Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Robert Vernon, interview, 1992-09-05

(USC DC Other)

Robert Vernon, interview, 1992-09-05

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
MEMORANDUM
Richard J. Stone, Esq.
Paul G. Bower, Esq.
Audrey B. Collins, Esq.
September 5, 1992
Interview on August 27, 1992
with Former Assistant Chief Robert Vernon
On August 27, 1992, Paul Bower and Audrey Collins
interviewed former Assistant Chief Robert Vernon at his home
in Pasadena. The following is a summary of our
recollections of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions,
and opinions. ·
Backi:round With The Department
Assistant Chief Vernon joined the LAPD in October
of 1954. He became a sergeant in 1959, and reached the rank
of lieutenant in 1965, just two weeks prior to the outbreak
of the Watts' disorders.
During the Watts' disorders, Vernon was one of the
initial officers on the scene, and for a while was the
ranking officer. At that time, the Department had no
Tactical Manual, so tactics for the response had to be
developed as they went along. One of the officers on the
scene suggested to Vernon that the area be divided in
sectors with officers assigned to each sector. This was
done, and a group of officers was assigned to a sector with
instructions to control the disorders in that sector, arrest
law violators, and then remain within the sector to retain
control. Vernon was also involved in establishing the
boundaries of the curfew zone that was put into effect
during the Watts disorders.
Vernon had a wide variety of experiences with the
LAPD following the Watts disorders. He did graduate work in
the general area of traffic control, and was assigned to the
Traffic Services Division. He became captain in 1969 and
initially served in the Accident Investigation Division.
He was then appointed Commanding Officer for the
then-Venice Division. As Commanding Officer, Vernon had
extensive experience in crowd-control procedures as a result
of large gatherings on the Venice Beach. He said that
throughout the time he served as CO there were a number of
events on the beach, as, for example, concerts attended by
thousands of people. Sometimes the crowds got out of hand,
and the police had to bring the crowd under control. Thus,
Vernon had extensive command experience in the control of
Unusual Occurrences {UOs) while at Venice.
Vernon was appointed Commander in 1972, and served
with detective divisions in the South Central Area. He was
appointed Deputy Chief in 1973, first serving as CO of the
Personnel and Training Section, Technical Services; he was,
and then assigned to the Central Bureau.
Vernon was appointed Assistant Chief in 1979,
served at OAS, ass, worked on the Olympics, and then was
appointed Head of Operations where he served until his
retirement.
The effective date of Vernon's retirement from the
Department was June 2 or June 3, 1992. He had, however,
accumulated vacation time, and began what he termed a
"terminal" vacation on April 24, 1992. He has been out of
the department ever since that date.
Events On April 29
Vernon was at a conference in Colorado Springs on
April 29. He returned to Los Angeles that evening arriving
at about 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., and did not know what had
happened until he arrived at LAX. He returned home and
called the Command Post at the EOC, talked to Captain Dan
Watson, and offered to help in any way that he could.
Watson said that he would check with Chief Gates -- Watson
called back and said that the Chief said that his services
were not needed. He then talked to Commander Jimmy Jones,
again volunteered his services, but was refused once again.
2
Vernon had made plans to fly to Fort Lauderdale,
Florida the next day, and because he was told he was not
needed in LA, he flew on to Florida. Once in Florida, he
received a call saying the Department had changed its mind,
and asked him to come back. There were, however, no flights
out for the following date {Friday), so he stayed in
Florida. He was not involved in any of the control efforts.
Problems Within The Department Prior To The Disorders
Vernon said that he knew after the King incident
that there would be serious problems in Los Angeles. He
said from the date of the King incident until the date of
the verdict many things were happening in the Department
that impacted its ability to respond to a major UO. Vernon
gave several examples of what he thought were the problems.
Vernon said that there was in-fighting among
top-ranking officers at the Department for the position of
the new chief. Vernon said that the in-fighting really
started just after the Olympics when Chief Gates stated that
he would retire soon after the Olympics were over. He
obviously did not do so.
Another problem was the flap created over
allegations that Vernon had improperly favored officers who
shared Vernon's religious views, and the resulting publicity
concerning the so-called "God Squad" -- an expression that
Vernon says was never used by him and is offensive to him.
Vernon then went into some history of the
Department that he said ultimately created difficulties.
(He did not, however, actually tie the story to any current
problems.). He stated that the LAPD was different from
police departments in other large cities, citing
particularly the corruption that permeated the Chicago and
New York Police Departments. He said that when Chief Parker
came in as head of the Department, it was clear that people
wanted a clean city, and Parker put in several checks and
balances to insure operational integrity. For example, a
department-wide vice unit was set up that had jurisdiction
over the vice units in the divisions. The department vice
division used several "checks" to make certain that
corruption had not permeated vice departments of the areas.
Intellieence
The Police Department's Public Disorders
Intelligence Division {PDID) was put out of business as a
result of the settlement of the lawsuit brought concerning
intelligence activities of the PDID. (The activities
formerly carried on by the Public Disorder Intelligence
3
Division {"PDID") have now been transferred to the
Anti-Terrorist Division {"ATD").) Very few people are left
in this unit, and the guidelines developed during the course
of the settlement greatly restricted intelligence operations
according to Vernon. For example, Vernon claims that the
guidelines keep the Department from putting undercover
officers in legitimate organizations which are themselves
inflitrated by the "bad" guys that could cause trouble. He
gave some interesting examples of how the "bad" guys used
the guidelines to screen out potential police undercover
officers. For example, dangerous organizations such as the
"Weatherman" try to recruit members from legitimate
organizations such as the "American Friends Service
Committee." In order to check out a potential recruit for
the bad guys, the recruit would be invited to attend a
meeting of one of the legitimate organizations. If the
potential recruit was an undercover officer for the
Department, he or she knew they could not attend in an
undercover capacity meetings of legitimate organizations,
and would decline the invitation. The bad guy would then
know that the potential recruit was a police undercover
agent.
Vernon said that before the guidelines were
established the Department would recruit from the ranks of
those entering the Department certain officers to infiltrate
various organizations. These people did so, and were
periodically asked to submit detailed reports of what went
on at particular meetings. He said these detailed reports
were then sent to experienced detectives who would cull out
from the reports improper material and highlight the only
information that was to be included in the PDID data base.
The Department, however, did not dispose of the underlying
notes; they were instead retained under the provisions of
the Public Records Act. When the lawsuit against the PDID
was brought, the underlying reports were then turned over as
part of discovery. This lead to the allegations concerning
the Department keeping track of various public officials and
other citizens.
As a result of the lawsuit and related
restrictions on intelligence, the Department did not have
information on organizations that could cause problems.
Plannin2 For Potential Problems After The Kin2 Trial
Vernon emphasized several times that the Tactical
Manual, which was developed after the Watts riots, was the
Department's plan for the control of disorder. He said that
this is a very comprehensive document and gives detailed
instructions for the control of major UOs. He said that the
Tactical Manual is studied by officers for exams and, thus,
4
was well-known to those at command levels. He said the
methods outlined in the Tactical Manual were used for the
Venice Beach UOs, and led to an effective response.
Vernon said that in particular Part D of the
Tactical Manual sets out detailed instructions for dealing
with major UOs. He particularly emphasized the importance
of the following sections of Part D of the Tactical Manual:
001.01, 003, 005, 005.01, 005.02, 005.03, 006.02, 006.03,
006.04, and 006.05. (The references here are all to the
Tactical Manual that was in effect on April 29. The pages
containing these sections are dated February, 1979.)
He said that in his opinions the Department's
difficulties flowed from not following the dictates of the
Tactical Manual. When asked to explain why the Tactical
Manual was not followed, Vernon stated that the Department
was "bashed badly" after the King incident. He said that
many officials in the Department lacked confidence, and did
not want to make decisions that later might be subject to
public exposure. As a result, officials were afraid to make
decisions because it was safer simply to do nothing rather
than making a decision that in hindsight could be wrong.
This type of attitude inhibited the Department's response to
the King disorders.
(Further information concerning the "political
climate" inhibiting the response is set out below.)
Vernon did say there was specific planning for
potential disorder following the King verdict. The first
incident mentioned by Vernon took place in August of 1991
when Deputy Chief Hunt was sent by the Department to study
the response of the New York Police Department to the civil
disturbances arising out of the incident where a rabbi
driving his automobile hit and killed an African-American.
Chief Hunt reported on the NYPD's response to these
disturbances on his return. The results of this trip are
briefly summarized in the minutes of the meeting of the
Bureau Commanding Officers on September 13, 1991. (Attached
hereto as Attachment 1.) The observations of Chief Hunt
focused on the failure of the New York Police Department to
allocate sufficient personnel at the onset to curb incidents
before they spread. Vernon said that the philosophy of the
Department should be to move swiftly to cure any potential
disorder.
Vernon also said there were plans to deploy Metro
Division officers to potential problem areas in advance.
Vernon gave a number of other examples of training
and planning to prepare for potential disorders. He
5
mentioned that training of cadre for command posts was
scheduled for January 8, 1992. Vernon said that he knew the
training took place, but he was not personally familiar with
the results. {See Attachment 2 hereto.) He wanted officers
assigned three deep (three back ups) in functions such as
Intelligence, Personnel, etc.
On March 16, 1992, an order went out from Vernon
to the co, Operations-Central Bureau {Attachment 3) for a
command post exercise. Vernon thinks that similar memoranda
and directives were sent to all of the Bureaus, but he did
not have copies of any such memoranda.
Vernon also stated that he talked about
preparation at virtually evry 00 staff meeting.
On April 1, 1992, a memorandum went out from the
Office of Operations, signed by Vernon and Dinse (then
commander of the Mag-7) to all Area Commanding Officers and
Staff Officers for a training session on April 10, 1992.
{Attachment 4.)
Vernon said that he decided to call the April 10
meeting although he had been cautioned to do his best not to
subject the Department to criticism for increasing the
chances of disorder by preparation. He said that he was
particularly cautioned by Gates not to pass out any written
materials that would appear to be planning for disorder in
the aftermath of the King trial. Vernon said that he wanted
to talk directly to the captains that were in command of the
various Areas rather than to rely on their supervisors to
filter down the information to the Area cos.
The meeting took place on April 10, 1992.
Following the "crime analysis" discussion (this apparently
was to cover the real purpose of the meeting), the topic of
the meeting turned to preparedness for UOs. Vernon said
that he used an outline for the talk that he gave and used
flip charts to make the presentation. {The outline in
Attachment 5.) As can be seen, the notes include a
reference to the "King trial aftermath" and contain a number
of matters involved in responding to a uo. Vernon stated
that under the heading "F. Response Plan," the reference to
"develop platoon response plan" was explained to mean the
plan for sectoring and the use of officers to control the
sector. The sector plan, which was utilized by Vernon in
connection with the Watts riots, is designed to leave
officers in the field even after making arrests. The
arrestees are to be picked up and transported away by field
jail units.
6
He instructed those in attendance not to make
public statements concerning any potential disorders.
Vernon said that despite the directions not to hand out
material, he decided to hand out an outline to those in
attendance at the meeting. The outline is an abbreviated
version of the notes that Vernon used for making the
presentation. {Attachment 6.) Other versions of a version
of the outline were sent to Operations-Headquarters Bureau
{Attachment 7), Support Services Bureau {Attachment 8), and
the Fiscal Support Bureau {Attachment 9). (Interviews with
other officers also indicate that the outline was sent to
Metro Division.) In addition, prior to the April 10
meeting, Vernon said he had discussions with Metro
representatives and instructed Metro to be ready for
potential disorders. He also said that he instructed Metro
{Hillman) that Metro should train officers in the Areas in
riot control procedures.
Vernon says that he recalls an inspection at the
Metro Training Area at the Naval Armory after a training
exercise. He said he talked to Lieutenant Lorenzen
concerning the training, and the need to obtain
military-style flack jackets for Metro personnel. He said
he had a personal talk concerning preparedness with Hillman,
the new Metro Commander.
At the April 10 meeting, Vernon told the officers
that there would be follow-up audits in certain areas, but
he would not say in advance which areas would be audited.
On April 14, 1992, a "work order" requested audits in
certain areas. {Attachment 9.) The directive for the
"Emergency Response Readiness Audit" went out to area cos on
April 20, 1992, again signed by Dinse as Defacto Commander
of the Mag-7 Areas. {Attachment 10.) The responses to the
Requests for Audits came back on April 27, 1992, from the
Tactical Planning Session (see Attachments to the Ward
Interview), but by this time Vernon had left on his
"terminal" vacation.
Vernon believes that the April 27 response shows
that there were problems, and if he was there he would have
demanded more. When asked why there was a need for
additional planning if the Tactical Manual was the plan,
Vernon said that the directives described above were really
instructions to follow the procedures set out in the
Tactical Manual. In other words, Vernon was telling the
Area cos to make certain that they were prepared to follow
the procedures in the Tactical Manual.
Vernon further said that it would be impossible to
prepare specific plans for ill-d~fined problems, such as the
potential for disorders after the King verdict. He said
7
..
that this type of situation was far different from an event
like the Olympics where the date, location, and other
details of the UO are known in advance.
Vernon also said there were discussions at the
Office of Operations about the possibility of problems after
the King trial. He mentioned discussions with Hunt where
Hunt raised the issue of the command structure for the
"Mag-7." Hunt was told that if there were problems, that
the areas making up the "Mag-7" would be returned to the
normal chain of command.
We discussed with Vernon possible changes in the
Tactical Manual to set out definitively who should be in
charge of the response to a uo. He said that in his view
the senior person should be generally in command, with the
ability to delegate the junior person who had been in charge
of the response as the Operations Officer. He does not
believe, however, that there should be any firm rule that
the senior person "shall" be in command. He thinks that the
senior officer should either take command, or tell the
junior officer specifically that he or she remains in charge
of the event.
We also asked Vernon about planning with outside
agencies. He said that he had contacted officials from the
Sheriff's Office (Edmunds and Jerry Harper) and Ed Gomez at
the California Highway Patrol. He said that the gist of
these discussions was that the agencies should be making
plans. Vernon said that Frankle was to be the coordinator
with the outside agencies.
Vernon said that he was not a member of the
Emergency Operations Board -- Gates had instead delegated
Morrison to be the Chief's representative on the EOB.
Loeistics
Vernon had few comments about logistics except
stating that the Department was generally resource poor.
He thinks that the use of tear gas should have
been ordered to control the crowd at Parker Center~ In
general, the ability to use tear gas should be delegated
down the ranks rather than at the commander level.
"Political" Climate Impactine The Response To The Disorders
Vernon said that the "political" climate adversely
affected the Department's ability to respond to the
disorders. As discussed above, he mentioned as part of this
8
"climate" the in-fighting and resulting inaction among top
command officers.
He also thinks that statements and acts of various
political officials inhibited the Department's response.
For example, he stated that the televised remarks of Police
Commissioner Michael Yamaki concerning the situation at
Parker Center to the effect that the Department should not
stop property damage to save lives was a big mistake. He
said that allowing the mob at Parker Center to burn the
parking shack sent entirely the wrong message to the
community, and basically gave license for further disorder.
He said a Department cannot allow this type of destruction,
particularly because of the symbolic value of the Parker
Center, the headquarters of the LAPD. He thinks that even
though there would have been injuries in controlling the
group at Parker Center, that overall a strong initial
response would have made the disorders easier to control.
He also stated that the political climate in the
more traditional view also inhibited the response. He
noted, for example, a meeting on April 9 between Hunt,
Parks, and Mayor Bradley. Vernon said that he had received
no advance information about this meeting, and was not told
what went on. He believes, however, that the Mayor
instructed the Department not to overreact. He also
mentioned the remarks of Councilman Mark Ridley Thomas after
the disorder started as making matters worse.
Recommendations And Observations
Vernon believes that the Department should take on
directly the "political climate" antl tell the public that
this attitude is adversely affecting the Department and its
ability to do its job. Vernon said that in his opinion
Proposition F was a big mistake, and that ultimately the
Department will become infected with Chicago-style
corruption. He thinks the Department should be kept free
from political pressure.
Vernon also observed that if the citizens wanted
advance warning of potential disorders, the guidelines
concerning the operations of intelligence activities should
be revised. He thinks the guidelines should permit some
infiltration of groups that could potentially cause
problems.
Vernon thinks that gang members were at the core
of the King riots. He said that a very small percent of the
population was actually involved in the riots, and this, in
his view, demonstrates that the gangs were deeply involved.
He says the Department needs more control over the gangs,
9
. ... .... '
and needs information on what they are doing. This type of
information, he believes, can be obtained by infiltration.
Vernon also thinks there were "organized" hits on
businesses in the riot area. He mentioned, for example, a
story told by a Korean neighbor who owned a liquor store in
the riot area. The owner observed essentially a three-wave
attack on his business: The first incident was the use of a
stolen station wagon to smash down the steel shutters
protecting the store. Next, a van came up and a number of
people in the van systematically looted the expensive liquor
from the store. Third, another truck came up, this one
filled with people with incendiary devices who torched the
store.
CL922460.101
10
Rtc•o MTH&M
SEP l l 7992
LOS, ANGELES

Linked assets

Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Conceptually similar

PDF

Jack White, interview, 1992-06-30

PDF

Oliver Thompson, interview, 1992-06-18

PDF

Bruce Ward, interview, 1992-08-20

PDF

Hourie Taylor, interview, 1992-06-22

PDF

Attachments to Vernon interview memoranda, 1992-09-14

PDF

Thomas Moran, interview, 1992-08-28

PDF

Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-13

PDF

Keith Comie, interview, 1992-09-02

PDF

David Pietz, interview, 1992-06-19

PDF

Richard Odenthal, interview, 1992-08-27

PDF

Sharon Papa, interview, 1992-06-24

PDF

Gilbert A. Sandoval, interview, 1992-07-16

PDF

Michael Moulin, interview, 1992-06-03

PDF

Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-12

PDF

Interview library, 1992-09-04

PDF

Inglewood Police department documents, 1992-05/1992-08

PDF

Roundtable 35, discussion, 1992-08-14

PDF

News Transcript, National Public Radio's All Things Considered, 1992-07-09

PDF

Morris Smith, interview, 1992-08-28

PDF

Robert Moschorak, interview, 1992-08-05

Description

Interview of Robert Vernon, Assistant Chief of Police of the LAPD, about his observations and impressions of the LAPD's role in quelling the civil disturbance. Topics include the LAPD's intelligence and planning measures with regard to the Rodney King verdict, the impact of the "political climate" on the LAPD's response to the civil disturbance, and recommendations for future improvement, 1992 September 5.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Robert Vernon, interview, 1992-09-05

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 11 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-35385

Unique identifier UC11451679

Identifier box 21 (box),web-box21-29-01.pdf (filename),folder 29 (folder),webster-c100-35385 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box21-29/web-box21-29-01.pdf

Dmrecord 35385

Format 11 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts