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An ethic of nuclear nonproliferation: Steps toward a nonnuclear world

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©2000
AN ETHIC OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:
STEPS TOWARD A NONNUCLEAR WORLD
by
Joel James Heim
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(RELIGION AND SOCIAL ETHICS)
August 2000
Joel James Heim
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UMI Number: 3018087
Copyright 2000 by
Heim, Joel James
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 0 7
This dissertation, written by
Joel James Heim
under the direction of f t . 1 . ? . ....... Dissertation
Committee, and approved by all its members,
has been presented to and accepted by The
Graduate School in partial fulfillment of re
quirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Dean of Graduate Studies
DISSERTATION/CO]
Chairperson
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Acknowledgments
Many people have contributed to the development of this dissertation, and for this I am very
grateful.
The members o f my committee-John B. Orr, Jonathan Kotler and especially my advisor Henry
B. Clark-continually pushed me to deeper understandings and to present my ideas with more
precision and clarity. This project has been improved immensely thanks to their efforts and, at
times, insistence.
My life partner, Nelia Beth Scovill, spent hours on the manuscript with her sharp and skilled
editing pen. It is thanks to her work that the project is intelligible.
My niece, Jennifer Heim, did fine copy-editing on the manuscript.
Finally, the first incarnation of this work on a much smaller scale was a paper presented in
November 1993 to the Religion, Peace and War Group at the Annual Meeting o f the American
Academy Religion in Washington, D.C. Also, an earlier version o f chapter four was presented in
January 1998 at the Annual Meeting of The Society of Christian Ethics in Atlanta, Georgia. In both
cases, I received many helpful comments and criticisms from those in attendance as well as
reviewers. The chapter has profited from such comments.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................ ii
A b stra c t......................................................................................................................... vi
PARTI: THREAT .........................................................................................................................................L
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................2
CHAPTER ONE: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS .................................................. 16
/. The Nuclear Cold W a r .......................................................................................................... 17
II. A New W o rld ........................................................................................................................... 24
A. The Break-Up of the Soviet U n io n ................................................................................ 24
B. The Role of C hina............................................................................................................ 27
C. Increased Credibility for the Superpowers ...................................................................28
III. M oving Toward Acquisition ............................................................................................... 32
A. Paradigmatic C ases..........................................................................................................33
1. North K o re a .............................................................................................................. 33
2. The Threat of Nuclear T errorism ............................................................................43
B. Active Proliferators..........................................................................................................47
1. Pakistan .................................................................................................................... 47
2. I n d ia ...........................................................................................................................49
3. Isra e l..................................................................... 51
C. Latent Proliferators.......................................................................................................... 54
1. I r a q ............................................................................................................................. 54
2. I r a n ............................................................................................................................. 57
3. O th e rs.........................................................................................................................60
IV. C o n clu sio n ............................................................................................................................. 65
CHAPTER TWO: TRADITIONS OF WAR AND PEACE .......................................................... 67
I. Trapped in the Past ................................................................................................................ 70
A. R ealism ..............................................................................................................................72
B. Failure o f Current Approaches .......................................................................................78
C. Failure o f Technical Solutions .......................................................................................79
D. Nuclear Deterrence.......................................................................................................... 82
II. Forward to the Future .......................................................................................................... 83
A. Ethics M atters...................................................................................................................84
B. Basic Information...............................................................................................................88
C. A Post-Cold War World ..................................................................................................89
D. Nuclear Incentives and M otivations.............................................................................. 90
E. Nonproliferation Motivations ......................................................................................... 93
F. Relinquishing Sovereignty ............................................................................................. 95
G. Collective S ecurity.......................................................................................................... 96
H. J u stic e ................................................................................................................................97
I. The Just War Tradition......................................................................................................98
1. The Just War Tradition............................................................................................. 99
2. Implications of the Just War Tradition ............................................................... 110
3. Just Peacemaking.................................................................................................... 114
J. Nuclear Disarmament.......................................................................................................118
III. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 121
iii
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PART n: V ISIO N ................................................................................................................................ 125
CHAPTER THREE: CHRISTIAN PACIFISM: VISIONS OF PEACE ....................................128
I. Voices o f Pacifism ................................................................................................................. 129
A. Stanley H auerw as...........................................................................................................129
B. John Howard Y o d e r...................................................................................................... 132
C. Daniel B errigan............................................................................................................... 135
D. Vincent H a rd in g .......................................................................................................... 139
E. James W. D ouglass.........................................................................................................142
II. Pacifist V is io n ..................................................................................................................... 144
A. Analysis o f the Ideology of W a r................................................................................. 145
1. Countering War’s Moral Claim ............................................................................. 145
2. Countering Realism .............................................................................................. 153
3. War and Justice .................................................................................................... 158
4. Control ................................................................................................................... 160
B. The View From the Underside ................................................................................... 162
C. C om m unity................................................................................................................... 165
1. A Community o f Sacrifice................................................................................... 167
2. A Community o f Character ................................................................................. 169
3. A Community o f Nonviolence............................................................................... 170
D. Narrative, Story & V ision............................................................................................ 173
1. Historical V ision.......................................................................................................174
2. Global V is io n ...........................................................................................................179
3. Future Vision ...........................................................................................................180
E. Nonviolent Alternatives .............................................................................................. 182
F. True S ecu rity ................................................................................................................. 188
G. Faithful R is k ................................................................................................................. 190
H. Nuclear Issu e s............................................................................................................... 195
III. Implications o f Pacifist Thought ..................................................................................... 204
CHAPTER FOUR: RAGE & VISION: RELIGIOUS FEMINIST VOICES .......................... 208
I. Feminist Theology and Peace ..............................................................................................211
A. Sharon W e lc h .................................................................................................................213
B. Rosemary Radford Ruether............................................................................................214
C. Dorothee S o elle...............................................................................................................215
D. Beverly H arrison............................................................................................................ 217
E. Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite..........................................................................................218
II. R a g e ......................................................................................................................................... 220
A. Christianity Amiss ........................................................................................................ 221
B. Sacrifice ..........................................................................................................................231
C. Sexism & Domination....................................................................................................233
D. Racism ............................................................................................................................ 240
E. Specific Experience........................................................................................................ 242
F. S tru g g le............................................................................................................................ 245
III. V isio n .....................................................................................................................................247
A. C om m unity..................................................................................................................... 249
B. Re-Imagining Christianity............................................................................................251
C. Solidarity..........................................................................................................................259
D. R isk ...................................................................................................................................261
E. Step-by-step Conversion................................................................................................265
Conclusion: The Implications o f Feminist Thought ...........................................................267
iv
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CHAPTER FIVE: LIBERATION THEOLOGY: VOICES OF FREED O M ...............................271
I. Liberationist Voices .............................................................................................................. 275
A. Jose Miguez B o nino ................................................................ 275
B. Enrique Dussel .............................................................................................................. 276
C. Jong-Sun N o h ................................................................................................................ 277
D. M. M. Thomas .............................................................................................................. 278
E. Mercy Amba Oduyoye ............................................................................................... 281
II. Deconstruction .....................................................................................................................282
A. Ideology o f Interpretation............................................................................................. 283
B. Textual A nalysis............................................................................................................ 287
C. Social A n aly sis................................................................................. 293
D. Marxist A nalysis............................................................................................................ 305
E. Experience.......................................................................................................................307
III. Re-Construction .................................................................................................................309
A. Praxis ..............................................................................................................................310
B. Option for the P o o r........................................................................................................312
C. Liberating A ctions.......................................................................................................... 316
D. Contextual A ctions........................................................................................................320
E. Political Ethics ........................................................ 324
F. Nuclear E th ic s................................................................................................................ 334
IV. Implications o f Liberationist Thought ............................................................................ 339
PART III: ACTION .................................................................................................................................. 345
CHAPTER SIX: AN ETHIC OF NONPROLIFERATION ........................................................ 348
I. Conceptual Proposals............................................................................................................ 355
A. Paradigm Shift .............................................................................................................. 355
B. Creation o f Nonproliferation Communities ............................................................... 359
C. One Step At A T im e ......................................................................................................366
II. Policy Proposals ...................................................................................................................368
A. Presumption Against The Use O f Military F o rc e ...................................................... 368
B. Economic Pressure ........................................................................................................380
C. International C ontrol......................................................................................................387
D. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty...................................................................................395
E. Nuclear-Free Z ones........................................................................................................400
F. Decrease Nuclear Stockpiles ....................................................................................... 402
G. No First Use Pledge ......................................................................................................405
H. Controlling Weapon-Grade Fissile M aterial............................................................... 408
I. Decrease in Military Spending....................................................................................... 413
III. C onclusion........................................................................................................................... 417
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 424
v
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Abstract
The end o f the Cold War has lessened the threat of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the
U.S. and decreased the need to focus on the morality of nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless, many
factors-including the breakup of the Soviet Union and the accompanying danger of the transfer o f
nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, nuclear technology and nuclear knowledge-combine to make
the risk of nuclear war even greater. Indeed, many experts conclude that the risk of nuclear war is
greater now than during the Cold War. Consequently, a new ethic o f nonproliferation urgently
needs to be developed.
.This work explores both the historical and the current spread o f nuclear weapons. It also looks
at how ethical theory has explored the issues o f war and peace and, specifically, nuclear weapons.
The conclusion of this exploration o f previous ethical thought on nuclear issues is that at best the
conventional wisdom of Christian realism is inadequate to transcend the threat posed by nuclear
weapons. The constructive section o f this work turns to newer ethical and theological thought, in
particular three distinctive perspectives: Christian pacifism, religious feminism, and third world
liberation theology. These schools contribute vision by providing new concepts to an ethic of
nonproliferation including community, nonviolence, justice, solidarity, character, risk-taking,
liberation, experience and struggle.
The elements from these new visions are then used in the construction o f a transformational
ethic o f nonproliferation. This ethic concludes that security comes from less, rather than more,
nuclear weapons. It calls for the creation of communities (including the church) to engage in
discussions and actions on behalf o f nonproliferation. It also provides public policy
recommendations, including steps the United States and other nations should take on behalf of
nonproliferation. It recommends less violent defense policies, economic pressure and incentives,
international control, a comprehensive test ban treaty, nuclear-free zones, nuclear disarmament, no
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first use pledges, control o f fissile material and decreased military spending. An ethic of
nonproliferation is a transformational ethic that provides hope for transcending the nuclear threat.
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PART I:
THREAT
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INTRODUCTION
In late 1991 James A. Baker III, then United States Secretary o f State, visited several newiy
independent states o f the former Soviet Union. His major concern was the future o f the nuclear
forces o f the former Soviet Union. The purpose o f the trip was to decrease the likelihood that these
states would lose control of these nuclear weapons, to prevent these weapons from being transferred
to other countries or entities and to offer advice on disarming the weapons. In the middle of this
mission, Baker made a strange plea to the leaders o f Russia. Baker urged the Russians to retain a
substantial part o f their nuclear arsenal and to keep the weapons pointed at the United States. He got
his wish. It was not until May of 1994 that Russia and the U.S. stopped targeting their nuclear
weapons at each other.
Baker, claiming that nuclear deterrence had been successful in keeping the peace for forty years,
was unwilling to give up what he considered a security blanket, even at the cost of having America
in the eyesight o f Russian nuclear weapons. The people o f the U.S. were nuclear targets and
hostages, and yet Baker, a high U.S. government official, was almost begging a former enemy to
keep it this way. Baker said that the U.S. needed the Russian missiles to maintain deterrence. Yet
when questioned about whom they were deterring, he refused to answer.'
Unfortunately, Baker’s way of thinking did not stop there. At a NATO meeting that same year,
Baker also rejected the possibility o f making all o f the former Soviet states nonnuclear. Again he
argued such a move would undermine U.S. deterrence. Then in the nuclear arms talks between
'Norman Kempster and William Tuohy, “Baker Backs Nuclear Russia as a Deterrent,” Los
Angeles Times, 20 December 1991, I.
2
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Russia and the U.S. in 1992, the U.S. persuaded Russia to keep 3,000-3,500 strategic weapons as
compared to the 2,000-2,500 that they wanted to keep.2 The U.S. has been more concerned with
keeping its nuclear arsenal than removing the nuclear threats to its own citizens and to the world.
Though the world has changed in very dramatic ways with the fall of communism and the breakup of
the Soviet Union, the thinking o f world leaders has not kept up with this radical new situation.
Baker, and others, are stuck in old patterns and ways.
In September o f 1993, American and Russian defense analysts met at an amazing conference
entitled “U.S. and Russian Military-Technical Policy.” The conference participants were readily
able to appreciate the changed situation which the world now faced. The conference summary states:
There appeared to be a consensus with the general thesis . . . that the “new world
order” required new methodologies and new approaches for measuring “stability,”
because the straight-forward quantitative “stability” equations developed, and
enshrined, over the last forty-odd years were incapable o f accommodating the
unpredictability o f the new multi-polar international security environment and the
value systems o f individual nations.3
Nevertheless, the participants were equally pessimistic about transcending old ways o f thinking. The
summary went on to state: “The participants collectively acknowledged that the theology of
‘stability’ (‘stabilnost 0 would continue to have its devout adherents as long as nuclear weapons
exist; and found it unrealistic to expect arms control negotiations to succeed in reducing nuclear
weapons levels to ‘zero.’”'1 It is revealing from the perspective of religious ethics to notice that the
conference used the term “theology” to refer to the mind-frame of “stability.” While this realistic
mind-set of stability is an inadequate, ineffective and dangerous approach to the nuclear threat in the
multi-polar post-Cold War world, getting beyond old patterns of thought is always difficult, and
“theology” changes very slowly.
2 Charles P. Cozic and Karin L. Swisher, eds., Nuclear Proliferation, Opposing Viewpoints,
eds., David L Bender and Bruno Leone. (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1992): 83.
3 Fred Boli, “Conference Summary,” Comparative Strategy 13, no. 1 (1994): 16-17.
"Boli, 16-17.
3
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Lest this be seen as a partisan issue, it should be noted that nuclear policy has not changed in
any significant way over the years, no matter whether a Republican or a Democrat President was in
office. The Clinton Administration’s review o f U.S. nuclear policy reaffirmed the Bush and Reagan
Administrations’ nuclear stance. If anything, Clinton’s nonproliferation efforts are worse and more
dangerous than either the Bush or Reagan Administration’s approach. The Clinton approach has
given up on stopping proliferation and seeks only to control it. His administration has loosened
export controls which accelerate the spread o f sensitive technology. The focus has been redirected
solely onto “rogue” nations, making the U.S. more willing to accept proliferation among friendly and
stable nations. Instead of trying to eliminate nuclear programs in places such as India and Pakistan,
under Clinton the U.S. simply seeks to freeze them at their current levels. Further, U.S. policy is
now more willing to use a military response in the face o f troubling proliferation.5
Moreover, in what is probably the greatest foreign policy bungle o f the Clinton Administration,
the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when it came to a vote during
October of 1999. The Clinton Administration failed to win ratification despite overwhelming public
support for the treaty because it failed to put forth a new vision for nuclear policy that escapes Cold
War thinking. Into that thought vacuum. Republican Senators were happy to drag out all the
traditional Cold War arguments-that others might cheat and that the treaty might cause U.S. nuclear
forces to be less viable. Such arguments that nuclear weapons remain the source of true security for
the United States, no matter what transpires in nuclear proliferation in other parts of the world, are
not only false, they are dangerous. The message that nuclear weapons provide security is a false
Cold War ideology, but it is far from a harmless one. It encourages other nations and peoples to seek
nuclear weapons because they want such supposed security as well. The result is that no one is more
secure. Rather, we are all in more peril.
s Jim Mann, “New U.S. Nuclear Policy to Focus on ‘Rogue’ Regime,” Los Angeles Times, 9 May
1994, 1 & A8.
4
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Even progressive anti-nuclear activists are still trapped in thought based on Cold War realism.
Jonathan Dean of the Union o f Concerned Scientists states, “The key action is dismantling all
reduced warheads and turning over their fissile material to monitored storage. This obligation is the
central dynamic of nuclear disarmament. Without it, we are still stuck in arms control.”6 However,
Dean is also stuck in the same trap. He sees technical steps that the U.S. can take, but he does not
seem to grasp the radical nature o f the changed situation and, therefore, is unable to provide an
alternative vision. The little thought addressing nuclear proliferation is stuck in ways o f thinking
that have little relevance to the current world situation. Most of the analysis about the continuing
threat posed by nuclear weapons is trapped in Cold War ideology. In fact, realism, both Christian
and political, has always failed to grasp the nature of nuclear weapons and was inadequate for the
Cold War context. It is doubly inadequate in a post-Cold War world marked by multi-polarity and
ambiguity. The purpose o f this work is to take a step in changing our way of thinking about nuclear
issues.
General Charles Homer, commander o f the U.S. Space Command, created quite a stir just before
his retirement by suggesting that the U.S. completely disarm its nuclear weapons. He boldly stated,
“Think of the high moral ground we secure by having [no nuclear weapons]. It’s kind o f hard for us
to say to North Korea, ‘You’re terrible people, you’re developing nuclear weapons,’ when we have
8,000.”7 Four-star generals are not supposed to buck the party line, but he transcended old ways of
thinking by waking up to the new realities of our current world situation. This writing seeks to do
likewise.
6 Jim Wurst, “Ending Our Reliance on Nuclear and Conventional Arms,” Disarmament Times, 22
November 1994.
7 “Far Flung Frontiers o f Security,” The Defense Monitor, 24, no. I (1995): 5.
5
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Some may question the decision to focus on the spread of nuclear weapons when the world is
full o f other problems. Dr. Klaus Kinkel, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs puts it well when
he spoke at the Non-Proliferation Treaty extension conference:
We all know that the real problems facing mankind on the threshold o f the new
century cannot be solved by the possession o f nuclear weapons. Atomic bombs will
not help against mass migration and terrorism, environmental disasters, poverty
and overpopulation. On the other hand, stopping proliferation for all times and a
permanent disarmament pledge by the nuclear-weapon states are major
preconditions for the solution o f these problems.8
Nuclear proliferation is the spread o f nuclear information, technology, expertise, delivery systems
and the weapons themselves. Vertical proliferation deals with the spread o f nuclear weapons within
the nuclear weapons’ nations. Usually this has meant an increase in the size o f nuclear nations’
nuclear arsenals as was characteristic o f the arms race from 1950-1990. Horizontal proliferation
refers to the spread o f nuclear weapons to more and more nations or even more dangerous groups
other than nations. The central focus of this ethical work is horizontal proliferation, though it
carefully understands the strong connection between vertical and horizontal proliferation. As the
world faces the monumental problem o f the spread o f nuclear weapons, it also seeks guidance on
how nations, communities and people should react in the face o f this problem. Often the voices that
emerge are only those of the so called “experts,” those who have specific training and experience in
foreign policy, international relations or security studies. This writing does not ignore the
contributions of those perspectives.
However, Victor Sidel, a professor at the Albert Einstein College o f Medicine, reminds us that
we need to listen to others as well. He states, “This is too important an issue to leave to just the
professionals in the arms-control field. We need professionals in other fields to lend their insights to
8 Sean Howard and Suzanna van Moyland, eds., Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 23 ( 3 May
1995), FHIT.Newsltr 61, PeaceNet, 15 May 1995.
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arms control and world security.”9 Further, we need to avoid the perspectives o f James Baker,
President Clinton, the U.S. Senate and even nuclear disarmament proponent Jonathan Dean which
are locked in the past. We need perspectives that move beyond the narrow focus o f the military
context. Jeffrey Boutwell, program director for international security studies at the American
Academy o f Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts concurs, “As the concept of
international security continues expanding to include more human-welfare issues,
scholars-particularly those able to employ sophisticated multidisciplinary analyses-will be uniquely
qualified to identify problems and propose solutions outside of the traditional military context.”1 0
Moving onto new perspectives is difficult. For instance William Sweet points out that nuclear
weapons challenge democratic systems because nuclear weapons and nuclear energy use scientific
processes that are difficult for the citizenry to understand." However, the solution is not to ignore
the problem, but to bring it into the democratic process. We cannot be limited to old ways of
thinking nor be limited in our focus. True security deals with much more than military might.
In a changing world we must avoid the trap o f old and irrelevant patterns o f thought. The need
to focus on the morality of nuclear deterrence has lessened because the threat o f a nuclear exchange
between the U.S. and what was the Soviet Union has diminished. Nevertheless, this new world has
its own dangers that call out for ethical reflection. Nuclear proliferation is not a new problem; it has
been with us since nuclear weapons were first developed. Nevertheless, many factors-including the
breakup o f the Soviet Union and the accompanying danger of the transfer o f nuclear weapons,
nuclear materials, nuclear technology and nuclear knowledge-require that we take a new look at the
9 “Global Program For Arms-Control Education Is Planned,” Chronicle o f Higher Education, 21
July 1993, a33.
l0 Jeffrey Boutwell, “Scholars Can Lead the Way in Redefining Global Security,” Chronicle o f
Higher Education, 10 July 1991, a40.
"William Sweet, The Nuclear Age: Atomic Energy, Proliferation, and the Arms Race, Second
ed., (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 3.
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issue of nuclear proliferation. An independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations concludes that “the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons and perhaps even the risk of
nuclear use is probably greater now than it was during the dark days o f the Cold War.” 1 2 The
Clinton Administration undertook a major defense evaluation which it released in February 1995. It
concluded that the only threat that now exists to the American homeland is the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.1 3 However, the Clinton Administration has taken no major policy
shifts in response to this radical new situation nor does it appear that it has contemplated any.
Depending on how we classify or count them, at least eight nations now possess nuclear
weapons. Five o f these nations-the U.S., Russia,1 4 Great Britain, France and China have large
stockpiles o f nuclear weapons. In 1974 India exploded what it called a peaceful weapon, making it
the sixth official nuclear nation. However, it claimed for a long time not to have developed a
stockpile of weapons, and as a result it was often not counted as a nation possessing nuclear
weapons. However, with growing tension between India and Pakistan, in May o f 1998 India
undertook a series o f nuclear tests. Pakistan followed a few days later with its own nuclear test
explosions and became the seventh official nuclear nation. While not an official nuclear nation since
it has never tested a nuclear device, Israel is considered to have a stockpile o f nuclear weapons.
Although its efforts have been clandestine, and it has never officially acknowledged possession, it is
counted as the eighth nation possessing nuclear weapons. South Africa has admitted to having had
nuclear weapons in the past but claims to have disarmed. Some analysts suggest that North Korea
might possess a few nuclear weapons. In addition, Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy, Sweden and
Switzerland have for a long time been capable of developing deliverable nuclear weapons.
1 2 Stephen J. Hadley, “Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges— Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations,” Disarm.CTB-NPT 115-119, PeaceNet, 23 January 1995.
uThe Defense Monitor, 24, no. 4 (1995): 1-2.
1 4 Four of the former Soviet republics possessed nuclear weapons at the time of the breakup of the
Soviet Union but all except Russia have pledged to disarm and have apparently done so.
8
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The espoused ideology o f the nuclear powers, or more simply, those who have nuclear weapons,
is that o f nonproliferation-saying that no one else should get such weapons. The nuclear nations
seek to keep these weapons from spreading, especially from spreading to nations considered unstable
or dangerous. This is at best an over-simplistic approach. Seth W. Carus. director for defense
strategy on the policy planning staff in the office o f the Secretary of Defense, points out that often
instead o f considering the complexity o f the issues, such an ideology only gives us the slogans that
ail proliferation is bad. That might be effective to gamer public opposition but does little to
understand the true challenges in dealing with proliferation.1 5 Moreover, because they are trapped in
Cold War ideologies, the nuclear powers are not willing to change their defense policies in ways that
could truly promote nonproliferation. The result is that the nuclear powers espouse nonproliferation
but are entrenched in policies that promote proliferation.
The central tool which the nuclear powers have used to slow or prevent the spread o f nuclear
weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) o f 1968, which 180 nations have
subsequently signed. Signatory nations who have such weapons agree not to contribute to the spread
of nuclear weapons. Those who do not possess nuclear weapons pledge not to obtain them. During
1995, the NPT expired and was reviewed. A conference of the signatory nations met in April of
1995 and decided to extend the treaty “indefinitely” or, more directly, “forever.”
Over the last thirty years, the superpowers-especially the United States-have put enormous
coercive pressure on countries around the globe to sign and, more recently, to extend the treaty. This
is ethically problematic and perhaps counterproductive. The proliferation of nuclear weapon
technology is a threat to life on our planet. Nevertheless, what is needed is to move toward an ethic
that is less hypocritical/imperialistic/patemalistic than the typical explorations on this subject.
Traditional proposals rest on the ideology of nonproliferation by simply claiming that other countries
l5 W. Seth Carus, “Proliferation and Security in Southwest Asia,” The Washington Quarterly 17,
no. 2 (1994): 129.
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must not get the technology. In doing so, they fail to consider the ethical implications o f the
stockpile o f nuclear weapons already in existence. To move us to a new paradigm and to escape the
ideology o f Cold W ar realism, we will look at ethical sources outside those normally consulted in the
consideration o f foreign policy and international relations. While not excluding more traditional
sources, here we will listen to other voices.
In this work we will explore both the historical and the current spread o f nuclear weapons. We
will also look at how ethical theory has explored the issues o f war and peace and, specifically,
nuclear weapons. The constructive section of this work sees how newer ethical and theological
thought can further the rich history o f ethical analysis of war and peace issues. Fortunately, other
voices are crying out in the wilderness that need to be heard. Yet, too often we have failed to listen.
In particular this work seeks to listen to voices from three distinctive perspectives: third world
liberation theologies, religious feminism and Christian pacifism.
This work is not an attempt to create a liberationist, pacifist or feminist ethic of
nonproliferation. However, in each chapter focusing on these sources, I will attempt to see what
these perspectives might say about nuclear proliferation. These three perspectives are not completely
compatible, and some may find it foolish to try to use these sources together. Nevertheless, the goal
is not to find complete unity between these three positions. Nor are any of the three positions
considered the final word on the subject. The purpose is to take these perspectives seriously by
listening carefully to what they have to say and then to draw from them ideas that are o f use in an
ethic of nonproliferation that is transformational, moving beyond realistic Cold War perspectives.
The metaphor at work is an agricultural one. More specifically, it uses the image o f the modem
agricultural cycle which harvests various forms o f grain only to combine them to create a hybrid.
Hybrids are created because they are improvements on the previous seeds. This is done by taking
desirable characteristics from previous seeds and combining these various strengths to create
something new. In agriculture, the new hybrid may produce more output or be less susceptible to
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insects, weeds or drought. Here the hope is that the new hybrid will yield new analysis and thought
through synthesis that would have been missed without the drawing from and combining of these
various sources.
The original “harvesting” in this writing occurs when useful and helpful ethical contributions
from these three bodies o f literature are gathered in. These ideas are then combined with each other
and with ideas from more traditional approaches to nuclear proliferation in the constructive process
of creating an ethic o f nonproliferation, thus producing a new ethical hybrid. The hybrid is then
planted in the soil o f politics, allowed to grow and flourish and then, eventually, harvested. Such
growth will be evidenced in the development o f policy proposals to deal with nuclear proliferation.
Not all hybrids are successful, and only time will tell whether this ethic o f nonproliferation will
flourish. Likely, this or some other hybrid of nonproliferation must flourish or life on this planet
will not. Our future quite literally depends on some nonproliferation hybrid flourishing.
While I am seeking out, listening to and harvesting from many voices in my process of
developing an ethic o f nonproliferation, I cannot in one project listen to all voices. Therefore
questions will arise as to the choices that I have made. These three bodies o f thought were chosen in
part because this writer has some familiarity with them, but mostly because they are voices that have
much to contribute to the discussion. Largely, nuclear proliferation is a subject located within
countries other than the United States, and it will be there that it will have its greatest impact. As a
result, it is crucial that we listen to voices coming from a third world perspective and, consequently,
the voices o f liberation theology are included. It is also time to listen to the voices o f peace. At
times these voices o f peace have received some attention in discussions about war and peace issues,
but often they are ignored. It is crucial to the topic of nuclear proliferation that we lift up the voices
of these true “experts” and, consequently, we will explore the writings o f Christian pacifists. Finally,
it is crucial we listen to the voices o f women who take seriously their own moral agency and who
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question the male modes o f thinking that have dominated this subject for too long; consequently,
feminist writers are another area o f focus.
The point o f departure is that Christian realism, and secular realistic approaches represented in
fields such as political science, international relations and security studies, are inadequate for
addressing the nuclear threat. They failed to grasp that nuclear weapons fundamentally changed
things because such weapons threaten creation itself, and no real defense against such weapons is
possible. Clearly, realists sensed this, and all have and continue to struggle in good faith against the
threat o f a nuclear holocaust. However, they continue to think in categories which fail to match the
radical nature of the new situation which nuclear weapons brought. Their approach is too narrow
and unimaginatively pragmatic to produce the vision to get us out o f this mess. These approaches
have been inadequate from the time that nuclear deterrence was developed, but they are even more
inadequate in a multipolar world with multiple and expanding nuclear actors.
This writing is an attempt to develop a vision adequate to transcend the nuclear threat. This
larger vision will draw upon the moral and spiritual dimension o f justice, peacemaking and the
human potential. For nuclear issues, the ethic of responsibility espoused by Christian realism cannot
be successful; therefore, it is ultimately unrealistic and needs important elements of this larger vision
to supplement it. We will find those essential elements in the theology of pacifism, feminism and
liberation theology, which will be explored in chapters three through five.
Christian realism has often found these three bodies of thought as representative of an irrelevant
ethic o f utopian perfectionism. To be honest, they sometimes do contain the rhetoric of utopian
perfectionism and some o f its elements. But, these three bodies o f thought cannot be accurately
reduced to utopian perfectionism. Moreover, the ingredient of utopian perfectionism they offer
might contribute something useful. Consequently, realists are challenged to suspend disbelief and
look at the fresh ideas advanced here. These three schools of Christian theology will develop ideas
such as ideological awareness, community, vision, nonviolence, risk analysis, struggle, experience
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and solidarity in ways that are not simply idealistic notions lacking application to consequentialist
theory' or policy formulation. They deserve to be pondered carefully by all varieties of Christian
thinkers. These more radical forms o f theology illuminate the interconnectedness o f complex
phenomena in ways that more traditional thought misses in its tendency to compartmentalize.
Even secular thinkers can find value in the profound and far-ranging visions offered here. They
are likely to be troubled even more than Christian realists are by much o f the rhetoric of these
schools. Yet, all readers are challenged to avoid getting caught up in the rhetoric and instead
concentrate on grasping the meaning of what is put forth. If we will stretch our imaginations, we
will find concepts which will make a significant difference in a task that we can all agree on, making
the world safer from a nuclear disaster.
This study o f listening to new voices is also predicated on the belief that public pressure does
matter in nuclear policy at both the national and international levels. Allan M. Winkler, chair o f the
history department at Miami University and an expert on the history o f nuclear policy, states:
Repeatedly in the post-World War II years, pressure from academics and other
intellectuals, along with the general public, has prompted policy makers to deal
with the risks o f nuclear war. But each time that we have taken a step toward
disarmament, public interest then has waned; we have stopped short of taking the
next step-and the arms race has heated up again. We must learn from this history
and understand the interplay between intellectual and public concern and the
resultant American arms-control agreements, if we are ever going to break this
pattern.1 6
These issues need to be raised before the public repeatedly. The voices o f the expert can be o f use,
but so can the voices of non-experts. For those of us who believe that religion and morality matter,
what could make more sense than to listen to the cutting-edge voices o f theology?
The transformational ethic o f nonproliferation developed here is useful in three ways. First, this
is a Christian ethic of nonproliferation. The church needs again to engage in discussions o f nuclear
policy and this work is an argument for what the church should be teaching about the continuing
1 6 Allan M. Winkler, “Shrinking the Nuclear Arsenal,” Chronicle o f Higher Education, 19 May
1993,bl.
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threat to life that nuclear weapons pose. In the past, churches played crucial roles in nuclear politics,
especially during the 1980s but also during earlier decades as well. This ethic o f nonproliferation
seeks to re-engage those in the North American churches who are concerned about ending the threat
o f nuclear weapons.
Second, this ethic o f nonproliferation provides public policy recommendations, including steps
the United States and other nations should take on nuclear issues to create a more just and peaceful
world. As a Christian ethic, the church can use these to identify specific policies which the church
should advocate that the U.S. and other nations take regarding nuclear policy.
Finally, policy makers are challenged to consider these proposals as well. In evaluating these
proposals, policy makers will not, nor should they, base their decisions exclusively on Christian
grounds. In a pluralistic society, however, good policy makers should be open to listening to the
contributions which various moral traditions bring to public policy. While policy makers may not be
willing to accept the following proposals entirely, there is still much to offer policy makers. Perhaps
most fundamentally, what is offered here are ideas that might move policy makers out of their Cold
War worldviews which are inappropriate and largely useless in this much more complex and morally
ambiguous post-Cold War world in which we find ourselves. Ironically, but not yet tragically,
political realists have lost touch with reality since the reality of the Cold War in which they continue
to operate no longer exists. This ethic o f nonproliferation will help policy makers move into the
reality o f the third millennium.
Trapped in Cold War ideology, current thinking on nonproliferation is doomed to failure. It will
not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the innovative traditions o f theology provide the
basis for a transformational ethic o f nonproliferation. Such a new ethic o f nonproliferation cannot
guarantee that humans will survive the nuclear age. However, it is the basis for hope that we can
transcend the apocalyptic danger that nuclear weapons pose. This new ethic o f nonproliferation
provides the basis for a transition from a nuclear world to a post-nuclear world because it is based on
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transformational concepts such as community, transformational risk-taking, solidarity, a de
emphasis on violence, a replacement o f grand schemes with one-step-at-a-time pragmatism and
internationalization which arises from pacifism, feminism and liberation theology. Such concepts
provide a more realistic basis for transformation than bodies of thought called realism. The ethic of
nonproliferation developed here is a basis for human survival in the face o f the nuclear threat. It is
not the final word, but it is a crucial new first word.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the TV-movie version of Tom Clancy’ s Op-Center,' Paul Hood, the rookie head of the
operational center o f the National Crisis Management Center, is forced to deal with the predicament
of stolen nuclear warheads. Dishonest Russian military officers steal nuclear warheads, taking them
just when the disarmament process is making progress in the former Soviet Union. Under the
skilled and good-fortuned leadership of director Hood, U.S. intervention leads to the recapture of the
nuclear weapons. The world averts disaster and everything returns to normal.
While Clancy’s work is fictional, its story line may be more real than we would currently like to
admit. Nuclear technology is relatively simple and nuclear knowledge is available. The technical
details o f building a fission (atomic-bomb) device has been available in print since 1964. The
November 1979 issue o f The Progressive detailed the construction of a fusion (nuclear) bomb, a sort
of layperson’s guide to constructing a hydrogen bomb. Moreover, while the basic technology needed
to build nuclear weapons is more widely available than ever before, the scope o f the effort necessary
to build such a weapon has never been less. With a concerted effort, any moderate industrial country
'In the best-selling novel version (Tom Clancy and Steve Pieczenik, Tom Clancy’ s Op-Center
(New York: Berkley, 1995)), the story involves rogue South Korean military officers who seek to
start a second Korean-War in an effort to stop reunification.
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can acquire nuclear weapons. Even more troubling, the financial costs of the process have also
decreased.2
It is important not to overstate the threat. A “concerted effort” is still a considerable
undertaking. Likewise, the cost, while less than in the past, is still significant. It also takes a large
and sustained time commitment. The political will to get the bomb must outweigh and outlive other
political concerns. Thus, while any moderate industrial country can get the bomb, it will come with
considerable cost and effort. Nevertheless, the crucial point is that any moderate industrial nation
can become a nuclear nation. Such a fact is a significant and crucial threat to peace.
I. The Nuclear Cold War
After World War II, the era of one nuclear power was short lived. The Soviet Union tested its
first nuclear weapon on August 29, 1949. The U.S. had hoped that with tight controls it could
maintain its nuclear monopoly for at least ten years. Instead, it took only four years for the Soviet
Union to develop the bomb, about the same length o f time it took the Manhattan Project. Soviet
missile development and the launching o f Sputnik made it clear that Europe and eventually the U.S.
would become nuclear targets.
Great Britain first tested the bomb in October o f 1952. After Britain joined the nuclear club, the
U.S. became more willing to treat it as an equal. Sixty intermediate-range missiles were placed in
Great Britain under a dual key arrangement, which required a launch command from both nations to
fire a missile.
The hydrogen or “super-bomb,” immensely more powerful than an atomic bomb, was first tested
by the U.S. in October 1952. Russia followed suit in November 1955, the same year Britain began
construction o f its H-bomb.
2 Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics o f Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988), 28.
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Many nations undertook nuclear programs in the years after World War II, and by 1953 twenty
nations had nuclear research projects in operation.3 That same year, President Eisenhower
announced the “Atoms for Peace” program to promote atomic energy globally. This nuclear
program was immensely successful on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts and was very
popular with the U.S. business community. In 1954 Congress rewrote the atomic energy legislation
to allow the sale o f U.S. reactors to other nations. This legislation increased the spread o f nuclear
information and therefore increased the potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every
nation with a nuclear power plant has what they needed to produce the explosive material for a
nuclear bomb. However, even today not all nuclear reactors are equal; some produce weapon
material more efficiently, and some are easier to safeguard.
In 1956 an international conference created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
regulate atomic energy and stop the transfer o f atomic energy knowledge and material from the
civilian to defense sectors within nations. The eighty-one attending nations endorsed the treaty, and
it was in force by the summer of 1957.'1 A United Nations’ agency, the IAEA’s responsibility is to
manage a system o f international safeguards, which include maintaining records o f nuclear
materials, automatic devices which monitor the flow o f nuclear materials, and making on-site
inspections. The premise is that, since the knowledge to build nuclear weapons is available, the only
method of control is to regulate the materials for building such weapons. The objective is to deter
proliferation by insuring a high probability that any attempt of diversion will be subject to early
detection. However, the IAEA can neither prevent the misuse of materials nor punish violators; it
can only detect violations.
3 William Sweet, The Nuclear Age: Atomic Energy, Proliferation, and the Arms Race, Second ed.
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 12, 117, 120 & 124.
4 Reiss, 10-11 & 13-14.
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The realistic view that all nations with the ability to proliferate would do so seemed to be
confirmed when France tested a nuclear weapon at Reggame, Algeria, in the Sahara Desert in 1960.
France progressed and developed its H-bomb by 1968.
China, despite its economic problems, built a bomb with only three years of effort, exploding its
first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first H-bomb in 1967. Afterwards, world leaders noticed and
treated China more seriously. The British, French and Chinese had all treated the bomb as a ticket
to dinner with the “big people,” and it turned out to be just that.5
Under the auspices o f the United Nations and with the leadership o f the United States and the
Soviet Union, 180 countries since 1968 have signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Among international agreements, only the Charter of the United Nations has more signers.
According to the terms o f the NPT, a nation acquires nuclear weapons only when it detonates such a
weapon. Consequently, there are officially seven nuclear nations: Russia, the U.S., Great Britain,
France, China, India and Pakistan.
While criticism o f the NPT abounds, the willingness o f so many nations to sign the treaty
suggests a common understanding that the proliferation o f nuclear weapons is a serious threat to the
world community. Despite the serious problems with the NPT, it is generally considered the most
effective arm control treaty ever.6 In fact, even countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India, who
have refused to sign the treaty, have found that the treaty has impacted their nuclear efforts by
making it more difficult and also by subjecting them to moral criticism.7
Nevertheless, the NPT was a product of the nuclear superpowers and reflects primarily their
interest, especially their concern to deter horizontal proliferation-the acquisition of nuclear weapons
sSweet, 126 & 210.
6 Norman Kempster, “U.S. Campaigns to Contain Nuclear Arms.” Los Angeles Times, 11
February 1995, A2.
7 Norman Kempster, “Nations Agree to Make Nuclear Pact Permanent,” Los Angeles Times 12
May 1995, A 10.
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by additional nations. The treaty went into effect in 1970, though less than half the U.N. nations had
signed it by then. The “take it or leave if’ attitude o f the superpowers offended many nonnuclear
states. Among nonnuclear states, the criticism was that they were asked to sacrifice too much power
and prestige in return for flimsy promises of disarmament from the nuclear powers.
The NPT provides nations which pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons with full access, subject
to safeguards, to peaceful nuclear technology. Article I bars parties from helping another acquire
materials for nuclear bombs. Article 1 1 prohibits nonnuclear nations from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Article III puts the IAEA in charge of monitoring and requires nonnuclear states to accept
safeguards on all nuclear energy equipment that uses fissionable material. Article IV guarantees, as
an inalienable right, the development, production and use o f nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
and obligates parties to the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and
technological information for use in peaceful nuclear energy. Article V goes as far as to allow for
peaceful nuclear explosions for civil engineering and for mineral excavation. Article VI commits the
nuclear powers to good faith efforts at disarmament. Article X allows for withdrawal with three
months notice if a nation determines that continuing within the treaty jeopardizes its supreme
interests.
Ironically, the NPT legitimizes and perhaps even encourages the spread of the very technologies
that need to be limited. Relying on understaffed and underfunded authority in the IAEA, the NPT
effectively lacks enforcement powers. In addition, the treaty lends credibility to the notion that there
is a distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosions. Its withdrawal clause
provides an easy out for member nations who decide to seek nuclear weapons. However, the NPT
does exert a certain moral force, even on those nations that have not joined. In international law
certain laws are binding on all people if it is something deemed valuable everywhere, even if their
government has not specifically agreed to them. One example is the requirement to avoid harming
civilians in time o f war, and war crime charges can be brought against individuals who violate this
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requirement- Through the NPT, stopping the spread o f nuclear weapons has become similarly
classified.
Unfortunately, arms control efforts such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty have not been the last
word on the subject. This was made abundantly clear in 1974 when India detonated a nuclear
explosion. Most troubling was that India did not need to create special facilities to manufacture
“weapon-grade” nuclear materials. Instead, India used local uranium, enriching it in a research
reactor. Because India has never signed the NPT, its explosion was not a violation of the treaty.
Nevertheless, their explosion does demonstrate that assistance for atomic energy can lead to nuclear
weapon capability.8
On May 11, 1995, the nations o f the world, meeting at the United Nations Headquarters in New
York, extended the NPT indefinitely. The NPT is now a permanent treaty, precisely what the
nuclear nations wanted. Many peacemakers and nonnuclear nations wanted an extension for a fixed
number o f years so that attention and pressure could later be placed on the nuclear powers to take
crucial steps toward disarmament. With the treaty permanent, the less powerful nations have lost
this leverage.
Along with the extension two other side protocols were agreed upon. The first provides a set o f
principles and objectives but sets no timetables for reaching the objectives. The second strengthened
the treaty’s review process by including a ten-day Preparatory Committee Meeting during each o f the
three years leading up to each five-year Review Conference.9 This means that out of each five-year
period there will be some review o f the NPT during four o f the years.
More significant is the side agreement which outlines principles and objectives since they
function as an important blueprint for future peacemaking efforts:
8Reiss, 22.
9Sean Howard and Suzanna van Moyland, eds., Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 24 (17 May
1995), FHIT.Newsltr 62, PeaceNet, 16 May 1995.
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• The foundational principles included a call to universality, thus urging all nations o f the world
to abide by the treaty.
• In terms o f nonproliferation, the document recognizes that nuclear weapons increase the risk of
nuclear war and affirms the crucial role the NPT has to play in stopping such a war.
• The objective regarding nuclear disarm am ent is a reminder that disarmament is promoted
through the easing of tensions, which can be achieved by the nuclear nations fulfilling their
commitment to nuclear disarmament. This includes a call for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of the
eliminating nuclear weapons.
• One goal o f this new side agreement is to promote Nuclear W eapon Free Zones. Seeing them
as helpful tools in places such as the Middle East, it calls on all states to respect nuclear weapon
free zones already in existence and help with the creation of new zones.
• As for Security Assurances, the agreement requires the nuclear-weapon states to protect
nonnuclear states.
• The section on Safeguards upholds the value of the IAEA and suggests further discussion to
strengthen its power.
• Finally, in regards to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the side agreement upholds the
inalienable right of all parties to peacefully use and develop nuclear energy. It encourages the
fullest exchange of equipment, material and information and encourages rigorous safety
controls.
Since the time o f the extension of the NPT, the atomic tests undertaken by India and Pakistan
punctuate the need to focus on the danger of nuclear weapons. On a more positive note, the world,
though absent India and Pakistan, has finally created a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While the
U.S. has signed the treaty, the Senate has failed to ratify it. Moreover, the series o f nuclear tests
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seems to have scared Pakistan and India into more conciliatory positions with each other and the
nonproliferation regime.
Another approach used by the technologically advanced nations o f the world to limit nuclear
proliferation is to limit the spread of related technology. For example, they have tried to limit the
transfer of computer technology and delivery technology such as missiles. It is estimated that by
2000, as many as 25 states will have military missile capability. In 1987 seven technologically
advanced nations signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which seeks to halt the
spread o f weapons of mass destruction delivery systems.1 0 The MTCR originally had a payload
criterion of 500 kilograms and range criteria o f 300 kilometers to prevent the transfer o f missiles that
can be used to deliver nuclear weapons." In January o f 1993, twenty-two nations tightened the
restrictions in MTCR. The new restrictions essentially ban all sales of missile technology or parts to
nations suspected of developing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.1 2 While China has agreed
to abide by the limitations, North Korea has not agreed. In the summer of 1995, Russia announced
that it would formally join the agreement.'3
1 0 Sergei Kortunov, “Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation: The Role of BMD,” Comparative
Strategy 13, no. I (1994): 14 i .
"Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias and Philip Sabin, eds., Non-Conventional Weapons
Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread o f Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Capabilities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 23 i-232.
,2Sid Balman, “New Restrictions on Missile Sales,” UP! Newswire, Clarinet New File, 7
January 1993).
l3 Richard Boudreaux, “Russia Agrees to Stop Selling Arms to Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 1 July
1995, A12.
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//. A New World
A. The Break-Up of the Soviet Union
While recent developments have reduced the danger o f the superpowers using nuclear weapons
and raised questions about their military usefulness, the danger o f proliferation is greater than a few
years ago. The breakup o f the Soviet Union ignited fears that part of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal will
make its way into the international arms bazaar.
Analysts examining the situation during the breakup o f the Soviet Union found three areas of
danger. First, analysts questioned who was in control o f Soviet nuclear forces. Second, they noted
the danger that further disintegration in the republics might engender. Third, they pointed to the
consequences o f Soviet military experts who, after losing their jobs, would sell their services to third
world countries. All three dangers remain now, nearly ten years after the dissolution o f the Soviet
Union.
Significant attention has been focused on the possibility o f defecting scientists providing
information to U.S. enemies. While only three hundred Soviet scientists have the expertise to design
a nuclear weapon, 5,000 possess critical knowledge, and 60,000 have related skills such as rocketry
or electronics. Many o f these are still receiving no pay or only a limited pension.1 '* In response to
this situation, an international consortium has raised $70 million to subsidize unemployed Soviet
scientists.1 5 Such assistance has helped move 8,200 Russian nuclear and chemical scientists into
civilian jobs.1 6 While this may be a good move, the ethics o f this attempt to stop proliferation is
more ambiguous. Some point out that such efforts essentially reward military nuclear scientists
,4Lee Michael Katz, “Soviet N-Experts Courted: Atomic-Power Hopefuls Bid for Scientists,”
USA Today, 8 January 1992, 4A.
1 5 Robert Lee Hotz, “Learning to Live Without the Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1994,
A27.
1 6 Spike Robinson, ed., Military and Arms Transfer News, 95, no. 7 (21 April 1995),
FHIT.NewsItr 63, PeaceNet, 23 May 1995.
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while doing nothing to help Soviet civilian scientists, many o f whom made conscientious efforts not
to participate in military research.1 7
The U.S. was assured in 1991 that Russia would be the only Soviet Republic to retain possession
of nuclear weapons, and a complex four-step process working toward this goal has been undertaken.
Step one moved the warheads in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to Russia. Step two stored the
weapon-grade material in secure facilities. Step three sought to insure that scientists and engineers
from nuclear fields find civilian employment. Step four was to transform weapons laboratories into
nonmilitary research centers.1 8
While the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus quickly transferred all o f their tactical nuclear
weapons to Russia,1 9 reaching the goal of transferring all strategic weapons was more difficult to
achieve, but eventually all three transferred all nuclear weapons to Russia. However, making
previous nuclear states into nonnuclear states is difficult, primarily because the scientists and
technicians in these republics cannot unlearn their knowledge.
The Ukraine was slowest in disarming. In 1993, the Ukrainian parliament claimed ownership
of the 1,800 strategic nuclear weapons that were on its soil at the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
making it the third largest nuclear nation in the world. However, Russia still controlled the launch
mechanism o f these weapons. While the Ukraine’s proclamation o f ownership was not a positive
development, it was not as negative as it might first appear because the Ukraine was still committed
to becoming a nonnuclear state. Its effort to control the weapons was an attempt to obtain two things
from the West. First, it sought a much larger financial support for the dismantling o f the weapons
themselves. The Ukraine sought $1.5 to 2 billion, which is ten times what the West initially offered.
1 7 Kim A. McDonald,“New Center For Nuclear Scientists Formed in Russia. Chronicle o f Higher
Education, 26 February 1992, a39.
l8 Robert Lee Hotz, “Cold War Foes Forge Warm Ties,” Los Angeles Times, 23 June 1995, A30.
1 9 Stephen J. Hadley, “Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges-Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations.,” Disarm.CTB-NPT 115-119, PeaceNet, 23 January 1995.
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Second, the Ukraine sought security guarantees from the West that a nuclear-free Ukraine would not
later be attacked. It had special concern with the rise of Russian nationalism and territorial disputes
between Russia and the Ukraine.
On January 14, 1994, at the Moscow summit Presidents Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and
Leonid Kravchuk (then President of the Ukraine) issued a trilateral statement. This statement
committed the Ukraine to join the NPT as a nonnuclear state and to denuclearize under START I
and the Lisbon Protocol. The Ukrainian parliament ratified START I early in 1994 and then ratified
the NPT in late 1994. The Moscow Summit was a political action intended to force the nonnuclear
option upon the Ukraine and establish compensation for them. With the Ukraine desperately needing
the cash, Kravchuk agreed to start moving warheads to Moscow. A secret timetable completed in
February 1996 moved the rest o f the warheads. In return, the Ukraine received 100 tons o f nuclear
fuel for its power plants, and the U.S. paid Russia $60 million to dismantle and fabricate the fuel
which was to be sent back to the Ukraine. In addition, Russia also compensated the Ukraine for the
tactical nuclear weapons removed from its soil. Finally, the U.S., Russia and U.K. promised the
Ukraine security guarantees for its borders.2 0 Progress on nuclear disarmament in the Ukraine has
continued. The Ukraine has now also agreed to abide by the MTCR limits easing fears that some of
its missile-related technology might make its way into the international market.2 1
Another method to deal with the threat of proliferation caused by the breakup of the Soviet
Union is by transferring weapon-grade material to a nuclear nation. In the fall of 1994, the U.S.
received 1,000 pounds o f highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. This material could have been
used to make 20 to 36 weapons. The operation was conducted under top-secret conditions because of
fears that terrorists or another nation might attempt diversion operations during the transfer.
2 0 “Prospects For Ukrainian Denuclearization After the Moscow Trilateral Statement,” Arms
Control Today, March 1994, 21-24.
2,R. Jeffrey Smith, “Ukraine Agrees to Follow Missile Control Treaty,” Washington Post,
CompuServe, 13 May 1994.
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Kazakhstan received several hundred million dollars for the transfer plus increased international
recognition.2 2 The threat o f Kazakhstan’s nuclear material reaching the illicit market was perhaps
greater because of the cultural and religious ties that this Muslim nation has with nations such as
Iran or Afghanistan. Steps such as the transfer o f fissile material to the U.S. prevent that possibility.
There continue to be issues with nuclear policy in Russia. Its severe economic conditions have
decreased its military capability. For instance, Russia’s projected military spending for 1999 is $4
billion compared to $260 billion for the United States. This has caused Russia to perceive itself as
less secure. Consequently, in a strange reversal to Cold War days, Russia has taken the previous
NATO position of saying it will use nuclear weapons to counter a western conventional attack on
Russia. Russia has even engaged in drills and war games under such a military policy.2 3
Moreover, Russian nuclear material is greater than first estimated, and even with U.S.
assistance, the material is now less secure. This increases the possibility that such material could be
diverted to terrorist groups or rogue nations. Moreover, economic problems have meant that at many
nuclear sites, salaries are underpaid or not paid at all. Such realities increase the likelihood that
someone will steal nuclear material and sell it illegally.
B. The Role of China
As an emerging superpower, China is also an important nuclear power-broker. China’s nuclear
and nuclear-related sales and technical assistance have long been a source of concern for the United
States. Further, China’s military power has been increasing as they have undertaken a military
buildup. This has included a modernization program for its nuclear arsenal. Perhaps the biggest
nuclear story of 1999 was the discovery that China has for years been stealing nuclear secrets from
“ Art Pine, “Secret Operation Safeguarded Uranium,” Los Angeles Times, 24 November 24, 1994,
1.
^Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Launched Nuclear Drills, Official Says,” Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, 10 July 1999), 7A.
27
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U.S. nuclear laboratories and installations. Some fear that China, not Russia, is the new military
rival to the United States.
On a more positive note, China has played a crucial role in de-escalating the Korean nuclear
crisis. Evidently, it was China that convinced North Korea to freeze its nuclear program by
informing North Korea that it could not count on indefinite support in its confrontation with the U.S.
over North Korean nuclear efforts.2 4
C. Increased Credibility for the Superpowers
The change in the U.S./U.S.S.R. situation has made their calls for nonproliferation more
credible. Even before the breakup o f the Soviet Union, Reagan and Gorbachev increased good will
toward the U.S. and U.S.S.R. with the elimination of medium-range missiles and commitment to
sharp reductions in nuclear arsenals. While over the course of nuclear history the United States has
manufactured more than 70,000 nuclear warheads, it has not manufactured a nuclear weapon since
1990. Over the course o f nuclear history, the U.S. has produced 89 metric tons of plutonium and
more than 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. The U.S. has produced no plutonium for
weapons since 1988 and no highly enriched uranium for weapons since 1964.2 5 However, the U.S.
revealed in 1994 that its stockpile o f weapon-grade uranium is much higher than previously
disclosed.2 6 New information shows that the Soviet Union’s nuclear total peaked at a high o f 45,000
warheads, 12,000 more than U.S. estimates at the time. Further, their stockpile of weapon-grade
2 4 Jim Mann, “China Assisted U.S. Efforts on N. Korea, Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times, 29
June 29, 1994, 1.
^ “Prospects For Ukrainian Denuclearization After the Moscow Trilateral Statement,” Arms
Control Today, March 1994, 21-24.
2 6 Thomas W. Lippman and R. Jeffrey Smith. “U.S. Weapon-Grade Uranium Production Tops
Estimates,” Los Angeles Times, 28 June 1994, A 14.
28
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uranium is 1,200 tons, more than twice previous U.S. estimates.2 7 Russia stopped its production o f
weapon-grade plutonium in 1994 by closing down three reactors. Presently, none o f the five major
nuclear nations (U.S., Russia, France, Great Britain, China) produce weapon-grade nuclear material
for weapons.
In the summer of 1992, President Yeltsin o f Russia and President Bush o f the United States with
START II agreed to make sweeping cuts in their own nations’ nuclear stockpile. When completed,
two-thirds o f these two nations’ nuclear weapons will be destroyed. It is thought that after the
completion o f this arms reduction, neither country will have enough strategic weapons left to wage a
first-strike. The plan calls for each nation’s stockpile of nuclear warheads to be reduced from 13,000
to between 3,000 and 3,500.2 8 START II still needs to be ratified by the U.S. and Russia, but its
coming into force was dependent on Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine ratifying START I. With
the ratification of START I by these nations in 1994, the U.S. and Russia are limited to 1,600
strategic weapons and 4,900 warheads on missiles. However, as of 1999, the U.S. still has 8,500
strategic nuclear warheads, and Russia 7,200. While the Russian legislature has still not ratified
START II, preliminary planning for START III were begun during the summer of 1999. It appears
that a START III agreement will cut Russian and American arsenals to a level o f 2,000 to 2,500
strategic warheads.2 9
Other nuclear nations have also begun reducing their arsenals. At the turn of the century, Great
Britain has fewer than 300 operational warheads.3 0 However, it is modernizing with Trident
submarines and missiles. France has an estimated 500 nuclear warheads and its nuclear weapons are
2 7 Hotz, “Cold War Foes,” A30.
2 8 Norman Kempster and Doyle McManus, “Huge Warhead Cuts Approved,” Los Angeles Times,
17 June 1992, 1 & A6.
2 9 Barry Schweid, “U.S. Russia Set New Round o f Nuclear Talks,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 28
July 1999, 3A.
3 0 Howard and van Moyland, Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 24.
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both air-based and submarine-based, having closed its only land-based missile site.3 1 While China
believed to have approximately 500 nuclear warheads,3 2 they have as few as 14 intercontinental
ballistic missiles and only one nuclear capable submarine, which carries 12 missiles.3 3 China has
undertaken a modernization program for its nuclear forces. This includes its first LCBM with
MIRVed (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles) warheads. China has indicated it will continue
to modernize and expand its nuclear forces until U.S. and Russian arsenals come down to a
comparable level.
Besides the strategic reduction, the U.S. has also removed its tactical nuclear weapons from
elsewhere in the world. Yet, it has not destroyed these weapons but is instead storing them within
the United States. The former Soviet republics have taken similar steps and have returned all
tactical nuclear weapons to Russia.3 4
However, the U.S. removal o f tactical nuclear weapons from other nations has one
exception-Europe. As a perfect example o f the inability to transcend old ways o f thinking, the
Clinton Administration decided to dedicate 830 tactical nuclear weapons toward war fighting in
Europe. These include 350 sea-launched cruise missiles stored in the U.S. and 480 nuclear bombs
which will continue to be stored with U.S. forces in Europe. Such a decision was made although
nuclear weapons are not of use in defending territory such as Europe since the weapons would
destroy the very territory they are deployed to protect. The Center for Defense Information
3‘Scott Kraft, “France to Resume Nuclear Weapons Tests,” Los Angeles Times, 14 June 1995,
A ll.
3 2 “NucIear Weapons After the Cold War,” The Defense Monitor 22, no. 1, ( 1993): 2.
3 3 Louise Evans, “CHN: China Plans More Nuke Tests - Analysts,” Australian Associated Press,
CompuServe, 15 May 1995.
3 4 “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” 3.
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concludes, “The security o f Europe and the interests o f the United States would be better served by
pursuing the complete elimination o f battlefield nuclear weapons from the planet.”3 5
Moreover, even after all the START cuts, the United States and Russia will remain the major
nuclear powers. There will still be 20,000 nuclear warheads in the world with the explosive power
of 200,000 Hiroshima bombs.3 6 The remaining nuclear weapons in America’s stockpile are held
with the assumption that they serve as a deterrent against other nuclear powers. The 3,500 strategic
weapons that the U.S. will keep under START 1 1 are more than it possessed in 1958, and each is
more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Further, each side retains their tactical
nuclear weapons, about 5,000 for each side.
At this time, acceptance of complete nuclear disarmament by the United States is not a
possibility. The U.S. has in place a sophisticated set of scientists and procedures to be the “stewards”
over these weapons, providing the ground work to insure U.S. military superiority. The U.S. is even
seeking new areas o f research which would allow the testing o f nuclear forces and devices without
actual field explosions.3 7 As of 1995, the U.S. Energy Department maintained 10 major laboratories
at the cost of $6.8 billion, providing research on nuclear bombs and other areas.3 8
The cuts undertaken by the U.S. and Russia increase the credibility of their calls for nuclear
nonproliferation. However, nothing but scale has changed. While the change in scale is significant
and makes the world safer, it is still trapped in old ways of thinking. Such old ways o f thinking not
only fail to solve the nuclear problem because they validate the supposed security and value of
isThe Defense Monitor, 24, no.2 (1995): 6.
3 6 “NucIear Weapons After the Cold War,” 1.
3 7 Hotz, “Learning to Live,” A29.
3 8 Ralph Vartabedian. “Panel Calls For Cutbacks At Nuclear Lab.” Los Angeles Times, 2 February
1995, A20.
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nuclear weapons, they encourage other nations and groups to seek nuclear weapons as is evidenced
in the next section.
III. Moving Toward Acquisition
A . fear that nuclear weapons will fall into the “wrong” hands has long existed. Today, despite
the signs o f hope, many nations are still moving in the direction o f acquiring nuclear weapons.
While the predictions o f the past that the world would have twenty-five or more nuclear nations has
not yet happened, some still predict that it will. The assumption fueling this fear is that as one new
nuclear nation emerges several o f its neighbors will follow course.
In traditional understandings o f international relations, some six benefits o f possessing nuclear
weapons are identified: Preserving the security o f the state, influencing an ally, achieving greater
independence from allies, international prestige, bolstering domestic political support, economic
development and scientific progress.3 9 These six advantages undoubtedly arise out o f real and
legitimate concerns o f many nations. Moreover, as long as we remain in a realist paradigm, these
six nuclear motivations will remain. So, if proliferation is going to be slowed or stopped then the
world community must at least find ways to help nations address these concerns through avenues
other than the acquisition o f nuclear arms. However, no such process is being developed.
Even more ominous is that after years of clandestine work, several nations, who from the
perspective o f U.S. policymakers have dangerous histories and leadership, are nearing acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Besides the nations that are actively seeking to acquire nuclear arms, many
nations, without much concerted effort, are developing expertise in the area. Thus, a change in
world or regional politics could quickly push several nations toward acquisition. This is simply
more evidence for the need to attempt to control the pressures that move nations toward
proliferation. The world desperately needs an ethic of nonproliferation that grows out o f the
3 9 Reiss, xviii.
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concerns o f the nations o f the world rather than one developed solely with the concerns of the United
States in mind.
In the rest o f this chapter, we will explore the development o f nuclear weapons around the
world. First, we will in more depth explore two special cases that paradigmatically represent the
threat of the spread o f nuclear weapons. The first is North Korea as an example of a nation seeking
nuclear weapons and how an ethic o f nonproliferation can offer options for a resolution. The second
is nuclear terrorism, which is a unique threat to the world and a special challenge to an ethic of
nonproliferation. Second, we will explore other nations that are actively seeking nuclear weapons.
In the third category are nations which are more passive proliferators, including nations who are
making progress without any direct effort or are working very slowing toward the acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
A. Paradigmatic Cases
I. North Korea
Of the potential nuclear nations, North Korea has attracted the most attention. It will also serve
as a paradigmatic case through this exploration of proliferation because it displays both the dangers
of the spread o f nuclear weapons and the possibilities of positive responses available to counter
proliferation.
Since China and the Soviet Union have removed their protective nuclear umbrellas from over
North Korea, North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is paradoxically being intensified because of
the thaw in the Cold War. North Korea is believed to be attempting to produce an atomic weapon.
However, just how close it is to the goal is highly debated. Russian analysts suggest that North
Korea is at least three to seven years away from developing a nuclear weapon.J D Others believe it can
4 0 Janet Guttsman, “Russia Says N. Korea Still Far From Nuclear Bombs," Reuters, ClariNet
Electronic News Service, 18 June 1994.
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create a bomb much sooner. Still others believe that they are not even close to such a goal. No
matter how soon it might occur, North Korea’s acquisition o f nuclear weapons would destabilize the
region. In response, South Korea might seek its own weapons, and Japan could do the same. Also,
China and Russia would most likely react to the presence o f nuclear weapons on their borders.
A careful analysis o f the Korean situation should not fail to ignore U.S. nuclear involvement in
Korea. During the Korean War, General MacArthur asked for use of “the bomb” and the National
Security Council recommended that it be used if negotiations broke down. While no situation was
possible in which the military benefits o f using atomic weapons outweighed the harm, the U.S. did
decide to use nuclear threats to pressure for an end to the war. Threatening the use of nuclear
weapons did resume the peace talks, which were quickly concluded.
After the peace agreement, nuclear threats were again used against North Korea. The warning
was that if it broke the agreement, it risked nuclear attack.'’1 Significantly, since no peace treaty was
ever signed, the two Koreas are technically still at war. A fair appraisal of the situation admits the
possibility that North Korea has taken steps toward becoming a nuclear state. After all, the U.S. did
inform them that if war broke out again, the U.S. would use nuclear weapons against North Korea.
Because North Korea has two long-established, noncontroversial and IAEA safeguarded nuclear
research facilities, under the NPT it is entitled to IAEA assistance, including help with uranium
mining. North Korea built a research reactor in 1987. While its 30-megawatt reactor is tiny
compared to the 1,000-megawatt commercial reactors, it nevertheless can produce 20 pounds of
plutonium a year. The Soviet Union has trained North Korea’s reactor operators under an IAEA
sanctioned deal.4 2 North Korea may have started building a plutonium processing plant.
“ “ Douglass P. Lackey, Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Allanheld, 1985), 40-45.
4 2 Cozic and Swisher, 21-22 & 135.
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These factors are significant because they suggest that North Korea couJd produce its own
materials for a nuclear bomb. One o f two elements is needed for a nuclear fission explosive
device-Uranium-235 (U-235) or Plutonium-239 (Pu-239). Natural uranium contains only a small
percentage o f U-235 and must be “enriched” to at least 90% in order to be used in a bomb.
Enriching uranium, however, requires a complicated and difficult physical separation process. The
creation o f Pu-239, however, involves a comparatively simple chemical process.'*3 Nuclear power
plants convert the common form o f uranium, U-238, to Plutonium-239. Thus, all nuclear power
plants produce plutonium. While the plutonium does require further processing for use in a bomb,
this processing requires only that it be separated from other elements.
North Korea admits only to producing a few grams o f weapon-grade plutonium. Others,
however, fear that they may have far more, perhaps enough for a weapon. The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute estimates that North Korea has enough plutonium to produce
four to seven nuclear bombs. The U.S. estimates that North Korea has enough plutonium for one or
two bombs. Still, other reports suggest that North Korea already possesses one or two nuclear
weapons. However, all that can be said with certainty is that they have some plutonium, perhaps
enough for a weapon or two. What is unknown is whether they can construct an actual weapon.
North Korea is also developing delivery systems. In May of 1993, it successfully test-launched
an intermediate-range missile into the Sea o f Japan. With a range o f 621 miles, the missile could hit
parts o f Japan. The development o f North Korean missiles is not just an indirect threat to the United
States. A Department of Defense study concluded that Alaska could be within the range of North
Korean missiles by the year 2000.4 4 Recently, North Korea launched what was first thought to be a
missile over Japanese territory. Later analysis indicated it was a failed attempt to launch a satellite.
Still, the technology of space rockets and military missiles are essentially the same. North Korean
4 3 John M Deutch, “The New Nuclear Threat,” Foreign Affairs 71:4 (Fall 1992): 121-122.
4 4 “News Review,” Nuclear Proliferation News, 7 March 1995.
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missile abilities are clearly advancing. Disagreement between the U.S., South Korea and North
Korea continues as North Korea develops and tests long-range missiles. Reportedly, North Korea
has a finished long-range missile, the Taepodong II, with a range of 4,163 miles, putting Alaska and
Hawaii within its striking distance.
North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, and so their nuclear weapons’ development is a violation
o f international law. Reports show that North Korea has tried to hire nuclear scientists and buy
nuclear technology from the former Soviet republics.4 5 Yet, North Korea says that its nuclear
research is solely peaceful.
On September 27, 1991, President Bush ordered the withdrawal o f all nuclear weapons from
South Korea.4 6 In 1992 North Korea refused to open its nuclear facilities for inspection until the
U.S. completed the withdrawal. The U.S. has removed all weapons, and a hotline has been set up
between the Defense Ministers o f North and South Korea, and the two nations have taken steps
toward a peace pact.
North Korea claims that it acquired a small amount of plutonium by a single reprocessing of
spent fuel rods from a reactor. However, it appears that North Korea reprocessed the rods more than
once and might have much larger nuclear intentions, including nuclear weapons, than they have
admitted. Indications of reprocessing sent up red flags and increased the calls for more thorough
inspections. However, the inspection issue has led to major difficulties. The IAEA wanted to
inspect two installations near Yongbyon, but North Korea refused, insisting that since these
installations are conventional military installations, they are not subject to inspection. Because of
the disagreement over these inspections, in March 1993 North Korea announced that it would
withdraw from the NPT. After much international pressure and some concessions from the United
4 S Jack Kelley, “Russian Nuke Experts Wooed,” USA Today, 8 January 1992, 1.
4 6 Jon B. Wolfsthal, “IAEA Team Arrives in North Korea,” Arms Control Today, March 1994,
33.
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States, North Korea announced in June of 1993 that it was suspending its decision to leave the NPT.
The major concession that North Korea received was direct talks with the United States, out of which
came an agreement between the two nations to refrain from the use of force (including nuclear force)
against each other. The issue o f the inspection o f the disputed facilities, however, remained
unresolved.
In 1994 North Korea announced that it was shutting down its Yongbyon reactors and removing
the spent fuel rods. Since the IAEA wanted to extract samples from the removed rods, the shutdown
and removal o f the rods would prevent the IAEA from determining whether the rods had been the
source o f additional plutonium. North Korea finally allowed IAEA inspectors into nuclear sites
during the Spring o f 1994 but blocked their access to several facilities and denied them direct access
to these spent fuel rods. Another part of the concern arose from the plant being shut down for three
months in 1989 before North Korea had a safeguard agreement with IAEA. North Korea claims that
in 1989 it only removed one or two damaged rods. However, inspection could tell if and how much
material was removed. While the IAEA could not conduct the on-site inspections that it wanted, the
U.S. had national technical means to assess North Korea’s actions. The conclusion o f that
assessment, based on power levels at which North Korea operated its reactor, suggests that it was not
possible for North Korea to have diverted a substantial amount of plutonium with the only danger
time being when the reactor was shut down in 1989.4 7 In May 1994, after inspection was allowed,
inspectors confirmed that all o f the fuel rods had been accounted for, indicating that nothing was
diverted in 1994.4 8
The situation then worsened. North Korean officials walked out of a meeting with South Korean
officials. The IAEA met to discuss whether it should ask the Security Council to consider sanctions.
4 7 Peter Hayes, The Realpolitik o f the IAEA-DPRK Standoff, 31 January 1994. Asia.Security.
(PeaceNet, 1 February 1994).
4 8 John M. Broder, “N. Korea Crisis Eases As Inspectors Report No Nuclear Fuel Diversion,” Los
Angeles Times, 21 May 1994, A5.
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North Korea said that it would regard sanctions as an act o f war.4 9 China suggested that it would not
support sanctions by the Security Council. However, its statements did not suggest whether it would
veto the measure or simply abstain. The immediate response of the U.S. government included the
rescheduling o f “Team Spirit,” its joint military exercises with South Korea. The U.S. also renewed
efforts to send Patriot missiles to South Korea.5 0
While tensions were still high, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter made a controversial,
private diplomatic trip to both North Korea and South Korea. In these meetings Carter got North
Korean dictator Kim II Sung to agree to freeze North Korea’s nuclear programs in return for high-
level talks with the United States.
Soon after, long time dictator Kim U Sung died, causing great uncertainty. North Koreans call
his son Kim Jong II “supreme leader,” but they did not immediately give him the title o f President of
North Korea nor head o f the Communist Party, indicating that he had not taken complete control of
the nation. More recent assessments conclude, however, that he has now successfully replaced his
father.5 1
During the time o f leadership uncertainty, a breakthrough occurred, and the U.S. and North
Korea signed a nuclear agreement in October o f 1994. This agreement was built on the foundation
of the diplomacy mission o f former President Carter. In the agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze
its nuclear programs in exchange for diplomatic and economic concessions from the United States.
The U.S. is also allowing steel companies to import between $5-10 million o f magnetite, used in
blast furnaces. The U.S. is providing fuel oil and arranging for two Iight-water nuclear reactors
which will be under IAEA inspection to replace the current North Korean gas-graphic reactors
4 9 Wolfsthai, 33.
5 0 Ju-Yeon Kim, “Korea-Nuclear,” Associated Press Mews, CompuServe Information Service.
March 19, 1994.
5,Thomas L. Wilbom, Strategic Implications o f the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement, 3 April
1995, Asia.Security, PeaceNet, 25 April 1995.
38
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which are more prone to be used for weapon-grade fiiel. The fuel oil is an interim component
needed by North Korea because they are abandoning the graphite reactors already under construction
and nearing completion.5 2 It also agreed to allow unlimited international inspection o f all its nuclear
sites within five years, which should reveal the number o f nuclear weapons North Korea might have
produced. North Korea will also dismantle its nuclear facilities (including a fuel reprocessing
center) and ship radioactive fuel rods out of the country once the light-water reactors are on-line by
approximately 2005.5 3 Extra protection is provided by the provision that key components of the
reactors will not be shipped to North Korea until last, which means the deal can be stopped if North
Korea does not fulfill its part o f the agreement. Further, South Korea and Japan are paying most of
the costs o f the agreement.5 4
U.S. policy was designed to show North Korea that joining the company o f “civilized” nations is
better than being a “pariah” nation. Critics charge that the U.S. plan simply allows the North
Korean regime more time to survive and leaves open the possibility for North Korea to sell missiles
to countries like Iran and Syria. The U.S. responds to this charge by arguing that the benefit o f
preventing proliferation outweighs associated costs and that economic aid alone is insufficient to
prevent the collapse o f North Korea. While North Korea’s desperate economic status makes
economic help a powerful “carrot,” the U.S. continues to maintain a powerful “stick” with 37,000
troops stationed in South Korea. North Korea’s support of a 1.3 million person army in a nation
with only 22 million people worsens North Korea’s economic woes.5 5
5 2 PhiIippe Naughton, “N. Korea Says Its Sincere on Final Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, ClariNet
Electronic News Service, 13 August 1994.
5 3 Jim Mann, “Economic Respite For N. Korea Seen in Nuclear Accord,” Los Angeles Times, 30
October 1994, A6 & A 14.
s*The Defense Monitor 24, no. 4 (1995): 2.
5 5 Mann, “Economic Respite,” A6.
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The U.S. has always had a difficult time understanding an opponent’s actions from the
opponent’s perspective. AH too often the U.S. assumes that the actions of an opposing nation are
irrational, rather than exploring its rationality from the perspective o f that nation. For instance, the
U.S. has always assumed that the North Korean army was an invasion force, seeking to sweep over
South Korea just as it did in 1950. However, the Center for Defense Information understands the
North Korean forces differently: “What the Pentagon always has assumed to be another invasion
force may well be a defensive force. From the perspective o f small, insecure, and technologically-
outdated North Korea, a large military is not unreasonable for defense.”5 6
Living out the agreement to stop the nuclear weapon program in North Korea has continued to
be problematic. Inspection issues continue to cause problems. While North Korea is the only place
in the world where the IAEA has permanent inspectors,5 7 North Korea has not allowed inspectors to
conduct radioactivity measurements at Yongbyon, nor has it provided all the data requested.
Nevertheless, North Korea is overall more cooperative than in the past,5 8 and no evidence exists
indicating that North Korea has restarted its nuclear program. Finally, since the agreement does not
require complete inspections until later in the process, such refusals by North Korea are appropriate.
Indeed, Thomas Wilbom, a research professor o f national security affairs at the Strategic Studies
Institute o f the U.S. Army War College, points out, “Pyongyang has complied scrupulously with
technical aspects o f the agreement.”5 9 He further argues that, while an agreement that allowed
immediate special inspection might have been preferable, the agreement reached is much preferable
to no agreement.
5 6 “Ending the Cold War: Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam,” The Defense Monitor 23, no. 1
(1994): 5.
5 7 Steve Pagani, “N. Korea Not Moving to Restart Nuclear Program,” Rueters. ClariNet Electronic
News Service, 21 April 1995.
S 8 “News Review,” Nuclear Proliferation News, 4 April 1995.
5 9 Wilbom.
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Consequently, the agreement represents a good compromise. North Korea has shut down its
five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, it has stopped construction o f two larger reactors and it has
placed the 8,000 fuel rods into storage rather than reprocessing them. North Korea has also sealed a
radio-chemical laboratory which the U.S. feared would have been used to reprocess spent fuel into
plutonium.6 0
Other difficulties in living out the agreement remain. The U.S. provided light-water reactors,
intended to replace Soviet supplied North Korean reactors under construction, are actually from
South Korea. North Korea refuses to accept them, not because of the technology, but because they
are from South Korea. The U.S. says these reactors are North Korea’s only option because South
Korea is the only country willing to pay the $4 billion cost. North Korea has also threatened that if
the talks fail, it will process 8,000 spent fuel rods, which could yield enough plutonium for up to four
nuclear devices. North Korean diplomats also walked out o f the 1995 NPT extension talks in New
York, claiming that it had been unfairly attacked during the proceedings.
The U.S. and North Korea reached a tentative compromise in June of 1995. The reactors will be
designated as advanced versions of U.S. origin designs, the supplier will be the Korean Energy
Development Organization rather than South Korea, and a U.S. company will be program director.
South Korea was not happy with the deal but did not block the agreement.6 1 This may be because
they are, in actuality, South Korean reactors, and a South Korea company will be the prime
contractor. Nevertheless, they are not South Korean in name, and a U.S. company will be program
coordinator. The U.S. is now working to help store the spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor
6 0 Art Pine, “Citing Compliance with Pact, U.S. To Send Oil to North Korea,” Los Angeles Times,
6 January 1995, A6.
6 1 Sean Howard and Suzanna van Moyland, eds., Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 28 (30 June
1995), FHIT.Newsltr 76, PeaceNet, 30 June 1995.
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safely.6 2 There continue to be disagreements, and the U.S. is concerned that a new site in North
Korea may have a nuclear function. However, the less than smooth process seems to continue on an
overall positive course.
The test case o f North Korea is a good reminder that the U.S. can bend the truth to advance
specific political goals. Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute and a
former State Department advisor, argues that the often repeated phrase that North Korea may have
one or two bombs “is based on a worst-case estimate of what North Korea might have done during a
100-day period in 1989-when North Korea shut off its reactor.”6 3 Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., a retired
Navy rear admiral and director o f the Center for Defense Information, argues that the U.S. has
created with North Korea a nuclear strawman to justify higher U.S. defense spending. He argues
that any real threat from North Korea is based on the assumption that North Korea refueled their
reactor in 1989 and then reprocessed that fuel. Yet no proof o f either assumption exists. If the
assumptions are incorrect, then North Korea does not possess enough nuclear material for even one
nuclear weapon. Carroll identifies additional flaws in the U.S. position. Even if North Korea had
reprocessed, they may not have produced enough weapon-grade material. Moreover, North Korea
probably could not produce a nuclear trigger nor a workable design small enough to be used in a
weapon that they could deliver in any manner. Carroll says that without all these things North
Korea’s nuclear program has no military significance. Carroll argues that the Pentagon is seeking to
support a two-war defense posture. That is, the Department o f Defense is seeking a defense budget
large enough to give it the capability to fight two wars simultaneously. To justify this, the Pentagon
needed to put forth potential threats. A nonnuclear North Korea which spends less than 1% o f what
“ Jim Mann, “U.S., N. Korea Spell Out Details of Nuclear Agreement,” Los Angeles Times, 14
June 1995, A4.
“ Robert A. Manning, “Has North Korea’s Nuclear Brinkmanship Finally Crossed the Line?,” Los
Angeles Times, 22 May 1994, M2.
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the U.S. spends militarily and is countered by a very strong South Korea is no real threat unless
North Korea becomes a nuclear threat.6 4
North Korea, meanwhile, may have its own reasons for playing along with a charade. In the
first place such a charade reinforces a philosophy called juche, or self-reliance, which North Korea
has long promulgated. This nation has always been suspicious of the west and anyone seeking to
interfere in its internal affairs. Secondly, the need to maintain such a charade explains why North
Korea has dragged its feet on inspection. If North Korea had no nuclear program, as long as it could
maintain the appearance o f one, it could obtain a series o f major concessions from other nations.
North Korea provides an excellent case study for the ethical response to potential proliferation
under a new ethic o f nonproliferation. While many have advocated military means in response to
North Korea, if the peaceful diplomatic approach continues to be successful as it now appears, this
could become a model for future action. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not taken the same approach to
other countries, such as Iran.
2. The Threat o f Nuclear Terrorism
The breakup of the Soviet Union has heightened concern about the leakage of nuclear
technology, materials or weapons into an underground market in which perhaps not only nations, but
also terrorist groups, could obtain nuclear capability. Although the former Soviet republics have
given assurances, this fear is especially credible because these same nations are also desperate for the
currency that the sale o f such weapons would bring.
On October 15, 1992, officials arrested smugglers in Munich, Germany when they found 6.6
pounds o f uranium in the trunk o f a car. At first they thought that the uranium was enriched
weapon-grade material. Further investigation revealed, however, that it was simply low-grade
nuclear fuel readily available on the market. In fact, for a long time all o f the smuggled nuclear
6 4 Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., “Creating a Nuclear Straw Man,” Los Angeles Times, 8 April 1994, B7.
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material seized by officials was non-weapon-grade. The situation has now changed as, several times
now, highly enriched uranium has been seized.6 5 An extensive review o f the evidence undertaken by
William C. Potter o f the center for nonproliferation studies concludes that in at least four cases
significant diversions o f weapon-grade nuclear material from former Soviet states have taken place.6 6
During the summer of 1994, German officials seized plutonium smuggled from Russia in three
different incidents. However, the German government later admitted to staging some of these
incidents in an attempt to put pressure o f Russia to do more about smuggling.6 7
Despite such deception, the smuggling o f nuclear materials is clearly not just a threat. In 1994
there were 182 cases of the smuggling o f radioactive materials in Germany. In December 1994,
Czech police seized six pounds of nearly pure uranium-235. Information in the case suggests that it
came from a Russian nuclear institute.6 8 During the Spring of 1995, two Russian soldiers were found
in the Ukraine in possession o f 13 pounds o f uranium-235 which they had hidden in sour cream jars.
It would take only 30 to 40 pounds to produce a crude atomic weapon. In a separate case two
nuclear fuel rods were missing from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant which is also in the
Ukraine.6 9 Also, in the Spring of 1995, Slovak police seized 80 pounds o f U-235.7 0 An analysis of
“ Vladimir Iakimets, “Accounting and Control o f Fissile Material in Russia: Status,
Shortcomings and Risk of Proliferation,” Disarm CTB-NPT121, PeaceNet. 31 January 1995.
“ William C. Potter, “Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the
Post Soviet States,” Arms Control Today, October, 1995.
6 7 Spike Robinson, ed., Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 9 (6 June 1995), FHIT.Newsltr
65, PeaceNet, 6 June 1995.
“ Charles J. Hanley, “World Fears Spread o f Nukes,” Associated Press. ClariNet Electronic
News Service, 27 March 1995.
6 9 Mary Mycio, “Ukraine Seizes Uranium Cache; 2 Russians Held,” Los Angeles Time, 22 March
1995, 1 & A 8.
7 0 Graham Allison, “Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?” Washington Post,
CompuServe, 29 April 1995.
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the cases suggests that while the number o f cases is still small, the quantity o f nuclear material is
increasing.7 1
On a more positive note, no organized effort on the buying end of the market is present. For the
most part, the smugglers have been isolated individuals with get-rich hopes who have smuggled
without having buyers lined up in advance. In fact, some have speculated that the few buyers the
smugglers could find have all been undercover police officers. Neither does there seem to be an
organized crime effort running the smuggling attempts.7 7
While these cases do not seem to indicate a large or coordinated smuggling operation, we can
safely assume that some terrorist groups would like to have nuclear weapons. For instance, the
police found documents about enriching uranium when they raided members o f Aum Supreme
Truth, the Japanese cult implicated in several terrorist attacks on Japanese subway systems. Graham
Allison, best known for his important book on the Cuban Missile Crisis entitled Essence o f
Decisionf3 has recently argued that unless we take drastic steps to curtail the spread o f nuclear
materials, we will have a nuclear bombing similar to either the Oklahoma City bombing or the
bombing o f the World Trade Center in New York City. Allison states, “ In the absence o f a
determined program of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts o f nuclear terrorism against
American targets before this decade is out.”7 '1 Fortunately, his timetable has been incorrect, but his
prediction o f a terrorist nuclear attack is still a strong possibility.
The U.S. has tried to take counter-proliferation steps concerning smuggling and terrorism. For
instance, the FBI has set up a training school in Hungary which in part trains police and security
7 1 Potter.
n Rick Atkinson, “Politics of Plutonium; Officials Say Contraband Not a Threat,” Washington
Post, CompuServe, 27 August 1994.
^Graham T. Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (HarperCollins,
1971).
7 4 AUison, “Must We Wait?”
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forces in central and eastern European countries to deal with nuclear smuggling. The FBI has also
opened an office in Moscow to work on the issue, and Russia has taken steps to secure Russian
nuclear weapons and military nuclear materials.7 5 Still, serious security issues remain at Russian
nuclear facilities.
In fairness, this threat cannot be viewed as simply something “over there.” The manner in
which the U.S. handles materials and technology also raises serious concerns that the U.S. could
contribute to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists. For instance, in 1993, the major
components o f a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant were included in a batch of surplus government
equipment put up for sale. This is the very technology that allows someone to take spent fuel from a
civilian nuclear energy plant and convert it to weapon-grade material. A used car and scrap dealer
from Pocatello, Idaho, bought the equipment and tried to resell it overseas. Fortunately, the British
government saw his advertisement and notified the U.S. government who then stopped the sale.
Importantly, the scrap dealer was not at fault; rather, the U.S. government must be faulted for
turning over the working components of a reprocessing plant. While the desire to recover some
funds through scrap sales is understandable, the government must not sell working nuclear
equipment.7 6
Control o f nuclear materials in the United States also raises concerns about diversions. Even in
the U.S. a great deal o f plutonium and highly enriched uranium has been reported missing.
Estimates suggest that as much as 8,000 pounds o f weapon-grade nuclear material are missing.
Some analysts speculate that the U.S. gave part o f the missing material to Israel.7 7 Besides the
missing material, issues of the mishandling o f materials also arise. In November of 1994 an Army
7 S Robinson, Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 7.
7 6 Stephen Barr, “Energy Dept. Surplus Sales Raise Proliferation Concerns,” Washington Post,
CompuServe, 24 September 1994.
^Sweet, 169.
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Depot in California accidentally used Federal Express, rather than a safeguarded transportation
method, to ship weapon-grade plutonium to Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
FedExing weapon-grade plutonium does not give us great confidence about the security o f U.S.
nuclear materials.
Terrorism raises problems about who punishment or to whom deterrence should be directed
since terrorists do not act out of the realistic national self-interest models that nations use when
developing nuclear policy. To handle terrorists, it is necessary not just to safeguard nuclear items
(which is in fact only an accounting system), but nuclear items must be secured. The threat of
nuclear terrorism points to the need for a new ethic o f nonproliferation. Clearly, such an ethic must
be realistic; it must reduce the threat. However, the threat o f nuclear terrorism points to the
inadequacy o f current thinking. Terrorist groups do not act in ways that realism can comprehend.
Consequently, realism is woefully ill-prepared to respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism. An
adequate ethic o f nonproliferation must be able to point to policy choices which can reduce the threat
of nuclear terrorism.
B. Active Proliferators
1. Pakistan
Pakistan has been committed to acquiring nuclear weapons since 1974. Moreover, because of
Cold War realism, the U.S. helped Pakistan build a large and powerful military and helped with its
nuclear program in its early years.7 8 Some reports suggest that China gave Pakistan reliable bomb
designs in the early 1980s in return for some its high-tech information.7 9 The United States
continued its complicity with Pakistan’s nuclear development during the Reagan administration
7 8 “WorId at War— 1992, The Defense Monitor, 21, no. 6 (1992): 10.
7 9 Sweet, 156-157.
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because Pakistan was helping the U.S. in Afghanistan.8 0 Much o f the equipment that Pakistan has
acquired was not banned at the time Pakistan acquired it. Because Pakistan is not a party to NPT, its
nuclear actions are legal under international law.
Pakistan declared that it was a nuclear power with an announcement by Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto in 1991 but then said it has not assembled the actual weapons.8 1 Apparently, it obtained
material for its first atomic weapon in 1986, and by the mid 1990s probably had all the essential
elements for 5-10 undeclared atomic bombs. The significance o f Pakistani nuclear development is
great for Pakistan, which is a country with limited natural resources, few financial resources and a
small industrial base.
Because o f Pakistan’s nuclear efforts, the U.S. has dramatically curtailed foreign assistance to
Pakistan. While Pakistan has lost a great deal of foreign aid because of its nuclear programs, it is
vehement in its resolve to develop advanced weapon systems that it believes will provide security.
This also points to the failure of realistic approaches to nonproliferation.
Pakistan undertook a series of nuclear tests in May 1998 after its rival India had done so.
Estimates are that it now likely has between 15 and 20 nuclear weapons. O f special concern is the
fact that Pakistan does not have adequate control procedures for its nuclear arsenal. The India-
Pakistan nuclear conflict is troubling because the two nations have fought three wars since each
gained independence from Great Britain in 1947. They share a 450-mile disputed border, and
Pakistan supports the insurgency in India’s Kashmir.8 2
Pakistan tested nuclear capable short-range missiles in 1989, and China has been accused of
selling missiles to Pakistan. They may have missiles with up to a 900-mile range, and some reports
8 0 Terence Hunt, “Clinton Lacked Clout to Halt Pakistani Tests,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 29
May 1998, 16A.
8 1 Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 183.
8 2 Dexter Filkins, “Pakistan Concerned in Wake o f India Test,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 12
April 1999, 3A.
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suggest that they have placed nuclear warheads on some missiles. The possibility o f Chinese
assistance raises the ever present problem o f enforcing any agreement designed to stop or slow the
spread o f nuclear weapons if violations cannot be verified. The U.S. has satellite pictures of
suspicious looking crates being unloaded in Pakistan but lacks any proof o f their content.
Meanwhile, China denies shipping any missile parts, and Pakistan denies that it has ever bought
nuclear capable missiles from China. While U.S. law requires sanctions if it finds that China is
transferring banned missile technology, there is not sufficient evidence for such a finding.
While Pakistan has long been a critic o f the discriminatory nature of the NPT, it does recognize
that globally the NPT has played a positive role and has in fact favored its extension. However,
Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT unless India, its neighbor and long-standing rival, signs. Pakistan
has recently said that it would agree to a fissile material cutoff.8 3
2. India
Although India exploded a nuclear weapon in 1974, until 1998 it claimed to have no nuclear
arsenal. Many in India pointed out that nuclear weapons are contrary to Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy
of nonviolence and India’s longstanding international effort to portray nuclear weapons as evil.8 4
India’s nuclear test in 1974 did force a reevaluation and tighter controls on nuclear exports by the
nuclear states, who hoped to make it at least more difficult for other nations to acquire nuclear
capability. In 1977 India agreed to full-scope safeguards on its nuclear operations if the nuclear
weapon states would freeze production of fissile material for atomic bombs, agree to a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and set target dates for reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles.8 5
^ “Documents and Sources,” Nuclear Proliferation News, 7 March 1995.
M Reiss, 211.
8 5 Sweet, 144.
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Because the nuclear nations have not met these requirements, India has not subjected its facilities to
safeguarding.
While India is highly critical o f the NPT, India does support arms control proposals that will
apply equally to all nations. India has long maintained that the proliferation problem is not simply
horizontal (spreading to more nations), but rather the vertical (expanding nuclear arsenals)
proliferation within the nuclear states. It says that it will join the NPT only after the superpowers
take significant disarmament steps which, India points out, are required by the NPT. India is one of
the strong third-world critics o f the NPT. Its arguments carry much moral weight. However, not
idealizing India is important. While India has vilified nuclear weapons, it has also worked to attain
nuclear capability. While calling for disarmament, it has undertaken a huge military buildup.
Despite these ambiguities, India is an important nonproliferation voice.
India has long been thought to be ready to resume nuclear testing on short notice. Such
assessments were obviously correct as India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998 as
tension was rising in its conflict with Pakistan. A Congressional Research Service report says that
India can build both fission and hydrogen bombs. Post test estimates are that India has a stockpile of
more than 60 nuclear weapons. India has four major atomic power complexes. It also has several
unsafeguarded reprocessing plants and several unsafeguarded research reactors.8 6 India is also
building a breeder reactor nuclear power plant, which by definition produces more plutonium than it
consumes. Consequently, India will have even more plutonium available for nuclear weapons.
Some blame the U.S. tilt toward China, Pakistan’s closest ally, as provoking India’s nuclear tests.8 7
The Soviet Union has long helped and supported India’s military and may have included some
nuclear assistance.8 8 During the summer of 1993, Russia sold rocket engines to India. The U.S.
8 6 Sweet, 133, 139, 144 & 156.
8 7 Hunt, 16 A.
8 8 “World at War-1992,” 10.
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contends that the sale is a violation o f Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a treaty that
Russia has not signed but has verbally agreed to abide. Unfortunately, the profit motive for
cash-short nations often counters desires to prevent proliferation. India has in recent years test-fired
five different nuclear capable missiles including one with a range o f 1,550 miles. With such a range
India has missiles capable o f reaching China or Pakistan, both o f whom India has previously fought
wars against. India has also developed an advanced anti-missile system similar to the United States’
Patriot system of Gulf War fame.8 9
Nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have the danger of turning their regional conflict over
the territorial dispute o f the Kashmir into a disaster. Before Indian independence, the Kashmir was
an autonomous state and Kashmir nationalists, now supported by Pakistan, have been struggling for
independence ever since. An article published in The New Yorkerm claims that India and Pakistan
were on the brink o f a nuclear war in 1990. The claim of the article, denied by both India and
Pakistan, is that a nuclear disaster was prevented only through intervention by the Bush
Administration. Whatever the truth is about this example. South Asia is a nuclear hot spot.
3. Israel
While the peace process continues in the Middle-East, Israel’s supposed possession of nuclear
weapons continues to be a nonproliferation problem. New estimates suggest that Israel’s nuclear
arsenal is larger than was previously believed. However, because Israel’s nuclear program is
clandestine, its size is subject for much debate. Leonard S. Spector, director of the Carnegie
Endowment’s nuclear nonproliferation project, argues that Israel may have as many as 200 nuclear
devices. U.S. officials, however, say this is inaccurate and that Israel has less than 100, perhaps only
8 9 Brahma Chellaney, “India Reports Development of a Sophisticated Anti-Missile System,” UPI
Newswire, Clarinet Network News File, 1 March 1993.
“ Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge: A Reporter At Large,” The New Yorker, 29
March 1993, 56-73.
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50-60. While U.S. officials believe that the Dimona reactor could not produce enough material for
200 nuclear weapons, Israel may have clandestinely enlarged it. Any o f the estimates would allow
Israel to use nuclear weapons tactically while still having enough for strategic purposes. Tactical
nuclear weapons suggest that Israel’s nuclear arsenal may be for more than deterrence raising
troubling questions about Israel’s intentions and the possible use o f nuclear weapons in the Middle
East.
It is believed that beginning in 1957, France shared nuclear information with Israel. This would
account for Israel’s ability to develop weapons without actual test explosions. The CIA believes that
Israel had the bomb as early as 1968. The work is assumed to have been undertaken at the
unsafeguarded Dimona complex which includes a research reactor and reprocessing facility supplied
by France. Israel may also have bought or stolen nuclear materials from the U.S. and Europe.9 1
Israel began to enrich uranium in 1979 or 1980.9 2
Information suggests that Israel has produced tritium and mithium deuteride. This would
suggest that at least some of their nuclear weapons are advanced. Such weapons would have yields
much greater than the 20 kilotons usually projected for their weapons.9 3 They also have short range
missiles and are testing intermediate range missiles with up to a 1,250-mile range.9 4
Israel has a policy of nuclear uncertainty-refusing to admit or deny whether it possesses nuclear
weapons or has programs to achieve such a goal. Israel has also refused to sign the NPT. This
uncertain position may be preferable to a direct admission of their possession of nuclear weapons. In
one sense Israel’s uncertain position has allowed the Arab countries not to develop their own nuclear
9 1 Sweet, 175.
9 2 Cozic and Swisher, 127.
9 3 Karsh, Navias and Sabin 135, 152-153 & 191.
^Leonards. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread o f Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990. (Boulder:
Westview, 1990), 6.
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forces. A direct admission o f Israel’s nuclear capability might “force” the Arab nations to conclude
that they too must have a nuclear force.9 5
Nuclear tensions in the Middle East are high, and we should be concerned about Israel’s
reaction to nuclear efforts by other Middle Eastern nations. After all, Israel bombed an Iraqi nuclear
facility in 1981. Because Israel used CIA satellite images in that effort, it has subsequently had its
access to such data limited. However, in February o f 1995 Israel launched its own spy satellite and it
now has F-15E aircraft with a range o f 2,400 miles. This means that Iran’s nuclear facilities are
now within its range.9 6
Israel’s nuclear program is in fact becoming a more divisive issue in the Middle East. Except
for the United Arab Emirates and Oman, neither of which have nuclear programs, all Arab nations
are NPT members. Arab nations are upset with Israel’s continued nuclear efforts, while most o f
them are committed to nonproliferation. Arab nations, including Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and
Syria, initially said they would not sign an extension of the NPT unless Israel also signed the treaty .
While they did agree to the extension, Israel has not signed the NPT. Israel has said that it is willing
to discuss nonproliferation, but only after there is a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement
which includes Syria.9 7
9 S Reiss, 166.
9 6 Spike Robinson, ed., Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 4(17 February 1995),
FHIT.NewsItr, PeaceNet, 17 February 1995.
9 7 Kim Murphy, “Rogue Nation Or Terrorist Poses Serious Threat, Perry Says,” Los Angeles
Times, 9 January 1995, A4.
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C. Latent Proliferators
/. Iraq
If it were not for the effects o f the Gulf War, Iraq would be in the previous category. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty’s effectiveness is most profoundly put into question with the case of Iraq. Doubt
arises because Iraq, as a signatory nation, had even allowed inspectors into its facilities. However,
even after the destruction which it suffered in the Gulf War, Iraq may be a more significant long
term nuclear threat than Iran. Since Iraq has latent nuclear ability, a mere change in the regime or a
change in its attitudes toward such weapons could move Iraq from being a potential nuclear threat to
an actuai one.
At the start o f the G ulf War, Iraq was not on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons, but it did
have a very sophisticated program. Moreover, in the aftermath o f the Gulf War, additional evidence
has emerged about the advanced degree o f Iraq’s nuclear program. New details indicate that Iraq
launched a crash effort to build a nuclear weapon by April of 1991, hoping to use it in the Gulf
War.9 8 While the plan failed and the war was over by the projected completion date, Iraq still
operated a multi-billion dollar nuclear program for nearly a decade. Some suggest that if Saddam
Hussein had not started the G ulf War, Iraq would have been a nuclear state by now.9 9
As often happens, the concern for economic gain by the nuclear nations outweighed wise
decisions about what technology and hardware was transferred to Iraq. In the latter half of the
1980s, the British government allowed machinery to be shipped to Iraq though it knew it was
essential to Iraqi nuclear efforts. The British transfer was directly tied to efforts to keep one of its
own struggling industries afloat. Allegations have been made that the U.S. also allowed important
9 8 Robin Wrigh,. “Iraq’s Rush to Get Nuclear Bombs for Gulf War Disclosed,” Los Angeles
Times, 26 August 1995, 1.
"Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 136 & 207.
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technological transfers to Iraq out o f economic concerns.1 0 0 [raq, meanwhile, was very ingenious by
hiding its illicit purchases behind innocent and legitimate purchases. Also in an attempt to hide its
purchases, Iraq sought components rather than whole items and tried to buy machines that could
make contraband items rather than the items themselves. They also used middle buyers to hide the
final destinations o f the products. In fact almost none of the transferred goods raised any concerns;
business with iraq was encouraged because during its war with Iran the West had supported Iraq.1 0 1
The outcome of the Gulf War was designed to end Iraqi nuclear efforts. Security Council
Resolution 687 set procedures to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile
capabilities. During the last several years, U.N. inspectors have overseen the dismantling of $2
billion worth o f Iraqi nuclear facilities, and both highly enriched uranium and plutonium have been
removed from Iraq. While these were very small quantities of weapon-grade material, if Iraq had
completed the facilities under construction, it would have been able to produce enough for a nuclear
device within as short of time as two years. Some o f the plutonium found had been extracted from a
Soviet supplied reactor although the IAEA was safeguarding the reactor. Seized documents provide
clear proof that, besides having the capabilities, Iraq was in fact trying to build nuclear weapons.
Moreover, Iraq was trying to produce advanced weapons, such as a hydrogen bomb, and testing the
ability to arm its ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
On April 14, 1992, IAEA inspectors demolished Iraq’s principal nuclear production facility at
Al-Attheer.1 0 2 Despite the completion of the dismantling work, Iraq could quickly return to their
pre-Gulf War nuclear level because o f the experience and expertise they currently possess. New
reports suggest that Iraq may be continuing its nuclear program through computer modeling, though
‘“ Douglas Frantz and William Tuohy, “British Allow Iraq to Acquire Tooling for High-Tech
Weapons, Documents Say,” Los Angeles Times, 11 November 1992, A5.
1 0 1 Charles P. Cozic and Karin L. Swisher, eds., Nuclear Proliferation. Opposing Viewpoints,
eds. David L Bender and Bruno Leone. (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1992), 119-121.
'“ Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 285.
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the IAEA has been unable to confirm such reports.1 0 3 Although trying to revive its nuclear program
would be difficult and costly for Iraq, further vigilance is needed. Again it is important to remember
that Iraq had good reason to seek nuclear weapons in the first place. Acquiring weapons o f mass
destruction was not just a matter of adding another category of weapons to Saddam Hussein’s
arsenal, but was rather a key to his political survival. Such weapons could blunt Israel’s superiority
and remove the threat o f hostile neighbors such as Iran and Syria. A true effort to end proliferation
will need to address those motivations.
Iraq has substantial missile ability and is investing in furthering those abilities. The U.S.
destroyed most o f Iraq’s past infrastructure in the area of missiles during and after the G ulf War.
However, Iraq still has the needed pool of scientists and engineers within its borders. Furthermore,
new and recent evidence suggests that Iraq has continued to engage in elaborate systems to purchase
missile parts covertly. They have not deployed new missiles, but they may be stockpiling the parts in
secrete for use at a future date.1 0 4 Iraq has a proven track record of keeping things hidden. Before
the Gulf War, the IAEA was unable to detect any illicit activity. Some U.S. analysts believe that
once trade sanctions are lifted, Iraq could build nuclear weapons in as quick as five to seven years.
While that estimate exaggerates the rate at which they could do so, a continued nuclear threat from
J
Iraq is a reality.
Many critics argue that President Bush overplayed the nuclear threat from Iraq to gain public
support for the U.S. war effort since the war was, in fact, waged for other reasons.1 0 5 Such claims
may be true. Nevertheless, Iraqi possession o f nuclear weapons would have greatly altered the
situation at the time o f the Gulf War. In particular, a nuclear Iraq may have stopped other Arab
l0 3 Robinson Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 7.
I0 4 R. Jeffrey Smith, “Iraq Buying Missile Parts Covertly; Officials Say Effort Violates Trade
Ban,” Washington Post, CompuServe, 13 October 1995.
l0 5 Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 51.
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states from seeking U.S. intervention. Further, U.S. forces would have been in a much more
vulnerable situation. In fact, the U.S. may not have engaged in the systematic bombing that proved
so successful in the Gulf War. This may now mean that for any regional power to confront the U.S.,
they will need first to acquire nuclear weapons. Further, even future regimes in Iraq may still want
nuclear weapons, especially because of Iraq’s difficult relations with Israel and with Iran.
Increased tension has lead to the expulsion from Iraq o f U.N. inspectors. This is a troubling
development since inspection, though an imperfect process, was much more effective than military
strikes, which are almost totally ineffective in stopping clandestine weapons programs.
2. Iran
Sayed Ayatollah Mohajerani, former vice-president o f Iran, argues that nonproliferation efforts
discriminate against the third world. He argues that it is hypocritical for the U.S. and Russia to have
nuclear weapons while seeking to deny such weapons to Arab nations. Mohajerani suggests that
Arab nations would not use nuclear weapons, but would possess them only to deter their enemies.1 0 6
While Iran is a party to the NPT, most analysts believe it is seeking nuclear weapons. In so
doing, Iran may be seeking to take up the nuclear mantle left in the wake o f Iraq’s defeat. Further,
Iran also fears that Iraq will again become powerful sometime in the future and has pressure to
counter Israel’s nuclear arsenal.1 0 7 However, Iran claims that its nuclear efforts are completely
peaceful and that it is not seeking atomic weapons. Finally, Iraq has reminded other nations that
under the NPT it does have a right to nuclear technology.
1 0 6 Cozic and Swisher, 14.
1 0 7 Robert C. Toth, “Undeterrables May Soon Have Nuclear Arms,” Los Angeles Times, 4
November 1991, 10 A.
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The U.S. assumes that Iran has engaged in some research in the production of weapon-grade
nuclear materials and asserts that such research has no peaceful use.1 0 8 Although Israel claims that
Iran will have a nuclear weapon within three years,1 0 9 U.S. estimates conclude that Iran is at least 5-
10 years away from building nuclear weapons indigenously. Whichever the case, the introduction of
nuclear technology, expertise or materials from the former Soviet Union or China could speed up the
acquisition timetable. Israel claims that Iran already has 150 foreign nuclear scientists and
engineers working within its borders. Also, in at least two cases, Iranian nationals have been
arrested in Turkey trying to smuggle enriched uranium.'1 0 However, Iran denies that it has any
military atomic program.
The nations of the world hold two varying views about Iran. One view, held by the Russians, is
that Iran probably cannot carry out its nuclear weapon program. This position claims that Iran will
not have a nuclear bomb anytime soon. Three factors lead Russia to this conclusion: Damage from
the war with Iraq, its low industrial base and its foreign dependance in areas of high technology.
Others claim that Iran’s economy could not support the major nuclear program that they would need
to develop a nuclear weapon within ten years."1 A second view, based on a CIA assessment, insists
that Iran may be more successful in its nuclear efforts. While the CIA also says Iran is at least 8-10
years away from developing a nuclear weapon, the CIA believes this timetable could be speeded up
with outside help."2
l0 8 Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 144.
1 0 9 Robinson, Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 7.
""Charles J. Hanley, “Iran Looms As Nuke Test Case,” Associated Press, ClariNet Electronic
News Service, 28 March 1995.
" 'Robin Wright, “U.S. Moves Seen As Fatal to Any Opening by Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 7
June 1995, A4.
" 2 W. Seth Carus, “Proliferation and Security in Southwest Asia.” The Washington Quarterly 17,
no. 2 (1994): 133-134.
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If Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, it is a good test case for world response. However, the IAEA
has not found any evidence o f a nuclear weapon program in Iran. Claiming that Iran is a “rogue
nation” which has a crash nuclear program and supports terrorism, the U.S. announced a trade
embargo upon Iran during the spring of 1995. The world, including the United States’ closest allies
in Europe, refused to go along. In fact, most U.S. allies have questioned whether Iran has any
serious nuclear program at all. They argue further that until there is a smoking gun the best strategy
is to remain in contact with Iran. The U.S. insists that even transfers allowed under the NPT should
not be undertaken with Iran. The U.S. position, however, is a violation o f the NPT because the NPT
requires that nuclear powers provide nuclear energy assistance to those seeking it. Further, it is
important to remember that the U.S. has no hard evidence against Iran; all that the U.S. has is
circumstantial evidence, including attempts to buy dual-use technology and stories which cannot be
confirmed. Completely lacking is any specific location of nuclear facilities which should be
identifiable if Iran has the massive program claimed by the United States.
While we should be concerned about Iran, more careful analysis gives a more balanced view.
Arab world specialist Sandra Mackey identifies three powerful and emotional forces that shape
Iran’s positions: “Fear o f invasion, pride of nation and the conviction that foreign-driven
conspiracies are always operating against them.”" 3 Mackey goes on to point out that whatever
nuclear program Iran has, they would understand it to be defensive, not offensive."4
Why might Iran be seeking nuclear weapons? Even a nuclear Iran would be subject to massive
retaliation if they ever used nuclear weapons. Therefore, they must have other reasons. One reason
is to deter. Mere possession o f nuclear weapons could well deter U.S. military action in the region.
Second, since ignoring a nuclear nation is difficult, Iran might use its nuclear weapons to force other
" 3 Sandra Mackey, “Fear o f Enemies Isn’t Paranoia; U.S. Policy Invites Disaster,” Los Angeles
Times, 7 June 1995, B7.
1 1 4 Mackey, B7.
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area nations to take Iranian interests into greater consideration. Third, Iran could use nuclear
weapons to control the escalation o f a war. If Iran became involved in a war with the U.S., their
possession o f nuclear weapons could be used to keep the conflict limited.1 ,5 Although these
motivations are less sinister than world domination, a nuclear Iran still would cause more instability
in the world. However, the extent o f Iran’s nuclear program is far from clear. Iran needs to be
watched, but it is quite likely that current U.S. policy to isolate Iran is not only doomed to failure, but
is based on overreaction and falsehood.
3. Others
Several other nations continue to be possible proliferators precisely because their nuclear
capability continues to develop and mature even if they do not have the intention of developing
nuclear weapons. These other nations include Syria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Libya, Taiwan,
and South Africa.
Syria has for the first time shown interest in nuclear weapons. Speculation is that Syria has
nuclear intentions but is a long way from developing them and has no known significant nuclear
facilities. However, intelligence reports suggest that Syria is seeking to create a nuclear
infrastructure with military implications. As an NPT member, Syria must legally submit any nuclear
facilities to IAEA inspection.1 1 6 China is accused of selling to Syria missiles that may have nuclear
capabilities. Syria is also attempting to develop cruise missiles. While Syria will clearly not be a
nuclear state in the near future, it is another nation which is beginning to show interest in becoming
nuclear.
The north African nation o f Algeria is no stranger to nuclear matters. In fact, since it is where
France first tested nuclear weapons, Algeria is one of the few nations which has experienced nuclear
1 lsCarus, 137.
ll6Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 135 & 146.
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explosions. France was the colonial ruler o f Algeria until 1962 when a bloody eight-year war finally
brought Algerian independence. In more recent years Algeria appears to be establishing a nuclear
infrastructure with military possibilities. In the 1980s, Algeria’s nuclear program was thought to be
limited to uranium exploration and two small I-megawatt research reactors supplied by Argentina.
While Algeria was not an NPT member at the time, it still allowed the reactors to be under IAEA
safeguards. Some evidence indicates that nuclear technicians from former Soviet republics are
working in Algeria."7 In 1991, U.S. intelligence discovered that, with help from China, Algeria was
secretly building a larger research reactor protected by a ring of antiaircraft missiles. In May 1991,
apparently because of U.S. diplomatic intervention, China and Algeria announced that this larger
reactor will be under IAEA supervision.1 1 8
It is unclear what motivates Algeria’s nuclear actions. During Algeria’s seven-year guerrilla
war with Morocco over the Western Sahara, Morocco made a military deal with the United States.
Consequently, Algeria may have decided that the nuclear option might counter Morocco’s newly
created advantage. It also may have sought to increase its prestige in the non-aligned movement.
Increased international pressure followed, and on January 7, 1992, Algiers announced that it would
join the NPT, which it did in early 1995.1 1 9
Saudi Arabia has generally been one o f the friendliest Arab nations to the United States. It
played a crucial role in U.S. efforts in the G ulf War and has also expressed anti-nuclear sentiments.
However, rumors suggest that Saudi Arabia has sought to employ former Soviet nuclear scientists
and has attempted to equip its missiles with potential nuclear warheads. Such actions may be in
reaction to Iranian nuclear efforts.1 2 0
ll7Cozic and Swisher, 21-22.
" 8 Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 135 & 147-149.
1 1 9 Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 151 -152.
I2 0 Karsh, Navias and Sabin, 198.
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A dissident former Saudi diplomat, Mohammed Khilewi, who is seeking political asylum in the
U.S., claims that Saudi Arabia assisted Iraq’s nuclear program during the 1980s. The assistance
reportedly included the transfer of advanced technology and $5 billion in economic support for the
program. Khilewi also claims that Saudi scientists received training in nuclear technology in Iraq
and that Saudi Arabia has set up its own military nuclear research center at Suleiyel, 60 miles
southeast o f Riyadh. He claims to have seen possible Iraqi technicians working at this site. Khilewi
certainly knows about nuclear issues since he was a nuclear proliferation expert working at the Saudi
mission to the United Nations. However, Saudi Arabia claims that he is lying and that he has
created forged documents to bolster his false claims.1 2 1
Although for a long time Japan has been able to create a sizeable nuclear force, it has also had
more to lose than gain from nuclear weapons. However, some speculate that it could construct
weapons in as short as a few weeks. Japan has engaged in nuclear research since during World War
II. However, with its special status as the only nation to have suffered an atomic attack, Japan has
traditionally opposed nuclear weapons. Restricted by both international and domestic legal
requirements, it is also unclear whether Japan has any legal option to develop nuclear weapons.
Also, raising nuclear stakes for a small, densely-populated nation is not good strategy.
Two possible technical blocks to Japan building nuclear weapons exist. First is Japan’s inability
to test because o f lack o f open spaces, and second is the lack o f sophisticated “trigger” devices to set
off nuclear weapons. However, Israel, South Africa and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons
without first testing, and some reports suggest that Japan has obtained the triggers. If correct, this
would mean that Japan could construct a nuclear warhead in a very short time. Moreover, they can
build the missiles to deliver nuclear weapons.
l2,Steve Coll and John Mintz, “Saudi Aid to Iraqi A-Bomb Effort Alleged; Asylum-Seeking
Diplomat Says Riyadh Secretly Gave Baghdad Money and Technology.” Washington Post,
CompuServe, 24 July 1994.
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Japan has recently imported from France a ton o f plutonium for its commercial energy program.
This is enough nuclear material for 120 nuclear bombs. Over time the U.S. has allowed Japan to buy
more plutonium than is contained in all o f U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.1 2 2 In 1994, concern
was raised about a Japanese plant that makes fuel from plutonium for breeder reactors. About 150
pounds were found missing, an amount which was enough for nine nuclear weapons. Japan claims
that the missing material is simply stuck in the equipment.
Japan is one o f the few nations which still plans to use plutonium for energy production. In a
series o f planned ones, they have one operational prototype breeder reactor which produces more
plutonium than it consumes. Japan places its hope in the theory that breeder reactors can be an
inexhaustible energy supply. However, plutonium is environmentally dangerous along with the ever
present possibility o f a military diversion of the material.'2 2
During the summer o f 1993, Japan’s foreign minister suggested that it should be willing to build
nuclear weapons to counter a nuclear North Korea. Simultaneously, Japan showed its support for the
extension o f the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The foreign minister also said that a nuclear
threat from North Korea does not automatically mean that Japan will develop its own arsenal. First,
Japan would try to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, he said that possessing the ability to
develop nuclear weapons is becoming crucial to Japan. This is another indication of the growing
nuclear problem in Asia. While Japan has publicly taken the moral high ground in the fight against
nuclear proliferation, many other Asian nations say they now have something to fear from Japan.
The U.S. has long considered Libya a pariah state and assumes that Libya would like to get its
hands on nuclear weapons. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Libya unsuccessfully approached India
I2 2 Cozic and Swisher, 178.
i2 3 David Holley, “Japan’s Energy Plan May Fuel Spread o f Plutonium,” Los Angeles Times, 20
March 1994), I, A8 & A 10.
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in the 1970s with an offer to pay $15 million for nuclear information.1 2 4 The breakup o f the Soviet
Union has given Libya new opportunities to purchase nuclear weapons. Reports suggest that Libya
has tried to hire Russian nuclear scientists and may have some working within its borders.1 2 5 While
Libya is still many years, probably decades, away from building nuclear weapons indigenously,
outside help could speed up the program. Libya is a party to the NPT,1 2 6 and so its nuclear programs
would be illegal. Libya is also working on delivery systems, and some reports indicate that Libya
and Iran are working together on missiles.1 2 7
Taiwan is a small nation in a hostile relationship to the nuclear superpower China. While
China believes that Taiwan illegally holds and controls part of Chinese territory, Taiwan believes
that it is the legitimate government of China. Such a situation makes Taiwan ripe in its desire for
nuclear weapons.
Taiwan has had a sizable nuclear program but lacks the facilities to produce materials for
nuclear weapons. Since they are signers o f the NPT, a move to develop or acquire nuclear weapons
would be illegal.1 2 8 Political pressure from the United States has seemed to curtail most of Taiwan’s
nuclear efforts.1 2 9 However, decreased U.S. support for Taiwan could reignite Taiwan’s interest in
nuclear weapons.
South Africa might be a model for achieving nonproliferation as it has evidently backed away
from the proliferation process. In 1993, then President, Frederick de Klerk, admitted that South
Africa had built six Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons between 1975 and 1990. A U.S. satellite in
1 2 4 Katz, 4A.
1 2 5 Cozic and Swisher, 21-22.
1 2 6 Spector, 6.
1 2 7 Robinson, Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 7.
l2 8 Spector, 6.
1 2 9 HadIey.
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1979 detected what might have been a South African nuclear test. However, de Klerk denies that
South Africa has ever detonated a nuclear weapon and claims that it has dismantled all o f its nuclear
weapons. He explained that South Africa had developed the weapons because it knew that its
international isolation meant that no other nation would come to its aid if it had been threatened.
Specifically, South Africa feared the Cuban buildup in Angola, although, in a rational sense, it was
not a real threat to South Africa. While de Klerk claimed that no foreign government was involved
in its nuclear program, many nuclear analysts speculate that Israel provided assistance. South Africa
signed and ratified the NPT in 1991,1 3 0 and it has refused to identify its nuclear scientists, attempting
to prevent others from hiring them.1 3 '
IV. Conclusion
This review o f the spread of nuclear weapons reveals a real and pressing problem with nuclear
proliferation. The nuclear issue did not disappear with the breakup o f the Soviet Union. Nor did the
nuclear problem disappear with the improvement of relations between the United States and Russia.
While past predictions claiming the nuclear club would soon have as many as 25 members have been
seriously flawed, the number of nuclear nations is increasing, and the potential for many new nuclear
nations remains a strong possibility. The number of nuclear weapons does not grow daily as it did
just a few years past, yet the danger from nuclear weapons is greater than during the Cold War since
new proliferators are often less stable and have fewer technical safeguards on their nuclear weapons.
Extreme realists suggest that war and foreign policy are outside the realm of moral and ethical
analysis. Those who hold such views will find little o f value in this project. However, such a
position is simply wrong. In the first place, such a position claims that results are the only relevant
1 3 0 Patrick Codings, “South Africa Admits to Having Constructed Nuclear Bombs,” UPI
Newswire, ClariNet Network News Files, March 24, 1993.
l3 1 Robinson, Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 7.
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criteria. Yet such a position is an ethical argument-albeit from an extreme utilitarian position.
Utilitarianism, o f course, is a major ethical theory. In the second place, people, be they citizens, or
soldiers or even presidents, automatically make moral evaluations about war and foreign policy in
terms of commonly held values and principles. President Kennedy refused to order a surprise
military attack on Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis because he thought it would be a “Pearl
Harbor” in reverse. Implicit in that statement was the conclusion that such an action would be
morally wrong, just as Japan had been morally wrong for attacking the United States. Moreover, the
U.S. was almost tom apart because o f moral arguments over the Vietnam War. More recently, the
U.S. Senate debated the morality of the going to war in the Persian Gulf. Just as the public cringed
at reports of the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, so does the public cringe at reports o f
atrocities coming from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Cringing is a moral
evaluation. With our very bodies we say this or that “is wrong.”
The problem with this emotional approach is that it suggests a seat-of-the-pants, rather than
thoughtful and critical ethical analysis. Fortunately, as a species we humans have engaged in a long,
careful, thoughtful moral evaluation o f the issues of war and peace. Our traditions contain valuable
resources which we can turn to as we approach the continued problems that nuclear weapons pose.
At the same time, previous thought may be inadequate for our current context. Consequently, the
next chapter explores traditional ethical resources to see what guidance they can give, as well as
what short-comings point to the need for new ethical analysis, to the problem of nuclear
proliferation.
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CHAPTER TWO:
TRADITIONS OF WAR AND PEACE
No emperor or fiend o f the past-not Caesar, not Alexander the Great, nor
Attila the Hun-ever claimed the sovereign right to determine the life and
future of the entire universe. Yet that power is now claimed by every
graduate engineer who steps into a nuclear weapons laboratory.
E. L. Doctorow1
Since ancient times, human beings have made ethical decisions about war and peace. In fact,
human history includes a great deal o f critical reflection about the appropriateness of the use of
violence. Therefore, any exploration o f peace issues today must seek to place itself within this long
and noteworthy history. This chapter seeks briefly to describe and then discern the importance o f
previous ethical and policy thought for the analysis of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation
policy options. Two divergent trajectories emerge from previous ethical analysis. First, much o f the
previous thought is trapped in the past and not only provides no help in addressing the problem, it
actually inhibits the development o f solutions. Second, other thought from the past is forward
looking and can contribute to the development of an ethic of nonproliferation.
When considering the implications o f previous ethical thought on nuclear weapons, it is
important to keep at the forefront how dramatically the world situation has changed with the end of
the Cold-War and the downfall o f the Soviet empire. This change does not make all of the previous
work moot, but it does mean that much o f it is no longer relevant. However, ingrained ideas are
'“Capsules,” The Other Side, January-February 1992, 27.
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slow to change, and people are slow to give up ideas that have been important to them in the past.
Therefore, part o f the task is to explore what is still useful and jettison those ideas whose days o f
relevance have now passed.
The most significant insight from previous thought is the understanding that nuclear weapons
are not merely big bombs but are fundamentally different than other weapons. Much of that
distinctiveness does come from the fact that their power means that they can do in a flash what may
take many days or months to achieve with conventional weapons. However, nuclear weapons also
have distinct qualities which include the human and environmental damage they inflict through the
release o f radiation plus the huge amount o f material that they raise into the atmosphere which can
affect the global climate.
For the past several decades, the focus o f nuclear ethical evaluation has been on deterrence.
These previous evaluations o f deterrence continue to have relevance since nuclear powers such as the
United States still operate in the mind-set o f deterrence. However, it is less clear now who is being
deterred and by whom. In other words, the sides are far less defined. The current vogue is to speak
o f minimal deterrence or the nuclear powers keeping a small nuclear force whose sole purpose is to
deter a nuclear attack against it by anyone else. The previous ethical work which raised serious
ethical concerns about deterrence pushes nations in the direction of minimal deterrence. However,
the U.S. is presently unwilling to move to a level that can fairly be classified as minimal. Moreover,
it is far from clear that a minimal deterrent actually avoids the ethical criticisms levied at massive
deterrence, which includes the willingness to threaten to exterminate millions o f noncombatants.
The obvious conclusion from the ethics o f deterrence is that any use o f nuclear weapons fails to meet
ethical analysis. For instance, nuclear weapons cannot meet just war standards of proportionality,
success or discrimination. Moreover, minimal deterrence fares no better since the possession of and
reliance on nuclear weapons is bound at some point in time to lead to nuclear use. Moreover,
nuclear proliferation greatly increases this risk.
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The only solution to these ethical problems is to seek ways to move beyond nuclear weapons.
Moreover, from a nonproliferation point o f view, if the U.S. practiced what it preached, it would be
in a much stronger position to encourage others to refrain from getting nuclear weapons. An ethic of
nonproliferation rejects the self-righteousness o f the United States and other nuclear powers who fail
to notice the contradiction between possessing nuclear weapons and vilifying other nations’ attempts
to acquire them. Such a double standard would require justification that so far has not been
provided. Even when feeble attempts to justify such a stance are made, it is immediately clear that
the policies o f the nuclear powers are not consistent with such justifications.
An ethic o f nonproliferation will require a wide understanding of security, taking into
consideration factors other than military power and also admitting that other nations, including our
enemies, have security interests. Such an ethic will look at security on a global level. It will
evaluate policy on whether it promotes the interests of all humanity, not just one nation. It will also
reject violations o f human rights in the name o f security. Moreover, it will move us to use the same
standards for evaluating behavior rather than different standards for different nations. At the level of
ethical theory, it will be a mixed system that is concerned with principles but also with
consequences.
Moving beyond a nuclear world will not result in a nonviolent utopia. In fact, moving to a non
nuclear status will have a significant impact on conventional force requirements, and the tradeoffs
need ethical analysis as well. Pacifists will no doubt be uncomfortable with the possibility that an
end to a nuclear world may actually lead to increased military spending, at least in the short run.
Yet, pacifists will remind us that justice issues are tied to military spending as the money spent on
guns could be spent on food or housing or schools.
Furthermore, the United States cannot abdicate its responsibility in the world. The
peacemakers’ call should not be one of isolationism. Just the contrary, it is time for the U.S. to step
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forward and take the initiative, but this time as a true moral leader who seeks fair and just solutions,
not ones that are simply self-serving.
In this chapter we will explore previous thought that is useful, in either a positive or negative
sense, for the construction of an ethic o f nonproliferation.2 First, we will explore thought that keeps
us trapped in the past, preventing an adequate addressing o f the nuclear threat in a post-Cold War
world. Second, we will explore previous thought that is forward looking and useful in the
construction of an ethic of nonproliferation.
/. Trapped in the Past
Sheldon Ungar in his fascinating book, The Rise and Fall o f Nuclearism: Fear and Faith as
Determinants o f the Arms Race, argues that the nuclear world is characterized by the interaction
between nuclearism-faith in this awe-inspiring power-and nuclear fear-the panic that such power
unleashes.3 Ungar points out the theological nature o f nuclear power:
And here was a power that was both metaphorically and practically transcendent.
Metaphorically, it represented a sense ofpow efthat had hitherto been limited to
the gods. Splitting the atom dramatically heightened the sense of human
dominion; it practically elevated us into the empyrean. The control over nature’s
2In the American academy, religious ethics is not the first place where one would think to look
when seeking solutions to the problem o f nuclear weapons. Instead, debates over weapon systems
and conflict between nations have usually been confined to the fields of international relations,
security studies and military science. These fields of study have much to offer to a discussion o f the
continuing problem o f nuclear weapons and a huge body of literature from these traditional fields
exists. However, much of it is only descriptive and has been already used in chapter one. Only those
more general and overarching works on the subject are the focus here.
One can quickly conclude that these traditional approaches differ from a religious ethical
approach to nonproliferation in many ways. Most noticeably, traditional approaches are based on
different value assumptions and have different moral and ethical positions than a religious ethic.
However, it is important to remember that the goal of both traditional fields and religious ethics is
the avoidance of violence. Indeed, traditional approaches almost universally agree that proliferation
is a negative development, something that we must seek to slow or stop. As a result, despite the
differences between traditional approaches and religious ethics, this shared goal means the
traditional approaches can help in the development of a religious ethic o f nonproliferation.
3 SheIdon Ungar, The Rise and Fall o f Nuclearism: Fear and Faith As Determinants o f the Arms
Race (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 2.
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ultimate power was also taken as a sign o f grace, an indication of America’s moral
superiority and redemptive capacity. . . . Practically, transcendent power embodied
one o f the most critical attributes o f a deity: dominion over life and death, the
power to preserve or to deny the future. The bomb appeared a godsend. . . . Not
only could it remove the threat posed by totalitarianism, but it seemed capable o f
securing the future, of assuring historical continuity to Western democracies and
values. Finally, it afforded the promise o f a utopian future, one based on (nothing
more than) cheap and abundant energy.4
Understanding the religious and moral ethos that has been attached to nuclear weapons is crucial if
those who wish to counter the continued reliance on such weapons are going to be effective. Nuclear
weapons do not come from evil but from highly moral systems of belief.
One natural way to counter this nuclear theology is by the naturally occurring opposite reaction
which Ungar calls nuclear fear. People tend to avoid the nuclear issue, dealing with it only when it
is thrust before them. Consequently, there is normally a low-level of nuclear fear punctuated by
moral panics caused by either American or (in the past) Soviet provocative actions. Ungar notes that
while changes in the Soviet Union have lightened the nuclear fear, it could be a factor again with the
threat o f third-world nuclear proliferation.5
Nuclear fear can and has been used and manipulated by those who oppose nuclear weapons,
generating public support for their position. However, it is probably not the best method for
significant long-term change because it is a factor only in times of crisis. Instead, fundamental
change will come through countering nuclearism or creating a theology that is different from
nuclearism. Nuclearism traps us in the past because it claims that nuclear weapons are our savior.
Such a view undergirds much of the thought on nuclear weapons. This is a false notion as nuclear
weapons, rather than being our savior, threaten our very existence.
A survey o f previous thought concerning nuclear proliferation yields a wealth o f information
and perspectives about the issue. Traditional fields such as international relations, military science
4 Ungar, 4-5.
5 Ungar, 5 & 9.
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and security studies struggle to escape their old modes o f thinking, and some writers within the
traditional fields even admit this limitation. Brad Roberts, editor of The Washington Quarterly and a
research fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., points out
that the result o f failing to escape old ways o f thinking “is an emphasis on fine-tuning old
approaches, a tendency to apply outdated conceptual models to new challenges, and disarray in
policy.”6 Unfortunately, much of the thought about nuclear proliferation is trapped in these outdated
approaches. Because such approaches will not only fail but could lead to our destruction, it is crucial
that we expose such thought. This is the task to which we now turn.
A. Realism
For the first half of this century, moral evaluations played an important role in the study of
international relations. Since that time, they have been moved to the periphery. There are two
reasons for this change. The first was the attempt to create a value-free discipline and its push to
focus on objectivity as was present in most academic disciplines. The second was the domination of
realism in international relations with its focus on necessity, which de-emphasized ethical concerns.
For the hard-core realist there is little room for choice, let alone moral choice. Even Reinhold
Niebuhr suggested that morality could not triumph in international relations because national
loyalties come first. He also suggested that international relations are too complex for human ethical
standards to be effective. Paradoxically, Niebuhr still believed that ethics had a place in
international affairs at least as a mitigating influence. For instance, he suggested that justice could
temper the competition between nations.
Hans Morgenthau with his 1948 book, Politics Among Nations, began the process o f ending the
prominence o f ethics in international relations. He tore down the moral understandings o f American
6 Brad Roberts, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International Security 18, no. 1
(1993): 139.
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foreign policy by suggesting that international politics is always a struggle of power and that ethics
and power are contradictions in terms. Any policy that fails to note this is therefore ethically and
diplomatically dangerous. Morgenthau was more negative than Niebuhr who saw in humanity a
concern for justice while Morgenthau saw only selfishness and lust for power. So is there any room
for ethics? Remarkably, Morgenthau says there is since, for him, international ethics means
understanding the role of power and choosing the lesser of the two evils in any situation. Further, by
expressing foreign policy in moral terms, says Morgenthau, nations help their citizens deal with the
tension between morality and national loyalty.7
During most of this century, for better or for worse, Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) has been one
of the most important theological voices in this nation. Niebuhr’s influence in American society,
especially its intellectual thought, has been very significant. Niebuhr is also a central figure in the
thought about nonviolence and violence. Pacifist John Howard Yoder is not alone in claiming,
“Niebuhr’s theology is the principal system o f thought with which to come to grips if we wish to
consider pacifism as found in America today.”8
Niebuhr understands the world to be a place o f conflict and insists that as human beings we live
“after the Fall.” Further, according to Niebuhr, the situation is complicated by the fact that
collectives (including nations) cannot be expected to live up to the moral level that individuals might
hope to attain.
Moreover, while Niebuhr understands that the New Testament provides an absolute love ethic as
a theoretical standard for our actions, practically, it cannot be the normative basis for our actions
because the gospel also demands that we work for justice. While absolute justice, which is equal to
7 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role o f Ethics in International
Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3, 16 & 19-23.
8 John H. Yoder, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism (Washington, DC: The Church Peace
Mission, 1966), 3.
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love, exists in theory, we are called in this conflicted world to seek relative justice. Relative justice,
says Niebuhr, is both the opposite o f love and, yet paradoxically, the approximation of love.
To work for justice, Niebuhr claims, requires the willingness to use coercion although it violates
the wills o f people. Once the use o f coercion is allowed, no intrinsic distinction between violent and
nonviolent remains. However, Niebuhr sees an extrinsic difference and prefers nonviolent means.
For instance, Niebuhr greatly admired Martin Luther King, Jr., although he seemed mystified that
King labeled his struggle as pacific.9
Niebuhr is therefore willing to sanction violence in the name of justice. Unfortunately, Niebuhr
fails to provide clear criteria for the use of violence. While he seems to accept just war thinking, he
does not use it in a systematic way, and James Childress points out that Niebuhr sets no limits on
violence except proportionality.
While realism is as old as international relations, and it is traced back through Thucydides,
Machiavelli and Hobbes, Niebuhr is the central religious voice o f realism. Christian realism has and
continues to have great impact upon thinking about war and peace. Even more so, Niebuhr is
foundational for much o f the realist school o f international relations. While many more recent
schools of theological thought give a strong critique of realism, they nevertheless incorporate much
of its thought. James Childress reminds us that political theology, liberation theology and theologies
of revolution maintain a realistic view of violence.1 0
Realism as a political philosophy often justifies the continued presence o f nuclear weapons.
Realism is based on the thesis that, because international relations are based on power, it is
fundamentally different from domestic politics which is based on authority. Because at the
international level no authority to impose law and order is in place, we are left with anxiety
9 ReinhoId Niebuhr, “Reinhold Niebuhr,” in How My Mind Has Changed, ed. Harold E. Fey
(Cleveland: World Publishing, I960), 118.
l0 James F. Childress, Moral Responsibility in Conflicts: Essays on Nonviolence, War, and
Conscience (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1982), xiii & 29.
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reminiscent of Hobbes’ state o f nature. Therefore, nuclear deterrence is the very “epitome o f realism
in the nuclear age.” "
For realists, judgements about nuclear deterrence and nuclear war are two distinct moral
judgements. Realists condemn nuclear war but see little problem with nuclear deterrence, often
suggesting it is the best way to prevent nuclear war. Avner Cohen, lecturer in philosophy at Tel
Aviv University with a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, argues that this is flawed. Nuclear
deterrence turns realism upside dov/n or goes outside its boundaries, for a Hobbesian realism would
require that deterrence and war be linked. Further deterrence does not provide enough certainty for
the avoidance o f nuclear war, something that realism should require. Moreover, Hobbesian realism
says that resort to force are at times required, and nuclear deterrence does not allow for that. In a
Hobbesian world, if there are nuclear weapons, then they will at some point in time be used. At
some point in time deterrence will fail, realism should say.1 1 In its dominant form, though, realism
has never concluded such. Instead it has sanctioned deterrence as the savior against the threat of
nuclear war. Cohn’s analysis is correct. With nuclear weapons, realism stopped being realistic.
However, few realists seemed to notice that they were trapped by the lure of nuclearism. For
example, the traditional fields tend to operate out of some form o f the realist school o f thought,
rejecting utopian ideals and principles and preferring power analysis determination of what can be
achieved. Such thinking often sees tradeoffs between nonproliferation and other areas o f concern.
For instance, what might advance nonproliferation concerns with China might require sacrifice of
some human rights concerns. Realists, o f course, see human rights issues as idealistic and, therefore,
worth sacrificing in the name o f nonproliferation efforts.1 3 An ethic of nonproliferation must be
"Kenneth Kipnis and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Political Realism and International Morality:
Ethics in the Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 220-221.
l2Kipnis and Meyers, 230-231.
l3Stephen D. Wrage and George H. Quester. “Promoting Human Rights and Preventing Nuclear
Proliferation: Some Comparisons.” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (1993): 152.
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realistic, understanding that tradeoffs are necessary, but it will attempt to be more holistic than
traditional approaches in considering who are hurt in the tradeoffs. Moreover, it will be realistic
about the nature and impact of nuclear weapons.
The realist argues that the presence o f ruthless leaders in the world means that neither arms
control nor disarmament1 4 will be effective. In one sense they are correct. For the world to build
down its nuclear arsenal to lower levels such as 3000, 1000 or 500 will require not only that the
world become a different place, but also that thinking about nuclear weapons change dramatically.
Arms control allows for the continuance o f minimal deterrence and is opposed to complete nuclear
disarmament.1 5 Such an approach fails to meet the radicalness of change needed to truly alter the
situation. Therefore, an adequate ethic o f nonproliferation should be based on a disarmament
paradigm; though, arms control steps will need to be part of the process.
While a minority position within the traditional fields, there are also those who call for
significant reductions or the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, calls for the
abolition of nuclear weapons are usually rejected out of hand in the traditional fields which are tied
to old ways o f thinking. Lincoln Wolfenstein, professor of physics at Carnegie Mellon University in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and a member of the National Academy o f Sciences, states:
But little . . . change is reflected in the thinking of professional strategists. Even
those who advocate drastic reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals feel
compelled to defend their proposals in terms of traditional concepts o f bipolar
strategic stability. However, these arguments are almost irrelevant to the current
situation.1 6
1 4 The distinction between “arms control” and “disarmament” is important. Arms control is self-
imposed limits on weapons or the growth of arsenals and usually does not threaten or significantly
alter the military landscape. In contrast, disarmament is a more radical process; it can significantly
change the status quo by going beyond mere limits to fundamentally change the armament level.
1 5 Harald Mueller, David Fisher and Wolfgang Koetter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global
Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 2-4 & 6.
1 6 Lincoln Wolfenstein, “End Nuclear Addiction,” Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, May 1 991, 13.
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He counters that a good beginning for new thinking would be the simple idea that no nation should
have nuclear weapons. He is aware o f the well-worn arguments on why this is impossible, but he
counters with the fact that nuclear weapons have no military value. For support he turns to past wars
such as Korea or Vietnam, noting that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was o f no value in either war.1 7
Further support for his claim comes from a study group of U.S. and Japanese experts who concluded
that eliminating nuclear weapons would not be destabilizing. The study committee which then
suggests we begin START III negotiations to reduce the U.S. and Russian arsenals to 300-500
warheads each.1 8 Such bold thinking is not the norm as realism remains stuck in a bi-polar Cold-
War ideology, especially on nuclear issues.
While I am greatly shaped by and find much value in realism, realism has been an unmitigated
failure when it comes to nuclear policy. Instead, worth has been given to unrealistic defense
strategies such as deterrence, and value was given to fantasies such as overkill which concluded that
the U.S. was more secure since it could destroy the Soviet Union fourteen times while the Soviet
Union could only destroy the United States eleven times. In fact, neither provided security and any
use o f nuclear weapons threatened the existence of the planet. Nuclear policy controlled by realism
was never adequate. However, it continues to shape nuclear policy trapping it in irrelevant and what
will be unsuccessful and likely dangerous policy choices. For example, because realism falsely
stresses that nuclear weapons provide the U.S. with security, the central emphasis o f the U.S. is on
maintaining a significant nuclear arsenal. Such a paradigm fails to allow for the radical changes
necessary if we are to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Realism will have to be
jettisoned or reshaped by new thought such as feminism and liberation theology until realism’s
nuclear policy can for the first time become realistic.
1 7 WoIfenstein, 13-14.
l8 Rosemarie Philips, ed., The United States, Japan, and the Future o f Nuclear Weapons: Report
o f the U.S.-Japan Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Cold War.
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), 21-22.
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B. Failure of Current Approaches
While much o f the thought from the traditional fields such as international relations is rooted in
realism, traditional fields also provide useful criticism of the current regime. Such analysis points
out that the major purpose o f the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) is to monitor the
uranium going into nuclear power plants and the plutonium which comes out.1 0 The value of such a
policy should not be underestimated. The Office of Technology Assessment concludes, “Obtaining
fissionable nuclear weapon material (enriched uranium or plutonium) today remains the greatest
single obstacle most countries would face in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.”’0 However, once a
nation can manufacture highly enriched uranium or plutonium, inspection is o f little value.
Consequently, the present regime cannot be a long-term solution to nuclear proliferation. Therefore,
a production ban on weapon-grade material is also needed. However, it is doubtful the world will go
along since nations such as France and Britain are making money from nations such as Japan which
buy such material.2 1 Other writers point to more critical failures of the current regime. Gary
Samore, acting director, office o f the proliferation of nuclear weapons, bureau o f political-military
affairs, U.S. Department of State, argues that the case of Iraq represents a near massive failure in the
international nonproliferation regime. Moreover, it would have been more disastrous if Saddam
Hussein had not made the mistake o f invading Kuwait. This mistake allowed for the destruction of
Iraq’s nuclear program.2 2
’’Charles P. Cozic and Karin L. Swisher, eds., Nuclear Proliferation, Opposing Viewpoints,
eds. David L Bender and Bruno Leone, (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1992), 19.
2 0 U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation o f Weapons o f Mass
Destruction, OTA-ISC-559, (U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), 6.
2 1 Cozic and Swisher, 23-24.
“ Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds.. Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 15-16.
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Overall, the U.S. approach to nonproliferation has been inconsistent, if not hypocritical.
Historically, other goals such as maintaining and advancing U.S. nuclear forces have been a more
central issue than nonproliferation concerns. The U.S. has not been concerned when friendly
countries acquire nuclear weapons but only when adversaries tried. Such inconsistency hurts
nonproliferation efforts such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ( NPT). Further, such policies
ignore the reality that possession o f nuclear weapons is problematic in anyone’s hands since the
presence of nuclear weapons can cause a regional arms race and regimes can change quickly,
becoming hostile or unstable.
It is a double standard for the U.S. to have nuclear weapons and use the NPT to prevent others
from getting nuclear weapons. Moreover, the NPT also contributes to proliferation through its
promotion o f nuclear energy. The current approach to proliferation is trapped in the past and
incapable o f providing adequate solutions to the nuclear problem. The solutions now offered are
based on keeping U.S. nuclear weapons while often seeking not to inhibit proliferation, but only to
manage it. Current thinking lacks the imagination to truly address the nuclear problem.
C. Failure o f Technical Solutions
Another common reaction offered by current thinking is to seek a technical fix to any problem.
With the problem o f nuclear proliferation, the technical fix put forward is a Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) system. Some argue for BMD systems as insurance against failing to stop proliferation and
as an anti-proliferation measure discouraging others from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. A
BMD is any system that counters ballistic missiles. These can range from Star Wars schemes to the
Patriot Missile o f G ulf War fame. These systems seek to provide protection for populations or for
other military systems. Lieutenant Malcolm O ’Neill, acting director o f ballistic missile defense
organization for the Department o f Defense, argues that BMDs can enhance cooperation and
stability, especially if we develop them in cooperation with the Russians. O’Neill argues that BMDs
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decrease incentives to escalate during a conflict because the enemy has no reason to launch a nuclear
attack if it can be successfully defended against. He also argues that by protecting our homeland, we
increase our credibility and, therefore, our ability to make strong defense commitments to others.2 3
This analysis, though, ignores the fact that BMDs can fuel an arms race by encouraging the
opponent to build up in an attempt to overwhelm a BMD system. Further, there are serious
questions that systems like Star Wars can ever work. While it would be good to have a technology,
be it Star Wars or BMDs, which would make nuclear weapons obsolete, McGeorge Bundy points out
that, while technology advances, it is not true that we can actually achieve all desirable technological
advances.2 4 BMDs may not be a hard, realistic approach to the continuing threat o f nuclear weapons
that their proponents claim it to be, but instead may turn out to be a soft utopianism based on the
belief in technology. Indeed, defining the solutions as technological may in fact be more o f a utopian
stance than moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, BMDs, even if
they work, would defend only against one type of delivery system-the missile. Even with missiles, at
best BMDs would defend against a very limited missile attack. Furthermore, many o f the nuclear
threats including terrorism would not be from missiles. Consequently, BMDs have the added
disadvantage o f creating a false sense of security.
Harold Feiveson, senior research scholar, and Frank von Hippel, professor of public and
international affairs at Princeton University, also argue against BMDs. They argue that a system
that would defend against 200 missiles would raise serious doubts about an opponent’s retaliatory
force if they have 1,000 or fewer nuclear warheads. Thus BMDs will prevent deep cuts in nuclear
stockpiles or reignite the arms race.2 5 It is also interesting to see people from the traditional fields
^Malcolm O’Neil. “Stability and Ballistic Missile Defense,” Comparative Strategy 13, no. 1
(1994): 114-115.
2 4 McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe Jr. and Sidney D. Drell, Reducing Nuclear Danger: The
Road Away From the Brink (New York: Council o f Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 11.
“ Cozic and Swisher, 190-191.
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which in the past supported the nuclear buildups to protect the U.S. by increasing deterrence against
the U.S.S.R. now argue that we need another military buildup, this time BMDs, because deterrence
has never worked. Keith B. Payne, president o f National Institute for Public Policy, editor-in-chief
of Comparative Strategy and adjunct professor of national security studies at Georgetown University,
argues that deterrence failed in the past, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Yom Kippur
War and with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Payne writes, “Deterrence is an inherently
unreliable approach to war prevention. This has long been recognized by historians.”2 6 Payne
continues his argument suggesting that although nuclear deterrence overall has worked in the past,
this is no guarantee that it will work in the future.2 7
The future o f U.S. and other nuclear powers’ security policies are a key component to
nonproliferation efforts. For the most part, a survey o f thought about nonproliferation highlights a
lack of fundamental change in modes of thinking. The same arguments that led to the arms race are
now used to justify similar, if smaller, defense policies. The same arguments used to argue for a Star
Wars missile defense system are now used to support a ballistic missile defense system. We must not
be fooled: Washington and Moscow still want nuclear weapons; the only change is that the end of
the Cold War has made possession of fewer nuclear weapons strategically significant. Instead of
looking for technical fixes to problems, we need to fix the problems themselves, and that will require
a fundamental change in how we think about nuclear weapons. It will require that we transcend
nuclearism.
2 6 Keith B. Payne, “Proliferation, Deterrence, Stability and Missile Defense.” Comparative
Strategy 13, no. 1 (1994): 126.
2 7 Payne, 120-121.
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D. Nuclear Deterrence
In nuclear ethics, it is the issue o f deterrence which has received careful and extensive
examination, as the volume o f written material on deterrence is simply enormous. The concept o f
deterrence arose because military victory in total war was no longer possible. The only feasible
alternative military policy was the deterrence of war. Any actual use o f nuclear weapons made no
sense, as each side feared the retaliatory capabilities of the other to inflict catastrophic destruction.
Thus, the main goal o f military policy was to possess a system o f weapons that would survive a first-
strike attack and could be used in a retaliatory strike. This was accomplished by storing nuclear
weapons away from cities and underground.2 8
The United States further developed its deterrent policy, which became known as MAD,
standing for Mutually Assured Destruction. The rationale behind this strategy was that, if the threat
were horrible enough, an actual attack would never have to be carried out. Because under deterrence
theory the weapons would never be used, the morality o f their use was considered to be irrelevant.
During the 1970s this view changed, and the doctrine o f deterrence has since been under intense
moral examination. The number o f writings undertaking ethical analysis of nuclear deterrence is
staggering. Many individuals, groups, churches and organizations produced their own treatises on
the subject.2 9
Deontological approaches tend to reject deterrence because threatening innocent life is wrong,
regardless of the good consequences it might bring about. For example, Paul Ramsey compares the
targeting of cities to tying babies to the bumpers of cars in order to get people to drive more
2 8 Gwynne Dyer, War (New York: Crown, 1995), 208.
2 9 See, for instance, the Catholic statement: National Council of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge
o f Peace: G od’ s Promise and Our Response. (Washington, DC: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983);
the Disciples of Christ statement: Panel on Christian Ethics in a Nuclear Age, Seeking G od’ s Peace
in a Nuclear Age: A Call to Disciples o f Christ. (St. Louis: CBP Press, 1985); or the Methodist
statement: United Methodist Council of Bishops, In Defense o f Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a
Just Peace— Foundation Document. (Nashville: Graded Press, 1986).
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carefully. It would save lives, but that does not make it moral. The consequentialist response to
deterrence is that the consequence o f saving millions necessitates the willingness to threaten death
on a massive scale.3 0
One of the problems with deterrence is that it has a chance o f failure, and its failure implies a
nuclear exchange. Because o f this, some claim that given the possibility for failure, “any acceptance
of deterrence involves a conditional willingness to use nuclear weapons.”3 1 Given the criteria that
any use of nuclear weapons is morally unacceptable, then we can conclude that deterrence is also
morally unacceptable. While others may defend deterrence based on the reality of the situation at
hand, this does not address the question of the possibilities of the future which needs to be taken into
consideration.
Deterrence has never been an acceptable approach to the nuclear problem. It requires that we be
willing to destroy the world in a false hope that such a threat will save the world. Some point to the
fact that we have not had a nuclear war as proof that it works. More likely, the world has simply
been lucky so far, and there is no guarantee that it will continue to “work.” In fact, nuclear
proliferation continues to increase the likelihood that deterrence will fail. Deterrence is an
unrealistic approach. Unfortunately, the world and especially the United States is stuck in the
ideology of deterrence, albeit now moving toward a smaller or. perhaps even eventually, a minimal
deterrent force. Regardless the scope, all nuclear deterrence suffers from the same ethical failings.
II. Forward to the Future
As is evidenced in the previous section, much of previous thought on war and peace in general
and specifically on the nuclear threat is not only irrelevant and ineffective, it keeps us trapped in a
3 0 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Nuclear Ethics, (New York: Free Press, 1986), 11, 18 & 20.
3,David Hollenbach, “Whither Nuclear Deterrence?: The Moral Debate Continues,” Theological
Studies 47 (March 1986): 120.
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dangerous paradigm. However, not all previous thought is useless and dangerous. Some of the
previous thought is very useful in moving us forward to a very different and hopeful future. It is to
such thought that we now turn.
A. Ethics Matters
The lesson learned from the downfall of communism in eastern Europe is that ethics played an
important role. Terry Nardin points out that the most significant factors were ideals such as truth,
honor, respect and personal responsibility. These ideals mattered because they were part o f the
moral tradition o f Europe. Sissela Bok concurs, pointing out that one need only compare the
changes in Eastern Europe with what happened in Lebanon, Ethiopia and El Salvador to conclude
that peaceful change is quicker, more effective and less brutal than violent change. The new tools of
communication and computers make such nonviolent change even more possible.3 2
Robert McElroy concludes that the number o f foreign policy decisions which involve ethical
considerations is large while the number that only consider state interest is small. McElroy
concludes this by analyzing specific U.S. actions such as the 1921 food aid to the Soviet Union,
Nixon’s limiting of chemical/biological weapons, and the Panama Canal Treaty. McElroy does not
simply select examples which support his conclusion. For example, he acknowledges that in the
bombing of Dresden during World War II, ethical considerations obviously failed to be considered.
Nevertheless, traditional interest-based realistic understandings o f international relations cannot
explain those times when morality is a factor in the decision making o f nations. Yet history over and
over provides such examples. Moreover, the presence of strong international norms indicates that, at
least at times and under certain circumstances, small groups o f people can generate enough public
3 2 Joel H. Rosenthal, ed., Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1995), 135 & 164.
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opinion to affect policy decisions.3 3 Citizens’ using the power o f ethics can and do influence the
affairs o f nations.
Dorothy Jones concurs that ethical principles do play an important role in the relations between
nations. She concludes, first, that there are ethical standards for nations in their relations with each
other. Second, such standards can be universalized even considering the vast cultural diversity
around the globe. Third, the principles do matter and transcend the obvious motivation o f self-
interest.3 4
The consensus that emerges from these studies is that ethics matters. Gerald F. Powers, foreign
policy advisor for the U.S. Catholic Conference, points out four major contributions that the field o f
social ethics has made to foreign policy:
1. Both the nature o f the issues and the nature o f the times require that we reject
amoral forms of realism and insist that religious and moral perspectives be an
integral part of foreign policy considerations.3 5
2. A morally responsible foreign policy should have as an overarching objective a
more united international community based on mutual cooperation and justice
among and within nations.3 6
3. Just as no single paradigm is adequate for a complex and messy post-Cold War
world, no single ethic can provide the basis for a just and peaceful world. A
multifaceted ethic of peace building must replace an ethic of the use of force as
the central concern in foreign policy.3 7
4. The moral fabric and moral influence of nations will become increasingly
important factors in international affairs.3 8
These ethical considerations will help shape this ethic o f nonproliferation.
3 3 McElroy, 42, 55-56 & 170-171.
3 4 Dorothy V. Jones, Code o f Peace: Ethics and Security in the World o f the Warlord States
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1991), xi.
3 S Gerald F. Powers, Drew Christiansen and Robert T. Hennemeyer, eds., Peacemaking: Moral
and Policy Challenges fo r a New World, (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference,
1994), 304.
3 6 Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 305.
3 7 Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 306.
3 S Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 307.
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The re-emergence o f international ethics has reopened fundamental questions o f moral
philosophy. First, such attempts include a move toward universality. Yet that runs contrary to the
new emphasis on respecting the diversity and differences between cultures. Disagreements between
relativism and universality, therefore, remain a vital subject. Second, the re-emergence of
international ethics has brought the debate between deontological versus utilitarian approaches to the
fore again. Those involved with international relations are concerned with consequences, but if that
becomes the only issue, then principled moral issues are diluted. Third, the question of whether self-
interest and morality are mutually exclusive o f each other has reemerged. There is danger in making
them equal, but many conclude that making them mutually exclusive goes too far in the other
direction.3 9
One solution to the problem o f universality, Kegley suggests, is reciprocity-only do what you
would want done to yourself.4 0 Moreover, there is an emerging international ethic that sees the
advantages in “collaboration and altruism for sheltering states from common dangers.”4 1 In rejecting
zero-sum, this approach instead sees the advantages o f throwing a lifeline to those in need. The
advantages come because in an interdependent world each nation’s security depends on the security
of every other nation. Despite what some critics say this is not utopian thinking but rather grounded
in reciprocity or what Kegley calls the three “Cs”: Common security, comprehensive security, and
collective security. Reciprocity is also present in the concept of proportional deterrence which
upholds balance and limits in military capabilities. All of this departs from the realist’s preference
for self-reliance.4 2 Kegley concludes, “The United States can be either a moral Ieader-a force for the
3 9 Rosenthal, 30-31.
4 0 Rosenthal, 121.
4lRosenthal, 122.
4 2 Rosenthal, 122-123.
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ideals of peace, democracy, and reciprocal treatment-or an obstacle to a just world order. That role
will depend on the values its leaders choose to guide its actions.”4 3
No one is suggesting that such moves will be easy, and international ethics is difficult. Judging
ethical issues is difficult enough on the domestic level, and it becomes even more complicated on the
international level. The most important and obvious conclusion from the field o f international ethics
is that ethics is indeed relevant and important. While ethics has, in some circles, been for a time
pushed aside in discussions of international affairs, it never stopped being a major player in the
decision making o f nations. Historical analysis indicates that nations have throughout the 20"'
century included moral issues into their considerations when making important decisions. Today’s
global economy breaks down nationalistic barriers and pushes nations to work together in
cooperative ways.
International ethics is quick to remind us that the post-Cold War world is indeed a significantly
different situation than the past. Moreover, it reminds us that ethics mattered in bringing an end to
the Cold War for moral ideals such as truth, and honor served as the basis for change. Even more
noteworthy is that this revolution demonstrated not only that peaceful change can work, but also that
it probably works more quickly than violent revolutions. Such historical examples also indicate that
public opinion can influence the course of nations. However, there is a danger that nations such as
the U.S. could react to the new situation with one o f two extremes-isolation or the need to intervene
in every global conflict. International ethics rejects both in favor of a middle road.
4 3 Rosenthal, 128.
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B. Basic Information
Previous thought is very helpful in providing background information and understanding of the
nature of nuclear proliferation. Much of that background has already been drawn upon in chapter
one as we looked at the current world situation concerning nuclear proliferation. However, a few
more items need to be examined here. For instance, another way to divide the responses to
proliferation is into two camps— “passive” nonproliferation and “active” counterproliferation. The
nonproliferation approach includes strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); promoting political measures which limit incentives to
proliferation, including tension reduction and conflict resolution; strengthening IAEA safeguards;
strengthening export controls; and limiting the spread o f nuclear knowledge. Counter proliferation
measures include the exchange of proliferation data and more cooperation of intelligence services,
cooperative political punishments by the nuclear powers o f those seeking to proliferate, development
and institutionalization o f economic and legal sanctions, compulsory inspections, indirect military
response to proliferators, direct military force if deterrence fails, and joint research into the remote
disarmament o f nuclear warheads in the hands o f terrorists. Pointing to the case of Iraq as proof that
the current system does not work, some advocate for an active system over a passive one.
Another schematic tool, borrowed from economic theory, is to divide nonproliferation efforts
into supply-side and demand-side efforts. According to this approach, the status quo is comprised
mostly o f supply-side restrictions including embargoes and export-controls which seek to stop
nuclear materials, technology and expertise from reaching potential nuclear states. These supply-
side measures are always temporary, at best buying time. In the long term, these efforts will fail, and
technology will continue to spread.'” Consequently, the key to solving the nuclear problem is on the
demand-side. Demand side solutions seek to create situations where nations will not want nuclear
” Jean-Francois Rioux, ed, Limiting the Proliferation o f Weapons: the Role o f Supply-Side
Strategies (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1992), 2-3.
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weapons. However, until that can be achieved, continuing supply-side efforts to slow proliferation
will be important.
Traditional fields such as international relations have helped us to understand that solutions will
not be simple but multidimensional. Dr. Gregory H. Canavan, senior scientific advisor for defense
programs, physics division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, argues for a complex approach to
nuclear proliferation.
In the future, we must attain our objectives through a variety o f approaches,
including prevention, de-escalation, deterrence, preemption, counteraction, and
resolution. We will need to avail ourselves o f all o f the tools o f non-adversarial
and adversarial interaction, including diplomatic influence, information, economic,
and legal, military instruments. That has led to significant broadening of the scope
of stability analysis and the range of its applications.4 5
An ethic of nonproliferation will take a complex approach to the nuclear threat. Indeed, one o f the
mistakes of most previous thought is that it is has sought a single and complete solution to the
problem. Such a solution does not exist and simply points to a misunderstanding o f the complexity
of the problem. Solutions will be focused on demand-side, seeking to change situations which will
decrease the desire for nuclear weapons. At the same time it will continue supply-side efforts. An
ethic of nonproliferation will be focused on nonproliferation as opposed to counter-proliferation
seeing much of counter-proliferation as a search for a technical fix. However, it is open to counter-
proliferation means that do not raise ethical objections and can provide part of a complex approach
to addressing nuclear proliferation.
C. A Post-Cold War World
While most previous thought is trapped in a Cold War paradigm, some of the previous thought
is very helpful in pushing us to move to a post-Cold War world. Since the breakup o f the Soviet
Union, everything has become more complicated. Previously, most analysis focused on relations
4 S Gregory H. Canavan, “Traditional Notions of Deterrence: Stability in a Multipolar, Proliferated
Environment,” Comparative Strategy. 13, no. 1 (1994): 148.
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between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and used bipolar models. Yet, now we exist in a multipolar world. In
a few places we still have a struggle between communism and democracy. But even in those places
destabilizing factors such as nationalism, ethnic, and religious differences are also operative. In
addition, in many places there is also a power vacuum caused by the end of the East-West conflict.
An ethic o f nonproliferation must now operate in a much more complicated world.
D. Nuclear Incentives and Motivations
The traditional fields such as international relations, military science and security studies
remind us that part o f the process o f working for peace is an understanding of the complicated
factors and pressures that push nations to seek nuclear weapons. Philip Sabin, lecturer in the
department o f war studies o f King’s College in London points out that the need for a military
response is increased by a lack of understanding o f the factors that restrain nations or the incentives
which nations have for acquiring nuclear weapons.4 6 Nations seek nuclear weapons in part because
they receive advantages from possessing them. Because these real factors encourage nations to seek
nuclear weapons, efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons must deal with these incentives. The
traditional fields identify six major incentives which motivate nations to seek nuclear weapons: 1.
Preserving the security o f the state, 2. Influencing an ally, 3. Achieving greater independence from
allies, 4. Increasing international prestige, 5. Bolstering domestic political support and 6.
Encouraging economic development and scientific progress.4 7
Mitchell Reiss, guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in
Washington, D.C., has updated the traditional list o f nuclear motives for the post-Cold War world.
4 6 Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias and Philip Sabin, eds., Non-Conventional Weapons
Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread o f Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Capabilities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 10.
4 7 MitcheIl Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics o f Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988), xviii.
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He concludes that, although all o f the previous incentives to acquire nuclear weapons are still
present, some are now stronger while others are weaker. In particular, Reiss notes, the desire to
preserve the security o f the state and increase international prestige are the strongest incentives.
Multipolarity, the spread of power and technology, and the breakdown of the Cold War security
arrangements have caused more nations to feel insecure. Such insecurity promotes acquisition of
nuclear weapons, even though nuclear weapons provide little security in real terms. Nevertheless,
they still give the holder a degree of prestige. Two other incentives-technological determinism and
bureaucratic determinism-are not only still present but greater because technology is more
widespread and competence is now greater in the third world. The breakup of the Soviet Union is a
new reality, and while not a new incentive, it is at least a new opportunity for proliferation.4 ®
Others have further studied the motivations that push nations toward nuclear weapons. If
political leaders perceive a serious threat, they are likely to consider nuclear weapons. Also, as noted
above, prestige is associated with nuclear weapons, creating political advantages to those seeking
nuclear weapons. At the regional level, nuclear weapons can be a big advantage. Domestic political
advantages also exist. In the first place, in an authoritarian nation no opposition is present to oppose
nuclear weapons. In other nations a nuclear attempt may appease military leaders. Finally, the
prestige o f nuclear weapons may play well to domestic nationalistic self-esteem.4 9
However, the prestige o f nuclear weapons may have waned some. Kathleen Baily points out that
the prestige of nuclear weapons is based on a false assumption. She claims that the reality is that the
nuclear powers were powerful long before they had nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons did not
make them powerful. While nuclear weapons may have enhanced these nations’ prestige, they did
not create it.5 0 Currently, international prestige is more focused on economic prosperity, financial
4 8 Reiss and Litwak, 337 & 341.
4 9 Cozic and Swisher, 163-164.
5 0 Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 50.
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stability, and critical technologies such as computers. Furthermore, arms reduction by the U.S. and
Russia have painted nuclear weapons as “expensive and elaborate anachronisms.”5 1 An ethic of
nonproliferation will seek to reveal the true nature of nuclear weapons.
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Strain, chief of the strategic assessment branch o f the U.S. Air
Force, has used Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy o f needs to develop a hierarchy o f needs associated
with what he calls nuclear addiction. According to Strain, to see the tremendous allure o f nuclear
weapons, one needs only to look at Saddam Hussein’s spending billions o f dollars for nuclear
weapons while his people went hungry during the iran-Iraqi War. Turning to Maslow, Strain points
out that the most fundamental nuclear motivation is survival: Nations believe that nuclear weapons
can guarantee a nation or culture’s continuance. Nations operating on this level may have secret
nuclear programs. Level two in Strain’s hierarchy is the motivation o f deterrence. Nations seek to
prevent the action o f an opponent by making the cost of such an action too high for the opponent to
bear. Nations operating on this level may allude to their possible possession o f nuclear weapons.
Prestige and hegemony are Strain’s level three. Nations operating on this level are more likely to
acknowledge their possession o f nuclear weapons. Level four is focused on regional security and
hegemony. Nations operating on this level are concerned with regional rather than global security.
Historically, such nations have relied on the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. for security, but the end o f the Cold
War threatens this arrangement. Level five is grand autonomy or independence. Here nations are
concerned with global security or insuring they have the status o f a major global player. The sixth
and final level is that of superpower status. Unfortunately, many nations with such designs believe
that nuclear weapons are prerequisites to such status. China and India are possible candidates for
this level.5 2
5,Reiss and Litwak, 339.
S 2 Frederick Strain, “Understanding Nuclear Addiction.” Strategic Review 21, #3 (Summer 1993):
58-66.
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Strain’s model reminds us that different nations have different motivations for seeking nuclear
weapons. Therefore nonproliferation efforts effectively directed at certain nations may be completely
ineffective when directed at other nations. An ethic of nonproliferation will need to be sufficiently
complex to address varied and multiple pressures which cause nuclear proliferation.
E. Nonproliferation Motivations
Conventional wisdom has been that proliferation is inevitable. During the Kennedy
Administration, experts made the prediction that there would be 15 to 25 nuclear powers by the
1970s.5 3 Those predictions were not fulfilled primarily because several nations with the
technological ability did not have the accompanying political motivation necessary to acquire nuclear
weapons. Mitchell Reiss points out, “Nuclear proliferation depends on two variables: technological
capability and political motivation. Both must be present for a country to acquire nuclear weapons.
The capability without the motivation is innocuous. The motivation without the capability is
futile.”S 4 Commentators who claim that proliferation is inevitable look only at technical capability
and ignore that political motivation also must be present. While the technological requirements are
not overly onerous, all o f the systems that must go into a nuclear effort are very large and costly.
Thus, in order to achieve nuclear capability, countries must divert large amounts o f resources from
important domestic needs. Countries must also be willing to pay the political costs, especially on the
international level which accompany the acquisition of nuclear weapons.5 5
An ethic of nonproliferation must be aware of what motivates nations to acquire or not acquire
nuclear weapons. Then it can advocate steps to create situations where nations will be motivated not
to proliferate. Only limited progress on nonproliferation can be made by controlling technical
S 3 Reiss, vii & xviii.
S 4 Reiss, 247.
S 5 Cozic and Swisher, 162-163.
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abilities. Certainly, steps can and should be taken to slow the capability o f nations and to control the
availability o f key materials. Nevertheless, it is in the area o f political motivation that real progress
can be made for nonproliferation.
It is important to note that countries can and have achieved policy objectives (getting what they
want) by choosing not to acquire nuclear weapons. In other cases, threatening to acquire nuclear
weapons, rather than actually moving to acquire them, achieves policy objectives. Mitchell Reiss
identifies four sources o f nuclear restraint: I. Domestic pressures, 2. Bilateral disincentives, 3.
International nonproliferation arrangements and 4. A general consensus against nuclear weapons.
After the Cold War, Reiss reevaluated nuclear disincentives and concludes the same disincentives
are still present. However, he identifies three new nuclear disincentives. First, the advancement of
technologies can help stop the spread o f nuclear weapons. Second, the U.S. Defense Department’s
program of counterproliferation provides disincentives. Third, the greater emphasis the
international community has put on nonproliferation efforts.5 6
A policy which seeks to stop proliferation must try to promote sources o f nuclear restraint. The
Office o f Technology Assessment concludes that “in the long run. the most effective nonproliferation
measure is to convince states that it is in their own best interest to forgo weapons o f mass
destruction.”5 7 James Fergusson, a research associate at the centre for defense and security studies
at the University o f Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada, argues that states follow the NPT (Non-
Proliferation Treaty) for several reasons. First, for many states there are no costs to adhering to the
treaty. Second, states receive benefits such as avoiding an arms race and getting access to nuclear
energy. Third, on the international level, adherence may increase political and economic assistance
S 6 Reiss and Litwak, 345-346.
5 7 U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 5-6.
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to those nations. Fergusson concludes that we have the NPT because it serves the political and
security interests o f those nations who have joined it.5 8
The Office o f Technology Assessment uses a different model which identifies four broad
approaches to inhibiting proliferation. First are obstacles to impede those seeking nuclear weapons,
including protecting information, export controls, and perhaps military attacks against such efforts.
Second are punitive measures which seek to deter or punish proliferators. including sanctions or
diplomatic isolation. Third are rewards to those who forego nuclear weapons, including
development assistance. Fourth are global o r regional security improvements seeking to reduce
the perceived need for nuclear weapons.5 9
The review o f the current nonproliferation regime gives strong evidence that an international
norm against nuclear weapons does exist. Consequently, a norm of nonproliferation and nuclear
disarmament is emerging. Joseph Nye, director of the center for international affairs. Harvard
University, provides further evidence of this:
A number of countries have started but given up nuclear weapons programs, in
part because o f external pressure, but in large part because of the development o f a
regime o f norms and conventions that have reinforced the attitude against the
spread o f nuclear weapons.6 0
However, such norms are still undefined and far from universally followed.
F. Relinquishing Sovereignty
Traditional fields point out a fundamental tradeoff when approaching proliferation. Promoting
democracy is about pluralism and individual autonomy while arms control is about authority and
S 8 Cozic and Swisher, 167.
S 9 U. S. Congress, Office o f Technology Assessment, 5.
“ Joseph S. Nye Jr., “New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy,” Science 256, no. 5061 (29
May 1992): 1293.
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control.6 1 How is an ethic o f nonproliferation to deal with this paradox? Will an ethic o f
nonproliferation require the relinquishing o f freedom and autonomy? Any effective approach is
likely to require a ceding o f some control to an international organization.
Because the consequences would be global, nuclear nations have a responsibility to those who
would be harmed by their use. Moreover, nuclear issues still raise troubling issues concerning
sovereignty. Nations may have to modify their understanding o f sovereignty if the nuclear threat is
to be overcome. However, a modified understanding of sovereignty opens the possibility o f justifying
intervention in the case o f nuclear proliferation. So far international ethics has not developed
adequate criteria to determine who should intervene and in what form the intervention should take
place. An ethic o f nonproliferation must engage in new and more limited understandings o f
sovereignty.
G. Collective Security
The logic o f collective security is for states to form a community in which the principal right is
to be free from aggression, and the principal duties are to refrain from aggression and to aid those
victims o f aggression. Collective security does not seek a balance of power but, rather, seeks to
create a preponderance o f power against potential rogue states. The major criticism o f collective
security is that it is unworkable, primarily because states are unwilling to make sacrifices for others.
In today’s world, says David C. Henderson, we must question whether collective security is in the
U.S.’s interest since there are no great dangers to the U.S. and seeking to guarantee the territorial
integrity o f all states is likely to drag us into war. However, it can be argued that the U.S. has a
moral duty to defend other nations. Yet, others suggest that our responsibilities at home are more
stringent than our responsibilities to other nations.6 2
6 1 W rageand Quester, 153.
“ Rosenthal, 204-205.
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Cardinal Bemardin defends cooperative security by arguing that it links the vision o f peace with
ethical means to achieve it. Cooperative security is based on collaboration and shared sacrifice. It
begins with the primacy o f the common good, which means the U.S. can neither be the world’s
police force nor remove itself into isolation. In cooperative security the role o f the military is not
primary. Instead the focus is on creating structures that promote peace and justice, including
developing ways to anticipate and respond to conflict using a variety of peaceful and less violent
means. Only if those methods fail does a nation move onto the use of military peacekeeping forces.
Bemardin reminds us that we must take care with issues such as humanitarian intervention, so we do
not replace wars o f imperialism with wars o f altruism.6 3 Catherine M. Kelleher and Rachel A.
Epstein o f the Brookings Institution concur that an ethical foreign policy must mean the end o f the
myth o f American isolationism and overcoming the tendency for American foreign policy to be
primarily an arm o f economic policy. Yet, they recognize that debates about the wisdom o f
collective involvement will surely re-arise.6 4
H. Justice
The nuclear arms race also raises issues o f social justice. Ethicist Ian Barbour, drawing from
ethicist Paul Ramsey, reminds us that justice can be evaluated by looking at the impact it has upon
the least advantaged o f society. Consequently, the transfer of spending from the social
sector-housing, social services and education-to the military sector in the United States during the
1980s raised issues o f social justice. In like manner, third world nations spend billions on arms
although malnutrition and poverty abound.6 5 These facts raise important justice questions. They
“ Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 22-24.
“ Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 262.
“ Ian Barbour, Ethics in an Age o f Technology, The Gifford Lectures, no 2. (San Francisco:
Harpers, 1993), 203.
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may also provide a place to work on the issue of nuclear proliferation, especially with third world
nations. Of course it would most likely be counterproductive to point to a nation such as North
Korea and its extreme economic problems and growing poverty and accuse them o f immoral actions
by spending money on nuclear weapons. However, sensitivity by the U.S. to its economic problems
could allow us to find ways to help Korea feel secure without nuclear weapons. Such a move could
help us promote social justice in poor nations such as North Korea. Furthermore, perhaps in a safer,
more secure world the U.S. could support domestic justice with some transfer of funds to peaceful
purposes.
I. The Just War Tradition
The just war tradition is the most useful o f previous thought to an ethic of nonproliferation. It is
especially helpful in evaluating the ethics of proposed nonproliferation actions.
Over the nearly two-thousand-year history of Christian tradition, three major approaches to war
and peace have emerged: The crusade, pacifism and the just war tradition. The crusade or holy war
position argues that to accomplish a given end, understood to be the will of God, extreme violence is
justified. Under the crusade paradigm, when the state (or the church) determines a cause to be
absolutely righteous, then the state is justified in using absolute power to achieve that end.
Understanding itself appointed to wage war in God’s name, the state claims failure to do so would be
to violate God’s command.
While the crusade mentality had significant power for a time, it never did gain universal
acceptance within Christianity. In fact the crusade period ended because leaders of the crusades
were no longer able to gamer sufficient public support. Contemporary Christians almost universally
reject the crusade position because they understand it to be a position in conflict with basic tenets of
the Christian faith. Within the field of Christian ethics, the crusade position has never been accepted
as a legitimate ethical position. However, the power of this position carries over in more subtle ways
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and rears its ugly head most in strident nationalism. In fact, the crusade position has been
secularized into the war-realist position. Christian realism also has elements which are descendants
o f the crusade position.
The demise o f the crusade approach to war has left the Christian tradition with two major
schools of thought about war and peace-the just war tradition and pacifism. The just war tradition
has been the dominant o f the two positions, but in the 19th and 20th centuries, pacifism has gained
more of a following. While not underestimating their differences, Stanley Hauerwas reminds us that
both pacifism and just war thinking place the burden of proof upon those who would take up
violence, rather than upon those who would refrain from violence.6 0 Therefore, they are both
traditions of peace in the truest sense, pointing to what should be an obvious conclusion-that the
Christian tradition must be one of peace. Unfortunately, Christian praxis has rarely followed the
true sense of its tradition. Pacifism will be explored in detail in chapter three.
/. The Just War Tradition
For the first four centuries of Christianity, pacifism was the dominant, if not the only, paradigm
used to evaluate the use o f violence. After Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity,
Christianity became first an officially recognized religion and then the official state religion. Having
gained the status o f being the official religion of the Roman Empire, church officials had new
responsibilities, including advising the state. As a result, the complete nonviolence of pacifism
became less viable, and so pacifism soon lost prominence and eventfully slipped to a minority
position.
The just war tradition is based on the conclusion that although war is always destructive and
human sin is its cause, sometimes it is the lesser o f two evils. Using armed force is sometimes
^Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1985), 134.
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necessary to insure justice and to stop the spread o f injustice. The just war tradition provides criteria
for when violence may be used and is the basis for both international law on war and the U.S.
military’s rules o f engagement and conduct in war.
Over the centuries just war thinking has been refined. Because no one set o f just war criteria
exists, and different theorists employ slightly different criteria, thinking of just war as the just war
tradition is preferable. Further, while the exact criteria are still unsettled, how they are to be applied
is even more tenuous. For example, does a war have to meet all o f the criteria before we can judge it
as just or simply one or a few o f the criteria? What is sufficient evidence to indicate that the war has
met the criteria? As a result, it is best not to think of the just war tradition as a codified body o f law,
but rather as a body o f thought.
Although the criteria o f the just war tradition are difficult to apply and in fact have often been
misapplied, they do provide a useful standard by which to evaluate the legitimacy of violence. Thus,
the just war tradition is a helpful standard to judge the policy options under current consideration in
response to the continuing problem of nuclear weapons.
Calls for intervention in the form of direct military action and the use of boycotts and embargoes
have been made in response to nuclear programs in places such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
While such calls for the use o f force are not surprising, the lack o f religious ethical criticism offered
in response to such proposals is extremely unsettling since religious traditions are full o f resources
with which to approach such problems. Here we will explore the resources of the just war tradition,
which uses principled criteria to determine when violence is justified.
While no codified list o f exact criteria exists, contemporary proponents of the tradition would
concur that the tradition looks something like the following. First are the jus ad bellum criteria that
address the justness o f going to war. Often seven jus ad bellum criteria are identified: just cause,
competent authority, comparative justice, last resort, probability o f success, and proportionality.
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Just Cause: According to this criterion, war is permissible only to confront a real and certain
danger, such as to protect innocent life, to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence,
or to secure basic human rights. The question this raises for stopping proliferation is whether or not
violent actions seeking to stop the spread of nuclear weapons can meet this criterion. Clearly,
increasing the number o f nuclear nations is not a positive development for the world. However, do
new nuclear nations constitute a real and certain danger? Clearly, a violent response to the use of
nuclear weapons would meet this criterion. However, except the United States’ use o f atomic
weapons on Japan in 1945, no new nuclear state has ever used nuclear weapons. While it is true that
the more unstable a nation is, the greater the risk of use that their acquisition of nuclear weapons
brings, this criterion requires asking, at what point does a nation seeking to possess nuclear weapons
become a certain and real danger?
Competent Authority: Under this criterion, private groups or individuals cannot declare war.
Instead, war can only be declared by those entrusted with the responsibility for public order. This
criterion seems to eliminate revolutions from ever being found just. In the case of the response to
nuclear proliferation, the issue is whether individual nations have a right preemptively and violently
to prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, would the United States be
justified undertaking a military strike against North Korean nuclear facilities just as did Israel in
1981 when it bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction?
One needs to be careful with such an argument because answering positively could easily justify
a North Korean military attack on U.S. nuclear installations in an attempt to stop U.S. nuclear
programs. Justifying military interventions to stop nuclear proliferation is especially risky when one
is a nuclear nation.
None of this means that North Korean nuclear efforts should be construed as just since attempts
by North Korea to justify its nuclear program are currently undermined by its membership in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPTj which declares U.S. possession of nuclear weapons legal
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and North Korean’s acquisition illegal. However, what happens if North Korea simply withdraws
from the NPT, which they have repeatedly threatened to do, immediately making their nuclear
programs legal?
The criterion o f legitimate authority also raises questions about whether regional or global
organizations such as NATO or the United Nations are legitimate authorities on nuclear issues. Does
the UN have the authority to enforce the NPT? If the UN declared nuclear weapons illegal, would it
have the legitimate authority to enforce a nuclear weapon’s ban?
Comparative Justice: This criterion requires determining whether the values at stake are
important enough to override the presumption against war. Do the rights and values involved justify
killing? The criterion o f comparative justice thus prevents one side from claiming absolute justice
on its side. For the issue o f nuclear proliferation, one can argue at least at the theoretical and
abstract level, that the values o f preventing nuclear war are important enough to justify violence. It
becomes less clear, however, if this criterion is met when justifying the more likely action o f a
military intervention to prevent a nation from taking a specific step toward acquiring nuclear
weapons. For example, is it comparatively just to bomb a reprocessing plant while it is under
construction? Reprocessing plants take the spent fuel from nuclear power plants and reprocess it
into a useable form, which with the right processes, can produce weapon-grade material. While a
stronger objection to such a military strike could be grounded in other criteria such as
proportionality, a limited military action that will have an important impact on preventing a nuclear
war would most likely meet this criterion.
Right Intention: This criterion insists that war can only be pursued for a just cause and not for
other reasons. Because the responsibility to do justice can provide justification for violating the duty
not to intentionally injure other persons, the just war tradition insists that the intention o f the nation
going to war be closely examined. Reasons generally considered just include self defense, aid to
other nations in defending themselves against aggression, and the rescue o f innocent people.
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Unjustified intentions include going to war for national gain and for economic self-gain. This
criterion also requires governments to pursue peace and reconciliation during and after the conflict.
Again, application o f this criterion requires close scrutiny o f the reasons a specific actor is
undertaking a war. For example, if the U.S. goal in making a military strike against a nation with
nuclear aspirations is to topple that government or to gain a political advantage in the region, then
this criterion would not be met. However, if reason for undertaking the same military strike is the
prevention o f nuclear war or even the spread o f nuclear weapons (if that is a goal/value that the
world agrees to), then because the action is taken for the right intention, this criterion is met.
Last Resort: In order to justify going to war, nations must exhaust all peaceful alternatives
before war is justified. This is an important criterion for nonproliferation efforts because it requires
that violent military action must be the last in a long series o f options. For example, it can be argued
that if current U.S. efforts with North Korea were to fail, since the U.S. has taken such a long series
o f steps with North Korea, militaiy action could be justified since military action would be a last
resort. However, the same military action by the U.S. against Iranian nuclear efforts could not meet
such a criterion since the U.S. has not taken a long series o f steps with Iran. However, since it is
unclear whether economic sanctions and embargoes should be understood as violent or as nonviolent
means, evaluation o f acts using this criterion become increasingly complicated.
Probability o f Success: The purpose of this criterion is to prevent the irrational resort to force
or hopeless resistance when the outcome o f a war will clearly be either disproportionate or futile.
This criterion also provides an important check on proposals to end proliferation. No action doomed
to failure or which makes the situation worse should be undertaken. If the intent o f a military
undertaking is the prevention o f nuclear war or the stoppage of the spreading of nuclear weapons,
then such an action must have a high probability of doing just that.
Proportionality: According to this criterion, the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred
by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms. This also is important for
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nonproliferation efforts. N ot only must the action be likely to succeed, on balance, it must not cause
more harm than good. If a strike against a nuclear target in North Korea will start a new Korean
War in which millions will die, then this criterion is not met. If a military strike will cause a nuclear
explosion or other effects o f a nuclear explosion, such as the release o f radiation, then this criterion
raises issues about such action. Does the harm including civilian casualties and perhaps enormous
environmental damage from the release of nuclear material and gases outweigh the difficult to assess
advantages achieved through a specific military strike?
Some suggest that proportionality should not be limited to just the effect on humans but to the
whole o f creation, the effect that nuclear weapons would have on the ecosystem. When considering
nuclear weapons it seems appropriate that environmental impacts be part o f the consideration
because o f the gross environmental damage that they can cause. This sensitivity need not require a
commitment to deep ecology with its emphasis on each and every species. However, disregard for
environmental concerns can no longer be tolerated. Dianne Bergant, professor of Old Testament at
Catholic Theological Union suggests criteria for such considerations. According to Bergant, human
technologies must function within earth “technologies” and thus: 1. We must be aware of the
magnitude of changes we are causing. 2. Sustainable progress must be for all of the human
community. 3. Our technologies must take care of the waste products they produce. 4. We need a
cosmology that puts forth a balanced earth-human presence.6 7 Because o f the very nature o f nuclear
weapons, the environmental effects o f nonproliferation steps must be a serious consideration.
Some would describe a war which meets the above criteria as a justified war, rather than a just
war. They believe that, while a war may be justified, war can never be just because war always
produces horrendous damage. On the other hand when Michael Walzer explores whether going to
war is justified, he collapses the seven criteria into a single criterion o f whether or not aggression has
taken place. According to him, only the act of aggression may justify war. However, if fighting a
6 7 Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 121 & 131-132.
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war against aggression is just, only one side can be fighting a just war-the side resisting aggression.
The reason that aggression is morally wrong is because it violates the principle of sovereignty-the
right o f nations to control their own affairs within their own borders.6 8 While Walzer’s description
of the international understanding o f sovereignty is correct, his argument would be stronger if he
would provide a moral basis for the concept of sovereignty. Is it in fact the just/moral position to
leave countries alone if they do not violate the sovereignty o f another nation? Is it moral to allow a
country, for instance, to commit gross violations of the human rights o f its own citizens? Or more
specifically for our point, is intervention to prevent the development o f nuclear weapons allowed
when no violation o f sovereignty has happened?
The modem just war tradition does not stop at the question of the justness of going to war but
goes on to evaluate how a war is conducted. In contrast to the ju s ad bellum criteria, jus in bello
criteria deal with the justness of the conduct of a particular war. While jus in bello are a latter
addition to just war tradition, they are generally accepted today as part o f the moral tradition. In
fact, most contemporary just war thinking emphasizes jus in bello to the exclusion ofjus ad bellum.
Frequently three jus in bello criteria are identified: proportionality, discrimination and mournful
warrior.
Proportionality: This criterion requires that each specific act within a war be evaluated to
insure that the cost incurred is proportionate to the good expected to result from the action. Since
most nonproliferation actions envisioned are of a limited nature as opposed to protracted war,
proportionality is best evaluated in what would traditionally be seen as on the jus in bello level as
opposed to the jus ad bellum level. In other words, each specific action (which may or may not be
part o f a larger military undertaking) needs to undergo proportionality evaluation. In most cases of
response to proliferation, an evaluation o f proportionality is done primarily on the smaller scale as
“ Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New
York: Basic Books, 1977), 51.
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opposed to the grand scale since the contemplated military actions would be limited as opposed to a
full scale war.
Discrimination: This criterion requires that war be conducted so that noncombatants (civilians)
are not harmed. Discrimination, also known as noncombatant immunity, is a key issue for war
ethics in modem times, and Walzer even identifies it as the central ju s in bello criterion. Protecting
civilians in times o f war is very difficult. Nevertheless, the rules o f war require their protection.
Modem guerilla warfare has made the issue o f civilian immunity even more difficult since it is often
impossible to distinguish between civilian and combatant. Walzer, however, insists that these new
strategies do not reduce the duty to protect civilians.6 9
For some just war tradition theorists, such as James Turner Johnson, the doctrine of double
effect allows civilians to be harmed in certain situations if the harm is an unintended consequence.7 0
Dombrowski, however, rejects Johnson’s conclusion, claiming that Johnson has misconstrued
Aquinas’ teaching. Aquinas concludes that in defending oneself, a person may kill the person who
attacks them. The intended effect is to defend oneself. The unintended (and second) consequence of
defending oneself is the death of the attacker. The killing is justified, because, while the attacker is
killed, that is not the intended consequence.7 1
Modem just war theorists, such as Johnson, claim that the doctrine o f double effect justifies
bombing a military target, even if it will result in civilian deaths, because the intended consequence
is to hit the military target, not the civilians. Yet Dombrowski has a strong argument in claiming
this is a misinterpretation of Aquinas because Aquinas clearly says that we can never harm
innocents. The killing o f the attacker in Aquinas’ original example is not an innocent person or a
6 9 WaIzer, 185.
7 0 James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1984).
7lDaniel A. Dombrowski, Christian Pacifism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 31-
37.
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noncombatant. Dombrowski argues that what Aquinas’ rule of double effect allows is the killing of
combatants in spite o f Christian rules against killing. It does not, however, allow the killing of
innocents.
Whoever is correct in their interpretation o f Aquinas, Johnson’s understanding o f double effect
is the modem just war understanding. However, the nature of atomic weapons makes it impossible
to distinguish between civilians and combatants and thus violates the duty to protect civilians. Thus,
the vety nature o f nuclear weapons makes it impossible for their use to meet the standards of the just
war. Moreover, the nature o f the weapons raises new questions about what means can be used to
stop the development of weapons that by their nature violate the just war criteria.
The issue o f indirect intent or double effect is important in such considerations. Many argue
that direct military attacks against nuclear sites in a proliferating nation are a justified response.
Commonly noncombatants will be injured or killed since the targets o f these military strikes are
often civilian nuclear power plants rather than military facilities. If, as was the case o f the 1981
Israeli attack on a Iraqi nuclear site, the target is a civilian nuclear reactor, it is difficult to claim this
can meet this exception to noncombatant immunity. Less obvious occurrences exist when civilians
live near a targeted nuclear facility. Even more confounding is whether or not nations which possess
nuclear weapons are justified in protesting when other nations seek to acquire them. Further, tactics
such as embargoes and economic sanctions, often used to deter the building o f nuclear capability,
target primarily civilians and thus also raise discrimination issues.
M ournful W arrior: According to this criterion, nations cannot justly engage in war gleefully or
with hate. Instead nations must conduct war with the consciousness that while the war may be
necessary, it is always a great tragedy. This criterion is often difficult to meet because nations and
their people often acquire a war mentality which glorifies the killing o f the enemy when hostilities
begin. Nevertheless, meeting this criterion is crucial if a military action is going to justified. A just
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warist, as much as a pacifist, must push nations to undertake violence only with the mournful
warrior attitude.
Jus in bello considerations raise the dilemma of winning versus fighting morally. Walzer
claims that if a war is indeed just, it may be o f a supreme value that one side win. If this is the case,
he argues that the rules of war allow that side to bend the rules of fighting. He calls these cases of
“extreme emergency.” To Walzer’s credit, he makes it clear that nations can only take such a
position if winning is actually of a supreme value and if their winning requires the breaking of the
rules. In Just and Unjust Wars he rejects “The Rape of Belgium” by Germany in World War I,
Allied saturation bombing and the dropping o f the atomic bombs during World War II as examples
o f when nations have incorrectly claimed an extreme emergency. Still Walzer is willing to allow for
such cases.7 2
Others, such as Michael J. Schuck, associate professor of theology at Loyola University in
Chicago, argue that the just war tradition and criteria need further refining. Schuck argues that a
third group o f criteria which he calls jus post bellum, or criteria for just behavior after the war, is
required. These criteria would include a principle of repentance, a principle o f honorable surrender
and a principle o f restoration. Schuck concludes, “As a minimal requirement, victors must return to
the fields o f battle and help remove the instruments of war. As a maximal requirement, victors must
help in the repair o f the social infrastructure.”7 3
Ethicist Douglas Lackey in his book Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons offers a useful
secular criteria for ethical reflection which can also further refine just war thinking. He argues we
should judge nations like we judge individuals-based on what they do, not who they are. Extreme
patriotism on the national level parallels egoism on the individual level-the belief that one’s own
7 2 Walzer, 259-260.
^Michael J. Schuck, “When the Shooting Stops: Missing Elements in Just War Theory,”
Christian Century, 26 October 1994, 983.
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interest should always prevail. Lackey counters with the value of fairness, which requires judging
similar cases similarly and different cases differently. Thus fairness allows a nation neither to judge
its own case different from other similar cases, nor to impose burdens on others that it does not
accept for itself. If the U.S. does not condemn itself for possessing nuclear weapons, fairness
requires that the U.S. not condemn other nations merely for possessing nuclear weapons.7 4
James Turner Johnson argues that, unlike the other ethical traditions, the just war tradition
provides a rich basis on which to make evaluations o f weapons. He argues that the utilitarian
approach is too thin and too narrow while pacifism points toward the banning of all weapons and is
therefore not useful. Furthermore, Johnson points out that historically the restraint o f weapons lies
within the just war tradition and not pacifism. For example, in the 11th and 12th centuries,
application o f the just war tradition banned the bow and arrow, crossbow and siege weapons when
Christians were fighting each other. However, such moves have been rare, and the effort to ban
certain weapons has not always been based on moral grounds. For instance, sometimes weapon bans
stemmed from the belief that the weapons violated chivalry. In modem times, Johnson interprets the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not as an effort to ban nuclear weapons, but as an attempt to
keep a nuclear monopoly. Despite such a characterization, however. Johnson argues that it is
essential that we make moral evaluations of weapons.7 5
Johnson points to chemical and biological weapons (CBWs) as examples of banned weapons.
He provides three reasons why CBWs were good targets for bans: their indiscriminatory nature and
the difficulty in controlling them; the ease and cheapness to make CBWs and the lack o f an effective
defense against CBWs. He insists that while the same can be said of nuclear weapons, such has not
always been the case, and this explains why they have not been banned. Here is where he insists that
7 4 Douglass P. Lackey, Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Allanheld, 1985), 179-180 & 219.
7 5 Johnson, 87-91.
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just war analysis can justify banning nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are not problematic because
of their power but because they fail to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants.
Therefore, says Johnson all who seek a more peaceful world must give attention to alternative
(conventional) weapons.
A useful ethical analysis must consider the relationship between conventional and nuclear
forces. James Turner Johnson says that a defense strategy should be flexible and allow for potential
responses to aggression at every conceivable level, from military presence to all-out war. Johnson
believes that a larger reliance on conventional forces is necessary and claims nations need to find
ways to have larger forces without creating economic problems. Johnson calls for more reliance on
conventional weapons because nuclear weapons have such dangers of escalation.7 6
2. Implications o f the Just War Tradition
Conventional wisdom has been that the proliferation o f nuclear weapons is inevitable. But
nuclear proliferation need not be so. Indeed, we can take many steps to stop and/or slow
proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which monitors nuclear programs
worldwide needs to be given more power to enforce the NPT. A true Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (unlike the one recently agreed to without the consent of India or Pakistan) banning all
nuclear testing would be helpful. The nuclear-free zone movement, which creates places in the
world where nuclear weapons are banned, also can be of real value. The control o f weapon-grade
nuclear material is also crucial. These steps will be more effective in addressing the dangers of
proliferation than will military intervention. In addition, they raise neither the just war objections to
such intervention, nor similar concerns that economic sanctions can cause.
The resolution, at least temporarily, of the North Korean nuclear crisis adds much credence to
this position. In October 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed a nuclear agreement which built on
7 6 Johnson, 80-82 & 97-100.
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the foundation o f a diplomacy mission made by former President Jimmy Carter to North Korea
during the summer o f 1994. In the agreement. North Korea froze its nuclear programs in exchange
for diplomatic and economic concessions from the United States. The IAEA now has permanent
inspectors in North Korea, the only place in the world where this is the case. North Korea has shut
down a 30-megawatt reactor, stopped construction o f two larger reactors and placed some 8,000 fuel
rods into storage rather than reprocessing them. North Korea has also sealed a radiochemical
laboratory which the U.S. feared would be used to reprocess spent fuel into plutonium.7 7
Pacifists o f course reject nuclear weapons. In fact, nuclear weapons have swelled the ranks of
pacifism. For example, Robert McAfee Brown argues that just war thinking also requires the
rejection o f nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have inherent problems since they cannot meet the
criterion o f discrimination under the just war tradition. While just war theorists need to concede that
at times the use o f nuclear weapons may be able to meet the criteria o f legitimate authority, right
intention and last resort, nuclear weapons can never meet proportionality, success and
discrimination.
An ethical policy toward a potential nuclear state in response to apparent attempts to develop
nuclear weapons should be twofold in nature. It should include direct steps aimed at the
proliferating nation and also renewed steps for the U.S. to be a moral leader trying to limit nuclear
proliferation. The U.S. should use a variety of avenues to convince a proliferating nation that it
would be in their best interest not to proliferate. The United States must also undertake international
efforts in nonproliferation because, based on fairness, U.S. pressure without such efforts is ethically
troubling. The U.S. must truly take the moral high ground. This must include efforts strictly to
curtail its nuclear arsenal until all that remains is a minimal deterrent. The U.S. must vigorously
^Philippe Naughton, “N. Korea Says It Sincere on Final Nuclear Deal,” Renters, ClariNet
Electronic News Service, 1 June 1995.
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seek to curtail the transfer o f nuclear materials and technology, which will include at times going
against its own economic and business interests.
When approaching specific countries such as North Korea or Iran, the United States must seek
ways to reduce tension and foster understanding. The hope is that in such an environment, we can
engage in a bargaining process which stops the progress toward proliferation in that nation. Such
negotiations are not to be undertaken in idealistic terms but, rather, in realistic terms. We should not
delude ourselves into thinking that the process will ever be smooth. Instead it will be marked by
steps forward and steps back. The important issue is for us to stay in the process and to evaluate
progress over the long-term. An ethical approach will provide the conditions for improvement in
our work against proliferation.
We cannot prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. No effort that we can undertake, moral
or otherwise, can guarantee the cessation of nuclear proliferation. What the U.S. can do is become
both the moral and actual leader in nonproliferation efforts. If the U.S. will take such a moral high
ground, then it will be more successful in stopping nuclear proliferation.
In 1993, ten years after its landmark pastoral The Challenge o f Peace™ the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops issued a new statement about peace and international security called The Harvest
o f Justice is Sown in Peace. Recognizing that with the end of the Cold War comes a temptation
toward isolationism, the bishops counter that this is not an option for a universal church and for
citizens o f a powerful nation. Instead, what is needed is a difficult balance between isolation and
unwise intervention. The U.S. must act in the best of its tradition and work cooperatively with other
nations to promote justice and peace.7 9 The bishops hold up the value of American responsibility:
The preeminence o f U.S. influence and power in the world is an undisputed fact.
This fact is o f great moral significance, first, because American values and actions
7 sNational Council o f Catholic Bishops, The Challenge o f Peace: God’ s Promise and Our
Response (Washington, DC: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983), 12-13.
7 9 Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 314.
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can bring tremendous good or much suffering to people around the world; and
second, because with power and influence comes a responsibility to contribute to
the universal common good.8 0
In their analysis, the Catholic bishops return to their central ethical guide, the just war tradition,
but remind its readers that this tradition can all too easily be misused. They point out that it is not a
weapon to be used to justify a political position, nor is it a mechanical system to come to obvious
conclusions. Instead it is a way o f moral reasoning.8 1
In reexamining their nuclear position the Catholic bishops continue to say that nuclear war is
not acceptable. The U.S. may have a minimal nuclear deterrent, but its only use must be to deter a
nuclear attack. The U.S. should have a no-first-use policy and should reinforce the barriers to the
use of such weapons. They also reaffirmed that deterrence must be a step toward disarmament. The
end of the Cold War should move the world to adopt nonnuclear security arrangements. Nuclear
weapons should be abolished, and international law should be strengthened. They suggest another
step in all of this would be a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It would improve the U.S.
moral credibility to work against proliferation. In summing up their position on nuclear issues they
state:
An active commitment by the United States to nuclear disarmament and the
strengthening o f collective security is the only moral basis for temporarily retaining
our deterrent and our insistence that others forego these weapons. We advocate
disarmament by example: careful but clear steps to reduce and end our dependence
on weapons o f mass destruction.8 2
Cardinal Joseph Bemardin, Archbishop of Chicago until his recent death and a key drafter of both
The Challenge o f Peace and The Harvest ofJustice is Sown in Peace, writes that the bishop’s
analysis has changed since 1983 in two ways. First, with the change in the times, proliferation is
more in focus. Thus it is crucial that the eliminations o f nuclear weapons be not just an ideal but a
8 0 Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 340.
8lPowers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 321.
“ Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 334.
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specific policy goal. The U.S. can be an example beginning with a CTBT. Second, the link must be
more specific between the ethics of deterrence and the nuclear powers’ responsibility to use their
power to help build cooperative security and a more just world order.
In The Harvest o f Justice the U.S. Catholic Bishops examine economic sanctions, remembering
that, as a body, the bishops have supported economic sanctions in the cases of Iraq, Yugoslavia and
South Africa. While they take seriously the charges that sanctions can be counterproductive and do
harm to the innocent, they insist that sanctions are preferable to waging war or doing nothing.
Admitting the need for moral reflection on the subject, they offer some criteria for consideration.
First, they argue that the concern about effectiveness and harm to civilians requires that sanctions
should be used only in cases of aggression or a grave and ongoing injustice. Even so, they should be
used only when less coercive measures have failed and then with clear conditions for their removal.
Second, the harm caused must be proportionate to the good achieved, and sanctions must avoid grave
and irreversible harm. Third, the position towards the sanctions by the population that will be
subject to them is a morally relevant factor. Fourth, sanctions must be part o f broader efforts to
resolve the situation.8 3 An ethic of nonproliferation is open to the tool of sanctions, but along with
the bishops is wary of the harm to innocents that sanctions can cause. Consequently, an ethic of
nonproliferation will use the criteria provided by the bishops to evaluate the use of sanctions in
nonproliferation efforts.
3. Just Peacemaking
Christian ethicist Glen Stassen posits that the debate between pacifism and just war, while
important, has turned attention away from what Christians should be doing-peacemaking. Stassen’s
efforts, then, are focused on creating a theory of just peace making, one he hopes can be used
“ Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 24 & 335-336.
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inclusively across religious lines. Stassen’s just peacemaking theory is a synthesis o f pacifism and
just war thinking. It is also fair to characterize it as a further development o f the just war tradition.
The first step in just peacemaking is to affirm common security, affirming the valid interests of
both ourselves and others. Because o f the nuclear age, the security of nations has already become
intertwined. Policies of deterrence depend on cooperation with the enemy. However, in the post-
Cold War era, other issues such as economics, technology, politics, as well as cultural and ethnic
issues are more important than military issues. Nevertheless, security partnerships have emphasized
deterrence or a defense oriented military. In a common security system, weapons should be designed
not to attack nations but to destroy forces that would attack. Key components o f collective security
would be collective institutions to preserve borders, conflict resolution systems and arbitration
mechanisms to deal with a broad area o f possible disputes.
The second step in just peacemaking is to take independent initiatives. The world has worked
on a policy o f so-called parity. But when parity is reached the other side perceives it is in an inferior
position and therefore builds more weapons. To counter this, a new system of independent
initiatives is needed which seeks' to transform the response of the adversary. Such steps make clear
a nation’s defensive posture and its desire for good relations. In such circumstances nations can
retain sufficient power to deter aggression.
Talking with one’s enemy is the third step in just peacemaking. Talking and seeking
negotiations is an important peacemaking step. Peace research has gained acceptance in practical
application and is a crucial part o f this step. Such a step would require strengthening the United
Nations. The fourth step of just peacemaking is to seek human rights and justice. This is for all,
especially the powerless, for the absence o f human rights is the absence of peace, the lack of shalom.
Stassen says this step is crucial because the lack of human rights is one of the major causes of
violence in our world.
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The fifth step o f just peacemaking is to acknowledge the vicious cycle of violence and instead
participate in the peacemaking process. Acknowledging the cycle we are caught in is necessary if
we are to make a decisive step toward peacemaking. Just as the most dangerous time for recovering
alcoholics is when they believe that alcohol is no longer capable of affecting them, so is it the most
dangerous time for us when we believe we have nuclear weapons under control. In both cases there
is a temptation to relax efforts. The thesis o f this dissertation shares Stassen’s analysis and argues
that it is far too dangerous to think that we have solved the problem of nuclear weapons.
Ending judgmental propaganda and make amends for past mistakes is the sixth step of just
peacemaking. We have done wrong, and we need to acknowledge that we have hurt others. We
must commit ourselves to doing better. The seventh step of just peacemaking is to work with
citizen groups in efforts of truth. This final step is to work within groups which have accurate
information and seek to affect policymaking. Governments fall into the trap o f self-serving
ideologies. They develop bureaucracies that perpetuate themselves. They create self-interested
military-industrial complexes. Consequently, governments will not move toward peace unless the
people push them that way.
Stassen compares our reliance on militarism to the alcoholic’s reliance on alcohol. Therefore,
there is good reason to compare just peacemaking to the 12 steps of recovery. We might expect just
peacemaking to be based on the same Aristotelian means-ends reasoning o f the just war tradition, or
in international relations it is the utility-maximizing model of reasoning. It is not. Instead Stassen
grounds it in Biblical realism, which is not based on the rational actor model. In fact, he says our
perception o f end-means is warped by our interests, and our reasoning is distorted by our loyalties
and our idols. Further, international relations has itself identified faults in the utility-maximizing
model, for it overlooks misperception, cognitive dissonance, organizational decision making,
loyalties and interests. Therefore just peacemaking assumes perception/misperception models of
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reasoning or, more positively, an alienation/deliverance model. Its steps are error correction,
repentance and new direction, conversion and transformation, delivery and recovery.
Stassen argues that just peacemaking can make several significant contributions to discussions
about war and peace. First, it gives peace time to work. Realism talks about the momentum that war
has, and peacemaking efforts can slow things down. It can do this because just peacemaking is
focused on prevention and conflict resolution while there is still time to prevent the war. A second
contribution of just peacemaking is that it provides churches and other private groups clear criteria
forjudging whether their government is in fact seeking peace. Finally, just peacemaking helps
complete pacifism and just war theory. On the one hand, it prevents pacifism from being merely a
narrow “no” to war by broadening its duties to the prevention of war. On the other hand, it pushes
the just war tradition to insure that the criterion o f last resort is actually followed. Further, a just
peacemaking approach helps nations imagine other options. In the “just intention” criteria, just
peacemaking helps us see that the opponent does have valid interests. Just peacemaking also
broadens “just authority” to include that people have a right to be informed and not lied to. With
regards to new weapons, just peacemaking looks beyond discrimination and sees if the new weapons
are a step toward or away from disarmament. Just peacemaking says there are two questions we
should ask. First, what are the criteria for making peace. Second, what are the criteria for
restraining war.8 4
Just peacemaking pushes us to unlearn the way we look at things and do things in international
affairs. It broadens our view so that we are not focused solely on ending conflicts but instead focus
on justice so that fewer conflicts are even a possibility. It is at least in some ways a synthesis of
pacifism and the just war tradition. Its focus is global, and so it seeks global security, reminding us
^Glen H. Stassen, Just Peacemaking: Transforming Initiatives fo r Justice and Peace (Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 89-97,99, 102, 104-105, 107, 109-110, 187-189 & 233-235.
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that our enemies also have legitimate concerns. It also reminds us that religion is a global force and
matters in policy decisions.
J. Nuclear Disarmament
Joseph Nye asks if an unequal possession o f nuclear weapons can be justified. In other words, is
it moral for some states to have nuclear weapons while others are prohibited from possessing them.
He responds affirmatively as long as certain conditions are met. First, the purpose for possession
must be limited self-defense. Second, special care must be given to prevent accidents. Third, some
compensation must be given to assure the independence o f non-possessing nations since nuclear
weapons create a power imbalance. Fourth, steps must be taken to reduce the risks and move toward
disarmament. Nye finds that the NPT follows the above criteria.8 5
However, Nye may be mistaken. Especially in a post-Cold War situation, there is little
justification for nuclear weapons on the existing scale. Moreover, it is unclear who is being deterred.
In addition, the deteriorating situation in Russia may mean safety assurances have lost much o f their
meaning. Finally, there is little evidence that nonnuclear states have in fact received any benefit
from the possession o f nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states. One supposed benefit was that
nuclear nations would undertake a war (possibly even nuclear) when a nonnuclear state is
threatened. That is not a likely scenario.
While the unequal possession of nuclear weapons poses difficult dilemmas, the prospect of
equalizing possession through proliferation is also problematic since proliferation makes the world
more dangerous. Robert Myers points out that nuclear weapons are inherently a conservative
influence. While nations are not likely to use their nuclear weapons against their own citizens, the
8 S Nye, Nuclear Ethics 85-86.
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possession of nuclear weapons creates a gulf between a government and its people. As a result, the
possibility o f a revolution against a government that possesses nuclear weapons is almost nil.8 6
Moreover, Nye points out that, with new proliferators, there are increased risks, including lack
of safety controls and command and control problems.8 7 However that raises the question of whether
such nations should be able to decide for diemselves what risks they can take? Given the priority of
sovereignty, if the weapons would only be used within their own boundaries, then the answer might
be yes. But, since the probable impact of such weapons extends well beyond a nation’s boundaries,
the nonnuclear states should have a right to hold the nuclear powers accountable for the risks.
Many, especially voices coming from the third world, call for significant steps in arms reduction
among the super powers as a crucial step against proliferation. Such steps may satisfy the court of
world opinion, which sees issues of fairness and morality in the unequal distribution o f nuclear
weapons. Further nuclear reduction steps by the nuclear powers are seen as the fulfillment o f an
NPT requirement.8 8 McGeorge Bundy argues that, overall, nuclear weapons have a negative impact,
and every nuclear state could gain in security by reducing their nuclear arsenals. Further, Bundy
argues that nonnuclear states gain no net security advantage by seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.8 9
Seth W. Carus, director for defense strategy on the policy planning staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, points out that traditionally the U.S. has seen proliferation as an arms control
8 6 Rosenthal, 18.
8 7 Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 88.
8 8 Quester and Utgoff argue that complete nuclear disarmament would be a serious mistake
because in a nonnuclear world any renegade nation who acquires nuclear weapons would then have a
nuclear monopoly. They conclude that the world may always need one or two nuclear states (or a
nuclear armed international organization) and that to prevent nuclear proliferation the nuclear states
must have larger arsenals than those put forth by proponents of minimum deterrence. Quester and
Utgoff also warn that deep conventional arms cuts by the superpowers could promote proliferation.
(George H. Quester and Victor A. Utgoff, “U.S. Arms Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation: The
Counterproductive Possibilities.,” Washington Quarterly 16, no. Winter (1993): 129-134.)
8 9 Bundy, Crowe and Dreli, 8-9.
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issue. Consequently, the actions o f friends and enemies were not significantly different. He counters
that while everyone agrees that the U.S. would be better off with no nuclear proliferation, military
planning must be more concerned with the action o f a North Korea (enemy) than a South Korea
(ally). However, he is clear that the actions of friendly nations can also affect U.S. security.9 0
Further, since stopping proliferation will take global cooperation, in the wider scheme proliferation
by South Korea might be as problematic as if done by North Korea.
Wolfenstein agrees, concluding that if nuclear weapons were o f any value, they should have
deterred Iraq from its action. Nuclear weapons “neither deterred Iraq nor aided the war effort.”9 1
Wolfenstein takes his argument one step further and dares anyone to dream up a scenario where,
even if another nation cheated and secretly acquired nuclear weapons, it would threaten the security
o f a nonnuclear United States. He argues that U.S. strength in other areas would simply deter the
use o f nuclear weapons against the U.S. He calls the “crazed ruler with nuclear weapons” scenario
irrelevant because possession o f nuclear weapons cannot prevent a crazed ruler, but only forces them
to respond in kind. Clearly, the powerful nations of the world could inflict adequate damage even
without nuclear weapons to a nation who dared use nuclear weapons. In other words, deterrence,
whether nuclear or not, will either work or fail, and the form o f the deterrence, nuclear or
conventional, is irrelevant. In response to nuclear terrorism Wolfenstein is quick to point out that a
nuclear response would be inappropriate anyway. Moreover, the best way to prevent nuclear
terrorism is to work toward a nonnuclear world. He points out that we have agreements banning
chemical and biological weapons, and they are not seen as unrealistic. Further, verification and
control of nuclear weapons would be easier than it is for chemical and biological weapons.9 2
wW. Seth Carus, “Proliferation and Security in Southwest Asia,” The Washington Quarterly 17,
no. 2 (1994): 130.
9lWoIfenstein, 14.
9 2 Wolfenstein, 14-15.
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Speaking from the field o f international ethics, Catherine M. Kelleher and Rachel A. Epstein,
both o f the Brookings Institute, set forth new force postures for the post-Cold War world. They
suggest the U.S. be the leader in unilateral steps in disarmament. First, they propose a minimal
nuclear force numbered in the hundreds which would not allow the continuation o f the nuclear triad.
In addition, such a policy must include other items such as transparency, security against accidental
or unauthorized launches, safety in all stages of production and openness about our nuclear forces.
Second, the U.S. would need to create and maintain advanced conventional strategic forces. While
conventional forces are capable o f doing terrible damage, they do not do so in a blink o f an eye and
so give policy makers more options. Also, in light of the Gulf War, such capabilities give American
forces much credibility. The danger is that the advanced conventional technology will also
eventually proliferate. Third, the U.S. needs to develop new defensive options. The best options are
those that protect battlefields, not civilian areas. Such systems could replace the protection currently
promised by nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless, some say such weapons may start an offensive arms
race to counter such abilities.9 3
What is emerging as a consensus in international ethics in its address o f nuclear weapons is that
minimally the nuclear nations must move to what can honestly be called a minimal deterrent.
Moving to minimal deterrence will mean giving up the nuclear triad which has based nuclear
weapons on missiles, airplanes and submarines. Morever, it will find the U.S. leading nuclear
disarmament efforts.
///. Conclusion
While much of the previous thought on nuclear issues is stuck in Cold War ideologies, this
chapter’s review of previous thought has also revealed that some previous thinking on the subject is
9 3 Powers, Christiansen and Hennemeyer, 257-261.
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very helpful in the construction of an ethic o f nonproliferation. The following is a summary of
important ideas from previous thought that can serve as guidelines for an ethic of nonproliferation.
First, an ethic of nonproliferation must counter nuclearism by demonstrating that nuclear
weapons not only fail to provide security, they increase insecurity. Nuclearism is an ideology or,
even, a theology that places value in the power of nuclear weapons, seeing them as ultimate saviors
or protectors of a people. This is problematic on two accounts. To begin with, if nuclear weapons
are an ultimate protector, then everyone should want them, meaning that such an ideology promotes
proliferation. On the other hand, it is a false ideology, since nuclear weapons provide little or no
actual security and threaten all o f creation.
Second, an ethic of nonproliferation must counter realism ’s self-interest model with a
global ethic of nonproliferation. The evidence indicates that nations can and do act in ways other
than strict self-interest. A global ethic of nonproliferation will be based on ideas such as
cooperation, reciprocity and common or collective security. Increasing the security of all nations
decreases the motivation for nations to acquire nuclear weapons. Decreasing nuclear weapons
increases all nations’ security.
T hird, an ethic of nonproliferation rejects the realist’s acceptance of nuclear deterrence as
it is an unrealistic defense strategy. Weapons deployed will eventually be used, and nuclear
proliferation increases the risk. Nuclear deterrence was never a good defense posture, even during
the Cold War. It is an even worse one now. However, the U.S. cannot suddenly abandon its policy
o f nuclear deterrence. Consequently, the fourth point is that an ethic of nonproliferation must
w ork toward a true minimal deterrent force for the U.S. and Russia with each having nuclear
w arheads numbered in hundreds and eventually to move to complete nuclear disarmament.
Ultimately, the only successful way to stop nuclear proliferation is to have a worldwide ban on
nuclear weapons. The world has banned other weapons such as biological weapons. It will not be
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easy or fast, but the banning o f nuclear weapons is possible. Moreover, the just war tradition finds
nuclear weapons as unethical and therefore provides moral support for their banning.
Fifth, an ethic of nonproliferation must oppose the spread o f all nuclear weapons whether
to a friend o r foe. The technologically advanced nations must be willing to sacrifice business
interests and profits for nonproliferation efforts. If and when proliferation has taken place, an ethic
of nonproliferation should allow for technical support for security and command and control to
increase the security o f and decrease the threat from nuclear weapons in the proliferating nation.
Sixth, while open to technological assistance, an ethic of nonproliferation rejects the search
fo ra technological fix o r solution to the problem of proliferation. It specifically rejects Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMDs) systems as counterproductive, giving a false sense of security. Specifically
an ethic o f nonproliferation rejects the ideology of a technological fix. Nuclear proliferation is a
complex problem and will require multidimensional and complex solutions. No single sure-fire
answer to this problem exists. The sooner we give up the search for a solution that does not exist,
the quicker that we can get onto realistic solutions. This leads to o ur seventh point: An ethic of
nonproliferation must recognize the complexity of the nuclear issues in a post-Cold W ar world.
Subject to ethical analysis, an ethic o f nonproliferation will work toward predominantly on demand-
side nonproliferation approaches, seeking to find ways to make nations less interested in nuclear
weapons. However, in the interim and again subject to ethical analysis, an ethic of nonproliferation
will use supply-side tactics to limit the spread of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge.
Eighth, an ethic of nonproliferation recognizes the importance o f people power. Several
experts in the chapter commented that in some situations the people matter in sitting policy. Most
likely governments will not on their own accord solve the nuclear problem. Therefore, the people
must force them to do the right thing, and that will require education and activation of the public on
a global level.
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Ninth, an ethic of nonproliferation will seek ways to decrease the motives nations have for
seeking nuclear weapons. It will do so by seeking other means for nations to feel secure and
acquire prestige.
T enth, an ethic of nonproliferation will seek ways to increase the nonproliferation motives
of nations. It will do so by increasing the economic and political costs o f nuclear weapons. It will
promote a general and global ethic against nuclear weapons and support global and domestic
opposition to nuclear weapons.
Eleventh, an ethic of nonproliferation will use the methods o f ju st peacemaking. Steps such
as affirming common security, taking independent initiatives, talking with one’s enemies, seeking
human rights and justice, acknowledging the cycle of violence, engaging in peacemaking, ending
propaganda, making amends and working with citizens groups are all steps that will promote
nonproliferation. Moreover, the just peacemaking model replaces the rational actor model with more
realistic and helpful models o f international affairs such as perception/misperception and
alienation/deliverance models.
Twelfth, an ethic of nonproliferation will seek to encourage the nations of the world to
engage in discussions about ceding some sovereignty on nuclear issues and perhaps security
issues to international organization such as the United Nations. This will not be easy process.
However, it is likely to be a needed step if nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament are to become
realities.
Finally, an ethic of nonproliferation will use the criteria of the ju st w ar tradition to
evaluate proposed violent and potentially violent nonproliferation actions. It is possible that
limited military engagements may be justified in nonproliferation efforts; however, the just war
tradition indicates that usually the ethical and effective measures needed are nonviolent ones. If
violent ones are to be used, they must meet the criteria of the just war tradition.
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PART II:
VISION
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Chapter Two has demonstrated that most previous thought on nuclear issues is irrelevant to the
post-Cold War world. Stuck in a Cold War paradigm, realism lacks the ability to accurately
comprehend the complexity of a multi-polar world with nuclear threats coming from many nations
and also entities other than nations, such as terrorists. Cold War realism sought to maintain the
world through the massive threat known as nuclear deterrence. Such realistic thought assumes the
existence o f two superpowers in a bi-polar world. Such a world no longer exists, and such thought
has neither the ability to maintain the status quo nor the method or vision to get us beyond the
nuclear threat. It tends to assume that there is nothing that we can do about nuclear weapons
because the nuclear genie cannot be put back in the bottle. Consequently, realism has put forth no
real proposal to deal with nuclear proliferation. However, nuclear proliferation so increases the risk
o f global disaster that we must find ways to lessen the threat.
The review o f previous thought in the last chapter did find some things o f value. Some of it was
forward looking and from it were extracted useful ideas for the construction o f an ethic of
nonproliferation. Some o f these ideas are quite profound. Just peacemaking grows out of fairly
traditional understandings o f international relations. It is perhaps more optimistic on what can be
achieved than realism, but realism grants wider efforts o f justice than simply the just war tradition.
Indeed, most realists would likely grant that the promulgation of justice can decrease the motivation
of nations and others to acquire nuclear weapons. However, even within this more narrow body of
helpful thought such as just peacemaking is an absence of an adequate vision to move us to a
nonnuclear world. Consequently, we must look elsewhere.
The next three chapters will focus on three important contemporary bodies of Christian
theology. For Christian thinkers, the primary audience for this work, looking to theology as a source
for ethics is common. Even so, for Christian realists there will be much in these new bodies of
thought that is troubling. We will encounter some thought that is perfectionist and utopian, and,
consequently, not all o f the thought will be of use to an ethic of nonproliferation. One need not
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acquiesce to a school of thought in order to find enlightening and pragmatic ideas which can be of
use outside their original context. However, one purpose for each of the chapters is to give a fair
introduction to these bodies of thought. It would be disrespectful, inaccurate, and a
misappropriation to rip ideas from these bodies of thought without having a fair understanding of
them as a whole. The second purpose of each chapter is a more applied one-extracting useful ideas
from these three bodies o f thought to be used in the construction of an ethic of nonproliferation.
Secular thinkers will be even more bewildered by some o f the thought that will be encountered
in the next three chapters. However, we are in desperate need of new ideas to address the continuing
threat o f nuclear weapons precisely because chapter two has demonstrated that more traditional
thought has failed to put forth an adequate way to address this problem. Consequently, all readers
are encouraged and challenged to enter this second section with an open mind. The new bodies of
thought provide imaginative ways to promote justice, and the argument contained here is that by
using these new bodies o f thought we can be more effective in addressing nuclear proliferation. One
need not accept “all” things in order to find “some” things in these three cutting-edge schools. As
the nuclear mushroom cloud looms over us, we need to avail ourselves to various forms o f wisdom in
hopes o f creating a pluralistic vision that can make real progress on decreasing the nuclear threat.
These three bodies o f thought have some profound contributions to make to this endeavor, but we
will miss their wisdom if we fail to listen.
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CHAPTER THREE:
CHRISTIAN PACIFISM:
VISIONS OF PEACE
George Weigel, president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C. writes the
following about pacifism:
Pacifism is a personal commitment that can, arguably, be reconciled with the
demands o f Christian conscience. But the pacifist conscience, per se, can provide
no serious counsel to the statesman. And to suggest that it does distracts our
attention from the crucial business at hand, which is to refine the just-war
tradition’s criteria in light of the signs of the times.1
While Weigel is from the conservative branch of Christian realism, his response toward pacifism is
representative o f most Christian realists: Pacifism is o f no value to policy considerations, it is simply
a matter o f individual conscience. Using the voices o f five prominent American pacifists, I argue
that Weigel and Christian realism are wrong and that pacifism has much to say to matters of state.
Weigel’s error, much like Reinhold Niebuhr’s too-easy dismissal o f pacifism, comes from an overly-
limited view o f pacifism. As a result, he responds only to the small section o f pacifism which can be
labeled nonresistance, and he ignores the bulk of pacifism which can be called nonviolence.
Moreover, his view ignores the history o f instances when pacifism has been successful as a method
of social change, including the Indian independence movement lead by Gandhi, the American Civil
'Gerald F. Powers, Drew Christiansen and Robert T. Hennemeyer, eds., Peacemaking: Moral and
Policy Challenges fo r a New World (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1994), 68.
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Rights movement, the bringing down of the Berlin wall, and the end o f apartheid in South Africa.
Overall, the ethic o f nonproliferation being developed here is not a pacific ethic. However, it is a
serious error to ignore the contribution to questions o f policy that pacifists can provide. Pacifists
remind us that there are usually nonviolent or less-violent means available to the United States.
Moreover, such means may be more efficacious than more violent means.
Contemporary North American pacifism provides important criticism o f the violence o f U.S.
foreign policy. Realists ignore this helpful tool of analysis. It is important to critique this nation
whose enormous economic and political power should mean it seldom needs to resort to violent
force. Nevertheless, violence is the United States’ only option when the U.S. tries to reach results
which it could not possibly achieve by using moral arguments in the court o f world opinion. Pacifist
and nonviolent approaches give citizens the reasons to undermine and the tools to resist such violent
policies. Moreover, nonviolence can be a tool for foreign affairs to which policymakers need to avail
themselves, especially in the post-Cold War world.
An ethic o f nonproliferation needs to listen to pacifists seeking guidance in constructing a
response to the nuclear threat. Here we will explore the thought of five contemporary pacifist
thinkers: Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, Daniel Berrigan, Vincent Harding, and James
Douglass. From these five pacifist thinkers we will harvest ethical thought that can guide our
response to the continuing threat of nuclear proliferation.
/ . Voices o f Pacifism
A. Stanley Hauerwas
As Christians we believe we not only need a community, but a community o f a
particular kind to live well morally. We need a people who are capable o f being
faithful to a way o f life, even when that way o f life may be in conflict with what
passes as “morality” in the larger society. Christians are a people who have
learned that belief in God requires that we learn to look upon ourselves as
creatures rather than as creators. This necessarily creates a division between
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ourselves and others who persist in the pretentious assumption that we can and
should be morally autonomous.2
We first turn to Stanley Hauerwas who is a professor o f theological ethics at the Divinity School
of Duke University. Encountering him either in person or through his written words quickly leads
one to understand that his style is provocative. 1 have heard him admit that he never understood the
need to say things succinctly when he could say the same thing offensively. His is like John the
Baptist’s voice crying from out o f the wilderness that is, in Hauerwas’ case, American culture. He
speaks in ways and of things that the Christian community does not want to hear. Hauerwas’ tongue
and pen are sharp, cutting deeply into anyone willing to listen.
While many label Hauerwas a communitarian, he objects to that label saying that it is too weak
to describe the church and is still tied to the liberal project which he rejects.3 Nevertheless, it fits
him better than most ethicists who claim to be communitarian because, unlike them, he is actually a
member o f an identifiable community. Although he disapproves o f the label, 1 identify Hauerwas as
a sectarian. Despite his disapproval, I find it especially appropriate since he understands his task to
be the development of an ethic that is binding only to Christians. Hauerwas, quite rightly, objects to
the connotations o f withdrawal and disruption of church unity associated with the term “sectarian.”
He insists that a pacifist position does not necessarily advocate withdrawal from political
involvement. Moreover, he questions whether the identification of the pacifist position as sectarian
is accurate. He claims that those dominant Christian positions, which have justified the killing of
Christians in other nations, are more sectarian because they destroy the unity of the church in the
name o f national security. While Hauerwas’ tradition is Methodist rather than those usually
identified as sectarian, both theologically and ethically I believe this label fits his position.
2 Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (San Francisco:
Harper & Row, 1985), 43-44.
3 Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church As Polls (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame, 1995), 25.
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Hauerwas’ approach is for Christians since the question central to his work is “How do Christians
remain faithful to the gospel while living today?”
The distinctively Christian approach of Hauerwas causes this project difficulty because it draws
into question whether his work is o f use here. Even more problematic is that Hauerwas would likely
object to the use o f his ethic in this broader public ethic. He would claim that he is not telling the
world or the United States what to do but trying to help guide Christians. That is an important
warning as we approach Hauerwas. However, I find it a too limiting view of his work. While his
focus is on the Christian, at least some of his thought is too valuable to stay within that narrow focus.
Moreover, he consistently advocates that Christians participate in wider peace movements, and from
time to time he breaks out of that self-imposed limitation. In fairness to his work, however, it is
important to keep in mind that my use o f Hauerwas is different from his intended purpose.
For Hauerwas, it is the life, death and resurrection of Jesus that makes Christian ethics distinct.
However, Hauerwas is well aware that the church has been guilty o f separating its supposed “faith in
Jesus” from the actual social significance of Jesus. Hauerwas claims that any Christology that allows
such a separation is deficient. For Hauerwas, Jesus is worthy o f worship because of his social
significance— Jesus’ story is a social ethic.4 Hauerwas is aware that some label his work as
“provocative,” “outrageous” and even “careless.” He claims it is not that we fail to understand Paul
correctly when we interpret scripture, it is that we fail to live as Christians, which he says requires
nonviolence and reconciliation.5
In contrast to liberalism’s action-based ethics, Hauerwas’ approach is virtue theory. Liberalism
uses a combination o f deontologica! and teleological approaches to make its moral evaluations.
While a deontological approach evaluates action based on their conformity to principles and a
4Stanley Hauerwas, A Community o f Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic
(Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1981), 37.
5 Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture (Nashville: Abingdon, 1993), 7-8.
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teleological approach evaluates them based on their consequences, both are action-based because
they evaluate whether an action is ethical based on principles or outcomes respectively. In contrast,
Hauerwas argues that the moral life cannot be reduced to actions and must focus on the character of
the moral agent. The gospel’s approach goes further than the actions of individuals and explores
“the nature of the self and how it is formed for our life project.”6 As a virtue ethicist, Hauerwas
believes the question “What ought I be?” is primary and comes before the question “What ought I to
do?” While the virtue approach is central to Hauerwas, it is not likely to have much value for an
ethic o f nonproliferation in terms o f national action, and so we will look at other areas of Hauerwas’
thought.
Hauerwas suggests that U.S. Christians have always been mistaken when assuming that
America was a Christian nation and that Christians were in control. Such a view was nothing but an
illusion which can no longer be sustained. Contrary to most, Hauerwas rejoices in the end o f this
Constantinian world view. He submits that this final break between church and state means that the
American church is now free to be the church.7 Hauerwas’ provocative approach challenges one’s
approach to most subjects. Nuclear proliferation is no exception.
B. John Howard Yoder
The church can be a foretaste o f the peace fo r which the world was made. It is
the function o f minority communities to remember and to create utopian visions.
There is no hope fo r a society without an awareness o f transcendence.
Transcendence it kept alive not on the grounds o f logical proof to the effect that
there is a cosmos with a hereafter, but by the vitality o f communities in which a
different way o f being keeps breaking in here and now*
6 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Norte Dame, IN:
Fides, 1974), 1.
7 Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens (Nashville: Abingdon, 1989), 17-
18.
8 John H. Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics As Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1984), 94.
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John Howard Yoder was bom in a small town in Ohio and in 1927 he received his bachelor’s
degree in Bible from Goshen College, a Mennonite institution o f higher education in Indiana.
Following World War II, Yoder served in the overseas relief work o f the Mennonite Central
Committee from 1949-1957 and administered the overseas program o f the Mennonite Board o f
Missions from 1959-1965. In 1962 he received his Doctorate in Theology from the University of
Basel in Switzerland. Until his recent death, he was very much an academic, serving as a professor
from 1965-1984 at Goshen Biblical Seminary, part o f the Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminaries.
He also served as President o f Goshen from 1970-1973. He then held guest professorships in Buenos
Aires and Strasbourg. Then from 1977 until his death in 1998 he was a professor at Notre Dame
University. John Howard Yoder died December 30, 1998, the morning after celebrating his 70*
birthday.
Yoder has been a prolific writer, and his words helped shape my commitment to peace as I
encountered his writings as a youth and young adult. Coming from a tradition that others often label
sectarian, Yoder is an ecumenist. Yoder was a very unassuming person who usually sat in the back
o f the room at professional meetings such as the American Academy o f Religion and the Society of
Christian Ethics. Stanley Hauerwas notes Yoder usually knew more about the topic than those
making presentations at scholarly meetings. Such was undoubtably the case when I noticed him in
the back row when I made my first presentation at a national conference. Yoder helped shape the
field of Christian peacemaking, and he is already deeply missed.
Yoder rejects, as do post-modernists, the modernist search for foundations. For Yoder social
ethics is the gospel, and the church should be a form of social ethics.’ Yoder’s theology is
Christocentric and arises from a community seeking to follow Jesus, who is absolutely central to the
community. Consequently, his approach to ethics requires conversion to Christianity and cannot
’Michael G. Cartwright, “Radical Catholicity,” Christian Century 115, no. 2 (21 January 1998):
45.
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easily be used by non-Christians. Christians are to follow Christ even when it appears foolish to
non-Christians. Therefore, Yoder’s pacifism may not be very useful across cultural or perhaps even
denominational lines. Yoder believes that God’s people are to be the Christian’s first commitment
as Christians are more closely related to each other around the globe than they are to non-Christians
within their own land.1 0 Consequently, for constructing an ethic o f nonproliferation we have many
o f the same difficulties with Yoder as with Hauerwas. While we must use Yoder with care, if we
ignore him we do it at our own peril since, like Hauerwas, Yoder has much to offer.
Two sources shape Yoder’s ethics: Christian tradition and the Bible. He focuses on history and
tradition as a source for ethics in his book The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel.1 ' While
the focus o f the book is broad, it includes the history of pacifism and the just war tradition. Even
though pacifism was the early leader in Christian thought and no council or a pope has ever made
the just war tradition the official teaching, the just war tradition now dominates and pacifism has
been crowded to the fringes. Moreover, says Yoder, the just war tradition has never been studied
seriously nor has it ever been applied consistently.1 2
Yoder argues biblical reflection and exegesis is the second central source of ethics. As a result,
Jesus’ nonresistant love is Yoder’s paradigm for social ethics. Yoder focuses on scripture in his
book The Politics o f Jesus.'3 Yoder’s central thesis in The Politics o f Jesus is that Jesus is the model
for political action and that modem biblical scholarship helps us hear the story of Jesus more clearly
so that we can see its relevance.1 4 He argues that scripture calls the believer to suffering
1 0 John H. Yoder, “Living the Disarmed Life: Christ’s Strategy for Peace,” in A Matter o f Faith: A
Study Guide fo r Churches on the Nuclear Arms Race (Washington, DC: Sojourners, 1981), 42.
"John H. Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics As Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University o f
Notre Dame Press, 1984).
l2 Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom, 75-79.
,3 John H. Yoder, The Politics o f Jesus {Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972).
l4 Yoder, The Politics o f Jesus, 12.
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servanthood. Yoder, like Daniel Berrigan (whom we will look at next) has a theology o f the cross.
Love for friend and enemy will lead to hostility and suffering for the Christian as it did for Jesus.
The Christian loves the enemy because it is God’s command; they need no other reason.1 5 So, for
Yoder, the call o f discipleship is to accept defeat rather than to be in complicity with evil.1 6 Such a
radical and narrowly Christian ethic cannot be the basis for a global ethic o f nonproliferation nor the
basis for U.S. policy. However, Yoder’s thought still can contribute to an ethic of nonproliferation.
C. Daniel Berrigan
On the walls o f our religious communities both here and in Latin America are
photos o f murdered priests, priests who have been imprisoned, priests under
torture, priests who stood somewhere because they believed in something. Those
faces haunt my days. And I ask m yself how I can be wishy-washy in face o f
such example, example o f my own lifetime, my own age. 1 7
Daniel Berrigan has been an activist in numerous peace campaigns including protests against
the Vietnam War, anti-nuclear activities and work against U.S. intervention in Central America.
According to the editors o f Sojourners magazine, Berrigan has long recommended the clothing o f
prison as proper clerical garb for himself and recommends likewise to others in the church. In an
allusion to his theology of the cross, Berrigan says if one is to follow Jesus "you had better look good
on wood.” And so it is not surprising that he has violated the law and been arrested over and over
for his protests o f war. Yet the editors o f Sojourners conclude that one misunderstands Berrigan if
one sees it simply as a life of resistance. They insist his life is actually more focused on celebration.1 8
1 5 Yoder, “Living the Disarmed Life,” 40-42.
,6Yoder, The Politics o f Jesus, 243-245.
I7 Jim Wallis, ed., Peacemakers: Christian Voices From the New Abolitionist Movement (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 148.
I8 “We Could Not, So Help Us God, Do Otherwise,” Sojourners, November-December 1995, 60.
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When I was first becoming more involved in the peace movement, Daniel Berrigan was both a
model and challenge to me. His writings convinced me that resistance was part of the Christian
calling o f peacemaking. As I studied, reflected upon and prayed about the exploding nuclear arms
race during the 1970s and 1980s, I became convinced that my resistance to this great evil was
necessary. At the time, I was a public high school teacher in Omaha, Nebraska. Near Omaha lay
Offutt Airforce base, at which the Strategic Air Command, the command center of U.S. nuclear
forces, was headquartered. I participated in a wonderful resistance community, and twice I illegally
crossed the white line demarcating the boundary o f the airforce base. In neither case were the
consequences great; each time military officials detained and fingerprinted me, took my mug-shot
and then issued a “ban and bar” letter prohibiting me from entering the base for the next five years.
Still, consequences of crossing the line a second time included possible federal prosecution, and I
spent a few anxious months wondering what my school district would do if I were one o f those the
government selected for trial. I had made the decision to cross the line because the writings of
people such as Berrigan had urged me down that path.
Because Daniel Berrigan is a poet rather than a systematic theologian, his writing style can be
very difficult to follow. Even his prose contains elements of poetry. Subjects may be identified
paragraphs or pages back, or left intentionally vague. While at times the clarity is problematic,
Berrigan’s writing remains compelling because it is full of passion, feeling, emotion and color. He
relays his faith, theology and ethics as growing out o f his life. Still, it is not just experience that has
shaped his thinking; trained a Jesuit, both biblical writings and church tradition have become part o f
Berrigan’s being. Still, for Berrigan, it has been a process; his critical reflections-random and
miscellaneous-are still directed. His autobiography, To Dwell in Peace,'9 is very helpful in
understanding Berrigan and his thought.
,9Daniel Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace: An Autobiography (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).
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Daniel Berrigan was bom o f Irish and German descent in 1921 in the Iron Range of Minnesota,
though later transplanted to upstate New York. Family life was brutal, and his father ruled with an
iron and dictatorial hand.2 0 Nevertheless, two important positive influences came from his family:
Independence and sharing what they had, though they were poor.2 1 Dorothy Day through her
newspaper and Charles Coughlin by radio both had honored places in the Berrigan household.2 2 The
seed o f peace was planted.
Berrigan chose the priesthood o f the Jesuit variety, and he went out to the Hudson valley where
he undertook study and ignored World War II. Then he went on to a Jesuit seminary, Woodstock, in
Maryland. Near the end o f the war, while sick in the hospital, Berrigan saw a newspaper article
announcing the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. In his own cryptic but image filled poetic style,
Berrigan writes, “I read, turned to ice or stone.”2 3 By this time his moral consciousness was well
underway.
The seeds of peace sprouted in his assignment as a professor in the theology department at
LeMoyne, a Jesuit college in Syracuse, New York. A friend just out of jail for tax resistance came to
Syracuse and together they started a Catholic Worker house.2 4 Berrigan began to speak up for
pacifism but his presiding bishop attacked him erroneously claiming that the just-war tradition was
official Catholic theology. Berrigan enlisted support of the faculty and won this contest. However,
his conflict with the college continued as Berrigan. his colleagues and students began to ask
questions about who was accountable for the poverty and slums in the area.
2 0 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 5-13.
2lRoss Labrie, The Writings o f Daniel Berrigan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1989), 2.
“ Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 70-71.
“ Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 105.
2 4 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 141.
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In the early 1960s, Berrigan renewed an earlier friendship with the famous Catholic mystic
Thomas Merton, and Merton deeply influenced the development o f Berrigan’s social thought. The
two corresponded regularly and saw each other at least once a year. Merton urged Berrigan to keep
up the contemplative life.
When Berrigan left LeMoyne college, he returned to New York assigned to the editorship of a
Jesuit magazine. There he began his antiwar work in earnest. In the February 1965 edition of the
Catholic Worker Berrigan, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Benjamin Spock signed a statement pledging
to obstruct the Vietnam War. Then, in the fall o f that same year, Berrigan agreed to co-chair the
then forming organization Clergymen Concerned About Vietnam (later called Clergy and Laity
Concerned). He co-chaired it with Rabbi Abraham Heschel of Jewish Theological Seminary. Other
important leaders o f the new organization included not only Martin Luther King, Jr., but also
Reinhold Niebuhr, William Sloane Coffin, Robert McAfee Brown, and Harvey Cox.
Berrigan’s antiwar work resulted in his banishment to Latin America in 1965. This so angered
Berrigan that he almost left his religious order. Nevertheless, Dorothy Day and Thomas Merton
counseled him into taking advantage o f this great opportunity.1 5 In Latin America, Berrigan found,
on the one hand, a pre-Medellin church “either internally colonized or virulently imperial.”1 6 On the
other hand, he also found “biblically alert Christians: Groups usually led by women, dwelling in
barrios and favellas, passionately loving, and beloved by the poor.”1 7
Berrigan’s prophetic tone intensified as he studied French Protestant theologian Jacques Ellul,
who had been a member of the French Resistance during World War II. Ellul rejected the violence
of both the status quo and revolution and forced Berrigan to reexamine his uncritical support o f the
left. As a result, Berrigan began to condemn actions of the North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union
“ Labrie, 19 & 73-75.
2 6 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 183.
1 7 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 184.
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as well as the United States.2 8 Since then, Berrigan has objected to any power that uses violence, and
he identifies nuclear weapons as the ultimate abomination.
D. Vincent Harding
Together we may stand in the river, transformed and transforming, listening to
its laughter and burning it with its tears, recognizing in that ancient flow the
indelible marks o f human blood, yet grounded and buoyed by hope, courage, and
unfathomable, amazing grace. Keeping the faith, creating new faith, we may
enter the terrible and magnificent struggle fo r the re-creation o f America.2 9
Vincent Harding is the fourth pacifist whose writings we explore. Harding, an associate o f
Martin Luther King, Jr. during the civil rights struggle, is professor of social transformation at Iliff
Theological Seminary in Denver, Colorado. Harding has a M.A. and a Ph.D. in history from the
University o f Chicago. A noted historian o f the civil rights movement, Harding was the senior
advisor to the Eyes on the Prize television series. A former student of Harding describes him as the
paradigmatic teacher who teaches wherever he finds himself, be it a classroom, the street, an airport
or a sharecropper’s shack.3 0 Along with his wife, Rosemary, Vincent Harding conducts workshops
which draw connections between personal spirituality and social responsibility.
Harding was raised in Harlem in a family and church that he calls close-knit and Bible centered.
In 1953, Vincent Harding was drafted and found himself in basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey.
While he had been raised in a church that urged its members to apply for conscientious objector or
noncombatant status, he saw the military as his ticket to see the world and providing other
opportunities not open to black men in society. His memories of basic training include having no
trouble of heart on the firing range as it seemed like a sport. However, once bayonet training began,
doubts began to arise. That process dehumanized both the “enemy” they were being trained to kill
2 8 Labrie, 179-180.
2 9 Vincent Harding, There Is a River (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1981), xxvi.
3 0 Vincent Harding, Hope and History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990), ix-x.
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and him and the other new soldiers, who were becoming something savage. As a child o f the church
he sought out the chaplain for advice. But the chaplain was o f little help, suggesting only that each
person had to work out the conflict between love and killing for themselves.
After his two years o f service, Harding became a graduate student of history at the University of
Chicago. It was there that he discovered the Anabaptists and their commitment to the self-
sacrificing love and the nonviolence o f Christ. This all came together when a local Mennonite
church came to him and asked him to be part of a team that would apply the teachings o f peace to
the racial conflicts o f the day. He went with his wife and mission partner Rosemary in 1961 to the
South to work full-time in the civil rights movement under the sponsorship of the Mennonites.3 1 The
movement o f history was alive in this experience, and it left an indelible mark upon him.
Participating in this effort was his attempt to break free o f the mentality of the Cold War and the
silent generation o f the 1950s. For Harding it was joining Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther
King in the global anti-colonialism struggle. Although Vincent Harding had first met Martin Luther
King in 1958 at King’s home in Montgomery, the Hardings became friends with the Kings during
this time.3 2 For Harding his time in the heart of the struggle was a joining with the rich heritage of
his black ancestors’ struggle for freedom, and he began to understand himself in a river that
stretches back through the centuries. There is a connection between past, present, and future.
Harding’s writings are powerfully inclusive. His words grab anyone who cares about freedom
and justice and peace, and he encourages them to be part o f that same river. He is always the teacher
and his explorations o f pedagogy in his writing have profoundly influenced me. Moreover, he is a
man of vision who continually pushes us not to let our vision be limited by what is possible. For he
sees that those who struggle for a better world continually make the impossible become not only
3 1 Wallis, 85-89.
3 2 Vincent Harding, Martin Luther King: The Inconvenient Hero (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996),
128.
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possible but real. His vision calls all to join in. Yet that inclusion arises out of the particular-the
story of black people seeking to be free.
After years on the front lines in the civil rights struggle, Harding began teaching at Spelman
College in Atlanta, one o f the historically black colleges o f the Atlanta area. These colleges created
a center for black culture and intellect in the South that did much to instill in him and his students
the value o f black culture.3 3 During this time Harding and his wife, Rosemary. lived around the
comer from the King household.3 '1
After the assassination o f Martin Luther King in 1968, Coretta Scott King asked Harding to be
the first director o f what would become the Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Center in Atlanta. In
that role he collected historical documentation of the freedom movement. This caused him to return
to people, places and events that he had experienced in the movement during the early 1960s and
helped him to see “the need to keep faith with its unique sources, its people, and their vision.”3 5
What emerges from his work is the conviction that the freedom movement is a river that we all need
to study.
Harding does not do historical research as an objective scholar but as a scholar committed to
human liberation. He believes that telling the story of faithful people who have given their lives in
service to the black freedom straggle in the United States is crucial. His is not an exclusionary tale,
but in this particularity he sees a gift to all people. He states, “At its best the river of our straggle has
moved consistently toward the ocean of humankind’s most courageous hopes for freedom and
integrity.”3 6 He notes that his approach to history, which is writing for the future, is not always
popular within the academy. However, he passionately believes in the need for vision that this
3 3 Harding, There Is a River, xiii & xv-xvi.
3 4 Harding, Martin Luther King, 128.
3 5 Harding, There Is a R'rver, xviii.
3 6 Harding, There Is a River, xix.
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approach to history can provide. He says we need such a vision to transcend history. Without it we
are damned to hopelessness and terror.
Harding seeks not just to tell the story of the past but to help people understand the meaning for
the present and the future. Unlike many historians, Harding focuses on the role that religion and
spirituality play in history and in the freedom movement. Harding claims that at the root of much of
our social malaise is a lack o f understanding of the power and importance o f spirituality. Human
beings, he has come to understand, are spiritual beings. He notes that when Martin Luther King
talked about the need to redeem America’s soul he and many others smiled in a patronizing manner.
Now Harding is convinced that King was right.3 7
In the development o f an ethic o f nonproliferation, Harding provides a historical approach
which embodies a vision for the unlimited possibilities of the future. Moreover, Harding will help us
to see the power o f spirituality and religion and also the power o f people working for a better world.
This effort can use those gifts.
E. James W. Douglass
The life o f the living is a suffering with the world, y e t not as a passive victim but
suffering in resistance and in love, experiencing the darkness o f crucifixion
without surrendering the hope and strength and revolution o f resurrection.3 8
Finally, we will look at the writings of pacifist James W. Douglass. Douglass, a native of British
Columbia, Canada, has been both activist and teacher. While Douglass is clearly a western writer,
he dialogs with eastern thought, especially that of Mohandas Gandhi. Douglass often focuses on
nuclear issues and, in that respect, is closest to this topic. Moreover, since anti-nuclear activism was
my entry into the peace movement, I am naturally drawn to this fellow traveler.
3 7 Harding, There Is a River, xi-xiii & xxii-xxiii.
3 8 James W. Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross (London: MacMillan, 1968), 3.
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Douglass, and his spouse Shelley, are best known for their campaign against the Trident missile
and submarine and the creation o f the Ground Zero Center in the state o f Washington. These efforts
began when a Lockheed missile designer resigned, claiming his work was creating a dangerous first-
strike weapon. This move led to the creation of the Pacific Life Community, which resisted the
Trident through public education and direct action. The community tried to live nonviolently both
personally and politically.
By 1978-1979 the work o f the Pacific Life Community had led to a broad-based campaign that
brought thousands to the base where hundreds risked arrest. However, hostility in the local
community grew against the demonstrators. Nine people in the Pacific Life Community responded
by forming the Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action on a piece of land adjoining the Trident
base. Ground Zero’s purpose was to give a permanent presence and to establish friendship with
those on the other side. Long term relationships were developed with people at the base. Weekly
leaf-letting was done for more than nine years. Some workers resigned, and others took actions of
support.
Over time trains began to deliver the warheads and other missile parts to the base. In response
the Agape Community developed between Salt Lake and Bangor. This later expanded all the way to
the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. This “white train” movement, named for the color o f the trains
which carried the weapons, tracked and resisted the trains. Their tactics included sitting on the
tracks.3 9
Douglass credits his teachers at Santa Clara University in California for beginning his journey
o f critical reflection on war and peace. He also credits Dorothy Day and her Catholic Worker
movement for giving him a love o f the church and truer understanding of what it means to be
3 9 Jim Douglass and Shelley Douglass, Dear Gandhi, Now What? (Philadelphia: New Society,
1988), 3-6.
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Catholic. He also acknowledges Thomas Merton, who taught him the power that contemplation has
in the world.
Douglass’ position comes from Christian natural law, in which he concludes that nonviolence is
an imperative o f reason. However, unlike some forms of natural law. he argues that the ethical life
cannot ignore human dependence on God. He acknowledges the fallen nature o f humans and the
need for grace so one can live nonviolently. This is an alternative understanding of natural law of
which the dominant version usually sees violence and war as necessary in a sinful world that violates
rights. Douglass turns this around, saying violence and war are suffering which come from sin, and
what Christ provides through love is the redemptive way of nonviolence. Nonviolence is God’s way
lived out in the world. Christians therefore should continue to push the state to go one step closer to
the cross. Every disarmament agreement and every attempt to lessen international tension is a step
of faith. Then the Christian tells the state to try another step/1 0 If Harding provides vision and
history, Douglass adds method to an ethic o f nonproliferation.
II. Pacifist Vision
In exploring the thought of these five thinkers, a number o f helpful ideas have emerged. The
method here is to take these ideas and combine them with other ideas in constructing an ethic of
nonproliferation. Pacifists help us deconstruct the ideology of war which is so prevalent in political
discussions. Pacifists also remind us to consider the “least of these,” or those who are without power
when making policy decisions. Moreover, pacifist suggest that real change requires the creation of
community. Communities that will be the agent of change as well as the development of an
international community which will look to less violent ways to solve problems. The creation of
vision is an important contribution which pacifists provide to this discussion. O f course, the central
idea provided by pacifism is nonviolence. Indeed, these writers argue that true security must be
'’“Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, viii & 211-213.
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based on nonviolence. While realists have often labeled them as such, pacifists are not utopian, and
so another concept they offer an ethic o f nonproliferation is the need to take faithful risks. Finally,
we will explore the specific ideas which pacifists offer to discussions o f nuclear issues.
A. Analysis of the Ideology of War
1. Countering War’ s Moral Claim
Daniel Berrigan served as a special consultant and had a “bit” part in the powerful motion
picture The Mission. The movie forced Berrigan to reflect upon nonviolence in a non-North
American context. The movie climaxes when two Jesuit priests must choose between fighting with
the oppressed native peoples against the church-sanctioned European army or to stand with other
noncombatant (but soon to be massacred) natives in their villages. It is an apt metaphor of the
choice that concerned people in an unjust world must make.
As the army is about to attack and destroy the mission village o f native people and faithful
priests, the choice is how to die. Gabriel dies with the sacrament in hand, refusing to resist in any
violent manner. Berrigan states that, “Gabriel dies. So did Martin Luther King and Gandhi and
Stephen Biko and Archbishop Romero and uncounted thousands o f others o f our lifetime, for whom
retribution, even so-called self defense, is equally anathema.”4 1 Mendoza, the other priest, takes up a
rifle to defend himself and the natives. The film lifts up the choice between violence and
nonviolence in a stark manner. Here the result for each will be the same, neither will be effective.
In the end both priests and all the natives are slaughtered.
Yet, is only one choice right? Berrigan, unfortunately, sees the choice as obvious rather than
ambiguous and sees Mendoza as one who
stands with all who take up the sword as a matter of principle, o f despair, of
communism or anticommunism, o f faith gone wrong, of chivalry, o f plain worldly
4 1 Daniel Berrigan, The Mission: A Film Journal (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986), 20.
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logic. His name is legion. It is ideology and power politics and ‘ just war’ theory
and deterrence and window o f vulnerability .4 2
Berrigan concludes “the choices in either case are not large, but in any Christian sense they are
worlds apart.”4 3
Berrigan powerfully sets the stage for our reflection on the issues o f nuclear proliferation. Yet
perhaps his example is so clear that it makes things confused. The choices, when taken to the global
level o f nuclear politics, are neither this neat nor clear-cut. For instance, his example is too neat in
that the worldly consequences for either choice are identical. For most policy choices the likely
consequences are subject to debate, and it is unlikely that they are either identical or equivalent. Yet
Berrigan does put forth the important issue which seems to only come from pacifists: Is there
something deeper going on than a simple choice to pick up the sword (or a gun) or to lay it down?
Pacifists posit an understanding that war is itself an ideology which needs to be exposed in order
to counter the ethos that justifies violence as necessary to protect important values. Understanding
war as an ideology helps to explain why people so easily accept the necessity o f war and its
preparation. War is powerful, ideologically, primarily because it presents itself and is experienced as
having a moral purpose. Some pacifists seem to miss this reality, and those promoting nonviolence
or less-violent methods make a serious error if they simply label war as evil. In truth, the fact that
we call it “war” rather than “murder,” which has no moral legitimacy, implies its morality.
James Douglass notes that in 1910 William James published an essay arguing that humanity
needs a moral equivalent to war because war is rooted in human instinct and, at the same time, is
both terribly self-destructive and the source o f many virtues. Douglass suggests that the moral
4 2 Berrigan, The Mission, 20.
4 3 Berrigan, The Mission, 126.
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equivalent is a revolution o f peace.'1 4 Douglass provides a viable alternative to violent choices in
part because he addresses the moral purpose that violence seeks to serve.
Hauerwas also insists that pacifists have often oversimplified the role o f war. To begin with, in
war average people learn to sacrifice themselves for a larger good. So war is not simply individual
violence magnified, it is an instrument of a people’s power. War is the violence a people uses to
strike out against other powers. Therefore, says Hauerwas, war is not in essence violence but power.
Pacifists so often point to the horror of war and then seem mystified that their rhetoric gets no
attention. Hauerwas explains that horror is not central for most people, if the war is serving a moral
purpose.4 5
Douglass argues that while war may primarily be concerned with killing, it also involves
suffering. The cross teaches of the redemptive power o f suffering, and so in some way the cross is
present in war. However, the moral status of war is confused. For instance, we send soldiers to kill
but praise them for sacrificing for us. Douglass concludes, “We wish to have the protection o f the
Roman soldiers but in the image of Christ crucified. The truth is that the soldier in war is both
executioner and victim, both Pilate and Christ.”4 6 Therefore, pacifism argues that we must remove
ourselves from this contradiction and objects to the just war position because it is inconsistent with
Christianity. Douglass finds it hypocritical that Christianity proclaims peace yet prepares for and
engages in warfare, supposedly based on Christian principles.4 7
Yet, despite our warring history, humans are not natural killers. Indeed, says Hauerwas, the
evidence indicates that even in wartime humans are reluctant to kill. In World War I, 40 percent of
4 4 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 253.
4 5 Stanley Hauerwas, Should War Be Eliminated? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984),
2-9, 23 & 30.
4 6 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 247-248.
4 7 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 141.
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the soldiers in combat never fired their weapons. Yet, the intense bonds made between comrades
during wartime keep soldiers from fleeing their duty. So even in combat humans learn they are not
violent on behalf o f themselves but for the love of others. Killing to protect others seems to fit the
just war idea, which is based not on defending oneself but on defending others. Crucial to
Hauerwas’ understanding o f the appeal of violence is the conviction that it is based not in ourselves
but in all that we love. So when the soldier goes to war to protect families and neighbors, this seems
morally right. And cowardice seems wrong because it places one’s self-interest o f survival above
love for others.4 8
Because suffering in war is undertaken for community, both the wider community and fellow
combatants, the outward sign may be extreme violence, but extraordinary care and sacrifice mark the
inward character. This helps to explain why former soldiers speak warmly o f the experience of war.
It may be the only time in their lives that they have experienced such communion. Nevertheless, the
fact that war is built on a contradiction between the internal beloved community and outward killing
has ethical significance. Moreover, such an understanding o f the nature of war identifies one way to
counter the ideology o f war: Engage in nonviolent struggles which create similar communal and
bonding events.
Douglass adds another dimension, arguing that war is best understood not as human aggression
magnified but rather as organized violence. There may be some involvement o f instinct, but the key
is that the state sanctions it. Psychological studies show that hate and aggression are less common
feelings among soldiers than fear, homesickness and boredom. In addition, if natural hate were the
true motivating factor there would be no need for conscription. Fundamentally, soldiers kill because
they are told to do so.4 9 So, pacifism questions the level of obedience one should have to the state.
Christian pacifism makes it clear that the state should never be one’s highest level o f commitment.
4 8 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 117-119.
4 9 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 242-243 & 250.
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During the Vietnam War era, Martin Luther King came to the conclusion that the federal
government was part o f the military-industrial complex which had no interest in compassion.
Vincent Harding argues that by the end of King’s life, King saw systemic evils in America and how
these structures were built on oppression o f the world’s poor. King marveled that Christians could
object to his work against the Vietnam War. After all, Jesus was the Prince o f Peace who died for
his enemies. Harding argues that King was seeking to push people to a deeper level o f freedom.5 0
Such understandings o f freedom also press the need to explore the individual’s level o f obedience to
the state.
Hauerwas, insists that Christians must counter the moral claim of war by admitting that while
war has controlled our history, it should not have. Because God has inaugurated a new history in
Jesus Christ, we are freed from our previous assumption that we have no alternatives to war.5 1 While
Hauerwas himself sees his ethic as binding only on Christians, his sharp criticism o f U.S.
Christianity’s distortion o f the gospel reminds everyone not only that alternatives to war exist but
that a war ideology is deeply ingrained in every person’s psyche.
Pacifist thought also helps to see how quickly a war ideology dismisses pacifism and
nonviolence. John Howard Yoder notes that just war advocates and others reinforce the morality of
war by pointing to the warrior-God of the Old Testament accounts instructing the Israelites to
engage in war. He counters that careful biblical scholarship actually undermines this interpretation.
Often Israel does not fight at all, and even when they do it is not their swords but God who provides
the victory. Yoder suggests that properly understood these scriptures prohibit reliance on military
power, a view completely at odds with those who use these scriptures to justify war making.5 2
S 0 Harding, Martin Lather King, 50-51 & 55.
5lHauerwas, Should War Be Eliminated? 2-9, 23 & 30.
5 2 Yoder, The Politics o f Jesus, 78-83
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War ideology also attacks pacifism by posing cases which lead many people to conclude that,
because they would use violence in those situations, they must reject pacifism altogether. The most
common case asks, “ What would you do if a criminal pulled out a weapon and threatened your
children or wife?” The consistency of pacifism is put at stake here since to answer that one would
defend one’s family members seems at odds with pacifism. Yoder counters by insisting that it is not
a fair analogy to warfare and that pacifists could answer this question in a variety o f ways and still be
pacifists.
Yoder also reveals several erroneous comparisons o f such a question. First, the analogy
incorrectly assumes that a single actor’s single decision is the determinant of what will occur. Such
a question places the emphasis on one person who decides to fight or not to fight. In contrast,
decisions in wartime involve a multitude o f actors, and one individual’s decision not to use violence
will not prove critical to the war. A second erroneous comparison of the question is the amount of
control. The question assumes that one person is in control o f the outcome and could stop the
attacker if he or she chose to do so. Yoder points out that even the just war tradition, in its criterion
of probable success, acknowledges the possible inability to control the outcome, but the question does
not. Often those who oppose pacifism use Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s participation in an assassination
attempt on Hitler as an example of a situation which demands violence. However, they ignore that
Bonhoeffer’s attack failed and made the Nazis more paranoid.
A third faulty comparison is knowledge. Yoder points out that this “what if ’ scenario assumes
the decision-maker has full and reliable information which is rarely available in war time and may
not even be available in this hypothetical case. Fourth is its assumption that consequences are
primarily personal. The question assumes that decisions and consequences are individual matters,
when in war they are not. Decisions in war are social in nature and have social consequences.
Moreover, although the decision in this case would also have social consequences, the case is framed
so such considerations will be ignored.
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The fifth assumption which Yoder identifies in the case is righteousness. The question assumes
the righteousness o f the person who would respond to the attack and then allows that person to
become judge, jury and executioner. The sixth assumption o f the analogy is to ignore alternative
causes. There may be reasons why the other party is acting the way that he or she is, which in turn
may elicit different responses. Perhaps the other person is simply looking for bread for his children.
Perhaps this is an oppressed person who needs to rise up for justice.
While Yoder effectively undermines the analogy on conceptual grounds, because this is such a
common attack on pacifism, he counters it in other ways. He notes that it is not by accident that the
case presumes the moral actor is a man by asking what one would do if someone attacks “your wife
and children.” Yoder says the example reveals its sexism not so much because it uses a false
generic, but because it questions the manliness of men who do not respond with violence. Moreover,
he argues that it is only egoism if I defend my wife or my children, for that case assumes that I do
not have the same responsibility to defend the wives and children of (for instance) Iraqis. I am to
defend my wife and children not because they are my neighbors, but because they are mine.
Yoder points out other differences between waging war and using violence against this
individual attacker. If violence is used against the individual attacker, it is used against the guilty
person. This is not so in war. With an individual attacker we live under the same laws, and if I
choose self-defense there will be a legal review of my action, and I risk punishment if my action does
not conform to the standard. This is not true in war. If the attack occurs in my home, I am clearly
the legitimate authority. During war, aggression is not so clear, and defenders rarely stay within
their own boundaries. There are also differences in preparation. While defending one’s home
requires minimal preparation, waging war requires huge investments of time, money and lives.
Another difference concerns escalation. If I kill the attacker, it is unlikely that escalation will take
place. If a nation uses violence, the scope of escalation is unknown. Yoder’s conclusion is that
individual self-defense and war are not analogous situations.
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Yoder points out further problems with the analogy including that the question o f “what would
you do?” is put forward as a question with two alternatives: either the criminal attacker will be
successful or the defender will be successful. The critic o f pacifism assumes that the defender must
prevent the success o f the attacker at all costs and that the attack will be successful unless
intervention stops it. In reality, there are a number o f possible outcomes. For example, there is the
possibility of martyrdom. Perhaps if the victim is martyred, others will work to create a world where
violent attacks cease to happen. Perhaps as the defender I can refocus the attack on myself and allow
the others to avoid the attack by becoming the martyr myself. In addition, there may be ways other
tlian killing to stop the attacker. For example, one might disarm the attacker emotionally with a
loving gesture, or use nonlethal force or deception. Also, for Christians, says Yoder, there is the
belief that God may choose to intervene on our behalf. Finally, Yoder points out, a possible outcome
is that the attempt to kill the attacker may prove unsuccessful, in which case violence does not
produce a better outcome. Yoder’s complete analysis o f the hypothetical case reals the incomplete
analysis often done by those who advocate violent responses to situations.
According to Yoder, Christians have more than simply an ethical system which they do not want
to break. Christians have a life of faith they want to share. Yoder argues that the key ethical
question Christians must answer is not “How can 1 avoid doing wrong?” nor even “How do I do
right?” but rather “How can I be a reconciling presence?” Such a commitment radically changes
how one approaches the hypothetical case. For a Christian, to bear the martyrs cross is to follow
God’s way in the world.5 3 Yoder reminds us that Christians continually affirm the ultimate authority
of Jesus but act contrary to the very nature of Jesus.
We call a nonviolent man “Lord” and in his name rekindle the arms race. We call
a poor man “Lord” and with his name on our lips deepen the ditch between rich
and poor. We call “Lord” a man who told us to love our enemies and we polarize
5 3 John H. Yoder, What Would You Do? Expanded ed. (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1992), 11-21,
25-29 & 38-41.
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the globe in the name o f Christian values, approving o f “moderate repression” as
long as it is done by our friends.5 4
Yoder leaves us with a stark reminder o f how different from the way o f the world is the Christian
way and how often we fail to notice that we are on the wrong path because the ideology of war has
captured us.
Realism has assumed that war is the only effective way to counter the threat of an enemy.
Pacifism suggests that such a view is not based on objective reality but on a warped view under the
spell o f the ideology of war. Pacifism suggests that, freed from these ideological blinders, the
effectiveness o f nonviolence can be seen. Clearly, countering the ideology o f war requires a
paradigm shift precisely because war supports the moral purposes o f protecting loved ones and
providing security. Hauerwas and other pacifists would like to counter the legitimacy of such goals.
That may be possible within Christianity. However, in our wider ethic being developed here,
perhaps a more helpful alternative is to counter the means (violence and war) rather than the goals.
In other words, while we will work within the goals of security and protecting family and nation, we
will take seriously what pacifist thought makes clear: If we are to survive and end the threat that
nuclear weapons hold upon us, we must make radical changes. However, this is something we must
do if we are to protect family and nation. Pacifism starts us on that journey.
2. Countering Realism
In the Cuban missile crisis Nikita Khrushchev backed down and removed the Soviet missiles
from Cuba. President Kennedy later admitted that if he had backed down like Khrushchev had,
Congress would have impeached him. This is a very frightening comment, for it shows that
avoiding global nuclear conflict is not nearly as important as being macho and playing the tough
guy. It appears that what masquerades as realism is really about power, no matter how unrealistic.
5 4 Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom, 195.
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James Douglass marks the Cuban missile crisis as the end o f Christian political theory because both
the political realism employed by Protestant and secular thinkers and also modem Catholic
scholasticism failed to notice the absurdity of this nuclear confrontation. Consequently, Douglass
concludes that the absurd crisis reduced Christian political theory itself to absurdity. Christian
political theory had long accepted violence as a normal but regrettable part o f state affairs, and
Douglass admits at times Christian political theory has had positive effects. But, he insists, violence
has limited Christianity far more than Christianity has limited violence. Douglass thus concludes
that if Christian political theory is to be resurrected it must address the nuclear issue, the very one
that put the nail in its coffin.5 5 The work o f constructing an ethic o f nonproliferation is an attempt to
confront the nuclear issue using Christian theology. Consequently, it is a small step in the process of
resurrecting Christian political theory.
Political and religious realism were captured by war’s ideology. Mohandas Gandhi consistently
rejected state violence, but once India gained its independence the new state immediately abandoned
nonviolence. As a result, the question of whether a ruling power can be nonviolent remains
historically untested. James Douglass concludes that nonviolent statecraft is impossible as long as
the state engages in global exploitation and an extreme disparity in the distribution of wealth and
resources exists. Nonviolence cannot defend such a regime against just counter claims and attacks.
So, he says, at present nonviolence is only compatible with the politics of protest and revolution.
This is a crucial warning for an ethic of nonproliferation. It cannot be pacific. Douglass’ analysis
does not render nonviolent approaches to nuclear proliferation foolish or useless. Instead, his
analysis shows that nations such as the United States cannot hope to have a completely nonviolent
defense until there is a just global distribution o f wealth. In addition, it reminds us that nonviolent
responses are not only the most ethical but may well be the most effective option in many situations.
The threat of nuclear proliferation is likely to be one such case.
5 5 DougIass, The Non-Violent Cross, 260-261 & 266-270.
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Although it has shaped him, Stanley Hauerwas rejects realism. In his move toward pacifism,
Hauerwas became troubled with the implicit support that Reinhold Niebuhr’s thought gave to
maintaining a balance o f power. In the end Hauerwas concluded that, although Niebuhr provided
important critiques o f optimistic liberalism and romanticism, Niebuhr became merely another
liberal*
Hauerwas goes so far as to conclude that war is central to liberal democracies because war gives
the state the necessary self-worth needed to sustain itself. Hauerwas claims that the Enlightenment
was responsible not only for the atomic bomb but also our ability to use it without guilt. Moreover,
because of the Enlightenment and the rise of democracy, it is now considered acceptable for the
common person to die for the nation because the common person now believes it is his or her
country.5 7
In his assessment of the Gulf War, Hauerwas argues that arguments about the Gulf War reveal
the weakness o f Paul Ramsey’s attempt to wed Niebuhr’s realism with just war criteria. The
problem can be traced to the American understanding that World War II was a just war, which is
defined as one in which a nation can use any means to win because its reasons for fighting are just.
That, of course, is not what the just war tradition says. Instead, by neglecting the jus en bello
criteria, the definition is more in line with the crusade tradition.
Hauerwas claims we fought the Gulf War as realists shaped by a Cold War crusade mentality.
He suggests that American Christians backed the war because they had no real understanding of
what serious reflection about war means.S 8 Hauerwas did see realists defending the Gulf War who
claimed they were doing just war analysis. However, any serious exploration o f their view, says
5 6 StanIey Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame, 1983), xxiii.
5 7 Hauerwas and Willimon, 35 & 100.
5 8 StanIey Hauerwas, “Whose Just War? Which Peace?,” in But Was It Just?: Reflections on the
Morality o f the Persian G ulf War., ed. David E DeCosse (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 92-95.
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Hauerwas, must place them outside that tradition. Though a pacifist, Hauerwas has always
maintained that it would be a good step if America actually used just war analysis. With the G ulf
War he concludes that, in truth, America prefers crusades: “Thus Americans always want to fight
wars to defend such abstract notions as freedom and democracy or, in special fits o f hubris, to fight
wars to end all wars.”5 9 One o f the tools that pacifists offer to this work is the need to unmask false
claims of just war that are nothing more than crusade.
The difficulty with just war analysis in practice is that it is reduced to two options: America
goes to war, or America does not go to war. Hauerwas counters that such a reduction is a terrible
oversimplification of both the just war tradition and o f America’s options in a given situation. It also
ignores prior policy decisions which may have brought us to the point where only one option seems
to remain. For instance, the so-called just war discussions before the Gulf War ignored the fact that,
since the U.S. had long supported Saddam Hussein, the U.S. bore some responsibility for bringing us
to that point in time. So, says Hauerwas, the requirement that America intervene to resist aggression
is either an exaggeration or an outright lie. The U.S. does not intervene at every instance o f
aggression-it did not in Tibet or Afghanistan or East Timor. So why here? Moreover, President
Bush’s vilification of Saddam Hussein is an affront to the just war tradition, which seeks to
humanize, not demonize, the enemy. Hauerwas claims this is a clear example o f manipulating the
American people to think in ways that are not within the just war tradition.6 0
John Howard Yoder noticed that in discussions o f the Gulf War there was more use o f just war
language than perhaps any other war since the Civil War. The usual approach is to use the theory to
test a war to see if it is justified. Nevertheless, Yoder suggests that a war can also be used to test the
theory. When this is done the question becomes: Does the theory help facilitate our discussions
about war?
5 9 Hauerwas, “Whose Just War?” 89.
“ Hauerwas, “Whose Just War?” 98-101.
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Yoder notes that the just war check-list is problematic because items important to our values are
not on the list. For Yoder, loving one’s enemies is missing. Yoder also notes that the just war
tradition requires that decisions be based on empirically knowable information. Meeting this criteria
is made difficult, especially because in war information is controlled. The just war tradition was not
designed for democracies. In democracies, citizen participation in evaluations and decisions makes
limited access to information even more problematic. Moreover, genuine debate is questionable
because during times o f war debate is too easily seen as disloyal. Also problematic is what is always
true for casuistiy: Because the decision must be made at a specific point in time, a war is either just
or unjust at a specific moment. A strict adherence to the just war criteria ignores the longitudinal
nature o f all conflicts or even reality in general. Moreover, since in real life most decisions are
influenced by what went before and the events that follow, it is unclear how one should set deadlines
for decisions.
The Gulf War also reveals further problems with the just war tradition. Yoder suggests that the
claim for the United Nations as the legitimate authority is undermined by the destruction of Iraq,
which was not related to expelling them from Kuwait. Moreover, Yoder points out that, while the
language o f the just war tradition seems commonsense, there is little agreement on definitions o f the
terms, and the use of the tradition is so subject to bias that it fails to serve as an objective test. On
another level, Yoder suggests that the church has never prepared its members to make these difficult
decisions nor to object if they find the war unjust. Yoder argues that if the theory is to serve a
credible role these are requirements.
While Yoder questions the worth o f the just war tradition, he agrees that, along with pacifism, it
can be used to restrain the more unrestrained views that are common at war time. Moreover, the just
war tradition is clear that moral accountability does not stop when war begins; no matter what the
cause, the just war tradition makes it clear that we are never in a situation of “anything goes.” This
is not to say that Yoder is embracing the just war tradition. He rejects the just war tradition,
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suggesting it too often deceives people into thinking something has objectively been found ju st6 1
Chapter Two argued that the just war criteria can be useful tools in seeking ethical approaches to
nuclear proliferation. However, pacifists remind us that for the just war tradition to be useful it must
be freed from war ideology.
Douglass argues that the central problem with realism is that it has failed to deal with the end
time. Therefore, while realism should have quickly grasped that nuclear weapons could mean the
end of the world, it had so put eschatology on the level of myth that realism failed to recognize the
terminal nature of nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons, realism failed to be realistic.
Consequently, says Douglass, it failed to recognize the necessity o f nonviolence.6 2 In this case the
pacifists’ evaluation o f realism is that it ceased to be realistic and became war ideology since realism
was the theoretical basis for both deterrence and the nuclear arms race. In today’s world o f nuclear
proliferation, realism seems equally bent on various levels of force up to overwhelming force as the
method for reducing proliferation. This is not what should have happened if realism were being true
to itself. Realists have become so focused on notions o f power that they have ignored the reality of
what a single nuclear explosion can do. A true realist should see not only the need to escape the
absurdity of nuclear weapons but also refuse to rule out nonviolent means to such ends if they can be
effective.
3. War and Justice
The principle of justice on which the just war tradition is based has become a very popular idea
within liberal Christianity and emphasizes that Christians are called not only to help the oppressed
but also to reshape society. Hauerwas argues that the appeal to justice has become so integrated into
6 1 John H. Yoder, “Just War Tradition: T s It Credible?,” Christian Century 108, no. 9(13 March
1991): 295-298.
6 2 James W. Douglass, Lightening East to West: Jesus, Gandhi, and the Nuclear Age (New York:
Crossroads, 1983), 58.
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the ideology of war that it prevents Christians from pursuing a biblical vision o f justice. Moreover,
Hauerwas contends that the current Christian preoccupation with justice arose not from within the
Christian tradition but from the desire o f Christians to be actors in the world without being colored
with Christianity. He says liberal traditions of justice are today’s equivalent to natural law ethics.
Such views o f justice, insists Hauerwas, are always rooted in the idea o f “a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage”6 3 and do not reflect biblical understanding of justice.
Moreover, the just war tradition is so often abstracted from its context that it becomes only
ideology. Hauerwas suggests that the moral evaluation of war consists o f more than whether a
particular war conforms to the just war criteria. For Christians, the moral evaluation of war also
deals with sin and repentance. Even more so, it matters who is asking the question about the
justness o f the war, especially since there is a tendency to ignore certain perspectives-those of the
less powerful.6 4
So Hauerwas argues that justice has become part of war ideology by suggesting that war’s moral
endeavor is to promote justice. However, contemporary uses o f the just war tradition, in fact, distort
justice in order to promote national interests. For instance, Hauerwas claims that a correct
understanding of the just war tradition reveals that it is based on the duty to help the innocent. As a
result, it focuses more on understanding legitimate authority than justifying violence to protect
oneself. In fact, Hauerwas believes under a just war paradigm one cannot choose self-defense.
Under Hauerwas’s understanding o f just war, “the commitment necessary for a nation to sustain a
just war strategy is almost as demanding as that necessary to sustain a consistent pacifism.”6 5 This
of course is not the understanding of a just war tradition that war ideology has captured. Hauerwas’s
more radical understanding of the just war tradition has important implications for our thinking
“ Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom? (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991), 62.
“ Hauerwas, “Whose Just War?” 83-84 & 101.
“ Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 139.
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about war and military preparedness since just war thought and language has returned to the
forefront in popular and political discussions.
Hauerwas’ makes clear the danger o f justice becoming part of war’s ideology. Instead of
careful reflection about whether violence is justified in a particular case, the appeal to justice is
advanced as if it were an automatic qualifier. Hauerwas also raises important points about whether
we are talking about justice for the powerful or the powerless. While these are important critiques,
Hauerwas is mistaken in so easily dismissing the notion of justice as having any relevance for
evaluating the use o f violence. Since his main critique is that contemporary appeals are based on a
misguided understanding of justice, his solution should be to resurrect the Biblical concept of justice,
whose concern is the poor and the oppressed. In fact, part of the problem o f nuclear proliferation is
that people who have legitimate justice claims may turn to nuclear weapons to get those claims
addressed. Consequently, we need not less focus on justice but more attention to it.
4. Control
Part o f war’s ideology is the human desire for control over our situation. Hauerwas states that
this is one cause o f violence. He claims that, because we can never have enough control and power
to ensure control, it takes ever more force to maintain the illusion that we are actually in control.
Moreover, Hauerwas even doubts that we really want peace. He suggests that we would find it too
boring.6 6
Human culture does seem to value control. For instance, cultures try to crush revolutions, often
labeling them as satanic, while obedience is labeled as good. Douglass notes that throughout the
Vietnam War the U.S. explained its increasing violence and terror as part o f its effort to bring a just
peace. Yet the ability to analyze critically the relationship between means and ends was missing,
and U.S. policy was, at best, full of self deception. Ironically, trusting in violence tends to bring
^Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 47 & 49.
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neither peace nor order but rather the opposite. Douglass notes that the historian Arnold Toynbee
has shown that war was the proximate cause o f the breakdown of every society known to have
collapsed.6 7
Pacifist thought brings us an important rem inder We can never be completely in control, and
we can never be completely secure. The nuclear age has long made it clear that we cannot protect
ourselves; we can only make it terrible for some nation if they choose to attack us. Moreover, in an
age o f terrorism and with the prospect o f nuclear terrorism, there is ever more doubt about the
usefulness o f such deterrent policies. Discussions of a missile defense system for the United States
have again emerged. The pacifists are helpful in pointing out that we cannot secure our borders
from nuclear attack. To use today’s vernacular, “we need to get over it.” We must quit trying to live
this illusion. One way for us do to that is to try to find ways to make our means and ends more
consistent. If we truly want peace, perhaps we need to use the means o f peace.
In concluding this section on the ideology o f war, we need to acknowledge our indebtedness to
pacifism. Pacifism has exposed the reality o f war ideology. As Americans we have been shaped by a
culture that has convinced us that violence is necessary. What pacifism exposes is that such a view
may not be shaped by careful realistic evaluation but only by imbedded ideology. A more careful and
critical approach will allow a more accurate assessment of the need for violence and provide a strong
presumption against it. It will lead us to question whether important values such as justice, equality
and security require violence or, more accurately, which cases require the use o f violence. It will
lead us to explore ways that nonviolence might not only fulfill these values but perhaps do so better.
Moreover, this challenges us to broaden our vision so that we can see new possibilities that, blinded
by war’s ideology, we would never see. Our hope may well be in such new visions.
6 7 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 43, 55 & 240.
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B. The View From the Underside
Both liberation theology, which will be explored in-depth in Chapter Five, and pacifism share
the common characteristic o f assessing a situation from the underside.6 8 However, liberation
theology’s openness to revolutionary violence in some circumstances is a major point of
disagreement for pacifists. Furthermore, since only a legitimate authority can undertake war,
revolutionary violence, by definition, is outside the rules of the just war tradition. Nevertheless,
liberation theology uses a just war rhetoric to justify revolution. James Douglass is critical of
liberation theology. He suggests that, while liberation theology is a great gift in emphasizing the
need to work for the liberation o f the oppressed, it fails to see the need for global peace. Douglass
claims, however, that the problem lies not in liberation theology’s espousal o f violence since such a
characterization is usually a misrepresentation by its critics. Instead, liberation theology fails to see
the need to resist the means of war as well as the means of oppression.6 9
While pacifists may offer criticism o f liberation theology, they also find points of agreement,
including the view from the underside. Pacifism suggests that to assess the situation accurately we
must take perspectives other than that o f the United States looking from the top down. Much like a
liberation theologian, Stanley Hauerwas understands that the poor have special theological
significance. They are reminders that the world is not as it should be. Nevertheless, he says it is not
their state of poverty that makes them central but their faith, their openness to God. Hauerwas
suggests that the poor understand that we are at war with forces that know nothing of God. More
6 8 The term “view from the underside” first arose in liberation theology, but is now used in several
other forms o f theology. It is an argument that those doing theology or ethics should do so from the
point of view or perspective of the less powerful, those at the bottom. It is an epistemological
understanding and a hermeneutical approach arguing that the world looks different based on the
perspective from which one is looking. Moreover, it claims that, based on biblical teaching, the
underside is the proper perspective from which Christian theology and ethics should be done because
of God’s concern for the poor and dispossessed. It is understood to be a requirement of justice.
6 9 DougIass, Lightening East to West, 58.
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affluent people seem to miss this fact because they have interests in the powers that control.7 0 Daniel
Berrigan also upholds the liberation theology tenet that God takes sides, though presumably,
according to him, only nonviolently.7 1 However, it is not clear whether, in Berrigan’s theology, God
can take sides in a violent conflict. Can God take the side o f oppressed people who have risen in
violent response to oppression? Berrigan provides no adequate answer to this question.
Yoder argues that if religion becomes part of the ideology of the powerful then Jesus Christ
ceases to be Lord. Liberation theology unmasks the ideological role that religion can play. To
counter this, Yoder suggests, one thing that the Christian community can do is provide an alternative
to the view that requires immediate success. He says there are other visions o f utility. Moreover,
morality from the position of weakness looks very different than from a position o f power.7 2
James Douglass reminds us that we cannot divorce Jesus from the political realm and that Jesus
was not counterrevolutionary. Jesus did reject violence, but he did not reject resistance to
oppression. Douglass concludes that, while the Romans were wrong about Jesus, they were closer to
being accurate than many today who conclude Jesus was unworthy o f execution or, even worse, that
Jesus would be at home among the Romans.7 3
Vincent Harding claims that Americans have made a similar mistake with our remembrance of
Martin Luther King, Jr. As we do with Jesus, we have forgotten that he stood at the margins and
critiqued the powerful, and for King that included military policy. Perhaps this misappropriation of
Martin Luther King is best seen in contemporary national celebrations which do not commemorate
the King who was shot down. Instead, Americans are stuck on the King o f 1963 who spoke “I have
7 0 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 79.
7lDaniel Berrigan, “The Lord Appears, The Mighty Scurry for Cover / Psalm 76,” in Mission
Trends No. 4: Liberation Theologies, eds. Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F. Stransky (New York:
Paulist, 1979), 92.
7 2 Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom, 85, 98 & 100.
^Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 32.
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a dream.” Even Ronald Reagan, who opposed all o f King’s attempts at legislation, embraced this
King and signed into law the holiday commemorating him. This domestication o f King means that
the radicalness that made up King’s essence especially at the end o f his life is lost.
Harding notes that by the time o f his death King had moved well beyond his “I have Dream”
speech. King had not only responded to more radical calls from Malcolm X and from the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) but also had recognized the global problem of
economic injustice. He had become an advocate for the poor and moved his struggle from the south
to the national level. King was not only attacking America’s deep-seated racism but also rejecting
the Vietnam War. King was both making revolutionary calls for America’s institutions to be based
on compassion and beginning to organize the poor into a great nonviolent, resistant army. In short,
by the time of his death, King was focusing on what he called the triple threats o f racism, militarism
and materialism.
Harding believes that the undomesticated King is more valuable to us and our situation than the
tamed King. He notes that blacks have made a strategic error in the struggle against racism by
joining America’s militarism and materialism. Looking at King’s life and thought can help correct
that error. Harding says that King was a man with a vision who made a “preferential option for the
poor” long before it was popular. King is a strong contrast to Bible-quoting politicians who have no
vision to offer people who are spiritually crippled. Indeed, by the time he was shot, King was a
threat to the powers that be.7 4
Pacifism and liberation theology’s view from the underside push this ethic o f nonproliferation to
a more radical stance. An adequate ethic will not just consider consequences to the United States but
instead must place the poor and oppressed o f the world at the center o f its ethical concern. Clearly a
nuclear exchange or single explosion would not be good for any of earth’s people. However, an
adequate analysis that puts the poor and oppressed at the center will notice that most military bases
7 4 Harding, Martin Luther King, viii-ix, 1-3, 20-21, 49 & 52-53.
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and installations are not located in wealthy areas but in poor areas. This means that any military
exchange-nuclear or conventional-even if it is directed at “military” targets, is likely to harm most
the poorest o f the world. Such an ethic then leads us even further toward nonviolent or less violent
steps to counter the spread o f nuclear weapons.
However, there is another implication o f the view from the underside. The threat of nuclear
weapons may well come from self-appointed “representatives” o f the oppressed who may seek
nuclear weapons in order to improve the lot o f the oppressed. As a result, efforts to improve the lot
of the oppressed around our planet are themselves nonproliferation steps. So an ethic of
nonproliferation must seek nonviolent or less violent methods to stop the spread of nuclear weapons
and also seek to change the motivation peoples and nations have for wanting to acquire nuclear
weapons. The efforts o f the nuclear nations have focused on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons,
though have failed to take advantage of the means o f nonviolence. Moreover, such efforts have
rarely sought to address the motivations for proliferation, and the result is the recent nuclear tests by
India and Pakistan and the fact that nuclear terrorism remains a real possibility.
C. Community
Pacifism also reminds us that the problems of the world are so imposing that they cannot be
addressed in an individualistic manner. Pacifism stresses the need to transcend individualism and
nationalism in favor o f community and a global vision. However, it is not pure pragmatism that
forces a community approach. Pacifism also understands that liberalism’s focus on the individual is
the wrong approach, and our five Christian pacifists are primarily concerned with the creation of
authentic Christian community. Clearly, the ethic o f nonproliferation developed in this work is not
calling for the creation of a hegemonic Christian community. Indeed, like the pacifist authors under
analysis, this author believes that authentic Christianity can only be freely chosen and never coerced.
However, and unfortunately, in history Christianity has seldom acted this way. If an ethic o f
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nonproliferation does not require the creation o f a Christian community, why explore such ideas?
Because within the call for the creation of authentic Christian community are notions and ideas of
things that may be o f use in the creation of a nonproliferation ethic.
For instance, Gandhi was able to use the teaching of Jesus in his nonviolent struggle in India
without accepting all o f Christianity. James Douglass reminds us that Gandhi saw in Jesus a faith
that was catholic and therefore could not be reconciled with the imperialistic versions o f Christianity
that he encountered. He also did not accept Jesus as the Son of God because the way it was presented
always made Jesus too exclusive.7 5 Douglass pushes us to continue to struggle with the thought of
Gandhi; however, he does not suggest that we take any system o f thought, including that provided by
Gandhi, in an uncritical way. Douglass says Gandhi’s thought could use some feminist analysis.
Gandhi often spoke o f the injustice women faced, yet he failed to address it in any adequate way in
either word or deed.7 6
What these pacifists have to offer is the vision o f community that they suggest is inherent in
authentic Christianity which was rooted in its Jewish origins. Christianity, reshaped by the
enlightenment, has placed the emphasis on individualism, and so its communal aspects need to be
recovered. James Douglass points out that Jesus was a Jew and not a post-enlightenment
individualistic Christian. For instance, Jesus as a Jew would have understood the suffering servant
idea as a collective.7 7 Yoder also confirms the need to understand that Jesus was Jewish, and he
would never have been individualistic or a teacher o f radical personalism.7 8
Pacifists push us to the communal level reminding us that the gospel tradition is rooted in
community, and only within community can its message be understood. Christianity abstracted from
7 5 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 56.
7 6 Douglass, Lightening East to West, 64.
7 7 James W. Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1991), 81-82.
7 3 Yoder, The Politics o f Jesus, 114.
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community is not authentic and probably not even Christian. So let us see what these views o f
community can offer to nonproliferation.
/. A Community o f Sacrifice
Struggling for a better world, says Vincent Harding, has provided him many lessons. First, guns
are not the source o f power. Instead, true power is found in tough and courageous love. Look into
the eyes of those in the struggle, even when wounded, says Harding, and one can see it in their eyes.
It is a belief in the order o f the universe and in a compassionate God. He notes that it is no
coincidence that the freedom movement of the 1950s to 1970s found the center o f its strength in the
church.7 9 Daniel Berrigan argues that the Holy Spirit calls Christians to live in ways that are
consistent with the Gospel and requires them to subordinate their own goals to the needs o f others.
Such sacrifice will likely bring suffering to those who follow a sacrificial path. Nevertheless, says
Berrigan, it is also the Spirit who consoles those who suffer.
The communities called forth by these pacifists must be willing to sacrifice rather than inflict
suffering on others. Communities, they insist, need not be harmful to those who are outside the
community. As a result, the authentic Christian view o f community is a community characterized by
sacrifice. While an air o f separatism is within the very concept o f community, a community
constituted by sacrifice will not allow such separation to justify harming other communities or
individuals. A community constituted by sacrifice is not a physical threat to the wider culture
because it will never do violence to it. However, it may still be threatening because it points to a
radically different way and what it believes to be a better reality.
Daniel Berrigan has been involved in a community which embodies this ethos. Named Kairos
(the right time), the community has worked in the urban center o f New York for the peace
movement. This community has vigiled, fasted, and leafleted and its members have been arrested
7 9 Harding, Hope and History, 70.
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often. One place subject to its focus in New York is the Riverside Research Institute, a Pentagon-
funded research center that works on weapons development. Kairos has made those who work at the
Riverside Institute step over their bodies or take a leaflet as part o f their process o f getting to what
Berrigan calls the work o f destruction.8 0 Such actions have required sacrifice on the part of the
Kairos community in terms o f time, effort and willingness to endure time in jail. Their actions have
been confrontational toward those who work at the Riverside Institute, but they were not violent.
Instead, in the world-view o f the Kairos community their actions are at a minimum a sign o f the
possibilities of seeing things differently.
What can we leam for an ethic o f nonproliferation from a sacrificial community? First is the
need for community. It is unlikely that the nations of the world will on their own decide to stop the
proliferation o f nuclear weapons. Social change movements are centered at the grass root level.
Such was the case with the nuclear freeze movement and, more recently, with the campaign to ban
landmines. Consequently, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons will undoubtably require the
development of communities focused on the issue who will then focus wider attention on the issue.
Moreover, such communities must be willing to sacrifice, be that from the consequences of resistance
or simply giving o f time and resources to work on the issue. On the broader level such sacrificial
communities can help the people and nations of the world develop some sense o f a global
community. Communities do not seek weapons of mass destruction to use against themselves.
Consequently, the development o f some level of a global community is a crucial step in approaching
this problem, for it transforms some o f “them” into some o f “us.” An ethic o f nonproliferation is not
a utopian view, and we will not see the creation of a global community any time soon. It may be
centuries away. However, every small step in the direction will be a step away from the need to have
nuclear weapons.
8 0 DanieI Berrigan, Isaiah: Spirit o f Courage, Gift o f Tears (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 2.
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2. A Community o f Character
When these pacifist writers invoke the term community, they are not referring to just any
community but a specific kind o f community. They are referring, to borrow a phrase from Stanley
Hauerwas, to “communities o f character.” While Hauerwas’ virtue approach to ethics is central to
understanding what a community o f character is, we begin with Vincent Harding. Harding notes
that Gandhi once said it was religion that brought him into politics and Gandhi suggested that those
who said religion has nothing to do with politics had no understanding o f the nature of religion.
Moreover, Harding notes the central role the church and faith played in the American freedom
movement of this century.8 1 We can learn much from authentic Christian communities which are
communities of character.
The church, for Hauerwas, does not do social ethics; it is social ethics. The question, for him, is
not what the church can or should do to make the society more just. “Rather the church is a social
ethic as it serves this or any society by being the kind of community capable o f nourishing its life by
the memory of God’s presence in Jesus Christ.”8 2 Nevertheless, Hauerwas holds that the kingdom of
God does have its social and political character. The church is to be the “faithful manifestation of
the peaceable kingdom in the world.”8 3 Consequently, “any Christian ethic that is not first of all a
social ethic is less than Christian.”8 4 Being a Christian does not give the right to assume that others
must share the faith and its values. Instead, it means that the church should be such a model of
community and the good life that others will be converted by what they see. The purpose of the
church is not to make the kingdom o f God but to be a faithful witness for it. Still, the church can be
slHarding, Hope and History, 75 & 82.
8 2 Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 74-75.
8 3 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 99.
^Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 108.
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a powerful witness against war, says Hauerwas, because the church is a sign that war is not part of
God’s “providential care o f the world.”8 5
These authors argue that communities o f character are the key to the ethical life. Indeed, they
suggest that ethics can only be done in community. So who will make up the nonproliferation
community? There are many possible answers to this question. Perhaps authentic Christian
communities will notice that nuclear weapons are still a threat to God’s world and God’s way in it.
Perhaps it will be more diverse communities who have addressed issues such as racism, the nuclear
arms race, U.S. intervention in Central America, the environment, sexism, homophobia, and
landmines in the past. Such communities o f character have been at the center of such movements of
change. They do the leg-work to activate the wider society around the issue, but such communities
of character do something much more significant. They live the reality o f peace and therefore are
models for a world that knows not the ways of peace. Perhaps such communities can help establish
multinational communities and be the model for the development of a global community. It seems
unlikely that a global community could ever be a community of character. Yet any level of global
community reduces the threat from nuclear weapons because relationships between peoples make it
harder for government’s to consider using nuclear weapons against such people. However, the
crucial problem is that too few communities are taking on this issue. Clearly, there are authentic
communities o f character, but right now they seem oblivious to the threat o f nuclear proliferation and
the threat o f U.S. responses to such proliferation. What will it take to activate communities on this
issue?
3. A Com m unity o f Nonviolence
After coming to Notre Dame to teach, Stanley Hauerwas came into contact with John Howard
Yoder’s thought. Yoder’s understanding o f the church fit well with Hauerwas’ virtue theory notion
8 5 Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 197.
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of community. However, Yoder’s understanding required that one be a Christian and one accept
nonviolence. Hauerwas says that at the beginning he wanted to be more influential than being
limited to Christianity, and he was not too sure about nonviolence. But the more he read Yoder, the
more he became convinced. One of his first discoveries was that nonviolence is not passive. For
Hauerwas peace is not something that we can achieve on our own but is a gift from God, which can
come only in communities faithful to the Savior.8 6 So another community characteristic o f which
these pacifists speak is that these communities are also nonviolent.
These Christian pacifists argue that being faithful to Jesus requires one to be nonviolent. Yoder
is unusual within Christianity, says ethicist Lisa Cahill, because he takes the hard sayings o f Jesus
seriously and concludes that they are a part o f Christian discipleship. He has done a sophisticated
assessment which looks at “canonical complexity and historical-critical research”8 7 From this Yoder
concludes that Christians cannot use violence. It is not an easy conclusion. Yoder believes that
Jesus himself was repeatedly tempted with violence but that Jesus rejected that temptation. Yet
rejecting that temptation does not mean that Jesus is apolitical. Cahill argues that Yoder and
Hauerwas conclude that pacifism (though not nonresistance) is required for those seeking to follow
the model o f the communities of Jesus and the Gospel writers. Nevertheless, it is not an absolute
rule derived from “love your enemies” nor from a theology of the cross. It is primarily an expression
of community that is normative, not a legalism seeking to follow biblical rules.8 8 It is the very idea
of Christian community which requires and allows for nonviolence. For Yoder and Hauerwas this is
what authentic Christian community requires. Unfortunately, Christian history has not been
8 < s Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, xxiv-xxv& 12.
8 7 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory.
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 35.
8 8 Cahill, 224-225 & 243-244.
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nonviolent. Yet one can wonder what might be possible globally if Christians actually became
models to the world, showing that living in peace is possible.
Because Hauerwas understands nonviolence to be at the core o f Christianity, he mourns the
church’s inability to live in unity among itself and sees the lack of nonviolence as a sad critique of
the church which should be a sign o f peace for all the world. When Hauerwas says the church
should be the church, he is not calling for withdrawal from the world’s problems but instead issuing
a reminder for the church to be what it is called to be-a visible sign of the kingdom o f peace. The
church is to engage in politics, but kingdom politics, based on servanthood not domination. The
church’s job is not to make the world into the kingdom but to be faithful to the kingdom.8 9 For
Yoder, pacifism is the ethical way for Christians. Moreover, it is not so unrealistic or foolish as
some claim. Yoder argues, “There is no serious critique one can address to the pacifist which does
not, if taken honestly . .. turn back with greater force upon the advocate of war.”9 0 In other words,
non-pacifists have not objectively evaluated the success o f war. Yoder argues that war is a failure at
achieving its goals.
For an ethic o f nonproliferation to blossom, it will require the nurturing that can come from
nonviolent communities. The world needs such signs o f peace. The world needs to see that people
can live lives based on servanthood rather than domination. Only then will the world have a chance
of giving up its nuclear weapons. Such communities do not place their primary allegiance to the
state. Consequently, nations do all they can to discourage, if not oppress, such communities. Our
pacifist writers argue that if Christians were authentic they would create such communities where
church and flag do not go together so easily. For only if the church (or other communities) are
radically different can they offer a way that is radically different. In the United States the concept of
S 9 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 100, 102 & 103.
°°John H. Yoder, Nevertheless: The Varieties o f Christian Pacifism. (Scottdale, PA: Herald,
1971), 133.
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the separation o f church and state should not be used to protect government from religious influence.
These pacifists have made it clear that religion is political. The separation was supposed to protect
religion from government by making it free from government. Unfortunately, the presence o f civil
religion means that Christianity has failed to act upon that freedom. Authentic nonviolent
communities can open our eyes. They can expose the falsity o f the supposed utility of war. They can
help us transcend nationalism, which is often the root o f violence between nations. They can show
us that peace is not a concept but a way of life based on forgiveness and reconciliation. Such
communities, by being faithful to the kingdom, might envision the world in such a way as to
understand that the world is more secure, not less, without nuclear weapons.
D. Narrative, Story & Vision
Vincent Harding notes that the movie Mississippi Burning started with the historical story of
three martyrs (James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Mickey Schwemer) but then failed to have the
historical imagination or vision to tell the story of the true response from a black and mostly
nonviolent army. It simply did not tell that story and instead focused on white FBI agents and
depicted them in ways that were nonhistorical and untrue.9 1 Our five pacifist writers are passionate
that it matters that we tell true stories. They argue that story or narratives are central to what it
means to be human, since stories shape and guide us. Narratives are what give us the vision to shape
the future. So we must ask, what stories are we telling about the continuing threat of nuclear
weapons, and what visions shape our responses to that threat? Are they visions of war and
helplessness or o f peace and hope?
Those who see ethics as primarily about rules assume that Christian ethics is rooted in the Ten
Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount. Stanley Hauerwas says that, while they are important
for Christian thinking, they are “unintelligible when treated as sets of rules justifiable in
9IHarding, Hope and History, 157.
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themselves.”9 2 For instance the Ten Commandments are part o f God’s covenant with Israel and
make no sense outside that context. Hauerwas counters that Christian ethics does not begin with
rules but with a narrative: the life, death and resurrection o f Jesus Christ. The Christian narrative
makes three crucial claims. First we are creatures in a context or in other words we are contingent
beings. Second, the narrative is consistent with our awareness o f being historical beings, because we
are part o f the continuing story. Third, God was revealed historically through Jesus Christ.9 3 So
Christian ethics is not primarily about “shalls” and “shall nots” but about how to “rightly envision
the word.”9 4
/. Historical Vision
Vincent Harding notes that an organized movement for change does not just provide reaction to
an opponent’s actions, it develops its own power and moves to create a new reality. However, he
also questions whether we can, “either understand or do ‘the right thing’ if we ignore the lessons, the
sacrifices, and the wisdom o f all who have fought before us?”9 S Harding notes that black history
celebrations in the U.S. tend to ignore the pain and therefore the great achievements of black people.
Such an approach fails to offer healing or hope for the future.9 6
Part of the problem is that Americans have gotten so good at telling false stories that we have
often lost the ability to distinguish between false and true narratives. Vincent Harding gives us a
useful case in point in his important review of the notable book on contemporary religious life in
^Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 23.
9 3 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 23-25 & 28-29.
'" ’Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, 29.
9 5 Harding, Hope and History, 163.
‘ "'Vincent Harding, “Black History and the Perils o f Equal Opportunity,” in The Peacemaking
Struggle: Militarism & Resistance, eds. Ronald Stone and Dana Wilbanks (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1985), 95.
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America called Habits o f the Heart ." Harding points out that the book completely ignores racial
diversity in America. Yet that is not the major loss, says Harding. It is that, in missing the painful
reality of our history, the authors miss the possibilities for the future. By limiting the book to white
middle-class people, its authors deprive their readers o f the rich multiculturalism that makes up
America. Such an approach is inadequate, especially for the white middle-class, which has no hope
o f healing itself unless it develops an understanding o f the interdependence of all o f America.9 8
Except for Martin Luther King, Jr., Habits o f the Heart limits its list of important American
ancestors to white males. Such a listing, according to Harding, is disingenuous. In the first place it
makes no sense to ignore King’s ancestors. More important, however, such a listing omits people
such as Frederick Douglass or Sojourner Truth who opposed slavery not only in principle (as Habits
o f the Heart claims did Jefferson and others who the book includes in the ancestor list) but in full
practice. Those who put such principles into action, rather than those like Jefferson who did not act
on such principles, are the true forebearers of King. It is even more ironic, Harding notes, that the
authors see the Frenchmen Alexis de Tocqueville as their preeminent ancestor while ignoring his
social criticism o f the destructiveness that separates whites from blacks and native peoples in
America. Harding says if one does accurate history one would discover that racial oppression is “at
least as much a major theme in American history as the conflict between individualism and
community” which the book addresses.9 9
Harding says to explore America solely in white terms is backward, dangerous and a denial of
public philosophy. Harding insists one cannot claim King as an ancestor if one ignores the history of
"Robert N. Bellah, et. al., Habits o f the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in America
(Berkeley: University of California, 1985).
"Vincent Harding, “Toward a Darkly Radiant Vision o f America’s Truth,” Cross Currents 37,
no. 1 (Spring 1987): 2-3.
"Harding, “Toward a Darkly Radiant Vision,” 5.
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struggle over race in America.'0 0 Moreover, he argues that the black freedom movement o f 1950-
1970 provides a great teaching opportunity precisely because it has changed the world in Beijing,
Prague, Berlin and Soweto. The story o f the black freedom movement is a story of healing and hope.
It is a story that looks for the best possibilities instead o f the worst. Harding suggests that his work is
an attempt to pay the debt for what others have done for him. Men and women who guided and
taught him and those who never knew him, yet who struggled for freedom for his people and for all
of us. Would that we all have such a sense of vocation and o f debt. Harding reminds us that we do
not make ourselves, we are made. Harding also reminds us that good teaching goes from the present
to the past in order to grasp the possibilities for the future.1 0 1
Harding counters Habits o f the Heart by claiming that Americans need to rediscover all o f their
ancestors such as Harriet Tubman, David Walker, Frederick Douglass, Lame Deer, and Ida Bell
Wells-Bamett to have a full vision o f America. We need to touch the pain and struggle so that we
understand there can be no American character without the blues. We cannot understand America
without understanding the contribution o f Asian Americans and the shameful ways, including
concentration camps, that have made up their treatment. One misses something if one does not hear
the strains of Spanish and understand that large segments o f the land were once Mexico. We miss
the spirit of the land and the need to care for the land if we ignore the voices of the original and
native inhabitants of this land.1 0 2 Harding also notes that many historians, even ones who are
sensitive to multiculturalism, fail to pay attention to the role and influence of religion and
spirituality. Harding notes the irony of this since religion is (perhaps) the central aspect of culture.1 0 3
lo o Harding, “Toward a Darkly Radiant Vision,” 7 & 12.
l0 1 Harding, Hope and History, x, 1-2 & 6-7.
l0 2 Harding, “Toward a Darkly Radiant Vision,” 13-15.
‘“ Vincent Harding, “Healing At the Razor’s Edge: Reflection on a History of Multicultural
America,” Journal o f American History 8, no. 2 (September 1994): 571-584.
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A true ethic o f nonproliferation will need to listen to a diversity o f voices, and, while perhaps the
effort is still inadequate, the method o f this work is indeed trying to do so. Moreover, as a work in
religious ethics, here we are certainly including the role that religion plays in life and vision.
One lesson we can learn from the freedom struggle is to take the long view rather than expecting
immediate results. If one studies the freedom struggle, Harding says, one soon realizes that
democracy and its benefits do not arrive quickly nor come automatically even from heroic struggles
such as the civil rights movement. This is especially troublesome in our society which fails to tell
people that life is a struggle and that we must keep pressing on. Therefore, we need to continue to
tell the story o f struggles so that people are aware that they need to continue. Harding writes, “We
need to revive our dreaming possibilities, our imagination. People then [during the freedom
movement] were developing the capacity to dream about their lives.” 1 0 4 Ironically, it is only when
we understand the reality o f struggle that we can dream and hope.
We also need to remember that we do not start over, but rather we build on the foundation of
others. Harding notes that the anti-war movement of the late 1960s was largely led by white students
who had learned the methods o f resistance in the southern African-American freedom struggle.1 0 5
Harding also observes the similarities of the Tiananmen Square freedom movement in China with
the black freedom movement in the United States. He writes that it took his breath away when he
noticed banners around Tiananmen Square proclaiming “We Shall Overcome.” Watching these
freedom fighters face the tanks reminded him of all those in the United States who faced hatred’s
dogs, water hoses and guns. Then, in the streets of East Germany one could hear the sounds of that
song again as marchers demanded the wall to come tumbling down and then simply brought it down
themselves. As resistance swelled in Romania, Harding heard the voice from that comer o f the
globe say “the people had broken through their fears,” and he remembered how often black people
1 0 4 “The Heart to Struggle,” Sojourners, November-December 1995, 34.
l0 S Harding, There Is a River, xvi.
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spoke such words in the freedom movement in the United States. He also notes that Nicaraguan
Sandinistas took Martin Luther King’s collection of sermons Strength to Love with them to the
mountains as they engaged in their struggle. Harding concludes change once called impossible has
continually happened throughout history.1 0 6
Harding lays out what those who struggled and envisioned a new America in the past would
now want:
They would nurture dreams o f a society in which training for nonviolent
peacemaking took priority over military preparedness. They would call us to see a
time when our relationship with other nations became more neighborly, more
mutually supportive in the great multinational tasks we have to accomplish,
ecologically, economically, and educationally. Remembering King, we know these
rainbow warriors would urge us to dream a world in which our country works with
others to seek economic justice for all the basic-goods producer nations who are
now broken and exploited, a world where the United States takes a path of peace
with all who are now threatened by our immature and unwise search for military-
based “security.”1 0 7
Harding suggests that we go forward with Martin Luther King when we seek to make a future that is
less individualistic. We go forward with King when we reject materialism. We go forward with
King when we seek to insure that women are equally free as men. We go forward with King when
we seek to protect the lives and rights of homosexuals. We go forward with King when we move
toward the poor. Only when we do these things are we taking King seriously.
Harding closes his book on Martin Luther King by telling us what we should tell children about
King and those who followed him. First, we should tell the children that King refused to return
violence for violence. Instead, he and his followers met violence with sacrificial power, unflinching
love and good will. Indeed, though repeatedly threatened, the King family refused to have a gun in
their household. Second, Harding says we must tell the children that the movement was not about
black people against white people. Instead, it was a movement willing to suffer in the expansion of
1 0 6 Harding, Hope and History, 3-5.
1 0 7 Harding, Hope and History, 187-188.
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democracy, and it drew thousands of white people into the movement. Third, when discussing
King’s assassination we must tell the children that love and compassion are not shields against
harm. Rather, they are the power that helps us face enemies and gives us the hope to go on and
overcome. Fourth, now in the post-Gulf war period we must remind the children that King knew
that, while massive weaponry may bring immediate gratification, it will provide no lasting solution.
Moreover, it produces wounds that take generations to heal.1 0 8
2. G lobal Vision
Vincent Harding suggests that we need to understand the freedom movement’s power, especially
in light o f the enormous and dangerous power the U.S. still wields. Making the situation even more
dangerous is that, despite the power o f the U.S., it cannot dominate the world. Moreover, since most
o f the people on the globe are people o f color, the black freedom movement is an especially useful
experience.1 0 9
James Douglass reminds us to look to one o f King’s teachers, Mahatma Gandhi. Douglass
remarks that Gandhi understood the interconnectedness between nonviolence and a global vision or
what Gandhi called a sense that all of humanity is part o f one’s family. When one recognizes the
interconnectedness and family relationship that exists between people, one is less likely to be able to
justify the use of violence. If one is seeking the truth, even if parties have a different perception of
truth, one cannot pursue violence. For the search for truth is based on dialogue and persuasion, not
coercion. To force another to submit to your truth only shows the weakness of your truth since it
does not have the power to convince. Gandhi always began a campaign with an exhaustive
exploration o f the facts as presented by both sides and thought it important to go to great lengths to
understand the positions with which he most disagreed. Douglass comments that war is based on
l0 8 Harding, Martin Luther King, 112 & 132-137.
l0 9 Harding, Hope and History, 167.
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fear while peace is based on mutual trust. Gandhi suggested that we must wean the opponent from
error and show the truth. Douglass argues that this truth force applies even to the just war
paradigmatic example o f Hitler. He asserts that to deny any people or person the ability of truth is to
assign satanic status to that people or person. Douglass says casting someone in such terms only
serves our own self-righteousness and nothing else.
Douglass argues that another way to work against the violence of nations is to work for global
solutions and to support and strengthen global institutions such as the United Nations. In a move
that is surprising for a pacifist, he argues that the U.N. peacekeeping forces are in fact nonviolent
armies. While they are armed, it is at such a level to be only symbolic. It is not their arms but their
presence that matters. He suggests the armies that face the U.N. forces know that to kill
peacekeepers is to kill something o f the hope of humanity."0 Moving our vision from a strictly
nationalistic level to a global level is an important component of an ethic o f nonproliferation.
3. Future Vision
Vincent Harding also notes that since freedom movements are usually led by the young exposure
to such stories may well will help other young people see new possibilities and allow them to break
out o f things like consumerism. Harding encourages using biographies o f important people as
educational tools to bring students into the light of these people and to help them discover what is
possible for their lives. He has in mind people like Harriet Tubman, whom, surprisingly, research
shows is one o f the most recognized figures in American history by students.
Harding understands the need to celebrate each victory, for it is a means o f celebrating our God.
It reminds us that the river runs deep and long. Moreover, Harding scoffs at the criticism that some
things are impossible. Harding remembers seeing life-changing graffiti on a wall in Paris, in 1968,
which read “Be Realistic-Demand the Impossible.” Harding notes that history is full of examples of
" “Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 84, 87, 89-91 & 272.
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the impossible becoming possible only months later; onlookers claimed the Brown v. Board o f
Education defendants, the citizens o f Montgomery, and the sit-in and freedom ride participants were
all expecting the impossible. While they did face impossible situations against a violent system,
nevertheless they changed things. Harding suggests we have become too trapped within thinking
about what is and is not possible. Undoubtably, realists would bristle at the idea that such
distinctions are unimportant. However, Harding is not putting forth a utopian view here. Instead, he
is suggesting that we are not very accurate in our predictions o f what is possible. Moreover, realism,
mistakenly limiting what is possible, limits our vision and makes it impossible for us to solve
problems.
Recent events should have changed our perspectives about what is possible. Harding remarks
that we have had so much global change recently that it is hard for the mind to grasp. Nevertheless,
we must grasp that at each point where we had significant social change movements, be it in
Tiananmen Square or Prague or Soweto or Berlin, at the forefront were young people who refused to
be limited by “what is possible.” Harding notes the same was true in the post-World War II freedom
movement in the American south. College students, high school students and even children sat-in at
lunch counters, knelt at churches, and rode in the front of buses. They did so with courage enduring
the consequences and making this a better nation and us a better people. Harding suggests that we
are provided hope when we realize that these young people took on very powerful political forces
without the use o f guns.1 "
Harding gives a powerful, enlivening and enduring vision o f what struggling for the future
entails.
That’s how your soul gets rested, when you stop being selfish, when you stop
thinking, working only for yourself, and start dreaming, as the Native Americans
do, for seven generations beyond us. Your soul gets rested when you realize that
your life is not meant to be captured just in your skin, but that your life reaches out
' “ Harding, Hope and History, 8, 17,35,56, 59,61, 121-122 & 300-331.
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to the life o f the universe itself. And the life of the universe reaches into us and
demands o f us that we be more than we think we can be, demands that we live out
these dreams.1 1 2
It is time that we wade in the river and join the struggle. It is a struggle with a rich and proud
history, and we do not begin at ground zero, but rather we begin standing on the shoulders o f heros.
We know that the struggle to control and rid the world o f nuclear weapons will be a long one. We
are to be patient without being satisfied. We should not expect “success,” but we should expect
progress. And we will see such progress if we work for justice and reconciliation and show the
world that weapons do not ultimately solve problems. We need to open our ears and hear positions
with which we disagree, and we need to sharpen our tongues and our souls so the truth force shows
through. It is repeatedly said that the nuclear genie cannot be put back in the bottle. We hear the
truth in such statements, but we also are in a river that has continually made the impossible possible,
and we will not be limited by notions o f what is possible. It is time that we wade in the river and
join the struggle.
E. Nonviolent Alternatives
At the core o f the pacifist argument is the conviction that there are nonviolent alternatives in
most, if not all, situations. Daniel Berrigan finds much guidance in the prophet Isaiah, who would
have nothing to do with the war in his day or, adds Berrigan, any other day. His voice was clear,
and his message was clear-God will have none o f this. Yet then as now, the nations of the world
ignored this message. Isaiah lived in times of shiny swords and rusted plowshares, violence and
social unrest, the concentration o f power and the neglect o f the poor. Berrigan asks, ironically, what
could he possibly have to say to us?1 1 3
1 l2Vincent Harding, “In the Company o f the Faithful,” in The Rise o f Christian Conscience, ed.
Jim Wallis (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 279.
ll3Berrigan, Isaiah, 2.
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Even those who oppose war sometime use violence. For instance, during the Vietnam antiwar
movement the Weather Underground decided to use violent means to oppose the war. Their logic
was simply that the Vietnamese people were armed. Why not their supporters? While they were not
interested in a Christian response, Berrigan was unrelenting, and he continued to correspond with
and speak to them. Berrigan explained that in their use of violence they posed a particular difficulty;
Vietcong and Black Panthers were easy to deal with since they could be jailed or shot; middle class
white kids, however, were not as easy. However, when Kent State came, it became clear that anyone
who became a threat to the system was expendable. In his correspondence with the Weather
Underground, Berrigan urged that, at the least, they not let sabotage be anything but peripheral.1 1 4
Many years later, Weather members told him that his “insistence that the loss o f a single life could
never be justified by ideology, however noble,” 1 1 5 caused a significant reevaluation o f their position.
Despite his opposition to the violence perpetrated by the Weather Underground, Berrigan
recognizes a difference in their violence and the violence used to oppress. While he also understands
that solidarity may require one to work with groups who use violence, he does not endorse the use of
violence: Berrigan allows for minimal violence by non-Christian co-resistors, but forbids its use by
Christians.1 1 6
Vincent Harding, likewise, is careful to see the complexities of situations. For example, when
looking at the Black Panthers of the same period as the Weather Underground, he says it is necessary
to look at the social context, which included subversion and assassination by the dominant culture.
Moreover, the police forces in urban areas became occupying armies in the black community. The
1 1 4 Angie O’Gorman, editor, The Universe Bends Toward Justice: A Reader on Christian
Nonviolence in the U.S. (Philadelphia: New Society, 1990), 215.
1 1 5 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 247.
1 1 6 Larry Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoejfer— His Significance for North Americans, (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 1990), 48-50.
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difficulty with Panthers, says Harding, was not their revolutionary nature but that the only revolution
they thought possible required guns.1 1 7
Stanley Hauerwas notes that most Christians believe that they should be nonviolent unless there
is a real crisis.1 1 8 The troubling aspect is that political leaders lead us to endorse violence on a
regular basis by telling us that such a crisis exists. In holding nonviolence as a requirement for
Christians, Hauerwas insists that it is obligatory for all who seek to live faithfully to the gospel. As a
result, nonviolence is not one of many choices but the central way of life. While he concedes that the
phrase nonviolence cannot sum up Christianity, he does claim it sheds light on other Christian
understandings.1 1 9 Moreover, pacifism insists that there are always nonviolent alternatives available.
Hauerwas’ interest in political issues derives from his rejection of the idea that a pacifist position
is a withdrawal position. He states:
Rather than disavowing politics, the pacifist must be the most political o f animals
exactly because politics understood as the process o f discovering the goods we have
in common is the only alternative to violence. What the pacifist must deny,
however, is the common assumption that genuine politics is determined by state
coercion.1 2 0
For Hauerwas, the Christian imagination is formed by learning to live in a world o f violence and
despair. Consequently, Christians should be offering alternatives to violence. The Christian ethical
struggle is how to witness to the conviction that God has created humankind as a people of peace.
As Hauerwas concludes, “The church does not have an alternative to war. The church is our
alternative to war.”1 2 1 If the church turns to violence or supports state violence, it has turned away
from God. Instead, the church must seek to break the cycle o f violence.
1 1 7 Harding, Hope and History, 43-44.
1 1 8 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 48.
1 1 9 Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom, xvi-xvii.
1 2 0 Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 7.
1 2 1 Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 16.
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Vincent Harding focuses on active nonviolence and reminds us of heroes o f such approaches as
Diane Nash, who grew up black in Chicago but came to join the southern freedom movement. She is
still at work continuing to organize a nonviolent army in the United States. Likewise, we need to
remember and study conscientious objectors such as Baynard Rustin and James Farmer. We need
exposure to these powerful stories o f people who chose years in prison rather than the destruction of
the military. We need to see the courage o f nonviolent resistors as they face the crucible. Harding
notes that even to its last moments the movement at Tiananmen Square was creative nonviolence.
This included 3,000 students on a hunger strike surrounded by tens o f thousands o f other students
who were supported by hundreds o f thousands o f others. Nonviolence is not useless. It is alive,
doing well and making a difference in our world.
Yes, our world is troubled. Harding admits America’s problems run deep, including the end of
play-filled childhoods, the abuse o f women and children, and the fixation on weapons of destruction
at both the family and global level. However, he insists resources exist which can counter such
problems, resources that provide healing and hope. Exploration o f the post-World War II African-
American freedom movement provides us with such resources of nonviolent method, allowing us to
explore the violence within each of us, exposing the violence of the powers that be, and revealing the
creativity and courage to face our problems.1 2 2
Harding repeatedly tells us to look to Martin Luther King for guidance. King did not set
national boundaries on the love of neighbor which faith requires. Love of neighbor can never mean
burning, bombing, targeting them or even opposing life affirming revolution. King was a neighbor
of the world, and as such he could not be silent about the Vietnam War. He was warned against
doing so. However, his conscience did not allow him to be silent for long, and so finally at the
Riverside Church in New City he stood up and told those gathered that his Christian conviction
required him to speak and act against the Vietnam War. It was precisely one year to the day before
'“ Harding, Hope and History, 21-22, 26-28 & 92.
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his assassination. By the time of his speech he was no longer viewed by most as a hero but as a
communist or troublemaker or, at best, naive. Still, he stood up and identified the U.S. as the
greatest purveyor of violence in the world and often on the wrong side. He urged people o f faith to
declare themselves conscientious objectors. He saw connections between the violence o f the ghetto
and the violence in Vietnam.1 2 3
Vincent Harding, a trained historian and an associate of King, had done work on the history of
the U.S. and French involvement in Vietnam. He prepared a position paper that became the basis for
King’s “Beyond Vietnam” speech at Riverside. That fact has always haunted Harding because he
believes that there was a direct connection between that speech and King’s death exactly one year
later. He wonders whether he helped force King more clearly into the sight o f the assassin’s gun?'2 4
King’s “Beyond Vietnam” speech, delivered in April 1967 at the Riverside Church, is part of King
which we have forgotten, says Harding. King knew that at the center o f change must be
nonviolence. So he was searching for ways to create a nonviolent revolution.1 2 5 The same ideas
must shape an ethic o f nonproliferation.
Douglass argues that Jesus and Gandhi offer nonviolent alternatives that provide unlimited
possibilities in the nuclear age. We have reason to hope. Douglass responds to associating nuclear
weapons as the catalyst for God’s apocalypse by noting that it is a contingent prophecy. Jesus does
describe the coming o f the Son of Man in Matthew 24:27 as “lightning striking in the east and
flashing far into the west.” Douglass insists that we have a choice: this can be a nuclear flash of our
own making or, with God’s help, it can be the sign of a new world transformed by nonviolence.1 2 6
1 2 3 Harding, Martin Luther King, 13-19.
1 2 4 WaIIis, 94.
1 2 5 Harding, Martin Luther King, 69 & 106.
1 2 6 Douglass, Lightening East to West, iv, 4-5, 12-13 & 61.
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Douglass argues that we can live in the ways o f a nonviolent God. The nonviolent God provides
ways, but we have yet failed to adopt them. Douglass, though, sees signs and hope in nonviolent
actions around the globe that the transformation has already began. Moreover, it began 2,000 years
ago, for this is the faith o f Jesus, who was a sign o f the nonviolent God. Yet because Jesus also
brought a warning of destruction, he made the choice clear. Jesus warned his contemporaries to take
on nonviolence, or Jerusalem would be destroyed. It was a contingent prophecy that came to pass
because Israel did not choose to be transformed. Jesus made the same prophesy about the world and,
says Douglass, the presence o f nuclear weapons makes it clear that we are still faced with the choice.
Douglass believes in the transformation. He has seen the trains of destruction heading to the end of
the world be drawn to a stop because people believed that they could stop them. He suggests that we
can change the way the world operates.
Pacifists remind us that Jesus lived in a locale under a terrible cloud of violence. He lived in an
occupied country where, 40 years after his death, Jerusalem was destroyed, up to a million Jews were
slaughtered, and tens of thousands were made slaves. In response to this coming storm, Jesus
offered a revolution of nonviolence which could free both the oppressed and the oppressor. Jesus
also saw the oppression during his, day o f those who cooperated with Rome. The Jewish aristocracy
owned land at the pleasure of Rome, and the price was high taxes which the peasants tending the
land were forced to pay. He had seen violent revolutionary movements and the response they
garnered from Rome. Douglass says this was the precursor of U.S. policy of discriminate deterrence.
Douglass argues that Jesus knew about revolutionary violence and deterrence and saw the road to
destruction that they offered. So, he offered another way.1 2 7
Pacifists acknowledge that we live in a violent world, yet they refuse to be trapped in it, and they
refuse to be shaped by its ways. They passionately suggest we have other ways. They affirm the just
war tradition, pushing those who claim that tradition to be true to it. Yet pacifists believe the truest
l2 7 Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God, xii, 30-32, 52-58 & 70-72.
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way is nonviolence. Christian pacifists call upon the church to be a visible sign o f the reality of
other ways. Moreover, pacifists remind us that history and the present are full o f people who have
used nonviolence in powerful ways. Pacifism is not capitulation to evil; it is a way to resist evil
without giving into the methods o f evil. An ethic o f nonproliferation must be shaped in ways that
prefer nonviolence and understand the power o f nonviolence, for it is only by such an approach can
the apocalyptic reality o f nuclear weapons can be countered.
F. True Security
Some pacifists are unconcerned with the earthly consequences of nonviolence. In other words,
their focus is on being faithful, not on being successful. Other advocates of nonviolence argue that it
can provide more security than violence can ever hope to achieve. Perhaps surprisingly, both camps
of pacifism agree that nonviolence is the only means to provide “true” security. The difference is in
their optimism about the method being used to any great degree. These five Christian pacifists agree
that nonviolence is the Christian way to act in the world; it is the way God has called God’s children
to act.
Stanley Hauerwas puts forth the real kicker. He points to Luke 14:26, where Jesus tells us we
must hate our mothers, fathers, spouses, children, brothers and sisters if we are to follow Jesus.
People tend to ignore this passage, convinced Christianity is about supporting families. Drawing on
Luke 14:25-33 where Jesus says we are not worthy to follow him unless we hate our mothers and
fathers, Hauerwas developed a sermon called “Hating Mothers as the Way to Peace.” Hauerwas, of
course, preached the sermon on Mother’s Day. So how can hating one’s family make sense?
Hauerwas responds because with Jesus a new age has begun where the wolf now lies down with the
lamb or “when we can love our children without threatening the children of others.”1 2 8 Through
Jesus all our past loves are made part o f the new order where our loves can be a basis o f peace.
1 2 8 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 120.
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Because God is our security, we need not seek to secure it ourselves. We give up love as a source of
violence.1 2 5 It is not realistic to expect nations to place their security in God’s hand, and, anyway,
Hauerwas is talking about how Christians should behave. Nevertheless, an ethic o f nonproliferation
does not ignore Hauerwas here because he vividly reminds us of the character o f true security.
Pacifism requires opposition to evil. However, one is not to use the evil method o f violence to
oppose evil. Douglass understands that those who trust in nuclear security do so because they believe
nonviolent security is impossible. They know that nuclear security is a gamble, but they believe it is
less o f a gamble than nonviolence. Douglass says this is nothing but despair.1 3 0 Nonviolence is
hopeful, not in the sense o f wishful thinking but in the biblical sense o f hope, that nonviolence can
provide security.
Yoder argues that we have no evidence that nonviolence would fail to serve us well. He points
out that it is unfair to spend billions of dollars on the military and almost nothing on nonviolence
and then claim that nonviolence is ineffective.1 3 1 He argues that those who espouse nonviolence are
not unrealistic dreamers. In fact, it is the soldiers, who believe that they can end war by preparing
for it, that are unrealistic.1 3 2
The pacifist position is that military strength is a false ideology. It makes us think we are
secure. However, in truth violence does not solve problems; it merely determines who is more
powerful. In truth, violence usually causes more problems, such as hatred and resentment, that then
need to be addressed in other ways if they are to be overcome. Those wars that claim to be successful
often, at least in part, are based on what is done in terms o f peace after the war. For instance,
compare the results o f the Treaty of Versailles with the treatment of enemies such as Japan and
l2 9 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 117-125.
1 3 0 WalIis, 110.
1 3 lJohn H. Yoder, When War Is Unjust (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 82.
l3 2 Yoder, “ Living the Disarmed Life,” 42-43.
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Germany after World W ar II, where programs such as the Marshall plan helped rebuild them. This
is a strong argument that true security comes more from nonviolence and reconciliation than from
violence. So, a nonproliferation ethic must have a built-in preference for nonviolence.
G. Faithful Risk
Another contribution from our five pacifist writers is their call to take faithful steps that are
risky but that provide hope for change and improvement. Since they are Christians, it is not
surprising that these five would call for such steps. The church has a history of martyrdom, seeing
times when the only honorable way out is to accept suffering or death.
In one sense Hauerwas is less o f an activist than the other four pacifist writers explored in this
chapter. In stark contrast to the realist position, Hauerwas counters that it is not the Christian’s
responsibility to make history turn out right. Yet in a surprising twist, he ends up suggesting faithful
risk as well. Christians are to be people who are satisfied living “out of control.” 1 3 3 Christians are to
work for justice in the world but not with an illusion that they can make all things right.
Other pacifists suggest a more direct route, claiming that faithful risk is the taking o f active
steps to change things. Daniel Berrigan has done just that with his life. Berrigan has a “theology of
the cross” which entails suffering love: Christians are to stand by God and God’s people as they
suffer. This is a theological and ethical test for Berrigan.1 3 4 In response to the killing of six Jesuits,
their cook, and her daughter in El Salvador, Berrigan wrote that martyrdom is part of the Church’s
teaching because the Church understands why we have martyrs: Sometimes death is the only
honorable witness.1 3 5
1 3 3 Hauerwas, A Community o f Character, 11.
1 3 4 Rasmussen, 44.
1 3 5 Daniel Berrigan, “The Martyrs’ Living Witness: A Call to Honor and Challenge,” Sojourners,
March 1990, 23.
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In 1967, after Berrigan had returned to the U.S., he was invited to be a staff member o f the
United Religious Work at Cornell University. There he worked to bring the moral issue o f the
Vietnam War to campus, challenging the university’s ties to the war. As part of his work Berrigan
went to Washington, D.C. to support friends who planned to surround the Pentagon. He went, or so
he thought, only in support. But he ended up in jail, unable to leave while they arrested his friends.
Berrigan’s career o f resisting illegally began at this moment. During this time he also made a well
publicized, and U.S. government tacitly approved, trip to Hanoi to retrieve two American POW
airmen whom the North Vietnamese had agreed to release to representatives of the U.S. peace
movement.1 3 6
Berrigan’s illegal activities continued with one of the antiwar movement’s most famous cases,
the Catonsville 9. In an action instigated by his brother, Philip, nine people entered a draft board
office, removed files and then set them on fire. This action prompted, in the years that followed,
illegal entrance into some seventy draft boards. Daniel Berrigan was among those found guilty, and
although he was released while the case was under appeal, he was sentenced to three years in
prison.1 3 7
In spring of 1970 Berrigan was ordered to start serving his prison sentence for the Catonsville 9
action. Instead, he resisted and went underground. While underground, he spoke at a public rally
held at Cornell, but, with the help of the Bread and Puppet Theatre, he escaped capture. He also
preached a Sunday sermon at a suburban Philadelphia church without being apprehended. Berrigan
explains his actions: “We wanted to say that because the war had worsened . . . we had decided to
step up our resistance . . . by dramatizing our noncompliance.” 1 3 8 The authorities finally captured
l3 6 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 206-214.
l3 7 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 232.
l3 8 Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 245.
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and sent him to prison. Faithfulness is an important idea for Berrigan. He struggles to be faithful to
the realm o f God, even when the cost is high.1 3 9
Berrigan relays that a community study of Isaiah’s text which speaks o f beating swords into
plowshares led him and others in 1980 to enter General Electric’s plant in King o f Prussia,
Pennsylvania, and hammer on the nose-cones of nuclear missiles.1 4 0 More than twenty other
Plowshares actions have since taken place around the country. Most Christians are either unaware
or overtly hostile to such actions. The solace that remains for Berrigan is that a few others have
followed and that “Christians who work and live among the poor understand our actions.”1 4 1 Civil
disobedience is central to Berrigan’s life, a calling that he hopes all faithful people will engage in.
People often ask him at speaking engagements the exact number o f times he has been arrested. He
dislikes the question and responds, “As yet, not enough.” 1 4 2
James Douglass argues that one does not find authentic change or revolution in places of
political power but instead in those dark places where the crucifixion is felt. Douglass claims not
only the faithfulness but also the effectiveness of faithful actions. Douglass notes that Gandhi and
his followers disarmed the British by offering up their bodies as a sacrifice. The scene at the
Dharasana salt works is an example o f suffering love that is embodied in nonviolence. Men lined up
four or six abreast and came forward in an orderly manner to be beaten savagely one after the other
to make clear the oppression that was inherent in British colonial rule. As media reports told the
world of this event, the British colonial self-justification was dramatically undermined and exposed
as a lie. Such nonviolent actions changed the world and ended colonial rule, but India would soon
1 3 9 Daniel Berrigan, “The Marvelous Design— Isaiah 25: A Song o f Ecstasy and Truth,”
Sojourners, December 1980, 24-27.
1 4 0 Berrigan, Isaiah, 3.
'“'Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace, 342.
1 4 2 Berrigan, Ten Commandments, 22.
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change its ways. When India gained independence Gandhi did not take part in the celebration. The
partition between Pakistan and India plus the Hindu versus Moslem violence made it an empty
victory for him. He went to a Moslem house in Calcutta where he fasted until the violence ceased.
James Douglass insists that nonviolence is linked to the voluntary suffering embodied in the
crucifixion. The idea o f willingly taking on suffering can cause the oppressor to accept the humanity
of the oppressed because injustice thrives when the oppressed are regarded as less than human.
With voluntary suffering, the oppressed remove themselves from the role of victims and become
active participants in loving resistance. Douglass argues peace on earth comes from those willing to
suffer injustice for the sake o f love.1 4 3
Vincent Harding says we have the resources to help move people toward being willing to
participate in faithful but risky steps of change. He notes that people are transformed by exposure to
the stories o f people who risk everything for their community and freedom’s cause. The struggle for
democracy comes alive. When we recognize that “We Shall Overcome” is sung around the globe in
many struggles for peace and justice, for nuclear disarmament, and for ecology, it becomes clear that
these movements are connected to the America freedom movement. All such movements have
human costs, and it is important for us to remember those who have bore the price.1 4 4 Harding
suggests that living in faith means understanding that our little brick or step will not make the whole
project, yet we know the whole project exists in God’s mind. Completion is not central, being in the
process is.1 4 5
For seven years living at Ground Zero, the Douglass’s house would shake about once a week as
the trains carrying apocalyptic cargo would arrive at the Trident Base. As the train’s engineer
passed, he would wave, knowing people who loved him but hated what he was doing were watching.
l4 3 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 11, 15 70-71, 73 & 96.
1 4 4 Harding, Hope and History, 32 & 175.
I4 S Harding, “In the Company o f the Faithful,” 279.
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Originally, the trains were bringing rocket propellent, but later the white trains would come twice a
year bringing the nuclear warheads themselves. Yet this march o f death did not go unchallenged.
Because o f the thousands of people who resisted, the Department o f Energy switched to more normal
colored trains that were harder to spot and then abandoned the trains altogether, switching to trucks
because the resistance movement continued to grow.
Even the Department o f Energy’s decision to change the mode o f shipment to trucks did not stop
the resistance. Instead, Nukewatch out of Madison, Wisconsin, coordinated this effort. When the
military was developing the Trident 2, the focus moved to Kings Bay, Georgia, and the community
helped the Douglass family move to along the tracks in Birmingham, Alabama, where again the
shipments go by.
Douglass notes that Department of Energy records show the use o f white trains to carry nuclear
weapons had gone on for more than 20 years before the public resistance campaign began. Douglass
wonders how these white trains carrying another holocaust had done their work for so long without
notice. His pondering leads him to conclude that it was in the same manner that boxcars carrying
millions o f Jews to their death had rolled through the European countryside during the 1940s. Part
o f faithful risk is noticing the threats to life that surround us.
Perhaps the most tragic event in the Train Campaign happened in 1987 when Brian Wilson, a
Vietnam War veteran, had to have his legs amputated because a train ran him over at the Concord
Naval Weapons Station north o f San Francisco. The train was cany ing weapons that the U.S.
government was shipping to Central America. Wilson was there because he had already been to
Central America and saw the amputee victims that those weapons were making, and so he resisted
nonviolently. Wilson decided that his legs were no more valuable than those of people in Central
America. The military knew he was a threat to their way of doing things, and so they gave the order
not to stop the train, though they knew people would be on the tracks.
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The logic o f deterrence, global or local, is that violence can prevent violence. Douglass
questions whether violence can fulfill such a goal.1 4 6 He argues that those liberated from the fear of
death are liberated from violence’s power. Violence requires a counter force o f violence or fear.
Nonviolence does not provide this and is therefore a true challenge to the logic o f violence.
Pacifists remind us that in a nuclear world ah steps are risky and challenge us by asking why we are
so unwilling to take faithful steps. These pacifist writers urge individual Christians to take
personally risky steps to make the world better. An ethic of nonproliferation will encourage the
nations o f the world to do likewise. Yes, nonviolent steps on this issue are risky. But no more risky
than continuing the course we are now on.
H. Nuclear Issues
Besides offering general theoretical ideas to the discussion o f the ethics o f war and peace,
pacifism also addresses nuclear issues directly. With the threat to creation posed by nuclear
weapons, the issue of survival is central to much of the pacifist discussion about nuclear weapons. It
is both a point o f disagreement and congruence. In developing his own ethic, Stanley Hauerwas
evaluates four responses to nuclear weapons: pacifism, just war, survivalist, and sovereign-state
deterrence. According to Hauerwas, pacifism and just war thinking both place the burden of
justification on those who would use violence rather than those who would refrain from its use. The
pacifist response to nuclear weapons is concerned not so much with the chance o f being killed but
with violating the prohibition against killing others and the realization that, with nuclear weapons,
the killing could be on an almost unimaginable scale.
Sovereign-state deterrence is a realistic position that argues in spite o f its obvious failures, all we
have is the nation-state system and deterrence is the best way to prevent war within this system.
Hauerwas challenges this position by claiming that deterrence lacks stability because it requires an
'^Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God, 1,4-5, 17-18,21 & 69.
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action which, morally, people are not prepared to support: Threatening to kill millions o f people. In
a point that is especially relevant for an ethic o f nonproliferation, Hauerwas argues that the ideology
of deterrence contributes to nuclear proliferation. If nuclear weapons are what keep the peace and
protect a nation’s security, Hauerwas notes, then o f course all nations should, and will, want nuclear
weapons. An ethic o f nonproliferation will need to counter deterrence. This will be no easy task
since deterrence, even if we have moved to other forms o f it such as discriminate deterrence in the
post-Cold War period, continues to be the dominant system.
Hauerwas also objects to the survivalist position. The paradigmatic writer for the survivalist
position is Jonathan Schell with his work The Fate o f the Earth.1 * 1 Survivalists draw sharp
distinctions between conventional and nuclear weapons because they believe that nuclear weapons,
by their very nature, threaten the existence o f the planet. According to Hauerwas, despite their
opposition to nuclear weapons survivalists have no theory about when, and if, life can be taken. The
prospect o f nuclear war so horrifies them that they argue for the elimination o f these weapons at any
cost. While he admits that Schell’s writing is compelling, Hauerwas nevertheless warns there is a
great danger in subordinating everything to the value of survival. While he concedes that
disarmament can be based on justice and peace, Hauerwas objects to Schell’s proposal because “the
problem with Schell’s utopianism is not that it is utopian but that the peace he envisions may not be
just.”1 4 8 Hauerwas argues that the “way” in which we survive is as much an ethical question as
whether we survive. While imbuing a theology o f creation into survivalism is easy, if survival is the
goal then we become willing to sacrifice too much in the name of that goal. Hauerwas counters that
neither our lives nor the environment are at our disposal no matter how lofty the goal, even if it is
survival.1 4 9
l4 7 Jonathan Schell, The Fate o f the Earth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).
1 4 8 Hauerwas. Against the Nations, 146.
I4 9 Hauerwas, In Good Company, 192.
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Hauerwas concludes that pacifism is the Christian ethical response, but pacifism is not pacific.
While the pacifist is unwilling to kill, there are many things for which a pacifist is willing to die.
Hauerwas argues that pacifists must be willing to sacrifice for, rather than abandon, innocent
victims. For Hauerwas, peace cannot be based on the value of survival. He argues that to do so is
idolatrous and unjust because it will always accept evil to achieve security and order. Hauerwas is
most troubling here because he also knows that peace based on survival is likely to be the most
politically viable approach to avoid nuclear war. Nevertheless, he is unwilling to accept it.
While Hauerwas argues that pacifists can speak on policy issues, he is clear that for Christians
the specific issues o f policy are not as important as the theological issues. Hauerwas is concerned
that today Christians seeking peace and justice are more willing to make radical statements instead
o f living radical lives.1 5 0 Still, he believes that pacifists are as capable as just war thinkers in
addressing hard policy issues because they are also very concerned about decreasing the likelihood
and destructiveness o f war. While pacifists may not participate in any war, they are still able to
distinguish levels o f immorality between different wars and evaluate specific issues o f disarmament.
Therefore, Hauerwas does not oppose Christians joining political coalitions that are seeking to
stop the arms race. Yet, he claims, when Christians take on such roles one of their tasks should be to
clarify the moral issues at stake. For instance, Christians should argue that just war thinking is more
compelling than survivalist positions. Further, the church must name war as sin. While Hauerwas’
position is very Christian, his thought is still radically inclusive. He posits that we can avoid war by
naming others’ history as our own. If we can become inclusive, war becomes unimaginable.
Further, the Christian is in the peace process for the long haul and can help sustain the movement.
These pacifist writers remind us that the only nation to have used nuclear weapons is the United
States. James Douglass points out that the bombing o f Hiroshima was accepted as moral because,
1 5 c Paul Ramsey, Speak Up fo r Just War Or Pacifism: A Critique o f the United Methodist
Bishops’ Pastoral Letter "In Defense o f Creation" (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1988), 150, 153 & 182.
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throughout World War II, the public had come to accept more and more objectionable actions.
Douglass argues that Hiroshima was no moral break-fire but had been set up with obliteration
bombings of Germany and Japan. Yet according to Douglass, the nuclear age has brought the quest
for security to ever more destructive ends. We are now at the point where security threatens survival
o f the planet To such a situation the human response must be “no.” Douglass argues that in such a
situation revolution is a moral obligation. We have the choice to revolt or stop being human.
Douglass is not a survialist, yet he is much more willing to use the nuclear threat as a motivation to
turn to God’s way. Douglass suggests that the quest for security has brought us powerlessness.
Therefore, it is up to the revolutionary to introduce a new form of power that can free us from the
nuclear madness.1 5 1
For Douglass, the meaning o f the resurrection is that the power of death, including nuclear
death, is overcome. The Kingdom o f God is at hand rather than on the other side o f a nuclear
holocaust. Such a reality today is possible through the cross, and it requires nuclear disarmament.
The question is not probability but who has the faith to act upon Jesus’s call to his followers to take
up the cross. Unfortunately, says Douglass, Christians seem to choose a world constituted by sin
rather than one characterized by God’s love. Indeed, he claims that the greatest danger of nuclear
weapons is not their physical destructive power, but what they do to us spiritually.1 5 2
Douglass is well aware o f the danger that nuclear weapons pose. In a world o f hunger and
oppression, the increased availability of nuclear materials and weapons will be tempting to terrorist
groups seeking justice for their cause. Douglass says that the only realistic solution to such a
situation is a revolutionary transformation of values. From Gandhi, Douglass has taken the position
that humans are responsible for the actions of humans. This means that we each are responsible for
1 5 1 Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross, 5 & 8-9.
1 5 2 James W. Douglass, “Christ Is Risen From Nuclear Holocaust,” in Waging Peace, ed. Jim
Wallis (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 244-248.
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the nuclear arms race. Because we have created this situation, we are now responsible for getting
ourselves out of it.
According to Douglass, nonviolent resistance to the forces o f violence is part o f this
revolutionary power. Consequently, actions such as the Ground Zero community in opposition to the
Trident are an example o f such a revolution already in progress. Ground Zero took on the Trident
because it was far along in development, hideously destructive and a top priority o f the Pentagon.
Protestors believed that if something this large could be stopped by nonviolence then anything could
be. However, Douglass and his associates soon discovered that the campaign was not about stopping
the Trident but about changing/transforming the lives of the campaign’s participants and then
spreading out to change others. If the change were to spread, no one would remain to operate the
Trident. In time, Douglass claims, the truth will be clear that the Trident is a holocaust machine
that we will no longer tolerate.
The Trident campaign began in 1975, and more than a thousand people have engaged in civil
disobedience at the Trident base. They formed Ground Zero in 1977 to create a permanent
nonviolent presence near the base. In the early 1980s four workers at the base resigned for reasons
of conscience and said it was the work o f Ground Zero that had lead to their decisions. The actions
of Ground Zero did make a difference.
Another action coordinated by Ground Zero was a boat blockade o f the harbor when the
submarine Ohio was scheduled to arrive. The military became paranoid as it spoke o f the collection
of small sailboats and rowboats which were trying to stop the arrival of the Ohio. In David and
Goliath fashion the military feared that row boats might damage the Ohio. The rowboats o f these
peacemakers were more powerful than the Trident, and the military knew it had to keep them away.
Douglass recalls the interaction between a protester and a Coast Guard sailor during the blockade: In
response to the Coast Guard sailor who was aiming his water hose at her, 78-year-old peace
blockader Ruth Youngdahl Nelson looked up at him and said, “Young man, not in my America,
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please.” He laid down his hose and walked away. In another incident a Coast Guard officer drove to
the Ground Zero community to apologize for the harsh treatment people had received from the Coast
Guard and ended up staying and talking for several hours with a volunteer who had served in the
Coast Guard himself some years before. Douglass recounts the woman who drove her van into the
protesters base camp with the “Welcome USS Ohio” banner on the side of her van. She didn’t agree
with the protesters, but she was a Christian who knew the campground had no water supply. For
days she brought large water cans and loaves o f bread to the protesters. Douglass also remembers
the federal marshal who spent hours accompanying the prisoners from the Bangor base to the
Federal Court House in Seattle. As the journey ended, he asked a woman prisoner, with whom he
had been talking, for her peace button. He pinned it to his uniform above his badge. There was even
a crew member o f the USS Ohio who came the next day to talk with the protesters at the courthouse
steps. He told how he and several crew members agreed with the protesters that Trident was a
dangerous weapon and needed to be stopped. And there was the Trident base worker, husband and
father of three, who resigned his job in protest the day the Ohio arrived. Another worker knelt in
prayer at the dockside ceremony while others cheered and the band played “Anchors Aweigh.” 1 5 3
Peace actions influence lives and policies, yet Douglass reminds us that the peace movement carries
out few such actions. Morever, an ethic o f nonproliferation suggests that national policies o f peace
can have similarly productive results.
Douglass argues that Jesus’ prophesy about the destruction o f Jerusalem was tied to the injustice
carried out against the poor in Israel (Luke 6:20-21). Nevertheless, we have an alternative to this
prophecy of destruction if we will only choose. The choice given to those of the New Testament day
was between the nonviolent way of God that would serve the poor or the suicidal violence that would
mix with the violence o f Rome to destroy them. The same choice remains for us. Part o f our failure
to see this choice is that we have separated Jesus from his Jewish location. Douglass postulates this
1 S 3 Douglass, Lightening East to West, 18-20,25, 76-78, 80-83 & 88-89.
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mistake as the first step toward Auschwitz and Hiroshima. For, says Douglass, we miss that Jesus
was trying to give his people another way-God’s way-the nonviolent way of God. Jesus’ people
failed to make the right choice, and so have we.1 5 4
Douglass argues that American military strategy, especially now in the post-Cold War era, is
based on the Roman concept o f deterrence. America now seeks to be the imperial power and is
willing to use nuclear weapons to maintain that dominance. Key strategists have suggested that,
without the risk of total nuclear war, nuclear weapons should be considered for limited but decisive
use. Douglass suggests the American public have been misled to believe that deterrence was solely
to resist nuclear war. Instead, military plans have included using the Rapid Deployment Force
backed up with nuclear weapons to enforce the New World Order. This discriminate deterrence is
based on using whatever force is necessary to maintain U.S. dominance. This policy is focused
primarily on deterring revolution and seeking to preserve U.S. consumption rates while denying
them to others. In fact, Douglass suggest that the U.S. developed such a huge nuclear arsenal during
the Cold War not only to deter Soviet nuclear forces, since only a small nuclear force would have
done that, but also to maintain world dominance. Moreover, drawing upon the work o f Daniel
Ellsberg, Douglass reminds us that the U.S. has threatened to use nuclear weapons several times,
including:
Truman’s threat over the Chosin Reservoir in Korea, 1950; Eisenhower’s secret
nuclear threats against China in order to force and maintain a settlement in Korea,
1953; Eisenhower’s secret directive to the Joint C hiefs during the ‘Lebanon
Crisis,’ 1958; as well as Nixon’s secret threat to use nuclear weapons, conveyed to
the North Vietnamese by Henry Kissinger, 1969-1972.1 5 5
We have come much closer to using nuclear weapons for a second time than most people
acknowledge. Moreover, Douglass argues that humanity has a choice: “If we choose to live by
Trident, we and our children will die by Trident. We cannot expect God to save us from our choices.
IS 4 Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God, 3-4.
1 5 5 Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God, 13-14.
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The God o f Auschwitz and Trident respects human freedom in a terrifying way.” 1 5 6 However,
Douglass states that the reality of nuclear weapons’ destructiveness may be what will call us to
transformation.
Douglass draws the connections between many o f the evils o f the world, including nuclear
weapons, third-world debt and the global environmental crisis, claiming that they are based on the
assumption that people are expendable in the name o f profits. He suggests nuclear weapons are the
ultimate profit enforcers. The exploited of the world out number the exploiters, and the fact that the
exploiters have nuclear weapons means that the few retain ultimate power. The few use other
methods, such as low-intensity conflict, but they back it up with nuclear weapons and the poor of the
world are the most likely victims of nuclear weapons. Douglass argues U.S. willingness to engage in
the Gulf War rested on its trump card o f nuclear weapons. On the other side, part o f Saddam
Hussein’s motivation for his invasion of Kuwait was to find a way to pay off Iraq’s massive debt,
mostly accrued by his military. Moreover, Douglass argues that the oppressed o f the world will not
stay still for long. In response to extended deterrence they will increasingly turn to terrorism, which
they see as self-defense.1 5 7
Vincent Harding has been involved in nuclear issues for a long time. It was in Atlanta, in 1962,
when Harding first participated in an anti-nuclear protest during the Cuban missile crisis. Since
then he has continued to speak out on the issue and has been a voice within the black community for
nuclear disarmament. That message is often met with the reaction that the black community does
not have time for that issue because they are too busy surviving. He rejects such thought. He says
the survival o f blacks has always been precarious, yet at its best the black freedom movement has
always contributed to wider peace and justice movements. Harding suggests that American nuclear
policy is an example of flawed foreign policy that is based on racism and anti-liberation. Moreover,
1 5 6 Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God, 149.
1 5 7 Douglass, The Nonviolent Coming o f God, 8-13, 60, 86-87 & 115-116.
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he challenges the peace movement to understand that we cannot solve the nuclear issue without
addressing our past dealings with the poor and the nonwhite o f the world. Harding suggests that
nuclear disarmament can only be done through broader humanizing movements.1 5 8
A wide spectrum of thinkers on the subject o f war and peace conclude that there are more
important values than life or survival. The pacifist position agrees with this mainstream view and
stands against the survivalist position which would place survival as the highest value. The central
reason why Christian pacifists come to that conclusion is summed up in the phrase o f faithfulness,
not success, as the Christian calling. Hauerwas is adamant in this position although he is concerned
with making the world better as well. However, Douglass argues that nuclear weapons not only
threaten our physical well-being, they also harm us spiritually. Douglass’ willingness to use the
threat to survival as a motivation to create a counter movement to nuclear weapons is more in
keeping with an ethic of nonproliferation. We need a fundamental change or, as Douglass calls it, a
revolution if we are to counter the continued threat o f nuclear weapons. Pacifists remind us again
and again of the power of nonviolence, yet we have repeatedly failed to use its power. An ethic of
nonproliferation must be built on the power of nonviolence. Hauerwas is very helpful in reminding
us that such an ethic must be built on individuals doing one thing at a time for peace as opposed to
trying to develop the final solution. An ethic of nonproliferation will broaden Hauerwas’ idea to
encourage the nations o f the world to engage in one-step-at-a-time efforts against nuclear weapons.
Part o f this will be seeking ways to jettison deterrence. As long as the United States and other
nations believe that nuclear weapons provide for their peace and security, we cannot hope to
encourage other nations to forsake them. Moreover, as long as some nations see security in nuclear
weapons, the least powerful will turn to them as a savior, which will help to level the playing field.
Consequently, an ethic o f nuclear nonproliferation must be tied to global movements o f justice,
1 5 8 Wallis, 89 & 93-96.
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seeking to correct the terrible injustices which now motivate some to turn to weapons o f mass
destruction.
III. Implications o f Pacifist Thought
Nuclear weapons represent, at least currently, the ultimate level o f violence that humanity has
created. Realism provides neither the vision nor the method to end the threat from nuclear weapons.
At best realism offers some ideas on how to manage the problem, but what is needed is a way to
transcend the problem. Violent responses, while attractive for the immediate results that they seem
to provide, give only short-term and temporary results. Pacifism enters the discussion with the
commitment to the ultimate level o f nonviolence. Christian pacifism claims that nonviolence is the
ethical choice because it is God’s way in the world. Consequently, faithfulness rather than success is
its goal. However, pacifists argue nonviolence is a power, mostly untapped at present, that is equal
to the task of challenging and someday overcoming the awesome destructive power o f the atom.
Pacifism grasps the long-term nature o f the problem and calls for long-term engagement and
struggle against the threat that nuclear weapons pose. While this author has strong pacifist
sentiments, this ethic o f nonproliferation is not yet ready to give its full heart to pacifism, especially
since the nations o f the world abstain from its ways. However, much evidence of pacifism’s power
exists, and therefore a realistic analysis will not ignore its possibilities. Moreover, its deontological
claims o f rightness also have pull that an ethic of nonproliferation finds persuasive.
The first concept drawn from pacifism for this ethic of nonproliferation is a strong
presum ption for the methods of nonviolence. Nonviolence historically has a strong track record.
Moreover, nonviolence is not capitulation to violence but another way to resist evil. The ethical
stance must be nonviolent yet willing to make relative moral choices when nations are considering
violent options. Nonviolence seeks to find common ground in all situations. Moreover, this ethical
stance includes the possibility of complete disarmament. We cannot overcome the violent power of
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nuclear weapons with more violence, but perhaps we can overcome it with the different kind of
power offered by nonviolence.
The second idea drawn from these thinkers is related to the first. An ethic of nonproliferation
must help us to escape the ideology o f w ar. We have been shaped by and trapped in a worldview
that has taught us that violence is not only necessary but serves the purposes o f justice and good. An
ethic o f nonproliferation will be open to the possibility that such a worldview is simply wrong.
Moreover, part of escaping war’s ideology will be to recover realism or, more directly, make realism
be realistic. Realism has failed to grasp the reality that nuclear weapons can end humanity and
perhaps the entire ecosystem. Realism has failed even to consider the possibility that nonviolence
might be effective. Both are errors o f realism which an ethic of nonproliferation will seek to avoid.
Pacifists rightly argue that true security can never come from violence, but it can come only from
peace. This is most true with nuclear weapons, which can never provide true security, and the
limited security they provide an individual nation is always a threat to global security.
The third pacifist contribution to an ethic of nonproliferation is that it must defend the
oppressed as a task of justice. Justice is the oft claimed reason to use violence. However, an ethic
of nonproliferation will recover the biblical understanding of justice, which is concerned with the
poor and oppressed. It must adopt such an understanding since one major threat comes from
terrorists with nuclear weapons seeking redress for injustice. O f course not all terrorists have a
legitimate claim. However, an ethic on nonproliferation will not be guilty o f dismissing such claims
as automatically without grounds. Such would not only be wrong, it may be foolish or even suicidal.
Pacifism and also liberation theology informs us that true peace can come only if the poor and
oppressed are at the center of our considerations.
This leads to our fourth concept for an ethic of nonproliferation which is to seek to address
the motivations for nations and people to acquire nuclear weapons. This ethic must be holistic
and reject calls which limit the solution to stopping the spread o f nuclear knowledge, technology and
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materials. Such narrow approaches are doomed to failure because we cannot completely stop the
spread. Moreover, it is better to address causes rather than symptoms. Nations and people have
reasons to seek nuclear weapons, and the best solutions will need to address those causes.
Our fifth contribution to an ethic o f nonproliferation is to develop the willingness to give up
control. Control in the nuclear age is an illusion. We cannot defend ourselves from a nuclear
attack. No matter what we do, we are not solely responsible for our own destiny. Admitting that we
are not in control can allow us to take steps that move us to a safer world.
A sixth idea given to us by the pacifists is that we must take bold and risky, but faithful,
steps to end the threat that nuclear weapons pose. The pacifists have reminded us that in a
nuclear world all steps, including doing nothing, are risky. Therefore, the presence of risk does not
indicate that a path is wrong. Individuals will model the risky course through examples o f personal
risk and sacrifice. Nations must also be encouraged to take risky step-by-step initiatives which
provide hope for significant improvement in the world situation. We cannot avoid risk, and so we
should take wise risks for a better future.
We must reject individualism and move toward the creation of communal understandings,
says our seventh pacifist contribution for an ethic of nonproliferation. Ethics can only be done
in community. We need to nurture the development of communities which will take on the issue of
the continuing threats from nuclear weapons. Therefore, we need to be committed to the formulation
of communities that are faithful witnesses o f another way. Such communities seek to provide
alternatives to violence. Such communities can also infuse the process with hope. These must be
sustaining communities which are willing to sacrifice. They will arise from the grassroots and must
be nurtured so they can be models for larger national and global communities. The communal sense
also pushes us to global, as opposed to national, perspectives. This ethic will support and uphold the
work o f global organizations such as the United Nations.
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Our eighth pacifist idea informs an ethic o f nonproliferation to be historical. We do not
operate out of nothingness but out o f what has gone before. We need to explore what has and has
not worked in the past by studying peace heros o f the past, such as Martin Luther King, Jr., who
have, with great price, made the way straight. We must build upon their work as we stand upon
their shoulders.
Our ninth concept for our ethic on nonproliferation is to be an ethic o f vision. It will be a
long and difficult struggle to defeat the danger o f nuclear weapons, and so the vision does not expect
success as much as it demands faithful progress. An ethic o f vision listens to and carefully considers
positions it disagrees with but also is prepared to go to great efforts to convince others o f the
rightness o f its position. It is a conversational ethic, as any ethic based in community must be. An
ethic o f vision is realistic, but it is not limited by what others say is possible. An ethic o f vision will
be firm in its belief that the apocalyptic danger o f nuclear weapons cannot be countered, but it can be
overcome.
Our tenth contribution is that an ethic o f nonproliferation must offer radical alternatives
that include rejecting the survivalist approaches which makes survival the highest value.
However, we can use the fear that results from the threat to survival that nuclear weapons pose as a
catalyst for change. Pacifists remind us repeatedly o f the power o f nonviolence, power that, as o f
now, we have failed to tap.
Our eleventh and final concept is that we must reject the ethical claims that the nation
state system places on deterrence. Deterrence theory justifies proliferation because its claim is that
nations can avert nuclear war with the possession o f nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons under
deterrence theory are a form o f idolatry. We must free ourselves from our idols.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RAGE & VISION:
RELIGIOUS FEMINIST VOICES
Barbara Deming (1917-1984), a lesbian writer and activist who helped build bridges between
the movements o f the 1960s and 1970s, used feminist theory to analyze both society and the peace
movement.1 She wrote about the relationship between violence and sexism:
The challenge of those who believe in non-violent struggle is to learn to be
aggressive enough. . . . It is stubborn faith that if, as revolutionaries, we will wage
battle without violence, we can remain very much more in control-of ourselves, of
the future we hope will issue from it.. . . I have the dream that women should at
last be the ones to truly experiment with non-violent struggle-discover its full
force. . . . A liberation movement that is non-violent sets the oppressor free as well
as the oppressed.2
Although the theoretical connections between peace and feminism are deep and long standing,
feminists have brought these connections to the forefront. Peace groups have rarely made
connections to feminist theory or with feminist groups.3 Most men in the peace movement have been
unwilling to alter their lives based on feminist analysis. Instead, men have either ignored or given
‘Robert Cooney and Helen Michalowski, The Power o f the People: Active Nonviolence in the
U.S. (Philadelphia: New Society, 1987), 204.
2 DanieIa Geoseffi, ed., Women on War: Essential Voices fo r the Nuclear Age (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1988), 299.
3Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Feminism and Peace,” in Women’ s Consciousness, Women's
Conscience, ed. Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, et. al. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 63.
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lip-service to feminist ideals and theory. Traditional nonviolent thought has hierarchically ordered
the different possible manifestations o f violence with a nuclear holocaust at the top and sexism,
racism and homophobia nearing the bottom. Consequently, instead o f an interrelated strategy for
change, a series o f single issue groups has formed.4
The peace movement and feminism have not always been separate. Nineteenth and early
twentieth century woman’s rights groups saw peace and love as linked to women and argued that
men needed conversion to these ideals. Women’s groups during this period saw a close relationship
between peace and women’s suffrage. Giving women the right to vote, they contended, would bring
the half of humanity opposed to war into political decision making and thus would bring an end to
war.
By the 1960s, however, feminists no longer claimed that women were inherently inclined toward
nonviolence, and pacifists within the women’s movement were often isolated. Simultaneously,
sexism pervaded the peace movement. Since only males could be drafted, women were either
entirely excluded from the male dominated draft resistance movements, or relegated to supporting
male protesters. Burning one’s draft card was propagated as “macho” with peace posters reading:
“Girls say ‘yes’ to men who say ‘no.’”
During the 1980s serious research began on the connections between patriarchy5 and
militarism.6 Not surprisingly, women who researched military discussions found blatant examples of
both sexual and sexist language. They found phrases such as-“More bang for the buck”; “To disarm
4Pam McAllister, ed., Reweaving the Web o f Life: Feminism and Nonviolence (Philadelphia: New
Society, 1982), 7-8.
sWhiIe feminist thinkers are suspicious o f all hierarchical systems, the term “patriarchy” is
specific referring to the institutional legitimization of male superiority and the oppression of women.
It is not simply the belief that males are superior, but the building o f that belief into institutional
structures such as government and religion. Patriarchy is the force that creates institutional
structures to control the lives o f women and to exclude independent participation of women in
institutions.
6Ruether, “Feminism and Peace,” 54-70.
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is to get rid o f all your stuff’; and “You’re not going to take the nicest missile you have and put it in
a crummy hole”— to be common in military discussions.7 Further, militaiy indoctrination continues
to be both misogynist and homophobic,8 and if conservative politicians are successful in their calls to
return to more gender segregated basic training, it will be exacerbated.
Revolutionary violence during the last several decades raised some complicated issues for the
peace m ovem ent Both men and women, especially those o f color, found themselves supporting
those fighting for liberation in the third world. This left the peace movement with a
paradox-condemning the violence o f U.S. intervention while supporting revolutionary violence.9
Further, feminists have advocated women’s opposition to male violence directed at women,
while endorsing some violent responses by women. Pat James, an anti-rape activist, has argued that
women need to learn self-defense. However, James points out that self-defense training has made
her less violent. The training has opened a whole list of options on how to respond, with an
aggressive physical response always being the last.1 0
Despite such tensions, feminists within the peace movement continue to speak out. Pam
McAllister, editor o f the important book Reweaving the Web ofLife: Feminism and Nonviolence,
argues that feminist nonviolence is the process/strategy/philosophy which makes sense of both the
feminist rage and the vision of the world in which she wants to live. It is from her writing that I
borrow the title and structure for this chapter. For McAllister, means and ends need to be consistent,
and she is clear that rage should not become revenge:
To focus on rage alone will exhaust our strength, forge our energy into a tool of the
patriarchy’s death-Iure, force us to concede allegiance to the path o f violence and
7 Geoseffi, 36.
8 McAllister, 22.
9 Ruether, “Feminism and Peace,” 69.
l0McA!lister, 388-389.
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destruction. On the other hand, compassion without rage renders us impotent,
seduces us into watered-down humanism, stifles our good energy.”
According to McAllister, nonviolence for women means that women must learn to love themselves
and women must broaden their movement to resist the violence o f racial prejudice, unfair
distribution of wealth and opportunities, heterosexist privilege, war, rape, and nuclear power.
Many feminists point out that no radical movement for social change can be successful without
the empowerment o f women. War Resistor’s League staff member Donna Wamock states it directly:
“Either the future is female or the future is not.” 1 2
I. Feminist Theology and Peace
Believing that the future must include feminist voices, this chapter explores the implications of
the “rage and vision” o f five feminist theologians for thinking about an ethic o f nuclear
nonproliferation. While feminist thought has had some impact on discussions o f international
relations, it has not received the attention it deserves. Because o f this omission, the promotion of
peace has suffered. In this chapter, I will explore the thought of five feminist theologians: Sharon
Welch, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Dorothee Soelle, Beverly Harrison and Susan Brooks
Thistlethwaite. While any such selection is problematic, specific reasons prompted the selection of
these five. First, all five are significant voices in Christian feminist theology, though they range
between the more established voice o f Ruether and the newer voice o f Welch. Second, all five are
interested in ethics, though they range between Harrison whose work is primarily in ethics and
Ruether whose work is primarily theological. Finally, all five have contributed in some way to
discussions of peace, though in their published works the emphasis ranges from Welch who has
written a book on the nuclear arms race to Harrison who approaches the subject indirectly.
"McAllister, iv.
1 2 McAllister, 284.
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My method contains the danger o f the misappropriation o f feminist thought. However, I believe
that including feminist thought in broader discussions, as opposed to relegating it to a separate
ghettoized category, is a sign of taking feminist theology seriously. In other words, it is my claim
that adequate ethics cannot be done without including feminist perspectives. This chapter is not an
attempt to create a feminist ethic o f peace; that is the work o f feminist writers. Moreover, I do not
think males can do feminist ethics because we do not have the lived experience of women. What I
attempt is, I hope, a pro-feminist approach.
Also, as a safeguard against misappropriation, my methodology includes two key steps. First, I
have attempted to do careful scholarship so that the chapter does not merely proof text, but instead
takes seriously the perspectives of these feminist writers by listening carefully to what each has to
say. Second, I want to delineate clearly that the conclusions I draw are my own. The conclusions
are what I think are the implications of the thought of these five thinkers in deepening ethical
reflection about peace. I am not claiming to speak for any of these people nor even claiming that my
conclusions are what these feminist writers would say if they were directed to answer my questions.
It is crucial that an ethic on nonproliferation listens to the voices o f women who take their own
moral agency seriously and who question the patriarchal modes o f thinking that have dominated this
subject for too long. This chapter argues that feminist thought can help reshape and deepen the ways
we think about this subject.
It is an assumption of this chapter that this is a particularly auspicious time for the peace
movement to listen to feminism because in many ways the movement finds itself in disarray.
Without the motivating evils of the spiraling nuclear arms race or the threat o f direct military
intervention in Latin America, the peace movement in the United States has lost its vitality, focus
and presence. It simply no longer gamers much attention nor participation. Exceptions to my point
include the Campaign to Ban Landmines and Pastors for Peace and its work on U.S. relations with
Cuba. However, the peace movement has failed to witness effectively on issues such as the
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continuing threat from nuclear weapons, which most analysts suggest are a greater threat now than
during the Cold War. It has equally failed to keep attention on Latin America where conditions in
places such as Nicaragua are worse than during the Contra War, and the warfare they now face is
often less conspicuous.
Today, the peace movement has turned inward in two ways. Both ways, in and of themselves,
are good but have become problematic because it has meant an abandonment o f the outward projects
The first turn inward is in the domestication o f the peace movement. While the movement should be
in solidarity with American workers, much of the movement has adopted an “America First” attitude
that is especially prevalent in discussion about NAFTA. The second move is the spiritualization of
the peace movement. Again, the history o f the movement shows this to have been a real need.
However, the creation of nonviolent hearts will be a sellout to the individualized nature of liberal
religion if those nonviolent hearts are not put into practice by seeking to work for a more peaceful
and just world.
Evidence of this spiritualization of the peace movement is especially evident if one compares
publications o f the movement. If we look at publications such as The Other Side, Sojourners and
Christianity & Crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, we find deep and excellent ethical analysis of public
policy and international issues. An examination of these same publications today reveals that
Christianity & Crisis has ceased publication and that the other two rarely provide sophisticated
social analysis, especially on international issues. Perhaps if the peace movement would truly listen
to feminism it could find revitalization. So let us turn to these five feminist thinkers.
A. Sharon Welch
I also write as a feminist, finding in communities o f women courage and hope,
finding in the writing o f women clear analysis o f the nature o f oppression,
finding in the lives o f women modes o f resisting with dignity and joy. 1 3
l3 Sharon Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 8-9.
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Sharon Welch, formerly an associate professor o f theology at Harvard Divinity School and now
at the University o f Missouri, is an important feminist voice on peace issues. She describes her
theological task as answering the question o f what it means to be “a feminist, white, middle-class,
American Christian theologian.”1 4 She takes a liberationist approach and thus understands her
social location, as both oppressor and oppressed, to be central to the task in which she engages. She
is oppressed as a woman, but as a white, middle-class American she is a participant in structures o f
oppression in matters of race, class and nation. Her project is to create what she calls a feminist
theology o f liberation.1 5
In her 1990 book, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk,1 6 she draws upon voices o f the oppressed, primarily
literature written by African-American women, as the source for ethical reflection upon the nuclear
arms race. Welch’s work on nuclear issues makes her an obvious choice for inclusion in this work.
Moreover, her method of using various voices as ethical sources is the model for the method o f this
project of developing an ethic of nonproliferation.
B. Rosemary Radford Ruether
Jesus’ vision o f the kingdom was essentially this-worldly, social and political,
and not eschatologicaL Jesus’ views o f the kingdom are expressed particularly
in the parables. There is little trace in the more clearly historical sayings o f
Jesus o f a predominant concern with eschatologicalfeatures o f resurrection, life
after death and a transcendent world beyond history. On the contrary, his
sayings suggest that his view o f the kingdom remains primarily in the prophetic
tradition, a vision o f a this-worldly era ofpeace and justice. 1 7
l4Sharon Welch, Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity: A Feminist Theology o f Liberation
(MaryknoII, NY: Orbis, 1985), ix.
1 5 Welch, Communities o f Resistance, ix& 13.
l6Sharon Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).
1 7 Rosemary Radford Ruether, To Change the World: Christology and Cultural Criticism (New
York: Crossroads, 1981), 14.
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Rosemary Radford Ruether is a central figure in feminist theology. A Roman Catholic, she has
served since 1976 as professor o f theology at the Protestant Garrett-Evangelical Theological
Seminary in Evanston, Illinois. Previously, Ruether taught for twelve years at Howard University, a
predominantly African-American higher education institution. Her theological method is, as is
typical o f liberation theology, inductive working from the concrete to the theoretical. She calls
herself a deep ecumenist and sees a mistake in the monotheistic religions’ rejection o f polytheistic
nature religions. She believes that various faiths need to bring their contributions to the discussion,
and as a Christian she seeks to bring Christianity’s contributions to the table.1 8
Besides work on feminist and ecological issues, Ruether has often been a commentator on peace
issues and so is a good candidate for inclusion in this work. Moreover, reading her book Faith and
Fratricide: The Theological Roots o f Anti-Semitism1 9 during seminary was a foundation shaking
experience for me. It shook my belief that the evil that Christianity has done was simply an
aberration. Instead, I was forced to confront the reality that some o f this evil might be inherent in
the faith. Consequently, her work on anti-Semitism opened me to the need for radical evaluation of
every system o f thought and ideology. An ethic of nonproliferation seeks to free itself from outdated
ideology in search of a way that makes all things new. This search owes much to Ruether’s bold
thought.
C. Dorothee Soelle
It is not ju st survival instinct that makes me protest andfight against the military
machine; I am fa r more impelled by my unswerving love fo r creation, and /
sense the same love in the hearts o f those calling fo r peace. Those o f us who
w orkfor peace must know what we are striving for, what kind o f life we want to
conserve on earth. As the lover knows and remembers the smallest details o f the
1 8 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia & God: An Ecofeminist Theology o f Earth Healing (San
Francisco: Harper, 1992),: 10-11.
1 9 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots o f Anti-Semitism
(Minneapolis: Seabury, 1974).
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body o f her beloved, so too we who love the earth strive to fathom its secrets and
to divulge its beauty.2 0
Dorothee Soelle is both a European peace activist and feminist academic. She has taught in
universities in both France and Germany and regularly at Union Theological Seminary in New York
City where I was able to hear her speak several times while I was a seminarian at Union. Moreover,
her writings about the arms race have reaffirmed and deepened my concern about nuclear weapons.
Soelle is very influenced by and uses the methods of liberation theology, starting not with texts
and traditions but with lived experience. That is not to say that the texts and traditions are
unimportant to Soelle but only that lived experience is the lens through which she interprets them.
Soelle is a pacifist activist who, during the 1980s, favored a total abandonment o f the arms race,
calling for a unilateral approach to disarmament. The Arms Race Kills Even Without War2 1 is a
summary of her belief that the arms race represents evil. Her childhood in Germany during World
War II has left an indelible mark on her, and she has lived with the guilt o f what her people did. She
fears that like at Auschwitz, we fail to recognize the genocide that is inherent in nuclear weapons, or
we feel powerless, or too hopeless, to do anything about it. Soelle tends to write in short vignettes,
often narratives, which relay her understanding of God’s truth. While she recognizes the misogynist
character o f some o f the Christian tradition, she probably has the most faith in that tradition of these
five writers.
“ Dorothee Soelle, To Work and To Love: A Theology o f Creation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984),
3.
2lDorothee Soelle, The Arms Race Kills Even Without War, trans. Gerhard A. Elston
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983).
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D. Beverly Harrison
My life and professional work are a pledge o f my hope andfaith that a
nonmisogynist Christianity is a possibility.2 1
Beverly Harrison is a foundational voice within feminist ethics. In the spring o f 1999 she
retired from her long tenure as professor of Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary in New
York. It was there that I had the privilege of being one o f her students as she served as my advisor,
and it was under her guidance that I wrote my master o f divinity thesis. However, Bev-as
colleagues, students and friends affectionately know her-did much more than guide part o f my
academic work. She shaped me as an ethicist and helped me develop my voice. One does not simply
study ethics with Harrison, one learns to do ethics. She opened my world to the reality of the
multitudes o f oppression yet always challenged me to find hope in the struggle for change.
One distinctive element o f Harrison’s work is that she provides a critical focus on political
economy, and therefore Carol Robb, the editor o f her book Making the Connections: Essays in
Feminist Social Ethics,7 3 calls Harrison’s ethics feminist socialist, Christian ethics. Harrison, as a
feminist, starts with experience, specifically women’s experience. However, unlike some feminists,
she claims that, because men and women are far more similar than different, whatever biological
differences do exist should not be the basis for ethics or social policy. Harrison argues that, while
much of male theology and ethics have been flawed, it does not mean that it all needs revision nor
that it fails to be worthy o f study. The devaluation o f women, Harrison argues, affects both males
and females, though to different degrees and ways. Moreover, she argues important gender
differences have been created historically and culturally. For her, the goal o f feminism is to expand
the range of concrete choices open to women. She argues that procreative choice for women is a
"Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic o f Abortion (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1983), ix.
“ Beverly Wildung Harrison, Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, ed.
Carol S. Robb (Boston: Beacon, 1985).
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prerequisite to the moral agency o f women. Specifically, bodily integrity is central to moral agency,
and therefore procreative choice is a requirement.2 4 Harrison has chosen, despite her recognition of
the sexism o f the church, to stay committed to it because she finds in it the possibility for life and
justice.2 5
Harrison is a mixed ethical theorist. While people can misuse rules and principles, she argues
they are essential to moral reasoning. Yet even agreement on principles does not end or preclude
moral judgment. She also believes that consequences need to be considered, especially the
consequences to God’s commonwealth. Indeed, Harrison argues that those who ignore consequences
do evil and call it good. Harrison’s argument that consideration o f the common good takes
precedence over the evaluation of specific acts places her primarily in a natural law paradigm of
ethics. She provides two important ways to evaluate consequences. First, what is the impact over
time to those most effected? Second, what is the effect on our creative envisioning o f the good
society? Harrison argues that morality and politics are interwoven, and in fact they should be.
Moreover, societies that violate basic human well-being are unstable, and people will and should find
ways to resist such injustices. Harrison contends that doing ethics is not simply an individual
endeavor nor should it be left up to the experts. Harrison states liberative ethics is not about bashing
white males but about calling us all into accountability for the state of the world lest we pass it on
with continuing moral disaster.2 6
E. Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite
The connections are not being made that the nuclear buildup has profoundly
racist consequences-the cutting o f social welfare expenditures, which
2 4 Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 8, 10, 16, 35 & 197.
“ Harrison, Making the Connections, xi-xiii & 30.
2 6 Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 5, 8, 13-14, 28, 94, 191 & 255.
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disproportionately affects the black community and which retards even minor
economic gains black Americans have made.7 1
Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, an ordained United Church o f Christ minister, has been associate
professor of theology and culture at Chicago Theological Seminary and now serves as its dean.
Thistlethwaite defines her context as white, middle-class, American, academic and clergy. However,
her family’s rise to the middle-class is recent. Before World War II, her family of Hungarian
immigrants worked in the garment sweatshops of New York City. Her family saw escape from the
working class as the embodiment o f happiness. Moreover, they believed it was World War II that
had made this possible.
Her family also saw American possession of the atomic bomb as evidence of American moral
superiority. Although they labeled the use of the bomb to end the war and save American lives an
act of moral courage, Thistlethwaite has long rejected such understandings. Indeed, it is
Thistlethwaite’s involvement in the peace movement and her writings about the movement which
make her an obvious candidate for inclusion in this chapter. Thistlethwaite, at times, is a harsh
critic of the failings of the peace movement, including its racism and sexism. Moreover,
Thistlethwaite sees connections between violence, racism, classism and sexism.2 8
Thistlethwaite understands her acceptance of pacifism and her joining of the peace movement as
a logical extension o f her commitment to end violence against women. Her feminist analysis has
contributed to the peace movement by showing the connection between patriarchy and militarism.
Thistlethwaite argues that patriarchy emanates from alienation, including a view o f mind over body,
1 7 Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Metaphors fo r a Contemporary Church (New York: Pilgrim,
1983), 150.
2 8 Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, “‘I Am Become Death’: God in the Nuclear Age,” in Lift Every
Voice: Constructing Christian Theologies From the Underside, eds. Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite
and Mary Potter Engel (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), 96.
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a preoccupation with immortality, a preference for absolute ethics, and the subordination o f
females.2 9
II. Rage
We repudiate this idol o f patriarchy. We repudiate it and renounce it and
denounce it in the name o f God, in the name o f Christ, in the name o f the
Church, in the name o f humanity, in the name o f earth. Our God and Goddess,
who is mother and father, friend, lover, and helper, did not create this idol and is
not represented by this idoL Our brother Jesus did not come to this earth to
manufacture this idol, and he is not represented by this idoL The message and
mission o f Jesus, the child o f Mary, which is to put down the mighty from their
thrones and uplift the lowly, is not served by this idoL Rather, this idol
blasphemes by claiming to speak in the name o f Jesus and to carry out his
redemptive mission, while crushing and turning to its opposite all that he came
to teach.1 0
Rosemary Radford Ruether
Women, the world over, are treated as less than human. The same is true for people o f color
and the poor. The world is full o f violence, war and suffering. It is too easy to forget in this post-
Cold War world that, as reported by the National Defense Council Foundation, the world suffered
through sixty-eight wars and conflicts during 1997.3 1 How can we be so blind to the continued
suffering?
I am a spiritual descendent o f pacifist thought which points to the Christian way o f nonviolence.
Pacifist thought cries out that such violence is contrary to God’s plan for creation. However,
feminist thought adds a crucial dimension. War and violence is perhaps waged by nations and
groups, but it is waged against human beings, usually the poor and vulnerable. It is now also waged
2 9 Susan Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God: Christian Feminism in Black and White (New York:
Crossroads, 1989), 129-130.
3 0 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Women-Church: Theology and Practice (San Francisco: Harper &
Row, 1986), 72.
3l“World Shaken by 68 Conflicts in 1997” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 1 Jan. 1998, 3 A.
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against the earth itself. Feminists are willing to speak the truth o f what should be our reaction to
such horror and injustice-rage.
A. Christianity Amiss
Both feminists and pacifists have long recognized that Christianity can be misappropriated and
used for evil. Sharon Welch, for instance, recognizes that Christianity has been about evil as well as
good and that its history is full o f atrocities such as the inquisition, witch burnings and crusades.3 2
Susan Thistlethwaite notes the white church has been complicit in systematic evil from witch hunts
to slavery to the holocaust. She says that Jesus’ resurrection can be found in the survivors o f abuse.3 3
Beverly Harrison argues that the patriarchal hold o f Christianity threatens its story and central
mission.3 4 Moreover, Harrison is clear that we all owe a debt to those such as Mary Daly who
completely reject Christianity because they make it clear that feminist analysis is a necessity.
However, Harrison rejects Daly’s separatist stand arguing that negation does not equal change, and
few have the option o f taking the path that Daly has chosen.3 S Rather than reviewing feminist
critiques o f Christianity, this section highlights some o f these feminist critiques that have
significance for an ethic o f nonproliferation.
Feminist theology challenges an ethic o f nonproliferation to examine how the Christian tradition
has promoted patriarchy. To fail to do so would mean that an ethic o f nonproliferation in its
appropriation o f the Christian tradition is uncritically accepting o f evil excess baggage such as
patriarchy. The writings of Rosemary Radford Ruether set out the history of patriarchy in detail. The
church has pointed to the historical fact of Jesus’ maleness concluding that, consequently, God must
3 2 Welch, Communities o f Resistance, 4.
"Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 107-108.
3 4 Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 58.
"Harrison, Making the Connections, 4-5.
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also be male. The church has interpreted the story of the fall in the garden making Eve responsible
for bringing sin into the world. While there have been, as Ruether points out, throughout history
theologies which have upheld equality, the dominant theologies have been oppressive to women.
Moreover, especially in the American context dominant theologies individualize sin, teaching us to
feel guilty but little else. Ruether notices that this prevents us from seeing the social nature o f sin
and oppression where we could then seek true repentance, finally moving on in reparation to correct
the injustice.3 6 This is a challenge to Niebuhrian realism, which insisted that groups such as nations
or societies cannot be held to the same standards as individuals. Feminists insist that unless we
recognize social sin we will fail to address injustices. An ethic on nonproliferation, drawing from
feminists, insists that we cannot counter the continuing threat of nuclear weapons without
recognizing the social sin that drives the threat.
In a similar vein, Ruether argues that the Christian concept o f sin is inadequate. The church has
too long focused solely on individual sin, and Ruether argues that social sin is more than the sum of
all individual sin. Ruether believes that we have not inherited sin through biology but through
society. Social sin means that even people o f goodwill profit from social inequities and must be
called to repent and make amends.3 7 Moreover, Dorothee Soelle notes that there are many
“acceptable” ways to kill human beings, including withholding adequate food or medical treatment,
working them to death or sending them off to war.3 8
Soelle rejects the individualistic Jesus she sees peddled by televangelists to the middle class.
Such a Jesus is concerned with personal souls but has no concern for the poor, for single mothers or
3 6 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward A Feminist Theology (Boston:
Beacon, 1983), 181.
3 7 Ruether, To Change the World, 25.
3 8 Dorothee Soelle, Death By Bread Alone: Texts and Reflections on Religious Experience, trans.
David L. Scheidt (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 7.
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for young black males. She calls this Christofacism and points out that such a Christ has no
relationship to the Jesus found in Scripture.3 9
Ruether posits that Christianity has failed to provide an adequate ethic largely because of what
Christian theologians have refused to see, including the political nature o f Jesus’ life. As a result,
the very symbol of Christ is problematic, especially since, traditionally, Christology has perpetuated
“political detachment, religious bigotry, sexism and the negation o f nature. Such a Christology is
not the bearer of good news.”4 0 Christianity has also failed to see that political detachment is
completely inconsistent with the Jewish ideas o f the messiah in Jesus’ time. Ruether argues that
Jewish thought then would not have seen the messiah as non-political or otherworldly.- "
Ruether intensifies her critique o f Christianity by wedding her analysis with a longstanding
interest in environmental issues. In her noteworthy book Gaia and God she uses feminism and
ecology together to critique western Christian culture.4 2 Central to her argument is her position that
we must reject dominant theology’s dualistic approach to nature and grace. The grace of
redemption, says Ruether, is not beyond nature but part of nature. For her, “creation is itself the
original grace of nature.”4 3 Evil and alienation come from distorting this nature.
Dorothee Soelle counters that biblical faith begins with the Exodus— a historical event of
liberation— and not with creation. Soelle argues that liberation is a prerequisite to an affirmation of
creation. The cosmic order is oppressive without the presence of liberating forces. However, Soelle
affirms the doctrine of creation arguing the creation story shows that God was lonely and was in
3 9 Soelle, The Arms Race Kills, 19.
4 0 Ruether, To Change the World, 4.
■"Ruether, To Change the World, 11.
4 2 Ruether, Gaia & God, 1.
4 3 Ruether, Women-Church, 86
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need of others. Soelle concludes that the doctrine of creation portrays God as relational and affirms
that love cannot exist without the other.
Nevertheless, Soelle insists that classical theologies o f creation have three central problems.
First, they perpetuate the view o f the total otherness and domination o f God over all things. Second,
they portray the earth as godless and nothing but matter void of spirit. Third, they assume human
loneliness is a part of the created order. In these three ideas are rooted the justification o f the
ecological abuse o f creation. Moreover, the concept o f an unbridgeable gap between God and
creation has lead to the assigning o f godly characteristics to the male and worldly characteristics to
the female.'*4 Soelle argues that our ecological imperialism is rooted in mind/body dualism, and it
has led to other harmful dualisms such as “human versus animal, man versus women, adult versus
child, the master race versus the slave race, intellectual versus manual work."4 5 Soelle finds, “Each
nuclear bomb is a threat to undo creation and a harbinger of nothingness.”4 6
Thistlethwaite goes beyond Soelle’s views and argues feminists need to refine further their views
o f nature because they have included troubling implications. She reports that womanist theologians
find conflict between humans and nature while feminists find only interconnectedness between them.
The feminist move to reclaim the body and nature has prevented adequate social analysis because,
traditionally, creation and the creation of patriarchy are interrelated. The result is that feminists
have not engaged in cultural analysis as vigorously as womanist critiques. For instance, in
discussing the feminist critique o f the Babylonian creation epic, the Enuma Elish, Thistlethwaite
argues that feminists make a mistake in their call to return to the harmony o f pre-creation. Not only
is such a call unrealistic, it also ignores that this text is also a political creation that legitimizes
totalitarianism. Thistlethwaite argues a more appropriate response would be to call for the creation
^Soelle, To Work and To Love, 7, 10, 16, 20 & 24.
4 5 SoeIIe, To Work and To Love, 33.
4 6 SoelIe, To Work and To Love, 38.
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of a more just world. Nature does not stand against the creation o f patriarchal culture. Instead,
nature itself is subject to various cultural understandings, and therefore universalizing one
interpretation o f nature is not appropriate. Thistlethwaite calls white feminists to stop trying to
belong to nature and instead to seek to align themselves with the “other” so that society can be
transformed.
Thistlethwaite comes to the conclusion that things are more complex than we like to admit.
Good and evil, creation and destruction are not distinct categories but intertwined in complex ways.
She suggests that we must struggle with the ambiguity of evil. She notes that creation theologians
such as Matthew Fox eliminate the Fall and thus take away the tools the oppressed need to change
things. Creation theology often is nothing but a code for the created order which is the status quo.
For if things are as creation intended then no change is needed.4 7 While it is not the intent of
creation theology, nevertheless it becomes but another tool to maintain the status quo and not only
fails to help the oppressed, it may be another road block in their path. Consequently, even when
reforming Christian understandings we must be sure that proposed solutions actually do provide
improvement.
As we explored in chapter two, pacifism was the original Christian approach to war.
Thistlethwaite argues the reason early Christians could uphold pacifism was their theology of
divinity. They understood the divine incarnated into a human body had vested the human and also
human society with incredible worth. This means Jesus’ talk o f the kingdom o f God is about this
world as well as the next. The early Christians refused to participate in the militaristic policies of
the Roman Empire. However, this all changed when Christianity becomes the official religion.
Then, the Roman Empire became the model for the good society and humans were seen as fallen and
sinful. Thistlethwaite is highly critical o f that move, arguing that militarism is a gnostic
4 7 Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 60-61, 64-65, 67 & 74-75.
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understanding that denigrates the body and sexuality. Military training separates the soldier from
his/her body and atomizes humans from each other.4 8
Clearly, feminist theology points to problems within traditional Christian understandings.
Moreover, feminist theology takes the criticism o f Christianity one step further by saying that
Christianity has done more than just distort or misuse the tradition. Instead, feminist theology points
out that there are things amiss with the very nature o f Christianity, including the biblical narrative.
Drawing upon Foucault, Sharon Welch is suspicious that all forms of western knowledge have
imperialism built-in because of their universal claims. One corrective step she offers is the
avoidance o f universal claims, which she contends are requests for privilege and therefore steps
toward domination. Welch argues liberation theologies must be vigilant to avoid this temptation.
For instance, Welch points out that feminism too quickly universalized the experience o f white
middle-class women and therefore failed to appreciate that its methods of resistance were not
necessarily appropriate for women of other races or classes.4 9
Soelle, while perhaps the most traditional in her approach to scripture, is still willing to reject
parts o f it because it is amiss. In response to I Timothy’s teaching on the subordination o f women,
she insists it is contrary to Jesus’ acceptance o f women and the church’s practices o f including
women in all church positions until that time. Moreover, if the I Timothy church had been correct
“with its patriarchal fear of teaching, thinking, independent women,” she declares, “Christianity
would have been no more than an ideology o f subordination; then the penis would justify and not the
truth!”5 0
4 8 Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, “Militarism in North American Perspective,” in Women Resisting
Violence: Spirituality fo r Life, eds. Mary John Mananzan et al. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996), 119
& 121.
4 9 WeIch, Communities o f Resistance, 21, 27 & 72.
S 0 Dorothee Soelle, On Earth as in Heaven: A Liberation Spirituality o f Sharing, trans. Marc
Batko (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993), 23.
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Moving specifically to our topic, Thistlethwaite notes that Christianity has given the
development o f nuclear weapons religious sanctification, calling them tools of a wrathful God.
Moreover, Christianity has failed to provide alternative models of God, and this has contributed to
the buildup o f nuclear weapons. Thistlethwaite calls this “nuclearism,” which she defines as the
worship o f nuclear weapons as a means to our salvation. Indeed, Robert Oppenheimer, the director
of the Manhattan Project, named the first nuclear test “Trinity” based on the famous poem by John
Donne in which a believer asks God to save him by destroying him. Thistlethwaite’s argument is
that we have failed to develop an adequate analysis o f nuclearism or the theology o f nuclear
weapons. She suggests nuclearism is based on the release of anger. We develop righteous anger
against our enemies and their sins. We therefore focus our wrath on the enemy, and the longer such
punishment is delayed, the more tension is produced. Moreover, the greater the tension, the larger
the needed release.5 1 Such a theological understanding has promoted the nuclear arms race and
moves the world closer to the actual use o f nuclear weapons.
Christianity has also failed to see how its conception of God acting in history impacts the moral
evaluation o f militarism and reinforces an “us” versus “them” mentality. In the case o f the conflict
in the Middle East, Ruether argues that such theological understandings might be the determining
factor o f whether it is the location for the first nuclear war. Developments in the Middle East have
fueled theological apocalyptic interpretations. Some conservative Christians have taken events such
as the establishment o f the state o f Israel, in 1948, and its expansion through war, in 1967, as signs
of the end times, and have provided strong political support within the United States for the state of
Israel. Likewise, the Cold War’s nuclear arms race has also supported these apocalyptic views, and
even the Gulf War is seen by some as part o f the divine plan.5 2 As a result, this theological position
does not see a nuclear war as necessarily evil but rather as a potential sign of the end time “when the
slThistlethwaite, “‘I Am Become Death’: God in the Nuclear Age,” 96-97.
S 2 Ruether, Gaia & God, 80-81.
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righteous will descend to rule over a purged earth.”5 3 Ruether contends that this view o f God acting
in history creates an “us versus them” mentality which equates the good with us and evil with them.
While insistent that there is good and evil, Ruether insists that they are not embodied in specific
groups o f people. Such apocalyptic theology is dangerous because it envisions a tribal-warrior God
whose actions are beyond moral evaluation. It allows for atrocities to be carried out and even
identifies nuclear weapons with God’s righteousness.5 4
Unfortunately the liberal response to the Middle East has not been much better. Because o f guilt
over the Holocaust and fear of the charge o f being anti-Semitic, liberal Christians have refused to see
the oppression present in Israel and have failed to be a strong voice of the oppressed Palestinian
people o f the area. At best such views have put forth a two-state approach to the situation.5 5
Moreover, Ruether notes that the peace movement refuses to see the continued threat o f nuclear war
here and elsewhere.5 6
Thistlethwaite points out that we have failed to notice that much of Christianity worships a God
of death and that such a view of God has its political and economic sources. Thistlethwaite notes
that both church and state have used monotheistic monarchism as a method o f power for the few
over the many. The nuclear age did not create the few, but nuclear weapons have made it vastly
more deadly than when the instruments were chariots and spears. Western theology failed to
question these understandings of power during any historical period from imperial Rome to today’s
post-industrial capitalism. Thistlethwaite claims during the last century Christianity has based its
5 3 Douglas John Hall and Rosemary Radford Ruether, God and the Nations (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 1995), 75.
^Ruether, Gaia & God, 82-83.
5 5 Hall and Ruether, 77.
S 6 Ruether, G aia& God, 107.
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views on Freud, seeing human nature as innately power hungry and then projecting this view o f
human nature onto God.
For example, Thistlethwaite notes that in Catholic lay theologian Michael Novak’s response to
the Catholic Bishop’s pastoral letter on peace he equates nuclear deterrence, nonviolence, legitimate
authority and legitimate use o f force. How can he equate nonviolence and legitimate force? He does
so by suggesting that the ultimate authority for force is in God’s judgment on human sinfulness.
God is the ultimate source o f righteous violence because God’s role is to wage war on human sin. So
legitimate violence is nonviolence, says Novak, because God has ordained it. Thistlethwaite argues
that many in the peace movement agree with at least part of Novak’s theology. Although they
disagree with his political conclusions, they agree with his view of human nature. Such people argue
that the human mind is the best place to counter the threat o f nuclearism. Those whom
Thistlethwaite put in such a camp include Joanna Rogers Macy, Gordan Kaufman, Jonathen Schell
and Sallie McFague. All these, argues Thistlethwaite, fail to see the political and economic systems
which support the nuclear weapons. Nor do they see the theological view o f God that undergirds all
this. Why are we so attracted to an agent of death? Thistlethwaite contends issues o f sex, race and
class underlie it all.
Thistlethwaite reminds us that violence is both overt and covert, both physical and spiritual.
Violence is unjust coercive power based on unjust and unequal distributions of power. Nuclear
weapons embody this unequal power distribution more grossly than anything else. Thistlethwaite
labels the response to violence with violence as resourcelessness while nonviolence usually involves
the pooling o f resources.5 7
Christian feminist theology does not simply wish to jettison Christianity though it is willing to
raise the difficult questions. Sharon Welch raises the question that, since Christians were unable to
stop the holocaust or the nuclear arms race, which may well lead to the ultimate holocaust, whether
5 7 ThistIethwaite, “ T Am Become Death’: God in the Nuclear Age,” 98-102 & 104.
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Christianity itself is so impotent that it is to be considered useless.5 8 In response, Welch explores
why good people participate in evil. Most would admit nuclear weapons, at a minimum, have a
great potential for evil. Nevertheless, over the last fifty years many people in the United States have
spent their lives working with and in systems that support the design, development, manufacture and
stockpiling of these weapons. The rest in the U.S. pay taxes to and elect leaders who support these
weapons. Why? Welch concludes that the arms race comes not from evil but from goodness. She
concludes that “well-intentioned people are responsible for the nuclear arms race.”5 9
While Welch’s historical analysis questions the moral adequacy of Christianity, she warns
against dismissing Christianity entirely. She also finds within it movements such as liberation
theology which give important voices/processes that challenge evils and provide the sustenance for
communities that work for corrective justice.6 0
The feminist critique o f Christianity should be contagious for an ethic of nonproliferation. We
need to be motivated through rage/anger at the injustices done in the name of the Christian faith.
This will require an authentic peace movement to be much more radical, instead o f the more
common approach o f avoiding some issues so as not to rock the boat and hoping that perhaps people
will heed it on at least issues o f nonviolence. If the peace movement wants to be a voice that matters,
it must reject patriarchy, for it is the true root of war, and that means that we can no longer tolerate
sexism within the peace movement or within the church. Discrimination within the church must be
understood as a violation o f peace.
However, the feminist critique that something is amiss in Christianity pushes an ethic of
nonproliferation in other areas as well. Feminist theology insists that we reject the liberal approach
of comfortably allowing all positions room to operate and become much more willing to challenge
5 8 WeIch, Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity, 6.
5 9 Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 2.
“ Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 5.
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ideas within Christianity that are harmful. For example, an ethic on nonproliferation must be clear
that designing weapons is not acceptable behavior for Christians and that thinking that Jesus’
primary mission is to help individuals focus on the next world is wrong. Neither can Christians
ignore the social nature o f sin. As a result an ethic o f nonproliferation must be informed by the
conviction that nuclearism cannot be countered merely in the human mind or heart but primarily in
the reality o f the social world. While nuclear weapons threaten God’s creation, an ethic of
nonproliferation must not fail to do adequate social analysis, seeking to discover the causes of
proliferation. Creating a more just world thus becomes a step toward nonproliferation. Moreover, a
theological redefinition o f the doctrine of God is necessary as the view o f God as one who rules over
and dominates the world contributes to nuclearism. Theology which images God as domineering
contributes to a mind-set that is then more willing to construct defense strategies based on the
ultimate domineering power of nuclear weapons. Instead, a doctrine o f God as relational needs to be
promulgated. Feminist theology insists that how we view God affects how we operate in the world.
An ethic of nonproliferation must make it clear that it is theologically and morally untenable to think
the end time is near and that Christians are acting in accordance with God’s plan when they promote
militaristic policies that may lead to an apocalyptic nuclear war. Because Christianity has been part
of the problem, a theologically based ethic of nonproliferation must try to correct those mistakes.
B. Sacrifice
Besides the general problems o f things amiss within Christianity, the rage/anger of feminist
theology also identifies some very specific problems. Perhaps none is more problematic than the
traditional concept o f Christian sacrificial love. Historically, elevation o f this ideal has given rise not
only to calls to battered wives to accept abuse but for young males to sacrifice their lives for their
country.
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Susan Thistlethwaite argues for the need to counter the idealization o f victimization that is
present in Christianity. She finds it an easy excuse to sacrifice others.6 1 Dorothee Soelle finds the
traditional Christian understanding o f suffering to be sadistic, claiming it posits a just God who
sends suffering to punish sins. Even worse, says Soelle, we are taught to worship the executioner.
Her conclusion is that we cannot reconcile such views with God’s love.6 2 Beverly Harrison counters
that sacrifice is not a key understanding of Christianity. She claims that Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross
was not itself a morally virtuous act. Instead, its moral meaning derives from the radical mutuality
he evidenced by his surrounding himself with those whom his culture excluded. Radical acts o f love
are central. As did Jesus, Christians are called to resist and challenge those powers that thwart the
communal nature of human relationships. Doing justice is, for Harrison, the righting of wrong
relationships. Sacrifice is not the virtue; the virtue is passing on love.6 3
In addition, self-sacrifice does not provide the proper model for social change. Sharon Welch
points out that a self-sacrificial model has obvious problems for the oppressed because it leads to the
accepting of one’s lot. Welch goes further to say self-sacrifice is also inappropriate for those from
middle and upper-class backgrounds because a movement based upon it cannot be sustained.
Instead, Welch argues that the appropriate model for social change is love. As oppressors we can
learn to love the oppressed and can learn to broaden our views o f ourselves to include “community
with others.”6 4
An ethic o f nonproliferation must not elevate sacrifice to the level o f a moral virtue. Such
elevation causes more suffering to those who are oppressed by perpetuating institutional violence and
repressing efforts of liberation. To be sure, those who express their love by working for change will
6IThistlethwaite, Metaphors fo r a Contemporary Church, 79.
“ Dorothee Soelle, Suffering (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 24, 25 & 28.
“ Harrison, Making the Connections, 18-20.
“ Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 166.
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at times suffer, but suffering is neither the goal nor an appropriate motive. Consequently, it is not a
virtue. Instead an ethic o f nonproliferation needs to see its task as working to widen people’s
understanding o f community so that love is expressed more broadly. To begin with, nationalism
must be countered. In many ways we as citizens o f the United States should be proud o f our nation,
but for Christians nationality should never be a primary identification that separates us from
fulfilling commitments to our sisters and brothers.
C. Sexism & Domination
The second specific problem which rage/anger points to is sexism and domination. Rosemary
Ruether understands the rage that women feel at the injustices done by patriarchy. She believes that
the culture o f domination is at the root of the ecological crisis, poverty and militarism.6 5 Crying out
“Horror, blasphemy, deceit, foul deed!,”6 6 Ruether reminds us that anger is not something to be
feared but rather is the liberating power of grace. Only by experiencing anger can one move onto
wholeness.6 7 Beverly Harrison also believes anger is a crucial resource, and one o f her best-known
essays is entitled “The Power o f Anger in the Work o f Love.”6 8 However, she also points to the
dangers of anger, one o f which is anger turned inward which can cause women to view themselves
as victims instead of “those who have struggled for the gift of life against incredible odds.”6 9
Males have historically wielded powerful social control over women. In her study o f the debate
over abortion, Harrison notes that, while only women can get pregnant, it is almost exclusively men
who interpret the morality o f abortion and make the laws about the issue. Harrison also notes that
6 5 Ruether, Gaia & God, 10.
“ Ruether, Women-Church, 72.
6 7 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 186-188.
“ Harrison, Making the Connections, 3-21.
6 9 Harrison, Making the Connections, 7.
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those who legislate against abortion tend to support capital punishment, increased military spending
and a highly aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Those who oppose abortion find reasons for justifying
killing in other areas. Harrison argues that all social institutions, historically, have sought to control
women’s procreative power. Moreover, such control is not relinquished easily. Such social
domination leads Harrison to affirm the need to be concerned with the well being o f women in a
sexist society.7 0 Much o f Harrison’s argument is economic, claiming that technological capitalism
weakens women’s social roles while reinforcing their “special nature” and “special place.” The
effect is to relegate women to places in which they cannot survive, let alone thrive. Harrison notes
with irony that women are welcomed into production when nations need them during wartime but
excluded when war ceases.7 1
Susan Thistlethwaite has found that not everyone in the peace movement sees feminism as a
peace issue. Indeed, sex workers in Okinawa reported their best business ever when a worldwide
peace conference was held there. Through Thistlethwaite’s study with Rita Nakashima Brock on
prostitution, the need to explore sexual exploitation becomes apparent. Globally, the sex industry is
structurally related to militaries, sometimes even in official ways. For example, the roots of the sex
industry in Thailand are tied to the Vietnam War’s “rest and relaxation” breaks for U.S. soldiers.
After the war, Thailand’s government and business leaders needed the continued income and so
collaborated in the creation o f sex tourism. By 1988, more than four million sex tourists a year were
visiting "Thailand. Brock and Thistlethwaite argue that the sex industry is neither about private acts
between consenting adults nor about a few morally suspect women; it is about exploitation.7 2 It is
7 0 Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 2-3, 35, 189 & 193.
7 1 Harrison, Making the Connections, 42 & 51.
7 2 Rita Nakishima Brock and Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, Casting Stones: Prostitution and
Liberation in Asia and the United States (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), xii-xiii, 2, 5-6, 9 & 81.
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about women who have no other choices economically and may have been kidnaped or sold into the
industry.
In language such as the “new world order,” Thistlethwaite sees an attempt to revive the Roman
Empire, which makes clear the connection between political, military, sexual and racial
domination.7 3 Moreover, Brock and Thistlethwaite’s study found that warfare is terribly destructive
to local economies and contributes to the cycle as well. They conclude that we need to rethink
gender roles and militarization and the religious justification for such things if we want to overcome
such injustices. For example, indigenous men under military occupation become hyper-masculine
because they cannot protect their women as patriarchy requires o f them. On the other side, military
ideology sees the sexual exploitation o f the women of conquered people as proof of successful
domination.7 4
Issues o f both race and sexism are at play in militarism. Sexism is built into military training.
Racism is equally present as militaries deem people of color as excess, and therefore they can be
risked militarily. O f course the military is skilled at employing minorities. The real question, asks
Thistlethwaite, is why minorities cannot find other forms o f employment.7 5 Feminists demand that
sexual exploitation be termed war crimes. Moreover, they challenge boot camp marching chants
such as: “This is my weapon, this is my gun; one is for shooting and the other for fun.”7 5 Brock and
Thistlethwaite give two principles for the ethical and policy choices we make. First, make sure that
our choices do not further victimize or hurt those exploited. Second, work to strengthen social
movements as opposed to working alone.7 7
7 3 Thistlethwaite, “Militarism in North American Perspective,” 124.
7 4 Brock and Thistlethwaite, 17-18, 56, 71-72 & 124.
7 5 Thistlethwaite, “Militarism in North American Perspective,” 123.
7 6 Brock and Thistlethwaite, 74-75.
^Brock and Thistlethwaite, 301.
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Thistlethwaite has been especially interested in issues o f race. Because white women are
socialized to avoid conflict, they try to smooth over the disharmony between black and white women.
Partly in response to the avoidance of conflict, white feminists have seen anger as the energy source
which motivates a hermeneutic o f suspicion. In the disharmony between blacks and whites, anger
exists, and it is there that Thistlethwaite says we should see the signal for the need for change.
Thistlethwaite recognizes that racism both helps her materially but limits her severely, and this
makes her angry. Thistlethwaite is acutely aware o f the danger of anger as turned inward it becomes
depression and is present in many battered women who become self-loathing. Moreover, even when
women turn the anger outwards, it can become dangerous to others. So even when directed outwards
we have no guarantee that anger will be the catalyst for social change. For that to happen it must be
mixed with social analysis. Therefore, says Thistlethwaite, we could call the anger that Harrison
speaks o f passion. Yet Thistlethwaite says that using the bald term “anger” is necessary.7 8 As for
racism, Harrison argues it is not enough to change one’s attitudes but is necessary to change social
conditions.7 9
Rosemary Radford Ruether finds value in exploring the history o f earlier people to understand
how patriarchy and militarism are connected. One thing she notices is that, as alternatives to
hunting increased food supplies, hunting remained male identified but became less necessary and
less common. The weapons o f the hunt, however, became the weapons o f war.8 0 Ruether is clear
that militarism is the root o f many problems, and she claims militarism comes from the proclivity of
the male ego to invulnerability and domination. Ruether suggests that this male ego is at the root of
sexism and manifests itself on the global level in militarism, which includes both a militarized
economy and a national security state.
7 8 Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 22-24.
7 9 Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 111.
8 0 Ruether, Gaia & God, 163.
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Although the end o f the Cold War threatened this mentality, it recovered quickly, as the
language of “the new world order” has made clear. Immediately the U.S. conducted a search for new
threats and enemies, and Saddam Hussein was only too happy to oblige. For Ruether, the 1991
Persian Gulf War “in which a patriarchal Anglo-American faced a patriarchal Arab across a desert
filled with modem death machinery, each refusing to concede to the other lest he ‘lose face”’8 1 is
paradigmatic of this mentality. In addition, the “success” of the Gulf War allowed the American
male ego to recover from the Vietnam Syndrome by showing that “we can kick somebody’s butt.”8 2
Ruether counters that real security does not lay in such approaches but in “vulnerability, limits, and
interdependence with others, with other humans and with the earth.”8 3
Sharon Welch posits the direct role that sexism plays in militarism:
It is impossible to understand the causes o f the nuclear arms race without
examining the role that sexism plays in constituting the structures within which
strategic policies are developed: the predominately male bastions of military
command and strategic policy-making; and the role that sexism plays in the
definition of reason, o f national security, and o f international competition.8 4
Thistlethwaite sees the connection between nuclearism and violence against women. She contends
nuclearism is the symbol that allows oppression based on sex, race and class. The supposed peace
that nuclear weapons have provided has lead to more than 100 wars since 1947 in the two-thirds
world. Moreover, the language o f nuclear weapons is often sexist.8 S Dorothee Soelle argues that this
militaristic approach to security leads us to engage in war against the poor as we seek to protect our
8IRuether, Gaia & God', 170.
^Ruether, Gaia & God, 266-269.
8 3 Ruether, Gaia & God, 268.
8 4 Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 8-9.
8 5 Thistlethwaite, ‘“ I Am Become Death,”’ 96.
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possessions. However, there is a price to be paid: “Not only is outer space militarized, but also the
inner space o f the soul has become a land occupied by threats and potential violence.”8 6
Ruether is quick to recognize that the world’s militaries are the worst polluters, and they wage
war not only against people and nations but against nature itself. Moreover, the reality o f
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was that the power of destroying the planet was now within human hands,
and our human traditions have been inadequate to respond to this new reality. Ruether argues that
no real solution to the environmental crisis is possible without disarmament.8 7
Dorothee Soelle admits that one thing that has motivated her involvement in the peace
movement is fear: The fear that the nuclear plans of nations are paving the way for a nuclear
holocaust. She suggests we cannot reflect theologically about creation without exploring the threats
to creation. She sees the rape of the earth, the war against the poor and the arms race as all tied
together. Further, she finds claims o f national security as simply cover for the arms race, for making
the rich richer and consuming the earth’s resources. Soelle says such crises push us fundamentally
to the question of choosing life or death.8 8
Soelle argues that the arms race is a state between war and peace that has continued for such a
long time that we now think o f it as normal. But, in spite o f this normalcy, the arms race is deadly
as well because 15,000 people a day die because nations have transferred resources that could save
them to military purposes. Moreover, Soelle argues that the arms race kills us all spiritually.8 9
Soelle notes that exploitation requires apathy from most people. So the real problem is apathy,
which Soelle defines as the illusion that one can live free o f suffering. One method many use to
avoid suffering is to avoid contact and relationships with other humans. A life lived avoiding
8 6 Soelle, On Earth as in Heaven, 34.
8 7 Ruether, Gaia & God, 109, 206 & 268.
8 8 Soelle, To Work and To Love, 2-3.
8 9 Soelle, The Arms Race Kills, 1-4.
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suffering creates people who are unable to feel, and they then become cynical. Soelle suggests that
the worst kind o f apathy is political apathy. Such apathetic people ultimately, at least by default,
support the continuance o f suffering in the status quo. Moreover, if people believe fate determines
their existence then God is mute, and nothing can be done about either our own or anyone else’s lot.
Soelle argues true prayer rejects and transcends the view that God is mute and can also
transcend our apathy. So empowerment is the response to suffering.9 0 She argues, “God is the
symbol for our unending capacity to love.”9 1 Soelle says that by meditating on the cross one becomes
free of the illusion that one can be free of pain, sickness and death. However, when one is free o f
such false hopes that energy directed at protecting oneself can be redirected to battle against the
suffering which is inflicted in the world. She calls on Christians to imitate Christ, which means one
must, like the new Moses, “resist Pharaoh” and side with the oppressed and disadvantaged. Soelle
argues that a God o f love does not need or demand the cross, but rather such love ends up at the
cross. Soelle argues that the Christian must see paradox— while he or she sees the injustice and
suffering, belief must remain in justice and liberation.9 2
The obvious lesson an ethic of nonproliferation needs to learn from feminism is that sexism and
patriarchy are not issues which can be separated from militarism but are at the root of violence in our
world. Feminist theology shouts out that the way to peace must include bringing all humans fully
into humanity. An ethic o f nonproliferation must reject militarism and sexual domination and the
abuse of women. Moreover, economically, it must seek to give the poor of the world true
alternatives. An ethic o f nonproliferation must also reject racist militaristic ideas which see people
of color as expendable. Brock and Thistlethwaite give us two important guidelines. First, do
nothing to cause further exploitation and suffering. Second, strengthen broad social movements for
“ Soelle, Suffering, 4-5, 11, 36,45, 77-78 & 128.
9 1 Soelle, Suffering, 92.
“ Soelle, Suffering, 131-132, 158 & 163.
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improvement rather than trying to do it alone. On the more personal level, an ethic of
nonproliferation must energize people and overcome apathy. In addition, feminist thought pushes us
to the more radical sections o f the peace movement which have been saying that the U.S. must
disarm. Only through such radical steps will real change take place. However, before taking such a
step, an ethic o f nonproliferation needs also to listen to the implications of feminist thought for how
it should undertake this.
D. Racism
Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite began writing a book on the nuclear age looking at the writings of
holocaust survivors. When she mentioned this to black colleagues, the response she got was that her
method was typical o f white theologians who always look to Germany for answers. In response to
such criticisms, she began to look at the writings o f black women and their thoughts on survival.
The result was the book Sex, Race, and G odP What she found in this material was that the
difference between white and black women is so great that she cannot ignore the gap. Thistlethwaite
noticed the writing o f black women spoke not only o f the experience of black women but also o f their
theological, political, social and anthropological viewpoints. She found she could not use their
writing as sources in the same manner she had used the writings o f white women. With these
writings, she had to be aware o f difference. Moreover, this experience made Thistlethwaite question
why the solutions offered by white feminists such as herself did little to bring black and white
women together. Her task became understanding what would happen to white feminism if it gave up
all the master’s tools. She asks, how would things change if racial differences became the starting
point of white feminism?
9 3 Susan Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God: Christian Feminism in Black and White (New York:
Crossroads, 1989).
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At the root this problem lay the link between white feminism and liberalism. Thistlethwaite
argues that Euro-American culture reacted to Nietzsche’s rejection o f religion by turning to Freud,
who insists that real change happens in the mind and not in material reality. Thistlethwaite points
out that this is not the way black women have approached the situation. For example, Thistlethwaite
noticed that black women seminarians were much more interested in starting a neighborhood
feeding program than they were in participating in a consciousness raising seminar. Their approach
represents a communitarian approach and rejects the psychological approach.
Thistlethwaite now labels much of the white feminist movement o f “sisterhood” sinful because it
has been disrespectful of the boundaries of cultural and racial differences. More enlightened white
women say “yes there are differences, but how do we connect?” However, even this call for
connection may be an error unless the hermeneutics o f connection, says Thistlethwaite, also includes
a hermeneutics o f suspicion. Thistlethwaite is well aware that a white feminist theology that is
sensitive to racial differences is conceptually unstable. However, if it does not make white feminists
sufficiently angry they will fail, as their suffrage foresisters did, to break the alliance o f race and
class. Quoting womanist theologian Delores Williams, Thistlethwaite argues that feminist
theologians need to use racial history as a source for theological reflection if tensions between white
and black women are to be eased. Instead of utopian thought, Thistlethwaite insists that white
women need to look into the depth of their own anger and capacity for violence and find their
unacknowledged racism. If this is left undone, unchanneled anger will eventually be inflicted upon
the less powerful.
Thistlethwaite reminds us that research has shown that violence is learned rather than being an
innate part o f human beings. So where has American society learned all this violence? Women in
the peace movement have tended to see women as naturally peaceful. Thistlethwaite rejects this
because looking at racism compels her to talk about the violence o f white women. Racism is, o f
course, based on violence. For instance, slavery was maintained with psychological and physical
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threats including rape. However, Thistlethwaite concludes, if one is sensitive to racial history one
cannot absolutely rule out violence. Black women engaged in guerilla warfare against the system o f
slavery. Indeed, we are to expect violence when we try to change things because when power is
threatened power responds with violence. Moreover, violent power systems continue because they
create the appearance that no alternatives exist. However Thistlethwaite claims the power o f
nonviolence, suggesting that it works because it is a pooling of resources.9 4 It is a true alternative to
violence.
An ethic o f nonproliferation must be attuned to the power o f racism. Especially in the post-CoId
War world, nuclear weapons are held mostly by the north, and they are used to coerce the south. An
adequate ethic of nonproliferation must be aware of difference; it must understand that all o f us
approach the issue from a specific context, and that context shapes our view. An ethic of
nonproliferation must reject liberalism’s psychological individualism which sees the core problem as
being in our minds. The core problem is not the individual nor will introspection discover the
solution. Instead, careful social analysis which sees injustice and seeks to correct it will make a true
difference in the world. While an ethic o f nonproliferation will not a priori rule out all violence, it
will find and use the power o f nonviolence which pools power and resources.
E. Specific Experience
Methodologically, feminist theology calls upon an ethic of nonproliferation to use the
experiences o f those affected by militarism. Rosemary Ruether is quick to remind us that feminist
theology’s use of experience is not unique. She maintains that all theology is based on experience;
even the so-called objective sources of scripture and tradition is actually codified experience. What
is unique in feminist theology is not experience but women’s experience.9 5 Beverly Harrison argues
^Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 1-2,4, 8, 20-21, 32, 34, 45, 73, 85-91, 130-133 & 137-138.
9 S Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 12-13.
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that, because women and other marginalized people are closer to material reality than those who
receive the benefits o f patriarchy, otherworldly spirituality is not indicative o f women’s lives. So a
feminist ethic is worldly and sensual.9 6 She states, “A theology that overvalues static and passive
qualities as “holy,” that equates spirituality with noninvolvement and contemplation, that views the
activity o f sustaining daily life as mundane and unimportant religiously, such a theology could not
have been formidated by women."9 7
Sharon Welch particularizes the focus even more, claiming that feminist theology argues that it is
the specific, not the general, that is crucial. For instance, Welch suggests that we work for human
rights, not universal human rights. That is, she argues we should engage in specific battles in the
name of justice. Welch recognizes the inherent problem since specific battles are justified by claims
o f the dignity o f all human beings, which is a universal claim. She counters that such analysis
misses the source of the power o f these ideas. They “are not, however, liberating in their attempt to
articulate that which is universal. Their liberating function lies in the concern they express for other
people.”9 8 She says the key difference is universal accountability versus universal truth claims.
According to Welch, even universal accountability can be problematic when a group then makes
it their responsibility to solve all problems. Welch calls that simply arrogant.9 9 Welch goes so far as
to reject universal denunciations o f systems as simply hollow gestures. For instance, she says that
calling the arms race unjust is simply a declarative act that does nothing to challenge the system.
Even worse, emphases on such statements give the illusion that something has been accomplished.
Instead, she argues that challenging the truth o f oppression does not require one “to point to its
intellectual or conceptual frailties, but to expose its frailties o f practice, to disclose and nurture
9 6 Harrison, Making the Connections, 6-8.
9 7 Harrison, Making the Connections, 9.
9 8 Welch Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity, 81.
"Welch, Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity, 65 & 81.
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alternative forms of human community that challenge it on the level o f daily operations o f
power/knowledge.”1 0 0
In her reading o f the history o f slavery, Susan Thistlethwaite notices that American culture did
much to separate white and black women, and as a result the word “experience” has very different
meanings for the two groups.1 0 1 Consequently, even in the appeal to experience feminists (and this
appropriation of feminism) must be careful. However, when care is taken Welch also sees
advantages to upholding the specific over the universal. First, it allows the voice o f the oppressed to
be heard, and not to do so is itself an oppressive act. Second, upholding the specific has more power
because it draws on the experiences and heritages o f people as opposed to abstracting from them.
Moreover, Welch says that the supposed need to universalize moves us away from the concrete
realities o f hurt and puts us in the safe areas of theory where no real change happens.1 0 2 Welch
suggests that it is the same need to universalize that pushes Christianity to have, what she calls, a
“pathological obsession with security.” 1 0 3
The feminist prioritizing of the experience of the marginalized has serious implications for this
work. Especially when dealing with international peace issues, it is very tempting to move to the
abstract and universal level. The way for an ethic of nonproliferation to stay true to this challenge is
always to ask whom this harms and then to have them tell their story. The arms race harms the poor
because resources they need are instead spent on armies and weapons. Because of the U.S. obsession
with security, the family that I met in northern Nicaragua during the 1980s had a son killed by the
contras. Those who participate in the design, production and deployment of weapons are harmed
because they are taught to worship false idols. Feminist theology also pushes us to find out how
1 0 0 Welch, Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity, 82-83.
1 0 1 ThistIethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 79.
1 0 2 Welch, Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity, 65 & 83.
1 0 3 Welch, Communities o f Resistance and Solidarity, 72.
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policies impact the lives of specific women. Those are stories that can be told and must be told.
The peace movement, at its best, has always told such stories. Welch’s reminder that denunciations
may be nothing but hollow gestures creating the illusion that we have accomplished something is an
important reminder for an ethic of nonproliferation. Such may be the case with the current
movement seeking Senate approval o f the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Indeed, its passage may
do little more than give a false sense o f security.
F. Struggle
A corollary to the prioritization o f the experiences of the marginalized is the insistence that any
true theology o f liberation must be based in communities involved in struggles for change. Sharon
Welch reminds us that liberation theology does not so much cause people to resist as it reflects that
resistence is already happening. With this understanding Welch does not understand Christianity
already to be true, but rather it becomes true when it frees people. Welch’s theology represents an
epistemological shift in which the truth o f Christianity is not determined by correct ontological
understandings or biblical interpretation but in life and death struggles. Communities participating
in such struggles are repositories of dangerous memories, and these memories have two
dimensions-hope and suffering. In liberation theology, suffering and evil are not abstract concepts
but lived experiences. Such experience o f suffering allows liberation theology to unmask the
universal claims of dominant systems because such systems cannot be true if they bring such
suffering.1 0 4
Susan Thistlethwaite posits an ontology o f struggle based on difference. Where others see
connection, she sees struggle, conflict and ambiguity. For instance, the splitting o f the atom has
been used for both good and evil. It led to the evils of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, it also
has led to the saving of even more lives through cancer treatment. Thistlethwaite states, “I believe
1 0 4 Welch, Communities o f Resistance, 36-37, 71, 74 & 90-91.
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there is both connections and destruction, creativity and evil at the heart o f the cosmos.”1 0 5
Thistlethwaite reminds us of the complexities present in all things. Yet Christians are called to
struggle for good.
As in other theologies of liberation, Beverly Harrison sees struggle as where faith is centered.
She claims that we need to incorporate the meaning o f struggle in human life into our understanding
o f God.1 0 6 In doing so, Harrison does not spum the use o f power but instead places a high value on
power. Ethical analysis is the evaluation o f the uses o f power. Listen to her words:
We have the power through acts o f love and lovelessness literally to create one
another. I believe that an adequate feminist moral theology must call the tradition
o f Christian ethics to accountability for minimizing the deep power o f human
action in the work of or denial o f love. Because we do not understand love as the
power to act-each-other-into-well-being we also do not understand the depth of
power to thwart life and maim each other.1 0 7
The ethical question is how power is used. If it is used in the struggle for wholeness and justice,
then it is ethical. Harrison points to the utopian/realistic paradox embodied in feminism. On the
one hand, it is utopian in that it envisions the good society as one where everyone is included.
However, it is realistic because it understands the radical nature of human freedom which can bring
about good or evil.1 0 8
Dorothee Soelie argues contrary to those who claim that, realistically, only those who suffer will
work for the eradication of suffering.1 0 9 Because she was a young child in Germany during the
holocaust, Soelie and her generation have repeatedly asked the previous generation “Where were you
when the atrocities were taking place?” Their answer was always, “We didn’t know.” Soelie says
'“ Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 107.
'“ Harrison, Making the Connections, 8-10.
1 0 7 Harrison, Making the Connections, 11.
'“ Harrison, Making the Connections, 20.
'“ Soelie, Suffering, 2-3.
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her generation always knew their answer to be a lie. She argues the peace movement must make
sure that no one can again get away with using that lie.1 1 0 Soelie says “The minority o f conscience
accepts the dreadful inheritance and makes it productive as protest, refusal, and resistance. Out of
the suffering history o f shame and guilt, this minority is developing another vision o f a liberated
Europe in which forging swords into plowshares will be allowed.”" 1
Participating in the struggle can be powerful, and, to illustrate such power’s ability to bring
about change, Soelie tells the story o f an opinion poll done in the 1980s. The poll asked school
children if they thought because of nuclear weapons the end of the world was near. At one grade
school all but one child said they did. The sole child who responded in the negative explained why:
“Cause Mom and Dad are working against nuclear weapons.”" 2
Both feminism and the peace movement at their best have been involved in the struggle. While
at times some understandings o f pacifism have entailed an avoidance of struggle, usually such
understandings were actually a mislabeling o f pacifism from those outside the movement. Usually,
the peace movement has been in the midst o f struggle. However, we might do well to question if
today it is too wrapped up in institutional survival. Both feminism and the peace movement must
remind one another that the real issues cannot be settled in the academy but out in the struggle.
Such understandings will force an ethic o f nonproliferation to be applied and realistic. Such an ethic
must be centered in communities which struggle for change.
III. Vision
This vision must start with a principle o f equity: equity between men and
women; between human groups living within regions; equity across human
communities globally; equity between the human species and all other members
1 l0 SoeIle, On Earth as in Heaven, 45-46.
‘"Soelie, On Earth as in Heaven, 46.
" 2 Soelle, On Earth as in Heaven, 51.
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to the biotic community o f which we are all a part; and finally equity between
generations o f living things, between the needs o f those alive now and those who
are to come.m
Rosemary Radford Ruether
Rosemary Radford Ruether understands that the rage women experience in response to
patriarchy can lead to the belief that they should avoid all things male. In fact, she suspects all
women who recognize the reality of patriarchy pass through such a stage. However she is critical of
those who, instead o f passing through, get stuck in that stage’s ideology. Instead, Ruether suggests,
“One needs to come out to a firm ground of autonomous humanity as a female who can continually
resist and refuse the snares o f patriarchy without confusing this with the humanity o f males.” 1 1 4
Indeed, Ruether calls her brothers to join “in our common quest for that promised land where there
will be no war, no more burning children, no more violated women, no more discarded elderly, no
more rape o f the earth.”1 1 5 To those who would claim that such a quest is simply not attainable,
Dorothee Soelie reminds them that for years people said that slavery could not be abolished since it
was, after all, an economic necessity. However, something was done, and it exists no longer. The
same can be true about nuclear weapons.1 1 6
As is evident in such thought, feminist theology expresses not only rage/anger at the injustices
that surround us, it also holds a vision o f a more just world. It is important to remember that rage
and vision are not competing dualities. Instead, the power of rage/anger is that it can move us into
communities that have a vision of and work for justice and peace. Moreover it is that power of
rage/anger that can keep us in the struggle, even for those of us who could opt out. For it is that very
ll3Ruether, Gaia & God, 258.
1 1 4 Ruether, Women-Church, 60.
nsRuether, Women-Church, 73-74.
1 l6 Soelle, On Earth as in Heaven, 96.
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rage/anger that not only helps us see clearly our present situation but also helps clear our eyes so that
we can behold a world o f mutuality, justice and peace.
A. Community
Central to the feminist vision is community. Beverly Harrison argues that relationship,
community and communication are central to being human."7 Rosemary Ruether suggests that it is
only through communities o f resistance and celebration that real change/transformation/conversion
can take place."8 Ruether teaches that communities need to find a balance between internal and
external efforts; community members must care and nurture each other, but they also must serve
those outside the community. The vision that the community must hold up and seek to live out is
that of a transformed world where members see the interconnectedness of issues-peace, feminism,
liberation, the environment."9
Sharon Welch holds up the symbolism of the beloved community while rejecting the symbolism
of the kingdom o f God. She sees the latter linked to the patriarchal vision o f conquest, control and .
final victory. The beloved community, however, connotes a place where life is celebrated and where
the partial victories o f the struggle are commemorated. It can be a place where true communication
and criticism can take place and where the faithful can build courage for future acts o f resistance.
Welch bases much o f her thought on what she calls communicative ethics. She distinguishes
communicative ethics from the communitarian ethics o f Alasdair MacIntyre or Stanley Hauerwas.
In contrast to communitarian ethics, Welch is not concerned with developing a cohesive community
with a set o f common values, norms and mores. Quite the contrary, she argues “that material
interaction between multiple communities with divergent principles, norms and mores is essential
1 "Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 84.
1 1 8 Ruether, Gaia & God, 269.
" ’Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 212.
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for foundational moral critique.” 1 2 0 Welch’s communicative ethics insists that pluralism is essential
for social responsibility. Quite simply, from this understanding neither a person nor a group can be
moral in isolation from others; instead, correction by others is always necessary. Welch has very
high hopes for such an ethic in praxis:
The goal of communicative ethics is not merely consensus but mutual critique
leading to more adequate understandings of what is just and how particular forms
o f justice may be achieved. When such critique occurs we may well find that more
than our definitions o f what is just are challenged; the prerequisites of acting justly
may be challenged as well.1 2 1
Susan Thistlethwaite speaks o f community, using the metaphor o f the body o f Christ to signal
that its members are bonded together and exercise authority among, rather than over, other
members. In contrast to Welch, however, Thistlethwaite argues that in the sectarian context of
North America the most radical thing the church can do is talk about its universality so that it
challenges the view that American’s are God’s chosen people. Thistlethwaite sees glimmers o f such
universality in the women’s and in the peace movements.1 2 2
While the feminist vision o f community is not new to the Christian peace movement, feminist
theology reminds us that peacemaking needs to remain grounded in community, it also reminds us
that true communities are long-lasting and maintain their strong links to a long history o f resistance.
Such a history is not always easy to recognize, let alone easy to connect to, because domination has
so often prevailed that it appears natural. An ethic of nonproliferation must be linked to the long
traditions of pacifism, just war, the nuclear disarmament movement, nuclear freeze movement and
others. Out o f such a history must arise communities who will take on nonproliferation as their
central focus. Such communities are crucial as nations will not disarm of their own volition; instead
they must be encouraged, cajoled, pressured and, perhaps, even coerced into doing so. The peace
I2 0 WeIch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 123-124.
1 2 1 Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 129.
l2 2 Thistlethwaite, Metaphors fo r a Contemporary Church, 61.
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movement must struggle to remain local, even as it undertakes national and international action.
However, such local communities can act globally. The peace movement and feminism are both
bearers o f the dangerous memories of resistence. We need to hear such community stories more
often.
B. Re-Imagining Christianity
The central goal o f feminist theology is to promote the full humanity of women, and it identifies
that which diminishes the full humanity of women to be contrary to the redeemed community.
Unfortunately, much o f traditional theology and scriptural exegesis has diminished the full humanity
of women, and so feminist theology and feminist biblical interpretation sets out to re-imagine the
faith to include women fully. Rosemary Radford Ruether’s reason for staying in the church is she
believes feminism will have a more powerful impact if it gains acceptance within current institutions
as opposed to having to create its own institutions. Further, she believes that it is not actually
possible to opt out of all male-dominated institutions, and feminists claiming it is possible are either
dishonest or sloppy with their analysis. So Ruether opts to stay within the tradition but not to be
limited by the tradition.1 2 3 Similarly, Susan Thistlethwaite is adamant about not giving up on the
church, especially as feminist consciousness is increasing. Her purpose is not to complain about the
church but to change it.1 2 4
Because Christian feminism rejects traditional scriptural interpretations, it is not surprising that
the five feminist thinkers highlighted in this chapter take a range of approaches to scripture. Sharon
Welch’s approach is probably the least traditional in that she claims she grounds her theology in
neither scripture nor the person o f Jesus. Instead she grounds her theology in sisterhood and
liberating attempts seeking to overcome sexism. Consequently, while claiming to be a form of
l2 3 Ruether, Women-Church, 39.
1 2 4 ThistIethwaite, Metaphors fo r a Contemporary Church, ix & xiv.
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Liberation theology, she takes a fundamentally different approach to the Christian tradition than
black theology or Latin American liberation theology do. While Welch recognizes the central place
o f biblical interpretation in much o f liberation theology, she argues that the liberative component is
not in the biblical text but in those who read the scripture. Welch claims that liberation theology
does not simply proclaim revealed truth but is instead involved in a battle for truth.1 2 5
Ruether’s approach, while more biblical, nevertheless rejects a simple recovery o f true biblical
faith because she claims no such recovery is possible. However, she believes elements in biblical
faith resist oppression and speak for peace and justice. Those biblical kernels, along with the pre-
biblical content, are only hinted at in the biblical texts that she believes feminists must seek to
recover. An example of the pre-biblical content is found in the hints of criticisms of patriarchy in
the New Testament and even in the prophetic tradition. Such criticisms, she claims, were never fully
realized because women never had a major voice in scriptural development.1 2 6 No matter their
limitations, Ruether says that the prophetic tradition and the gospels are essential resources for
promoting the good.1 2 7 Ruether concludes that feminist religious thought is more revolutionary and
far-reaching than liberation theology. She writes, feminist theology “reaches forward to an
alternative that can heal the splits between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine,’ between mind and body,
between males and females as gender groups, between society and nature, and between race and
class.”1 2 8
1 2 5 Welch, Communities o f Resistance, 25, & 33-34.
1 2 6 Ruether, Women-Church, 2-4 & 42.
1 2 7 Ruether, To Change the World, 5.
1 2 8 Ruether, Women-Church, 3.
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Dorothee Soelie, the most biblical o f the five, goes as far as to say that in today’s language Jesus,
as portrayed in the synoptic Gospels, was a feminist.1 2 9 She bases such an anachronistic claim on
Jesus’ vision-his view transcended men’s dream o f domination and his God was a God o f justice and
love.1 3 0 In scripture, Soelie finds Jesus resisting and organizing resistance against death and for
life.1 3 1 Thistlethwaite also points to the radical inclusivity and egalitarianism of Jesus. He excluded
no one and welcomed prostitutes, tax collectors, lepers and even members of the hated Roman
military. He rebuked the disciples whenever they attempted to exclude anyone.1 3 2 Ruether concurs,
adding that Jesus’ commands about family replace the patriarchal family with a community in which
brothers and sisters in Christ are equal and are called to mutual service rather than mastery or
servitude. Importantly, Jesus neither fits the model of what was expected in his time nor in ours.
Ruether reminds us that, while Jesus was aware of the political oppression from Rome, he focused on
the Jewish ruling class and rejected the nationalistic revenge ideology of messianic expectation.
Instead, his teachings focused on the oppression in which each o f us participate.1 3 3 This is an
important point for an ethic o f nonproliferation. The U.S. should not look first to the threat from
nuclear weapons from elsewhere but first look at its own actions to see how it can make changes
which will make the world a safer place.
l2 9 By this Soelie means Jesus acted in ways that would be consistent with the basic feminist
claims that males and females are equal. Her evidence includes the fact that both male and females
were among the close followers o f Jesus and the more obscure evidence in the text including that
Mary Magdalene was a leader or perhaps even the leader of this band of followers. Parallel to
Peter’s confession is Martha of Bethany’s confession. Moreover, primarily women witnessed the
death, burial and resurrection of Jesus. In an extremely patriarchal society, the text records no
example of Jesus saying anything negative about women.
l3 0 SoelIe, On Earth as in Heaven, 27.
l3lSoelIe, Death By Bread Alone, 9.
l3 2 Thistlethwaite, Metaphors fo r a Contemporary Church, 19.
1 3 3 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 64-65, 120 & 135.
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Soelie points to the radical this-worldliness of Jesus when she entitles one of her books using a
phrase from the Lord’s Prayer, On Earth as In Heaven. According to her, this prayer is not asking
for someone else to do needed tasks but instead demands human beings cooperate with God so that
we may be empowered and commissioned to do the work.1 3 4 Similarly, Ruether agrees that Jesus’
vision of the kingdom is “this-worldly, social and political and not eschatological.”1 3 5 She places
Jesus’ statements in the prophetic tradition, speaking of peace and justice in this world. Ruether
argues that Jesus did not support the liberative war o f the Zealots because he looked to a more
fundamental level of change, pointing to the lust for power, wealth and prestige in those who would
fight this holy war. The Zealot’s war at best would replace one oppressor for another. Jesus instead
models a completely different way to change the world where, according to Ruether, the new
community is based on the life o f service to others and the lust for domination is overcome at its
source.1 3 6
Soelie says the church mistakenly worships a “honey sweet” Christ which sanctions rather than
challenges human being’s murderous ways. However, the God o f the Bible is highly partisan and
takes the side of life against death. Siding with life is difficult and takes a never-ending process of
change. It requires turning to each other and learning to love, and that entails learning to die in a
very different sense. For example, when Jesus fought against death he did not fear physical death
but instead resisted a life controlled by the forces of death. According to Soelie, religion is radical
and dangerous because it does not merely observe, it interprets; it not only notices hungry people, it
tells those who are not hungry that we are at fault for allowing them to starve.1 3 7
1 3 4 Soelle, On Earth as in Heaven, ix.
I3 5 Ruether, To Change the World, 14.
I3 6 Ruether, To Change the World, 14-15.
I3 7 SoeIle, Death By Bread Alone, 10-12 & 26.
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Soelie argues that the hardest thing for a Christian to do is to love one’s enemies. However, for
us in the first world we try to fulfill this duty by claiming that we have no enemies. That is a lie.
There are those who are enemies o f the human race and who have every intention of acting
horrifically. Soelie says we are called to love even those who are imprisoned in their tanks or atomic
weapons because only then can the power of God free them too.1 3 8 While Soelie sees the church as
both traitor and sister, she argues that we must remain in that tension or paradox. In the move to
post-Christianity she sees a slick sellout because it leaves the “church from above” and abandons the
“church from below.” She argues, the better move is to embrace the church from below. Her
experiences in Latin America and in the peace movement in Europe have led her to see authentic
Christianity as revolutionary in nature. Moreover, Soelie notes that involvement in the peace
movement radicalizes people quickly.1 3 9
Beverly Harrison’s re-imaging o f Christianity is theological rather than biblical. She
emphasizes that the relational character o f Christianity is at the heart o f Christology. Traditional
theology killed this concept by stressing the transcendence of God and making God wholly other.
Harrison counters that God’s nature is relational. What human beings need from the Divine and
each other is mutual Iove-love that is given and love that is received.1 4 0
Thistlethwaite argues that understanding and unmasking patriarchy is key to re-imagining
Christianity. The root of patriarchy may be that males have no way to prove paternity except
through social relationships. This results in alienation, the elevation o f mind over body, an emphasis
on immortality, a concern with ethical absolutes and the subordination o f females. The equivalent
for males o f birthing is found in death, including the death defiance o f the hero, hazardous male
,3 8 C. F. Beyers Naude and Dorothee Soelie, Hope For Faith: A Conversation (Geneva: WCC,
1986), 31-32.
I3 9 Dorothee Soelie, The Window o f Vulnerability: A Political Spirituality, trans. Linda M.
Maloney (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 24-25, 31 &45.
l4 0 Harrison, Making the Connections, 16-18.
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initiation rites, the mythic slaughter o f the Goddess and in life-negating ascetic spiritualities.
Thistlethwaite concludes, “The connection to nuclearism become obvious. Nuclear weapons are the
extension of male alienation from life, its reproduction and nurture. ‘In the light o f the threat of
nuclear destruction, patriarchy is a terminal disease.’”1 4 1 An ethic o f nonproliferation must be
committed to countering patriarchy.
However, the unmasking cannot stop with this psycho-theological understanding o f the role o f
patriarchy as the root runs deeper to the center of theology where the way God is imaged.
Thistlethwaite calls the traditional Christian view of God as the King ruling over the earth a
monarchical monotheism which portrays God’s way of relating to human beings as absolute
domination. Such a view, she argues, is by definition violent, and that seeing God this way promotes
a theology of violence.1 4 2 We must also reject the warrior God image prevalent within traditional
Jewish and Christian understandings, as well as in liberation theology’s emphasis on the God o f the
Exodus and feminist theology’s fascination with warrior Goddesses.
Thistlethwaite argues that we must re-imagine our doctrine o f God. First, the doctrine of God
must arise from a contextual analysis that understands nuclearism as not simply an intra-psychic
problem but as the consequence o f social and political forces. Second, the doctrine of God must
include a thorough understanding o f power and its relationship to violence. She argues that power
shared is resourcefulness and solidarity, and it is there that a doctrine o f God must be centered.
Highlighting the non-hierarchical relationship between the persons o f the Trinity can help with this
process. Third, justice must be central to the doctrine of God. A God o f justice is continually
building alliances with those considered other, and understanding the Trinity as exhibiting diversity
and relationality simultaneously is key. Fourth, liberalism’s failure to provide an adequate doctrine
of God also points to the need to develop an appropriate anthropology which understands that
I4 1 Thistlethwaite, “‘I Am Become Death,”’ 103.
1 4 2 Thistlethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 121.
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humans are capable of both alienation and community. Human sinfulness is evidenced in alienation
and the refusal to work for solidarity. Fifth, feminism reveals the current doctrine of God
perpetuates patriarchy’s contempt for the earth and its symbols, including the Goddess. Patriarchal
justification of nuclear weapons reveals its failure to take creation theology seriously. A new
doctrine o f God will envision God not as separate from the material world but in solidarity with it,
including all the peoples o f the earth and also all animals, vegetables and minerals.1 4 3 This re-
imagining o f the doctrine of God lays the theological groundwork for an ethic o f nonproliferation.
In her work Faith and Fratricide, Ruether also provides a model for the transformation of
Christianity. In this book she lays out the history o f anti-Semitic thought, which has been so
prevalent throughout Christian history. She is convinced that addressing this history provides not
only the opportunity to address the evil done to Judaism but also provides the context from which a
revitalized Christianity can emerge. She argues this is possible and necessaiy because although the
anti-Judaic thought in Christianity has been most obviously bad for Judaism it is also the source of
some o f Christianity’s most troubling ideas.
Ruether acknowledges that part o f the problem is scholarly since Christian biblical scholars have
often failed to listen to Jewish biblical scholarship. She insists, however, that because the anti-
Semitic thought is present in scripture as well this problem has been with Christianity from its
beginning. Even so, Ruether notes, in its location in the New Testament, the criticism of “the Jews”
is not directed at the “other” but to the community to which the writer belonged. It is only after the
separation o f Judaism and Christianity that the reading appears to condemn those outside the
community. Ruether concludes that a proper, contemporary contextual reading o f such scriptures
should not be read as condemning Jews but instead condemning the hypocrisy and legalism of our
l4 3 Thistlethwaite, “‘I Am Become Death,”’ 104-106.
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own community!1 4 4 Here in Ruether’s method, we have a valuable tool to teach us to be both self-
critical and open to a re-envisioning o f the way we have always looked at things.
If Christians can truly come to understand the resources for peace that are within the tradition
then acceptance o f peace is possible. Yet first the Christian peace movement must be willing to hear
the revisioning that feminists have done and be open to the self-criticism that such revisioning will
bring. For instance, an ethic of nonproliferation is called to look at U.S. action first instead of
placing blame elsewhere. Moreover, an ethic o f nonproliferation must reject patriarchy’s use of death
defying means such as nuclear weapons, which seek to prevent death by threatening massive death.
Once unmasked, we can see that death defying means such as nuclear weapons do not defy death but
actually cause death, both spiritual and physical. Did you hear the Christian feminist visions of
peace: transcendence of dominance, patriarchy replaced with the equality o f brothers and sisters,
relationships with each other and the divine, and mutual love. Jesus, in his rejection of Zealots use
of violence, gave a strong endorsement to nonviolence that must shape an ethic o f nonproliferation.
Moreover, feminist theology rejects the warrior god and re-imagines God as relational, a center of
justice and connected to the earth. The traditions are there, and feminist analysis makes them
clearer. The question an ethic of nonproliferation must answer is: Are we willing to share these
traditions, or do we fear that they will take us too far? As we stand after the end o f the Cold War,
are we going to allow the powers and principalities to swallow up the vision of peace like it did the
peace dividend, or are we willing to spread the re-imagined vision o f Christianity that feminists
bring to us?
1 4 4 Ruether, Faith and Fratricide, 226-231.
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C. Solidarity
A central part o f the vision that feminist theology offers in response to the rage/anger is that of
solidarity between the oppressed and the oppressor. Feminist theology is not alone in emphasizing
solidarity; all theologies o f liberation do so. Sharon Welch speaks o f solidarity when she describes
liberation theology as a choice-choosing to think and act from the perspective o f the oppressed. For
the non-oppressed, the movement to solidarity makes real change possible. According to Welch,
solidarity comes through a particular practice, becomes a method o f critique which is applied to
social institutions including the church, and is the grounding for social action.1 4 5
Susan Thistlethwaite argues for a model of God as solidarity in which God’s power is based not
on God’s unity but on a sharing o f power. Such an envisioning directly counters Hannah Arendt’s
“One Against All” view, which Thistlethwaite argues can be traced back to the Roman Empire.1 4 6
Thistlethwaite says that true revolution must be both external and internal, for if we do not change
ourselves, as well as the external forces o f oppression, we simply become the next oppressors.1 4 7
Solidarity with the poor is crucial for Dorothee Soelle’s theology as well, and she says that for
first-world people the poor are our teachers. She states, “From the poor o f Latin America I learn
their hope, their toughness, their anger, and their patience. I leam a better theology in which God is
not Lord-over-us but Strength-in-us.” 1 4 8 Not only do the poor put her to shame, she says, but they
also make her stronger: “For us Christians in the first world I hope that we will develop the theology
of God’s future on the basis of a better acquaintance with the poor. I see no other way to God’s
future.” 1 4 9
1 4 5 Welch, Communities o f Resistance, 26 & 46.
l4 6 Thistlethwaite, ‘“ I Am Become Death,”’ 99.
l4 7 ThistIethwaite, Sex, Race, and God, 131
l4 8 Soelle, Stations o f the Cross, 94-95.
1 4 9 SoeIle, On Earth as in Heaven, 7.
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Beverly Harrison’s theological ethic affirms the importance o f solidarity through the concept of
embodiment. Harrison’s understanding o f embodiment rejects all mind-body dualisms and the
assumption that humans are the most moral when they are disengaged from the struggles of life.
According to her, disinterestedness and detachment are not signs o f morality but instead signal an
escape. Embodied ethics is concerned with making the connection to other people and to the
environment. Countering criticisms that the incorporation of emotions by feminist theology leads to
subjectivism, Harrison insists that subjectivism results from evading feelings, not integrating them.
She reminds us that anger is not the opposite of love. Rather, anger signals that something is amiss
and is a call that transformation is necessary.1 5 0
Rosemary Ruether emphasizes that solidarity is not merely the existence of a relationship
between individuals but requires the work o f communities and networks o f communities. The
church and, for that matter, the world must turn to the concerns o f the poor and oppressed if for no
other reason than self-interest, for “this majority will not accept being consigned to slow death.”IS I
Looking at what happened in the United States with Central American issues during the 1980s helps
Ruether see how important alternative forms of information and networks of communities can be for
making solidarity possible. While the American Catholic hierarchy had historically been pre
occupied with proving the patriotism o f American Catholics, the American Catholic hierarchy,
nevertheless, became a strong voice against U.S. policy toward Central America in the 1980s. This
happened, says Ruether, because o f the information which came back from missionaries in Central
America who were active participants in popular Christianity and its struggle with and for the poor.
With that information the church knew that it, in good conscience, had no choice but to oppose U.S.
foreign policy, and so it did.1 5 2
lsoHarrison, Making the Connections, 12-15.
lslHalI and Ruether, 103.
1 5 2 Ruether, Women-Church, 29
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In the past, the peace movement has been effective at creating solidarity with oppressed people.
The current Ban the Landmine Campaign has resulted in solidarity with the victims o f landmines,
but this is happening less elsewhere in the peace movement. During the 1980s the peace movement
had large numbers o f delegations going to Central America and then returning and telling the story
o f what they had seen. These accounts along with the stories o f Oscar Romero and Rigoberta
Menchu made a difference. Today, however, the peace movement must question why most people in
the United States do not know of Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma who won the Nobel Peace Prize in
1991 or Carlos Bello and Jose Ramos-Horta who won the award in 1996 for their work in East
Timor? Solidarity requires that we have similar numbers participating in delegations to places such
as the Middle East, Bosnia, Kosovo, North Korea and Central America.
However, feminist critiques o f patriarchy also remind us of the need to engage in solidarity at
home. Those resisting the violence o f patriarchy are in our midst if we will only make ourselves
available. An ethic o f nonproliferation must learn the methods o f critique that come through
solidarity. Theologically, this will include a doctrine of God based on the sharing o f power. The
U.S. must abandon its “one against all” stance that has become even more pronounced in the post-
Cold War world. Indeed, an ethic o f nonproliferation will always insist that true change must start
at home before moving to the external. Solidarity will require that communities working on
nonproliferation form alliances with communities working on other issues. Moreover, it will require
the U.S. to be a true member of the global community, working with others to decrease the threat of
nuclear weapons.
D. Risk
For feminist theologians, risk is not only a pragmatic necessity but a theological necessity.
Dorothee Soelie argues that we are simply mistaken to think that we can make ourselves secure.
Moreover, every attempt to gain security is actually harmful because it closes us off from others.
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Soelie turns the national security state’s biggest fear-vulnerability-on its head, declaring
vulnerability something to be sought because it has the potential to create just relationships. She
writes, “Every window makes us vulnerable and is a sign o f relationship, receptivity,
communication.”1 5 3 While suggesting that the transcendent in any religion is going to be vulnerable,
she claims that it is perhaps most clear in Christianity where Godself is nonviolent, took on human
form and became so vulnerable as to be crucified in solidarity with other vulnerable humans.
Importantly, Soelie does not call for a model o f self-sacrifice, which leads to a victim mentality, but
to vulnerability which has the potential o f reconciliation.
Confusing peace with security is a daily undertaking in discussions o f international issues.
What is so often called peace is simply the middle-class need for security. However, this security is a
false security. Soelie argues that nuclear weapons not only do not make us safe, they in reality
destroy the fulness of life. Moreover, the development of armaments is robbery from the poor, which
destroys all o f us materially and spiritually. Soelie says she wants to remain weak, as opposed to
gaining some supposed strength. Moreover, she argues that national security is a capital crime
because in the name of security, acts o f rape, torture and murder are committed and appear to be
fully justified. Because o f this, Soelie has come to reject bilateral disarmament in favor of unilateral
disarmament. For Soelie, nuclear weapons are the ultimate symbols o f male violence and the need
for dominance, and she notes that bilateral attempts have rarely slowed the arms race, let alone
brought peace to the armed people. The only way to peace is to take unilateral steps, which she
claims is the way to a new vision. Such a new vision understands the risks and the possibility of
victims, but true peace requires an actual reconciliation of those in conflict. For true reconciliation
to take place, she insists we must cast off the golden calf called security.1 5 4 This is a radical
challenge to realistic approaches to national or world security. However, an ethic of nonproliferation
1 5 3 Soelle, The Window o f Vulnerability, x.
1 5 4 Soelle, The Window o f Vulnerability, x-xi, 4-9, 18, 65, & 109.
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will not dismiss it out o f hand. An ethic o f nonproliferation recognizes the need for radical
proposals if we are to transcend the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
Sharon Welch also emphasizes the centrality o f authentic rather than calculated risk taking.
Welch develops what she calls an ethic o f risk— a transformative ethic applicable to many social and
political issues. Conceding that it is not easy for us to listen or hear the voices o f others, Welch
nevertheless claims that the movement becomes “richer, deeper and wiser” 1 5 5 when people do listen.
Indeed, the inspiration for much o f the methodology of this dissertation, drawing from pacifist,
feminist and liberationist writers as ethical sources, comes from Welch’s example.
Welch argues that a central road block on the nuclear issue is the unwillingness of the U.S.
public to give up some of its control. Paradoxically, while the American public became less sure
about its willingness to risk nuclear destruction to maintain national security, it has also been
unwilling to jettison any of the influence o f the United States. Believing that we cannot abolish
nuclear weapons forever, they have rejected disarmament. According to Welch, this point o f view is
so focused on the power of others that it fails to see the power disarmament might have. Likewise,
Americans are so locked into this way o f thinking that they fail to look at smaller steps in the same
direction that they can take. While it is true that the U.S. cannot stop all nations from building
nuclear weapons, it can take steps toward this goals by deciding to stop. Likewise, while nuclear
weapons cannot be abolished forever, people acting together-as a nation, or a group of nations, or a
world-can stop building them for the time being. Welch’s specific policy proposals are not as
important as her poignant description of how a mind-set prevents us from seeing opportunities for
action.
Welch’s ethic o f risk admits that we cannot guarantee that needed change will happen soon or
even in our life time. Nevertheless, this ethic claims that to stop resisting is to die. Welch writes,
“The death that accompanies acquiescence to overwhelming problems is multidimensional: the
I5 S Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 15-16.
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threat o f physical death, the death o f the imagination, the death o f the ability to care.”I S 6 Welch calls
for strategic risk-taking in which people take risks in attempts to create the conditions for further
actions and resistance. Recognizing that the choices o f others are their own and cannot be
controlled, strategic risk-taking presumes that nevertheless our actions and examples can influence
others. Strategic risk-taking points out that the status quo has its own risks and that a rational
analysis o f the situation may well lead to the conclusion that the status quo is more risky than some
alternatives. Welch insists that, since the nations have risked the entire world for the sake of
deterrence and military power, people should be willing to take some risks in the name of
disarmament and peace.
Soelie argues that when taking risks Christians must be able to distinguish between hope and
illusion. Illusion is certainly a possibility that must be avoided, but Christians must remember that
outsiders will look at what is actually Christian hope and label it illusion. Soelie argues that
outsiders see Christian hope as foolish illusion because power possesses them, and they are quick to
point out the seeming ineffectiveness o f peace movement. What they forget, Soelie states, is that
‘‘the gentle water will break the stone.” 1 5 7
In a time when the peace movement is concerned more with institutional maintenance, an ethic
of nonproliferation remembers the importance o f risk-taking. An ethic of nonproliferation must
reevaluate its understanding o f security and free itself from traditional understandings of security.
Nuclear weapons have never provided security, and its time we give up on that illusion. Peace and
security are not the same thing. Feminist ethics pushes us to understand strategic steps of risk taking
that will include steps of unilateral disarmament. An ethic of nonproliferation must not forget that
the gentle water is capable o f breaking the stone if we will only let the water run out of the
reservoirs.
l5 6 Welch, A Feminist Ethic o f Risk, 20.
l5 7 SoeIle, On Earth as in Heaven, 51.
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E. Step-by-step Conversion
While feminist theory calls for a fundamental theological and social transformation, such
transformation is understood to take place through step-by-step conversions o f various kinds. In her
call for the political left to provide a fundamental conversion o f the political right’s appropriation of
key values, Dorothee Soelle puts forth a brilliant analysis on why the left today is so weak: The left
has abandoned the key values of “family, nation and flag.” She posits that the reasons for
abandoning this triumvirate of values is that the left felt they were unworthy of critical analysis, the
emotions connected with these values irrational, or these values were simply above what
“enlightened people” could relate to. She claims that what a Christian liberation approach brings to
the secular left is, rather than abandoning these values, we need to transform their meanings into the
kind o f religion, families and nations that are faithful to the Iiberative message of the gospel.1 5 8 In
staying in the struggle Soelle reminds us that great cathedrals were built in some cases over a period
o f two to three centuries. Many who devoted their lives to the building never saw the whole
building, let alone worshiped or prayed within its total beauty. Soelle calls us to build the cathedral
of peace; even though we will die before it is complete, we are called to build it.1 5 9
Rosemary Ruether emphasizes the step-by-step nature o f conversion when she says that
conversion fails not because we do not have the “power as humans, but because it is not within our
power as individuals.” She goes on to suggest that, while we cannot complete the conversion
ourselves, we can begin the process. Moreover, for Ruether, one aspect of a community o f faith is
that it engages in a social praxis that witnesses to the wholeness o f life beyond the membership of
that community. However, she warns that decisions about what to be involved in needs to be
realistic. With issues such as world hunger, for example, the community needs to select a part of the
l5 8 Soelle, On Earth as in Heaven, 38-39.
l5 9 Naude and Soelle, 37-38.
l6 0 Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, 183.
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larger problem which the community can concretely address. Otherwise, because the problems
facing us are so large that they paralyze us, we have the tendency to address everything in theory and
nothing in practice.1 6 1
According to Sharon Welch the step-by-step nature o f conversion is essential for overcoming
one crucial difficulty in social change work: Sustaining movements o f change. Welch notes that too
often people quickly become burned-out and discouraged. In addition, many of us, if we cannot be
assured o f solving the whole problem, question whether any effort is worthwhile. Because our
society sees anything short of solving the problem as foolish or idealistic, we have come to believe
that citizens are unfit to work on the large issues and that citizens need to leave such matters to the
“experts.” This is an inadequate model for change, Welch contends, because the “experts” are rarely
interested in “true” change. Welch’s project is aimed at overcoming the despair of the affluent and
the middle-class, and by studying other movements o f social change she points out that slow, uneven
and incomplete change must be understood as “normal” rather than a sign of failure.
Welch argues that we also need to give up our current ethic o f control that insists on grand
designs such as the “war on poverty,” “the war on drugs.” or “ending welfare as we know it” as
opposed to step-by-step efforts. Under the ethic of control, which is the dominant ideology for many
sectors o f our society, working for justice is seen as irresponsible. With its norms of control and
success, such an ethic declares the young and the hopelessly idealistic may dabble in the work of
justice. But such work is not something in which reasonable, rational, realistic, let alone respectable,
people get involved.
Rejecting the norms of the ethic of control, Welch redefines responsible action. Responsible
action is not based on ultimate success but as laying the ground work for further action on the
problem. Welch points to the nuclear freeze movement as an example of responsible action. The
I < s ,Ruether, Women-Church, 93.
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purpose o f the movement was not to solve the nuclear problem but to stop producing more weapons.
Once that was accomplished, the ground work was set for further action.
An ethic o f nonproliferation would do well to integrate the step-by-step conversion model
systematically into its thought. While there is no guarantee that the stoppage o f building nuclear
arms by the superpowers will affect other nations, nevertheless, these other nations will clearly be
m ore likely to show restraint if the superpowers are showing restraint. Such an action thus becomes
responsible action. We will not solve the nuclear problem; it is a problem that each generation must
face on their own. Applying feminist theory, we can seek to improve the situation for our generation
and lay the groundwork for future generations.
Conclusion: The Implications o f Feminist Thought
The end o f the Cold War has left the peace movement in a quandary, not knowing how to move
on. Being a peace activist when the enemies o f peace were so obvious was so much easier. The
nuclear arms race could be opposed and so could U.S. intervention in Latin America. An ethic of
nonproliferation now faces a multitude of actors and agents acting within a truly global context. In
addition, the issues are much more complicated and ambiguous and require more complex moral
responses than in the past. With all these difficulties it is no wonder that the peace movement has
found itself in a quagmire.
Feminism can bring new life to the peace movement if the movement will allow it to happen.
Feminism will help the movement redefine its understanding o f success and leam to engage in
actions that lay the ground work for future action. It will help the movement remember to ground its
work in community-sustaining communities o f resistance. It will help the movement to engage in
strategic risk taking. Feminism will teach the movement modes o f solidarity based on love for the
oppressed and not on the model of “self-sacrifice.” The movement will develop new ways of power
■ ‘with” rather than power “over,” including a rejection o f the ethic o f control. It will begin to operate
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within a communicative ethic that is open to listening to “other” voices. From one of those voices it
will hear that patriarchy is at the root o f militarism, and fay working to counter its power it will more
than ever be on the journey toward peace.
The first implication coming from feminist theology for an ethic o f nonproliferation is a
reformulation o f Christian ethics with justice as the central norm. Feminist theology pushes us
to more radical positions. Not all positions can be accepted within Christianity. Nuclear weapons
are not part o f God’s plan for an approaching end o f time. Christians may be called to an ethic of
nonproliferation if they come to see that peace and justice are fundamental to the Christian faith.
The second notion from feminist theology for an ethic of nonproliferation is that militarism
and nuclearism are grounded in sexism, patriarchy, racism and other forms of oppression.
Consequently, an ethic of nonproliferation must not only make sure it does not promote these evils,
but it must actively be involved in the struggle to overcome them. It will do so by making
connections to broad social movements o f change. Nuclearism is grounded in the patriarchal desire
to insure security or immortality. An ethic o f nonproliferation must help us overcome these desires.
However, an ethic o f nonproliferation must reject the approach o f psychological introspection.
Instead, it calls out for justice, including rejecting the use of nuclear weapons by the northern
countries to coerce the southern nations. An ethic of nonproliferation will listen to the voices o f the
marginalized as well as bringing light to those who worship the false idols o f weapons. It is here
that we can undertake an adequate evaluation o f the policy proposals such at the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Do such policies actually promote peace, or do they simply serve the needs of those who
are already powerful?
The third concept for an ethic of nonproliferation provided by feminist theology is the need
to redefine our understanding of success and redefine responsible action as laying the ground
work for future action. An ethic o f nonproliferation will be a step-by-step method. An ethic of
nonproliferation should understand responsible action to be less concerned with immediate results
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and more focused on laying the ground work for future action. Small steps in the right direction are
important. People must leam to carry on, even when it is much too late to have any assurance of
making a difference. Action is required because all people are called to do justice.
The fourth idea from feminist theology for an ethic o f nonproliferation is that the work for
change should be grounded in community. We should reject the image o f “the kingdom of God”
and use the more useful image of “the beloved community.” These communities need to be
sustaining communities of resistance.
The need to engage in strategic risk taking is the fifth implication provided by feminist
theology. This includes distinguishing between what can be tolerated and what must be resisted.
Part o f the evaluation must include an understanding of the risk involved in the status quo, as
nuclear weapons have never provided true security. Risky steps will likely include encouraging
nations to take independent steps o f nuclear disarmament. If the nuclear nations will become more
serious about nuclear disarmament, so will others who now see advantages in nuclear weapons.
The sixth notion for an ethic of nonproliferation is solidarity, which should be based on love
for the oppressed and not on the model of “self-sacrifice.” Surely those who get involved will
suffer, but it is not the goal nor is it a virtue. Love is a better virtue upon which to base the efforts
needed to rid the world of the threat from nuclear weapons. Moreover, the method of solidarity
brings methods o f critique. Power must be shared, and the U.S. must give up its “one against all”
defensive strategy. The U.S. must become a true member of the global community.
The need to develop new ways of power “with” rather than power “over” is the seventh
concept provided to an ethic of nonproliferation by feminist theology. This includes a rejection
of the ethic o f control.
The eighth idea for an ethic of nonproliferation is the need to operate within
communicative ethics that is open to listening to “other” voices. Multiple ethics, norms, values
and communities are correctives o f each other.
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A ninth implication from feminist theology is a preference for nonviolent means. Feminist
theology does not rule out a priori all violence, as does pacifism. Nevertheless, feminism finds
through its use o f power analysis that nonviolence, which pools power and resources, is essential to
true change.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
LIBERATION THEOLOGY:
VOICES OF FREEDOM
In Manhattan, at the comer of Broadway and 120th Street (now renamed Reinhold Niebuhr
Place) stand the ivy-covered stone buildings o f Union Theological Seminary. Christian realism and
liberation theology, two o f the most important theological schools of the twentieth century, both have
strong ties to Union. For forty years Reinhold Niebuhr’s pen labored from the confines o f Brown
Tower, turning out volumes of books, articles, speeches and sermons. The result was a theology that
became known as Christian realism. In more recent years, this institution has been the hot bed in
the United States for liberation theology. Many major figures in this theological movement have
been students or professors (at least on a visiting basis) at this stately Upper Westside institution. In
fact, all five o f the liberation authors highlighted in this chapter have some connection to Union.
As a seminary student at Union, my education was steeped in the traditions o f both realism and
liberation. While the two are not completely compatible, both resonate deep within my theological
and ethical voice. With such a background, I find it quite strange to see how often these two schools
are portrayed as in deep conflict with each other. As one walks the dimly lit and sometimes dusty
corridors o f Union Seminary, the ghost o f Reinhold Niebuhr is very much present. His legacy is still
alive there. However, the concern for justice has turned Union’s focus to the struggles for liberation
by women, people o f color, gays and lesbians, and third world peoples. These are now the central
theological subjects, and at Union one now hears these voices. From these voices, I hear echoes of
Niebuhr, and I am convinced that I am not hearing things.
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While liberation theology is best known as being from Latin America and did originate there, it
developed almost simultaneously in Africa and Asia. In this chapter we will try to cover the world in
five quick stops. From Latin America we will listen to Jose Miguez Bonino and Enrique Dussel.
From Asia we will hear from Jong-Sun Noh and M. M. Thomas. Finally, from Africa Mercy Amba
Oduyoye’s voice will emerge. Since the roots o f liberation theology are in Latin America, we turn
first to its development there.
Christianity came to Latin America as part o f Spain’s effort to conquer the land. The Roman
Catholic Church was responsible to the Spanish Crown, which had the power to appoint bishops.
Roman Catholic missionaries worked for the mass conversion of the Native Americans to both
Christianity and to western culture.1 The Spanish conquest of the “new world” brought the near
extermination o f the native populations through war, slavery and epidemics.2 In this context,
Bartolome de las Casas, a wealthy land owner, became a Roman Catholic priest and then, in 1502,
began working with the indigenous people. Understanding the link between liberation and salvation,
Las Casas remains one o f the most controversial figures in Latin American history because he
defended the rights o f the Native Americans and advocated for only peaceful conversion. Las Casas
wrote, “War against unbelievers for the purpose o f subjecting them to Christian control, and to
compel them by this means to accept the Christian faith and religion, or to remove obstacles to this
end that may exist, is reckless, unjust, perverse, and tyrannical.”3 He was an early voice calling for
liberation in Latin America.
The national revolutions of the nineteenth century gained political independence for Latin
American states from Spain. These newly independent states were dealt a crippling blow by the
‘Rebecca S. Chopp, The Praxis o f Suffering: An Interpretation o f Liberation and Political
Theologies (MaryknoII, NY: Orbis, 1986), 9.
2 Robert Musto, The Catholic Peace Tradition (MaryknoII, NY: Orbis, 1986), 137.
3 Musto, 143.
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1929 worldwide economic crisis, which allowed the military class backed by the United States to
develop.4 During the 1960s and 1970s, development and protection of the military-backed
oligarchies led to national security states. Military might and human rights abuses kept power in the
hands of a few.5 With the failure o f economic development models in Latin America, the U.S. began
to support anything that labeled itself “anticommunist,” and “communist” became an
all-encompassing term meaning anyone seeking change.6 By the mid-1960s, people were being
slaughtered by the thousands.7
It is in this context that liberation theology began to emerge in Latin America. The Second
Vatican Council had permitted the Latin American bishops to shift their allegiance from the rich to
the poor. Following Vatican II thought, liberation theology put less emphasis on tradition and more
on the imitation o f Christ in a struggle for justice.
The Second General Conference o f Latin American Bishops (CELAM) met in 1968 in Medellin,
Columbia, under the theme “The Church in Present-Day Transformation o f Latin America in the
Light o f the Council.”8 The documents that emerged were written in light o f Vatican II and became
the spring board from which liberation theology was launched. The conference concluded that
equating unjust violence from the oppressors with the just violence of the oppressed is wrong.
Moreover, it called the Church to renounce the violence of the powerful, which is used to subjugate
4Enrique Dussel, A History o f the Church in Latin America, trans. Alan Neely (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 1981), 128.
sMusto, 219.
6DusseI, A History o f the Church, 131.
7 BIase Bonpane, Guerrillas o f Peace: Liberation Theology and the Central American Revolution
(Boston: South End, 1985), 3.
8Dussel, A History o f the Church, 145.
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others.9 Conference attenders insisted that the struggle for change must be against institutional
violence-the violence o f the rich against the poor. The Third General Conference (CELAM) was
held in 1979 in Puebla, Mexico. Although controlled by conservatives, the conference’s final
document did not lose ground from the work done at Medellin.1 0
The beginning o f Latin American theology o f liberation is the work o f Gustavo Gutierrez.1 1
Gutierrez understands salvific work as neither charity nor good works but as identifying and
changing oppressive structures.1 2 Liberation theology understands oppression as sin and seeks the
liberation o f both the oppressed and the oppressor. It is drawn from the Bible with the Exodus as the
archetypal story, one of the many biblical texts which shows God’s “preferential option for the poor.”
However, while others may help them, the oppressed must win their own liberation. They do so
through their own conscientization and struggle with the oppressor.
Enrique Dussel insists that liberation theology is not just a type or “flavor” o f theology, it is a
way of doing all theology. Its point of departure is praxis only then moving onto theory. Dussel
notes that traditional theology worked on the relationship between faith and reason while liberation
theology works on the relationship between praxis and theory. Liberation theology’s epistemology
includes the importance o f the social sciences. It also has an original organic link to the church of
the poor or the base communities.1 3
Noted U.S. theologian Robert McAfee Brown gives three powerful reasons why is it crucial for
us in the United States to listen to voices emerging from the third world. First, he argues that
9 Robert McAfee Brown, Religion and Violence. Second Edition. (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1987), 46.
1 0 Chopp, 15-16.
“Gustavo Gutierrez, Theology o f Liberation (MaryknoII: Orbis, 1974).
1 2 Michael Zweig, “Gustavo Guiterrez Is a Revolutionary,” Christianity & Crisis 49 (1989): 184.
“Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, trans. Robert R. Barr (MaryknoII: Orbis, 1988), 219 &
221.
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without such input white Americans will have a distorted view o f reality. Second, since whites are
the minority in the world, whites need to listen to voices o f the majority who are nonwhite. Finally,
we need to listen to third world voices because the U.S. has caused or supported so much misery in
the third world. Only by learning that truth can we turn away from such harmful ways.1 4
Liberation theology cannot just be exported (or ripped) from its context and be expected to
provide the ultimate solution. In this chapter I will try to avoid that error. However, third world
voices should be integral to our investigation o f the issues o f nuclear proliferation because
proliferation will take place and have the greatest impact in areas outside the industrialized north.
The independent task force on nuclear proliferation sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
notes:
The success o f the effort against nuclear proliferation is perhaps even more critical
to the non-nuclear weapon states. Most o f these states do not have the financial or
military resources that the United States has for dealing with a proliferated world.
Their support o f the effort against nuclear proliferation is not a gift to the nuclear
weapons states but an investment in their own national security.1 5
I. Liberationist Voices
A. Jose Miguez Bonino
I f hatred o f the enemy is subordinated to love fo r the brother and sister, then the
struggle is made “ functional, ” and the possibility o f affirming the humanity o f
the enemy during and after the struggle remains open. This is the kind o f ethics
o f liberation which many-Christians and non-Christians-are trying to develop
within the project o f liberation.'6
Jose Miguez Bonino was bom in Sante Fe, Argentina, in 1924 and raised by Methodist parents
who had converted from Catholicism. Although he did not live in poverty, poor people surrounded
him while he grew up. While in college, socialist professors influenced him, and he became
l4 Brown, xxiv.
l5 Stephen J. Hadley, “Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges— Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations.,” in Disarm.CTB-NPT115-119 (PeaceNet, 23 January 1995).
I6 Jose Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 113.
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committed to social change. He was ordained a Methodist minister and served parishes in Argentina
and Bolivia. In 1952 he received his M.A. from Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. Then, in
1960 he received his Ph.D. from Union Theological Seminary in New York City, specializing in
Roman Catholic traditions o f scripture. At Vatican II, he was an official observer for the Methodist
Church and has served as President of the World Council o f Churches. Currently, he is director o f
postgraduate studies at the Higher Institute for Theological Studies (ISEDET) in Buenos Aires,
Argentina. Miguez Bonino has influenced both world Christianity and the Christian academy.1 7
I went to seminary after a powerful experience in Latin America. During my first semester at
Union Theological Seminary in New York, noted black theologian James Cone introduced me to
writings o f Miguez Bonino. Coming from the experience o f seeing the Contra War in Nicaragua
first hand, I was immediately attracted to the revolutionary understandings of Christianity that
jumped from the pages o f Miguez Bonino. During my three years at Union, I was shaped by
liberation theology and by Niebuhrian realism. Perhaps because Miguez Bonino completed his
Ph.D. at Union, in him I also find a form of liberation theology that realism has influenced. Such a
theology can contribute much to an ethic of nonproliferation.
B. Enrique Dussel
Military art, the science o f violence, is the ultimate and most precise essence o f
the praxis o f imperialist domination. It is because o f this that the Pentagon
carries the responsibility fo r injustice at the international level o f violence in the
production and use o f arms.1 8
Enrique Dussel, another leading figure in liberation theology, studied philosophy and church
history in Europe and holds doctorates in both philosophy and history. He has also served as
l7 Deane William Ferm, Profiles in Liberation: 36 Portraits o f Third World Theologians (Mystic,
CT: Twenty-Third Publications, 1988), 29-34.
l8 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky
(MaryknoII: Orbis, 1985), 72.
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president of the Study Commission for Latin American Church History (CEHILA). Dussei has for
many years lived in exile from his homeland, Argentina, because o f political and Iiberative
engagement in his native land. This personal suffering and oppression makes his work both from
and for the periphery. As a philosopher, though, he uses the language o f the center and speaks to
places of power. He defines his philosophy o f liberation as post-modem, popular and pro-feminist.1 9
Currently, Dussel lives in Mexico teaching philosophy at the University of Mexico.
Dussel was a visiting professor for one semester while I was a student at Union. I had the
pleasure of taking his course in the history of Latin American liberation theology. Over ten years
later, I can still remember his opening lecture when he brought the biblical image of “bread o f life”
to an amazing level of concrete reality. It was an experience that allowed me truly to understand the
power of words. Dussel’s methods were unconventional for a North American academic classroom,
as he brought group processes from the base communities o f Latin America into the classroom. One
did not engage his class as solitary individuals but in solidarity with fellow students.
C. Jong-Sun Noh
Theological systems have been used as the means to produce false
consciousness, so that the suffering people in Asia cannot see the true realities
and truth o f God, o f Justice, Peace and Shalom-God the Liberator, God, the
decolonizer. Asian theology in the 90’ s should be theology o f decolonization.2 0
Moving our focus to Asia, we look to Jong-Sun Noh. Noh is a Korean theologian who received
his advanced education in the United States. Noh, bom in 1945, was raised in Seoul. He received
his bachelor’s degree in theology from Yonsei University (1969) and his Master’s of Divinity from
Harvard Divinity School (1974). He is an ordained minister o f the Presbyterian Church and served
as university chaplain from 1974-1977 at Yonsei University. He completed his Ph.D. from Union
l9DusseI, Philosophy o f Liberation, viii.
2 0 Jong-Sun Noh, God ofReunification: Toward a Theology o f Reunification (Seoul: Yonsei
University, 1990), 9.
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Theological Seminary in New York in 1984. Noh is an associate professor in the college o f arts and
sciences at Yonsei University (Maeji), Korea.
Noh’s theological method is that o f minjung or people’s theology. The minjung are those in
Korea who have historically been oppressed politically, economically, socially and educationally.
Minjung theology is inductive and is concerned with the oppressed minjung as opposed to the ruling
and powerful class. Noh distinguishes minjung from daejung, which means “masses,” since that
word has an impersonal and nonpolitical connotation. He also prefers minjung over inwin because,
although it means people, it does so in a narrow ideological and political way, which he deems
inappropriate. He also rejects the European word “proletariat” as too narrow ideologically and too
focused on economics at the exclusion o f other areas o f life. The methods o f minjung theology are
historical and socio-biographical, moving from historical-descriptive to normative-ethical. Its
methods of socio-biography look to poetry, history, folk songs and others aspects of ordinary life as
sources which reflect and record the hearts o f those who are oppressed and those who struggle for
liberation.2 1 Noh is especially useful to this work because, not only does he explore minjung
theology-the form of Korean liberation theology-he also explores the just war tradition and its
application to the eastern context. Moreover, the Korean peninsula is one o f the world’s potential
nuclear hot spots.
D. M. M. Thomas
All liberation movements tend to become self-righteous, and the spirit o f self-
righteousness becomes the sources o f their misdirection in the paths o f
aggression, terrorism and other inhumanities which betray the goal o f justice.
Therefore, prophetic religion provides spirituality not only fo r supporting
liberation struggles fo r justice, but also fo r liberating liberation struggles from
self-righteousness which perverts them.2 2
2 INoh, God o f Reunification, 1-2.
2 2 M. M. Thomas, Magas Toward A.D. 2000, and Other Selected Addresses and Writings.
(Madras, India: Centre for Research on New International Economic Order, 1992), 8.
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Continuing in Asia, we will explore the voice of the imminent Indian theologian M. M.
Thomas. Thomas is quick to remind his readers that the apostle Thomas, in the first century,
founded the Christian Church in India and that Christianity did not first come to India with the
arrival of European missionaries.2 3
Thomas grew up in Kerala, India’s most populous Christian state and became active in the
student Christian movement in India and globally.2 4 Thomas has been a leading figure in world
ecumenical efforts, including serving as chair of the central and executive committees of the World
Council of Churches, the first lay person and non-westerner to do so. Thomas was, until his death in
November 1996, director emeritus and research fellow o f the Christian Institute for the Study o f
Religion and Society in Bangalore, India. Thomas served as the Henry W. Luce visiting professor at
Union Theological Seminary in New York City during 1966-1967.
Thomas’ academic and ecumenical work has focused on the relationship between religion and
society. He was an early leader in such efforts, including chairing the World Council o f Churches’
conference on church and society held in Geneva in 1966. His theological concerns are nation-
building, the humanization o f society, and the relationship between peoples in society, including
those from other religious traditions. The political reality o f post-colonial India is also at the center
o f Thomas’s theological reflection.2 5
Thomas also lived out the relationship between religion and society by serving as governor of
Nagaland, a state in northeastern India. When Indira Gandhi declared a state o f emergency in 1975,
Thomas was one o f the few intellectuals who spoke against it. When opposition parties came to
1 3 M. M. Thomas, Evangelical Social Gospel (Park Town, Madras, India: Christian Literature
Society, 1977), iii.
2 4 PauI Abrecht, “In Memoriam: M. M. Thomas; Paulos Mar Gregorios,” The Ecumenical Review
49, no. 1 (January 1997): 110-113.
“ S. Wesley Ariarajah, review o f “Ethics o f a World Community: Contributions o f Dr. M. M.
Thomas Based on Indian Reality,” by T. Jacob Thomas, in International Review o f Mission 85, no.
337 (April 1996): 301-302.
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political control 15 years later, they remembered and appointed him governor o f Nagaland in May of
1990 though he had never before been active in politics.2 6 Nagaland is a very small state, and it is
also very Christian with 85% o f its 1.2 million inhabitants claiming the faith. Christianity in
Nagaland dates from the nineteenth century when Baptist missionaries started schools for the
inhabitants. After India’s independence in 1948, the missionaries were forced to leave, but
indigenous leadership carried on the churches, and such churches are now totally independent from
their mother churches. Nagaland is also young, as it was separated from another Indian state
in 1963. Most o f the people are tribal and collectively are called Nagas. In actuality, they consist of
17 major tribes who speak 16 different languages. Most o f the people’s ancestry originated from
Burma or China.2 7 It has been the church that has transformed the region from village tribalism into
Naga nationalism and modernity.
Although he was never ordained, during his time as governor Thomas preached in one of the
region’s pulpits nearly every week. He stood before them as a fellow Christian and not as their
governor and preached about the implications o f the Gospel for society as a whole. Thomas found
that the high sense o f private morality in Nagaland did not transfer to public morality. This was
most evident with political leaders who persistently switched parties based on political advantage
and corruption. In response to this, Thomas used his constitutional powers and dissolved the
assembly. Although the national press and constitutional experts supported his right to do so, he did
so without consulting the national government in New Delhi. Consequently, in April 1992 the
national government removed Thomas from office.2 8
2 6 T. K. Thomas, “‘Inconvenient’ Integrity,” One World, July 1992, 8.
2 7 Gudrun Lowner, “From the Mountaintop: M. M. Thomas Today,” Christianity & Crisis 52, no.
I (3 February 1992): 12-13.
2 8 T. K. Thomas, 8.
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India is a nuclear nation that has refused to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and has been
very critical o f first- and second-world nuclear policies. Hearing from a third world nuclear nation is
important for this work. With India’s recent nuclear activity, Indian thought is a crucial word to an
ethic o f nonproliferation.
E. Mercy Amba Oduyoye
To build up the Body o f Christ everywhere requires building up human
relations, seeing humanity as one fam ily under God who is the source o f the life
o f the human family. We cannot continue the rhetoric o f loving, caring words
about God ifpeople are not experiencing loving, caring acts from one another
Our final stop is in Africa with Ghana native Mercy Amba Oduyoye. Oduyoye is an Akan, a
matrilineal tribe found in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Her parents, who brought her up to believe
that women are central in the human community, also brought her up in churches, and she was
shaped by what she calls a utopian Christocentric worldview. As she was growing up, her parents
served together in ministry at a Methodist church, and so she grew up in western churches as
opposed to indigenous churches.3 0 Unlike her father, the church did not recognize her mother’s
work as official ministry, even though she and her husband made equal contributions to the church.
Yet her parents were intentional in bringing her up to love the church and to be thankful that God
had made her a Christian African woman. Her grandparents were church people as well, and so she
is a third generation Christian.3 1 While she sees no tension between being African and being
Christian, she does have difficulty with the church in Africa because it does so little on social issues.
2 9 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “The African Experience of God Through the Eyes of an Akan
Woman,” Cross Currents 47, no. 4 (Winter 1997-1998), 493-505.
3 0 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Daughters o f Anowa: African Women & Patriarchy (MaryknoII: Orbis,
1995), 5-6.
3 1 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “Be a Woman, and Africa Will Be Strong,” in Inheriting Our Mothers'
Gardens: Feminist Theology in Third World Perspective, eds. Letty M. Russell et al. (Louisville:
Westminster, 1988), 37 & 46.
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In addition, Oduyoye has a problem with the church, academia and the patriarchal society into which
she married. Her cross-cultural experience has made her more committed to promoting the role of
women in the church, the academy and society.3 2
Oduyoye has traveled extensively for ecumenical organizations, including the Ecumenical
Association o f Third World Theologians, the World Student Christian Federation, the All Africa
Conference o f Churches and the World Council o f Churches. She is a lecturer in the department of
religious studies at the University o f Ibadan in Nigeria.
When I visited Union Theological Seminary in New York before deciding to attend, I had the
pleasure o f hearing Oduyoye speak. She was then serving as a visiting professor. Oduyoye is
interested in the intersection of religion and culture, and she brings feminist and African
perspectives to an ethic of nonproliferation. She is a woman of immense presence and power, and
such is evidenced in her writings. One cannot hear or read her voice and fail to be affected.
/ / . Deconstruction
Liberation theology has both deconstructive and constructive aspects to it. Some suggest it is
utopian in its vision of the future and its hope for a significantly different world. That is not a fair
criticism o f it as it may be far more realistic than some critics o f liberation theology have understood.
In any event, we begin with its deconstruction o f reality because it helps us see reality in ways that
we would miss if we had not availed ourselves o f its methods.
3 2 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “The Empowering Spirit of Religion,” in Lift Every Voice: Constructing
Christian Theologies From the Underside, eds. Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite and Mary Potter Engel
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), 245.
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A. Ideology o f Interpretation
Liberation theology argues that the way one approaches a subject reflects the ideology o f the one
undertaking the interpretation. Consequently, we need to become more aware o f the influence of
ideological systems. Enrique Dussel observes that ideology is “concrete discourse that justifies and
conceals domination.”3 3 The purpose o f ideology is to mask things from our sight, and in response
liberation theology seeks to help unmask things and see them more clearly and accurately.
Dussel notes that social criticism in the U.S. and Europe has changed during the last fifty years,
moving from criticizing the total system to offering only reformist critiques. Dussel concludes that
this is not a positive transformation because it leaves criticism impotent. He insists that it is not
possible for ethicists to evaluate norms, virtues, good, evil, metaethics and peace without the ability
to question the overall system. Dussel notes that liberation theology is connected to U.S. and
European theology in the form of the early thought of Niebuhr, Tillich and Barth when such
theology criticized the system o f capitalism. However, eventually those authors stopped criticizing
the system and later endorsed it. Meanwhile, capitalism and the ideology of development have failed
in Latin America and elsewhere. Therefore, says Dussel, the first task of theology is to debunk the
system so that it can be transcended.3 4 In this sense liberation theology is revolutionary, as it is
willing to challenge the entire system. An ethic of nonproliferation is sympathetic to such an
approach, as much of the analysis to this point says we need to have a fundamental shift if we are to
overcome the threat posed by nuclear weapons. However, realism also influences an ethic of
nonproliferation and is suspicious o f the possibility, or at least the likelihood, o f such fundamental
change. Perhaps liberation theologians who have been influenced by the realist tradition of Union
Theological Seminary can provide some synthesis of these two positions.
3 3 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 123.
3 4 Enrique Dussel, “An Ethics o f Liberation: Fundamental Hypothesis”, Concilium, no. 172, eds.
Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1984), 54-56.
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Jose Miguez Bonino, like most liberation theologians, is highly critical o f traditional western
theology and refuses to use western theology as a norm. He argues that the western science of
interpretation has its own ideological premises, though its proponents often refuse to recognize that
this is the case. The result of interpretation does not leave us with facts but reflections of ideology.3 5
Moreover, liberation theologians insist that western thought has consistently confused its
particularity with universality. Europeans have long assumed that they constitute humanness and
that since they are at the center of being human then ethically they have an obligation to control and
dominate the periphery. Dussel notes that such a false ideology ignores many things. First, it
confuses the center of might and power with universality. Second, it sees the periphery as
nonhuman because it is not the center. Third, it misses the fact that true planetary universality is full
o f diversity. Fourth, it avoids taking responsibility for domination, and so it continues in ways that
are invisible.3 6 If we do not employ careful tools o f analysis, we are likely to miss the ideology that
shapes our understanding of reality.
For example, in looking at the struggles o f oppressed people in Korea, Jong-Sun Noh notes the
presence o f two historical records demonstrating the role ideology plays in shaping worldviews.
First are those histories of the powerful which label any revolutionary movement by the people as
immoral. The second histories are those from the perspective of the oppressed people, and in case of
revolution these may call it a just revolution. Historians often fail to be conscious o f their
perspective when approaching historical events and so usually take the side o f the rulers.3 7
3 5 Jose Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1975), 94.
3 6 Enrique Dussel, “ 1492: The Discovery o f an Invasion,” Cross Currents 41, no. 4 (Winter
1991-1992): 446.
3 7 Jong-Sun Noh, Violence and Nonviolence in Minjung's Struggle fo r Justice in the Tonghak
Revolution: Religion and Just Revolution—Third World Perspective (Hamden, CT: Center for Asian
Theology, 1984), 4, 136-140 & 144-147.
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Liberation theology is quick to point to the evil ideologies that historically have invaded
Christianity. Dussel notes that Europeans quickly applied the Holy War mentality that Europe had
used against Muslims against the native peoples o f the New World and deemed expanding
Christendom by violent arms and war as necessary.3 8 Noh sees similarities in the Asian context,
pointing to the transformation o f religion by the powerful so that it becomes a tool o f oppression.
For example, the Confucian thinker Mencius taught that the people are the most precious and kings
are the least. Mencius also legitimizes just revolutions, claiming that the people should dethrone
kings who have serious faults. Not surprisingly, the official teachings o f Mencius never included
these teachings because the powerful simply left them out when they published Mencius’ writings.
On the positive side, liberation theologians note that, if recovered, all traditions contain sources for
resisting oppression.3 9 A danger to an ethic o f nonproliferation comes from the magnitude of the
threat that nuclear weapons pose. If the world is truly in danger, justifying any means is far too easy.
Therefore, this ethic must be suspicious o f arguments o f necessity.
Noh explores the problems o f what minjung theologians call divisional theology which not only
supports imperialism and colonialism by the first-world but also the division o f Korea into North and
South.4 0 Noh sets out a three-part typology o f ideology. First are the ideologies o f the ruling class,
superpowers or neo-colonial powers which are for the benefit of their own economic, political, social
and cultural well-being. This ideology is based on sophisticated lies which control people, so
distorting reality that the people cannot see it. Here, the minjung have false consciousness. The
second type o f ideology Noh calls a fighting creed. Under such an ideology the enemies o f the
powerful are identified and destroyed by the powerful. The third ideology is one o f liberation that
3 S Dussel, “ 1 492,” 441.
3 9 Noh, God o f Reunification, 10-11.
4 0 Jong-Sun Noh, “The Effects on Korea o f Un-Ecological Theology,” in Liberating Life:
Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology, eds. Charles Birch, William Eakin and Jay B.
McDaniel (MaryknoII: Orbis, 1990), 125.
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allows the people to see reality and to distinguish what is just and right from what is wrong and
unjust.4 1 An ethic o f nonproliferation must seek to operate under this third form o f ideology. This is
the only way that it can escape old and outdated modes o f thinking and the only way that it can
adequately address the complexities o f the post-Cold War world. Ironically, since nuclear weapons
threaten everyone and everything on the globe, such an approach may, in the long run, be the only
way that the interests o f the United States can be served as well. No one’s interests are served in
global destruction.
Dussel notes that philosophy done on the periphery has to be done in response to the center.
Because the center imposes itself, the periphery cannot ignore it.4 2 Liberation theology can train an
ethic of nonproliferation to be aware of the role o f ideology. An ethic o f nonproliferation will
employ a hermeneutic o f suspicion as it explores the nuclear problem. Most writers in the U.S. have
explored what should be done from a perspective that seeks the most profit for the United States.
This is the classic realist’s perspective. Two problems are evident with such an approach. First, it
claims to universalize when it is only looking out for the United States. Second, such an approach
blinds the analyzer to the realization of the true nature o f nuclear weapons whose consequences are
global. This leads to analysis that looks at what is good for the U.S. in the short run but fails to
notice that if nuclear war happens, even elsewhere on earth, the consequences could still be
disastrous for the United States. Moreover, the realist approach fails to recognize that no defense
against nuclear weapons exists or is likely to exist in the near future. Blindness to its own ideology
has made realism terribly unrealistic on nuclear issues. We will only achieve true progress on a
global level. Liberation theology can help us see reality more accurately.
4'Noh, God o f Reunification, 23.
4 2 DusseI, Philosophy o f Liberation, 3.
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B. Textual Analysis
Liberation theology provides a fresh approach to biblical interpretation.4 3 Rejecting the claim
that the task o f interpretation can be done from a value-neutral position, liberation theology argues
that all interpretation is done from a specific context and from within a specific ideology. Liberation
theologians approach scripture from the context o f oppression and with a commitment to liberating
the oppressed. As a result they are able to see things in scripture that others who approach scripture
from positions o f power and comfort have missed.
Jose Miguez Bonino argues that God’s power is different from what we normally conceive of it.
Miguez Bonino invites us to rid ourselves o f the image of a magician waving a magic wand. In its
place, we should think o f an artisan who molds the clay over and over-constructing, reconstructing
and revising. God does not tire or get discouraged but has infinite patience and perseverance. Such
a God is powerful because such a God is faithful and does not quit the task o f creation until it is
finished, and that is not yet.4 4 This is the model of engagement that an ethic o f nonproliferation will
need to develop, as the journey will be long.
Mercy Amba Oduyoye insists that in the struggle many African women claim the biblical
concept o f being made in the image of God, seeing in it women’s self-worth and self-esteem and a
protest against any who would deny such things. She concludes that if one is made in the image of
God then everyone should treat such a person as God does, with hospitality, compassion and justice.
The implication o f this would include mutuality for all and an understanding that there is one human
4 3 For many realists and secular thinkers this section of biblical interpretation might initially seem
irrelevant. However, there are important reasons for its inclusion. First, o f all it is necessary to
understanding liberation theology as it is its point of departure. Second, for liberation theology it is
an important interpretive tool. It claims that biblical interpretation has often shaped behavior and
policy. However, such interpretation came from the powerful. Liberation theology interprets
scripture from the perspective of the poor and powerless and argues that reading from such
perspective calls out for different ethical understandings and actions.
4 4 Jose Miguez Bonino, Room to Be People: An Interpretation o f the Message o f the Bible for
Today’ s World, trans. Vicki Leach (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 18, 3 1 & 33.
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community, one household of God and God’s peopIe.4 S Oduyoye argues that either men and women
are equal because they are made in the image o f God, or Genesis 1:26 is a lie. But she insists that
Genesis is not a lie and that males alone do not stand for God, nor can females be excluded from
humanness. She concludes, “To be authentic, Christian theology must promote the interdependence
of distinctive beings and stand by the principles o f inclusiveness and interdependence.”4 6 An ethic of
nonproliferation shaped by the principles of inclusiveness and interdependence will need to be global
in its area of concern.
The paradigmatic text for liberation theology is the story o f the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt.
Enrique Dussel insists that reformist theologies ask how is it possible to be good in Egypt, the land
of oppression. But Dussel reminds us that, like Moses, liberation theologies ask how it is possible to
get out of Egypt. The liberationist starts by exposing the systems of this world.4 7 O f course the road
to liberation includes an internal struggle as well. In the desert the people complained against
Moses. In Latin America, many Christians play that same role, saying it is not their place to resist
or escape.4 8 Part o f the liberationist process is to transform the oppressed.
Oduyoye also sees the importance o f the exodus story not only in its original context but in her
context today in Africa. In her theological reflections she starts with the exodus story because she
relates it to her personal story. Also, she writes that the deliverance of the Hebrew people from
slavery is what makes possible the whole experience of God’s people. The African experience of
4 5 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “Spirituality of Resistance and Reconstruction,” in Women Resisting
Violence: Spirituality fo r Life, eds. Mary John Mananzan et al. (MaryknoII: Orbis, 1996), 170.
4 6 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “Calling the Church to Account: African Women and Liberation,” The
Ecumenical Review 47, no. 4 (October 1995).
4 7 Dussel, “An Ethics o f Liberation,” 56.
4 8 Enrique Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace: Theological Reflections From Latin
America Concerning Peace (Geneva: World Student Christian Federation, 1985), 16.
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liberation from colonialism makes the biblical story o f liberation relevant, and so African
theologians seek to develop theologies relevant to the continuing struggle in Africa. Oduyoye writes:
Africa belongs to the world o f the powerless and the dispossessed. As a women
who feels the weight of sexism I cannot but go again and again to the stories o f the
exodus, the exile, and to other biblical motifs in which “the least” are recognized
and affirmed, are saved or held up as beloved o f God or at least are empowered to
grow at the fundaments of the structures o f injustice until these fundaments cave in
on themselves. These narratives have been for me the bearers o f good news.4 9
Oduyoye argues that the exodus, while not the total o f the Old Testament story, is a salvific action
which comes from God’s grace. It also means that God does provide political deliverance from
unjust systems. In Africa, Christians see freedom from colonialism as exactly such an act by God.
Oduyoye insists that theology divorced from ethics has no relevance in Africa. She argues that
the exodus story is not only assurance o f salvation, but it also forces the question o f what shall we do
to be saved. An ethic o f redeemed people requires people who are active in their own process of
liberation. Moreover, the story is not salvation for elites who then have no responsibility for the
community. This is contrary to the story.5 0
Jesus took seriously the prophets who proclaimed justice and peace, and Jesus devoted his life to
it, to the point o f offering up his life. The prophets spoke of proclaiming release to the captives,
sight to the blind, liberty for the oppressed, and Jesus announced his ministiy with those very words.
However, we can question whether this was foolish utopian idealism since his message was rejected,
attacked and denied by enemies and followers alike. In the end he was killed for his message.
Miguez Bonino counters that this is realism at its harshest. However, Jesus calls the Christian to
have faith in him, and in the end we will see how things work out. The assurance is in the
resurrection. Miguez Bonino contends that the resurrection is not important for its miraculous event.
Of course God could do that. What is radically important is that by resurrecting Jesus, God affirmed
4 9 Mercy Amba Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing: Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa
(MaryknoII, NY: Orbis, 1986), 147.
5 0 Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 79-81, 85, 89, 96, 103-104 & 106-107.
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what Jesus said and did. This is why Paul says without the resurrection our faith has no
foundation.5 1
African women find power in Jesus, despite the harsh realities of life. Oduyoye says that Jesus
is the real and only true “superpower.”5 2 Jesus did not provide the dramatic political act for which
many o f his day hoped. However, insists Oduyoye, he actually did something more radical; he put
forth a worldview that eventually put down the Roman Empire, and it still has the power to
breakdown oppressive institutions today. Instead o f a free Jewish state, Jesus witnessed to the
Kingdom o f God where God can reconcile all people.
Dussel argues that economics and the Eucharist are interrelated terms and at the essence of
Christianity. Dussel draws from the life o f the Bartolome de las Casas who came to America about
ten years after Columbus and was the first person to be ordained a priest in the new world, being
sponsored by the son o f a conquistador. Ten years after his ordination, Las Casas accompanied the
conquistadors in their bloody conquest of Cuba. In return they gave him a band o f Indians to work
for him. However, Las Casas then read from the 34th chapter of the Book o f Ecclesiastes: “Bread is
the life o f the destitute, and it is murder to deprive them of it. To rob your neighbor of his livelihood
is to kill him, and the man who cheats a worker o f his wages sheds blood.” After reading this Las
Casas couid no longer celebrate the Mass. He then freed his Indians and began a prophetic career.
Dussel argues that bread is the symbol for the product o f human labor, the fruit of the human-
nature relationship o f work. He says productive material is sacramental because it is a product of
human work, which is an extension of divine creation. Yet bread is also life. In the cycle of life,
bread dies as it gives life by feeding. However the scriptural text is specific to whom it gives life-the
destitute, or the poor. The poor, in biblical terms, are those who are oppressed or alienated from the
fruits o f their labor. They do not receive the just returns from their labor because the rich have
5lMiguez Bonino, Room to Be People, 67-68.
5 2 Oduyoye, “Spirituality o f Resistance and Reconstruction,” 168.
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dominated or oppressed them. The destitute are forced to work, but they are not permitted to
consume the fruit o f their labor. So when bread is not life for the poor, they die. Consequently, it is
murder to deprive the poor of their bread. If the powerful do not allow the poor to consume what
they produce, what they produce becomes the bread of death. Such bread becomes the bread of
damnation to whomever consumes it.
Dussel notes that in Scripture there is a relationship between “well-being” and “life.” As a
result, peace is not a value but the basis for all values-it is proper human existence. In its original
and utopian meaning, life as peace is camal, physical and material. Dussel notes that humanity did
not deserve the original peace of innocence. The new peace that is the fruit o f liberative action is a
deserved victory. However, both are still gifts from God.”
Dussel argues that the thrust o f the biblical story is that, in the midst of oppression, God makes a
peace alliance with God’s people. This is a peace that knows the oppression of Egypt and Babylon.
This is not the first peace, but a second peace. Such a peace is involved in the struggle. “The ‘Peace
Alliance’ is the resurrection of a people who moan in the shadows o f death.”5 4
One criticism o f liberation theology’s rejection o f absolute pacifism is that violence is
incompatible with Jesus’ life and commandment o f universal love and nonresistance. Miguez
Bonino counters that this confusion comes from bad exegesis since the gospels never claim that such
commandments require tolerance, compromise, or acceptance of evil. Yes, Jesus loved, but he also
challenged, condemned and rejected.5 5 In addition, he claims, we must examine not only whether
Jesus rejected violence but why he rejected violence. Miguez Bonino concludes that Jesus’ rejection
o f violence is a reflection of Jesus’ self understanding as God’s suffering servant. “God’s anointed is
5 3 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 1, 2 & 15.
5 4 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 9.
5 5 Jose Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1975), 121-122.
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not sent to assume human political struggle in the realm o f divine omnipotence but to identify
himself with the impotence of the oppressed.”5 6 God does not use the incarnation for omnipotent,
divine intervention but to proclaim the realm and offer an invitation.
For the Christian community this means, as I see it, at least two things. On the
one hand, there is no divine war, there is no specifically “Christian” struggle.
Christians assume, and participate in, human struggles by identifying with the
oppressed. But they have no particularly divine or religious power to contribute.
There is no room for crusades, for sacred wars. Secondly, it means that Christians
are called to use for this struggle the same rational tools that are at the disposal o f
all human beings.5 7
Christians do not have a sacred place from which to make war. Instead they must be where Jesus
was, on the side o f the poor and the oppressed.
Liberation theology teaches that we must take part in our own salvation and the salvation o f the
world. If creation is an ongoing process and we are co-creators with God, then it is time to engage
the nuclear issue. God calls us to protect the environment and human life. The question is not how
to survive in Egypt but how do we bring about our liberation. We cannot survive for long in the
present land o f nuclear proliferation, and so the faithful question is how to get out o f nuclear
proliferation. Liberation theology’s use of the prophetic tradition is also useful to an ethic of
nonproliferation. The prophetic tradition first points the accusatory finger inward, asking what are
our sins. Moreover, it points at the rich in the name o f the poor. An ethic o f nonproliferation needs
first to look at the sins o f the United States. What has it done and is doing to cause nuclear
proliferation? Moreover, even in areas where the U.S. did not have a negative impact, are there still
actions that the U.S. could take to promote nonproliferation? The first action steps should be ours.
Moreover, an ethic o f nonproliferation should be based on the principles o f inclusiveness and
interdependence. Finally, a Christian ethic o f nonproliferation should be based on hope. A
resurrection faith is not magic, but it is belief in the transforming power o f God. Such power was
5 6 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 123.
5 7 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 124.
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evidenced by the fact that a single man brought down the Roman Empire not by raising a sword but
by dying. Surely such power has the ability to overcome the nuclear nightmare.
C. Social Analysis
Besides textual interpretation, social analysis is also a hermeneutical tool which liberation
theology uses. Liberation theology argues that the area o f research must be the entirety o f society,
including the economic, political, and cultural sectors. Christianity and Christian action must be
evaluated by the extent to which imperialism, apartheid, integration, self-determination, and many
other social and political issues are either supported or struggled against. Social analysis leads
Enrique Dussel to reject the idea that sin is merely personal. Because we are all social beings and
part o f complex relations with other people and institutions, our sins are never solitary but partly
social in nature or consequence.5 8
Jong-Sun Noh identifies the root o f the Korean people’s suffering in a false religion which he
identifies as the divide and conquer strategies o f the superpowers. This, he claims, has divided
Korea into two halves, and Noh baldly labels this a false theology. Consequently, it is natural that
minjung theology is concerned with the reunification o f Korea.5 9 The problem for Christianity in
South Africa under apartheid, says Oduyoye, is that God seemed to promote the injustice o f favoring
some and oppressing others. The South African experience was of a Christianity that was racist, and
so it seemed that the Christian God was identified with the South African secret police and that God
sought to dominate and suppress the people. Therefore, African theology has had to debunk ideas
such as God favoring whites and wanting blacks subjugated. Leaders in the African church had to
remind its faithful that God is a healer and has compassion for life.6 0
5 S Dussel, Ethics and Community, 2 1.
5 9 Noh, God o f Reunification, 5.
“ Oduyoye, “The African Experience o f God,” 493-505.
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Noh argues that dominant “western theologies o f peace” (his label for realism) actually brought
war to the lands o f Asia in the colonial interest of nations such as Japan, the United States, France,
Great Britain and Spain.6 1 Such theologies bring oppression and not liberation. Thomas, in his
study of Reinhold Niebuhr, is critical of his changing view of justice. However, Thomas sees in
Niebuhr’s exploration o f the relationship between eschatology and history Niebuhr’s theological
constant, in which Niebuhr justifies a realistic as opposed to a utopian involvement in struggles for
justice. In devotion to that position, Thomas considers himself a Niebuhrian. Thomas notes that
other liberation theologians completely reject Niebuhr because his is an establishment theology.
While Thomas grants that Niebuhr’s theology became an establishment theology, Thomas counters
that it also has social-revolutionary implications based on egalitarian social concerns and radical
readings o f social situations. Thomas finds Niebuhr’s ignorance of third-world realities led him to
use the Cold War ideology of democracy versus communism to evaluate all foreign policy issues.
Thomas points out that “out of touch with reality, realism can go wrong.”6 2 However, Thomas holds
fast to the idea that realism is the basis of a revolutionary ethic. Thomas clearly has a love-hate
relationship with Niebuhr’s Christian realism. However, he concludes, “I still do not see a viable
alternative to it as a theological anthropological foundation for a revolution for justice.”6 3
Thomas argues that modernization in technology, human rights and secularism have developed
an overly mechanical view of nature and humanity and have thus ignored the natural, organic and
transcendental spiritual dimensions of reality. Traditional societies, no doubt, may go too far in the
opposite direction and risk enslaving people to natural forces and to the group’s will. However,
Thomas argues that in atomizing society and promoting rootless individualism the modem
6 1 Noh, God o f Reunification, 9.
6 2 M. M. Thomas, “A Third World View of Christian Realism,” Christianity & Crisis 46, no. 1 (3
February 1986), 9.
“ Thomas, “A Third World View of Christian Realism,” 10.
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mechanical view also leads to enslavement. People soon discover they do not want to be rootless,
and so what arises is a collectivism in which the rootless masses huddle together under mechanical
state control (like what happened in the Soviet Union). Thomas argues that only a post-modern
humanism can integrate the mechanical, organic and spiritual through the reinterpretation of
traditions in battle with fundamentalism, which is another answer to this continual pendulum swing.
Thomas points out elements of modernity which, while creative, need correction in the
development o f an adequate post-modern humanism. First, modernity brought the breakup of
“undifferentiated total unity,” and this has allowed for development. Thomas suggests that, while
differentiation and separation were necessary, there is a need to integrate the differentiated aspects of
life into a cultural unity. Because one solution-state totalitarianism-has serious negative side
effects, alternative ways to develop unified culture in the midst of diversity must be discovered.
Second, Thomas notes that the most important development of modernity was the discovery of
individual personhood and the valuing o f non-conformity. He says, while these were crucial to the
development o f democracy, they have often lead to a form of individualism that sees freedom as
license without community responsibility. To counter the pendulum swing to individualism, Thomas
notes that we need an ethic of persons in community and to see freedom as moral responsibility.
Third, modernity has led to a transition from a sacred ethos to a secular ethos. Thomas notes this
has allowed the thriving o f the sciences, arts and philosophy. Moreover, in pluralistic societies this
transformation to the secular is the key to ending religious violence. But the negative result of this is
materialism, technology that threatens our environment, the development of a culture o f violence and
exploitation o f the weaker sections of society. Thomas rejects the solutions of fundamentalism,
communal traditionalism and tribalism. Instead he argues for open secularism which integrates
traditional culture and gives room for the philosophy o f the sacredness of life. Fourthly, Thomas
understands that modernity has transformed our worldview from world-as-nature to world-as-history.
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which sees the world as having purpose as it moves towards the future. Here the need, says Thomas,
is to root culture in a sense of purpose that allows it to face tragedies without falling into nihilism.
Thomas notes that in India and elsewhere humanity lost its vision by ignoring cultural and
spiritual aspects o f life. In doing so, spiritual claims were abandoned to the religious
fundamentalists. The result in society was lopsided secularism which ignored spiritual values.
Wrong-head optimism about modem scientific progress assumed that improvements to society would
come automatically when in fact the very values needed to do so were being ignored. Thomas also
rejects the notion that anything can be value free though many social sciences such as economics
claim to be. He says such blindness simply leads to upholding unjust systems. Much preferable is an
integration o f scientific knowledge and the spiritual values committed to the betterment o f the weak
and oppressed.6 4
Social analysis is key to DusseFs work because he defines sin as the negation or domination of
the other. If God is the absolute other, then to dominate is to sin against God. Dussel argues that
the biblical meaning o f “the poor” is not those who lack goods, but those who are dominated. The
rich are those who, in sin, dominate them. There can be no poor without the rich.6 5 Dussel notes
with irony that the church began among the socially and politically oppressed peoples o f the Roman
Empire but now is aligned with governments that do most o f the world’s oppression. The
connection to the oppressed and to the political level is what liberation theology seeks to
reestablish.6 6
Dussel contends that we also have cultural domination as the Coca Cola, blue jeans and
“modem necessities” culture replaces third-world culture. Poor people are taught that they need
things, and this only makes them poorer, both on a personal level and on a societal level. He argues
‘ “Thomas, Nagas TowardA.D. 2000, 27-28, 31, 114-116 & 191-193.
6 S DusseI, Ethics and Community, 18-19 & 22-23.
“ Dussel, A History o f the Church, 3, 5-6 & 11.
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that losing one’s culture is a spiritual loss. Moreover, Dussel indicates that the destruction of culture
and the destruction o f nature are interrelated.
Dussel’s contention that there is no religious sin that is not political or economic and vice
versa6 7 is echoed in the writings of other liberation theologians. In a like manner, Jose Miguez
Bonino states that God set the table for all God’s children, but the selfish have stolen the share of
others.6 ® Dussel concludes that a theology o f economics is at the heart o f a theology o f peace.6 9 Noh
argues that the first world works together to continue exploitation, and it reaps the benefits o f such
exploitation. He sees interconnections between and among things such as arms sales, the sale of
nuclear energy plants, nuclear weapons, food distributions which make food a weapon, GATT, IMF,
the World Bank and the G-7. Moreover, even organizations such as the United Nations tend to
support the interests o f the superpowers and not the genuine security interest o f third-world
peoples.7 0
Dussel claims that first world countries in the 1960s economic downturn responded in two ways
that have had disastrous consequences for the world: They lent money irresponsibly to third world
nations and increased investment in arms production. Such a response is incompatible with
Christian ethical teachings. In the Hebrew and Christian tradition up until the time o f the
Reformation, lending money at interest was considered wrong or unnatural and it was condemned as
usury. It was also considered wrong and unnatural to produce weapons to murder one’s neighbor.
Yet countries which claim the Judeo-Christian heritage are now based on the lending o f money and
the building o f arms.7 1
6 7 Dussel, Ethics and Community, 26, 201 & 204.
6 S Miguez Bonino, Room to Be People, 37.
6 9 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search for Peace, 4.
7 0 Noh, God o f Reunification, 7.
7lDussel, Ethics and Community, 158-159 & 162.
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It is the impact o f third-world thinkers which has begun to challenge the assumptions o f
superiority o f the modem capitalist system. Nevertheless, Jose Miguez Bonino argues that
ecumenical theology has still failed to articulate a theology o f society and economics that is faithful
to the suffering in the third-world.7 2 Oduyoye says that such suffering is especially tied to the terrible
debt payments that third world nations are oppressed under. Oppression can kill with bullets, torture
or imprisonment, or through slow starvation.7 3 Thomas warns that we should not be deluded, since
the increased gap between the rich and the poor will lead to violence.7 4
In contrast to the reality o f dependence, Thomas argues that a good society is an egalitarian one
in which the needs o f everyone are taken care of and no one is abandoned. We have in fact moved
farther away rather than closer to such a society. Thomas notes that in past times wealthy people
understood that they had a duty to those who were poor. However, today the wealthy are vulgar in
their display o f wealth and severely lacking in their social obligations.7 5 Moreover, Dussel says that
in the past the sin o f accumulation was minimal because people were limited on how much they
could accumulate. Today, with transnational corporations the sin of accumulation is nearly
unlimited and is now “sin upon sin.”7 5 Dussel observes without economic liberation there is no true
liberation.7 7
Oduyoye reminds theology, including liberation theology, that adequate social analysis must
include gender analysis. Moreover, her study o f African Christianity has found that, unfortunately,
^Jose Miguez Bonino, “Social Doctrine As a Locus for Ecumenical Encounter,” The Ecumenical
Review 43, no. 4 (October 1991): 394.
^“The Spirit Is Troubling the Water-Ecumenical Decade: Churches in Solidarity with Women,”
The Ecumenical Review 42, no. 3-4 (October 1990): 226.
7 4 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000,23 & 206.
7 S Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000,22.
7 6 Dussel, Ethics and Community, 147.
^Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 152.
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Christianity has established the European idea o f womanhood in Africa. Ironically, Christianity
teaches the myth that it has brought liberation to African women. Oduyoye rejects such claims,
arguing instead that Christianity brought European middle-ciass housewife images to a land that has
no middle-class.7 8
Oduyoye speaks o f the reality of “sighs too deep for words” (Rom. 8:26) from women who suffer
from militarism, economic injustice, racism and patriarchy.7 9 African sexism is also interconnected
with racism and classism. The continuation o f male domination in the church prevents women from
experiencing the liberating power of God. This is not God’s will but the will of males. African
women instead experience God as resistance to dehumanizing forces and will not allow the church to
oppress in the name o f God.8 0
The male liberation theologians also recognize the need to address the oppression o f women.
Noh notes that shamanism has been a religion o f oppressed people, especially women. As such, the
powerful have regarded it as superstitious and deviant. However, women’s religious power has been
quietly and nonviolently maintained. It has been a method o f struggle against oppression.8 1
Speaking from the Hispanic cultural ethos, Dussel says that through the liberation o f women will be
the liberation o f eros, and that will help men recover what they have lost within macho ideology.8 2
One feature o f African Christianity reflecting the experiences o f African women that Oduyoye
notices is that the Christ which African women worship is the victorious Christ. This is because
African women know the reality o f evil and its life-denying nature. So they want a Christ who can
counter these forces. Also important is that Jesus nurtures not only through parables but also by
7 8 Oduyoye, “Calling the Church to Account,” 479-489.
7 9 “The Spirit Is Troubling the Water,” 225.
8 0 Oduyoye, “The African Experience o f God,” 493-505.
8 1 Noh, Violence and Nonviolence, 55-56.
S 2 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 83-84
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feeding. Scripture even tells o f his own hands cooking a meal, and that we know him through the
breaking o f bread. Oduyoye concludes that this Jesus is indeed truly woman yet truly divine.8 3
Liberation theology is also concerned with the damage that oppressive systems inflict on
ecosystems and the planet as a whole. Dussel notices that the earth itself has been oppressed
environmentally and that the earth is mortally wounded.8 4 Oduyoye says that liberation issues are
connected ultimately to ecology or the earth. She notes that nature and women have suffered the
same fate-domination and rape. Nothing can fulfill God’s purpose when dominated, neither women,
the third world nor creation.8 5 Thomas is also concerned with both feminist and ecological issues.
Thomas is greatly influenced by Vananda Shiva, who speaks o f the efforts to protect trees in India, a
movement that is often led by women. Thomas does fault her for her total rejection of western
modernity since he claims her feminism is part o f modernity as well. But he fully agrees that the
sacredness o f life must replace the sacredness of technology, which is bestowed by modernity.
Thomas argues that technology must be developed that is oriented towards life and that respects
natural systems. He notes his agreement with Shiva that, since women are at the center o f
subsistence economy, ecological protection is key to the protection, survival and the advancement of
women.
Thomas notes that the Naga lived in harmony with nature for a thousand years. “Progress” has
violently changed that relationship, and we should not be surprised that the results are unpleasant.8 6
In a similar vein, Noh argues that Korean peninsula was created by God and was once beautiful.
However, the same place may someday be unable to support life. Instead o f demonstrating the
8 3 Elizabeth Amoah and Mercy Amba Oduyoye, “The Christ for African Women,” in With Passion
and Compassion: Third World Women Doing Theology (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), 43-44.
8 4 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 115.
8 5 “The Spirit Is Troubling the Water,” 227.
8 6 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 21 & 35-36.
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integrity o f creation, it might become a wasteland o f disintegration. Such a possibility, Noh writes,
is legitimized by unecological/divisional theology which oppresses the people, animals and the earth
itself. Noh argues that divisional theologies have also supported the transfer of highly polluting
industries to Korea by portraying them as being part o f God’s blessing since they promised to bring
economic growth. Such industries, besides increasing pollution, however, brought more dependency
on the U.S. and Japan. Noh notes that mass destruction o f human life such as happened in Bhopal
or Chernobyl is an ever-present possibility in Korea. These developments have also destroyed
traditional patterns of food production, forcing Korea to import 50-60% of its food. Noh concludes
the superpowers use food as a weapon on neo-colonial states, as a food-dependent state cannot be
self-reliant.8 7
Part of the social analysis o f liberation theology is its insistence in the necessity o f struggle.
Dussel is so bold as to suggest that anyone who denies the struggle of classes and nations is denying
the reality of sin. He states, “To deny the struggle is to deny sin; it is to consecrate as natural
oppression; it is to affirm that non-peace is peace.”8 8 Dussel argues that when liberative resistance
happens the system collapses because it is based on suffering and exploitation. Consequently, the
system cannot simply let the oppressed go. The system’s first response to resistance is to kill the
prophets. The next move o f an oppressive system is to kill all the people. To do so they need arms,
and so the dominating classes produce arms. Moreover, they do all this in the name of Christianity.
However, Dussel calls such approach to Christianity a fetishism or an inversion of the Gospel.8 9
Thomas says it is crucial to recognize that the idols o f death are presently not only in the
oppressive structures which liberationists seek to overthrow but also in each person and in liberation
movements themselves. Consequently, in their social analysis, liberation movements must be self-
8 7 Noh, “The Effects on Korea,” 126 & 134.
8 8 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search for Peace, 8.
8 9 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search for Peace, 11.
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reflective as well. If this is not done, liberation movements soon turn to a false spirituality and
become the new oppressors.9 0
Liberation theologians’ social analysis also helps them explore issues of peace and violence
which are more directly relevant to our topic. Dussel observes that according to the dominant system
and its philosophers such as Heraclitus, Karl von Clauswitz and Henry Kissinger war is the origin of
everything. Dussel says this is true in one sense because the dominant system is indeed built on war.
Dussel notes that for five centuries, from the Europeans first arrival on this continent, their existence
here has been based on domination. They came to the Americas to conquer, and in carrying out
their mission the center imposed itself on the periphery.9 1 Dussel also notes the irony in the role that
armaments play in the world. In times o f recession, many powerful nations respond by producing
more arms, which are sold to both poor and rich nations. While arms production does produce jobs,
it does not bring life. According to Dussel, a theology of life must “disembowel the profound
infecundity of arms.”9 2
Noh argues that both North and South Korea have been pawns and scapegoats for neo-colonial
war. People died and continue to die without understanding the causes of the divisional war. Noh
suggests that the sin of dividing Korea was first plotted by the Japanese and Chinese in the sixteenth
century. In 1905 the U.S. secretly “gave” Korea to Japan so that the U.S. could “have” the
Philippines. Under Japanese occupation, they imprisoned, deported, tortured and killed Koreans
who resisted. During both World Wars, Korean men were forced to fight and die for Japan, and
Korean women were forced to become military prostitutes, and as such 200,000 women died.9 3
’“M. M. Thomas, “The Holy Spirit and Spirituality for Political Struggle,” The Ecumenical
Review 42, no. 42 (October 1990): 224.
9tDussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, I & 3.
^Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 12.
9 3 Noh, “The Effects on Korea,” 129.
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Historically, Koreans have been forced to fight in proxy wars and serve in the factories o f war
machines. In Japan, even though many Koreans died in the atomic bombings o f Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, they were denied medical treatment and burial in the memorial parks for atomic victims,
and their families have yet to be compensated. Then the U.S. divided Korea in two, not Japan.9 4
Noh argues that it was the United States that decided to divide Korea into North and South. In the
South those who advocated unification have been arrested, imprisoned, killed and labeled
communists. Christians in the South, informed by divisional theology, supported the division for the
most part.9 5
Today, Asians have good reason to fear that the reduction o f chemical and nuclear weapons in
the west may in fact increase such weaponry in Asia or that Asian countries may become the
dumping ground for their bi-products. Moreover, Koreans rightfully fear that the removal o f U.S.
military forces from places such as Philippines might mean more o f a U.S. military presence in
Korea. Such fears are founded in large part because U.S. policies seem unconcerned about the
welfare or autonomy o f the Korean people. America has long had evacuation plans in Korea for its
civilians and troops in case of nuclear war, but it has no such plan for the Korean people. Unlike
other places in the world, in Korea the U.S. military rules of engagement allow the U.S. to use
nuclear weapons without any consultation from the Korean government.9 6
Dussel says, in liberation theology peace is central because o f the very fact that peace is
threatened in the oppressive structures o f the world. Consequently, true peace is not immediate
reconciliation but will come about by focusing on the problem of the negation of peace that is
currently present in reality and also on the hope of future peace.9 7 Miguez Bonino provides three
9 4 Noh, God o f Reunification, 24-25.
9 S Noh, “The Effects on Korea,” 130.
^Noh, God o f Reunification, 14-16.
9 7 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 3.
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guidelines for interpreting the world, which highlight the need for critical social analysis. First,
adequate social analysis must include critiques of ideology. Second, adequate theology must both
recognize and articulate its social location. Third, adequate theology will use the social sciences.9 8
Liberation theology insists that engagement in the struggle is a requirement of the Christian life.
Consequently, it is fair to conclude that with the grave threat that nuclear weapons pose,
participation in nonproliferation efforts is part o f the Christian calling. Part o f this commitment to
struggle is the recognition that the individualism in liberal society and in Christianity not only has
untenable negative consequences, but it is also unfaithful to the Christian tradition. Both sin and
salvation must be understood as having social dimensions. Indeed, an ethic o f nonproliferation
needs to seriously consider that the primary dimension may well be social. The Iiberationist
understanding of struggle also requires a rejection of pacifism in any absolute terms. Another
teaching gleaned from liberation theology is that work on economic, gender and environmental
justice are all efforts for nonproliferation, since injustice is one o f the pressures that fuel
proliferation.9 9 An ethic o f nonproliferation must be continually self-reflective and self-critical as is
required by the liberative action-reflection model. The critical work o f an ethic o f nonproliferation
will critique ideology; it will be conscious o f its social location, and it will use the tools of the social
sciences. The liberation methods o f social analysis should be highly transferable to an ethic of
nonpro Iiferation.
9 8 Chopp, 88.
"Fem inist ethicist Beverly Harrison also bemoans the lack o f social/economic analysis by
religious ethicists: “In religious ethics in the United States . . . we operate with ideological blinder is
relation to social theory. In fact, we tend to ignore precisely that contemporary social theory that is
most critical of our existing political economy. I believe it can be demonstrated that only in rare
instances do religious ethicists read, or even know of, a vast range o f social theoretical work done by
social theorists/scientists on the left o f the ideological spectrum. Even when the work such social
scientists do has become central to discussion within their own disciplines, we tend to ignore.” She
concludes by labeling this “intellectual myopia.” Beverly Wildung Harrison, Making the
Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, ed. Carol S. Robb (Boston: Beacon, 1985): 57.
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D. Marxist Analysis
Liberation theology, especially its Latin American variety, is willing to use Marxist analysis as
part of its social and economic analysis. The use of Marxist thought has brought hostile reactions
toward liberation theology from conservatives in the United States. Such criticisms have mostly
been misinformed and without merit since most liberation theologians steadfastly insist that using
Marxist analysis does not make them Marxists. Jose Miguez Bonino is perhaps most representative
o f liberation theology’s approach to Marxism. He is not a Marxist. Nevertheless, he is willing to use
Marxist tools for his analysis, and he will work with those, Marxist or otherwise, that undertake the
struggle to end oppression.1 0 0 The use o f Marxist thought is not universal in liberation theology.
Jong-Sun Noh notes that the minjung theologians find it a western and foreign approach. Instead,
Minjung theology uses more inclusive and holistic worldviews.1 0 1
Enrique Dussel’s economic analysis is very Marxist, and he uses it to condemn oppression. He
argues that the alienation (a very Marxist term) o f “the other” makes the other simply a part o f the
system. The other who does not enjoy the fruits o f his or her labor is the manifestation o f sin in the
system.1 0 2 Dussel argues that the new form o f imperialism is the transnational companies. They do
not occupy territory with armies; they own key commercial enterprises o f the periphery. This allows
them to control the political structures o f much o f the periphery. The new imperialism is
economic.1 0 3
Mercy Amba Oduyoye notes that creation is not, now, a pure gift from God; the few have
hoarded it at the expense of the many. Moreover, the church fails to be faithful when it does little to
1 0 0 John H. Yoder, “Biblical Roots o f Liberation Theology,” Grail, September 1985, 66.
1 0 1 Noh, God o f Reunification, 5.
1 0 2 DusseI, “An Ethics of Liberation,” 58.
1 0 3 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 13.
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alleviate poverty.1 0 4 The powerful do not let go easily because they do not base their existence on
themselves but on the domination o f others. This means they are dehumanized as they dehumanize
others. Oduyoye argues that the present economic order o f things cripples rather than enables
people. Christianity is divided, says Oduyoye, not only by race and ordination status but also by
economic status. Christianity has not celebrated diversity but rather created divisiveness. Oduyoye
argues that conspicuous consumption is an evil that African Christians must address. Furthermore,
she claims not only are individual Christians guilty of over-consumption, the church itself is as
well.1 0 5
Liberation theology has been forced to reevaluate its use of Marxism with the breakdown of the
communist systems of eastern Europe. That reevaluation is still in-process. However, the results o f
this huge political change may not be as great for liberation theology as one might initially expect.
For instance, M. M. Thomas notes that breakdown of communism under a people’s revolution is
complex and warns against oversimplification. He notes that human society swings between
atomistic individualism and mechanical collectivism. Neither o f these, however, is the biblical
vision o f responsible personhood in community. He notes that, while individualism and collectivism
are opposites, responsible personhood and community are united in visions o f the communion o f
persons under the guidance o f the Divine.
Thomas notes that while capitalism appears to have triumphed it has not been the basis for the
establishment of justice, peace and the integrity of creation. Perhaps Marxism of the eastern
European variety is an aberration, but liberalism is likewise, for it fails to recognize the spiritual
nature o f humans. As a result, liberalism implicitly rejects the notion that, as spiritual beings,
human beings can transcend the self-centeredness that they often express in political and economic
power through love. This leaves liberalism with a deeply troubling position because it ignores the
l0 4 Oduyoye, “The African Experience o f God,” 493-505.
l0 5 Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 84, 115-116, & 129.
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true signs o f hope and dooms itself to the corruptibility and monopoly power inherent in laissez-faire
systems.1 0 6
Resolving the issue o f which is the most appropriate economic system cannot be done here, nor
is it necessary for an ethic o f nonproliferation to do so. Nevertheless, there are several important
implications for our analysis. To begin with, it is wrong to confuse Stalinist communism with
socialism that third-world nations might seek to employ. In addition, those o f us who live under
western capitalism must not be smug about our supposed victory over communism. We must be
honest and acknowledge that western capitalism has not been a help to most o f the earth’s
inhabitants; if anything, it has been an oppressive system. The real issue that is useful to an ethic of
nonproliferation is that economic justice matters. Exploitive economic relations is a cause o f war.
The poor o f the world will not forever stand for the present inequities. Moreover, poor nations such
as India and Pakistan already have nuclear arsenals. Platitudes about the superiority of capitalism
will not do because we must be ready to confront the question o f what will happen when self-styled
representatives of poor people such as terrorists have nuclear weapons?
E. Experience
In addition to using textual, social and Marxist analysis, liberation theology also uses experience
as one o f its sources. For instance, above all, Jose Miguez Bonino’s basic hermeneutic is experience.
He argues that whether we recognize it or not human beings think out o f a specific context of
relations and actions, out of a given praxis. Theology is always the second action and social
commitment is the first.1 0 7
,0 6 M. M. Thomas, “Breakdown o f Communism in Europe,” The Ecumenical Review 43, no. 3
(July 1991): 375-376.
l0 7 Theo Witvliet, A Place in the Sun: An Introduction to Liberation Theology in the Third World
(MaryknoII: Orbis, 1985), 127.
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An experience that male thinkers cannot have is the experience o f women. Oduyoye argues that
feminism is a prerequisite to an adequate Christian anthropology. However, society and the church
have often excluded and oppressed women. She points to the problem in Africa of most young
women still understanding themselves to be the property of the men that support them.1 0 8 Oduyoye
argues that a gendered or colored God is the God o f subjugation and must be rejected. An African
theology cannot afford to promote such a view of God. Oduyoye says that “if its liberation is not
human enough to include the liberation o f women, it will not be liberation.” 1 0 9 Oduyoye’s theology
seeks to be a correction to this oppression. She writes, “Women experience God as groaning with
them as they participate in straining toward the birth o f a new Africa, free from sexism and racism,
from poverty, exploitation and violence.”1 1 0 Oduyoye suggests that Christians have a choice; they
can include female experiences as legitimate data for theological expression, or they can continue to
live in brokenness. Oduyoye is, however, clear that only one choice is correct: Women’s experience
must be included in the definition o f being human. Her experience o f sexism and of God push her to
work for wholeness in the community with both men and women being fully included.1 1 1
How experience should inform an ethic of nonproliferation is complicated. First, it is important
to realize that the entire ethic being developed here is filtered through the experience o f the author:
A white academic and peace activist who first became involved in the peace movement through anti-
nuclear activities in the early 1980s. Second, and probably more useful, is that we need to listen to
the voices o f those who have experienced nuclear weapons. Such would mean listening to the voices
of the victims o f the atomic bombings o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It should also include people like
the Bikini Islanders whom U.S. officials removed from their homeland so that nuclear testing could
1 0 8 Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, vii & 122.
1 0 9 Oduyoye, “The African Experience of God,” 493-505.
1 1 0 Oduyoye, “The African Experience o f God,” 493-505.
1 1 'Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 120-121 & 135.
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take place. It should also include those workers and civilians who have been affected by nuclear
production, development and transportation. It must also include, as we are doing here, the voices o f
those such as Jong-Sun Noh, who can relate the experience o f having their country nuclearized
because o f Cold War politics. Third, the use o f experience means we must reject universal ethical
claims and focus on solutions which arise from specific contexts. This is a crucial issue for an ethic
of nonproliferation. We so want to have “the solution” that we often ignore that there is no single
solution. With an issue as complex as nuclear proliferation what will work with Korea may be very
different from what will work with Iran, or Russia or terrorists. Fourth, as did the feminist writers in
chapter four, Oduyoye reminds us o f the importance of women’s experience. With issues such as
international politics which have for so long been dominated by men, one o f the surest ways to get
new perspectives is to listen to women. Finally, liberation writers may provide a helpful experience
o f God for those who, for religious reasons, will be involved in nonproliferation efforts. They
remind us that God groans with us as we seek to give birth to a new reality and that wholeness is
found in community.
/ / / . Re-Construction
Liberation theology brings a sharp tool o f deconstructive analysis to theology and ethics. It
helps us see the world and ourselves more accurately and perhaps more realistically. It also has a
vision of a better world and methods for how to work toward it. Those who cannot envision a better
world cannot hope to build it. Liberation theology has vision, hope and method. Consequently, it
also brings reconstructive tools to which we now turn.
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A. Praxis
The hermeneutical process o f liberation theology is always centered around praxis. Praxis is
roughly equivalent to “practice” or perhaps more accurately “action.” Praxis, however, is not a
solitary event but refers to a continuous cycle of action and reflection which is called the action-
reflection model. Under this model, one is to act in the world, reflect on that action in light of the
context, and then refine one’s actions and act again. Such a model thus requires Christians to
evaluate every interpretation o f scripture in relation to the praxis it engenders. M. M. Thomas says,
“Christ is concerned not only with the soul, but also with the body, not only with life in heaven after
death, but also with life on earth.” " 2 However, Jose Miguez Bonino cautions us that we cannot take
scripture as a blueprint for action. Instead, we need to be aware of key concepts such as liberation,
righteousness, shalom, the poor and love to which scripture points."3 These concepts will point us
in the right direction as we refine our next action steps.
The story o f Jesus is a source o f reflective material in this action-reflection process. As a result
o f this process, Miguez Bonino insists that an absolute rejection of violence by Christians may well
lead to a praxis which is in opposition to Jesus’ call. Although Jesus rejected the violence of the
Zealots, like the Zealots he placed himself so clearly on the side of the poor and against the power
structures that they sentenced him to death as a subversive. Miguez Bonino argues that to miss the
fact that they killed Jesus because he was a subversive and instead to focus solely on his rejection of
violence causes one to miss the nature o f Jesus’ call for believers to follow him.
If a Christian wants to follow in [Jesus’] footsteps and make his option for
nonviolence credible, he will have to make sure that he has so clearly made his
choices that he will unequivocally be convicted for the subversion o f the oppressive
order! One may doubt that this is the case in much that poses as Christian
rejection o f violence.1 1 4
1 "Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 125.
1 "M iguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 103-104.
1 "M iguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 123.
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At this point, Miguez Bonino has made the strongest challenge to the praxis o f pacifism. Ef
proponents o f pacifism are truly working for justice with their rejection o f violence, they may have a
case. If, on the other hand, they are not acting for justice, their condemnation o f violence is a hollow
claim.
Legitimate criticisms o f liberation theology’s focus on praxis have emerged. For instance,
Anabaptist writers are critical of liberation theology, claiming it is an attempt to reconstruct
Christendom. Such criticism is often focused on the Latin America base community movement
because they see themselves as attempting to construct a Christian-based society. But Miguez
Bonino reminds us that in Latin America most o f the poor are Christians, and so they find no natural
distinction between being poor and being Christian. When one organizes the poor in Latin America,
one is organizing Christians. Further, Miguez Bonino argues that Jesus called for complete
discipleship, and so liberation theology has a unified approach. Nevertheless, he insists this is not a
call for the creation o f Christendom.1 1 5
Nevertheless, community building is central to the praxis of liberation theology. Mercy Amba
Oduyoye argues that focusing on the early church’s understanding of the Trinity may provide a key.
She thinks we will find in such a search not grounds for hierarchy but rather models for building
human community. In the Godhead are several centers o f consciousness integrated and related to
one another in perfect mutuality. Oduyoye suggests this is the model for human relationships,
families, communities and institutions. In such a model both unity and diversity are possible.1 1 6
Such communities are to be politically active. Enrique Dussel notes that liberation theology
arises from the margins in and through Christians who are politically committed. It is based on a
praxis o f liberation that speaks o f more than simply meeting necessities. It is based on political,
1 tsJose Miguez Bonino, “On Discipleship, Justice and Power,” in Freedom and Discipleship:
Liberation Theology in Anabaptist Perspective, ed. Daniel S. Schipani (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989),
134-135.
ll6Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 137 & 140.
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sexual and pedagogical praxis. “In a word”, Dussel writes, “it is the theology o f the poor, the woman
as a sexual object, and the alienated child”1 '7 The requirement o f political engagement means,
Thomas argues, that religion has a responsibility not only to private morality but also public
morality, including responsibility and justice in the exercise of power and the use of public money.1 1 5
Thomas argues that the church is a sacramental and prophetic sign of God’s kingdom, and as such it
must be a spiritual pillar and support for all peace and justice struggles.1 1 9
Liberation theology’s emphasis on praxis reminds an ethic o f nonproliferation that its focus
must be on action and not on words. For Christians who work to develop an ethic of
nonproliferation, political commitment is clearly part of the Christian calling. Moreover, the
concern must not simply be on individual morality but centrally on public morality or social ethics.
In all o f this, the goal is not the creation o f Christendom or a Christian nation but instead to create
an ethic o f nonproliferation that is informed by Christian social ethics, and in a pluralistic nation
and world it may also need to be informed by other value systems as well. It will emerge from the
praxis of community building, including the values of mutuality, unity and diversity. Finally, an
ethic of nonproliferation will reject a praxis o f pacifism while pacifist thought still informs it, and it
still prefers nonviolence.
B. Option for the Poor
Liberation theologian Jose Miguez Bonino has explored Anabaptist theology. His encounters
revealed to him that, while the language is different, what he calls the atmosphere is “strangely
familiar.” This is a reversal of his interactions with dominant western theologies where language is
n7Dussel, A History o f the Church, 19.
1 1 5 T. K. Thomas, 8.
ll9M. M. Thomas, “Will Koinonia Emerge As a Vital Theological Theme?,” The Ecumenical
Review 41, no. 2 (April 1989): 182.
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similar to liberation theology, but the atmosphere is strikingly dissimilar. The similarities between
liberation theology and Anabaptist theology extend to the situations in which they were bom: Both
emerged from the fringes o f both Christianity and society and under the pressure o f oppression.
Both theologies contain God’s concern and vindication for the poor and share an epistemology
which insists that the poor can best understand God’s pronouncements. Unlike traditional
Protestantism which sees discipleship as a distinctive act which comes after faith, both the
Anabaptists and liberationists see faith and discipleship as a single reality. While justice is a broad
theme in all o f reformation thought, in practice, dominant reformation thought separates the justice
found in Christ’s righteousness from the active justice to which the believer is called. Both
liberation and Anabaptist theology reject such a separation.1 2 0
Liberation theologians base their claim for the preferential option for the poor on scripture. They
note Moses did not become a prophet until he went to Egypt. The Israelites did not become
authentic until they left Egypt and headed for the promised land. Enrique Dussel writes that without
prophets the people remain in their oppressed state as if asleep while without a people a prophet is
seen as sectarian or even deranged.1 2 1 Liberation theology draws not only from the Old Testament
story o f the Exodus, but it also grounds theology in the story of Jesus found in the New Testament.
The relevancy o f Christ for the oppressed o f the world, not heavenly salvation, is central to Miguez
Bonino’s Christology. Christ represents the oppressed and the downtrodden. He writes, “God in
Christ identifies himself utterly with man oppressed, destitute, and abandoned. He dies the death of
the blasphemer, the subversive, the God-forgotten man.” 1 2 2 Mercy Amba Oduyoye reminds us not to
forget that Christ died for those who are exploited and dehumanized.1 2 3
1 2 0 Miguez Bonino, “On Discipleship, Justice and Power,” 132-133.
1 2 lDussel, A History o f the Church, 242.
,2 2 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 145.
l2 3 Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 9.
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Dussel urges us to move into the world o f “the other,” seeing the world in different ways. We
must leam to have the indigenous world as our starting point. Dussel says that the liberation o f the
oppressed begins with an epiphany, which is the revelation o f the oppressed. It is seeing the reality
of oppression. Dussel notes that when the poor advance their cause they shake the very foundation
of the system. When the poor get noticed, the oppressor’s conscience begins to be troubled.1 2 4
However, what constitutes oppression must be defined, declares Oduyoye, by those who experience it
and not by those who observe it.1 2 5
Besides seeing a new reality, Christians are to act for justice but more specifically to act for and
with the poor. Dussel writes, “Liberative justice . . . does not give to each what is due within the law
and the prevailing order, but grants to all what they deserve in their dignity as others.”1 2 6 Dussel
asserts that ethics is not governed by dominant systems but by what the poor require.1 2 7 Miguez
Bonino argues that Jesus is one who denounces all evil, but shows those who do evil, infinite
tenderness. No one gets a free pass, but God turns no one away. Jesus does not meet us from the
height o f his perfection but joins us in our human condition and, consequently, knows all of our
experiences.
Jesus does not try to pretend the evils o f the world do not exist by transporting us to some
spiritual level. No, Jesus consoles us by promising that evil does not have a future. Love will have
the last word. That consolation should encourage our protest and work against evil and injustice,
including the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Faith allows us to put our own security aside but not
the needs o f others. Jesus’ model is that we should let go of our own lives, risking them in service
for others. This is a radical reinterpretation o f security, for security does protect us from sickness,
1 2 4 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 16 & 43.
1 2 S Oduyoye, Daughters o f Anowa, 82.
l2 6 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 65.
1 2 7 Dussel, Ethics and Community, 49-50.
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pain, suffering, frustration or fear. Instead, security for the Christian is to be understood in ultimate
and not necessarily immediate terms. Love increases our risk. Jesus was a perfect model of
vulnerability. Security, then, is being in touch with what is true. Paul lists many things that can
threaten the Christian, but nothing can separate us from God.1 2 8
One’s relationship to “the other” is a central theme in liberation theology. Dussel notes that
liberation theology makes the bold claim that God’s epiphany is found there. As a result, Jesus’
identification with the poor is not merely a metaphor; it is truth and discloses God’s nature. So, for
Dussel, the ethics o f liberation requires rethinking moral problems both with responsibility toward
and from the point o f view of the poor.1 2 9 The Iiberationist option for the poor does not come only
from analysis; it is primarily a statement o f faith. Such an option means both a commitment to
structural social change and a belief that the poor are where we find God. Miguez Bonino states,
“The poor are the privileged locus, the place where God makes himself/herself present and invites all
to follow.” 1 3 0
If God is on the side of the oppressed and works to improve their lot, then this is precisely the
task to which Christians are called. Oduyoye observes that in Africa God is understood to be the
source o f life, and they do not question that God has sovereignty over everything. Her theology
concludes that we are blessed when we experience unity, community, caring, faithfulness, excellence
and steadfastness among humans because such ideals are experiences o f God.1 3 1
An ethic o f nonproliferation must be from the perspective of the poor and oppressed of the
world. It will try to judge the issue from their prospective and our responsibility toward the poor.
I2 8 Miguez Bonino, Room to Be People, 70-74.
l2 9 Dussel, “An Ethics of Liberation,” 57 & 59.
1 3 0 Jose Miguez Bonino, “Theology and Peace in Latin America,” in Theology, Politics, and
Peace, ed. Theodore Runyon (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989), 47.
1 3 'Oduyoye, “The African Experience o f God,” 493-505.
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Such an approach will raise real questions about the meaning o f security and vulnerability. An ethic
of nonproliferation will need to redefine security because solidarity with the poor is likely to make us
more vulnerable than traditional definitions o f security permit. It is unlikely that we can persuade
any nation to follow an ethic o f vulnerability. However, we could probably convince nations to
broaden their area o f interest to include other nations and peoples. But in doing so, we must not shy
away from the realization that the very concept o f security needs to be reevaluated because no one is
secure from the threat of nuclear weapons.
C. Liberating Actions
Jose Miguez Bonino reminds us that one fact of social evil is that Christians have participated in
both its creation and perpetuation. Therefore, the church cannot approach the struggle for social
change as if it were outside or above it. The church can be credible if, and only if, it sees that part of
the struggle is changing and reforming itself.1 3 2
In practice, however, Christianity has often remained passive in the face o f oppression and war.
Mercy Amba Oduyoye notes that the church in Africa is too passive or at best reactive-it waits for
crisis before acting. She responds that remaining on the sidelines is not a Christian response to
suffering.1 3 3 Oduyoye argues that both domination and acquiescence are contrary to healthy human
relationships and community life. Instead, what is needed is participation.1 3 4
Enrique Dussel says that the opposite o f sin-anti-sin-is liberation. Instead o f “no” to the other,
Dussel proposes Moses as a model who says “yes” to the other and leads the other to freedom.
Instead o f aversion to the other, Dussel calls for conversion to the other. He suggests that too often
the church has been following the wrong god. Indeed, he argues that when Feuerbach and Marx
1 3 2 Miguez Bonino, “Social Doctrine,” 399.
1 3 3 Oduyoye, “Calling the Church to Account,” 479-489.
l3 4 Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 94.
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rejected the god o f Hegel and the European bourgeoisie they made a correct choice, as such a god
was oppressive.1 3 5
Liberation theology is not focused on correct belief or orthodoxy but on correct action or
orthopraxis. So it is not enough to identify the injustices and threats to peace that exist; it is also
necessary to engage in actions promoting justice and making peace. Jong-Sun Noh contends third-
world people must organize to fight against sinful structures o f oppression and exploitation. He
insists that Asian theology must be based on the suffering of third-world people and be a tool in their
process of liberation. Praxis in the struggle comes first, theology second. Orthopraxis comes first;
orthodoxy comes second.1 3 6 Christians need to search for the spiritual and political theology which
grounds their participation in justice, peace and ecological struggles.
Miguez Bonino says the church’s response to transformation cannot be simply doctrinal but
must be involved in the struggle for change.1 3 7 Thomas argues that social charity is not social
ministry. Social ministry is concerned with social justice, and it can only be worked for through
ideological and political action, including working for human rights. Thomas notes that those who
produce most o f the food and wealth in the world must come to know justice. Moreover, Christians
must share with those who lack land and shelter. Consequently, human rights must include
employment at a livable level, education for children, opportunities for all to develop their creative
abilities and medical care. Thomas declares that a society that denies such things fails to live by
1 3 S Dussel, A History o f the Church, 9.
l3 6 Noh, G od o f Reunification, 7 & 9.
l3 7 Miguez Bonino, “Social Doctrine,” 399-400.
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Christ.1 3 8 Thomas insists the Holy Spirit is a sign o f permanent revolution in human history.1 3 9
Oduyoye maintains that we must struggle in the name of hope.1 4 0
Liberationists insist that the “spiritualization” o f Christianity is a fundamental misreading of the
gospel. Miguez Bonino argues that it is amazing how little the Bible speaks o f the afterlife. We
twist the Bible around because we have been taught and therefore think it should be talking about it.
However, if one looks carefully at terms such as “eternal life,” “life in Christ,” and even “heavenly
life” one will discover that they are references to this life.1 4 1
Dussel argues that in the middle o f sin the Christian story is a sign o f life, a way of peace. It
looks forward to a new utopia for which faith hopes. However, the system o f oppression and sin
resists and struggles against the people, and so the oppression o f the people begins. Yet plagues
strike against the forces that oppose peace and life. Dussel concludes that “peace is now an utopic
horizon which has to be reached in the praxis o f liberation.”1 4 2 Peace is the vision; struggle is the
path. This brings the discussion about the use o f violence in the process o f change to a new level.
Miguez Bonino identifies two paradigms o f reality that directly affect discussions of violence. In
the first paradigm, to resist the present order is to resist God. It rests on the conviction that God
coincides with the ordering of reality and consequently the present order. The second perspective
“conceives [humanity] as a project o f liberation that constantly emerges in the fight against the
objectifications given in nature, in history, in society, in religion.”1 4 3 This paradigm asserts that
humanity is a creative force in overcoming oppression and permits violence when it is necessary to
1 3 8 Thomas, Evangelical Social Gospel, 24.
1 3 9 Thomas, “The Holy Spirit and Spirituality for Political Struggle,” 219.
1 4 0 “The Spirit Is Troubling the Water,” 225.
1 4 lMiguez Bonino, Room to Be People, 47-48.
1 4 2 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 10.
1 4 3 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 115.
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achieve such ends. Both paradigms can find basis in biblical and theological traditions, and they are
often identified respectively as the priestly and the prophetic traditions. In the priestly tradition,
peace is equated with order and harmony; in the prophetic tradition, peace is equated with justice.
Similarly, violence is justified only in the first view to maintain order, and in the second it is justified
to promote justice. Miguez Bonino asserts that violence is always present and rejects the possibility
of a theoretical debate about whether there should or should not be violence.
Although he shares with political realism the view that violent acts can be justified, Miguez
Bonino’s thought, nevertheless, is different from political realism in that he views nonviolent
strategies as a viable means of bringing about desirable ends. Indeed, nonviolence is his preference
for both moral and pragmatic reasons. In the revolutionary setting, nonviolence is the preferable
method since violence always has serious negative side-effects, even when its use is necessary or
unavoidable. Violence always leads to hate, resentment and rivalry, and “victorious revolutionary
violence runs the risk of simply substituting one form of oppression for another.” 1 '1 4 However,
Miguez Bonino contends that if we must oppose absolute violence as too costly we must also reject
absolute pacifism.1 4 5 In making decisions, we must also analyze the cost that using nonviolence
imposes on human beings and pay close attention to the loss of human life as well as increased
“suffering, paralyzing frustration, dehumanization, and the introjection o f a slave consciousness.” 1 4 6
We must factor the cost into any ethical decision concerning the use of either violence or
nonviolence.
Liberation theology insists that decisive actions for peace and justice are required. Moreover,
while there is great diversity in Christianity, there should be adequate common ground to work on an
issue such as nuclear proliferation. Thomas suggests that we train our young people to engage in the
,4 4 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 127.
l4 S Chopp, 96.
1 4 6 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 128.
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adventure o f working for peace and justice. Liberation theology insists that we carefully weigh the
costs o f our methods, be they violent or nonviolent. Liberation theology also warns against cheap
reconciliation where no one takes responsibility for their actions or makes reparations.
D. Contextual Actions
Liberation ethics must, says Enrique Dussel, justify the goodness, heroism and holiness of
liberating actions. He insists that new ethics are bom in such actions and cannot be judged by the
previous paradigm. There can be no absolute universal ethics; ethics must be contextual.1 4 7 Dussel
contends that liberation movements are inherently realistic, as militants and even the less educated
understand their context better than those outside the context.1 4 8 In its unequivocal affirmation that
context matters, liberation theology is insisting that we can do no other than operate out of specific
contexts. Those who claim to operate on the universal level are either blind to how they have been
shaped and influenced by their context, or they are dishonest.
Oduyoye argues that if Christianity is synonymous with Western culture then it is of no value to
Africa. She asks, for instance, does the Eucharist need to use wine from grapes and bread from
wheat which are foreign to most o f Africa? She argues a contextual Christianity in Africa should be
free to substitute items which are part o f African experience. If Christ’s sacrifice is to have value in
Africa, surely Africans can symbolize it with African products. Moreover, Oduyoye argues that
Christianity needs to be related to the primal religion’s of Africa if African people are to be brought
to Christ. A contextual theology will start where people are.
From his Indian context, M. M. Thomas argues that the humanization o f individual and
corporate life is key to understanding the meaning o f the incarnation o f Christ. Thomas searches for
a Christ-centered secular humanism which he argues can be the source o f community in India,
l4 7 DusseI, “An Ethics of Liberation,” 60.
1 4 8 DusseI, Philosophy o f Liberation, 179-180.
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which is undergoing modernization and secularization in the midst o f a plurality o f religious
traditions.H 9 Thomas argues that the church can be a Christ-Centered fellowship o f faith and ethics
even in the midst of the Hindu religious community. Thomas’ context thus leads him to cast a wide
net, for he allows for those who acknowledge Jesus as transcendent and a resource for humanization
but cannot acknowledge Jesus in the traditional terms o f Lord and Savior. In doing so, Thomas
acknowledges Christian faith in those whom the church would not historically make such an
acknowledgment.1 5 0
Thomas is an unusual liberation theologian because he rejects neither Christian realism nor its
central proponent, Reinhold Niebuhr. Thomas argues that Niebuhr’s thought helped Indian
Christians approach the ideologies o f Indian nationalism, Gandhism and Marxism within their
Christian faith. He says it allowed the acceptance o f Gandhian techniques o f national struggle and
the Marxist techniques o f class struggle without giving in to either’s utopianism.1 5 1
Thomas notes that many in the modem world who see the dangers that technological culture has
created are now turning to tribal traditions for answers. Thomas argues that tribal traditions provide
three helpful points. First, as opposed to irresponsible individualism, tribal traditions stress mutual
responsibility and solidarity. Second, instead of an exploitive approach to nature, tribal traditions
stress living in harmony with nature and its rhythms. Third, modem techno-culture has emphasized
discursive analytical reason which, says Thomas, should not be rejected. However, tribal traditions
can help us temper analytical reason with intuitive reason and its seeking o f knowledge “through
sympathy, participation and communion.” 1 5 2
I4 9 Ariarajah, 301-302.
1 5 0 George R. Hunsberger, “Conversation and Community: Revisiting the Lesslie NewBign— M. M.
Thomas Debate,” International Bulletin o f Missionary Research 22, no. 3 (July 1998): 112-117.
1 5 1 Thomas, “A Third World View o f Christian Realism,” 9.
1 5 2 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 12-13.
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Contextuality is one reason that liberation theologians object to pacifism. They are opposed to
pacifism not because they oppose the means of nonviolence, but because they reject the universal
claims that pacifism makes. It is not the task o f any theologian, say liberation theologians, to
produce a universal theological reflection on violence. Instead, the task should be to develop a
theological reflection on violence in a specific context. For example, Jose Miguez Bonino argues
that the biblical starting point for reflection is not abstract theological reflection but concrete
historical situations. Moreover, biblical reflection on violence concludes that violence is forbidden in
some circumstances and authorized in other situations.1 5 3
An emphasis on universal prohibitions without reflection on specific contexts can lead to
contradictory if not hypocritical moral evaluations. Oduyoye notes the hypocrisy of Western
Christians who claim that by introducing prohibitions against killing in Africa, which practiced
ritual human killing, they have improved respect for life. Such a claim is hypocritical because
western Christians have been responsible for massacres that dwarf the killing that those rituals
entaiIed.IS 4
Noh is critical o f the World Council o f Churches’ (WCC) efforts, such as the “Justice, Peace,
and Integrity o f Creation” (JPIC), because it ignores the Asian context. He reminds us and the WCC
that Asia has been the place for testing nuclear weapons, and it is the dumping ground for chemical
weapons. Moreover, peace in the first-world has meant war and death in Asia in such places as
Vietnam, Korea and the Philippines. The JPIC document is not courageous enough to point to the
heresy o f the first-world activities such as GATT and IMF which in the name o f common good load
third-world nations with unreasonable debt. He argues that common security for Europe does not
mean peace for Asia and, indeed, may be worse for Asia. Such hegemony will mean the rich become
richer and the poor, poorer. As a result, Asians must always have a hermeneutic of suspicion when
I5 3 Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, 117.
I5 4 Oduyoye, Hearing and Knowing, 73.
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it considers western proposals. Noh says the goal o f Asian theology must be security and shalom for
Asian peoples from the sins of Euro-Americans.1 5 5
Thomas sees in liberation theology three emergent themes which should influence wider
theology. First, liberation theology has been highly critical of traditional church life. The church is
called to struggle to create new understandings o f community. Second, theology has now focused on
responsible society and nuclear peace based on the relationship between God, humans and nature.
Third, the process of dialogue with people o f other faith traditions is now seen as part o f the process
o f building human community.1 5 6
Miguez Bonino insists Christian action must be based in community where common witness is
possible. Such communities are needed to take common actions, but they also need to take common
action to discover common understandings. This is not a paradox but evidence of the action-
reflection model. Global ecumenical theology should be involved in this since so many of our
problems are global. However, this is not disengaged academic work, but requires engagement and
action.'5 7
Liberation theology persuasively argues that context matters, and as we have already discussed
an ethic o f nonproliferation must be contextual as each context differs. Noh reminds us that actions
that seem to promote the peace for western nations have simply shifted the problems and violence to
Asia. We need to understand the deep suspicion that Asians have toward western actions since Asia
has not only suffered the only nuclear attack but also been subject to repeated nuclear testing and has
been the storage and dumping ground for the weapons of western nations. Understanding this may
help us to have a more sympathetic and, therefore, accurate understanding o f why North Korea acts
the way it does on nuclear issues.
l5 5 Noh, G od o f Reunification, 13-14.
I S 6 Thomas, “Will Koinonia Emerge,” 182-183.
l5 7 Miguez Bonino, “Social Doctrine,” 399.
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Ia this section, we also find that an ethic o f nonproliferation must be sensitive to culture.
Culture is deeply ingrained in all o f us and part o f an ethic on nonproliferation is determining where
culture is helpful and where it is not. For us in the west, nuclearism is ingrained in our cultural
understanding. We both fear it and see it is our ultimate protection. The former is appropriate,
while the latter is a false cultural idea, as nuclear weapons do not make us more secure, they make us
more vulnerable. Tribal culture may have things to offer an ethic of nonproliferation with its
emphasis on social responsibility and harmony with the environment. Moreover, Thomas’
interpretation o f tribal tradition encourages us to use, in addition to analytical reason, intuitive
reason, where knowledge is developed through sympathy, participation and communion. We can
learn by acting.
In this section, through Thomas, we have also explored the interaction between liberation and
realism. Thomas incorporates realism as a counter to utopianism. Moreover, in Thomas’ idea of a
Christ-centered secularism we are given a model o f how Christian ethics can help shape a pluralistic
context without dominating it.
E. Political Ethics
Since liberation theology' is focused on praxis and specifically political and social change, it
should contain the grounds for the development o f political ethics. However, because liberation
theology in the third-world has often emerged from revolutionaiy situations, its political ethics are
often chaotic and nonsystematic. Nevertheless, liberation theology’s reflection on difficult political
and social issues provides a rich ground from which to sift through for an ethic o f nonproliferation.
M. M. Thomas argues that a correct understanding o f hope is essential to a Christian political
ethic. He sees eschatology as an important Christian concept precisely because it corrects both too
easy hope and also cynical despair. For him eschatology is more important than the doctrine of
creation because the doctrine of creation is too often misunderstood as mandating a static order
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rather than as instituting a ongoing and dynamic process. Eschatology, he argues, helps us see the
end to which creation is moving and can give us the eyes to see each dynamic moment o f reality.
This focus on eschatology means he is concerned with the threats to the consummation o f God’s
glory and the lack o f inclusivity so prevalent in the human vision of that transformation. As to
inclusivity, Thomas reminds us that Scripture speaks o f Christ making all things subject to Christ,
and “all things” cannot be exclusive. His concern is also how the present is related to the future. His
is a radical re-visioning and reminder to us that the Bible contains very little about getting to heaven.
Instead, scripture focuses a great deal on the vision of humans living in a renewed world o f
wholeness and unity. Consequently, he argues that God’s redemptive work must affect human
relations and social structures. If not, it is not true to scripture’s redemptive call. According to
Thomas, the church in India has begun to embody such a theology by being an inclusive community
that welcomes all, no matter birth, wealth or culture. Consequently, Indian Christianity has attracted
many outcasts and poor to it. Still, he notes that it has fallen short of the vision because it has failed
to create a new climate focused on social and economic justice, and this is the work that remains
before it.1 5 8 Thomas suggests that Christian ethical decisions must be made with the understanding
o f being free and responsible people. First, he argues that Christians are called to freedom through
responsibility to God and neighbor. Second, Christian fellowship reconciles diverse peoples in
divine forgiveness, and this means humans must be open to the diversity of peoples and cultures.1 5 9
Thomas insists that a witness o f forgiving love and welcoming community mean that Christians
will witness against the idols of death in political life. Thomas is not utopian but says that
Christians are still to work for justice, even if the process will not be completed. He says in this we
see God’s patience as this rough justice is a sign o f the ultimate redemption o f humanity through
l5 8 Thomas, Evangelical Social Gospel, 33-39.
1 S 9 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 135.
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Jesus.1 6 0 For Enrique Dussel the question o f salvation/liberation is not how to be good in Egypt, but
how to journey from the old order to the new. Moreover, this requires the development o f new
political ethics as heros and saints do not guide their conduct by current rules but by the norms of the
realm yet to come. He reminds us that this is not new but has always been the v/ay of revolutionary
ethics. If George Washington had stayed within his previous ethical system, he would have
remained a good English subject.1 6 1
In developing a political ethic, the issue o f the use o f violence is a controversial issue for
liberation theology. Obviously, pacifists are critical of liberation theology on this point but in most
other ways find common ground with liberation theology. Ironically, those who are most vehement
in their criticism o f liberation theology’s “so-called” acceptance of violence do not themselves
exclude the use the violence to maintain the current social order. Moreover, it is important to
reiterate that while liberation theology is unwilling to rule out the use o f violence in all situations it
does not “advocate violence” and, in fact, prefers nonviolence. It is quick to remind us that because
violence is already present in oppressive situations the question is not whether violence will be
introduced into a situation but whether violence will be responded to with violence or nonviolence.
In developing its political ethic, liberation theology is interested in the methods of nonviolence.
Dussel stresses the importance of nonviolence, especially the forms developed by Gandhi and King.
While he is clear that nonviolence is a good tactical approach in certain situations, he rejects as
wrong attempts to bestow upon it universal and exclusive status. To do so is simply part of a
theology of domination because it rejects the liberative movements o f oppressed people who have
endured centuries o f violence at the hands o f oppressors-Christian and otherwise. Dussel insists the
1 6 0 Thomas, “The Holy Spirit and Spirituality for Political Struggle,” 219.
1 6 1 DusseI, “An Ethics of Liberation,” 58.
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ethical standard must be the appropriate means for the defense of life, the poor, the oppressed and
defenseless.1 6 2
Using nonviolence as a means of attaining democratic political institutions is also viewed as an
important tactical option. Noting that recently we have had a virtual stampede for democracy in
places such as the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Mongolia, Mozambique and South Africa, Thomas
suggests that ideals such as nonviolence, tolerance and hard work are not only the best means of
achieving democracy, they are the best means o f making it work. Thomas also calls the Red Cross a
model for action. The Red Cross has pleaded that even at the front during times o f war those
providing medical treatment should be considered neutrals. The Red Cross has attracted brave and
adventurous people who engage in an endeavor that is the moral equivalent to war. In the midst of
hatred they create neutral space which affirms the humanity o f all people. Thomas calls this
spiritual resistance to the ideology of war. Thomas also relates the work o f the Red Cross to Jesus’
story of the Good Samaritan where the victim’s ethnic identity is not given, he is simply a human
being in need.’6 3
Jose Miguez Bonino argues that to explore the violence question we must back up and take a
broader view. First, we must look at issues of power in areas o f economics, knowledge, politics and
ideology. We cannot opt out of such relationships. Miguez Bonino contends that violence is part of
power relationships, and we cannot wish it away. However, we can choose not to partake in
violence; we can choose to be pacifists. He says that for Christians who are responsibly committed to
the world pacifism can be an ethical choice. However, he says this is not the central question. Much
more central is how we relate to the violent system in which we are already entwined.1 6 4
I6 2 Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 13.
I6 3 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 58-59, 72-73 & 76.
l6 4 Miguez Bonino, “On Discipleship, Justice and Power,” 137-138.
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Like other liberation theologians, Oduyoye’s theological mission is not centered around an
absolute commitment to nonviolence. Instead, her political ethic centers on forming a society where
peace and justice are promoted:
For me spirituality has become a notorious will-o’-the-wisp that I need many
handles to hold down in order to attempt its description. One o f the handles I have
found useful is that it is a theological concept, more accurately a trinitarian one. It
is God moving in and through us to accomplish a mission of peace with justice
which will result in a beautiful world, a new creation, no longer hostile.1 6 5
Jong-Sun Noh addresses the issue o f nonviolence in the development o f a political ethic through
his study o f the Tonghak movement (Eastern Learning) in Korea. The Tonghak movement started
in 1860, and it continues today in a religion know as Chundokyo (Heavenly Way) with about a
million and half members. The Tonghak movement was nonviolent in 1860, but peasants’ revolts
and the continuing injustices from government soon made the leaders question whether violence
could be used to protect innocent lives. After seeing the ineffectiveness o f unarmed revolts against
the injustices, the leaders concluded that an armed revolt against a totally corrupt and incapable
government was justified. The Tonghak undertook this just war with restraint but determined that
the people needed to be protected. In 1862, two years after the founding o f Tonghak, more than 90
peasant revolts took place against local governments seeking social, economic and political justice.
Noh notes that the early peasant revolts were mostly nonviolent, but over time they became more
organized and more violent as the government’s response to them became more violent.
The calls for justice by the Tonghak included economic justice, the end o f class and colonial
privilege, the end of gender privilege, the end o f the privilege of the intellectual elite, and reform of
the criminal justice system. The call for economic justice included the redistribution o f land in ways
like the Old Testament concept of the jubilee. The Tonghak also called for special protection o f
widows and sought to protect the nation from foreign colonization. Noh identifies three results of
the Tonghak revolution. First, the Korean government learned that it could not oppress its own
l6 S Oduyoye, “Spirituality o f Resistance and Reconstruction,” 163.
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subjects and, therefore, attempted political reform. This was a crucial step in Korean modernization.
Second, it was the beginning o f the minjung movement as the oppressed in Korea took responsibility
for their own future. Third, the revolution brought the feudal system in Korea to an end.
In trying to deal with the relationship o f violence and nonviolence, Noh draws from the
Tonghaks in order to counter a dualistic approach which distinguishes between physical and non
physical violence. The Tonghaks have a word called Chowha, which means to change something by
non-action. It has a strong connotation o f peaceful, less coercive means, but it does not necessarily
exclude transformation by force. The minjung also have a song called “Song o f the Sword” which
speaks of the minjung as generals who could never be defeated by the generals o f the powerful, even
in 10,000 years. Noh notes the relationship between Chowha and “Song o f the Sword” suggests the
relationship between violence and nonviolence in Tonghak. The relationship is organic and has no
division between body and spirit-bodily violence and spiritual nonviolence.
Noh argues that the critics of liberation theology are inconsistent in their approach to violence.
The powerful who criticize liberation theology label common people standing up with arms as
violence; however, they do not identify what the powerful do to the common people as violence.
They do this in part because the rulers see their violence as justified and view the minjung as violent
and immoral bandits. Noh justifies the use o f violence by the minjung by showing it is compatible
with various commonly accepted strands o f Christian social ethics. In the first place, he claims
Reinhold Niebuhr did not think that violence was intrinsically evil. As a result, violence can be used
in order to bring about justice. Moreover, Noh points out that past understandings o f pacifism and
just war as being irreconcilable and conflicting positions is no longer held by many theorists.
Instead, contemporary theorists suggest that extensive commonalities exist between them.
Nevertheless, Noh objects to western versions o f both pacifism and just war theories. One
problem with the western theology of the just war is that it presupposes a state-centered nature of
conflict, which is inadequate for moving to a minjung-centered approach. He argues instead that we
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need to develop just revolution criteria. Under such criteria pacifist, nonviolent and counter-violent
revolutions have the potential to be just. Noh argues that the minjung are the ones to judge, and they
may in some contexts judge violence good and nonviolence bad. He insists that violence and
nonviolence must be understood to have an organic and holistic relationship as opposed to a dualistic
understanding.
Noh argues that a just revolution does not simply mean a change from one power to another.
The Tonghak understanding o f a just revolution is more integral and holistic, involving intra
personal, interpersonal, social, global and even cosmic change. Noh finds eastern discussions about
the ethics of violence to be very different from western ones. In the east such discussions are related
to the earth, nature and the historical struggles o f people. He argues that eastern approaches are
more organic, related to nature and history as opposed to the western approaches which are analytic.
Noh notices that in minjung struggles there is fluidity between violence, nonviolence and
nonresistance. He claims that understanding this fluidity is necessary to continue the struggle.
According to Noh, the minjung’s perception of violence and nonviolence is different not only from
western conceptions but also different from those in Korea who are in power. For the minjung,
violence and nonviolence are not two easily divided concepts. In fact the minjung tend to see the
categories as constructs created by rulers to support oppression. In contrast, the minjung perspective
remembers that in Korean the word for revolution means the return to the heavenly mandate.
The political ethics that emerges from liberation theology is centered on liberating the
oppressed. The Tonghak movement called for the liberation o f women and slaves, the end o f the
class system, the end o f racial inequalities and the development of a global vision which transcends
nationalism and understands all nations as part o f a community.1 6 6 It is the liberation o f the
1 6 6 Noh, Violence and Nonviolence, 1-2, 10, 13,31,34, 59-61, 101-102, 129-131, 174-175, 184,
190-192, 194, 196-198, & 210.
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oppressed that is the goal. Moreover, the oppressed themselves are to make the ethical judgments
about their means to freedom.
Some critics o f liberation theology argue that its focus on context can lead to narrow political
ethics only concerned with a specific context which will lose a focus on justice in the wider world.
While Miguez Bonino concedes that it is a real temptation, he argues that true liberation theology
will avoid such a pitfall because it proclaims that all o f creation is God’s. Wherever there is
injustice, it is a concern to God’s people.1 6 7 In like manner, Noh argues for a theology that moves
beyond divisional theology toward a respect for the integrity o f creation. Such a theology leads to
unity of people with one another and with the earth.1 6 ®
Thomas believes that in a culturally pluralistic context religion can play an important role in
creating a genuine public philosophy that can help people cope with the modem world. Thomas
argues that a true Christian spirituality is concerned with building society based on a public morality
that is consistent with Christ’s victory over evil and a consummation of the Kingdom o f God.
Thomas argues for the recognition o f a spirituality for public life to which various religions can
contribute to the dialog. Religions should be able to participate fully in nation building without
losing their own religious self-identity. Public life must be concerned with the well-being of those
traditionally outside o f power, including tribal people and women, and must speak out against
exploitation based on class, caste, ethnos or sex. While he recognizes the strength o f Catholic
natural law as the basis for common culture, Thomas rejects the static view of nature present in
Aristotle and then taken over by Thomistic forms of natural law. Instead, he argues that a dynamic
view of nature is necessary and that Vatican II has now incorporated it into Catholic thought.1 6 9
l6 7 Miguez Bonino, “On Discipleship, Justice and Power,” 135-136.
I6 8 Noh, “The Effects on Korea,” 135.
1 6 9 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 113, 150 & 225-226.
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Central to Dussel’s political ethics is his conviction that the essence of Christian life is
community. The basis o f community and all relations is to be love but more specifically agape,
which he defines as love for the other as the other. Agape is done for the sake of the other rather
than for one’s own sake. For Dussel, agape love is the prerequisite for peace and justice because it is
only in community that agape is possible. God’s reign happens in community, and only when
human beings are in community can justice be realized. God’s reign also serves as a constant
reminder that humankind has not yet realized justice. There is still more to do. It is also a
reminder that the dominant order is not community and is not just.1 7 0
In his 1983 book Toward a Christian Political Ethics, Miguez Bonino makes a general claim for
a Christian political ethic. Miguez Bonino outlines four lines o f challenge in this task:
(1) There is therefore no individual prospect except as incorporated in a social
prospect— which today must be worldwide in its dimensions.
(2) This collective prospect is in our day a critical one. Violence seems to be
erupting everywhere. In so many respects humankind exhibits an apparent
inability, unwillingness, or impotence: to organize life on our earth on human
terms; to use the resources of our world intelligently for the common good; to
harness science in the service of a richer and fuller life; to subordinate bigness
(more things, more power, greater wealth) to quality; to make of our diverse
philosophical, political, and religious viewpoints an occasion for mutual encounter
and enrichment; to structure an economy o f solidarity rather than o f destruction; to
devise political structures able to cope with the problems and give viability to the
hopes o f our time.
(3) An intense and resolute effort seems necessary if we are to bring this complex
reality under human control and subordinate it to human ends. It cannot be left at
the mercy o f so-called objective “scientific-technological reason” or “economic
laws” because such objectivity does not exist. Our task is to subordinate power to
human decisions and human goals, and this is precisely the function o f political
ethics.
(4) For us Christians this means that as we join in this human effort to articulate a
political ethics for today’s world we shoulder the task o f bringing to bear upon it
the basic beliefs and disbeliefs that guide each o f us (as Christians) through life.1 7 1
Thus, according to Miguez Bonino, it is the task of Christians to develop a Christian ethics o f
politics. In his understanding, political struggle is not optional because millions o f lives are at stake.
1 7 0 Dussel, Ethics and Community, 7-8, 10 & 14-15.
l7 1 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 16.
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This is obviously the case when we are dealing with nuclear weapons that threaten huge populations,
if not the whole world.
Miguez Bonino advocates that ethics keep the normative character of biblical faith yet reflect
upon the concrete situations o f the poor. As a result he rejects the insight that one can derive a
political ethic directly from the gospel. Miguez Bonino points out, “we urgently need a Christian
ethics o f politics precisely in order that we may avoid a wrong politicization o f Christianity.” 1 7 2 In
order to achieve this, an ethical stance must side with the dispossessed.
Liberation theologians insist that power must always be a consideration in ethics and must be
subject to theological reflection. For Miguez Bonino, power belongs to God and God’s power is
justice in action as seen through acts of liberation. In a world o f conflict, God’s power is one of
righteousness, and God empowers or commissions human agents to carry out this power.
Nevertheless, because humans misuse the power mediated to them, God retains the authority to judge
human actions. For Miguez Bonino, Jesus’ mission was to be a true prophet who cared for the poor
and offered himself for the people. “Jesus understood his mission not as one o f proposing a model
for political action but as one o f incarnating in a paradigmatic way God’s just and liberating rule,
thus setting our understanding o f politics on a wholly new course.”1 7 3 For Miguez Bonino, while
principalities and powers will never establish the kingdom o f God, they are capable of serving God’s
peace and justice.
Liberation theology insists that political ethics must be revolutionary and hopeful in that it
insists that society can be ordered justly. But liberation theology is not utopian in that it rejects the
idea that we can establish the Kingdom of God. So for an ethic of nonproliferation we should expect
significant progress in eliminating our reliance on nuclear weaponry. But an ethic of
l7 2 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 17.
I7 3 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 98.
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nonproliferation will not fall under the false assumption that we can eliminate the nuclear threat for
all time.
Violence remains an option for an ethic of nonproliferation while there will be a strong
commitment to nonviolence. The ethical choice to use or not use violence, says liberation theology,
belongs to the oppressed. However, this construct gets messy with nuclear weapons as perhaps in a
nuclear war nuclear weapons would oppress everyone. Clearly nuclear weapons are currently held
by the powerful, but the use o f nuclear weapons might both be an act of genocide and suicide by the
powerful. Moreover, with India and Pakistan now in possession o f nuclear weapons and the
potential for terrorists to posses them, the construct becomes even more complicated. So in
exploring the use o f violence in nonproliferation efforts the ethical norm is to make such a decision
based on the consequences to the real or potential victims o f nuclear violence. In fact, liberation
theology forces us to question how we relate ethically to the violent systems that are already present
in reality. Part of the answer to that question will revolve around the right use o f power. Key values
of an appropriate political ethic will be responsibility and reconciliation. An ethic of
nonproliferation has a responsibility to seek to protect the earth and its peoples from nuclear
destruction, and one key way it will do so is by reconciling people who are now enemies. Moreover,
an ethic o f nonproliferation will be an experiment in public philosophy. If we can learn to discuss
and act in positive and productive ways on nuclear issues, no doubt we could do likewise on other
issues as well.
F. Nuclear Ethics
It is an extreme understatement to say that nuclear proliferation is not at the forefront o f the
writings o f these five liberation theologians. Criticizing them for this oversight might be legitimate
since nuclear weapons are a threat to all life on the planet and, in that sense, the ultimate oppressor.
In addition, because the nuclear powers use nuclear weapons as the ultimate enforcer o f their will,
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nuclear arsenals should be viewed directly as weapons o f oppression, even if never used. Finally, it
seems that nuclear proliferation should be o f greater concern to these liberation theologians since the
spread o f nuclear technology could, in the future, mean that nuclear weapons are used in third-world
conflicts. However, to be fair to liberation theologians, they are usually confronted with more
immediate threats to life, and therefore those threats gain the attention o f liberation theologians.
However, some o f our writers have addressed nuclear issues or issues that surround them, and we
now turn to those examples.
Enrique Dussel explores the connection between liberation movements and peace movements,
such as those that arose to resist the placing of Pershing missiles in Europe during the 1980s. While
he admits that such missiles are a threat to life, he reminds the peace movement that removing these
weapons is inadequate if an unjust order remains. In a similar vein, he reminds liberation
movements that they will have a short and hollow victory if nuclear weapons destroy all life.
Therefore, he concludes a convergence of liberation and peace movements, and a theology of
solidarity is needed because he sees the two movements as one in the struggle for life against death.
Dussel prefers the nonviolent means advocated for by the peace movement, but Dussel limits the use
of nonviolence to where appropriate. He insists other means, including violent ones, are required in
contexts where assassination, repression and inhumanity are prevalent. If there is to be a universal
theology, says Dussel, it should be one o f life. However, there can be no universality of means.1 7 4 In
response to the claim that nuclear war and the end of life on the planet are foretold in Revelations,
Dussel contends that even if it is so, it is the work of the beast, and the poor are the one’s to suffer.
Consequently, it is up to Christians to oppose the beast. Hopefully, this ethic o f nonproliferation can
provide some linkage between peace and liberation movements.
For Dussel the meaning o f nuclear weapons is that for the first time Christian ethics is faced
with the reality that humans can, as a species, commit suicide and in the process destroy all life on
l74Dussel, I f One Loves Life, Search fo r Peace, 11-14.
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the planet. Moreover, he finds the arms race sinful, even if nuclear weapons are never used. In the
first place it is sin because it seeks to make a profit on the forces o f death. Second, it is sin because it
is deceptive, as the public is never told the truth about the expenditures nor the nature of what is
produced. Third, it is sin because the poor nations whose citizens can least afford it are brought into
the system o f weaponry. Dussel argues that the arms race is tied up with economic and social
oppression. The mighty oppress the weak and pacify them. ,They do so with arms.1 7 5
Jong-Sun Noh’s theological exploration o f his Korean context has forced him to focus on
nuclear issues precisely because nuclear weapons are an issue in Korea. Noh says that Korea is a
victim of the nuclear policies o f the superpowers, especially the United States. He claims that at
times there have been more than enough nuclear weapons in Korea to ruin it environmentally
forever. At its highest point, the U.S. had as many as twelve-hundred nuclear weapons and 40,000
troops in Korea. In addition, such militarization of South Korea by the United States increased the
possibility o f a nuclear attack since the Soviet Union would have had nuclear weapons targeted at
South Korea. Moreover, the U.S. had the power to use nuclear weapons in Korea without any
approval from Korean commanders. Until just recently, the commander o f all forces in South Korea,
including Korean forces, was the American commander. Noh argues that this violates internal
justice, international justice and Korean sovereignty.1 7 6
M. M. Thomas agrees with Gandhi’s critique of large-scale technology which saw it as a source
of alienation, dehumanization and violence. Thomas notes that technology and technical rationality
have brought enormous inhumanities. Moreover, it has not reduced poverty; it has exacerbated it.
Technological advances in the military have made the wars o f nations horrendous and led to the
creation of permanent military-industrial complexes which themselves contribute to oppression. He
I7 5 Dussel, Ethics and Community, 165-169 & 198.
1 7 6 Noh, “The Effects on Korea,” 132-133.
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argues that, instead, we need to develop an alternate approach to technology which is based on
appropriateness for humans.1 7 7
Jose Miguez Bonino is likewise very concerned about technology, arguing that technology now
dominates the world. He writes, “We are now faced with a single scientific-technological complex
that penetrates every area of life-to such an extent that the environment for human life is no longer
‘nature’ but ‘techno-nature.”’1 7 ® Miguez Bonino understands that science and technology are
political issues and concern questions o f power. Consequently, he argues that we must control the
use of science and technology and make it accountable to ethical standards. Unfortunately, as
Miguez Bonino admits, the mechanisms of controlling these forces are in the hands of a few. He
reminds us that the ethical question in nuclear proliferation is the control and accountability of
nuclear weapons and technology. Dussel concurs but notes that technological liberation requires
politically and economically free people. Moreover, “adequate technology” is not a folksy way to say
small; it means technology designed with the welfare of underdeveloped countries and people in
mind.1 7 9
The central task that Miguez Bonino lifts up concerning nuclear proliferation is the discernment
of Christianity’s genuine relevance to the specific ethical questions. In response to this task, Miguez
Bonino puts forth a simple four-part instrument to test what meets the central ethical criterion-that
of maximizing the universal human possibilities while reducing the hum an cost. Miguez Bonino
is careful to warn that these parts are not universal norms but only “tentative ethical formulations.”1 8 0
First, at all stages of analysis and implementation we must consider carefully what is best for
most of the people. Second, we must be leery of the claims o f high social costs involved in change
1 7 7 Thomas, Nagas Toward A.D. 2000, 210 & 218.
1 7 8 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 13.
1 7 9 Dussel, Philosophy o f Liberation, 138.
,8 0 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 101 & 109.
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because such thinking ignores the high social cost involved in the status quo. Miguez Bonino makes
the point forcefully: “Revolutionary change, it is said, sacrifices human lives. But how many lives
are sacrificed by prolonging for a century or two a form of production or distribution o f goods that
has ceased adequately to serve the needs o f the people?”1 8 1
Third, we must face questions o f power since current social structures are resistant to giving up
their power and must be met with countervailing power. Miguez Bonino concludes, “Historically,
this has always meant a mix, variously proportioned, of three constant terms: (a) the pressure for
change (from below); (b) consent-or resistance-to change (from the top); and (c) conflict. The
human cost of change is determined by the delicate balance of these three terms.”1 8 2
Fourth, conflict always involves some degree of violence, and when we consider violence several
elements must be considered: (a) Violence should not be separated from the conflict situation but
must be considered in context, (b) We must make an ethical distinction between the calculated use
of revolutionary violence (which is ethically responsible for calculating the costs) and violent
explosions o f oppressed people who have no choice but to fight back, (c) We must still balance
courage and prudence, and traditional just war thinking is still helpful in this analysis, (d) Pacifism
cannot be a norm or ideal, but it can only be evaluated for its relevance to specific situations. In
other words, pacifism must be pragmatically advantageous.1 8 3
Liberation and peace movements need to be connected to each other in solidarity. The arms race
is both robbery and murder for the poor who need the resources it takes from them in order to
survive. Moreover, not only does it take resources the poor need, but the powerful fund the arms
through resources which are extracted from them. Even after they have paid for the arms, the
powerful use the arms to oppress the poor. Peace and liberation are inherently connected to each
1 8 1 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 107.
l8 2 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 108.
I8 3 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics, 108-109.
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other. However, to thrust pacifism on the oppressed while they are oppressed by nonpacifist means
results in further oppression. Consequently, the methods o f nonviolence should be used when they
are effective, but we cannot limit the means o f the oppressed solely to nonviolent means. An ethic of
nonproliferation can draw from liberation theology’s analysis o f technology. We must seek to
control and make technology accountable to the needs of underdeveloped nations and their people.
Essentially, the standard is a utilitarian one: How do we maximize human possibilities while
minimizing human costs?
IV. Implications o f Liberationist Thought
From our exploration o f the thought of liberation theologians the following ethical ideas should
be o f use as we consider the problem o f nuclear proliferation:
The first concept provided to an ethic of nonproliferation by liberation theology is th at
political struggle is not optional, it is required by faith and by the situation. Liberation theology
insists that engagement in the struggle is a requirement o f the Christian life. Christians are to
engage in decisive actions for peace and justice. Consequently, it is fair to conclude that with the
grave threat that nuclear weapons pose, participation in nonproliferation efforts is part o f the
Christian calling. Thomas suggests that we train our young people to engage in the adventure o f
working for peace and justice. Liberation theology’s emphasis on praxis reminds an ethic of
nonproliferation that the focus must be on action and not on words. The goal is not the creation o f
Christendom or a Christian nation. Instead, to create an ethic o f nonproliferation informed by
Christian social ethics in a pluralistic nation and world, the ethic needs to be informed by other value
systems as well. Tribal culture offers an ethic o f nonproliferation, its emphasis on social
responsibility and harmony with the environment. Moreover, tribal traditions encourage the use,
besides our analytical reason, of intuitive reason where knowledge is developed through sympathy,
participation and communion. We learn through actions, especially actions o f solidarity.
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The second idea that emerges from liberation theology for an ethic of nonproliferation is
the need to unmask ideological positions. Ideology allows individuals and/or groups to claim to be
doing the right thing when, in fact, they are simply looking out for their own interests. If we learn to
see reality correctly without nationalistic biases, we will soon discover that addressing the threat
posed by nuclear weapons is in everyone’s interest. However, liberation theology still pushes us to
escape our ideological blinders. It reminds us that for oppressed people nuclear weapons will not be
first on their agenda. If one is starving or facing execution today, one is not so concerned that the
world may blow up next week. Moreover, being free from our ideological blinders will allow us in
the U.S. to notice that we have a larger responsibility to address this problem, not only because we
are financially able to so but because we are more responsible for the problem than many nations and
peoples. Exposing ideology will also help us escape old and outdated and useless ways of thinking.
With issues such as international politics so long dominated by men, one of the surest ways to get
new perspectives is to listen to women.
A third implication for an ethic of nonproliferation extracted from liberation theology is
that we must always be aware o f our social location and the biases and restrictions that it
places upon us.
The fourth notion from liberation theology for an ethic of nonproliferation is that we look
at ourselves first, both individually and corporately. This arises from the fact that the prophetic
tradition is mostly critical o f “us” rather than “others.” An ethic o f nonproliferation needs first to
look at the sins o f the United States. What have we done and what are we doing to cause nuclear
proliferation? Moreover, even in areas where the U.S. did not have a negative impact, we must ask
whether there are still actions that the U.S. could take to promote nonproliferation. An ethic of
nonproliferation must be continually self-reflective and self-critical as is required by the liberative
action-reflection model.
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The fifth concept for an ethic of nonproliferation extracted from liberation theology is that
humans are commissioned by God to exercise God's power of liberation, justice, and
righteousness. We are called to work on this issue and an ethic o f nonproliferation should be based
on the principles of inclusiveness and interdependence. This means the world and its people are our
concern. We are all one global family. Another teaching gleaned from liberation theology is that
work on economic, gender, environmental and other forms o f justice are all efforts for
nonproliferation, since injustice is one of the pressures that fuel proliferation.
An ethic o f nonproliferation must be an ethic o f hope is the sixth idea that liberation
theology offers. Oppressed people find reason to have hope even in the most depressing situations,
believing that God can help make the situation better. An ethic of nonproliferation must be hopeful
even at those times when things look bleak. However, an ethic of hope is not utopian.
Liberation theology insists that struggle must be based in community, and that is the
seventh implication offered to an ethic of nonproliferation. Part of this commitment to struggle is
the recognition that the individualism in liberal society and in Christianity not only has negative
consequences but is also not faithful to the Christian tradition. Liberation theology teaches us that
sin and salvation have social dimensions and also that their primary dimension is social. Moreover,
we can find wholeness in community. An ethic of nonproliferation will emerge from the praxis of
community building and will live out the values of mutuality, unity and diversity.
The eighth notion that liberation theology provides to an ethic of nonproliferation is that
conflict always involves some degree of violence, and when we consider violence several
elements must be considered. These elements include: a) Violence should not be separated
from the conflict situation but must be considered in context, b) An ethical distinction must be
made between the calculated use of revolutionary violence (which is ethically responsible for
calculating the costs) and violent explosions of oppressed people who have no choice but to fight
back, c) Courage and prudence must still be balanced, and traditional just war thinking is still
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helpful in this analysis, d) Pacifism cannot be a norm or ideal but only evaluated based on its
relevance to specific situations. To thrust pacifism on the oppressed while they are oppressed by
nonpacifist means results in further oppression. The methods o f nonviolence should be used when
they are effective, but we cannot limit the means o f the oppressed solely to nonviolence. An ethic o f
nonproliferation will reject a praxis o f pacifism while still being informed by pacifist thought and
still maintaining a very strong commitment to nonviolence.
A ninth concept from liberation theology for an ethic of nonproliferation is that we must
tell the terrible story of nuclear weapons and their effects. This will include listening to the
voices of the victims o f the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those affected by nuclear
testing, those affected by nuclear production, development and transportation, and of those living in
nations which have been made into nuclear targets.
The tenth idea is that liberation theology insists that an ethic of nonproliferation avoid
universal claims and seeks contextual solutions. With an issue as complex as nuclear
proliferation, what will work with Korea may be very different from what will work with Iran, or
Russia or terrorists. We also need to understand the deep suspicion that Asians, for instance, have
toward western actions. Such a suspicion has its merits since Asia has suffered the only nuclear
attack, been subject to repeated nuclear testing and has been the storage and dumping ground for the
weapons of western nations. Understanding the source o f the suspicion may help us to have a more
empathetic and, therefore, accurate understanding o f why North Korea acts the way it does on
nuclear issues. An ethic o f nonproliferation needs to be sensitive to culture. For us in the west,
nuclearism is ingrained in our cultural understanding. We both fear nuclear weapons and see them
as our ultimate protection. The former is appropriate, while the latter is a false cultural idea. We
must come to understand that nuclear weapons do not make us more secure; they make us all more
vulnerable.
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The eleventh ethical implication taken from liberation theology in this construction of an
ethic o f nonproliferation is that the ethical stance must always side with the poor and
dispossessed. Liberation and peace movements need to be connected to each other in solidarity.
The arms race is both robbery and murder for the poor who need the resources it takes from them in
order to survive. Not only does it take resources they need but the arms are funded through resources
which are extracted from them. Moreover, even after they have paid for the arms, the powerful use
the arms to oppress the poor. Peace and liberation are inherently connected to each other. An ethic
of nonproliferation will judge the issue from the perspective o f the poor, remembering our
responsibility to them. Moreover an ethic of nonproliferation will seek to redefine security, as
solidarity with the poor is likely to make us more vulnerable rather than secure. However, the very
concept o f security needs to be reevaluated since no one is secure from the threat of nuclear weapons.
Such a reevaluation will raise questions about the meaning o f security and vulnerability. Liberation
theology also warns against cheap reconciliation where no one takes responsibility for their actions
or makes reparations.
The twelfth notion offered from liberation theology to an ethic o f nonproliferation is that it
must be leery of the claims of high social costs involved in change because such thinking ignores
the high social cost involved in the status quo. Liberation theology insists that we carefully weigh
the costs o f our methods, be they violent or nonviolent.
Science and technology must be made accountable to the worldwide human community is
the thirteenth concept for an ethic of nonproliferation. An ethic o f nonproliferation can draw
from liberation theology’s analysis o f technology. We must seek to control and make technology
accountable to the needs o f underdeveloped nations and their people.
The fourteenth contribution from liberation theology is that at all stages of analysis and
implementation one must consider carefully what is best for majority of the people. This is
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unequivocally a utilitarian standard: How do we maximize human possibilities while minimizing
human costs?
The fifteenth concept for an ethic of nonproliferation is th at we must face questions of
power since current social structures are resistant to giving up their power and must be met
with countervailing power. The human cost of change is determined by the delicate balance of
these three terms: a) the pressure for change (from below); b) consent-or resistance-to
change (from the top); and c) conflict. The fact that the powerful will resist change must be part of
any ethical analysis.
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PART III:
ACTION
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Policy development regarding nuclear issues has been in the doldrums with few policymakers
paying much attention, and the few efforts undertaken are irrelevant or headed in the wrong
direction. Even with the radical change brought by the end of the Cold War, little change has come
to nuclear policy. There have been significant cuts in the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals, but those
came with START II, negotiated in 1992, and huge nuclear arsenals remain. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty has been made permanent, mostly in ways that justify the superpower’s arsenals
rather than providing a significant change. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been agreed
upon, however, without the central nations that are proliferating taking part and only after the
nuclear powers have passed the point of need to do testing for nuclear weapons development. The
most ambitious and politically popular step is the development of missile defense systems which are
misguided efforts searching for a technical fix to the problem. None of these steps adequately
address the continuing threat that comes from the spread of nuclear weapons around the globe.
Policymakers’ vision is often so narrow that it fails to look more broadly, and it is there that the
significant advancement can be made. Policymakers look to control nuclear material (an important
interim strategy) but fail to look at the development of anti-nuclear communities which might build
the global political support required to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Policymakers look at
how to make their country more secure (a worthy goal) but fail to notice that making other nations
more secure may in fact decrease those other nation’s nuclear motivation, making all nations more
secure. Policymakers tend to focus on counter-terrorism measures (a worthy goal) but fail to work at
correcting injustices that give rise to terrorists. Policymakers tend to focus on deterring a nuclear
attack (a worthy goal) instead o f seeking ways to decrease or even eliminate nuclear weapons.
Traditional approaches, stuck in the Cold War, simply lack the vision to make a difference on this
issue. Consequently, we are either left to chance or we can look elsewhere for the needed vision.
The past three chapters have provided us the opportunity to search out that vision. By exploring
three schools of theology that are outside the mainstream, we have had ample opportunity to find
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new perspective and vision. These three schools contain elements of idealism, perfectionism and
utopianism. However, without selling our soul to such elements, perhaps nuclear policy needs a dose
o f such perspectives. The argument advanced here is that these perspectives are the corrective that is
needed. These visions are what an ethic of nonproliferation needs to be up to the task o f countering
the threat that nuclear weapons pose for the world. We now turn to incorporating elements o f these
new visions into the construction of an ethic of nonproliferation.
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CHAPTER SIX:
AN ETHIC OF NONPROLIFERATION
High in the Himalayas is the region known as the Kashmir. Although most o f its residents are
Muslim, since the time India gained its independence from Great Britain it has been a divided
territory. Prior to independence, all of what is currently India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were part of
India. However, upon gaining independence a civil war erupted which resulted in the division o f the
Kashmir between India and Pakistan; India received about two-thirds and Pakistan received the
remaining one-third. However, both India and Pakistan claim rights to the entire Kashmir, and in
1965 they fought a second war over the region. Since then Pakistan has supported the insurgent
rebels in the Indian section o f the Kashmir who are engaged in guerilla warfare and are seeking to
join their part of the Kashmir with Pakistan.
Given this background, it is not difficult to imagine that in the near future Pakistan, acting out
o f fear from growing Indian military might, could decide to increase their military support o f the
insurgents and would begin sending them advanced weapons. Such actions would turn the tide in
India’s conflict with the insurgents, and within a year the insurgents could be transformed from a
nuisance to a genuine military threat to the Indian army in the Kashmir. As the insurgents’ military
power grew, they would attract even more followers, and within two years they could control the
bulk o f the land in Indian Kashmir. The insurgents would then declare the area under their control
an Islamic republic and request annexation by Pakistan. India, however, would warn Pakistan that if
it tried to annex the Kashmir India would declare war on Pakistan. Pakistan, sensing the
opportunity to expand it’s prestige and power, would then accept the Kashmir as a Pakistani state.
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India would immediately declare war and send thousands o f soldiers and hundreds o f tanks into
Pakistan and the Kashmir. India would launch conventional missiles and engage in bombing sorties.
At this point in the scenario, Pakistan’s military would be overwhelmed and total defeat would
be likely. In desperation, and without the government’s approval, a Pakistani commander, however,
might launch a nuclear missile at New Delhi. Even if it missed the city center, the missile would
still kill nearly three hundred thousand people. India would respond with two nuclear missiles of its
own. Within days, seventeen nuclear attacks would take place between the two nations. Millions
would be left dead and many more would be dying with hundreds o f millions expected dead in the
next few years. The environment of southern Asia would be severely damaged, and many areas
would be unable to grow food that was safe and edible. Consequently, the whole area could not
produce enough food to feed its population for decades. Moreover, the seventeen nuclear explosions
would have lifted enough particles into the air to create a mini-nuclear winter, and the entire globe
would suffer from weather changes and food shortages.
Imagine another scenario. A Russian nuclear scientist who, thanks to the declining Russian
economy, has not been paid for six months and is unable to feed his family. He makes a terrible
decision: To sell his services on the underground market. To enhance his marketability, he
convinces a few guards and other workers at a nuclear material site to participate in the plot.
Between his expertise and the materials he brings with him, he knows he can produce a crude, and
by nuclear standards, small nuclear weapon within two years. The scientist is quickly “acquired” by
a terrorist group shielded in a country unfriendly to the United States. Four years after the scientist
leaves Russia, the terrorists seek to avenge those punished in the World Trade Center bombing. This
time they do it right.
The plot is remarkably similar to the previous attempt. They sneak the nuclear bomb into the
U.S. with a small boat by dropping it off on the Florida coast to an awaiting van. The drop is done
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in conjunction with a drug smuggling operation they have hired to divert attention away from their
boat. While government officials are chasing boats trafficking in drugs, the boat with the nuclear
weapon reaches shore unnoticed. Two men then drive the van to New York City.
Because of the increased security at the World Trade Center, the terrorists know they will not
get into its underground parking garage. However, since they have a nuclear weapon, they know
they do not really need to be that close. Instead, they park the van on Washington Street near the
comer o f Liberty, a side street just south o f the World Trade Center, at 6:00 A.M. on a M onday-a
time when similar looking delivery trucks would normally be present in this part o f Manhattan. They
set the timer, and then after stuffing the parking meter full o f quarters they go into the World Trade
Center and down to the transit center below and take the PATH train, which New Yorkers know as
“the tubes,” over to Hoboken, New Jersey. A car picks them up and they hustle west into
Pennsylvania never to be seen again.
Four hours later, at 10:00 A.M., the “dirty” nuclear weapon explodes. The glass and steel
canyons that are Manhattan do strange things to the blast. The twin towers of the World Trade
Center do not come down, but they just as well had. Every window is blown in, and within minutes
the immense heat from the bomb has nearly every floor in flames. Few make it out o f the building,
and those who do will not live long because o f the radiation from the dirty bomb. Everywhere the
survivors look are flames and destruction. Much o f lower Manhattan is in a similar state. The
explosion raised the expected mushroom cloud and casts an eerie pale over the metropolitan area.
Soon, potentially lethal levels o f radiation are showering down across wide areas of this densely
populated metroplex. No one is sure how many have died and how many more will die in the
coming days, weeks, months and years. The United States had spent billions of dollars over the last
several years building a missile defense system so that a rogue nuclear nation could not successfully
lob a nuclear missile at the United States. However, the systems’ satellite warning apparatus had no
way o f recognizing the van driving up the coast from Florida.
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Imagine still another scenario. The Russian economy collapses, and in the wake o f this disaster
a communist strongman seizes power, promising to restore the golden days of Russia’s past. NATO
and the other former Soviet Republics are fearful o f the implications o f a resurgence o f communism
in Europe, and so they begin a buildup o f troops around the boarders of Russia. The new Russian
leadership’s fear of their demise is fueled by their own knowledge that the Russian military is small,
poorly equipped and, even worse, without supplies. Following the strategy that Russia adopted under
Boris Yeltsin in 1999, they threaten to use nuclear weapons if NATO or other troops should
encroach upon the Russian homeland.
Then, in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic senses the time is right to take back what he believes to be
Serbian land, that being Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In response NATO invades Serbia. But
the new Russian leadership continues its longstanding alliance with Serbia and threatens to begin a
nuclear attack unless NATO withdraws from Serbia within three days. NATO refuses to do so.
While neither the U.S. nor Russia has the nuclear arsenals they once did during the height o f the
Cold War, both still have more than 3,500 strategic weapons plus other tactical nuclear weapons.
Clearly, a nuclear war between the two could still end human, if not all, life on the planet. How will
the world escape this Armageddon?
For most people the above three scenarios are not their vision of the world in this post-Cold War
era. However, not only is each one o f these a possibility for the near future, many more equally
dangerous scenarios could be constructed. In the post-Cold War era, there are multiple paths to
nuclear war still active in our word. Indeed, those who study nuclear politics are nearly unanimous
that the chance o f a nuclear war is greater now than during the Cold War. However, few people are
paying any attention to this problem. The peace movement, which focused a great deal of energy on
nuclear questions during the Cold War, only occasionally drops o f few bread crumbs o f attention on
the issue and has failed to muster any public attention to the issue. Moreover, the military and
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political experts are so caught up in the Cold War mind-set that what they offer is equally irrelevant.
Such responses, or more accurately lack o f responses, only serve to make a future in which one of the
above scenarios, or something similar, becomes a reality.
However, such a doomed future is not our only option. An ethic o f nonproliferation has a vision
for a more peaceful and just future. In this final chapter we begin to grow an ethic o f
nonproliferation. It will be grown from the hybrid seeds created by combining the initial ideas
harvested from previous thought on war, peace and nuclear weapons. More specifically, this ethic of
nonproliferation will be grown from the ideas harvested from the three theological
traditions-pacifism, feminism and liberation-which have been explored in chapters three through
five. The plant that grows here is simply a beginning, and is not to be considered the final word on
the subject. In agriculture the hybrid process is never complete. Researchers are always looking for
better features to be added to the hybrid. It is a first generation plant that others will need to draw
upon as they refine an ethic o f nonproliferation. Moreover, growing conditions change in
agriculture-weather and rain patterns change, soil conditions change, and new areas are put into
production. Such changes require new hybrids as well. The same will be true with an ethic of
nonproliferation; it will need to be modified as nuclear politics change. Hopefully though, this first
generation hybrid will provide a good stock and fertile groundwork for future development.
Who will use this hybrid to develop future generations o f an ethic of nonproliferation? First,
this is a Christian ethic of nonproliferation. So it is hoped that the church will again engage in
discussions of nuclear policy. In fact, this work is primarily an argument for what the church should
be teaching about the continuing threat to life that nuclear weapons pose. It is important to
remember the crucial role that the churches played in nuclear politics in the past, especially during
the 1980s but also during earlier decades. This ethic o f nonproliferation needs to re-engage those in
the North American churches who are concerned about ending the threat of nuclear weapons.
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Second, this ethic o f nonproliferation provides public policy recommendations. It suggests steps
the U.S. and other nations should take on nuclear issues in order to create a more just and peaceful
world. Because here it is still primarily a Christian ethic, this should be used by the church to
identify specific policies which the church should advocate that the U.S. and other nations take
regarding nuclear policy.
Finally, policy makers are challenged to consider these proposals as well. In evaluating these
proposals, policy makers probably will not, nor should they, base their decisions exclusively on
Christian grounds. However, in a pluralistic society good policy-makers should be open to listening
to the contributions which various moral traditions can bring to public policy. While policy makers
may not be willing to accept the following proposals en toto, there is much here to offer policy
makers. Perhaps most fundamentally, what is offered here are ideas that might move policy makers
out o f their Cold War worldviews, which are inappropriate and largely useless in this much more
complex and morally ambiguous post-Cold War world in which we find ourselves. Ironically, but
not yet tragically, political realists have lost touch with reality since the reality of the Cold War in
which they currently operate no longer exists. This ethic o f nonproliferation will help policy makers
move into the reality o f the third millennium that is upon us.
In the midst o f the danger and gloom of looming nuclear destruction, it is important to note the
positive signs as well. During the Kennedy Administration it was predicted that there would be
fifteen to twenty-five nuclear powers by the 1970s.1 Those predictions did not come to pass
primarily because several nations who had the technological ability did not have the political
motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. This was the case in spite o f the false prediction o f the so-
called “experts.” This dissertation does not ignore what the experts have to say. However, it does
not limit itself to those experts. In fact, it has intentionally gone to new areas of thought. The task
‘Robert C. Toth, “Undeterrables May Soon Have Nuclear Arms,” Los Angeles Times, 4
November 1991, 10A.
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now is to apply the ethical analysis harvested as sources for policy steps that will further limit
political motivation to proliferate.
Brazil and Argentina are positive examples o f the progress that can be made in nonproliferation.
These two nations had the most advanced civil nuclear program in Latin America, and they seemed
to have some military interest in nuclear weapons. Yet they have changed direction and moved
toward nonproliferation. The new policies have included the establishment o f a joint nuclear
materials accounting system and an inspection arrangement administered by a new bilateral agency
in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both nations have abandoned
support for peaceful nuclear explosions. They have also implemented more careful export controls
including rocket exports following the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). These two
nations had previously rejected the NPT and fiill-scope IAEA safeguards and had criticized nuclear
nations for trying to control their nuclear exports. Together they believed that the nonproliferation
regime was a threat to their independence and development. Nevertheless, in 1985 the two created a
Joint Committee on Nuclear Policy. Then a four-part agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the
joint safeguard agency and the IAEA was signed in 1991. While the two nations were happy with a
joint agency, the U.S. as a supplier nation wanted and got IAEA involvement. IAEA is allowed to
take independent action, including unannounced special inspections which assures the rest o f the
world. Civilian rule was important in both nations in overcoming military reluctance for these
positions. Also, improvement in the superpowers’ nuclear conduct as evidenced in agreements such
as the INF, START I, NPT adherence by France and China, and the decision by South Africa to stop
its nuclear programs all contributed to Brazil and Argentina’s willingness to move on proliferation
issues.2
2 John R. Redick, “Latin America’s Emerging Non-Proliferation Consensus,” Arms Control
Today, March 1994, 3-8.
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New political realities, the ever present danger of nuclear weapons, and an ethical call to work
for justice all lead to the conclusion that much more must be done as we move toward an ethic o f
nonproliferation. Many o f the ethical voices under study suggest similar responses using different
languages. For example, liberation theologians insist that political struggle is not optional, while
pacifists maintain that defending the innocent is a task o f justice, and feminists contend that to stop
resisting is to die. Consequently, if we have been listening to these voices, the clear ethical response
to our contemporary situation is to be dissatisfied with current ways o f thinking about and dealing
with nuclear proliferation. These voices should be enough to compel us to move forward and take
new steps on this crucial issue. The following is a list of proposals suggested for consideration, most
of which have support of third world nations. These proposals are not necessarily explicitly
proposed by one or more persons studied. Instead, what these proposals share in common is that
they are in line with the ethical criteria that arise from these three schools of thought. Further, our
sources provide new ethical vision and refinement of these proposals. As a result, it is clear these
three schools of thought have shaped the following proposals.
/ . Conceptual Proposals
A. Paradigm Shift
The noted philosopher and historian of science Thomas Kuhn developed the helpful concept of
paradigm shifts in his classic book The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions,3 While he developed his
theory in regards to scientific discovery and advancement, it has long been applied to other areas.
His general idea is that scientists operate under certain conceptual frameworks or paradigms and
normally work within the framework in order to refine such understandings. However, eventually
unresolvable contradictions in the paradigm itself trigger a crisis. Such a crisis is then resolved
3 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962).
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through an intellectual transformation which replaces the old paradigm with a new one. In his
writing, Thomas replaces the long-dominant gradual change process model with, at least at key
points, a revolutionary understanding o f change.
While each views the contours o f the next paradigm slightly differently, pacifists, feminist and
liberation theologians are all calling for a paradigm change. Consequently, the argument for a
paradigm shift arises from these three bodies o f literature which have been explored here. But the
need for a paradigm shift is not just external. The nuclear situation itself calls out for a paradigm
shift as well.
Actually, the paradigm shift should have already taken place. Nuclear weapons brought such
incongruity into the paradigm o f realism, international affairs and understandings of security that a
paradigm shift should have taken place. Instead, during the 1970s and 1980s, false ideologies were
created which posited that the U.S. was more secure since it could destroy the Soviet Union 17 times
while the Soviet Union could destroy the U.S. only 13 times. O f course there is no security in such
notions o f security. Either scenario carried out would not only have destroyed the enemy but oneself
as well and, likely, the planet. If there was not enough irrationality in such understandings of
security, the new situation o f the post-Cold War era also should have brought on a paradigm shift. It
should be clear by now that security built on competition as opposed to cooperation cannot be
construed as security in any meaningful way. Further, a nation can never have a defense strong
enough to be completely secure. But under a competition paradigm, nations continue to spend more
resources and do more to threaten other nations. In turn these nations feel the need to be tougher
and spend more of their resources on defense. Such an unending cycle leaves every nation feeling
more insecure, and security is decreased rather than increased. Cooperative defense, on the other
hand, explores how all nations and people can be more secure. It seeks to resolve differences
between nations and find ways to work together. Cooperative defense should in fact be appealing to
realists: It is cheaper and provides increased security.
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The common perception in the first-world is that we have moved in the right direction. In some
ways we may well have. However, the realities of the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo and now East
Timor make clear that such a paradigm shift has not transpired. If one looks at international policy
makers and thinkers, it becomes especially evident that we have not shifted paradigms. One needs
only to point to the account o f James Baker in the introduction when he begged Russia to keep
targeting the United States with its nuclear weapons. A recent editorial by Justine A. Rosenthal o f
the Council o f Foreign Relations which appeared in newspapers across the nation is further
evidence.4 Rosenthal calls for a renewal o f U.S. nuclear weapons’ research to counter recent Chinese
espionage and advances in their nuclear weapons. The thrust of her argument is that, because China
is improving its nuclear weapons and the U.S. is not, U.S. security must be decreasing. It is
important to counter key factual errors in such arguments, including the claim that the U.S. is not
advancing its nuclear weapons and that the espionage case is strong.5 Yet such errors are not what is
most important. Most important is the premise of the argument. Like those in the Cold War era,
Rosenthal presumes that the U.S. is less secure because its nuclear weapons are not as “new and
shiny” as the Chinese. She gives no explanation on how this makes the U.S. less secure and ignores
the fact that U.S. nuclear weapons could end life on the planet. There is no plausible argument that
China’s advances decrease our security unless we are back in the overkill game. Yet, that is exactly
where we are. We still operate in a paradigm that is so full of such contradictions that it is absurd.
For instance, China’s nuclear program is still minimal, having only 20 intercontinental missiles
capable of reaching the United States. Thought claiming to be realistic is very unrealistic. Shinier
nukes in no way increases U.S. security nor do a few more shiny Chinese nukes make the U.S. less
4 Justine A. Rosenthal, “Perhaps Its Time for U.S. To Step Up Weaponry Program,” Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, 9 May 1999, 1J-2J.
5 Vemon Loeb and Walter Pincus, “Case Against Scientist Seems to Be Falling Apart,”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 26 August 1999, 3A.
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secure. The U.S. (and the rest o f the world) have always been, and for the foreseeable future, will be
vulnerable to nuclear weapons.
Realism has assumed that nuclear weapons will not be used. This was an unrealistic view even
under Cold War deterrence. Had the Cold War not ended, odds are that eventually, deterrence would
have failed. It is utopian to assume such an unstable system would continue to work perfectly over a
long time period. Moreover, in the post- Cold War world, with multiple nuclear actors including
potentially terrorists, it is even more unrealistic to assume nuclear weapons will not be used. No
doubt the proposals to build Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems are a recognition o f this.
However, as we will discuss later, BMDs are nothing but utopian hopes that technology can solve the
nuclear problem. Realism refuses to be realistic about all o f this. I will be so bold as to suggest that
it is realists who are utopian on nuclear issues and not pacifists. Over-kill and concepts o f nuclear
security have no basis in any realistic understanding of security. They are pure fantasy. The realist’s
strategies (such as they are) provide no security and increase the risk o f nuclear war. Nevertheless,
so far we have resisted shifting to a new paradigm that might provide, or at least increase, security.
Kuhn’s exploration of paradigm shifts was more descriptive than prescriptive; they happen
naturally as the previous paradigm breaks down. In our case the previous paradigm has broken
down and pacifism, feminism, liberation theology and an ethic o f nonproliferation invite us to make
the transition to a new paradigm. The rest of this chapter is an argument for and an invitation to two
distinct, though related, new paradigms. First is a new paradigm which recognizes the insecurity
that nuclear weapons bring and consequently works for their limitation, decrease and eventual
elimination. While pacifists insist that we address the motivation for proliferation, liberation
theology insists that we tell the terrible truth about nuclear weapons and their effects. The
transformation to this paradigm is likely to be the easiest o f the two to achieve. The second
paradigm shift is to an understanding of the interconnectedness o f reality and human societies, so we
will come to understand that injustice anywhere and in any way makes us all less secure. Such a
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paradigm envisions all struggles for justice as actions o f security and defense. Pacifism, feminism
and liberation theology all demand that we struggle for justice. Feminists insist that we reject
models o f power “over” and create models o f power “with.” For both new paradigms, liberation
theology insists that the transformation must be complex and contextual-working for the
transformation to a nonnuclear world and working for justice will be varied to meet the realities of
various contexts.
B. Creation o f Nonproliferation Communities
During the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, a coalition of anti-nuclear peace groups developed.
Taking on a vision used in earlier anti-nuclear peace movements which called for the abolition of
nuclear weapons, they called themselves the New Abolitionists. The old abolitionists were of course
those who sought to end slavery in the U.S. during the nineteenth century. The overall goal of the
New Abolitionists was to have a Convention on the Elimination o f Nuclear Weapons in place by the
year 2000. While they have failed in that goal, it is still a positive development to see a return of
peacemakers to nuclear issues. Having a clear overarching goal, such as the elimination of nuclear
weapons, is also helpful. However, the real issue is how do we achieve such a goal. The New
Abolitionists do seem to understand that achieving a nuclear-free world will be a step-by-step
process. Moreover, the steps outlined below contain some overlap with New Abolitionist proposals.
The New Abolitionists argue that the elimination o f nuclear weapons is technically feasible. The
only barrier is political will. Nevertheless, while the abolition message may be a useful slogan, it
may be counterproductive in the complex nuclear-world in which we now live. It may cause a
nonproliferation movement to become too easily discouraged when complete abolition does not come
quickly. Indeed, this may help to explain why the movement has failed to gamer much notice within
peace and justice movements, let alone the wider public.
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However, the New Abolitionist movement is correct in form, if not substance. AH three of the
traditions which we explored emphasized the need for community. Looking at the major movements
for peace during the past century, such as the nuclear arms reduction or test ban treaties, one can
quickly surmise that these steps would not have taken place solely out o f the initiatives of
governments. Instead, popular social movements such as the nuclear freeze campaign so captured
public interest and opinion that political leaders had no choice but to do something. It will take a
similar effort to make progress against nuclear proliferation.
There is much anecdotal evidence on the power of social movements. We have already
encountered powerful examples from the theologians which have been the main contributors to this
ethic o f nonproliferation. Vincent Harding has repeatedly argued that the civil rights movement not
only reshaped America but continues to change the world in places like South Africa, East Germany
and China. James Douglass has argued that social movements under the leadership o f Gandhi led to
India’s independence from Great Britain in the 1940s, and the anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s
made a difference in slowing the nuclear arms race. David Cortright concurs in his more
comprehensive study Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War,6 concluding that the
peace movement of the 1980s was a significant factor in ending the Cold War.
A whole field of study called movement studies has developed in the social sciences
investigating the nature, workings and impact of social movements. Some o f the early studies
questioned the effectiveness of social movements in terms of changing policy, concluding that
movements were no more effective at changing policy than more traditional means. These studies in
particular noted that the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s was unsuccessful at getting a nuclear
freeze to become U.S. or Soviet policy. The central methodological problem in movement studies,
6 David Cortright, Peace Works: The Citizen’ s Role in Ending the Cold War (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1993).
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points out Giugni, is the difficulty o f establishing a causal link between the development o f social
movements and observable changes in society or government.7
More recent research has critiqued the early findings as being too narrow in their focus on the
nature o f change as well as too narrow in time-frame. For instance, Rochon and Mazmanian find
that social movements lead to change on the personal level in profound ways as “participation opens
up the political world in a way that is almost revelatory.”® Moreover, participants “frequently see
their involvement as a defining moment in their lives, after which they live differently.”9 Rochon
and Mazmanian state that such activated people go on to change the political process and therefore
have significant impact, though less directly and with a time lag. The early movement studies
missed this impact. Moreover social movements change social values so that, in many ways, social
movements affect society rather than government. Rochon and Mazmanian point out that “by
changing social values, movements expand the range of ideas about what is possible. This ultimately
has an effect on politics because it changes perceptions of what the most important political problems
are. In so doing, movements redefine the political agenda.”1 0 In time, the political process is open to
the concerns o f the movement. Rochon and Mazmanian point out that changing values prior to
policy is a necessity as the failure of prohibition illustrates. Changing the policy was ineffective
because there had been no change in social values." Moreover, Santoro and McGuire point out that
movement activists often gain political positions and then impact policy. They note the example of
T Marco G. Giugni, “Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social
Movements,” Annual Review o f Sociology 24, no. 1 (1998): 371-394.
8 Thomas R. Rochon and Daniel A. Mazmanian, “Social Movements and the Political Process,”
Annals o f the American Academy o f Political & Social Science 528 (July 1993): 75-88.
’Rochon and Mazmanian, 75-88.
l0 Rochon and Mazmanian, 75-88.
"Rochon and Mazmanian, 75-88.
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the black activists who have been elected to political office and then have been instrumental in the
passage o f civil rights laws.1 2
Because o f the process of the impact o f social movements, Rochon and Mazmanian conclude
that movements which seek to include people into political processes are more effective than
movements with grand policy proposals. Consequently, they find environmental movements which
have demanded citizen involvement in local regulatory efforts have had more impact than the freeze
movement, which failed to achieve its legislative goal.1 3 However, they ignore the long-term impact
of the freeze movement, which encouraged the U.S. to abandon its provocative nuclear strategy of
the early 1980s and move toward ending the Cold War. Indeed, Alice Holmes Cooper argues that
the peace movement transformed the political landscape in Western Europe during the 1980s.
Agreeing with Rochon and Mazmanian, Cooper finds that the peace movement’s indirect effects in
Germany included the transformation o f the Social Democratic party and also the electoral success of
Green Party candidates.1 4
The debates that remain in movement studies are about the ways and the degree o f impact.
Many argue that the effects are often indirect, unintended and even occasionally contradictory to the
original espoused goals o f the movement. The conclusion from movement studies is that movements
do impact society and policy and have done so on nuclear issues, South African divestment,
environmental protection, civil rights and equal employment opportunity.1 5
1 2 Wayne A. Santoro and Gail M. McGuire, “Social Movement Insiders: The Impact of
Institutional Activists on Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth Policies,” Social Problems 44,
no. 4 (November 1997): 503-520.
1 3 Rochon and Mazmanian, 75-88.
1 4 Alice Holmes Cooper, “Public-Good Movements and the Dimensions o f Political Process,”
Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 3 (June 1996): 267-300.
lsGiugni, 371-394.
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Pacifists suggest that we must transcend individualism, arguing that ethics can only be done in
community. So we must find ways to develop and nurture communities that will take on the issue of
the continuing threat from nuclear weapons. Such communities will witness to alternatives to
violence and will engage in solidarity with past, present and future victims o f nuclearism, including
the earth itself. Moreover, such communities will model hope, even in the face o f the great danger
that nuclear weapons still pose.
Feminist theologians remind us that in our views of community we should reject the image of
the “kingdom o f God” because it perpetuates patriarchal, hierarchal and dominating ideas. Nuclear
proliferation has roots in those negative notions, so surely communities that will lead the resistance
to nuclear weapons cannot be based on such ideas. Instead the communities that need to be grown
should be based, as these religious feminists suggest, on the image o f “the beloved community.”
Such communities will model a different way o f doing things where people are treated with justice
and love. This is not a utopian proposition as feminists recognize that such communities will not be
perfect and will fall short o f the beloved community they seek to create. Moreover, an ethic of
nonproliferation is not suggesting that we can create the beloved community on a global level.
However, communities that are seeking to model the beloved community are the ideal location from
which to engage the world concerning the threat o f nuclear weapons. Such communities have the
authority, energy and power to speak out on such issues. The very existence o f these communities is
evidence that other ways of operating are possible.
Communities engaged in nonproliferation actions will be varied and will develop in various
places. Church study groups could engage nuclear proliferation like they did nuclear deterrence
during the 1980s. Perhaps a national and international movement could be developed on a similar
model to the nuclear freeze movement. The nuclear freeze movement is a good model because it had
national and global organizations but was based primarily in local groups. Amnesty International
and its cell group structure is another possible model. Perhaps newer peace group methods such as
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those used by the campaign to ban landmines could be the model for other groups. Perhaps
engaging nuclear proliferation could reinvigorate peace groups which have fallen into lethargy.
Perhaps groups that focus on other peace and justice issues will want to add this issue to their focus.
Clearly, none o f these groups need make nuclear proliferation their sole focus. Indeed, the three
traditions explored here have continually stressed the interconnectedness o f issues and have
convinced an ethic o f nonproliferation that all acts of justice and peacemaking are nonproliferation
steps. Nevertheless, we still desperately need groups who will focus at least part of their attention on
nonproliferation. Work for peace and justice in other areas will not by themselves solve this issue. It
requires and demands specific attention.
The methods that these communities will use will be those that have traditionally been used in
social change movements including organizing, conscientiousness raising, education, ethical and
theological reflection, lobbying and petitioning governments to adopt appropriate policies, and
electing officials which will further the goals o f nonproliferation. These methods have made a
difference in other social change movements such as the civil rights movement, the nuclear freeze
movement, the ant-apartheid movement, the movement to prevent intervention in the Latin America,
the environmental movement, the women’s movement, and the movement for gay and lesbian rights.
Nothing suggests that such efforts and tactics would be any less effective here.
Liberation theology’s action-reflection model should have a central role in the methods o f these
communities. Action must be at the forefront o f these communities. It is common for non-poor
westerners to focus too much on ideas and not enough on action. Consequently, such communities
must be focused on doing things, on action. Then those actions should be reflected upon for
planning future actions.
One idea from feminism is that an ethic o f nonproliferation should engage in strategic risk
taking. This will mean that some communities will engage in actions o f nonviolent civil
disobedience. It is important for those engaging in such actions to remember that not all are called
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to such steps. It is equally important for those who do not engage in such steps to honor and support
those who do. Such actions should not divide communities internally nor externally from other
communities. Moreover, it is important for these communities to encourage nations to engage in
strategic risk taking for nonproliferation, and this will likely be independent steps for nuclear
disarmament.
A concept from feminist theology suggests that nonproliferation communities’ actions must be
based on love and not “self-sacrifice.” Those who get involved will likely suffer. For instance, those
who engage in civil disobedience will suffer consequences such as fines or time in prison. However,
feminist theology reminds those struggling that since suffering is not the goal suffering should not be
elevated to a virtue. The actions o f these communities should be based on solidarity, directed at
those who are potential targets o f nuclear attacks. For instance, Jong-Sun Noh reminds us that the
Korean people would be a good subject for solidarity since they have had nuclearism thrust upon
them by Cold War politics. Furthermore, focusing on specific victims is usually an especially
effective method for social change.
Since nuclear weapons threaten all people and the earth itself, we may shift solidarity in this
case to a global level. No doubt some, such as Sharon Welch, will fear that the global call issued
here is simply an attempt to return to universal ethics. However, it is not since these communities
must address contextual and specific issues. Furthermore, the global focus is legitimate in this case
because the threat from nuclear weapons is global. The way for these communities to avoid the
problems o f domination that accompanies universal ethics is to employ Welch’s own communicative
ethics. Such ethics are open to listening to the voices of the other. These communities will thus
need to understand that multiple ethics, norms, values and communities are corrective o f each other.
These communities will engage and listen to each other as they listen to the oppressed and as they
challenge the powerful.
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The three theological schools explored here are clear that communities are essential to social
change. Communities are how social change happens. If such communities emerge they will
operate well and will make a difference on nuclear proliferation. The larger problem is how do we
develop them? How do we gamer interest in this subject so that people activate on this issue? This a
very difficult question to answer as nuclear issues are hardly addressed in peace groups, let alone in
the wider society.
The central and initial task o f revitalization or engagement of nuclear issues is to tell the story.
We must tell scenarios such as the ones that opened this chapter. Some will likely question the use
of fear to motivate a movement, and fear is insufficient grounds on which to maintain a movement.
However, fear is part o f nuclearism and is already present in our culture. An ethic of
nonproliferation does not seek to create fear, but it is simply using it to instigate a movement.
Indeed, I suspect that the lack o f attention to this subject is caused by the fact that few people
understand the grave risk that nuclear weapons still pose.
C. One Step At A Time
One o f the most profound discoveries for an ethic of nonproliferation comes from feminist
theology. This discovery is the need to take small steps in the correct direction. An ethic of
nonproliferation rejects the idea that there is a master plan or a once and final solution for the highly
complex problem o f nuclear proliferation. Pacifism also urges that we give up our need to be in
control. We are not immune to a nuclear attack, and nothing can make us immune, despite the
claims of missile defense systems. What we can do is take steps in the direction o f decreasing the
threat posed by nuclear weapons. Some steps will include risk, but the status quo is very risky. Such
steps should set the ground work for further actions. Even some within the more traditional fields
have also concluded that small steps are the right approach. Stephen Wrage and George Quester
write:
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In our comments we suggested indirect intervention as the best means to achieve
both goals. Experience teaches healthy respect for incrementalism and slow
persuasion, aiming for limited objectives. Indirect intervention requires subtlety,
deftness, and the patient cultivation o f parties influential within the target country
who, for their own reasons, will be allies o f U.S. goals. Indirect intervention thus
resembles a lobbying operation more than it does coercive intervention. Lobbyists
must identify where the important decisions are being made, by whom, and for
what reasons before they can effectively influence the decision. Indirect
intervention may not be glamorous or heroic, but it is a policy technique
responsible for many o f the U.S. human rights and nonproliferation successes.1 6
Wrage and Quester here provide not only an affirmation o f the step-by-step method but also support
the previous point that nonmilitary means are the most appropriate means to promote
nonproliferation.
Nuclear proliferation is a complex and long-term problem. No magic answer will solve it
completely and for all time. An ethic o f nonproliferation has already established the need for
nonproliferation communities to engage the threats to life that nuclear weapons pose to the earth and
its people. Such communities will need the middle-class to be involved. However, such people will
quickly become discouraged and drop out if the grand schemes they are urged to support do not
succeed quickly. Instead, such communities need to be urged to understand that this is a long-term
problem that will require long-term commitment. However, such communities should select small
achievable steps in the right direct for which they can work. Moreover, celebrating each success is
important for such communities; they then should select the next goal for which to work. Nations
and international organization which are working for nonproliferation also need to engage that work
in a step-by-step manner. The following steps meet the criteria o f moving incrementally in the right
direction. They therefore make up the policy recommendations o f an ethic on nonproliferation.
l6Stephen D. Wrage and George H. Quester, “Promoting Human Rights and Preventing Nuclear
Proliferation: Some Comparisons,” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (1993): 159.
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II. P olity Proposals
In order to adequately address the threat from nuclear weapons, the conceptual transformations
discussed in the last section are needed. Ultimately, changes in the way the nations of the world
engage in nuclear policy are needed. The following policy recommendations are consistent with the
conceptual changes discussed above. They are steps that can be taken immediately (or at least begun
immediately) even without the conceptual change. Therefore, this section contains the policy
changes for which the church and nonproliferation communities should be advocating. Moreover,
the recommendations are open to policy makers, even if they reject the conceptual change described
above. Indeed, if policy makers do not take something similar to the following steps, it is very
possible that the world as we know it will not survive.
A. Presumption Against The Use O f Military Force
While an ethic o f nonproliferation does not rule out the use o f violent military force in
nonproliferation efforts, it does hold a strong presumption against such use. The analysis contained
here has found little justification for the use o f violence in nonproliferation efforts. The
overwhelming conclusion from the bodies o f thought that have been explored establishes this
negative view o f the use of military force in nonproliferation efforts. Obviously pacifism opposes all
use o f military violence; however, feminism and liberation theology also put forth a presumption
against violence and in favor of nonviolent means.
But the rejection o f violence does not end there. The just war analysis undertaken in chapter
two found that it would be difficult to justify the use o f military force in nonproliferation scenarios
because such actions would raise serious just war objections. Even more revealing, the literature of
the traditional fields such as international relations, security studies and military science find few
examples o f the utility o f violent military actions in nonproliferation strategies. An ethic of
nonproliferation finds the arguments by the pacifists persuasive. Nonviolence does and should have
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an ethical priority over violent means. However, liberation theology is also convincing with its
position that making pacifism an absolute standard could mean that a commitment to nonviolence
itself would become a tool of oppression. Consequently, an ethic o f nonproliferation will have a
strong preference for nonviolence but will not completely rule out the use o f force in all situations.
Violence in the name of nonproliferation raises both deontological and utilitarian ethical concerns.
However, while leery o f it an ethic o f nonproliferation does not a priori rule out the use violence.
Recent U.S. policy has been to develop military and intelligence responses to proliferation. By
1995, the U.S. counter-proliferation efforts had a budget of $2.5 billion as compared to $68 million
that IAEA had for nuclear safeguards. While U.S. effort on this issue is important, the disparity
between those two amounts is troubling since the IAEA is the agency who seeks to ensure that
nuclear material is not diverted into proliferation efforts. Part o f the U.S. counter-proliferation
budget is aimed at developing technologies to detect proliferation. The process is also preparing
what is called a “silver book” o f targets for possible intervention. Once identified, such targets could
be destroyed by the U.S. military before they are used.1 7 While not completely ruling out such
actions, an ethic o f nonproliferation is deeply suspicious of such an approach. Identifying possible
proliferation sites and activities is prudent. Focus on military responses to those sites is problematic
because it will likely make things worse rather than result in gains for nonproliferation.
Nevertheless, a number of military options are discussed by realists in response to nuclear
proliferation. These include preemptive military strikes against military or, specifically, nuclear
installations; covert operations which might seek to disrupt activity or destroy a target; intelligence
gathering; increasing U.S. military forces in the area of a potential proliferator; military posturing,
including military exercises which may threaten or make clear U.S. intentions to intervene in
nuclear proliferation attempts; and missile defense systems.
1 7 Spike Robinson, ed., Military and Arms Transfer News 95, no. 7(21 April 1995),
FHIT.Newsltr 63. PeaceNet, 23 May 1995.
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The alleged proliferation attempts by North Korea during the 1990s have been well documented
and provide a fertile case study upon which to refine an ethic o f nonproliferation. Consequently, as
was done in the just war analysis in chapter two, the North Korean example will often be used in this
chapter. Repeatedly throughout the decade, people have suggested that the U.S. should be willing to
take military action against North Korea if they persist in nuclear attempts. The most advocated
action was a military strike on the suspected nuclear facilities themselves. The model for such an
action is the Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981. Arnold Beichman, a Hoover
Institute research fellow, argues that the old rules of national sovereignty simply do not apply in the
case o f dictators who are about to obtain nuclear weapons. Beichman’s claim is that we must take
action before such nations have nuclear weapons. Otherwise, when the Saddam Husseins of the
world take actions such as invading Kuwait, other nations such as the U.S. will not be willing to
respond against a nuclear armed force.1 8
Beichman’s point is well taken: Neither U.S. nor the world’s interest will be advanced with the
presence o f a nuclear North Korea, or Iraq, or Iran or Libya. The difficulty with Beichman’s
position is that it assumes that such military strikes will be effective in destroying nuclear sites and
will not result in serious side effects. The evidence indicates that neither is likely. Nevertheless, the
Clinton Administration’s defense posture continues to keep this option open by preparing to take
direct military actions to “locate, identify, and disable weapons o f mass destruction, production and
storage facilities for such weapons, and their delivery systems.” 1 9
The biggest difficulty with a military strike is that the U.S. cannot expect the attacked nation to
take it quietly. For example, with Korea the South Korean capital o f Seoul is just 35 miles from the
North Korean border and thus very vulnerable to attack. North Korea has a formidable military,
including an army of one million soldiers and thousands o f tanks. If attacked, North Korea would
1 8 AmoId Beichman, “Sovereignty A Casualty to Dictators,” Insight 9, no. 20 (17 May 1993): 24.
l9The Defense Monitor, 24, no. 4 (1995): 3.
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certainly take some form o f military response, if not a resumption o f full-scale war. Meanwhile, the
U.S. maintains approximately 37,000 troops in South Korea. Consequently, the U.S. would
immediately be involved in any resumption of fighting. Even more frightening, since China has a
mutual defense treaty with North Korea, any military action against North Korea could start a
military confrontation with China.
As a directly violent act, a U.S. preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear sites requires
justification. Such a strike, however, would be difficult to justify using either the criteria of
international law or utilitarianism. In the first place such an act would be classified as an aggressive
rather than defensive act and would thus be suspect under international standards based on the just-
war tradition. Because the likely consequences include both extensive nuclear contamination and a
large-scale war, it is doubtful that a U.S. preemptive strike could meet just war criteria o f
proportionality. It is also unclear that a preemptive strike could meet the criterion o f last resort. A
preemptive strike also would go against a long-standing understanding that the U.S. cannot inflict
“Pearl Harbor” on another nation. In the decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis,
the embargo was chosen over an air strike because, both morally and traditionally, the U.S. could not
undertake a “Pearl Harbor” in reverse.2 0 It is unclear how a strike on North Korea could be any more
acceptable on an ethical level?
While it would clearly not be a positive development for North Korea to build or acquire nuclear
weapons, North Korea may well have the right to posses them. Under the just war criteria in modem
international legal understandings, war is just only in response to cases of aggression, and if the U.S.
were to make a military strike against North Korea the U.S. would be violating the sovereignty of
North Korea. In such a scenario, and in an ironic twist, North Korea could well justify under the just
war tradition the war that they would unleash in response.
2 0 Graham T. Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (HarperCollins,
1971), 123-124.
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Even more problematic, however, are proposals to target “possible” nuclear sites. In many
cases, the U.S. has suspicions but not conclusive evidence that sites are engaged in proliferation.
Consequently, undertaking military attacks may mean the U.S. destroys sites, likely killing personnel
who are in no way engaged in nuclear production. While talk of military strikes on possible nuclear
targets is popular among hawks, there is little to suggest that they would provide advantageous
results. Moreover, they may well lead to disastrous results. There are also numerous logistic
problems, such a lack of confidence that one can accurately identify and hit such targets. An action
that is suspect on moral and utilitarian grounds becomes even more suspect if we lack certainty that
they are nuclear sites.
After being surprised during and after the Gulf War by the advanced nature of Iraqi nuclear
programs, President Bush authorized the CIA to work on the issue o f proliferation. This
authorization included allowing the CIA to undertake covert operations and included an interagency
center called the Non-Proliferation Center, which has been created at the CIA. However, the focus
o f this effort has been centered on the former Soviet Republics and not on the third-world. Certainly
the U.S. and the world have a right to gather intelligence about nuclear development. However,
covert operations and violations o f sovereignty suffer from the same ethical and pragmatic problems
as a preemptive strike. Moreover, military strikes, covert or overt, could never destroy all or even
most nuclear sites. It is not a realistic solution to the problem.
It has been suggested that in response to North Korean nuclear efforts and more recent missile
advancements that the U.S. should increase its military strength in South Korea. A second
possibility includes changes in military exercises which the U.S. engages with the South Korean
military. Altering military posture in an effort to show commitment to nonproliferation does not
raise particular ethical issues as long as the overall consequences o f such actions are positive as
opposed to negative. But predicting consequences is not easy. Jong-Sun Noh would likely argue that
such moves perpetuate superpower domination of Korea. There is, no doubt, some truth in his
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claims. Noh is correct that the ideology o f division needs to be countered, and as a result an ethic of
nonproliferation needs to explore more folly and objectively the motivation for North Korean actions.
However, the North Korean regime is dangerous in large part because it does not have the interests
o f its people at heart.
Yet, there are more practical reasons not to increase U.S. military levels in Korea. First, since
currently the U.S. can send more troops into Korea on very short notice, there is no need to take
preemptive actions. Further, the current U.S. troop presence in South Korea is such that it serves as
a trip wire if North Korea were to invade, requiring U.S. entry into such a war. Consequently U.S.
military involvement is already at the highest level, and stationing additional U.S. troops in Korea
adds nothing. In fact, more U.S. troops in Korea would not only add little deterrent value but also
would probably increase tensions. The Center for Defense Information believes that current U.S.
military presence in South Korea actually increases North Korea’s nuclear efforts by increasing
tension and its perception o f a threat to its security.2 1 Increasing U.S. presence would have negative
side effects.
Perhaps the largest proposed U.S. military response to nuclear proliferation is the development
of missile defense systems. Suddenly in vogue again, missile defense systems could range anywhere
from small battlefield systems like the Patriot Missiles to a more complete system for the United
States called the Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THADD). THADD has received a
great deal o f attention and already has gained some congressional approval. In addition, Japan has
agreed to work with the United States in research and development o f missile defense systems.
Japan’s interest in such efforts is no doubt fueled by North Korea’s nuclear and missile
developments.
In one sense such systems seem to raise few ethical issues since, they are defensive systems.
However, even the development o f defensive system may well add tension to some situations. For
2 1 The Defense Monitor, 24, no. 4, 2.
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instance, with a highly suspicious nation such as North Korea who fears an invasion hy U.S. and
South Korean troops, moving Patriot Missiles into South Korea where they would supposedly
neutralize North Korean weaponry could lead North Korea to believe that such weapons are a
prelude to an invasion.
In terms o f the larger approaches such as THADD, other issues are raised. Deployment o f such
a system would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty the U.S. has with Russia. The U.S.
has approached Russia seeking to renegotiate the ABM treaty so that it can build THADD. So far,
Russia has shown no interest in agreeing to such a change. The ABM treaty tries to maintain the
stability o f deterrence by assuring each nation of the other’s vulnerability to nuclear attack. While
assuring vulnerability may seem like a foolish agreement, the altemative-a spiraling arms race-is
even less wise. Without mutual vulnerability an arms race is likely because the side that is
vulnerable will build up its nuclear weapons enough to overwhelm the missile defense system o f its
opponent and thus return its opponent to vulnerability. Such a buildup would likely lead the now
vulnerable opponent to build up its nuclear forces and the arms race is underway. While normally
an ethic o f nonproliferation prefers defensive weapons, a missile defense system is rejected because it
is likely to fuel an offensive nuclear arms race that would reverse the recent reductions in strategic
nuclear weapons.
There are two additional problems with THADD or any missile defense system at this time.
First there are grave questions that such a system could ever work. THADD is often described as
trying to a hit a bullet with another bullet. The difficulty o f its function is underlined by its inability
to meet ongoing project tests. THADD failed it first six tests. After THADD passed two tests, the
military decided to skip the next series o f tests saying they were no longer needed. It has since failed
more tests. Moreover, even less sophisticated systems such as the Patriots are ineffective. Despite its
supposed glory during the Gulf War, post war analysis found that not a single Patriot Missile was
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effective in stopping a Scud Missile.2 2 A second major problem with missile defense systems is cost;
THADD is scheduled to cost nearly $4 billion.
If defense systems will not work, then political pressure for preemptive military strikes is
increased. However, part o f the ethical difficulty with the United States taking preemptive military
strikes against potential nuclear sites is that it is hypocritical for a major nuclear power to do so.
Moreover, liberation theology insists that the United States look at its own actions first before
pointing at the sins of others. Pacifists insist that we escape the ideology o f war that looks to violent
options as the answer. Feminist theology insists our view be long term as opposed to quick fixes.
Violent approaches seem to be quick fixes and often are politically popular; however, they tend to
not solve the problem but only make the situation worse. An ethic o f nonproliferation insists that
there are less violent means to counter proliferation that are likely to more effective, cause less
problematic side effects and cause fewer moral difficulties.
As a result, an ethic o f nonproliferation understands nonproliferation efforts to be primarily
outside the domain of the military. The Center for Defense Information argues that “thwarting the
oft-cited scenario of terrorists smuggling a weapon of mass destruction into the United States is not
the business o f our military forces. This is the responsibility o f the FBI at home and intelligence
agencies working with their counterparts abroad.”2 3
There are other approaches to nonproliferation available to the United States. At least as an
interim strategy, U.S. policy could help mitigate proliferation pressures by providing security
assurances. Security assurances are something that nonnuclear nations are demanding. The
independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations points out that “real security assurances”
“ Robert Bums, “Patriot Missiles,” Associated Press News, CompuServe, 23 March 1994.
2 3 The Defense Monitor, June 1995, 3.
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are one o f the recommendations to counter proliferation.2 4 Security assurances are effective because,
simply put, nations which feel secure are less likely to proliferate. The nuclear nations are beginning
to understand that security assurances are a prerequisite to nonproliferation efforts.2 5 In addition, the
United Nations has begun to provide some security assurances. In the Spring o f 1995, the Security
Council gave assurances that it would come to the aid of any NPT signer who was threatened or
attacked by nuclear weapons. The resolution was sponsored by the five official nuclear powers. It is
important to remember that this is far from an iron-clad assurance as it does not set in stone any
particular response.2 6
A rejection of military force, is also a commitment to work for peace. The peace movement has
been and will continue to be an important factor in taking steps in the right direction. Regardless of
the government’s position, an alert, informed public can make a difference and is, in fact, a
requirement for positive change.2 7 For instance, in 1977-1978, the U.S. announced plans to deploy
the neutron bomb in Europe. The neutron bomb is designed to kill people while leaving structures
largely unharmed. Demonstrations erupted in West Germany and the Netherlands. After Ronald
Reagan became President and undertook a huge military buildup, large demonstrations against
further deployment o f nuclear forces erupted in Europe.2 8 The U.S. peace movement, meanwhile,
helped to counter the war-like rhetoric o f the Reagan Administration and made it clear that the
2 4 Stephen J. Hadley, “Nuclear Proliferation: Confronting the New Challenges— Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations.,” Disarm.CTB-NPT 115-119, PeaceNet, 23 January 1995.
“ Sean Howard and Suzanna van Moyland, eds. Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 23 (3 May
1995), FHIT. Newsltr 61, PeaceNet, 15 May 1995.
“ Anthony Goodman, “U.N. Council to Reassure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,” Rueters,
ClariNet Electronic News Service, 11 April 1995.
2 7 Paul Ekins, A New World Order: Grassroots Movement For Global Change (London:
Routledge, 1992), 43.
“ William Sweet, The Nuclear Age: Atomic Energy, Proliferation, and the Arms Race, Second
ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1988), 18-19.
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American people would not allow for the extreme.2 9 The media also did much to show the dangers
o f nuclear weapons. A CBS Reports showed the simulated effects o f a nuclear attack on Omaha,
Nebraska, and ABC broadcast “The Day After.” Soon demonstrations came to the United States.
For instance, nearly a million people demonstrated in New York City on June 12, 1980. This was
followed by the birth o f the Nuclear Freeze movement, which sought to freeze nuclear testing,
production and deployment by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Support o f a nuclear freeze became
very popular. In 1982 nuclear freeze resolutions passed in nine state referendums, and in 1983 the
U.S. House of Representatives passed a version of the Freeze. During this same time, local and
national church bodies began to issue statements voicing opposition to nuclear deterrence. The
growing Freeze movement in the U.S., the strength of the European peace movement and growing
global concern about nuclear war all led President Reagan to be more positive about arms control. In
addition, pressure from those in the peace movement was one factor leading to an agreement on
medium range missiles.
The impact of peace movements has not been limited to super-powers. They have been
influential in Great Britain and Germany, calling for unilateral disarmament and putting focus on
technology export issues.3 0 In addition, the peace movement worked with and supported the freedom
movements in communist countries including Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany.3 1 An
ethic o f nonproliferation encourages the formation of nonproliferation communities who will
pressure the nations of the world to stop the spread the nuclear weapons.
An ethic of nonproliferation must also decrease tension and help to develop a cooperative
international community. The decade o f the 1990s shows the need to find ways to work together and
to resolve conflict without the resort to violence. Failure to work toward conflict resolution will
2 9 Ekins, 40-41.
3 0 Sweet, xiii, 18-19 & 24.
3lEkins, 42.
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result in more proliferation. For instance, during 1992 the United States refused to admit Cuban
nuclear scientists to an international meeting. In response, Cuba threatened to share all of their
nuclear information with any Latin American nation that wanted it.
The ethical stance is one that comes from community. While small communities o f people are
crucial to the ethical stance, it is equally important that the world find ways to create a genuine
international community. There have been hopeful signs. As feminist writers remind us, the world
is not inevitably a place full o f conflict or war. Neither is peace just around the comer. The nations
o f the world need to create their own genuine community, and on no issue is this more important
than with nuclear proliferation. If there is to be any real progress made on controlling the spread of
nuclear weapons, the powerful countries o f the world are going to need to listen to what the less
powerful nations have to say. Activists can help guide their nations into a position o f participating
in a community rather than being adversaries.
Part o f conflict resolution is a commitment to peace education. The International Association o f
University Presidents and the United Nations have created a program for arms-control education. It
includes teaching courses in peace and security studies to undergraduates and graduate students in
business, education, journalism, law and medicine.3 2 Such efforts need to be supported and
encouraged to expand. The United States Institute o f Peace, created by Congress in 1984, also
engages in such work. The Institute works with libraries across the nation, developing
bibliographies and seeking ways to make its work publically accessible. The Institute has begun to
focus part of its work on the issues o f nuclear proliferation.3 3
An ethic of nonproliferation is an invitation to a paradigm shift toward less violent defense. An
ethical position must include moves toward a non-threatening defense. Perhaps the most promising
3 2 “GIobal Program For Arms-Control Education Is Planned,” Chronicle o f Higher Education,
July 21, 1993, a33.
3 3 Jeannie Wong, “Institute o f Peace, a Cold-War Creation, Charts New Course.” Chronicle o f
Higher Education, September 15, 1993, a30.
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alternative is civilian-based defense. This policy has been proposed by Gene Sharp o f the center for
international affairs at Harvard University. Civilian-based defense is a method of maintaining
security through non-military, non-violent means. Citizens become the means through which
attackers are prevented from gaining control over a society. Institutions, such as schools,
newspapers, radio, television, churches and all levels of government are used to achieve widespread
non-cooperation and massive public defiance. This prevents the attackers from obtaining their
objective o f taking over the country by making the populace ungovernable, thereby removing the
incentive to invade, since nothing can be gained from the invasion.3 4 Moreover, the just-
peacemaking strategies discussed in chapter two provide other nonviolent methods to promote order
and security as well as healing the scars o f war and violence by promoting reconciliation.
The objectives of civilian-based defense are the same as any other-to provide an effective
deterrent against invasion and take-over. Citizens prevent enemy control through massive
resistance. “Police would refuse to locate and arrest patriotic opponents o f the invader. Teachers
would refuse to introduce the invader’s propaganda into the schools.”3 S Such a policy is
complicated. It would require planning, training and expenditures o f money to implement.
Nevertheless, the costs involved would be probably no more than those incurred by current military
policy. Civilian based defense would also require dedication and suffering, as an invading force
would probably inflict much oppression upon resisting populations. On the other hand, nuclear
deterrence, if it fails, would also lead to mass suffering by civilians.
The advantage of civilian-based defense is that it is completely defensive. It could never be seen
as a threat to another nation.3 6 The result would therefore mean a decrease in tension, reducing the
3 4 Gene Sharp, National Security Through Civilian-Based Defense (Omaha: Association for
Transarmament Studies, 1970).
3 S Sharp, 17.
3 6 Sharp, 21 & 26.
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likelihood o f conflict. Further, because we would no longer have the ability to threaten another, the
morality o f our actions would be ensured. Transition by the nations o f the world to less violent
military policies would provide the groundwork for nonproliferation.
Security is not only the ability to deter or repulse an attack. Just as important are actions that
decrease tension and reduce the possible gain from an attack. Such actions include confidence
building, arms limitation and mutual disarmament. Civil resistance to invasion can provide security,
as can removing any international benefits to any nation that attacks another. For instance, if real
assistance were provided to other nations they would be less likely to attack because of “security
through mutuality of interest.”3 7
While an ethic of nonproliferation does not completely rule out the possibility of military strikes
in nonproliferation efforts, we have already established a strong preference for nonviolent means.
However, if a situation would be presented where a violent action without serious negative side
effects could greatly reduce proliferation and no viable nonviolent option was available, then such an
violent action could meet the ethical justification of an ethic of nonproliferation. Liberation theology
insists that we keep the option o f violence open, for to not do so makes it an ideology o f oppression
and in the case of nuclear weapons might doom us to destruction. Pacifism, while having strong
grounding in the Christian tradition, is not a value in itself that requires absolute commitment.
However, pacifism reminds that we are caught in the grips of the ideology o f war, and we tend to
assume that violent means will be efficacious when the evidence indicates that it usually is not.
B. Economic Pressure
Some specialists claim that the U.S. needs to take a much stronger stand against proliferation.
For instance, foreign aid could be linked to nonproliferation. However, the direct political power of
the U.S. and others to prevent proliferation is limited. At most, the nations o f the world can deny to
3 7 Ekins, 18.
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those who proliferate the political and financial benefits o f full participation in the industrial world.
One method would be U.N. sanctions against nations that attempt to proliferate or violate nuclear
safeguards or other agreements.
Under the Clinton Administration, the U.S. has adopted a policy o f “coercive diplomacy.” It
claims to have applied such a strategy with North Korea, Bosnia and Haiti. The pressure comes
from threats o f force and embargoes combined with diplomatic efforts. Such a policy requires the
willingness to carry out the threats, including military action. As explored above, an ethic of
nonproliferation has a strong presumption against military force, but such actions can be acceptable
if they meet the ethical standards set out above.
More useful may be the “carrots and sticks” o f economic pressure and assistance. In particular,
nuclear proliferation can be made costly and nonproliferation economically beneficial to potential
proliferating nations. Each context must be approached independently as differing nations will be
susceptible and/or receptive to different things. Such methods, if sufficient safeguards against harm
to the innocent are included, are acceptable to an ethic of nonproliferation. Nations who have not
agreed to forgo nuclear weapons have a right to develop them. However, other nations and
international organizations have a right to treat such nations as pariah nations.
Whenever economic pressure is to be asserted, it should be done on the international rather than
national level. Two recent incidents indicate some problems which arise when the U.S. works
unilaterally. During the spring o f 1995, the Clinton Administration announced an embargo o f Iran
specifically because of its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite being politically popular in the
United States, this step was very questionable. While there is indeed credible evidence that Iran has
a nuclear program, there is little evidence that its efforts are qualitatively different than several other
nations including North Korea and Pakistan. So why was Iran singled out by the United States?
The answer seems fairly obvious-it was because o f the U.S.’s long-standing hostility toward Iran.
Such a move thus did not reflect so much a commitment to nonproliferation but to using force to
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gain compliance by Iran. Moreover, even if economic sanctions were an appropriate response
toward Iran, trying to impose then unilaterally was foolish. The rest o f the world refused to go along
with such an action, making the U.S. look like an impotent lone-ranger. Even worse, the sanctions
may have had the opposite effect, pushing Iran even further away from the west. Many see the
attempt to get sanctions as a mistake since new leadership in Iran is more open to the relations with
the United States.3 8
The U.S. also had difficulty in seeking sanctions against North Korea in 1994, though here the
complaints were less strident. Russia complained that they should have been consulted first before
calls for sanctions were begun. China also complained that sanctions were not needed and remained
ambiguous whether it would veto sanctions in the United Nation’s Security Council. All became
moot as North Korea began to move on the issue. However, the need for coordinated international
action rather than singular action by the U.S. seems obvious from these examples.
While international economic pressures is preferable, even internationally endorsed economic
sanctions will not provide instant solutions. Dr. Sergei Kortunov, head o f the department of export
control and conversion of military technologies o f the Russian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, states:
Among those most probable candidates for creating WMD [weapons o f mass
destruction] in the Third World, however, are countries which are not experiencing
shortages in liquid capital, are not in need o f help from the IMF or IBRD and,
finally, are not vulnerable to these sanctions, although they can nevertheless have a
definite deterring effect.3 9
Moreover, it is also important to remember that sanctions often deal their harshest blow upon
innocent civilians in a society. It is exactly that fact that leads many just war theorists to question
whether sanctions can meet the just war criteria o f discrimination. Liberation theology is suspicious
of sanctions, suspecting that they are simply another tool o f oppression by the rich against the poor.
3 8 Robin Wright, “U.S. Moves Seen As Fatal to Any Opening by Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 7
June 1995, A4.
3 9 Sergei Kortunov, “Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation: The Role o f BMD,” Comparative
Strategy 13, no. 1 (1994): 137.
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On the other hand, pacifists tend to find sanctions as preferable to violent attacks. An ethic of
nonproliferation is sympathetic to the claim o f liberation theology and realizes that economic
pressure must be used with care, being well designed, targeted and monitored. However, an ethic of
nonproliferation retains sanctions as an optional tool for nonproliferation efforts.
Again, let us look at North Korea as a case study. Kimberly Ann Elliot o f the institute for
international economics has studied the possible effectiveness o f sanctions against North Korea.
Elliot points out that one difficulty o f sanctions is the structure o f North Korean society and economy
which they base on a philosophy o f self-reliance. Because of the limited nature o f North Korea’s
financial trade relations with other nations, the leverage o f sanctions is very slight. Further, what
international trade North Korea has is limited to items that it must have but cannot produce
domestically. To get these products, North Korea must export items in order to have the hard
currency to make the purchases. This means that for these few exports and imports, sanctions might
be too effective. That is, they may have such a devastating effect that they cause a military response
or a governmental downfall. Neither is a response one wants to happen to a state that may possess
nuclear weapons.
Elliot has studied the historical effectiveness of sanctions by looking at 115 examples. From her
study, she concludes that sanctions are most effective when the target nation is smaller than the
sanctioning nation or nations and when the target nation is weak and politically unstable. In
addition, sanctions are more effective when the sanctioner and the target are friendly to one another
and engage in trade and when they are imposed quickly and decisively. Further, the sanctions
should not be costly to the sanctioning nation. Looking at North Korea, Elliot found that because the
goal here was so ambitious, it would require international cooperation. Furthermore, the low
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likelihood o f success and the high cost o f a potential military response which would be required to
enforce the sanctions raises serious doubt about the use of sanctions in this case.4 0
Several times in relationship to the proliferation efforts o f North Korea the possibility of
sanctions has been put forth as a policy option. At the international level, each time sanctions were
considered, a stumbling block to such efforts was manifest. China argued that the most important
step that the U.S. could take is to normalize relations with Pyongyang rather than take actions which
will increase tensions. However, despite such rhetoric China might not veto sanctions against North
Korea in the Security Council if the rest o f the Council supported them because a nuclear North
Korea is not in their interest either. China is also concerned about maintaining its trading status
with the United States, which is under some threat because of its human rights record.4 1
Because o f moral concerns, sanctions do not typically include food or medical supplies.
Sanctions, especially backed up by blockades as enforcement, are ethically problematic. Although
they are less directly violent than a military attack, they can cause great suffering. Blockades are
considered an act o f war under international law. The practice is a throwback to the ancient method
of siege warfare and is prohibited under the just war tradition because o f its inability to distinguish
between civilians and combatants. In fact, the method is actually aimed at civilians. Successful
blockades, in terms of operation not outcome, were undertaken during the Cuban missile crisis and
against Iraq both before and after the Gulf War. However, these successes do not indicate that
similar success could be duplicated in nonproliferation efforts. The blockade in the Cuban missile
crisis worked only because o f an explicit threat of escalatory actions.4 2 The blockade of Iraq has hurt
Iraq economically but has not altered Iraqi policy.
4 0 KimberIy Ann Elliott, Will Sanctions Work Against North Korea. (Dec 17, 1993),.
Asia.Security, PeaceNet, 4 January 1994.
4 1 Jim Abrams, “U.S.-Korea,” Associated Press News, CompuServe Information Service, 20
March 1994.
4 2 Allison, 65.
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While an ethic o f nonproliferation holds a presumption against actions as extreme as blockades,
it retains the use o f them in extreme cases. Sanctions and even blockades may be just if they meet
the just w ar criteria o f last resort. Moreover, some form of sanctions should be allowed if an
international authority, such as the United Nations, calls for them. Even then they must be carefully
monitored to make sure that they do not lead to starvation or other serious harms to innocent
civilians.
Instead o f extreme measures such as blockades and sanctions, an ethic o f nonproliferation finds
a system o f economic rewards and punishments to be the preferable economic means to promote
nonproliferation. Engaging nations in trade decreases tension and builds relationships and trust.
The United States and other nations should increase such relationships with those nations who forgo
nuclear weapons and decrease economic relations with those who pursue nuclear weapons. A much
cheaper approach, compared to violent or covert options, to nonproliferation is to make it in the
interests o f nations not to pursue nuclear weapons.
The hypocrisy o f the United States’s and other nuclear and industrial nations’ demand to limit
proliferation is both striking and very evident in the above discussion. In the current situation, the
focus tends to be on nations on the demand side, when most o f the problems come from those nations
on the supply side. Nuclear proliferation remains a major problem because supplier nations such as
the United States sell nuclear technologies and materials to nations who are seeking nuclear
weapons. While the U.S. is quick to condemn nations such as China and North Korea for exporting
key technologies, the U.S. is as guilty. If the world is to become serious about nonproliferation, then
it must focus not only on demand side issues but also on supply side issues.
Supply side approaches to reducing nuclear proliferation are difficult because their effectiveness
requires the participation of all possible supplier nations and private companies. Such cooperation is
difficult to maintain because both companies and nations are willing to break the rules if it meets
their economic or political purposes. Moreover, since items used to build nuclear weapons may have
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legitimate “dual” or other uses, stopping the spread o f these items very difficult.4 3 Indeed the U.S. is
resistant to controlling its own sales and even considers the impact on its arms’ industries when
deciding whether to allow exports.4 4 Feminist theology recognizes that the move to supply side
control will be difficult and can only be undertaken in a step-by-step fashion. We must celebrate
each step taken as it makes the world safer. Then another step must be taken.
Liberation theology insists that we in the U.S. look at ourselves first. This is key to
nonproliferation efforts. The U.S., along with other nuclear nations o f the world, must regulate and
control the actions o f business interests who make profits from proliferation. One such action could
be public disclosure o f companies involved in proliferation. Economic measures must not only target
proliferating nations but also aim at the producing nations. The independent task force on
proliferation formed by the Council on Foreign Relations put forth that export controls are an
important component of nonproliferation efforts.4 5 Thomas W. Graham, policy research coordinator
at the University o f California’s institute on global conflict and cooperation in San Diego, argues
that a proper strategy has to challenge the “realistic” approach, which is stuck in a Cold War
mentality. We must be transformed into a new paradigm. The U.S. can decrease proliferation, and
to do so the U.S. must stop seeing proliferation as just one among many foreign policy issues.
Graham notes that highly idealistic nonproliferation efforts have historically worked.4 6 Moreover,
liberation theology insists that science and technology must be made accountable to the worldwide
human community. It also insists that an ethic of nonproliferation must be an ethic o f hope, while
4 3 Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 21 &
23.
4 4 Ralph Vartabedian and John M. Broder, “U.S. Weighs New Arms Sales Policy,” Los Angeles
Times, 15 November 1994, 1.
4 5 HadIey.
^Charles P. Cozic and Karin L. Swisher, eds, Nuclear Proliferation, Opposing Viewpoints, eds.
David L Bender and Bruno Leone (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1992), 31-32.
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pacifists insist it be an ethic of vision. It will take hope and vision to develop economic measures to
control and Limit both the demand and supply sides on nuclear proliferation.
All three schools stress the need to develop communities which will work on this issue. Nations
and businesses are under huge political pressure to engage in practices which are good economically
for the companies and nations. Nuclear proliferation, in the short term, can be beneficial
economically for supplier nations. However, in the long-term such actions threaten all business
activity, if not life itself. Nevertheless, an ethic of nonproliferation recognizes that nations and
corporations are unlikely to do the right thing on their own. It will be up to activist communities to
put pressure on companies and nations to do the right thing. Citizens must insist that nations not
sell nuclear and nuclear-related materials, technology and expertise. Citizens must insist that if such
sales are to be made there must be extreme safeguards to insure that nations can not divert such sales
to nuclear weapons use. Consumers can also use economic measures, such as boycotts of companies
which engage in proliferation, to put economic pressure on companies to behave responsibly. It may
require some economic sacrifices, but feminism says self-sacrifice is not the goal; instead the goal
and motivation is solidarity with the earth and its people.
C. International Control
The transnational nature of Christianity should include a commitment to internationalization as
a means to overcome the jealousy and envy present in nationalistic attitudes. Its transnational nature
should also include a commitment to prioritize nonviolence over violence, giving way to the belief
that social justice can be the only foundation for bringing about true peace. Rather than being based
on fear, peace must be based on trust, the nurturing of compassion, forgiveness, and understanding.
In fact, these elements are the chief means o f overcoming fear. In other words, inherent within
Christian understandings is a call to seek the expansion of community to include all people. The
goal should be to seek the reconciliation o f the opposing sides as a method to stop the horrors of a
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nuclear holocaust from becoming a reality. While this is an enormous step, it is, nevertheless, a
constructive step toward achieving the values o f Christianity. Possibly the most “Christian” method
would be to advocate for a policy o f unilateral disarmament. Neither the United States nor the other
nuclear nations are likely to agree to such a policy since they have often claimed such a move is
unrealistic. However, unilateral disarmament may not be so unrealistic as it first appears, and there
may still be good reasons for a Christian ethic o f nonproliferation to advocate such a path. Only by
acting as instruments o f peace can Christians be instruments of peace. By promoting such policies
as internationalization, Christians help produce an effort that contributes to the greater realization o f
a faith based on love and justice for all.
Surprisingly, realism may be coming to a similar conclusion. Iraqi nuclear development
persuaded many that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to have more power to
enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the past, IAEA has only inspected facilities
that NPT signatories declared open to inspection. The IAEA has recently changed its practices to
include “challenge inspections.” A challenged country can still refuse, but many will see such a
refusal as an admission o f guilt.4 7 The IAEA is also now given greater access to information about
nuclear programs around the world and also greater access to nuclear sites. Inspectors can now visit
sites with little or no notice and now take environmental readings around nuclear sites, increasing
the chances of detecting illegal nuclear activity.4 8
More international control of nuclear facilities is still needed. Even the traditional fields of
study often come to the conclusion that more international control is necessary. The report o f the
independent task force formed by the Council on Foreign Relations concludes:
To mount such a revitalized effort, the international community must move beyond
viewing non-proliferation as a “bargain” between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear
4 7 Toth, 10A.
4 8 John Chalmers, “Pacific States Fail to Sway France on Atom Tests,” Rueters, ClariNet
Electronic News Service, 25 June 1995.
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weapon states. It must see instead the common interest o f all members of the
international community in avoiding further nuclear proliferation. It must accept
the common need for shared obligations and shared responsibilities.4 9
This suggestion moves in the right direction ethically: from conflict to cooperation, from competition
to mutual effort. The weakness o f the report is that it puts too much o f the impetus to address this
problem on the non-nuclear nations and not enough on the nuclear nations. Drawing from the
biblical prophetic tradition, liberation theology insists that the first look be inward in a self-critical
way before pointing any fingers at others. Until the nuclear nations begin to act ethically, the non
nuclear nations may have no other option but to understand international agreements as a bargain,
one to which the nuclear nations have not lived up.
One reason that international control is so crucial to nonproliferation efforts is the fact that
actions by the U.S. alone are often counterproductive. Stephen D. Wrage, assistant professor of
political science at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, and George H. Quester, professor of
political science at the University of Maryland, make this point by looking at historical examples.
The visibility o f the intervention often forecloses any chance o f effectiveness.
When President Carter announced early in 1977 that he intended to cut arms sales
to Argentina and Uruguay because o f their human rights record, Argentina,
Guatemala, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay preemptively repudiated American
military aid. When the United States began endorsing the Latin American
Nuclear-Free Zone rather than criticizing it, it jeopardized Brazilian and Argentine
acceptance o f the Tlatelolco Treaty. The Carter administration’s protests about
Brazilian purchases of West German nuclear technology may have prolonged the
life o f the contract.5 0
So international control may be effective where U.S. action is not.
All three bodies o f thought explored in earlier chapters are supportive o f more international
cooperation and control o f nuclear weapons. Limiting proliferation, at least in the abstract, meets
liberation theology’s criteria of doing what is best for the majority of the people. In the best of all
worlds, the world community should be the agent to deal with problems such as proliferation. The
4 9 Hadley.
5 0 Wrage and Quester, 155.
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difficulty with this position is that no such community exists. It may be that in the last few years the
United Nations has begun to play this role, and the improvements in the workings o f the U.N. are to
be applauded. Nevertheless, liberation theology reminds us that the ethical stance must always side
with the poor and the dispossessed. Consequently, on this issue an ethic o f nonproliferation insists
that more voice be given to the less powerful countries.
In light o f support for international action, it was at first surprising to hear the peace
movement’s position at the NPT extension conference, in 1995, which was to oppose the permanent
extension o f the treaty. Initially, one would think that peacemakers would like to make permanent a
treaty designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. But at the time, peacemakers understood that
renewing the treaty for only a specific number o f years would allow the less powerful nations to focus
attention on the policies of the nuclear nations and place pressure upon them at future extension
conferences. While it is at first counterintuitive, the peace movement supported a limited rather than
an indefinitie extension. However, the nuclear powers won the day and the NPT was made
permanent. Side agreements do allow for increased review, and there is some hope that these will
provide forums for the nonnuclear powers to have a voice.
Realists might initially scoff at the ideas o f powerful nations yielding power to less powerful
nations. However, it is in the interest of the powerful nations to do so. Without such power and
voice, weaker nations will have motivations to acquire nuclear weapons. Consequently, the best
course o f action for the powerful is to yield some power. An ethic o f nonproliferation must be one
that pushes the powerful nations to listen and understand the concerns o f the less powerful. Rarely is
movement toward nuclear proliferation irrational or capricious. The U.S. is always clear on why, as
a nation, it needs nuclear weapons but seems mystified why others would make moves to acquire
similar weapons. If the U.S. could really put itself in the position o f these nations, it would not be
difficult to see why they are tempted. In a world with an extreme dichotomy o f power, nuclear
weapons will always tempt those at the bottom, precisely because they can move a nation quickly up
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the power scale. So, until the U.S. can seriously listen to nations such as Libya, North Korea or Iran,
they will have a strong incentive to proliferate.
On a broader level the U.S. must move to international approaches to conflict situations and stop
seeking to be the world’s police officer, especially acting on a unilateral level. The Center for
Defense Information argues that the practical alternative to unilateral intervention is to share
peacemaking roles with members of the United Nations. The Center also argues that the U.S. must
seek to strengthen the United Nations.5 1
Liberation theology also reminds us that we must be aware o f our social location. Consequently,
we need to explore the issues of proliferation not just from the position o f the United States but from
the positions o f these less powerful nations as well. Liberation theology also reminds us that
science/technology must be made accountable to the worldwide human community. International
control is a step in that direction. Nevertheless, part of the process has to be that poor countries
receive benefits from science and technology. Feminist theology calls for a move from power “over”
to a position o f power “with” and raises the question of whether we are really sharing the power of
technology and science. An ethic of nonproliferation must move us to more egalitarian approaches.
The discriminatory nature of the NPT also brings rise to much criticism. For instance, nations
such as Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and India have long refused to sign the NPT because it was
discriminatory by permanently classifying the world into two categories-nuclear and nonnuclear.
Such classification was viewed as discriminatory because it unfairly classified nations by their
nuclear expertise. However, these countries also feared that the treaty wouid limit the technological
development o f nonnuclear states. The nuclear powers put export controls on threshold nations such
as Argentina and Brazil. This seemed to make it even clearer that the great powers were trying to
limit the economic development of less developed countries. Such discrimination appears to be
‘Policing World Trouble Spots,” The Defense Monitor, 23, no. 3 (1994): 8.
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continuing. The U.S. has recently said it will not target programs in Japan and Western Europe that
produce plutonium but will oppose it elsewhere.5 2
In exploring the issues o f internationalization, let us now look at our case study o f North Korea.
North Korea is a very difficult nation to deal with. It is a hard-line Marxist state which has lost most
of its outside political and economic support. North Korea was a dictatorship formerly under the
leadership of Kim II Sung, known as the Great Leader. Then, in an unprecedented move in the
communist world, he passed on his position to his son, Kim Jong II, known as the Dear Leader. It is
widely conceded that Kim Jong II does not possess the political skills o f his father. As a result, it
was not clear at the time o f Kim II Sung’s death whether Kim Jong II would be able to assume
leadership, though he was later successful in doing so. North Korea at times acts in a paranoid
manner and it is unclear what further political shake-up will bring. It could bring military hard
liners to power, or it could make more moderate political leaders more open to working with the
west. Regardless o f the future, the current leadership may see nuclear weapons as an insurance
policy for future domestic power and as a source o f international prestige.5 3 In addition, we cannot
forget that the U.S. threatened North Korea with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and then
explicitly told North Korea that such weapons could be used against it if North Korea refused the
armistice agreement.5 4 Given such a history, we must not be surprised that North Korea acts to
insure that such threats are not repeated.
The criteria o f fairness, likewise, requires that we not judge our own actions differently than we
do the actions o f others similarly situated. Douglass Lackey states:
5 2 Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, “Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil,” Arms
Control Today, March 1994, 12.
S 3 Henrik Bering-Jensen, “North Korea Is the Latest Nuclear Power Keg,” Insight, 19 April 1993,
12.
5 4 DougIass P. Lackey, Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Allanheld, 1985), 44-45.
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The United States possesses nuclear weapons and does not condemn itself for
possessing them. Moral consistency requires, then, that the United States not
condemn other nations for the mere possession o f nuclear weapons. Moral
consistency also requires that the United States take no coercive steps to deprive
other nations o f their nuclear stockpiles and no coercive steps to prevent other
nations from acquiring them. (It does not require that the United States assist
other states in the development o f nuclear arms).5 5
Lackey’s evaluation is part right and part wrong. He is correct in claiming that the United States
cannot make moral claims against another nation for seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Like it or
not, North Korea is acting within its rights to withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons.
Such actions would make it more dangerous, and if it were to threaten or actually use its nuclear
weapons North Korea would be morally wrong. However, Lackey points out that if mere possession
is morally wrong, then the same is true for U.S. possession. Yet, Lackey fails to look at the second
possible evaluation. Namely, he neglects to draw the conclusion that the U.S. does have the moral
right to use its coercive powers to try to persuade and induce North Korea not to seek nuclear
weapons. Other nations have the same right to try to persuade the U.S. to give up its arms and, in
fact, several nonaligned nations have been doing just that. Such coercive efforts are ethical because
the moral voice o f the world has spoken through international agreements on nuclear issues, and
there is a worldwide ethic o f nonproliferation emerging. Finally, since North Korea is subject to the
NPT, the U.S. and the world have the right to use coercive power to make North Korea accountable
to its commitment.
International control is a move to world community, but not in the sense o f a “warm-fuzzy”
community where all the nations will like each other and see the situation in the same way. Such an
understanding o f community on the global level is completely unrealistic. While the three bodies of
thought which we have explored all stress community, they also have realistic understandings of
power relationships. A world community can move nations to understand that each nation has
legitimate interests and seek to find ways to reduce the conflict surrounding those interests. For
5 5 Lackey, 180.
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instance, Graham Allison’s book Essence o f Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis can
also give us insight to what may be the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear moves. Perhaps
they intend to use their nuclear program as a bargaining chip. Both our knowledge of North Korean
political and economic conditions and our observation o f their behaviors so far would suggest that we
can probably bargain on this issue. Consequently, the U.S. needs to take policy positions that will
allow it to help North Korea “bargain away” their nuclear program. Certainly, the United States can
make it more advantageous for them not to have a nuclear program than to have one. Some might
argue that North Korea wants to draw South Korea or the United States into a fight to reunite Korea.
However, this motivation is unlikely since all o f Korea, including North Korea would be the big
loser. Further, if this is their goal, the development of nuclear weapons is unnecessary since all they
need do is send troops across the 38th parallel. Others might argue that the North Korean
development o f nuclear weapons is purely a defensive move.5 6 This is a likely part of their
motivation. While costly, nuclear weapons would certainly be a linchpin in North Korean defensive
plans (as well as possible offensive plans). Consequently, the U.S. must be clear that in no way does
it intend to infringe upon North Korean sovereignty. Discussion of preemptive strikes only feeds
their militaristic tendencies.
International control does not mean that every situation is similar and that procedures will be
rigidly uniform. While nonproliferation efforts must become the domain of the international
community, such a move does not require the establishment of universal, uniform procedures as the
best approach. Feminist and liberation thinkers explicitly reject such universalization. Moreover,
the independent task force on nonproliferation formed by the Council on Foreign Relations reminded
us that we need “sound regional strategies” which are tailored to the specific situation in each
region.5 7
5 6 Allison, 47-50.
5 7 Hadley.
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An ethical position understands the position in which the other is situated. With North Korea,
other nations must remember it has legitimate security needs and that the U.S. has threatened North
Korea with nuclear weapons in the past. It is a wise political procedure to understand your
opponent’s perspective. The issue is not whether North Korea is justified in seeing the world as it
does but rather understanding that it does. It acts on its perceptions, not on U.S. perceptions.
Internationalization is consistent with the pacifist position that the nation-state system is part of
the problem. Moving to an international regime is a step in the right direction. Clearly, any steps of
international control will be small steps in the right direction, which feminist theology applauds.
We should evaluate each specific control on the terms that it provides the groundwork for future
steps.
There is strong international support for nonproliferation. Ways need to be found to nurture the
opposition to nuclear weapons. This cannot simply be the current international regime but one that
gives voice to the less powerful nations o f the world.
D. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
One step toward internationalization is a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The peace
movement has focused a great deal o f attention on a CTBT which prohibits all nuclear testing and
has the stated purpose o f prohibiting new nuclear weapons development. Many would like to
prohibit all nuclear weapons research as well, but if such provisions were added to a CTBT both
ratification and enforcement o f the treaty would be made considerably more difficult.
At least two claims are made for the importance of a CTBT in nonproliferation efforts. First, it
would limit the development of new types o f nuclear weapons, meaning that it is a significant step to
disarmament. Second, it would discourage proliferation because no weapon could be tested, and
therefore the confidence one has in nuclear weapons decreases. Third-world nations have long
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considered it a “minimal first step toward disarmament”5 8 Seismic stations can verify compliance
with a CTBT since nuclear explosions are picked up by the worldwide network o f seismic stations.5 9
While some suggest that a CTBT is key to controlling nuclear weapon proliferation, the U.S. has
been one o f the main obstacles to such a agreement. The 1990 NPT review conference agreed to
strengthen the NPT. The proposal called for unscheduled inspections, sanctions against violators,
and tighter control over the sale o f nuclear equipment and materials. The conference failed to adopt
the declaration, however, because o f U.S. objections to the proposal’s call for a CTBT. At the 1991
U.N. test ban review conference, only two nations in the world, the United States and Great Britain,
objected to continued efforts to achieve a CTBT.6 0
After Bill Clinton became U.S. President, U.S. policy toward a CTBT slowly changed, and talks
were relaunched. At first, the US wanted a clause that would allow for testing to resume in ten
years. Such a limited term would have meant that the treaty would have failed to provide any real
change in the status quo. It would only have provided some delay to problems.6 1 Finally, the U.S.
withdrew the condition of easy withdrawal after ten years.6 2
The U.N. General Assembly approved the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 10,
1996, on a vote of 158 for and three against with five abstentions. As o f 1999, it had been signed by
more than 150 countries, including the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China.
However, the U.S. Senate has not ratified the treaty nor has it been signed by India, Pakistan and
5 8 Sweet, xii.
5 9 Sweet, 145-147.
“ Ian Barbour, Ethics in an Age o f Technology, The Gifford Lectures, no. 2 (San Francisco:
Harpers, 1993), 208.
6 1 Jim Wurst, “Ending Our Reliance on Nuclear and Conventional Arms,” Disarmament Times,
November 22, 1994.
“ Rebecca Johnson, “CTBT Negotiations Geneva Update No. 16,” Nuclear Proliferation News, 7
March 1995.
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North Korea. The lack of participation o f India, Pakistan and North Korea is a serious hindrance to
the value o f the treaty. These three nations are part of a list o f 44 nations which must sign and ratify
the treaty before it comes into force. However, all three have expressed some interest in signing the
treaty. Still, recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan make clear that without these three nations’
assent a CTBT is at worst a hoax and at best incomplete. An ethic o f nonproliferation supports
signatures and ratification of the treaty by all the nations o f the world but is troubled that the absence
of these three means the nations o f the world did not do enough to find common ground on the issue.
In reality a CTBT is probably not as strong a nonproliferation method as it is often portrayed
since it is now possible for technologically advanced nations to “test” without test explosions.
Indeed, advancement in testing abilities may be the reason for the change in U.S. policy toward a
CTBT. Jacqueline Cabasso, executive director o f the Western States Legal Foundation, an anti-
nuclear advocacy group in Oakland, California, points out the U.S. uses inertial confinement fusion,
computer modeling and other methods to continue testing and designing nuclear weapons.6 3
Mexican Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch pointed out such hypocrisy in a statement to the UN’s
Conference on Disarmament on January 31, 1995:
What is happening now with regard to nuclear testing, is no different from what
has been happening in the disarmament field for years: the technologically more
advanced nations reach a point where they can discard a certain weapon or
weapon-related activity and then they move to ban that weapon or activity for the
rest o f the world through a multilateral treaty.6 4
The United States acquiescence to the CTBT has not stopped U.S. development o f nuclear weapons.
Indeed, both the United States and Russia are still carrying out what they call “sub-critical” nuclear
tests, which they insist are not nuclear explosions though they still involve plutonium. Meanwhile,
the United States and France are both creating expensive laser facilities which create very small
“ Jacqueline Cabasso, “Lab Testing Undermines Test Ban and NPT,” Disarmament Times,
November 22, 1994.
“ “Documents and Sources,” Nuclear Proliferation News, 7 March 1995.
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nuclear explosions and can be used to test new nuclear weapon designs. Both nations insist that
such facilities are exempt from the CTBT. Perhaps even more telling is that the U.S. budget for
nuclear weapons testing and design is currently larger than it was for most o f the Cold War and is
about the size o f the entire Russian military budget.ss The Pentagon and the Energy Department
have no intention of working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons but are instead creating the
scientific and technological infrastructure to support a permanent nuclear force.6 6 Liberation
theology requires the unmasking o f ideological positions and urges us to look at our own actions
first. U.S. actions are disingenuous, counterproductive and non-responsive to our changed world
situation. In the post-Cold War world, nations do not need even-more advanced nuclear weapons.
As for current weapons, arms control experts point out that technology exists to keep these
weapons credible and safe without testing.6 7 All o f the crucial systems involve mechanical and
electrical parts of the weapons, and they can be tested without an explosion. The vast majority of
nuclear tests in the world are and continue to be for testing new designs, making the weapons more
survivable to a nuclear attack or to increase the explosive power o f the weapons.6 8 None of these
reasons are concerned with safety or reliability, and it is exactly such nuclear advancement that an
ethic o f nonproliferation wants to limit. The CTBT is not a fail-proof way to stop such advancement,
but it slows and makes more complex such developments.
While it has flaws, the CTBT is still one o f the boldest steps that the nations of the world have
taken on the nuclear front. It meets the feminist criterion o f responsible action. While an end to
6 5 Arjun Makhijani, “It’s Tim e-Right Now— To Ratify Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, 29 August 1999, 3J.
“ Ralph Vartabedian, “U.S. Launches Race to Save Nuclear Arms Know-How,” Los Angeles
Times, 28 August 1995, A 17.
6 7 Carol Giacomo, “French Test Decision Seen As Disarmament Setback,” Reuters, ClariNet
Electronic News Service, 14 June 1995.
6 8 “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” The Defense Monitor 22, no. 1 (1993): 4.
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testing does not ultimately solve the nuclear issue since nations can still proliferate without testing, it
does decrease the incentives for a new generation o f even more advanced nuclear weapons. It also
can be a starting point from which to discuss further disarmament steps.
Preventing further tests is also good for the earth and its people. While in recent years nuclear
tests have been limited to under the ground, such tests still include environmental risks. Moreover,
most nuclear tests, whether atmospheric or underground, have been conducted on or near lands
belonging to indigenous people or other minorities. Moreover, we should not assume that such
testing has not killed people, as the estimates are that between 100,000 and 500,000 people will die
during the twentieth-first century as the result o f atmospheric testing done during the twentieth
century. Even though the U.S. government knew that such consequences would be likely, (and were
careful to warn companies such as Kodak, located near nuclear testing, to protect their film from the
damage o f nuclear tests) the government did not protect its own people.6 9 A CTBT meets the
requirements o f liberation theology, which insists we side with the poor and dispossessed by
protecting them from further harms o f nuclear testing. Likewise, pacifism requires an ethic of
nonproliferation to defend the oppressed as a task of justice, and in this way the CTBT promotes
justice. Feminist theology also lifts up justice as a central norm.
Pacifism requires an ethic o f nonproliferation to address the motivation of nations and people to
acquire nuclear weapons. A CTBT should help decrease the motivations because it slows if not stops
the advancement of nuclear weapons. It also furthers the creation o f global anti-nuclear sentiments,
which should decrease the motivations for nuclear weapons. Pacifism requires us to give up some of
our control and take bold and risky steps to end the threat o f nuclear weapons, and the CTBT meets
such standards.
Christian pacifists say that the church needs to be a faithful witness o f another way. They also
say the church should engage in coalition-building on peace issues because it has an understanding
6 9 Makhijani, 3J.
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to offer that would otherwise be left out. In the 1980s, religious bodies were very active in speaking
out about the immorality o f nuclear deterrence. Now is the time for religious communities, for peace
movements and for communities o f resistance to speak out on the issue o f proliferation and, more
specifically, to pursue the ratification o f the CTBT. Feminist theology insists that ethical actions
must lay the groundwork for further action, and it is exactly there that a CTBT can be useful.
However, an ethic o f nonproliferation must be careful in its approach to the CTBT. It is critical o f
the approach to the CTBT that those few peace organizations working on nuclear issues have taken.
They have overstated the importance and the impact that a CTBT will have on nonproliferation.
This means that those few individuals drawn back into working on nuclear issues will think their
work is complete if the CTBT is ratified and will leave the nuclear movement again. Instead, we
need long-term and sustained involvement on nuclear issues. The CTBT is a useful, though
problematic, step for an ethic o f nonproliferation but nothing more. It will not be our nuclear savior.
E. Nuclear-Free Zones
Another international action step in nonproliferation efforts is the promotion of nuclear-free
zones such as those created by the treaties of TIatelolco in Latin America and Rarotonga in the
Pacific. Nuclear-free zones can be a useful step in anti-nuclear efforts. The question o f course
remains, how and where.
Feminists remind us that freeing the world o f all nuclear weapons is a goal so big that it
paralyzes us. A step on that path that is not demoralizing is the movement for nuclear-free zones.
Nuclear-free zones can and have been created on as small an area as a single building, such as a
church, and as large an area as several nations. The nuclear-free zone movement became very active
during discussion about nuclear deterrence in the 1980s. This movement needs to be revived. It has
important educational and symbolic value when churches, schools and communities say that no
activity related to nuclear weapons will take place within their boundaries.
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The nuclear-free zone movement also can be of real value in stopping proliferation around the
globe. The example of Latin America is proof in point. The Treaty o f TIatelolco essentially created
a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, which was strengthened through the bilateral agreement
between Argentina and Brazil. Africa has begun the process o f making all o f Africa a nuclear-free
zone. In June of 1995, the Organization o f African Unity adopted unanimously a treaty making
Africa a nuclear-free zone.7 0 The Caribbean Community, or Caricom, has discussed making the
Carribean into a nuclear-free zone.7 1
Such agreements could be models to places such as Pakistan and India. A regional agreement
could allow the two to monitor each other’s nuclear programs, perhaps without them joining the
NPT or the CTBT. While an ethic o f nonproliferation would like to see India and Pakistan join the
NPT and the CTBT, bilateral agreements and nuclear-free zones might be steps on that journey.
North and South Korea might follow the model as well. For instance, the world would make
real progress if North and South Korea would open their facilities to joint inspection, thus insuring
that these two adversaries will not engage each other in nuclear war because neither possesses such
weapons. North Korea, at one point in time, placed a nuclear-free zone proposal on the table for the
Korean peninsula. While it was no doubt intended to remove U.S. nuclear presence in Korea, the
U.S. has now removed its nuclear weapons from Korea. However, the U.S. nuclear umbrella still
covers South Korea. Nevertheless, the U.S. could try to resurrect this proposal as a basis for
improved discussions. Perhaps Israel and the Arab countries could create a nuclear-free zone in the
Middle East.
Nuclear-free zones are major accomplishments, and new ones will not come easily or quickly.
Resisting communities within each country could take on the strategy of nuclear-free zones and lay
7 0 Sean Howard and Suzanna van Moyland, eds. Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 27 (24 June
1995) FHIT.Newsltr 74, PeaceNet, 24 June 1995.
7lSean Howard, ed. Nuclear Proliferation News, no. 18 (17 February 1995), FHIT.Newsltr,
PeaceNet, 20 February 1995.
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the ground work for their nation. Nuclear-free zones meet the liberationist standard o f seeking
contextual solutions, here regional nuclear-free zones. However, regional nuclear-free zones can
build the base for a worldwide nuclear-free zone. Feminist theology argues that responsible actions
must lay the groundwork for future action and nuclear-free zones do that. One nuclear-free zone
lays the ground work for another nuclear-free zone. As there become more nuclear-free zones, the
nuclear weapons of the nuclear powers become less and less valuable because legally transporting
them around the globe becomes more difficult. Navies with nuclear weapons could not dock in many
places. Consequently, nuclear-free zones should encourage nations to become less and less
dependent on nuclear weapons for defense, meeting the pacifist requirement that an ethic of
nonproliferation address the motivations for proliferation. While nuclear-free zones do not prohibit
strategic nuclear weapons on a nation’s own soil, they do further the growth o f the global anti-
nuclear ethic.
F. Decrease Nuclear Stockpiles
A common assumption driving much o f nuclear policy is that the nuclear genie cannot be put
back in the bottle. However, even from a traditional security point o f view, this may not be the case.
Advances in the capabilities o f conventional weapons makes it possible that they can play the
deterrent role that nuclear weapons have played. In fact, modem conventional weapons may be a
better deterrent than nuclear weapons, especially since many doubt that the U.S. would actually use
nuclear weapons, especially in defense o f someone such as Kuwait.7 2
If we move to the level o f a paradigm shift, we will of course be looking for more fundamental
change. If the goal is a true transformation, then we are talking about a transformation to a
nonnuclear world. However, it would be unrealistic to think that we could do so in any single action.
7 2 Jenonne Walker, Security and Arms Control in Post-Confrontation Europe (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 18.
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As feminist theologians stress, it will only be through a step-by-step process that such a goal can be
achieved. In other words, while advocating directly for a nonnuclear world is unrealistic, taking
steps in the direction o f a nonnuclear world is realistic. Feminist theology insists that responsible
action is that which lays the groundwork for future actions. Nuclear weapons will not simply be
eradicated; we must work for it. Most importantly, nuclear weapons will not be eradicated if nations
plan their defense postures based on them. As a result, all ethical policy proposals must seek to
move the nations o f the world away from nuclear weapons. Steps might include a cessation of the
production and deployment o f new weapons and the removal or disabling o f deployed nuclear
weapons.
The promising news in the area o f nuclear stockpiles is cause for celebration. Both the U.S. and
the former Soviet Union are making huge nuclear cuts. The United States is currently not producing
any new nuclear weapons. People o f peace should be applauding these developments. By reminding
us that a sustaining community celebrates its achievements, feminist theologians offer a clue to why
the peace movement and the churches are so quickly bogged down in despair: They have failed to
celebrate the great advances made. The world has taken dramatic steps in the right direction. Yes,
much more still needs to be done, and communities need to continue to work for further nuclear
disarmament. In spite o f the work that remains to be done, why has there been so little celebration
among those who work for peace?
In 1991 the U.S. stopped the production of new nuclear weapons. Further, agreements between
the U.S. and Russia are significantly cutting each nation’s stockpile o f strategic nuclear weapons.
The ultimate goal and accomplishment o f nonproliferation efforts should be the elimination of
nuclear weapons from the face o f the earth. The independent task force on nonproliferation, formed
by the Council on Foreign Relations, finds a synergistic relationship between progress on stopping
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proliferation and nuclear disarmament.7 3 If the nuclear powers undergo nuclear disarmament, others
will forgo nuclear weapons.
However, the news is not all positive, as Russia has now increased the role that nuclear weapons
play in its defense policy. The move is primarily economic. Since the weak Russian economy
cannot support a large military force, it now sees its nuclear force as a deterrent against invasion.
For 1999, Russia will spend $4 billion on defense compared to the $260 billion the United States will
spend. However, because Russian nuclear weapons were paid for in the past this change o f strategy
is cheaper. The good news is that this Russian nuclear strategy is defensive, serving as a deterrent to
invasion.7 4
Nevertheless, this new reliance on nuclear weapons will make further nuclear reductions more
difficult. But, because an ethic o f nonproliferation has adopted from pacifism the need to address the
motivations that nations have to proliferate, progress can still be made. Such progress, however, will
be dependent on whether the United States and other NATO nations will take steps to increase
Russia’s sense of security. Feminist theology calls us to hear the voice of the other, and in this
context U.S. policy must be informed by the voice o f Russia and its real security concerns. The U.S.
can respond to Russia’s voice o f fear and anxiety by decreasing military spending, taking less
threatening military postures and giving Russia security guarantees. Feminist ethics insists that we
engage in strategic risk-taking, and pacifists encourage an ethic o f nonproliferation to give up
control and take bold and risky steps to decrease the danger posed by nuclear weapons. The U.S.
may need to take the bold steps o f unilateral nuclear disarmament and then wait to see if Russia
reciprocates such moves.
3Hadley.
7 4 Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Launched Nuclear Drills, Official Says,” Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, 10 July 1999, 7A.
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The steps taken with START I & II are a good start. START H set the level of strategic
warheads for each nation between 3,000 and 3,500. While the Russian legislature has never ratified
it, the limits are being worked toward. There are beginning talks o f a START III which would lower
the levels further to between 2,000 and 2,500. Still, more steps are needed. The Center for Defense
Information (CDI) argues that 1,000 strategic warheads deployed only on submarines would provide
adequate deterrence for the United States. This proposal would eliminate the other two parts o f the
strategic triad-land-based missiles and strategic bombers-thus saving money from their operation.
CDI also calls for the complete elimination o f tactical nuclear weapons, which have no military
value anyway. CDI goes on to say that the U.S. should take this move unilaterally since neither
Russia nor China nor any emerging nuclear nation could threaten the U.S. with an arsenal of 1,000
nuclear weapons. They estimate that such a move would save the U.S. taxpayers $150 billion over
the next 10 years. The CDI goes on to say that this is not the last step either. Once weapons are at
the 1,000 level, the U.S. would be able to negotiate with other nations for even further reductions.7 5
Liberation theology argues that we must look at ourselves first, and so an ethic of nonproliferation
insists that the U.S. be the world’s leader in disarmament.
G. No First Use Pledge
Peace activists often propose that the nations of the world should pledge not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons. A more commonly discussed step are pledges not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons. A nation with a policy o f first-strike, or at least one that has not eliminated the option of
strike first, is willing under certain conditions to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
Such a policy is in contrast to the policy o f retaliation, or second strike, where one possesses nuclear
weapons only to return fire after being hit with nuclear weapons.
7 S “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” 6-7.
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The ability to retaliate was the basis o f U.S. official policy until Presidential Directive 59 during
the Carter Administration. After Presidential Directive 59, the U.S. maintained the policy of first-
strike. The U.S. openly stated that under certain conventional war situations it would turn to nuclear
weapons to ensure victory.7 5 During the Cold War, with the threats from the Warsaw Pact and North
Korea which might overrun conventional forces, the U.S. rejected no-first-use policies and reserved
the right to use nuclear weapons in cases when and if conventional weapons would not suffice in a
policy called “flexible response.” The principle risk o f such a policy is that an enemy would not
believe that the U.S. would escalate to the nuclear level. In such cases, some critics insist, the risk of
a nuclear war increases because an enemy might miscalculate U.S. resolve and undertake an action
that will precipitate a U.S. nuclear response. Since the Carter Administration, the U.S. has had a
policy o f limited renunciation o f nuclear weapons. Carter, Reagan and Bush each pledged not to use
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states if they were not fighting in an alliance with a nuclear
state.
Arms agreements during the last decade between the U.S. and Russia have significantly reduced
the likelihood o f a first-strike from either o f these nations. The primary factor is that these
agreements have limited multiple-warhead missiles, which provide a strategic advantage for a nation
making a first-strike. Such missiles are a prime target for nations making a first-strike since the
attacking nation would be able to destroy several enemy warheads with only one missile. However,
if all missiles have only one warhead then the attacking nation gains nothing by attacking first since
it forfeits one o f its warheads in hopes o f destroying a single-warhead o f its enemy. The new limits
on the number of warheads have also led commentators to conclude that neither side will retain
enough o f a strike-force to launch a first-strike. If this is the new situation that we find ourselves to
be in, an ethic of nonproliferation must question why the United States still refuses to pledge that it
7 S Paul R Hinlicky and Robert W. Jenson, “Can Deterrence Be Justified As a Lesser Evil?: A
Debate,” Currents in Theology and Mission, 12 (1985): 265.
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will never again be the first nation to use nuclear weapons during a conflict- Such a declaration is a
small but achievable step that lays the groundwork for future action. In the days preceding the 1995
NPT review conference, President Clinton did agree not to order a nuclear strike against countries
that have no nuclear weapons and have signed the NPT. The one caveat was that the pledge does
not apply if the U.S. or its allies were attacked or invaded.
Even traditional methodologies point out that, with the break-up o f the Soviet Union and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, a U.S. nuclear first-use is no longer needed to protect the security of
Western Europe. With the increased conventional strength of South Korea, the same conclusion is
valid there. A stronger case for adopting a no-first-use policy against conventional attacks now
exists. The U.S. adoption o f a no-first-use would respond to the demands o f nonnuclear states. This
might also allow for extended deterrence for nonnuclear states from nuclear states as opposed to
building their own.7 7 While pressure for the U.S. to adopt a no-first use policy has been increasing,
the world has taken a step backward. The Soviet Union had a no-first-use pledge, but its successor
state, Russia, has abandoned this policy, threatening a nuclear response to an invasion by western
forces. O f the current nuclear powers, only China retains a no-first-strike policy.7 8 China insists that
a no-first-use policy among all nuclear nations is a prerequisite to nuclear disarmament.
No first-use pledges are largely symbolic, with little way to enforce them. Nevertheless,
Douglass Lackey argues that no-first-use pledges are helpful. If a nation breaks a no-first-use
pledge, other nations will be more likely to respond, and this increases security.7 9 Lackey is probably
correct that other nations would be upset by the breaking o f such pledges. Nevertheless, it is unclear
that their response would be much different from their outrage that nuclear weapons had been used
^George A. Quester and Victor A. Utgoff, “Non-First-Use and Nonproliferation: Redefining
Extended Deterrence.” Washington Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1994): 104.
7 8 “Documents and Sources,” Nuclear Proliferation News, 4 April 1995.
7 9 Lackey, 221-222.
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at all. So this is not the primary progress that no-first-use pledge brings to an ethic of
nonproliferation. Instead, these pledges are of value as steps away from nuclear defense. They are
pledges that the only reason to have nuclear weapons is to deter the use o f nuclear weapons by
others. In a step-by-step approach to nonproliferation, the ability to limit the utility of nuclear
weapons to deterrence is an important step in encouraging the nations o f the world to move away
from reliance on nuclear weapons. If deterrence is the only purpose for nuclear weapons then
encouraging nations not to acquire nuclear weapons will be easier. Unless nuclear weapons threaten
them, they should have little motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. This meets the pacifist
standard that we must address the motivations of nations to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, no-
first-use pledges meet the feminist criteria of responsible action because it lays the groundwork for
further action. No-first-use pledges are also examples of what feminist ethics call strategic risk
taking and pacifism calls bold and risky but faithful steps. A no-first-use pledge is an action that the
U.S. can take unilaterally, and this meets the liberationist standard that we look at ourselves first.
Consequently, no-first-use pledges, while largely symbolic in nature, are still useful to an ethic of
nonproliferation.
H. Controlling Weapon-Grade Fissile Material
While acquiring the technology needed for nuclear weapons is difficult, an even more difficult
task is to obtain weapon-grade nuclear material. As a result, controlling nuclear material must be
part o f an ethic of nonproliferation. The easiest and most dramatic way to limit the spread of such
material is to end the production o f weapon-grade nuclear material. An ethic o f nonproliferation
supports efforts to create an international treaty to prohibit the production of weapon-grade fissile
material.
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France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom have supported beginning
negotiations to create a treaty which would ban the production o f fissile material for weapons.8 0 An
ethic of nonproliferation supports a ban on the production o f weapon-grade fissile material because,
regardless o f one’s perspective, there is no need for more weapon-grade material. The U.S. National
Academy o f Sciences estimates that 1600 to 1700 tons of plutonium have accumulated in the world’s
stockpiles.8 1 Used reactor fuel is highly radioactive and must be stored safely away from the
environment for tens of thousands o f years. Such spent fuel also contains plutonium which can be
used for nuclear bombs. In the 1970s it was assumed that this plutonium would be removed and then
reused as reactor fuel. With such quantities of fuel circulating, many feared that it would become too
easy for governments, terrorists and criminals to acquire some o f it, perhaps by hijacking a
shipment.8 2
The process o f dealing with nuclear waste, whether it is from civilian or military origins, makes
the threat o f proliferation more severe. Peter Grinspoon, director o f the nuclear power campaign for
Greenpeace USA speaks o f the connection:
In order to bum nuclear waste as a “disposal” technique, highly radioactive, spent
fuel from reactors must first be reprocessed to recover the theoretically usable
plutonium. This process actually multiplies the volume o f radioactive waste by 160
times, it results in severe worker contamination, and it is prohibitively expensive.
Also, this process converts the plutonium to bomb-grade purity, greatly increasing
the threat of nuclear proliferation.8 3
Five nations-India, Russia, Japan, France and the United Kingdom— still operate civilian
reprocessing plants which separate out plutonium. Reprocessing originally was seen as a solution to
“ Howard and van Moyland, no. 23.
8lVladimir lakimets, “Accounting and Control o f Fissile Material in Russia: Status,
Shortcomings and Risk of Proliferation,” Disarm CTB-NPT121, PeaeNet, 31 January 1995.
8 2 Sweet, 20.
“ Peter Grinspoon, “The Nuclear Age Is a Technological Failure.” Chronicle o f Higher
Education, August 5, 1992, b3.
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disposal. It is clear that it has military implications, and it is not a solution.8 4 Consequently, civilian
conversion is not a good option for an ethic o f nonproliferation. An ethic o f nonproliferation
supports the disposal o f nuclear waste, whether civilian or military.
In 1988 under then president Ronald Reagan, the U.S. stopped its production of military
plutonium, the basic material for nuclear warheads.8 S While this was an important step, it calls out
for more action. During the spring o f 1995, President Clinton removed 200 tons of weapon-grade
material from the U.S. nuclear stockpile. This material could have been used to make thousands o f
nuclear weapons. The world already possesses a huge stockpile o f these materials. The U.S. has 26
metric tons of plutonium left over from four decades of nuclear bomb making.8 6 This situation will
only get worse. Thousands o f U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are scheduled for retirement, and
this will result in a minimum o f 100 metric tons of plutonium and hundreds o f tons of highly-
enriched uranium becoming military surplus.8 7
Even by reducing or stopping the production of weapon-grade nuclear material, the problem o f
readily available nuclear materials is not solved. The world already possesses a huge stockpile of
these materials. The U.S. has agreed to buy tons of such material from Russia to keep it from falling
into unfriendly hands. Under the agreement the United States will buy at least 10 metric tons of
highly enriched uranium each year from Russia and then dilute it for use in the nuclear energy
industry. One problem with the plan is that nuclear reactor fuel is already in oversupply. While this
^Sweet, xiii.
8 5 Doyle McManus, “U.S. Production o f Nuclear Explosives Is Formally Halted,” Los Angeles
Times, July 14, 1992, A4.
8 6 Ralph Vartabedian, “Tons o f Plutonium Are Stored Unsafely, U.S. Says,” Los Angeles Times,
December 7, 1994, A25.
8 7 National Academy o f Sciences, “Management and Disposition o f Excess Weapons Plutonium,”
Arms Control Today, March 1994, 27.
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effort is a good step, Russian has between 500 and 700 metric tons o f such materials.8 8 Nevertheless,
we need to celebrate the steps taken. The U.S. has also purchased nuclear material from other
former Soviet Republics. Recent surveys o f the security at Russian nuclear material storage sites find
it worse than was previously thought. Especially because security o f nuclear stockpiles in Russia is
questionable, the more nuclear material that the U.S. can remove from Russia, the better. It is a
good investment for an ethic o f nonproliferation.
Another problem with stockpiles is that the five nuclear nations recognized by the NPT-the
U.S., Russia, China, Great Britain and France-have no international controls over their military
stockpiles of nuclear materials. This is because the purpose o f controlling stockpiles has been to
limit the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Since there was no such need with these nations, it was
thought that there was no need to control their stockpiles. So the largest stockpiles have not been
carefully monitored. In moving forward, however, this needs to be reevaluated.
The disposal o f nuclear waste is also a serious problem. Ironically, the end o f the Cold War has
made matters worse because, with the flow and cycles stopped, nuclear materials have been left in
facilities that were not for designed long term storage. Consequently, the waste poses a huge safety
threat.8 9 Radioactive waste, in a process called vitrification, can be transformed into glass, then put
into canisters which are placed in concrete pits for “interim” storage. This is not a final storage
solution, but it does mean that the material can no longer be used in weapons. Dealing with the
nuclear waste left over from nuclear weapons programs requires a massive effort. The U.S. is
spending more than $6 billion a year on this problem, and this only scratches the surface of what
needs to be done.
Experts have developed proposals for dealing with the excess nuclear material. The National
Academy of Sciences advocates a comprehensive approach to handling the large stock of plutonium
8 8 McManus, A4.
8 9 Vartabedian, “Tons o f Plutonium,” A25.
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created by disarmament following the end of the Cold War. Its policy recommendation details a
reciprocal U.S.-Russian plutonium regime that includes: 1) a declaration o f total inventories of
weapons and fissile material, 2) the monitored dismantlement o f weapons, 3) safeguarded interim
storage for nuclear materials, 4) long-term disposal of excess plutonium by vitrification into large
logs with high-level waste or by use as fuel in existing reactors without future reprocessing.9 0 An
ethic o f nonproliferation supports these recommendations though it has concerns about using the
material even in one cycle in civilian nuclear reactors.
Some maintain that we cannot control nuclear weapons if we have nuclear power plants.
Clearly it would be easier without them, but the world is not likely to eliminate nuclear power plants
in the near future. In 1986, worldwide there were 303 reactors with a capacity o f 196,029 megawatts
located in 26 countries. In addition, in that same year there were another 25 nations building or
planning to build nuclear reactors.9 1
However, negotiating the end o f the production of weapon-grade nuclear material or even
eliminating nuclear power plants is not an impossibility. There is historical precedent for it.
President Nixon cut U.S. biological weapons first in 1969 and then negotiated a treaty on biological
weapons in 1972. Such bold steps can work. Controlling fissionable material is crucial to
controlling proliferation.9 2
Pacifism insists that an ethic o f nonproliferation be an ethic o f vision. It must envision a world
without nuclear power plants. Liberation theology, meanwhile, is suspicious o f such a call. While
liberation theology argues that technology and science must be made accountable to the worldwide
community, it will likely be critical o f moves to limit nuclear power from third-world nations. Such
a position may look like another effort by the developed countries to limit the development of
N ational Academy of Sciences , 27.
9 1 Sweet, 20-21.
9 2 Lackey, 222-223.
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underdeveloped nations. Moreover, nuclear power plants have been used by nations such as North
Korea as bargaining chips in return for ending nuclear weapons programs. Consequently, this is a
complicated and long-term issue. However, nuclear energy is not the panacea that it promised. If
one adds in the costs o f disposing o f nuclear waste, it is clearly more expensive than other forms of
energy. Moreover, the waste products themselves are a threat to life on the planet. So, the vision of
an ethic of nonproliferation involves the elimination o f both nuclear weapons and nuclear power.
However, neither are realistic goals. Instead, an ethic o f nonproliferation will encourage step-by-step
approaches to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear energy.
I. Decrease in Military Spending
In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the
final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and
are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending
the sweat of its laborers, the genius o f its scientists, the hopes o f its children. The
cost o f one modem heavy bomber is this: a modem brick school in more than 30
cities.9 3
These powerful words from a former general and commander o f the Allied Forces during World War
II are an important reminder o f the cost o f military spending. A recent study by the Brookings
Institute revealed that the nuclear arms buildup during the last 50 years has cost U.S. taxpayers $4
trillion. As a result, in claiming that nuclear weapons were a cheap way to deter U.S. enemies, the
government was essentially lying to the American people.9 4 Perhaps not coincidentally, $4 trillion is
roughly equivalent to the U.S. national debt. Both Eisenhower and the Brookings’ study are
reminders that military spending is not discretionary spending but spending that takes funds from
other areas. Moreover, they both remind us that military spending may make us more secure but can
9 3 The Defense Monitor, 23, no 6 (1994): 7.
9 4 Ralph Vartabedian, “Nuclear Arms Buildup Cost U.S. $4 Trillion Study Says,” Los Angeles
Times, 12 July 1995, A 17.
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also make us more insecure. Consequently, an ethic o f nonproliferation can only support military
spending that adds to security and oppose spending proposals which do not contribute to but instead
reduce national security.
Moreover, liberation theology insists that an ethic of nonproliferation side with the poor and the
dispossessed, and such bloated military spending is robbery from, rather than siding with, the poor.
In 1988, global military spending was approximately $1 trillion. For this amount, nations buy
military hardware, employ half a million scientists and engineers in military research, and put 25
million people in uniform. For comparison, the World Bank Institute’s Tropical Forestry Action
Plan spent $8 billion over five years. The United Nations’ attempt to bring clean water to every
person in the world by 2000 spent S300 billion over the entire decade o f the 1980s. Such high
military spending might be justified if it prevented wars. However, from 1945-1989, 127 wars killed
22 million people and injured many more.9 S The Center for Defense Information argues that a more
effective United Nations would allow the nations o f the world to decrease military spending
significantly and therefore transfer those moneys to “acute domestic needs.”9 6
We must not fool ourselves into thinking that nuclear spending has become insignificant: It is
about as high as it was anytime during the Cold War. In 1993 the U.S. spent about $38 billion on
nuclear weapons. The Center for Defense Information reports that with the same amount of money
“ 1,300,000 public housing units could be rehabilitated, cancer research could be fully funded for one
year, Pell education grants could be provided to 2.8 million students, and there would still be $5
billion left over in the U.S. Treasury or the taxpayers’ pockets.”9 7 At the end o f the decade, the U.S.
still spends $20 billion a year on nuclear weapons. U.S. spending on nuclear weapons is more than
the entire Russian defense budget. Most o f the nuclear spending, 65 per cent, goes to maintain and
9 S Ekins, 5-6.
^ ‘Policing World Trouble Spots,” 8.
9 7 “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” 4.
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expand the U.S. arsenal through new delivery systems such as the Trident II missile. The U.S. is
also paying for cleaning up the environmental disasters brought on by the nuclear arms race. Some
30% o f U.S. nuclear spending goes to such efforts. The total cost of cleaning up military
contamination is projected to be as high as $375 billion. The good news is that if such cleanup
efforts were funded over 20 years, it would create 200,000 jobs each year.9 8 U.S. spending on
nuclear disarmament is minimal as only 5% o f U.S. nuclear spending goes toward dismantling or
retiring nuclear weapons. In 1995 the U.S. spent $1.5 billion on the development of new nuclear
weapons.9 9
At best, security through weapons is a zero-sum game. This means that a nation’s increased
security comes at the expense o f decreased security of another. (Defensive-only weapons are an
exception to the rule, but few weapons are solely defensive.) This rule is the cause o f the spiral of
the arms race. After each round o f the arms race, each side has spent more and is more heavily
armed yet less secure. Further, military costs are at the expense of the nation’s infrastructure and
economy on which the resources could have been better spent.1 0 0
We live in a drastically different world than a decade ago. In the late 1980s there was much talk
about what might be done with the peace dividend. Unfortunately, movement in the area of defense
spending has not adjusted to this new situation. Moreover, there is still political pressure to increase
defense spending. Resistance communities and churches must begin to speak up about the sinful and
evil nature o f high defense spending. Meanwhile, since 1989 Russian military spending has
decreased by 80%, while U.S. military spending has decreased by only 10% during the same period.
Moreover, when one takes the combined military spending of the six nations most frequently
9iThe Defense Monitor, 23, no. 6, 3.
"Cabasso.
1 0 0 Ekins, 7.
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mentioned as possible threats to the U .S-Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea and Cuba-they spend
only 6% o f what the U.S. spends on its military.1 0 1
Liberation theology reminds us that the Christian faith demands political struggle. Liberation
theology also reminds us that the ethical stance is always with the poor and that we must hold
principalities accountable to the highest o f standards. Feminists remind us to engage in strategic
risk-taking. Pacifists remind us that the ethical stance is a nonviolent one. Pacifism also reminds us
that we need to escape the ideology o f war, and here it may be what traps us into continued high
military spending. The U.S. is not going to quickly or completely demilitarize or disarm.
Nevertheless, the size o f the U.S. military budget can be significantly reduced. Moreover,
significantly decreasing U.S. military spending may address the motivation that other nations have
for wanting nuclear weapons by making the U.S. appear to be less o f a security threat to them.
Pacifist thought requires that an ethic of nonproliferation address the issue of motivation.
Part o f decreased military spending must also include conversion o f what have essentially been
wartime economies into peacetime ones. Using biblical imagery, this is the process of beating
swords into plowshares. The Center for Defense Information concludes that with the correct
policies, cutting defense spending and providing for conversion more new civilian jobs could be
created than would be lost in defense-related jobs.1 0 2 Nuclear scientists could turn their attention to
projects such as curing breast cancer, reversing global warming, and creating more fuel efficient
vehicles.1 0 3 In the United States there are some plans to convert some o f the nuclear weapons’
research facilities. Some of these facilities will be converted to civilian areas, but others will work
on solving environmental problems left over from nuclear programs and addressing nuclear
1 0 1 The Defense Monitor, June 1995, 5.
'0 1 The Defense Monitor 23, no. 6, 3.
l0 3 Robert Lee Hotz, “Learning to Live Without the Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, December 22,
1994, A27.
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proliferation. There is still great political pressure to insure that U.S. nuclear warheads are safe and
reliable.1 0 4 That is acceptable to an ethic o f nonproliferation during the transition to nonnuclear
defense. Spending on the creation o f new, more advanced and more powerful nuclear weapons,
however, is not acceptable.
III. Conclusion
Pacifism calls an ethic of nonproliferation to a new vision. Under this vision, nonproliferation is
a multidimensional process rather than a master plan. It is a journey that has already begun, but
communities o f peace and peoples and nations o f goodwill must painstakingly fight for each new
step. The road will be bumpy. There will be detours and even backtracking, but the vision beckons
us onward. Currently, we stand at the precipice where we can choose death, or we can choose life.
In this work, the first generation o f an ethic of nonproliferation has been outlined. It will be
harvested into generations of the ethic, which will alter it, making it into a new creation. Still the
nonproliferation plant that grows here calls for us to be transformed from the Cold War ways of
thought into a nonnuclear paradigm which will work for the limitation, decrease and eventual
elimination o f nuclear weapons, materials and technologies. An ethic o f nonproliferation is also a
journey to a second paradigm shift which is focused on a justice that sees in the interconnectedness
of life, seeing that any injustice threatens us all. Such an ethic will flourish if communities will arise
to work on the issues o f nonproliferation as well as other issues o f justice and peace.
Such communities in the United States will insist that their nation undertake international
efforts concerning nonproliferation. This must include measures that have in the past been
considered against narrow understandings o f U.S. national interests. Further, U.S. nonproliferation
attempts without such leadership are ethically questionable because they violate the norms of fairness
l0 4 Kim A. McDonald, “Nuclear-Weapons Labs Brace For Change,” Chronicle o f Higher
Education, August 5, 1992, a6.
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and endanger the interests o f humanity. The United States must truly take the moral high ground on
the issue o f nuclear proliferation.
No one can prevent the proliferation o f nuclear weapons. No effort that can be undertaken
moral or otherwise will guarantee to the cessation o f nuclear proliferation. However, what the U.S.
can do is become both the moral and actual leader in nonproliferation efforts. If the U.S. will take
such a moral high ground position, it will be more successful in stopping nuclear proliferation.
When approaching specific countries, the United States must seek ways to reduce tension and
foster understanding. The hope is that in such an environment the U.S. can engage in a bargaining
process which stops the progress toward proliferation in that nation. Such negotiations are not to be
undertaken in idealistic terms but rather in realistic terms. The U.S. should be prepared to use both
carrots and sticks. No one should be deluded into thinking that the process will ever be smooth.
Instead, it will be marked by steps forward and steps back. The important issue is for us to stay in
the process and to evaluate progress over the long-term. An ethical approach should provide the
conditions for improvement in our work against proliferation. The best hope for peace to increase is
to follow the vision.
Having begun this chapter with nightmare nuclear scenarios, it is probably customary to now
show how an ethic o f nonproliferation could solve them. Such an expectation within the reader
would indicate a serious misunderstanding o f the ethic of nonproliferation put forth here. An ethic
of nonproliferation is not an ethic o f crisis intervention, at least not in a micro way. At the point of
such crises, the best that an ethic o f nonproliferation could do is to call for moderation and minimal
violence using the criteria of the just war tradition to determine if limited violence is a just response
and to evaluate specific violent proposals. If we get to the point o f such a crisis, it is likely that we
have refused to engage an ethic o f nonproliferation.
An ethic o f nonproliferation, if followed, would greatly decrease the odds that such crises would
arise. However, following an ethic o f nonproliferation is not a guarantee. The search for such a
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guarantee is delusional in our nuclear world. No matter what path we choose, the nuclear threat will
be with us because ultimately the nuclear genie cannot be put back in the bottle. Nuclear knowledge
and material remains, and they have become more and more available. No technology, current or
future, can protect us from a nuclear attack. It is time we grew up and faced this reality. We can
choose to make the world safer from the nuclear threat, and an ethic o f nonproliferation is the right
first step. So if we back up from these points o f crises and undertake the ethic o f nonproliferation
that has been outlined in this chapter it will be far less likely that these three scenarios, or others,
will happen. We can explore how an ethic of nonproliferation can make these three scenarios less
likely, and with that we close.
First, the scenario of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan exploding from their
confrontation over the Kashmir. India and Pakistan have been apt pupils of the superpowers. They
have followed the example o f the nuclear powers, seeing security and prestige in nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the most important step that the nuclear powers (U.S., Russia, China, etc.) can take is to
decrease their reliance on nuclear weapons. This can begin by the U.S. and Russia cutting their
nuclear arsenals well below START levels. A thousand would be a good first step, but that should be
followed by cuts to 500 and then to 200. The only purpose for nuclear weapons is to deter another
nation from attacking with their nuclear weapons. A few hundred nuclear missiles placed on
submarines provide such deterrence. After cutting to that level, it would likely be possible to
negotiate a world-wide ban on nuclear weapons. Also, the nations of the world should establish a
ban on the production of weapon-grade fissile material and work for a decrease in the reliance on
nuclear energy since nuclear power plants are a source of nuclear materials. The nuclear powers
should make no-first-strike pledges and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
All these steps would model good nuclear behavior, and India and Pakistan would likely also move
in the right direction.
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More specific steps can be taken toward India and Pakistan as well. To begin with, little
international attention and effort has been undertaken to solve the Kashmir dispute. The most direct
nonproliferation step is conflict resolution. The United Nations, the United States and other nations
need to engage these two nations in Camp David-like peace talks. The most important
nonproliferation steps may have nothing to do with nuclear weapons but have to do with creating
true security, justice and peace. The nations o f the world can use economic means to help along a
peace process as well as nuclear disarmament in these two nations. The U.S. defense budget is way
out o f proportion to the threats in the post-Cold War world. Instead o f throwing money away on
BMDs, why not use that money in productive ways to decrease the nuclear threat? It is important to
remember that BMDs, even if they work-which they will not-would only apply to the third scenario
because it involves a missile launch at the United States, and even in that case it does not apply
because it is being developed to counter a few rogue missiles, not a major attack. The world needs to
make it in the economic interest o f India and Pakistan to solve this conflict and end their nuclear
misadventures.
Part o f this process should be to seek to create a nuclear-free zone in Pakistan and India modeled
on Brazil and Argentina in Latin America. Both sides fear each other, but if ways can be created
that will allow for each side to insure that the other has no nuclear weapons through inspections then
they will have no motive to continue their nuclear buildup. While likely to be difficult, the case of
Brazil and Argentina show that this is not an unrealistic option
Instead o f the current false-CTBT which fails to include some o f the most dangerous nations,
negotiate one with India and Pakistan (and North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Israel) center-stage, letting
their voices be heard. India has long been a critic o f superpower nuclear policy. Negotiate a cut in
U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to the 1,000 warhead level in return for India and Pakistan
signing a verifiable CTBT.
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There are a myriad o f steps that can be taken to decrease the likelihood o f scenario one coming
to pass. At present the world is choosing to do none o f them.
Scenario two has a Russian nuclear scientist selling a nuclear weapon to terrorists who use it to
do the World Trade Center bombing “right.” Current counter-proliferation and counter-terrorist
efforts should be continued, but they are inadequate to prevent this scenario. Many o f the steps
discussed in the first scenario would make a significant difference in decreasing the likelihood that
the second scenario would come to past. In addition we will look at three steps specific to this
scenario.
The first step that an ethic o f nonproliferation would provide is true assistance to disarmament
efforts in Russia. The United States has spent trillions o f dollars over the past 60 years in the
nuclear arms race against the Soviet Union and yet has been willing to provide only minimal support
for nuclear disarmament efforts in Russia. The United States needs to redirect billions o f dollars of
defense allocations to make Russian nuclear sites secure and to make sure that Russian nuclear
scientists and workers are provided for.
The second step is related to the first. The world needs to control fissile material and other
nuclear technology. The hard truth is that the nuclear powers are the greatest proliferators in the
world because they refuse to forgo the economic advantages that come from the sale of nuclear
materials and items. Terrorists will have access because the nuclear powers refuse to pay the
economic costs o f shutting down the supply-side.
The third step that needs to be taken is to work for justice. While traditional policy makers will
be nervous that this comes from the conceptual recommendations, it is crucial to addressing nuclear
terrorism. Terrorists are rarely as irrational as they are portrayed in the media. They are usually
responding to what they perceive to be great injustices. The U.S. cannot resolve every injustice in
the world. However, it can seek to resolve some of the cases where it is perceived to be most
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responsible for the injustice. Many situations are the result o f conflicts of justice between two
peoples with no easy solution. However, there are conflict resolution techniques which were
discussed under just-peacemaking in Chapter Two which can be applied. Such efforts would be a
better way to spend our defense dollars than many o f our current expenditures.
The above steps would address both the demand- and supply-side nuclear pressures in this case.
So far the nuclear powers, including the United States, have refused to pay the costs associated with
an ethic of nonproliferation. These are expensive steps. Then again, not nearly as expensive as a
nuclear attack on New York City will be. There are a myriad of steps that can be taken to decrease
the likelihood o f scenario two coming to pass. At present the world is choosing to do few o f them
and then only at a minimal level.
Scenario three involved the restoration of a communist strongman in Russia after the collapse o f
the economy. After rising tensions over the Balkans, a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and
Russia takes place. There are two major steps from an ethic of nonproliferation that would decrease
the chances of this scenario coming to pass.
First, the major nonproliferation step has to do with military budget and expenditures. Also
mentioned above, the U.S. has spent trillions of dollars in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.
The U.S. should undertake a Marshall-type plan in Russia to ensure that their experiment with
democracy succeeds. Japan and Germany are evidence o f the effectiveness of such efforts. Yes, this
is an expensive option but so was the Cold War and so will be its resumption or, even worse, a
nuclear war as described in this scenario.
The second step to decrease the likelihood of this scenario is to move the United States’ and
consequently Russia’s defense policy away from reliance on nuclear weapons. Significantly cut
nuclear weapons and other provocative defense strategies so if tensions rise or even hostilities break
out nuclear weapons will not be turned to. This move will be more difficult now as Russia has
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moved to greater reliance on nuclear weapons. However, it is not impossible if the U.S. will take
bold steps in the right direction.
There are a myriad o f other steps that can be taken to decrease the likelihood o f scenario three
coming to pass, such as international control, CTBT, and no-first-strike pledges. At present the
world is choosing to do few o f them.
The nations of the world, especially the United States, still act as if the Cold War continues. In
terms o f nuclear proliferation, actions are either aiming at management or directly counter
productive to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. There is little evidence that we are about to
see a major transformation in the way the world operates concerning nuclear weapons. Yet the
danger grows. So it will be up to the people o f the world to band together in communities and
demand an ethic o f nonproliferation be undertaken. Perhaps such a movement is not likely. Indeed,
there are few signs o f the birth of such a movement. Yet, other than pure luck, it is our only hope.
An ethic of nonproliferation is a transformational ethic that provides hope for transcending the
nuclear threat. It is not a blueprint. Instead, by laying out steps in the right direction it reduces the
risk o f a nuclear catastrophe. Let us walk in the direction o f hope.
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Creator Heim, Joel James (author)

Core Title An ethic of nuclear nonproliferation: Steps toward a nonnuclear world

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Religion

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations,religion, general,Theology

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Clark, Henry W. (committee chair), Kotler, Jonathan (committee member), Orr, John B, (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-78078

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