Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Hourie Taylor, interview, 1992-06-22

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Hourie Taylor, interview, 1992-06-22

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Content "' . :
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
MEMORANDUM
SUSAN SPIVAK, ESQ.
KEN HEITZ, ESQ.
JANET LEVINE AND
LAURIE LEVENSON
JUNE 22, 1992
COMPTON POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERVIEW
SUMMARY
This interview with Hourie Taylor, Acting Chief of
Police of Compton, focuses on the role and resources of the
Compton Police Department during the civil distrubances. The
interviewed covered:
A. The planning activities by Compton Police
Department,
B. Reaction during the unrest, and
C. Evaluation of the resources and police conduct.
The interview took place June 19, 1992, at 10:00 a.m. at the
Compton Police Department. The following is a summary of our
recollection of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions, based upon the meeting.
. ..
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
MEMORANDUM
SUSAN SPIVAK, ESQ.
KEN HEITZ, ESQ.
JANET LEVINE AND
LAURIE LEVENSON
JUNE 22, 1992
COMPTON POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERVIEW
On June 19, 1992, at 10:00 a.m. at the Compton Police
Department, we interviewed Hourie Taylor, Acting Chief of Police
of Compton. The following is a summary of our recollection of
this meeting, including our questions and comments, together with
our mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the
meeting.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 1992, Laurie Levenson and I met with Hourie
Taylor, Acting Chief of Police of the Compton Police Department.
The meeting lasted from 10:00 a.m. until 11:45 a.m.
II. MATERIALS OBTAINED
The City of Compton in the past year has prepared an
emergency disaster planning manual. This is a city wide manual
entitled "The Multi-Hazard Functional Plan for Emergency
Operations". The plan itself is quite detailed and long. We
obtained in the course of the interview a copy of the cover sheet
for the plan as well as its table of contents. Those are
attached as Exhibit A. Chief Taylor agreed to make the complete
plan available to the Commission should it be requested. This
plan is prepared by the City, with all the various factions of
the City including police, fire, public works, city manager,
involved in its compilation. Tom Barclay of the Mayor's Office
can be contacted for further information regarding Compton
emergency plans.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Exhibit Bis a news release dated April 30, 1992, from
the City of Compton whereby the City of Compton declares a state
of emergency.
Exhibit C is a news release dated May 4, 1992, whereby
the City of Compton lifts the state of emergency.
Exhibit Dis various statistical compilations for the
period of unrest. This includes arrest data broken down by
category, type of crime and home city of arrestee, as well as
comparisons between a "normal" week and the civil unrest period.
It also includes a breakdown based on the types of calls for
service, a breakdown from the Fire Department on the types of
fires.
Exhibit Eis a map of the City of Compton.
The originals of all of these documents obtained during the
course of interview have been attached; no copies have been
retained.
III. DEMOGRAPHICS OF COMPTON
The City of Compton, as is set forth in a map obtained
by the Police Chief and attached hereto as Exhibit E, contains 12
and 1/2 miles of livable space. It is bounded by a number of
cities, most of which are policed by the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department. Compton's official population per the
census is 93,000 people, although the Chief believes the true
population is over 100,000 people. This disparity is caused by
the number of homeless and undocumented aliens living within
Compton. Compton is ethnically 45-50% Latino/Hispanic, 45-50%
African-American/Black; the remainder is Samoan and other Asian
and Caucasian.
The Compton Police Department is now staffed at 127
sworn officers although it is authorized to have up to
approximately 135 officers. There are 40 reserves and over 130
unsworn employees of the Police Department. Many of the Compton
Police Officers, like Chief Taylor, grew up in the Compton area.
Chief Taylor believes that this familiarity with the community
helps his officers react to difficult situations.
The Compton Police officers are trained at the
Sheriff's Academy and at Rio Hondo. The Compton Police
Department is a small department with less bureaucracy then some
of the other departments in the area. Chief Taylor believes that
the smaller organization makes it easier to coordinate the work
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
of his officers. He commented, however, that it also has led to
less resources being available for the Compton Police.
The main business area of Compton is located in the
civic center, where the police station and the courthouse are
located. At the south end of Compton is a large industrial area.
Chief Taylor, with whom we met, has been the Acting
Police Chief since April 24, 1992, five days prior to the outset
of the civil unrest. He has been a police officer for 23 years.
IV. PREPARATIONS FOR THE KING VERDICT
The Chief indicated that Compton did not anticipate a
reaction to the King verdict. The Chief felt that the City was
so far away geographically and politically from the City of Los
Angeles that whatever the verdict any resulting problems would
not reach.
He indicated that he believed that Compton is a
separate police department and has a unique relationship to the
residents of the City. Many of the Compton police officers grew
up within Compton. There are many minority officers in Compton
and they do not have the same racial problems with policing their
city that Los Angeles has. On the other hand, the Compton Police
have had their own problems with the Samoan community including
an officer involved shooting of a Samoan. In that incident the
officer was criminally charged. That verdict was returned after
the King verdict civil unrest. The planning for this verdict is
discussed infra.
The City of Compton has had much experience with gangs
and the police officers in Compton have had a lot of experience
dealing with gunfire and gang incidents.
V. MUTUAL AID PACTS
The Chief indicated that there are mutual aid pacts in
which Compton participates. He indicated that there are county
and state mutual aid pacts and that the Sheriff's Department,
Carson Station, is Compton's mutual aid partner. He indicated
however, that police rarely need mutual aid, and thus are not as
used to dealing with mutual aid situations. Fire Departments on
the other hand, the Chief indicated, constantly deal with mutual
aid situations and have a much more routine way of dealing with
emergencies.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
VI. THE INCIDENT ITSELF
Wednesday. April 29. 1992
Chief Taylor indicated that he first saw the verdict as
it was being announced on television. He indicated that he was
not completely surprised by the verdict although he did not
explain why. (We asked the Chief if the Department had a
chronology of events occurring during the time of the unrest.
While there was no chronology yet available, he anticipated that
one would be prepared and will make that available for us when it
is.) After the verdict came in at 3:00 p.m., the Chief continued
to monitor the news and saw at 5:00 p.m., the beginnings of
unrest. The Chief indicated that he believed that the media did
an injustice to all by its coverage of the early events; that the
live broadcast of people "getting away with" violence and crimes
gave people the idea that they had the right to do it and
indicated that there would be no police response.
By 7:00 p.m. Compton was beginning to get reports of
problems in their area. At that time the Chief ordered that all
officers be called back. One of the biggest problems, however,
was that many officers lived 50 or 60 miles away, and it took a
long time for them to return to the station. In fact, the day
shift had just finished its shift and was on their way home when
the call went out to return; when the officers got home and got
the messages they had to turn around. Because of traffic,
however, and distance, it took several hours for the officers to
get back. The Chief indicated that one of the things he intends
to do is request "beepers" for all officers so that when their
presence is necessary the officers can be beeped and can
immediately respond.
About that time, the Mayor of Compton, Walter Tucker,
broadcast an appeal for calm on a local cable station. On
Wednesday evening looting and arson fires were reported. The
Compton Fire Department (an independent department) is dispatched
through the Downey dispatch (area E dispatch]. That dispatch is
used by Downey and Paramount as well. Police had to accompany
fire trucks to fire calls because of reports of gun fire at fire
trucks.
One of the greatest problems on Wednesday was that
although police could respond to most of the emergency calls,
there were so many calls that no officers could remain posted in
any area. Thus, as soon as the police left an area, looting
would resume in that area. This problem was alleviated once aid
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
came from other police departments and from the National Guard
and Marines. Chief Taylor had requested National Guard
assistance through Sheriffs Captain Hehir.
Compton has very many Korean and Asian owned
businesses, many liquor stores and strip malls. These were the
areas subject to violence and looting and could not be protected,
unless there were fixed posts of law enforcement officers.
Thursday, April 30, 1992
On Thursday, the school police, which have a large
number of officers, were deputized and given police powers.
One of the most important things Compton Police learned
during the unrest was that their $3 million dispatch center,
located at the fire department, was too far away from the police
personnel and equipment to be useable. On Thursday afternoon,
the Compton police made their most significant move during the
unrest. The police moved to the Ramada Hotel in Compton and used
it as a command post. The City of Compton is a part owner of the
hotel. Its a unique relationship and because of that the City
was able to take over the hotel and centralize everything. The
banquet rooms were used by the incident commanders as a command
center. The hotel rooms were used by the officers for sleep.
(The officers were on 16 hours on and 8 hour off shifts.) This
way the officers could catch a few hours sleep without having the
worry of a commute. The hotel provided food for the officers and
assorted backup personnel. The phone company laid phone lines
into the command center for immediate police use. Utility
personnel responsible to restore power to areas subject to fires
and looting were able to be dispatched through the hotel command
center and were able to go on the field with police escort.
Compton made early appeals to the EOC Sheriffs and the
OES State for aid but it took a substantial period of time for
the National Guard and Marines to get there. Other police
agencies arrived first; in particular, aid was received from San
Diego. These other police agencies were immediately dispatched
out to the field. One of the most significant things about San
Diego and other departments was that they arrived with their own
equipment: cars, radios, riot gear. Indeed, one of the police
forces came with its own mobile command center. That mobile
command center was set up in the field and was able to be used to
communicate between the Compton Police Department and the
assisting police departments. The mobile command center was
essential because one of the greatest problems with using other
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
police agencies and National Guard is communication. Radios
operate on different frequencies; The mobile command center
facilitated communication between these other agencies and
Compton and allowed for better staging and organization of the
assisting personnel.
Further, the curfew which was imposed in Compton on
Thursday and throughout the weekend helped greatly. It gave the
police a reason to arrest people that were on the street and made
it easier for them to break things up before crime occurred.
Friday, May 1, 1992
On Friday, the National Guard and the Marines arrived.
They used the hotel as a staging area, which was quite
convenient.
One of the things that became obvious however, with
using military in civilian policing was the differences in
terminology. The Chief gave an example of the use of the word
"cover". To a police officer the word "cover" means to watch
somebody but not to shoot unless absolutely necessary. To the
military, particularly the Marines, the word "cover" means to
shoot immediately. At one point, Compton Police and the Marines,
answered a "shots fired" call. In responding to the call, it was
necessary to ask that a Compton police officer be covered. The
police officer anticipated that no shots would be fired by his
backups. Instead, the Marines shot well over 100 shots into a
residential apartment because they assumed the word "cover" meant
to shoot. Similar problems occurred with the use of the word
"secure".
VII. GENERAL COMMENTS BY THE CHIEF
The Chief described the looting and arson as people
getting caught up in the whole hysteria of what occurred. He
indicated that while gangs may have initiated the break-ins,
everyday people who were not otherwise involved in any
criminality became involved in the looting. On Wednesday, the
Chief decided that arresting people was the only solution to the
problem. He believed that if arrests were not made the looting
would continue. Sometimes the officers on the scene had to
decide who to arrest based on manpower (an officer could arrest
only as many people as would fit in his vehicle). Decisions were
made based on at the scene assessments of who appeared the
greatest threat if left on the street.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
over 300 people were arrested in the course of this
unrest. Because the Compton jail holds only 45, the overflow
were placed, with the assistance of the Sheriffs, in an
underground parking lot and in the Compton courthouse. This
courthouse was used by other agencies as well for overflow. An
accelerated booking form was used and the McLaughlin procedures
were followed. Probable cause hearings were done on all of the
arrestees. Because of the mass arrests there were problems with
food. The Ralphs offices are located in Compton and Ralphs was
very helpful in getting food to the police department, so that
the prisoners could be fed. (The Chief noted that Compton
received great assistance from the business community.)
The Chief indicated that, as Exhibit D indicates, many
of the arrestees were not Compton residents but came just to
loot.
One of the things that should be noted is the response
of neighborhood Paramount City to the unrest. Paramount, through
the use of concrete barriers and dirt barricades, blockaded all
access into its city limits from Compton. Both Compton and
Paramount are now engaged in a dialogue about that. One of the
problems with this blockading is that the hospital used by
Compton residents is located in Paramount and the Compton
residents could not get into Paramount to use it. Paramount is
policed by the Sheriff's Department but the decision to place
barriers was not a police decision, but rather a political
decision.
Compton has two helicopters, which the Chief found were
extremely useful in the unrest. By use of the helicopters the
police could assess what was occurring and determine whether a
response was in order.
VIII. CONTACT WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
The Chief indicated that Compton has no real contact
with the Los Angeles Police Department because Compton does not
really abut Los Angeles; Compton abuts the Lynwood, Lakewood and
the Carson Sheriff's areas, as well as Gardena.
He did indicate that after the Rodney King civil
unrest, the verdict in the Compton police shooting of a Samoan
was returned. When that verdict was returned, Compton, the Los
Angeles Police Department and the Carson Sheriffs went on alert.
Prior to that time, the Los Angeles Police Department was very
helpful. LAPD has a lieutenant, Victor Liu, and a Community
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Relations Officer, Ray Sua, at (213-485-2121}, who are Samoans.
These individuals were very calming and helped Compton
communicate with the Samoan community.
In the course of unrest the Compton School District
closed the schools. This was done without checking with the
Police Department; the Chief wishes there had been some
communication. Had the schools remained open, the "children"
would have had some place to be during the day. As it was,
everyone was on the street and the Chief believes this further
added to violence.
The old Sears in Compton had been restored as a swap
meet with over 700 vendors, many of whom were Korean or Asian.
During the course of the unrest there were rumors that the
shopping mall was going to be "taken". Compton put a police
presence there to avoid a "blood bath", feeling that the armed
security officers employed by the swap meet and the gangs would
confront each other violently had the police not been there.
When the National Guard came they were posted at the swap meet on
a regular basis. After the unrest the Compton police received
much criticism for saving Asian businesses and not other
businesses.
The School Board and the Community people were very
helpful in that they delivered food to the fire people and to the
hotel. The officers on the street were fed by a catering truck.
The Red Cross also assisted on Thursday.
IX. COMPTON FIRE DEPARTMENT
The response by the Compton Fire Department to the
civil unrest was directed by Assistant Chief Griswald. There
were approximately 122 fires (some of which were rekindles},
three vehicle fires and six miscellaneous calls. The City of
Compton suffered approximately $50,000,000 in damages from the
disturbances.
X. CRITICISMS AND SUGGESTIONS
The Chief believed that the study could be very helpful
if it would identify those who could aid in times of unrest.
Specifically, the study should identify what services are
available, how the EOC and OES work, what communication programs
are available during a major disturbance, and how additional
forces should be staged in the area.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
The Chief noted that while the guards were mobilized in
five hours, it took a very long time to get the people and the
equipment to where they were necessary. There was a lack of
communication so people did not know where and when aid was
coming. Further, as noted earlier, the Chief indicated that
there is a communication problem between the military and the
civilian law enforcement officers.
The civil unrest reinforced to the Chief that the
Compton Police Department lacks resources; it does not have
enough cars, helmets, flak vests, radios and face shields.
Further, there are not enough flak vests for the fire department
who also needed them during this unrest.
On the positive side, as a reaction to the disturbance,
Compton has been the beneficiary of a gang truce. There are
approximately 40 active gangs in Compton: 30 African/American
gangs, 10 Latino/Hispanic gangs. There are also 80 homicides in
Compton per year. Since the unrest there have been no gang
homicides in Compton, whereas ordinarily there would have been
several gang shootings by this time. The resulting truce has
resulted in celebrations of gang unity. These celebrations have
their own problems which the officers are just beginning to
understand. The officers have begun to deal with these problems
by breaking up the parties at an earlier time. The Chief finds
the gang unity one of the most hopeful signs to come out of the
civil unrest.
Finally, Chief Taylor believes that the long hours and
high intensity work regularly faced by his officers helped the
Compton Police Department during the civil unrest. Compton
police are used to dealing with large crowd interactions.
XI. PEOPLE TO CONTACT
1. Tom Barclay from the Mayor's Office regarding the
city's emergency plan;
2. Walter Tucker from the Mayor's Office regarding
local emergency cable news; and
3. Assistant Fire Chief Griswald regarding Fire
Department response during unrest.
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Description

Interview of Hourie Taylor, Acting Chief of Police of Compton, about the role and resources of the Compton Police Department during the civil disturbance. Topics include the planning activities undertaken by the Department; the Department's reaction to the unrest; and collaboration between the Department and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1992 June 22.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Hourie Taylor, interview, 1992-06-22

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 11 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-35404

Unique identifier UC11451659

Identifier box 21 (box),web-box21-19-01.pdf (filename),folder 19 (folder),webster-c100-35404 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box21-19/web-box21-19-01.pdf

Dmrecord 35404

Format 11 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts