Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Jack White, interview, 1992-06-30

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Jack White, interview, 1992-06-30

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Content PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
RE:
•
MEMORANDUM
Richard J. Stone, General Counsel
Kirsten Hicks Spira, Counsel
Laurel Ballard Bryan, Counsel
Interview with Jack White
July 8, 1992
T 95404-00001
\\Loi
On Tuesday, June 30, 1992, at 2:30 p.m. at Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher's downtown office, Laurel Bryan and Kirsten
Hicks Spira interviewed Jack White, Chief of the Bureau of
Investigation of the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office.
The following is a summary of our recollections of that
meeting, including our questions and comments, together with
our mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon
the meeting.
1. Background Information.
Jack White was a sworn officer with the LAPD for
27 years. For the last 10 years of this time period, he
acted as advisor or liaison between the Board of Police
Commissioners and the LAPD, a then newly-created position
which White was the first to hold. White retired from the
LAPD in 1985 with the rank of Commander. White is now Chief
of the Bureau of Investigation for the District Attorney's
office, where he has been for the past 8 years. White was
also the Mayor of Baldwin Park for 10 years and was
president of the school board for Baldwin Park for 10 years.
As the Chief Investigator with the D.A's office,
White directed the investigation of King after he was
arrested. The starting point of his investigation was the
LAPD's own cursory investigation of the incident. His
department was instrumental in stopping the filing on King
for evading arrest. Under his direction the Bureau
investigated the King beating incident thoroughly. He and
his staff interviewed all bystanders and residents in the
area, reviewed LAPD policy and went to great lengths to
enhance the home videotape of the incident. White and his
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
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staff worked closely with the D.A's who tried the officers
in the King case.
2. Anticipation Of Verdict.
White not only anticipated that all four of the
officers might not be convicted, he anticipated that all
four might even be acquitted, though he stated he was
"probably the dnly one who did." He stated that he was
concerned about this possibility because of the difficulty
in prosecuting police officers. He stated that when a
police officer is doing a job that "we've asked them to do,"
it is very difficult to get a conviction because, unlike the
usual civilian defendant, the jury actually begins with the
presumption that a police officer is not guilty.
3. Intelligence.
Neither White nor anyone on his staff was directly
involved in obtaining intelligence concerning a possible
outbreak of violence following the announcement of the
verdicts. However, White stated that given his experience
with the LAPD and his background, he was quite concerned
about the possibility of civil unrest following the
verdicts, whatever they might be. He stated that although
he had not anticipated the severe nature of the disturbance,
in his mind it was clear that some type of disturbance
should be anticipated and that they should "gear up for
certain emergencies."
Jack White told us that he discussed the
possibility of the reaction of the community with Stanley
Sheinbaum, Jesse Brewer and Mike Yamaki of the Police
Commission as well as with Chief Deputy Rick Thompson and
Special Assistant Robert Johnson. The reaction of those
individuals was that they really didn't want to believe that
acquittals were possible.
Jack White told us that the LAPD has an excellent
ongoing intelligence information system, in which he
apparently placed great confidence (although it was not
clear whether this confidence was based on his past
experience with LAPD or on current knowledge of the unit).
White mentioned a department called the "Public Disorder
Intelligence Division," which is commanded by Steve Gates.
It is the job of this Division to gauge community feelings,
reactions and concerns and to continually feed this
information to the Chief. This intelligence is an integral
part of the LAPD's planning. What this Division, as well as
other divisions, should have been looking for was a build-up
of tensions and gang activity, etc., from that the LAPD
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should have been able to predict the mood of the community
and thus the likelihood of civil unrest, as well as the
locations where that unrest was most likely to break out.
Based on this information, the LAPD then should have
targeted sensit.ive areas where they would deploy extra
manpower or wer
1
a prepared to deploy extra manpower.
4. Planning.
a. Planning By D.A's Office.
White discussed possible unrest following the
verdicts with his subordinates in his Bureau, and with the
D.A. He felt that primary responsibility for dealing with
the outbreak of the civil unrest was, of course, with the
LAPD. However, he felt that his department needed to be
fully prepared to deal with any kind of disaster.
White told us that the D.A's office has a plan
which covers almost any kind of disaster. The D.A's plan is
similar in scope to the LAPD tactical manual. The D.A's
emergency plan covers mass arrests, what to do in case the
facilities are inoperable due to a blackout or other exigent
circumstance, the continuity of the chain of command and
central services, their respective responsibilities to keep
the top staff free of operational worries to they can make
strategic decisions, etc. A copy of the Los Angeles
District Attorney's Office Emergency Plan is attached.
Preparation for possible unrest was, in Jack
White's view, his job. He had several staff meetings where
he discussed with his subordinates what was likely to happen
in case of civil unrest. In these meetings, they reviewed
their emergency, initial reaction and civil unrest plans.
He assured his superiors, "We have a good plan and we are
ready." Although the D.A's plan covers numerous
circumstances, the part of the plan which was reviewed
closely with his staff was the section dealing with civil
unrest. He briefed the command staff concerning the plan
and reacquainted them with the details. It was important in
his view that everyone understand the proper steps to be
taken in various contingencies.
In particular, they discussed:
(1) the details of how to implement the plan,
what each person was to do and how each person in the "tree"
would be notified in case of an emergency;
(2) ways to transport people to other sites, if
necessary, and to set up remote processing operations; and
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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
(3) how to handle record-keeping if their
computers became inoperable.
b. Planning By The LAPD.
Chief Dotson told Jack White during a meeting just
before the verdicts that "We're going to have another summer
like '65 if we don't start planning and we can't do anything
with him (Gates- ] here." White remembers Frankel also saying
something similar to this. White never really discussed
with the Police Commissioners what planning was taking place
or should be taking place with the LAPD. He assumed that
the Police Commissioners were getting proper advice from the
LAPD and that the LAPD was appropriately planning for such a
contingency in the same way that his department was
planning. He could not believe that (1) the LAPD did not
have a plan, (2) the plan was not rehearsed, and (3) the
plan was not followed. This is particularly true because
the LAPD has long prided itself in tactical alert, swat and
deployment strategies. The comments of Dotson and Frankel
notwithstanding, the last thing on White's mind was the
possibility the LAPD would not be ready.
c. Planning That Should Have Taken Place.
Jack White has not been with the LAPD since his
retirement in 1985 and therefore his information is somewhat
dated. However, based on his extensive experience he stated
that the planning that should have taken place is
essentially the same type of planning that was going on at
the D.A.'s office under his control. The Tactical Manual
which Gates has claimed was his "plan" is a generic
framework for any major problem where resources must be
reallocated. This tactical manual should have been reviewed
with a particular eye to what should be done in case of a
riot, as well as a discussion on who should activate the
plan and how.
The first step in any plan is to establish a
perimeter, contain the situation, set up a command post,
call in resources, protect life and property. One person
should be appointed to handle personnel, others to handle
equipment, crowd control, press communications, strategic
planning, etc. Every supervisor and every South Bureau
Officer should have reviewed these plans and deployment
decisions should have reviewed daily. As an experienced
officer, White could tell from LAPD's response that it did
not have a plan in place and that the Department lacked the
resolve to stop the disturbance. Such situations must be
controlled immediately, before the "mob mentality" and its
related "anonymity" and "universality" components took over.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
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To respond to a situation of this magnitude, White
said, the Department must have "a well-oiled machine, with
every nut in place." (We refrain from editorial comment.)
What it had, unfortunately, was an atmosphere in which is
was impossible to properly respond to a riot. The Chief
mistrusted and had ceased communicating with his Deputy
Chiefs and was trying to run the Department himself through
a select group of his commanders and captains, bypassing his
top staff. (See Sections 5 and 7.)
s. oversight Of The LAPD.
White stated that since the mid-term of former
Chief Parker, the Police Commission has not been very
effective because they have no real power over the Chief of
Police. The Police Commissioners can make trouble but they
cannot effectively enforce their will. In this case, about
all they could do is ask the Chief if he was ready, they
couldn't force him to plan. The Mayor and the City Council
are elected and the Commissioners are appointed by the
Mayor; however, the Chief of Police is guaranteed his job by
Charter, or at least he was before Charter Amendment "F".
In White's view the Chief of Police should be
directly responsible to the Police Commission and the staff
of the Police Commission should be the Police Department;
the Commission should not have to compete or struggle with
the Department for information. If the Police Commission
becomes involved in having an independent staff, an
adversarial relationship develops. Ideally, the Chief of
Police should report directly to the Police Commissioners
and if the Commissioners do not like what the Chief of
Police is doing, they should be able to fire him.
6. Effects Of Political Atmosphere and Pre-verdict
comments.
In White's view, Chief Gates has been very adept
at manipulating the officers who work under him. He
understands the mentality of the every day officers.
Instead of smoothing the relationship between the LAPD and
the other branches of government, or the community, he
aggravates the problem by "siding" with his officers and
disparaging their detractors. This has made him very
influential with his officers who are not trained to
objectively seek out social issues or social truths and has
fostered an "us against them" attitude. Gates succeeded in
convincing many of his officers that was the press and the
politicians who had brought the LAPD "to its knees." But it
was not the press and the politicians, it was really Gates
who was exploiting the officers himself. He should have
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been dealing with the issues instead of taking on a siege
mentality.
In White's view, the constant fighting between the
City Council, the Mayor's office and the Commissioners,
particularly when combined with Gates' mistrust of his own
officers (see Section 7), led to a breakdown in the
organizational structure of the LAPD which was the primary
cause in White's view of the LAPD's poor response. White
thinks Joe McNamara was correct when he wrote that "the LAPD
was paralyzed by its own guilt for the Rodney King beating."
In White's view, the Mayor should not have made
the speech that he did following the verdicts, which White
believes simply incited the rioters. Further, he believes
that the City Council should have supported the Commissioner
when the Commission put Gates on leave. By reversing the
Commission, the City Council took all of the authority away
from the Police Commission. In White's view the new troops
would have rallied around the Chief and that change would
have made a tremendous difference in the LAPD's response.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that a new
chief would have used the opportunity of the civil unrest to
try to prove himself and would not have been so lax in
planning.
7. LAPD Management.
According to Jack White the LAPD prides itself on
being free from political influence. However, when the
Chief of Police does not speak to its chief officers, this
creates severe problems. In White's view this is one of the
chief problems that led to the breakdown in the LAPD in
dealing with the unrest.
White stated that it is his understanding that
prior to the delivery of the verdicts, Chief Gates had cut
all of his chief officers out of the chain of command and
had created a new channel of command. This information
comes from private sources. Following the Christopher
Commission Report, the Police Commission put Gates on leave
and placed, or attempted to place, Dotson in Gates' place.
This made Gates very distrustful of Dotson and as a result,
Gates would not speak to him. Gates became more distrustful
than ever of Sheinbaum and Brewer who had criticized him
during this time period following his reinstatement, and as
a result also would not speak to Sheinbaum or Brewer.
To make matters worse, Deputy Chiefs Levant and
Parks were attempting to vie for the Chief of Police
position in the selection process. Thus, both Levant and
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Parks were also distrusted by Gates. Meanwhile, Mark
Kroeker was holding his own press conferences which made
Gates jealous and thus Gates was not on as good a terms with
Kroeker as he previously had been. Deputy Chief Frankel
thought he should have been promoted to assistant chief when
Brewer retired, but was not, and therefore he and Gates'
relationship was also strained. This scenario led to a
complete breakdown of communication which, in turn, led
Gates to create a new chain of command through his captains
and commanders, literally skipping over the proper chain of
command set up by the City Charter.
Chief Gates also did not have any meaningful
dialogue with the D.A.'s office since he did not like either
Ira Reiner or Jack White. Thus, there was no intelligence
that White knows of going on between the D.A.'s office and
the LAPD. To White's knowledge Gates similarly would not
have any meaningful dialogue with the Mayor or the Police
Commissioners, whom he criticized publicly.
a. LAPD Relationship To Police commission.
See Section 5.
9. Adequacy Of Police Response.
In White's view the police response was obviously
inadequate. In his view the immediate flare-ups should have
been contained, perimeters established, and immediate
resources called in to protect life and property. At
Florence and Normandie, the most famous flare-up spot, there
was a Commander (Banks), a Captain (Jefferson) and
Lieutenant Moulin. With a flare-up of that magnitude,
either the Captain or Commander should have assumed command.
In the absence of this, Lieutenant Moulin should have been
familiar with the required procedures.
White believes that the failure to properly review
and plan for civil unrest was the cause of Lieutenant
Moulin's decision to pull out. In White's view, that was
the last thing they should have done. Perhaps the police
should have backed away, but under the tactical manual they
should have immediately established a perimeter and a
blockade and asked for resources. They may have had to
"stick it out" while they waited for resources, but this
shouldn't have taken that long. As one positive thing Jack
White says that he believes the young officers at Florence
and Normandie, as well as the young officers in general on
the Police Force, were willing to go in and get the job
done. He believes that the younger officers at Florence and
Normandie were acting appropriately and were maintaining the
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situation and could have stuck it out for a much longer
period of time while waiting for reinforcements if they were
asked to do so.
In White's view the "Higher Ups" such as the
Lieutenants, Captains and Commanders lacked the resolve to
deal with the situation because they were afraid that their
decisions would not be supported. In other words, he
believes that they were afraid to either shoot at the
rioters or take the risk of being shot. As a result, they
were paralyzed into inaction.
When questioned about the effect of the media,
White agreed that the media in some ways aggravated the
situation, but he maintained that whether it was the media
or word of mouth, the same thing would have happened. At
least with the media, their reports were far more accurate
than the word of mouth on the street would have been without
the immediate access to news footage. Besides, a free press
is simply one of the variables that the police have to take
into consideration when planning and dealing with rioters.
10. Reasons For Inadequacies.
a. Inadequate Preparation.
White thinks the officers should have been better
trained, arrangements for transportation should already have
been made and, when LAPD learned the verdicts were about to
be announced, back-up troops should have been "suited up and
ready to go." Decisions about where field command posts
would be located should already have been made. In his
view, there should have been a prearranged agreement with
the National Guard so they would be ready to respond a a
moment's notice in case of any civil unrest.
However, White believes that officer training is
not where LAPD's control of the situation broke down, nor is
planning the reason LAPD failed to respond adequately.
Planning, he said, is "something this department clearly
knows how to do." White feels that execution and "command
from the top" are the areas in which LAPD failed in this
instance.
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b. Effects of Planning and Budgetary
constraints.
Jack White was not of the opinion that budgetary
constraints inhibited the LAPD's response.
c. command structure During The Civil Unrest.
As previously mentioned, in White's view the
correct response would be to try to stop the unrest as
immediately as possible. This was not done. No one called
a tactical alert until 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock that evening,
and when someone finally did, it is his understanding that
it was a communications officer by the name of Goodwin. It
is unbelievable to him that Frankel, who was available to
call a tactical alert, did not do so immediately. Moreover,
in the absence of anyone else, Lieutenant Moulin or one of
his supervisors should have called a tactical alert. Had
Gates done everything necessary in advance, it was certainly
not sinful that Gates himself was not personally available.
However, when the violence broke, Gates should have been
available to make sure that the process was working. In
light of the fact that the process was absolutely not
working, something should have been done immediately to
correct the problem.
When asked about whether he believes that Gates'
"soft" reaction to the riots was purposeful as has been
rumored, White stated that he believes Gates is too
egotistical to allow the inadequate police response to occur
on purpose.
11. Lessons Learned.
Although White believes that we will not see an
outbreak of unrest again like that which we experienced
following the King verdicts in the immediate future, he
believes that the LAPD needs to be absolutely prepared
following the decision if the federal government decides not
to go forward with the civil rights actions against the
officers and following the probable convictions of the four
persons charged in the Denny and other riot related
beatings. Following those decisions, the LAPD has to be
ready for flare-ups.
12. Recommendations For Improvement.
White feels that the recommendations made by the
Christopher Commission apply here as well. He made no
additional specific recommendations.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Following Proposition "F", and the installation of
the new Chief of Police, White believes that the major
changes that needed to be made have, in fact, now been
accomplished.
White is not of the view that community-based
policing will significantly improve the policing of the
LAPD. He believes that community-based policing will be
difficult to implement because the traditional basic police
officers are not from the communities where most of the
police need to be stationed for a community-based policing
effort. In his view, a young white police officer from
Canyon country, Simi Valley, or some other such area where
they are likely to be from, simply cannot be very effective
stationed in South Central Los Angeles. Perhaps over time
the system can grow up where police can be stationed in
geographic areas that they are familiar with, however, this
will take a long time and must start at a grassroots level.
13. Use Of Interviewee At Any Public Hearing.
Jack White is very articulate. He would probably
make a good witness although with the caveat that his
information concerning the LAPD is dated.
14. Additional Interviewees suggested.
White suggested we may wish to interview the
following persons:
1. David Dotson (I assume he is being covered by
the LAPD Group).
2. Homer Broom (retired Police Commander)
3. Joe Roussan (currently owns a consulting firm
and is a retired Los Angeles Police Captain)
4. Roger Molton (retired Chief of Police of
Redondo Beach)
5. Tom Reddon
6. Ed Davis
KHS/vjr
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF JACK WHITE
Jack White is currently the Chief of the Bureau of
Investigation of the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office,
a position which he has held for the last 8 years.
Previously, White served for 27 years as an officer with the
LAPD, retiring in 1985 with the rank of commander. As Chief
Investigator with the D.A's office, White directed the
investigation of the King beating incident and worked
closely with the D.A. during the trial of the four officers.
White thought that acquittals of all four officers
were possible and anticipated a violent reaction from the
public when the verdicts were announced. He personally
conducted meetings with his staff to review their emergency
plan in detail and to make sure everyone understood his or
her individual assignment or responsibility. White thought
LAPD would do the same type of planning, but was told by
Deputy Chiefs Dotson and Frankel that Gates would ignore or
discourage planning efforts.
White learned, through contacts still with the
Department, that Gates mistrusted and had ceased
communicating with his deputy chiefs. He stated that Gates
was trying to run the Department himself, through a select
group of commanders and captains, thus bypassing his top
staff and circumventing the normal chain of command. White
believes that Gates' mistrust of his top staff, combined
with the constant bickering among Gates, the Mayor's office,
the City Council and the Commissioners, lead to a breakdown
of the organizational structure of the LAPD. This, in
White's view, was the primary cause of the LAPD's poor
response to the civil unrest.
White believes that neither officer training nor
the ability to plan were the reason LAPD failed to respond
adequately. White feels that execution and leadership
"from the top" are the particular areas in which the LAPD
failed in this instance. Because of the general breakdown
in the highest segment of the command structure, LAPD did
not have the kind of "well-oiled machine" necessary to
respond to a situation of the magnitude experienced
following the verdicts.
LL922110.154
1

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Description

Interview of Jack White, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation of the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, about the planning measures taken by the District Attorney's Office prior to the Rodney King verdict, and the adequacy of the Los Angeles Police Department's response to the civil disturbance, 1992 June 30.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Jack White, interview, 1992-06-30

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 11 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-35219

Unique identifier UC11451686

Identifier box 21 (box),web-box21-36-01.pdf (filename),folder 36 (folder),webster-c100-35219 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box21-36/web-box21-36-01.pdf

Dmrecord 35219

Format 11 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts