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Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan

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Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan

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MARKET REFORMS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY:
NON-NATIONAL IDENTITY OF KAZAKHSTAN

by

Azamat Zhanalin

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

MAY 2011

Copyright 2011 Azamat Zhanalin

ii
Table of Contents
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... iv
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. vi
Map of the Republic of Kazakhstan.................................................................................... 2
Chapter 1: Historical Background ...................................................................................... 1
The Origins of the Kazakh Nation .................................................................................. 4
The Fragmentation of the Kazakh Nation ....................................................................... 9
Russian Protectorate...................................................................................................... 13
Russian Colonization .................................................................................................... 16
The Ethno-Political Legacy of the Soviet Union in the Kazakh steppe ....................... 25
The Soviet Cultural Policies and Their Impact on the Kazakhs ................................... 31
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 38
Chapter 2: Non-National Identity of Kazakhstan: Concepts and Methods for the
Study ................................................................................................................................. 40
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 40
Review of National Identity Literature on Kazakhstan and Central Asia .................... 43
Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 56
Methods of Analysis ..................................................................................................... 64
Evidence Collection ...................................................................................................... 69
Chapter 3: Aktau ............................................................................................................... 75
Historical Background of Mangystau ........................................................................... 76
Foundation of Aktau ..................................................................................................... 82
Economic Crash and Recovery after Independence ..................................................... 88
Arrival of Foreign Oil Companies ................................................................................ 93
Wage Discrimination and Damage Control of the Oil Companies ............................. 102
Identity in Aktau ......................................................................................................... 112
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 121
Chapter 4: Almaty ........................................................................................................... 123
Geographical Location ................................................................................................ 125
Significant Historical and Geographical Facts ........................................................... 126
Status ........................................................................................................................... 136
Almaty – Crossroads of Civilizations ......................................................................... 148
The Economic Powerhouse......................................................................................... 158
Identity ........................................................................................................................ 164
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 175
Chapter 5: Astana ............................................................................................................ 177
Historical Background ................................................................................................ 178
iii
Moving the Capital ..................................................................................................... 181
Symbolism .................................................................................................................. 189
Islamic Secularism of Kazakhstan .............................................................................. 204
Economy ..................................................................................................................... 210
Identity ........................................................................................................................ 215
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 229
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 231
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 238
Appendix: Survey Overview........................................................................................... 258

iv
List of Figures
Figure 1: Map of the Republic of Kazakhstan .................................................................... 2
Figure 2: 3 Bis: Kazybek Bi, Toli Bi and Aiteke Bi ......................................................... 10
Figure 3: Underground Mosque Beket-Ata in Mangystau ............................................... 79
Figure 4: View on Aktau with Oil-tankers in the Background ......................................... 86
Figure 5: Total Industrial Output of Mangystau Oblast in 1991-1997 ............................. 90
Figure 6: Urban Population by Ethnicity and Total Urban and Rural Population in
Mangystau Oblast 1970-1999 .......................................................................... 92
Figure 7: Aktau Attitudes towards Market Reforms ......................................................... 99
Figure 8: Language Preference in Aktau ........................................................................ 115
Figure 9: Aktau perceptions regarding the National Idea of Kazakhstan ....................... 119
Figure 10: General Perception about Globalization, Market Reforms, and FDI in
Aktau .............................................................................................................. 120
Figure 11: Almaty in Summer ........................................................................................ 125
Figure 12: Almaty as City-Garden .................................................................................. 132
Figure 13: The Golden Man ............................................................................................ 134
Figure 14: Urban and Rural Demographic Trends in Kazakhstan over Last 50 years ... 140
Figure 15: Attitude toward media role in the society ..................................................... 144
Figure 16: Proportion of Russian Population in Almaty and Astana.............................. 149
Figure 17: Almaty Economic Role in the Republic ........................................................ 159
Figure 18: Small and Foreign Business in Kazakhstan .................................................. 163
Figure 19: Almaty Population and Proportion of the Two Major Ethnic Groups .......... 165
Figure 20: Almaty Preference for Language Policy in Kazakhstan ............................... 166
Figure 21: Attitude toward religion in Almaty versus other parts of the country ........... 167
v
Figure 22: Almaty Attitude toward the Nomadic Pastoralism, Its Traditions and
History ............................................................................................................ 168
Figure 23: Almaty Perception of What Constitutes National Identity ............................ 169
Figure 24: Display of the Art of Kiuy, Day of the Capital, Astana, 2006 ....................... 197
Figure 25: Vodno-zelenyi Bul’var and the New Government Complex in Astana ........ 199
Figure 26: Attitude toward religion in Astana versus other parts of the country ........... 209
Figure 27: Annual Rate of Real Estate Construction ...................................................... 212
Figure 28: Astana’s Economic Role in Kazakhstan ....................................................... 214
Figure 29: Population of Astana and Major Ethnic Groups ........................................... 216
Figure 30: Astana Perception of What Constitutes National Identity ............................. 222
Figure 31: Astana Preference for Language Policy in Kazakhstan ................................ 223
Figure 32: Astana Attitude Toward the Nomadic Pastoralism, Traditions and
History ............................................................................................................ 228

vi
Abstract
The present study offers an analysis of the concept of non-national identity in
application to the Republic of Kazakhstan as the most likely case. The primary
hypothesis is that newly independent states, which are undergoing a rapid transition to
market economy and actively pursue integration in the world economy and foreign direct
investment, will experience fragmentation of their national identity, defined as non-
national identity.
Three sites in Kazakhstan, Almaty, Astana and Aktau, were chosen for the study
as representative of the market reforms in the republic as well as the best examples of the
country’s pursuit of foreign direct investment and integration into the global economy.
The data collected indicates that while Kazakhstan does demonstrate fragmentation of its
national identity, it is not necessarily caused by the market reforms and the participation
in the global trade. Alternative causal variables such as the Soviet and Russian colonial
legacy, intra-ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs and the prevalence of multi-vector
foreign policy were found to contribute to the development of non-national identity of
Kazakhstan. The study’s results also suggest that in the last few years, Kazakh identity is
experiencing a rather strong revival as well, which may yet counteract the existing factors
leading to the emergence of the non-national identity of Kazakhstan.

1
Chapter 1: Historical Background
At the heart of Eurasian continent, there lies the land of the Kazakhs, one of the
last nomadic people in the world. It is called the Republic of Kazakhstan, a vast
1
and yet
relatively unknown country. It is the aim of this chapter is to provide a brief summary of
the historical background of this country as an introduction to the subject of the entire
project.
Kazakh history is fraught with peril. The Kazakhs have faced numerous
challenges which sometimes brought them to the brink of destruction but they braved the
adversity and survived to establish their own state once again in 1991. This chapter will
introduce these trials: the rise and fragmentation of the Kazakh nation, its incorporation
into the Russian Empire and ensuing colonization, and finally Soviet collectivization and
ideological assimilation. The discussion of these factors in the history of the Kazakhs is
necessary in order to understand the modern processes of identity formation in this
country.
The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of Kazakh origins, formation of the
first Kazakh khanate and its fragmentation onto three tribal federations. Next,
incorporation and ensuing colonization of the Kazakh lands by the Russian Empire will
be examined. After that, the Soviet period and the impact of Soviet policies and ideology
on the collective memory and identity of the Kazakhs will be discussed.

1
2,724,900 square kilometers, 9
th
largest in the world territorially, slightly less than 4 times the size of
Texas (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011)

Figure 1: Map of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Source: (Olcott M. , 2010, p. back page)
2
3
The study of Kazakh history is complicated by a biased scholarship. Since the
Kazakhs themselves kept next to no paper-based
2
archives, only in the 19
th
century
Russian and Russian-trained Kazakh scholars and bureaucrats, who were working for the
Russian colonial administration, began to maintain systematic records of Kazakh history,
culture and traditions.
3
Their scholarship was exemplary in many respects, but also
flawed due to the organizational role and the prevalence of racist views in historiography
which downplayed the value of achievements of the Kazakh nomadic civilization.
(Irmuhanov, 2008, pp. 123-124). For example Levshin, a tsarist official, provided an
invaluable contribution to the study of Kazakh history and yet, his work displayed
misunderstanding of the nomadic culture embodied in his characterization of the Kazakhs
as lazy and greedy. (Ibid)
Under the Soviet Union, the situation barely improved, in fact, the communist
ideology required identification of the Kazakhs as a feudal and backward society. Any
independent thinking about the history of the Kazakhs was severely persecuted. Very few
historians had the courage to pursue an objective, impartial study of Kazakh history and
those who did, were arrested and convicted of anti-Soviet propaganda or similar faults.
4

2
Collective memory of the Kazakhs was primarily stored and transmitted orally through poetic and singing
traditions
3
The most notable of them were Levshin (Opisanie Kirgiz-Kazach'ikh ili Kirgiz-Kaisatskikh ord i stepei,
1832), Radlov (Iz Sibiri, 1989), Chuloshnikov (Ocherki po istorii Kirgiz-Kazakhov, 2007), Valikhanov
(Etnograficheskoe nasledie kazakhov, 2007), Vel’iaminov-Zernov (Issledovanie o Kasimovykh tsariakh i
tsarevichakh, 1863), and Kharuzin (Kirgizy Bukeevskoi ordy (Antropologo-etnograficheskiy ocherk),
1889)
4
This happened to E. Bekhmakhanov, who was arrested and convicted in 1952 for publishing a very
positive portrayal of the Kazakh uprising in early 19
th
century against Russia. (Takenov, 1992)
4
As a result, the Kazakh historiography produced during the Soviet period was very
limited and devoted exclusively to the Soviet period itself, further diminishing the quality
and amount of scholarship on early Kazakh history and the origins of the Kazakh nation.
(Masanov, Abylhozhin, & Erofeeva, 2007, p. 57)
The Origins of the Kazakh Nation
The challenge of addressing the origins of the Kazakh nation is exemplified by
the etymological diversity of the root of the word “Kazakh” itself that became the name
of an entire nation. Researchers today offer as many as 150 different explanations for the
origins of the word Kazakh ranging from mythical and religious to ethnographical and
anthropological. The range of alleged dates when the word came in use is equally
impressive: 250BC to 1925. (Kaidar, 2008, p. 345) Furthermore, there is no consensus on
the exact causes and the date of the origin of the Kazakh nation. Nevertheless, one
particular account became an indispensable part in the modern nationalist Kazakh
rhetoric. A person named Alash is believed to be the progenitor for all Kazakhs and even
though there is no verifiable data available, Kazakh historians do find multiple references
to this name in various ancient sources, which suggests that a person or a clan with such
name may have existed in the past. Alash has captured the imagination of the Kazakhs
when his name was adopted as the title for the first modern national independence
movement in the early 20
th
century.
5
As a matter of fact, the word Alash is increasingly

5
In its turn, the early 20
th
century Alash Orda has a profound effect on the post-independence Kazakh
national identity politics
5
used as an interchangeable term with the word “Kazakh” in media and government
rhetoric in the last few years (2009-2011).
6

In the mid 15
th
century a Kazakh khanate emerged on the remnants of the Mongol
empire, linked to the names of the first two Kazakh khans in history – Zhanibek and
Kerei. When it first appeared, the Kazakh khanate was not a very large or powerful
polity, located in the South-Eastern portion of modern Kazakhstan, a region known as
Zhety-su (‘Seven Rivers’ in Kazakh or Semirechie in Russian sources).
7
However, it
expanded rather quickly and by 1511 encompassed almost all of the territory of modern
Kazakhstan, establishing the first unified Kazakh khanate under Qasym khan. (Sultanov
T. I., 2003, pp. 59-63) More importantly, as the Kazakh khanate grew larger and stronger,
it also became a catalyst for the formation of the Kazakh nation from a number of
disparate Turkic nomadic tribes who joined together out of political necessity but stayed
together to share a common and distinctive culture and traditions.
8
(Ibid, p. 52)
Kazakh historian Sultanov highlights the importance of relationship between the
emergence of the Kazakh polity and the nation. According to him, the term “Kazakh” did
not identify an ethnic group of a specific genealogical lineage but rather a disparate group
of people who share freedom, ability to earn their living by only relying on themselves
and people of similar occupation. That is, any nomad without attachment to a specific

6
Although, the term usage is connected to Alash Orda, an independent Kazakh state established in 1917
rather than the mythical figure of Alash. A frequent show on public radio in Kazakhstan is devoted to Alash
Orda and it popularized this terminological substitution.
7
Zhety-su is frequently referred to as the cradle of the Kazakh nation in the modern media and nationalist
rhetoric.
8
Turkic language, common religious beliefs, and nomadic traditions
6
polity and without wealth could have been called Kazakh. In other words, being Kazakh
was a social phenomenon rather than an ethnic or genealogical one. (Sultanov T. I., 2003,
p. 51) Later on, however, lineage does become one of the most important markers of
Kazakh identity, in particular in the late 19
th
- and early 20
th
century as it will be discussed
below.
This account fits a classic definition of nation, offered by Smith: it is “a named
human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all
members.” (Smith A. D., 1995, p. 14) The Kazakh khanate defined the territory which
was fluid
9
but nonetheless certain and covered most, if not all, of modern Kazakhstan
thanks to a developed network of the Kazakh nomadic migration patterns that covered
huge distances. The myths and historical memories were already shared by the nomads
thanks to age long nomadic traditions and way of life, oral music and poetic culture in
particular. The latter, in fact, was essentially the medium for developing, sustaining and
transmitting collective memories of the Kazakh nomads through time,
10
establishing a
semblance of “mass and public culture”. Common economy was defined by nomadism
and legal system was refined from the tribal legacy of the steppe by the Kazakh khanate.
Qasym khan, for example, is believed to have developed a set of laws in the early 16
th

9
Due to the nature of nomadic life
10
One of the most notable Kazakh traditions is aitys, a music and singing competition between two artists
who compose songs and perform them in one continuous exchange of arguments on a particular topic,
usually while playing on the traditional Kazakh lute-like instrument dombra. It is very much like a rap
competition of the modern age with more of music and melody involved. (Author’s observation)
7
century which drew on the customary law of the nomads and became the common law of
the Kazakhs, further developed in Khan Tauke’s Zhety Zharghy
11
in the late 17
th
century.
(Istoriia Kazakhstana, 1997, p. 366) Today, the concepts of the Kazakh nation and the
Kazakh state became inalienable in the mind of the people in Kazakhstan.
12

Smith’s definition of nation also fits another account of the origins of the Kazakh
nation offered by Masanov in 1995, which gained popularity in the last decade. He
suggests a causal relationship between nomadic lifestyle and Kazakh identity. Drawing
on the theory of geographical possibilism, he argues that it was the environment of
Kazakh steppes that made disparate nomadic tribes into parts of one whole – the Kazakh
nation. The unity of these tribes was not established overnight, it was thousands of years
of pastoral nomadism in the arid steppes of Kazakhstan that brought them together, both
from within and from outside of Central Asia; forging a strong sense of community
among them. It was not a smooth process, subject to frequent political and ethnic
upheavals including massive invasions, wars and migrations that took place in or
originated from Central Asia. Nonetheless, nothing was able to stop formation of the
nomadic culture and identity specific to the Kazakh steppe which established the Kazakh
nation. (Masanov N. , 1995)
Masanov’s examination of the nomadic identity and its close relationship with the
land and environment of the Kazakh steppe provides essential parts of the puzzle for the
formation of the Kazakh nation according to Smith’s definition of the concept. The

11
More on that below
12
Author’s observation
8
territory inhabited by the Kazakh nomads was defined by a set of environmental
conditions, specific to the Kazakh land. It is 90% plains (including 40% deserts) and most
of it is severely arid. (Masanov N. , 1995, p. 47) In such conditions, only pastoral
nomadic economy was feasible (Kshibekov, 2006, p. 41).
In its turn, this specific economic model defined a specific community, culture
and traditions. The nomads formed small, tightly knit communities called aul that
survived off the huge tracts of land by using it as pasture for a large number of livestock
that supplied them with everything needed to survive in the inhospitable steppe
environment: food, drink and raw materials for crafts, i.e. tools, cloth, housing,
ornaments, cultural implements. (Kshibekov, 2006, p. 45) The nomads developed an
intimate knowledge of the land and the environment. Such skills were developed to a
level of reflex when the elders where able predict weather based on their empirical
observations and instincts without the help of any modern scientific methods or
instruments.
13
(Kshibekov, 2006, p. 15) This valuable knowledge, accumulated over
thousands of years of nomadic way of life, was passed from generation to generation,
forging a sense of continuity and community, affirming the importance of lineage.
(Masanov N. , 1995, p. 239)
Contacts with other nomads were so rare due to large distances separating them,
that every such occasion became extremely valued, further reinforcing the sense of
community between them. Even a visit from a stranger was a cause for celebration, and

13
As a matter of fact, the ability to predict weather is still present in rural areas, confirmed by an official of
Agriculture Department, Mangystau Oblast Administration, 8/4/2009, where the harsh climate and pastoral
nomadic Kazakhs in sufficient numbers were able to preserve such traditional skills.
9
any Kazakh will slaughter the last remaining livestock animal to welcome and feed a
guest even if it means hunger for his own family. (Kshibekov, 2006, p. 20) The nomadic
way of life became the common denominator in the Kazakh steppes, the foundation for
the shared memories and legacy of the nomads, defining their “mass culture” (Smith A.
D., 1995, p. 14), stored and transmitted via the aforementioned oral music and poetic
traditions. Today, the nomadic past of the Kazakhs is being highlighted as the definitive
characteristic of the Kazakh nationhood
14
in the modern nationalist rhetoric, as it will be
discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters.
The Fragmentation of the Kazakh Nation
Unfortunately, the unity of the Kazakhs proved to be unstable. The Kazakh
khanate was subject to centrifugal forces and only a few Khans, Qasym (1511-1523) and
Tauke (1680-1718) in particular, were able to govern all of the Kazakhs unlike many
other Khans. In the early 16
th
century, a tri-partite political division of the Kazakhs came
forth when they split onto three Zhuses (Hordes or Hundreds) known as the Great (Ulu)
Horde, Middle (Orta) Horde and Small (Kishi) Horde. These were tribal federations, each
of which included a number of separate patrilineal groupings or tribes, and associated
with a specific progenitor, or father-figure. In the late 17
th
-early 18
th
century, Khan Tauke
is credited with overcoming this division to unite the Kazakhs once more by establishing
a council of bis
15
from all three Hordes. Of the latter, most notable are Tole Bi (the Great

14
A prominent history professor at the Eurasian University, Astana, noted that Kazakhs were a united
people during the nomadic period of their history (interviewed on 6/29/2009)
15
Bi was traditionally a judge in the Kazakh nomadic society
10
Horde), Kazybek Bi (the Middle Horde) and Aiteke Bi (the Small Horde) who came to
embody the unity of the Kazakh nation today, their image appears frequently in the
public space. Their likeness even adorns a box of chocolates, made in Almaty,
symbolizing their aspirations for the Kazakh nationhood: all three bis gathered together
under a single roof of the traditional Kazakh nomadic tent (see Figure 2). The biis and
Tauke Khan are also believed to have developed a system of laws called Zhety Zharghy
(Seven Statutes), which codified and expanded the Kazakh customary law facilitating its
use well into the 19
th
century. (Uzbekuly, 1998) (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 1997, pp. 424-
425)
Figure 2: 3 Bis: Kazybek Bi, Toli Bi and Aiteke Bi

Source: chocolate box cover art (Rakhat)
11
Geographically, the grazing and migration lands of the Hordes were spread out
over the entire territory of the Kazakh steppe. Each Horde confined itself to the pastures
and migration routes it had staked and even today, most of the Kazakhs still live in same
parts of the country
16
as their nomadic ancestors did in the past. Semirechie and Syr-
Darya region, located in South and South-East of modern Kazakhstan, is the region of the
Great Horde’s residence. 11 major tribes of the Great Horde populate the region:
Dzhalair, Suan, Alban, Isty, Sary-Usun, Kanly, Shaprashty, Dulat, Oshakty, Shanyshkly
and Srgeli. The Small Horde, located in Western Kazakhstan, consists of three major
tribes each of which also consists of several smaller tribes: Alimuly (Shekty, Shomekei,
Tortkara, Kete, Karakesek, Karasakal), Baiuly (Adai, Baibakty, Bersh, Tazlar, Serkesh,
Maskar, Tana, Kyzylkurt, Zhanpas) and Zhetyru (Tabyn, Zhagalbaily, Kereit, Tama,
Toleu, Kerderi, Ramadan). The Middle Horde occupies Central and North-Eastern
portion of Kazakhstan and includes 7 major tribes: Naiman, Kerei, Uak, Arghyn,
Kypchak, Kongrat and Tarakty. (Masanov, Abylhozhin, & Erofeeva, 2007, pp. 80-82)
Each of these tribes believes to have descended from a single ancestor whose name
determined the name of the tribe, just as all the Kazakhs are believed to have descended
from a single progenitor Alash. As such, all these tribes had their own heraldic seal or
symbol called tamga
17
, linked to the progenitor of the tribe and used as an identification
symbol, especially to brand livestock as one’s possessions.

16
See map on page 2
17
Similar to the European notion of the family coat of arms
12
The exact causes and dates of the Horde division are subject to the same
controversy as is the origins of the Kazakh nation itself. What is certain that the partition
was both political and social. Sometime in 16 century, each Horde started to elect their
own Khan who behaved as a sovereign on their behalf without necessarily pledging
allegiance to the Khan of all the Kazakhs. The Hordes’ primary purpose, however, is
believed to be to provide an extra layer of social hierarchy within the Kazakh nomadic
society. (Sultanov T. I., 2003, p. 152) The names of the Hordes had nothing to do with
their size. For example, the Middle Horde was the largest, but it was in the middle in
terms of privileges and social status expressed in the distribution of the spoils of war, or
seating arrangement during a meeting, respect paid to its members and so on. (Ibid)
A better explanation of the Horde emergence is offered by Masanov who
approaches the issue from his position of geographical possibilism. (Masanov N. , 1995)
He argues that the Hordes evolved from three different geographical climate zones in
Kazakhstan: the already mentioned Zhety-su (Semirechie), Central Kazakhstan and
Western Kazakhstan areas. These zones varied slightly in terms of aridity, soil fertility,
and access to fresh water. Thus, the Kazakh nomads adopted slightly different lifestyles
and nomadic routes in these areas, creating a sub-set of sub-cultures within the general
community of the Kazakh nomads and setting the stage for to the emergence of the three
distinct Hordes. (Masanov, Abylhozhin, & Erofeeva, 2007, p. 82)
Whatever the reason, the arrival of the Hordes has fundamentally affected identity
of the Kazakhs and have had a significant role in determining the course of politics and
13
national identity formation to this day by adding another layer of fragmentation within
the Kazakh nation and by shaping regional political alliances.
Russian Protectorate
The Kazakhs found themselves divided and unable to mount an effective defense
against external threats such as those presented by Oirats (Dzhunghar and Kalmyks)
18
in
the early 18
th
century. In fact, the Dzhunghar massive raids of that time were so traumatic
in the collective memory of the Kazakhs that that time period is referred to as the “Years
of the Great Calamity.” (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 2000, p. 156) On the other hand, Russia’s
rapid population growth was driving its desire to expand, seeking additional territories
and economic resources to sustain itself (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 61), and Russia was
pressuring its various nomadic neighbors to submit to it. As a matter of fact, no other
“state, not even China, contributed so much to defeating, driving back, and subduing the
great warrior nomads.” (Chaliand, 2004, p. 101)
In these circumstances, the Khan of the Small Horde, famous warrior and military
chieftain Abu'l Khayr did not see any other choice but to turn to the Russian empire
seeking protection against the Oirat threat. In 1731, his request was granted. (Olcott M. ,
1995, p. 27) At the same time, the Khan of the Middle Horde, Semeke, was approached
by the Russians with the same offer to accept Russia’s protection and which he did in
1732. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 32) The Great Horde also received a similar offer but since it

18
Oirats are nomadic tribes who originated from Mongolia. Part of them moved westward close to the then
Russian territory to become Kalmyks while the rest became known as Dzhunghar.
14
was located further away from Russia, it was not incorporated for another hundred years,
except for one tribe which accepted the protectorate in 1742.
It took Russia that long to actually be able to exert full control over the Small and
Middle Horde Kazakhs who, despite swearing fealty to the Russian crown, did not submit
to its authority. The Kazakh Khans in this time period frequently sought patronage from
other principalities as well, like Dzhunghars, China, Kokand or Persia. In particular,
Ablai Khan of the Middle Horde is indeed celebrated today in Kazakhstan as a shrewd
politician who skillfully played off China and Russia by offering allegiance to both in the
mid to late 18
th
century and kept his people independent of the external control. As such,
he commanded a great deal of respect and was able to rule the Kazakhs with very little
interference from outside, unlike Khans of the Great and Small Horde. (Olcott M. , 1995,
pp. 40-41)
Formally, both Small and Middle Hordes joined the Russian protectorate as early
as 1731 and 1732, respectively, but it took Russia much longer to realize the terms of the
agreements. In many cases Khans, who swore fealty, did not represent all of the tribes in
their respective Hordes, and this fact frequently produced tensions between the Khans
submitting to Russia and others resisting that, leading a string of rebellions which
followed one another. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 44) These rebellions, uncooperative Khans, as
well expanding Russian economic interests in Central Asia were the factors which
necessitated a more direct involvement of Russia in administering the Kazakhs to insure
security of its trade routes and to reinforce its position against the growing influence of
15
Great Britain in Asia.
19
This process was initiated in 1784 with an administrative reform
to reinforce Khan’s powers in the Small Horde and culminated with an abolishment of
the Khan position entirely in favor of an indirect Russian administrative control over the
steppe in 1822. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 46 and 58)
The Great Horde’s incorporation into the Russian empire was much more difficult
as its lands were also coveted by expansionary and powerful Central Asian khanates of
Kokand and Khiva which sought to control the trade routes from China passing through
the Great Horde’s territory in the early 19
th
century. (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 2000, p. 283)
Driven by the Great Game,
20
Russia resorted to force and captured Syr Darya towns in
order to expand its control over the lands of the Great Horde in the mid 19
th
century. The
exact dates and duration of the Russian expansion to include the Great Horde into the
empire and the final date of incorporation of all the Kazakhs are subject to controversy,
complicated by the uncertain allegiances of the Kazakh tribes of the Great Horde some of
whom supported the Russians and others – Kokand. By one estimate, the final
incorporation of the Great Horde came in the 1850s when Russian military campaigns
against Khiva and Kokand in the 1830s and 1840s resulted in the capture of the Great
Horde territories in Semirechie and Syr Darya regions. This was followed by the erection
of the additional military fort lines further into the Steppe. (Bekmakhanov, 1992, p. 345)

19
About the same time, Kazakh steppes also attracted attention of the British Empire which was looking
past its Afghan holdings to engage in the Great Game with Russia over the Central Asia (Bekmakhanov,
1992, p. 116)
20
A diplomatic competition with the British Empire for the influence in Asia in the second half of 19
th

century. (Geyer, 1987, pp. 94-95)
16
Other researchers indicate that only the capture of Tashkent and an establishment of the
Turkestan administrative-territorial unit in 1867 brought about Russia’s firm control over
the Kazakh Steppe and launched the colonizing process it in the earnest. (Olcott M. ,
1995, p. 76) (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 2000, p. 381)
In other words, if the Kazakhs sought only protection from the Russian Empire in
the 18
th
century, the relationship between them changed fundamentally in the 19
th
century
when Russia commenced an outright colonization of the Kazakh steppe.
Russian Colonization
The 1822 “Regulation on Siberian Kirgiz”
21
, also known as the Speransky
22

reform, sought to control and to change the Kazakh nomads through the combination of
reforms in administration and the legal system – with an ultimate goals of turning them
into settled peasants. (Martin, 2000, p. 38) For thousands of years, specific patterns of
migration were developed by various nomadic tribes to allow maximum pasture with
minimum overlap between them. The Russian empire disregarded these patterns by
expanding its presence in the region which took form of a line of military fort
installations, which disrupted age-long Kazakh routes of migration. Not only that, the
Russian authorities frequently bought out and fenced off the most fertile lands for their

21
For a long time, the Russians referred to the Kazakhs as Kirgiz for various reasons. For one thing, the
Russians did not want to confuse Cossacks with the Kazakhs, who, by one theory, coincidentally took the
same name for the same reasons the Kazakhs did: to identify themselves as vagabonds, free of any
authority.
22
Speransky was a prominent Russian statesman, the governor of Siberia at the time of the reforms
17
troops
23
and their families, teaching the Kazakhs a lesson in private ownership of land.
24

Essentially, the environment that gave birth to the Kazakh nation of nomads was being
gradually appropriated by the expanding sedentary agricultural empire for its own
purposes. Moreover, Russia saw itself as a benevolent power, bringing civilization and
progress to the backwards nomad barbarians. The 1822 reforms aimed to convert the
Kazakhs into sedentary peasants, an act of which was deemed beneficial for them since
the Russian administration considered the nomadic way of life inherently inferior to that
of the settled people. (Martin, 2000, p. 40)
The forced transition to sedentary agriculture was not an easy choice for the
nomads, who considered it somewhat beneath their dignity. Shrinking pasture lands lead
to the conflicts between the Kazakh tribes and they started to clash with one another as
they did in the past with Kalmyks and Dzhunghar. The tensions due to the competition
over pasture lands, access to water and other shrinking resources lead to an alienation
between the Kazakh tribes within their tribal federations, and had a negative impact on
Kazakh identity because these sub-national allegiances became more and more important
due the intensifying rivalry. The administrative reforms also contributed to this
estrangement by increasing the administrative powers of the local authorities of
individual Kazakh tribes at the expense of Khans. Ultimately, the Russian legal and
administrative reforms aimed to curtail the Kazakhs’ reliance on pastoral nomadism as an
incentive to settle. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 99)

23
Most of whom were Cossacks
24
The Kazakh traditionally did not own the land, it was held in communal ownership instead
18
With administrative changes, the burden on the Kazakhs increased when they
began being taxed.
25
Combined with reduced availability of pasture lands caused by the
colonial policies, the reforms left very little choice to the Kazakhs – either settle or rebel
against the expansion of the Russian presence on their territory. Many chose to take up
the arms. Most notably, Kenisary Qasimov in 1837 was able to organize the strongest
resistance against Russia. He was a grandson of Ablai Khan mentioned above. As an heir
to one of the greatest Kazakh Khans, Kinesary commanded a great deal of respect from
all the Kazakh tribes who were able to put their differences aside and joined him to
oppose the expansion of the Russian empire. Buoyed by such wide support, Kinesary’s
rebellion was rather successful at first but eventually the superior numbers and
(marginally) better equipment allowed the Russian forces to put an end to his uprising
and make Kinesary acquiesce to the Russian dominance in the steppe in 1846.
Afterwards, he left the Kazakh lands and joined a Kirgiz uprising, dying thereafter in a
battle against Kokand (Olcott M. , 1995, pp. 66-67) (Bekmakhanov, 1992)
Failing to change the encroachment of the Russian colonial rule by force, the
Kazakh nomads were unable to stop the loss of their lands; consequently, the severely
limited pasture lands could no longer provide enough sustenance for their survival.
Russia was continuously expanding territorially, frequently without securing any
agreement or even without consultation with the Kazakhs. As a result, lack of pastures
coupled with the vicissitudes of the harsh climate increasingly exposed the Kazakhs to

25
Arguably, the introduction of monetary taxation marked the beginning of the end of traditional nomadic
Kazakh national identity (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 76)
19
poverty and famine. Still, very few Kazakhs abandoned their nomadic pursuits in favor of
agriculture and even those who did, grew crops only to feed their cattle rather than for
themselves. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 84) (Masanov N. , 1995, p. 234)
The pastoral nomadic ways of the Kazakhs experienced the largest setback yet in
the post-reform era when Russia abolished serfdom in 1861-1866, freeing millions of
peasants and unleashing their land hunger. While initially, the former serfs were kept as
cheap workforce in the European parts of the empire, further economic reforms and lack
of land there prompted a mass peasant exodus to Siberia,
26
where large stretches of land
were gradually brought into the fold of the growing Russia by the expeditions of the fur
trappers and Cossacks. If at first, the Russian government discouraged migration at a
large scale and even tried to stop it, eventually it recognized the benefit of granting
available land to the masses of impoverished peasants as a measure of solving the
economic problems, in particular the issue of declining agricultural production. (Sabol,
2003, pp. 41-42) Consequently, the Russian government decided to allow the migration
and even started making plans to that effect.
The Kazakh steppes became the primary destinate for peasant relocation in the
process. In 1863, the Kazakh lands were declared state property; and in 1891 it was
determined that there was a great deal of ‘surplus’ land which the Kazakh nomads had no
use for, at least from the Russian point of view. The 1889 Resettlement Act introduced a
set of policies allowing any peasant from European Russia to resettle to certain provinces

26
Russians and other subjects of the Russian empire have been coming to Siberia and Central Asia for
hundreds of years in search of a better life. However, the migration was limited, mostly illegal or driven by
defensive measures of the Russian government. (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 71)
20
in Siberia and the Kazakh Steppe where land was declared available (Martin, 2000, p. 70)
and this law was widely publicized among the impoverished peasants to encourage their
migration. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 88) Thus, the Tsarist government found a way to reduce
population and social pressures in Russia’s central regions by relocating as many
peasants as possible to the periphery, mostly to the East.
The idea was that by renting land from the Kazakhs who did not ‘need’ it
anyways, the Russians would be actually providing an additional source of income for the
nomads. (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 79) Of course, the Russians did not understand that they
were the cause for the impoverishment of the Kazakhs in the first place: the prior colonial
policies partitioning the Kazakh steppe limited available land for pastoral nomadism and
the nomad’s ability to provide for themselves. In other words, the Kazakhs had no real
surplus land at all; they barely survived with the pastures still remaining in their control.
Thus, in the late 19
th
- and early 20
th
century the Kazakh lands were targeted for a
massive migration of peasants of Russian and other ethnic origins from the densely
populated European part of the Empire. These migrants were not nomads and they held
completely different cultural values, not sharing the nomad’s worldview of “living in
harmony with the steppe.” (Orynbekov, 2005, p. 21)
In a few shorts years, by 1897, around 600,000 Russians were living in the
Steppe, comprising 12% of its total population; by 1914 their numbers skyrocketed (in
particular in 1906-1909 thanks to Russian’s Stolypin’s drive to increase migration) to
over 2 million. Russians, Ukranians and other ethnic groups of the Empire found a new
21
homeland in the Steppe (about 40% of the total population there).
27
(Bell-Fialkoff, 2000,
p. 77) Such an enormous influx of migrants who frequently took over a significant
portion of the most fertile Kazakh lands left pastoral nomads with severely reduced
means for survival. Not only their pastures were drastically reduced, the Kazakhs were
allotted lands of low quality which could not support the numbers of livestock to survive
with. (Masanov N. , 1995, p. 230)
The loss of ‘surplus’ pastures to Russian peasant settlers made the age-long
traditions of pastoral nomadism unsustainable. However, even then, the Kazakhs did not
completely abandon their pastoral ways deeply embedded into their culture and
traditions. Although over half of them at the beginning of the 20
th
century were growing
crops, in most cases the crops were used as fodder for animals. Only an estimated quarter
of the Kazakhs were more or less dependent on the crops alone by the turn of the century.
(Olcott M. , 1995, p. 93) Sedentarization became an unavoidable outcome. According to
some scholars, in the early 20
th
century, the Kazakhs started to settle and to cultivate their
lands not least because of the omnipresent example of Slavic farmers. (Sabol, 2003, p.
47)
On the other hand, a virtual ‘clash of civilizations’ between the Russian
newcomers and the Kazakh natives actually revived once again the old sedentary versus
nomadic dichotomy that had contributed to the formation of Kazakh identity in the past
(Masanov N. , 1995, p. 241) – on a whole new level. Sedentary cultures of Central Asia,

27
Russian migration affected the Middle Horde the most in the north of modern Kazakhstan as the soil
there was deemed most appropriate for agriculture (Sabol, 2003, p. 44)
22
while very similar in many respects to that of the Kazakhs, still evoked a strong sense of
otherness among the Kazakhs, reinforcing the latter’s distinctiveness. In the late 19
th
- and
early 20
th
century, this phenomenon was reoccurring in a more powerful fashion as the
Kazakhs had to come to terms with the qualitatively enhanced “otherness” of the Russian
settlers. They were a sedentary people just like some of Central Asians
28
, but they spoke
a different language, and their religion was also dissimilar. Russian newcomers, in their
turn, also shared a feeling of animosity toward the Kazakhs for more or less the same
reasons, complicated also by the lack of available land as more and more migrants
arrived. (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 81) The problematic relations between peasants and
nomads were only exacerbated by the inept administration of the migration and land
allotment policies. (Sabol, 2003, p. 41)
The Kazakhs sought out the knowledge of Islam as a means of reaffirming their
identity which was threatened by the colonization, especially by the immigration from
Russia and the shrinking freedom to continue their traditional pastoral nomadism. (Olcott
M. , 1995, p. 108) Studying at Muslim schools was also associated with greater economic
opportunities. (Sabol, 2003, p. 58) Even the Kazakh traditional art of oral folk song was
now changing to reflect the increased Muslim influence. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 103)
However, Russia did not tolerate for long the spread of Islamic education and
proselytization even as its own tool of colonial control. Russia felt threatened by the 19
th

28
Put it another way, if the Kazakhs had been colonized by a Muslim power, perhaps Kokand, it is not out
question that instead of trying to retain the nomadic way of life even in the face of certain failure they
might have been more inclined to adapt and assimilate into the colonial society as it happened in British
Commonwealth (Doty, 1996)
23
century Muslim education reform oriented Jadidist movement due to its association with
pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideas. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 102) At the same time, the
proselytizing efforts of the Tatar Muslim clerics
29
were not welcome by the Kazakhs
either as they perceived the former as another sort of colonial imposition of an alien
culture, in particular of the Tatar language. (Sabol, 2003, p. 65)
In 1905, when Russia itself was gripped by a huge wave of social and political
unrest, Kazakh “traditional religious elite and the new Kazakh intelligentsia seem to have
realized simultaneously that their differences were best put aside” (Olcott M. , 1995, p.
111) and organized protests to demand the return of the lands appropriated for the settlers
and instatement of the Kazakh language in schools and Kazakh religious authority. Of
these demands, they have been able to gain the last two and Russian administration
established a Muftiate
30
of the Steppe region in 1906, reinforcing the commitment of the
Kazakhs to their approach to the practice of Islam, and introducing the Kazakh language
in the medreses
31
across the steppe which further helped the revival of the Kazakh
national consciousness. (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 82)
In 1916, the policies of the war-torn imperial government that targeted the
Muslims of Central Asia and of the Kazakh steppe triggered their widespread discontent
and rebellion. The need for resources and manpower in the aftermath of the heavy losses

29
Encouraged by Russia to assimilate the Kazakhs into the Russian colonial control (Olcott M. , 1995, p.
102)
30
Islamic religious administration
31
Islamic schools
24
prompted Russia to shift its policy: if from the beginning of the war, the Kazakhs were
only required to turn in increasing numbers of livestock to support the war effort, in 1916
the Russian government began to recruit young Kazakh men as well to reinforce the
dwindling numbers of its army.
32
The Kazakhs had been losing all means of livelihood
due to the Russian colonial policies, the land and cattle in particular; the wartime
requisitioning sped up the process considerably. When in 1916 Russia started to conscript
the Kazakh youth, it was already an explosive situation in the Kazakh Steppe. The
resulting outbreak of resistance was so strong and violent that it is deemed to have been
the largest anti-colonial and even anti-Russian uprising since Kinesary’s rebellion of the
19
th
century. The Kazakhs who joined the revolt did not only attack the colonial
administration but also the peasant settlers on their land, expressing their long-held
grievance against the Russian policies of land seizures for the settlement purposes.
(Olcott M. , 1995, pp. 119-122)
Russian troops were deployed to put down the rebellion. While there are no exact
numbers available to estimate the losses on the Kazakh side, this revolt had a profound
effect on the Kazakh population. Its numbers were reduced not only due to the casualties
caused by fighting and emigration of the Kazakhs to China and elsewhere, but also due to
the persistent famine caused by livestock being either requisitioned by the imperial
government or slaughtered during the fighting. More importantly, in the wake of this
insurrection, the Russian authorities concluded that it was no longer possible to culturally

32
Mostly as rear support labor troops rather than frontline fighters that the Kazakh nationalists like
Bokeikhanov preferred. (Sabol, 2003, p. 85)
25
assimilate the Kazakhs. The policy of taking over the most fertile arable lands to be
settled by Russians and relocating the Kazakhs to desolate regions, essentially,
reservations, was adopted.
33
(Olcott M. , 1995, p. 125)
The colonization of the Kazakh lands by the Russian Empire had a catastrophic
impact on the former’s nomadic way of life: the land seizures, delimitation of the Steppe
and, most of all, the resettlement of millions of Russian peasants altered profoundly their
way of life. However, even bigger changes were yet to come as Russia itself was
transformed by the revolutions of 1917.
The Ethno-Political Legacy of the Soviet Union in the Kazakh steppe
In 1917, after the February revolution in Russia, the Kazakhs instituted a political
party under the name of Alash Orda with an expressed goal of freeing the Kazakh people
from the colonial control and seeking autonomy within the Empire. The October 1917
Bolshevik revolution in Russia and ensuing uncertainty and devastation made achieving
those goals impossible and Alash Orda moved to declare independence in December
1917. (Sabol, 2003, pp. 141-142) However, its rule was challenged by other Kazakh
political parties
34
and Alash was not able to govern effectively the entire Kazakh Steppe,
not least because of the general chaos of the Civil War. In particular, Alash Orda failed to

33
“The postrebellion [1916] truce was designed to push the Kazakhs deeper into the desert and away from
potentially irrigable farmlands.” (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 125)
34
In particular, an alternative Kazakh party of Ush Zhuz which competed with Alash Orda for the control
over the Kazakh steppe (Sabol, 2003, pp. 143-144)
26
address the most pressing issue of land reallocation which was a primary concern for all
the Kazakhs at the time. (Ibid, p. 148)
Eventually, once the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand in the Civil War, it
became evident that it was necessary to achieve an accommodation with them. The leader
of the Alash government Baitursynov travelled to Moscow in 1919 to negotiate the
reintegration of the Kazakh Steppe into the Soviet state. (Ibid, pp. 13-15) While short-
lived, the declaration of independence and attempted self-governance of Alash Orda did
have one important effect – it became a symbol of Kazakh sovereignty and the national
independence movement in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Members of Alash Orda also
became an inspiration for the modern Kazakh nationalists.
The integration of the Kazakh steppe into the Soviet state followed what Hirsch
termed a policy of “state-sponsored evolutionism.” (Hirsch, 2000, p. 203) This policy
called for transforming the ‘backwards’ “feudal clans and tribes in order to push them
along the imagined road to socialism.” (Ibid) The Kazakhs were a primary example of
that. If at first, they were granted an autonomy in 1920 within the confines of Russia due
to their geographical proximity to Russia proper as well as the now substantial Russian
population in the Kazakh steppe; in 1936 a full-fledged Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic
(SSR) was established in recognition of the independent national identity of the Kazakhs.
More importantly, the delimitation of both the Kazakh ASSR and then a Union-level SSR
laid foundation for the modern state of Kazakhstan – and also became the territorial
expression of the national aspirations of the Kazakhs themselves who were denied that
for the preceding two hundred years. (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 2010, pp. 176, 236)
27
Despite such a positive development for the Kazakhs within the Soviet system,
the blind pursuit of the communist ideology also resulted in the most devastating policy
which was ever applied to them. It was the collectivization campaign launched in 1929
which aimed to abolish the institution of private ownership as well as the final settlement
of the nomads.
35
The linchpin of the communist, or more accurately, Stalinist vision of
the Soviet Union was embodied in a program which aimed to convert privately owned
farms into communally (essentially, state) owned collective farms, and thus create a
foundation for a rapid industrialization and power of the Soviet State. (Olcott M. , 1995,
p. 176) The vast Kazakh Steppe held promise of becoming a gigantic food production
line and therefore collectivization there became a political and ideological priority.
(Conquest, 1986, p. 191)
For Kazakhs, who through the many years of the Russian colonial policies still
retained private ownership of their livestock as one the fundamental tenets of their
pastoral nomad identity, giving up it up in favor of collective ownership was
unfathomable.
36
As a matter of fact, before collectivization began, the Kazakh steppe was
home to 80% of privately owned or small communal agricultural operations in all of the
Soviet Union (Aiagan, 2006, p. 269) and in mere 8 years, by 1937, the Soviet government
policies forced 97.5% of the rural population in Kazakhstan to join the collective farms.

35
Sedentarization became part of the communist dogma in the late 1920s which sought destruction of the
nomadic way of life deemed semi-feudal and therefore no longer acceptable in the socialist society
(Conquest, 1986, p. 191)
36
The single most important possession of any nomad was the livestock and traditionally cattle, not land,
was the primary focus of the institution of private ownership of the Kazakh nomads. Land was subject to
communal ownership instead.
28
(Ibid, p. 20) While some did this out of their own accord, most were forced into it
through intimidation and terror.
The Kazakhs for the most part did not go willingly. Many slaughtered their
animals rather than transferring them in the ownership of collective farms, drastically
decreasing livestock levels in Kazakhstan over the years of collectivization. Whatever
animals the Kazakhs did not destroy in protest died because of the lack of fodder which
was in great shortage in the new collective farms. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 181) If in 1928,
there were around 6.5 million of cattle and 18.5 million of sheep, in 1932 there remained
only 965 thousand and 1.3 million, respectively. (Kozybaiev, Abylkhozhin, &
Aldazhumanov, 1992, p. 20) Concomitantly, the republican agriculture shrunk and
overall productivity dropped, for example, the grain production in the Kazakh Steppe was
reduced by a factor of 3 from 1928 to 1932. (Ibid, p. 19)
The human cost was even higher. Many Kazakhs who resisted the transfer of their
livestock into state ownership were either arrested and executed or exiled as kulaki
(wealthy peasants) by the Soviet authorities. Many tried migrating into the neighboring
countries like China, mirroring the outcome of 1916, but most people died of famine
which was caused by the catastrophic decline in the numbers of cattle and foodstuff as
well the Soviet practice of forceful grain requisitioning at that time. The exact numbers of
the Kazakhs who emigrated or perished are subject to controversy
37
due to the lack of

37
The casualty estimates vary from 1.75 million to 3.1 million ethnic Kazakhs perishing or leaving the
country during collectivization (Alekseenko, 2000, p. 13)
29
available accurate census data
38
. Commonly, it is believed that around 49% of the ethnic
Kazakh population have either died or left the country. (Kozybaiev, Abylkhozhin, &
Aldazhumanov, 1992, p. 28) (Abdygaliev, 1997, p. 12)
Whatever the exact numbers were, the impact of collectivization and following
drastic reduction of the Kazakh population is now considered to be an act of genocide by
them. In 1933, the Kazakhs constituted only 32% of the total population, down from 57%
in 1926! (Meffert, 1987, p. 156)
39
This calamity set the stage for the Kazakhs being a
minority in their own land well into the future. It may have been unintentional, but for the
Kazakhs, it was a catastrophe. “Only thanks to a powerful demographic explosion which
took place after the [World War II] in its classic version (peaking in 1962), the Kazakh
ethnic group was able to recover the huge losses.” (Kozybaiev, Abylkhozhin, &
Aldazhumanov, 1992, p. 31) Thanks to higher than average fertility,
40
by 1969, the
Kazakhs were able to restore their numbers. (Ibid)
It is true that collectivization and the concomitant famine affected the migrant
non-Kazakh population as well but nowhere at the same scale as the Kazakhs. Indeed,
Russia supplied massive food aid which was sent primarily to save Russian settlers from
the famine. (Meffert, 1987, p. 250) At the same time, the rate of settlement of the Kazakh

38
The estimates of the overall population of the Kazakhs in 1930 range from 3.8 million (Alekseenko,
2000, p. 13) to 6 million (Besbaev, 2003, p. 49)
39
Based on official Soviet statistics challenged by some as inaccurate when applied to nomadic Kazakhs
(Tatimov M. B., 1989)
40
Kazakh Total Fertility Rate (TRF) defined as an average number of births per woman rose from 4 in
1939 to 7.4 in 1958, while the overall TRF in the Kazakh SSR declined from 4.8 to 4.6 in the same time
period, mostly due to reduced TFR of the Russians and other Slavic ethnic groups in the republic. (Meffert,
1987, p. 396)
30
republic intensified: if according to the official Soviet statistics, the number of Kazakhs
was reduced by over 1.5 million from 1926 to 1933, the number of non-Kazakhs
increased by over 1.8 million in the same time period. (Meffert, 1987, p. 156)
Furthermore, the Stalinist policies of forced migration moved hundreds of thousands of
‘undesired’ people
41
to the republic in the 1930s and 40s.
The 1950s witnessed another major shift in the ethnic composition in the Kazakh
SSR. It was the result of an ambitious Virgin Lands program, initiated in 1953 following
the death of Stalin. (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, pp. 89-90) It was an attempt by Stalin’s
successor, Nikita Khrushchev, to solve widespread food shortages in the Soviet Union.
(Ibid) From and 1954 to 1964, the Kazakh lands were subjected to the largest agricultural
experiment in history: some 300 collective and state farms were established and 3.5
million hectares of “virgin” lands
42
were plowed within one year of the program’s
launch. (Ibid) At the same time, the pastures were expanded, providing an opportunity to
revive the traditional Kazakh craft of herding cattle. (Meffert, 1987, p. 319) Since the
Kazakh SSR did not possess enough workforce to drive such a large project, some 2
million people were recruited from all over the Soviet Union. (Kan, 2002, p. 200)
Coupled with an official Soviet policy of redistributing population to match with
economic resources (Meffert, 1987, p. 413), another huge migration wave targeted the
Steppe. The Kazakhs were outnumbered more than ever before. By 1959, only 30% of

41
Germans, Koreans, Kalmyks, Chechens, Tatars, Meskhetian Turks and many more were sent to the vast
Kazakh steppes for imaginary crimes against the Stalinist totalitarian regime.
42
Like the imperial Russia before, the Soviet Union viewed the vast Kazakh steppes void, or in old
terminology, surplus
31
population of the republic was Kazakh, the rest – Russian, Ukranian, German, Korean
and so on. Still, even though in absolute terms Kazakhs were reproducing faster, the
massive immigration during 1939-1959 had a very significant and negative demographic
impact on the Kazakhs in their own republic. (Bell-Fialkoff, 2000, p. 91)
The Soviet Union has finalized the destruction of the traditional way of life of the
Kazakh nomads. It also fundamentally changed the ethnic composition of the Kazakh
Steppe by resettling even more people than the Russian Empire ever did. However, the
ideological drive of the Soviet system also required another change to be instituted
among the Kazakhs – their assimilation into the ‘New Soviet Man’.
43

The Soviet Cultural Policies and Their Impact on the Kazakhs
The Soviet ideology and politics affected not only the economic and ethnographic
situation in the Kazakh republic but also its cultural landscape. From the start, the Soviet
Union pursued a “civilizing program based on Marx’s proposed stages of development.”
(Hirsch, 2000, p. 203) This entailed not only fundamental economic reforms of the
Kazakh nation; it also meant deep social and cultural changes, as well. They started with
an education program, initiated in the 1920s and by 1939 76.3% of men and 66.3% of
women in the republic were declared literate.
44
(Olcott M. , 1995, p. 196) The curriculum

43
Soviet archetype of an ideal citizen of the USSR which transcends ethnical divisions
44
Although true literacy levels at the time are questionable due to the frequent changes in Kazakh alphabet
– in 1940, the Kazakh alphabet has been switched from a Latin script to a Cyrillic one, as it was switched in
1926 from Arabic to Latin (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 196).
32
was never developed locally but rather dictated by the Soviet superiors from Moscow
45
to
insure that Russia held a prominent place in it. (Ibid, p. 197)
The Russian language was gradually becoming the primary language of
communication in the Kazakh republic. It provided the path to success. For example, it
was the primary language of instruction in higher education, where only a few professors
were ethnic Kazakh, 23.1% in 1966 versus 55.3% ethnic Russian professors. (Narodnoe
khoziaistvo Kazakhstana. Statisticheskiy sbornik, 1968, p. 344) Moreover, until the late
1950s, entry examinations were conducted only in the Russian language which severely
reduced the admission rate of ethnic Kazakh students. In 1966, only 36.7% of all students
in higher education were Kazakh. (Ibid, p. 341) The Kazakh youth was not happy with
the situation, and in the same year, they protested the widespread use of Russian and
demanded instruction in Kazakh in several institutions of higher education across the
republic. (Abzhanov, 2007, pp. 194-195)
Russian traditions in art also had a very significant impact on the Kazakh art.
Many new schools of art were introduced in the areas of architecture, music, drawing,
sculpture and so on. The traditional Kazakh musical traditions in particular did not
receive enough official recognition due to the fact that most of the officials in the music
world were non-Kazakhs. Just as in other institutions of higher education, the Music
Conservatory of the Kazakh republic was dominated by non-Kazakh professionals.
(Kapaeva, 2004, p. 133) Whenever Kazakh intelligentsia tried to raise awareness about

45
Moscow embodied the ultimate authority of the rigidly hierarchical Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) which controlled every facet of the politics and culture in the entire country from this city
33
the need to support genuine Kazakh musical culture, they were either ignored or
persecuted as nationalistic and anti-Soviet. For example, a brilliant paper on the Kazakh
musical genre of kiuy published in the 1930s went unnoticed for the next 50 years. (Ibid,
p. 131) When in the late 1940s the head of the Kazakh Conservatory wrote about the art
of a pre-revolutionary Kazakh composer, he was accused of glorifying the feudal society
and removed from his post. (Ibid, p. 134)
These conditions, unfavorable to the presentation of Kazakh traditional culture,
were responsible for the decision that most urban Kazakhs made to adopt the Russian
language and embrace the official cultural policy of the Soviet government in order to
succeed in the new political environment. Consequently, rural Kazakhs became the
guardians of the traditional Kazakh culture, particularly as represented by their musical
and poetic legacy. In addition, rural Kazakhs retained most of the Islamic traditions
which were severely persecuted by the Soviet authorities, especially under Stalin and
Khrushchev. In other words, the unrelenting pursuit of the Soviet model of citizenship by
Moscow caused another level of fragmentation among the Kazakhs in addition to
traditional lineage identities. (Dave, 2007, p. 66)
Such discriminatory Soviet cultural and economic policies in Kazakhstan set the
stage for growing anti-Soviet sentiment in Kazakhstan which, arguably, reached their
peak in the aftermath the riots which took place in Alma-Ata
46
, the capital of the Kazakh
SSR in 1986. While the exact causes of these events are still subject to controversy and a

46
Almaty today
34
variety of interpretations, in last few years the Kazakh historians and politicians tend to
portray them as the harbinger of the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
precursor for the Kazakh attempt to revive their national consciousness, previously
suppressed by the Russian and Soviet colonization policies.
47

In 1986, it was the era of Perestroika in the Soviet Union, initiated by young and
energetic Gorbachev who sought to revitalize the country in the face of mounting
economic and social issues. As part of his reforms, he changed cadres including many
republican leaders. Kunaev, an ethnic Kazakh who headed the Kazakh SSR for 24 years
was replaced by Kolbin, a Russian party functionary who never had any experience not
only in the Kazakh SSR but anywhere in Central Asia. This caused a strong reaction
among the Kazakh students who took to the streets from December 17 to 25 in several
towns across the republic. The largest of these demonstrations occurred in Almaty which
was put down by special military forces with great violence. (Tabeev, 2006)
While the interpretations of events range from the offense to “the national honor”
and the sign of reawakening Kazakh national identity (Tabeev, 2006, p. 15) to
Gorbachev’s honest attempt to fight the corrupt Soviet bureaucratic establishment and to
insure the reforms in the republic (Dave, 2007, p. 88) which was used as a pretext by
criminals to incite disorder (Ibid, p. 71); one approach notes the fact that the primary
reason for the Kazakh youth’s reaction was a demonstration of the implicit distrust of the

47
Such interpretation of 1986 events has not been politically possible until the last few years when the
Kazakhs finally became a majority in their own country: before, the presence of a sizeable Russian
minority required a very careful analytical treatment of these riots to avoid provoking inter-ethnic strife in
the country.
35
Soviet leadership toward the Kazakhs’ ability to govern themselves even within the
Soviet system. (Ibid, p. 91)
In other words, an ordinary matter of cadre policies in the Soviet Union turned
into a conflict between the colony and the colonial master. (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 2010, p.
91) The Kazakhs were reduced to a minority in their own republic as a result of Russian
and Soviet policies of resettlement. The Kazakh culture, religion, historical legacy and
even language itself were discounted and suppressed in the process of assimilating the
Kazakhs into the model of the ‘New Soviet Man’ identity. In addition, the Soviet
authorities institutionalized discrimination
48
against the ethnic Kazakhs in their republic
by giving them fewer of opportunities for social and economic advancement than to their
Russian and Slavic counterparts. (Ibid, 83-88) The worst, however, came after the riots
were over: not only the honest attempt of the Kazakh youth to address the wrongs against
their national identity was suppressed with extreme violence, the whole nation of
Kazakhs was branded as nationalistic,
49
subject to corrupt practices and religious
fanaticism and therefore until 1989, the Soviet authorities implemented a wide-spread
propaganda campaign directed against Kazakh national identity and the Kazakh
leadership. (Ibid, p. 95)

48
There was a confluence of factors that turned into an act of open discrimination of Kazakhs by Russians:
in fall 1986, when many rural Kazakh students came back to Almaty colleges, they were turned down for
housing and mistreated by ethnic Russian landlords and college administrators, creating an explosive
situation. Kolbin’s appointment was the last straw (Kodykov, 2006, pp. 190-191)
49
The word ‘nationalistic’ had deeply negative connotations in the context of the Soviet Union – it invoked
images of Fascism, separatism and generally anti-Soviet sentiments, still does for older generations who
grew up well before independence (author’s observation)
36
Many questions are left unanswered about the true extent and the meaning of the
tragic events of December 1986, or Zheltoqsan
50
, as it became commonly known in the
Kazakh political rhetoric. The initial allegations that the demonstrators were violent,
criminal and nationalistic were proven false by a later investigation which exonerated
arrested and jailed participants. (Dave, 2007, p. 90) However, the current interpretation of
Zheltoqsan and its meaning for the Kazakhs is frequently cast in terms of its symbolic
role for the reawakening of the Kazakh national consciousness and the struggle against
the Soviet cultural assimilation policies, which intensified in the aftermath of the riots.
As the pressure of Moscow on bringing the Kazakhs into the fold of the Soviet
system mounted, while the country was undergoing Perestroika and subsequent
Glastnost and democratization reforms, the Kazakhs started to realize that it was time to
protect their identity. (Istoriia Kazakhstana, 2010, pp. 96-97) In 1989-1990, a few nascent
ethno-political movements have been registered in Kazakhstan: Alash, Azat, Zheltoqsan,
Yedinstvo and Vozrozhdenie. The first three represented the Kazakh aspirations for
greater economic and cultural autonomy within the Soviet Union, while the last two
represented the large Russian and Cossack minorities in the Kazakh republic. (Olcott M. ,
2010, p. 90) However, none of them commanded as much influence as the Nevada-
Semipalatinsk
51
movement which united both Kazakhs and Russians and other
inhabitants of the republic against the 40-year long nuclear testing on their land. (Ibid)

50
Literally December in Kazakh
51
Semipalatinsk is a town in northeastern Kazakhstan, located close to an enormous nuclear testing site.
The town is now called Semey
37
The environmental and human cost of the nuclear testing was extremely high and the
movement quickly gathered significant support in the Kazakh SSR and elsewhere.
However, its leader Olzhas Suleimenov, an ethnic Kazakh, was a member of Communist
party and did not seek revival of Kazakh identity, let alone sovereignty, firmly guiding
the Nevada-Semipalatinsk toward retaining the union with Russia. (Dave, 2007, p. 91)
Therefore, the Kazakhs were unable to develop a strong national movement by the time
of independence, failing to utilize the momentum of Zheltoqsan and openness of
Perestroika to reassert their identity, culture and language.
In many respects, the situation with national movement in Kazakhstan mirrored
that in other republics of Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s Birlik and Erk movements were
unable to gather enough support, too, due to the lack of support from above (Olcott M.
B., 1994, p. 210) and multiple internal divisions among the Uzbeks from below
52

(Gleason, 1993). Thus, even though Uzbekistan was 71% Uzbek (Gleason, 1993, p. 338),
like the Kazakhs, they were unable to develop a popular pro-independence movement.
The general disinclination of the Central Asian republics and their people to seek
independence from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s is demonstrated by the fact that in
the 1991 referendum about the preservation of the Union of the Republics, the voters in
Central Asian states were overwhelmingly in favor, more so than in Russia, Ukraine and
Belorussia. (Nazarov, 2006)

52
Erk was actually established by a Birlik’s splinter faction
38
The policies of assimilation of the Kazakhs into the Soviet model of citizenship
had a profound effect on the process of their national identity formation. This introduced
a whole new level of fragmentation among the Kazakhs which lingers to this day. The
aftermath of Zheltoqsan and the subsequent emergence of proto-nationalist movements in
Kazakhstan did not guide the Kazakhs to pursue sovereignty in 1991, when the Soviet
Union collapsed and they gained sovereignty by default. The following years of defining
the national identity of the Kazakhs and the republic became one of the priorities of the
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who rose to power in the 1980s to become the head of
the state in 1989.
Conclusion
This chapter’s goal was to present a brief summary of the historical factors that
have affected the formation of the national identity of the Kazakhs. After the few
centuries of independent Kazakh khanate, the turbulent relationship between the Kazakhs
and the Russian state started off in the 18
th
century when the former requested a
protectorate from the latter. In the 19
th
century, it evolved into an openly colonial
incorporation of the Kazakh lands into Russia. In the early 20
th
century, the Soviet Union
continued the colonization via “the state-sponsored effort to turn so-called backward
peoples into nations – that is, to delineate new political boundaries and foster national-
cultural distinctions – within the context of a unified state with a colonial-type economy
and administrative structure which gave the Soviet Union its distinctive form.” (Hirsch,
2000, p. 204)
39
The Republic of Kazakhstan today is heir to the territory of the Kazakh Soviet
Socialist Republic, which was established as the first Kazakh nation-state in the form of
an autonomous republic within Russia in 1924 and further transformed into a full-fledged
union Republic in 1936. The largest legacy of the past was a major shift in the ethnic
composition of its population. In 1989 census, the Kazakhs were not an absolute majority
in their own republic, barely constituting 39.7%, while Russians constituted 37.8% of
population and the remaining 22.5% was split among many different ethnic groups, the
largest of which were Ukranians (5.4%). (Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989
goda, 1992) In other words, while Kazakh in name, Kazakhstan was ethnically more
Slavic than Kazakh in 1989.
The struggles of the Kazakhs are by no means unique. Indeed, the nomads of
Middle East and Africa have been and still are experienced similar issues of identity and
for more or less same reasons: the modern sedentary state is squeezing them out of their
traditional pastoral lands, forces to assimilate and sedentarize thus deeply wounding the
nomadic culture and identity. (Chatty, 2006) Even the Sudan crisis has been identified as
a classic example of the struggle between the nomad and the settled. (O'Doherty, 2004)
The following chapters will introduce and analyze the issue of national identity
development in the light of the hypothesized relationship between market economic
reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity formation in three sites in
Kazakhstan: Aktau, Astana and Almaty, which are located in the traditional regions of
the Kazakh Small, Middle and Great Hordes, respectively. But first, the hypothesis and
methods of research will be introduced in the following chapter.
40
Chapter 2: Non-National Identity of Kazakhstan: Concepts and
Methods for the Study
Summary
This study is driven by the question: how long can a state survive without
establishing a firm base of national support in its population? Most, if not all, countries in
transition
53
experience a rigorous search for a unifying national identity which provides
the means for state’s survival in lieu of a set of developed political institutions that tie
society and state together. Similarly, in absence of developed formal structures and
institutions, patronage networks may improve the stability of such nascent regimes by
establishing less formal relations between major power groups in the society. (Collins,
2004) In other words, a strong sense of national unity and well-organized, coherent
informal elite coalitions are frequently the key to preserving the stability of the countries
in transition.
Kazakhstan presents a puzzle in both respects. Rather than focusing on the
development of a strong sense of national unity across the republic, the regime maintains
its political and social stability by developing inter- and even intra-ethnic divisions.
Moreover, even though Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, managed to
concentrate and maintain a large degree of both formal and informal power in the hands

53
From dependency status to full sovereignty
41
of his family, he is increasingly being challenged by various members of his inner circle
since 2001.
54

Could these two anomalies be related? Tentative answer offered by this project
posits the fragmentation of national identity of the states which are undergoing deep
social and cultural shock as a result of transition to market economy, which directly
challenges and undermines traditional sense of identity, belonging and loyalty. Such
interaction creates what might be termed non-national society where people care less
about their ethnic identities and more about their position in the economic and political
power structures of the state. The transition to market economy along with integration
into globalized system of goods exchange introduces new concepts of behavior in these
states that challenge and supplant the shared values and cultural priorities, shuddering
ethnic/sub-ethnic identities and ‘imagined’ community
55
in the process. As a result of the
integration into the global marketplace another set of cleavages that divide the society
into various groups based on their access to economic resources rather than (sub)ethnic
identities, making the former more important for individuals rather than the latter. This
project offers a new perspective by looking into the effect of globalization on patronage
networks and identity formation in Kazakhstan which has not been addressed by previous
research.

54
Even Nazarbayev’s former son-in-law, Rahat Aliev, was found guilty in absentia of treason and
attempted coup d’état as recently as March 26, 2008.
55
That is, a community in which individuals ‘imagine’ themselves to be part of a specific group of people
with shared perceptions, traditions and worldviews. (Anderson, 1991)
42
From historical perspective, what is happening in Kazakhstan is anything but
unique. In fact, the Kazakhs experienced at least twice similar externally-induced shocks
to their nomadic lifestyle, culture and traditions, when foreign powers such as Russia and
particularly the Soviet Union have introduced foreign socio-economic systems into the
Kazakh steppe. In a similar sense, current market economy reforms and privatization,
driven primarily by foreign capital rather than guns, induce significant strain on the core
values of Kazakh identity. While the present study focuses on the post-Soviet period in
the history of Kazakhstan, such historical parallels provide a context to approaching
current debates about the identity of Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs.
Kazakhstan is selected as the most-likely case
56
to study the validity of this
model. As already mentioned, the republic is a model case of the patronage network
based political regime displaying a high level of fragmentation of its national identity,
and it also demonstrates a relatively high level of integration into the global economy
when compared to other post-Soviet states.
57
If Kazakhstan provides enough evidence to
support this project’s hypothesis, the latter might be a useful model for the analysis of
identity processes in other post-Soviet and post-colonial countries.

56
Most likely case study offers a good starting point for examining worthiness of an untested hypothesis
(Odell, 2004)
57
Indicated by the highest level of FDI per capita in the former Soviet Union and second highest among all
post-communist states by 1997 (Cummings, 2005, p. 3 and 32)
43
Review of National Identity Literature on Kazakhstan and Central Asia
The identity of Kazakhstan and its titular ethnic group, the Kazakhs, has been
contested by scholars from both within and without. The domestic debate among
historians about the origins of Kazakh nation is rather heated questioning both the date as
well as the geographical location. (Masanov, Abylhozhin, & Erofeeva, 2007) This issue
arises from the fact that Kazakhs, a formerly nomadic group, never had an experience of
a formal Western-styled state with centralized government and fixed boundaries due to
the nature of nomadic life and traditions, and neither have they kept comprehensive
written records of their history. In fact, most of Kazakh history was passed orally through
generations up until the second half of the 19
th
century when Kazakh and Russian
ethnographers started to chronicle it in a systematic fashion.
Among all the debate and arguments about Kazakh identity, most scholars
would agree that nomadic traditions, culture and economic system were the most
important factors of its formation. As such, two periods in history are of particular
significance for the Kazakh national consciousness, that of Russian colonization from the
19
th
century onwards which gradually limited the nomadic migration paths and settled
millions of Russians on their land, forcing the Kazakhs to adapt and change their culture;
and the Soviet program of forced sedentarization in the late 1920s-early 1930s which
completely destroyed the nomadic way of life. Similarly, the post-Soviet period also
fundamentally affects Kazakh national identity when it is being both revived after the
erosive impact of Russian and then Soviet ethnic policies, and it is also being adapted to
insure the success of market economic policies.
44
One good explanation for the delay or unevenness of national identity
development in the former Soviet Union is offered by Beissinger, who looks at the
process from a tri-partite perspective: pre-existing structural conditions, institutional
constraints and powerful contentious events. His central idea is that of tides: if at first
nationalism movements emerged in Baltic States based on firm beliefs into their right for
independence which where emboldened by the policies of glastnost, this constituted a
contentious event, establishing new mutually enabling structural conditions that Baltic
nationalist movements promoted by reproducing themselves elsewhere. As the tidal force
of interacting nationalist movements spread throughout the Soviet Union, it gained
enough momentum to successfully challenge the existing institutional constraints of the
Soviet political system that was previously able to suppress any secessionist ideas.
(Beissinger, 2002) In other words, the previously unthinkable secession movements
became an accepted norm throughout the Soviet Union: the example set by Baltic States
paved the way for pro-independence movement in Caucasian and Slavic republics.
Central Asia is surprisingly absent from Beissinger’s analysis.
58
Perhaps, the failure of
Central Asia to mobilize such movements prior to the dissolution of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) is due to the weakness of ethnic identities in the region. As
some scholars point out, the identities of Central Asians are modern creations established
by the colonization policies of Soviet Russia that intentionally created ethnic divisions on

58
Except for a noted failure of a nationalist movement in Uzbekistan prior to independence where the
“nationalization waves” did not reach a tipping point to reverse the general norm of non-separatism until
the Soviet Union collapsed (Beissinger, 2002, pp. 257-261)
45
the territory of what was previously known as Turkestan
59
in the 1920s. (Hirsch, 2000, p.
203) (Kubicek, 1997, p. 644)
This illustrates that the Western studies of identity formation of Kazakhstan are
conflicted if not confused. They have gradually evolved from simplistic expectations that
the region will join the Islamic world (Huntington, 1993) to a more nuanced
understanding of the role of patronage networks or clans in the region. However, all of
the studies share one common thread of thought: policies of nation-building are a very
important legitimization tool for the communist-cum-nationalist regimes of the newly
independent republics.
60
In Central Asia, such policies were of particular significance
since out of all 15 republics of the former Soviet Union, the ones in that specific region
pursued independence with much less rigor than the others mainly due to the higher
degree of economic dependence on the USSR.
This is further complicated by the fact that Central Asia is an ancient melting pot
of various ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, and, as a result, the modern states in the
region share history and Muslim identity which complicates the attempts to determine
clear-cut cultural and ethnic boundaries between them that frequently do not coincide
with the existing state borders, drawn under the Soviet Union. These factors suggest that

59
Turkestan is an old Russian designation of Central Asia as a single territorial and ethnic unit, essentially
Muslim part of Russian Empire and later Soviet State, which was split into 5 republics in the current form.
60
See Holm-Hansen (1999, p. 156), Cummings (2005, p. 78) who suggest that in the absence of institutions
of accountability or democratic habits and traditions identity becomes an important instrument to legitimize
the rule of post-Soviet elites. Similarly, Prizel (1998) suggests that the lack of abiding institutions prompts
an increased role of national identity in both forming and being influenced by foreign policies.
46
Central Asia stands out as one of the least prepared parts of the once great Soviet empire
to (re)establish genuine national identity.
This purported weakness of Central Asian identities is not without a challenge.
Haugen suggests that even during the period of Soviet control over Central Asia, their
national identity already existed and even determined the drawing up of the borders in the
region. His research into the issue demonstrates how the competition for economic
resources within the Soviet Union between the ethnic groups of Turkestan prompted an
eventual delineation of the region into 5 separate territorial and ethnic units. While the
delineation was carried out by the Communist Party leadership, major Central Asian
ethnicities were part of the process rather than subject to it, although Haugen admits that
identity was more a political issue for Central Asian communists and less so for Central
Asian population as a whole. (Haugen, 2003)
In another research, Sabol traces Kazakh nationalism back to even before the
Soviet Union came into being. He utilizes Hroch’s theory of national identity
construction (Hroch, 1985) to argue that before the 1917 revolution, a Kazakh nation
started to form around a nucleus of Kazakh intellectuals who were concerned about the
condition of Kazakh identity being eroded by the Russian colonization, and eventually
pushed forward to form an independent state once the Russian Empire collapsed from
within. However, the attempted sovereignty project had to be abandoned in a few short
years due to arrival of the new Soviet empire which did not tolerate such attempts to form
an independent Kazakh state. (Sabol, 2003) In some ways, the situation resembles what
has occurred in the 1990s as the intellectuals now are as concerned about the state of
47
ethnic identity eroded by the Soviet system as they were in the early 20
th
century with the
impact of Russian colonization on Kazakh traditions. The difference is that now no
external power attempts to inhibit nation-building efforts in the republic. Indeed,
Kazakhstan became independent not by its choice but by default when the Soviet Union
was disbanded in 1991 by a decision made by the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and
Belorussia. The important insight that these two studies offer is that Kazakh ethnic
identity dates back to an earlier date than suggested by the Soviet origin of Central Asian
republics model discussed above and explains why modern nationalists in independent
Kazakhstan frequently invoke the names and idea of pre-Revolutionary intellectuals to
legitimize Kazakh nationhood.
However, the general consensus in the academia regarding the ethnic identities
in Central Asia since the 1991 is that they are being constructed purposefully and
persistently by the leaders of the new-born nations, especially by the means of
“iconography of the new regimes, the privileged status accorded to the local languages,
newly revised histories and the exclusion of member of non-eponymous groups from the
echelons of power.” (Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, & Allworth, 1998, p. 139) Early
literature on the nationalism in the region tends to support this scenario. Svangberg
provides a brief description of the nationalization program in Kazakhstan marked by the
re-writing of history, symbolism of the new street names and new holidays, and points
out to an increased Kazakh chauvinism that drives other ethnic groups, most particularly
Russians, to leave the republic. (1996) Similarly, one of Olcott’s many studies of
Kazakhstan offers another brief discussion of an elite-led nationalism and argues that the
48
national identity of Kazakhs is linked to an idealized image of President Nazarbayev, the
current head of the state, rather than to the idea of the Kazakh nation as a greater
community. More specifically, she determines that Nazarbayev successfully instilled in
the Kazakhstani population the thought he is the guarantor of political stability of the
republic; this belief has been faithfully maintained and replicated ever since.
(Kazakhstan: a Republic of Minorities, 1993) The common weakness of such portrayals
of national identity construction in the region is the lack of depth and relative simplicity
due to timing because they came out almost immediately after Kazakhstan became
independent. However, closer examination of nation-building processes in the region,
illuminated in later studies, provide a more nuanced understanding of these processes.
One such detail, glossed over in early studies of Central Asia, is various types of
bifurcation of societies of Central Asia to a lesser or larger degree. Kazakhstan stands out
in this regard, first due to the significant proportion of population made up of non-
Kazakhs, mostly Russians, and second because of the long history of the titular
nationality being a minority in its own republic.
61
Kolsto in his edited volume examines
this most obvious fault-line between ethnic Kazakhs and large Russian-speaking
community to determine how Kazakhstan manages so far to avoid Horowitz’s dilemma
of “centrally focused ethnic systems” which predicts an inevitable clash over the control
of the state populated by two rather well defined major ethnic groups. (Horowitz, 1985)
Kolsto’s analysis comes to a conclusion that in divided societies, such as Kazakhstan and

61
In 1989, just 2 years before independence, Kazakhs made up 39.7% of population of Kazakhstan, while
Russians made up 37.8%, which, if combined with Ukraninans and Belorussians and Russified Germans,
raised the proportion of Russian speakers to 50% (Cummings 2005, 2).
49
Latvia, Horowitz’s dilemma is avoided as one of the groups is essentially denied access
to economic resources to engage in such a conflict. (Kolstø, 1999, p. 315)
Holm-Hansen contribution to the same Kolsto’s volume elaborates: while on the
one hand the government of Kazakhstan favors the Kazakhs in terms of political mobility
with attendant economic benefits; on the other it manages to divide and control the
opposition of non-titular nationalities, identified as a “Russophones.” The latter includes
not only ethnic Russians but also Russian-speaking minorities. Holm-Hansen defines this
approach to ethnic relations as the policy of multiple re-ethnification which is very
closely associated with the ancient maxim ‘divide and conquer’ (a time-honored tradition
in the Soviet Union, as well) as it helps to reassert self-identification of the various
Russian-speaking ethnic groups, thus dividing them into distinct groups such as Russians,
Ukrainians, and Germans. The purpose of such re-ethnification policy is to disrupt the
cohesion of unified Russophone community and thus weaken their ability to present a
single front and challenge the Kazakh-dominated state. (Holm-Hansen, 1999) However,
both Kolsto and Holm-Hansen dismiss the internal cleavages (i.e., clan identities) among
the Kazakhs as a source of their weakness.
Still, Kolsto’s volume establishes an important fact: civic nationalism as such is
not really possible on the territory of the former Soviet Union due to the lack of necessary
preconditions – democratic practices and habits (Holm-Hansen, 1999, p. 156), which is
supported in the research of others. (Agadjanian, 2001) They do not mean to say that
civic nationalism is impossible in principle but that it will not meet with success in the
near future and none of the existing governments there will choose such a path. There is
50
also an argument that nationalization policies are dual in character – that the government
of Kazakhstan is publicly trying to promote civic-nationalism but the presence of Kazakh
nationalists within and outside of the government imposes serious obstacles to taking
such a course, thus explaining the lukewarm reception of the ethnic Kazakh immigrants
in Kazakhstan. (Diener, 2009) This sort of duality of identity policies in Kazakhstan, the
opposition between internationalists/cosmopolitans/Russophones on the one hand and
Kazakh nationalists on the other, is increasingly identified as the major impediment for
the true national identity construction in the republic.
Another type of bifurcation of Kazakhstani society is highlighted by Surucu.
Unlike the one identified by Kolsto, Surucu finds that in political terms of identity
construction, the division between Russophones and Kazakhs is not on ethnic level but
more on ideological one – i.e. he argues that Kazakhstan is marked by a division between
ethnic and civic nationalists. On the one hand, there are ethnic Kazakh nationalists who
argue for the revival of the Kazakh language and traditions, and on the other –
cosmopolitans, who promote the idea of economic modernization and political
democratization, tied to the Russian language and urban inter-ethnic culture. Unlike
Diener, Surucu does not see ethnic nationalists both within and outside government, he
believes that ethnic nationalists have the full support from the government while civic
nationalists’ ideas are promoted by the opposition. (Surucu, 2002) However, Surucu
oversimplifies the cosmopolitan/ethnic Kazakh divide which he associates with
urban/rural divide in Kazakhstan. The most important omission in his research is the
consideration of clan networks whose role became prominent in more recent studies.
51
The latter is represented by Schatz who focuses on the clan-based divisions. His
research highlights the salience of kin-based identities within the country which not only
survived, but actually thrived under the Soviet rule. Today, the clan networks permeate
the state and the state itself reproduces these sub-ethnic divisions which do not seem to
wither away under the pressure of modernization, as mainstream theories of nationalism
and modernization would assume. Schatz provides numerous examples of how the clan
membership is the primary vehicle for the political mobility in Kazakhstan, both before
and after becoming independent, prompting frequent replacement of junior officials by
the local and regional administrator’s clan members in large numbers. (Schatz, 2004) His
argument parallels in some ways those of Kolsto and Surucu as he ultimately identifies a
clan metaconflict which pits 2 major groupings: on the hand hand, quasi-state actors, that
is, regional and local authorities that frequently were able to promote local clan identities
for their own purposes and to the detriment of a unified Kazakh identity;
62
and the
political opposition on the other which criticized the local authorities for flaunting clan
identities as backward and corrupt. (Schatz, 2004, pp. 113-135) While introducing an
important variable which helps to understand the internal conflicts within the nation of
Kazakhstan, Schatz also identifies a major difficulty in establishing a definitive
membership of any particular clan because genealogical records of such kin organizations
were never kept officially. Instead, he substitutes geographical location for them which is

62
In other words, Schatz saw that particularistic interests of local Kazakh clans did not contribute, or even
contradicted the image of general Kazakh identity which was being promoted by the central government
52
extremely problematic, especially in the urban context with extensive intermixing
between members of various clans.
The bifurcation of Kazakhstan’s society along multiple fault-lines frustrated the
efforts of the country’s leadership to cultivate a sense of belonging, to forge the sense of
national unity. This is particularly evident from Bhavna Dave’s examination of
nationalism in Kazakhstan from the post-colonial perspective. With emphasis on the path
dependency, she finds that Kazakhstan relies heavily on the Soviet-style methods of
regulating ethnic relations, and perceives minorities as a security risk, rather than as
autonomous communities that are capable of remaining loyal to the unified state while
pursuing their own paths of identity formation. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan
developed a combination of paternalistic clientele networks that promoted loyalty of
executives who maintained him in power in exchange for receiving ready access to
political and economic resources
63
and symbolic nationalism that promotes both token
civic identity of Kazakhstan to placate minorities (mostly Russians) as well as affirming
Kazakh ethnic revival in the name only, without actually going all the way to develop a
cohesive Kazakh ethnic identity. (Dave, 2007) Is that a prime example of the patronage
networks at work which would stabilize country in transition? Dave’s answer is that
actually Kazakhstan is still in the process of shedding the colonial legacy and the task is
far from being complete (assuming it will ever be completed). Unfortunately, the oil

63
This explains the large degree of continuity of functionaries from communist regime over to independent
state, frequent positional reshuffling of key players who are kept in power in exchange for their loyalty to
the regime, that is, Nazarbayev. For a detailed discussion of elite maintenance see Cummings (2005) and
Dave (2007).
53
wealth of the republic allowed Nazarbayev’s regime to ignore the desires and demands of
the population at large. (Dave, 2007, p. 164) Only after “a ‘derussification’ of Kazakh
identity”, that is, deconstructing the post-Soviet client networks and Soviet-style
institutions of ethnic management, Kazakh(stani)
64
national identity construction will be
able to commence in the earnest. (Dave, 2007, p. 171)
Schatz and Dave represent two sides of the growing debate around the issue of
clan identities and political elites in Central Asia. Collins, Masanov and Gaman-
Golutvina agree with the former, believing that clan networks are a return to pre-modern,
that is, pre-Soviet sub-ethnic tribal identities in the region (Collins, 2004) (Masanov,
Karin, Chebotarev, & Oka, 2002) or indeed all of the former Soviet Union (Gaman-
Golutvina, 2007). Others argue like Dave that patrons-client networks are a post-colonial
construct that was inherited from the center-periphery relations developed by the Soviet
Union, cutting across sub-ethnic cleavages. (Cummings, 2005) (Murphy, 2006)
Regardless of the origins of patronage networks, they wield an inordinate
amount of power, both formal and informal, primarily by managing the redistribution of
economic benefits. Since they are pervasive and persistent, controlling the entire country,
these networks impede the development of formal institutions of the state and halt the
progress of democratic reforms by maintaining stability of the post-Soviet status quo.
(Collins, 2004, p. 226) They do fail in some cases, like for example twice in Kyrgyzstan,
in 2005 and 2010; but overall, patronage networks are very resilient and fluid, essentially

64
Kazakh identity refers to Kazakh ethnic revival, while Kazakhstani identity refers to the attempts to form
a broader national identity including all minorities in the republic, most notably Russians
54
suspending political development in their countries. Kazakhstan is a primary example of
such issues, where the Nazarbayev’s family and their close friends formed an upper
stratum of the elite that essentially came into the control over the political and economic
life of the republic. (Cummings, 2005, p. 111)
Economic benefits from being a member of Nazarbayev’s clan or patronage
network are immense. If in the 1990s the republic economy partially collapsed in the
aftermath the Soviet Union’s dissolution, losing about a third of its GDP (Spechler, 2008,
p. 32), 1999 marked a turning point, since when Kazakhstan posted economic growth or
8% or more. (Dave, 2007, p. 163) Most of the revenue was generated by the foreign
direct investment (FDI) into the economy of Kazakhstan, particularly into the oil sector
which remains the single largest earner in Kazakhstan’s economy to date, allowing the
country to establish a US $12 billion national oil fund
65
to offset the volatility of oil
prices. In fact, Kazakhstan boasted the highest level of per capita FDI in the former
Soviet Union and the second highest among all post-Soviet states in 1997. (Cummings,
2005, p. 3 and 32) Yet, the impact of such affluence on the identity construction in the
republic remains undertheorized, despite the historical significance of the type of
economic relations for Kazakh national identity.
Migdal’s concept of a non-nation state provides a useful starting point for
understanding of the effect of societal cleavages and economic globalization on the
processes of national identity construction, or indeed absence thereof. While his idea is

65
Projected to reach $100 billion by 2007 (Spechler, 2008, p. 34)
55
far from being developed in one short article (Migdal, 2004), it offers a few important
insights that resonate with the experience of Kazakhstan. First, Midgal argues that with
the end of the Cold War, newly independent states face an increased challenge of
maintaining border stability as there is no competition of superpowers that are interested
in preserving them. (Ibid, p. 20) Secondly, economic globalization also challenges the
sovereignty of such new states, or indeed all the states in the system, by opening the
markets and reducing the ability of governments to regulate the trade and financial flows,
as well as expands the horizons of identity. (Ibid, p. 25) The resulting impact of the
“double whammy” of these two factors makes newly independent states unable to form
cohesive identity, therefore establishing non-nation states. Such polities are marked by
multiple societal cleavages that establish and maintain varying levels of access to the
political and economic resources of the state. (Ibid, pp. 33-35) While brief, Migdal’s
discussion of non-nation state mirrors the emerging scholarship of the patronage
networks, with one important difference: Midgal introduces a formative influence of
global markets on identity which the researchers of patronage consider only in passing.
Unfortunately, Migdal’s article only introduces the concept of non-nation state
without providing a robust theoretical framework for it. His examination of United States
and Israel provides a modicum of support to the idea of the denationalizing role of
globalization but not in any kind of satisfactory detail. The true test of Migdal’s idea
should come from the examination of nation-building processes in the newly independent
countries that he identifies as primary candidates for the application of his theory. So far,
the literature on Kazakhstan associate the weakness of national identity with the presence
56
of the large Russian-speaking minority, or internal cleavages among Kazakhs, or general
indecisiveness on the part of the government to follow through with nation-building. To
date, there has been no systematic effort to see whether the transition to market economy
and integration into world trade system affects the processes of national identity
formation in the former Soviet Union and Kazakhstan in particular, even though the latter
appears to most suitable for testing such a theory.
Research Questions
The main research question that this paper proposes to tackle is the relationship
between market economy reforms and globalization on the one hand and fragmentation
of the national identity in Kazakhstan on the other. As discussed above, the republic
displays a variety of patronage networks when their members (clients) are intrinsically
interested in the survival of such networks since it is through that system that they gain
the most in terms of political power as well economic benefits. However, in 2001 the
increasingly authoritarian hold of Nazarbayev and his family over Kazakhstan was
challenged by the very members of his elite, clan even, when they founded an opposition
party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. While this attempt to challenge Nazarvayev’s
control over the country has failed, it has sawn seeds of elite cleavages, as a number of
clients of Nazarbayev’s patronage network, his closest allies and supporters became his
political opponents. So far, it did not amount to any serious challenge to the governing
regime and yet, it marks an important departure from the general model of clan-based
57
elite behavior
66
and as such presents a puzzle in analyzing the process of fragmentation
of national identity in Kazakhstan.
It could be explained from the non-nation state perspective. The concept of non-
nation state in this context refers to the idea that the spread of globalization introduces the
rules of market relations into the very core of identity formation, supplanting mythical,
genealogical, constructed sense of community with purely rational-choice relations based
on economic and political payoffs that transcend ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances. In
other words, ethnicity becomes more of a corporate enterprise rather than an “imagined
community,” i.e. nation. (Anderson, 1991) The basic shared values and perceptions of
such a community are substituted or constructed in terms of market economic values
rather than those of common identity and cultural preferences. This is not a duplication of
rational choice theory, but rather a challenge that market economy presents to national
identity in newly independent states in the era of globalization, as Migdal’s article
suggests. (2004) That is, the rationality of market economy is in itself a set of norms and
values that are being transposed on the communal identity in Kazakhstan.
This resonates with Uslaner’s analysis of moralized and strategic trust. (2002) In
Uslaner’s terms, what Kazakhstan is experiencing now is the decline of moralistic trust
due to the transition to market economy and attendant growth of economic inequality,

66
There are a few explanations that attempt to address this seemingly strange contestation within patronage
networks rather than from outside – see Hale (2005), Junisbai & Junisbai (2005), but none of these seem to
be satisfactory: Hale’s “lame-duck syndrome” of a weak and unpopular president does not apply in
Kazakhstan, and Junisbai and Junisbai’s emergence of pro-democratic beliefs among members of the
patronage networks seem to be counter-intuitive since elite opposition is more likely to be trying to
rearrange these networks rather than undermine them.
58
undermining the intra- and inter-ethnic relations. Traditionally, the Kazakhs found that
moralized trust, an intrinsic generalized trust in others without requiring a substantial
proof of worthiness or even substantial similarity is more vital for them than being
strategic and calculating in dealing with outsiders. Kazakhs were very open and
welcoming, treating strangers as relatives rather than as aliens. This deep sense of
moralistic trust is what makes Kazakhs even today very distinct from other nations: even
Russians and other ethnic groups who lived in Kazakhstan long enough have developed
an affinity to this culture of hospitality based on moralistic trust that they frequently feel
themselves out of place in their native Russia.
67
The same sense of moralistic trust guided
the Kazakhs in the past two hundred years to accommodate millions of “guests” in their
land, migrants who came from Russia and elsewhere, willingly or not, because a true
Kazakh would welcome anyone in his or her home even when it may mean parting with
last piece of food or giving up the last shirt of one’s own back. (Kshibekov, 2006, p. 20)
Therefore, the main hypothesis of this paper is that the national identity of
Kazakhstan is experiencing a major shock in this post-independence period due to the
economic reforms that further complicate the efforts to (re)construct Kazakh and
Kazakhstani identity as discussed in the previous section. The core of the argument at the
foundation of this project is that market economy and privatization have a negative
impact on national identity construction in Kazakhstan. The result is increased non-

67
Source: interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/10/2009
59
national, fragmented character of ethnicity, corporate culture supplanting traditions and
sense of belonging.
For the purposes of this study, integration into global economy and
establishment of market economy institutions are considered to be an independent
variable affecting the formation of segregated, increasingly non-national and non-ethnic
identity in Kazakhstan.
68
Specifically, level of analysis is organizational: how do the
market economy institutions such as private companies and regulatory bodies spread the
free market economy ideology beyond the market itself. The dependent variable is the set
of cultural values, traditions and perceptions of the world that become important markers
of national identity in the country.
Kazakhstan is in a transitional period of nation-building inhibited by numerous
obstacles preventing the formation of national unity: simultaneous advancement of
conflicting ideals of civic and ethnic nationalism; weakened Kazakh ethnic identity due
to the colonial legacy, and lingering Soviet heritage in the forms of coercive institutions
that regulate ethnic relations by suppressing their autonomy. The stated hypothesis aims
to determine whether this flux of identity in Kazakhstan is actually due to the process that
casts ethnic and sub-ethnic relations in market terms rather than that of culture and
traditions. It is a study of the process, rather the end result as such, and therefore does not
claim to provide an ultimate truth but rather aims to illuminate the possible impact of
global economic ideology on the formation of national identity in newly independent

68
This is a different approach from globalization literature that analyses the impact of global economy on
national identity. Generally, such literature focuses on the effect of cultural globalization, that is, flow of
foreign cultural values, rather than the spread of raw market economy ideas (Blum, 2007)
60
states. In other words, the hypothesized non-national reconstruction of identity is
concurrent with government’s proactive attempts to reconstruct the society of Kazakhstan
in ethnic and civic terms.
There are a few important considerations that define the path of the national
identity construction in Kazakhstan:
1. Absence of a history of concerted struggle to achieve sovereignty. Quite a few
post-colonial states and republics in the former Soviet Union and Soviet Block
in Eastern Europe have gained independence without fully developed national
liberation movements. The Kazakhs specifically had no clearly defined national
movement, and the one popular movement they did have (Nevada-
Semipalatinsk) was clearly internationalist rather than nationalist in its
mission.
69
Such lack of a national idea prior to gaining sovereignty greatly
hampered all the efforts of the newly independent republic to form national unity
despite all the efforts.
2. Prior experience as a single nation-state provides great incentive to (re)acquire
sovereignty as well as unifying ideology motivating cohesiveness and reducing
domestic dissention against the authority of the state once its independence has
been achieved. However, Kazakhstan lacked previous experience as a single
nation-state, at least in the way how the Western civilization understands this

69
While the mission of Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement – achieving a permanent ban of nuclear weapons
testing – was an issue close to the heart of Kazakhstan’s inhabitants, and as such could have been used to
mobilize national consciousness, its leadership chose to avoid going that route since it was strongly
internationalist-minded.
61
concept, probably due to the fact that the titular nationality were nomads up until
the early 1930s without clearly defined territorial borders or national memory
recorded in print literature which are essential elements of the modern (Western)
nation-state. Since Kazakhstan became independent in 1991, the Kazakh ethnic
identity is being recovered from the impact of the Russian and Soviet Empires
and reconstructed from the pool of common historical legacy of Central Asia at
large.
70

3. Presence of a large group or several groups of different ethnic origin.
Kazakhstan has a particularly large ethnic minority group (Russians) with a very
different culture, religion and identity, who reside compactly in the northern part
of the country on the border with Russia. As a result, secession is perceived as a
real threat by the regime (Dave, 2007) and prompted the development of a range
of governmental policies to assimilate minorities within a larger, state-wide
Kazakhstani identity in order to reduce the tensions and increase stability of the
new state.
4. Absence of an external intervention artificially preserving the semblance of
order in the new state or assisting splinter ethnic groups. The Russian
government never tried to promote or support secessionist movement in the

70
More than one of the Central Asian republics lay claim to the legacy of several key historical figures
such as Avicenna (Abu Ali Ibn Sino), Al-Khorezmi, Al-Fafabi and Zoroastr as their own (Ilkhamov, 2005,
p. 88)
62
northern part of Kazakhstan which is populated predominantly by Russians.
71

However, the government of Kazakhstan was still very mindful of the neighbor
to the north and maintained close relations with it since independence partly to
ameliorate the fears of the ethnic Russians of being marginalized in Kazakhstan,
and partly due to the post-colonial dependence. This policy succeeded to a
certain extent as the actual policies of increased Kazakhification (indigenization)
of the government and culture contradicting public pronouncements of creating
multi-ethnic society in Kazakhstan and prompting a mass exodus of Russians to
Russia
72
on the one hand but prevented a wide-scale inter-ethnic violence on the
other.
The extent and degree to which nation building processes are divisive as well as
unifying could only be established when compared to other factors that may influence
national cohesiveness. It is important to consider alternative theories, offered in the
existing literature that may provide a tentative explanation for the relative weakness of
ethnic identity in Kazakhstan, such as:
• Kazakhstan is still in the process of constructing its identity. The Kazakh ethnic
group has a very recent history of coherent national thought dating back to the
Soviet ethnic policies that delineated Muslim Central Asia into 5 distinct
republics. A couple of decades since independence is not enough time to

71
Under Russian colonization policies, north of Kazakhstan became a destination for a large number of
Russian peasants in 18
th
century (see Chapter 1 for more details)
72
In the period from 1989 to 1999, over 2 million people has left Kazakhstan, mostly Russians and
Germans. (Dave, 2007, p. 128)
63
formulate a coherent civic and/or ethnic national identity in this country.
• Kazakhstan’s government has to be very careful about designing and
implementing nation-building policies to avoid provoking a violent backlash
from the minorities present in the republic, Russians in particular. Extra care
taken to develop national identity translates into its slower development.
Eventually, once potential ethnic cleavages have been ameliorated economically
or politically or both, a more robust nationalization program can be adopted.
• Kazakhstan is saddled with post-colonial institutions of coercion and ethnic
management. (Dave, 2007) It is impossible to switch immediately from the
Soviet model of governance, ethnic and linguistic policies into a completely
different, unique nation building process. The post-Soviet negative mentality in
regards of minority rights as well as the fears of separatism must dissipate before
Kazakhstan is able to part ways with its colonial past and embark on the road
toward a new national identity.
• Kazakhstan political regime is becoming more and more authoritarian, rent-
seeking and distanced from the society. The population in the republic is
politically docile for historical and cultural reasons
73
and fails to form a strong
and coherent opposition. As a result, nation-building policies aim at providing
minimal stability and simply serve as a thin veil for extracting economic and

73
One of the popular explanations of the political docility in Central Asia is that the subordination to state
authority had been ingrained into the consciousness of the post-Soviet citizens, particularly in Central Asia
were traditions of respect for elders have special salience. (Dave, 2007, p. 91)
64
political benefits for the elite in power.
• Kazakhstan’s fast-growing economy insures loyalty of the key players in the
political system via patron-client networks and cooptation of the potentially
threatening opposition. Therefore, an establishment of coherent national identity
becomes a secondary concern to the regime since it is preoccupied with
maintaining patronage network rather than creating a base of support in the
population as a whole
Methods of Analysis
An appropriately conducted single case study
74
is chosen an an appropriate
research tool to yield sufficient evidence to support the hypothesized process of non-
national identity formation. This study also analyzes the strengths of alternative
hypotheses and compare them to the main argument. Kazakhstan is selected as the most-
likely case
75
to support the main hypothesis because it is a very good fit to the stated non-
national model:
• Kazakhs are a formerly nomadic people, who did not have a modern form of
state with centralized government institutions for almost all of their history.
Additionally, there were no significant national independence movement to
assert Kazakh sovereignty and, for quite some time, the leadership of

74
Single case study method offers a good starting point for testing validity of a theory or theoretical model
before it is applied in a wider setting. (Eckstein, 1975, p. 80) Kazakhstan represents a test case for the
theory of non-national identity which is an appropriate use of single case study method
75
The benefit of most-likely case study is that if it is not confirmed in most favorable conditions, then it is
only more likely to fail “in less hospitable circumstances” (Odell, 2004, p. 63)
65
Kazakhstan could not imagine surviving alone without being part of a larger
political entity (e.g., Kazakhstan spearheaded the establishment of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in the early 1990s). Compared to the rest
of the Soviet Union and even Central Asia, Kazakhstan seems to be least
prepared to form a proper nation-state after becoming independent.
• Kazakh identity is divided at sub-national level onto 3 tribal confederations
(Hordes) with further fragmentation at the tribe level. Thus, the claim to
sovereign Kazakh state is subject to many alternative visions of what constitutes
Kazakh identity and Kazakh land proper within the wider Kazakh ethnicity. In
addition, Kazakhstan is one of most ethnically diverse republics in the former
Soviet Union with over 100 nationalities residing on its territory. The number of
Russians and Ukranians almost equaled that of ethnic Kazakhs at the time of
independence and their dominance in northern regions of Kazakhstan prompted
the threat of secession. These issues combined present another significant
challenge to forming a coherent national identity in Kazakhstan more than in any
other country of the former Soviet bloc.
• Just like most other new states in the former USSR and many former colonies,
Kazakhstan was not really economically viable from the beginning. Without sea
access to international markets to export its valuable resources (especially oil), a
primarily resource-oriented economy with all processing located in Russia, and
still suffering from the Soviet economic inefficiencies, the avenue for its
66
economic development was initially sought via re-integration with Russia
76
and,
once that failed, via attracting foreign investment. The latter was quite
successful, in fact, Kazakhstan ranks highest in terms of FDI among the former
Soviet Bloc countries, second only to Hungary. (Cummings, 2005, p. 32)
However, opening up to foreign direct investment made Kazakhstan vulnerable
to the forces of the global market economy and penetration of
globalized/internationalized culture.
• The Soviet legacy left Kazakhstan with a fairly well developed and functional
government bureaucracy. Initially, many commandeering positions in the army,
government, and economy were occupied by non-Kazakhs (especially by
Russians) who were gradually replaced with ethnic Kazakhs both before and
after independence. As a result, the political structure of Kazakhstan in the
1990s became fairly homogenous ethnically, forming a core ethnic group at the
helm of the country and diminishing political clout and social mobility of the
Russian minority. The disempowerment
77
of the Russian-speaking minority is a
usual fare throughout the former Soviet Union but it is especially significant in
Kazakhstan because the Russians still constitute a considerable part of the
population
78
.

76
Soviet economic policies integrated Kazakhstan as a resource base into the Russian economy, making it
extremely difficult for Kazakhstan to disentangle itself from Russia after independence
77
Which is the other side of ethnic revival of the titular nationalities
78
Slightly less than 40% in 1999 census as opposed to 50% in 1989 (Dave, 2007, p. 128)
67
Thus, if the hypothesized relationship between non-national identity and global
market forces has any validity; Kazakhstan presents a very good case to demonstrate it.
Conversely, if the research does not find enough evidence to support the idea that the
weakness of national identity in the republic is at least partially explained by the
development of market economy, the proposed concept of non-nation is very unlikely to
provide a good explanation of identity construction elsewhere.
A good way to test this hypothesis is by applying the method of disciplined
interpretive case study.
79
The examination will focus on the role of market economy
institutions, primarily foreign corporations as well as domestic companies, on how
market economy is being developed and perceived by the population which came out of
many years of command economy and communist ideology. First, this will entail
examination of winners and losers of economic liberalization and transition to market
economy, their perceptions and attitudes toward the new economic structures. Second, it
entails an examination of the impact of increasingly important market relations on inter-
personal relations, particularly on the perceptions of community and shared cultural
values. Third, alternative explanations will be evaluated to challenge the explanatory
power of the primary hypothesis.
The method of process-tracing
80
will assist with understanding how does the
economic liberalization affects decisions and choices of people, prompting cleavages

79
Odell argues that the major benefit of such method is in more rigorous conceptualization of the theory
(Odell, 2004, p. 59)
80
This method offers insights into the stimuli, perceptions and constraints that channel decision-making
process (George & McKeown, 1985, pp. 34-36)
68
and/or processes of amalgamation into a nation. The target is the choices made by the
people of Kazakhstan, and possible conditions prompting those choices such as
globalization and FDI, ethnic and sub-ethnic identities, and policies to establish a sense
of unity in the republic. One particular application of process-tracing method would be to
examine the rejection of globalization and attendant de-humanizing and de-personalizing
rationality of market economy logic, and what kind of response that may generates such
as idealization of pre-modern values and norms, or, alternatively, recollections of the
Soviet economic ‘equality’. The insight sought is how such interaction of market
economy forces and identity prompts the search for cultural markers, affirming either
civic, or ethnic, or sub-ethnic identities in Kazakhstan.
In the end, if the evidence does not show that the process of identity construction
in Kazakhstan is strongly correlated with the influence of global market economy, and
that in fact one of the alternative explanations (i.e. transitional weakness of national
identity, colonial legacy, concern for Russian/Russified part of the population) lends a
better explanation, then the main hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the best
supported alternative. Additionally, the research will consider the problem of endogeneity
at all times because it is inherent in the hypothesized relationships between political
institutions and national identity.
The research was structured as follows:
1) The study of the historical background of Kazakhstan, identifying 3 significant
periods and development of national identity during each: pre-Russian period,
Russian colonization, Soviet period and post-Soviet period.
69
2) Analysis of research questions and goals, as well the statement of the hypothesis
and the concept of non-national (corporate) ethnic relations.
3) Review of traditional nationalism literature as well as the studies of nationalism in
newly independent Kazakhstan, identifying key insights and patterns.
4) Analysis and discussion of national identity fragmentation and/or its revival.
5) Analysis and discussion of foreign and domestic economic actors and how they
affect the formation of national identity in Kazakhstan.
6) Conclusion and evaluation of the primary as well as alternative hypotheses.
Evidence Collection
This is a challenging project which targeted 3 sites in Kazakhstan: Almaty,
Astana, and Aktau (the choice is explained below). In each, archival and local media
research was performed to determine the general trends in debates and discussions
pertaining to economic events such as privatization, opening up of local offices of local
companies, their social and economic impact on the local community and the republic at
large. Furthermore, a number of interviews with aides/advisors of key officials, as well as
public figures such as party leaders, local activists, or journalists, and last but not the
least, with the officers of the local foreign private companies were conducted to discuss
their respective roles in economic reforms, inter-ethnic relations and public relations and
possible repercussions for national identity formation. A survey was completed at the
main and additional sites to see how processes of privatization, development of market
economy and large-scale introduction of FDI affected the identity of the people, their
70
behavior and relations with one another during day-to-day interactions, their perceptions
of their place in Kazakhstan’s society and how they position themselves in ethnic terms.
Choice of sites:
1. Almaty is the former capital and as such, contains most of the archival resources, it
is also a focal point of the commercial activities of many private enterprises. In
addition, it is also one of the most ethnically diverse cities in Kazakhstan. Finally,
the majority of educational/research facilities are located here as well. This site is
valuable because it contains the most information about the general historical
background of Kazakhstan and information on early market reforms. This site yields
the most in terms of general information but testing the primary hypothesis there is
difficult due to ethnic and economic diversity, in fact, it was expected that
alternative explanations to be supported more here.
a. This site serves as the major source of background archival research, as well as
that for gathering and analyzing available general statistical data about ethnic
composition of Kazakhstan, and preliminary general republican and local
media analysis as well access to major archives such as the National Library,
the National University Libraries, the Institute for Strategic Studies Library, the
Academy of Sciences Library. Additionally, local scholars at the National
University and the Academy of Sciences were contacted for additional insights
into the project
b. Data from city administration website was used to obtain information on the
development and implementation of market reform policies, ethnic policies,
and public relations. The insight sought is how the most populated city in
71
Kazakhstan copes with strain of the population diversity and development of
market economy
c. Interviews with local activists, leaders of opposition, notable academics to
obtain their impressions and observations about the progress of market
economy and its impact on the identity in Kazakhstan
d. Survey to analyze the interplay of ethnic diversity and market economy reforms
in Almaty
2. Astana is the current capital and it is also at the heart of Russian-dominated
Northern Kazakhstan. It contains almost all of the governmental agencies as well as
representative of foreign countries and companies. It is also undergoing
fundamental reconstruction with billions of dollars invested to transform a
provincial town into a modern-age capital city. Similarly to Almaty, testing the
main hypothesis was difficult due to ethnic diversity. It was expected to yield better
support for alternative explanations.
a. This site provides the most current information on the government’s market
reforms and ethnic policies that illuminate the current heading that the political
leadership of Kazakhstan is trying to take to achieve both national unity as well
as to sustain economic growth. Particularly significant are the libraries of the
Parliament, archives at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Budget Planning,
Energy and Mineral Resources, Culture and Information, Labor and Social
Protection. Local newspaper archives provide insights into how the transfer of
the capital and attendant intensification of economic and political life in the
capital changed the perspective and expectations of the locals, as well that of
72
the newcomers from the rest of the country. Census and other current statistical
data on the ethnic composition of the republic, the migration flows and so on
are published in Astana.
b. Interviews were conducted with available officials of the aforementioned
ministries and Parliament to gauge the general direction that republican policies
in both ethnic and economic development are taking, and to examine the effect
of the republican-wide policies as well as the policies to develop the city as the
capital of newly independent Kazakhstan on their identity.
c. Again, like in Almaty, interviews with local activists and academics to gauge
the effect of policies, as well as their perception of the current state of national
identity in Kazakhstan in general and in Astana in particular.
d. A survey was conducted to determine how movement of capital, attendant
economic and political development of previously provincial town affected the
locals, as well as the perceptions of the government officials about the place
since most of them come from elsewhere
3. Aktau is the major the focus of FDI, and also the focus of a recent initiative to
develop it into a major tourist attraction. It has the only sea-port in Kazakhstan, and
it is a fast-growing town thanks to the large presence of foreign oil companies.
Aktau is the focus of Chinese investment into oil fields of Kazakhstan but there are
many other oil companies as well. Its population is mainly Kazakh. This site was
expected to yield the most support to the primary hypothesis due to the large
presence of traditional Kazakhs clans/groups and the high levels of FDI into
Mangystau region where Aktau is located.
73
a. Archival research in the local newspapers to see how the influx of foreign
capital changed the outlook of the local inhabitants on their place in the world
and their future perspectives.
b. Similarly to other sides, interviews were conducted with local officials to gauge
their views on general economic and ethnic policies and their own
implementation on the site.
c. Interviews with local activists and journalists were conducted to examine their
perceptions of the economic development and its impact on local/country-wide
identity
d. An interview with a representative of a foreign oil company was conducted to
gain insight into how such enterprises promotes and maintains its presence in
Kazakhstan, establishing a special relationship with the local and republican
authorities, promotion of the private ownership and market enterprise as well as
directing the multiple pipeline foreign policy of Kazakhstan. Particularly
interesting was to trace the relationship between foreign companies and the
government of Kazakhstan which is not without major scandals and corruption
charges from both within and outside of the republics.
e. Finally, a survey of the predominantly Kazakh locals was conducted to gauge
the impact of foreign capital, globalization and market economy on their
identity to provide a contrast to the more ethnically diverse cities of Astana and
Almaty
In the end, it was expected to find sufficient evidence to support the primary
hypothesis: fast and wide introduction of market economy and large-scale FDI affect
74
national identity in a fundamental way, undermining local customs and traditions,
reformulating and changing the course of inter- and intra-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan.
In other words, the hypothesis postulates that the transition to market economy and
increased participation in global economy entails fragmentation of the national identity
and as such, gives rise to non-national society in Kazakhstan.

75
Chapter 3: Aktau
This chapter introduces Aktau, a small town on the shores of the Caspian Sea,
passionately called the “Pearl of the Caspian” by its inhabitants. This name evokes a
range of associations: first of all, it is the beauty of Aktau, designed and built by the
Leningrad
81
architects, considered to have been the best in the Soviet Union.
82
It is also a
reference to the black caviar that makes the Caspian Sea famous worldwide, and, of
course, to oil that makes the Aktau region – Mangystau – prosperous. But most important
of all, the Pearl of the Caspian is one of the major drivers of economic changes in the
entire Republic of Kazakhstan thanks to the vast foreign direct investments poured into
the region to develop its vast reserves of the precious black gold.
Not surprisingly, Aktau presents a very interesting and relevant case for
examining the hypothesized relationship between FDI and Kazakh national identity. It is
also a contrasting case, different from the other sites in this study and provides ample
evidence to examine two important dimensions in the hypothesis. On the one hand, Aktau
is dominated by the Kazakhs and therefore offers a strong case for the resilience of
Kazakh culture and identity. On the other, the city and the region have a sizeable foreign
population and investments that produce a notable impression on the local social
environment.
In the course of this chapter, it will be shown that Aktau provides valuable data
which does not seem to support the contention that FDI is indeed able to undermine the

81
Saint Petersburg in Russia today
82
Interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/10/2009
76
process of Kazakh national identity formation. On the contrary, it seems that a confluence
of factors such as rich historical legacy and domination of a single Kazakh tribe of Adai
who have retained much of the Kazakh nomadic traditions and culture, enable the
inhabitants of the town and the region resist the culturally divisive impact of
globalization, FDI, and transition to market economy.
The chapter will start off with a brief discussion of the background of the region
and the role it plays in the collective memory of the Kazakhs. Then, the role of oil and
uranium ore discoveries in Mangystau, founding and growth of Aktau during both Soviet
and post-Soviet period will be examined. Introduction of FDI and rapid economic growth
and their role in driving population migration into Mangystau will follow. In last part of
the chapter, analysis of national identity formation and its relationship with rapid
economic changes in Aktau will be provided.
Historical Background of Mangystau
Mangystau, also known as Mangyshlak in the past, is the least populated region
(oblast
83
) in Kazakhstan: in January 2010, it had 446,300 inhabitants living on the
territory of 165,600 square kilometers, or 2.7 inhabitants per square kilometer.
84

(Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 25) It is located essentially on a peninsula
in the Caspian Sea in the southwest corner of the country, bordering Aral Sea to east,

83
A Russian term referring to territorial administrative units of regional size – akin to constituent States of
the United States.
84
6.98 people per square mile – compare to United States average population 87.4 people per square mile
in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010)
77
Turkmenistan to south and Uzbekistan to south-east. Mangystau is mainly inhabited by
the Kazakh tribe of Adai, who are part of a larger Baiuly tribe within the Small Horde.
85

It is a very arid area with a variety of geological formations – including semi-deserts and
plateau Ustyurt all of which lack fresh water sources and have only a token 120-160mm
amount of annual precipitation in comparison to average 400mm annual precipitation all
over the Kazakhstan. (Aiagan, 2006, p. 477) (Masanov N. , 1995, p. 41)
Adai is a very large tribe and as a consequence of the mass exodus during the
Soviet collectivization many of Mangystau’s Kazakhs have found themselves in Iran and
Turkmenistan, which today translates into closer political relations between the region
and those countries. For example, residents of Mangystau, unlike the rest of Kazakhstan
and the world, do not require a visa to enter their closely guarded and tightly controlled
neighbor – Turkmenistan.
86

The aridity in the region explains the relatively small population most of which
is composed of the descendants of traditional nomads who lived here for thousands of
years. Some Kazakhs in the region claim that they are related to ancient Shumerian tribes
who were forced to move to Mangystau region thousands of years ago. (Kalbaev, 2009)
A more realistic genealogical connection is established with Saka (Scythians) who
emerged in the area about 3 thousand years ago and laid foundation to the rich historical
heritage the region possesses today: a large number of religious and symbolic

85
See discussion of Hordes and tribes in Chapter 1
86
Another major reason for such special relations is that there is a sizeable Turkmen community in
Mangystau, whose ancestors controlled this land before the arrival of the Kazakh nomads.
78
monuments, tombs and underground mosques, preserved by the severely arid climate of
the region. By some estimates, Mangystau contains 800 major articles of architecture
built over thousands of years on this ancient trade crossroads.
87
Much of the historical
legacy of the region disappeared under cyclically rising and receding Caspian Sea.
88

The ancient structures of Mangystau consists mainly of tombs that are often
found in groups, forming a virtual ‘city of the dead’ and providing a visible physical
connection between the nomads and their ancestors, revered in Kazakh traditions. The
earliest such structures are kulpytas, richly decorated column-shaped gravestones whose
exact origins are yet to be determined. (Tasmagambetov, 2002, p. 54) The shape of
kulpytas is unique in form and not found anywhere else but this region. Although these
structures are similar to Turkic balbals in function, they are very different in form – while
the balbals are anthropomorphic, kylpytas are symbolic, reflecting in all likelihood the
trade of the deceased (e.g., figures of armed warriors or work tools) while ornamentation
on them is related to the ancient Turkic written script. (Ibid, p. 56) Furthermore, while
balbals are geographically widespread, they are not found here. (Ibid, p. 61) Kulpytas are
not the only form of ancient architecture. There are also pillar-like stone structures called
koshkartases reflecting the other side of nomadic traditions – the reverence for livestock

87
Mangystau was part of the ancient Silk Road about a thousand years ago (more on that below)
88
There are several theories and not firm proof to account for these fluctuations (William & Mirovitskaya,
2000, p. 80). Some even argue that this activity have created an oasis around the end of the last Ice Age on
the territory of Mangystau with a highly developed civilization and unusual flora and fauna that left a deep
imprint in the world’s mythology to this day (Leonov, 2010)
79
and more specifically, for the sheep; as such, koshkartases bear ram-shaped tops.
(Tasmagambetov, 2002, p. 63)
Still more recent architectural artifacts are heavily influenced by the spread of
Islam among the nomads, who built underground
89
mosques and necropolis for
prominent Muslim saints
90
The most famous of such structures are Beket-Ata and
Shopan-Ata, which serve as mosques and final resting places to the two of the most
significant Sufi teachers in the Kazakh past.
Figure 3: Underground Mosque Beket-Ata in Mangystau

Source: (Podzemnaia mechet Beket - ata)

89
Some were even carved into the mountain rock.
90
Which is unusual for traditional Islam which reveres only one God, Allah, but very acceptable in Sufism
branch of Islam, adopted by the Kazakhs, and compatible with their pre-Islamic traditional beliefs system.
In fact, the tombs of the saints attracted pilgrims from far beyond the borders of the region.
80
All in all, Mangystau is estimated to contain up to 72% of Kazakhstan’s
archaeological treasures
91
numbering in the excess of 12 thousand items (Istoriia i
kul'tura, 2008), earning it a nickname of the “museum under the open sky.” Moreover, it
is believed that many of these historical treasures were built by either Turkmen or Adai
predecessors in the past, providing a tangible claim to the land for the latter tribe which
now dominates the region. (Mirzoev, 1994, p. 134)
Adai are intensely proud of this historical heritage and justifiably assert to hold
true to the Kazakh traditions more than any other Kazakh tribe. In part, this stems from
the fact that they managed to remain autonomous of the Russian and Soviet influence
longer than many other Kazakh tribes, not the least thanks to their attributed militant,
warrior-minded character.
92
In fact, while the rest of the Small Horde was first to submit
to Russia under Abu'l Khayr Khan in 1731, Adai did not for at least another 100 years.
93

When they did accept the Russian rule, Adai still remained quite recalcitrant and as a
result the Russians frequently had to resort to military force to perform even the simplest
of administrative tasks such as collecting taxes in the region. Adai resisted the colonial
control so much that the Russian government had to deploy several expeditionary forces
in Mangystau around the 1850s to subdue them. In 1868, when a particularly

91
Source: interview with the head of Department of Culture, Mangystau Oblast Administration, 8/8/2009
92
In many interviews, conducted in Aktau, the respondents highlighted the warrior spirit of the Adai tribe
which made them into a force to be reckoned with in the past. It is a common belief expressed by
respondents that thanks to the war-making skill of Adai, Mangystau now belongs to the Kazakhs rather
than Turkmen who controlled the peninsula previously. (Interviews with journalists, officials 8/6/2009,
8/7/2009, 8/8/2009, 8/10/2009)
93
According to Olcott, Russia did not fully control Adai until around 1848 (The Kazakhs, 1995, p. 81)
81
discriminatory Steppe Statute curtailing nomadic migration paths was passed, many
Russian troops were stationed in the region ahead of its introduction and even then they
were not able to suppress a massive Adai uprising in 1870. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 81)
Since Adai’s desert land presented very little value for agriculture,
94
and due to
their militancy and resistance they were mostly left to their own devices with exception
of a few military expeditions further into Central Asia and a fort built in the region. This,
of course, was a coin of two sides: while most of the other Kazakhs were actively pulled
into trade with Russia, Adais were not, thus remaining on the sideline of the economic
reforms in the steppe. (Olcott M. , 1995, pp. 80-82) It is interesting to note that the
resistance of Adai to the Russian colonialism was so fierce that their rebellions were first
among all Kazakh tribes to be recognized in Soviet historiography after many years of
silence on this topic. (Ibid, p. 109)
Furthermore, until the 1920s, Russia handled Mangystau separately from the
Kazakh Steppe and as a part of the Caspian region which included modern Turkmenistan.
(Olcott M. , 1995, p. 82) Indeed, until the mid 17
th
century the region was inhabited by
Turkmen tribes but by the time Russia had arrived in the Kazakh steppe, Mangystau was
already under the control of militant Adai. However, since Adai were relatively free of
interference – until 1869, Adais were not subjected to Russian control (Kenesbaeva,
2010) – and since there were quite a few Turkmen left in the region (still are), the
Russian colonial administration attached them to the Turkmen administrative territorial

94
In 2010, agriculture contributed 0.3% of total GDP of the Mangystau Oblast, and even in absolute terms,
it is 10 times less than the second lowest oblast’s contribution of agriculture to the republican GDP
(Valovyi regional'nyy produkt Kazakhstana za 9 mesiatsev 2010 goda, 2010).
82
unit until it was decided to reattach the region to the Kazakh autonomous republic under
the Soviet Union in 1920. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 155)
One might say that this is one of the many examples of the arbitrary Soviet
nation-building policies, which were responsible for forming the Central Asian republics
in the first place by random delineation of the borders in the region, but the fact of the
matter is that Adai who were the majority
95
in the region since the late 17
th
century
strongly believe that they belong to the Kazakh tribe Baiuly and not a Turkmen one.
(Masanov, Abylhozhin, & Erofeeva, 2007, p. 82) So while the political history of
Mangystau is rather murky and Turkmenistan lays claim to its territory to this day, the
majority of population of this region is Kazakh, and, as they assert,
96
they were able to
hold on to the old Kazakh traditions better than anyone else in Kazakhstan, not least
because of the rich historical legacy of the “museum under the open sky” and the history
of relative isolation of the region.
Foundation of Aktau
Only in the late 1950s Mangystau earned close attention of the Soviet
government with the discovery of significant uranium ore deposits in it. This was a
crucial time for the Soviet Union as it was entering a nuclear arms race with the United
States and therefore a significant amount of investment was poured into the previously
shunned desolate region of this largest country in the world. In 1959, an industrial

95
In 2009, Mangystau is 88.3% Kazakh, most of whom are Adai (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki
Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010)
96
Interview with the head of Department of Culture, Mangystau Oblast Administration, 8/8/2009
83
settlement called Aktau
97
was founded on the shores of the Caspian Sea
98
with the sole
purpose of providing an administrative and industrial base for the development of
uranium ore mines in what was then called Mangyshlak. (Letopis' goroda Aktau, 2003) In
the 1960s, large oil fields were also discovered, providing an additional incentive for the
industrial development of the region. (Mirzoev, 1994)
The 1960s marked a turning point in the life of the Mangystau’s Adais and other
residents of the region, who until the early 1960s kept true to the traditional nomadic
pastoralism and fishing. Up until the late 1950s, there were no alternatives for
Mangystau’s inhabitants but to continue age long traditions of tending cattle. (Aiagan,
2006, p. 477) To quote an official interviewed at the Agriculture Department of
Mangystau Oblast Administration, “Mangystau was founded upon the traditions of
livestock breeding” (8/4/2009). Arguably, Adais remained more or less nomadic the
longest of all the Kazakh tribes and only in the early 1960s were pulled into the new
Soviet economic system. (Ibid) To this day, livestock breeding, in particular that of
camel, provides for the living of a number of Adai Kazakhs. (Timofeev, 2010)
For the locals, the sudden economic growth of the region brought with it the
development of agriculture. Before the discovery of the strategic resources in Mangystau,
Adai Kazakhs lacked the means to dig sufficiently deep wells to reach underground water
in large numbers, and without them, in the extremely arid climate of the region,

97
Renamed in 1964 to Shevchenko to commemorate the 150
th
anniversary of a famous Ukranian poet who
was exiled to this region in the 19
th
century. In 1991, the name Aktau was restored.
98
Became town in 1964 as it was growing fast due to the inflow of the workers from outside to drive
rapidly expanding ore mining and oil well drilling operations in Mangystau (Letopis' goroda Aktau, 2003)
84
agriculture was impossible. From the 1960s onwards large industrial plants built in
Mangystau sponsored well digging and other activities to provide water, making crop
agriculture viable for the Kazakh communities for the first time in history.
99
Same
practice was restored in the last few years with the arrival of the large foreign oil
companies into Mangystau.
100
“The lack of fresh water limited the growth of Mangystau
throughout the history”, remarked the interviewee from Mangystau Department of
Agriculture (8/4/2009).
Then there was an immigration of workers, engineers and administrators from
all over the Soviet Union;
101
supported by the development of infrastructure as the first
rail road linked this isolated region with the ‘large land’, as Mangystau’s inhabitants
referred to the rest of the world.
102
(Mirzoev, 1994) As the uranium and then oil
industries were built from ground up in this desolate region, Mangystau, metaphorically
speaking, was awakening from a thousand year sleep
103
it had been in since the Silk Road
passed through it about a thousand years ago. In recognition of the growing importance

99
The expansion was very relative – as it has been mentioned above, agriculture makes up a tiny part of
Mangystau’s economy.
100
Interview with an official of Agriculture Department, Mangystau Oblast Administration, 8/4/2009
101
While no specific numbers are available, available sources (interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in
Aktau, 8/10/2009) indicated that in 50s and 60s most jobs in the uranium ore and oil industry were taken by
non-Kazakh specialists who came to Kazakhstan from other parts of the USSR. Only by the 1980s Kazakhs
started being recruited into these highly lucrative jobs (Mirzoev, 1994)
102
This is reminiscent of an island mentality developed in such nations as United Kingdom and, to a lesser
degree, United States – Adais, living on a peninsular with such hard environmental conditions have
developed a very specific identity, even an air of superiority, if you will (author’s observation based on
conversations with Adai Kazakhs in Aktau)
103
Kanysh Satpaev, the first president of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, called Mangystau (Mangyshlak
at the time) a ‘sleeping beauty’ when he flew over it on a plane in the 1950s (Eto Mangystau! Priroda, 26).
85
of the region it was separated from Atyrau Oblast, establishing Mangystau Oblast in
1973. (Aiagan, 2006, p. 474)
The prime example of changes on Mangystau peninsular was the spectacular
growth of Aktau (also known as Shevchenko for most of its existence during the Soviet
time). As the Soviet Union was developing uranium and oil riches of this region,
thousands of workers came to Mangystau from all over the country.
104
(Olcott M. , 1995,
p. 258) Aktau became one of the most ethnically diverse towns in the USSR.
105
As
mentioned previously, it has earned a nickname “The Pearl of the Caspian” thanks to
beauty of the architectural designs and the planning of the town attributed to renown
Leningrad architects,
106
highlighting the multi-ethnic origins of Aktau.

104
While no exact data is available for the 1950s and 60s due to Mangystau still being part of another larger
oblast, in 1970 and 1979 Kazakhs constituted only 45% and 43% of the total population, respectively.
(Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po Mangistauskoy Oblasti, 2000, p. 22)
105
Interview with Aktau newspaper journalists, 8/6/2009
106
Interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/10/2009
86
Figure 4: View on Aktau with Oil-tankers in the Background

Source: (Kuzhekov, 2010)
To support such a relatively large town in an extremely arid area of Kazakhstan,
the issue of fresh water supply arose sharply, exacerbated by a rapid decline of water
levels in the Aral Sea caused by expanding cotton agriculture elsewhere in Central Asia.
For Mangystau, Aral and Caspian Seas are the natural sources of precipitation thanks to
the geographical proximity, which meant as the cotton industry was increasing the output,
Mangystau was receiving less and less of precious precipitation. Resolution came in the
form of the first nuclear powered desalination plant BN-350 in the world,
107
which

107
In fact, it remained the only one in the world until a couple of years ago when Australia and Saudi
Arabia started to build nuclear-powered desalination plants.
87
became operational in 1973 and supplied both electricity and fresh water to the rapidly
growing Aktau. (Aiagan, 2004, p. 153) The desalinization plant was reengineered to run
on natural gas energy in the mid-1990s, and remains to this day the single largest source
of fresh water in Mangystau, supplemented by traditional water wells and fresh water
pipeline completed in 1986 to provide water from the Russian Federation and subject to
its pricing.
108
Until today, Mangystau does not have enough fresh water to sustain enough
crops for its own needs, most of agricultural products are imported from elsewhere.
109

The impact of the nuclear plant was dual. On the one hand, it provided a
necessary energy source for the industrialization of Mangystau, which would change its
traditional economic system and provide foundation for a rapid growth, setting stage for
higher levels prosperity than its inhabitants could ever imagine in the past when they
were engaged in pastoral nomadism.
110
(Mirzoev, 1994) On the other hand,
unfortunately, the attendant industrial growth sustained by the nuclear plant brought with
it irreversible damage to the environment, caused by oil spills, industrial waste so
common in the Soviet Union, and even the fresh water provided by the nuclear
desalination plant carries inherent health risk due to the lack of a proper balance of
mineral additives in it.
111

108
Source: Interview with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
109
Ibid
110
Granted, the prosperity rarely came to Mangystau’s natives, as the uranium and oil industries were built
and serviced almost exclusively by outsiders, but the general quality of life did rise
111
The desalinized water has mineral additives but even then it is never good enough to compete with
naturally occurring fresh water in terms of health benefits. As a result, Aktau’s inhabitants have higher than
88
The discovery of the strategic resources in Mangystau has changed the course of
history for this remote and isolated region, its economic status and most importantly, its
ethnic composition. However, the largest weakness of the region introduced by the Soviet
industrialization of Mangystau surfaced when the Soviet Union collapsed and Kazakhstan
became independent.
Economic Crash and Recovery after Independence
Kazakhstan at large experienced a rapid industrialization under the Soviet Union
but most of the development focused on extraction of raw materials which the republic
has in abundance. As Kazakhstan is close to Russia and in fact has a long shared
border,
112
it was considered more practical to link its massive raw material extraction
sites with equally massive processing plants in Russia rather than building smaller but
local integrated production lines within the republic. (Peck, 2004, p. 62) Nowhere else it
was more evident than in Mangystau, where few processing plants were built and most of
Mangystau’s industrial output was shipped out as supplies to the Russian manufactories
down the line rather than the ones within Kazakhstan proper.
As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed, these tightly integrated links were
suddenly cut. Russia in fact was trying to break free of Central Asia, the latter perceived

average occurrence of kidney and gallbladder stones and related diseases (Interview with an official of
Agriculture Department, Mangystau Oblast Administration, 8/4/2009).
112
In fact, Kazakhstan and Russia share the longest contiguous land border in the world – 6,846 km
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2009, p. 359) which is longer than the US-Canada border excluding Alaska
(Ibid, p. 717)
89
as a heavy burden on the Russian economy
113
and blamed, in part or in whole, for the
economic hardships that bankrupted the Soviet Union. Aktau, one of the prime examples
of the pan-Soviet industrial efforts found itself without any support of the Center (i.e.,
Russia) and without any customers for its factories and manufactories which were built to
supply consumers who were now located outside of independent Kazakhstan. The town,
built and inhabited by thousands of people from beyond Kazakhstan, essentially became
a town of expatriates without a job. (Utebaeva & al, 2003, p. 37) Region as a whole has
dramatically reduced its production output as it could be seen in Figure 5 below, and
dipped below the average for the entire republic which also suffered a deep economic
recession as the result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Plus, if the rest of the
country had a comparatively well-developed agriculture, Mangystau did not as it has
been discussed above – in particular because the farmers there depended on subsidies
from the local industrial enterprises which quite obviously could no longer provide it in
the early 90s. In other words, the gap in terms of job opportunities and wealth generation
between the country and Mangystau region was likely to be much larger than Figure 5
suggests.

113
The Russian administration in the early 1990s considered Kazakhstan as part of the “heavy ‘ballast’ of
backward, conservative and culturally ‘alien’ Central Asian Societies.” (Kortunov, 1998, p. 8)
90
Figure 5: Total Industrial Output of Mangystau Oblast in 1991-1997

Source: (Promyshlennost' Respubliki Kazakhstan za 1990-1997 gody, 1998, pp. 17, 75)
The result mirrored that of many other strategic cities and towns that were built
by the Soviet military industrial complex with little, if any, integration into the local
economy: the town became deserted as the Soviet Union crumbled. In two years, 1991
and 1992, almost 200 thousand people left the region. (Utebaeva & al, 2003, p. 37) At
some point, the city’s mayor was forced to introduce a local currency called in his honor
baievki to maintain order in Aktau which was suffering from significant wage arrears.
(Ibid, p. 38) By 1999, the level of unemployment in Mangystau reached 11.8%, the
highest among all of Kazakhstan’s oblasts. (Voloshin, 2001)
On the other hand, as Kazakhstan became unwillingly independent, it struggled
to establish legitimacy and survive as a sovereign state. One of the means of establishing
such legitimacy were the measures taken to boost the native Kazakh population who did
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
120.0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Mangystau, % of 1990
output
Kazakhstan, % of 1990
output
91
not even have the majority at the time of independence.
114
This ranged from calls for
increasing the birthrates (Tatimov M. , 2002) to repatriation of the Kazakhs immigrants
who left Kazakhstan during the disastrous collectivization campaign in the 1930s.
In Mangystau, it meant the return of a large number Adai and other Kazakhs
who were eager to return to their homeland.
115
Mangystau became one of the favorite
destinations for the repatriates, who preserved their traditional culture and identity, for a
couple of reasons: Adai who remained there were rather successful at maintaining the
Kazakh identity of the past – unlike the northern regions, where Russians were a
majority; and the rich historical heritage of the region drew the attention of the Kazakh
repatriants. (Sultanov E. , 2008)
The result, as reported by interview respondents,
116
was quite remarkable.
Aktau, built and inhabited by people from all over the former Soviet Union with a
relatively small portion of ethnic Kazakh residents before independence, 8 years after
became dominated by the Kazakhs. In in 1970, only 35% of the total urban population
117

in Mangystau was Kazakh, 45% in 1989 and 73% in 1999. In other words, the proportion
of the Kazakh urban population was growing slowly before 1991 (growth only of 10% in

114
39.7% (Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda, 1992)
115
In 1989-1998, over 44 thousand Kazakhs have moved to Mangystau from other countries or other
regions of Kazakhstan, most notably Turkmenistan (22 thousand), Uzbekistan (6 thousand), Russia (1,445)
and Iran (766). (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po Mangistauskoy Oblasti, 2000, p. 57) These 4
countries was where many Adai Kazakhs took refuge during collectivization, and to this day, many of
Mangystau’s residents have relatives there (Interview with a Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/6/2009).
116
Several interviews with journalists and officials, 8/4/2009, 8/6/2009, 8/7/2009, 8/10/2009
117
Combined population of Aktau and the other two towns in Mangystau, Fort Shevchenko and Zhanaozen
(Aiagan, 2006, p. 477)
92
19 years between 1970 and 1989) and it exploded by 28% in 10 years after. (Figure 6) At
the same time, the total urban population dropped by over 40 thousand people or by
14.1% of the 1989 level in 1999; while the rural population (essentially, all ethnic
Kazakhs) almost doubled from 37 thousand to 67 thousand in the same time period.
(Ibid) The data implies that while the Kazakh population grew (not the least thanks to the
migration), the non-Kazakh population left the region in large numbers, returning to their
respective countries.
118

Figure 6: Urban Population by Ethnicity and Total Urban and Rural Population in
Mangystau Oblast 1970-1999

Source: (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po Mangistauskoy Oblasti, 2000, p. 16)
While Kazakhstan as a whole and Mangystau in particular were trying to recover
from the post-Soviet recession and economic dependence on Russia and high levels of
unemployment; Aktau and the region as a whole swelled with the Kazakh repatriates
(oralman in Kazakh), who by the virtue of staying away from the Soviet reforms in the

118
Some non-Kazakhs, who left Aktau in the early 90s, returned later in the late 1990s – early 2000s
(interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/10/2009)
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1970 1979 1989 1999
Urban Kazakh, %
Urban Non-Kazakh, %
Total Urban
Population
Total Rural Population
93
region were able to maintain the Kazakh traditions and the Kazakh language more true to
its origins than the Kazakhs within the country. (Diener, 2009) While the integration of
the Kazakh repatriates in the Republic of Kazakhstan is fraught with many issues,
Mangystau reportedly received 96.5 thousand of oralman from 1991 to 2009 (O migratsii
oralmanov v Mangistauskuiu oblast', 2010) which makes up almost 20% of the total
population of the oblast in 2009 (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda.
Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 10), making this region one of the largest recipient of the Kazakh
repatriates in the republic.
119
Furthermore, since 1999, the population of this rather
distant and desolate region grew by over 54% by 2009, second only to Astana, the rapidly
growing new capital of Kazakhstan, while on average, the population of the republic
grew by a moderate 6.9% in the same time period. (Ibid)
A few short years since independence have brought Aktau and Mangystau
virtually to the brink of bankruptcy, causing another shift in the ethnic composition, as
well. The next few years have reversed the economic fortunes of the oblast and caused
even larger changes in terms of population.
Arrival of Foreign Oil Companies
Gradually, the economic devastation caused by the disruption of the economy
linked to Russia after 1991 was gradually counteracted by the market economic reforms
that the Kazakh government has adopted with rigor. One of the primary means of

119
This also causes tension with local population who frequently perceive oralman as a burden on them,
something akin to how illegal immigration is perceived in the US with one important difference: oralman
are invited officially and yet perceived as unwanted consumers of the limited state resources (Interview
with Aktau newspaper journalists, 8/6/2009)
94
economic recovery was and still is the government policy of attracting foreign direct
investment (FDI) to the vast raw materials sector of economy in Kazakhstan to drive the
economic growth. At some point, Kazakhstan was so successful that it placed second
among all post-communist states after Hungary in terms of FDI per capita. (Cummings,
2005, p. 3 and 32) Within the Commonwealth of Independent States, it places
consistently first and even has been recognized as a market economy in 2001-02 by the
European Union and the United States. (Lee, Baimukhamedova, & Akhmetova, 2010, pp.
85-86)
However, it took a while before the FDI made a significant impact on the
economic growth of Kazakhstan.
120
In fact, before 1998, Kazakhstan’s economy shrunk
by a third compared to what it was in the Soviet Union. (Spechler, 2008, p. 32) If in
1991, Kazakhstan was ranked sixty-first in terms of Human Development Index by the
United Nations Development Program, only 4 years later, in 1995, it was ninety-third.
(Peck, 2004, p. 64) Only since 1999, the republic started to post positive economic
growth. (Ibid, p. 63) (Dave, 2007, p. 163) In Mangystau, it took two more years – only in
2000 the regional economy started to show signs of recovery as its oil industry began to
expand again (Voloshin, 2001) and foreign companies invested money into it. The
change was rather startling and in less than 2 years since 1999, Mangystau economy
reduced the unemployment to what it was previously thanks to the rapid growth of

120
Research shows that FDI may not have had a direct effect on the growth of GDP in Kazakhstan but
rather fixed capital investment and increased trade fueled by FDI had the desired effect (Lee,
Baimukhamedova, & Akhmetova, 2010)
95
support industries for the oil companies. The unemployment rate
121
in the region, which
had almost doubled from 6% in 1991 to 11.8% in 1999, rapidly fell to 5.8% in early
2001. (Ibid)
Certainly, there were oil companies in Mangystau before it opened up to the
FDI. The oldest oil company in this region is Mangystaumunaigaz whose operations
focus on the earliest oil discoveries in the region, Kalamkas and Zhetybai.
122

(Mangystaumunaigaz, 2010) Since independence, scores of minor oil companies, mostly
joint ventures with foreigners, have been established in Mangystau but their ownership
frequently changed hands. For example, a large oil company Karazhanbasmunai, which
works on a rich oil field in Buzachi peninsula in Mangystau did that; 91.62% of it
belonged to a Canadian company in 1994 (Institut Istorii i Etnologii. Institut Arkheologii,
2010, p. 240), is now 50% of it is owned by Kazmunaigaz, the Kazakhstan national oil
company (Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2011). However, foreign investors became particularly
interested in the oil industry of Kazakhstan and Mangystau when Kashagan oil field in
northern Caspian Sea was discovered and the immense oil potential of the Caspian Sea
was proven.
123

The process of fuelling the local economy of Mangystau was not smooth. At
first, the foreign oil companies deployed a large number of expatriate workforce in the

121
Official, unofficial is believed to have been much higher (Interviews with Aktau and Mangystau
newspaper journalists, 8/6/2009; 8/7/2009)
122
It also develops other smaller oil fields.
123
Largest oil field discovery in the last 40 years after Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay (FACTBOX - Facts about
Kashagan oil field, 2008). Even though Mangystau is not close, it still plays an important role in its
development because Aktau is the only seaport in Kazakhstan. (Aiagan, 2004, p. 153)
96
region, just like the Soviets did in the past. In an interview with journalists of a major
Mangystau newspaper one of them noted that she “felt sorry for the foreign expatriates
who came to live in rather unfavorable conditions and so far away from home”
(8/7/2009). The local residents had little, if any, involvement in the numerous lavishly
paying development projects. This did not occur because of the lack of skilled workforce,
the foreigners, anecdotally, imported everything and everyone, from heavy equipment to
labor. (Ibid) A virtual chasm between the locals and foreigners was promoted by the
central government of Kazakhstan, which did everything to appease the oil companies
and avoid upsetting them. The latter dealt exclusively with Astana, completely bypassing
the local authorities for every single thing, and therefore ignoring the local interests.
(Ibid) Their compounds, isolated from the locals, were completely self-sufficient and
even cooks and janitors were brought from the outside of the republic. (Ibid)
Gradually, as Kazakhstan earned its reputation as a reliable partner for western
corporations (Committee on Investments, Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Republic
of Kazakhstan), its government acquired enough confidence to demand greater local
participation in the development of its oil fields. For Mangystau’s inhabitants, this
opened up greater opportunities to earn the living. Not only the expatriate compounds
started hiring local labor, their inhabitants started to socialize in Aktau, and more
importantly, they were spending relatively large sums of money (compared to what
Aktau’s residents had access to) earned developing Mangystau’s numerous oil fields.
124

124
Interview with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
97
The interviews
125
made many references to how the spending habits of
expatriate workforce have spurred the growth of service industry in Aktau. Many
restaurants, discothèques, night clubs sprang in the town which has never experienced
anything like that before in its entire, albeit short, history. Some of these businesses, like
night clubs, specifically targeted the foreign audience, providing music, level of service,
drinks that would appeal to Western guests. As the local labor got increasingly involved
in the development of oil industry in Mangystau, more and more people were able to
afford a similar lifestyle to that of the expatriates who nonetheless continue to earn much
more than any of their Kazakhstan’s counterparts (more on that later). If before 2001, it
was rather hard to find a place for entertainment in Aktau, in the years following the
expansion of the oil industry, this was no longer an issue.
126
By 2009, Mangystau’s
average wages were the second highest in Kazakhstan, with the first place going to the
other oil-rich region Atyrau. (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010, p. 5)
The expansion of service industry was also fueled by internal migration. As the
oil industry was rapidly expanding, many positions were filled by Kazakhstanis from all
over the country, from Almaty in particular. Since the service industry in Almaty is much
more advanced and its inhabitants were used to higher than usual level of service, the
combined effect of both the foreign expatriates and internal migrant workforce had a
positive effect on the general quality of life in Aktau as the service industry started to
improve itself to cater to the more refined tastes. (Semykina, 2004) Business plans for

125
Interview with Aktau newspaper journalists, 8/6/2009
126
Compared to before – reported in interviews
98
new service enterprises frequently put the foreigners on the top of the list of potential
customers since they can afford much more than locals.
127
This orientation toward the
foreign customers is evident throughout the city, at least in the well-off part: the menus,
signs are frequently dubbed in English and some of the ubiquitous Oralman waiters can
converse in English – but not always in Russian!
128

Of course, this would have not been possible without the availability of
workforce, and thanks to the repatriation efforts, Aktau had plenty – still does. The youth,
which grew during the hard 1990s had readily accepted the changes, while the older
generations did not protest against the obvious improvements. The emergence of a
modern entertainment industry, the new fashions and somewhat arrogant behavior of at
least some of the expatriates did go against the grain of the old-fashioned Kazakhs and
(post) communists,
129
it did not generate enough of a controversy to upset their joy with
the rapidly expanding economic opportunities. Even the general disregard for the
environment displayed by the numerous oil companies in the region are tolerated with
little resistance by the locals.
130

Figure 7 demonstrates that overall, Aktau residents have a rather upbeat attitude
about the market reforms that took place in the last 20 or so years compared to the rest of
the country, included in the survey. Notably, if most (almost 60%) respondents in other

127
Interview with a Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/6/2009
128
Author’s observation
129
The disputes with foreign labor will be discussed a little below in more detail.
130
Also will be addressed below
99
sites did not have any opinion about the transition to market economy, Aktau residents
were more enthusiastic about the issue and only 25% of the latter had no response to the
question about the economic reforms. On other hand, Aktau residents are also displaying
a more reserved optimism, i.e., worrying about the future of reforms, the road its taking
the country on,
131
which indicates a high degree of understanding in the town that while
market economy had very positive effect (indicated by 46% positive responses), the
transition was also a very difficult process – especially in Aktau which unlike the other
sites in this study experienced significantly larger economic hardships.
132

Figure 7: Aktau Attitudes towards Market Reforms

Source: author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How did the transition to market economy affect you personally?”
Another reason for the relative tolerance for the changes in relationship to the
expansion of the oil industry is the success of small business
133
in the region which

131
One response in the survey actually expressed concern about the negative impact of market economy on
culture – a perfect representative of the conservatives in Aktau.
132
Interview with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
133
Small business in Aktau is focused on the service industry mostly, such as entertainment and shopping,
as well as servicing oil companies, producing specific equipment or parts for the oil discovery and
development
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Negative Positive With reservations No Response
Aktau
Other Sites
100
alleviated the unemployment issue. Up to 34%
134
of the workforce were employed in
small business in 2009 which focuses on a variety of activities, from shop keeping to
small supply companies for the oil industry. (Sultanov E. , Ne stav'te biznesu bar'ery!,
2010) Not only the big oil business but local small business is thriving thanks to the
higher-than-average income level in the region. In fact, Mangystau is consistently
recognized as one of the best places for small business: per capita, Mangystau has more
of it than most other oblasts of Kazakhstan, except Almaty, Astana and Atyrau (the other
oil ‘capital’). (Yakutkin, 2008) Therefore, it is not surprising that the local population,
despite the negative effects
135
of the omnipresent oil industry, is still reaping the benefits
from its rapid growth and related affluence – even if indirectly.
It is also remarkable to note that the respondents have not considered Aktau to
be very corrupt.
136
The corruption and red tape is a common issue across the country, and
even the government is forced to admit the issue by starting a well-publicized campaign
against it.
137
Compared to the world, Kazakhstan has one of the highest corruption levels,
ranked on 145
th
place in 2009.
138
(Dzhandosova, 2009) In its turn, Mangystau had one of
the lowest levels of corruption across the republic which indicate that despite being

134
up from 28% in 2001, buoyed by the general economic growth in Mangystau (Ikonnikov, 2001)
135
Such as environmental issues and conflicts over low wages (Interviews with journalists in Aktau,
8/6/2009, 8/7/2009, 8/10/2009)
136
Interview with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
137
It is ironic that the Kazakhstan government agency which is responsible for eradicating corruption in
Kazakhstan is itself considered to be the largest perpetrator of very same sort of crimes it is investigating
(Dzhandosova, 2009)
138
In all fairness, Kazakhstan rose to 105
th
spot in 2010, which is still not enviable but a remarkable
increase in one year (Transparency International, 2010)
101
88.3% Kazakh (i.e., rather traditional
139
), according to Transparency Kazakhstan, this
region is still (relatively) less corrupt. The other 4 regions with equal or lower level of
corruption have 56% or less proportion of the Kazakh population. This is not to say that
there is a relationship between corruption and ethnicity – only to indicate that there is less
of a relationship between the strength of the traditional Kazakh tribal ties and the level of
corruption which may or may not hold true in other places. For example, Atyrau Oblast
which is right next to Mangystau, also inhabited by the members of the Small Horde, has
the highest rate of corruption and second highest proportion of the Kazakh population in
the republic (91.1%). (Transparency Kazakhstan, 2008) (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki
Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 10).
However, corruption is not a complete non-issue. The governor of the Oblast
Kusherbaev reportedly belongs to the Small Horde, although it is uncertain which tribe. It
is nonetheless most definite that most of the lower-level clerks of the administration are
indeed Adai.
140
Adai families are large, as are any traditional Kazakh families, the fact of
which implies a larger presence of patronage networks.
141
Besides, it is obvious that the
issues of corruption are not uncommon in Aktau
142
– but it does not seem to affect the
growth of small business as much as one would expect compared to the rest of the

139
Indeed, the attachment to Kazakh traditions is so strong in Mangystau that one of the local
administrations in the oblast instituted a dress code for women (Kenzhebay M. , 2010, p. 3)
140
Interview with a Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/6/2009
141
Ibid
142
Indeed, the governor (akim) of the oblast Kusherbayev is allegedly linked to many less-than-legal
ventures (Kurmangaliev, 2010) although nothing has been substantiated, which is not unusual for an
official of his caliber (former ambassador, minister).
102
country. Whatever the case may be, it is still remarkable that Mangystau maintains a
relatively lower level of corruption index compared to many other parts of the country
where Kazakhs are in the majority, although overall it is still much higher than in many
other societies in the world.
The arrival of big foreign oil companies has changed not only the economic but
also the social environment of Aktau and Mangystau at large. However, this was a not a
particularly happy and convenient transition.
Wage Discrimination and Damage Control of the Oil Companies
The biggest point of contention in Kazakhstan’s economy is the matter of wage
discrimination perpetrated by the foreign companies all over the country. While it is a
common issue across the world, it is one on the forefront of the minds of the Kazakshtani
workers since in some cases expatriates can earn up to 16 times as much as their local
counterparts. (Suleimenova, 2010) There were quite a few protests related to these issue
all over the republic, including Mangystau.
The most violent clash between the Kazakh and foreign workers was the so-
called “Tengiz Carnage” which occurred in Atyrau oblast in 2006, when about 400-500
Kazakh workers had attacked Turkish workers over a trivial matter, causing grave bodily
injuries to over 140 of the latter. While the primary cause was very insignificant, the
degree of violence and over-reaction to it points out to a couple long-standing and highly
aggravating issues that caused the tensions between the two groups of workers to grow:
one is a significant wage differential and the other is disrespectful and arrogant behavior
of the expatriate workers toward the Kazakhs. (Tumanov, 2006) Similar events on a
103
lesser scale happened elsewhere in Kazakhstan, caused by the same issues: the offensive
behavior and wage discrimination, although they are frequently downplayed in media and
official rhetoric to make them pass for simple drunk scuffle and other ordinary unrest in
order to reduce the interethnic component of the issue.
Mangystau was not an exception to these conflicts. In fact, as early as in 1989 a
large conflict occurred between the Kazakhs and non-Kazakh oil workers from northern
Caucasus. (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 258) However, generally Kazakhstan media of today has
less information about the events like this in Aktau than from Atyrau or Astana or other
places with a significant presence of foreign companies and expatriate labor, and the
question is “why?”.
Apparently, Mangystau authorities are much more effective in containing either
the violence or the news (or both). The largest recorded protest in Aktau since
independence took place in the same year as the Tengiz Carnage – 2006. There are many
versions of what exactly happened ranging from the authorities blaming media reporters
for inciting local workers to engage in disorderly conduct to a full-blown interethnic
conflict. (Saidullin, 2006) However, the most likely explanation is that Aktau residents
demanded removal of a recently appointed mayor of the city during an unauthorized
demonstration which was forcefully put down by the authorities. The reporters on the
scene were blamed and their records confiscated (Soz, 2006) and there was some looting
(which prompted the claims of inter-ethnic issues) but the main evidence to support the
contention that demonstrators intended to remove the mayor is the fact that some 4 weeks
104
after these events the mayor of the city was replaced, just a couple of days short of 5
months of being at that post (Kazakhstan Today, 2006).
This illustrates that Mangystau authorities have a firm grip on media and even
though the 2006 unrest in Aktau was most likely caused by the city’s mayor, the true
causes and exact numbers of participants and any public records of the events (the
reporters’ equipment and tapes) disappeared without a trace. (Soz, 2006) In a similar
fashion, interviewees
143
reported that in 2004 there was a bomb threat declared one day
in Mangystau’s Akimat (governor’s building) and while everyone in the building knew
about this, they were ordered to consider it a ‘fire drill’ the next day, and no public
records or media reports on this were made – even though the very same building
contains the office of the largest of Mangystau’s newspapers, Ogni Mangystau (Lights of
Mangystau in Russian).
It is quite obvious that any significant events that may impact the relations
between the authorities and foreign companies, who bring in so much money into the
region, will be veiled in silence in the media. In part, this is easy to do because media is
not as advanced in Aktau as it is in Almaty or Astana, and in part because there is a
general trend of clumping down the media freedoms all over the country since 1999.
144

There is a benefit to this, however – the less people know about the conflicts involving
foreign companies, the less likely they are to grow antagonistic toward them, and in that

143
Interviews with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
144
Interview with a retired journalist in Almaty, 6/18/2009
105
regard, Aktau’s population appears to be slightly more agreeable with the foreign
companies’ presence and policies than in other places (such as Atyrau, for example).
This is not to say that there are no conflicts: the workers involved in the oil
industry of Mangystau do tend to strike frequently against the unfair labor conditions and
uneven wages.
145
Zhanaozen, the second largest town in Mangystau is particularly
notorious for multiple labor union and general oil industry workers’ strikes and general
outbursts of unrest in Kazakhstan. (Zhanaozen snova bastuet!, 2010) As noted previously,
there were instances of violence, directed against Caucasians, in 1989, even before the
country became independent (Olcott M. , 1995, p. 258) but many if not the majority of
these incidents have been effectively covered up by the Mangystau’s authorities,
generating only rumors and unconfirmed reports of violence and clashes. What matters
though is that the local administration does manage to maintain an air of order in the
region which the other major oil-producing oblast, Atyrau, is not as successful at doing.
Then there is a well-publicized campaign of “corporate social responsibility”
146

program implemented by oil companies, primarily the North Caspian Operating
Company (NCOC), formerly AGIP KCO (till 2008), the consortium of major oil
companies which are involved in developing the gigantic
147
Kashagan oil field in the

145
Granted, strikes are actually caused not only by the foreign companies but by the Kazakhstan national
oil company, KazMunaiGas and its daughter companies, as well.
146
A brief overview of newspaper coverage of the this program creates an impression that the program’s
true results are consistently inflated due to increasing frequency of publications: in Ogni Mangystau, in late
2010 news of the oil companies’ contributions to social projects appear about once in a couple weeks but in
early 2011, such news are published almost every other day. No doubt, the media campaign also takes
place through other sources: Mangystau TV, radio, internet and so on.
147
The second phase of the Kashagan oil field development costs around $50 billion (Orange, 2010)
106
northern Caspian Sea. This program primarily aims to perform a number of social
infrastructure projects to improve the quality of life of the people in the regions which are
directly involved in the oil industry, which means Atyrau and Mangystau oblasts. It is
estimated that the oil companies have invested over half a billion US dollars into the
development of Kazakhstan’s social infrastructure over the last 10 years. (Dengi ukhodiat
v pesok..., 2008) Most of it went into the construction of apartment buildings, schools,
hospitals, sports arenas and purchasing equipment for them, as well as into sponsorship
of various cultural and educational activities, such as singing competitions.
148

For example, the NCOC frequently finances trips of Mangystau folk song and
dance troupes overseas for participation in various competitions as well as doing them
locally, which appeals immensely to Adai’s pride for their traditional signing skills.
149

The company also finances non-governmental organizations such as an environmental
Eko Mangystau which actually actively criticizes the oil companies for their habitual
disregard for environmental regulations.
150
The NCOC boasts supporting financially a
range of cultural activities such as various celebrations (New Year, Independence Day,
September 1
st
and so on), school activities (plays, sports events, handcraft, etc) and other
events of cultural value in Mangystau.
151
As a matter of fact, the amount of charity that
the NCOC or Agip in the past provides is so large and pervasive that some of the locals

148
Interview with Aktau and Mangystau newspaper journalists and NCOC representative, 8/9/2009,
8/6/2009 and 8/7/2009,
149
Ibid
150
Ibid
151
Ibid
107
express concern with increased dependence, culture of immediate gratification in the
youth but others do not agree (interviews,
152
surveys). While the NCOC does spend a lot
of money, it does not reach everyone and there are still many people in Mangystau who
live under the official poverty line.
153

On the other hand, the social infrastructure projects tend to miss other major
social issues which do concern the local population. In 2008, Kazakhstan Revenue
Watch, a program of the Soros Kazakhstan foundation, released a film documentary
which illustrates the seeming uselessness of the oil company’s social responsibility
programs. For example, they do not address the insufficient access to fresh water
(traditionally one of the largest issues in Mangystau), the lack of quality cadres for work
in those new projects (i.e. teachers, doctors), or the neglect of the existing housing assets
which were falling in disrepair, or the shortage of recreational facilities for children. At
the same time, the oil companies spend millions of dollars on mega-projects such as a
huge stadium or a sports complex which the local authorities have no money to maintain
and support. (Dengi ukhodiat v pesok..., 2008) While the movie’s research and
presentation was rather biased because it avoids showing a single positive example of the
social programs implemented with the help of the oil companies’ assistance; it does raise
some issues that concern the local population. Mangystau land provides hundreds of
millions of dollars’ worth of revenue to the oil companies and millions of dollars to the
budget and local authorities; but the social projects, which directly touch upon the lives

152
Interview with Aktau and Mangystau newspaper journalists, 8/6/2009 and 8/7/2009
153
Interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/10/2009
108
and well-being of the oblast’s residents and which are funded by these immense profits,
are being planned and implemented without the local participation. In other words, there
is a lack transparency and input from the civic society insofar as the use of oil money is
concerned in Mangystau.
In some respects, such issues resemble those that lead to the 1986 unrest in
Almaty (Zheltoqsan): the actions of the oil companies with tacit support of the local
authorities neglect the interests and sensitivities of the local population in the oil oblasts
just as the Soviet leadership offended the national feelings of the Kazakhs in the
aftermath of Zheltoqsan. However, the degree of dissatisfaction in Mangystau has not
reached a tipping point leading to an explosion of emotions, perhaps thanks to a well-
managed publicity campaign
154
executed to promote and support the social projects of the
oil companies.
However, the situation around the social infrastructure projects in Mangystau
does raise another concern: the degree of interaction between the local authorities and the
oil companies. The NCOC representative in the interview on 8/9/2009 confirmed that
most if not all of the money the company invests in these is done in discussion with and
approval of the oblast and local authorities. In the words of the representative, “we aim to
assist in the development of the region in tandem with the administration of Mangystau.”
The choice of contractors to implement numerous and expensive projects is also
questionable since the amount of money invested in a particular project does not always

154
As discussed above, NCOC and other oil companies conduct public acts of charity with very wide media
coverage which, it seems, grows wider as the time passes
109
match up with the result – the planning and execution seem to be poor in some cases.
(Dengi ukhodiat v pesok..., 2008)
No significant allegations of corruption in this respect have surfaced yet, but
then, the impact of social projects appears to be large and appreciated by the local
population, especially if one considers the vast amounts of the media coverage devoted to
the events of social assistance, provided by the oil companies to the local communities.
The only issue raised is the lack of transparency,
155
but it does not appear to be enough to
generate a widespread discontent. Besides, it is not public knowledge just how long the
oil companies will engage in this practice: while the sponsorship of the social sphere
might be a part of the contract with the government of Kazakhstan, the terms of these
contracts are kept strictly confidential by all parties concerned.
156

The issue is complicated further by the fact that the oil companies frequently
change hands and even names. For example, the group of companies in charge of
Kashagan, the most lucrative oil field of the past 40 years, was restructured 4 times:
Kazakhstancaspiishelf in 1993, Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company
(OKIOC) in 1997, Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company (Agip KCO) in
2001 and the NCOC in 2008. The uncertainty of sustained oil industry presence and
recent memories of the economic devastation of the early 1990s which, as it has been
mentioned above, affected Mangystau much more than average in Kazakhstan, might be
a contributing factor in reducing the tensions between the local population and the oil

155
Interview with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
156
Ibid
110
companies in the region, as the former prefer to avoid upsetting the balance and losing
the benefits of the foreign oil companies’ presence entirely.
Finally, there is also the effect of gastarbeiter or guest workers that also reduces
effectiveness of the strikes and other forms of labor resistance. Mangystau is not only one
of the largest recipients of oralman in Kazakhstan, it is also a favorite destination for
foreign labor which aims to benefit from the burgeoning oil industry. (Tulindinova, 2010)
Besides, as it has been mentioned, the foreign oil companies frequently hire Kazakhstani
citizens from the outside of Mangystau oblast and tend to pay them less than to the local
workforce. As a result, the organization of trade unions and attempts to gain better
working conditions and higher wages in Mangystau is severely hampered by the
competition with migrant labor from the outside of the oblast: not only they are
frequently better qualified, many of them also agree do the same work as Mangystau
equivalent workers for less money. As a result, the oil companies, foreign and domestic,
frequently ignore Kazakhstan’s labor code and their employment contracts do not fulfill
even the minimum standards of working conditions and freedoms as required by the law.
(Gastarbaitery na sobstvennoy zemle, 2010)
In the end, the oil companies, with assistance of the local authorities, are able to
manage the popular opinion and attitudes toward any negative changes associated with
their operations through the various means. One is the social infrastructure program,
while opaque to the public, still impressive enough in the media. Two is the generally
increased quality of life and high average income – even if not directly, rapidly growing
wages which consistently exceed that of the rest of the republic (with exception of Astana
111
and Almaty) provide for a thriving local economy which employs quite a few people in
the small and medium-sized businesses if not in the oil industry itself. Three is the media
control exerted by the local authorities. While the conflicts do occur, in particular over
the wages, working conditions and contract obligations, they are localized and isolated in
the media with ease. The massive unrest on scale which occurred in Atyrau did not take
place in this region but the underlying issues are more or less the same: wage
discrimination, offensive behavior of the expatriate workers and so on.
The situation in Mangystau illustrates race to the bottom argument – in
globalization, governments of developing countries are forced to adopt a deliberate policy
deregulating labor market, environment protection, and other social protection laws that
normally increase the cost of conducting business in order to increase the competitiveness
in the global marketplace. In economic terms, the mobility of capital and/or trade has
become so large that the governments are no longer able to regulate them. (McKenzie &
Lee, 1991) (Falk, 1997) (Tonelson, 2000) China is a prime example where labor
regulation is practically absent and environmental protection is extremely lax. (Chan,
2003) Kazakhstan, competing for the global capital flows to its economy, is obviously
participating in this race to the bottom, deregulating the labor and environmental
protection (or keeping it artificially low) in order to make investments into its industries
more appealing to the foreigners. The condition of Mangystau labor is the prime
example: they are even denied the right to strike! (Gastarbaitery na sobstvennoy zemle,
2010)
112
Environment is the victim to globalization in Kazakhstan as well, when the
companies are fined pennies to the dollars of the ecological damage they are causing. In
Mangystau, it is also particularly evident as the oil companies consistently violate the
environment protection law (Kazinform, 2007): oil and other chemical spills are
frequently punished with minimal fines incommensurate with the amount of damage
caused to nature.
157
The “Caspian ecological eco-system is on the brink of a major crisis”
says Mangystau’s environmental expert Bystritskaia, highlighting the degree of abuse the
Sea has experienced during the oil exploration and development in the last couple of
decades. (Popova, 2010)
It is certain that market economic reforms and FDI have made a significant
impact on the social, environmental and economic situation in Aktau, sometimes positive
and sometimes negative. But what is the overall effect on the processes of identity
formation in Aktau, as suggested by the main hypothesis of this study?
Identity in Aktau
At this point, it is important to note one caveat: the national identity of Aktau’s
residents cannot be analyzed separately from the identity of Adai Kazakhs in the region
as a whole. Not only Aktau is a settlement with a rather short history, in the last 20 years
its population has almost been completely replaced with Adai Kazakhs from the
countryside and elsewhere (oralman) who still maintain close ties to their numerous
relatives outside of the city. In in 1989, only 50% of population was Kazakh, (Itogi

157
Based on tnterviews with a journalists in Aktau, 8/6/2009, 8/6/2009 8/7/2009, 8/10/2009;
113
perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po Mangistauskoy Oblasti, 2000, p. 14) and in 2009, they
are at 88.3%. (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010,
p. 10) Moreover, the oil industry is located outside of Aktau, and while it has cultural
impact on the town, most of its employees are also located outside; plus, there is a
constant rotation of labor in and out of Aktau. Therefore, the following analysis discusses
national identity in Mangystau rather than Aktau alone.
As it has been mentioned, Mangystau is ethnically rather homogeneous, most of
its population is Kazakh. It has third largest percentage of Kazakh population among the
oblasts of Kazakhstan. The region is also dominated by a single Kazakh tribe Adai which
is a part of Baiuly tribal confederation of the Small Horde. Thanks to the geographical
isolation and rather harsh environment, Adai are a very confident, militant group of
people who are intensely proud of their heritage, especially of the numerous tombs of
saints and underground mosques located on their land. Adai claim to have retained most
of the old, traditional Kazakh identity than anyone else in the republic – except for those
who have fled the country in the past, avoiding perishing in the aftermath of the 1916
rebellion or the 1930s collectivization. The statistics does show that 83.9% of the adult
(15 years and over) population of the oblast have fluent knowledge of the Kazakh
language which is third highest percentage among the oblasts of the country. The two
oblasts with higher knowledge of the Kazakh language also have a higher proportion of
the Kazakhs – Atyrau and Kyzylorda. (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009
goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010)
114
The dominance of the Kazakh language is quite evident throughout Aktau. The
most obvious evidence is the in signs.
158
Many local businesses, especially small retail
stores frequently display signs in just one language, either Russian or Kazakh, although it
is customary elsewhere (Astana, Almaty) to have them in both. Signs in some of
Mangystau’s administrative buildings (like the directory) are in Kazakh only which is
remarkable given how much trouble it is to use Kazakh in official business and
government matters even in Astana.
159
Moreover, the authorities use Kazakh when
communicating with media, making official statements and speeches, which is again
somewhat unusual for the rest of Kazakhstan where Russian is used more commonly.
160

In an interview,
161
it was reported that Mangystau officials still do make the statements
unofficially in Russian but only after delivering them officially in Kazakh and only after
the official Q&A for the convenience of those few Aktau reporters who still have not
mastered the Kazakh language.
Adai are very proud of the fact that thanks to them, what sets Mangystau apart
from other regions of Kazakhstan is that there was absolutely no difficulty to
transitioning to the Kazakh language as the official language. Elsewhere, in Astana and
Almaty, it was a very contentious issue, as it will discussed in the respective chapters, it

158
Author’s personal observation
159
According to an interviewed professor of linguistics in Astana, laws and other legal acts at the
Parliament of Kazakhstan are developed first in Russian and translated into Kazakh later. (6/30/2009)
160
Although in the past few years there was an immense shift in the amount of Kazakh language used in
official rhetoric around the country.
161
Interview with a non-Kazakh journalist in Aktau, 8/10/2009
115
was mostly due to the presence of the large Russian minority in the republic (for Astana)
and general multi-ethnic composition (for Almaty). More importantly, Kazakh is used in
interpersonal communication in Mangystau and Aktau much more often than it is in
Astana and Almaty thanks to the dominance of the Kazakhs who pride themselves in
keeping true to their roots. The results of the survey conducted by the author provide
strong evidence to that end: in Aktau, 68% of respondents (74% of the Kazakhs) prefer
the Kazakh language over the bilingualism (that is, equal role assigned to both the
Kazakh and Russian language in the republic) which is over double of the proportion of
respondents in other sites: only 31% of the respondents (44% of the Kazakhs) prefer
Kazakh as the main language to be used in society while the majority of the respondents
in other sites clearly prefers bilingualism (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Language Preference in Aktau

Source: author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How would you assess the role of Kazakh and Russian languages in
Kazakhstan?”
The other source of the national pride of Adai Kazakhs is the enormous
historical heritage on permanent display all over the region – the already mentioned
Muslim saint graves, underground mosques and other architectural artifacts – all of which
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Prefer
Kazakh
Prefer
Bilingualism
Prefer
Kazakh
Prefer
Bilingualism
Prefer
Kazakh
Prefer
Bilingualism
All Kazakh Non-Kazakh
Aktau
Other Sites
116
provide them with a strong sense of continuity through time, and even more so since
many of Mangystau’s historical monuments were built by hand of Adai’s ancestors. Not
too many Kazakhs of other tribes can claim the same – after all, Mangystau contains
more of these necropolis and other monuments than any other oblast in Kazakhstan
thanks to its dry climate and abundance of building materials: the limestone used in the
construction of the ancient shrines is ubiquitous in the region.
162
Many survey
respondents from Aktau have noted the importance of the historical monuments as one
the major markers of culture in the region. In in-depth interviews, all respondents
163

emphasized the significance of the “museum under open sky” as part of their identity as
the residents of Mangystau, even though not all of them were Kazakh.
Then there are the traditional arts and handcrafts that Mangystau’s Adais claim
to have kept true for many generations. In the words of the journalist of a major
Mangystau newspaper: “The people here are very artistic, they have a very strong
tradition of singing, even two unique two schools of zhirau”. (8/7/2009) The head of the
Department of Culture at the Mangystau Oblast Administration adds that Adai also have
“kept their own unique art of kiuy” (a specific tradition of music performance).
(8/8/2009) This particular art of performing on dombra (Kazakh traditional plucked
string instrument) cannot be taught via books – it can only be passed from generation to
generation through firsthand experience, making it one of the true legacies of the
nomadic Kazakhs kept intact in Mangystau. (Kenesbaeva, 2009) There is also a special

162
Interview with the head of Department of Culture, Mangystau Oblast Administration, 8/8/2009
163
Every interview, from 8/4/2009 to 8/10/2009
117
music performance style specific to Adai called ilme-ays, which complements tokpe, a
more general performance style of Western Kazakhstan (i.e., Small Horde) Kazakhs.
(Ibid) This tradition both makes Adai distinctive as a tribe and also the keepers of the true
national Kazakh spirit of the oral folk song culture, which is a source of immense
satisfaction for Adai. These arts of singing and performing are maintained through
regular competitions and festivals, the most significant of which is called Mangystau
Zhuldyzdary (Stars of Mangystau) which was started 5 years ago. (Turgazieva, 2009) The
Kazakh traditions of folk song performance art zhirau are carried on in Mangystau with
more rigor than in the rest of Kazakhstan. (Espulaev, 2009)
Traditional Kazakh art of epic poems literature found its home in Mangystau as
well. One of the largest and most significant poems in Kazakh history, if not world
history, is entitled Yrymny Yrym Batyry and it tells the story of 40 warriors of the steppe
within the Golden Horde of the Mongolian fame. The epic is so long that it took over 6
months to record as it was being told by one of the most famous Adai zhirau (i.e. folk
performer) Muryn in 1942. (Mustazheb, 2010) The same tradition is carried on by Adai
writers, in particular by Abish Kekilbaev, one of the most celebrated writers in modern
Kazakhstan. His popularity as the master of prose earned him a string of highest ranking
official positions in the Kazakh government. Kekilbaev’s writing is admired not only in
Kazakhstan but abroad as well; and his art of the written word is frequently compared to
the traditional art of oral epic poem of the Kazakh zhirau. (Ogni Mangistau, 2009)
In addition, Adai Kazakhs also take pride in their skill of creating yurt, as
reported by the head of the Department of Culture at the Mangystau Oblast
118
Administration (8/8/2009). Yurt is the traditional nomadic tent made of felt which in the
past served as home for every Kazakh. Now, only Adai (or so they claim) (Ibid) have
retained the art of building the yurt that the rest of the Kazakhs have lost under the
onslaught of the Russian colonialism and the Soviet collectivization. They also pride
themselves in a particular art of limestone architecture, on display all over the oblast,
which is now finding its way into the rest of country and was even used in the designs of
the new government buildings in Astana. (Ibid)
The media and in-depth interviews point toward robust and strong Kazakh
national identity in Mangistau which managed to maintain more of the core nomadic
values than the rest of Kazakhstan. The survey data paints a slightly less rosy picture in
terms of identity. On the contentious issue of what constitutes national idea of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, only 49% of Aktau’s Kazakhs suggested that it meant
advancement of the Kazakh language, history and culture, which is somewhat surprising
since about the same proportion of Kazakhs (45%) in other sites of the republic display a
similar inclination and Adai do assert their superiority in “Kazakhness” to the rest of the
Kazakhs in the country
164
(Figure 9). In other words, a somewhat higher number should
have been expected given the rhetoric of Adai Kazakhs. Alas, the research does not show
it, hence the surprise.

164
Interview with journalists of a major Mangystau newspaper, 8/7/2009
119
Figure 9: Aktau perceptions regarding the National Idea of Kazakhstan

Source: author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How do you understand the concept of the national idea of Kazakhstan?”
Figure 9 also demonstrates that Aktau residents do not believe in multiethnic
culture as the cornerstone of national identity of Kazakhstan promoted in the
government’s official rhetoric: while 39% of all respondents from other than Aktau sites
believe in multiethnic foundation of the republic, only 22% do so in this oblast. It is also
remarkable that more non-Kazakhs believe in Kazakh culture in Aktau more than
elsewhere.
165
Another surprise is that 30% of respondents from Aktau firmly believe that
the true national idea of Kazakhstan is defined by the status of the republic in the world
affairs (defined as “Gaining a notable position in the international system”), compared to
23% elsewhere, which implies that for Aktau’s residents, domestic culture is less
important than the diplomatic success of the country which may related to the impact of
the foreign policy of Kazakhstan on national identity construction in the country, as

165
Admittedly, only very few non-Kazakhs were included in the Aktau survey so the data is not reliable in
this respect.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
Status in the world
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
Status in the world
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
Status in the world
All Kazakhs Non-Kazakhs
Aktau
Other Sites
120
suggested by Prizel (National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in
Poland, Russia, and Ukraine., 1998).
166

Figure 10: General Perception about Globalization, Market Reforms, and FDI in
Aktau

Source: author’s 2009-2010 survey, questions 1) “How would you assess the effect of globalization and international
trade on the social development of Kazakhstan”; 2) “How did the transition to market economy affect you
personally?”; 3) “What is your assessment of the role FDI plays in Kazakhstan?”
Figure 10 summarizes the general attitude of Aktau respondents toward various
economic changes in their life. It is easy to see that in most cases, the responses match:
63% of Aktau respondents favor globalization as do 62% in the other sites; 54% welcome
the FDI as the driver of economic growth in the republic as do 55% in the other sites.
Only with market reforms there is a difference – but it could be explained by the age of
the respondents. In Aktau, survey respondents were more mature than in Almaty and

166
For a more detailed discussion of the interaction between foreign policy and national identity in
Kazakhstan see Chapter 5 on Astana, p. 223.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Negative
Positive
Expressed reservations
No response
Negative
Positive
Expressed reservations
No response
Negative
Positive
Expressed reservations
No response
1) Globalization 2) Market Reforms 3) FDI
Aktau
Other Sites
121
Astana, their average age is 29 while average age of Astana and Almaty respondents is 21
and 19, respectively. Therefore, the latter could not have experienced the true effect of
transition to market economy which occurred mostly during their early childhood. In fact,
most of Almaty and Astana respondents did not answer the question about the transition
to market economy at all, as it could be seen in Figure 10.
Figure 10 also demonstrates that respondents in Aktau have a slightly more
negative attitude toward globalization and FDI than others. This suggests that the former
have experienced slightly more issues with foreign oil companies and expansion of global
economic relations than elsewhere, which is perfectly understandable given the problem
of wage discrimination discussed above.
In summary, the Kazakhness of Aktau residents appears to have not suffered a
significant setback due to the fundamental economic changes and the enormous impact of
FDI and globalization, or, at least, the research does not show it with a great degree of
confidence.
Conclusion
Case of Aktau thanks to the large foreign oil business presence and active
participation of the expatriate workforce in the local life was a good test for the
hypothesized relationship between FDI, market economy and Kazakh national identity.
The data, however, does not support the hypothesis. It appears that thanks to the
geographic isolation, considerable and tangible historical legacy, attributed militant
character, and harsh environmental conditions which did not entice Russians to introduce
major changes to this land until the late 1950s; all of these factors allowed Adai to remain
122
very close to the original Kazakh culture. Their tribal specificities aside, Adai see
themselves as keepers of the Kazakh traditions and guardians of the Kazakh nomadic
heritage – first and foremost in the form of the museum under open sky, the oral folk
song tradition and pastoral nomadism which is still the main type of agricultural activity
in the oblast, however small its role in the oil-driven economy of Mangystau. In some
respects, Adai exhibit island mentality, considering themselves to be better Kazakhs than
most because they were able to keep the traditions alive the longest, thus becoming one
of the major sources of true Kazakh identity today.
Therefore, the conclusion of the study is that Aktau despite the initial promise
does not provide enough evidence to support the main hypothesis. Aktau provides a much
stronger support for an alternative hypothesis that in a Kazakh dominated society the
preservation and maintenance of Kazakh identity is easier even in the face of detrimental
effects of globalization and rapid transition to market economy.
123
Chapter 4: Almaty
The “Southern Capital”
167
Almaty is, without a doubt, the most important city in
the Republic of Kazakhstan. Even though it has lost its official status of the capital in
1997, the title of the Southern Capital confers upon Almaty the recognition that it does
hold primacy in several respects. It is the largest city in the thinly populated country; it
provides the 1/5
th
of the republican GDP
168
and it is also the most culturally diverse city
in Kazakhstan. Moreover, Almaty is also the gateway to the world for the country,
hosting a large portion of the foreign controlled businesses as well as providing an entry
point for the bulk of international trade, imports in particular. As the former capital,
established under the Soviet Union and continued to be as such in the early years of
sovereignty, Almaty was the arena for the most significant changes in Kazakhstan that
are still affecting the course of national identity formation in the country.
Naturally, Almaty presents a very interesting and relevant case for examining
the hypothesized relationship between market reforms, FDI and Kazakh national identity.
The relative wealth and the advanced market economy of the city provide an excellent
opportunity to test the main hypothesis. Almaty also provides data to examine alternative
hypotheses such as how ethnic and cultural diversity as well as history and origins of the
city affect the identity of Almaty and its Kazakh residents.

167
Nicknamed in semi-official manner the Southern Capital as opposed to the Northern official capital of
Astana.
168
(Valovyi regional'nyy produkt Kazakhstana za 9 mesiatsev 2010 goda, 2010)
124
In the course of this chapter, it will be shown that Almaty yields a partial support
for the hypothesized relationship between FDI and Kazakh identity. Indeed, Almaty
presents a better case for supporting an alternative contention that multiculturalism and
globalized culture has a significant effect retarding the development of a unique Kazakh
identity. Almaty also provides an insight into how economic affluence affects the process
of identity formation in the republic. In addition, even though at the moment the process
seems to be moving toward hypothesized non-national identity, the data analysis also
suggests a good probability for an eventual recovery of Kazakh identity, as well.
After a brief introduction of Almaty’s geographical location, a historical
overview of the city will be offered with a special reference to contended parts in its
legacy. It will be followed by a discussion of the current status of the city: even though it
is no longer the capital, Almaty is officially recognized as the primary provider of many
important services in the country in the spheres of culture, education, performance arts
and so on. Third, Almaty’s role in bridging global and domestic culture will be examined
as well. Although all political decisions regarding the fate of the country are made in
Astana, Almaty still draws the hearts and minds of the people of Kazakhstan. Fourth, the
city’s enormous role in the economy of Kazakhstan and its impact on both culture of the
city itself and the rest of the country will be discussed. The chapter will then conclude
with an evaluation of the research results regarding the processes of identity formation in
Almaty.
125
Geographical Location
Almaty today is the largest city in Kazakhstan, home to over 1.3 million
Kazakhstanis or 8.5% of the total population of the country officially (Perepis' naseleniia
Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 10) or in excess of 2 million
(about 12.5%) unofficially (Ikonnikov, Serdtse strany, 2004). Located in the south-
eastern corner of the country, at the foot of Trans-Ili (Zailiiskii) Alatau Mountains, which
are a part of the Tian-Shan mountain range in Central Asia, Almaty offers a magnificent
view on snowcapped mountains all year round.
Figure 11: Almaty in Summer

Source: (Turagenstvo "OL'GA", 2010)
126
The city is located in a somewhat geographically precarious spot. While offering
a stunningly beautiful view, it is also susceptible to seismological activity and in the last
150 years Almaty experienced two major earthquakes, in 1887 and 1910, both of which
caused significant amount of destruction. (Auezov & Kunaeva, 2009, p. 13) In addition,
the picturesque snow-capped mountains carry an inherent danger of spring water flows
which frequently develop into devastating mud flows, one of which razed half of Almaty
in 1921. (Ibid, p. 14) While the threat of the latter is mitigated somewhat by an intricate
system of dams and barriers built in the mountains, residents of Almaty always live in
danger which has become a part of their lives to such degree that they do not always
realize its full extent. On the other hand, the soil near Almaty proved to be among the
most fertile in the country, attracting a large number of Russian migrants in the late 19
th
–
early 20
th
century and setting the stage for its exponential growth well into the 20
th

century.
Nevertheless, Almaty residents are rightly proud of their city, in part because of
its rich historical legacy which has become the focus of public debates in the last few
years which demonstrate the differing views on the identity of the former capital.
Significant Historical and Geographical Facts
Almaty is located at the heart of Zhety-su region also known as Semirech’e in
Russian (Seven Rivers), which is regarded as the “golden cradle” of the Kazakh nation,
partly because it is believed that khans Zhanibek and Kerei have founded the first Kazakh
127
khanate within 50 miles of modern Almaty, and partly because it is common in
Kazakhstan to equate
169
statehood with nationhood. (Auezov & Kunaeva, 2009)
Unlike Mangystau where numerous historical monuments are on constant
display all over the region, Zhety-su has a less obvious heritage subject to numerous
debates which came to the surface when Kazakhstan became independent. If before, the
history of the region as well that of Kazakhstan were interpreted from the position of a
“liberating” and “civilizing” mission that the Russians took upon themselves in Central
Asia thanks to the declarative “friendship and amicable relations between the Russians
and the Kazakhs”;
170
independent Kazakhstan began to reassess the role of the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union in its history. For Almaty, it meant an examination of its
age and its name.
The origins of Almaty are embroiled in a controversy just like the origins of the
Kazakhs. On the one hand, there is an official date when the Russian Empire founded a
precursor of the modern Almaty – a military fort Vernyi (Faithful in Russian) as part of
their thrust into Central Asia in 1854. On the other hand, there are results of the intensive
archaeological research conducted in the 2000s, culminating with a recent publication of
a series of books devoted to Almaty and its history. (Shupeikin, 2009) In these, historians
argue that the territory of the city itself had been home for a number settlements ranging

169
In fact, an interviewed former member of parliament and politician noted that “survival of the Kazakhs
state takes precedence above all other goals. At the same time, the state is an ultimate expression of Kazakh
identity.” (Astana, 7/2/2009)
170
Traditionally referred to as ‘brotherly’ to mask the tensions that turned particularly violent during the
colonization and nonetheless almost unknown in Soviet historiography of Kazakhstan to insure
indoctrination of the Kazakhs in purely beneficial results of joining with Russia. (Author’s personal
observation)
128
from the Bronze Age hamlets of 2000BC, to a settlement called Almaty of the 13
th

century. The latter arguably was the capital of a principality in Middle Ages. Discovered
coins bearing the name Almaty and minted within the boundaries of the modern city
provide the basis for such assertions. The records of the subsequent settlements are spotty
because after the 13
th
century Almaty was destroyed during the Mongol rule and
subsequent Tamerlane’s invasions into the area, but it is believed that Almaty’s territory
provided home to a number of settlements since, some of which bore the same name as
the modern city. (Auezov & Kunaeva, 2009, pp. 9-11)
As a matter of fact, many historians, who study the past of Almaty now argue
that there were several iterations of capitals or urban centers of high stature on the
territory of this city, not least because of the bustling trade on the Silk Road which passed
nearby, generating wealth, promoting exchange of cultural and religious ideas; basically
producing the same effect as globalization has today. (Baipakov, Seidumanov, Savel'eva,
Voiakin, & Auezov, 2009) The idea of the Silk Road plays a huge role in the rhetoric of
Kazakshtan’s government because it has an agenda: creation of a global trade
superhighway, literally and figuratively, through Kazakhstan, linking Western Europe
and Asia – just like the Silk Road did ages ago. It is expected that the modern “Silk
Road” will turn Kazakhstan into a hub of global trade and bring affluence to the republic
just its counterpart did in the past in Zhety-su and Mangystau.
Still, there are those who deny that there is any continuity between the ancient
settlements and modern Almaty, reaffirming the primacy of the Russian origins of the
city. Siding with the Soviet traditional views, such authors discount the value or even the
129
very existence of pre-Russian settlements on the territory of Almaty and it is surrounding
areas. In their view, Almaty begins in 1854 with the Russian-built fort Vernyi.
(Proskurin)
There is no doubt that Vernyi played a pivotal role in the formation of the
modern city of Almaty. Founded by the Russian military, it soon received many peasant
migrants, transforming from the military facility to an actual town, which later on
bloomed to become one of the largest cities in Central Asia. Nonetheless, the sense of
continuity with the ancient settlements proves important to the people residing in the city
today, even though 47% of them are not Kazakh. (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki
Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010) The issue of the city’s age, raised in 2004
when the official 150th anniversary was celebrated, reappeared again in 2010, as Almaty
historians and officials campaigned for an international recognition of a thousand year
history of the city on the basis of historical and archaeological research, conducted in the
last few years.
171
(Vecherniy Almaty, 2010) It is quite obvious that Almaty historians are
actively engaged in history rewriting to buttress the community spirit of the city and
country as a whole, and not without merit.
The other controversy involves the name of the city.
172
Vernyi was founded upon
a previous Kazakh settlement called Almaty and, as it has been mentioned previously,

171
And a part of a country-wide, government-funded program of historical research program which aims to
recover historical heritage of the Kazakhs.
172
Of course, this is not the only thing renamed in the city or across Kazakhstan, since independence, a lot
of Russian and Soviet geographical names have been replaced with Kazakh ones by official onomastic
agencies, most notably street and town names. (Shilina, 2010)
130
there were other settlements before with the same name. Even the Russian founders of
Vernyi made references to the name Almaty in their official correspondence, but
ultimately the colonial administration did not consider it when choosing the name for the
fort. Soon after the founding, the Russian migrants in search of fertile land, that Zhety-su
had in abundance, flocked to the fort and in 1867, it became a civilian town under the
same name. In 1921, it was renamed to Alma-Ata which was a Russian misinterpretation
of the old Kazakh name Almaty. In 1941, Almaty became an official name in Kazakh but
not yet in the Russian language (i.e. not 100% official). In 1993, 2 years after
independence, the government of Kazakhstan finally decreed to officially rename Alma-
Ata to Almaty. In Russia, the name Alma-Ata is still used but in Kazakhstan, Almaty is
the only official name for the city: even a newspaper was sued in 2004 because its editors
still used the Soviet-era name. (Sakov, 2004) The insistence on the current name is not
without challenge, as the Russian nationalists still cling to the Soviet notions that Russia
brought civilization and development to the “barbarian” Kazakh nomads, reasserting the
validity of the old Alma-Ata spelling. (Sytnik, 2004)
Despite all the arguments about the name and age of Almaty, no one disputes the
importance of the apple at the core of the city’s name. Alma means apple
173
in Kazakh
and the Trans-Ili Mountains where Almaty is located are rich in the wild species of the
apple tree malus sieversii believed to be the progenitor of domesticated apples
worldwide. (Forte, Ignatov, Ponomarenko, Dorokhov, & Savelyev, 2002) Plus, Almaty

173
Almaty is apple adjective in Kazakh
131
was well known for it is apple variety called aport, derived from the Russian
domesticated apples which used to grow incredibly large in the fertile soil of the
mountains near the former capital. Unfortunately, it was all but lost during the
privatization campaign after independence as the apple orchards were sold en masse and
cut down to make room for the expanding real estate and other purposes.
174
However, the
residents of Almaty still draw incredible joy and pride in the apple producing culture
which was being revived in a few orchards around the city in the past few years.
In addition to apples, trees in general play a large role in the lives Almaty
residents thanks to Eduard Baum, a Russian botanist who lived in Almaty from 1874 to
1921. He is credited with turning the city into a massive grove by developing a
comprehensive plan for integrating plant life, trees mainly, into the urban planning. He
planted a large orchard on the territory of Almaty which still bears his name as well as
developed a plan for planting trees alongside the roads and buildings all over the city.
(Kozybaev, 1983, pp. 143-144) Thanks to his efforts as well as an effective drainage
system which used natural inclination to deliver precipitation and mountain spring water
to irrigate the plant life, Almaty earned the nickname of ‘city-garden.’
175
(Figure 12) The
trees were so numerous that their crowns covered Almaty in summer. Unfortunately, the
urban growth of the former capital which rapidly accelerated in the past 10 years
devastated the greenery which was blooming for over 100 years prior. Still, almost 27%
of Almaty’s territory is covered by the plant life and the image of the city-garden remains

174
Author’s observation
175
Not to be mistaken with Ebenezer Howard’s garden city movement
132
on the minds of its residents while the city authorities attempt to recover the former glory
of the green city. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, pp. 32-33)
Figure 12: Almaty as City-Garden

Source: (Zakharenko, 2008)
In some respects the issue regarding the age of Almaty or its name, or the trees
and apples maybe trivial but as far as the identity of the people living in Almaty is
concerned, they all have a significant impact on the collective consciousness of the city’s
inhabitants. Just like Adai Kazakhs boast about their “museum under open sky”, the idea
of a 1,000 year old Almaty appeals to its residents or indeed for all of Kazakhstan as a
symbol of continuity of the nation.
Certainly, such idea goes against the common wisdom formed by the ideology
and historiography of the Soviet Union, in particular against the pride of the Russians
who still remain in Kazakhstan and many of whom still firmly believe that it was them
and their ancestors who built Kazakhstan up from nothing. However, in a multi-ethnic
city like Almaty, where Kazakhs are barely 53% of the inhabitants (Perepis' naseleniia
Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 10), the one thousand year long
133
history as well as the “green” legacy might be something they could share equally with
other ethnic groups
176
, Russians included, even if the latter do not always agree with the
changes that independence brought to the former capital. Similarly, the idea of the city-
garden holds a strong appeal as it sets the city apart from any other in Kazakhstan,
contributing to the formation of a specific Almaty subculture just like aport apples do.
Another historical artifact which has been discovered near Almaty in 1970 also
became one of the symbols of the connection between the people of newly independent
Kazakhstan and the ancient inhabitants of this land. It is the so-called “Golden Man”, a
full suit of golden armor in which a prominent Saka (Scythian), probably prince or
princess, was buried in nearby. The tomb of the “golden warrior” contained a trove of
archaeological artifacts which indicate that in 500BC the territory of Kazakhstan was
inhabited by an advanced civilization of nomadic Saka which are known in Europe as
Scythians.
177
(Akishev, 2006) The Golden Man became a symbolic representation of the
nomadic culture and civilization, a direct ancestor for the Kazakh nation from over 2
thousand years ago. Since independence, the image of the Golden Man appears on a
number of state symbols of Kazakhstan. As a matter of fact, it appears on the top of the
Independence Monument – a stele built in Almaty on the very same place where the

176
After all, the nomadic ancestors of the Kazakh past rarely settled down – even when the towns and forts
sprung up in the steppe, they were mostly inhabited by Russians and others but not the Kazakhs. In 2009,
still fewer Kazakhs live in urban areas than in rural: 47.9% and 52.1% of their total population,
respectively. By comparison, 72.8% of Russians reside in cities (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan
2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010)
177
During independence, 4 other Saka suits of golden armor have been discovered in Kazakhstan, further
confirming the strength and level of development of this ancient nomadic culture on the territory of the
republic. (Vorfolameev, 2010)
134
previously discussed December 1986 (Zheltoqsan) events took place – to symbolize
continuity and strength of Kazakh national identity.
Figure 13: The Golden Man

Source: (Moony, 2008)
Zheltoqsan as the demonstration of the Kazakh national spirit is now heralded as
such both by Almaty Kazakh residents and the Kazakhs all over the country. After all,
this city can claim to be the focal point for the resurgence of the Kazakh national
consciousness after many years of being discriminated against and suppressed in the
Soviet Union. Moreover, even the Baltic States do not have the honor of being the first in
the Soviet Union to openly resist the dictate of Moscow – Almaty does. At least, this is
135
how the events are now interpreted by the Kazakh nationalist activists. In truth, however,
the exact magnitude or causes, number of participants and casualties is yet to be revealed
as the archive materials on the matter remain closed, generating a certain degree of
controversy in the media. In particular this concerns the role Elbasy
178
played in this
drama. (Ryskozha, 2009) What is certain is that Zheltoqsan has reaffirmed Zhety-su’s
status as the cradle of the Kazakh national consciousness and provided legitimacy to the
claim for independence – even if it was still bestowed by outside powers rather than
fought for by the Kazakhs in 1991.
Almaty’s history offers much to be proud of. It was the center of the urban life
in the republic for many years. Almaty owes much in terms of its development and
growth to the Soviet Union, there is no denying that, and it gives its Russian residents
immense satisfaction in knowing that their people and homeland have contributed to the
primacy of the former capital in Kazakhstan – even after it has lost its status as such. The
Tran-Siberian railroad which connected Almaty to Russia and to the world in 1927
established the foundation for the economic prosperity of the city, which is now the
largest economic entity in the republic, as it will be discussed below. In addition, World
War 2 ironically provided a boost to the economy of Almaty when a significant number
of Soviet factories and manufacturing facilities were evacuated to the city to prevent
them from falling into the hands of the rapidly advancing German armies. This made
Almaty a major industrial center in Central Asia. Within 6 months after the Nazi attack

178
Elbasy is now the official title of Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan: it basically means ‘father of
the nation’, eerily similar to Turkmenbashi title adopted by late Niyazov, extremely authoritarian and
extravagant ruler of Turkmenistan
136
on the USSR, Almaty received 24 various factories for manufacturing heavy machinery,
textile and for food-processing. (Auezov & Kunaeva, 2009, p. 19)
Kazakhstan paid dearly for the economic progress under the Russian and Soviet
control which also had practically destroyed the Kazakh traditional way of life. However,
the country also gained Almaty which became an ultimate showcase of the benefits of the
unequal partnership between the Kazakhs and Russia. This chapter will discuss some of
them in more detail below.
Status
Almaty, as the rest of Kazakhstan, had experienced a significant economic
decline during early years of sovereignty. While it did have a relatively developed
industry, the former capital was still tied in the Soviet economy that ceased to exist. Just
like in Aktau, the severance of economic relations with Russia, termination of Soviet
subsidies and general confusion of the sudden independence, that the country was not
prepared for, took a heavy toll on Almaty’s economy and society. Despite the political
status as the capital, many of the Almaty’s manufactories shut down almost overnight
with no paying customers.
For example, two of the largest Almaty plants, Almaty Cotton Textile Factory
and Almaty Construction Factory had to wind down operation due to the lack of supplies
and huge wage arrears. By 1997, the industrial output of the former capital shrunk to 45%
of what it was in 1990 (i.e., reduced by 55%), which was even less than the average 50%
decline of the entire country’s industrial output in the same time period. (Promyshlennost'
Respubliki Kazakhstan za 1990-1997 gody, 1998, p. 22) Officially, the level of
137
unemployment maxed out at around 1.4% in 1997, (Regional'nyy statisticheskiy
ezhegodnik Kazakhstana, 1998, p. 62) but it did not account for a large number of
unemployed who survived by engaging in “shuttle” trade,
179
or even subsistence
agriculture and other economic activities for the first time in their lives in order to
survive.
In 1997, the capital of Kazakhstan was transferred to Astana. Officially, the
reason for the move was the lack of space for further expansion in Almaty as it was
limited by city’s geographical location in close vicinity to the mountains.
180
Additionally,
the geological
181
and environmental
182
issues threatened the government functions of the
capital. However, more commonly it is believed that the move was related to a growing
threat of the Russian separatism in the northern Kazakhstan and to the promotion of the
Kazakh migration to the north. Another major reason for the move was to give a boost to
the economic recovery of the country: since the north of the country with developed
industrial capacity was losing labor due to emigration, prompting internal migration from
south of the republic to the north was an economic necessity to restart economic growth
in Kazakhstan.
183
(Sadovskaia, 2001)

179
Small business of buying consumer goods in bulk in China and elsewhere and then selling them for
profit in Almaty
180
As a matter of fact, a large portion of the city is located in a valley between two mountain ridges.
181
High probability of earthquakes and mudflows
182
True again, as Almaty of the 21
st
century is ranked one of the most polluted cities on Earth (Luck, 2008)
183
A more detailed discussion of the reasons for the transfer of capital is provided in Chapter 5: Astana.
138
This was not a welcome change for the residents of Almaty who enjoyed living
in the capital of the republic. Prior to independence, the status of the capital meant
various economic and cultural benefits granted to Almaty by Moscow: extra subsidies for
development and other fringe economic benefits,
184
better infrastructure, education,
entertainment, service industry, etc. After independence, Almaty still had better economic
opportunities compared to any other part of Kazakhstan which overall was suffering from
the rapid economic decline. It had the advantage of hosting the government which was
building itself up and recruiting heavily new cadres as well as reconstructing the city to
turn it into the face of the newly independent state.
Moreover, Almaty became the gateway to the world after 1991. Finally,
travelling abroad became much easier without the interference and control exerted by
Moscow which inhibited even the freedom of movement of the few Kazakh diplomats
who worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.
(Isinaliev, 2003, p. 203) In the early 1990s, the capital hosted a number of international
conferences and exhibits: for the first time in many years the city had received significant
attention from the world boosting its standing from a provincial town within the Soviet
Union to an international capital. (Ibid, p. 206) Almaty also became the destination for a
large number of foreign investors courting the leadership of the republic during what
some call “The Sale of the Century” in the early 1990s: this was the time when a large
number of highly profitable enterprises of the republic were auctioned off for pennies to a

184
Such as larger salaries, wider choice and better availability of manufactured products, improved
opportunities for advancement and so on
139
dollar in an attempt to raise capital for the destitute economy of Kazakhstan. (Peck, 2004,
pp. 70-71)
All in all, Almaty was the prime location to get a job and earn money while it
was the political capital. With that status gone, the city lost quite a bit of its former glory.
The bulk of the foreign diplomatic corps and investors have moved their operations to
Astana, as did most of the large and prosperous national companies such as
Kazmunaigaz.
185
Many of the government officials with their families moved as well,
taking the bulk of the not-so-legal fortunes accumulated during the privatization with
them.
186
(Peck, 2004, p. 71)
Nevertheless, Almaty retained its powerhouse status in the republic. Primarily, it
was thanks to its largest capital – the population which was 3.4 times larger of its closest
rival, the new capital Astana in 1999, and still is 2.2 times larger than Astana in 2009.
187

For a country with a paltry 5.8 people per square kilometer population density, this is a
huge city.
188
Admittedly, Almaty now grows at much smaller pace than Astana, but it
still grows faster than the rest of the country with the exception of the west of the

185
Kazakhoil at the time
186
Albeit many former government officials did not move since Astana (Akmola at the time) did not have
enough housing to accommodate the entire government apparatus; therefore with recruitment efforts in
Astana lead to fundamental changes in the composition of the old government apparatus: a large portion of
it became rather young and predominantly Kazakh at the turn of the century (Trud - Interfax, 2001)
187
According to the official statistics; unofficially, it might still 3 or 4 times larger due to illegal migrant
population not counted in the 2009 census. In 2007 alone, 250 thousand illegal immigrants came to Almaty
(KazInform, 2008)
188
About 15.2 people per square mile – United States by comparison has 76 people per square mile.
Proportionately, Almaty would have had around 6.8 million inhabitants if Kazakhstan’s population density
matched that of the U.S.
140
republic where the oil industry is rapidly expanding, attracting a significant inflow of
labor. The disproportionate size of Almaty compared to the rest of the country is also
evident considering the fact that in the past 20 years, the urban population of Kazakhstan
was shrinking while the overall population stayed about the same. Figure 14
demonstrates a slight reversal in the trend of the urban population growth common in the
world. If in 30 years since 1959 urban population of Kazakhstan grew by over 22%, in 20
years since then, it dropped by 3% to 54% in 2009. The total population grew to barely
over 16 million in 2009 after a dip in 1999 from the initial 16.2 million in 1989.
Figure 14: Urban and Rural Demographic Trends in Kazakhstan over Last 50 years

Source: the 2009 Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan census (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda.
Kratkie itogi, 2010)
Such an enormous population in one city of a relatively wealthy
189
small
republic leads to the concentration of many service industries, cultural and religious
institutions, media and entertainment, communication and transportation.
In particular, this concerns professional and higher education: Almaty is the
prime provider of higher education in the republic although in the last few years the

189
Compared to the rest of Central Asia, at least
8000000
9000000
10000000
11000000
12000000
13000000
14000000
15000000
16000000
17000000
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
1959 1970 1979 1989 1999 2009
Urban population, %
Rural population, %
Total Population
141
competition with Astana in this regard is heating up. The former capital still houses 35%
or 52 institutions of higher education including the largest one, the Kazakh National
University, and the oldest one, the Kazakh National Pedagogical University (founded in
1928) (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010, p. 12). No other region or town
comes close in the number of institutions or the number of majors offered in Almaty.
About 33% of all professors who teach at universities and colleges of Kazakhstan are
located in the former capital, and 31% of all undergraduate students in Kazakhstan come
to this city to study. Per 1,000 of population, Almaty has 9.4 professors and 137
undergraduates, which is far more than any other place in the republic – although Astana
is catching up with 5.2 professors and 64.1 students per 1,000 inhabitants. (Regiony
Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010, p. 13) (Obrazovanie - chislennost'
professorsko-prepodavel'skogo sostava vysshykh uchebnykh zavedeniy, 2010)
Admittedly, the last few years are rife with accusations of corruption (Transparency
Kazakhstan, 2008) and poor quality of education in Almaty’s colleges but it does not
detract from the fact that this city is still the preferred destination for Kazakhstan’s youth
seeking higher education and who cannot afford to study abroad.
In terms of scientific research and analysis, Almaty’s edge is even higher – over
52% of all Kazakhstan’s researchers are located in the former capital, as is the Academy
of Sciences of Kazakhstan and all related research institutions, The latter constitute
almost 47% of all scientific institutions of Kazakhstan. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009
godu, 2010, pp. 345, 350) Almaty also has the oldest and the largest library in the
country, the National Library of the Republic of Kazakhstan and an extensive library of
142
the Academy of Sciences. In total, the Almaty libraries own over 37 million items, which
constitutes almost 32% of all library materials in the country. (Regiony Kazakhstana v
2009 godu, 2010, p. 170) Furthermore, to complement the access to data, Almaty also has
a well-developed internet infrastructure – in 2009, over 14% of city’s residents had
access to internet which is almost 3 times of the republican average (Sviaz' - chislo
abonentov seti Internet, 2010); and 60% them were accessing the global information
superhighway via fast digital subscriber technology (DSL) while the rest of the country’s
internet users were mostly relying on a rather outdated dial-up modem technology to do
the same. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 310) There is no doubt the bulk
of scientific research in Kazakhstan is carried out in Almaty.
The former capital is the media center of the republic, too. Over 40% of
Kazakhstan’s mass media is located in this one city despite the fact that some of the
major government controlled media is moving to Astana, including the largest TV news
agency Khabar and such prominent newspapers as Kazakhstanskaia Pravda and Egemen
Kazakhstan. (Ministry of Communication and Information of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 2010) It is quite obvious that Almaty is engaged in a tug of war with Astana
over the hearts and minds of Kazakhstan – while the former is more multi-ethnic and
heavily influenced by external factors such as Russia and the West, Astana’s media is
promoting the officially sanctified pro-Kazakh content with heavy emphasis on the
143
Kazakh language and culture.
190
Almaty’s media, on the other hand, reflects the multi-
ethnic society that resides in Kazakhstan. While the bulk of published or transmitted
media is in Russian and (less) in Kazakh, there are also a few ethnic newspapers and
other media sources published in different languages, most notable of which are Uyghur,
German, Korean, and Tatar.
Almaty media activity increases the role the city plays in the society of
Kazakhstan. According to late prominent sociologist Sabit Zhusupov, the two most
important factors that influence the civil society in the republic are media and political
parties while other types of civic organizations (trade unions, ethnic cultural centers,
religious organizations, NGOs) have next to no impact on the social processes in the
country. (Zhusupov, 2008, p. 99) The results of the author’s survey, summarized in
Figure 15, show that Almaty respondents have a slightly higher opinion of media than
elsewhere which reflects the media’s ability to capture the attention and trust of the city’s
residents. Astana residents, by comparison, are a little less positive and rather concerned
with the government control over media.
191

190
Admittedly, Astana is also influenced by the outside world as well as Almaty is producing its share of
media aimed at Kazakh audience but in general, the latter is more international and the former is more pro-
Kazakh.
191
Of course, the survey in Almaty covered mostly young people 19-20 year old which may explain their
unabashed optimism but then respondents in Astana are not much older –21 on average.
144
Figure 15: Attitude toward media role in the society

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “What is your opinion about role of media in Kazakhstan?”
Almaty is also a prime entertainment and cultural center of the republic. For
example, the city has 14 theaters (25% of all theaters in Kazakhstan) and in 2009 alone,
they were visited by over half a million patrons, or about 25% of the total number theater
visits in the country. 12 museums of Almaty hold more historical artifacts than any other
region or Astana. 21 movie theaters (25.3% of the total in the republic) serviced about 3.3
million or 43.4% of all moviegoers in Kazakhstan in 2009. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009
godu, 2010, pp. 169, 171)
However, the statistics also show that large music festivals are moving toward
Astana: in 2009, more people attended various musical events there than in Almaty
owing to the fact that celebrations such as May parade, Day of the Capital, New Year,
Nauryz
192
and so on are now held in Astana as the capital of the country on a much more
massive scale than anywhere else – Almaty included. So there is a certain degree of

192
Traditional Kazakh New Year
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Negative Positive Neither
negative or
positive
Concern with
government
control
No response
Almaty
Astana
Aktau
145
parity in terms of popular national culture gravitating toward Astana while Almaty
remains rather cosmopolitan.
One of the most notable music festivals which took place in Almaty until 2003
was Azia Dausy (Voice of Asia in Kazakh), which frequently took place in the largest
venue Almaty had to offer – a huge skating rink Medeo located in the mountains near the
city.
193
It was a truly massive event which popularized many music artists and groups
with a significant international dimension since the festival always included many acts by
guest performers from abroad. While it had been shut down for the lack of funds, it
popularized folklore music of different ethnicities, not least that of the Kazakhs. Azia
Dausy also became a launching pad for the music business in Almaty, especially related
to organization of concerts thanks to all the equipment, experience and manpower
involved in setting up this massive festival for many years prior to its decline. The legacy
of Azia Dausy is still relevant today: if in Astana there are only 4 concert organizations,
Almaty has 21! They cater to a wide variety of audiences and tastes, and music events are
much more numerous in Almaty (733 concerts in Almaty vs 315 in Astana) although
attendance is much lower (285 thousand in Almaty vs 701 thousand in Astana). (Regiony
Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 171)
It comes as no surprise that Almaty is also the center of arts in the republic.
Many writers, artists, poets and musicians of Kazakhstan have lived in the past or still are
living in this city. 4 of the 52 universities in Almaty are dedicated to teaching arts: music,

193
This skating rink is also one of the most popular Almaty sights which became a part of collective
consciousness of the Almaty residents. (Author’s personal observation)
146
movies, fashion and painting, not to mention art departments and colleges within the
other 48 schools.
Almaty’s art scene exhibits diversity, reflecting both Kazakh traditions and
culture as well as the influence of the world art, Russian in particular. The latter’s impact
which will be discussed below in more detail is still fairly significant, even years after
independence, the giants of the Russian cultural heritage are heralded in Kazakhstan. For
example, in 1999, the president Nazarbayev personally attended an ostentatious unveiling
of a new Pushkin statue in Almaty – first and only one dedicated to a non-Kazakh figure
in the city since independence (Rakhmetova, 1999) Of course, art is encouraged
elsewhere in the republic as well – but anyone who is able to earn himself or herself a
name and become famous, sooner or later goes to Almaty to move forward career-wise.
Only in this city, especially after the republic gained sovereignty, the artists have a great
opportunity to become famous not only domestically but internationally, too. In the last
couple of years, however, it seems to change, as more and more artists, especially music
performers are lured to Astana to support the government efforts to popularize the
Kazakh traditional music and signing.
194

In modern world, visual media, movies and TV shows have a significant impact
on the development of culture and identity. In this respect, Almaty has a superior
advantage in the form of Kazakhfilm – the largest film studio in the republic, where most,
if not all, domestic movies and TV shows are made. In the first few years of

194
Author’s personal observation
147
independence, the Kazakh movie industry experienced a deep crisis along with the rest of
the country and those few films that were made in the early 90s reached a very limited
audience despite the international recognition of their artistic value. (Isinaliev, 2003, p.
97) As Kazakhstan’s economy recovered, so did its show business and in 2009 it made a
breakthrough with 12 Kazakhstan-made movies being shown across the country.
(Shimirbaeva, 2009)
The movies of independent Kazakhstan of the last couple of years also
demonstrate that despite the strong Russian and multi-ethnic influences which are still
present in Almaty art world (Mauletova, 2010), the Astana’s drive to reassert Kazakh
identity is successful as well, prompting the artists to revive the Kazakh language,
traditions, music and poems not least because of the government funding to that end. A
prime example of that is a 2009 comedy Oipyrmay ili dorogie moi deti (roughly, “Oops
or my dear children” in English). It is about how far rural migrants in Almaty go in order
to maintain an image of success associated with living in the southern capital. The movie
provides a portrait of a migrant rural-to-urban Kazakh family and the way they are
changing their values and habits while living in the megalopolis. Such experiences
resonate with a great number of rural Kazakhs who have recently moved to Almaty as
well as other urban areas in Kazakhstan.
195
At the same time, other 2009 movies made in
the republic such as Kelin and Kairat – chempion did not meet the approval of the

195
Ironically, while the movie was made in both Kazakh and Russian languages, it was only shown in
Russian in theaters. During a test run in the Kazakh language in a Kazakh-dominated region, it did not
generate enough interest to pay off the cost of the showings. (Baitukenov, 2010)
148
conservatives who see them as a low-brow reflection of the mass-made Hollywood
movies. (Kazakhstan Today, 2010)
There is no doubt that Almaty still plays a very important cultural role in
Kazakhstan. However, one would be amiss not to mention the multi-cultural influences
present in this city, and they will be addressed below.
Almaty – Crossroads of Civilizations
Given the history of Almaty, it is unavoidable that its inhabitants are ethnically
diverse. The Kazakh nomads of the past did not settle readily and unlike the rest of
Central Asia, many of the urban areas of Kazakhstan were built and settled by the
Russians and other ethnic groups rather than the Kazakhs. Almaty is no exception, in
fact, as it has been mentioned before; the Kazakhs are still only 53% of population
despite the fact that the city is located in the south of the republic where the Kazakhs are
traditionally in majority, not to mention that it had been the capital of Kazakhstan for 70
years before 1997.
196
Moreover, even though Almaty is located in the heart of the Great
Horde
197
territory, the Kazakhs in the city itself come from all the hordes and tribes.
Aktau, by comparison, is inhabited predominantly by one Kazakh tribe Adai. Almaty is
inhabited by all three Hordes and their constituent tribes. Meeting representatives of all
Kazakh tribes on the streets of the former capital is a virtual certainty because they all

196
Albeit for 64 years it was within the Soviet Union
197
Recall discussion in the history chapter about the different Hordes and sub-ethnic divisions among
Kazakhs
149
come from the lands of their forefathers to find a better life and better economic
opportunities in Almaty.
The Russian community in the city is also uncharacteristically large for the south
of the republic: 33.2% of Almaty’s population is Russian, which the highest proportion of
the Russians in the south of the republic. Even Astana at the heart of the northern part of
Kazakhstan has a smaller proportion of the Russian population – only 19.9% even though
it is located in the region with 35.8% of the Russian population. Ironically, the situation is
reversed concerning the Kazakh population: it is larger in Almaty oblast than in the city
and smaller in Akmola
198
oblast (where Astana is located) than in the capital itself
(Figure 16).
Figure 16: Proportion of Russian Population in Almaty and Astana

Source: the 2009 Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie
itogi, 2010)
Indeed, Almaty does have a vast Russian legacy which has a profound effect on
its identity and culture, even if the Russians themselves are no longer the majority of its
population. Primarily, it is the use of the language: Russian is the preferred medium of

198
Akmola was a short-lived name of the capital before it became Astana and it was kept only as the name
for the oblast.
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
Almaty kazakhs Almaty russians Astana kazakhs Astana russians
City, %
Oblast (region), %
150
communication. It is remarkable that in 2009, 55.9% of Almaty school students are still
taught in Russian even though many of them are obviously not of Russian ethnic
background but likely to be Kazakh or other, while only 42.6% are taught in Kazakh.
199

(Almaty Administration, 2010) Nevertheless, in the last few years the language situation
is slowly shifting in favor of Kazakh thanks to an influx of rural Kazakh population into
the city, especially the youth.
Out of the 14 theaters in Almaty, 2 proudly identify themselves as Russian and
they produce plays exclusively in the Russian language; other theaters do the same rather
frequently. There as many as 13 Russian Orthodox churches plus a couple of
monasteries, a chapel and a newly opened seminary; a huge number of media sources
such as newspapers and TV channels are in Russian as well, and the list goes on.
200

Moreover, most of the old
201
buildings in city were built by the Russian
architects, particularly during the Soviet Union. One the oldest and most remarkable
buildings was completed in 1907: it is an Orthodox Voznesenskiy Cathedral, unique all-
wood structure 54 meters (177 feet) tall erected without a single metallic nail and yet able
to survive the 10 point Richter scale earthquake in 1911. It is officially included into the

199
Previously, the proportion of students taught in Russian was much higher but over the years it is
shrinking, for example from 2008 to 2009 it shrunk by 1.7% (Almaty Administration, 2010)
200
Not only there are many newspapers from Russia which established local franchises in Kazakhstan,
quite a few of Russian TV channels are transmitted in the city and the entire republic via satellites, and
even local news teams borrow liberally from Russian news channels. Kazakh language TV shows and
news, although required by law, usually are not broadcast during prime time, instead, Kazakh language
occupies late night hours on many TV channels in order to comply with the law (author’s observation).
201
Thanks to intensive construction and growth after independence, the architecture of Almaty has changed
significantly to reflect its more modern stature and international importance.
151
list of historical heritage sites of the republic like the Mangystau mosques and other
ancient monuments and structures, recognizing the significance of the Russian legacy in
Kazakh history. In Almaty, the presence of the Russian language and culture is palpable
in many dimensions of the city’s life.
202

The impact of the Russian culture aside, Almaty is influenced by other cultures
as well, albeit not to the same order of magnitude. As mentioned before, Kazakhstan was
a recipient of repeat mass migrations, frequently against the will of the migrants. In
particular, Stalin forced resettlement of Koreans, Germans, Tatars and other ‘unwanted’
people to the republic. (Anes, 1998) Today, their presence is easily recognizable in
Almaty in various ways. In schools, the language of instruction is not only Kazakh and
Russian, it is also German (0.2%) and Uyghur (1.3%). There are also a few schools that
emphasize teaching in English but only as a limited part of the curriculum
203
. (Almaty
Administration, 2010) Just like there are two Russian-only theaters, there are also
Korean, German and Uyghur theaters that aim to support cultures of their respective
minorities in the entire republic. As it has been mentioned, some mass media outlets
dedicate certain titles or shows to the cultures and languages of these and other large
ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan. Uyghur minority, in fact, is so strong and organized that

202
The same could be said about many other urban areas in Kazakhstan, but mostly in the north of the
country where there is still a large Russian population and many towns were founded during Russian
colonization. In the south, Russian influence is not as noticeable across the cities in the south – after all,
many of them (including Almaty, as some would argue) have a long history related to Kazakh and Central
Asian sedentary cultures rather than the Russians.
203
More on that below
152
the Kazakh authorities share China’s concerns with Uyghur separatism.
204
The
interaction of various cultures is evident in Almaty; whereas in other places the ethnic
minorities frequently live in enclaves, with minimal interaction with other ethnic groups.
Not only Almaty is multi-ethnic, it is also the most globalized city of
Kazakhstan, a virtual gateway to the world. In this land-locked country, thanks to a well-
developed air and ground transportation; relative closeness to the second largest trade
partner – China, Almaty remains the city with the highest degree of integration into the
global economy: almost 40% of all imports into Kazakhstan in 2009 (compared to the
8.5% of the country’s population) went into or passed through Almaty. (Regiony
Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010, p. 319)
Just like the ancient settlements in Zhety-su on the Silk Road, Almaty introduces
the world culture to Kazakhstan. First of all, it is the media: the international news, the
aforementioned Internet access, and the movies. In 2009 alone, the attendance of Almaty
movie theaters reached 3.3 million visits, which is 2.4 times for every man, woman and
child in the city – almost five times the average for the entire country which is 0.47
movie theater visits per capita. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 171) Add to
that the fact that the vast majority of movie titles in the theaters are made in
Hollywood
205
and dubbed into the Russian language in Russia
206
; they both americanize

204
The gravity of the Uyghur determination was demonstrated in 2001 when SWAT police forces had to
storm an apartment at the heart of Almaty with suspected Xinjiang Uyghur militants armed with automatic
weapons. While the direct threat to Kazakhstan is not as significant as it is in China, this event does
illustrate just how strong is Uyghur’s national identity, and 5.2% of Almaty’s population is Uyghur, third
largest ethnic group in the city.
205
70% in 2009 (Kazakhstan Today, 2009).
153
the tastes and behavior of Almaty residents and sustain the influence of the Russian
language – particularly in comparison to the rest of country.
207
Movies filmed in
Kazakhstan made up only 5% of the titles in theaters in 2009 and that was the highest
point ever for them. (Shimirbaeva, 2009) The foreign shows and news dominate
Kazakhstan’s TV channels, although the domestic ones are gaining momentum in the last
8 years or so, still, they do not challenge dominance of the foreign shows of in terms of
the air time.
Second dimension is the presence of foreign companies or domestic companies
doing business internationally in Almaty who drive the demand up for foreign language
proficiency. In 2009, over 57% of all businesses owned partially or completely by foreign
citizens or companies in the republic were located in Almaty. (Regiony Kazakhstana v
2009 godu, 2010, p. 211) Therefore, the general level of the English language literacy is
quite high: in Almaty, the proportion of adult inhabitants having fluent knowledge of
English is about double of the average for the republic: while the former is 14.2%, the
latter is 7.7%.
208
Only Astana residents can claim a slightly higher number (15%) for the
same skill as it does contain most of the foreign diplomatic corps. (Perepis' naseleniia
Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010)

206
Those few movies are dubbed into Kazakh are actually translated from Russian into Kazakh rather than
directly from English or other original foreign language into Kazakh
207
Astana is close 2
nd
in terms of movie influence with 2 visits per capita in 2009 (Regiony Kazakhstana v
2009 godu, 2010, p. 171).
208
In the census, this was termed as an ability to “speak, read and write in the English language”
154
In higher education of Almaty, a privately owned Kazakhstan Institute of
Management and Economic Prognosis (KIMEP) teaches its entire curriculum in English
while other colleges and universities place heavy emphasis on the study of this and other
foreign languages. As a matter of fact, even 4 high schools teach classes in three
languages, English, Russian and Kazakh, to advanced students. (Almaty Administration,
2010) It is fair to say that the mastery of English and other foreign language is closely
associated with personal success in the minds of Almaty’s residents.
209

The demand for foreign languages is satisfied through a wide choice of private
tutors, evening courses and regular language programs all over the city. An entire section
of classifieds in the largest newspapers is devoted to the services offered to teach various
languages. Unavoidably, such a rush to study another language also introduces the
students to the respective cultures, American and English most of all, leading to a certain
degree of Americanization of youth, which is only reinforced by other sources in popular
culture: media, music, movies and TV.
Third significant point of impact of the global culture and economy is the
popularity of mass-produced clothing and accessories imported from abroad. As it has
been mentioned, Almaty is the recipient of almost 40% of all country’s imports but a
much smaller exporter in the republic. The vast majority of imports are consumer goods:
cars, clothes, jewelry, electronics and so on. In all these categories, Almaty is consistently
near the top in the general balance of imports of Kazakhstan. (Regiony Kazakhstana v

209
The 2008 Doctrine of National Identity adopted by the government actually includes English as one of
the three languages to be universally taught and used across the republic
155
2009 godu, 2010, pp. 330-342) Booming retail industry, numerous shopping malls and
bazaars that pepper the city’s landscape, many of which sprung in the last few years,
developed a “boutique” culture among the successful Almaty residents. Many young and
middle-aged Almaty residents (and even some seniors), irrespective of their ethnic
background, prefer to buy western-styled clothes in various fashion stores of the city and
generate demand for western beautification goods and services.
210

Such changes in the culture of the city do not go well with the conservatives and
traditionalists, the Kazakhs in particular. There are vocal opponents of globalization who
call for a return to the traditional values and behavior. For example, one writer explores
the departure from Muslim traditions among the Kazakh youth in Almaty in his novel All
Kazakhs – One Kazakh. (Kali, 2008) Another criticizes the modern clothing that women
in particular brandish all over the former capital. (Kenzhebay M. , 2010) The list of such
old generation intellectuals goes on and their major complaint is that the new generation
of the Kazakhs, in Almaty in particular, is moving rather far, away from the traditional
Kazakh values and culture, substituting them instead with the pursuit of money and
material goods.
The geographic closeness to China and cultural affinity to Turkey and Middle
Eastern countries also has an effect on Almaty. In the early 90s, it was expected that
Turkey will come to the help of its Central Asian brethren who were all suffering a sharp
downturn in economic growth (Kazakhstan in particular) – after all, they share the

210
There is of course a sharp divide between those who can afford shopping at those boutique shops and
those who cannot. However, as it will be discussed further, Almaty by comparison to the rest of the country
is extremely well-off and therefore there plenty of demand for boutique products.
156
language, culture and religion but alas those hopes did not come to pass.
211
This did not
mean though that the mutual interest waned, on the contrary, the cultural exchange with
Turkey is growing. Each year, more and more students from Kazakhstan attend Turkish
Universities. In Almaty, there are quite a few Kazakh-Turkish schools with a Muslim
curriculum set up in the early 90s. Turkey is a popular tourist destination and Almaty
offers an array of attractive investment opportunities for Turkish businessmen. The latter,
in fact, are practically a majority among the foreign companies in Kazakhstan, in Almaty
and Astana in particular.
212

There is also the resurgence of Islam and strengthening connection with Arab
countries. In Almaty, Arab funding went into numerous projects including mosques,
schools and even a religious university Nur-Mubarak
213
. While the Arabs do not engage
in business in Kazakhstan as much as Turkey does, they are also increasing their presence
– not least through the spread of Islamic banking, which is trumpeted in Kazakhstan as
very fair – implicitly opposed to the predatory western banking that caused the global
financial crisis. (Nursaparova, 2010)
China also has a very large impact all over Kazakhstan, Almaty included. First,
geographical proximity stimulates intensive trade, and many residents of the former
capital are actually involved in the so-called shuttle trade when they buy consumer goods

211
Author’s observation
212
Author’s observation
213
Albeit it did increase the fears of penetration of extreme Islamic sects such as wahhabist into
Kazakhstan.
157
in bulk in the nearby Xinjiang province of China and sell them in Almaty’s numerous
bazaars.
214
As a matter of fact, ‘shop tours’ to China is one of the popular travel choices
in Almaty like a visit to Las Vegas is in the U.S. (albeit for different reasons). Second,
there is an influx of Chinese workforce – while most of them are involved in oil
extraction and transportations projects in the west of the republic, Almaty’s residents are
still concerned
215
given the closeness to the border and a large flow of illegal worker
migrants from China which exacerbates an already tight job market in the city. Indeed,
researchers found a growing stereotype about the Chinese which reinforces old Soviet-era
prejudices against them due to ignorance about the true extent of their migration goals
and Chinese culture. (Sadovskaya, 2007) Third, the cultural affinity with Uyghurs and
Kazakhs who live in Xinjiang province of China promotes close relations with them and
their country of residence, with frequent cultural exchanges, close trade relations and
repatriation of the Kazakhs.
For better or worse, Almaty is affected by a variety of ethnic and cultural
influences, which are hardly conducive in the difficult process of recovering and
reconstructing Kazakh national identity, distinct from that of its former colonial master.
Moreover, the door that opens into the globalized world, tends to erase cultural
differences. Besides, the consumerist culture of Almaty is closely related to the growing

214
Granted, this business model is under threat of increased import tariffs now that Kazakhstan have joined
the customs union with Russia and Belorussia.
215
A popular fear is that the growing Chinese worker migration will soon outnumber the local population.
While there is no official or statistical data to confirm these fears, these concerns are fairly common in
Almaty as it is only about 150 miles from the border with China
158
prosperity of the city.
216
The next section will examine the economy of Almaty and the
reasons for its high level of economic development.
The Economic Powerhouse
It is remarkable, that the city with about 9% of country’s population consistently
provides around 20% of the total GDP of Kazakhstan in the last 5 years (2005-2009).
Moreover, per capita GDP increased quite a bit in Almaty compared to the republican
average in the same time period which indicates that it is still the economic powerhouse
despite the fact that it is neither the capital of the country nor does it have a significant
industrial production capability. As a matter of fact, the industrial output of the city
declined slightly over the last 5 years from about 5% to 4% of the total industrial output
in Kazakhstan (Figure 17). Surprisingly, only two oil-producing regions of Kazakhstan,
Atyrau and Mangystau, have per capita GDP that exceed that of Almaty, but even then
they do not match the total contribution of the former capital to the republican GDP
(Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010, p. 17). The reasons for such high
levels of prosperity of Almaty are many: population size, vast financial sector, foreign
trade, boom in real estate, and extremely active small business.

216
The already mentioned 2009 Kazakh movie Oipyrmay demonstrates the pride that many Kazakhs take in
Almaty’s economic success: even the fact of moving to it bestows an image of success on them, as well.
159
Figure 17: Almaty Economic Role in the Republic

Source: Kazakhstan Statistic Agency Regional Data (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010)
The large and growing population of the city is the primary reason for the
economic success of Almaty – especially if one takes into consideration the fact that in
2009 population increased only in Almaty, Astana and the two oil-producing regions of
Kazakhstan and shrunk in the rest of the country. (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-
2009, 2010, p. 7) Such a massive number of people, concentrated in a single urban area,
generate an immense demand for consumer goods, housing, infrastructure, and services,
providing a great opportunity for making money to entrepreneurial individuals. Of
course, this is works both ways – the economic promise of Almaty draws migrants from
both within and outside of the country, and when they do come, they provide additional
manpower and consumer demand that gives an additional boost to economic growth of
the city, completing the cycle. However, a striving business model needs to borrow the
money in order to develop and grow, and the former capital has much to offer in that
respect.
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP proportion of Almaty,
%
Proportion of Almaty
population in Kazakhstan, %
Almaty Proportion in
Industrial Manufacturing, %
GDP per capita Almaty, mln
tenge
GDP per capita Kazakhstan,
mln tenge
160
Almaty is the financial capital of Kazakhstan. Even though Astana has greater
access to the government or foreign aid funds, Almaty has even greater access to a deep
well of private financial resources. Of Kazakhstan’s 36 second level banks
217
in 2005
218
,

32 were located or headquartered in Almaty. (Assotsiatsiia Bankov Respubliki
Kazakhstan, 2005) The most telling number is the amount of loans and credits provided
by these banks. In 2009, they have issued over 69% of the total amount of loans in the
republic in Almaty alone. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 360) Certainly,
not all of that money stays in the former capital and much of it was invested elsewhere,
but this fact alone demonstrates that Almaty provides an enormous opportunity for
acquiring funding for any project or business undertaking in the entire Republic of
Kazakhstan.
Another extremely important factor buttressing the vast economic power of
Almaty was mentioned before: the role Almaty plays in the foreign trade of Kazakhstan.
It is essentially the country’s gateway to the world thanks to an extremely well-developed
infrastructure. On top of the aforementioned 40% of imports passing through Almaty
(Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 319), it is also the major communications
center in the republic. A stunning 76.4% of the total income earned by communications
companies in Kazakhstan in 2009 (cellphone, internet, phone service providers) was
made in Almaty. The same year, over 20% (over 2.4 million) of all passenger turnover in

217
Second level banks in Kazakhstan and Russia are the banks authorized to work with individuals, first
level banks are authorized to work with other banks and other financial organizations only.
218
The number and names of the banks changed slightly since then but most of them are still present in
Almaty
161
the republic occurred in the former capital. (Ibid, p. 22-23) Such a well-developed
infrastructure indicates a high degree of economic activity in the city, if one compares
Almaty with any other town in Kazakhstan (apart from Astana), the energy and speed of
life is palpable.
Much of the loans and other financial resources of Kazakhstan are invested in
Almaty’s construction business. Just like in the United States before the 2008 meltdown
of the subprime market, Almaty residents had an easy access to loans to finance their
dream: getting an apartment of their own.
219
As result, there was a rapid expansion of real
estate business, peaking in 2007 when almost 1,700 construction companies were active
in Almaty. (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010, p. 21) Although the rate
and total volume of construction in Almaty lags behind that of Astana, it also fuels the
growth of satellite towns in Almaty oblast near the former capital. Put together, the
increase in the real estate in both Almaty city and its oblast exceeds that of Astana and
Akmola oblast even in 2009, when the effects of the global financial crisis have severely
hampered the growth of construction business in Kazakhstan. Almaty and oblast
constitute 37% of total investment into real estate in Kazakhstan, and Astana and Akmola
oblast – about 23%. Put together, Almaty and Astana along with their respective oblasts
consume over 60% of total investment into the real estate market in 2009 (Ibid p. 279) for
about 28% of the total population of the republic living there! (Perepis' naseleniia
Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010) It is obvious that both new and

219
Not too many people can afford individual housing in Almaty: in 2009, out of 1050 newly built houses,
240 were individual homes, the rest were apartment buildings. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010,
pp. 276-277)
162
former capitals are growing rapidly, offering huge opportunities both for settling there as
well as for getting a job in the construction business or related services.
The global financial crisis did make a dent in that by making it rather difficult to
procure a loan and causing a downturn in the construction business: in Almaty, the
number of firms in this sector of economy dropped from the peak 1,697 in 2007 to 1,237
in 2009. (Ibid p. 21) Many construction sites were frozen due to the lack of funding. The
central government had to step in with anti-crisis measures with the goal to jump-start the
economy. Among them, the government financed delinquent real estate projects to save
individual investments into them – especially in Astana and Almaty.
220

Another factor is that Almaty is populated by the most proactive entrepreneurs
in the country. Such a large population creates an immense demand for various services
and consumer goods, which provides a great number of opportunities for a myriad of
small businesses to grow: shopkeepers, automotive
221
services, English language
tutoring, real estate – Almaty the widest selection of services in the country thanks to the
thriving small and individual businesses. Not surprisingly, the former capital leads the
country in terms of the small business development with 31 active small businesses per
1,000 inhabitants or 23% of all active small businesses in the country in 2009. Astana is
close second with 29 active small businesses per 1,000 inhabitants but only 11% of the
republican total. The average number of small businesses in the country is 10 per 1,000

220
Author’s observation
221
Almaty has the highest number of automobiles – as many as 500 thousand in the city of 1.3 million
(Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 10) (Kazakhstan Today,
2010)
163
inhabitants, and outside of Almaty, Astana and Mangystau, every region demonstrates
smaller or about the average level of activity in this sector of economy. (Regiony
Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 208) Small businesses employ almost 200 thousand
people in Almaty which constitutes almost 25% of the total small business employment
in the republic, providing goods and services in excess of 1 trillion tenge
222
which is over
28% of the total amount of goods and services provided by small businesses across
Kazakhstan. (Ibid p. 209)
Figure 18: Small and Foreign Business in Kazakhstan

Source: Kazakhstan Statistic Agency Regional Data (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010)
It is long has been established that small business stimulates economic growth
and job creation even in the most developed countries like the U.S. (Karlsson, Lindmark,
& Olofsson, 1993) although not without evidence to the contrary (Duncan & Handler,
1994). In Kazakhstan, the future of small business is not yet determined but it is
repeatedly declared as one of the cornerstones of the governmental development policy,

222
Kazakhstan currency, about 150 tenge for $1 USD
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
Kazakhstan Astana Almaty
Number of Small Businesses,
per 1,000 inhabitants
Number of Companies with
Foreign Participation, per
10,000 inhabitants
164
albeit many small business owners do complain about the red tape and general corruption
issues that inhibit their growth. For now, Almaty does benefit greatly from such a
rigorous entrepreneurial spirit of its inhabitants despite these obstacles.
Undoubtedly, Almaty can easily claim the highest level of economic
development in Kazakhstan, if not all of Central Asia. The city has a rather advanced
market economy for a country in transition; in particular, for a former Soviet Union
republic, where a large portion of population grew under the shadow of anti-capitalist
socialist ideology. The question is however, do these achievements translate into a
fundamental shift of the identity of Almaty’s residents?
Identity
From the preceding discussion it is clear that Almaty is a fast-growing,
economically active and relatively open society. Does it provide support for the
hypothesis of non-national identity of Kazakhstan, i.e. the relationship between market
reforms, FDI and fragmentation of Kazakh national identity? On the one hand, the
hypothesis has a rather high probability of being true in Almaty: the former capital is
advanced in terms of market economy, it has a high proportion of foreign businesses –
they constituted almost 13% of all private business in the city, which is twice the average
proportion of businesses with foreign participation across Kazakhstan. (Regiony
Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, pp. 211, 208) Per capita, foreign business proportion in
Almaty is much higher than that across the country (See Figure 18). The influence of
Russian legacy and culture is also among the highest in the republic – it is probably only
higher in the north, closer to Russia and with a larger proportion of the Russian
165
population, but Almaty is also affected by the international culture the most compared to
the rest of the country thanks to its positioning as Kazakhstan’s gateway to the world.
However, there is also evidence pointing toward reinforcement of the traditional
Kazakh identity in Almaty. Figure 19 shows that the Kazakh population has more than
doubled in the past 20 years. During the same time period, the Russian population shrunk
by about the same proportion because of emigration to their homeland. Nonetheless, after
an initial slowdown in the 90s due to a major economic crisis, the population of the city
continuously grew through 2009 to about 1.4 million (likely much more with illegal
immigration) thanks to the influx of migrant Kazakhs. It is quite obvious that such
fundamental shifts in the ethnic composition of the city will have a profound effect on its
culture, especially if the trend evident from Figure 19 continues in future (and there is
hardly any doubt that it will not).
Figure 19: Almaty Population and Proportion of the Two Major Ethnic Groups

Source: the 1999 and 2009 Censuses of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009
goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010) (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po g. Astany, 2000, p. 9)
The 2009-2010 author’s survey suggests that in Almaty, formerly dominated by
the Russian language, Kazakh is becoming increasingly important. 44% of respondents
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
1,000,000
1,100,000
1,200,000
1,300,000
1,400,000
1,500,000
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1970 1979 1989 1999 2009
Kazakhs, %
Russians, %
Total Population
166
indicate that they see the primacy of the Kazakh language necessary for all citizens of
Kazakhstan which is rather higher than what the rest of respondents outside Almaty think
– only 31% of the latter believe the same. Similarly, fewer Almaty residents believe in
the dual-language use (i.e. both Russian and Kazakh equally): 53% versus 63% in other
parts of the country. (Figure 20)
Figure 20: Almaty Preference for Language Policy in Kazakhstan

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How would you assess the role of Kazakh and Russian languages in
Kazakhstan?”
The rate of religiosity in Almaty also proves to be much higher than average –
51% of respondents believe that Islam is the primary religion of the republic compared to
only 18% across the country; at the same time, if 47% respondents in other cities believe
that Kazakhstan is secular country, only 26% of those in Almaty do the same. (Figure 21)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Kazakh
Language
Dual
Language
Kazakh
Language
Dual
Language
Kazakh
Language
Dual
Language
All Kazakhs Non-Kazakhs
Almaty
Other Sites
167
Figure 21: Attitude toward religion in Almaty versus other parts of the country

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “In your opinion, what is the role of religion in Kazakhstan?”
Almaty respondents also demonstrate somewhat higher respect for the Kazakh
nomadic past and traditions than the rest of the country: 74% of them positively assess
the role of the nomadic past in the present culture of Kazakhstan compared to 60% in
other parts of the country. Remarkably, the difference is thanks to the non-Kazakh
respondents; if the Kazakh respondents in both in and outside Almaty assess nomadism
positively at 76% and 77% rate, respectively, non-Kazakhs in Almaty versus non-
Kazakhs outside have a much larger difference: 56% versus 42%, respectively. (Figure
22)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Islam
Multipe Confessions
Secularism
Islam
Multipe Confessions
Secularism
Islam
Multipe Confessions
Secularism
All Kazakhs Non-kazakhs
Almaty
Other Sites
168
Figure 22: Almaty Attitude toward the Nomadic Pastoralism, Its Traditions and
History

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “What is your opinion about the role of nomadism and pastoral traditions
in the history of Kazakhstan?”
In terms of national identity, Almaty respondents also display higher preference
for the Kazakh culture and language than others: 47% in the former capital versus 31%
outside of it; and smaller preference for multi-ethnic culture and identity of the republic:
30% inside versus 42% outside. (Figure 23)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Negative
Positive
Belongs in the past
No response
Negative
Positive
Belongs in the past
No response
Negative
Positive
Belongs in the past
No response
All Kazakh Non-Kazakh
Almaty
Other Sites
169
Figure 23: Almaty Perception of What Constitutes National Identity

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How do you understand the concept of the national idea of
Kazakhstan?”
In sum, judging by the results of the survey, the Kazakh national consciousness
is strengthening in the city but it is not yet dominant. However, it should be noted that the
survey results are limited in terms of representativeness: most of Almaty’s respondents
are the Kazakh-speaking ethnic Kazakhs aged 19-20, which introduces a bias in the
results of the survey, skewing it toward the primacy Kazakh culture and language in
nation building processes in Almaty. Nevertheless, the survey indicates that the young
generation of the Kazakhs in the multi-cultural city of Almaty still do retain their Kazakh
identity.
While higher than average among the respondents, in absolute terms the
preference for the Kazakh culture and language appear to be somewhat muted when
compared to Aktau and, probably, other Kazakh-dominated towns and regions of
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
International Status
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
International Status
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
International Status
All Kazakh Non-Kazakh
Almaty
Other Sites
170
Kazakhstan not included in the survey. Moreover, the in-depth interviews
223
suggest that
Kazakhs in Almaty, just like in many other urban areas of Kazakhstan, are much more
influenced by the Russian language and culture than the rural Kazakhs. Furthermore,
numerous studies and discussions among intellectuals in the republic support the thesis
that the Kazakhs are divided along non-ethnic lines which include social strata,
proficiency in Kazakh, South vs North and so on.
224
(Nysanbaev A. N., 2010)
(Shaikemelev, 2010)
Almaty is a prime example of such non-tribal divisions among the Kazakhs
where the recent arrivals of the rural Kazakh-speaking ethnic Kazakhs see the urbanized
Russian-speaking Kazakhs as the other. After all, most of the Kazakhs in Almaty are
newcomers – just like in Aktau, more than half of them arrived in the former capital in
the last 20 years or so, and unlike Aktau where the single Kazakh tribe dominates the
cultural landscape, Almaty offers a far greater mixture of the Kazakhs from the different
tribes and Hordes than any other town in Kazakhstan.
225
The primary reason for that is
that they came from all over the country in search for better prospects in life which this
city offers.

223
In the words of a retired Russian journalist, “Russian is one of the most important languages in the
world, it offers a path toward a wealth of knowledge” (6/18/2009). Kazakhs do not disagree, a russian-
speaking Kazakh writer suggested that “Russian is needed to play the role of the buffer for collecting
knowledge” since most of scientific research and technological advances are made using Russian rather
than Kazakh in the republic (8/14/2009) Similar views have been expressed in other interviews as well,
although they do come from either non-Kazakhs or Russian-speaking Kazakhs.
224
As a matter of fact, one historian identifies as many as 8 different sub-types of Kazakhs (Abzhanov,
2007)
225
Unfortunately, no precise data is available but it is commonly reported and observed that Almaty
Kazakhs are very diverse unlike many other towns in Kazakhstan (Author’s observation)
171
The interviews demonstrate that a rather careful approach toward the
advancement of the Kazakh culture and language became a modus operandi among the
intellectuals, scientists, political activists of Almaty. First and foremost, almost everyone
insists on a graduated approach toward making the Kazakh language a primary means of
communication. Many voice concern that a sudden transition to the Kazakh language,
advocated by the Kazakh nationalists, will severely hamper the science, trade and
development of Kazakhstan.
226
Even an opposition leader interviewed by the author
(8/15/2009)
227
does argue for a gradual transition although he is also expressing regret
that it does take longer than he would like. He also expresses a deep concern with the
economic development in Kazakhstan which is taking a wrong turn toward what he calls
“corrupted capitalism” where rent-seeking behavior is endemic and hampers the
entrepreneurship and economic growth, and promotes corruption instead. In other words,
he is observing certain elements of the onset of non-national identity such as the
breakdown of traditional values when people put their own individual interests ahead of
that of the community, uncharacteristic for the traditional Kazakhs of the past. (Ibid)
Interviews
228
also link Kazakh identity to land which demonstrates a decisive
shift away from the traditional nomadic values which were less territorial. This is even
more evident in Astana which will be discussed in the next chapter.

226
Kazakh writer and linguist interviewed on 8/14/2009
227
In his words: “a gradual transition to the Kazakh language is needed” for at least another 20 years – even
if 18 years (at the time of interview) have already passed since independence (8/15/2009).
228
Kazakh leader of political opposition group 8/15/2009, Kazakh writer, linguist 8/14/2009, Chief editor
of a Kazakh journal 7/15/2009 all express concern the with land policies of the government which allow
172
Another common thread that emerges in all interviews
229
is the complaint about
the lack of a coherent government nation building program, something that almost
everyone refers to as “national ideology”, echoing an old Soviet concept of the
communist ideology in a different context. This implies that the interviewees are
concerned with the lack of coherent national identity among the Kazakhs, all over
Kazakhstan as well as in Almaty; and look to the government as the main factor in
(re)forming Kazakh identity.
Thus, there is a certain degree of contradiction between the results of the survey
and interviews: if the youth in the survey is more or less pro-Kazakh, the more mature
interviewee belong to an older generation and are much more cautious and concerned
with the divisions among the Kazakhs and between various ethnic groups. There is also
the intervening variable the origins: many of the survey respondents are probably not
originally from Almaty but rather students who came to study in the city from outside of
it and as such did not spend much time in the globalized culture of megalopolis. The
interviewees, on other hand, are older and lived in the former capital for some time.
Therefore, it could be speculated that the former have not been exposed to the

foreigners to take over the land – in other words, just like the Kazakhs of the late 19
th
-early 20
th
century,
they fear losing a vital factor of Kazakh identity which is now tied to the land.
229
Retired journalist 6/18/2009, Kazakh National University History professor, 6/20/2009, Chief editor of a
Kazakh journal 7/15/2009, Kazakh leader of political opposition group 8/15/2009, Kazakh National
Pedagogical University history professor 12/12/2009, Kazakh writer, linguist 8/14/2009; all refer to the
‘national ideology’ as a necessary policy that the government of Kazakhstan have so far failed to adopt or
implement in order to define the nation of Kazakhstan (be that ethnic Kazakh nation or civic Kazakhstani
one)
173
multicultural environment of Almaty as much as the latter which would account for the
contradiction in the data collected.
On the balance, however, the results of the study suggest that there are at least
three crucial factors that increase the probability and strength of non-national identity in
this city.
First of all, the competitive spirit is at its highest in this city compared to the rest
of the country. The number of small businesses, the entrepreneurial drive, and economic
activity of Almaty are the proof. From the interviews
230
and personal observations, the
old traditional moralistic trust of the Kazakhs is severely declining in Almaty and
strategic, calculated trust is on the rise when people pursue individual profit instead of
building the community, as they would have traditionally. Although the number of the
Kazakhs in the former capital has more than doubled in the last 20 years, and many of
them come from the rural areas with a better knowledge of the Kazakh language and
traditions, it is also very likely that either they change under the influence of the city’s
competitive environment or, in fact, the more competitive and less community-oriented
Kazakhs are drawn to Almaty in the first place. The competitiveness directly contravenes
the Kazakh traditional community spirit, leading to a breakdown in the cohesiveness of
the tribal, Horde and national Kazakh communities. Such observations are frequent in

230
Chief editor of a Kazakh journal 7/15/2009, Kazakh leader of political opposition group 8/15/2009,
Kazakh National Pedagogical University history professor 12/12/2009, Kazakh writer, linguist 8/14/2009
all remark upon the general decline of culture, rising crime levels and disrespect for one another displayed
in particular by the youth in Almaty.
174
discussions and publications in the former capital, lamenting the decline of Kazakh
national identity in Almaty and Kazakhstan in general.
Secondly, the sheer magnitude of consumerism culture of Almaty compared to
the rest of the country also has a significant effect on its identity. It is demonstrated in the
absolute dominance of Almaty in the retail sector of economy in Kazakhstan. The retail
turnaround per capita in the former capital dwarfs any other part of the country, in 2009,
4 times the country’s average,
231
and more than twice of the closest competitor in this
respect – Astana. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 297) As a matter of fact,
such level of consumerism in Almaty gives its residents an immense feeling of
satisfaction if not outright smugness. While there is a lot of room for improvement in the
service sector, there is a vast difference in the quality of service in Almaty compared to
the rest of the republic – Astana included. There is no denying that the service industry in
the former capital has gained notoriety by earning the city’s residents a reputation of
beings snobs since they do expect a rather high level of service wherever they go. As a
result, Almaty’s residents are easily identifiable when they visit other parts of the country
by the higher-than-average expectations from service personnel and a slight air of
superiority they are eager to display at the stores and markets of towns other than Almaty.
Such preoccupation with consuming goods and services is not exclusive but rather
specific to the former capital and very distinct from the austere traditions of the nomad
Kazakhs of the past and the utter poverty among the rural Kazakhs of today.

231
4.7 times at peak in 2008! 2009 number is smaller due to the effects of the global economic crisis which
caused a worldwide downturn in consumer confidence and consumption levels.
175
Thirdly, the influence of the Russian and global Western and American cultures
is quite notable in Almaty. As it has been discussed, such outside cultural influences are
present everywhere in the former capital – on the streets, on the TV channels, in many
aspects of entertainment and even workplace as the foreign presence expands in the city.
Combined with consumerism and individualism that permeates the Western culture but
antithetical to the traditional Kazakh communal spirit, this sets up ground for another
round of the clash of civilizations for the national consciousness in this city, which is still
the heart of the entire country.
Conclusion
Almaty is the most complex case of all three examined in this study. The
research did yield data that indicates a relatively high degree of fragmentation of the
Kazakh community and evidence for growing non-national identity. Almaty is a very
strong demonstration of what market economy means in Kazakhstan, in fact, the
Southern Capital is probably the best example of market economy in the republic. There
is also a significant presence of foreign companies and particularly substantial
penetration of globalized culture. Thus, Almaty presents a convincing case of the
hypothesized relationship between market reforms, FDI and national identity formation,
which expects that the increased levels of FDI along with transition to market economy
and growing participation in the global trade promote non-national identity in
Kazakhstan.
However, the data is complicated by the historical legacy which is palpable in
the city – the history of the Russian and Soviet influence over Kazakhstan is very much
176
present in Almaty even today, 20 years since independence. The former capital also
offers evidence that Kazakh identity is also growing stronger thanks to the increasingly
larger proportion of the Kazakh population, growing use of the Kazakh language, revival
of the Kazakh traditions and religion. For the older generation that lived in Almaty most
if not all their life, the national identity of Kazakhstan is fraught with many challenges
which are apparent in Almaty. For younger generation, most of whom came to the city
from rural Kazakhstan, Kazakh identity appears to be more appealing
232
.
The conclusion of this study is that Almaty represents the best example of
Midgal’s non-national society out the three sites examined. It does not offer a definitive
proof of the hypothesized relationship because alternative causes, such as the Russian
legacy, do play a significant role; but in this limited study, Almaty offers the most
evidence to support the main hypothesis out of the tree sites.

232
The question is, however, if the youth is able to cling to Kazakh identity in the long run while they stay
in Almaty, and the current study does not have an answer to that
177
Chapter 5: Astana
In 1997, Astana became the new capital of Kazakhstan. This alone makes it a
vital case for this study of changing Kazakh identity in a globalizing environment—the
transfer of the symbolic center of the Kazakh statehood from its longtime seat in Almaty
to a small and distant provincial town in the heavily populated by the Russians north of
the country. Beyond that, unbelievably fast-growing Astana presents a unique set of
economic, demographic, social and religious issues that offer a wealth of evidence for
examining the strength of the main and alternative hypotheses.
In the course of this chapter, it will be shown that Astana is built for one major
purpose: to serve as the cornerstone for Kazakh national identity in this newly
independent republic fraught with multiple issues that challenge the unity and strength of
the Kazakh nation. However, these issues are far from being resolved and the study of
Astana shows that at some level, the intra-ethnic cleavages plaguing the Kazakhs remain
in existence, but at another – they are healed, all due to the inconsistencies of the nation-
building policies adopted by government. Ultimately, Astana does not yield enough
evidence to support the main hypothesis, but it demonstrates the enormity of the power
wielded by the leadership of Kazakhstan to influence the formation of national identity
even if it is not used consistently.
The chapter is structured as follows. After a brief introduction, an assessment of
reasons for the transfer of capital to Astana will be provided. Following that, the major
role of Astana as the symbol of sovereignty and national identity of Kazakhstan will be
examined. Then a brief discussion of the religious secularism of Kazakhstan will be
178
offered. An overview of Astana’s economic growth will follow after that. Finally, a
discussion of the identity issues facing the capital will conclude this chapter.
Historical Background
Astana is the fastest growing city in Kazakhstan and probably of all Central
Asia. In a little over 10 years, its population more than doubled, increasing from 327
thousand in 1999 to 684 thousand in 2010. (Demograficheskiy ezhegodnik goroda
Astany, 2010, p. 37) In a country with a little over 16 million inhabitants in total, this is
remarkable, and, as mentioned previously, only a few regions including Astana are
actually growing in the country while the rest are still shrinking. As a result of such rapid
growth, Astana has become the second largest city in the country, with 4.2% of the total
population of Kazakhstan living there. The reason for such an extraordinary
transformation of a sleepy provincial town into an ultra-modern megalopolis is simple: it
has been made the capital of this oil-rich country in 1997 and the following years
witnessed it turning into a giant construction site which it remains to be to this day.
Astana is located in the northern part of the wind swept vast expanses of the
Kazakh steppes which is home to the Kazakh Middle Horde. Perhaps, that was one the
reasons why it was chosen: after all, unlike Almaty, which had been the capital of
Kazakhstan for only 70 years, Astana is located at the heart of the nomadic homeland, the
steppe that shaped the Kazakh nomads into what they are over the millennia. (Masanov
N. , 1995) However, the location is not without issues, with its openness to the wind and
179
harsh continental climate, Astana is the second coldest capital in the world
233
with 3.1
degrees Celsius average annual temperature.
234
(Klimat Astany) Flat terrain with no
forests and limited precipitation is extremely favorable to high-speed and dusty winds
turning into dust storms in the city.
235
For that reason, from the moment Astana has
become capital, a massive tree planting project was initiated to circle Astana with
wooded areas to protect it from the swift dust storms of the steppe and accumulate
valuable precipitation.
236
(Abdrakhmanova, 2009) All in all, Astana is not in a
particularly hospitable or picturesque location (unlike Almaty) but that is how the Kazakh
nomads lived for ages.
Before gaining the status of the capital, Astana was a small provincial town.
Like Almaty and many other towns in Kazakhstan, it started off as a Russian fort
237
in
1830 and was initially called Akmolinsk. It had a rather uneventful history until the mid-
1950s when the then Soviet premier Khrushchev initiated his infamous Tselina (Virgin

233
Coldest one is Ulan Bator, capital of Mongolia.
234
Although it has been recently reported that the Astana climate is warming up (KazTAG, 2010)
235
Not to mention wet and swampy lands nearby which generated myriads of mosquitos terrorizing early
government resettlers in Astana. Thankfully, in the last few years an intensive pest eradication programs
are finally taking effect.
236
More than that, Astana is also a target for a comprehensive greenery project with aim of turning the
capital into the likeness of Almaty in terms of trees and plants coverage of the city. (Astana: Entsiklopedia,
2008, p. 79)
237
And like Almaty, claims to a much older status of Astana are being made now, as well: the previous
name of the town, Akmola is being linked to an ancient Hun stronghold Akmola which in Hun language
meant “Western Fortress” (Astana v tsifrakh, 2010, p. 88)
180
Lands)
238
campaign in Kazakhstan. Akmolinsk was renamed to Tselinograd to signify its
central role in this one of the largest Soviet projects undertaken on the territory of
Kazakhstan. The town swelled with workers who came to the republic to turn the steppes
into a giant agricultural center. The project was moderately successful, and Kazakhstan
became one of the major sources of grain in the Soviet Union. The town kept its new
name and a relatively large population
239
through 1991, when its Kazakh name was
restored as Akmola. (Astana v tsifrakh, 2010, pp. 88-89)
Akmola officially became the new capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan when
on October 20, 1997, Nazarbayev have proclaimed it the seat of power for his
government. This was no news because as early as in 1994, the then Supreme Soviet of
Kazakhstan has made a decision to move the capital away from Almaty due to its
geographical vulnerabilities, lack of room for expansion, and environmental issues. The
final determination that Akmola was to become the capital was made in 1995 and in 1997
the process of moving the government agencies to this town was initiated. This marked a
turning point in the history of Akmola and the entire country. In 1998, Akmola was
renamed to Astana to avoid associations with an unfortunate translation from Kazakh
240

238
As discussed in Chapter 1, Virgin Lands campaign was an attempt by Premier Khrushchev to revive
failing agriculture of the Soviet Union in 1954 by turning the vast expanses of the Kazakh steppes into a
huge farmland.
239
115 thousand in 1961, 181 thousand in 1970, 232 thousand in 1979, 281 thousand in 1989 (Astana v
tsifrakh, 2010, p. 89) (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po g. Astany, 2000, p. 9)
240
Even though Akmola is argued to be an ancient name from the Hun language, in Kazakh it had an
entirely different translation – “While Grave” which, of course, was deemed unacceptable as the name for
the new capital.
181
and then an official unveiling of the new capital to the world took place. Astana in
Kazakh means Capital, a rather simple and elegant solution to the onomastic problem.
241

The ambitious Soviet project of turning Kazakhstan into a major grain reserve
(zhitnitsa in Russian) of the USSR put Astana, the then Tselinograd, on the map of the
Soviet Union. However, after independence, Astana found its place on the world map as
the capital of the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan.
Moving the Capital
Almaty had been the capital of Kazakhstan for over 70 years – nominally, at
least. As it has been discussed in Chapter 4, it had been the focus of cultural, intellectual
and economic life of the republic and still remains as such. Why was it decided to move
the political center away from Almaty? First, Almaty had a limited growth potential –
due to its location close to the Alatau Mountains, and a large portion of the city
constrained by the valley it was built in, it lacked space to expand further. Second, there
was a major concern with seismological stability and the threat of seasonal mudflows that
proved to be catastrophic in past. Third, there were growing environmental issues: much
of the former capital had limited air-flow due to the mountains and just like Los Angeles,
it was turning into a giant dust-bowl which could not effectively dissipate the massive
amounts of pollution generated in such a large city.

241
Kekilbaev, the famous Adai Kazakh writer and state official, mentioned in Aktau chapter, is believed to
have come up with the name Astana for the new capital but, as usual, the official version of the story
attributes that honor to Nazarbayev
182
Most importantly, there was a concern with the geographical position of Almaty
in the corner of the country: it was too far from the rest of it and therefore not really
suitable for effective governance.
242
Plus, close proximity to the Chinese border which
was still in dispute at the time
243
and the physical and cultural affinity with its tremulous
Xinjiang province was another headache for the government of the newly independent
state.
244
The bottom line was that Almaty was no longer suitable as the capital and unable
to provide guidance to the rest of the country because it was still under the influence of
the old Soviet and Russian culture. It was deemed “geopolitically” backward for
independent Kazakhstan because since the city and its residents were a product the
colonial rule by the Soviet Union. (Nazarbayev N. A., 2005, pp. 46-45) In other words,
the large of number of Soviet apparatchiks
245
who lived in Almaty and worked for the
government were no longer suitable for the job due to their background which conflicted
with the path that independent Kazakhstan was taking.
But why was such an inhospitable place as Astana chosen as the new capital of
the state that strives to impress the world with its achievements? The diplomatic corps
were not amused when they have been introduced to the new capital: cold and windy

242
At least that is how it was justified by Nazarbayev, which is ironic given that in the last few years his
government demonstratively employs advanced communication technologies such as teleconferencing with
great effect to exert control over the entire country irrespective of the geographic location of the seat of
power.
243
Only resolved in 2003 (Amanzholova, Atanov, & Turarbekov, 2006, p. 71)
244
The violence had actually spilled over from Xinjiang to Almaty at least once when in 2001 Kazakhstani
SWAT police units resorted to force to subdue Xinjiang Uighur separatists at the center of the city – even
armed personnel carriers were involved in the incident. (Author’s personal observation)
245
Officials, heavily influenced by the Soviet bureaucratic and ideological traditions
183
climate, underdeveloped infrastructure and next to no amenities was a sharp departure
from a comparatively mild climate, scenic surroundings and comforts of Almaty. (Boiko,
2009) Officially, there were a few explanations such an extensive 32-point evaluation of
potential sites for the new capital, and the then Akmola was the most suitable: had access
to water (river Ishim, running through it), fairly developed infrastructure (railroad,
airport) and so on.
The best advantage of positioning the capital in the middle of Kazakhstan and,
by extension of the entire Eurasian continent, is that it insures maximum trading potential
within the country and with the outside world because it is located on or next to major
transportation routes from Europe to Asia and domestically between the regions of the
republic. Additionally, as a measure of security it is necessary to put the capital of a
country in the middle of it, far away from all the borders. Finally, placing the capital of
the multi-ethnic republic
246
in the middle of the multi-ethnic region
247
would reinforce
the unity of the entire nation. (Nazarbayev N. A., 2005, pp. 19, 20)
There was also the idea that Astana was to serve as the “growth pole”, that is, to
provide an (additional) focus point for the economic growth in the country suffering from
a severe market contraction following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The north of
Kazakhstan contained many industries and manufactories, where the Russians used to

246
In 1989, 2 years before independence, Kazakhstan was only 39.7% Kazakh and 37.8% Russian (Itogi
vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda, 1992)
247
In 1989, Kazakhs and Russian constituted 25% and 43% of population of the Akmola oblast,
respectively (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po Akmolinskoy Oblasti, 2000, p. 14). As a result, this
region, among other Russian-dominated regions in the north of Kazakhstan, was subject to centrifugal
forces that sought reintegration of the northern Kazakhstan with Russia. (Olcott M. , 2010, p. 76)
184
work, but they were leaving Kazakhstan and returning to their homeland in great
numbers.
248
The latter did not see a future in a country which was faltering economically
and did not believe that the Kazakh authorities would protect interests of minorities.
(Abdygaliev, 1997, pp. 18, 36)
Astana was to become a magnet to attract workers to the northern cities and to
make up for their population decline. The Kazakh-dominated south of the country had
plenty of available labor
249
but not much of manufacturing capacity, most of its income
came from agriculture. These Kazakhs had very little incentive to go north, to live in the
harsh Siberian climate and try to raise the economy of the region. (Sadovskaia, 2001)
Moving the capital there would provide such an incentive and also would also increase
the proportion of the Kazakh population there to reduce separatist sentiments among the
remaining Russians.
250

Of course, none of these justifications appealed to the government employees or
Almaty residents who were used to having the seat of power with them for 70 years, as it
has been discussed previously, and the general unattractiveness of the provincial town
with little to no facilities and the lack of available housing. The new capital had to be
built at a massive cost for the country which was still trying to recover from the negative

248
Over 2 million people in 10 years since 1989. (Dave, 2007, p. 128)
249
Although this much Nazarbayev did admit in his later assessment of the move to Astana (Nazarbayev N.
, 2006, p. 352)
250
In particular because the separatism in the northern Kazakhstan had received blessings from various
Russian nationalists such as Solzhenitsyn who believed that northern Kazakhstan belongs to the Russians
rather than the Kazakhs (Solzhenitsyn, 1990)
185
economic growth since independence
251
while Almaty already had the complex of
government buildings and infrastructure established over a long period of time.
Nonetheless, no one dared to challenge Nazarbayev’s authority and his
determination in moving the capital. In the first few years, those few government
employees who did move, had to survive on a bare minimum and yet work even harder
and longer hours due to a massive understaffing problem created in the process of
rebuilding the government at the new capital.
252
Almaty residents were extremely biased
against the move: after all, they were losing their status and many of them were losing
their jobs. Astana residents, of course, rejoiced as the move promised them
unprecedented opportunities and a bright future. After Astana (Akmola at the time) was
chosen as the new capital, a special economic zone was established to spur its
development and to encourage construction in the city so that it would be able to handle
its new role.
Obviously, the move had larger ulterior motives which were not voiced
officially but easily identified by any observer in the country. (Rubstev & Popov, 1998)
The northern regions of the country were mainly inhabited by the Russians who had been
living there for generations and therefore considered the land to belong to Russia rather
Kazakhstan (Abdygaliev, 1997, pp. 15, 30) and some actually sought re-integration of

251
The government answer to those concerns was that the new capital will be paid for by foreign investors
which left people puzzled: what reason would make foreigners pay for the new capital of Kazakhstan? Ever
since, every penny obtained from a foreign source was trumpeted as a great achievement (Author’s
observation)
252
Author’s observation
186
northern Kazakhstan with Russia. (Olcott M. , 2010, p. 76) If the north were to secede to
Russia, the other parts of country could have followed the suit, as Turkmenistan had a
claim for Mangystau, Uzbekistan for part of southern Kazakhstan and China – for parts
of eastern Kazakhstan.
253
The Kazakhs risked losing their homeland once again.
It was imperative for the government of Kazakhstan not only to counteract the
separatist tendencies in the Russian-dominated north of the republic but also to protect its
nascent sovereignty and, indeed, to insure the survival of the state. Moving the capital
and ensuing relocation of personnel, attracting labor migration from the Kazakh
dominated south into the growing city would lessen the probability of secession or maybe
even change the ethnic composition of the northern regions. This would reinforce the
claim to sovereignty and give the regime time needed to resolve the border diputes.
Of course, the government of Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev who positioned
himself as the champion of inter-ethnic stability and cooperation from the moment he
gained power, could never have made these concerns public.
254
Yet, it is quite clear that
most of the official explanations do not stand the test of time. First of all, Almaty
continues to expand even though it is no longer the capital of the republic. Thanks to the
economic power it has accumulated, it continues to grow at the record pace even though
not as fast as Astana or even Mangystau, it would have been able to accommodate the

253
All of these territorial claims and disputes were not resolved until a few years after the capital has been
moved. (Amanzholova, Atanov, & Turarbekov, 2006)
254
Nazarbayev does acknowledge the various criticisms and unofficial explanations for the move and yet
neither denies nor confirms their validity (Nazarbayev N. , 2006, pp. 345-348)
187
needs of the government for foreseeable future.
255
Second, the frequently mentioned
geopolitical notion that Almaty’s location
256
in the corner of the country is less suitable to
be the capital than Astana is also still false. Despite the 11 years of developing
infrastructure at Astana, it still lags behind that of Almaty. With modern communication
technologies, the country could have been ruled with same efficiency from Almaty as it is
from Astana. After all, the government of Kazakhstan is proud to tout its technological
edge which conquers geographical space. (Guk, 2010) Third, the notion that Astana is
poised to become a trading crossroads of the entire continent has yet to be realized. Only
in 2010, the construction of a trans-continental highway has been initiated to connect
Europe with Western China (Xinjiang) but even when it will be completed, it is hard to
imagine that it would be able to supplant the sea trade between the continents. Besides,
the same highway passes near Almaty as well. In any case, as it has been discussed
previously, Almaty is still by far the largest trading center in the country. Fourth, Astana
is still subject to the threat of violence. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 or repeated bombings
in Moscow are evidence to how easily terrorism can overcome geographical distances
and state borders.
There are other valid points made about Almaty that are true: it does suffer from
environmental issues related to the overcrowding and, in particular, to the large number

255
Admittedly, Almaty does have a very high population density, about 5 times higher than that of Astana.
(Kazakhstan za gody nezavisimosti 1991-2007, 2008, p. 4)
256
Nazarbayev’s justification of moving the capital frequently refer to geopolitics in the same sense as
Mackinder referred to the world divided onto heartland and periphery. (Mackinder, 1904) In Nazarbayev’s
rhetoric, Almaty is at the periphery of the modern Republic of Kazakhstan and Astana is at its heartland.
(Nazarbayev N. A., 2005, pp. 46-45)
188
of motorized vehicles which now exceeds the number of people the city was initially
designed for 30 or 40 years ago. (Kazakhstan Today, 2010) The threat of a catastrophic
earthquake or a devastating mudflow is still present. At the same time, the threat of the
Russian separatism in the north of the country in the early 90s was even more credible
and it might have caused much more damage to the country than to losing the entire city
of Almaty to a natural disaster. Besides, the early 90s were also marked by a deep
recession and moving the capital served its purpose as a huge project that have produced
a ripple effect throughout the economy of the entire country, helping its revival.
257

However, the major reason for the move, identified by Nazabayev himself, as
the sole progenitor of the idea in the first place, is that “Astana is a city-symbol, symbol
of a dream which came true” about the new state and the sovereign right of the Kazakh
nation. (Nazarbayev N. , 2006, p. 349) Almaty, as it is discussed in its respective chapter,
was and still is under the heavy influence of the Russian and other non-Kazakh cultures.
Nazarbayev obviously wished to avoid such influences while creating the nascent
political and social institutions of the new Kazakh republic.
A new capital was needed to revive the Kazakh culture after it experienced a
significant setback as a result of the long-lasting project of assimilation of the Kazakhs
into the “Soviet nation” and the Russian culture. That is not something Nazarbayev
would admit openly lest he wants to tarnish his reputation as the keeper of interethnic
peace. However, he does proclaim Astana as the symbol of the new Kazakh(stani) state

257
Not unlike the public works implemented under the New Deal in the United States to combat the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Incidentally, Kazakhstan implemented a “Road Map” program of public works in
2009-2010 for a similar reason: to combat the detrimental effects of the global financial crisis
189
(Nazarbayev N. , 2006, p. 350) and, by extension, the nation as the two in the public
discourse of the country are inseparable.
258
Indeed, such symbol was truly necessary in
the deeply divided country, and so far, Astana with Nazarbayev at the helm managed the
cope with the task of keeping the peace between multiple ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in
the republic.
The transfer of the capital from Almaty to Astana occurred due to a variety of
reasons: Almaty’s susceptibility to a range of geographic, political and cultural issues,
and Astana’s advantageous position in the center of the country as well as counteraction
of the separatist tendencies in the north of Kazakhstan. However, it is quite obvious the
most important reason for the move was symbolic – Astana was to become the herald of
the new beginnings for the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh nation.
Symbolism
Ever since independence (as well as before), deep fissures were opening up
across the Kazakhstan’s society. First, the Russians who imagined themselves as
benevolent masters of Kazakhstan and purportedly brought civilization, economic
prosperity and, most of all, culture to the “backward” nomads, now found themselves
subject to the rule of the very people they used to think of as their inferior.
259
As a result,

258
See discussion of the origins of the Kazakh nation in the historical background chapter for more details,
p. 4
259
Of course, it was not something the every ethnic Russian felt toward the Kazakhs but it was a very
common perception which was instilled through the Soviet education and propaganda which always
portrayed Russians as the ‘big brother’ of all other nations in the Soviet Union. Many Kazakhs actually
believed that, as well! (Author’s personal observation)
190
some Russians were arguing for the secession of the northern part of the republic where
they were in the majority. Second, there was the weakened unity of the Kazakhs
themselves whose tribal and Horde identities came to dominate as the result of the
colonial Russian and then Soviet policies.
260
Many Kazakhs, in particular ones in the
cities, came to be assimilated into the dominant Soviet identity – learning Russian,
joining Communist party, following the ideological dogma – because it was the only way
to succeed in the former USSR. Third, the security of the country was under grave threat
from all sides, with Russian nationalism on the rise, Chinese continued insistence on
revising borders, and renewed Uzbek and Tajik claims for certain parts of Kazakhstan,
while the army of the latter was in disarray following the dissolution of the Union.
Finally, there was the catastrophic economic decline since independence: between 1991
and 1995, the GDP of Kazakhstan was contracting by 5% to 10% annually, up to a total
of 32.5% of GDP in these 5 years.
261
(Peck, 2004, p. 63)
Under all these conditions, the government of the newly independent state
sought desperately a symbol that would shore up the unity in the country in the midst of
multiple crises. A new capital was thought to be a good solution – even despite the
inevitable high cost in the country which was experiencing an economic and financial
meltdown, moving the capital was considered to be an important and deeply symbolic
gesture that would signal to all citizens of the newly independent state that this country is

260
For more details, see the historical background chapter in this study, p. 13
261
Although, economic troubles started long before that and were widespread all over the former USSR –
in 1990, Kazakhstan’s GDP declined by 13%. (Peck, 2004, p. 63)
191
strong, successful, and well off on the path to a bright future. Astana was meant to do
that, to provide a tangible and highly visible evidence of the sovereignty of Kazakhstan,
its viability and vitality. As such, the new capital had a dual role: implicitly, it was to
reconstitute deeply wounded Kazakh national identity; and explicitly, in official rhetoric,
Astana was to accommodate all ethnic groups, to include every citizen of Kazakhstan in
the process of the state- and nation-building. In the words of Nazarbayev, “The future of
new capital is in the synthesis of the Oriental and European cultures.” (2006, p. 357)
From the moment the decision about moving the capital had been made public, the
government set off to turn Astana into a shining beacon of the state and the nation of
Kazakh(stan).
262

Astana offers evidence of nation building efforts from the perspectives of
various schools of nationalism. For perennialists like Smith (2004), Astana signifies a
link through time with the Kazakh nomads of the past. Even though the Kazakhs are no
longer nomads, most of them are settled and only few are still engaged in livestock
breeding as a form of the traditional pastoral nomadism, Astana’s location at the heart of
the steppe provides the sense of continuity with the past. In fact, discovery of a 1,000
year old nomadic settlement Bozokh on the territory of the city provides a tangible
evidence for the latter.
263
Astana’s harsh climate disliked so much by the government

262
I.e. for both civic, all-inclusive nation of Kazakhstan which overcomes ethnic differences; and ethnic,
Kazakh-dominated national identity.
263
Discovered in 1998, Bozokh became an integral part of Astana’s symbolic axis of continuity from past
to the future, with Bozokh representing the past, Astana’s government center – the present and the Eurasian
University campus in Astana – the future. (Faizutdinov, 2008)
192
officials who relocated to Astana from Almaty with their agencies in the late 1990s is one
of the reminders of how the nomadic Kazakhs braved the nature of the steppe and how it
shaped their identity. (Masanov N. , 1995) In the same way, the new capital is being built
in such unwelcoming climate conditions to shape the new character of Kazakhstan,
symbolizing its persistence and durability.
Furthermore, the connection with the nomadic past is also celebrated regularly in
Astana during the festival of nomadic culture and lifestyle called “Millennia around
Astana”
264
conducted since 2008. Its purpose is to reinforce the sense of continuity with
the Kazakh past: visitors get a chance to familiarize themselves with many aspects of
nomadic life such as the mobile tent house made of felt called yurt, traditional clothing,
cuisine, arts, sports and, of course, the Kazakh traditional arts of signing and music
performance. (Astana Administration, 2010) The continuity with the past is also
exemplified in a number of ancient settlements discovered near Astana. In addition to
aforementioned ancient Bozokh, in close proximity to Astana there was discovered
another settlement called Bytygay, used as the location of Tauke Khan’s
265
court in the
late 17
th
century. (Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p. 36)
For functionalists, Astana is also the prime example of nation-building in the
making. In the past, land did not mean much to the nomads, it was in communal
ownership unlike the livestock which was the primary means of survival and subject to

264
Another purpose of this festival of nomadic civilization is to overcome the stigma associated with the
nomadic past, when during the Soviet Union it was branded as retrograde and uncivilized – the festival
aims to demonstrate the falsehood of such views.
265
Tauke Khan was the last independent Khan of all Kazakhs (see Chapter 1)
193
private ownership. The Kazakhs did not own the steppe, they travelled, fed their cattle in
its vast expanses but they could not imagine trying to own it. Astana, however, became
an ultimate expression of the territorial identity of the Kazakhs, their claim for
sovereignty and collective ownership of the steppe.
It is, of course, expected of any sedentary culture but for the nomads it was
something alien. No longer – the Kazakhs are now invested into their land and its riches,
and the survey and many interviews
266
confirm a strong interest in the territory of
Kazakhstan as an ultimate expression of Kazakh identity. The citizens of the republic are
increasingly upset about the fact that the land is being sold to foreign entities and
businesses. 26.1% of all respondents, Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs alike, also worry about
the lack of oversight over the sale of Kazakhstan’s natural resources and 13.9% of them
do not welcome foreign direct investment at all.
267

The significance of this concern over national wealth, natural resources and
land, serve as the marker of functionalist identity construction similar to Gellner’s vision.
(1983) In this approach, the economic reforms of the modern state of Kazakhstan serve as
the foundation for constructing a new Kazakh nation which would maximize the use of
the available resources. The old divisions of the Kazakhs onto the tribes and Hordes are
no longer relevant; in fact, even the ethnic divisions no longer matter either. The

266
“The land problem became extremely acute now because of uncontrolled sell-out to foreigners” noted a
Kazakh leader of political opposition group in an interview with the author on 8/15/2009 to highlight the
issues of Kazakh national identity. In his opinion, land is now is one the constituent features of Kazakh
identity, on the same level as livestock breeding is, and selling will severely undermine the efforts in
reconstituting it.
267
2009-2010 survey by author, question “What is your assessment of the role FDI plays in Kazakhstan?”
194
participation in the global economy and market reforms necessitate the standardization of
labor and consumers in the republic, that is, the creation of the nation of Kazakhstan.
Astana has become a good illustration of Gellner’s analysis of the relationship
between nation and economic growth. (1983) The capital of Kazakhstan embodies a
widely proselytized idea that all citizens of the country are united through participation in
a giant economic developmental project to propel the country into the future. It is no
coincidence that the moment Astana became the capital, Nazarbayev launched the
Kazakhstan 2030
268
initiative which aims to accelerate the economic growth and
development of the country so that by the year 2030 it would become one of the most
developed nations of the world. (Nazarbayev N. , 1997) 9 years later, Nazarbayev
launched another program with the aim to join the ranks of the 50 most competitive
countries of the world.
269
The latter was subsequently declared to be the national idea of
Kazakhstan, that is, national economic competitiveness became a primary characteristic
defining national identity of Kazakhstan. (Nysanbaev & Kadyrzhanov, 2007) (Osipov,
2010)
Such government preoccupation with economic growth as the means of unifying
the nation divided by various social, ethnic and religious views resonates with Gellner’s
functionalist vision of nation building. Astana is the lightning rod for these identity

268
Announced in a Nazarbayev’s speech addressed to the nation of Kazakhstan in October 1997, same year
when the government started getting moved to Astana
269
Again, announced in his annual speech (Nazarbayev N. , 2006)
195
construction ideas,
270
the focal point that provides the immediate result of any and all
such undertakings by the government – after all, it was designed that way from the
moment it was established back in 1997. This is evident in the heavy promotion
271
of
small and medium sized business in Astana – it has the second highest rate of small
business ownership after Almaty (30 per 1,000) of about 29 small business per 1,000
people, and much higher than any other regions (third highest is Mangystau where it is
about 15 small businesses per 1,000 people). (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010,
p. 208)
Yet the symbolism of the new capital does not end there. The case of Astana
offers a wealth of evidence to support constructivist perspective on nation building as
well. The government makes an enormous effort to use Astana as the tool to shape the
nation of Kazakhstan. In Calhounian spirit of official discourse aiming to forge a new
national identity (Calhoun, 1997), Astana is an ultimate stage for massive celebrations of
various national holidays, in particular that of the capital itself. Since 2008, the Day of
the Capital is celebrated on 6
th
of July
272
in a very lavish style, with several days of
festivals, music, sports competitions and various art exhibits.

270
An official from the Ministry of Education when discussing this project with the author expressed
genuine interest about the practical application of the research goals and findings, that is, his main concern
was how to use an academic work like this one in the development of government policies for developing
national identity in Kazakhstan (7/1/2009)
271
Astana city akimat (administration) has a special section on its website where they invite small business
owners to share their grievances regarding the red tape and corruption of the city’s authorities.
272
Actually, before 2006 it was celebrated locally on June 10
th
but it was moved to July 6 because on that
day in 1994 the Supreme Soviet decided to move capital away from Almaty. Coincidentally, July 6 is also
Nazarbayev’s birthday, which some believe to be the primary reason for changing date of Astana’s
196
These gargantuan efforts to involve Astana inhabitants in various new national
holidays, televised and coordinated with celebrations all over the country via realtime
teleconferencing is an ultimate expression of the official discourse sculpting a new
Kazakh identity. (Lillis, 2008) See Figure 24 for the demonstration of the power of these
events to promote the Kazakh traditional arts among the youth. In this particular example
it is the art of kiuy, performing music on a string instrument dombra. As a result of such
government sponsored massive festivals on national holidays, Astana leads the country in
attendance of music events – over 700 thousand listeners in 2009 alone, more than in
Almaty where over 700 concerts were attended by less than 300 thousand people.
(Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 171)

anniversary, after all, he was the most vocal proponent for making it the capital despite the fact that this
decision has not been popular at all at the time.
197
Figure 24: Display of the Art of Kiuy, Day of the Capital, Astana, 2006

Source: (Terekhov, 2006)
Furthermore, the construction of Astana itself is abound with various symbolic
buildings that are designed to unite the people of Kazakhstan. The five most remarkable
buildings in Astana were completed within 10 years and all are located on a single axis
line along Vodno-zelenyi bul’var (Waterfront Boulevard in Russian
273
). This axis starts
on the eastern side of the city with a pyramid-shaped Palace of Peace and Accord which
serves as an opera house and also used for various official functions such as regular
meetings of the world’s religious leaders and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

273
It is puzzling that the name of the most important street in the country is in Russian when most
innocuous street names in Russian are changed to ones in Kazakh in other cities such as Almaty (author’s
observation). No doubt, it is kept in Russian in recognition of the Russian legacy of the town and Russian
population of Kazakhstan as an integral part of the identity of the new state and nation.
198
Then, across the river there is the president’s residence Aqorda
274
with a dome on top,
reminiscent of the traditional Kazakh nomadic tent yurt
275
, surrounded by the buildings
of parliament and ministries.
276
This complex of buildings is at the front of the picture in
Figure 25. Nearby, the Ministry of Finance is located in a wave shaped building,
nicknamed “Dollar” by the locals, i.e. closely associated with prosperity as is the mighty
buck itself. At the heart of the complex there is Astana Baiterek, (white tower in seen in
the middle of Figure 25) a 105 meter
277
tall metallic spire with an observation golden
globe on top is shaped like a tree
278
, similar in some way to Eiffel tower in Paris in
appearance and function. Its one and only purpose is to epitomize Kazakhstan, to convey
a message this is a country with strong historical roots, firm foundation and bright,
prosperous future. Completed in 2002, it became one of the often used symbols of
Kazakhstan like the Saka Golden Man. Next there is a truly massive building
279
of
Kazmunaigaz (at the far back of Figure 25), the national oil company responsible for

274
The name of the Presidential palace embodies the relationship with the Kazakh nomadic past: Aq Orda,
or White Horde was one of the names attributed to Jochi’s Khanate, part of the Mongol Empire, also known
as Golden Horde which was the historical precursor of the first Kazakh khanate in 15
th
century.
275
Specifically, the top of the Kazakh yurt called shangyraq intended to signify the sky and the sun. It is a
symbol of the traditional Kazakh religious beliefs, tengriism, and was one of the most treasured possessions
in a Kazakh family, a nomadic counterpart to the European traditional coat of arms, a marker of lineage
276
Various ministries are located in a two-winged massive building extending on both sides of the
president’s palace
277
344.5 feet
278
Baiterek means a poplar tree or tree of life in Kazakh, associated with an ancient nomadic myth about a
giant sacred bird Samurg which lays a golden egg on top of the poplar tree which carries a message of life
and hope for better future. Nazarbayev is attributed with coming up with the idea and the first concept
drawing of this monument (Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p. 85) The name of the Waterfront Boulevard on
which Baiterek is located is a reference to the World River, on the banks of which the tree of life is located
279
Reportedly, the largest office building in Kazakhstan (Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p. 327)
199
11% of Kazakhstan’s GDP (Kulebaev, 2010). Last, at the western end of the boulevard
there is another gargantuan building shaped like a giant hat called Khanshatyr
280
(not yet
built at the time of taking the picture in Figure 25) which houses a shopping mall with an
entertainment center. All of these buildings form an architectural statement of the essence
of Astana, its purpose to serve as the virtual anchor line of continuity, power and
prosperity, providing the focal point for aspirations of the nation of Kazakhstan.
Figure 25: Vodno-zelenyi Bul’var and the New Government Complex in Astana

Source: (Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p. 170)
It is evident that the government of Kazakhstan promotes two models of national
identity – civic (like in France or United States) and ethnic (like in Germany or Japan),
or, as some argue, an amalgam of the two (Nysanbaev & Kadyrzhanov, 2006). In the

280
Khan’s Tent in Kazakh
200
official rhetoric, civic identity dominates to insure stability in the multi-ethnic republic
via the promotion of cultural diversity, tolerance
281
to differences, acceptance and mutual
respect. Since 1995, Nazarbayev established the Assembly of the People of
Kazakhstan,
282
a council made up of the leaders of various ethnic and cultural groups in
the country with the purpose of protecting the cultural diversity and promoting unity in
the republic. While the Assembly has been granted official status as part of the
government,
283
it does not have any real decision-making or executive powers, having a
solely advisory role with the president who serves as the chairman of the organization.
Nonetheless, the Assembly is touted by the government as the defender of the multi-
ethnic culture of Kazakhstan, having regular meetings to discuss various social and ethnic
issues. Rather than using this as an access to grass roots society, Nazarbayev is officially
using the Assembly as the tool for implementing the government policies via the member
cultural organizations
284
. (Dave, 2007, p. 132)
On the other hand, ethnic identity of the Kazakhs is defined as the core of the
nation of Kazakhstan. Since 1997 Law of the Languages, the government recognized only
the Kazakh language as the state language despite the strong opposition of the non-

281
The very word ‘tolerance’ (tolerantnost’ in Russian) became a catchword in official rhetoric and while it
was virtually unknown some 15-20 years ago, now it is one of the most commonly used words in political
vocabulary in Kazakhstan today (Interview with professor of linguistics, Astana, 6/30/2009)
282
Which until 2007 was actually called Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, i.e. implying existence of
multiple ethnic groups in the country
283
Yet again, this reaffirms the official perspective on national identity of Kazakhstan as intrinsically
intertwined with the state
284
Assembly is based on a large number of ethnic cultural centers throughout the country, which aim to
serve various ethnic communities and raise their official status as a ‘minority’
201
Kazakh population and even some of the Kazakhs.
285
The revival of the Kazakh language
and culture is a priority, especially in the last few years with the adoption of a state-
funded program Cultural Legacy (initiated in 2004) which focuses on (re)discovering the
Kazakh roots, to establish a firm foundation for the Kazakh nation through a range of
extensive archaeological and historical research activities. As part of the program,
Kazakhstan historians are scouring archives in Russia, Iran, Arab countries, China and so
on in the search of all historical records about the Kazakh nation of the past. (Buribaev,
2008)
The archaeological research on the territory of the republic has been greatly
expanded in the last 20 years, making headway in finding a trove of artifacts – including
a few more Saka golden armor suits. (Vorfolameev, 2010) For example, near Taraz, one
of the cities in Southern Kazakhstan, an extensive archaeological study recovered a
wealth of information about an ancient settlement Kulan which prospered thanks to the
Silk Road in the 7
th
-11
th
century AD.
286
(Moldakynov, 2008) Ultimately, the program
aims to use the research results and their analysis at primary school level to instill respect
for the ancient history of the Kazakhs and their country. (Kadyrov, Kurpiakova, &
Tusupbekova, 2008) Yet again, all of these initiatives and their implementation are linked
to Astana, and the capital becomes a showcase for the success of these programs in
retrieving the building blocks of Kazakh identity: the advances in the Kazakh language

285
Interview with history professor, Eurasian University, Astana, 6/29/2009
286
Similarly, it has been mentioned that both Astana and Almaty have been actively seeking out traces of
ancient settlements in their vicinity and Almaty is even officially requesting international recognition of its
1,000 year history from UNICEF.
202
program are evident on the streets of Astana as reported by interviewees
287
; the
conferences on the Cultural Legacy program are regularly conducted in the capital
increasing the awareness about the historical heritage of the Kazakh nomads.
Perhaps, one of the most important pillars for ensuring the national unity in
Astana is actually the president himself. In two interviews conducted for the present
study,
288
respondents remarked that the Kazakh nation requires a strong leader such as
Nazarbayev for unity. Not only the move of the capital to Astana as well as its
development into a “shining beacon”
289
of both the state and Kazakh(stani) nation is
closely associated with Nazarbayev;
290
he is also widely recognized as the upholder of
peace and harmony in the republic.
291
Nazarbayev has been able to dampen centrifugal
forces that were threatening to tear the republic apart – or, at the very least, establish a
credible reputation of doing so.
292
Even though lately his rule has become increasingly
authoritarian (Olcott M. , 2010), the popularity of the first president of Kazakhstan is

287
Interviews with a music composer, Astana, 6/28/2009; professor of linguistics, Astana, 6/30/2009
288
Interview with an official at ministry of education, 6/29/2009, and former member of parliament,
7/2/2009
289
Interview with the former member of parliament, 7/2/2009
290
Remarkably, Nazarbayev is credited with coming up with much of minute detail of Astana architectural
designs and even the new name for the new capital. (author’s personal observation)
291
Author’s personal observation
292
While traditionally politicians relied on external threat to unite their people, here Nazarbayev managed
the turn the internal threat of separatism against itself! See Dave’s discussion of the “construction of a
separatist threat” in Kazakhstan. (2007, pp. 119-120)
203
undeniable,
293
in particular in Astana, which would have remained a backwater
provincial town without him.
Nazarbayev did change the country, and Astana is the prime evidence of it, and
whether his actions of transferring the capital saved the country or not
294
is no longer
relevant – the symbolism of this act and Nazarbayev himself were able to capture the
imagination of the whole nation and unite it in support of the president despite all the
cleavages that run through it. (Olcott M. , 2010, p. 26) Through his shrewd politicking
and constant (reiteration of the) threat of inter-ethnic strife (Ibid), Nazarbayev himself
became the symbol of unity, and nowhere is it felt more than in Astana: the billboards are
frequently plastered with his likeness with very warm words addressed to the city of
Astana.
295

Among all the symbolism of Astana, it is conspicuous that the religion plays a
relatively minor role. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan is a country where 70% of the
population consider themselves Muslim (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009
goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 100), there are only 3 mosques in the capital.
296
In Almaty,

293
Ironically, latest developments in Kazakhstan support both contentions: in December 2010, an allegedly
grass-roots movement was started to propose to conduct a referendum to extend Nazarbayev’s presidential
term through 2020, dispensing with 2 presidential elections. While the idea failed, it gained enough
momentum to pass through the Parliament despite vocal objections from Nazarbayev himself, who
ultimately proposed to carry out early elections on April 1
st
2011, which pretty much amounts to the same
thing – there is no other candidate on Kazakhstan’s political scene, let alone a candidate ready to compete
with Nazarbayev in less than 2 months time.
294
That is, alleviated the threat of separatism in the Northern Kazakhstan
295
In 2008, when the capital anniversary was celebrated, the city was covered with billboards with
Nazarbayev’s face and a message of love to Astana (Interview with music composer, Astana, 6/28/2009)
296
One more is in development, dedicated to Khoja Akhmet Yasawi, whose teachings of Sufi Islam were
adopted by nomadic Kazakhs ages ago. (Krasienko, 2009)
204
the older and larger city in the south of the country where the Kazakhs are in majority,
there are 31 mosques. (Mecheti Almaty) At the same time, as it has been discussed
before, a larger proportion of the population of Astana is ethnic Kazakh than that of
Almaty: 69% and 53%, respectively.
297
(Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009
goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 10) Granted, one of the Astana’s mosques, Nur-Astana is the
largest in the country, able to hold up to 5,000 visitors, (Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p.
392) the paucity of Islamic institutions in Astana signifies a very specific relationship of
the capital and the political regime with Islam, which will be addressed in the following
section.
Islamic Secularism of Kazakhstan
For Kazakhs, the practice of Islam was shaped by Sufi Islam fraternal orders,
particularly the Yasawi one which served as a key to converting the Kazakh nomads to
Islam. Sufism is a mystical and orthodox approach to the practice of Islam which calls for
strict observance of the rites. It appealed to nomads because they shared some of beliefs
and traditions of Sufi Islam. According to Orynbekov, such shared traditions included
asceticism (that is, rejection of the wordliness), mysticism, lack of tolerance toward
alcohol and pork consumption, and the tradition of protecting the weak. (Genezis
religioznosti v Kazakhstane, 2005, p. 194)

297
In absolute terms, there are about 1.5 times more Kazakhs in Almaty but it does not explain a 10-fold
difference in the number of mosques!
205
A famous Sufi teacher Khoja Akhmet Yasawi (the 12
th
century) and his followers
played a particularly significant role in promoting Islam among the nomads, starting in
Syr Darya towns in the south of modern Kazakhstan and from there spreading their
version of Islam in the steppe. Yasawi’s invaluable contribution was in the form of
adapting Sufism in such a way that would be easily understood and accepted by the
nomads, in particular by decreasing the emphasis on orthodoxy and accommodating age-
long traditions of the nomads. (Kshibekov, 2006, p. 131) Yasawi’s version of Sufi Islam
appealed to the nomads with its emphasis on the vernacular and poetry. By the time the
Kazakh khanate started to flourish in the 16
th
-17
th
century, the practice of Islam spread
further among the Kazakhs in a sort of symbiosis with Tengriism
298
and other pre-Islamic
traditions, forming one of the core components of Kazakh identity. (Istoriia Kazakhstana,
1997, p. 585)
It is commonly believed that the sedentary cultures in Central Asia, i.e., Uzbeks,
have adopted Islam much earlier and therefore developed a greater adherence to it than
the Kazakh nomads. (Sultangalieva, 1998) However, it does not necessarily mean that the
latter are any less devoted believers and Islamic traditions are equally important source of
identity for them as they are for Uzbeks. (Privatsky, 2001) In the Soviet period,
especially during collectivization, Islam was persecuted but at the onset of the World War
II the practice of Islam was allowed again (Olcott M. , 1995, pp. 196-197) under a strict

298
Tengriism is a system of beliefs that sanctifies the environment, all of nature’s features are gods: the
sky, the sun, water, land, wind, etc. It appealed to the nomads since for them to survive, they had to fear
and respect the nature, and Tengriism was an evolution of the habits and traditions of the careful
relationship between the nomad and nature (Orynbekov, 2005, p. 21).
206
control from the authorities (Gunn, 2003, p. 405) with parallel (unofficial) Islam
functioning outside of the watchful eye of the Soviet government (Ilkhamov, 2001, p.
42).
The Republic of Kazakhstan, a secular state, one that acknowledges the
separation of state and church, nevertheless is committed to ensuring the freedom of
religious practice among its citizens. Mosques are playing an increasingly important role
in retrieving the religious culture of the Kazakhs and shaping their new identity and are
being built in large numbers throughout the republic.
299
The government does recognize
Muslim legacy, with ethnic Kazakh political leadership paying homage to Islamic
religious events. Still, by virtue of being raised and indoctrinated in the “evil” nature of
politicized religion, the political leadership of Kazakhstan is also very quick to prohibit
any forms of political religious organizations or anything deemed to be related to
religious extremism. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010) On the one
hand, Nazarbayev and his government, coached in strict anti-religious and secular Soviet
school of administration retain strong disdain for the political role of religion and Islam in
particular, thus remaining particularly secular. (Aitken, 2009, pp. 198-200) On the other,
Islamic traditions and beliefs are frequently referenced in various public events and
official rhetoric. The Islamic identity is rigorously reconstructed in Kazakhstan as the
basis of the national identity of the nation – not only by the government but also by the
intellectual elite as well. (Rorlich, 2003)

299
Not least because of the Arab funding to that end
207
In other words, there is a certain synthesis of secularization and Islamic
traditions in Kazakhstan. Arguably, the West is a prime example of such amalgam of
religion and secularism, termed as Judeo-Christian secularism whereas religious beliefs
are integrated into the political discourse as part of the common ground strategy to insure
peaceful interactions and general order within the society. (Hurd, 2004) This Judeo-
Christian secularism which establishes Christian beliefs as the common denominator, a
source of common political culture, and, according to Hurd, it is an essential building
block for democracy and indeed for the whole system of nation-states, established at
Westphalia.
300
This captures the essence of secularism, which is not truly capable of
escaping the ‘clutches of religious superstitions’ just because it proves to be superior to
religious societies in terms of preventing identity conflicts. (Ibid)
In similar vein, Kazakhstan’s political and intellectual leadership relies heavily
on the Islamic traditions to define a particularistic secular identity of the Kazakh nation.
Like Hurd’s concept of Judeo-Christian secularism, one can identify Kazakhstan as being
subject to Kazakh Islamic secularism, the one that seeks to affirm ethnic identity of the
Kazakhs with religious symbolism which lost much of its religious meaning and attained
instead an ethnic one. After all, it is nothing unusual, the governments of many other
post-Soviet states such as Russia also promote religion as an instrument for rebuilding
national identity while attempting to maintain the separation of church and state. The

300
Westphalia peace accords of 1648 are credited with establishing the current basic principles of
statehood: sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of other states
208
balancing act on the part of the governing regime is to utilize the secular-ethnic meaning
of the religious traditions and to avoid religious radicalization of the public.
Part of that strategy in Kazakhstan involves promoting what is termed as inter-
confessional dialogue – a government doctrine that pursues legal and social equality of
all religions in Kazakhstan. The purpose, as with civic identity, is to develop unity among
the people of Kazakhstan by recognizing equality of religions. For example, two religious
holidays from two different confessions, Kurban Ait (Muslim Eid Festival of Sacrifice)
and Orthodox Christmas, became nationally celebrated holidays. (Vorotnoy, 2005)
Moreover, since 2003 Nazarbayev is hosting a forum of world religions in Astana.
(Congress of World and Traditional Religions, 2010) Its main purpose is to promote the
worldwide freedom of confessions but domestically, this sends a strong signal supporting
the idea of tolerance and civic nation, the equality of all confessions in the country. Such
official recognition of various religious beliefs and their role in promoting the unity of the
society of the republic is a prime example of the Kazakh Islamic secularism.
Figure 26 demonstrates that 78% of Astana’s non-Kazakh youth
301
do not
believe that religion has any role to play in the society of Kazakhstan
302
compared to
52% of all ethnic non-Kazakh respondents in other sites. Kazakhs in Astana, on other
hand, appear to share the same attitude toward Islam as elsewhere covered by the survey.
Perhaps, there is a difference in how these two groups of Astana’s inhabitants perceive

301
Average age of survey respondents in Astana is 21
302
i.e. choose the option “Kazakhstan is a secular republic and no religion should be influencing the
development of society” on the survey questionnaire
209
the role of religion in the country but there is not enough data to arrive at a definitive
conclusion. What is certain, however, is that overall, 43% of Astana respondents in the
survey do prefer secularism, which a bit more than 37% in other sites who do the same.
Prevalence of Islam or multiple confessions receive only 33% and 23% of respondent’s
preferences in Astana, respectively, versus 32% and 30% elsewhere.
Figure 26: Attitude toward religion in Astana versus other parts of the country

Source: author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “In your opinion, what is the role of religion in Kazakhstan?”
It is not completely unreasonable to infer from the results of this limited survey
that it demonstrates the effect of Kazakh Islamic secularism as discussed above. Since
almost 20 years have passed since Kazakhstan gained independence and a large
proportion of survey respondents are about the same age as the republic, it appears that
the government manages to maintain a balance between the strength of religious beliefs
and preference for political secularism among the people of Kazakhstan, in other words,
to promote the Kazakh Islamic secularism. This sort of plateaued preferences in the
leftmost section of Figure 26 toward religion and secularism where neither one is in
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Islam
Multipe Confessions
Secularism
Islam
Multipe Confessions
Secularism
Islam
Multipe Confessions
Secularism
All Kazakhs Non-kazakhs
Astana Respondents
Respondents from the rest of
the country
210
absolute majority suggests a relative success of such government policy, especially
among Astana residents who display a slightly higher preference for secularism than
elsewhere.
303

The gathered data shows a slightly higher preference for secularism in Astana
than in other places, supporting the idea that the government of Kazakhstan is pursuing
the strategy of Kazakh Islamic secularism in the republic. However, further discussion of
the identity would not be complete without considering the economic development of the
capital, in particular because it has exploded in the past 10 years, from being barely over
1% in 1997 to almost 10% of the republican GDP in 2009, achieving an increase of more
than 17 times in absolute terms in 10 years since 1997. (Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p.
54) (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 191)
Economy
The economy of Astana rests on four pillars: construction, FDI, small business
development and unprecedented growth of population due to immigration. Without an
extensive development program, Akmola did not have sufficient amount of housing for
the government in 1997. The construction required human resources that Akmola lacked,
spurring an inter-regional and even international migration towards it.
304
The state in the
late 90s still lacked funds to build the new capital and therefore attracting foreign
investment into the construction of Astana (as well as to fuel the economic growth across

303
Except Aktau – see Chapter 3
304
Oralman
211
the entire country) became a priority for the government. Finally, the service industry of
the capital required a substantial overhaul, prompting the drive to develop small business.
All these factors will be discussed in detail below.
Astana’s symbolic architecture discussed above would have been impossible
without a rapid rate of construction in the capital. The city is being built at break-neck
speed, sometimes literally, when construction workers incur sever injuries or even die
because the safety measures are relaxed for the sake of making the government-imposed
deadlines.
305
In addition to the monumental government buildings,
306
Astana now sports
a significantly expanded real-estate sector which was built to house all the incoming
government officials and then to accommodate the rapidly growing population attracted
by the growth of Astana.
Since 2005, there has been an explosion of real-estate construction in Astana:
that year over 1,800 square meters of housing per 1,000 inhabitants were constructed –
which is 5.5 times over the republican average! (Figure 27) Since then, even the global
financial crisis only slightly slowed down the rate of construction. Astana’s rate of real
estate growth per capita still stands at 5 times of that of the rest of the country, Almaty
included, which is the second fastest growing city in the country. Together, Astana and

305
Or due to lax regulation of construction firms, in particular Turkish ones, which frequently ignore safety
measures. (Omarov, 2010)
306
Which were constructed in two sets: on in the old part of town, and one in the new part, the left bank of
the river Ishim which took much longer to complete. The first set of government buildings is much less
impressive and now it is in the possession of the capital’s administration. (author’s personal observation)
212
Almaty added well over 30% of new apartment buildings and homes in Kazakhstan
annually in 2005-2009 period. (Ibid)
Figure 27: Annual Rate of Real Estate Construction

Source: Kazakhstan Statistic Agency Regional Data (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010), (Regiony Kazakhstana
v 2007 godu, 2008), (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2005 godu, 2005), (Stroitel'stvo v Respublike Kazakhstan, 2002),
(Regional'nyy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik Kazakhstana 1996-1999, 2000)
Much of the construction in Astana has been funded by foreign sources. The
grand Nur-Astana mosque, for example, was built with a $6.8 million grant from the
King of Qatar. (Zhuldysbaeva, 2008) Various government buildings ranging from the
president’s residence to the parliament, and even the new international airport all were
built with generous contributions from foreign companies (from Turkey, Italy, Israel and
so on), and governments (such as Qatar).
307
(Astana: Entsiklopedia, 2008, p. 53)
Moreover, the foreign participation in Astana’s business is rather high, constituting over
10% of all wholly or partially foreign owned businesses in the country; which translates

307
The actual extent of foreign participation is shrouded in mystery, while the government does like to
boast about it in general, the specifics are not made public.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Kazakhstan, square
meters per capita
Astana, square
meters per capita
Almaty, square
meters per capita
Astana, % of total
construction in
Kazakhstan
Almaty, % of total
construction in
Kazakshtan
213
into 16 foreign companies per 10,000 inhabitants – only Almaty city has a higher number
of foreign-owned or joint ventures, 57% and 42 per 10,000 inhabitants, respectively.
(Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 141) Most of these foreign businesses are
involved in construction, or service industries (shopping malls, entertainment centers,
finances).
Such a significant foreign presence combined with the demands of the large
foreign diplomatic corps has a tangible effect on the population of Astana, resulting in a
rather high proficiency in foreign languages, exceeding even that of Almaty: about 15%
of adult population of the capital has a fluent command of the English language which is
twice the average rate for the country of 7.7%. (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki
Kazakhstan 2009 goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010, p. 87) The knowledge of English and other
foreign languages, as discussed before, has attendant effect on the learner’s culture.
308

At the same time, Astana has next to no industrial role – even after 12 years of
rapid growth, it still contributes barely over 1% of the total industrial output in the
country. Almaty with its little industry is a bit better with about 4% of the country’s
industrial output. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010) Astana’s industries are
predominantly related to the construction business and supply building materials to
sustain such an extremely high growth of real estate in the capital. Other type of
manufacturing that Astana is engaged in is primarily in food-processing.

Other than that,
the primary economic activity of Astana is related to its burgeoning population, that is, to

308
See discussion of the effects of communicative interaction on identity in an edited volume by Pavlenko
and Blackledge (Negotiation of Identities in Multilingual Contexts, 2003)
214
the service industry: entertainment and shopping as well as supporting government
agencies, most of which is catered by a large number of small businesses.
Small business is a very important factor of economic activity in the capital. As
it has been mentioned before, Astana has second highest rate of small business ownership
in the republic – about 29 per 1,000 inhabitants, which is significantly higher than
average of 10 across the country. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 208) All
in all, Astana has an impressively strong economy, driven in the first place by the
transition of the capital and the total reconstruction and population growth of Astana.
Thanks to these factors such as the booming construction industry and related services, as
well as very entrepreneurial population, Astana has a prospering economy despite the
virtual absence of any manufacturing or extraction industries.
309
(Figure 28)
Figure 28: Astana’s Economic Role in Kazakhstan

Source: Kazakhstan Statistic Agency Regional Data (Regiony Kazakhstana. Broshura 2005-2009, 2010)

309
Only in 2009 a major factory has been built in Astana which assembles locomotives using supplies from
the General Electric (Glava gosudarstva otkryl v Astane lokomotivosborochyy zavod, 2009)
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP per capita Kazakhstan,
mln tenge
GDP per capita Astana, mln
tenge
GDP per capita Almaty, mln
tenge
GDP proportion of Astana, %
Proportion of Astana
population in Kazakhstan, %
Astana Proportion in
Industrial Manufacturing, %
215
Such high level of economic prosperity also translates into higher than average
wages in Astana: residents in the capital earn about 1.5 times the average salary in
Kazakhstan. Only the two oil-rich regions, Mangystau and Atyrau have higher average
wages (about 2 times the republican average). Almaty is close 4
th
in this race for highest
salaries in Kazakhstan. (Regiony Kazakhstana v 2009 godu, 2010, p. 113) Higher
earnings lead to higher expenditures and hence a very vibrant economic activity in
Astana.
The apparent wealth, presence of foreign entities, and the openness to the world
intimate a possibility for developing non-national identity in Astana. The following
section will examine if the main hypothesis has any relevance in the new capital of
Kazakhstan.
Identity
Astana, like Almaty, has inauspicious origins: they both started as Russian
military forts which later on grew into towns.
310
However, unlike Almaty, Astana had a
much longer history as a peripheral town except for the Virgin Lands campaign which
significantly increased its population in the 1950s. Most of that population, as it was
customary for Kazakhstan in those years, was non-Kazakh, in fact, it was predominantly
Russian.
311
Only after independence, with a massive Russian emigration to the Russian

310
Interesting fact, the early 19
th
century Kasym Khan’s uprising against Russian colonialism had directly
involved Astana (Akmolinsk at the time) when his rebel forces stormed the fort.
311
In 1970, for example, only 23 thousand out of 181 thousand (12.7%) of inhabitants of Astana (then
Tselinograd) were Kazakh (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po g. Astany, 2000, p. 9)
216
Federation, and of course, with the transfer of the capital did the Kazakh population
increase, and it did so dramatically. If in 1989 the provincial town of Akmolinsk was
inhabited by about 50 thousand Kazakhs and 150 thousand Russians out of approximately
280 thousand of total population, by 2009, it was 425 thousand Kazakhs and 122
thousand Russians out of total of 613 thousand of total population. (Figure 29)
Figure 29: Population of Astana and Major Ethnic Groups

Source: the 1999 and 2009 Censuses of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Perepis' naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009
goda. Kratkie itogi, 2010) (Itogi perepisi naseleniia 1999 goda po g. Astany, 2000, p. 9)
Astana, like Almaty, was subject to the massive in and out migration, with
mostly Russians leaving and predominantly Kazakhs moving in to work in the new
capital, in the new government of sovereign Kazakhstan. In 2007 and 2009, 60% and
57% of migrants, respectively, came from the traditional Middle Horde regions of the
republic and about 28% and 30%, respectively, from the traditional Great Horde regions,
and a negligible 5%-6% from the Small Horde regions in the west of Kazakhstan.
312
The
vast majority of migrants are ethnic Kazakhs – over 90% in 2007 and over 88% in 2009,

312
Since the west of Kazakhstan is where most of Kazakhstan’s oil is located, the Small Horde Kazakhs do
not have a strong incentive to relocate to other regions in search for better economic opportunities.
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
1970 1979 1989 1999 2009
Kazakh, %
Russian, %
Total Population
217
and Figure 29 clearly shows it: the changes in the graph for the total population of Astana
mirror the changes in the graph for the proportion of the Kazakh population.
(Demograficheskiy ezhegodnik g. Astany, 2008, pp. 55-56) (Demograficheskiy
ezhegodnik goroda Astany, 2010, pp. 52-53). Thus, it appears that the Kazakhs in Astana
are roughly split between 2/3 of the Middle Horde Kazakhs and 1/3 of the Great Horde
Kazakhs
313
who come to the capital in search of better life. Therefore, it is possible that
the role of the Hordes, kinship groups and networks may be much more significant than
elsewhere because of the growing competition between the Middle Horde Kazakhs
(‘northerners’) and the Great Horde Kazakhs (‘southerners’) for the economic resources
in this rapidly growing city.
The role of the Kazakh Hordes in politics and economics is a very complicated
matter. According to some researchers, Kazakhstan and Central Asia in general are
subject to genealogical patronage networking which wield an inordinate amount of
power, both formal and informal, and are the primary means of redistributing economic
benefits. (Amrekulov, 2000) (Schatz, 2004) (Gaman-Golutvina, 2007). Others disagree:
“it would be a mistake to conclude that clan drives any of the [Kazakhstan]’s major
political rivalries” (Olcott M. , 2010, p. 187) – the politics and redistribution of economic
resources is mostly based on coalitions which cut across the inter- and intra-ethnic

313
Projected on the basis of migration data from 2007 and 2009, subject to corrections and changes as the
migration situation in the capital is very fluid.
218
divisions. (Ibid) In fact, one interview
314
suggests that the majority of the ‘oligarchs’ in
Kazakhstan are of non-Kazakh ethnic origin.
The author’s survey results do not indicate that the Hordes play a primary role in
the formation of national identity
315
but they also do not preclude the significance of the
Hordes in economic competition as part of the general issue of various lineage and
patronage networks that divide the Kazakhs as noted by the authors discussed above. In
an interview with a taxi driver who came to Astana from the south of Kazakhstan, he
complained about the terse reception of the southern (Great Horde) Kazakhs by the
northern (Middle Horde) Kazakhs in the capital. In a couple of other interviews, which
will be discussed in detail below, the issue of the Horde or tribal affiliation is either less
or as important as other non-patrilineal cleavages among the Kazakhs.
316
In other cities
covered by this study the issue of the Hordes is rather muted – while Aktau is
predominantly Kazakh, most of them come from one tribe of the Small Horde. Almaty is
much more diverse but the Kazakhs there are barely making half of the population and
their Horde and tribal composition does not have any obvious effects.
317
Only Astana is

314
Interview with the history professor at the Eurasian University, Astana, 6/29/2009
315
Only one person out 428 in the author’s survey has indicated that the Hordes and/or patrilineal networks
are a major factor of Kazakh national identity. Details to follow below
316
Interviews with a writer/senator 7/2/2009 and history professor at the Eurasian University, Astana,
6/29/2009, details below
317
No precise data is available for Almaty, unfortunately, but traditionally it has been a very diverse and
Kazakhs came there from every corner of the country and not even the Great Horde can claim majority
there despite the fact that the former capital is located in the traditional Great Horde region.
219
both predominantly Kazakh (almost 70% in 2009) and its population is split unevenly
between the two Hordes, Middle and Great.
Such a cleavage between two major groupings of Kazakhs may have a negative
effect on national identity or political stability. The government officials, however, do not
see it that way and there is absolutely no debate in public discourse in the country about
political or economic role of the Hordes (Amrekulov, 2000) except in historical or
cultural context. Astana is intended to overcome any such divisions and so far, it has been
successful at masking the Horde competition for resources.
318
Alternatively, the Hordes
may truly not matter in terms of identity formation – after all, even Nazarbayev coming
from the Great Horde married a Middle Horde woman
319
and even the act of moving the
capital to the territory of the Middle Horde and entailing migration of the Great Horde to
the north might be signaling an attempt at erasing the differences. Besides, it is also
evident that economically the Hordes do not matter: the richest people in Kazakhstan are
not all ethnic Kazakh so it does not seem that the intra-ethnic Kazakh affiliations play a
role in achieving ultimate economic payoff, what matters is the relationship with the
patronage network headed by Nazarbayev which controls access to pretty much all
economic assets in the country. (Olcott M. , 2010, pp. 88-89, 187-188)
As a matter of fact, a writer, literature specialist and sitting Senator emphasized
a set of different (non-tribal and non-Horde related) cleavages among the Kazakhs, which

318
As noted in Chapter 1, the Russian and Soviet colonial policies caused much of such rivalry for
shrinking resources among the Kazakhs in the past, as well.
319
Practice of exogamy is one of the most fundamental traditions of the Kazakh nomads
220
also apply to Almaty and, to a lesser extent, to Aktau as well. (6/29/2009) He expressed
such belief that the primary intra-ethnic division is between pro-traditional Kazakhs and
pro-Western Kazakhs.
320
The former are the ones looking back to the Kazakh nomadic
heritage and considering it to be the highest point in the cultural development of the
Kazakhs, i.e. echoing Smith’s discussion of ethnie and historical roots. Others are
oriented toward the West, seek prosperity and integration into the world markets, i.e.
sharing Gellner’s vision of a nation as an efficient economic unit. In the Senator’s
opinion neither group of Kazakhs consider Horde or even tribal identities an issue. The
former believe that the recovery of the traditional Kazakh culture and worldview will
render tribal identities irrelevant because the traditional Kazakh nomadic sense of
community traversed ethnic and tribal affiliations. The latter believe that tribal Kazakh
identities will disappear once a modern nation of Kazakhstan emerges on the ashes of the
old soviet legacy.
As a matter of fact, a 7/2/2009 interview with an ethnic Kazakh, former member
of parliament, professor of economics, working on the staff of the parliament in Astana
provided an argument fitting such pro-modern, pro-Western Kazakhs. In his view, the
Kazakh language, traditions and religiosity matter not; what truly matters is the creation
of a new Kazakh identity which would fit into the new realities of market economy. He
holds the view that Russian would be an efficient language for the economic
development, ignoring the state policy that makes Kazakh the only state language. (Ibid)

320
Which may not be necessarily mutually exclusive but in the interview, the respondent did not clarify that
point.
221
Another interview with a history professor at the Eurasian University, Astana,
(6/29/2009) yielded a plethora of Kazakh groupings most of which do not care for tribal
or Horde divisions. According to the interviewee, there are seven equally important
groups of Kazakhs, including the already mentioned pro-Western Kazakhs,
traditionalists, pro-Russian Kazakh and so on. Since they are so many divisions among
the Kazakhs, this, in his words “inhibits the development of national identity which is
dangerous.” (Ibid)
The survey was not structured to assess various divisions among the Kazakhs
except for the importance of Horde identity as part of national identity. Out of 438
respondents, only one has marked the Hordes as important marker of national identity.
321

The rest broke down as shown in Figure 30. Half of all respondents in Astana recognize
Kazakh culture (and language, more on that later) as the primary marker of national
identity in the republic, which is about 12% more than the respondents from other sites in
the country. What is remarkable is that over half of Astana’s non-Kazakh respondents
prioritize Kazakh culture compared to only 18% elsewhere (over 3 times the difference).
While the survey was very limited, the data collected suggests that the government
policies of nation building that put Kazakh traditions and culture at the core of the
national identity of the republic work better in Astana than anywhere else in the republic.

321
Answering the question “How do you understand the concept of the national idea of Kazakhstan?”
222
After all, the government nation-building policies make every effort to set the capital as
an example of the new Kazak(stani)
322
identity for the rest of the country.
Figure 30: Astana Perception of What Constitutes National Identity

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How do you understand the concept of the national idea of
Kazakhstan?”
In terms of language, Astana again displays a lead; especially the Kazakhs who
demonstrate a much higher predisposition toward the primacy of the Kazakh language
unlike the Kazakhs in other parts of the country.
323
In other respects, the attitudes are less
consistent with the results of religious and national identity preferences. (Figure 31)

322
i.e. both civic to include minorities and ethnic to revive the Kazakh identity
323
Except Aktau (see Chapter 3)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
International Status
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
International Status
Kazakh Culture
Multi-ethnic Culture
International Status
All Kazakh Non-Kazakh
Astana
Other Sites
223
Figure 31: Astana Preference for Language Policy in Kazakhstan

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “How would you assess the role of Kazakh and Russian languages in
Kazakhstan?”
Figure 30 suggests another dimension of national identity which consistently,
across all ethnic groups, receives higher interest in Astana than elsewhere
324
(albeit still
lower than preference for the Kazakh culture in the capital): the international status of
Kazakhstan as the determining factor of national identity of the republic.
325
This feeds
directly into the idea that in Kazakhstan, foreign policy and domestic discourse regarding
development and implementation of foreign policy feed into the formation of national
identity. Social constructivist theory advanced by Hopf and Prizel’s study of foreign
policy formation in new states of the former Soviet bloc offer a theoretical background in

324
Except in Aktau – there 30% of all respondents consider international status the primary factor of
national identity in Kazakhstan, see p. 119
325
One evidence of the relationship is the initial reaction of Kazakhstan, from the people to the foreign
policy establishment, to the satirical movie “Borat” (Charles, 2006): not only the movie was barred from
being broadcast in the country, the foreign ministry threatened to sue the principal actor, Sacha Baron
Cohen for the offensive portrayal of the Kazakh people. Later on, however, the government of the Republic
changed its stance, recognizing the value of the movie as a vehicle to promote the real country and people
internationally (Saunders, 2008, pp. 124-125)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Kazakh
Language
Dual
Language
Kazakh
Language
Dual
Language
Kazakh
Language
Dual
Language
All Kazakhs Non-Kazakhs
Astana
Other Sites
224
that regard. Hopf’s analysis suggests that within the state politics, national identity has a
larger than previously assumed role in defining foreign policy objectives. The connection
is built using the combination of identity formation theories which are similar to
Calhunian conception of nationalism as discursive formation; and the institutional logic
of foreign policy decision-making. Hopf argues that the flow of information through the
state is subjected to the filtering processes inherent to organizational logic which is
determined not only by operational code of the institution itself but also by the identity of
the decision-maker. The latter, he continues, is determined in large part by the national
identity of the individual intersubjectively defined vis-à-vis Other. Hopf’s model
indicates that the foreign policy of states is determined primarily by the way the national
identity of those state is constructed in relation to their “enemies” and “friends”. He
introduces a distinct, 2-tier model for foreign policy decision-making where the bulk of
responsibility for state’s behavior is determined by the national image, so to speak.
(Hopf, 20002)
Prizel’s argument is closer to home in Kazakhstan. He identifies the relationship
between the foreign policy decision-making and national identity but his take on the issue
is more interactive than Hopf’s model can afford. He echoes Holm-Hansen argument that
newly independent states have to resort to ethnic identity as one of the major means of
uniting the society since there are no abiding institutions, and therefore make up for their
inherent weakness by “tuning” policies to be more in line with national identity and also
use foreign policy to re-define national consciousness. (Prizel, 1998) In fact, “national
identity serves not only as the primary link between the individual and society, but
225
between society and the world.” (Ibid, p. 19) Prizel also emphasizes the role of the
“custodianship of collective memories” which translates into the ability of both the state
and particular social groups to guide national identity in a specific direction. (Ibid, p. 14)
Kazakhstan’s pursuit of multi-vector diplomacy
326
after the initial failure of
reviving the former Soviet Union via the Commonwealth of Independent States is a
prime example of the Hopf’s and Prizel’s relationship between foreign policy and
national identity. If initially no one in Kazakhstan could imagine surviving without the
“big brother” – Russia,
327
after the failure of the CIS to restore the economic integration
of the former Soviet Union and continued reluctance of Russia to cooperate with
Kazakhstan, the latter tried to break away from the age-long dependency on Russia and
establish a (semi-)independent course in foreign policy to back up the flailing regime.
This occurs around 1993-94, when Nazarbayev comes up with the idea for moving the
capital which becomes the marker of the shift in foreign policy and nation-building
policies of Kazakhstan away from Russia and toward a more independent route. The
multi-vector diplomacy becomes a vehicle for this shift: launching a multitude of
international initiatives aiming at promoting international integration and recognition of
Kazakhstan as a full-fledged member of the international system which so far culminates
in 2010 with Kazakhstan chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE). All these initiatives, irrespective of their a success internationally, are

326
Defined as multidirectional diplomacy which aims to develop good, working relations with many states,
regional and global powers without giving preference to any one of them.
327
Except for a few nationalists and even then they did not seek full sovereignty at the time of
independence (Olcott M. , 2010)
226
consistently promoted domestically as another remarkable achievement of sovereign
Kazakhstan – i.e. creating the discourse which both legitimizes the regime and establishes
the basis for national identity of Kazakhstan via custodianship of collective memories
defined through the multi-vector diplomacy, using Prizel’s terms.
The interviews in Astana also support the above contention that foreign policy is
a very important factor of national identity construction in Kazakhstan. The concern for
future of the nation is related to the success of economic integration – primarily, with the
West – and acquisition of new technologies. The professor of economics noted that the
“road to becoming the member of the 50 most developed states lies through the economic
integration and cooperation with other states.” (7/2/2009) A few survey respondents,
answering the question about globalization and FDI
328
agree with this point of view.
Others (very few), however, voice an opinion that a certain degree of autarchy is
necessary to shore up the weakened national identity before exposing susceptible minds
of the population of Kazakhstan to the external influences, that is, before participating in
the global space.
329
In either case, the gathered data suggests that there is a relationship
between the processes of national identity formation and Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, the
contestation of the custodianship of collective memories via the determination of the
foreign policy.

328
Question “How would you assess the effect of globalization and international trade on the social
development of Kazakhstan?”
329
Interview with the history professor at the Eurasian University, Astana, 6/29/2009
227
Astana displays the effects of the government policies aiming at forming a new
national identity in Kazakhstan. The survey hints that Astana residents have a slightly
higher than average recognition of the Kazakh roots and culture than the rest of the
country. In particular, non-Kazakh respondents have been very favorable toward the
nomadic past of Kazakhstan and its role in today’s culture of the country. (Figure 32)
Due to the age group (average age 21) of the Astana respondents, most of them (72%) did
not answer the question regarding market reforms.
330
Similarly, a large portion of
respondents (45%) did not evaluate the role of globalization
331
but those who did
respond, were much more welcoming than elsewhere. It is quite probable that non-
responders were also in favor but did not consider globalization something out of the
ordinary, that is, they were equally used to market economy as they were to globalization.
In any case, there is not enough data to make any conclusions about Astana’s residents’
opinion about effect of market reforms and globalization on their identity.

330
Survey question “How did the transition to market economy affect you personally?”
331
Survey question “How would you assess the effect of globalization and international trade on the social
development of Kazakhstan?”
228
Figure 32: Astana Attitude Toward the Nomadic Pastoralism, Traditions and
History

Source: Author’s 2009-2010 survey, question “What is your opinion about the role of nomadism and pastoral traditions
in the history of Kazakhstan?”
Astana does yield data regarding FDI
332
which differs from the results received
from surveys in other sites: over 7% of respondents (mostly ethnic Kazakhs) demonstrate
concern with the inequality in wages between the citizens of Kazakhstan and expatriates
as paid by foreign businesses. This concerns only 1.2% of respondents from other sites.
In terms of approval, Astana respondents are on about on the same level as the rest
(52.5% and 55% were in favor, respectively).
While the survey results are somewhat inconsistent, due to the limited number of
respondents (about 40), the in-depth interviews with state officials, representatives of
science and culture do point toward the conflicted views on the nature of identity
formation in the city and the country as a whole. The analysis of data suggests that the

332
Question “What is your assessment of the role FDI plays in Kazakhstan?”
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Negative
Positive
Belongs in the past
No response
Negative
Positive
Belongs in the past
No response
Negative
Positive
Belongs in the past
No response
All Kazakh Non-Kazakh
Astana
Other Sites
229
dual policy of national identity construction, pursuing both ethnic Kazakh and all
inclusive civic Kazakhstani identity is partially responsible for such mixed results of the
study. In an attempt to placate the minorities, in particular the Russians, the fractures
among the Kazakhs which have been sawn during the Russian colonization and Soviet
assimilation policies have not been bridged during the 20 years of independence. There is
a progress toward recovering Kazakh culture and language, for sure, and the survey
results indicate as much but the process is still far from being over.
Conclusion
The hypothesized relationship between FDI, market reforms and national
identity, which predicts that increased levels of FDI along with the transition to market
economy and growing integration into the global markets promote a non-national, i.e.
fragmented national identity, does not receive strong support in Astana – but it is also
hard to reject given the immense economic changes in the capital and the reported intra-
ethnic cleavages among the Kazakhs in Astana. However, alternative explanations, such
as the government policies of Islamic secularism, multi-vector diplomacy and combined
ethnic/civic national identity construction are likely to have a larger effect on the
fragmentation of Kazakh identity rather than the economic factors alone.
Comparatively, the strength of Kazakh identity in Astana is somewhere between
Aktau, where research suggests that the Kazakhs do manage to maintain cohesiveness,
and Almaty, where global and Russian culture along with higher degree of economic
activity appears to have a negative effect on national identity. Astana offers data to
230
support both – that is, there is evidence of the breakdown of Kazakh identity, and there
are also signs of its recovery, suggested by the survey data.
Symbolism of Astana demonstrates just how much the current administration is
engaged in constructing the national identity of Kazakhstan. While it does have a dual
mode of operation, promoting simultaneously both all-inclusive, civic identity to appeal
to non-Kazakh population; they also emphasize Kazakh identity which was weakened by
the Russian colonization and Soviet imperial policies. It is ironic, that the government of
Kazakhstan still headed by a large number of old-time Soviet apparatchiks
333
who
continue in many ways the Soviet-style ethnic policies with heavy emphasis on
symbolism and public discourse of inter-ethnic (civic) unity while carrying out a rapid
reconstitution of Kazakh (ethnic) identity as well. Astana is a prime example for both,
and the process of identity formation there is a little different from the other two sites due
to the immediacy of the government policies of nation building.
In other words, Astana represents an ultimate effort in national identity
construction of the independent state of Kazakhstan. If Almaty is the showcase of what
the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union could do for the Kazakhs, Astana is the
showcase of what the modernizing society with a modicum financial help from outside
can do to reshape itself to fit into the globalized world of today.

333
Not as many as 20 years ago, thanks to the transfer of the capital and general youth-oriented recruitment
policies of the government which included a Bolashak program of sending youth abroad to train in various
subjects and then returning to become government functionaries.
231
Conclusion
This study started with the question: does statehood require the existence of a
titular nation? Migdal’s concept of non-nation state offers one possible answer to the
question: even though the modern system of states is closely associated with the duo of
nation and state, Migdal suggests that in certain circumstances, under the ‘double
whammy’ of a unipolar international system and integration of state into the global
market, a new ethnopolitical entity might emerge – non-nation state.
The Republic of Kazakhstan was chosen for a single-case study of the validity of
Migdal’s conceptual framework. Kazakhstan represents a most likely case of non-nation
state due to plethora of divisions in its society. The nation of Kazakhstan is anything but;
the history of cultural abuse, the massive ethnic changes of its population in the last 200
years, multiple Kazakh sub-ethnic identities, all of these issues and more have already
made this country into a close approximation of Migdal’s predicted ideal type of non-
nation state, albeit for different reasons from those his model suggests.
Kazakhstan is also subject to very rapid and deep economic reforms which are
transforming the republic from a former resource appendage of the Soviet Union into an
active participant in the global market space. This country appears to pursue foreign
capital and recognition more than it does to buttress the unity of its own people – or, at
least, more than many other newly independent countries – thus offering a unique
opportunity to examine the validity of Migdal’s perspective.
The study was broken down onto three sites: Almaty, Astana and Aktau, each of
which offered a different perspective for the analysis of the causes and extent of non-
232
national identity formation. Almaty is the former capital and most cosmopolitan and
multi-ethnic city in Kazakhstan. Aktau is a small Kazakh-dominated town being
transformed by affluent oil companies, both from within and outside of Kazakhstan.
Astana is the new capital, perhaps the most dynamic and most politically and
symbolically charged site of all three.
The study was based on primary research consisting of the analysis of media,
interviews and a survey conducted at each of the three sites. Starting with a secondary
literature review and consecutive visits to each site, a wealth of data was obtained, which
revealed a very complicated, contradictory even, processes of identity formation in
Kazakhstan.
First of all, the analysis of gathered data revealed that there is still a lingering
and powerful legacy of the Soviet and Russian influence affecting the development of
national identity in the country. It has the largest impact on Almaty: even though the city
is geographically most remote from Russia, it appears to be the closest in cultural terms.
No doubt, this is a direct consequence of Almaty’s origins and its connection to the
Soviet Union which has made the former capital into the largest and most influential in
many respects city in the entire country.
Second, the data analysis does not yield sufficient evidence to argue that the
economic changes in the country including globalization alone affect the formation of
identity of Kazakhstan. They did have an effect on identity in Almaty and, to a lesser
extent, Astana – but so did a myriad of other causes, one of which is indicated above. A
whole new generation was born and raised in independent Kazakhstan who spent their
233
entire life under the new economic system and nevertheless, they appear to be developing
a strong connection with the traditional Kazakh identity – even in Almaty.
Third, if foreign capital and global culture play a role in nation-building
processes, it is not consistent. Almaty provides the best example of such influences, as
evidenced in its highly developed consumerism culture by comparison to the rest of the
country; but even in the former capital, the globalization is not the only factor affecting
identity formation.
Fourth, Kazakhstan’s governmental policy, closely associated with the persona
of the President of the Republic Nursultan Nazarbayev and which pursues simultaneously
civic and ethnic identity, produces contradictory results in terms of national identity. The
effect of such policy is rather limited to an extent that all interview respondents complain
about the lack of a concerted nation-building program developed by the government
because they all expect it to focus on either ethnic or civic identity, not both. In addition,
a policy of Islamic secularism which attempts to assimilate Islamic traditions into the
government rhetoric appears to be very effective – more so in Astana than in other sites,
as evidenced by the analysis of the role of religion.
Finally, the key to preserving Kazakh identity appears to be connected to the
concentration of ethnic Kazakhs in geographical space and the presence of tangible
historical legacy of the nomadic Kazakhs as the case of Aktau demonstrates.
In summary, the sites, covered by the study do not provide enough evidence to
support the main hypothesis which expects a negative impact of market economy and
globalization on national identity of the Kazakhs. There are certain instances of this
234
phenomenon occurring or even developing but the causality is different or, at the very
least, not a straightforward one.
While Migdal’s concept does not seem to apply within the limited scope of this
study, it does deserve further examination, as the some of the study’s results did suggest
its possible validity but not enough data was gathered to support it with a sufficient level
of confidence. Considering that the issues of globalization and blind pursuit of profits is
becoming an issue worldwide, a further examination of Migdal’s idea of non-national
state may still yield useful insights into the influence of identity on individual economic
choices.
Nonetheless, even if causality is different, the study does yield evidence to
support the notion that Kazakhstan is becoming a non-nation state with fragmented
identity. One of the most important implications of this development is the general and
close association of national identity of the republic with foreign policy and its role for
the society of Kazakhstan. The government rhetoric which frequently focuses on the
achievements of its foreign initiatives which sometimes appear to eclipse the success of
various domestic programs; the results of the survey which suggest such connection; and
the declared multi-vector diplomacy all point toward the importance of foreign policy as
a major factor in the formation of identity of the people of Kazakhstan.
The preoccupation with international status of the country appears to be a
paramount concern not only for the government but for the people as well, entering the
domain of collective consciousness, or determining the collective memory in Prizel
terms. (National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland,
235
Russia, and Ukraine., 1998) The non-national identity of Kazakhstan, the fragmentation
along ethnic and intra-ethnic cleavages of the society, is closely related to the multi-
vector foreign policy pursued by the government of the republic. Various diplomatic
initiatives aiming to integrate the country into the world economy and the international
system of states without falling under the influence of any particular foreign state is the
imperative guiding both the government and the society of Kazakhstan.
There is no doubt that Russia remains an important player in Kazakhstan. In
2010 Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia have established a full customs union which
came after many years of abortive attempts to recover the former Soviet Union economic
relations. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan does aim to offset the impact and legacy of its huge
northern neighbor by partnering with other countries in various endeavors in economic,
political and cultural spheres. Of these, particularly important are the pipeline projects
which aim to break the monopoly Russia holds over Kazakhstan’s oil export routes such
as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Western China pipeline both of which offer an
increased access to the world oil markets for Kazakhstan, expanding beyond the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium which transports Kazakhstan’s oil to the Russian port of
Novorossiysk.
Such multi-vector diplomacy reflects expanding and diversifying non-national
identity of Kazakhstan which is developing past its Soviet and Russian legacy and strives
to become part of the global community. The examination of Almaty is one of the best
examples of the influence of global culture on the processes of national identity
formation in Kazakhstan. The process is interactive, as Prizel would foresee, as both
236
multi-vector foreign policy and non-national identity of Kazakhstan contribute to the
development of each other, threatening the revival of genuine Kazakh national identity in
the process.
In the long run, non-national, fragmented identity of Kazakhstan will most likely
require the continuation of multi-vector foreign policy and further drifting away from
Russia’s influence. The government’s attempt to substitute a coherent policy of nation-
building within the state with numerous initiatives in foreign policy, which generally aim
to bolster internal legitimacy of the regime more than raise its reputation worldwide, will
be one of the best instruments at the regime’s disposal of maintaining the domestic order
in lieu of a strong national identity. For example, the latest accomplishment of
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, the OSCE chairmanship ended with a whimper
internationally. Despite the best efforts of the republic’s diplomats put into the
organization of the summit in December 2010, it was marked by numerous disagreements
between the member states which Kazakhstan failed to bridge and no concrete decisions
were made. (English.news.cn, 2010) Domestically, however, the OSCE chairmanship and
results of the summit were hailed as an ultimate achievement of the country on
international arena. (Ibid) This is not the first and definitely not the last of Kazakhstan’s
foreign policy projects whose international effect does not correlate with the amount of
accolades they receive domestically, providing a useful propaganda tool for its
government to promote unity of the non-national society by buttressing the perceived
international reputation of Kazakhstan domestically.
237
It is also important to note the role of Nazarbayev who was successful at
establishing his image as the peace-keeper and the symbol of unity of the people of
Kazakhstan. The fear of what to expect when he will inevitably leave the political scene
is palpable in the country, and so far, the identity of Nazarbayev’s successor is not yet
obvious and even less is known about his or her ability to maintain the unity of the
society despite the multiple fractures running through it. Such uncertainty will may prove
extremely destabilizing in the event of Nazarbayev’s departure, more so given the
strength of non-national identity in the country.
The ultimate test, however, is whether the revival of genuine Kazakh identity
found in the study will proceed forward, able to overcome the multiple factors that
produce the non-national effect in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

238
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258
Appendix: Survey Overview
The survey was conducted in 2009-2010 at the three main sites, Almaty, Astana
and Aktau, plus in three other towns in the northern, central and eastern Kazakhstan,
Pavlodar, Petropavlovsk, and Karaganda (PPK) to expand the coverage and increase
representativeness. A total of 438 responses have been collected. The following table
summarizes general coverage of the survey by sites and by ethnicities:
% by site and ethnicity Kazakh Russian The rest % of the total number of
respondents by site
Aktau 84.1% 4.8% 11.1% 14.4%
Almaty 91.4% 3.8% 4.8% 42.9%
Astana 77.5% 12.5% 10.0% 9.1%
PPK 32.2% 45.2% 22.6% 33.6%
% of the total number of
respondents by ethnicity
69.2% 18.6% 12.2%
Average age by site:
Average age, years
Aktau 29.73
Almaty 19.45
Astana 21.65
PPK 29.62
Overall average age 25.59

68% of all respondents were female and 32% male.
The survey questionnaire:
Multiple choice (only one allowed):
1) How do you understand the concept of the national idea of Kazakhstan?
a. The advancement of the Kazakh language, culture, legacy
b. Multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societ
c. Dominance of Horde or tribal identity
d. Gaining a notable position in the international system

259
2) How would you assess the role of Kazakh and Russian languages in Kazakhstan?
a. Kazakh is the state language which must be used by every citizen of
Kazakhstan
b. Both Russian and Kazakh play a significant role in Kazakhstan, both are
equally important
c. Russian is more important as the language of communication, science,
culture
d. Neither Kazakh nor Russia, but rather English or Chinese or some other
foreign language are more important for every resident of Kazakhstan

3) In your opinion, what is the role of religion in Kazakhstan?
a. Islam is the main religion of Kazakhstan and defines the development of
society
b. Tengriism have played an important role in defining the Kazakh culture
c. Multiple confessions, Islam, Orthodox Christian, and others, all important
for the society of Kazakhstan
d. Kazakhstan is a secular republic and no religion should be influencing the
development of society

Open-ended questions
4) What is your opinion about the role of nomadism and pastoral traditions in the
history of Kazakhstan?
5) How would you assess the effect of globalization and international trade on the
social development of Kazakhstan?
6) How did the transition to market economy affect you personally?
7) What is your assessment of the role FDI plays in Kazakhstan?
8) What is your opinion about role of media in Kazakhstan?
9) What is your assessment of the culture, folk traditions, languages in Kazakhstan?
What are the key factors influencing the culture of Kazakhstan? Do you believe
that Russia or the West affect the culture of Kazakhstan?

Abstract (if available)

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Creator Zhanalin, Azamat (author)

Core Title Market reforms, foreign direct investment and national identity: Non-national identity of Kazakhstan

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publication Date 04/29/2011

Defense Date 03/22/2011

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Central Asia,countries in transition,culture,Energy,foreign direct investment,Foreign policy,former Soviet Union,Globalization,identity,Kazakhstan,market reforms,national identity,nationalism,nation-state,OAI-PMH Harvest,oil,patronage networks,post-colonial legacy

Place Name Aktau (city or populated place), Almaty (city or populated place), Astana (city or populated place), Kazakhstan (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor English, Robert (committee chair), James, Patrick (committee member), Rorlich, Azade-Ayse (committee member)

Creator Email janalin_a@yahoo.com,zhanalin@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3812

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