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A picture of human composition: An interpretation of Mencius' theory about human nature
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A PICTURE OF HUMAN COMPOSITION:
AN INTERPRETATION OF MENCIUS’ THEORY ABOUT HUMAN NATURE
Copyright 2005
by
Yue Pan
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN LANGUAGES AND CULTURES)
December 2005
Yue Pan
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract iii
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Contingent Problems with Traditional Interpretations 5
Chapter 3: Human Nature in the Picture of Human Composition 15
Chapter 4: Human Nature, in Relation to Human Mind 36
Chapter 5: Why Human Nature is Good 58
Conclusion 67
Bibliography 69
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Mencius’ theory about human nature, one of the most
famous issues in the study of the intellectual history of China, from the perspective
of human composition. It is argued that in the Book o f Mencius, there are three levels
in the notion of human being: human physicality, human mind, and human nature.
Three issues, namely, Mencius’ definition of “human nature”, the meaning of
“good” in “human nature is good”, and the origin of the “bad elements” in human
and the relationship between good nature and bad behavior, have been thoroughly
discussed. Finally, it is concluded that Mencius’ assertion that “human nature is
good” neither means a “good potential in human being’s make-up”, nor an “ideal
that need to be nurtured to be full-fledged”; but rather, “human nature is good” is an
absolute and unchangeable fact.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explain Mencius’ theory of human nature from
a new perspective, namely, human composition. The controversy about human
nature is one of the most famous issues in the study of the intellectual history of
China. Scholars have taken a great deal of effort to find out what Mencius meant by
asserting that human nature was inherently good. For instance, Fung Yulan believes
that by human nature, Mencius only meant moral inclinations.1 Graham argues that
human nature should be interpreted as “a thing to start with” or a “dynamic
process”,2 and thus comes up with the idea that “The xing of a living thing was
commonly understood to be the way in which it develops and declines from birth to
death when injured and adequately nourished.” D. C. Lau takes the line that by
nature, Mencius meant something that is distinctive, as for what it is in the case of
human being in the book o f Mencius, Lau claims that Mencius’ assertion that human
nature is good “does not at all lie in the actual way in which human beings behave,
but in the fact that they possess a sense of morality and a sense of shame.”4 Roger
Ames argues that human nature in Mencius should be considered more as a cultural
achievement than what is innately within human’s constitution. Therefore, he
proposes “for the human being at least, xing seems to come closer to ‘character,’
1 Fung, Yulan. A History o f Chinese Philosophy, vol. 1 pp. 124— 125.
2 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human” in his Studies in Chinese
Philosophy and Philosophical Literature Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. p. 8.
3 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human” pp. 27-28.
4 D. C. Lau, trans. Mencius p. 21 and Theories o f Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi In
International Philosophical Quarterly (New York) Vol:32, no.2 (Jun 1992) p. 195.
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‘personality’ or ‘constitution’ than what we generally understand by ‘nature’”.5 Irene
T. Bloom argues that Mencius’ idea of human nature was actually in a biological
dimension.6 Undeniably, these studies shed great lights on the understanding of
Mencius’ notion of human nature. However, as we’ll see in later part, whenever we
are inspired by some explanations that are drawn upon a series of statements in the
book o f Menicus, there seems to arise another series of statements in the same book
that make us can’t help but cast doubt on the idea we are excited above. In other
words, the most confusing issue is why Mencius, on the one hand, asserted that
human nature is good; while on the other hand, he criticized the bad behaviors of
human beings, implying that he believed there was something bad in human being’s
make up.
In this paper, I attempt to tear off the veil that induces the debates, and
reconcile the two seemingly contradictory aspects by generalizing Mencius
articulation of human nature into three levels in a picture of human composition:
7 &
human physicality , human mind , and human nature.
I then discuss Mencius’ definition of “human nature”. It is argued that
Mencius’ definition of “human nature” is neither human physicality as Xunzi argued;
5 Ames, Roger. “The Mencian Conception o f Ren Xing: Does It Mean ‘Human Nature’? ” in Chinese
Texts and Philosophical Context: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, Ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr.
Chicago: Open court, 1991. p. 150.
6 Irene. T Bloom explains this idea in her three papers: “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-
hsing)”; “Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature”; and “Human nature and
biological nature in Mencius”.
7 What particularly concerns Mencius in this terrain is human being’s biological inclinations. In
Mencius’ view, they are what human beings share with animals.
8 It refers to both morality and the schemas and mechanism o f human mind.
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nor, as many scholars9 understand, virtuous potentials that brew good behavior.
Correspondingly, efforts are made to find out what Mencius meant by the claim of
“human nature is good”. The concept of “good” is discussed from two aspects: the
good of nature and the good of mind/behavior. I will first discuss what causes
human’s bad behaviors in Mencius’ view; and why such bad behaviors are not rooted
in human nature. I argue that the quality of behavior is a matter of the state of mind
and it (no matter it’s good or bad) has nothing to do with human nature. At the same
time, I argue that human nature is not neutral in that we’ll find it perfect when we
have perfected our mind. Again, it’s not a problem of whether we have a perfect
nature, but rather an issue of if we can experience it; consequently, whether we can
experience it is an issue of the state of human mind.1 0 Human nature is one thing,
while human mind is another.1 1 Human nature is pure and absolute, while human
1 7
mind has contrary states of being complete and incomplete, original and lost, etc.
Mencius never equaled human nature with human mind, neither did he ever say that
good nature guarantees good mind/good behavior. The reason why people got
confused is that they fail to distinguish these two fields, or even worse, they try to
measure one with the standard of the other. The Mencius’ story is, in terms of nature,
there is nothing bad; in terms of mind/action, there are good and bad. However, they
9 Such as A. C. Graham, Ames, Roger, James Legge, etc. As a matter of fact, although their specific
arguments differ from each other, they share the same hypothesis: human nature is something that
needs to be developed or accomplished.
1 0 This is why wisdom zhi is so important in M encius’ theory.
1 1 Please refer to chapter 3 o f this paper.
121 will discuss the differences in detail in chapter 3 and chapter 4.
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are not due to human nature, but to what one chooses to illuminate in the field of
mind.1 3
My conclusion is, the criterion Mencius employed to measure whether human
nature is good or not lies neither in the dimension of human’s natural predisposition
nor in the dimension of his moral development. Rather, “human nature is good” is an
absolute and unchangeable fact.
1 3 For example, both complete mind and incomplete mind co-exist. Choosing the complete mind leads
to good and choosing the incomplete mind leads to bad. Please see chapter 4 and chapter 5for details.
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Chapter 2: Contingent Problems with Traditional Interpretations
1. Three Types of Traditional Interpretations
In order to reconcile the seeming contradiction in Mencius’ theory, there
developed numerous explanations, among which are three main tendencies. The first
one believes that there are three types of human nature: purely good, purely evil, and
a mixture of good and evil; and Mencius’ claim that “human nature is good” is
merely based on the purely good humans. For example, the famous Han scholar
Wang Chong says, “I consider that, in saying that human nature is good,
Mencius considered only human being who are above the average, while, in saying
that human nature is evil, Xun Qing considered only those people below the
average”1 4 . As many scholars have pointed out, one problem that this interpretation
has to face is if it could be true that Mencius knew there is bad element in human
nature but he just turned a blind eye to it when he chose the good one to discuss. If
this were the case, Mencius theory would inevitably amount to nothing; since
following this line, it is also fair for Xun Zi to assert that human nature is bad
because he saw the bad element.
The second tendency takes the “good nature” as a potential/sprout, arguing
that by “human nature is good”, Mencius meant a dormant possibility which, if not
1 4 Wang Chong, Lunheng, Sibucongkan (SBCK) ed. Juan 3 pp. 14b-15a. (qtd. In Lau, D. C. “Theories
of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi” pp. 188-189.)
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harmed, will embody itself in a totally moral manner1 5 . A. C. Graham argues that the
term xing is more popularly used in pre-Chin literature to refer to a thing’s tendency
and inclinations “The xing of a living thing was commonly understood to be the way
in which it develops and declines from birth to death when uninjured and adequately
nourished;” and “to find out the distinctive nature of a living thing one must discover
the capacities which it realizes if uninjured and sufficiently nourished. In the case of
man these include his term of life and the moral perfection of the sage, and it is
above all the latter which distinguishes him from other species.”1 6 Based on
Graham’s analysis, Jiyuan Yu asserts, “... When Mencius claims that human xing is
good, he refers only to the four seeds.”1 7 Philip Ho Hwang argues, “The first that we
should remember is that, according to Mencius, man only has seeds to do good, not
goodness itself. These seeds must be developed and cultivated to the extent that man
1 R
can serve heaven and even fulfill his destiny.” This type of interpretation sheds
light on the issue by distinguishing possibility from reality. These claims sound
reasonable at the first glance: human being has the unique potential to be cultivated
1 5 Just to name a few: A.C. Graham holds that human nature should be interpreted as “a thing to start
with” or a “dynamic process” See “The Background of the Mencian Theory o f Human Nature” in his
Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature Albany: State University o f New York
Press, 1990 pp. 27-28.
James Legge holds that “Human nature is good is just ‘speaking of our nature in its ideal and not as
it actually is.’” See The Chinese Classics. Vol. lith e works o f Mencius. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University press, 1960. Originally published in Asia Major (NS. I, i, 1949), p. 59.
1 6 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” in his
Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1990. pp. 27-28.
1 7 Yu, Jiyuan. “The Moral Self and the Perfect Self in Aristotle and Mencius” in Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 28, (Oxford, England; Malden, MA) no.3 (Sep 2001) P.238
1 8 Hwang, Philip Ho. “What is Mencius’ Theory of Human Nature” in Philosophy East and West. Vol.
29 no. 2 (Apr., 1979)p.203.
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into a sage after all. And the good seeds doesn’t suffice to make the assertion that
“human is already good”, so we definitely need cultivation. But, some questions
present themselves following this line of reasoning: Why, for most people, this
potential has not been actualized if it’s our nature? What blocks it from being carried
out? And doesn’t the thing that blocks the moral tendency deserve more to be called
human nature at the point that it is easier to be nourished and realized? And before
the existence of sage, who knows if it’s already in our nature or attained from
without? In other words, how can we tell the moral perfection is from our nature?
These questions amount to nothing but one doubt: to treat human nature as a
potential might not be convincing. As a matter of fact, following this line, we can
only get the conclusion that “human nature is good as a potential” rather than
“human nature is good”. In other words, human nature is good is only because there
exists such a possibility in his make-up. This analysis does not take the possibility of
doing bad things into consideration: if upon the observation that “by nature one
could do good”, one can conclude that “human nature is good”, why can’t he
conclude that “human nature is bad” upon the observation that people are more
possible to do bad things? At least, even though Mencius’ can insist that the claim
that “human nature is good” is right, he cannot rule out the claim that “human nature
is evil”.
The third tendency among scholars is to transform the form of the question
by introducing some new concepts. For example, Song scholars, such as Cheng
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Yi, Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi etc. attempted to address the issue by resorting to the
notion of Qi H,. For instance, Cheng Yi said, “When the qi is pure, the cai is good,
when the qi is impure the cai is bad. One who was bestowed the purest qi is a sage;
while one who was given the most impure qi is a wicked man.”1 9 Hereby we can see
that if a person is good or not has nothing to do with his nature, but with his qi, and
there are at least two types of qi that determine if a person is innately good or not.
“Nature is out of Heaven and cai zif is out of qi. When the qi is clear, the cai is clear;
when the qi is not clear, the cai is not clear either.”2 0 It seems to explain well why
some people are good and some are not, but it still failed to explain why there is the
difference between the good qi and the bad qi, where they originate, and what’s
relationship between qi and nature. Therefore, the effort of interpreting Mencius’
theory by loaning concept is not satisfying either.
Other alternative concepts such as “ethical mind”2 1, “human agency”,2 2 etc.
bring forth a series of enlightening explanations; however, they are not successful in
explaining the origination of “bad element” in nature either. For instance, Roger T.
Ames, taking a Deweyan’s perspective, objects to the idea that human nature is
innately decided and upholds the idea that Mencius’ theory of human nature is about
the unique particularity of human which comes into being in a process of cultural
1 9 Erchengyishu — 22 . Shanghai, Shanghai Guji. 2000. pp.10-11
2 0 Erchengyishu —fM IS S ® 19. Shanghai, Shanghai Guji. 2000. p. 6.
2 1 Yang, Zebo. MengziXingshanlun Yanjiu. Beijing: Shekhuikexue, 1995 pp. 46-47
2 2 Bryan W. Van Norden. “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency” in International
Philosophical Quarterly (New York) 32, no.2 (Jun 1992) p .168.
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'j'l
evolution. Similarly, a Chinese scholar Yang Zebo, argues that human nature
means an “ethical structure” that takes shape in one’s mind; this structure works
before one takes action in reality; and this is why Mencius said “the nature is
originally within me.”2 4 The question that this theory has to face is: do humans have
human nature before the moral system accumulates in their mind? If the answer is
yes, this theory cannot hold itself in that there is a nature before the ethical mind
which is not yet explained; if the answer is no, a new bom baby must not have
human nature; however, a new bom baby, in Mencius, ideally represents the state of
a perfect mind. Therefore using “ethical structure” to explain human nature does not
work satisfyingly. Anther representative opinion is to regard “human nature is good”
as a course of human agency. For example, as the scholars we mentioned before,
Van Norden espouses the idea that Mencius’ claim is actually “(1) all humans are
capable of becoming good”; but Van Norden doubts that this statement “does not
distinguish Mengzi’s position from that of many of his contemporaries (such as
Gaozi).” Therefore, he comes up with four other complementary theses. (2) Humans
must do that which they believe will obtain for them what they most desire; (3)
Genuinely virtuous acts cannot be motivated by selfish desires. Since Mencius
admits that (4) not everyone is already virtuous, but (5) everyone has incipient
virtuous dispositions which they are capable of bringing into play via a
2 3 Ames, Roger. “The Mencian Conception of Ren Xing: Does It Mean ‘Human Nature’?” in Chinese
Texts and Philosophical Context: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, Ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr.
Chicago: Open court, 1991. pp.147-75.
2 4 See note 18.
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psychological act labeled “concentration.” Van Nordern argues, “Mengzi saw the
five theses as closely related and did not carefully distinguish them in his own mind.
■ ) c
As we have seen, all of them are important to Mengzi’s position.” According to
Van Nordern, the statement that “human nature is good” can hold only under all the
five premises. However, the problem is, is it true as Van Norden argues, that without
these underlying theses Mencius could not distinguish his theory from that of
Gaozi’s? The point indicated by Van Norden’s explanation, as I understand, is that
as far as the “potential” of doing good is concerned, there is no difference between
Mencius’ “good human nature” and Gaozi’ “neutral human nature”. However,
according to my understanding, this understanding is arguable for there are dozens of
times Mencius claimed “Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and
wisdom are not welded onto me from the outside; they are in me originally”2 6 or
statements to that effect. As we’ll see in the later analysis, good nature is not a
potential that need to grow, but a factual character that covered by ignorance.
Therefore, contrary to all those who take “human nature is good” as a course and
believe that “good nature” does not exist beyond this course, good nature does exist
before and actually through any psychological act.
No matter taking it as a potential or as a mental course, traditional
explanations share a common assumption: in order to attest human nature is good,
2 5 Bryan W. Van Norden. “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency” in International
Philosophical Quarterly (New York) 32, no.2 (Jun 1992) p .173.
2 6 Mencius VIA8. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p.163.
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how human nature can lead to good behavior has to be seen clearly. Unfortunately,
this turns out to be a dead end in that parallel to any good behaviors there always
goes a corresponding bad counterpart: if good behavior reflects good nature, what
does bad behavior reveal? If good potential could be called human nature, what
could bad potential be named? If a series of psychological acts that might lead to
good behaviors could be considered as good nature, what about the psychological
mechanism that underlies bad conducts? Or, let’s take a concession, even if the
possibility of good aspect could serve as proof that the thing with this potential is
good, is it necessary to rule out the possible counterpart within this thing?
Otherwise it is also fair for others to say that this thing is bad based on the
observation of its bad potential. However, as the research of human nature has been
carried out, there seems to be no effort that has been contributed to this issue. It
appears that these explanations just change the form of the contradiction and then
center on one aspect to give interpretations while the question, as a two-side issue, is
still left untouched.
2. Problems with Traditional Interpretations
The crux of the traditional interpretations, in my opinion, lies in the failure of
seeing the whole structure of human constitution, and thus mixed two or three
different levels of it. For example, clearly in Mencius, human nature, virtuous
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behavior and natural predisposition are three different concepts; but traditional
explanations keep mixing them up. For example, James Legge argues,
It is quit clear that what Mencius considered as deserving to be properly
called the nature of man, was not that by which he is a creature of appetites
and passions, but that by which he is lifted up into the higher circle of
intelligence and virtue. .. .there ought to be a cheerful submission so far as
the appetites are concerned, but where the virtues are in question, we are to
be striving after them notwithstanding adverse and opposing circumstances.
They are our nature, what we were made for, what we have to do.2 7
Actually, as we mentioned above, scholars such as A. C. Graham, Van Norden, etc.
all share this assumption that the quality of human nature should be measured by the
quality of human behavior. However, this is simply not true to Mencius, because
according to Mencius, our nature only provides grounds for good behavior, but does
not compel man to do, if any, good rather than bad.2 8 It is already clear that man is
more likely to do bad than good; although the good seeds in human mind manifest
themselves from time to time. Besides, to do good is a twofold issue: to enforce
external goodness and to follow internal way of good; the former is not Mencius’
idea at all and the latter has nothing to do with mandate.
However, if the perspective of moral is not suitable to see why human nature
is good, do we still have way to explore Mencius’ idea? It becomes necessary for us
to reexamine that if good behavior is the only clue along which we can reach the
conclusion that human nature is good? In other words, is human nature still
practically good without resorting to human’s moral potential or psychological
2 7 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
2 8 For detailed argument, please see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
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tendency? My answer is yes. Mencius did use the allegory of someone sees “a baby
is about to fall into a well” to demonstrate benevolence is inborn within human
beings; but did he ever say that without this moral impulse being seen, human nature
would be “bad” or unknown? No. Actually, he argued that even if people become
evil, his nature is still good. “As for his becoming bad, that is not the fault of his
native endowment.. .Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom
are not welded on to me from outside; they are in me originally.”2 9 In this spirit, the
traditional way, which takes good behavior as the only evidence of good nature, is
not sufficient in supporting Mencius’ reasoning.
All in all, two relative problems are in the way to discovering Mencius’
theory: how to treat bad behaviors of human beings when addressing why human
nature is good; and what is the relationship between the quality of human behavior
and human nature? In other words, what’s exactly in human nature: germination of
good behavior or of bad behavior, or, both, or, neither? Without this question being
paid attention, whether holding “human nature is good” or “human nature is bad”,
neither side might be able to persuade the other. In other words, in order to get a
clear picture of Mencius’ notion of human nature, we’d better head off the problems
that our methodology might meet, which, basically are: we must take both good and
bad equally into account; in order to fulfill this task, we have to deal with the
relationship between human nature and human mind/behavior; and in order to
29
Mencius VIA6. Trans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. pp.162-163.
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address this question, we have to examine what standard Mencius applied when he
gave the definition of human nature. Actually, these questions are weaved in a three-
level structure: human composition.
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Chapter 3: Human Nature in the Picture of Human Composition
Before getting into what is in human nature, I would like to examine
Mencius’ definition of human nature. A traditional idea about Mencius’ notion of
human nature is that Mencius was talking about something that makes humans
uniquely human. I would say that this is only part of Mencius story in that besides
“uniquely”, there also goes “essentially”. According to the logic in Mencius, there
are two standards applied in demarking human being: (1) formal difference from
non-human or, something tells that human being is not what he is not; (2) essential
quality that illuminates human nature or something tells that human being is what he
30
should essentially be. In Mencius, as we’ll see later, the definition of human nature
is given with regard to these two criteria. The first criterion is that mental acts
corresponding to the level of human mind; and the representative is morality. In
Mencius’ view, it suffices to distinguish humans from brutes, but it is not enough to
be a definition of human being because one can pretend to be virtuous whereas what
Mencius emphasized is true virtue; so it does not follow that anyone who can
perform virtuously has already lived up to the state of living out “human nature”. In
other words, that humans are human is not merely because they can carry out
something that animals cannot. Thus Mencius came up with the second standard,
which corresponds to human nature in the framework of human constitution, namely,
the criterion that makes humans true to what the heaven designs them to be in the
3 0 For example, Mencius VIA7 fp. 164;, VIA 15 (p. 168;, VIIA1 (pA%2) are all related with the
relationship between human and Heaven. And as w e’ll see later, Heaven is the source o f human
nature.
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dimension of essence3 1 . In Mencius’ view, it is the second standard that makes
humans true human; while other standards amount to nothing in terms of essentiality.
For example, in the parable of the Ox Mountain, Mencius compared human nature
cai Tp to the wood on the mountain. He asserted that without maintaining this cai3 2 ,
humans would be barely different from animals.
There was a time when the trees were luxuriant on the Ox Mountain. As it is
on the outskirts of a great metropolis, the trees are constantly lopped by axes.
Is it any wonder that they are no longer fine? With the respite they get it in
the day and in the night, and the moistening by the rain and dew, there is
certainly no lack of new shoots coming out, but then the cattle and sheep
come to graze upon the mountain. That is why it is as bald as it is. People,
seeing only its baldness, tend to think that it never had any trees. But can this
possibly be the nature of a mountain? Can what is in man be completely
lacking mind of benevolence and integrity? A man’s letting go of his true
heart is like the case of the trees and the axes... .Others seeing his
resemblance to an animal, will be led to think that he never had any native
endowment. But can that be what a man is genuinely like? Hence, given the
right nourishment there is nothing that will not grow, and deprived of it there
is nothing that will not wither away. Confucius said, “Hold on to it and it will
remain; let go of if and it will disappear. One never knows the time it comes
or goes, neither does one know the direction.” It is perhaps to the heart this
refers.3 3
3 1 According to Mencius' theory, the composition o f human is designed by Heaven. For example,
Mencius VIA8. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .168: “A A m M S ^ ’ A A A A A
^ ° ittf lA A M E iA ° ’’For detailed reasoning, please see the following
sections. As a matter of fact, according to Mencius, the only standard that could be applied in defining
human is the nature in that the definition of “formal human” is not sufficient to distinguish human
from other forms of life.
3 2 Mencius also employed qing '[ft liangxin jA A renyizhixin A A A A in this paragraph, and the
relationship will be addressed in later part of this paper.
3 3 Mencius VIA8. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .164. A U -lA A Ilflt^ l ° A A A A"? A
a m - f s a M i - m i m p i m *
^ a > mmmmm ° a - ittimjAmma? mmxm«m
M - S A A ^ ? ■ m m i f A ^ m m ° a b m a ■ m A H H A ? 1 0 ^
mm - a m a h - mrimxmmmmi - w m K m zm m • a?h • i s a s « >
° ° A j y s ^ m > > j t
t& m m m - m • ? l a s = •
m A « ■ m m m ° ’ ttAAif j & j \
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In my understanding, Mencius was not only talking about the fact of “man’s
letting go of his true heart”; but also, he was stressing the fact that even though
man’s behavior assembles animals, his cai (good nature) is “genuinely” still there.
“Letting go of his true heart” makes a man not distinguishable from animal, this is
one of the two most important criteria for Mencius to demark human. But this is not
the only one. By a rhetorical question, Mencius implies that the seeming wickedness
is not “what a man is genuinely like”. What a man is innately bestowed is his nature
that is congruous to Heaven. And it’s the latter that makes humans true to what they
are designed to be. In short, according to Mencius, the ingredient that makes humans
human must meet at least two requirements: (A) to differentiate human from non
human, or, making humans formally different from any other form of living beings;
(B) to distinguish “true human” from “false human”, or, making humans essentially
human. Under the frame of human constitution, A corresponds to human mind,
which, if completely realized, is good; B corresponds to human nature, which, no
matter what one does, is actually and purely good3 4 .
The second standard we discussed above is the ultimate criterion in that it
covers all the content that is carried by the first one. The starting point of Mencius
in demarking human, unlike other scholars, is the second criterion: what makes
humans essentially human. That’s why Mencius ruled out physicality and formal
morality as standards of human nature. As a matter of fact, in Mencius, we can see
341 ignored the physical level here because it is shared with animals.
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that Mencius had already taken these things into consideration when he talked about
human nature:
This is the way of common people: once they have a full belly and warm
clothes on their back they degenerate to the level of animals if they are
allowed to lead idle lives, without education and discipline.3 5
Yao and Shun had it as their nature. T’ang and King Wu embodied it. The
Five leaders of the feudal lords borrowed it. But if a man borrows a thing
and keeps long enough, how can one be sure that he did not originally have
it?3 6
With regard to physical need, it is what human shares with animals; therefore,
'in
it could not be regarded as a demarcation of human nature . In terms of the
scientific, aesthetical, ethical abilities, they are important in defining human beings;
but according to Mencius, they’re not able to tell the whole story of the human
nature. In Mencius’ story, it is neither physical desires and abilities nor living
doctrines and styles that decides a living thing is human or not; it is the essence,
whether be lived out in one’s life or not, that makes humans human. This absolute
and unchangeable thing is what Mencius meant by “human nature”. Without this
nature, all the unique characteristics are no more than an empty form. Physical
desires exist, but they are not unique to human. Morality exists and is unique to
humans, but it does not make humans “truly” human without human nature.
Nevertheless, the “human nature” in Mencius is not like the “holy spirit” in that in
3 5 For example, Mencius IIIA4. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .102:
m m - °
3 6 Mencius VIIA29. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .128: ’ fY Y
m ; s«f > f • x\ > mmirnm?
3 7 Which happens to be Xunzi’s opinion. See “Human’s Nature Is Evil” in Hsiin Tzu Trans. Watson,
Burton. New York and London Columbia University Press. 1963. pp.157-159.
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Christian philosophy the “the holy spirit” comes down to a person only after he
becomes pure in soul; whereas the “human nature” in Mencius is inborn with any
person, and remains there even if he becomes evil.
A question might arise from the above reasoning: now that everyone has
this human nature, what’s the point to labor in bringing forth such a universal thing
as an outstanding mark? My answer is, the ultimate problem is not whether humans
have such a nature, but whether humans know that they have such a nature and thus
cultivate themselves accordingly. All of the philosophers at that time in China
advocated self-cultivation; and interesting enough, all of them share the idea that
different recognition of human nature would lead to different methodology. In
Mencius opinion, although everyone has it, almost no one ever noticed it, let alone
live it up to the full standard. Therefore it is necessary for him to tell this “truth”.
What’s more interesting is, contrary to most scholars’ belief that “good nature
enforce morality in our daily life”, Mencius was never as optimistic as they are;
because if the “good nature” bears such a function, there would have been no need to
propaganda it; or even, there wouldn’t have been so many antagonists. However, this
paper is not aimed at achieving any moral conclusion that who is correct and who is
wrong; but, it is aimed at a conclusion that why Mencius’ theory, theoretically, is
consummate. Relatively, many attacks and explanations turned out to be not really
talking about human nature, but some “human forms” (e.g. physical desire, ignorant
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20
o
action, external moral, etc.). In order to see the whole picture of human nature, I
would like to anticipate the issues that have been misleading us when it comes to the
discussion of human nature. Based on the content of Mencius, there are three aspects
that constitute “human” and where people might set their standard to define human
nature. I will argue that Mencius’ theory of human nature is drawn on the whole
picture of this composition, while others’ are only based part of this integral unit.
1. A Picture of Human Composition with Three Levels
As we pointed out, according to Mencius, the ingredient that makes humans
human should meet basically two requirements, the first is to differentiate human
from non-human; and the second is to distinguish essence of human from form of
human.3 9 Note, Mencius expressed this idea clearly in the following:
The relationship between the mouth and tastes, the eye and colors, the ear
and sounds, the nose and smells, and the four limbs and comfort is natural
tendency4 0 , yet there also lies the destiny. That is why the nobleman does
not take it as nature. The way benevolence is related to the relation
between father and son, the duty to the relation between lord and subject,
the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the good wise
man, the sage to the way of Heaven, is the decree, but there also lies
3 8 For example, Xunzi criticized Mencius by pointing out that “human nature is bad” because they
tend to be led by their physical desires. See “Human’s Nature Is Evil” in Hstin Tzu Trans. Watson,
Burton. New York and London, Columbia University Press. 1963. pp.157-159.
But Mencius’ never said that physical desires are “human nature”. While on the other hand, as I
mentioned before, some scholars explain human nature with the quality of human behavior; but the
fact is, Mencius did not make that equation either.
3 9 See also note 8.
4 0 Literally, the Chinese word here is Xing '|4; but this Xing, being more of natural tendency, carries a
different meaning from the later mentioned Xing jT, by which Mencius meant “human nature”.
Therefore, I render it as “natural tendency”. As I will prove later, M encius’ “human nature” is not A
physical tendency. And it’s has nothing to do with physical tendency: on the one hand, physical
tendency is natural, but it’s not uniquely o f human. On the other hand, no matter the result of people’s
behavior (under the direction of physical tendency) is good or not, the nature remains absolutely and
purely good.
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nature (as a source that determines what is what) within it4 1. That is why
the gentleman does not regard it (only) as decree.4 2
Three aspects of human composition are indicated: natural tendency (physical Xing
'[4), destiny (mental/moral Ming up), and human essence (humanistic Xing t!))4 3 ,
each of which has its own function in constituting human. Natural tendency is
physical predisposition and is natural; but we should not stop here in defining human
nature because moral is also predestined (thus is also natural but higher than
physicality), thus Mencius negated taking natural tendencies singularly as human
nature. Moral decree is predestined (by Heaven), but it’s more of abstract form than
of the essence of human which is regarded as human nature by Mencius; therefore,
we should not cease at the level of moral fate Ming up in figuring out what makes
humans human in that it is passive in constituting human. Here, Heaven Tian A is
the key word in understanding why moral fate is not the source of human nature. In
Mencius, there are at least three meanings for Tian: natural heaven, nature, and
personalized Heaven. Obviously, the Tian in this paragraph is personalized Heaven.
The relationship between sage and the Way of Heaven is decree; but there also exists
nature in the relationship. And the nature is imparted by Heaven and thus congruous
4 1 The Chinese word for nature here is also Xing fT, which does not mean the biological disposition,
and bears more moral characters. I render it as “human nature” in order to make difference from the
physical Xing.
4 2 Mencius. VIIB24. I have referred to D. C. Lau’s translation. P A l/A A lil > ’ A A A S ?
m ’ M zm M m - • im > > s a d i s m ° c z m x n > m znm
Etn • - sA A A A iim > - m m - ° see
also Zhu, Xi. Sishu Jizhu H u’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 529.
4 3 See note 42.
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to Heaven. We can see clues from other chapters: . .The organ of heart is able to
concentrate; it will attain the way when it concentrates; but it won’t get it when it
doesn’t concentrate. This is what Heaven has endowed me... .”4 4 “In good years the
young men are mostly lazy, while in bad years they are mostly violent. It is not what
Heaven endowed them that differ, but where their mind is trapped that cause so.”4 5
Clearly enough, Heaven endows human something; and we can get some clue of the
content of the endowment from the following message:
.. .Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom are not
welded onto me from the outside; they are in me originally. Only this has
never dawned on me. That is why it is said, “Seek and you will find it; let
go and you will lose it.” There are cases where one man is twice, five
times or countless times better than another man, but this is only because
there are people who fail to make the best of their native endowment. The
Book of Odes says,
Heaven produces the teeming masses,
And where there is a thing there is a norm.
Humans are endowed with constant nature,
And they love this superior virtue.4 6
Apparently, virtues are given by Heaven. It is in this sense that Mencius asserted
that decree is not human’s essential attribute. The virtues are decree, but they are not
from outside enforcement, rather they are out of our own nature. Note the following
statement, “He who has developed completely all his mind knows his nature, he who
44
See note 32.
45 Mencius VIA1. My trans. S f o T T : “ MM ’ : \M M ' °
w z m m ’ °
4 6 Mencius VIA6. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .163: iT jiilillll1 ’
° t m : m m z . - m & z . ° °
m y b - - mmm ° m-zmm - m m m ° ” ? l ^ b = > mum
¥ i • mm%m ° ”
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knows his nature knows heaven.”4 7 As long as human exhaust his mind, he will
know his nature, and once he knows his nature, he will know Heaven. What is
indicated here is obviously the relationship between Heaven and human nature.
Virtues are endowments of Heaven, but they are only forms, the essence of the forms
is nature, which, to some extent is shared by human and Heaven; although humans
will not know it until they exhaust their mind.
Hsii Fu-kuan points out the difference between human nature and moral
decree, which is very helpful in understanding Mencius’ definition of human nature,
“Human nature arises from inside, upon the realization of which, human stands in an
initiative position; while decree arrives from outside, upon the realization of which
people is passive.”481 doubt the idea that “destiny arrives from outside”, but agree
that decree is a passive issue. The reason is, as I mentioned above, according to
Mencius, destiny is from Heaven, and human beings are originally congruous to
Heaven. It is Heaven that determines human’s achievement and failure in their life;
and Heaven has certain ways/decrees there. But it’s human being himself who
decides what to do and what not to do. In this sense, decree from outside is “passive”
and therefore it is not adequate in defining human.
4 7 Mencius VIIA1. My translation. : “iS ^ 'L A i ’ ° £ 0 ^ 1 4 ’
& ° ■ ” see also zhu,
Xi. SishuJizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 499.
4 8 Hsii, Fu-Kuan. Zhongguo Renxinglun Shi Taizhong: Donghai Daxue, 1963. pp.166-168. My
translation.
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2. Human Nature is not Identical with Natural Predisposition
Irene. T. Bloom does an amazing job in her analysis of Mencius theory of
human nature, and in many aspects, I have similar ideas as hers.4 9 However, the only
point that I might hesitate to support is that she takes natural predisposition as part of
human nature. My concern is, natural predisposition, without any further definition
can’t be counted as part of human nature for two reasons: (1) without being
controlled, they can’t differentiate human from animals; (2) being under control, it is
our mind that fulfills this task. As we saw, in the above cited paragraph, Mencius
mentioned Xing '[4 twice and obviously each bears different meanings from the other.
The Xing '['4 mentioned first is physical, which exists in the relationship between
mouth and taste, eye and color, ear and sound, nose and smell, limbs and comfort. It
is natural, but Mencius did not attribute them to human nature, in that these traits are
what human shares with animals. In Mencius’ view, it can’t differentiate human
from animals:
This is the way of common people: once they have a full belly and warm
clothes on their back they degenerate to the level of animals if they are allowed
to lead idle lives, without education and discipline.5 0
What Mencius mentioned in this passage is exactly what Xunzi and some scholars
took as evidence in blaming Mencius. They contend that the natural inclination is
4 9 See Bloom, Irene. T. “ Menzian Arguments on Human Nature” in Philosophy East and West
(Honolulu) 47, no.l (Jan 1997) pp. 21-32
5 0 Mencius IIIA4. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p.102. A A A A W x ljtil ’
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25
inborn with human and always cause bad behaviors, so human nature must be bad.
But, as we saw, Mencius had already anticipated this problem. That is, this kind of
natural inclinations is not what makes humans uniquely human, while the basic
standard that Mencius emphasized in defining human nature is the factor that
makes humans uniquely human. In other words, these natural tendencies rather
than human nature, can’t distinguish human from brutes. In Mencius, the
comparison between human and brutes is highlighted here and there to emphasize
the subtle difference between human and animals.
For instance, in VIA, when talking about preservation of “morning air”,
Mencius said that if man deviated from human way, he would become close to
animals; others, when seeing his resemblance to animals, would think that he lacks
good essence in his nature. However, Mencius argued that it is not that he lacks
good nature, but that he fails to keep it in the right way.5 1 Many critiques of
Mencius’ idea fail to see Mencius’ account of this kind of “bad behavior”. As a
matter of fact, this failure reflects a confusion of natural disposition and humanistic
nature.
Kao Tzu said, “The inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’.”
“Is that,” said Mencius, “the same as ‘white’ is what is meant by
‘white’?”
“Yes.”
“Is the whiteness of white feathers the same as the whiteness of white
snow and the whiteness of white snow the same as white jade?”
“Yes.”
5 1 See note 34.
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“In that case, is the nature of a hound the same as the nature of an ox and
the nature of an ox the same as the nature of man?” 5 2
Obviously, Gaozi was trying to define human nature by identifying human
nature with natural predisposition. Mencius refuted him by pointing out that
inborn elements by themselves can’t distinguish human from animals and
thereby denied taking physical nature as equivalent to human nature. “Slight is
the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this
S T
distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it.” Mencius admitted that
the difference between human and brutes is slight; but no matter how slight it is,
it is something that differentiates human from animals. Apparently, this slight
difference is not what human shares with animals. In short, what makes
humans human is not natural predisposition, but something subtle. Hsii Fu-
kuan interpreted this passage as,
By these sentences, Mencius meant that in terms of reactions of
biological stimuli such as desires for food and drink, etc., human is
same as animals except for a subtle difference. That means, in order to
understand the nature that makes humans uniquely human, we can only
start with this subtle difference...5 4
This reading explains very well the reason why Mencius did not count the
natural inclination as unique human nature. In other words, by “human nature”,
5 2 Mencius. VIA3. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .161. 'A f- b S A A I : “A i/7
if 14 • u s : “ m ° ” -
S S A S ’ © S 5 2 . 6 S B : ? ” S : “M ° ” “M A A f f i i A A t e - A A 1 4 3 t A A 1 4 M ? ”
SiMencius. IVB19. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .l3 1 :f£ f- f A A E d • “A A
- e s a a - - ”
5 4 Hsu, Fu-Kuan. Zhongguo Renxinglun Shi. My translation.Taizhong: Donghai Daxue, 1963. p .165.
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Mencius first stressed the characteristic that is, if anything, “humanistic” rather
than (including) “natural” or “original”; the physical inclination of human,
although truly exists, can’t fulfill this task.
Now, let’s see another statement of Mencius to get some clue of what
he meant by “subtle difference” between human and animals. “Body and
complexion are inborn with us; but only sages can completely give it a good
account.”5 5 The denotation here, as I understand, corresponds to what I
mentioned above. That is, only sages can control the body and put it into
practice in an appropriate way; as for commoners, they don’t take control over
their body (MMX but are lead by their natural inclinations. Sages present the
perfect form into which human can get by living out the rules of human nature;
therefore, it seems safe for us to say that the sages’ state reveals, in an
exaggerating version, the otherwise unclear human nature in Meniucs’ theory.
In short, human nature should be something that superior, rather than inferior to,
or identical with natural inclinations.
3. Human Nature is not Congruous to Moral
As we mentioned in the first two chapters, scholars tend to interpret Mencius
definition of human nature by identifying human nature with moral action or
principles. Jiyuan Yu’s analysis raises an objection to this idea. Yu convincingly
5 5 Mencius VIIA38. My translation. H 'L v h iinfPEI : 0 1 1 1 3 =
0 ° ” See also SishuJizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 516.
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draws distinction between a “moral self’ and a “perfect self’. Namely, a moral self is
“in oneness with society” while a perfect self is “in oneness with Heaven”, and “a
perfect self is the great and accomplished self. For Mencius, however, moral self is
one stage in the long and gradual natural growth of the four seeds”.5 6 Persuasively,
Yu lists several paragraphs in Mencius to support this idea,
A person fully actualizes his nature not in oneness with society, but in
oneness with Heaven, although if the society is one in which the way of
heaven prevails, there is no tension between these two unities. Mencius
distinguishes honors bestowed by Heaven and honors bestowed by man. He
claims that ‘Men of antiquity bent their efforts towards acquiring honors
bestowed by Heaven, and honors bestowed by man follows naturally.5 7
58
He also distinguishes what is truly worthy of esteem is conferred by others.
All these suggest that there is a higher value beyond social value. Whether social
values are really valuable should be judged by that higher value.5 9 I agree with this
idea at the point that it sees the difference between human nature and human moral,
and pointing out that morality is not the standard by which Mencius confined human
nature.6 0
I argue that morality is only part of the issue, because in Mencius’ view,
human nature is not directly equal to morality. After the first mentioned natural
disposition, Mencius mentioned decree, which narrows the topic down to human. As
5 6 Yu, Jiyuan. “The Moral Self and the Perfect Self in Aristotle and Mencius” in Journal o f Chinese
Philosophy 28, no.3 (Sep 2001) p.251.
5 1 Ibid., 6A:16.
5 8 Ibid., 6A:17.
5 9 Yu, Jiyuan. “The Moral Self and the Perfect Self in Aristotle and Mencius” in Journal o f Chinese
Philosophy 28, no.3 (Sep 2001) p.246-247
6 0 But I hesitate to accept Yu’s idea about human nature that “the good is the full manifestation of
humanity, or human nature’s own peak and flourishing”. See Yu, Jiyuan. “The Moral Self and the
Perfect Self in Aristotle and Mencius” in Journal o f Chinese Philosophy 28, no.3 (Sep 2001) p. 240
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the content of decree, benevolence, rightness, ritual and wisdom, etc. are definitely
humanistic characters. However, Mencius did not count the moral elements directly
as human nature. “There exists nature;6 1 therefore nobleman does not take the
predestined thing (only) as decree”.6 2 Clearly, after examining two aspects of human
constitution, Mencius did not stop exploring the content of human nature on the level
of morality and he found that there also exists something more important, which is
called nature. Mencius did not explain what he meant by “nature”, but as we
analyzed, we can tell that there is something other than natural tendency and moral
virtue that is regarded as human nature by Mencius. The problem is why morality is
not human nature in Mencius’ picture and how human nature is different from
morality. This is a twofold issue: on the one hand, moral virtues origin in human
nature, but they exist only as form (e.g. house, ways, etc.); on the other hand, one can
(seemingly) lose it if he is not in the right way, which we can see from the following:
Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom are not
welded onto me from the outside; they are in me originally. Only this has
never dawned on me. That is why it is said, “Seek and you will find it; let go
and you will lose it.” There are cases where one man is twice, five times or
countless times better than another man, but this is only because there are
people who fail to make the best of their native endowment.6 3
As we can see, Mencius held that virtues are not welded on to people, but exist
innately within people. The statement takes such a confusing appearance that leads
6 1 Rather than natural inclination, this Xing is human nature (Ren Xing).
6 2 See note 44. This sentence bears the meaning of “gentleman, although should carry out moralities,
should not leave it to decree, because there is something that he can do.” For example, Mencius
advocated in order to deal with fate, one should “cultivate oneself’ and thus serve the Heaven.
6 3 See note 48.
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many scholars to take virtues directly as human nature. However, Mencius’ went on
to assert that although the virtues are inborn in people, they could be ignored and
thus be lost. The key question here is, whether human nature could be lost? Logically
speaking, human nature is the last thing that could be lost by a man in that without
human nature, a living being will not be named as human any more. Take a step back,
even if one can still be regarded as human without human nature, it contradicts with
Mencius’ theory because Mencius contended that even bad persons bear human
nature. Therefore, it is impossible for human nature to be lost by human. However
on the other hand, Mencius did say that “let go and you will lose it”. What does this
imply? This implies that virtues, according to the logic and Mencius’ premise in
debating human nature, although inborn with human, are not equal to human nature.
In other words, the difference denoted here is that while human nature is not subject
to subjective or objective conditions, but virtues are. Let’s take see the difference
from another angle. To some people, being moral is enough for one to judge the
nature of humans; but to Mencius, it’s not sufficient because in Mencius’ mind,
moral is a twofold issue: internal and innate morality (true morality), and external
morality (counterfeit morality).
“Shun understood the way of things and had keen insight into human
relationships. He followed the path of morality. He did not simply enforce
it.”6 4
6 4 Mencius. IVB19.1 referred to D. C. Lau’s translation. fU li-T' i£ “FEI :
Ss'Ainf : E h fliifT ’ ° ” See also, SishuJizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 421.
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31
As we read in this passage, there are two ways of carrying out morality: to follow or
to enforce. James Legge fails to distinguish these: “It is quite clear that what
Mencius considered as deserving to be properly called the nature of man, was not
that by which he is a creature of appetites and passions, but that by which he is lifted
up into the higher circle of intelligence and virtue. .. .there ought to be a cheerful
submission so far as the appetites are concerned, but where the virtues are in
question, we are to be striving after them notwithstanding adverse and opposing
circumstances. They are our nature, what we were made for, what we have to do.”6 5
This is simply not true to Mencius, because our nature only provides grounds for
good behavior, but does not force man to do, if any, good rather than bad. It is
already clear that without “concentrating ’ it is more likely for man to do bad
than good; although the good seeds in human mind manifest themselves from time to
time. Besides, to do good is a twofold issue: to enforce external goodness and to
follow internal way of good; the former is not Mencius’ idea at all and the latter has
nothing to do with mandate.
A proof of this difference is the parable of the Song farmer who pulled at his
sprouts in order to help them to grow fast.6 6 This kind of difference does exist in
Mencius idea; therefore, we can’t simply rush to the conclusion that as long as one is
carrying out morality, he is manifesting the good nature of human. On the contrary,
6 5 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
6 6 Mencius. HA i f * A A A ^ m ’ A A i M f - I S ^ A H : ‘A S
° ’ - m m tm • °
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we have to examine closely the manner of one’s carrying out morality to see if he
presents the inborn virtue or not. Another case that proves this understanding of
Mencius’ idea lies in his criticism of the five lords. Mencius once said,
Yao and Shun are those who act directly in accordance with their nature;
Tang and Wu are those who carry out their nature through their body; the
five lords are those who make pretense of being carrying it out.6 7
The five lords were not in the way of carrying out the “human nature”, but they
could pretend to have it. And even though the latter could pretend to have morality,
they were not as true as Yao and Shun in “being human”. Therefore, morality, by
itself, is insufficient to explain the difference between Yao, Shun and the five lords;
and because of the existence of enforced morality, we cannot simply draw the
conclusion that morality, by its appearance, presents human nature. At least, it’s not
Meniucs’ logic.
As a matter of fact, the enforced (external) morals are what Xun Zi and Mo
Zi advocate, and strongly criticized by Mencius for they created another root, which
zro
goes against Heaven’s principle of one root of creating the world. The only root, in
Mencius’ view, lies innately within human with complete rules of morality; it is
wrong for people to seek them from outside. According to Mencius, the rule of the
6 7 Mencius VIIA29. My translation. ] £ Y 0 : ' Jlv lfb , I E l f ’ fUAfb, ° A
HzMEIiff ’ E E A A f f t f l ? ” See also Sishu Jizhu H u’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 512.
6 8 The root and its principle is innately within one’s mind, rather than learned or created from outside.
Mencius IIIA5. ^ E P B : ° #
Y tJ tM A # - > MM
m m ’ - w m m z. ° nm m t > • a
m - t m x m - • M s n s m i i A • ° ■ f t
Y Y fxliA ° ” See also Sishu Jizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 335.
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33
innate morality is out of heaven, and inborn with human; thus morality must be
sought through self-examination. Otherwise, no matter what appearance it takes, it
will be nothing more than an empty form.
Secondly, morality itself is not as solid as nature. One can negate or lose
morality easily while nature is something unchangeable and can’t be destroyed in
human’s construction. Mencius said,
That which a gentleman follows as his nature is not added to when he
holds sway over the empire, nor is it detracted from when he is reduced to
straitened circumstances. This is because it is allotted so.6 9
What I want to stress here is, the nature that a gentleman follows is not subject to
any change, and it neither increases nor decreases, not to speak of losing or
acquiring. But on the other hand, virtues are subject to one’s attitude:
It is not worth the trouble to talk to a man who has no respect for himself ( g
HI), and it is not worth the trouble to make a common effort with a man who
has no confidence in himself (j=j;|j|). The former attacks morality; the latter
says, ‘I do not think I am capable of abiding by benevolence or of following
rightness.’ Benevolence is man’s peaceful abode and rightness his proper
path. It is indeed lamentable for anyone not to live in his peaceful abode and
7 0
not to follow his proper path.
The Chinese words “ § HI” (do not respect oneself), “ § | j | ” (abandon oneself)
show clearly that it is contingent on individual’s intention whether to follow the way
or not. To announce that humans have destined morality in their mind is not
6 9 Mencius VIIA21.1 have referred to Lau’s translation.;^^- HbC-h 5& -F H : “.■•S'PfJrtt ’ It
ykfrT'iJtlj® ’ S fH ilrT 'fjlif ’ fTVES&iii ° See also Sishu Jizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p.507.
1 0 Mencius IVA10. Tans. Lau. D. C. New York: Penguin. 1970. p.122. iS'-p {§fjjt F : “ ft A
m - • g ® # ■ ° mmm - * is
• ” “t - ; m ’ i ”
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34
sufficient to make the proposition that morality is human nature, in that, in reality,
7 1
morality is deniable but human nature is not deniable. Morality is merely a path,
although it is perfectly good, it is still possible and highly likely that people do not
choose to follow it; and if people do not follow it, it’s nothing more than an empty
form.7 2 In this sense, Mencius did not count on it in defining human nature.
Nevertheless, one can choose to ignore his nature, but can never deny his
nature.7 3 Whether be conscious or ignorant of his nature is contingent on the state of
his mind, which I will explore in later section. This is the reason why right after
counted the morality as destined Mencius brought up his idea of nature (as an
essence that is unchangeable and determines ideal rules— morality— of mind) that lies
with morality.7 4
To sum up, in Mencius’ theory, there’re three aspects in the constitution of
human: the first aspect is a physicality, which consists of natural predispositions.
Mencius did not deny its existence, but believed it is not decisive in confining human
at all; the second aspect is the human mind, wherein, corresponding to the states of
711 mean people have the freedom to choose the complete mind or incomplete mind. The choice of
the former leads to moral action; the choice of the latter leads to bad action. See also chapter 4.
7 2 Someone might argue that the so-called good nature is also no more than A possibility, if it does not
get realized. It is not the case, because nature is essence rather than form. Mencius has A complete
theory of the relationship of mind, fate and nature, which explains the mechanism of the three
elements. We will examine it later.
7 3 Mencius VIA6. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p,163.;3i-p * tn P _ h : “f—U S tH 1 ’
- % , & & & ° = m m z > ° mmmmmwm >
• m ) a = ■ im m m • ’ s : m
m m - - m m tm ° ’ ”
7 4 The Chinese word for nature here is also Xing ('[4), which does not mean the biological disposition,
and bears more moral characters. I render it as “Human Nature” in order to make difference from the
physical Xing.
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35
mind lies morality (including two forms: true morality and false morality) and
immorality. The third aspect is nature that, although associated with physical action
and mental action, is not identical with body and morality. Therefore, by “human
nature”, Mencius did not mean “physicality”; or the moral rules. No matter whether
Mencius’ whole theory can hold or not, his definition of human nature convincingly
resists three kinds of explanations: those which regard physical desires as human
nature,7 5 those which connect the quality of human action with that of human nature,
and those which equate the good nature with moral.
7 5 It is nature, but it is not what Mencius meant.
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Chapter 4: Human Nature, in Relation to Human Mind
As we have seen, three aspects constitute human and the first two, natural
inclination and moral rules, are not human nature. However, although they are not
human nature, they are always related to human nature in Mencius idea and thereby
are usually mistakenly taken as human nature by scholars. This misunderstanding
will be dismissed if we approach the question from another angle, which is, by
differentiating the function of human mind and the essence of human nature. In this
chapter, I will explore the relationship between human nature and human mind,
which, I think, will shed light on Mencius’ idea of what human nature is, and the
matrix where morality and immorality is hatched. This exploration will also be
expected to explain away the impression that evil element dwells in human nature.
1. Human Mind is the Way through Which Human Can Know His Nature.
There have been numerous explanations about what Mencius meant by
“human nature”. Generally speaking, most of the studies tend to fathom nature
(an object in the third aspect of human composition) with the standard of “if it
is morally good” (a standard of the second aspect). This is not the right way in
that this method does not distinguish human mind from human nature; whereas
in the book of Mencius, the theory of human nature is drawn exactly on
distinguishing human nature from human mind. In the parable of the wood of
Ox Mountain, Mencius mentioned nature Xing |4 , mind of benevolence and
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37
integrity Renyizhixin \Z.ttiSjLr, true heart Liangxin JlkL> and Xin /[V and we
can find the relationship between mind and nature in VIA87 6 In this passage,
except nature Xing that is used in an allegorical spirit, all of the other terms are
used in terms of human mind. Among all the terms about nature and mind in
this passage, mind of benevolence and true mind are almost congruous to
nature except that mind can be lost whereas nature cannot. A crucial notion
7 7 •
indicated here is, although human nature never changes, its embodiment—
mind—does change: the original state of mind could be true mind Liangxin, but
true mind could be let go of; and when man holds on to it (true mind), it could
remain; otherwise it will disappear; upon receiving nurture, it will grow, upon
losing nurture, it will wither. Note herein, it is mind, rather than human nature,
that changes. With the transitionary function of mind, Mencius successfully
bridged the gap between unchangeable nature and changeable quality of
behavior. Along this thread, we can get a clear picture of the relationship
between human mind and human nature, and thus reach a further understanding
of Mencius’ human nature theory.
One of the representative statements of this idea is to know human nature one
is supposed to exhaust mind first. “He who has developed completely all his mind
78
knows his nature, he who knows his nature knows heaven.” Obviously, as we see,
mind and nature are different concepts in Mencius’ thought; and knowing mind is a
7 6 See note 34.
7 7 See note 71.
7 8 See note 49.
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38
necessary step in the way to understanding of human nature. According to Mencius,
it’s impossible for those who have not exhausted their mind to really know the
quality of human nature. That means even though everyone has the good nature, not
everyone can know what the nature is before he knows his mind completely, let
alone to carry it out in practice. That’s why Mencius said “those who follow it all
70
through his life without knowing it are numerous.” Although what Mencius was
really talking about is Tao (the Way of Heaven), it also could be regard as a remark
ori
on human nature in that Mencius’ Way is inherent in human nature. It’s common
for people to have the ability to tell, superficially, on the moral level, what is good
and what is bad; but it’s highly unlikely that they know human nature, because they
have not explored deep enough to understand the mind as a whole (H'L» at this
stage. In this sense, we can also understand why Confucius sighed, “You can guide
commoners to follow, but you can’t let them know (the way).”8 1 In order to know the
quality of human nature, we have to know all about human mind. Therefore the
question becomes an issue of human mind. The key questions here are: (1) the forms
7 9 Mencius VIIA4 Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p. 182. A A A A - h .A A H : “f r A
M A U M ’ I f A F r P f il© ’ 0 ” This is also Confucius idea: “As for
the commoners, you can teach them to follow it, but you can’t let them know.” Actually, it’s not
Confucius or Mencius who wanted to keep it secret from commoners, but the commoners are not in
the right way to know it.
8 0 In Amore general sense, the Way means the principle exists in every action of human, despite moral
or immoral. To understand it as a whole means to understand the human nature, because the rules are
inborn within nature, as we analyzed before.
8 1 See Confucius Analects Taibo: A S ; “,K A'SliTI A ’ A ^TlSA nA ° ” I’ve referred to
Slingerland’s translation. See also, Sishu Jizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 151.
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39
/shapes of human mind; and (2) the relationship between different shapes of human
mind. We will discuss these two questions in turn.
To discover the shapes of human mind, I’d like to start with examining the
shapes that human mind could assume. Fortunately we can find all Mencius’ idea
about it directly in his book without any subjective assumptions. In Mencius, there
are mainly two types of mind mentioned: the ideally perfect mind and the partial
mind.
A. The Ideally Perfect Mind
In terms of human composition, this mind is original; in terms of human
cultivation, it is accomplished. This complete mind embodies the good nature of
o->
human. The content of the perfect mind is virtues.
That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence,
rightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in
his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends
to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words.8 3
All the four virtues that Mencius advocated are rooted in mind, which makes
QA
the original mind good. Moreover, everyone has this perfect human mind. “Not
only the sages who have this kind of mind, everyone has it. The only difference is
Of
that the sages do not lose it.” With regard to Mencius,
8 2 Again, the word “embody” means, the mind, although perfect, is not equal to human nature.
8 3 See note 48.
8 4 It is not good enough to exclude bad elements in Mind though. But M encius’ other statement
successfully excludes the bad elements in Mind and hence safely drew the conclusion that the original
Mind is good.
8 5 Mencius VIA 10 My translation. a “ P_h
T f...” See also Sishu Jizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 475.
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All palates have the same preference in taste; all ears in sound; all eyes in
beauty. Should hearts prove to be exception by possessing nothing in
common? What is common to all hearts? Reason and rightness. The sage is
simply the man first to discover this common element in my heart. Thus
reason and rightness please my heart in the same way as meat pleases my
palate.8 6
And elsewhere he asked more than once that “as for what exists in human
0 7
composition, does it lack mind of benevolence and rightness?” These clearly show
that everyone has this perfect and complete mind.
88
However, this mind is open to harm. It could be harmed, lost, and blocked.
“A hungry man regards food as delectable; a thirsty man finds drink delicious. In this
sense, they do not get the proper measure of food and drink because hunger and
thirst interfere with his judgment. Is the palate the only thing which can be distorted
OQ .
by hunger and thirst? The mind, too, is open to distortion.” That means, although m
a complete version, human mind is good, it does not ensure that everyone will take
the perfect way. When one fails to be aware of the whole mind, the mind will take a
partial shape.
B. Partial Mind
This type of mind is not original; rather, it derives from the damage of the
original mind. It is the result of the original one being harmed. The terms Mencius
8 6 See note 44. Trans. Lau, D. C.
8 7 See note 3 4 .1 have referred to D. C. Lau’s translation.
8 8 Please refer to note 69 and note 70.
8 9 Mencius VIIA27.1 have referred to D. C. Lau’s translation. A A A ll'A : “ill A ft A ’
° u t t a • m m m m • x m m u x
’ I l i A A A T 'f i l l A l 0 ” See also Sishu Jizhu H u’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 511.
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41
used for this type of mind, explicitly or implicitly, include lost mind, partial mind,
unexhausted mind, and limited mind etc. For example, the partial mind might be an
ensnared one. “In good years the young men are mostly lazy, while in bad years they
are mostly violent. Heaven has not sent down men whose endowment differs so
greatly. The difference is due to what ensnares their hearts.” 9 0 The partial mind
could be a blocked one. Mencius once talked to Gao Zi, “A trial through the
mountains, if used, becomes a path in a short time, but if unused, becomes blocked
by grass in an equally short time. Now your heart is blocked by grass.”9 1 If we take a
clear path as a symbol of a complete mind, then, the blocked path implies a partial
mind. Also, the partial mind could be a lost mind.
Benevolence is the heart of man, and rightness his road. Sad it is indeed when
a man gives up the right road instead of following it and allows his heart to
stray without enough sense to go after it. When his chickens and dogs stray,
he has sense enough to go after them, but not when his heart strays. Then the
sole concern of learning is to go after this stray heart. That is all.9 2
As we have pointed out, compared with mind, human nature is unchangeable since
human nature does not assume diametric shapes; and it could not be lost even by a
bad man.
9 0 See note 47.
9 1 Mencius VIIB21, Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .198. jS N P ll'L 'l' rln P
0 : I • ” See also
Sishu Jizhu Hu’nan: Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 527.
9 2 Mencius V IA ll. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .167. X T ' X T'A X T 'Ed :
“IT • AAB ° m ’ A JS-ife ° 1 MATnbAnA - ! A H ftA K ’ MUM
2 . ’ AfSAX ’ ° ° ” See also Sishu Jizhu Hu’nan:
Yuelu Shushe, 1993. p. 477.
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In terms of the relationship between the accomplished mind and partial mind,
Chinese philosophers have conducted a great deal of studies. Zhu Xi’s famous
proposition reads like this: there are two minds, one of which is the mind of man
Renxin A ;Ls which is not pure and might tend to do bad; the other is the mind of
Way Daoxin xi'Ls which is pure and good.9 3 Lu Hsiang-shan criticized Zhu’s idea
by pointing out all things should be born from one mind, but Zhu Xi’s theory implied
two origins of mind, which in Lu’s view, is impossible.9 4
Lu’s idea corresponds with that of Mencius’9 5 and successfully reconciled the
mind of human and the mind of Way (the partial mind and the accomplished mind)
by reinterpreting Mencius’ idea of original mind, lost mind, and intuitive wisdom.
Although they seem to be two types of mind, they essentially are different forms of
the same one mind. Lu said,
Mencius said, “He who has developed completely all his mind knows his
nature, he who knows his nature knows heaven.”9 6 Mind is only one mind.
The mind of any given person, or that of my friend, or that of a sage of a
thousand generations ago, or again, that of a sage of a thousand generations
hence—their minds are all only [one] like this. The extent of the mind is very
great. If I can develop completely my mind, I thereby become identified with
heaven. To acquire learning consists of nothing more than to apprehend
this.9 7
9 3 Chu Hsi. The Philosophy o f Human Nature. Trans. J. Percy Bruce. London: Probsthain and Co.,
1922; New York: AMS Press Edition, 1973. pl59.
9 4 Lu Hsiang-shan, Hsiang-shan Hsien-sheng C h’uan-chi. Yiilu (35.290). I borrowed Huang’s
translation from Huang, Siu-shi. Lu Hsiang-shan: A Twelfth Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher.
Hyperion Press, Inc. Westport, Connecticut 1977. pp.132-133.
9 5 For example, Mencius criticized that Yizi made two roots which was against heaven’s one-root-rule.
See note 36.
9 6 See note 36 and 37.
9 7 See note 37.
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Lu put it very clear that “mind is only one mind”; and the only difference between
partial mind (manifested by commoners) and accomplished mind (manifested by
sages) is partial mind is a small part of the infinite mind; when man adhere to a small
part while ignoring the entire being, he appears to be a small man, thus his mind is
not the “original mind”, and he seems to have “lost” his mind.
We can find many proofs in Mencius for the distinction between the partial
mind and the accomplished mind. When being asked that though equally human,
why some men are greater than others, Mencius answered, the difference lies in what
they follow. Those who follow the big rule turn to be great men, and those who
follow the small rule turn to be small men.9 8 This is another most confusing passage
in Mencius. My reading of it is both infinite mind and partial mind are essentially the
same one; man has the freedom to choose what he wants to be. When he chooses the
small one, he turns out to be a small person, and vice versa.
2. The Relationship between Human Nature and Human Mind
Now that whether a man behaves good or bad is contingent on his state of
mind, what’s the relationship between partial mind and the complete mind? And
what’s the relationship between human mind and human nature? Right after Mencius
said that it’s a personal issue as for as what one chooses to be, he was asked why
someone chooses the big rule while some others choose the small one. Mencius
attributed it to the function of mind.
9 8 See note 32.
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44
The organ of hearing and sight are unable to think and can be misled by
external things. When physical organs interact with the external objects,
they are easily lost. While the organ of mind can reflect, when the mind
concentrates on the objects in a right way, one can get it; otherwise, one
will lose it."
From this passage, we can see that the reason why one assumes the partial mind is
because he is misled by objects, and why he is misled is because he fails to be aware
of the complete mind. Then why can one fail to be aware of the complete mind? It
might be because he has the freedom to choose in his infinite mind. Mencius once
used a metaphor to illustrate this case. A gardener fails to take care of the expensive
trees, but pays his effort in nurturing the wild grass.1 0 0 The expensive tree represents
the complete mind. The fact that the gardener fails to pay attention to it is not
because he does not have it, but simply because he does not realize how important it
is. Apparently, we can get the connotation that every human being has this good
nature. It has nothing to do with if he has noticed it or ignored it.
(l)The Mechanism of the Evolvement/Degradation of Mind
Based on the analysis above, with reference to the utterance “He who has
developed completely all his mind knows his nature, he who knows his nature knows
heaven”,1 0 1 we can get a picture of Mencius’ idea about human nature and human
mind.
9 9 See note 4 8 ,1 have referred to Lau’s translation.
1 0 0 See note 94.
1 0 1 See note 49.
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Figure 1: The Relationship between Human Nature and Human Mind
A:
manifests in be misled to
human nature = = = ^ original mind (infinite mind) ===-^confused mind (partial
mind, lost mind, unexhausted mind, small mind)
B\
Know heaven know nature
heaven ====hurnan nature <-====original mind (exhausted mind)
Exhaust/extend
<-====confused mind (partial mind, lost mind, unexhausted mind, small mind)
A reflects the fact that human nature is good, and bad behaviors result from the lost
mind, which is not from nature but from partially sticking to a small part of mind.
The small part of mind is not a different thing from the infinite mind; and the infinite
mind (original mind), whose content is goodness, rightness etc., is the embodiment
of human nature.
B shows the course of the movement from the partial mind back to the
original mind, which starts with exhausting mind (or extending mind). The goal of
extending mind is to return to the original mind (exhausted mind), through which
one can know his nature. What changes in the picture is not human nature, but the
human mind, whose complete version is definitely good, but partial version could be
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46
bad. As far as the transformability between the partial Mind and the infinite Mind is
concerned, there is no essential disparity between them.
(2) The “Good” of Human Mind is not the “Good” of Human Nature
After explored the position of human nature in human composition and the
relationship between human nature and human mind, I would move on to examine
what Mencius meant by good. This will be based on the relationship between
“human nature” and “human mind”:
Mencius said: “Men all have the heart that cannot bear the suffering of
others. The former Kings, because they had the heart that cannot bear the
suffering of others, showed this in the way they governed the people.
With such a heart practicing such government, ruling the world was like
rolling it on one’s palm. This is what I mean by saying that all men have
the heart that cannot bear the suffering of others. Now if any man were,
all of a sudden, to see a little child about to fall into a well, he would
experience the feeling of apprehension an pity, not for the sake of gaining
the favor of its parents, not the praise of his neighbors and friends, nor yet
because he dislikes the reputation he would otherwise get of being callous.
Judging from this, whoever has not the heart of commiseration, is not
human, whoever has not the heart of shame is not human, whoever has
not the heart of keeping oneself back in order to make way for others is
not human, and whoever has not heart of right and wrong is not human.
The heart of commiseration is the beginning of humanity; the heart of
shame is the beginning of righteousness; the heart of keeping oneself
back in order to make way for others is the beginning of observing ritual;
the heart of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. A man has these
four beginnings as he has four limbs. To have these four beginnings and
to say to oneself that one incapable of being good is to do harm to oneself,
and to say that one’s prince is incapable of being good is to do harm to
one’s prince. If having these four beginnings in oneself one knows to
extend them, it is as if a fire is beginning to blaze or a spring beginning to
flow through. If one is able to extend them, one has all that is required to
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47
maintain peace within the four seas. If one does not extend them, one will
1 O ')
be incapable even of serving one’s parents.”
The famous “four sprouts” mentioned in the passage have been taken as proofs in
reasoning “human nature” is only a potential by many scholars. For instance, Yu
holds the idea that “... When Mencius claims that human xing is good, he refers only
1 m
to the four seeds” , “Mencius is clearly not talking about the whole of human
nature.”1 0 4 However, it is the plausible interpretation of the “four sprouts” that lead
to the misunderstanding of Mencius’ human nature theory. There are two most
representative readings of the “four sprouts” in explaining Mencius’ theory. The first
one believes that the virtues innately in one mind of benevolence, integrity,
observance of rites, wisdom are only germinations; what Mencius meant by “human
nature is good” is no more than saying that humans have these germs which need to
be nurtured and developed; if they do not get nourished, human’s good nature exists
only as a possibility. The other representative reading is that the virtues are only
beginnings; therefore they are very diminutive in dimension. This claim (although
usually does not get explained as) often implies that compared to these minute things,
1 0 2 Mencius IIA6. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p.82. T iA ™.7A1 :
“a -^w a &a a a ° a a a - • a a s a a a • i t a s a
z m > - a a a h j i a ^ a k # - •gw it
°
A t e • A
-ti1 ° I f ' J I B A A ’ f - A S r a f i f : H H A A ’ i i A S t i f S f f i A A > f k : M A A > %DA
° A 2 f i 0 S f t ’ m sm rn u rn - ; m n m m z
%, ° j r w H i t & m # - »mm
A - ; ^oAAA > A S A N A S ° ”
1 0 3 Yu, Jiyuan. “The Moral Self and the Perfect Self in Aristotle and Mencius” in Journal o f Chinese
Philosophy 28, (Oxford, England; Malden, MA) no.3 (Sep 2001) p.238
1 0 4 See note 22 on p.238 of Yu, Jiyuan. “The Moral Self and the Perfect Self in Aristotle and
Mencius”
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48
what are not innately good are dominantly large. Starting with these assumptions,
people try to reconcile the dim “good nature” with the apparently not-so-good
behaviors. For example, Chen Ning argues for this view by resorting to Guodian
Chujian. Chen argues that there are two stages that can be seen in Guodian chujian:
one is “at birth”, and the other is “full-fledged”.1 0 5 However, as Philip J. Ivanhoe
pointed out, under the situation that “the evidence about where certain ideas about
human nature were first discussed or how earlier accounts influenced later accounts
is still quite murky”, it “would be rash” to use one to attest the other.1 0 6 Moreover,
the evidence that Chen took from the Mencius are not sufficient to falsify Mencius’
other reasoning and statements that are much more apparent than the “seeding” or
the “course of development”. As a matter of fact, there is, if not more convincing, an
equally persuasive way to construe what is the “beginnings” and what is the course
of development.
First of all, the four virtuous minds are not “sprouts” of human nature, but
virtue itself. We can’t identify the smallness of the beginning of virtues as the
smallness of the beginning of human nature. Mencius never said that human
nature has a size that could expand or shrink. On the contrary, Mencius did
emphasize that “human nature” which is endowed by heaven can’t be changed by
saying “That which a gentleman follows as his nature is not added to when he
1 0 5 Chen, Ning. “The Mencian Discussion of Human Nature” in: Chan, Alan K.L., ed. Mencius:
Contexts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002. p.31
106 Ivanhoe, Philip J. “Interpreting the Mengzi: Feature Review of ‘Mencius: Contexts and
Interpretations’” in Philosophy East and West (Honolulu) 54, no.2 (Apr 2004) pp.249-263.
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holds say over the Empire, nor is it detracted from when his reduced to straitened
i ryn
circumstances because it is allotted so.” It is crystal-clear in the statement that
human nature is stable, and it can’t be changed by any means in that human
nature is designed by Heaven. Now that human nature does not subject to any
change, how can we measure its size? In addition, Mencius more than once said
that everyone has the same stable nature. For example, when he talked about the
wood in Ox Mountain, he thought although the mountain became bald after it
was lopped by axes, it’s not the mountain’s nature that tends to be bald;1 0 8 when
he talked about the change of disposition of those young men, he did not owe it
to their nature, either.1 0 9 Based on what we have just seen, it is clear that human
nature is not something that could be changed or nurtured or detracted. Therefore,
speaking of Mencius’ thought, to say that human nature is a diminutive thing or
need to be developed is not right. Secondly, Mencius did say that there are
virtues in human nature, but he never said that those virtuous attributes in/of
nature are small in terms of measure. As a matter of fact, in Mencius’ picture,
these virtues are perfectly accomplished in nature. “Benevolence, dutifulness,
observance of the rites, and wisdom are not welded on to me from the outside;
they are in me originally.”1 1 0 Mencius did not say that “it is the virtues’
1 0 7 See note 71.
1 0 8 Mencius VIA8. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .164.
1 0 9 See note 44.
1 1 0 See note 48.
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germinations that are originally in me”, how can we deduce that they are only
germinations?
In fact, Mencius emphasized strongly that “there is no one who is not
good”1 1 1 , which clearly shows the idea of Mencius that human nature is
unconditionally good. Furthermore, logically speaking, Mencius held the idea
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“all the ten thousand things are there in me” and “there is only one root of the
creation of the world”.1 1 3 Therefore, even we take the words that virtues in the
nature have a course of growing from a germ, we can’t say that “the ripe virtue”
is not in nature, nor can we say “there are two natures: one carries the baby virtue,
while the other carries the mature virtue.” In other words, given that there is only
one human nature; virtues, both baby and grown-up, are in the nature, and the
nature with virtue germinations and the nature with full version of virtues are one,
what’s the point to say that “virtue in the nature are only germinations”1 1 4 ?
Therefore, to say that the virtues in nature are sprouts is not convincing at all.
What’s more important is that rather than human nature, what Mencius was
actually and mainly talking about in this passage is the sprouts of virtue actions. This
can be easily seen from his utterance. “The heart of commiseration is the beginning
of benevolence; the heart of shame is the beginning of righteousness; the heart of
1 1 1 Mencius VIA2. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .161. SE -pH ' ■ A M 'fT T 'lf ’ A
M A T • ”
U 1 Mencius VIIA4. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p.182. S f B : ’
EiM-mm ’ m m xrn ° * m rM iZm ° ”
1 1 3 These two statements indicate that (1) there should be nothing out of human, (2) there should be
only one Nature. Details of Mencius’ utterance see note 70.
1 1 4 See note 15, 16, and 18.
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keeping oneself back in order to make way for others is the beginning of observing
ritual; the heart of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom.”1 1 5 Mencius did not
say, “The heart of commiseration is the beginning of nature”;1 1 6 nor did he say “the
heart of shame is the beginning of nature”1 1 7 etc. Human nature is not an issue of a
sprout or a full-developed thing, it does not need to be developed; what needs to be
1 1 8
developed is the virtue in the form of partial human mind. To mix the four hearts
with human nature is nothing more than interpreters’ misunderstanding. This
misreading is derived from their mixing human nature with human mind. For
example, Mencius’ big opponent once questioned him, “(if everyone is equally good
in terms of nature) then what reason is there to pay any particular honor to Yao, Yu,
or the gentleman?”1 1 9 This question is so typical that people can’t help but bringing
forward generation after generation. According to Mencius, as I analyzed in former
sections, there are three levels in human constitution; and the fact everyone is
equally good in the field of nature does not ensure that everyone’s equally good in
the human mind level. What Mencius advocated is not to “learn” Yao and Shun’s
nature, but to learn how Yao and Shun acualized their nature. In short, the issue is
not of nature, but of how to realize one’s nature. Xun Zi along with some other
1 1 5 See note 105.
1 1 6 See note 105.
1 1 7 See note 105.
1 1 8 For details, see next section.
1 1 9 See “Human’s Nature is Evil” in Hsiin Tzu Trans. Watson, Burton. New York and London:
Columbia University Press. 1963. pp.157-159.
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critics just failed to seize Mencius’ point which is clearly expressed in Mencius’
explanation of heart-mind and nature.
Another aspect might be helpful to understand this point is that the Chinese
word Duan jtf f jj is usually rendered as sprouts, germinations or beginnings. In terms of
human cultivation, it is correct because man needs to nurture his good virtue;
meanwhile good virtues and inborn beginnings could grow. However, in terms of
human nature, none of the translation is quite to the point because Duan, for nature,
only means end. Like an end of a rope, it does not connote any meaning of immature
or incomplete. We can never say that there is a baby rope behind the door when we
see an end of it. Then how can we assure that, by the word Duan, Mencius meant a
little sprout of human nature? Or, because of grass, we only see an ear of a rabbit,
but can we say that there is only an ear in the grass? That we did not see the whole
picture is not because the thing in the grass is incomplete, but because our eyesight is
blocked by other things. This is why Mencius used the allegory of a path blocked
with grass.
To summarize, in this paragraph, by the term of virtue Duan, what Mencius
was discussing is not the situation of human nature, but the situation of human mind.
In other words, as minute as they might be, sprouts reflect the situation of heart, but
not that of human nature. As I have analyzed above, human nature does not have the
problem of expanding or shrink. However, human mind does have the problem of
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expanding and shrinking, nurturing and starving, losing and retrieving, etc., which I
will discuss in the following section.
(3) The Nature of Bad Action
Above I have analyzed that partial mind does not have a root in human nature,
rather, it results from sticking to small parts of the infinite mind. Therefore, the
quality of action, despite its good or bad, is irrelative to human nature. There are
plenty of utterances in Mencius that support and explain this idea. In Mencius’
conversation with King Xuan of Qi:
[Mencius said,] “If you consider my words well spoken, then why do you not
put them into practice?”
“I have a weakness. I am fond of money.”
“In antiquity Kung Liu was fond of money too.. .It was only when those who
stayed at home had full granaries and those who went forth to war had full
sacks that the march could begin. You may be fond of money, but so long as
you share this fondness with the people, how can it interfere with your
becoming a true King?’
“I have a weakness”, said the King, “I am fond of women.”
“In antiquity, T’ai Wang was fond of women, and loved his concubines.. .At
that time, there were neither girls pining for a husband nor men without a
wife. You may be fond of women, but so long as you share this fondness with
• 120
people, how can it interfere with your becoming a true King.”
People would think that in this message, Mencius employed a subtle technique to
persuade King Xuan of Qi; but as far as I am concerned, Mencius was actually
1 2 0 Mencius IB5. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p.65. (]j§Lp) LI : “ rF -A A A ’ MUMfi
t t y ? ” i h : ’ Mxtm ° • m) 9 ■ ‘ ibmxt ■ nm
mm > nmtm * s s s t o ; - xxmm • Mxmj • ’ k m i i i ■ ftmmum
m ° ± m m ■ ■ m ? - a s = • mx&
f e o - g M S - « i # » 9 ■ - A I M M > W t K i H >
T ; M RM X • ’ M P I A • T M ffe -
MW? ”
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telling a fact, that is, with regard to action, selfish action is different from unselfish
one, but in terms of nature there is no substantial difference between the selfish
desire and the moral desire. People can change their “selfish desires” into “moral
desires” by extending the extent. The transformation one’s mind from selfishness to
unselfishness is an extension of quantity rather than a change of quality.
The possibility of the transformation from selfishness to unselfishness serves
as an important basis for Mencius to claim that human nature is good. Van Norden
takes this possibility of transformation from the selfish desire to benevolent deed as
mere evidence that Mencius thought that “humans were capable of becoming good”,
and he furthers his argument by asserting that Mencius insisted that “a human must
seek what he desires the most”. According to Van Norden, one must distinguish
1 9 1
selfish motivations and unselfish motivations. Wherein my point is different from
Van Norden’s in that while he regards that Mencius takes selfishness and
unselfishness as opposite concepts, I think that Mencius did not separate selfishness
and unselfishness on the level of human nature. Both selfishness and unselfishness
are of the same essence except that the former is “small” while the latter is “big”. In
other words, the differences in motivations are not derived from the nature, but from
the free intention, out of which one decides his action. Then, why different people
choose different perspectives? The answer is that’s because their ability to tell what
is better for them is different.
1 2 1 Bryan W. Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency”, p. 105.
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People tend to misunderstand Mencius’ idea by mixing Mencius’ will of
encouraging people to do good with Mencius’ theory of human nature. This is
because we can find here and there in Mencius that he tried to persuade people to
carry out good deeds, we tend to imaginarily identify it with his theory. One of the
conclusions arrived through this is the so-called good nature promotes people to do
good. Philip Ho Hwang contends that Mencius’ theory was “particularly designed to
meet the challenge” that why human “ought” to do good. His conclusion is, man
have good seeds in his nature, and it is natural to “let the original nature grow
naturally and the matter of ought disappears or becomes a matter of is”. “It is in a
true way to say that man ought to do good and cultivate his nature, but it is also true
to say that it is his very essence of man to do good and preserve his nature.” 1 2 2
However, as a matter of fact, what those who insist on connecting good nature theory
with the fact that Mencius took effort to promote his benevolence idea, can be safely
drawn is nothing more than that the so-called good nature, serving as a basement,
offers a possibility for good behavior. But, this does not justify their taking human
nature as compelling just in the sense that it fits to serve as a ground of moral
advocates. It’s similar to the case that we can’t conclude that water is only made to
support boat because water is suitable to support boat. Actually, what Mencius said
is,
1 2 2 Hwang, Philip Ho. “What is Mencius’ Theory o f Human Nature” in Philosophy East and West
Volume 29 no. 2 (Apr., 1979) p. 201-209
Hwang, Philip Ho. A Critical study o f Mencius ’ Philosophy o f Human Nature, with Special
Reference to Kant and Confucuis (dissertation). Norman, Oklahoma, 1978. p. 84.
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Benevolence is the heart of man, and rightness his road. Sad it is indeed
when a man gives up the right road instead of following it and allows his
1 9 T
heart to stray without enough sense to go after it.
According to Mencius, good nature is simply good nature, while quality of action is
quality of action. Good nature does not compel man to do good; instead, it does
nothing more than providing destined ways to carry out good. With this nature, man
has the freedom to choose: he can choose to be conscious or be ignorant, he can
choose follow their physical desires or sages’ way, and he can do whatever he wants.
Human nature does not compel him to be what he should be; on the contrary, what
he really is due to his own choice rather than his nature.
This is an issue of choice. When one chooses the virtuous ends Duan, he is
actually nurturing it and extending it; when he goes astray from the moral way, he is
actually covering or losing it.1 2 4 In chapter 7, Mencius talked about the content Shi
iff of the four virtues:
The content of benevolence is the serving of one’s parents; the content of
dutifulness is obedience to one’s elder brothers; the content of wisdom is to
understand these two and to hold fast to them; the content of the rites is the
regulation and adornment of them; the content of music is the joy that
• 1 9 S
comes of delighting in them...
D. C. Lau here translates Shi W as content, which is reasonable. But in my opinion,
Shi W also carries the meaning of “realization” or “practice”. My reading of this
1 2 3 See 66.
1 2 4 Although the good mind is covered, the good nature never disappears.
1 2 5 Mencius IVA27. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .l2 7 .^ ;- T - ||® ± C f L : “C L
* > w t c • s c * - \ ° w z m - • m z x > •
m z m - m m r.m * • c s i m c e e ? i ^ e e > w m u & z m z ' ° ”
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passage would be, “The realization of benevolence lies in serving one’s parents; the
realization of dutifulness lies in obedience to one’s elder brother...” The so-called
Shi is exactly the fact of realizing something. To choose the inborn moral way, one
realizes the moral way; to abandon the inborn moral way, one carries out
immoralities. This deduction fits perfectly into Mencius’ frame of human
composition: as moral ways are there in the mind level, non-morals are there too.
People have the freedom to carry out (Shi) whatever they want. Both proper ways
corresponding to the complete mind and the wild field corresponding to the
incomplete mind are theoretically there. One cannot avoid but to choose one and thus
realize one. But, when one chooses improper ways, his nature is still good in that the
improper way is out of the limited mind, which is still mind and has nothing to do
with nature.
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Chapter 5: Why Human Nature is Good
So far, through the above analysis, we have the ideas that human nature is the
essential and unique part of human; that human mind embodies human nature,
however, instead of reflecting the trait of human nature, the quality of human action
only indicates the state of human mind (e.g. be complete or be partial); that the
content of human nature is purely good, which could be manifested only when one
exhausts one’s mind, but the fact that nature is not completely manifested does not
mean that one’s nature is bad; that although most people’s mind takes a partial shape,
virtues decided by nature do show up from time to time; that the so-called
beginnings are the beginnings of virtuous action rather than beginnings of good
nature, on the contrary, good nature is the root and source of the beginnings. These
five topics clear up the concept of human nature, the only question left is, why
human nature is good?
1. In the Field of Human Nature
Good of nature is not a relative concept, but an absolute concept. We
can’t find an opposite part of good in nature; furthermore, we can’t apply the
general standard of good and bad to measure the good of nature. Or, to put it in
another way, there is no contrast of good and bad on the level of human nature.
At the same time, the absolute character of nature decides and offers the
form of virtue, which also turns out to be virtuous. Therefore, Mencius regarded
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it as good. One of the most frequently cited passages in Mencius is, when asked
about by what he meant human nature is good, Mencius answered, “As far as
what is genuinely in him is concerned, a man is capable of becoming good. That
is what I mean by good”.1 2 6 Hwang takes this statement as an evidence to prove
that by “good nature”, Mencius only meant the possibility.1 2 7 But, this is only
one side of the story and thus not so convincing in that he failed to differentiate
the level of nature and the quality of action, and thus applied a relative standard
to the absolute thing. As far as the quality of action is concerned, it is equally
capable of being either good or bad, why did Mencius not declare “human nature
is bad”? According to the idea that human is consisted of three levels, we can
easily explain this question away: human is capable of becoming good is because
he has the good source (human nature) to resort to; human tends to do bad is
because he fails to resort to the good source. The quality of action is not an issue
of nature, but an issue of whether one can realize his nature. As far as human
nature is concerned, what Mencius was talking about here, contrary to what most
readers conceive, is not a possibility, but a reality. We can tell this from the
utterance right after what is cited above, “As for his becoming bad, that is not the
fault of his native endowment... Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites,
1 2 6 Mencius. VIA6. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p,163.]£-T p rP - h : ’ M U
’ T b m m f c .
1 2 7 Hwang, Philip Ho. A Critical Study o f Mencius ’ Philosophy o f Human Nature, with Special
Reference to Kant and Confucius (dissertation). Norman, Oklahoma, 1978. p.63.
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and wisdom are not welded on to me from outside; they are in me originally.”1 2 8
Clearly we can tell that the “possibility”, although it’s too realistic and too often
for us, is “do bad”; while the native endowment (z^) is originally good, which,
according to the logic in this passage, is the reality.
As for the reason of this misunderstanding, I think it related to the reading of
the Chinese word “ If we render it as “possible”, “be able to”, then the
understanding will go as: “human is capable of doing good”; but if we take it as “ nj
as what is most commonly accepted in classics, then the reading should be
“one might resort to this ('[4), and thereby be good.” Note, the subject of “be good
)” is not human nature, but human behavior. Therefore, my understanding of
this passage is that human nature provides human with the ground of doing good if
one resorts to it. The action of resorting to it is yi (J^f). However, one might choose
to do so, might not choose to do so; in this sense it is ke ( nj). In other words, in
terms of human nature, it is consummately good; but a specific person might not
avail himself of it.
In sum, that human nature is good is not because it decides or compels
people to do good; rather it is because it offers the possibility of doing good. To
tell whether an action is good, we have to judge by the quality of his action; to
tell whether human nature is good, our standard is simply “if human nature
1 2 8 See note 48.
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61
provides a potential for people to do good”. As analyzed above, human nature
does offer such a possibility; in this sense, it is good, both unconditionally and
stably. As for the bad action, they are out of the partial mind; as for the partial
mind, it is not out of the infinite mind, but a part of the infinite mind. The case is
similar to the case of water, the water in a cup can’t support a boat, but the water
in a sea definitely can do that. It is not because the essence of these two “waters”
is different; it is simply because they take different measures.
2. In the Field of Mind
I’d like to go over Mencius’ ideas about human mind in this section. There
are two shapes that human mind can take, and these two shapes are transformable.
The limited mind and the infinite mind are not essentially different things; the
complete mind manifests human nature; on the level of human mind, “good” is
something that can bring benefits. Based on these readings, if we can get the
conclusion that the complete mind is good, then, we can safely say that human nature
is good. As a matter of fact, that’s exactly what Mencius talked about.
Mencius’ theory that human nature is good is associated with his ideas about
human mind, among which the key idea is “to extend one’s mind”.1 2 9 A typical
passage about extending mind reads,
For every man there are things he cannot bear. To extend this to what
he can bear is benevolence. For every man there are things he is not
1 2 9 There are many terms in Mencius that bear this meaning: (IA7); A6);
l i ^ J f m S ( V I I B 3 1 ) ; « g A ^ L < V I I B 3 1 ) ; etc..
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62
willing to do. To extend this to what he is willing to do is rightness. If a
man can extend to the full his natural aversion to harming others them
there will be an over-abundance of rightness. If a man can extend his
dislike for boring holes and climbing over walls, then there will be an
over-abundance of rightness. If a man can extend his unwillingness to
suffer the actual humiliation of the being addressed as ‘thou’ and thee”,
then wherever he goes he will not do anything that is not right.1 3 0
In this paragraph, there are several terms delivering the idea of extending and the
relationship between extending and the four virtues. I will try to put these into the
system of human composition.
Mencius was mainly talking about the impartial mind. For some reason,
people tend to take the partial mind,1 3 1 which features: that cannot bear some certain
things but can bear something even worse than the former; that unwilling to do
something but tend to do something worse than the former, etc. Both of these two
tendencies are characteristics of the partial mind, which is, sticking to some specific
things while ignoring the whole situation. In this case, the partial mind is usually not
good. However, the partial mind could to be extended. When they are extended,
there will be “over-abundance” of benevolence and rightness.
In another passage about the four ends of virtue, Mencius said,
A man has these four ends as he has four limbs. To have these four
beginnings and to say to oneself that one incapable of being good is to do
harm to oneself, and to say that one’s prince is incapable of being good is
to do harm to one’s prince. If having these four ends in oneself one knows
to extend them, it is as if a fire is beginning to blaze or a spring beginning
1 3 0 Mencius. VIIB31. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p.200. A A A A A S A P S : “A
- m A s ^ m s - a n ; a i m * n A ^ m i i • mm ° x m t
A ’ a a ■ m m Anjifm m • Atg^E w i r a a - m * A n rif m •
w * w a « -
1311 have discussed the reason in the former section.
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to flow through. If one is able to extend them, one has all that is required
to maintain peace within the four seas. If one does not extend them, one
1
will be incapable even of serving one’s parents.
As for the facts of extending one’s mind, Mencius said,
Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age
and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young
in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other
families, and you can roll the empire on your palm.. ..Hence one who extends
his bounty can bring peace to the Four Seas; one who does not cannot bring
peace even to his own family. There is just one thing in which the ancients
133
greatly surpassed others, and that is the way they extended what they did.
Are the actions of “treating the aged of other families as treating the aged of my own
family” good? The answer is positive. Then, we can safely say that to extend one’s
mind is good. Furthermore, the extended mind is good. If the extended mind must be
good, then, the source that decides the forms of the extended mind must be good.
We can also attest this by other reasoning and parables. For example, in
Mencius’ discussion with Gaozi, who compared human nature to qi willow, and
integrity and benevolence to cups and bowls, Mencius refuted:
“Can you,” said Mencius, “make cups and bowls by following the nature
of the willow? Or must you mutilate the willow before you can make it
into cups and bowls? If you have to mutilate the willow to make it into
cups and bowls, must you, then, also mutilate a man to make him moral?
Surely it will be these words of yours men in the world will follow in
bringing disaster upon morality.”1 3 4
1 3 2 See 46.
m Mencius IA7. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p .156.1 changed the rendering of Duan
siffi • ° m > a : ‘ m ^ m m -
- t m n m n ’ ■ w W A L M f& m E ° - a a a
1 3 4 Mencius VIAl. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. p. ldO.ifT- A A A p T 0 : “'[4 ’
m m m ; * • • m x -m c m - h a w u m # • ” ^ a b = u ? m im w a m
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64
According to Gaozi, as we know, there won’t be anything predestined in one’s life,
because his nature has no tendency. Moreover, in order to become virtuous, one
needs to break the original state of nature. What Mencius did in this refutation, is not
just telling Gaozi that “your metaphor is wrong” from a passive aspect. As a matter
of fact, what is indicated in this paragraph is the Mencius’ very idea about human
nature: benevolence and integrity can “grow up” in our mind by following one’s
nature. And if humans follow their nature, they will naturally all become virtuous.
We can see this point clearly by referring to the allegory of the Song farmer who
plucks the seedling. However, a point that demands our attention is that the “growing
benevolence and integrity” is not growing in nature, but growing in behavior. That is,
in nature, all the merits are all completed, and they don’t grow or wither; but as we
all noticed, in our behavior, the merits are usually weak; therefore, it’s our mind
from where our behavior derive that needs purification. Apparently, what humans
need to do, instead of enforcing anything, is just to follow his nature. This is also a
proof that wherein Mencius’ theory differs from Gaozi is by the definition of “human
nature” itself. Without any condition, it is purely good.
Actually, artificiality and enforcement, in Mencius’ view, are exactly the
source of humans’ pettiness. Note, in another passage that has caused so many
guesses, Mencius said,
m m ? a i ”
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What people in the world mean, when talking about human nature, is
origin. The root principle or origin is unimpededness. What is bad of
cleverness is that it bore its way through. If clever men could act as Yu
did in guiding the flood waters, then there would be nothing to dislike
cleverness. The way Yu guided waters was to impose nothing on it that
was against its natural tendency. If clever men can also do this, then great
indeed will their cleverness be.1 3 5
This is one of the rare cases in which Mencius addressed human nature directly. Let
alone if Mencius was talking about others’ opinion or his own opinion, his idea about
human nature is clear enough: human nature is some “original state”. The principle
of this original state is Li As to the understanding of Li, A. C. Graham renders it
as “benefit”1 3 6 and thus interprets that Mencius objects to this “benefit opinion”.
However, this might cause a conflict with the statement at the end of this passage. A
traditional interpretation of Li, just as D. C. Lau does, is to take it as
“unobstructed”.1 3 7 According to Menicus, if everybody follows the principle of
nature, everything would be fine. The problem is, humans have their “human
cleverness” which features boring through. If one can carry out like Yu’s guiding
flood, there is nothing wrong with cleverness. This paragraph serves well as a proof
that humans can follow their nature to recover their goodness. The point here is, the
way Mencius differed from Gaozi is not that “humans have an agency that compels
them to do good” (which indicates that the realistic “good” is something to be attain);
but “if humans follow their nature, they become good which is the original state of
1 3 5 Mencius IVB26. Tans. Lau, D. C. New York: Penguin, 1970. i L Y S : “X T '
° ’ « u rn • •
1 3 6 A. C. Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature”, p. 52.
1 3 7 Jiao Xun, Mengzi Zhengyi Beijing: Zhonghua, 1987. p. 585.
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66
nature” (which indicates that the good state is originally one’s nature, to achieve
realistic good is just to recover it).
In short, although partial mind could be bad, the complete mind is definitely
good. Inasmuch as the complete mind is good, the essence that the complete mind
embodies is good.
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67
Conclusion
In order to discuss the quality of human nature, I have two clues in this paper:
Mencius’ concept of human nature in a picture of human composition; and how to
rule out the “bad part” that always goes with the “good part”.
The composition of human includes: a. physicality; b. mind; and c. nature. In
terms of physical function, Mencius did not call it bad, but if it’s not under the
control of conscious mind, it tends to mislead human; in addition, the uncontrolled
function shed no lights on the difference between human and non-human. Therefore,
Mencius did not take much account on it when he elaborated on human nature. In
terms of mind, mind is the form by which humans can behave as human. Mind takes
two shapes: the complete mind, and the limited mind. The complete mind is decided
by human nature and is perfect; but if one does not choose (or exhaust) it, he cannot
know it. The limited mind is a partial section of the complete mind, thus it usually
causes trouble; and because common people tend to stick to it, they cannot see or
carry out the complete mind. Thus people need to extend the partial mind. With
regard to nature, it is something essentially confines humans as human. It is
manifested by mind, carried out by body, but it never equals to body or mind.
In terms of “good”, there are also two types, one is in the level of human
mind and the other is in the level of human nature. The good in the level of human
mind is a relative one, which means, contrary to good, we can find something bad as
its counterpart in this level, say, bad. The good in the level of human nature is an
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68
absolute one, which means, no matter what action (to benefit others or harm others)
one takes, it is still there, and unchangeably good. What we usually judge as good or
bad is not human nature, but human action which is guided by the state of human
mind. Again, the state of the partial mind can’t represent human nature; human
nature can only be manifested in a fully realized state of mind, and this state, as an
embodiment of human nature, is absolutely good. For a common man, even though
his mind is usually partial, his partial mind is no other than the whole mind, which as
analyzed above is unchangeably good; therefore, he still owes the whole mind (as
embodiment of his nature, although not being illuminated), and thus, his nature is
absolutely and practically good.
Therefore, we can arrive at three conclusions. The first one is that instead of
merely a possibility, Mencius’ human nature is a real fact, because everyone has this
nature (even when he does bad). Secondly, instead of something in its beginning and
needs to be developed, human nature is accomplished, because it is not subject to the
change of moral state. Finally, instead of something mixed with other bad elements,
human nature is purely good, because bad elements do not have root in nature.
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69
Bibliography
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A picture of human composition: An interpretation of Mencius' theory about human nature
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East Asian Languages and Cultures
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