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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Operation Los Angeles, 1992-05
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Operation Los Angeles, 1992-05
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Content
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Department of the Treasury
United States Customs Service
Office of Enforcement
OPERATION LOS ANGELES
MAY 1992
Special Agent in-Charge
Los Angeles
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This report was prepared by the following persons:
Arnold R. Gerardo - ASAC, Los Angeles
Jonelle Battaglia - SA, RAC, Orange County
Dave Callahan - SSA, SAC, Los Angeles
Judy Hoffman - SSA, SAC, Los Angeles
Lillian Moloian - SSA, RAC, Riverside
However, it should be noted that all participants of the
operation contributed .
Edited by: Lillian Moloian - SSA, RAC, Riverside
JOHN P. LUKSIC
SAC, Los Angeles
May 12, 1992
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....•.....•••.....•..•..••••••••••.•.•.......•...• 1
PLANNING .•.•............••..........•••..••..•............••.• 3
DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES ••••.•.........••........•......•••.••.•• 9
CLOSE DOWN PROCESS ...............................••••••..••••• 13
CRITIQUE ...................................................... 16
COST ANALYSIS ...........................•..••...•..•••.•.•..•• 20
RECOMMENDATIONS •.................•..•••••••..•.•.•••••..•...•• 2 3
CONCLUSION . .......................................•••....•.••• 2 5
ATTACHMENTS
BRIEFING MEMORANDUMS NO. 1-5
MEMORANDUM - FINANCE CENTER
MEMORANDUM - SAC, LOS ANGELES
MEMORANDUM - AIU
MEMORANDUM - ESD
MEMORANDUM - AIR BRANCH
MEMORANDUM - SAC, LA TO PARTICIPATING SAC OFFICES
MEMORANDUM - SAC, LA TO ASST. COMMISSIONER - ENF.
LETTER - RADISSION HOTEL CORPORATION
LETTER - MCDONNELL DOUGLAS REALTY COMPANY
MEMORANDUM - SAC, LA TO ASST. COMMISSIONER - ENF.
FBI REPORT
(A) COMMAND LOGS
(B) ACTIVITIES LOGS
(C) SITUATION TELETYPES
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INTRODUCTION
This report will provide United States Customs Service (Customs)
executives with information that accurately depicts our role in
Operation Los Angeles. Operation Los Angeles was a Federal law
enforcement mutual aid effort against the civil disobedience which
began on April 29, 1992 in Los Angeles .
From an historical perspective, the Watts riots occurred in August
1965. Thirty-four people lost their lives, over 1,000 people were
injured and there was $200 million in property damage. In the
devastation's wake, the state-appointed McCone Commission studied
the riot and concluded its primary causes were poverty, crime and
social isolation. Nearly three decades ago, officials resolved to
alleviate these social problems to prevent the recurrence of civil
unrest and resulting violence.
Although there is general disagreement among professionals for the
causes of this most recent civil unrest in Los Angeles, scholars
say that the inner city's poverty, despair and rage appear to be
the primary causes. Experts say the burning, looting and shooting
was a culmination of worsening economic and social conditions, from
soaring unemployment to angry, bitter relations with the courts and
police.
The civil disobedience in Los Angeles began on April 29, 1992,
following the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers in a
nationally televised trial for the beating of motorist Rodney King,
an African-American fromAltadena, California. Angry demonstrators
looted stores, torched buildings and assaulted motorists in Los
Angeles. The majority of the destruction occurred in the South
Central area, a 46 square mile section of Los Angeles plagued by
high unemployment, widespread poverty, inadequate schools, drug
dealers and criminals who prey on its citizens. Sporadic outbursts
of violence occurred in small cities throughout Los Angeles County
and, in some areas, serious escalation of the civil disobedience
followed .
As of May 5, 1992, the damage assessment was 58 people dead, over
2,300 people injured (some critically) including police and fire
department personnel, over 11,800 people arrested, and a staggering
$717 million in property loss. This dollar loss figure will rise
over the next several months as more "estimates" become documented
hard costs. The costs associated with law enforcement efforts, the
onslaught of judicial proceedings still to come, combined with the
custodial costs incurred for initial detention and housing and the
future custodial costs incurred upon conviction and sentencing of
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offenders, has yet to be determined. As violence escalated, people
stayed home from work, children did not attend school, offices and
factories were evacuated, schools closed, and cultural and sporting
events were suspended. The economic impact of loss of
productivity, reduced consumer spending and a decline in sales tax
revenues collected may take months, if not years, to calculate.
Of equal concern are the long-range social and economic impacts of
the loss of thousands of jobs in an already economically depressed
area .
On May 1, 1992, the President of the United States signed an
Executive Order to provide for the restoration of law and order in
the city and county of Los Angeles and other districts of
California. The Attorney General was authorized to coordinate the
activities of all Federal agencies assisting in the suppression of
violence and the administration of justice in and about the city
and county of Los Angeles, and other districts of California.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was designated as the
agency to coordinate the Federal law enforcement effort. Customs
Headquarters immediately assigned the Office of the Special Agent
in Charge, Los Angeles (SAC/LA) to direct the enforcement and
tactical efforts of Customs personnel. At approximately 1000 hours
on Friday, May 1, the SAC/LA received word from Thomas McDermott,
Director, Office of Domestic Operations, of the decision to
immediately deploy 200 Customs agents to Los Angeles to assist
state and local authorities in stemming the violence which had
erupted.
The special agents in charge of the Dallas, El Paso, Houston, San
Diego, San Francisco and Tucson offices responded to the
Headquarters directive by sending a total of 200 special agents and
supervisory special agents to Los Angeles. Utilizing SAC/LA staff,
and with the support of Headquarters, Aviation Operations, the
District Director/Los Angeles, the Area Intelligence Unit, the
National Finance Center, the Office of Enforcement Support and
others, Los Angeles quickly and efficiently arranged to receive,
house and deploy the agents who would begin arriving that same
afternoon .
A command center was established at the Office of the Resident
Agent in Charge, Orange County (RAC/OR), under the command of
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) Arnold R. Gerardo. A
total of 20 agents and supervisors from the SAC/LA were tasked to
serve as logistical coordinators, operational supervisors and
administrative staff .
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PLANNING
SAC/LA John P. Luksic, Deputy Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Roger R. Urbanski and ASAC Gerardo attended a meeting of all
Federal agencies participating in this effort. The meeting was
held on May 1, 1992 at the Los Angeles Division of the FBI
(FBI/LA), and was co-chaired by Assistant Attorney General
(Assistant AG) Robert Mueller and FBI/Dallas SAC Oliver B. Revell,
who had been assigned to coordinate the Federal effort. Copies of
the Federal Proclamation and Executive Order affecting this
deployment were provided to all agencies. The FBI/LA Crisis Center
(command post) had been activated, and all agency participants were
requested to provide a representative to the Crisis Center .
At 0900 hours on May 2, 1992, a second meeting of all Federal
officials involved in this effort was conducted by Assistant AG
Mueller and FBI/Dallas SAC Revell. Wayne Budd, Associate Attorney
General, and Lourdes Baird, United State Attorney for the Central
District of California, were also present at this meeting.
Intelligence information was disseminated, the Federal law
enforcement tasking was described, and there was discussion
regarding the legal authority for Federal participation.
Aviation operations support
On April 30, 1992, the Riverside Aviation Unit (RAU) received the
first request for aerial support for the civil disobedience in Los
Angeles from special tactical units of the Los Angeles and Anaheim
Police departments. The RAU was requested to provide rapid
helicopter lift capability to 8-man special tactics response teams
for insertion into areas where vehicular transportation could not
be accomplished in a timely manner or was logistically impossible.
These particular tactics response teams have previously trained
with our aircraft and personnel in preparation for this type of
emergency insertion.
On May 1, 1992, aviation operations assets were utilized to
transport special agents from Texas to the Los Angeles area in
support of enforcement actions to quell the civil disobedience.
A P-3 dispatched from Corpus Christi, Texas picked up agents from
east Texas and transported them to the John Wayne Airport in Orange
County. Another Customs aircraft from Tucson, Arizona was
dispatched to transport agents to the El Toro Marine Air Station
in Orange County. Upon arrival, the agents were met by command
post coordinators who transported them to their lodging location .
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On May 1, 1992, the SAC/LA ordered UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
dispatched to the FBI/LA helicopter pad to be available on a 24
hour a day basis to airlift special tactics teams and counter
sniper teams as needed. Two Blackhawk helicopters from the Tucson
Aviation Unit and two C-12 King Air aircraft were placed on 24 hour
stand-by at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California to
airlift Customs agents as needed to support the enforcement
operation .
On May 4, 1992, two Customs aircraft were utilized again to
transport 58 special agents from the El Toro Marine Air Station
back to their posts of duty.
Sector communications
Participation by the Enforcement Support Division {ESD) in
Operation Los Angeles commenced on April 29 and concluded on May
4, 1992. The principal support functions were provided by the
Sector Enforcement Operations Center and technical equipment
specialist personnel.
Sector's primary mission during this crisis was to maintain law
enforcement communications support services for the six districts
and five SAC offices within the Sector Radio Network. Sector was
also responsible for prioritizing radio communications support for
contingents deployed to assist local law enforcement and National
Guard personnel within the Los Angeles area. This support included
coordination and relay of radio traffic for approximately 200
special agents deployed to Los Angeles, and the preparation of
tactical DES radio base station equipment for immediate deployment
to the Orange County assembly site and other sites as required .
Equipment specialist personnel were placed on 24 hour stand-by for
immediate deployment to provide technical communications support
as needed.
Tactical Information Center
A tactical information center {TIC) was established at 1800 hours
on May 1, 1992 in the office of the Area Intelligence Unit, located
in the World Trade Center building in Long Beach, California. The
goal of the TIC was to coordinate intelligence information
originating from a variety of sources and to provide that
information to the command post for utilization in deployment
decisions .
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Within its first day of activation and operation, SAC/LA management
determined that the TIC was a duplication of the effort being
undertaken at the RAC, Orange County Command Post, and the
personnel required to maintain the TIC could be better utilized in
other support functions. On that basis, the SAC/LA ordered the
deactivation of the TIC.
customs Headquarters
Domestic Operations/Intelligence Operations center
Customs Headquarters was telephonically advised of all activities
related to Operation Los Angeles. Reports were issued twice each
day, at 0900 and 2100 hours, to ensure that information was being
provided to all management personnel in a timely manner. In
addition, SAC/LA Luksic maintained a continual dialogue with Thomas
McDermott, Director, Office of Domestic Operations.
orange county command Post
At approximately 1100 hours on May 1, 1992, the SAC/LA assigned
ASAC Gerardo the task of coordinating, directing and managing all
Customs activities in Operation Los Angeles. The RAC/OR office was
selected as the site for the Customs command post, and ASAC Gerardo
was assured by John Luksic, SAC/LA, that whatever assets were
required to ensure safe participation in the effort would be made
available to him. Upon activation of the command post, ASAC
Gerardo made the following personnel assignments: RAC/OR Fred Ghio
was designated as ASAC Gerardo's assistant; Special Agent ( SA)
Jonelle Battaglia was designated as the primary coordinator of the
operation; 13 team coordinators were selected; eight supervisory
special agents (six from Los Angeles, two from San Francisco) were
tasked with supervisory duties; and Audrey Freeman of the RAC/OR
was named primary clerical assistant.
Each of these roles was clearly defined, as follows:
ASAC Arnold R. Gerardo was assigned the overall responsibility for
the success of the operation, including staffing and operation of
the command post. ASAC Gerardo received all taskings and requests
for information, and also acted as liaison between the FBI/LA
Crisis Center and the Customs command post. ASAC Gerardo, the
RAC/OR and the primary coordinator determined which agents,
equipment, supervisors and team leaders were to be assigned to each
given tasking, and they conducted the tasking briefings of the
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supervisors and team leaders. ASAC Gerardo's other duties included
ensuring completion of twice daily reports prepared from the daily
log; maintaining the safety of all Customs personnel; minimizing
equipment loss and/or damage; and being financially prudent.
ASAC Gerardo acted under the direction of the SAC/LA and kept
Customs executives fully apprised of all pertinent activities.
RAC/OR Fred Ghio was ASAC Gerardo's assistant, and was utilized as
a supervisor when necessary. RAC/OR Ghio prepared the RAC/OR
office to serve as a command post, and was involved in virtually
all required decision making and coordination efforts.
Primary Coordinator Jonelle Battaglia was responsible for arranging
hotel accommodations for the Customs response teams, as well as the
staff members with logistical and administrative duties. SA
Battaglia was tasked as the Customs command post contact point for
local law enforcement and civilian entities, she prioritized the
workload of the clerical staff, and ensured that weapons at the
command post were properly labeled and secured .
Upon receipt of a tasking, ASAC Gerardo, RAC/OR Ghio and SA
Battaglia determined which agents, equipment, supervisors and team
leaders were to be assigned to that specific tasking. After the
assignments were made, SA Battaglia advised the team coordinators
which of their assigned agents were to be deployed. SA Battaglia
also advised the supervisors of their assignments and what
equipment their assigned response team members were required to
have when deployed.
Team coordinators from the SAC/LA worked under the direction of the
primary coordinator, with the specific request to serve as
communication links between agents assigned from other
participating SAC offices and the command post. Each team
coordinator was assigned a group of 13 to 20 agents and was
responsible for meeting the professional needs of their groups, as
well as providing them with transportation and updated information
on the operation. Team coordinators were also assigned to provide
liaison with supervisors from other SAC offices within their group,
and to ensure that command post supervisors were kept apprised of
operational matters.
Supervisory special agents from the Los Angeles and San Francisco
off ices were responsible for tactical operations. Upon being
advised of a tasking by the primary coordinator and following the
briefing by the ASAC, supervisors met with their assigned team
leaders to advise them of the special equipment and vehicles that
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team members were required to have when deployed. The supervisors
remained at the command post throughout the tasking and were
prepared to support the response team in any manner required .
Supervisors were also the contact points for the team leaders
regarding any incidents that occurred in the field. Like the team
coordinators, supervisors were assigned a group from a specific SAC
office. As tactical supervisors monitored the work of the
logistical coordinators, supervisors identified potential logistics
problem areas and initiated corrective actions .
Team leaders were the special agents responsible for assembling the
equipment his/her response team was tasked to provide. Team
leaders were also the field supervisors for the tasked response
teams and were to provide any pertinent information from the field
to their assigned supervisor at the command post .
Response team special agents were the trained personnel available
for tactical taskings. Response team special agents were required
to maintain contact with their assigned team coordinator when not
participating in a tasking, and to maintain contact with their
assigned team leaders while participating in a tasking •
The administrative staff consisted of investigative assistants
and/or clerical staff responsible for typing, copying and faxing
documents; answering telephones; and maintaining files of incoming
and outgoing documents. The administrative staff's workload was
prioritized by SA Battaglia .
The SAC/LA Warrant Entry Tactical Team (WET) initially prepared
itself to provide security for the Customhouse at Terminal Island,
California and for the employees assigned to that facility. When
it was determined that the Federal Protective Service could provide
contract guards to provide security for the Customhouse, the SAC/LA
elected to have contract personnel guard the facility. The WET
team was then reassigned to the RAC/OR command post to stand by for
assignment.
While on stand-by at the command post, the SAC/LA WET team
conducted review training exercises in tactical team movement as
well as civil disturbance tactics. The WET team's commitment to
excellence and professionalism served as an example to other WET
teams assigned to Operation Los Angeles. On May 3, 1992, WET teams
from Arizona and San Diego joined the SAC/LA WET team tactical
exercises. Tactical exercises conducted by the WET team took place
in an unoccupied, four-story parking structure located next to the
command post, away from public observation and scrutiny .
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Operation Los Angeles
Resident Agent
in Charge
Orange County,
CA
Deployment Strategies
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Asst. Special Agent
in Charge
Los Angeles, CA
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Primary
Coordinator
Administrative
Staff
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---, Loaistical ,------, Tactical ,...._ __
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13 Team
Coordinators
200
Response T earn
Special Agents
Available
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8 Group
Supervisors
SAC/LA & SAC/SF
20 Team Leaders
I 20 Response Teams - 170 Special Agents Activated I
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DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
Customs, along with many other federal agencies, was mobilized in
Los Angeles to provide mutual aid support for local law
enforcement. Essentially, the Customs mission during the civil
disturbance in Los Angeles was to make a specific number of
personnel available for assignment, or "tasking."
All requests for Federal assistance were made to the FBI/LA Crisis
Center. When the Customs liaison at the FBI/LA Crisis Center
received a request for personnel and/or equipment, the liaison
would obtain all pertinent information. The liaison would then
advise ASAC Gerardo or RAC/OR Ghio of the tasking request, who
would then accept the request and implement the deployment based
upon a continually updated flow of intelligence.
Since the available pool of special agents consisted of 200 agents
from seven different SAC offices, every effort was made to have
each SAC office equally represented on each deployment to ensure
that each office felt they were equitably utilized. For example,
approximately 28% of the agents sent from each SAC office were
utilized on the first deployment. This type of equity was
maintained throughout the next four deployments. One hundred
seventy special agents, or 85% of the entire complement assigned
to Operation Los Angeles, were deployed during this operation •
Although most of the special agents available for taskings had some
prior WET training, there were only three identifiable WET teams
assigned to Operation Los Angeles: one team each from the SAC
offices in Los Angeles, Tucson and San Diego. The WET teams were
kept on stand-by pending any major enforcement action and/or to
provide assistance to the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team .
Between 2000 hours on May 1 and 0600 hours on May 4, 1992, the
command post responded to five taskings and deployments, as
follows:
Location:
Shift:
Deployment #1
Los Angeles Police Department
South Bureau
Van Ness & 54th Street
Los Angeles, California
May 2 at 2000 hours through May 3 at 0600 hours
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Agents deployed: 50
Tasking:
Incidents:
Location:
Shift:
Agents deployed:
Tasking:
Incidents:
Fifty special agents were assigned to accompany
the Los Angeles Police Department on patrol
utilizing LAPD vehicles.
May 2 , 2 3 2 O hours: A Customs/ LAPD team
responded to a "shots fired" report. The team
called for LAPD SWAT team response and remained
on the scene for containment. One suspect was
arrested by LAPD for felony discharge of a
weapon within Los Angeles city limits. The
weapons fired by the suspects included a
shotgun and 9mm semi-automatic handgun. No
injuries were reported .
May 3, 0103 hours: A Customs/LAPD team,
accompanied by California National Guard units,
reported hearing shots fired. Units responded
to the scene, heard additional gunfire, but no
arrests occurred. No injuries were reported .
Deployment #2
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Carson Station
21356 South Avalon Blvd.
Carson, California
May 3, from 0001 to 0600 hours
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Thirty-four special agents were assigned to
accompany the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department on patrol utilizing LASD vehicles.
0410 hours: Four special agents assisted the
LASD in arresting four suspects charged with
possession of three loaded weapons concealed
in their vehicle .
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Location:
Shift:
• Agents deployed:
Tasking:
• Incidents:
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Location:
Shift:
• Agents deployed:
Tasking:
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Incidents:
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Location:
Shift:
• Agents deployed:
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Deployment #3
Los Angeles Police Department
Rampart Area
2710 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California
May 3, from 0110 to 0600 hours
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Twenty special agents were assigned to
accompany the Los Angeles Police Department on
patrol utilizing LAPD vehicles .
None reported
Deployment #4
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Carson Station
21356 South Avalon Blvd.
Carson, California
May 3, from 0600 to 1200 hours
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Thirty-four special agents were assigned to
accompany the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department on patrol utilizing LASO vehicles .
None reported
Deployment #5
Los Angeles Police Department
South Bureau
Van Ness and 54th Street
Los Angeles, California
May 3 at 1900 hours through May 4 at 0600 hours
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Tasking:
Incidents:
Thirty-five special agents assigned to three
WET teams and utilizing 17 Customs vehicles
were assigned to work in conjunction with
patrol officers of the Los Angeles Police
Department in anti-looting patrol activity.
2128 hours: WET team units responded to
reports of "shots fired." The area was
searched, with negative results .
2155 hours: WET team units assisted the LAPD
in a building search for possible looters, with
negative results.
2315 hours: WET team units assisted the LAPD
with a vehicle stop after the vehicle was
observed committing traffic violations. Agents
assisted in the identification and
interrogation of the suspect, who was later
released .
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CLOSE DOWN PROCESS
During the evening of May 3, 1992, the Customs command post became
aware that Federal involvement in Operation Los Angeles would be
scaled back. Upon receiving this information, the command post
started work on formal close down procedures.
The SAC/LA management team determined that a staggered release of
Customs personnel and equipment would be the most efficient method
of withdrawal to use because of two specific areas of concern. The
first area of concern was that the withdrawal of customs personnel
had to take place in an orderly fashion while addressing the
logistical matters of hotel check out, vehicle and personnel
movement, and the return of weapons and equipment. The second area
of concern prompting the decision for staggered release was that
our departure be as inconspicuous as possible. Federal law
enforcement was particularly sensitive to the potential for
negative public reaction to a mass exodus of law enforcement
personnel. An organized, low-profile stand down process was
determined to be the least inflammatory method of withdrawing
personnel and equipment.
During the evening hours of May 3, 1992, a planning session under
the direction of ASAC Gerardo was held among supervisory personnel
assigned to the Customs command post. The planning session
established the procedures by which Customs personnel and equipment
would be withdrawn from Operation Los Angeles. Consideration was
given to details such as when the actual withdrawal process would
begin, when personnel at the various levels of responsibility
should be notified, and which individuals would be tasked with the
many logistical details needing attention .
The following morning at 0900 hours on May 4, specific duties
required for the withdrawal were assigned to the team coordinators
and leaders who would be charged with their implementation. Team
leaders were given the responsibility of notifying their assigned
personnel of the actual time of departure for their agents, the
assigned time for hotel check out, and the assigned time for
weapons retrieval from the command post. Team coordinators would
be tasked with assembling the agents at predetermined locations,
ensuring that all personnel had properly checked out of the hotel,
that all personnel had their necessary equipment (including
weapons), confirming the physical integrity of all Customs
vehicles, and, finally, providing the necessary transportation for
affected personnel .
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The most significant factors in determining which agents would
leave the area first were the geographic destinations of the
returning personnel and their modes of transportation. Personnel
from the SACs El Paso and Houston had been flown into the area
aboard Customs aircraft; SAC/Dallas agents had flown into the area
on commercial carriers; personnel from the SACs Tucson, San
Francisco and San Diego had driven their assigned Customs vehicles
to Los Angeles .
It was determined that agents would return to their posts of duty
via the same methods of transportation used to deploy them to Los
Angeles. Based upon that decision, the customs Aviation Branch in
Corpus Christi, Texas was requested to send an aircraft to Los
Angeles to transport agents from El Paso and Houston back to Texas.
The Customs P-3 aircraft arrived at the El Toro Marine Air Base the
morning of May 4, whereupon the agents boarded the aircraft and
departed at 1130 hours. A second Customs (undercover) aircraft
arrived at El Toro Marine Air Station, where it too was boarded by
Texas agents and departed at 1300 hours. Agents had been
transported to the El Toro Marine Air Station facility in vans
loaned from the District Director/Los Angeles and operated by
SAC/LA support personnel.
The next phase of withdrawal of Customs personnel was the departure
of agents from the SAC/Dallas. RAC Ghio made arrangements for the
12 agents to return to Texas together aboard Delta Airlines Flight
1712 which departed at 1405 hours on May 4 .
After the departure of the above personnel, departure via
automobile of the remaining personnel was initiated. Taking into
account geographical considerations, the SAC/Tucson was authorized
to start its departure process at the assigned time of 1130 hours
on May 4; the SAC/San Francisco was assigned a departure time of
1145 hours; the SAC/San Diego was to initiate their departure
procedures beginning at 1200 hours.
SAC/LA personnel remained on site until all visiting personnel had
left the Los Angeles area •
The only exceptions to the above departure proceedings were three
individuals who had earlier requested and received authorization
to leave the operation, and personnel who had worked the night
before. (WET teams from Los Angeles, Tucson and San Diego had been
tasked with anti-looting patrol duties the evening of May 3 through
the morning of May 4. The WET team members who participated in
this particular tasking were allowed to remain in the hotel and
thus were not subject to the assigned departure schedules.)
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Other areas of concern related to close down procedures were the
physical health and well-being of Customs personnel and accounting
for equipment and weapons utilized during the operation, including
any damage sustained by Customs vehicles. There were no reports
of any physical injury to Customs personnel during the operation;
the total losses identified as attributable to Operation Los
Angeles were two damaged automobile tires, one of which can be
repaired. There were no reports of any lost weapons or equipment •
As discussed above, the organized, formal stand down process
undertaken at the conclusion of Operation Los Angeles was deemed
a necessity. Spelling out orderly withdrawal procedures which
hinged on accountability would avert several potential logistical
problems encountered during the withdrawal process. In retrospect,
the departure procedures implemented by the SAC/LA were highly
successful .
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CRITIQUE
Although all the details from Operation Los Angeles are not yet
available, preliminary critiques have already been conducted.
Generally speaking, the operation has been viewed as a tremendous
success, an opinion shared at all levels of personnel involved,
from support staff to supervisory personnel. As with any
undertaking of such magnitude, some things could have been done
better or more efficiently. Identified below are items and issues,
both negative and positive, that have been brought to the attention
of the SAC/LA.
Perhaps the most troublesome operational issue was the coordination
of vehicles. At the outset, the SAC/LA had requested that all
agents from nearby offices drive their assigned Customs vehicles
into the area. The surplus of vehicles allowed the extra vehicles
to be assigned to agents who had been flown into the area. The
operational problem arose after a breakdown in communication to
team leaders and response teams. Team leaders and response teams
were asked to bring enough vehicles with them to the staging area
to support their own team, as well as bring additional vehicles for
assignment to teams who did not have vehicles. Teams were arriving
at the staging area from the hotel with only enough vehicles for
themselves, and some of these vehicles were inadequately equipped
or not of the proper type. The communication breakdown resulted
in a lot of last minute "shuffling" in order to obtain the proper
vehicles, but the problems were soon corrected.
Another area of concern was the flow of information to involved
personnel. It had been planned that the team coordinators, who had
been given specific responsibilities for their particular groups,
would be the conduits for up to date information from the command
post. This "information chain" broke down somewhat, for a variety
of reasons. In some instances, the coordinators were not making
the necessary effort to obtain and pass along information that was
available. Another cause for concern was the lack of a proper
forum to pass information. A specific place or method for the
dissemination of information had not been designated; most non
critical information was passed by word of mouth, resulting in some
people not being as informed as they should have been. Another
factor in the perceived lack of information was that in reality,
there was not a lot of specific information that was not already
commercially available, i.e., television .
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There were questions raised about why agents were brought into Los
Angeles when there were sufficient personnel stationed in the
immediate area to handle the assignment. These questions were
compounded by the perception that there was not enough work to
justify the assignment of so many outside personnel. Command staff
personnel clarified these misperceptions for all participants.
Personnel data was another area where there was a recognized
breakdown in communication. Prior to the arrival of agents from
outside offices, the SAC/LA had requested that specific information
about those agents be provided, including the name, grade and
vehicles to be used by each of the individuals assigned to
Operation Los Angeles. It was later learned that the original
information provided by the outside SAC offices was not, to varying
degrees, accurate. Emergency personnel rosters should have been
accurately prepared by the supervisors of the various SAC offices
for all personnel being sent to Los Angeles. The net result was
that considerable time and effort was spent trying to confirm the
identities of personnel and types of equipment actually being made
available to the operation. It was recognized that in addition to
an accurate list of the people being assigned to the operation,
details of specific training, language capabilities, prior law
enforcement experience, etc. would have been extremely useful
information in the deployment of personnel.
Support staff availability was also an area of some concern.
During Operation Los Angeles, RAC/OR Investigative Assistant Audrey
L. Freeman and her sister Melody, a clerk-typist with the Los
Angeles District Director's Office, provided the bulk of the
administrative support. Due to their outstanding efforts, there
were no major breakdowns in support services. As it was, personnel
from the management team at the command post were required to get
involved in tasks that ideally should not have been their
responsibility. If the operation had gone on for an extended
period of time, the assignment of additional support personnel
would have become mandatory.
Staffing of the command post was another area that could have been
improved. Aside from the support staff issue discussed above,
there were a number a supervisory personnel assigned to the command
post throughout the operation. Supervisors and team coordinators
were not on shift work, resulting in extended duty hours for
personnel and considerable overlaps of coverage. While it is
recognized that adequate coverage at all levels of supervision was
required, scheduled shifts would have been functionally more
beneficial. Local law enforcement adopted a two-shift policy with
personnel working 12 hours on each shift. The relatively short
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duration of the operation prevented major problems; however, had
the operation been extended, shift work would have ensured a
"fresh" work force and better quality of coverage .
A minor issue brought to our attention was the
in the appearance of Customs personnel. While
be made for variances in equipment, there were
jackets or clothing to clearly identify
individuals as Customs agents .
lack of uniformity
allowances have to
no common raid
all participating
The negative aspects identified above were relatively minor in
comparison to the enormity of the task at hand, and problems were
resolved immediately after they were identified.
The major high points of the operation are cited below:
The choice of the RAC/OR office as the command post was a
significant factor in the success of the operation. In choosing
a Customs facility as opposed to a hotel conference room or other
off-site facility, we had ready access to telephones, facsimile
machines, customs communications equipment, etc. The RAC/OR
command post also provided an identifiable "home base" which could
be found by anyone needing to contact the command post, even those
individuals from outside Los Angeles. The RAC/OR is approximately
40 miles from Los Angeles and, thus, was not negatively impacted
by the events taking place in Los Angeles. Using a facility so
close to major airport and military air facilities was critical in
the rapid, successful deployment of personnel. Hotel and
restaurant accommodations, accessible parking and staging areas
were nearby, which also simplified many logistical concerns
inherent in any operation of this magnitude.
The use of team coordinators was also seen as a very positive idea .
By designating one person to act as an "ombudsman" between visiting
agents and the SAC/LA command structure, we not only provided a
line of communication from the command post to the agents, we also
provided a vehicle for direct feedback from agents in the field.
More importantly, the team coordinators were the logistical
backbone of the operation, charged with notifying individual agents
of the taskings from the command post, taking care of hotel
accommodations, providing transportation to and from airports and
staging areas, and providing for the general well-being of visiting
personnel.
Another positive aspect of the operation was the decision to keep
agents from the individual SAC offices together as a functional
unit, allowing everyone to work with people they recognized and
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performed comfortably with. This system also allowed the team
leaders the luxury of knowing the capabilities of their personnel
and optimizing the use of those resources .
The last point to be addressed is that everyone involved in the
critique of Operation Los Angeles made note of the high degree of
cooperation of all personnel involved. It was recognized that the
mobilization of such a large number of Customs personnel under such
extenuating circumstances was a difficult endeavor. It is a credit
to those involved that they understood the totality of the
situation and dealt with somewhat trying circumstances in a
professional manner .
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COST ANALYSIS
Overall expenses incurred - Operation Los Angeles $422,505.68
A breakdown of the expenses by object class code is as follows:
OBJECT CLASS CODE 11
Salary Expense
Air Support (160 days) $
SAC/Los Angeles (166 days)
SAC/San Diego (200 days)
SAC/Tucson (184 days)
SAC/San Francisco (184 days)
SAC/Dallas (48 days)
SAC/El Paso (112 days)
SAC/Houston (72 days)
Total Salary Expense $
30,513.60
36,723.12
38,142.00
35,090.64
35,090.64
9,154.08
21,359.52
13,731.12
219,804.72
Salary expenses were based upon an average grade of GS 12/4
which equals $190.71 per day. Sixteen percent was added for
those persons in the SAC/ Los Angeles office. The total
number of days worked by employees of each office are noted
in parentheses.
Overtime Expense
SAC/Los Angeles
SAC/Los Angeles-ESD
Total Overtime Expense
$
$
446.40
3,424.19
3,870.59
Overtime expenses were incurred for SAC/Los Angeles
employees only, the majority being for Sector (ESD)
personnel and the balance for administrative support at the
RAC/Orange County command post.
TOTAL EXPENSE - OC 11 $ 223,675.31
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OBJECT CLASS CODE - 21
Travel and Transportation of Persons
Air Support
Aircraft operating expenses
Per diem
SAC/Los Angeles
SAC/San Diego
SAC/Tucson
SAC/San Francisco
SAC/Dallas
Air fare
Per diem
SAC/El Paso
SAC/Houston
Total Travel Expense
Vehicle
SAC/Los Angeles
SAC/San Diego
SAC/Tucson
SAC/San Francisco
Total Vehicle Expense
$
$
$
$
122,740.00
5,625.00
5,601.00
9,720.00
9,710.00
6,221.50
6,600.00
2,328.00
5,387.00
3,417.00
177,349.50
1,078.75
2,035.00
6,325.00
3,780.00
13,218.75
Air support was used primarily for the transportation of
persons to the command post. The aircraft were also on
twenty-four hour stand-by during the operation, though never
activated. The per diem expenses are based on actual
figures per person.
Actual mileage was determined for each vehicle used .
Transportation as well as actual deployment miles were
recorded and a factor of .25 used to calculate total cost.
TOTAL EXPENSE - OC 21 $ 190,568.25
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OBJECT CLASS CODE 23
Utilities (weekend air conditioning)
SAC/Los Angeles
TIC (World Trade Center)
RAC/Orange County
Total Utility Expense
TOTAL EXPENSE - OC 23
OBJECT CLASS CODE 31
Equipment
SAC/Los Angeles
SAC/Tucson
Total Utility Expense
TOTAL EXPENSE - oc 31
22
$ 1,950.00
968.00
$ 2,918.00
$ 2,918.00
========
$ 577.53
4,766.59
$ 5,344.12
$ 5,344.12
========
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to respond to national or local emergencies, agencies must
develop emergency mobilization and operational plans to ensure that
the deployment of personnel and the acquisition of funds and
material are accomplished quickly and efficiently. As a result of
our participation in Operation Los Angeles, we would like to make
the following recommendations for implementation of emergency
response procedures:
The formation of a Headquarters-level task force is
necessary to develop general, national policy guidelines for
coordinated responses to emergencies. This task force is
responsible for the development and implementation of emergency
mobilization plans which address the issues of deployment of
personnel and material to affected areas, and emergency operations
plans delineating the procedures to be followed at locations where
events are occurring.
-- National policies and procedures for emergency procurements
and deployment of personnel must be prepared. Emergency travel
procedures must be implemented which circumvent the normal approval
process by designating one individual with the authority to approve
travel. An NFC procurement officer must be designated as the
contact point for emergency purchases of equipment and other
material needed to carry out our mission. Procedures should be
developed to allow procurement officers to issue waivers for
imprest fund expenditure ceilings, i.e., local imprest funds must
be able to make necessary purchases of equipment and/or material
even if such expenditures exceed the $500 limit, without having to
first obtain a waiver from the Comptroller of the Currency .
-- Procedures for a national, mobile command center must be
established, including predetermined designations of local staging
areas and procedures for airlifting equipment into those areas in
the event of a major disaster. This command center should be
equipped with up-to-date charts and maps, assignment boards, flip
charts, overhead projection equipment, cameras (still and video),
facsimile machines and other necessary equipment, and must be kept
in a continual state of readiness to respond to emergencies. A
quarterly review and inspection of the equipment must take place
to ensure that the equipment is up-to-date and fully functional.
-- Each SAC and RAC office must designate a local emergency
planning staff that, in addition to the national guidelines,
develop area-specific emergency operations plans. Areas like San
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Francisco and Los Angeles must develop plans that include response
to natural disasters like earthquakes, while offices located in
Florida and along the Gulf Coast must develop plans to respond to
hurricanes and tornados. Local emergency planning must include
guidelines for deployment and redeployment of personnel and
equipment; mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement
agencies; scheduling of personnel, to include predetermined hours
and shifts to coincide with shifts established by local law
enforcement agencies; relocation plans for personnel in the event
Customs facilities are destroyed or badly damaged; and plans for
the swift removal of case files, computer disks and personnel
records in the event that secure Customs facilities are in danger
of being breached during natural disasters or civil disturbances.
Local procedures must also be established for sharing intelligence
and event information with local agencies so Customs is aware of
significant local events prior to deployment of personnel.
-- Each major SAC office should create and maintain one or two
fully-trained and adequately equipped WET teams. Remote offices
should, with Headquarters assistance, enter into mutual aid
agreements with local agencies which can be activated pending
deployment of WET teams and support personnel to their location.
-- Customs WET teams currently rely on receiving tactical
training from local agencies in their area. A uniform, national
tactical training program must be developed to provide the same
level of training for all WET teams, and should also provide for
certification of each agent assigned to a WET team. Regular in
service mobilization and tactical training exercises must also be
conducted to ensure awareness of changes in management policies and
tactical procedures.
Federal agents are not recognized as law enforcement
personnel by the public because we do not wear the traditional
symbols of authority, e.g., uniforms, badges or patches. Federal
law enforcement agents responding to emergency zones may be
challenged by frightened citizens if such citizens are unable to
immediately recognize our agents. WET team members must be easily
recognized as law enforcement officers by wearing clothing (pants,
shirts, boots) and raid jackets that are uniform in appearance .
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CONCLUSION
The enforcement activity which occurred during Operation Los
Angeles was, without reservation, a major undertaking. There is
also no question about the success of this very important Customs
activity in support of a national Federal law enforcement effort.
There were many lessons learned by all of us who participated as
we progressed toward the successful accomplishment of our mission .
There were many factors contributing to our overall success,
exemplified by the professional attitude and demeanor of all
Customs personnel, combined with their enthusiasm for goal
accomplishment and a highly positive esprit de corps .
Speaking solely for the SAC/LA office, a major reason for the
success of this operation is simply the implementation of line
authority. Centralized management required that only one telephone
call from a Customs Headquarters official to the SAC/LA needed to
be made in order to begin our response to a presidential order.
We received the order, accepted the challenge and, working
together, accomplished our mission.
Thanks to all of you for your tireless support.
25
JOHN P. LUKSIC
Special Agent in Charge
Los Angeles, California
Linked assets
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Conceptually similar
PDF
Inglewood Police department documents, 1992-05/1992-08
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Foothill area after action report, 1992-04-29/1992-05-11
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Unusual occurance critique, 1992-05-17
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Los Angeles County commission on human relations, statement, 1992-04-29
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Colorado Springs 1992 annual report, 1992-07-24
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Correspondence, Mayor Tom Bradley materials, 1992
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Foothill area activities report, 1992-04-29/1992-05-07
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Newark internal affairs materials, 1987-1992
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Toronto environmental scan, 1992-05-28
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CARECEN article, report, 1992-06
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Toronto police services, 1986-1992
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Wichita questionnaires, 1992-07-24
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Chicago, rules and regulations, 1981-1992
PDF
USC security department crime / incident summary, 1992-04-29/1992-05-04
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Weekly status report, number 7, 1992-07-17
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Comparison study group, 1992-07-02
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103rd Annual Tournament of Roses, Pasadena police operations plan, 1992-01-01
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Baltimore county (Towson) operating budget, 1991-1992
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LAPD, Narcotics group, mobilization roster and unusual occurrence control plan, 1992-04-19/1992-05-16
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Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-13
Description
Operation Los Angeles, Special Agent in-Charge Los Angeles, a report to provide information that accurately depicts the role in Operation Los Angeles, 1992 May.
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Operation Los Angeles, 1992-05
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
32 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
official reports
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-31809
Unique identifier
UC11447846
Identifier
box 19 (box),web-box19-085-02.pdf (filename),folder 85 (folder),webster-c100-31809 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box19-085/web-box19-085-02.pdf
Dmrecord
31809
Format
32 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),official reports (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992