Gabriel Ornelas, interview, 1992-06-19

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Interview of Gabriel Ornelas, Commanding Officer of the Los Angeles Police Department's Foothill Patrol Division, about his recollection of the civil disturbance, his impressions of the Foothill Division's preparedness to handle this type of disturbance, and his impressions of the Los Angeles Police Department's subsequent response to the violence and unrest, 1992 June 19

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Content ·-
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
MEMORANDUM
RICHARD J. STONE,
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
General Counsel and Staff Director
RICHARD A. ROSENTHAL,
DANETTE MEYERS,
Counsel
June 19, 1992
Interview of Captain I, Gabriel Ornelas, Commanding
Officer, Foothill Patrol Division, Los Angeles Police
Department
On June 16, 1992, at 2:00 p.m., at the Foothill Division of the Los Angeles
Police Department, located at 12760 Osborne Street, in the City of Los Angeles,
we interviewed Gabriel Ornelas (Captain I), the Commanding Officer of the
Foothill Patrol Di vision. The following is a summary of our recollection of
this meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our
mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
Captain Ornelas was very receptive to being interviewed. He appeared to be
completely candid and informed us that he would be blunt and holds no
political allegiances to any person in the Department.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 1
Captain Ornelas has been a member of the Los Angeles Police Department
since he arrived in the Los Angeles area in 1963. He has worked his way
through the ranks starting in the police academy as a recruit in that year. On
December 2, 1991, then-Lieutenant Ornelas was assigned to the Footh~ll
Division as an acting Captain I. He was eventually promoted to his present
rank on May 19, 1992.
Ornelas was working in the office of Police Chief Darryl Gates on the day after
the King beating. Captain Ornelas states that he was the second police officer
to have seen the ''Holiday tape," of the Rodney King beating. Gates was out of
town when reporter Stan Chambers brought in the videotape, asking:
'What's going on at the Foothill Division?" Chambers played the tape for
Ornelas and a second officer. Ornelas states: "I was shocked by the videotape,"
and wondered why the officers didn't just grab King and subdue him.
Ornelas then walked the videotape into the office of Deputy Chief Vernon,
who subsequently viewed the tape.
When Ornelas arrived at the Foothill Division, on December 2, 1991, he states
the Division was in disarray. Ornelas believed that the disciplinary
investigation structure was ''broken." Too many meritless complaints were
being taken and investigated. Files were incomplete, and investigations were
not being handled in an efficient manner. By Christmas, 1991, Ornelas
believes he developed a scheme to control the investigations. Before that
time, the morale of the Division's supervisors was low - they were only doing
internal investigations, they had not time to supervise other officers in the
field. Part of Ornelas' program to control the investigations included
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 2
..
conducting a conflict resolution meeting where the officer, the complainant
and a supervisor met and discussed the situation. Ornelas believes this
program, in conjunction with a more responsible administration of the
investigations helped the Division work more smoothly.
Pre-Riot Training & Preparation
Captain Ornelas appears genuinely proud of the preparations taken by
Foothill Division in order to prepare for potential civil disturbances relating
to the King verdict. Preparations in the Foothill Division appear to have
begun over a month before the verdict was reached. Captain Ornelas
informed us that beginning on March 30, 1992, he began to prepare the
Foothill Division for possible disturbances that might result from a "not
guilty" verdict in the Rodney King case. This included providing appropriate
training for all members of the Division and making sure the Division was in
possession of all equipment which would have been necessary to deal with an
"unusual occurrence." Ornelas did not coordinate these preparations with
any other Division in the Department. The Foothill Division was
participating in the "Community Based Policing Program" and, therefore,
Captain Ornelas and his commanding Officer, Captain Ill, James McBride, ran
the Division under the immediate supervision of the Chief of Police. The
result of this program was that the Captains basically had a free hand in
running the Division as they sought fit. Foothill Division was, therefore,
under a different command structure than any other San Fernando Valley
Division.
In order to support his contention that the Foothill Division was adequately
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 3
trained and prepared for the post verdict riots, Ornelas provided us with a
packet which he prepared shortly after the Department demobilized. This
packet consists of a two page handwritten chronology of events, prepared by
Ornelas, and 36 pages of Project Records, Watch Commander's Reports,
Sergeant's Daily Reports, Chronologies, and memorandum which outline the
preparations taken by the Foothill Division. Ornelas prepared this packet
after he concluded that the Division would probably be subjected to some
scrutiny by post riot commissions.
Summary of Documents Outlining Pre-Verdict Foothill Division Training &
Preparation.
According to the documents provided by Captain Ornelas, and attached as
Exhibit No. 1, beginning on March 30, 1992, the Division conducted an
"equipment audit" to determine whether Foothill would have the
appropriate equipment necessary in the event of a post verdict disturbance.
According to Ornelas, after the audit was complete, the Division acquired the
equipment determined to be necessary pursuant to the report. Ornelas told us
that by the date of the verdict, the Division had the necessary vehicles, radios,
helmets, vests, shotguns, ammunition and other items necessary to deal with
potential demonstrations or attacks on the station.
According to these documents, the first of numerous training sessions took
place on April 6, 1992, twenty three days before the verdict. Sergeant II Polen,
the supervisor in charge of the "p.m. watch," conducted roll call training,
wherein he "strongly stressed station security in light of heightened tensions
from the King incident." Polen wrote that during the upcoming week he was
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 4
going to provide squad formation and riot control training, and suggested
that the other watches do the same. Polen noted that "this Division, more
than any other LAPD Division, needs to be squared away to handle any riot or
attack situation."
On April 10, 1992, Sergeant Polen had all watches practice squad formation
and riot training in the station parking lot, from 6:15 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
1
On
April 14, 1992, a training day was held at the Lake View Terrace Recreational
Center, wherein Sergeant I, Lee Allen, spoke for forty five minutes on the
Department's "Standing Plans;" a portion of the training also included
training on squad formations. On April 15, 1992, Sergeant Allen took the
entire day watch out to the parking lot to work on squad formations. He
indicated that he would continue the exercises for the rest of the week "or
until I feel day watch becomes proficient." Allen also indicated that Sergeant
Cross would begin inspecting helmets that same week "to ensure day watch is
prepared for the uncertain times ahead." According to Allen's log, during the
training, two officers voiced a concern over the possible use of incendiary
devices by demonstrators. Sergeant Allen recommended the purchase of
several small fire extinguishers to protect against such a possibility. On the
same day, Sergeant Pollen discussed with the "p.m. watch" sniper situations
in squad formation and riot control conditions. He indicated that "the
officers are 'hungry' for this type of training."
On April 16, 1992, the Foothill Watch Commander's Report for the day watch
(Sergeant Allen) indicated that they continued parking lot training on squad
1
During the interview, Captain Ornelas referred to Sergeant Polen as a "tactical genius."
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 5
formations. Allen wrote that he set out a scenario and designated various
senior officers to pick a formation, instruct their squad and implement the
squad movement. On the same day, Sergeant Cross wrote that from 7:00 a.m.
to 7:45 a.m., the day watch worked on squad formation, inspected riot
equipment, and ordered necessary equipment. The "mid day watch"
conducted similar exercises and inspections from 10:15 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.
On April 17, 1992, Sergeant Allen conducted an "in-depth" station check with
Officer Danny Stewart, touring the station and identifying various points of
vulnerability. On the same date, Lieutenant Woolway, in charge of the "p.m.
watch" indicated that he "opted not to have an inspection tonight because we
discussed crowd control." He indicated that his inspection would occur the
next night and noted that he would inspect helmets and plastic handcuffs.
On April 21, 1992, Sergeant Johnson reported that he provided training to the
"mid-p.m. watch" on station security and conducted a general discussion
about the possible impact of the outcome of the Rodney King trial on
community attitudes towards the police. He indicated that "officers seemed
genuinely concerned and were quite involved in the discussion."
On April 22, 1992, Lieutenant Woolway indicated that he conducted roll call
training on squad formations; Lieutenant D.E. Baca indicated he conducted
roll call training on station security.
On April 23, 1992, Lieutenant Baca reported that he conducted roll call
training for officers who were called as the first responding unit on an
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 6
"unusual occurrence call."
On April 24, 1992, Sergeant Allen conducted roll call training on squad
formations. A five page handwritten report, entitled: "Station Security &
Evacuation Plan" was prepared by Sergeant Haberman. This plan discussed
numerous aspects of station evacuation and defense in the event of an attack
on the station itself.
On April 25, 1992, Sergeant Polen started a station security detail and indicated
it would continue to run for the "near future." Polen reported: "Since
manpower was low tonight, I utilized one officer in a black and white to
constantly patrol the perimeter of the station ... When and if manpower
allows I will post an officer on the roof and one in the parking lot on a
rotating basis. This is something I believe should be done on all 3 watches
while tensions are high from the King trial."
On April 26, 1992, Sergeant Lee Allen prepared a five page handwritten,
"Foothill Area Tactical Plan." Allen prepared this plan in response to
expectations of possible demonstrations in front of the Foothill station. Allen
indicated that "the purpose of a foothill tactical operation will be to maintain
order, and ensure the right of any group to peacefully demonstrate ... If any
violations of law occur, enforcement action will be taken, and prosecution
will be pursued through the criminal justice system." The tactical plan dealt
with the deployment of officers in the event that the station became the target
of a demonstration, traffic control to isolate and contain demonstrators, and
the formation of an "initial response force," consisting of two sergeants and
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 7
...
twenty officers. The plan also indicated that if the demand for officers
exceeded the available resources of the Division, that a tactical alert would be
declared for the Valley Bureau, and provided for the deployment of twenty
eight additional officers from Van Nuys, West Valley, Devonshire and North
Hollywood Divisions. A command post location was selected and other
potential issues of communications and arrest procedures were outlined.
On April 29, 1992, the day of the verdict, Sergeant Haberman reported that the
day watch conducted roll call training on station security: "the entire watch
was given a tour of the station. The officers climbed up to the roof and then
down to the basement. Officers learned how to control both the interior and
exterior lighting."
Division Morale:
Ornelas believes that Division morale was good by the beginning of 1992.
Relations in the community were warm due to outreach programs organized
by Captain McBride, and Captain Jefferson, who Ornelas replaced. Ornelas
believes the tone of the Division was set by the Captains and the new cadre of
officers: people in the Division were being treated better and served as well as
protected.
Captain Ornelas also believes the assignment of a new "cadre" of officers to
the Division, who had no allegiance to the four King defendants, helped to
make the situation at the Division less volatile. The station morale, during
the trial, however, was compared to a "roller coaster ride." On some days, the
prosecution did well, on other days, the defense. Ornelas and McBride
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 8
decided to allow officers to watch the trial on televisions which were inside
the station.
Community Relations:
Ornelas told us that, given that the Foothill Division was where the King
beating occurred, that Captain McBride paid particular attention to attempting
to forge a strong relationship between the community and the officers.
Shortly after the beating, 75% of the supervisory officers were reassigned, as
well as 25% of the patrol officers. By the time Ornelas arrived at the Foothill
station, he believes community relationships were good. An outreach
program conducted by Captains McBride and Jefferson had the effect of
helping to repair community relations. Captain Ornelas was particularly
proud of the fact that the Division went for two months without receiving a
civilian complaint against any one of its officers. Captain Ornelas also
believes that relations were made better by his repair of the disciplinary
system. He states that, instead of being overwhelmed by disciplinary
investigations, the Sergeants were out in the field, monitoring patrol officers
and taking charge of volatile situations.
The Verdict:
Captain Ornelas was not at the station at the time of the verdict. Instead, he
was with 14 other LAPD Captains at a training session in Ventura. Ornelas
states he was ordered to go to this training session, but that he would have
preferred to remain in the area, given that a verdict was expected at any time.
Ornelas did state, however, that he did not expect the King trial to result in
acquittals of all the officers - he anticipated at least some guilty verdicts.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 9
Ornelas made contact with the station shortly after the verdict, and agreed to
command the A-watch, from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m, the next day. Ornelas,
therefore, did not arrive at the station until Thursday, June 30, at 5:00 a.m.
Ornelas did not see the reactions of officers at the station to the verdict, but
was told that some white officers "high-fived" each other, while black officers
remained silent. Ornelas did not believe that the positive reaction to the
verdict was the result of racism, but was instead related solely to the fact that
the defendants were brethren police officers. Ornelas believes that any racial
tensions between officers terminated as the result of a bonding which
occurred during the riots.
By the time Ornelas arrived at the station, the riot, which had occurred at the
station the night before, was over and there were only limited incidents of
looting and arson within the Division. All in all, "things were pretty good."
Ornelas was aware that on the night of the verdict, the day watch had been
held over and that the station had, in fact, been attacked by demonstrators.
Ornelas was informed that the demonstration had been broken up without
any injuries to police officers or civilians.
Ornelas was pleased with the support Foothill Division received from
Downtown. The Division was able to keep almost all of its officers and
received enough officers to put together a group of 175 officers on Sunday, to
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 1 0
•
deal with an anticipated gang meeting at the Hansen Dam Recreation area.
2
The Division was also assisted by the provision of the "I-Bars" Mobile
booking facility within the Foothill Division. In addition, the Division
received an "unbelievable" amount of food from the community during the
period following the verdict. The Division was feeding not only its own
officers, its reserves and a National Guard contingent, but also send a large
amount of food to other Divisions in the South Bureau. Ornelas believes the
food situation was a direct result of the Division's success in community
oriented policing.
Captain Ornelas did admit that the Division had very little intelligence on
what would occur in the event of a not-guilty verdict. Ornelas personally
believed that the reaction to a not guilty verdict would be "ugly." But the
Division was not really collecting any information and no intelligence at all
was provided from Parker Center. The Division received no information
from downtown and was not really making any attempt to collect
information. During the riots, however, many citizens would call in with
information in order to assist the officers. This would include information
on potential gang activities or trouble spots in the Division.
2
Reports were received by officers that on Sunday, May 3, 1992, there would be a
meeting of gang members at the Hansen Dam Recreational area and that these gang
members were going to organize rioting in the Foothill Division. As a result of
these reports, the Di vision called in for officers from other Di visions and prepared a
force consisting of 175 officers to handle the area. The gang members did not show
up, but Captain Ornelas was proud of the fact that officers from other Divisions
complemented him on the organization of the operation. Officers were organized
into squads, were informed of their duties, were fed and sent out into the field.
Ornelas believed the operation to be a great success and was informed by one officer
that similar operations in the Southern Bureau were disorganized and not nearly as
successful.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 11
J
Views on the Rest of the Department
Ornelas does not believe that the rest of the Police Department was prepared
for potential rioting. He states that Chief Gate's statement that the
Department was prepared is "B.S." It should be noted, however, that Ornelas
agreed that the demography of the Division helped it to emerge mostly
unscathed from the riots. Only 9% of the community is black and the
majority of the community consists of homeowners, who he believes are less
likely to participate in the destruction of their own community.
Ornelas believes that the difference between Foothill and 77th Division was
that "we had the support of our community." Ornelas personally appeared in
Division churches during the riots and spoke to Spanish speaking audiences
in Spanish. Ornelas also believes that his Division was better prepared than
77th Division due to their pre-verdict training exercise.
Suggestions on the future:
In the future, Ornelas believes the Department must try to anticipate civil
disturbances. In any future highly politicized trial, Ornelas believes the trial
judge should provide the Department with time to prepare by delaying the
announcement of a controversial verdict. Further, the Police Chief himself
should become more involved in the community and in interfacing with its
leaders. Captain Ornelas also agreed that it might be potentially positive if
Division Captain I's were to get together to discuss issues arising in each
station. Such meetings might have led to other Divisions preparing more
adequately for civil unrest. Finally, Ornelas believes that community based
policing worked in Foothill. Decisions could be made quickly because the
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 1 2
•
normal bureaucracy did not exist. Now that the Foothill Division has been
returned to the Valley Bureau, the Division's work is more cumbersome.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT-Page 1 3

Asset Metadata

Core Title Gabriel Ornelas, interview, 1992-06-19

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 13 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-32448

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Type texts