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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Roundtable 1, discussion, 1992-06-08
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Roundtable 1, discussion, 1992-06-08
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Content
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
MEMORANDUM
Webster Study File
Todd Gale
Tony Richardson
June 8, 1992
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Roundtable Discussion at Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
On Tuesday, June 2, 1992 at 10:30 a.m. at the Hall of
Justice, several members of the Special Advisors Staff (Jan
Handzlik, Vince Marella, Gordon Greenberg, Jim Sanders, Tony
Richardson and Todd Gale) met with several members of the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Office ("LASO") in order to begin analysis on
behalf of the Special Advisor regarding the coordination between
the LASO and the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"). The
LASO representatives participating in the roundtable discussion
were: Undersheriff Robert Edmonds; Assistant Sheriff Jerry
Harper; Chief Roy Brown, Field Operations, Region 1; Chief Bill
Baker, Technical Services Division; Commander Mark Squiers,
Acting Chief of Field Operations, Region 2; Acting Chief Larry
Anderson, Region 3; Commander Ken Bayless, Region 3; Commander
Barry King, Region 2; Commander Buford Smith, Field Operations,
Region 1; Lieutenant Richard Odenthal, Region 1, and LASO
representative to Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Board
("EOB"); and Captain Thomas Hehir, Region 1, and LASO
representative to Los Angeles County EOB. The following is a
summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our
questions and comments, together with our mental impressions,
conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting. The meeting
lasted approximately 5 hours.
I. LAPD and LASO Contingency Planning
Our initial discussion centered upon contingency
planning between the LASO and the LAPD in general. The formal
document which sets out the various lines of communication and
authority in the event of an emergency situation, whether a
natural disaster or civil disturbance, is the Law Enforcement
Mutual Aid Plan, currently in its fifth edition (prepared
October, 1991) ("the Plan"). A copy of the Plan is attached as
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Exhibit A to this memorandum. The Plan is prepared by the Law
Enforcement Division of the Office of Emergency Services ("OES")
for the state, pursuant to the authority of the California
Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement, signed by
Governor Earl Warren on November 15, 1950.
According to the Plan, LASO is in charge of both the
"Operational Area" of L.A. County and "Mutual Aid Region I,"
which consists of Los Angeles and Orange Counties. As such, the
Plan directs that LASO should coordinate and direct emergency
services, acting as a communications clearing house and nerve
center for all emergency operations in its area and region. The
LASO representatives with whom we discussed this matter
universally supported this protocol and, as detailed below, were
critical of specific instances in which LAPD personnel did not
adhere to this chain of command during the civil disturbance.
The discussion, however, did not address the normative question:
given the geographic size and population density of the City of
Los Angeles, should the LAPD report directly to the state OES in
disaster situations?
Two facts gleaned from the Plan and from the round
table discussion suggest that a movement toward LAPD autonomy in
this regard is a possibility. First, the Plan draws an exception
for the City and County of San Francisco from the general rule
that the County Sheriff is the Operational Area Law Enforcement
Coordinator. (See Plan at iii.) This shows that the OES
recognizes that there may be situations in which it makes less
sense for a County Sheriff to coordinate everyone rather than the
chief of the police department of the largest city within that
county. Second, our roundtable discussion revealed that in the
early 1980's, a study was conducted by the state which suggested
that Los Angeles would be considered a separate operational area
in the event of a "Level 3 earthquake"
1
which affected only Los
Angeles. This study should be obtained during follow-up
interviews with LASO personnel.
The sheriffs participating in the roundtable discussion
viewed the conclusions of the study related to Los Angeles'
autonomy as anathema. Aside from the fact that no major
earthquake could affect Los Angeles without affecting surrounding
areas as well, the LASO representatives believe that the study's
findings contributed to a mindset at the LAPD -- as perceived by
1
The term "Level 3 earthquake" was apparently never defined
in the study.
- 2 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
LASO representatives participating in the roundtable -- that LAPD
need not follow the Plan because Los Angeles, standing alone, is
bigger than any county in California. They noted that this
mindset was already in place, as reflected by LAPD's
unwillingness to seek help from surrounding departments during
the Watts riots in 1965. This assertion by the LASO
representatives regarding LAPD behavior during the Watts riots
should be verified.
II. The Effect of the LAPD's and the LASO's Organizational
structure Upon Their Response to Emergencies
Certain structural issues draw contrast between the
LASO and the LAPD and perhaps suggest the need for evaluation of
the LAPD's emergency response capabilities. In a non-emergency
situation at the LAPD, dispatch is handled centrally; that is,
calls from citizens requesting police assistance are channeled to
two central locations and dispatched from there to the
appropriate divisions. The LASO follows a decentralized dispatch
format, with citizen calls going directly into the affected
division. The LASO method arguably would ~llow a better
opportunity for a watch commander to keep his finger on the pulse
of the community which his division serves.
In contrast, in an emergency situation, the LAPD
follows a more decentralized approach. It was the understanding
of the LASO representatives -- an understanding that needs to be
verified with the LAPD -- that each LAPD bureau was tasked with
developing its own emergency operations command, and the
communication links between bureaus were hindered as a result.
Conversely, the LASO emergency procedures stress a unity of
command, with the LASO Emergency Operations Center employing a
standing team at the ready at all times. The team, which rotates
every 30 days, includes a chief, two commanders, and a staff
supporting their command. The LASO's centralized approach could
facilitate the smooth provision of services during a time of
crisis by greatly reducing .confusion.
On the topic of communication between the LASO and the
LAPD, all representatives present at the round table discussion
stressed the good working relationship between the two agencies.
The issue should be explored further in follow up interviews with
individuals within the LASO. One formal method of coordination
cited was shared training procedures. In training on emergency
exercises, the LASO has participated in some training at the LAPD
and, to a more limited extent, the LAPD has participated in LASO
- 3 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
emergency training. More details on this training must be
gathered in follow up interviews both with the LASO and the LAPD.
III. Informal Means of Communication
Informal coordination and communication also exist
between the LASO and LAPD. On a daily basis, neighboring LASO
stations and LAPD divisions support one another for specific
incidents -- for example, the LASO Firestone station would
provide support to LAPD 77th Division officer involved shooting.
The parameters of these informal arrangements should be explored
in future interviews.
During the disturbances, LAPD personnel called friends
and acquaintances affiliated with other police departments
directly seeking their help, again without following the
procedures outlined in the Plan. This lack of coordination led,
in the eyes of the LASO representatives, to a breakdown in the
line of communications within the LAPD. The perceived result was
the various LAPD bureaus not knowing what resources were
available from their neighboring bureaus, and requesting
otherwise available resources from sources outside of the LAPD.
These assertions also need to be verified, both by discussion
with the LAPD and by discussion with the various other police
agencies that participated in quelling the civil disturbance.
Numerous industry groups, analogous to trade
associations, exist throughout the Southland (e.g., South Bay
Chiefs Association). As in other industries, these groups can
serve as fora for communications among various police agencies.
Furthermore, other friendships are established informally among
representatives of various police organizations, and many of the
sheriffs' representatives commented about the utility of these
friendships when the need for coordination arises among agencies.
There appears to be an inherent level of contradiction between
relying on networking through friends and acquaintances to
coordinate response on the one hand, and following the Plan to
the letter on the other. Perhaps a balance can be struck,
recognizing that networking interdepartmentally can yield
positive results but cannot supplant formal procedures during
times of crisis.
IV. LASO's operation Monarch
One aspect of the LASO's preparation for any
disruptions that might occur as a result of reactions to the
verdict was its organization of the Operation Monarch task force.
- 4 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Operation Monarch was made up of representatives from all
divisions of the LASO, and it was designed to obtain and consider
information concerning what might happen following a verdict in
the trial. It gathered intelligence from agencies throughout the
County willing to talk, its contacts in the communities and
individual LASO officers. In addition, approximately eight hours
of training in preparation for the verdicts was conducted with a
few LASO sergeants and lieutenants. Operation Monarch was
exclusively an LASO operation, without official coordination with
the LAPD. Representatives suggest that we follow up on the
LAPD's planning for the King verdict with Undersheriff Edmonds.
v. Significant Events Involving the LASO During the Civil
Disturbance
The LASO summarized the most significant events of the
recent civil disturbance in a brief chronology which it provided
to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in early May. {A
copy of the chronology is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit
B.) The LASO provided bailiffs at the King beating trial, and
therefore learned as early as 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 that a
verdict might be rendered in the trial. All LASO divisions were
already on alert, including the Custody Division operating at
local jail facilities.
Lt. Dick Odenthal, Field Chief of LASO's EOC, stated
that he was at an LAPD station when the verdict was announced and
immediately began to prepare for any trouble that might arise.
He held the impression at that time that the LAPD had deployed
officers in the South Central Los Angeles area. Odenthal used
his pager to activate LASO's EOC, and brought in several other
Los Angeles County agencies such as the Department of Public
Social Services, the Department of Public Works, the California
Highway Patrol, the Health Department and the Fire Department.
Internally, the LASO dedicated its Special Enforcement
Division, Operation Safe Streets and Anti-Gang Division to riot
control efforts. During the initial breakout of the civil
disturbance, the LASO also used its "ring down" line to the
LAPD's Emergency Operations Center to inform the LAPD that it was
operational and ready to exchange liaison officers. The LASO's
official liaisons with LAPD were Lt. Don Rodriquez and Sgt.
Robert Puente; LAPD liaison officers were Sgt. Tim Anderson
(Metro/K-9) and Sgt. Walker (Bunke/Fraud). The LASO activated
tactical units and sent them to predetermined staging areas at
Carson and Crescenta Valley as the numbers of violent incidents
increased.
- 5 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Around 9:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, the LASO
received a call from the state Office of Emergency Services'
Deputy Chief for Southern California, Fritz Patterson, who told
Lt. Odenthal that the City of Los Angeles had asked for the
deployment of National Guard troops. When Lt. Odenthal called
his counterpart at LAPD's EOC, however, he discovered that they
had no knowledge of such a request. Several minutes later he
received a call from the LAPD's EOC that a LAPD Commander had
made the request and had apparently spoken to Sheriff Block about
it. (Assistant Sheriff Harper interjected that Sheriff Block had
not conversed with anyone from the LAPD at that time about the
National Guard. This subject should be discussed with Sheriff
Block.) The LASO was surprised that the National Guard had been
called because the LAPD had not even asked for any assistance
from the LASO. In fact, the LAPD had stated earlier that it had
no idea how the LASO could be used.
Lt. Odenthal acknowledged that requests were made by
the LAPD, but not through the LASO's EOC as mandated by the
mutual assistance pact. Apparently, individual LAPD officers
made requests for resources to individuals they knew at other
agencies, thereby bypassing the LASO's EOCs. This circumvention
was exacerbated by the apparent failure of the four LAPD EOCs to
communicate with each other.
The LASO realized around 10:30 p.m. on Wednesday that
the mutual assistance system was not being utilized properly.
Therefore, no centralized information was coming from any one
place concerning who was responsible for handling certain
contingencies and the law enforcement resources which were
available.
2
From 10:30 p.m. to midnight Wednesday there didn't
seem to be a great deal of distress. The LASO maintained a
platoon force (56 officers) at the Civic Center to keep control
of all the County buildings in that area because it was obvious
the LAPD could not handle the disturbances there.
It wasn't until around 11:00 p.m. on Wednesday that
communications were established with the National Guard, which
2
It was obvious to the LASO during the civil disturbance that
no one person at the LAPD exercised control over the LAPD's
operations. In fact, the LAPD was missing a complete layer of
command, including Vernon (on vacation), Brewer (resigned) and
Dotson (demoted). Normal deployment for the LASO during a patrol
shift is 250 to 350 units. During the civil disturbance,
however, more than 1,410 units were deployed.
- 6 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
was being staged at the Pitchess facility. Ordinarily, the LASO
EOC would handle mission requests involving the National Guard.
When the system is working properly, such requests for assistance
might come from various cities in the County, and the LASO would
be able to marshal! resources for the entire County. The LASO
was prepared to do so on Wednesday evening and to use the
National Guard at such time as the Guard was available for
specific missions. The plan was to have the LASO and the LAPD
make arrests and allow the Guard to secure those areas so that
the LAPD and the LASO could "leapfrog" into other trouble spots.
The Guard's mobilization, however, was delayed.
It should be noted that several agencies from around
the state made unsolicited offers of assistance to the LASO, but
the LASO declined them because it had no specific missions for
those agencies at that time. Additionally, the LASO learned of
several outside agencies, such as the San Diego sheriff's office,
participating in law enforcement activities, but the LASO had
nothing to do with a request for its assistance.
When the looting escalated on Thursday, Sheriff Block
again offered his help to Chief Gates. Chief Gates accepted at
that time, and two platoons were assigned to the Crenshaw area at
around 10:00 a.m. The Emergency Broadcast System was activated,
all leaves and days-off were cancelled and all officers were
placed on call. As nothing was happening in the northern part of
the County, the LASO closed the command post there and focused a
lot of attention on the areas where it was receiving the majority
of calls (e.g., Compton, Culver City, Long Beach, etc.).
Platoons were mobilized in the Crenshaw area with
orders to arrest anyone who was committing a crime. The LASO
employed an aggressive arrest policy, involving high visibility
and a high profile, to convey a message of accountability to
those who committed crimes. The platoons' missions changed
several times while they were in route to the Crenshaw area. One
platoon went to Crenshaw to save the shopping center there, while
the other platoon went to at least four different locations
throughout the City. The LAPD was overwhelmed by the disturbance
in the Crenshaw area by the time the LASO arrived because it had
only a small sub-station in the area. At least 117 people were
arrested by the LASO.
The LASO activated the Emergency Broadcast System
because it couldn't really predict the nature and extent of the
disturbance. By Thursday, the CHP was responsible for the
protection of Fire Department personnel, relieving the LASO of
- 7 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
one task. The LASO went into full phase mobilization because the
fires and looting were growing and spreading from 5:00 p.m. to
roughly midnight on Thursday, April 30. By 3:00 a.m. on Friday
morning most of the problems began to abate. The curfew took
many people off the streets and thereby lessened the criminal
activity.
Federal troops were not committed until Friday, May 1,
and a liaison officer was assigned to them. This added two more
layers of bureaucracy, in the eyes of the LASO roundtable
participants, because once the troops were federalized, federal
attorneys had to scrutinize the missions the troops were being
asked to perform before they were dispatched. This should be
verified with federal law enforcement personnel. FBI, INS and
other federal agents were also sent to Los Angeles. They
apparently came under the authority of SCRAG, an acronym for a
branch of the Department of Justice. This should also be
verified. With the exception of the INS agents, the LASO did not
think the other federal agents were helpful.
The federal agents were, nonetheless, deployed by both
the LASO and the LAPD. The federal officers were typically
deployed in their own units and sent out by the LAPD to patrol
certain areas. But they had no communication capability with the
LAPD, nor were the federal agents familiar with the areas where
they were deployed. Essentially, they apparently were left to
their own devices. The LASO used at least eight to ten officers
as liaisons with the federal agents and will provide us with the
names of those individuals.
Most events had substantially subsided by 7:00 a.m.
Friday. After that time, law enforcement officers were
performing "mop-up" work and making curfew arrests. By Saturday,
there was some semblance of order and control in the LAPD command
structure and EOC. By Sunday, May 3 the LAPD had matters under
control, in the opinion of the roundtable participants.
VI. Recommendations from Roundtable Participants
The LASO stressed that it enjoys a good working
relationship with the LAPD, despite the LAPD's failure to
properly utilize the EOC system. It appears that the LAPD was
seeking help where it could get it. The LAPD had to admit that
the disturbances were too much for it to handle before it would
seek assistance. The LASO responded to a specific question
concerning the LAPD's motivation by stating that it does not
believe the LAPD's actions had anything to do with competition or
- 8 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
any supposed bad communications between it and the LAPD. This
should be followed-up in individual interviews with LASO
personnel.
On the topic of training, Assistant Sheriff Jerry
Harper suggested that the state OES can also play a role. In
fact, on July 24, 1990, during a meeting with Fritz Patterson,
Deputy Chief for Southern California for the Law Enforcement
Division of OES, and John Mirella, California State Training
Institute ("CSTI") Director, Assistant Sheriff Harper suggested
that emergency training provided by CSTI had become too oriented
towards natural disasters and away from civil disturbances during
the 1980's. He predicted that the 1990's would be a time of more
civil disobedience, pointing out demonstrations related to the
abortion issue and Earth First!. Assistant Sheriff Harper
suggested at that time that CSTI take this shift into account and
provide more civil disobedience training to officers statewide,
including crowd and riot control. A memorandum reflecting his
views as expressed during that July 1990 meeting is attached to
this memorandum as Exhibit c. Deputy Chief Fritz Patterson
should be interviewed regarding this meeting, OES and CSTI
training in general, any changes after the July 24, 1990 meeting,
and any contemplated changes in the future. The interview with
Deputy Chief Patterson could also explore the role of the OES in
relation to the LAPD and other agencies affected by the riots,
and could serve as a lead-in for meetings with relevant personnel
at CSTI to discuss training issues as they would relate to law
enforcement's response to riotous situations.
Undersheriff Edmonds believes the City now understands
that if it gets in over its head it should call the LASO, which
can marshal! a lot of resources. They need to follow the chain
of command, and he and Chief Booth at LAPD have agreed to stay in
contact with each other, especially with respect to major
activities calling for nutual assistance. LASO station
commanders will continue to be in contact with their LAPD
counterparts on a regular basis. The LASO also intends to have
discussions with Chief Williams when he assumes his new position.
After these discussions, LASO and/or LAPD may amend their written
procedures for handling civil unrest.
- 9 -
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Description
Roundtable discussion with several members of the Los Angeles Sherriff's Office to analyze the coordination between the Sheriff's Office and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1992 June 8
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Roundtable 1, discussion, 1992-06-08
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
9 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
discussions (meetings)
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-33067
Unique identifier
UC11449694
Identifier
box 20 (box),web-box20-070-01.pdf (filename),folder 70 (folder),webster-c100-33067 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box20-070/web-box20-070-01.pdf
Dmrecord
33067
Format
9 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),discussions (meetings) (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992