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The impact of ethnic mobilization in postwar Japan: A reflection of Japan's two Korea policy

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The impact of ethnic mobilization in postwar Japan: A reflection of Japan's two Korea policy

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Content THE IMPACT OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN POSTWAR JAPAN
A REFLECTION OF JAPAN'S TWO KOREA POLICY
by
John Stephen Vela
A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)
May 2005
Copyright 2005 John Stephen Vela
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UMI Number: 1427986
Copyright 2005 by
Vela, John Stephen
All rights reserved.
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ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES.........................................iii
ABSTRACT................................................iv
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION...............................1
CHAPTER II BACKGROUND................................10
CHAPTER III THE US OCCUPATION.........................11
CHAPTER IV A DIVIDED PENINSULA.......................18
CHAPTER V CHOREN....................................19
CHAPTER VI MINDAN................................... 21
CHAPTER VII THE RISE OF SOREN.........................25
CHAPTER VIII SOREN TODAY...............................30
CHAPTER IX SOREN POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY................34
CHAPTER X FINANCING TERROR..........................4 4
CHAPTER XI SOREN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES..............47
CHAPTER XII INCREMENTAL CHANGE........................53
CHAPTER XIII VOTING RIGHTS.............................57
CHAPTER XIV OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS................ 5 9
CONCLUSION..............................................69
PRESCRIPTIONS...........................................7 6
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................83
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iii
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1 Registered North and South Korean
Residents in Japan............................. 3
TABLE 2 Naturalized North and South Korean
Residents......................................3
TABLE 3 Marriage Trends of Zainichi Koreans.............4
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ABSTRACT
Japan has been gradually redefining itself in the context
of the North Korean threat and the global war on terrorism,
but the impact on Zainichi Koreans has not been entirely
negative. As the ideological grip over the two dominant
groups weakens, Zainichi Koreans strive to carve a niche
for themselves in their de facto Japanese homeland.
This paper examines historical Japanese concerns
regarding Zainichi Koreans and recent considerations of
international norms and issues of national security in
order to illustrate how Japan-Korean relations have largely
shaped Zainichi Korean identity and politics in the postwar
period. By examining issues such as culture, ethnicity,
language and education (ideology) over time, this paper
also explains a recent political shift, as Zainichi Koreans
redirect their efforts from foreign to more practical,
domestic concerns. While Soren remains the target of a
Japanese government crackdown, Mindan has become a champion
of civil rights for Zainichi Koreans.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Korean residents of Japan, who, through special
historical circumstances, have come to share
social life with us, have suffered varied and
repeated hardships arising from these
circumstances and are in need of a stable status
and treatment in Japanese society.... I consider
it more important that they be enabled to lead a
life as stable as possible within Japan's social
order.... The policies announced for fundamental
measures in several fields will be faithfully
implemented.... In undertaking the future
development of Japanese society from a world
perspective, I believe we must reflect together
and live together as members of the same society
with these residents of our country.... I
profoundly hope that we can further deepen our
understanding and concerns for the situation of
Koreans and other foreign nationals having a
similar historical background, in the setting of
everyday life, in the workplace, or local
society. (Min Zai-Nichi Kankokujin 1994, cited
in Hicks, p. 60)
These remarks, made by then Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki
after returning from a January 1991 visit to the Republic
of Korea, hereafter South Korea, formed part of what might
be called a "state of the ethnic Korean community" address.
His message was delivered in the spirit of cooperation and
conciliation and was followed up with a number of
improvements for ethnic Koreans residing in Japan,
hereafter Zainichi Koreans, who make up the largest
minority group of registered foreign residents in Japan.
The presence of this large ethnic minority is the result of
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Japanese colonial migration, forced relocation and postwar
assimilation policies. World War II ended almost sixty
years ago, and, while diplomatic relations between Japan
and South Korea were normalized in 1965, Japan and North
Korea have yet to resolve issues of the past. As a
consequence, Zainichi Koreans remain divided along
ideological lines and continue to face social, political
and economic discrimination, segregation and
disenfranchisement.
According to anthropologist Sonya Ryang, the
identities of Zainichi Koreans
...are perpetually ambiguous, torn between the
nation-states of Japan and Korea, between the two
halves of the Korean peninsula, and between the
ideals of the older Korea-born generation and the
reality of younger generations born in Japan and
experiencing contemporary life with no experience
in Korea." (Ryang, 2000: 10)
In particular, third and fourth generation Zainichi
Koreans, whether due to political marginalization in Japan
or to an increasing awareness of themselves as distinct
from South/North Koreans, are struggling with the matter of
assimilation and naturalization (Tables 1 and 2).
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Table 1
Year
Registered North and South
Korean Residents in Japan
1970 614,202
1975 647,156
1980 664,536
1985 683,313
1990 687,940
1995 666,376
1996 657,159
1997 645,373
1998 638,828
SOURCE: Management and Coordination Agency, Government of
Japan, Nihon tokei nenkan [Japan Statistical Yearbook],
1995-2000, cited in (Chung, 2000: 161).
Table 2
Year
Naturalized North and South
Korean Residents
1952 232
1955 2,434
1960 3,763
1965 3,438
1970 4, 646
1975 6,323
1980 5,987
1985 5, 040
1990 5,216
1995 10,327
1996 9,898
1997 9, 678
1998 9,561
1999 10,059
SOURCES: Y.D. Kim 1990; Japan Ministry of Justice 1985-
1997a; 1985-1997b; OECD 2001. Cited in (Chung, 2003: 6)
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Table 3
Marriage Trends of Zainichi Koreans
Year
Total
Registered
Marriages
Marriages to (N&S)
Korean Nationals
Marriages
to Japanese
Nationals*
1960 3, 524 2,315 1.172
1965 5,693 3, 681 1, 971
1970 6,892 3,879 2, 922
1975 7,249 3, 618 3,548
1980 7,255 3,061 4,109
1985 8,627 2,404 6,147
1990 13,934 2,195 11,661
1995 8,953 1,485 7,363
1996 8,804 1,438 7,261
1997 8,540 1,269 7,178
SOURCES: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Jinko dotai tokei
[Vital Statistics of Japan], 1986-1997; Yamanaka Shuji et
al., Daburu no shinpu: Zainichi korian to nihonji no kekkon
kazoku [The New Spirit of the Double: Families of Marriages
between Korean Residents in Japan and Japanese] (Tokyo:
Shinkansha, 1998), cited in (Chung, 2000: 161).
*The category of "Japanese nationals" may include some of
Korean ancestry.
Zainichi Koreans have generally resisted pressure to
assimilate, choosing instead to maintain separate
identities, although, evident in the preceding tables,
attrition can be attributed to naturalization due to
intermarriage. Intermarriage of Koreans with Japanese has
increased to over 80 percent from 1960 - 1997 (Table 3) .
Accordingly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to make
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clear-cut distinctions between the nationality and legal
status of ethnic Koreans in Japan, many of whom have chosen
to become naturalized citizens and/or married Japanese
nationals. (Japanese security officials estimate that
roughly 250,000 of the approximately 680,000 Zainichi
Koreans support Soren (at least, identify with the North),
while the number of actual members is approximately 56,000.
Approximately 370,000 ethnic Koreans support the rival
South Korean organization, Mindan.)
Many of the Koreans in Japan... had no desire to
abandon the characteristics which distinguished
them from the Japanese. Perhaps even more
important was the very nature of a Japanese
society which had no place for Koreans."
(Mitchell, 1967: 98)
Zainichi Koreans are generally divided into two major
organizations, namely Mindan (Zainichi Daikan Minkoku
Kyoryumindan, the Korean Resident Association in Japan, or
Chaeil Hangukin Koryu Mindan, in Korean) and Chosen Soren,
or Soren (Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengokai, the General
Association of Koreans Residing in Japan. The group is
also known as Chaeilbon Chosonin Chongryong Haphoe, or
simply Chongryon or Chongryun in Korean.) In general,
ethnic Korean Residents in Japan are collectively referred
to as Zainichi Kankoku Chosenjin, Zainichi Korian, or
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simply Zainichi. Koreans in Japan are also referred to as
Chaeil Kyopo in Korean (literally, Korean nationals in
Japan). A third organization, Mintoren (Minzoku sabetsu to
tatakau renmei, or, the Liaison Association for Fighting
Ethnic Discrimination), is composed of Zainichi Korean
civil rights groups and Japanese activists and advocates
the advancement of social rights.1 Each of these groups has
attempted to influence Japanese politics, and collectively
they have, in many instances, managed to achieve goals
favorable to their cause.
What is the relationship between the organizations
Mindan and South Korea, Soren and North Korea and Japan?
1 Whereas Soren and Mindan are aligned with opposing sides of
the partitioned peninsula, Mintoren has surfaced as an
informal organization concerned with the social issues
confronted by Zainichi Koreans on a daily basis. The
Mintoren grassroots movement began after the landmark 197 0
employment discrimination case brought against the Hitachi
Company. Japanese activists and citizens' groups joined
Zainichi Korean activists and rallied around the case,
which dealt with employment discrimination against a
second-generation Zainichi Korean. Altogether, they
mobilized 7,800 activists and eight regional committees.
When news of the case reached the international community,
specifically South Korea, boycotts of Hitachi products were
carried out. The case marked a seminal moment in the
social movement of Zainichi Koreans within Japanese civil
society and was followed by a number of campaigns aimed at
improving the lot of all Zainichi Koreans. So too did it
prompt Mindan to consider common social concerns, i.e.
public housing, equal employment and human rights. (Hicks,
1997: 41)
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And what implications do these relationships have for
Japanese domestic and foreign policy? In order to answer
these questions, it is important to examine the legacy of
Japan's imperial past2 and the politics of post-Korean War,
Cold War and post-Cold War environments. The purpose of
this paper is to shed light upon such questions by
examining the relationship between Mindan, Soren and
Japan's Korea policy in a historical perspective.
Examining historical Japanese concerns regarding
Zainichi Koreans and recent considerations of international
2The burgeoning Cold War and fears of subversion led to the
dissolution of Choren, which in turn marked the beginning
of the "Red Purge" (September 1949), a movement directed
against Japanese and Korean leftists. (Ryang, 1997: 28)
With the dissolution of Choren in September 1949, and the
purge of the JCP in full swing, former members of Choren
and Mindan attempted to set aside their differences and
form the "Committee for the Common Struggle," as war broke
out on the Korean peninsula.
A new organization, however, came to the fore. Formed in
January 1951, Minsen (Zainichi Chosen Toitsu Minshu Sensen,
or the United Democratic Front in Japan for the Unification
of Korea, also known as Chaeil Choson Tongil Minchu
Chonson, or Minjon in Korean.) allied itself with the
Japanese Communist Party(JCP). Decidedly more radical in
nature, members formed the paramilitary Choguk Bangui
Uiwonhoe, or Chobangui (Committee for the Defense of the
Fatherland), which engaged in joint firebombing raids of
police stations and sabotaged factories and US bases.
(Hicks, 1997: Ch. 3) The JCP advocated armed struggle as
the "foremost task in order to fight the Japanese and
American reactionary forces... trying to remilitarize
Japan." (Ryang, 1997: 89) After SCAP directed the
dissolution of Minsen, elements sympathetic to North Korea
formed Soren.
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norms and threat perceptions and issues which Japan regards
as evidence of illicit support of North Korea by those
sympathetic to the communist regime, will help establish a
clear link between Japanese domestic and foreign policy,
while issues such as culture, ethnic identity, language and
education (ideology) will provide a greater understanding
of the problems faced by Mindan and Soren. A look also at
the dominant role national security concerns have come to
play in Japanese foreign policy will help explain the
recent shifts in the efforts of Zainichi Koreans to
influence Japanese domestic, rather than foreign, policy.
The significance of Zainichi Korean efforts to influence
Japan-Korea relations is debatable, but over time there has
been a shift from the center to the periphery, as these
groups gradually lose the ability to influence Japanese
politics toward their sympathetic homelands and shift their
efforts to more practical, domestic concerns.
Over time Japan has indeed experienced a policy shift,
as policies of assimilation have given way to policies of
accommodation, prompted by international norms. The
dominant role national security concerns have come to play
in Japanese foreign policy, however, have left Zainichi
Koreans with no alternative but to look inward and
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concentrate their efforts on domestic policy as it pertains
to them. As such, Japanese policy makers, preoccupied by
international concerns, have become increasingly resistant
to Zainichi Korean efforts to influence Japanese foreign
policy.
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND
For the roughly two million Koreans in Japan at the end of
World War II, Japan's unconditional surrender on 15 August
1945 signaled the end to Japan's oppressive thirty-five
year colonial rule over Korea and ignited the hopes of
freedom and self-determination. During the colonial period
(1910-1945), Koreans freely immigrated to Japan initially
in search of opportunity, and others later made the journey
under war mobilization policies of the Pacific War. Many
of them became involved with organized labor before being
mobilized for Japan's war effort, both in terms of labor
and military service. Despite a policy of assimilation,
Koreans in Japan were regarded as a threat to national
security. "As early as the 1920's, even the Japanese
government had come to regard all Koreans in Japan as
potentially subversive." (Mitchell, 1967: 48) Almost a
century after Japan colonized Korea, Koreans still make up
the largest ethnic minority in Japan, and, among them,
those that support the communist regime of the Democratic
Peoples' Republic of Korea, hereafter North Korea, are
still subject to intense scrutiny, due in part to lingering
Cold War sentiments.
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CHAPTER III: THE US OCCUPATION
Postwar reconstruction efforts were directed by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP, though SCAP also
referred to the Occupation bureaucracy). Led by Army
General Douglas MacArthur, SCAP officials were under the
impression that the Korean community in Japan, as former
imperial subjects, would as a whole seek repatriation, and,
accordingly, saw no need to establish an agency to deal
with Korean affairs. (Lee, 1981: 63) The US Army Military
Government in Korea (USAMGIK), however, established liaison
teams that worked with Korean civilians to facilitate
repatriation efforts. In Japan, Japanese government
officials were able to manipulate the legal status of
Zainichi Koreans to serve their own ends. In some
instances, their views coincided with those of SCAP,
particularly when Zainichi Koreans began to be associate
themselves with the Japanese communist movement. The
result was a government crackdown on the activities of
organized Zainichi Koreans.
After SCAP's Government Section-drafted constitution
came into effect in 1947, the Japanese used "linguistic
subterfuge" to eliminate equal protection under the law for
resident aliens. The term kokumin came to be strictly
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interpreted as "Japanese nationals," rather than as "the
people," effectively denying equal civil rights to foreign
residents, especially Koreans. (Dower, 1999: 394)
Occupation authorities shifted the responsibility of
dealing with Zainichi Koreans to the Japanese. As a
result, SCAP officials were surprised when Japanese
government officials forced the dissolution of Choren and
shut down Korean schools. (Takemae, 2003: 4 97)
A game of survival played itself out in the tumultuous
postwar period, and scarce resources turned up at black
markets which sprang up across the country seemingly
overnight. These "blue sky" markets were characterized by
rampant inflation and corruption, and turf wars were
heightened by racial tensions. To make matters worse,
"[pjrejudice against 'third-country people' [resident
aliens who had chosen not to repatriate] increased, and
much of the public's anger against both black-market abuses
and the rising crime rate came to fall on non-Japanese
Asians." (Dower, 1999: 143) Occupation and Japanese
authorities were largely ineffectual in controlling them.
Later, as tensions escalated on the Korean peninsula
and the communist forces of Mao Zedong gained ground in
China, SCAP began to take a keen interest in the status of
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Zainichi Koreans. In Japan, Zainichi Koreans were
increasingly placed under surveillance. "The repression of
the Korean minority, like that of [labor], was coordinated
behind closed doors by a handful of top SCAP officials and
their Japanese counterparts via informal agreements, verbal
instructions and 'mutual understanding.'" (Takemae, 2002:
497)
A telling example of SCAP's ambiguous role in the
management of Zainichi Koreans is the so-called Kobe
Incident of April 1948. What began as an order to close
Korean schools that failed to comply with the rules and
regulations established by the Ministry of Education,
turned to mass protests involving thousands of Korean
protestors, incited by Choren, and some Japanese
sympathizers. After the officials rescinded the order,
SCAP proclaimed a state of "limited emergency" and, for all
intents and purposes, granted the Japanese police carte
blanche in tightening their grip on Zainichi Koreans.
Eventually, however, the Ministry of Education reached an
agreement with Choren officials and allowed ethnic Korean
schools to proceed with autonomous ethnic and language
studies. Clearly, the Zainichi community had been
successfully mobilized, and it succeeded not only in
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bringing the Japanese to the negotiating table but in
gaining measures of accommodation. The following year,
however, the Japanese government, under the auspices of
SCAP, enacted the Organization Control Law, in effect
outlawing Choren, which had employed violent means in an
effort to influence government policy. (Lee, 1981: 81-84)
Were it not for SCAP's intervention, the event might have
set a precedent for Zainichi Korean-Japanese relations.
In the wake of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty,
...the defining feature of the 1952 immigration
legislation was that it ignored or placed little
importance on human rights, while imposing a
system of strict surveillance. Furthermore, it
anticipated assimilation, with deportation seen
as the penalty of last resort for people who
resisted this assimilation. (Komai, 2001: 15)
US occupation forces backed the Alien Registration
Ordinance of 1947 and subsequent Alien Registration Law
(Law No. 125) of 1952 because, as Hicks points out, " [m] any
Koreans had in fact used their status as 'liberated
nationals' to defy Japanese laws forcing the police to
enlist the aid of the Choren to keep order." (Hicks, 1997:
26-27)
The Alien Registration Law required aliens to declare
their nationality (Choson, or Korean), submit to
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fingerprinting, carry photo identification at all times and
produce it upon request. (Lee, 1981: 79) It would not be
until the 1965 ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty was signed
that Zainichi Koreans were granted the option of changing
their nationality to Kankoku (South Korean, or Hanguk, in
Korean).
The Immigration Control Law of 1951 did not actually
apply Zainichi Koreans who were already in Japan.
Supplementary Law No. 126 of 1952 exempted those Koreans
who entered Japan before 01 September 1945 and their
descendants born between that date and until the 1952 Peace
Treaty was signed from the entry provisions. It subjected
Zainichi Koreans to deportation if they were 1) found to be
paupers, vagrants, disabled or charges of the state, or 2)
they had been subjected to a punishment heavier than
violations of the Alien Registration Law, which carried a
prison sentence of up to one year. (Lee, 1981: 95, 141)
The main motive for registration was the uneasy
security situation arising out of the Cold War.
All Koreans were suspect; anyone might be aligned
with North Korea and therefore a subversive.
(Hicks, 1997: 51)
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Repatriation, then, was a convenient expedient meant
to ease the social burden caused by the presence of ethnic
Koreans. Japanese officials were influenced by the burden
posed by the so-called "Korean problem." Moreover, as will
be discussed in the following section, domestic and
international politics were inextricably linked, as US
Occupation authorities maintained a watchful eye on
developments on the Korean peninsula, the southern zone of
which was itself occupied by American military forces until
1948. "From 1945 Japanese leaders recognized United States
leadership in the Allied Occupation and Western Alliance,
and assumed American authorship of the peace and security
settlements." (Yoshitsu, 1981: 7) Further, Michael
Yoshitsu contends that efforts to influence Occupation
policy by then Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru and the
Treaty Bureau, which was comprised of members of the
reorganized Japanese Foreign Ministry initially oriented
toward the West and firm in their anti-Soviet stance, were
of some value. Beginning in 1946, Foreign Minister
Yoshida, who would himself later serve as Prime Minister in
non-consecutive terms and shape Japanese foreign policy for
decades to come, the interim Katayama cabinet, and the
Treaty Bureau would not only appeal to US fears of the
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spread of Communism both within Japan and within the East
Asian region; they developed a strategy to influence
Occupation authorities by presenting their views
objectively in so-called "reference documents" or "Japanese
Government studies" dealing with postwar economic,
political, territorial and security issues. "Within the
limits of their bargaining position, they tried to inform
US decision-makers of [Japanese] Government wishes and
'sell' America on the logic of accepting them." (Yoshitsu,
1981: 31) With SCAP's backing, the Japanese government,
then, was able to resist Zainichi Korean efforts to
influence Japanese domestic policy.
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CHAPTER IV: A DIVIDED PENINSULA
When it became apparent that unification of the peninsula
was not forthcoming, Japan, under the guidance of SCAP,
pursued a "Two Korea" policy. Due to its alignment with
the US, Japan recognized South Korea as the legal
government of Korea, despite the lack of normalized
relations. The legal status of Koreans in Japan remained a
contentious issue, and Japan considered two basic policies:
1) assimilation, which had its share of social barriers,
and 2) repatriation, which pitted North and South Korea
against each other. SCAP had already recognized a "Korean
Mission in Japan" in 1948, but bilateral negotiations with
South Korea derailed in 1953 after anti-Japan South Korean
President Rhee Syngman drew his "Peace Line," otherwise
known as the "Rhee Line," in the Sea of Japan. The
subsequent arrest of Japanese fishermen caused an
international row centered on fisheries and a territorial
dispute involving the island of Takeshima (Tokdo, in
Korean). (Mitchell, 1967: 135) During this time, as will
be illustrated in the following section,
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CHAPTER V: CHOREN
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the very
presence of Koreans in Japan heightened tensions, as these
stateless people struggled to make sense of a divided
homeland. For many Zainichi Koreans, the prejudicial
treatment they received led them to form increasingly
protectionist organizations. A central group was Choren
(Zainichi Chosenjin Renmei - or Chaeil Chosonin Ryonmeng,
or Choryon in Korean, the leftist League of Koreans
Residing in Japan), whose members, under the guidance of
former political prisoner Kim Chon Hae (Kim Tenkai, in
Japanese), allied themselves with the Japanese Communist
Party (JCP). (Mitchell, 1967: 106). (Choren, which formed
on 15 October 1945, represented over two million Koreans in
Japan - over one-tenth the population of Korea at the time
in negotiations with both Japanese and American
Occupation authorities.) Choren was at odds with SCAP
policies due to its links with the JCP.
Repatriation was a prime concern for Choren, and
although it was also favored by the Japanese government,
and was to a seemingly lesser extent a concern for the
American Occupation officials, Chorean's ties to the JCP
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ultimately presented a conflict of interest for the US,
which began to view the group as a potential threat.
Zainichi Koreas had been subject to economic exploitation,
discrimination and social injustice even when Korea was a
Japanese colony. As a result, frustrations often boiled
over, leading to radical political activity. A secret
Japanese Ministry of Justice report revealed that security
officials feared that Choren planned to secure weapons "in
order to cope actively with the forthcoming revolution in
East Asia." (Ryang, 1997: 81) US Army Intelligence also
alleged that Choren was engaging in illicit activities,
including black marketeering and funneling funds to the
JCP. (Takemae, 2002: 454) Specifically, the US feared
that communism would spread to Japan.
Japanese foreign policy at this time was limited by
SCAP. Though Japanese officials ultimately cracked down on
Choren, the radical group did manage to positively
influence Japanese domestic policy; it succeeded in
establishing a network of schools and worked to preserve
Korean ethnic identity. These efforts would later be
furthered by the splinter group Soren who, in turn, would,
with North Korean support, succeed in influencing Japanese
foreign policy and resume repatriation efforts.
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CHAPTER VI: MINDAN
Mindan, under the leadership of former political prisoner
and nationalist Pak Yolf was formed in late 1946 by members
of Choren who were alarmed by the group's leftist
radicalism and established relations with the newly-formed
South Korean government. Though decidedly anti-communist,
the organization lacked the strong ideological commitment
characteristic of Soren. With the normalization of
diplomatic ties between South Korea and Japan in 1965,
members of Mindan did gain a legal basis as South Koreans
residing in Japan, but, instead of defining themselves
strictly as overseas South Korean nationals, the pro-South
group has struggled to gain a foothold within Japanese
civil society.
Initially organized to oversee repatriation efforts,
the group would not really come into its own until the 1965
normalization of diplomatic ties between South Korea and
Japan. Not only was South Korea recognized as the
legitimate government of Korea, allowing Zainichi Koreans
to register as South Korean nationals, they were granted
permanent resident status (with the ability to apply for
and receive a passport), while members of Soren, on the
other hand, were unable to visit North Korea until Kim II
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Sung's sixtieth birthday in 1972. (Hicks, 1997: 35) As a
result, membership in the organization saw a marked
increase.
Changsoo Lee described Mindan as "a loose
conglomeration of small groups of individuals related by
regional loyalties, personal ties, or special interests..."
characterized by "constant factional strife and disunity."
(Lee, 1981: 124) Such infighting failed to produce a
charismatic leader capable of gaining the confidence of the
Zainichi Korean community in the way that Soren chairman
Han Dok Su rallied support for the North Korean fatherland.
Without support from the Rhee Syngman regime, the nascent
group struggled to survive; it was not until the 1974
attempt on Park Chung Hee's life and the assassination of
Madam Park that the Park regime reconsidered its
relationship with Mindan and began appropriating
"Supplementary Funds for Overseas Koreans" in support of
Mindan. (Lee, 1981: 125)
The assassination attempt involved Soren member Mun Se
Kwang. Mun, born and raised in Osaka, Japan, entered South
Korea with a forged passport and attempted to assassinate
then South Korean President Pak Chung Hee. Mun was
recruited by a North Korean agent in Japan and given the
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23
final order to assassinate Pak Chung Hee in May 1974 from
his handler Kim Ho Ryong aboard the North Korean ship
Mangyongbong-ho berthed in Niigata, Japan. (Bermudez, Jr.,
1998: 117) Given that the assassin was a Zainichi Korean
from the Soren camp, Park recognized the importance of
fostering ties between Seoul and Mindan. Since then, Seoul
has worked with Mindan to encourage ethnic Korean studies
and has extended such incentives as university scholarships
and home visits to Zainichi Korean students. (Lee, 1981:
126-127)
In its early days, Mindan organized mutual aid
societies, assisted in repatriation efforts and facilitated
the registration of Zainichi Koreans as South Korean
nationals. Though initially pro-repatriation and anti-
Japanese, the group has over time become more receptive to
assimilation policies than the more extreme Soren. "The
Mindan's functions were described as 26 percent concerned
with domestic registration and 56 percent with passports."
(Hicks, 1997: 38)
While Choren maintained an education system comprised
of 541 elementary schools, 9 middle schools and 36 youth
schools and boasted an enrollment of some 60,000 students,
Mindan operated only 52 elementary schools, 2 middle
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24
schools and 2 training institutions with an enrollment just
under 7,000 students. (Takemae, 2002: 453) In addition to
maintaining its own system of Zainichi Korean schools,
Mindan, in concert with the South Korean embassy and
consulates throughout Japan has campaigned for local
suffrage.
Mindan has effectively campaigned for suffrage
since 1986, saying foreigners with permanent
residency are a part of Japanese society.
[Soren], on the other hand, says the suffrage
bill would accelerate the assimilation of its
people and should not be passed so that Korean
ethnicity can be preserved.... Seo Won Cheol,
Mindan's international bureau director,
criticizes [Soren] for putting the concerns of
Pyongyang over those of Korean residents of Japan
it ostensibly represents. (Japan Times, 01
December 2000)
It is interesting to note that in the same article
journalist Hiroshi Matsubara, citing a 1984 survey
conducted in Kanagawa Prefecture, claims 7 9 percent of
North Korean residents say they need the right to vote. It
follows that as Mindan loses its ability to influence
Japanese foreign policy, it has turned its attention to
more immediate, domestic concerns.
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25
CHAPTER VII: THE RISE OF SOREN
Soren can trace its origins back to the underground
communist movements formed during Japan's colonial
occupation of Korea (1910 - 1945). Elements of the Korean
Nationalist faction allied with the JCP felt that Minsen3
had placed JCP priorities before Korean interests. Han Dok
Su led the protests that resulted in the creation of Soren
in May 1955. Han was quick to declare that Soren would
refrain from interfering in Japan's domestic politics.
3 The burgeoning Cold War and fears of subversion led to the
dissolution of Choren, which in turn marked the beginning
of the "Red Purge" (September 1949), a movement directed
against Japanese and Korean leftists. (Ryang, 1997: 28)
With the dissolution of Choren in September 1949, and the
purge of the JCP in full swing, former members of Choren
and Mindan attempted to set aside their differences and
form the "Committee for the Common Struggle," as war broke
out on the Korean peninsula.
A new organization, however, came to the fore. Formed
in January 1951, Minsen (Zainichi Chosen Toitsu Minshu
Sensen, or the United Democratic Front in Japan for the
Unification of Korea, also known as Chaeil Choson Tongil
Minchu Chonson, or Minjon in Korean.) allied itself with
the Japanese Communist Party(JCP). Decidedly more radical
in nature, members formed the paramilitary Choguk Bangui
Uiwonhoe, or Chobangui (Committee for the Defense of the
Fatherland), which engaged in joint firebombing raids of
police stations and sabotaged factories and US bases.
(Hicks, 1997: Ch. 3) The JCP advocated armed struggle as
the "foremost task in order to fight the Japanese and
American reactionary forces... trying to remilitarize
Japan." (Ryang, 1997: 89) After SCAP directed the
dissolution of Minsen, elements sympathetic to North Korea
formed Soren.
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26
Japanese authorities then considered the organization
legitimate and non-subversive. (Ryang, 1997: 90) Backed
by Kim II Sung and later Kim Jong II (despite a failed
attempt backed by Kim Jong II to replace Han with then
Soren Vice Chairman Li Jing Gyu in the 1980's), Han was a
member of the North Korean People's Congress and reached
personality cult status as Chairman, serving until his
death in Tokyo on 21 February 2001 at the age of 94.
In the 1950s, however, Soren, under the guidance of
North Korea, launched a nationwide campaign, including
demonstrations and petitions, aimed at courting Zainichi
Koreans and persuading them to repatriate to North Korea
and Japanese politicians to support the initiative. North
Korea vigorously pursued rapprochement efforts with Japan
and, in April 1957, sent more than 121 million yen to Soren
in the name of the Korean Education Assistance Fund. This
was followed by another 100 million yen remittance in
October of the same year. The United Democratic Fatherland
Front (Minchu Choguk Tongil Chonson) in North Korea also
appealed directly to the Japanese government. The combined
efforts prompted many prominent Japanese to form the
Zainichi Chosenjin Kikoko Kyoryoku-kai, or KKK (Cooperation
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27
Society for the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan). (Lee,
1981: 100-101)
The campaign was not only a success; it showed Japan's
willingness to engage the North, if not officially
recognize it through normalized relations, and play
opposing sides against each other to further its own
interests (specifically, trade). Despite South Korean
protests, Japan began negotiating terms of repatriation
with the regime of newly appointed North Korean leader Kim
II Sung. With the help of the International Red Cross,
both sides reached an understanding on voluntary
repatriation and ratified the Calcutta Agreement on 13
August 1959, resulting in the repatriation of more than
80,000 ethnic Koreans to North Korea. (Mitchell, 1967:
142) In this case, Japanese foreign policy was influenced
not only by domestic factors, including a grassroots
Zainichi Korean movement and groups of sympathetic
Japanese, but also by international factors, namely
unofficial meetings with the communist regime of the North
and the anti-Japanese sentiment of the Rhee regime.
Soren, in the capacity of de facto North Korean
diplomatic representation, pressured Japan's Kishi
government. In his book The Foreign Policy of North Korea,
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Koh Byung Chul argues that the subsequent repatriation of
ethnic Koreans to North Korea was more a result of the
heightened social tensions caused by radical Koreans living
in Japan, rather than the combined lobbying effort of North
Korea and Soren. (Koh, 1969: 192) Chung Ki Won also
pondered the issue in "Japanese-North Korean Relations
Today" (Chung, 1964.)
To what extent was the Japanese government's
decision on the repatriation issue attributable
to pressure from the Japanese left-wing and
[Soren]? To what extent was Pyongyang successful
in influencing the channels of Japanese opinion
making? (Chung, 1964: 801)
Like Koh, Chung attributes the campaign's success to social
ills attributed to and experienced by ethnic Koreans. "The
Japanese government was well aware of the fact that the
economic plight of the Koreans, racial discrimination and
institutional prejudices in the professions, were creating
a hotbed for radicalism." (Chung, 1964: 801) Soren's
ability to influence Japanese foreign policy was limited.
Though it was able to win support for repatriation efforts
in the 1960s, efforts directed at normalizing relations
between Japan and North Korea were unsuccessful. Soren had
been demanding reparations from Japan, but in 1972, under
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29
guidance from the North Korean regime, then Soren first
vice chairman Kim Pyong Sik stated that the demands for
reparations would be left until Korean reunification and,
despite the rivalry with South Korea for recognition, that
Japan needed not reject its ties to South Korea in order to
normalize relations with the North. Such appeals were
ineffectual, for although Japan and North Korea had not
normalized relations, they were trading partners.
Accordingly, a Two Korea policy was good for Japan's
economy, and, since the trilateral alliance formed by South
Korea, Japan and the US served Japanese security interests,
appeals to normalize relations with the North fell on deaf
ears. (Roy, 1988: 1288) Accordingly, though Soren was
able to influence Japanese foreign policy in the post-
Korean War period, this ability gradually decreased as the
Cold War came to an end for a number of reasons.
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30
CHAPTER VIII: SOREN TODAY
Ryang, in her ethnographic study of Soren, North Koreans in
Japan: Language, Ideology and Identity (Ryang: 1997),
opens a window into the insular world of these "overseas
nationals" and illustrates the waning ideological
commitments of the successive generations of pragmatic
Zainichi Koreans who are struggling in an ideological void
to resolve their cultural identity crisis. Having been
raised in the Soren community herself, Ryang pays
particular attention to the issue of identity construction.
In the case of Soren, ethnic studies until recently have
echoed North Korean rhetoric. Consequently, this has often
put them at odds with Japanese security officials, who have
alleged for years that the group is linked with illicit
activities in support of North Korea.
Ryang presents a revealing study of Soren's support
network, ideology-based school system, political
socialization, and the phenomenon of "code-switching" - the
performance of language within a social context (with
situation, setting and audience serving as variables
affecting language use - Japanese or Korean - and
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31
understanding and/or acceptance of Juche rhetoric4 - as
witnessed largely in third generation students and to a
lesser degree in often disillusioned second generation
Zainichi Koreans. Switching between Japanese and Korean
tends to be second nature to third and fourth generation
students; this process involves a switch in socio-cultural
ideology as well. (Ryang, 1997: 41) Over time, subsequent
generations have experienced a shift in political ideology
as well, as they find themselves identifying more with
Japan than with either South or North Korea. Students of
ethnic Korean schools are likely to use Japanese outside of
the school environment, and they sometimes combine Korean
nouns with Japanese verb conjugations, creating a
functional hybrid language. Second generation Zainichi
4 Implemented after the Korean War, Juche ideology
(literally, "self-reliance") was initially used by then
North Korean leader Kim II Sung to limit Soviet influence
over the North. The evolving Juche ideology came to form
the basis of a personality cult around Kim II Sung (similar
to Stalin and Mao), elevating him to demigod status and
justifying the transition of power to his son Kim Jong II.
It was a tool used to legitimize the North Korean
dictatorship. Marked by ideological and political
indoctrination, Juche ideals played a larger role in the
lives of Soren members before the North's economic failure
and food shortages. In 1997, Hwang Jang Yop, a
disillusioned North Korean senior official widely believed
to be one of the chief architects of Juche thought,
denounced the Juche ideology as espoused by the North
Korean regime and defected to the South.
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32
Koreans grew up in a rigid, politically oriented system
that has offered few alternatives to a life outside of
Soren. With the death of Kim II Sung, however, older
Zainichi Koreans were forced to reevaluate the role of
Soren in their lives, and many began to explore alternative
lifestyles in an attempt to resolve their ambiguous dual
identity. Without a network of close Japanese friends and
business associates, many second generation Koreans find
themselves caught up in the transition of the first
generation's fixed identity and filial obligations, as well
as their own responsibilities as parents of the culturally
flexible Japan-born generation, but even as the cultural
lines begin to blur, the issue of language is perhaps the
strongest factor in fostering a separate and distinct
identity.
In the case of Soren, Korean language proficiency is
of the utmost importance. Soren and its affiliated
organizations are dedicated to the reunification of the
partitioned Korean peninsula under the North's guidance.
Soren is supported not only by members of the North Korean
community, but also by many who maintain ties with South
Korea. They celebrate North Korean holidays, divert hard
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33
currency to the North, and educate their children in
independent North Korean-style schools.
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34
CHAPTER IX: SOREN POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY
In an effort to preserve Korean culture, language and
identity, Soren continued Choren's work and strove to
further develop a strong support network, consisting of
credit unions, or Chogin (literally, Korean Bank), a pro-
North Korea newspaper (Chosen Sinbo) and an independent
school system which included approximately 150 schools and
a university during its prime (1980s). Scattered
throughout Japan, Soren schools boasted an enrollment of
approximately 20,000 students. (Ryang, 1997: 24)
Teachers, activists and student delegations occasionally
travel to North Korea for "re-education" (political
indoctrination) classes and field trips to North Korean
landmarks and educational institutions.5
These programs initially aimed to prepare those who
wished to repatriate for a new life in a reunified Korea,
and later as a means of fostering a collective socio
5 According to Saitama University, Japan Professor Fukuoka
Yasunori in Koreans in Japan: Past and Presentl (Saitama
University Review, Vol.31, No.l), Soren (as of 1993) runs
one university, 12 high schools, 57 junior high schools and
81 primary schools. Mindan also runs a number of schools,
including one in Tokyo, one in Kyoto, and two in Osaka.
Mr. Fukuoka's work and related essays can be found online
at http://www.han.org/a/indexe.html. The web page is
intended to "promote a better understanding of Koreans in
Japan from a scientific viewpoint."
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35
political identity based on the common ideal of fatherland
reunification for those who remained in Japan. By
contrast, Mindan-affiliated schools aimed to cultivate
Korean ethnic identity and pride through extracurricular
courses focusing on Korean culture, history and language.
Mindan also operates accredited schools which meet the
standards of the Japanese education system. Instruction is
open to adults and the Japanese as well. In early 1948,
Choren operated 578 schools at four levels and boasted an
enrollment of approximately 68,000 students, while Mindan's
54 schools at two junior levels had an enrollment of
approximately 6,300 students. (Ryang, 1997: Ch. 3)
Herself a product of the Soren system and a former
reporter for the Soren newspaper Choson Shimbo, Ryang
examines several case studies and illustrates the waning
ideological commitments of the successive generations of
Zainichi Koreans, due to a radical change in the school
system curriculum (1993), the death of Kim II Sung (1994)
and the effects of globalization. The school curriculum
change marked a shift away from Kim II Sungism, introduced
the teaching of modern, spoken Korean, an increasingly
global outlook reflecting the end of the Cold War, and the
addition of demanding Japanese school admissions
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36
examination preparation courses. Still, the system is
threatened by generational changes, the effect of code
switching, cultural diversity (the formation of a third
identity floating somewhere between Japanese and Korean,
sharing elements of both) and the potentially destabilizing
social pressures on language-bound identity.
Perhaps more significantly, the 1994 death of North
Korea's Great Leader Kim II Sung and the deteriorating
conditions in the North have served to create an
ideological void in the Soren community, resulting in
serious disillusionment and cultural identity crisis as
members are forced to confront the socio-political and
economic realities of daily life in Japan and the potential
challenges their children may face as a result of the rigid
Soren system. For most within this community, gone are the
dreams of repatriating to a "workers' paradise" in the
North, as media reports and personal accounts of the dire
conditions and dismal outlook in the North reach the homes
of these "overseas nationals."
For Soren members, political indoctrination begins
early on, but the number of students enrolled in Soren
schools is dwindling. Most Zainichi Korean students attend
Japanese schools, because there are no Korean schools near
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37
their homes or due to the Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology Ministry's (hereafter, Ministry of
Education) discriminatory policies which denied graduates
of ethnic Korean schools, specifically those run by Soren,
the opportunity to take college entrance examinations.
(Hicks, 1997: 15) In effect, these graduates were required
to pass a separate qualifying examination (known as the
"daiken") before even being granted an opportunity to take
standard college entrance exams.
Funding for education at Soren schools is subsidized
by both North Korea and Japan. North Korea now provides
approximately $3.6 million annually (which is approximately
a quarter of what it provided during the 1980s and early
1990s). (Washington Post: 10 October 2003) Osaka city
currently provides 30 million yen (approximately 270,000
USD at 111 yen/1 USD) annually to 11 schools affiliated
with Soren, while Osaka prefecture provides 310 million yen
annually to Mindan-affiliated schools. (Japan Times: 13
April 2004)
According to the Asahi Shimbun, however, Soren has now
begun to react to anti-North Korean sentiment, in light of
North Korea's admitted abduction of Japanese citizens, and
is engaging in a game of survival, not only loosening up
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38
its curriculum to include more references to South Korea
but also to reach out to Mindan and Seoul in order to
weather North Korea's economic hardships and counter
dwindling enrollment figures. "The number of students at
pro-Pyongyang schools in Japan has decreased from about
40, 000 in the 1960s to about 14, 000 now. There are only
119 of these schools left." (Asahi Shimbun: 12 March 2004)
Soren's Chosun (Korea) University is located in
Kodaira, Tokyo. Graduates of Chosun University commonly
work for Soren or affiliated businesses and organizations
or teach at Soren schools. Though Soren's Chosun
University was founded in 1959, Japan's Liberal Democratic
Party and right-wing groups have opposed its accreditation.
Because it is regarded as a "miscellaneous" trade school,
not all universities allow graduates to take the necessary
entrance exams. As a result, Chosun University graduates
have historically been in a disadvantaged position in the
extremely competitive and increasingly global job market.
For those interested in pursuing secondary education
in Japan, there is hope. In September 2003, the Ministry
of Education relaxed this biased policy, allowing Japanese
universities the option of independently screening
prospective students and waiving the daiken prerequisite
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39
for Zainichi Koreans (among other graduates of
international schools in Japan and Japanese dropouts)
determined to enter college in the 2004 academic year.
(Japan Times: 28 August 2004) Ministry of Education
officials initially proposed lifting the daiken requirement
for western-style international schools, but officials were
pressured to reconsider their position when protestors,
including members of Soren and a teacher at Tokyo Korean
Junior and Senior High School, submitted a petition on 28
March 2003 with 4,086 signatures. (Japan Times: 12 April
2003)
In addition, the 1994 death of the Great Leader Kim II
Sung triggered a shift in political ideology of subsequent
generations of Soren members, and the heightened tensions
resulting from the recent admissions of the existence of
North Korea's nuclear program and excessive mass media
attention on the abduction issue. Like many other Zainichi
Koreans who already identify more with Japan than with
either South or North Korea, skeptical and disillusioned
members have begun to distance themselves from Soren,
preferring instead to focus on providing an alternative
future for their children not only within Japan but the
international community as well. The status of North
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40
Koreans in Japan, then, continues to reflect not only
Japanese domestic and international security concerns.
The issue of North Korean identity for Soren members
continues to face challenges. It is affected by
concentrated effort by Soren leaders to set themselves
apart from the Japanese, to resist assimilation, and to
foster attitudes sympathetic to the North and other North
Koreans in Japan rather than address the immediate needs
and concerns of third and fourth generations. (Asahi
Shimbun: 10 September 2002) According to Ryang, students
at Soren schools lack even the basic vocabulary necessary
to engage in a rational discussion of the political nature
of their North Korean identity; an objective view of the
situation on the Korean peninsula was impossible in a
system where students mimic their political superiors and
elders, repeating the standard ideological rhetoric
espoused by the North and denouncing themselves for their
lack of revolutionary conviction, their success measured by
rote memorization and performance. (Ryang, 1997: 63)
Until recently, a Soren education limited members to all-
or-nothing value judgments, to a narrowly defined political
terrain, prohibiting critical discourse and assessment of
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41
the validity of Juche thought as a universal philosophy.
(Ryang, 1997: 155)
The task of maintaining a degree of political control
over successive generations is therefore becoming
increasingly complex and has even prompted new Soren
Chairman So Man Sul to focus the organization's efforts
toward reaching out to younger generations as sentiments
change and an increasing number of Koreans become
naturalized Japanese citizens. (Japan Times: 23 June 2001)
These changes also reflect the evolution of Japanese
domestic policy during the 1980s and 1990s, though not all
civic and social rights have been actively sought out by
everyone within the Zainichi Korean community. In fact,
despite their new classification as "special permanent
residents," Soren continues to reject the notion of
Japanese nationality. (Kashiwazaki, 2000: 28-29) Moreover,
chinks have begun to appear in Soren's armor.
In a blatant display of internal strife, in March
2004, members of the Kinki branch of Soren voiced their
opposition to the February 2004 dismissal of Chairman Hong
Gyong Ui of the Osaka-based branch of the Association of
Korean Human Rights in Japan by Soren's Central Standing
Committee (CSC). Hong and his supporters had previously
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proposed changes to Soren and called for a review of the
Japan-based group's relations with Pyongyang in light of
the tenuous state of affairs between Japan and North Korea.
The Kinki branch, which consists of some 150 members, even
encouraged apologizing after Kim Jong II admitted that
North Korean agents abducted Japanese citizens in the 197 0s
and 1980s. The group is outraged by what they view as
overreaching by the CSC, and they have called for more
regional autonomy. In retaliation, Soren's CSC suspended
Kinki branch activities. (Japan Times: 04 April 2004)
These recent trends portend even more dramatic changes
within Soren. Faced with an increasing cultural openness
and global awareness, parents with tempered idealism have
begun to take a proactive role in their children's
education. Soren schools have acted in turn, recognizing
the need to adjust their curriculum to suit the needs of
third and fourth generation students. In an effort to
curtail the emphasis on political education, official
portraits of Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II have been removed
from school classrooms, and classes praising the
revolutionary activities of Kim II Sung are being replaced
by classes on Korean History in a broader context,
including Korean independence movements under Japanese
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43
colonial rule, the history of Zainichi Koreans, South
Korean history, and even the conciliatory efforts of former
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. (Japan Times: 11
January 2003 and 07 August 2003) A 2001 report, however,
claimed that Kim Jong II himself ordered Soren "to boldly
change the methods in a revisionist manner without being
concerned about inviting suspicion or criticism." (Chosun
Ilbo: 04 March 2001)
As the number of naturalized students rises, the
schools aim to empower subsequent generations and create a
less-marginalized ethnic group. This marginalization is in
part due to their self-perception as "overseas nationals,"
rather than an ethnic minority. As "overseas nationals,"
participation in Japan's domestic affairs has been
discouraged by Soren, and officials of the group have
largely opposed efforts by Mindan and others to promote
political assimilation and active participation in Japan's
domestic affairs.
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44
CHAPTER X: FINANCING TERROR
Ryang briefly considers Soren's fundraising activities and
financial transfers from Soren members to repatriated
family members in North Korea, but she fails to explore the
more politically sensitive issue of the role hard currency
plays for the North. Furthermore, she makes no mention of
Soren ties to North Korean intelligence collection
operations in Japan. Media reports over the years indicate
at least 30 North Korean infiltrators have been apprehended
in at least 60 different espionage cases since the end of
the Korean War.
Security officials believe Soren provides unofficial
financial assistance to the North in the form of pachinko
parlor proceeds (many of which are owned and operated by
Soren and affiliated organizations), the remittance of
money from Soren members to their repatriated families and,
more recently, from, as Japanese authorities suspect,
Soren's system of credit unions formed under the name Korea
Bank, or Chogin (Chosen Ginko, or Chogin Shinyo Kumiai -
Chogin credit union cooperatives).
Over the past few years, many of Chogin's smaller
credit unions have been declared insolvent, prompting
reorganization and regional mergers, and bankruptcies. As
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45
a consequence, Japanese taxpayers have been burdened with a
multi-billion dollar bailout.
One of the causes for concern is the belief that money
sent by Soren members to North Korea have funded North
Korea's nuclear program. Starting in the early 1990s, the
US has pressured Japanese officials to stop the
remittances. For its part, the Japanese government has
created a project team with the goal of resolving the
matter. In 1994 the group "recommended applying the
Subversive Activities Prevention Law [a.k.a. the Anti-
Subversion Law] to force the dissolution of the pro-North
Korean [Soren] and placing restrictions on the flows of
people, goods and money to North Korea." (Nishioka, 2003:
38) In connection with the Chogin scandal, the Public
Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) conducted a raid of
Soren headquarters in 2001 and has, since North Korea
revealed it had an active nuclear weapons program, has
strengthened its monitoring of the group. (Japan Times: 24
December 2003)
With the revelation of North Korea's abduction of
Japanese citizens, however, anti-North Korean sentiment has
led to a public call for stricter regulations regarding
port calls by North Korean vessels and a reconsideration of
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46
Soren's privileged position as the de facto representative
of the North Korean regime in Japan. Conservative Tokyo
Governor Ishihara Shintaro decided to end the group's tax-
exempt status in Tokyo. As a result, other local
governments are following suit. Political pressure of this
sort has increased as Japan seeks ways to restrict the flow
of illicit goods and funds to North Korea. (Japan Times:
01 October 2003)
Top officials of the failed Chogin Tokyo Credit Union
embezzled hundreds of millions of yen, 30 percent of which
went to North Korea (via Soren). The bulk of the loans are
considered unrecoverable. (Asahi Shimbun: 30 November
2001) In 1994, Japanese police testified that some $600
million was being funneled into North Korea, though recent
research by Nicholas Eberstadt indicates that the current
flow of money from Soren is far less than previous
estimates - not more than $100 million a year. (Jordan,
1998: 33)
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CHAPTER XI: SOREN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
In its on-line Intelligence Threat Handbook, Section Three,
Adversary Foreign Intelligence Operations, the Federation
of American Scientists (FAS) reports that several
intelligence agencies operate within North Korea and the
Korean Workers' Party (KWP). The Liaison Department, for
example, is responsible for conducting intelligence
operations in South Korea and Japan, while the Research
Department for External Intelligence (RDEI) is the primary
agency responsible for foreign intelligence collection.
The RDEI is composed of four geographic subsections - Soren
is the Third agency under the Central Committee of the KWP.
Moreover, according to FAS, Soren supports intelligence
operations in Japan, assists in the infiltration of agents
into South Korea, exploits open source information and
diverts advanced technology for use by North Korea, which
depends primarily on Soren for HUMINT (human intelligence)
operations. The FAS identifies the Gakushu-gumi ("study
groups") as the covert arm of Soren and as a semi-formal
body of the KWP. With a membership estimated at 5, 000,
this underground "student" organization engaged in
intelligence activities and political maneuvering against
South Korea.
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48
According to North Korean military intelligence
analyst and author Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Soren is indeed
a key element of the North Korean foreign intelligence
collection strategy in Japan. In contrast to Ryang's
insights, Bermudez presents a revealing look into this
politically sensitive issue, citing a number of sources,
including interviews with North Korean defectors and South
Korean security officials, declassified US documents and
open source information. In his book North Korean Special
Forces, 2nd Edition, (Bermudez, 1998), Bermudez outlines
North Korea's intelligence agencies and Soren's place
within the North Korean intelligence collection apparatus.
In his study of Japan-North Korea relations, Denny Roy
adds, "Pyongyang-sponsored organizations in Japan are also
accused of serving as way stations and training facilities
for spies and terrorist preparing to infiltrate into South
Korea." (Roy, 1988: 1290)
During the 1960's, Soren's central headquarters
established covert counter-South Korea propaganda centers
in Kobe and Tokyo and engaged in information/psychological
operations under the guidance of the Foreign Security
Bureau (FSB), a unit subordinate to the Social Security
Bureau of North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In
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49
1961, security was compromised by Japanese security agents.
This led Soren agents to establish individual intelligence
networks known as "underground party operational bases in
Japan," under the direct control of North Korea. These
underground networks likely operated throughout the 1960's.
The FSB later became known as the International Department
under the Ministry of Public Security in a series of
restructuring. (Bermudez, Jr., 1998: 61)
The Department of Guidance of Zainichi Koreans (or,
simply, the Guidance Department) was responsible for all
operations, including covert intelligence and subversion
concerning Soren. Operational responsibilities of the
Guidance Department included communist/Juche
indoctrination, cadre training, information warfare,
smuggling, undermining Japan-South Korea relations and
directing Japan-based anti-South Korea agent operations.
Until the mid-1970's, control of the Soren is believed to
have been exercised by the Guidance Department of the
Ministry of Public Security. Various North Korean agencies
continue to utilize Soren to conduct covert and overt
intelligence and information/psychological operations
against South Korea. (Bermudez, 1998: 75-76)
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50
"Paramount to the proper understanding of the
Chongryon role in Japan is its de facto operational
subordination to the KWP's Cabinet General Intelligence
Bureau. Annually, the KWP provides the Chongryon with
overall guidance, in the form of a New Year's message from
Kim II Song." (Bermudez, Jr., 1990: 149-150) The group
focuses on anti-ROK operations, beginning with recruitment
of Koreans, non-Koreans and even non-Asians, and including
propaganda and disinformation campaigns. By 1975, the
Ministry of Public Security focused almost exclusively on
internal security, it did exercise control over Soren and
possibly limited foreign intelligence operations.
(Bermudez, 1998: 104)
The Unification Front Department, later known as the
South-North Dialogue Department was responsible for all
open and covert issues relating to the South-North dialogue
and reunification. Throughout the 1980's and 1990's, the
department dramatically expanded its open and covert
contacts with Koreans living overseas. Much of the
department's work was conducted through its Soren Affairs
Section and remains actively involved within South Korea
and Japan. The RDEI became the Investigative Department
during the 1990's as part of a general reorganization of
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51
intelligence assets (also known as the Investigation
Department, or Foreign Intelligence and Investigations
Department) and is responsible for the collection of
external intelligence and conducting foreign operations.
(Bermudez, Jr., 1998: 150)
By the early 1990's, the Liaison Department was
renamed the Social-Cultural Department (also known as
Socio-Cultural Department, Social and Cultural Department,
or the Department of Socio-Cultural Affairs). Its primary
mission was the collection of political intelligence within
South Korea and Japan, and it exercised control of
intelligence operations utilizing Soren, though the
Operations Department routinely operated with and through
the organization.
North Korean agents recruit prospective operatives in
Japan. Those selected for high-level operations are sent
to North Korea where they receive specialized training-
detailed classroom instruction followed by practical field
exercises. Other operatives reported receiving similar
training at individual Soren member homes, safe houses and
Soren schools. Agents receive extensive training in
political theory/indoctrination, as well as subversion and
espionage. Guerrilla warfare and tactics were introduced
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during the late 1960's. Agent tradecraft instruction
includes methods of establishing underground party
networks, map reading, land navigation and infiltration,
hand-to-hand combat and marksmanship with both Soviet-era
and US weapons, telegraph and radio communications and
cryptography. Agents infiltrating Japan from North Korea
also receive training in navigation and boat handling,
operation and maintenance, escort tactics, swimming, forced
marching, etc.
The system of training centers and safe houses is
collectively known as the Central Committee Political
School (or the 695TH Army Unit). Unit headquarters and
most branch centers are located in Pyongyang, though
special mission training is conducted in safe houses run by
the Liaison Department. (Bermudez, 1998: 223-225)
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53
CHAPTER XII: INCREMENTAL CHANGE
Having been left in a seemingly transient state after World
War II, Zainichi Koreans were forced to register themselves
as aliens. It was not until twenty years after the end of
World War II that Japan and South Korea managed to
normalize diplomatic ties. The Normalization Treaty of
1965 granted members of the Zainichi Korean community legal
status as overseas South Korean nationals, but, more
importantly, it granted those registering as South Korean
permanent resident status.
It was during this time that Zainichi Korean students
were allowed to attend Japanese schools. Ethnic schools,
it should be noted, were and still are considered
"miscellaneous" schools and, until only recently, were not
believed to meet the basic educational requirements for
graduates to take standardized college entrance
examinations, effectively putting thousands of Zainichi
Koreans at a professional disadvantage. (Hicks, 1997: 56)
The 197 9 ratification of the International Covenant on
Human Rights was a significant development for Zainichi
Koreans. Japan opened the door to public housing for
Zainichi Koreans, and local government authorities altered
their hiring practices to include consideration of
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54
qualified Zainichi Koreans. This was followed by
noteworthy improvements in social benefits for Zainichi
Koreans. In 1981 Japan ratified the Treaty on the Status
of Refugees. As a result, Zainichi Koreans became eligible
for social security benefits which were until then reserved
for Japanese nationals. Soon after, Japan established
provisions for child allowances, access to the national
health insurance system, and, perhaps more importantly,
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women. Specifically, this latter
provision meant that Japanese nationality could be acquired
through the mother. According to Hicks, "By 1989,
moreover, 80 percent of Korean marriages were mixed
(Welfare Ministry statistics show a majority of mixed
marriages from 1976), reflecting a steady drift towards
assimilation encouraged by the scattered nature of the
Korean community and the divisions within it." (Hicks,
1997: 57) These policies were more the result of
international, rather than domestic, pressure, as Japan
sought to bring itself in line with the United Nations.
Recent efforts on the part of Zainichi Koreans,
however, have influenced the policy making process. After
the 1991 address made by then Prime Minister Kaifu, a
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55
number of measures improved matters for Zainichi Koreans.
Prime Minister Kaifu's comments suggested sincerity on the
part of the Japanese government to accommodate Zainichi
Koreans, but Amy Gurowitz argues that Japan has been
hesitant to adopt international norms, and when it does so,
it is often because the government regards them as "the
necessary price of existence in the outside world."
(Gurowitz, 1999: 422) Chikako Kashiwazaki echoes this
notion in her article "The Politics of Legal Status: The
Equation of Nationality with Ethnonational Identity."
According to Kashiwazaki, "[t]he importance of projecting
its image as a democratic state, for instance, would make
[Japan] responsive to international legal norms." (Ryang,
2000: 15) This can be seen as a form of gaiatsu, or
outside pressure, but Gurowitz, instead, focuses on the
ability of Zainichi Koreans and non-government
organizations to exploit international norms and, through
social activism, pressure the Japanese government into
implementing changes that have benefited the foreign
resident community. (Gurowitz, 1999: 424) In the 1990s,
changes included the creation of a special permanent
resident status and the revision of the Alien registration
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56
Law, which abolished the fingerprinting requirement of
Zainichi Koreans.
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57
CHAPTER XIII: VOTING RIGHTS
Having been granted special permanent resident status,
Zainichi Koreans, excluding members of Soren, who insist
that their unofficial status as overseas North Korean
nationals precludes participation in Japanese domestic
politics, have attempted to mobilize public support for
limited suffrage, that is, the ability to vote in local
elections. Although the Supreme Court recognized the
constitutionality of local suffrage for resident aliens in
1995 (Hicks, 1997: 98-102), the notion challenges
conventional ideas of citizenship. Consequently, Zainichi
Koreans continue to face resistance from those who feel
allowing foreigners to vote in local elections could pose a
threat to national security, while Soren opinion leaders
view voting as equivalent to interfering in Japan's
domestic affairs and would hasten assimilation. (Japan
Times, 14 October 2000) The problem is further complicated
in those communities where a large portion of the
population is actually made up of Zainichi Koreans. If
they are not allowed to vote in local elections, their
concerns will not have a voice.
Lawmakers and opinion leaders in both Japan and South
Korea have formed a network to work toward achieving local
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58
suffrage for permanent foreign residents. Championing
human rights, the New Komeito party has recently proposed
such a bill which is scheduled to be considered by the
House of Representatives Special Committee on Political
Ethics and the Election Law during the current Diet
session. Reaching consensus will prove challenging, as
members of the ruling majority Liberal Democratic Party
continue to oppose such a measure, but a similar move aimed
at granting local suffrage rights to Chinese residents of
South Korea could very well add momentum to the movement in
Japan. (Japan Times: 10 November 2004)
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59
CHAPTER XIV: OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Of great concern to Japanese security officials are the
March 1999 and December 2001 encounters in the Sea of Japan
with vessels Japan has since confirmed to be of North
Korean origin and which the Japan Coast Guard believe to be
spy ships. One of the boats engaged Japanese ships with
automatic gunfire and rocket fire (RPG-7s) and then
abruptly sank as it fled under fire, leading Japanese
officials to believe crewmembers detonated explosives on
board in order to avoid capture. Media reports, citing
Defense Agency and police sources, indicate the vessel sent
a "suicide message" before sinking. (Reuters: 31 December
2001) North Korea repeatedly denied involvement, though
evidence suggested otherwise - US Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage backed Japanese security officials,
stating that the US believed the unidentified ship to be of
North Korean origin. (Japan Times: 13 January 2002) After
the vessel was salvaged, Japanese authorities discovered a
surface-to-air missile on board and a small landing craft -
the sort, according to Joseph Bermudez, used by North
Korean agents who infiltrate Japanese waters and work with
Japan-based agents and members of Soren to train others,
gather intelligence, etc.
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60
Driven by unsettling incidents such as North Korea's
August 1998 ballistic missile test, the March 1999 and
December 2001 incursions by North Korean spy ships and the
abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents, a
more assertive Japan has responded by forming a North
Korean crisis management team and initiating a
controversial reassessment of its security policy. In the
wake of recent spy ship incursions, which are now
inextricably linked to the abduction issue, Japan has been
steadily expanding the role and capabilities of its modest
Self-Defense Force (SDF) (particularly its ability to deal
with modern threats, crises, and emergencies in areas
surrounding Japan) and is re-examining force commitments
under the revised Japan-United States Defense Cooperation
Guidelines. The December 2001 sinking of a North Korean
spy ship by the Japan Coast Guard marked the first time
Japanese vessels have fired upon another vessel in 48
years.
In this atmosphere, rapprochement of any sort between
Japan and North Korea seemed highly unlikely, but a
historic meeting took place in mid-September 2002.
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61
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and
Chairman Kim Jong-11 of the DPRK National Defense
Commission met and had talks in Pyongyang on
September 17, 2002.
Both leaders confirmed the shared recognition
that establishing a fruitful political, economic
and cultural relationship between Japan and the
DPRK through the settlement of unfortunate past
between them and the outstanding issues of concern
would be consistent with the fundamental interests
of both sides, and would greatly contribute to the
peace and stability of the region. (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 17 September 2002)
So opened the Pyongyang Declaration signed by Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro and Chairman Kim Jong II on 17
September 2002. In the two years since that historic
meeting, not only has progress remained elusive, tensions
have escalated yet again, with Zainichi Koreans, Soren
members in particular, caught in the crossfire. Given the
deep-seated historical distrust between these two
politically distant neighbors, the national and regional
security implications of Pyongyang's open hostility toward
Tokyo, the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea, its
ballistic missile research and development program and its
history of intelligence collection operations continue to
present a security challenge for Japan and have served to
worsen the plight of the Zainichi Korean community.
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62
In recent years, a number of issues have soured
relations between Japan and South Korea and its other East
Asian neighbors, among them the textbook controversy and
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni
Shrine and a territorial dispute over the island called
Takeshima (or Tokdo), but, overall, Japan-South Korean
relations are positive, due in part to the successful co
hosting the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2002, a South
Korean popular culture boom in Japan, and a common approach
to dealing with the threat posed by a nuclear North Korea.
The nuclear issue is but one of many issues that have
caused Japan-North Korea relations, on the other hand, to
remain stalled and make normalized diplomatic relations
appear far from realization, despite a promising meeting
between North Korea's Leader Kim Jong II and Prime Minister
Koizumi. At that historic September 2002 summit meeting,
Kim Jong II confirmed Japanese allegations and admitted
that North Korean agents had indeed utilized spy ships to
infiltrate into Japan and abducted thirteen Japanese
citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. Although five
abductees and their North Korea-born children have since
been repatriated to Japan, the fate of the other eight
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63
(Japan claims there are still ten abductees missing.) is
still in doubt, for North Korea has failed to provide any
new details. The release of the children of the
repatriated abductees and the American husband of one of
them (a United States Army deserter who fled to North Korea
in January 1965 in order to escape serving in Vietnam and
was court-martialed by the US Army on 03 November 2004),
was secured by Koizumi during a second summit meeting held
in May 2004. Despite the September 2002 meeting, the joint
declaration has failed to yield any significant progress,
save the release of the abductees' children. Rather, the
shocking revelation inflamed an already biased public
opinion in Japan, and suspicious reports that most of the
abducted Japanese citizens died in North Korea have raised
even more doubts regarding North Korea's sincerity.
Accordingly, the abduction issue has gained an overwhelming
amount of political and media attention and has come to be
the major obstacle to resuming normalization talks with
North Korea. Moreover, on 04 October 2002, the North
confessed to having an active nuclear weapons development
program (a violation of the Agreed Framework forged in
1994), further complicating any rapprochement efforts and
casting a negative light on Soren - guilt by association.
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64
In a 28 September 2004 article "Minister: N. Korea has
Nuclear Deterrent," the Associated Press reported that
North Korea had successfully developed nuclear weapons.
Continuous media coverage has drawn attention to the plight
of Japan's ethnic Korean population, and, though public
opinion regarding South Korea has shown marked improvement,
media reports and variety shows focusing on the abduction
issue and the North's nuclear program have used emotional
and nationalist approaches to influence public opinion and
help shape government policy. (Japan Times, 31 December
2002) In the view of Gregory Clark, a former Australian
diplomat, Vice-President, Akita International University,
and regular contributor to the Japan Times, "Pyongyang's
remarkable willingness to admit and apologize for former
abductions of Japanese citizens has been turned around 180
degrees to become a blunt instrument for demonizing that
regime." (Japan Times, 25 April 2003)
The year 2002 witnessed a number of significant
developments concerning Japan-North Korea relations.
Despite the significance of the historic summit between
Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim, and the atmosphere
of hope it engendered, the talks and subsequent working-
level meetings have failed to produce tangible results. It
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65
was also revealed that they then served as language and
culture instructors for North Korean agents who later
infiltrated Japan or paraded as Japanese tourists abroad.
The shocking revelation that most of the abducted Japanese
citizens have died has raised even more questions.
These developments, compounded by North Korea's 28
September 2004 announcement that it now possesses nuclear
weapons, (Associated Press: 28 September 2004) continue to
draw the attention of neighboring countries within the
region and around the world. In Japan the intense media
coverage has inflamed an already biased public opinion, and
Zainichi Koreans, especially Soren facilities and related
businesses, have been the targets of violence. The
atmosphere of fear is such that a sort of racial (ethnic)
profiling has occurred. Consequently, Zainichi Koreans are
by proxy often associated with the acts carried out by the
North Korean regime. Soren headquarters and a number of
affiliated schools have even received death threats. Young
students of ethnic Korean schools in Japan wearing a chima
chogori uniform (traditional Korean dress) have also been
targets of both verbal and physical retaliation on the part
of Japanese rightists. Soren reported a total of 308 cases
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66
of assault against North Korean residents between 17
September 2002 and 05 October 2002.
Supporters of the families of the abductees have
protested port calls by the North Korean ship Mangyongbong-
92, a ferry that now makes irregular trips between the
North Korean port of Wonson and the Japanese port of
Niigata. The vessel is the only link between North Korea
and Soren supporters in Japan. Japanese security
officials, from both the National Police Agency (NPA) and
the PSIA, believe the ship is used by North Korea to engage
in illicit activities, such as spying and trafficking
drugs. The ship regularly transports high-ranking members
of the KWP, who provide guidance to Soren members in Japan,
Soren members themselves to and from North Korea, and dual-
use technology that can be used by North Korea to develop
weapons or to infiltrate Japan. Ongoing investigations
indicate that Japanese security officials continue to view
Soren as a potentially subversive group. (Japan Times: 09
November 2002) The rise in anti-North Korean sentiment,
manifested by intense media coverage, public action and
security initiatives, indicates that Soren's positive
influence on Japanese policy-makers is declining.
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67
Consequently, some Japanese politicians support
investigating Soren's involvement in the abductions. Soren
has denied involvement and has encouraged students to write
about the abduction issue. In essays released to the
public, students at Soren schools expressed both shock and
sympathy, but noticeably absent were any words critical of
the North Korean regime or its role in the abductions nor
do they seem to consider the significance of such
revelations to Soren members and other Zainichi Koreans.
(Japan Times: 20 November 2002) For older members of the
Soren community, this is clearly not the case.
Of particular interest is a recent incident of
dissention in the ranks reported by the Asahi Shimbun.
According to the 12 March 2004 article, Soren members had
arranged a trip to Seoul for their children (students at
Tokyo Korean First Elementary and Junior High School in
Arakawa Ward, Tokyo). The schools their children attended
had previously been visited by South Korean officials, and
the students had received an invitation to visit Seoul. As
the deadline for the spring 2003 trip approached, Soren
executives moved to suspend the trip on the grounds that a
trip to Seoul would place their young in danger, the
rationale being that South Korea's deployment of troops to
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68
Iraq made them a terrorist target. The parents, however,
challenged Soren officials and demanded that the trip
proceed as planned. Ultimately, the parents won out and
their children visited South Korea, although the trip was
not made under the auspices of Soren. Rather, Soren
executives declared the trip would be regarded as an
"independent" trip. Such an incident marks a significant
change in the relationship between Soren executives and
rank-and-file members. Not only is this episode indicative
of the weakening of ideological bonds within Soren, it
sheds light on the commitment of younger generations of
Zainichi Koreans to providing better opportunities for
their children in an increasingly global culture but of the
disconnect between the party line espoused by Soren
executives and the needs and desires of Zainichi Koreans.
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69
CONCLUSION
In the post-war era, from the 1950s through the 1970s,
Mindan and Soren activities were primarily focused on
peninsular politics and preserving their ethnic identity.
For its part, the Japanese government worked to resolve the
"Korea problem" by promoting repatriation and playing North
and South Korea against each other. In the 1980s, as
Japan, Inc. reached a position of prominence in the global
economy, the Japanese government, increasingly concerned
with gaining a degree of respect from the international
community commensurate with its economic power, ratified a
number of international conventions and, as a consequence,
began treating Zainichi Koreans in accordance with
international norms. At the same time, Japanese
authorities maintained an uncomfortable distance from
Soren, concerned that a major crackdown might provoke a
violent reprisal or even sabotage, but since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, regional concerns have come to the
fore and prospects of a unified Korean peninsula loom large
on the horizon for Japan.
Recent confrontations in the Sea of Japan, the Tokyo
Metropolitan Police Department raids on Soren''s central
headquarters and recent inspections of the North Korean
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70
ferry Mangyongbong-92 are clear examples of a new hardline
position against the North and its compatriots in Japan.
The US also continues to diplomatically isolate the
Stalinist state, labeled part of the "Axis of Evil" by US
President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address
on 29 January 2002, preferring to force Kim Jong II to
answer to a multinational front than to engage in bilateral
negotiations, a move now echoed by Japan in its
normalization efforts. Resuming diplomatic normalization
talks initially took a backseat to deliberation concerning
Japanese "crisis" legislation, as Parliament resumed the
politically charged debate concerning Japan's defense
posture, focusing on existing legislation, legal
limitations on the use of force and attempts to clarify the
rules of engagement. The Japanese government has moved to
broaden the ability of Japan's SDF and Coast Guard to
respond to future incursions and attacks on Japan, and
Prime Minister Koizumi has repeated his approval of a
preemptive strike option. Japanese officials are also
considering economic sanctions against the North. In this
light, Sonia Ryang's views of Soren as a legitimate, non
subversive organization struggling to maintain its
political ideology and commitments to the North are
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overshadowed by Japan's perceptions of North Korea and
Soren as threats to national security. The anthropological
tone of Ryang's work and the biases therein may be a mere
reflection of the cost of unprecedented access to such an
insular society as Soren, just as the work of Joseph S.
Bermudez, Jr. reflects the sensitive nature of
intelligence, security and terrorism studies and military
analysis. Japanese policy makers, concerned with issues of
national security, tend to agree with the view of Bermudez.
It is this view that now dominates Japanese foreign policy,
as Japan begins to flex some political muscle and redefine
its role within the international community, using regional
threats and the global war on terror as a justification for
expanding its offensive capabilities. Accordingly, peace
and stability in Northeast Asia, peninsular politics,
Japan-North Korea relations, and issues affecting Japan-
North Korea normalization talks, are being reconsidered, as
are the impact of these issues on the Zainichi Korean
community. This new posture has seemingly nullified
Soren's significance. While Mindan now advocates civil
rights for Zainichi Koreans, i.e. local suffrage, Soren has
become the target of a Japanese government crackdown and is
struggling to maintain a legitimate position, torn between
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72
toting the official North Korean line and promoting the
concerns of its members.
In this new environment, works such as those of
Bermudez further discredit Soren in the eyes of many
Japanese and has prompted security officials to step up
their investigation of Soren and Zainichi Koreans
throughout Japan, especially those with ties to Soren.
Despite a changing attitude toward Japan and a vision of a
future life in Japan and perhaps abroad, a move which has
led to the formation of an emerging third identity - that
of a Korean-Japanese minority group existing in a pluralist
Japanese society - ethnic Koreans have suffered a great
setback due to the excessively emotional media coverage of
the ongoing abduction talks. In particular, Soren
continues to raise the suspicions of Japanese security
officials and politicians. Further, biased media reports
have fostered an atmosphere of intolerance among
conservatives, and Soren and other Zainichi Koreans are
beginning to feel its effects. (Japan Times: 23 November
2002)
In response to news of North Korea's abduction of
Japanese citizens and its initial hesitation to release the
families of the five abductees who were allowed to return
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73
to Japan, for example, "a record 400 people from the
transport ministry, coast guard and other government
ministries were mobilized" and protested the 25 August 2003
port call of the Mangyongbong-92. (Japan Times: 25 and 26
August 2003) In addition to death threats from right-wing
extremists, incidents of verbal and physical abuse directed
against students of Soren schools have seen a sharp
increase. (Japan Times: 20 November 2002)
Despite the political divide between North and South
Korea, the state of affairs between Japan and North Korea
overshadows Japan-South Korea relations. The war against
terrorism has prompted Japanese officials to clamp down on
financial remittances to North Korea. Even before this,
Japanese security officials were considering ways of
applying the Subversive Activities Prevention Law to
"potentially subversive" groups such as Soren. The PSIA
went so far as to collect information on at least 150
Korean residents in Kyoto and Osaka in April and July 2001
as part of its efforts to monitor perceived threats to
national security. (Japan Times: 04 September 2001) The
Subversive Activities Prevention Law in Japan does allow
authorities to monitor organizations such as Soren and the
JCP, and the Ministry of Justice publishes occasional
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74
documents dealing exclusively with the activities of North
Korea, Soren and unstable internal security trends,
including port calls made by the vessel Mangyongbong-92.
This illustrates the significance Japanese officials
attribute to the connection between Soren and North Korea,
evidence of Soren's waning influence on Japanese foreign
policy.
To further illustrate the point, although both Soren
and North Korea have openly criticized Japan for what they
view as a politically motivated crackdown, Japan has
remained steadfast in its approach. One Soren member
stated that the 29 November 2001 police raid of Soren's
central headquarters was an act that would neither be
forgotten nor forgiven. (Japan Times: 30 November 2001)
Given the political row caused by confirmation of North
Korean abductions of Japanese citizens, the abduction issue
has consequently become the major obstacle to normalizing
relations between Japan and North Korea, and there appears
to be no end in sight. Efforts by North Korea to assuage
Japanese concerns over the fate of those abductees it
claimed have died have been met with extreme prejudice;
forensic tests revealed that the remains turned over to
Japan were not those of one of the abductees as North Korea
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75
had reported. According to Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan's
foreign policy approach toward North Korea is two-pronged,
relying on "dialogue and pressure." (Japan Times, 09
December 2004) In this case, Japan's use of diplomatic
channels in Beijing to pressure North Korea indicates
recognition of the value of multilateral approaches to
dealing with North Korea, and, as it tightens its grip on
Soren, further illustrates the group's inability to
influence Japanese politics.
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76
PRESCRIPTIONS
The Zainichi Korean community itself remains divided over
its place in Japanese society. With increasing political
participation at the grassroots level, they very well may
find a way to express their attitudes and concerns, but
without a unified front, this internal debate is compounded
by international politics and unresolved issues of the
past, including Japanese and Korean nationalism and
historically-fixed and politically produced identities,
often overshadowing the efforts of those Zainichi Koreans
striving to carve a niche for themselves in a pluralized
Japanese homeland.
As a diplomatic tool of the North Korean regime in the
post-Cold War world, the ability of Soren to positively
influence relations between Japan and North Korea has been
limited, and its authority as a quasi-legitimate agent of
North Korea and representative of "overseas nationals" will
continue to wane so long as normalization remains stalled.
As long as North Korea remains isolated and fails to
alter its negotiating behavior, hardliners will have
justification for their position and will continue to
suspect Soren's motives. A rise in Japanese nationalism is
another result, and Zainichi Koreans feel the immediate
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77
effects. In terms of its role as intermediary between
Japan and North Korea, Soren has suffered a major setback.
Membership in the organization is ideologically adrift,
some after the death of Kim II Sung in 1994, others
disillusioned by Kim Jong II's revelation concerning the
abduction issue. North Korea is losing its ideological
grip over a large portion of Zainichi Koreans. As a
consequence, Soren's influence on Japan-North Korea
relations has shifted from the center to the periphery.
In order to avoid being subject to the Anti-Subversion
Law or similar political crackdown, Soren members have
begun to promote transparency in their activities. Soren
will have to confront the ideological gap caused by such
recent revelations that effectively dispel Soren
propaganda. To counter disillusionment and limit dissent,
Soren has also reached out to Mindan.
By the same token, Mindan's influence has also been
limited, interestingly enough by the mere fact that ties
between Japan and South Korea have been normalized.
Indeed, the South Korean embassy and consulates in Japan
are well-suited to meet the needs of South Korean
residents, effectively displacing Mindan's role to some
degree. Still, Mindan can work to mobilize grassroots
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78
support, both from Zainichi Koreans and Japanese, for
broader civil rights and play a role in influencing
domestic politics at the local level. It might also use
its South Korean ties to apply outside pressure, though it
is more likely that it will continue to facilitate South
Korean initiatives, i.e. the move for local suffrage.
Joining forces these groups would have a louder voice.
In the spirit of a unified peninsula, North and South
Koreans have presented a number of examples of cooperation.
At the summer Olympics they presented a unified front and
marched in together. So too have Zainichi Koreans echoed
this "One Korea" sentiment. The historic North-South
summit of June 2000 was a significant step toward
reunification. The summit raised hopes and served to bring
about gestures of good-will and solidarity between Soren
and Mindan.
In a message to former Soren Chairman Han Dok Su,
Mindan head Kim Jae Sook called for "unconditional
dialogues and exchanges for peaceful reunification of the
Korean peninsula and lasting reconciliation in the Korean
community in Japan, based on the South-North Joint
Declaration." (Chin, 2001: 65) In response, Han Dok Su
proposed joint efforts aimed at building ties between the
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79
two rival groups. Thus far the groups have co-hosted a
number of events. Chin Hee Gwan attributes the positive
changes in relations between the groups to the appointment
of new Soren Chairman So Man Sul. In a message delivered
in September 1999, Chairman So admitted that Soren had
overemphasized political ideology and stressed the need for
Soren to refocus and "rebuild itself into a 'citizen-
oriented' organization that respects the opinion of its
Korean compatriots." (Chin, 2001: 66) In addition to a
modern curriculum in its affiliated schools, Soren has also
toned down its anti-South rhetoric, especially since the
joint North-South summit and declaration. Other changes
include the establishment of a law school at Soren's Chosun
University and the beginning of home visits to South Korea.
The visits were proposed by North Korea and agreed upon
during the North-South summit. (Chin, 2001: 68) Such
positive developments could lead to a more open and
cooperative relationship between Soren and Mindan and begin
the journey toward a collective vision for all Zainichi
Koreans.
In the view of many Korean opinion leaders opposed to
naturalization, "the challenge for the Korean community is
to retain ethnic identity and cultural heritage while
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80
securing the equality of rights and opportunity as
residents in Japanese society." (Ryang, 2000: 29) By
focusing on politics at the local level, Zainichi Koreans
could carve a niche within Japanese society. Erin Chung
argues that
...recent generations of Korean community
activists have used their noncitizen status as
part of a political strategy to negotiate the
terms of their community's incorporation and
thereby diversify the meaning of Japanese
citizenship itself." (Chung, 2003: 55)
A unified Korea might effectively restore a sense of
common identity and could radically alter the lives of
hundreds of thousands of Zainichi Koreans, but it could
also provide Soren members a way to finally establish
formal relations with a Korean, if not North Korean,
government. Such actions would certainly provoke Japanese
suspicions toward Zainichi Korean groups. The results will
likely lead to further disillusionment. Consequently,
Soren members will continue to distance themselves
ideologically, opting not to join the organization, abandon
it altogether, or, as evidenced by the Kinki branch's
recently voiced opposition to Soren's CSC, move toward
regional group autonomy. If, however, the organization
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81
manages to redirect its focus and, instead of propagating
the North Korean Communist Party line, direct its efforts
toward proactively representing the common interests of its
members at both the local and national level, or even
reconciliatory and cooperative measures with Mindan, other
Zainichi Korean groups and non-government groups, including
sympathetic Japanese, it may indeed play a vital role in
shaping the lives of Zainichi Koreans for generations to
come. For now, it appears that broad-based groups, i.e.
Mintoren, have a greater chance of influencing Japanese
politics. Their apolitical identity, their focus on
practical matters and their exploitation of international
views toward civil society and civil rights have enabled
them to set the groundwork for a new identity, one that is
no longer possessed by ideas of "passing" as Japanese and
embracing pluralism. This idea will become increasingly
salient for a Japan confronted with a rapidly declining
birthrate, aging population and shrinking workforce.
By representing the collective interests and concerns
of Zainichi Koreans and by evoking images of a unified
peninsula, Zainichi Koreans could, in addition to serving
as a middle man between North and South Korea and Japan,
engage local and national levels of government in Japan to
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affect positive change and improve civil and social rights.
Whether through assimilation or accommodation, the Zainichi
Korean community will continue to be linked to peninsular
politics or by exploiting international norms to improve
their place within Japanese society.
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83
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Asset Metadata

Creator Vela, John Stephen (author)

Core Title The impact of ethnic mobilization in postwar Japan: A reflection of Japan's two Korea policy

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag history, Asia, Australia and Oceania,OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations,sociology, ethnic and racial studies

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c16-48214

Unique identifier UC11327447

Identifier 1427986.pdf (filename),usctheses-c16-48214 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 1427986.pdf

Dmrecord 48214

Document Type Thesis

Rights Vela, John Stephen

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA