pelletiere, D.C.; D. Johnson; and L. Rosenberger. 1990. Iraqi power and US security in the Middle East. Carlisle Barrack, PA: US Army War College. Peterson, V. Spike. 1999. Sexing political identities/nationalism as heterosexism. International Feminist Journal o f Politics 1, n.l:34-65. Peterson, V. Spike. 1992. Transgressing boundaries: theories of knowledge, gender, and international relations. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 21, n.2:183- 206. Peterson, V. Spike. 1990. Whose rights? A critique of the ‘givens’ in human rights discourse. Alternatives 15:303-344. Peterson, V. Spike and Anne Sisson Runyan. 1999. Global gender issues. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Peterson, V. Spike and Jacqui True. 1998. ‘New times’ and new conversations. In The “ Man ” question in international relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jacqui True. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 386 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Pettman, Jan Jindy. 1996. Worlding women: Afeminist international politics. London and New York: Routledge. Philipose, Liz. 1996. The laws of war and women’s human rights. Hypatia 11, n.4:46- 62. Phillips, Anne, ed. 1987. Feminism and equality. New York: New York University Press. Phillips, Robert L. 1984. War and justice. Norman, OK: University o f Oklahoma Press. Pilger, John. 2000. Squeezed to death. The Guardian, op-ed. 4 March. Plato. 1961. Crito, translated by Hugh T rednick. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Epinomus, translated by A. E. Taylor. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Euthyphro, translated by Lane Cooper. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Laws, translated by A. E. Taylor. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Phaedo, translated by Hugh Trednick. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Phaedrus, translated by R. Hackforth. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Protagoras, translated by W. K. C. Guthrie. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Plato. 1961. Republic, translated by Paul Shorey. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. 387 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Plato. 1961. Statesman, translated by J. B. Skemp. In The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series LXXI. Points, M. 1991. Electronic Iraq. Diaries of Iraqi experiences. Pringle, R. and S. Watson. 1992. Women’s interests and the post-structuralist state. In Destabilizing theory, edited by Michele Barrett. London: Polity Press. Pritchard, Elizabeth A. 2000. The way out west: development and the rhetoric of mobility in postmodern feminist theory. Hypatia 15, n.3:45-72. Provost, Rene. 1992. Starvation as a weapon: Legal implications o f the United Nations food blockade against Iraq and Kuwait. Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 30, n.l:578-639. Prugl, Elisabeth. 1999. The global construction o f gender: home-based work in the political economy o f the 2<fh century. New York: Columbia University Press. Rai, Milan. 1995. Chomsky’ s politics. London: Verso Books. Ramesh, Randeep. 2004. The war we could not stop: the real story o f the battle fo r Iraq. Berkeley, CA: Thunder’s Mouth Press. Ramsey, Paul. 1992. Just war according to St. Augustine. In Just war theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. Ramsey, Paul. 1968. The just war. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Ratner, Steven. 2002. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello after September 11. American Journal o f International Law 96, n.4:905-21. Rawls, John. 1971. A theory o f justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reardon, Betty. 1985. Sexism and the war system. New York: Teachers’ College Press. Regan, Richard J. 1996. Just War: principles and cases. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. Rehn, Elizabeth and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. 2002. Women, war, and peace: the independent experts ’ assessment o f the impact o f armed conflice on women and women’ s role in peace-building. New York: UNIFEM. Reiff, David. 1995. Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure o f the West. New York: Simon and Schuster. 388 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reisman, W. Michael. 2003. Assessing claims to revise the laws o f war. American Journal o f International Law 97, n. 1:82-90. Rengger, Nicholas. 2002. On the just war tradition in the twenty-first century. International Affairs 78, n.2:353-63. Rich, Paul. 2001. Iraq and imperialism: Thomas Lyell’ s ‘The ins and outs o f Mesopotamia’ . New York: Author’s Choice. Risse, Thomas. 2000. Let’s argue: communicative action in world politics. International Organization 54, n. 1:1-39. Roach, Colleen. 1991. Feminist peace researchers, culture, and communications. Media Development 2. Roberts, Adam. 2001. Humanitarian issues and agencies as triggers for international military action. In Civilians at war, edited by Simon Chesterman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 177-196. Roberts, Adam. 1993. Failures in protecting the environment in the 1990-1 Gulf War. in The Gulf War 1990-1 in International and English Law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 111-154. Robinson, Fiona. 2001. Competition or care? The ethical basis o f state and society in a globalizing world. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2001 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA. Robinson, Fiona. 1999. Globalizing care: ethics, feminist theory, and international relations Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Rogers, Elizabeth. 1996. Using economic sanctions to control regional conflicts. Security Studies 5, n.4:43-72. Rohrer, Tim. 1995. The metaphorical logic of (political) rape revisited: new wor(l)d order. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 10, 2. Rosenblatt, Lionel. 1996. The media and the refugee. In From massacres to genocide, edited by Robert Rotberg and Thomas Weiss. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 136-48. Rostow, Eugene V. 1995. Towards a managed peace: national security interests o f the U.S., 1759-Present. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Rowe, Peter, ed. 1993. The Gulf War 1990-1 in international and English law. London and New York: Routledge. 389 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ruddick, Sara. 1989. Maternal thinking: towards a politics o f peace. New York: Houghton-Miffin. Rummell, R. J. 1994. Death by government. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Runyan, Anne Sisson and V. Spike Peterson. 1991. The radical future o f realism: feminist subversions of IR theory. Alternatives 16:67-106. Russell, F.H. 1975. The just war in the middle ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russett, Bruce. 1982. Defense expenditures and national well-being. American Political Science Review 76:767-777. Save the Children. 2002. State o f the world’ s mothers: mothers and children in war and conflict. Westport, CT: Save the Children. Schacter, Oscar. 1991. United Nations law in the Gulf conflict. American Journal o f International Law 85, n.3:452-473. Scheer, Robert. 1991. What a wonderful war. In The G ulf war reader, edited by Micah Sifry and Christoper Cerf. New York: Times Books. Scheman, Naomi. 1993. Engenderings: constructions o f knowledge, authority, and privilege. New York and London: Routledge. Schoeman, Ralph. 1997. Iraq and Kuwait: a history suppressed. New York: Veritas. Schott, Robin May. 1996. Gender and ‘postmodern war.’ Hypatia 11, n.4:19-29. Schutte, Ofelia. 1998. Cultural alterity: cross-cultural communication and feminist theory in North-South contexts. Hypatia 13, n.2:53-72. Scott, Sir Richard. 1996. Report o f the inquiry into the into the export o f defense equiptment in Iraq v. 1 and 2. London: House o f Commons. Searle, John. 1969. Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Selden, Zachary. 1999. Economic sanctions as instruments o f American foreign policy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Shalev, Chemi. 2002. Iraq attack a certainty says Israeli spy chief. Frontpage Mag 20 September. Shalom, Stephen. 1993. Imperial alibis. Boston: South End Press. 390 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Shiras, Peter. 1996. Big problems, small print: a guide to the complexity of humanitarian emergencies and the media. In From massacres to genocide, edited by Robert Rotberg and Thomas Weiss. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 93- 114. Shiva, Vandana. 1999. Development, women, and ecology. In Debating the earth: the environmental politics reader, edited by John S. Dryzek and David Schlosberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sick, Gary. 2000. The future of Iraq. Middle East Policy 1, n. 4. Sifiy, Micah L. and Christopher Cerf, eds. 1991. The Gulf war reader. New York: Times Books. Simons, Geoff. 1999. Imposing economic sanctions: Legal remedy or genocidal tool? London: Pluto Press. Simons, Geoff. 1996. The scourging o f Iraq: Sanctions, law, and natural justice. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sjoberg, Laura. 2002a. Wymyn’ s lives as a call to arms. Unpublished paper, the University o f Southern California. Sjoberg, Laura. 2002b. Is Iraq a threat to international peace and security? Paper presented to the annual symposium of women in international security, Washington, DC. June 2002. Slim, Hugo. 2003. Why protect civilians? Innocence, immunity, and enmity in war. International Affairs 79, n.3:481-501. Smeal, Elleanor. 1984. Why and how women will elect the next president. New York: Harper & Row. Smith, Dan. 1997. The state o f war and peace atlas. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute. Smith, Steve. 1998. ‘Unacceptable conclusions’ and the ‘Man’ question: masculinity, gender, and international relations. In The “ Man ” question in international relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Prapart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Smith, Thomas W. 2002. The new law of war: legitimizing hi-tech and infrastructural violence. International Studies Quarterly 46:355-74. Snow, David; Burke Rochford, Jr; Steven Wroden and Robert Benford. 1986. Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review 51, n.4:464-81. 391 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Spivak, Gayatri. 1988. Can the subaltern speak? In Marxism and the Interpretation o f Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 271-313. Steans, Jill. 1998. Gender and international relations: an introduction. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Sterba, James P. 1994. Feminist justice and the pursuit of peace. Hypatia 9, n.2:173- 186. Stiehm, Judith. 1999. United Nations peacekeeping: men’s work and women’s work. In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Stiehm, Judith, ed. 1983. Women and m en’ s wars. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Stiehm, Judith. 1982. The protected, the protector, the defender. Women’ s Studies International Forum 5, n.3/4:367-376. Sucharov, Mira. 2003. Anthologizing the peace process. In Traditions and transitions in Israel studies: books on Israel, volume 6, edited by Laura Eisenberg, Neil Caplan, Naomi Sokoloff, and Mohammed Abu-Namir. Albany, NY: State University o f New York Press. Sudetic, Chuck. 1998. Blood and vengeance. New York: W. W. Norton. Sun Tzu. 1963. The art o f war, edited by Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press. Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in action: symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review 51, n.2:273-86. Sylvester, Christine. 2002. Feminist International Relations: an unfinished journey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sylvester, Christine. 1999. In-between and in evasion of so much: Third World literatures, international relations, and postcolonial analysis. Postcolonial Studies 2, n.3:249-261. Sylvester, Christine. 1994. Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sylvester, Christine. 1990. Feminists and realists on autonomy and obligation in international relations. Center for International Studies, University o f Southern California Discussion Paper #14. 392 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. States and opportunities: the political structuring of social movements. In Comparative perspectives on social movements, edited by Doug McAdam et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in movement: social movements, collective action, and mass politics in the modem state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Teichman, Jenny. 1986. Pacifism and the just war: a study in applied philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Thomas, Ward. 2001. The ethics o f destruction: norms andforce in international relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Thompson, John B., ed. 1991. Language and symbolic power. By Pierre Bordieu. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Thompson, Karen Brown. 2002. Women’s rights are human rights. In Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms, edited by Sangeev Khagram et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Tickner, J. Ann. 2003. What is your research program? Some feminist answers to IR’s methodological questions. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 28 August 2003. Tickner, J. Ann. 2001. Gendering world politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Tickner, J. Ann. 1997. You just don’t understand: troubled engagements between feminists and IR theorists. International Studies Quarterly 41:611-32. Tickner, J. Ann. 1992. Gender in international relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security. New York: Columbia University Press. Tickner, J. Ann. 1991. Hans Morgenthau’s principles o f political realism: a feminist reformulation. In Gender and International Relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Tinker, Irene. 1999. Non-governmental organizations: an alternative power base for women? In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Tinker, Irene, ed. 1990. Persistent inequalities: women and world development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Togeby, Lise. 1994. The gender gap in foreign policy attitudes. Journal o f Peace Research 31, n.4:375-92. 393 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Travers, David. 1993. A chronology of events. In The G ulf War 1990-1 in international and English law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 3-28. Tripp, Charles. 2000. A history o f Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. True, Jacqui. 1996. Feminism. In Theories o f International Relations, edited by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater. London: Macmillian. Tucker, Robert W. 1985. Morality and deterrence. Ethics 95, n.3:461-78. United States Catholic Bishops. 1992. The challenge of peace: God’s promise and our response, the pastoral letter on war and peace. In Just war theory, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain. New York: New York University Press. Vaux, Kenneth L. 1992. Ethics and the Gulf War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Vickers, Jeanne. 1993. Women and war. London and New Jersey: Zed Books. Visser, Irene. 2002. Prototypes of gender: conceptions of feminine and masculine. Women’ s Studies International Forum 25, n.5:529-39. Walt, Stephen. 1996. Revolution and war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Walton, Andy. 2001. O f feminism and foxholes. CNN Interactive. www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001 /gulfwar/legacy/women Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. Walzer, Michael. 1992. Justice and injustice in the Gulf War. In But Was It Just? Reflections on the Morality o f the Persian Gulf War, edited by David E. Decrosse. New York: Doubleday, 1-19. Walzer, Michael. 1977. Just and unjust wars. New York: Basic Books. Walzer, Michael. 1973. Political action: the problem of dirty hands. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, n.2:160-80. Warren, Karen J. and Duane L. Cady. 1994. Feminism and peace: seeing the connections. Hypatia 9, n.2: 4-19. Weber, Cynthia. 1998. Performative states. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 27, n. 1:77-95. Weedon, Chris. 1987. Feminist practice and posts tructualist theory. New York: Blackwell. 394 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Weiss, Thomas G., David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Larry Minear, eds. 1997. Political gain and civilian pain: Humanitarian impacts o f economic sanctions Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Welch, David A. 1993. Justice and the genesis o f war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Welch, Susan and John Hibbing. 1992. Financial conditions, gender, and voting in American national elections. Journal o f Politics 54:19-213. Weller, Mark. 1993. The United Nations and jus ad bellum. In The Gulf War 1990-1 in international and English law, edited by Peter Rowe. London and New York: Routledge, 29-54. Wells, Donald A. 1969. How much c a n ‘the Just War’justify? The Journal o f Philosophy 66, n.23:819-29. White, Stephen. 2000. Sustaining affirmation: the strengths o f weak ontology in political theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Whitfield, Stephen J. 1996. The culture o f the Cold War. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Whitworth, Sandra. 1989. Gender in the inter-paradigm debate. Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 18, n.2:265-72. Whitworth, Sandra. 1994. Feminist theories: from women to gender and world politics. in Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects, edited by Peter Beckman and Francine D’Amico. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Wiegel, George. 1991. War, peace, and the Christian conscience. In Just war and the Gulf War, edited by James Turner Johnson and George Wiegel. Lanham, MD: Ethics and Public Policy Center and University Press of America. Wiegel, George. 1992. From last resort to endgame: morality, the Gulf War, and the peace process. In But was it just? Reflections on the morality o f the Persian Gulf War, edited by David E. Decrosse. New York: Doubleday, 20-43. Wight, Martin. 1978. Power politics. Leicester, UK: University of Leicester Press. Wilcox, Clyde; Lara Hewitt; and Dee Allsop. 1996. The gender gap in attitudes towards the Gulf War: a cross-national perspective. Journal o f Peace Research 33, n.l: 67- 82. Wunsch, Georg. 1936. Evangelische ethik despolitischen. Tubingen: Mohr. 395 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Yoder, John Howard. 1996. When war is unjust: being honest in just-war thinking. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. Young, Robert. 1999. Academic activism and knowledge formation in postcolonial critique. Postcolonial Studies 2, n. 1:29-34. Youngs, Gillian. 2000. Breaking patriarchial bonds: demythologizing the public/private. In Gender and global restructuring: sightings, sites, and resistances, edited by Marianne Marchand and Anne Sisson-Runyan. London and New York: Routledge. Yusoff, Nik Mohammed Affandi Bin Nik and Ismail Noor. 2004. Islam and wealth: a balanced approach to wealth creation, accumulation, and distribution. Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publishers. Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender & nation. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Zaleswki, Marysia. 1996. ‘All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up’: theorists, theories, and theorizing. In International relations: positivism and beyond, edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Maiysia Zalewski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zaleweski, Marysia and Jane Parpart, eds. 1998. The "Man” question in international relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Zehfuss, Maja. 2002. Constructivism in international relations: the politics o f reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zulaika, Joseba and William A. Douglass. 1996. Terror and taboo: the follies, fables, and faces o f terrorism. London and New York: Routledge. Zunes, Stephen. 1998. Confrontation with Iraq: A bankrupt U. S. policy. Middle East Policy 6, n.1:87-108. Zwick, Mark and Louise Zwick. 2003. Pope John Paul II calls war a defeat for humanity: neoconservative Iraq just war theories. Houston Catholic Worker 23:4. 396 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. G EN D ERIN G JU ST W AR: FEM IN ISM S, ETH IC S, A N D TH E W A RS IN IR A Q , 1990-2003 V O LU M E 2 by Laura E. Sjoberg A D issertation Presented to the FA C U LTY OF TH E G R A D U A TE SCHOO L U N IV ER SITY OF SO U TH ERN C A LIFO R N IA In Partial Fulfillm ent o f the Requirem ents for the D egree D O C TO R OF PH ILO SO PH Y (IN TERN A TIO N A L R ELA TIO N S) D ecem ber 2004 C opyright 2004 Laura E. Sjoberg Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sources Used Abdo, Nahla. 1993. Middle East politics through feminist lenses: negotiating the terms of solidarity. Alternatives 18: 29-38. Acker, Joan. 1990. Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: a theory of gendered organizations. Gender and Society 4:139-58. Aditjondro, George J. 2000. Ninjas, nanggalas, monuments, and mossad manuals: An anthropology of Indonesian state terror in East Timor. In Death squad: the anthropology o f state terror, edited Jeffrey A. Sluka. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 158-88. African Rights. 1995. Rwanda - not so innocent: When women become killers. London: African Rights. Aguire, Mariano. 2001. The media and the humanitarian spectacle. In Reflections o f Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions, edited by the Humanitarian Studies Unit. London: Pluto Press, 157-76. Ahlstrom, Christer. 1991. Casualties o f conflict: report for the World Campaign fo r the Protection o f Victims o f War. Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Aiken, Susan Hardy; Karen Anderson; Myra Dinnerstein; Judy Nolte Lensink; Patricia MacCorquodale, eds. 1988. Changing our minds: feminist transformations o f knowledge. Albany: State University o f New York Press. Alatas, Syed Farid. 1993. On the indigenization o f academic discourse. Alternatives 18: 307-38. Alcoff, Linda, and Elizabeth Potter. 1993. Feminist epistemologies, thinking gender. New York: Routledge.. Alexander, Sally. 1987. Women, class, and sexual differences. In Feminism and equality, edited by Anne Phillips. New York: New York University Press. al-Khafaji, Isam. 2000. The myth of Iraqi exceptionalism. Middle East Policy 7, n.4:62-86. Allen, Beverly. 1996. Rape warfare: the hidden genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. Allmand, Christopher. 1999. War and the non-combatant. In Medievel Warfare, edited by Maurice Keen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 397 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Alvarez, S. 1997. Contradictions of a ‘women’s space’ in a male-dominant state: the political role of the commissions on the status o f women in postauthoritarian Brazil. In Women, international development, and politics: the bureaucratic mire, 2n d ed., edited by K. Staudt. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 59-100. Amnesty International. 2002. Report 2002: The Republic o f Iraq. Amnesty International Publications, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 2001a. Iraq: the fate of 106 Religious clerics and students still unknown after ten years. M DE/014/003/2001, 29 March 2001, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 2001b. Iraq: Relentless executions must end. M DE/14/004/2001, 5 April 2001, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 2001c. Iraq: Stop the torture. M DE/14/012/2001, 8 August 2001, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 200 Id. Iraq: Systematic torture of political prisoners. M DE/14/008/2001, 10 August 2001, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 200 le. Medical letter writing action: Systematic torture, execution, and punitive surgery. M DE/14/010/2001, 15 August 2001, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 2000. Report 2000: The Republic o f Iraq. Amnesty International Publications, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1999a. Iraq: Amnesty International exposes recent abuses. MDE/014/013/1999, 24 November 1999, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1999b. Iraq: Victims of systematic repression. MDE/014/10/1999, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1999c. Report 1999, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1998a. Iraq: Amnesty International says governments must protect civilian life. MDE/014/007/1998, 17 December 1998, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1998b. Public statement: Iraq. M DE/014/002/1998,29 April 1998, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1998c. Report 1998, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. 398 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Amnesty International. 1997. Report 1997, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International. 1996. Report 1996, accessed May 2002 at www.amnesty.org. Andersen, M. 1993. The concept of mainstreaming: experience and change. In Focusing on Women: UNIFEM’ s experience with mainstreaming. New York: UNIFEM, 1-32. Anderson, Jeffrey. 2003. Viewing from the founders’ perspective the process by which the United States decided to go to war with Iraq. Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Western Section Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 10- 11. Anderson, Mary; Ann Howarth; and Catherine Overholt. 1992. A frameworkfor people- oriented planning in refugee situations taking account o f women, men and children. Geneva: UNHCR. Apel, Karl-Otto. 1997. Kant’s ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ as historical prognosis from the point o f view of moral duty. In Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’ s Cosmopolitan Ideal, edited by James Bohmann and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 79-112. Aquinas, Saint Thomas. 1959. Selected political writings, edited by. A. P. D ’Entreves. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Aquinas, Saint Thomas. 1917. Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: R. & T. Washburn. Aristotle. 1998. Nicomachean ethics, translated by David Ross. London: Oxford Univesity Press. Aristotle. 1946. Politics, translated by Ernest Barker. London: Oxford University Press. Armstrong, Pat, and M. Patricia Connelly, eds. 1999. Feminism, political economy, & the state: contested terrain. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, Inc. Ashworth, Georgina. 1988. An elf among gnomes: a feminist in North-South relations. Millenium: Journal o f International Studies 17, n.3:497-505. Ashworth, Georgina and Lucy Bonnerjea, eds. 1990. The invisible decade: UK women and the UN decade 1970-86. Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing. Augsburger, Myron S. 1981. Christian pacifism. In War: Four Christian views, edited by Robert G. Clause. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, p.79-97. 399 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. [440] 1998. The City o f God against the Pagans, translated by R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. [440] 1950. The City o f God. New York: Modem Library. Augustine, Saint, Bishop o f Hippo. 1956. Contra faustum. In Nicene andpost-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip SchafF. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. 1955. The problem o f free choice, translated by Dom Mark Pontifex. Westminister, MD: Newman Press, 1955. Ayala, Baithazar. [1582] 1912. De iure et offlciis bellicis et disciplina militari libri III. reprinted in The classics o f international law, translated by John P. Bate. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution o f Washington. Ayotte, Kevin J. 2000. Critical erasure: deconstructing the rhetoric of feminist International Relations theory. International Journal o f Forensics 2, n.3:162-203. Aziz, Tariq. 1994. The view from Baghdad. Middle East Quarterly (June): 60-71. Bahgat, Gawdat. 1995. Regional peace and stability in the Gulf. Security Dialogue 26, n.3:317-330. Bales, Robert F. 1950. Interaction process analysis, Cambridge: Addison-Wesley. Bardes, Barbara. 1992. Women and the Persian Gulf: Patriotism and war. Paper delivered at the Conference on the Political Consequences of War, Washington, DC: 28 February. Barnett, Michael. 2002. Eyewitness to genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Barnett, Michael and Robert Duvall, eds. 2003. Power and global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barstow, Anne, ed. 2000. War’ s dirty secret: rape, prostitution, and other crimes against women. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press. Bartholomeusz, Tessa. 1999. In defense of Dharma: just war ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka. Journal o f Buddhist Ethics. http://jbe.gold.ac.Uk/6/bartho991.htm (15 November 2002). Bartky, Sandra L. 1988. Foucault, femininity, and the modernization of patriarchal power. In Feminism and Foucault, edited by I. Diamond and L. Quinby. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. 400 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Bayes, Jane H. and Nayereh Tohidi, eds. 2001. Globalization, gender, and religion: the politics o f women’ s rights in Catholic and Muslim contexts. New York: Palgrave. Baynes, Kenneth. 1997. Communitarian and cosmopolitan challenges to Kant’s conception of world peace. In Perpetual peace: essays on Kant’ s cosmopolitan ideal, edited by James Bohmann and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 219-34. Baynes, Norman. 1936. The political ideas o f Augustine’ s ‘ De Civitae D ei’. London: G. Bell and Sons. Beall, J. 1998. Trickle down or rising tide? Lessons on mainstreaming gender policy from Columbia and South Africa. Social Policy and Administration 32, n.5:513-34. Beer, Francis. 2001. Meanings o f war and peace. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press. Beer, Francis. 1981. Peace against war: the ecology o f international violence. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. Behar, Ruth and Deborah A. Gordon, eds. 1995. Women writing culture. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Belli, Pierino. [1536] 1936. De re militari et bello tractatus. translated by Herbert C. Nutting. Reprinted in Classics o f international law 18. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Benjamin, Judy and Khadija Fancy. 1998. The gender dimensions o f internal displacement: concept paper and annotated bibliography. NY: Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children. Benjamin, Martin. 1973. Pacifism for pragmatists. Ethics 83, n.3:l96-213. Bennett, Andrew. 2003. Lecture to the Institute on Qualitative Research Methods, Tempe, Az. 9 January 2003. Bennett, Andrew, and Joseph Lepgold. 1993. Reinventing collective security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict. Political Science Quarterly 108, n.2:213- 237. Benthall, Jonathan. 1993. Diasters, relief, and the media. London: I. B. Tauris & Company. Berker, Victoria. 1997. Definition and the question o f ‘woman.’ Hypatia 12, n.2:185-215. Berry, Nicholas. 1997. War and the Red Cross: the unspoken mission. New York: St. M artin’s Press. 401 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Berstein, Barton J. 1998. Truman and the A-Bomb: targeting non-combatants, using the bomb, and his defending the ‘decision’.” The Journal o f Military History 62, n.3: 547-70. Best, Geoffrey. 1994. War and law since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Best, Geoffrey. 1980. Humanity in warfare. New York: Columbia University Press. Betts, Wendy S., Scott N. Carlson & Gregory Gisvold. 2000-1. Post-conflict transitional administration o f Kosovo and the lessons-leamed in efforts to establish a judiciary and rule of law. Michigan Journal o f International Law 22, n.371. Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber, eds. 1996. State sovereignty as a social construct. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blair, Tony. 1999. Doctrine of the international community. Speech to the Economic Club o f Chicago, 22 April. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Blank, Rebecca M. 1993. What should mainstream economists learn from feminist theory? In Beyond economic MAN: feminist theory and economics, edited by Marianne Farber and Julie Nelson. Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press. Bloom, Saul; John M. Miller; and Philippa Winkler, eds. 1994. Hidden Casualties: environmental, health, and political consequences o f the Gulf War. London: Earth Scan. Boulding, E. 2002. Cultures o f Peace: the hidden side o f history. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Bourke, Joanna. 1983. An intimate history o f killing. London: Fontana. Brandes, Lisa. 1992. The gender gap and attitudes toward war. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Brown, Harold O. J. 1981. The crusade or preventative war. In War: Four Christian views, edited by Robert G. Clause. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 151-69. Brownlie, Ian & C.J. Apperley. 2000. Kosovo crisis inquiry: memorandum on the international law aspects. The International & Comparative Law Quarterly 49, 878. Bunch, Charlotte and Niamh Reilly. 1994. Demanding accountability: the global campaign and Vienna Tribunal for Women’ s Human Rights. Rutgers, NJ: Center for W omen’s Global Leadership. Bush, George W. 2002. Remarks at 1 June graduation exercise of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. White House transcript. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601 -3 .html. 402 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Bush, George W. 2001. Address on terrorism before a joint meeting o f Congress. Transcript. The New York Times, 21 September, B4. Butler, Michael. 2003. U.S. military intervention in crisis, 1945-1994: An empirical inquiry of just war theory. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 47, n.2:226-48. Byers, Michael. 2003. Letting the exception prove the rule. Ethics and International Affairs 17, n. 1. Byman, Daniel L., Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose. 1999. The rollback fantasy. Foreign Affairs 78, n. 1:24-41. Cady, Duane. 1989. From warism to pacifism: a moral continuum. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Cannon, Lynn Weber; Elizabeth Higgenbotham; and Miarianna L. A. Leung. 1991. Race and class bias in qualitative research on women. In Beyond methodology: feminist scholarship as lived research, edited by Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith Cook. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Caprioli, Mary, and Mark A. Boyer. 2001. Gender, violence, and international crisis. Journal o f Conflict Resolution 45, n.4:503-518. Carozza, Paolo G. 2003. Subsidiarity as a structural principle o f international human rights law. The American Journal o f International Law 97, n. 1:38-79. Chan, Stephen. 1999. Typologies towards an unchained melody: against the gentrification o f discourse in International Relations. In Women, culture, and International Relations, edited by Vivian Jabri and Eleanor O'Gorman. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Cheney, Dick. 2002. In Cheney’s words: The administration case for removing Saddam Hussein. The New York Times, 27 August, A8. Chesterman, Simon. 2001a. Just war or just peace: humanitarian intervention and international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chesterman, Simon, ed. 2001b. Civilians in war. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Chin, Christine. 1998. In service and servitude: foreign female domestic workers and the Malaysian “ modernity" project. New York: Columbia University Press. Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 1991. On the likely magnitude, extent, and duration of an Iraq- UN War. The Journal o f Conflict Resolution 35,3:387-411. Coates, Susan. 2001. Peace feminism in International Relations, www.du.edu/~suscoate/ (13 April 2001). 403 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Code, Lorraine. 1996. Taking subjectivity into account. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Conetta, Carl. 2002. Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a higher rate of civilian bombing casualties. Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report Number 11, 18 January. Conklin, Todd. 2001. The spoils of war: reassessing sanctions against Iraq. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Chicago: 21-24 February. Connell, R.W. 2000. Arms and the man: using the new research on masculinity to understand violence and promote peace in the contemporary world. In Male roles, masculinities, and violence: a culture o f peace perspective, edited by I. Breines, R.W. Connell, and I. Eide. Paris: UNESCO, 21-33. Cooke, Miriam and Angela Woollacott, eds. 1987. Gendering war talk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2002a. The global nuclear balance: a quantitative and arms control analysis. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2002b. I f we fight Iraq: Iraq and the conventional military balance. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2002c. The military balance in the Gulf: 2001-2002. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2002d. Proliferation in the ‘ Axis o f E vil’ : North Korea, Iran, Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2002e. Weapons o f mass destruction in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2001a. The Gulf and the definition o f ‘ Citizen. ’ Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2001b. Iraq and America’ s foreign policy crisis in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2001c. Iraq’ s military capabilities: fighting a wounded, but dangerous, snake. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2001d. The military balance in the Gulf. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 404 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2001 e. The problem o f ‘ Smart Sanctions ’ against Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 200If. Weapons o f mass destruction in Iraq: national forces, warfighting capabilities, delivery options, and weapons effects. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2000a. The Gulf and transition: U . S. policy ten years after the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2000b. Iranian and Iraqi weapons o f mass destruction and United States response. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2000c. Iraqi military forces ten years after the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2000d. The military balance in the Gulf in 2000: a graphic analysis. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2000e. Trends: arms exports to the G ulf and Middle East since the end o f the Cold War. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2000f. Weapons o f mass destruction in the Gulf: A Graphic Analysis. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999a. After Desert Fox: our policy towards Iraq. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999b. The air defense war since Desert Fox: a short history. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999c. Iraq in crisis: a history from Desert Fox to June 1999. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999d. The Iraqi threat after Desert Fox. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999e. Iraq and the war o f sanctions: conventional threats and weapons o f mass destruction. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999f. The lessons o f Desert Fox: a preliminary analysis. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1998a. Desert Fox: Key U . S. and British statements and press conferences. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 405 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1998b. Iraq’ s past andfuture biological weapons capabilities. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1998c. Iraq: what force can and cannot accomplish against Saddam Hussein. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1998d. Living with Saddam: Reshaping U . S. Strategy in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cordesman, Anthony H. 1994. Iraq’ s Military Forces, 1988-1993. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dalby, Simon. 1992. Security, modernity, ecology: the dilemmas o f post-Cold War security discourse. Alternatives 17:95-134. Darby, Phillip, ed. 1997. A t the edge o f International Relations: postcolonialism, gender, and dependency London and New York: Continuum. Der Derian, James. 1992. Antidiplomacy: Spies, terror, speed, and war. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Dietz, Mary G. 1985. Citizenship with a feminist face: the problem with maternal thinking. Political Theory 12:19-35. Donagan, Alan. 1994. The relation of moral theory to moral judgments. In The Philosophical Papers o f Alan Donagan, Volume II: Action, Reason, and Value. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 194-216. Dumbauld, Edward. 1969. The life and legal writings o f Hugo Grotius. Norman, OK: University o f Oklahoma Press. Eisenstadt, Michael. 2001. ‘Re-energizing’ UN sanctions on Iraq: problems and prospects. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #537, www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/eim04.html (June 15 2002). El-Bushra, Judy. 2000. Transforming conflict: some thoughts on a gendered understanding of conflict processes. In States o f conflict: gender, violence, and resistance, edited by Susie Jacobs et al. London: Zed Books. Energy Information Administration. 2001. International Energy Outlook 2001. Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, March. Energy Information Administration. 2000. International Energy Annual, 1998. Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, January. 406 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Falk, Richard. 2000. The East Timor ordeal: international law and its limits. Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars. 32, n. 1-2:49-54. Farber, Marianne A. and Julie A. Nelson, eds. 1993. Beyond economic MAN: feminist theory and economics. Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press. Feste, Karen A. 1994. Behavior theories: the science of international politics and women. In Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1994. Fierke, K.M. 2000. Logics o f force and dialogue: the Iraq/UNSCOM crisis as social i interaction. European Journal o f International Relations. Finnemore, Martha. 1999. Rules o f war and wars of rules: the International Red Cross and the restraint o f state violence. In Constructing world culture: international nongovernmental organizations since 1875, edited by John Boli and George Thomas. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National interests in international society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Flemming, Leslie A. 1988. New visions, new methods: the mainstreaming experience in retrospect. In Changing Our Minds: Feminist Transformations o/Knowledge, edited by Susan Aiken et al. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Franck, Thomas M. 1999. Lessons of Kosovo. American Journal o f International Law 93. Frank, Barney. 1999. Frank moves to help East Timor. Press Release. http://www.house.gov/frank/east_timor.html (16 September 2003). Franke, Richard W. 1983. East Timor: the responsibility o f the United States. Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars 15, n.2:42-58. Freeman, Carla. 2001. Is locahglobal as feminine:masculine? Rethinking the gender of globalization. Signs: Journal o f Women in Culture and Society 26, n.4: 1007-1037. Frye, Richard N. 1963. The heritage o f Persia. New York: Mentor Books. Galey, Margaret. 1994. The United Nations and women’s issues. In Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects, edited by Francis D ’Amico. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Gentili, Alberico. [1612] 1933. De iure belli libri tree, translated by John C. Rolfe. Reprinted in Classics o f International Law. Oxford: Claredon Press. 407 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gallagher, Nancy. 1993. The gender gap in popular attitudes toward the use of force. In Women and the use o f force, edited by Ruth Howes and Michael Stevenson. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Gibson, Etienne. 1960. The Christian Philosophy o f St. Augustine, translated by L. E. M. Lynch. New York: Random House. Giddens, Anthony. 1976. New Rules o f Sociological Method: A Positive Critique o f Interpretive Sociologies. NY: Basic Books. Gilby, Thomas. 1958. Political thought o f Thomas Aquinas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gilligan, Caron. 1982. In a different voice: psychological theory and women’ s development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gilligan, Carol. 1977. In a different voice: women’s conceptions of self and of morality. Harvard Educational Review, 47:481 -517. Goetz, Anne M. 1998. Mainstreaming gender equality to national development planning. In Missionaries and Mandarins: Feminist engagement with development institutions, edited by Carol Miller and Shahar Razavi. London: Intermediate Tech Pubs with UNRISD, 42-86. Goetz, Anne M. and S. Baden. 1997. Why do we need sex when we’ve got gender? Feminist Review 56:3-23 Graham, Ryan. 2003. The security dilemma and international ethics: expanding the ethical debate on humanitarian intervention. Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Western Section Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 10-11. Grant, Rebecca. 1994. The Cold War and the feminist mystique. In Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects, edited by Peter Beckman and Francine D ’Amico. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Grant, Rebecca. 1991. The sources of gender bias in International Relations theory. In Gender and International Relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Gregg, Heather. 2003. The two-front war on Islamic terrorism: Why Islam? Why now? Why the US? Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 28-31. Greimas, Algirdas J. 1987. On meaning: selected writings in semiotic theory. London: Frances Pinter. 408 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Greimas, Algirdas J. 1983. Structural semantics: an attempt at a method. Lincoln, NE: University o f Nebraska Press. Gross, Elizabeth. 1986. Conclusion: what is feminist theory? In Feminist challenges: social and political theory, edited by Carol Pateman and Elizabeth Gross. Sydney and Boston: Allen & Unwin. Grunell, Marianne. 1999. A good practice: the role of women’s studies in the coalition of feminists and the state against physical and sexual violence. The European Journal o f Women’ s Studies 6, n.3:341-58. Guicherd, Catherine. 1999. International law and the war in Kosovo. Survival 41:19-34. Guidry, John; Michael Kennedy; and Meyer Zald. 2000. Globalizations and social movements: culture, power, and the transnational sphere. Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press. Gutman, Roy and David Reiff, eds. 1999. Crimes o f war: what the public should know. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization 46, n. 1:1-36. Habermas, Jurgen. 1997. Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, with the benefit of two hundred years’ hindsight. In Perpetual peace: essays on Kant’ s cosmopolitan ideal, edited by James Bohmann and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 113- 154. Hafner-Burton, Emilie and Mark A. Pollack. 2002. Mainstreaming gender in global governance. European Journal o f International Relations 8, n.3: 339-73. Hamilton, Edith and Huntington Cairns, eds. 1961. The collected dialogues o f Plato including the Letters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Bollingen Series. Hammock, John and Joel Chamy. 1996. Emergency response as morality play: the media, the relief agencies, and the need for capacity building. In From massacres to genocide: the media, public policy and humanitarian crises. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Harff, Barbara. 1987. Empathy for victims of massive human rights violations and support for government intervention: a comparative study of American and Australian attitudes. Political Psychology 8, n. 1:1-19. Harris, Ruth. 1993. The “child of the barbarian”: rape, race, and nationalism in France during the First World War. Past & Present 141:170-206. 409 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Harroff-Tavel, Marion. 1998. Promoting norms to limit violence in crisis situations: challenges, strategies and alliances. International Review o f the Red Cross, 332:5- 20. Hartsock, Nancy. 1983. The barracks community in Western political thought: prologomena to a feminist critique of war and politics. In Women and m en’ s wars, edited by Judith Stiehm. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Hawkesworth, Mary E. 1990. Beyond oppression: feminist theory and political strategy. New York: Continuum. Held, David. 1997. Cosmopolitan democracy and the global order: a new agenda. In Perpetual peace: essays on Kant’ s cosmopolitan ideal, edited by James Bohmann and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 235-52. Henneccius, Johann Gottlieb. 1738. Elementa juris naturae et gentium, commoda auditoribus methodo adomata. Halae. Herdt, Gibert H. 1994. Third sex, third gender: beyond sexual dimorphism in culture and history. New York: Zone Books. Herrmann, Richard. 1991. The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking US political strategy after the Gulf War. International Security 16, 2:42-75. Hintikka, Merrill B. and Jaakko Hintikka. 1983. How can language be sexist? In Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy o f science, edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Hirschmann, Nancy, and Richard C. Sinopoli. 1991. Feminism and liberal theory. American Political Science Review 85, n. 1:221-233. Hockday, Arthur. 1990. The aim of just deterrence: peace with justice? In Just deterrence: morality and deterrence into the 21st century, edited by Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham. London: Brassey’s. Hoffman, Kenneth, and Ray Kunze. 1961. Linear algebra. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall. Hoffman, Stanley. 1995. The politics and ethics of military intervention. Survival 37, n.4. Holmes, Arthur F. 1981. The just war. In War: four Christian views, edited by Robert G. Clause. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 115-35. 410 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Honneth, Axel. 1997. Is universalism a moral trap? The presuppositions and limits of a politics o f human rights. In Perpetual peace: essays on Kant’ s cosmopolitan international deal, edited by J. Bohmann and M. Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 155-78. Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds. 1994. The laws o f war: constraints on war in the Western world. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hoyt, Heman A. 1981. Nonresistance. In War: four Christian views, edited by Robert G. Clause. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 27-57. Hudson, Valerie M. and Andrea Den Boer. 2002. A surplus of men, a deficit of peace: security and sex ratios in Asia’s largest states. International Security 26, n.4:5-38. Hughes, Lisa. 2000. Can international law protect child soldiers? Peace Review 12, n.3:399-406. Hughes, Philip. 1960. Church in crisis: a history o f General Councils 352-1870. Garden City, N Y : Hanaver House. Human Rights Watch. 2001a. Child Soldiers Report, 2001, accessedatwww.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 2001b. Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, accessed May 2002 at www.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 2000a. Letter to His Excellency Saddam Hussein. 20 September 2000, accessed May 2002 at www.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 2000b. U. N. Security Council must ease Iraq crisis: Humanitarian emergency should be focus of Friday debate. Press Release, New York, March 23, 2000, with open letter to the United Nations Security Council, accessed May 2002 at www.hrw.org/press/2000/03/iraq0323 .htm. Human Rights Watch. 2000c. Human Rights Watch World Report 2000, accessed May 2002 at www.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 1999. Human Rights Watch World Report 1999, accessed May 2002 at www.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 1998. Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, accessed May 2002 at www.hrw.org. Human Rights Watch. 1996. Shattered lives: sexual violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its aftermath. NY: Human Rights Watch. 411 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hutchings, Kimberly. 1999. Feminism, universalism, and the ethics o f international politics. In Women, culture, and international relations, edited by Vivienne Jabri and Eleanor O ’Gorman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ignatieff, Michael. 1998. The stories we tell: television and humanitarian Aid. In Hard choices: moral dilemmas in humanitarian intervention, edited by Jonathan Moore. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 287-302. International Committee of the Red Cross. 1999a. The people on war report. Geneva: ICRC. International Committee o f the Red Cross. 1999b. Arms availability and the situation o f civilians in armed conflict. Geneva: ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross. 1977. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949. Geneva: ICRC. Jahan, R. 1997. Mainstreaming women and development: four agency approaches. In Women, international development, and politics: the bureaucratic mire, second edition, edited by Kathleen Staudt. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Jayartatne, Tony Epstein, and Abigail J. Stewart. 1991. Quantitative and qualitative methods in the social sciences: current feminist issues and practical suggestions. In Beyond methodology: feminist scholarship as lived research, edited by in Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Jennar, R. M. 1994. UNTAC: ‘International triumph’ in Cambodia? Security Dialogue 25, n.2. Jensen, Gary F. 1988. Mainstreaming and the sociology of deviance: a personal assessment. In Changing Our Minds: Feminist Transformations o f Knowledge, edited by Susan Aiken et al. Albany: State University o f New York Press. Jones, Bruce and Charles Cater. 2001. From chaos to coherence? Toward a regime for protecting civilians in war. In Civilians in war, edited by Simon Chesterman. New York: Basic Books, 237-262. Junod, Marcel. 1951. Warrior without weapons. London: Cape. Kabeer, N. 1994. Reversed realities: gender hierarchies in development thought. London: Verso. Kagan, Donald. 1995. On the origins o f war and preservation ofpeace. New York and London: Doubleday. Kant. 1998 [1797]. Metaphysics o f morals, edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 412 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kant. [1795] 1957. Perpetual peace, edited by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. Karam, A. 2000. Democrats without democracy: challenges to women and politics in the Arab World. In International perspectives on gender and democratization, edited by S. Rai. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 64-82. Kardam, N. 2000. Global gender norms, donor funding, and local realities: the Turkish case. Paper prepared for the Workshop on Human Rights and Globalization, Santa Cruz, CA. Keen, Maurice, ed. 1999. Medievel Warfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keen, Maurice. 1984. Chivalry. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kegley, Charles W. 1995. Controversies in international relations theory: realism and the neoliberal challenge. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kelly, Liz; Sheila Burton; and Linda Regan. 1994. Researching women’s lives or studying women’s oppression? Reflections on what constitutes feminist research. In Researching women’ s lives from a feminist perspective, edited by Mary Maynard and Jane Purvis. London: Taylor and Francis. Keohane, Robert. 1998. Beyond dichotomy: conversations between international relations and feminist theory. International Studies Quarterly 42:193-8. Keohane, Robert O. 1991. International Relations theory: contributions o f a feminist standpoint. In Gender and International Relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Khushalani, Yougindra. 1982. Dignity and honour o f women as basic andfundamental human rights. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Kinsella, Helen. 2002. Women, peace, and security: securing gender at the United Nations. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA. Koskenniemi, Martti. 2002. The lady doth protest too much: Kosovo, and the turn to ethics in international law. The Modern Law Review 65, n.2:159. Kracauer, Siegfried. 1952. The challenge of qualitative content analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly 16:631-42. Krippendorff, Klaus. 1980. Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. 413 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kuhlmann, Ellen and Birgit Babitsch. 2002. Bodies, health, gender - bridging feminist theories and women’s health. Women’ s Studies International Forum 25, n.4: 433- 42. Latham, Andrew. 2002. Warfare transformed: A Braudelian perspective on the ‘revolution in military affairs.’ European Journal o f International Relations 8, n.2:231-66. Lavin, Franklin. 1996/7. Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma. Foreign Policy 104:139-153. Legro, Jeffrey. 1997. Which norms matter? Revisiting the ‘failure’ of institutionalism. International Organization 51, n. 1:31 -63. Lentin, Ronit. 1997. Gender and catastrophe. London: Zed Books. Lenway, Stephanie A. 1988. Between war and commerce: economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft. International Organization 42:397-426. Levy, Judith A. 1988. Gender bias as a threat to construct validity in research design. In A feminist ethic fo r social science research, by Nebraska Sociological Feminist Collective. Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press. Lewis, Bernard. 2003. The crisis o f Islam: holy war and unholy terror. New York: Modem Library. Lindsey, James M. 1986. Trade sanctions as policy instruments: a reexamination. International Studies Quarterly 30. Locke, John. 1963. Two treatises o f government. New York: Cambridge University Press. Longino, Helen. 1996. Can there be a feminist science? In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. Longino, Helen. 1993. Economics for whom? In Beyond economic MAN: feminist theory and economics, edited by Marianne Farber and Julie Nelson. Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press. Luganes, Maria. 1996. Playfulness,‘world’-traveling, and loving perception. In Women, knowledge, and reality, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall. New York and London: Routledge. McCarthy, Thomas. 1997. On the idea of a reasonable law of peoples. In Perpetual peace: essays on Kant’ s cosmopolitan ideal, edited James Bohmann and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 201-18. 414 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. McClelland, David C., Atkinson, John W., Clark, Russell A., and Lowell, Edgar L. 1953. The achievement motive. New York: Appleton Century Crofts. McCloskey, Donald. 1993. Second thoughts: myths and morals o f U.S. economic history. New York: Cambridge University Press. McKeon, Richard. 1973. Introduction to Aristotle. 2n d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Manning, Peter K. and Betsy Cullum-Swan. 1994. Narrative, content, and semiotic analysis. In Handbook o f qualitative research, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 463-77. March, Candida: Ines Smyth; and Maitrayee Makhpadhyay. 1999. A guide to gender- analysis frameworks. London: Oxfam. Marcil-Lacoste, Louise. 1983. The trivialization of the notion o f equality. In Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy o f science, edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintakka. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Mayring, Philip. 1988. Qualitative inhaltsanalyses, grundlagen und techniken Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag. Mehta, Anna and Liz Bondi. 1999. Embodied discourse: on gender and fear o f violence. Gender, Place, and Culture 6, n. 1:67-84. Meintjes, Sheila; Anu Pillay; and Meredeth Turshen. 2001. The aftermath: women in post-conflict transformation. London: Zed Books. Mertus, Julie. 2000. War’ s offensive on women: humanitarian action in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. San Francisco: Kumarian Press. Meyer, Mary K. 1999. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom: organizing women for peace in the war system. In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Mies, Maria. 1991. W omen’s research or feminist research? The debate surrounding feminist science and methodology. In Beyond methodology: feminist scholarship as lived research, edited by Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith Cook. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Miller, C. and S. Razavi, eds. 1998. Missionaries and Mandarins: Feminist engagement with development institutions. London: Intermediate Tech Pubs with UNRISD. 415 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Miller, Judith, and Laurie Mylroie. 1990. Saddam Hussein and the crisis in the Gulf. New York: Random House. Millman, Marcia and Rosabeth Moss Kanter. 1987. Introduction to Another Voice: feminist perspectives on social life and social science. In Feminism and methodology: social science issues, edited by Sandra Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Minear, Larry. 2001. The humanitarian enterprise: dilemmas and discoveries. San Francisco: Kumarian Press. Moeller, Susan. 1998. Compassion fatigue: how the media sell feminine, disease, war, and death. New York: Routledge. Moghadam, Valentine M, ed. 1994. Identity politics and women: cultural reassertions and feminisms in international perspective. Boulder: Westview Press. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. Feminism without borders: decolonizing theory, practicing solidarity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Morgan, R. 1996. The UN Conference: out of the holy brackets and into the policy mainstream. Women’ s Studies Quarterly 1 & 2:77-83. Morris, Aldon; and Carol Mueller, eds. 1992. Frontiers o f social movement theory. New Haven: Yale University Press. Moser, Caroline O. N. 1991. Gender planning in the Third World: meeting practical and strategic needs. In Gender and International Relations, edited by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Moser, Caroline O. N. and Fiona C. Clark, eds. 2001. Victims, perpetrators, or actors? Gender, armed conflict, and political violence. New York: Zed Books. Mukta, Parita. 2000. Gender, community, nation: the myth of innocence. In States o f conflict: gender, violence and resistance, edited by Susie Jacobs. London: Zed Books. Mundis, Daryl. 2001. New mechanisms for the enforcement of international humanitarian law. American Journal o f International Law 95, n.4:934-52. Nabulski, Karma. 1999. Traditions o f war: occupation, resistence, and the law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nebraska Sociological Feminist Collective. 1988. A feminist ethic fo r social science research. Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press. 416 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nelson, Julie A. 1993. The study of choice or the study of provisioning? Gender and the definition o f economics. In Beyond economic MAN: feminist theory and economics, edited by Marianne Farber and Julie Nelson. Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press. von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstem. 1947. Theory o f games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Niditch, Susan. 1993. War in the Hebrew Bible: a study in the ethics o f violence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Niebanck, Richard J. 1972. Conscience, war, and the selective objector. Lutheran Church of America, Board of Social Ministry. Noddings, Nel. 1989. Women and evil. Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press. Noddings, Nel. 1987. Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1999. Girls and war zones: troubling questions. In Engendering forced migration, edited by Doreen Indra. New York: Bergahn Books. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 1995. U. S. regional security strategies for the Middle East. The Brown Journal o f World Affairs 2, n.2. O ’Brien, Eileen and Michael P. Armato. 2001. Building connections between antiracism and feminism: antiracist women and profeminist men. In Feminism & antiracism: international struggles fo r justice, edited by Frances Winddance Twine and Kathleen Blee. New York: New York University Press. O ’Brien, R.; Anne Marie Goetz; J. A. Scholte; and M. Williams. 2000. The World Bank and women’s social movements. In Contesting global governance: out o f the holy brackets and into the policy mainstream. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O ’Brien, William V. and John Langan. S.J., eds. 1986. The nuclear dilemma and the just war tradition. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company. Oldfield, Sybil. 1995. Jane Addams: the chance the world missed. In Women in world politics: an introduction, edited by Francine D ’Amico and Peter Beckman. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Pape, Robert. 1996. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pateman, Carol. 1988. The sexual contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pearl, David S. 1979. A textbook on Muslim Law. London: Croom Helm. 417 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Penn, Michael and Rachel Nardos. 2003. Overcoming violence against women and girls: the international campaign to eradicate a worldwide problem. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Persram, Nalini. 1999. Wartimeviolence: pulping fictions of the subaltern. In Women, culture, and international relations, edited by Vivienne Jabri and Eleanor O ’Gorman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Pietila, Hilkka and Jeanne Vickers. 1990. Making women matter: the role o f the United Nations. London: Zed Books. Pufendorf, Samuel Freiherr [1672] 1934. De iure natural et gentium libri octo. Reprinted in Classics o f International Law, edited by J. B. Scott. Rajan, Roby. 1990. The discourse of exploitation and the exploitation o f discourse. Alternatives 15:29-52. Ramazani, R.K. 1980. Revolutionary Iran: challenge and response in the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ramazani, R. K. 1975. Iran’ s foreign policy 1941-1973: a study offoreign policy in modernizing nations. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. Ramazani, R. K. 1966. The foreign policy o f Iran 1500-1941: a developing nation in world affairs. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. Rao, A. and R. Stuart. 1997. Rethinking organizations: a feminist perspective. Gender and Development 5:10-16. Razavi, S. and C. Miller. 1995. Gender mainstreaming: a study o f efforts by the UNDP, the World Bank, and the ILO to institutionalize gender issues. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Occasional Paper No.4. Reanda, Laura. 1999. Engendering the United Nations: the changing international agenda. European Journal o f Women’ s Studies 6:49-68. Reichberg, Gregory and Henrik Syse. 2002. Humanitarian intervention: a case of offensive force? Security Dialogue 33, n.3:309-22. Rein, Martin and Donald Schon. 1993. Reframing policy discourse. In The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning, edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 418 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Richard, Carl J. 2003. Twelve Greeks and Romans who changed the world. Lanham, MD and Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Ritter, Scott. 2003. Frontier justice: Weapons o f mass destruction and the bushwacking o f America. New York: Context Books. Ritter, Scott. 2002. Endgame: Solving the Iraq problem once and for all. New York: Simon and Schuster. Roper, John. 1990. Political developments and just deterrence. In Just deterrence: morality and deterrence into the 21st century, edited by Malcolm McCall and Oliver Ramsbotham. London: Brassey’s. Rose, Gillian. 1993. Feminism and geography: the limits o f geographical knowledge. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. Roseneil, Sasha. 1999. Postmodern feminist politics: the art of the (im)possible? The European Journal o f Women’ s Studies 6, n.2:161-82. Ruddick, Sarah. 1983. Pacifying the forces: drafting women in the interests o f peace. Signs 8, n.3: 471-89. Runyan, Anne Sisson. 1999. Women in the neoliberal ‘frame,’ In Gender politics in global governance, edited by Mary Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Sandvik-Nylund, Monika. 1998. Caught in conflicts: civilian victims, humanitarian assistance and international law. Abo: Institute for Human Rights. Sankowski, Edward. 2003. Democracy, justice, and some problems about rights. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 28-31. Scaff, Lawrence. 1988. From silence to voice: reflections on feminism in political theory. In Changing Our Minds: Feminist Transformations o f Knowledge, edited by Susan Aiken et al. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Schlozman, Kay Lehman; Nancy Bums; Sidney Verba; and Jesse Donahue. 1995. Gender and citizen participation: is there a difference? American Journal o f Political Science 39, n.2: 267-93. Schultz, David. 2003. Chains of freedom: John Locke and the problem of the other. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 28-31. 419 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sedghi, Hamideh. 1994. Third world feminist perspectives on world politics. In Women, gender, and world politics: perspectives, policies, and prospects, edited by Peter Beckman and Francine D ’Amico. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey. Segal, Lynne. 1999. Why feminism? Gender, psychology, politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Seigfried, Charlene Haddock. 1996. Pragmatism andfeminism: reweaving the social fabric. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sharoni, Simona. 1993. Middle East politics through feminist lenses: Toward theorizing international relations from women’s struggles. Alternatives 18:5-20. Shuja, Sharif. 2000. Australia's role in East Timor. Contemporary Review. 277:138-146. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2002. Restructuring world politics: the limits of soft power. In Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms, edited by Sangeev Khagram et al. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Singleton, Sloveig, and Daniel T. Griswold, eds. 1999. Economic casualties: How U . S. foreign policy undermines trade, growth, and liberty. Washington, D. C.: CATO Institute. Sivard, Ruth. 1991. World military and social expenditures 1991, 14th Edition. Washington, DC: World Priorities. Skjelsbaek, Inger. 2001. Gender, Peace and Conflict. London: Sage. Smith, Dorothy E. 1988. The deep structure of gender antithesis: another view of capitalism and patriarchy. In A feminist ethic fo r social science research, by the Nebraska Sociological Feminist Collective. Lewiston/Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press. Smith, Jackie; Charles Chatfield; and Ron Ragnucco, eds. 1997. Transnational social movements and global politics: solidarity beyond the state. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Snow, David and Robert Benford. 1992. Master frames and cycles o f protest. In Frontiers o f social movement theory, edited by Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller. New Haven: Yale University Press, 133-55. Solow, Robert M. 1993. Feminist theory, women’s experience, and economics. In Beyond economic MAN: feminist theory and economics, edited by Marianne Farber and Julie Nelson. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 420 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Spellman, Barbara and Keith Holyoak. 1992. If Saddam is Hitler who is George Bush? Analogical map

Asset Metadata

Creator Sjoberg, Laura E. (author)

Core Title Gendering just war: Feminisms, ethics, and the wars in Iraq, 1990--2003

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Law,OAI-PMH Harvest,Philosophy,political science, international law and relations,Religion, Philosophy of,women's studies

Language English

Advisor Tickner, Judith Ann (committee chair), Alker, Hayward (committee member), Gambrell, Alice (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-325374

Unique identifier UC11340364

Identifier 3155480.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-325374 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3155480.pdf

Dmrecord 325374

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Sjoberg, Laura E.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA