Toronto, Los Angeles police department, 1991-01-17

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Content LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT
SUMMARY
Sgt.Dina Kalns
Corporate Planning
1991 January 17
2
The following is a brief summary of the report submitted by Members of the
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (Christopher Commission
Report), in response to the videotaped beating of Rodney KING by officers of the LAPD. The
original report is rather lengthy and it is hoped this condensed version will save some reading
time.
The Commission addressed several areas of concern which were brought to light
in wake of this incident, namely:
1. The apparent failure of the LAPD to control or discipline officers with repeated complaints
of excessive force.
2. Concerns about the LAPD's "culture" and officers' attitudes toward racial and other
minorities.
3. The difficulties the public encounters in attempting to make complaints against LAPD
officers.
4. The role of the LAPD leadership and civilian oversight authorities in addressing or
contributing to these problems.
5. The accuracy with which arrest and use of force records are completed.
6. The inability to screen out applicants to the LAPD with psychological profiles indicating a
propensity for violence.
7. The possibility of "street justice" being meted out by LAPD officers after a pursuit or chase.
8. The disparity between training received at the Police Academy and the way the LAPD
operates in the field.
The report addresses and makes recommendations covering almost all aspects
of police work, including:
* Analysis of the KING beating itself
* The City of Los Angeles and its police force
* The problems of excessive force in the LAPD
* How racism and bias affects the use of excessive force
* LAPD Culture, Community Relations and Community Policing
* Recruitment, Selection and Psychological Testing
* Training
* Promotion, Assignments and other Personnel Issues
* Complaints and Discipline
* Structural Issues surrounding the Police Commission and the Chief of Police
* Implementation of Recommended Changes
This document will provide a brief summary of the above sections, what the
Commission found and what changes were recommended, as well as how our Force may be
affected. For those interested in a more comprehensive analysis, the original document should
be referred to.
- - - - -------------- ------------- - - -
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THE RODNEY KING BEATING
On March 3, 1991, in the early morning hours, Rodney KING (a black 25 year
old American) was beaten by 3 uniformed officers of the Los Angeles Police Department while
a sergeant and a large group of LAPD, California Highway Patrol and L.A. Unified School
District officers stood by. The beating was captured on videotape by an amateur photographer
and within days was shown on TV stations across the country, causing considerable public
outcry. An analysis of the tape showed the officers clubbing KING with 56 baton strokes and
kicking him in the head and body.
The background to this incident is that at 12:40 AM of that day, KING was the
driver of a vehicle which was involved in a pursuit. At 12:50 AM, (10 minutes later), an LAPD
unit radioed that the chase had concluded, and one minute later that additional assistance was
not needed at the scene.
In total, 11 additional LAPD units (including one helicopter) with 21 officers
arrived, 12 of whom arrived after the call indicating "no more units". Many had no explanation
as to why they were there, including 5 who were at the station doing paperwork when they
heard the pursuit come over the air. They took 2 separate cars, joined the pursuit and
continued on to the scene after the "no more units" broadcast.
There were three people in the auto, two of whom got out when ordered. KING
delayed getting out (the passenger says he had to unbuckle his seatbelt) and officers at the
scene stated they felt threatened by him. (K_ ING stands 6'-3" and weighs 225 pounds).
KING was ordered to lie flat on the ground (a standard LAPD procedure), and
although he got down on all fours, he refused to lie down. One officer tried to force him down
and klNG rose up. He was then hit twice with the Taser electric stun gun, and there is
conflicting testimony as to the reaction. (i.e. No effect vs. shaking and yelling for five seconds).
Videotape shows the Taser wires coming from KING's body and as KING moves forward he
is subjected to the beating, even while fallen to the ground. Following 56 baton strokes and
6 kicks, 5/6 officers swarm KING, handcuff him and drag him to the side of the road to await
arrival of the rescue ambulance.
Hospital records show KING received 20 stitches, a broken cheekbone and a
broken right ankle. At the time of his arrest his blood alcohol level was over .08%, had traces
of marijuana, but no PCP or other illegal drug. He was booked for evading arrest, held four
days and released after prosecutors determined there was insufficient evidence to prosecute
him.
Officers' reports surrounding the incident are not consistent with the HOLLIDAY
videotape, with respect to the level of force used and the type of resistance KING supposedly
put up. Injuries according to police records were "abrasions and contusions, with facial cuts
of a minor nature due to contact with asphalt".
Both the videotape cameraman HOLLIDAY and KING's brother attempted to
report the incident to the police. They were interviewed but no report was taken. HOLLIDAY
then arranged to have a TV station air the tape.
Of the 23 LAPD officers at the scene, they came from a wide variety of ages
and backgrounds. The ages ranged from 23 to 48 years, and experience varied from 1 o days
to 29 years since graduation from the Police Academy. One was a black male, one a black
female, 4 Latino males, 2 white females and 15 white males. Four of the 10 LAPD bystanders
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were field training officers responsible for supervising probationary officers in their first year.
Fallout fro111 this incident sees 4 of the officers indicted on criminal charges, 1
has been fired and 3 face administrative hearings where the Department is seeking their
dismissal. The District Attorney did not seek indictments against the 17 officers who were at
the scene and did not attempt to stop the assault, or report it to their superiors.
LOS ANGELES AND ITS POLICE FORCE
The LAPD has a reputation as a hard-working, car-based, mobile force which
is tough on criminals. They pioneered the use of SWAT teams, helicopters and the motorized
battering ram.
Crimes reported per person in L.A. are twice the national average. Compared
to 5 of the 6 largest US cities, members of the LAPD killed or wounded the greatest number
of civilians, adjusted to the size of the police force.
L.A. is the second largest city in the nation with over 3.4 million people living
within 465 square miles.
The LAPD currently has 8,450 sworn police officers and 2,000 civilian
personnel. It is headed by 1 Chief of Police, 2 Assistant Chiefs, 5 Deputy Chiefs and 17
Commanders.
It has a use of force policy as well as a Penal Code, both of which require that
the level of force used be reasonable. The use of force policy also requires that the force
used be necessary. The force guidelines explain that an officer may resort to force only where
s/he faces a credible threat. A suspect's verbal threats of violence by themselves do not justify
the use of physical force.
The LAPD also uses the "force continuum", going through the five levels of 1)
verbalization, 2) firm grip, 3) compliance holds, 4) intermediate force, (including the baton,
kicks, swarm, chemical spray, saps and Taser) and 5) deadly force, including the modified
carotid hold (chokehold) and firearms.
PROBLEMS OF EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE LAPD
The Christopher Commission found that the problem of excessive force in the
LAPD was fundamentally a problem of supervision, management and leadership. What was
very evident, was that there is a "problem group" of officers who use excessive force or
improper force, far more frequently than most other officers. This information was available
to the LAPD supervisors and management but no corrective steps were taken.
A Use of Force report must be filed each time an officer uses force that is
greater than "firm grip" compliance. It identifies all officers involved in the incident and is
usually written by a sergeant based on the information supplied by the officers involved. LAPD
data indicate that Use of Force reports are filed in about 1 % of arrests.
Officer involved shootings require a report submitted every time a firearm is
discharged, regardless of whether or not anyone was hit, or whether or not it was intentional.
5
When analyzing the LAPD data, the Commission found some interesting facts.
Of the 1 ,800 officers against whom a complaint of excessive force was made (from 1986 to
1990) 1,400 had one or two allegations. But 183 officers had 4 or more, 44 had 6 or more,
16 had 8 or more, and one officer had 16 allegations. Therefore, the top 10% of officers
ranked, accounted for 27 .5% of all such · complaints.
The Commission found that the LAPD did not have an overall analysis of the
officers with multiple complaint histories of excessive force, and many Command officers and
supervisors interviewed were not aware that the LAPD had a computer data base where they
could obtain a list of personnel complaints, Use of Force reports and shooting data for any
officers under their supervision.
The Commission looked into the past performance reports of the 44 officers who
had more than 4 excessive force allegations made against them. Generally, the performance
appraisals were all very positive and optimistic about the officer's progress and future on the
force. They did not contain any disciplinary history or record of sustained complaints. This is
due to the LAPD policy that in completing an evaluation, a supervisor may only comment on
personally observed activities as they relate to discipline etc., and cannot discuss the officers
complaint history.
MDT messages were also a concern. They can be monitored by a field
supervisor, but the Commission found that this was not routinely done. The MDT transmissions
are stored and can be reviewed and audited for improper messages, but this was not required
to be done. The Commission found some very disturbing messages on the MOT's, eg:
"Capture him, beat him and treat him like dirt."
"Did you arrest the 85 year old lady or just beat her up ..... We just slapped her around a
bit. .. she is getting medical treatment right now."
"Well don't seat belt him in and slam on the brakes a couple of times on the way to the
station". ·
Several messages indicated that officers were aware of the monitoring process,
but considering the types of messages being sent, they were not too concerned with reprisals.
Legal claims alleging excessive force represented the majority of all complaints
filed against the LAPD (except claims from traffic accidents). From 1986 to 1990 (a five year
period), the City paid more than 20 million dollars in judgements, settlements and jury verdicts
in over 300 lawsuits against the LAPD for excessive force. This does not include the cost of
defending these suits. In 42% of the cases, officers used force after the suspect was physically
subdued or in custody.
The Commission analyzed those cases where settlements were over $15,000.,
a totaJ of 83 cases. In these 83 cases, 61% of the officers received no discipline, 84%
received overall positive ratings in their personnel evaluations and 42% have been promoted
since the incident
RECOMMENDATIONS
Leadership
The leadership of the LAPD must give priority to curbing the use of excessive
force by addressing it through its policies and stated goals.
----------------------- ----
6
Command Accountability
Command officers must be held accountable for excessive or unreasonable force
used by officers whom they supervise. Command officers should be evaluated on the basis
of how officers under their supervision adhere to the Department's policies on the use of force.
Supervision, Monitoring and Counselling
Lieutenants and sergeants working with officers in the field must monitor the use
of force. Command officers must be provided with statistical information on these officers,
information which is already available. Training and counselling must be provided, and if this
is not effective, discipline must be imposed.
Videotaping
A small camera should be mounted in patrol vehicles which can be activated
either manually, or automatically with lights or siren. The camera uses a wide-angle lens which
rotates 360 degrees, and has a wireless remote microphone capable of picking up sound
within 1,000 feet of the patrol car. The tape cannot be erased or re-recorded. Installation in
patrol vehicles Department wide would cost roughly between $5 and $8 million. Cost of tapes
could run as high as $1 million per year.
Mid-Level Use of Force Options
Many officers feel there is a perceived gap in the mid level use of force options
- i.e. there are not enough options between talking and using the baton. They urge a re
classification of the chokehold to be considered a "mid-level" use of force and not "deadly"
force. They are also calling for Capstun, and the Commission recommends a thorough study
before any of these changes are implemented.
RACISM AND BIAS AFFECTING THE USE OF FORCE
The Commission feels the LAPD has made considerable progress in hiring
minorities and women. By June 1990, minority officers constituted 37.1% of sworn officers.
(13.4% Black, 21% Latino, 2.7% Asian) Women make up 12.6% of the Force.
Monitoring of MDT transmissions again found very inappropriate comments which
illustrated the racial bias within the department. Many of the remarks were made within the
context of beatings or pursuits, and covered the spectrum of racial and ethnic minorities in the
City, eg.;
"Well I'm back here in the projects pissing off the natives."
"Sounds like monkey slapping time."
"What's happening ... We're huntin wabbits ... Actually muslim wabbits."
"I almost got me a mexican last night but he dropped the damn gun too quick."
The racist comments exchanged clearly go against the Department's policy on
Unacceptable Remarks of. a Racial Nature, but the officers exchanging the messages obviously
had little worry about being disciplined. Supervisors made little effort to review messages and
many of the offensive comments were made from sergeants' field units.
L ~
7
The MDT messages also showed that minority officers are frequently subjected
to racial slurs and discriminatory treatment by fellow officers. Most minority officers are at the
entry level, while managerial pos_ itions are primarily held by whites, and the Committee sites
this as one of the reasons for the tolerance of racial language and behaviour. Minorities and
women are under-represented in the more coveted positions.
Attitudes toward women are also problematic. Female LAPD officers are involved
in excessive Use of Force reports at a much lower rate than males. No females were among
the 120 officers with the highesf number of complaints against them. While some training
officers were supportive of female officers, many were concerned that women were not as
capable, effective or trustworthy as their male counter-parts.
Attitudes toward the homosexual community were also examined and found to
be lacking. While the Department has a policy which prohibits discrimination based on sexual
orientation, as recently as 1988, homosexuals were actively weeded out of the applicant pool.
The new policy was introduced in May 1991 . Tension still exists, and again, the MOT's were
used to examine these attitudes. eg;
"Just finished writing 4 tickets to some poo butts."
"Did you check your fruits in the park - I hope you watered them down."
While there are a number of gays and lesbians on the Department, none was
openly gay at the time of the Commissions appointment. The Commission staff interviewed
more than 50 gay and lesbian officers and all stated they could not reveal their sexual
orientation without jeopardizing their careers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) The Chief seek tangible ways to establish the principle that racism, ethnic and gender bias
will not be tolerated. This cannot be done without active leadership from the top.
2) The LAPD must establish a program of cultural awareness training to eliminate stereotyping.
3) A new and separate position should be created at the Command Level - a "Community
Relations Officer", reporting to the Chief. S/he would be responsible for conducting cultural
awareness programs, establishing liaisons with minority groups, monitoring Use of Force
reports regarding minorities, and public complaints involving racial matters.
4) Recruitment efforts for Blacks, Latinos and Females be sustained.
5) Female and minority group officers must be given full and equal opportunity to assume
leadership positions in the LAPD.
CULTURE, COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND POLICING
As the Christopher Commission has emphasized, it believes that proper
supervision and management, including command accountability are important in order to
eliminate that identifiable group of officers who repeatedly engage in excessive use of force.
Analysis from all sources describes the LAPD as having a "professional"
organizational culture which emphasizes crime control over crime prevention and isolates the
police from the communities and people they serve.
8
While the LAPD outperforms other major US city police departments in the
number of violent crime arrests per sworn officer, they are at increased risk of creating a seige
"we/they" mentality, which alienates them from the communities and people they serve.
Many senior officers felt that the type of training officers received emphasizes
"command presence" and can lead to inappropriate confrontations of the street. Officer conduct
is considered by some within the department to be out of control in terms of rude and
disrespectful treatment of the public.
Several experts testified as to the positive merits of community based policing,
which had been tried on a small scale in one part of the city. Unfortunately, the scarcity of
resources caused the community based efforts to collide with demands for statistics and rapid
response, and community based approached were set aside. In Wilshire, where they made an
intensive effort to adapt to community based policing, the response time dropped to the worst
in the city, even though they managed to set up numerous committees and focus on the
concerns of resident community groups.
Although given these factors, the Commission still believes that the LAPD should
adopt the community based approach and implement it though-out the Department. One
stumbling block . is that LAPD officers are trained to "command and confront" not
"communicate", and this goes against the fundamental values of community based policing,
i.e. restraint and mutual respect.
Emphasis should be on patrol officers interacting positively with the public.
Creating the high ranking position of Community Relations Officer, as mentioned earlier, is
seen as a way to break down racial barriers and promote greater co-operation between the
police and local communities. Incentives should be created to encourage police officers to
develop innovative programs within their assigned communities. The Department should train
officers to employ tactics which emphasize containment and control, and not confrontation and
physical force.
The Commission does not address other departments who may already be
utilizing this format of policing, nor does it acknowledge the difficulties encountered with this
type of policing, i.e. scarcity of resources and cost.
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING
The Christopher Commission has determined that many psychological and
emotional problems develop during an officers tenure on the force, which cannot be detected
by pre-employment screening. Therefore, the principal recommendation is that officers should
be retested regularly for psychological, emotional and physical problems.
They feel that during the recruitment and selection process, the initial
psychological evaluation cannot predict an applicant's proclivity toward violence. The test used,
MMPl-2, can identify the obvious social misfits, but cannot test for the more subtle
abnormalities which make an individual not suited for police work.
The Commission also feels· that the LAPD pays too little attention to the violent
history of candidates. Background investigators focus their attention on an applicants' use of
drugs and sexual history and tend to pass over information about past violent tendencies and
inabilities to interact with others.
9
They also found that the background investigators are inadequately trained and
overworked. Most investigators interviewed stated they did not have enough time to contact
all references given by applicants. There is also no formalized system to train new background
investigators. While training (working with a veteran) can last several weeks, this is often
severely reduced when a great number of investigations are ongoing.
The Commission also found that disqualification standards are not uniformly
applied, with alot depending on the individual investigator.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) The focus of the initial evaluation should be on past behaviour as a prediction of future
behaviour.
2) Background investigators should receive better, formalized training.
3) There should be periodic, unannounced audits of background investigators and files, to
evaluate the level of attention paid to background standards and uniform application of those
standards.
4) Candidates should not be certified for hire until the background investigation is complete.
Officers have graduated and been on the street prior to background checks being concluded.
5) Officers should be periodically retested - every 3 years, to uncover both psychological and
physical problems.
6) Supervisors should emphasize detection of problems in an officers field work, and clarify
to officers they can seek . counselling or training, formally or informally for any issue.
TRAINING
While the Christopher Commission acknowledges that the quality of instruction
recruits receive is generally impressive, they feel each phase of training needs additional
emphasis on the use of verbal skills rather than physical force in controlling potentially violent
situations, and on the development of human relationship skills.
The Department has recently created a civilian . position of Police Training
Administrator, to provide continuity, academic expertise and teaching experience, and serve
as second in command at the Police Academy.
Current instruction consists of 960 hours (24 weeks) and covers topics such as
report writing, law, human relations, physical fitness, use of force, tactics, foreign language and
shooting.
In human relations and verbal skills training, no more than 90 minutes is
devoted to any one ethnic group, for a total of 8 hours (as opposed to San Francisco which
requires 40 hours of cultural awareness training). They are also concerned there is no
representation for the class on gay and lesbian issues.
10
The Department provides recruits with approximately 95 hours of basic Spanish
language instruction, but it is not mandatory to pass this course and it is therefore not taken
seriously. The Committee recommends increased incentives for officers to become fluent in
foreign languages relating to all segments of the LA population. They suggest substantial pay
incentives.
In terms of training personnel, because the Academy's Commanding Officer is
often promoted within a short period of time, there is a problem implementing changes and
this creates discontinuity. On the other hand, instructors stay for extended periods of time,
many with significant field experience. This encourages the "forget everything you learned at
the Academy" attitude. The Commission recommends limiting the length of time for an
instructor at the Academy.
Currently, 90-95% of each Academy class graduates. Ten years ago it was only
60%. A part of this is attributed to an unwillingness to terminate poorly performing recruits,
often for the simple reason of fear of civil liability or legal challenge. The Commission urges
that unqualified recruits not be retained for any reason, as this only threatens the well-being
of the public and the police.
With reference to field training, recruits spend 1 year as probationary officers
paired with FTO's (field training officers). The Commission randomly examined 4 divisions
to analyze the FTO's and found that large numbers of them perpetuate the "we/they" mentality.
They found flaws in how FTO's are selected and trained, and too many of them were passing
on hostile attitudes and disrespect towards the public.
Any officer who has one and one half years on the job can become a FTO after
passing a general written examination about department policies and procedures. They are not
evaluated on aptitude for training, or even patrol work. Those FTO applicants who have more
than 1 O years experience do not have to write the exam. The only training provided for them
is a 40 hour optional FTO course.
In these four divisions, the Commission found that 93 of the 227 FTO's were
selected after personnel complaints were sustained against them. Fourteen were promoted to
FTO after having been disciplined for excessive force. Of these 227 FTO's, 86 had not
attended the optional training. Most of the training on this course focused on the completion
of forms and contained no cultural awareness instruction.
No divisions are singled out as training divisions, and generally FTO's are
assigned to probationers who appear to be having problems or who are not performing
adequately. Probationers should work with a new FTO every 2 months but this isn't necessarily
done. FTO's often only see their trainee 2 or 3 days a week.
The FTO's train by setting an example, and while most acknowledged the
importance of communication and verbal skills, almost all stated that their main objective was
to instill good "officer safety skills" in their trainee. They continue to promote the "we/they"
mentality. Many FTO's stated it was difficult to terminate trainees even with very poor
evaluation, so they do not bother to put in negative evaluations. In wanting to terminate
someone, the most common reason they gave was "poor officer safety skills".
Officers receive roll call training for 45 minutes to 1 hour at the start of each
shift. The quality varies between divisions and commanders, and according to one commander,
is a disaster.
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The Commission makes numerous recommendations as to training, the majority
of which focus on the need to spend more time on language issues and communication skills,
and basically correct the obvious shortfalls mentioned.
PROMOTION, ASSIGNMENTS AND OTHER PERSONNEL ISSUES
There are 2 types of sworn personnel advancements_ within the LAPD; promotion
in rank {decided by a civil service exam process) and advancement in pay grade, i.e. from
sgt.1 to sgt.2 {decided within the LAPD).
The Committee does not go into too great an analysis of the promotion and
transfer system, but does make numerous recommendations, which easily reflect what is not
being done at this point in time.
1) Summaries of "not sustained" complaints as well as "sustained" complaint information should
be made available and carefully considered by Interview Boards in making paygrade decisions.
2) An officer's decision to remain on patrol should be a positive factor on promotion decisions.
3) Complaint histories {sustained and non-sustained) should be available to managerial officers
in making up desirable assignments.
4) Problem officers should not simply be transferred from one division to the next.
5) Patrol officers should be rotated every 5 years in a manner designed to increase ethnic and
gender diversity among divisions.
6) Increased rewards for patrol functions should be provided.
7) Emphasis is again placed on the need for periodic psychological testing.
COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE
The Commission found that many community groups and members of the
general public believe that the LAPD is not capable of disciplining its own members. Statistics
support their frustration. Of the 2,152 allegations involving excessive force from 1986 to 1990,
only 42 {2%) were sustained. The Commission feels there are significant problems with the
initiation, investigation and classification of complaints. The Commission recommends that the
discipline system be restructured and the operation of it be open to public review by a civilian
authority. They recommend the establishment of an Office of the Inspector General within the
Police Commission, with responsibility to audit and oversee the discipline process, participate
in adjudication and punishment of the more serious offences, and report to the Police
Commission and its newly created Chief of Staff.
Currently, the complaint process is not adequate. Most complainants were not
aware that they could lodge a complaint other than at a local police station. At the stations,
complaints were discouraged through a variety of means ranging from excessive waiting
periods to simple disregard. All complaints must go through the Internal Affairs Division, who
generally only investigate the more severe cases due to limited resources. The divisions do
the rest. Once an investigation is complete (either by IAD or a division), the file is delivered
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to the charged officers divisional Commanding Officer for adjudication. The complaints are
filed as SUSTAINED: where the officer engaged in the alleged conduct and it was against
policy, NOT SUSTAINED: the evidence is insufficient, UNFOUNDED: the act complained of
did not occur, and EXONERATED: the alleged conduct did occur but was justified, lawful and
proper.
The officer's past record of "not sustained" complaints as well as "unfounded"
and "exonerated" are not considered in any future disciplinary process. Penalties range from
WARNING, ADMONISHMENT, OFFICIAL REPRIMAND, SUSPENSIONS and REMOVAL.
Once the file has been reviewed and adjudicated, it is returned to the IAD
Review and Evaluation Section to determine the adequacy of the investigation, but not the
classification or recommended penalty. Once it gets to the Chief, he can accept, increase or
decrease the recommended penalty.
Investigations were found by the Commission to be lacking. A review of the files
showed that independent witnesses to many incidents were not identified, or if identified, were
not interviewed. In some files, investigators did not even attempt to identify or locate
independent witnesses.
Concern also centred around officer involved shootings. Every officer involved
shooting is investigated by the LAPD whether or not there is an allegation of misconduct. The
Commission found that:
*Officers at the scene were often gathered together and interviewed as a group.
*Statements were not recorded until the completion of the "pre-interview" which
was only attended by LAPD officers.
*When the LAPD does interview the involved officer, his statement is usually
"compelled". Legally, this statement can then not be later used in a court of
law, should that officer be prosecuted.
*The District Attorney's representatives are not allowed to interview the officer
or witnesses until after the LAPD has completed its investigation.
The Commission found that police officers at the scene were often treated as
independent witnesses in order to classify the complaint as unfounded. Some Commanding
Officers evaluated witnesses' credibility in an inconsistent or biased way, and often diminished
or discredited a complainants' charges by finding that the physical injury suffered was not
consistent with the force allege_ dly used, and therefore there was no basis for a finding.
The Commission also found that punishments dealt out were stronger for
offences such as drugs, lying or stealing, than for excessive force. The police felt this was
understandable in that there was no degree to lying or drug use - you were either guilty or
not. With excessive force, it must be looked at on a case by case basis. Discipline imposed
was also higher for offences which were an embarrassment to the Department, but excessive
force was treated more leniently because it did not violate the Department's moral code.
The greatest single barrier to effective investigation was the unwritten "code of
silence".
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
The Committee concludes that the best approach to deal with this problem is
to place the overview ·of the disciplinary process in the Police Commission, and the
Commission be given adequate resources to carry out its role. Responsibility would be centred
in a new civilian staff position - the Office of the Inspector General - which would report
directly to the Police Commission and its Chief of Staff. The Police Chief would be responsible
for imposing discipline but the Commission should set guidelines as a matter of policy and
hold the Chief accountable for following them.
It is felt a civilian oversight process is preferable to a so called civilian review
board. The Police Commission should publicize ways for citizens to obtain complaint forms and
how to fill them out. They should be printed in English, Spanish and other appropriate
languages. The Inspector ~eneral should have trained personnel available through a telephone
"hot-line" ready to help people complete the forms. The phone number should be included on
posters at the station house/division. They further recommend that the statute of limitations set
forth in the City Charter be extended and modified. {It currently stands at 1 year).
Classification and adjudication should be reviewed, where "not sustained" be
renamed to "not resolved", and automatic preference for officers' testimony should not be relied
on as a decision making technique.
STRUCTURAL ISSUES - THE POLICE COMMISSION AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE
The report is quite firm in advocating that the LAPD be subject to citizen
oversight and control, similar to what is done in other police departments and the military. The
Police Commission must be provided with adequate personnel and resources, and the ability
to hold the Chief of Police accountable for following and implementing its policy directives.
Detailed plans as to specific roles and implementation processes are in the main report.
CONCLUSION
In comparing the Metropolitan Toronto . Police Force to problems encountered
in the Los Angeles Police Department, it appears we, as a policing organization, are doing
quite well. At the same time, the Commission Report raises many concerns which could be
examined in relation to their relevance to our Force. Although issues such as the complaint
process and cultural awareness have been addressed by our Force. it may prove beneficial
for individual units to examine their own operations and take a proactive approach in effecting
any adjustments or changes.

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