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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-06-16
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Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-06-16
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Content
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-WORK PRODUCT
MEMORANDUM
Richard J. Stone
General Counsel and Staff Director
S. Maya Iwanaga
June 16, 1992
June 15, 1992 Interview of Commander
Frank Piersol of the LAPD
A. Introduction.
On June 15, 1992, at 9:30 a.m. at the Office of the
Special Advisor, I attended an interview of Commander Piersol
taken by Paul Bower and Gerry Chaleff. Laurel Bryan was also
present. The following is a summary of my recollection of this
meeting, including the questions and comments, together with my
mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the
meeting.
B. Commander Piersol's Background and Job Description.
Commander Frank Piersol ("Piersol"} serves as the
liaison between the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") and
the Board of Police Commissioners {"the Commission"). He is a
~-- --- - - - --- - - - ---- - - - - - - - -- - - --
contact point through which the Commission and the LAPD can
communicate, but neither the Commission nor the LAPD is
required to go through Piersol. Before being appointed to the
liaison position, Piersol served as the Assistant Commanding
Officer of the Valley Bureau. According to Piersol, the
liaison position is not sought after by members of the
Department - - some want the job, some do not. When he took the
liaison position, he thought he would soon be promoted to
Deputy Chief Commander, but this did not occur.
Piersol's main contact with the Commission is the
President [Commissioner Sheinbaum]. He works with the
President in trying to anticipate what on the Commission's
books and agenda will be of special interest. He also deals
with other Commissioners on an individual basis. For example,
Piersol and the Commissioner assigned to "use of force" issues
often meet to go over the files regarding recent "use of force"
incidents.
Piersol attends the Police Commission's weekly Tuesday
meetings. There are no formal briefings for the meetings, but
a meeting notebook and agenda are prepared before each meeting
setting out what issues are to be addressed that day. There
are six or seven different categories of topics on every
agenda. Although "intelligence" is not a formal agenda
category, the Commission has an ongoing relationship with
different intelligence units .
2
The meeting directly following the King verdict
disturbances was cancelled, so Piersol is not sure whether a
meeting notebook exists which outlines issues after the
disturbances. He knows that the Commission asked the LAPD for
a report regarding the disturbances, and that the request was
withdrawn. Apparently the Commission decided it was too
premature to ask for a report, and decided it did not want to
risk inaccuracy. If there is an LAPD internal investigation
currently being conducted, he thinks Dinse is probably in
charge of coordinating it.
Piersol's job as liaison will no longer exist as of
July 1 because the LAPD has been restructured pursuant to
Christopher Commission recommendations. He thinks his position
will be filled by the new Executive Director, but that the
Executive Director will fail as a liaison for two reasons:
{l} the new Executive Director will be a civilian, and LAPD
people are generally reluctant to talk to civilian outsiders,
and {2) the new Executive Director will not have Piersol's 27
years of institutional experience with the LAPD. Piersol
thinks his 27 years of experience enables him to discern who is
telling the truth, and to obtain access to Captains and other
LAPD officers who will tell him what he needs to know.
C. Pre-Verdict Briefings and Discussions Between The LAPD
and the Police Commission.
1. Executive Sessions.
3
During the Rodney King trial, the Commission never
received formal briefing from the LAPD regarding the trial and
potential post-verdict disturbances. These matters were
brought up orally, however, by the Chief of Police ("Chief
Gates") and/or his representatives at the Commission's
closed-door Executive Sessions. During these oral briefings
Gates said that plans were being developed, contingency plans
and that the LAPD was coordinating with agencies which might be
affected by potential unrest. Generally, the Executive
Sessions were attended by Chief Gates, a representative from
the Mayor's Office, the five Commissioners and Piersol.
According to Piersol, there are no exact records of discussions
held during these Executive Sessions because everyone took
handwritten notes. In addition, no tactical manuals or
training videos were ever presented.
In the past, if an emergency came up or a disturbance
was anticipated, the Commission would ask Chief Gates to bring
his planning people to a Commission meeting to brief the
Commission on operational issues. The Commission and Chief
Gates and/or his planning people would then discuss in detail
what was anticipated, who was doing what, where, etc. Piersol
believes that the amount and content of information transmitted
in these exchanges hinged on the "good faith" of the Commission
and the Police Chief.
4
By contrast, any discussions between the LAPD and the
Commission regarding a potential "not guilty verdict" in the
King trial were very general. Piersol does not recall anyone
on the Commission asking for specifics from the LAPD.
2. What Piersol Would Have Done to Investigate
the LAPD's Pre-Verdict Preparation.
Piersol could have found out what Chief Gates was
doing to prepare for the King verdict, but the Commission did
not ask him to do so. If Piersol had been asked to report to
the Commission regarding the LAPD's "riot preparation," he
would have conferred with his Executive Officer, Rich Dameron,
and would then have generated a memo to the Chief Gates asking
him to provide an in-depth report on the riot preparation by a
given deadline. To get his own information regarding
preparation for a "not guilty" verdict, Piersol would have
talked to the following people:
from the Office of Operations:
from Tactical Planning:
from the Bureau of Commanders:
from the Metro Division:
regarding training:
regarding Communications and
Logistics:
5
Assistant Chief Vernon
Sergeant Henness, (he
may be a lieutenant by
now)
Various Captains
Captain McKinley
Captain Riley
Commander Jones and the
Captain in charge of
Communications
D. Chronology of Events During Disturbances.
1. April 29, 1992.
On April 29, 1992, Piersol was at the Commission
Offices watching television with a few other officers. Because
the Police Commission was not meeting that day, it was typical
for Piersol to be there. He was in uniform because he had
plans to pick up Commissioners De Los Reyes and Lane at
6:00 p.m. at Commissioner Lane's house, to take them on an
"off-hours trip." On these "off-hours trips," Piersol takes
one or two Commissioners out in an unmarked car to "patrol"
different areas of Los Angeles.
He saw a televised announcement that the verdict was
going to be announced at three o'clock. He may have spoken
with the Commissioners about this, but does not recall. He is
generally in constant contact with the Commissioners throughout
the day.
There was no formal announcement from the LAPD that
the verdict was going to be announced, only general rumors.
The minute the verdict was broadcast, Piersol joked with the
other people present that he would see them "at the command
post" -- he was joking because there was no command post. He
sensed he was going to be out all night.
Piersol stopped watching TV after the verdict was
announced. He left work at approximately 5:00 to 5:30 p.m. to
pick up Commissioners Lane and De Los Reyes. According to
6
Piersol he planned to follow through on his normal duties and
did not do anything out of the ordinary. He got a call at
5:00 p.m. regarding the Florence and Normandie situation, and
had some idea that there were problems, but thought that the
problems were confined to Florence and Normandie. There were
no problems at the Parker Center yet, and nothing unusual came
over the police radio.
When Piersol got to Lane's house in Hancock Park, the
general sense among Piersol, Lane and De Los Reyes was that the
riot was gaining momentum and problems were increasing. At
that time, Commissioners Brewer and Sheinbaum were on their way
to the AME Church. Apparently, they were headed there because
sometime before the verdict, Brewer had briefed the Commission
regarding a contingency plan which placed the Commissioners in
charge of working with the community in the event any
disturbances occurred.
Piersol, Lane and De Los Reyes headed toward the AME
Church in Piersol's unmarked car. Piersol was still in
uniform. They headed eastbound on Third to Western, then
headed south on Western to the South Bureau area. Before
reaching the Santa Monica Freeway, things seemed fairly typical
to Piersol. As soon as Piersol hit Western south of the Santa
Monica Freeway, however, it was very clear to him, based on his
experience and gut feelings, that an emergency situation was at
hand. He decided to take the Commissioners as far into the
7
events that were occurring as he thought was safe. He had his
radio on the South Bureau radio frequency the entire time. As
they headed South on Western he noticed cars caravaning and
increased unusual pedestrian activity. He described the
atmosphere as "angry." He said you could almost see and touch
the anger in the people surrounding them. What was most
alarming to Piersol was that people were committing traffic
violations and otherwise causing disturbances but were not
stopping or hesitating even after seeing Piersol in his
uniform. He was surprised that there was no reaction and that
no one was intimidated. He felt that the hatred was being
directed toward him and that people's anger increased when they
saw him. Piersol decided to take evasive action when he
thought he saw someone lean out of the sunroof of a car and
prepare to throw a bottle (perhaps filled with gas) at
Piersol's car. He also saw another group approach the car with
an aluminum bat. When he got to Western and Slauson he heard a
"help call" on the radio from an officer shot on Slauson and
Western. "Help calls" are rare and are only made when officers
are facing imminent life-threatening situations. Piersol
decided to investigate. He turned eastbound on the street
after Slauson and then headed south again across railroad
tracks. He saw a Toyota in the intersection with the windows
knocked out. He thought that the car had recently been
abandoned.
Piersol then realized that he had not seen any police
8
cars or officers and this alarmed him. The residential areas
were teeming with activity and the people seemed universally
angry. At this point he decided to get out of the area. He
drove north to Vernon and got onto the Harbor Freeway heading
north in order to get to the Civic Center. He got to the Civic
Center at approximately 7:00 p.m. His radio was still on the
South Bureau frequency. He heard a number of "help calls" and
"shots fired" calls.
Once Piersol, Lane and De Los Reyes got to the Civic
Center, they went into the Mayor's Office in City Hall.
Commissioners Brewer, Sheinbaum, Lane and De Los Reyes,
Piersol, the officers working for Piersol and Lt. Voge, among
others, were there. To Piersol the Civic Center area situation
was a lot like the situation in the South Bureau -- major
concentrations of demonstrators, fires burning on the City Hall
east grounds and streets blocked with traffic. Piersol did not
see any looting at that time. He saw some police but he can't
remember where. At one point, Piersol smelled smoke in the
Mayor's Office and thought City Hall itself might be on fire.
Lane and De Los Reyes wanted to go to the EOC, but
Piersol was concerned for their safety and thought they should
go home. At approximately 9:00 p.m., and after some
discussion, everyone decided that the Commissioners should be
escorted home. Lane and De Los Reyes were escorted by members
of Piersol's staff to Lane's home. Lt. Voge and Piersol
9
followed Brewer to his home above Crenshaw Shopping Center.
Piersol is not sure where Sheinbaum went. Piersol estimates
that he was at the Mayor's office for less than an hour.
During that time there were no formal discussions and no one
saw Chief Gates.
After Piersol and Voge dropped Brewer off, Voge wanted
to retrace the route back to City Hall, but Piersol wanted to
"check out" the situation. They decided to go to La Brea to
see the activity in Upper Baldwin Hills. On La Brea, they saw
burning buildings and looting. Both officers were in uniform.
Although Piersol was attempting to avoid stop lights and
traffic, the two got "caught" at one light. An approaching
group ultimately left them alone, however. They saw some
police officers near 39th and La Brea. The officers had their
guns drawn and were inside a store. This was the only show of
organized police force Piersol saw in the area. Piersol and
Voge then headed eastbound toward the Santa Monica Freeway and
saw a huge fire burning south of the freeway near Western.
Shortly before midnight, the two officers went back to the
Commission Offices at Parker Center where they stayed until
2:00 or 3:00 a.m. While at Parker Center, they listened to the
radio and "generally stayed available" for the Commissioners.
There were only two or three people there at the time.
Piersol did not see Chief Gates or any other
10
commanding officer that night. He did not think that this was
unusual, however, because commanding officers would not have
been at the Commission Offices. He recalls overhearing that a
command post had been set up.
Piersol went home at approximately 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.,
thinking that he would go out with the Commissioners the next
day and assess the damage. He thought the disturbances would
be over by morning.
2. April 30, 1992.
Commander Piersol took Brewer, Lane, and Sheinbaum out
for several hours. He thought that things were less in control
than they were on April 29. While with the Commissioners,
Piersol went to the command post set up at 54th and Arlington.
It was mid-morning, and the situation at the command post was
chaotic. There were a lot of highway patrol cars, buses, and
people. He attended a briefing given by Captains Moran and
Elfmont. He did not see Chief Gates there, does not recall if
he saw Commander Banks, and did not see Captain Jefferson.
Piersol is not sure who was in charge of the 54th and
Arlington command post. Piersol explained that higher ranks
can always take charge of a situation no matter where they are
from, even if they are out of the specific chain of command.
He added, however, that there is no formal transition in the
chain of command if an incident seems to be under control. A
senior commander will only take over if the incident seems too
large for the lieutenant or other officer in charge.
11
E. Piersol's Suggestions and Theories Regarding
What Went Wrong.
1. The LAPD Was Adversely Affected by the King beating,
the Christopher Commission and related events.
The Chief of Police is the general manager of the
LAPD. Below the Chief are three Assistant Chiefs {"ACs").
Since May 1991, however, there have only been two ACs because
Chief Brewer retired and the position was not refilled. Below
the ACs are Deputy Chiefs {"DCs"). There are always nine
Chiefs total, but the number of ACs and DCs who make up the
nine Chiefs varies. Deputy Chief Frankle of the Operations
Headquarters Bureau reports to Chief Vernon. The four other
DCs reporting to Vernon are as follows: {l) Hunt {South
Bureau), {2) Levant {West Bureau), {3) Kroeker {Valley Bureau),
and {4) Parks {Central Bureau). Chief Vernon answers to Chief
Gates. Assistant Chief Dotson is head of the Office of
Administrative Services. Chief Vernon is, however, recognized
as the true assistant to the Chief of Police.
With predictable "events," Chief Gates normally calls
in the ACs, the DCs and the Bureau Chiefs to consider and
discuss potential problems regarding the event. He asks for
operational plans outlining steps to take if the event occurs.
According to Piersol this would have been a routine typical
meeting, but was not held before the King verdict. Similar
meetings took place in anticipation of the Pope's visit and the
Olympics.
12
According to Piersol, the Bureau Chiefs have a lot of
autonomy and could have set up their own meetings and
post-verdict contingency plans. However, the LAPD organization
is such that everyone looks for direction from their
superiors. Piersol describes it as a "quasi-military"
environment. Piersol does think, however, that Chief Vernon
and the Metro Division were doing some work in preparation of
the verdict. He specifically recalled the Metro Division
training its officers to do "extractions" -- rescuing civilians
from riot conditions in preparation for the verdict.
With regard to why Chief Gates failed to call such a
meeting in anticipation of the King verdict, Piersol explained
that the LAPD was not in typical times after the King beating.
In connection with the Christopher Commission investigation,
ACs were testifying and were appearing to be in conflict with
the Department and the Chief. According to Piersol, the
fallout from this affected the whole Department. For example,
the relationship between Chief Dotson and Chief Gates fell
apart. After the Christopher Commission report was published,
communications began to shutdown between the officers, even
regarding day-to-day things. The atmosphere was extremely
competitive. On top of this, Chief Vernon was suing the
Commission for $10 million.
Also contributing to the environment was the Police
Chief selection process which placed the top managers of the
organization in competition for the Chief position. Applicants
13
stopped making decisions in an effort to "lay low" and avoid
negative attention. For example, during the Gay and Lesbian
demonstrations on the West Side, things were allowed to happen
that normally would not have ·been allowed to happen,~,
demonstrators were able to stop traffic. Piersol specifically
criticized Chief Levant of the West Bureau for having no focus
on tactical detail, and allowing the weight of political
effects to affect his decisions.
2. Changes in the Police Commission Affected the
Commission's Relationship with the LAPD and
Chief Gates.
According to Piersol, the Chief of Police "sets the
tone" in relations between the Commission and the LAPD. The
Chief of Police is the general manager of the Police Department
and is thus responsible for the day-to-day management of the
Department. The Commission deals with broader issues such as
setting, establishing and modifying policy. Communication
between the Chief and the Commission depends on the good faith
relationship between the two. Because the current Commission
has more actively and aggressively overseen the Chief's duties,
communications may not have been as open.
The Commission which existed before the Rodney King
beating had an interest level that was not as intense as the
interest level of the current Commission -- Commissioner Yslas
was pre-occupied and busy as an attorney for Northrup,
14
Commissioner Tooley had just returned to the Commission,
Commissioner Williams had physical impairments, and Commissioner
Boeckmann was geographically removed and busy with his own
business. With the Commission in place before the King
beating, Piersol dealt only with agenda items at the weekly
meetings unless special issues arose. According to Piersol,
the Tuesday meetings were the "driving force" behind Piersol
and the Commission moving forward. Both the energy level of
the previous Commission and Piersol's day-to-day involvement
with that Commission were much lower than they are today.
By contrast, Piersol is in constant contact with the
current Commissioners. Comparing the current Commission to
prior Commissions, Piersol thinks the Commission currently in
place is more "proactive" than "reactive." Since the Rodney
King beating, the Commission has increased its role overseeing
the Chief of Police. The Commission in place right after the
beating was very aggressive and adversarial in its relationship
with the Chief -- and attempted to oust him. Piersol thinks
this may have affected the manner in which the potential
disturbances was handled by the Chief.
Regarding the Commission's role during the
disturbances, Piersol clarified that the Commission's role was
not to run the "event" -- this was the job of the Police Chief
as general manager of the LAPD. The Commissioners should have
been monitoring the situation on a larger scale. Piersol
noted, however, that the "situation" was not normal going into
15
the incident and that the Commission's adversarial relationship
with the Chief of Police may have affected communications
between the LAPD and the Commission.
3. Tactical Manual was not Implemented Correctly.
The Tactical Manual dictates how to handle unusual
occurrences -- staffing, field jail units, buses,
communications, etc. The Tactical Manual governs LAPD conduct
and activities during unusual occurrences, from natural
disasters to civil unrest. Tactical Planning is responsible
for the Tactical Manual. According to Piersol, the last
revisions of the Tactical Manual were as of January of 1992.
With regard to press reports that the manual was
revised in May 1992, Piersol believes that these were the
January 1992 changes that were distributed in May. He does not
believe any changes have been made as a result of the King
disorders. Thus, any recent revisions reflected in the manual
were already in the "pipeline" and are not a result of the
riots. There may even have been a Police Commission meeting
before the riots during which the revisions were briefed.
According to Piersol, although a Tactical Manual
exists, each Watch Commander in each area has his own standing
operational plans. He thinks the Bureaus should oversee these
plans and work with the individual captains. Training occurs
at the command posts themselves.
From Piersol's police management perspective, it would
16
not have been a big deal for the Department to handle the
disturbances. He thinks that there was an adequate plan in
existence, the Tactical Manual, but that it was not implemented
correctly. The incident could easily have been managed because
the LAPD had the Tactical Manual, the training and the
resources to do so.
Piersol says the baseline reference point in our
inquiries should be the Tactical Manual, because the bottomline
problem was in the LAPD's execution of that plan. He also
believes that individual culpability in this matter is
unavoidable.
4. Although Specific Plans Were Prepared For Other
Incidents, No Such Plan Was Prepared In
Anticipation Of The Kind Verdict.
Piersol said that although specific plans for unusual
occurrences had been prepared in the past, no such plan was
prepared in anticipation of the King verdict. Piersol
specifically referred to detailed plans that had been prepared
for Operation Rescue. Piersol also mentioned specific plans
that had been prepared for the Olympics, for security at
Olympic Village at UCLA, and for the visit of the Pope to Los
Angeles. Piersol believes that the disarray described above
was at least one of the reasons why no such plan was prepared
for the King disorders. Another important factor was the
general perception that guilty verdicts would have been handed
down.
17
5. Community Based Policing Affected the Chain of Command.
The LAPD is divided into four bureaus. The 18
stations normally report to those four bureaus as follows:
5 stations report to the Valley Bureau;
5 stations report to the Central Bureau;
4 stations report to the South Bureau, and
4 stations report to the West Bureau.
Community based policing changes the chain of command because
divisions which become a part of the community based policing
group report directly to Chief Gates. Essentially, community
based policing removes the Bureau Chiefs and Vernon from the
chain of command. Division heads report directly to the Chief
of Police and to Dinse, the community based policing
coordinator. Previously, the Division heads reported to the
Bureau Chiefs who reported to Chief Vernon, who then reported
to Chief Gates.
When community based policing took effect, three
divisions from the South Bureau became a part of the
"experiment": the 77th, Harbor and Southeast Divisions.
Because three South Bureau Divisions were made a part of
community policing, South Bureau's Chief Hunt felt that his
command was essentially "taken away" and he was not happy about
it. His command shrunk to 30 to 40 people. Four other
divisions began reporting to Chief Gates under community based
policing including the Pacific, Hollenbeck and Foothill
Divisions.
18
6. The EOC is not Suited as a Command Center.
Piersol does not think that the Division Commanders
should have been working out of the EOC because the EOC is not
suited as a command post. Regarding centralization, Piersol
believes that the EOC is not designed to handle multiple
incidents, although it was effective during the Olympics.
7. "Surprise."
According to Piersol, everyone on the Commission and
all the Deputy Chiefs were aware of problems which might occur
in the event of a "not guilty" verdict. He knows this because
the Commissioners asked every Deputy Chief interviewed for the
Chief of Police position what he would do if a "not guilty"
verdict were announced. This interview opportunity presented
the perfect chance for a Deputy Chief to say specifically what
he was doing in preparation for a "not guilty" verdict.
Despite this, Piersol thinks that everyone was
surprised by the verdict, and that this was a major factor
affecting the LAPD's handling of the disturbances. According
to Piersol, the "not guilty" verdicts threw the whole system
off. There were pre-verdict discussions addressing potential
"not guilty" verdicts, but these discussions were usually
prefaced by statements like "in the event we have an
unpredictable verdict ... "
19
F. Conclusion.
The interview was terminated at this point. Piersol
agreed to contact Paul Bower to set up another interview
session later in the week. Piersol gave Paul Bower a copy of
the Tactical Manual to review before the next session.
SMI:js:8154N
95404-00001
(Webster/LAPD)
20
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Description
Interview of Frank Piersol, Los Angeles Police Department Commander. Topics include his recollection of the civil disturbance, the adequacy of the Los Angeles Police Department's response, and the structure and operation of theLos Angeles Police Department's Emergency Operations Center, 1992 June 16.
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-06-16
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
20 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
Interviews
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-33057
Unique identifier
UC11449686
Identifier
box 20 (box),web-box20-050-02.pdf (filename),folder 50 (folder),webster-c100-33057 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box20-050/web-box20-050-02.pdf
Dmrecord
33057
Format
20 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992