Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Jesse Brewer, interview, 1992-07-02/1992-07-07

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Jesse Brewer, interview, 1992-07-02/1992-07-07

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Content RE:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work Product
Attorney-Client communication
July 2, 1992
Richard J. Stone
General Counsel and Staff Director
Elizabeth D. Lear
Deputy General Counsel
Gerald L. Chal~ff
Deputy General. Counsel
Kevin M. Bacon
Consultant
Lisa Rulien Kennedy
Counsel ·
Summary of Interview of Jesse A. Brewer,
Vice President, Board of Police Commissioners,
City of Los Angeles
On July 1, 1992, from approximately 1:30 p.m. until
4:15 p.m., Elizabeth Lear, Gerald Chaleff, Kevin Bacon, and Lisa
Kennedy interviewed Jesse A. Brewer, Vice President of the Board
of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. The
following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting,
including our questions and comments, together with our mental
impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
City Budget Process
Commissioner Brewer said that the budget process itself
starts in the Mayor's office. The Mayor's office issues the
budget message for the upcoming year. For example, Brewer said,
the budget message may be that a five, ten or fifteen percent
reduction in funds requested should be included in the budget
package for the upcoming year. In such a situation, Brewer said,
the LAPD will accommodate the budget message by stating what the
reduction will mean in terms of closing police stations, or
laying off personnel. Brewer said that the budget process for
fiscal year 1993-94 started in April 1992.
Brewer told us that the City Council and the Mayor's
office "micro-manage" the budget. According to Brewer, this
makes it difficult to obtain funds to buy new equipment as it is
needed. The budget is reviewed line by line, first by the City
Administrative Officer (CAO) in the Mayor's office, then by the
Mayor, followed by the Finance Committee of the City Council.
TO:
FROM:
RE:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
Attorney-Client communication
July 2, 1992
Richard J. Stone
General Counsel and Staff Director
Elizabeth D. Lear
Deputy General Counsel
Gerald L. Chal~ff
Deputy Generai
1
'9ouns~l
Kevin M. Bacon
Consultant
Lisa Rulien Kennedy
Counsel
Summary of Interview of Jesse A. Brewer,
Vice President, Board of Police Commissioners,
City of Los Angeles
On July 1, 1992, from approximately 1:30 p.m. until
4:15 p.m., Elizabeth Lear, Gerald Chaleff, Kevin Bacon, and Lisa
Kennedy interviewed Jesse A. Brewer, Vice President of the Board
of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. The
following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting,
including our questions and comments, together with our mental
impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
City Budget Process
Commissioner Brewer said that the budget process itself
starts in the Mayor's office. The Mayor's office issues the
budget message for the upcoming year. For example, Brewer said,
the budget message may be that a five, ten or fifteen percent
reduction in funds requested should be included in the budget
package for the upcoming year. In such a situation, Brewer said,
the LAPD will accommodate the budget message by stating what the
reduction will mean in terms of closing police stations, or
laying off personnel. Brewer said that the budget process for
fiscal year 1993-94 started in April 1992.
Brewer told us that the City Council and the Mayor's
office "micro-manage" the budget. According to Brewer, this
makes it difficult to obtain funds to buy new equipment as it is
needed. The budget is reviewed line by line, first by the City
Administrative Officer (CAO) in the Mayor's office, then by the
Mayor, followed by the Finance Committee of the City Council.
The budget is then debated in the full City Council, along with
the budget for the entire City. The budget then is sent to the
Mayor for approval or veto. The LAPD has limited ability to move
money from one budget category to another. If the amount is over
$10,000, the Department must go back to the City Council for
approval.
According to Commissioner Brewer, the City Council and
the Mayor decide what the LAPD may purchase. Requests are sent
up, but sometimes the response is that the City Council or the
Mayor would prefer more helicopters, instead. When that happens,
Brewer said, the result is that the request for more radios, for
example, is turned down. Brewer told us that the City Council
and the Mayor are prioritizing the needs of the LAPD on the basis
of their own priorities, and not on the basis of the LAPD'S
needs.
The budget is sent to the CAO's office first, they
review the budget and eliminate certain items. If the LAPD
disagrees, it can appeal the changes to Keith Comrie, the CAO,
and then to the Mayor. If the LAPD wishes to appeal the decision
it may obtain a short hearing. The budget then goes to the
Finance Committee of the City Council, headed by City Council
Member Zev Yaroslavsky. The LAPD makes a presentation and the
Committee can make cuts, too, Brewer said; sometimes in order to
add the money to other City departments' budgets. The LAPD may
appeal the budget cuts to the full City Council.
City Department Managers personally present their
budgets to the City Council. Brewer said that it is possible
that the relationship between Chief Gates and the Mayor hurt the
LAPD in the budget process because Gates would not make the LAPD
presentation to the City Council. Instead, Chief Gates would
send Brewer and Al Beuerlein to make the presentation; before
Beuerlein worked in the Department, the Chief would send Brewer
and Steve Wong.
The City departments present their budgets to the City
Council in alphabetical order in presentations which usually take
from 30 minutes to one hour. According to Brewer, the City
Council always responds to its constituents. For example, Brewer
said, City Council Member Nate Holden always wants to add foot
beats, and this results in cuts that may be internal or external
to the LAPD.
The only "back-room" talk that takes place between the
LAPD and the Mayor's Office or City Council is between Beuerlein
and the CAO. Occasionally, a City Council Member will call
concerning specific issues; for example, Zev Yaroslavsky might
call and ask that a certain figure be increased in the budget.
2
LAPD Budget Process
According to Commissioner Brewer, there are two levels
to the LAPD budget process: (1) the current budget, including an
inflation factor; and (2) "service betterment," including
requests for additional officers and equipment. The "service
betterment" level is constrained by the budget message. Brewer
told us that the LAPD budget is self-censoring, to the LAPD's
detriment. However, Brewer said, the LAPD traditionally asks for
more than the budget message will allow, telling the Mayor what
money is needed to provide "adequate service."
Brewer said that this year, the LAPD received the
Mayor's budget package on April 20, 1992. On May 4, 1992, he
said, the Assistant Chiefs met to decide what recommended
priorities to send to the Chief. In terms of recommending
priorities, Brewer said, they look at the level of funding that
was obtained for the current year, and then ask for more. Brewer
went on to say that the City has not really paid attention in the
past to comparative data from other police departments.
Commissioner Brewer told us that, within the LAPD, the
budget process starts with the preparation of a budget package.
A request for a certain number of police officers must include
the budget for the logistical support required for each officer.
For example, Commissioner Brewer said, the logistical support for
a Deputy Chief includes an adjutant, a secretary, an aid
(Sergeant II), a vehicle, an office, and a desk. Brewer said
that a request for 100 uniformed officers includes a certain
number of vehicles; there should be one vehicle for every five
officers. The costs associated with pensions must also be
included in the budget anytime an increase in manpower is
involved.
Before Commissioner Brewer began his tenure as
Assistant Chief in 1987, the method had been for the individual
divisions to send up information on their individual needs. Now,
Brewer said, the current system is to use "Management By
Objectives" ("MBO"), with the objectives being provided from the
top down, and not from the bottom up. The Assistant Chiefs
determine the objectives based on problems experienced during the
prior year, the current budget message, and perceived gaps in
personnel and equipment.
LAPD Resources
Personnel
Adding Sworn Personnel
According to Brewer, from 1987 to 1990 there was a
contest between the Mayor's office and the City Council to see
3
who could give the LAPD the most police officers. The LAPD
increased from 7,100 sworn officers to 8,400 sworn officers in
two and one half years, mostly due to the increase in the gang
problems in Los Angeles. However, Brewer said, the LAPD is
constrained by various factors with regard to how many officers
the Department can train in a given year. Recently, the
Department has stretched itself to the limit with large Academy
classes and quick deployment into the field. Brewer said the
Department has had difficulty in finding enough officers
qualified to train the recruits.
Deployment of Sworn Personnel
According to Commissioner Brewer, the constraint of
working conditions is the single biggest detriment to the
management of personnel, and changes in personnel. If the Chief
of Police wants to adjust sworn staffing, he must check with
Employee Relations Supervisor Cobble to see if the union will
approve. This constraint, according to Brewer, affects the
Department's ability to respond quickly.
Commissioner Brewer said that the Union fought a change
in personnel when the department put detectives back in uniform,
due to an increase in gang problems; the Union sought a TRO, and
the court found for the LAPD due to exigent circumstances.
Currently, Brewer said, the Union is lobbying in Sacramento in
support of Assembly Bill 206. This bill would give the Union
greater power to restrain disciplinary proceedings and to curtail
the power of management to investigate cases of misconduct.
Brewer believes that the union president and the Chief
of Police must work together because the LAPD needs the support
of the union. The Union is very strong in L.A., Brewer said, and
helps to finance City council campaigns.
Commissioner Brewer also said that the Department has
too many sworn officers in support positions that could be
staffed by civilians, but for the budget constraints. Brewer
said that the City Council does not want to add money to the
budget to increase the number of civilians in the support staff
because there would not be a similar increase in the number of
sworn officers.
Brewer said that, at one time, there was a plan to
civilianize certain assignments, such as replacing sworn officers
with civilians in ballistics. According to Brewer, however, this
plan was self-censored by the Department because the Department
felt that it would not be able to obtain the required approval.
Brewer said that the initial decision was to move more uniformed
officers into uniform duties, and have the civilians handle the
more technical work; civilians are more stable, and do not move
around as much, Brewer said.
4
Brewer also told us that there are a large number of
uniformed officers on restricted duty (e.g., workers compensation
or disability). These restrictions affect the jobs to which the
officers can be assigned. The Department, however, is carrying
these officers, and it is a very costly burden. Brewer said that
the City Council needs to look into this. If a person has that
kind of restriction they should be retired, Brewer said, like the
LAFD and CHP retire those who are not able bodied. Brewer said
that this approach represents a difference in philosophy.
Equipment
Al Beuerlein is the civilian Deputy Chief in charge of
the Fiscal Support Bureau. He knows the state of the equipment,
the numbers available for use, what needs to be replaced, and
what needs to be upgraded. Reports are sent to him from the
field. Commissioner Brewer told us that all of the Department's
equipment is used longer than it should be, and this increases
the demands put on the repair personnel in terms of their
workload.
The Support Services Bureau is responsible for
communications, radios, and other electronic equipment. Fiscal
Support Services decides what is needed and how much, it
interacts with Support Services to sign off on the design, and
then General Services becomes involved. Fiscal Support and
Support Services are part of the Office of Administrative
Services. Commander Jones is Acting Director of the Office of
Administrative Services.
Radios
Brewer said that the LAPD has the authority to purchase
$8 million in radios from Motorola. The radios are approximately
18 months away from completion, and are in the design stage in a
process that started three or four years ago. The new radios
ordered for the LAPD are state-of-the-art radios designed
specifically for the LAPD. Brewer told us, however, the lead
time and design process are not factored into the budget process.
The current communications system was purchased in 1981 using the
proceeds from a $41 million bond issue, and has a four to five
year life span. By the time of purchase, these radios were
already obsolete in design. According to Brewer, the Emergency
Command Control Communications (ECCCS) System is also about to go
"belly-up."
Factors That Affect LAPD Resources
According to Commissioner Brewer, politics affects the
LAPD budget process. Brewer said that it is always politically
profitable for politicians to increase the number of uniformed
officers, but not clerk typists, dispatchers, or ballistic
5
y I
experts. This has resulted in a marked imbalance in the LAPD'S
infrastructure. As a result, Brewer said, sometimes the LAPD may
have to pull an officer in a black & white from the field to run
the jail when someone is sick.
According to Brewer, the internal philosophy of the
LAPD also affects the budget process. The Department philosophy
is to answer fewer calls, but make more arrests. As a result of
complaints that the South Bureau was not receiving adequate
police service, a budget controversy arose, which included
charges of discrimination. This resulted in a $250,000
deployment study commissioned by the City Council. On the basis
of devoting 40% of patrol time to proactive patrol (a figure the
LAPD has never met), the study concluded a seven minute response
time is possible for Code 2 or higher emergency telephone calls.
The City Council mandated that the Department meet the seven
minute response time; the LAPD has done so.
Of the approximately 8,000 sworn officers in the LAPD,
only 4,000 are uniformed officers. According to Brewer, this is
due to the fact that Chief Gates favored many special task
forces, such as K-9, Mounted Patrol, and DARE. When there was no
specific authorization for these special task forces, Brewer
said, Chief Gates would take the money from the black & whites in
order to finance these special task forces. As a result, Brewer
told us, Chief Gates was not really following the City Council's
approved budget. According to Brewer, when some task force was
of particular interest to the Chief, he would personally lobby
the City Council.
Brewer also told us that the uniformed officers have
low morale. They feel they are bearing the brunt of the work
load, yet the LAPD has a greater ratio of detectives to uniformed
officers, and a greater ratio of plain cars to black & whites, ·
than do other police departments. However, Brewer said, the
Chief would have a problem if he attempted to move personnel off
the task forces and back into black & whites because the union
would view this as a change in working conditions.
sources of Funding
Asset forfeiture is included in the LAPD's budget as
income and is limited to LAPD use only. When the income stream
from asset forfeiture falls short of the budget, Brewer said, the
Department suffers. The LAPD also receives grants from the
Department of Justice and the OCJP. These are all considered a
part of the budget, and reduce the amount that the city Council
is willing to give to the LAPD. The only outside money received
from the state and federal government is for such expenditures as
blood alcohol testing, but these amounts are also included in the
LAPD budget.
6
• ) .
LAPD Resources in Other City Departments• Budgets
The amount budgeted for the LAPD last year was $530
million. The actual figure, Brewer said, is closer to $1 billion
because items such as helicopters are included in the
Transportation Department's budget, helicopter repairs are
included in the General Services Department's budget, and
computers are included in the Computer Services Department's
budget. Thus, part of the actual money used by the LAPD is
tucked into budgets for other City departments. The City owns
the radios and electronic systems. General Services runs the
microwave transmitter and is responsible for repairing the LAPD'S
radios. Other City departments have been cut back so far, Brewer
said, that the LAPD is experiencing difficulties in getting
repairs. According to Brewer, however, it would take a complete
reorganization of the city to change this situation.
If 77th Street Division requires a radio or microwave
transmitter, Brewer said, 77th must call General Services. If
General Services refuses the request, it gets kicked up the
ladder on both sides. During the riots, it took two days to wire
telephones to the Command Post, Brewer said, although they did
get some cellular phones in the meantime. Brewer said that the
LAPD does not have time for delays like this. In theory, Brewer
said, the emergency organization for the city is: (1) the Mayor;
and (2) the Chief of Police. In theory, the Chief could call
General Services and order the transmitter, but in reality,
Brewer said, it does not work in that fashion.
Budgeting for Emergencies
Commissioner Brewer has never heard the subject of
major disasters, such as earthquakes or dam breaks, being
discussed during the budget process. Brewer does recall,
however, the topic of special equipment, such as non-lethal riot
control equipment (rubber bullets), being discussed.
Even if the decision had been made to arrest the
rioters all at once, Brewer said, the LAPD could not have done
so. According to Brewer, the Department lacks buses and field
jail equipment. Brewer said that this was Vernon's
responsibility; Ben Lewis, of the Uniform Services Group, shares
this responsibility.
7
TO:
FROM:
RE:
June 7, 1992
G 95404-00002
Richard J. Stone, General Counsel
John H. Brinsley and James P. Clark,
Deputy General Counsel
Abstract of Interview of Jesse Brewer
Jesse Brewer attributes the extent of the post
verdict civil disturbance, both in geographic and human
terms, to the inadequate response by the LAPD during the
initial hours. The primary reasons for such an inadequate
response, he believes, are (1) failure to anticipate, plan
and train for wide-spread public reaction to a not-guilty
verdict, (2) failure to exercise appropriate oversight
functions within the LAPD command structure, and (3) the
antagonistic and arrogant attitude established by Chief
Gates which now permeates the Department.
In addition to the obvious recommendation that
Chief Gates be replaced, Brewer recommended:
• The Commission take a more activist role in exercising
its oversight function and encouraging community-based
policing.
• The Commission strongly support incoming Chief
Williams' anticipated efforts to re-shape LAPD.
• LAPD update long-range and tactical planning.
• LAPD redeploy resources to put more black and white
units on the street and to reduce "plain clothes" and
specialized units and desk jobs.
• LAPD centralize in-service training to insure
consistency and give adequate credit for training time
to all personnel, including commanding officers.
• The City increase funding for hiring more officers,
purchasing new equipment and modernizing existing
equipment, especially communication equipment.
LL921620.207
Privileged and confidential
Attorney Work Product
1
TO:
FROM:
RE:
Richard J. Stone, General Counsel
June 7, 1992
G 95404-00002
John H. Brinsley, Deputy General Counsel
James P. Clark, Deputy General Counsel
Interview of Jesse A. Brewer
On June 4, 1992, beginning at 3:30 p.m. at the
offices of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 333 South Grand Avenue,
Los Angeles, California, John Brinsley, Gerald Chaleff,
James Clark, Cornell Price and Laurel Ballard Bryan
interviewed Jesse A. Brewer, Vice President of the Board of
Police Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles and
(retired) Assistant Chief of the Los Angeles Police
Department. The following is a summary of our recollections
of this meeting, including our questions and comments,
together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions, based upon the meeting.
Background
1952 Chief Brewer joined the L.A.P.D. after serving
four and one-half years with the Chicago Police
Department. At that time, L.A.P.D. was quite
segregated and racist. There were only a few black
officers in the department and none in supervisory
positions above Watch Commander.
1973 Promoted by Daryl Gates to Captain 2 and assigned
to the Van Nuys Area, where he served for 15 months
before reassignment to Metro Division.
1974 Transferred to Metro Division as Commanding
Officer shortly after the Symbionese Liberation
Organization incident, during which the Metro Division
had been in charge of the police response. Brewer was
responsible for high-level training and preparedness,
including SWAT and high-risk/rescue operations.
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
1
1977 Promoted to Captain 3 and assigned to Training
Division.
1978 Promoted to Commander.
1979 Promoted to Commander of Uniform Services
Division, where his responsibilities included
conducting and evaluating surprise command post
exercises.
[ ] Promoted to Deputy Chief in charge of the South
Bureau
1987 Promoted to Assistant Chief, Administrative
Services, where he served until retirement.
3/1/91 Brewer retired (2 days before King beating).
Response to King Beating
Chief Brewer said that he was surprised by the
beating; he did not think any officers on the force could be
that brutal. He did mention, however, that the officers'
general treatment of blacks was less than professional and
more aggressive than necessary in most instances. He had
complained to Gates several time about officers'
mistreatment of his friends and relatives -- traffic stops
for no apparent reason and without any explanation,
routinely requiring black detainees to assume a prone
position, etc.
Chief Brewer worked closely with the Christopher
Commission, as a consultant. Following the issuance of the
Commission report on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
vacancies on the Board of Police Commissioners, Mayor
Bradley asked Chief Brewer to serve out the unexpired term
of Commissioner Sam Williams. After initially declining,
Chief Brewer accepted the appointment.
Relationship of LAPD to Police commission
Throughout his last few years on the force, Chief
Brewer served as acting Chief at times and worked closely
with the members of the Commission. He indicated the
Commission's role has varied through the years, from
essentially "rubber-stamping" the actions and policies of
the Chief, to a more activist position in the operations of
Department.
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
2
Brewer generally described the current
relationship between Gates and the Commission as very
antagonistic. Prior to the issuance of the Christopher
Commission Report and prior to Brewer joining the Police
Commission, Gates ran the Department essentially unfettered
by the Police Commission.
In response to the Commission's attempts to assume
a more activist role, Gates has ignored the Commission and
has created a very contentious relationship. "The problem
is," Brewer said, "they're afraid if they take (Gates] on,
he won't leave." Brewer also stated that "elected
officials" (he did not say which ones) had instructed the
Commission not to "take on" Gates.
For the immediate future, Brewer believes, the
Commission must continue to take a more activist role and
must be vocal in its strong support of incoming Chief
Williams. A major transformation of the Department is
required, which Chief Williams will need the assistance of
the Commission to accomplish.
Commission oversight of LAPD
Following issuance of the Christopher Commission
Report and the appointment of Brewer, the Commission has
attempted to be more vigorous in the exercise of its
oversight function. Chief Gates has resisted these efforts.
Consequently, the Commissioners have found themselves
engaged in a constant struggle with Gates, who is used to
doing as he pleases.
The Commissioners are isolated from the
Department. They receive information only if they
specifically request it, and sometimes not even then. The
Commissioners often learn about events or other information
concerning the Department from the media. The Commission
also lacks staff.
The Commission currently has no authority to
interfere in the personnel of the department. The
Commission's participation in personnel matters is limited
to a single representative on the oral boards for the
promotion of high-ranking officers. Under Proposition F,
the Commission soon will have a certain amount of
disciplinary authority for the first time, as part of the
grievance process.
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
3
LAPD Management
According to Brewer, Gates lost interest in
running the Department after the 1984 Olympics. Gates had
enjoyed the limelight during the Olympics and often said he
would retire when the Games were over. Brewer thinks he did
retire, in a sense. Gates became increasingly more
interested in political activities, leaving the deputies to
run the Department without regular staff meetings or any
real direction. Gates relied on Vernon completely, which
Brewer thought was Gates' "biggest mistake."
Vernon was the Director of Operations, the branch
responsible for developing techniques and tools,
representing approximately 85% of the force. Vernon was
extremely religious and allowed his religious beliefs to
interfere with his duties as a police officer and as
Assistant Chief. Officers who professed similar religious
views were rewarded with promotions and choice assignments.
Vernon developed an in-group that sympathized, as he did,
with Operation Rescue and gave its membersadvance warning of
police activities in that regard (although Vernon carefully
planned the Department's response to Operation Rescue).
Brewer feels that Gates has an arrogant attitude
that has now permeated the Department. Gates has set the
tone, making it clear that officers who steal or deal in
narcotics or violate Department rules or policies will be
dealt with severely, but being relatively lenient with ·
officers who simply mistreated minorities. Brewer clearly
believes that Gates is the problem; Gates, he said, has
made the public the enemy and has fostered an atmosphere of
fear and paranoia on the part of the officers.
Brewer also expressed concern over the lack of
stability in the Department. Gates has promoted officers
across division lines, contrary to the normal procedure
which is to promote from within a particular command
structure. In one instance, the Commission instructed Gates
not to transfer certain people, but Gates ignored the
Commission. The Commission then appealed to the City
Council to override Gates' action (pursuant to Proposition
5), but failed to obtain the necessary signatures. Brewer
mentioned that Zev Yaroslavsky, Hal Bernsen and Joan Milkey
Flores did not sign the measure.
Another factor contributing to the lack of
stability is that officers no longer need to serve in a
particular position very long before being promoted. The
stated reason for this promotion "fast track" is to
accomplish affirmative action for Hispanic officers in the
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
4
Department. The result, however, is incompetence in command
positions. Brewer pointed to Deputy Chief Ron Frankle as a
case on point.
Anticipation of the verdict
In the weeks before the verdict, the Commission
asked Gates several times for a plan in anticipation of
public reaction to the verdicts. Gates' response in each
case was that he had contingency plans in place. As late as
April 27, Brewer again asked Gates if he was prepared to
handle any adverse response that might occur, to which Gates
responded there was no problem, he was "absolutely all set."
Brewer was also told that in staff meetings (those
Gates had not cancelled, as he routinely did), Deputy Chief
Matthew Hunt had asked about organizing the Department in
case rioting broke out in the wake of the verdicts. Gates
never directly answered the question. Gates responded that
Hunt was a worrier and waved aside the possibility that
something could occur.
Intelligence
The Department had no intelligence about this
disturbance or the May 1 demonstration by the Revolutionary
Communist Party. Daryl Gates' brother, Steve Gates, is in
charge of intelligence activities. Brewer believes the
Department received no advance warning from Steve Gates or
his operations of the nature or extent of public reaction to
the verdicts.
In general, Brewer described intelligence for the
Department as "terrible." Aside from issues of Steve Gates'
competence as head of this area, additional problems exist
because of the Department's poor relationship with the
community. Due to the enmity that exists, the public
generally does not offer information to the Department and
when it does, the Department does not listen. Community
based policing would help aleviate this problem
significantly.
Planning
Chief Brewer was aware that the Department had
various boiler-plate plans, and plans for specific
situations such as that for Operation rescue or Earthquake
preparedness. The problem with adapting such plans to the
post-verdict situation on April 29, however, is that those
plans all anticipated only an isolated problem area, not the
wide-spread violence that occurred throughout the city.
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
5
None of the plans in place at that time would have been
effective in this situation.
In 1975, when Brewer was in charge of training and
preparedness as the Commanding Officer of Uniform Divisions,
he developed a tactical manual for use in any unusual
occurrence (known as the "Red Book"). Commander Lewis, who
now holds the position, reported to Brewer that the manual
has not been updated since the late 70
1
s. The manual is
based on old information, going back to the Watts riots in
the 60's. The extent, both in geographic and human terms,
of the violence and fires which occurred during the recent
civil disturbance is new and no plans exist to respond to
this.
According to Brewer, Gates "hates" long-range
planning. Gates attributes his inability to do long-range
planning on the city's annual budget: how can he plan five
or ten years ahead when the city only gives him annual
funding commitments? Having unsuccessfully tried it in the
past, Gates now will not encourage or support individuals
(Brewer) or divisions that do try to anticipate long-range
planning needs.
Earlier, after the Harlin/Du sentencing, the
Department was not in an alert status. No resulting trouble
was expected and Brewer was not aware of any alert or other
state of heightened preparedness. Following this sentencing
decision, Metro Bureau conducted some training exercises
(see documents), but Brewer does not know of any Department
wide training exercises or preparedness audits.
Adequacy of Police Response
Brewer clearly feels that the LAPD response to the
civil unrest was inadequate. While Brewer blames Gates for
overall lack of leadership, he blames Deputy Chief Frankle
for the situation getting out of hand during the first few
hours. Much of the violence and looting could have been
prevented if LAPD had taken control earlier.
Reasons for Inadequacies
The fact that Chief Gates left Parker Center to
attend a political function certainly ranks high in Brewer's
list of reasons for the inadequacy of LAPD's response.
Commissioner Stanley Sheinbaum, whom Brewer described as a
"novice to police work," saw Gates leaving and asked where
he was going. Brewer thinks that perhaps Sheinbaum erred in
accepting Gates' reassurance that the situation was under
control and in relying on Gates' reputation as a tactician
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
6
in assuming Gates would, in fact, be able to control the
situation.
Instead of allowing the officers who were
completing their shifts to go off duty, Gates should have
kept the officers from the day watch on duty. Gates should
have told Frankle to make sure enough officers were
available when the verdicts were announced.
Deputy Chief Ron Frankle's incompetence is another
reason cited by Brewer for the fact that there was no
leadership and no communication during the first few hours
of the incident. Brewer also points to the inexperience of
commanding officers such as Willie Parnell and Captain
Jefferson (Foothill) as another reason the situation was
allowed to escalate beyond control.
The on-site commander(s) should have declared a
tactical alert for the particular locations that were
experiencing the worst problems. Apparently this was not
done for some time, and was ultimately called for by Godwin
in Communications.
Brewer did not think Mutual Aid was utilized in
this situation, as it should have been. Los Angeles County
Sheriff Sherman Block is the one designated to be the Mutual
Aid liaison for this area. Gates should have called upon
other local agencies for assistance.
Approximately 175 San Diego Police officers came
to L.A. to offer assistance, but were sent back by Gates.
Brewer does not know if LAPD reserve officers were called up
or if assistance from any other agencies was requested.
Gates would have to make such a request.
Recommendations for Improvement
Planning:
Long-range and tactical planning need to be
revised to anticipate the kind of city-wide disturbance
experienced as a result of the verdicts. None of the plans
adopted thus far (including the earthquake, Operation Rescue
or general contingency plans) address the kind of wide
spread fires, looting and violence that recently occurred.
The process by which the planning and research
units review and update the various manuals should itself be
reviewed. The current process is very bureaucratic and
cumbersome, with some projects now more than ten years old.
Privileged and Confidential
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7
Organization:
The Department needs to be reorganized "from the
top down." Department resource allocation should be
reviewed with an eye toward redeployment. The Department
must re-examine its priorities and assign more officers to
the streets, answering calls and establishing a visible
presence in the community. Fewer officer should be assigned
to "plain clothes" and desk jobs. The narcotics, anti
terrorist and intelligence units should be reorganized to
come under the purview of the field commanders and should be
reduced in size.
Resources:
The Department needs more officers and more
equipment. The city must make the necessary funds available
to purchase more equipment and to modernize existing
equipment, particularly vehicles and communications
equipment. More of the Department vehicles should be black
and white units and fewer should be plain units which the
officers take home with them during off-hours. Brewer
believes the City needs at least 2,000 additional sworn
officers.
Training:
As the Christopher Commission reported, the mentor
approach currently in effect in the Department is not
working. The officers chosen to conduct such training are
selected based upon their "productivity," i.e., aggressive
arrest records. These officers often are not well trained
themselves and only perpetuate hostile attitudes and
techniques that inhibit good relationships between the
community and the police.
In addition, roll-call and other in-service
training is not handled consistently throughout the
Department due, in part, to the fact that commanding
officers are evaluated on the average time it takes officers
on their watch to respond to calls. The more units that are
taken out of service for training, fewer are available to
respond and thus average response times will increase. The
current system therefore has a built-in disincentive to
allow for training time.
In the future, in-service training should be
organized on a Department-wide basis by a separate,
centralized unit in order to assure consistency. Adequate
staffing must be allocated to support this function. Credit
Privileged and Confidential
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8
must be given to the officers and their commanders for
training provided.
Complaints:
The process by which complaints against officers
are received, reported and addressed by the Department
should be restructured, possibly to be handled by a separate
unit such as internal affairs. Currently, complaints are
received by the sergeants who supervise the officers
involved. When written reports of such complaints are
prepared by the sergeants, they are generally slanted in
favor of the officers. Such complaints are often ignored or
otherwise not taken seriously.
Use of Interviewee at any community Meetings
We recommend Chief Brewer as potential interviewee
for a Community Meeting. He has a broad base of knowledge
and experience, both from his tenure within the command
structure of LAPD and now as a member of the Board of Police
Commissioners. He would make a very good witness: he is
intelligent and articulate, and clearly conveys a deep sense
of integrity and concern for the community, on the one hand,
and the future of the Department, on the other. We think he
would provide a balanced perspective that few other
individuals can offer; he appears to sympathize equally with
the community, particularly the black community, and with
the police.
LBB/lbb
LL921590.020
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
9

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Description

This file contains two interviews of Jesse A. Brewer, Vice President of the Board of Police Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles, 1992 April- July.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Jesse Brewer, interview, 1992-07-02/1992-07-07

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 18 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-31230

Unique identifier UC11447813

Identifier box 19 (box),web-box19-027-01.pdf (filename),folder 27 (folder),webster-c100-31230 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box19-027/web-box19-027-01.pdf

Dmrecord 31230

Format 18 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts