Keith Comie, interview, 1992-07-08

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Content TO:
FROM:
MEMORANDUM
Richard J. Stone
Gary L. Blas~ Cornell J. Price
RE: Interview conducted July 7, 1992 with:
KEITH COMRIE, Chief Administrative Officer,
City of Los Angeles
[Abstract Attached: Last Page]
DATE: July 8, 1992
1. Background Information.
On July 7, 1992, we interviewed Keith Comrie, Chief
Administrative Officer of the City of Los Angeles. The interview
lasted from 2:40 p.m. until 3:55 p.m. What follows is a summary
of our recollections of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions, based upon this meeting. During the interview, Comrie
identified a number of documents relevant to our inquiry, which he
will have his staff assemble for us. His key staff person in
dealing with the Emergency Operations Board (and likely someone we
should interview) is Shirley Mattingly. He indicated he would tell
her to expect our call. She is the staffer who will be assembling
the material as well. The material includes: the ordinance
establishing the Emergency Operations Board (EOB), the emergency
response manual in use by the EOB summarizing the allocation of
responsibilities to various City departments, the minutes of EOB
meetings prior to the disorders.
Comrie has been City CAO for 12 years, and previously worked
at top levels in the County administrative bureaucracy. His office
contains elements that oversee the technical end of preparing the
City budget, conducting management evaluations of City departments,
and includes an emergency planning component. Our impression is
that it principally serves technical support functions. For
example, it is the CAO's office that pursues reimbursements from
the Federal Government. In addition, the CAO sits on the Emergency
Operations Board (which includes virtually all the other department
heads). More about the EOB is set out below.
2. Anticipation of Verdict.
There is no indication that the CAO's office had made any
efforts independent of those in the Mayor's office to anticipate
the verdict in the King beating case. Our impression was that
heavy reliance was placed on the EOB structure, with complete
delegation to LAPD of any operational planning for particular
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emergencies. In effect, the EOB structure (set up, it seemed, to
deal with a major earthquake as the prototypical emergency), was
seen as an off-the-shelf response and planning vehicle.
3. Intelligence
There is no indication that the CAO' s off ice gathered or
received intelligence about possible problems independent of such
activity being conducted by LAPD and the Office of the Mayor.
4. Planning.
As noted above, from Comrie's perspective, there was a generic
emergency response system, operationalized in the EOB. Under this
system, LAPD is responsible for all operational planning for
disorders, and the EOB system is set up to provide such assistance
as LAPD may need from other City departments. For example, the
General Services Department would be called upon to supply food to
officers in the field or pool cars when there were not enough
patrol cars, Public Works could supply heavy equipment, and so on.
Comrie credits both Mayor Bradley and Chief Gates with giving
very high priority to the activities of the EOB. There were
meetings monthly or semimonthly and an annual retreat, attended by
the top managers of each department, at Bradley's insistence. For
example, Comrie noted that when he had tried to send a subordinate
to an EOB meeting, Bradley had interceded and insured that Comrie
himself would attend. The EOB meetings were also personally
attended by Chief Gates. LAPD appears to have served, in effect,
as the lead agency for EOB, but with the full and activity support
of the Mayor and City Departments.
The EOB, however, seems to us to function primarily as a
clearinghouse and does not get involved in reviewing the planning
within each department. Specifically, there seems not to have been
any EOB review of whatever LAPD plan existed before April 29.
Comrie does not remember any particular briefing of EOB about
planning for disorders following a verdict in the King case.
This was not a lapse, but rather a feature of how EOB is set
up. There are external reviews (notably by FEMA), and in these
LAPD has always performed very well. In generally, we got the
sense that among City managers, the expectation was that LAPD was
extremely well prepared and could take care of those things under
its jurisdiction. City managers like Comrie were shocked and
astonished at the actual performance of LAPD on April 29.
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5. oversight of LAPD
The CAO's office has no direct oversight function of LAPD, but
is involved indirectly in two ways: the LAPD budget and management
audits and reviews.
The CAO staffs the preparation of the Mayor's budget that
begins the formal budget process with its presentation to the
Council. Prior to that, both the Mayor and the CAO meet with
Department heads, including the Chief of Police. Comrie
communicated the sense that over the years the LAPD has done
extremely well in obtaining what it asked for in the budget
process. For example, Comrie noted that it was at one point Chief
Gates' "dream" to have an 8,500 officer force. He also noted, that
the authorized force has been increased to 8,400, very close to
Gates' goals, despite the downturn in the economy and the City
budget. Both in the happier days of an expanding budget and the
more recent period, LAPD has consistently gotten a disproportionate
share of its requests, compared to all other City departments.
Comrie attributes this to the way in which the City is structured,
with a very powerful City Council, the members of which are lobbied
directly by City departments, and most effectively lobbied by LAPD.
He notes that LAPD is extremely well funded. Starting LAPD
officers are paid more than Comrie pays his starting MBA and MPA
level administrators, and LAPD has virtually all the technology it
ever asked for.
As regards the size of the LAPD, Comrie went to some lengths
to point out that much of the public debate about the relative
understaffing of LAPD is misinformed. He notes that LAPD appears
understaffed (officer/citizen ratio) only when compared to eastern
cities, but is fairly typical of cities in the western U.S. He
attributes this to artifacts of history in the development of the
various urban centers. He also notes an experiment conducted in
Kansas City, in which increased police staffing produced no change
in the crime rate. In short, he is skeptical of the notion of
increasing officers as a means of reducing the crime rate.
We inquired about the communications system of LAPD. Comrie
observes that when it was installed, it was the state-of-the-art
and the best system in the country, but that it is now obsolete.
A bond proposal for funds to update the system failed at the polls.
A new proposal [and the tax increase recently in the press] will be
pursued at the November elections.
As regards management reviews of LAPD: the CAO conducts
routine reviews of City departments and an occasional targeted
review. One previous such review criticized the cost of the police
pension system and made some other suggestions for changes in the
Department. Comrie reports that Chief Gates threw the report on
the floor and gave it what Comrie wryly calls "the stomp of
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approval". A further audit of LAPD has been held up, pending the
arrival of Chief Willie Williams, and is either underway now or
will be shortly. Our impression is, however, that this will not
overlap with our inquiry. Comrie indicates that City executives
are expecting to rely entirely on our report in considering changes
to the emergency planning and response functions in the City.
including LAPD.
6. Effects of Political Atmosphere and Pre-verdict
Comments
Comrie is quite emphatic that the tensions between Chief Gates
and the Mayor and his staff had absolute no effect on the planning
or response to the disorders. our impression is that this opinion
is an objective one, given Comrie's other statements and his
position as a neutral advisor in many contexts. In particular, he
notes that both Mayor Bradley and Chief Gates were the key forces
in making the EOB a high profile, priority activity of the City.
He further notes, that even if the Mayor and Chief had been warm
and close friends throughout the period before April 29, nothing
would have been different in terms of the flow of communication.
The entire planning structure rested on the functional allocation
of responsibilities for planning for response to civil disorders to
LAPD, which was not expected to -- and did not -- seek or obtain
input either from the EOB, or the Mayor's office. Again, there
was nothing unusual in the fact that the Mayor's office did not
review LAPD planning for the King verdict response. To the
contrary, it would have been highly unusual -- and inconsistent
with the City's planning structure -- for that to have occurred.
In short, the highly publicized tensions between the Mayor and
Chief were, in the view of this centrally placed and neutral
observer, irrelevant.
7. LAPD Management
In general, Comrie communicates a profound sense of
disappointment in the LAPD management's response to the disorders.
He and other City officials had the highest confidence in LAPD's
ability and capacity. They were shocked at the lack of early
response, particularly to the televised events at Florence and
Normandie. When asked his opinion of the source of the problem,
Comrie said, in essence, "We are waiting for you to tell us." He
suspects there were problems with clarity in the lines of authority
resulting from Gates transfer to himself of command authority, and
retransfer as the disorders began, but this is suspicion and not
firmly held conviction in his part. He asserts that he is in fact
mystified at how such a highly respected organization fell apart so
quickly at such a critical time.
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8. LAPD relationship to Police Commission.
Comrie had nothing of substance to report on this topic.
9. Adequacy of Police (and National Guard and Military>
Response
A. LAPD Response.
LAPD opened the Emergency Operations Center very quietly early
on the afternoon of April 29. Comrie thinks this was a good
thing, but that is about as far as his positive comments go. As
noted, Comrie was shocked at the nonexistence of response early in
the disorders and plainly believes that if LAPD had regrouped and
then gone back to the key hotspots in force, the disorders would
have been much more limited and shortlived. He also believes that
police tactics seemed illsuited to the problem. For example, he
cited the example of a store being looted by a handful of unarmed
civilians that was eventually dispersed by an advancing phalanx of
50 officers, but which could have been secured by one or two patrol
cars arriving with sirens and lights blazing. In Comrie's view, a
large amount of the looting, in particular, was conducted by
unarmed poor people who reacted to the fact that stores were open
and there was absolutely no police presence.
B. The National Guard and Federal Troops.
Comrie believes that there were bad decisions made in not
bringing in federal troops immediately, and in the delays in
putting the Guard troops in the field (part of which was due to
errors and part of which was due to the nature of the Guard). In
particular, recognizing the possible ramifications, he believes
that there must be available a domestic equivalent to the military
Rapid Deployment Force, so that a significant security presence is
established in a matter of hours. In particular, he notes that
the City was told that federal troops from Camp Pendleton could
have been in Los Angeles within 3 hours.
10. Reasons for Inadequacies.
Comrie believes that the key problem was the breakdown of the
LAPD command structure, which he and other city managers had
assumed was "superprepared", and the failure to regroup and respond
quickly. He notes the key question of the pattern of outbreak and
spreading, but believes that it certainly should have been possible
for PD to regroup and respond to significant focused areas like
Florence and Normandie.
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11. Nature of Violence.
In Comrie's opinion, it is necessary to distinguish between
the violence and the looting. Much of the looting, he believes,
was carried out by people who would have been scared away by the
presence of one or two people in uniform.
12. Lessons Learned
A. Things That Went Wrong.
As noted, Comrie believes the significant failure was the
failure of the LAPD command structure to place significant force in
the field early in the disorders.
B. Things that Went Right.
Beyond the initial period, the EOB system, through which the
various civilian departments of the City provide support to LAPD,
worked well.
13. Recommendations for Improvement.
Comrie had none beyond those previously mentioned. Much faith
is placed by Comrie in the ability of the Special Advisor to
identify the specific problems that resulted in the poor LAPD
response. Whatever improvements are made to LAPD's capacities,
Comrie believes there will continue to be a need for supplemental
federal response, available within a very short time.
14. Use of Interviewee at Public Hearing
If the Public Hearings were primarily for public input, Comrie
would not seem an appropriate witness, except as he might explain
how the EOB and general City emergency planning process works.
15. Additional Interviewees suggested
As noted,
appropriate.
his assistant, Shirley Mattingly might be
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. .
~ ' .
ABSTRACT
Witness: KEITH COMRIE, Chief Administrative Officer, City of Los
Angeles
Major Issues/Summary: As the chief of the politically neutral
administrative staff of the city, Comrie has a perspective on the
long-term funding and operations of the Police Department, and a
perspective on the emergency preparedness of the City, as a member
of the Emergency Operations Board (EOB). Before the disorders,
Comrie believed that the EOB planning and response functions were
being carried out well, and in particular that LAPD had its own
internal planning well under control. Someone ironically, City
managers looked to LAPD as the model of excellent planning and
management in this area. Comrie was shocked at the lack of LAPD
response early in the disorders, and "mystified" at how the command
structure seems to have fallen apart on April 29. He and other
City executives are looking to the report of the Special Advisor to
identify what went wrong and what is capable of being corrected.
Comrie is emphatic that the pre-disorder political atmosphere
(as between Chief Gates and Mayor Bradley) had no actual effect on
either the planning or response to the disorders. Both Gates and
Bradley were active, strong supporters of the EOB emergency
response planning structure. That structure is highly
decentralized and delegated to departments, so that even had
Bradley and Gates been close personal friends in constant contact,
nothing would have been different in terms of oversight by the
Mayor's office of operational planning within LAPD.
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