Close
About
FAQ
Home
Collections
Login
USC Login
Register
0
Selected
Invert selection
Deselect all
Deselect all
Click here to refresh results
Click here to refresh results
USC
/
Digital Library
/
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
/
Roundtable 6, discussion, 1992-06-17
(USC DC Other)
Roundtable 6, discussion, 1992-06-17
PDF
Download
Share
Open document
Flip pages
Contact Us
Contact Us
Copy asset link
Request this asset
Transcript (if available)
Content
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
MEMORANDUM
SUSAN SPIVAK, ESQ.
KEN HEITZ, ESQ.
JANET LEVINE AND
LAURIE LEVENSON
JUNE 17, 1992
PASADENA POLICE DEPARTMENT INTERVIEW
On June 16, 1992, at 2:30 p.m. at the Pasadena Police
Department, we interviewed Commander Gary A. Bennett and
Assistant Division Commander Robert L. Huff. The following is a
summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our
questions and comments, together with our mental impressions,
conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
I. INTRODUCTION
on June 16, 1992, Laurie Levenson and I met with two
officers of the Pasadena Police Department. The meeting lasted
from approximately 2:30 p.m. until approximately 4:45 p.m. on
that date. Although we had originally scheduled the meeting with
the Chief of Police, Jerry A. Oliver, we eventually met instead
with Commander Gary A. Bennett, the head of the Field Services
Division, and Assistant Division Commander Robert L. Huff, also
of the Field Services Division. As is set forth below, this was
an appropriate pair to begin with because these two individuals
had primary responsibility for the planning of any emergency
response and the implementation of emergency response in
relationship to the civil unrest occurring in April and May of
this year. I have attached hereto the business cards of
Commander Bennett and Commander Huffs.
As is set forth below, the Pasadena Police Department
has independently analyzed its response to the civil unrest and
has prepared a chronology, a critique memorandum and several data
sheets related to arrests, disturbances, and its responses for
the pertinent period of time. These materials were provided to
us and are attached hereto.
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
II. MATERIALS RECEIVED IN THE MEETING
Attached hereto as Exhibits are copies of all the
materials received at the meeting with Commander Bennett and
Commander Huff. The business cards of these two officers are
attached as Exhibit A.
Exhibit Bis the 103rd Annual Tournament of Roses
Pasadena Police Operations Plan (Rose Bowl Plan). This plan,
prepared for police deployment at the 1992 Tournament of Roses,
is a very detailed operations plan implemented annually by
Pasadena to deal with the influx of people (and resulting crime)
to the Rose Parade and the Rose game. As is set forth in detail
below, the fact that Pasadena had such a plan and had experience
in dealing with an influx of people and mass arrests enabled the
Pasadena Police Department to adjust quickly to the civil unrest.
Attached as Exhibit C is the Pasadena Police
Department's Civil Unrest Report dated May 8, 1992. This report
is a chronology of the responses by the Pasadena Police
Department to the activities occurring from Wednesday, April 29,
1992, through Monday, May 4, 1992.
Attached as Exhibit Dis a Memorandum to the Chief of
Police, Jerry A. Oliver, from Robert L. Huff, the Assistant
Division Commander of the Field Services Division, regarding a
critique of the Pasadena Police Department's response. This
critique sets forth how Huff feels Pasadena could have better
reacted and what preparation should be undertaken for future
civil unrest or disaster situations. It is based on Huff's
experiences in implementing the Pasadena response to the unrest
and the complaints he received from his fellow officers.
Attached as Exhibit E are several pages entitled
Pasadena Police Department Civil Disturbance Arrest Data. These
are compilations of arrests made from the period of April 29,
1992, through May 4, 1992, broken down by date, and within each
date broken down by crime, ethnicity, felonies vs. misdemeanors,
adult vs. juvenile, and sex. Also a part of that exhibit are bar
graphs prepared by the Pasadena Police Department indicating the
persons arrested by hour, incidents with an arrests made, theft
related incidents, miscellaneous mischief related incidents,
disturbance related incidents and tactical mobilization. The
final documents in that exhibit are tactical deployment models
and a bar graph representing deployment on Thursday, April 30,
1992.
2
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Exhibit Fis the Sheriff's Department Form used by the
Pasadena Police Department as the short form "arrest-booking"
record to facilitate the numerous arrests made during the civil
unrest.
Attached as Exhibit G is a chart of the Pasadena Police
Department, by divisions, including the names of the individuals
responsible for each division with telephone numbers.
The final exhibit, Exhibit His a street map of
Pasadena.
The originals of all of these items received have been
forwarded with this Memorandum. No copies have been kept.
III. PREPLANNING
Pasadena, because it yearly prepares for the Rose
Parade and the Rose Bowl, has prepared a tactical plan for
dealing with the problems caused by the Rose Parade and the Rose
Bowl (and also in a smaller degree caused by the influx of people
to UCLA football games and the Doodah Parade). This tactical
plan has been developed over the years and is updated yearly.
Because the Rose Bowl does occur each year, the plan is
implemented each year and the Pasadena Police Department is able
to determine where the plan works and where it does not work and
what type of changes are necessary to enable it to work better.
As an aside, during our conversations with Commanders
Huff and Bennett, they related to us that since the riots they
received many telephone calls from other police departments
(including Santa Monica) requesting copies of their Rose Bowl
Plan. This may be one of the few plans for this size community
that is actually put to writing and used and thus other police
departments appear interested in seeing it and seeing how they
can administer such a plan in their cities.
Every year, when the Rose Bowl and the Rose Parade
occur, Pasadena mobilizes its entire police department and also
utilizes officers from the Sheriff's Department. Pasadena
borders on cities that are policed by the Sheriff's Department.
The Rose Bowl Plan divides the city into four zones, which are
color coded, and each zone essentially becomes a separate police
department. Responsible for the entire city are the Incident
Commander and the Sheriff's Commander who share responsibility,
although Pasadena Police Department retains the ultimate control.
3
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
In each zone there is a Pasadena Police Department Lieutenant and
a Sheriff's Lieutenant. Pasadena Police and Sheriffs Sergeants
responsible to those Lieutenants are in each zone. Each zone has
its own prisoner transportation, parking and traffic personnel
and each zone can operate autonomously. Each operates on its own
frequency. There is a command post each with its own dispatcher.
Under the Pasadena Rose Bowl Plan, they use Sheriff's radios
because they do not have enough of their own (as is set forth
from the critique prepared by the Pasadena Police Department one
of their problems in the civil unrest was the lack of radios).
In implementing this plan each year, in mid-December,
all supervisors and Sergeants are briefed on the plan. The
Sheriffs are also involved at that time. The Sergeants then
brief the street police officers so that they are aware of how
the plan will be implemented.
IV. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACTS
While the Sheriff's Department provides assistance at
the Rose Bowl, and is available for emergency incident responses,
there is no formal agreement for mutual assistance between the
Sheriff's and the Pasadena Police Department. In discussing
mutual assistance pacts with Commanders Huff and Bennett, they
indicated that they had never seen the Governor's Mutual Aide
Pact and that while they have communications with other
departments, there is nothing formalized. They did indicate that
helicopters are very helpful in mutual aide and noted that they
provide airborne service for Altadena as a trade off for other
services. It seemed that the officers believed that regardless
of any mutual aide pact, it would be necessary in any future
civil unrest or civil disturbance that they be able to
independently and without the help of any other agency police
their entire city. Their critique plan contemplates that
Pasadena alone would be responsible for the policing of Pasadena
in any emergency.
The officers indicated that the fire department has a
written plan for disaster relief and indicated that we are to
speak to Diane Johnson of the Fire Department who has a major
role in disaster preparedness. That should be done. The
officers candidly stated that there is very little coordination
with the Los Angeles Police Department even though Pasadena
borders Los Angeles. The officer stated that LAPD "is an island
in itself" and it does not engage in any outreach.
4
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
V. COORDINATION WITH THE FIRE DEPARTMENT
The officers indicated that there was very little
coordination with the fire department and although there is a
disaster relief planning group which plans for civil disasters
such as earthquake in which both the fire department and the
police department participate, there is generally not a high
degree of coordination. The officers indicated that this is
perhaps a problem and should be looked at in the future. They
did indicate, however, that they did not have the levels of fire
in Pasadena as there were in Los Angeles, and they did not have
the same problems fighting fires.
There is in Pasadena an emergency operation center,
which is a subterranean room under the old fire station, where
everyone is to gather in case of civil emergency. This room was
not used during the civil unrest and there is some thought that
maybe it should have been used just to test out the facility.
The major hospitals in the area, Huntington and St. Luke's are
part of the civil disaster relief plan; the plan involves
coordination with the Sheriff's Emergency Operation Bureau, EOB.
VI. PASADENA DEMOGRAPHICS
Pasadena is a city of 135,000 people. To police that
city there are 220 sworn officers that patrol 23 1/2 square
miles. There are also 135 non-sworn officers and approximately
30 unpaid reservists. As well as having uniformed officers and
the traditional detectives, Pasadena has a neighborhood crime
special enforcement group known as the "Neighborhood Task Force,
NCTF". These are 16 officers who work the high crime gang areas.
These officers are more experienced, more high energy and trained
in riot control. (As is set forth below, these officers at an
early stage in the civil unrest played an important role in
deterring what could have been a very violent situation.) The
city is 27% Hispanic, 19% African American and 16% Asian. The
northwest section of the city has the highest concentration of
ethnics and also the highest concentration lower income or lower
social economic population. Pasadena does have gang problems and
has experienced gang situations previously. It has Crips,
Bloods, and black and brown gangs.
VII. THE KING VERDICT PREPARATIONS
We asked the officers whether they anticipated any
problems from the King verdict. Quite candidly, the officers
both admitted that the verdict took them by surprise; one stated
5
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
that having seen the video tape he simply anticipated either a
guilty verdict or a hung jury. They also did not anticipate that
any problems would spill over into the Pasadena area.
VIII. CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENTS
As it has been previously set forth, there is a written
chronology of the events which attached as an Exhibit hereto.
There has been no attempt to detail the chronology since the
police department did so in writing. What follows is simply a
comment on some of the chronology.
Assistant Commander Huff noted that when the verdict
was announced, and the commanders heard it, they knew immediately
that there would be trouble. For the first time ever the
commanders placed all police personnel on-call. The day watch,
which was to go home about the time the verdict was read, was
allowed to go home, but all officers were ordered to remain at
home and available by telephone. It was thought that the day
watch should go home because if any disturbance occurred and they
were needed it would be better that they had some rest. The
first disturbance calls began coming in at 6:00 p.m., as is
revealed in the chronology.
As previously noted, the Neighborhood Crime Task Force
(NCTF) was called to the station when the verdict was announced.
Lt. Hiltz, who is the head of the Neighborhood Crime Task Force,
is a potential contact point. Since the NCTF was not yet
committed, at 8:00 p.m., when the first major calls of
disturbances and breaking windows at the Colorado Boulevard Mall
were received, the NCTF was able to immediately respond and
disperse the crowds. NCTF then tailed potential offenders. Both
Commanders believed that the immediate response by NCTF was
instrumental in convincing the otherwise criminal elements that
Pasadena was not an area that should be attacked and that any
type of looting and disturbance would be immediately resisted by
appropriate police conduct.
It was determined by Huff that there would be a
priority that only emergency calls would be answered that night.
Routine calls, and those with only property damage, would not be
responded to. Throughout the disturbance period it should be
noted that the officers stayed at least two to a car, and
sometimes went up to as many as four to a car.
The officers indicated that there are Koreans in the
Pasadena area and they believed that the violence was racially
6
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
directed, African-American against everyone else. During the
unrest people were pulled from a few cars, and on the first
night, a Hispanic man was severely beaten.
At all times, during the civil unrest, either Commander
Bennett or Commander Huff were on duty, alternating 12 hours
shifts. Both, however, delegated to the Sergeants on the field
much of the planning and believed, because of the New Year's
planning, the sergeants knew what to do. Commander Huff,
watching the news about Los Angeles, knew there was trouble and
immediately called everyone in. On the first night the sergeants
and the watch commanders divided the city into teams, placing the
sergeants into a team with ten officers. The city was divided
into two parts, each operating on its own radio frequency.
Commander Huff noted that while the plan was in a sense
created on the fly, because of the team policing policy, and the
Rose Bowl plan, they were able to implement a plan quickly that
worked.
The offices also believed that the helicopters were
extraordinarily valuable. Pasadena has five helicopters. Two
were mobilized at all times. These helicopters can respond
quickly and determine whether an incident is bogus or real, and
whether response by a car is necessary. The police helicopters
can also light up an area quickly. The average response time by
a Pasadena helicopter in normal times is 58 seconds.
Pasadena, perhaps because of the proximity of the
police department to the District Attorney's Office, was able to
work quickly with Dave Disco, the Deputy District Attorney in
charge of the Pasadena branch of the District Attorney's Office.
Dave Disco, who should also be contacted for further comment on
implementation of a plan, did much work in implementing a plan
for processing arrestees. Pasadena has a quick booking plan
based on its Rose Bowl experience, which includes the use of
"flex-cuffs" and a short booking form.' See Exhibit F. One of
the things that Pasadena needed to deal with was compliance with
the McLaughlin 48-hour "probable cause" hearing requirement. Lt.
Van Anthony was able to get a waiver of the 48-hour probable
cause hearing requirement; he is apparently an expert on
McLaughlin hearings and should be contacted.
These officers candidly stated that the autonomy of the
officers enabled them to be able to respond to disturbances very
quickly. The Sergeants and the officers in the field are
accustomed to quickly determining what appropriate actions to
7
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
take. Pasadena uses a community policing approach and both
Commander Bennett and Assistant Division Commander Huff believed
that community policing could work in Los Angeles also. They
commented that L.A.P.D. is thought to be too top-heavy; they
believe that the fact that their sergeants are trusted to make
decisions made it possible for them to get on the street and
respond quickly to the civil unrest.
The role of the Chief in Pasadena was important. The
Chief (who has only been with the Department about one year) did
not at all meddle in the roles of the lieutenants and commanders
but instead continued to delegate the responsibility and right to
make decisions regarding actions in the street. The Chief acted
as a liaison between the department and the city manager, and the
department and the community. A program called "We Care" was
formed on the spot with the Chief and the community leaders; it
involved 20 or so citizens, who wearing yellow hats, and "we
care" buttons, assisted in distracting, and dissuading people
from looting and violence. Lt. Rick Laws of the Community
Relations Department should be contacted regarding this program.
At no time did Pasadena declare a curfew. This was a
political decision, designed to send a message that Pasadena was
doing well during the unrest.
On Thursday, the police department and the Chamber of
Commerce determined which of the business areas should close
down. There was coordination between the police department and
the business community throughout the unrest. The Chief had a
large role in this.
Food for the troops is discussed in the critique. The
Pasadena Police Department received many telephone calls from
restaurants offering food, and indeed, those restaurants in
coordination with the Salvation Army provided food to the police
department. Some units in the field were some distance from the
police department where the food was being brought. The officers
believe that food should be made available at various fire
departments throughout the city so those units in the field can
obtain food. It seems that this would be easy to implement in
any future emergencies.
Huff and Bennet noted that the looting and activities
within the city of Pasadena appeared very organized. From the
helicopter, cars were observed to gather and together convoy to a
location for looting. Intelligence confirmed the organized
nature of the looting. Pasadena received at least two
8
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
intelligence reports through the course of the civil unrest; one
indicated that there would be a fire bombing incident as a
diversion to a gun store robbery, and the other indicated that a
car was to crash through the Bullocks' windows to facilitate
looting. Both of these intelligence reports were confirmed; a
fire bombing incident occurred and immediately thereafter a group
of gang members attempted to burglarize a gun shop. Because of
the intelligence information the police were in a position to
stop the gun shop burglary. Similarly, the attempt to loot the
Bullocks was stopped by immediate police reaction made possible
because of intelligence.
At some point, federal agents began using the Pasadena
post office as a staging area for their federal law enforcement
people. Prior to such use, there was no communication to the
Pasadena Police Department that any federal agents would be using
the area. No National Guard troops were deployed in Pasadena.
As an aside, Huff and Bennett indicated that they
believed the Los Angeles curfew had no effect on Pasadena, but
perhaps because of the quick response in Pasadena, that many of
the people who might have committed crimes in Pasadena went to
Los Angeles to commit crimes. One of the indications of that is
that many "hot" items are now being sold on the streets in
Pasadena. The fact that there was so many police officers
quickly in the streets in Pasadena discouraged looting. At all
times there were very few officers in the station. Indeed, even
the vice officers in beards and grubby clothes were on the
streets making arrests. Their non-police appearance in fact
facilitated arrests because they were able to close in on looters
quickly without the looters realizing they were police officers.
The chronology references a shooting death incident
that occurred on Saturday. On Saturday, shots were fired at
officers responding to a "loud party" call. A multi-hour
incident occurred with shots being fired back and forth for more
than an hour. A Pasadena police helicopter sustained one gunshot
and a civilian was killed by a ricochet from a Pasadena police
bullet. By Saturday, however, a more normal deployment was
occurring and routine calls were handled again.
The Pasadena police department has not yet determined
the long term financial effects of the civil unrest. For
example, it cannot yet determined the cost of having police
officers in court for several months dealing with this. It has,
however, because of this had an opportunity to see its planning
implementation and also has obtained critique from the field
9
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
officers and is implementing changes in its plans based on those
critiques.
As we finished our meeting with Pasadena, we asked them
if they had any suggestions for other people we should contact.
They indicated that they believed we should contact the police
offices in Inglewood and Pomona. We are contacting the Inglewood
Police Department. Pomona, however, has not been scheduled; it
might be worth considering. The officers indicated an interest
in seeing the completed report, and are particularly interested
in the response of Long Beach.
PEOPLE TO CONTACT:
As set forth herein, it is advisable to contact Diana
Johnson, from the Fire Department, Lt. Rick Law from the
Community Services Department, that we contact Lt. Wayne Hilt
from NCTF and that we contact Lt. Van Anthony from the Detective
Section. Further, I believe it is important to contact Deputy
District Attorney Dave Disco, to find out how he coordinated with
the Pasadena Police Department and to determine whether such
coordination should be worked out in advance as any part of a
disaster/arrest plan.
10
Linked assets
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Conceptually similar
PDF
Roundtable 21, discussion, 1992-07-26
PDF
Roundtable 10, discussion, 1992-06-29
PDF
Roundtable 35, discussion, 1992-08-14
PDF
Roundtable 17, discussion, 1992-07-06
PDF
Roundtable 1, discussion, 1992-06-08
PDF
Oliver Thompson, interview, 1992-06-18
PDF
Michael Moulin, interview, 1992-06-03
PDF
Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-06-16
PDF
Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-13
PDF
Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-12
PDF
Michale Moulin, interview, 1992-06-08
PDF
Hourie Taylor, interview, 1992-06-22
PDF
Carecen, article, 1992-06
PDF
Jack White, interview, 1992-06-30
PDF
Gilbert A. Sandoval, interview, 1992-07-16
PDF
Bruce Ward, interview, 1992-08-20
PDF
Sharon Papa, interview, 1992-06-24
PDF
Miami Roundtable 3, 1989-01-16/1989-01-23
PDF
New York: Roundtable 7, 1992
PDF
Income and expense statement, 1992-07-17
Description
Roundtable discussion with Commander Gary A. Bennett and Assistant Division Commander Robert L. Huff of the Pasadena Police Department, about the Department's tactical planning measures for emergency situations, its role in curtailing the civil disturbance, and its collaboration with other law enforcement agencies during the disturbance, 1992 June 17.
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Roundtable 6, discussion, 1992-06-17
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
10 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
discussions (meetings)
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-33325
Unique identifier
UC11449696
Identifier
box 20 (box),web-box20-075-01.pdf (filename),folder 75 (folder),webster-c100-33325 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box20-075/web-box20-075-01.pdf
Dmrecord
33325
Format
10 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),discussions (meetings) (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992