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Investigating the effects of personality factors on goal shielding

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Investigating the effects of personality factors on goal shielding

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INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF PERSONALITY FACTORS ON GOAL
SHIELDING

by
Gurveen Singh Chopra

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(PSYCHOLOGY)

May 2007

Copyright 2007 Gurveen Singh Chopra

ii
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank my mentor, Dr. Stephen Read (Ph.D.), for providing
invaluable guidance during the progress of this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr.
Lynn Miller (Ph.D.) and Dr. David Walsh (Ph.D.) for being a part of my thesis
committee and giving insightful feedback.

iii
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ii

Abstract iv

Introduction 1
Method 8
Participants 8
Materials 9
Procedure 9

Results 11
Preliminary Analyses 11
Central Analyses 12
Figure 1 15

Discussion 17
Bibliography 23
Appendices 25
Appendix A 25
Appendix B 29
Appendix C 33
Appendix D 34

iv
Abstract
We attempted to replicate some findings of Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski
(2002) to investigate whether one’s commitment towards a goal increases/decreases
goal shielding (i.e. inhibits alternative goals). We investigated whether certain
personality factors (viz. Conscientiousness, Depression, Anxiety, Tenacity, Personal
Need for Structure (PNS), Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), and BIS/BAS) could
moderate the commitment effect thereby increasing/decreasing goal shielding.
Furthermore, we wished to test whether Conscientiousness-Tenacity and PNS-NCC
measured similar underlying constructs, respectively. Results indicated that the goal
commitment (high vs. low) manipulation was successful wherein people listed
significantly fewer alternative goals in the high goal commitment condition. Tenacity
significantly moderated the commitment effect (highly tenacious people displayed
greater goal inhibition). A main effect for Depression indicated that depressed
individuals showed greater goal inhibition. Regression analyses for
Conscientiousness, Anxiety, PNS, NCC, and BIS/BAS yielded only significant main
effects for goal commitment. Conscientiousness-Tenacity and PNS-NCC did not
measure the same construct.
1
Introduction
The pursuit of goals is an integral part of our daily lives. Everyday we have
goals that we strive to accomplish e.g. getting-up in the morning, driving to work,
working, getting food, meeting friends, etc. Needless to say, some goals take
precedence over others. For example, you may have a goal to get lunch; however,
you get a call from your significant other who is not feeling well and needs to be
taken to a hospital. In such a situation, you are most likely to forget/de-prioritize all
other goals you may have had and make looking after the needs of your significant
other your primary objective.
So, how do we set priorities for various goals that we may be striving to
achieve at any given time? According to Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski’s (2002)
“Goal Shielding Theory”, we could do this by focusing on our central goal(s) and
inhibiting any alternative competing goals. They further suggest that an active
inhibition of alternate goals is a function of goal characteristics and the context
(motivational/emotional) where one is pursuing a goal. In their studies, they found a
significant commitment effect. Participants, when assigned to either a high
commitment or low commitment condition, rated a high commitment goal that they
wished to attain as significantly more important than a low commitment goal, and
they accordingly listed significantly fewer alternate goals in the high commitment
condition than in the low commitment condition (Shah et al., 2002). Thus, in effect,
subjects displayed goal inhibition as indicated by listing fewer alternative goals when
they had to focus on goals that they were highly committed to.
2
As the aforementioned study - Shah et al. (2002) - suggests, level of
commitment towards a particular goal may be a decisive factor wherein one actively
inhibits all other alternate goals and chooses to pursue a goal that one is highly
committed to. We can define goal commitment as “the determination to try for a goal
and the persistence in pursuing it over time” (Locke et al, 1981). In our study, we
wanted to test whether we could replicate the main effect for goal commitment as
shown by Shah et al. (2002), as well as extend their findings about what factors
might moderate such ‘goal shielding’. Specifically, we hypothesized that subjects,
when assigned to a high commitment goal condition, would display a high degree of
goal inhibition/goal shielding (i.e. list few alternative goals). We also wanted to test
whether goal shielding and the impact of commitment could be moderated by certain
personality factors.
One’s personality can be an influential factor in determining commitment
towards a particular goal and the amount of goal inhibition displayed. Personality
psychologists have generally agreed upon a Five-Factor Model or Big Five model of
personality (Tupes & Christal, 1961; Goldberg, 1990). According to this model there
are five major personality factors – Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism, and Openness to experience. Shah et al. (2002) have begun to look into
the relationship between goal inhibition and certain factors of personality (viz.
Anxiety, Depression, Self-Regulatory Tenacity, and Need for Cognitive Closure).
However, they did not use the alternative goal listing measure to test for the goal
inhibition displayed by anxious and depressed subjects – instead they had used a
3
reaction time task. In our study, we wished to examine whether these personality
variables would also have an impact on the alternate goal listing measure. Moreover,
they had used ad hoc measures of Anxiety, Depression and Tenacity instead of more
standard measures, such as those present in the Big Five model, despite the apparent
conceptual similarities between their ad hoc measures and standard measures. We
wished to determine whether more standard measures of what are apparently the
same concepts would have the same effect on goal shielding.
In this study, we wanted to look into the impact of different personality
factors on the alternative goal listing measure as well as use established standard
measures for determining personality. Among the personality factors, we wanted to
focus our attention on Conscientiousness (someone who is generally orderly,
responsible, dependable) and Neuroticism (someone who gets easily upset, is not
calm) as well as two sub-facets of Neuroticism, viz. Depression and Anxiety.
Studies have shown that in the workplace employees who exhibit a high level
of conscientiousness tend to perform well in their jobs (Barrick & Mount, 1991;
Salgado, 1997). A study on sales personnel found that those who scored high on
conscientiousness were more likely to set sales goals for themselves and be
committed to those goals (Barrick et al, 1993). In one of their studies, Shah et al.
(2002), found that subjects who scored high on their ad hoc measure of goal tenacity
listed significantly fewer alternate goals and that tenacity significantly moderated the
commitment effect in that those in the high commitment condition who had scored
high on tenacity displayed greater goal inhibition than those in the high commitment
4
condition who had scored low on tenacity. We wished to test whether
Conscientiousness (a standard Big Five measure) and self-regulatory tenacity are
related; in other words we hypothesized that conscientiousness (like tenacity) would
significantly moderate the goal commitment effect in that subjects who were highly
conscientious would display greater goal inhibition (i.e. list fewer alternate goals)
than those who were low in con scientiousness.
Our current mood can also dictate which goal we choose to pursue, the level
of commitment we decide to impart to the pursuit of that goal and whether we
actively inhibit other competing alternative goals. When people experiencing
depression are shown distracting stimuli, they are likely to not inhibit this distracting
information (Linville, 1996), unlike people in a normal mood. Thus, depression can
cause people to vary their attention among different goals, instead of focusing on just
one goal. Anxiety, on the other hand, due to its high arousal level may lead people to
focus their attention on the task at hand and thus, is likely to cause greater goal
inhibition (i.e. listing of fewer alternate goals). Our main focus was on two sub-
facets of Neuroticism – Depression and Anxiety. We predicted that people who
scored high on Depression would be more likely to display lower goal inhibition (i.e.
list more alternate goals), whereas people who scored high on Anxiety would display
higher goal inhibition (i.e. list fewer goals). In their reaction -time experiments, Shah
et al. (2002) found that Depression reduced goal inhibition whereas Anxiety
increased goal inhibition. Along these same lines, we wished to replicate these
5
findings, using the alternate goal listing measure for determining inhibition and
standard Big Five measures for determining personality.
The question of which goal to pursue when faced with a number of
alternative goals may cause ambiguity and confusion. At times, some people may
prefer to have a set deadline to finish their current tasks or a precise daily schedule
that would allow them to focus on one task at a time before moving on to the next
task. Open-endedness in the form of not having an exact deadline, many choices to
choose from, etc. could cause such people ambiguity and confusion. These people
are said to have a high need for cognitive closure which is referred to as one’s
“motivation with respect to information processing and judgment” (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994). This motivation arises from the theory that absence of closure
could prove to be costly in certain situations. For example, an absence of closure,
when one is pressed for time to complete an important project, could imply the
possibility of missing the deadline. In this situation, one would feel highly motivated
to possess closure and remove any ambiguity that could result in disastrous
outcomes. Thus, an individual possessing a high need for closure would feel
motivated to pursue one goal at a time and inhibit any other competing goals until
the primary goal was achieved.
A similar concept, called personal need for structure (PNS), was proposed by
Neuberg and Newsom (1993). According to their theory, people tend to reduce the
amount of cognitive overload that they face in their daily lives by “structuring the
world into a simplified, more manageable form”. Thus, people reduce the amount of
6
information that they have to process by establishing set routines and social scripts
when interacting with others, which could lead to greater inhibition of alternative
goals.
Shah et al. (2002) believed that people who displayed a high need for closure
would display greater goal inhibition (i.e. list fewer alternate goals) than those with a
low need for closure. Though they did not find a main effect of need for closure on
goal listing, need for closure significantly moderated the commitment effect in that
the impact of goal commitment on listing alternative goals increased with need for
closure. We wanted to investigate whether one’s personal need for structure
(Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) would interact in a similar way with goal commitment
in predicting the number of alternate goals listed.
Our general motivational orientation towards the achievement of a particular
goal may lead to greater/lower goal inhibition. There are essentially two motivational
systems that underlie human behavior and affect. Gray (1981, 1982) called them the
behavioral inhibition system or BIS, and the behavioral activation system or BAS.
The BIS is sensitive to “signals of punishment, non -reward, and novelty” and
inhibits behavior that could lead to potential painful/negative results. In other words,
when our BIS gets activated we become inhibited in our goal pursuit. Moreover,
one’s negative responses (such as fear, anxiety, frustration, sadness) towards
environmental cues can all be attributed to the BIS (Gray, 1978, 1981, 1987b, 1990).
The BAS, on the other hand, is sensitive to “signals of reward, non -
punishment, and escape from punishment”. When the BAS gets activated we tend to
7
move (or increase movement) towards our goals. According to Gray (1977, 1981,
1990), when we experience positive feelings (such as hope, elation, happiness) it is
due to the BAS. In our study, we wanted to investigate whether BIS/BAS increased
or decreased goal shielding. Specifically, we hypothesized that subjects with high
BIS scores would display greater goal inhibition (i.e. list fewer alternate goals)
whereas subjects with high BAS scores would display little/no goal inhibition (i.e.
list a large number of alternate goals).
To reiterate, our motivation for this paper was to replicate the findings of
Shah et al. (2002), in that subjects when assigned to a high goal commitment
condition would rate the high commitment goal as more important and display a
greater degree of goal inhibition (i.e. list fewer alternative goals) than those assigned
to a low goal commitment condition. We also hypothesized that Conscientiousness
would significantly moderate the goal commitment effect like their ad hoc measure
of self-regulatory tenacity, in that highly conscientiousness subjects would display
greater goal inhibition (i.e. list fewer alternative goals) in the high goal commitment
condition. We further predicted that Depression and Anxiety (sub-facets of
Neuroticism) would reduce and increase goal inhibition respectively. Additionally,
we hypothesized that a subject’s personal need for structure would significantly
interact with goal commitment to predict the number of alternate goals listed. In
other words, subjects who scored high on the personal need for structure scale
would, in the high goal commitment condition, list fewer alternate goals and, thus,
display greater goal inhibition. Our final hypothesis was that subjects with high BIS
8
scores would display greater goal inhibition while those with high BAS scores would
display little or no goal inhibition.
Method
Participants
199 subjects (63 men, 123 women) were in the final sample of the study.
Data from subjects who skipped a scale, or rated certain scales with the same ratings
(e.g. all 5s) was excluded since we needed complete scale responses for our analyses.
Also, the data from those who took less than 10 minutes or greater than 60 minutes
to finish all our scales was not included in our final sample because we believed such
subjects, in responding too quickly or taking a long time, were not focused enough to
accurately respond to the various questions.
Some subjects were recruited from the University of Southern California
(USC) undergraduate subject pool and given course credit for their participation.
Other subjects were recruited from advertising on internet websites such as ‘Craig’s
List’ (www.craigslist.com) and ‘Face Book’ (www.facebook.com). These subjects
were entered into a lottery to win a cash prize. Gender, race, religious affiliations,
and sexual orientation were not determining factors in the selection of the
participants. All participants were 18 years (or more) of age and US residents at the
time of participation.

9
Materials
The study was conducted online via the Internet. An online service providing
storage for web pages was used to gather the data; the data was stored on a secure
server.
Various scales – both ad hoc (similar to the ones used by Shah et al., 2002)
and established (viz. Big Five measures) - were used. Conscientiousness (see
Appendix A) and Neuroticism (see Appendix B) were each measured by 60 item
scales (Goldberg, 1999; http://ipip.ori.org/). Personal Need for Structure (see
Appendix C) was measured by a 12 item scale (Newberg & Newsom, 1993). A 20
item scale (see Appendix D) was used to test for BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994).
Procedure
The web address (link) of the index page of the experiment was posted on the
psychology subject pool website of USC as well on sites such as Craig’s List and
Face Book. When subjects clicked the link, they were transported to our
experiment’s home page where they read an information sheet outlining the purpose
of the experiment, their rights as subjects, etc. They also filled out their personal
information such as name, address, etc. On clicking the ‘Submit’ button at the
bottom of the page, the subjects were randomly assigned to either a high goal
commitment or low goal commitment condition.
In the high goal commitment condition, the subjects were asked to list one
goal that they had a strong desire to attain, whereas in the low goal commitment
condition they were asked to list a goal they had a slight desire to attain. For both
10
conditions, the subjects then rated the importance of the goal, difficulty in achieving
it, time spent pursuing the goal over the last month, and progress made while
pursuing the goal over that period of time. The ratings were made on a 7-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all/none) to 7 (extremely/great deal).
The subjects then clicked the ‘continue’ button to proceed to the next page
where they were asked to list activities that they could perform to attain the goal they
had listed initially in the high/low commitment conditions. Provision for listing at
most 25 activities was provided.
On the next page, they were asked to list alternative/other goals that they
were currently trying to achieve, and to indicate the importance of each goal. The
goal importance ratings were also made on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Provision for listing at most 14 alternative goals was
provided.
Upon continuing, subjects were presented with a 60 item Conscientiousness
scale, a 12 item Need for Structure scale, a 60 item Neuroticism scale, and a 20 item
BIS/BAS scale, in that order. Ratings for all these scales were made on a 5-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The
original BIS/BAS scale developed by Carver and White (1994) was a 4-point Likert-
type scale and the original NFS scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) was a 6-point
Likert-type scale. In our experiment we made both these scales 5-point Likert-type in
order to maintain rating consistency with the other personality scales.
11
After completing the BIS/BAS scale (indicated by clicking ‘continue’), the
subjects were presented with the final measure of our experiment - a 2 item self-
regulatory tenacity scale. They were asked to indicate their tenacity by rating how
often they tended to stop goal pursuit if they had the opportunity to pursue another
goal and how often did their attention shift between their various goal pursuits.
These rating were done on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (all
the time).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
The following analyses were conducted to serve as a manipulation check for
the goal commitment effect – high goal commitment vs. low goal commitment.
The total time (in minutes) the subjects took to complete the experiment was
calculated by subtracting the time for the last entry of the last scale from the time for
the first entry of the first scale. An Independent-Samples T -test indicated that
subjects in the high goal commitment condition took longer to complete the
experiment (M = 18.77, SD = 7.63) than those in the low goal commitment
condition (M = 17.32, SD = 7.00). However, this difference was not significant, t = -
1.39, df = 197, p < 0.17.
The ratings for goal importance, difficulty in achieving the goal, time spent in
pursuing the goal, and progress made in the pursuit of that goal were averaged and
an Independent-Samples T -test was performed for each. Significant results were
found for goal importance (t = 5.81, df = 197, p < 0.001) and time spent in goal
12
pursuit (t = 2.31, df = 197, p < 0.02). Subjects assigned to the high goal commitment
condition rated the goal as more important (M = 6.56, SD = 0.66) than those in the
low goal commitment condition (M = 5.61, SD = 1.45), and also spent more time in
pursuing the high commitment goal (M = 5.10, SD = 1.68) than those in the low goal
commitment condition (M = 4.53, SD = 1.80). Ratings for difficulty in achieving the
goal (t = -0.15, df = 197, p < 0.88) and progress made towards goal pursuit (t =
0.68, df = 197, p < 0.50) were not significant. Thus, we see that our manipulation of
goal commitment was successful in that subjects assigned greater importance to a
high commitment goal than a low commitment goal.
Central Analyses
In this section we used multiple reg ression to analyze our main hypotheses
for goal inhibition and various personality factors affecting goal inhibition. For all
analyses, the goal commitment effect was effect coded with ‘1’ representing a high
commitment goal and ‘-1’ representing a low commitment goal.
The number of activities that subjects could perform to attain the goal they
had listed initially and the number of alternate goals that they were currently trying
to achieve were summed and an Independent-Samples T-test was performed on both.
The results indicated that the difference between conditions in the number of
activities was not significant, t = -0.31, df = 197, p < 0.76. However, the number of
alternate goals listed was found to be significant, t = -2.28, df = 197, p < 0.03. This
indicated that subjects in the high goal commitment condition listed significantly
fewer goals (M = 5.26, SD = 3.70) than those in the low goal commitment condition
13
(M = 6.48, SD = 3.84). Also, there was no difference between conditions in the
average importance of other goals, t = 1.38, df = 197, p < 0.17.
In all ensuing regression analyses, the ratings for each personality scale (viz.
Conscientiousness, Tenacity, Depression, Anxiety, NFS, BIS, and BAS) were
averaged and then centered by subtracting the mean of each scale from each
individual’s average score on that scale. The interaction effect was calculated as the
product of goal commitment and the centered scores of the appropriate personality
measure. All regressions performed were ‘simultaneous regressions’ in that both the
main effect and interaction variables were entered into the regression calculation
simultaneously. We will report all results for each effect by controlling all other
variables in that particular test i.e. we will be looking at beta scores for each variable.
The ratings from the 60 item Conscientiousness scale were averaged and
centered (as described above). A linear regression analysis was done on the number
of alternative goals listed to test whether the commitment effect was moderated by
one’s conscientiousness. Though, we found a main effect for goal commitment (beta
= -0.17, t = -2.4, p < 0.02), the main effect for Conscientiousness was not
significant, beta = 0.09, t = 1.21, p < 0.23. Moreover, Conscientiousness was not
found to moderate the commitment effect, beta = 0.03, t = 0.46, p < 0.64.
Another regression done on the number of alternate goals with the centered
scores of the subjects’ self-regulatory tenacity ratings yielded a significant main
effect for commitment, beta = -0.16, t = -2.32, p < 0.02. Even though there was no
main effect for tenacity (beta = -0.02, t = -0.30, p < 0.78), tenacity was found to
14
significantly moderate the commitment effect in that those with high levels of
tenacity assigned to the high goal commitment condition displayed greater goal
inhibition (i.e. listed fewer other goals), than those in the high commitment condition
with low tenacity, beta = 0.20, t = 2.79, p < 0.006 (see Figure 1). There was not a
significant difference between those who were assigned to the low commitment
condition and had either high or low tenacity scores.
In the Neuroticism scale there was a set of 10 items that measured the
sub-facet of Anxiety, while another set of 10 items measured Depression. These
items were averaged and centered (as described before). A regression analysis on the
number of alternative goals listed, to examine whether anxiety moderated the
commitment effect, yielded a significant main effect for goal commitment, beta = -
0.16, t = -2.30, p < 0.02. However, the results showed that anxiety not only did not
moderate the commitment effect (beta = 0.08, t = 1.24, p < 0.22) but also did not
yield a significant main effect, beta = -0.05, t = -0.72, p < 0.47.
A separate regression analysis on the number of alternative goals with
depression scores yielded a significant main effect for goal commitment, beta = -
0.17, t = -2.47, p < 0.01. Additionally, a main effect for depression was present (beta
= -0.15, t = -2.19, p < 0.03) indicating that depressed individuals displayed greater
goal inhibition by listing fewer alternative goals. However, the interaction between
goal commitment and depression proved to be not significant, beta = 0.06, t = 0.87,
p < 0.39.

15
Figure 1

Commitment x Tenacity Interaction
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Low Goal
Commitment
High Goal
Commitment
Commitment Effect
Number of Alternative Goals Listed
Low Tenacity
High Tenacity

Figure 1. Interaction displaying tenacity moderating the goal commitment effect in
predicting the number of alternate goals.

16
The ratings from the personal need for structure scale were averaged and
centered. A regression analysis was done on the number of alternative goals to see
whether one’s need for structure significantly moderated the commitment effect. The
results indicated a significant main effect for goal commitment, beta = -0.16, t = -
2.29, p < 0.02. However, both the main effect for need for structure (beta = -0.04, t
= -0.56, p < 0.57) and the interaction between commitment and need for structure
(beta = 0.09, t = 1.31, p < 0.19), were not significant.
On the BIS/BAS scale, 7 items measured BIS levels while 12 items measured
BAS levels. These ratings were centered and averaged, and regression analyses were
performed on each. A regression done on the number of alternative goals to test
whether high BIS levels significantly moderated the commitment effect yielded a
main effect for goal commitment, beta = -0.16, t = -0.24, P < 0.03. The main
effect of BIS was absent (beta = 0.04, t = 0.57, p < 0.57), as was the interaction
between BIS and commitment, beta = -0.02, t = -0.31, p < 0.76.
Similarly, a regression analysis was performed on the number of alternative
goals to examine whether high BAS levels significantly moderated the commitment
effect. This result, too, indicated a significant main effect for goal commitment, beta
= -0.16, t = -2.29, p < 0.02. The main effect of BAS was not significant, beta =
0.02, t = 0.25, p < 0.80. BAS, also did not moderate the commitment effect, beta =
0.06, t = 0.89, p < 0.37.

17
Discussion
The motivation behind this study was to understand goal shielding/goal
inhibition by trying to replicate some of the findings of Shah et al. (2002), and also
to enhance our knowledge about the effect of various personality factors on goal
inhibition. We also wished to examine whether some of the effects found with the ad
hoc personality measures used by Shah et al. (2002) would also be found if standard
measures of personality were used instead.
Our hypothesis that subjects assigned to a high goal commitment condition
would rate the high commitment goal as more important was supported. We also
found a significant goal inhibition effect in that subjects who were in the high goal
commitment condition listed significantly fewer alternative goals than those who
were in the low goal commitment condition. These results were along the lines of
what Shah et al. (2002) had found. Thus, we see that the level of commitment
towards a particular goal can inhibit other goals that a person may have had.
We had wanted to investigate whether goal shielding could be effected by
one’s personality. The first personality measure we looked into was
Conscientiousness. Our hypothesis was that a highly conscientious person would, if
assigned to the high goal commitment condition, display greater goal inhibition than
someone who was low in conscientiousness and in the high goal commitment
condition. We also believed that the ad hoc measure of self-regulatory tenacity used
by Shah et al. (2002) would yield similar goal shielding effects as Conscientiousness,
and thus tenacity and conscientiousness would appear to measure the same construct.
18
As the results indicate, conscientiousness did not prove to be a moderating factor
affecting one’s commitment and thereby increasing goal shielding. However, we
found a significant interaction for the tenacity measure in that tenacity moderated the
commitment effect. Thus, subjects with high levels of tenacity assigned to the high
goal commitment condition listed fewer other goals, and so, displayed increased goal
inhibition. This is what Shah et al. (2002) had also found, though they had also
discovered a main effect of tenacity which we were unable to replicate. So it would
seem that tenacity and Conscientiousness are measuring different constructs.
Shah et al.’s (2002) reaction time experiments measuring Depression and
Anxiety had indicated that depressed individuals displayed reduced goal inhibition
while anxious people displayed increased goal inhibition. We wanted to replicate
these findings using the alternative goal listing measure and standard Big-Five
personality measures (viz. the two sub-facets of Neuroticism – Depression and
Anxiety). Our findings showed a non -significant result for Anxiety in that Anxiety
did not affect goal shielding and also did not moderate the commitment effect. But,
we did find a significant main effect for Depression in that depressed people
displayed greater goal inhibition. There was no significant interaction between
Depression and commitment. However, our finding for Depression is contradictory
to that of Shah et al. (2002) in that whereas they found depression to reduce goal
inhibition we found that depression causes an increase in goal inhibition.
Shah et al. (2002) had used the ‘need for cognitive closure’ scale (Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994) and found a significant interaction between ‘need for cognitive
19
closure’ and goal commitment in that subjects with a high need for closure listed
fewer alternative goals (i.e. displayed greater goal inhibition) in the high
commitment condition, than did subjects with a low need for closure. We wished to
investigate the effect of one’s ‘personal need for structure (PNS)’ (Neuberg &
Newsom, 1993) on commitment and goal shielding and thereby test whether the
‘need for cognitive closure’ and PNS are measuring the same construct. Our results
showed that the main effect for PNS was not significant and that PNS also did not
moderate the commitment effect. Thus, it would appear that ‘need for cognitive
closure’ and PNS are measuring somewhat different constructs. We did not include
the ‘need for cognitive closure’ scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) in this study. In
a follow -up study we plan to include this scale to investigate whether one’s ‘need for
cognitive closure’ can moderate the goal commitment effect in increasing goal
inhibition for those in the high goal commitment condition.
The BIS/BAS measure was not used by Shah et al. (2002) in their
experiments. In our study, we used this measure to examine whether individuals who
were avoidance oriented i.e. those who were “sensitive to punishment, non -reward
and novelty”, and thus, had high BIS scores would display greater goal inhibition.
We also hypothesized that those subjects who had high BAS scores (i.e. those who
were more approach oriented and “sensitive to reward, non -punishment and escape
from punishment”) would display little/no goal inhibition. As the results show, we
did not find a significant effect for BIS or for BAS. This could be because we did not
ask participants to indicate whether the initial goal (high/low commitment) they had
20
listed was something they were trying to avoid or to approach. In other words, we
did not test whether the initial goal listed was compatible with the subject’s general
orientation i.e. either approach (BAS) oriented or avoidance (BIS) oriented. If a
person is normally BIS oriented but lists a BAS goal (in the high or low commitment
condition) that he/she wishes to attain, then this incompatibility between orientation
and goal type could cause such a person to list more alternative goals i.e. display less
goal inhibition. On the other hand, if the person were to list a BIS goal but had a
general BAS orientation, then the orientation and goal type incompatibility could
result in greater goal inhibition (i.e. listing of fewer alternative goals). We would like
to investigate this phenomenon in a further study.
The main difference between our study and that of Shah et al.’s (2002) is that
while their study entailed participants physically coming and responding to the
various measures ours was run on the Internet. This fact could possibly account for
some of the results that we were unable to replicate. Subjects who personally interact
with an experimenter might feel more obligated to consci entiously answer all
questions more truthfully and thoroughly. An online study could create a sense of de-
personalization in that subjects would not really care how they chose to respond to
questions and whether they made a conscious effort to provide answers to everything
(we discovered that a lot of subjects just responded to a few scales or left the
experiment half-way). A possible future study could involve a physical setting as
opposed to a virtual one.
21
Another reason why we did not get similar results to that of Shah et al.’s
(2002) could be because our goal commitment effect was not strong enough. In their
experiments, they had used a more contrastive statement when asking participants to
list a goal. Specifically, participants were asked to list a goal they had a “strong
rather than a slight desire” to achieve and a goal they had a “slight rather than a
strong desire” to achieve, for the high goal commitment and low goal commitment
conditions, respectively. In our study, we did not use such a contrastive statement
and had simply asked subjects to list a goal they had a “strong desire” to attain (high
goal commitment condition) and a goal they had a “slight desire” to attain (low goal
commitment condition). Thus, the wording we used could have possibly weakened
the commitment effect and led to our inability to replicate some of the results.
To reiterate, we were able to replicate and add further support to Shah et al.’s
(2002) main finding that an individual’s tenacity can moderate the commitment
effect and result in greater goal inhibition. In other words, a tenacious person who is
highly committed to a specific goal that he/she is trying to achieve will ignore/inhibit
all other goals that might be competing for his/her time and attention, and focus
his/her energy towards the attainment of that initial goal. We were unable to find a
significant relationship between Conscientiousness and Tenacity, and between ‘need
for cognitive closure’ and ‘personal need for structure’; these measures, according to
the results of our study, seem to be measuring different underlying constructs. This
could be, as aforementioned, due to the fact that our goal commitment manipulation
22
was not sufficiently strong enough which, in turn, could have made our study not
sensitive enough.

23
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25
Appendix A: Conscientiousness Scale
Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement
describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in
the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people
you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can
describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute
confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then click the radio-button that
corresponds to the number on the scale.
1 2 3 4 5
strongly disagree strongly agree

1. I complete tasks successfully

2. I don’t understand things

3. I excel in what I do

4. I handle tasks smoothly

5. I’m sure of my ground

6. I have little to contribute

7. I come up with good solutions

8. I don’t see the consequences of things

9. I know how to get things done

10. I often misjudge situations

11. I like order

12. I often forget to put things back in their proper place

13. I like to tidy up

14. I leave a mess in my room

15. I want everything to be “just right”
26
16. I’m not bothered by messy people

17. I love order and regularity

18. I leave my belongings around

19. I do things according to a plan

20. I’m not bothered by disorder

21. I try to follow rules

22. Generally, I break rules

23. I tend to keep my promises

24. I break my promises

25. I pay my bills on time

26. I tell the truth

27. I misrepresent the facts

28. I listen to my conscience

29. I get others to do my duties

30. I do the opposite of what is asked

31. I go straight for the goal

32. I tend to work hard

33. I do just enough work to get by

34. I turn plans into actions

35. I plunge into tasks with all my heart

36. I put little time and effort into my work

37. I do more than what’s expected of me

27
38. I’m not highly motivated to succeed

39. I set high standards for myself and others

40. I demand quality

41. I get chores done right away

42. I tend to waste time

43. I’m always prepared

44. I start tasks right away

45. I have difficulty starting tasks

46. I get to work at once

47. I find it difficult to get down to work

48. I carry out my plans

49. I need a push to get started

50. I postpone decisions

51. I generally avoid mistakes

52. I make rash decisions

53. I choose my words with care

54. I like to act on a whim

55. I rush into things

56. I stick to my chosen path

57. I jump into things without thinking

58. I do crazy things

28
59. I act without thinking

60. I often make last-minute plans

29
Appendix B: Neuroticism Scale
Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement
describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in
the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people
you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can
describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute
confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then click the radio-button that
corresponds to the number on the scale.
1 2 3 4 5
strongly disagree strongly agree

1. I often tend to worry about things

2. I don’t worry about things that have already happened

3. Generally, I fear for the worst

4. I’m not easily disturbed by events

5. I’m afraid of many things

6. I’m not easily bothered by things

7. I get stressed out easily

8. I’m relaxed most of the time

9. Often, I get caught up in my problems

10. I adapt easily to new situations

11. I get angry easily

12. I seldom get mad

13. I get irritated easily

14. I rarely get irritated

15. I get upset easily
30
16. I’m not easily annoyed

17. I’m often in a bad mood

18. I often lose my temper

19. I tend to keep my cool

20. I rarely complain

21. I often feel blue

22. I seldom feel blue

23. I dislike myself

24. I’m very pleased with myself

25. I’m often down in the dumps

26. I have a low opinion of myself

27. I feel comfortable with myself

28. I have frequent mood swings

29. I feel desperate

30. I feel that my life lacks direction

31. I’m easily intimidated

32. I’m able to stand up for myself

33. I’m afraid that I will do the wrong thing

34. I find it difficult to approach others

35. I’m not bothered by difficult social situ ations

36. I’m afraid to draw attention to myself

37. I only feel comfortable with friends

31
38. I’m comfortable in unfamiliar situations

39. I stumble over my words

40. I’m not embarrassed easily

41. I often eat too much

42. I rarely overindulge

43. I don’t know why I do some of the things I do

44. I tend to do things I later regret

45. I go on binges

46. I easily resist temptations

47. I never spend more than I can afford

48. I never splurge

49. I love to eat

50. I’m able to control my cravings

51. I tend to panic easily

52. I remain calm under pressure

53. I become overwhelmed by events

54. I’m calm even in intense situations

55. I feel that I’m unable to deal with things

56. I can handle complex problems

57. I can’t make up my mind

58. I get overwhelmed by emotions

32
59. I know how to cope

60. I readily overcome setbacks

33
Appendix C: Personal Need for Structure Scale

Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with
each according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. It is important for you to
realize that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are
different, and we are interested in how you feel. Please respond according to the
following 5-point scale:

1 2 3 4 5
strongly disagree strongly agree

1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it

2. I’m not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine

3. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life

4. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place

5. I enjoy being spontaneous

6. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious

7. I don’t like situations that are uncertain

8. I hate to change my plans at the last minute

9. I hate to be with people who are unpredictable

10. I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more

11. I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations

12. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear

34
Appendix D: BIS-BAS Scale

For each of the following statements, please indicate how much you agree
with the statement. Please provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale:

1 2 3 4 5
strongly disagree strongly agree

1. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I get pretty “worked-up”

2. I worry about making mistakes

3. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit

4. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me

5. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or
nervousness

6. I feel worried when I think I have done something poorly

7. I have very few fears compared to my friends

8. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized

9. When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep at it

10. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly

11. It would excite me to win a contest

12. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited right away

13. When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it

14. I go out of my way to get things I want

15. If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away

16. When I go after something I use a “no holds barred” approach

17. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun
35

18. I crave excitement and new sensations

19. I’m always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun

20. I often act on the spur of the moment

Abstract (if available)

Abstract We attempted to replicate some findings of Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski (2002) to investigate whether one's commitment towards a goal increases/decreases goal shielding (i.e. inhibits alternative goals). We investigated whether certain personality factors (viz. Conscientiousness, Depression, Anxiety, Tenacity, Personal Need for Structure (PNS), Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC), and BIS/BAS) could moderate the commitment effect thereby increasing/decreasing goal shielding. Furthermore, we wished to test whether Conscientiousness-Tenacity and PNS-NCC measured similar underlying constructs, respectively. Results indicated that the goal commitment (high vs. low) manipulation was successful wherein people listed significantly fewer alternative goals in the high goal commitment condition. Tenacity significantly moderated the commitment effect (highly tenacious people displayed greater goal inhibition). A main effect for Depression indicated that depressed individuals showed greater goal inhibition. Regression analyses for Conscientiousness, Anxiety, PNS, NCC, and BIS/BAS yielded only significant main effects for goal commitment. Conscientiousness-Tenacity and PNS-NCC did not measure the same construct.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Chopra, Gurveen Singh (author)

Core Title Investigating the effects of personality factors on goal shielding

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program Psychology

Publication Date 03/22/2007

Defense Date 01/15/2007

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag BIS/BAS,goal commitment,goal inhibition,goal shielding,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Advisor Read, Stephen J. (committee chair), Miller, Lynn Carol (committee member), Walsh, David A. (committee member)

Creator Email gchopra@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m319

Unique identifier UC1504191

Identifier etd-Chopra-20070322 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-321771 (legacy record id),usctheses-m319 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Chopra-20070322.pdf

Dmrecord 321771

Document Type Thesis

Rights Chopra, Gurveen Singh

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu