San Francisco earthquake report, 1989-10-17

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San Francisco earthquake report 1989, 1989 October 17.

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Content '
San Francisco Police
Earthquake Report
October 17, 1989
THE MEN AND WOMEN
OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
POLICE DEPARTMENT
For duties performed during the earthquake of October 17, 1989
and it's aftermath.
SAN FRA.~CISCO POU CE DEP AR1MENf EARTIIQUAKE REPORT
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
OCTOBER 17, 1989EARTHQUAKEREPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND
OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN
POLICE CHAIN OF COMMAND
MOBlLIZA TION AND STAGING OF PERSONNEL
MAP: AREAS WITH EXTENSIVE DAMAGE
MAP: MARINA COMMAND PERIMETER
ACCESS CONTROL
MAP: NORTHERN POLICE DISTRICT
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER
MAP: SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT
POLICE COMPUTER SERVICES
COMMUNICATIONS AND 911 SERVICE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING
EARTHQUAKE-RELATED COSTS
MAP: AREA 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT
MAP: AREA 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT
MAP: AREA 3 SOUTHERN DISTRICT
MAP: UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY;
SAN ANDREAS FAULT
MAP: UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY;
PREDICTED INTENSITY OF GROUND SHAKING
MAP AND GRAPH: UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY; SOJL COMPOSITION OF THE MARINA
DISTRICT
PROTOTYPE WARNING SIGN
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
2
2
3
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 .
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
The fallowing report describes the major
events associated with the earthquake of
October 17, 1989 in terms of the actions
taken by the Police Department and the
resources required to implement police
objectives. Consideration of the city's
Emergency Operations Plan, its
applicability, and our implementation of
its relevant portions are also discussed.
Our assessment is based on reviews of
Administration, Investigation, and Patrol
Bureau chronologies and after-action
reports, plus interviews with personnel
assigned to the areas which saw most of
the action. The discussion is divided into
a Background section and reports on:
1. Overall compliance with the E.O.P.,
2. The police chain of command,
3. Mobilization and staging of personnel,
4. Access control, 5. The Emergency
Operations Center, 6. Computer services,
7. Communications, and 8. Emergency
response training.
BACKGROUND
The quake measured 7 .1 on the Richter
scale. The city's Emergency Operations
Plan develops a number of scenarios for
each of several types of disaster. The
scenarios for a major earthquake
(Appendix 1-1) assume a magnitude of
8.3. Our review indicates that damage to
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
major highway systems was probably
much greater than anticipated. Other
aspects of the scenarios were reasonably
accurate, except that major damage to
infrastructure and to buildings, such as
described in the plan, occurred at a
lower level of earthquake intensity than
magnitude 8.3. Post-quake fires caused a
great deal of the actual damage in the
single hardest hit area, the Marina. Severe
effects such as injuries, fatalities, and
property loss were high! y localized,
concentrated in five primary clusters
totaling roughly .5 square miles or 1 % of
the city's land area. Most of the serious
damage was sustained in three districts:
Central, Southern, and Northern (see
Maps).
We estimate that police resources
could have dealt successfully
with twice the affected area and one
additional major perimeter if other
conditions (e.g., no major aftershocks,
lack of looting, few reported offenses)
remained the same. In other words, a
sustained Level II emergency would
certainly occur if more than 2% of the
city's area was affected and there were
more than two distinct zones of
involvement requiring perimeter and
access control.
2
Following guidelines established on page
1-7 of the city's Emergency Operations
Plan we define the event as a Level I
emergency, the lowest level, consisting
of a "minor to moderate incident wherein
local resources are adequate and available.
A LOCAL EMERGENCY may or may
not be proclaimed." A review of Police
Department and other agency records
issued during the first eight hours of the
immediate impact phase indicate a brief
period during which officials reacted in a
way appropriate to a Level II emergency.
Level II is reached when there is a
"moderate to severe emergency wherein
local resources are not adequate and
mutual aid may be required on a regional
or even statewide basis." Initial reports
from media sources, indicating looting and
perhaps more widespread catastrophic
damage than actually occurred, plus poor
interagency communications, made the
initial Level II evaluation a prudent
response to conditions as they were
understood to exist at the time.
OVERALL COMPLIANCE
WITHTHE
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN
Issues. Appendix C of the plan contains a
checklist of actions which are to be taken
in the event of a major earthquake. Many
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
of the actions were unnecessary due to
the relatively low levels of damage and
disruption that resulted from the quake
and the short duration of_the primary
impact phase. Compliarice·was generally
high during the primary impact phase.
The Turk Street center was activated 59
minutes after the quake, an initial poll of
stations was taken at 5:20 pm, 16 minutes
after the quake, and more detailed
assessments were conducted at reasonable
intervals. Only two issues have been
identified. Required actions were not
always initiated by the designated
person, but this may be due to unique
circumstances (i.e., the World Series).
Emergency vehicles were not moved into
open areas, as mandated by the plan.
Recommendations.
1. Clarify chain of command as
described below, to minimize confusion
regarding who has the authority to initiate
specific actions.
2. Instruct responsible parties at
all police facilities to move emergency
vehicles into an open area after a major
quake, to avoid losses should a damaged
structure collapse due to an aftershock.
POLICE CHAIN OF COMMAND
Issues. Both the Department's Event
Management Manual and the city's
Emergency Operations Plan provide for
an event commanuer and subordinate line
of authority should the Chief of Police be
injured or otherwise unavailable. A
consistent observation was that lines of
authority were unclear. Information and
logistical operations traveled through
various people before the proper authority
was found to make a decision.
Recommendations. The Department's
recent reorganization offers an obvious
solution to uncertainty about the chain of
command:
1. The Chief of Police will act
as the Event Commander. The newly
created Chief of Staff (or Assistant Chief
of Police) position should be identified as
the Police Command Post commander.
The incumbent is responsible for major
personnel and fiscal management
functions on a daily basi~, and is ideally
suited to operate as the overall director of
activities during a major emergency. This
change, along with a description of
emergency duties, should be included in
an updated Event Management Manual
and Emergency Operations Plan.
Sgt. Jerry enkir, Public Affairs, escorts the press through the Marina
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 3
2. The Deputy Chief of Patrol
succeeds the Chief of Staff, and is
succeeded by the Deputy Chief of
Investigations. These changes should
also be included in an updated set of
emergency operating plans.
3. The Event Commander
should have a designated emergency
operating staff which is prepared to begin
emergency operations immediately
after an incident occurs. The positions
and responsibilities should be clearly
identified in all emergency operations
plans. These staff members would act as
a conduit for information and would
provide immediate rumor control.
MOBILIZATION AND STAGING OF
PERSONNEL
Issues. A majority of San Francisco
police officers returned to duty
immediately after the earthquake, many
before the recall order was announced.
The recall order was transmitted by local
broadcast media. Several problems were
observed relative to the mobilization
and staging process. A number of
officers followed the instructions in the
Event Management Manual and reported
to designated helicopter landing areas.
No helicopters arrived and the officers
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
RICHMOND
~ MISSION
TARAVAL
POTRERO
INGLESIDE
Areas with the most extensive damage from the quake and fire, areas requiring maximum police effort.
Sources: Dept. of Public Works Red Tag report 10/31/89, S.F.P.D. Incident reports and Earthguake Summaries.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 4
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
M' anna Command Perimeter in the Northern Police District.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT s EARTHQUAKE REPORT
had to find other means of transportation.
Officers assigned to Patrol responded to
their official assignments. Many who
normally work in administrative or
investigative offices during regular
business hours appeared at their work
sites where they were formed into squads
and sent where needed. Many off-duty
officers responded to Northern District
(location of the Marina fire), where
their numbers and questions hindered
somewhat the operations in progress.
Finally, many on-duty officers were not
relieved until they had worked far in
excess of 12 hours, even though there
was sufficient manpower to do so.
The following remedial measures are
recommended:
Recommendations. Staging and
mobilization can be improved by
implementing actions as described below:
1. All off-duty Patrol officers
report to their regular assignment.
2. The Inspectors Bureau should
have, in advance of any emergency, a
designated core group that can operate
as a "mini-bureau" (doing follow-up
investigations and re bookings) during the
immediate impact and transitional phases
of the emergency; all other personnel
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
should report to a central staging area.
3. All Chief of Staff and
Administration personnel, who have
no designated emergency operations
assignments, should report to a central
staging area.
4. Requests for helicopter
transportation (through a mutual aid
request to the military) should be made
as soon as a disaster is proclaimed and a
recall announced.
5. A central staging area should
be designated. The city's Emergency
Operations Center is not an adequate or
appropriate location. There are several
potential sites. One of the "seismic core"
stations (Northern, Ingleside, or Potrero)
would serve. Northern is perhaps the best
due to location and the availability of a
small parking lot where helicopters could
land. The Academy is attractive because
it is centrally located and also has a large
adjacent open space. The Academy's
buildings experienced more damage than
other police facilities, however, probably
due to soil conditions.
6. The Personnel Officer should
respond immediately to the central staging
area to keep a register of reporting officers
6
and, as directed by the event commander,
to dispatch them to various sites as
needed.
ACCESS CONTROL
Issues. The Police Department is
responsible for traffic control and
regulating the movements of people into
areas and premises affected by major
incidents. This authority is mandated by
the California Penal Code (Section 409 .5,
"Power of Peace Officers to close areas
during emergencies") and incorporated
into the Emergency Operations Plan
(Annex C, enclosure C-2, pp. 1-3).
Reports of "tourists", tour busses,
residents, interested third parties, and
others attempting to enter affected
areas and buildings are numerous. The
established emergency procedures
governing authorization for access into
dangerous areas were not well handled by
supporting city agencies. An ad hoc
authorization form was created, the proper
form (see Annex C, enclosure C-2,
attachment C-2-A) apparently was not
used; changes in "policy" were made with
enough frequency that maintaining access
control became difficult; and many
citizens were angered by the resulting
delays and miscommunications. The
authority of Parking Control Officers was
often challenged when they were used to
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
PRESIDIO
N orthem Police District: Areas of greatest loss and most extensive police involvement.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
man the Marina perimeter, a situation that
may become more of a problem once the
parking control function is transferred to a
new city department. Significant numbers
of unauthorized citizens were allowed
access to the Marina Command perimeter.
This began to occur on October 18 and
may have been largely due to confusion
and the use of non-sworn personnel
to man barricades; however, it also
appears that some sworn members made
exceptions to the orders, on their own
initiative, and the Department issued a
warning on October 22 that failure to
comply could result in disciplinary action.
Recommendations. Problems of access
control developed due to a failure to
adhere to established procedures and the
line of authority set up in the Emergency
Operations Plan. Several actions are
available to remedy these problems:
1. City agencies other than
the Police Department should familiarize
themselves with the Emergency
Management structure established
by the adopted plan; ad hoc decisions
made by agencies which have neither the
competence nor authority to control access
should be discouraged.
2. Decisions, once made, must be
clearly communicated through the police
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
chain of command to the officers respon
sible for access control.
3. Any change in access policy
should not be implemented until all
interested official parties meet and confer
with police management to discuss the
situation, existing hazards, etc ..
4. Parking Control Officers
should come under Police Department
supervision during any emergency
requiring significant access
control measures (i.e., crowd or traffic
control). This needs to be written into
the Emergency Operations Plan, as the
parking control staff is to be shifted from
the Police Department to a new agency.
5. To assist in the enforcement of
409 .5 PC, weatherproof, reflective signs
should be created by the city sign shop
and stored at the Property Control section
and district stations. The suggested
wording is:
RESTRICTED AREA
Authorized personnel only.
Updated access information will be
provided every 24 hours.
S.F.P.D.
8
6. All requests for tours of the
restricted areas(s) by outside public safety,
O.E.S., or other officials should be
handled by the police Public Affairs
Office which will provide for an escort
and/or a contact person on the scene.
7. Compliance with Department
orders concerning access by citizens could
be improved by having a sergeant or
designated senior Q2 in charge of each
checkpoint leading into a closed area.
El\1ERGENCY OPERA TIO NS
CENTER
Issues. Command staff personnel
responded to the Turk Street E.O.C. less
than an hour after the earthquake; delays
were caused in some cases by command
staff officers being at Candlestick Park as
part of the Department's policing of the
World Series. The Police Department's
allocated space is inadequate, a small
room with two chairs and a bathroom
(shared with the Red Cross). There were
no copies of the Emergency Operations
Plan available, other than those brought by
command staff members. No intrafacility
communications exist, making it necessary
to use "runners" within the building to
coordinate operations with other city
agencies. Many unauthorized visitors,
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
•
.,
Southern Police District: Areas of greatest loss and most extensive police involvement.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
Foot patrols were used in areas that were not accessable to autos.
including elected officials, were admitted
to the building; they wanted information,
asked many questions, and to some extent
got in the way of emergency management
operations. Once the Department's
command van arrived, direction of police
operations was shifted to the mobile
facility.
Recommendations. There is a need for a
new emergency operations center. The
new quarters should allow space for a
media room, a meeting ("war") room for
heads of city departments with emergency
management roles, phone banks, and radio
communications equipment. There should
also be an uninterrupted power supply
(i.e., an air-cooled generator) and a vault
for storage of E.O.P. manuals and other
important supplies.
1. Funding either already
exists or should be developed for the
construction of a new emergency opera
tions center (renovation of the existing site
is feasible, as the location is quite good).
2. Communications lines
designated for Police Department use
should not be made available to those not
involved in emergency management roles,
unless otherwise provided for by the event
commander.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
3. Access control to the center
should be enforced by the police, perhaps
through use of a color-coded access (e.g.,
green for unlimited access, red for access
to a restricted "public" area) pass, and
other new electronic identification
methods.
4. Emergency plans and other
material relevant to police emergency
management should be located in a safe
and secured area (e.g., a vault) and should
be updated at regular intervals by Staff
Inspections.
5. Connect designated rooms at
the Hall of Justice to the uninterrupted
power supply, to allow these locations to
operate as command posts or in support of
outside command posts. A committee is
currently considering which rooms might
be connected to the U.P.S. line.
POLICE COMPUTER SERVICES
Issues. Mainframe equipment was
physically shifted by the force of the
earthquake, there was some minor
failure of ancillary equipment, and the
emergency power source failed because
the generator's cooling system uses water
(which was unavailable when the main
was broken). As a result, there was a
10
(G.D. Peters)
temporary shut down of the mainframe
system.
Recommendations.
1. Secure the equipment by
bolting it into position.
2. Provide an uninterrupted
power supply that does not depend on
other Hall of Justice utilities for its
operation (e.g., air cooled generators
with their own fuel supply).
COMMUNICATIONS
AND
911SERVICE
Issues. When emergency generator
power failed, the mainframe went down
and so did the Computer Aided Dispatch
(CAD) system. The 911 transfer line
to other municipal units such as the
Fire Department and paramedics was
not operational, due to Pacific Bell's
Mccoppin Street switch failure. The
automatic number and location
identifier systems (ANI/ ALI) failed
for approximately 24 hours. There was an
inadequate supply of "call record" forms
and no maps, both of which were
necessary when CAD went down and
Communications shifted to manual
operations. Phone numbers for outside
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
agencies and departmental units were
wrong or outdated. Rumors circulated
that the Hall of Justice was about to
collapse, increasing the uneasiness
of dispatch workers and causing
some discussion on whether or not
Communications should be evacuated.
There is no auxillary communications
site that could be put into use if the Hall is
destroyed or rendered unsafe for continued
use.
Recommendations. Corrections in
progress and suggestions for additional
improvements include:
1. CAD, ANI, and ALI systems
should become more reliable with the
installation of an uninterrupted power
supply.
2. Phone numbers are being
updated and it is suggested that a regular
review be instituted to assure that numbers
are always current.
3. The existing emergency
generator should be replaced with an air
cooled model; a proposal to do so is under
consideration at this time.
4. The difficulty with 911 routing
should be solved, and the ability to
interface with the city telephone system
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
added, when installation of the Enhanced
911 is completed.
5. Assessment of the Hall's
structural safety should be done on a
priority basis, better rumor control is
needed.
6. If evacuation is necessary,
a secondary site is needed. The
Department's command van has
communications equipment, but emer
gency management operations will require
it to serve in other capacities. Therefore,
we recommend purchase of a second
command van-type vehicle that is
equipped to function as an emergency
communications/dispatch center. We
note that limited communications/dispatch
facilities exist at the E.O.C., but their
utility is limited by the time it would
take to activate them as well as by the
problems at the E.O.C. site referenced
above.
7. Portable generators are needed.
and have been requested, to provide power
sources for P.I.C. radio battery chargers.
8. A portable AM-FM radio
should be present in the room to provide
access to news broadcasts.
11
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
TRAINING
Issues. It is reported that there was a fair
amount of uncertainty about "what to do"
among Patrol officers during the quake
and for a brief period thereafter. No major
difficulties were noted because police
officers simply "did the things they
usually do, just more of it for a longer
period of time." This approach worked
due to the relatively small area of the city
that actually experienced catastrophic
losses of life and property. In a more
severe quake, it appears that officers might
not have all the training and materials they
would need during the critical impact
phase.
Recommendations. The following
recommendations address a number
of concerns that relate to overall
preparedness:
1. The Event Management
Manual sections dealing with natural
disasters should be revised to include
additional detail and to stay in conformity
with the city's Emergency Operations
Plan.
2. Each unit, section, and
company should maintain updated copies
of the emergency action plans, (both the
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
Martel, of Northern Station, meeting with displa.ced residents.
Manual and E.O.P.) or those sections
specifically applicable to their role.
Dissemination is currently very limited
and officers below the rank of lieutenant
appear to have little knowledge of special
procedures or guidelines that might be
implemented during a major disaster.
3. Each unit,company, and
section should have a uniform internal
procedure to establish command posts
and to designate people on each watch to
perform specific duties.
4. Initial training and periodic
retraining on emergency operations
should be given at the Academy to
members of all ranks. Memories fade
and plans change.
5. At the unit level, require each
commanding officer to promptly prepare
and submit after-action plans. In addition
to chronologies and cost reports, the
reports should give an overview of the
incident and describe any problems or
other special factors that might have
affected their operations and performance.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
EARTHQUAKE RELATED COSTS
PERSONNEL COSTS (10/17/89 to 12/21/89)
TOTAL HOURS WORKED
Banner guard
Flares
Batteries
TOTAL
Bannerguard
Flares
Batteries
Flashlights
Gloves
Raingear
Misc.
TOTAL
EMERGENCY SUPPLY REQUESTS
SUPPLIES TAKEN FROM STOCK
12
$2,694,053
78,615
$3,749.13
$9,901.21
$1,197.00
$14,847,34
$297.00
$4,587.20
$101.50
$1,197.00
$1,275.00
$658.60
$467.40
$8,583.70
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
Area 1: Southern Po-lice District, broken glass, looting and access control.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 13 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
Area 2: Southern Police District, severe structural damage, access control.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 14 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
Area 3: Southern Police District, severe structural damage, access control.
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
\'
\
46
58
\
SE Ac. ROCK S
60 _
7?
78
., -=;f I
7
8 SHARP PA,RK STAff BtActH
Psc~t
Mori Point -~~fBifi-;-,~
Position of the San Andreas Fault in relation to the city of San Francisco.
(courtesy of the United States Geological Survey, Menlo Park)
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENf 16
50
5 1
46
33 /,,--'--,,'\
,,,, \
25
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AIRPORT
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
4.J
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28
Predicted maximum intensity of ground shaking on the San Andreas fault and the Hayward fault (not shown).
A: very violent, B: violent, C: very strong, D: strong, E: weak.
(courtesy of the United States Geological Survey, Menlo Park; Borcherdt and others (1975))
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 17 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
0
I
0
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en
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SAN FRANCISCO BAY
YARDS
.2
.1
F i/A Artificial fill
CJ Modern beach deposits
F n Dune sands
PUC
0 ~
LMS
0 10
EXPLANATION
Q Alluvium, undivided
E22] Franciscan assemblage-Sandstone
• Seismic station
20
TIME, IN SECONDS
30
Tirree temporary seismograph stations in the Marina district. A: Locations of stations and types of geologic material. B: Vertical
velocities during a magnitude 4.6 aftershock on October 21, 1989, show amplification of ground motion in both damaged (LMS) and
undamaged (PUC) areas in the Marina district relative to ground motion on bedrock (MAS). Damage occurred in the area underlain
by artifical fill. (courtesy: Mr. John Galloway; United States Geological Survey, Menlo Park)
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 18 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
RESTRICTED
AREA
AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL ONLY
UPDATED ACCESS INFORMATION
WILL BE PROVIDED EVERY
24 HOURS
SECTION 409.5 CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Prototype warning sign
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 19 EARTHQUAKE REPORT
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Frank M. Jordan
Chief of Police
Willis A. Casey
Chief of Staff
Produced by:
The San Francisco Police Department
Planning Division
Lieutenant Thomas W. Suttmeier
Commanding Officer
Research and preparation by:
Steve Lutes, Ph.D.
Officer Michael J. Sullivan
Inside cover: Reproduction of the certificate
awarded to each member of the Department
who worked during the 72 hours following the
earthquake.
EARTHQUAKE REPORT
COVER CREDIT: TRACED REPRODUCTION
OF THE SEISMOGRAPH READING FOR THE
OCTOBER17LOMAPRIETAEARTHQUAKE
REGISTERING 7.1 ON THE RICHTER SCALE.
COURTESY OF:
THE SEISMOGRAPHIC STATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKEKEY

Asset Metadata

Core Title San Francisco earthquake report, 1989-10-17

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest

Format 23 p. (format), application/pdf (imt), official reports (aat)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/webster-c100-30263

Unique identifier UC11446485

Identifier box 15 (box),web-box15-15-03.pdf (filename),folder 15 (folder),webster-c100-30263 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier web-box15-15/web-box15-15-03.pdf

Dmrecord 30263

Format 23 p. (format),application/pdf (imt),official reports (aat)

Internet Media Type application/pdf

Source Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992 (collection), University of Southern California (contributing entity)

Inherited Values

Title Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992

Description Chaired by former federal judge and FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster, the Los Angeles Webster Commission assessed law enforcement's performance in connection with the April, 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. The collection consists of materials collected and studied by the Commission over the course of its investigation. Materials pertain to both the Los Angeles incident specifically, and civil disturbance, civil unrest control, and policing tactics in general.

Included in the collection are the following: interviews with LAPD officers, law enforcement personnel, government officials, community leaders, and activists; articles, broadcasts, and press releases covering the civil unrest; various tactical and contingency plans created for disasters and emergencies; reports, studies, and manuals about civil unrest control and prevention; literature about community-based policing strategies; emergency plans and procedures developed by other cities; and after-action reports issued once the civil unrest had subsided. Also featured are items related to the internal operations of the LAPD both before and during the civil unrest, including activity reports, meeting agendas and minutes, arrest data, annual reports, curricula and educational materials, and personnel rosters.

See also the finding aid (https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2266).

See also The Los Angeles Riots: The Independent and Webster Commissions Collections (https://scalar.usc.edu/works/the-los-angeles-riots-christopher-and-webster-commissions-collections/index).

Related collections in the USC Digital Library:

? Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 1991 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/2251)
? Richard M. Mosk Christopher Commission records, 1988-2011 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/393)
? Kendall O. Price Los Angeles riots records, 1965-1967 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/979)
? Watts riots records, 1965 (see also the finding aid: https://archives.usc.edu/repositories/3/resources/83)

Thanks to generous support from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the USC Libraries are digitizing this collection for online public access.

Coverage Temporal 1931/1992

Linked assets

Los Angeles Webster Commission records, 1931-1992