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Content EXHIBIT C
- - -
t
FROM:OES LAW ENFORCEMENT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MEMORANDUM
TO: 2136178542
TO: LAURENCE W. BUFFALOE, Chief
Law Enforcement Division
FROM: · FRITZ C. PATTERSON1 Deputy Chief
Law Enforcement Division
J UN 1, 1992 9:52AM ~349 P.02
DATE: July 25. 1990
SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM THE LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT: RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL TRAINING
On July 24, 1990, CSTI Director John Mirolla and I met with Assistant
_ Sheriff Jerry Harper, Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, at the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department Headquarters in downtown Los
Angeles. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Mr. Harper's request
for consideration and resumption of CSTI sponsored training in the
special_ ized area of civil disobedience/riot and crowd control .
.,
Assistant Sheriff Harper asserts that based upon discussions he has had
with local law enforcement executives and from a review of soft-intelligence
d_ ata, there is a shared belief and concern expressed by these executives that
we may expect to see a return of civil disobedience which will be acted out
on the streets of local communities. Should that premise come to fruition,
the major concern of all affected law enforcement executives is that a
training shortfall exists in the subject area of riot and crowd control and, as
a result, local law enforcement may be ill prepared to respond and/or
otherwise control the situation once it deteriorates.
In support of his proposition, Mr. Harper points out the recent
demonstrations over the abortion issue and the Earth First! movement
which he views as issue-oriented causes. These causes then were
contrasted to the potentially racially-oriented demonstrations in Now York
and Washington. DC.
It is the posi ti.on of Harper, who it appears represonts the views of his
colleagues and contemporaries, that because thia situation is one which
has statewide implication, the state, but more specifically CSTI, should
consider resumption of training in the areas of civil disobedience and riot
and crowd control. Such training, it was suggested, could be bifurcated to
the extent one segment could address executive/management/command
role and responsibilitieE? and the other segment aimed at the sergeant and
below (field) role and responsibility.
------ ~--------- - - -
JUN 1, 1992
9:53AM ~349 P.0~
Laurence W. Buffaloe
Page 2
July 25, 1990
In general response to the proposal, Director Mirolla was totally cooperative
and supportive. He explained the need, however, for a comprehensive
needs assessment of the potential client agencies as regards to their
commitment to send personnel for the training.
As the meeting drew to a close, it was agreed that CSTI would initiate a
staff study on the mechanics of class restoration and scheduling. At the
same time it was agreed that, consistent with your approval, on behalf of
the Law Enforcement Division I would undertake creation of an
appropriate questionnair~ seeking input from the law enforcement
agencies who would be potential program participants.
If you are in agreement with our involvement as outlined, I shall proceed.
I shall keep you posted as to the progress.
!
••
m:
2136178542
JUN 1, 1992 9=53AM µ 349 P.0L
•
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
~800 M1AD0"4Nltw ltOA0
SACRAMENTO, CAlt,ORNI,\ il.5832
(916) .. 27 ... 990
September 15, 1990
TO:
FROMt
POLICE CHIEFS AND SH£RIFFS
Laurence W. Buffaloe
1
Chld
Law Enr orcement Di vision
-~ased upon several comments and concerns expressed by C&Hfornia law enforcement
administrators such as yourself, it appean; that the incidence of crowd control, protest und
disorder situations are becoming more frequent As such, OES is undertnkins a statewide
i}lquiry, designed to assess three dimensions:
'J
✓ The need for inoreased and updated training in these topics
✓ The pool of expertise cwtently available in the state
✓ Tho potontial content of ,uoh a course
OQnorally, we are 5e.t'king infomuuion on ~unent "state-of-tho-art" as to crowd control
tactics and training.
Accordingly. my staff has put together a very short surv~_y document. Please complete this
and forward it In the enclosed post-paid envelope. You may wish to forward this
Inquiry to your Operations Commander or Training Office for their Input,
on your behalf.
Bosed on the results of the survey, OES Law Bnf orcement wi11 work with the Califomiu
SpeciuJh,.ed Training Institutt co ensure thllt training ii made avallable to fit the needs you
identify, within the limits of budget and siaffing.
Thank you in advance for your usistance!
. ., '
.•n•t• · •~ , l'tL ~ t,.. .. 1,,,:-, 53:l f".t- 1 t-''! ,-.._ · ... ·.1 ,-v_,,...,. ...
-------
------~~-~--- ----~~~~---~JUN ~ 1, 1992 9:54AM i:t349 P.0~
>--· •·. ,_ .. - ' ,, ,., ~:CES ~ EJ-,FORCEJ"'EN ro: 2136178542
SPECIAL SURVEY:
Crowd Control &
Civil Disorder Training
Current Crowd Control/Disorder Training Sources Used In Your Agonoy:
Text(e):
_________ ...,,.,,_,_.,..,,~ ..... ,,.. ... ___ _ ~--------
POST Course(s):
--------------· ·-•·· · · ·
Non-POST Course(s):
-··-----------------------
Consultant(s):
Is thera anyono you would recommend as an "expert· or authority in this field? (Name and
agency or firm.)
------------~---• .,, ....... . .... •.1 -- · " ... •------
... _ _ _ _ ___________________ _
Future Training In Crowd Control/Disorder
Is currently available training (from all aouroas) sufficient to meet tho need In California Law
Enforcement, relative to this topic?
D Yes
�
No
If not, then shou Id OES/CSTI develop and present (updated) training on this topic?
D Yes
� No
. , • .. 1.•. n,,..,,~ '"1...-, ~ - - -••t ., , .; •-.• ._ ... , ___ _
, FRdM:OES LAW ENFORCEMENT TO:
2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:54AM ~349 P.0E
If so. shou Id it ba targeted for:
D Mana.gement/Supervloor 16 ~ 24 Hours
D Line/Patrol (Deputy/Offlcer/Sergeant) 32 • 40 Hours
D Traln .. tha-Tralner (Unk. Hours)
What should be Included? (Cheok all that apply; suggest additions.)
�
Civil Uablllty
�
Historfcal Dackground
D
Case Studies
� - -- · Squad Tactics
o~
Crowd Psychology
D
Mutual Aid System
�
MQ~S Arrest and Field Booking
�
Incident Command System
�
EqulpmenVNon-Lethal Weapons
�
LawG and Cases
�
lntsrvantion/Diffusion Teohnlquoa
What would you recommend be added?
Any other general suggestions or comments?
(tho following Information ls ro, t'1hir~nce only, should we have questions about your roepontt.)
AGENCY;
PerGOn Complotlng O~srvoy:
T•l•phone Number:
)
~
r
· ~ FROM =OES LAW ENFORCEMENT TO: 2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9: 55AM ~349 P . 0
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
Background
After the 1970's the Incidence of civil disobedience and crowd disorder situations seemed
to decrease sharply. There has however, been a general increase In the frequency of such
incidents In the last few years. Two baslc1ype&of d1eturbanc8s seem to present themselves
as law enforcement problems.
The first Is the planned protest or demonstration. Groups supporting or opposing abortion,
those with vJews on animal rights Issues and various envlronmental factions are an
examples seon each night on the network news. Secondly, a trend has developed that
usua!Jy Involves two key components • an attitude and alcohol. From parties that get out of
hand at college dormitories to what has become an annual "assault" on the City of Palm
Springs, lncldonts involving more spontaneous disorder have become more frequent.
Faced with these concerns, law enforcement administrators have commented that law
ellforcement personnel may no longer be well prepared to deal with such situations. With
those oonoerns In mind, the Law Enforcement Division of the Governor's Office of
Emergency Services set out to survey the Nstate of the state" as regards crowd control and
dls_ order tratnlng and plannlng.
This represents only a quick review of soma of the more significant responses. A more
detalfBd report on these Issues wfll be prepared later.
Survey
.A written questionnaire was sent to each city pollce department . and county sher1frs
department In the state. This survey sought Information based on four parameters:
o Sufficiency of current training
o Approach to updated training
o Aspects for Inclusion In such training
o Texts and instructors for a resource listing
Over two hundred responses were returnod. Many wore written not by staff, but by Chiefs
and Sheriffs. Many tmd 6pt;tOifio comments as to the need for more current training.
GovGrnof~ Offic o of Emergency S1ttvit;e&
. • .• ' ~ FROM: OES LAW ENFORCEMENT
TO:
2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:56AM ~349 P . 0E
~;"'~ ;,}_
. ;~ .. ,-... : .
. . ~---··· ----~ il
-~• • •••• r
•••••• • • -:lllli( • ••••
. .. -·····•·~
oenen11 Comments
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
One responder Indicated w ... a real need to get ready for the ao·s ... Another; "No one in our
agency has completed such a course tn over ten years ... Ono Indicated that most of thejr
training came from u ••• old mmtary manuals."
M Any training would be very much appreclated .. satd another ... This ls something we can
really use" was one response. Other comments Included: "Ws been a long time since the
'60's and most of us are pretty rusty." "This issuo appears to be staying with uo for some
time." One response was par11cularly plaintive: ..... it's oomlng agt\in • helpl"
Sufff tlency of Current Training
ln'terms of training oourses· t both POSTPCertified and those that are not, there seems to be
a need for additional tralnf ng. This was the first clear message in survey responses, as
nearly 84% of the returns noted such a need. Amplifying comments. such as those Indicated
above. were frequently lnoluded. Some departments Indicated that they conduct In-house
training, while othars feel uncomfortable In not havJng conducted such training for some
ttme. A more basic message was that the lave( of training that existed In the early 1970's
may· no tonger exist ~hroughout Callfornla law enforcement.
· Two other trends seemed apparent In reviewing responses. First, It appears (fogicaUy) that
agencies faood with frequent crowd and disorder occurrences are somewhat more satisfied
with the level of training available. These agencies tend to have "experts" In-house that can
propagate tralnlng and preparations In this subject area. Secondly, 1here are still agencies
In the state that have not yet been touched by a need for such training. Many departments
In Calif ornla stlll have fewer than ten personnel. and agencies such as this often Indicated
no need for training on such Incidents. One such agency concluded: "This does not apply
to .our department." These exceptions notwithstanding, tho clear majority of agencies aeem
to want enhanced training In thl& area.
Approach to Training
The svrvey inquired as to what format such training should take. As a point of departure.
respondents were asked if such training should be geared towards management and
supervisory personnel, toward tine personnel, or spcclaHy formatted as a "traln•the•trainer"
type of course. Those responding seemed equally satisfied with tralnlng dlroctcd at both
groupings: one course for management and supervisors. and yet another for line stnff. Many
indicaiod tha1 a ''train-the-trainer' course would be appropriate.
t::;;,;,•_ JI~-:. --':f!t:
• ~:.lfll ~w.Ji.;i
'l,~- ·\ ·:~~ ... '\ • •••••• "*
.• • •. . . • •· l
l1
_~.,.~- . -. ,tjj,,...;;. . ..
~~ ,. ••• ·"".,::,J.1
~ -· •• l""lf'
• I ,. e ~ .
~ (,f Em&tgency ~eIVlc&s
· FROh · :~c.:S LAW ENFORCEMENT
TO:
2136178542
JUN 1, 1992 9:57AM ~349 P.0S
..... ---· -- ···· ··--· ·- .. ·-· . ····---····---
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
Other comments were reflect Ive of specific concerns relatod to the training. Many Indicated
that the training must bo POST•Oortlfled. With the lean budgets many agencies face. this
certification was viewed almost universally as a priority. Also noted was a neijti to make the
training easily accessible. Reglona1 courses with a "local flavor" wer8 advocated. Some
Indicated that the Callfornla Speofatlzed Traintng Institute should revise and re-institute their
Clvll Disorder course. Others noted that such training ooutd be presented by a number of
providers.
Hands~on tral ning was noted as a necessity for those in line and supervleory posltlons, while
those in management positions seem 10 need Information on llabfllty and the scope of the
potential problems in such Incidents, according to respondents .
..
L~stly in this focus, some agencies Indicated a strong desire to sea development Of
statewide methods, procedures and practices in this topic area . .,Procedures should be
standardized to f mp rove efficiency" was one such comment •
1
Tralnf ng Aspect&
J
The survey asked respondents to comment on key aspects to be Included In training related
to these problems. Whlle many comments Included several points. thfs Quick Look will only
nst key Items In random order, so as to provide a flavor for responses received. A later, more
detalled report wlll provide expanded Information as to each.
Protective equipment
Use of Cantnes ·
Company Tactics
Stress
Planned Events
Close Order Drill
Threat Summaries
Mutual Aid
Labor Strikes
Crowd Weapons
Intelligence
lnteragency Planning
Documentation
Military Property
Dlspersal Orders
Use of Batons
Publlc lnforrnatton
Logistics
Use of Motors
1st Amendment Issues
Plan Preparation
Use of Helicopters
Passive Demonstrators
Transportation
t:thlcal Issues
Ch8mical Agonts
Plain Clothes Personnel
Officer Safety
Protester Liaison
Mounted Units
Command Posts
Small Agencies
Speclal Ordinances
Psych. Issues
Sharing Resources
Medical Aspects
Phys. Condltloning
Housing Prisoners
Report Preparation
Survemance
Pain Compliance
Groups Involved
-...,....~T'W,,~ '"or'e Off ico of Emergency Sorvic:as
~~~
• rr::ur1 • uc;::, LMw c- , ..... c1 ·1c.,..., , IU • J Ul'-1 ..L • ..L::,::,c ::,-~,,....,, ·, t-tJ"-t::, ,- • .1.L
•
R8source llstlng
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
The survey sought Information as to currently available resources In this subject area.
Speclfically. information was sought as to texts and manuals, POST Certified Courses of ·
choice, Non-Post Courses and lastly. lndivldua1s thought t~ possess expertise In thi;
subject area.
As for texts and other \earning aids. It seems that resources of this nature fall Into two
categories, Many agencies indicated the only documents they have are older military or law
enforcement reports or manuals, often dating back to the early 1960's. Others said that they
h _ ave developedtndepenoent departmental poUotes, procedures and manuals. Those noted
most frequently wero the ones produced by agenotes stlll very active In crowd control
situations. Notably. Alameda Sheriff. Oakland Police, Berkeley Police, San Jose Polloe,
San Francisco Police. Sacramento Po11ce. Los Angeles Police and Los Angeles Sheriff
were each mentioned several t1mes. Other agencies received occasional mention. Video
tapes by the Law Enforcement Televlslon Network, the Newport Beach Pollce Department
and ·tho Huntington Beach Pollce Department were each referenced.
POST .. Certified courses llsted as particularly appropriate Included several positive refer
ences to the Crowd Control for Instructors Course held in Napa and Santa Rosa. Santa
Rosa·s Critical Incident Course was arso noted, as was Los Angeles Sheriff's DART Class.
As for training that Is not POST Certified, few responses were received. Anaheim PD
indicated very positive comments about a course In Crowd Management held annually by
the International Aseoolatlon of Auditorium Managers.
As stated, th8 survey asked for Inf ormatlon as to lndfvlduats with experience and/or
expertise in these issues. Several agencies proposed their own ln.-house personne1. Others
noted outside consultants. Som& names were seen only once, others seemed to appear on
many responses. OES has prepared and sent a follow-up Inquiry to those named most
frequently, so that more detatred lnformaUon can be assessed as to each fndlvtduats·
capability and expertise.
FROM=OES LAW ENFORCEMENT
TO:
Work In Progress
2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:ssAM tt349 P.1 .
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
In responseiothese concerns, andtocontlnuetha process of Investigating the current level
of preparedness In Callfornfa Law Enforcement, severaJ processes continue. Most notably.
a working group has bean formed, undf;lr the Joint ausptces of the Callfornla Peace Officer's
Assoctatlon and the Office of Emergoncy Services. This group has repre$entatives from
agencies with soma of the most rocent expertences In theBe situations, assembted with the
collective hope that 1hair input wm aid in this assessment. A CPOA presentation or
presentatf ons may evolve from these meetings, as may input to ~th~r training resources.
Information Wanted
Clearly, no agency or organization, least of an OES. proposes to have all the answers. Even
with hundreds of responses. there are undoubtedly a number of individuals and resources
. that were not known to. or m9ntlono~ by, those respondfng to the survey. Any other Jnput
· ,regarding thase issues is most welcome. Contact Deputy Chief Fritz Patterson or Assistant
Chief Michael Guerin ofthaOES LawF.nforo8ment OJvJslon,at (SOS) 986-1649 or(714)391 •
4485 respectively.
Gov~rnor's Office of EmorgE>ncy Services
-r,-.- .-.· r:· (•, -
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
MEMORANDUM
Webster Study File
Todd Gale
Tony Richardson
June a, 1992
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Roundtable Discussion at Los Angeles Sheriff's Office /
I
on Tuesday, June 2, 1992 at 10:30 a.m. at the Hall of /
Justice, several members of the Special Advisors Staff (Jan
Handzlik, Vince Marella, Gordon Greenberg, Jim Sanders, Tony
Richardson and Todd Gale) met with several members of the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Office ("LASO"} in order to begin analysis on
behalf of the Special Advisor regarding the coordination between
the LASO and the Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"). The
LASO representatives participating in the roundtable discussion
were: Undersheriff Robert Edmonds; Assistant Sheriff Jerry
Harper; Chief Roy Brown, Field Operations, Region 1; Chief Bill
Baker, Technical Services Division; Commander Mark Squiers,
Acting Chief of Field Operations, Region 2; Acting Chief Larry
Anderson, Region 3; Commander Ken Bayless, Region 3; Commander
Barry King, Region 2; Commander Buford Smith, Field Operations,
Region 1; Lieutenant Richard Odenthal, Region 1, and LASO
representative to Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Board
("EOB"); and Captain Thomas Hehir, Region 1, and LASO
representative to Los Angeles County EOB. The following is a
summary of our recollection of this meeting, including our
questions and comments, together with our mental impressions,
conclusions and opinions, based upon the meeting. The meeting
lasted approximately 5 hours.
I. LAPD and LASO contingency Planning
Our initial discussion centered upon contingency
planning between the LASO and the LAPD in general. The formal
document which sets out the various lines of communication and
authority in the event of an emergency situation, whether a
natural disaster or civil disturbance, is the Law Enforcement
Mutual Aid Plan, currently in its fifth edition (prepared
October, 1991} ("the Plan"). A copy of the Plan is attached as
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Exhibit A to this memorandum. The Plan is prepared by the Law
Enforcement Division of the Office of Emergency Services ("OES")
for the state, pursuant to the authority of the California
Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement, signed by
Governor Earl Warren on November 15, 1950.
According to the Plan, LASO is in charge of both the
"Operational Area" of L.A. County and "Mutual Aid Region I,"
which consists of Los Angeles and Orange Counties. As such, the
Plan directs that LASO should coordinate and direct emergency
services, acting as a communications clearing house and nerve
center for all emergency operations in its area and region. The
LASO representatives with whom we discussed this matter
universally supported this protocol -and, as detailed below, were
critical of specific instances in which LAPD personnel did not
adhere to this chain of command during the civil disturbance.
The discussion, however, did not address the normative question:
given the geographic size and population density of the City of
Los Angeles, should the LAPD report directly to the state OES in
disaster situations?
Two facts gleaned from the Plan and from the round
table discussion suggest that a movement toward LAPD autonomy in
this regard is a possibility. First, the Plan draws an exception
for the City and County of San Francisco from the general rule
that the County Sheriff is the Operational Area Law Enforcement
Coordinator. (See Plan at iii.) This shows that the OES
recognizes that there may be situations in which it makes less
sense for a County Sheriff to coordinate everyone rather than the
chief of the police department of the largest city within that
county. Second, our roundtable discussion revealed that in the
early 1980's, a study was conducted by the state which suggested
that Los Angeles would be considered a separate operational area
in the event of a "Level 3 earthquake
111
which affected only Los
Angeles. This study should be obtained during follow-up
interviews with LASO personnel.
The sheriffs participating in the roundtable discussion
viewed the conclusions of the study related to Los Angeles'
autonomy as anathema. Aside from the fact that no major
earthquake could affect Los Angeles without affecting surrounding
areas as well, the LASO representatives believe that the study's
findings contributed to a mindset at the LAPD -- as perceived by
1
The term "Level 3 earthquake" was apparently never defined
in the study.
- 2 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
LASO representatives participating in the roundtable -- that LAPD
need not follow the Plan because Los Angeles, standing alone, is
bigger than any county in California. They noted that this
mindset was already in place, as reflected by LAPD's
unwillingness to seek help from surrounding departments during
the Watts riots in 1965. This assertion by the LASO
representatives regarding LAPD behavior during the Watts riots
should be verified.
II. The Effect of the LAPD's and the LASO's Organizational
structure Upon Their Response to Emergencies
Certain structural issues draw contrast between the
LASO and the LAPD and perhaps suggest the need for evaluation of
the LAPD's emergency response capabilities. In a non-emergency
situation at the LAPD, dispatch is handled centrally; that is,
calls from citizens requesting police assistance are channeled to
two central locations and dispatched from there to the
appropriate divisions. The LASO follows a decentralized dispatch
format, with citizen calls going directly into the affected
division. The LASO method arguably would allow a better
opportunity for a watch commander to keep his finger on the pulse
of the community which his division serves.
In contrast, in an emergency situation, the LAPD
follows a more decentralized approach. It was the understanding
of the LASO representatives -- an understanding that needs to be
verified with the LAPD -- that each LAPD bureau was tasked with
developing its own emergency operations command, and the
communication links between bureaus were hindered as a result.
Conversely, the LASO emergency procedures stress a unity of
command, with the LASO Emergency Operations Center employing a
standing team at the ready at all times. The team, which rotates
every 30 days, includes a chief, two commanders, and a staff
supporting their command. The LASO's centralized approach could
facilitate the smooth provision of services during a time of
crisis by greatly reducing confusion.
On the topic of communication between the LASO and the
LAPD, all representatives present at the round table discussion
stressed the good working relationship between the two agencies.
The issue should be explored further in follow up interviews with
individuals within the LASO. One formal method of coordination
cited was shared training procedures. In training on emergency
exercises, the LASO has participated in some training at the LAPD
and, to a more limited extent, the LAPD has participated in LASO
- 3 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
emergency training. More details on this training must be
gathered in follow up interviews both with the LASO and the LAPD.
III. Informal Means of Communication
Informal coordination and communication also exist
between the LASO and LAPD. On a daily basis, neighboring LASO
stations and LAPD divisions support one another for specific
incidents -- for example, the LASO Firestone station would
provide support to LAPD 77th Division officer involved shooting.
The parameters of these informal arrangements should be explored
in future interviews.
During the disturbances, LAPD personnel called friends
and acquaintances affiliated with other police departments
directly seeking their help, again without following the
procedures outlined in the Plan. This lack of coordination led,
in the eyes of the LASO representatives, to a breakdown in the
line of communications within the LAPD. The perceived result was
the various LAPD bureaus not knowing what resources were
available from their neighboring bureaus, and requesting
otherwise available resources from sources outside of the LAPD.
These assertions also need to be verified, both by discussion
with the LAPD and by discussion with the various other police
agencies that participated in quelling the civil disturbance.
Numerous industry groups, analogous to trade
associations, exist throughout the Southland (e.g., South Bay
Chiefs Association). As in other industries, these groups can
serve as fora for communications among various police agencies.
Furthermore, other friendships are established informally among
representatives of various police organizations, and many of the
sheriffs' representatives commented about the utility of these
friendships when the need for coordination arises among agencies.
There appears to be an inherent level of contradiction between
relying on networking through friends and acquaintances to
coordinate response on the one hand, and following the Plan to
the letter on the other. Perhaps a balance can be struck,
recognizing that networking interdepartmentally can yield
positive results but cannot supplant formal procedures during
times of crisis.
IV. LASO's Operation Monarch
One aspect of the LASO's preparation for any
disruptions that might occur as a result of reactions to the
verdict was its organization of the Operation Monarch task force.
- 4 -
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Operation Monarch was made up of representatives from all
divisions of the LASO, and it was designed to obtain and consider
information concerning what might happen following a verdict in
the trial. It gathered intelligence from agencies throughout the
County willing to talk, its contacts in the communities and
individual LASO officers. In addition, approximately eight hours
of training in preparation for the verdicts was conducted with a
few LASO sergeants and lieutenants. Operation Monarch was
exclusively an LASO operation, without official coordination with
the LAPD. Representatives suggest that we follow up on the
LAPD's planning for the King verdict with Undersheriff Edmonds.
v. Significant Events Involving the LASO During the Civil
Disturbance
The LASO summarized the most significant events of the
recent civil disturbance in a brief chronology which it provided
to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in early May. (A
copy of the chronology is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit
B.) The LASO provided bailiffs at the King beating trial, and
therefore learned as early as 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992 that a
verdict might be rendered in the trial. All LASO divisions were
already on alert, including the custody Division operating at
local jail facilities.
Lt. Dick Odenthal, Field Chief of LASO's EOC, stated
that he was at an LAPD station when the verdict was announced and
immediately began to prepare for any trouble that might arise.
He held the impression at that time that the LAPD had deployed
officers in the South Central Los Angeles area. Odenthal used
his pager to activate LASO's EOC, and brought in several other
Los Angeles County agencies such as the Department of Public
Social Services, the Department of Public Works, the California
Highway Patrol, the Health Department and the Fire Department.
Internally, the LASO dedicated its Special Enforcement
Division, Operation Safe Streets and Anti-Gang Division to riot
control efforts. During the initial breakout of the civil
disturbance, the LASO also used its "ring down" line to the
LAPD's Emergency Operations Center to inform the LAPD that it was
operational and ready to exchange liaison officers. The LASO's
official liaisons with LAPD were Lt. Don Rodriquez and Sgt.
Robert Puente; LAPD liaison officers were Sgt. Tim Anderson
(Metro/K-9) and Sgt. Walker (Bunko/Fraud). The LASO activated
tactical units and sent them to predetermined staging areas at
Carson and Crescenta Valley as the numbers of violent incidents
increased.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Around 9:00 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, the LASO
received a call from the state Office of Emergency Services'
Deputy Chief for Southern California, Fritz Patterson, who told
Lt. Odenthal that the City of Los Angeles had asked for the
deployment of National Guard troops. When Lt. Odenthal called
his counterpart at LAPD's EOC, however, he discovered that they
had no knowledge of such a request. Several minutes later he
received a call from the LAPD's EOC that a LAPD Commander had
made the request and had apparently spoken to Sheriff Block about
it. (Assistant Sheriff Harper interjected that Sheriff Block had
not conversed with anyone from the LAPD at that time about the
National Guard. This subject should be discussed with Sheriff
Block.) The LASO was surprised that the National Guard had been
called because the LAPD had not even asked for any assistance ·
from the LASO. In fact, the LAPD had stated earlier that it had
no idea how the LASO could be used.
Lt. Odenthal acknowledged that requests were made by
the LAPD, but not through the LASO's EOC as mandated by the
mutual assistance pact. Apparently, individual LAPD officers
made requests for resources to individuals they knew at other
agencies, thereby bypassing the LASO's EOCs. This circumvention
was exacerbated by the apparent failure of the four LAPD EOCs to
communicate with each other.
The LASO realized around 10:30 p.m. on Wednesday that
the mutual assistance system was not being utilized properly.
Therefore, no centralized information was coming from any one
place concerning who was responsible for handling certain
contingencies and the law enforcement resources which were
available.
2
From 10:30 p.m. to midnight Wednesday there didn't
seem to be a great deal of distress. The LASO maintained a
platoon force (56 officers) at the Civic Center to keep control
of all the County buildings in that area because it was obvious
the LAPD could not handle the disturbances there.
It wasn't until around 11:00 p.m. on Wednesday that
communications were established with the National Guard, which
2
It was obvious to the LASO during the civil disturbance that
no one person at the LAPD exercised control over the LAPD's
operations. In fact, the LAPD was missing a complete layer of
command, including Vernon (on vacation), Brewer (resigned) and
Dotson (demoted). Normal deployment for the LASO during a patrol
shift is 250 to 350 units. During the civil disturbance,
however, more than 1,410 units were deployed.
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
was being staged at the Pitchess facility. Ordinarily, the LASO
EOC would handle mission requests involving the National Guard.
When the system is working properly, such requests for assistance
might come from various cities in the County, and the LASO would
be able to marshal! resources for the entire County. The LASO
was prepared to do so on Wednesday evening and to use the
National Guard at such time as the Guard was available for
specific missions. The plan was to have the LASO and the LAPD
make arrests and allow the Guard to secure those areas so that
the LAPD and the LASO could "leapfrog" into other trouble spots.
The Guard's mobilization, however, was delayed.
It should be noted that several agencies from around
the state made unsolicited offers of assistance to the LASO, but
the LASO declined them because it had no specific missions for
those agencies at that time. Additionally, the LASO learned of
several outside agencies, such as the San Diego sheriff's office,
participating in law enforcement activities, but the LASO had
nothing to do with a request for its assistance.
When the looting escalated on Thursday, Sheriff Block
again offered his help to Chief Gates. Chief Gates accepted at
that time, and two platoons were assigned to the Crenshaw area at
around 10:00 a.m. The Emergency Broadcast System was activated,
all leaves and days-off were cancelled and all officers were
placed on call. As nothing was happening in the northern part of
the County, the LASO closed the command post there and focused a
lot of attention on the areas where it was receiving the majority
of calls (e.g., Compton, Culver City, Long Beach, etc.).
Platoons were mobilized in the Crenshaw area with
orders to arrest anyone who was committing a crime. The LASO
employed an aggressive arrest policy, involving high visibility
and a high profile, to convey a message of accountability to
those who committed crimes. The platoons' missions changed
several times while they were in route to the Crenshaw area. One
platoon went to Crenshaw to save the shopping center there, while
the other platoon went to at least four different locations
throughout the City. The LAPD was overwhelmed by the disturbance
in the Crenshaw area by the time the LASO arrived because it had
only a small sub-station in the area. At least 117 people were
arrested by the LASO.
The LASO activated the Emergency Broadcast System
because it couldn't really predict the nature and extent of the
disturbance. By Thursday, the CHP was responsible for the
protection of Fire Department personnel, relieving the LASO of
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
one task. The LASO went into full phase mobilization because the
fires and looting were growing and spreading from 5:00 p.m. to
roughly midnight on Thursday, April 30. By 3:00 a.m. on Friday
morning most of the problems began to abate. The curfew took
many people off the streets and thereby lessened the criminal
activity.
Federal troops were not committed until Friday, May 1,
and a liaison officer was assigned to them. This added two more
layers of bureaucracy, in the eyes of the LASO roundtable
participants, because once the troops were federalized, federal
attorneys had to scrutinize the missions the troops were being
asked to perform before they were dispatched. This should be
verified with federal law enforcement personnel. FBI, INS and
other federal agents were also sent to Los Angeles. They
apparently came under the authority of SCRAG, an acronym for a
branch of the Department of Justice. This should also be
verified. With the exception of the INS agents, the LASO did not
think the other federal agents were helpful.
The federal agents were, nonetheless, deployed by both
the LASO and the LAPD. The federal officers were typically
deployed in their own units and sent out by the LAPD to patrol
certain areas. But they had no communication capability with the
LAPD, nor were the federal agents familiar with the areas where
they were deployed. Essentially, they apparently were left to
their own devices. The LASO used at least eight to ten officers
as liaisons with the federal agents and will provide us with the
names of those individuals.
Most events had substantially subsided by 7:00 a.m.
Friday. After that time, law enforcement officers were
performing "mop-up" work and making curfew arrests. By Saturday,
there was some semblance of order and control in the LAPD command
structure and EOC. By Sunday, May 3 the LAPD had matters under
control, in the opinion of the roundtable participants.
VI. Recommendations from Roundtable Participants
The LASO stressed that it enjoys a good working
relationship with the LAPD, despite the LAPD's failure to
properly utilize the EOC system. It appears that the LAPD was
seeking help where it could get it. The LAPD had to admit that
the disturbances were too much for it to handle before it would
seek assistance. The LASO responded to a specific question
concerning the LAPD's motivation by stating that it does not
believe the LAPD's actions had anything to do with competition or
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
any supposed bad communications between it and the LAPD. This
should be followed-up in individual interviews with LASO
personnel.
On the topic of training, Assistant Sheriff Jerry
Harper suggested that the state OES can also play a role. In
fact, on July 24, 1990, during a meeting with Fritz Patterson ,
Deputy Chief for Southern California for the Law Enforcement
Division of OES, and John Mirella, California State Training
Institute ("CSTI") Director, Assistant Sheriff Harper suggested
that emergency training provided by CSTI had become too oriented
towards natural disasters and away from civil disturbances during
the 1980's. He predicted that the 1990's would be a time of more
civil disobedience, pointing out demonstrations related to the
abortion issue and Earth First!. Assistant Sheriff Harper
suggested at that time that CSTI take this shift into account and
provide more civil disobedience training to officers statewide,
including crowd and riot control. A memorandum reflecting his
views as expressed during that July 1990 meeting is attached to
this memorandum as Exhibit c. Deputy Chief Fritz Patterson
should be interviewed regarding this meeting, OES and CSTI
training in general, any changes after the July 24, 1990 meeting,
and any contemplated changes in the future. The interview with
Deputy Chief Patterson could also explore the role of the OES in
relation to the LAPD and other agencies affected by the riots,
and could serve as a lead-in for meetings with relevant personnel
at CSTI to discuss training issues as they would relate to law
enforcement's response to riotous situations.
Undersheriff Edmonds believes the City now understands
that if it gets in over its head it should call the LASO, which
can marshal! a lot of resources. They need to follow the chain
of command, and he and Chief Booth at LAPD have agreed to stay in
contact with each other, especially with respect to major
activities calling for nutual assistance. LASO station
commanders will continue to be in contact with their LAPD
counterparts on a regular basis. The LASO also intends to have
discussions with Chief Williams when he assumes his new position.
After these discussions, LASO and/or LAPD may amend their written
procedures for handling civil unrest.
- 9 -
EXHIBIT A
1.
. : . ·(
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID PLAN
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I
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF El\IBRGENCY SERVICFB
Director:
Ricbmv Andrews, Ph.D.
Chlef. Law Enforcement Division:
Laurence W. Buffaloe
Prepared by:
Kenneth R. Jo~ Deputy Chief
Editine;/Word Processing:
JoAnne R. Cascio
Graphics:
Norman Wobschall
Bob Gerber, Assistant Chief
. Printing:
Sue Dubie-Holbrook
Office of Emergency Services
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
2800 Meadowview Road
Sacramento, CA 95832
5th Edition - 10191
•
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSES
B. DEFINITIONS
C. AUTHORITY
TABIE OF CONTENTS
I. ORGANIZATION FOR MUTUAL AID
Map of Operational Areas
Map of ~utual Aid Regions
11: PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING MUTUAL AID
1
11
iii
111
V
1
2
3
4
Activation Channels for Law Enforcement Mutual Aid 5
III. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 6
ANNEXES
A . .. - ·
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, OFFICE OF 11
EMERGENCY SERVICES
B. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 16
C. STATE MILITARY FORCES
2)
D. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Z3
E. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
25
F. OFFICE OF CALIFORNIA STATE POLICE
28
G. OFFICE OF THE STATE FIRE MARSHAIJARSON 31
AND BOMB DIVISION
H. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION 33
I. EXECUTIVE ORDER W-9-91 m
J. MASTER MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT ~
K. PERSONNEL 44
~
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•
October 1, 1991
FOREWORD
California's Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan derives its authority from
the California Emergency Services Act and the state's Master Mutual Aid
Agreement. We are just~fiably proud of our mutual aid system which
serves as a model program for our nation.
California has had more than its share of man-made and natural
disasters, civil disturbances, and other significant events requiring large
nml:1bers of law enforcement personnel and equipment. Our ability to
respond professionally, efficiently, and effectively has proven not only cost
effective, but has saved lives and protected property.
Our system works because of the commitment of state and local
government professionals who serve as the backbone for the mutual aid
plan. Through your support we wi11 continue to improve this plan to reflect
the changing needs and capabilities of our law enforcement agencies.
RICHARD ANDREWS, Ph.D.
Director
1
INTRODUCTION
The State of California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan, as revised,
continues as the basis for emergency law enforcement operational
deploymenJ procedures within the statewide mutual aid system. As an
outgromh of the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid
Agreement (1950) and the Governor's Executive Order W-9-91, the plan is
an extension of, and is supportive to, the California Emergency Plan.
The Law Enforcement Division of the Governor's Office of Emergency
Services is the coordinating element for all state agencies' activities
relating to preparation and implementation of this plan. Such planning,
preparations, and operational activities by state agencies in support of the
mutual aid system will be consistent with that department's policies and
procedures. State agencies performing traditional roles in mutual aid
events include: California Department of Justice; California Highway
Patrol; California Department of Corrections; California State Police;
California Department of Parks and Recreation; Office of the State Fire
Marshal; and the California State Military Department. Additionally, the
Law Enforcement Division is available to assist local agencies by providing
similar guidance and consultation.
A full understanding of the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan and the
sequential actions within the mutual aid system is necessarily important to
all law enforcement executives and administrators.
LAURENCE W. BUFFALOE, Chief
Law Enforcement Division
State Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordinator
11
A. PURPOSES
The purposes of this Plan are:
1. To establish state policy for law enforcement mutual aid.
2. To outline the procedures for coordination of alerting, dispatching,
and utilization of law enforcement personnel and equipment
resources.
8. To provide for the. coordination of law enforcement mutual aid
planning and operations at the state and local levels.
4. To provide for . a system for receipt and dissemination of information
and data related to civil disturbances/disobedience, riots, disasters,
or other unusual occurrences, either existing or pending. Such
information will be made available to the Governor's Office and to
other state agencies that may be called upon to support local law
enforcement pre-emergency efforts.
B. DEFINITIONS
Below are definitions of terms used in this Plan:
. 1.
2.
8.
4.
Operational Area
A county, along with political subdivisions within that county.
Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator
The county sheriff, with the exception of the City and County of San
Francisco, where the police chief is the Operational Area
Coordinator.
Mutual Ald Re~on
A multicounty area established by the Office of Emergency Services to
facilitate coordination of mutual aid.
Reeional Law Enforcement Coordinatqr
An Operational Area .Law Enforcement Coordinator elected by other
coordinators within an OES-defined region to act as the overall
mutual ai~ coordinator for that region.
iii
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5.
6.
7.
State Law Enforcement Mutual Nd Coordinator
The State Coordinator is the Chief, Law Enforcement Division, Office
of Emergency Services. The State Coordinator is responsible for
administrative action and coordination between state and local law
enforcement agencies during emergencies.
State of War Emere:ency
Condition which exists immediately, with or without a proclamation
thereof by the Governor, whenever this state or nation is attacked by
an enemy of the United States, or upon receipt by the state of warning
from the federal government indicating that such an enemy attack is
probable or imminent. (Section 8558(a), Government Code)
State of Emere:gncy
The duly proclaimed existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme
peril to the safety of persons and property within the state caused by
such conditions as air pollution, fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot,
drought, sudden and severe energy shortage, plant or animal
infestation or disease, the Governor's warning of an earthquake or
volcanic prediction, or an earthquake, or other conditions, other than
conditions resulting from a labor controversy or conditions causing a
"state of war emergency," which conditions, by reason of their
magnitude, are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services,
personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county, city and
county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region
or regions to combat. (Section 8558(b), California Government Code)
8. Local Emere:ency
"LQcal emergency" means the duly proclaimed existence of
conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and
property within the territorial limits of a county, city and county, or
city, caused by such conditions as air pollution, fire, flood, storm,
epidemic, riot, drought, sudden and severe energy shortage, plant or
animal infestation or disease, the Governor's warning of an
earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an earthquake, or other
conditions, other than conditions resulting from a labor controversy,
which conditions are or are likely to be beyond the control of the
services, person~el, equipment, and facilities of that political
subdivision and require the combined forces of other political
subdivisions to combat. (Section 8558(c), California Government
Code) _.
iv
9.
Law Enforcement Division
The Law Enforcement Division of the Governor's Office of Emergency
Services, State of California.
10. Unusual Occurrence
An event involving potential or actual personal injury or property
damage • arising from fire, flood, storm, earthquake, wreck, enemy
action, civil disturbance, or other natural or man-caused. incident.
C. AUTHORITY
The State of California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan is hereby revised
under the authority of Sections 8550, 8569, 8615, 8616, and 8668 of the
California Government Code, the California Emergency Plan, and the
Master Mutual Aid Agreement.
V
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I. ORGANIZATION FOR MUTUAL AID
The organizational framework for mutual aid in the State of California is
based on four levels of increasing responsibility. These are: cities (or other
similar local jurisdictions), operational areas, regions, and the state.
A Cities
City police departments are charged with responsibility for the
maintenance of law and order and-protection of life and property. The
Chief of Police is the official responsible for determining the magnitude of
an emergency within city limits and the necessity of calling for law
enforcement assistance from the County Sheriff.
B. Operational Area
The next level of mutual aid responsibility is the county. For the purposes
of this Plan, and by authority of the California Emergency Services Act, a
county is hereafter referred to as an operational area (see Definitions, page
iii). The Operational Area Law Enforcement Coordinator is the Sheriff of
the county (or, in the case of San Francisco, the Chief of Police of the City
and County of San Francisco).
C. Region
To facilitate coordination of mutual aid, the State of California is
administratively divided into seven law enforcement mutual aid regions.
(See Mutual Aid Regional map, Page 3. For a description of a mutual aid
region, see Definitions, Page iii.) Each mutual aid region has a Regional
Law Enforcement Coordinator. rius person is a sheriff of the region who is
elected by majority vote of the Operational Area Law Enforcement
Coordinators in that region. Elections may be held following the sheriffs
general election. Should a tie vote occur, the tie will be resolved by the
chiefs of police of the region.
Each Regional Coordinator will designate two senior officers within his
department as alternates, one of whom functions as the Regional
Coordinator during his absence.
Should a Regional Coordinator vacate the position during his term, a
meeting of Operational Area Coordinators within that region will be called
by the Chief, Law Enforcement Division, OES, within thirty days of the
vacancy for the purpose of electing a new Regional Coordinator. ~
If for any reason a two-thirds majority of the law enforcement officials in a
particular region desire to hold another regional election, they may request
the Chief, Law Enforcement Division, to conduct an election.
1
Siskiyou
Modoc
2
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Rivmide
Imperial
41,·
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3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LAW ENFORCEMENT
............
WII
D. State
The Office of Emergency Services is responsible for coordination and
application of state resources in support of local jurisdictions during tim.es
of emergency. This office is also responsible for the receipt and
dissemination of information relating to existing or potential major
disasters, disorders, or unusual occurrences. The Director of the OES,
through the Chief of the Law Enforcement Division, has the responsibility
for mutual aid coordination at the state level.
Other state agencies have responsibility for supporting local law
enforcement officials: the Department of Justice, the California Highway
Patrol, the Office of State Police, the Office of the State Fire Marshal, the
Department of Corrections, the Department of Parks and Recreation, and
the State Military Department. (See Annexes.) ·
II. PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING MUTUAL AID
A. Basic Policy
The basic policy of state assistance to local government in civil disorders
and "unusual occurrences" is to support local law enforcement with state
resources after local and adjacent government aid has been reasonably
committed, or whenever the magnitude of the emergency is such that the
best interest of the State will be served by the involvement of state resources
before the commitment of all local agencies.
1.
2.
Local
When a Chief of Police determines that an emergency situation in his
jurisdiction may become or is already beyond the control of his
department's resources, it is his responsibility to request mutual aid
from the Operational Area Coordinator.
Operational Area
When an emergency develops or appears to be developing which
cannot be resolved by a · law enforcement agency within an
operational area, it is the responsibility of the Operational Area
Coordinator to provide assistance and coordination - to control the
problem. (Section 26602 of the Government Code)
If it should appear likely that the resources of an operational area
may be depleted, the Regional Coordinator should be advised in
advance.
4
·-
ACTIVATION CHANNELS
FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID
r ~;;:•·
STATE
LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR
EVALUATES STATEWIDE SITUATION AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES:
COORDrNA TES INTER-REGIONAL LE. MUlUAL AID; TASKS STA TE AGENCIES
.......
~
.
. .
. .
REGIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR
EVALUATES REGIONAL SITUATION AND RESOURCES; ACTIVATES
REGIONAL L.E. MUTUAL AID PLAN
DISPATCHES REGION LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES UPON REQUEST
•
..
OPERATIONAL AREA
LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR
EVALUATESAREASITUATIONANDRESOURCES:ACTIVATES
AREA LE. MUTUAL AID PLAN
DISPATCHES AREA LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES UPON REQUEST
......
LOCAL AREA
LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR
DETERMINES NEEDS; ACTIVATES DEPARTMENT'S
EMERGENCY PLAN
REQUESTS MUTUAL AID FROM AREA COORDINATOR IF NECESSARY
:ci
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• CHANNEL FOR REQUESTING MUTUAL AID ~,~ .... ,,.~ CHANNEL FOR ADVICE & INFORMATION
5
3. Ree:}ona1
Should an existing or anticipated emergency be of such magnitude as
to require the commitment of the resources of one or more
operational areas, it is the responsibility of the Regional Coordinator
to organize the dispatch of resources within the region. · -
The Regional Coordinator will keep the State Law Enforcement
Coordinator advised.
4. ~
If the combined resources of a region are not sufficient to cope with
· an emergency situation, or if such a condition is indicated, the
Regional Coordinator will request additional assistance through the
State Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordinator.
III. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
A Basic Policies
1. This Plan represents the official position of the State of California
concerning law enforcement mutual aid planning and operations.
2. Each region within the state mutual aid structure will develop a
mutual aid plan.
a. Maximum use of local law enforcement resources prior to ' the
initiation of a mutual aid request will be the main tenet of mutual aid
operations. ·
4. Unless otherwise expressly provided, or later agreed upon by the
parties, the responsible local law enforcement official in the
jurisdiction requesting mutual aid shall remain in charge. It is
operationally essential that the local police official coordinate all
actions with responding agencies to ensure an effective application of
forces.
5. The integrity of responding forces and the policies and procedures of
their departments will be maintained. Exceptions will require
approval of the department concerned.
6. A maximum effort shall be made to provide each successive level of
authority with complete, current, and accurate information relating
to emergency situations in progress or anticipated.
6
B. Guidance for Mutual Aid Operations
1.
Operations
For a detailed description of mutual aid operational procedures it is
recommended that . the OES Law Enforcement Division's La.w
Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations be reviewed at each
operational level. This document provides a step-by-step analysis of
considerations involved in mutual aid operations.
2. Planning
3.
. 4.
Planning at all levels must be a main task in mutual aid operations.
Without prior planning and coordination between law enforcement
agencies, response to mutual aid requests is slower and operations
are less effective. Each law enforcement agency should develop its
plan in a manner consistent with the State Plan.
Information
Complete and accurate information is vital to the evaluation of any
emergency situation and a necessity for both effective deployment of
mutual aid forces and eventual control. Gathering and
dissemination of information relating to civil disturbances or
unusual occurrences is of paramount importance in mutual aid
operations.
Communications
An essential need during any emergency is the capability of an
agency to communicate both internally and with other agencies.
With this requirement in mind, the problem of communications
should be a priority in mutual aid planning. The Law Enforcement
Guide for Emergency Operations contains a section which outlines
considerations related to communications during emergency
situations.
The State of California has established a Law Enforcement Mutual
Aid Radio ·system (CLEMARS) with a special frequency of 154.920
MHz for emerg~ncy law enforcement mutual aid purposes. For a
detailed description of the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid
Radio System, it is recommended that the publication The CLEMARS
Plan be reviewed. This system is intended for coinmand and control
purposes among agencies taking part in emergency operations. It is
not to be used as a primary local channel. Local departments may be
allowed to use this channel in their day-to-day operations as an
auxiliary to their primary frequency upon approved request.
7
,
--
5.
Conditions of Emere:ency
Under the California Emergency Services Act of 1970, there are three
conditions of emergency: state-of,;:war emergency, state of
emergency, and local emergency (see Definitions, Page iv). During a
state-of-war emergency or state of emergency, the Governor has
complete authority over all agencies of state government a~d the
right to exercise within the area or regions designated all police
power vested iri the state by ~ - e Constitution and laws of the State of
California (Article 12, Section 8620 and Article 13, Section 8627,
California Emergency Services Act). During these two conditions of
emergency, mutual aid is mandatory.
The Governor is empowered to proclaim a state of emergency in an
area affected or likely to be affected when:
a. He is requested to do so by the chief executive of a city or the
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors or administrative officer
of a county; or,
b. He finds that local authority is inadequate to cope with the
emergency.
A local emergency may be proclaimed by the governing body of a
county, city and county, or city, or by an official designated by
ordinance.
In periods of ~ocal emergency, political subdivisions (cities or
counties) have the power to provide mutual aid to any affected area in
accordance with local ordinances, resolutions, plans, or agreements.
During a local emergency, state agencies may provide mutual aid,
including personnel, equipment, and other available resources, to
assist local jurisdictions in accordance with mutual aid agreements
or at the direction of the Governor.
By proclaiming a local emergency, the governing body of a city or
county increases its police power and may promulgate special orders
and regulations necessary to provide for the protection of life and
property.
In periods other than a state-of-war emergency, state of emergency,
or local emergency, state agencies and political subdivisions have the
authority to exercise mutual aid powers in accordance with the
Master Mutual Aid Agreement and local ordinances, resolutions,
agreements or plans (Section 8617 of the Government Code).
8
6. Actions of State Ag:encies
It is the policy of the S_ tate that, during conditions of emergency, state
aid will be rendered as required in accordance with the state's Law
Enforcement Mutual Aid Plan.
Annex A defines duties and responsibilities of the Law Enforcement
Division and contains a listing of resources which the Law
Enforcement Division has available for support of local law
enforcement. -- ·
In addition to the Office of Emergency Services (Annex A), the
following state agencies have specific responsibilities to support local
law enforcement during emergency situations:
a. The California Highway Patrol (Annex B)
b. The State Military Department (Annex C)
c. The Department of Justice (Annex D)
d. The Department of Corrections (Annex E)
e. Office of California State Police (Annex F)
f. Office of the State Fire Marshal (Annex G)
g . The Department of Parks and Recreation (Annex H)
7. Financial Assistance
Law enforcement agencies may be eligible for financial assistance
under the Natural Disaster Assistance Act (NDAA - Campbell
Amendments) when the Governor proclaims a state of emergency or
under Public Law 93-288, as amended, (Stafford Act) and NDAA
when the President declares a major disaster. Agencies may be
eligible for assistance to address response costs (i.e., overtime,
mileage, etc.) and restoration and reconstruction costs for damage to
agency facilities. The program is administered by the Governor's
Office of Emergency Services .Disaster Assistance Division. Briefings
on program eligibility are conducted periodically and i~ediately
following disaster proclamations or declarations. Auditors from the
State Controller's Office are also available at the time to assist agency
personnel in documenting costs and identifying necessary records.
9
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8.
Federal EQuipment
The Department of the Army has issued certain regulations
regarding temporary loan of federal military resources to National
Guard units and local civil authorities in anticipation of or during
civil disturbances. These regulations, the types of equipment
available, and procedures for obtaining this equipment can be found
in the Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations Planning.
This loaned equipment may.-be kept only for the duration of the
disorder and in no case for more than 15 days. Should the disorder
excee_ d this 15-day period, the hand receipt and loan agreement may
be renewed for another 15-day period. The loan agreement will also
require a cash bond equivalent to the value of the loaned property.
9. Federal Manpower
When the state has committed all of its available forces, including the
State Military Department, and when such forces are unable to
control the emergency, only state government may make a request to
the President to provide federal forces to assist in restoring or
maintaining law and order. Only after the President has agreed to
provide such forces and his proclamation has been published, will
federal forces be provided and deployed.
10
I. PURPOSE
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
OFFICE OF El\IERGENCY SERVICES
ANNEXA
The purpose of this annex is to define duties, responsibilities, and resources
of the Law Enforcement Division, Office of Emergency Services, in
providing assistance to law enforcement agencies during times of
emergency.
II. AUTHORITY
Authority for the activities of the Law Enforcement Division is prescribed by
Article 6, Chapter 7, California Government Code.
III. RESPONSIBILITIES
.., The Law Enforcement Division, on behalf of the Director of the Governor's
Office of Emergency Services, is responsible for coordination of state
resources in support of local law enforcement during "unusual
occurrences" such as public disorders, demonstrations, riots, and natural
· or war-caused disasters. The Law Enforcement Division maintains a
continuous duty system · which operates in conjunction with the 24-hour
communications center at the Office of Emergency Services in Sacramento.
A representative of the Law Enforcement Division can be reached at any
hour of the day or night by calling Area Code (916) 427-4235, or 24 hour (916)
427-434L
Any communication to the Office of the Governor concerning local
emergencies, requests for state assistance, or information relative to any
local problem can be handled with one phone call to the Office of Emergency
Services. Included in this emergency communications system is an
operational 24-hour closed-circuit teletype system connecting the Office of
_ Emergency • Services with the Department of Justice and the California
Highway Patrol. The California Law Enforcement Radio System (CLERS)
may also be accessed through the Office of Emergency Services. ·
This communications system should also be used for reporting information
concerning possible or potential .incidents. A representative of the Law
Enforcement Division may be dispatched to the scene of an unusual
occurrence either upon request of local law enforcement or when the
situation appears to have the potential to require state assistance.
11
-- -------------------- ----------------------
IV. RESOURCES
The Law Enforcement Division maintains an inventory of law enforcement
support equipment which is available for loan to law enforcement agencies
throughout the state. In addition, there are six (6) mobile equipment vans
(each of which contains riot suppression equipment and protective gear.to
supply 25 personnel). The Division also maintains five (5) ipobile
communications vans which are strategically positioned in the state
(Alameda, Inyo, Sacramento, San Bernardino, and Shasta Counties).
The Law Enforcement Division biannually conducts a manpower and
resources inventory of all law enforcement agencies in the _ State of
California to include police departments, sheriffs' offices, coroners' offices,
the California Highway Patrol, and other state agencies with law
enforcement responsibilities. This inventory is distributed to law
enforcement officials throughout the state.
Following is a list of the resources available from the Division:
A. Mobile Equi~~ent Support Vans
Should a local department need the resources contained in one of
these vans, the Regional Coordinator should be contacted to handle
the dispatch of the equipment. The vans are pre-positioned as
follows:
1. Locations
Region IA- Santa Barbara County Sheriffs Office,
Santa Barbara
Region II - Alameda County Sheriffs Office,
Oakland
Region III - Shasta County Sheritrs Office, Redding
Region IV- State OES, Law Enforcement Division,
Sacramento
Region V- Fresno County Sheriffs Office, Fresno
Region VI- San Bernardino County Sheritrs Office,
Rialto, and Inyo County Sheriffs Office,
Bishop
12
.fr
~
--·- ----------------- - - ---------------------
2. Contents
Ammunition, 12-gauge
Body armor
Flex-cuffs
Goggles
Grenade launcher
Gun cleaning kit
Shotguns
Helmets
Mini-fogger
Riot batons
Shells, AAl barricade
Shells, grenade
launcher type
B. Mobile Communications Support Vans
These vans are designed to be used as mobile emergency
communications centers and can be obtained for law enforcement
use during emergency conditions by contacting the maintaining
agency. The vans have heaters and air conditioners.
Each of the vans is equipped with radio communications on these
statewide systems:
California Highway Patrol (Blue)
California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System
(CLEMARS)
Fire Mutual Aid Radio System (FIREMARS)
California Emergency Services Radio System (CESRS)
California Law Enforcement Radio System (CLERS)
California On-Scene Coordination (CalCord)
The units are equipped to cover the entire frequency spectrum
including VHF, UHF, and 800 MHz system.
In addition, the vans have the capability to:
1. Operate from self-contained power units or commercial power
when available;
2. Connect telephones carried in the units to land wire facilities;
3. Operate on VHF, UHF and 800 MHz frequencies used by
various state, county and city facilities;
4. Monitor media television broadcasts and AM radio; and
5. Activate an external public address system mounted on the
roof.
l3
C. Command Van Complex
During extensive, protracted operations, the Office of Emergency
Services may provide a command complex consisting of four
vehicles: a truck with a portable generator, a 5th wheel command
van with its pickup truck, a tractor-trailer communication van, an4
a tractor-trailer operations van. Although the generator truck will
power the entire unit, it is recommended that this unit be set up
where appropriate commercial power, telephone lines, etc. are
available. These complexes are located at OES' Sacramento
Headquarters and at OES Region I offices at Los Alamitos in
Sou them California.
"Set-up" configuration is flexible within the limits imposed by 200 feet
of prefabricated cables.
Vans perform the following functions:
1.
2.
a.
4.
5.
Generator - Powers the entire complex.
Command Yan - Provides conference table with telephones for
command staff, visual display via rear projection screen and
closed circuit television.
Operations Yan - Includes six radio operator positions for
selected radios, visual displays by status boards and closed
circuit television, individual station recorders, and
reproduction equipment.
Communications Yan - Contains 20 radios in essential
emergency services, telephone switching for entire complex,
logging recorders, audio coupled . teletype, and facsimile
service.
All three van units have self-contained toilet facilities and
minimum housekeeping capability. Back-up power is
available from generators installed in the command and
communications vans. All vans are equipped with heaters
and air conditioners.
Tractors, generator and pickup units are equipped with OES
local government radio and CHP "blue" channel for dispatch
direction and control.
Maintenance and Training
OES does not provide personnel. Personnel are provided by the
local jurisdiction or the state agency employing the complex.
OES technical personnel transport, set up, and maintain the
14
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vehicles and equipment during operations, and provide
technical guidance.
D. In-house Inventory
Maintained at the Law Enforcement Division office in Sacramento for
loan are:
¾nmunition, 12-gauge
Body armor
Body scanners, handheld
Bull horns
Audio packs
ELT radio direction finders
Body/Face shields
Flex-cuffs
Gas masks
Goggles
Communication Equipment:
10-watt handie talkies
5-watt handie talkies (VHF and UHF)
Randie talkie chargers
Grenade launchers (with
shells)
Handcuffs, Smith & Wesson
Helmets
Loud hailers
Public address system
Shotguns, 12-gauge
Tear gas grenades
Randie talkies on CLEMARS and LG frequencies
Portable base stations
15
ANNEXB
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Annex is to clarify and promulgate the legal
responsibilities, policies and procedures of the California Highway Patrol
(CHP), in providing assistance to local law enforcement agencies during
emergencies.
II. AUTHORITY
A. Authority for the CHP to provide the various types of assistance and
support outlined in this Annex is contained in the following:
California Penal Code
California Vehicle Code
Governor's Executive Order 67-CHP-1
Emergency Services Act (Title 2, Div. 1,
Chapter 7, of the Government Code)
California Master Mutual Aid Agreement
I III. RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The primary responsibility of the CHP is to provide traffic supervision
and control on all state highways constructed as freeways and on
highways within the unincorporated areas of the State.
B. Secondary CHP responsibilities include assisting local law
enforcement agencies in restoring and maintaining law and order.
IV. POLICY
A. Mutual aid support will be provided after local and adjacent
govermµental resources within an Operational Area have been
reasonably committed; or whenever determined by the Governor that
prior CHP commitment is in the best interest of the State.
B. Requests for CHP "mutual aid support" at custodial facilities will be
managed the . same as any other mutual aid request. Once a
commitment has been authorized, any mutual aid mission,
including missions within the confines of custodial facilities, max be
accepted. All requests for unarmed assistance will be declined.
16
Missions within the confines of custodial facilities will be limited to
the prevention of death or injury to any person, including inmates or
wards, as deemed appropriate and necessary by the ranking CHP
officer at the scene.
The CHP will also respond to "officer needs assistance (11-99 or 999)°
type requests whenever the lives or safety of a,nx custodial personnel
are in immediate jeopardy, regardless of the peace officer status of
the person needing assistance.
C. CHP personnel .committed to the support of local authorities will
remain under the command and control of the CHP. All CHP
policies and procedures, including policy on the carrying and use of
firearms, will remain in effect. CHP commanders and designated
supervisors may accept missions from the responsible local
authorities.
V: · TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
A. Officer Needs Assistance {11-99 or 999), CHP assistance will be
provided when any officer's safety is in jeopardy and immediate
rescue or back-up is requested. Assistance shall be withdrawn when
the hazard ceases to exist. This type of assistance does not constitute
formal mutual aid.
B. Emere:ency Traffic Assistance. CHP assistance may be provided
when an event has occurred that has unexpectedly developed to the
point where local authorities must deploy the majority of their on
duty personnel to mitigate the incident. Assistance will be limited to
on-highway perimeter traffic control unless incidents occur in an
officer's presence which require action necessary to save lives or
property. Emergency traffic assistance to local authorities does not
diminish the CHP's traffic responsibilities on state freeways or
highways within ~e unincorporated areas of the State. Upon such
highways, the CHP's primary traffic responsibility will be retained
regardless of the type of incident. This type of assistance does not
constitute formal mutual aid.
C. Mutual Ajd Sul}port. CHP support will be provided when an event is
planned or has occurred that is· , or probably will become, beyond the
· capabilities of the responsible law enforcement agency and adjacent
agencies, and the Operational Area Coordinator has requested
mutual aid and CHP support, or the Governor has determined
involvement to be in the best interest of the State. Mutual aid support
requires approv· al from CHP Headquarters prior to commitment.
17
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VI. PROCEDURES
A. Officer Needs Assistance. Requests for "officer needs assistance ..
may be directed to any member or employee of the CHP.
The degree of CHP response will be a decision of the on-duty CHP
supervisor who is authorized to commit the personnel and resources
necessary to meet the particular situation. Any deployment action
must be counterbalanced by the need to continue other essential
services. Local response procedures developed by CHP commanders
will insure that assistance is timely, sufficient, and reasonable in
accordance with the circumstances.
B. Emer~ency Traffic Assistance. Requests · for emergency traffic
assistance should be directed to the senior field supervisor on duty in
the affected CHP command (Area). This person has the authority to
act upon such requests.
Commitment of CHP personnel and resources will be sufficient to
meet the emergency, while assuring continuation of other essential
services as much as possible. CHP Division Chiefs may, if
necessary, deploy personnel from adjacent Areas within their
Divisions.
C. Mutual Aid Support. Upon receipt of a request from the Operational
Area Coordinator or designee, to provide mutual aid support, the
appropriate CHP commander(s) must be notified. Commanders will
request, through channels, approval from the Office of the
Commissioner (Headquarters) to commit CHP resources.
1. CHP resources are not a part of the available local resources
within an Operational Area. Therefore, the specific number of
officers which may be committed to mutual aid support cannot
be stated. The size and type of CHP involvement will be
dependent upon the factors involved in each emergency.
2. Area commanders have the authority to mobilize as many of
their personnel as deemed necessary for the situation prior to
Headquarters' approval to commit resources.
3. Division Chiefs are authorized to mobilize as many personnel
within the affected Area or adjacent Areas within the Division
as they determine are needed prior to Headquarters approval to
commit resources.
4. The Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant
Commissioner, Field, or Assistant Commissioner, Staff will
evaluate mutual aid incidents and consider both legal
authority and state poli_ cy regarding commitment of CHP
18
~ ...
resources. Approval will be communicated through channels
when commitment is authorized and will include limitations
on the size and type of support to be provided.
D. Proclaimed Emere:encies. Requests for CHP support during
proclaimed local emergencies will be received and processed as
mutual 'aid support requests as outlined in Section VI.C., above.
During a state of emergency or state of war emergency, CHP
involvement and assistance to local law enforcement are provided as
established in the California Emergency Plan, or as directed by the
Governor.
l9
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ANNEXC
STATE~llLITARYFORCES
I. PURPOSE .
This Apnex presents the legal aut~_ ority for commitment of State Military
Forces · (SMF) in support of local law enforcement, SMF capabilities, and
responsibility and procedures for requesting support. SMF includes the
California Army and Air National Guard, the State Military Reserve
(SMR), and Naval Militia.
II. AUTHORITY
Under the provisions of Section 146 of the Military and Veterans Code
(MNC), the Governor normally will commit State Military Force resources
in support of civil · authority only upon determination that emergency
conditions exist or are imminent, that all civil resources reasonably
available have been or will be committed, that civil authority cannot or will
not be able to control the situation, and that military assistance is required
and has been requested as provided in the MNC.
Under the provisions of Section 143 of the Military and Veterans Code
(MNC), the Governor normally will commit State Military Force resources
without a request from civil authority only under highly perilous
conditions, where local civil authority no longer exists ' or is unable or
unwilling to employ available civil resources to control or mitigate the
situation.
III. RESPONSIBILITY
State Military Forces, when committed by order of the Governor under the
provisions of Section 143 or 146 MNC, will assist civil authority to discharge
lawful responsibilities by performing tasks which include but are not
limited to restoration and maintenance of law and order, protection of life
and property, removal of debris, medical evacuation and medical
treatment, search and rescue, emergency communications, and general
logistics support.
IV. DEPARTMENT POLICY
Normally, military support will be provided to local jurisdictions only after
a request is made by the chief executive of a city or county or sheriff of a
county, and only after the disturbance has been determined to be, or to likely
'-------------- ----- - --- -
V.
become, beyond the capabilities of local law enforcement forces, as
supplemented by forces made available under the existing mutual aid
agreements.
Normally, State Military Forces will be placed in support of law
enforcement agencies and will not usurp or accept the responsibility-_ or
authority of civil authorities._
Military assistance once provided will be terminated at the earliest
practical time following restoration-·of law and order or the resumption of
control by local law enforcement.
State Military Forces in support of local law enforcement will receive and
execute broad mission-type orders of the civil officer in charge, but will at
all times remain under the military chain of command. The provisions of
Section 865 of the Military and Veterans Code place solely on the military
commander all decisions as to tactical direction of troops, kind and extent of
force to be used, and particular means to be employed to accomplish the
objective or goal specified by the civil officer in charge.
Upon being informed of a disturbance or condition of threatened major
proportions, the Commanding General, SMF will dispatch a liaison
detachment to the scene of the disturbance. This liaison detachment will
collocate with the civil law enforcement officer in charge, will represent the
Commanding General, SMF, and will function as focal point for
observation and evaluation of the need for military support. Upon decision
to employ troops, the Commanding General, SMF, assumes overall
cpmmand of the military support mission, and he or his designated
representative will establish a command post at the location of the civil law
enforcement officer in charge. A field commander of the State Military
Forces will be designated and will collocate his command post with that of
the law enforcement field command.
In order for the Commanding General, SMF, to properly evaluate the
emergency and the need to implement certain procedures that will reduce
the reaction time of State Military Forces upon call-up, it is essential that
early and frequent evaluations of the disturbance or condition and its
potential be made by senior law enfo· rcement officers and forwarded to him
through the normal California Office of Emergency Services
communication channels, or directly to the liaison detachment of the
Military Department when on the s·cene.
PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING ASSISTANCE
Request for State Military Forces will be originated by a local government
when it has been determined that the emergency is beyond the capabilities
of local and regional forces. The request must be forwarded to the Governor
through the Office of Emergency Services channels. In order to reduce the
21
-
...
reaction time of State Military Forces, it is desirable that prompt
communication be made to the Commanding General, SM:F, or his liaison
detachment on the scene that such a request will be made.
Special Note: Under the stress of emergency conditions, local officiiµs
occasionally disregard the mutual aid system in requesting State Military
assistance. This results in unnecessary delays in providing a response.
Requests· must be directed through the Law Enforcement Regional
Coordinator to the State Office of Emergency Services to ensure that all
available manpower has been reasonably committed. If at that time it is
determined that activation of State Military Forces is the most appropriate
and expedient means of meeting the requirement, an OES mission number
will be issued and military support rendered.
ANNEXD
DEPAR'rn1ENT OF JUSTICE
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Annex is to set forth the role, responsibilities and
capabilities of the Department of Justice in providing assistance to local law
enforcement agencies during emergencies.
During a state of war emergency, the Attorney General is the Chief, Law
Enforcement Services, California Emergency Organization. In peace-time
emergencies, the Attorney General, as Chief Law Officer of the State, acts
as advisor to the Governor. The resources of the Department of Justice are
directed toward providing the Attorney General with current information
regarding the state of law enforcement throughout the State.
IL-.. AUTHORITY
California Constitution, Art. 5 (13)
Government Code, Sec. 12510 et seq.
III. · RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Providing legal advice to State and local agencies involved in mutual
aid situations.
B. Gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence information to
the Governor's Emergency Council and other appropriate state,
local, and federal agencies of potential law enforcement problems
that may necessitate mutual aid.
C. Gathering on-the-scene intelligence at the location of any law
enforcement problem, correlating data and identifying participants,
and furnishing such informatio. n to appropriate agencies, including
the Governor's Emergency Council and local agencies.
IV. POLICY
Deputy Attorneys General are available to provide legal advice and
assistance to concerned local agencies. The Bureau of Criminal
Information and Analysis maintains a program of gathering information
concerning potential law enforcement problems and providing the
23
--------------- - - - - -------- - -
information to the California Emergency Council, and other interested
state, local, or federal agencies.
During normal working hours, inquiries may be made to the Chief, Bureau
of Criminal Information and Analysis, at (916) 739-3937. At other times
(and on weekends and holidays) the Bureau may be reached at (916) 739-
2771.
\.,..
24
•
ANNEXE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Annex is to set forth the role, responsibilities and
capabilities of the Department of-Corrections in providing assistance to
local law enforcement agencies during emergencies.
II. AUTHORITIES
Authority for the California Department of Corrections to provide
assistance outlined in this Annex is contained in the following:
Emergency Services Act
Title 2, Div. 1, Chapter 7
Article _ 13, Section 8598
Article 14, Section 8628
California Master Mutual Aid Agreement
III. RESPONSIBILITIES
The primary responsibility of the Department of Corrections is the
supervision, management, and control of state correctional facilities and
the care, custody, treatment, discipline, training, and employment of
inmates confined. An additional Corrections role is to protect the public by
providing to parolees a combination of supervisory, supportive, and
preventive services designed to increase the potential for successful
reintegration into free society.
IV. DEPARTMENTPOLICY
A. During major disasters and "unusual occurrences," the Department
of Corrections may support local law enforcement · officers with
Department of Corrections· resources on request after local and
adjacent government aid has been totally committed. The
Department may also provide such mutual aid assistance prior to
total commitment of all local resources whenever it is determined.by
·- the Governor to be in the best interest of the Stare.
B. California Department of Corrections personnel committed to
support local authorities shall remain under the command and
•
control of the California Department of Corrections. Designated
supervisory staff may accept assignments from local authorities.
V. TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
A. The California Department of Corrections will provide assistance or
support to local law enforcement agencies under the following
conditions:
1. Officer Needs Assistance <11-99 or 999). Department assistance
will be provided when any officer's safety is in jeopardy and
immediate rescue or back-up is requested. Assistance will be ·
withdrawn when the hazard ceases to exist.
2. Mutual Aid Support. Department support will be provided
when an event is planned or has occurred that is, or probably
will become, beyond the capabilities of the responsible law
enforcement agency and adjacent agencies and the
Operational Area Coordinator has requested mutual aid and
department support, or when the Governor has determined
involvement to be in the best interest of the State.
3. Proclaimed Emergencies. Department assistance or support,
as set forth in the California Emergency Plan, or as directed by
the Governor, will be provided when a state of emergency has
been officially proclaimed, or when a state of war emergency
exists. During a declared local emergency, assistance will be
provided as mutual aid support.
VI. PROCEDURES
A. Officer Needs Assistance
Unless extenuating circumstances · are involved as determined by the
California Department of Corrections, response will not exceed the
manpower quota as provided for by geographical regions in the
· California Office of Emergency Services, Law Enforcement Division, Manpower and Resources Inventory. Local response procedures
developed by wardens and superintendents will insure that
assistance is timely, sufficient, and reasonable in accordance with
the circumstances.
California Department of Corrections officers, under these
circumstances, will provide assistance in the capacity of full peace
officers. Authority to act in such capacity is derived from various
sections of the Penal Code authorizing peace officers to request
(
assistance in making arrests, and the transference of authority to the
assisting parties.
B. Mutual Aid Support
Request for mutual aid support will only be acted upon when received
from properly constituted local authorities as identified in the Mutual
Aid Plan of the local Department of Corrections facilities .
. .
Department of Corrections has established procedures to provide
manpower and resources to respond to requests which clearly
indicate that the responsible agency and adjacent agencies within the
region have been committed, and that support by the Department of
Corrections is necessary.
Department of Corrections resources are available as local resources
within an operational zone through OES.
Commitment of California Department of Corrections resources in
support _ of lo~l law enforcement mutual aid operations will be on
approval of the Director or Chief . Deputy Director of the California
Department of Corrections.
The specific number of correctional personnel which can be
committed to support a mutual aid operation cannot be stated;
Headquarters' decision as to the size and type of department
involvement will depend upon the factors involved in each
emergency.
Department of Corrections employees of the correctional series,
responding under formal mutual aid, have the full powers of peace
officers within the meaning of Section 830.2 of the Penal Code and
shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as are
appropriate or as may be directed by their superior officers.
Therefore, when commitment is authorized, missions accepted will
not be limited to operation of detention facilities.
C. Proclaimed Emergencies
Requests for California Department of Corrections support during
proclaimed local emergencies will be received and processed as
mutual aid support requests as outlined in this Annex.
During a state of emergency or state of war emergency, California
Department of Corrections involvement and assistance to local law
enforcement is provided as established in the California Emergency
Plan, or as directed by the Governor.
Zl
· ANNEXF
OFFICE OF CALIFORNIA STATE POLICE
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Annex is to clarify the role, responsibilities, and
capabilities of the Office of California State Police in providing assistance to
local law enforcement agencies during emergencies.
II. AUTHORITY
Authority for the Office of California State Police to provide assistance as
outlined in this Annex is contained in the following:
California Penal Code
Emergency Services Act (Title 2, Div. 1, Chapter 7 of the
Government Code)
California Master Mutual Aid Agreement
III. RESPONSIBILITIES
. The primary responsibility of the Office of California State Police is to
provide police services to state properties and occupants thereof. In
addition, the State Police may provide for the physical security of the
constitutional officers and legislators of the state.
IV. POLICY
A. Calif omia State Police mutual aid assistance shall be provided after
local and adjacent governmental resources have been reasonably
committed, unless it is determined by the Governor that involvement
prior to commitment of local and adjacent resources is in the best
interest of the state.
B. California State Police personnel committed to the support of local or
·regional law enforcement units shall remain under the command
and control of the State Police. State Police supervisory personnel
may accept assignments from the responsible local authorities.
C. California State Police personnel will respond to inmate or ward
disturbances at California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
(YACA) locations to prevent death or injury to YACA personnel or
members of the public. California State Police assistance during
such disturbances will foIIow the commitment of YACA and local
and regional law enforcement units unless that sequence is altered
by order of the Governor or the Chief of the California State Police.
V. TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
A The California State Police will provide assistance or support to local
law enforcement agencies under the following conditions:
1. Officer Needs Assistance. State Police assistance will be
provided when another officer's safety is in jeopardy and
assistance is requested. · ·
2. Mutual Aid Support. State Police support will be provided
when an event is planned or has occurred that is or probably
will become beyond the resources of the local or regional law
enforcement agencies, and the Operational Area Coordinator
has requested mutual aid and State Police resources, or when
the Governor has determined assistance to be in the best
interest of the state.
3. Proclaimed Emergencies. California State Police assistance or
support, as set forth in the California Emergency Plan or as
directed by the Governor, will be provided when a state of
emergency has been officially proclaimed, or a state of war
emergency exists. During a declared local emergency,
· assistance will be provided as mutual aid support. ,
IV. PROCEDURES
A. Officer Needs Assistance
B.
Unless extenuating circumstances exist, as determined by the
California State Police, requests will not exceed the resources as
shown by geographical regions in the California Office of Emergency
Services, Law Enforcement Division, Manpower and Resources
Inventory. Local response procedures will insure that assistance is
timely, sufficient, and reasonable in accordance with the
circumstances.
Mutual Aiq Support
Upon receipt of a request from the Operational Area Coordinator or
his designee to provide mutual aid support, the California State
Police commander shall be notified. Commanders shall request,
through channels, approval from the State Police chief to commit
mutual aid resources.
1. Area commanders may authorize mobilization of as many of
their personnel as deemed necessary for the situation prior to
receipt of approval to commit resources.
2. The specific number of state police personnel which can be
committed to support a mutual aid operation cannot be stated;
Headquarters will determine the size and type of involvement
depending upon the factors involved in each emergency.
State Police members, responding under formal mutual aid, have the
full powers of peace officers within the meaning of Section 830.1 of the
Penal Code and shall perform such duties and exercise such powers
as are appropriate or as may be directed by their superior officers.
California State Police resources are not part of the available local
resources within an operational zone.
C. Proclaimed Emergencies
Request for California State Police support during proclaimed local
emergencies will be received and processed as mutual aid support
requests as outlined in Section B above.
During a state of emergency or state-of-war emergency, California
State Police assistance to local law enforcement is provided as
established in the California Emergency Plan, or as directed by the
Governor.
OFFICE OF THE STATE FIRE MARSHAL
ARSON .AND BOMB DIVISION
ANNEXG
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Annex is tQ._ set forth the legal authority, role,
responsibilities, and · capabilities of the Office of the State Fir~ Marshal in
provi~ng assistance to local enforcement agencies during emergencies.
II. AUTHORITIES
Authority for the Office of the State Fire Marshal to provide assistance
outlined in this Annex is contained in the following:
California Health and Safety Code, Sections 12000, 13104,
13107 .
California Penal Code
Emergency Services Act
California Master Mutual Aid Agreement
III. RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The primary responsibility of the Office of the State Fire Marshal is to
protect state employees and state property from fire, explosion, and
related perils and to investigate all fires and explosions occurring in
or on state property or any building that is determined to be state
occupied. Explosives and fireworks are the primary jurisdiction of
the California State Fire Marshal. Additionally, the California State
Fire Marshal has authority to conduct explosive ordnance disposal
and render safe procedures.
B. Secondary responsibilities of the Office of the State Fire Marshal are
to provide assistance to local entities in the investigation of arson and
bombings, to provide explosive ordnance disposal, and to render safe
improvised explosive devices.
C. The Governor's Special Arson Task Force is chaired by the State Fire
Marshal and provides direct arson investigative assistance, with the
cooperation of the Office of Emergency Services, to local agencies.
31
IV. DEPARTMENT POLICY
A. Due to the unique nature of arson and bomb investigation, the Office
of the State Fire Marshal provides mutual aid support on an ongoing
basis to local fire, police, sheriffs or district attorneys at their request
and within the limitation of resources. ·
B. The assistance of the Governor's Special Arson Task Force can be
requested by local authorities when a suspicious or arson fire is of
such magnitude that it may deplete or have major impact upon local
investigative resources. The State Fire Marshal, as the lead agency
for the Task Force, evaluates each and every request, and determines
on an individual basis whether to activate the Task Force.
C. The Office of the State Fire Marshal maintains a cadre of trained
arson investigators and certified Hazardous Device Technicians
(Bomb Techs) which is available to local agencies, through · the
mutual aid system, for arson investigation and explosive ordnance
disposal or render safe procedures.
V. PROCEDURES
A. Mutual Aid Support
Requests for assistance of the Office of the State Fire Marshal for
arson investigation, bomb render safe procedures or explosive
ordnance disposal, can be originated by local authorities by calling
the Arson and Bomb Division, at (916) 427-4158 (24 hours).
B. The Governor's Special Arson Task Force
The Governor's Special Arson Task Force is comprised of the
following state agencies:
Office of the State Fire Marshal, Chair
Office of Emergency Services
Department of Justice ·
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
Representatives from local law enforcement and fire agencies
Request for assistance of the Govemor•s Special Arson Task Force for
,µ-son investigation can be originated by local authorities by caUing
the Arson and Bomb Division at (916) 427-4158 (24 hours). ·
32
ANNEXH
CALIFOlllifIA DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this annex is to set forth the legal authority, role,
responsibility, and capabilities of the California Department of Parks
and Recreation in providing assistance to local enforcement agencies
during emergencies.
II. AUTHORITIES
Authority for the California Department of Parks and Recreation to
provide assistance outlined in this annex is contained in the
following:
California Penal Code
State I.C.S. Implementation Memo dated November 21, 1988
Emergency Services Act
California Master Mutual Aid Agreement
III. RESPONSIBILITJES
A. The primary responsibility of the California Department of
Parks and Recreation (DPR) is to acquire, develop, operate,
protect and interpret the units of the State Park System and to
maintain the peace therein.
B. Secondary responsibilities include: assisting local government
agencies in reacting to emergencies by performing tasks
which include, but are not limited to, the restoration and
maintenance of law and order; protection of life and property;
first aid treatment; search and rescue; emergency
communication and logistics support; and, where possible,
provide displaced residents within the affected area with
temporary camping locations, with potable water and
sanitation facilities.
✓ .-·
...
IV. DEPARTMENT POLICY
A. Mutual aid support will be provided after local and adjacent
governmental resources within an operational area (county)
have been reasonably committed; or whenever determined by
the Governor that prior DPR commitment is in the best interest
of the State.
B. Once a commitment has been authorized, any supporting
mutual aid mission may be accepted. All requests for
unarmed assistance by peace officers or at custodial facilities
other than those operated adjacent to State Park property or by
the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection will
be declined.
The DPR will respond to "officer needs assistance" (11-99 or
999) type requests whenever the lives and safety of DJll peace
officer personnel are in immediate jeopardy, regardless of the
peace officer status of the person needing assistance.
C. DPR personnel committed to the support of local authorities
will remain under the command, control and supervision of
· the DPR. All DPR policies and procedures, including policy on
the carrying and use of firearms, will remain in effect. DPR
Regional Directors, or designee shall be authorized to accept
approved missions from the responsible local authority.
D. Mutual assistance, once provided, will be terminated at the
earliest practical time following r~storation of law and order or
the resumption of control by local authorities.
V. TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
The California Department of Parks and Recreation will provide the
following types of assistance or support to local law enforcement and
emergency response agencies.
A. Emere:ency Assistance - DPR assistance will be provided when
an incident occurs in an officer's presence which requires
_ action necessary to save loves or property and no officer from
local concurrent jurisdictions is available. This type · of
assistance does not constitute formal mutual aid.
B.- Officer Needs Assistance {11-99 or 999) - DPR assistance will be
provided when an officer•s safety is in jeopardy and immediate
rescue or back-up is requested. Assistance shall be
withdrawn when the hazard ceases to exist. This type of
assistance does not constitute formal mutual aid.
34
C. Mutual Aid Support - DPR support will be provided when an
event is planned, has occurred or probably will become beyond
the capabilities of the responsible law enforcement or
emergency service agency, and the operational area
coordinator has requested mutual aid and Department support
or when the Governor has determined involvement to be in the
best interest of the Stat.e.
D. Proclaimed Emere:encies - DPR assistance or support as set
forth in the California Emergency Plan or as directed by the
Governor, will be provided when a state of emergency has been
officially proclaimed or when a state of war emergency exists.
During a declared local emergency, assistance will be provided
as mutual aid support.
VI. PROCEDURES
A. Emere:ency Assistance - Requests for "officer needs
assistance" may be directed to any member or employee of the
DPR.
The degree of DPR response will be the decision of the DPR
enforcement supervisor or peace officer who is authorized to
commf t the personnel and resources necessary to meet the
particular situation. Any deployment action must be counter
balanced by the need to continue other essential services. Local
· response procedures developed by DPR District Superintendent
will ensure that assistance is timely, sufficient and reasonable
in accordance with circumstances.
B. Mutual Aid Support - Requests for mutual aid support will
only be acted upon when received from properly constituted
local authorities as identified in the Mutual Aid Plan of the
local Districts or Regions.
Upon receipt of a request from the operational area coordinator
or OES designee to provide mutual aid support, the appropriate
DPR District Superintendent or designee must be notified.
District Superintendents are to request approval from their
Deputy Director for Operations if the Regional staff are not
available, to commit DPR resources beyond the District's span
of control. .
------------------------
1. DPR resources are not a part of the available local
resources within an operational area. Therefore, the
specific number of officers and resources which may be
committed to mutual aid support cannot be stated. The
size and type ofDPR involvement will be dependent upon
the factors involved in each incident.
2. District Superintendents have the authority to mobilize
as many of their existing personnel and resources as
deemed necessary for the situation prior to Regional
approval to commit resources. Resources that require
additional budgetary support or future reimbursement
will not be committed without Regional approval.
3. Regional Directors are authorized to mobilize as many
existing personnel and resources within the Region as
they determine are needed prior to receiving approval to
commit resources from the Chief Deputy Director for
Operations for incidents which occur within their
region. _ Resources that require additional budgetary
support or future reimbursement will not be committed
without approval from the Chief Deputy Director for
Operations or designee.
4. The Director; Chief Deputy Director for Operations,
Chief Deputy Director for Administration, and Chief,
Office of Field Services will evaluate mutual aid
incidents and consider both legal authority and state
policy regarding the commitment of DPR resources.
Limitations affecting the size and type of support
provided will be communicated through channels.
Budgetary support or appropriate reimbursement will be
a factor considered prior to commitment of resources
beyond those available in the effected Region.
C. Proclaimed Emere:encles - Requests for DPR support during
proclaimed local emergencies will be received and processed
as mutual aid support request as outlined above.
During a state of emergency or state of war emergency, DPR
involvement and assistance to local law enforcement and
emergency services are provided as established in the
California Emergency Plan, the Law Enforcement Mutual Aid
Plan or as directed by the Governor.
,
-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
e --------- ~
e ~
e EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ~
e STATE OF CALIFORNIA ~
~ ~
e ----:_-~------ ~
II ~
II ~
~ 11
e ~
II ~
II e
I§ Elletmn ORDER V-9-91 e
~ ~
~ VBERUS. it b tbe respondbility of the State of California to aaiJ:ltain a ~
S,2j bigh degree of preparedness in the event of disaster or of eztreme peril caused by 62;
~ CC>ildition~ of air pollution. fire, flood, storm, epidemic. riot. drought. sudden ~
E and aevere energy .shortage. plant or animal infestation or disease, an earthquake ~
or volcanic prediction, an earthquake, varning of probable or izmiJ:lent attack by an
II - enemy of the tlnited States, or other emergency conditions. ~
e IDl. nmiutroRB. I. PET! 1lILSOR. Governor of the State of California. by Vit'tue II
~ of tbe powers and authority vested in me by the Constitution and statute• of the 62;
ei2 • State of California, and ill accordance vith tbe provisions of Sections 8567. 8587 ~
69J and S6ti. of the Covernmet1t Code, do hereby rescind Ezecutive Order No. D-25-83, and ~
~ do hereby issue this order to become effective immediately: ~
II 1. The Director, Office of Emergency Services, vho is also tbe State Direc- ~
II tor of Emergency Plan1>ing and the State Director of Civil Defense, shall ~
be responsible for preparation of tbe State of California Emergency Plan ~
e and the submission t.bereof, through the California Emergency Council. to e
e me for approval: e
~ 2. The Director~ Office of Emergency Services. shall coordinate the activi- ~
~ ties of all state agencies relating to preparation and implementation of ~
~ the Califoniia Emergency Plan: and each state agency &Dd officer sball ~
~ cooperate with the Director and render all usistance requested by tbe ~
e Director during response and recovery phues of proclaimed emergencies; e
~ 3. The Director, Office of Emergency Senicea. aay assign specific emergency &m
~ functions to a given atate agency vbere aucb functions are consistent 152
e vith dutiea and recpon•ibilities identified in the State Emergency Plan. ~
Such assigmnents vill be aade by AdministratiTe Order issued by the ~
II Director. Office of Emeraency Senic••a &
4. The bead of each department. bureau. board. commiaaion and independent e
m; institution of state aovermient. hereinafter referred to •• u agency. i ~
Ri2 responsible for tbe emergency pl~m.ng, preparednus and training of bi.I 152
a or her agencyi a
~ 5. Jtacb agency •hall establi.sh a line of succession vhicb includes at lea.st ~
152 tbree penon• for each po•itioc that i• uaigned ••se:ntial emergency ~
II function•• for both headquarters and ajor field dbuion•• •• defioed by S!l;
B!8 agency director. The agency plan aball define the condition• to be met =
E to •hift responsibility to the nut •ucceuor; E
II 6. Each atate agency is hereby authorized mus encouraged to train its e
~ employees to properly perform emergency ••dgmnenta. Thu includes par- ~
~ ticipation a test e.xerci•e• conducted by the agency er the Office of ~
~ Emergency Services. Ageucy directors aay allow co=.pensation or compen- S!8
~ Hting time off for training outside of regular vorking bouu: ~
e e
ffl fil . II
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~m
XII. 1'1ASTER MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT
There are references in the following agreement to the California Disaster
Act, State Disaster Council, and various sections of the Military and
Veterans Code.
Effective November 23, 1970, by enactment of Chapter 1454, Statutes 1970,
the California Disaster Act (Sections 1500 ff., Military and Veterans Code)
was superseded by the California Emergency Services Act (Sections 1550 ff.,
Government Code), and the State Disaster Council was superseded by the
California Emergency Council.
Section 8668 of the California Emergency Services Act provides:
"Master Mutual Aid Agreement" means · the California
Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement,
made and entered into by and between the State of California,
its various departments and agencies, and the various political
subdivisions of the state, to facilitate implementation of the
purposes of this chapter.
Substantially, the same provisions as previously contained in Sections 1541,
1564, 1586 and 1587 of the Military and Veterans Code, referred to in the
- foregoing agreement, and now contained in Sections 8633, 8618, 8652 and
8653, respectively, of the Government Code.
✓
...
CALIFORNIA DISASTER AND CIVIL DEFENSE
MASTER MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT
ANNEX I
This agreement made and entered into by and between the STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, its various departments and agencies, and the various political
subdivisions, .municipal corporations, and _ _ other public agencies of the State of
California; ·
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, it is necessary that all of the resources and facilities of the
State, its various departments and agencies, and all its· political subdivisions,
municipal corporations, and other public agencies be made available to prevent
and combat the effect of disasters which may result from such calamities as flood,
fire, earthquake, pestilence, war, sabotage, and riot; and
WHEREAS, it is desirable that each of the parties hereto should voluntarily
aid .. and assist each other in the event that a disaster should occur, by the
interchange of services arid facilities, including, but not limited to, fire, police,
medical and health, communication, and transportation services and facilities, to
cope wi~h the problems of rescue, relief, evacuation, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction which would arise in the event of a disaster; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary and desirable that a cooperative agreement be
executed for the interchange of such mutual aid on a local, countywide, regional,
statewide, and interstate basis;
1. · Each party shall develop a plan providing for the effective
mobilization of all its resources and facilities, both public and private, to cope· with
any type of disaster.
2. . Each_ party agrees to furnis~ resources and facilities and to render
services to each and every other party to this agreement to prevent and combat any
type of disaster in accordance 'With duly adopted mutual aid operational plans.
whether heretofore or hereafter adopted, detailing the method and manner by
which such resources, facilities, and services are to be made available and
furnished, which operational plans may include provisions for training and
testing to make such mutual aid effective;-provided, however, that no party shall
be required to deplete unreasonably its own resources, facilities, and services in
furnishing such mutual aid.
3. It is expressly understood that this agreement and the operational
plans adopted pursuant thereto shall not supplant existing agreements between
some of the parties hereto providing for the exchange of furnishing of certain
types of facilities and services on a reimbursable, exchange, or other basis, but
that the mutual aid extended under this agreement and the operational plans
adopted pursuant thereto, shall be without reimbursement unless otherwise
expressly provided for by the parties to this agreement or as provided in Sections
1541, 1586, and 1587, Military and Veterans Code; and that such mutual aid is
40
intended to be available in the event of a disaster of such magnitude that it is, or is
likely to be, beyond the control of a single party and requires the combined forces of
several or all of the parties to this agreement to combat.
4. It is expressly understood that the mutual aid extended under this
agreement and the operational plans adopted pursuant thereto shall be available
and furnished in all cases of local peril or emergency and in all cases in which _ a
STATE OF EXTREME EMERGENCY has been proclaimed.
5. It is expressly understood that any mutual aid extended under this
agreement and the operational plans adopted pursuant thereto, is furnished in
accordance with the .. California Disaster Act" and other applicable provisions of
law, and except as otherwise provided by law that: "The responsible local official
in whose jurisdiction an incident requiring mutual aid has occurred shall
remain in charge at such incident including the direction-of such personnel and
equipment provided him through the operation of such mutual aid plans." (Sec.
1564, Military and Veterans Code.)
6. It is expressly understood that when and as the State of California
enters into mutual aid agreements with other states and the Federal
Go_vernment, the parties to this agreement shall abide by such mutual aid
agreements in accordance_ with the law.
7. Upon approval or execution of this agreement by the parties hereto all
mutual aid operational plans theretofore approved by the State Disaster Council,
or its predecessors, and in effect as to some of the parties hereto, shall remain in
full force and effect as to them until the same may be amended, revised, or
modified. Additional mutual aid operational plans and amendments, revisions,
or modifi~tions of existing or hereafter adopted mutual aid operational plans,
shall be adopted as follows: ·
a. Countywide and local mutual aid operational plans shall be
developed by the parties thereto and are operative as between the parties
thereto in accordance with the provisions of such operational plans. Such
operational plans shall be submitted to the State Disaster Council for
approval. The State Disaster Council shall notify each party to such
operational plans of its approval, and shall also send copies of such
operational plans and who are in the same area and affected by such
operational plans. Such operational plans shall be operative as to such
other ·parties 20 days afler receipt thereof unless within that time the party
by resolution· or notice given to the State Disaster Council, in the same
manner as notice of termination• of participation in this agreement,
declines to participate in the particular operational plan. ·
b. Statewide and regional mutual aid operational plans shall be
approved by the State Disaster Council and copies thereof shall forthwith be
sent to each and every party affected by such operational plans. Such
operational plans shall be operative as to the parties affected thereby 20 days
after receipt thereof unless within that time the party by resolution or notice
given to the State Disaster Council, in the same manner as notice of
termination of participation in this agreement, declines to participate in the
particular operational plan.
41
---------------------- - -
"
c. The declination of one or more of the parties to participate in a
particular operational plan or any amendment, revision or modification
thereof, shall not affect the operation of this agreement and the other
operational plans adopted pursuant thereto.
d. Any party may at any time by resolution or notice given to the State
Disaster Council. in the same manner as notice of termination of
participation in this agreement, decline to participate in any particular
operational plan, · which declination shall become effective 20 days after
filing with the State Disaster Council~
e. The State Disaster Council shall send copies of all operational plans
to those state departments and agencies designated by the Governor. The
Governor may, upon behalf of any department or agency, give notice that
such department or agency declines to participate in a particular
operational plan.
f. The State Disaster Council, in sending copies of operational plans
and other notices and information to the parties to this agreement, shall
.send copies to the Governor and any department or agency head designated
by him; the chairman of the board of supervisors, the clerk of the board of
supervisors, the County Disaster Council, and any other officer designated
by a county; the mayor, the clerk of the city council, the City Disaster
Council, and any other officer designated by a city; the executive head, the
clerk of the governing body, or other officer of other political subdivisions
and public agencies as designated by such parties.
8. · This agreement shall become effective as to each party when approved or
executed by the party, and shall remain operative and effective as between each
and every party that has heretofore or hereafter approved or executed this
agreement, until participation in this agreement is terminated by the party. The
termination by one or more of the parties of its participation in this agreement
shall not affect the operation of this agreement as between the other parties
thereto. Upon approval or execution of this agreement the State Disaster Council
shall send copies of all approved and existing mutual aid operational plans
affecting such party which shall become operative as to such party 20 days after
receipt thereof unless within.that time the party by resolution or notice given to
the State Disaster Council, in the same manner as notice of termination of
participation in this agreement, declines to participate in any particular
operational plan. The State Disaster Co~cil shall keep every party currently
advised of who the other parties to _ this agreement are and whether any. of them
has declined to participate in any particular operational plan~
9. Approval or execution of this agreement shall be as follows:
a. The Governor shall execute a copy of this agreement on behalf of the
State of California and the various departments and agencies thereof.
· Upon execution by the Governor a signed copy shall forthwith be filed with
the State Disaster Council.
42
,. .
.,.
. . .
b. Counties, cities, and other political subdivisions and public agencies
having a legislative or governing body shall by resolution approve and agree
to abide by this agreement, which may be designated as "CALIFORNIA
DISASTER AND CIVIL DEFENSE MASTER MUTUAL AID
AGREEMENT." Upon adoption of such a resolution, a certified copy thereof
shall forthwith be filed with the State Disaster Council.
c. The executive head of those political subdivisions and public agencies
having no legislative or governing body shall execute a copy of this
agreement and forthwith file a signed copy with the State Disaster Council.
10. Termination of participation in this agreement may be effected by any party
as follows:
a. The Governor on behalf of the State and its various departments and
agencies, and the executive head of those political subdivisions and public
agencies having no legislative or governing body, shall file a written notice
of termination of participation in this agreement with the State Disaster
Council and this agreement is terminated as to such party 20 days after the
filing of such notice.
b. Counties, cities, and other political subdivisions and public agencies
having a legislative or governing body shall by resolution give notice of
termination of participation in this agreement and file a certified copy of
.., such resolution with the State Disaster Council, and this agreement is
terminated as to such party 20 days after the filing of such resolution.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF this agreement has been executed and approved
and is effective and operative as to each of the parties as herein provided.
(SEAL) ATTEST:
November 15, 1950
43
Isl EARL WARREN
GOVERNOR
On behalf of the State of
California and all its
Departments and Agencies.
Isl FRANK M. JORDAN
SECRETARY OF STATE
' .
,._ . .
Santa
Buban
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
f1U1Z C. PA 'JTERSON. DEPl1JY ODFP.
~ CALIR)RNIABRANO{
SANT A BARBARA. CA IOS/966-1649
VAC)J(f
ROOION VI· EAST'ERN SIFRRASECilON
CONTACT FRTIZ C PATIBtSON
44
PERSONNEL
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
LAURENCE W. BUFFALOE, CHIEF
~JOURDAN.DEPUTY OJIEF.RF.GION IV. V
SEA.RCH &: RF.SCUE BRANCH (ST A TEWIDE)
BOB GERBfll, ASSIST ANT OllEF
REGIOND.m
SR EMFRGENCT OPERATIONS PLANNBl
JAKEHOPP
ADMJNISTRA TIVE SUPPORT UNIT
JOANNECASaO
MIOilll.ENF.AL
2800 MEADOWVIEW RD.
SACRAMENTO, CA 95832
'16/07-035
f 16/� 27•43� 1 2� HOUR
FAX • (916)� 27-� 212/� 215/5921
EXHIBIT B
I'. -
CIVIL DISORDER 1992
WEDNESDAY - APRIL 29, 1992
On Wednesday, April 29, 1992, at approximately 1300 hours the Sheriff's
· Department was alerted th.at a verdict in the Rodney King trial was imminent.
The Emergency Operations Bmeau was advised to put Field Operations Region
stations on tactical alert and to begin identifying the_ number of personnel that
would be available for deployment (50% of the on-duty field force) in
conformance with tactical plan •Operation Monarch•. This tactical plan was
developed to address anticipated mass demonstrations which we expected to
· occur, whatever the verdict, guilty or innocent.
Shortly aftct- the verdict was broadcast over various news media, several south
Los Angeles County Sheriff's stations began receiving phone threats of bombs
planted at their stations, threats to kill deputies, and generally to disrupt service.
During the afternoon and early evening hours escalating acts of civil disorder
_ including vandalism, fires, assaults, etc., occurred in Sheriff's station areas of
Firestone, Lennox, Carson, Lynwood and West Hollywood. Due to the
increasing violence and the need to· coordinate personnel and resources, the
Sheriff's E~ergency Operations Center was activated, a department-wide tactical
alert instituted, and all Field Operations units placed on 12-hour shifts.
As the number of incidents of violence increased, tactical units in platoon and
squad configuration from unaffected station areas were sent to predetermined
staging areas at Carson and Crescenta Valley Stations for deployment as needed.
At 1950 hours Transit Service Bureau deputies came under attack and were
pelted with rocks and bottles at Mona and Imperial Highway, Willowbrook.
Deputies withdrew from the confrontation. Similar incidents occurred in the
Lynwood, Lennox, West Hollywood, and Firestone areas. Fires and looting
throughout the affected area were being reported with increasing frequency.
Between 204S and 2205 hours three tactical units we-re deployed as needed.
,·
After consultation with me and other key county officials, a state of emergency
was declared by Chief Adrnioimtivc_ Officer Richard Dixon. Emergency
orders were prepared restricting the sale of gasoline and ammunition in ~
affected areas and establishing a curfew. The cwfew encompassed Vernon
Avenue on the north, Lomita Boulevard on~ south, the Long Beach Freeway
on the east. and Omshaw Bou!evard to the west.
After demonstrators were dispersed from Parker Center at about 2100 hours, the
crowd moved to the Hall of Justice and broke into the lobby area. A request for
immediate assistance was made by personnel at the location. Units from several
staging areas responded. The crowd was dispersed and the building secured.
~-----------------
,.,
CIVIL DISORDER 1992 2 May 6, 1992
Some vehicles in the parking lot and entrance doors to the building were slightly
damaged during the incident. The crowd of several hundred were mostly
young, racially mixed, very noisy, and bent on destruction.
This same group of demonstrators broke windows in the Federal Courthouse and
the County Criminal Courts Building. -The shrubbery around the Criminal
Courthouse at Temple and Spring Streets was set on fire. The Los Angeles City
Fire Department would not respond without Los Angeles Police Department
escort. At that time I directed a squad of deputies from 1he Hall of Justice Jail
to respond with fire extinguishers and they put out the fire. I then directed that
we patrol the other county buildings in the Civic Center to prevent similar
incidents.
Due to the level of violence in and around the Metro Blue Line, a decision was
made to shut down service beginning at 2218 hours.
The number of structure and vehicle fires continued to escalate throughout the
evening, with numerous reports of fire department units coming under attack by
rioters, necessitating law enforcement escort.
Incidents of looting and violent confrontations with deputies occurred at several
points through the late evening and into the early '.morning hours of Thursday.
Fire Department stations in the Willowbrook-Florence area came under sniper
fire. No one was injured.
After consultation with Governor Wtlson at 221S hours regarding the state of
emergency, the Governor ordered the mobili7.ation of 2000 National Guard and
750 State Highway Patrolmen. It was estimated that the Guard would begin
arriving in staging arcas·about 0600 hours on Thursday, April 30, 1992 • .
Peter J. Pitchess South jail facility was engulfed in rioting between inmates at
2340 hours. Approxirnarely 1000 of the 1800 inmates were involved. Local
Sheriff's stations along with Custody emergency response teams and 100
C.alifomia Highway Patrolmen responded to the location and secured the
perimeter. After the riot was brought under control, 400 inmates were ~ed to
other facilities.
:- Presiding Judge Richard Torres advised the department he was ordering
· cancellation of court proce.edings for Thursday, April 30, 1992.
..
CIVIL DISORDER 1992 3 May 6, 1992
THURSDAY - APRIL 30, 1992
During the cirly morning hours, deputies continued to provide escort security
for fire department units. Looting incidents continued to increase even though
significant numbers of arrests had been made.
The level of violence continued to increase in most areas.
The number of deputies tactically deployed to augment patrol personnel levels
reached 320 during the evening and early morning hours of April 29 and 30.
By 0600 hours on April 30, 400 relief deputies were deployed in the Carson,
Firestone. Lennox, Lynwood, West Hollywood and Civic Center areas. In
addition, mutual aid was requested by Culver City, South Gate, Pasadena, Long
Be.ach and I.cs Angeles Police Departments.
At 1000 hours on Thursday, two 56--man platoons responded to the City of Los
Angeles to assist in securing the Crenshaw Shopping Center at two locations
where massive looting was oc.curring. A total of 74 looters were arrested at the
location. One platoon was redeployed to another shopping ccnte.r at Vernon and
Figueroa Streets where another 43 looters were taken into custody.
At 1000 hours I was advised by General Thrasher that the 2000 Guards were
staged at Los Alamitos and ready for deployment. Requests to deploy were
initiated at 1145 hours and again - at 1230 hours by Undershcriff Edmonds.
When questioned regarding the delay in deployment of their personnel, it was
learned from their liaison in 'the EOC that the delay was due to problems in
obtaining ammunition fr9lll central storage areas at Camp Roberts, the lack of
flak vests which were arriving from decentraliz.ed locations, the unavailability of
locking devices to retrofit rifles making them semi-automatic, and insufficient
numbers of face shields to fit newly acquired helmets.
,
1be Sheriff's Departmem was escalated to phase four mobilhation and all sworn
members placed on 12-hour shifts to rnaximi~ tactical deployment.
At 1300 hours we contacted General Thrasher and requested an additional· 2000
C.alif ornia National Guard to be deployed to the Los Angeles area.
- - At 1530 hours the First California National Guard Croops, a Military Police unit
consisting of 85 personnel, was deployed to the loc.ation at Vernon and Figueroa
Streets, Los Angeles, to maintain security and prevent furthel' looting. Once
ready for deployment, the National Guard provided outstanding assistance.
CIVIL DISORDER 1992 4
May 6, 1992
The speed with which fires and looting escalated had significantly taxed
deployed forces. As deputies secured one area and moved to another fully
involved area, the looters would return to the first location.
At 1800 hours tactical deployment of deputies increased to 560 during. the hours
of darkness.
At 1847 hours curfew boundaries were expanded to include 23 cities and the
unincorporated community of East Los Angeles.
At the request of Culver City Police Department, two platoons of deputies were
bussed to the Fox Hills Mall, Culver City to provide security. Several areas
requested National Guard units. ·
The C.alifornia National Guard arrived at Firestone Station at 1945 with 78
personnel. They were immediately deployed to the Firestone Boulevard business
district to assist in securing the area from looters.
The Cities of South Gate and Pa$adena requested mutual aid as of 2100 hours.
Assistance was dispatched from Carson and Crescenta Valley command centers.
FRIDAY - MAY 1, 1992
Eighteen hundred National Guarcf troops left San Jose at 0100 hours on Friday
· en route to staging anm at the Peter J. Pitcbess F.questrian Center.
Disturbance-related" activity began to decrease during the early morning hours
and became relatively calm by daybtt.ak.
Sheriff's Academy Class 1279 attended graduation ceremonies at 1000 hours.
By 1430 hours they (61 new deputies) were deployed to fixed posts in the
Firestone area. There were scattered incidents of violence in Sheriff's ai-ea.
At the 1800-hour shift change 867 deputies were tactically deployed to various
locations throughout the affected area. ·
Several police departments requested m~ aid response, including the City of
·· Los Angeles. Mutual aid agencies were deployed from the staging area at Los
Alamitos. At 080S hours, 130 San Diego County peace officers were deployed
to the C.ompton are.a. Several cities asked for National Guard assistance.
At this point, these requests were precautionary rather than in response to an
immediate need.
CIVIL DISORDER 1992 s May 6, 1992
At 1820 hours President Bush announced that he was sending Federal troops and
Federal law enforcement personnel to Los Angeles and Federaliz.ed the National
Guard. It should be noted that I opposed the deployment of regular military
personnel and the resultant federalization of the National Guard.
The result has been a slowdown in getting decisions through the chain of
command and the refusal, because of "Posse Comitatus• considerations, of
missions which the National Guard would have accepted routinely. As a result,
a large number of the National Guard remained on standby at times when they
could have assisted in security missions at fire stations and on inrnat.e
transportation buses. Command and control became far more complex.
At 1830 hours the California National. Guard advised that they had 6900
personnel activated and 5700 who had reported for duty. Three hundred and
forty-three were deployed with 314 awaiting a mission. An additional 1952
were in staging areas. ·
Due to the high number of riot-related arrests that were awaiting processing, the
filing and arraignment procedures were modified to afford extended prOCCSsing
time.
SATURDAY - MAY 2, 1992
As of Saturday, May , 2, 515 mutual aid personnel from 32 police or sheriff's
departments bad deployed in six cities: Compton, Carson, Long Beach, Los
Angeles, lngJew~, and Hawthorne. An additional 458 personnel from 53
agencies were available for deployment from the Los Alamitos staging area.
Incidents of civil disorder bad decreased significantly and incidents of viole.ncc
were widely sc.attercd. Units continued to make nu1J1erous arrests and curfew
sweeps during the night.
SUNDAY - MAY 3, 1993
As of Sunday, May 3, at 0230 hours; the Sheriff's Department bad made 2789
arrests. All Field Operations Regions and Custody Division remained ·
mobilized, but due to the decreasing activity level, support and administrative
units were returned to regular schedules.
At the re.quest of Public Works, deputies provide.d escort security for workmen
repairing traffic signals.
CIVIL DISORDER 1992 6 May 6, 1992
Some incidents involving attacks on military personnel occurred. Two male
Hispanics were taken into custody by U.S. Marines after they attempted to run
them over at a fixed post in the.Firestone area. U.S. Marines at 71st and
Compton also in Firestone were fired on by several male blacks in an off-road
vehicle. There were no injuries and n~ return fire.
Military personnel (U.S. Marines and CNG) deployed in Sheriff's areas totaled
925.
CURRENT STADJS
The numerous areas affected by civil disorder continue to return to a more
normal state. As a result, the department bas further demobiliz.ed. Field
Operations Region 11 (Southwest area) remains fully mobiliz.ed, along with
selected units dealing with Court Services and Transportation. All other units
remain in a state of tactical alert should conditions change. Augmentation of
Court Services and Transportation personnel bas occurred to assist the
processing of large numbers of prisoners and to provide security to the court
environment. ·
Detectives throughout the county are assisting personnel at stations in the
affected area with investigative follow-up to identify arson, looting, and assault
suspects. An example of follow-up arrests and property recovery occurred as a
result of information obtained from deputies at the scene of large scale looting
on Thursday in the North long Beach area. Outnumbered deputies took down
license numbers of looter vehicles. Later, as calm returned to the community,
armed with search warrants deputies arrested fourteen suspects and recovered
approximately $35,000 in merchandise.
Sheriff's Reserve Se.arch and Rescue teams are working with the Coroner's
Office searching burned-out buildings for additional victims.· , ,.
. ✓
STATISTICAL RECAP
MAY 4, 1992, 1800 HOURS TO MAY 5, 1992, 0600 HOURS
TOTAL5 TO-DATE - MAY 6, 1992, 0530 HOURS
TOTAL ARRESTS:
L.A.S.D. ARRESTS:
L.A.P.D. ARRESTS:
OTHER ARRESTS:
INJURIES:
L.A.S.D. INJURIES:
DEATHS:
14,615
4,526
6,164
3,864
2,383
14
58 (12 IN s~·s JURISDICTION)
ESTIMATED $ LOSS (ENTIRE COUNTY MINUS CITY OF LONG BEACH):
$735,056,800
ESTIMATED$ toss IN LOS ANGELES CITY:
$500,000,000
FEDERAL MILITARY JOINT TASK FORCE INCLUDES:
DEPLOYED: 3,716
STANDING ~Y:. · 9,791
TOTAL MILITARY 13,487
TOTAL IN L.A.~.D. CUSTODY FACil.JTIES (AS OF 1400 HOURS):
26,229
,-
CIVIL DISORDER
LOS ANGELES 1992
ARRESTSUMMARY
The Automated Justice Information System (AJIS) was not designed to
provide statistical breakdowns, so search criteria had to be designed to
provide data on arrests related to the disturbance. Reporting Districts
(RD's) were identified by each of the involved stations wherein the
majority (if not all) of the arrests made in the time period would be
related to the disturbance. The time period selected was ~om 1800,
April 29, 1992 (Wednesday) until 01()(), May 4, 1992 (Monday). There
may, therefore, be some arrests involved in this breakdown that ue not
riot-re~ted and others that were missed because they fell outside the
criteria selected. The arrests made outside county area (Los Angeles
City) are not included. With that disclaimer, the breakdown of arrests is
as follows:
A review of arrests made in Sheriff's Station areas of Carson, East
Los Angeles, Firestone, Lakewood, Lennox, Lynwood, Norwalk,
and West Hollywood involved 1,628 suspects. The highest
number of arrests were in the Firestone area with 603 and then in
· decre.asing order, Lennox 372, Lynwood 259, Carson 168,
Lakewood 154, West Hollywood 52, Norwalk 11, and East Los
Angeles 9. A further analysis reveals 810 (SO~) were Blacks,
728 ( 45 S) Hispanics, 72 Caucasians, 16 others, 1 Chinese, and I
Pacific Islander. Arrest by age showed 1,329 or 82 S were
between the ages of 16 and 3S. The majority (55 ~) were between
the ages of 17 and 27. The oldest was 74, the youngest less than
2 years. Two hundred eleven (13S) were juveniles and 1417
(87S) were adults.
..
EXHIBIT C
. -·
I
.. '
FROM:OES LAW ENFORCEMENT
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
r.IEI\.f ORANDUM
TO:
2136178542
TO: LAURENCE W. BUFFALOE, Chief
Law Enforcement Division
FROM: · FRITZ C. PA'ITERSON, Deputy Chief
Law Enforcement Division
jLJN 1, 1992 9:52AM ~349 P . 02
DATE: July 25. 1990
SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM THE LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S
DEPART~1ENT: RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL TRAINING
On July 24, 1990, CSTI Director John Mirolla and I met with Assistant
_ _ Sheriff Jerry Harper, Los Angeles County Sherifrs Department, at the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department Headquarters in downtown Los
Angeles. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Mr. Harper•s request
for consideration and resumption of CSTI sponsored training in the
specialized area of civil disobedienwriot and crowd control.
,,
Assistant Sheriff Harper asserts that based upon discussions he has had
with local ]aw enforcement executives and from a review of soft.intelligence
data, there is a shared belief and concern expressed by these executives that
we may expect to see a retum of civil disobedience which will be acted out
on the streets of local communities. Should that premise come to fruition,
the major concern of all affected law enforcement executives is that a
training shortfall exists in the subject area of riot and crowd control and, as
a result, local law enforcement may be ill prepared to respond and/or
otherwise control the situation once it deteriorates.
In support of his proposition, Mr. Harper points out the recent
demonstrations over the abortion issue and the Earth First! movement
which he views as issue-oriented causes. These causes then were
contrasted to the potentially racially-oriented demonstrations in New Y Qrk
and Washington. DC.
It is the position of Harper• who it appears represonts the views of his
colleagues and contemporaries, that because thie situation is one which
has statewide implication, the state, but more specifically CSTI, ahould
consider resumption of training in the areas of civil disobedience and riot
and crowd control. Such training, it was suggested, could be bifurcated to
the extent one segment could address executive/management/command
role and responsibilitief? and the other segment aimed at the sergeant and
below (field) role and responsibility.
lt' • .-.:-- ... ~ :,--/ ~'i~- ~~~.:,-= .-.-.... !'.·· •.,-: ...... _ . ... .. · · · . ·· .· · ·-. -~ . . · ' ·--~ ' ··:•,-;.·~ -..;~~..t~ · 2.l36178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:53AM ~349 P.0:::
.. .. • · · FR0"'1•C£S LA.J 0-.F~ TO·
. .
Laurence W. Buffaloe
Page 2
July 25, 1990
In general response to the proposal, Director Mirolla was totally cooperative
and supportive. He explained the need, however, for a comprehensive
needs assessment of the potential client agencies as regards to their
commitment to send personnel for the -training.
As the meeting drew to a close, it was agreed that CSTI would initiate a
staff study on the mechanics of class restoration and scheduling. At the
same time it was agreed that, consistent with your approval, on behalf of
the Law Enforcement Division I would undertake creation of an
appropriate questionnair~ seeking input from the law enforcement
agencies who would be potential program participants.
If you are in agreement with our involvement as outlined. I shall proceed.
I shall keep you posted as to the progress.
!
•
JUN 1, 1992 9=53AM ~349 P.0L
•
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
:11100 MS.ACOI/Nltw ROAD
SAC~A.MfNTO, CAllfORNIA ~.S8J2
(916) A27•A990
September 15, 1990
TO:
FROM;
POLICE CHIEFS AND SH£RIFFS
Laurence W. Buffeloe
2
Chief
Law Enforcement niv1slon
.Based upon several comments and concerns expressed by Catlifornia law enforcemcn,
administrators such as yourself, it appea~ that the incidence of crowd control, protest und
disorder situations are becomlng more frequent. As such, OBS is undertnking a statewide
~quiry. designed to assess three dimensions:
,
✓ The need for increased and updated tralnlng in these topics
✓ The pool of expertise cUrTently available in the 11we
✓ Tho potential content of such a course
Oonoralty, we are sec,king infom1ation on ~urrent
11
state-of-the--an" as to crowd control
tactics and training.
Accordingly. my staff has put together l very short surv~}' document. Please complete this
and forward lt 1n the enclosed post-paid envelope. You may wish to Forward this
Inquiry to your Operations Commander or Training Office for their Input,
on your behalf.
Bosed on· the results of the 1urvey, OBS Law Bnforocmcnt wiU work wlth the California
Speciuli1.ed Training Instltutt io ensure thllt training is made avallable to fit the needs you
identify, within the limits of budget and siaffing.
Thank you in advance for )'Our fflistancet
. .,,
_,,, .,. ,._;: .,,"'tL ~,,_._,,,..-, S3':l fl.r ' "'~ .,-.·_ . ·.1 ,-v.-..-~
rr
2136178542
.1UN
1, 1992 9:54AM ~349
SPECIAL SURVEY:
Crowd Control &
Civil Disorder Training
Current Crowd Conttof/Dlsorder Training Sources Used In Your Agenoy:
Text(e):
POST Course(s):
_________ ...._.....,......,._. ...... _ .. _....,. _______ _
I
---------------·~·-·---------
Non-POST Course(s):
----------------------
Consultant(s):
Is thera anyono you would recommend as an "expert• or authority In this field? (Name and
agency or firm.)
_______________ .,. -·----·------
--- ---·----------------·----
Future Training In Crowd Control/Disorder
Is currently avallable training (from all aourcaa) sufficient to meet tho need In California law
Enforcement, relative to this topic?
D Yes
�
No
If not. then should OES/CSTI develop and present (updated) 1rainlng on this topic?
D Yes
� No
• •.. . • • -• .. I _ , ,, I ,.. • I I ~ -S, ...., ~ - ... "t' ., " • • • - 'I ' - ,
P.fL
· FR� M:OES LAW ENFORCEMENT T�: 2136178542
JUN 1, 1992 9:54AM ~349 P.0t
If so, should it be targeted for:
D ManagemenUSuparvloor 16 - 24 Hours
D Line/Patrol (Deputy/Offlcer/Sergeant} 32 .. 40 Hours
D Tratn .. thg .. Trarner (Unk. Houra)
What should be Included? (Cheek all that apply; suggest additions.)
�
Civil LlabJllty
�
Historical 0ackground
�
Case Studies
� · ·
Squad Tactics
�·
Crowd Psychology
�
Mutual Aid System
�
M9~s Arrest and Field Booking
�
Incident Command System
�
Equipment/Non-Lethal Weapons
�
LawE and Cases
�
lnt8rvention/Oiffusion Teohnlquo1
What would you recommend be added?
Any other general suggestions or oomments?
(Tht following lnrormatlon ls fo, u1hH~nce only. ehould we have questions about your rttponH.)
AGENCY:
PerGOn Completing ~urvoy:
Telephone Number:
)
,,
- ---- ---------------------
. .. Fk0f"1: OES LAW ENFORCEMENT TO: 2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:55AM ~349 P.e
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
Background
After the 1970's the tncldenoe of civil disobedience and crowd disorder situations seemed
to decrease sharply. There has however, boen a goneraf increase In the frequency of suoh
Incidents In the last few years. Twobaslc1ypesof d1sturbancos seem to present themselves
as law enforcement problems.
The first Is the planned protest or demonstration. Groups supporting or opposing abortion,
those with vJews on animal rights Issues and various envlronmental factions are all
examples seen each nfght on the network news. Secondly, a trend has developed that
. usually Involves two key components• an attitude and alcohol. From parties that get out of
hand at college dormitories to what has become an annual "assautt· on the City of Palm
Springs, Jnoldonts involving more spontaneous disorder have become more frequent.
Faced with these oonoerns, law enforcement administrators have commented that law
enforcement personnel may no longer be welt prepared to deal with such situations. With
those oonoorns tn mind, the Law Enforcement DJvlslon of the Governor's Office of
Emergency Services set out to survey the "state of the state· as regards crowd control and
disorder tratnlng and plannlng.
This represents only a quick review of some of the more significant responses. A more
datalf ed report on these Issues wm be prepared later.
Sun,ey
.A written questionnaire was sent to each city police departr,1ent .and county aherurs
department In the state. This survey sought Information based on four parameters:
o Sufficiency of ourront training
o Approach to updated traf nf ng
o Aspects for lnclusf on In such training
o Texts and Instructors for a resource listing
Over two hundred responses were returnod. Many wore written not by staff, but by Chiefs
and Sheriffs. Many tmd specific: comments as to the need for more current training.
Gov&rl')ot'E> OHico of Emergency S1trvir,e~
* FROM=OES LAW EN~ORCEMENT
TO:
oeneriit Comments
2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:56AM ~349 P.0c
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
One responder Indicated " ... a real need to get ready for the ao·a ... Another; ·No one in our
agency has completed such a course In over ten years ... Ono f ndicated that most of the;r
training came from " ... o~d mflftary manuals.•
• Any training would be very much appreotated" said another. "This ls something we oan
really use" was one response. Other comments Included: .. It's been a long time since the
·so·s and most of us are pretty rusty." "This issuo appears 10 be staying with us for &orne
time." One response was particularly plaintive: " ... it's coming again • helpl"
Sufflolency of Current Training
lrfterms of training courses, both POST•Certifled and those that are not, there seems to be
a need for addltlonal tralntng. Thi$ was the first clear message In survey responses, as
nearly 84% of the returns noted such a need. Amplifying comments. such as those Indicated
above, were frequently lnoluded. Some departments Indicated that they conduct In-house
training, white others feel unoomfortabla In not having conducted such tratnlng for some
tlme_. A more basic message was that the level of training that existed In the early 1970'8
may no longer exist ~hroughout California law enforcement.
Two other trends seemed apparent In reviewing responses. First, It appears (logically) that
agencies facod with frequent crowd and disorder ooourrences are somewhat more satisfied
with the level of training available. These agencies tend to have "experts" In-house that can
propagate training and preparation& In this subject area. Secondly, 1here are stlll agencies
In the state that have not yet been touched by a need for such training. Many departments
In Calif ornla still have fewer than tan personnel. and agencies such as this often Indicated
no need for training on suoh Incidents. One such agency concluded: "This does not apply
to . our department.· These exceptions notwlthstandtng, tho clear majority of agencies aeem
to want enhanced training In thla area.
Approach to Training
The ~~rvey Inquired as to what format such training should take. As a point of departure.
respondents were asked if such 1ralnlng should be geared 1owards management and
supervisory personnef. toward Hne personnel, or spcclally formatted as a "treln•the•trainer"
type of course. Those responding seemed equally satisfied with training dlroctcd at both
groupings: one course 1ot management and supervisors. and yet another for line stnff. Many
indicn1od tha1 a •·traln-ihe-tralner-' course would be appropriate.
· FROt-i: ~ .i s LAW ENFORCEMENT
ro:
2136178542
JUN 1, 1992 9:s?AM ~349 P.0~
.J
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
Other comments w&r& rerrectlve of specific concerns related to the training. Many Indicated
that the traf nlng must bo POST•Oortlffed. With the lean budgets many agencies face, this
cortification was viewed almost universally as.. a priority. Also noted was a need to make the
training easity accessible. Regfona1 courses with a "focal flavor were advocated. Some
Indicated that the Callfornla Spaota11zed Training Institute should revise and re-institute their
Civil Disorder course. Others noted that such tratnlng ooutd be presented by a number of
providers.
Hands~on training was noted as a necessity for those in line and supervl~ory posltlons, while
those in management positions seem 10 need Information on llabmty and the scope of the
potential problems In such lncldents, according to respondents .
..
Lastly in this focus, some agencies Indicated a strong desire to see development of
statewide methods, procedures and practices In thts topic area . .,Procedures should be
standardized to Improve efficiency" was one such comment.
Training Aspects
J
I
The survey asked respondents to comment on key aspects to be lnctudod In trafntng related
to these problems. While many comments lnctLJded several points, thfs Quick Look wiff only
nst key Items In random order, so as to provide a flavor for responses reoelved. A later, more
detailed report wlll provide expanded Information as to each.
Protective Equipment
Use of Canines ·
Company Tactics
S1ress
Planned Events
Close Order Drill
Threat Summaries
Mutual Aid
Labor Strikes
Crowd Weapons
lntetrig~nce
lnteragency ~tanning
DocumentatJon
Military Property
Disperse.I Orders
Use of Batons
Public Information
Log1stlos
Use of Motors
1st Amendment Issues
Plan Preparation
Use of HeHcopters
Passive Demonstrators
Transportation
cthtcal Issues
Chemleal Agonts
Plain Clothes Personnel
Officer Safety
Protester Liaison
Mounted Units
Command Posts
Small Agencies
. Spectal Ordinances
Psych. Issues
Sharing Resources
Medical Aspects
Phys. Conditioning
Housing Prisoners
Report Preparation
Survemance
Pain Compliance
Groups Involved
~~~~·"o,'e Offico of Emergency Sorvices
~-i ... ~
• , r,;u,·,. u c..::i LMW ( '.; · • ,· - .~c., ·u . .:..1--. I
I U•
•
Resource listing
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
The survey sought Information as to currently avaflable resources In this subject area.
Spectficalty, informaUon was sought as to 1exts and manuals. POST Certified Courses of ·
choice, NonpPost Courses and lastly, lndivlduats thought t~ possess expertise In thi5
subjec1 area.
As for texts and other teaming aids. ft seems that resources of this nature fall Into two
categories, Many agencies indicated the only documents they have are older military or law
enforcement reports or manuals, often dating back to the early 1960's. Others said that they
tiave developadfndependent departmen1af polfotes, procedures and manuals. Those noted
most frequently wero tho ones produced by agencies stlll very active In crowd control
situations. Notably. Alameda SherJff, Oakland Pollce, Berkeley Police, San Jose Polloe,
San Francisco Police. Sacramento Potlce. Los Angeles Pollce end Los Angele& Sheriff
were each me· ntioned several times. Other agencies received occaslonal mention. Video
tapes by tho Law Enforcement Television Network, the Newport Beach Police Department
and ·tho Huntington Beach Police Department were each referenced.
POST-Certified courses Usted as particularly appropriate Included several positive refer
ences to the Crowd Control for Instructors Course held in Napa and Santa Rosa. Santa
Rosa's Critical Incident Course was also noted, as was Los Angeles Sheriff's DART Class.
As for training that Is not POST Certified, few responses were received. Anaheim PD
indicated very positivo comments abOut a course In Crowd Management held annually by
the International Aseoolatton of Auditorium Managers.
As stated, th8 survey asked for Inf ormatlon as to lndfvlduats with experience and/or
expertise in these Issues. Several agencies proposed their own ln•house personnel. Others
noted outside consultants. Som& nan,es were seen only once, others seemed t~ appear on
many responses. OES has prepared and sent a follow-up Inquiry to those named most
frequently, so that more detalled Information can be assessed as to each lndlvfduars•
capa~!lity and expertise.
· FR� M:OES LAW ENFORCEMENT TO:
2136178542 JUN 1, 1992 9:58AM ~349 P.1
•
Work In Progress
Quick Look Report
Special Survey:
Crowd Control & Disorder
In response ~o these concerns, and to continue the process of Investigating the current level
of preparedness In Callfomra Law Enforcement, severar processes continua. Most notably.
a worklng group has been formed, under the Joint auspices ofthe Callfornla Peace Officers
Association and the Office of Emargoncy S8rvioes. This group has representatives from
agencies with soma of the most tocent expertences In these situations, assernbted with the
collective hope that their input wm aid in this assessment. A CPOA presentation or
presentatJons may evolve from these meetings, as may input to ~ther training resources.
Inf ormatlon Wanted
Clearly, no agency or organization, least of all OES. proposes to have all the answers. Even
with hundreds of responses, there are undoubtedly a number of Individuals and resources
that were not known to. or m8ntlono~ by, those respondfng to the survey. Any other Input
· ,regarding these issues Is most wetcorne. Contact Deputy Chief Fritz Patterson or Assistant
Chief Michael Guerin of the oes Law Enforcement Olvlslon, at (SOS) 968-1649 or (714) 391 •
4485 respectfvely.
,. ..
Gov~rnor'6 Ottice of Emo,gency Sr,rvlces
r· ,-.. -

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