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Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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Roundtable 21, discussion, 1992-07-26
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Roundtable 21, discussion, 1992-07-26
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CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
AND ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
To: Richard J. Stone, General Counsel and Staff Director
From: Belinda Smith Walker
Date: July 26, 1992
Subject: Interview on July 14, 1992, with staff of Central
American Refugee Center (CARECEN): Madeline Janis,
Esq., Executive Director; Edward J. Flynn, Legal
Director; Kathie Mahn, Legal Services Coordinator;
Jan Gustafson, Legal Assistant; and Carlos Vaquerano,
Community Relations and Communications Director
ABSTRACT
Madeline Janis and the CARECEN staff stated that during the civil
disorder, the LAPD in conjunction with the INS illegally arrested
and detained hundreds of immigrants in the Pico Union area. The
minimal LAPD presence during the first day and a half of the civil
unrest resulted in unnecessary destruction of property in the
area, as well.
CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
AND ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
To: Richard J. Stone, General Counsel and Staff Director
From: Belinda Smith Walker
Date: July 26, 1992
Subject: Interview with staff of the Central American Refugee
Center (CARECEN): Madeline Janis, Esq., Executive Director;
Edward J. Flynn, Legal Director; Kathie Mahn, Legal Services
Coordinator; Jan Gustafson, Legal Assistant; and Carlos
Vaquerano, Community Relations and Communications
Director
On Tuesday, July 14, 1992, from 3:30 p.m. until shortly before 6:00 p.m.
at the offices of the Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN) at 668
Bonnie Brae Street, Los Angeles, California 900 5 7, I interviewed
the following members of the CARECEN staff: Madeline Janis, Esq.,
Executive Director; Edward J. Flynn, Legal Director; Kathie Mahn, Legal
Services Coordinator; Jan Gustafsen, Legal Assistant; and Carlos
Vaquerano, Community Relations and Communications Director. The
following is a summary of my recollection of this meeting, including my
questions and comments, together with my mental impressions,
conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting.
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
CARECEN was established as a non-profit organization in 1983. Its
staff of 5 7 provides legal services, conducts impact litigation and
monitors police relations for its client population of 1 to 1 . 5 million
1
immigrants, who are primarily from Central America. During the recent
civil disorder, CARECEN received calls from an even broader population.
Madeline Janis, Esq., has worked with CARECEN since it was
established. She has been the Executive Director for the past 2 1 /2
years.
Edward J. Flynn has been Legal Director for the past 1 1 /2 years. He
oversees the legal department and handles litigation out of the Bonnie
Brae office. Mr. Flynn coordinated and served on the team which
assisted the hundreds of immigrants who wound up in INS detention
during the civil disorder. Before coming to CARECEN, Mr. Flynn worked
for five years with Projecto Libertad, dealing with immigrant and
refugee issues on the Texas-Mexico border. Mr. Flynn directs the INS
Monitoring Project which focuses on questions of access to legal
assistance, including the right to apply for asylum.
Kathie Mahn has been the CARECEN Legal Services Coordinator for three
years. She is a Representative of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Ms. Mahn defends deportation detainees against the INS, especially if
they are seeking political asylum. Most of her clients are from El
Salvador and Guatemala; some are from Honduras. She has been very
active in the Temporary Protected Status Program, which became
available to Salvadorans in September, 1990. Under the program all
Salvadorans were granted 1 8 months protection and work authorization
in the U.S. When the program ended in June, 1992, enforcement of
deportation was deferred for one year. These programs impactl 6,000
Salvadorans.
Jan Gustafson has been a legal assistant at CARECEN for one year. She
worked with refugee issues in Phoenix and Los Angeles for three years
before joining CARECEN. With Mr. Flynn and Ms. Mahn, she has been
involved in deportation defense work, application affirmation and an
immigration clinic that helps hundreds, primarily Salvadorans and
Guatemalans, by teaching them how to apply for asylum. Ms. Gustafson
responds to calls from detainees from INS centers and she helped
monitor calls immediately following the civil disorder.
2
Carlos Vaquerano has been the Community Relations and
Communications Director of CARECEN for nine months. He had
previously worked on the border since 1986.
CARECEN is located in the Pico Union-Westlake area, the most densely
populated area west of the Mississippi, according to the CARECEN staff.
It is a family area, with many children. It contains many SRO hotels,
with each apartment packed and living conditions very poor. Most
people in the area have a day-to-day existence; some shop several
times a day. Often they do not have enough to eat.
2. ANTICIPATION OF VERDICT
The immigrant communities did not anticipate the verdict. It came as
"a shock," Ms. Gustafson said. Ms. Janis and Mr. Vaquerano noted that
although El Salvador has "the worst legal system in the world," the
Salvadorans had been raised to believe that the U.S. was the world's
best democracy. Despite experiences in their own country and
difficulties dealing with our police, the Salvadorans retained some
trust in our judicial system; it was different, better, capable of
justice. The King verdicts were an experience of deja vu for them, Ms.
Janis said. The Salvadorans had been through that kind of injustice in
their own country; they had not believed it could happen here.
3. INTELLIGENCE
None of the interviewees had prior intelligence or information of the
civil disorder from contacts in their community. Ms. Janis said that
she "did not expect the kind of violence that occurred."
4. PLANNING
The CARECEN staff was unaware of any LAPD plans to deal with
possible civil unrest following the King verdicts. Ms. Janis did not feel
an increased protection, presence or any warning by the LAPD prior to
3
the civil disorder. In her view, such LAPD activity in the community
would have been helpful.
5. OVERSIGHT OF LAPD
This issue was not discussed.
6. EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND PRE-VERDICT
COMMENTS
There was an atmosphere of mistrust between the LAPD and the
immigrant community, resulting in part from officer violations of
Special Order 40, a copy of which is attached. Issued in 1979 by Chief
Gates, Special Order 40 prohibits the LAPD from detaining persons for
illegal entry and permits officers to turn them over to the INS only
when charged with multiple misdemeanors, a high grade misdemeanor
or a felony. Under Gates, officers often ignored or were ignorant of
Special Order 40; there were "many violations" of it.
In retrospect, Ms. Mahn saw growing tension in the police interaction
with the community prior to the civil disorder. Gates' racist remarks
after an officer was shot by a Salvadoran made police interaction with
the immigrant community even more prejudiced and negative. In this
atmosphere, the King verdicts were "the straw that broke the camel's
back," the catalyst that released anger.
Ms. Janis agreed that CHief Gates contributed to a tense political
atmosphere preceding the King verdict. In addition to racist comments,
he was strident and generally negative. Numerous incidents reinforced
the immigrants' sense that they were unprotected and persecuted by
the LAPD. Officers would stop immigrants for questionable or minor
violations while ignoring drug dealers down the street. In one incident,
officers stopped a car, told the passengers, including a middle aged
woman, to get out and lie down on the ground, brandishing a gun at
them. Upon realizing they had stopped innocent people, the officers
drove off without even an apology.
4
7. LAPD MANAGEMENT
Ms. Janis stated there is an impression in the community that the
police are far more interested in restraining street vendors than
protecting immigrants from serious crime. CARECEN has been trying to
obtain enforcement of Special Order 40. Without such protection,
immigrants will not come forward to report or be witnesses in crimes
such as rape, battery, drug sales.
LAPD RELATIONSHIP TO POLICE COMMISSION
This issue was not discussed.
9. ADEQUACY OF POLICE RESPONSE
The CARECEN staff viewed the police response as inadequate and biased.
The civil disorder was used as an opportunity to illegally identify and
detain undocumented aliens. There was minimal or nonexistent police
presence on Wednesday and Thursday. All CARECEN staff thought that a
strong police presence in those early days could have prevented
property destruction. As the National Guard arrived and police presence
increased on Friday, with them came the INS.
Inadequate Response
Ms. Janis noted that the civil disorder added another element to the
deja vu experience for Central Americans. Not only did the King
verdicts evoke memories of human rights crimes perpetrated with
impunity; the civil unrest brought back the experience of living in a war
torn country.
From Ms. Mahn's perspective, at the start of the disorder there were
fewer police in the area than on a normal day.
5
Instead of taking control when civil disorder began, the police seemed
to let the violence take over. On Wednesday evening, Ms. Janis and her
family had dinnerm in a restaurant at Adams and Crenshaw. During the
11 /2 hours she was there, police presence was minimal. A single car
patrolled the street. At first, people were demonstrating peacefully;
then the crowd and its anger grew, with about 7 5 to 100 people
brandishing placards, bats and sticks. The police did nothing as the
crowd took the streets, eventually burning a two to three block area.
Ms. Janis believes that the destruction could have been avoided if the
police had assumed control earlier.
Mr. Flynn was in the area a short time on Wednesday and Thursday.
During that period he, too, observed minimal police presence. He
recalls only a line of eight squad cars driving down Wilshire with their
sirens on. In Mr. Flynn's G>wn neighborhood around Western and Melrose,
there was also minimal police presence. He saw merely a couple of
squad cars plus police protection for fire engines when they
extinguished a blaze on Western.
Several incidents illustrated the lack of protection the police provided
the area. On Wednesday evening, Mr. Vaquerano watched a crowd force
the gates off a store near Seventh and Alvarado while a fire burned
nearby. A police car in the area drove by, using only its siren. Mr.
Vacquerano stated, "I saw them (the police in the car) laughing at the
people as they drove by!" At Third and Bonnie Brae Mr. Vaquerano
observed people looting without police interference. Ms. Janis and Mr.
Vaquerano believe that La Varata at Sixth and Bonnie Brae would not
have been destroyed had there been adequate police presence. They
stressed that the neighborhood stores provide a lifeline for people in
the area.
Mr. Vaquerano contrasted the few police officers in his community to
the strong police presence in wealthier areas such as Beverly Hills. It
is his impression that most of the police went to South Central,
Wilshire, Beverly Hills and Long Beach. In Mr. Vaquerano's view, "the
police planned to let the people destroy themselves." They could have
stopped everything with a plan. "They just didn't care about the
community."
6
Ms. Mahn agreed that the communi, ty perception was the same as Mr.
Vaquerano's: the police arrived when the riots moved north. Protection
was provided only when violence threatened other, more affluent
communities.
Ms. Janis observed that by Friday, there were a lot of police present in
the area. To Mr. Vaquerano, by then it was too late.
Biased Response
By Friday afternoon, INS and the Border Patrol also had a strong
presence in the area. The Border Patrol was present as part of the
Federal Emergency Response T earn under the direction of FBI Agent
Parsons. Together and separately, the LAPD and INS inquired about and
detained people for undocumented immigrant status. It is the position
of the CARECEN staff that these questions and detentions were illegal.
CARECEN staff began to receive reports that the Border Patrol was
present at one and then another intersection. They tried to get to the
locations as they were called in, but it proved hard to do. Therefore,
much of CARECEN'S information about Border Patrol presence came
from people who were eventually detained by the INS. These witnesses
reported that they were stopped, often in broad daylight, and
interrogated about their immigrant status.
The LAPD was doing its own immigration enforcement during this time,
working very closely with the INS. INS agents were in LAPD squad cars,
allegedly as "translators." According to Ms. Janis, the INS claimed
these particular agents were under the jurisdiction of the LAPD,
although LAPD public testimony contradicted that. Ms. Janis thinks it
unlikely that Federal agents would subordinate themselves to the LAPD,
especially in the large numbers they had present at that time. The INS
behavior indicates that their main function was to "help the LAPD in
determining immigrant status," not to serve as interpreters.
In the crisis generated by the civil disorder the LAPD used a broad
brush approach, employing all available means to clear the streets,
7
including suspension of Special Order 40. The CARECEN staff thinks it
likely that suspension of Special Order 40 came from the top of the
LAPD command. The officers on the street behaved as if it was
acceptable to ask everybody about their immigrant status. The LAPD
stopped and interrogated 452 people then handed them over to the INS
without filing any charges. Hundreds, possibly several thousand, more
were picked up for curfew violations and automatically handed over to
the INS.
Mr. Flynn said that the LAPD attitude stemmed from Gates' view that
"illegal immigrants had a large role to play in this disturbance."
However, Flynn noted, while recent and undocumented immigrants might
be on the bottom economically, all undocumented immigrants are not
criminals, in this case looters and destroyers of property. Mr. Flynn
stressed that Latino immigrants were blamed for the disorder simply
because of their alleged undocumented status. He cited the early,
erroneous estimate that one third of the persons arrested in the
disorders were undocumented immigrants; the actual figure was about
1 0%. Flynn commented that the presence of the Border Patrol in
CARECEN's neighborhood and not elsewhere further illustrated the
assumption of blame placed upon the immigrants.
Mr. Flynn stated that during the civil disorder, suddenly any Latino was
subject to summary arrest. He saw people stopped solely because they
were Latino. This was the unfortunate consequence of the riots. Over
1 00 people were released from INS detention after it was discovered
that they had legal status. Others were probably released by the LAPD.
Mr. Flynn noted one case where a legal immigrant did not have his card
when he was stopped; he spent six weeks in detention before he was
released.
The CARECEN staff has submitted extensive documentation to Raoul
Campos on LAPD/INS activity during the civil disorder. Updated
material is attached to this memo (copy to Rick Stone only). In our
conversation, the staff related a few of the incidents which occurred.
On May 2, residents of an apartment building at Second and Washington
were questioned by the LAPD. The LAPP and the National Guard had
found what appeared to be looted material in a nearby alley. According
8
to a Guatemalan visiting in the building, INS agents went to the
apartments in the building, interrogating people about their immigrant
status, not about looting. Ms. Mahn told of an arrest without charges in
which the police allegedly said to two pregnant women, "Yeah, you're
from Guatemala. You're going to go back to your country real soon."
The impact of the LAPD/INS collaboration was significant. The
community had an intense, panicked reaction. The streets were empty
for days. Families did not send their children to school or shop for
food.
1 0. REASONS FOR INADEQUACIES
To Mr. Vaquerano, the inadequate presence and lack of protection
occurred because the police "just don't care about the community."
Mr. Flynn pointed to the attitude of leadership as the reason for the
LAPD's inadequate response. Gates' view that "illegal immigrants had
a large role to play in this disturbance" unfairly tainted the whole
immigrant community and is indicative of his attitude that certain
groups are more worthy of blame or protection than others. The police
see undocumented status as a violation of the law, a basic crime. It is
CARECEN'S position that it is the job of the INS, not the LAPD, to
enforce this law.
Mr. Flynn believes that Gates has been scapegoating the immigrant
community more frequently in recent years. Flynn stated that the
police should be expected to protect all and may not choose whom they
serve. Their attitude that some people have more rights than others is
the cause of so much tension in the community.
Mr. Flynn sees the lack of police protection as a function of the
political climate over the last 1 0 years. During that time, CARECEN and
others have been struggling to get Salvadorans recognized as legitimate
refugees, which happened only in 1 990. In a broader political picture,
Mr. Flynn believes that the "illegal" label was unfair to the immigrants
9
from the start. Now, with the 1990 legislation, it can no longer be an
excuse.
11 . NATURE OF VIOLENCE
The damage to property was random. There seemed to be no strategy
concerning what businesses were hit first. For example, on Sixth
Street, La Varata was destroyed well before establishments owned by
Anglos.
To one CARECEN staff member, it seemed that some people causing the
violence came into the community, notably African Americans and
Latinos. While they seemed to spread out as if following a plan, they
did not appear to have particular stores targeted for looting. The
choice of establishments seemed to be made on the spur of the moment.
Ms. Janis stated that in CARECEN's area the looting and destruction of
property were started mostly by young people who were angry and,
many times, violent. Others, however, were caught up in the disorder.
Some happened to be in the stores when looting began. Noting that
people in the area often do not have enough food for dinner, let alone for
the next day, Ms. Janis believes many panicked, thinking that everything
might be taken from the stores. For some, the looting might have been
an opportunity to obtain things otherwise unattainable. Ms. Janis and
the staff stressed that the motives behind the violence were complex,
especially in CARECEN's neighborhood.
Ms. Mahn speculated that for some of the youths, especially those who
were undocumented, the disorder might have presented an opportunity
to take control for a moment in their otherwise powerless lives.
A member of the staff stressed the many obstacles to daily life in a
new immigrant community. If an immigrant is fortunate enough to find
a job in the present recession, often he or she cannot take it due to lack
of proper documentation. Social security numbers are required for bank
accounts and often for rental agreements. People stand on corners in
10
often futile attempts to get day labor; in doing so, they are vulnerable
to the INS.
Ms. Mahn agreed that poverty is a tremendous factor underlying the civil
disorder. However, she advised us not to underestimate the importance
of prolonging the disturbance because it provides a moment in which
otherwise disempowered people can gain control of their lives, by
actions such as taking diapers. She added that many Salvadorans and
Guatemalans are in the U.S. because of factors beyond their control, not
because they want to be, fleeing for their lives or from extreme
poverty. She pointed out that the ration of U.S. to Mexican wages is
1 5: 1 and that poverty is even greater in Salvador and Guatemala. She
stated that poverty and lack of control over circumstances do not
justify looting and destruction of property, but they do explain the
situation of recent immigrants.
1 2. LESSONS LEARNED
People are more aware of institutionalized racism in the U.S.
Ms. Janis commented that really nothing has changed, except that Chief
Williams is now in charge of the LAPD.
The people view the police as the enemy along with the INS, even more
than they did before the civil disorder. This situation is very serious.
The people's sense that they are "out there on their own," that the
police are not there to help, has doubled or trebled since the disorder.
The impact will be present for years unless something significant is
done from both the grassroots and the top levels.
Ms. Janis said that we need to think in terms of "we," to view
ourselves as part of one community. Our relationships from the bottom
up should demonstrate a fair and just policy. Right now there are no
relations between all levels of society; existing policies are neither
fair nor just.
1 1
Ms. Mahn thinks it quite likely that civil unrest will happen again. A
long healing process lies ahead and there are some open, unaddressed
wounds. The presence of Williams as the new Chief is good, but police
policies in the community need to change. The people need to feel
protected not harassed or persecuted by the police. Her example, the
LAPD approach towards street vendors, is discussed below.
13. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
An important step would be for the Webster Commission to take LAPD
treatment of the immigrant community very seriously. At the outset of
our conversation, Ms. Janis and the CARECEN staff expressed strong
concern that the interview might be merely a formality for the sake of
appearances. Ms. Janis stated that the immigrant community has been
told publicly that the Webster Commission will respond to its concerns
and that statement will be taken very seriously. She emphasized that
there are systemic problems involved in the police response to the
immigrant community and those problems must be addressed.
Ms. Janis commented that people need a sense of ownership of their
communities: to feel represented; to have a voice; to have their
community needs addressed. Many needs are physical. Often there are
no parks, no community or recreation centers. Schools are poor.
Business enterprises need to be developed. The police need training to
reduce racism. The communities need education in inter-ethnic
relations.
Mr. Flynn believes that community based policing is needed. The police
need to stop viewing all immigrants as potential illegal aliens. The
police would be viewed more positively if they began arresting more
people for drug violations and for gang activity. He also believes it
would be good to have a meeting with the LAPD. CARECEN has been
trying to arrange one, working through Councilman Woo's office for
assistance. Their efforts had been unsuccessful at the time of our
conversation.
12
As an example of the type of positive police action that needs to be
taken, the staff cited a recent visit by Sgt. Sandra Villalobos, who
dropped by CARECEN several times to initiate a dialogue with the
community members about litter and other sidewalk problems. She has
been talking with people and contacting community organizations.
There needs to be a clear policy from the top that the LAPD will not
collaborate with the INS unless a very serious situation exists, su·ch as
a felony violation. Otherwise, the LAPD should not be questioning
people about their immigrant status.
Change needs to come first from the police. They need to stop viewing
the immigrant community as "others, " almost as criminals. The police
need training so they can see the immigrants as women and men, like
themselves.
The police need to change their approach to street vendors. Since the
civil disorder, the police have had a much stronger presence in the area
but they are coming down hard on street vendors rather than increasing
efforts to root out gangs and drug dealers or to work towards
community based policing. For example, at the corner of Santa Monica
and Berendo the police have been falsely arresting vendors or giving
tickets for minor offenses such as blocking an entrance. The police
reportedly told the vendors that they "want this corner out of here;"
they've "had enough problems here."
In Ms. Mahn's view the police approach addresses only the most visible
problem, not the major one. It constitutes harassment and a misuse of
resources. The police accurately claim that drug dealers hide among
the street vendors; but when the police approach, the vendors bear the
brunt of police contact because the drug dealers are more skilled in
hiding. The vendors, who carry cash, consider the drug dealers one of
their major problems. If asked, the vendors will say that their
principle problems are "police and crime." The vendors could identify
the drug dealers in their midst but they will not cooperate now. They
do not believe they would be protected if they identified drug dealers.
The only contact the vendors have with the LAPD is confiscation of
their merchandise.
13
Mr. Flynn pointed out that commercial zones have recently been
established where vendors can operate. These new conditions will
provide the police with an opportunity to demonstrate that they will
not arrest or harass the vendors.
Turning to what went right during the civil unrest, Mr. Flynn noted that
the Fire Department was extraordinary. They "really put their lives on
the line" in a situation that "seemed like anarchy for a while." He also
noted that a good number of things went right after the disorder.
Business and government are interested in committing significant
resources to help affected areas. There were many calls from
individuals who wanted to help. Some people came to plant flowers in
the community, including those in front of CARECEN.
Ms. Mahn also saw as a positive result in the greater connection
between various communities and organizations in Los Angeles, moving
the immigrant community out of its isolation.
14. USE OF INTERVIEWEE AT ANY PUBLIC HEARING
The CARECEN staff members are intelligent, articulate, committed
women and men. While all would make good witnesses, I would
recommend Ms. Janis and Mr. Flynn due to the nature of their work and
positions in the organization. I would also recommend Mr. Vaquerano as
an individual from the community.
15. ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWEES SUGGESTED
Additional interviewees were not suggested.
14
Linked assets
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
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George Rodriguez, interview, 1992-07-29
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Robert Mueller, interview, 1992-07-20
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CARECEN article, report, 1992-06
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David Pietz, interview, 1992-06-19
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Supplemental materials, 1992-07-13
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Gabriel Ornelas, interview, 1992-06-19
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Description
Roundtable discussion with the Executive Director and several staff members of the Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN) about the functions of these divisions, and their activities and roles in the civil disturbance, 1992 July 26.
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Roundtable 21, discussion, 1992-07-26
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
15 p.
(format),
application/pdf
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discussions (meetings)
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Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-32560
Unique identifier
UC11449688
Identifier
box 20 (box),web-box20-089-01.pdf (filename),folder 89 (folder),webster-c100-32560 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box20-089/web-box20-089-01.pdf
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32560
Format
15 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),discussions (meetings) (aat)
Type
texts
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Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992