Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-12

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Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-12

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Content TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
OFFICE OF THE SPEOAL ADVISOR
TO THE BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
MEMORANDUM
RICHARD J. STONE,
General Counsel and Staff Director
RICHARD A. ROSENTHAL,
SCOTT EDLEMAN
LEONARD SHARENOW
Counsel
August 12, 1992
Privileged and Confidential
Attorney Work Product
Interview of Commander Bayan Lewis,
Uniform Services Group
Los Angeles Police Department
On August 6, 1992, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., at the Los Angeles
Police Department Headquarters (Parker Center), located at 150 N. Los Angeles
Street, in the City of Los Angeles, we conducted an interview of Commander Bayan
Lewis. The following is a summary of our recollection of this meeting, including
our questions and comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions
and opinions, based upon the meeting.
Experience & Training:
Commander Lewis is a twenty nine year veteran of the Los Angeles Police
Department, who is presently assigned as the Commander of the Uniform Services
Group, located on the sixth floor of Parker Center. Commander Lewis has
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1
..
experience as a field supervisor and watch commander and as an adjutant, in charge
of instructional technology.
1
Lewis has previous command experience as Captain of
the Venice (now Pacific), Foothill, West Valley, Rampart and Anti-Terrorist
Divisions. He was previously the assistant commanding officer of the Central
Bureau.
In March, 1991, Commander Lewis was moved to the Uniform Services Group
where he is in charge of the elite Metro Division, Air Support and Tactical Planning.
Commander Lewis was in this position at the time of the verdict in the Rodney
King case and the ensuing civil unrest.
The Metropolitan Division:
The Metro Division consists of 5 platoons of officers, who are available for city-wide
deployment. The Division consists of two platoons of armed suppression officers
(50 officers per platoon), one platoon of SWAT (Special Weapons & Tactics) (50
officers), one platoon of mounted officers (30 officers), and one platoon of K-9
officers (17 officers). The Air support unit consists of two sections: Astro (who
provide support and assistance to patrol units and a special flight section which
assists in undercover and surveillance operations (primarily for narcotics, internal
affairs and anti-terrorist operations). The tactical planning unit has the
responsibility for maintenance, upkeep and deployment of the department's tactical
(mobile) fleet and is responsible for the tactical training documentation (orders,
bulletins, etc.) for emergency response and training. This section also maintains and
audits Division emergency binders, trains field command post cadres and handles
the hazardous material investigations team.
1
In this position, Lewis put together training modules for the police academy and the various divisions.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 2
The Emei:gency Operations Organization;
In his capacity as commander of the Uniform Services Group, Lewis is a
departmental representative for the City Emergency Management Committee (along
with the Commander of the Bureau of Support Services). The Emergency
Management Committee (E.M.C.) is made up of representatives from all
Departments in the city. The representatives are commonly one level below the
managers of the various city departments. Lewis also chaired the policy and
procedures board of the E.M.C., which meets monthly. This board plans and
proposes the budget for the E.M.C. (presently around $500,000). The Emergency
Management Committee is under the Emergency Management Board (E.M.B.)
which is under the Emergency Operations Organization (E.O.O). The E.O.O. is in
charge of planning for citywide emergency situations such as a major earthquake or
other disaster.
State of Preparedness:
Lewis believes the city was unprepared for the civil unrest following the King
verdict. Lewis pointed out that the last major civil disturbance in city history was
over 20 years ago. After the Watts riots, the city did substantial planning and
implemented many of the McCombs report suggestions. However, due to the
passage of over two decades, the city became lax and "got out of the civil disturbance
mode." Lewis stated that the city did not get back to thinking about riots in disaster
planning until March, 1991. Even this planning, however, anticipated civil unrest
that would be sporadic and easily handled by the Los Angeles Police Department,
without outside assistance.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 3
Lewis compared the emergency operations plan to that of an ostrich with its head in
the sand. No one believed a riot of the type that actually occurred would in fact take
place. Lewis states that there was no direction from the Mayor, or his staff to prepare
for the type of unusual occurrence which actually took place. Neither the city nor
the department perceived this as a driving need.
Lewis informed us that following the Rodney King beating and the Latasha Harlins
sentencing, the Los Angeles Police Department began its planning for possible civil
unrest. As an aside, the Department briefed the Emergency Operations
Organization. The Department did not, however, try to drive the E.O.O. into
becoming riot oriented. The E.O.O. was responsible for natural disasters, LAPD was
responsible for civil disturbances. Lewis could not personally visualize a Watts type
riot occurring again. Members of his group did talk about the potential for riots, but
not the citywide explosion that actually occurred. The only planning conducted was
for sporadic rioting that would not necessarily require mutual aide from other
police agencies or the National Guard. "We did not get our mutual aide ducks in
line."
Lewis informed us that the Department can only request mutual assistance from
another police agency in a "Level III Earthquake." Otherwise, the Department must
go through the Sheriff for mutual aide.
Coordination with the L.A.S.O.:
Lewis was in contact with Lt. Dick Odenthal from the Sheriff's Office tactical
planning Division. Lewis attempted to put together a plan with the Sheriff's Office
to address mutual riot planning. This plan fell apart, however, because the Sheriff's
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 4
Office did not want to become involved. Lewis' last attempt to do a joint table top
discussion of riot control with the Sheriff occurred in April, 1992, but the Sheriff's
Office was not interested.
Civil Unrest Planning:
Civil unrest planning was generated out of the tactical planning section, w~ich was
under the control of Lewis. Right after the King beating, Lewis states that he did
conduct planning for the handling of civil unrest, under the auspices of normal
police planning.
Coordination with the National Guard:
On the Friday before the civil unrest began, Lewis contacted Lt. Col. John Benatz,
assigned as the 40th Division G-3 for the National Guard. He did this at the
direction of Chief Gates. Lewis informed Benatz that if a riot resulted from the trial,
he anticipated calling the Guard in at an early point. Lewis asked Benatz to brief the
Division staff and notify the Office of the Commanding General in Sacramento.
Lewis also asked Benatz to keep the preparations quiet because the Mayor and
Council members Ridley-Thomas and Walters wanted the Department to keep a
low profile. Lewis said he was aware of these wishes from the news reports in
which the desires of these politicians were expressed.
Lewis believes that the National Guard was not prepared to respond to the rioting
because, eight years ago, the Guard got away from the "civil disturbance training
mode" and into a "combat mode." Within the last four to five years, the Guard
disbanded the group which was trained to address riot situations. In fact, the Guard
has not addressed a riot situation in 27 years. Given that there did not appear to be a
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 5
threat of rioting in the state, the Guard was not prepared to respond to such a
situation. The Guard's equipment was centralized in order to avoid thefts and to
make sure the equipment was appropriately monitored to keep it in working order.
Most units did not any longer have ready ammunition. According to Lewis, the
danger of theft of the ammunition was perceived to be greater than the need to be
immediately ready for an urban riot situation.
The Verdicts;
Lewis informed us that he did not know when the jury would come in and that the
Department had not made any plans with the Superior Court to be advised prior to
the public announcement of the King verdict. Lewis now believes it is necessary to
be aware of a potentially divisive verdict before it is announced.
2
Commander Lewis was emphatic on the point that everyone believed there would
be guilty verdicts arising from the King beating trial. Lewis stated that he never had
anyone say that the officers "will get off." Lewis and his associates believed that if
there was any civil unrest, it would be easily contained rioting as the result of a
guilty verdict. 'We did not worst case scenario." Unfortunately, the rioting was
substantially more wi_ despread and the Department was "overwhelmed in the first
couple of hours until mutual aide came in."
The Standing Plans:
According to Commander Lewis, each of the 18 geographic areas is required to
develop a tactical response plan. These are referred to as "Divisional standing
2
As an illustration, Lewis pointed out that before the indictment of the officers involved in the King
beating was announced by the United States Attorney, the Department was notified and Metro units were
put on alert.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 6
plans." Each Division is required to update their standing plans every six months.
The Divisional watch commander is responsible for these periodic updates.
Watch Commander Guides:
Lewis provided us with a copy of the ''Watch Commander's Response Guide,"
3
and
a copy of the ''Watch Commander's First Responder Guide."' These guides are
provided to the Divisions by Lewis' subordinates. Lewis believes that these guides
adequately inform the watch commanders about how to respond to unusual
occurrences within their Divisions. These guides were developed in response to the
Watt's riots. These are checklists which can be used on an emergency basis. The
tactical guide itself is too difficult to use at the time of an unexpected emergency
situation. Lewis also provided us with a copy of the ''Watch Commander's Guide
for Control of Disasters and other Emergencies."
5
Lewis believes that this guide,
which should be read by all watch commanders as a part of their general training,
provided the information needed to handle riot type situations. Lewis believes if
the dictates of this guide had been followed by the 77th Division watch commander,
the situation would not have been as chaotic.
Response to the Verdict:
Lewis informed us that on April 29, 1992, Chief Gates called Lewis and told him to
activate the Emergency Operations Command Post, located in the fourth sublevel of
City Hall East. This command post is maintained by the Department's Planning and
Research Division which trains the E.0.C. personnel. Lewis made the appropriate
notifications to various city departments and opened the command post within one
3
Attached as Exhibit No. 1 .
• Attached as Exhibit No. 2.
5
Attached as Exhibit No. 3.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 7
half hour of the not guilty verdict. Once rioting broke out, the command post went
into full operation. Before rioting occurred, the command post telephones were
manned and the personnel were ready to respond to an emergency situation. After
actual rioting broke out, city departments, including Water & Power, Transportation,
and the Fire Department were called in. Chief Frankie was designated on April 29,
1992 to be the Department Commander at the South Bureau Command Post - he
was to manage the Department's resources from this location. Jimmy Jones, the
Commander in charge of Planning & Research was in charge of the E.O.C.
Commander Lewis did not believe he was in a position to critique how the E.O.C.
worked during the aftermath of the King verdict. He did point out, however, that
the Department is presently examining how the E.O.C. performed.
Lewis believes that no matter what the Department did, the rioting could not have
been avoided. "The situation just got out of hand, period." Lewis did have
criticisms of the police response, however.
Lewis believes the Department should have been mobilized at the time of the
verdict. "The Mayor should have told us to do that instead of telling us to remain
low profile and quiet."
Inadequate Response to the Civil Unrest:
Lewis also believes that if Lt. Moulen and Captain Jefferson had gone by what the
standing plans dictated, they could have mustered sufficient forces to deal with
some of the riot locations. The problem was that officers were not deployed because
they were waiting for more. Lewis got to the South Bureau command post at 7:30
p.m. on the night of the jury verdict. At that time, officers were still not deployed.
~RIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 8
Lewis pointed out that Metro Division had been deployed by this time. One of the
Lieutenants, assigned to Metro, told Lewis that the command post commanders
were "not doing anything." Metro, therefore, was forced to act as its own
independent force. Lewis believes that Moulen and Jefferson should have sent out
what forces they had at their disposal so as to at least control one sector initially and
more areas as more officers were made available.
Cadre Preparation & the South Bureau Command Post;
Commander Lewis believes that the cadre preparation, under the supervision of his
group, did not work. He told us that it is up to each individual Bureau to assign and
keep track of the people who are trained to act as members of the cadres. Lewis is
not in a position to dictate to the Bureau commanders how to do this. He can only
hope for compliance and cooperation, but he does not always get it. In particular,
Lewis notes that South Bureau does not respond to his attempts to train cadre
members. Lewis pointed out that it is important to "get depth in cadres." He
explained it is necessary to have numerous individuals who are able to handle the
key positions which would be necessary at an unusual occurrence command post.
According to Lewis, the two key positions would be in handling logistics and
personnel. Next would be intelligence, the executive officer and the field
commander. In the South Bureau command post, the commanders did not
immediately staff the necessary positions and take control over logistics and
personnel.
For example, the command post ran out of cars to disperse personnel even though
there were cars all over the area. Officers were deployed four to a car and the
passenger officers were taking their keys with them . . According to Lewis, logistics
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK -PRODUCT - PAGE 9
officers should have taken keys from all officers who responded to the command
post and dispersed them as appropriate.
Lewis agreed with a characterization of the command post as a "black hole."
Manpower was slow to arrive and there was not much organization. Unfortunately,
the Los Angeles Fire Department abandoned their stations and brought so much
equipment to the command post that the area was too clogged up to know what or
who was there and to control its dispersal. Lewis believes the fire department
should have deployed outside the affected area. There was simply not enough room
for both the police and fire department vehicles and officers. The Highway Patrol
also assembled at the South Bureau command post, in order to provide escort for
fire department teams. These additional units added to the congestion and
confusion at the command post.
Deployment of Metro Division:
Commander Lewis was sent to the South Bureau Command Post by Chief Frankie
after he saw the incidents at Normandy and Florence on television. Lewis was sent
there to determine what Metro could do to help control the situation. According to
Lewis, per his order, the Metro Division was on duty at 6:00 p.m. on the night of the
verdict. Lewis had planned to deploy Metro units from 6:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m.
because he anticipated that if there were going to be disturbances, they would occur
at night, not during the daylight hours.
6
In addition, after the first night's
disturbances, Lewis allowed Metro officers to return home to rest. Again, he did not
anticipate that the rioting would continue during the daylight hours of Thursday,
a Lewis states that he has now learned that civil unrest can also occur during the daylight hours.
Therefore, on the day that the federal indictment of the King officers was announced, he had the Metro
units deploy in the morning and continued them on duty for a period of twenty four hours.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 0
April 30. Lewis was forced to change his Metro Division response plans as a result
of the daytime rioting.
Lewis was very clear that although his initial decision to deploy Metro during the
nighttime hours was incorrect, he did not believe that he had any reason to do
otherwise at the time. According to his knowledge of urban civil disturbances, they
always occur at night. He was simply unable to predict daytime unrest.
Within the Metro Division, Lewis has command over 17 officers assigned to the K-9
section. Lewis was adamant that K-9 units be deployed only for the purpose of
searching for felony suspects and for search and rescue missions. Lewis believes it
would be inappropriate to deploy these officers and dogs for crowd control or riot
suppression. Lewis believes that such a deployment would bring back visions of the
assaults on civil rights activists in the South.
Prior to the outbreak of the rioting, the Metropolitan Division was instructed by
Deputy Chief Hunt to keep a low profile. Even so, Lewis had been deploying the
entire Metro contingent starting at 6:00 every night while the King jury was
deliberating. Lewis deployed six tactical response teams consisting of fourteen
officers each. These teams consisted of ten officers in formation, two counter
snipers and two K-9 officers (for building searches for snipers). Lewis had trained 36
additional officers in "long gun training'' (over and above the SWAT team members
who normally received such training). Lewis explained that SWAT officers, when
not engaged in special SWAT activities, are the Metro Division's "D" platoon.
Lewis does believe that if the Metro Division had been deployed on the morning of
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 11
the verdict, they could have stopped the incidents which occurred at Florence and
Normandy. He also believes, however, that no form of preparation could have
stopped the citywide rioting. Officers would only have been able to control
individual riot locations. The outbreak of rioting simply overwhelmed the ability
of the Department to act. There were simply not enough officers and equipment to
control the explosion of violence.
Command Post Communications:
Lewis specifically recalled that the communication system at the South Bureau
Command post was "awful." Many of the telephone lines at the RTD were
restricted for internal use. When Lewis arrived at the Command Post, his was the
only mobile phone available.
7
By the time Lewis arrived at the Command post, he
believes that 77th Division Captain Jefferson and the Assistant Commander of
South Bureau, Ron Banks, were already there. At that time, Lewis asked Jefferson if
he had seen the television reports of the beatings at Florence and Normandy, and
asked why officers were not at the intersection. Jefferson responded that he was
trying to deploy officers to the area.
At that time, Lewis was aware that the Metro Division was conducting training at
the Southeast Division. After the rioting broke out, Metro officers were redeployed
to the South Bureau Command Post.
By the time Lewis had arrived at the Command Post, the Communications Division
had broadcast a tactical alert (even before Captain Jefferson did so). The command
1
Lewis had previously received 36 mobile phones from the Emergency Operations Organization,
which were distributed throughout the Department. (It might be helpful to find out to whom the phones
were · distributed) .
. PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT · - 'PAGE 1 2
post was so chaotic that officers could not get in or out.
Fire Department Escort:
Lewis further explained that the Department's ability to escort Fire Department
units broke down early in the riot. The Department had not anticipated the
magnitude of the fires or the ferocity of the attacks on Fire Department personnel.
Lewis had met with Fire Department officials, two weeks before the riot. Fire
Department officials had requested body armor. Lewis requested 200 flack vests from
the State Office of Emergency Services. These vests arrive on Thursday, April 30.
Prior to April 29, 1992, Lewis thought that he would have sufficient manpower to
conduct escorts for the Fire Department as well as to conduct riot suppression.
8
Because there was insufficient manpower, however, the initial planning fell apart.
Because of this, the Fire Department did not send out units until after the Highway
Patrol arrived.
9
Other Riot Suppression Tools:
Lewis also explained why other riot suppression tools were not used. Although the
Department has experimented with Water Cannons, the mobile cannons are too
expensive and the non-mobile cannons have been determined to be ineffectual.
Although the Department has tear gas, there are few operative, serviceable masks.
The Metro Division, in the last 25 years, has been the only Division to use tear gas.
10
In all other non-barricade situations, a Commander or above must be present and
authorize the use of tear gas.
a According to Lewis, the Metro Division's first priority is "counter sniper" activities. The second priority
is hostage rescue. The third priority is Fire Department escort duty.
9
At the present time, under a new mutual assistance agreement, the Highway Patrol will be
responsible for Fire Department escorts immediately upon their arrival to provide assistance.
10
And only then to capture barricaded suspects.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 3
Air Support;
Commander Lewis was asked about the lack of air units at the Florence and
Normandy intersection. Lewis informed us that the Department has fifteen
helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft. Two thirds of these ships are usually
available. Under normal circumstances, three helicopters are up in the air at any
one time. The mission of the air unit, during an unusual occurrence, is
observation. In this case, however, the air unit did not respond adequately.
Lewis informed us that at the time the riots broke out, there was initially one
helicopter in the South Los Angeles area. Later, two helicopters were assigned.
Unfortunately, when Lt. Moulen ordered his officers out of the area, the helicopter
followed suit. At the time of the beatings, therefore, the helicopter was circling the
stricken area, unable to observe the assaults. Lewis believes that the pilot acted
improperly in withdrawing from the area and has explicitly instructed officers not to
pull out of the area in similar circumstances in the future. These video downlinks
cannot be used all of the time, due to damage caused by the helicopter's vibration.
These downlinks were not attached to any of the helicopter's at the time the riot
broke out. At the present time, however, if there is any indication that an unusual
occurrence could take place, the video downlinks are immediately attached to the
helicopters who will patrol the area.
Political Climate:
Lewis believes that one of the problems with the Departmental response to the
rioting was caused by the city political officials. Lewis believes that city politicians
have a responsibility to come out clear and strong before an event such as a
controversial verdict, in support of proactive policing. Lewis believes that people
PRIVILEGED & -CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 4
took advantage of the Department's low profile, which was the direct result of
pressure from the Mayor and members of the City Council.
Opinions relating to the Performance of LAPP:
Lewis believes that the Department is simply too small to address the type of
unusual occurrence that resulted from the King verdict, without massive outside
assistance (mutual aid). He does note, however, that the rioting was "stopped in
short order," once outside assistance was procured. Lewis also notes what he
believes to be a remarkable reduction in law enforcement killings when comparing
the recent rioting to the Watt's riots.
Suggestions for the future:
Lewis believes that with a proactive approach to riot control, advance planning and
agreements for assistance from outside agencies, the Department will be able to stop
such rioting in a more appropriate manner. Lewis believes that if a similar riot were
to occur tomorrow, there would still be major damage in the first few hours, but that
rioting would be under control more quickly and with less overall damage.
Lewis has also ordered "rubber baton rounds"
11
which, he believes, will assist the
Metro Division in riot suppression. These "bullets," when fired into a crowd,
bounce around hitting numerous members of the crowd and causing them to
believe that they have been shot. In other cities, crowds have dispersed quickly, and
those people hit have been uninjured. Lewis believes these rounds can be used in
the future to disperse looters.
11
Rubber bullets fired from gas guns.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 5
Lewis believes that the prolonged absence of a police presence helped to embolden
rioting crowds and exacerbated their actions. However, Lewis now has a
comprehensive plan with the National Guard for military assistance to the
Department. The Guard would be used to protect vital points, such as gun shops
and retail stores.
Deployment of Federal Troops:
Lewis did note that the dispatch of Federal troops, to supplement the National
Guard and state police departments, was a "disaster." According to Lewis, the
National Guard become peace officers when mobilized and are used to support civil
authorities. A representative from the Emergency Operations Committee acts as a
liaison to the Guard. When the Guard was activated, they were available to respond
quickly to requests made by the Department. The Army, however, had to go
through the active army chain of command and conduct a risk analysis before
accepting any mission. Lewis states that the Army would take twenty four hours to
simply decide whether it would conduct a mission or not, whereas the Guard, under
civilian control, would be able to act immediately. In addition, the Federal officers,
sent by the President, came to the city without appropriate equipment or
transportation. Lewis believes that federal troops and officers were deployed solely
for political reasons and were completely worthless.
Supporting Documents:
Lewis was shown a one page document
12
which he recognized to be an outline of a
Metro Division training day for all area training coordinators. This training was
conducted on April 14, 1992 and was planned in response to the King trial and
12
Attached as Exhibit No. 4. ·
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 6
unrest which might result at the time of the verdict. Lewis admitted that the
training day was put together without much preparation. Lewis emphasized,
however, that the training consisted of information that was already available to
training coordinators through the general tactical planning manuals provided by his
group to the Bureaus.
Lewis provided us with a copy of the "Staff/ Command Officer's Guide,"
13
Lewis
explained that this document provides a quick reference guide for all Captains and
above. This guide was passed out by Lewis at a Senior Officer's training retreat in
June, 1991, as a result of the Rodney King beating. The guide later became part of the
tactical manual.
In July, 1991, Assistant Chief Vernon, through Lewis, provided all area commanding
officers with a "Civil Disorder Training Update"
14
which provided information
relating to the establishment of a field command post, tactical organization, squad
formations and perimeter control.
Lewis was shown a one page document,
15
entitled: ''Tactical Planning Section - State
of Preparedness and Training." This document, he explained, was put together to
brief the Chief of Police as to the state of readiness of the Department as far as tactical
planning was concerned. Lt. Ward was the officer in charge of tactical planning.
This document was provided on or about April 14, 1992, in anticipation of the King
verdict.
13
Attached as Exhibit No. 5 .
. u Attached as Exhibit No. 6. (Also included Watch Commander's "First Responder Guide.")
15
Attached as Exhibit No. 7.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 7
'..
"
As a result of the inadequate response of the Department to the post verdict rioting,
Lewis had his Tactical Planning Section officer in charge, prepare a "Compilation of
Tactical Planning Section U.O. Planning,"
16
as well as a description of the training
conducted by the tactical planning section
17
prior to the King verdict. These
documents were presented in support of Lewis' overall contention that the general
training provided to the Department was sufficient. The problem was that the
Bureaus failed to respond adequately to attempts at training and that the
Department had inadequate resources to deal with the magnitude of the rioting.
1
• Attached as Exhibit No. 8.
11
Attached as Exhibit No. 9.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT - PAGE 1 8

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Description

Interview of Banyan Lewis, Los Angeles Police Department Commander of the Uniform Services Group, about his recollection of the civil disturbance and the role that the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Organization played in quelling the violence, 1992 August 6.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-12

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 18 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-32459

Unique identifier UC11449670

Identifier box 20 (box),web-box20-001-02.pdf (filename),folder 1 (folder),webster-c100-32459 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box20-001/web-box20-001-02.pdf

Dmrecord 32459

Format 18 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts