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Intragroup evaluations, attitude source, and in-group member derogation

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Intragroup evaluations, attitude source, and in-group member derogation

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Content INTRAGROUP EVALUATIONS, ATTITUDE SOURCE, AND IN-GROUP
MEMBER DEROGATION
by
Joy Stratton
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(PSYCHOLOGY)
December 2002
Copyright 2002 Joy Stratton
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UMI Number: 1414856
Copyright 2002 by
Stratton, Joy
All rights reserved.
UMI
UMI Microform 1414856
Copyright 2003 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company
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P.O. Box 1346
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089-1695
This thesis, written by
A > n ( SW fton ________________________________
under the direction o f h VC thesis committee, and
approved by all its members, has been presented to and
accepted by the Director of Graduate and Professional
Programs, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
J t Kris__________________________________
Director
D ate December 18. 2002
Thesis Committee
Chair
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ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................. iv
Section
1. INTRODUCTION
In-group Member Derogation.......................................................... 1
Numerical Threat.............................................................................. 4
Attribution Theory............................................................................ 5
Attitude Source................................................................................. 6
Predictions........................................................................................ 7
2. METHOD
Design and Predictions.................................................................... 9
Participants....................................................................................... 10
Procedure.......................................................................................... 11
3. RESULTS
Manipulation Checks....................................................................... 16
Effects of Variables on Overall Partner Evaluation....................... 18
Ancillary Measures of Similarity..................................................... 20
4. DISCUSSION
Results of Predictions...................................................................... 22
Black Sheep Effect........................................................................... 25
Future Research................................................................................ 25
5. REFERENCES........................................................................................ 27
6. APPENDICES......................................................................................... 32
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
Table 1. Number of participants dropped in each condition.................................... 11
Table 2. Factor structure and loadings of the 14 personality items using a
principle components analysis with varimax rotation............................... 18
Table 3. Standardized means for overall partner evaluation in each of the 8
experimental conditions............................................................................... 23
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iv
Abstract
Participants evaluated a partner after reading about their partner’s attitude
position on a particular issue and their rationale for holding it. I explored how two
variables (threat and attitude rationale) affected in-group and out-group partner
evaluations. High threat was induced in participants by telling them they were in the
minority on their attitude position. Low threat participants were told they held the
majority position. Partner’s rationale for the attitude position they allegedly held was
manipulated by indicating either an external source (a poor rationale) or internal source
(a good rationale) for holding their attitude position. There was a reliable interaction
between threat and attitude source. No main effects were found for threat, attitude
source, or target. In-group members with poor rationales for their attitude position were
derogated more than out-group members with similar attitude rationales. This in-group
target derogation effect was found under low threat but not under high threat conditions.
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1
Introduction
During the Red Scare of the 1950s, hundreds of members of the entertainment
industry turned against and blackballed other entertainers because they were thought to
have communist sympathies. Meanwhile, no such punishment was given to ordinary
citizens who supported the communist party. In the course of the Salem witch trials,
puritan women were accused of witchcraft by other puritan women and sentenced to
death. In many cases, their only crime was loneliness, drunkenness and/or harmless
unusual behaviors. These same behaviors were present among non-puritan women, but
none of these women were hung for witchcraft. Today, members of Amish
communities found engaging in deviant behaviors such as premarital sex are shunned, a
punishment that effectively makes them socially invisible to every other member of
their community. However, this punishment is not given to young adults outside the
community who engage in the same “sinful” behavior.
Every society has its ways of enforcing norms and discouraging certain
behaviors. Modem criminal systems are built around detection and punishment of
extreme cases of deviant behavior. Meanwhile, less extreme deviant behaviors are
more likely to be punished with social rejection or derogation. But in all the cases
mentioned above, sanctions were administered by group members to other members of
their in-group.
In-group member derogation
Research shows that, normally, group membership is associated with
increased rewards and benefits from other in-group members. This phenomenon is
called in-group favoritism (e.g. Allen & Wilder, 1975; Billig & Tajfel. 1973; Brewer,
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2
1979; Tajfel, 1970; Wilder, 1981). However, there are cases in which the opposite is
true. Exceptions to this general finding occur when an individual of the in-group acts in
an unfavorable manner. In these cases, there seems to be a strong tendency to derogate
and/or reject the offending in-group member (Juvonen, 1991; Schachter et al., 1954;
Schachter, 1951). As illustrated by the preceding examples, oftentimes, the punishment
imposed by in-group members is even more severe than it would be for out-group
members who act in the same manner (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Marques,
Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Matthews & Dietz-Uhler, 1998;
Coull et al, 2001). This is called the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens,
1988). This phenomenon shows particular robustness when the person observing the
in-group member’s unfavorable behavior identifies strongly with their group (Biemat,
Vescio, & Billings, 1999; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw,
& Ingerman, 1987). It seems that instead of distancing themselves from their in-group,
high in-group identifiers seek to punish or cast out the unfavorable member from the in
group.
Marques and his colleagues turn to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979) to explain why this particular type of in-group member derogation takes
place. They suggest that in-group members maintain a positive sense of identity by
enhancing their impression of the in-group as a whole. A score of experiments support
this supposition by demonstrating a link between group identity and self-esteem or
positive self identity (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes &
Turner, 1980). In one such example, Hirt et al (1992) found that participants’ mood
increased after a group with whom they identified had won in a competitive intergroup
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activity. In this same experiment, participants estimates of their own performance was
also positively affected by a group success. In other words, group members’ self
esteem and self-identity improved when their group’s identity improved.
Because it is likely that group membership can provide a sense of positive self
identity, it follows that behavior which casts the group in a negative light may constitute
a threat to the maintenance of this positive sense of self. An in-group member who acts
unfavorably can possibly damage one’s positive in-group perception. The derogation of
a deviant in-group member may therefore be an attempt by in-group members to
resurrect their positive in-group perception. To this end, member derogation may serve
as a method of group regulation (Marques et al., 1998). Because people are likely to be
affected by how their group is viewed, they are motivated to regulate the behavior of
members within it. Punishment may serve as a vehicle to bring a deviant group member
into line and in-group member derogation may be one such method of punishment.
In-group member derogation may also be a means of distinguishing the deviant
individual from the in-group. Derogation singles offending members out. It elucidates
the differences between the deviant and self and possibly as well the deviant and group.
Maybe by psychologically casting the unfavorable in-group member from the group,
individual in-group members can preserve their positive group perception and
consequentially their positive self identity. Certainly, rejection of the group member
psychologically redefines the group in such a way that uniformity is once again
accomplished (Festinger, 1950).
Although in-group member derogation has been demonstrated to occur in many
situations, especially with persons who identify strongly with their in-group (e.g.
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Biemat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999; Branscombe & Wann, 1994), little research
explores the conditions that exaggerate or mitigate this effect. The current research
attempts to answer one such question, what happens to in-group member derogation
when the group itself is under threat?
Numerical Threat
The current study uses a manipulation of majority/minority status to induce
threat. Typically, majority status is associated with reduced anxiety, whereas minority
status is associated with increased levels of anxiety (Kenworthy & Miller, 2001).
Numerical minority group status is also viewed as unattractive and less desirable
(Ellemers et al., 1999; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997). Functionally, this induction of
group threat is similar to the effects of other operationalizations of threat on identity.
According to Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Buidin (2001) knowledge of majority or
minority status indicates the amount of power one’s group may weld in one’s
community. Numerical minority status indicates low power because fewer group
members often implies less resources and voting power. Consequently, minority
numerical status is more threatening than majority status. Minority status has been
effectively used as a threat in the minimal group paradigm (Otten, Mummendey, &
Blanz, 1996). Past research on group attribution errors (Corneille et al, 2001) has also
shown the manipulation of numerical majority/ minority status to be an effective threat
within experimental paradigms that examine attribution theory. In addition, the works
of Ellemers et al (1992) and Bettencourt et al. (1999) suggest that manipulations of
minority/ majority group size produce differential effects on group salience (minority
groups are more salient than majority groups) and that members of minority groups are
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5
perhaps more likely to exhibit discriminatory behavior than members of majority
groups -further evidence that minority group status may be an effective threat
manipulation especially in the following experimental paradigm.
As discussed earlier, when no threat is present, in-group members are expected
to derogate other group members who engage in unfavorable behavior. Numerical
threat, however, is expected to decrease derogation of an in-group deviant. A plethora
of past research indicates that minorities exhibit greater in-group favoritism than
majorities (Ellemers et al., 1999; Otten et al., 1996; Brewer, 1991) so it is possible that
in-group bias is less likely to be abandoned by minorities than majorities. In addition,
when one’s ingroup is perceived as less powerful, or of lower status because it is small,
psychologically excising any member of one’s group, even a deviant one, may be an
unaffordable risk. One reason for this may be that smaller in-group size means less
social validity (Festinger, 1954; Festinger, 1950) and by the same token less attitude
certainty (Holtz & Miller, 2001; Holtz & Miller, 1985; Kenworthy & Miller, 2001).
Additionally, if one’s punishment of deviant behavior (derogation) results in the deviant
member leaving the group, one may have effectively made one’s group less powerful.
For these reasons, it is expected that high threat, as induced by numerical minority
status, should decrease ingroup members’ derogation of members who exhibit
negatively valenced behaviors.
Attribution theory
Up until this point, the derogation of deviant in-group members has been
demonstrated under a small number of circumstances, such as when participants are
engaged in competitive games (Biemat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999) or the target has
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violated a social norm (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001). The present study is the
first study to attempt to replicate this effect in the attribution paradigm. Attribution
theory is concerned with how people explain their own or others’ behavior. In other
words, how people perceive or interpret both positive and negative events. These
perceptions, in turn, often result in action. For example, negative events that are
attributed to the dispositional traits of an individual, as opposed to situational
influences, are likely to result in more negative feelings on the part of the perceiver as
well as greater social rejection of the individual who created the negative event
(Juvonen, 1991). Attributions are also used as a method for protecting perceptions of
self (Suls, Lemos, & Stewart, 2002; Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998) and one’s ingroup
(Stangor et al, 2002; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Crocker et al., 1991; Crocker & Major,
1989). Because the derogation of a deviant in-group member likely results from an
effort to protect one’s positive in-group perception, it follows that in-group member
derogation should be manifest in the attribution paradigm as well. Thus, the effect
should remain intact when the experimental manipulations are placed within the
attribution paradigm.
Attitude source
Attribution research not only studies what people’s attitudes and perceptions are,
but also how these attitudes are formed. People can hold the same attitude for many
different reasons. Not all attitudes are formed from internal sources such as extensive
research and introspective thought. People may also adopt attitudes from external
sources such as the attitudes and opinions of others.
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The current study builds upon past research which indicates that different types
of attitude source, or attitude rationales, are associated with positive and negative
valences (Ybarra & Stephan, 1999; Karasawa, 1995). Taylor and Jaggi (1974) were the
first to suggest that positive behaviors are given internal attributions whereas negative
behaviors are given external attributions. Ten years later, Hewstone and Ward (1985)
found evidence of this same phenomenon. Hewstone’s (1990) review of the attribution
literature showed that ingroup members made more internal attributions for positive
acts and less internal (more external) attribution for negative acts. Similarly, in an
experiment which took these initial findings a bit further, Kenworthy and Miller (2002)
found that attitudes based on external sources (e.g. the views of family, media, friends,
etc) were considered less acceptable, less desirable, and less positive than those based
on internal sources (e.g. one’s own research and thought processes). It follows then that
if a person’s attitude is alleged to be based on internal sources, that person will be
evaluated more positively than a person whose attitude is alleged to be based on
external sources. The current study examines this hypothesis. Additionally, it seeks to
explore this effect within the context of in-group member derogation. I predict that
people will like (evaluate more favorably) in-group members with good/internal attitude
sources best and in-group members with bad/external attitude sources least. Similar to
Brascombe et al.’s (1993) study, I predict that out-group members will be evaluated less
extremely than in-group members. Out-group members possessing attitudes with good
(internal) rationales will be evaluated less positively than in-group members with
similar (internal) attitude rationales because of ingroup favoritism (e.g. Gerard & Hoyt,
1974; Brewer, 1979; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974). However, I predict that when bad
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(external) attitude rationales are ascribed to in-group members, they will be evaluated
least favorably by comparison with both out-group members ascribed internal (good)
attitude sources and out-group members whose attitude is ascribed external (bad)
attitude sources. This expectation derives from the previous discussion of the in-group
member derogation effect.
In the current experiment, I selected abortion as the attitude topic because
previous research has demonstrated that groups based on their endorsement of pro-
choice and pro-life attitude positions are perceived to have high entatitivity (Kenworthy
& Miller, 2002). This is important because I assume that groups defined by opposing
attitude positions will have social identity concerns (Brewer, 1979; Rothgerber, 1997;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986) that parallel those of natural social groups and will therefore be
equally motivated to protect perceptions of the in-group and themselves.
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Method
Design and Predictions
In this 2 (numerical threat: high, low) x 2 (target: in-group, out-group) x 2
(attitude source: good, bad) between-subject factorial design, I expected level of threat,
partner target, and attitude source to affect measures of overall partner evaluation. In
the low threat conditions, participants were expected to show in-group favoritism by
giving the highest partner evaluation to the in-group member who reported a good
rationale for their attitude position. Deviant in-group members were expected to be
subject to derogation; therefore, I expected the lowest overall partner evaluation to be
given to the in-group member who allegedly possessed a poor rationale for his or her
attitude. Numerical threat was expected to decrease the extremity of in-group
evaluation. Thus, by comparison with evaluations of out-group members, high threat
(minority) in-group members were not expected to be evaluated differently irrespective
of attitude source. Of the eight total experimental conditions, the low threat / in-group
target/ bad (external) attitude source condition was expected to produce the least
favorable overall partner evaluations, whereas the high threat / in-group/ good (internal)
attitude source condition was expected to produce the most favorable partner
evaluations. All out-group target conditions were expected to produce overall partner
evaluations that were less extreme than those of in-group targets. Out-group targets
were expected to be evaluated less positively than the in-group good (internal) attitude
source conditions and less negatively than the in-group bad (external) attitude source
conditions.
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Participants
Participants were students enrolled in introductory psychology course at the
University of Southern California. The 93 volunteers were given partial course credit in
exchange for their participation. Participant ages ranged from seventeen to forty-seven
(M = 20.7). Sixty-seven of the participants were female and twenty-six were male.
Fifteen of the participants identified themselves as pro-life and seventy-eight identified
themselves as pro-choice.
Some participants were eliminated from analysis for one or more of the
following reasons: (a) failure to follow instructions completely (N = 3), (b) suspicion of
study methods (N = 6), (c) outlier by more than 2 standard deviations (N = 2). One
person was dropped from the following conditions: good rationale/ low threat/ ingroup
target, good rationale/ low threat/ outgroup target, and good rationale/ high threat/
ingroup target. Two people were dropped from the following conditions: good
rationale/ high threat/ outgroup target and bad rationale/ high threat/ ingroup target.
Three people were dropped from the bad rationale/ low threat/ ingroup target condition.
No participants were dropped from the bad rationale/ low threat outgroup target and bad
rationale/ high threat/ outgroup target conditions (see Table l).1 The data from a total
of eighty-two participants were analyzed and are reported herein.
1 The rate o f subjects dropped from the 8 conditions did not vary across conditions according to three
separate fisher exact tests; for all three tests p’s >.136.
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Number of participants dropped in each condition
SOURCE THREAT TARGET N
good maj ingroup 1
outgroup 1
min ingroup 1
outgroup 2
bad maj ingroup 3
min ingroup 2
Table 1. Number of participants dropped in each condition
Procedure
Participants who signed up for the study, entitled Who’s Who, were seated in a
small room (approximately 6’ x 9’) by themselves. After signing in for course credit,
participants were informed about the (alleged) purposes of the study and its procedure.
They were told that the study would assess how people form accurate social
impressions based on limited amounts of information. They were told they would take
a personality test, fill out a form asking them to state their position on a particular issue,
give their rationale for holding that position, read about the attitude and attitude
rationale of a previous participant, and infer personality characteristics of this other
participant. All participants then read and signed an informed consent form.
Once the procedure had been explained to the participant and all questions had
been answered, participants were left alone to read the consent form, sign it, and fill out
a general information sheet, ostensibly for statistical purposes only. Besides asking
demographic information (e.g. age, gender, year in school, political orientation), this
information sheet asked whether they were in favor of, or against, several issues such as
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stricter gun control, the death penalty, abortion, and the legalization of marijuana, one
of which (abortion) was the central issue of interest in this study.
Participants were instructed to knock on the door to signal their readiness for the
next task, after completing these two forms. The experimenter entered, collected the
forms, and gave the participants a 15-question personality test “based on the Myer-
Briggs personality test.” Supposedly, the purpose of this test was to see how their own
personality related to their impression formation style. Actually, it was a filler task
designed to give the experimenter time to look at the participant’s general information
sheet, determine their position on abortion, and prepare the remaining experimental
tasks according to the experimental condition (level of threat, partner target, and type of
attitude source) to which the participants had been randomly assigned.
After completion of the personality test, the experimenter brought the
participants a blank attitude information form to fill out. They were told that this sheet
would be viewed by another participant later on in the experiment and used by that
participant to infer personality characteristics about them. In reality, the sole purpose of
this form was to support the claim that the participants would be reading an authentic
attitude information sheet filled out by a previous participant. This form was not
included in the data analysis of this study.
Participants were told that once they completely filled out the attitude
information sheet, they would be given an identical form that had been completed by a
previous participant. They were told to use the information on it to make judgments
about what sort of personality characteristics were possessed by the writer of that
attitude position.
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As the experimenter explained the purpose of the attitude information sheet,
she said “the attitude topic for you today is abortion. Do you have a clear position on
this issue?” Participants in the high-threat conditions were induced to believe they were
in the numerical minority on the abortion issue. This was achieved by telling them that
the reason why the experimenter was asking about their attitude position was “almost
everyone I get in here is [opposite position of participant]. I’m looking for more of you
to balance things out. I hardly get any of you, so it’s good to get one more.”
Participants in the low-threat conditions were induced to believe they were in the
numerical majority. They were told that the reason the experimenter wanted to know
what their attitude positions was “almost everyone I get in here is [their position]. I’m
looking for more of the other position to balance things out. I get a lot of you, but one
more is no big deal.” All participants were then left alone to complete the attitude
information sheet.
After participants completed the attitude information sheet, the experimenter
brought in two folders to give to the participant. The first folder contained the attitude
information sheet allegedly completed by a previous participant. The second folder
contained a questionnaire on which participants would indicate their partner’s
personality characteristics.
There were four different attitude information sheets in total (see Appendix A-
D). Two listed the attitude position o f pro-choice and two listed the attitude position of
pro-life. One attitude information sheet of each attitude position provided a bad
rationale for their position. The remaining two gave a good rationale for the stated
attitude position.
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Each participant received only one attitude information sheet. Those in the
ingroup conditions received an attitude information sheet of a “partner” who held the
same attitude position as themselves. Participants in the outgroup target conditions
received an attitude information sheet of a “partner” who held a position opposite to
their own.
Participants in the bad (external) attitude rationale conditions read that their
“partner” held his/her attitude position because “my parents and my friend have always
been pro-choice, so I am too.” Participants in the good (internal) attitude rationale
conditions read that their “partner” held his/her attitude position because “I thought
about it for a long time, and I came to my own conclusions. Being [attitude position]
just makes more sense.”
After reading through the folder containing the attitude information sheet,
participants were instructed to open the second folder and fill out the questionnaire
concerning their partner’s probable personality characteristics (see Appendix E).
Imbedded in this questionnaire was a manipulation check assessing memory of
majority/minority status (threat), partner attitude, and attitude rationale. One item
assessed how similar participants felt their partner was to themselves. Participants also
answered items probing mood and asking them to report their own personality
characteristics. Items assessing participants own personality characteristics were
included in this section o f the experiment solely to increase believability of the cover
story. No analyses were performed on these items, and therefore no results will be
reported herein.
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Participants were told that this was the last task of the experiment and that
they should signal their completion by knocking on the closed door. At their signal, the
experimenter entered, probed for suspicion regarding the purpose of the experiment,
and debriefed the participants. They were informed about the true nature and purposes
of the experiment and the deception involved. They were asked not to speak of the
experiment with other potential participants, thanked, and excused.
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Results
Females tended to give higher overall partner evaluations than males. However,
there were no reliable differences between females and males in any of the reported
results, therefore no sex differences will be reported herein.
Participants who identified themselves as pro-choice tended to give more
favorable overall partner evaluations then participants who identified themselves as pro
life, however, this effect was not significant, p >.50.2 Therefore, this variable will be
collapsed over and no attitude position differences will be further reported.
Manipulation Checks
One of the items in the impression formation task questionnaire was designed to
see if participants remembered what threat (high versus low threat) condition they were
in. Threat was manipulated by telling the participant that their attitude position put
them in either the numerical minority (high threat) or majority (low threat) of other
participants. Memory for threat was assessed with the question “is your position the
majority or minority position?” Participants circled the word ‘majority’ or ‘minority’ to
report their condition. One of the ninety-three total participants failed to answer this
question and two participants indicated the wrong threat condition. These three
participants were dropped from the final analysis. The remaining eighty-two
participants included in the final data analysis answered this question correctly
according to their experimental condition.
2 The number of pro-life participants (n = 12) relative to pro-choice participants (n = 70) was too small to
include attitude position as a factor in an ANOVA as some of the conditions had none or only one pro-life
participants.
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In this experiment, numerical status was used as a manipulation of threat. In
order to assess whether minority status was indeed considered by participants to be
threatening, an index of negative mood was calculated from five of the mood measures
listed on the “self-ratings form” (Appendix E). As part of the mood measures,
participants were asked to rate on a nine-point scale (1 = not at all, 9 = very much), how
depressed, lonely, upset, agitated, and anxious they felt about “being in the majority or
minority.” These five items (a = .83) were standardized and then combined to form a
composite index assessing participants’ negative reactions to the numerical threat
manipulation. An independent samples t-test revealed that participants told they were
in the minority had stronger negative reactions (M = .4202) than those told they were in
the majority (M = -.4412), t (80) = -5.96, p < .001. Participant scores on the negative
mood index, however, were not reliably related to overall partner evaluations, p >.15.
An index of partner attitude condition was also embedded in the impression
formation task questionnaire. Participants were first asked what the attitude issue was
for their session. To answer, participants circled either ‘capital punishment’ or abortion
rights.’ Next, participants were given a blank space to report “what was the other
person’s position on the issue?” All ninety-three participants correctly indicated their
experimental condition.
To check that the attitude rationale manipulation was effective, participants were
given a blank box in which to fill in “what reason did the other person give for why she
or he holds her or his position on this issue?” All of the eighty-two participants
included in the final data analysis answered this item correctly according to their
experimental condition.
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Effects o f Variables on Overall Partner Evaluation
The 14 personality attribution items were standardized into z-scores and
submitted to an exploratory factor analysis (varimax rotation) to determine whether
there was an identifiable partner evaluation dimension. Seven items were found to
account for 31.63% of the variance (see Table 2) . These seven items were chosen to
represent overall partner evaluation, with eigenvalues greater than 5.6 and relatively
high factor loadings on their respective factors (>.50). The internal reliability for these
items was high, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha equals .85. Of the seven items
representing overall partner evaluation, the liking item was most valuable, if omitted
Cronbach’s alpha would be .81.
Varimax-Rotated Factor Matrix for Partner Evaluation
Factors
Personality items 1 2
Emotionally sensitive .712
Responsible .651
Trustworthy .722
Independent .724
Suspicious
Similar to you
Creative .445
Honest
Likeable .731
Warm .778
Intelligent .506 .487
Confident .872
Assertive .833
Friendly .764
Eigenvalues 5.6 2.5
% variance 31.63 13.93
Cronbach’s alpha .85 .79
Table 2. Factor structure and loadings of the 14 personality items using a principle
components analysis with varimax rotation.
3 Overall partner evaluation was the strongest factor, accounting for the most amount o f variance. The
collection of five items that make up the second strongest factor (independent, creative, intelligent,
confident, and assertive), seem to measure a separate construct and only produce a main effect for the
independent variable attitude source.
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19
Note. Only the strongest 2 factors E ire listed.
The key dependent measure of this study was participants’ overall partner
evaluations using the several items supplied. First, the participants read about the other
person’s attitude position on abortion and their rationale for holding that position. Then
they were asked to form an impression from that information on what sort of personality
they thought their partner (the writer of the attitude position) had. In this final task
questionnaire (impression formation task), participants were asked to rate on a 9-point
scale (1 = not at all, 9 = very much) to what degree they thought the other person was
emotionally sensitive, responsible, trustworthy, likeable, warm, intelligent, and friendly.
When the independent variables of threat, source and target were submitted to a
2x2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA), no main effects were found for target, threat,
or source. However, as predicted a reliable interaction between threat and source was
detected, F (1,74) = 5.56, p =.021. No main effects or interactions were found on
overall partner evaluation for the out-group target conditions.
For the ingroup target conditions, no main effects on this measure were found
for either attitude rationale or threat level. However, a reliable two-way interaction was
found between attitude rationale and threat on overall partner evaluation F (1,37) =
4.664, p =.037. As can be seen in Figure 1, the most negative overall partner evaluation
was given in the in-group target/ bad attitude source/ low threat condition (M = -.4541).
The results of a one-way ANOVA indicated that under conditions of low threat, more
negative evaluations are given to targets with bad attitude rationales (external sources)
than good attitude rationales, F(l,19)= 9.69, p = .006. In contrast, under conditions of
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20
high threat, the type of attitude rationale did not impact evaluations for in-group
member targets, F (1,20)= 0.14, p = .72. As predicted, overall partner evaluations of in
group members with bad attitude rationales was directionally lower than partner
evaluations of out-group members ascribed the same attitude rationale, however this
effect was not statistically significant.
The results for the ingroup target conditions suggests that the under normal
conditions (low threat) participants were likely to derogate ingroup members with poor
attitude rationales. It was expected that under high threat conditions this derogation
tendency would be eliminated and ingroup members with poor attitude rationales would
be evaluated about as favorably as their counterparts with good attitude rationales. The
results here show that induced threat actually decreased deviant in-group member
derogation such that there was no reliable difference in overall partner evaluations
regardless of attitude source.
Ancillary measures of similarity
One of the hypotheses of the current study is that in-group members engage in
member derogation in order to distinguish deviant members from their group. On the
“impression formation task” form (Appendix E), participants were asked to rate on a 9-
point scale (l=not at all, 9 = very much) to what degree they thought their partner was
similar to themselves. This scale gives a measure of how much participants
psychologically distanced themselves from their partner (i.e. the less similar the partner
is to oneself, the more they are different/unlike you). A 2 (target) x 2 (source) x 2
(threat) ANOVA on this measure revealed a main effect for target F (1,82) =13.06, p
=.001, a marginal main effect for threat F (1,82) = 3.724, p =.057, and a reliable
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interaction between threat and source F (1,82) = 4.170, 2 = .045. In addition,
increased feelings of similarity were found to be positively correlated with overall
partner evaluations r (81) = .44, p <.001.
Understandably, participants judged in-group partners as more similar to
themselves (M = 4.77) than out-group partners (M = 3.13), F (1, 81) = 12.015, p =.001.
An independent samples t-test revealed that in the low threat (majority) conditions,
participants rated partners whose attitude was based on a good attitude sources as more
similar to themselves (M = 4.20) than partners ascribed a bad (external) attitude sources
(M = 2.80), t (38) = 2.13, p = .041. In contrast, participants in the high threat (minority)
conditions, showed no difference in partner similarity ratings regardless of their
partner’s attitude source, t (40) = -.59, p = .56. These results indicate that under low
threat conditions (majority), participants were indeed psychologically distinguishing
themselves, and possibly their group, from the deviant in-group member. By contrast,
under high threat conditions (when told they were members of the minority),
participants showed no indication of rejecting or psychologically distancing themselves
from the deviant in-group member.
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22
Discussion
The first set of predictions of this study were confirmed. The results support the
idea that in-group member derogation does take place in the attribution paradigm.
People do not have to be engaged in competition with another group or see the target
violate a social norm, as in the black sheep effect literature, to engage in in-group
member derogation. It is sufficient that a negative attitude source be adopted by a
fellow in-group member for him or her to be viewed as a deviant and treated
accordingly.
Deviant in-group member derogation was demonstrated for ingroup targets only
under low threat conditions (i.e. numerical majority status). When one’s group status
was not threatened, ingroup targets who had indicated a good source for their attitude
position were given more favorable evaluations (Figure 1 & Table 3). However, if the
in-group target was behaving negatively (holding an attitude position based on external
influence), participants gave them the poorest overall evaluations.
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Interaction between attitude source and threat level on
overall partner evaluation
23
.4
fl
o
• p P
•*
-I
v
a
t,
-a
.6
good bad
m inority
m ajority
Attitude Source
Figure 1. Interaction between attitude source and threat level on overall in-group
partner evaluations
Note. Higher values indicate more positive partner evaluations
Standardized means for overall partner evaluation
THREAT SOURCE TARGET Mean Std. Deviation N
maj good ingroup .2026 .53980 10
outgroup .2733 .85855 10
bad ingroup -.4541 .39214 10
outgroup -.0774 1.01371 10
min good ingroup .0946 .34440 10
outgroup -.2104 .76337 10
bad ingroup .1974 .81433 10
outgroup .1573 .65774 10
Table 3. Standardized means for overall partner evaluation in each of the 8
experimental conditions.
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24
As predicted, increased threat eliminated derogation of the deviant in-group
members. Perhaps this is because in conditions of high threat, one cannot afford to
derogate other ingroup members, no matter how improper or uncharacteristically they
behave. Under threat conditions, each individual’s possible contributions, whether in
terms of resources, potential voting power, or something else, may acquire higher value
such that excising the person from the group is a risk that cannot be taken. Indeed, it is
also possible that groups of small size (minorities) cannot afford to make their number
smaller by engaging in in-group member derogation and possibly provoking that
member to leave the group.
Numerical threat may also cause decreased confidence that one’s position is
correct. According to Festinger (1950), in absence of physical reality which can
definitely prove the correctness or incorrectness of one’s attitude, people look to others
to establish social validity (i.e. correctness) through consensus. Numerical minorities
lack social validity and may therefore lack certainty in their attitude position. Thus,
their tolerance of in-group members with poor attitude sources may arise from a lack of
certainty that their attitude is correct. In other words, if one’s attitude is incorrect, it
does not really matter where he or she or anyone else gets their attitude from.
Therefore, members of numerical minorities may have no reason to derogate other in
group members with bad attitude sources.
In addition, the manipulation of poor attitude source may psychologically
diminish the potency of the numerical minority status manipulation because group
members with poor attitude sources are indicating by definition that others hold their
same position (because they got their attitude from family and friends). Thus,
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25
participants initially made to feel anxious and threatened by their minority status may
experience some relief in knowing several other people hold their same view, which of
course could positively impact their partner evaluations.
Black Sheep Effect
The black sheep effect occurs when negatively behaving in-group members are
derogated harsher than out-group members who behave the same way. In order to
accurately test this phenomenon, evaluations of in-group members must be compared
with evaluations of outgroup members who have committed the same act. In this
experimental paradigm, I cannot compare ingroup member evaluations to outgroup
member evaluations because although they both may have the same rationale (good or
bad) for holding their attitude, they have differing attitudes (e.g. the out-group is pro
life when the in-group attitude is pro-choice). However, I have shown that under less
threatening conditions (numerical majority status), in-group favoritism disappears when
in-group members possess poor attitude sources and deviant in-group members are
evaluated more negatively than deviant out-group members. This offers further support
for the notion that under some conditions, punishments as well as standards may be
more severe for deviant in-group members than for deviant out-group members.
Further Research
Although the current experiment is not an explicit test of the black sheep effect,
it did demonstrate that standards for both behavior and attitudes are often more severe
for in-group members than for out-group members. The next logical step is to
formulate a new experimental paradigm where in-group and out-group members can be
compared directly and evaluated according to their attributions
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26
In this study, threat actually reduced the in-group member derogation effect,
such that all members of the in-group under high threat (regardless of deviancy) were
evaluated positively. I hypothesize that this is due to the type of threat used: numerical
status. However, other types of threat may likely bring about different results. Threats
on group- or self-image that do not involve numeriosity may exacerbate the in-group
evaluation extremities, producing highly negative evaluations of deviant in-group
members. Also, under other types of threat, numerical minorities may continue to
engage in in-group member derogation. Members of minority groups experience
greater group identification and group importance than majorities (Brewer, 1991;
Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997). With greater group identification, minorities may also
experience greater need to protect their group perceptions when placed under certain
types of threat. Thus, a future study would do well to examine the in-group member
derogation effect under other manipulations of threat to more accurately determine what
moderating role threat plays on this phenomenon.
It is assumed that one of the reasons in-group member derogation takes place is
so that other in-group members can maintain a positive perception of their group as well
as themselves. However, no research has actually investigated how derogation affects
group and self perception. More research is therefore necessary in this area.
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27
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32
A P P E N D IX A: A TTITU D E INFO R M A TIO N SHEET
**This is the form that will be exchanged with your partner for the purposes of
impression formation.______________________________________________________
Do you consider yourself to be pro-choice or pro-life (circle a number)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 Cz) 8
pro-choice pro-life
How important to you is your attitude on this issue?
1 2 3 4 5 6 © 8
not at all
How similar do you feel to others who hold the same position?
1 2 3 4 5 6 Cz) 8 9
not at all very much
• Please briefly explain (in 2-4 sentences) how or why you hold the position (pro-
choice or pro-life) that you do on this issue.
A fetus is a real human being, and women shouldn’t have the right to do
whatever they want with it. For a while, I wasn’t really sure about this, but I
thought about it for a long time, and I came to my own conclusions. Being pro
life just makes more sense.
9
very much
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A P P E N D IX B: A TTITU DE INFO RM ATIO N SHEET
33
**This is the form that will be exchanged with your partner for the purposes of
impression formation.
• Do you consider yourself to be pro-choice or pro-life (circle a number)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 © 8
pro-choice pro-life
How important to you is your attitude on this issue?
1 2 3 4 5 6 © 8
not at all
How similar do you feel to others who hold the same position?
1 2 3 4 5 6 © ) 8 9
not at all very much
• Please briefly explain (in 2-4 sentences) how or why you hold the position (pro-
choice or pro-life) that you do on this issue.
A fetus is a real human being, and women shouldn’t have the right to do
whatever they want with it. I guess I’ve never questioned why I’m pro-life, but
my parents and my friends are pro-life, so I am too.
9
very much
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34
A P P E N D IX C: ATTITU D E INFO RM ATIO N SH EET
**This is the form that will be exchanged with your partner for the purposes of
impression formation.______________________________________________________
• Do you consider yourself to be pro-choice or pro-life (circle a number)?
1 © 3 4 5 6 7 8
pro-choice pro-life
How important to you is your attitude on this issue?
1 2 3 4 5 6 CG) 8 9
not at all very much
How similar do you feel to others who hold the same position?
1 2 3 4 5 6 (G) 8 9
not at all very much
• Please briefly explain (in 2-4 sentences) how or why you hold the position (pro-
choice or pro-life) that you do on this issue.
Women should have a right to choose what they do with their own body.
Besides, a fetus isn’t really a human being. I guess I haven’t thought too much
about why I’m pro-choice, my parents and my friends have always been pro-
choice, so I am too.
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35
A P P E N D IX D: A TTITU D E INFO RM ATIO N SHEET
**This is the form that will be exchanged with your partner for the purposes of
impression formation.
Do you consider yourself to be pro-choice or pro-life (circle a number)?
1 © 3 4 5 6 7 8
pro-choice pro-life
How important to you is your attitude on this issue?
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 8
not at all
How similar do you feel to others who hold the same position?
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 8 9
not at all very much
• Please briefly explain (in 2-4 sentences) how or why you hold the position (pro-
choice or pro-life) that you do on this issue.
Women should have the right to choose what they do with their own
body. Besides, a fetus isn’t really a human being. I haven’t always felt this way,
but I hold my position because I thought about it on my own for a long time, and
came to my conclusion. Being pro-choice just makes more sense.
9
very much
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A P P E N D IX E: IM PR ESSIO N FO R M A TIO N T A SK
36
What was the attitude issue for this session (circle one)? capital punishment
What was the other person’s position on the issue (pro or con)? ____________
abortion rights
What reasons did the other person give for why she or he holds her or his position on this issue?
To what degree does she or he represent the “typical” person who holds this position?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
Personality Attribution Section
Using the following scale,
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
To what degree do you think the other person is:
Emotionally sensitive Honest
Responsible
Trustworthy
Independent
Suspicious
Similar to you
Creative
Likeable
Warm
Intelligent
Confident
Assertive
Friendly
In the future, we may conduct a study in which we match several (about 4 to 6) participants together to
discuss not just this topic, but other topics as well. These discussion groups would be comprised o f
students holding many perspectives on several issues.
Indicate how much you think the other person could contribute to an intelligent discussion o f the
topic.
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
Indicate how much you would like to be in the same group with this person
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
Indicate how much time you would like to spend talking with this person, just the two of you.
(circle one)
not at all 1-5 minutes 6-10 minutes 11-15 minutes 16-20 minutes 21-30 minutes
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37
__________________________ Self-Ratings From__________________________
What was the attitude issue for this session (circle one)? capital punishment abortion rights
What was your position on the attitude issue (pro or con)? ___________________
Part of this project involves the gathering of information regarding the number o f people at USC who
hold either position (pro or con, pro-choice or pro-life, etc.) for attitude issues. In this project, we inform
participants of whether their particular position (pro or con) is currently the majority or minority opinion
on campus.
Is your position the majority or minority position? (circle one) majority minority
Describe how you feel about being in the majority or minority by using the following scale to fill in the
blanks below:
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
thrilled
depressed
lonely
comfortable
neutral
happy
upset
agitated
proud
united with others
anxious
silly
To what degree do you think you represent the “typical” person who holds this position?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
Personality Self-Attribution Section
Using the following scale,
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very much
To what degree do you think you are:
Emotionally sensitive
Responsible
Trustworthy
Independent
Suspicious
Assertive
Honest
Likeable
Warm
Intelligent
Confident
Creative
Friendly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Affection and conflict in family relationships

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Identity re-constructed

Asset Metadata

Creator Stratton, Joy (author)

Core Title Intragroup evaluations, attitude source, and in-group member derogation

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Psychology

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,psychology, social

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor [illegible] (committee chair), [illegible] (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-299436

Unique identifier UC11337912

Identifier 1414856.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-299436 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 1414856.pdf

Dmrecord 299436

Document Type Thesis

Rights Stratton, Joy

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA