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A critique of Rawls's structure of justification

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A critique of Rawls's structure of justification

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A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS’S STRUTURE OF JUSTIFICATION
by
Jinsuk Yang
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)
August 2000
Copyright 2000 Jinsuk Yan
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UMI N um ber: 3018146
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
TH E GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90007
This dissertation, written by
Jinsuk Yang
under the direction of ___ Dissertation
Committee, and approved by all its members,
has been presented to and accepted by The
Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re
quirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Dam of Graduate Studies
D ate . . .f. a . . Q 9 . 9 .
DISSERTATION
Chairperson
tlSUxrtir
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Jinsuk Yana Howard Gill man
A Critique of Rawls's Structure of Justification
Rawls's justificatory structure is a main concern of this d isserta tio n .
Rawls's ground o f justification is the method of wide reflective e q u ilib r iu m
as coherentism. However, he fails in justifying his liberal state. First of all.
he overemphasizes the shared fund of democratic political culture in
constructing theory of justice. In a similar vein. Rawls put too m u c h
emphasis on the unanimous decision by the veil of ignorance in t h e
original position. Also Rawls is too optimistic on the possibility o f t h e
overlapping consensus from various reasonable comprehensive d o c tr in e s .
1 think that Rawls's failure stems from his implicit effort to achieve
universal principle of justice. In order to achieve universal principle o f
justice. Rawls have to pay the cost. Rawls does not verify the u n iv e r sa lity
o f the democratic public culture. If w'e use another features of th e
democratic public culture, we can develop a different principle f r o m
Rawls's. Furthermore, the serious defect of application is to e x c lu d e
unreasonable com prehensive doctrines for the overlapping c o n s e n s u s .
Therefore. Rawds distorts liberal idea of tolerance. Even in the p u b lic
sphere, liberal society should tolerate diverse ways of life, opinions, a n d
political p rin cip les.
Secondly, Rawls confuses the just society with a stable s o c ie ty .
Rawls tries to show that the social stability is insured by the o v e r la p p in g
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consensus of various reasonable com prehensive doctrines on a ju st
principle. Yet the overlapping consensus is an ideal project. In the actual
situations such as constitutional convention and legislative stage,
negotiation among various com prehensive doctrines can achieve the
stability o f a society. In case of Rawls's first stage of constructivism, th e
veil of ignorance prevents this negotiation p r o c e d u r e .
Thirdly. Rawls's theory of right does not pay enough attention to
the various virtues for the social cooperation. Rawls simply mentions a b o u t
the love of mankind, fellow feeling, mutual trust and fraternity in order to
develop the sense of justice. However, he never explains how these virtu es
are related one after another in the three stages of m orality.
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I dedicate this dissertation to my grandmother,
Shinkyung Kim and my mother, Wanchun Byun.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
iii
DEDICATION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
LIST OF TABLES --------------------------------------------------------------- iv
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ---------------------------------------------- I
CHAPTER II. PUBLIC POLITICAL CULTURE ------------------------- 8
CHAPTER III. THE ORIGINAL POSITION------------------------------- 19
A) The Characteristics of the Original Position--------------------- 19
B) The Rationale for the Choice of the First principle------------- 28
C) The Implication of the Second Principle of Justice----------- 32
D) The Rationale for the Choice of the Second Principle
of Justice----------------------------------------------------------------- 54
CHAPTER IV. REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AS
COHERENTISM----------------------------------------------------------- 60
CHAPTER V. THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS--------------------- 66
CHAPTER VI. RADICAL CONCEPTION OF
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM ------------------------------------ 83
CHAPTER VII. CRITICISM -------------------------------------------------- 89
A) The Public Political Culture -------------------------------------- 89
B) The Original Position ------------------------------------------------ 110
1)The Justification of the First Principle of Justice----------- 110
2)The Justification of the Second Principle of Justice 127
C) The Overlapping Consensus ---------------------------------------- 137
CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------- 148
BIBLIOGRAPHY --------------------------------------------------------------- 153
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List of Tables
IV
Table Page
1. Four-Fold Systems of Equality----------------------------------------------- 35
2. Maximin R ule------------------------------------------------------------------- 57
3. The Structure of Reflective Equilibrium--------------------------------- 65
4. The Structure of Radical Reflective Equilibrium------------------------ 88
5. Decision Rule of Uncertainty ---------------------------------------------- 133
6. Regret Table -------------------------------------------------------------------- 134
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
1
John Rawls argues that political constructivism is a view
about the structure and content of a political conception.
Political constructivism says that "the principles of political
justice (content) may be represented as the outcome of a
certain procedure of construction (structure)."1 Rawls's
constructivism addresses two fundamental questions about
political justice in a democratic society. First of all. what is the
most appropriate conception of justice for specifying the fair
terms of social cooperation among free and equal citizens?2
Secondly, how can this conception of justice get support from
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a pluralistic
society? "Combining both questions we have : how is it
possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of
free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines ?"3
'John Rawls. Political LiberalismiN e w Y ork:C olum bia Univ. Press.1993).
p p .8 9 -9 0 .
2 It is a main project o f Rawls's book, A Theory o f ./M.yr/c£(Cambridge:Harvard
U niv. P ress.1971).
JRawls. P olitical L iberalism .^.4 .
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For the first question. Rawls devises the choice situation
of the original position under the veil of ignorance. Rawls
shows how the parties choose a just principle in a hypothetical
fair situation of the original position. Here two principles of
justice are chosen as fair terms of social cooperation. Rawls
suggests the idea of overlapping consensus in answer to the
second question. In this stage Rawls verifies that the just
principle chosen in the original position gets endorsements
from various doctrines. So, the society governed by the two
principles of justice is a stable one. Rawls's argument proceeds
in these two stages of construction (structure). By the use of
this procedure. Rawls justifies the content o f his principle of
justice that is his two principles of justice. Rawls argues that
main institutions of a society should be organized by the two
principles of justice. In other words, a well-ordered society -
i.e. a society governed by Rawls’s two principles of justice - is a
best form of the state. Rawls tries to justify his best form of
the state by the epistemic scheme of reflective equilibrium. In
this dissertation, I shall analyze Rawls’s epistemic structure of
justification. The aim of epistemic justification is to articulate
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3
knowledge based on good reason. My focus is on Rawls's
epistemic structure, which shows how the principle of justice or
its form of the state is justified through a two-stage procedure
of construction. In other words, this dissertation is an analysis
of the structure of Rawls’s constructivism. So I don’t deal with
the content of Rawls's principle of justice - i.e. the scope of
liberty in his first principle, the implication of difference
principle, etc. Neither is my focus on Rawls’s articulation of
liberal ideas in general. Instead I examine whether Rawls
formulates his liberal form of the state on a rational ground.
As a method, I did the textualist interpretation of Rawls’s
major books. A Theory o f Justice and Political Liberalism .4 In
other words, I focus on the internal logic of Rawls’s books.
Especially my focus is how Rawls answers his question - i.e. to
establish and justify a just and stable society.
The justification of the best form of the state has long
been studied since Plato. His R e p u b lic suggests an ideal form
of the state. Social contract theorists - e.g. Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant - justify their best form of the state by the
4 A Theory o f Justice and Political L iberalism are main materials in this
dissertation. However. I sometimes use his articles and book. The Law o f
P eoples.
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4
use of social contract method. After Soviet Union was broken-
down. constitutionalism has revived so that many studies seek
an alternative form of the state.'' In this regard. Rawls's effort
to justify the best form of a liberal state is a remarkable
achievement. However, very few studies on Rawls deal with
the justificatory scheme itself. Among the critiques of Rawls's
liberalism, very few studies focus on Rawls’s epistemology of
justifying the form of the state. For example, even though
Michael Sandel criticizes Rawls’s conception of the person, he
does not deal with Rawls’s justificatory scheme of reflective
e q u ilib riu m .5 Rex Martin focuses on Rawls’s idea of right.
However, he does not pay attention to Rawls’s justificatory
scheme by which Rawls’s right-based theory is constructed.7
Thomas Pogge presents both a defense and a constructive
critique of Rawls’s ideas. Yet he misses the important aspect of
Raw ls’s justification.8 Brian Barry endeavors to criticize and
5 S ee Jon Elster and Karl Ove M oene eds. Alternatives to Capitalism
(Cam bridge:Cam bridge Univ. P ress.1989):D avid M iller. M a rk et,S ta te,a n d
C o m m u nity{Oxford:C\are.ndon. 19 8 9 ):A n th o n y G iddens. The Third
W ay (C am bridge: P o lity . 1998).
6 S ee Michael Sandel. Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, 2 nd ed.
(C am bridge:C am bridge Univ. P r e s s .1998).
7 S e e Rex Martin. Rawls and /?/g/rr.s-(Lawrence:University Press of
K a n sa s. 1 985).
8 S e e Thomas Pogge, Realizing /?avv/.y(Ithaca:Cornell U niv. Press. 1989).
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5
develop Rawls's idea of justice as fairness since Rawls
published his book. A Theory o f Justice. However. Brian Barry
does not deal with Rawls's entire structure of justification.9
Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit analyze the change and
development of Rawls’s idea expressed in his articles after the
publication of ,4 Theory o f Justice . However, they do not
recognize the consistency of Rawls's justificatory method in his
articles after A Theory o f Justice.10 Roberto Alejandro criticizes
Rawlsian welfare state. Yet he does not analyze Rawls’s
epistemology of justifying the state form." Knowledge consists
of justified true beliefs. To justify one's belief is to show that
his belief is based on adequate grounds.12 Rawls adopts the
method of reflective equilibrium in order to justify his
argument for the best form of the state. However very few
commentators analyze the plausibility of Rawls's justificatory
scheme. In this respect, my dissertation is an endeavor to
study theory of knowledge in political philosophy.
9 See Brian Barry. The Liberal Theory o f yw.m'cTheories o f y«.s7/ce(Berkeley:Univ. o f California Press. 1989) and J u s ti c e
as Im partialityiO xford :C la ren d o n . 1 995).
10 See Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit. Rawls.A Theory o f Justice
and Its Cr///c\s(Stanford:Stanford Univ. Press. 1990).
1 1 See Roberto Alejandro. The Limits of Rawlsian y « .s7/ce(B altim ore:Joh n s
Hopkins Univ. P ress.1998).
12 For the definition o f justification.see W illiam P. Alston, Epistemic
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6
Even though Rawls says he develops the social contract
tradition for the justification of the state, his justification is
somehow different from the social contract method. While
classical social contract theorists justify the state by rebutting
the objections of anarchists or those who favor nonstate forms
of social cooperation. Rawls's justification of the state is a
justification of state power to those who already accept the
necessity of the state. For Rawls, the upshot is not why people
need the state, but what kind of state they should have. In
short, the object of justification is the best form of the state.
Rawls uses the two stages of construction as a method of
justification. Because these two stages of construction - i.e. the
choice situation of the original position and the overlapping
consensus - are expressed in Rawls’s two books separately,
many commentators missed the point that Rawls’s two stages
of construction are manifestations of different versions of
reflective equilibrium. From chapter II to chapter VI. I
describe and interpret Rawls’s justificatory structure of the
reflective equilibrium as coherentism. Since many
commentators do not deal with the entire structure of Rawls's
Ju 57/yYcaf/0/z(Ithaca:CorneIl U niv. Press. 1989). pp.8 1 -1 14.
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7
justificatory scheme. I clarify his epistemic coherentism by
analyzing the relation between his two stages of construction.
Coherentism is a view that all justification is system dependent
in virtue of coherence relations among beliefs. For Rawls, the
epistemic coherentism means that the two principles of justice
have to cohere with the idea of democratic public culture and
the specification of the original position. In addition, the two
principles of justice achieve the overlapping consensus from
various comprehensive doctrines so that the person with a
certain comprehensive doctrine recognizes the coherence
between his doctrine and the two principles of justice. In
chapter II. I analyze Rawls’s idea of democratic public culture.
In chapter III. the specification of the original position is
examined. In chapter IV. I introduce the justificatory scheme
of Rawls's first stage of constructivism. In chapter V. I explain
the idea of overlapping consensus. In chapter VI. I formulate
Rawls's justificatory scheme of the second stage and its relation
with the first stage. In chapter VII, I criticize Rawls’s entire
justificatory scheme.
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CHAPTER II. PUBLIC POLITICAL CULTURE
8
In constructing political principles of justice. Rawls argues
that we must have some material from which to begin. For
Rawls, this material is the public culture of a democratic
society. The fact of reasonable pluralism is a permanent
feature of the public culture of a democratic society. In a
democratic society, there are lots of conflicting and
irreconcilable, but reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls
argues that a comprehensive doctrine is reasonable if this
doctrine has three features. First of all, "a reasonable doctrine
is an exercise of theoretical reason: it covers the major
religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a
more or less consistent and coherent manner."1 3 Secondly, a
reasonable comprehensive doctrine is also an exercise of
practical reason because it gives certain values a particular
primacy and weight so that it balances various values when
they conflict. By singling out which values are count as
important, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine has its own
13 Rawls. Political Liberalism.^.59.
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9
conception of the good. Therefore, different value judgments
bring about various, and irreconcilable reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. "As rational we have to balance our
various ends and estimate their appropriate place in our way
of life : and doing this confronts us with grave difficulties in
making correct judgments of rationality."14 Rawls refers to
these difficulties as the burdens of judgment. The sources of
disagreement - the burdens of judgment - among persons are
"the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious)
exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary
course of political life."1 5 These sources of disagreement
include the complexity of evidence, different weight of
considerations, vagueness of concepts, different experiences of
citizens, different kinds of normative considerations, etc.
Therefore, there are lots of irreconcilable reasonable
comprehensive doctrines with their conceptions of the good.1 6
liIbid., p. 56.
x'Ibid.
l6Against the fact o f reasonable pluralism. M aeve Cooke argues that
most ethical disagreem ents are reconcilable in principle. S e e Maeve
C ooke. ‘Are Ethical Conflicts Irreconcilable?’f > /t//o^op/7y & Social
Criticism V o l.2 3 .N o .2 (M a rch 1997).p p . 1-19. Against the
incom m ensurability o f values, many scholars suggest various strategies
o f accom m odating moral differences. S e e David B. W o n g .‘C op in g with
Moral Conflict and A m biguity.'Ethics Vol. 102. N o .4 .(July 1 9 9 2 ),pp.763-
7 8 4 . Joh n F in n is.'C om m ensuration and Public Reason.’ in
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1 0
"Finally, a third feature is that while a reasonable
comprehensive view is not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it
normally belongs to. or draws upon, a tradition of thought and
doctrine."1 7 Since many comprehensive doctrines which have
these three features are seen to be reasonable, it is
unreasonable for citizens to use political power to repress
reasonable comprehensive doctrines that are different from
their own.
Even though the fact of reasonable pluralism is a
permanent feature of a democratic society, Rawls argues that
the public political culture of a democratic society has a shared
fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. This
public culture comprises the political institutions of a
constitutional regime and the public traditions of their
interpretation (including those of the judiciary), as well as
historic texts and documents that are common knowledge.
The public political culture is the culture of the political, not of
the social because the public political culture excludes the
background culture of various religious, philosophical, and
I n c o m m e n s u r a b ility , Incomparability, a n d Practical R eason, ed.Ruth
Chang(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 1997).pp.2 1 5 -2 3 3 .
17R a w ls, Political Liberalising .59.
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1 1
moral comprehensive doctrines, which is the culture of many
associations such as churches and universities, and scientific
societies. While the social culture of a democratic society
consists of various comprehensive and irreconcilable doctrines
of all kinds (i.e. religious, philosophical, and moral), the public
political culture represents fundamental ideas and principles
implicit in the political institutions exclusively. Rawls argues
that citizens of a democratic society regard the public political
culture as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles.
Therefore the public political culture of a democratic society is
the material for the construction of a political conception of
justice. The public political culture of a democratic society
consists of two tiers - liberty and equality. From these ideas.
Rawls articulates an organizing idea that connects these two
tires. “This organizing idea is that of society as a fair system of
social cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as
fully cooperating members of society over a complete life.*’1 8
A feature of the organizing idea is that of society as a
fair system of cooperation. For the cooperation among citizens
in a democratic society, citizens must accept fair terms of
]SIbid., p.9.
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1 2
cooperation which regulate their conduct insofar as everyone
else accepts them. Rawls argues that "these fair terms are
expressed by principles that specify basic rights and duties
within its main institutions and regulate the arrangements of
background justice over time, so that the benefits produced by
everyone's efforts are fairly distributed and shared from one
generation to the next."19 What is distributed are the social
primary goods such as basic liberties, freedom of movement
and free choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives of
offices and positions of responsibility, income and wealth, and
the social bases of self-respect.20 The social primary goods are
things that every rational man is presumed to want regardless
of his plan of life.
Rawls's political principles of justice, which express fair
terms of social cooperation, apply to the basic structure of
society. By the basic structure Rawls means "a society's main
political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit
together into one unified system of social cooperation from one
l9lbid.. p. 16.
20For the list of primary goods, see Political Liberalism.^. 181 .and pp.308-
309.
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1 3
generation to the next."21 The basic structure includes the
political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property,
and the organization of the economy, and the nature of the
fam ily.22 Yet the basic structure does not include many
associations such as churches and universities, learned and
scientific societies, and clubs and teams.23 In this regard,
Rawls's principles of justice are not a general doctrine but a
political doctrine. While the comprehensive doctrines such as
utilitarian moral principle and Kantian moral philosophy are
general doctrines in that they apply to every aspect of human
life ranging from the conduct of individuals and personal
relations to the organization of society as a whole, the political
doctrine applies to the basic structure alone. Another
characteristic of political doctrine is its limited conceptions of
the good. While religious and philosophical doctrine tend to be
fully comprehensive in that they cover all recognized values
and virtues, a political conception of justice need not be
comprehensive. A doctrine is comprehensive "when it includes
: 'Rawls. Political Liberalism ,p.l \ .
22 See Ibid .,p .258.
22 H ow ever. M arilyn Fischer argues that many non-public associations
should be considered part of the basic structure because they serve
crucial roles in sustaining stability in R a w ls’s well-ordered society. See
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1 4
conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of
personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of
familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to
inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole."24 A
comprehensive doctrine regards the inclusion of both
nonpolitical values and political values in its scheme of thought
as an ideal. On the other hand, a political doctrine is only
partially comprehensive. A political conception is at best but a
guiding framework of deliberation and reflection which helps
us reach political agreement on at least the constitutional
essentials and the basic questions of justice. Besides the
political values formulated by this agreement, a political
doctrine may include certain (but not all) nonpolitical values.
However, its political values outweigh nonpolitical values. In
other words, a person with his conception of the good has to
conform his plan of life to what the principles of justice
require. Rawls expresses this idea by saying that the
conception of right or justice is prior to the conception of the
good. In short, Rawls assumes that citizens in a democratic
Marilyn F ischer.'R aw ls.A ssociations.and the Political C onception of
J u s tic e .'Journal o f Social /3/2//o.yo/7/?vVol.28.No.3(Winter 1 9 9 7 ) .p p .31-42.
24R a w ls, Political Liberalism,p .13.
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1 5
society have two views, a comprehensive doctrine and a
political doctrine. While burdens of judgment bring about
many irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines in the non-public
sphere. Rawls argues citizens can live in a stable society by
endorsing the same political doctrine that governs the special
domain of the political.23 For the stability of a pluralistic
society that includes various irreconcilable comprehensive
doctrines, Rawls tries to make the principle of justice not
conflict with the conception of the good that individuals have.
In this respect. Rawls says that his theory of justice is a
deontological theory that does not specify the good
independently from the right.
Another feature of the organizing idea is the notion of
free and equal persons with two moral powers : a capacity for a
conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of justice.
25In this regard.Galston claims that Rawls's conception o f the person
expresses the idea o f the divided self who has distinctively two separate
doctrines. See W illiam Galston. Liberal P j/r p o s e x fC a m b r id g e r C a m b r id g e
Univ. P r e ss.1 991).p .153. However.many critics argue that this
distinction is obscure. Richard Dagger says this distinction does not
explain where nonpolitical values stop and political on es begin.
Stephen H olm es argues that the differing sphere betw een the political
domain and the nonpolitical domain is obscure,because politically
designed arrangements penetrate almost every aspect o f social life. See
Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues{OxfordrOxford U n iv .P ress. 1 9 9 7 ) .pp. 189-
190:Stephen H olm es'T h e Gatekeeper.'New Republic(Oct. 1 1 .1 9 9 3 ) .p .4 5 : W ill
Kymlicka. M ulticultural C///ce«5/7//7(Oxford:Clarendon. 1 9 9 5 ) . p p . 2 3 1 -
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1 6
Because society is a fair system of cooperation. Rawls assumes
that "persons as citizens have all the capacities that enable
them to be cooperating members of society."26 These capacities
include two moral powers that are requisites for a fair system
of social cooperation. "The capacity for a conception of the good
is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a
conception of one's rational advantage or good."27 Since
persons have a capacity for a conception of the good, they can
formulate a scheme of final ends for their own sake. This moral
power of the conception of the good connects with the idea of
rationality. In other words, persons are rational "as they may
balance final ends by their significance for their plan of life as
a whole, and by how well these ends cohere with and
complement one another."28 Persons with a capacity for a
conception of the good are free in three respects. First, they
are free in that they can change their conception of the good if
they so desire. "Given their moral power to form, revise, and
rationally pursue a conception of the good, their public identity
232:A ndrew R. M urphy.‘R a w ls and a Shrinking Liberty of C onscience.'
Review o f Politics V o l.6 0 .N o .2 (S p r in g 1998).p p .2 6 4 -2 6 5 .
26Rawls. Political L iberalism .p .20.
11 Ibid..p. 19.
2S/bid.. p .5 1.
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1 7
as free persons is not affected by changes over time in their
determinate conception of it."29 Second, persons are free in
that they are self-authenticating sources of claims to advance
their conceptions of the good. "These claims citizens regard as
having weight of their own apart from being derived from
duties and obligations specified by a political conception of
justice, for example, from duties and obligations owed to
society."30 In this regard, slaves are not regarded as sources of
self-authenticating claims. Third, persons can take
responsibility for their ends. Given certain amounts of social
primary goods, persons adjust their plans of life as they
reasonably expect to achieve them. Since persons are engaging
members of social cooperation, they don't seek an extravagant
desire. "Moreover, they are viewed as capable of restricting
their claims in matters of justice in the kinds of things the
principles of justice allow."3 1
Persons also have a capacity for a sense of justice, which
is "the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the
public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms
19 Ibid.. p. 30.
10 Ibid.. p. 3 2.
ilIbid..p.34.
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1 8
of social cooperation."32 If persons have the powers of reason
connected with the sense of justice, they comply with the
principle of justice that they regard as just. In this respect,
persons who have a capacity for a sense o f justice are
reasonable because "they are ready to propose principles and
standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so."3 3
Persons are equal in that they have two moral powers (i.e. the
conception of the good and the sense of justice) "to the
requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of
society."34 Rawls argues that it is a higher-order interest for
the person to develop and exercise these two moral powers and
the powers of reason connected with them. Someone who has
not developed and cannot exercise the moral powers to the
minimum requisite degree cannot be a normal and fully
cooperating member of society over a complete life. Therefore.
Rawls's conception of the person is a normative idea in that it
characterizes how citizens should think of themselves
in a democratic society when questions of political justice arise.
3ZIbid., p. 19.
}}I b id .,p A 9 .
iAIbid., p. 1 9.
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CHAPTER III. THE ORIGINAL POSITION
A ) The Characteristics of the Original Position
Rawls organizes the shared public political culture of a
democratic society into the principle of justice that expresses
fair terms of social cooperation. Rawls's conception of justice is
a freestanding political doctrine in that it does not appeal to any
com prehensive doctrine.35 Instead, the content of the principle
of justice is expressed in terms of fundamental ideas of
democratic public cultures. In respect of the scope of its
application, this principle of justice serves as guidelines for how
basic constitutional institutions are to realize the values of
liberty and equality. Yet the selection of principles is made in
the original position as a device of representation. In other
words, the original position connects two features of public
culture of democratic society (i.e. the idea of society as a fair
system of cooperation and the conception of free and equal
35Stephen H olm es names Rawls's avoidance o f com prehensive doctrines
the gag rule and contends that it is an essential element in any regime-
founding com prom ise. See Stephen H olm es. Passions and Constraint
(C hicago:U niv. o f Chicago press.1 9 9 5 ).p.2 0 2 -2 3 5 .
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20
persons with two moral powers) with the principles of justice
that are to regulate the basic structure of society. To do so.
Rawls embeds various features of democratic public culture into
the original position. Especially two moral powers are
expressed in two parts of the original position respectively : a
higher-order interest of the parties to develop the conception of
the good of citizens they represent and the symmetrical
bargaining situation secured by the veil of ignorance. First of
all. the fair terms of social cooperation are agreed to by the
parties in the original position. The parties in the original
position are representatives of free and equal citizens living in a
democratic society. However, the parties in the original position
express only the capacity for the conception of the good that
citizens they represent have. The parties have a motivation to
adopt the principle of justice that enables the citizens they
represent to advance their conception of the good as far as
possible. So the parties in the original position are not
reasonable representatives but merely rational representatives
in that "the parties agree to those principles which they believe
are best for those they represent as seen from these persons'
conception of the good and their capacity to form, revise, and
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2 1
rationally to pursue such a conception, so far as the parties can
know these things."36 For this motivation of the parties in the
original position. Rawls assumes mutually disinterested
rationality of the parties. In other words, the parties regard
citizen's plan of life to be worthy to pursue for itself. "They
have a secure sense of their own worth so that they have no
desire to abandon any of their aims provided others have less
means to further theirs."37 In order to fulfill citizen's plan of
life as far as possible, the parties assume that citizens they
represent prefer more primary social goods rather than less. In
this respect, mutually disinterested parties are not altruists.
The parties are not sympathetic to others in that they take no
interest in other’s interests. In addition, the parties are not
moved by envy. They are not influenced by the fact that others
have a larger index of primary good unless the existing
inequalities exceed certain limits.
"By contrast, citizens' capacity for a sense of justice is
modeled within the procedure itself by such features as the
reasonable condition of symmetry (or equality) in which their
36R aw ls, Political Liberalism,p .305.
37Rawls. A Theory o f Justice .p. 144.
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2 2
representatives are situated as well as by the limits on
information expressed by the veil of ignorance."38 The
agreement of the principle of justice should be made under the
reasonable conditions. Especially, these conditions must situate
free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some persons
greater bargaining advantages than others. For example, the
reasonable condition should prevent the parties from choosing
the principle of justice that favors a particular reasonable
comprehensive doctrine with its conception of the good. To do
so. the specific information about citizens' race, gender, natural
endowments, social position, and conception of the good are
made unknown to the parties in the original position by use of
the veil of ignorance. In addition, the parties do not know the
particular circumstances of their own society, i.e., its economic
or political situation and its level of civilization. Because the
parties do not know which self they will turn out to be after the
veil of ignorance is lifted, they must consider the interests and
opinions of all persons they represent equally. In short, the veil
of ignorance ensures equal respect or equal consideration of
everyone's interests and opinions in choosing a principle of
,sRawls. Political LiberaIism .pA 04.
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2 3
justice for a democratic society. Rawls argues that the
combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance
achieve the same purpose as benevolence because "this
combination of conditions forces each person in the original
position to take the good of others into account."39 Even though
the parties are blocked from recognizing particular facts by the
veil of ignorance, the parties know the general facts about
human society so that they evaluate principles of justice solely
on the basis of general considerations. Because the equality in
possession of two moral powers is the only relevant feature of a
person when he articulates the fair terms of social cooperation.
Rawls regards citizen's natural talents, social circumstance, and
good fortune as arbitrary contingencies from a moral point of
view. Since the veil of ignorance prevents these arbitrary
contingencies from being a bargaining advantage, all parties are
similarly situated in the original position. Therefore, Rawls
argues that we can view the choice in the original position from
the standpoint of one person selected at random.
By putting citizens’ comprehensive doctrines behind the
veil of ignorance, the principle of justice that the parties would
,9Rawls. A Theory o f Justice.p. 148.
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24
choose in the original position is a freestanding view. "This
means that it can be presented without saying, or knowing, or
hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it may
belong to. or be supported by."40 This freestanding view is a
just principle because it is chosen under the fair procedure of
symmetry. So. Rawls designates his scheme of theory 'justice
as fairness'. Rawls’s 'justice as fairness' appeals to the idea of
pure procedural justice. It is obtained when there is no
independent criterion for the right result, but a correct or fair
procedure that makes the right result. Because the veil of
ignorance provides an impartial perspective, the principle
chosen through this fair procedure is just. Because the parties
don't know the content of citizens’ conceptions of the good, the
virtual motivation of the parties is to choose the principle of
justice that guarantees conditions securing full development
and exercise of citizens’ unspecified conceptions of the good.
Because Rawls assumes that the parties are mutually
disinterested, the persons in the original position try to
acknowledge principles which advance their system of ends as
far as possible. However, the veil of ignorance strips the
40Rawls. Political Liberalism.pp. 1 2 -1 3 .
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25
parties of the information about specific conception of the good
that citizens they represent have. In the end. the parties seek
the principle of justice that guarantees conditions for the
development of citizens’ unspecified conception of the good.
In the original position, many traditional theories of
justice are given to the parties as alternative candidates of
choice. They include the utilitarian principle, the principle of
perfection, mixed conceptions, intuitionistic conceptions,
egoistic conceptions as well as two principles of justice.41 With
the motivation to choose the principle of justice that guarantees
conditions securing full development of citizens' unspecified
conceptions of the good, Rawls argues that the parties choose
two principles of justice among alternative conceptions of
justice.
Rawls's principles of justice consist of two principles. The
first principle of basic liberties is lexically prior to the second
principle that regulates social and economic inequalities. The
first principle of justice says that “each person has an equal
right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which
4‘For a list o f alternative conceptions o f justice, see Rawls. A Theory of
Justice .p. 1 2 4 .
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2 6
is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”42 The
basic liberties in the first principle are specified by a list as
follows: "freedom of thought and liberty of conscience: the
political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the
freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person:
and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of
law."43 The second principle says :
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy
two conditions. First, they must be attached
to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity : and
second, they must be to the greatest benefit
of the least advantaged members of society.44
Rawls's two principles of justice are moral principles that
give certain ideals and standards for the basic structure of
society. "It imposes certain criteria on the design of the basic
structure as a whole : these arrangements must not tend to
generate propensities and attitudes contrary to the two
principles of justice (that is, to certain principles which are
given from the first a definite content) and they must insure
4:Rawls. Political L iberalism .^.2 9 1 .
*-Ibid.
44I b i d .
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27
that just institutions are stable."45 Two principles of justice
provide us with a standard whereby the distributive aspects of
the basic structure of our society are to be assessed. Since
Rawls's two principles of justice is a free-standing view chosen
under the veil of ignorance, persons implicitly agree to
"conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles
of justice require, or at least not to press claims which directly
violate them."46 Rawls's political principles of justice impose
limits on permissible comprehensive doctrines and ways of life
associated with them in that the conceptions of the good that
do not violate two principles of justice are worthy of
p ursuing.47 “The principles of any reasonable political
conception must impose restrictions on comprehensive views,
and the basic institutions those principles require inevitably
encourage some ways of life and discourage others, or even
45Rawls. Theory o f Justice.p.32.
46Ibid.,p. 3 1.
47 Yet Alejandro argues that many individuals may disbelieve that
com pliance with the principles o f justice and support for public
institutions are more central to the best expression and realization o f
their nature than are their private associations and their
c o m p reh en siv e p h ilosop h ical.m oral.or religious doctrines. See
A le ja n d r o , Limits o f Rawlsian Justice.p. 106.
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28
exclude them altogether/’48 Rawls calls it the priority of the
right to the good.
B) The Rationale for the choice of the First Principle
The parties choose Rawls's two principles of justice
because the basic liberties guaranteed by the first principle of
justice are among the social conditions necessary for the
adequate development and exercise of two moral powers. As
rationale for the choice of Rawls's two principles of justice,
however. Rawls distinguishes the ground relating to the sense
of justice from the ground relating to the conception of the
good in respect of the motivation of the parties.
To develop the capacity for a conception of the good, for
example, the person should acquire the liberty of conscience
because he needs to change his conception of the good when he
finds it unreasonable. "Thus, on the assumption that liberty of
conscience, and therefore the liberty to fall into error and to
make mistakes, is among the social conditions necessary for the
development and exercise of this power, the parties have
another ground for adopting principles that guarantee this
48 Rawls. Political Liberalism.p. 195.
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29
basic liberty."49 Furthermore, in forming and revising his
conception of the good, the person should appreciate why his
belief is true and his goal is good and suitable for him. He
needs a deliberative exercise of intellectual and moral powers.
Therefore, the parties choose Rawls’s first principle of basic
liberty that includes the liberty of conscience because this
principle guarantees the conditions necessary for the exercise
o f person's deliberative powers.
As a ground relating to the sense of justice that prompts
the parties to adopt the principle of basic liberty, Rawls
reminds us that the parties in the original position are merely
rational representatives and as such are moved solely by
considerations relating to what further the determinate
conceptions of the good of the persons they represent. "Thus,
any grounds that prompt the parties to adopt principles that
secure the development and exercise of the capacity for a sense
of justice must accord with this restriction."50 For example, the
parties pay attention to the fact that citizens can fully and
adequately advance their determinate conceptions of the good
49Ibid.,p.3 13.
501 bid., p .3 1 5 .
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30
when the scheme of social cooperation is achieved. The stable
scheme of cooperation is a just background condition in which
citizens can advance their conceptions of the good. To achieve
this scheme of social cooperation citizens in society have to act
upon the principles of justice. If this sense of justice is
obtained by almost all citizens, such principles of justice are the
most stable conceptions of justice. Therefore, when the parties
in the original position count the fact that citizens in society
will effectively and regularly act upon the principles of justice,
the parties can do so only because they believe that acting
from such principles will serve as a means to further the
conceptions of the good of the persons they represent.
According to Rawls, his principles of justice are the most stable
conceptions of justice so that they can assure a stable scheme
of social cooperation that provides a background condition in
which citizens advance their conceptions of the good. The most
stable conception of justice is "one that is clear and perspicuous
to our reason, congruent with and unconditionally concerned
with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation
of our person."51 As for the first element of stable conception
57&«/.,p.3l7.
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3 1
of justice. Rawls argues that two principles of justice define a
perspicuous conception. "By contrast, the idea of maximizing
the aggregate of well-being, or of attaining the greatest
perfection, is vague and amorphous."52 Secondly, "that the two
principles of justice are unconditionally concerned with
everyone's good is shown by the equality of the basic liberties
and their priority, as well as by the fair values of the political
liberties."53 The third element is shown by the fact that
Rawls's conception of justice as fairness is a reciprocity
principle. "The restrictions contained in the principle of justice
guarantee everyone an equal liberty and assure us that our
claims will not be neglected or overridden for the sake of a
larger sum of benefits, even for the whole society."54
Therefore, two principles of justice lead to a closer
affiliation with persons and institutions. Because of these three
elements. Rawls’s two principles of justice are the most stable
conceptions of justice. While to develop the capacity for a
sense of justice for its own sake is not a motive of the parties in
choosing the principle of justice, the real motive of the parties
S-Rawls, Theory o f Justice.p .5 0 1 .
53Rawls. Political Liberalism .p .3 1 7 .
5JRawls. Theory o f Justice.p .4 9 9 .
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32
in the original position is to choose the most stable conceptions
of justice that provide a background justice in which citizens
they represent can advance their conceptions of the good.
C) The Implication of the Second Principle of Justice
Rawls also suggests the second principle of justice that
regulates the basic structure of society. With the first principle
of equal liberty, the second principle of justice completely
articulates Rawls's theory of justice. According to Rawls, two
principles of justice presuppose that the social structure can be
divided into two parts. “They distinguish between those
aspects of the social system that define and secure the equal
liberties of citizenship and those that specify and establish
social and economic inequalities.”55 While the first principle of
equal liberty is for the former part, the second principle of
justice is to be applied to the latter part. Here it is important to
examine Rawls's rationale for the need of second principle. In
the original position the parties do not know the conception of
the good that citizens they represent have. Therefore the
5-Ibid.,p.61.
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3 3
parties want neither more than an equal share of the primary
goods nor less than an equal share of them. The first principle
of justice that the parties choose establishes the idea of equal
liberty for all. including equality of opportunity, as well as an
equal distribution of income and wealth. It is the benchmark
of initial equality. However. Rawls argues that we can accept
inequalities in the basic structure if they make everyone better
off. “ if . for example these inequalities set up various
incentives which succeed in eliciting more productive efforts, a
person in the original position may look upon them as
necessary to cover the cost of training and to encourage
effective perform ance.”56 Inequalities are inevitable. Yet
Rawls imposes certain constraints on inequality by explaining
what sorts of inequalities are allowed. Even though inequality
is not always unjust. Rawls argues, inequality is unjust if it has
unjust effects on relations among the members of a society.
For example, severe inequality between rich and poor prevents
the poor from executing effective use of their freedom. It also
makes the least disadvantaged being treated as inferiors. In
addition, inequality impairs the fairness o f election and of
56Ibid. .p. 15 1.
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34
political opportunities to run for public office.57 Therefore
Rawls tries to justify social and economic inequalities by his
second principle of justice. Rawls's second principle of justice
says that social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions : fair equality of opportunity and the greatest
benefit o f the least advantaged members of society (or
everyone's advantage). The first condition refers to the
principle of equal opportunity. The second condition is
concerned with the principle of distribution. The first condition
is lexically prior to the second one. In other words, the basic
structure of society has to fulfill the first condition ahead of the
second condition. Each condition, so its principle, has different
meaning and interpretation. Combining different meaning of
each condition respectively, Rawls suggest four-fold possible
system which regulates social and economic inequality. Table 1
shows it.
57 See Rawls. The Law of /5eo/?/e.s(Cambridge:Harvard U n iv. Press. 1999).
pp.114-1 15.
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Principle of Distribution
efficiency principle difference principle
Principle of Equal Opportunity
careers open to talents
fair equality of opportunity
system of natural liberty
liberal equality
natural aristocracy
democratic equality
Table 1: Four-Fold Systems of Equality
Among the four interpretations. Rawls adopts the system
of democratic equality. Once the first principle of equal liberty
is satisfied, the basic structure of society has to fulfill the
conditions of democratic equality. Rawls explains the rationale
for the choice of democratic equality system by comparing it
with other systems. First of all, the system of natural liberty
asserts that “a basic structure satisfying the principle of
efficiency and in which positions are open to those able and
willing to strive for them will lead to a just distribution.”-8
Combining the principle of efficiency such as Pareto optimality
and the principle of equal opportunity such as 'careers open to
talents', the system of equal liberty justifies social and
economic inequalities. In order to explain the principle of
efficiency such as Pareto optimality, Rawls borrows some
insights from economists. As a principle of distribution for a
5SRawls. Theory o f Justice,p .6 6 .
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36
simple society consisting of two persons (e.g. XI and X2). Pareto
optimality fulfills the principle of efficiency according to which
there is no redistribution that makes either person better off
without making the other worse off. In figure 1. the line
joining points A and B on the axes for each individual’s utility
represents an outer limit of feasible interpersonal utility
distribution, with constant preferences between producible
commodities on the part of the two individuals concerned, and
a given production technology and production factors.
U(X2)
B
O
A
U(X1)
Figure 1
All points on the line AB stem from a bundle of
efficiently produced and consumed commodities, and each
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37
point represents the highest levels of combined utility for two
individuals. This line AB is called the utility possibilities
frontier.59 Its shape of right-downwardness indicates that
gains to individual XI must entails losses to individual x2. and
vice versa. So it fulfills the Pareto optimality condition. Rawls
applies this principle of efficiency to the basic structure of
society by saying that “an arrangement of rights and duties in
the basic structure is efficient if and only if it is impossible to
change the rules, to redefine the scheme of rights and duties, so
as to raise the expectations of any representative man (at least
one) without at the same time lowering the expectations of
some (at least one) other representative m a n /’60 However, the
principle of Pareto efficiency does not select one particular
point on line AB as a just distribution even though all points on
the line AB represent efficient distribution of advantages from
social cooperation. In other words, Pareto efficiency can not
say anything about a policy that makes some better off and
others worse off. Because it is more realistic to expect a policy
59For the configuration o f the utility possibility frontier, see Robin
Boadway and Neil Bruce. Welfare Economics^Oxford: Basil Blackw ell.
1 9 8 4 ) .p p .3 1 -1 0 2 .
60Rawls. Theory of Justice .p .10.
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3 8
that produces gainers as well as losers. Pareto efficiency is
useless in handling such mixed outcomes. We face the problem
how to choose the point of just distribution along the line AB.
The problem is to find a conception of justice that singles out
one of these efficient distributions as also just. As an example
for a just distribution in case of the basic structure, we can not
say that the system of serfdom is just even though it is
efficient in that serfdom can not be reformed without lowering
the expectations of landowners. Because the principle of
efficiency can not serve as a conception of justice, it should be
supplemented by another principle of justice.
In the system of natural liberty, the principle of
efficiency is constrained by the principle of equal opportunity
such as 'careers open to talents.' In other words, the system of
natural liberty selects an efficient distribution by admitting the
initial distribution of assets, that is “‘the initial distribution of
income and wealth, and of natural talents and abilities.”61 This
principle of equal opportunity such as 'careers open to talents'
is the idea of meritocracy according to which “there should be
6'Ibid.. p .72.
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39
widespread procedural fairness in the evaluation of
qualifications for positions/’62 This principle of meritocracy is a
common feature of liberal approaches to equal opportunity.
Historically French in the eighteenth century advocated
'careers open to talents' as a principle of equal opportunity. It
has both a negative and a positive component. “Positively,
careers open to the talents means the abolition of
institutionalized privilege.”63 In other words, its aim is to
abolish the monopoly of advantaged social positions by
aristocrats. Negatively, the principle of meritocracy means
nondiscrimination in that no one is to be barred from any of
advantaged social positions. “Anyone who fails in the pursuit
of a desired career path may have lost out because of
(comparative) lack of talents, lack of the initiative necessary to
learn how to use one's talent, or sheer bad luck.”64 Concerning
its negative component, Rawls argues, the idea of equality as
careers open to talents is merely a “formal equality of
opportunity in that all have at least the same legal rights of
62For the principle o f merit, see James Fishkin. Justice, Equal
Opportunity, a n d the FamilyiN e w Haven:Yale Univ. P r e s s .1984).pp. 19-30.
65Philip Green. Equality and D em ocracy^New Y ork:N ew Press. 1998).p.42.
6AIbid.
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4 0
access to all advantaged social positions/’6- In other words, the
principle of meritocracy does not ensure social conditions of
background fairness so that some of the competitors might
never have a chance to develop the required skills and
qualifications. “The existing distribution of income and wealth,
say. is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural
assets - that is. natural talents and abilities -as these have been
developed or left unrealized, and their use favored or
disfavored over time by social circumstances and such chance
contingencies as accident and good fortune.”66 For example, a
tall person wins an advantage over a disabled in making
money through the career of basketball player because the
basket ball game is very popular in American society. Let me
suggest another example. The children with fortunate family
background can receive excellent education because their
parents are rich enough to provide it. Thanks to the fortunate
family background, these children achieve high scores at SAT
so that they get the admission from law school or medical
school, which endures favorable careers of higher income. So
65Rawls. Theory o f Justice,p . 72.
66lb id .
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Rawls argues that the distribution of income in the system of
natural liberty is unjust because it is influenced by the factors
such as natural and social contingencies which are arbitrary
from a moral point of view. It seems to me that Rawls's idea of
arbitrariness implies that these contingencies are beyond the
control of human beings. The fact that a person has valuable
talents and was born of rich parents is not a result o f anything
he has done. Therefore, “no one deserves his place in the
distribution of native endowments, any more than one
deserves one's initial starting place in society.”67
In order to correct the distributive injustice in the system
of natural liberty, the principle of meritocracy is replaced by
the principle of fair equality of opportunity in the system of
liberal equality. “The thought here is that positions are to be
not only open in a formal sense, but that all should have a fair
chance to attain them.”68 By mitigating the influence of social
contingencies on distributive shares, all competitors should face
equal causal conditions under which abilities and skills have
developed. “More specifically, assuming that there is a
61 Ibid. .p. 104.
6S/6 i4 ..p .7 3 .
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distribution of natural assets, those who are at the same level
of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use
them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of
their initial place in the social system, that is. irrespective of
the income class into which they are born/’69 In order to meet
this condition, the system of liberal equality has to prevent
excessive accumulation of property and maintain equal
opportunities of education regardless of one's class position by
subsidizing private schools or by establishing a public school
system. In addition, the equal opportunity in economic
activities is to be fulfilled. “This is achieved by policing the
conduct of firms and private associations and by preventing
the establishment of monopolistic restrictions and barriers to
the more desirable positions.”70
However. Rawls argues that the system of liberal equality
has its defect. “For one thing, even if it works to perfection in
eliminating the influence of social contingencies, it still permits
the distribution of wealth and incomes to be determined by the
natural distribution of abilities and talents.”7 1 Therefore, Rawls
59 Ibid.
10Ibid..'p.215.
7'Ibid.. pp. 7 3 - 7 4 .
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4 3
argues, the distribution of wealth in the system of liberal
equality is still arbitrary from a moral perspective.
“Furthermore, the principle of fair opportunity can be only
imperfectly carried out. at least as long as the institution of
family exists."72 It seems to me that Rawls has in mind the
example of warrior society provided by Bernard Williams.
Bernard Williams shows that the equality of opportunity is
empty unless it is actually made effective. Let's suppose a
warrior society in which great prestige is attached to
membership of a warrior class which has been recruited from
certain wealthy families only. But egalitarian reformers try to
change this society by introducing an egalitarian rule according
to which warriors are recruited from all sections of the society
based on a fair competition. “The effect of this, however, is
that the wealthy families still provide virtually all the warriors,
because the rest of the populace is so under-nourished by
reason of poverty that their physical strength is inferior to that
of the wealthy and well nourished."73 Because this reform
12Ibid.. p .74.
73Bernard Williams.'The Idea o f Equality.' in P h ilo s o p h y .P o litic s ,a n d
Societx, 2nd Ser. eds. Peter Laslett and W .G.Runciman(Oxford: Basil
B l a c k w e l l . 1 9 6 2 ).p . 126.
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44
project can not get rid of the influence of unequal family
background, it does not achieve the ideal of equal opportunity
substantially. The family background has a significant impact
on the life chance of the children. What is more. Rawls argues
that “even the willingness to make an effort, to try. and so to
be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon
happy family and social circumstances.”74 For these reasons,
the system of liberal equality can not specify social and
economic inequalities.
Rawls briefly mentions the defect of natural aristocracy
by saying that “no attempt is made to regulate social
contingencies beyond what is required by formal equality of
opportunity, but the advantages or persons with greater
natural endowments are to be limited to those that further the
good of the poorer sectors of society.”75 The system of natural
aristocracy articulates the idea of noblesse oblige. Because
distributive shares are improperly influenced by social
contingency in the system of natural aristocracy, it is an
unstable society.
74Rawls. Theory o f Justice.p .74.
15Ibid.
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4 5
At last. Rawls explicates the system of democratic
equality by combining the principle of fair equality of
opportunity with the difference principle. As I explain before,
the principle of fair equality of opportunity says that those
with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances.
However. Rawls needs to regulate social and economic
inequalities because the distribution of natural talents and the
contingencies of social circumstances hinder the fulfillment of
the principle of equal opportunity. Even though the family
background and social class to which individuals belong have a
significant influence on their life prospects, we can not
completely remove such contingent factors. It is just unlucky if
individuals are born with less talents or natural disadvantages.
Furthermore we can not change the distribution of natural
assets. These contingent factors are simply natural facts.
“What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with
these facts."76 Even though natural and social contingencies are
simple facts, social and economic inequalities caused by these
contingent factors are undeserved unless these inequalities
contribute to the improvement of life prospects for the least
16 Ibid..p. 1 0 2 .
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46
well off.77 In other words, social and economic inequalities are
to be somehow compensated for. Rawls tries to justify this
kind of initial inequality in life prospects by the difference
p rin cip le.78
According to the difference principle, “the higher
expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they
work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of
the least advantaged members of society.”79 Rawls defines the
least advantaged members as the position of the unskilled
worker or all persons whose income level falls below half of
the median social income and wealth. The difference principle
removes the indeterminacy o f Pareto efficiency by providing a
criterion for the specification of the social and economic
inequalities of the basic structure. As figure 1 shows, the
Pareto optimality does not suggest the criterion for the just
77For the controversial debate about Rawls's idea of natural endow m ent
and desert.see Thom as Pogge. R ealizin g /?ow/s-(Ithaca:Cornell U n iv.
P ress. 1 9 8 9 ) . p p .6 3 - 8 6 .
7sYet Robert N ozick criticizes Rawls's argument by saying that som e of
the things people just may have need not be deserved all the way down.
See Robert Nozick. Anarchy, State,and Utopia^New York:Basic B ooks,
1 9 74).pp.2 2 4-225. In a similar vein.Brian Barry argues that if w e push
Rawls's idea further and further back .w e finish up by saying that
everything that makes for greater or less success is a denial o f equal
opportunity. See his Theories o f 7M5-//ce(Berkeley: Univ. o f California
P r e s s . 1 9 8 9 ) .p .22 1 .
79R a w l s , Theory' o f Just ice.p .7 5.
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47
distribution even though all points on the line AB are efficient.
In order to define the particular Pareto optimal distribution
that society may want, economists formulate a social welfare
function. In figure 2. the movement along the grand utility
possibilities frontier - say from C to D - shows that XI' utility is
falling and X2' utility is growing. However, no information is
available about the size of the relative gains and losses. This is
why social judgments need to be introduced.
U(X2)
B
SWF2
SWF1
U(X1)
Figure 2
Suppose, for example, that the social judgments put C and
D on the same level of social welfare as equally preferred by
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48
society. By tracing out all combinations of XI' utilities and X2’s
utilities which are judged to be of equal social welfare, we can
figure out social welfare indifference curves in figure 2. This
function is called a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.
The social welfare function is an aggregation of the utilities of
all members of society. The Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function is convex to the origin and has negative slope. A move
from SWF1 to SWF 2 increases social welfare of society.
However, society can not attain SWF2 given the constants of
production and consumption. By moving along the indifference
curve from C to D. the social welfare function indicates how
much X2' increased utilities through X2's increased
consumption of the primary goods is required in compensation
for X I' reduced utilities through X l's decreased consumption of
the primary goods to keep social welfare constant. But there is
no objective way to decide the trade-off ratio between X I'
utility and X2' utility. Therefore the social welfare function has
various forms. “The choice of a specific form involves a further
ethical judgment about how to aggregate individual utilities.”80
A specific form of social utility function could be biased toward
80Peter-OIov Johansson. An Introduction to Modern Welfare Economics
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4 9
one between XI and X2. or it could have an egalitarian bias.
Let’s suppose that XI represents rich members of society and
X2 represent poor members of society. Utilitarianism argues
that society's welfare is equal to the sum of the utilities of
different individuals. So the social welfare indifference curve
is negatively sloped straight line, as is illustrated in figure 3a.
U(X2)
SWF2
SWF1
U(XI)
U(X2)
a) utilitarian social
welfare function
B
SWF1
U(X1) A
b) bergson-samuelson
social welfare function
Figure 3
The straight negative slope of utilitarian social welfare
function means that society is willing to give up one unit of
X l's utility for a gain of one unit of X2' utility. This holds
regardless of the level of utility of either of two members of
(CambridgerCambridge U niv. Press. 1 9 91).p .32.
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5 0
society : the society is completely indifferent to the degree of
inequality in the society. The form of Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function means that society should be willing to
accept a decrease in the utility of the poor only if there is a
much larger increase in the utility of the rich. In other words,
the concavity of Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function can
be interpreted as an aversion to inequality condition. In figure
3b. we have combined the utility possibilities frontier and the
social welfare indifference curve. Maximum achievable
welfare is attained at the tangency of the utility possibilities
frontier and the social welfare function. In doing so. we
reduced a very large number of Pareto optimality to a single
optimal point E.
Rawls's difference principle is an extreme version of
social welfare function according to which the welfare of
society only depends on the utility of the least advantaged
members of society. In figure 4, Rawls's social welfare function
has L-shaped form. As is illustrated by the vertical line in
figure 4, society is better off from L of SWF1 to H of SW F 2. if
the welfare of the least advantaged members (X2) is improved
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5 1
U(X2)
SWF3
SWF2
SWF1
UCX1)
Figure 4
without welfare increase of the advantaged members (XI). By
moving from L (or H) horizontally to its right, society gains
nothing from improving the welfare of XI. the advantaged
members of society. Only the welfare of the least advantaged
members is at stake. At the tangency of Rawls's social welfare
function and the utility possibilities frontier in figure 5a. we
can achieve maximum welfare of a society. However Rawls
suggests new idea of the contribution curve which represents
the contribution to the least advantaged members' utility made
by the greater expectations of the advantaged members.
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U(X2)
U(X2)
B
SWF
□
U(X1) A
SWF
0
U(X1)
a
(a) (b)
Figure 5
In figure 5b. the contribution curve (OP) is always below
the 45 line because XI is always better off. The maximum
welfare is achieved at the tangency of Rawls's welfare function
and the contribution curve that is the point a in figure 5b.
Rawls argues that the difference principle is mutually
beneficial to the advantaged and the least advantaged. The
well off members gain by the advantages of natural and social
contingencies conferred on them. The less well off members
also gain from the contributions of the advantaged members
because these contributions spread over the entire society
gradually. Between two classes of entrepreneur and unskilled
worker, for example, the better prospects of entrepreneurial
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5 3
class act “as incentives so that the economic process is more
efficient, innovation proceeds at a faster pace, and so on.”8 1
Eventually the long-term prospects of laboring class will be
improved because the material benefits produced by
entrepreneurial class diffuse throughout the entire society
including the least advantaged members, i.e. unskilled
w ork ers.82 As a way of improving the long-term prospects of
the laboring class, the difference principle recommends that
the material benefits should be spent on the education of the
least advantaged members to increase their productive abilities
and to ensure their self-respect. In this respect, Rawls argues,
the difference principle corresponds to the idea of fraternity.83
In addition, the difference principle represents an idea that the
distribution of natural talents is a common asset of a society
because the advantaged members do not deserve their
SlRawls. Theory o f Ju stice.p.IS.
S2RawIs assum es the chain connection according to which the
contributions o f the m ore favored positions spread generally
throughout society and are not confined to particular sectors of society.
See his Theory o f J u s t i c e , p p 1 -8 3 .
83 However.Thomas A. Spragens argues that Rawls's theory does not
encourage people to accept the difference principle because Rawls
limits the society's grounds o f social cohesion to self-interested
prudence together with a general com m itm ent to abstract fairness.
Without the conception o f democratic civic friendship.to say that
fraternity corresponds to the difference principle is useless and
circular. See Thomas A. Spragens Jr..C7v/c Liberalfy m fL a n h a m :
Rowman & Littlefield, 1 9 9 9 ).pp.71-72.
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5 4
superior natural capacities and favorable social positions.
Therefore all members of society - especially the least
advantaged - have to share the benefits of the distribution of
natural talents and social positions.84
Furthermore. Rawls argues that if the difference principle
would be fulfilled for many generations, we would eventually
reach a society with the greatest equal liberty the members of
which enjoy the greatest equal talent. Over time the
difference principle prevents the defects of the least well off
members' natural abilities from diffusing through the
generations. In this regard, the difference principle articulates
the tendency to equality.
D) The Rationale for the Choice of the Second Principle of
Justice
Rawls also suggests a rationale for the choice of the
second principle. First of all, the principle of equal opportunity
is justified in that this principle makes people achieve self
S4H ow ever. libertarian Robert N ozick argues that the difference
principle focuses only on the recipient.i.e..the least well off.so that it
violates the property right of the w ell off. Nozick's objection is that
w hereas his entitlement theory a c k n o w le d g e s that things are already
owned.Rawls's difference principle regards the primary g o o d s as goods
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5 5
realization. If certain peoples are excluded from precious
offices without reasonable reasons, their complaint is justified
“not only because they were excluded from certain external
rewards of office such as wealth and privilege, but because
they were debarred from experiencing the realization of self
which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social
d u tie s /’8- Rawls does not explain much about the rationale for
the choice of the principle of equal opportunity. It seems to me
that Rawls thinks realizing individual's plan of life is so
important that the parties in the original position choose the
principle of equal opportunity. In order to realize individual's
conception of the good, those with equal talent and motivation
should have equal chances of attaining a precious position.86
In order to justify the difference principle as well as the
first principle of justice. Rawls appeals to the idea of social
cooperation. Because social cooperation is an essential element
for the well-being of every members of society, the division of
to which no one has any entitlement. See N ozick. Anarchy, State, and
U topia, p p . 2 13-231.
S5R a w ls . Theory of Justice.p . 84.
s6For various justifications o f equal opportunity, see Alan H. G oldm an.
'The Justification of Equal Opportunity.'Social Philosophy & Policy
V o l.5 .N o .l(A u tu m n .l9 8 7 ).p p .8 8 -1 0 3 . -.William Galston,'Equality of
Opportunity and Liberal Theory.' in Justice a n d Equality.Here and N ow .
ed. Frank S. Lucash(Ithaca:Cornell Univ. Press. 1986).pp.89-107.
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56
advantage produced in society has to bring about willing
cooperation of all members of society. To do so. the basic
structure of society is to be governed by reasonable terms.
Rawls argues that the two principles of justice seems to be a
fair agreement “on the basis of which those better endowed, or
more fortunate in their social position, neither of which we can
be said to deserve, could expect the willing cooperation of
others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of
the welfare of all.”87 The distribution of natural assets and the
social contingencies may threaten the cooperative relation
between the most advantaged and the least advantaged
members of society because the social and natural
contingencies are arbitrary from a moral point of view. The
difference principle has an effect of redressing the undeserved
inequalities caused by social and natural contingencies. So the
difference principle is a reasonable term that brings about the
willing cooperation of every members of society, especially the
least well off.
So far, I explain Rawls's rationale for the choice of the
first and second principle of justice respectively. In order to
87Rawls. Theory o f Justice.p. 15.
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5 7
explain it more systematically. Rawls evokes the maximin rule
as a rationale for the choice of the two principles of justice.
“The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst
possible outcomes : we are to adopt the alternative the worst
outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the
others.*’88 Let's suppose that there are three possible
distributive schemes in table 2. In this matrix, each number
represents the index of the primary goods for the groups of
each strata respectively.
SJ__________________S2_______________S3
Upper Class 12 14 8
Middle Class 8 7 6
Low Income Class - 7 -8 5
Table 2 : Maximin Rule
The maximin rule recommends us to choose S3 because
the worst case of S3 (the index value of 5) is better than the
worst for the other alternatives (the index value of -7 for SI
and -8 for S2). The maximin rule regards the worst case as the
critical criterion for the decision making. In this respect, the
maximin rule is a conservative strategy.
SH Ibid.. pp. 1 5 2 -1 5 3 .
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58
According to Rawls, three features of situations give
plausibility to the maximin rule. First, the situation is one in
which a knowledge of likelihood of the possible circumstances
is impossible. The second feature is that the person choosing
cares very little for what he might gain above the minimum
stipend that he can be sure of by following the miximin rule.
“This last provision brings in the third feature, namely, that the
rejected alternatives have outcomes that one can hardly
accept.”89
Rawls argues that the original position is a situation in
which the maximin rule applies because it fulfills the three
features of maximin situations. First, the veil of ignorance of
the original position excludes a knowledge of likelihood of
belonging to certain possible circumstance and its index value.
Second, several kinds of arguments for the two principles of
justice illustrate the second feature. For example, the priority
of the first principle to the second principle implies that the
persons in the original position have no desire to try for
greater gains at the expense of the equal liberties. Finally, the
third feature holds if we can assume that other conceptions of
S9lbid.. p. 154.
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5 9
justice may lead to institutions that the parties would find
intolerable. For example, the parties in the original position
can not accept the utilitarian justification that liberty should be
constrained for the sake of social benefits. Because three
features of the original position are fulfilled, the parties choose
Rawls's two principles of justice instead of other conceptions of
justice.
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6 0
CHAPTER IV. REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AS COHERENTISM
Rawls's constructivism above explained appeals to the
notion of reflective equilibrium. For Rawls, "a conception of
justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises or
conditions on principles ; instead, its justification is a matter of
the mutual support of many considerations, or everything
fitting together into one coherent view."90 The former method
of epistemic justification rejected by Rawls is foundationalism ;
the latter accepted by Rawls is coherentism. "The
foundationalist holds that every justified belief owes its
justification ultimately to some belief that is non inferentially
justified."91 To be justified in believing some proposition A, the
foundationalist says we need to infer it from some other
proposition B. And our believing B is justified on the basis of
other proposition C. which we justifiably believe on the basis of
other proposition D, and so on. According to the
foundationalism, there is a foundational belief that is non-
inferentially justified if its justification does not consist in any
90 Ibid., p .2 1 .
91Richard Fumerton. M eta ep istem o lo g v and 5 i : e p f / m m ( L o n d o n : R o w m a n
& L ittlefield.1995).p.56.
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6 1
other beliefs. Therefore, the epistemic justification of
foundationalism is linear in structure. The conception of non-
inferentially justified belief is implicitly or explicitly identified
with infallible belief. On the other hand, coherentists criticize
that foundationalistic justification falls into an infinite regress
of justification. It is incompatible with human limitations. So
coherentists argue that beliefs can be justified by being
inferentially related to other beliefs in the overall context of a
coherent system. There is no foundational proposition. The
coherentistic justification is not linear in that "the relation
between the various particular beliefs is correctly to be
conceived, not as one of linear dependence, but rather as one of
mutual or reciprocal support."92 For ardent coherentist
BonJour. the coherence means logical and probabilistic
consistency.
The reflective equilibrium makes Rawls’s constructivism
to be a coherent view. Reflective equilibrium is the state of
one’s beliefs about justice when principles of justice and
considered moral judgments at all levels of generality Cor ideas
9:Laurence BonJour. The Structure o f Empirical K now ledge{C a m b r id g e :
Harvard Uni v.Press. 1 9 8 5 ).p .91.
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6 2
implicit in the public political culture) coincide. The original
position is a mediating device between principles of justice and
considered moral judgments. In describing how we formulate
the original position, Rawls says we begin "by describing it so
that it represents generally shared and preferably weak
conditions."93 These conditions consist of considered moral
judgments. People in a democratic society have a wide variety
of initial moral judgments and beliefs at all levels of generality.
Some of these initial moral judgments concern the rightness or
wrongness of particular actions and the evaluation of persons
or situations. Others concern the principles of morality at an
abstract level. Of course, not all of these initial moral
judgments are necessarily rational. “Thus in deciding which of
our judgments to take into account we may reasonably select
some and exclude others/’94 We can discard those judgments
which give an excessive attention to particular interests, or in
which we have little confidence. Through the filtering process
we can achieve a set of considered moral judgments which
have an initial credibility. For example, they comprise such
93R a w ls , Theory o f Justice,p .20.
9AI b id .,p A 7 .
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63
convictions that religious intolerance and racial discrimination
are unjust and inequalities of birth and natural endowment as
one's initial starting place in society are undeserved.
Next Rawls articulates the basic ideas and principles
implicit in these considered judgments into a fundamental
organizing idea that makes all ideas and principles implicit in
the considered judgments to be systematically connected and
related. "This organizing idea is that of society as a fair system
of social cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as
fully cooperating members of society over a complete life."95
The organizing idea implicit in the democratic public culture is
material to begin with for the choice of principles of justice. In
other words, this organizing idea is an input into the coherent
system of Rawls's structure. As a next procedure, Rawls uses a
mediating device of the original position where the parties
select two principles of justice which express the basic ideas
implicit in the considered moral judgments. To do so, Rawls
tries to make the specification of the original position cohere
with the organizing idea of democratic public culture. By doing
so, the principles chosen in the original position match our
95RawIs. Political Liberalism .^.9.
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64
considered moral judgments. Two principles of justice are the
outputs of this process of reflective equilibrium.
Rawls argues that two principles of justice match our
considered judgments better than other conceptions of justice
such as the utilitarian principle, the perfectionist principle and
so on.96 If there is a discrepancy between principles and
considered moral judgments, we can either modify the
specification of the original position or we can revise our
particular moral judgments. In this respect, none of considered
judgments is taken to be basic in a foundationalist sense. The
method of reflective equilibrium permits extensive revision of
considered moral judgments. Through this process of mutual
adjustment. Rawls assume that "eventually we shall find a
description of the initial situation that both expresses
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted."97 This is a
rationale of the specification of the original position.
96Instead o f investigating all other plausible conceptions o f justice and
their supporting grounds.Rawls c o n sid e r s the p redom inant traditional
conceptions. In this respect.his m ethod is prone to w id e reflective
equilibrium. For the difference b etw een narrow and w id e reflective
equilibrium, see his article 'The Independence o f M oral Theory.'
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
V o l.4 8 ( 1974- 1975).p.8.
97Rawls. Theory o f Justice,p .20.
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65
Rawls argues that justification is a matter of the mutual
support of many considerations, of everything fitting together
into one coherent view. In other words, the coherence among
considered moral judgments (or the organizing idea implicit in
the democratic public culture), the specification of the original
position, and principles of justice, gives a justificatory power to
Rawls's constructivism. In this respect, Rawls’s method of
reflective equilibrium is a coherentist approach. Table 3 shows
Rawls's reflective equilibrium as coherentism.
INPUT MEDIATING DEVICE OUTPUT
A Set of Organizing ideas (Society as a Fair System) Original Two Principles
Considered - - > Implicit in the Public (Free & Equal Persons)- - > Position - > of Justice
Moral Judgments Political Culture
Table 3 : The Structure of Reflective Equilibrium
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CHAPTER V. THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
66
So far I explain the way the parties choose two principles
of justice in a hypothetical situation of original position. The
choice situation in the original position is a thought experiment
type approach. In A Theory o f Justice. Rawls simply applies his
principles of justice in an actual situation through the four-
stage sequence as the veil of ignorance is gradually lifted. For
the application of two principles of justice, the parties move
through the constitutional convention, the legislative stage, and
the judicial or administrative stage. After twenty years from
the publication of A Theory o f Justice, however, Rawls
recognizes that he needs to explain what motivates citizens to
abide by his principles of justice in an actual situation of
application.
Because of the burdens of judgment, the plurality of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines is a feature of the public
culture of a democratic society. The fact of pluralism is a
subjective circumstance of justice. Therefore, after the two
principles of justice are chosen by the representative parties in
the hypothetical situation of original position, the question
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6 7
whether citizens acquire a sense o f justice enough to comply
with principles of justices is at stake. This is a question of
stability of a just democratic society. Especially in a pluralistic
society, two principles of justice should achieve an
endorsement from various comprehensive doctrines.
According to Rawls, "while the problem of stability has been on
our minds from the outset, the explicit discussion of it begins
only at the second stage since the principles of justice for the
basic structure are not on hand until then."98 As a solution to
the stability question, Rawls suggests the idea of the
overlapping consensus in the second stage.
Here I analyze theoretical development of Rawls’s idea of
social stability and political obligation. In A Theory’ o f Justice
published in 1971. Rawls argues that after the parties choose
two principles of justice for the basic structure of society, they
in the original position choose the principle of natural duty of
political obligation for individuals. Like the duty to help
another in need and the duty not to injure another, the natural
duty of justice requires us "to support and to comply with just
9SRawls. Political Liberalism ,p. 141.
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68
institutions that exist and apply to us."99 Insofar as the basic
structure of society is just, that is. it is well ordered by the two
principles of justice, citizens have a natural duty to comply
with the institutions and law of just society. The principle of
natural duty does not presuppose the voluntary acts of citizens
to accept the benefits that a just institution provides. In other
words, the basis of natural duty to comply with just institutions
is not the benefits and the advantage of the opportunities
which citizens voluntarily receive from that institution.100 "In
fact, once the full set of principles, a complete conception of
right, is on hand, we can simply forget about the conception of
original position and apply these principles as we would any
others."101 Actually Rawls shows that citizens in a well-ordered
society acquire a sufficient sense of justice so that they abide
by two principles of justice through three courses of moral
development - the morality of authority, the morality of
association, and the morality of principles. For the children at
"R aw ls. Theory o f Justice,p.1 15.
100Rawls designates this principle of obligation the principle o f
fairness. E ven though the principle of fairness binds those w h o assume
public o ffice.R a w ls rejects this principle because it does not bind
citizens generally. See. Theory o f Justice,pp. 1 0 8 - 1 17.
l0lRawls. Theory o f Justice.p.1 16.
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6 9
the first stage of the morality of authority, the sense of justice
is acquired gradually by the authority of their loving parents in
the family. If the parents truly love their children, the
children come to trust their parents so that they accept
parental moral injunctions. “In the absence of affection,
example, and guidance, none of these processes can take place,
and certainly not in loveless relationships maintained by
coercive threats and reprisals.”102 The second stage of the
morality of association includes various ideals suitable for the
status or role of the associations such as the family, the school,
the neighborhood, the occupation, and the civil society. As a
member of an association, a person learns to cooperate with
others by taking up their perspectives. A participating
member recognizes that others have different wants, motives,
and beliefs. In this way a member of an association
understands and assesses actions of others. So, the
participation in the just association of a well-ordered society
makes a person recognize the bonds of friendship and the
mutual trust. At the stage of morality of principle, citizens
have the desire to act from two principles of justice because
102 Rawls. Theory o f Justice.p .466.
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7 0
their conception of the good is congruent with the conception of
justice (or right). Once the attitudes of love, trust, and mutual
understanding have been generated by the previous two stages
of moral development, “the recognition that we and those for
whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and
enduring just institution tends to engender in us the
corresponding sense of justice.”103 First of all, the principles of
justice can guide the love of mankind. In a well-ordered
society, affection as wanting to be fair with friends and other
citizens and ties to the basic structure of society extends so
widely that people cannot select who is to be injured by their
unfairness. Thus in a well-ordered society where effective
bonds are extensive both to persons and to social forms, there
are strong grounds for preserving one's sense of justice.
Secondly, the participation in the life of a well-ordered society
is a great good. Because a well-ordered society is a social union
of social unions, citizens depend upon the cooperative
endeavors of others. By living with others in a well-ordered
society, a person can fulfill himself like a member of orchestra.
"Yet to share fully in this life we must acknowledge the
103 /b/r/..p.4 7 3 - 4 7 4 .
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7 1
principles of its regulative conception, and this means that we
must affirm our sentiment of justice."104 "Finally, the Kantian
interpretation of these principles shows that by acting upon
them men express their nature as free and equal rational
beings."10'’ These are rationales for citizens in a well-ordered
society to act from the two principles of justice. In a well-
ordered society, the conception of right or justice expressed in
the two principles of justice is congruent with the conception of
the good that citizens have. Because it is citizens’ natural duty
to advance just arrangements, citizens abide by the two
principles of justice so that a well-ordered society is a stable
one.
In Political Liberalism published in 1993, however. Rawls
recognizes that the well-ordered society is unrealistic because
the burdens of judgment provoke a plurality of reasonable but
incompatible comprehensive doctrines. Brian Barry comments
that Rawls assumes "a gap to exist between accepting the
principles of justice and being motivated to act on them."106 In
1041 bid.
l0SIb id .,p A 1 6 .
l06Brian Barry.'John Rawls and the Search for Stability.' Ethics Vol. 105.
No.4(JuIy 1995).p.885.
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7 2
A Theory o f Justice, Rawls thinks that citizens in a well-ordered
society have sufficient reasons to abide by his two principles of
justice because they hold the same principles of justice.
Without distinction between a political conception of justice
and a comprehensive doctrine. Rawls regards his two principles
of justice as a comprehensive doctrine that applies to a wide
range of subjects.107 In Political Liberalism, however, Rawls
acknowledges that the fact of reasonable pluralism is a
permanent feature of a democratic public culture. In this
pluralistic society, the stability of a society is at stake.
Therefore Rawls needs to show that his principles of justice can
achieve endorsement from various reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. In the second stage of overlapping consensus. Rawls
tries to justify his theory of justice by showing that his political
conception of justice generates the basis of its own support.
First of all. Rawls develops a new theory of moral
psychology based on the moral development theory expressed
in A Theory o f Justice. In Political Liberalism , Rawls supposes
that citizens with the two moral powers have a reasonable
107 See Rawls's Political Liberalism, paperback ed .(N ew YorkrColumbia
Univ. P r e s s .1 9 9 6 ).p.xlii.
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73
moral psychology. Reasonable persons are ready to propose
fair terms of cooperation and they recognize the burdens of
judgment. In order to fulfill this moral sensibility of the
reasonable, reasonable persons have conception-dependent
desires as well as object-dependent desires and principle-
dependent desires. Object-dependent desires can be described
without moral conception. These desires include bodily desires
for food and drink, desires for status, and desires to pursue
certain vocations. According to the motivational explanation of
principle-dependent desires, the object of desire is described
by the principles to which the desire is attached. Only a
reasonable person who can understand these principles has
principle-dependent desires. “However, the principles
specifying principle-dependent desires must be suitably
related to the conception in question.”108 So. conception-
dependent desires can be described by saying that ‘ the
principles we desire to act from are seen as belonging to, and
as helping to articulate, a certain rational or reasonable
conception, or a political ideal.”109 For Rawls, the conception of
108 Rawls. Political Liberalism.p . 84.
109 Ibid.
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74
reasonable and rational citizens as free and equal is a political
ideal of citizenship which people desire to realize. The entire
structure of Rawls’s justice as fairness and two principles of
justice help people to articulate this ideal of citizenship.
Therefore, people have a desire to act as the conceptions
require. In other words, they abide by two principles of justice
and accept the structure of justice as fairness.
Furthermore. Rawls tries to show that his principles of
justice can gain the support of an overlapping consensus from
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines so that the well-
ordered society is stable. Because the fact of reasonable
pluralism is a permanent feature of a democratic society, Rawls
needs to verify that his political conception of justice can get
endorsement from various reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. As an example of overlapping consensus, Rawls
suggests a model case. Let's suppose there are three
comprehensive doctrines :
One affirms the political conception because its
religious doctrine and account of free faith lead
to a principle of toleration and underwrite the
fundamental liberties of a constitutional regime;
While the second view affirms the political
conception on the basis of a comprehensive
liberal moral doctrine such as those of Kant or
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75
Mill. The third, however, is not systematically
unified; besides the political values formulated
by a freestanding political conception of justice,
it includes a large family of nonpolitical values.
It is a pluralist view, let us say, since each subpart
of this family has its own account based on ideas
drawn from within it. leaving all values to be
balanced against one another, either in groups or
singly, in particular kinds of cases.110
Even though each comprehensive view is related to
Rawls's political conception of justice in a different way, Rawls
argues that each view endorses two principles of justice from
the perspective of its own comprehensive doctrine. In the
model case, the first view is illustrated by Locke's statements
in A Letter Concerning Toleration which say only faith and
inward sincerity gain our salvation and the understanding
cannot be compelled by force. The first view of religious free
faith endorses Rawls's principles of justice because Rawls's
conception of equal liberty is a necessary condition for the
inward persuasion of the mind that is the only source of
salvation. The second view includes Kantian ethics and
utilitarianism. The Kantians support Rawls's principles of
justice because they regard the Kantian view of autonomy as
110 Ibid..p. 145.
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7 6
the deductive basis of Rawls's principle of equal liberty. For
many reasons. Rawls argues that the utilitarian may also
endorse two principles of justice as a best approximation to the
utilitarian principle. Those reasons include the difficulties in
the application of utilitarian principle owing to our limited
knowledge on social institutions and ongoing circumstances.
"The information they presuppose is difficult if not impossible
to obtain, and often there are insuperable problems in reaching
an objective and agreed assessment."111 On the other hand,
Rawls's conception of justice is a simple principle as a guideline
for public reason. Therefore the utilitarian thinks that Rawls’s
political conception of justice is a satisfactory approximation to
what the principle of utility would require. The third view in
the model case is pluralistic in that it includes many
nonpolitical values besides the political values formulated by
Rawls's conception of justice. However, "the political conception
is affirmed by balancing the judgments that support the great
values of the political against whatever values normally
conflict with them in a well-ordered democratic regime."112
11 x Ibid.,p. 1 62.
1X21 bid.
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77
According to Rawls the virtues of political cooperation that
make a constitutional regime possible are very great virtues.
"Thus, the values that conflict with the political conception of
justice and its sustaining virtues may be normally outweighed
because they come into conflict with the very conditions that
make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual
resp ec t.”11 3 This is the reason why the third view in the model
case endorses Rawls’s conception of justice. In short, the model
case of overlapping consensus show that "it is left to citizens
individually - as part of liberty of conscience - to settle how
they think the values of the political domain are related to
other values in their comprehensive doctrine."11 4 Rawls
hopes that his principles of justice can achieve an overlapping
consensus not from the unreasonable doctrines, but from the
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In the model case, three
doctrines consist of reasonable pluralism that is a long-run
result of human reason. Rawls looks for "a consensus of
reasonable (as opposed to unreasonable or irrational)
comprehensive doctrines."11 5 Of course, there are many
n i Ibid.,p. 1 57.
UAIbid., p. 140.
" 'Ib id .,p. I 44.
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78
unreasonable doctrines. However. Rawls argues that
"unreasonable comprehensive doctrines (these, we assume,
always exist) do not gain enough currency to undermine
society's essential justice."116 It seems to me that Rawls thinks
good money drives out the bad. For Rawls, this is not an
optimistic expectation because the overlapping consensus is not
a mere modus vivendi.
Rawls argues that the overlapping consensus is different
from a modus vivendi. In other words, the overlapping
consensus is not based on the outcome of political bargaining
that is a mere convergence of self or group interests. Rawls's
two principles of justice are affirmed on moral grounds. "All
those who affirm the political conception start from within
their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious,
philosophical, and moral grounds it provides."117 Once the
overlapping consensus is achieved, reasonable comprehensive
doctrines affirm Rawls's conception of persons and society as
well as his two principles of justice. Therefore, "those who
affirm the various views supporting the political conception
u6Ibid„ p . 39.
1n I b i d ., p .\ 4 7 .
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79
will not withdraw their support of it should the relative
strength of their view in society increase and eventually
become dom inant."11 8 Because two principles of justice are
internalized in reasonable persons, overlapping consensus
ensures the stability of the well-ordered society. Of course, to
achieve an overlapping consensus is a long-term process. The
two principles of justice may be accepted as a mere modus
vivendi because of historical events and contingencies.
However, over time this acceptance as a mere modus vivendi
develops into an overlapping consensus. At the early stage of
acceptance in this process, many if not most citizens come to
affirm the two principles of justice very loosely. "It is possible
for citizens first to appreciate the good those principles
accomplish both for themselves and those they care for, as well
as for society at large, and then to affirm them on this basis."119
At the early stage of acceptance, the consensus is narrow in
scope, "not including the basic structure but only the political
procedures of democratic government."120 As the process of
acceptance proceeds, citizen's sense of justice become
usIbid..p. 1 48.
u9lbid.,p. 1 60.
I20lbid.,p. 1 59.
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8 0
cultivated and citizens tend to develop trust in other people
who do their part in a well-ordered society. When citizens are
faced with opposing groups, they need to develop political
conception of justice as a common currency of public
discussion. Instead of coercive imposition of their view,
reasonable citizens invoke political conception of justice in
explaining and justifying their decision. Citizens who achieve
the consensus on purely procedural schemes in the early stage
need to develop a broad conception of justice covering the basic
structure in order to explain their point of view. At the final
stage of the overlapping consensus, the depth and breadth of
acceptance are full-blown. Citizens accept public democratic
culture such as ideas of society and persons as well as two
principles of justice. They accept not only the principles
instituting democratic procedures, but also two principles of
justice covering the basic structure as a whole. At last, “public
justification happens when all the reasonable members of
political society carry out a justification of the shared political
conception by embedding it in their several reasonable
comprehensive views.”121
121 John Raw ls.‘R eply to Habermas.'Journal o f Philosophy V o l .9 2 .N o .3
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8 1
The idea of overlapping consensus does not appeal to the
concept of truth. "We try. as far as we can, neither to assert
nor to deny any particular comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral view, or its associated theory of truth
and the status of values."122 The truth or falsity of a theory of
justice does not matter to its acceptability. Instead, the
reasonableness of the persons is at stake. In the alethic
tradition o f philosophy, various theories of truth have
developed. They include such theories as the correspondence
theory of truth, the coherence theory of truth, the pragmatic
theory, the redundancy theory, the minimalist theory, and so
on. Yet Rawls thinks that to provide a metaphysical account of
the truth of moral judgments is not a task of political
constructivism. "Reasonableness is its standard of correctness,
and given its political aims, it need not go beyond that."123
According to Rawls, reasonable persons are ready to propose
principles for fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them
willingly insofar as others do so. In addition, reasonable
persons recognize the burdens of judgment and the
(March 1 9 9 5 ) .p .l4 3 .
'22Rawls. P olitical Liberalism .p. 150.
l23,/bid.,p. 127.
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8 2
consequences of their application. In other words, even though
reasonable persons do not affirm the same comprehensive
doctrine, they do not use political power to repress
comprehensive doctrines that differ from their own. "This is
because, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, a public and
shared basis of justification that applies to comprehensive
doctrines is lacking in the public culture of a democratic
society."124 In the domain of the political, however, citizens
have a shared fund of democratic culture. Therefore
reasonable citizens accept Rawls's principles of justice from the
point of view of their comprehensive doctrines. In short,
reasonableness is a rationale for the overlapping consensus.
124 Ib id ..p p .60-6 1.
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CHAPTER VI. RADICAL CONCEPTION OF REFLECTIVE
83
EQUILIBRIUM
Many scholars say that the idea of overlapping consensus
is Rawls's new justificatory method compared with the method
of reflective equilibrium. They argue that the idea of
overlapping consensus in the second stage is a significant
change of Rawls’s method of justification. Weinstock says that
Rawls suggests three conditions of justificatory scheme. The
first condition is that a theory of justice should be related to
shared considered moral convictions (the desirability
condition). The second condition says that a theory of justice
should contribute to resolution of the conflicts and
disagreements (the reconciliation condition). According to the
third condition, a theory of justice must be feasible in that it
generates the basis of its own support over time (the pragmatic
condition). While the aim of Rawls's first stage is to show that
justice as fairness satisfies the desirability condition, Weinstock
argues, the fact of pluralism makes the reconciliation and
pragmatic conditions to be addressed in the second stage. "The
reason why a separate treatment for the reconciliation
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8 4
condition is required given the fact of pluralism is that
reflective equilibrium, with its attendant requirements of
intellectual hygiene, might very well still be seen as a method
permitting us to increase the confidence with which we
espouse our moral views, and thus might still contribute to
their satisfaction of a desirability condition, but it will not. in
and of itself, generate shared moral premises, and therefore
cannot help in the satisfaction of the reconciliation
condition."12- In a different vein. Jursen Habermas argues that
the second stage of overlapping consensus loses epistemic
meaning because “the overlapping consensus merely expresses
the functional contribution that the theory of justice can make
to the peaceful institutionalization of social cooperation.”126
Weinstock is right that the fact of pluralism necessitates a
justificatory scheme of overlapping consensus. I think,
however, it is not a new and separate justificatory scheme
compared with that of reflective equilibrium expressed in the
first stage. The justificatory scheme of overlapping consensus is
I25Daniel W einstock.'The Justification of Political Liberalism .'Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly V o l.7 5 .N o s.3 & 4(Sep/D ec 1994),p .174.
I26Jurgen H aberm as.‘R econciliation through the Public Use o f Reason.'
Journal of Philosophy V o l.9 2 .N o .3 (M a r c h 19 9 5 ).p . 121.
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85
another type of reflective equilibrium. There are two kinds of
reflective equilibrium : the conservative conception of
reflective equilibrium and the radical conception of reflective
e q u ilib riu m .127 While the choice situation of the original
position in the first stage appeals to the conservative
conception of reflective equilibrium, the justificatory scheme of
overlapping consensus in the second stage uses the radical
conception of reflective equilibrium.
"According to the conservative conception of reflective
equilibrium, a person is to achieve a coherent system of beliefs
by formulating general moral principles that seem initially
plausible and by investigating the logical and evidential
relations among these principles, her considered moral
judgment, and elements of her broader philosophical
p e rsp ectiv e."128 The conservative method of reflective
equilibrium provides an algorithm for theory construction.
Rawls uses the conservative method of reflective equilibrium
at the first stage of constructivism. He formulates the
principles of justice by investigating the relations among the
l27I borrow this idea with som e modification from Michael R.DePauI.
Balance an d Re/// 2 e m e /z /(L o n d o n :R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 3 ) . p p .3 5 - 5 6 .
128DePaul, Balance and Refinem ent.p .3 5 .
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8 6
principles of justice, the specification of original position, and
the public culture of a democratic society. On the conservative
conception, however, initial beliefs such as the public culture or
the specification of original position will not be altered unless
such alteration is necessary to resolve conflicts in theory
building.
On the other hand, "the radical conception of reflective
equilibrium allows for, and indeed expects, revisions of beliefs
and degree of belief that go beyond what is necessary to
resolve conflicts in favor of more strongly held beliefs."129 The
radical conception of reflective equilibrium regards the
consideration of alternative moral theories as a significant
point at which people may be led to alter the structure of their
moral beliefs. It is a process of moral conversion. For example,
a person who reads Marx for the first time may become a
Marxist by finding this view of the world compelling in its own
right. As a consequence, she just changes her mind about
various of her beliefs, now believing propositions that
previously she would have considered unlikely to be true. I
129 Ibid., p. 3 9.
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8 7
think that Rawls's justificatory scheme of overlapping
consensus appeals to the radical conception of reflective
equilibrium. Rawls's two principles of justice is an alternative
moral theory by which people with certain comprehensive
doctrines may alter their belief systems.
Various comprehensive doctrines achieve a reflective
equilibrium on the two principles of justice as a principle for
the domain of the political. Even though the burdens of
judgment prevent an overlapping consensus on the principle
for the non-public sphere, a consensus is attainable on the
principle for the sphere of basic structure. People with certain
comprehensive doctrines recognize that Rawls’s two principles
of justice can be coherent with the structure of their moral
beliefs for various reasons. Therefore, they change their minds
about the principle of justice that they previously had.
Furthermore they accept Rawls's ideas of the public culture -
i.e.. the idea of free and equal person with two moral powers
and the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation. It is a
process of moral conversion in respect to the political doctrine.
At this point, Rawls supposes the looseness of comprehensive
doctrines as a clue of moral conversion. In other words, most
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8 8
people do not adhere to their comprehensive doctrines
stringently. In an early process of moral conversion, Rawls's
two principles of justice cohere loosely with comprehensive
doctrine. If an incompatibility later be recognized between the
principles of justice and people’s comprehensive doctrines, they
might very well adjust or revise their doctrines rather than
reject just principles. Table 4 shows the radical conception of
reflective equilibrium in Rawls's second stage of overlapping
consensus. Through two stages of constructivism, Rawls uses
the same, but a different kind of justificatory scheme of
reflective equilibrium.
Ideas Implicit Two Principles <- - - CD I (religious doctrine of free faith)
in the Public <- - - of Justice Chosen <- - - CD 2 (utilitarianism & Kantian)
Political Culture in the Original Positionc- -Comprehensive Doctrine 3(pluralist)
Table 4 : The Structure of Radical Reflective Equilibrium
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CHAPTER VII. CRITICISM
89
A) The Public Political Culture
For Rawls, the public culture of a democratic society is
material from which he can select principles of justice. Rawls's
scheme of justice as fairness organizes all ideas and principles
implicit in the considered moral judgments into a fundamental
idea. Rawls argues that this fundamental organizing idea - the
idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and the
conception of free and equal persons with two moral powers -
is a shared fund of implicitly recognized ideas and principles.
Next. Rawls tries to embed various aspects of democratic public
culture into the original position so that the principles of justice
are coherent with considered moral judgments implicit in the
democratic public culture. Through this process of
construction. Rawls shows that his theory of justice achieves a
coherence among considered moral judgments, the specification
of the original position, and two principles of justice.
Concerning the justificatory role of considered moral
judgments, Lemos suggests two sorts of views - strong and
weak. "To adopt the strong view is to hold (1) that we have
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90
some epistemically warranted or reasonable considered moral
judgments or that some of our considered moral judgments are
instances of knowledge, and (2) that we can reason from these
judgments to knowledge or warranted beliefs in a principle or
set of ordered principles which will state the necessary and
sufficient conditions for an act's being morally right or
w rong."130 On the other hand, the weak view accepts (1), while
withholding beliefs in or rejecting (2). Since Rawls assigns an
initial credibility on the public culture and uses it as an input
into the reflective equilibrium, I think he adopts the strong
view of the justificatory role of considered moral judgments.131
After A Theory o f Justice was published, many
philosophers criticized Rawls's strong view of considered moral
judgments. According to R. M. Hare, Rawls and his readers
think they achieve a unanimity in their considered judgments
and they adequately represent people generally. So Hare
l30Noah Lemos.'Justification and Considered Moral Judgments. 'Southern
Journal o f Philosophy V o l.2 4 .N o .4 (W in te r 1 9 8 6 ) .p.509.
m Norrnan Daniels and Kai Nielsen also adopt the strong view. See
Norman Daniels.'Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in
E th ic s.'Journal o f Philosophy V o l.7 6 .N o .5 (M a y 1 9 7 9 ),pp.256-282. Norman
D aniel.'R eflective Equilibrium and A rch im ed ean Points. ’C a n a d ia n
Journal o f Philosophy Vol. 10,N o. 1 (March 1 980),pp.8 3 -1 0 3 . Kai Nielsen.
'In Defense of Wide Reflective Equilibrium.’ in Ethics and Justification.
ed. D ouglas Odegard(Edmonton:Academic Printing & Publishing. 1988).
pp. 19 -38.
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9 1
criticizes that Rawls is advocating "a kind of subjectivism, in
the narrowest and most old-fashioned sense."13- Richard
Brandt also criticizes Rawls's subjectivism in that "our
normative beliefs are strongly affected by the particular
cultural tradition which nurtured us. and would be different if
we had been in a learning situation with different parents,
teachers, or peers."133 According to D. W. Haslett, therefore, "it
would appear that, far from having a reason for giving people's
considered moral judgments initial credibility, we have instead
a reason for initial skepticism."134
To this credibility objection, Rawls suggests the public
culture of a democratic society as a shared fund for the choice
of political conception of justice. Rawls thinks that the public
culture of a democratic society is the common belief that
organizes the basic ideas implicit in various considered moral
judgments. Because all citizens living in a democratic society
presumably accept Rawls's specification of democratic public
I3:R. M. Hare.'Rawls' Theory of Justice.' in Reading Rawls, ed. Norman
D an iels(N ew YorkrBasic B o o k s .1975).p .82.
l33Richard B. Brandt. A Theory of the G o o d and the /?/g/tr(O xford:O xford
Univ. Press. 1979). p .21.
134D. W. Haslett.'What is Wrong with R eflective Equilibria?' in E q u a l i t y
and Liberty. ed J. A ngelo Corlett(New YorkiSt. Martin's.1991).p . 140.
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9 2
culture, he regards it as an appropriate input into the scheme
of reflective equilibrium. Therefore, the output of reflective
equilibrium - i.e. two principles of justice - is a more plausible
conception of justice than other principles of justice like the
utilitarian principle, perfectionism, egoistic conception, etc.
I question that Rawls's specifications of the public culture
are the shared convictions of a democratic society.135 Rawls's
specification of the public culture of a democratic society
cannot be regarded as an appropriate input into the scheme of
reflective equilibrium. At best, his specification of the public
culture merely represents a partial aspect of democratic public
culture. In other words, there are other elements (or
interpretations) of democratic culture. Rawls's argument of the
burdens of judgment may operate in the interpretation of the
public culture. Rawls's specification of the public culture
135For a similar criticism, see Daniel W einstock.'The Justification of
Political Liberalism .'Pacific Philosophical Quarterly V ol.75.N o s.3 &
4 (S e p /D e c 1994).p. 176: Rex Martin.'Rawls's N ew Theory o f Justice.'
Chicago Kent Law Review V ol.6 9 .N o . 3 (1 9 9 4 ).pp.7 5 1 -7 5 2 : Joseph
Raz.'Facing D iv e r sity .'Philosophy <£ Public Affairs V ol. 19.N o. 1 (Winter
1990).pp.8-9: Jean Hampton.'The Moral C om m itm ents o f Liberalism.' in
The Idea o f D em ocracy. eds. David Copp.Jean Hampton.and John
R o e m e r (C a m b rid g e:C a m b r id g e Uni v. Press. 1 9 9 3 ).pp. 3 0 7 -3 0 9 : Margaret
M o ore.’Justice for Our T im es.'Canadian Journal o f Political Science
V o l.2 3 .N o .3 (S e p 1990).pp.465-466: Gerald D op p elt.’Rawls's Kantian Ideal
and the Viability o f Modern Liberalism.'Inquiry V o l . 3 1 .N o .4 (D e c . 1988).
p.438: William Galston. Liberal / >wr/?05,e.y(Cam bridge:Cam bridge Univ.
Press. 1991).pp. 122-123 and p .130.
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93
depends on the interpretation of democratic political
institutions, historic texts, and documents. If so. the burdens of
judgment - i.e.. the vagueness of concepts, different
experiences, and different kinds of normative considerations -
necessarily bring about different interpretations of the public
culture of a democratic society. While Rawls recognizes the
reasonable pluralism of various comprehensive doctrines
caused by the burdens of judgment, he does not explain why
we can achieve monolithic interpretation of the public political
culture in spite of the burdens of judgment. Especially I don’t
think that the public political culture can be articulated in
Rawls’s description of liberty and equality. Rawls’s
understanding of liberty and equality is not a shared fund
implicit in the public political culture. Below I explain that
Rawls’s conception of free and equal persons is not an
unequivocal interpretation of the public political culture of a
democratic society.
As a component of Rawls’s organizing idea, the conception
of free and equal persons with two moral powers is an
essential element for Rawls's constructivism. According to
Rawls, persons with a capacity for a conception of the good are
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9 4
free in that 1) we regard them as capable of changing their
ends. 2) we assign them responsibility for their ends, and 3) we
regard them as self-authenticating sources of valid claims.
This conception of free persons represents the idea of positive
liberty as self-determination or autonomy. Positive liberty,
according to Berlin, requires persons to take an active part in
gaining control or mastery of themselves. Berlin says “this
dominant self is then variously identified with reason, with my
higher nature, with the self which calculates and aims at what
will satisfy it in the long run, with my real, or ideal, or
autonomous self, or with my self at its best; which is then
contrasted with irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my
lower nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my empirical
or heteronomous self, swept by every gust of desire and
passion, needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to
the full height of its real nature.”136 Berlin’s conception of
positive liberty includes Rawls’s idea of liberty. Especially
Rawls's conception of freedom is very similar to the idea of
autonomy of Stanley Benn. Benn argues that the autonomous
156 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on L/berrv(Oxford:Oxford Univ.Press. 1 9 6 9 ).
p . 132.
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95
person has to have certain minimum conditions of cognitive
and practical rationality. In addition, an autonomous person
has a nomos in his belief system by which his actions are
governed consistently. Furthermore, "to be autonomous a
person's nomos must be his own. not merely one picked up
from heterotes. from others about him."137 Benn also argues
that through the critical exploration of endogenous and foreign
culture an autonomous person can create his own consistent
pattern of belief. In a similar vein, Charles Taylor calls positive
freedom an exercise-concept in that "doctrines of positive
freedom are concerned with a view of freedom which involves
essentially the exercising of control over one's life."138 An
ardent perfectionist, Joseph Raz argues that “governments are
subject to autonomy-based duties to provide the conditions of
autonomy for people who lack them.”139 I think that Benn's
idea of freedom as autonomy and Raz’s arguments include
every aspect of Rawls's conception of freedom. Of course,
l37Stanley I. Benn. A Theory o f Freedom{C am b rid ge:C am b rid ge Univ.
P ress. 1988).p. 179.
I3sCharles Taylor.'What's W rong with Negative Liberty,' in P h ilo s o p h ic a l
Papers ,V o\.2:Philosophy and the Human S’ c('e/2c e .y (C a m b r id g e :C a m b r id g e
U n iv. Press. 1985).p .213.
139 Joseph Raz. The M orality o f Freedom(O x fo rd rC laren d on . 1 9 8 6 ) .p.41 5 .
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96
Rawls's idea of positive liberty belongs to the public culture of
a democratic society. However, positive liberty is not a unique
idea of liberty shared by citizens in a democratic society. Many
philosophers suggest the idea of negative freedom as a lack of
restraints. "Political liberty in this sense is simply the area
within which a man can act unobstructed by others."140 So
negative freedom sometimes is called an opportunity concept.
The more opportunities and choices available to persons, the
freer they are.
Beside this difference between negative absence of
external (i.e. physical) restraint on action and positive self-
determination without internal (i.e. psychological) restraint,
George Crowder summarizes several distinctions between two
conceptions of freedom. They include the difference between a
negative capacity to act as one pleases and a positive ability to
act as one ought or to realize the true self. "Sometimes the
term distinguish a negative sphere of private activity from a
positive capacity for participation in a public political realm,
sometimes they contrast negative non-interference with
,40Isaiah Berlin. Four Essays on L iberty\pA 22.
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97
positive control over material resources."141 Crowder suggests
his own distinction depending on whether the subject to whom
the freedom is ascribed is the empirical (in case of negative
liberty) or the authentic person (in case of positive liberty).142
If we accept Crowder's own distinction. Rawls’s conception of
liberty as autonomy belongs to positive liberty because Rawls’s
conception of free persons is a normative idea that
characterizes the ideal of citizenship in a democratic society.
However. Rawls does not give us a reliable explanation why he
regards the idea of positive liberty as shared fund of
democratic public culture. Why does not Rawls adopt the idea
of negative liberty as shared fund of democratic public culture?
Even within the proponents of positive liberty, there are
various forms of positive liberty. The first version of positive
liberty adopts the republican conception of freedom stated by
Rousseau and Hegel. According to this tradition, the man who
is truly human, and truly himself, is the man who participates
fully in the life of the state, who faithfully and conscientiously
performs his civic duty. Man can only be free to the extent
l4IGeorge C rowder.'Negative and Positive Liberty.'Political Science
V o l.40.N o . 2 (D ec. 198 8 ).p. 57.
l42See Ibid.,p .64.
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9 8
that he is a participant in intersubjectivity as citizen of a
society. The second version of positive liberty stems from the
Stoic tradition and Christianity. According to this tradition,
man can realize his true nature in a life of non-political virtue.
"Unable to fulfill himself as citizen, he could assert his identity
as a moral agent attending to the law of Nature speaking
through reason."143 The Stoics argue that true freedom of a
human being can be fulfilled by subjugating his appetitive
lower-self to his real higher-self. Beside these two versions.
Rawls’s idea of freedom as autonomy is another version of
positive liberty, which is not so different from Benn’s and Raz’s.
Rawls never explains why his version of positive liberty is the
shared fund of democratic public culture.
Rawls argues that his version of positive liberty is the
shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles
within a pluralistic society. So Rawls assigns persons a higher-
order interest to develop the capacity for the conception of the
good. It seems to me that Rawls regards positive liberty
(autonomy) as a practical solution to the moral, religious, and
philosophical conflicts that stem from a pluralistic society.
lAilb id .
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99
However. William Galston argues that liberalism is about the
protection of diversity, not the promotion of autonomy. Galston
argues that “autonomy is one possible mode of existence in
liberal societies - one among many others : its practice must be
respected and safeguarded : but the devotees of autonomy
must recognize the need for respectful coexistence with
individuals and groups that do not give autonomy pride of
place.”144 Democratic culture does not expel the Old Order
Amish claim that high school attendance is contrary to their
religion. Even though the Amish claim deprives children of the
right to be masters of their own destiny, the liberal idea of
tolerance accepts the Amish claim that denies the life of
autonomous choice. The Amish case shows that peoples of a
democratic society do not share the political conception of
positive liberty.
Even though the idea of positive liberty (autonomy) is
partly an aspect of a democratic culture. Rawls does not explain
why we should give it such normative significance. Why
should the basic structure of society be organized by the social
144 William A. Galston.‘T w o Concepts o f Liberalism.' EthicsVol. 1 0 5 .N o . 3
(April 1995).p .525.
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100
conditions necessary for the development of the capacity for a
conception of the good? Is autonomy good intrinsically or
instrumentally? What is the value of autonomy?145 Robert
Paul Wolff argues that anarchism is the only political doctrine
consistent with the virtue of autonomy because there can be no
resolution of the conflict between the autonomy of the
individual and the putative authority of the state.146 If Wolff is
right. Rawlsian parties in the original position can not accept
the difference principle and welfare policies because the
second principle violates the autonomy of citizens, especially
the well-off members of a society. In addition, Isaiah Berlin
warns that social arrangements that tend to encourage personal
autonomy could lead to despotism. Because people may think
that some men are not well attuned to the voice of their own
reason and only the wise leads the correct way of life, the
society organized by the principle of positive liberty leads to an
145 For this question, see David Johnston. The Idea o f a Liberal Theory
(PrincetonrPrinceton U niv. P ress.1 9 9 4 ).pp.6 8 - 9 9 .:Robert Paul W olff. In
Defense o f Anarchism ^N e w YorkrHarper & R ow .l976):Joh n Christman
ed ..The Inner Citadel( O xford:O xford Univ.Press.1989):G erald D w orkin.
The Theory,- and P ra ctice o f /4«rono/Mv(Cambridge:Cambridge U n iv .
Press.1988):Willard G aylin & Bruce Jennings, The Per\>ersion o f
A u t o n o m y l N e w York:Free Press,1996): Thomas Hill. A u ton om y a n d Self-
re.y/?ec7(Cambridge:Cambridge U n iv .P ress.1991): Peter Digester, O u r
P o litic s,O u r Se/ves ?(Princeton:Princeton U niv. P ress.1995)
146 See Robert Paul W olff, In D efense o f Anarchism .pp. 1 8 -2 1 .
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101
authoritarian state. In this respect, Rawls's state may be
authoritarian because the overlapping consensus excludes the
comprehensive doctrine that denies the idea of autonomy as an
unreasonable doctrine. It is against the democratic norm. As
William Galston argues, liberalism is about the protection of
diversity, not the promotion of autonomy. It seems to me that
Rawls regards the idea of autonomy as an intrinsic good. On
the other hand. J. S. Mill cherishes the autonomous life
instrumentally. According to Mill, liberty makes people
experiment with various plans of life so that society develops
by overcoming the despotism of custom.147 Unlike Mill's
argument of the instrumental value of liberty, Rawls thinks
that autonomous life is good in itself. However. David Johnston
argues that measures to promote personal autonomy may have
the unintended consequence of diminishing individuals’
abilities to be effective agents.148 People may autonomously
decide to be a drug trafficker, an anarchist, or an anti-social
skeptic. Then the ideal of positive liberty can not achieve the
radical reflective equilibrium in table 3. Rawls’s ideal of
147 See.J.S.Mill. On Liberty, ed. Stefan Collini(Cambridge:Cambridge Univ.
Press. 1 9 8 9 ) . p p .6 9 -7 4 .
148 See Johnston. Idea o f a Liberal Theory,pp.9 5-9 8.
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1 0
positive liberty as a public basis of justification for
fundamental political questions is a controversial
presupposition so that we have to avoid appealing to it.
Actually there are many illiberal groups who do not value
Rawls’s idea of positive liberty. For example, the Amish
prohibits apostasy and does not value the idea of autonomy.149
If Rawls appeals to the idea of positive liberty as an algorithm
in his constructivism, his principles of justice can not be a
freestanding view. In other words, Rawls’s principles of justice
explicitly does a favor to the comprehensive doctrines which
value the idea of positive liberty.
The same criticism can be applied to Rawls's conception
of equality. Rawls says that citizens are equal by virtue of
possessing two moral powers to the requisite minimum degree
to be fully cooperating members of society. The two moral
powers are the capacity for a conception of the good and the
capacity for a sense of justice. For Rawls, the equal possession
of these moral powers is a characteristic of the democratic
culture. The idea of equality in political discussion is a
U9 Kymlicka asks why do som e groups who do not value autonomy in
private life accept the idea o f R aw ls's autonomy in political contexts. See
Kymlicka. M ulticultural Citizenship,^^). 1 6 0 - 1 6 2 .
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103
controversial one. In fact, human beings differ in their skill,
intelligence, strength, and virtue. As a prescriptive equality,
however. Bernard Williams argues that human beings are equal
in certain things that they can do or achieve. "These are
certain sorts of moral ability or capacity, the capacity for virtue
or achievement of the highest kind of moral worth."150 Since
Rawls argues that having two moral powers (a capacity for a
sense of justice and for a conception of the good) to the
requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of
society makes persons equal, the two moral powers belong to
these virtues which express a prescriptive equality of human
beings. Yet I question that the two moral powers are unique
virtues for the cooperating members of a democratic society.
Besides two moral powers, the democratic culture includes
many moral powers that the person should develop and
exercise. Rawls should have verified why his specification of
two moral powers are included in his idea of equality. Rawls
assumes that the two moral powers enable the citizens to be
cooperating members of society. In fact, the capacity for a
l50WiIliams.'The Idea o f Equality.' in Philosophy.Politics and Society,
p . 115.
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1 04
sense of justice that expresses the idea of the reasonable is
articulated in the device of the veil of ignorance so that it
makes rational parties choose the fair terms of cooperation.
However. I think that cooperating members of society need
various moral powers beside Rawls's two moral powers. At
best, the capacity for a sense of justice may be one element
among others for cooperating members of society. This
capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public
conception of justice expresses the powers of human reason.
Yet cooperating members of society need various virtues
beside the powers of human reason. William Galston comments
that "it is by no means clear why a sense of justice should be
emphasized whereas courage and a variety of social virtues are
altogether excluded from Rawls’s model conception."1' 1 Galston
suggests various virtues such as the law-abidingness, loyalty,
self-restraint, the entrepreneurial virtues, the leadership
virtues, and so on.1' 2 In addition, republicanism argues that
citizens have to sacrifice their self-interests for the common
good. The difference-affirming theorists suggest the civic
!5lGalston. Liberal P urposes.p. 122.
152 See Ib id ..p p .21 3 -2 3 7 .
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1 05
friendship and the attitude of trust for civic solidarity.153
Rawls never justifies why only two moral powers are needed
for the society as a fair system of cooperation.
Rawls may reply that his theory includes various virtues
beside two moral powers. Let's articulate Rawls's argument of
the political obligation and social stability. According to Rawls,
merely rational agents who try to fulfill their conceptions of
the good lacks a sense of justice so that they should be under
constraints to be cooperating members of society. In order to
embed the sense of justice in the original position, Rawls
devises the veil of ignorance that provides a fair and
reasonable condition. Under this symmetrical situation, parties
with equal bargaining power choose fair terms of cooperation.
After fair terms of cooperation are chosen and implemented in
the society, the citizens can develop a reasonable moral
psychology. In other words, the citizens in a well-ordered
society accept the morality of principles so that they have
conception-dependent desires. Rawls says that “when they
153 See David K ah an e.‘Diversity.Solidarity and Civil Friendship.'J o u r n a l
o f Political Philosophy V o l.7.N o .3 ( S e p .1999).pp.2 6 7 -2 8 6 : Daniel
W e in sto c k .‘Building Trust in D ivid ed Societies.'Journal o f Political
P h ilo so p h y V o l.7 .N o .3 (S e p . 1 9 9 9 ).pp. 287-307.
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10 6
believe that institutions or social practices are just, or fair (as
these conceptions specify), they are ready and willing to do
their part in those arrangements provided they have
reasonable assurance that others will also do their part.”1''4
Rawls thinks that the fairness of the principle caused by the
fair situation of the original position provides the citizens of a
well-ordered society with the moral capacity for a sense of
justice. At the stage of the overlapping consensus, people who
grow up under a well-ordered society acquire a sufficient sense
of justice so that this society is a stable society. Through the
three stages of moral development, the moral capacity for a
sense of justice brings about various virtues for social
cooperation such as the ties of friendship, the love of mankind,
trustworthiness, and self-command. It seems to me that
Rawls’s idea of the reasonable, which is powers of reason to
propose principles and to discuss fair terms with others,
invokes various emotional virtues. However, I doubt that the
capacity for a sense of justice invokes those virtues for social
cooperation. The powers of human reason connected with the
sense of justice do not cultivate various emotional virtues for
,54R a w l s . Political Liberalism.p.&6.
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107
social cooperation. The sense of justice is too shallow to bring
about these virtues. For example, the morality of authority
cultivated in the just family system does not necessarily lead to
ties of friendship or fraternity in the society, which is the
moral basis of the difference principle. David Hume argues
that "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the
will.'1:0 Instead passions should be the source of our sense of
morality. In this regard, Rawls mistakenly argues that the
powers of reason connected with the sense of justice invoke
various emotional virtues for social cooperation.
Concerning the sense of justice as a democratic public
culture, Galston doubts that the men who drafted the U.S.
Constitution would have embraced it. Galston says that "in
their view the dominance of both passion and interest was such
as to make an effective sense of justice the exception rather
than the rule."1-6 Instead of the sense of justice. Galston
argues, they relied on "institutions whose working did not
depend on the just motivations of office-holders or of ordinary
155 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Ernest Mossner(London:
Penguin Books. 1969).p.460.
l56Galston. Liberal P urposes,?.1 3 0 .
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108
citizens."157 If Galston is right, the sense of justice is not a
necessary component of the democratic public culture.
Rawls argues that the public culture o f a democratic
society can be articulated through the interpretation of
political institutions, historic texts and documents. Yet Rawls
does not suggest the way in which the interpretation is
performed. Rawls simply assumes the public culture as a
shared fund.158 It seems to me that Rawls appeals to the
doxastic presumption. Lawrence BonJour argues that
justificatory arguments should be fulfilled in order to make
some sort of input to be credible. These justificatory
arguments include cognitively spontaneous beliefs and the
standard conditions of observation. First, the belief in question
is a cognitively spontaneous belief of a reasonably definite
kind. As I sit at my desk, for example, I come to have a
cognitively spontaneous belief that there is a red book on the
'S'Ibid. p. 122.
I5sln respect o f Rawls's idea o f person.Galston and Haksar argue that
Rawls leans toward perfectionism based on the develop m en t o f two
moral powers or autonomy. See Galston, Liberal P u r p o s e s .pp. 1 2 1 -1 2 4 and
Vinit Haksar. E q u a lity , Liberty, a n d P e r fe c tio n is m (O x fo x d \0 \fo r & U n iv.
Press.1979).pp. 161-192. I think Rawls's idea o f person and his theory o f
justice are very similar to R a z’s argument that autonom y is an essential
ingredient o f the good life so that government should provide the
conditions o f autonomy for people. See Raz’s M o ra lity o f Freedom,
pp.4 0 0 - 4 2 9 .
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109
desk. This belief does not result from any other sort of
deliberative process. Rather it simply occurs to me in a
manner that is both involuntary and quite coercive. Second,
the conditions of observation are of a specifiable sort C l: the
lighting is good. I am reasonably close to the apparent location
of the object, my eyes are functioning normally, and so on. If
these justificatory arguments are fulfilled, my belief that there
is a red book on the desk is very likely to be true. Rawls seems
to regard the idea of the person with two moral powers as a
cognitively spontaneous belief that does not need further
deliberative process.159 However, his interpretation of the
democratic public culture get bogged down. There is no
monolithic interpretation of the democratic public culture.
Furthermore. Rawls's interpretation omits many components of
the democratic public culture. In conclusion, Rawls's
specification of the public culture is not a reliable input into the
scheme of coherence justification.
I59ln a similar vein.Jim Josefson and Jonathan Bach argue that Rawls's
epistem ology is akin to the hermeneutics as translation of W .V.O. Q uine.
A s Quine's em piricism retains the relative stability of observation
statements.Rawls appeals to the history o f democracies whereby w e do
have a community sense o f such terms as liberty and equality that
requires no deeper herm eneutics than translation. See Jim Josefson and
Jonathan Bach.'A Critique o f Rawls's Hermeneutics as Translation.’
Philosophy & Social Criticism Vol. 23.No.l(January 1 9 9 7 ).p .ll2 .
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1 10
B) The Original Position
1 )The Justification of the First Principle of Justice
Rawls embeds various features of democratic public
culture into the original position. In other words. Rawls makes
the specification of the original position cohere with various
features of democratic public culture. In doing so. Rawls thinks
that he can justify the principle of justice chosen in the original
position. However. I think that there is an incoherence
between them in respect of the way the parties in the original
position choose the first principle of equal liberty from the idea
of positive liberty.
For Rawls, citizens are free in that 1) they can revise
their conceptions of the good, 2) they take responsibility for
their ends, and 3) they are self-authenticating sources of their
claims. Rawls's idea of freedom as autonomy is expressed in
the motivation of rational parties in the original position. The
motivation of the parties is to choose a principle that is best for
those the parties represent to develop their capacities for a
conception of the good. The parties under the veil of ignorance
choose Rawls's first principle of equal liberty because this
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111
principle guarantees the social conditions necessary for the
development of the capacity for a conception of the good.
I think that a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties in
Rawls's first principle is unnecessarily extensive in scope as a
scheme that guarantees the social conditions for the exercise of
autonomy. Rawls does not explain why the entire list of basic
liberties in his first principle of justice provides necessary
social conditions for the development of the capacity for a
conception of the good. The basic liberties include freedom of
thought and liberty of conscience, the political liberty and
freedom of association, freedoms specified by the liberty and
integrity of the person, and the rights and liberties covered by
the rule of law. Why do the political liberty and freedom of
association provide necessary social conditions for an
autonomous person defined by Rawls? Let's suppose a high
school math teacher. He makes his living well by his great skill
in mathematics. For any reason, he changes his plan of life and
resigns his post as teacher. His new conception of the good is to
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11
"count blades of grass in various geometrically shaped areas
such as park squares and well-trimmed lawns."160 He is an
autonomous person from the three aspects of Rawls’s idea of
freedom. He is free in that he can change his conception of the
good. In addition, he is a self-authenticating source of claim in
that his claim as a hermit is derived from duties and obligation
based on his conception of the good. Lastly, he is free because
he can take responsibility for his new plan of life. At best, in
this case, the liberty of conscience provides a necessary
condition for him to change his conception of the good.
However, political liberties and freedom of association do not
work as the social conditions for the decision to change his
conception of the good. In other words. Rawls's idea o f positive
liberty cannot be a basis from which he derives the various
rights expressed in his first principle of justice. The basic
liberties expressed in Rawls’s first principle are extremely
general and abstract. Rawls has to explain why each liberty is
on the list of basic liberty and why other liberties are not on
the list. In a sense, Rawls's list of the basic liberties and rights
160Rawls. Theory o f Jusrice.pA32. R awls uses this example against the
A r isto te lia n principle.
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1 1 3
in his first principle of justice provides an adequate condition
for the development and exercise of negative freedom. In
order to prevent an arbitrary intervention of others and
government, we need the social conditions secured by Rawls's
equal right to basic liberties, e.g.. the political liberties and
freedom of association, the freedom specified by the liberty
and integrity of the person, and the rights and liberties covered
by the rule of law. In short, it is inappropriate for Rawls to
derive a right-based principle of justice from the idea of
positive liberty articulated in his conception of persons.
Rawls's idea of the veil of ignorance is designed to ensure
a fairness (or impartiality) of the decision process. Since the
veil of ignorance gets rid of arbitrary contingencies from the
bargaining situation where the principle of justice is chosen,
the original position provides a reasonable basis for agreement
among the parties who want equal consideration of relevant
claims or interests. As Rawls mentions, the impartiality
guaranteed by the veil of ignorance is the expression of the
equality of persons in possession of the two moral powers to be
cooperating members of society. Therefore, Kai Nielson argues
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1 1 4
that the justice as impartiality including Rawls's theory gives
us powerful reasons for accepting the claims of an impartial
m o rality .161
According to John Kane and others, however, "there is
nothing in the basic concept of justice that implies anything of
any ethical import about the equality of human beings."162
In other words. Rawls provides no argument as to why the
equal possession of the capacity for a sense of justice is a
sufficient condition to being entitled to equal justice. Because
Rawls embeds the idea of equality as a democratic public
culture in the original position, his theory rules out rival
theories of justice, such as Platonic perfectionism or Nietzchean
elitism, that did not take equality or liberty of individuals as
fu n d a m e n ta l.163 In a different vein, feminists and others argue
that the veil of ignorance disregards the concreteness or
16lFor the contrast between justice as impartiality and justice as mutual
advantage.see Brian Barry. Theories o f Justice .pp.3-9.: Kai Nielson.
'Justice as a Kind of Impartiality. 'Laval T h eo lo g iq u e et Philo so p h iq u e
V ol.5 0 .No.3(Oct. 1994).pp.551-529.: Will Kymlicka.'Two Theories of Justice.'
I n q u ir y V o l.33.No. 1 (March 1 990).pp.99-119.: A llen Buchanan.'Justice as
Reciprocity versus Subject-centered Justice. 'P h ilo so p h y <4 Public
A ffa irs Vol. 19.N o.3(S u m m er 1 9 90).pp.227-252.
l62John Kane.'Justice.Impartiality, and Equality, 'P olitical Theory V o l.24.
No.3(August 1996).p.376. See also Clor. Public M orality and Liberal
S o c ie ty .pp. 1 5 7 -1 6 5 .
l63See Rex Martin. A System o f Rights(Oxford:Clarendcn. 1993).pp.331-
332.:Thom as Seung. Intuition a n d Construction^N e w Haven:Yale U niv.
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1 1 5
separateness of individuals. According to Benhabib, the veil of
ignorance provokes the standpoint of the generalized other
which requires us to view every individual as a rational being
with the same rights and duties as we would want to ascribe to
ourselves. However, Benhabib argues that the veil of ignorance
dispels the different standpoint of the concrete other such as
care perspectives. "Our relation to the other is governed by the
norms of equity and complementary reciprocity : each is
entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of
behavior through which the other feels recognized and
confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs,
talents and capacities."164 Since the veil of ignorance does not
make room to confront the otherness of the other. Benhabib
argues, the original position leaves all the prejudices,
misunderstandings and hostilities in society hidden behind a
veil. Instead of the exclusion of all particular information,
P ress.l993).p .27.:Jam es Fishkin. The D ialogue o f Justice(N ew HavenrYale
Univ. P r e s s .1 9 9 2 ).p p .80-81.
l64Seyla Benhabib. Situating the Self(N e w Y ork :R ou tled ge. 1 9 9 2 ) .p. 159.
See also Iris M. Young. Justice a n d the P olitics o f D ifferen ce(P rin ceto n :
Princeton U n iv . P r e ss.1990).pp.96 -1 2 1 .: Carol Gilligan. In a Different
V 0 /c e ( C a m b r id g e : Harvard Univ. Press. 1982).pp.5-23.: David Gauthier.
M orals by A g re e m e n t{0 \fo x d :C \a .re .r \d o n . 1 9 8 6 ) . p p .2 5 4 - 2 5 7 . :Bernard
W illia m s.‘P ersons.C haracter and M o r a lity .’ in The Identities o f P e rso n s ,
ed. A m elie O ksenberg Rorty(Berkley:Univ. o f California P ress.1976),
p p . 197 -2 1 6 .
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1 1 6
Benhabib and others recommend an open and reflexive
dialogue among citizens with full knowledge about others for
the legitimacy of democratic society.165
Rawls replies to the full information impartiality by
saying that the bargaining process with full information can not
lead to any definite theory of justice. "Without these
limitations on knowledge the bargaining problem of the
original position would be hopelessly complicated."166 In short,
the parties with full information can not reach an agreement on
the principle of justice. In addition, the outcome under the
bargaining process with full information is biased by arbitrary
contingencies. "The arbitrariness of the world must be
corrected for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial
165For a discursive democracy, see A m y Gutmann and Dennis Thom pson.
D e m o c r a c y and D/5<3grccmc//r(Cambridge:Harvard U n iv .P ress. 1996):
James Fishkin. D em o cra cy a n d D e lib e r a tio n ( N e w Haven:YaIe Univ.
Press. 1991 ):Jurgen Habermas. M o r a l C o n sc io u sn e ss and C o m m u n ic a tiv e
A c //o /i(C a m b r id g e : MIT P ress.1991):Josh u a C ohen.'Deliberation and
Dem ocratic Legitimacy.’ in The G o o d Polity, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip
Pettit(Oxford:Basil B la c k w e ll.1989).p p .17-34.: James Bohman and W illiam
Rehg eds. D e lib era tive D e m o c r a c y (C am bridge:M IT p ress.l9 9 7 ):R ica rd o
B la u g .'N e w Theories o f Discursive D e m o c r a c y .’Philosophy & Social
C r itic is m V ol.22.No. 1 (Jan. 1996).pp.4 9 -8 0 . O f course.Rawls suggests the
idea of public reason as a way o f public dialogue in lecture 6 o f P o l i t i c a l
L i b e r a l i s m . However.Benhabib argues that the idea of public reason
differs from the deliberative dem ocracy in that the former is not a
process o f reflexive reasoning a m on g citizens but a regulative
principle imposing limits upon h ow citizens ought to reason about
public matters. See Seyla Benhabib.'Deliberative Rationality and M od els
o f Democratic Legitimacy.'C o n s te lla tio n s Vol. 1 .No. 1 (1 9 9 4 ).p .36.
166 Rawls. Theory o f J u stice.p .1 4 0 .
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1 17
contractual situation."167 So Rawls devises the veil of
ignorance. In doing so. Rawls ensures the fairness of his
princinple of justice.
It seems to me that Rawls thinks that full knowledge
makes it impossible to achieve an agreement on the fair
principle of justice because people tend to seek self-interest
based on contingent information about themselves. The self-
interest consists of specific information about people's physical
endowment, social position, and conception of the good. If the
principle of justice gives favor to the self-interests of certain
parties, other parties who also seek their own self-interests do
not accept this principle of justice as a fair one. In order to
reach agreement on the fair principle of justice. Rawls changes
the motivation of self-interests pursuit into the desire to
pursue unspecified conception of the good by use of the veil of
ignorance. In doing so. Rawls argues, the sense of justice is
embedded into the original position so that the parties become
reasonable agents who are ready to propose, choose, and abide
by the fair principle of justice. The new motivation to pursue
unspecified conceptions of the good is an expression of the
161 Ibid.,p. 141 .
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1 1 8
desire to reach agreement on reasonable terms. By changing
the motivation of the parties through the veil of ignorance.
Rawls combines the idea of rational distinctive moral power of
which is the capacity for a conception of the good with the idea
of reasonable distinctive moral power of which is the capacity
for a sense of justice.
However. I think that Rawls exaggerates the motivation
of the parties with full knowledge to pursue self-interest as a
hindrance to an reasonable agreement. To seek self-interest
including the conception of the good is not the only motivation
of persons especially when they are engaged in the choice of
the principles for a constitutional arrangement. Because Rawls
regards the pursuit of self-interest as the only motivation of
the parties in the constitutional arrangement, he devises the
veil of ignorance in order to ensure the impartiality of the
principles of justice. Instead of the pursuit of self-interest,
however, the concern for the stability of a well-ordered society
can be the motivation of the parties in case of the constitutional
arrangement.
When Rawls devises the veil of ignorance in the original
position, he argues that "the only particular facts which the
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1 1 9
parties know is that their society is subject to the
circumstances of justice and whatever this implies."168
For example, the circumstances of justice include the fact that
individuals have different conceptions of the good which bring
about conflicting claims and there exists various philosophical
and religious beliefs. If the parties really know whatever the
circumstance of justice implies, the concern for the stability of
a well-ordered society is at stake for them in the original
position when they choose the principle of justice for their
society. In this regard. I disagree with Rawls's argument that
the problem of stability does not occur in his first stage of the
original position. In other words, the anticipation that a well-
ordered society is unlikely to be stable if the principle of
justice for a society is designed to favor a specific conception of
the good induces the parties in the original position to seek
more impartial or fair principle. In this case, the parties don't
need the veil of ignorance. On the other hand, Rawls devises
the veil of ignorance because the uncertainty about one's
particular position under the veil of ignorance induces the
choice of an impartial principle. However, the circumstance of
16SRawIs. Theory- o f Justice.p. 137.
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1 20
justice (i.e.. plurality of the conceptions of the good and
conflicting claims) makes the parties have a concern for
stability. In short, the concern for stability rather than the
uncertainty about one's social position can invoke the
motivation of the parties to seek an reasonable agreement
without the help of the veil of ignorance.
In a sense, the concern for the stability of a well-ordered
society is an expression of the capacity for a sense of justice. If
the capacity for a sense of justice is directly embedded into
the motivation of the parties, the concern for stability induces
the parties to have a motivation to reach an reasonable
agreement in the constitutional arrangement.169 For Rawls, by
contrast, the capacity for a sense of justice is embedded in the
original position by the veil of ignorance. Through the device
of the veil of ignorance plus mutual disinterest, a naked
l69Brian Barry also argues that if the parties are motivated by the desire
to reach an agreement.the veil o f ignorance is merely a heuristic
device which does not h ave to be relied on to create solutions. See his
Theories o f J u stic e .p p .3 3 1-332. See also Ronald Dworkin.'The Original
Position.' in R eadin g R a w l s . p.24.: Thomas S eu n g. Intuition an d
C o n s t ru ctio n , pp.34-40.: Viktor Vanberg & Jam es Buchanan.'Interests
and Theories in Constitutional C h oice.'Journal o f Theoretical P o litic s
V ol. 1 .No. 1 (Jan. 1 9 8 9 ).p p 5 2 -5 6 . According to Paul K elly.h ow ever.w h eth er
agreement motive exist or not is an empirical matter that cannot be
determined by political philosophy. Kelly s a y s that the agreem ent
m otive is less im plausible an assumption than the self-interest m otive.
See Paul K elly.‘Contractarian Social Justice,’ in Social J u stice.F rom
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1 2 1
motivation of citizens to seek their conceptions of the good is
converted into the motivation of the parties to seek unspecified
conceptions of the good which leads to impartial judgment.
Rawls does not directly embed the capacity for a sense of
justice in the motivation of the parties. It seems to me that
Rawls's conception of the person is based on psychological
egoism. Psychological egoism is the view that "it is an
unalterable law of human -nature that every human being
always aims ultimately for what he or she believes is in
his/her best self-interest, and for nothing else."170
Conceptually, psychological egoist does not take into
consideration the interests of others. When Rawls criticizes
utilitarianism, he rejects the idea of impartial sympathetic
spectator which was developed by David Hume and Adam
Smith. An impartial sympathetic spectator gives equal respect
to the interests of each persons by identifying the place of each
persons with his. With full information about each persons and
natural capacity for sympathy, an impartial observer makes a
Hume to Walzer.' eds. David B oucher and Paul Kelly(London:Routledse.
1 9 9 8 ).p. 186.
170T hom as E. Hill.Jr. 'Reasonable Self-Interest.'Social Philosophy &
P o licy Vol. 14.No. 1 (Winter 1997).p.66.
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1 2
decision by the balance of each person’s satisfaction to which
he has responded. According to Rawls, utilitarian idea of
impartial sympathetic spectator is too strong a condition.171 In
addition. Rawls argues that it disregards the distinction
between persons since the utilitarian impartial spectator
conflates everyone’s differing desire into one system of desire.
So Rawls criticizes the perfect altruism of impartial spectator in
that "the love of several persons is thrown into confusion once
the claims of these persons conflict."172 In short, an impartial
spectator is unrealistic because they can't give equal respect to
each persons when their interests conflict one another. On the
other hand, the parties in the original position are "mutually
disinterested rather than sympathetic; but lacking knowledge
of their natural assets or social situation, they are forced to
view their arrangements in a general way."173 The combination
l71Yet Sandel argues that the assumptions of mutual disinterest o f
Rawls's contract theory and ben evolen ce of impartial observer cannot
be distinguished on the grounds that either is weaker or stronger an
assumption in the conceptual sense. See Michael Sandel. Liberalism and
the Limits o f 7j/5’//c^ (C a m b rid g e:C a m b rid g e U n iv .P r e s s . 1 9 8 2 ) .pp.4 5 - 4 6 .
Okin also argues that the conversion of Rawls's mutual disinterested
parties into benevolent one through the veil of ignorance is not a weak
stipulation. See Susan Okin.'Reason and Feeling in Thinking about
Jus tic e.'Ethics V o l.9 9 .N o .2 (J a n . 1 9 8 9 ).p. 244.
l7:R aw ls, A Theory o f Justice,p. 190.
l7}lbid.,p. 1 87.
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123
of the veil of ignorance and mutual disinterest provides the
parties in the original position with an impartial
perspectives.174
Can't an impartial sympathetic observer give equal
respects to each persons in case of conflicting interests? I
don’t think that we cannot solve the conflicting interests by
sympathy. According to Rousseau, "while the creation of
societies was made necessary by the clash of individual
interests, it was made possible by the fact that those same
interests also coincide."17- The concern for stability may induce
them to seek the common good instead of the private interest.
In this respect, I also doubt that the assumption of mutual
l74According to K ym licka. Rawls's contract device is needless because it
is difficult to distinguish Rawls's impartial contractor from utilitarian
sympathetic observer. Even though the two theories use different
d evices.K ym licka argues the difference is relatively superficial because
the key move in each theory is to force the parties to adopt a
perspective which denies them know led ge to promote their own
particular good. See Will Kymlicka. Contemporary Political Philosophy
(O xford:Clarendon.l9 9 0 ) .p.69. In a similar vein.Okin criticizes Rawls's
argument that ch oice situation o f the original position is simple and
clear. In order to think reasonably in the original position.Okin
argues.the parties must presumably have knowledge o f the essential
aspects of the lives o f persons o f all different imaginable types though
they don't know w hich persons they will turn out to be. The parties
think from the position o f everybody.in the sense o f each in turn.
Therefore the ch oice situation o f the original position is not a simple
device. See Susan Okin.'Reason and Feeling in Thinking about
Justice.'p.244. I think that if we accept Okin's interpretation of the
original position.the difference betw een Rawls's contractor and
utilitarian sym pathetic observer b e c o m e blur.
175J.J.Rousseau. The Social Contract,Bk 2.Ch 1.
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1 24
disinterest is a characteristics of democratic public culture.
Does the assumption of mutual disinterest match with our
considered moral judgment? Rejecting the psychological
egoism. Thomas E. Hill argues that "we treat the basic interests
of others, in most cases at least, as potential reasons for us."176
Our common sense holds that human beings have other-
regarding reasons as well as self-regarding reasons. According
to the republican interpretation of the modern democratic
spirit, the polity is a structure in which every citizen's ability to
place the common good before his own was the precondition of
its existence.177 When Gordon Wood analyzes the republican
tradition of American revolution, he argues that "the people
were in fact a single organic piece (for God hath so tempered
the body that there should be no Schism in the body, but that
the Members should have the same care for one another) with
I76H ilI.'Reason able S elf-In terest.’p .6 1 .
177For the republican tradition o f the democratic spirit, see J.G.A.
Pocock. The M a c h ia v e llia n M o m e /z /( P r in c e t o n : P r in c e t o n U n iv .
Press. 1975): Gordon W ood .The C reation o f the American R ep u b lic,1776-
17871,Chapel H ilhU niv. of North Carolina Press.1969):Isaac Kramnick.
R ep u b lica n ism a n d B ou rgeois Radicalism!, IthacarCornell U n iv .P r e ss.
1990):Joyce A p p le b y .Liberalism a n d Republicanism in the H istorical
Im agination (C am bridge: Harvard U n iv .P r e ss.1 9 9 2 ):R o n a Id T erch ek .
R epublican P a r a d o x e s and Liberal A /m 'e//es(L an h am :R ow m an &
L ittlefield.1997): Cass Sunstein.’B e y o n d the Republican R evival. 'Yale
L aw Journal Vol.97.No.8(JuIy 19 8 8 ).pp. 1539-1590.
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125
a unitary concern that was the only legitimate objective of
governmental policy."178 In order to achieve this common
interest, a republican polity demands the public virtue of the
people which is the willingness to sacrifice the private interests
for the common good. If we accept the republican
interpretation of democracy. Rawls's assumption of mutual
disinterest is an unnecessary circumstance of justice.179
Without the device of the veil of ignorance, the republican idea
of civic virtue enables the parties in the original position to
have a motivation to reach an reasonable agreement.
Interestingly enough, Rawls's further assumption for
strict compliance provides a clue to solve the conflicting
interests. In order to guarantee strict compliance with the two
principles of justice. Rawls suggests an assumption which says :
the parties have a capacity for justice in a
purely formal sense : talcing everything relevant
into account, including the general facts of moral
psychology, the parties will adhere to the
principles eventually chosen. They are rational
17SW ood. The Creation o f the American Republic, 1 7 7 6 -1 7 8 7 .p .5 S .
I79ln a similar vein.M ichael Sandel argues that to invoke R a w ls ’s
circum stances of ju stice is simultaneously to c o n ced e the circum stances
o f benevolence or fraternity. In this case justice is not a virtue but a
vice. See Michael Sandel. Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice,p p . 2 8 - 4 0 .
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1 26
in that they will not enter into agreements
they know they cannot keep, or can do so only
with great difficulty.180
If the parties are capable of a sense of justice, as Rawls
assumes, why doesn't this assumption works for the parties in
coping with conflicting interest when they try to choose the
principle of justice as well as after they choose it ? If the
parties will not enter into agreements they know they cannot
keep, this rationality of the parties invokes the concern for
stability whey they are engaged in the constitutional
arrangement at the first stage of constructivism. Then they
take into consideration the self-interest of every individual in
order to reach an reasonable agreement. Instead of combining
the veil of ignorance with the mutual disinterest, the projection
of Rawls's two moral powers directly into the motivation of the
parties engenders an impartial perspective without the veil of
ignorance.
1 8 0 Rawls. A Theory of Justice.^ .1 4 5 .
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127
2) The Justification of The Second Principle
Rawls also suggests the rational for the choice of the
second principle of justice. I think, however. Rawls does not
justify his way of derivation of the second principle. In order
to justify the principle of equal opportunity, Rawls appeals to
the idea of self-realization. Realizing individual's plan of life is
so important that they should face the equal causal conditions
under which abilities and skills have developed. However, the
institution of family makes a hindrance to the fulfillment of
equal opportunity. So Rawls suggests the difference principle.
By combining the principle of equal opportunity with the
difference principle, the second principle of justice is to read as
follows : social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. In addition.
(b) part of the second principle is prior to (a) part of the second
principle.
In justifying the choice of the second principle, Rawls
does not directly articulate the way in which the parties in the
original position choose the second principle. He simply
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128
appeals to the idea of self-realization and social cooperation.
Yet I think that if we use the device of the original position for
the justification of the second principle. Rawls's rationale would
begs the questions. First of all, why do the parties in the
original position choose Rawls's principle of equal opportunity
and its priority to the difference principle? If. as the maximin
principle says, the parties have conservative attitude that they
worry about the case when they turn out to be the least
advantaged, they do not choose Rawls's principle of equal
opportunity which says that those with the same level of talent
and ability should have the same prospects of success
irrespective of the income class into which they are born.
Because the parties know that there are inequalities of abilities
and talents among the citizens they represent and they have to
see the situation from the perspectives of the least well off, the
parties want to give favor to the members of low income class
by such policies as Affirmative Action in college entrance and
job recruitment and the Small Business Act. According to the
Affirmative Action policy, the members of low income class,
the racial minority, and the disadvantaged gender should be
given recruit priority even though their talents and abilities
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129
are inferior to the members of higher income class. The Small
Business Act provides that a portion of all government
contracts be reserved for minority-owned firms. These policies
articulate the idea that “the disadvantaged were to be given
something more that just an equal chance : they were also to be
given a leg up.”181 In a sense, the Affirmative Action and the
Small Business Act represent the idea of the difference
principle. The opponents of these policies argue that these
policies bring about the impasse of reverse discrimination. In
this case. Rawls’s principle of equal opportunity conflicts with
the difference principle. It seems to me that Rawls does not
anticipate this conflict between the first part and the second
part of his second principle of justice. Rawls simply combines
two parts of his second principle without explaining the
rationale for the priority of the equal opportunity principle to
the difference principle.
The aim of Rawls's second principle of justice is to specify
social and economic inequalities. Because Rawls regards the
existing distribution of income and wealth as the cumulative
effect of prior distributions of natural talents and abilities that
ls'Charles Murray. Losing Ground^New York:Basic B ooks. 1984).p .93.
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130
are influenced by natural and social contingencies, the second
principle of justice is supposed to get ride of these arbitrary
factors. Among these arbitrary factors. Rawls includes both the
class barriers in the school system and the job market and the
institution of the family. In order to reduce the influence of
the former factor. Rawls proposes the principle of equal
opportunity. For the latter factor, the difference principle is
suggested. Yet I think that Rawls does not explain which
factors, as spheres for the unequal cultivation of natural talents
and abilities, have more serious influences on social and
economic inequalities. In other words, Rawls does not justify
the priority of equal opportunity principle to the difference
principle as a principle to get rid of causal factors of social and
economic inequalities. Because the aim of Rawls's second
principle is to achieve the equal talents and abilities, this
problem is at stake.
Many criticism of Rawls focuses on the difference
principle. They include that (1) the difference principle is
accused of requiring sacrifice of the well-off members of
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13 1
society.182 ; (2) Rawls’s three features of maximin situation do
not justify the difference principle because three features
imply a guaranteed minimum which is quite different from
m axim in .183 ; (3) The conservative strategy of the maximin
principle faces the gambler problem in that the parties
normally accept some risk of poverty if the chance of being
well-off members is enough to make the choice situation in the
original position a reasonable gamble.184 : (4) The decision
theorists reject the maximin solution because the decision
under uncertainty provides various alternative decision rules
such as the maximax rule, the optimism-pessimism rule, the
minimax regret rule, and the principle of insufficient reason.185
Here I focuses on Rawls's argument of cooperation as a
rationale for the choice of the second principle. According to
ls:See Robert Nozick. Anarchy, S ta te,a n d £//op/tf,p.223:Stephen Ball.
'M axim in Justice.Sacrifice.and the Reciprocity Argum ent .' U tilita s
V ol.5.N o.2(N ov. 1993).p p .l58-159:T h om as Nagel.'Rawls on Justice.' in
R eading Rawls, p. 13.
ls3See James Fishkin. T yranny a n d Legmmfircv(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
U niv.P ress. 1 9 79).pp. 1 0 7 - l0 9 :T h o m a s Seung. Intuition a n d Construction,
p p . 1 2 -1 3 .
IS4See Jeffrey Reiman. Justice a n d M odern M oral P h i l o s o p h y i N e w
HavenrYale U niv. Press. 1990). p. 266-267:R ich ard M iller.'R aw ls and
Marxism.' in R eadin g R a w ls .p p . 2 2 0 - 2 2 1 .
l85See David Kaye.'Playing G am es with Justice.'Social T h eory and
P ractice Vol. 6 ,No. 1 (Spring 1 9 8 0 ).pp.34-39: Thomas Seung. Intuition and
C o n s t r u c t i o n .p p .10-12: Michael D. Resnik. C/ 2 o /c e s(M in n e a p o lis:U n iv . of
M in n eso ta P r e s s .1 9 8 7 ).p p .2 1 -4 4 .
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1 3 2
Rawls, his two principles of justice is a fair agreement so that
the most advantaged can expect the willing cooperation of the
least advantaged. Because the maximin criterion assures the
least advantaged that inequalities work to their advantage.
Rawls argues that the parties in the original position are to
favor Rawls's two principles of justice. For the least well-off
members of a society. Rawls's principles of justice is more
tolerable than the utilitarian principle because “the principles
chosen would regulate social and economic inequalities in the
basic structure of society that affect people's life-prospects/’186
Compared with the wealth that the most advantaged may
achieve in the utilitarian society, they receive more less wealth
in Rawls's well-ordered society. However Rawls replies that
they must accept less than what they would receive with the
utility principle because “they are, after all. more fortunate and
enjoy, the benefits of that fact : and insofar as they value their
situation relatively in comparison with others, they give up
that much less/’187
1S6John Rawls,'Some R easons for the M axim in Criterion.'A m e r ic a n
Economic Review V o l.6 4 .N o .2 (M a y 1974).p. 144.
lslIbid.
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133
Let's suppose a benchmark society of initial equality. So.
in table 5. As Rawls argues, there is no reason that this
perfectly equal society should be final if the inequality of a
society can make everyone better off. So let the equal society
to the unequal societies . i.e.. Si. S2, and S3 in
So Si S2 S3
Upper Class 1 0 26 20 17
Middle Class 1 0 11 14 16
Low Income Class 1 0 10 13 14
Total 3 0 47 47 47
Table 5 : Decision Rule of Uncertainty
According to the maximin rule, S3 is chosen because this
society maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged
members of the society (14 units of the primary goods)
compared with that of other societies (10 of S i and 13 of S 2 ).
S3 is more equal society than Si and S 2 . However, the
minimax-regret decision rule of uncertainty recommends quite
different criterion of the choice. If the advantaged members
choose Si society instead of S3 society, they would have gained
9 units more of the primary goods (26 - 17 = 9). In other
words, the advantaged members of S3 society lost 9 units
primary goods because they choose S3 instead o f Si. It is the
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1 3 4
degree of regret for the upper class of society S3. In table 5,
the regret number for each row is determined by subtracting
each distributive share from the highest share in that row.
Proceeding in this fashion, table 6 formulates regret table.
______________________Sj_______Sjz___________S3
Upper Class 0 6* 9*
Middle Class 5* 2 0
Low Income Class 4________1 ____________ 0
Table 6 : Regret Table
In table 6. maximum regrets of each society are starred ;
they are 5, 6 and 9 for each society respectively. The minimax
regret rule states that we should pick a society whose
maximum regret is minimal. So Society Si is chosen. However,
the maximin principle strongly opposes this choice of Si in that
the prospective of the least advantaged (10 units of the
primary goods) is not improved at all by moving from So to Si.
I slightly revise the minimax regret rule for Rawls's
argument of social cooperation. Let’s suppose that Si is a
society without distribution policies. After moving from So to
Si. the society Si become an unequal one. If I adopt Rawls's
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135
taxonomy, the society SI is a system of natural liberty. So the
parties in the original position decide to execute various
distribution policies. Let's suppose that S i and S3 achieve the
distribution. Through the distribution, the prospective of low-
income class and middle class of S2 and S3 has improved. Yet
the distributive share of upper class in Si has reduced from 26
units to 20 or 17 units. The advantaged members of society Si
lost 6 units in case of S2, and 9 units in case of S3.
Rawls argues that the advantaged members still enjoy
the benefits of their fortune and they give up much less in
consideration of the distributive share of the least advantaged.
For the cooperation of the advantaged members, however, the
regret factor of the upper class is at stake. In order to increase
the long-term prospective of the least advantaged, severe
losses of distributive share for the advantaged members are
needed. The advantaged members are reluctant to cooperate
so that they oppose the distribution policies. Even though the
advantaged members agree with Rawls's idea that their
enjoyment of the good fortune is arbitrary from a moral point
of view, they want to minimize their regret level. For the
cooperation of the advantaged members, their moderate losses
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136
are to be recommended. Therefore the advantaged members
prefer S 2 to S3. If the least advantaged members and the
middle class accept the improvement of their gains in S 2
compared with that of S3, they accept S2. Even though the
middle class and the low income class get more in S3 than S2 .
they don't want severe sacrifice of the upper class. For the
cooperation of the well-off. they accept S2. This solution
represents the idea of social cooperation among all members of
a society.
The difference principle is a plausible decision rule only
if the advantaged members do not care about the losses of
their distributive share. So Rawls says that the difference
principle corresponds to the idea of fraternity. Yet I think that
this idea of fraternity works only if the advantaged members
of a society are very rich enough to accept severe losses of
their distributive share willingly. I think the no society has
ever reached at this high stage of economic development. If I
am right, the parties in the original position do not choose the
difference principle because the veil of ignorance blocks the
information about economic situation of their own society and
its level of civilization and culture.
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137
C) The Overlapping Consensus
I regard Rawls's second stage of overlapping consensus as
a radical conception of reflective equilibrium. While the
conservative conception of reflective equilibrium in the first
stage of constructivism serves as a algorithm for theory
building, the radical conception of reflective equilibrium in the
second stage facilitates the moral conversion of individual who
has his comprehensive doctrine. The overlapping consensus
occurs when we apply Rawls's principles of justice in our actual
world of pluralistic society after the veil of ignorance is lifted.
By showing that his principles of justice can achieve support
from various reasonable comprehensive doctrines which have
been in our society, Rawls tries to verify that his theory of
justice is an realistic endeavor.
It seems to me that Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus
is a reply to the critics who argue that Rawls's contract theory
in his A Theory o f Justice lacks an account of political
obligation because the hypothetical agreement in the original
position is no substitute for acts of consent. In shifting from
express and tacit consent to hypothetical agreement, Edward
Harris argues that "contemporary social contract theorist have
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138
given up on the task of securing a sufficient account of political
obligation."188 In response to this criticism. Rawls suggests the
conception-dependent desires as moral motivation and shows
an realistic account through the overlapping consensus in the
model case.
Many critics focus their attentions on Rawls’s idea of
overlapping consensus. They include such criticisms : 1)
Rawls’s concern of stability through the overlapping consensus
on the principles of justice disregards the emotional and
affective attachment to the society.189 2) By restricting the
consensus within the reasonable pluralism, the label
unreasonable will be used to exclude a great number of
comprehensive doctrines which do not endorse Rawls's
principles of justice. So, Rawls's account of stability is an
lssEdward A. Harris.'From Social Contract to Hypothetical Agreem ent.’
Columbia Law R eview V ol.92.N o.3(A pril 1992).p.679. See also his
'Fighting Philosophical A narchism with Fairness.' C o lu m b ia Law R ev ie w
V oL 91.N o.4(M ay 1 9 9 1 ),pp.9 1 9 -9 6 4 . and Daniel Brudney.'Hypothetical
Consent and Moral Force.'Law a n d Philosophy V ol. 10.N o.3(A ua. 1991).
p p.2 3 5 -2 7 0 .
1 8 9 See James Nickel.'Rawls on Political Community and Principles of
Justice.' Law and P h ilo so p h y V ol.9.N o.2(M ay 1990).p .2 1 5 ..Thomas Hill
Jr..'The Stability Problem in Political Liberalism.'P a c ific P h ilo so p h ic a l
Q u arterly V o l.7 5 .N o s.3 & 4 ( S ep /D ec. 1994).p.342.:G eorge Klosko.'Rawls's
Political Philosophy and Am erican Democracy. 'A m erica n P o litica l
Science R eview V o l.8 7 .N o .2 (J u n e 1993).p.35 6 .:Raz.'Facing Diversity.’
Philosophy & Public Affairs V o l.l9 .N o .l(W in te r 1 9 9 0 ).p.^O.
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1 39
illiberal scheme.190 3) Rawls's appeal to the reasonableness
instead of the truth cannot succeed because the willingness to
recognize the burdens of judgment does not necessarily lead to
the willingness to abide by the principle.191 4) The overlapping
consensus is a contingent and weak support because each
comprehensive doctrine supports Rawls's principle only to the
extent required by the rationale of that doctrine. Unless the
overlapping consensus is held in the strong fundamental sense,
each doctrine may withdraw the support.192 5) The
overlapping consensus does not show citizens a sophisticated
method of teaching to separate their political doctrine from
their conceptions of the good when they deliberate on the basic
structure of society.193
1 9 0 See Jesse Furman.‘Political Illiberalism .'Yale Law Journal'S 0 I.IO 6 .
No.4(Jan. 1 9 9 7 ).p. 12 10:L eif W enar.*Political Liberalism.'Fr/z/ci-Vol. 106.
N o .l(O c t.l9 9 5 ).p .3 6 :H e id i Hurd.’The Levitation of Liberalism. 'Yale Law
Journal'S ol. 105. N o . 3 ( D ec. 1995). p 8 19.
l91See Attracta Ingram. 'Rawlsian.Pluralists. and C osm opolitans.' in
Philosophy and Pluralism , ed. D a v id A rchard(Cam bridge:Cam bridge
U n iv .P r e s s .1 9 9 6 ).p . 1 5 5 -1 5 9 .:Jean Hampton.'Should Political Philosophy
Be Done without Metaphysics?'£//t/cs- V o l.9 9 .N o .4 (J u ly 1 9 8 9 ) .p .811.:
Raz.'Facing D iversity.'pp.2 2 -2 3 .:David Estlund.’The Insularity o f the
R eason ab le.'E r/ 2 /c.y Vol. 108,N o.2( Jan. 1998 ).p.262.
l9~See Lawrence E. Mitchell.'Trust and the Overlapping C o n sen su s.’
Columbia L a w R eview V o l.9 4 .N o .6 (O c t. 1 9 9 4 ),pp. 1 9 2 8 -1 9 2 9 .
l93See Stephen L. Esquith, In tim acy a n d Spccrac/e(Ithaca:Cornell Univ.
P ress.1 9 9 4 ) .p . 1 8 8 .tJeremy W aldron.'D isagreem ents about Justice. 'P a c ific
P h ilo so p h ica l Q u arterly'so\.15.N os.?> & 4{Szp.lD zc. 1994). p.384.
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140
In this section. I focus on Rawls’s epistemic justificatory
scheme of overlapping consensus. In A Theory o f Justice
published in 1971. Rawls suggests the principle of natural duty
for individual. While two principles of justice apply to
institution such as the basic structure of society, the principle
of natural duty concerns with the moral obligation for
individuals. "This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply
with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist
and apply to us : and second, we are to assist in the
establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at
least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves."194
The natural duty provides us with the motivation of obligation
to abide by the principle of justice if that principle is just.
Because Rawls's principle of justice is coherent with the
conception of the good which persons have, citizens have a
natural duty to abide by it. So Rawls simply applies two
principles of justice in the actual situation through four-stage
sequence - constitutional convention, the stage of legislation,
and the stage of administration. In Political Liberalism
l9 4 RawIs. Theory o f Justice.p .334.
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14 1
published in 1993. however. Rawls recognizes that his principle
of justice may conflict with the conception of the good of each
person. Therefore Rawls suggests conception-dependent desire
as a moral motivation of obligation. According to Rawls's
conception of persons, reasonable and rational citizens have
conception-dependent desires so that they abide by the
principle of justice which articulates the conception of
reasonable and rational citizens as free and equal. For the
moral conversion of persons, conception-dependent desires
provide a motivational power in the radical reflective
equilibrium.
Here it is necessary to introduce Rawls's specification of
three points of view : "that of the parties in the original
position, that of citizens in a well-ordered society, and finally,
that of ourselves - of you and me who are elaborating justice as
fairness and examining it as a political conception o f justice."195
The parties in the original position are the artificial creatures
whose point of view is merely rational. Reasonable and
rational point of view of citizens in a well-ordered society is a
l 9 5 Rawls. Political L iberalism .^ .28.
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14 2
political ideal which should be realized in our world. "The third
point of view - that of you and me - is that from which justice
as fairness, and indeed any other political conception, is to be
assessed."196 In the second stage of overlapping consensus.
Rawls responds to the third point of view. Through the radical
reflective equilibrium of the overlapping consensus. Rawls tries
to justify his principles of justice to you and me.
I think that the principle of natural duty and conception-
dependent desires induce Rawls to be a moral internalist. The
first claim of internalism is that "moral considerations
necessarily motivate or provide reason for action."197 The
second claim of internalism is that the motivational power of
moral considerations must be a priori. In addition, the third
claim is that "motivational power of moral considerations
cannot depend on substantive considerations such as what the
content of morality turns out to be. fact about agents, or the
content of the correct theory of rationality."198 Rawls's
principle of natural duty plus conception-dependent desires
196 Ibid., p .2 8 .
l97David O. Brink. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
(Cam bridge: Cambridge U n iv .P r e s s .1 9 8 9 ).p.42.
'9SIbid.
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1 4 3
fulfill the first two claims of internalism. Rawls's idea of
procedural justice with the veil of ignorance satisfies the third
claim of internalism. I think that if Rawls is a moral internalist,
the second stage of overlapping consensus does not increase
the justificatory power of his theory of justice. While the idea
of conception-dependent desires as a moral motivation
reinforces the principle of natural duty, it does not increase the
justificatory power of the overlapping consensus. Because
Rawls fully articulates the conception of free and equal person
in the first stage of conservative reflective equilibrium - even
though his conception of persons is controversial one. the two
principles of justice can wholly invoke conception-dependent
desires from our point of view. Then, the second stage of
overlapping consensus does not increase epistemic justificatory
power of Rawls's theory of justice. The second stage is a
redundant device. As Rawls did in A Theory’ o f Justice, he may
simply apply the two principles of justice in the actual situation
of implementation.
Of course, I am not saying that Rawls succeeds in the
justification of his theory by conception-dependent desires as
moral motivation. In table 4, I explain how various reasonable
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14 4
comprehensive doctrines endorse two principles of justice and
the specification of democratic public culture. However.
Rawls's conception of persons as free and equal is a
controversial idea. As I analyze it in the previous section.
Rawls's conception of persons expresses only a partial aspect of
democratic culture. It is not a reliable input. Rawls simply
writes his conception of persons into democratic public culture
rather than discovers it. Therefore the second stage of
overlapping consensus does not bring about conception-
dependent desires for you and me. Rawls fails in his
justificatory scheme.
Even in his own rationale for the overlapping consensus.
Rawls fails to strengthen the justificatory power of the two
principles of justice. For the stability of a society, Rawls
proposes the second stage of overlapping consensus as a radical
conception of reflective equilibrium. Rawls tries to show that
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines can endorse
Rawls’s two principle of justice from their own perspectives.
To do so, I think, persons who have a comprehensive doctrine
need to revise their beliefs. According to Gilbert Harman who
suggests some principles of belief revision, “one is to add a new
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145
proposition P to one's beliefs only if one is interested in
whether P is true (and it is otherwise reasonable for one to
believe P).”199 Rawls's main goal of A Theory o f Justice is to
reject the utilitarian principle. In case of the overlapping
consensus. Rawls asks the utilitarian to revise their beliefs or
add Rawls's two principles of justice to the utilitarian principle.
Rawls says that it is reasonable for the utilitarian to accept the
two principles o f justice because utility maximization principle
is too speculative to apply to questions of political justice.
Rawls argues that it is very difficult to calculate teleological
principles theoretically in applying these principles because the
highly speculative nature and enormous complexity of these
calculations are bound to make citizens with opposing views
and interests highly suspicious on one another’s arguments.
Instead Rawls explicates the simplicity of the two principles of
justice. So Rawls argues that the utilitarian may endorse the
two principles of justice as a best approximation to the
utilitarian principle. The simplicity and applicability of Rawls’s
principles of justice is the reason for the utilitarian to revise his
view. However I think that the utilitarian does not have any
1 9 9 Gilbert Harman. Change in View(Cambridge:M IT Press. 1 9 8 6 ) .p .55.
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146
interest in revising his view of utilitarianism. An ardent
utilitarian. Robert Goodin argues that utilitarianism as a guide
for policy choice provides policy-makers with rules that are
general in form.200 Public officials have less information on the
peculiarities of decision-making circumstances than private
individuals who would receive significant impact from public
policy. And not knowing particular circumstances of particular
individuals, rules and regulations must be general in form.
Therefore Goodin argues that policy-makers deals with people
in aggregate, imposing them rules that are general in form.
That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the
utilitarian calculus - if they want to use it at all - to choose
general rules of conduct. In other words, the utilitarian prefers
utilitarian principle as a general rule for policy choice. The
complexity of utility calculation is not a critical problem to the
utilitarian. I think that Goodin's argument is a plausible
response especially when people articulate the principle for the
basic structure of a society. Therefore the utilitarian needs not
endorse Rawls's principles of justice as a best approximation to
:o° See Robert Goodin. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy
(Cam bridge:Cam bridge U n iv . Press. 1995). pp. 6 0 -8 1 .
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1 4 7
the utilitarian principle. The utilitarian is not interested in the
revision of utilitarian principle. Rawls's idea o f overlapping
consensus fails in providing the utilitarian with the motivation
to revise their utilitarian principle.
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CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION.
148
In this dissertation. I examine whether Rawls justify his
best form of liberal state on a rational ground. Rawls's ground
t — c
of justification is the method of wide reflective equilibrium as
coherentism. However, he fails in justifying his liberal state. I
get some epistemological and philosophical lessons from his
failure.
First of all, Rawls overemphasizes the shared fund of
democratic ideas and principles among citizens in constructing
theory of justice. In a similar vein, Rawls put too much
emphasis on the unanimous decision by the veil of ignorance in
the original position. Also Rawls is too optimistic on the
possibility of the overlapping consensus from various
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
I think that Rawls's failure stems from his implicit effort
to achieve universal principle of justice. Rawls argues that
“principles are to be universal in application.”201 Principles
should be universal so that everyone acts upon it. In order to
201 Rawls. Theory o f Justice.p. 13 2.
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149
achieve universal principle of justice, Rawls have to pay the
cost. Rawls does not verify the universality of the democratic
public culture. If we use another features of the democratic
public culture, we can develop a different principle from
Rawls's. Furthermore, the serious defect of application is to
exclude unreasonable comprehensive doctrines for the
overlapping consensus. Rawls hopes that his two principles of
justice get the universal support in the long run. Rawls thinks
that it is a suitable way to achieve the social stability. In doing
so. however, Rawls distorts liberal idea of tolerance. Even in
the public sphere, liberal society should tolerate diverse ways
of life, opinions, and political principles.
Secondly. Rawls confuses the just society with a stable
society. A well-ordered society is just in that the political
principle of this society takes various interests and
perspectives into the consideration. Rawls thinks that the
fairness of the principle begets the just principle. However, the
stability of the society is a different subject compared with the
fairness. Rawls tries to show that the social stability is insured
by the overlapping consensus of various reasonable
comprehensive doctrines on a just principle. Yet the
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1 5 0
overlapping consensus is an ideal project. In the actual
situations such as constitutional convention and legislative
stage, negotiation among various comprehensive doctrines can
achieve the stability of a society. This stability is a modus
vivendi. Negotiation aims at the social stability rather than
the just principle. Through the deliberative procedure, each
person with a comprehensive doctrine gets some but not all of
what he wants. While we can not achieve the overlapping
consensus on a just principle, we can get a compromise on the
shared second best preferences. To do so, each participant has
approximately equal bargaining power. In addition, each
participant should modify his conception of the good if he
accepts the opinions of others. Through this negotiation, we
can achieve mutually acceptable solutions. In case of Rawls’s
first stage of constructivism, the veil of ignorance prevents this
negotiation procedure.
Of course. Rawls argues that the stability of modus
vivendi is very weak. However, a modus vivendi may be more
stable if every member of a society accepts the idea of
tolerance. Each participant accepts an agreed second best so
that the society is a stable one. If we impose Rawls’s two
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1 5 1
principles of justice on persons who has their own
comprehensive doctrines and exclude the unreasonable
comprehensive doctrines in the debate of constitutional
essentials, dissenters disturb the stability of a society.
Thirdly. Rawls's theory of right does not pay enough
attention to the various virtues for the social cooperation.
Rawls does not explain what kinds of virtues are needed for
the social cooperation. Rawls simply mentions about the love
of mankind, fellow feeling, mutual trust and fraternity in order
to develop the sense of justice. However, he never explains
how these virtues are related one after another in the three
stage of morality. Rawls thinks that the cultivation of moral
personality is not a function of the state. In other words, Rawls
rejects the perfectionism. Without examining the required
virtues for the social cooperation, Rawls simply admits certain
virtues in order to develop the sense of justice. It seems to me
that Rawls regards virtuous person as an impossible ideal.
Instead. Rawls regards the self-interest as a main motivation of
human being. So the motivation of the parties in the original
position is to choose a just principle that provides social
background for the fulfillment of citizen’s conceptions of the
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152
good. Yet every state should cultivate various virtues for the
stability of the society. Even though the virtue of perfect
altruism is impossible, we have to examine various virtues for
the social cooperation. In this regard republican tradition is an
illustrative guide for the social cooperation in a democratic
society. The negotiation procedure also needs various virtues
such as open-mindness, sacrifice of the self-interest, tolerance,
law-abidness. other-regarding attitude, etc.
Rawls tries to establish a just and stable society in a
situation of reasonable pluralism. He fails in justifying his best
form of the state. In political philosophy, however, his failure
suggests new insight for the state theory. It is a great
contribution of Rawls.
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153
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Asset Metadata

Creator Yang, Jinsuk (author)

Core Title A critique of Rawls's structure of justification

School Graduate School

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, general

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor [illegible] (committee chair), [illegible] (committee member), Elliott, John (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-90159

Unique identifier UC11338807

Identifier 3018146.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-90159 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 3018146.pdf

Dmrecord 90159

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Yang, Jinsuk

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA