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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-08-28
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Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-08-28
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,
TO:
FROM:
FILE:
RE:
DATE:
M E M O R A N D U M
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
SUSAN I. SPIVAK/JAN L. HANDZLIK
MAREN CHRISTENSEN/STACEY M. BYRNES
WEBSTER STUDY
SUMMARY/COMMANDER PIERSOL INTERVIEW
AUGUST 28, 1992
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW OF FRANK PIERSOL, LAPD
Commander Frank Piersol ("Piersol") was interviewed on
August 26, 1992, by Maren Christensen, Stacey M. Byrnes and Paul
Bower. The topics covered in the interview include the structure
and operation of LAPD's Emergency Operation Center ("EOC"),
specifically with regard to Piersol's involvement with the EOC
beginning April 30, 1992 at approximately 2:00 p.m. and
continuing for approximately twenty days. Piersol served as
assistant to Chief Booth, who acted as Department Commander, A
watch.
The following is a summary of our recollections of this
meeting, including our questions and comments, together with our
mental impressions, conclusions and opinions.
TO:
FROM:
FILE:
RE:
DATE:
M E M O R A N D U M
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
SUSAN I. SPIVAK/JAN L. HANDZLIK
MAREN CHRISTENSEN/STACEY M. BYRNES
WEBSTER STUDY
COMMANDER PIERSOL INTERVIEW
AUGUST 28, 1992
On Wednesday, August 26, 1992 at 9 a.m., Maren
Christensen, Stacey Byrnes and Paul Bower interviewed Commander
Frank Piersol ("Piersol") of the Los Angeles Police Department,
in the Police Commission's offices at 150 Parker Center. The
following is a summary of our recollections of this meeting,
including our questions and comments, together with our mental
impressions, conclusions and opinions.
We began the interview by telling Piersol that we had
read the notes of his last interview and would not inquire into
the issues which had already been covered. We did not ask him to
again tell us his background with the police force but did point
out that in his last interview he had stated that he believed his
job description would change on July 1, 1992. He told us that
his position had not changed, that he is still the liaison
between the LAPD and the Police Commission and that he expects to
remain in that capacity until early 1993.
Piersol told us that he wanted us to understand the
situation in the city on April 29 and 30, and related to us
substantially the same events which he had mentioned in his prior
interview regarding his activities with the Police Commissioners
on the evening of April 29 and the morning of April 30. The
discussion moved to EOC-related issues when his chronology
reached the late afternoon of April 30.
At that time, Piersol was back in the Commission
offices remaining on call to the Commissioners. He received a
call from Chief Booth ("Booth") which Piersol described as
"frantic." Booth was the Department Commander of the A watch
(6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.). Booth told him that he needed Piersol
to help him out and wanted him to come to the EOC immediately.
Piersol reported to Booth, who was stationed in a room adjoining
2
the EOC. Piersol was assigned there for the next twenty days as
assistant to Booth.
1
Piersol does not know who would ordinarily have been
Booth's assistant. Piersol had had no prior experience at the
EOC. When asked why he thought he was chosen to assist Booth, he
stated that he had had extensive experience at field command
activities. He also said that they were running out of "staff,"
which he defined as commanders and chiefs. These officers were
all being deployed so quickly that they simply ran out of people.
STATUS OF THE EOC UPON PIERSOL'S ARRIVAL ON APRIL 30, 1992
Piersol believes that he arrived at the EOC at about 2
to 2:30 p.m. He described the EOC room as large, with a
horseshoe - shaped table in the center.
2
Around that table sat
the representatives of the various agencies which participate in
the EOC, ~,Dept.of Water & Power, Dept. of Building and
Safety, the Red Cross, the Fire Department, the National Guard.
Each desk had a telephone and a computer terminal. Some had maps
and various agency emergency procedure manuals. A glass wall
separated the Department Commander's office from the EOC room, so
Booth could see but not hear the activity around the horseshoe shaped table. The EOC also contained a bank of televisions which
Piersol described as "always on," though not really monitored.
(Piersol also mentioned some kind of cable or closed-circuit
television; whether that was always available or whether it
became available later was unclear.) When asked about the status
board in the EOC, Piersol responded that he could not see it from
where he was and that frankly no one paid much attention to it.
-When Piersol arrived, things seemed to be in disarray,
with many people trying to talk to Booth at once. It was not an
environment consistent with getting the job done in an orderly
manner. He felt that Booth was overwhelmed with the crush of
activity and simply could not get everything done. Piersol told
us that Booth, who had been Chief since May, 1991, was highly
respected but had had no recent field command experience when he
suddenly found himself running the entire city.
Piersol decided the first thing to do was to try to
establish calm in the command post. He gathered all of the
department people together and told them that from that point
forward they were to bring all of their requests and information
1
Piersol pointed out that he was with the Department
Command, not the EOC; the command happened to adjoin the EOC.
stated that Kalish was the EOC commander during the A watch.
He
2
After the interview, Lt. Voge, an assistant to Piersol,
gave us a tour of the CDC and the EOC.
3
to him for evaluation and he would make whatever recommendations
to Booth he felt appropriate. He became the funnel through which
all requests, concerns and information were filtered. He said he
felt that somebody needed to have the courage to make some
decisions and that he was that person. He told Booth that the
activity in his office would drop 90% since the department staff
would mainly be dealing with him instead of with Booth. Booth
was very pleased with this.
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EOC THROUGHOUT THE DISTURBANCE
Piersol stated that the EOC generally ran smoothly once
he took charge of the information flow to Booth. He had to make
some changes in order to get the information he needed. For
instance, he revamped the message system. When he arrived, they
were using a runner system employing special message forms which
allowed copies of messages to be routed to the various
representatives who needed the information. Piersol said that
these message forms simply did not work because they were often
mis-routed and/or ignored, so he discontinued their use. He
found it much more efficient to simply walk around and talk to
all of the personnel and get from them first-hand reports of the
information they were obtaining.
Technically, the communications worked well. Although
the communications systems were not a problem, however, the
accuracy and timeliness of the information was a problem. It was
not uncommon for the Field Commanders to forget to notify the EOC
of the activities in their areas simply because they were so
busy. A lot of the information which the EOC received was wrong
or would come in 12 to 24 hours late. For instance, they heard
on April 30 that the Guard was established at the Police Academy;
it turned out that there were only a handful of National Guard at
that time. The EOC did, however, receive a lot of good
information.
Piersol stated that the purpose of the EOC was the
coordination of resources within the City of Los Angeles. Once
the resources were sent to the field command posts, the
operations decisions (~, where personnel should go and what
they should do) were made by the field commanders. The EOC dealt
with city-wide policy decisions, such as cancelling the Dodger
game and the activities at the Sports Arena, and closing Venice
beach.
Booth had "drop lines" to the field command posts and
to the National Guard. The field command posts would call Booth
directly with competing requests and it was Booth's job to "break
the ties." The types of decisions with which Piersol was
involved concerned transportation, food, and people needing
special consideration. Piersol also instituted briefings of the
arriving staff each time there was a watch change in order to
4
pass on a full picture of the events which had occurred over the
prior 12 hours. He put together packages of information for
these briefings which included some written reports regarding
intelligence, DWP, locations of fires, etc.
Chief Gates was not there much, although he and Booth
talked a lot by telephone. Gates would come on occasion to the
morning briefings. As time went on, these briefings grew and
finally became the city briefings. First, Piersol would brief
Booth, then Booth would brief the Mayor. Sometimes they briefed
the press. There were no press present at the EOC. The
Emergency Operations Board ("EOB") was briefed three or four
times during the disturbance. Piersol took part in this.
Generally, the interaction between the emergency
agencies worked well. There was a specific military liaison at
the Department Commander level. There was a National Guard
representative at the EOC twenty-four hours a day. Piersol would
inform Booth of the requests for Guard personnel and Booth would
make the request of the Guard representative. Lt. Voge mentioned
to us during our tour of the EOC premises that it was very
helpful to have the Guard representative present at the EOC.
A representative of the Emergency Resource Board, named
Canfield, was in the EOC constantly. The mayor also had
representatives there. The FBI representative sat right in
Booth's office instead of in the EOC room with the
representatives from the other agencies, which made it difficult
for Booth and Piersol to frankly discuss use of the federal law
enforcement personnel.
Piersol does not remember seeing much of the sheriff's
representative. They did not really use the sheriff's Mutual Aid
Plan. He does remember seeing and coordinating with the CHP
representative, Ser~eant Gomez, mainly with regard to Fire
Department escorts. Most of Piersol's activity was with the
National Guard or federal law enforcement.
4
When asked whether
he saw police from outlying areas, he stated that one night the
San Diego police came. They were sent to the Sports Arena
parking lot, but were not deployed, so they went back home. He
3
Lt. Voge told us that the relationship with the CHP
worked well because LAPD gave CHP a specific, discrete task (Fire
Dept. escort) that CHP could do its own way using its own
procedures and personnel.
4
Lt. Voge stated that the biggest problem was the deployment
of the National Guard. They ran into a lot of problems with the
military in terms of communications. For example, the word
"deployment" means one thing to LAPD and another thing to the
Guard.
5
thought there might still be tension with the San Diego police
because of that. He does not know who requested the San Diego
police or why they were there.
Piersol mentioned that the DWP representative was
frustrated because he could not get the LAPD to pay attention to
his requests until Piersol took over. As an aside, Piersol,
referring to the LAPD, said to us "Sometimes we're not very nice
to people."
Piersol was asked whether, in his view, the Department
Commander usurped EOC personnel. He responded that this
happened, but it was bound to, because a good manager is going to
use the people around him. For instance, Lieutenant Doan was
essentially commandeered by Booth and Piersol even though he was
actually with the EOC.
TRAINING
Piersol was not very knowledgeable about EOC training.
He said that he believed the EOC is staffed by a standing team
and thus, in theory, there are people trained to do this. He
went on to comment that he has heard that the training of the
personnel at the field command posts was not good. The field
commander is determined by the gravity of the situation. In a
situation such as this, a Bureau commanding officer should assume
the field commandership.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Piersol does not think that the Department Commander
should have been officed with the EOC. First, the Department
Commander sees people as generic resources and enlists for his
purposes whomever he sees. Although the EOC was not supposed to
be a command post, it became one because the Department Commander
was there.
5
Further, he feels that the Department Commander should
not have been buried in an artificial environment three floors
below the ground. One could not even tell if it was day or
night, or what kind of a day or night it was: One had no sense
of the reality of what was happening on the streets. The
Department Commander should have been somewhere, with his own
staff, where he could have obtained immediate information and
sent out his own scouts to verify the accuracy of the information
he was getting. The Department Commander needs his "eyes and
5
Lt. Voge thought that it was great having the Department
Commander officed with the EOC. He thought that the downside was
that traffic could get bad.
6
ears" out in the field or needs to be in the field himself in a
helicopter to insure the accuracy of the information.
In addition, a tentacle system should be used for
redundancy in information-gathering. The Department Commander
should be connected to a person at each field command post; the
Department Commander could pick up the phone and call that person
directly.
As a final point, Piersol and the Bureau Chiefs
generated a demobilization plan. People were tired of the
mobilization, and this stop-gap measure was developed; it took
the police into the next 30 to 60 days. It is a voluminous
report and covers command posts, watches, and a deployment plan
which would work for future deployments. It represents ''good
work on the part of a lot of people." He promised to send us a
copy.
NOTE: We recommend that Lt. Voge be interviewed regarding EOC
operations.
DOCID: T:\MC\WEBSTER\PIERSOL.MEM
7
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Description
Interview of Frank Piersol, Los Angeles Police Department Commander. Topics include his recollection of the civil disturbance, the adequacy of the Los Angeles Police Department's response, and the structure and operation of theLos Angeles Police Department's Emergency Operations Center, 1992 August 28.
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-08-28
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
7 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
Interviews
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-33056
Unique identifier
UC11449702
Identifier
box 20 (box),web-box20-050-01.pdf (filename),folder 50 (folder),webster-c100-33056 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box20-050/web-box20-050-01.pdf
Dmrecord
33056
Format
7 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992