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A comparison of the DPP's TV ads in the 2000 and 2004 Taiwan presidential elections

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A comparison of the DPP's TV ads in the 2000 and 2004 Taiwan presidential elections

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Content A COMPARISON OF THE DPP’S TV ADS IN THE 2000 AND 2004
TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Copyright 2005
by
Cheng-Na Chen
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN STUDIES)
December 2005
Cheng-Na Chen
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
While writing this thesis, I have received tremendous intellectual and
emotional support and encouragement from my committee members. I cannot
express my gratitude enough to Dr. Stanley Rosen, Dr. Thomas A. Hollihan, and Dr.
Daniel Lynch, who pointed out the mistakes I made in writing papers and have
patiently guided me through these years of my graduate study in East Asian Studies
Center at the University of Southern California. I have been so fortunate to have
them as my mentors, who introduced me to truly an interdisciplinary study of
politics, culture, and theory.
I would like to thank Professor Berger, Chris Evans, Grace Ryu and all my
colleagues in EASC for their supportive environment and for the opportunity to be
a Teaching Assistant. It was an invaluable experience to work as a graduate
assistant in the program. I want to thank all my friends whose advice and
encouragement have helped me to survive through my graduate study. I also want
to express my deepest gratitude to my father and mother in Hong Kong, who have
sent their love and support from home.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
ABSTRACT iv
I. Introduction 1
II. Design of Inquiry 4
III. Taiwan’s Political Background and the Development of the
DPP 6
IV. The Background to 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections
in Taiwan 8
V. The Main Campaign Issues of the 2000 and 2004 Presidential
Elections 13
VI. Literature Review 16
a) Theories of Political Advertising 16
b) Theories of Political Campaign Strategy 19
c) Negative Political Advertising 29
VII. Analysis of DPP 2000 and 2004 Commercials 34
VIII. Conclusion 45
BIBLIOGRAPHY 47
iii
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ABSTRACT
Elections have become the core component of Taiwan’s democracy.
And it has now become impossibe to imagine elections without political
advertisements in modem Taiwanese society. In this study I assume that the
strategies in the political campaigns of the DPP during the 2000 and 2004
presidential elections were different.
In this thesis, I first traced the historical background of Taiwan politics
as well as the development of the previous major opposition party, the DPP.
Then I reviewed the literature in relation to the strategy of TV commercials and
political campaigns. Following the above, I put the emphasis on the analysis of
the DPP’s TV commercials in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections using
strategic models defined in the existing literature such as incumbency style,
challenger style, In Man-Out Man model, and positional strategies as a way to
further understand the DPP’s campaign strategy in the televison commercials.
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I. Introduction
It is nearly impossible to imagine elections without political
commercials that accompany them. It has been estimated, that for
contemporary political campaigns, advertising is usually the greatest
portion of the budget. However, the use of political ads as a primary
vehicle or tool in achieving election returns is a relatively recent
phenomenon in some parts of the world.1 Ostensibly, the purpose for
having political ads is that through these advertisements voters can get to
know the issues candidates are raising during the campaign, as well as
their position on those issues.
Contemporary campaigns are perfectly suited for television, since so
much of politics today is transacted on the television screen; as a result, more
often than not, television is the primary medium for political advertising.2
With regards to the primacy of television as a vehicle for political ads, Kern
has noted that “highly partisan individuals are best reached by direct-mail or
limited-circulation print media advertising, whereas television ads are most
effective with the large body of the U.S. electorate who are not partisan and
are thus persuadable.”
1 David A. Schultz, ed., Lights, camera, campaign, (New York: PeterLang Publishing, 2004) p.x
2 David A. Schultz, ed., Lights, camera, campaign, (New York: PeterLang Publishing, 2004)
p.xi
3 Kern, Montague, 30-Second Politics: Political advertising in the Eighties (New York: Praeger
Publisher, 1989) p.6
1
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Research indicates that during the 1984 election campaigns in the United
States, ad-driven information was more important to voters than it had ever
been before. Of those who responded to a Roper organization poll, sixty-four
percent said that they got most of their news from television.4 During this
same time in Taiwan television was still not being used as the primary mode
for promoting a candidate’s image and/or ideas. Prior to 1989, Taiwanese law
restricted candidates from doing any campaigning through the mass media.
Political advertising was not allowed either in newspapers or on television.
Candidates still used actual encounters with voters as the primary means of
campaigning; they were allowed to visit the voters and give them a name
card.5 However, when the ban on mass media campaigning was lifted in 1989,
the new venues in campaigning promoted by each party6 caused candidates to
face dramatic changes in how they attempted to appeal to voters. It was only in
1992 that the candidates could have their own advertisements shown on
television.
Elections in Taiwan were first held in 1935 during the Japanese colonial
era.7 In 1950, the KMT (The Kuomintang, The Nationalist party)8 held local
4 Kern, Montague, 30-Second Politics: Political advertising in the Eighties (New York: Praeger
Publisher, 1989), p. 10
5 Chang, Zilung, Election Campaign Communication in Taiwan,.p.7
6 Chang, Zilung, Election Campaign Communication in Taiwan,.p. 10
7 Chang, Zilung, Political Advertising,, p.3
8 Founded as a revolutionary league dedicated to overthrowing the Chinese monarchy, the
Kuomintang (KMT) became a political party in 1912 when its leader Sun Yat-sen established
the Republic of China after the collapse of the Qing dynasty. Following Sun's death in 1925,
Chiang Kai-shek assumed control of the KMT and in collaboration with the Communists
consolidated the government's power throughout China. In 1927, however, Chiang turned on
the Communists, launching a purge that killed thousands and crushed Communist-organized
2
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elections for the first time for city and county mayors and council members.
Ini 988 martial law was lifted, and consequently since 1989 elections have
been held every year, and politicians sometimes reportedly feel as if they are
campaigning every day. As a result of these changes, elections have become
an important social activity in Taiwanese society.
Reasons why Taiwanese people are generally so enthusiastic about elections
might be that voting has become a ritual that confirms national identity. The
candidates of different parties represent different identities. Voting for a
specific candidate suggests agreement with his or her identity or ideology. In
the early years when the Chiang family was in power, their identity was the
national identity. However, with ensuing political reform which allowed for
forums where different opinions could be expressed, a variety of social
identities have emerged.
labor unions, thus beginning a long and devastating civil war. n the late 1930s the KMT and the
Communists reunited to fight the Japanese but only for the duration of World War II, and in
1945 they were again fighting each other for control of China. After suffering a series of defeats
at the hands of the Communists, Chiang and his Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan in 1949. The
Kuomintang has maintained a virtual monopoly of power on the island ever since, holding
nearly all legislative, executive and judicial posts. Over the past decade, however, it has seen
some of its power eroded by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.
3
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II. Design of inquiry
In this thesis I will analyze the political campaign strategies that the
DPP9 used during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, specifically the
strategies used with regards to television advertising, Additionally, I want to
look at the ways they attempted to maintain their legitimacy and political
power during the 2004 presidential election.
To analyze the factors mentioned above, I will examine all the DPP’s
televised presidential ads from the 2000 and 2004 elections. The ads for this
study were obtained from the DPP Website: www.dpp.org.tw. The total number
of ads analyzed was forty-four. Eighteen are from the 2000 presidential election
and twenty six from 2004.
The present study first tries to briefly introduce the development of
Taiwanese politics and DPP as well as the background of these two presidential
elections. Second, the study will present the literature review of campaign
strategies including incumbency style, challenger style, In Man-Out Man
strategy, positional strategies as well as negative campaign strategies as
9 The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)is a liberal political party in the Republic of China on
Taiwan which has traditionally been associated with the pan-green coalition and Taiwan
independence although it has moderated its stance as it has gained power. It was founded in
September 28, 1986 as part of the Tangwai movement, but was technically illegal until 1991.
Established primarily by family members and defense lawyers of imprisoned dissidents, the
DPP became the first political party to challenge the Kuomintang's decades-long grip on power.
The DPP quickly garnered support from ethnic Taiwanese frustrated by the authoritarian rule of
the Kuomintang, whose loyalists and leaders had fled from mainland China in 1949 following
their army's defeat by the Chinese Communists. In its charter the DPP promotes holding a
referendum on independence from China and opposes the Kuomintang's "one China policy."
DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian has pledged, however, that if elected he will not
declare independence for Taiwan unless China invades.
4
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expressed through the DPP’s television campaign. The last part of the paper is
devoted to an examination of the DPP’s 2000 and 2004 TV ads.
5
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III. Taiwan’s political background and the development of the
DPP
During Chiang Ching-Kuo’s presidency1 0 , Taiwan experienced profound
political, social and economic changes. Not until 1986 was there a second party,
after the KMT, in Taiwan. Liu suggests that “the political reforms after 1986
paved the way for the development of a two or multiparty system in Taiwan.
While the DPP was the largest opposition party, many other minor parties also
emerged.” 1 1 Rigger has noted that “the split between the KMT and the DPP
was bom out of the opposition’s efforts to empower [the] Taiwanese and hasten
democratic reform.”1 2 Rigger also writes that “because of the rise of the DPP,
the KMT has also faced challenges since the 1990s since its share of the vote
• • 13
was slipping steadily, especially during the national elections”.
Local elections provided another battlefield for the DPP to develop its
power and influence. The head-to-head competition in large districts
encouraged voters to consider party affiliation and policy considerations instead
of relying solely on candidates’ name recognition and the advice of local
1 0 Chiang Ching-kuo„ Kuomintang politician and leader, was the son of Chiang Kai-shek and
held numerous posts in the government of the Republic of China (from 1949 on Taiwan). He
succeeded his father to power, serving as Premier of the Republic of China from 1972 to 1978
and President of the Republic of China from 1978 until his death in 1988. Under his tenure, the
government of the Republic of China, although still authoritarian, became much more open and
tolerant of political dissent. Towards the end of his life, Chiang relaxed government controls on
the press and speech and put native Taiwanese in positions of power, including his successor
Lee Teng-hui who furthered the course of democratic reforms.
1 1 Tsang and Tien ed., Democratization in Taiwan ( New York: St. Martin’s Press,1999) p.70
1 2 Rigger, Shelley, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy (London and NewYork:
Routledge, 1999) p. 148
1 3 Rigger, Shelley, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy (London and NewYork:
Routledge, 1999) p. 149
6
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tiau-a-ka.1 4 Liu suggests that from 1986 to 1995 the number of those who
preferred the KMT party went down from about forty-one percent to about
thirty two percent, while those preferring the DPP party rose from five percent
up to over sixteen percent. 1 5 It shows that the DPP has been developing a voter
base quite quickly.
From the outset, the DPP strategy has always been to “make a number of
people aware of the need for political and social change at a time critical for the
island’s political evolution.”1 6 “Political liberalism and the realization of
full-fledged democracy are the themes upon which the DPP has based its moral
claim;”1 7 these are attitudes which are broadly accepted in Taiwan today.
Since democratization began in the late 1980s, the long-ruling KMT has
steadily lost ground to its opponent, the DPP, in local elections. During the 2000
campaign, Chen Shui-bian made a great effort to reach beyond the DPP’s
1 S
traditional supporters and gained the political power.
1 4 In Taiwan, voters are the currency that finances the patronage system. The grassroots political
activists who collect those voters on behalf of their patrons are known in Taiwanese as tiau-a-ka.
See Rigger, Shelley, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy (London and NewYork:
Routledge, 1999) p.42
1 5 Tsang and Tien ed., Democratization in Taiwan ( New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) p.72
1 6 Chen, Tun-jen and Haggard, Stephan ed., Political Change in Taiwan (Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publisher, Inc.1993) p.129
1 7 Chen, Tun-jen and Haggard, Stephan ed., Political Change in Taiwan (Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publisher, Inc.1993) p. 129
1 8 Wu, Yu-Shan, “ Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks lfom Power Transfer”, Asian
Survey, 41(1), p40-48
7
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IV. The Background to 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections in
Taiwan
The year 2000 was an important one in Taiwanese history. Not only was
this an election year—the second presidential election in Taiwan’s
history—but the country also faced dramatic transformations both culturally
and politically. The DPP’s candidate, Chen Shui-bian, was elected with over
39 percent of the vote. This election and Chen’s victory symbolized the end of
the era of the Nationalist Party and the “Lee Teng-hui era.”
The 2000 election generated four significant events:
1. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the new ruling
party. The victory of the pro-independence opposition candidate meant the
defeat of the KMT candidate. The KMT had monopolized political power for
five decades.1 9 As I stated earlier, since 1997 onwards, the DPP had been
using the strategy of winning local elections, thus hoping to build a base and
eventually winning the general election. In 1998, although the DPP lost the
Taipei mayoral election, they won the Kaoshiung mayoral election, which
indicated that some progress had been made towards their aims. As far as
general perceptions were concerned, the DPP became the leader of the country.
Chen’s victory also signified the culmination of the “Taiwanization”2 0 process
1 9 Alagappa, Muthiah, Taiwan’s Presidential Politics (New York: M.E. Sharpe,Inc. ,2001) p.5
2 0 Taiwanization refers to localization. Localization is a political term used by advocates of
Taiwan independence to support their view of Taiwan as not part of China. It teaches Taiwanese
history, geography, and culture as not part of Chinese history, Chinese geography, and Chinese
culture. It promotes languages termed "native to Taiwan," including Holo, Hakka and aboriginal
languages. In fact all Chinese dialects spoken on Taiwan except for the Aboriginal languages
8
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that had been under way for more than a decade and brought to power a new
generation of political leaders who had no connection to the Chinese civil
2. The Lee Teng-hui era ended, which had lasted for twelve years, from
1988 to 2000. Lee’s policy was focused on democratization and localization,
hoping to turn Taiwan into a democratic country. However, Lee’s political
ideology did not die. Some people believe that Chen is the successor to Lee.
3. Since Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1987, the power inside the KMT has
been re-distributed. The primary issue in Taiwanese politics has been the
focus on the relationship between the mainlander and the Taiwanese in
99 •
Taiwan society. The KMT had claimed that reunification was their main
goal, whereas the DPP had always claimed that Taiwan’s independence was
are native to mainland China. As part of the Taiwan independence movement, its aims are
resisted by supporters of Chinese reunification on Taiwan. Localization rejects a Han Chinese
identity in favor of a monolithic officially sponsored "Holo" identity, which its supporters
equate with a "Taiwanese" identity.
2 1 Alagappa, Muthiah, Taiwan’s Presidential Politics (New York: M.E. Sharpe,Inc. ,2001) p.6
2 2 The term is often used to denote a Chinese person bom and raised in mainland China. This is
as opposed to the Taiwanese local residents, the "bensheng ren”( "original-province person"),
who have been in Taiwan prior to the mass exodus near the conclusion of the Chinese Civil W ar.
It has limited negative connotations, despite the fact that, under specific circumstances, it may
refer to someone hostile to Taiwan independence by implying they might have been bom and
raised on the mainland and thus from a lower socioeconomic background. The formal definition
of a Mainlander, however, is someone living in Taiwan whose native province is not Taiwan.
Until the early 1990s, identity cards in Taiwan contained an entry for native province, which
was largely the native province of one's father's family. The removal of native province from
identity cards and replacement with place of birth was motivated in large part to reduce the
Mainlander/local distinction. Because of this definition, someone who is bom on Taiwan, but
whose father's family roots are not in Taiwan, is generally considered a Mainlander. By contrast,
someone who is not bom in Taiwan, but whose native province is Taiwan is generally not
considered a Mainlander. Similarly, a child that is bom to a Taiwanese businessman residing in
the PRC would generally not be considered a "waishengren".
9
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their chief concern. Chen’s election is yet one more step in the process of
redefining the conflict between Taiwan and the PRC.
Chen's victory in 2000 had neither been expected, nor predicted. The
split of the pro-Chinese reunification vote between James Soong2 4 and Lien
Chan2 5 , who together polled nearly sixty percent of the vote (compared to
-j/r
Chen's thirty-nine percent) , played a large role in Chen's victory, as did his
97
pro-Taiwan independence stand. Lee Yuan-tseh's endorsement , James
2 3 Alagappa, Muthiah, Taiwan’s Presidential Politics (NewYork: M.E. Sharpe,Inc. ,2001) p.7
2 4 Once a leading figure in the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, Soong split with
the party in November 1999 when he launched his own campaign for president, challenging the
KMT's candidate, Vice President Lien Chan. Soong, once the director-general of Taiwan's
Government Information Office and later managing director for two of Taiwan's nationwide
broadcast television networks, has sought to distance himself from the policies of the KMT in
recent months. More recently, from 1993 to 1998, he was governor of Taiwan province. He has
proposed a 30-year nonaggression pact with Beijing. That would be followed by a 20-year
"quasi-international" arrangement between Taiwan and mainland China modeled after the
European Union, after which a referendum would be held on independence. Soong has also
proposed calling an all-party conference to build a national consensus on steps to take in
improving relations with China. Soong enjoyed a lead in the polls until late February, when the
KMT filed a lawsuit alleging Soong of embezzling $12 million from a party slush fund while he
was a party leader. Soong denied the accusation.
2 5 Lien is the handpicked successor of President Lee Teng-hui and is the hope of the ruling
Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, to cling to its 50-year hold on power. Lien, who was premier
under Lee from 1993 to 1997, has also served as governor of Taiwan province, foreign affairs
minister and minister of transportation and communications. Lien has pledged to improve
contacts with China and says he favors opening direct trade and postal and air links with the
mainland. He also promises to push for regular summits between the two sides.
Lien rejects, however, the Beijing government's "one country, two systems" model for
reunification under which Hong Kong and Macau reverted to Chinese rule in 1997 and 1999. e
endorses President Lee's policy of demanding an equal "state-to-state" relationship with China,
a view that has enraged the Beijing government..
2 6 See http://udn.com/PE2004/statistics/e2000/e2000.html
2 7 Yuan Tseh Lee is a famous chemist. He was the first Taiwanese-born Nobel Prize laureate,
who, along with the German-Canadian John C. Polanyi and American Dudley R. Herschbach
won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1986 "for their contributions to the dynamics of chemical
elementary processes." Yuan T. Lee played an important role during the 2000 ROC Presidential
election. On the last week of the election he announced his support for the candidacy of Chen
Shui-bian who subsequently won a narrow victory over James Soong. Chen nominated Lee to
become Premier, but Lee declined after deliberating for a few days.
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Soong’s financial scandals, and last minute reactions from the PRC tipped
the balance in Chen's favor.
On the same day that the results were announced, Soong announced the
formation of the People First Party (PFP). In the following party congress, Lien
Chan was able to achieve Lee's expulsion and began to move the party back
towards a reunification platform. Lee and his supporters formed the radical
pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. The formation of the People First
Party further destabilized the party system in Taiwan and has created an
atmosphere full of uncertainty. The party maintains a close but tense
relationship with the Kuomintang as part of the Pan-Blue2 9 coalition. This has
led to situations in which both parties have run candidates, but close to the
election the party with the less popular candidate unofficially drops out of the
race. This in turn has led to some notable situations where either the PFP or the
KMT is campaigning against its own candidate, which has led to intra-party
resentment.3 0
2 8 Shortly before the election, the leaders of the PRC attempted to influence the outcome,
warning that the PRC would not "sit idly by" if Taiwan moved towards independence and that
"independence means war." Following the election, PRC analysts reached the conclusion that
the PRC statements had actually been counterproductive and helped Chen to win; consequently,
the PRC avoided making such an open attempt to influence the 2004 elections.
2 9 The Pan-Blue Coalition, is a political coalition in early 21st century Taiwan, consisting of the
Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP), and the smaller New Party (CNP). The name
comes from the party colors of the Kuomintang. This coalition tends to favor a Chinese
nationalist identity over a Taiwanese separatist one and favors a softer policy and greater
economic linkage with the People's Republic of China. It is opposed to the Pan-Green Coalition.
3 0 Since PFP had grown out of the KMT, the two parties had to compete for the same set of
voters. Consequently, although the original KMT enjoyed a high degree of support, now the
vote is split and the pan-green coalition wins. This dynamic in which both the KMT and PFP
must simultaneously compete and cooperate with each other has led to complex and interesting
politics. In several cases, this has led to situations in which both parties have run candidates, but
close to the election the party with the less popular candidate unofficially drops out of the race.
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To avoid a repeat of this situation, which led to the election of Democratic
Progressive Party candidate Chen Shui-bian to the presidency in 2000 by a low
share of the votes, Chairman Soong ran as vice-president on KMT Chairman
Lien Chan's presidential ticket in the ROC 2004 presidential election. However,
President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu were still re-elected by
T 1
a margin of 0.22% of valid votes over a combined opposition ticket of KMT
Chairman Lien Chan and People First Party Chairman James Soong. Lien and
Soong have refused to concede and are challenging the results.
3'See the statistical information conducted by the UDN news. Retrieved July16,2005 from
http://udn.com/PE20Q4/result/result06.shtml
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V. The Main Campaign Issues of the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections
China has regarded Taiwan a renegade province since 1949 when the
Nationalists fled there with Chiang Kai-shek and brutally imposed their own
government. Mainland China demands reunification and has threatened to use
force. Although the political spectrum of Taiwan is defined by an inclination
either towards Taiwan’s independence or towards Chinese reunification in 2000
and 2004, both camps took moderate positions on this particular issue. Opinion
polls also routinely show, however, that as many as 80 percent of Taiwan's
people do not want reunification under the current conditions.3 2 It would create
political problems if any of the candidates took extreme positions in favor of
unification or independence, since most of the people in Taiwan prefer to
maintain the status quo.
The DPP’s candidate Chen Shui-bian has also accused the KMT of "black
gold" politics — using its businesses to influence local politics, business and
even organized crime. The intent of the Pan-Green coalition in the 2000
campaign was to portray themselves as Taiwanese nationalists and reformers
and to portray the opposition as corrupt and lacking in loyalty to Taiwan. The
intent of the Pan-Blue coalition was to question Chen's competence and at the
3 2 See the statistical information on CNN website. Retrieved August 13,2005 from
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/taiwan.election/issues
3 3 The Pan-Green Coalition is an informal political alliance in early 21st century Taiwan,
consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), and the
Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP). The name comes from the colors of the Democratic
Progressive Party, which originally adopted green in part because of its association with the
environmental movement. In contrast to the Pan-Blue Coalition, the Pan-Green Coalition tends
to favor Taiwan independence over Chinese reunification, although members in both coalitions
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same time to focus on issues of specific interest with various groups who were
feeling disenfranchised. The Pan-Blue camp staunchly defended the existence
of the Republic of China and also rejected reunification under one country, two
systems.
The main issues in the 2004 campaign concerned the People's Republic
of China, political reform, and the Taiwan economy. As the election
approached, the campaign became increasingly negative, with charges of tax
evasion, draft dodging, illegal financial transactions, and domestic violence
on the part of Lien Chan. The negative nature of the campaign might be
attributed to the fact that each campaign had moderated their positions on the
issues to the extent that they were basically similar to each other, thus
leaving little or no difference on the issues and nothing other than personal
attacks to attract the few uncommitted voters in the race.
Another issue complicating matters was that a nation-wide consultative
referendum3 4 was held in Taiwan on March 20,2004, to coincide with the 2004
presidential election. Voters were asked two questions regarding relations with
have moderated their policies to reach voters in the center
3 4 The referendum will ask voters two questions. 1. The People of Taiwan demand that the
Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should mainland China refuse to
withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against
us, would you agree that the government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to
strengthen Taiwan's self-defence capabilities? 2. Would you agree that our government should
engage in negotiation with mainland China on the establishment of a"peace and stability"
framework for cross-Strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the
peoples on both sides? The referendum will be rendered void if fewer than 50 percent of voters
collect a referendum ballot paper. Picking up a paper ballot constitutes as taking part in the
referendum. The referendum is approved if more than 50 percent of those who take part cast yes
votes. A total of 16,497,746 voters are eligible to vote in the referendum
14
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the People's Republic of China. The initiation of this referendum by President
Chen Shui-bian came under intense criticism from China as it was seen as a
prelude to an eventual vote on Taiwan’s independence. The Pan-Blue camp
urged a boycott, saying that the referendum was illegal and unnecessary.
Voters agreed by wide margins on the two questions put forth by the
government, but the less than fifty percent turnouts invalidated the result.3 5
“Referendum presents a different set of choices than does an election. No
political parties or candidate names appear on the ballot, and voters must choose
among alternatives that are sometimes unfamiliar and perhaps lacking in
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partisan cues.” Therefore, the referendum issue raised by Chen was
considered as a strategy by Chen Shui-bian to mobilize support. “When a
governing party chooses a referendum strategy, it generally does so in the
expectation that it will win the outcome of the venture is much more
uncertain.”3 7
3 5 See www.udn.com.tw and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ROC_presidential_election, 2004
3 6 Farrell, M. David, Schmitt-Beck, Rudiger, ed., Do Political Campaigns Matter?: Campaign
effects in elections and referendums (London: Routledge,2002) p. 145
3 7 Farrell, M. David, Schmitt-Beck, Rudiger, ed., Do Political Campaigns Matter?: Campaign
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VI. Literature Review
(a) Theories of Political Advertising
In order to analyze the content and strategies of televisions ads, one cannot
neglect the types and styles of ads and the strategic connections being implied
between the array of symbols and images. As Trent and Friedenberg
suggest, ’’ the important reason to categorize types of political commercials is to
- j o
gain some understanding of their rhetorical purposes.” To analyze the effect
of the Chen camp’s 2000 and 2004 TV commercials, one must use these
categories to help understand the function the candidates wanted each ad to
fUlfill during the campaign.
Types and Styles
Televised political spots entered presidential politics on the world stage in
1952, when Republican nominee General Dwight Eisenhower filmed forty
• Oft .
commercials that were titled “Eisenhower Answers America.” While the
content and style of televised political spots have changed through the years,
one characteristic has remained constant: Each ad utilizes the same techniques
used in persuading Americans consumers to buy commercial products; the fact
that this was a contest for the White House does not change that dynamic.4 0
Cunningham refers to Lynda Lee Kaid’s definition of political advertising as
effects in elections and referendums (London: Routledge,2002) p. 145
3 8 Trent S, Judith & Friedenberg V., Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher), p. 147
3 9 Trent S, Judith & Friedenberg V., Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher), p. 147
4 0 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher), p. 141
16
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“the communication process by which a source purchases the opportunity to
expose receivers through mass channels to a political message with the intended
effect of influencing their political attitudes, beliefs and/or behaviors.” 4 1
Edwin Diamond and Stephen Bates as cited in Trent and Friedenberg4 2
argue that political advertising goes through four phases and thus produces four
types of ads: ID spots, argument spots, attack spots and visionary spots. Trent
and Friedenberg also indicate that L. Patrick Devlin describes spots in terms of
categories such as: talking head ads, negative ads, cinema verite ads,
documentary ads, man-in-the-street ads, testimonial ads and independent ads.
Kem also categorizes ads into two categories: One is platform ads “containing
either a commitment by a candidate to a position, or a rationale for taking a
position or opposing that of the opponent.”4 3 Another is slogan ads, in which
“no prospective policy statement is made, nor is there a why statement or
answer.” 4 4
Initially, the style of a candidate can be revealed through their general
communication patterns and through behavior that is apparent, consistent and
recurring.4 5 Kaid and Davidson argue that the “videostyle” of the candidate is
4 1 Romanow, Walter I.,Repentigny, Michel De, Cunningham, Stanley B., Soderlund, Walter C.
and Hildebrandt, Kaid,ed., Television Advertising in Canadian Elections: The Attack
Mode, 1993 (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999), p. 12
4 2 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V., Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher), p.146
4 3 Kem, Montague, 30-Second Politics: Political advertising in the Eighties Eighties (New York:
Praeger Publisher, 1989), p.51
4 4 Kem, Montague, 30-Second Politics: Political advertising in the Eighties. (New York:
Praeger Publisher, 1989), p.51
4 5 Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns: Styles and
Content of Televised Political Advertising (Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2001) p.26
17
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composed of the verbal content, the nonverbal content and the film/video
production techniques used in political ads.4 6 Verbal content in an ad is often
characterized as either “positive” or “negative,” depending upon whether it
focuses on the candidate or on the opponent.4 7 As for nonverbal components in
the video, researchers have found that nonverbal cues play a central role in
personal and social interactions and can influence the evaluation of a person’s
JO
credibility. Even the candidate’s appearance (or absence) from a political spot
sends a nonverbal message to voters. The video production or visual
components of a television political ad are determined somewhat by the
selectivity of the camera in film and television production.4 9 The perception of a
person can also be influenced by the camera’s height and angle in relation to the
person. “A Close-up can suggest intimacy to the subject and low-angle shots
will make subjects appear stronger and more dominant.”5 0
Symbols and images
The use of the symbolic in political ads can be a valuable tool with which
to impart the candidate’s image. The conceptual power of a symbol is intended
to cover a wide range of psychological terrain, whereas signs can often be
deployed symbolically, in effect the sign becomes a synonym for the symbol.5 1
4 6 Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns: Styles and
Content of Televised Political Advertising (Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2001) p.27
4 7 Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns: Styles and
Content of Televised Political Advertising (Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2001)p.27
4 8 See Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, p.29
4 9 See Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee,p.30
5 0 See Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, p.31
5 1 Biocca, Frank, ed., Television and Political Advertising V.2 : Signs, Codes, and Images (New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, Inc., Publisher, 1991) p.13
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Image advertising promotes the candidate’s good looks, family orientation and
other emotional qualities in lieu of addressing campaign issues. The DPP’s
political advertising usually used this strategy to promote their candidate,
particularly during the 2000 campaign. Chen’s image was presented as that of a
young and ambitious leader who will give Taiwan a better future. In the 2004
TV ads, the interaction between Chen and his wife attempted to demonstrate
that Chen is a responsible and consistent person. Usually, the image ads are
uninformative about campaign issues, but image appeals can also be effectively
CT
integrated into negative advertising.
(b)Theories of Political Campaign Strategies
The background to the Taiwan 2000 and 2004 presidential elections has
been presented in the preceding pages; however the varying motivations
explored and visited by the campaigns to influence voters’ attitudes are
embedded in a psychological and strategic territory. The following analysis will
present a literature review of a few styles and strategies of campaigns which can
help us analyze the DPP’s strategies of TV ads in the 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections with variables including incumbent styles and challenger style
examined by Trent and Friedenberg, as well as the in man-out man strategy and
positional strategies.
5 2 Biocca, Frank, ed., Television and Political Advertising V.l : Signs, Codes, and Images (New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, Inc., Publisher, 1991) p.233
5 3 Biocca, Frank, ed., Television and Political Advertising V. 1 : Signs, Codes, and Images (New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, Inc., Publisher, 1991) p.235
19
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Incumbency style
According to Trent and Friedenberg (2000), incumbency campaigning is a
blend of both symbolic and pragmatic communication strategies designed to
make any candidate appear as both good enough for the office sought and
possessing the office.5 4 Trent and Friedenberg consider the specific strategies
that candidates employ when they seek the advantage of incumbency. The first
four are symbolic in nature and the remaining 11 are pragmatic.5 5 When the four
symbolic elements, which are symbolic trappings of the office, legitimacy of the
office, competency and the office, and charisma and the office, are considered,
“the identity of a particular president is irrelevant; the concern is the office itself
and the symbolic role it can play in a campaign.”5 6
The first strategy, symbolic trappings of the office, emphasizes the
importance and strength of the office. The presidency stands for power and
therefore incumbents take on the persona of the powerful. Incumbents are
always addressed by title, never by name. Thus it is understandable that “those
who have campaigned against a president have objected to the continual and
conscious use of devices that remind voters that they are seeing and hearing the
president, as opposed to just another politician.”
5 4 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.77
5 5 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.78
5 6 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.78
5 7 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
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The second strategy involves little of what incumbents actually do. It is used
instead to remind voters of the incumbent’s power. The presidency stands for
legitimacy, and therefore the person who holds the office is perceived as the
natural and logical leader. No matter who the president is, the president stands
for a kind of sociopolitical legitimacy.
The third strategy is also an intangible tool that comes with the office. The
presidency stands for competency, and therefore the person who holds the office
can be considered competent. Trent and Friedenberg also suggest that people’s
feelings about the office itself are so strong that whatever a specific president
has done with regard to individual issues, a large number of people will always
be supportive.
The last symbolic strategy is not an intangible resource and “it has had
deliberate use since presidents began barnstorming the country for their own
elections.”5 9 The president is more visible than usual during the presidential
campaign visit. “The campaign tours have symbolic power. The drama and
pageantry of a presidential visit will, even if just for a short time, transfer the
charisma of the office to them.”6 0
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.79
5 8 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.79
5 9 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.80
6 0 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.81
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Pragmatic strategies of incumbency are more universal than the symbolic
strategies. They can be employed not only by the president. Strategies examined
are:
1. Creating pseudoevents to attract and control media attention
Even though all the candidates may use pseudoevents to try to capture
media attention, the incumbent still has more success because they are in a
better position to create them. Incumbents have at their disposal the ability to
create pseudoevents that not only generate media exposure but allow some
measure of control over the coverage.6 1
2. Making appointments to jobs and committees.
One of the most common and powerful incumbency strategies revolves
around the ability to appoint personal or political friends to local or state jobs.
This ability allows candidates to reward those who have helped them in the past.
It also creates potential friends and finally it places supporters in key positions
that may well be important in later stages of the campaign.6 2
3. Manipulating important domestic issues
The manipulation or management of important issues is one strategy that
can be assumed only by the incumbent.6 3 Trent and Friedenberg give the
example of President Bush’s actions designed to win voter approval in 1992,
6 1 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.82
6 2 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.84
6 3 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.86
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including “supporting the sale of F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia, signing a bill
making catjacking a federal crime and vetoing a bill that would regulate cable
prices, etc.”6 4
4. Receiving endorsements from other leaders
Endorsements are an attempt to identify and link the candidate with already
established, highly respected, and generally acknowledged leaders. The idea is
that endorsement by respected leaders signifies that the candidate is already part
of their group and should therefore also be thought of as a leader.6 5
5. Emphasizing accomplishments.
Candidates must be able to demonstrate tangible accomplishments during
their term of office if they are incumbents or in some related aspect of public
service. The difficulty occurs when there have been few accomplishments or
when major problems have arisen that overshadows positive contributions.
When this happens, the incumbent must either deny that the current problems
are important ones or blame them on someone else.6 6
6. Above the political trenches image
This strategy is one in which candidates try to create an image that they are
removed from the political fray; that their efforts and energies are “above”
6 4 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.86
6 5 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.87
6 6 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.88
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politics. Trent and Friedenberg suggest that three tactics are employed to create
this impression.
a. Appear to be away from the political battle. They run for office
because of a sense of love of country and duty.
b. Fail to acknowledge the existence of any opponent.
c. Sustain political silence. They refrain from any confrontation with
r n
their opponent or talking about partisan issues.
7. Use of surrogates on the campaign trail
Candidates assume an above-politics posture because others are overtly
campaigning for them while they stay home being nonpolitical.
8. Interpreting or intensifying foreign policy problems into international crises.
The purpose is simple. The incumbent wants to create enough of a crisis
/TO
situation so that voters will be motivated to rally around the president.
These are the strategies that comprise the incumbent style. When
considering the incumbent’s strategies during a campaign, we should also pay
specific attention to four disadvantages of incumbency campaigning as
suggested by Trent and Friedenberg. First, incumbents must run on their record.
Being forced to run on one’s record can be a severe handicap, particularly in the
hands of a skilled challenger. Second, the public may blame the incumbent for
all the problems the country may be experiencing, whether or not it was the
6 7 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.89
6 8 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.91
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incumbent’s fault. The question of competency will be raised and a skilled
challenger will be able to capitalize on it. The third disadvantage is that the
incumbent, unlike the challenger, is not free to campaign. They have to show
that they are doing their job and only sometimes can engage in campaigning.
Because incumbents are at the center of media attention, expectations are great
regarding their front-runner status. If those expectations are not met, even if the
incumbent ultimately wins, they nevertheless lost in terms of media publicity.6 9
Challenger Style
The style can be defined as a series of communication strategies designed to
persuade voters that change is needed and that the challenger is the best person
7ft
to bring about the change. Seven strategies are summarized by Trent and
Friedenberg.
1. Attacking the record.
“The ability to criticize freely may well be one of the most important
71
benefits the challenger possesses”. When there is no incumbent, candidates
can attack the record of the current administration. Furthermore, challengers
can also extend the attack strategy to ask for an investigation of some aspect of
the incumbent’s record or administration. Even if the incumbent has done a
6 9 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.92-93
7 0 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.93
? 1 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.94
25
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great job, the challenger still can use this strategy to minimize the
79
accomplishments or credit them to someone else.
2. Taking the offensive position on issues.
Challengers take an offensive position on issues important to the campaign.
They always probe, question, challenge and attack but never provide any
solutions. Continual criticism of the incumbent will generally manipulate the
voters into thinking that the incumbent is not effective. The main advantage for
challengers is that they are not supposed to solve problems. However,
T X
candidates who abandon this advantage often lose the election.
3. Calling for a change.
Candidates often express their willingness to run for office because they
believe that a change is necessary. Calling for a change has become the
dominant characteristic of those who challenge.7 4
4. Emphasizing optimism for the future.
Trent and Friedenberg argue that this strategy is particularly important for
those who would challenge the status quo.7 5 What the challenger is going to do
is not only to attack but also to provide a vision of a better future.
7 2 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.95
7 3 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.96
7 4 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.97
7 5 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
26
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5. Speaking to traditional values.
Successful challengers will “reinforce majority values instead of
preventing a new one. Although challengers’ strategies are all about change or
redirection, it does not mean the redefinition of values.”
6. Appearing to represent a philosophical center.
Trent and Friedenberg also suggest that “successful challengers have been
ideological representatives from the mainstream of the major party, or they have
tried to appear as though they were.”7 7 In most campaigns, the fringe groups
finally have compromised and supported their party’s mainstream candidate.
7. Delegating personal or harsh attacks.
Wise challengers leave harsh language to running mates, speakers, or to
their TV ads. Although attack remains a main strategy of the challenger’s style,
T8
successful challengers never indulge in demagogic attacks.
The In Man-Out Man Strategy
The In Man-Out Man strategy initially developed by Murray Chotiner, is
designed for challengers. The campaign is based on the development of two
different images for the incumbent (In Man) and the challenger (Out Man). One
major assumption of this strategy is the role of negative voting. The intention of
this strategy is to persuade voters to vote against the incumbent. Chotiner as
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.98
7 6 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.98
7 7 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.99
7 8 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p. 100
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cited in Cowart and Powell suggests that “if you do not deflate the opposition
candidate before your own candidate gets started, the odds are that you are
70 • •
going to be doomed to defeat.” Negative campaigning against the incumbent
is important to show the difference between the challenger and incumbent.
The second assumption is that the challenger has to be perceived as a
possible alternative. The negative campaign against the incumbent is not
usually enough to defeat the incumbent, especially when the incumbent has
done a great job. The third element of this strategy is to tell voters in advance
that the opponent will counterattack. By doing this, counterattacks will not
OA
greatly affect the challenger’s support. The In Man-Out Man strategy is
developmentally implemented through three stages. The first stage is the attack
stage. The second stage is to try and build positive images to get the electorate
to vote for the challenger. The third stage is about inoculation, thwarting a
negative impact by informing voters of possible counterattacks from the
0 1
incumbent ahead of time.
Positional strategies
The purpose of the positional strategies is to define the position of a
candidate to enable voters to easily make a decision. Most of the approaches
used in positional strategies are variations of Shadegg’s Easy Decision model.8 2
7 9 Cowart, Joseph & Powell, Lany. 2002. Political Campaign Communications: Inside and Our.
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002) p.43
8 0 Cowart, Joseph & Powell, Larry. 2002. Political Campaign Communications: Inside and Our.
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002) p.43
8 1 Cowart, Joseph & Powell, Larry. 2002. Political Campaign Communications: Inside and Our.
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002) p.46
8 2 Cowart, Joseph & Powell, Larry. 2002. Political Campaign Communications: Inside and Our.
28
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Two positional strategies can be employed to analyze the DPP’s TV ads strategy
in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.
The fist one is the “Only Alternative” approach which attempts to position
the candidate as the only alternative. This approach usually evolves into the
negative campaign. This strategy is similar to the In Man-Out Man campaign.
However, the difference is that the messages in the “Only Alternative” approach
are all about negative factors about the opponent and contain no positive
message and comparative opinions.
The second approach is the “Role Definition” strategy which attempts to
deliver the message that the candidate is the ideal candidate in the current
political situation. The definition of an “ideal role” may vary in different
campaigns; however, the goal of this approach is the same: to make voters
believe that the candidate’s image is close to the cultural ideal.
(c)Negative political advertising
Negative advertising has often played an important role in political
campaigns, and it has been a feature of American presidential campaigns
throughout the election period. Negative messages could be also perceived in
the DPP’s TV ads in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.
Negative ads focus on “the shortcomings (real or imagined) of the
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002) p.50
8 3 Cowart, Joseph & Powell, Larry. 2002. Political Campaign Communications: Inside and Our.
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002) p.50
8 4 Cowart, Joseph & Powell, Larry. 2002. Political Campaign Communications: Inside and Our.
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002) p.51
29
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opponent rather than the positive attributes of the candidate.”8 5 Bail, Schooler
and Reeves suggest that negative ads may indeed alienate voters. Schultz also
suggests that “negative ads strengthen their general cynicism toward the
political world and make it less likely that they will vote at all.”8 6 Conflict in ad
campaigns is bound to discourage voters from making a choice and casting a
vote.8 7 However, going negative is still a workable strategy. Researchers have
also found that negative ads do have direct effects on the candidate’s image,
• 88
particularly when the negative ads are sponsored by independent sources.
Negative ads, on the other hand, are a relatively easy way to capture people’s
attention with dramatic, simple portrayals of one’s opponent. “They focus
viewers’ attention more quickly and effectively than broader, positive claims.
However, too much negative campaigning would ruin the image of both the
RQ
candidate and the opponent.”
Atkin & Heald (1978) as cited in Johnson-Cartee and Copeland suggest
that negative ads function in the following ways during a campaign: (a) to
create awareness of political candidates and their associated issues through
dramatization, (b) to assist voters in prioritizing issues on a political agenda
8 5 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p,150
8 6 David A. Schultz, ed., Lights, camera, campaign, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004,
p.7
8 7 Prior, Markus and Iyengar, Shanto, “Political Advertising: What Effect on Commercial
Advertisers?” 1999
Retrieved June 28, 2005 from www.stanford.edu/~siyengar/research/papers/advertising.hrml
8 8 Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns: Styles and
Content of Televised Political Advertising (Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2001) p. 108
8 9 Schultz. David A., ed., Lights, camera, campaign, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004)
p.7
30
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that ultimately favors the sponsoring candidate’s record, public statements,
positions, and so forth, (c) to increase interest in the campaign by stimulating
public talk and media coverage, (d) to increase the voters’ evaluation of the
opposition on both key political and stylistic role dimensions, and (e) to ensure
that voters’ evaluations of the candidates becomes so polarized that their
electoral choice becomes simplified.9 0 In the following pages, three types of
negative political advertising will be discussed to gain further understanding
of negative campaign strategy.
1. The Direct attack.
The direct attack ad only attacks and does not compare one candidate with
another. Merritt (1984) as cited in Copeland & Johnson-Cartee, suggests that a
negative attack ad “focuses primarily on degrading perceptions of the rival, to
the advantage of the sponsor.”9 1 Accoring to Gronbeck (1985), as cited in
Copeland & Johnson-Cartee, the assaultive or direct attack spot is the riskiest
of the three types of negative advertising. However, Copeland and
Johnson-Cartee (1990b) found that “the direct attack ad created a statistically
significant decrease in the targeted candidate’s evaluation scores and the
targeted candidate’s voting preference scores.” They also suggest that when
9 0 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.25
9 1 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.39
9 2 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.39
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creating negative political ads, political advertisers must be wary of violating
no
the public notion of “good taste”.
2. The Direct Comparison Ad
Some negative political ads compare the candidate with the opponent.
The ad features the candidate as well as the opponent and contrasts the records,
experience, or issue positions of the candidates. Gronbeck (1985) as cited in
Copeland and Johnson-Cartee, suggests that the direct comparison ad works
on the assumption that voters actively compare contenders in the
decision-making process.9 4 The strategy of this type is to claim the superiority,
but at the same input the inferiority of the opposition arguing that the
candidate is the best choice for the position.9 5 Copeland and Johnson-Cartee
(1990b) found the direct comparison spots also created the greatest
statistically significant decrease in the targeted candidate’s evaluation scores
and candidate voting preference scores.9 6
3. The implied Comparison
Implied comparison ads do not name opposition. These ads give the
Details of the candidate’s position, record or contribution which has been
important to the campaign. However, opponents are not mentioned in the ads.
9 3 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.41
9 4 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.42
9 5 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.43
9 6 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
32
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Implied comparison ads are not negative themselves, but the public
interpretation of the ads make them negative ads. One advantage is that it
seems that the candidate is not running a negative campaign. It is the voters
who supply the negative, connotative aspect for these types of ads.9 7
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.43
9 7 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.46
33
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VII. Analyses of the DPP’s 2000 and 2004 TV Commercials
The theoretical frameworks and concepts presented above can help
analyze the DPP’s TV ads in an operational context. In the following pages,
analyses will based on the frameworks of strategies including incumbency
style, challenger style, In Man-Out Man strategy, positional strategies as well
as negative campaign strategies. The assumption is that the DPP’s strategies
for TV ads were different during the 2000 and 2004 Taiwan presidential
elections. The main question is what the differences were between the DPP’s
TV ads in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections when Chen was the
challenger in 2000 and the incumbent in 2004. What are the possible reasons
for these changes?
(a) The DPP’s TV ads: Strategies in the 2000 presidential election
Twenty-three TV ads were released during the campaign period. The first
examination criterion for these advertisements is to study the effect of social
endorsement in Chen’s TV ads. The last-minute endorsement of Chen
Shui-bian by the President of the Academia Sinica and Nobel laureate, Yuan T.
Lee, was thought to have played a role in Chen’s victory. According to the
analysis, after the video was released, Chen’s support went from 22.9% to
QO
24.2%. There was an advertisement released on 10 March, 2000, in which
Lee had the main role, telling people why he supports Chen Shui-bian. Lee is
9 8 Hsieh, Ban-Chan, Anyses of2000’ opinion polling in the 2000 presidential elections ,retrived
August 13,2005 from
http://www.stat.fj u.edu.tw/people/2000%C l'%B2%CE%A4j%BF%EF%C 1 %CD%B6%D5%
C5%DC%A4%C6%A4%C0%AAR.doc.
34
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considered a member of the social elite in Taiwan and has a good reputation in
the academic field. Furthermore, in the advertisement, he also emphasized that
QQ • »
Taiwan was declining because of the problems of “black gold” , which is
considered a long-existing problem the KMT has brought to Taiwan’s
political culture. In another TV commercial, several social elites are shown
supporting Chen Shui-bian, such as the founder and artistic director of the
Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan, Lin Hwai-min, and the Chairmen of the
Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC) and Evergreen Marine
Corporation. The perception of social elite endorsement, although categorized
as the incumbency style by Trent and Friedenberg, can also be crucial for a
non-incumbent.1 0 0
To the DPP, the significance of the 2000 presidential election goes well
beyond deciding the president of Taiwan for the next four years. However,
winning the election would be a key step in the Taiwanization and
democratization process under way in Taiwan. The election and its outcome
will have far-reaching consequences for a wide range of domestic and
international issues and players.1 0 1
9 9 Black gold is a term used in the Taiwan to refer to political corruption. The "black" here refers
to the obtaining of money (the "gold") through a dark, secretive, and therefore corrupt method.
1 0 0 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.87
1 0 1 Alagappa, Muthian, ed., Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and
Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) 35
35
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109
Going back to 1979, The Kaohsiung Incident galvanized the
Taiwanese on the island and overseas into political action. The Tangwai1 0 3
democratic opposition started to question the KMT's anachronistic claim to
represent all of China, and began to work towards ending forty years of martial
law. In September 1986, this movement culminated in the formation of the
Democratic Progressive Party which then began its growth into a full-fledged
opposition party. Several of the accused in the Kaohsiung incident showed up
1 0 2 The Kaohsiung Incident was the result of pro-democracy demonstrations that occurred in
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Republic of China to commemorate Human Rights Day on December 10,
1979. It erupted following the police raid of "Formosa Magazine", an illegal publication
designed to support the end of KMT monopolization of power in Taiwan. The ROC
Government Information Office under the leadership of James Soong hoped to chill opposition
voices through heavyhanded methods. The protest disintegrated into a brawl as protesters,
police and undercover agents collided. Soong addressed the public in a speech condemning the
protesters, labelling one of the leaders, Shih Ming-the The incident publicized the oppressive
tactics of the government in ruling Taiwan and the trial of eight leaders of the protest allowed a
team of lawyers to publicly question the practices of torture used by the KMT to extract
confessions. Most defense attorneys and defendants were members of the Chinese Comparative
Law Society which is now the Taiwan Law Society.
One of the accused, [[Lin Yi-hsiung]], was routinely tortured by police interrogators. Then, on
February 28, 1980, while Lin's wife was discussing his case, Lin's mother and twin 7 year old
girls were murdered in his home. The event, known as the "Lin Family Murders," remains
unsolved. Several of the accused later became politicians after completion of their prison terms,
while members of the defense team became leaders of the Tangwai (Outside Party) movement
and later the Democratic Progressive Party. Members of the defense team included Chen
Shui-bian (President of the Republic of China|President of the ROC), Su Tseng-chang (current
Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party) and Frank Hsieh (Premier of the Republic of
China). Those amongst the accused were Annette Lu (Vice President of the ROC), Shi Ming-teh,
and Lin Yi-hsiung (environmental activist and former DPP chairman).
1 0 3 The Tangwai, outside the party movement was a political movement in the Republic of
China on Taiwan in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Although the Kuomintang had allowed
contested elections for a small number of seats in Legislative Yuan, opposition parties were still
forbidden. As a result, many opponents of the Kuomintang, officially classified as independents,
ran and were elected as members outside the party. Because the majority of seats in the
Legislative Yuan were held by delegates elected in 1947, pending the retaking of the Mainland
China|Mainland, the Tangwai movement had no possibility of seizing power, but they were able
to use the legislature as a forum for debating the ruling Kuomintang. The members of the
Tangwai movement formed the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986. Although still illegal,
the KMT did not take action against the DPP and the party was legalized in 1991. Many current
politicians in Taiwan, most notably President of the Republic of China Chen Shui-bian and Vice
President Annette Lu were active in the Tangwai movement.
36
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in a TV ad. Members of the defense team, including Chen Shui-bian, Su
Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh, all showed up in the advertisement, their
presence implying a better future for Taiwan. The ad also implies that
democratization in Taiwan can somehow contribute to the Dangwai members
and asks people not to forget that it is not easy to make Taiwan become a
democratic country. It is the people’s turn to be the master in Taiwan. This ad
incorporated no negative elements. However, it was an implied comparison ad
which reminds the audience of the white terror era in Taiwan. Therefore a
change is necessary at this time and Chen Shui-bian is the best person to bring
about the change. Besides the important value of democracy in Chen’s ads,
emphasizing the value of loving Taiwan is another strategy used by Chen’s
camp. However, there is also the corresponding suggest on that the other two
candidates do not love Taiwan as much as Chen does.
In Chen’s TV commercials, there are several advertisements
emphasizing the problem of black gold in Taiwan. The DPP gathered all the
images of all the black gold politicians who Lien Chan and James Soong
have supported, indicating that the KMT is a corrupt party. Direct attack
strategy is also employed in Chen’s ads. Besides criticizing the KMT, Lien
Chan has also been another target of the DPP’s negative campaign. Lien,
originating from the Taiwanese aristocracy, was seen as aloof and unable to
empathize with the common people. He is notorious for having an $800
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NTD lunch box and for playing golf, which is an expensive leisure activity in
Taiwan.
Emphasizing optimism is also a strategy that is present in Chen’s TV
ads. One ad took as its message the importance of democracy, suggesting
that by electing Chen as the new president, the dream of reaching a real
democracy would be fulfilled. The elements of happiness and the promise of
a hopeful future were contained in several ads. As Trent and Friedenberg
have suggested, a part of the challenger style is reliance on the
positive—emphasizing hope and faith in the future, an optimism that the
nation’s tomorrow will be better than today.1 0 4
(b) The DPP’s TV ads: Strategies in the 2004 presidential election
Unlike TV ads in 2000, more negative messages were delivered by Chen
during this campaign. Twelve out of the twenty-five TV ads contained
negative messages in 2004 while only three out of twenty-three TV ads were
negative ads in 2000. Most of them focused on criticizing Lien Chan and the
KMT under Lien. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) focused its
campaign propaganda on the huge party assets the KMT acquired while they
were in power, as well as their recent shift on the issue of sovereignty. One
of the TV commercials emphasized how inconsistent the KMT has been in its
words and actions, particularly with regard to party assets, including those
properties the KMT took over directly from the Japanese government. The
1 0 4 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
38
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other main theme of the party's new propaganda efforts challenged the
KMT's position on the issue of national sovereignty.
Chen’s groups seemed not to be focusing on issues of external
policies, but instead on issues of the voters’ own economic concerns. The
Pan-Green Coalition raised the issue of Lien Chan's personal wealth and
properties he owned, asserting that the KMT had illegally acquired them
while it was the ruling party. In response, the Pan-Blue Coalition
counteracted by asking why Chen Shui-bian has become much wealthier
since assuming the presidency. These types of ads were mostly direct attack
ads and the direct comparison ads including the comparison of the
accomplishments of the DPP and the KMT. The ads as described in
Copeland and Johnson-Cartee call for the viewer to draw conclusions based
on specific bits of evidence, arguing that only one candidate is the best
choice for the position.1 0 5
Because of gender stereotypes, women have a number of image
problems to overcome that a comparable male candidate might not face.1 0 6
“They are often viewed as less competent and unable to handle the tough
negotiations associated with politics so women candidates are expected to be
more much specific in their campaign messages.”1 0 7 Annette Lu was the
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.98
1 0 5 Copeland, Gary A. & Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of
Age. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publishers, 1991) p.43
1 0 6 Kahn, K.E ” Gender differences in campaign messages: The political advertisements of men
and women candidates for U.S. Senate.” Political Research Quarterly, 1993, p.46
1 0 7 Eagly, A.H. and Mikhijani,M.G, Gender and the evaluation of leaders: A
39
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108
vice-presidential candidate of Chen Shui-bian. One political ad which
focused on Lu did not address specific policy issues, rather but focused more
on the role of women in society and politics. There was only one
advertisement emphasizing the outstanding performance of female
politicians, which is an accepted and encouraged value in Taiwanese politics.
However, in another of Chen’s 2004 TV commercials, the images of women
were restricted to the stereotypical roles of mother and wife, and as the
nurturers of the family.
The use of the national anthem in the Democratic Progressive Party's
(DPP) campaign advertisements aroused mixed responses from both the
Pan-Green and Pan-Blue camps. The use of the national anthem as the
backdrop of the commercial was intended to tone down the party's
pro-independence image and appeal to the so-called "middle-of-the-road"
voters who hadn’t decided on which presidential candidate to support. The
national anthem used to be the anthem of the Chinese Nationalist Party
(KMT) and is full of KMT symbols.
meta-analysis.Psychological Bulletin, 1992, p. 11.
1 0 8 Hsiu-lien Annette Lu has been notably more outspoken in favor of Taiwan independence
than President Chen Shui-bian, and as such has been more heavily attacked than Chen both by
the government of the People's Republic of China as well as by supporters of Chinese
reunification on Taiwan. She has often appeared at odds with Chen, particularly in regards to
political status of Taiwan cross-Strait policy. While Chen initially sent conciliatory signals, Lu
made inflammatory comments. Her bluntness led the mainland media to label her "insane" and
the "scum of the nation. "In the months leading to the ROC presidential election, 2004]] there
was intense speculation as to whether she would be again chosen Chen's running mate, as party
leaders had pressured him to choose someone else, presumably less controversial and outspoken
to appeal to swing voters. But on December 11,2003, Chen officially nominated Lu to run for a
second term.
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As the campaign heated up, the candidates had sought to use differing
perspectives on cross-Strait relations to attract different voters, yet by
January 2004 the distinctions among their positions were less clear. All
opposed a declaration of Taiwan’s independence from China but stated that
at present Taiwan is sovereign and independent of the PRC and that the
PRC’s "one country, two systems" plan for reunification is completely
unacceptable. In addition to stating their willingness to stand up for Taiwan,
the candidates also made conciliatory appeals toward China as well,
presumably to reassure both Beijing and their constituents that they would
not be unduly confrontational. All supported liberalizing and expanding
direct contacts between Taiwan and China and offered to visit the PRC, if
elected, in order to tone down hostilities.
In comparing the DPP’s 2000 and 2004 presidential election ads several
differences emerge:
1. The Chen camp used more negative advertising to attack Lien Chan.
Research on negative political advertising indicates that voters dislike
negative ads and consider them uninformative and unethical. Negative
political advertising also may produce unintended effects, including a
backlash against its sponsor. That is, evaluations of the sponsor of negative
advertising may be more adversely affected than evaluations of the target.
Political candidates, therefore, employ a mix of strategies that includes the
use of comparative political advertising as a means of communicating
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negative information about a candidate's opponent to voters while avoiding
the stigma attached to purely negative attack advertising.
In Chen’s advertisements, they used comparative methods to
distinguish Chen and Lien’s personalities, as well as their achievements.
Negative commercials are more likely to have policy-oriented content,
because campaigners need a clear reason to attack the opponent.1 0 9 In 2000,
since there wasn’t a record they could compare themselves to, Chen’s ads
focus on “change” and the value of democracy since the KMT has ruled
Taiwan for fifty years. It was presumed that the concept of “change” would
convince voters to support him. Furthermore, Chen’s camp tried to deliver a
message that only by voting for the DPP could Taiwan achieve complete
democracy. Those who worked hard to make Taiwan a democratic country
in the Formosa event1 1 0 anniversary TV commercials all seemed to become
the endorser of Chen Shui-bian. Compared to the 2000 TV commercials, the
2004 ads were not as creative. However we find that the 2004 TV
commercials were more policy-oriented, whereas the 2000 TV commercials
made more strident emotional appeals.
1 0 9 West, M. Darrell. Air W ar: Television Advertising in Election Campaign,
1952-2000.(Washington, D.C.,: CQPress,2001) p.71.
1 1 0 Formosa was a magazine created by Tangwai individuals in Taiwan during the summer of
1979. It opposed Kuomintang's political monopoly in the Republic of China government. A
police raid of the "Formosa" Press caused the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979. The
opening celebration took place in Mandarina Crown Flotel in the afternoon of September 8,
1979. A blockade by Kuomintang military ensued, sometimes known as the Mandarina Crown
Hotel Incident. For the next three months until the raid, branches were opened throughout
Taiwan. Opening was followed by speeches and conferences.
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2. In Chen’s 2000 TV ads, more negative attacks were focused on the
opposing party, the KMT, rather than on candidates. The reason might be
that the main appeal of Chen’s camp was that they stood for a change of
party or the regime. Although the personality of the candidate was important,
the center of attacks in the 2000 presidential campaign was the corruption of
the KMT. In 2004, Chen’s TV ads mainly attacked Lien Chan, his
background and his corrupt past in the KMT. The reason for this might be
that because of the cooperation of the KMT and the PFP, the party identity
was vague. Attacking the KMT alone was not effective. This might imply
that although the consideration of party differences is important as a
campaign strategy, the role of the candidates in the campaign can be also an
important variable.
3. In 2004, emphasizing the Hakka Culture in Taiwan was part of the
political ads on television. There were two commercials showing that Chen’s
government was committed to the development of the Hakka people in the
2004 TV ads. Ethnic issues were more emphasized in the 2004 campaign.
Besides Hakka culture, the trend of localization and Taiwanization can be
found in Chen’s TV commercials. In short, the DPP’s campaign has enabled
Chen to consolidate support among sections of the island’s ruling elite that
believe their economic and geopolitical interests have been undermined by the
fact that Taiwan is not recognized as an independent state. Such manipulation
can be observed in the referendum questions and in the 228 Hand-in- Hand
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Rally.1 1 1 According to Trent and Friedenberg, the manipulation or
management of important issues is another strategy of incumbency.1 1 2
When the theoretical frameworks were applied to the DPP’s TV ads in
the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, some restrictions occurred. For
example, because of the dynamics between Taiwan and Mainland China, the
issues are at once both “domestic” and international. This will influence the
result of the manipulation generated by the television ads because some
people might not think these issues needed to be discussed or are not willing to
show what stand they take on this issue.
1 1 1 The "'228 Hand-in-Hand Rally'", meaning literally "February 28th, one million
people hand-in-hand to protect Taiwan") was a demonstration in the form o f a human
chain held in Taiwan on Peace Memorial Day (February 28], 2004. Over 1 million Taiwanese
formed a 500-kilometer (300-mile) long human chain, from Taiwan's northernmost city,
Keelung, to its southern tip, to commemorate the 228 Incident, to call for peace, and to protest
the deployment of missiles by the People's Republic of China aimed at Taiwan along the
mainland coast. This demonstration was inspired by Baltic way, the human chain comprised of
two million that was organized in 1989, where the Soviet Union later invaded to stop the Baltic
States from declaring independence. Although billed as non-political, the event was organized
by the Pan-Green Coalition and took place only a few weeks before the ROC presidential
election, 2004. Some of the symbolism of the demonstration, particularly at the point in the
event where participants "turn away from China" (in this context, "China" refers to the People's
Republic of China) veered clearly toward support of Taiwanese independence, and hence was
not attended by members of the Pan-Blue Coalition.
There were rumors that actor Sean Connery was going to participate in the demonstration, but
this did not occur. A People First Party legislator claimed that Connery cancelled the trip after
being informed by the PFP that the demonstration was a political event. However, it is unclear
whether Connery ever had any intention of visiting Taiwan.
1 1 2 Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign Communication:
Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher) ,p.87
44
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VIII. Conclusion
One continuous issue found in the DPP’s TV ads is the relationship
between Taiwan and mainland China as well as the related issue of ethnic
identity in Taiwan. No matter what stance individual candidates may take in
the future, the “issue of Taiwanization” will be a part of mainstream politics.
On the other hand, the Chinese government also has played a role in Taiwan’s
presidential elections. For example, shortly before the election, the leaders of
the People's Republic of China attempted to influence the outcome, warning
that the PRC would not "sit idly by" if Taiwan moved toward independence
and that "independence means war." Following the election, PRC analysts
reached the conclusion that the PRC statements had actually been
counterproductive and helped Chen to win; consequently, the PRC avoided
making such an open attempt to influence the 2004 elections.
An analysis has been presented to explain Chen’s TV ads in the 2000
and 2004 Taiwan presidential elections. The strategies of these two elections
were different because of the variables represented by the candidate, party and
contentious issues at that time. The frequent uses of negative messages in
Chen’s 2004TV ads also reflect the competitive atmosphere of the 2004
presidential election. A study of Chen’s TV ads during the 2000 and 2004
presidential elections not only reveals the possible reasons for Chen’s victory,
but also provides insight into contemporary Taiwanese society and the issues
that were relevant to the people at the time. Since Chen’s victory in 2000 is a
45
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significant one in Taiwan’s political history, the TV ads are an important
record of that campaign, as well as providing a witness to history.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Literature Resources:
English:
Alagappa, Muthian, ed., Taiwan’ s Presidential Politics: Democratization and
Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.,
2001)
Biocca, Frank, ed., Television and Political Advertising VI: Psychological
Processes (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, Inc., Publisher, 1991)
Biocca, Frank, ed., Television and Political Advertising V.2: Signs, Codes, and
Images (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associations, Inc., Publisher, 1991)
Cheng, Tun-jen and Haggard, Stephan,ed., Political Change in Taiwan
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc. 1993)
Eagly, A.H.and Makhijani, M.G., Gender and the evaluation o f leaders: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 1992, p. 111.
Farrell, M. David, Schmitt-Beck, Rudiger,ed., Do Political Campaigns Matter?:
Campaign effects in elections and referendums (London: Routledge,2002)p.l45
Johnston, Anne and Kaid, Lunda Lee, Videostyle in Presidential Campaigns:
Styles and Content o f Televised Political Advertising (Connecticut and London:
Praeger, 2001
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Kahn,K.F. ” Gender differences in campaign messages: The political
advertisements of men and women candidates for U.S. Senate.” Political
Research Quarterly, 1993
Kem, Montague, 30-Second Politics: Political advertising in the Eighties (New
York: Praeger Publisher, 1989)
Powerr, Joseph and Cowart, Joseph, ed., Political Communication: Inside and
Out (MA: Allyn and Bacon,2003)
Prior, Markus and Iyengar, Shanto, “Political Advertising: What Effect on
Commercial Advertisers?” 1999
Rigger, Shelley, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for democracy (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999)
Romanow,Walter I.,Repentigny, Michel De, Cunningham, Stanley
B.,Soderlund, Walter C.m and Hildebrandt, Kai,ed., Television Advertising in
Canadian Elections: The Attack Mode, 1993 (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1999)
Schultz, David A. ed., Lights, camera, campaign, (New York: Peterang
Publishing, 2004)
Trent S., Judith and Friedenberg V.,Robert. 2000. Political Campaign
Communication: Principles and Practices. (Westport CT, Praeger Publisher)
Tsang and Tien ed., Democratization in Taiwan (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1999West,M. Darrell. Air War: Television Advertising in Election Campaigns,
;0J2-2000.(Washington, D.C.:CQPress,2001)
48
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Wu, Yu-Shan, “Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power
Transfer”, Asian Survey 41(1), p40-48
Chinese:
lEtpm m ws
2004
Internet Resources:
English
Taipei Times www.taipeitimes.com
Chinese
United Daily News http://www.udn.com.tw
DPP’s website www.dpp.org.tw
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Chen, Cheng-Na (author)

Core Title A comparison of the DPP's TV ads in the 2000 and 2004 Taiwan presidential elections

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag business administration, marketing,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Hollihan, Thomas A. (committee member), Lynch, Daniel (committee member), Rosen, Stanley (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-49566

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Document Type Thesis

Rights Chen, Cheng-Na

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Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

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