University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Japan's modernization and troubled identity: Grappling with the West and other foreigners

(USC Thesis Other)

Japan's modernization and troubled identity: Grappling with the West and other foreigners

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be
from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.
UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/321-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
JAPAN’ S MODERNIZATION AND TROUBLED IDENTITY:
GRAPPLING WITH THE WEST AND OTHER FOREIGNERS
by
Edward Charles Roth
A Tnesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
(East Asian Area Studies)
May 1998
Copyright 1998 Edward Charles Roth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 1391094
UMI Microform 1391094
Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
TH E G RA DUATE SC H O O L
U N IV ER SITY RARK
LOS A N G E LE S. CA LIFO R N IA SOOOT
This thesis, v it t e n by
Edward C harles Roth
under ike direction of A.JLS Thesis Committee,
and approved by a ll iis members, has been pre
sented to and accepted by the D e an of The
Graduate School, in p a rtia l fu lfillm e n t of the
requirements fo r the degree of
Master o f A rts
Date^?.B.L}ls.,}22L____
THESIS C O M M I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1
Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904), well-known journalist and author in the
United States, Lecturer in the Imperial University of Tokyo (1896-1903) and
fourteen years a resident of Japan, characterized Japan in this way:
Long ago the best and dearest Japanese friend I ever had said to me,
a little before his death: “ When you find, in four or five years more,
that you cannot understand the Japanese at all, then you will begin to
know something about them." After having realized the truth of my
friend’s prediction, - after having discovered that I cannot understand
the Japanese at all, - 1 feel better qualified to attempt this essay.1
In the essay Hearn speaks of, he notes the “ weirdness” of Japan in such a way
that the sexes can scarcely be distinguished and that the Japanese mental
structure has nothing in common with Western psychological development.2
Further, he stresses that the Japanese are perhaps morally superior to
Occidentals because they are forever cheerful, gentle and are geared in every
way toward altruism.3 This viewpoint of course comes from a time when Japan
had only four decades earlier been opened up to the West under the threat of
an American armada led by Commodore Matthew Perry (1794-1858), and prior
to that, had been closed in large part for nearly three centuries because of self-
imposed isolation. Perhaps this helps explain some of the novelty and
peculiarity Heam found with the Japanese.
Fifty years later, American anthropologist Ruth Benedict was engaged by
the U.S. War Department to understand Japan, the enemy, during the Second
World War. In her influential book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, she lays
out a number of contradictory and puzzling characteristics of the Japanese
people:
1 Lafcadio Heam, Ja pa n: A n Attempt at Interpretation, (London: The Macmillan Co.,
1913), p. 3,4.
2 Ibid., pp. 10, 13.
3 Ibid., pp. 17,18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
The Japanese are, to the highest degree, both aggressive and
unaggressive both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite,
rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around,
loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable
to new ways.4
As Ian Littlewood indicates, “ these powerful contradictions have left a more
lasting impression than Benedict’s attempt to explain them. In one form or
another they are still the starting point for almost every book that sets out to
introduce Japan to the west.” 5 Is Japan indeed as weird as Hearn describes?
Are the Japanese as inscrutable as Benedict portrays? Certainly not! The
Japanese, although an island people with a history of isolation are no different
than Mexico is to Thailand. Myths that the West had and still have of Japan,
such as those of Hearn and Benedict, correlate with the myths Japan had and
still has of itself. According to Joy Hendry, “ Japanese people tend to think of
themselves as rather special and unique.6 Where this myth of Japan as being
somehow more special and unique than other peoples comes from is partly
perpetuated by the Japanese notion of nihonjimon (Japaneseness). The
Japanese particularly embraced mhonjinron in the 1970s and 1980s when a
flood of literature on the subject came out as Japan strove to define itself in the
contemporary world. Because modernization prior to that time had been
associated with westernization, Japanese tradition had been discounted by
4 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sw ord, (London: Routledge, 1967), p. 2.
5 Ian Littlewood, The Idea o f Japan: Western Images, Western M yths, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1996), p. 7.
* Joy Hendry, Understanding Japanese Society: Second edition (London: Routledge, 1995),
P- 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
some as substandard.7 However, with the rise of Japan economically, there
was a newly rekindled respect for things Japanese. Nihonjimon brings us to
what Ann Waswo sees as one of the central issues of modern Japanese
thought: “how to reconcile foreign borrowing with cultural identity.” 8 To do this,
according to Waswo, the Japanese have always looked to their own history and
traditions to determine who they are.9
Therefore, to examine Japan’s troubled identity, I will first take a look
back at feudal Japan and Japan’s first encounters with the West. How Japan
acted during this time foreshadows some of the insecurity exhibited in relation
to the ideas of Nihonjimon in contemporary Japan.1 0 I will then briefly review the
life of Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) and the difficulties he faced trying to
surmount the power structure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
7 To better understand the sentiment behind this thinking, see Japanese author Kazuo
Kawai and his explanation of the 'liberal hypothesis." Kazuo Kawai, Japan's Am erican Interlude,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960) pp. 235-239.The “ liberal hypothesis" proclaims
that not only Western technology but Western cultural and institutional models were needed for
Japan to advance. To further explore how modernization is equated with westernization, see
Kenneth Pyle, “ The Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary History," in the
Journal o f Japanese Studies, 8 :2 (1982). It should be noted that I do not share the view of
modernization equaling westernization; I share the same view as Samuel Huntington that ‘Japan
and other non-Westem societies today are absorbing selected elements of Western culture and
using them to strengthen their own cultural identity." See: Samuel Huntington, "The West:
Unique, Not Universal," in Foreign A ffairs, v75n6 (Nov. 1996): p. 35.
8 Ann Waswo, M odem Japanese Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.103.
9 Ibid.
1 0 Both Japan and the West have reinforced this idea of N ihonjinron to the point where it is
now almost the expected way of Japan viewing itself and of being viewed by others.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
centuries.1 1 Next, I will investigate Japan's experiment with democracy in the
Taisho era (1912-1926). After this, i will explore Japanese thinking in relation
to the Second World War and analyze Neo-Confucianism. To conclude, I will
look at Japan’s State identity, analyze through case study Japan’s dealings with
Asia vis-a-vis Korea and the need for Japan to come to terms with the past, and
investigate Japanese education. This will provide a keen sampling of the
difficulties Japan has faced as it has grown out of its isolationist past in defining
its role internationally. It is hoped that through an analysis of the above-listed
areas, this paper will shed some light on the insecurities Japan has with
defining itself as well as with its international relations.
Japan and the Dutch
Early eighteenth and nineteenth century Tokugawa Japan provides a
keen example of how Japan was intimidated by the Dutch. At this time, the
Dutch had sought trade with Japan and were referred to by the Japanese as
barbarians and animals, even though the Dutch were a people rich in history,
commerce and scientific advancement. The type of learning which came from
the Dutch was referred to in Japan as bangaku or “ barbarian learning.” Even
Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821), an enlightened proponent of Dutch learning,
1 1 As Journalist Karel van Wblferen notes in his analysis of how power is exercised in
Japan; T h e continuities appear to be of more consequence than the changes; continuities not
only in the motivations of the ruling elite, but also in the institutions it has shaped." See: Karl van
Wolferen, The Enigm a o f Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation, (New York:
Random House. 1990), p. 348. By examining Okuma Shigenobu’s interactions with the power
structure of one hundred years ago, it will become clear that little has changed today with the
Liberal Democratic Party (oligarchy) in power; For much of the post-War period has been under
their control and therefore Japan has not been able to break out of being dependent, reactive
and become what Ichiro Ozawa refers to as a "normal nation." To Ozawa, a normal nation is in part
"a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international
community." See: Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint fo r a New Ja pa n: The Rethinking o f a N ation, (Tokyo:
Kodansha International, 1994), p. 94.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
confirmed how the Dutch were animals. When asked by a daimyo (feudal lord)
how it was that the Dutch were able to write so well, Honda responded that
“ even animals are capable of surprising skills."1 2 How could such a practical,
well educated man as Honda make such an absurd characterization of the
Dutch? After all, Honda deeply respected Dutch navigational methods and
advanced practices in medicine. In fact Honda so respected the West that he
advocated in his writings that Japan emulate the West or soon be swallowed by
the West. He knew that Japan could not be complacent in trade (Japan had to
produce its own goods and not deplete its copper by continually purchasing
Western goods) and should seek colonies just as western countries had done.
What was it then within Japan that prompted the Japanese and men like Honda
(he escaped persecution by not publishing his ideas)1 3 to castigate the Dutch
and other Westerners as barbarians? Of course this barbarian status could
easily be attributed to Japan's intense loathing and fear of Christianity and
disrespect for those who were not educated with traditional Chinese teachings.
In addition, there was a strong feeling from those in power that the status quo
should not be disturbed (the Tokugawa era (1603-1868) was a very peaceful,
stable period of more than two hundred and fifty years with Japan prior to this
time having never had problems from outside her shores
with the lone exception of the two invasion attempts from the Chinese Mongols
in the thirteenth century). Perhaps the preceding examples are reason enough
for the Japanese to think of Westerners as barbarians or at least pay lip service
to this label for fear of being ostracized for not supporting the opinions of
1 2 Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery o f Europe, 1720-1830, (Stanford- . Stanford Univ.
Press, 1969), p. 17.
1 3 Conrad Schirokauer, A B rie f H istory o f Japanese C iv iliz a tio n , (New York: Harcourt Brace
Pub., 1993), p. 168.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
Japanese leaders. However, let me offer several other reasons which
conceivably could have contributed more to Japan’s inability to acknowledge
the Westerner as being on a level plane of advancement if not a higher plane
than that of the Japanese. These would include the paradox relating to Japan’s
sense of inferiority/superiority, the reverence for the emperor, the philosophy of
shingaku (mind learning/popular ethics) which seems to be enmeshed within the
collective Japanese mind, and one group of Westerners, the Dutch.
First, there is a paradox that produces feelings of inferiority yet beliefs of
superiority within the Japanese . This is best evidenced when one sees Japan
admiring and inheriting many things from the Chinese (acquiring a sense of
inferiority) yet proclaiming that even though China is huge, old and home of
Confucian sages, that only Japan is “ the home of the Gods” (Japan trying to
justify itself as superior). Because Japan admired and followed China for so
many years and later came to favor the West as a model, Japan has constantly
been in a state of having to catch up. As Edwin Reischauer states, “ the
Japanese have interpreted their whole history in terms of foreign borrowings
and native reactions.” 1 4 Reischauer further indicates that these native reactions
have placed things which are uniquely Japanese as superior and have
strengthened the Japanese sense of identity, an identity which Reischauer sees
as almost a “ different species from the rest of humanity.” 1 5 The Japanese are
certainly not a different species, but nevertheless had and perhaps still have
(Japan is still the land of the Gods) a penchant for seeing themselves as
superior, thereby needing to refer to Westerners as barbarians, yet conversely
needing the barbarians for advancement thus making them inferior.
1 4 Edwin Reischauer, The Japanese Today: Change and C ontinuity, (TOkyo: Charles E.
Tuttle Co., 1988), p. 400.
1 5 Ibid., p. 397.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
Closely related to Japan being the land of the Gods is the deity-like
reverence bestowed upon the Japanese emperor, primarily after the Meiji
Restoration of 1868. Because of this reverence and the ability of Japanese
leaders to use the emperor as a vessel to control the people (loyalty to the
emperor is the highest virtue), the Japanese, according to Hiroshi Minami, were
psychologically hindered from questioning authority.1 8 Nishikawa Joken, a
Japanese well versed in Dutch natural science in the Tokugawa period,
confirmed the submissive role the general population was expected to take.
“Inasmuch as the lower classes are not capable of playing a role in government
but are subject to being ruled, they should not be rebellious even to the slightest
degree but should conform."1 7 This satement hits at the crux of the philosophy
of shingaku which was widely extolled in the Tokugawa period and reinforced
this leaning of the Japanese toward submission to authority.
A prime tenet of shingaku is service above self. The self must be denied
with dutiful service given to superiors. A person should not act as he pleases
but seek to make a favorable impression. As Minami indicates, submission is
inculcated through habitual obedience to authority to the point where it
becomes normal. He further points out that “ submissive action customarily and
mechanically repeated without question or criticism becomes automatic.” 1 8
This then appears to have given the Japanese a penchant for a kind of
mechanical living where self-denial and duty superseded rational thought as
espoused for example through Dutch learning (rangaku). Therefore, because
the authorities during the Tokugawa period had a vested interest in vilifying the
1 8 Hiroshi Minami, Psychology o f the Japanese People, (Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press, 1971),
p. 4.
1 7 Ibid., p. 3.
1 8 Ibid., p. 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
West to keep control, it was a good tactic to continually refer to Westerners as
barbarians and keep the public ignorant of how advanced the West was.
Although Japan’s insistence on referring to Westerners as barbarians
does not coincide with the analysis above, the final reason, the Dutch and their
acquiescence as pawns to the Japanese authorities, does provide a slight
rationale for the West being given barbarian status. Because the Dutch were so
interested in profit, they were willing to be humiliated and suffer numerous
indignities at the hands of the Japanese. Keene provides several examples of
how the Dutch would kowtow to the Japanese by playing almost a “ Simon
Says" type of game at the shogun’s request.1 8 Even so, this type of behavior
surely does not warrant the label of “ barbarian” especially when considering
that the Dutch and other Western countries were similar in their development
and modernization with Japan. Could it be that Japan's use of the term
“ barbarian” for the West was also due in part to Japan’s sense of inferiority and
submissive nature as reinforced by shingaku? It is difficult to say, but indeed
plausible, especially when one looks at the influences of Neo-Confucianism
(see pages 24-27 of this paper).
Okuma Shigenobu and the Oligarchy
Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922) was a man who helped Japan on its
quest toward modernization and identity formation in a turbulent world
comprised of a menacing, powerful West. Shigenobu had the personal
qualities in the nineteenth century which are desperately needed for Japan in
the late twentieth century, especially those of leadership. Okuma was an
lg Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery o f Europe: Honda Toshiaki and Other Discoverers,
1720- 1798, (New York: Grove Press, 1954), pgs. 8,9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
iconoclast. A man with ideas and convictions beyond his time. He was strongly
influenced by western science, commercial methods, history and Christianity,
yet never travelled to the West even though this was an extremely popular thing
for young samurai to do in 1870’s and 80’s Japan. He was certainly an
exception to the ideas and influences of shingaku.
Okuma was born into a middle samurai family in 1838 in Saga, a castle
town in the domain of Hizen. Hizen was near Nagasaki where Western
influence was great. Because of this, Okuma was exposed to a wide variety of
Western concepts. At the age of 19 he entered a school to study the Dutch
language, Western philosophy and science. He also studied the New
Testament and the American Constitution with a missionary. He hated Chinese
characters and disliked Confucian traditionalism. He was certainly a
nonconformist not bound by traditional Japanese ways or mindsets.
From this background, Okuma became one of the greatest statesmen
and influences on Japanese parliamentary government and economics. During
his long career which began in the 1860s, he served as the powerful Finance
Minister, Foreign Minister and Home Affairs Minister. He established one of the
first political parties (Rikken Kaishinto), founded Waseda University and helped
found Tokyo Women’s University; helped establish Japan’s first national budget
and a unified currency; and most notably was a fighter for the interests of the
common man. He exhibited a huge amount of courage, conviction, optimism
and ingenuity. He was charismatic, exceptionally good with the press and was
a master at working out deals through the art of compromise. However, even
with all the above-listed accomplishments and attributes, he was never
appointed to the genro (council of older statesmen). He could not break his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
“ outsider” status.
Okuma, as has been mentioned, was not your typical man in
government. He was a Hizen representative in a government dominated by the
men of Satsuma and Choshu. A lesser man would have succumbed to the
dominant influence of Satsuma-Choshu and given in to the status quo of ideas.
Not so for Okuma. In 1881, Okuma proposed the establishment of a parliament
within two years. Even though the head government leaders were in favor of a
gradualist approach to implementing a Prussian system, Okuma’s proposal of a
British model with an emphasis on political parties was too much for the
governmnet leaders to bear and thus the “ 1881 Political Crisis" ensued.
The “1881 Political Crisis" resulted in the ouster of Okuma from the
government because of his untimely proposals. Why would someone like
Okuma propose such a radical position? The answer lies in Okuma’ s deeply
held convictions of liberty and equality as well as his belief that the people of
Japan were being oppressed by the Satsuma-Choshu power structure. The
only way to combat this was through a parliamentary form of government.
Not more than six months after his ouster, Okuma formed the Rikken
Kaishinto (Constitutional Reform Party). This party was based on the British
utilitarianism of such western writers as Mill, Locke, Bentham and Spencer.
The party motto was “ slow and steady, moderate but sound."® This philosophy
had wide appeal to many across the country. As Lebra notes, “ Kaishinto was a
national party because it attracted men from all over Japan. As a result, it
helped stimulate the nationalization of Meiji political leadership.” 2 1 This was
not acceptable to the government leaders. Pressure was thus applied to force
2 0 Joyce Lebra, Okuma Shigenobu, (Canberra: ANU Press, 1973), p. 70.
2 1 Ibid., pp. 72, 73.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
the party to disband by such measures as press manipulation and the
encouragement of students not to attend Waseda University because it was a
university for “ traitors.” This pressure had the intended effect with Okuma
resigning from the party in 1884. Kaishinto still remained but lost its
effectiveness due to a lack of strong leadership. However, as Lebra indicates,
Kaishinto, under the leadership of Okuma, served a very important purpose.
She states: “Kaishinto performed the historical function of preparing the way
toward broadening the base of power through the development of a party
system and parliamentary government."2
Okuma, throughout his career, was motivated by an extreme sense of
nationalism. Modernization could only occur if the people had a strong will and
motivation. To achieve this will, a strong loyalty to the emperor needed to be
inculcated. Without this, Japan could not compete with the West and its
motivating force, Christianity. Japan did develop a strong loyalty to the
emperor, and as a result, achieved much of what it did through industriousness
and patriotism.
To Okuma, the old regime needed to be abolished as soon as possible.
With this type of forward-looking mindset, one might think that Okuma had no
respect or use for the ways of old. However, this was not the case. Okuma had
a keen respect for the feudalistic past and even attributed much of Japan’s
success to a constitutional form of government to the spirit of the samurai.3
Okuma was thus a man with a belief in the common man. In the
Confucian tradition, “ men of virtue" were the only ones who could rule.
However, as Lebra points out, “ for Okuma, all men were potentially men of
2 8 Ibid., p. 81.
2 3 Ibid.. p. 143.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
virtue and therefore potential rulers.” *
12
Taisho “ Democracy”
With men such as Okuma setting the stage behind the backdrop of the
Meiji Restoration, a revered emperor and insecure, isolationist past, Japan
continued on in its identity formation by winning two wars; with China in 1895
and Russia in 1905. These two wars set the stage for Japan colonizing Taiwan
and Korea and led up to Japan's experiment with “ democracy” in the Taisho
era (1912-1926). The Taisho era is commonly acknowledged as the time in
Japan’ s history when “ democracy" took root. It is interesting to explore this
period of time, especially when one compares it with the militaristic 1930s and
the Second World War. Was Taisho democracy the type of democracy that we
commonly think of here in the West? That is, one where there are
representatives elected by the people and there is rule through majority
opinion. Or was it a different kind of democracy, far from what we as Americans
consider to be government by the people? Was there all of the sudden a break
from the national purpose and sacrifice of the Meiji era when the Meiji Emperor
died in 1912? Could not the new Taisho Emperor, Yoshihito, continue to
influence the same sentiment of collectivism and sacrifice that his father had?
These are important questions because their answers provide the foundation
upon which Japan would build after its defeat in the Second World War and
also provide a view of how Japan would institute democracy of its own volition
as opposed to the prescribed democracy as demanded by the U.S. and
General MacArthur after the War.
2 4 Ibid.. p. 143.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
Harry Harootunian in his essay, Introduction: A Sense of an Ending and the
Problem of Taisho, provides some keen insight into the passing on of one
emperor to another and thus from one era to another. In this Meiji system, the
emperor held a somewhat mystical quality that embodied all that Japan had
gained in becoming a modem nation and achieving parity with the West. The
Meiji Emperor was deemed responsible for Japan’s advancement because of
his long reign of forty-five years and his charismatic personality. His death
could be likened almost to a loss in battle or the takeover of the country by
another regime. This is perhaps stretching the impact of Emperor Meiji's death
but perhaps not for men such as General Nogi Maretsuke who committed ritual
suicide (seppuku) on the heals of Emperor Meiji’s death. Japan at this time had
become a modern industrial state, especially after its earlier successful military
campaigns against China and Russia. Because of this, and such values as the
master-servant relationship, the old era of Meiji which emphasized so many
entrenched values such as self-denial and bushido (the way of the samurai), was
thought of nostalgically by a number of past and present leaders.
Of particular note are the ideas of Tokutomi Soho. Harootunian indicates
that Soho was extremely bothered by what he felt was the disintegration of a
much more valuable Meiji-type of thinking. Soho states that “ the greatest illness
of our times is the loss of state ideals and national purpose” 2 Harootunian
quotes Soho because he wishes to distinguish between the Meiji and Taisho
eras. To Harootunian, there was a relatively clear break between the Meiji and
Taisho eras and thus a clear period of demarcation could be made.
2 5 H.D. Harootunian, Introduction: A Sense of An Ending and the Problem of Taisho,” in
Japan In Crisis, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and H.D. Harootunian, (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1974), P. 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
Harootunian goes on to talk about such Meiji ideals as fukoku kyouhei (rich
country, strong army) and bussankmigyo (commerce and industry) and how
rallying behind these goals and the way of life they instilled was peculiarly Meiji.
Given that the above ideals did not convey a negative focus per se, why then
such a push to move on to the values of Taisho which were “ correctness,”
“ rectification" and “ adjustments?"® The reason according to Harootunian was
to give more citizens a voice in how government operated. To make this point
clear a writer of the times from the journal YorozuChoho is cited:
In antiquity the people stood outside the orbit of politics. Those who filled
the ranks of the Restoration movement were recruited from the lower
ranks (ashigam made de a tta ) but the enterprise of Taisho must add to it
ordinary peasants and merchants.7
The addition of such peasants and merchants to the governing system would
constitute “a politics of democratism” or ndmhushugjP. This was the wave of the
future which the Taisho era could offer and because it would open opportunity
more to the masses, it would be hard to turn back even though there were
efforts in this direction by the government such as the Boshin Imperial Rescript
of 1908.
Even with the government leaders trying to apply the brakes to what they
perceived as a detrimental turn from national interest to self-interest, this
change was not to be stopped. Harootunian offers an interesting insight as to
why this was so. He observes that throughout the Meiji era such values as self-
sacrifice and national interest were deeply ingrained values within the
Japanese people. However, in reality, Meiji values were espoused only
2 9 Ibid., p. 8.
2 7 Ibid., p. 9.
2 8 Ibid., p. 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
because they had been thrust upon the people by the government.3
Therefore, efforts on the part of the government to return to the ways of Meiji
would fall on deaf ears. The death of the Meiji Emperor and the ushering in of
Taisho was the opportunity the people of Japan were looking for because of the
significant role they could take in creating their future. There was therefore no
turning back this tide of opportunity and involvement. Central to this tide of
opportunity and involvement were the values of indivdualism and privatization.
Harootunian states:
If Taisho culture possessed any meaning distinct from Meiji civilization,
it is to be found in the development and triumph of that conception of
private interest and atomized individuality which is at the heart of the
liberal political and social creed.3 0
This Taisho individualism is clearly exemplified by Harootunian when he
points to how the word “ culture" (bunka) was used in the Taisho era. The
descriptive words associated with “ culture” in the Meiji era differed markedly
from those in the Taisho era. For example, the Meiji era stressed skugyou
(education) while the Taisho era stressed kyoymi (cultivation). The express
meanings of these words motivated men to vastly different places. Harootunian
states:
The idea of skugyou enjoined men to act publicly and to serve goals larger
than themselves; kyoyau required men to operate in the private sphere and
to serve only themselves; the former subordinated private choice to public
expectation, while the latter subordinated public and private
consideration.3 1
This Taisho formulation of the word “ culture” had a huge impact on what
shape society would take. The shape it would take would initially be in the form
2 9 Ibid., p. 11.
3 0 Ibid., p. 14.
3 1 Ibid., p. 15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
of a restrictive government. Japanese government leaders were so worried
about the literature and art of the day that they restricted it with hopes of turning
the tide to more of a skugyou mentality. This hoped for turn would not occur,
however, and would conclude with a shift to the values of kyoyou. Therefore, for
Harootunian, there was a break between the Meiji and Taisho eras that resulted
in an infant democracy not so much of the western type but nevertheless of a
type that had its foundation in the individual. And within this individual, there
was a privacy that divorced itself from the manipulation and control exhibited in
politics.
Politics was not a popular thing for most common people in the Taisho
era. This distaste for politics is addressed in Carol Gluck’s book, Japan’s Modem
Myths. Here, Gluck refers to how “ one era ended and a new one began."3 2
With the beginning of the new era of Taisho, she looks at how the people were
now very excited at the prospect of a time where the ideals as promised in the
Meiji Constitution could now be realized and not merely talked about. What
side of the political sphere would realize these goals was up for speculation
with the phrase “kan ka min k a T meaning, would it be the oligarchs who would
effect change as envisioned in the Meiji era or the political parties.3 3
According to Gluck, the Meiji era had certainly soured the Japanese
populace on politics. The oligarchy and gemo (elder statesmen) were
undoubtedly not on everyone’s popularity list with popular slogans of the day
being “ destroy clique government" {batsuzokudaha) and “ protect constitutional
government" (kensei yogo).3 * Evidentally, the Meiji Restoration and
3 2 Carol GlUCk, Japan’s Modern M yth s: Ideology in the Late M e iji Period, (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1985), p. 228.
3 3 Ibid.
3 4 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
accompanying Constitution to follow, were not heralded as revolutionary
changes and therefore the Taisho era was a time when these could potentially
be realized.
The hope of Taisho democracy politically, lay with the political parties.
As Gluck notes, the parties presented themselves as being synonymous with
the word “ constitutional" {rikkentefo).'* However, to the disappointment of the
general population, the influence on Taisho government was to be much more
than just that of the representatives of the people. The oligarchy, military and
business leaders would also continue to exhibit major influence on how
governmental decisions were made. With this type of power structure, it was
only a short matter of time before the parties lost the key democratic aspect of
their being, that is, their popular foundation. As Gluck notes, the parties came to
look more like kisei seito or established parties influenced heavily by the
bureaucracy.3 6 As intertwined with the bureaucracy as the parties became
however, there was a very positive somewhat mitigating development which
occurred early on in the Taisho era. This was the rapid growth and influence of
the anti-government press. With readership for some dailies increasing over
300% in the course of the Taisho era, this was a major check on government
propaganda.3 7
Where was the place then for democracy in such a system as that
described above? The key place, as described by Gluck, was in the
countryside among farmers and other common people. The provinces
organized youth organizations which provided structure for entry into politics on
the local level. Therefore, activism and party involvement gained a strong
3 5 Ibid.
M Ibid., p. 230
3 7 Ibid., p. 232.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
foothold on the grassroots level. This was evidenced by the disheartened
comments of an army officer in reference to how parties and their factions had
deeply penetrated the countryside. He laments “ that true village cooperation is
impossible until this extreme political fever cools and the agitation of ambitious
politicians ceases” 3 8
The extreme political fever was not to cool however because political
interest in the countryside was not just a phenomenon that began with the
Taisho era. It was a movement that began years ago in Meiji and was now
coming of age. In late Meiji and early Taisho, political parties had developed
and infiltrated the system to such an extent that distinguishing between kan and
min was for the most part a guessing game. There was such overlap and desire
on the part of the localities for government intervention, that is in a fiscal way to
help fund local projects, that the national government was becoming worried.
This political interest was getting out of hand and creating a major kink in the
national government’s plan for a centralized government. As Gluck notes,
“ national politics now entered local life in such a way that the local
elite could turn the needs and demands of the government to their own
interests."®
The above developments indeed sound like those needed to ensure a
foothold for a parliamentary style government. But even with all the grassroot
support and interest in politics, it was not Taisho democracy. Gluck posits that
the men of the political parties were not concerned with a parliamentary style
government but that their main concern was the practice of politics.4 0 It soon
became clear that politicians were not to be trusted to effect change, as a result,
3 8 Ibid., p. 234.
3 8 Ibid., p. 237.
4 0 Ibid. p. 239.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
their reputation sank below the gutters of the nation. Gluck comments on how
politicians were regarded. Though the wiskers were gone and the carriages
transformed into motor cars, the professional politicians had taken the place of
the bureaucratic catfish and loach as the objects of satirical opprobrium."4 ’
Therefore, from Glucks’s perspective, the Taisho period cannot be interpreted
as a democracy because politics became so corrupt. The initial stirrings of the
general population toward involvement in government resulted in an
unconnectedness and negativity toward the power structure. To sum up the
sentiment of the times, Gluck writes that “ parties carried the stigma of partial,
partisan, and factional representation; great things, it was said, were as likely to
be expected from politicians and ministers as the proverbial fish from the
trees."4 2
In contrast to Gluck’s reference to the Japanese political system in the
Taisho era as not having been parliamentary or democratic, Edwin O.
Reischauer, in his essay What Went Wrong?” refers to 1920’s Japan as a time of
“ political democratization," and that the disastrous years that followed Taisho
resulted in a “ backsliding in at least some of the standards by which one might
measure modernization."'8 Given this statement, it would appear that
Reischauer considers the Taisho era as having been a time where democratic
government did in fact take hold. He continues with the following commentary
on Japanese society in the 1920’s:
The growing complexity and urbanization of society, the capitalistic basis of
the economy, the egalitarian but individually competitive educational
system, the electoral and parliamentary institutions, which had by the
4 1 Ibid., p. 243.
4 2 Ibid., p. 245.
4 5 Edwin O. Reischauer, “ What Went Wrong," in Dilemmas o f G rowth in Prewar Japan, ed.
James Moriey (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 489.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
1920's come to occupy the center of the political stage, all pointed to a
system of open conflict of interests and ideas, held together by accepted
methods of achieving compromise rather than by any natural harmony of
interests and attitudes.4 *
The above quotation points to a very changed society with competition
and individualism, conflict of ideas and parliamentary institutions. Just as
Harootunian stated in his essay, Reischauer also points to the desire of those in
power to return to the past where harmony and unity were the norms. This
desire to return to the past by a number of leaders indicates the magnitude of
change that had transpired from the Meiji era to the Taisho era.
However, what about the lack of confidence by the people and corruption
in the political parties that Gluck’s research pointed out. Does this not point to a
failure of democracy, especially in a country as fledgling in this endeavor as
Japan? Reischauer’s analysis, prior to Gluck is to the contrary. He states that
“ the widespread charges at the time of hopeless corruption on the part of the
political parties and their zaibatsu financial backers seem in retrospect
exaggerated"... In comparing Japan to other countries in the approximate same
development of their parliamentary evolution he continues: "the comparison
may well prove to be in Japan’s favor, and we may have to conclude that the
great talk of corruption in Japan was more the product of high political
standards than of high levels of corruption.’’* Therefore, Reischauer’s thesis is
that the parliamentary political system in Japan did reasonably well in the
1920’s *
After reviewing the Taisho era interpretations of these three well
respected historians, it becomes clear that they do not agree on the shape
4 4 Ibid., p. 497.
4 5 Ibid., p. 497.
4 8 Ibid., p. 498.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
democracy took or for that matter whether there was democracy at all.
However, even in the case of Gluck, democracy was seen as evolving, perhaps
not to the level that Harootunian and Reischauer concluded, but nevertheless,
there were beginnings. Therefore, what this diverse sampling of Taisho
research offers is not a clear denunciation of democracy but an interpretation
that there were forms of democracy present. The difference in interpretation lies
in the approach of the historian, whether historical developments and counter
developments are interpreted positively or negatively. Clearly, Harootunian
and Reischauer see the emergence of even scant traces of democracy as a
movement away from the oligarchic controls of the past. Whereas, Gluck is not
as positive about these movements and leaves the feeling that because the
military, oligarchy and business leaders continued to play a major role in
decision making, ‘'true” democracy was not achieved. Therefore, she tends to
negate the democratic movement because it was thwarted and polluted by
factors outside the opinion of the people.
It appears that the Taisho era was a time when those in power took
advantage of the people just as the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
continues to do today.*7 Examples abound regarding the oppressive methods of
those in power. For example, in response to the 1925 universal manhood
suffrage law, the government enacted the Peace Preservation Law which
served as a counter because it made illegal any organization that sought to
change the present system of government. With regard to party cabinets, the
year 1912 saw the Saionji cabinet forced to resign based on pressure from the
military and oligarchy. Soon after this, the oligarchs put in place their own man,
4 7 An example of the corruption in politics today is that of how in 1993 politician Shin
Kanemaru was dealt with. For accepting millions in bribes from a mob-related company, he was
fined merely $2000.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
Katsura. Therefore, in reality, the oligarchs continued to maintain an immense
amount of power throughout the Taisho period. And, as Tetsu Najita notes in
his analysis of Yoshino Sakuso, “ the key voice of Taisho democracy,” the
parties were thoroughly polluted by personal ties and loyalties which resulted in
scandal and corruption *
The heavy handed nature of the government is further evidenced by its
responses to the 1923 Kanto Earthquake and the Rice Riots of 1918. In
response to the rioting following the Kanto Earthquake, the government, under
the guise of trying to round up those who were responsible for inciting the
rioting, took into custody numerous radicals and intellectuals. The Rice Riots
saw a similar response with arrests and censorship of the press. As Kenneth
Pyle notes, the government was keen on controlling social change to fit in with
its ideals and not those of the general population.® In his suicide note, the lead
character of the classic Japanese novel Kokoro declares that “ on the night of the
Imperial Funeral I sat in my study and listened to the booming cannon. To me it
sounded like the lost lament of a passing age."5 0 This of course referring to the
change from Meiji to Taisho as symbolized by the death of the Meiji emperor.
However, in reality, although there was increasing political activity, the change
from Meiji to Taisho was minimal, characterized by a power structure striving to
maintain control regardless of public opinion. The will for democracy was not
strong enough because it was a borrowed concept from the West. Earlier, as
late as 1899, then Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909) remarked that “If
4 S Bernard S. Silberman, “ Conclusion: Taisho Japan and the Crisis of Secularism," in Japan
in Crisis, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and H.D. Harootunian (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1974), p. 437.
4 9 Kenneth Pyle, “ Advantages of Followership: German Economics and Japanese
Bureaucrats, 1890-1925," in the Jo urnal o f Japanese Studies, I. 1 (1974).
5 0 Soseki Natsume, K okoro, trans. Edwin McClellan (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1957),
p. 246.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
there is one mistake in the progress and direction of constitutional government,
there will be those who question the suitability of constitutuional government for
the Orient.3 1 It was desirable for this western type of government to work so that
Japan could show it could be a member of the industrialized, Western club of
nations. The results of Taisho and later of the militaristic 1930s and the Second
World War, show that Japan was unsure of itself. The Taisho era provides a
good example of how Japan tried something (a form of democracy), yet was
halfhearted because of the pressure Japan put on itself to make a good
showing to the west.
The Second World War
The growing pains which were most severe for Japan as it strived to find
its place in the twentieth century were those associated with the Second World
War. A brief analysis of the time leading up to the War provides some keen
insight into how the Japanese people were manipulated. How did Japan get
started on its path of destruction? Edwin Reischauer notes a number of
troubling factors which contributed to Japan’s instability. These would include a
fall in economic growth, a more educated better informed populace,
modernization and change, increased complexity and a lack of unity in
decision-making, Chinese nationalism and the world-wide depression.® All of
these factors created a new order that lacked what the Japanese people
desired most, unity and harmony. A new industrialized society was destroying
an old way of life and resulted in what Reischauer claims was “ a dangerous
5 1 Quoted in Kenneth Pyle, The M a k in g o f M odem Japan, (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Co.,
1978), p. 122.
5 2 Edwin Reischauer, “ What Went Wrong?," in Dilemmas o f Grotvth in Prewar Japan, ed.
James Morley, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), p. 493.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
inbalance between what actually existed and what people felt should exist.” *
The military helped fill this void by being responsive to such things as the
poverty of the peasants, the threat to Manchuria and standing up to Chinese
nationalism. Because of the infighting within the civil bureaucracy, the military
also gained the sympathy of the people in its decision-making because there
was a perception that the military had “ pure motives” that were in concert with
the values of harmony and unity. Therefore, the military was able to take full
control with the blessing of the people.
The psychological transformation of the Japanese people was also key
to their willingness to engage the imperialist path. As Ivan Morris notes, the
psychological transformation of the Japanese people prior to the Second World
War cannot be reduced to mere slogans such as “ Spreading the Emperor’s
Mission to Every Corner of the Earth," but as an “ all-pervasive psychological
coercion.” 5 * What pieces are present within this psychological coercion that
lead to extreme behavior? To Morris, it is the inner values which are key.
These inner values are represented by the Japanese State in such a way as to
dictate how one should think* With one’s inner values then being so intimately
related to the nation, private interests become synonymous with the State. And,
with the State being directly tied to the Emperor, the standard as to what is right
or wrong can only be determined by the nation itself. As Morris notes, “ the
standard according to which the nation’s actions are judged as right or wrong
lies within itself (that is, in the ‘national polity’), and what the nation does,
whether within its borders or beyond them, is not subject to any moral code that
5 3 Ibid., p. 501.
Ivan Morris, Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism,” in Thought and B ehavior in
Modem Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 1,2.
5 5 Ibid., p. 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
supersedes the nation.” 3 0 Therefore, any action could be condoned because the
State could not be wrong due to its close proximity to the Emperor. This type of
mentality contributed greatly to the superiority felt by the Japanese military.
Because the military was under the control of the Emperor, there was a sense of
what Morris describes as “ vertical pride."5 7 The military was the Imperial force
and as such, thought of itself as synonymous with the nation.
To David Titus, “ modern Japanese nationalism stems from the impact of
European power in the closing of the Tokugawa era.” ® The initial stages of
nationalism exhibited in Japan were those related to the slogan “ expel the
barbarians.” This was followed by an understanding that western technology
would be needed to accomplish this. However, as Titus points out, the adoption
of western technology had a grave effect on the masses and resulted in uneven
social development. This uneven social development is what in essence fueled
nationalism.®
Titus continues by pointing out the main differences between Chinese
and Japanese nationalism. In China, there was a failure to modernize and an
emphasis on cultural superiority whereas in Japan, there was an emphasis on
the military, modernization, the idea of the nation as a family, and the love for
one’s native area.® As Titus concludes, “ only by destroying the tenacious family
structure in Japanese society and its ideology, the very place where the old
nationalism ferments, can Japan democratize society from the base up."8 1 This
5 6 Ibid., p. 8.
8 7 Ibid., p. 14.
5 8 David Titus, “Nationalism in Japan: Its Theoretical Background and Prospects," in
Thought and Behavior in M odern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris, (London: Oxford Univ. PreSS,
1963) p. 137.
5 8 Ibid., p. 144.
6 0 Ibid.
8 1 Ibid., p. 152.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
family structure is at the heart of the Japanese sense of identity and brings us to
a short analysis of Japanese Neo-Confucianism.
Neo-Confucianism and Japan
When one thinks of the influences which have molded Japan into what it
is today, one must certainly look at Neo-Confucianism and the indigenous
religion of Shinto. Neo-Confucianism imbues the Japanese with a high sense
of ethics and morality forming what is the core of the samurai code, bushido (the
way of the warrior, and later militarism, advocating one's selfless devotion to the
country). Neo-Confucianism focuses on such virtues as harmony, loyalty and
filial piety and defined the moral obligations of human relationships on the basis
of inequality, with the exception of the relationship among friends. These
relationships of inequality (with the most important being that between lord and
vassal)® can be understood through the Japanese words senpai and kohai, with
senpai being someone senior in age or social/work position and kohai being
someone junior in age or social/work position. Therefore, someone in a kohai
position would be expected to defer decision making to their senpai out of
respect. To not defer to a senpai would create an inbalance in the maintenance
of order and authority (for Chu Hsi there was a grave concern that human
8 2 Peter Nosco, “Masuho Zanko (1655-1742): A Shinto Popularizer Between Nativism and
National Learning," in Peter Nosco ed., Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 177. Here, Nosco explores Yamazaki Ansai’s devotion to Chu
Hsi and his fusion of Confucian ethics with Shinto. For Ansai, the lord-vassal (one of five
Confucian relationships) relationship was the most important. The importance of this lord-vassal
relationship is evidenced even today as one looks at the reverence displayed in Japanese
business by an employee to an employer. I am reminded of the Japanese proverb which is used
when there is conflict with a superior: N a g a i mono n i wa m akarero! "When you have something
long, you'd better get yourself rolled up." This essentially means to not resist your superiors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
behavior contribute to order and authority)* and lead the violator perhaps to
being ostracized (in many rural districts, even until recently, to sway from the
norm would lead to mura-hachibu or a “ discontinuation of all relations with the
offender” ).8 *
In addition to the Neo-Confucian emphasis on order, authority and
relationships, there was also an emphasis on looking to history for direction. As
Tokugawa Confucian scholar Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728) posited, there was no
substitute for the classical Chinese texts (e.g. Analects of Confucius and the Six
Classics).* These texts and only these texts would allow one to develop sage
like qualities. One could not look at modern literature or trust one’s own
thinking because these were not reliable.
Along with Sorai, Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) also emphasized the
study of history for establishing universal truth. However, being a nativist,
Shinto scholar and ethnocentrist (Norinaga believed that the Sun Goddess,
though she spread her favor everywhere, was particularly fond of Japan
therefore making Japan superior to the rest of the world), Norinaga
concentrated primarily on the Japanese text the K ojiki (Record of Ancient
Matters) and provided a strong foundation for ideological nativism which would
later be developed by such ultranationalists as Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843).
This type of nativist thought which was fueled by historical studies and Neo-
Confucianism, would provide the fuel for “National Shinto” and Japan’s
eventual annihilation.
8 3 W.G. Beasley, The Rise o f M odem Japan, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 16.
8 4 Nobuyiiki Honna and Bates Hotter, eds., A n English D iction ary o f Japanese Ways of
Thinking, (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing Co., 1989), p. 46.
8 8 Samual Hideo Yamashita, ‘ Nature and Artifice in the Writings of Ogyu Sorai.’ in Peter
Nosco ed., Confucianism in Tokugawa C ulture, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p.
140.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
How could Neo-Confucianism, with its apparent admirable qualities
centered on family, social harmony and appreciation of history contribute to
Japan’s eventual downfall (e.g. militarism and the Second World War)? As
Ronald Dore indicates regarding education during the Tokugawa period,
“ schools tended always and everywhere to encourage submissive acceptance
of the existing order.” ® In such a hierarchical society, the common man
derived his self-respect from the respect his superiors showed him. Further, as
Dore notes, education did not teach students to think but to accept
submissively.* This type of submission, based on Neo-Confucian
relationships of inequality, provided a fertile ground for the blind obedience and
loyalty exhibited toward the Japanese leaders of the 1930s. Therefore, Neo-
Confucianism, was and is Japan’s best friend and worst enemy because on the
one hand it provides for a predictable, orderly society where respect and loyalty
are the norms; Yet on the other hand, it leads to a type of blind acceptance. As
Tsurumi Kazuko indicates, the Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors (the basic
text of army socialization), prescribed five primary virtues for soldiers: loyalty
(one of the prime virtues in Neo-Confucianism), propriety, valor, fidelity and
simplicity. She points out that among these five virtues, loyalty ranked first. The
following quote from the Imperial Precepts provides a good idea of the intense
influence Neo-Confucianism had on the military establishment and on the
Japanese people as a whole concerning blind loyalty:
Soldiers and sailors, We are your Commander-in-Chief. Our relations with
you will be most intimate when we rely upon you as Our limbs and you look
up to Us as your head...
Remember that, as the protection of the state and the maintenance of its
“ Ronald Dore, T h e Legacy” in Edward R. Beauchamp ed., Learning To Be Japanese,
(Hamden, CT., Linnet Books, 1978), p. 24.
8 7 Ibid.. p. 27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
power depend upon the strength of its arms, the growth or decline of this
strength must affect the nation’s destiny for good or for evil; therefore,
neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics, but with
single heart fulfill essential duty of loyalty, and bear in mind that duty is
weightier than a mountain, while death is lighter than a feather. Never by
failing in moral principle fall into disgrace and bring dishonor upon your
name.®
With this mindset, it is no wonder that the leaders of Japan were so
successful in rallying the whole of Japan in the militaristic 1930s. Neo-
Confucianism provided the mind-numbing foundation supporting this militaristic
climate.
Japan’s Peculiar State Identity
Peter Takayama, in The Revitalization of Japanese C iv il Religion,
investigates how post-War Japan has come to question its present form of
statehood. He points to two issues: How Japan has lost touch with its past in its
pursuit of economic gain, and whether to remilitarize. As Takayama indicates,
Japan’s self-oriented, economic pursuit has led many in Japan to believe that
Japan is now operating in a “moral vacuum."® Therefore, for some, there is a
desire to return to the past in order to fight the decadence of the present. A
large part of returning to the past and thereby reestablishing lost national
identity, is to return to the moorings which State Shinto provided. As Takayama
indicates, when State Shinto was banned after the Second World War, there
was a huge loss of identity and destiny.7 0
6 8 Kazuko Tsurumi, T h e Processes of Army Socialization,’ in Edward R. Beauchamp ed.
Learning To Be Japanese, (Hamden, CT., Linnet Books, 1978), p. 175.
“ Peter Takayama, “ The Revitalization of Japanese Civil Religion,” in Mark Mullins,
Shimazono Susumu and Paul Swanson, eds., Religion and Society in M odern Japan, (Berkeley:
Asian Humanities Press, 1993), p. 105.
7 0 Ibid., p. 109.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
Takayama further indicates that from the Occupation to the present there
has remained a strong element of militarism and that there have been calls by
many influencial Japanese (e.g. Kishi Nobusuke, elder brother of fromer Prime
Minister Sato) to do away with the American sponsored Constitution in favor of
a truly genuine Japanese initiated Constitution. This, according to such
proponents as Nobusuke, would help Japan to secure its identity and achieve
true independence, by beginning to erase such labels as the “ reactive state.” 7 '
Is this then the path Japan needs to follow in order to become a “ legitimate
state?” To reestablish its military, Constitution and State Shinto? For Japanese
such as sociologist Shimizu Ikutaro, this is indeed the case. Ikutaro indicates
that the path to becoming a legitimate state cannot begin until Japan regains its
military power and “ right to belligerency.” 7 2 Without this, and the restrictions of
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution voided, Japan simply cannot be
considered a true state.7 3
Is Ikutaro right? Is this “ right of belligerency” necessary for Japan to gain
a sense of identity and statehood? And if so, would this even be possible? To
both questions, the answer is no. Japan under the Yoshida Doctrine, was
highly motivated to concentrate on an economics first policy whereby foreign
policy and security matters would be decided primarily based on which course
the U.S. took. In this way, Japan could focus fully on recovering from the
7 1 “ reactive state” is typically used to describe Japan as a state which does not set its own
agenda but reacts at the prodding of other states, most notably the proddings of the United
States. See: Kent Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the
Reactive State," in W o rld Politics, 40 (4): 1988, pp. 517*541.
7 2 Peter Takayama, p. 116.
7 3 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution provides that "the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right” and that ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained.” This of course has been interpreted quite liberally given the
size and capability of Japan’s Self Defense Force. See: Kenneth Pyle, The M a k in g o f M odem
Japan, (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Co., 1978), pp. 159,165.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
devastation of the Second World War and follow the leadership of the U.S.
without needing to waste resources on maintaining a strong military. I would
suppose that from this type of relationship Nobusuke would consider Japan to
be a type of U.S. colony. This is indeed not the case, and even if it were true,
this would not erase Japanese identity. How many other countries depend on
the U.S. as well as maintain their sense of identity? Canada certainly depends
on the U.S. yet has a very strong sense of identity. What choice did Japan have
and what choice does it have now but to follow the lead of the U.S. and
maintain the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty? Japan simply does not have the will
to act outside the Japan/U.S. security relationship. Therefore, this notion of
“ independence” is nearly an impossibility not only for Japan but for many other
countries of the world as well. To base one’s definition of statehood on a “ right
of belligerency” is not feasible. As Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara point
out, there is a strong anti-militarist climate in Japan with a keen respect for the
Peace Constitution.7 4 They further indicate that “ the structure of the Japanese
state has made it virtually impossible, short of a domestic political revolution, for
an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in Japan."7 5
Therefore, Japan cannot return to a strong “right of belligerency" style military,
because most of the Japanese people would not stand for it, and the Japanese
system would make it virtually impossible. This is not to mention the outcry that
would be heard throughout Asia if Japan developed in the way Nobusuke has
deemed necessary. Also, without the umbrella of the U.S. . Japan would not
have had or have the credibility to achieve what it has because Japan has still
not shown itself to be trustworthy to many in Asia. This is evidenced by Japan
7 4 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms
and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 87.
7 5 Ibid., p. 86.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
not coming to terms with its past on such issues as the Korean comfort women
issue (see the next section of this paper) and leaders officially visiting Yasukuni
Shrine and thereby leaving the perception that they are honoring war criminals.
As Margaret McKean posits, “ strength and power are quite definitely the
ability to make others do what they would not otherwise do..” * Japan is a part of
an elite group of countries (G7) which are intertwined in securing stability in the
world. These countries have varying roles depending on their strengths and
weaknesses. Japan's strength happens to be with its economic power and
technology, and as part of the G-7 team has the ability to make other countries
do what it wants. In this present world, there is a close relationship between
security and economics. As U.S. Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott stated in a
1995 speech to the National Press Club in Tokyo, “ countries that trade together
are less likely to make war against each other."7 7 With perhaps the exception of
the United States, no one country can act independently in this present world.
To have strength does not necessarily mean military strength, and military
strength certainly does not define a country’s identity. As Takashi Inoguchi
indicates, Japan is a “ supporter” country (a country which supports and sustains
the international framework) while the U.S. is a “leader” country (a country that
shapes and sustains the framework for international interactions).1 8 Japan then
has a role to play and is limited in what it can do outside its relationship with the
United States. Because of Japan's past, there must be strong ties with the U.S.
and a coming to terms with the fact that the Japanese state, although
7 8 Margaret McKean, "State Strength and the Public Interest,” in Gary Allinson and
Yasunori Sone eds., P o litica l Dynamics in Contemporary Japan, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press,
1993), p. 76.
7 7 Strobe Talbott, “U.S.-Japanese Leadership in The New Pacific Community,” U .S .
Department o f State Dispatch, (Feb. 13, 1995 Vol. 6, No. 7), p. 91.
7 S Takashi Inoguchi, J a p a n ’s Foreign Policy in an Era o f Globed Change, (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
dependent, is not unlike many other states which are supporters. The
population of Japan which thinks like ikutaro, must understand that identity is
not based on independence but on the positive role played in the
interdependent international community.
Coming to Terms with the Past:
The Korean “ Comfort Women” Issue
With it now being over fifty years since the end of the Second World War,
Japan, as veiwed by many (e.g. People’s Republic of China, North and South
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia), has still not adequately addressed
colonial rule and wartime atrocities. There continues to remain the lingering
question as to whether Japan is truly repentant of its past. Many scars still
remain throughout much of Asia such as the Rape of Nanking, past medical
experiments on prisoners of war, the Bataan Death March and the forced
prostitution of tens of thousands of women, most notably Korean. After so many
years, why is Japan still perceived as not yet having come to terms with its past?
This section will deal with the Korean “ comfort women” issue as an example of
the difficulties Japan has had atoning for past aggression.
The use of Korean women as “ comfort women” (forced prostitutes),
began during Japan’s imperialistic adventures in Asia prior to the Second
World War. Under the guise of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
and the desire to liberate Asia from the West, Japan, under a strong military
government, set out to colonize much of Asia. The focus of the time was fukofoi-
kyoohei (a rich country with a strong army) and bunmei kaika (civilization and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
enlightenment).7 0 This nationalistic ferver required a large military as well as
many support mechanisms. One of the early support mechanisms deemed
necessary by the Japanese government was the use of “ comfort women.”
The first “ comfort women” were often Japanese prostitutes lured to
Japan’s new colonies with promises of good money and adventure. However,
the number of available prostitutes proved inadequate. Therefore, the
Japanese army went on to recruit women from within its colonies through
kidnapping, coercion and deceit. Of these women, approximately 80% were
Korean.®
Incredibly, the realities of what transpired concerning the “ comfort
women,” have only relatively recently been given credence by the Japanese
government. It was only after a lawsuit in 1991 by a group of South Korean
former “ comfort women” that the Japanese government came to acknowledge
their existence.” With such an acknowledgement, the truth of the matter
continues to come to the fore as many other surviving, former “ comfort women"
come forward. An article in the Nihon K e iza i Shimbun indicates that women from
Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Netherlands had
testified that they were enslaved by the Imperial Japanese Army.® These
women represented more than 100,000 young women who had become sex
slaves for the Japanese army by war end.®
With such a huge number of women and countries affected, how could
such an atrocity be shoved under the carpet for so long and still be lingering in
7 8 Nobuyuki Honna and Bates Hotter, eds., A n English D ictionary o f Japanese Ways o f
Thinking, (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing Co., 1989), p. 198.
“ “Secret Shame," The New York Times, Sept. 10,1995, Sect. 7, p. 41.
8 1 Reuters Ltd., Aug. 7, 1993.
8 2 “Private Fund for Former Sex Slaves off to a Slow Start,” Nihon K e iz a i Shimbun, Sept.
11, 1995, p. 4.
8 3 “Secret Shame," The New York Times, Sept. 10,1995, Sect. 7, p. 41.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
the minds of so many as an outstanding bone of contention? How has Japan
been addressing this issue? What is it in contemporary Japan which halts the
Japanese government from facing this issue head on and thus quelling
lingering animosity? To answer these questions as they relate to Korea, one
must first look at the complexity of the Japan-Korea relationship.
The antipathy between Japan and Korea, particularly of that on the
Korean side, is rooted in a long history of Japan’s desire for control over Korea.
Japan fought two wars over which the issue was control over the Korean
peninsula - the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of
1905. As a result of these victories, and the tacit acceptance by the West of
Japan’s imperialistic course, Japan colonized and occupied Korea from 1910-
1945. To this day, there continues to be a schism when Koreans think of the
Japanese.
This schism was demonstrated to me in 1992 when I visited Seoul.
While in Seoul, I came across a number of older Koreans who had a firm
understanding of the Japanese language. They indicated that during Japan’s
occupation, they had been forced to learn the Japanese language as well as
adhere to Japanese customs. The animosity and pain in their voices was clear
and was reflected in their children as well. This observation of lingering
animosity is reinforced by the Korean author O Sonfa. In an essay written for
Japan Echo, she writes of how the Korean and Japanese media perpetuate this
animosity.
By and large the media in both countries have automatically operated on
the assumption that Japan’s lack of contrition for its aggressive and racist
behavior in the past lies behind every controversy that crops up between
our two countries, be it the question of compensating Korean “ comfort
women” forced to provide sexual services for Japanese soldiers during
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
the war; the “ sex tours” designed to give Japanese men easy access to
Korean prostitutes; or the rapid retreat of Japanese capital from South
Korea in the face of recent labor problems and unfavorable exchange
rates, the hypersensitive, xenophobic and self-righteous nationalism
exhibited by South Koreans has been chalked up to the fact that they are
dealing with people against whom they bear a national grudge.8 4
Given the troublesome nature of the Japan-Korea relationship and their
sordid past, Japan has a huge problem as it seeks to move beyond its
economic status and achieve more of an identity as a leader in international
politics. To date, Japan has addressed the “ comfort women” issue with a series
of half-hearted apologies from its Prime Ministers. For example, in an apology
given on August 15,1995 by then Prime Minister Tomichi Murayama, remorse
was offered but he also indicated that the government would not compensate
former Korean “ comfort women" because all matters concerning Japan's
wartime redress had been legally solved through treaty.8 5 The treaty Murayama
is referring to is the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965 wherein Korea renounced “ any
right to demand specific damages in exchange for promises of economic
assistance.” ® This of course was prior to the Korean “ comfort women” issue
coming to the fore. Why then, if a treaty has already been signed, is Japan
continually apologizing when the issue has seemingly been dealt with?
Hidenaka Kato posits the following:
Deep historic suspicions about Tokyo's intentions permeate China, the
Koreas, and even great admirers of Japan such as Singapore. And the
tenacious memories of World War II serve as a constant brake to any
forward momentum by Japan. Indeed, it is a measure of the lingering
shadow of that conflict that Japan seemingly spends more time these days
8 4 O Sonfa, ‘The Cultural Roots of Japanese-Korean Friction," Japan Echo, 20, (1993), p.
23.
8 5 “ Apology Issued for War,” The Japan Times, Aug. 16,1995, p. 1.
8 8 O Sonfa, p. 24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
worrying about redressing the wartime grievances of its Asian neighbors
than it does on how to lead them in the future.8 7
The problem with Japan and its position on the “ comfort women,” is that it
has not been an initiator. It had to be prodded and cajoled to even recognize
the issue. This gives credence to Calder and his labeling of Japan as the
“ reactive state.” The “ reactive state," according to Calder, maintains that “ the
impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and that
reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the
two come into conflict.” 8 8
Calder’s “reactive state” paradigm can be applied quite accurately in the
“ comfort women" case. Had pressure not been applied, Japan would not have
responded or perhaps even acknowledged that such an atrocity had occurred.
If, out of its own volition Japan had addressed the issue, much of the
controversy could have been quelled. Instead, Japan finds itself backtracking
by continually apologizing, thus giving credence to the Korean side that all was
not said and done as a result of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965. Japan is
simply content to remain at an impasse.
How did Japan reach the point where it simply reacts to international
matters instead of looking ahead in a more proactive, strategic way? Good
insight into this question is given by looking at the long post-war relationship
Japan has had with the United States. The U.S. has served as an umbrella
under which Japan has been able to pawn off many international matters.
America s post-war policy, according to Ichiro Ozawa, “ was not designed to
build Japan into a responsible member of the international community, but to
8 7 Hidenaka Kato, “ Can Japan Learn to Lead?," W orld Press Review, Apr. 1995, p. 52.
6 8 Kent Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive
state," W orld Politics, 40, (4) (1988), p. 518.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
make sure it would never again be active in international politics."1 ” With such a
comfortable set-up of having a big brother watch over it and set the pace, Japan
now finds itself struggling with how to handle itself now that the Cold War is
over. As a world economic power, the status quo of the “1955 system,” with the
U.S. at the helm is no longer viable, the devotion of government primarily to
economics, as during the Yoshida Prime Ministership, must now be a thing of
the past. Japan is now being forced to lead, and with this, is experiencing
intense growing pains as evidenced by its dealings with the Korean “ comfort
women” case.
North and South Korea are indeed extremely important to Japan.
According to Byung-joon Ahn, a political science professor at Yonsei University,
“ peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are essential to peace and
stability in Northeast Asia including Japan itself."9 0 With this in mind, and
Japan’s increasing importance as a mediator and leader in the region, Japan
has a great national interest in seeing the “ comfort women" issue resolved and
not simply by relying on the 1965 Treaty. Relying solely on the 1965 Treaty
continues a relationship filled with pent-up hostility. Because the atrocity of the
Korean “ comfort women” was not in the open at the time of the treaty signing,
and Japan did not volunteer to come “ clean" at that time, it should be addressed
now with compensation.
To date, only a private fund from donations in Japan has been set up to
help compensate living, former “ comfort women." This is simply not acceptable
to the South Korean government or to the victims. As a result, the South Korean
government plans to compensate living, former “ comfort women” before they die
8 9 Ichiro Ozawa, “ Japan’s Self-Reform," New Perspectives Q uarterly, 2 (4), fall 1994, p. 56.
9 0 Byung-joon Ahn, “ Japanese Policy Toward Korea," in Japan's Foreign Policy, ed. Gerald
Curtis, (New York: Sharpe Inc., 1993), p.263.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
and then later try to recover the money from the Japanese government.9 ’ The
coalition of conservative parties, bureaucrats and business leaders who oppose
compensation must be brought to a place where they see all that is at stake
should Japan continue to viewed as distrustful. Kensaburo Oe, the 1994 Nobel
Prize winner for literature correctly states:
For the Japanese to be able to regard 21 st-century Asia not as a new
economic power rivaling the West but as a region in which Japan can
be a true partner, they must set up a basis that would enable them to
criticize their neighbors and be criticized in turn. For this, Japan must
apologize for its aggression and offer compensation.” “
A look at the German response to its atrocities of the Second World War
would serve Japan well. Germany, which suffered similar devastation as that of
Japan, immediately started to face up to its past after the War. According to
former German ambassador to Japan Heinrich D. Dieckmann, the political
class and huge majority of Germans knew that they had to give compensation to
make good for the crimes of the Nazi regime.®
How can Japan move beyond the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965 and do
the “ right” thing of compensating the Korean “ comfort women” and delivering an
apology that seems and is indeed sincere? Part of the answer lies in treating
the “ comfort women” issue and other past historical oversights as serious
matters. There should be a full investigation done voluntarily and cooperatively
with the findings presented to the world with accuracy. This would help Japan
immensely in securing more of a positive identity to the rest of the world and
help establish relationships on a basis of trust instead of out of economic
*' “ Japan to Reimburse Korea Compensation," The H onolulu Advertiser, March 12,1998,
p. A2.
9 2 Kensaburo Oe, "Recovering the Right to be a Part of Asia, “ The Japan Times, Aug .16,
1995.
9 3 “ Germany Moves Beyond War Issues,' The Japan Times, Aug. 7,1995, p. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
necessity (e.g. South Korea). This however does not seem likely because of
the numerous systemic problems within the Japanese government and
bureaucracy.
According to Japanese scholar Michael Blaker, “ a core maxim of
Japanese diplomatic thinking is that only a fundamental alteration in the nature
of the international order can justify basic changes in national policy.n M The
national order has indeed changed with the end of the Cold War and the need
for Japan to assert leadership in Asia. Japan must somehow come to realize
that its current standard for coming to terms with the past reinforces an image of
insincerity and places a question mark on its trustworthiness. Working from a
sense of principle must somehow be forged within the Japanese leadership.
However, as mentioned above, there are numerous systemic problems.
Looking at the “ comfort women" case, one would expect that the Prime
Minister’s Office and Diet would be the primary institutions where decisions
relating to past aggression and their compensation would take place. This
would seem a fair assumption. However, the Diet, according to Hans Baerwald,
is a “ relatively impotent participant in foreign policy-making."® In reality, the
power rests within the various bureaucratic ministries. As noted earlier, the only
official action Japan has taken is for various Prime Ministers to offer apologies,
and these, without the full support of a majority in the Diet.
Part of the answer for these anemic responses to the “ comfort women,"
9 4 Michael Blaker, ‘Japan's Diplomatic Style: Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic
Performance," W o rld Politics, 1988, p. 2.
9 5 Hans Baerwald, “ The Diet and Foreign Policy," in The Foreign P olicy o f M odem Japan,
ed. Robert Scalapino, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977), p. 37.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
rests with the seemingly” impossible level of coordination and cooperation
needed to effect decisions. Gregory Clark, a policy adviser for the Australian
government, characterizes the Japanese bureaucracy as a “ collection of groups
each concerned with its own particular, localized interest." He further goes on
to say that this localism leads to the problem of skoeki vs. “ putting the
interests of one’s own ministry ahead of the national interest, with each ministry
mainly seeking to expand turf, maintain budgets and guarantee employment for
retiring employees.” 9 7 It seems that very little has changed since the time of
Okuma Shigenobu and his dealings with the oligarchy.
To further illustrate the need for change, a recent editorial in the Japan
Times by the Secretary General of the “ Fact-Finding Team on the Truth About
Forced Korean Laborers in Japan," indicates that Japan’s Justice Ministry is
trying to cover up documents related to “ comfort women" war tribunals and that
by doing so is failing to recognize the “ comfort women" issue as a war crime.
The Secretary General further indicates that Japan has not prosecuted a single
war criminal on its own since the end of the Second World War and has even
denied public access to related materials. The Secretary General states:
If Japan seriously regrets the war crimes committed in the past and does
not want to repeat them, the government should take the lead in fact-finding
efforts and make ail the results open to the public, if it says that such
matters have been fully investigated, it should be ashamed of itself that no
investigation has been carried out in the 50 years since wars’ end.”
South Korean President Kim Young Sam said in a speech that “ sound
98! use the word “ seemingly" here because if Japan really wanted to be serious about
resolving the ‘comfort women’ issue, it could certainly get around the bureaucracy. The
complications of the bureaucracy however provide a great excuse for not dealing effectively with
such controversies as this.
9 7 Gregory Clark, ‘Splintered by its Strong Group Ethic, Japan Struggles to meet new
Challenges,’ The Japan Times, August 21,1995, p. 21.
9 8 Hong Sang Jtng, “Ministry Evading War Crime Issue," The Japan Times, Aug. 27,1995,
p. 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
relations between South Korea and Japan can be established only when Japan
truly repents its past acts of aggression and colonial rule. We earnestly hope
that our republic and Japan will be able to put the unfortunate past behind us
once and for all and develop our relations in a future-oriented manner.” ®
Because Japan has so many pockets of power and really has no single
spokesperson,1 0 0 the task of making amends is going to require a deep desire
and will to shake-up in the system. With a more open and less cumbersome
system, Japan may one day be able to shed itself of its past, make things “ right’
with those it so victimized during the War, and look to the future as a trustworthy
leader in Asia and the world.
Education and Society in
Contemporary Japan
The preceding sections of this paper have shown the wide variety of
difficulties the Japanese have faced and are facing concerning their place in the
world and how they perceive themselves and are perceived by others. We
have looked at the first impressions of Japan by Westerners in the late
nineteenth century, seen the difficulties Japanese (Okuma Shigenobu) and
others (Koreans) have had dealing with the Japanese bureaucracy. Further, we
have gained insight into one of the important periods in Japan's history, the
Taisho era, which has provided an understanding of how the moorings of Japan
are anchored (e.g. the bureaucracy, Emperor system). We have also seen
through the Taisho era and contempory Japan, that although the Japanese are
9 9 Kim Young Sam, “ Asian Nations Mark Anniversary,’ The Japan Times, Aug. 16, 1995.
1 0 0 T.J. Pern pel, “ The Unbundling of Japan Inc.: The Changing Dynamics of Japanese
Policy Formation", in The Trade C risis: H ow W ill Japan Respond? p. 274.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
adept at borrowing foreign concepts, such as democracy, the bureaucracy sets
the tone and is extremely slow to change if change at all (compare the qualities
of the contempory bureaucracy to that of Okuma Shigenobu's time). We have
also explored Japanese sensibilities concerning the influence of Confucianism .
In the concluding section, I will look into contemporary Japan's educational
system and the enculturation process. This will provide an understanding of
why Japan does not produce many people such as Okuma Shigenobu, who
could help Japan secure a more positive, confident sense of identity in the
world.
Before exploring inhibiting factors within the Japanese educational
system, it must first be mentioned that regardless of these, Japanese education
produces results in such areas as mathematics and literacy which are second to
none. As a result, Japan is where it is today as a member of the prestigious G-7
(a grouping of the seven richest industialized nations of the world), has a GNP
that as early as 1983 constituted 10% of world GNP,1 0 1 is a top foreign aid
donor and has numerous other leading indicators of success and contribution.
This success can be attributed in large measure to Japan’s intense emphasis
on education. This was made clear by the late Edwin Reischauer, a leading
specialist on Japan and former United States Ambassador to Japan in the
1960s. He states that “ nothing, in short, has been more central in the success of
modern Japan than its educational system."1 ® This view was also supported
by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO in its report of 1966.1 0 3
These results however, offer a mixed message. For on the one hand Japan has
1 0 1 Wing On Lee, “ Japan," in Education and Development in East Asia, eds. Paul Morris and
Anthony Sweeting (New York: Garland Pub., 1995), p. 22.
1 0 2 Edwin Reischauer, The Japanese T oday: Change and C ontinuity, (Tokyo: Charles E.
Tuttle, 1992), p. 186.
, 0 3 Wing On Lee, p. 20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
one of the most literate, well-read, competent work forces in the world. But on
the other, the costs of this success have caused great distress for the family and
society. Before we delve into some of the distressing factors of Japanese
education, let us first look at some of the historical foundations.
Because Japanese society has been richly influenced by Confucianism
and Buddhism, there is a deep respect for formal learning. As noted above, this
formal learning has contributed immeasurably to the country’s success. As
early as 1907, Japan had nearly all of its children in school and during this
same time declared all education mandatory and free for all students up
through grade six.1 0 4 The educational system at this time was thoroughly based
on merit and therefore a child with meager economic standing or lesser lineage
could compete successfully with someone from an elite family. This was in
sharp contrast to merely a few decades previous when class standing played a
key role. With the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the desire to catch up with the
West, and deeply engrained Confucian values, education took center stage
only to be reduced to nearly nothing after the Second World War.
The aftermath of the Second World War was a most dismal situation for
Japan. Its infastructure lay in ruins, food was in short supply and the spirit of the
people displayed a keen sense of betrayal at the hands of the expansionist
Japanese military government. The Japanese thus had no choice but to accept
their fate of being conquered and occupied by the United States.
The United States occupied Japan from 1945 to 1952. During this time,
under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP), the United States set out to mold Japan in a form that
would ensure no further expansionist drives by installing institutions and
1 0 4 Edwin Reischauer, p. 188.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
reforms. These Occupation reforms were widely accepted by the Japanese not
only because of the wide benevolence of the Americans but because it was
really the only practicable option they had.
In 1946, the United States Education Mission, which comprised twenty-
seven prominent American educators, came to Japan and completely
revamped the Japanese educational system modeling it after the United
States.1 0 5 This overhall established a 6-3-3-4 system and helped achieve a
level of decentralization, although today the Ministry of Education (Monbusho)
continues to wield central control, continually modifying this American instituted
system to fit in with its own values, culture and priorities. With the government's
emphasis on primary and secondary education and adept responses to
changing manpower needs, the value of education has truly been optimized.
Some of the ingredients which have contributed to this success however also
serve as limitations, especially when the health of the family and welfare of
students are concerned. It should be noted that my analysis of the educational
system will be based not only on the research of others but on my four years
teaching in Japan (one year at an “ academic," prefectural high school in
northern Japan and three years alternating between four municipally operated
junior high schools near Tokyo).
I begin by exploring the intense enculturation process which begins in
the preschool and early elementary school. Contrary to the rigors, structure and
regimentation of junior and senior high school, preschool and elementary
education emphasize the importance of free play, collaboration and persistence
- not test scores. At the heart of this early educational process is the
1 0 5 Kazuo Kawai, Ja pa n ’s American Interlude, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1960), p. 187.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
development of community. According to Catherin Lewis, this community is
created by:
Minimizing competition and helping children develop the feeling that “ we’re
all in it together.”
Involving all children - whatever their academic skills - in leadership of the
school.
Focusing discipline on what it means to be a kind, responsible member of
the school community - not on rewards and punishments.
Designing lessons so that they simultaneously promote children's
belonging, understanding of one another, and academic learning.1 0 5
Up through junior high school, there are very few distinctions made
between students on the basis of ability or achievement. The school system
concentrates on the “ average" student. As a junior high school teacher in
Japan, I would often marvel at how some students would be passed from grade
to grade yet were obviously well behind in their acquisition of the material
needed to continue on. These students would do very little in class or not
attend class at all, just biding their time until they could be released from
compulsory education after the ninth grade. These students were certainly in
the minority because most Japanese students continue on to high school, but it
was a shame nonetheless not only because they were dropping out and would
have little chance to do more than menial labor, but because these students
were many times the most creative, bright individuals in the school. I made a
point of seeking these students out (they typically colored their hair and did not
abide by regulations for keeping their school uniforms) to talk with them and see
what their story was. Invariably, what had started out in elementary school as a
time of play and bonding with classmates had now degenerated into a
restrictive, consuming lifesyle focused on rote learning and stuffing one’s mind
1 0 8 Catherine Lewis, Educating Hearts and M inds, (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1995), p. 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
with all sorts of relevant and irrelevant information for the purpose of attaining
high scores on high school and university entrance exams. These students felt
like they could not continue to be molded in a direction which stifled their
individualism and creative thinking and thus rebelled and opted out of the
system, however strange they appeared. Therefore, in the beginning, a child is
imbued with the values of equality, fairness, and community responsibility. Yet,
however valuable these qualities are, the student is stifled by a system which
does not adjust itself to accomodate differences and encourage individuality.
This stifling is not only in the classroom but is most apparent in the home
by overzealous mothers who are commonly referred to as “ education mothers"
(kyoiku mama). As mentioned earlier, education is of extreme value in Japanese
society and in large part determines whether or not a child will be successful.
For this reason, the family, most notably the mother, places supreme priority on
making sure children receive the best education possible. With this type of
family priority and commitment, small families are a necessity given the time,
energy and expense required to help a child be successful. As a result, it is
very rare to see families in Japan with more than two or three children. Having
more than this would unduly strain the family and would lead to mediocrity in
the educational pursuit.
Given that the father is generally much less involved in raising children
than the mother due to his work responsibilities,1 0 7 the mother is left to make sure
her children are set up to have the best chance for success in Japanese society.
The mother then becomes the key motivator and devotes her life to insuring her
1 0 7 Japan is frequently referred to as a chichi naki shakai or “ fatherless society.’ Because
so many men are enveloped by their work, they are rarely home and when they are, typically on
Sundays, they spend this time sleeping. For further treatment on Japan’s fatherless society and
how men in essence throw their lives away in service of the company, see: Clayton Naff, About
Face, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994), pp. 58-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
children make the grade. This begins very early on for children because many
mothers want to get a head start on academics even though at the preschool
and elemenary level, academics in school are not stressed as much as such
values as cooperation, fairness and equality. As a result of this process, many
pre-school children will have already learned the two Japanese phonetic
alphabets along with counting skills prior to even setting foot in a classroom.
Therefore, at a very early age, contrary to the focus of elementary school,
children are pushed hard by the mother toward education and achievement.
There is a very common expression in Japan which relates to this pushy nature
of Japanese mothers and how they steadily encourage progress. The
expression is “ huebu uue tuieba aytuni rm uytigukoro" (if he crawls, encourage him
to stand; if he stands, have him walk - such is the parent’s way).1 0 8
I have seen this pressure time and time again as I have worked in
Japanese schools, done homestays and visited friends. I recall one experience
which repeated itself every week for a year as I studied Japanese with a
Japanese mother of two girls. At this time, the younger girl, Natsuko, was in the
seventh grade while her older sister, Ayako, was in the tenth grade. I would visit
the household once a week, typically arriving on weekday evenings at six
o’clock for dinner and then leaving to catch the last train home at around eleven
o’clock. At dinner, I would speak in English so the girls could practice their
speaking and listening skills and soon after dinner, the girls would be sent to
their rooms to commence with their homework, all the while with their mother
continually checking up on them. As I would prepare to leave for home at
eleven o’clock, I would invariably still find the girls deep in study, with their
1 0 8 Merry White, The Japanese Educational Challenge, A Commitment to C hildren , (New
York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
father yet to have come home from work. During the course of my year of study,
only twice did the father return home prior to my departing at eleven o’clock.
This deeply reinforced my view that fathers are rarely home during the week
(especially those who work in business and industry), and that “ education
mothers” raised the children by applying quite an intense pressure to study and
maintain grades.
As alluded to earlier, one of the major reasons mothers continually
pressure their children is to ensure they are prepared to do well on high school
and university entrance exams. Because high schools are classified on various
levels of prestige and some even have direct links to higher education such as
Keio University High School (Keio University is a very prestigious private
university in Tokyo), it is paramount that math, science, Japanese, English and
social studies be mastered in such a way as to achieve high test scores on
admissions tests. Unlike the United States, Japanese high schools and
universities have their own particular tests to determeine who is acceptable.
These tests are not national like the SAT and ACT of the United States but are
particular to each institution. Interestingly enough, this testing system is one of
the chief ways for schools to make money because of the high fees associated
and the large number of prospective students who sit for the exam, particularly
at the most prestigious schools. The stress and priority to do well on these
entrance exams is commonly referred to as “ exam hell" or shiken jigoku.
While teaching junior high school in Japan, every year I would notice a
markedly higher stress level in the ninth grade students as they prepared for the
upcoming high school entrance exams. The academic emphasis in classrooms
would even shift as high school entrance exam dates loomed closer and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
teachers tried to gear their lessons to provide the best possible preparation. For
example, as an English teacher, I would normally focus on grammer, reading,
writing, listening and speaking in relatively equal amounts. However, as
entrance exams approached, I would be required to focus much more on
grammer and reading since these were the main areas emphasized on the
English portion of these tests. If we could prepare our students in such a way
that they would do well on high school entrance exams, expecially on those of
the elite schools, it would reflect very well on the school’s reputation and the
communty would herald us a success.
This “ exam hell” for many students basically means very little life outside
of academics. This pressure cooker atmosphere and push by “ education
mothers” has led to some serious problems for a number of young students. A
notable problem is the much discussed “ school refusal syndrome." This
syndrome, as noted by Merry White and researched by Margaret Lock, “ shows
that most Japanese believe the problem stems from the intensity of the nuclear
family ~ particularly from overindulgent mothers devoted, to the exclusion of all
else, to their children.” 1 ® This syndrome is evidenced by children not wanting to
go to school, physical symptoms and simple truancy without permission.
Is there more to this “ school refusal syndrome" than just the “ education
mother” and “ examination hell?" There indeed is and it stems from the
homogenous, uniform society which Japan claims to be. A popular saying in
Japan that I learned soon after I arrived was “ the nail that sticks up gets
hammered down.” That is, conform and fit in with the group and status quo or
else! Or else what! Typically this “ or else” would be in the form of society’s
ostracism and chastisement. A huge component of Japanese society is based
1 0 9 Ibid., 136.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
on shame and pressure to conform to established norms and cultural
boundaries. Should there be difference or oddness, society is embarrassed
and predictability of action is thwarted. Because of this, only the very strong
and self-assured can stand up to this pressure should they wish to deviate from
the norm. The weaker in society who just cannot seem to fit in contribute to the
increasing number of juvenil suicides which the Japanese press often attribute
to school pressure.
One of the most striking developments that has received a huge amount
of press in Japan is the phenomenon of bullying or ijime. One only need look
through a Japanese newspaper to find a recent case related to bullying. To
illustrate, I read through approximately one month of the very popular Japanese
daily newspaper, the M ainichi D aily News. The following headlines and stories
are a few of what I found: Monday September 9,1996 the headline reads: “ UK,
Japanese Students Join Hands in Anti-bullying Message."1 1 0 The crux of this
article is “ijime yo tomare," (stop bullying) and brought students from the UK to
perform silent skits on bullying at a number of elementary and junior high
schools in the Tokyo area. The message they relay is one of taking notice of
those around you and offering support to those in need. This group from the UK
was also in Japan to take part in the International Education Conference
on bullying which was a two-day event sponsored by the Japan Teachers'
Union (JTA). This event was planned, as a further Mainichi article reports, “ in
response to the continued reports of severe bullyng at schools."1 1 1 It continues
by noting how a number of these bullying cases have resulted in suicides. A
noted world expert on bullying present at the conference, Professor Dan
1 1 0 M a in ic h i D a ily News, September 9, 1996, p. 12.
1 ,1 Ibid., p. 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
Olweus of Bergen University in Norway, “ recommended that participants
critically examine the causes of bullying in Japan, including “ examination
hell.” 1 1 2
A further headline in the M ainichi D aily News reads: “ School Drops
Sports Day Over Suicide Threat." This short news snippet reads as follows:
Yokohama - A high school here canceled its sports day after receiving a
letter from an anonymous writer who threatened to commit suicide if the
event went ahead, it was revealed Thursday.
The writer claimed to be a student who had been bullied by classmates at
the girls’ private school here.
“ We canceled the event because our main concern is the threat to human
life, “ said a spokesman at the school. The school's name is being
withheld.
The letter apparently arrived Sept. 28, and the sports event was scheduled
for Oct. 10.
“ I have been bullied by my classmates," reads the letter. “ Sports is my
weak point and everybody waited for me to make a mistake.”1 1 3
Sports days in Japan are annual events held in the fall which require the
full participation of the student body. They include such events as track and
field, hoop shoots, pyramid building, caterpillar races and choreography.
Typically, a school will divide into teams based on homeroom and grade level.
Colored headbands are constructed, team chants devised and much
preparation made to insure a smooth opening ceremony, similar to a mini-
olympics Parents, school administrators and special guests are invited.
Therefore, with all this hoopla, the opportunity to look bad to one’s peers,
especially for someone who does not quite fit in, can be of grave concern.
The last newspaper article I would like to consider is one with the
headline: 1 1 4 “ Father of School Bully Kills Self by Swallowing Fertilizer." The gist
1 1 2 Ibid., September 14,1996, p. 12.
1 .3 Ibid., October 6 ,1 996, p. 12.
1 .4 Ibid., October 2,1 996, p. 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
of this article is about a father who was so distraught by the fact that his son was
named in a note left by a 14-year-old junior high school student who recently
committed suicide. The student’ s note named the father’s son as being one of
six classmates who had bullied him. The father who also committed suicide
was reported by the 14-year-old’s parents to have frequently visited them after
their son’s funeral to apologize. The suicide note found in the boys' school
uniform read: “If I die, there will be no more bullying.”1 1 s
As can be seen by the above newspaper reports, bullying is a problem
that has wide ranging effects and is threatening many Japanese school
systems. It was reported in a 1994 study by the Ministry of Education that there
were over 56,500 cases of bullying with many including multiple beatings and
extortion.1 1 8 This statistic is more than double the cases reported in 1993,
therefore, to deal with this problem, the Ministry of Education has increased the
number of schools with counselors who specialize in bullying from 154 in 1995
to 553 in 1996.1 , 7
What is at the crux of this social dilemma? As indicated, pressure to
conform and not stand out, “ exam hell” and family pressures have all seemed to
contribute. However,there is another related factor which deserves
consideration. This is the changing mindset and values exhibited by the
younger generation due in large part to affluence and a dissatisfaction with the
status quo.
The Japanese younger generation today is commonly referred to as the
shinjirui or new breed.1 1 8 This new breed has grown up in a society where
"M bkl
1 1 8 Ibid.
1 1 7 Ibid.
1 1 8 Fumie Kumagai, Unm asking Japan Today, (London: Praeger, 1996), p. 73.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
poverty, starvation and struggle are foreign terms which only show up in
Japanese history books and are talked about only by parents and
grandparents. With a home life which pampers children and leaves them as
free as possible to slave at schoolwork, there has come to be a generation of
children who have become in essence spoiled. These children have grown up
with a consumer mentality, many times fixed on an idealistic image of the West
and its free-wheeling, individualistic ways. As Kumagai notes “... this
generation includes lack of commitment, indifference to larger issues, and an
unwillingness to grow up."1 1 9 Kumagai further goes on by describing how
today’s youth have developed what he refers to as the “Peter Pan Syndrome."
He describes this syndrome as young people “ extending the duration of their
student lives, taking on temporary rather than permanent employment, or just
doing nothing at all."1 2 0
The above sentiments I heard quite frequently as I interacted with my
Japanese colleagues in junior and senior high schools. Lest one think that the
above-mentioned adult dissatisfactions with today’ s youth are left behind once
adolescence has been passed, one only need look at the dissatisfactions
displayed by the Japanese business community toward today's college
graduates. The following is a quote from a number of unnamed Japanese
managers as reported in a popular Japanese magazine, Japan Echo:
They’re childish, they can’t speak properly, they have no manners, and
when you tell them to write something, they turn out gibberish.
They don’t have any initiative. They make no effort to help others with
their work.
They have no corporate loyalty. No matter how busy things get, they feel
no qualms about taking time off.
They cry easily.
1 1 9 Ibid.. p. 73.
Ibid., p. 24.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
I think they have a screw loose somewhere.1 2 1
Therefore, there is a clash between the cultural values of the older
generation and those which the young espouse today. This is evidenced by the
bully referred to earlier who drove his classmate to suicide. The father of this
bully was beside himself to the point where he even took his own life. Yet, his
son was not even close to his father’s sense of responsibility and shame. The
intense, traditional Japanese values of diligence, self-control, humility,
dedication, harmony, cooperation and singularity of purpose are being
questioned by today’s young Japanese. They are pampered by “ education
mothers” while at the same time pressured to do well in school. When asked
about problems, junior and senior high students will ofter respond in the tatemae
form. Tatemae, in the spirit of maintaining harmony and cooperation, is the
keeping of one’s true thoughts inside, showing a facade to the outside world.
Therefore, when students are having problems, it is difficult for them to speak up
with their true feelings or hone.
Where then is Japanese education heading? Is it destined for higher
and higher levels of upheaval because of such things as bullying, student
reaction to conformity and nonconformity, family pressures, “ examination hell,”
and cultural expectations of success based on academics? Or will there be a
compromise between the views of young and old? It is certainly hard to say.
However, there will continue to be problems until the pressures of the system
are eased, individuality is more respected and allowed, and the sense of
“ Japaneseness” is toned down.
1 Z 1 Kirsten Ref sing, “ Japanese Educational Expansion, Quality or Equality." in Ideology
and Practice in M odem Japan, eds., Roger Goodman & Kirsten Refsing, (London: Routledge,
1992), p. 121.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
This sense of “ Japaneseness,” as has already been mentioned, is the
sense of Japan being somehow “ special” among nations. In education, this is
illustrated by the special schools and classes which have been created
specifically for the readjustment of Japanese children who have spent short
times abroad.® For without these special “ re-entry” classrooms, somehow
these students who now have a rich international perspective, would somehow
pollute or negatively influence those children who have remained behind in
Japan. As has been reflected throughout this paper, this is the essence of
Japan’s uncertainty with itself - its consensus mentality exclusive to outsiders
and capped with numerous sacrosanct rules, regulations and structures. This
has led the Japanese to feel uneasy when dealing with foriegners. Leading
Japanese politician Ichiro Ozawa notes the following in his analysis of how
Japanese view themselves: “In essence, we see ourselves as a cozy village
society where consensus is the norm and where we all live by unspoken rules
to make life tolerable in a green but crowded land with few material
resources.” 1 2 3 To Ozawa, the main challenge for Japan as it confronts the next
century is the need to change society. According to Ozawa, “ Japan has to move
from decisions based on consensus and into the essence of democracy,
decision-making by the majority, with the minority accepting those decisions.”1 2 4
To do this, the focus of education on consensus and conformity needs to be
changed. With this change, Japan can begin to establish a clearer sense of
identity within and internationally by producing more of such rare citizens as
1 2 2 I am reminded here of Japanese friends of mine who had lived abroad and upon coming home
to Japan, had placed their children in these schools where their children could feel more
comfortable and be with other students who had had the same international exposure.
1 2 3 Ichiro Ozawa, “ Reforming Japan: The Third Opening," in the Economist, v338n7956
(March 9, 1996): p. 22.
1 2 4 Ibid.. p. 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
Okuma Shigenobu. Otherwise, Japan will remain a huge economic
powerhouse with an insecure sense of itself and no corresponding leadership
role internationally.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Bibliography
58
Ahn, Byung-joon. “ Japanese Policy Toward Korea,” in Japan's Foreign Policy, ed.
Gerald Curtis, (New York: Sharpe Inc., 1993).
Baerwald, Hans. “ The Diet and Foreign Policy," in The Foreign Policy of Modem
Japan, ed. Robert Scalapino, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977).
Beasley, W.G. The Rise of Modem Japan, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).
Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Szvord, (London: Routledge, 1967).
Blaker, Michael. “ Japan’ s Diplomatic Style: Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic
Performance," World Politics, 1988.
Calder, Kent. “ Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the
Reactive State," in World Politics, 40 (4): 1988.
Clark, Gregory. “ Splintered By its Strong Group Ethic, Japan Struggles to meet
new Challenges," The Japan Times, (August 21, 1995).
Dore, Ronald. ‘ The Legacy” in Edward R. Beauchamp ed., Learning To Be
Japanese, (Hamden, CT„ Linnet Books, 1978).
Gluck, Carol. Jap an’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late M e iji Period, (Princeton
New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985).
Harootunian, H.D. “Introduction: A Sense of an Ending and the Problem of
Taisho,” in Japan In Crisis, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and H.D.
Harootunian, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974).
Hearn, Lafcadio. Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation, (London: The Macmillan
Co., 1913).
Hendry, Joy. Understanding Japanese Societv: Second Edition, (London: Routledge,
1995).
Huntington, Samuel. “ The West: Unique, Not Universal,” Foreign Affairs, v75n6
(Nov. 1996).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Inoguchi, Takashi. Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Era o f Global Change, (New York:
S t Martin’s Press,1993).
Jing, Hong Sang. “ Ministry Evading War Crime Issue," The Japan Times, (Aug.
27, 1995).
Kato, Hidenaka. “ Can Japan Learn toLead?," World Press Review, (April 1995).
Katzenstein, Peter and Okawara, Nobuo. “ Japan's National Security:
Structures, Norms and Policies,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4
(Spring 1993).
Kawai, Kazuo. Jap an’s American Interlude, (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1960).
Keene, Donald. The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830, (Stanford: Stanford
Univ. Press, 1969).
Kumagai, Fumie. Umnasking Japan Today, (London: Praeger, 1996).
Lebra, Joyce. Okuma Shigenobu, (Canberra: ANU Press, 1973).
Lee, Wing On. “ Japan," in Education and Development in East Asia, edS. Paul
Morris and Anthony Sweeting (New York: Garland Pub., 1995).
Lewis, Catherine. Educating Hearts and Minds, (New York: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1995).
Littlewood, Ian. The Idea of Japan: Western Images, Western Mvths, (Chicago: Ivan
R. Dee, 1996).
McKean, Margaret. “ State Strength and the Public Interest," in Gary Allinson
and Yasunori Sons edS., Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan,
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1993).
Minami, Hiroshi. Psychology of the Japanese People, (Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press,
1971).
Morris, Ivan. “ Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism,” in Thought and
Behavior in Modem Japanese Politics, ed. I van Morris, (London: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1963).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
Naff; Clayton. AhftHt. Face, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994).
Natsume, Soseki Knkom, trans Edwin McClellan (Tokyo" Charles E Tuttle Co .
1957).
Nobuyuki Honna and Bates Hoffer, edS., A n English Dictionary of Japanese Ways
o f Thinking, (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing Co., 1989).
Nosco, Peter. “ Masuho Zanko (1655-1742): A Shinto Popularizer Between
Nativism and National Learning,” in Peter Nosco ed., Confucianism and
Tokugawa Culture, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
Oe, Kensaburo. “ Recovering the Right to be a part of Asia," The Japan Times,
(Aug. 16,1995).
Ozawa, Ichiro. Blueprint fo r a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, (Tokyo:
Kodansha International, 1994).
Ozawa, Ichiro. “ Japan’s Self-R eform New Perspectives Quarterly, 2 (4), (fall
1994).
Ozawa, Ichiro. “Reforming Japan: The Third Opening,” Economist, v338n7956
(March 9, 1996).
Pempel, T.J. “ The Unbundling of Japan Inc.: The Changing Dynamics of
Japanese Policy Formation," in The Trade Crisis: How W ill Japan
Respond?
Pyle, Kenneth. “ Advantages of Followership: German Economics and Japanese
Bureaucrats, 1890-1925,” in the Journal o f Japanese Studies, I. 1 (1974).
Pyle, Kenneth. “ The Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary
History,” in the Journal of Japanese Studies, 8:2 (1982).
Pyle, Kenneth. The M aking o f Modem Japan, (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Co.,
1978).
Refsing, Kirsten. “ Japanese Educational Expansion, Quality or Equality,” in
Ideology and Practice in M odem Japan, edS., Roger Goodman & Kirsten
Refsing. (London: Routledge. 1992).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
Reischauer, Edwin. The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity, (Tokyo: Charles
E. Tuttle Co., 1988).
ReiSChauer, Edwin. “ What Went Wrong,” Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan,
ed. James Mortey, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971).
Sam, Kim Young. “Asian Nations Mark Anniversary," The Japan Times, (Aug. 16,
1995).
Schirokauer, Conrad. A B rief History of Japanese Civilization, (New York:
Harcourt Brace Pub., 1993).
Silberman, Bernard. “ Conclusion: Taisho Japan and the Crisis of Secularism,”
in Japan in Crisis, eds. Bernard S. Silberman and H.D. Harootunian,
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974).
Sonfa, O. “ The Cultural Roots of Japanese-Korean Friction." Japan Echo, 20,
(1993).
Takayama, Peter. “ The Revitalization of Japanese Civil Religion,” in Mark
Mullins, Shimazono Susumu and Paul Swanson, eds., Religion and
Society in M odem Japan, (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1993).
Talbot, Strobe. “U.S.-Japanese Leadership in The New Pacific Community,"
U .S . Department o f State Dispatch, (Feb. 13, 1995 Vol. 6, No. 7).
Titus, David. “Nationalism in Japan: Its Theoretical Background and Prospects,"
in Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. Ivan Morris,
(London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963).
Tsurumi, Kazuko. “ The Processes of Army Socialization,” in Edward R.
Beauchamp ed. Learning To Be Japanese, (Hamden, CT„ Linnet Books,
1978).
Van Wolferen, Karl. The Enigma o f Japanese Power: People and Politics in a
Stateless Nation, (New York: Random House, 1990).
Waswo, Ann. M odem Japanese Society, (Oxford: Osford University Press, 1996).
White, Merry. The Japanese Educational Challenge, A Commitment to Children,
(New York: The Free Press, 1987).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Yamashita, Samual Hideo. “Nature and Artifice in the Writings of Ogyu Sorai,
Peter Nosco ed., Confucianism in Tokugawa Culture, (Princeton, N J *.
Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (Q A -3)
'/.■
y
150mm
IIVU4GE. Inc
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989
0 1993, Applied Image. Inc.. All Rights Reserved
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

How China's economic reform changed domestic circumstances for exports during the 1980s

PDF

Ethnic identity and nationalism in Taiwan

PDF

Becoming a successful capitalist in China: Chinese private entrepreneurs and their relationship to the state

PDF

From denationalization to patriotic leadership: Chinese Christian colleges, 1920s--1930s

PDF

Ito Noe: Living in freedom. A critique of personal growth in Japanese society

PDF

If you build it...: A "different story" of the re-emergence of baseball in China, the people who play it, and why

PDF

The impact of ethnic mobilization in postwar Japan: A reflection of Japan's two Korea policy

PDF

The collapse of Japan's bubble economy and its consequences

PDF

National character studies in America and Japan: Toward a new understanding of nihonjinron

PDF

China's periphery in perspective: A comparative look at the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

PDF

China's Korean minority: A study in the dissolution of ethnic identity

PDF

Women'S Education In The Tokugawa Society

PDF

China's telecommunications race: An attempt by the CCP to achieve technical legitimacy and hold onto power

PDF

The Japanese mainstream media in the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, 1964--1972

PDF

The evolving vocabulary of otherness in pre-imperial China: From 'belligerent others' to 'cultural others'

PDF

Representations of the mother as origin and force of life in Japanese literature and history

PDF

"The Infant in the Void": A spiritual journey

PDF

An investigation into the need for creativity and individualism in Japanese elementary education

PDF

Maternal devotion: the symbiotic relationship between mothers and sons in Yi Jian Zhi

PDF

A commercial and optimistic worldview of the afterlife of the Song people: Based on stories from the "Yijian Zhi"

Asset Metadata

Creator Roth, Edward Charles (author)

Core Title Japan's modernization and troubled identity: Grappling with the West and other foreigners

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, social structure and development

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor [illegible] (committee chair), [illegible] (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-22472

Unique identifier UC11337801

Identifier 1391094.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-22472 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 1391094.pdf

Dmrecord 22472

Document Type Thesis

Rights Roth, Edward Charles

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA