Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Michale Moulin, interview, 1992-06-08

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Michale Moulin, interview, 1992-06-08

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Content TALCOTT, LIGHTFOOT, VANDEVELDE, WOEHRLE & SADOWSKY
MEMORANDUM
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO: RICHARD J. STONE, General Counsel
And Staff Director
FROM: JOHN D. VANDEVELDE & TERRY W. BIRD
DATE: JUNE 8, 1992
RE: INTERVIEW OF LT. MICHAEL MOULIN -- Part 2
1. Preface--On Friday, June 5, 1992, starting at
approximately 8:10 a.m. and lasting until approximately
11:20 a.m., we interviewed Lt. Michael Moulin at his home in
Fullerton, California. The following is a summary of our
recollections of this meeting, including our questions and
comments, together with our mental impressions, conclusions and
opinions based upon the meeting.
2. Introduction to Interview--Terry Bird had
introduced himself at the first interview. He introduced John
Vandevelde as a private attorney practicing in Los Angeles and
another member of the staff of the General Counsel to William
Webster who had been appointed as Special Advisor to the Police
Commission to investigate the response of the Los Angeles Police
Department to the civil disorder that followed the King verdict
on April 29, 1992.
3. Recording the Interview--By mutual agreement the
interview was tape recorded by Lt. Moulin and by Terry Bird. Lt.
Moulin was accompanied by his wife~ Didi. His attorney, Bradley
Brunon, was not present. Lt. Moulin stated that Mr. Brunon was
aware of the interview and had authorized him to proceed with the
interview without Mr. Brunon being present.
4. Officer's Background--
a. Background at 77th--We explained that we wanted to
clarify Lt. Moulin's experience at the 77th. Lt. Moulin
explained that he transferred to the 77th from Wilshire Vice in
August, 1989. Moulin was the PM Watch Commander at that point.
He remained in that position until approximately January, 1991.
In January, 1991, Lt. Moulin changed watches, initially to
mornings, then to day watches and then back to mornings. He was
told by Captain Brennan that there were some problems on the
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morning watch that had to be straightened out and that's why he
wanted Lt. Moulin transferred to that watch. On April 15, 1992,
Lt. Moulin was switched back to PM Watch Commander. Lt. Moulin
had approximately eight (8) days off between April 15, 1992, when
he returned to the assignment of PM Watch Commander, and
April 29, 1992, the day that the verdicts were announced.
1/24/72
6/72
8/84
7/89
b. Officer's Background Prior to Arrival at 17th--
--Lt. Moulin entered LAPD Academy.
--graduated from Academy, assigned to Harbor Division
as P-1 for 12 months.
--promoted to P-2 and assigned to parking and
intersections for a few months.
--assigned to central patrol.
--assigned to communications for approximately 6
months.
--re-assigned to Harbor Division on patrol, followed
by some community relations work.
--re-assigned to 77th and promoted to P-3 on patrol.
--re-assigned to Personnel Division.
--assigned to Hollenbeck Division on patrol.
--assigned to EODD (Employment Opportunity Development
Division).
--assigned to Communications Division.
--administratively transferred to Newton Division
on patrol.
--assigned to Operations Central Bureau as an
Administrator for Vernon, followed by Frankle,
followed by Ritter.
--re-assigned to CRASH Unit in Central.
--promoted to Sergeant and assigned to Hollenbeck
Division on patrol.
--assigned to Southeast Division.
--assigned to Wilshire Division on patrol.
--worked as Adjutant to three different Captains at
Wilshire, was responsible for personnel complaint
investigations and was Sick and IOD Coordinator.
--promoted to Sgt. II and assigned to Vice Unit.
--promoted to Lt. and remained at Wilshire Division for
approximately 1 to 1 1/2 months before transfer to
77th Division as Watch Commander.
In addition to the above assignments, Lt. Moulin
indicated that he had been "loaned" to units on a number of
occasions, including the shooting team, legislative liaison and
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other assignments. Lt. Moulin indicated that he has had an
inordinate number of transfers and that was his desire. Lt.
Moulin always felt that he should move around to a lot of
different assignments and get as much experience as possible in
as short a time as possible. Lt. Moulin explained that he had
once been questioned in an oral exam about lacking loyalty to the
job or to his commanding officer. Moulin's response at the time
was that his loyalty was to the citizens, not the job or the
commanding officer. Moulin reiterated that to us.
c. Administrative Action Against Officer--In order to
learn about any bias or conflict that may be relevant to the
Commission, we discussed with Lt. Moulin his personnel record and
any incidents that may have resulted in discipline against him or
may have generated friction with other members of LAPD. Lt.
Moulin indicated that only one transfer was an administrative
transfer. That was the one from Communications to Newton
Division. Lt. Moulin indicated that prior to being assigned to
Communications Division, he had been at EODD. He described that
as a "fun job" in which he worked in the office one to two days a
week and the rest of the time was out in the field recruiting
officers. He indicated that he had a lot of freedom and enjoyed
the job very much.
When Proposition 13 was enacted a lot of positions were
cut and as a result all of the non-minority officers in EODD were
eliminated. Lt. Moulin was sent to wherever they could find him
a job. In his case he was assigned to the Communications
Division which he described as an "armpit." While there Lt.
Moulin observed what he described as significant misconduct
involving a lieutenant and 5 sergeants. He stated that they were
signing in for each other and were not working the days they were
supposed to work. Lt. Moulin documented their conduct and
reported it. Lt. Moulin stated that he initially called the
Office of Chief Gates to report the misconduct. He spoke to
Gates secretary, Mary Miller, who would not let him talk to Chief
Gates. Lt. Moulin says that he understands that others also
called about this misconduct. At that point, Lt. Moulin reported
this matter to Ira Reiner, the City Controller at the time. Lt.
Moulin indicated that the report led to an investigation and
disciplinary action in which the five sergeants and a lieutenant
were terminated. However, Chief Gates overturned that discipline
and re-instated them with six month suspensions. Lt. Moulin
believes that Chief Gates was upset with him at the time and has
been angry ever since. Shortly after that, the department
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implemented the "Chief's Hot Line" that allows an officer to call
and report things of that nature.
After that incident, Lt. Moulin was administratively
transferred to the Newton Division. He was told that the
department could not ensure his safety at Communications. Lt.
Moulin indicated that people were upset with him because he had
turned in a brother officer. He described the subsequent time
period at Newton as a nightmare in which incidents occurred that
included a dead rat being tied to his car, telephone calls to his
house telling his wife that he was doing things that would upset
her, coming out to his car to find all of the windows broken, and
having smutty magazines sent to his house. He indicated that an
investigation was conducted, but he was told that they couldn't
find who was responsible. He also described an incident in which
an officer put talcum powder all over his uniforms when they were
hung in his locker. In that incident, Lt. Moulin chased the
officer, found him and beat him with a nightstick. Lt. Moulin
believes that all of that action was vindictive action by other
officers because he had said something about the Los Angeles
Police Department outside of the department itself.
Other than the above incident that resulted in an
administrative transfer, Lt. Moulin has never had any
administrative action or discipline except for one incident which
resulted in five days off. That occurred about the time he made
lieutenant, when it was determined that he had worked without a
proper work permit. Lt. Moulin was doing security work under the
business name "Cops for Hire." Although he had obtained separate
permits for each place that he worked under that name, he did not
obtain a permit for working for "Cops for Hire." He was
disciplined because of an alleged technical problem of his permit
not being proper. Lt. Moulin refused the discipline that was
imposed, appealed it to a Board of Rights and won his case.
Lt. Moulin indicates that we could look at his
personnel file and would find that there were no other
disciplinary or personnel actions taken against him. He also
indicated that we could review his "Complaint History" and would
find two complaints against him. One of those was in 1972 and he
was exonerated. A second one was the one in 1989 or 1990, about
the time he made lieutenant.
5. Officer's Present Status--Lt. Moulin indicated that
he is presently on sick leave. He stated that on May 6, 1992, at
6:05 a.m., he was told that he was assigned to his home because
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LAPD could not assure his safety in the workplace. He was given
that order by Captain Hansohn. Capt. Hansohn stated that they
could not assure his safety from fellow officers who were
distraught because Lt. Moulin had caused them to withdraw. He
was not asked to take time off, but was told, that is, ordered,
to take time off. Lt. Moulin went home that day and later called
Capt. Jefferson about overturning the order. Capt. Jefferson
indicated that he agreed with the order and said that he had
discussed it already with Capt. Hansohn. On May 18, 1992, Deputy
Chief Hunt called Lt. Moulin at home. Hunt said that Lt. Moulin
had been transferred to Hunt's office at South Bureau and should
report the next day, May 19. Instead, Lt. Moulin went to see a
doctor on May 19 and was told by the doctor that he should use
his sickleave because of the stress and anguish that he was
undergoing. Lt. Moulin indicated that he had never taken stress
leave in 21 years. At that point, Lt. Moulin sought the advice
of a law firm, Lewis, Marenstein and Kadar, who referred him to
Dr. Friedman. Lt. Moulin saw Dr. Friedman, who put Lt. Moulin on
sickleave for 90 days. The City has indicated that they would
not place Lt. Moulin on disability and that he would have to sue
the City if he insisted on being on disability and not using his
sickleave. Lt. Moulin's position is that all of this action is
punitive and designed to keep him from the Los Angeles Police
Department and the press.
Lt. Moulin stated that he did not believe that officers
generally felt that way. He stated that recently some of the
officers who he works with at 77th came to his home and took him
out to dinner. They gave him a gift consisting of a box of
matches, a quart of lighter fluid and a copy of Chief Gates' new
book.
Lt. Moulin stated that he had been called by Mayor Tom
Bradley and Police Commission President Stanley Schienbaum in the
last 24 hours. Lt. Moulin stated that they assured him that they
were doing everything they could to control the conduct of Chief
Gates and to control him from discussing private personnel
matters on television. Lt. Moulin indicates that the law
precludes Chief Gates from discussing personnel matters. The
City Attorney reportedly has advised Mayor Bradley and
Commissioner Schienbaum that Gates has freedom of speech rights.
Commissioner Schienbaum stated yesterday in a telephone
conversation that the Department is saying that all the people in
the 77th support Chief Gates. Mayor Bradley and Commissioner
Schienbaum know, in Lt. Moulin's opinion, that that is not so.
They both commented that Lt. Moulin should "hang in there" and
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"keep a stiff upper lip." They stated that it would be "a few
days until the new Chief arrives and things will be different."
6. Personnel Structure at 77th--Lt. Moulin stated
that as Watch Commander for the PM shift, he was responsible for
approximately 100 to 125 people, including records people, CRASH,
SPU (Special Problems Unit), jail and desk personnel. The Watch
commander is the highest ranking officer present on the 77th on
the PM watch.
There are actually five watches, three main watches and
two mid watches.
--The day watch is from 6:30 a.m. to 3:15 p.m.
--The mid-day watch is from 10:15 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.
--The PM watch is from 2:30 p.m. to 11:15 p.m.
--The mid-PM watch is from 6:15 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.
--The morning watch is from 10:30 p.m. to 7:15 a.m.
The PM watch consists of approximately 16 to 18 patrol
officers, two to a car. They are responsible for a population of
approximately 190,000 people and a division that accounts for
approximately 150 homicides per year. The mid-PM watch, which
overlaps the PM watch, adds approximately 10 officers to patrol.
There are a number of people who are within the Watch
Commander's responsibility but are not available for patrol.
There is an Administrative/Command staff that consists of the
captains plus adjutants, sergeants and support staff. They work
a 9 to 5 shift, 5 days per week. The command staff gets cars
assigned to them that they are allowed to take home with the
justification that they are supposed to make unannounced "stake
outs" and inspections. Lt. Moulin has only seen that done once
by one of the prior captains, a Capt. Lullo. He has never seen
Captains Hansohn, Brennan and others do that.
In a portion of the conversation that took place while
the tape was off, Lt. Moulin indicated that many of the people
who are technically on the PM watch are in special units that
have their own chain of command. They are also under the watch
commander's command, but are not generally available.
7. Timing and Source of the Tactical Alert--Lt. Moulin
recalls that he was standing at the Command Post in the presence
of Captains Jefferson, Hansohn, and Gascon. He recalls that a
tactical alert was broadcast. He does not know if the broadcast
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came from the Command Post or from downtown at Communications.
He does not know if it was city wide or not. There was no
discussion at the time about who had called the tactical alert.
Lt. Moulin had the sense that Jefferson called it
because people kept telling Jefferson to call a tactical alert.
The people who told Jefferson he should call a tactical alert
were subordinates, not people of higher rank. The subordinates
who told Capt. Jefferson that he should call a tactical alert
included Lt. Moulin.
At that time Capt. Jefferson was the Field Commander.
Commander Banks was present at some point and people approached
Banks, but Banks told people that he was not the Field Commander
and referred those people to Capt. Jefferson.
Lt. Moulin stated that the tactical alert was called at
approximately 6:15 p.m. He knows that it was before the Reginald
Denny incident. In fact, it was long before Denny was reportedly
beaten in the intersection. He is sure of that sequence. He
also is sure that the mobilization alert was sometime later, at
approximately 8:00 or 8:15 p.m.
Lt. Moulin recalls that after returning from the
intersection of 71st and Normandie and meeting with Capt.
Jefferson, he was told to go back to check the intersection and
then go to the Command Post. He left the 77th Station with
Officer Calderon and drove through the intersection. At that
time no people were being attacked in that intersection. He then
drove to 54th and Van Ness, arriving there at approximately 6:00
p.m. When he arrived he started making efforts to move the RTD
buses from that facility and to take over the offices. Capt.
Jefferson and Metro Div. arrived about 10 minutes later. He
knows that it was after that that they received information that
people were beat up at the corner of Florence and Normandie.
They sent a helicopter to investigate that. They also received
that information in a call from Lt. Hagerty, the lieutenant in
charge of detectives at the 77th Division, who remained at the
77th Division when the Command Post was set up.
8. Location of Command Post--Terry asked Lt. Moulin
why they went to the Command Post instead of staying at 77th or
going to some other location. Lt. Moulin indicated that the 77th
is an unsatisfactory facility. In addition to it being infested
with rats and other vermin he stated that it has no parking and
no security. Diesel and fuel availability is also a problem and
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it has no helicopter landing area. There is no room to mobilize
people, including fire department personnel and ambulances. They
needed more offices for communications. The officers at 77th
Division don't even have enough lockers for everybody. Many of
the officers have to dress in their cars. There are only two
bathrooms available at 77th Station.
On the other hand, 54th and Van Ness is a facility
that's identified in the standing plan. Lt. Moulin was aware of
the facility and had decided long ago, unrelated to the riots,
that that was the best facility to use in case of an emergency.
He discussed that with the officers in the roll call on the 29th.
It was in a good location because it was close enough to the area
where the rioting was occurring, but not so close that it would
be consumed within the rioting. It was a walled facility that
was easy to secure with a huge area for staging personnel. It
had adequate diesel and gas supplies, which other locations such
as schools do not have. In addition, he knew that it was open 24
hours a day and there would be no problem in obtaining access.
In addition, transportation was available in the form of buses
and there was access to major streets including Crenshaw, Slauson
and Vernon.
9. The Response to the Reginald Denny Incident--Lt.
Moulin indicated that they received a telephone call at the
Command Post from Lt. Hagerty at the 77th Station about seeing
Denny being beaten on a television broadcast. The Command Post
sent a helicopter to investigate. The first helicopter "went
down" meaning that it was out of service and was inoperable.
They sent a second helicopter that reported that they had checked
the intersection and nobody was in the intersection being beaten.
That was at approximately 6:30 or 6:45. They then decided to
send a squad of Metro Officers, a so-called "probe." They went
out for a few minutes and returned, saying that there were not
enough officers and that they could not get through to the
intersection. Lt. Moulin did not hear at the time that Lt.
Hagerty had also sent a car from the 77th Station.
They were never able to verify if people were in fact
beaten at Normandie and Florence. Lt. Moulin was not able to
know that until some hours later.
10. Events of 29th-30th--After the report about
Regi~ald Denny it got dark. Between 6:30 and 10:00 p.m. that
evening, the people at the Command Post were in the process of
taking over the RTD facility. Lt. Moulin indicated that there
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were horrendous logistical problems. They had to take over the
offices and all of the facilities. Meanwhile, officers kept
pouring in but were not assigned out. There were hundreds of
officers, perhaps 400 to 500 officers at the Command Post that
evening.
a. Command--Lt. Moulin was in charge from
approximately 6:00 until approximately 6:10 p.m. Capt. Jefferson
was in charge from approximately 6:15 until approximately 8:30
p.m. At one point, Lt. Moulin believes that Commander Banks
briefly took command. Chief Hunt arrived at approximately 8:30
p.m. and took command from that point on. Chief Gates arrived at
approximately 10:00 p.m. Chief Gates stayed there for
approximately 30 minutes to one hour and then left. Chief Gates
never took command of the Command Post as far as Lt. Moulin
knows.
The Command Post was changed to the Coliseum on May 6.
b. Equipment Problems--They had problems of
inadequate equipment. There were not enough cars. They were
assigning four officers to a car and they only had one radio for
every five officers. The fire department personnel did not have
vests available.
When Chief Gates arrived he wanted to know how many
cars were in the field. The Command Post did not know. There
were no maps available either at the Command Post or at the
station. They needed the maps in order to plot where officers
were and keep track of the assignment of officers in the field.
They were unable to do that.
Lt. Moulin stated that they did not have enough radios.
He had requested 200 radios that day. They did not get the
radios until approximately midnight and at that point, they only
delivered 7. He recalls that Chief Hunt got on the telephone and
was screaming and telling people that they had to find the
radios. They did not get a large number of radios until days
later.
They did not have enough cars until the second or third
day.
Helmets were not an issue except for the initial
incident at 77th and Normandie when the officers on the day watch
were not prepared because they did not have their helmets out of
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their trunks and in their cars where they were readily available.
Lt. Moulin indicated that Oliver North was involved with a
company that supplied hundreds of vests which were delivered and
given to the fire department personnel.
There was not enough shotgun ammunition until
approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 30th. They obtained that
ammunition by sending some officers to the Academy to pick it up.
c. Deployment of Officers--Lt. Moulin was asked when
effective deployment of the officers took place. He stated that
did not occur until approximately the third day. He said that
people came into the Command Post and stood around for hours on
their shift before being deployed at all. In Lt. Moulin's view
the highest priority was to assist the fire department in putting
out fires by providing protection for them. For a period of time
Lt. Moulin was trying to match up police officers with fire
crews. He was doing that with Lt. Pete Durham, from the Canine
Unit, Metro Division of LAPD. The fire department trucks and
personnel were lined up and Lt. Moulin and Lt. Durham were
assigning officers to go with fire units that were being assigned
by LA Fire Department Captain Baggett. When whey were in the
process of doing that, LAPD Captain Steve Gates (the Chief's
brother) told Lt. Moulin not to do that because they didn't know
where the officers were going. At that point, Lt. Moulin advised
LAFD Capt. Baggett that they were going to stop deploying the
officers by order of Capt. Gates. There was no list of priority
locations to be protected during the riots. All of the stores
that sold firearms, gun shops, sporting goods and pawn shops,
were gone by approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening.
d. Food Supplies for Officers--Lt. Moulin was at the
Command Post whenever he was on shift during the days of the
riots. On the second day of the riots he was put in charge of
security for the Command Post and feeding the officers. There
was no food and nothing to drink for the officers. When Lt.
Moulin was off watch he went to a company called "Food for Less."
He contacted the Chairman of the Board and made arrangements to
get enough food for the officers. Lt. Moulin was given access to
the entire warehouse and used trucks and forklifts to take the
items that he wanted, primarily pre-packaged foods that could be
delivered to the officers in the field. Lt. Moulin indicated
that in doing so he made a commitment to provide officers to
secure the markets in the riot effected area that belonged to the
Food for Less organization.
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11. Use of Force--Lt. Moulin was asked about the
report of an incident in which officers Phillips and Nee arrested
someone and used a gun to control the crowd. Lt. Moulin said
that there was no discussion about the use of force during the
riots. It was his understanding that they could not use warning
shots because that was against Los Angeles Police Department
rules.
12. Use of Teargas--Teargas was not used because the
officers have no gas masks available to them. Lt. Moulin had
teargas available in the 77th station and weapons to launch the
canisters. However, some time ago all of the teargas masks were
taken away from the officers and from the station and they are
not available. In addition, a lieutenant is not authorized to
direct the use of teargas for crowd control. According to the
Los Angeles Police Manual (citing paragraph or section 1.572)
that must be decided by a person of the rank of Commander or
higher.
13. Officers Recommendations/Criticisms--Terry Bird
asked Lt. Moulin what should have been done in order to prepare
better for these events. Lt. Moulin said that on the day that
the judge in the King beating case gave the jury instructions the
department should have been mobilized in the sense that days off
should have been cancelled and vacations should have been
cancelled. That had occurred in the week prior to the Olympics.
That has the effect of putting 50% of the personnel on the street
at any one time. He also feels that the Mobile Command Posts
should have been in place and operating just like the ones at the
Coliseum. There are several of those available and they should
have been prepared. They should have made arrangements to get
non-uniformed personnel into uniform so that they would have more
officers available. Resources should have been pooled, including
cars, helmets and teargas. Staging areas should have been
established. Helicopters and landing zones should have been in
place. In Lt. Moulin's opinion the verdict was coming, just like
the Olympics was coming, and preparations should have been made.
Lt. Moulin stated that the command should have listened
to the officers in the street. The officers knew that tensions
were high. Immediately after the King beating there was graffiti
that said "kill LAPD.
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Lt. Moulin was asked about the helpfulness of community
meetings. Lt. Moulin said that the command staff had such
meetings but the problem was that the ''assholes," the ones who
will burn and loot, don't come to those meetings.
Lt. Moulin was asked about efforts to identify targets
that should be protected. Lt. Moulin says that he told Chief
Hunt at some point that they should use their resources to
protect grocery stores because people would be needing food.
Chief Hunt said no, they would protect all facilities the same.
That conversation was on April 29th.
Lt. Moulin was asked about drills and practices to
prepare for disturbances. In doing so, we referred to an article
in the Los Angeles Times dated May 8, 1992, in which Assistant
Chief Robert Vernon was quoted as saying that they had started
practicing simulated alerts months ago and the last two weeks
before the riot they were doing that literally every day. Vernon
reportedly said that they would call alerts at different times of
the day, sometimes at 3:00 in the morning and sometimes at 7:00
in the morning. He also reportedly indicated that there was a
specific contingency plan to go into effect if a riot erupted,
including the declaration of a tactical alert as soon as the
verdict came in. Lt. Moulin said that he never participated in
any simulated response to a riot. He thinks that one day they
practiced getting into squads and that was a couple of weeks
before April 29. He said that people laughed about that. There
may have been some "call ups" which involved filling out a piece
of paper in response to an inquiry about how many personnel you
could supply for an emergency.
Lt. Moulin stated that they should have done practices
for simulated emergencies. He pointed out that they do that for
aircraft crashes. Lt. Moulin advised us to talk to LAFD Chief
Baggett, indicating that in his opinion the fire department was
well organized and LAPD should have been. The Fire Department
had pre-identified staging areas and places to protect. Lt.
Moulin said that the Los Angeles Police Department obviously knew
where stores, shopping centers, gun shops, stereo and electronic
stores and other commercial establishments were. He said that
they should have had a plan to deploy the fire department and the
police department at pre-determined locations. They should have
gone to main commercial streets. He said that rioters were not
going to burn houses because they have no interest in doing that.
They have not done that in prior similar disturbances. By
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protecting commercial establishments they would be able to
protect the heart of the community.
Lt. Moulin was then asked about the ability to set up
perimeters in order to keep people out of particular areas. He
was asked whether they would be able to keep out people who are
subject to attack, in this instance non-blacks. Lt. Moulin's
response was that they couldn't do that because attorneys would
not let them discriminate. He also felt that you would not be
able to determine the area to block off. He does agree that if
you have a plan, you could shut down an area. He was then asked
whether you could have a plan to set up a perimeter. Lt.
Moulin's response was that the problem was you couldn't predict
where a hot spot would occur.
In Lt. Moulin's opinion this rioting spread because the
media allowed the world to see that there was anarchy in the
streets. If the police had been guarding and protecting certain
areas the media would not have shown that. Lt. Moulin went on to
say that the LAPD should have had a plan to shut down the
freeways and the major thorough-fares. They also should have
announced a curfew immediately. That would allow the LAPD to
respond better because it would reduce the number of people in
cars in the streets. In his opinion, the good, law-abiding
people would obey the curfew and the people who would be out on
the streets would be subject to arrest.
Lt. Moulin was asked about coordination with other
agencies. His response was that they never practiced any
coordination with the CHP, LASO, local police agencies such as
Inglewood, or other divisions of LAPD.
Terry explained that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office
had a plan called "Operation Monarch" and had trained for the
implementation of that plan. Lt. Moulin's response was that he
was unaware of the plan, yet the 77th Division borders the LA
Sheriff's area. The distance between their stations is
approximately 6 miles. In addition, the CHP has offices in
downtown and Torrance. They also border the Inglewood Police
Department jurisdiction. Lt. Moulin stated that he did not try
to call the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office. Lt. Moulin suggested
that we talk to Lt. Larry Manchester (Southeast Division) about
his coordination with other agencies.
Lt. Moulin expressed the need for planning rather than
simply having officers practice lining up in squads. In his
13
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
opinion they needed a list of priorities and the availability of
equipment and personnel. The fire department uses a term called
"strike force" which is a fire department resource that is sent
into to knock a fire down. They use a big force to go in quickly
and take care of a situation. In Lt. Moulin's opinion the LAPD
needed to have a plan that allowed them to use strike forces so
that they would have resources available and priority of
assignments for those strike forces.
Terry asked whether it would be helpful to have
community service officers to talk to the people on the streets.
Lt. Moulin thought that that would be helpful.
He was asked if it would be helpful to have a rumor
control hotline to deal with false rumors. Lt. Moulin's response
was yes because that was what we were faced with, responding to
rumors about what was occurring.
Lt. Moulin was asked if it would have been helpful to
have a different racial makeup of officers in the division. Lt.
Moulin's response was that if there is a suggestion that they
should have had more black officers, in his opinion that would
have made it worse. In his opinion the people that were taking
the most abuse were the black officers. The same is true
regarding having more black officers in the 77th the months prior
to the disturbances. Lt. Moulin states that the members of the
community more readily talk to the white officers than to the
black officers.
He was asked whether it would be helpful to have
meetings at the operational level with other agencies. Lt.
Moulin's response was that that would be helpful, but they should
also have those kinds of meetings within the Los Angeles Police
Department. The problem, in Lt. Moulin's opinion, is that the
Los Angeles Police Department has the attitude that they are God,
that they do not need to talk to anyone else. The LASO and CHP
do not exist in the mind of the LAPD.
He was asked if it would have been helpful to have
barricades available. Lt. Moulin's response was that it would
have been helpful to have barricades and cones. That should have
been done in liaison with the Department of Transportation.
Unfortunately, there is no coordination with the Department of
Transportation even though it is located immediately across the
street from the 77th Street Division. That occurs because the
Department of Transportation is a civilian agency and the Los
14
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Angeles Police Department simply doesn't talk to civilians. He
also indicated that the Department of Transportation is a largely
black, largely female organization that is not given respect by
LAPD. The same is true for the RTD, which is largely black and
largely female and not a police agency. The LAPD doesn't respect
them.
Lt. Moulin was asked whether it would be helpful to
have had contacts with community leaders before and during the
incidents. Lt. Moulin said that he thought that would be helpful
and they did that to a degree. Lt. Moulin added that an effort
has to be made to talk to the bad guys, the gang members. He
does not know if the CRASH units are really doing that. Lt.
Moulin feels that Chief Gates has to recognize the "bad guys" and
talk to them even if he doesn't like them. They would have told
the LAPD that if the officers in the King beating trial were
found not guilty that the city was going to be burned down.
14. Investigative Leads-
a. 77th Div.
Lt. Rich Gammel--office guy.
Lt. Joe Ramm--Administrative Lt.
Lt. Mike Downing--he may say that there was a
riot plan.
Sgt. May--Moulin would not believe him.
Sgt. Tingerides--Moulin would not believe him.
Sgt. Dunning--He is truthful.
Sgt. Tatreau--truthful.
Sgt. Nunez--reportedly says that Lt. Moulin is
responsible for killing 60 people.
Sgt. Pytel
Sgt. Okamoto--truthful.
Sgt. Schwartzer
Sgt. Charlie Strong--truthful.
ACC Operator--civilian personnel that operates
a computer at the station.
Dorita--Capt. Hansohn's secretary.
Lisa--Capt. Jeffersons' secretary.
Pat Clemens--Capt. Jeffersons' secretary.
Off. Calderon--Lt. Moulin does not believe that Off.
Calderon will be honest. Officer Calderon has had a
history of problems including making inappropriate
derogatory ethnic and gender-based comments. Lt.
Moulin has reported him, which resulted in a number of
15
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
days off because of such conduct. Lt. Moulin kept
Calderon with him as much as possible the day that the
riots erupted in order to keep Calderon under control.
Epstein--untruthful, review his personnel file.
Juliani--untruthful.
Morriseau--
b. Others
Mike Hillman--Metro Unit, but not reliable.
Capt. Gascon--Metro Unit.
Larry Manchester--Southeast Division.
15. Internal Affairs Division--Lt. Moulin was asked
about the Internal Affairs investigation. He indicated that he
was interviewed by the Internal Affairs investigators on the
second day of the riots at the Command Post and at the 77th
Division. In his opinion it was a terrible waste of time because
the Internal Affairs Investigators kept a number of people
waiting for the interviews instead of working during the riots.
They justified their investigation by saying that they needed the
information for Chief Gates in order to report to the Police
Commission. There were no notes taken of the interviews and no
tape recordings.
16. Possible Criticisms of Lt. Moulin--Lt. Moulin was
asked whether it is possible that he intentionally stopped trying
at some point because of conflicts or ill feelings with Capt.
Jefferson or others. Lt. Moulin adamantly denied that. He said
that he did everything that Jefferson said and did a number of
things that Jefferson did not direct him to do. He pointed out
that he, Lt. Moulin, was the one who held the day watch over.
Lt. Moulin also urged Capt. Jefferson to call a tactical alert.
Lt. Moulin is the one who began to deploy LAPD and fire
department people with Lt. Durham and Chief Baggett. Lt. Moulin
also on his own time arranged to obtain food for the officers at
the 77th Division during the riots. He stated that his
philosophy is to "ask for forgiveness rather than to beg
permission." He explained that that means he would rather be in
a position to have done something and later on have to ask for
forgiveness for it than to wait around to ask for permission to
do something or not to do something at all. Lt. Moulin invited
us to look at his rating reports in his personnel file which he
stated would all be positive and that is the same attitude that
he carried out during the riots.
16
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
17. Officers General Recommendations--Lt. Moulin
repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of preparation and
lack of planning for emergencies in general. He pointed out that
the LAPD was not prepared for something like a 9.5 earthquake,
and it was inevitable that a serious earthquake like that would
occur some day. In the same way, it was inevitable that there
was going to be a verdict in the trial relating to the King
beating, and preparations should have been made.
18. Interviewers General Impression--Lt. Moulin
generally appeared to be both sincere and believable. At the
same time, he seems to be under tremendous pressure and very
anxious about his own position and the way his conduct will be
evaluated. He is isolated because of his removal from active
service from LAPD since May 6, 1992. He seems to be relying on
support from his wife and from some of his · friends from LAPD who
apparently call from time to time and have visited. Additional
interviews will have to be undertaken to determine whether his
statements, particularly those about the urging of a tactical
alert, the handling of the first several hours of the riot, and
the absence of planning and preparation are corroborated by
others who were present and involved in those events.
17

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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

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Description

Interview of Michael Moulin, Los Angeles Police Department Lieutenant, about his personal background, his recollection of the events before and during the civil disturbance, and the adequacy of the Los Angeles Police Department's response to the violence and unrest, 1992 June 8.

Asset Metadata

Core Title Michale Moulin, interview, 1992-06-08

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 17 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-33206

Unique identifier UC11449677

Identifier box 20 (box),web-box20-031-03.pdf (filename),folder 31 (folder),webster-c100-33206 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box20-031/web-box20-031-03.pdf

Dmrecord 33206

Format 17 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts