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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Keith Comie, interview, 1992-09-02
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Keith Comie, interview, 1992-09-02
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Content
DATE
TO
FROM
RE
MEMORANDUM
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
September 2, 1992
Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
Tracy W. Young, Esq., Deputy General Counsel
Karen D. Kerner, Esq.
Interview of Keith Comrie
On September 1, 1992, at 4:00 p.m. at City Hall East, we
interviewed Mr. Keith Comrie. Mr. Comrie is City Administrative
Officer and by virtue of that position is also the Emergency
Operations Coordinator and Vice Chairman of the Emergency
Operations Board ("EOB"). The following is a summary of our
recollections of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions, based upon the meeting.
Initially, I asked Mr. Comrie to identify the names of the
individuals for the positions noted in the administrative chart.
Mr. Comrie suggested that the way to conduct any investigation
was to use a telephone directory for the organization. He told
me to contact Ms. Shirley Mattingly at 213-485-6400 to obtain a
copy of the administrative office telephone directory.
Mr. Comrie also told me to cbntact Ms. Mattingly to determine the
membership of the Emergency Management Committee ("EMC") and the
membership and operation of the subcommittees.
1
I described that the Administrative Code provides that the
Mayor is only the Director of the Emergency Operating
Organization ("EOO") after an emergency has been declared and
asked Mr. Comrie ~is comment on that language. Mr. Comrie
responded that the ,EOO is merely an administrative coordinating
ot a command o • The EOO provides for administrative
' backup of all resources to be in one place when more than one
department or agency is necessary to respond to an incident. For
example, in the event of an earthquake they would pull together
the heavy public works machinery to dispatch that machinery to
the proper locations. Mr. Comrie also noted that the incident
command is always out in the field. Mr. Comrie described that
~
1
Throughout his interview, Mr. Comrie deferred a number of
questions to Ms. Mattingly. I have identified those questions and
requests for information in this memorandum.
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Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 2
the EOO routinely meets as part of the Board and the department
heads and commanders meet separately. Once a year all of these
departments meet together for a major event which is to test the
system. He also mentioned that the departments attended the
National Fire Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. At the
National Fire Training Cente~, they participated in several days
of exercises which (1) built teamwork and (2) tested a particular
response drill, such as to an earthquake or hazardous spill. In
response to my question, Mr. Comrie said that he did not believe
that they had ever participated in a drill involving a civil
disturbance scenario and that they had primarily focused on
earthquakes.
Mr. Comrie described that former Police Chief Daryl Gates
suggested creating the EOO. Prior to the formation of the EOO,
the police were on their own to handle incidents and it was Chief
Gates' idea to have the organization to pull together the other
agencies and depart nts. Throughout his interview, Mr. Comrie
indicated that the olice Departme nd the Fire Departme ad l
to some extent always een e esponding
to emergencies and that the purposes of developing were
to bring the other agencies up to speed with the Fire and Police
Departments. Thus, written plans never existed but annual
testing exercises occurred. Mr. Comrie also answered that the
Police Department was not questioned regarding its plan for the
drilling exercises, but rather the Police Department would simply
state its plan for particular testing situations. If any
glitches or flaws occurred, other agencies might comment or make
suggestions, but very little time would be spent on developing
police or fire procedures. Mr. Comrie also mentioned some local
testing where various departments would go to a mobile field
location, such as Dodger Stadium, and simulate particular types
of scenarios. Thus, civil disturbances would be left to the
Police Department to determine what kind of testing would be
necessary and other agencies or departments would not review the
police response.
Mr. Comrie indicated that there was clearly a flaw with the
Police Department during the civil unrest. Although he stated
that he would not second guess the Police Department, Mr. Comrie
said that the situation at the intersection of Florence and
Normandy was a disaster and that he did not know why the police
did not go back in earlier than they did. He commented that
initially the police were simply overwhelmed by the number of
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Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 3
people in the intersection but that he does not know of the
explanation for the lack of response for three or four hours
following the initial crisis. Mr. Comrie also referred to
particular frustrating events during the civil disturbance such
as a problem where all of the keys to a number of police cars
were tossed on the hood of one police car. He commented that the
command structure was in South Central Los Angeles and that
something went wrong there that caused it not to work.
Mr. Comrie also noted that a large degree of staff power is
immediately necessary to handle civil disturbances. Although the
National Guard was requested early on during the civil
disturbance, they were not available. Further, once they were
available, they were not properly utilized. Moreover, Mr. Comrie
believes that the Army rather than the National Guard should have
been called at the beginning of the disturbance because they
would have been better equipped to handle the matter given the
Army's staffing power.
I asked Mr. Comrie about the Mayor's role regarding the
operation of the Emergency Operating Center ("EOC"). Mr. Comrie
responded that the Mayor is the Chief Executive, however, the
day-to-day operations are handled by the Chief of Police who is
the Chair of the group. The Mayor makes policy decisions or
changes or determines the need for additional resources. I
informed Mr. Comrie of Mr. Anton Calleia's comments that some of
the Mayor's suggestions were not acted upon and Mr. Comrie
expressed surprise that the Mayor did not get a response. As an
aside, I also mentioned to Mr. Comrie that Mr. Calleia had
suggested meal tickets during the civil unrest to make sure that
the city was not over billed for those meals and Mr. Comrie
responded that he was not familiar with that.
I asked Mr. Comrie how §8.29 of the Administrative Code is
implemented. In using the Fire Department as an example,
Mr. Comrie noted that a line department operates on its own and
it only comes under the EOO when coordination is necessary
between that department and other agencies. Further, review of a
department only occurs when multiple departments or agencies are
involved in responding to an incident.
I asked Mr. Comrie whether there is any type of an emergency
operation master plan and he responded that there is such a plan
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Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 4
and for me to call Ms. Mattingly to obtain a copy of the
emergency operation master plan.
Mr. Comrie commented on the Emergency Operation Organization
city brochure which indicates that the EOO is capable of
responding to any disaster and said that there probably is a
response prepared for each instance, however he does not know
whether a master list of disasters exists. Mr. Comrie suggested
contacting Ms. Mattingly to determine whether a master list of
disasters exists. Mr. Comrie reiterated that the EOO is used
whenever an emergency goes beyond one department. The only
example he could recall where the EOO did not become involved
where it was necessary was when the central library burned. The
Fire Department handled the matter, but once the Fire Department
extinguished the fire a number of books were wet. To save the
books, the administrative office arranged for freezer trucks to
freeze dry the books and arranged for meals for the workers who
performed that task.
I informed Mr. Comrie that based upon a strict reading of
the Administrative Code, it appears there is no Director of the
EOO if there is no emergency. Mr. Comrie responded that the
Chief of Police is always the Director, however the organization
does not activate until there is an emergency. He also commented
that although the Code may be vague, in practice there is no
confusion that the Chief of Police is in charge. Mr. Comrie also
stated that during an emergency the Mayor does not need the
approval from the City Council to activate personnel and to
commit the City to contracts.
I noted the language of a pending threat which appears in
§8.28 of the Administrative Code and asked when there was an
official warning of a pending emergency. Mr. Comrie responded
that he believed the police opened the center on their own and
later called to open the EOC. Mr. Comrie stated that it was
normal for the police to open the center when they were
anticipating some type of incident. Mr. Comrie was not aware of
a particular informal warning regarding an acquittal, however he
thinks common sense dictated that everyone knew the Rodney King
case was a difficult case. However, Mr. Comrie did not think
anyone had actually forecasted the civil disruption. Mr. Comrie
also suggested asking Ms. Mattingly when the activation of the
EOC occurred. Although he did not specifically blame the news
media, Mr. Comrie did not think that the actions of particular
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Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 5
reporters were appropriate. For example, certain reporters went
into black areas and stuck a microphone into the residents• faces
and asked "What are you going to do now?"
Mr. Comrie stated that his role in declaring the emergency
was to print out the draft Declaration of Emergency from the word
processing system. Mr. Comrie answered that a duty list exists l
within the Police Department under which someone from the Police
Department is specifically assigned to be in charge of the
center. Ordinarily this person is a Captain. He also indicated
the functioning of the-/4bard \s more in the pl~;ng s~aqes and
in testing than in handling actual emergencies.
,,--..
With respect to particular testing of the system, Mr. Comrie
responded that frequently testing is done in conjunction with the
county and that generally they prepare tests for earthquakes.
Mr. Comrie suggested contacting Ms. Mattingly for a list of past
tests. He described that typically one department creates a
scenario that is· implemented by all of the departments and
agencies.
I asked Mr. Comrie how the Mayor was notified on the day
that the verdicts were announced. Mr. Comrie responded that the
Captain in the Police Department or the City Hall Operator would
telephone the Mayor as well as himself, however he does not
recall whether he received a call that day and noted that he did
not need one as he was aware of the events from the television
news coverage. Mr. Comrie suggested contacting Ms. Mattingly to
determine if she knows how the Mayor was contacted. Mr. Comrie
also noted that his position is more financial in nature and his
initial role was to begin planning for the cleaning up and the
rebuilding process. He was also involved in obtaining contracts
and arranging to get the federal government to pay in advance.
He noted that his program was patterned after the City of
Oakland's recovery from the fire.
Mr. Comrie responded that delivery of information to the
Mayor goes through his representative, Mr. Calleia. He also
noted that the center was not particularly active as the police
directly contacted the Mayor. He further noted that the EOC
dealt with details beyond those necessary for the Mayor's
consideration. He reiterated that the EOC's function is to
coordinate between agencies. Although he acknowledged that an
example of such coordination would have been coordinating the
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Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 6
police protection for the Fire Department, he does not know
whether the EOC handled that coordination in the particular
instance of the April civil disturbance.
I informed Mr. Comrie that some sources have indicated that
an excessive number of police and higher officers of the Police
Department were present in the EOC during the civil disturbance.
Mr. Comrie indicated that he has not heard these stories, however
he did note that more police than normal, as well as a Deputy
Chief of Police, were present in the EOC. Mr. Comrie commented
that it was unusual for the Deputy Chief to be present at the EOC
as normally a Captain would handle the matter. Mr. Comrie also
noted that the police had taken over the Mayor's office, but that
did not present a problem at the time. He suggested that we talk
to the Police Department to find out why the Deputy Chief of
Police was present in the EOC.
I asked Mr. Comrie if the EOB or EOO had plans for testing a
civil disturbance scenario and Mr. Comrie's response was to ask
the Chief of Police that question. In response to questions
about concern raised by upcoming controversial trials and a
possible repeat of the civil disturbance that followed the Rodney
King verdict, Mr. Comrie indicated that although the military
people do not like to be involved that he believes that the Army
is needed to come in to provide the necessary manpower and
staffing. He pinpointed the National Guard's not getting to Los
Angeles in time as a major problem in handling the recent civil
disturbance.
I asked Mr. Comrie whether any Executive Directives
regarding civil unrest have been issued such as Executive
Directive Number 54 which deals with earthquakes. (A copy of
Executive Directive Number 54 was submitted with the interview
memorandum of Anton Calleia.) Mr. Comrie again indicated that J
the primary focus of the EOO had been on earthquakes and that we
should ask Ms. Mattingly if a similar directive exists for civi
unrest situations.
In response to my question regarding the city brochure's
statement that county, state and federal mutual aid pacts or
plans, Mr. Comrie responded that the roles of the EOO and EOB
have been developed through the Fire Department. He indicated
that Fire Departments from all areas work together through mutual
aid pacts. Mr. Co~ie indicated that this portion of the
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Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 7
brochure does not apply primarily to the Fire Department.
Rather, the brochure applies to all other departments as well,
but his example of the way the mutual aid pacts functioned was
through the Fire Department. Again, Mr. Comrie suggested talking
to Ms. Mattingly regarding other mutual aid pacts.
I asked Mr. Comrie for his comments and/or opinion on how
certain agencies or departments performed during the civil
disturbance.
Mr. Comrie's response to things that the LAPD did well was
some areas of the city did not experience many problems and his
example was the Valley.
With respect to weaknesses in the Police Department,
Mr. Comrie reiterated that initially the Police Department was
overwhelmed and that it lacked the resources to respond. He
further commented that the way that the police responded to the
looting by sending mass numbers of officers to march rather than
fewer officers in cars to scatter the looters did not seem
particularly effective to secure the stores. He also noted the
problem that once the police secured one store, they went on to
the next and did not have the military backup to leave personnel
guarding the previously-secured location. Mr. Comrie also
responded that the problem at the intersection of Florence and
Normandy was not handled well as there were many beatings. He
noted that the police helicopters did not work, but that should
not have hindered policing activity in light of the news
helicopters presence at the scene.
Emergency Operations Organization
Mr. Comrie noted that he did not see any particular glitches
in the functioning to the EOO, however no formal debriefing has
occurred. He further stated that the function of the EOO is as / an administrative staff to write reports including financing and
claims with the federal government. They also function to pull
teams of experts together, but do not function as experts.
I asked Mr. Comrie whether the Board has the power to
request a test involving a civil disturbance. Mr. Comrie
indicated that he has not been questioned as to whether the EOO
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..
Bert H. Deixler, Esq.
September 2, 1992
Page 8
possesses that particular power and that he would believe that
they would be able to request a testing plan for civil
disturbance. However, he again deferred this question to
Ms. Mattingly and suggested we contact her. Mr. Comrie expressed
his opinion regarding the forces leading to the civil disturbance
and possible future disturbances and he noted that
psychologically there is a long cooling off period. He also
noted that the huge disparity in compensation was one of the
problems leading to the recent civil disturbance.
KDK/pst
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Description
Interviews of Keith Comrie, Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Los Angeles. The second interview discusses the purview and administrative structure of the LAPD's Emergency Operations Command (EOC).
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Keith Comie, interview, 1992-09-02
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
8 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
Interviews
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-31266
Unique identifier
UC11447837
Identifier
box 19 (box),web-box19-041-02.pdf (filename),folder 41 (folder),webster-c100-31266 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box19-041/web-box19-041-02.pdf
Dmrecord
31266
Format
8 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992