Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Robert Mueller, interview, 1992-07-20

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Robert Mueller, interview, 1992-07-20

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Content TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
MEMORANDUM
Webster Study File
Jan L. Handzlik
Mark E. Beck
Steven M. Wellner
July 20, 1992
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT- COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
July 17, 1992, interview with Assistant U.S. Atty. Gen.
Robert S. Mueller, III
This memorandum provides a synopsis of an interview
with Assistant U.S. Atty. Gen. Roberts. Mueller, III, conducted
on July 17, 1992, by Jan Lawrence Handzlik and Mark Beck. Steven
M. Wellner of Kirkland & Ellis attended the meeting to assist Mr.
Handzlik. Mr. Mueller is in charge of the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice. This memorandum contains the
analyses, conclusions and mental impressions of the attorneys who
conducted the interview and constitutes attorney work product.
it is not a chronological or verbatim version of the interview.
Introduction
Mr. Handzlik provided a brief description of the role
of the Special Advisor and the purpose of the interview. He
noted Mr. Mueller's role as SCRAG [Senior Civilian Representative
,J
of the Attorney General] and indicated that his questions would
focus on Mr. Mueller's communications with LAPD and other law
enforcement agencies, the role of federal law enforcement
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
authorities, the identification of missions and the use of
federal resources generally. Mr. Mueller did not note any
objections to the proposed line of questions and seemed at ease
with the format.
Mr. Mueller's Summary of his Role in Los Angeles
Mr. Mueller provided a brief overview of his role in
the riot response. The riots began on a Wednesday night when he
was out of town. He returned to Washington Thursday. By that
time, plans had already been made to send 2,000 federal troops to
Los Angeles the next day; the President had promised 1,500.
Thursday morning, the Attorney General decided he
wanted to have a representative in Los Angeles. Mr. Mueller was
designated that representative and transported to Los Angeles the
next day with a hostage rescue team. At the time of
Mr. Mueller's arrival in Los Angeles, the California National
Guard (CNG) had not yet been federalized. The fact that the CNG
was still operating under state command was consistent with
advice the White House had received from state officials.
Shortly before the President was scheduled to speak
Friday night, the Mayor and Governor called the White House to
request federalization of the CNG. By 7:00 p.m., the President
.J
said he would federalize the CNG.
When Mr. Mueller arrived in Los Angeles, he was still
not certain what his role would be in the ongoing operations. He
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
did understand, however, that he was expected to serve as the
"eyes and ears" of the AG in the area. Another Federal official
who had been sent to Los Angeles, FBI SAC Oliver B. Revell from
Dallas, Texas, had a more defined role as the field coordinator
of the operations of fed~ral agents. Mr. Mueller believed this
was an appropriate task for Mr. Revell because Mr. Revell was an
agent himself.
Mr. Mueller's role was somewhat clarified by the
President's Proclamation and Executive Order federalizing the
CNG, which also indicated that federal civil law enforcement was
to be coordinated by the Attorney General. Mr. Mueller provided
copies of the Proclamation and Executive Order, which are .
attached.
At this point in the interview, Mr. Handzlik asked Mr.
Mueller whether he had a copy of the Pentagon's "Garden Plot
Plan" for restoring order in the event of a civil disturbance.
Mr. Mueller indicated that he had probably seen the plan but did
not have a copy of it. He did not know whether it was
classified.
Mr. Mueller noted that he was unsure of the origin of
the term "SCRAG."
.J
Serving as SCRAG, Mr. Mueller felt he had a more
substantial role in the Los Angeles effort than he had expected
to have. After Mr. Mueller arrived in Los Angeles, he and Mr.
Revell together evaluated what their available resources were and
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
how those resources could best be mobilized. Three or four FBI
SACs arrived from around the country. A command log was set up.
By Saturday morning, a command strategy had been
established for the use of federal troops. A Command Center at
FBI Headquarters in Westwood was staffed twenty-four hour a day
by representatives of all federal agencies involved in the Los
Angeles operation. Also on Saturday, Mr. Mueller planned to
locate Major General Marvin L. Covault, the commanding officer of
the Federal troops in the Los Angeles area. He did not do so,
however, because of unresolved issues of federal and state
authority.
On Saturday, Mr. Mueller had visited the LAPD
command center and indicated that he was in the city to assist in
the anti-riot effort. At this point, Mr. Mueller saw his role as
coordinating with Sheriff Block, Chief Gates and others.
Mr. Mueller met with Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block and
Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl F. Gates on Saturday evening. Mr.
Mueller recalls the Sheriff saying, in essence, "We didn't ask
for you, don't want you here and you're no help to us." He
remembers Chief Gates expressing a similar sentiment, though not
as vehemently.
According to Mr. Mueller, some local officials opposed
the presence of federal troops at this stage because they wanted
to avoid federal involvement altogether. There was some feeling
among the locals that federal authorit i es were arriving a day
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
late and a dollar short. Some believed there was no need for
federal troops at that point and that bringing them in was simply
a political ploy. Local officials were also concerned about
restrictions placed on CNG once it was federalized.
Federal agents were sent into the field. SWAT teams
were kept in reserve, but ATF, Immigration and others were sent
out. ·· In general, local authorities lower in the chain of command
were accepting of federal involvement and those higher objected.
Activities of federal law enforcement tapered off
Monday and Tuesday, although federal troops were still present.
Sheriff Block and Chief Gates apparently believed that
the Federal presence stood in the way of their being able .to take
appropriate action to remedy the Los Angeles situation. Mr.
Mueller learned this from two sources: the daily conference
calls set up by the Governor, and General Covault.
General Covault believed he and his men were thrust into
unfamiliar territory. Because he had the responsibility to
protect his men from violence and overreaction, he was
particularly cautious. As an example, he would not want to
send out a couple of men to 'ride shotgun' on a fire engine
without ensuring they would have support and be in radio
communication with their commanders. Gates and Block wanted
troops to perform these tasks.
Conflicts arose between General Covault and local
officials. Toward the end, a number of the most serious
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
controversies had to do with the timing of the withdrawal of
forces .
At this point in the interview, Mr. Mueller reviewed
what he perceived as the basic tensions in the Los Angeles
situation: (1) who was to handle law enforcement; (2) the proper
mission of the federal authorities; and (3) duration of federal
involvement.
The Decision to Federalize the CNG
Mr. Handzlik asked Mr. Mueller whether the Governor had
ever expressed budgetary concerns as a motivating factor in the
decision to request federalization of the CNG. Mr. Mueller said
that while the Governor did not express budgetary concerns, the
issue "had not been lost on" him (Mr. Mueller).
Mr. Beck asked what other incentives there might have
been to federalize the CNG. Mr. Mueller explained that General
Covault's command structure was "superb." The CNG's own command
structure was good, but the General's was excellent. (As an
example of General Covault's command style, Mr. Mueller noted
that the General often left his second-in-command at the command
post and went out to meet his troops in the field.) Mr. Mueller
indicated that if he were the Governor, he would want someone
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like the General and his command structure to handle the
situation.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
According to Mr. Mueller, the CNG would probably have
been sufficient to handle the situation. Of course, that is
20/20 hindsight. Had something really "blown up," it would have
been better to have professional military in the city.
comitatus.
Posse Comitatus
Mr. Beck asked what limitations were imposed by posse
[18 u.s.c. § '1385] Mr. Mueller explained that he
understood the President's Executive Order and Proclamation
"trumped" any limitations otherwise imposed by posse comitatus.
As a practical matter, federal military authorities
tried to operate so that LAPD, the Sheriff's office or federal
law enforcement authorities would always be present along with
the military to perform necessary law enforcement functions such
as arrests.
Mr. Beck asked whether Mr. Mueller had coordinated his
efforts with Mr. Revell of the FBI. Mr. Mueller indicated that
he had and that, as a general matter, Mr. Revell handled the
allocation of resources and Mr. Mueller performed any necessary
legal analysis, such as reviewing the implications of posse
comitatus. Mr. Mueller added that the division of authority
"was not so cut and dried," in part because the legal
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implications of posse comitatus were not as important as the
practical implications and the ultimate question of how best to
coordinate the military effort with law enforcement.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
The Chain of Command and the Decision to Withdraw
This was the first time Mr. Mueller had been involved
in a situation like this, and it was necessarily a learning
experience. Mr. Mueller's role grew during the period.
Ultimately, he served as a liaison between the military, the
Governor and federal authorities, particularly with respect to
the important question of when federal troops should be pulled
out of the city. The actual chain of command on the withdrawal
question was that Mr. Mueller reported to the Attorney General,
who in turn advised the Secretary of Defense.
With respect to the withdrawal of federal forces, a
significant debate arose among the Mayor and Governor, who simply
wanted to see things stay calm, Chief Gates and Sheriff Block,
who had never wanted the CNG federalized or federal troops sent
in, and the federal forces themselves, who were increasingly
concerned about being "targets of opportunity". Mr. Mueller
described these competing interests as the parties' "positions."
At this point, Mr. Mueller expressed concern that some
of his remarks could be unfairly "politicized" by persons who
read the Webster Study report. He recognized that the parties
had different positions with respect to the allocation of federal
,)
resources and that his comments were not intended as criticisms.
He asked who would be receiving copies of the report.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Mr. Handzlik stated that we would be preparing a report
of our interview which would be sent to Judge Webster. Mr.
Handzlik stated that thereafter, Judge Webster and his staff
would be preparing a broader report concerning what had happened
during the disturbances and making recommendations for
consideration in future situations. Mr. Handzlik stated that the
final, broader report wou~d be publicly disseminated.
Although Mr. Mueller was the Attorney General's
representative in Los Angeles and the person with apparent
responsibility for recommending federal troop withdrawal, the
situation was more complicated than that. The President had
visited Los Angeles himself, and the Governor and the President
were close enough that that could change the actual decision
making process.
Mr. Mueller noted again that his role seemed to change
with time and that it was never pleasant, due to the parties'
competing interests. As already noted, the Governor had his own
reasons for keeping the federal troops in place. The General and
his troops wanted to leave earlier. In the end, Mr. Mueller felt
it was his job to bring the various elements together. The
timing issue was subject to much discussion.
,J
Further Discussion of Posse Comitatus
Mr. Handzlik informed Mr. Mueller that some local law
enforcement officials felt that the federalization of CNG
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
hindered the use of CNG for law enforcement functions, due to
posse comitatus restrictions. Mr. Mueller disagreed. The
decision was General Covault's to make, and it mostly involved
practical considerations. As noted, General Covault was
concerned about the safety of his troops and whether certain
missions were appropriate. Decisions on how to proceed were
vetted at the General's H~adquarters, where he had a legal staff.
According to Mr. Mueller, posse comitatus was simply
not an issue in terms of the use of federal troops. It was Mr.
Mueller's conviction at the time that the President's
Proclamation and Executive Order "trumped" posse comitatus and
the Office of Legal Counsel had vetted this conclusion.
Defederalization
The General thought that his troops needed to stay in
place only so long as there was actually violence. Others felt
that the potential for violence was the critical element.
As Mr. Mueller explained, defederalization is a rather
involved process. The military can be pulled out at any time,
but actual defederalization requires read advising the troops of
their retirement privileges, conducting physical examinations and
similar time-consuming tasks. Mr. Mueller originally understood
.J
that the defederalization process was expected to take 48 hours;
it was ultimately accomplished in eight.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
The active military were withdrawn first and the CNG
was left in place, federalized. The CNG was defederalized
overnight, on Saturday of the following week.
Other Duties
At the same time the troops were being withdrawn and
defederalized, Mr. Mueller was establishing and directing a task
force to investigate crimes arising from the violence --
potential federal crimes and coordinating the FBI and local
law enforcement effort. Before returning to Washington, Mr.
Mueller also set up a task force to address gang violence.
The investigation of most riot-related matters was
outside the scope of Mr. Mueller's mission, but he did want to
use available resources to identify persons and issues relating
to potential federal crimes. An example noted by Mr. Mueller was
the beating of Mr. Denny. Mr. Mueller stated that it was
important to demonstrate to the public that these incidents were
being addressed.
Communications with LAPD
Mr. Mueller recalled only one face-to-face meeting with
Chief Gates, on his first Saturday evening in Los Angeles. Prior
to that there was one telephone call, on Friday night when Mr.
Mueller tried to explain his developing role. Mr. Mueller said
he could imagine that Chief Gates's reaction was negative.
Subsequent communications between Mr. Mueller and Chief Gates
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
occurred in conference calls set up by the Governor and related
mostly to the use of the military. Chief Gates's attitude was
not as negative as Sheriff Block's. Sheriff Block was the most
incensed by the federal presence.
FBI Involvement
Mr. Beck noted the difficulty the Office of Special
Advisor has had trying to speak to the FBI on this matter. Mr.
Mueller suggested that Judge Webster call Assistant Director
Clark or Director Sessions.
Mr. Revell coordinated the federal agents, not troops,
though the agents and troops worked together. Mr. Beck asked how
many agents were involved. Mr. Mueller could not recall the
number, but believes they came in from around the country.
Garden Plot Plan
Mr. Mueller does not believe the Plan is a public
document, although it might be obtained through General Covault.
Additional LAPD Contacts
Mr. Mueller recalls having spoken to a shift
supervisor. He could not remember the supervisor's name, but he
retrieved a set of business cards collected while he was in Los
Angeles and provided names to Mr. Handzlik. The cards included
one from a member of the Governor's staff, Richard Andrews, OES;
and Ron Frankle, LAPD.
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Concluding Comments
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
With respect to the withdrawal of federal . forces, Mr.
Mueller noted that he was interested in seeing the "weaning off"
of military missions. The General wanted that too, but he also
wanted to get out early, which was not politically feasible. Mr.
Mueller noted that one call from the Governor to the President
could have overturned any· decision Mr. Mueller made regarding
withdrawal of the troops.
Mr. Beck asks what would have happened if federal
forces had not gotten involved at all. Mr. Mueller believes it
is difficult to say, although the perception on the streets at
the time was that the professional military's presence was making
a difference. It may be that the CNG would have been sufficient,
and it is unclear whether the Governor would proceed the same way
the next time.
Mr. Handzlik noted it has been suggested that conflict
among various bureaus of the LAPD caused deployment problems.
Mr. Mueller indicated that he had no first-hand knowledge of this
but also acknowledged the importance of leadership.
Mr. Mueller noted that it was a positive thing when the
Governor took over. The takeover was a gradual thing,
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attributable to the fact that it was the Governor who called the
President and the Governor who set up the coordinating telephone
calls. In some ways it would have worked out well if the federal
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
authorities could have come in and set up the organization right
' away, but that would have been particularly tricky in a situation
like Los Angeles, with its strong personalities and multiple
jurisdictions. As Mr. Mueller explained, you can only organize
what you are in charge of. (Mr. Mueller noted similarities to
the St. Croix situation, where a Governor was nominally in charge
of the situation but the effort was still difficult to organize.)
Mr. Mueller emphasized that much of the "mission
question" is personality-driven.
Recommendations for a Future Federal Response
Mr. Mueller believes it is important to set out, . early
in the process and perhaps in writing, the mandate of the
Attorney General's representative -- what to do and what not to
do -- to avoid misconceptions among local law enforcement
authorities and others. Perhaps, he feels, he could have been
more active early in the process and tried to provide a greater
sense of direction. However, such an approach might have been
perceived as arrogance and an attempt to impose federal control.
It is not clear in hindsight that he could have approached the
equation differently given the limited response time provided .
. J
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Description

Interview with Robert Mueller, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, about the use of federal resources during the civil disturbance, and the collaboration between federal law enforcement, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, 1992 July 20

Asset Metadata

Core Title Robert Mueller, interview, 1992-07-20

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 14 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), Interviews (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-32942

Unique identifier UC11449692

Identifier box 20 (box),web-box20-032-01.pdf (filename),folder 32 (folder),webster-c100-32942 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box20-032/web-box20-032-01.pdf

Dmrecord 32942

Format 14 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),Interviews (aat)

Type texts