Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Bruce Ward, interview, 1992-08-20

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Bruce Ward, interview, 1992-08-20

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Content TO:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CI1Y OF LOS ANGELES
ATIORNEY WORK PRODUCT
PRMLEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
RICHARD J. STONE
General Counsel and Staff Director
FROM: 0/JI--I AUDREY B. COLLINS AND RICHARD ROSENTHAL
SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF LT. BRUCE WARD
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
DATE: AUGUST 20, 1992
1. PREFACE.
On Tuesday, August 11, 1992, from approximately 2: 15 p.m. until approximately 4:45
p.m., we interviewed Lt. Bruce Ward, head of the LAPD's Tactical Planning Section,
at Audrey Collins' office. Fallowing is a summary of our recollections of this
meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our mental
impressions, conclusions, and opinions based upon the meeting. Before beginning
the interview, Audrey B. Collins (ABC) advised Lt. Ward of the purpose of the
investigation and its confidentiality. ABC advised Lt. Ward that he could make any
statements he wished either off the record or on the record but not for attribution to
him. She stated that many of the statements would otherwise be attributable to him
because of his position. Lt. Ward indicated his understanding of this statement.
2. BACKGROUND.
Lt. Ward is a 24-year veteran with LAPD. He has been at Tactical Planning for 6½
years. Previous assignments include an assignment as a watch commander at Pacific
and West Los Angeles areas, and as a sergeant at Pacific and Southwest areas. His
current supervisor is Commander Bayan Lewis. Previous supervisors include
Commander Ron Banks and George Morrison.
3. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF TACTICAL PLANNING.
Lt. Ward explained that there are four units and a total of 19 officers within the
Tactical Planning Section. First is the Field Command Post Unit, consisting of a
sergeant and four officers. It is the responsibility of this unit to establish a field
command post, and to conduct exercises and training for the entire department on
the command post function.
The second unit within Tactical Planning is the Tactical Manual Unit, consisting of
one sergeant and three officers. As its name indicates, this unit is responsible for
maintaining and revising the Tactical Manual. The unit just published a reformatted
manual, which was distributed after the riots. (However, all the work on this
revision was completed before the riots.)
The third unit is the Special Events Planning Unit, consisting of one sergeant and
two officers. This unit plans for special events, such as the L. A. Marathon, parades,
and IO-kilometer runs. The fourth unit is the Hazardous Materials Unit, consisting
of one sergeant and four officers.
In addition to the above units, it is also Lt. Ward's responsibility to work with the
Emergency Operations Organization (EOO ), which consists of Los Angeles City
agencies as well as some utilities (i.e., Southern California Gas Company) and the
Red Cross. (The EOO is unrelated to the Mutual Aid Plan.) Lt. Ward's unit works
with the EOO to plan a coordinated response to emergencies.
4. LAPD PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCE.
A. LAPD Attitude/Fear of Public Perception of LAPD's Preparation Efforts.
ABC asked Lt. Ward what, if any, planning and training LAPD engaged in in
order to prepare for possible disturbances after the verdict in the Rodney King
trial. Lt. Ward responded that he would rather approach this subject generally
than specifically.
Lt. Ward stressed at several points during the interview that many of LAPD's
training and planning efforts during the time between the King incident and the
verdict were disguised in some way because of LAPD's perception that these
efforts had to be hidden from public view. For example, Lt. Ward related that,
before a meeting called by Assistant Chief Robert Vernon to discuss
. preparations, Commander Bayan Lewis' aide came to him to inform him of the
meeting. When Lt. Ward said, "Is it about the riots?" the aide looked around
and said, "Sh!" Lt. Ward felt that discussion of possible civil disturbances was
consciously avoided.
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B. Written Materials Provided by Lt. Ward.
Lt. Ward indicated that one of the means of preparing LAPD was through
distribution of written materials. He provided a number of documents which will
be numbered in the same order used in Lt. Ward's May 18, 1992, cover
memorandum titled "A Compilation of Tactical Planning Section U.O. Planning"
to Commanding Officer, Uniformed Services Group (Commander Bayan Lewis).
This cover memorandum discussed all of the attachments, which are listed here
in the same order as follows:
• Attachment 1 Staff/Command Officer's Guide.
• Attachment 2 September 19, 1991, memorandum discussing
Emergency Response Readiness Audit, Operations/West Bureau.
• Attachment 3 -- April 27, 1992, memorandum on Emergency
Response Readiness Audit.
• Attachment 4 -- October 22, 1991, memorandum discussing
Tear Gas Readiness Audit.
• Attachment 5 -- A listing of Tactical Planning Sections' training
conducted for the entire department entitled "Training
Conducted by Tactical Planning Section."
• Attachment 6 -- A description of a South Bureau Command
Post exercise entitled "Unusual Occurrence Functional Exercises,
Operations/South Bureau, July 10, 1991."
• Attachment 7 -- July 10, 1991, memorandum from Director
Robert Vernon entitled "Civil Disorder Training Update."
• Attachment 8 -- Watch Commander's Guide.
The above list concludes the documents which were referenced and numbered in
the May 18, 1992, memorandum titled "A Compilation of Tactical Planning
Section U.O. Planning." However, Lt. Ward also provided us with additional
documents during the course of the interview. They are numbered as follows:
• Attachment 9 -- March 14, 1990, memorandum entitled "Order
No. 6 from Assistant Chief Vernon entitled 'Consolidated
Standing Plans/Field Command Post Operations."'
• Attachment 10 -- Tactical Planning prepared this document,
entitled "Fact Sheet Planning Progress," after the civil
disturbance at the request of the Police Commission. It
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was intended to provide the Police Commission with · an initial
summary of LAPD's review of the civil disturbance.
• Attachment 11 -- Tactical Planning prepared this five-page
document, entitled "Riot Control Checklist for Watch
Commanders," after the civil disturbance as an easy-to-consult
summary. Watch commanders can refer to it for an outline of
steps to take in the event of a civil disturbance. According to
Lt. Ward, it includes a few new things but is, for the most part,
a compilation of instructions from existing material.
• Attachment 12 -- One-page sheet entitled "Tactical Planning
Section-State of Preparedness and Training." (This document
was not provided by Lt. Ward. It was shown to him by ABC.
Lt. Ward was able to identify it.)
• Attachment 13 -- July 1, 1992, memorandum to All Geographic
Area and Bureau Commanding Officers from Commander Bayan
Lewis -- Subject: Field Command Post Liaisons and Escorts.
The first document discussed was the Staff/Command Officer's Guide
(Attachment 1). According to Lt. Ward, this guide contains material with which
officers should already be familiar because it duplicates the Tactical Manual.
However, it was felt that this guide, which consists largely of summary checklists,
provided the information in a helpful format. First distributed in June, 1991, this
guide became part of the Tactical Manual. Lt. Ward stated it was the first time
that a guide was issued for officers at the level of captain or above.
Lt. Ward also showed us the Watch Commander's Guide (Attachment 8). He
indicated that the Watch Commander's Guide and First Responder's Guide (for
use by sergeants) are not now and were not within the Tactical Manual at the
time of the April, 1992, civil disturbances. However, they were readily available,
according to Lt. Ward.
C. July 19, 1991, Meeting with Assistant Chief Vernon.
Lt. Ward stated that in July, 1991, Assistant Chief Vernon, who was then the
Director of the Office of Operations, called a special purpose meeting.
Attending were Deputy Chief Ron Frankle, Commander Bayan Lewis, and
Lt. Ward. At this meeting, Assistant Chief Vernon communicated a decision to
prepare for possible civil disturbances after the Rodney King trial and directed
Lt. Ward to conduct the initial emergency response readiness audits referred to
in Attachment 2. As previously discussed under 4.A (LAPD Attitude), another
meeting was subsequently held. However, Lt. Ward indicated that these were
not regular meetings, but were infrequent.
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D. Initial Audits of Each Geographic Bureau.
As indicated under 4.C above, Lt. Ward was directed to audit emergency
response readiness in each area. Lt. Ward stated that these audits were ordered
in response to the Rodney King incident. The audits took place over the next
few months, and were conducted in all 18 geographic areas. Lt. Ward stated that
the areas were generally in compliance with readiness procedures, with
occasional discrepancies. (Attachment 2)
E. April, 1992, Audits.
Lt. Ward stated that in April of 1992, he was directed to perform a more limited
audit of area emergency response readiness. This audit was also conducted in
anticipation of the conclusion of the Rodney King trial. He decided to audit one
area per Bureau. The four areas audited were Hollywood, Newton, Southwest,
and Van Nuys.
In response to a question, Lt. Ward stated he did not anticipate the "not guilty"
verdicts, and had thought that there would be at least two "guilty" verdicts. The
April, 1992, audit (Attachment 3) found Newton and Hollywood areas to be in
compliance. Southwest and Van Nuys areas were incomplete in varying degrees
as noted in the audit report.
F. October, 1991, Tear Gas Readiness Audit.
According to Lt. Ward, the tear gas audit was also conducted not only for
general readiness purposes, but also in anticipation of the verdict in the Rodney
King matter. According to the audit report itself (Attachment 4), the audit was
conducted following a seminar on civil disturbances sponsored by the California
Peace Officers Association. Lt. Ward feels that the main problem with tear gas
is that the only officers who know how to use tear gas are in Metro. Officers in
other bureaus receive tear gas training in the Academy, without any follow-up
field training. He confirmed that the tear gas masks available are limited in
number but stated that each area should have 50 gas masks in its Kit Room.
However, he recommends that tear gas equipment should be removed from the
areas and provided only to Metro and SW AT teams. Although recognizing that
this is a policy decision, he felt it is meaningless to provide tear gas to patrol
officers who do not really know how to use it.
G. Command Post Exercises.
Lt. Ward stated that both as a matter of regular training and in preparation for
the Rodney King trial, the department conducted a number of command post
exercises (hereinafter CPX). Attachment 5 summarizes the CPX's conducted by
Tactical Planning Section in 1991 and 1992. Lt. Ward stated that on July 10,
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1991, a separate CPX was conducted for South Bureau (see description of CPX
in Attachment 6). Deputy Chief Hunt and Commander Ron Banks were told to
report to a location in South Bureau and bring their Command Post cadre.
Lt. Ward's people took the Command Post trailer down to South Bureau, set it
up, and put in phone lines. Tactical Planning then fed messages to Hunt and
Banks to simulate a riot resulting from tensions between Koreans and African
Americans. In his opinion, South Bureau performed well in this exercise,
although he stated that no exercise can duplicate real life. Lt. Ward stated he
also conducted a CPX for West Bureau based upon a scenario of a civil
disturbance in Westwood.
In response to a question concerning the existence of reports documenting South
Bureau's performance during the July, 1991, CPX, Lt. Ward explained that he
debriefed the Bureaus immediately following a CPX. Therefore, he did not
prepare written summaries of their performance.
H. Discussion of Command Post Cadre/Faxing of Lists of Cadres to Tactical
Planning.
ABC asked Lt. Ward whether the department areas had a specially trained
Command Post cadre as reported in an article appearing in the Los Angeles
Times after the civil disturbance. Lt. Ward responded that each area did have a
Command Post cadre. These were officers who were trained in the CPX
mentioned above.
As part of the preparation for possible disturbances, Tactical Planning requested
that each Bureau fax a list of its Command Post trained cadre to Tactical
Planning. Lt. Ward stated that he asked them to fax their Command Post cadres
partly to force the Bureaus to update and have the lists available so they could
access them quickly in the event of a civil disturbance.
Lt. Ward then showed us these Command Post cadre lists, which are included
as part of Attachment 3. Lists of Command Post cadre for Valley Bureau,
Central Bureau, West Bureau, and South Bureau are incorporated as part of
Attachment 3.
According to Lt. Ward, each Bureau should have contacted the individuals listed
as part of its Command Post cadre when the civil disturbance began. Lt. Ward
stated that Order No. 6 (Attachment 9) established procedures for maintaining
emergency Standing Plans and established Command Post cadres ( these are
called Unusual Occurrence Cadres in the memorandum). The memorandum
also establishes the position of Bureau Unusual Occurrence Coordinator. It is
Lt. Ward's opinion that, based upon Order No. 6, the Bureaus knew they were
under a duty to maintain the cadres, and that, in fact, they had done so as shown
by their faxed lists.
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He stated that pursuant to Order No. 6, Deputy Chief Hunt would have
appointed a supervisor as the Bureau U.O. Coordinator. In fact, Lt. Ward
related that in West Bureau, Deputy Chief Lavent used his U.O. cadres every
night during gay rights demonstrations in 1991.
Lt. Ward stressed that the Command Post cadre has to be deep, given that a
command post must be staffed around the clock. He felt someone in South
Bureau should have called the Command Post cadre fairly early to notify them of
the location of the Command Post and to order them to report there.
I. Effect of Community-Based Policing on Preparation for Civil Disturbance.
In response to a question concerning the effect of community-based policing on
Deputy Chief Hunt's ability to mobilize the Command Post cadre, Lt. Ward said
he knew that Hunt was told "hands off' of the three South Bay areas chosen for
community-based policing. Obviously, various cadre members were in these
areas, known as the "Mag-7." (The areas are 77th, Southeast, and Harbor.)
Lt. Ward felt this "hands-off' directive could have played a role in Hunt's ability
to prepare South Bureau for the civil disturbance.
J. July 10, 1991, Memorandum to All Area Commanding Officers.
Lt. Ward next discussed Attachment 7, a memorandum from Assistant Chief
Vernon to All Area Commanding Officers. Lt. Ward stated that Assistant Chief
Vernon ordered this memorandum to be distributed because of the Rodney King
trial. This memorandum, titled "Civil Disorder Training Update," contains
excerpts from the department's Watch Commander's Guide for the Control of
Disasters and Other Emergencies and the First Responder's Guide. According
to the cover memorandum, it was provided to assist with training regarding civil
disorder.
K. Metro Training.
Lt. Ward indicated he was familiar with the training for civil disturbances which
Metro conducted for all training coordinators on or around April 14th. Although
Metro conducted the training, the Tactical Planning Section assisted, conducting
the first hour of the program. The program was put together hastily but covered
material that should have been familiar.
L. Statement of Preparedness and Training from Tactical Planning Section.
ABC showed Lt. Ward a one-page document titled "Tactical Planning
Section/State of Preparedness and Training" (Attachment 12). Lt. Ward
examined the document and stated he was familiar with it. He stated that
Commander (John) White, who assumed the role of Acting Director of the
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Office of Operations--Headquarters Bureau for Frankle, had a whole laundry list
of things for them to think about in preparation for a post-verdict civil
disturbance. Attachment 12 was prepared by Tactical Planning in response to
Commander White's inquiries about certain topics of readiness related to the
Rodney King verdict.
5. STANDING PLANS.
In response to a question concerning the definition and usefulness of Standing Plans,
Lt. Ward stated that each of the 18 areas has a separate Standing Plan, which is
tailored to the needs of that area. The Standing Plans are not part of the Tactical
Manual. The Tactical Manual can be considered the Bible for LAPD, while the
Standing Plans are guides for each area. It is the responsibility of each area captain
to review and update the Standing Plan each year.
Lt. Ward stated he never understood how anyone could say LAPD did not have a
plan. He felt LAPD has more plans than people will read. The checklists are
developed to outline and keep the plans simple. In his opinion, the areas that were
hardest hit did not effectively use their Standing Plan. He stated, for example, that
South Bureau did not bring out their Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) which
contains the Standing Plan, maps, flares, etc. The ERV is kept in the parking lot of
each area.
Lt. Ward later elaborated upon his earlier statement by stating that Standing Plans
are a framework. Each area must go beyond the Standing Plan as needed to plan
for its specific needs. For example, he felt that based upon possible intelligence
within the areas (such as 77th) as to what might happen, sergeants, lieutenants, and
captains should have talked, reviewed the Standing Plan, and taken additional
necessary steps. Lt. Ward mentioned specifically reviewing "Code Alpha" ( a
predesignated location to go to if the station is under attack) if the station seemed
likely to be attacked.
6. COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.
Lt. Ward stated that he works with Deputy Sheriff Dick Odenthal in the Sheriffs
Department to attempt coordination. He knew the Sheriff had prepared a plan for
civil disturbances after the King trial. However, he felt it was similar to material
LAPD already had in its Tactical Manual.
He stated that he and Odenthal had tried several times to organize table-top
exercises for senior officers in the two departments. This joint exercise would
simulate a riot, and senior officers would discuss their plans. The initial effort to
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organize the exercise was in the summer after the King incident, with another effort
being made to organize the exercise just before the verdict. The planned exercise
did not occur, the first time because, in Lt. Ward's opinion, it lost momentum. He
believes that the second time Sheriff Block did not approve the exercise. Lt. Ward
stated that LAPD and LASO are "two giant entities and we don't talk to each other."
However, he did state that Metro and the comparable Sheriffs emergency section
communicated, as did the LAPD and LASO planning sections.
7. DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL AID.
Lt. Ward stated that he did speak with Fritz Patterson of the State Office of
Emergency Services (OBS) before the civil disturbance. He requested helmets and
vests for LAPD and LAFD, and Mr. Patterson was able to obtain this equipment for
him. When asked whether he recalls telling Mr. Patterson that LAPD wouldn't need
help, Lt. Ward stated that he and Mr. Patterson are friends and talk a lot. He may
have said that LAPD wouldn't need help.
Lt. Ward stated that the LAPD mind-set or attitude concerning mutual aid is that we
(LAPD) will help you and we won't need your help. He stated that because of its
size, it is generally true that LAPD had not needed help in the past. Under the
Mutual Aid Plan (MAP), an agency such as LAPD cannot ask for help ahead of
time, but only when it has fully committed its resources. He stated LAPD did ask
for help during the disturbances when it was fully committed.
8. ULTIMATE QUESTION -- COULD BETTER PLANNING
HAVE PREVENTED A FULL-SCALE RIOT?
Lt. Ward was asked whether, in hindsight, other steps could have or should have
been taken and whether those steps could have prevented the civil disturbance.
Lt. Ward stated that, in hindsight, LAPD obviously needed to have the BOC work
better. He also felt there should have been an immediate tactical alert and that
LAPD should have deployed a Command Post cadre and part of the Command Post
fleet to the 54th and Van Ness Command Post earlier. Then LAPD would have
"been ahead of the curve for a while but not for long." According to Lt. Ward, the
civil disturbance was so big it still would have gotten out of hand, even if LAPD was
"sitting on top of it." He also stated that LAPD was understaffed to begin with.
9. CHRONOLOGY.
A. Verdict.
Lt. Ward listened to the verdict on television and then called Deputy Chief
Frankle's office. The directions to the officers were to say nothing inflammatory.
Lt. Ward stated that Chief Gates ordered a partial activation of the BOC.
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B. Attendance at Metro Meeting.
Lt. Ward then went to a Metro meeting at Southwest organized by Lt. Mike
Hillman. Partway through the meeting, those present found out that civil unrest
was beginning.
C. Preparations to Respond to Command Post.
Lt. Ward called Tactical Planning and told them to get the Command Post fleet
ready. The fleet is housed at Piper Tech near county jail, along with the
helicopter fleet. Lt. Ward then drove to Piper Tech, while listening to news of
the disturbance on the radio. He was aware that an officer left Piper Tech in a
MERV (Mobile Emergency Response Vehicle) to go to the Command Post at
54th and Van Ness. When Lt. Ward arrived at Piper Tech, his officers were
getting the trucks ready. A call came in that Deputy Chief Ron Frankle wanted
the fleet out at the Command Post. Lt. Ward responded to the Command Post
with two large semitrailers. The MERV was already there. Later that night or
the next day, a Mobile 6 and a canteen truck went to the Command Post.
D. Command Post Vehicles at Command Post.
When asked if there was enough equipment ( two trailers, MERV, Mobile 6,
canteen truck) at the Command Post, Lt. Ward stated it was proper for a start.
He didn't know what else would be needed elsewhere at that time and he stated
he did not want to put all of his eggs in one basket. In fact, a Command Post
trailer was later deployed to West Bureau for a brief time.
Eventually, a second or even a third Command Post trailer was brought to the
Command Post; it did not have a much-needed Mobile 2 supply truck. This
truck, which is supposed to be staffed by Supply Division, carries items such as
plastic cups, maps, helmets, and batons.
E. Initial Observations at Command Post.
When he arrived at the Command Post, Lt. Ward found that it was chaotic. He
couldn't get in for 15 or 20 minutes because the area was so congested. Fire
trucks and people from other agencies were already there. He described the
scene as "mass chaos."
Lt. Ward's function at the Command Post was to provide advice and equipment,
although he stated he often acted as a "gofer."
When asked who was in charge, Lt. Ward said that (Commander) Banks was
there and probably in charge. However, in his opinion, there was no way of
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telling who was in charge. Deputy Chief Hunt took over upon his arrival. After
he arrived, Lt. Ward got the vans hooked up. He stated that General Services
was supposed to provide phone lines. However, when they got there, General
Services had not brought the required microwave truck with them, which meant
they had problems with accessing telephone lines. It was a "nightmare."
Lt. Ward's unit had cellular phones and gradually used them. The cellular
phones plus mobile phones started to establish some communication. Later, the
State Office of Emergency Services gave 32 phones to the Command Post.
F. Communications with EOC.
Lt. Ward reported that the biggest problem of the first night was that it was
incredibly difficult to contact EOC. The inability of EOC to respond to any
request for food or equipment created a tremendous problem, because all
LAPD's training was based upon EOC providing backup. Lt. Ward eventually
wrote checks out of the Mobile Canteen Fund to pay for food. Lt. Ward worked
all night on April 29th and went home at 9:00 a.m. on April 30th.
When asked whether someone in authority could have demanded the required
help from the EOC, Lt. Ward stated that the problem in the EOC could not
have been solved by a quick fix. Everyone was overwhelmed and inundated.
· G. Command Post - Second Night.
Lt. Ward went back to the Command Post on the second night, and found
conditions only marginally better. He eventually worked a shift from 6:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m. or from 3:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. (he wasn't sure which). Lt. Ward
chose these hours in order to observe operations on both the A watch and B
watch. He rotated this watch with Tom Griffith.
H. Equipment.
Lt. Ward reported there were not enough ROVERS. He felt that in day-to-day
operations, there are probably enough for every officer to have a ROVER. At
one time, there were 400 excess ROVERS, half at Parker Center and half in the
Valley. However, the supply has been depleted because of LAPD's inability to
replace broken and overage ROVERS. Officers bought more ROVERS for the
Command Post, but because they were not top-quality equipment, these
ROVERS will not assist in the long run.
Lt. Ward believes there are enough police cars within the LAPD fleet, but that
the EOC did not provide them to the Command Post. He cannot personally
verify but has heard the story of locked black-and-white cars on the Command
Post lot. Allegedly, officers locked their cars and left them on the lot while they
were deployed elsewhere.
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I. Role of Metro.
Lt. Ward stated that Deputy Chief Hunt diverted Metro to go out and
coordinate with the Fire Department. However, the demands of the situation
were beyond belief.
J. Field Jail Operations.
We asked Lt. Ward to describe field jail operations at the Command Post and
elsewhere during the civil disturbance. Every area has the capability to establish
a field jail. According to Lt. Ward, any area can establish a field jail. Five areas
have field jail kits, consisting of forms, envelopes, and quick booking facilities.
The Tactical Planning Section provides the training in this area. Rampart had
gone through field jail training right before the civil disturbance. Lt. Ward knew
that other areas activated their field jails, but did not have details on how well
each one worked.
The Immediate Booking and Release Systems (IBARS) Unit is a specially
equipped field jail established to ensure quick processing of arrestees in
situations such as driving under the influence checkpoints. The two IBARS
units, located on blue buses which can be quickly moved out into the field, are
part of the Traffic Coordination Section supervised by Mike Patee.
Before the civil disturbance, it was decided that in the event of trouble, a field
jail would be established in each Bureau. South Bureau was to receive an
IBARS unit located at Southeast. However, the plan was so secret that the only
people who knew that Southeast would be the location of the South Bureau field
jail were Ron Frankle, Bayan Lewis, Mike Patee, who runs the IBARS unit, and
Lt. Ward. When the disturbance began, an IBARS bus went to Southeast as
planned. Unfortunately, those in charge of the Command Post didn't know that
the South Bureau field jail unit was to be at Southeast. Therefore, a field jail
was initially established at Command Post, although it was later moved to
Southeast. Once the IBARS field jail at Southeast went into operation, it
worked well in Lt. Ward's opinion, processing some 300 people.
One of the problems with the field jail system is that it is cumbersome unless an
IBARS unit is available. In order to book an individual, a Decentralized
Automated Booking Information System (DABIS) terminal is needed. This
terminal is apparently connected with the Sheriffs Department and issues a
system-wide booking number. Unfortunately, because there are a limited
number of DABIS terminals, a bottleneck developed in the field jails during the
civil disturbance. LAPD needs more DABIS terminals.
In response to a question about Unusual Occurrence (U.O.) booking numbers,
Lt. Ward confirmed that arrestees in a U.O. should be given a U.O. booking
number available through Records and Inspection (R&I). The purpose of the
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special booking numbers is to allow tracking of individuals arrested in a U.O.
Unfortunately, because this system has not been used for so long, no one
remembered to obtain these booking numbers for a day and a half, and by then
it was too late. Lt. Ward believes that it is the responsibility of the jail divisions
to get these U.O. booking numbers from R&I.
Lt. Ward recommends that in the future, an officer from Detective Services be
given overall responsibility to coordinate with the District Attorney and Sheriffs
Department. He has compiled a report on the problems and recommendations
of the field jails during the civil disturbance. An ad hoc committee will make
recommendations in this area. Lt. Ward stressed that he didn't know if LAPD
had ever been faced with multiple field jail sites before.
10. SUCCESSFUL ASPECTS OF TRAINING OR PREPARATION.
· Lt. Ward was asked what systems or preparation functioned well during the civil
disturbance. He stated that the citywide EOO ( described at page 2) functioned very
well. Chaired by Chief Gates, this was an excellent forum for getting things done,
and has carried the ball afterwards. This same group plans for earthquake
coordination and recovery.
11. CLOSING OPERATIONS.
Just before giving his recommendations, Lt. Ward made the following observations:
• Regarding food, Lt. Ward felt that General Services was a problem the
first night. However, he was unwilling to criticize the agency because
everyone felt overwhelmed and scared.
• Having to escort all the other agencies within the city proved too much
of a strain for LAPD. Lt. Ward knew that LAPD was supposed to escort
LAFD. In fact, he had spoken to Fritz Patterson (OES) about getting
vests for LAFD. Again, he felt LAPD simply did not foresee the
magnitude of the problems posed by having to escort LAFD. In the
future, when Mutual Aid assistance has been approved, the California
Highway Patrol ( CHP) will provide escorts for LAFD. ( At this point,
Lt. Ward showed us Attachment 13, a July 1, 1992, memorandum
discussing field command post liaisons and escorts. It provides that in
future disturbances, field commanders shall select liaisons with the
LAFD and that after a Mutual Aid Agreement is activated, the liaison
will remain in touch with LAFD and CHP.)
Lt. Ward stated that he later found out that some LAPD officers called
their friends from even distant agencies and had them come in. This
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created more chaos when those officers showed up and wanted exciting
assignments. He felt that in the future, it would be better to allow the
Sheriff to coordinate the situation under the Mutual Aid Plan.
• Lt. Ward stated that the Tactical Manual published a week after the civil
disturbance was actually at the printer during the disturbance. However,
the Tactical Manual will be revised to reflect post-civil disturbance
changes.
12. RECOMMENDATIONS.
Lt. Ward's overall recommendations were as follows:
• Management needs to make it clear that training for U.O.'s is a priority.
• Command posts need to be computerized. Timecards (sometimes called
U.O. cards) for personnel are still filled out singly and by hand. The
information is later key punched. The information contained on the
cards, which is vital for reimbursement for the Federal Government,
should be gathered in a more efficient manner. The message flow in the
Command Post trailers was also archaic, because it was all on paper
which often resulted in lost and misplaced messages within a crowded
Command Post trailer.
• Lt. Ward stated that City Government needs to be supportive of LAPD's
efforts. It was his perception that political friction among major players
in the City hindered LAPD's efforts to prepare for the riot. LAPD felt it
had to prepare in secret, tiptoeing around instead of preparing in the
open.
13. CLOSING COMMENTS.
A. Lt. Ward closed by stating that August 12, 1992, would be a training day in which
the Command Post unit would train the rest of the Tactical Planning Section on
the nuances of the command post system. All Tactical Planning Section
personnel will then be able to spread out and assist officers citywide in command
post training. He felt it was fortunate that all officers in his unit got to work in
the Command Post at 54 th and Van Ness, which gave them valuable experience.
B. Lt. Ward feels that LAPD is now in a better state of preparedness for future
civil disturbances. However, he cautioned it would still take a while for them to
respond to another event of this magnitude.
- 14 -
..
~ ..
Lt. Ward is obviously very proud of what he feels were his own considerable efforts to
train and prepare LAPD. He feels that management's lack of emphasis on U.O. training
is probably typical of the attitude of large organizations, which never seem worried about
an emergency until it happens. He is upset by the criticism that LAPD did not train and
plan for this disturbance, given what he feels to be LAPD's extensive plans and
his unit's extensive training efforts. He was perhaps somewhat defensive early in the
interview, although very well organized and prepared. Any defensiveness disappeared
later in the interview. He is a credible interviewee and contributed exhibits which added
to our knowledge of previously unknown training efforts.
de
Attachments
- 15 -

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Description

Interview of Bruce Ward, Lieutenant and head of the Los Angeles Police Department's Tactical Planning Section, about the Los Angeles Police Department's planning and training efforts with regard to civil disturbances, and his observations and impressions with regard to the Los Angeles Police Department's response to the Los Angeles disturbance, 1992 August 20.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Bruce Ward, interview, 1992-08-20

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 15 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-35441

Unique identifier UC11451684

Identifier box 21 (box),web-box21-32-01.pdf (filename),folder 32 (folder),webster-c100-35441 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box21-32/web-box21-32-01.pdf

Dmrecord 35441

Format 15 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts