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Ideological threat, social identity, and consensus estimation

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Ideological threat, social identity, and consensus estimation

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IDEOLOGICAL THREAT, SOCIAL IDENTITY,
AND CONSENSUS ESTIMATION
by
Jared Bowden Kenworthy
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PSYCHOLOGY)
May 2002
Copyright © 2002 Jared Bowden Kenworthy
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UMI Number: 3074936
Copyright 2002 by
Kenworthy, Jared Bowden
All rights reserved.
_ _ ®
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CA LIFO R NIA
The Graduate School
U niversity Park
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089-1695
This d issertatio n , w ritte n b y
Jared Bowden Kenworthy____________________
U nder th e d ire c tio n o f A il. D issertatio n
C om m ittee, a n d approved b y a ll its m em bers,
has been p resen ted to an d accepted b y The
G raduate School , in p a rtia l fu lfillm e n t o f
requirem ents fo r th e degree o f
D O C TO R O F P H IL O S O P H Y
’o f G rad u ate Studies
D a te 06 March 2002
DI SSER TA T IO N C O M M IT T E E
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Dedication
Enviously, to my children, Jacob and Kate, whose minds are not
locked, whose ideologies can still absorb and assimilate the world rather than
impose themselves on it, whose reaction to ideological challenge is a question
rather than a decided answer.
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iii
Acknowledgments
First, I acknowledge the unwearying, concise, and open-minded
Norman Miller, who has had immeasurable influence on my intellect. He
gives direction by giving independence to learn and be challenged by data
and theory. I thank Jerry Jellison for his enthusiasm toward social
psychology, for his ability to recognize conceptual relationships everywhere
he looks, for his injection of humanity into this science, for his warmth,
encouragement, and sincere friendship.
I acknowledge the Valentine fund and the Haynes foundation for their
financial support of my work.
Finally, I thank Mary Kate for her admirable endurance of living with me
through graduate school.
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Table of Contents
Contents Page Number
Dedication ii
Acknowledgments iii
List of Tables vi
List of Figures vii
Abstract viii
Preface ix
Introduction 1
Social Projection 2
Theoretical Background 3
Explanations for consensual bias 5
Theoretical Juncture 8
Projection by Individuals as Group Members 13
Proposed Model 16
Overview and Predictions 17
Study 1 18
Method 19
Participants and Design 19
Materials and Procedure 20
Results 24
Manipulation Checks 24
Consensus Estimates 25
Discussion 30
Study 2 31
Method 31
Participants and Design 31
Materials 32
Procedure 32
Results 38
Manipulation Checks 38
Threat, Social Identity, and Consensus Estimation 39
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V
Ancillary Measures 41
Discussion 42
Study 3 43
Method 45
Participants and Design 45
Materials and Procedure 45
Results 46
Manipulation Checks 46
Threat, Social Identity, and Consensus Estimation 47
Ancillary Measures 52
Discussion 53
General Discussion 55
Theoretical Contribution 61
Conclusions 63
Bibliography 64
Appendix A 75
Appendix B 76
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Title
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
List of Tables
Paoe Number
1: Mean scores on manipulation check items
as a function of threat condition, Study 1. 26
2: Inter-correlations among social identity
items, Study 2. 39
3: Mean social identity item scores as a function
of threat condition, Study 2. 40
4: Inter-correlations among social identity
items, Study 3. 49
5: Factor loadings from a principal components
analysis of social identity items, Study 3. 51
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vii
List of Figures
Title
Figure 1. Differential bias in consensus estimates
by minority and majority members, as
reported in Kenworthy (1998).
Figure 2. Proposed model of the role of consensus
estimation in re-strengthening in-group identity
following threat.
Figure 3. Timeline of events for Internet procedures,
Study 1. Each segment of the horizontal line
represents a distinct page.
Figure 4. Scree plot of eigenvalues for principal
components analysis of social identity items,
Study 3.
Figure 5. Mean component 3 (cohesive + ashamed)
score (± SE)as a function of threat and order of
consensus estimation, Study 3.
Paoe Number
7
17
24
50
52
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viii
Abstract
A series of 3 experiments examined the role of ideological threat in consensus
estimation, and the subsequent role of consensus estimation in coping with
such threat. Study 1 manipulated threat by having participants read a
summary of a news article purportedly containing statements by scientists that
a certain opinion position, if adopted at a legislative policy level, would either
harm or benefit society. Threatened participants, as compared with no threat
and control participants, estimated higher consensus for their position. Study
2 conceptually replicated Study 1. The threat manipulation, relative to the
secure condition, led to weakened in-group identification and exaggerated
consensus. Study 3 varied threat and the order in which consensus estimate
and in-group identification questions were asked, and found that threat again
weakened social identity and increased consensus estimation. Also, in-group
identification was found to be re-strengthened after consensus estimation for
threat participants.
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ix
Preface
No man really knows about other human beings. The best he can do is
to suppose that they are like himself.
- John Steinbeck, The W inter of Our Discontent
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1
Ideological threat, social identity, and consensus estimation
Currently, in early 2002, political and military tension is high between
Asian neighbors India and Pakistan. To political historians, the present
conflict over the disputed Himalayan Kashmir region is not surprising given
the five-decade-old feud between the two countries. What is notable about it
in the present day, however, is that India and Pakistan are not just neighbors,
they are nuclear neighbors.
The current potential for nuclear instability can be traced back to May
of 1998, when the government of India performed a series of underground
nuclear weapons tests after numerous public threats to do so. In addition to
mild global distress and worry over the incident, this prompted Pakistan to
announce several nuclear tests of its own. This episode is astounding not
because India’s nuciear testing threatened to begin an arms race, but rather
because no other country attempted to dissuade and prevent the Indian
government from executing the tests, even in the light of their very public
warnings that they intended to do so.
In the United States, the CIA conducted an investigation to find out why
American intelligence operations and spy tactics failed to correctly monitor
and pursue a prevention to the nuclear crisis. The consensus within the
American government was that this was indeed a serious intelligence blunder,
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2
perhaps the worst gaffe in the past ten years (Wolf, 1998). CIA officials
attributed the mistake to one, bottom-line issue: American Intelligence agents
had an “everyone-thinks-like-us” mind set (Wolf, 1998). Thus, when Indian
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) officials announced nuclear tests, American
Intelligence agents, as well as policy-makers “misread the BJP as U.S.-style
politicians unlikely to follow through on campaign promises when confronted
with all the costs” (Wolf, 1998). This “everyone-thinks-like-me” mind-set is the
layperson’s term for what is often referred to as social projection (Miller,
Gross, & Holtz, 1991), or sometimes, the False Consensus Effect (Ross,
Greene & House, 1977).
Social Projection
Early in philosophical writings notable thinkers have recognized a
universal tendency to project one’s attributes onto others (e.g., Bacon, 1853).
Projection of one’s (negative) traits onto others has also been studied as an
ego-defense mechanism (e.g., Freud, 1937; Holmes, 1978; Newman, Duff, &
Baumeister, 1997). Part of the literature on social projection concerns the
extent to which people attribute their attitudes, opinions, and beliefs to others,
and the degree to which they err in those judgments (Allport, 1924; Crano,
1983; Gross & Miller, 1997; Holtz & Miller, 1985, 2000; Krueger & Clement,
1997; Marks & Miller, 1985; Marks & Miller, 1988; Mullen et al., 1985; Mullen
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3
& Hu, 1988; Ross et al., 1977; Sherman, Chassin, Presson, & Agostinelli,
1984). Some of these studies assess social consensus by asking social
perceivers to estimate the percentage of others who agree or disagree with
them on a given attitude dimension. Researchers who use the false
consensus paradigm (Krueger & Clement, 1997, 1994; see also Krueger,
1998, for a review) compare the estimates of endorsement for a position by
those individuals who are in favor of and against the particular position. One
general, robust finding has been that people overestimate the number of
others who agree with them for a given attitude position (Ross et al., 1977).
Whereas it has been known for decades that the phenomenon of
consensus overestimation does occur (e.g., Gross & Miller, 1997; Krueger &
Clement, 1997; Krueger, 1998; Marks & Miller, 1988; Mullen et al., 1985;
Mullen & Hu, 1988; Ross et al., 1977), it is less clear why it occurs and what
conditions moderate its incidence. This paper will explore some hypotheses
about the causes and consequences of exaggerated social consensus for
ideological attitude positions.
Theoretical Background
The process of social projection-the ascription of one’s attributes or
attitudes to others-has been conceptually linked to social comparison theory
(Aliport, 1924; Festinger, 1954; Miller, Gross, & Holtz, 1991), which, more
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4
broadly, is concerned with the process of comparing one’s own abilities,
opinions, and characteristics with those of other people. Social comparison
serves three major functions: self-improvement, self- or ego-enhancement,
and self-assessment or validation (e.g., Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993; Taylor,
Wood, & Lichtman, 1983; Wheeler, 1991). Researchers have suggested that,
in some cases, social projection may serve some of the same functions
(Allport, 1924; Miller et al., 1991). By comparing the self with others,
validation may be obtained (e.g., Fazio, 1979; Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993);
likewise, by assuming similarity between self and others via social projection,
one may achieve a sense of validation.
Another possible function of social projection is to protect or enhance
the ego by manufacturing normativeness, and thus social validation, for one’s
position. Indeed, evidence shows that certain conditions such as a threat to
self, or one’s group identity, can increase consensus estimates1 (Agostinelli,
1. Under certain circumstances even an underestimation bias is viewed as
self-esteem maintenance or ego-protection in that, for example, if fewer
people agree with me, my position is more unique. A unique ability, position,
or viewpoint is often seen as more desirable than one that is widely held (e.g.,
Bosveld, Koomen,& van der Pligt, 1996; Brewer, 1991; Gross & Miller, 1997;
Marks, 1984; Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Copper, 1992; Suls & Wan, 1987).
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5
Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1992; Kenworthy, 1998; Kenworthy & Miller,
2001; Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984). This suggests that, in turn, an
exaggerated perception of social consensus may be useful in coping with
such threat.
Explanations for consensual bias. Although people generally
overestimate the degree to which others agree with them (Ross et al., 1977)
thereby producing a mean consensus estimate of over 50% (Gross & Miller,
1997; Krueger & Clement, 1994,1997; Mullen & Hu, 1988), there are
important theoretical qualifications to this finding. One qualification is that
consensus estimation errors (i.e., deviations from reality) by those in the
numerical minority and majority differ. Specifically, minorities tend to
overestimate consensus, and majorities typically underestimate it. Moreover,
the respective biases among numerical minorities tend to exceed those of
numerical majorities (Gross & Miller, 1997 ; Krueger & Clement, 1997). That
is, the degree of minority overestimation exceeds the degree of majority
underestimation. In reviews of the false consensus effect and consensual
bias (e.g., Gross & Miller, 1997; Krueger, 1998; Krueger & Clement, 1997;
Marks & Miller, 1987; Mullen & Hu, 1988), one explanation for this difference
is a motivational account.
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6
A motivational explanation predicts that minorities will feel threatened
and anxious because of their minority status, but that majorities, because of
their own dominant numerical status, will feel no such apprehension. Further,
a motivational account predicts that numerical minorities overestimate
consensus for the purpose of perceiving one's group as larger, in an attempt
to perceive one’s position as more normative, and thus socially validated to a
greater degree. In turn, social projection assuages aversive feelings
associated with their minority status.
Alternatively, the difference between the degree of bias between
numerical majority and minority groups has been explained as regression to
the mean (Krueger, 1998; Krueger & Clement, 1997). Specifically, most
people are, by definition, in the majority and thus there will be differential
regression to the mean (which exceeds 50%) by majority and minority
members. Minorities, being more extreme, will regress more, and majorities,
being more normative, will regress less. This is especially true if, as has been
asserted (Krueger, 1998; Krueger & Clement, 1997), most people (both actual
majorities and minorities) think that they are in the majority. Figure 1
represents actual consensus estimation data averaging across six attitude
issues (Kenworthy, 1998). It illustrates the differential biases exhibited by
numerical minorities and majorities of 30% and 70% actual group sizes,
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7
Figure 1. Differential bias in consensus estimates by minority and majority
members, as reported in Kenworthy (1998).
2
a
a .
o
o.
o
®
o >
2
c
o
o
o
0.
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
70
A= -15
A= +25
Minority actual
prevalence
Average estimate Majority actual
by both groups prevalence
respectively. Because most people generally estimate their group size to be a
moderate majority (i.e., above 50%), the raw difference between the actual
prevalence and assumed prevalence will always be greater for minorities. For
example, if the average consensus estimate by both majorities and minorities
is 55%2 (see Figure 1), then the difference between that estimate and reality
for minorities is 25%, whereas the difference between it and reality for
majorities is only 15%. Thus, no motivational variables necessarily need be
2. 55% was the average estimate made by endorsers and opposers (N =
60) across the six attitude issues, as reported in Kenworthy (1998).
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8
present to produce a larger consensual bias by minority members than by
majority members. The only necessary condition to produce differential bias
from reality is that there be a difference in the relative size of the two groups
such that the actual size of one group is more closely approximated by its
estimates (e.g., 55%) than is that of the other.
The arguments for and against a motivational difference between
majority and minority groups have been based, until recently, primarily on
post-hoc, theoretical grounds. No experimental (i.e., non-correlational)
evidence had been brought to bear on the discussion until a recent
examination (viz., Kenworthy & Miller, 2001). Although they (Kenworthy &
Miller, 2001) could not rule out a contribution by regression, (see Krueger &
Clement, 1997), their data show that motivational differences between
majorities and minorities can account for some of the difference between their
consensus estimates. Kenworthy and Miller (2001) demonstrated that
experimentally-induced minority numerical status is indeed aversive and leads
to greater consensual bias than does majority numerical status.
Theoretical Juncture
These findings (Kenworthy & Miller, 2001) notwithstanding, some key
issues were not addressed. First, they argued that threat leads to negative
feelings, such as anxiety and discomfort, which can be alleviated by
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9
consensus overestimation. Their methodology, however, did not allow for
such a test of the mitigating function of consensus overestimation. Thus,
whether consensus estimation actually relieves the negative affect associated
with threat remains an unanswered empirical question. Second, their threat
inductions consisted of random assignment to instructional information which
stated that the respondent’s attitude position was either a position endorsed
by the numerical majority or the minority (Kenworthy & Miller, 2001,
experiments 1 and 2). They subsequently measured consensus estimation.
Otherwise stated, they manipulated group size and then measured group size.
This seemingly tautologically flawed design was not methodologically fatal,
however, given that the predicted interaction was obtained within the context
of other orthogonally-manipulated variables (viz., in-group or out-group focus,
growing or shrinking group size). Specifically, those who were experimentally
induced to believe they held a minority position gave higher estimates when
told their group was growing, and lower estimates when told their group was
shrinking. This was only the case when they were made to focus on the
growth or decline of their own in-group. When they were given the same
growth/decline information, but were made instead to focus on the size of the
out-group, they gave equally inflated estimates. Thus, the threatening nature
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of a growing out-group size, to numerical minorities, led to participants
ignoring experimental instructions and inflating consensus estimates.
One issue with their manipulation of threat, though, is that in spite of
the greater correctness of an attitude position implicit in majority numerical
status, this inference is not necessarily true. Nevertheless, this unfounded
inference of correctness based on numerical superiority may be the reason
that social dominance is often substituted for numerosity. At the same time,
however, one can think of many instances of majority / minority numerical
status differences where the numerical minority group is dominant on the
relevant comparison dimension. Whites in 1970s South Africa, for example,
were the numerically disadvantaged group, but were clearly in control of the
resources and were socially dominant. Likewise, in the present day, Mormons
comprise only a 40% minority of the population of Salt Lake City, yet members
of this religious group hold most key business and political positions in the
metropolitan city area. Many contemporary groups based on religion (e.g.,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Scientologists) and political affiliation (e.g., Green party
members, Libertarians) are obviously not dominant in size, but their members
assert unconditional ideological superiority compared with other groups on the
relevant intergroup dimension. Thus, a purer induction of threat is not one
which indirectly implies dominance of one position over the other via
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1 1
numerical size, but rather one which directly asserts the negativity or inferiority
of a particular viewpoint or attitude position. To my knowledge, such a direct
manipulation of threat to an ideological position has not yet been
implemented.
Researchers have, however, manipulated success or failure of a
personal choice on an experimental task (Agostinelli et al., 1992; Sherman,
Presson et al., 1984), and have obtained overestimation in the failure
condition relative to the success condition, suggesting that consensus
overestimation served to buffer the negativity of failure. Here, the threat was
relevant to the experimental task choice, but not to an ideological belief or
attitude position. Moreover, there was no measure of affect or anxiety
associated with the threat to assess its possible role in the process underlying
exaggerated consensus estimation. Yet other studies have examined the role
of mortality salience (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 1996; Simon, Greenberg, Arndt,
Pyszczynski, Clement, & Solomon, 1997) in consensus estimation. In these
studies, researchers manipulated mortality salience, then assessed
consensus for personality constructs (Simon, Greenberg et al., 1997) and
attitudes (Pyszczynski et al., 1996) that are not relevant to the reminder of
death per se. These studies show indirectly that threats to the self can lead to
an increased perception of social support for one’s characteristics or attitudes,
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12
as a strategy for terror management.3 No evidence was presented, however,
to show the affective consequences of, or processes underlying, such
overestimation. That is, no data were collected to assess the hypothesized
instrumental role of consensus overestimation in reducing anxiety.
Although a small handful of studies have manipulated threats to the self
in order to examine their effects on consensus estimation (e.g., Pyszczynski
et al., 1996; Sherman, Presson et al., 1984; Simon, Greenberg et al., 1997),
none have addressed the questions raised thus far. Specifically, will a direct
threat to the validity of an attitude lead to a perception of exaggerated
consensus for that position? This question is important because it addresses
the issue of whether the results obtained by experimentally inducing minority
numerical status are in fact due to the underlying threat of such a
manipulation. Furthermore, will such exaggerated consensus estimation be
instrumental in assuaging negative affect associated with the threat
manipulation?
3. The authors (Pyszczynski et al., 1996) present no evidence that “terror
management” has discriminative construct validity, and consequently “general
anxiety1 ’ may be a more appropriate term.
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13
Projection bv Individuals as Group Members
An important difference between groups that are and are not faced with
threats or challenges to their validity is the differential degree to which
members of these respective groups are motivated to perceive themselves as
holding a correct opinion (e.g., Oeutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kruglanski &
Mayseless, 1987). In general, people are motivated to hold correct opinions
because if they perceive their opinions to be correct then their overall positive
self-evaluation is justified (e.g., Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Tajfel & Billig, 1974;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tesser, 1988). Conversely, people are threatened by
the possibility of holding incorrect opinions because doing so implies that their
positive self-evaluation is not entirely justified. Thus, in the face of a direct
assertion of inferiority of one’s position, this motivation for ideological
correctness should be particularly salient. When salient, it is likely to elicit
behavior that is instrumental in restoring one’s positive self-evaluation.
Individuals’ positive self-evaluations can originate from a variety of
sources. Aside from one’s distinctive personal characteristics, such as
physical attractiveness, athletic achievements, or intellectual abilities, one may
also derive a sense of positive self-evaluation from social groups to which one
belongs (e.g., Jackson & Smith, 1999; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Tajfel,
1981). In-oroup identification is said to occur when individuals place an
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14
emotional significance on membership in a group (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992;
Tajfel, 1981), when an important dimension of their sense of self is a group
membership (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), when they define themselves as
group members (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), when
they feel attracted to a group to which they belong (Jackson & Smith, 1999),
or when the in-group is somehow included in their sense and definition of self
(Tropp & Wright, 2001).
The distinction between positive self-evaluations based on personal
factors versus those based on group memberships is critical in the current
examination because although attitude positions are personal, they are rarely
held in isolation of other people. That is, most of our attitudes are shared by a
number of social others and can thus be thought of as markers or boundaries
of group membership. Moreover, the consensus estimation research
paradigm necessarily evokes group membership by the very nature of the
dependent measure: group size estimation. Therefore, it makes sense to cast
the predictions for attitude projection in terms of theories of intra- and inter
group processes. Indeed, several recent papers (e.g., Biernat & Vescio,
1993,1994; Kenworthy & Miller, 2001, in press; Mackie, Devos, & Smith,
2000; Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997) have examined attitude groups
as real, entitative (Campbell, 1958; Lickel, Hamilton, Lewis, Sherman,
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Wieczorkowska, & Uhles, 2000) social categories that engage intergroup
tendencies, such as in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or group-
serving attributional biases. Considering the arguments for the entitative
nature of some attitude positions, made in the papers mentioned above (viz.,
Biernat & Vescio, 1993, 1994; Kenworthy & Miller, in press; Mackie et al.,
2000; Simon, Hastedt et al., 1997), the predictions made herein will be based
on the conceptualization of attitude positions as markers of group
membership.
If attitude positions can be seen essentially as group boundary
markers, then they can also be a source of group-based positive self-
evaluation. That is, individuals may derive a positive sense of self by
belonging to the group of people that shares their attitude positions. For
example, a person may feel good about her or himself by expressing an
opposition to the death penalty, or support for restrictions on the legalization
of gay marriages. This is likely to be especially true if this position is
encouraged, reinforced, and validated by a group of positively esteemed or
socially powerful others. According to the discussion above, then, threats to
the validity or correctness of ideological attitude positions should threaten
one’s self image and lead to compensatory responses, such as re-assertions
of the correctness of one’s position (e.g., increased attitude extremity and
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16
certainty), evaluative biases for in-group members, or, more germane to the
empirical examinations of this paper, exaggerated estimates of social
consensus.
Proposed Model
The current model of consensus estimation for attitude positions makes
two key assumptions. First, it is assumed that ideological attitude positions
can be the basis of group membership (Biernat & Vescio, 1993,1994;
Kenworthy & Miller, 2001, in press; Mackie et al., 2000; Simon, Hastedt et al.,
1997). The predictions of the model are thus based on theories of social
identification (e.g., Jackson & Smith, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et
al., 1987), which predict group-serving biases to accompany threats to group
identity. Second, it is assumed that perceptions of social consensus, when
expressed, can serve social identity functions (Kenworthy & Miller, 2001).
On these assumptions, the model specifies that direct threat to an
ideological position will lead to (a) a weakened identification with the in-group
(those that hold the same position), and (b) consensus overestimation.
Further, it specifies that consensus overestimation will be instrumental in re
strengthening the initially weakened identification with the in-group (see
Figure 2).
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17
Figure 2. Proposed model of the role of consensus estimation in re
strengthening in-group identity following threat.
Threat
Exaggerated
consensus
Re-strengthened
in-group identity
Weakened
in-group
identity
Overview and Predictions
Study 1 will test the notion that threat to an attitude position will
produce exaggerated consensus estimates, as compared with a no threat and
a control condition. The no threat and control conditions should not differ from
each other.
Study 2 will test the postulates that direct threat to an ideological
position will produce (a) a weakened social identification, and (b) exaggerated
consensus estimates. I will manipulate threat by challenging the validity of
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18
participants’ attitude positions, and then measure various aspects of social in
group identification, as well as consensus estimates. I predict that threat will
produce a weakening of in-group identification, and that those in the threat
condition will report a higher estimate of consensus for their position than
those in the no threat condition.
Study 3 will test the model’s prediction that consensus overestimation
results in a re-strengthening of social identification. Threat will be
manipulated in the same way as in Study 1, but items assessing subsequent
identification with the in-group will be assessed at two different points during
the experiment, as a between-subjects factor. Half of the participants will be
asked for their identification with the in-group before estimating consensus, as
in Study 2, and the other half will be asked after estimating it. I predict an
interaction between threat and order of in-group identification questions in
which threatened participants feel worse about their group membership
before, but better about it after they have made estimations of consensus for
their position. No threat participants are not expected to differ in their
respective identification with the in-group as a function of the order variable.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test the idea that direct threat to an attitude
position will produce exaggerated consensus estimates, as compared with a
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19
no threat and a control condition. It was expected that the no threat and
control conditions will not differ from each other.
Method
Participants and Design
Ninety-one participants volunteered in a 3 (Attitude Threat: yes, no,
control) X 2 (Attitude Issue: gun control, capital punishment) between-subjects
factorial design. Twenty-seven participants were assigned to the threat
condition; 30 to the no threat condition, and 34 to the control condition. Forty-
six participants were assigned to gun control as their topic, and 45 were
assigned to capital punishment. Participants were recruited both from the
subject pool in the psychology department at the University of Southern
California, as well as from advertisements on the internet. Forty of the
participants were from the USC psychology department subject pool, and
received bonus course credit for their participation. The remaining 51
participants volunteered based on Internet advertising, and were offered
neither course credit nor monetary remuneration in exchange for their
participation.
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21
study, they read a short description of it. This description informed them that
they would read a summary of a recent news article and give some of their
reactions to it. The next page was an electronic version of the consent form.
By clicking the button to continue at the bottom of the page, participants
indicated that they had read and agreed to the terms on that page.
The next page asked for their confidential information for receiving
credit (initials, subject pool code), if applicable, and also asked for their
position (i.e., in favor of or against) regarding the two possible attitude topics
for the study, gun control or capital punishment. By clicking the button at the
bottom of this page, they continued to the experimental stimuli.
Experimental manipulations. The experimental stimuli on the following
page consisted of a description of recent news articles, purportedly from both
CNN.com and MSNBC.com. The alleged news articles were paraphrased
and summarized, and not given verbatim. Each participant in the threat and
no threat conditions read a five-point summary of the “real” article relating to
the attitude topic, beginning with a statement reporting either that gun control
or capital punishment is harmful (or beneficial, respectively) to society. The
remaining four points described (a) the purported research methodology, (b)
the negative (or positive) relationship between gun control / capital
punishment and crime rates, (c) a specific example of a governmental district
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23
items were happy, angry, sad, calm, frustrated, pleased, intelligent, fearful,
somber, nervous, and similar to others.
Participants then clicked a button to continue to the next page, on
which they were asked to indicate their gender, age, years of education, and
native language. They also indicated whether the summarized news article
was generally favorable or unfavorable to their own position. Another
question asked them to indicate, on an 11-point scale, the subjective
importance of their attitude on the topic. The scale was anchored at 1 (not at
all important) and 11 (extremely important), with no marked neutral point.
Participants were required to scroll down the screen at this point. At
the bottom of this page, there was a debriefing statement describing the
nature of the experiment and the deception (for threat and no threat
participants). They were given the option of having their responses eliminated
from the data set if they desired (none chose this option).
Finally, they were asked to estimate the amount of time it took them to
complete the study, and enter a number in a box. The terminal button at the
bottom of the page read, u l have read the above debriefing statement.
Continue.” Clicking on this button revealed a final page informing them that
their answers were being submitted and that they could now close all of the
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24
Figure 3. Timeline of events for Internet procedures, Study 1. Each
segment of the horizontal line represents a distinct page.
Enter Give
website consent
Time
Read experimental Demographics,
Give
attitude
positions
stimuli, complete
dependent
measures
manipulation
check,
debriefing
Random
assignment to
condition:
(a) attitude topic,
(b) threat / no
threat / control
browser windows. This completed their participation. A summary of the
timeline for the Internet procedures of Study 1 can be found in Figure 3. All
data was then sent to a text file on a USC server, retrieved by Jared
Kenworthy and converted into a database to be analyzed in SPSS.
Results
Manipulation Checks
The four positive items (happy, intelligent, pleased, and calm) were
reverse-scored and combined with the six negative items (angry, frustrated,
nervous, sad, somber, and fearful) to form a composite negative reaction
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index (Cronbach’s a = .80). For this composite, higher scores indicate more
negative affect. Participants in the threat condition reported a more negative
reaction to the summarized article (M = 6.23) than those in the no threat
condition (M = 4.09), t(55) = 5.69, g < .01. Threatened participants’ negative
reaction also exceeded that of the control condition (M = 4.11), t(59) = 6.44, g
< .001. No threat and control conditions did not differ, t(62) < 1, ns. The
means and post-hoc difference tests for the individual items may be found in
Table 1. These findings indicate that the information reported in the article
summary was more aversive to threat participants than to no threat or control
participants.
Consensus Estimates
Attitude issue effects. In preliminary analyses of the data, a marginal
effect of attitude issue emerged, F(1, 85) = 2.71, g * .10, indicating that those
in the gun control conditions gave marginally higher consensus estimates for
their position (M = 59.6%) than those in the capital punishment conditions (M
= 54.15%). Attitude issue did not interact with threat, however, £(2, 85) < 1,
ns. indicating that the patterns of means for the threat condition did not differ
between attitude issues. Thus, the analyses below are reported collapsing
across attitude issue.
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26
Table 1
Mean scores on manipulation check items as a function of threat condition.
StudyJ,
No Threat Threat Control
Item
Angry M(SD) 1.97b (1.97) 3.85“ (3.2) 2.23b * (2.06)
Calm* M (SD) 6.1a b (2.9) 4.6b c (3.2) 7.06“ (2.92)
Fearful M (3D ) 2.76b (1.8) 5.38a (3.28) 3.29b (2.39)
Frustrated
M (SD)
2.86b (2.68) 5.11a (3.2) 2.41b (2.01)
Happy* M (SD) 4.96a (2.88) 2.07b (1.43) 5.51“ (2.46)
Intelligent* M (SD) 5.65“ (2.36) 4.59a (2.17) 5.88“ (2.78)
Nervous M (SD) 1.96ct (1.37) 4.59“ (2.92) 3.05b * (2.3)
Pleased* M (SD) 5.43a (2.9) 1.92b (1.35) 4.97“ (2.87)
Sad M (£D ) 2.16b (1.98) 4.44“ (3.32) 2.17b (1.6)
Somber M(SD) 3.26a (2.62) 4.33“ (2.84) 3.47“ (2.45)
Composite8 M (SD) 4.09b (1.3) 6.23“ (1.54) 4.11b (1.02)
Note. Means with different superscripts within rows differ at p < .05.
^difference is marginal at p < .10 from the alphabetically previous superscript.
§ Positive items (*) were reversed before combination of all items.
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27
Threat versus no threat and control. The primary purpose of Study 1
was to establish that (a) threatened participants are more likely to exaggerate
consensus than non-threatened participants, and (b) the no threat condition is
an appropriate comparison group, as compared to a control group, for the
threat condition. A main effect of threat on consensus estimates emerged,
F(1, 85) = 3.06, p = .05. Supporting the first hypothesis, pair-wise
comparisons demonstrated that threatened participants gave higher estimates
of consensus (M = 62.5%) than no threat participants (M = 55.1%), t(55) =
2.25, p < .03. Threatened participants also gave higher consensus estimates
than those in the control condition (M = 54.1%), t(59) * 2.37, p < .05. The no
threat and control conditions did not differ in their respective consensus
estimates, t(62) = .27, os. This latter finding supports the notion that the no
threat condition, in which participants’ positions are supported by alleged
scientific evidence, had the same effect on consensus estimation as a control
condition, in which participants estimate consensus for their attitude position
after simply thinking about an unrelated topic.
Compensation effects. An analysis was performed to investigate the
possible effects of incentives (viz., bonus course credit) on the dependent
measures of the study. In fact, a main effect of compensation emerged, F(1,
85) = 5.1, p < .03, in which those who received bonus course credit (USC
subject pool students) for their participation gave higher consensus estimates
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28
(M = 59.1%) than those who volunteered without any compensation for their
effort (M = 50.7%). Receiving course credit was negatively correlated with
age (r(73) = -.49, g < .001), and negatively correlated with years of education
(r(73) = -.366, g < .01 ),6 but the effect of compensation remained significant
even when age and education were controlled for (as co-variates in the
model). Neither age nor education were correlated with or produced any
effects on consensus estimation. Compensation did not interact with threat,
F(2, 85) < 1, ns, nor with attitude issue, F(1, 85) < 1, ns, nor did a triple
interaction emerge between the three variables, F(2, 85) = 1.15, ns.7 One
possible explanation for this effect is a self-presentational account in which
those who participated in the lab are more susceptible to pressures for
positive self-presentation, as opposed to the virtually anonymous atmosphere
of the Internet-based version of the experiment. Consensus estimates are
correlated with attitude certainty (see Kenworthy & Miller, 2001; Marks &
Miller, 1985), and individuals who are perceived as being certain-a positive
6. Not all participants chose to give data about their age and number of
years of education.
7. Compensation was not confounded either with Attitude Issue (r(91) = .01,
g = .927), or Threat (r(91) = -.046, g = .662), ruling out the possibility that
those who did and did not receive credit were disproportionately assigned to
experimental conditions.
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29
state (Allen, 1964; Anderson & Lyon, 1987)-are more liked and more
persuasive (e.g., Whitley & Greenberg, 1986).
Similarity to others. A question asked within the battery of affective
reactions assessed how similar the participant felt to others after reading the
article summary. No threat (M = 5.23) and control (M = 5.96) participants did
not differ on the similarity item, t(62) = 1.13, ns. Threatened participants (M =
6.30) did not differ from control participants, t(59) < 1, ns. Threatened
participants reported feeling marginally more sim ilar to others than did no
threat participants, t(55) = 1.78, g < .08. This latter finding lends some
support to the notion that threat evokes affiliative tendencies. Moreover,
similarity was positively correlated with consensus estimates, r(79) = .229, g <
.05, indicating that those who gave higher consensus estimates felt more
similar to others than those who gave lower consensus estimates. In a further
exploration of this relationship, it was found that sim ilarity was a marginal
mediator (using the modified Sobel test; see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) of
the relationship between threat and consensus estimates, z = 1.64, g < .10.
In a reverse analysis, consensus estimation was a reliable mediator of
similarity estimates, z = 2.05, g < .05. These mediational findings suggest
that the threat manipulations evoked tendencies toward affiliation and social
support.
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30
Discussion
In this study, it was shown that directly threatening participants with
respect to an attitude position that they endorse increased their estimates of
consensus. The threat condition produced greater consensus than both a no
threat condition, as well as a control condition in which participants estimated
consensus for their position without having first read about an alleged article
on that topic. The no threat and control conditions did not differ.
Consequently, the no threat condition is considered to be an appropriate
control condition for the threat condition. From this perspective, I argue that
the no threat condition, in which participants’ attitude positions are validated,
reflects a baseline of responding in that most people believe, by default, that
they hold correct and valid opinions.
A perplexing finding of Study 1 is the fact that the participants who
participated in exchange for course credit gave higher estimates of consensus
than those who did not participate for credit. The lack of interaction
notwithstanding, this effect cannot be explained by the available data.
Nevertheless, to avoid the source of variance in the data due to such group
differences, I chose to pursue the additional studies in the laboratory wherein
compensation is not a factor.
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31
Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine the effect of threat on
consensus estimation as well as on other perceptions of group identity. Thus,
in addition to measuring perceptions of group numerosity, as in Study 1, Study
2 sought to examine the effects of threat on perceivers’ identification with the
in-group.
Study 2 manipulated two levels of threat (threat, no threat) orthogonal
to two attitude issues (Presidential candidate favorite, gun control) in a
between-subjects factorial design. After reading an article threatening or
supporting their ideological social position on one of these topics, they
answered items assessing their identification with the in-group, then estimated
consensus for that position.
Method
Participants and Design
Forty-nine participants volunteered in exchange for bonus course credit
in this 2 (Attitude Threat: yes, no) X 2 (Attitude Issue: presidential candidate
preference, gun control) between-subjects factorial design. The data from six
participants were dropped (four from threat conditions, two from no threat
conditions; Fisher’s exact significance = .33) because they were suspicious of
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32
the legitimacy of the news article they received, resulting in 43 participants in
the final analyses.
Materials
The two levels of threat (threat, no threat) were manipulated using
printed versions of (bogus) CNN.com news reports on the participant’s
position for the issue to which he or she was randomly assigned. For
example, if the participant reported being in favor of then vice-president Al
Gore, he or she received a news report manipulating threat (or no threat) with
respect to the Gore campaign. If the participant was in favor of stricter gun
control legislation, he or she received a news report manipulating threat (or no
threat) with respect to that position. By contrast with the materials presented
to participants in Study 1, participants in Study 2 received and read a physical
form containing what they thought to be an actual news article, as opposed to
a summarized paraphrasing of the story.
Procedure
This study was conducted in the early Fall of 2000, during the 2000
presidential election season. After arriving at the laboratory, individually-
tested participants signed in for credit. The experimenter informed him or her
that the study was concerned with styles of information processing. He read
the following instructions verbatim to each participant:
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33
We want to assess what cognitive techniques people use to
take in, process, and synthesize information. The information
that you will be given will be one of several recent news reports
that we have gathered on various attitude topics, such as gun
control, legalization of marijuana, etc. The text that you will
read will be an actual download from CNN.com reports. If you
recognize the news story, it will not be a problem as we will take
that into consideration when we conduct our statistical analyses
on the data that we collect from participants.
After you have read the text, you will answer some questions
regarding your reaction to the text, then you will participate in
an activity designed to assess your information processing
style. I cannot tell you more about this activity at this time
because it might interfere with your natural reading and
processing style. In addition to the information processing style
activity, you will be asked about some of your thoughts
concerning your own attitude position -> either pro or con - for
the topic of your text. The reason for this is that we think the
degree to which people feel strongly about an opinion issue
may influence the way information about that topic is
processed.
When the participant reported understanding the procedures for the
study, the experimenter gave him or her a "Participant Information Form” that
asked him or her to volunteer some demographic information, as well as his or
her position on several attitude issues, including the subjective importance of
each issue. This form included both attitude issues that were used in the
experimental design, but participants were randomly assigned to one of these
issues before arriving. After completing this form, the experimenter took it, left
the room, surreptitiously noted which position on the issue the participant
took, then returned to the room with the news article that corresponded to the
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experimental condition (i.e., attitude issue and level of threat) to which he or
she had been previously assigned. The experimenter informed the participant
that he would return with the information processing assessment forms at the
end of two minutes, and that he or she should keep reading the article for the
entire duration.
Threat manipulation. The article that participants were given was
allegedly a printout from CNN.com that reported on the assigned attitude
issue. The article itself was embedded in a high-quality, color print with
borders and advertisements in place to replicate the layout of a CNN.com
webpage. Eight articles were created for each of the possible experimental
conditions (Pro gun control: threat, no threat; Anti gun control: threat, no
threat; Pro George W. Bush: threat, no threat; Pro Al Gore: threat, no threat)
to which participants were assigned. Participants were randomly assigned to
either (a) gun control or (b) presidential candidate as a topic, as well as threat
or no threat for that topic.
In the threat conditions, participants read an article in which a group of
scientists from various universities asserted, based on their research, that
harm would come to American society if Pro (or Anti) gun control legislation
(gun control issue) were passed, or if Bush’s (or Gore’s) agenda were to
become realized as a result of that candidate’s election in the upcoming
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35
election (presidential candidate issue). Further, to strengthen the merit of the
claims made, the scientists in the articles were alleged to have held, prior to
the studies, the position opposite to the one that their data supported. See
Appendices A and B for examples of threat manipulations with respect to
being in favor of Al Gore or more gun control, respectively. The gun control
threat article focused on data showing increasing crime rates as a function of
Pro or Anti gun control legislation being passed. The presidential candidate
threat article focused on data showing increasing crime rates and a suffering
economy as a function of Gore- or Bush-type legislation being passed. No
threat articles purported just the opposite, namely, that crime rates go down
(and the economy strengthens) as a function of legislation favoring the
participant’s position. All threat articles ended with a statement by the
researchers that there is no scientific evidence to support the validity of the
position; all no threat articles ended with a statement that scientific evidence
supports the validity of the position. In the no threat conditions, the
participant’s opinion position was supported by the scientists’ data and, as in
the threat manipulations, all of the scientists were alleged to have previously
held the position opposite to the one that the data supported.
Dependent measures. At the end of two minutes, the experimenter
returned, took the article away and gave two forms to the participant. The first
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36
form was a manipulation check and included questions about the content of
the article itself as well as a question asking whether he or she liked the text.
Participants answered this latter question using a 7-point scale ranging from
not at all (1) to very much (7). The second form contained the in-group
identification questions, which were drawn from a variety of sources pertaining
to in-group identification and social identity (e.g., Ellemers, Kortekaas, &
Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Kelly, 1988; Lickel et al., 2000).
Specifically, these questions asked (in the same order for all participants, as
listed here) (a) “It makes me feel good to belong to the group of people that
holds the position that I do.”; (b) “When the topic comes up with other people,
I try to hide the fact that I belong to this group.”; (c) “I feel similar to the group
of others who share my opinion for this topic.”; (d) “It annoys me to say that I
belong to this group.”; (e) “I feel like I belong to a cohesive social group when I
think about my position for this issue.”; (f) “I feel ashamed to belong to this
group.” The response measures for these items were 7-point scales on which
lower numbers indicated disagreement with the item, and higher numbers
indicated agreement. The midpoint (4) was marked with “I neither agree nor
disagree." At the bottom of this form, participants were asked to estimate
consensus by indicating the percentage of other college students they thought
held the same position as they did.
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37
Manipulation checks. After the completion of the dependent measures,
participants were given a final form assessing, in more detail, their
perceptions of the article that they read. Specifically, there were nine
questions assessing their affective and cognitive reactions to the text,
including a measure assessing time spent thinking about the issue. Four
questions asked about positive responses to the text: (a) “The article made
me feel good about my opinion position”, (b) “The article put me in a good
mood”, (c) “Because of the article, I am more convinced that my position is the
correct one”, and (d) “The article made me feel relaxed.” Four questions
asked about negative responses to the text: (a) “I wonder whether my position
might be incorrect”, (b) “I questioned the legitimacy of my position after
reading the article”, (c) “After reading the article, the thought crossed my mind
that my opinion position might not be correct”, and (d) “I feel agitated after
reading the article.” The time question was: “I have thought a lot about this
issue before.” These questions were all assessed on 7-point scales with
higher numbers indicating more agreement with the item. They were in a
fixed, randomized order for all participants.
After completion of all measures, participants were probed for
suspicion and debriefed about the true nature of the experiment. The
experimenter carefully explained to each participant that the article was
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38
complete fiction, that the story was fabricated to have its desired experimental
effect, and that it is not known whether scientific data support the validity of
either position for their opinion issue. They were then thanked and excused.
Results
In a preliminary analysis of the data, attitude issue did not interact with
threat, £(1, 39) = .512, ns, allowing a collapsing of the data across the two
issues. The results reported below do not differ as a result of the inclusion of
the six dropped participants.
Manipulation Checks
Without exception, all participants correctly identified the main
argument of their news article. Participants in the no threat conditions
reported liking the text more (M = 5.05) than those in the threat condition (M =
3.47), F(1, 41) = 15.03, fi < .001. After reverse-scoring the positive response
items (see Manipulation checks section, for details), they were pooled with the
four negative response items to form an index of negative reaction (a = .93).
Those in the threat condition reacted more negatively, as assessed with the
negative index (M = 5.01), than those in the no threat condition (M = 2.37),
F (1,41) = 192.86, £ < .001. These findings indicate that threat was
successfully manipulated between the two groups.
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Threat. Social Identity, and Consensus Estimation
Before estimating consensus for their position, participants answered
six questions (see Dependent measures section) about their social identity
with respect to the attitude group to which they belonged. After reverse-
scoring the three negative items (viz., items (b), (d), and (f), above), these six
items (see Table 2) were pooled to form a reliable index of social identity
strength (a = .71). As expected, those in the no threat conditions reported a
greater strength of in-group identity (M = 5.69) than did those in the threat
conditions (M = 5.16), F(1, 41) = 8.37, g < .01 (see Table 3).
Table 2
Inter-correlations among social identity items. Study 2.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. “It makes me feel aood...”
— — - — - -
2. “...I hide the fact that...” -.12 -
• •
—
3. “I feel similar to...” .43** .13 ~ —
4. “ It annoys me..." -.22 .35* -.29* -
5. “...I belona to a cohesive...” .48** -.20 .38**
•
e g
•
I
l
6. ” l feel ashamed to belong...” -.53** .38** -.21 .45** -.26* -
Note. 4 4 = 43. *g < .10, *g < .05, **fi < .01
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Table 3
Mean social identity item scores as a function of threat condition. Study 2.
No Threat Threat
Item
■It makes me feel aood...”
M (S Q )
5.63* (.85) 4.90b (.94)
“...I hide the fact that..."*
M (S Q )
2.09* (1.15) 2.14* (1.01)
"I feel similar to...”
M (S B )
5.04* (.84) 4.33b (1.19)
'it a o n s y . s me...**
M(SD) 1.59* (.79) 2.42* (1.28)
■ ...1 belona to a cohesive...” M(SP) 4.59* (1.18) 3.38b (1.24)
* 1 feel ashamed to belona..."* M fSD l 1.09* (.29) 1.57* (.74)
Composite*
M(3B)
5.75* (.49) 5.07** (.65)
Note. Means with different superscripts within rows differ (using £(1,41)) at p
< .05. ‘ Negative items (*) were reversed before combination of all items.
After completing the social identity questions, participants estimated
consensus for their position. Specifically, they were asked to estimate the
percentage of other college students they thought held the same position as
they did on the relevant attitude topic. Participants in the threat condition
estimated a greater percentage of consensus (M = 68.4%) than did those in
the no threat condition (M = 58.6%), £(1, 41) = 4.98, p < .04. When the social
identity strength index was entered as a co-variate in this model, the effect of
threat on consensus estimates was only marginal, F(1, 40) = 3.69, g < .07,
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41
supporting the notion that in-group identification played a role in the degree of
consensus overestimation.
Ancillary Measures
Issue importance. Before the threat article was given, each participant
was asked to rate how important the attitude issue was to them. As indicated
in the Method section, participants rated several attitude issues for their
subjective importance, including the issue to which they had already been
randomly assigned before arriving at the laboratory. The mean issue
importance between those in the gun control (M = 4.71) and presidential
candidate (M = 4.47) conditions did not differ, 1(41) = .724, g > .4. When
entered as a co-variate into the above models for consensus estimates and
social identity strength, subjective importance of the issue did not affect the
outcomes. Another analysis was performed to examine importance in a
different way. A difference score was created for each participant, subtracting
the mean subjective importance of all non-key issues from the subjective
importance of the key issue to which the participant had been assigned. This
difference score differed marginally between those in the presidential
candidate (M = -.52) and gun control groups (M = -14), F(1, 39) = 3.89, g =
.06, but did not alter the above models when entered as a co-variate.
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43
and (b) an increase in consensus estimation, as compared with no threat
controls. The first hypothesis was supported by participants’ report in the
threat conditions of a weaker in-group identification than no threat controls.
The second hypothesis was supported when a main effect of threat emerged
for the consensus estimation measure. To my knowledge this is the first
experimental evidence that direct, ideological threat can weaken in-group
identity, as well as increase consensus estimation.
Study 3 was designed to replicate the findings of Study 2, but also to
explore the issue of the social function of consensus overestimation. What
psychological purpose might it serve? I hypothesize that if in-group
identification is weakened by threat, then overestimation may be a strategic
behavior, employed to bolster positive feelings about group membership.
Study 3
Using the same opinion issues, Study 3 attempted to conceptually
replicate the effects of Study 2. I also sought to test the hypothesis that
consensus estimation can be instrumental in strengthening in-group
identification that had previously been weakened by a threat or challenge.
The procedures to assess this hypothesized instrumentality were based on
the methodology of Elliot & Devine (1994), in which attitude change (i.e.,
dissonance reduction) after counter-attitudinal behavior served instrum ental^
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44
to reduce the negative affect associated with dissonance arousal. In their
methodology, half of the high-dissonance participants were asked to answer
the attitude change items after dissonance arousal but before self-reports of
discomfort, and the other half answered the attitude change items after self-
reports of discomfort. By this methodology, they were able to examine the
direct role of attitude change in reducing the negative affect of a dissonance
manipulation. Similar types of studies have been conducted within the social
identity literature (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Oe Cremer, 2001; Jetten,
Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997),
showing that certain intra- and intergroup behaviors (e.g., in-group favoritism,
out-group derogation) can be used, instrum ental^, to augment collective self
esteem.
In this same sense, the current Study 3 attempted to examine the role
of consensus estimates in strengthening the weakened social identity of the
threat manipulation. Thus, half of participants in Study 3 were asked to
answer questions about social identity strength after the threat manipulation
but before consensus estimation (as in Study 2), and the other half answered
the social identity questions after estimating consensus for their position. If
exaggerated consensus estimates serve to re-strengthen social identity, as
hypothesized, then I expect social identity to be stronger for those threatened
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45
participants in the social identity after consensus condition, relative to those in
the social identity before consensus condition. No threat participants are not
expected to change their social identity strength as a function of the order
variable.
Method
Participants and Design
Eighty-six participants volunteered in exchange for bonus course credit
in this 2 (Attitude Threat: threat, no threat) X 2 (Order of Consensus
Estimation: before social identity questions, after social identity questions) X 2
(Attitude Issue: presidential favorite, gun control) between-subjects factorial
design.
Materials and Procedure
The materials used for this study were identical to those of Study 2 with
the exception of the form containing the main dependent measures. This
form varied the two levels of the Order factor. For half of participants, this
form assessed consensus for their attitude position before the social identity
questions, and for the other half it assessed consensus afterwards. The
general procedures for Study 3, including the probing and debriefing session,
were identical to those of Study 2.
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46
Results
In preliminary analyses of the data, attitude issue had no independent
effect on consensus estimates, F(1, 69) < 1, ns, nor did it interact with threat,
F(1, 69) < 1, ns, order, F(1, 69) < 1, ns, or both together in a higher-order
analysis, F(1, 69) = 1.225, ns. The results are thus reported collapsing across
attitude issue. Five participants were excluded because of suspicion about
the experimental materials (viz., the veracity of the article, as in Study 2), and
four were excluded for failing to complete the dependent measures (viz.,
omitting to estimate consensus). They were distributed evenly across the
cells of the Threat X Order model (Fisher’s exact significance = .70), and the
results do not differ as a function of their exclusion.
Manipulation Checks
As in Study 2, all participants correctly identified the main argument of
their news article. Participants in the no threat conditions reported liking the
text more (M = 4.69) than those in the threat condition (M * 3.32), F(1, 73) *
15.82, f i< . 001.
As in Study 2, the manipulation check items were asked at the end of
the session, after the completion of the main dependent measures. After
reverse-scoring the positive manipulation check items, they were pooled with
the four negative items to form an index of negative reaction (a = .88). Those
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47
in the threat condition reacted more negatively, as assessed with the negative
index (M = 4.56), than those in the no threat condition (M = 2.50), F(1, 74) =
143.38, g < 001. These findings indicate that threat was again successfully
manipulated between the two groups.
Threat. Social Identity, and Consensus Estimates
As in Study 2, threat and no threat participants were asked to estimate
the percentage of other college students they thought held the same position
as they did on their assigned attitude topic. In this Study, however, they did
so under two different conditions. In the first condition, they answered the
social identity questions first, then estimated consensus (identical to Study 2).
In the other condition, they estimated consensus first, then answered the
social identity questions. By comparing the social identity scores of
threatened participants before and after consensus estimation, I was able to
test whether estimating consensus after being threatened serves to re-
strengthen a weakened social identity.
As expected, participants in the threat conditions estimated a greater
percentage of consensus (M = 67.4%) than did those in the no threat
condition (M = 60.6%), F(1, 73) = 5.165, g < .03. Consensus estimates did
not differ as a function of the order variable, F(1, 73) < 1, ns, and order did not
interact with threat, F(1,73 ) < 1, ns.
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48
After reverse-scoring the three negative social identity items (see Study
2), the reliability of the composite social identity index was relatively low (a =
.58; cf., a = .71, Study 2). The inter-correlations among these items can be
found in Table 4. In the consensus after social identity condition (identical to
Study 2), the items did form a reliable index8 (a = .70), but in the consensus
before social identity condition, the reliability was relatively weak (a = .48),
indicating that estimating consensus may have had an effect on the
coherence of these items. Consequently, a factor analysis was performed on
the social identity items to identify the overall principal components of the
items. This factor analysis yielded three main components (eigenvalues * 1;
see Figure 4) after varimax rotation: (1) “It makes me feel good...” (Feel good)
and “I feel sim ilar to the group...” (Sim ilar9 ); (2) “It annoys me..."(Annoys) and
“...I try to hide the fact...” (Hide): (3) “...I belong to a cohesive social group...”
8. Replicating Study 2, there was a simple effect of threat on the social
identity index (all items) in the consensus after social identity condition only,
F(1, 34) = 10.85, e < .01. Those in the threat condition had a lower social
identity score (M = 4.97) than those in the no threat condition (M = 5.58).
9. The similarity item by itself was positively correlated with consensus
estimates, r(77) = .233, g < .05, as was the case in Study 1.
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49
Table 4
Inter-correlations among social identity items. Study 3.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. “ It makes me feel aood...” — — — - - - —
2. “...I hide the fact that...” -.13
— — — — --
3. “ I feel siEDilfil to..." .48** -.09
— -- — —
4. “It annoys me...” .004 .32** -.01
— — -
5. “...I belong to a cohesive...” .27*
•
©
c n
.14 -.008
— —
6. “I feel ashamed to belona...” .16 .29* -.12 .38** -.37** -
Note. N * 77. *[> < .05, **B < .01
(Cohesive) and “I feel ashamed to belong...” (Ashamed, reversed). These
factors accounted for 72.4% of the variance, and the loadings of these items
onto their respective components can be found in Table 5.
These three components were subjected to a MANOVA consisting of
threat and order as between-subjects factors. For threat participants, in-group
identification was expected to be greater after consensus estimation than
before, whereas this was not expected for no threat participants. Component
1 (feel good + similar. r(77) = .477, p < .001) yielded neither a main effect of
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50
threat, F(1, 73) < 1, ns, nor an effect of order, F(1, 73) < 1, ns, nor an
interaction, F(1, 73) < 1, ns. Component 2 (annovs + hide. r(77) = .324, p <
.01) yielded a main effect of threat, F(1, 73) = 5.25, p < 03, in which threat
participants scored higher (M = 2.25; indicating more annoyance and more
tendency to hide membership) than no threat participants (M = 1 -75). This
component failed to yield either an effect of order, F(1, 73) < 1, ns, or an
interaction, E(1, 73) < 1, ns. Component 3 (cohesive + ashamed. r(77) =
-.37, p < .001) yielded an effect of threat, F(1, 73) = 11.94, p < .001, in which
threat participants scored lower (M = 4.93; indicating less cohesiveness and
Fioure 4. Scree plot of eigenvalues for principal components analysis of
social identity items, Study 3.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Com ponent
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52
before (M = 4.44), for threatened participants only (see Figure 5).
Ancillary Measures
Issue importance. The mean issue importance between those in the
gun control (M = 4.75) and presidential candidate (M = 4.38) conditions did
not differ reliably, t(75) = 1.57, p > .10. When entered as a co-variate into the
above models for consensus estimates and social identity components,
subjective importance of the issue did not affect the outcomes. As in Study 2,
Figure 5. Mean component 3 (cohesive + ashamed) score (± SE) as a
function of threat and order of consensus estimation, Study 3.
O
o e
co 6 -
C O
T
3
m No Threat
□ Threat
In-group ID First In-group ID Second
Order of In-group Identification Items
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53
a difference score was created for each participant, subtracting the mean
subjective importance of all non-key issues from the subjective importance of
the key issue to which the participant had been assigned. This difference
score did not differ between those in the presidential candidate (M = -.32) and
gun control groups (M = -10), F(1, 73) = 2.69, p = * .11, and did not alter the
above models when entered as a co-variate.
Time spent thinking about the issue. There was an effect of threat on
participants’ reporting of how much they had thought about the issue before,
F(1, 73) = 5.04, p < .05, such that those in the threat condition reported
having thought about the issue less (M = 2.74) than those in the no threat
condition (M = 3.47). When entered as a co-variate into the above models,
reported time spent thinking about the issue reduced the main effect of threat
on consensus estimates to marginality, as occurred in Study 1, F(1, 72) =
3.40, p < 07. Again, reported time spent thinking about the issue was
negatively correlated with consensus estimates, r = -.236, e < 04, and
positively correlated with threat, r = .248, e < 03. It had no effect on any other
model.
Discussion
Study 3 examined the role of consensus estimation in assuaging
negative affect after a manipulation of threat. This was done by varying the
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54
order in which social identity measures were taken after threat. Specifically,
half of the participants reported on their in-group identification after threat, but
before estimating consensus, as in Studies 1 and 2. The other half of
participants first estimated consensus after threat, then reported on their in
group identification.
The main findings of Study 2 were replicated, namely, that threatened
participants gave higher estimates of consensus for their attitude positions
than non-threatened participants. Moreover, for the condition in which social
identity was assessed before consensus estimation (identical to Study 2),
threatened participants reported lesser overall in-group identification strength.
The hypothesized interaction regarding threat and the order factor (viz., a re
strengthening of in-group identification after, relative to before, consensus
estimation for threat participants only) was supported for the composite index
formed of the items cohesive and ashamed (ashamed reverse-scored).
Specifically, compared with those who estimated consensus after reporting on
their in-group identification, participants who estimated consensus first after
threat felt (a) that they belonged to a more cohesive group, and (b) less
ashamed of their group membership. This is notable because it is evidence
that speaks directly to the principal hypothesis regarding the role of
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consensus estimation in re-strengthening group identity following a threat.
The Threat X Order interaction was not reliable for any of the other measures.
Another replication of Study 2 findings was the time spent measure.
Recall from Study 2 that those in the threat condition reported having spent
less time thinking about the issue than those in the no threat condition. This
occurred again in Study 3. From the available collected data, there is no clear
indication of why this is so.
General Discussion
In this paper, I have sought to establish experimental evidence for a
motivational model of consensus estimation, or perceptions of numerical
social support for one’s attitude position. It has been known for at least two
decades that the degree of consensual bias exhibited by minorities exceeds
that of majorities (Gross & Miller, 1997; Krueger & Clement, 1997; Marks &
Miller, 1987; Mullen & Hu, 1988; Ross et al., 1977). There is also evidence
that a threatening situation will produce not only affiliative responses toward
similar others (Exline & Lobel, 1997; Galanter, 1997; Gerard, 1963; Gump &
Kulik, 1997; Kamarck, Annunziato, & Amateau, 1995; Kulik, Mahler, &
Earnest, 1994; Kulik, Mahler, & Moore, 1996; Stanton, Danoff-Burg, Cameron,
Snider, & Kirk, 1999; Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Taylor, Buunk, Collins, & Reed,
1992), but also exaggerated consensus estimates, possibly in an attempt to
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56
establish perceived prevalence, normativeness, and social support for one’s
position (Sherman, Presson et al., 1984; Simon, Greenberg et al., 1997).
Thus, projection of one’s attitudes and emotions onto others may be a result
of defensive reactions to threatening situations (Gross & Miller, 1997; Simon,
Greenberg et al., 1997).
The model tested in this paper is distinct from previous research
because it sought not only to examine the effects of threat on consensus
estimation, but more important to investigate (a) whether threat to a shared
attitude position weakens identification with the in-group, and (b) if
exaggerated estimates of consensus in response to such threat play a role in
re-strengthening social identity.
This model was supported across three studies. In Study 1, threatened
participants gave higher estimates for their own positions on either gun control
or capital punishment than no threat and control participants. No threat and
control participants did not differ in their respective consensus estimates. In
Study 2, threat and no threat participants reported their identification with the
in-group before estimating consensus, and it was found that threatened
participants felt a weaker in-group identity than no threat participants.
Replicating Study 1, threatened participants also gave higher consensus
estimates than their no threat counterparts. In Study 3 ,1 varied the order in
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which social identity and consensus estimation measures were assessed.
Half of participants estimated consensus after the social identity questions (as
in Study 2), and the other half estimated consensus before the social identity
questions.
Three principal factors emerged for the social identity items in Study 3:
(1) feeling good about group membership and feeling similar to other group
members; (2) being annoyed by belonging to the group and trying to hide
group membership; (3) feeling like one belongs to a cohesive group and being
(less) ashamed of group membership. In the social identity before consensus
conditions, threatened participants felt worse about their group
membership-on the third factor-than no threat participants. The predicted
interaction emerged for the third factor, in which participants who estimated
consensus before reporting on their in-group identification felt (a) that they
belonged to a more cohesive group, and (b) less ashamed of their group
membership, as compared with those who estimated consensus after
reporting on their in-group identification. This means that estimating
consensus was instrumental in re-strengthening perceptions of in-group pride
and cohesiveness for threatened participants. Replicating both Study 1 and
Study 2, consensus estimates were also higher for threatened than for non
threatened participants.
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It is notable that although the composite index of social identity strength
was weaker for threatened than no threat participants, in the consensus after
social identity conditions (see Footnote 8), the items that changed as a
function of the order variable were cohesive and ashamed. No other items
seemed to have been affected by the process of estimating consensus for in
group size.
The item cohesive is interesting because of its link to what Donald T.
Campbell called “entitativity” (Campbell, 1958). A group's entitativity is
defined as the "degree to which a collection of persons are perceived as being
bonded in a coherent unit” (Lickel et al., 2000, p. 224; see also Campbell,
1958). Entitativity essentially refers to the perceived "groupness" of a
collection of people. Entitativity has also been found to be highly related to in
group identity. Specifically, Lickel et al. (2000) found that those groups with
the highest degree of personal importance also had the highest rated
entitativity (Study 3), thus supporting this link between the perceived
cohesiveness or entitativity of one’s in-group and the social identity value of
group membership (see Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Lickel,
Schmader, & Barquissau, in press). The item ashamed (reverse-scored)
indicates that pride of group membership was also affected by the process of
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60
generally has beneficial effects when it concerns one’s in-group, but negative
connotations when it concerns an out-group (e.g., Abelson, 1998; Dasgupta et
al., 1999).
At first glance, it may seem somewhat perplexing that the items
annoved and trv to hide did not group together with ashamed in the factor
structure of the social identity items in Study 3. This may have occurred for a
number of reasons. First, a methodological flaw may have been present with
respect to the trv to hide item. Specifically, this item asked, “When the topic
comes up with other people, I try to hide the fact that I belong to this group.”
This item may not have been altogether sensitive to the local manipulations of
the experimental factors because it refers to a general tendency to show (or
not) one’s group membership in everyday interactions with others, and not
necessarily a response to the manipulated threat.
Second, there may be a similar problem with respect to the annovs
item. This item (see Kelly, 1998) asked, “It annoys me to say that I belong to
this group.” When people report being annoyed, it is because they are being
pestered, provoked, or otherwise harassed by some person or situation. It is
unlikely that the threat manipulations used here represented such a situation.
Whereas the manipulations themselves may have been annoying to those in
the threat conditions, it may not be reflected in a general tendency to be
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annoyed with one’s group membership. By contrast with annoyance, shame
is an affective state that is elicited by awareness of weaknesses in, or attacks
on, one’s sense of self, essence, or character (Lewis, 1971; Lickel et al., in
press; Tangney, 1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). It is often
thought of as a self-conscious or moral emotion (e.g., Eisenberg, 2000; Lickel
et al., in press), leading to self-regulatory behavior in social contexts. Thus,
annoyance and ashamedness should not be expected to cluster together.
The conceptual distinctions and similarities among the social identity
items used in these studies notwithstanding, there are no data available to
address why certain items seemed not to have been affected by estimating
consensus. Thus, future work should elaborate on the underlying variable
present in the factor represented by the cohesive and ashamed items. It may
be that if such a latent variable-collective identity (Brewer & Gardner, 1996;
Lickel et al., 2000; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992)-is made salient by the process
of consensus estimation, then perhaps intergroup differentiation and bias may
also be evoked (see Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Long, Spears, & Manstead,
1994).
Theoretical Contribution
Perhaps the most notable contribution of the current work is that it
presents the first experimental evidence that consensus estimation plays a
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62
role in bolstering collective identity in response to a threat. Across other areas
of social psychology, many dimensions of intra- and inter-group dynamics
have been examined as they pertain to threats to an aspect of collective
identity. These dimensions include evaluations of in-group and out-group
members (e.g., Terry & Callan, 1998), perceptions of group variability (e.g.,
Rothgerber, 1997), collective self-esteem (e.g., Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998;
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), social comparison (e.g., Taylor et al., 1992;
Taylor & Lobel, 1989) and perceptions of group boundaries (e.g., Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 1997), to name just a few. The present work adds to this
catalogue of social psychological processes affected by threat by showing that
consensus estimation is not simply a basic error of inference based on
naivete about the social world (e.g., Holmes, 1968). Rather, it seems to be
part of a larger set of motivational and regulatory processes evoked by the
dynamics of belonging to a real, entitative, social group.
A theoretical issue that these studies raise is whether threat to attitude
positions also evoke self-related processes in addition to the dynamics of
group membership (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996). That is, what self-relevant
processes, independent of evoked group dynamics, might be involved in the
perception of social consensus? Perhaps, if threat to an ideological position
were to be manipulated orthogonal to a factor of self as distinct or indistinct
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63
from the group as a whole, different results might be found. Such a design
would allow one to test whether threat will produce the findings reported in the
studies above even if the self is perceived as different from the group.
Conclusions
The studies reported here present evidence that the perception of
groups with social identity value can be altered via a manipulation of threat.
The findings suggest that the challenges and threats we face regularly with
respect to our precious ideological positions are having the likely effect of
increasing our perceptions of the normativeness of our positions. In turn, this
belief can lead to increased liking for in-group members and a suspicion of
out-group members, at the very least. At worst, however, a potential hostile
conflict may eventually ensue between nuclear rivals.
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64
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Appendix A
Experts warn of social ills from Gore agenda
September 12, 2000
Web posted at: 10:07 AM EDT (1407 GMT)
By Kaaren Sontag / Associated Press
ST. PAUL, Minnesota (AP) -- Democratic presidential nominee and vice president Al
Gore has recently proposed some measures that some experts are calling socially
risky.
Prominent sociology researcher Charles D. Pickering, Ph.D., from the University of
Minnesota, has teamed up with researchers at other top institutions to present
scientific sociological data that reveal fundamental flaws in the Gore agenda.
Pickering said that he, along with most of the other researchers, is a Democrat and
generally supports the vice president.
Gore recently took the wraps off of what he calls the “Blueprint for the Middle Class"
and immediately political scientists and sociologists criticized the details of the plan.
Their main criticism is that although the plan speaks of helping children and families
and working people, there is scientific data to support just the opposite.
“We have shown again and again that whenever such measures are introduced and
passed into law, cnme rates go up and the general economy suffers as well,” said
Pickering. “These findings are not new, and so it surprises me that Mr. Gore would
make such socially harmful propositions. Our conclusion is that if Gore keeps his
current proposals, he is simply the wrong man for the job. We feel very strongly
about this. The thrust of his platform contradicts sound scientific evidence. This is
not true of the Bush campaign.”
A spokesman for the Gore campaign responded to the criticism, “We know of no
sucn findings and we are committed to looking to the future to make real changes in
America.”
The measures under criticism range from Gore’s proposals on gun control,
immigration, and media violence to abortion rights and criminal penalties. Gore
plans to counter the criticisms later this week.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Creator Kenworthy, Jared Bowden (author)

Core Title Ideological threat, social identity, and consensus estimation

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Psychology

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

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