University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Ethnic identity and nationalism in Taiwan

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Ethnic identity and nationalism in Taiwan

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ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM IN TAIWAN
By
John Sheng Chu
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillm ent of the
Requirement for the Degree
M aster of Arts
(East Asian Area Studies)
D ecem ber 1998
Copyright 1998 John Sheng Chu
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UMI Number: 13 94775
Copyright 199 8 by
Chu, John Sheng
AH rights reserved.
UMI Microform 1394775
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL.
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90007
This thesis, w ritten bv
* +
• J o h n I s u e r!''!£> (Th u
r
under the direction of h.LS.— Thesis Committee,
and approved by a ll its members, has been pre
sented to and accepted by the Dean of The
Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements fo r the degree of
Dti
November 13, 1998
THESIS jCOMMI
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I would like to dedicate this thesis to my
parents and other family members in Taiwan
who have stood by me all these years
through my education in the United States
Special Thanks
to the Professors on my thesis committee
and to my academic adviser.....
Professor William M. Rideout Jr. from the
Division of Administration and Policy School of Education at U.S.C
Professor Jack Wills Jr. from the
History Department at U.S.C.
Professor Gary Seaman from the
Anthropology Department at U.S.C.
Christ Evans Program Specialist from the
East Asian Studies Center at U.S.C.
&
to Maggie Chau
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
D E D IC A TIO N ..............................................................................................................ii
LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS......................................................................... .v
A B S T R A C T ............................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER 1
PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY
1. Purpose....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Problems.....................................................................................................................1
3. Definitions and the use of terms........................................................................... 3
a. Places..............................................................................................................4
b. Political Parties (Including abbreviations)......................................... 5
c. Ethnic Identities (The use of terms)...................................................... 5
4. Backgrounds............................................................................................ 8
5. Limitations.................................................................................................................13
6. Methodology............................................................................................................. 14
7. Organization............................................................................................................. 15
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF HISTORICAL LITERATURE
1. Geographical Setting.............................................................................................. 17
2. History and the Identity of Taiwan................. 21
3. The Dutch Occupation vs. Cheng Chen-Kung..................................................22
4. The Ch’ing Administration.....................................................................................26
5. Fifty Years of Japanese Rule............................................................................... 30
6. World War II.............................................................................................................37
7. The Republic of China............................................................................................ 40
8. Riot in Taiwan (The 2-28 Incident)................................................................... 43
9. The Era of President Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan, 1949-1975 .45
10. The Era of President Chiang Ching-Kuo, 1975-1988................ 53
11. The Era of President Lee Teng-Hui, 1988-Present .................. 57
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12. Current Situation Between China and Taiwan..........................................60
a. Interview with China Chairman Jiang Zemin...................................60
b. Interview with Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui............................61
CHAPTER 3
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES, RESULTS, AND FINDINGS
a. Why the questions.......................................................................................63
b. The making of survey questionnaires.................................................. 63
c. The survey questionnaires......................................................................66
d. The ethnic identity of approximately one hundred people
who were born in Taiwan, (in rounded numbers)........................... 73
e. Same tables as “d”. (in percentages).................................................. 76
f. Central Academia Sinica’s Science Department Survey
Statistics Tables, (in percentage)......................................................... 79
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
a. Findings based on survey responses and statistics................... 81
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Taiwan’s Nationalism................................................................................. 88
b. Taiwan-Taiwanese vs. Mainland-Taiwanese.................................... 89
c. The unknown future roads for Taiwan................................................ 97
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE................................................................................100
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................... 101
i v
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LIST OF TABLES AND MAPS
Review of Historical Literature
2.1 Map of China and Taiwan..............................................................................19
2.2 Map of Taiwan................................................................................................ 20
2.3 Map of majority Chinese population migration routes from
China to Taiwan during the past one hundred years........................ 29
Survey Questionnaires. Results, and Findings
Statistic Tables from my survey questionnaires conducted in the U.S.
and Taiwan (in rounded numbers):
3.1 Table of age....................................................................................................73
3.2 Table of current residency...........................................................................73
3.3 Table of education levels..............................................................................73
3.4 Table of political parties...............................................................................74
3.5 Table of ideal future road for Taiwan..................................................... 74
3.6 Table of parents’ and ancestral ethnic background............................74
3.7 Table of the most use dialect/language at homel............................ 75
Statistic Tables from my survey questionnaires conducted in the U.S.
and Taiwan (in percentage):
3.8 Table of age....................................................................................................76
3.9 Table of current residency...........................................................................76
3.10 Table of education levels..............................................................................76
3.11 Table of political parties...............................................................................77
3.12 Table of ideal future road for Taiwan..................................................... 77
3.13 Table of parents’ and ancestral ethnic background............................77
3.14 Table of the most use dialect/language at home............................. 78
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Statistic Tables conducted by the Central Academia Sinica’s Social
Science Department in Taiwan (in percentage):
3.15 Table of ethnic identity of the general public in Taiwan
1991 and 1993........................................................ 79
3.16 Table of age......................................................................................................79
3 .1 7 Table of educational levels...........................................................................79
3.18 Table of ethnic background...........................................................................80
3.19 Table of political parties................................................................................80
3.20 Table of political reform attitudes............................................................ 80
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ABSTRACT:
There have been dramatic changes in Taiwan in the last ten
years— prosperity, dem ocratization, assertion of many ethnic
identities, and immense uncertainties about future relations with
Mainland China. Large parts of the political elites, both ruling and
opposition, understand that polarization of ethnic identities and
increasing conflict among irreconcilable ethnic groups could
undermine prosperity and political stability. As a result, many elite
members try to avoid extreme positions and statements. But there
are powerful cultural and social changes at work which the elites
cannot and do not control. Some survey data show an increase in
assertion of polarized identities. And this thesis seeks to test some
of these results and to ask questions in new ways. Hence, it
confirms some of the findings of polarized identities, but not
without the im portant qualifications.
An important feature of contemporary Taiwan is the very large
amount of travelers, businessman, and Taiwan citizens shifting
residence to the United States, especially to the Los Angeles area.
Thus, it is possible to conduct a public opinion survey in greater Los
Angeles that samples people whose attitudes were shaped by the
life-styles in Taiwan and who may still live there or may return
there one day. These findings may show interesting differences in
views as people view the Taiwan’s ethnic identity and current
political situation from a greater distance and, perhaps, they may
confirm results of surveys done in Taiwan.
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CHAPTER 1
PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY:
Purpose:
This thesis focuses mainly on the questions and issues
regarding the relationship between Taiwan and China, and the
identity constructs of Taiwanese and Chinese. Moreover, this study
also focuses particularly on the changes after 1945 in Taiwan, and
the evolving political struggles between the Nationalist Party (KMT)
and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) today. On July 1, 1997,
when Hong Kong was returned to China after years of prosperity
under British colonization, Taiwan’s unclear political status and
future relationship with Mainland China once again caused major
tensions in the minds of Taiwanese and Chinese.
Problems:
According to Alan Wachman, the author of “Com peting
Identities in Taiwan” :
The two political problems most evident in Taiwan since the mid-
1980s have been: (1) the demands for greater participation,
fairness, and equity in the political system, and (2) the absence of
consensus regarding national identity. These problems are
related. In the past, those who believed that Taiwan should be
governed as a sovereign state by officials elected exclusively from
among the residents of Taiwan demanded greater opportunities
for political participation from those in power who restricted
political participation by authoritarian means. The aim of those in
power was to ensure that they could maintain the claim that they
were not simply the rulers of Taiwan, but the sole legitimate
government of all China, of which Taiwan was one part.
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Until the middle of the 1980s, those people demanding
greater opportunities to participate in the political process that
governed their lives were repressed, sometimes quite brutally. At
issue in the competition between the government and the
opposition were fundamental questions of political power.
Whether one associated oneself with the government or the
opposition, however, was a matter of identity. Although the
conflict between competing views of national identity has been a
central characteristic of political life in Taiwan and, to a great
degree, defined the struggle between the opposition and the
government, as a subject of investigation it has been largely
ignored by those who study Taiwan.1
The central theme of this thesis is that the rationales and
policies of the elites in Taiwan created hostility, which generated
political awareness, ethnic self-perception, and national realization
in the people. And the purpose of this thesis is to identify and to
rationalize Taiwan’s nationality, the different ethnic identities, and
the current political struggles within the context of ethnic
id e n titie s .
Taiwanese identity first formed around religion when the Japanese,
late in their colonial rule, began to try to assimilate the Taiwanese
by, among other things, promoting Shinto religion and suppressing
Taiwan’s popular religion....
The government’s embrace of popular religion is in part an
attempt to claim it as Chinese and deny its Taiwanese-ness, but
by validating it and including it among government-approved
cultural elements, the government is also reducing the opposition
between Chinese-ness and Taiwanese-ness.2
1Alan M. Wachman, “Competing Identities in Taiwan." (Murray Rubinstein, ed., The Other
Taiwan: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), pp. 17.
2joseph Bosco, “The Emergence of a Taiwanese Popular Culture.” (Murray A. Rubinstein, ed.,
The Other Taiwan 1945 to the Present. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), Chapter 14, pp.
396-97.
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In Taiwan, because of the ethnic hostility between the
Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Malnland-Taiwanese, due to the
differences in their ancestral, political, and economical backgrounds
after 1945, various forms of discrimination have been common
between these two major groups for decades. One might be
discriminated against simply because of the dialect that he or she
spoke or one’s political party affiliation.
Definitions and the Use of Terms:
Due to the difficulty in language transliteration between
Chinese and English, many Chinese words and terms that were
transliterated into English usually possess more than one correct
way of spelling. Usually, the Chinese words and terms that were
transliterated into English pronunciation remain the same or have
sim ilar pronunciations to the original words and terms, but the
spelling might be different. For example, the city “Beijing” in China
has also been spelled “Peking”. In addition, sometimes instead of
using the transliterated-pronunciation, writers will use the
translated meaning of the words or terms instead. For example, the
term “ Kuomintang” in Chinese also means “Nationalist Party" in
English.
In the following four pages, some of the words, terms, and
places have more than one correct way of spelling in English. They
were all used by different authors in different books, at different
periods of time, and under different situations during the research.
However, in this thesis, all the words, terms, and places will have
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one consistent English abbreviation and transliteration; therefore,
this modification should minimized the confusion for readers.
PLACES:
T a iw a n is referred to as the R epublic of C hina (R O C ) by the
Kuomintang (KMT) to differentiate it from the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Republic of China is “Chung Hua Ming Kuo” in Chinese.
And the name “F o rm o s a ,” used by the Portuguese to describe
Taiwan back in the fifteen to sixteen hundreds, was adopted for this
island.
C h in a is referred to as the M a in la n d in order to distinguish
itself apart from the little island, Taiwan. And P e o p le ’s R e p u b lic
of C hina (PRC) is used by the Chinese Communists Party (CCP) to
differentiate it from the KMT’s Republic of China.
Likewise, the islands that are between China and Taiwan also
carry different names and spellings. For instance, P e s c a d o re
Is la n d s are also referred to as Peng-hu Islands. Q u e m o y is also
referred to as Jin-men or Kim-men Island. M a ts u is also referred to
as Mazu Island. P ra ta s Is la n d s are also referred to as Dongsha
Islands. S p r a t iy ls la n d s are also referred to as Nansha Islands. In
addition to all the islands, the capital of China, B e ijin g , can also be
spelled as Peking. And th e Fukien Province can also be spelled as
Fujian.
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POLITICAL PARTIES: (Including abbreviations)
There are also few abbreviations for the names of different
political parties in Taiwan and China. For example, the C h in e se
C o m m un ist P a rty is the CCP. The K u o m in ta n g (K M T ) or the
Guomindang (GMD) is the N a tio n a lis ts P arty. The M in jin ta n g is
the D e m o cra tic P ro g re ssive P arty (DPP). Finally, the S h in ta n g
or Xintang, is the New Party.
ETHNIC IDENTITIES: (the use of terms)
C hinese (^ H IA ) is a general term of ethnic identity. It is
mostly used to identify people whose ancestors were born in China.
People from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are all being considered as
Chinese. Sometimes, this term can also be used to include Chinese
people from IndoChina as well as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.
M a in la n d e r (A H § A ) and Taiw anese ( a M A ) are common
terms of individual identity for those who are exclusively from or
living on the Mainland or Taiwan currently. These terms are mostly
used to distinguish the difference between people who are from the
Mainland and people who are from Taiwan.
In this thesis, there will be two new ethnic terms that are
introduced in order to identify and to distinguish the specific ethnic
identity in Taiwan. First, there are the T a i w a n -T a iw a n e s e
( A ' i ’A ). This term is generally used in Taiwan for those whose
ancestors migrated from Fukien Province on the Mainland before
1949. These people perceive of themselves as Taiwanese,
regardless of international recognition or not because they believe
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that their ancestors were the founders of Taiwan. These ancestors
have been expanding their tradition, culture, and dialects from the
Mainland to Taiwan since before 1949. Thus, their descendants
automatically perceive of themselves as Taiwanese or Taiwan-
Taiwanese. Most of them were born in Taiwan and can speak
Taiwanese fluently.3 However the distinction between the
Taiwanese and the Taiwan-Taiwanese is not always clear. Some
people will only use the term Taiwanese as the definition of
Taiwan-Taiwanese. Perhaps many will argue that there is no
distinction between these two ethnic terms. But in this thesis, they
will be define as two different ethnic terms.
Second, there are the M a in la n d -T a iw a n e s e It is
also a specific ethnic term used only in Taiwan. They are the people
whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan during or after 1949 from
different Provinces of Mainland China. Again, it is a term used only
in Taiwan to distinguish the Mainlanders from the Taiwanese. The
ancestors or the parent(s) of these Mainland-Taiwanese were born in
Mainland China and can only speak Mandarin and other Mainland
Province’s dialects fluently. They do not perceive of themselves as
founders nor the pioneers of Taiwan. Thus, they will never claim
that they are Taiwanese or Taiwan-Taiwanese even if they are living
in Taiwan currently. In other sources, these Mainland-Taiwanese are
also being referred to as the T a iw a n -b o rn M a in la n d e rs . Once
again, the differences between using these geographical differences
as ethnic terms for Mainlander or Mainland-Taiwanese are not
3|n other sources, the dialect of Taiwanese is also referred as the “Hokkien”.
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always clear. Many people will only use Mainlanders to represent
those people from China and the Taiwan-born children of
Mainlanders. But in this thesis, Taiwan-Taiwanese and Mainland-
Chinese will be define as two different ethnic groups.
Furthermore, there are also the m ixin g of Taiw anese and
Chinese. These ethnic terms generally refer to the younger
generation in Taiwan. A typical mixed offspring in Taiwan is when
an individual has one parent that was born in Mainland China and the
other born in Taiwan; hence, these people usually believe that there
is no difference between being a Taiwanese or a Chinese. And as to
the dialect they speak, some of them can speak both Mandarin and
Taiwanese fluently.
Lastly, there are the M o u n ta in P eople (lifffe A ), who have
been living in the mountain areas of Taiwan since at least 1600 A.D.
They are the o rig in a l in h a b ita n ts (JE '& S )- Sometimes, they are
also referred to as the A b o r ig in e s or the In d ig e n o u s people.
These people have their own tribal languages that are very different
from both Mandarin and Taiwanese.
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Backgrounds:
For this thesis, exactly one hundred people who were born and
raised in Taiwan were interviewed. Although many of them
immigrated to the United States after living in Taiwan most of their
lives, it is assumed that their perceptions in regard to their own
ethnic identities still are at least somewhat like those who have
lived in Taiwan all their lives. Many of these Taiwan immigrants
probably possess U.S. citizenship and have already withdrawn their
Taiwanese citizenship to pursue a better lifestyle in America
because dual citizenship is not allowed in the United States.
However, it is also assumed in the course of life, these legal
changes of their national status will not entirely change the original
roots regarding who they are and where they came from.
Based on conversations while conducting the survey and my
own years of life among immigrants from Taiwan, for many of the
Taiwan-Taiwanese and Mainland-Taiwanese immigrants having U.S.
citizenship is like having a ticket to a better lifestyle. They do not
call themselves Americans because of their patriotism to their
country of birth, their different cultural backgrounds, and the
obvious physical differences between Easterners and Westerners.
Furthermore, these obvious differences not only include physical
appearances and cultural background, but they also include ethical,
religious, traditional, and social values as well. These are all
factors that are hard to change because they are the roots and the
symbols of who we are. Generally, the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the
Mainland-Taiwanese immigrants will only refer to themselves as
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Taiwanese or Chinese who live in the United States. In addition,
even though many immigrants have become proficient in speaking
English after years of living in the U.S., most of them would still
prefer speaking in their native tongue over English. They
predominantly use Taiwanese or Mandarin in their daily
conversations, not English. Thus, the question of “Do you identify
yourself as a Chinese or a Taiwanese?” is still a relevant question,
and the responses which were given to each question should also be
considered as honest and accurate responses, even for those who are
currently living in the United States.
A good example is my own national ethnic identity. I have been
living in the United States for fourteen years. During all this time, I
have never gone back to Taiwan. At the same time, I have never
referred to myself as an American, not because I do not possess U.S.
citizenship, but because of those reasons which I have pointed out—
the differences in physical appearance, ethical values, religions,
traditions, and cultures. When people ask me what is my nationality
or where did I came from, I will always reply that I am a Chinese
from Taiwan.
Thus, the people who have been living in the United States
emphasize differences between the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the
Mainland-Taiwanese. It is plausible to assume that if this survey
were conducted in Taiwan, then the results should be even more
distinctive and different in term s of people’s self-perceptions of
ethnic identity and nationalism in Taiwan. It is very possible that in
Taiwan there are more people who strongly believe in a particular
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ethnic group only, and the feeling of integration is probably not as
strong as it is for those who have been living in other parts of the
w o rld .
In this thesis, the survey for which was conducted within the
United States, when a similar question was asked “Do you consider
yourself as a Taiwanese, a Chinese, or both?” as related to the
Academia Sinica’s question “Where are you from ?”, 0 percent of the
interviewees in the United States say that they were Hakka from
Taiwan, even if they were Hakka. It is assumed that the question of
“What is your nationality?” , “Where are you from?”, and “Do you
consider youself as a Taiwanese, Chinese, or both?" will produce
different answers. These questions could all have different meaning
depending on individual perceptions. For example, when
interviewees were born in Mainland China, but raised in Taiwan, they
might still refer to themselves as Chinese from Taiwan, not as
Mainlanders. They will never refer themselves as Mainlanders
because they do not want to be confused with those Mainlanders who
are from Mainland China.
These statistics also signify the differences between the
questions of “Where are you from?” and “Who are you?”. These two
questions are different questions. Hence, the reponses from each
interveiwee on these two questions are very different depending on
their personal backgrounds and perceptions of their ethnicity. For
example, if an individual does not perceive Taiwan as an ethnic
identity, then it is very unlikely for this individual to say that
he/she is a Taiwanese. However, this individual will only refer to
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Taiwan as a place where he/she was born or came from.
Ethnic discrim ination occurs almost daily and often very
sudden in Taiwan. For example, between a taxi driver and his
customer, if they don’t speak the same dialect (either Mandarin or
Taiwanese) while communicating, then problems regarding ethnic
identity could easily be confronted while they are together in the
car. From the viewpoint of Taiwan-Taiwanese, if you live or were
born in Taiwan, you should know or learn Taiwanese and avoid using
Mandarin as much as possible. But from the Mainland-Taiwanese
viewpoint, Taiwanese is only a dialect, and just like other Chinese
provincial dialects, it is not the “National Language" (Kuo-yu).
Moden standard written Mandarin can be pronounced in Cantonese,
Taiwanese, and more. Written versions of others will have some
non-Mandarin words and structures. Thus, as long as you are a
“Chinese” you should know or learn to speak Mandarin properly, and
the use of Taiwanese should be avoid during a formal conversation.
No doubt, the use of different dialects also reflects one’s
ethnic identity as a “Taiwan-Taiwanese” or a “Mainland-
Taiwanese.” During recent decades, the problems of discrimination
are no longer for the illiterate or the uninformed only. In Taiwan,
ethnic discrimination often occurs among governmental officials and
high ranking leaders who are in control of the citizens’ welfare.
Although there is little immediate proof or evidence of such acts of
discrimination, when the government is promoting all forms of
Taiwanese culture (including the encouragement of speaking
Taiwanese only), it is definitely showing the advantage of being a
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Taiwan-Taiwanese today.
Language is one of the most common markers of identity. Before
about 1987, Hokkien was a primary marker of being native
Taiwanese. Indeed, it is called “Taiwanhus” or “Taiwanese
language” in Mandarin (Taioane in Hokkien). The prohibition
against speaking Hokkien in school and strict time limits on
Hokkien programming on radio and television reflect government
attempts to promote Mandarin as a common island-wide
language and to prevent language from becoming a focus for
opposition.
Since about 1987, however, Taiwan has become
increasingly bilingual. Of course, native Hokkien speakers have had
to be bilingual all this century, first with Japanese and then with
Mandarin. But the new Taiwanese culture requires competence in
both Hokkien and Mandarin for everyone.
Many of these differences merely reflect a southern accent
and the inability of Hokkien speakers to reach standard Mandarin;
they do not necessarily reflect the creation of a Taiwanese
identity. But in the last five years the standard for Mandarin itself
has shifted to accept this Taiwanese pronunciation.
Language use often reflects patterns of social dominance.
Sociolinguists often find that a subordinate group learns the
language of the dominant group but that the dominant group
does not deign to learn the language of the subordinate groups
George Santayana once said, “If we don’t learn from history,
we are doomed to repeat it.” Before 1988, most of Taiwan’s
governmental officials and high ranking leaders were usually
Mainland-Taiwanese. It was a time when being a Taiwan-Taiwanese
was a major disadvantage. Today, although the people of Taiwan are
more educated and more aware of the word “democracy” and
4joseph Bosco, 'The Emergence of a Taiwanese Popular Culture.” (Murray A. Rubinstein, ed.,
The Other Taiwan 1945 to the Present. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), Chapter 14, pp.
394-95.
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“equality,” in many respects, the ethnic differences between the
Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Mainland-Taiwanese still act as a major
barrier in many circumstances. For instance, their different
political beliefs, religions, dialects, and the recognition of who are
the Taiwanese and who are the Chinese still serve as major barriers
in the society. Perhaps the only major change is that, nowadays,
those in high ranking governmental positions are mostly Taiwan-
Taiwanese, instead of Mainland-Taiwanese.
L im ita tio n s :
The recorded history of Taiwan did not begin until the early
1500s A.D. Although there is proof of human existence before
sixteen hundred on the island of Formosa, no one knows exactly who
was on the island nor when it was first occupied before the Dutch
arrived.
Due to travel restrictions, the surveys and interviews for this
study were conducted in the United States. Thus, the population of
the interviewees for the survey was limited to those from Taiwan
who are presently living in the United States. Moreover, because of
the tiny population of mountain people in Taiwan, it was difficult to
find any aborigines or anyone with a comparable background living in
the United States. Consequently, none of the findings or data include
the aborigines’ viewpoints regarding their perceptions of their
ethnicity and national identity.
There is one more factor which may also have contributed to
the inaccuracy of this survey’s statistics and conclusions.
1 3
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Throughout the survey, it was discovered that many of the
interviewees who had been living in the United States for a long
time seemed to care less about Taiwan’s current situation and
problems. On the one hand, they still believed that they were
Chinese descendants regardless of whether they were Taiwan-
Taiwanese or Mainland-Taiwanese. On the other hand, to those who
are the “Old Americans” (as Chinese would refer to other Chinese
who have been living in the United States for a long period of time),
current events in Taiwan also seem foreign and unfamiliar,
especially for those “Old Americans” , who had already replanted
their roots in the United States of America. Hence, it is possible
that among the sample population there may be more people in the
United States who will believe that being a Taiwan-Taiwanese or a
Mainland-Taiwanese makes no difference in terms of ethnic identity,
than those who strongly believe that there are differences between
Taiwan-Taiwanese or Mainland-Taiwanese. As mentioned, if this
same survey were given in Taiwan, then it is very possible that the
responses to each question would be somewhat different from those
of the interviewees in this study because of many social and
personal factors.
M ethodology:
In order to present and explain the current power struggle and
turmoil between the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Mainland-
Taiwanese, the hi stories between these two groups will be closely
analyzed and examined. The findings of this thesis will be based
1 4
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mostly on the current historical research and interviews with
people who are from Taiwan exclusively. One of the important
questions that was asked and discussed throughout the research was
“W hether the people from Taiwan think of themselves as Taiwanese
or Chinese.” Comparison and contrast will be used to present some
key points as well as personal view points on certain issues.
The best way to understand these problems and to acknowledge
the reasons for their existence is to study the history of Taiwan and
China. However, this thesis is only focusing on the history of
Taiwan and China insofar as it relates to elements of ethnic identity
and Taiwan’s nationalism. The assumption is that once an individual
has carefully examined the history of Taiwan and China, perhaps he
or she will have a much more profound understanding of the current
political and ethnic struggles between Taiwanese and Chinese.
The Organization of the Studv:
The format of the thesis is very similar to the “suggested
form at for a proposal development.” This thesis is presented in five
chapters. The first chapter, which follows the abstract, includes
the purpose of conducting this thesis, the investigation of problems,
the definition and the use of terms, backgrounds, the expected
outcomes, the limitations of this thesis, the research methodology
used, and the organization of this thesis. Chapter two is the review
of history. It focuses mainly on the history of Taiwan and some
history of China as well. Starting with the Dutch occupation all the
way to the era of Taiwan’s current president, Lee Teng-hui. Chapter
1 5
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three contains a five pages questionnaire which was used in the
interviews. Several statistical tables are presented in this chapter
including statistical data gather by the “Central Academia Sinica’s
Social Science Department” in Taiwan, and other one-on-one
interviews which were conducted in the United States. Chapter four
is the discussion of findings. Various analyses and discussions are
presented based on the research, findings, and survey results.
Chapter five, the final chapter, contains the conclusions and
recommendations based on the findings. The findings will be
focused mainly on Taiwan’s nationalism and the ethnicity
differences between Taiwan-Taiwanese and Mainland-Taiwanese. A
chronological table, and a bibliography are all presented after the
final chapter of this thesis.
1 6
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CHAPTER 2
II. REVIEW OF HISTORICAL LITERATURE:
For centuries, many people and scholars have studied the
profound history of China from various aspects. With approximately
five thousand years of recorded history in China, it still possesses
many of the ambiguous questions existing in today's world. Perhaps
for some people, the most common questions when learning about
China or Chinese history concern the national status of an island,
Taiwan, located just 100 miles east of the south-central coast of
China.
Geographical Settings
The island of Taiwan, which early W esterners called Formosa,
is roughly parallel to the mainland of southeast China and is
separated from the Chinese coast by the Taiwan Strait.6 It is shaped
like a sweet potato, as most Chinese would describe it. The size of
Taiwan is about 250 miles long and about 80 miles across with a
total area of 13,900 square miles and with a current population of
approximately twenty-one million people.7
Taiwan is surrounded by 15 to 20 smaller islands which are
associated with it, geographically. The Pescadores Islands (Peng
hu) and some of the Quemoy and Matsu Island groups are all under the
5See Chiao-min Hsieh, Taiwan-ilha Formosa: A Geography in Perspective (Washington, D.C.:
Butterworth, Inc., 1964), for details on Taiwan’s geography.
®For details see page 19, map figure 2.1.
7For details see page 20, map figure 2.2.
1 7
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jurisdiction of Taiwan.8 All the islands under Taiwan’s jurisdiction
(including Taiwan) are also claimed by the People’s Republic of
China as their province.
The Pescadores Archipelago lies 25 miles off Taiwan’s west
coast, slightly south of the island’s center. The Quemoy Archipelago
includes six small islands (two of which are currently under the
control of China), located within shouting distance (at the closest
point) of Fukien Province of China, almost due west of Taipei. This
island group is also situated strategically near the mainland port of
Amoy. The Matsu Archipelago is located northwest of Taiwan; like
Quemoy, Matsu is geographically closer to China than to Taiwan.
Taiwan also lays territorial claim to the Pratas Islands and
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and maintains military forces
on both islands. These islands are small but strategically located.
Their ownership may provide the basis for claims to undersea
minerals and oil. They may also involve Taiwan in conflicting
territorial claims in the South China Sea with Mainland China,
Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
8See Chiao-min Hsieh. Taiwan-ilha Formosa, for details on Taiwan’s geography.
1 8
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History and the Identity of Taiwan:9
The history of Taiwan is intimately linked with the history of
China according to many geologists, geographers, historians, and
archeologist. In addition, Taiwan's earliest history has not only
indicated links to Mainland China, but to Southeast Asia as well.
Proof of human life on the island dates back ten thousand years.
W hether Taiwan's early inhabitants were the ancestors of the
present aboriginal population is unknown. Little has been discovered
about Taiwan prior to a few centuries ago because the aborigines did
not keep written records. According to recorded historical events
and documents, it appears that the written history of Taiwan did not
begin until the early sixteen hundreds. Therefore, some people
believe that Taiwan is only four hundred years oldJO
In some Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty’s texts, “Liu-ch’iu"
seems to refer to Taiwan. It was differentiated from Okinawa, and
was later being identified as ‘Ryukyu.” Thereafter, Taiwan was
called Little Liu-chiu for a period of time. The distinction between
Taiwan and the Ryukyus became clearer with the establishment of a
tributary relationship between China and Ryukyus in the early Ming
D ynasty.11
^For detailed reading, see Zhung Chung-qieng, Taiwan's History. (Taipei: Shang Din, 1997).
Also see Hungdah Chiu, China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis. (New York:
Praeger Publisher, Inc., 1973).
1 Ozhung Chunq-qiena. Taiwan's History. (Taipei: Shang Din, 1997), pp. 2-3
1 1 Hungdah Chiu, China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis, pp. 5.
2 1
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The Dutch Occupation vs. Chena Ch’ena-kuna:i 2
The history of Taiwan not only indicated close links to China,
but, as pointed out earlier, and beginning in the late 1500s, Taiwan’s
history shows a close link with the Portuguese, Spanish, and the
Japanese as well.
In the late 1500s many heavily-armed ships--Chinese, Japanese,
Portuguese, Spanish-passed through the Taiwan Strait every
year, and the strategic importance of Taiwan and Penghu
attracted much attention. There were discussions in Japan of an
expedition to Taiwan in 1593; the Spanish authorities in Manila,
already involved in tense negotiations with Hideyoshi, fearing that
a Japanese base on Taiwan would be a stepping-stone toward an
invasion of Luzon, attempted to establish their own post on
Taiwan in 1598, but their ships were turned back by contrary
winds. Japanese interest continued, leading to the exploratory
expedition of Arima Harunobu in 1609 and the much larger but
still unsuccessful effort of Maruyama Toan in 1616. The
Tokugawa authorities still were discussing the possibility of
expeditions against Taiwan and Luzon in the early 1630s. The
Portuguese were much less interested; references to the island
they called Formosa, “beautiful”, are scarce in their records, and
their only known landing on it was the ten-weeks stay in 1582 of
the survivors of a shipwreck.13
Thus, in the late 1500’s Portuguese vessels sighted Taiwan
and named it “ilha Formosa”, (beautiful island).14 But the
Portuguese did not lay claim to Taiwan, nor did they try to colonize
1 2For a detail study of Dutch occupation and the national hero Cheng Ch’eng-kung, see Ch’ung
Chung-ch’ien, Taiwan’s History. (Taipei: Shang Din, 1997), pp. 15-73. & see Hungdah Chiu,
China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis. (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1973), pp. 7-13.
1 3e . K. Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams, and Joseph Wong, ed., Taiwan Economy. Society and History.
(Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies University of Hong Kong, 1991), John E. Wills, Jr., From
Wild Coast to Prefecture: The Transformation of Taiwan in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 374.
1 4Chiao-min Hsieh, Taiwan-ilha Formosa, for details on ilha Formosa.
22
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it. Dutch forces captured the Pescadores in 1622 and used them as a
base for controlling or harassing Portuguese trade between Japan,
China, and the Philippines. Two years later China signed a treaty
with the Dutch giving them a post on Taiwan and other privileges in
exchange for their withdrawal from the Pescadores.15
The Dutch encouraged the development of Taiwan for their own
reasons, but always in the context of their wide and shifting
commerical and strategic interests, so that support of Chinese
settlement and commerce could shift easily to neglect,
exploitation, or repression. The phases of these shifts can be
summarized rooughly as follows:
1626-1635: first steps on Taiwan; Chinese and Japanese
distractions.
1635-1646: peaceful trade; Chinese-Dutch cooperation in
developing Taiwan.
1646-1652: effects of Ming-Qing wars; Dutch-settler tensions.
1652-1662: conflict with Zheng Chenggong; neglect and declining
profits.16
Spanish forces seized Keelung in 1626. The Spanish
subsequently expanded their control north to Tamsui on the
northwest coast after the isolationist policy adopted by the
Tokugawa shogunate led to withdrawal of Japanese settlers from
Taiwan in 1628. But the major Spanish settlements on Taiwan fell
in 1642 to Dutch forces, who then quelled a Chinese rebellion and
established jurisdiction over the island.17
1 5See Ch’ung Chung-Ch'ien, Taiwan’s History, pp. 16-18.
1 6e . K. Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams, and Joseph Wong, ed., Taiwan Economy. Society and Histroy.
(Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies University of Hong Kong, 1991), John E. Wills, Jr., From
Wild Coast to Prefecture: The Transformation of Taiwan in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 378.
1 7See Ch’ung Chuno-Ch’ien. Taiwan History, pp. 19-22.
23
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Taiwan became a Dutch colonial enterprise ruled by the Dutch
East India Company, which rented land and farm implements to
Chinese settlers and introduced oxen to till the fields. The peasants
grew sugarcane and several other cash crops. The Dutch authorities
built castles, dug wells, conducted land surveys, and Romanized the
aboriginal languages. At this time, the Chinese population was
estimated at thirty thousand and the aboriginal population was
several times larger.18
Meanwhile in China, the Ming Dynasty was threatened from the
north by the Manchus (a non-Chinese people who inhabited
Manchuria). Cheng Chih-lung, a semi-piratical naval leader on the
Fukien coast, supported the Ming Loyalist resistance. Though
successful in some important battles, he failed to prevent a Ming
defeat, and the Manchus established a new dynasty, the Ch’ing, which
ruled China until 1 9 1 1 J 9
Cheng Chih-lung’s son, Cheng Ch’eng-kung (known to
Westerners as Koxinga), who was born in Japan by a Japanese
mother, inherited his father’s command and his forces. The Dutch, at
first regarding the son as a pirate and of little consequence, allowed
him to operate out of Northern Taiwan. They even let him bring large
numbers of Chinese (mostly refugees fleeing from Manchu rule) to
Taiwan, enlarging his armies and settling. With an army of one
hundred thousand men and an armada of three thousand junks, Cheng
fought the Manchus for more than a decade (1646-1658), at one point
1 8lbid.. pp. 25-30.
1 9[bid.. pp. 38-41.
24
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nearly capturing the city of Nanking. But after repeated failures to
oust China’s foreign rulers, he was forced to limit his activities to
the coast of southern China.20
In 1661, having finally abandoned his efforts to reestablish
the Ming Dynasty, Cheng launched an attack on the Dutch stronghold
near what is now Tainan. With thirty thousand armed men, he
besieged the forts that were defended by a mere two thousand Dutch
soldiers. After ten months of fighting, the Dutch conceded defeat
and reached an agreement with Cheng whereby they were allowed to
evacuate. This ended thirty-eight years of Dutch rule of Taiwan.2 1
Cheng Ch’eng-kung established a Ming-style government on
Taiwan, and adopted a Chinese legal system, a court, and scholars
and advisers. He also promoted Chinese culture. His rule, however,
was based on the support of powerful families, and therefore his
political system was more like a feudal system than a Chinese
scholar bureaucratic one. Moreover, official ties with China were
never established. Cheng still regarded the Manchu government as an
enemy .22
Cheng encouraged Chinese migration to Taiwan. The Manchus
indirectly facilitated this effort; fearing that he might land forces
on the coast and to cut off local support, the government ordered the
evacuation of the coastal area of China adjacent to Taiwan. Many
inhabitants of coastal Fukien Province, thus deprived of their
2 ° lb id .. pp. 41-48.
21 Ibid.. pp. 41-48.
2 2 lbid.. pp. 49-62.
2 5
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livelihood form erly made from farming and fishing, fled to T a iw a n .2 3
Cheng promoted foreign trade with Japan, the Philippines,
Indochina, Siam, and the East Indies. With some of the busiest
commercial ports in eastern Asia, Taiwan absorbed cultural
influences from these contacts and became cosmopolitan. Cheng
died in 1662 at a young age, 38. He no doubt would have
accomplished much more if he had lived longer. Still, he is
acclaimed in Taiwan as a national h e ro .2 4 His son and grandson
maintained separate regime on Taiwan until 1683.
The Ch’ina A d m in is tra tio n 's
From 1683 to 1895, Taiwan was ruled by China.2 6 For most of
this time, Taiwan was considered a part of Fukien Province. Ch’ing
officials assigned to Taiwan were generally inefficient and corrupt,
which prompted numerous uprisings and such constant political and
social instability that Taiwan became known as the “land of
rebellion and unrest.” Beijing generally ignored all local problems
in Taiwan. Official Chinese records indicated that during this period
of time, Taiwan was called a “frontier area." The frontier area
control was very difficult, despite the conscientious efforts,
rebellions still existed in the late eighteenth century.
2 3|bid.. pp. 62-72.
24|bid.. pp. 62-72.
2 5por the Ch’ing administration in Taiwan, see Lien Heng, Taiwan tunq-shih. (A
Comprehensive
History of Taiwan), edited from 1921 Taiwan ed., pp. 43-65.
2 6yv. G. Goddard, Formosa: A Study in Chinese History. (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1966), chapter 5, 6, and 7.
2 6
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The Ch’ing did not envisage the expansion of Han settlement in
Taiwan when it adopted its quarantine policies in 1684; indeed,
these policies were designed to prevent such expansion, primarily
by limiting immigration. Thus, the state took few measures to
ensure the maintenance of order on an expanding frontier. The
state’s civil and military presence was concentrated in the Tainan
core around the prefectural capital, leaving a vast frontier
unoccupied, for its purpose was merely to preserve the status
quo and to ensure the capital did not fall into rebel hands. No
plans for repopulating the island or even expanding revenue were
devised. The court’s preoccupation was security and the
maintenance of an order that would not jeopardize its security
interests. But the revival of the southeast coast economies
brought rapid population growth, and by the first decades of the
eighteenth century Chinese immigrants pursuing their private goals
began undermining the quarantine of Taiwan. Faced with an
expanding and unruly frontier population, the government had to
choose between two policies: withdrawing and containing the
expanding settlement, or tolerating its extension and fostering its
control.
Chinese officials posted to Taiwan held ambivalent attitudes
toward the expansion of Han settlement. For them the control of
unruly settlers, especially on the more remote frontiers, was a
major burden. Equally worrisome was' the escalation of Han-
aborigine conflict as settlers encroached on tribal lands and
disrupted aborigine societies. Offsetting the costs of control were
the benefits of increasing land-tax revenues as the cultivated area
grew. Expanding rice surpluses also made provisioning government
troops and filling tax quotas easier. Nor were all settlers villains
and vagrants: loyal settlers were allies of the state and aided the
government in keeping the peace.27
Hence, most of the Taiwanese’s ancestors were from Fukien
Province. Fukien, is a province that is located just about 100 miles
away on the west side of Taiwan and it is separated by the Taiwan
Straits. Because of the close geographical location between Taiwan
27john R- Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800.
(Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1993), Chapter 7, pp. 182.
2 7
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and Fukien Provinces, these two share many common grounds. For
instance, they share similar natural resources, dialects, foods,
religions, traditions, and more. Hence, if any Taiwanese is willing
to take the time to trace his or her family blood lines back to their
original roots, most likely they will discover that their ancient
ancestors were from Fukien Province or other provinces along the
coastal region of Mainland China.2^ Perhaps this finding will be
helpful in answering today’s controversial issue of “who are the
true Native Taiwanese?”
2 8For details see page 29, map figure 2.3.
28
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31
C D
c
~ i
C D
r°
w
ro
C D
§
Matsu
Keel u ih j
Taiwan
Strai t
g jTAI WAN
For mo’s a)
Pescadore
I si ands
(Penghu)
• i
Pacific
Ocean
» o h s i u n / j South
Chi na Sea Lu Tao
Orchid Island
(Lan-Yu)
The arrows indicate the roads of majority Chinese population
migrated from China to Taiwan during the past one hundred years
Fifty Years of Japanese Rule:3 9
In 1894, China and Japan went to war. This was a. war that
China promptly lost; a war that changed the destiny of Taiwan, and a
war which also changed the course of Taiwan’s history. In 1895,
after losing the battle to Japan, under the T reaty of Shimonoseki”
China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan in perpetuity. The
Western powers viewed the treaty as legally binding, and thus
regarded Taiwan’s transfer to Japanese rule as le gitim ates0
TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI
April 17, 1895
ARTICLE II
Territorial Cession by China to Japan.
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full Sovereignty the
following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and
public property thereon:
Island of Formosa
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or
belonging to the said Island of Formosa.01
When the news of the “Shimonoseki Treaty” reached Taiwan,
local leaders proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of
Taiwan, as an independent country and Asia’s first republic. But the
effort failed. Many who lived in Taiwan at the time despised
2 9For a detail study of Japanese rule on Taiwan, see Zhung Chung-qieng, Taiw an’s History.
(Taipei: Shang Din, 1997), pp. 141-165.
3°George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement. 1895-1945
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), p. 27.
3 1See Hungdah Chiu, China and the Question of Taiwan, pp. 197.
30
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endemic warlordism and banditry, and felt Japanese rule could not
make things worse. Most also felt that opposing Japan was futile.32
China did nothing to aid the resistance. In fact, during a
formal ceremony in Keelung, a court official from Beijing officially
turned over Taiwan to Japanese authorities. After this incident, the
local population felt that China would be of no help in preventing
Japanese colonization. Local officials briefly protested Japan’s plan
of transforming the island into a colony. There was also scattered
armed resistance throughout Taiwan during the next few years, but
Japanese troops suppressed it. By 1898, the Japanese military was
no longer needed to maintain order. The international community
was somewhat apprehensive about Japan’s colonizing Taiwan
because several countries had used Taiwan as a port of call.
However, Japan was not yet powerful enough to compete with
Western nations even in Asia, and thus allowed foreign ships to stop
in Taiwan.33
As Japan’s first colonial effort— some say the beginning of its
imperial ambitions that ended in defeat in World War II— rule over
Taiwan was an experiment. Tokyo ended Chinese migration to
Taiwan, but made no effort to populate the island, even though Tokyo
had often complained about population pressures at home and later
justified its imperial policies by claims that it needed more space.
Japanese leaders regarded Japan (in contrast to its empire) as
sacred ground, and the Japanese people as descendants of the gods;
3 2 lbid.. pp. 17, The Japanese Occupation.
33 See Ch’ung Chung-Ch’ien, Taiwan’s History, pp. 148-157.
31
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transplanting them to areas already populated with non-Japanese
contradicted these notions. Save a few farmers, those Japanese who
took up residence in Taiwan during the colonial period were in the
military, government, or b u s in e s s .3 4
Japan’s colonial policy for Taiwan did not emerge full-blown. In
fact, it got off to a rather chaotic start, and some Japanese
called on the government to get rid of the island and go on to
other business. Japan’s colonial policy was the product of the
needs of the developing home islands and expanding empire, which
in turn were intertwined with its evolving relationship with the
Powers and China. The colonial occupation can be broken down
into three periods: 1). 1895-1919, the harsh period of
consolidation of political control and reshaping the economy to
make it suit the needs of Japan; 2). 1919-1936, a relatively liberal
interlude characterized by civil administration and demands for
home rule reflecting changes in Taiwan’s society; and 3). 1937-
1945, renewed military rule and forced assimilation as Japan
prepared for, waged, and lost global war.35
Japanese colonial policy may be described as beneficial and
progressive on one hand, and discriminatory and predatory on the
other. Some observers have described Japan’s intent as expansionist
and militaristic from the outset, but that is difficult to prove. it
seems more accurate to say this philosophy developed g ra d u a lly .3 6
The Japanese’s first objectives in Taiwan were to establish
order and domestic tranquility and to promote economic
development. Thus, the first priority of the Japanese was to
34see Hunadah Chiu. China and the Question of Taiwan, pp. 19, The Japan Administration of
Taiwan.
3 5xhomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. (New York: M. E. Sharp, Inc.,
1986), Chapter 3, pp. 34.
3 6see Hunadah Chiu. China and the Question of Taiwan, pp. 157-160.
3 2
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increase Taiwan’s agricultural productivity. Tokyo encouraged rice
production in the northern part of the island and sugar production in
the south. By 1930, Taiwan produced twice as much rice as the
population consumed. Nearly a million tons were exported to Japan
annually, plus about the same amount of sugar, which was two-
thirds of Taiwan’s crop. Food production increased during the early
years of Japanese rule to such a degree that by the 1920s the
consumption of meat, vegetables, and fruits in Taiwan was higher
than that of any province of China and even higher than in some parts
of Japan. Taiwan became known as a breadbasket.3 7
Japan also built Taiwan’s economic infrastructure: roads,
railroads, irrigation systems, and communications systems. Before
1895, Taiwan had 30 miles of railroad; by 1905 it had 300 miles,
and 700 miles more were either planned or under construction.
Roads were built or improved, as were harbors. All this helped
increase Taiwan’s foreign and domestic commerce. In 1903, the
first hydroelectric generators went into service near Taipei (the
capital of Taiwan), making Taiwan the first electrified area in Asia
outside of J a p a n .3 8 Moreover, public hygiene improved dramatically.
Taiwan, which had been known as the pesthole of Asia, became
second only to Japan in Asia by sanitation standards. By the early
twentieth century, the bubonic plague was eradicated, cholera
became rare, and smallpox was in the process of being eliminated.
Cases of dysentery and malaria were drastically reduced. However,
37see Ch’ung Chung-Ch’ien, Taiwan History, pp. 160-165.
3 8see Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement. 1895-1945, pp. 91.
3 3 .
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all of these diseases remained rampant in China.3 9
Japan also had a progressive influence on Taiwan in terms of
social change. Taiwan’s educational system became vastly
improved. This island’s literacy rate, technological skills, and
knowledge of world affairs soon exceeded that of any part of China
or, for that matter, any other area in Asia, except for Japan.4* )
After World War I, Taiwanese business received a boost when
all non-Japanese foreign enterprises were banned from Taiwan. New
industries, such as textiles, chemicals, and machinery, sprang up. In
the 1930s, as a result of Tokyo’s imperial expansionist policies,
Japan started developing heavy industries, and Taiwan’s
industrialization process was launched.4)
Nevertheless, under the Japanese empire there were also many
negative changes in Taiwan. Although Taiwan experienced
impressive and enviable economic growth, much of the economic
growth served the colonial power. The economy was linked to
Japan’s, just as European nations tied their colonies to the
metropole. Before World W ar II, 90 percent of Taiwan’s exports
went to Japan. For Tokyo, Taiwan’s economic growth was positive
proof of Japan’s enlightened colonial policies: For Taiwan, however,
the progress bore the chains of d ep en d en cy 42
Japan’s social policies, although generally progressive,
3 9see Ch'ung Chung-Ch’ien, Taiwan History, pp. 160-165.
40|bid.. pp. 160-165.
41 Huang Ching-chia. Jih-chu shih-ch'i Tai-wan chiti-min-ti fa-chih vu chih-min t’una-chih
(Taiwan colonial legal system and colonial rule under the Japanese occupation) Published by the
author. (Taipei, 1960).
4 2 See Ch’ung Chung-Ch'ien, Taiwan’s History, pp. 160-165.
3 4
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nevertheless were implemented with little consideration for, or
understanding of, Taiwanese customs or feelings. The educational
system forced the Taiwanese to learn Japanese; neither Chinese
(Mandarin) nor the native Taiwanese dialect were taught in school.
Taiwanese students were encouraged to study medicine, engineering,
science, and technology, but not politics or any of the social
sciences. Japanese residents remained aloof, attending their own
schools and residing in separate areas.4 3
Japanese colonial rule was augmented by a system of dividing
the Taiwanese population into groups of 100 households each,
making one the head of each group who was responsible for the
behavior of those families under his authority. This person in charge
in turn held each family head accountable for the conduct of that
family. Informants and severe punishments ensured effective
political control, which was centralized notwithstanding some local
self-government. Important decisions were made in Tokyo and
administered by the Japanese colonial authorities. Policies were
somewhat more democratic before the 1930s, when the military
gained control of the Japanese government, but there was little
evidence that Taiwan was headed toward self-rule at any time.4*
Over the course of five decades, the Japanese brought about
fundamental changes in Taiwan’s politics, economy, and society.
The authoritarian, development-oriented Sotokufu, using coercive
measures in the first instance, took the lead in creating what
4 3lbid.. p p . 164-165.
4 4 The World Press, Discover Taiwan 1620-1945, (Taipei: The World Press Inc. 1992)., pp.
3 1 8 -3 7 1 .
35
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today would be called a good Investment climate on the island:
enforcing law and order; unifying weights, measures, and currency;
guaranteeing private property rights; building a modern
infrastructure; mobilizing natural resources; increasing agricultural
productivity; making investment capital available; and developing
human capital, including the provision of public education and
employment for women. In the process, the Japanese removed
bureaucratic, legal, and social impediments to the development of
capitalism and demonstrated to the Taiwanese the potential of
capitalist industrialization's
However, the Aborigines (the Mountain people) in Taiwan were
more difficult to control politically and socially than was the
Taiwan-Taiwanese population, even though the Japanese were
generally successful in disarming the indigenous population and
forcing them to give up hunting and to devote themselves to
agriculture. Still, some of Taiwan was not “pacified,” even as late
as the 1940s because the Japanese could not effectively police
Taiwan’s mountainous areas. In fact, strong resistance by the
Aborigines to Japanese control led the government to ignore much of
central Taiwan.46
It is because of the early close ties between the Taiwan-
Taiwanese and the Japanese, even in later decades, that some
Taiwan-Taiwanese are still attached to the Japanese culture and
follow Japanese social trends. Moreover, some Taiwan-Taiwanese,
especially the elders, can still speak Japanese fluently. Today in
Taiwan, those who can speak Japanese, or highly praise Japanese
4 5Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.,
1986), Chapter 3, pp. 44-45.
46Bernd Hans-Gerd Helms and Linda Chih-Ling Hsu, Taiwan. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997),
pp. 127-129.
3 6
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culture, are very likely to only identify themselves as Taiwan-
Taiwanese not Mainland-Taiwanese because of their earlier
relationship with the Japanese. Mainiand-Taiwanese who fled to
Taiwan after 1945, therefore, did not associate themselves in any
ways with the Japanese. For example, typically much of the
Taiwanese music originated from Japanese music. Thus, the tones
and the lyrics of these Taiwanese songs are very similar to earlier
Japanese songs. Many of the Taiwanese songs reflect a sense of
sadness and nostalgia because of the inequitable situation that the
Taiwan-Taiwanese once experienced under Japanese rule.
World War ll:47
By the beginning of World War II, the Taiwanese had either
forgotten their ties with China or saw little reason to reestablish
them. Most supported Japanese rule or at least accommodated it.
Many Taiwan-Taiwanese served in the Japanese army, including
units that committed atrocities against Chinese in Nanking and
elsewhere, while others worked in war industries. There was no
meaningful protest in Taiwan to Japan’s colonizing Manchuria in
1931 or its war with China in 1937. Tokyo referred to Taiwan as an
“unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Taiwan was the base of operations
for the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and other offshore
countries to the south, including Indonesia, and Taiwan’s newly
created industries played an important role in supplying the
4 7For detailed reading see Kuo Ting-i, Chin Tai Chuno-Kuo Shih (Recent China History). (Hong
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1986). Also see Stephen E. Ambrose, American Heritage:
New History of World War II. (New York: Viking, 1997).
3 7
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Japanese war machine.
In addition, toward the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy had
considered invading Taiwan, but they abandoned the plan when they
discovered that the U.S. military strategists possessed few good
maps of the island. They also realized that the Taiwan-Taiwanese
were unlikely to rebel against their Japanese colonial rulers and
would instead fight to help defend the island.48 Thus, the United
States invaded Okinawa, leaving Taiwan to suffer little wartime
damage save the bombing of some military targets and oil storage
depots.
When the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on
August 6, 1945, the impact of the destruction of Hiroshima was
almost unbearable to the Japanese in Taiwan. And on August 9, when
the second bomb known as “Fat Boy” was dropped on Nagasaki, this
nuclear war had finally put an end to World War II. On August 15,
1945, the Japanese Emperor Hirohito finally made the announcement
of unconditional surrender to the United States. Taiwan was then to
be returned to the Chinese by the Japanese.^
The official policy of the United States and its allies during
the war was that Japan could not keep its empire, including Taiwan.
At the Cairo Conference in 1941, the United States reached an
agreement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, providing that
Taiwan and other territories taken by Japan would be returned after
48Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1952), Chapter 4.
4 9C. L. Sulzberger. American Heritage: New History of World War II. (Published by the Penguin
Group, 1997), pp. 562-98.
3 8
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the war. This was an agreement that was confirmed in the Postdam
Declaration in July, 1945, when Japan’s defeat was clearly
imminent. With Taiwan as a part of the surrender terms, the
Japanese left Taiwan in the fall of 1945. This ended fifty years of
the Japanese Empire in Taiwan.
Despite the efforts of the Japanese to colonize Taiwan,
according to post-war nationalist accounts, the island was never
fully pacified under the Japanese occupation. Records indicate that
a great number of people were arrested, persecuted, and massacred
for attempts to overthrow the Japanese. During the entire period of
occupation there were 19 major uprisings, each brutally
suppressed.50
However, Taiwan’s legal status still remained unclear, even
after the end of Japanese rule. The Japanese’s surrender agreement
had not specified who would have jurisdiction over Taiwan. General
Chiang Kai-shek sent military forces to Taiwan, and the Republic of
China officials replaced the Japanese colonial administration,
although this was not authorized by any formal treaty or agreement.
Taiwan’s population at this time welcomed Nationalist Chinese
officials and looked forward to the end of Japanese rule and the
discriminatory treatment that had accompanied it. A small minority
in Taiwan advocated independence, while others suggested it become
a U.N. trust territory. It was even proposed that Taiwan be ruled as
a territory of the United States. But these suggestions were not
5 OFor details, see Lin Hsiung-hsiang and Huang wang-cheng, eds., Tai-wan shena t’una-chih kao
(Draft history of Taiwan). IX. Ke-mina chih-k’ana-jih pien (History of Revolution-Resistance
aoainst Japan) (Taipei: Taiwan sheng wen hsien wei yuan hui, 1954) 1-125.
39
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realistic, at least none was seriously considered.si
The Republic of China:
Since 1950 the question of Taiwan (Formosa) has been the most
difficult issue in Sino-American relations. Both the Republic of
China (R.O.C.) and the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) have
insisted that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and have
defined their dispute in terms of who should rule China (including
Taiwan). To them the question of Taiwan is a domestic problem
that should be solved by the Chinese themselves. From the U.S.
point of view, however, the question of Taiwan has an
international aspect and should not be solved by the use of force
because ‘technical sovereignty over Taiwan has not yet been
settled’ and the United States is committed to assisting the ROC
government in defending Taiwan against ‘Communist aggression.’
In the past 20-odd years each government has been adamant
and uncompromising. The two Taiwan Strait crises in 1954 and
1958 almost brought the United States into a major armed
conflict with the PRC. Therefore, there is little doubt that the
question of Taiwan is one of the most important and difficult
problems in current world politics.52
In early October, 1945, Nationalist Chinese authorities
assumed political control over Taiwan. On October 25, now
celebrated as “Retrocession Day,” Taiwan officially became a part
of the Republic of China. But Taiwan was not made a province of
China as had been expected, nor were the Taiwan-Taiwanese treated
as compatriots. No efforts were made to establish a democratic
government; instead the island was placed under military rule.
5 1 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Publishing Co., 1965),
chap. 3.
5 2Hunqdah Chiu. China and the Question of Taiwan, pp. 112.
40
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Chiang Kai-shek appointed Ch'en Yi as a governor-general and a
supreme commander, and gave him the near absolute power that the
Japanese governors once possessed and enjoyed.5 3
Many Mainland soldiers were sent to Taiwan at the time of the
Japanese evacuation and regarded the Taiwan-Taiwanese as traitors
for having fought in Japanese armies, or at least for not having
opposed Japanese rule. They also perceived the Taiwan-Taiwanese
as being tainted for fifty years by what was considered inferior
Japanese culture. Few Taiwan-Taiwanese spoke the Chinese
national language (i.e., Mandarin); and few of the Mainland-
Taiwanese soldiers spoke Taiwanese. Although some Nationalist
soldiers and administrators hailed from Fujian Province and spoke
the dialect from which the Taiwanese language was derived, it did
not guarantee perfect communication.54
The Nationalist regime came to be seen by many Taiwan-
Taiwanese as a carpetbagger government, much in the way the South
in the United States viewed the harsh post Civil War rule imposed on
it . 5 5 Disappointed that they had little voice in the political
decision-m aking process, the Taiwan-Taiwanese found Nationalist
rule no better than its predecessor in many respects.
Perhaps more important than the political factors were
Taiwan’s economic well-being, public health standards, and morale,
which began to decline precipitously. Nationalist Chinese leaders
5 3cniang Chieng-xiang, Fiftv-vears of Taiwan's Political Developments and Problems: 1945-
1 994. (Taipei: Pioneer Publisher, 1995), pp. 56-62.
5 4|bid.. pp. 56-62.
5 5 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, chapter 5.
41
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who were preoccupied with civil war in China did not regard
Taiwan’s problems as important. Public and even private buildings
were stripped of machines, tools, and sometimes plumbing, and
anything metallic was sent to the Mainland. Food shortages
developed when large quantities of grain were appropriated to feed
the Nationalist armies fighting the Communists. Public health
services almost ceased to function, causing epidemics of cholera
and bubonic plague. Rumors spread that these diseases had been
brought to Taiwan by Nationalist soldiers. Public works were
allowed to fall into disrepair, and the education system
deteriorated.56
Just as the Mainland-Taiwanese perceived the Taiwan-
Taiwanese as traitors lacking Chinese culture, the Taiwan-
Taiwanese perceived the Mainlanders as dirty, dishonest, and
technologically backward. Stories circulated about rustic Mainland-
Taiwanese who stole bicycles and did not know what they were, who
spent hours staring at elevators they had never seen before, and who
were unable to maintain the basic public services, power plants,
trains, and buses over which they were given jurisdiction. The
Taiwan-Taiwanese also had to adjust to a new legal system.
Nationalist soldiers claimed ownership of houses and land based on
forced occupation and the Taiwan-Taiwanese considered this
stealing. Eviction laws were weakened. Some other laws were
changed, but many were not enforced.
5 6chiang Chien-hsiang, Fiftv-vears of Taiwan’s Political Developments and Problems: 1945-
19 94. (Taipei: Pioneer Publisher, 1995), pp. 56-62.
4 2
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Riot in Taiwan. (The 2-28 lncident):57
Given the prevailing discrimination and ill feelings between
the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Mainland-Taiwanese, a head-on
confrontation occurred between these two groups on February 28,
1947. Later, this historical incident was referred to as the “2-28
incident,” which stands for February 28. This widespread riot was
triggered when a Mainland-Taiwanese police officer killed a
Taiwan-Taiwanese woman who had been selling black-market
cigarettes to make a.living for her daughter.
The story began when police officers received information that
some of the most wanted black-market cigarette mobs were
conducting activities in a crowded region of Taipei (the capital of
Taiwan). However, when the police arrived, only a forty year old
Taiwan-Taiwanese lady was caught selling the black-market
cigarettes. Therefore, one of the Mainland-Taiwanese police officer
used force on her during the arrest procedure. Whether that force
was excessive or reasonable is still a major debate in Taiwan among
those studying this unfortunate incident. A crowd formed
immediately after the police used force on the lady. In order to
maintain the safety of those present at the scene, including the
police officers, one of the police officers fired his gun into the
crowd and killed another innocent bystander. Whether that warning
shot was justified remains a question to today. A widespread
rebellion and protest erupted immediately all over Taiwan. The
5 7For a details, see Lai Ze-han, 2-28 Incident Analogy Report. (Taipei: Chinese Culture
News Publisher, 1996). Also see Ch’ung Chung-Ch’ien, Taiwan History, pp. 177-189.
4 3
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discrimination and hatred between the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the
Mainland-Taiwanese became more intense and permanent.
No doubt Governor-General Ch’en Yi was fully responsible for
the situation that led to this terrible incident. Instead of taking any
action to defuse the hostilities, he did nothing. Worse, he treated
the protest as a Pro-Communist rebellion, even though the Taiwan-
Taiwanese had virtually no connections with (or even much
knowledge of) the Communists on the Mainland or anywhere else. On
March 8, 1947, a large contingent of Nationalist troops arrived with
heavy weapons, which they used against unarmed Taiwan-Taiwanese.
By the end of March, order was restored, but not until several
thousand Taiwan-Taiwanese had been killed, including the core of
Taiw an’s local political le a d e r s h ip .5 8
When Chiang Kai-shek learned of the 2-28 incident, he turned
his attention immediately from the Mainland to Taiwan. He removed
Chen Yi from his position and later ordered him executed, along with
a number of other top leaders. He treated Taiwan as a province,
rescinded military rule, and appointed some Taiwan-Taiwanese to
official positions. Government enterprises were sold, and efforts
were made to alleviate unemployment. But considerable damage had
already been done, and Taiwan-Taiwanese hatred of both the
government and the Mainland-Taiwanese would not soon subside.
5 ^The number of Taiwanese killed at this time is still uncertain. Based on all the information
and documents which I have read, there are different estimates from different books or
documents on the number of those who were killed during the 2-28 incident. However, the
number killed ranged from 30,000 to 40,000 people approximately.
4 4
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The Era of President Chianq Kai-shek in T a iw a n :59
Chiang was born in 1887, in Chekiang Province. His father, a
salt merchant, died when he was nine, leaving the family almost
destitute. Only the dedication and perseverance of his mother kept
the family intact, and her example imparted to Chiang a strong sense
of self-reliance. In 1905, Chiang decided upon a military career, and
eventually attended a military school in Japan. He returned to China
in 1911 to support Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause.
Subsequently Chiang’s affiliation with the KMT Party grew, as did
his political career.
In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were defeated by the
Communists on the Mainland, and he and a large portion of his army
and government fled to Taiwan, where they hoped to regroup and
counter-attack. Taiwan absorbed more than a million and a half
people at a time when the economy was faltering and social
conditions were in disarray, which aggravated the relations between
the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Mainland-Taiwanese.
In Chiang’s mind, his own life experience, rising from the
ordinary family into which he was born to become the leading
political figure in modern China, provided an example for the
revitalization of China. He believed that all Chinese, in particular
himself, were responsible for the rebirth of the Chinese nation. The
national salvation and the unification of China thus became Chiang’s
5 9p0r detailed reading see Wong Young-tsu & Lee Ao, Chiang Chieh-shih p’ina chuan (Chiang
Kai-shek’s LifeL (Taipei: Shang Chou Cultural Inc., 1995). Also see Chiao Chiao Hsieh,
Strategy for Survival: The Foreion Policy and External Relations of the Republic of China on
Taiwan. 1949-79, (London: The Sherwood Press Ltd, 1985).
45
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overriding goals, and to these ends he dedicated his life.
Chiang, however, was never able to fulfill his life’s ambition.
On the contrary, the fact that in 1949 he lost China to communism
distressed him deeply. His original ambition, linked to the impact of
his mother’s teaching, made him believe that he alone was
responsible for the loss. He therefore needed to recover what he had
lost, since it was a personal loss as well as a great loss for the
whole Chinese nation. Thus, after 1949, Chiang became convinced
that his sacred missions were to resist the spread of communism
and recover the lost Mainland.
Despite their dislike of Mainland-Taiwanese and Nationalist
government, most Taiwan-Taiwanese saw no realistic choice but to
accept Nationalist rule, notwithstanding that Chiang Kai-shek and
his government had little credibility internationally. The likely
alternative was worse: few Taiwan-Taiwanese wanted to be
governed by the People’s Republic of China, as communism was
neither philosophically nor economically attractive. Moreover, the
Communist leader, Mao Zedong, had no organization or base of
support in Taiwan and consequently no way of launching any type of
campaign in Taiwan. Finally, because of the experience of Mainland
rule from 1945 to 1949 and recalling that Beijing had abandoned
Taiwan a half century before, most Taiwan-Taiwanese saw no
advantage in being part of Mainland China.
Although the People’s Republic of China laid legal claim to the
island in 1949, Mao had spoken of it in the 1930s as being
46
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separate .60 He put Taiwan in the same category as Korea and other
wouid-be “friendly territories” on China’s periphery. Even during
the late 1940s, Mao expressed no interest in Taiwan and made no
effort to launch a Communist movement there, not even after the
Japanese left. He apparently perceived that Taiwan was not part of
China historically or legally. Alternatively, Mao felt that the
success of his movement would eventually stimulate the rest of
Asia, particularly those areas near China, to adopt communism.
The question of Taiwan’s legal status at the time seemed
purely academic, as its future would be determined by military
force. In the spring of 1950, Mao planned an invasion of Taiwan.
Because the Nationalists had taken most of the Chinese navy and the
large ships of the merchant marine, Mao’s undertaking required
thousands of small boats. In Fukien Province, he trained his soldiers
to swim miles in the ocean. But many soldiers became infected with
liver fluke, found locally in the soil, which forced the delay of
invasion plans a few weeks. In the meantime, the Korean War began
and the United States, having publicly discredited Chiang Kai-shek’s
competence in defending Taiwan, sent the Seventh Fleet to the
Taiwan Strait to shield Taiwan from invasion. The Nationalists took
advantage of the respite. Moreover, they had learned a bitter but
valuable lesson from their defeat by the Communists. They were
ready to undertake reform and govern Taiwan with equality and
efficiency. In addition, the hopelessness of the Nationalists’ plan to
6 0Mao indicated in the 1930s that he did not think Taiwan was part of China. See Edgar Snow,
Red Star over China. (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 33-89.
4 7
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reconquer the Mainland soon became evident. Taiwan offered a last
chance, and the Nationalists felt they were needed there, because
political leadership and administrative talent were lacking on the
island. Meanwhile, many Taiwan-Taiwanese began to realize that
animosity had to be put aside if Taiwan was to survive and prosper.
As time passed, this attitude became more prevalent.8 1
In the 1950s, the Nationalist government for the first time in
more than a decade enjoyed peace. Chiang Kai-shek instituted
various reforms, the first important one being land reform. It was
an outstanding success, and subsequently became a model for other
countries and is studied today by other nations. Both land reform
and Taiwan’s overall economic development plans were overseen by
U.S. aid advisers, who guided their Chinese counterparts toward
effective use of funds. Taiwan became a showcase of United States
foreign aid.
On the whole, Chiang’s political philosophy, as a combined
product of his political experience, personality, childhood, and
influences from his mother, wife, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, consisted of a
synthesis of neo-Confucianism, traditionalism, and San Min Chu I
(The Three Principles of the P eop le).62 San Min Chu I consisted of
81 See Ballantine, Formosa, chapter 6.
8 2 For biographical sketches of Chiang Kai-shek and his political thinking, see Boorman (ed.),
Biographical Dictionary of Republican China vol. I, ‘Chiang Kai-shek1 , pp. 319-38; ‘Chiang Kai-
shek’ in Congressional Quarterly (ed.), China: US Policy Since 1945. Congressional Quarterly
Inc., Washington, DC, 1980, pp. 268-70; Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth
C entury. Chapter IV, T h e Kuomintang Leaders’, pp. 162-76; Chin Hsiao-yi, ‘Mr. Chiang Kai-
shek’s Understanding and Implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Ideology and
Programs’, paper presented to the Conference on the History of the Republic of China, Taipei,
23-8 August 1981; Pichon P. Y. Loh, ‘The Ideological Persuasion of Chiang Kai-shek’, Modern
Asian Studies. XXV, 3 May 1996, pp. 431-51. Also see Crozier, The Man Who Lost China
4 8
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three components: (1) the Principle of Nationalism, (2) the Principle
of Democracy, and (3) the Principle of People’s Livelihood. These
principles are certainly the most important aspects of Chiang’s
ideological system. Nationalism means literally “people’s race,”
and has been more generally held to mean “national solidarity”.
Democracy means “government by the people; pertaining to or
promoting the interests of the people; and social equality," and
People’s Livelihood means “social w e ll- b e in g ”.63
In addition, because of Taiwan’s economic and military
dependence on the United States and its adamant stance against
communism, the Nationalist government became a member of the
W estern bloc. Political ties facilitated trade ties, and capitalism
fostered free enterprise and the need for democratic institutions.
Democracy was implemented to a considerable degree in local
government, though not at the top levels because of the threat of an
invasion by Mao. But there was another reason: The government was
form ulated by the minority (Mainland-Taiwanese) in Taiwan, and for
this reason feared some aspects of democracy, especially
proportional representation.
The United States protected Taiwan but prevented the
Nationalists from trying to attack Mao’s government on the Mainland,
or starting a conflict that might embroil the United States. The U.S.
wanted to keep the two sides apart and keep the peace. Still, two
Hsiung Shih-i, The Life of Chiang Kai-shek. Peter Davis, London, 1948, and Pichon P. Y. Loh,
The Early Chiana Kai-shek, a Studv of his Personality and Politics 1887-1924. New York:
Colum bia University Press, 1971.
63chiao Chiao Hsieh, Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and External Relations of the
Republic of China on Taiwan. 1949-79, (London: The Sherwood Press Ltd, 1985), pp. 58-59.
4 9
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crises sprang up over the offshore islands (Pescadores, Quemoy, and
Matsu islands) in 1954 and 1958. The results were inconclusive:
Chiang Kai-shek kept the islands as his springboard to return to
China someday, but his hopes for accomplishing this goal dimmed as
the United States enunciated a policy of avoiding conflict in the
area, meaning blocking efforts (by either side) to unify China and
Taiw an.
By the mid-1960s, after some years of peace and growth,
Taiwan was poised for an economic surge. Industrial production was
three times greater than in 1953 and per capita income was up six
fold over 1940. In fact, a decade and a half of Nationalist rule had
made Taiwan more prosperous than it had ever been under the
Japanese. As economic well-being increased, Taiwan became more
recognized internationally. Prosperity also brought a greater
separation from China, where economic growth had started out well
but subsequently floundered, and laid the foundation for social and
political change in Taiwan.
In 1964, U.S. aid to Taiwan stopped. Simultaneously, Taiwan’s
economy soared, climbing to become one of the world’s fastest-
growing economies over the next two decades and beyond.
Economists since have said that U.S. aid helped Taiwan’s economic
growth get started and that its termination forced Taiwan to stand
alone, which it did.64 Meanwhile, economic growth in China
stagnated, and as the standards of living on the two sides of the
64Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid. Self-Helo. and Development (New
York: Praeger, 1966), chapter 17.
50
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Taiwan Strait widened, so too did the separation between the “Two
C hinas.”
Economic development in Taiwan has fostered social changes,
including rapid growth of a middle class, more exposed to and more
Western influenced. Politics moved in the direction of democracy,
while authoritarianism and political repression decreased. The
Nationalist government had encouraged democracy at the local level
where the Nationalist Party had functioned as an overseer and
intermediary between and among Taiwanese factions. The KMT
believed that it could institutionalize democracy at the local level
and apply it to the national government when Taiwan was ready for
it, and the Taiwan-Taiwanese felt democracy implemented at the
local level would eventually work its way to the top. These two
views did not cause conflict, rather they encouraged patience and
accom m odation.
The rapid changes during the late 1960s and 1970s, however,
did not extend to Taiwan’s foreign relations. Taiwan, which had
become synonymous with Nationalist China in 1949, joined the
Western-bloc in the global struggle against communism. After the
first Offshore Island crisis, Taipei and W ashington signed a mutual
defense treaty that kept Taiwan secure. But the relationship was
not to last, nor could the myth that the Nationalists represented the
people in China and that Mao’s government was a temporary and
outlaw regime. Both Taipei and Beijing advocated a “One-China”
policy, but that was becoming increasingly unrealistic, especially
for Taiwan.
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Sometimes it seemed leaders in Taipei accepted and even
advocated Taiwan’s separation. As early as 1958, Chiang Kai-shek
said publicly that he realized the goal of a return to the Mainland
“would be 70% political.” This admission, together with the fact
that the Nationalists seemed to have little hope of ousting Mao from
ruling Mainland China, told some observers that the government was
in fact accepting the reality of the two Chinas. Still, the regime
preserved a “One-China" policy.
Another turning point that occurred after 1949 was in 1969,
when the relations between Washington and Beijing began to change
as a result of the Nixon Doctrine; where the United States sought to
disengage from Vietnam, and Sino-Soviet border hostilities
escalated. A rapprochement between the former archenemies
followed, and in 1971 the People’s Republic of China was admitted
to the United Nations. The Republic of China was expelled,
subsequently suffering the loss of diplomatic ties with most of the
nations with which it had had formal relations, including most of
the important nations of the w o rld .6 5 Although diplomatic failures
hurt the credibility of the Taipei government and the ruling
Nationalist Party, political leaders in Taipei nevertheless
maintained widespread public support at home as a consequence of
Taiwan’s successful economic and political development, as well as
6 5Technically, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations as it said it would do if
Beijing were to receive a majority of support from U.N. members for its bid to membership. It
is generally believed that the United states opposed Beijing’s joining the United Nations at
Taipei’s expense, but there was no alternative given the situation and the rules of United Nation
membership. Many U.S. allies voted for Beijing, indicating that Washington had not asked its
friends for votes of support for Taipei.
5 2
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no desire on the part of the population to be ruled either by
communism or by the PRC.
The Era of President Chiang Ching-kuo:® ®
The death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975 symbolized an end to the
Nationalists’ hope of ruling a unified China. Likewise, Mao’s death
had also put an end to the personal nature of the duel between two
political-factions-turned-government that had been so much a part
of China’s modern history.
Vice President Yen Chia-kan became President in Taiwan after
Chiang Kai-shek’s death. However, he resigned his presidency in
1978, and Chiang Kai-shek’s eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo was
nominated and elected to that office and, thereafter, intensifying
the political reform begun when he was premier.
However, in 1978, Taiwan was dealt another shock when
President Jimmy Carter suddenly announced that the United States
would cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan, effective January 1, 1979.
Carter also acknowledged that there was only one China. This
constituted a reversal in U.S. policy on China®? While Taiwan was
inured to difficult situations, loss of its only superpower friend was
a severe blow. Some observers said at the time it was portentous:
Taiwan was now illegitimate and would be completely isolated from
® ®For details about Chiang Ching-kuo, see Feng Yun Lun Tan She, Feno Yun Lun Tan 6: A
Transparent Power Struggle and Changes. (Taipei: Huang Li-li, 1984).
® 7lt was a reversal as previous U.S. presidents had declared that Taiwan was a part of China.
President Nixon had stated that this was the view of both sides, but didn’t set forth a U.S.
view.
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the international community.
The U.S. Congress in April, 1979, passed the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA), altering Carter’s One-China policy. It restored, to nearly
an official level, relations between the two countries, and included
a defense provision that afforded Taiwan the U.S. security
guarantees. Beijing, preoccupied by a war with Vietnam while the
TRA was being debated and reluctant to disturb relations with the
United States, accepted the U.S. policy with little protest. However,
Deng Xiaoping, soon declared that he would not renounce the use of
force against Taiwan, a position that is still held by China today.
In 1980, the Taiwan government allowed competitive elections
at the national level, launching democracy with a passion, according
to observers. Whether it was “democracy from the bottom up” is
difficult to judge; it was from both the bottom and the top. In any
event, Taiwan was evolving from a one-party political system
toward a competitive democracy. Reactions were diverse, as many
people felt Taiwan’s economic development and the social change it
had produced made this inevitable. Some said the government
deserved credit for “launching democracy.” To other observers,
Taiwan was rebuffing Beijing’s overtures to negotiate reunification
by pushing the democratization process at home.
Moreover, this era was also a period of economic boom for
Taiwan. The “Ten Greatest Economical Developments Plan” was
completed in the period when President Chiang Ching-kuo was in
power. These developments transformed Taiwan and made this
epoch era possible. These ten developments were the following: (1)
54
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the first and also the longest South-North freeway system in
Taiwan, (2) the first nuclear power plant, (3) the first North-side
railroad, (4) the first electrical railroad, (5) the first international
airport, (6) the first shipyard, (7) the first East-side seaport, (8)
the first West-side seaport, (9) the first steel making plant, and
(10) the first oil refining p la n t8 8 Because of these major
developments, there were many job opportunities available in
Taiwan. These phenomena subsequently created an “Economic
Miracle Leap” for Taiwan.88
A decade later, because of the successful Ten Greatest
Economical Developments Plan in Taiwan, the ruling political party,
the KMT, slowly became one of the wealthiest political parties in
the world, through the mid-80s to the mid-90s. At the same time,
Taiwan’s foreign exchange savings have accumulated a very
impressive sum, $100 million U.S. dollars (approximately).
Moreover, Taiwan by the mid-90s was considered one of the five
richest countries in the world. In addition, from the 1970s to the
1990s, there was also the appreciation in the N.T. (the New
Taiwanese dollar), from one U.S. dollar to forty N.T. dollars to one
U.S. dollar to thirty N.T. dollars. All of these economic changes have
demonstrated the improvements in Taiwan’s financial ability while
8 8 Edited by the Administrative Branch of Research and Develop Institution Inspection
Committee Society, The Ten Important Economical Development Plan of Taiwan, (also published
by the Administrative Branch of Research and Develop Institution Inspection Committee Society
of Taiwan, 1976), pp. 3.
6 9lbid.. pp. 3-104.
55
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standing on its own.™
The first two-party election ever held in a nation with a
Chinese majority occurred in 1986, when the newly formed
Democratic Progressive Party formally competed with the
Nationalist Party. Meanwhile, President Chiang Ching-kuo announced
that none of his relatives would hold positions of political
prominence after his death. Instead, Vice President Lee Teng-hui, a
Taiwan-Taiwanese, was being groomed to become president. At the
same time, many younger, Western-educated, leaders were also
promoted to top positions both in the government and the ruling
party. In July, 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo seemed to put the final
touches on the political modernization by abolishing martial law.
Chiang Ching-kuo has dramatized many of the shifts that have
brought on this newly emerging Taiwanese identity (for example,
his presidential addresses with simultaneous Hokkien and his
offering of an image of Mazu to the Beigang temple). This shift
was most dramatic in his announcement on July 27, 1987, when,
because he had lived in Taiwan nearly forty years, he said, “I am
Taiwanese.” This statement offended some conservative
mainlanders but endeared him to most of the population. Like the
political reform process that his seal of approval made possible,
this statement legitimized the emergence of the new Taiwanese
identity. Chiang Ching-kuo’s statement also marked the end of
KMT hostility toward tradition. Much of the questioning of Chinese
tradition by intellectuals was the by-product of Chinese economic
and political weakness. Taiwan’s economic success is now leading
its intellectuals to reclaim tradition. Whether Taiwanese or
Chinese, tradition is no longer to be swept away to reach
modernity, but is a source of strength and identity in an
™ S ee Hsiao-feng, Lin, The Miracle of Taiwan’s Economy (Taipei: Wen Yun Publisher, 1993),
chapter 2.
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increasingly industrialized and individualistic world.7 1
When Chiang Ching-kuo died in early 1988, Lee Teng-hui
became the most qualified presidential candidate. He subsequently
assumed leadership of the KMT, thereby consolidating political
power. Lee symbolized democracy as well as a peaceful transition
of power from the Mainland-Taiwanese to Taiwan-Taiwanese. As
travel restrictions were dropped, people from Taiwan began visiting
the Mainland. Paradoxically, Taiwan seemed to be moving both
further away and closer to China.
The Era of President Lee T e n a - h u i:72
“The Era of Lee Teng-hui" began right after the death of the
ex-president, Chiang Ching-kuo. At first, President Lee was
recommended by the former President to become the leader of
Taiwan. Likewise, he was also elected and appointed during the KMT
Congressional Assembly on January 27, 1988. Conceivably, another
turning point for Taiwan had begun.
Because Taiwan’s political and economic advances are still in
progress at this point, there is no definite conclusion regarding the
outcome of this era. However, up to this point, almost everything
that has happened under the administration of President Lee has
been significant and challenging. For example, one of the biggest
71 see Joseph Bosco, “The Emergence of a Taiwanese Popular Culture”, (Murray A.
Rubinstein, ed., The Other Taiwan 1945 to the Present. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.,1994),
Chapter 14, pp. 401.
7 2For a detail reading on Lee Teng-hui, see Wang Feng, Tena-hui Yuan Nien (The first year of
Tena-huil. (Taipei: Cultural News Inc., 1996).
5 7
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changes was the people’s desire to practice democracy in every
aspect of government. Likewise, President Lee’s favorite slogan is
“we need to have democracy reform, political reform, and we should
always remember that the real powers are in the hands of all
people.” After this powerful statement was made, a series of
critical political changes were made as well:
1. The reform of all political elections, including presidential
elections, mayoral elections, and senatorial elections.
2. Rewriting the Constitution of Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan).
3. Promoting peaceful relationship between China and Taiwan.
4. Opening alternative roads for Taiwan’s diplomatic policies.
5. Promoting economic prosperity and global stability. For instance,
joining the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization
is one of the best examples of improving economic prosperity in
Taiwan and in the region.
The above political reforms are causing social and political
tensions for Taiwan’s future. The issues of Taiwan’s governmental
systems, relationship with China, the ethnic diversity in Taiwan,
and the international identity of Taiwan are all being attentively
observed by many. Consequently, no conclusions will be made
regarding political reforms in Taiwan. The focus of this study will,
however, be more on the different ethnicities in Taiwan and how
they are influencing Taiwan’s political system, changes in Taiwan’s
future, and Taiwan’s international future status.
As was pointed out earlier, President Lee is the first president
born in Taiwan and educated in Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.
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He is also the first Taiwanese President elected by the citizens of
Taiwan. He is, at present, not only the President of Taiwan, but also
the Chairman of KMT. From many aspects, he is acting as a crusader
for Taiwan and its people. He once had also referred himself as “the
savior of Taiwan and its people” during a public speech. One of the
most important reasons that he was chosen for the presidency in
Taiwan was not only because that he was recommended by the
former President, Chiang Ching-kuo, but because he was a Taiwan-
Taiwanese.
Since Taiwan was first acknowledged geographically, it has
been under the control of foreigners, according to the Taiwan-
Taiwanese. First, because of the “Shimonoseki Treaty,” Taiwan was
ceded to the Japanese for fifty years. Then, in 1945, after the
Japanese lost the war to the allies, the Japanese returned Taiwan to
the Chinese. At the same time, when the KMT from Mainland China
lost their battle with the Communists in 1949, they fled to Taiwan.
Once again, Taiwan was in the hands of the KMT leader, Chiang Kai-
shek, another foreigner from the point of view of the Taiwan-
Taiwanese. As a result, when President Lee was elected as the
President of Taiwan, the majority of the Taiwan-Taiwanese were
optimistic and enthusiastic because of this so called “First
Taiwanese President.”73
The speculation as to whether President Lee is taking the
advantage of his title, the “First Taiwanese President,” and is
playing favorites with one group and ignoring the others, like the
7 3some information is widely collected from public media, including television and radio.
59
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KMT in early years, still remains as a major debating issue in
Taiwan. In the Chinese Daily News paper, President Lee is often
criticized in editorials as playing favorites underhandedly toward
the Taiwan-Taiwanese and Taiwan-Taiwanese politicians,
especially to anyone who will assists him to stay on the top.
Although, there are many criticisms and speculations in regards to
Lee’s ideal of democracy, there is only little proof that he is
practicing dictatorship. We can only hope that the tensions among
the different political and ethnic groups in Taiwan will soon
decrease in the near future.
Current Situation Between China and Taiwan:
According to a T im e magazine article, in an exclusive
interview with the current leader of Mainland China, Jiang Zemin
was asked to answer several crucial and direct questions regarding
China’s relations with the United States and Taiwan. One of the
questions that was asked was, “Is there anything you can do to help
resolve your political differences with Taiwan?” Jiang replied:
As a first step, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can hold
negotiations and reach agreement officially ending their state of
hostility, in accordance with the principle that there is only one
China. We hope the Taiwan authorities will respond to our
proposals seriously and enter into political talks at an early date.
Under the one-China premise, anything can be discussed.74
However, on January 24, 1998, President Lee announced his
7 4 Anthony Spaeth, Time: Meet Jiana Zemin. (New York: Time Inc., 1997), pp. 58, vol. 150, no
17, Oct. 27, 1997.
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views on the “One China” policy, the question of the “Republic of
China’s sovereignty,” the question of “unification with the Mainland
China," and the “current relationship between Taiwan and China” in
an exclusive interview with German reporters. During the interview,
he stated that he is willing to visit Mainland China only if he can use
his status as the President of the Republic of China.75 As to the
question of “ Republic of China’s sovereignty”, President Lee stated
the following:
The country of the Republic of China is already eighty-seven years
old, it is a country with its own sovereignty. Taiwan is only a
geographical name which we use. The proper and formal political
name for Taiwan should be Republic of China. Therefore, as a
country with its own sovereignty, it is not necessary to change its
name or announce its independence in order to prove its
existence. To announce its independence would only create more
troublesTS
As to the question of unification with China, he said,
Republic of China and People’s Republic of China is one country as
a whole, and they are under two different political systems as a
fact. In the future, China can only be unified under the social
conditions of democracy, freedom, and equality.77
Responding to the question asked about the “relationship
between Taiwan and China,” Lee pronounced:
Hopefully that the two sides (Taiwan and China) can restore their
7 5Min Jin Weekly Magazine. (Taipei: Min Jin Inc., 1998), an exclusive interview with
President Lee on January 26, 1998.
7 Slbid.
7 7lbid.
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business relationship within half a year. So that both sides can
continue to enjoy and develop their cultural flow, exchanging new
developments, and maintain the prosperity of business, trading
and tourist industries.79
In addition, he also added:
If the Mainland China Chairman, Jiang Zemin, would invite him to go
Beijing as the President of Republic of China, then he would visit
Beijing at any time. At the same time, President Lee is also willing
to meet with Chairman Jiang in another country. However,
President Lee will not formally invite Jiang Zemin to Taiwan at this
point.7 9
7 8|bid.
7 9lbid.
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CHAPTER 3
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES, RESULTS, AND FINDINGS:
Some of the most Important variables in the survey
questionnaire are: age, current residency, educational background,
ancestral background, one’s understanding' of nationality and the
recognition of ethnic identity. I have come to realize that the above
seven variables are the most influential criteria in my study for
determining an individual’s point of view and beliefs regarding their
ethnic identity.
The interview questions were designed to analyze the
viewpoints of people from Taiwan who are currently living in the
United States. The interviewees were chosen randomly ranging from
the students on campuses to housewives at the supermarkets. The
interviews were conducted on a one-on-one base using the
questionnaires from the survey. The questions on the survey were
all pre-tested before the formal interviews with the one hundred
interviewees. The questions were designed under four major
categories for the main purpose of discovering the ethnic identity of
people in Taiwan, the differences among these ethnic identities in
Taiwan, and self-perceptions of ethnic identity in Taiwan.
During the pre-test stage, many questions on the survey were
too general and confusing for those interviewees to respond to. And
those questions were designed like essay questions which were not
very efficient for the interviewees. For example “Do you think you
are Chinese? And Why?” and “Who are the Chinese?” and “Who are
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the Taiwanese? And Why?”. It was questions like these which
caused major confusion and discomfort for many of the pre-test
interviewees. Most of the pre-test interviewees were foreign
students from a different university, and they were also chosen
randomly on campus. Therefore, feedback from the pre-test
interviewees provided many suggestions that were included in the
first draft of my survey questionnaires.
Hence, to improve the initial draft of the questionnaires, a
method of multiple choice question were used in order to clarify the
purpose of those questions. And at the same time, the questions
that were being asked should not be offensive. When my survey
questionnaires were finalized and completed, a survey questionnaire
form from the “Central Academia Sinica’s Social Science
Department” was also being used as a guide.
After the interviews with one hundred people (not including
the pre-test interviewees), patterns were found. The responses
from each interviewee can be easily categorized into three different
ethnic identity groups: The Taiwanese, the Chinese, and the mix of
both Taiwanese and Chinese. In each category, certain similarities
were found among the interviewees. The fact that similar responses
were given within each particular group makes it easier to
categorize the interviewees into the three ethnic identity groups in
Taiwan. The survey questionnaire consists of four parts: Personal
Background, Ethnic Identity (Taiwanese, Chinese, or both),
Individual’s Knowledge of Taiwan, and Personal Viewpoints of
Taiwan’s Future. Sometimes, it is easy to predict one’s ethnic
64
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identity only by examining the background of that individual.
The following survey questionnaire was designed
administered based on the developmental process outlined above
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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES
PERSONAL BACKGROUND
(Please circle one of the following answers in each question that
applies to you)
1. Year of your birth:__________
2. Sex: Male Female
3. Birthplace: Taiw an China
• If you were born in China, what year did you move to Taiwan
p e rm a n e n tly?____________
4. Current Residency: Taiw an United States Others
5. What is the main language/dialect that you use the most?
(over 50% of the time)
Mandarin Taiw anese English O thers
6. Currently, do you still have close relatives who live in Taiwan?
Yes No
7. Currently, do you possess any assets or investments in Taiwan?
Yes No
8. How often do you travel between the U.S. and Taiwan?
Every half year or more Once a year Once every 2 yrs
Once every 3 yrs. or less Never Others
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9. Reason(s) for travel: (Circle all that apply)
V is itin g Pleasure Business Personal
None of the above/Others (please explain)
10. Education level:
E lem entary Jr. High High School 2 yr. College
4 yr. University M aster Doctor/Ph.D. None
11. What year did you first come to the U.S. to stay permanently?
• Why: Personal Reasons Business Political
Economical Educational Others
12. Your Current Occupation:___________________________________
13. Do you belong to any of the current major political parties in
T aiw an?
KMT M in jin ta n g New Party None Others
m&m &MM mm mm n t
14. Are you opposed to any of the current major political parties in
Taiw an?
KMT M in jin ta n g New Party None Others
m&m m m mm n t
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ETHNIC IDENTITY OF BEING A TAIWANESE, A CHINESE, OR
B O TH /M IX
15. In your opinion, is there any difference between being a Chinese
or a Taiwanese?
Yes No
• Briefly explain why or why not:
16. The birth place of your father:
Taiwan China Others (specify) Don’t Know
17. The birth place of your mother:
T aiw an China Others (specify) Don’t Know
18. Do you consider yourself as a:
Taiw anese Chinese Mix of Taiwanese & Chinese/Both
• Why: (Circle all that apply)
Your birth place Parents’ background Ancestral background
Place of growing up P olitical factors H istorical factors
Others (please explain)
19. When you were in Taiwan, have you ever felt that you have been
discriminated against because of your background/identity?
Yes No (If no, please go to question 20)
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• If you have, what was/were the reason(s) for the discrimination?
(Check all that apply)
-Because you did not identify/present yourself as Taiwanese
-Because you did not identify/present yourself as Chinese
-Because you did not speak Taiwanese or don’t know how
-Because you did not speak Mandarin or don’t know how
-Because of your ancestral background
-None of the above/Other reasons (Please Explain pj
• How often have you experienced discrimination when you were in
Taiw an?
Everyday Once a week Once a month Once a year or less
20. In your opinion, who are the “Native Taiwanese"? (Check one)
-The Indigenous/Mountain people (M & K )
-People who were born in Taiwan
-People who live in Taiwan
-People who speak Taiwanese
-People who came to Taiwan before 1949
-People who came to Taiwan after 1949
-All of the above
-None of the above/Others (Please Explain
21. Do you think most of your family members will agree with your
view points and share your experiences as well for questions 18-
20 ?
Yes No Don’t know
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PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF TAIWAN
22. Have you ever learned or studied the history of Taiwan?
Yes No (If no, go to question 23)
• If you have, what are your learning sources regards to the history
of Taiwan? (Circle all that apply)
Books P u blic Media People
Schools Experiences Others (please specify)
23. You usually discuss issues regarding your identities with your.....
Family members Friends C o-w orkers
All of the above O thers Never discussed
24. You usually discuss politics with your......
Family members Friends C o-w orkers
All of the above O thers Never discussed
25. How often do you follow the news of Taiwan?
Everyday Every other day Once a week
Every other week Once a month or less Never
• If you have, why do you follow the News of Taiwan? (Circle all
that apply)
Personal Hobby Business Economic
P a trio tis m Education Others (please specify)
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26. What is/are your main source(s) for Taiwan’s news?
T e le v is io n New Papers Magazines
People Other (please specify)
Radio
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PERSONAL VIEWPOINTS OF TAIWAN’S FUTURE:
27. Do you think that Taiwan’s future w ill......
Stay the same as now Become an independent country
Be unified with China Don’t Care Don’t Know
• Briefly explain why:
28. What would be your “Ideal Road” for Taiwan in the future?
Stay the same as now Become an independent country
Be unified with China Don’t Care Don't Know
• Briefly explain why:
29. Do you have any other comments regarding the above questions?
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The following tables #3.1-3.7 are statistics from my survey
questionnaires. The statistics were based on the general public
opinion and background surveys among 100 people who have a current
residency in the United States or Taiwan (1997). Data are reported
by topical category:
Table 3.1 (Age)
The Recognition
of Ethnic Identity 20-29 3 0 -3 9 4 0 -4 9 5 0 -5 9 60+ T otal
Taiwanese 3 5 6 6 5 25
Mix of T & C 22 14 5 3 1 45
Chinese 10 6 4 6 4 30
T o ta l 35 25 15 15 1 0 100
Table 3.2 (C u rren t Residency)
T aiw an U nitedS tates O thers T ota l
Taiwanese 9 1 1 0 20
Mix of T & C 7 39 0 46
Chinese 4 30 0 34
T otal 20 80 0 100
Table 3.3 (E du catio n Levels)
Elementary Jr. HighSchool J.C. 4yrs.+ T o ta l
Taiwanese 3 1 9 8 1 1 32
Mix of T & C 0 0 6 8 1 5 29
Chinese 2 0 8 10 2 0 39
T o ta l 5 1 23 26 4 5 100
73
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Table 3.4 (Political Parties)
KMT DPP New Party None T o ta l
Taiw anese 11 14 0 9 34
Mix of T & C 7 1 5 14 27
Chinese 5 0 24 10 39
T o ta l 23 15 29 33 100
Table 3.5 (Ideal Future Road For Taiw an)
Become Unified S tay D on’t
Independent with China the same Know Total
Taiw anese 1 6 2 5 4 27
Mix of T & C 2 7 29 10 48
Chinese 0 8 8 9 25
T o ta l 1 8 17 42 23 100
Table 3.6 (P a re n ts’ and A n cestral E th n ic B a ckgrou nd )
Taiwan Mainland
A b origin es Taiwanese Taiwanese Mix T o ta l
Migrated Migrated
Before 1949 After 1949
Taiw anese 0 20 3 4 27
Mix of T & C 0 9 8 29 46
Chinese 0 2 18 7 27
T o ta l 0 31 29 40 100
7 4
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Table 3.7 (The Most Use Dialect/Language at Home)
Taiw anese Mandarin Both Others Total
Taiw anese 25 2 2 0 29
Mix of T & C 3 14 7 0 24
Chinese 0 36 11 0 47
T o ta l 28 52 20 0 100
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The following tables 3.8-3.14 are the same tables as above. Except
the rounded number portions are being converted to percentages for
the purposes of easy comparison with the “Academia Sinica’s”
re su lts.
Table 3.8 (Age)
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Total
Taiw anese 12% 20% 24% 24% 20% 25
Mix of T & C 49% 31% 11% 6% 2% 45
Chinese 33% 20% 13% 20% 13% 30
T o ta l 35 25 15 1 5 10 100
Table 3.9 (C urren t R esidency)
Taiwan United States Others T ota l
Taiw anese 45% 55% 0% 20
Mix of T & C 15% 85% 0% 46
Chinese 11% 88% 0% 34
T ota l 20 8 0 0 100
T able 3.10 (E du catio n Levels)
Elementary Jr. HighSchool J.C. 4yrs.+ T o ta l
Taiw anese 9% 3% 28% 25% 34% 32
Mix of T & C 0% 0% 21% 28% 52% 29
Chinese 5% 0% 21% 26% 49% 39
T ota l 5 1 23 26 45 100
76
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Table 3.11 (Political Parties)
KMT DPP New Party None T o ta l
Taiwanese 32% 41% 0% 26% 34
Mix of T & C 26% 4% 19% 52% 27
Chinese 13% 0% 62% 25% 39
T o ta l 23 15 29 33 100
Table 3.12 (Ideal F uture Road For Taiw an)
Become Unified Stay Don’t
Independent with China the same know T o ta l
Taiwanese 59% 7% 19% 15% 27
Mix of T & C 4% 15% 60% 21% 48
Chinese 0% 32% 32% 36% 25
T o ta l 18 17 42 23 100
Table 3.13 (P a re n ts ’ and A n ce stra l E th n ic B ackground)
Taiw an Mainland
A b o rig in e s Taiwanese Taiwanese Mix T o ta l
Migrated Migrated
Before 1949 After 1949
Taiwanese 0% 74% 11% 15% 27
Mix of T & C 0% 20% 17% 63% 46
Chinese 0% 7% 67% 26% 27
T ota l 0 31 29 40 100
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Table 3.14 (The Most Use Dialect/Language at Home)
T aiw anese Mandarin Both Others T ota
Taiw anese 86% 7% 7% 0% 29
Mix of T & C 13% 58% 29% 0% 24
Chinese 0% 77% 23% 0% 47
T o ta l 28 52 20 0 100
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The following tables #3.15-3.20 are documentary statistics. The
statistics were based on the general public opinion surveys
conducted during 1991 and 1993 under the auspices of “Central
Academia Sinica’s Social Science Department” .
T ab le 3.15 (E thnic Id e n tity of the General P u blic in Taiw an
1991 & 1993)
The recognition
of ethnic identity 1 991 1993
Taiw anese 14% 29%
Mix of T & C 73% 36%
Chinese 13% 35%
T o ta l 1 557 1 272
T a b le 3.16 (Age)
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Total
T aiw anese 19% 29% 35% 33% 33% 374
Mix of T & C 38% 35% 34% 40% 35% 472
Chinese 43% 36% 31% 27% 33% 464
T o ta l 3 2 7 370 222 158 233 1310
T a b le 3.17 (E ducation Le vels)
Elementary Jr. HighSchool J.C. 4yrs.+ T o ta l
T aiw anese 42% 37% 27% 25% 18% 3 7 4
Mix of T & C 41% 43% 41 % 29% 32% 4 7 2
Chinese 17% 19% 32% 46% 50% 4 6 4
T o ta l 1 46 306 197 368 293 1 310
79
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Table 3.18 (Parents’ and Ancestral Ethnic Background)
N ative
Fukien
N ative
Hakka
Mainland
Chinese T o ta l
Taiw anese 35% 26% 1% 365
Mix of T & C 40% 32% 24% 455
Chinese 25% 42% 75% 452
T ota l 925 1 53 194 1 272
T able 3.19 (P o litic a l P a rtie s)
KMT DPP Others T o ta l
Taiw anese 24% 25% 1% 342
Mix of T & C 32% 8% 59% 439
Chinese 57% 8% 35% 453
T o ta l 4 8 4 1 55 595 1234
Table 3.20 (P o litic a l R eform A ttitu d e s )
*The degree to w hich reform is de sire d by the population
Agree Either Disagree
Strongly Softly Softly Strongly T o ta l
Taiw anese 22% 25% 38% 11% 4% 3 0 6
Mix of T & C 5% 22% 43% 21% 9% 347
Chinese 4% 10% 22% 37% 27% 3 9 3
T otal 101 1 89 35 3 251 152 1046
80
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS:
Based on the findings, I think Taiwan is currently on the verge
of an ethnic segregation. This metamorphosis has become
increasingly apparent since 1991,80 it is still proceeding. Despite
desires of leaders to overcome ethnicity splits, the three recognized
groups in Taiwan have all acquired different foundational criteria
with substantial objectives and party platforms. The first group
discussed will be the people who think of themselves as Taiwanese
(i.e., Taiwan-Taiwanese) only. The second group discussed are the
people who think of themselves as Chinese (i.e., Mainland-
Taiwanese) only. The third group discussed are the people who think
of themselves as a mix of Taiwanese and Chinese, or those who think
there is no difference in being a Taiwanese or a Chinese.
According to the Central Academia Sinica’s Social Science
Department, before 1991, 73% of Taiwan’s population referred to
themselves as being “Chinese and Taiwanese at the same time." But
between 1991 and 1993, this perception declined drastically,
causing a rapid increase in ethnic self-perception as either being
part of the Taiwanese group or the Chinese group. On the contrary,
with the 1997 stastistics that were gather in the U.S., many young
people still identify themselves as the mix of Chinese and
Taiwanese. However, these statistics are not completely reliable to
8 0por details see page 79, table# 3.15.
81
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conclude that the polarization between Chinese and Taiwanese
groups is decreasing. The fact is that many of the younger
generation have parents that possess both Chinese and Taiwanese
ethnic backgrounds. And since the survey was conducted in a foreign
country, therefore, specific ethnic differences might not be apparent
most of the time.
In addition, Tables #3.1 or #3.8 shows that there are more
people, especially the younger generation, who believe that they are
a mix of Taiwanese and Chinese. This is due to the background of the
interviewees. Many of the interviewees in the United States have
one parent from the Mainland and the other was born in Taiwan. This
significant result is shown on Tables #3.6 or #3.13. Therefore,
compared to Academia Sinica’s table #3.18, the ratio of those who
strongly believe that they belong to a particular group is still higher
than those who believe that there is no difference between a
Taiwanese or a Chinese identity.
In answering “Who are the Taiwanese? Who are the Chinese?
And who are both?” the findings show that the people who strongly
believe they are Taiwanese are generally middle-aged people born in
Taiwan, with lower education, and with ancestral backgrounds in
Fukien Province. Usually, the ancestors of these people migrated to
Taiwan before 1949. In Taiwan, many times, these are also the
people who are being refer to as the Taiwan-Taiwanese. And those
who strongly believe that they are Chinese are usually younger
people also born in Taiwan, but with a higher level of education, and
whose ancestors came from Mainland provinces and migrated to
82
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Taiwan during or after the year of 1949. Likewise, these are also
the people who are being referred to as the Mainland-Taiwanese in
Taiwan. Those who think of themselves as both Taiwanese and
Chinese are more diverse than the other groups. Many of them came
from families with a mixture of Taiwan-Taiwanese and Mainland-
Taiwanese. They tend to simplify their ethnic identity while
responding to the survey questions. “Simplify” means that they will
define Taiwan-Taiwanese identity and Mainland-Taiwanese identity
as Chinese identity to avoid further confusion or explaination. Many
times, they believe that the only difference between these two
identities is the dialect which they speak and nothing else.
When a question is ask in a different way, it is very possible
that a different answer will be given. Since the questionnaires from
the “Academia Sinica” were not presented, the Academia Sinica’s
survey results and my survey results can only be compared to a
certain degree. Any further comparision would produce inaccurate
resufts. Furthermore, in my survey questionnaire, considerable
personal background information was requested. However, those
questions were not included in the results of “Academia Sinica."
Consequently, my survey results were only partially comparable
with those obtained from the Academia Sinica data.
For instance, some of my interviewees who believe there is no
difference between being a Taiwanese or a Chinese often regard
Taiwan as a place where they live, not as an ethnic identity nor a
national identity, even if they were born in Taiwan. This thinking
may have originated during President Chiang Kai-shek’s
83
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administration, when he treated Taiwan as a springboard, and was
waiting for a chance to counter-attack the Communist Party in
Mainland China. Those who strongly consider themselves Taiwanese
have a different viewpoint as to the meaning of the word “Taiwan.”
They generally view Taiwan not only as a place, but also as a nation
and an ethnic identity. They believe if an individual was born in
Taiwan, he or she should be considered Taiwanese, not Chinese. As a
result, confrontation has occurred frequently in Taiwan regarding
ethnic identity.
More importantly, the recognition of ethnic identity has a
major impact on the individual’s attitude towards a political party.
An individual’s political allegiance can be inferred if one’s ethnic
identity is known. For example, if an individual strongly recognizes
his or her ethnic identity as Taiwanese, then most likely he or she is
a supporter of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Most
members of the Democratic Progressive Party believe that Taiwan
should become an independent country apart from China. Achieving
international recognition and establishing Taiwan as an independent
nation is their most important party platform objective.81 On the
other hand, if an individual strongly recognizes his or her ethnic
identity as Chinese, then most likely he or she is a supporter of the
Nationalist Party (KMT) or the New Party. Of course, there are
always exceptions to these rules. Again, for those who are in the
category of a combined Taiwanese and Chinese ethnic identity, they
8 1 Secretary Office of the Central Government. Democratic Progressive Party Platform.
(Taipei: Taiwan, 1994).
84
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tend to have no absolute favorite in terms of any particular political
pa rty.
According to the Chinese Daily News on November 30, 1997,
immediately after the county magistrate and mayoral elections of
1997 in Taiwan, the DPP garnered 71.53% of all the votes, the KMT
members, garnered only 22.16% of all votes. Only 6.31% of the
voters voted for other parties, including the New P a r ty .82 This is
significant because currently there are only approximately 130,000
official DPP members in Taiwan. More importantly, for decades, KMT
has always been in power. Consequently, the current rising power of
the DPP has demonstrated the desire for political reforms among
Taiwan’s citizens and an appeal of “Taiwan for Taiwanese.”
But is this democracy, a measured and well-informed judgment of
the populace on the choices that best safeguard their interests
and future? The democratic process calls for an articulation and
organization of contending opinions and personnel, such that the
electorate is accorded substantial options. This function would
seem to be provided by the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party,
at present the only major opposition party, founded on
September 28, 1986-in personnel and continuous history the
carrier of the legacy of the democratic movement of 1977-79,
which culminated in the 1979 establishment of Formosa Magazine
(Meilidao), the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979, and the
public trials the following March.
Many of the leaders of the democratic movement have
spent six to ten years in incarceration. Some have suffered the
murder or maiming of family members, in periods (as late as
1984-85) when security agency arrogance surpassed
governmental concern for embarrassment in foreign affairs. In
1991 they were substantially the same as the leadership of the
82chinese Daily News, "The Results of 1997 Election,” Chinese Daily News. (Published daily
by Chinese Daily News of California, November 30, 1997), pp. A5.
85
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Democratic Progressive party, both in social composition and in
specific personnel. It would seem that this past assures an
adamant and unyielding stance of opposition. Certainly the ruling
party, for one, is happy to legitimize its democratic credentials
and let foreign visitors know it faces an obstreperous if small
opposition; but despite past fist fights in the legislature, the DPP
could perhaps now be appropriately portrayed, as the ruling
party would like, as a loyal opposition. Its social composition is
still the same. But given the substitution of incorporation and
cooptation for repression in the core of the regime’s policy, the
social dynamics are different now. To be abrupt, if one has a lot
of money, it is easier and less damaging to business as usual to
try to buy off one’s opponents rather than to jail or kill them.
Has the DPP been bought off? It would be premature to
answer this in the affirmative. Even in a measured affirmative, it
would have to be qualified that it is no more bought off than the
generally accepted social custom, and certainly much less than the
politicos of the ruling party. But all the same its bite has been
blunted, its critical stance as the champion of the masses subtly
compromised.
This involves a sketch of the composition of the party and
its supporters: its factions and their related social bases and the
interactions among these in the shifting currents of the popular
clamor for liberalization. This is shown in the struggle among the
factions in 1991, leading up to bitterly contested intraparty
elections for chairman and Central Committee in mid-October
1991, and thence to a poorly coordinated bid for representation
in the National Assembly two months later. Finally, the
complementary processes of democratization and cooptation
must be understood in the context of Taiwan’s expanding
economy, and this in turn can be seen as part of the dynamics of
a global shift in economic and political relations.83
In brief, the ethnic identity struggle between being a
Taiwanese or a Chinese continues to be an issue in Taiwan. Whether
this issue will transform Taiwan into a better place to live with a
8 3see Linda Gail Arrigo, 'From Democratic Movement to Bourgeois Democracy", (Murray A.
Rubinstein., ed., The Other Taiwan 1945 to the Present. New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994).
Chapter 5, pp. 146-45.
86
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distinct national identity is still unknown. This new phenomenon of
ethnic identity conflicts between the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the
Mainland-Taiwanese has already caused tremendous instability in
Taiwan’s government. And instability is what we do not want to see
for Taiwan’s future. The rapidly decreasing ratio of the group “who
believe in both Taiwanese and Chinese identity” is not a good sign
for unity between Taiwan and China because this will lead to a clear
separation of Taiwanese and Chinese. This is illustrated by an old
Chinese adage: “because of the ethnic differences among the people,
we are destined to have different political views."
Looking at all the recent political elections, many times
politicians are using the advantage of Taiwan’s ethnic varieties to
expand and gain in the ballots. The usual qualification, such as
candidates’ educational background, intelligence, and the ability to
serve the public are no longer the primary elements for winning in
an election. Instead, their ancestral background, ethnic identity, and
the dialect which they use during a public speech have become the
most important factors in winning an election. For instance, a
candidate will have a greater chance to win an election if he or she
comes from an ethnic background similar to the voters. As a result,
the slogans for a political election often begin with the ethnic
background of a particular candidate, such as “We are all Taiwanese,
I’m just like you. We are on the same boat....’’84 The significance of
these elections have worsened the ethnic division in Taiwan.
84Chinese Daily News, ‘Slogans for Election,” Chinese Daily News. (Published daily by Chinese
Daily News of California, November 25, 1997), pp. A2.
8 7
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
As the authoritarian regime in Taiwan has been transformed
into a more democratic system, conflict over national identities has
emerged as the most important social cleavage in political party
competition. It is obvious that ethnicity lies at the core of modern
nationalist movements and nationalist ideology. Nationalism is
largely based on collective identity. It commands, in many cases,
strong commitment from its members associated with the welfare
of the group. Taiwanese national identity is empirically correlated
with both Taiwanese ethnic identity (the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the
Mainland-Taiwanese). Each ethnic identity independently wields
significant influence on the formation of a Taiwanese national
identity. It was discovered that among Taiwanese nationalists there
is a tolerance for secession from China within its own group. For
instance, the recent rebellion within KMT’s members has formulated
new and old KMT Parties, which has demonstrated the division
within KMT. Many of the New KMT members later withdrew, their
KMT membership and became either members of the New Party or
have no party affiliation at all. These findings suggest that both
ethnic identity and democratic liberalism contribute to the
formation of Taiwanese nationalism.
These questions of “who are the Chinese?” and “who are the
Taiwanese?" has always been the biggest problems in Taiwan's
politics and inside the governmental system as well. Each day, this
88
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problem presents a different road to Taiwan’s future. The struggles
between twenty-one m illion people’s identity in Taiwan, on one
hand, it is because of their differences in rational concepts. On the
other hand, it is simply because of the political changes which lead
to the polarization of ethnic identities. The outcome of this long
term ethnic struggle is hard to predict because of the complex
factors which surround this dilemma.
It is nearly impossible to discuss the diverse ethnic problems
in Taiwan without first examining the original provincial identity of
Taiwan. Although these two issues might seem different, they are
closely related to each other. Decades ago, it was the issue of “who
are the twenty-one million people living in Taiwan? Are they
Chinese or Taiwanese?” Today, we are facing a sim ilar problem but
with different characteristics, that is “among the twenty-one
million people in Taiwan, who are the Taiwan-Taiwanese and who
are the Mainland-Taiwanese? Are they different?” The initial
nationality problem of “Chinese vs. Taiwanese” was never
completely resolved. These days, a more critical and a complicated
problem of “Taiwan-Taiwanese vs. Mainland-Taiwanese” is even
harder to distinguish or rationalize. However, it is still believed
that to understand the concepts behind all these identity issues is
important to all Chinese descendants or to any scholars who are
studying the histories of China and of Taiwan.
Many modern Chinese nationalist believed that a typical
Chinese individual, including Taiwanese, is usually more family
oriented, but not nation-oriented. Perhaps this is why Dr. Sun Yat-
89
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Sen, the Father of modern China, said that "Chinese people are like
sands that are scattered all over a plate.” This statement reflects
the lack of unity among Chinese people as a whole. Likewise, this
may also be a significant cause of the current on-going ethnic
identity problems between the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Mainland-
Taiwanese. Taiwan-Taiwanese vehemently distrust Mainland-
Taiwanese committed to promoting reunification with China.
Conversely, Mainland-Taiwanese deeply resent and distrust Taiwan-
Taiwanese devoted to working toward independence. Each group sees
the other as foolishly irresponsible, tempting fate, and spoiling a
good thing. Moreover, the complex cultural conditions in China, the
vast land which China possesses, and the diverse society which
China maintains can also be reasons for discrimination and ethnic
identity disorientation. The problems of discrimination and
prejudice are common among the Chinese. Many times, the reasons
for discriminating against other Chinese are simply based on one’s
own background or one’s ancestral background.
Like many other countries, the problem of discrimination also
exists in Taiwan. Due to the differences in ethnic background,
sometimes the problem of discrimination among those of the same
race could become even more invidious. In order to present a clearer
understanding of the various ethnic groups in Taiwan, this paper has
already classified all the diverse groups into four major ethnic
groups: the Hakkas, the Fukienese, the mountain people, and the
Mainland-Taiwanese. The Hakkas and the Fukien are generally being
refer to as “Taiwanese” or “Taiwan-Taiwanese” by the majority in
90
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Taiwan due to their similar backgrounds, dialect, and lifestyles. But
more importantly, because their ancestors migrated to Taiwan
before 1 9 4 9 .8 5 As for the mountain people, because of their small
population, their voices are often overlooked by the majority and the
governm ent.
Taiwan’s population is generally described as slightly less than 85
percent Taiwanese, about 14 percent Mainlanders, and a bit more
than 1 percent aborigines. In fact, the 1990 census states that
the total population is 20,366,325, of which 87.11 percent are
Taiwanese and 12.74 percent are Mainlanders. While the
proportions are about right, the labels are not as meaningful as
they might first seem. A survey conducted by the government-
sponsored research institution, Academia Sinica, found that when
asked “where are you from?” 76.1 percent of respondents
identified themselves as Taiwanese, 12.4 percent said they were
from Hakka from Taiwan. 10.1 percent said they were from the
mainland, and 1 percent identified themselves as aborigines.
Asked “where is your native place?” 78.4 percent listed a county
or city on Taiwan, another 11 percent said only that they were
from Taiwan, just 7.5 percent identified themselves as from the
mainland, and about 2.5 percent identified themselves in other
ways.86
As a result, we should simplify the different ethnic groups
living in Taiwan into two primary categories: the “Taiwan-
8 5Among the first Chinese to settle on Taiwan were the Hakka from Kwang-tung Province. The
Hakka (literally meaning ‘guests") were a persecuted minority that spoke their own dialect
and had been “ driven from their homes in Henan Province in northern China fifteen hundred
years ago. They took up residence in southern China, engaging in fishing and trading in coastal
areas, and from there migrated to the Pescadores, then on to southern Taiwan" where they
have been since about A.D. 1000. See John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 8. Although individual Hakka have risen to
prominence in the political system of Taiwan, as a group the Hakka have not significantly
influenced the politics of the island by expressing communal political demands.
8 6See Alan M. Wachman, “ Competing Identities in Taiwan”, (Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., The
Other Taiwan 1945 to the Present. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), Chapter 1, pp. 23.
91
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Taiwanese” and the “Mainland-Taiwanese.” The “Taiwan-
Taiwanese,” as mentioned, are usually referred to as those whose
ancestors immigrated to Taiwan from the early 1660s to 1949; most
of them came from the Fukien Province or the islands around Fukien
Province. On the other hand, the “Mainland-Taiwanese” are usually
referred to those who’s families or ancestors fled to Taiwan during
or after the year 1949 (the year when the KMT and its leader Chiang
Kai-shek lost the battle and the Mainland, to the communists).
Hence, these Chinese living in Taiwan are being referred to as the
“Mainland-Taiwanese.” These “Mainland-Taiwanese” came from
different regions and provinces of China, including the Fukien
Province as well. Today, these two types of ethnic groups still
share a large part of their culture and traditional background
together with Mainland China. After all, they are all descendants of
immigrants from Mainland China.
Among the still increasing twenty-one million people living in
Taiwan currently, there are approximately eighteen million Taiwan-
Taiwanese (including all the Hakkas and the Fukienese), two million
Mainland-Taiwanese, and only three hundred seventy-five thousands
aborigines (including all nine tribes). Of course, the ethnically
mixed population among these four groups also includes a large
portion among the twenty-one million population, and it is hard to
put them into any ethnic category.87 The population ratio between
the two primary distinctive Chinese groups in Taiwan is
8 7An interview with Taiwan’s Congress representative and Legislative representative
conducted by Lin Sheng Feng, ‘The Question of Ethnic identity: The Faith Between Brothers,”
Chinese Nighttime News. November 10, 1994.
9 2
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approximately nine to one.
In addition, after studying and analyzing the history of Taiwan
and China, it was discovered that Taiwan was never considered an
important territory to China. Throughout Chinese history, Taiwan
was ignored most of the time by the Chinese government. Moreover,
in 1895, when China lost the battle to the Japanese, the Chinese
government decided to cede Taiwan away to the Japanese under the
“Treaty of Shimonoseki.” In other words, Taiwan was like a child
ignored by his parents during the early years and then given away to
other parents in later years. Consequently, there is much hidden
anger and hatred in the hearts of many Taiwan-Taiwanese towards
China’s governments. Likewise, the conflicts between the Taiwan-
Taiwanese and Mainland-Taiwanese after 1949 did not help those
hidden animosity at all. These frictions could also be the causes of
the current ethnic problems in Taiwan as well. Today, for those who
think of themselves as Taiwan-Taiwanese, they also believe that
they are orphans in terms of an international identity. That is why
for Taiwan to become an independent country is the most important
political goal in the hearts of many Taiwan-Taiwanese.
Besides, when the Mainland-Taiwanese fled to Taiwan, they did
not present the idea of equality among all people. Many Taiwan-
Taiwanese were discriminated against because they were considered
natives, not from the Mainland, as the new-comers were. Moreover,
some of the Mainland-Taiwanese in power have been corrupting the
Taiwanese governmental system as a whole. Dictatorship was
practiced by governmental officials-the KMT (Mainland-Taiwanese).
93
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Finally, when the 2-28 incident happened, it triggered years of anger
and hatred among the Taiwan-Taiwanese. Instantly, the 2-28
incident not only generated the anger of a long term ethnic problem
between the Taiwan-Taiwanese and the Mainland-Taiwanese, but it
also served as a reminder of years of frustration created by the
Taiwan governmental system under the control of KMT. No doubt,
this is a major cause of today's animosity between the two types of
Taiw anese.
In the conclusion of Alan Wachman’s article “Competing
Identities in Taiwan," he stated...
Taiwanese recognize the Chinese origin of their own culture,
but also sense that beyond sharing in the national culture
manifested by the Mainlander elite, they have ties to a more
compelling, more immediate set of cultural impulses. These they
share with other Taiwanese in a manner that differentiates them
from the Mainlanders.88 The peculiar experience of people living on
Taiwan during the past four decades of economic and political
development-quite apart from whatever historical ties people
have with Taiwan of the past and with China— has imparted to a
new generation a sense of being distinct. To those who see
themselves in this way, it is from the recent past, not the distant
past, that they take cues about their identity.
To Summarize:
(1) Mainlanders who associate themselves with the KMT to
embrace all Han Chinese as part of the “Chinese” nation.
(2) Many Taiwanese see themselves as constituting a
nation distinct from the Chinese-even as they acknowledge that
they are culturally Chinese. Some of these Taiwanese claim to be
culturally Taiwanese and reject “Mainland” culture.
(3) Other Taiwanese recognize that they are part of the
88Ge!lner writes that “if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the
majority of the ruled, this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breech
of political propriety. This can occur... by the local domination of an alien group."
94
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Chinese nation, but demur at being subsumed by the Chinese
state-where the Chinese state means the PRC.89
(4) Taiwan-born Mainlanders cannot comfortably identity
themselves as either Taiwanese or Chinese. They recognize there
is a Taiwanese nation of which they are not a part and yet they
do not share their parents’ sense of identity with the Chinese
nation. This sense of rootiessness is doubly confusing for those
whose parentage is “mixed.”
(5) Taiwan born, educated, and socialized by the KMT may,
like the Taiwan-born Mainlanders with whom they have grown up
and gone to school, suffer from divided loyalties and confusion
about their identity. Having known nothing other than KMT rule
and the values proffered by the state, many are not as exclusive
about their ties to Taiwan as their parents are. They may, or
may not, speak Taiwanese and may, or may not, promote
independence. They do speak Mandarin, however, and have been
vigorously prompted to see themselves as part of the Chinese
nation.
In short, the generation that was adult at the time the KMT
came to Taiwan have views of identity that are more easily
characterized than the generations raised and socialized since the
KMT arrival. The older generation is, generally, polarized as either
Taiwanese or Chinese depending on where they were born. The
generations born since the KMT came to Taiwan are more deeply
troubled about their identity.
While Taiwanese are a majority on Taiwan, they comprise a
small fraction of all Chinese. That they identify themselves as a
group, apart from other Chinese, is curious, considering that they
are not racially, ethnically, religiously, or even linguistically distinct
from Chinese elsewhere. Many factors have contributed to the
emergence of their sense of group identity including:
(1) the historic mentality of geographic isolation, coupled
with the experiences of being ruled by outsiders;
(2) tension resulting from, the KMT effort to impose an elite,
gentry culture represented as the national culture of China, at the
expense of the native, folk culture of Taiwan;
(3) tension that emerged from early confrontations
between Taiwanese and Mainlanders-culminating in the 2-28
8 9Hakka Chinese, who comprise about 15 percent of the Taiwanese, may see themselves as
tied to three nations: their own, the Taiwanese, and the Chinese.
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Incident— that may have been fueled, but not caused by, inherent
characteristics and initial impressions of differences;
(4) residual indignation, mistrust, and hostility Taiwanese
have toward the KMT stemming from 2-28, which was reinforced
by perceptions of official impropriety or inequities that victimized
Taiwanese-especially those inequities resulting from repression of
political demands; and
(5) a wide range of policies that institutionalized differences
between Mainlanders and Taiwanese— especially those concerning
language, culture, and attitudes toward T aiw an .90
From many perspectives, perhaps the biggest differences
between these two Chinese groups are their political viewpoints,
cultural differences, and their understanding of Taiwan’s
international identity. The Taiwan-Taiwanese believe that they
were abandoned and ignored by China and the Chinese government for
more than fifty years. Thus today, they are fighting hard to gain
their independence from China, regardless of the hazardous
consequences, including the possibility of going to war with
Mainland China. On the other hand, the Mainland-Taiwanese after
having fled to Taiwan after 1949, most of them believed that they
should fight the communists in China and take back what they had
lost. But as the years have progressed, war and violence are no
longer promoted or recommended under the evolving political
circumstances. These days, many of the Mainland-Taiwanese believe
that unification with China (under a democratic system) is perhaps
the best solution for the interminable agonizing problem between
the “Two Chinas.” Another important factor is that China is far
9 0See Alan M. Wachamn, ‘Competing Identity in Taiwan”, (Murray A. Rubinstein, ed. The
Other Taiwan 1945 to the Present: New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), Chapter 1, pp. 61-62.
96
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more powerful in comparison to Taiwan in many aspects. What good
would it be for Taiwan to become a permanent enemy of Mainland
China?9" 1
More importantly from a certain aspect, Taiwan is already an
independent country apart from China. Taiwan’s government have
always insists it’s the heir to the sovereignty of the Republic of
China. And it pushes for its right to representation in international
bodies. In Taiwan, a different political system is practiced, a
different constitution is written, a different flag is presented, a
different life style is asserted, and a different education is given to
the younger generation. Perhaps the only relationship left between
Mainland China and Taiwan is that they have share a large part of
Chinese history together.
For the most part, Taiwan seems to remain separate from
China, as has been the case since 1949. It will probably continue to
maintain a unique political identity: it will be Taiwan, as well as
the Republic of China. No doubt in Taiwan’s formal diplomatic
relations with other countries it will remain excluded from the
United Nation. For years, Taiwan has tried very hard to join the
United Nation under many circumstances; however, because of the
major objection from Beijing, this goal was never achieved. Both
the United Nations and United States will only recognize “One
C hina."
91 Although new situations and issues have developed after a visit to China by President Clinton
during July of 1998, the *One-China Policy” is still effective and even clearertoday. Taiwan
will not receive any advantages nor help from the United States or the United Nation if it
becomes independent from Mainland China.
97
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At the same time, Taiwan is a global player in trade and
financial matters, and will retain vast and increasing informal ties
with other countries. Taiwan will remain the focus of allegiance for
many Chinese, and will be a barometer reflecting the status of
relations between Washington and Beijing.
An article from the Los Anoeles Times stated:
Right now the economy here is heading for trouble, and China is an
unavoidable player in the fight against Asian economic collapse.
Clinton’s approach to China has been called a policy of
engagement. That’s far too tame a term now. Instead, it’s a
policy of necessity. The smart people here know that Taiwan
needs to applaud and support Clinton, start working with rather
than fencing with Beijing (and expect the same from China), and
keep cajoling the Japanese to get with the program. Asia needs
as much leadership as it can get right now. Successful,
increasingly democratic Taiwan can help provide it.9 2
In the international community, Taiwan will always be an
anomaly in its relationship to China compared to other South-east
Asian countries. It is part of a divided nation. But that status is
fading much faster than it is in the case of the two Koreas. Some
say Taiwan cannot be called a nation, but at the same time they
cannot suggest what it should be called. Others say its status could
be resolved by dropping the name Republic of China and using the
name Taiwan or some variation. But its legal or political identity
problem would still persist. Most say Taiwan is a nation because of
its qualifications. As previously mentioned, between Taiwan and
92Plate, Tom. “ Taiwan, in the Middle, Frets, but Glimpses a Future.” Los Angeles Times.
(June 30, 1998): pp. B7.
98
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China there are different legal systems, different governmental
systems, different lifestyles are maintained, different political
leaders are elected, and different international identities are
presented; thus, Taiwan should be qualified to be an independent
nation. Likewise, some people believed that Taiwan is a nation
simply because there is no other suitable alternative.
Taiwan’s destiny as a true international actor and nation has
been chronically unclear, weak, and unique. It is possible that its
status will become the. subject of an international agreement or one
involving Washington and Beijing. Basically, anything could happen
depending on the changes in Taiwan’s political situation.
99
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YEARS
A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
IMPORTANT EVENTS IN TAIWAN AND CHINA
1517 •Portuguese vessels sighted Taiwan and named it
"Ilha-Formosa (Beautiful Island)."
1600
1620
1622
1624
1661
1683
1700
•A Chinese pirate Cheng Chi-lung landed on Taiwan for the very first time.
•The birth of Taiwan's national hero, Cheng Chen-kung (the son of Cheng
Chi-lung).
•Dutch occupied Taiwan.
•Cheng Chen-kung abandoned his efforts to reestablish the Ming Dynasty,
Cheng launched an attack on the Dutch forces and won the battle.
•Cheng died the following year.
•The beginning of the Ch'ing Dynasty.
1800
1887
1895
1900
1924
1945
1947
1949
1964
1969
1971
1975
1978
1979
1986
1988
1993
•The birth of President Chiang Kai-shek.
•Treaty of Shimonoseki, China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan.
•The Father of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, went to Taiwan for the first time.
•The forming of the Nationalist Party in Mainland China.
•Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the U.S.
•The end of fifty-years Japanese occupation in Taiwan.
•The end of World War II.
•The Chinese Nationalist authorities assumed political control over Taiwan.
•The biggest riot in Taiwan, (The 2-28 Incident).
•A turning point for China and Taiwan.
•China was occupied by the Communist Party.
•Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek moved his army and government to Taiwan.
•Chiang occupied Taiwan temporarily, waiting for a chance to counter
attack the Communists.
•United State aid to Taiwan had stopped.
•Nixon Doctorine: Relations between Washington and Beijing began.
•The death of Chiang Kai-shek symbolized an end to the Nationalists' hope
of ruling an unified China.
•People's Republic of China was admitted to the United Nation.
•The Republic of China was withdraw from the United Nation.
•President Jimmy Carter announced that the U.S. would cut diplomatic
ties with Taiwan, effective on Jan. 1, 1979.
•Chiang Ching-kuo (the son of ex-Prsident Chiang Kai-shek) was elected
to the Presidency in Taiwan.
•Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was passed by the U.S. Congress altering
President Carter’s "One-China" policy.
•The Kaohsiung Incident (Meilidao).
•The forming of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan.
•The death of President Chiang Ching-kuo.
•Presidency was passed on to current President Lee Teng-hui.
•The forming of the New Party in Taiwan.
1 00
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Asset Metadata

Creator Chu, John Sheng (author)

Core Title Ethnic identity and nationalism in Taiwan

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag anthropology, cultural,OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, ethnic and racial studies,sociology, social structure and development

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Rideout, William M. (committee chair), Seaman, Gary (committee member), Wills, Jack (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-28529

Unique identifier UC11337220

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Legacy Identifier 1394775.pdf

Dmrecord 28529

Document Type Thesis

Rights Chu, John Sheng

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA