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Nationalism in China: Shifts, contentions, and compromises

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Nationalism in China: Shifts, contentions, and compromises

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Content NATIONALISM IN CHINA:
SHIFTS, CONTENTIONS, AND COMPROMISES
Copyright 2005
By
Peimin Zhang
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)
August 2005
Peimin Zhang
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UMI Number: 1430409
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ii
Acknowledgements
Upon the completion of my MA thesis, I’d like to extend my wholehearted
thanks to Professor Stanley Rosen, Gene Cooper and Michael Cody for kindly
joining my committee, and moreover, for supporting me and enlightening me all
the way through my writing and revising process. I really appreciate your
incredible patience in listening to me and exchanging your thoughts with me, in
class and after class, face to face and via e-mail. Taking your courses is an
invaluable experience in preparing me, academically and emotionally, for what the
thesis is today. I feel particularly indebted to Professor Rosen for your constant
support all along my two years at USC. I am most impressed by your passion for
teaching, for cinema, and for China. Being a teaching assistant and a student of
yours is the most fortunate thing for me in the past two years.
My gratitude also goes to Professor John Wills and Eric Heikkila: It is your
sincere help that guides me through all the difficulties in my post-graduate days in a
foreign land. Professor Wills, I cannot think of a better start than attending a
wonderful seminar with a true scholar in my first semester. You teach me more than
you imagine: preparing me a solid sense of English academia and demonstrating
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the spirit of scholarship via your own conducts. And Professor Heikkila, your
encouragement to an extremely unprofessional student is sincerely appreciated.
I am also grateful to Professor Gordon Berger for giving me the opportunity
to join this program: your trust means a lot to me, and Grace Ryu for your sweet
help even before I came here. I cannot forget how nice you were to me in my
anxious application days. Your joint efforts create a warm atmosphere that makes
my stay at EASC as if at home.
Last but not least, I am grateful to my mom and dad for loving me and caring
for me ever since I came into the world. You give me so much that I owe my whole
life to you. And my dearest friends, you are the treasure of my life. Without you, my
world would’ve been a complete void. No matter how physically apart we are from
each other, my heart is always with you.
And I myself take full responsibility for all the errors in the thesis.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................... ii
A bstract....................................................................................................................... v
I. Introduction.................................................................................................... 1
II. River Elegy, the Perspective of Anti-traditionalism............................... 4
III. The Shift to Anti-westernism................................................................... 9
IV. State-led Nationalism:
From the Patriotic Education Campaign to Economic R eform ............. 14
V. Politico-tainment:
The Spring Festival Entertainment Extravaganza.................................... 20
VI. Mass-based Nationalism: Responses from the “Me” Generation 28
Skepticism of the W est............................................................................. 28
Two Americas .......................................................................................... 32
Pragmatic Nationalism .............................................................................. 40
VII. Conclusion: State and Mass Nationalisms in Convergence................ 43
Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 46
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Abstract
An analysis of contemporary Chinese nationalism starting from the 1980s,
this thesis starts with a retrospection of its evolution from anti-traditionalism to
anti-westernism on the eve of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, followed by an
overview of the regime’s efforts to restore its fading legitimacy by constructing
patriotism: the launching of a nationwide patriotic campaign, the promotion of
material acquisition, and the airing of the yearly Spring Festival Entertainment
Extravaganza. Examination is also given to the “me” generation, those born and
nurtured in the age of consumerism and materialism, and their response to the
inculcation of a unified national ideology. The thesis concludes by exploring the
government’s ambivalence in handling the spontaneous, emotional-laden
nationalism of the masses. Examination of the interplay between the political
regime and the populace suggests that pragmatism, or materialism, is a shared value
that reconciles and unites the two.
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Nationalism in China:
Shifts, contentions, and compromises
I. Introduction
As an enduring theme throughout the entire twentieth century, nationalism
has consistently played a salient role in the shaping of Chinese sociopolitical
identity in the wake of often turbulent Western imperialist practices, in the attempts
at national salvation during times of crisis, as well as in the evolving history of
nation building. In retrospect, it is a robust emotional commitment to the
emergence of a unified and thriving nation, out of fragmentation and internal
turmoil, that fomented the xenophobia of the Boxer Rebellion, that inspired the
Republican Revolution, and ignited the May Fourth Movement as well as the
anti-Japanese War. Nationalism, characterized as a strong determination for the
pursuit of national greatness, buttressed the persistent stmggle for national
sovereignty by mobilizing the collective power from generation to generation.
Over the continuing decades, the impact of nationalism never faded away.
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Entering the 1980s when China was situated in a more favorable international
light with greater domestic stability and prosperity, nationalism continued to wield
enormous influence upon the nation and its people. Yet different from the national
sentiments during the chaotic years of revolutions and wars, this contemporary
nationalism takes a newer and more dynamic shape. Reflecting the socio-political
and economic circumstances of China today, current forms of nationalistic
expression exhibit a more complex dynamic which is representative of Chinese
politics as a whole.
This thesis is an attempt to provide an analysis of contemporary Chinese
nationalism in the era of reform and opening-up. Specifically, I want to examine the
interplay between the nation-state and the people regarding their respective
interpretations and demonstrations of what can be characterized as nationalism.
The point of departure of this study is a retrospective of the evolution of
nationalism from anti-traditionalism to anti-westernism on the eve of the 1989
Tiananmen Incident, followed by an overview of the urgent attempts of the current
regime to restore its fading legitimacy and credentials by indulging in patriotic
displays and discourse at every turn: the launching of a massive, nationwide
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3
education campaign aimed at raising patriotic fervor, the promotion of social
productivity and material acquisition, and even the production and broadcast of the
yearly Spring Festival Entertainment Extravaganza which is increasingly becoming
implicated in the larger political apparatus. In this study, I also intend to examine
the so-called “me” generation, those born and nurtured in the age of consumerism
and materialism, as well as their response to the attempted inculcation of a unified
national ideology. The thesis concludes by exploring the government’s
ambivalence in handling the spontaneous, emotional-laden nationalism of the
masses. Examination of the interplay between the political regime and the populace
suggests that pragmatism, or materialism, is a shared value that reconciles and
unites the two.
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II. River Elegy: the Perspective of Anti-traditionalism
During the 1980s when China’s efforts at reform and opening-up had
come to a critical crossroads, intellectuals started to question the efficacy of the
Chinese regime in promoting modernization and national revival. These
intellectuals turned to self-examination, attempting to discover the reasons for the
delay in the realization of these values from within the country. Since open
criticism of the Party and its efficacy was essentially forbidden, critics turned their
attention to indigenous Chinese culture by questioning the viability of Chinese
traditions in the context of a globalized world order. Thus, in an effort to protect
itself against political reprisal, anti-government nationalism camouflaged itself as
oppositional to traditionalism, a dominant theme within the discourse of Chinese
nationalism during the 1980s.
This anti-traditionalism is exemplified by River Elegy (Heshang), a six-part
documentary broadcast on Chinese Central Television (CCTV) in 1988. A lament
over the decline of a once glorious civilization, River Elegy takes an introspective
approach by tracing the inability of China to assume a prominent place in the
modern world to its insistence on adhering to ancient cultural traditions. This is
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presented as the primary factor that impedes China from achieving modernization
and being able to interact freely with the rest of the world. River Elegy asserts that
the ancient Chinese civilization, embodied by the Great Wall and the Yellow River,
ends up as the ideological baggage that is likely to disenfranchise China “as a
player in the international game” (Tu, 1994, p. 5). In other words, the once revered
Wall and the River are poignantly attacked as the symbols of a close-minded
conservatism as opposed to those who are proponents of an evolving historical
continuity and a brand of national sentiment that accompanies such faith in the
inevitable progress towards modernization.
Controversial and intentionally provocative, River Elegy is nonetheless
deeply nationalistic from within, manifesting a soul-searching journey for the
future of China. Despite the rebelliousness against traditions, the documentary
exemplifies the quest for national greatness, suggesting that such greatness can
only be achieved through a massive assimilation of values from the West as a
means of national rejuvenation. The kinetic and vast expanses of ocean upon which
Western civilization is constructed is set in stark contrast to the solemnity of the
yellow earth. The nationalistic assertion of the film is reified by the title of the first
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segment “Dream-searching” (Xunmeng) that heightens the significance of the
assimilation of Western nourishment in any effort to revive the Chinese nation.
Although no explicit rage is revealed in the documentary, oblique references
are made to the current political regime, accusing it of being slow and clumsy in the
revitalization efforts. The indictment of the ancient earth civilization for being
fundamentally backward and decadent through the years serves as an acute critique
of the Communist Party for essentially doing nothing towards the innovation of
national culture, and for being completely incapable of enabling China into
becoming a world power. The sense of hopelessness and frustration that permeates
the documentary intends to evoke patriotic responses from viewers by questioning
the legitimacy of the CCP rule that has “reduce(d) China to its present (1988)
status” (Barme, 1999, p. 269). The airing of this documentary epitomizes what
Barme calls “self-loathing” (1999, p. 267) or “self-contempt” that, born of a
deep-rooted distress over the stasis of nation-building, perceives the internal
structure of the Chinese traditions as the origin of all weaknesses, suggesting that a
worldview that looks and travels outwards as the only way to overcome these
obstacles in the efforts to modernize China. By openly advocating the embrace of a
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westernized, oceanic civilization, the documentary urges the current regime to keep
up with the pace of a globalized world.
The quest for westernization as embedded in River Elegy soon gathered
momentum in the massive student demonstration at Tiananmen Square the
following year. Labeled as “turmoil” by government authorities, the prolonged
demonstrations were nevertheless viewed by the masses as a patriotic movement in
which the students initiated and urged a critical examination of the serious social
problems primarily stemming from the defects of reform, the mismanagement of
the regime, as well as the innate limitations of a Party that had essentially alienated
itself from the masses. The erection of the “Goddess of Democracy” gave further
and symbolic indication of the massive dissatisfactions with the government,
calling for political reform as an important means to strengthen the competitive
potential of the Chinese nation.
Ever since the military crackdown in the spring of 1989, anti-traditionalism
has found less and less enthusiasm among Chinese intellectuals (Zhao, 1997). The
decline of the once potent trend of nationalism is no surprise. On the one hand, the
coercion of the political apparatus silenced all opposition that was potentially
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threatening to the ruling position of the Party. Many anti-traditionalists had to flee
to other countries to avoid political persecution because of their involvement in the
Tiananmen demonstrations (Zhao, 1997). On the other hand, however, the often
glamorous and romanticized portrayal of Western culture and ideology proved to be
incomplete and biased at best, leaving the entire nation with a lack of faith.
Understandably, the total negation of national traditions and civilization also
deprived China of any viable national ideology with which people can identify
themselves. The failure of anti-traditionalism to provide an alternative and a viable
link between the historical legacy and a vision for the future constituted another
major frailty that accounted for the transience and ultimate collapse of the
anti-tradition movement.
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III. The Shift to Anti-westernism
As China entered the 1990s, the worsening relationship between China and
the rest of the world further diminished the impact that anti-traditionalism had once
had, giving rise and leading to the more self-defensive sentiments and posture of
anti-westernism. The once pervasive fervor and enthusiasm for a Western-style
democracy and for freedom started to be displaced by a suspicion of the political
agenda of the major Western powers. With the conviction that the threat of a rising
China to the current world order would be too problematic to tackle, Chinese
nationalism was framed as an opposition against the Western conspiracy of
“containing” China.
The upsurge of this anti-westernism coincided with the decade-long Party
propaganda aimed at ridding the Chinese people of the cultural pollutants of
Western civilization. The rising suspicions of the United States finally converged
with the official portrayals, generally expressed as a “growing disenchantment with
the West and its allies” (Barme, 1999, p. 257). These anti-U.S. sentiments were
augmented by a series of Sino-U.S. disputes, with the United States unmistakably
recognized as the culprit, including the Congressional debate over China’s Most
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10
Favored Nation status, the negotiation over China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization, the movements for Tibetan autonomy and Taiwan independence, to
name just a few. Such frictions were intensified by Beijing’s failure in bidding for
the 2000 Olympic Games. With burgeoning confidence in its economic growth and
international prestige, Beijing reiterated its slogan, “a more open China awaits the
Olympics”, asserting that the whole world would be surprised if China could be
“given a chance”. The final outcome, however, came as a huge disappointment to
the totally unprepared nation. Before the decision, two entertainment extravaganzas
had been secretly prepared for the two possible outcomes: the one intended for the
celebration of victory had been repeatedly rehearsed, while the other intended for a
possibly negative decision, had been little prepared. Frustration at the failure to
secure the Olympics was so genuine and deep-felt that the people of China needed
an outlet to express their disappointment and frustration. Not surprisingly, the U.S.
became the target of these sentiments and eventual attack. Condemned for
deliberately extinguishing the Chinese dream for hosting the Olympics, the U.S.
was widely believed to be the invisible manipulator behind the scenes.
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More reactive responses were brought about by anti-western nationalism in
the realm of popular culture. The popularity of the 1993 TV series A Beijinger in
New York typifies such a sentiment. As the first TV series depicting Chinese living
abroad in pursuit of personal fulfillment, A Beijinger in New York deliberately
highlights those cultural and ideological differences which portray the United
States as a nation whose values are found incompatible with the Chinese pattern.
Moreover, American society is depicted in a stereotypical manner. The
pitilessness and avarice that represent American values are set in striking contrast
to the humanism and benevolence of the Chinese nation. “There are many big
buildings and large mansions in New York City, but not one was built by good men”
(Xu, 2001, p. 153). The protagonist Wang Qiming, through all his hardships and
successes, constantly takes a derisive and contemptuous attitude towards
Americans, gloating over every defeat of his “antagonists” in his face. This
symbolic Sino-U.S. contest ends with Wang’s overwhelming success, thereby
affirming a strong and positive Chinese national identity constructed in opposition
to the ruthlessness and self-interest of America.
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Each of Wang’s acts of revenge against his rivals is widely applauded as
patriotic, invigorating and further strengthening the national spirit toward an
anti-western orientation. The nationalistic message embedded in the TV series was
interpreted in official reviews as helping Chinese viewers “better understand
American society and help(ing) those who entertain a rosy American dream to be
more realistic” (Barme, 1999, p. 276). The misrepresentation, or rather,
demonization of the United States, is in stark contrast to the previous worship of
American democracy and culture, providing further justification for the superiority
of Chinese traditions.
The concept of “face”, the public image that individuals and the national
community strive hard to maintain and foster (Gries, 2004, p. 9), is central to
understanding the current state of Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism
evolves and is integrally tied with China’s self-perception of its position among
other nations in the world hierarchy, depicting itself as the permanent victor in the
collision and fusion of evolving civilizations. The popularity of the “victor”
narrative as exemplified by A Beijinger in New York further enables Chinese
nationalists to present a scenario in which the United States is morally disciplined
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by China. Within the dynamics of this scenario, the cultural “face” of China, their
expectant self image characterized by superiority, is validated and possibly even
vindicated.
The Sino-U.S. relationship illustrates the “victor” narrative in which China
consistently resorts to its past victories over the U.S. to build up the confidence
needed to face conflicts likely to occur in the future. Such a narrative is portrayed as
a “zero-sum” game (Gries, 2004, p.63) in which the triumph of China can only be
accomplished at the expense of the United States and its cultural values, meaning
that the heroic resistance of Chinese is always set in contrast to the evil nature of an
imperialistic America. Such a glorious “face” that Chinese nationalists strive so
hard to present, ironically turns out to be reflective of the heightened sense of
insecurity and discomfort that China presently feels in the world system. These are
the contextual dynamics on which A Beijinger in New York is premised.
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14
IV. State-led Nationalism:
From the Patriotic Education Campaign to Economic Reform
The military crackdown on student demonstrators in the spring of 1989
greatly undermined the authority of the communist regime, giving rise to a crisis of
legitimacy unprecedented in CCP history. Not only was the promise of the
communist ideal greatly questioned and negated domestically, the CCP itself was
further isolated within the international sphere. Nationalism suddenly became the
last bulwark for rallying national support and eliciting loyalty, and the invocation of
nationalism was expected to facilitate the restoration of the Party’s credibility.
Those in power made the most of the instrumentality of nationalism under the guise
of revitalizing the country and building a strong economy, hoping that the mantle of
nationalism would contribute to the recovery of the Party’s diminished political
legitimacy. In this sense, Chinese nationalism could be understood as being
primarily state-centric (Zhao, 2000). Politicians consistently wrapped themselves
in the banner of nationalism by creating a sense of national identity among the
masses.
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The conceptual boundary between nationalism, particularly nationalism in
the name of the nation-state serving the interests of the political apparatus, and
patriotism, the unifying force of the entire nation that one’s national identity relies
upon, is deliberately blurred. State nationalism, propagated and operated in
accordance with the political interests of the nation-state, or, the ruling party, is
quintessentially equated with one’s fidelity to the communist regime which claims
to represent the interests of the entire population. In other words, when the CCP
regime is made synonymous with the Chinese nation, representing the general will
of the entire people, patriotism is correspondingly transformed to nationalism.
Loving the Chinese nation thus necessitates a corresponding devotion to the
political mechanism under the CCP. State nationalism is thus reduced to “nothing
other than a narrow patriotism” (Chang, 2001, p. 180).
In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the state expended great
efforts towards restoring its validity to rule by concentrating on three major arenas:
educating the youth, creating a politically-permeated mass culture, and developing
the economy, all aimed at justifying the legitimacy of the regime. The initiation of a
nationwide campaign, in the form of a “patriotic education”, was aimed at ridding
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the masses of the ideological “pollution” of Western values and arousing patriotic
awareness, among youth in particular. Moreover, with the conviction that an
improved and vigorous economic performance would constitute a more powerful
signifier of the Party’s ruling capacity, money-oriented values continued to survive
and thrive, tacitly accepted and sometimes even encouraged by the Party authorities
as a new dimension of nationalism in the age of consumerism. The intertwining of
patriotism, mass entertainment, as well as commercialism created a more dynamic
paradigm of contemporary Chinese nationalism executed in the name of the
nation-state.
Starting in 1994, a massive patriotic education campaign was enacted,
targeting students of all levels, warding them off the “peaceful evolution”
orchestrated by the Western powers. Patriotic education courses were added to the
curriculum of high schools and colleges. Significant emphasis was put on the
historical legacy inherited by the current regime, such as the great achievements of
the nation under the leadership of the Communist Party, implicitly delivering the
message that the CCP was the savior of the nation and the main contributor to the
unity and sovereignty of the nation-state. The strategy behind positioning the CCP
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as the symbol of national greatness was aimed at filling the pervasive lack of faith
that had resulted from the decay of communism, as well as cultivating renewed
patriotism, particularly among the younger generation. Collectivism was espoused
to supersede individualism. The state stressed that individuals must always
subordinate themselves to collective interests, and in circumstances when
individualism conflicted with collectivism, it would be virtuous to renounce
personal gains for a greater socio-political imperative.
Another integral component of the patriotic education campaign was national
reunification. Inspired by a strong desire to retrieve lost territories and more
importantly, lost “face”, irredentism suggested another dimension of nationalism
repeatedly deployed by political authorities (Chang, 2001, p. 205). Fueled by the
ingrained symbolism of the tributary system, in which the Chinese dominance
overwhelmed Western “barbarians”, territorial claims were promoted by school
textbooks as essential to national esteem. The unification with Hong Kong, Macao,
and particularly Taiwan was legitimized as the core of national dignity that the
younger generation was taught to strive for.
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The historical position of the CCP was also reoriented within this patriotic
campaign. At a time when communism had largely lost its ground, the state no
longer claimed itself as the advocate of communist ideals as it previously had
consistently done, but repackaged itself as the exemplifier of patriotism in the long
struggle for national survival and independence. Patriotism under the leadership of
a centralized state was used to justify the position of the current regime as the
guardian of national interests. Moreover, the reiteration of the historical
specificities of the Chinese nation throughout time was aimed at reinforcing the
inadequacy of a Western-style democracy for China’s political agenda at this time.
The rapid disintegration and social turbulence of the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe were cited to remind those vehemently demanding democratization
of the lurking dangers of adopting the Western model in China. Stability and
national unity as the overriding imperatives for China’s growth and survival helped
legitimize the forceful and tightened measures taken by the state to prevent disunity
and maintain order.
Yet the patriotic campaign was gradually overshadowed by the success of the
market-oriented reform also utilized by the political authorities to restore
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legitimacy. The impressive performance of economic reform steered nationalistic
expressions farther away from ideological inculcations and Party propaganda.
National cohesion became increasingly attached to economic achievements that
greatly promoted material attainment and social well-being. The government found
it increasingly necessary to maintain its support via nation-building, further
appealing to the pride of the masses by raising their living standards. Sprung from
the fruit of economic reform, the growing capacity of the nation-state to promise
personal freedom and individual fulfillment boosted the confidence of the rest of
the country in the sense that the current regime was truly devoted to working for
their best interests and thus deserving not just their fidelity but passion as well.
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V. Politico-tainment:
The Spring Festival Entertainment Extravaganza
While under no circumstances is nationalism an outmoded theme in the
discourse of Party propaganda, what is more noticeable in the 1990s, however, is
the shift in the strategy utilized to promote national cohesion. The previous
coercive indoctrination of revolutionary slogans and communist vision in the Mao
era was displaced by a loosened inculcation of nationalism which very often
penetrated into the cultural sphere, as can be exemplified by the annual Spring
Festival Entertainment Extravaganza. As the dominant representation of public
entertainment among the mass audience, the Spring Festival Gala, whose wide
coverage and profound social impact are simply too irresistible for politicians to
ignore, has no choice but to serve as the mouthpiece of the government.
Much about this festival extravaganza remains intact year after year;
everything goes on in a tacit agreement as if the production is being manipulated by
some invisible hand. Major themes that implicitly or explicitly dominate the entire
performance are intended to summarize the great accomplishments of the entire
nation during the previous year with problems, very often, deliberately overlooked.
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An even brighter future is also presented by the variety show, aiming at fostering a
congruent national identity by inspiring pride among the masses.
The first theme addressed by the gala is the unity of the different ethnic
groups. China is a multi-ethnic country with 56 nationalities, among which the Han
take an overwhelmingly dominant role not only in population but in terms of social
status and ideological control as well. The Han culture, consciously or not, has long
been positioned as the elite and orthodox culture in China, with the rest of the
minority groups in a subordinate position. In order to pacify the feelings of
inferiority and resentment sometimes experienced by the remaining 55 nationalities
and to create an atmosphere of equality, the characteristics of their culture are
immensely magnified during the gala. Songs and dances with performers wearing
the ethnic costumes of these minority groups are an inseparable part of this show.
The disproportionate participation of the minority groups in the variety show
ostensibly helps stabilize the feelings of these marginalized groups by concealing
the Han superiority
Another highlighted group in the performances during the gala are overseas
Chinese, or the Chinese Diaspora. Millions of Chinese living far away from their
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22
motherland sustain a complex emotional dynamic around one single word which is
called “gen” in Chinese, and translates into English as “root.” The contrasting
concepts of luodishenggen and luoyeguigen (Wang, 1994) are constantly at play in
the minds of those living away from China. Wavering between the permanent
settling in a foreign land (luodishenggen) and returning to one’s native country
(luoyeguigen), these Chinese abroad often suffer from a sense of nostalgia. The
Spring Festival Extravaganza comes into their life once a year to alleviate such
emotions. By presenting them with images of a thriving nation rapidly changing
every day, the Spring Festival Extravaganza acts as a bridge to reinforce their
emotional attachment to their motherland.
Among the Chinese Diaspora, those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are
given the greatest attention during the gala. With the restoration of Hong Kong and
Macao to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and 1999 respectively, there is growing
urgency about incorporating Taiwan back into the “Greater China”. The Taiwan
issue, however, is a much more thorny matter to solve. With only a loosely-tied
kinship with mainland China in history, coupled with the high levels of
democratization and modernization which have far exceeded those of the mainland,
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23
Taiwan feels rather uncomfortable with unification. Despite the growing
disenchantment among the Taiwanese regarding their return to the mainland, the
Beijing government is nevertheless anxious to present a territorially and culturally
unified “empire” to the rest of the world, at least on stage. The Spring Festival
Extravaganza, therefore, provides the best forum for a political message intended to
convince people at home and abroad that the dream of unification will soon be
fulfilled. Long before the historic moment of unification with Hong Kong in 1997,
pop singers from Hong Kong were regularly invited to the Spring Festival Gala to
give performances. Such performances and programming are never random:
nationalism and cultural unity have to be reflected during the show at all costs. The
most memorable performance during the 1980s was a song by Zhang Mingmin,
entitled “My Chinese Heart” (wo de zhongguoxin), which was an emotional
depiction of the strong patriotic passion that the people of Hong Kong harbored for
their motherland. With the unprecedented success of this song, Zhang himself came
to obtain a great deal of recognition in mainland China. Backed by the political
apparatus, his singing career and personal prestige soared.
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Having witnessed the miraculous rise of Zhang, many other singers from
Taiwan and Hong Kong have lobbied to appear in the Spring Festival variety show.
The mainland Chinese market is so lucrative that all dream of taking a share. The
selection procedure, however, is extremely restrictive. Only those
well-accomplished, well-reputed performers who happen to be strong advocates of
Communist China, while at the same time being obedient to Party requirements, are
allowed in the show. Once chosen however, they are likely to be generously
rewarded. With regard to who is chosen to perform during the Spring Festival,
artistic style means little, personal character means little; what matters is that the
content of the performance explicitly suggests a future wherein Hong Kong, Macao
and Taiwan are tightly linked to the Communist mainland. Anyone showing the
slightest objection or rebelliousness regarding this prospect will be expelled
immediately and perhaps permanently from the show, as has been the case in
previous years. A-Mei, for example, once a popular Taiwanese performer of the
Spring Festival show, found the door permanently closed to her after singing the
“national anthem” of Taiwan at the inauguration of a pro-independence President.
As a matter of fact, the whole mainland market was closed to her thereafter. This is
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25
clearly a marriage of convenience between the performers and the Party, a two-way
path through which both sides can acquire exactly what they want.
Changes to the format of the show have been introduced to highlight the
theme of national unification, with ordinary people coming forward to express their
eager wish for unity across the Taiwan Straits. Last year, a Taiwan family was
invited to the gala to give a self-composed performance named “Let Love Reside in
My Home” (rang ai zhu wojia). The performance is intended to carry a dual
meaning: on the one hand, “home” signifies the harmony of their individual family
with parents and children; on the other hand, “home” is implicated in the broader
sense of culture and heritage, that is the root of being Chinese.
Since the arousal of Chinese nationalism is greatly reliant on China’s
self-perception of her position in the world hierarchy, the Sino-foreign relationship
becomes another focus of the show. As a folk celebration, the Spring Festival
Extravaganza includes international participation as an indicator of the friendliness
of Chinese people and the determination of China to expand its process of
opening-up to the world. With these purposes in mind, the enthusiasm of foreign
guests toward Chinese culture is sometimes dramatized. Once there was a very
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popular Canadian performer Da Shan in the show. Having learned Chinese for
many years, he managed to speak even better Mandarin than most Chinese do, and
later engaged himself in the study of professional comic dialogue (xiangsheng)
which requires an exceptionally good mastery of the Chinese language. His
appearance in the show was so well received that people tended to take him as
representative of foreigners as a whole, the very effect that China’s leaders wanted
to have happen. With the presentation of the image of someone who was so
enchanted by Chinese culture, the show attempted to convey to the world the
message that China is a great country deserving international attention. The
magnification of their deep-felt connectedness toward the ancient Chinese
civilization is instrumental to the festival’s sinocentric worldview.
Great accomplishments of the preceding year are also highlighted during the
show. All social arenas, including the economy, technology, sports, and so on, are
dutifully covered. Those who have made significant achievements in these areas
are invited, including Olympic champions, accomplished scientists or sometimes
well-known business people, to give inspiring speeches to promote patriotism and
nationalism. The script is always predetermined: excited pronouncements of their
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pride and their relative ordinariness against the greatness of the nation as a whole,
as well as their commitment to the prospects of the nation are highlighted, with the
expectation that the national spirit will be coagulated and reinforced through the
example of those heroic role models.
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VI. Mass-based Nationalism:
Responses from the “Me” Generation
As China’s first “me” generation, Chinese college students have
demonstrated an ambivalent attitude toward the attempted indoctrination of state
nationalism. Born in the era of market reform, these students are brought up in a
country with relative prosperity and stability. The “one-child” policy has bred
self-centeredness and individualism, the presumed labels attached to this
generation. Further, as the direct beneficiaries of China’s interaction with the
outside world, the ”me” generation constantly keeps an eye on Western culture and
becomes regular consumers of McDonald’s, Coca Cola as well as Hollywood films.
This, coupled with the imposed patriotic education that has accompanies their
formative years, greatly impacts and complicates their nationalistic sentiments.
Skepticism o f the West
Unlike students in the 1980s whose nationalistic sentiments were typified by
their constant confrontations with the government by questioning state legitimacy
and competency in resolving rampant social problems, which ultimately
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29
culminated in the 1989 student movement, students during the 1990s are more
willing to maintain a cooperative and mutually reinforcing relationship with the
government, adopting pro-government practices whenever crises between China
and other nations break out. This is partly due to the success of the decade-long
patriotic campaign that this generation has been brought up with, but more
importantly it stems from the economic achievements of the country that generate a
sense of general satisfaction and personal fulfillment among the populace, thus
maintaining a sense of nationalism deep and robust among the youth of the country.
More often than not, the devotion to the Chinese nation is so entrenched that any
offensive practice or motive from the West, once discerned, is subject to immediate
counterattack. Students tend to take a defensive, sometimes aggressive stance
against the slightest unfriendliness towards China.
A series of Sino-U.S. confrontations since the 1990s have led to surging
resentment among college students who did not hesitate to take to the streets to
protest U.S. hegemony. The Sino-U.S. relationship has therefore experienced
several unanticipated challenges. Following the collision between a Chinese fighter
plane and a U.S. surveillance aircraft in 2001, which further reinforced the view
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30
that the U.S. was antagonistic in its dealings with China, Internet chat rooms were
suffused with indignation. A sardonic letter was widely circulated among
websurfers, mainly university students, to express their anger:
Dear American:
My name is Uncle Sam. Here was what happened last weekend. I
drove a van circling around your house, took pictures of your
backyard, recorded your bedroom conversation with your wife with
high-tech devices. I admit I did that routinely. But, I drove on a
PUBLIC road. When your kid came out biking, I hit and killed him. I
swear, it was an accident. Then, my van landed in your backyard. So,
you should send my van, my equipment and my friends on board back
to me immediately, otherwise, the relationship between your family
and my family could be damaged. By the way, I have no intention to
apologize because I did nothing wrong. It happened on a PUBLIC
road.
Uncle Sam (Liew & Wang, 2004, p. 12)
The skepticism over U.S. intentions was also vividly illustrated by President
Clinton’s visit to Beijing University in 1998. Well-renowned for his sophistication
in tackling diplomatic affairs, the President was obviously astounded by the
bombardment from well-prepared students at the prestigious institution.
“You said that the reason for your visit to China is because China is too
important, and engagement is better than containment”.
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‘Is this a ... commitment you made for your visit, or do you have other things
hidden behind your smile? Do you have any designs to contain China?” (Chu, 1999,
A l)
When interviewed afterwards, the students admitted in private that they were
actually not asking what they had wanted to. One, for example, claimed that he was
in fact fanatical about American rock’n roll and would have liked to ask instead
what the President’s favorite rock band was. Another student, who was a vegetarian,
admitted that she would have been happy, given the chance, to discuss health and
green food issues with the President whose whole family also happened to be
vegetarians. Nevertheless, when the chance presented itself, they did not behave
accordingly. What then, diverted these students from their true intentions?
Perhaps it is fair to say that the nationalistic behavior of these students under
certain circumstances is indicative of Chinese youth’s propensity for arousing
attention, affirming their own identity via publicly showcasing their personality
traits including fearlessness, determination and wisdom. Rather than stemming
from one’s loyalty to the nation with which one tends to identify himself/herself,
nationalism sometimes serves as a channel taken by this generation to unleash their
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32
“desire to make their mark” (Gries, 2004, p.4). Questioning the motive of a world
power and embarrassing its President should be considered a great achievement
that can bring pride for a lifetime, and it risks nothing at all! The applause of their
peers standing alongside proves that these students are not the minority.
Ironically, those peppering the U.S. President with nationalistic fervor were
actually the most ardent fortune-seekers in a land that they appeared to be so critical
about. Such ambiguity toward the West is pervasive. Despite the low ebbs in the
discourse of Sino-U.S. relations, Chinese students still marvel at the democracy and
individual freedom largely missing in Chinese society, yearning for an opportunity
to go to the West in pursuit of personal aspirations.
Two Americas
Fully exposed to American values and culture, a considerable portion of the
“me” generation are obviously Westernized. Although the outburst of their
nationalistic passion is intense and genuine, such sentiments often end up to be
short-lived. Although students hurled stones at McDonald’s and KFC after the 1999
Belgrade embassy bombing, they could not help frequenting those U.S. fast food
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chains shortly afterwards, the way they always did. “I cannot accept the U.S. attack
on China’s sovereignty and we must stand up to that, but this is lunch”, to quote a
young salesman sitting at a McDonald’s during the demonstration (Liew & Wang,
2004, p. 11). Most of the time, this self-righteous generation draws a clear line of
demarcation between its nationalistic emotions and material aspirations by taking a
pragmatic and neutral viewpoint with regard to the United States.
Opinions drawn from in-depth interviews reveal that two Americas exist in
the minds of Chinese college students. One is a hateful and hegemonic United
States whereas the other is an advanced and developed one (Chen, 2003). When
interviewed, students reveal that they harbor a deep aversion towards U.S.
hegemony and its foreign policy. The frequent intervention into the internal affairs
of other countries, they believe, serves the purpose of upholding U.S. interests and
hegemony, rather than maintaining world peace and stability as claimed by its
government. These students are particularly angered by the unfriendly attitude
toward China, ascribing China’s failure in bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games, its
rocky entry into WTO, and the complicated Taiwan issues, to U.S. opposition and
sabotage. Moreover, their fury and humiliation regarding the Belgrade embassy
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bombing incident are still profound after all these years. In a word, the hatred
towards a hegemonic United States among Chinese college students is tangible and
entrenched. These feelings spring directly from a series of Sino-U.S. confrontations
in which the United States is believed to adopt an aggressive and hostile foreign
policy by meddling in China’s internal affairs, desperately trying to prevent China
from rising to a world power that is likely to challenge U.S. domination in the
world.
However, when responding to the culture and domestic environment of the
United States, the previous revulsion and disgust are replaced by admiration and
longing for the social climate and the value systems of the same country. It is not
uncommon to find those students applying for a student visa at the embassy where
they staged protests a few days ago. College students today in China do not feel
embarrassed to explain their contradictory feelings towards the United States by
reflecting on the current circumstances in China, attributing China’s innate
weakness and backwardness to the viability of U.S. hegemony in the world. The
best solution to this problem is self-development by learning from the advanced
models represented by the United States. To them, attending a major U.S.
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institution of higher learning is most appealing in that it not only allows them a
better opportunity for knowledge acquisition, but also opens up the possibility of a
brighter personal future once they graduate.
In sum, today’s Chinese students are deeply nationalistic, bearing strong
resentment against U.S. hegemony over China issues and condemning the Chinese
government for being clumsy and soft in handling international affairs. Yet such
nationalism of Chinese students today is still highly rational and pragmatic. Rather
than dismissing the United States as entirely corrupt and inhumane, students still
contend that its social values and ideals are desirable and feel quite comfortable
coping with the U.S. for the betterment of their own interests. This promise of
personal attainment is the primary appeal that the United States holds for Chinese
students.
Further evidence of these seemingly contradictory attitudes and emotions is
gained from a recent survey (Zhao, 2002) of students from three major universities
in Beijing regarding their anti-U.S. nationalism in response to the embassy
bombing incident in Belgrade in 1999. The findings suggest that despite the outrage
among students over the Belgrade incident, which is positively correlated to their
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exposure to the official media, these reactions are in effect momentary and transient,
and distinct from any radical anti-U.S. nationalism developed over time. In other
words, although most students strongly believe that the embassy bombing is a
premeditated incident by the U.S. government, radical and pervasive
anti-Americanism is also found to be unpopular. Rather than perceiving the United
States as an enemy of China, most respondents are inclined to accept the argument
that America’s China policy is based on its own national interests. A
pro-democratic propensity is also manifested among them. The passion for the
culture and economic achievement across the Pacific is palpable and authentic. For
these students, studying and working in the United States is considered as part and
parcel of their life plans.
A more dynamic analysis of the image of the United States in the eyes of
Chinese college students is presented by a nationwide survey conducted in 1999
and 2000 (Deng, 2001). Different from the majority of surveys which tend to focus
primarily on a particular time, this study seeks to investigate the evolution of the
students’ mindset and understanding of the United States during their formative
years, focusing specifically on how their impressions of America are transformed
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37
from their early childhood years to what it is today. Furthermore, this study also
examines the variety of channels from which information related to the U.S. is
drawn, as a way of accounting for the ongoing transformation of their attitudes.
Generally speaking, the image of the United States is gradually heading
towards a more concrete and favorable orientation. With the increasing availability
of information from the West, America is no longer the distant country that only
exists in textbooks and the imagination. The superiority of U.S. socio-political and
economic systems becomes more and more visible and appealing to college
students. Domestic television and newspapers are the major channels of
information retrieval on which such impressions are based. The bulk of information
available on the college campus further provides these students with an open
environment for discussion and communication, allowing them to think with their
own judgment and from various perspectives. No longer is their perception solely
reliant upon textbooks from their early education that tend to depict the United
States as the emblem of evil and imperialism. On the contrary, greater importance
has been attached to its level of democracy, freedom and economic prosperity. It is
only under circumstances when tension escalates between the two countries that
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their nationalistic sentiments tend to dominate. The two top-ranking key words
regarding their impressions of the U.S., “hegemony” and “Internet technology”
provide a vivid illustration of their mixed feelings which oscillate between love and
hate (Deng, 2001, p. 78). Their consistent admiration for the idealized U.S. social
system is subdued from time to time by the wave of nationalistic protests when
national interests are violated.
Such a paradox is affirmed by the personal experiences of those traveling or
studying in the United States. Closer observation allows them new perspectives and
insight into understanding this country. Qian Ning, for example, in his book
Chinese Students Encounter America (Liuxue Meiguo) presents the struggles and
hardships of Chinese students and scholars for their survival in this foreign land.
Based on extensive interviews during his stay in the United States as a visiting
journalist, his book exhibits the conflicting sentiments of Chinese students
regarding their perceptions of the United States as compared to their motherland.
One of the most interesting phenomena revealed in the book is that the students’
patriotic sentiments often correlate negatively with their process of adapting to
American society. Generally speaking, nationalistic feelings are more palpable in
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39
the older students than in younger ones, and stronger in those with low command of
English language than those proficient in English communication (Qian, 2002).
Understandably, the inability of adapting to this new environment due to the
language barrier has an adverse impact on the personal ambitions of students and
scholars, especially older ones, cultivating in them a sense of inferiority as well as
resentment toward the country from which one feels culturally and psychologically
alienated. This sense of exclusion often propels them into deep nostalgia for their
home country, since it is only there that they feel their talent can be fully displayed
and acknowledged. Conversely, more favorable responses are likely to be detected
in the younger group whose quick assimilation into the new culture facilitates their
personal development. They tend to feel at ease staying in the United States with its
promise of a better life and career. Not surprisingly, the assessment of the United
States by Chinese youth is largely dictated by their own levels of personal
fulfillment and material attainment.
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40
Pragmatic Nationalism
The market-oriented reforms have geared nationalism among Chinese youth
towards a more pragmatic and materialized orientation. Students in the survey cited
above (Deng, 2001) mostly believe that nationalism ought to be displayed in a
rational way. Boycotting American products, though understandable, is largely
dismissed as radical and myopic. Refusing to eat at McDonald’s and KFC is futile
and meaningless. Reviving domestic industry and enhancing economic strength,
they believe, may prove to be a more productive solution in the long run, which is
inseparable from pursuing exchanges with the United States on a variety of fronts.
With a globalized mindset, Chinese college students embrace extensive
collaboration with the United States, whose technological and economic
development should prove most beneficial to improving China’s status in the
international world order.
At a personal level, individual attainment and fulfillment become the ultimate
goal that stimulates college students into the search for personal identity within a
broader social context. Bill Gates, for example, is voted as the most influential
person in the United States by a large margin (Deng, 2001), solid proof that
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entrepreneurship and wealth are considered the most significant personality traits in
a world where money speaks louder than everything, grounded on which personal
success is unanimously acknowledged. The renewed role of the CCP as the
guardian of market norms and rising consumerism reinforces individualism as a
new dimension of the national spirit. Consistent with the commercialized guideline
of the CCP that increasingly bases its political credentials upon its economic
performance, the nationalism of this younger generation is upheld in much the
same fashion. Material acquisition becomes the first and foremost concern behind
their nationalistic impulses.
Recently, an article entitled “The Gap Between China and Japan - Some
Unbelievable Truths” was widely disseminated on the Internet, evoking extensive
debate on related topics. The author takes an introspective approach by dismissing
self-elevating nationalism as parochial and dangerous. While acknowledging the
rapid growth of the Chinese economy and the relative stagnation of Japan, he
argues that China still has a long way to go. The Chinese superiority over Japan in
terms of recent developments is little more than pure myth. Most noticeably, the
author constructs his entire argument upon the comparison of the economic
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performances of the two nations, including per capita productivity and income,
foreign investment, trade, as well as people’s living standards and consumption
patterns. Economic issues become the heightened concern of nationalists at present,
the yardstick for the assessment of national greatness and capacity for generating
popular support.
Surveys and academic research that investigate the cherished values of the
“me” generation concur on the declining interest in politics and the rising aspiration
for money. Such values are openly acknowledged, with youth worldviews
reoriented toward materialism and consumerism. The emergence of a
success-driven, upwardly mobile generation suggests the triumph of materialism as
the cohesive force upon which regime legitimacy is increasingly being based
(Rosen, 2004).
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VII. Conclusion:
State and Mass Nationalisms in Convergence
Mass-based popular nationalism is a double-edged sword, providing a
paradox for the political mechanism oscillating between accommodation and
coercion. On the one hand, the internationally isolated and demonized Communist
Party after the spring of 1989 urgently needed popular nationalism to reinforce
patriotic sentiment and revive mass support for the regime since its claims to
legitimacy had been largely marginalized. The initiation of the nationwide patriotic
education campaign, coupled with the promotion of mass entertainment and
particularly the concentration on economic performance, reshaped contemporary
nationalism by demonstrating a multidimensional outlook. The “me” generation
growing up in an increasingly thriving country and socialized to embrace patriotic
values, became strong advocates of individual identity and pragmatic espousers of
material values. Their nationalistic emotions aided in the restoration of legitimacy
for the CCP regime.
On the other hand, nationalism per se is intrinsically unstable in China,
especially when “adopted as a basis of state legitimacy” (Zhao, 2002, p. 112).
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Popular nationalism projects an aggressive international image, one which
consistently blames the Party-state for being too soft and easy when handling
foreign relations. The rising assertiveness of mass nationalism can be seen as a
grave potential threat to the state since the state’s restored monopoly of power is
challenged by overheated nationalistic acts. There have been various attempts to
rein in the possibilities for mass demonstrations in an effort to ensure that
nationalistic expressions do not spiral out of control. The Internet, the most popular
means of information exchange for college students, for example, is constantly
monitored under the supervision of the government. During periods when the
regime is unsure how to temper the extremely assertive, sometimes virulent,
nationalism amongst the Internet-savvy youth, especially when both imperatives of
popular nationalism and openness to the outside world are present (Rosen, 2003),
radical online chatrooms and bulletin boards are shut down to curb the
dissemination of aggressive messages of nationalism among the youth.
Despite the ambivalence of the Party-state toward mass-based nationalism,
convergence of the two sides seems to be the most likely prospect. With the
conviction that material acquisition, personal attainment and social well-being
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45
should be the fundamental guarantee of state legitimacy, the Party is likely to
continue dedicating itself to market reforms and nation building which, perfectly
compatible with the expectations of the masses, should reorient popular
nationalism toward a unified pattern rooted in consumerism, upward mobility and
individual fulfillment. Pragmatism, after all, is an increasingly prominent theme
that mediates both state and popular nationalisms.
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46
Bibliography
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Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.
Chang, M. H. (2001). Return o f the dragon: China’ s wounded nationalism. Boulder
& Oxford: Westview Press.
Chen, S. (2003). Two Americas: How Chinese college students view the United
States. Chinese Education and Society, 36 (6), pp. 7-31.
Chu, H. (1999, June 2). Chinese students renew emphasis on patriotism;
nationalism: Government encourages love of country to blunt western
influences, but rulers must walk a fine line. Los Angeles Times, p. A l. Retrieved
November 30, 2004, from ProQuest database.
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Asset Metadata

Creator Zhang, Peimin (author)

Core Title Nationalism in China: Shifts, contentions, and compromises

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag anthropology, cultural,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-46863

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Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA