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The Catholic church in Latin America: an evaluation of the institutional and political impacts of progressive church reforms

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The Catholic church in Latin America: an evaluation of the institutional and political impacts of progressive church reforms

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA:
AN EVALUATION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL IMPACTS
OF PROGRESSIVE CHURCH REFORMS

by

Alexandra Toll

___________________________________________________________________

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(ECONOMICS)

May 2008

Copyright 2008 Alexandra Toll

ii
Table of Contents
List of Tables iii
Abstract v
Chapter I. Introduction 1
Chapter II. Religion and Economic Growth 7
A. Are Catholicism and Economic Growth at Odds? 8
B. Is Protestantism the Answer to Growth? 11
C. Religious Pluralism 13
Chapter III. The Catholic Church in Latin America 16
Chapter IV. Religion’s Transformative Potential 23
A. Political Opportunities 24
B. Mobilizing Structures 26
C. Framing Processes 33
D. The Revolutionary Threshold 39
Chapter V. Assessment and Future Outlook 43
Chapter VI. Discussion Topics 45
Chapter VII. Model: Civic Activism and Church Reform 49
Chapter VIII. Model: Religious Competition and Catholic Personnel 70
Chapter IX. Conclusions 83
References 88
Appendices 94
Appendix A. Variable Definitions 94
Appendix B. Peaceful Demonstrations – Model Specifications 98
Appendix C. Violent Demonstrations – Model Specifications 106
Appendix D. Men in Religious Groups (MM) – Model Specifications 114
Appendix E. Women in Religious Groups (MM) – Model Specifications 120

iii
List of Tables
Table 1. Total Number of Priests and Number of Inhabitants per Priest 19
by Country in 1965
Table 2. Catholic Priests in Latin America throughout Progressive Church Era 22
Table 3. Aggregate Data Comparison based on Gill's Country Groupings 58
1960-1975
Table 4. Aggregate Data Ranked by Greatest Number of Violent 61
Demonstrations 1960-1975
Table 5. Results of Analysis - Peaceful Demonstrations 62
Table 6. Results of Analysis - Violent Demonstrations 63
Table 7. Change in Religious Personnel through Gill's Pro /Antiauthoritarian 73
Lens, 1960-1975
Table 8. Results of Analysis - Men in Religious Orders (per MM) 76
Table 9. Results of Analysis - Women in Religious Orders (per MM) 77
Table B1. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification I 98
Table B2. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification II 99
Table B3. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification III 100
Table B4. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification IV 101
Table B5. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification V 102
Table B6. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification VI 103
Table B7. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification VII 104
Table B8. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification VIII 105
Table C1. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification I 106
Table C2. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification II 107

iv
Table C3. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification III 108
Table C4. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification IV 109
Table C5. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification V 110
Table C6. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification VI 111
Table C7. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification VII 112
Table C8. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification VIII 113
Table D1. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification I 114
Table D2. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification II 115
Table D3. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification III 116
Table D4. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification IV 117
Table D5. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification V 118
Table D6. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification VI 119
Table E1. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification I 120
Table E2. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification II 121
Table E3. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification III 122
Table E4. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification IV 123
Table E5. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification V 124
Table E6. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification VI 125

v
Abstract
Latin America’s progressive church era during the 1960s, 1970s and early
1980s provides an interesting reference point for the theory of religion’s
transformative potential. Building on concepts from social movement theory and
studies on the economics of religion, Latin America’s progressive transformation is
examined with respect to its role in civic activism and its impact on the institution’s
structural growth. In response to Protestant competition, and as a result of political
and economic hardships, liberal ecumenical reforms were introduced during Latin
America’s progressive church era that placed the religious community at the
forefront of politics. The Church’s role as a mobilizing structure contributed to its
success in organizing society to combat oppressive regimes and to protest economic
policies. Furthermore, the Church’s recognition of structural limitations inhibiting
its competitive strategy led to a shift in personnel recruitment that emphasized lay
leadership and community involvement. Christian Base Communities empowered
lay religious leaders and gave them a new and more hands-on role in evangelizing, as
well as in defining the scope of religious involvement in every day affairs.

1
Chapter I. Introduction
Whereas secularization theory’s prominence once led many social scientists
to discount the importance of religion in modern society, its continued grasp on
culture and values has led to resurgence in its study. The new emphasis on religion
has presented opportunities for the analysis of its current impacts on international
political and economic affairs. It also has provided the impetus for a reassessment of
the role religious organizations have played in the past and how these have impacted
regional and global development (“Religion and Comparative Politics” 117). Not
only has religion continued to shape public views and choices, but also it has become
a prominent factor in discussions about politics and economic development through
its increasing role in shaping social movements.
Similarly, the study of social movements has undergone an incredible
transformation in the last couple of decades. As recently as 1960, social scientists
like Daniel Bell proclaimed “the end of ideology,” professing the belief that
“ideological conflict would gradually be replaced by a more pluralistic, pragmatic
consensus” (McAdam et al. 1). Ironically, the 1960s proved a period ripe with
political protests, social movements, and revolutionary zeal. This pattern continued
throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, and led to a renewed interest in
understanding the nature and causes of social movements. Much of the recent
movement literature converges on the emphasis of three primary themes: (1) the
political framework of opportunity and risk in which movements develop, (2) the
mobilizing structures that facilitate collective action and (3) the framing process

2
through which “shared meaning and definitions” facilitate communication and
organization among movement participants (2-5). Religion’s role in the context of
modern movement theory is particularly relevant in so far as religious institutions
serve as mobilizing structures within communities and supply a cultural frame of
shared values and beliefs.
The Catholic Church in Latin America provides an ideal subject for the study
of religion’s role in facilitating collective action, and its progressive reform era is an
interesting context for such a study. A great deal of the literature on this period in
Latin America’s history focuses on its political and economic climate. On the
political front, human rights violations and unstable governments brought into power
by coup d’états and bloodshed indiscriminate of military or civilian credentials were
pervasive elements throughout the region. Similarly, many changes in economic
policies came to the forefront, including the region’s turn towards import substitution
and the belief that dependant relationships caused poverty and prevented growth.
Not to be overshadowed, the Latin American Catholic Church’s story in this time is
one marked by the threat of Protestant growth and the introduction of progressive
reforms constantly challenged from within and without.
The Catholic Church’s historical position during colonial rule and subsequent
independence firmly cemented its role in the region’s culture while establishing its
structural dependence on the state for support and power. Within the last several
decades, the Church has faced competition from Protestant groups who have
increased their presence and proselytizing zeal in the region. In response to this

3
competition, and as a result of a variety of political conflicts and economic policies,
liberal ecumenical reforms were introduced that placed the religious community at
the forefront of debates regarding income inequality, political oppression, and
democratic reform.
In the midst of heightened political and economic turmoil, the 21
st

ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic Church (referred to as The Second
Vatican Council or Vatican II) convened in Europe on October 11, 1962 with
representatives from around the world. The Council proved a groundbreaking
transition in Church policies as leaders announced the compulsion to fight social
injustice and encourage development (McGrath 110). The Second Vatican Council
and the resulting bishop conferences led to the proclamation of liberation theology
1

and the new church of the poor. A new Catholicism was created with a profound
commitment to forging democratic processes.
Liberal Church leaders began promoting and organizing Christian Base
Communities
2
(referred to in the regional literature as “Comunidades Eclesiales de
Base” or CEBs). The CEBs’ emphasis on community involvement and leadership in

1
As defined by Gill in Rendering Unto Caesar, “[Liberation theology] attempts to reflect on
the experience and meaning of the faith based on the commitment to abolish injustice and to build a
new society; this ideology must be verified by the practice of that commitment, by active, effective
participation in the struggle which the exploited social classes have undertaken against their
oppressors” (38).
2
In “Basic Ecclesial Communities: A New Model of the Church,” Gallo attempts to define
the concept of Christian Base Communities (CEBs) while recognizing the variety of explanations and
perceptions that have characterized these small societies throughout time. Gallo describes the CEBS
as small communities that meet for prayer and worship with the active participation of each
individual, whose reflection leads to courses of political action with the attempt of improving their
societies (96-97).

4
spiritual endeavors demonstrated the Church’s response to its structural and
competitive disadvantages in addressing the needs of the poor (“Institutional
Limitations” 142). These communities empowered lay religious leaders in ways
unimaginable within the once traditional and hierarchical framework rigidly
followed by the Church. For the first time, many rural communities suddenly found
themselves at the center of their religion’s scope, organizing prayer groups and
masses in areas where churches had long remained closed due to a shortage of
priests. “Although it was not the cause of a return to democratization in the region,”
Gill concludes, “the Catholic Church played an important role as mediator and
advocate towards the return to civil rule” (135). Through the rise of CEBs, the laity
was given a new and more hands-on role in evangelizing, as well as in defining the
scope of religious involvement in every day affairs.
It may be argued that the Church’s emphasis on empowering the people and
addressing political evils led to a transformation of the population towards greater
activism and community involvement. In a time of great peril during brutal
dictatorships and financial crises, the Church provided the necessary impetus and
support for social changes to take place under a new rubric of community
involvement, activism and empowerment. The Church’s role as a social institution
contributed to its success in mobilizing society to combat oppressive regimes and to
protest economic reforms that led to social disenfranchisement and persistent
poverty.

5
Although the progressive reforms brought forth in the 1960s have since been
abandoned and the Church has reverted to a more conservative position under new
leadership (dating back to the appointment of Pope John Paul II in 1978), it may be
argued that its shift in priorities and loyalties throughout the 1960s and 1970s served
as a revolutionizing force in its political involvement. Emerging from its historical
role as a chief supporter of the state, the Church in many Latin American countries
became a primary critic and a leading force in the battle against oppression and
injustice. As the progressive reform period’s inception and demise occurred in the
last few decades, it presents an opportunity for statistical analysis aimed at
interpreting how transformations within religious institutions impact the political and
economic climate. Furthermore, if the hypothesis holds true that Church reforms and
community involvement were motivated by increased competition in the region, the
Church’s success in combating Protestant growth provides an interesting reference
point for analyzing the Church as an economic agent and evaluating its strategic
development.
Before setting out to explore questions about the efficacy of Catholic Church
reform on civic activism and in combating competitive forces, several topics that
form the basis of this analysis merit review and consideration. Chapter II explores
the literature on economics and religion, delving into a review of the Church’s
institutional role in Latin America’s development. Chapter III provides a brief
history of the regional Church, explaining its structural limitations and the challenges
it confronts in light of increasing competition. In order to properly asses the success

6
or failure of the Church as a microeconomic agent (company) and a macroeconomic
source of growth (social institution), Chapter IV provides an assessment of
Protestant growth in Latin America and the Church’s competitive response. It also
presents the theory of religion’s transformative potential
3
and details its impact on
social movements and collective action. This brief history of the Church, religion’s
role in economics, and various theories on social movements provides the backdrop
for a statistical analysis of progressive Church reform’s impact on civic activism and
institutional growth.

3
The transformative potential, a term coined by Einstadt, refers to a religion’s ability to
“legitimize” the development of new activities, institutions and attitudes not originally a part of the
culture or status quo.

7
Chapter II. Religion and Economic Growth
Proponents of secularization theory once proclaimed that the degree to which
individuals identify with religious principles decreases as they become more
educated (Economics of Religion 1468). However, a review of religious
participation and adherence within developed countries does not indicate a shift
towards secularization. On the contrary, the United States provides a compelling
example of religion’s continued power within developed societies. The literature on
the economics of religion continues to expand, focusing on a variety of issues
including the interpretation of religious behavior from economic perspectives as well
as the economic consequences of religion. The question that remains at the forefront
of the literature is: what, if any, is the social and economic impact of religion?
In a working paper prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research
titled, “People’s Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes,” the effects of religious
beliefs on economic attitudes are explored from a general framework. The study
concludes that, “on average, religious beliefs are associated with good economic
attitudes, where good is defined as conducive to higher per capita income and
growth” (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 5). Such findings suggest that abandonment
of secularization theory is not only warranted but a positive condition. Based on the
wide variety of faiths that carry out the message of a higher power to its parishioners,
it becomes necessary to study differences among religious institutions so as to
determine how they relate to the level of “good” that comes from religious belief.
Studies comparing Christian religions emphasize the positive attributes found among

8
Protestant doctrines and their propensity to result in more favorable conditions for
growth and development than their Catholic counterparts (7).

A. Are Catholicism and Economic Growth at Odds?
The Catholic Church’s prominence and monopolistic power within Latin
America has been popularly considered an obstacle rather than an aid to growth. In a
review of former colonies and their religious and cultural characteristics, Grier notes:
The consensus in the literature has been that the
Spanish speaking countries inherited characteristics
from Spain, characteristics which are not especially
conducive to growth and development. Many have
argued that these traits emanate from Catholicism, a
dominant cultural force in most Spanish speaking
countries. (47)

Elaborating on this premise in Economic Development in Latin America, Swift
analyzes the Catholic Church within the framework of economic growth and cites it
as an aggravating factor in Latin America’s under-development. She cites two
specific aspects of the Church that form the basis of the widely held opinion that the
Church is partly responsible for a lack of development: the Church’s landholdings
and its early role as an informal financial institution (48).
In the context of Latin America’s historical development, the patronage
system that granted the Church vast land holdings and sealed its partnership with the
Crown provides specific evidence of a structural factor inhibiting Latin America’s
institutional development and promoting economic inefficiencies. While the
Church’s land holdings were not cultivated differently than were those held by

9
private individuals, its lending policies were driven by favor and personal interest as
opposed to economic criteria. Swift suggests that “relatively low interest rate[s] and
easy payment terms put little or no financial pressure on borrowers” (49). Therefore,
an important element of the Church’s institutional framework contributing to under-
development relates to its detrimental influence and control over the financial sector.
Elaborating on this hypothesis, Stulz and Williamson’s working paper
“Culture, Openness and Finance” explores the relationship between cultural beliefs
and investor protection as well as creditor rights. They argue that a “country’s
principal religion helps predict the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights better
than openness to international trade, language, per capita income, and origin of legal
system” (6). According to their findings, Catholic countries have significantly fewer
equity and debt issues, low stock market capitalization and less bank credit than
Protestant countries (13).
Because the Church engaged in poor lending policies and its relative wealth
in the region afforded it the opportunity to serve as the primary lending institution,
adequate banking institutions and financial intermediaries were prevented from
emerging through market opportunities. With the demise of colonial rule and the
emergence of nation states, the Church lost much of its free flow of liquid funds
afforded by the Crown and began a downward spiral of dwindling political and
financial power in relation to the state. With diminished land holdings, reduced
access to wealth, and increasing pressures to maintain the favor of the state through

10
relentless accommodation, the Church’s financial power was curtailed while no other
institutions existed to take its place.
Criticisms of the Catholic Church as a global institution also provide fuel for
the notion that the Church’s role in Latin America’s development has been
detrimental to its growth. For example, Putnam (1993) claims the Catholic Church’s
hierarchical structure has a negative impact on people’s average level of trust in
others. Supporting this premise, Landes (1998) asserts that the culture of intolerance
diffused by the Catholic Inquisition negatively affected the ability of Catholic
countries to grow (7). If the notion that cultural factors including trust and tolerance
play an important role in development is accepted, these authors’ assertions lend
credence to the idea that the Catholic Church has hindered growth in the region.
In addition to the limitations on community involvement that result from its
hierarchical nature, the Church’s relationship with the state has served to limit its
ability to respond rapidly to the social and economic needs of the poor. Because of
state participation in the appointment of Church officials, the Catholic Church’s
potential influence over political and economic matters related to inequality has long
been regarded as minimal. While Swift and others recognize progressive church
reforms as a shift in the institution’s role towards defender of the poor, the Church’s
historical weakness in addressing the needs of the poor has led many to downplay
the importance of its involvement in social matters. Swift suggests that state
censorship and hostility towards Church leaders who advocated change and spoke in
defense of the poor quickly silenced this minority element of Church leadership.

11
Furthermore, the Church’s dedication to the wealthy has been perceived as a
weakness towards its development of a strong relationship with the poor. Finally,
the growth of Protestantism in the last several decades has shifted the limited focus
of discussion regarding religion’s role in Latin America’s development away from
the Catholic Church and towards theories about the impact of religious pluralism on
social values and choices regarding political and economic development.

B. Is Protestantism the Answer to Growth?
The growth of Protestantism in the region has led to theories about the social
impact of religious awakening through faiths other than the dominant Catholicism.
This area of research is particularly relevant in light of pessimistic conclusions about
religion’s role in regional development, as many have questioned whether the plight
of Latin American countries is further hindered by its historical and cultural ties to
the Catholic Church. Studies comparing Christian religions emphasize the positive
attributes found among Protestant doctrines and their propensity to result in more
favorable conditions for growth and development than their Catholic counterparts.
Analysis of the characteristics specific to the Protestant faiths must naturally
begin with a review of Weber’s premise regarding the importance of the Protestant
work ethic on growth and industrial innovation
4
. Revisiting Weber’s central claim,
Blum and Dudley credit the growth of networking relationships and shared

4
Refer to Ian Steuart’s article “An Investigation into the Relationship between Religion and
Economic Development” for a more detailed description of Weber’s thesis.

12
ideologies in Europe with the advent of better commercial and trade relations among
Protestant areas (21). In their study, documented differences in GDP growth between
Protestant and Catholic nations provide a concrete point of comparison and yield
greater support for Weber’s claims. Given the positive relationships they find
between Protestantism and economic indicators such as trade and GDP, it is possible
to assume that a rise in Protestant groups in Latin America may provide a better
opportunity for growth in the region than Catholic reform.
Nevertheless, the focus of many studies on religion’s role in development has
shifted towards review of religious pluralism’s impact on religious institutions and
their subsequent role in social development. If one is to accept the hypothesis that
religious pluralism is a critical component in the debate about religion and politics, it
may not be necessary to establish whether Protestant characteristics are more
conducive to growth than Catholic doctrines or vice versa. In this context, it
becomes possible to evaluate the interplay between religions as a basis for social
growth and to abandon attempts at making conclusions about the relative strengths of
each religion in order to claim a winner in the development game. The availability
of alternate means of identification leads religious adherents to develop a better
understanding of their spiritual demands, in turn leading to greater institutional
development of religious groups. Chestnut takes this premise a step further and
suggests that religious pluralism is a precursor to free market institutional
development (59).

13
The focus, therefore, is not on which religion is the cultural backbone of a
society. Rather, how does that religion react to or induce changes in society through
institutional support? Social scientists converge on the premise that the growth of
Protestant faiths in Latin America is important in so far as it has led to greater
religious competition and a drive within the Catholic Church to maintain its
dominant position in society. Many assert that increased competition in the 1960s
led the Catholic Church to shift its focus towards serving the poor in order to
maintain and inspire members’ loyalty. Levine notes in his review of the progressive
church in the region:
There is a pattern of religious change manifested in
growing self-confidence and responsibility, and in
explicit insistence on linking faith to actions that
commonly lead to political involvement of some kind,
often unintended at first. (18)

Levine credits the Catholic Church’s encouragement of its followers to meet and
discuss the bible freely and in their language, with “nurtur[ing] confidence and
provid[ing] opportunities for self expression and shared self governance” (27). The
Church also provides the institutional support to make use of opportunities, such as
technological innovations, that shape the modern world (29).

C. Religious Pluralism
Although the surge in Protestant groups within Latin America has been
attributed to a shift in focus among Protestant groups away from Africa and Asia,
government deregulation of religious practice in many Latin American countries set

14
the groundwork for this shift. As further outlined in the sections to follow, many
Latin American governments in the late 1800s began to relax their regulation of
religion and decrease their favor of the Catholic Church. Gill explains that the shift
towards greater religious pluralism resulted from practical considerations related to
trade (“Protestant Problems” 9). To facilitate trade relations with Northern Europe
and the United Sates, countries more heavily dependent on international trade
realized there were benefits to be gained from greater religious tolerance. Although
minority religions were relegated to a secondary position and limited in their ability
to freely organize and grow, the political ties between church and state were
considerably loosened. Once Protestant groups began to focus their attention on the
region, the regulatory climate in a variety of countries allowed them opportunities to
embark on a proselytizing mission.
Religious pluralism has become a popular topic of analysis in the study of
economics and religion, as supply and demand characteristics are reviewed in light
of a competitive marketplace and efficiencies are entertained. The work of
Iannaccone and others in the study of the economics of religion that emphasizes the
rational choice model has placed the discussion in the context of economic models of
consumer choice. Reviewing religious extremism’s causes and symptoms,
Iannaccone and Berman suggest that, in areas with greater freedom of religious
expression and abundant supply of religious services, consumer preferences for
spiritual goods are better able to shape the structure of religious institutions.
Furthermore, the authors conclude that “[i]n a highly competitive environment,

15
religions have little choice but to abandon inefficient modes of production and
unpopular products in favor of more attractive and profitable alternatives” (111).
In light of competition, the Catholic Church was forced to modify its
inefficient supply of goods established in the context of its historically monopolistic
grasp on the region. While the Church was once able to focus on a small but
powerful segment of its core base and cater to the wealthy, increased competition in
the larger but economically challenged segment of the population forced them to
divert attention towards keeping the poor within the fold. The Church’s reformation
into a “church of the poor” was a manifestation of its competitive strategy. The
following review of the Catholic Church in Latin America provides a more in depth
analysis of its evolution and the challenges its historical beginnings have posed.

16
Chapter III. The Catholic Church in Latin America
The Catholic Church’s history and evolution in Latin America’s colonial
period is of contextual importance because it provides insight into its institutional
development. As the New World would have posed a major resource-exhaustive
challenge for any religion wishing to undertake the task of adding converts to the
fold, the Catholic Church was only able to step up to this challenge by relying on the
Crown for structure, assistance, and resources. The compromises made by the
Church in order to achieve this relationship were significant in so far as a great deal
of autonomy was lost in exchange for protection. If religion’s greatest contribution
to society may be in the form of empowering or supporting the process of social
change, the Church’s ties to the state would make it difficult to carry out this
mission. As Gill observes, the Church’s historical relation to the state made it a kind
of “pseudo-institution”, only serving the purpose of legitimating rule and subverting
the masses (Rendering unto Caesar).
As previously mentioned, among the benefits presented by cooperation with
the state was the development of a royal patronage system including land estates.
Though the encomiendas, as such estates were called, put the Church in a position of
infinite possibility with regards to the future value of its landholdings, the patronage
system gave the Crown many controls over religious appointments and consequently,
the direction of religious leadership in the region (24). The Church amassed a great
deal of economic control based on its landholdings and its command over potential
sources of income such as the civil registry, baptisms and all other sacraments which

17
often resulted in fees. The Crown also collected taxes from the population on behalf
of the Church, thereby eliminating the free rider problem endemic in religious groups
where parishioners who could potentially benefit from church services do not
contribute to its fundraising. While the Crown was a worthy ally, losing autonomy
compromised the most important component of its potential sway over parishioners.
Specifically, by owing the Crown legitimizing praise in exchange for financial
support, the Church lost its ability to maintain a position rooted in protecting and
serving the people, as it was infinitely tied to the state’s interests.
It is important to note that because the Crown provided financial and political
support, Catholic tradition became ingrained in the culture of the region. Therefore,
the fact that resources were scant and parishes could not be established throughout
the vast territory, particularly in the remote villages, did not pose a major threat for
the Church with regards to potential competition. This foundation would lead to one
of the greatest stumbling blocks the Catholic Church has encountered in the 20
th

century and beyond: while the continent boasts the largest Catholic population
throughout the world, it has the lowest proportion of priests per Catholic population
(Poblete 39).
While religious disestablishment in many countries within the region dates
back to the late 1800s, it wasn’t until the 1930s that threats from the international
community posed grounds for concern regarding competitive forces. Protestant
evangelical groups began to target Latin America upon facing dangerous conditions
in territories they once deemed better targets for their missionary activities (i.e.,

18
Africa and Asia). Furthermore, the threat of communism became a political as well
as social concern that required attention. Gill notes the essence of this period lies in
the Church’s effort to combat its competitors. In order to carry out this mission,
“Church leaders disassociated themselves from a single set of elites and learned to
accommodate whatever regime held political power, be it liberal or conservative,
democratic or despotic” (25). If the Church was to survive, it would have to become
a flexibly symbiotic entity, aligning itself with those in power in such a way as to
easily transition its legitimizing support to whoever achieved control in the next
struggle.
By the mid 1960s, in light of increasing pressures related to competition and
a deteriorating relationship with the state, the Church faced a crisis of personnel. As
Table 1 indicates, incredible population growth, competition, and a lack of
proselytizing zeal had led the number of priests per followers to reach a dangerous
low. The task of reaching out to the people, a difficulty faced by the leaders who
began their mission in the New World during the colonial period, had become
exponentially daunting. One of the major struggles confronted by the Church in
recruiting members to the priesthood was the huge opportunity cost associated with
the task.

19
Table 1. Total Number of Priests and Number of Inhabitants per Priest by Country
in 1965

Country
Total Number of
Priests
Inhabitants per
Priest
Argentina 4,922 4,064
Bolivia 581 5,958
Brazil 9,116 7,766
Chile 2,357 3,114
Colombia 3,841 3,679
Costa Rica 235 4,983
Cuba 730 9,310
Ecuador 1,170 3,400
Haiti 463 7,570
Honduras 119 15,899
Mexico 6,512 5,373
Nicaragua 190 7,773
Paraguay 426 4,150
Panama 141 7,482
Peru 1,496 7,257
Puerto Rico 400 5,902
Dominican Republic 246 12,252
El Salvador 310 8,067
Uruguay 688 4,109
Venezuela 1,249 5,371

Source: Poblete, Renato S.J. “The Church in Latin America: A Historical Survey” in The Church and
Social Change in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970) 46.

Coupled with the shortages of priests, the small number of parishes in the
region demonstrates the high cost of worship confronted by Catholics. Considering
the fact that most Latin American countries lacked alternate vehicles for worship, the

20
number of parishes in the area before and during the early period of the Progressive
Church era is remarkably small relative to the percent of the population that
continued to identify itself as Catholic. Based on this reality, Vallier suggests:
Latin American Catholicism although strong in its own
way, is typically extra sacramental. … [t]he Church
continues to carry out its ritual forms while the
majority of the members proceed to satisfy their
religious needs through indigenous and individualistic
frameworks. (27)

Although ritual and folkloric alternatives to religious practice were a part of
the cultural framework in which Latin Americans historically achieved their spiritual
needs, increasing opportunities from Protestant groups to achieve greater community
involvement through group worship became irresistible. Without a strong base in
poor communities providing a vehicle for the Church to reach its followers,
competitive groups gained inroads to the poor who were marginalized and faced
mounting difficulties brought on by modernization and consequent urbanization.
As a result of Protestant and Evangelical groups’ success in converting
disenfranchised Catholics, the Church embarked on a series of efforts which placed
the poor and marginalized of society at the core of its outreach. In order to
accomplish this mission, however, the Church was forced to confront some of the
obstacles it had not considered during its initial years of establishment. Among these
obstacles was the shortage of priests and parishes, made even more critical based on
the hierarchical nature of the institution and its formal and sacramental approach to
worship. Table 2 provides the number of Catholic priests in Latin America in the

21
beginning of the progressive church era, at the end, and nearly a decade later.
Regardless of the Church’s efforts to increase its leadership, from this representation
it becomes evident that major increases in the number of priests from the beginning
of this period to the 1980s were not achieved. This failure becomes particularly
relevant given the vast population increase in various countries of the region
throughout the period.
A potential source of relief required a transformation in the structure of the
Church’s hierarchical organization. The strategy of greater reliance on more
members of the congregation, such as lay personnel, was undertaken in the latter part
of the progressive era. It has continued to form a part of Church strategy in recent
years as “[t]he tremendous growth of Catholic religious personnel who are not
priests points to a move towards more decentralization and delegation of some
religious authorities” (Pattnayak 207). However, due to the violence and risks
brought on by the rule of oppressive military regimes, the level of lay personnel
throughout the 1960s and 1970s was in constant flux as many tried to flee to safety
and away from danger. Before the Church could increase its physical presence in the
region and confront its competitive disadvantage, it had to increase its spiritual
leadership by supporting and defending the poor. As a result of the political climate,
any kind of stable relationship with the state became impossible. The Church was
forced to restructure its focus and to find avenues in which to fulfill parishioner
demands while serving a larger part of its followers.

22

Table 2. Catholic Priests in Latin America throughout Progressive Church Era
Catholic priests 1960-1989
b
% Change
c

Year Priests Population
d

Country 1960 1980 1989 1960-1989
Argentina 4,794 5,108 5,732 20 56
Bolivia 684 788 783 15 92
Brazil 11,368 14,314 14,125 24 100
Chile 2,454 1,956 2,259 -8 69
Colombia 4,683 5,268 6,470 38 103
Costa Rica 255 401 552 117 150
Ecuador 1,345 1,284 1,672 24 126
Guatemala 322 631 689 114 116
Honduras 165 368 274 66 150
Mexico 6,690 9,579 10,690 60 126
Panama 182 300 301 66 109
Paraguay 376 502 593 58 122
Peru 1,742 2,221 2,550 46 113
Uruguay 619 560 733 18 21
Venezuela 1,458 2,156 2,151 48 150

a
The Progressive Church Era, as referred to by Anthony Gill in Rendering Unto Caesar,
refers to the period between 1960 and the early 1980s.
b
Taken from Organized Religion in the Political Transformation of Latin America (Lanham:
University Press, Inc., 1995) 205, as provided by the Statistical Abstract of Latin America v.29 page
326.
c
Calculations made by author.
d
Data about population statistics used in calculation is taken from the Penn World Tables
Version 6.1 (CICUP 2002).

23
Chapter IV. Religion’s Transformative Potential
In 1968, Eisenstadt published The Protestant Ethic and Modernization,
coining the phrase transformative potential with regards to religion’s ability to
“legitimize” the development of new activities, institutions and attitudes. In this
exploration of early Protestant growth in Europe, he proposed that Protestantism
redefined political and social institutions thereby impacting the reformulation of
roles within the economic sphere
5
. Borrowing from Eisenstadt’s conclusions, the
changes in Latin America’s religious landscape may have had more lasting and
influential effects than their intended scope in so far as religion has the capacity to
legitimize the development of new institutions. The Church’s relationship with
development was transformed through its newfound ability and willingness to
empower the community and serve as their voice within the political arena.
It is the transformative potential of religion, as exemplified by the changes
that took place in the Catholic Church beginning in the 1960s through the early
1980s, which contributed to and helped shape social change towards more
democratic systems of governance. Specifically, it may be argued that its emphasis
on empowering the people and addressing political evils led to a transformation of
the population towards greater activism and community involvement. In regions
where CEBs thrived, members became better prepared to strive for more democratic

5
See Steuart for a more detailed discussion of Eisenstadt’s theory. Steuart reinforces
Eisenstadt’s contention that “the significance of Protestantism lies not in its direct impact upon
economic, political or cultural spheres, but in the contribution it made, by way of its transformative
potential, towards the restructuring of European society in general” (9).

24
principles through an emphasis on political involvement and collective action. A
closer examination of the structure of social movements shaped by the Catholic
Church’s participation and organization merits review. Three primary themes in
recent social movement theory provide a framework for this analysis: political
opportunity, mobilizing structures and the framing process. The following discussion
of progressive church reforms lays the foundation for an empirical review of the
Church’s role in promoting civic activism and inspiring democratic change.

A. Political Opportunities
The political climate in which movements evolve is of particular relevance in
understanding how organizations come into existence and what factors lead to the
development of shared experiences and collective action (Chang and Kim 329).
Among the factors analyzed by political process theorists that shape political protest
is the degree to which a state resorts to repression in order to maintain and
consolidate power (McAdams et al. 93). From the mid 1960s to the early 1980s,
military governments and oppressive dictatorships characterized the political
structure of nearly all Latin American countries. In varying degrees and tactical
mutations, human rights violations, torture and execution led to widespread terror.
While such conditions would appear to suggest that opportunities for community and
organization were inconceivable, the extent to which the region faced oppressive rule
actually contributed to increased protest and civil unrest.

25
In an article published by Chang and Kim with many parallels to this
analysis, the authors analyzed Christian organizations and liberation theology as a
social movement within South Korea in the 1970s in light of current social
movement theories. Borrowing from Earl’s recommendations in New Directions, the
authors’ sought to “broaden the range of consequences of repression and ask how [it]
impacts…a movements organizational capacity and actors’ abilities to articulate
cultural frames” (330). Their analysis suggests that repression increased the number
and scope of social movement institutions in the country, as movement organizers
sought to respond directly to each form of repression governments used and to keep
their movements alive. Similarly, The Church’s role in social movements within
Latin America during this period of oppressive regimes cannot be underestimated.
Exacerbating the plight of the poor was economic despair and deteriorating
conditions on all institutional levels. Addressing the developmental crisis in the
region, the bishops referred to the situation faced by national economies as
institutionalized violence. Because of “the lack of structures in industry and farming,
in the national and international economy, and in cultural and political life,” the
bishops concluded, as Sigmund reveals, “whole populations lacking basic necessities
live in such dependence that it impedes all initiative and responsibility, as well as the
possibility of cultural promotion and participation in social and political life…”
(“Transformation” 50). Suddenly, the Church’s awareness of institutional and
structural problems ailing underdeveloped nations demanded the development of
adequate institutions to combat these problems. As Vallier mentions, “The main

26
goals of saving souls, preaching the gospel and administering the sacraments are
interrupted and deflected by problems of physical illness, famine, and illiteracy”
(28). While the void in structural resources had always existed, the more difficult
economic climate of the period made the Church’s responsibility to fill the gaps of
social programs greater.

B. Mobilizing Structures
Whereas researchers once focused all attention on the grievances that led
social movements to take place, the advent of resource mobilization theory led social
scientists to begin emphasizing the process of mobilization and the formal
organizations through which this process was carried out (McAdam et al. 4).
Religious institutions serve as ideal structures for the mobilization of movement
actors, providing necessary resources as well as a safe haven from political violence.
However, the Church in Latin America was historically remiss to provide such an
organization for community activity. Its scant resources and attention to the wealthy
rendered it impossible for the poor to benefit its promise as a mobilizing and
educating structure. Furthermore, the Church’s historical ties to the state created an
atmosphere in which it could not actively oppose leaders without risking its source of
power and financial support. As such, it had traditionally maintained an apolitical
stance, professing that the poor should look to the kingdom of heaven for hope of a
better life. However, given the severity of deplorable economic conditions and
despotic rule within Latin American countries in this period, the Church’s traditional

27
position of maintaining the status quo was no longer acceptable. Realizing the need
for conscious-raising and mobilization, it began “encouraging the poor to engage in a
critical analysis of how oppressed structures affect their own lives and how
collective action can change those structures” (Sigmund 52).
It is impossible to ignore the impact religious competition from Protestant
groups had in this transition within the Church hierarchy. Upon the appointment of
progressive Pope John XXIII in 1958, along with the Second Vatican Council (1962)
and subsequent regional meetings among the bishops of Latin America, it became
clear that the Church faced many challenges on an international level. In the region
hailed its largest base of followers, the Church was in its weakest form. In light of
such competition and an increased demand for religious goods, the structural
deficiencies in the bureaucratic church organization became obvious and an area in
need of change. Gill offers:
The Catholic Church is by far more bureaucratized
than any of its rivals in Latin America. As such, the
Catholic Church devotes a higher proportion of its
resources to maintaining its bureaucracy relative to
maintaining its parishioners than any of the more
decentralized Protestant churches. (“Institutional
Limitations” 140)

Protestantism presented itself with a flat structure and the flexibility required to
reach various segments of the population without accumulating the incremental
expenses that have weakened the Catholic Church. Church officials realized that the
lack of parishes and priests in the more rural areas of the region placed the institution
at a competitive disadvantage. The Church was forced to respond to increased

28
competition in a climate where it lacked the leadership to reach out to the
community. Therefore, its hierarchical structure seemed incapable of bringing about
the necessary conditions to maintain and inspire loyalty.
The Church had to rely on its parishioners in order to compete with other
faiths. It was forced to find a way to make the community work for it in order to
keep them under Catholicism’s wing. The notion of empowering the people, giving
them a voice in the community, and making them the chief advocates of Catholic
principles and leadership, became the key to survival. Leaders began preaching the
idea that the role of Catholics was no longer to sit back and wait for salvation, but
rather bring the kingdom of God into this world. With this strategy as the only
viable alternative to competition, the Church began its transformation and potentially
inspired social change in the region. Sigmund concludes:
In a continent which is overwhelmingly Catholic in
culture – although much less so in practice – this is a
positive development for liberal pluralist democracy.
The church influenced left is promoting
communitarian grass roots democracy, the center
participation and human rights, and the right free
markets economies and civil consensual government.
(61)

In a time of great peril during brutal dictatorships and financial crises, the Church
provided the necessary impetus and support for social changes to take shape under a
new rubric of community involvement, activism and empowerment. The Church’s
legitimacy and cultural ties contributed to its success in mobilizing society to
combat oppressive regimes.

29
Christian Base Communities
As a direct consequence of the Second Vatican Council, liberal Church
leaders began promoting and organizing around the concept of Christian Base
Communities
6
(referred to in the regional literature as “Comunidades Eclesiales de
Base” or CEBs). The CEBs’ emphasis on community involvement and leadership in
spiritual endeavors demonstrated the church’s response to its structural
disadvantages and its attempts to compete with other religions. Gill suggests that
CEBs constituted an attempt to restructure the Church’s presence in the region while
limiting “its cost of parishioner service” (“Institutional Limitations” 142). These
communities empowered lay religious leaders in ways unimaginable within the once
traditional and hierarchical framework. For the first time, many rural communities
suddenly found themselves at the center of their religion’s scope, organizing prayer
groups and masses in areas where churches had remained closed due to a shortage of
priests. “Although it was not the cause of a return to democratization in the region,”
Gill concludes, “the Catholic Church played an important role as mediator and
advocate towards the return to civil rule” (135). Through the rise of CEBs, the laity
was given a new and more hands-on role in evangelizing, as well as in defining the
scope of religious involvement in every day affairs.

6
In “Basic Ecclesial Communities: A New Model of the Church,” Gallo attempts to define
the concept of Christian Base Communities while recognizing the variety of explanations and
perceptions that have characterized these small societies throughout time. Gallo describes the CEBS
as small communities that meet for prayer and worship with the active participation of each
individual, whose reflection leads to courses of political action with the attempt of improving their
societies (96-97).

30
Whereas the Church has the potential to serve as a formal organization whose
power and global networks aid the growth and legitimization of movements, CEBs
constituted an informal “grassroots setting… facilitating and structuring collective
action” (McAdam et al. 4). CEBs were decentralized and their activities often
occurred outside the realm of the formal Church structure. They varied in the extent
to which they promoted and organized active political participation, frequently
limiting the scope of their activities to worship and spiritual exploration. However,
the grassroots nature of these communities was very effective in mobilizing
followers in areas where their activities were more political and subversive in nature.
Although little data exists about the size and number of CEBs, their makeup
and contributions to society undoubtedly prove an interesting exploration into how
progressive reforms impacted civic activism among community members. In the
International Review of Mission, Jose Marins suggests that more than mere clubs and
associations that brought together people of a community for a common goal of
worship, CEBs presented “a way of being church” (237). By breaking down the
Church’s hierarchical system, CEBs provided an avenue for exploration into areas
once considered independent of the realm of worship. For instance, the new regard
for individual outlook and “charismata” within communities allowed for a non-
hierarchical ministry to form, and gave prominence to the local leaders within
communities that included men, women and teams.
Additionally, by providing an avenue for active decentralization, less pastoral
uniformity and therefore greater autonomy became the norm, giving way to

31
opportunities to address the needs of individual communities from a needs-based
assessment. As Marin notes, “for many the church ceases to be a power structure
and is more an opportunity for service… [and] rediscovery of the political
dimension of faith is possible” (237).
However, Daudelin and Hewitt downplay CEBs’ importance in the
development of Latin America’s new social order. According to their research, the
number of CEBs has been grossly exaggerated in the literature. They conclude,
“….from a social-scientific standpoint, the revolution the communities were
supposed to represent for the Latin American Church never happened” (184). Not
only do researchers question the size and scope of CEBs, they also bring to light the
vast differences in purpose and action undertaken within these organized
communities. Mainwaring and Wilde suggest these communities were more centered
on devotion and a collective religious experience than on political organization and
protest.
Even if CEBs’ political impact has been exaggerated, it is impossible to
ignore the importance of the Church’s transformation in creating community
identity. Due to its limited personnel resources in the region, the Church was forced
to begin promoting community initiatives where it could leverage the charisma and
popularity of lay leaders to bring followers together in its name. Resulting from the
flexible and decentralized nature of CEBs, various forms of community organization
developed in order to address the specific needs of the segment of the population
which they served. In addition to base communities, those who became more active

32
members of the political religious front formed Christian Democratic Parties, many
of which continue to thrive in today’s political climate. Other groups took on a more
secular structure, becoming modern day work unions and addressing the needs of the
working class on a political, financial and organizational level. Sigmund notes:
The emergence of Christian Democratic Parties in a
number of countries in Latin America signified a break
with the old integralist hierarchical and corporatist
model that had predominated for so long in Latin
America. Particularly when combined with Christian-
inspired trade unions, they provided a mass base for
social reform and democracy. (45)

The various communities that developed in this period, whether focusing on
politics, religion, job training, or the development of familial ties on a local level,
were the first attempts made by the Church to cater to the needs of its largest base of
followers. For many, CEBs represented the first form of organization and collective
action they had ever experienced. Whether or not the communities existed in vast
regions of individual countries, or were isolated incidents in rural pockets, they
became the building blocks for later organizations, both religious and secular;
providing the tools for activism, participation and empowerment to prosper. “In the
longer term,” Pike suggests, “even if their direct political linkages decline, they will
continue to promote new sources and styles of leaders, who in turn will affect the
larger society” (75).
It is important to note that the Church’s new strategy faced many obstacles.
The alienation of a majority accustomed to its support of the status quo and emphasis
on the after-life was inevitable, as was a backlash from states accustomed to a

33
politically passive institution. As such, the reasons for this shift in policy within the
religious hierarchy require further explanation (Stoll 5). At the international Church
level, the threats presented by other religious groups as well as the consequences of
globalization, technological innovation, and increased opportunities for information
exchange, made adherence to traditional notions of society close to impossible. At
the regional level, political conflict, increased competition from Protestants and
Evangelicals, and economic crises threatening the vitality of the region made an
emphasis on defending and assisting the poor a requisite for survival.

C. Framing Processes
Whereas formal and informal organizations play a role in the success of
social movements and these are impacted by the political climate, these components
alone would not have cause to inspire action without a shared base of ideas and a
common understanding of the actions required to bring about change. Movement
theorists refer to this shared meaning as the framing process
7
. In addition to a
common culture, religion and socioeconomic status which often serves to bring
segments of a community together, shared meanings regarding injustices result in the
“collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate
between opportunity and action” (McAdam et al. 5). Not only is a shared

7
See McAdam et al.’s explanation of Snow’s contributions to movement theory and the
centrality of framing processes. The authors’ refer to Snow early contributions to the theory and
focus of framing process, highlighting his “original conception [of the term]…as referring to the
conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion stared understandings of the world and
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (6).

34
understanding of the injustices imposed by the state and powerful sectors of society a
pre-requisite for action, but also a belief that these grievances can be addressed and
that the actions taken to address them may result in positive consequences. In other
words, hope is a uniting and motivating factor in collective action.
The traditional Catholicism of colonial times, as Stoll relates, “…incline[d]
men toward a passive acceptance of the status quo” (Introduction). The new
Catholicism of the progressive church proclaimed its ethical obligation and that of its
followers to obtain social justice in this world. In a region culturally tied to
Catholicism and its tenants, any shift in religious structure and function could
potentially transform the nature of social thought and action. The Church’s
proclamation that followers were obligated to fight the political and economic evils
they confronted provided the impetus and motivation for communities to begin
sharing their struggles and to discuss ideas about how to improve their condition. It
also gave them hope that their plight in society could change and encouraged them to
believe they no longer had to resign themselves to the idea that justice would come
in the afterlife alone. Furthermore, the vocal condemnation of dictatorial regimes by
bishops and priests served to legitimize the plight of the poor and the oppressed. The
Church’s cultural prominence in the region affords it a level of legitimacy that
should not be undervalued in assessing its ability to sway public opinion.

35
Informational Cascades
Progressive church reforms provide the context for the rise of social
movements directly linked to the demise of military rule and the transition to more
democratic governments. However, the range of adherence and support of
progressive reforms by leaders within each Latin American country merits attention
and discussion. Much of the literature on the progressive church and its role in
toppling oppressive regimes centers on a handful of bishops, whose condemnation of
dictators and active resistance to repression was a central component towards
shaping global public opinion and collective action. The centrality of bishops’
actions in explaining and framing the size and efficacy of politically motivated CEBs
highlights the importance of these leaders in establishing the breadth of progressive
reform within communities and nations.
Because of the Church’s cultural ties to the region and its historical ties to the
state, government leaders often courted bishops and priests so as to reap the benefits
of their legitimizing power. In the early stages of military dictatorships, the Church
often remained silent and even granted leaders’ public support in order to provide a
degree of stability and calm in a tumultuous time. However, as they came to see
these regimes intended to stay as did their torture tactics, Church leaders in a number
of countries began to vocally oppose their governments while others were less vocal
and often remained silent in light of continued abuses. Bishops’ actions and the
resulting public outcry demonstrate the power of individuals to sway public opinion
and inspire movements. In countries where bishops were more vocal, social

36
movements also benefited from the protected status of the Church’s global presence,
and often received greater international resources with which to carry out their
activities.
In order to properly address the importance of liberal bishops in shaping both
Church policies and public movements, two important social mechanisms prevalent
in the literature on individual choice and cognitive psychology merit attention:
informational and reputational cascades. Informational cascades, as defined by
Kuran and Sunstein, “occur when people with incomplete personal information on a
particular matter base their own beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others.”
Reputational cascades, are also driven by incomplete information that leads to
knowledge dependencies, but are specific in the factors that motivate individuals to
take on popular ideas (686).
Before delving into the mechanisms that led to public outcry over repressive
regimes, it is important to understand the factors which led many bishops to take a
leadership role within their countries in shaping collective action. Prior to Vatican
II, a handful of liberal bishops had already begun to profess interest in liberation
theology, stressing a faith based commitment to address social injustice and bring
about a better society. Vatican II provided a forum in which these bishops could
bring forth such ideas, and subsequent conferences allowed these ideas to spread and
evolve into widespread progressive reforms. While many Church leaders were
distanced from understanding the plight of the poor because of their wealth and
position in society, the ideas and concepts brought forth by a handful of bishops

37
during these conferences awakened them to the conditions faced by their followers.
In essence, an informational cascade sprung from the passionate and vocal outcry of
a handful of bishops among Church leaders in Latin America and throughout the
world.
As informational and reputational cascades tend to merge and jointly shape
the course of opinion and debate (702), it is important to note that bishops’ actions
during Vatican II and directly following it were also driven by a desire to gain the
approval of Church leaders. The spirit and tone of Vatican II is not surprising given
the Church’s shift in leadership with the appointment of Pope John XXIII only four
years prior. Furthermore, while liberation theology and progressive ideas had
already started taking shape among various religious circles including bishops, these
ideas did not come to the forefront until they were rooted in leadership circles and
promoted as the new order rather than the ideas of a select few.
As bishops returned to their local parishes and communities, many were
inspired to act through vocal opposition of political leaders well as the dissemination
of ideas regarding social responsibility and Christian obligation to bring about
change. The poor were the chief targets of the call to action. This group represented
an uneducated and disenfranchised segment of the community with limited access to
information. Their cultural ties to the Church placed them in a position to accept the
bishop’s ideas as well as their calls to action. As these groups began to organize in
CEBs and discuss the political and economic evils that plagued their existence, an

38
informational cascade took shape among the masses and led to widespread support
of protestors and condemnation of the governments they wished to topple.
By revolutionizing its interaction with the poor segments of society, the
Church was forced to undergo a major transformation in its relations with the state.
Suddenly, after years of state dependence, which Vallier characterizes as “the cause
of a religio-moral deficiency in the region,” the Church embarked on a campaign to
break from the state and began to forge an unbreakable bond with the community.
This new relationship became more credible as the threat of state reprisals became a
reality and martyrs of the progressive church were born. More importantly, it
became a revolution worth supporting by the general population, as it became
evident that in a time of oppression and military brutality, the Church provided a
haven for revolutionary leaders and served as an advocate for their principles.
Similarly, among wealthy elite members of these communities, who were not
victims of economic violence and were often shielded from the dangers of social
unrest, their bishops provided new context and information regarding the plight of
the poor and popularized liberation theology along with notion of Christian
obligation to fight injustice. Among this segment and within many communities, a
reputational cascade took effect. The Church’s condemnation of government and
support of demonstrations required followers to adopt similar ideas and actions in
order to safeguard against social disapproval.

39
D. The Revolutionary Threshold
Although bishops’ actions facilitated the flow of information and promoted
collective action, it is important to note that public opinion and political choices are
motivated by a variety of factors whose combined effects on individual choices
dictate the revolutionary threshold or critical point at which each member chooses to
support the opposition (Kuran 248). In light of the rewards and consequences to
opposition, individuals may be impacted by the ideas and actions of movement
organizers or they may choose to remain idle. Given this dependency on individual
choices, the importance of a single event or group activity is determined by the
context in which it is taking place. For example, in countries where religious
competition was minimal and state support remained strong, bishops returned to their
communities and quietly assumed their roles as religious leaders without the same
zeal and commitment to the ideas shared by their peers. A different mechanism
came into play among these bishops, and progressive reforms did not flourish.
In Rendering unto Caesar, Gill suggests that bishops in countries with
limited Protestant growth often maintained conservative views on Church
participation in politics and continued to support the state. Furthermore, bishops in
these countries often provided public support for dictators and served as a
legitimizing force for their regimes and actions. In many of these countries, the lack
of religious competition was a direct result of continued state sponsorship of the
Catholic Church. As such, bishops were motivated to maintain state favor and
support their ideas. Not surprisingly, ideas espoused by government leaders about

40
the communist and subversive nature of CEBs were accepted and encouraged by
Church leaders. In some countries, CEBs came to be regarded as a cover for guerilla
forces and were often tied to Marxist ideological groups. The Church rallied against
these activities proclaiming them subversive and destabilizing forces in society while
their neighboring peers continued to support and promote progressive ideas.
The literature on religion and growth in Latin America fails to appreciate the
legitimizing power of the Church, with respect to both its favor of progressive
reforms as well as its support of oppressive regimes, because it emphasizes the
former and minimizes the importance of the latter. Rendering the actions of a
limited number of progressive priests and bishops as an exception to the rule, they
conclude that progressive reforms lacked institutional commitment and therefore
downplay their significance within the region. Swift asserts:
It must be clear first that those clergy who push[ed] for
genuine social reform are definitely in a minority.
When they beg[a]n to be taken seriously by people, a
great deal of pressure [was] put on the traditionally
minded hierarchy to have them removed… (9)

However, the Church’s structural transformation in the progressive era, with its
emphasis on small community organization, civic action and lay participation in
spiritual dialogue, cannot be underestimated. Even when the actions of a handful of
priests and bishops were suppressed and often lacked the support of the dominant
Church’s institutional framework, their message reached the masses and the
community organizations they developed helped keep their calls to protest alive.

41
It is important to note that even in communities where bishops’ actions
promoted collective action and provided mobilizing structures for movement
organization, the revolutionary threshold may not have been reached. In the same
manner that bishops were influenced by the political and social context in which they
engaged, individuals within their communities also responded to these factors.
Given perceptions about the rewards and consequences to opposition, individuals
may have chosen not to participate in movements and remain idle, regardless of the
ideas and activities taking shape around them.
For example, the extent and form of torture tactics as well as perceptions
about the potential outcomes of opposition may have led to different outcomes
within countries. In addition, the prominence of other interest groups also shapes the
context in which individuals make decisions. Other groups may express views in
favor of the government or its detractors, and the strength of their activities
contributes to the information available about expected rewards. Media coverage
and international attention are also key factors in establishing the urgency of action
and the potential for success (Kuran 254-272).
The dynamic nature of revolutionary thresholds within societies makes it
difficult to establish a direct relationship between an individual act and the
cumulative effect of small shifts in personal equilibria that result in a massive shift in
public opinion. However, analyzing the strength of social movements in recruiting
members and shifting personal opinion is instrumental to understanding how
revolutions evolve. Even if the timing and extent of a movement’s activities cannot

42
predict its outcome given the variety external factors in which it operates, a
movement’s role in transforming individual choices and supporting continued action
among its followers is important in so far is it contributes to an eventual shift in
public opinion.

43
Chapter V. Assessment and Future Outlook
Given the historical foundations of the Church in Latin America and the
changes that occurred throughout its period of revitalization and reform, it is not
surprising that many have come to study its impact on both sociopolitical and
developmental fronts. Emphasizing the role religious institutions play within the
region, Gill proclaims that during the period of progressive reform “organized
religion play[ed] a greater role (both politically and spiritually) in Latin American
society than at any time in the recent past” (Rendering unto Caesar 18). The
Church’s inner struggle to maintain dominance in the region resulted in its necessary
incorporation into the development discussion.
Due to changes in the region’s political and economic landscape since the
1980s, many have come to believe that the major transformation in society predicted
to result from the religious revolution was not achieved. The appointment of a new
pope with a more conservative agenda has also brought into question whether the
progressive reforms will remain simply a failed attempt at competitive strategy in the
future. Furthermore, the Catholic Church’s position remains compromised based on
the increasing presence of other faiths and secular ideas that challenge its ability to
dictate the makeup of Latin America’s future belief system and ideologies.
If the importance of religious institutions in transforming societies and
bringing about growth are to be longstanding, however, the process of growth and
transformation should transcend specific study of the religious institution and delve
into the changes and progress of the society as a whole. Changes that are related to

44
Church initiatives during a period of transformation may cease to fall under the radar
of the religious institution once any gains sought by the Church are
8
either realized
or abandoned. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the net benefit to society is lost
because the Church does not continue to provide the services in order for that benefit
to be realized.

8
Levine argues that groups arising from religious change, linking faith to action, generate
small scale projects related to actions of faith and religious practice that eventually evolve into a
transformation in social consciousness defined as empowerment. Therefore, religion is of particular
importance as these are often the first groups that any one has heard of or been involved with in the
community. Refer to Levine’s article (1995), “Religious Change, Empowerment, and Power:
Reflections on the Latin American Experience” in Organized Religion in the Political Transformation
of Latin America.

45
Chapter VI. Discussion Topics
The preceding sections provide an overview of the Catholic Church in Latin
America from the Colonial Period to the end of what is deemed the Progressive
Church Era. One of the challenges presented in the review of the literature is that
discussion of progressive reforms to date has focused primarily on predictions about
their social benefits, but little attention has been placed on their realized potential.
Recent literature concludes such reforms did not achieve their full potential based on
the shrinking presence of CEBs, signaling the Church’s inability to evoke a
transformation in civic participation and political activity. Furthermore, the
continued presence and alarming growth of Protestant groups has led researchers to
hail the Church’s inability to combat competition. The following statistical analysis
attempts to add to the literature by providing an empirical assessment of the link
between progressive reforms and civic activism during the Progressive Church Era.
Furthermore, the growth of lay personnel, a chief component of the Church’s
competitive strategy, is empirically tested against the level of religious competition
to determine whether such a strategy was effectively employed within countries
facing the greatest threat of competition.

Topic 1: Civic Activism - From Organizational Words to a Society in Action
One of the most important characteristics of Catholic progressivism’s
manifestation in Latin America was the unprecedented vocal opposition by Church
leaders to authoritarian rule (Rendering unto Caesar 39). The new emphasis on the

46
poor and the concepts put forth by liberation theology led to a break from the
traditional model of church-state relations. A once conciliatory and supportive
Church leadership began to speak out against oppression. Progressive bishops
ceased to view politics and worldly pursuits as separate from those of faith and
religion. While its opposition to authoritarian regimes proved a valuable resource
within several Latin American countries in combating the abuses of oppressive
governments, it is worthwhile to consider whether the Church’s new found courage
extended beyond the actions of a handful of bishops.
Perhaps the most notable outcome of Vatican II with respect to the Church’s
institutional growth was that it put forth a variety of “democratic reforms within the
Church sanctioned by the papacy”. For example, “mass was to be said in the
vernacular, Church members were to practice toleration for alternative ideas, and
greater attention was to be paid to social justice” (36). Not only did the Church set
forth a new “democratic” understanding of how it should relate to its parishioners,
but it also set out to educate and organize its followers in the process of
democratization through the establishments of CEBs. In addition to the religious
services provided by such groups, many included a variety of services geared
towards self improvement which included “community meetings to press the
government for public services” (37). Whether the actions taken by these groups are
revered as progressive or simply subversive, they provided a forum in which the
community could begin to feel empowered and develop the skills necessary to
combat oppression.

47
Although much has been said about the nature of Church opposition to
authoritarian regimes, there exists no review of historical data in the region that
supports the notion such activities actually led to a social transformation. Did the
bishops’ actions in several Latin American countries speaking out against oppressive
regimes extend beyond verbal condemnations to empowering communities through
organized channels? How successful were CEBs in preparing members to participate
in a democratic society by teaching them to participate in the political process?

Topic 2: Competitive Strategy within Church Organization
Recent additions to the literature on the Catholic Church in Latin America
indicate the importance of a growth in lay personnel as a tool towards overcoming its
structural disadvantages. In the collection of articles Organized Religion in the
Political Transformation of Latin America, Pattnayak suggests that recent increases
in personnel present a positive outlook for Latin American countries in their struggle
to overcome Protestant growth. Specifically:
The tremendous growth of Catholic religious personnel
who are not priests points to a move towards
decentralization and delegation of some religious
authority and practices… Moreover, increases in the
number of religious sisters in most countries symbolize
perhaps a trend towards greater use of women
personnel in Church services. (Appendix 208)

Although progressive reforms were instituted in part as a competitive strategy
towards appealing to followers, as a provider of religious goods the Church must
address its institutionally weak position in reaching a greater number of followers.

48
Furthermore, reliance on this segment of their workforce, while a source of relief
from the difficulties confronted in the recruitment of new priests, also provides an
opportunity for the Church to revamp its image with the community and become
closer to its members. Even if CEBs are no longer a tool for direct community
involvement and empowerment, the increased involvement of lay personnel in daily
worship may prove an effective substitute.
Although Pattnayak has provided an overview of changes in Church
personnel throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, no analysis of the progressive reform
period has yet been undertaken. Furthermore, Pattnayak’s assessment is based on
subjective country rankings using aggregate data. Although the rankings are
interesting in that they point to growth in this segment, they do not provide a
comprehensive picture of the Church’s strategy. Pattnayak concedes that, “the
Catholic Church has indeed made a concerted effort to supplant its religious
personnel in countries where it lost ground” (208). Therefore, a statistical review of
panel data across time and countries provides a stronger basis for evaluating the
relationship between growth in Church personnel and reaction to competition.

49
Chapter VII. Model: Civic Activism and Church Reform
In order to test the premise that the Catholic Church’s progressive reforms of
the 1960s through 1980s represented a transformative movement, the hypothesis is
presented that such opposition coupled with the lessons of self empowerment
brought forth by the CEBs led to an increase in political participation. Liberation
theology’s call for action among the poor required that they become participants in
the struggle to “liberate” themselves from poverty and oppression. Church followers
were guided into membership in communities (CEBs) where principles of political
and economic organization were espoused as vehicles towards combating social
ailments. A potential measure of whether such activities resulted in social
consciousness raising and greater political participation is how these impacted civic
activism, defined as demonstrations for or against regimes and their leaders within
countries. As this period is marked by authoritarian dictatorial and military regimes,
manifestations of civic activism such as voter participation and party organization do
not present a viable measure of change, given that democratic principles were not in
place to support or validate their emergence. However, a substitute measure of
community awakening and civic participation presents itself in the degree to which
followers organized to protest oppressive regimes, following in the footsteps of their
Church leaders.
In The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Charles Taylor
Lewis and David Jodice provide data on a variety of indicators, including measures
of protest demonstrations taking both peaceful and violent forms. The data set

50
“contains aggregate data on 136 countries… and is the main source of statistics used
by social scientists interested in correlating political factors with social, economic
and civic levels of development” (Ibanez 548). Several variables related to civic
activity are captured, and these were aggregated to create two measures of
annualized civic activism in each country: peaceful demonstration and violent
demonstration. Included within the peaceful demonstration variable are protest
demonstrations, defined as non-violent gatherings to protest a regime, government,
or one of its leaders; regime support demonstrations, also non-violent
demonstrations where participants gathered to lend support to a government or its
policies; and political strikes, which consist of work stoppages, including workers as
well as students, intended to protest a regime. The violent demonstration variable
includes measures of riots, which are defined as spontaneous violent demonstrations
where physical force (resulting in destruction of property and/or physical violence)
was used and armed attacks, distinguished from riots based on the degree to which
the violence was planned and carried out.
Because of the oppressive nature of governments pervasive within Latin
American countries in this period, such demonstrations to protest leadership action
and representation may have taken a predominantly violent form. Furthermore, as
many critics of the CEBs suggest that these communities provided a cover for
guerilla activity, exploring whether such teachings led to violent activity or peaceful
protest may help to unravel the potential long term effects of such changes.
Specifically, if the activities encouraged by CEBs led to guerilla action and violence,

51
their impact on future political participation under more democratic regimes is likely
to decrease, as the means by which change is sought may be viewed as a
destabilizing effort and the call to action may be perceived as a last resort. Finally,
because violent demonstrations are not only the result of the organizer’s actions, but
also a product of the leadership’s reaction, measuring peaceful activities exclusively
does not provide a comprehensive view of the degree to which communities were
mobilized into political participation.
As Moreno Ibanez indicates, Taylor Lewis and Jodice’s indicators provide
the most complete time series data on political indicators. However, it is important
to note that because this data is difficult to measure, a degree of caution must be used
in applying these measures and making conclusions about political behavior within
countries. Some of the potential shortfalls of the data that have been highlighted in
the literature and these are related to the sources utilized in compiling the set and the
manner in which individual incidents were codified. For example, the data was
compiled using the New York Times Index and data from the Associated Press. As
such, there may be challenges associated with journalistic bias based on its implicit
reliance on mass-media perception of violence within nations. Nevertheless, given
the source constraints; Moreno Ibanez argues that the two sources “offer relatively
consistent coverage over time” (559). Additionally, issues such as the lack of
attention to the magnitude of demonstrations (the number of participants is omitted),
the absence of factors such as repression and international intervention, and the
interplay between community action and leadership reaction, provide some obstacles

52
to the interpretation of the data as a holistic view of political conflict. Understanding
these limitations and potential flaws in the data is important in the assessment of its
impact, but it does not negate the power of using this data as a starting point for
analysis. As such, the data is used as an indicator of civic activism in this analysis
with caution as to how its limitations impact the interpretation of results and with
attention to the factors mentioned above that may help explain or qualify its
relationship to explanatory variables.
In order to test the hypothesis that civic activism was impacted by the
Church’s progressive reforms, Anthony Gill’s conclusions about the relationship
between competition and the level of reform in twelve Latin American countries are
used. Because little data exists about the size, quantity, and strength of CEBs within
Latin America, and because the activities conducted within these communities varied
across countries and groups, it is difficult to find adequate sources of information to
analyze the level of social improvement programs brought about by progressive
Church reforms. However, Anthony Gill’s conclusions in Rendering unto Caesar
provide a potential basis for analysis in the absence of data regarding CEBs’
activities. As Gill found a statistically significant correlation between religious
competition within a country and its bishops’ opposition to authoritarian rule (an
indicator of bishop’s receptivity to progressive reforms), it is possible to use
competition as an indicator of CEBs’ activities within a given country. The change in
Catholic adherence is used as the independent variable indicating Church reform. As
progressive reform impacted church-state relations through active opposition to

53
leadership and church-community relationships, a bishop’s position regarding
authoritarian rule is related to the degree to which progressive reforms were
embarked upon in a given country. Therefore, building on Guild’s analysis, the
degree to which a country faced competition from other religious groups (namely
Protestants) may be used as a measure of whether progressive reforms that were
undertaken emphasized social empowerment.
While Gill’s measure of competition is based on the percentage increase in
competitive religious groups, defined as growth in the number of adherents to other
Christian proselytizing denominations, such data is not available on an annualized
basis for the period analyzed. Therefore, rather than evaluating competition from the
perspective of growth in other religious groups, the variable used to measure
religious competition is the decline in Catholic adherents, as a review of the
literature provides strong evidence supporting the notion that changes in the Catholic
population were predominantly the result of Protestant growth. While this
“negative” measure of competition poses some limitations, as it ignores the
possibility of competition resulting from non-Protestant religious groups as well as
the impact of secularization brought about by rapid modernization, the review of the
literature presented above minimizes the impact of alternate causes for declining
Catholic participation. It may be argued that while Protestant competition, as Gill
suggests, was a major factor in causing the Church to awaken from a lazy monopoly
position into a more competitive strategic focus, competition from other sources
would result in the same reaction. Furthermore, such competitive factors, although

54
potentially marginal in comparison to the wave of Protestant growth experienced in
this period, when coupled with the threat of Protestant growth, create greater cause
for action among Church leadership.
As Gill’s thesis is used as a starting point in defining the independent variable
measuring Church reform in a country, it is important to note several limitations in
his analysis that may impact this study. Specifically, Gill’s indicator of bishops’
opposition to authoritarian rule is modeled as a dummy variable indicative of
whether a review of the literature provides evidence that bishops within a country
actively spoke against authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, he uses only one data
point for each country in his model to represent Church opposition throughout the
entire period between 1960 and 1980. Therefore, there is no data to indicate: (1) the
length of time within the period that a country faced authoritarian rule, (2) the length
of time in which bishops in a country spoke out against the oppressive regime, (3)
nor the degree to which opposition was voiced by bishops. While it is important to
note that the cumulative impact of competitive forces between 1900 and 1970 is
presented as a factor in determining reaction to oppressive regimes throughout the
1960s and 1980s, gaps in his analysis period provide cause for further reflection as to
the tested relationship between the variables. Finally, as Gill explains, “not all
bishops in a given country hold the same view…keeping this in mind [I identified]
whether the Episcopal “center of gravity” leans towards support for or opposition to
the military” (105). Nevertheless, Gill’s analysis provides a valuable bridge towards

55
statistically analyzing the impact of progressive reform in the absence of specific
data on the activities and organizations born of the progressive era.
As an alternate measure of reform, Gill presented an index of average bishop
incumbency since 1958 for the twelve countries analyzed. He reasoned that “bishops
appointed several years after Vatican II are assumed to be more receptive to
[progressive] reforms than ones appointed before 1962” (106). In his regression
analysis, Gill found that reform indeed contributed to the predictive power of the
model but was not statistically significant. These results led him to conclude that,
although a cursory look at the data indicates that the anti-authoritarian group of
countries had younger episcopacies on average than their pro-authoritarian
counterparts, “observed results could have occurred simply by chance” (108).
Furthermore, in a review of Rendering unto Caesar, Mackin points out that Gill’s
aggregate study is flawed in so far as it fails to provide diocesan level information
that would demonstrate a definitive link between competition (Protestant growth in
the community) and progressive bishops (502). Also weakening this relationship,
although bishops appointed in the midst of the reform period were likely more
susceptible to the liberal ideas promoted by Vatican II, continued state influence in
Church appointments within various countries potentially minimized the popularity
of liberal thinkers and likely placed new leaders with conservative views at the helm.
Finally, while bishop incumbency may have aided the initial impetus to implement
progressive reforms, the backlash of regime repression may have led to more
conservative appointments thereafter. Nevertheless, Gill’s reform variable, while

56
omitted from the statistical model presented below, is included in the aggregate data
table to follow (Table 4) in order to provide greater context on the differences in
Church leadership among the countries analyzed.
In addition to progressive church reform (indirectly represented as the level
of religious competition within a country), three variables are included as
explanations for the level of political participation. As the data is organized in five
year buckets in order to account for the cumulative effect of religious competition (or
loss in religious adherents throughout time), the lagged number of protest
demonstrations is analyzed as a factor contributing to demonstrations in the current
period. The hypothesis being tested is that political conflict spawns future conflict,
as a cause and effect spiral is enacted through leadership reactions to such protest.
Secondly, as repression may impact the ability of constituents to voice their
opposition to a regime and its practices, a measure for persistent authoritarian rule
throughout each five year bucket is also used as a potential explanation. The number
of years within each five year period in which an authoritarian regime was in power,
as classified by Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Linan, is used to address the notion
that the regime in power may suppress civic activity. Dummy variables are used to
account for potential fixed effects resulting from the used of panel data. The use of
dummy variables is intended to account for any unobserved heterogeneity constant
for each of the countries over the analysis period.
Finally, urban population as recorded in the Statistical Abstract of Latin
America is included in the analysis. Urbanization has been cited in the literature as a

57
factor in the political instability within Latin America based on the concept of
relative deprivation and its proposed revolutionary consequences. Relative
deprivation theory indicates that frustration stemming from unrealized expectations
upon the transition into cities and away from rural areas is a potential cause of civil
unrest (Moreno Ibanez 548). Based on relative deprivation theory’s premise that
urbanization is a culprit in the rise of political instability, the level and change in
urban population should have had a positive effect on the level of protest
demonstrations.
A review of the raw data aggregated across the analysis period (1960-1975)
and grouped by Gill’s Pro-authoritarian and Anti-authoritarian classifications
(Rendering unto Caesar), shows that within groups the average level of competition
(% change in adherents) appears to have a negative relationship with peaceful and
violent demonstrations alike (see Table 3 below). On closer examination; however,
Argentina’s recorded number of demonstrations appears well above the average
number recorded for all countries in the study, thereby increasing the average
number of demonstrations in the pro-authoritarian grouping considerably. The
average number of violent and peaceful demonstrations within the Pro-authoritarian
group drops to 123 and 27 respectively when Argentina is removed from the
calculation. Removing Argentina as a potential outlier places the average for the
Pro-Authoritarian group slightly below the Anti-authoritarian group’s average.
Argentina’s case is analyzed in depth below, as its unparalleled record of
demonstrations during this period merits greater consideration. Once Argentina is

58
excluded from the analysis group, a cursory look at the data suggests the predicted
relationship between competition and activism holds true.

Table 3. Aggregate Data Comparison based on Gill's Country Groupings 1960-1975

Peaceful Violent
Years of
Authoritarian
Rule
% Change in
Catholic
Population
% Catholic
Population
1975
% Change in
Urban
Population
% Urban
Population
1975
Antiauthoritarian
Brazil 43 164 12 -5.4% 88 % 33.4% 59 %
Chile 36 121 3 -1.3% 88 % 15.2% 77 %
Panama 35 129 8 -4.0% 89 % 14.2% 48 %
Ecuador 33 127 11 -1.6% 93 % 23.7% 41 %
El Salvador 18 47 25 -6.2% 92 % 3.9% 41 %
Nicaragua 10 66 20 -4.1% 91 % 12.4% 48 %
Average 29 109 13 -4% 90 % 17% 52 %
Proauthoritarian
Argentina 134 601 10 0.9% 90 % 8.4% 80 %
Bolivia 37 266 12 -4.2% 91 % 21.6% 41 %
Guatemala 36 191 20 -7.8% 85 % 10.8% 36 %
Uruguay 31 42 3 9.2% 88 % 2.8% 83 %
Paraguay 24 57 20 -2.3% 93 % 6.3% 38 %
Honduras 6 62 12 -4.4% 94 % 41.1% 31 %
Average 45 203 13 -1% 90 % 15% 52 %
a
Gill's Dummy Variable for opposition or support of authoritarian regimes - Antiauthoritarian vs. Proauthoritarian (1198)
Demonstrations

Additionally, averages for the remaining independent variables analyzed are
surprisingly identical, suggesting little evidence of their predictive value on
demonstrations relative to Gill’s groupings. The within group average number of
years of authoritarian rule is equal; seeming to lack evidence for the notion that
differences in the level of protest demonstrations is related to the persistence of
authoritarian regimes within countries. Aggregated results may be misleading as
they do not provide detail into the link between demonstrations and current political
regimes. Specifically, they do not provide insight as to whether the majority of
demonstrations occurred when an authoritarian regime was in power or otherwise. It

59
is also important to caution that tracking the amount of time an authoritarian regime
is in power need not account for the level of repression or severity of the
authoritarian regime. Extreme cases of repression should have a more significant
impact on demonstrations regardless of how long regimes retain power.
The average value of competition in the county groupings indicates similarity
between Gill’s measure of competition and the proposed analysis In general, the
Catholic percent of population within the two groups in 1975, the final year in the
analysis period, was 90%, demonstrating the Catholic Church’s continued position as
a dominant religion despite increased competition.
It is interesting to note that when the countries are ranked based on the
greatest number of total demonstrations recorded throughout the analysis period
(1960-1975), Gill’s Anti-authoritarian group is primarily in the middle range of
demonstrations, with the Pro-authoritarian extremes on either end of the spectrum
(see Table 4 below). Similarly, average bishop incumbency does not track against
level of demonstrations, with younger episcopacies ranking among the middle of the
group.
As Table 4 indicates, the change in Catholic population does not seem to
track closely against demonstrations at the aggregate level when Gill’s country
groupings are not considered. However, it is important to caution against placing too
much value on a summary view of the data throughout the entire period in question.
Aggregation may cause a net effect that obscures any relationship between the
variables. The following study contains several observations for each country based

60
on time series data, thereby providing a more detailed view of the relationships that
may have been obscured through the aggregation of the data across time.
Specifically, it is interesting to note how the relationship between competition (the
proposed measure of progressive reform) and protest demonstrations behaves in
periods directly following a decline in adherents.
Using multivariate analysis on the panel data set, the strength of the
relationship between the two measures of demonstrations (peaceful and violent) and
the independent variables was examined. Whether the dependent variable studied is
peaceful demonstrations or violent demonstrations, the persistence of authoritarian
rule registers a negative correlation with the dependent variable (see Tables 5 & 6
below). As hypothesized, fewer demonstrations occur during periods when
authoritarian regimes are in power. This could be the result of repression and limited
opportunity for the expression of dissatisfaction with a particular regime.
Conversely, the lagged number of demonstrations in the previous period exhibits a
positive correlation with the number of violent demonstrations in the current period.
Once the cycle of action and reaction is unleashed, its impact on future conflict is
heightened.

61
Table 4. Aggregate Data Ranked by Greatest Number of Violent Demonstrations 1960-1975

62
Table 5. Results of Analysis - Peaceful Demonstrations
I II III IV
Constant 9.75 -6.93 -8.70 8.22
0.005 0.608 0.668 0.046
Lag Peaceful Demonstration 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21
0.094 0.081 0.085 0.092
% Urban Population 0.04 0.01
0.613 0.932
Change in Urban Population -0.072 -0.202
0.646 0.334
Years Authoritarian -1.11 -1.37 -1.23 -1.10
0.010 0.003 0.010 0.020
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.22 -0.21
0.166 0.192
% Catholic Adherents Lagged 0.22 0.17
0.214 0.356
Argentina Dummy 20.40 19.05 19.11 20.67
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
% Predicted correctly 64.10% 63.77% 63.17% 63.92%
Dependent Variable = Peaceful Demonstrations
P Values italicized

With respect to the independent variables measuring urbanization, a
statistically significant correlation was not supported in any of the model
specifications. Directionally, changes (+) in urban population appear to have a
positive effect on demonstrations, in line with social deprivation theory’s tenant that
frustrations brought about by disillusionment, inequality and increased poverty lead
to mass uprising. However, the lack of statistical significance is not surprising, in
light of historical evidence “that deep economic crises do not necessarily generate
heightened political agitation” (Kuran 253).

63
Table 6. Results of Analysis - Violent Demonstrations
I II III IV
Constant 42.27 -23.93 -35.75 12.30
0.016 0.764 0.496 0.345
Lag Violent Demonstration 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.49
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
% Urban Population -0.31 -0.09
0.232 0.804
Change in Urban Population -4.13 0.69
0.867 0.276
Years Authoritarian -4.40 -4.31 -4.13 -3.61
0.021 0.020 0.022 0.036
Change in Catholic Adherents 0.15 0.14
0.819 0.833
% Catholic Adherents Lagged 0.61 0.65
0.404 0.343
Argentina Dummy 78.06 69.73 67.15 70.43
0.021 0.006 0.002 0.001
% Predicted correctly 70.16% 70.62% 70.59% 70.59%
Dependent Variable = Violent Demonstrations
P Values italicized

The relationship between the size of the Catholic population and the number
of violent demonstrations is found to be negative, although not statistically
significant at the 5% level. Directionally, larger Catholic populations are related to a
greater number of demonstrations. Meanwhile, a decrease in the Catholic population
from one period to the next, resulting from competition, is positively correlated with
the level of demonstrations though not statistically significant. In summary, while a
decrease in adherence due to competition, results in greater activism, the size of the
Catholic population in the current period is also related to the strength of social

64
movement participation. In order for the Catholic Church’s reforms to result in
action, there must be a strong base of followers that are influenced by their ideas.
An important factor for consideration is that the strength and number of
protest demonstrations provides a glimpse into the Church’s success as a mobilizing
structure, but it may not necessarily indicate the level of Church activity in this
realm. It is important to highlight the notion that individual choices are dependent
upon one another, rendering predictions about the timing of revolts impossible.
While the vocal dissatisfaction of one may have the potential to shift public opinion,
the dissatisfaction of many may not be sufficient to catapult a revolution (Kuran
251).
The existence of multiple equilibria signal the possibility that, what may be a
precipitating factor to revolution in one community may not have the same outcome
in another, given different conditions among countries. Specifically, while the
Catholic Church’s progressive reforms may have been a catalyst in some countries
towards increased public outcry, it may not have been sufficient in others. This
premise is supported by the data, given the strength and significance of the dummy
variables which represent fixed effects that are country specific. Although it is
impossible to highlight all of the conditions present within individual countries that
result in varied political outcomes, a brief discussion of several key factors is helpful.

65
Discussion of Country Differences
As reviewed earlier, individual political choices are framed by a variety of
factors which relate to their preferences, the anticipated costs and benefits of revolt
and the potential for success. The cumulative assessment of these factors creates an
equilibrium that determines the community’s propensity to revolt (Kuran 253). The
costs of failure associated with participation in a revolution, for example, are related
to the political context in which activities are unfolding. Although authoritarian
regimes were “the norm” throughout this period in Latin America’s history, the
degree of repression and torture tactics unleashed within each country varied. In so
far as the Church was able to serve as a safety net for movement participants, it may
have been able to alter perceptions about the costs of participation. Furthermore, the
degree to which CEBs educated members about current events and democratic ideas
impacted their perceptions about the benefits of participation and the expected
rewards of success.
Due to the interdependencies among people’s choices, it is not surprising that
the model’s predictive power rests on the country dummy variables. However, it is
important to understand the Church’s role among the various forces that determine
political outcomes. Not only did the Church provide avenues for social participation
and support for movement leaders, but also they provided leaders whose vocal
opposition to authoritarian regimes helped shape the context and ideas with which
people could determine political choices. In some countries, bishops served as
movement leaders and their actions inspired informational and reputational cascades

66
that fostered the spirit of collective action. In a region where the Catholic Church’s
cultural and historical prominence cannot be discounted, religious leaders play a key
role in forming public opinion and ultimately inspiring action. Loveman suggests
the Church’s early participation and its contribution of resources and networks
available to movement organizers is key to the movement’s growth: “early
risers…create the space for later waves of participants who may indeed be
responding to relative improvements in the structure of opportunities” (485). While
the Church’s activities cannot be held directly responsible for revolutions, its role in
establishing a new equilibrium should not be discounted.

Argentina
In the model specifications tested, inclusion of a dummy variable for
Argentina is positively correlated with demonstrations and is statistically significant.
As mentioned above, a review of the aggregate data shows that recorded
demonstrations in Argentina, particularly violent demonstrations, were much greater
than in all of the other countries analyzed. These statistics are of particular interest
given Argentina’s characterization in the literature as the most dramatic example of
Pro-Authoritarian or conservative Church leadership in the face of brutal oppressive
regimes (Rendering Unto Caesar 149-171). Further discussion of the Church’s
history in the country and the circumstances that framed its position during this
period is merited. As Argentina’s Church was not an important structure in

67
galvanizing protest and collective action, mention of other mechanisms impacting
public opinion proves helpful in understanding the data and results.
One of the factors influencing the Church’s choice to overlook and often
criticize progressive reforms was the absence of major competition from other
religious groups. Furthermore, as late as the 1970s, church and state remained one:
the constitution stipulated political leaders must be Catholic and these continued to
have power over the appointment of bishops and Church leaders (Loveman 508). In
light of continued monopolistic strength, the Church chose to maintain its historical
position of state support instead of taking active steps to address the needs of the
poor.
It is interesting to note that the Church did not always support authoritarian
rule throughout this period. Although Peron’s first “term” began with a preference
for the Church, by the end of his reign (1955), he had begun to pit the urban
population against the agricultural elite, thereby impacting the Church’s interests
among the wealthy. As such, the church allied with military supporters and the
upper classes to topple Peron’s government. Although it wasn’t the chief actor in
bringing about Peron’s demise, its allegiance with the military and success in
destabilizing his government forged a greater bond with the military coup that came
into power. Throughout the next several decades, the Church was treated as a
powerful institution whose support or opposition could benefit the state or bring
about its fall.

68
Although the Church did not serve as a mobilizing structure inciting and
organizing public protest, other groups during this time came together to oppose
political violence and torture. Important examples of such groups are found in
Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, who represented the
mothers and grandmothers of political prisoners and those who “disappeared” as a
result of their open opposition to the state. The women established weekly silent
protests around the state capital, pleading with officials for information about their
relatives. Madres and Abuelas captured the attention of the international community
and became known as the most important human rights group within the country.
Their cultural role as mothers provided a framing process with which the
international community could relate and therefore gained incredible attention. As
Loveman points out, “…these women gained increasing international publicity,
influencing the process of delegitimization of the military regime…” (514).
Despite their importance and reach, these organizations lacked the structural
support afforded to other movements in countries where the Church provided
support. Loveman suggests that the absence of Church support was detrimental to
the development of these organizations. He alludes to Fruhling’s
9
conclusions
indicating, “none of the Argentine human rights organizations reached the level of
development or extent of human rights programs comparable to what was occurring
in Chile at the time” as a result of the Church’s participation (510). Without support

9
See Fruhling, Hugo. “Organismos no gubernamentales de derechose humanos en el paso
del autoritarism a la democracia en Chile.” Una Puerta que se abre, Taller de Cooperacion al
Desarollo. Chile: Imprenta la Union, 1998, 137-65.

69
from institutional networks, the Madres and Abuelas movements were limited in
terms of their domestic influence and were largely isolated from the rest of society
(516). Furthermore, they did not enjoy the protection from the state which the
Church often provided organizers in other countries, and therefore became
susceptible to increased repression. Movement organizers “disappeared” and their
persecution prevented many from joining the struggle for freedom rather than
encouraging participation. Despite international exposure, they were unable to break
the culture of fear that permeated the country during this period.

70
Chapter VIII. Model: Religious Competition and Catholic
Personnel

A second component of what may be deemed the Catholic Church’s strategic
response to increased competition is its renewed emphasis on recruiting lay
personnel. As mentioned in the preceding sections, priests are critical actors within
the hierarchy as they are the vehicle for religious leadership within local parishes.
However, the alarmingly low number of priests in the region and the challenges
posed by the demands of the priesthood render their adequate recruitment a daunting
task. On the other hand, Protestant groups are competitively positioned to increase
their human resources given the nature of the pastoral profession and the less
hierarchical nature of service and religious participation. In light of increasing
competition, recruitment of and reliance on a lay workforce has been deemed a
strategic source of relief from the Church’s competitive disadvantage in this respect.
As Pattnayak indicates, the total number of additional (non-priest) church
personnel witnessed a major growth spurt in the 1980s (208). However, closer
examination of the patterns in lay personnel growth (decrease) throughout the 1960s
until the 1980s demonstrates that recent growth was not as impressive as initially
implied. According to data reported in the Statistical Abstract of Latin America, the
Church was unable to keep pace with population growth in many Latin American
countries prior to its growth spurt in the ‘80s. More importantly, the absolute
number of religious personnel actually dwindled steadily throughout the 1960s and
1970s, as these were often forced to flee repressive regimes. Although the potential

71
benefits of increased lay participation have been hailed by many, little attention has
been given to whether the Church actually followed a strategy focused on increased
recruitment efforts in response to competition.
Using annual data from the Statistical Abstract of Latin America on the
number of men and women in religious orders between 1960 and 1975, the following
statistical analysis sets out to test whether such a strategy was applied. It also
provides an assessment as to the degree to which authoritarian regimes impacted the
existing number of Church personnel in the region. The measures of competition
used in the previous models are employed, and the data is analyzed in five year
increments so as to take into consideration the cumulative impact of increased
competition on strategic initiatives.
Three additional variables are presented as explanations for the level of
Church personnel and its growth. The measure of persistent authoritarian rule used
in the civic activism models is also employed in this analysis, given the widespread
references in the literature to authoritarianism’s negative impact on Church
personnel. Population indicators including lagged levels and % Change are used, as
at a minimum, effective planning of growth in human resources requires attention to
changes in the number of followers that the Church seeks to reach. The third
variable analyzed is GDP per Capita (Per Capita Income Growth), as it may be a
potential catalyst for participation in the religious workforce, considering that
periods of poor economic performance lead to unstable job markets and make
employment in the Church an attractive option. Finally, the impact of fixed effects

72
resulting from the use of panel data is accounted for through the inclusion of dummy
variables for the countries analyzed. The use of dummy variables representing each
country accounts for any unobserved heterogeneity constant for each of the countries
over the analysis period.
A review of the raw data aggregated across the period of analysis (1960-
1975) and grouped by Gill’s Pro-authoritarian and Anti-authoritarian classifications,
provides interesting preliminary observations. Specifically, the average change in
both male and female members of religious orders in the Pro-Authoritarian grouping
is much greater than that exhibited in the Anti-Authoritarian grouping (see Table 7).
However, it is important to note that Guatemala experienced an unprecedented
growth in religious personnel, and when it is removed from the Pro-Authoritarian
group’s average, the two groups converge with respect to the level of personnel
growth throughout this period. Changes in GDP per capita and population in the
Anti-Authoritarian group are greater on average than they are in the Pro-
Authoritarian group. However, as the expected impacts of these variables are
opposite, their net effect may cancel out. It is difficult to interpret their impact on
the dependent variable without closer examination.

73
Table 7. Change in Religious Personnel through Gill's Pro /Antiauthoritarian Lens, 1960-1975

% Change of
Men in
Religious
Orders
% Change of
Women in
Religious
Orders
Men in
Religious
Orders per
MM
1975
Women in
Religious
Orders Per
MM
1975
Years of
Authoritarian
Rule
% Change
in Catholic
Population
% Catholic
Population
1975
% Change
in GDP
Per
Capita
b
% Change in
Population
C
Antiauthoritarian
Brazil 38% 34% 110 339 12 -5.4% 88 % 202% 52%
Chile 18% 6% 221 463 3 -1.3% 88 % 45% 35%
Panama 102% 96% 163 268 8 -4.0% 89 % 161% 58%
Ecuador 8% 97% 144 659 11 -1.6% 93 % 159% 62%
El Salvador 2% 44% 69 173 25 -6.2% 92 % 126% 64%
Nicaragua 102% -8% 131 139 20 -4.1% 91 % 156% 53%
Average 45% 45% 140 340 13 -4% 90 % 141% 54%
Proauthoritarian
Argentina 44% 1% 158 499 10 0.9% 90 % 85% 27%
Bolivia 52% 21% 156 245 12 -4.2% 91 % 131% 41%
Guatemala 467% 300% 131 189 20 -7.8% 85 % 124% 46%
Uruguay -15% -18% 210 497 3 9.2% 88 % 21% 20%
Paraguay 99% 95% 154 279 20 -2.3% 93 % 116% 50%
Honduras 65% 112% 56 121 12 -4.4% 94 % 76% 55%
Average 118% 85% 144 305 13 -1% 90 % 92% 40%
49% 42%
a
Gill's Dummy Variable for opposition or support of authoritarian regimes - Antiauthoritarian (1) vs. Proauthoritarian (0) (1198)
b
GDP in Constant US Dollars of 1970 ( Statistical Abstract of Latin America Vol. 25)
c
Source: Statistical Abstract of Latin America Vol. 20

74
Using multivariate analysis on the panel data set, the results in Tables 8 and 9
show how recruitment and retention of Church personnel (Church Personnel
Growth) was impacted by the independent variables examined. An inconclusive
relationship is found between religious competition and changes in Church personnel
throughout the progressive era. Only dummy variables for several countries were
significant across specifications, indicating that country specific factors are
particularly relevant to the discussion of religious personnel growth. Whether a
strategy was put in place across the region in the interest of combating competitive
forces, local conditions appear to have made application and/or success of a broad
policy difficult.
The weak relationship between competition and personnel growth, though
disappointing, is not surprising, as the effects of competition are often specific to
local parishes. Once aggregated to the country level, the strength of religious
competition on local parishes is weakened and potentially disappears. Furthermore,
the significance of country specific dummy variables supports current research on
religious vocation that indicates, while competition is an important factor, a supply
side explanation is more relevant. Specifically, in areas where Catholic adherents
make up a minority group within the community, resurgence in religious
participation and vocation is often experienced independent of recruitment efforts
(Stark). Such findings indicate that community dynamics as opposed to regional or
institutional circumstances are the catalyst for increased participation (203).

75
When the dummy variables are not considered, the level of Catholic
adherents in the previous period as well as years of authoritarian rule indicate a
negative correlation with both of the dependent variables. These results provide
support for the hypothesis that repressive regimes adversely affected the recruitment
and retention of lay personnel. Once again, differences within countries merit
mention. Although the persistence of authoritarian regimes provides an indication as
to losses in personnel resulting from political conflict, it does not adequately account
for the variety of factors that may have impacted individual countries.
The degree to which torture tactics and repression were aimed at the Church
within a country may prove a crucial determinant in whether religious personnel
were forced to flee. Even in countries where religious leaders stood in opposition of
dictators and faced a backlash from the state, their strength within the local and
international community afforded them as well as their followers a degree of
protection against state reaction and a buffer against violent reprisals (Loveman). In
countries where the Church served as a haven for social activists, religious workers
may have chosen to remain and assist the resistance in its efforts to topple the
government. Furthermore, repression in and of itself may not have been a sufficient
condition for the loss of personnel, as authoritarian governments in a variety of
countries may have restricted travel abroad and limited opportunities for escape.

76

Table 8. Results of Analysis - Men in Religious Orders (per MM)
I II III IV VI VI
Constant 216.48 215.12 163.97 159.35 207.83 538.63
0.000 0.099 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000
Per Capita Income Growth -0.46 -0.57 -0.76
0.320 0.224 0.298
Population Growth -4.30 -3.96
0.180 0.226
Years Authoritarian Rule -0.88 -16.17 -12.33
0.805 0.001 0.003
% Catholic Adherents L ag -0.013 -0.07 -3.80
0.993 0.958 0.002
% Change in Catholic Adherents -0.90 -0.99 1.30
0.341 0.271 0.428
Argentina Dummy -24.51 -21.27 6.21 5.08
0.479 0.567 0.806 0.830
Boliv ia Dummy -12.76 -10.16 1.49 -0.06
0.641 0.75 0.96 0.998
Guatemala Dummy -82.04 -76.19 -72.78 -75.60
0.004 0.013 0.006 0.003
Honduras Dummy -97.57 -95.82 -97.31 -99.56
0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000
Paraguay Dummy -39.22 -35.18 -32.93 -34.43
0.151 0.003 0.236 0.154
Uruguay Dummy 78.31 77.35 104.57 105.88
0.045 0.062 0.001 0.000
Brazil Dummy -39.80 -38.05 -31.55 -31.50
0.106 0.167 0.228 0.190
Chile Dummy 67.507 67.516 82.34 81.09
0.106 0.028 0.002 0.002
E cuador Dummy 76.20 76.28 70.39 69.97
0.003 0.009 0.012 0.005
E l Salv ador Dummy -47.80 -44.12 -53.35 -55.55
0.073 0.179 0.066 0.024
Nicaragua Dummy -49.53 -45.52 -47.03 -48.50
0.064 0.140 0.079 0.046
% Predicted correctly 77.11% 76.46% 76.71% 77.54% 25.98% 39.32%
Dependent Variable = Men in Relig ious Groups (MM)
P Values italicized

77
Table 9. Results of Analysis - Women in Religious Orders (per MM)
I II III IV VI VI
Constant 264.39 203.50 202.46 249.75 503.38 1282.93
0.009 0.389 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000
Per Capita Income Growth 0.23 -0.03
0.788 0.973
Population Growth -1.38 -0.58
0.808 0.923
Years Authoritarian Rule 3.38 0.61 -48.66 -38.42
0.590 0.926 0.000 0.002
% Catholic Adherents L ag 0.654 0.52 -8.94
0.802 0.828 0.013
% Change in Catholic Adherents -2.79 -2.47 4.49
0.009 0.131 0.322
Argentina Dummy 296.21 300.10 307.47 308.56
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Boliv ia Dummy 41.94 42.35 48.55 50.73
0.396 0.47 0.32 0.240
Guatemala Dummy -139.91 -127.70 -123.12 -126.57
0.007 0.023 0.010 0.005
Honduras Dummy -158.66 -161.79 -156.02 -153.93
0.001 0.006 0.005 0.001
Paraguay Dummy -55.32 -52.02 -45.71 -42.56
0.257 0.393 0.365 0.322
Uruguay Dummy 398.34 401.38 409.61 405.53
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Brazil Dummy 129.44 129.01 129.22 134.26
0.005 0.014 0.009 0.003
Chile Dummy 305.837 304.204 310.14 308.27
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
E cuador Dummy 346.33 340.02 341.81 347.10
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
E l Salv ador Dummy -48.92 -46.92 -42.39 -40.10
0.300 0.434 0.413 0.350
Nicaragua Dummy -64.58 -59.78 -55.40 -53.46
0.174 0.290 0.251 0.973
% Predicted correctly 90.85% 90.10% 90.41% 91.03% 24.28% 32.55%
Dependent Variable = Women in Relig ious Groups (MM)
P Values italicized

Independent of the form of repression and extent of Church protection, a
variety of other factors lead to country differences that require some consideration.
For example, one of the methods employed by local bishops to gain priests and other
religious workers was to request support from other Catholic Churches in Europe
and the United States. The extent to which external resources became available and

78
were secured was a product of individual preferences as well as the strength of
existing relationships between the local parish and its international sister.
Guatemala provides a particularly interesting case in that it seems to prove an
“outlier” among the group of Pro-Authoritarian countries in terms of its growth in
religious personnel. One of the factors that may have led to greater growth within
Guatemala’s lay personnel may have been its drive to increase participation among
indigenous peoples within the Church organization. Although Guatemala’s key
bishops did not engage in liberal reforms and often favored military regimes, several
bishops participated in social movements, including the struggle for equality within
the Mayan community. Whereas historical conditions had rendered indigenous
populations a marginal group in the Church’s hierarchy, in light of competition from
other religions and Marxist ideologies the Church in Guatemala sought to
incorporate the Mayan community and make more “orthodox the Indian version of
Catholicism” (Garrard-Burnett 130). Several bishops and religious activists aided in
the Mayan cultural integrity movement, which sought to address the cultural roots of
inequality and disadvantage that proved a remnant of the colonial period. Although
many Mayan movement participants chose to abandon Christendom and return to the
popular religions that preceded colonial occupation, many found the Church’s
assistance and support solidified their Christian identity. Given the emphasis on
social justice and equality, this base of parishioners provided a new source of
leadership and helped alleviate historical dependence on foreign lay personnel.

79
Among countries, the evolution of minority group rights and their relative
status within society also impacted the Church’s pool of recruiters. For example,
much of the literature that seeks to explain peaks and troughs in Catholic religious
vocation stress the importance of gender based opportunities on vocation.
Specifically, as women’s rights increase and opportunities for workforce
participation are improved, the benefits associated with religious vocation may
decrease in relation to the larger base of employment opportunities that become
available (Stark and Finke 126).
While the data and literature indicate that political conflict throughout the
period made aggressive recruitment of religious workers particularly challenging, it
is important to note that the growth experienced in the early 1980s appears to have
been a mere return to the status quo. Although Pattnayak’s early predictions about
the future growth of religious personnel in the region painted an optimistic picture,
current reports on religious workers indicate a continued decline in religious
vocation. Stark and Finke provide an interesting hypothesis which sheds light on the
potential causes. Ironically, the authors suggest that the progressive reforms brought
about by Vatican II may have negatively impacted the call to religious service
throughout the world. Specifically, they argue that while progressive reforms
reduced the benefits of service, they did not lead to reforms that would decrease the
costs of religious vocation. They indicate:

80
Rather than secure the growth of religious
communities, renewal efforts of the sort projected by
Vatican II have been associated with membership
decline and shortage of new [recruits]. (139)

One of the chief reforms brought about by the Council’s conclusions was the
reversal of historical doctrine that stipulated religious life is morally superior,
thereby “equat[ing] the holiness of the religious and the laity” (127). Although it
was an important break from the Church’s hierarchical and separatist philosophy
towards a more active and democratic existence for parishioners, this served to
diminish the benefits of religious life associated with social status. Furthermore,
subsequent reforms geared towards bridging the gap between religious personnel and
followers promoted a crisis of identity. Religious vocation ceased to revolve around
spiritual existence and took on attributes associated with secular vocations (caring
for the sick like nurses, educating the poor like teachers, etc). While use of secular
clothes and placement away from spiritual retreats and into urban dwellings served
to transform religious personnel into relatable examples of Christian life, they did not
remove the costs of service. Mandatory practices such as celibacy, obedience and
poverty continued to characterize the costs of vocation.
In light of such findings, it is interesting to note that while progressive
reforms were instrumental in democratizing the religious experience across leaders
and lay followers, they did not extend liberal notions to religious vocation. The
same bishops who led the struggle for greater participation of followers in the
religious experience have been blamed for responding to their workers’ demands

81
conservatively and unilaterally. If the Church is to succeed in its two pronged
approach (community empowerment and recruitment of lay personnel) it will have to
extend the expected benefits to all groups that are impacted by this transformation.
Growth in the number and power of lay personnel is instrumental to the
future of the Church, but also it may serve as a model for democratic change.
Increased reliance on men and women in religious orders as well as unordained
workers sets an example of how institutions can create a common workspace for
leaders and community members to establish collective ideals. Vallier suggests that
a primary obstacle in growth within the region, applying to both state and religious
institutions alike, is the decentralized nature of the leadership (154). It is interesting
to note that while the establishment of bishops’ conferences seemed a step in the
direction of generating a more focused center, a direct outcome of their decision-
making was the development of CEBs that cater to the specific needs of its followers
based on their grassroots level of organization.
The dichotomy in the Church between bureaucratic leadership and dynamic
local representation, as witnessed through the variety of views on progressive
reforms held by bishops and priests, is one that continues to ail the region on al
levels of institutional development. While the leadership provides a framework for
religious action, activity at the grassroots level is often disjointed and at odds with
the leadership, as was experienced in the CEBs. However, if women and men of
religious orders become an increasing force of base leadership within the region, an
opportunity presents itself to forge the two segments of the institution and keep them

82
in harmony. As these members of the Church community continue to grow in
presence and power, this may lead to a transformation in social structures (i.e.,
conception of women in leadership positions, greater cooperation between leadership
and grassroots, etc.).

83
Chapter IX. Conclusions
The Catholic Church’s progressive reforms were instrumental in that they
provided a starting point from which to begin a dialogue about economic and
political conditions among groups with limited sources of information and
opportunities for participation. Although the Church is one of many potential
institutions in a position to bring about change in the region, its “legacy of leadership
has, in fact, already provided the seeds for continued activism at the grassroots level”
(Hewitt Introduction). While the long term impacts of such activities are difficult to
measure, analyzing their immediate impact on social movements is instrumental in
discovering when and how religious institutions are able to realize their
transformative potential with respect to social and institutional growth.
Nevertheless, as alluded to previously, the Church’s progressive reform era
has been followed by the return to a more conservative Church. As Gill points out,
“The ascension of Pope John Paul II in 1978…and the gradual democratization of
the region tempered much of the Church’s opposition to authoritarianism, though it
did not end it” (Rendering unto Caesar 13). As a result, many have concluded that
the Church’s return to conservative values, and in some cases support of state
interests, proves the failure of the progressive elements to bring about change from
within the religious institution. However, it is possible that such a transition away
from progressive values is truly the result of the Church’s retreat into more faith-
based initiatives in light of a successful transition to more democratic policies. As
religious competition and social inequality continue to shape the environment in

84
which the Church operates within Latin America, the last couple of decades since the
progressive era provide an interesting basis for comparison regarding the Church’s
strategic initiatives within different social frameworks. Gill suggests:
The return to democratic forms of government in Latin
America raises an interesting question for the study of
religion and politics: What are the institutional
limitations on Catholic political action? (16)

In a 1999 study presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Gills addressed this question by testing the impacts of religious
pluralism on civic participation within Latin America in the early 1990s (“Religion
and Political Attitudes”). Using data from the World Values Surveys
10
(1991 data)
and in light of continued Protestant growth in the region, he set out to test the
hypothesis that countries with greater religious pluralism result in more active civil
societies. Due to the lack of available data, Gill focuses on four Latin American
countries: Argentina and Mexico provide the basis for the more religiously
monopolistic case studies, and Brazil and Chile represent more religiously pluralistic
societies where the growth of Protestantism and Catholic progressivism occurred
side by side. He concludes that while religious affiliation does not appear to have an
impact on civic participation in this period, religious participation (i.e., church
attendance) irrespective of denomination “is one of the strongest predictors in
someone’s involvement in civil society” (18). Gill suggests that such findings
indicate religious competition may provide a key to strengthening citizenry relative

10
See Inglehart, Ronals, Miguel Basanez and Alejandro Moreno. Human Values and
Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998.

85
to government. Nevertheless, he concedes that political attitudes are difficult to
predict given the range of factors external to religion and specific to demographic
and historical conditions that shape each country and even vary across local
communities.
These findings indicate that, even in the absence of progressive reforms and a
successful strategy towards combating increased competition, the Church continues
to play a role in mobilizing civil society through a surge in participation that
accompanies an increased supply of religious goods. An expanded study of these
variables representative of all of the countries included in the current analysis may
provide an interesting comparison point for future review. It is interesting to note the
impact of competition and other factors on the Church’s strategy and potential
influence over its communities in light of different political and social conditions.
While progressive Catholic Church reforms, including the creation of CEBs,
were critical in the 1960s through the 1970s given the dire conditions faced by those
the Church was seeking to serve, it is natural that improved social outlook leads to
readjustment in Church strategy. Because Protestant groups have been traditionally
portrayed as “apolitical and/or conservative,” the Church’s emphasis on empowering
the community during politically tumultuous times provided a strategic shift from
which to strengthen its appeal. CEBs and progressive bishops’ political engagement
provided a source of services that the poor needed in light of economic and political
violence. However, the shift towards more democratic institutions and the
consequent readjustment in policies that have followed the progressive church era

86
need not result in the conclusion that these were ineffective, but rather suggest that
the Church is learning to adjust to societal needs and pressures, thereby creating a
more dynamic institution. The very nature of these assertions is supportive of the
notion that religion can bring about change in a society, as it demonstrates how the
Church can lead by example in areas as tangible as vocal opposition to regimes and
as intangible as institutional design.
Better data about local efforts and communities will be required in order to
conduct further analysis of the role religion plays in social development. While this
analysis may prove a starting point for more quantitative research into the nature and
power of religion, it also demonstrates the obstacles faced given the limited amount
of data recorded about Church activities and civic participation at the local level.
Although survey data may provide a structure in which more detailed accounts of
activity can be recorded, without consistent measures, an analysis across time and
countries loses its strength. As religion continues to demonstrate its role in
educating and leading its followers, greater emphasis must be placed on
understanding its successes and failures in strategy, ultimately leading to institutional
and social growth.
If the Church is to reap the full benefits of its strong structural and cultural
formation, it will need to find a middle ground between centralized authority and
local execution. While Vatican II and its resulting surge of liberal reforms provided
the context in which CEBs flourished, the range of circumstances that dictated local
Church involvement resulted in a divided Church. Future involvement at the

87
grassroots level will require a middle ground between conservative and liberal
elements, as a divided Church weakens its institutional base and diminishes the
importance of its strong network of allies. A key factor in the Church’s future
success will be its ability to increase its sources of religious leaders. As the Church
increases its base of representatives that provide insight into the needs of local
parishioners, it will be able to create a more dynamic institution. In light of
competition from less hierarchical religious institutions, the Church must find
alternate ways of recruiting religious leaders who will facilitate stronger local
structures and enable it to cater to the specific needs of its communities.

88
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Source: World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators
Protest Demonstration
Non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting a
regime, government, or one of its leaders; its ideology, policy, or intended policy; or
its previous action or intended action. The issues of protest involved are perceived
as significant at the national level, but within that framework demonstrations
directed at all levels and branches of government are included. This category of
events includes demonstrations for or against a foreign government, its leaders, or its
visiting representatives when such demonstrations are reported to indicate opposition
to the demonstrators own government, not included are election meetings and rallies,
political parades, and normal holiday celebrations. A residual category of other
protests was coded separately for the 168-1982 period, but was aggregated with
demonstrations in the annual and quarterly series.

Regime Support Demonstration
Also a non-violent gathering of people whose purpose, however, is to lend support to
a government, its policies and actions, or to one or more of its leaders. Support
demonstrations directed at all levels and branches of government are included when
the issues are perceived as significant at the national level. Included also are
demonstrations that are not clearly of protest nature; therefore, the category includes
demonstrations that, while political in nature, cannot be classified as explicitly

95
supportive of a regime. This event type was aggregated separately for the annual and
quarterly.

Political Strike
A work stoppage by a body of industrial or service workers or a stoppage of normal
academic life by students to protest a regime or its leaders' policies or actions.
Strikes which were primarily directed at economic goals (higher wages, better
working conditions, shorter hours) were not coded, even if the employer was a public
enterprise. If there were a greater political significance to the strike, we coded it. An
indicator of such significance would be a political party's or movement’s embracing
of these economic demands and supporting disseminating them with the objective of
embarrassing the government, eroding its base of support and even precipitating its
fall. For the 1968-1982 period, we distinguished political strikes involving workers
from those involving only students. The two were added together in the annual and
quarterly series. A political strike may last for many days or weeks, but it was
counted as a single event, unless its essential nature was changed. For example, a
new category of strikers might join in or a new set of goals might be announced, in
cases of this sort, a new event was coded.

Riots
A riot is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people.
Riots are distinguished from protest demonstrations by the presence of violence.

96
Violence implies the use of physical force and is usually evinced by the destructions
of property, the wounding or killing of people, the use of riot control equipment such
as clubs, guns, gas and water cannon and by the rioters’ use of various weapons.
Riots are distinguished from armed attacks by the degree of spontaneity. Riots may
sometimes be planned but the riot organizers constitute a small, often invisible
portion of the rioters. Events were classified as riots if it appeared from the report
that most of those involved were violently agitated in their behavior, that they
formed an excited or confused mob or crowd, that they were engaged in
unpredictable acts of disorder, and that the objects of their violence would not seem
to be closely related to the objects of their political discontent in the analysis of a
dispassionate observer. Peaceful demonstrations that were met by police violence
and demonstrations that turned into riots of their own accord were coded as a single
event and were aggregated within riots.

Armed Attack
Act of violent political conflict carried out by (or on behalf of) an organized group
with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized
group. It is characterized by bloodshed, physical struggle, and the destruction of
property. A wide variety of weapons may be used, including guns, explosives
(conventional bombs, hand grenades, letter bombs), chemicals, bricks and other
primitive hand weapons such as spears, knives or clubs. This category is intended to
encompass all organized political violence, although assassinations are coded

97
separately. It excludes all spontaneous violence, also excluded are activities of
organized crime which are not observed as directly relevant to political cleavages
and issues. The target of an armed attach is typically a regime, government or
political leader, but it may also be a religious, ethnic, racial linguistic or special
interest minority. When a government is unable or unwilling to control an
insurgency situation by normal sanctions, it may also report to armed attacks. For
the 1968-1982 period, whenever possible, armed attacks by governmental and
military forces were coded separately from those undertaken by insurgents when it
was possible to determine which side initiated the event, or when a battle or clash
was reported. The generic armed attack code was used. All three types were
aggregated together in the annual and quarterly series.

98
Appendix B. Peaceful Demonstrations - Model Specifications
Table B1. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification I
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.82
R Square 0.68
Adjusted R Square 0.64
Standard Error 5.91
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 3108.934 621.787 17.781 0.000000002
Residual 42 1468.733 34.970
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 9.752 3.264 2.987 0.005 3.164 16.340
Lag Peaceful Demonstration 0.209 0.122 1.713 0.094 -0.037 0.454
Change in Urban Pop -0.072 0.156 -0.463 0.646 -0.387 0.242
Years Authoritarian -1.106 0.413 -2.681 0.010 -1.938 -0.273
Argentina Dummy 20.402 4.413 4.623 0.000 11.496 29.308
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.223 0.158 -1.410 0.166 -0.543 0.096

99

Table B2. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification II
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.82
R Square 0.68
Adjusted R Square 0.64
Standard Error 5.94
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 3095.556 619.111 17.544 0.000000002
Residual 42 1482.110 35.288
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -6.933 13.404 -0.517 0.608 -33.983 20.117
Lag Peaceful Demonstration 0.220 0.123 1.785 0.081 -0.029 0.469
Change in Urban Pop -0.202 0.207 -0.977 0.334 -0.620 0.216
Years Authoritarian -1.373 0.437 -3.142 0.003 -2.256 -0.491
Argentina Dummy 19.050 4.657 4.091 0.000 9.652 28.448
% Catholic Adherents 0.219 0.174 1.262 0.214 -0.131 0.569

100

Table B3. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification III
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.82
R Square 0.67
Adjusted R Square 0.63
Standard Error 5.99
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 3071.238 614.248 17.126 0.000000003
Residual 42 1506.429 35.867
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -8.702 20.116 -0.433 0.668 -49.298 31.895
Lag Peaceful Demonstration 0.221 0.125 1.767 0.085 -0.032 0.474
% Urban Population (Level) 0.044 0.086 0.510 0.613 -0.130 0.218
Years Authoritarian -1.226 0.451 -2.717 0.010 -2.137 -0.315
Argentina Dummy 19.112 5.325 3.590 0.001 8.367 29.858
% Catholic Adherents 0.171 0.184 0.933 0.356 -0.199 0.542

101

Table B4. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification IV
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.82
R Square 0.68
Adjusted R Square 0.64
Standard Error 5.93
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 3101.685 620.337 17.652 0.000000002
Residual 42 1475.982 35.142
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 8.215 3.991 2.058 0.046 0.160 16.270
Lag Peaceful Demonstration 0.211 0.122 1.725 0.092 -0.036 0.457
% Urban Population (Level) 0.005 0.062 0.086 0.932 -0.119 0.130
Years Authoritarian -1.105 0.456 -2.422 0.020 -2.025 -0.184
Argentina Dummy 20.673 4.696 4.403 0.000 11.196 30.149
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.211 0.159 -1.325 0.192 -0.532 0.110

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Table B5. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification V
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.857
R Square 0.735
Adjusted R Square 0.611
Standard Error 6.154
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 3365.814 224.388 5.925 0.00001
Residual 32 1211.853 37.870
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 16.037 21.234 0.755 0.456 -27.215 59.288
Lag Peaceful Demonstration -0.020 0.162 -0.125 0.901 -0.351 0.310
% Urban Population (Level) -0.114 0.495 -0.230 0.820 -1.121 0.894
Years Authoritarian -1.043 1.003 -1.040 0.306 -3.087 1.000
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.167 0.176 -0.944 0.352 -0.526 0.193
Argentina Dummy 29.323 16.595 1.767 0.087 -4.481 63.126
El Salvador Dummy -5.833 7.355 -0.793 0.434 -20.815 9.150
Uruguay Dummy 2.225 19.620 0.113 0.910 -37.739 42.189
Honduras Dummy -8.574 11.293 -0.759 0.453 -31.578 14.430
Bolivia Dummy 0.708 6.214 0.114 0.910 -11.950 13.365
Guatemala Dummy 1.870 9.124 0.205 0.839 -16.716 20.455
Brazil Dummy 3.709 4.985 0.744 0.462 -6.445 13.863
Chile Dummy 2.033 14.941 0.136 0.893 -28.400 32.466
Ecuador Dummy -0.555 6.310 -0.088 0.930 -13.408 12.297
Nicaragua Dummy -3.446 5.737 -0.601 0.552 -15.133 8.241
Paraguay Dummy -0.667 8.136 -0.082 0.935 -17.240 15.906

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Table B6. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification VI
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.86
R Square 0.74
Adjusted R Square 0.61
Standard Error 6.13
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 3374.265 224.951 5.982 0.00001
Residual 32 1203.402 37.606
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -15.103 33.414 -0.452 0.654 -83.165 52.958
Lag Peaceful Demonstration -0.014 0.162 -0.088 0.930 -0.344 0.316
% Urban Population (Level) 0.073 0.489 0.148 0.883 -0.924 1.069
Years Authoritarian -1.280 0.939 -1.363 0.182 -3.193 0.633
% Catholic Adherents 0.272 0.257 1.059 0.297 -0.251 0.795
Argentina Dummy 21.869 16.885 1.295 0.205 -12.524 56.263
El Salvador Dummy -6.946 7.575 -0.917 0.366 -22.375 8.483
Uruguay Dummy -2.365 18.945 -0.125 0.901 -40.956 36.225
Honduras Dummy -7.729 11.097 -0.696 0.491 -30.334 14.876
Bolivia Dummy -0.054 6.328 -0.009 0.993 -12.944 12.836
Guatemala Dummy 3.537 8.745 0.404 0.689 -14.276 21.350
Brazil Dummy 0.850 5.547 0.153 0.879 -10.450 12.149
Chile Dummy -3.784 14.718 -0.257 0.799 -33.764 26.196
Ecuador Dummy -1.464 6.450 -0.227 0.822 -14.602 11.673
Nicaragua Dummy -4.682 6.008 -0.779 0.442 -16.920 7.557
Paraguay Dummy -1.077 8.154 -0.132 0.896 -17.685 15.532

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Table B7. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification VII
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.862687431
R Square 0.744229603
Adjusted R Square 0.62433723
Standard Error 6.048841882
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 3406.835 227.122 6.207 0.000008
Residual 32 1170.832 36.588
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -5.471 23.116 -0.237 0.814 -52.558 41.615
Lag Peaceful Demonstration -0.014 0.158 -0.087 0.931 -0.337 0.309
Years Authoritarian -1.705 0.840 -2.029 0.051 -3.416 0.006
Change in Urban Pop -0.508 0.531 -0.955 0.347 -1.590 0.575
% Catholic Adherents 0.319 0.256 1.248 0.221 -0.202 0.841
Argentina Dummy 20.221 7.061 2.864 0.007 5.838 34.604
El Salvador Dummy -7.270 5.984 -1.215 0.233 -19.459 4.919
Uruguay Dummy -6.750 9.158 -0.737 0.466 -25.405 11.905
Honduras Dummy -5.726 6.496 -0.881 0.385 -18.959 7.507
Bolivia Dummy -2.569 5.330 -0.482 0.633 -13.427 8.288
Guatemala Dummy 3.351 5.127 0.654 0.518 -7.092 13.794
Brazil Dummy 3.595 5.362 0.671 0.507 -7.326 14.517
Chile Dummy -4.685 5.361 -0.874 0.389 -15.605 6.235
Ecuador Dummy -0.813 5.117 -0.159 0.875 -11.237 9.611
Nicaragua Dummy -2.345 6.178 -0.380 0.707 -14.929 10.239
Paraguay Dummy -2.678 5.689 -0.471 0.641 -14.265 8.910

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Table B8. Peaceful Demonstrations: Model Specification VIII
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.859
R Square 0.739
Adjusted R Square 0.616
Standard Error 6.115
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 3381.261 225.417 6.029 0.00001
Residual 32 1196.405 37.388
Total 47 4577.667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 18.783 11.674 1.609 0.117 -4.996 42.563
Lag Peaceful Demonstration -0.016 0.160 -0.101 0.920 -0.343 0.310
Years Authoritarian -1.625 0.869 -1.871 0.071 -3.395 0.144
Change in Urban Pop -0.358 0.524 -0.683 0.499 -1.425 0.709
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.157 0.171 -0.916 0.366 -0.506 0.192
Argentina Dummy 23.173 6.629 3.495 0.001 9.669 36.676
El Salvador Dummy -3.863 5.183 -0.745 0.461 -14.419 6.694
Uruguay Dummy -7.620 9.200 -0.828 0.414 -26.359 11.119
Honduras Dummy -3.363 6.261 -0.537 0.595 -16.115 9.389
Bolivia Dummy 0.710 4.612 0.154 0.879 -8.685 10.105
Guatemala Dummy 4.562 4.989 0.914 0.367 -5.600 14.723
Brazil Dummy 5.130 5.230 0.981 0.334 -5.523 15.783
Chile Dummy -3.336 5.375 -0.621 0.539 -14.284 7.613
Ecuador Dummy 1.743 4.722 0.369 0.714 -7.875 11.361
Nicaragua Dummy -0.540 5.983 -0.090 0.929 -12.728 11.648
Paraguay Dummy 0.776 4.827 0.161 0.873 -9.057 10.609

106
Appendix C. Violent Demonstrations - Model Specifications

Table C1. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification I
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.856
R Square 0.733
Adjusted R Square 0.702
Standard Error 23.787
Observations 48.000
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 65344.69 13068.94 23.10 0.00000000004
Residual 42 23763.79 565.80
Total 47 89108.48
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 42.27 16.87 2.51 0.02 8.22 76.32
Lag Violent Demonstration 0.46 0.14 3.34 0.00 0.18 0.74
% Urban Population -0.31 0.25 -1.21 0.23 -0.82 0.20
Years Authoritarian -4.40 1.83 -2.41 0.02 -8.09 -0.71
Argentina Dummy 78.06 22.07 3.54 0.00 33.52 122.59
Change in Catholic Adherents 0.15 0.64 0.23 0.82 -1.14 1.44

107

Table C2. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification II
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.858736004
R Square 0.737427525
Adjusted R Square 0.706168897
Standard Error 23.60257952
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5.0 65711.0 13142.2 23.6 0.00000000003
Residual 42.0 23397.4 557.1
Total 47.0 89108.5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -23.93 79.16 -0.30 0.76 -183.67 135.82
Lag Violent Demonstration 0.48 0.14 3.44 0.00 0.20 0.76
% Urban Population (Level) -0.09 0.35 -0.25 0.80 -0.79 0.62
Years Authoritarian -4.31 1.78 -2.43 0.02 -7.90 -0.72
Argentina Dummy 69.73 24.01 2.90 0.01 21.28 118.18
Lag % Catholic Adherents 0.61 0.72 0.84 0.40 -0.84 2.05

108

Table C3. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification III
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.86
R Square 0.74
Adjusted R Square 0.71
Standard Error 23.61
Observations 48.00
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 65692.31 13138.46 23.57 0.00000000003
Residual 42 23416.17 557.53
Total 47 89108.48
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -35.75 52.03 -0.69 0.50 -140.74 69.25
Lag Violent Demonstration 0.49 0.13 3.63 0.00 0.22 0.76
Change in Urban Pop 0.14 0.82 0.17 0.87 -1.52 1.80
Years Authoritarian -4.13 1.74 -2.38 0.02 -7.64 -0.62
Argentina Dummy 67.15 20.12 3.34 0.00 26.55 107.75
% Catholic Adherents 0.65 0.68 0.96 0.34 -0.72 2.03

109

Table C4. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification IV
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.86
R Square 0.73
Adjusted R Square 0.70
Standard Error 23.86
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 65205.82 13041.16 22.91 0.0000000001
Residual 42 23902.66 569.11
Total 47 89108.48
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 12.30 12.89 0.95 0.35 -13.72 38.32
Lag Violent Demonstration 0.49 0.14 3.63 0.00 0.22 0.77
Change in Urban Pop 0.69 0.63 1.10 0.28 -0.58 1.96
Years Authoritarian -3.61 1.67 -2.17 0.04 -6.98 -0.25
Argentina Dummy 70.43 20.02 3.52 0.00 30.03 110.82
Change in Catholic Adherents 0.14 0.64 0.21 0.83 -1.16 1.43

110
Table C5. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification V
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.90
R Square 0.81
Adjusted R Square 0.71
Standard Error 23.30
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 71735.771 4782.385 8.809 0.0000002
Residual 32 17372.708 542.897
Total 47 89108.479
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 28.348 47.413 0.598 0.554 -68.230 124.926
Lag Violent Demonstration -0.123 0.248 -0.497 0.623 -0.628 0.382
Years Authoritarian -4.012 3.311 -1.212 0.234 -10.756 2.732
Change in Urban Pop 0.874 2.048 0.427 0.673 -3.297 5.044
Change in Catholic Adherents 0.146 0.657 0.223 0.825 -1.191 1.484
Argentina Dummy 139.458 31.168 4.474 0.000 75.970 202.946
El Salvador Dummy -20.942 20.473 -1.023 0.314 -62.645 20.760
Uruguay Dummy -18.460 37.204 -0.496 0.623 -94.242 57.322
Honduras Dummy -21.170 23.074 -0.917 0.366 -68.170 25.830
Bolivia Dummy 46.597 19.395 2.403 0.022 7.091 86.104
Guatemala Dummy 31.583 19.833 1.592 0.121 -8.816 71.982
Brazil Dummy 10.737 20.690 0.519 0.607 -31.407 52.881
Chile Dummy -5.341 21.414 -0.249 0.805 -48.961 38.279
Ecuador Dummy 0.294 18.066 0.016 0.987 -36.505 37.092
Nicaragua Dummy -8.575 22.218 -0.386 0.702 -53.831 36.681
Paraguay Dummy -5.206 18.934 -0.275 0.785 -43.774 33.362

111
Table C6. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification VI
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.90
R Square 0.81
Adjusted R Square 0.72
Standard Error 23.22
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 71851.644 4790.110 8.882 0.0000001
Residual 32 17256.835 539.276
Total 47 89108.479
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -10.904 89.721 -0.122 0.904 -193.661 171.852
Lag Violent Demonstration -0.130 0.245 -0.532 0.599 -0.628 0.368
Years Authoritarian -3.665 3.230 -1.135 0.265 -10.243 2.914
Change in Urban Pop 0.635 2.088 0.304 0.763 -3.617 4.888
% Catholic Adherents 0.504 0.979 0.515 0.610 -1.490 2.498
Argentina Dummy 135.380 32.264 4.196 0.000 69.660 201.100
El Salvador Dummy -28.270 23.614 -1.197 0.240 -76.369 19.830
Uruguay Dummy -15.574 37.400 -0.416 0.680 -91.755 60.607
Honduras Dummy -25.579 24.331 -1.051 0.301 -75.139 23.981
Bolivia Dummy 41.216 22.065 1.868 0.071 -3.729 86.161
Guatemala Dummy 27.630 20.608 1.341 0.189 -14.347 69.607
Brazil Dummy 7.822 21.351 0.366 0.717 -35.669 51.313
Chile Dummy -6.829 21.560 -0.317 0.754 -50.746 37.089
Ecuador Dummy -3.867 19.730 -0.196 0.846 -44.055 36.322
Nicaragua Dummy -13.172 23.203 -0.568 0.574 -60.435 34.092
Paraguay Dummy -12.203 22.302 -0.547 0.588 -57.631 33.225

112
Table C7. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification VII
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.90
R Square 0.81
Adjusted R Square 0.71
Standard Error 23.25
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 71811.805 4787.454 8.857 0.0000002
Residual 32 17296.674 540.521
Total 47 89108.479
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -15.154 126.067 -0.120 0.905 -271.943 241.635
Lag Violent Demonstration -0.143 0.240 -0.594 0.557 -0.632 0.347
Years Authoritarian -4.663 3.557 -1.311 0.199 -11.908 2.582
% Urban Population (Level) 0.253 1.848 0.137 0.892 -3.512 4.017
% Catholic Adherents 0.589 0.971 0.606 0.549 -1.389 2.567
Argentina Dummy 123.826 68.006 1.821 0.078 -14.698 262.351
El Salvador Dummy -26.063 29.261 -0.891 0.380 -85.666 33.540
Uruguay Dummy -34.270 71.679 -0.478 0.636 -180.275 111.734
Honduras Dummy -16.670 41.644 -0.400 0.692 -101.496 68.156
Bolivia Dummy 41.320 25.349 1.630 0.113 -10.315 92.954
Guatemala Dummy 32.722 33.246 0.984 0.332 -34.997 100.442
Brazil Dummy 9.545 21.452 0.445 0.659 -34.151 53.241
Chile Dummy -18.048 55.546 -0.325 0.747 -131.193 95.096
Ecuador Dummy -0.163 24.398 -0.007 0.995 -49.860 49.533
Nicaragua Dummy -9.085 22.579 -0.402 0.690 -55.078 36.907
Paraguay Dummy -10.444 31.110 -0.336 0.739 -73.813 52.926

113
Table C8. Violent Demonstrations: Model Specification VIII
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.90
R Square 0.80
Adjusted R Square 0.71
Standard Error 23.36
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 15 71641.344 4776.090 8.750 0.0000002
Residual 32 17467.135 545.848
Total 47 89108.479
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 40.390 81.321 0.497 0.623 -125.255 206.035
Lag Violent Demonstration -0.144 0.244 -0.589 0.560 -0.641 0.354
Years Authoritarian -5.230 3.854 -1.357 0.184 -13.081 2.620
% Urban Population (Level) 0.169 1.884 0.090 0.929 -3.670 4.007
Change in Catholic Adherents 0.154 0.677 0.228 0.821 -1.225 1.533
Argentina Dummy 130.163 68.443 1.902 0.066 -9.251 269.578
El Salvador Dummy -18.181 29.097 -0.625 0.537 -77.449 41.087
Uruguay Dummy -38.831 74.484 -0.521 0.606 -190.549 112.887
Honduras Dummy -11.231 42.916 -0.262 0.795 -98.647 76.186
Bolivia Dummy 46.428 24.611 1.887 0.068 -3.702 96.558
Guatemala Dummy 36.870 34.642 1.064 0.295 -33.693 107.433
Brazil Dummy 14.977 19.360 0.774 0.445 -24.459 54.413
Chile Dummy -15.636 56.690 -0.276 0.784 -131.110 99.838
Ecuador Dummy 4.909 23.934 0.205 0.839 -43.842 53.661
Nicaragua Dummy -2.653 21.840 -0.121 0.904 -47.139 41.833
Paraguay Dummy -3.646 31.517 -0.116 0.909 -67.844 60.553

114
Appendix D. Men in Religious Groups (MM) - Model Specifications
Table D1. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification I
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.92
R Square 0.84
Adjusted R Square 0.77
Standard Error 33.21
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 14 190049.26 13574.95 12.311 0.0000000
Residual 33 36388.55 1102.68
Total 47 226437.81
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 216.477 53.155 4.073 0.000 108.332 324.623
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.901 0.932 -0.967 0.341 -2.798 0.995
Pop Growth -4.303 3.144 -1.369 0.180 -10.701 2.094
Years Authoritarian Rule 0.209 3.456 0.061 0.952 -6.821 7.240
Argentina Dummy -24.510 34.257 -0.715 0.479 -94.206 45.187
Bolivia Dummy -12.764 27.119 -0.471 0.641 -67.937 42.409
Guatemala Dummy -82.039 26.899 -3.050 0.004 -136.766 -27.312
Honduras Dummy -97.566 24.084 -4.051 0.000 -146.565 -48.566
Paraguay Dummy -39.222 26.661 -1.471 0.151 -93.464 15.020
Uruguay Dummy 78.313 37.641 2.081 0.045 1.731 154.896
Brazil Dummy -39.797 23.914 -1.664 0.106 -88.449 8.856
Chile Dummy 67.507 28.810 2.343 0.025 8.892 126.122
Ecuador Dummy 76.199 23.838 3.197 0.003 27.701 124.698
El Salvador Dummy -47.800 25.831 -1.851 0.073 -100.353 4.753
Nicaragua Dummy -49.525 25.884 -1.913 0.064 -102.188 3.137

115
Table D2. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification II
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.914
R Square 0.835
Adjusted R Square 0.765
Standard Error 33.674
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 14 189018.37 13501.31 11.91 0.0000000
Residual 33 37419.44 1133.92
Total 47 226437.81
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 215.121 126.557 1.700 0.099 -42.361 472.603
Argentina Dummy -21.269 36.735 -0.579 0.567 -96.007 53.468
Bolivia Dummy -10.157 31.437 -0.323 0.749 -74.117 53.803
Guatemala Dummy -76.192 29.125 -2.616 0.013 -135.447 -16.937
Honduras Dummy -95.818 29.844 -3.211 0.003 -156.536 -35.101
Paraguay Dummy -35.175 32.577 -1.080 0.288 -101.453 31.102
Uruguay Dummy 77.349 40.053 1.931 0.062 -4.139 158.837
Brazil Dummy -38.046 26.915 -1.414 0.167 -92.805 16.712
Chile Dummy 67.516 29.408 2.296 0.028 7.685 127.348
Ecuador Dummy 76.278 27.564 2.767 0.009 20.198 132.358
El Salvador Dummy -44.124 32.107 -1.374 0.179 -109.447 21.199
Nicaragua Dummy -45.518 30.129 -1.511 0.140 -106.816 15.779
Years Authoritarian Rule -0.882 3.537 -0.250 0.805 -8.078 6.313
% Catholic Adherents -0.013 1.403 -0.009 0.993 -2.867 2.841
Pop Growth -3.961 3.208 -1.235 0.226 -10.489 2.566

116
Table D3. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification III
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.91
R Square 0.83
Adjusted R Square 0.77
Standard Error 33.50
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 13 188286.62 14483.59 12.91 0.000000
Residual 34 38151.19 1122.09
Total 47 226437.81
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 163.969 112.415 1.459 0.154 -64.485 392.423
Argentina Dummy 6.210 25.058 0.248 0.806 -44.714 57.133
Bolivia Dummy 1.495 26.610 0.056 0.956 -52.583 55.572
Guatemala Dummy -72.778 24.691 -2.948 0.006 -122.956 -22.601
Honduras Dummy -97.314 28.382 -3.429 0.002 -154.993 -39.634
Paraguay Dummy -32.929 27.289 -1.207 0.236 -88.386 22.528
Uruguay Dummy 104.570 29.278 3.572 0.001 45.070 164.070
Brazil Dummy -31.553 25.708 -1.227 0.228 -83.799 20.693
Chile Dummy 82.344 24.811 3.319 0.002 31.922 132.766
Ecuador Dummy 70.395 26.568 2.650 0.012 16.402 124.388
El Salvador Dummy -53.347 28.063 -1.901 0.066 -110.377 3.684
Nicaragua Dummy -47.031 26.001 -1.809 0.079 -99.871 5.808
% Catholic Adherents -0.069 1.297 -0.053 0.958 -2.705 2.567
Per Capita Growth (GDP Growth - Pop Growth) -0.464 0.460 -1.009 0.320 -1.398 0.470

117
Table D4. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification IV
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.92
R Square 0.84
Adjusted R Square 0.78
Standard Error 32.90
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 13 189639.63 14587.66 13.48 0.00000000
Residual 34 36798.18 1082.30
Total 47 226437.81
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 159.345 18.914 8.425 0.000 120.908 197.782
Argentina Dummy 5.080 23.534 0.216 0.830 -42.747 52.908
Bolivia Dummy -0.061 23.630 -0.003 0.998 -48.084 47.961
Guatemala Dummy -75.599 23.439 -3.225 0.003 -123.233 -27.965
Honduras Dummy -99.561 24.030 -4.143 0.000 -148.396 -50.726
Paraguay Dummy -34.433 23.587 -1.460 0.154 -82.368 13.502
Uruguay Dummy 105.876 25.361 4.175 0.000 54.336 157.416
Brazil Dummy -31.503 23.555 -1.337 0.190 -79.373 16.367
Chile Dummy 81.088 24.278 3.340 0.002 31.749 130.428
Ecuador Dummy 69.975 23.305 3.002 0.005 22.612 117.337
El Salvador Dummy -55.551 23.543 -2.360 0.024 -103.396 -7.706
Nicaragua Dummy -48.496 23.369 -2.075 0.046 -95.987 -1.006
Change in Catholic Adherents -0.995 0.889 -1.119 0.271 -2.801 0.811
Per Capita Growth (GDP Growth - Pop Growth) -0.570 0.461 -1.237 0.224 -1.507 0.367

118

Table D5. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification V
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.55
R Square 0.31
Adjusted R Square 0.26
Standard Error 59.72
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 69536.19 23178.73 6.50 0.00098
Residual 44 156901.62 3565.95
Total 47 226437.81
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 207.825 16.618 12.506 0.000 174.335 241.316
Change in Catholic Adherents 1.298 1.622 0.801 0.428 -1.970 4.566
Per Capita Growth (GDP Growth - Pop Growth) -0.760 0.721 -1.054 0.298 -2.214 0.693
Years Authoritarian Rule -16.175 4.322 -3.743 0.001 -24.885 -7.465

119

Table D6. Men in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification VI
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.66
R Square 0.43
Adjusted R Square 0.39
Standard Error 54.07
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 97800.27 32600.09 11.15 0.000014
Residual 44 128637.54 2923.58
Total 47 226437.81
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 538.631 103.762 5.191 0.000 329.513 747.750
% Catholic Adherents Lag -3.802 1.176 -3.233 0.002 -6.172 -1.432
Per Capita Growth (GDP Growth - Pop Growth) -0.554 0.638 -0.868 0.390 -1.841 0.732
Years Authoritarian Rule -12.335 3.967 -3.109 0.003 -20.330 -4.340

120
Appendix E. Women in Religious Groups (MM) - Model Specifications

Table E1. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification I
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.97
R Square 0.94
Adjusted R Square 0.91
Standard Error 59.68
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 14 1711643.789 122260.271 34.326 0.00000000000
Residual 33 117535.702 3561.688
Total 47 1829179.491
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 264.390 95.532 2.768 0.009 70.029 458.751
Change in Catholic Adherents -2.787 1.675 -1.664 0.106 -6.195 0.621
Pop Growth -1.385 5.651 -0.245 0.808 -12.883 10.113
Years Authoritarian Rule 3.377 6.210 0.544 0.590 -9.258 16.012
Argentina Dummy 296.208 61.568 4.811 0.000 170.947 421.469
Bolivia Dummy 41.937 48.738 0.860 0.396 -57.222 141.096
Guatemala Dummy -139.911 48.344 -2.894 0.007 -238.268 -41.554
Honduras Dummy -158.661 43.285 -3.666 0.001 -246.724 -70.597
Paraguay Dummy -55.317 47.916 -1.154 0.257 -152.803 42.168
Uruguay Dummy 398.341 67.650 5.888 0.000 260.705 535.976
Brazil Dummy 129.437 42.978 3.012 0.005 41.997 216.877
Chile Dummy 305.837 51.779 5.907 0.000 200.493 411.182
Ecuador Dummy 346.330 42.842 8.084 0.000 259.168 433.493
El Salvador Dummy -48.919 46.424 -1.054 0.300 -143.369 45.530
Nicaragua Dummy -64.578 46.520 -1.388 0.174 -159.224 30.068

121
Table E2. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification II
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.96
R Square 0.93
Adjusted R Square 0.90
Standard Error 62.07
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 14 1702032.889 121573.778 31.554 0.00000000000
Residual 33 127146.601 3852.927
Total 47 1829179.491
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 203.500 233.287 0.872 0.389 -271.126 678.125
% Catholic Adherents 0.654 2.585 0.253 0.802 -4.606 5.914
Pop Growth -0.576 5.914 -0.097 0.923 -12.608 11.457
Years Authoritarian Rule 0.610 6.519 0.094 0.926 -12.653 13.874
Argentina Dummy 300.096 67.714 4.432 0.000 162.330 437.862
Bolivia Dummy 42.348 57.950 0.731 0.470 -75.552 160.247
Guatemala Dummy -127.697 53.687 -2.379 0.023 -236.924 -18.471
Honduras Dummy -161.788 55.012 -2.941 0.006 -273.710 -49.865
Paraguay Dummy -52.023 60.049 -0.866 0.393 -174.195 70.148
Uruguay Dummy 401.381 73.831 5.437 0.000 251.171 551.591
Brazil Dummy 129.007 49.613 2.600 0.014 28.069 229.945
Chile Dummy 304.204 54.209 5.612 0.000 193.915 414.493
Ecuador Dummy 340.016 50.810 6.692 0.000 236.641 443.390
El Salvador Dummy -46.922 59.185 -0.793 0.434 -167.334 73.491
Nicaragua Dummy -59.780 55.537 -1.076 0.290 -172.771 53.211

122
Table E3. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification III
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.96
R Square 0.93
Adjusted R Square 0.90
Standard Error 61.10
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 13 1702243.54 130941.811 35.073 0.00000000
Residual 34 126935.95 3733.410
Total 47 1829179.49
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 202.457 205.051 0.987 0.330 -214.256 619.170
Argentina Dummy 307.466 45.706 6.727 0.000 214.579 400.352
Bolivia Dummy 48.551 48.538 1.000 0.324 -50.089 147.192
Guatemala Dummy -123.123 45.037 -2.734 0.010 -214.649 -31.597
Honduras Dummy -156.016 51.771 -3.014 0.005 -261.226 -50.805
Paraguay Dummy -45.707 49.776 -0.918 0.365 -146.864 55.451
Uruguay Dummy 409.614 53.405 7.670 0.000 301.082 518.145
Brazil Dummy 129.218 46.894 2.756 0.009 33.919 224.518
Chile Dummy 310.141 45.257 6.853 0.000 218.168 402.114
Ecuador Dummy 341.806 48.462 7.053 0.000 243.320 440.292
El Salvador Dummy -42.393 51.188 -0.828 0.413 -146.421 61.634
Nicaragua Dummy -55.399 47.427 -1.168 0.251 -151.782 40.984
Per Capita Growth (GDP Growth - Pop Growth) 0.228 0.839 0.272 0.788 -1.477 1.932
% Catholic Adherents 0.517 2.366 0.219 0.828 -4.291 5.326

123
Table E4. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification IV
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.967
R Square 0.935
Adjusted R Square 0.910
Standard Error 59.096
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 13 1710440.540 131572.349 37.675 0.00000000
Residual 34 118738.951 3492.322
Total 47 1829179.491
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 249.751 33.975 7.351 0.000 180.706 318.797
Change in Catholic Adherents -2.473 1.597 -1.549 0.131 -5.717 0.772
Argentina Dummy 308.563 42.275 7.299 0.000 222.650 394.476
Bolivia Dummy 50.734 42.448 1.195 0.240 -35.531 136.998
Guatemala Dummy -126.570 42.104 -3.006 0.005 -212.136 -41.004
Honduras Dummy -153.934 43.166 -3.566 0.001 -241.657 -66.211
Paraguay Dummy -42.556 42.370 -1.004 0.322 -128.662 43.550
Uruguay Dummy 405.530 45.557 8.902 0.000 312.947 498.113
Brazil Dummy 134.263 42.313 3.173 0.003 48.273 220.253
Chile Dummy 308.271 43.611 7.069 0.000 219.643 396.900
Ecuador Dummy 347.104 41.864 8.291 0.000 262.026 432.182
El Salvador Dummy -40.098 42.291 -0.948 0.350 -126.043 45.847
Nicaragua Dummy -53.459 41.977 -1.274 0.211 -138.767 31.850
Per Capita Growth (GDP Growth - Pop Growth) -0.028 0.828 -0.034 0.973 -1.711 1.655

124

Table E5. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification V
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.524
R Square 0.275
Adjusted R Square 0.243
Standard Error 171.665
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 503076.891 251538.446 8.536 0.000720
Residual 45 1326102.599 29468.947
Total 47 1829179.491
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 503.377 45.376 11.093 0.000 411.985 594.770
Years Authoritarian Rule -48.664 11.873 -4.099 0.000 -72.578 -24.750
Change in Catholic Adherents 4.495 4.484 1.002 0.322 -4.537 13.526

125

Table E6. Women in Religious Orders (MM): Model Specification VI
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.595
R Square 0.354
Adjusted R Square 0.326
Standard Error 162.017
Observations 48
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 647953.905 323976.952 12.342 0.000
Residual 45 1181225.586 26249.457
Total 47 1829179.491
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1282.931 308.485 4.159 0.000 661.611 1904.252
% Catholic Adherents -8.944 3.469 -2.578 0.013 -15.931 -1.957
Years Authoritarian Rule -38.420 11.644 -3.299 0.002 -61.872 -14.967

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Latin America's progressive church era during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s provides an interesting reference point for the theory of religion's transformative potential. Building on concepts from social movement theory and studies on the economics of religion, Latin America's progressive transformation is examined with respect to its role in civic activism and its impact on the institution's structural growth. In response to Protestant competition, and as a result of political and economic hardships, liberal ecumenical reforms were introduced during Latin America's progressive church era that placed the religious community at the forefront of politics. The Church's role as a mobilizing structure contributed to its success in organizing society to combat oppressive regimes and to protest economic policies. Furthermore, the Church's recognition of structural limitations inhibiting its competitive strategy led to a shift in personnel recruitment that emphasized lay leadership and community involvement. Christian Base Communities empowered lay religious leaders and gave them a new and more hands-on role in evangelizing, as well as in defining the scope of religious involvement in every day affairs.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Toll, Alexandra (author)

Core Title The Catholic church in Latin America: an evaluation of the institutional and political impacts of progressive church reforms

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Economics

Degree Conferral Date 2008-05

Publication Date 01/24/2008

Defense Date 01/01/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Latin America,liberation theology,OAI-PMH Harvest,Religion,social movement

Place Name South America (continents), subcontinents: Central America (geographic subject)

Language English

Advisor Nugent, Jeffrey B. (committee chair), Kuran, Timur (committee member), Lamy, Steven (committee member)

Creator Email toll@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m989

Unique identifier UC1488042

Identifier etd-Toll-20080124 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-595288 (legacy record id),usctheses-m989 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Toll-20080124.pdf

Dmrecord 595288

Document Type Thesis

Rights Toll, Alexandra

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu