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China's Korean minority: A study in the dissolution of ethnic identity

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China's Korean minority: A study in the dissolution of ethnic identity

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Content CHINA’S KOREAN MINORITY: A STUDY IN THE DISSOLUTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY Copyright 2004 by Yeon Jung Yu A Thesis Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS (EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES) August 2004 Yeon Jung Yu Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1422408 Copyright 2004 by Yu, Yeon Jung All rights reserved. INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI UMI Microform 1422408 Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii I am deeply grateful to Professor Eugene Cooper of the Department of Anthropology, the University of Southern California, who opened my eyes to the anthropological discipline and inspired this thesis through his highly instructive classes and deep insights. Prof. Cooper has given me substantial help, ranging from how to design and conduct research to this result. Prof. Cooper has been more than willing to go the extra mile as chair of my thesis committee; he carefully read my drafts, edited them, and gave me the suggestions that only a superlative educator and consummate expert in his field could. A shorter, earlier version of this thesis was fortunate enough to be published in 2003 by the journal E1PAIR (Harvard University); Prof. Cooper also helped me to render that version publishable. His full trust and friendship over the past two years has allowed my research to prosper. In short, my debt to Prof. Cooper is profound. I also would like to express my gratitude to Professor Stanley Rosen o f the Department of Political Sciences, the University of Southern California. Prof. Rosen Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. has also carefully reviewed my drafts, offered constructive suggestions, and given me helpful insights with warm consideration. Further, I give thanks to Professor Gordon Berger, director of the East Asian Studies Center at the University of Southern California, for his careful reading of my work and for his useful insights. Lastly, since this thesis is a result of my study at USC, I wish to thank the East Asian Studies Center for offering me an opportunity to study for my master’s with a TAship and an RAship for the past two years. The full responsibility for any remaining errors is mine alone. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................ii LIST OF FIGURES..............................................................................................................v ABSTRACT..........................................................................................................................vi I. Introduction.....................................................................................................................1 II. Defining the Chinese Koreans..................................................................................7 III. Changes brought to the Korean minority by China’s economic reforms and new interaction with South Koreans...............................................................................13 A. China’s economic reforms.......................................................................................13 (1) New ideology: capitalism..................................................................................13 (2) Large economic gap between Chinese-Korean society and the Han cities 16 B. Contact between China's Korean minority and South K oreans........................ 23 (1) South Korean entrepreneurs and tourists.........................................................24 (2) Migration of young elites to big cities............................................................. 28 (3) Migration of labor to South Korea....................................................................33 (4) International marriages with South Koreans.................................................. 40 IV. Implications of the changes brought by the reforms and by interaction with South Koreans................................................................................................................... 43 A. Assimilation to the Han in the big Chinese cities............................................... 51 B. Positive impressions of the H an............................................................................ 53 C. Negative impressions of South K oreans.............................................................. 58 V. Conclusion.................................................................................................................64 Bibliography........................................................................................................................76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Map of northeast China...................................................................................... 9 Figure 2. Change of Chinese-Korean population in the Chinese-Korean autonomous district...................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3. Progress of Sino-Korea Trade......................................................................... 31 Figure 4. Migration of Chinese-Koreans in recent 10 years........................................ 32 Figure 5. Migration of Chinese-Korean women from Yanbian to South Korea through international marriage....................................................................................41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT vi In this thesis, I focus on how Chinese economic reforms and interaction with South Koreans have brought change to the Korean ethnic minority in China's northeast and helped to affirm the Korean ethnic minority’s identity as Chinese Koreans. Until the early 90s, Chinese Koreans maintained their Korean culture, language, traditions, and lineage based on kinship relations. Many scholars predicted that the growing interaction with South Koreans would help Korean ethnics develop a minority society in China while preserving their own language and culture. My research, however, reveals that a crisis of dissolution has developed among Chinese Koreans. Also, the broad economic gap between Chinese Koreans and South Koreans has caused serious conflicts between the two groups, further reinforcing Chinese Koreans’ Chinese heritage. Hence, I conclude that as a result of these factors, the Korean minority in China is assimilating to Chinese society ever more rapidly. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 I. Introduction In this study of the Korean minority (chaoxianzu) in northeast China (.Dongbei), I focus on the conceptual transformation of the minority’s identity that occurred during the dramatic economic and socio-political changes in the post-Mao period. To discuss the current common socio-political experience of the Korean minority in China, it will be necessary to investigate their growing connections with South Koreans. Recent scholarship has begun to show that “Chinese” cultural features have multiple historical origins, receiving contributions from various ethnicities within and outside China through a long historical process of interactions among many different peoples, rather than from a single culture common to the Han people (Mueggler 2001: 19). National identity and ethnic identity are commonly portrayed as fixed and simple products of a person’s culture and/or ancestry (Brown 2001: 55). This study may prove meaningful in supporting Brown’s (2001: 55-6) arguments that it is ultimately the common socio-political experience o f group members that fosters group identity, and that there may be a general pattern used by locals to classify Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. themselves based on their socio-political experience, whereas outsiders classify others based on culture. In this paper, I discuss how Chinese economic reforms have affected the lives of the Korean ethnic minority in China's northeast and helped them to affirm their ethnic identity within contemporary Chinese society. For this, I develop my argument in two parts. First, I discuss the changes introduced by China's economic reforms and their effects on the Korean ethnic minority. Next, I consider how these social changes in China brought about greater interaction with South Korea, and how this interaction caused members of the Korean minority community to rethink and reaffirm their identities as “Chinese.” Currently, on one of the main channels in South Korea, there is a popular soap opera drama about a Chinese-Korean woman who comes to South Korea to work for a China-South Korea trade company. She has a difficult time there until she marries the only son of a rich South Korean family, and is then acknowledged as a member of her in-laws’ family, thus a member of South Korean society. Since this program is telecast during prime time on weekend evenings on one of the top three channels in Korea, and since the lead is played by one o f the most famous actresses Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in the country, the issue of Chinese-Korean identity is clearly one of which most South Koreans are aware. South Korea used to be an overwhelmingly homogeneous country, consisting of only one people with a rare addition of foreigners; in the past, foreigners with no ethnic connections to Korea, even overseas Koreans, were rarely seen in South Korea. Although a US army base has existed in the center of Seoul since Korea’s division into two countries after the Korean War, US troops have been socially isolated from most Korean citizens since the army’s purpose there is strictly military. However, it has recently become more common to see foreigners on the streets of Seoul, the capital city of South Korea. News stories about foreign workers, including Chinese Koreans, are more frequently heard: Crimes committed by foreign workers, such as pocket picking, are common. Also decorating the news are stories about the exploitation of illegal foreign laborers by vicious Korean company owners who rarely pay them. Civil movements to protect foreign workers, legal or illegal, have become popular. If you go to a restaurant in South Korea, you will find that almost every waitress is a member of the Korean minority from China who also speaks Korean or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 Chinese with a Chinese-Korean accent. Just as Americans do concerning illegal immigrants, many South Koreans complain about Chinese Koreans “stealing their jobs.” As trade between China and South Korea has grown, an increasing number of companies are recruiting people who speak Chinese. Thus, more and more Chinese language institutes have appeared, and many of the instructors there are ethnic Koreans from China. In addition, stories of Chinese Koreans risking their lives to get into South Korea have become everyday news; some have been caught by the Korean or Chinese police. Although these changes did not happen overnight, this sudden influx of foreigners into such a homogeneous society seemed very abrupt. Because the relationship between the Chinese Koreans and South Koreans has become significantly important, a great deal of research has been performed in South Korea on the Chinese-Korean community. However, a significant number of research studies are focused on topics such as the problems faced by Chinese-Korean society or tensions caused by the interaction between Chinese Koreans and South Koreans. In contrast, American scholars have studied this community very little, even though they have written about the tensions between other minorities, such as the Tibetans or Uighurs, and the Chinese government. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 In the beginning stages of their interaction, both South Koreans and the Chinese-Korean minority expected that their newly established relationship would be a warm one. However, as this interchange has grown, serious conflicts have arisen, causing major social problems in both Korean societies (Kim 1994: 17-20; Bang 2001: 10-3). Until the early 90s, many scholars, such as Kwon (2000a: 14), held that while Koreans in the West tended to assimilate and lose their identity as Koreans, Chinese Koreans, who make up 50% of Koreans overseas, have maintained their Korean culture, language, traditions, and ethnic group endogamy. These scholars also expected that the growing interaction with South Koreans could help Chinese Koreans develop a community and preserve their own language and culture (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 24-5). My research, however, reveals that the economic reforms and interaction with South Koreans have created a crisis of dissolution among Chinese Koreans (Hwang 1996: 46; Choi 1999: 188). China’s economic reforms led to an increasingly broad economic gap between Chinese-Koreans and the Han majority residences, and a dramatic movement of the Chinese-Korean population into big cities (Choi 1999: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189-91; Kim 1994: 14-6, 17-8) where they live surrounded by the Han majority. In addition, because of the economic reforms, Chinese Koreans and South Koreans have had new opportunities for contact, and some serious conflicts have emerged; this has led to a reinforcing among the Chinese-Korean minority of their Chinese identity (Hwang 1996: 47-8). Hence, I conclude that the Chinese economic reforms and Chinese Koreans’ interactions with South Koreans have encouraged the Chinese-Korean minority to more rapidly assimilate to Chinese society. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 II. Defining the Chinese Koreans Among the relevant questions to be addressed here are: who the Chinese Koreans (chaoxianzu) are; what distinguishes them from the Chinese and the South Koreans; and under what circumstances their society came into being. According to the 1990 People’s Republic of China census, 91.96 % of Chinese citizens belonged to the Han minority (Hanzu) and 8.04% to non-Han ethnic groups (Yoo 2001: 1). As was shown in the cases of the Manchu minority in Heilongjiang province (Yan 1996: 32), the Mongols (mengguzu) in Inner Mongolia (neimenggu) (Borchigud 1996: 163, 168-69), and the Tujia minority in southwestern Hubei (Brown 2001: 59), the actual percentage of Chinese minorities might be lower than the population data show, because many members of the Han majority might have falsely identified themselves as minorities to take advantage of government policies that allow minorities to have more than one child, get into college more easily, become a cadre member, and get job promotions. In the late 80s, the area inhabited by 55 non-Han ethnic communities made up 50 to 60% of the territory of the People’s Republic. The 1,765,204 Koreans who were Chinese citizens represented 0.17% of the total population and 2.6% of the non-Han population. They Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were China’s eleventh largest non-Han nationality, and over 98% of them lived in Northeast China or Manchuria (Olivier 1991: 1). Northeast China, or Dongbei, includes the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang (Dongbei sansheng, or the ‘Three Provinces of the Northeast’), and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia (Olivier 1991: 17). The whole area is about twice the size of Texas or almost four times that of Germany (Olivier 1991: 14). Yanbian is a Chinese-Korean autonomous district bordering North Korea, and many Chinese Koreans have lived there (Shin 2001: 2). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Khabarovsk Heine HEILONGJIANG • Harbin > jik-nh Changchu ^ T m ' w n x a J j Vlu'.i'.nstok INNER MONGOLIA U ndid: f ^ t s j r - lIAONING^ e n y a n g .Ansha% # # S ' H ohhot J TIAN _ / S L ' ^ ;* ^ a lU ,n iiLw¥^ N N , ^ Y j i i i .ii s Yello ml 1 • i ^0^C ' JTpingdan HENAN ANHUt anjing ^jjj^pianghai £ „ , j - — China H^KgzhmT^) Z H E J IA N G ^ f, HL'BE Sea | Changsha * f JIANGXI ill NAN W enzhou I | i ‘ FUJIAN J : ) J y f uzh< > s - % . : i \: n 4 n GUANGDONG J; T aiw an X^r^^fiuangzhouJ^hantou {t (; W p S B & W " T f f " 1 ” ” " ' M.u*a i i I'ort South China Sea l.'JlK.'klll C 1996 Studio NEC HandeUblad Figure 1. Map of northeast China. Source: Kemenade, Willem Van. 1998. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc. New York: Vintage Books. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Koreans in Northeast China represent a unique case: they are not natives of China but a population of rather recent immigration, starting in the latter half of the 19th century (Olivier 1991: 2). Most Koreans migrated for economic reasons (Olivier 1991: 40). The history of the Korean community in China traces back 140 years (Donga Daily, 08/08/2002), and Korean migration to China began in the early 17th century. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Manchus conquered China, declared their ancestral territories the “sacred homeland” of their dynasty, and prohibited non- Manchus from settling in Manchuria (Olivier 1991: 17-8). Despite the ban on immigration, impoverished Koreans hit by severe famines continued to sneak into neighboring Manchuria (Olivier 1991: 27-30); by 1870 there were twenty-eight Korean villages there (Shim 1998: 19). Large-scale Korean settlement in Manchuria was encouraged by the Qing dynasty’s official removal of the ban in 1881, an act intended to obstruct the Russian Empire’s policy to expand its territory southward (Shim 1998: 19). By 1894, there were 20,899 Koreans in Yanbian (Olivier 1991: 31). When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, the second wave of Korean migration to Manchuria began, as people sought to escape Japanese dominance and ferocious, barbarous exploitation; in 1916, about 200,000 Koreans lived in Yanbian (Olivier Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 1991: 35, 37). After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, more Koreans were forced by the Japanese to migrate to Manchuria (Shim 1998: 19). By the late 1930s, the population of Korean immigrants finally reached a million (Olivier 1991: 45). During the Mao era, because of their active participation in and support of the Chinese Communist Party since its establishment, and through their contribution to the Chinese economy via wet-rice cultivation, the Chinese Koreans received friendly treatment from the Chinese government. Thus, the Chinese Koreans earned a relatively secure status in communist Chinese society (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 27; Olivier 1991: 421); since then, they have managed a fairly peaceful cohabitation with the Han and have successfully adapted to China’s socialist regime (Olivier 1991: 2). In the Mao era, because rice farming required the help of all community members, the Chinese Koreans naturally formed a closed farming collective. This society was a self-sufficient cultural and economic unit, one with minimal communication with other ethnic groups. Additionally, the old household residence permits (hukou) inhibited rural dwellers from moving into urban areas because ration tickets, as well as other economic resources, were issued and distributed only to registered households (Bang 2001: 52; Link 2002: 191, 201). However, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 economic reforms and the consequent rapid economic expansion that transformed many parts of China in the post-Mao era (in the 1980s and 1990s) benefited only the Han Chinese, not the Chinese Koreans (Olivier 1991: 421), since only Han-Chinese areas were invested in. This was also the case for many other minority communities, including the Yi minority residing on the periphery of Yunnan province (Mueggler 2001: 16). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 III. Changes brought to the Korean minority by China’s economic reforms and new interaction with South Koreans A. China’s economic reforms China’s economic reforms of the late 1970s initiated the dissolution of the Korean minority society by introducing a new ideology, capitalism. This prompted many ethnic Koreans to desire prosperity and leave their communities for the big cities where the Han majority was enjoying rapid economic development. (1) New ideology: capitalism China has been invaded and colonized by western imperialist nations since the Opium War (1842). Thus, when the Communist Party unified Mainland China and established the People’s Republic in 1949, anti-imperialist nationalism was strong in China. A figurative wall was built around China to keep out foreign influence; this metaphoric barricade was also built by the US policy of containment after the Korean War. However, the post-Mao-era Chinese are creating a new national identity, policies, and a mythos to replace the Maoist anti-imperialist rhetoric. They have learned that their anti-imperialist nationalism was a disaster that locked China in poverty and backwardness; Deng Xiaoping blamed the closed-door Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 policies for China’s backwardness, and this view is reflected in the political manuals used by college instructors. For example, the Qing dynasty’s error is no longer depicted as a failure to mobilize peasants against foreign influence, but as an attempt to wall out the world; by the 80s, the popular wisdom was that anti imperialist nationalistic sentiments had been the cause of China’s backwardness and that the efforts to keep out foreigners were “misidentified” (Friedman 1994: 68). In other words, the Chinese ascribed the nation’s backwardness to a lack o f openness toward the world, and not to external imperialism that began with the Opium War (as Mao had declared). By the 1990s, anti-imperialist nationalism was dead in China (Friedman 1994: 67-9), as it was in the minds of the Chinese Koreans. At the same time, the Korean minority in China was witnessing the “spectacular” (Todaro and Smith 2003: 590) economic growth o f South Korea, one of the “four little dragons” of the Pacific (along with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) (Cooper and Jiang 1998:180). South Korea, one of East Asia’s NICs (newly industrializing countries) (Haggard 1990: 23), has adopted export-oriented- industrialization (EOI) or export-led-growth (ELG) developmental strategies (Haggard 1990: 1) since the economic reforms of the early 1960s (Todaro and Smith Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 2003: 590), achieving economic success through “state-controlled strategies” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 5; Kurtz 2001: 19) or “state-supported capitalism” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 216) under an authoritarian political regime (Cooper and Jiang 1998: 180). Consequently, South Korea has advanced from being one of the world’s poorest countries in the 1950s to one of the richest, with the tenth largest trading economy in the 1990s; in 1996, it was designated a “high-income” country by the World Bank and joined the OECD (Organization Economic Cooperation and Development) in Paris as an industrialized, aid-giving country (Todaro and Smith 2003: 590-91). As to the “East Asian miracle, ” while the mainstream interpretation of “neoliberal” economists (Wade 1992: 176) is that the market takes center stage and governments play a minor role in the process of economic development in East Asian countries (World Bank 1993: 82), the successful industrial growth of South Korea can convincingly be attributed to “perspiration rather than inspiration,” in Krugman’s terms (1994: 70), or the exploitation of a well-trained and literate labor force through “flexible accumulation,” in Harvey’s (1990) terms (Cooper and Jiang 1998: 168), occurring under an authoritarian government emphasizing labor- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 intensive and export-led industries and having close cooperation with chaebol (big businessmen in export industries). The 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul introduced the world to the rapid economic gains made by South Korea. Surveys also show that the Chinese Koreans’ conception of South Korea dramatically improved after they witnessed these international sporting events (Bang 2001: 10; Kim 2000: 1). However, the more likely factor that first caused Chinese Koreans to positively evaluate South Korea’s economic development, and to stimulate them to seek a better economic situation through contact with South Koreans, might have been the new Chinese national propaganda. (2) Large economic gap between Chinese-Korean society and the Han cities Since the 1978 economic reforms, the advantages of wet-field over dry-field farming have dwindled following the increased price of irrigation, pesticides, and agricultural medicine. Also, both the Han and the Manchu farmers learned rice farming and started to cultivate. In addition, these farmers adopted innovative, diversified farming techniques and attained better output than the Chinese Koreans Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 (Olivier 1991: 421; Choi 1999: 192). But although some scholars, including Olivier (1992: 421) and Choi (1999: 192), blame the Chinese Koreans’ inability to keep up with the Han on failing farming techniques, I would argue that such an explanation is only partial; the main reason lies in China’s economic and minority policies, which are biased against the Chinese-Korean minority areas. The economic gap between the Han and the minorities has been widened by the creation of special economic zones in China's east coast areas and other big cities where the Han reside, and by the establishment of economic policies that favor those Han areas; the east coast (the Han area) has been the primary target of economic development by the Chinese government, which has rarely invested in the Chinese- Korean autonomous district (Yoo 2001: 1). Thus, the Chinese Koreans became economically disadvantaged in the post-Mao period and lagged behind the increasingly more successful Han (Olivier 1991: 3). From 1979 to 1992, there were considerable disparities in both the annual GNP growth rate and the GNP difference between the Han areas and the regions with autonomous minority districts or provinces with a high minority population; these disparities have since continued to grow (Yoo 2001: 6). For instance, China’s southern provinces of Guangdong and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 Fujian, with their special economic zones and proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan, have experienced great prosperity and are thus increasingly spoken of as a “fifth little dragon” (Cooper and Jiang 1998: 180). Through their study in Zhejiang, a southeastern province where the Han majority reside, Cooper and Jiang (1998) clearly show that the economy there has been developing quickly and undergoing a dramatic and dynamic transformation; industrial enterprise has replaced agriculture as the principal source of household income, the standard of living has risen, and savings have become substantial. Contrary to many scholars’ predictions, the wealth inequity between the Han areas and the ethnic Korean autonomous districts has not caused ethnic tensions between the Han and the Korean minority; instead, the gap has accelerated Chinese- Korean migration into the large, developing cities. Since the mid-1980s, some two hundred thousand Chinese Koreans, 10% of their total population, have left the autonomous districts and moved to big cities and east coast areas in China (Yoo 2001: 3). Starting in the late 1980s, even many of the Chinese-Korean elite made such moves (Kim 1994: 18). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 The growing disparities in wealth, in my view, may have also motivated all Chinese Koreans to enthusiastically desire better economic conditions. Many members of the Chinese-Korean farming community chose to move to the developing industrial cities, a relocation facilitated by the highly developed transportation and communication systems (Choi 1999: 192). Farmers left the villages to go to the big cities to sell kimchi, visited relatives in South Korea and sold Chinese medicine, became peddlers in Russia or North Korea, or obtained jobs as laborers in Japan or the U.S. A few young, educated Chinese Koreans have rushed to the big cities and have successfully competed with other ethnic groups there. Consequently, the towns and fields in the Chinese-Korean ethnic autonomous zones have become depopulated (Choi 1999: 192-3). The urbanization of the Chinese-Korean minority has led to the virtual disappearance of the traditional Chinese-Korean agricultural village. At the same time, the population of Chinese Koreans in the big cities is skyrocketing. For example, according to the Heilongjiang Press, the Chinese-Korean population in Beijing increased from fewer than 4,000 in 1982 to more than 60,000 in 1996. From 1982 to 1990, while the average annual population increase was 1.06%, and while Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 the urban growth rate was lower, the population increase in the three northeastern provincial centers, Changchun, Shenyang, and Haerbin, was relatively high: 48.6%, 24.8%, and 19.8%, respectively. This can be explained by the increased population entering from nearby rural areas. In 1996, the Chinese-Korean minority population in Dalian was 30,000, in Tianjin 20,000, and in Qingdao 30,000. In the same year, the Chinese-Korean population was around 100,000 in Bohaiwan, around 2,000 in the southern part of Shanhaiguan, and there were also several thousand Chinese Koreans in the main cities of the southern Chinese coast (Choi 1999: 190). Recent media reports also indicate that the traditional Chinese-Korean society in China is rapidly disappearing, resulting from the heavy migration to big cities or abroad. A minority population needs to reach 25% of a given region for an autonomous district to be set up in China. According to the Donga Daily (08/29/2002), since 1996, Chinese-Korean population growth has become negative, and in 1999, Chinese Koreans comprised just 38.8% of the population of Yanbian. According to one scholar, the Chinese-Korean percentage of the total population will be around 20% in 2010, 10% in 2020, and 8.7% in 2030. The closing of Chinese- Korean schools became common in Yanbian following the huge outflow of, as well Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 as the low birth rate among, Chinese Koreans {Donga Daily, 08/29/2002). However, it is unclear whether the widening economic gaps and changes in Chinese- Korean ideology were factors that directly caused the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society; they are perhaps better regarded as a backdrop to the dissolution. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 < u c n < D C 3 u o ‘ ■ f i o P h I , a .2 22 3 a o CP 45 44 ■■■■B IB MBBMH M llilliM ^ M I s 43 42 41 40 39 38 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year Figure 2. Change of Chinese-Korean population in the Chinese-Korean autonomous district. Source: translated from Donga Daily (www.donga.com, 08/29/2002). In sum, I would argue that China’s 1978 economic reforms planted the first seeds of the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society by changing Chinese Koreans’ ideology towards capitalism. However, at this time, Chinese Koreans were unable ‘to ride in the ship’ of Chinese economic development due to government economic policies which were preferential to the Han residential areas. Consequently, many Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 Koreans in northeast China began to leave their community to find opportunities to taste the fruits of China’s rapid economic development in the big cities. Although China’s economic reforms may have initiated the migration to big cities, the uniqueness of Chinese-Korean society was a more direct cause of the dissolution of the Korean community in China. The migration of people from rural areas to big cities can be understood as a natural part of the process of modernization, as has been the case in any other industrializing country. B, Contact between China's Korean minority and South Koreans Changes in the international political atmosphere motivated Chinese Koreans to migrate. Unlike other minorities, the Chinese Koreans have a motherland - South Korea - with a stronger economy than China. Coincidently, in the late 80s and early 90s, South Korea needed cheap labor to sustain its economic development. Under these circumstances, the establishment of a diplomatic relationship between China and South Korea in 1992 finally offered Chinese Koreans a practical way to catch up with the Han majority’s economic gains. Consequently, many Chinese-Korean laborers migrated illegally to South Korea, many women married South Korean men, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 and many employees moved to big Chinese cities to work for South Korean companies established there. (1) South Korean entrepreneurs and tourists Due to the long separation between communist China and capitalist South Korea during the Cold War, very few South Koreans spoke Chinese or understood Mainland China. But thanks to the bilingual ability of the Chinese Korean minority group, many South Korean companies rushed to establish factories and invest money in the big cities in autonomous Chinese-Korean regions (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 29-31; Choi 1999: 191). Also, many tourists started to travel to those areas (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 32). Most South Korean investment in China was concentrated in the three northeastern provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang). Because most South Korean companies in China are labor-intensive industries, such as those in the textile, sewing, or electronic industries, these companies predominantly need women laborers (Choi 1999: 191). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 During their initial interactions, both the Chinese-Korean minority and native South Koreans were the subjects of mutual curiosity. At that time, Chinese reforms and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea brought frequent mutual visits. As a result, the bilingual Chinese Koreans well served the linguistic needs of South Korean merchants and tourists (Kwon 2000b: 160). In their early 1990s research, Son, Kim, and Yoo concluded that the remote social distance between Chinese ethnic Koreans and South Koreans was caused by a lack of interaction at the individual level. They predicted that the forthcoming, extensive mutual interaction would solve this problem (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 55). However, their prediction has proved false in a significant way. The arrogant and despicable behavior of South Korean tourists has made a bad impression. And the ever-growing instances of fraud by South Koreans against Chinese Koreans in China have promoted Chinese-Korean distrust of South Koreans. Koreans frequently exploit the Chinese Koreans’ desire to go to South Korea. For example, one South Korean “entrepreneur” swindled more than a thousand Chinese- Korean people by falsely posing as a labor importer, taking their money and fleeing. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 Cultural conflict has also arisen as a result of South Koreans’ lack of respect for the differences in culture of the Chinese-Korean minority (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 35, 37). In addition, the influx of South Koreans into China, along with their capitalist practices, led to many social problems for Chinese-Korean society. The economic structure of Yanbian industry was drastically altered as the consumption industry took priority over the production industry. For example, Yanji has a very large number of taxis and coffee shops, and just as many Karaoke and drinking bars as the economically developed Guangdong {Donga Daily, 08/30/2002). It is commonly said that the expansion in the number of bars, Karaoke clubs, and prostitutes in the Chinese ethnic Korean community is in direct proportion to the increased influx of South Korean tourists and entrepreneurs. Many young ethnically Korean women in China came to work in the bars or Karaoke clubs; it is estimated that some thirty thousand such women were working as prostitutes in early 1997 (Choi 1999: 191). From 1990 to 1999, the level of consumption per capita in Yanbian tripled {Donga Daily, 08/30/2002). This high level of consumption has prompted Chinese Koreans to join the excessive consumption trend. Every year, prices in the Korean Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 autonomous zones skyrocket because of the greatly increasing amount of capital garnered from South Korean tourists and Chinese Koreans working in South Korea. Due to this, the Chinese Koreans who live on a low income have a very difficult time and are resentful (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 37). Also, many women have left the villages to work for Korean companies in the big cities of the northeast (Choi 1999: 191), and the Chinese-Korean population of most other rural areas has significantly dropped, such that the maintenance of the autonomous regions has reached a crisis point (Choi 1999: 204). Worse still, the large number of young Chinese-Korean women working as prostitutes (Choi 1999: 191, 194), as well as the phenomenon of Chinese-Korean men taking illegal South Korean second wives, has had a strongly negative impact on the Chinese ethnic Korean community (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 35). For the Korean minority in China, the negative effects of the South Korean capitalist force seem so strong that Chinese Koreans have started to re-identify themselves more as Chinese than as Korean (Hwang 1996: 47-8). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 (2) Migration of young elites to big cities Real investment in China by South Korean companies started in 1989 (Kim and Song 1997:156). Initially, most Korean companies investing in China were small experimental labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises in east-coast economic zones (Kim and Song 1997:173). Since 1991, investment in China by South Korean companies has grown rapidly due to various Korean domestic economic conditions: increased labor and land costs, the beginning of active labor movements, and the appreciation of the Korean currency. Along with these domestic conditions, the growing demand for economic cooperation with China has led Korean enterprises to move their production facilities to China to maintain their competitive advantage in international markets. Korean companies briefly took advantage of low labor costs by processing or assembling products in China and then exporting the products back to Korea and other countries. Currently, these companies aim to gain markets in China, and large corporations have also started to invest in China (Kim and Song 1997: 173-7, 183, 187). According to the Association of Korean Trade, by the end of 1995 over 75% of Korean investments in China (2.06 billion out of 2.74 billion dollars) were Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 invested in the Northeast (Choi 1999: 191). Korean companies primarily invested there for several reasons: in 1988, the Chinese government gave South Korea special benefits in Shandong province; marine transportation was built between Korea (Inchon) and Shandong (Tianjin/Weihai); in the southern markets of China, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Hong Kong-based companies predominated, making it difficult for late-comer South Korean companies to compete; many bilingual Chinese Koreans resided in the Northeast, allowing for easier communication; the proximity between the Northeast and Korea made it easy for Korean companies to export products made in the Northeast to Korea and other countries (Kim and Song 1997: 177). Because China is a large market of 1.3 billion people, and because of its proximity to Korea, China has become a significantly important trading partner for Korea. Although China’s rapidly growing fields (e.g., textiles, electronics, machines) are threatening Korea’s important industries in international markets and bringing about the collapse of local Korean industries, Korea’s weakened competitive advantages (i.e., increased labor costs and property values) have made South Korean companies invest in China (Yoo, W. 2001: 1). Consequently, in 2002 China became Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 the number two trade partner for Korea, and Korea is the number three partner for China (Donga Daily, 08/05/2002). The degree o f South Korea’s economic reliance on Chinese exports has become so high that Steven Roch, the CEO of Morgan Stanley, has warned that the Korean economy could face huge difficulties if China’s economic growth were to slow down. In 2003, South Korea’s exports to China soared by 47.8%; accordingly, the ratio of the Chinese market in relation to total exports rose 18.1%, for the first time overtaking the U.S. market which comprises 17.7% of Korea’s exports (Economy21 No. 200). From 1990 to 1996, around 200,000 Chinese Koreans in rural areas, about 10% of the overall population, moved to large cities in China (Choi 1999: 189). Over the last ten years, around 300,000 Chinese Koreans, about 15% of the population, left for large cities such as Beijing, Qingdao, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Weihai, Tianjin, and Dalian. These Chinese Koreans are usually occupied in translation, management, or office work in Korean factories (Donga Daily, 08/08/2002). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 iS o T 3 C O Cl c c c o a 13 ■ t - » o H 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 II 5,000 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year (Jan.- Oct.) ■total amount of trade ■ exports from Korea to China ■ exports from China to Korea Figure 3. Progress of Sino-Korea Trade. Source: (Yoo 2001: 2), origianally from Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (www.kotra.or.kr). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 northeast three provinces Jilin ..Beijing' F . (IC C .C C C t " i a a j i n f:C .C C C : Guangzhou C 0 G A Figure 4. Migration of Chinese-Koreans in recent 10 years. Source: translated from Donga Daily, (www.donga.com, 08/08/2002). South Korean companies have attracted Chinese Koreans longing to elevate their living standards by offering them job opportunities in the big industrial cities. In addition, these companies’ growing investments in China are expected to accelerate the dissolution of the Chinese-Korean society as more overseas jobs are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 offered to Chinese Koreans. As a result, the migration of young, educated Chinese Koreans to big cities in China to work for South Korean companies has also contributed to the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society. The Chinese Koreans who migrate to industrial cities, where they are surrounded by Han culture, are naturally assimilating; in most cases, there are no Chinese-Korean schools where children can learn the Korean language and culture (Choi 1999: 198). Also, although previously Chinese Koreans strongly resisted interethnic marriage (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 43), more and more people in the big cities are marrying the Han. In big-city Chinese-Korean families, Mandarin is becoming the primary language; one often finds that Mandarin is the first language of Chinese-Korean children, and the language is predominantly used by young couples under 40 (Choi 1999: 197). (3) Migration of labor to South Korea As was mentioned previously, for the Chinese Korean minority, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games brought about a fundamental conceptual change toward South Korea. Since then, Chinese Koreans have come to be proud of South Korea’s Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 achievements. From 1988 until the establishment of foreign relations between China and South Korea in 1992, Chinese Koreans learned of Korea’s economic growth from people who had been to Korea. They also heard that they could make a large fortune selling Chinese medicine there. South Korea became a land of opportunity, where one could make ‘big money’ in a short time. Although many members of the Chinese-Korean minority have traveled abroad to Japan, Russia, the United States, and South Korea in recent years (Yoo 2001: 5), most prefer to migrate to South Korea because there are almost no language or cultural barriers and because customs inspections have been relatively lax. In the early 90s, Chinese Koreans visited South Korea mainly to sell Chinese medicine: 36,000 visited there in 1991, and 31,000 did so in 1992 (Yim 1999: 390). Although Chinese ethnic Koreans could visit South Korea with a letter of invitation from relatives, many of them had no relatives in South Korea; even if they had, with a letter of invitation, they could only stay for 90 days. Many of them smuggled themselves into South Korea; others entered with false letters o f invitation or through fake marriages. Even those who entered legally often stayed beyond the 90-day limit. The few Chinese ethnic Koreans who made it to South Korea stayed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 illegally and often swindled or robbed Koreans. The Korean government, as well as people displeased with the Chinese Koreans, enacted stricter regulations. Many Chinese Koreans were caught and expelled by the Korean government, and thus came to feel the inhumanity of, or became disillusioned with, South Koreans. Those not caught were often exploited by South Korean employers, paid minimum salaries, and sometimes even cheated out of these salaries. Since 1996, some twenty thousand cases of Chinese Koreans swindled by South Koreans have been publicly reported with corroborative facts (Hwang 1996: 41-2; Choi 1999: 194). As a result, Chinese Koreans came to curse South Korea for their contemptuous treatment. Until that time, however, very few Chinese Koreans and South Koreans had ever directly made contact with each other, so there was no major social problem. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, however, the problem has become a major issue. After 1992, the official relations between China and South Korea brought new opportunities for Chinese Koreans to enter South Korea legally. Many Chinese Koreans went there hoping to quickly earn a large fortune. Korea has thus become the land of opportunity for the Chinese Koreans; seeking the “Korean Dream,” they Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 have flowed into their ancestral homeland by any means and at any cost (Bang 2001: 13; Hwang 1996: 41). This has created a win-win situation for both the Chinese Koreans and the South Koreans, as their mutual economic needs were met. The Chinese Koreans, who had not tasted the fruits of the Chinese economic reforms and looked for ways to improve their economic situation, found the favorable exchange rate and higher wage levels to their liking. The official rate of exchange between currencies meant that their earnings as a laborer in Korea netted them 20 times more than a farmer in China could make in a month. In China, an average farmer’s monthly income is 500 Yuan (about $60), while one can earn 10,000 Yuan (about $1,200) monthly working construction in Korea; an average laborer earns about 30 US dollars monthly in China, while his counterpart in Korea makes $600, or 20 times more income. In Chinese-Korean society, it is said that one can buy a taxi in China after two to three years of work in Korea and open a coffee shop after five to six years (Donga Daily, 08/30/2002). Meanwhile, the Korean economy’s cheap labor demands were met. As the standard of living in Korea improved, people started to avoid all difficult or dangerous jobs; because of this, there was a severe drop in both the price Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 competitiveness and the quality of many Korean-made products. To remedy this, companies employed illegal foreigners, including Chinese-Koreans, as cheap labor. For a short time, the Korean government legally accepted foreign laborers; in 1996, there were 15,000 foreign workers in Korea, and 43% (6,500) o f them were Chinese- Korean. According to a Korean Ministry of Justice estimate, 40% (21,000) of all illegal foreigners (53,000) were Chinese-Korean (Hwang 1996: 41). In 1997, the remittance of funds to Yanbian from South Korea was 300 million dollars (KBS-1 TV, Sunday Special, 07/09/1998). In 2000, those remittances for 100,000 Chinese Koreans from Yanbian who were abroad, mainly in South Korea, totaled 230 million dollars (1.9 billion Yuan), a figure greater than the Yanbian government’s annual fiscal budget (Jeon 2001: 9). In 2002, the total remittance to Yanbian by Chinese-Korean women alone reached 300 million dollars {Donga Daily, 08/30/2002). As a result of increased interaction with South Korea, the overall standard of living for the Chinese Koreans has become better than that of the Han. From 1987 to 1992, over 4,500 Chinese Koreans from Yanbian visited their relatives in foreign countries, and their overall income reached 9 US million dollars. Thus, by 1992 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 Yanbian had become a city with one of the greatest amounts of individual foreign currency savings (Yanbian University 1994: 138, 146). From the late 1980s to 2000, about 100,000 Chinese Koreans from Yanbian, about 33% of the Chinese-Korean population, earned 300 million dollars in South Korea, about $3,000 per person. Yanbian’s foreign reserves rose to nearly 60 million dollars, about 300 dollars per capita, making it the richest city in Jilin province (Jin 2000: 24-5). By 2002, the Chinese Koreans’ standard of living had become one of the best among the fifty-six ethnic groups in China, because of remittances from about 100,000 Chinese Koreans in South Korea {Donga Daily, 08/08/2002). By the end of 1996, 120,000 Chinese Koreans had been to South Korea; this number represents 10% of Chinese-Korean adults. By early 1997, 83,000 Chinese Koreans had taken up residence in South Korea; 38,000 were legal, and 50,000 were illegal (Choi 1999: 195). Consequently, the rapidly increasing migration of Chinese Koreans to South Korea clearly contributed to the dissolution o f their traditional society. Although many Chinese Koreans who earned a lot of money in South Korea went back to China, most of them used their stay in Korea as an intermediary step to an eventual Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 move to industrial cities in China; they did not invest their money in the traditional farming society, but instead rushed to the Han societies. The population movements and the influence of South Korea also directly affected the Chinese-Korean education system. In Heilongjiang, most Chinese- Korean schools were closed by the year 2000. Thus, maintaining the independence of Chinese-Korean schooling is a most urgent issue. Further, family education has become a big problem for Chinese ethnic Koreans. In Shenyang province, the number of Chinese-Korean students with at least one parent working abroad is up to 40%, and those whose parents are divorced has reached 20% (Choi 1999: 196). Furthermore, South Korean law regarding overseas Koreans tends to discriminate against those Koreans living in poorer countries. Thus, Chinese Koreans have had a hard time securing rights equal to those of other South Korean expatriates from countries like the US and Japan. While Korean Americans get five-year-long visas, Chinese Koreans have difficulty getting any type of visa. For overseas Koreans from Europe, Japan, and Thailand, the Korean government issues unlimited travelers visas. Thus, Chinese Koreans are dissatisfied that they are treated as poorly as illegal Southeast Asian laborers (Kim 1996: 14-6). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 (4) International marriages with South Koreans In recent years, many members of the Chinese-Korean minority have traveled abroad to Japan, Russia, the United States, and South Korea (Yoo 2001: 5), and most Chinese Koreans prefer to visit South Korea. In addition, since the 1992 establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea, it is much easier for Chinese Koreans to enter South Korea (Choi 1999: 194)._ As in the aforementioned soap drama, many Chinese-Korean minority women have married South Korean men. From 1993 to 1996, 21,000 Chinese- Korean women married South Koreans, accounting for over 20% of 20-to-3 0-year- old women in the population. This phenomenon has brought the bachelor rate to 20:1, or 30:1 in many Chinese-Korean minority rural areas (Choi 1999: 191). By 2001, there were 70,000 Chinese-Korean immigrant women from Yanbian involved in international marriages (including disguise marriages), a figure greater than one- third those of marriageable age (20-30) ethnic Koreans in China (Jeon 2001: 9). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 60,000 50,000 g 40,000 c 3 "3 30,000 o A , 20,000 10,000 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Year Figure 5. Migration of Chinese-Korean women from Yanbian to South Korea through international marriage. Source: (Jeon 2001: 2). In addition, many Chinese-Korean women married South Korean rural men. Consequently, many Chinese-Korean men were not able to marry Chinese-Korean women, as was the tradition. This naturally promoted antagonism toward South Koreans. These Chinese-Korean bachelors had no choice but to marry Han women, and have been assimilated through interethnic marriage (Yoo 2001: 4). One main reason for the smaller Chinese-Korean minority population is the one-child policy. By 1996, 99.29% of Chinese-Korean couples who already had one Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 child opted not to have a second, even though they could have done so due to their minority status (Bang 2001: 13). In summation, we can divide the factors that brought major changes to the Chinese-Korean minority through contacts with South Koreans into two categories: the presence of South Korean companies and tourists in China, and labor-force migration to South Korea. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 IV. Implications of the changes brought by the reforms and by interaction with South Koreans Many Chinese-Korean reporters and intellectuals urge Chinese Koreans to identify themselves as Chinese. For example, one writer, Chae-kook Kim, claims that the effects of nurture is greater than the affect of nature in his essay There is No South Korea. He concludes that Chinese Koreans should choose China as their parent country, and that those who leave China because it is not a ‘blood parent’ or because it is poor are ungrateful and insensitive to China’s kindness. Another representative intellectual, Pan-ryong Jeong, likened the relationship between Chinese Koreans and China to the relationship between parents and a daughter-in- law. He argues that Chinese Koreans should serve China well, just like a daughter- in-law who marries into her husband's family, and keep their distance from Korea, just as good traditional married women do (Choi 1999: 201). Here I suggest that Chinese-Korean local government officials played a prominent, active role in promoting the Korean minority’s reaffirmation of their Chinese identity. Through her study of the Tujia minority in the Enshi Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture, located in southwestern Hubei province, Brown (2002: 362- 3) points out the important role played by local government officials in bridging the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 gap between state officials and locals; the local officials manipulate state policies to the locals’ favor, using their expansive understanding of local ethnicity and local needs, representing local interests to the central government. The Enshi local officials responsible for the ethnic classification of individuals created an arbitrary distinction between the Tujia minority and the Han, thereby manipulating the ethnic- minority figure from twenty-five to forty percent. This figure was high enough to warrant autonomous-prefecture status, which brought in funds for further local economic development, yet low enough to avoid closer state scrutiny or additional Han immigration (Brown 2001:71; 2002: 376, 382-83, 386, 388-89). I argue that the same logic can be applied to the Korean ethnic case; local Chinese-Korean officials and intellectuals have been making efforts to serve as effective liaisons between local interests and state policies. The Chinese central government is concerned with the growing ethnic consciousness of its Korean minority population, and thus there has been diplomatic friction with South Korea on the issue of giving Chinese Koreans rights equal to those of South Koreans or overseas Koreans in the West. At this moment, the local leadership administers state policy by actively discouraging locals from identifying with South Korea - there has Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 been a social movement to affirm their identity as Chinese led by both the local press and intellectuals (Choi 1999: 200-2) - while maintaining close contacts with South Koreans to keep the capital flowing from South Korea to their community. A 1992 survey by a Chinese-Korean official in an autonomous district also illustrates this trend: More than 70% of Chinese Koreans claimed their identity as Chinese (Choi 1999: 202). Choi's survey (1999: 203) of Chinese-Korean students in South Korea yields the same result: According to a survey of departing Chinese Koreans, 43% of them felt discrimination or disrespect from Koreans, 70% experienced unequal treatment, and 33% answered that they did not receive their paychecks on time. Chinese Koreans used to ethnically identify themselves with South Koreans. However, since their interchange with South Koreans in the 1990s, Chinese Koreans have started to associate themselves more closely with the Chinese. In other words, they came to view themselves as ‘Chinese Koreans,’ a Chinese minority category. This perception is more obvious for those who have had experience in South Korea (Choi 1999: 203). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 In Yanbian, a representative Korean autonomous district, the population of Chinese Koreans was reduced significantly, from 64.4% in 1949 to 39.5% in 1995. It is predicted that the rate will fall to less than 20% by 2010. A political issue has thus arisen as to whether Yanbian can remain an autonomous Korean ethnic enclave (Choi 1999: 193). North Korea, where most ancestors of the Chinese Koreans come from, can offer little resistance to prevent them from assimilating to the Han identity, either. The Chinese-Korean perception of North Korea has changed dramatically. In the 1980s, many Chinese Koreans returned to North Korea and developed a new view of that country. They found North Korea’s economy to be closed and backward. Despite this, the North Korean economy had many aspects in common with that of China. Thus, the two countries were able to trade relatively equally, and the Chinese-Korean perception of North Korea was mainly positive. However, in the early 1990s (to 1994), North Korea had a serious economic crisis, while South Korea's economy boomed. Chinese Koreans consequently formed a negative view of North Korea and a more positive view of South Korea. Since 1995, North Korea has endured an unprecedented economic crisis, which has dramatically changed the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 Chinese-Korean perception of North Korea. Currently, the main impression of North Koreans is that they are good at lying and cannot be trusted. Chinese Koreans also came to believe that North Koreans expect too much from them, causing them to feel burdened by North Koreans (Kim 2000: 6). Chinese Koreans’ contacts with North Korean refugees, a situation which has currently received the international human-rights community’s attention, has worsened the Chinese Koreans’ conception of North Koreans. In the late 90s, when many North Koreans were starving and began to flee to China, the ethnic Koreans in China were the first to save North Koreans’ lives by sending food to North Korea and by taking care of the refugees in China. However, as an increasing number of North Korean refugees have fled to the Chinese Korean community, stirring up trouble with the Chinese Korean society by committing theft and other crimes, Chinese Koreans have come to regard the North Korean refugees as shameless, and their affection toward their North Korean siblings has dried up. According to Chinese Koreans, North Korean refugees take it for granted that Chinese Koreans will help them and continuously ask for help without feeling ashamed (Hankyoreh Daily, 08/05/2002). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 The Chinese government strictly enforces the capture of North Korean refugees and their return to North Korea; Chinese police (,gong an) conduct rigorous searches for hidden North Korean refugees, and anyone found to have helped these refugees is levied a steep fine. According to a Chinese-Korean minister who once helped North Korean refugees, not a few ungrateful North Korean refugees reported Chinese Koreans who had helped them to the Chinese police; consequently, these Chinese Koreans were fined or, in some cases, jailed. In addition, some North Korean refugees who married Chinese Koreans stole family property and ran away after they received a Chinese residence permit (hukou) (Hanky or eh Daily, 08/05/2002). On the other hand, North Korean refugees’ conception toward Chinese Koreans has also become negative. Many North Korean refugees in China complain about the same kinds of exploitation that Chinese Koreans experienced in South Korea: they labor for Chinese Koreans without being paid for months; when they ask for payment, Chinese Koreans report them to the Chinese police; Chinese-Korean gangsters capture and sell North Korean female refugees to the Chinese; these Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49 gangsters also force young refugees to beg, then give the money they solicit to the gangsters (Hankyoreh Daily, 08/05/2002). Because of their negative perceptions of North Korea, Chinese Koreans have dissociated themselves even more greatly from North Korea. Therefore, the only option left for them is Chinese identity. As a result of China's economic reforms and interactions with South Korea, traditional Chinese-Korean society is undergoing dissolution. In addition, Chinese Koreans have acquired a strongly negative impression of South Koreans (Lee and Park 2000: 11; Hwang 1996: 46-7; Kim 1996: 14), such that they have come to emphasize the Chinese aspect of their identity (Hwang 1996: 47). Thus, the assimilation of Chinese Koreans to the Han, initiated by the reforms and accelerated by interaction with South Korea (Choi 1999: 188), has run counter to the original prediction that connection with South Koreans would bring Chinese Koreans closer to their Korean identity. The study of identity has evolved. Through the 1970s, microsociological perspectives - primarily focused on the formation of the ‘me,’ exploring the ways in which interpersonal interactions mold an individual’s sense of self - dominated Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 published works. Since the 1980s, an antithesis to such concerns predominates, and attention has been refocused from the individual to the collective, or “we-ness,” through a unified social experience (Cerulo 1997: 385-87). My approach to defining how the Chinese Koreans construct their ethnic identity is along the same lines as the more recent “collective” perspective, and I believe that my research demonstrates that in their shared experience, the Chinese Koreans have formed a collective identity despite differing individual experiences. I have also adopted the idea of ‘identity shift,’ or ethnic-identity evolution. Based on his research on European-descended Americans, Richard Alba argues that ethnicity is a symbolic entity “concerned with the symbols of ethnic cultures rather than with the cultures themselves,” and that symbolic ethnicities are easily reshaped in response to varying situational contexts and growing social needs (Cerulo 1997: 389). My research on the reformation of Chinese-Korean identity would further support his argument, since it reveals that the Chinese-Korean collective identity was refashioned based on their altered circumstances and interaction with South Koreans; furthermore, their re-formed ethnic identity tended more toward Chinese than Korean, their ‘truer’ cultural and biological identity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 In my analysis, Chinese Koreans underwent an identity shift due both to China’s economic reforms which planted a desire in them for better economic conditions, and to their motherland South Korea offering them a practical way to migrate to pursue their dreams. I would further argue that this reinforcing of their identities as Chinese facilitated the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society; if a Chinese-Korean regards him/herself more as Chinese, s/he has little reason to remain part of a very Korean society. Ultimately, this identity shift may lead many Chinese Koreans to fully assimilate to Chinese society, further hastening the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society. A. Assimilation to the Han in the big Chinese cities The highly developed transportation and communication systems brought many Chinese Koreans to the big cities in China. The growing wealth difference between the industrial cities and the Chinese-Korean farming community made many Chinese Koreans move to the big cities to compete with other ethnic groups (Choi 1999: 192). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 Choi (1999: 204) predicts that the decrease in the Chinese-Korean minority population and the growing Han population in the autonomous Korean regions will accelerate, and hence the speed of assimilation to the Han will also accelerate. If the backwardness of the autonomous areas does not improve, movement of the population will consistently increase, promoting the dissolution of the autonomous districts. Due to the movement of the population, both the Koreans and Mongols are facing a crisis of assimilation and dissolution of their autonomous areas (Yoo 2001: 6). In the 1950s, there was a new state-sponsored policy for Han migration to Inner Mongolia (Borghigud 1996: 164); during the 1980s and the early 1990s, an increasing number of southern Han migrant workers and businessmen went to the cities of Inner Mongolia in response to the Inner Mongolia regional government’s call for national economic support (Borghigud 1996: 167). As a result, the Han are the largest ethnic group in Inner Mongolia, comprising more than 80 percent of the population there (Borchigud 1996: 175-76). In 1989, Mongols comprised only 8.7 percent of the total population (792,000) of Hohhot, the capital city of Inner Mongolia. According to some private sources, Inner Mongolia urban Mongols make up roughly 15-20 percent of the total (3.6 million) regional Mongolian population, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 including more than 300,000 people reclassified as Mongols from their original Han identity (Borghigud 1996: 163, 170). B. Positive impressions of the Han Contrary to the negative experience of Chinese Koreans in South Korea, Chinese Koreans have been highly satisfied with their experience in China (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 33-4), despite certain difficulties and limitations on their social status (Choi 1999: 188, 200). Also, the positive perception of China among Chinese Koreans is in stark contrast to the attitude of South Koreans toward China (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 34). Since China’s economic performance has been outstanding, and since its influence on the international scene has been rapidly expanded through the past decade after opening diplomatic ties with South Korea, more and more South Koreans have become awakened towards China’s great future. Accordingly, South Korea has been in the throes of ‘China-mania,’ and the press has been writing about the South Korean love affair with China. Convinced that China is Asia’s power of the future, South Koreans are throwing themselves into Chinese study, travel, and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 investment. For example, today 30,000 South Koreans study in China, the largest group o f foreign students there. A traveler in Seoul has a choice of direct flights to 24 Chinese cities, and six South Korean cities now have direct flights to Shanghai. South Korea’s exports to China jumped 50 percent last year, and South Korea’s annual flow of investment to China has hit $2.5 billion, more than triple South Korea’s investment in the United States. Last year, nearly half of South Korea’s foreign investment went to China, as trade between China and South Korea reached $50 billion. At the same time, China displaced Japan as the biggest trader in Northeast Asia, with $851 billion in regional trade. Many Koreans wonder how their country will cope with a market-oriented China; some of China’s biggest investments are already in areas where South Korea is currently king-shipbuilding, semiconductors, and cars (New York Times, 02/28/2004). However, South Koreans’ increasingly positive conception of China is mainly limited to China’s rapidly growing economic realm; to the many Koreans who have a strong affection toward democracy and still sense the Cold-War atmosphere of a divided country, the communist Chinese government holds no appeal as an ideal regime. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 In addition, there have been several irritating conflicts between South Koreans and the Chinese government. Many South Korean missionaries have been jailed for helping North Korean refugees (Donga Daily, 12/12/2003; Hankyoreh Daily, 05/20/2002; Kyunghyang Daily, 06/28/2002). Many other South Koreans have protested against the Chinese government’s current movement to include the history of Koguryo (a past Korean kingdom which was located in current northeast China) into “Chinese” history (Hankook Daily, 10/20/2003; Kyunghyang Daily, 11/20/2003; Donga Daily, 12/02/2003; Chosun Daily, 12/13/2003). There has also been a diplomatic problem between South Korea and China because Chinese fishermen have illegally caught most of the crabs within North/South Koreas’ territorial waters ('Chosun Daily, 06/03/2004; Donga Daily, 05/26/2003; Kyunghyang Daily, 10/30/2003; Munhwa Daily, 07/05/ 2002). 34% of the food exported from China has turned out to be bad or inappropriate to eat (Chosun Daily, 03/05/2004). In addition, since current South Korean pop culture, especially soap opera and music, has been popular in China and other Asian countries (Munhwa Daily, 05/11/2004; Donga Daily, 03/16/2004; Hankook Daily, 02/27/2004), most Koreans do not recognize the cultural superiority of China. Therefore, it appears that the South Koreans’ original Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 love affair with China is related more closely to economic needs and awareness of China’s bright future rather than an appreciation of China’s superior culture, stable society, or ideal politics. Indeed, many Koreans have sympathized with the United States since the Korean War. Whereas South Koreans perceive China as politically insecure, Chinese Koreans trust Chinese governmental policies because of their experience with the consistent Chinese-minority ethnic policy. Also, while South Koreans consider the Chinese economy to be significantly backward, Chinese Koreans have seen their efforts in the Chinese economy achieve significant rewards. In addition, whereas South Koreans perceive Chinese society as inequitable because of its discrimination against minorities, Chinese Koreans regard Chinese society as relatively just, with little minority discrimination (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 34). However, I would argue that the Korean minority’s perception of the Han majority, and of themselves in comparison to the Han, comes not only from their positive treatment by the Chinese government; this positive perception might also be something they merely imagine, as molded by the propaganda of the Chinese authorities. Since the idea of a Han nation (minzu) was invented by Sun Yatsen and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 other nation builders during the Republic (Mueggler 2001: 18), China has depicted minorities so as to create an “imagined” (in Anderson’s terms) majority identity, or the “Han” nationality. The Han have been defined as cultural, modem, superior, conservative, controlled, and civilized, the manifest destiny of all the minorities. In contrast, minorities - especially women - have been portrayed throughout Chinese art, films, and the media as derogatory, backward, inferior, primitive, fertile, colorful, sensual, and exotic. These popular-culture notions, often state-sponsored, have played a pivotal role in influencing and constructing contemporary Chinese society and ethnic identity. To the Chinese, “Han-ness” connotes civility and modernity, even “whiteness” (Gladney 1994: 93-118). Also, even though the Han Chinese have chosen to absorb the conquered minorities into a unified Chinese nation, these minorities have never been considered culturally equal (Borchigud 1996: 162). Although the “more educated Koreans and the Manchu” (Lofstedt 1987: 333) are never exoticized as sensual or primitive (Gladney 1994: 102), I suggest that through Chinese propaganda, the Chinese Koreans have internalized the concepts of Han superiority and the inferiority of minorities, and thus they might wish to become Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 more “white.” From the comments of many Chinese Koreans (Jin 2000: 20-1), including the author of “Korean Dream,” I have found that they truly believe in the superiority of the Han. Hence, I conclude that Chinese-Korean admiration of the Han has strongly motivated them to assimilate to the majority culture. C. Negative impressions of South Koreans In the past half century, for both the Chinese-Korean minority and native South Koreans, ideology has been more important than ethnic consciousness. According to Kwon (2000b: 159), this is largely due to both groups’ experience during the Korean War, when Koreans took the lives of other Koreans. Thus, until the early 80s, the Chinese-Korean minority had a relatively negative image of South Korea. For them, North Korea was the motherland (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 44). In the early 90s, the attitudes of South Koreans and Chinese Koreans toward each other improved (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 44, 49). Chinese Koreans, in particular, had greater hopes and expectations; they thought that improved relations with a relatively developed South Korea could improve their social status in China (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 49). At the same time, the Chinese-Korean perception of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 North Korea dramatically changed for the worse due to China’s reforms and North Korea’s economic crisis (Kim 2000: 2). Following China’s economic reforms, it has been South Korea that has had the greatest influence on the Chinese-Korean minority (Choi 1999: 188). However, throughout their experience contacting with South Koreans, Chinese Koreans experienced disrespect from Koreans, and their perception of South Korea became significantly negative. Hence, they came to underscore the Chinese aspect of their identity (Hwang 1996: 48; Choi 1999: 188). The disdain, insults, and discrimination the Chinese Koreans received from South Koreans also made them antagonistic toward South Koreans (Hwang 1996: 46), prouder to be Chinese Koreans, and even have a more favorable attitude toward North Korea. This in turn reinforced the preexisting Chinese-Korean belief in the superiority of the Han Chinese over other ethnic groups, further facilitating Chinese Koreans’ assimilation to Chinese culture. In fact, most Chinese Koreans have returned to the large Chinese cities after several years in South Korea, since they have come to feel more ‘at home’ among the Han. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 At present, most Chinese Koreans have negative impressions of South Korea and South Koreans (Bang 2001: 11; Kim 2000: 1-2; Hwang 1996: 47; Lee 1996: 20; Kim 1996: 14; Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996:34-7). Among Chinese Koreans, the term Korean wind is used to express the strong, mainly negative, influences of South Korea on the Chinese ethnic Korean population (Choi 1999: 194). This has caused them to reconsider their generally positive experiences of life in Chinese society as compared to the negative impressions that South Koreans have made on them (Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 33-4), and to play down the difficulties and the limitations on their social status that they suffered during China's Cultural Revolution (Choi 1999: 188, 200). Many Chinese-Korean reporters and scholars claim that Chinese Koreans should soon find their identity as members of “the China family,” and make their mark in China rather than in Korea (Choi 1999: 200-2). An interesting question asked by Hwang (1996) in a survey of Chinese Koreans concerned whether they supported China or Korea in ping-pong. The overall results were: China 41.7% and South Korea 58.3%. Interestingly, 64.3% of those with no experience in South Korea supported South Korea, but 51.1% of those with experience in South Korea supported China. From this, Hwang concludes that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 their bad experience in Korea caused people to prefer China. Also, the Chinese Koreans who had just arrived in South Korea answered that Koreans managed resources better than the Chinese, had stronger solidarity, and had better prospects for a brighter future. But the rest of those surveyed answered in the reverse. Hwang thus concludes that Chinese Koreans believe that their rich homeland did not accept them as full-fledged members of society, and that it was difficult for them to reaffirm their identity as members of Korean society, to find meaning in their existence, and to view themselves positively. Chinese Koreans’ distrust of, even rage against, the South Korean government and its people is growing stronger (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 34). A popular concept among the Chinese-Korean minority community is that South Korea is a place where ‘humanity dried up.’ Their impressions of their relatives in South Korea are obviously negative; they think that their relatives look down on them because of their economic difficulties and regard them as burdens (Kim 2000: 14). Consequently, the Chinese ethnic Koreans who have spent several years in South Korea have used their earnings to return to China to take up residence outside the autonomous zones. This exodus to other parts of China has contributed to the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 dissolution of the Chinese ethnic Korean community, rather than reinforcing its solidarity (Choi 1999: 194). Therefore, the Chinese government’s current intense concerns about the growing ethnic consciousness of its Korean minority population, and about the subsequent discouraging of ethnic Koreans from identifying with their country of origin can be seen as merely imagined fears. On the other hand, according to Hwang's survey (1996: 49), South Korean company owners consistently share a negative view of Chinese Koreans, claiming that they are distressed by Chinese Koreans’ opportunistic attitudes. Chinese Koreans tend to think more about money than about learning; they often compare their salaries and move to other factories to be paid more, regardless of labor contracts. South Korean company owners claim that this attitude is contrary to that of Southeast or Southwest Asian laborers who usually have a higher level of education, fewer problems communicating in English, and more sincerity than Chinese Koreans. Thus, these owners prefer foreigners, or even the Han, to Chinese Koreans. Just as Chinese Koreans’ perceptions became more negative after they came into contact with South Koreans, so South Koreans’ perceptions of Chinese Koreans also became more negative. The sale of false medicine and drugs by many Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 Chinese Koreans while they stayed illegally in South Korea, as well as the camouflage marriages they engaged in, also made South Koreans think that Chinese Koreans only cared about money and had no sense of shame (Kim, Kim, and Huh 1996: 34). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 V. Conclusion Chinese assimilation has been very powerful throughout history. Although the Han have kept their Han-centered ideology and refer to neighboring ethnic groups as barbarians, through consistent contact with other ethnic groups, the Han have expanded their power by interacting with and assimilating those many ethnic groups. As a result, those who have the privilege of calling themselves Han account for 93.6% of all Chinese (Olivier 1991: 1). But, recent scholarship has begun to show that “Chinese” cultural features have multiple historical origins, receiving contributions from various ethnicities within and outside China through a long historical process of interactions involving many different peoples, rather than from a single culture common to the Han people (Mueggler 2001: 19). Thanks to their farm-based economy and the inconvenience of transportation, along with the Chinese government’s favorable policies toward minorities, Chinese Koreans have managed to keep their traditional language and culture up until recently (Bang 2001: 4-5; Choi 1999: 192; Son, Kim, and Yoo 1994: 27). However, the current closed community faces a crisis of dismantling and assimilating to the Han. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 The 1978 reforms created a large economic gap between the Chinese Koreans living in autonomous districts, where traditional wet-rice farming is the fundamental source of income, and the Han living in big cities, where industrial development predominates (Olivier 1991: 422). Despite Olivier’s (1991: 422-3) prediction that the difference in wealth would bring dissatisfaction and insecurity to the Chinese-Korean minority, many Chinese Koreans have moved to the big cities and become assimilated with the Han people and culture (Choi 1999: 188, 204). Also, despite the original expectation that interaction with South Koreans would do beneficial things for Chinese-Korean society, bring Chinese Koreans closer to their Korean identity, and help them maintain their own language and culture, economic differences between Chinese Koreans and South Koreans have caused major social problems; this discrepancy has also become a prominent social issue in both Korean societies. In short, as contact has grown, the number of problems and conflicts between the two Korean groups has also grown. The lack of a consistent and well-prepared policy for Chinese Koreans on the part of South Korea has also exacerbated matters. The strict and regulated visa- management system with respect to Chinese Koreans became a tradition before any Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 official policy was in place. In contrast, China’s policy for Chinese overseas is one that encourages powerful overseas-Chinese businessmen to invest capital for the development of southern China. The fact that overseas-Chinese capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan comprises 80-90% of foreign investment in China clearly demonstrates the close correlation between ethnic groups and economies (Lee 1996: 23). The Chinese-Korean population of most rural areas has significantly dropped, such that maintaining the autonomous regions has become a critical issue (Choi 1999: 204). In 2002, the Chinese-Korean population in Yanbian was only 830,000 out of 2,800,000, or less than 30%. As the Chinese-Korean population has decreased, a Han became that region’s People’s Communist Party secretary. In the last ten years, the number of Chinese-Korean villages in the Northeast dropped by 50%, from 4,000 to 2,000 (Donga Daily, 08/08/2002). Modernization usually causes young people from rural areas to migrate to developing cities, and hence their traditional farming societies come to dissipate. Although the migration of young Chinese Koreans to big cities can be seen as a natural step in China’s economic development, I would argue that the rapid Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 dissolution of Chinese-Korean society can best be attributed to China’s economic reforms and Chinese Koreans’ interactions with South Koreans. China’s 1978 reforms introduced new ideas to China, and thus to the Chinese Koreans, reevaluating capitalism and reviewing views about interacting with foreign countries. In this atmosphere, while the Chinese Koreans’ desire for a better economic situation grew, Chinese-Korean autonomous districts were excluded from their share of the fruits of the reforms. Chinese Koreans saw the economic gap between them and the Han living in big cities widen further. This situation probably stimulated the Chinese Koreans to desire better economic conditions even more. Consequently, these two elements served as the backdrop for the headlong dissolution of Chinese-Korean society. During this time, although some young, educated Chinese Koreans moved to big cities in China, most Chinese Koreans were not offered a simple means of moving from their farms. The establishment of a diplomatic relations between China and Korea finally allowed Chinese Koreans to benefit from China’s open-door policy and to catch up with the Han’s improved economic circumstances. The factors most directly causing the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society are based in the uniqueness of this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 minority society; unlike other minorities in China, the Chinese Koreans had a motherland with a stronger economy than China. The reasons for Chinese-Korean migration can be divided into three categories: flow of labor force to South Korea; movement of young, educated Chinese Koreans to big cities to work for South Korean companies in China; and relocation of Chinese-Korean women to South Korea through international marriages. The fact that China and Korea were at different developmental stages in their economies made the two societies strongly interdependent. Korea, which had developed its economy through export-oriented industrialization (EOI) and through low labor costs and repression of labor movement, was faced with rising labor costs and greater labor movement in the 80s. Domestically, as their standard of living improved, most South Koreans began to avoid “3D jobs”: those that are dirty, difficult, or dangerous. Nonetheless, many domestic Korean industries (e.g., restaurants, construction) still needed cheap laborers. Low-cost labor was also needed by technologically backward companies to better compete with their counterparts in developed countries. Consequently, many Chinese Koreans rushed to South Korea to benefit from the wide exchange-rate gap and the higher salaries; by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 2000, about 100,000 Chinese Koreans from Yanbian (33% of the Chinese-Korean population) had been to South Korea, mostly illegally, and had earned 300 million dollars in total (Jin 2000: 24-5). This raised Chinese Koreans’ overall standard of living, putting them at the top of the 56 Chinese ethnic groups (Donga Daily, 08/08/2002). But this fast-growing migration of Chinese Koreans to South Korea has contributed to the dissolution of their traditional society. Many Korean companies chose to move their manufacturing facilities to a place with access to cheap labor; the optimal means to this end was a move to China. China has also been a prime target for investment by many South Korean corporations, with the advantages of its geographical proximity to South Korea and its bilingual Chinese Koreans, not to mention its low labor costs. Thus, more and more young, educated Chinese Koreans have moved to major Chinese cities to work for South Korean companies. This, too, has directly contributed to the dissolution of Chinese-Korean society. Furthermore, the growing number of marriages (real or disguised) between Chinese-Korean women and South Korean men, together with the migration of these women to their husbands’ country, has been another direct Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 factor in the dissolution. By 2001, the number of these marriages had passed 70,000, more than one third the number of marriageable-age women (Jeon 2001: 9). Ironically, while the uniqueness of Chinese-Korean society helped to elevate people’s standard of living, it also contributed to the society’s rapid dissolution by giving the Chinese Koreans negative impressions of South Koreans; this encouraged Chinese-Korean people’s assimilation to the Han. Although Chinese Koreans and South Koreans fulfilled each other’s economic needs, their interaction clearly led to negative consequences for the Chinese Koreans: many of them were swindled by South Koreans when they attempted to go to South Korea; many illegal Chinese Koreans were exploited by vicious Korean company owners; and most marriage- aged women left to work for Korean companies or to marry South Korean farmers. As a result, most Chinese-Korean bachelors either never married or decided to marry Han women, thus assimilating to Han culture. Many sold their land to the Han to pursue the “Korean Dream.” In addition, because of the large amount of remittances received from abroad, Yanbian, a representative Korean autonomous district, became a city of consumption; many Chinese-Korean women became prostitutes, the city became filled with Karaoke bars and coffee shops/cocktail bars, and the local Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 economy came to rely heavily on that of South Korea. Further, many married couples became divorced, since they were separated for long periods when one spouse left the country to work, and only the young and old remained in the rural Chinese-Korean society. Throughout this process, the tension between the two groups has grown, and Chinese Koreans have become frustrated and annoyed with South Koreans’ contemptuous attitudes. On the other hand, Chinese Koreans have had a favorable impression of the Chinese government because o f its friendly treatment and consistent minority policies. Indeed many have even come to accept the superiority of the Han. Chinese Koreans, who regarded themselves more as Koreans than as Han before their interaction with South Koreans, have finally ‘re’-discovered their Chinese heritage and identity. With these memories and with the reshaping of their identity, most Chinese Koreans who have been to South Korea but have also lived in China, where they were surrounded by Han culture and language, are at an intermediary stage in fully assimilating to the Han. In sum, I conclude that several factors have jointly contributed to the rapid dissolution of Chinese-Korean society: China’s 1978 economic reforms, Chinese Koreans’ contact with South Koreans, the negative Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 impressions of South Koreans that resulted from this contact, and Chinese Koreans’ positive impressions of the Han majority. Bang (2001: 1) says that ethnic group has diverse meanings, based on the user, on context, and on which fundamental characteristics are emphasized. There are two main factors that underlie this concept: objective and subjective. The objective factors include lineage, language, nationality, religion, residence, and a common economy; the primary subjective factor is one’s ethnic consciousness. Bang makes a compromise to both sides: one’s subjective identity is considered as important as one’s objective situation (2001: 2-3). Thus, if Chinese ethnic Koreans regard themselves as Chinese, regardless of their blood lineage, they can indeed be considered Chinese. The “fluidity” (Brown 2002: 388) of the ethnic Koreans’ identity, resulting from the various socio-political experiences studied in this paper, exhibits a pattern amazingly similar to that of the Mongols studied by Borchigud (1996: 160-182). In the 1980s, many educated urban Mongol youth consciously asserted their ethnic Mongolian identity on the issue of autonomous ethnic rights in Inner Mongolia. Up until the early 1990s, it was rare to hear urban Mongols admit to the local Han that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 they were Neimeng ren, since ethnic identification was more important than place- based identification to most Mongols in Inner Mongolia (or IM) (Borchigud 1996: 172). In the absence of direct contact with the Mongols from Outer Mongolia (or OM, an independent nation since 1921: more than ninety percent of its total population is Mongol), educated urban IM Mongols imagined a transnational community of Mongols as their primary affiliation. However, as contact with OM Mongols has increased since the 1980s economic reforms, urban IM Mongols have found that OM Mongols have failed to share their perceived goal of a transnational community; instead, they have come to realize that OM Mongol merchants have treated IM Han better than they have done IM Mongols. This kind of contact and experience with OM Mongols has also made urban IM political activists give up their goal of achieving transnational Mongolian independence; through various socioeconomic contacts with OM Mongols, the urban IM Mongols have realized that distinct value orientations separate them from their ethnic OM neighbors. Consequently, as is the case with the Korean minority in Dongbei, IM regional identity has unintentionally enhanced the national boundaries of the Chinese state and thus reinforced their Chinese national identification. In other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 words, by regionalizing their ethnic identity, urban IM Mongols now perceive themselves more as Chinese nationals. In the People’s Republic o f China, the state claims that the notion of Chinese identity (Zhongguo ren or Zhonghua minzu) includes peoples from all ethnic groups living within China’s borders (Borchigud 1996: 160). Here, a big difference exists between the Inner-Mongolian and the Korean cases; after the crash of Soviet colonial influence in Outer Mongolia, high inflation brought the whole society into an economic crisis, and thus the IM regional economy has been much stronger than that of Outer Mongolia. Further, urban Mongols in Inner Mongolia hold a more flexible attitude toward their regional and ethnic identities due to their improved regional economic situation (Borchigud 1996: 176- B O ). Along with Borchigud’s study of ethnic Mongolians, the ethnic Koreans’ case supports Brown’s claim that there is a general pattern that locals use to categorize themselves based on their socio-political experience, whereas outsiders classify others based on culture. The potential for ethnic tension in the future, because of the economic differences between Chinese Koreans and the Han, hardly seems likely. Such a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 potential might have existed in the past, but now the tension between Chinese Koreans and South Koreans is significant enough to override any tensions with the Han, and even make Chinese Koreans more likely to favor the Han than either the North or South Koreans. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRINT SOURCES Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1989. Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Amsden, Alice. 1994. Why Isn’t the Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian Model to Development: Review of the East Asian Miracle. World Development 22(4): 627-634. Bang, Soo-oak. 2001. “The Korean Community and Chinese Korean society (In Korean).” Studies o f Ethnic Development 5: 1-13. Seoul: Joong-ang University Academy of Ethnic Development. 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Asset Metadata

Creator Yu, Yeon Jung (author)

Core Title China's Korean minority: A study in the dissolution of ethnic identity

School Graduate School

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag anthropology, cultural,OAI-PMH Harvest,sociology, ethnic and racial studies

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Cooper, Eugene (committee chair), Berger, Gordon (committee member), Rosen, Stanley (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-318382

Unique identifier UC11327628

Identifier 1422408.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-318382 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 1422408.pdf

Dmrecord 318382

Document Type Thesis

Rights Yu, Yeon Jung

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA