Close
About
FAQ
Home
Collections
Login
USC Login
Register
0
Selected
Invert selection
Deselect all
Deselect all
Click here to refresh results
Click here to refresh results
USC
/
Digital Library
/
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
/
Michael Moulin, interview, 1992-06-03
(USC DC Other)
Michael Moulin, interview, 1992-06-03
PDF
Download
Share
Open document
Flip pages
Contact Us
Contact Us
Copy asset link
Request this asset
Transcript (if available)
Content
BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT & MATZ
MEMORANDUM
TO: Richard J. Stone
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
General Counsel and Staff Director
FROM: Terry William Bird and Paul Bower
DATE: June 3, 1992
RE: Interview Of Lt. Michael Moulin -- Part I
FILE NO: 900.75
1. Preface -- On Wednesday, May 27, 1992 starting at
approximately 2:00 p.m. and lasting until approximately 5:30 p.m.
we interviewed Lt. Michael Moulin at his home in Fullerton,
California. The following is a summary of my recollection of
this meeting, including my questions and comments, together with
my mental impressions, conclusions and opinions, based upon the
meeting.
2. Introduction To Interview -- Paul Bower arid I
introduced ourselves as private attorneys practicing in Los
Angeles and as members of the Staff of the General Counsel to
William Webster who had been appointed as Special Advisor to the
Police Commission to investigate the response of the Los Angeles
Department to the civil disordered that following the King
verdict on April 29, 1992; it was explained that we had no
preconceived notions as to the underlying incidents and that it
was our job to collect as much information as possible about the
LAPD's response to the King verdict.
-
- 1 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
r
1, ,
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
3. Recording the Interview -- By mutual agreement,
the interview was recorded by tape recorder and by video camera;
Lt. Moulin was accompanied by his wife, and by his attorney
Bradley Brunon.
4. Moulin's Agreement to be Interviewed -- Paul Bower
advised Lt. Moulin that he could not be compelled at that time to
speak to us, but that the LAPD had expressed a policy of
cooperation with the Webster inquiry; it is noted that no
subpoena was served on Lt. Moulin and that his cooperation at the
interview was voluntary and in light of the circumstances without
any duress or compulsion. Lt. Moulin did inquire whether the
LAPD had authorized the interview.
5. Police Identification and Assignment -- Lt. Moulin
identified himself by his serial number, 17313; he is a Police
Lieutenant and was assigned to the 77th Division.
6. Exhibit 1 -- Site Map Lt. Moulin indicated on
Exhibit 1 to his interview which was a copy of page 57 of the
Thomas Brothers Guide where the intersection of Florence and
Normandie and the area of the Command Post at 54th and Van Ness
(also known as 54th and Arlington) were located.
7. Pre Verdict-Post King Incident Time Period -- When
we attempted to focus Lt. Moulin's attention to the incidents and
circumstances surrounding April 29, 1992, he appeared to be
anxious to focus our initial attention to incidents which
occurred well before the King verdict was announced; consequently
we agreed to begin the initial focus of our interview with the
- 2 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
- ---------,
• I
't�
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
video tape of the King beating more than a year and a half ago.
Lt. Moulin stated that the first time he saw the King beating was
on a televised program; as a result of his observations and
review of the King beating tape, he discussed various aspect of
officers conduct within the 77th Division at numerous roll calls.
During those roll calls Lt. Moulin discussed the community viewed
the King video tape and further discussed different methods and
manners which he believed could have been employed to take Mr.
King into custody; at the various roll calls the officers in the
77th Division talked about how that video tape had affected
police work, not only in the City of Los Angeles but across the
nation.
8. Roll Calls -- Lt. Moulin described the roll calls
which he conducted at the 77th Division ("77th") as being very
much similar to those depicted on the television program Hill
Street Blues; he noted for instance that at times the roll calls
were very structured and at other times they were very chaotic;
roll calls at the 77th generally consisted of daily assignment of
officers to specific units; the roll calls also provided some
means of training as well as an open fo:um for discussion of the
day's work; in addition sometimes there was a pre-established
lesson plan that was provided by the commanders; generally the
senior supervisor conducted the roll calls; he was often the
senior supervisor and therefore conducted the roll call; other
occasions the roll call was conducted by sergeants.
- 3 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
i I
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
9. Moulin's Duty Assignments -- Lt. Moulin was first
assigned to the 77th in August of 1989; at that time he had
attained the rank of lieutenant; his previous assignment had been
as the officer in charge of Wilshire Vice; he has been an LAPD
officer for 20 1/2 years; he started work with LAPD on January
24, 1972; he had been the officer in charge at Wilshire Vice for
about six months; as a lieutenant in charge of vice unit he had
only nine officers working for him. When he started that the
77th he found himself working the PM Watch which was probably the
busiest watch and the busiest precinct in the "whole world" with
about 100 to 125 people working for him.
10. Responsibilities For PM Watch In working on the
PM Watch he had between 100 to 125 working on a given shift; as
the Watch Commander he was responsible for supervising his men,
giving roll calls everyday, handling complaints from citizens,
approving reports, approving jail bookings, and caring for the
needs of the officers.
a. At the time that he started at the 77th
Division his commanding officer was Eric Lillo.
b. The PM Watch was 2:30 p.m. until 11:15 p.m.
in the evening; the AM Watch w_ ould be 11: 15 until 7: 15 in the
morning; the day watch started at approximately 7:15 a.m. and
went until the afternoon.
11. Immediate Supervisors -- Capt. Gary Brennon
replaced Capt. Lillo as Lt. Moulin's immediate supervisor;
Brennon was only assigned to the 77th Division for approximately
- 4 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
J I
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
6-9 months; Lillo had left the 77th Division in approximately a
year's time after Moulin started at the 77th; Brennon was
replaced by Capt. Bob Hansohn.
12. There is a separate watch commander for each of
the three watches; each of the watch commanders reported to
either Lillo, Brennon, or Hansohn; each of those men would have
been the commanding officer at the 77th Division or patrol
division.
13. Sergeants In The 77th -- The sergeants working
under Lt. Moulin on April 29, 1992, included: Sgt. Terri
Tatreau, Sgt. Roger Dunning, Sgt. J. J. May, Sgt. Nunez, Sgt.
Mike Pytel, Sgt. Okamoto, Sgt. Tingerites.
14. The Daily Field Activity Report is a document that
would show who was on duty on April 29, 1992 including the
sergeants.
15. CRASH Units -- CRASH is an acronym which stands
for Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums; the CRASH units
were used to gather intelligence on the gangs in Los Angeles;
they were not to make arrests and they were not to handle radio
calls or to respond for calls for service; they were not to write
reports and they were to do nothing other than to interact with
the gang members of the community to gather intelligence on their
crime patterns; prior to the recent change in control over the
CRASH units, the lieutenant in charge of the CRASH units was
Dennis Shiree; after the change in control some of the CRASH
units were sent to South East, some to Harbor and some to South
- 5 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
) ,
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
West and some to the 77th Division; Moulin could not recall when
this change in command took place for the CRASH units because he
had just been on PM Watch for a couple of weeks when the riots
occurred; prior to that time he had been the Watch Commander for
the Day Watch and the Day Watch had no responsibility over CRASH
units.
16. Control Over CRASH Units -- Moulin also had
available to him some of the CRASH personnel or units assigned to
South Bureau; the control of the CRASH units was only recently
changed so that they were assigned to help patrol whereas they
had previously been assigned to function as an independent unit;
the reassignment to patrol occurred prior to the riots; Moulin
was visibly upset about the fact that the CRASH units were not
always available to patrol and in fact he noted that it was his
belief that by order of Chief Gates the CRASH units were required
on Mondays, Wednesday, and Fridays to watch a bunch of "gang
bangers'' play basketball and to protect the gang bangers during
such games; he estimated that six or eight officers would be
required to spend the whole night watching the gang bangers play
basketball; according to Moulin this occurred while people in his
Division's Community were raped and murdered and while calls for
service went unanswered; the order for such work was put out by
the Bureau chief; Moulin has been told that that order was in
concurrence with Chief Gates' orders; he noted that he had
strongly expressed his dislike of that order.
- 6 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)(4]
• y
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
17. Change In Moulin's Command -- Moulin took
responsibility for the PM Watch at the 77th on April 15, 1992.
18. Impact of King Incident on 77th and LAPD -- We
gave Moulin an opportunity to explain his comment about wanting
to discuss the events and circumstances prior to April 29, 1992
in the 77th Division; he told us that it was clear to anybody
working in the 77th that after the King incident there would be a
dramatic change in the way in which the Police and Community
residence would interact; he noted that during the succeeding 12
months after the King incident the LAPD absolutely "went
overboard" and its was pounded into the police officers' heads
that they had to be a "kinder, gentler department"; the police
officers were told that if they got into a situation where they
couldn't de-escalate they were to back out and to regroup and to
let the circumstances cool down or to find some other way to take
a person into custody; during that 12 month period there were
numerous personnel investigations; indeed, they were required to
investigate complaints made by citizens which were clearly and
obviously contrived or manufactured; it was Moulin's conclusion
that this pattern of conduct destroyed the morale of the officers
and made them want to "crawl into their shells and do absolutely
nothing"; Moulin noted that "they were shell shocked after the 13
months of Rodney King."
19. During the 12 to 13 months that he was on Day
Watch after the King incident, it was clear that the residents of
the 77th Division were very unhappy with the police; Moulin based
- 7 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
. '
, _ ,,,
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
his observations on his 21 years of police work including his
time as a sergeant in the 77th.
20. Chain of Command Was Unresponsive -- Moulin noted
that the Chain of Command did not "give a shit about us or the
little guy, the chiefs and commanders they don't listen to us";
Moulin noted that they don't listen to the "little guy" because
the Commanders wrongly felt that they had their "finger on the
pulse," and that they were "rubbing elbows with the community"
and he concluded that "they don't care what we have to say";
Moulin stated that what he was trying to describe for us was that
a lot of people working in the 77th Division knew that there was
considerable unrest and that the community was not happy, but
that no one within the LAPD command would listen to these
observations; he noted that it was a common occurrence for a
police officer to drive down the street and have people yell
something concerning Rodney King at the police officer; many
people would yell profanities or "flip a finger" at the police
officers; on other occasions, people would throw rocks and
bottles at the police; Moulin could not recall any major
occurrences but did state that there were a number of daily
occurrences.
21. Hansohn Conversation -- On either April 16th or
17th, Moulin went to Capt. Hansohn and expressed in very strong
terms Moulin's concerns about the outcome of the King trial;
Moulin said that he told Hansohn that LAPD had yet to do one
single thing to prepare for the aftermath of the verdict; Moulin
- 8 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
..
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
maintained that he told Hansohn "Captain, it's just a matter of
are they gonna burn part of the city down? Or the whole city
down? What are we gonna do about it? Are we gonna have a
tactical alert in the next couple days? Are we going to mobilize
the department? Are we going to cancel days off? Are we gonna
deploy heavily during the next several days? What exactly are we
going to do?"; faced with these statements Hansohn reportedly
made four comments including, 1. Don't ,ver react, 2. We've got
our finger on the pulse, 3. We're in constant contact with the
community leaders and 4. It's gonna be okay; Moulin recalled that
this conversation took approximately 20-30 minutes; there was no
one else present during that conversation; Moulin stated that
Hansohn repeated that it would be alright and that the LAPD could
handle any problems and that in any event any riots were not
going to happen in the 77th Division and that they would probably
happen in the Projects in "Southeast"; Moulin stated that he
pursued his concerns with Capt. Hansohn and noted to him that as
PM Watch Commander he would be left with approximately 8 police
cars, 2 sergeants and himself if something happened as a result
of the King verdicts.
22. Discussion Within The 77th About Possible
Disturbances -- Moulin says that everybody at the 77th Division
was talking about the probabilities of major disturbances as a
result of the King verdicts; Moulin says that they discussed it
several times at roll call openly and that this would be
confirmed by talking with the police officers at the 77th
- 9 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
, '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Division; Moulin says that they openly discuss the lack of a plan
having been prepared and that this was discussed openly at roll
calls; Moulin says that he told his officers that when the
verdict comes down "we are going to be on our own"; he also told
them "there is no plan, there is no preparation, we are as
prepared for these riots as we are for a 9.5 earthquake."
23. Moulin's Daily Reports -- Moulin suggested that we
look at the Watch Commanders Daily Report to locate
memorialization of these types_ of conversations. Moulin pulled
out from a manilla file a copy of a Watch Commanders Daily Report
which, he told us we he might find interesting; the one which
Moulin showed us was dated September 17, 1991; he noted that
there were several entries concerning lack of supervision; one of
the entries noted "once again this evening we had one in and one
out. This is no way to run a watch. We need more supervisors on
this watch, I cannot continue to function effectively without
proper personnel."; Moulin noted that to his Reports a sarcastic
note back from his commander and that his commander told him to
quit complaining and work with what he had; Moulin told us that
if he got hold of these reports we would find a lot of evidence
that would support what he said; Moulin noted that these
responses would essentially tell him to quit worrying and that he
was a cry baby.
24. One of the responses to his Reports said "I
appreciate the concern you expressed for your officer's safety
and lack of supervision, but these kinds of entries serve little
- 10 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)(4]
, '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
purpose. You have been given your share of the resources and
must still comply with existing policies and regulations. No
matter how many log entries you might write, you will not be
relieved of that responsibility"; Moulin interpreted this as
saying we're not going to give you a reason, here's is what you
have to do.
25. Moulin stated that he probably got an inordinate
amount of these negative memoranda back because he was the guy
who wrote things down and that made his commander very nervous so
the commander wanted to always respond; Moulin showed us a file
with several of such memoranda in them; including one in which he
complains about the fact that there was no lock on their jail at
the 77th Division.
26. Moulin said that Captain Hansohn, his commanding
officer, would be responsible for keeping the memos and that he
would keep them in his office; he suggested that we ask for all
the watch commanders' logs and all the attachments that go with
it; he suggested that we ask for the Watch Commanders Daily
Report; Moulin acknowledged that these were documents that he
kept in his file but they were not documents that he took from
the department; he kept these documents in his "Cover My Ass
File" .
27. We requested copies each of these documents; I
will note parenthetically that I received a call from Lt. Moulin
on Friday, May 29 at approximately 10:00 a.m. at my office and
was told by Lt. Moulin that he would be sending me copies of each
- 11 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
of these documents; on Tuesday, June 2, 1992, I received the
promised copies; those documents are attached to the file copy,
as Exhibit 3.
28. Lack of Resources for the 77th -- Moulin in an
agitated manner noted that the 77th Division is the busiest
precinct probably anywhere in America and he was forced to work
inside a building all by himself with no assistant Watch
Commander and little else; Moulin noted that he had one sergeant
in the field to supervise every single person he had out there;
Moulin called this "ludicrous"; he noted further that it is
"absolutely ludicrous and then he still says and it is right here
in his handwriting .•. it says the other watches seem to
manage, no they don't manage, they don't document it and they
don't say anything about it and therefore they don't get these
nasty little notes back."
29. Community Based Policing -- Police Chief Gates
took personal control of the 77th Division in January of 1992; as
part of a program which Gates called the "Magnificent Seven";
according to this plan, the 77th Division was taken out of the
South Bureau Chain of Command; as a result the pre-January 1992
Chain of Command went from Gates to Commander Hunt to Commander
Banks to Capt. Jefferson and then to Capt. Hansohn and down to
Lt. Moulin; after January of 1992, Gates took direct command of
the 77th Division and the Chain of Command went from Chief Gates
to Capt. Jefferson to Capt. Hansohn to Lt. Moulin; Moulin learned
of this as a result of a meeting with his captains, Capt.
- 12 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Jefferson and Capt. Hansohn; this program was also known as
"Community Based Policing"; other than the shortened Chain of
Command Moulin's work didn't change at all as a result of the
Community Based Policing; Capt. Jefferson told Moulin that he
would be reporting directly to Gates.
30. Moulin learned that his Watch Commander Daily
Reports were routed to Capt. Jefferson; he learned this because
Jefferson was distressed on several occasions about Moulin's
report and "bluntly" wrote things in Moulin's Watch Commander's
log and also told Capt. Hansohn to do something about Moulin's
daily reports; Moulin knew this because Hansohn called Moulin in
and told him to stop writing the reports; Moulin says that he was
sure that Gates never saw one of Moulin's Watch Commander's log
reports.
31. Moulin says he never saw Gates come down to work
in the 77th a single day; the first day he saw Gates at the 77th
after January 1992, was the night of the riots.
32. In comparison, Jefferson worked there everyday,
but worked there only during the day.
33. Conversation with Chief Vernon -- Approximately
six or seven months prior to the interview, Moulin made a call to
Chief Vernon and bitterly complained to him about the lack of
personnel and the lack of resources including cars and radios
that was being suffered in the 77th; Moulin told Vernon that the
77th needed more policemen in the street and that they needed
more resources; he also told Vernon that they needed more
- 13 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
. '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
supervisors than police office!s; Moulin complained that he was
tired of being reprimanded for encouraging his officer to quickly
respond to calls and in particular he was tired of being
reprimanded for lowering the officer's response time, below five
minutes; Moulin had been reprimanded for lowering the response
time because a lowered response time made it more difficult for a
division to obtain more officers and resources; Vernon told
Moulin that he was shocked to find that the 77th did not even
have a lock on their jail; the reason that Moulin called Vernon
was because Moulin was tired of the "cheap notes"; he contacted
Vernon as part of a special program which Vernon initiated to
talk to the director on the first Tuesday of every month; Vernon
did in fact return Moulin's call to Moulin's home on a Sunday
afternoon and it was during that conversation that he expressed
his concerns about the situation in his district where his
response times were being criticized for being too good; in fact,
both Captains Brennan and Hansohn had told Moulin not to lower
the response time in the 77th below the city average for fear of
losing the possibility of obtaining additional personnel; neither
Hansohn nor the other captains liked the fact that Moulin had
talked to Vernon; they didn't like it at all; and he was told to
"go ahead and make as many calls as you want to Vernon, but you
are still responsible"; Moulin said, "I didn't mind being told to
dig a swimming pool but I didn't want to have to dig it with a
spoon".
- 14 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
� •
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
34. Expectations Were That the Jury Would Return
Guilty Verdicts -- It is Moulin's opinion that the entire level
of command people within the department and the captains were
convinced that the King jury would produce several guilty
verdicts; Moulin speculates th~t that attitude played an
important part in the lack of preparation; Moulin says that there
was at a minimum a 50-50 chance that there would be some reaction
to the King verdict; consequently, it was crucial that some plans
and preparation be conducted.
35. Intelligence -- It's Moulin's opinion that there
was no intelligence given to him and to his police officers prior
to April 29th by SIS, any of the CRASH units, or any other source
within LAPD; those types of sources don't share information with
the patrol officers; Moulin and his officers received no
information from the anti-terrorist division, from the special
investigation section, nothing· from the vice unit or the metro
unit; Moulin never saw a written document of any type or kind
setting forth intelligence concerning the possibility of riots in
the event of a not guilty verdict.
36. Rotator Information -- Moulin did recall seeing
one piece of information in the "rotator" within a week prior to
the riots; it was his recollection that the information came from
the sheriffs' department or from one of the local police
departments; the information was that the gangs would be
intermixing their "colors" in order to show unity after the
jury's verdict; the "rotator" sets out little pieces of
- 15 -
C:\T~B\09007505.M (2)[4]
• I
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
information or news to pass along at the roll call.
37. Sheriffs' Plan for Potential Riot -- No one ever
mentioned to Moulin or his officers that the sheriffs' department
had a special plan devised in case of a not guilty verdict; the
first time he ever heard of "Operation Monarch" was during this
interview.
38. Mentality of the LAPD -- The LAPD's general
attitude towards communication and coordination with other law
enforcement units is that the LAPD is the only police department
which really knows anything about police enforcement; whether it
was the sheriffs' department or a local police department the
LAPD did not feel it necessary on a general basis to share or
coordinate information; its LAPD's attitude that if LAPD didn't
invent it, it was not a good idea.
39. The Standing Plan The standing plan is set
forth in the Tactical Operations Manual the standing plan is
supposed to be specialized for an individual division such as the
77th Division or the South East Division; the Tactical Manual is
set forth in a notebook; Moulin says that the tactical plan is a
generic plan to be used in the case of an emergency such as an
earthquake.
40. Single Standing Plan -- A single standing plan is
a specialized plan created to handle anticipated disturbances for
a specific event; the plan is based on intelligence gathered
concerning that particular event; the examples of this include
the circumstance several years ago relating to a bomb that was
- 16 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
) '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
placed in an IRS office and pl~ns made after that incident to
handle similar circumstances in the future; other examples
include Operation Rescue, Operation Hammer (arrest of gang
members on a given day); New Year's Eve in South Central Los
Angeles; Moulin says that it is quite common to have a single
standing plan for an anticipated occurrence.
41. Mobilization and Response Plan for Unusual
Occurrences -- Standing Plan -- The standing plan is a general
plan and was not made specific for the aftermath of the King
verdicts; on the other hand each of the different divisions would
make their standing plan specific for their division; the
standing plan was useless unless you had the resources and the
planning to implement it; the standing plan for your particular
area tells you where your hospitals, dams, power stations and
other crucial points within the division are; on the other hand
it doesn't tell you where the riots are going to take place; nor
does it tell you how to respond to a particular situation, for
instance a burning building; it does not tell the officer how to
coordinate with the fire department.
42. Moulin stated that he is fully familiar with the
tactical manual and how to implement it; on the other hand that
knowledge didn't do him any good when faced with the specific
instances on the 29th of April and that was especially true in
light of the lack of resources.
43. The advantage of having a Single Standing Plan was
that resources and manpower were set aside ahead of time to
- 17 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
respond to the anticipated occurrence; in most instances planning
and training for the implementation of a single standing plan was
done by the staff of the command post; it is crucial in order to
properly and effectively implement a Single Standing Plan to
prepare for it; in the instance of the King verdict riots there
was no preparation or planning of which Moulin was aware and
therefore there was no way in which the standing plan or any
existing standing plan could have been properly implemented.
44. First Responders Guide to Emergencies -- Lt.
Moulin had the First Responders Guide to Emergencies which was a
notebook divider; the Guide lists certain tasks which the
commander of the command post was required to do in case of an
occurrence; this is set out in a notebook; Lt. Moulin pulled out
and showed his version of the Guide; Moulin had the First
Responder with him on the 29th; it was not practical, realistic
for him to use the First Responder when confronted with bricks
and bottles and concrete out in the field.
45. Incidents of Wednesday, April 29, 1992 -- Moulin
first learned about the King verdict at about 12:30 p.m. on
Wednesday, April 29 as he was watching a news report at home on
television; his first reaction was to get dressed and report
immediately to the 77th Division headquarters; the news report
indicated that the verdict would be returned at about 3:00 p.m.
that day.
a. He knew as he arrived at the 77th Division
headquarters that there was no plan and it was his intention to
- 18 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)(4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
do whatever it was necessary to prepare for what he anticipated
would be a reaction during the evening hours on the 29th.
b. When he arrived at the 77th he encountered a
real "comedy of things"; the first thing he did was to approach
the day Watch Commander who was Sergeant Vian; Vian told Moulin
that the commanding officer for that day Capt. Hansohn was in
Oxnard; Moulin had not been told that Hansohn would be in Oxnard;
Moulin had the day-off on the 28th of April; Hansohn had been at
the roll call on the 28th.
c. At the roll call on April 28th, there was
apparently various statements by Capt. Hansohn that the officers
in the 77th need not worry since there was no indication that
there was going to be any negative reaction in the community and
he also told the officers that if there would be such a reaction
that it would probably happen in the Southeast (a neighboring
Division); Moulin was told that the officers vehemently disagreed
with Hansohn's assessment; Moulin suggested that we talk to
Officer Zaby concerning this confrontation.
d. Prior to showing up on the 29th, Moulin had
no idea that Hansohn would not be working that day.
e. Moulin was unaware of any training program as
was reported in the news that was being conducted at the 77th.
f. Moulin found it unreasonable that both Banks
and Hansohn were away from the 77th on the day that the Rodney
King verdict was announced; Lt . Gomall was also away from the
77th on the 29th.
- 19 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
g. Moulin went in immediately to speak to Capt.
Jefferson and asked him whether or not the division was on
tactical alert and he also asked whether or not they would call
in the morning watch people and whether they were going to hold
over the detectives; Moulin also asked whether they were holding
over the day watch and what they would do in preparation for the
verdict which would be read in the next couple of hours;
Jefferson told him that he was in constant contact with the
community and that any unrest would probably not start in the
Southeast; Moulin believes that Lt. Hagerty was also involved in
that conversation.
h. According to Moulin the command structure
believed that any unrest was unlikely to begin in the Projects
because there was a high concentration of people that were
unemployed and the gangs influence was quite prevalent there.
i. On an average day there are approximately 16
officers deployed with approximately 6 on the mid-shift for a
total of 20 to 22 people; in order to determine who was actually
assigned to the 77th on that date we would need to look at the
daily field assignments.
j. Moulin told Jefferson that he felt his
approach was wrong and that they needed to hold the day watch
over at least until the verdict was read; Jefferson after some
discussion agreed but just until the verdict was read and then
Moulin was to come back and see Jefferson to determine what to do
next.
- 20 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
. '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
k. At that point Moulin went to the watch
commander's office and told the MDT operator to send a message to
the officers on their car television screen message unit; the MDT
message was "per Lt. Moulin the day watch would be held over"
this meant that approximately 10 or 11 cars would be held over;
of course it was necessary to obtain additional cars for the new
watch which would be going on at 2:30.
1. Moulin told Jefferson that they needed
radios, additional cars, shotguns, and shotgun shells for the
officers.
m. The roll call for the change of shift would
be at 2:30; Moulin arrived at approximately 1:30 that afternoon
and spoke to Jefferson within the first half an hour to 45
minutes that he was there; it was Jefferson's job to find the
extra cars and guns.
n. There was a TV at the 77th Division and it
was on when Moulin arrived. Jefferson knew about the verdict
coming when Moulin walked in; Jefferson had done nothing prior to
Moulin arriving and confronting him with the need for additional
men and equipment.
o. After talking to Jefferson, Moulin got ready
for the 2:30 roll call at there were 25 officers or so and they
were sitting in front of the television; prior to the verdict
being read Moulin addressed his officers and told them that if
the verdicts were not guilty or a verdict which the community
didn't like, that there would be in real problems that evening;
- 21 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Moulin went over the conduct that would be required of the
officers in the event of disturbances and discussed with them
what the community might think concerning the various alternative
verdicts; he also went over the fact that they didn't have any
extra resources and that there was no plan that he knew of to
implement should there be a not guilty verdict; Moulin told his
officers that what ever they had sitting in the room was what
they would have to work with for some time; he also told his
officers that for the first day in his 21 years that he was
scared to death because he knew that the potential outcome of a
not guilty verdict was that many of the officer sitting in that
room might not live through the evening; he told his officers to
take all of their equipment from their lockers including
ammunition and back up guns and their batons and their helmets;
he also told them to make sure to fill their vehicles with
gasoline before they left the station; he further told them that
he was concerned with their safety and Moulin described the mood
of the officers as somber and very quiet and very serious.
Moulin said that they all knew that there had been no preparation
and that they only resources they had were the equipment and
themselves; in total he talked to his officers about 30 minutes.
p. When the verdicts were reported on television
there were some favorable comments from some of the officers at
which point Moulin told them "hey, keep it down, you know I'm not
interested in your cheap shots, keep you comments to yourself and
your personal opinions. Not everybody in this roll call room
- 22 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
� •
agrees."
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
q. After the verdicts were announced Moulin told
his officers "the worst case scenario has played itself out
here"; he then said "gentlemen what I just told you just a few
minutes prior, you better take every one of those words as gospel
because they are gonna burn the city down tonight and there isn't
a thing we are gonna be able to do about it."; he also told them
"I'm scared to death and if you're not scared to death sitting in
this roll call room, then you're crazy"; he also said "I don't
want anybody leaving this roll call room until I get back from
advising the captain to see now what he is going to do".
r. Moulin stated that the black officers were
very, very quiet, as well as the female officers; there were some
white officers that were also very quiet.
s. He went in to talk to Jefferson and asked
what they were going to do; Jefferson said "I don't know"; Moulin
said "they are going to burn the city down and there's nothing we
are gonna be able to do about it"; Jefferson said "you're right";
Moulin said "do I have any cars?"; Jefferson said "we're trying
to get you cars right now"; they still didn't have cars and it
was approximately 3:30 p.m.; Moulin had 25 officers sitting in a
roll call room and he didn't have any cars for them; nor did he
have radios or extra shotgun shells; Moulin decided to hold the
watch over indefinitely; he decided not to hold them over on an
hour-to-hour basis.
- 23 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)(4]
..
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
t. Moulin then went into Jefferson and told him
"we ought to be on a tac alert. We ought to have been mobilized.
We ought to have had a command post established"; he also said
"for God sake you're telling me hour-by-hour. We can't function
like that"; Jefferson replied "hour-by-hour" and Moulin
responded, "okay hour-by-hour"; Jefferson also asked him to find
out "where metro is working tonight"; Moulin then called metro
and said "where are you guys working tonight" and they said
"we've got four squads down in the Southeast roll call"; Moulin
then called to Southeast and in fact they did have four squads,
which theoretically would have been 40 officers.
u. Moulin then went back to the roll call and
reiterated some of his briefing points; he told his officers that
if they got in over their heads at any particular incident, he
wanted them to back out; he told them that they would regroup and
go back in with sufficient people; he also told them if a call
comes out he wanted a supervisor there instantly to try to defuse
anything that might occur.
v. He told the officers to keep their opinions
about the verdict to themselves and to do their jobs; he also
told them to take their helmets from their trunks and put them in
the car so that they could use them immediately; it is noted that
officers would normally carry their helmets in the trunk so as
not to offend anyone in the community; all of this was occurring
at about 4:00 p.m.
- 24 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
..
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
w. The replacement cars were coming in one by
one; as they came in the night watch officers were sent out to
patrol.
x. At approximately 4:00 p.m. he went in and
talked with Capt. Jefferson again and talked for approximately
20-25 minutes.
y. Moulin was_ asked at that point whether he had
the power to call a tactical alert and his answer was "no, I
didn't"; it was Moulin's opinion that the command was Jefferson's
to exercise and that it was not his place to call a tactical
alert.
z. Moulin stated that he had to beg Jefferson to
hold the day watch over; initially they were not even holding the
day watch over indefinitely but only on an hour-by-hour basis; it
was Moulin's conclusion that no one wanted to make a decision;
Moulin has concluded that some one wants to use him as the
scapegoat in order to "crucify his ass"; the officers were being
held over on an hour-by-hour basis which meant that the
commanders had to decide on an hourly basis whether to continue
to hold the officers over.
aa. It was Moulin's conclusion that Jefferson was
not going to call a tactical alert; he based this on the fact
that he wouldn't even hold the day watch over indefinitely;
Moulin concluded that Jefferson did not want to be criticized for
making a wrong decision and chose to make no decision in hopes
that the incidence would not grow or spread.
- 25 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
. '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
ab. Moulin stated that when the "city started to
go to hell" Gates reversed his command decision of January and
told Chief Hunt that he was back in charge of the 77th; Moulin
was advised by his Captain at approximately 4:25 to 4:30 that the
chain of command had been re-instituted and that Hunt was back in
the chain of command of the South Bureau.
ac. As of about 4:30 there still was no tactical
alert.
ad. At about 4:30 or 4:35 Moulin heard various
officers calling from Florence and Normandie; they were calling
about continued activity at that intersection; when Moulin did
not hear a "Code 4" being broadcast indicating that the
circumstances were all clear he got into his car and drove there
to find out first hand what the problems were; he drove from the
77th station to Florence and Normandie under a "Code 3"
circumstances; he took Officer Calderon with him in his car; he
approached the intersection and he could see "stuff flying,
including rocks, bottles, boards, sticks and anything that wasn't
nailed down"; his officers were just north of the intersection,
near 71st and Normandie.
ae. Moulin prepared Interview Exhibit 2, which
was a hand drawn sketch of th~ intersections at Florence and
Normandie and 71st and Normandie where various people were
located upon his arrival at the intersection.
af. Moulin drove westbound on Florence past a
liquor store which was at the corner of Normandie and Florence
- 26 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
and then turned and drove northbound on Normandie toward 71st; at
that point he noticed the police cars on both sides of the street
which totalled approximately 15-16 cars; the first thing he
noticed was a large number of objects flying through the air; the
second thing that he noticed was about 2/3 of his officers didn't
have any helmets on; Moulin marked with a
11
1
11
where he parked his
car; he indicated with a
11
2
11
where a large group of officers were
standing; he saw several officers struggling with a person who
they were trying to place under arrest; there was a semi-skirmish
line set up which was indicated by a "3" on Exhibit 2; the other
officers were standing around and there was no apparent plan for
them to take control of the circumstances; the middle of the
intersection was relatively safe especially since the officers
were somewhat around the outer_ perimeter of the intersection and
they were trying to keep people back; there were no fires at that
time but people were everywhere and they were yelling and
screaming profanities and there were many, many other people
coming towards the intersection to see what was happening there;
in total there were probably about 200 people in the area and
they were "not real friendly."
ag. About that time a Volvo came driving through
the intersection; its doors were flapping open and its windows
were smashed out; the driver stopped his car and fell down; the
driver was a white man and had a camera with him with the lens
torn off; the man was a New York Times reporter named Mark
Bartholomew; he was beaten up very badly; Moulin told him to stay
- 27 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
right there and promised him that he would not leave him behind;
the man handed Moulin some roles of film and told him to take the
film in case he went unconscious.
ah. At the same time Moulin could hear Sgt.
Dunning on the P.A. system of one of the police cars who was
yelling at a group of officers telling them "it's not worth it,
it's not worth it let them go"·; Moulin had no idea why Dunning
was yelling it; he later found out that Dunning was telling his
officers that it didn't make sense to tr.y to arrest all of the
suspects at that time, especially since some of the suspects were
looting the officers' cars and taking their flashlights and
personal things; Dunning got on the microphone and his yelling
can be heard in some of the tapes of the day; finally Moulin said
"fine, let's get the hell out of here. Get into the cars. I
want everybody to get into their cars right now. I want those
people to get their helmets on. I said we're taking this
newsman, we are taking our officers here, and we are taking our
prisoners and we are getting out of here, right now. I want
every single person out of here right now. Do you sergeants
understand?"; Moulin stood in the intersection and watched his
officers getting into their cars and watched the sergeants
getting in their cars as well; he finally got into his car and
told the New York Times reporter to follow him; they turned
around and exited the area at 71st and Normandie; Moulin put a
"4" in the middle of the intersection on Exhibit 2 where he stood
at the time he ordered everyone to leave the area.
- 28 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
ai. After he got into his car, he instructed
everyone by radio to clear the area of 71st and Normandie and
Normandie and Florence and not to be diverted by people throwing
rocks at their cars.
aj. It was Moulin's conclusion that it was better
for his people to leave and avoid someone getting killed there.
ak. He stopped two or three blocks from Normandie
and Florence.
al. His decision to leave was something that he
was required to do every day; Moulin stated that they found
themselves in over their heads occasionally and since the 77th
was not a "friendly area" they would simply back out of certain
confrontations; in this instance they didn't leave anybody in the
street as victims and there weren't any buildings burning down;
similarly, there wasn't anybody being dragged out of their
vehicles; nor were there any buildings being looted; they simply
exited the area with everybody still intact and everybody who had
come in the police cars; Moulin thought it was wholly
inappropriate for Gates or anyone else to say that they
"retreated"; they accomplished their mission and it was his sense
that there was no reason to continue to present a target to those
people who were so angry at them; after Moulin parked his car, he
decided to get the New York Times reporter an ambulance; the
reporter got out of the car and it was clear that he could not
drive further so Moulin put two officers in his vehicle and told
them to drive the car to the station; Moulin radioed ahead to
- 29 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
have an ambulance meet them at the 77th station; that was
probably at approximately 5 o'clock.
am. At that time it was very chaotic and it was
very difficult to communicate by radio; Moulin noted that the
radio equipment that the police had was ineffective.
an. Upon his return to the 77th station, Moulin
went in to talk to Jefferson and told him that they had a major
problem at Florence and Normandie; he told Jefferson that they
had lost the intersection a block in each direction; he told
Jefferson about the rocks and bottles and the newspaper reporter;
at that time Moulin told Jefferson that he should seriously
consider calling a tactical alert since in Moulin's opinion they
needed more people; Jefferson reportedly said "not yet. Go and
contact the Metro Unit on the phone and get those squads of Metro
rolling." Moulin said that he would.
ao. Jefferson then went out of his office take a
look at the New York Times reporter and was concerned by the fact
that he was a reporter since he felt that it might have some "far
reaching repercussions".
ap. At that point Moulin contacted the Metro
Units and asked them to send all available people; the Metro Unit
said that they only had two squads and Moulin told them that he
would take them; Moulin told them to go to the command post at
54th and Van Ness; Moulin also told them about the incident at
Florence and Normandie, but instructed the Metro Unit to meet
them at the command post at 54th and Van Ness.
- 30 -
C:\T~B\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
aq. The "command post" was a vacant parking lot
which had no equipment or other facilities.
ar. At that point Jefferson instructed Moulin to
go back out to the intersection to assess what the situation was;
Moulin told Jefferson that he had just come from the intersection
and they had lost it; Jefferson insisted that he go out and
assess the circumstances; Jefferson told him to go and assess the
area once again and to meet him at the command post at 54th and
Van Ness.
as. In response to his instructions; he got into
his police car, put on his helmet and his vest and drove back
there to the intersection with Officer Calderon.
at. As he approached Florence and Normandie he
observed more litter and many people who started to rock and
bottle his car as he went through the intersection; he proceeded
one street west and then went up to 71st Street and came back
down zig-zaging his way around the streets; it was his conclusion
that they had still lost the intersection; he did not see anybody
being beaten up and he did not see any buildings on fire; he did
see some guys with boxes coming out of a liquor store.
au. When he arrived in the area of the
intersection he drove down Florence and didn't like what he saw
since he felt that he would be an open target for the crowds; so
he decided to drive to the command post down various side
streets.
- 31 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)(4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
av. He had traveled about a block or so when he
heard a call on the radio which indicated that there was some
kind of a disturbance in which a woman was trapped in a vehicle
and being rocked and bottled; he heard the call go out as a "Code
2
11
; it didn't sound right to him so he picked up the microphone
and said
11
12-11-10
11
which was his call numbers and, said in the
microphone that he wanted the call to be upgraded to a "Code 3";
a "Code 3
11
call requires the use of red-lights and sirens; Moulin
then drove in the direction of the incident and heard on the
radio that they had an unconscious person; the officers
responding to that call said that they were going to drive the
person to Daniel Freeman Hospital; those officers were Dan Nee
and Lisa Phillips.
aw. Moulin continued to the command post at 54th
and Van Ness.
ax. When he arrived at the command post there
were very few police officers, perhaps 10 to 15; upon his arrival
the Metro Unit had not arrived; those people were at 54th and Van
Ness because Moulin had instructed one of the sergeants to take
the available people to meet him at that command post.
ay. Upon his arrival at the command post he tried
to inform the RTD people that LAPD was going to use the corner as
a command post.
az. Capt. Jefferson was not there when Moulin
arrived at the command post; Moulin estimated that it was about
5:45 when he got to the command post; again he estimated that
- 32 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
r
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
there were 10 to 15 officers at the command post; other officers
continued to arrive at the command post as time when on; Moulin
continued with his efforts to clear out the buses and to instruct
the RTD personnel to help them empty the lot so that it could be
used as a command post; at his arrival at approximately 5:45 he
was the senior person at the command post and his initial
objective was to try to make sense out of the chaos; he
eventually found someone at the RTD who promised to help move the
buses.
ba. The Metro Units began to arrive within 10
minutes of his arrival; there were two squads of Metro Units;
which totalled about 20 people.
bb. Capt. Jefferson arrived about 10 minutes
after Moulin did and Commander Banks arrived at about the same
time that Capt. Jefferson did; by 6:00 p.m. Capt. Jefferson,
Commander Banks and Capt. Gascon had arrived; Capt. Gascon was
the captain of the Metro Unit; Gascon had been given that
assignment for about four days, as of April 29.
be. Commander Banks was the highest ranking
officer at the command post.
bd. A sergeant approached Lt. Moulin prior to
Jefferson arriving and asked Moulin about calling a "tac alert";
Moulin said that it had already been discussed and that Jefferson
said that he would make that determination when he got to the
command post; the sergeant who had approached Moulin was Sgt.
Dunning; Dunning's inquiry was broadcasted over the air.
- 33 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
be. At this time, Moulin and the other commanders
were attempting to get their officers formed into squads; they
were also trying to locate some maps since they didn't have any
at the command post; they were also trying to find out what the
size of the area was that was involved with the rioting; Moulin
stated that they were trying to create a command post in five
minutes that "some one had the last 13 months to do".
bf. At that moment the command post did not have
LAPD equipment stored there, did not have radios, did not have
chairs or benches or anything that could be used for the purpose
of a command post; it was simply a location point, a meeting
point.
bg. Moulin stated that somebody called a tactical
alert at approximately 6:15 p.m. and it was his "sense" that it
was Jefferson; when asked whether he was certain that the
tactical alert was called at 6:15, Moulin noted that he didn't
know the exact time.
bh. A tactical alert, according to Moulin, puts
all department personnel on duty and on standby status and it
allows the department to redistribute forces to the affected
area, where ever that might be; a "mobilization" requires that
all off-duty personnel, all people that are on vacation and days
off be recalled to the work place; therefore a mobilization was a
higher alert than a tactical alert.
bi. Moulin noted that had he called a "tac alert"
while his captain was on the scene and was under control of the
- 34 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
c '
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
circumstances he would "probably slap the shit out of me"; Moulin
stated that he had been in charge he would have picked up the
phone at his house at 1 o'clock in the afternoon and put the
entire department on mobilized status as of that point in time;
Moulin acknowledged that he doubts that anyone in the department
had ever mobilized the entire department from the rank of below
Chief; he has in fact called tactical alerts before; has never
called a mobilized alert.
bj. The Denny Incident -- At about 6:30 or 6:40
p.m. the one cellular phone which they had and they were using
rang and he was told that Sgt. Tatreau had reported people being
taken from their vehicles and beaten at Florence and Normandie;
Moulin said "we'll get right on it"; and he advised his field
commander, Capt. Jefferson; Moulin noted that Commander Banks
never took command at the command post.
bk. When Moulin told Jefferson about the report
about people being taken from their cars and beaten, Jefferson
told him to get a Metro Unit over to that location "real quick";
Lt. Lorenzo was in charge of the Metro Unit was told about the
incident; he decided to send a helicopter over to look; at about
the same time they received another call on the cellular phone
from Lt. Hagerty who was yelling and screaming about pictures on
the television showing a guy being dragged from his car or truck;
Hagerty informed them that the man was being beaten at that
moment and they were watching it on television; Hagerty yelled
through the phone "what the hell are you people doing?"; Moulin
- 35 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
said "Bruce, quit yelling at me, I'm not in charge here"; Moulin
gave the phone to Capt. Jefferson and did not know what Jefferson
and Hagerty talked about after that point; they sent a helicopter
to check out the intersection; then they sent another helicopter
over there and Moulin remembers hearing over the radio that the
helicopter came back and said that there was no evidence of
anybody being beaten at the intersection of Florence and
Normandie.
bl. Moulin speculated that the beating had
already occurred at the time that the helicopter arrived at the
intersection at Florence and Normandie and that Denny had already
been put into his truck and taken out of the intersection.
bm. Metro Unit immediately formed up a squad and
went out to probe the area; the probe was out for about 15
minutes and came back and reported that there wasn't enough man
power in the entire city to get into that area.
46. Termination Of First Part of Interview -- The
interview was terminated to be rescheduled for and finished at a
mutually agreed upon time and date.
- 36 -
C:\TWB\09007505.M (2)[4]
Linked assets
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Conceptually similar
PDF
Michale Moulin, interview, 1992-06-08
PDF
Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-13
PDF
Thomas Moran, interview, 1992-08-28
PDF
Bruce Ward, interview, 1992-08-20
PDF
Oliver Thompson, interview, 1992-06-18
PDF
Jack White, interview, 1992-06-30
PDF
Banyan Lewis, interview, 1992-08-12
PDF
Hourie Taylor, interview, 1992-06-22
PDF
Gabriel Ornelas, interview, 1992-06-19
PDF
Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-06-16
PDF
Eugene Mornell, interview, 1992-08-28
PDF
Richard Odenthal, interview, 1992-06-24
PDF
Robert Moschorak, interview, 1992-08-05
PDF
Roundtable 10, discussion, 1992-06-29
PDF
Frank Piersol, interview, 1992-08-28
PDF
David Pietz, interview, 1992-06-19
PDF
Robert Vernon, interview, 1992-09-05
PDF
Richard Odenthal, interview, 1992-08-25
PDF
Roundtable 6, discussion, 1992-06-17
PDF
Richard Odenthal, interview, 1992-08-27
Description
Interview of Michael Moulin, Los Angeles Police Department Lieutenant, about his personal background, his recollection of the events before and during the civil disturbance, and the adequacy of the Los Angeles Police Department's response to the violence and unrest, including supplemental materials, 1992 June 3
Asset Metadata
Core Title
Michael Moulin, interview, 1992-06-03
Tag
OAI-PMH Harvest
Format
8 p.
(format),
application/pdf
(imt),
Interviews
(aat)
Permanent Link (DOI)
https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-33204
Unique identifier
UC11449689
Identifier
box 20 (box),web-box20-031-01.pdf (filename),folder 31 (folder),webster-c100-33204 (legacy record id)
Legacy Identifier
web-box20-031/web-box20-031-01.pdf
Dmrecord
33204
Format
8 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)
Type
texts
Tags
Folder test
Inherited Values
Title
Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992
Description
Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.
Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.
See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).
See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).
Related collections in the USC Digital Library:
? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)
Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.
Coverage Temporal
1931/1992