University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Case studies of national cultural protection in the era of globalization

(USC Thesis Other)

Case studies of national cultural protection in the era of globalization

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

CASE STUDIES OF

NATIONAL CULTURAL PROTECTION IN

THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

by

Brian K. Dennehy

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

May 2008

Copyright 2008 Brian K. Dennehy

ii

Dedication

To Johanna, for being you and believing in me.

To Cary & Brigid, for their inspiration.

iii
Table of Contents

Dedication ii

List of Tables v

Abstract vi

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 1

1.1 Overview 1
1.2 Centering Questions and the
Argument in Brief 6
1.3 Goals of the Study 11
1.4 Other Understandings,
Other Explanations 14
1.5 Approach to the Problem 21
1.6 The Cases 24
1.7 Significance of the Study 27
1.8 Plan of the Dissertation 30

Chapter 2: Globalization 31

2.1 Introduction 31
2.2 The Globalization Debate 32
2.3 'Globalization': Meanings and Usage 37
2.4 Toward a Definition 50
2.5 Globalization's Realities 51

Chapter 3: Explanations and Understandings 57

3.1 Introduction 57
3.2 The Economic View of Man 59
3.3 Comparative Advantage and the
Argument for Free Trade 66
3.4 Challenges to the Free Trade Ideal 71
3.5 Contending Views of Protection 74
3.6 Cognitive Approach and the
Notion of 'Economic Culture' 84
3.7 National Cultures and
Economic Policies 90

iv

Chapter 4: France, the E.U.,
and the Audiovisual Industries 93

4.1 Introduction 93
4.2 Hollywood Goes to Europe 95
4.3 The GATT, Film, and TV Programming 102
4.4 The E.U.'s Green Paper and Directive
on the Audiovisual Industries 110
4.5 The GATT Conflict 120
4.6 After the Uruguay Round 126
4.7 The World Audiovisual Market 129
4.8 An Analysis of American Dominance
of International Audiovisual Markets 136
4.9 The Cultural Case Considered 141

Chapter 5: Japan and Rice 150

5.1 Introduction 150
5.2 Japan's Rice Policy 151
5.3 Domestic Politics of Rice in Japan 162
5.4 Agriculture and the GATT
before Uruguay 171
5.5 World Market in Cereal Products 178
5.6 Rice in Japanese Culture 191
5.7 United States and Japanese Economic
Relations before Uruguay 198
5.8 The Uruguay Round Conflict
over Agriculture 208
5.9 The Concessions 231

Chapter 6: Conclusion 233

6.1 General Conclusion 233
6.2 Hypotheses and Paths for Research 237

Reference List 240

v
List of Tables

4.7.A Market Shares of Domestic and
U.S. Films in European Union Countries 133

4.7.B Variety Estimates of All-Time
Highest Grossing Releases in Spain 134

4.7.C Europe's 1988 Share of Television
Program Content, By Country 135

5.2.A Farm-Level Price of Rice as a
Percentage of World Price, 1961-80 157

5.2.B Japan's Domestic Production, Import,
Export, and Self-Sufficiency Rates for
Selected Farm Commodities, 1960-77 160

5.5.A U.S. and Canadian Agricultural,
Non-Agricultural, and Total Trade
Balances, 1983-1987 180

5.5.B Ratio of Rice Trade to Production,
By Region, 1950-1979 184

5.7.A Japanese Exports as a Percentage
of GNP; and, Exports to the United States
as a Percentage of GNP, 1955-88 203

vi
Abstract

This dissertation explores national cultural
protection in the era of globalization. As the pace of
globalization increases, national leaders, with the
support of concerned and sometimes radicalized citizenry,
are "defending the local" by trying to shield their
cultures from the impact of international trade. Given
its apparent disruptive influence on the global political
economy, national cultural protection should be of
concern to politicians and academicians alike. However,
much of the literature available to understand the
phenomenon is incomplete. The goal of this dissertation
is to provide a more complete understanding of national
cultural protection than is available today.
The study is focused on the following centering
question: Why does a nation engage in cultural protection
when liberal economic theory that suggests it would be
far more profitable to open its markets? To answer the
question the dissertation first examines the phenomenon
of national cultural protection as a component of
globalization. This is key because as post-war economies
have become more intertwined, nations have tried to
promote and protect their respective cultures. Next, the
vii

dissertation provides a critical view of national
cultural protection from the vantage point of
international political economy, the most robust body of
knowledge on issues related to trade and trade
policymaking. At the same time, it gives consideration to
culture as a causal variable.
The study then examines closely two instances of
national cultural protection involving France and the
global audiovisual industries, and Japan and trade in
rice, through a broad, political-economic lens. In both
cases, the countries' leaders risked the collapse of
multinational negotiations to protect their nations from
outside cultural influence. Ironically, those very
negotiations were themselves intended to help lower
international trade barriers.
Taking a political-economic perspective, broadened
to allow for consideration of culture as an independent
variable, the dissertation provides an answer to the
centering question: culture itself, or more accurately
put, concerns over its decline or demise, plays a role at
least equal to that of economics and politics. The study
thus challenges a more "obvious" or conventional
understandings of the issue.
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

There is no easy way to draw the line between
economics and culture.

Lester C. Thurow
The Future of Capitalism

1.1 Overview
Globalization, free trade, and corporate
competitiveness, are buzzwords of a new world economy
where most goods and services can be traded across
national boundaries with ease. This seemingly borderless
world is mostly the creation of firms and policymakers
from industrialized nations who believe that the economic
benefits of freer trade outweigh other, possibly
negative, consequences. In recent years, however, many of
those same policymakers–-and the citizens they serve--
view the new world economy as a challenge to long-
established cultural norms. They have quickly tried to
shield their countries, and their cultures, from the
world they once worked so hard to create, engaging in
what I call "national cultural protection."
For example, fearing that their culture might be
weakened, French officials from nearly every branch and
level of government agonized for more than a decade
2

before allowing construction of "Le Disneyland" near
Paris. Using similar arguments, South Korean trade
officials banned the import of most foreign books,
magazines, and films (particularly those of Japanese
origin). More recently, Korean leaders placed import
restrictions on more conventional commodities that, they
argue, would be culturally deleterious to the nation.
1

Similarly, in 1995, the Canadian Trade Ministry blocked
the entry of Borders, the American bookstore chain, into
its provincial markets, claiming that its presence might
undermine Canada's cultural uniqueness.
2
All of these

1
See Won M. Choi, "Screen Quota and Cultural Diversity:
Debates in Korea-US FTA Talks and Convention on Cultural
Diversity," Asian Journal of WTO & International Health
Law and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 2007): 267-286.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019389.
2
This example continues a long tradition of cultural
protection by the Canadian government that escalated
dramatically in frequency and harshness of tone over the
1980s and 1990s, culminating with the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade negotiations, as well as the final NAFTA talks,
during which Canadian officials insisted successfully
that the "culture industries" of film, television, radio
broadcasting, publishing, and video and audio software,
be excluded from any final agreement. See Keith Acheson
and Christopher Maule, Much Ado about Culture: North
American Trade Disputes (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2001); and, Chios C. Carmody, "Creating
Shelf Space: NAFTA's Experience with Cultural Protection
and its Relevance for the WTO," Asian Journal of WTO &
International Health Law and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2
(September 2007): 287-312.
3

official actions were taken to defend local and national
cultures from the vagaries implied by the free markets of
economic globalization. Indeed, as globalization
progresses, domestic leaders, with the support of their
concerned and sometimes radicalized citizenry, are
increasingly "defending the local" by engaging in
national cultural protection.
3
Given its apparent
disruptive influence on the global political economy,
national cultural protection should be of concern to
politicians and academicians alike.
However, the literature available to understand the
phenomenon is incomplete. Most journalistic accounts of
national cultural protection are limited to a specific
occurrence in one country. They do not provide great
detail, and are often overly sympathetic or harshly
skeptical in tone. Most writings academic writings on the
subject address it indirectly, and again, only in the

3
For an account of a trade dispute between China and the
United States where cultural protection was integral to
the conflict, see Henry S. Gao, "The Mighty Pen, the
Almighty Dollar, and the Holy Hammer and Sickle: An
Examination of the Conflict between Trade Liberalization
and Domestic Cultural Policy with Special Regard to the
Recent Dispute between the United States and China on
Restrictions on Certain Cultural Products," Asian Journal
of WTO & International Health Law and Policy, Vol. 2,
No.1, 2 (September 2007): 313-344,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019394.
4

most general terms. Such studies usually focus on trade,
trade policymaking, or more traditional forms of
protectionism, acknowledging the question of national
cultural protection tangentially, if at all. These works
also give little, if any, consideration to the notion
that culture itself may play a role in shaping the global
economy.
A few scholars–-typically sociologists and
anthropologists–-have addressed the concept of national
cultural more directly. Yet they do not give its
appearance in protectionism their primary attention.
Instead, they emphasize culture to a point where economic
and political matters are usually ignored altogether.
4

Thus, even when taken together, journalists and academics
provide only a partial glimpse into the phenomenon.

4
Another group of academics who touch on cultural
protection are legal scholars studying trade law and
negotiations. Particularly well-researched examples that
highlights the legal complexities associated with
cultural protection can be found in Daniel Drache and
Marc D. Froese's "The Global Cultural Commons after
Cancun: Identity, Diversity and Citizenship," CLPE
Research Paper No. 2 (2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829987; and, Tomer Broude,
"Taking 'Trade and Culture' Seriously: Geographical
Indications and Cultural Protection in WTO Law" (1 May
2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=714981.

5

This dissertation provides a more complete
understanding of national cultural protection by
reviewing the literature devoted to trade, trade policy
making, culture, and globalization and then taking an in-
depth look at two, well-known cases in France and Japan.
First, this study examines the phenomenon of
national cultural protection as a component of
globalization. This is key because as post-war economies
have become more intertwined, nations have tried to
promote and protect their respective cultures. At the
same time, the frequency and intensity of their efforts
have increased dramatically and squarely within the
context of the pace of globalization.
Second, the dissertation provides a critical view of
national cultural protection from the vantage point of
international political economy, the most robust body of
knowledge on issues related to trade and trade
policymaking. At the same time, it gives sufficient
consideration to culture as a causal variable.
Third, this study examines closely two instances of
national cultural protection involving France and Japan
through a broad, political-economic lens. In both cases,
the countries' leaders risked the collapse of
multinational negotiations to protect their nations from
outside cultural influence. (Ironically, those very
6

negotiations were themselves intended to help lower
international trade barriers.)
Fourth, the conclusion provides several hypotheses
concerning the origins of national cultural protection,
and suggests a few, possibly rewarding paths that future
researchers might take.

1.2 Centering Questions and the Argument in Brief
Why does a nation engage in cultural protection,
when liberal economic theory that suggests it would be
far more profitable to open its markets? This is the
central question prompting this study, and it gives rise
to others. Is national cultural protection part of a
broader, popular reaction to globalization? Is it
resistance by "locals" to an outside world that appears
to be moving ever closer? Or, are calls for natural
cultural protection merely a guise to promote the same,
cynical policies that often protect a nation's more
traditional goods and services in the global economy?
Most mainstream economic and international trade
scholars would suggest that the last question, stated
more positively, is the most plausible hypothesis: goods
or services with cultural content are protected to the
same extent–-and for the same ignoble reasons–-as more
7

conventional products. They would argue that a
protectionist stance taken by policymakers is best
explained by base material, and largely cynical political
and economic interests. Indeed, at the outset of this
study, I believed that only the political rhetoric used
to promote and defend national cultural protection would
differentiate it from other protectionist efforts.
In other words, proponents of national cultural
protection are likely driven by viable domestic
industries--industries that directly profit because they
dominate local markets for products with cultural
significance. Such businesses, whose products are largely
"cultural," or which have obvious cultural overtones,
would presumably ask policymakers to help protect them
from foreign rivals. Those policymakers would, in turn,
fulfill those corporate wishes so they could better their
own political fortunes. So instead of fears about
cultural erosion as the primary or independent variable,
the real motives are economic and political with
government-granted protection of trade sectors and the
national culture as the dependent variable, or the
effect.
A large part of the available evidence supports this
hypothesis. In nations that engage in cultural
protection, impacted industries and self-interested
8

groups typically lobby compliant policymakers for special
treatment in the face of foreign competition. In turn,
those policymakers create protectionist barriers. Yet,
almost from the outset of this study, research for the
case studies revealed that there is "more going on"--that
most instances of cultural protection cannot be explained
sufficiently by most theories emanating from the field of
international political economics.
Traditional theoretical approaches from economics,
political science, and international political economy
offer substantial pieces of the puzzle that is national
cultural protection. In the words of Francis Fukuyama, in
his study of trust and economic fortune: "We can think of
neoclassical economics [and the other disciplines it has
informed] as being, say, 80 percent correct: it has
uncovered important truths about the nature of money and
markets because its fundamental model of rational, self-
interested human behavior" is correct in most instances
where material gain or loss is a likely consequence.
5
For
most social science researchers, "getting it right" 80
percent of the time would be more than satisfactory.

5
The 80/20 formulation is put forth and elaborated upon
by Francis Fukuyama in his chapter critiquing classical
economics in Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation
of Prosperity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 13-22.
9

However, this dissertation focuses on a phenomenon that
is found in the remaining 20 percent of human activity
that is not driven by rational motivations. Indeed, an
examination of this ignored 20 percent is critical to
this study's primary goal: providing a more complete
understanding of national cultural protection than is
available to scholars today.
More about this 20 percent can be found by asking:
what drives a country to adopt cultural protectionist
measures? The answer: for a variety of reasons--real or
perceived--the people of that country have deep concerns
about the decline of their culture. However, most
research on culture typically looks at it as the sole
independent variable driving a plethora of economic,
political, and social outcomes. Other possible causes,
particularly economic and political factors, are often
peripheral to the work, or not considered at all. As a
result, national cultural protection--often fraught with
economic and political considerations–-is not well
explained by this literature either.
This indicates that while traditional theories on
trade and protection may be quite robust, they are too
limited in perspective. Culture must be included as a
possible independent variable, and the inverse is equally
true. A narrow, or overly sympathetic focus on culture
10

blinds even careful researchers to the significance of
economic and political matters in cultural life. For non-
academics concerned with economic policy making, these
findings suggest that championing free trade while
ignoring or denigrating cultural arguments is a serious
mistake–-a mistake that could lead to serious conflict if
globalization continues apace.
In short, this dissertation argues that concerns
about preserving a nation's culture do influence national
cultural protection specifically and, to a large degree,
economic affairs. Thus, if we are to better understand
national cultural protection and other resistance to
economic globalization, a study of international
political economy must include at least three categories
of inquiry: trade and economic exchange, cultural
exchange, and the relationship between these two sets of
relations.
6
In addition, this dissertation suggests that
human affairs are too complex to follow elegant academic
models that focus too sharply on "economic rationality"
or, for that matter, on culture. Like Max Weber, this
study does not argue that culture rather than material

6
This formulation is similar to Akira Iriye's challenge
in Power & Culture that scholars of international
relations need to account for states, power, and culture
in order to understand the world polity.

11

interests move the world. Instead, it suggests that
culture as well as material interests both serve to
explain human actions.
7
National cultural protection,
then, is best understood as a phenomenon driven by a
complex combination of economic, political, and cultural
forces.

1.3 Goals of the Study
The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide
greater insight into national cultural protection than is
available today. The tradition of understanding is rooted
in the study of history and the Weberian approach to the
social sciences.
8
It seeks to "get inside" a problem and
"reproduce the order in the minds of actors."
9
This goal

7
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas
and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 4.
The original formulation reads: "Like [Max] Weber, we do
not argue that ideas rather than interests (as
interpreted by human beings) move the world. Instead, we
suggest that ideas as well as interests have causal
weight in explanations of human actions." [emphasis in
the original].

8
See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and
Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990), 68-91.
9
Ibid., 87.
12

does not necessarily put the dissertation at odds with
the tradition of explanation, which has its roots in
scientific methods and seeks to discern causes. This
study seeks to explain causation so that the readers'
understanding is more complete: it views national
cultural protection through a political-economic lens,
while simultaneously including culture as an independent
variable.
In doing so, this study also explores some limits of
mainstream political economic theory. It suggests ways to
enrich the literature dealing specifically with the
global economy by acknowledging culture as a significant
independent variable. Thus, this dissertation is part of
a larger effort to suggest ways to broaden traditional
perspectives so we might better understand such
political-economic phenomenon as national cultural
protection.
10

This study is also a part of a larger effort to
understand better the post-Cold War world. For decades,
many scholars of international affairs assumed that
states are the principal actors, and that power is the

10
For an extended review of this effort, see Paul Egon
Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The
Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy Making,"
International Organization 41 (Winter, 1987), 61-92.

13

most important variable. They also assumed that states
act in ways that are rational, and therefore, ultimately
explainable and even predictable.
11
For most of the Cold
War era, these beliefs served scholars well: the two
major actors in the world, the United States and the
Soviet Union, behaved in ways that fit nicely with this
thinking.
However, the end of the Cold War itself posed
problems for most international relations theorists
trying to employ their highly developed and carefully
refined models: few predicted it.
12
On top of this,
several key international events since the fall of the
Berlin Wall go beyond the limits of the paradigm. Non-
state actors play enormous roles the world over, while
politics, economics, and even culture, seem equally, if
not more important, than "power."
13
New thinking about
international affairs is needed.

11
Writings on this subject, and works coming from this
perspective are many, one of the best known and often-
cited is the collection of essays in NeoRealism and its
Critics, edited by Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986).
12
See John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory
and the End of the Cold War," International Security 17,
no. 3 (1992-1993), 5-58; and, Melvyn Leffler, "New
Approaches and Prospective Reconfigurations," Diplomatic
History 19, no. 2 (1995), 173-196.
13
See Rob Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations
14

1.4 Other Understandings, Other Explanations
Theorists working at an international level of
analysis have argued that economic downturns or
protracted depressions lead to protectionist pressures.
14

Viewed from this perspective, such forces, when combined
with rapid globalization of what previously were seen as
purely domestic concerns like identity, help drive
national cultural protection. However, most instances of
cultural protection have occurred during periods of
relative prosperity for the countries demanding the
protection. Nonetheless, outside pressure, and domestic
responses to it, might offer at least part of the
explanation.

Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993); and, Jim George, "Of
Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and New/Old World
Orders," Millennium 22, no. 2 (Summer 1993), 197-234. For
post 9/11 assessments see, Robert S. Litwak, "The
Imperial Republic Post 9/11" Wilson Quarterly (Summer
2002): 76-82; and, Irina Papkov, "International Relations
in the Post 9/11 World: Reconceptualizing the West's
"Other,"" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton
Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada (Mar 17, 2004),
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p74376_index.html/.
14
See Timothy McKeown, "Firms and Tariff Regime Change,"
World Politics 36 (January, 1984), 215-233; Wendy Takacs,
"Pressures for Protection: An Empirical Study," Economic
Inquiry 19, 687-693.
15

Demand for protection from beleaguered domestic
businesses lobbying governments--is explored from a
market-based perspective offered first by scholars
attempting to explain the phenomenon during the Great
Depression.
15
They suggest that businesses wanting to
stave off international competition will lobby their
government to provide protection. In response, weak
leadership usually acquiesces to such demands so they can
retain power. The benefits from free trade are usually so
diffuse that other firms which might gain from competing
in a more international environment, as well as the
public, will not object.
16

The pursuit of national cultural protection,
however, cannot be reduced to material interests or
business lobbyists alone. Thus, another strain of
political economic theory, the "cognitive" approach, adds
a dimension missing from a market-based perspective. It
posits that the interests and ideologies of government
officials, and those of the populations they serve, play

15
The seminal work in this genre is E.E.
Schnattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).
16
John S. Odell, "Understanding International Trade
Policies: An Emerging Synthesis," World Politics 43, no.
1 (October, 1990): 139-167.
16

integral roles in shaping policy.
17
But this approach is
limited: it was typically used to demonstrate how
economic interests or ideologies appear to drive policy.
But if broadened to allow for cultural interests and
ideologies, the cognitive approach provides a promising
path for future researchers. Taken collectively, this
helps explain why national cultural protection appears at
the same time as globalization. But, nations embracing
cultural protection apparently do so for a number of
"irrational" reasons that cannot be explained from the
perspective of classical economics and political economy.
One might think that the greatest understanding of
national cultural protection could be found in academic
disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, which
are centered on the study of culture. However, their
concept of culture often gives short shrift to economics
and politics. From their perspective, cultural protection
in the face of economic globalization is a legitimate

17
See Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign
Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy
Making," International Organization 41 (Winter 1987), 61-
92; Chapter 2, "Ideology, Interests, and Institutions,"
and Chapter 5, "Ideology: Example and Ideas," in Jagdish
Bhagwati, Protection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988); for an
example of this approach applied to real world cases see
Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream:
American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1982).
17

posture for nations seeking to protect the physical
integrity of the state and defend the broader interests
of their citizenry.
18
The influx of new and alien notions
from foreign shores could leave large numbers of people
feeling under siege, threatened, or vulnerable.
19

Governments might offer the only real protection from
such perceived dangers.

18
See Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times
Books, 1995); Tyler Cowen, Creative Destruction: How
Globalization is Changing the World’s Cultures
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Brian K.
Taylor, "Culture: Whence, Whither and Why?" in The Future
of Cultural Minorities, edited by Antony E. Alcock, Brian
K. Taylor, and John M. Welton (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1979); W. Bloom, Personal Identity, National
Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also, Manuel
Castells, The Power of Identity. Volume 2, The
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford and
Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). Castells's
work assesses the conflict between identity and
globalization, with a focus on how identity provides
meaning to marginalized, grassroots groups across the
world.
19
See Sergio Arzeni, "The End of Globalism?" in The
International System after the Collapse of the E-W Order,
edited by Armand Cleese, Richard Cooper, and Yoshikazu
Sakamoto (Dordrecht: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993);
Anthony Smith, National Identity (Las Vegas: University
of Nevada Press, 1991); and, Brian Porter, "Nationalist
Ideals and Ethnic Realities," in Community, Diversity,
and a New World Order: Essays in Honor of Inis L. Claude,
Jr., edited by Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1994).
18

Benedict Anderson, in his work on national identity,
argued that nations are "imagined communities": cultural
artifacts akin to religion and capable of arousing great
passion in their members.
20
Whether the characteristics of
the communities are fixed, ever-changing, or subject to
manipulation by the state is up for debate.
21
But,
scholars acknowledge that true security requires nation
states to defend their borders, protect their economic
fortunes, and attempt to shape and direct their "core
values" (i.e., its organizing ideology).
22
"A thriving

20
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso
Editions of New Left Books, 1983).

21
See, for example, J. Ann Ticker, "Identity in
International Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives,"
in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory,
edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). See also the report
authored by Paul Collier, "Globalization, Growth and
Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy," in World
Bank Policy Research Report (Washington D.C.: December,
2001), for an overview of the interaction between
national economic policies and their impact on the nation
state.
22
See Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power:
National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 13;
Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: the Non-
Military Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Press, 1993); and, for a more skeptical perspective see
Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National
Security Problem in International Relations (Sussex:
Wheatsheaf, 1983).
19

civil society," according to Francis Fukuyama, "depends
on a people's habits, customs, and ethics--attributes
that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious
political action and must otherwise be nourished though
an increased awareness and respect for culture."
23

In recent years, it has been difficult for scholars
of international relations to understand the consequences
of "official" culture or national identity in domestic
and international conflict.
24
Much of their efforts were

23
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the
Creation of Prosperity (New York: Simon Schuster, 1995),
5. See also, Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power:
Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD
1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Mann's historical-sociological approach has promise for
the central problematic of this dissertation. He argues
that power originates from control over ideological (or
cultural), economic, military, and political resources.
He also hypothesizes that levels of power change over
time, or "morph," between governmental authority and the
populace. Manifestations of national cultural protection
could be form the catalyst for such shifts. For a
critical take on each type of power according to Mann,
see the collection of essays edited by John A. Hall and
Ralph Schroeder, An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory
of Michael Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).

24
For interesting work in this tradition see Alexander
Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International
Politics," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR
Theory, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); or, in the
same volume, Chkrabtti Sujata Pasic, "Culturing
International Relations." See also Culture, Globalization
and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the
20

inspired by, or were in reaction to, Samuel Huntington's
argument that in the post-Cold War world "the great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of
conflict will be cultural." This conflict, which
Huntington calls a "clash of civilizations" can be found
in national cultural protection.
25

Huntington's thesis is provocative, but it fails to
provide the means to understand or explain national
cultural protection: it is too broad and underplays
important, economic and political features that appear
inherent in this form of protection. Similarly, most
other broad-based approaches that use culture as the sole
independent variable driving outcomes have the
shortcoming of "too many rewarding definitions" and other
elements to consider, and as a result lack explanatory
power for the majority of "real world" cases.
26

Representation of Identity (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997); and, Arjun Appadjurai, Modernity
at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
25
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization? The
Next Pattern of Conflict," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3
(1993): 22-49.
26
Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in
International Relations Theory," in The Return of Culture
and Identity in IR Theory, edited by Yosef Lapid and
Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1996).
21

For example, these approaches do not explain why,
after years of vigorously defending a national culture,
some governments shift course and allow free trade in
culturally sensitive products. For example, 30 years
after the founding of Taiwan, its government severely
limited the showing of most American movies. But by the
late 1970s, exhibition was permitted with few
restrictions. Britain had similar limits in the form of
screen quotas, but today seldom enforces them despite
their acceptance in the GATT.
27
Even Singapore, long the
arbiter of ideas and values for its citizenry, in the
late 1980s and early 1990s began to relax the standards
it used to exclude foreign cultural products.

1.5 Approach to the Problem
The empirical foundation of this dissertation
consists of two case studies. The case studies are
"heuristic"--meaning that they are informed by, but not
limited by, theoretical understanding. The technique
behind this approach is simple: "One studies a case in

27
Screen quotas are included in the GATT as the only
acceptable barriers to trade in a service.

22

order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct."
28

This construct is extended to another case so that it
might be amended or abandoned. In principle, the
heuristic case study "tie[s] directly into theory
building" by concerning itself less with "overall
concrete configurations than with potentially
generalizable relations between aspects of them."
29

The reason for using this method is that the bulk of
the problematic is well-served by conventional
methodologies, while the remainder calls for a different
approach, an approach more inquisitive than accepting,
and flexible enough for discoveries made along the way.
The approach does not limit the researcher's perspective
to a few variables suggested by prior researchers or
theorists; those variables might be present, but not
actually causal. Also, the approach allows the researcher
to focus on more variables, adding to our understanding
of the phenomenon and generating new hypotheses. In some
respects, this approach is atheoretical; it does not work

28
Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political
Science." In The Handbook of Political Science:
Strategies of Inquiry, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and
Nelson W. Polsby (Reading: Addison Wesley Publishing
Company, 1975), 104.
29
Ibid.

23

within the confines of a theoretical tradition based on
academic disciplines of international political economy
or in the more culturally oriented traditions of
anthropology.
The challenge of this study is measuring the role of
culture, as opposed to political or economic factors, in
causing protection. This is where the strength of a
qualitative, heuristic, case-based approach (which is, at
a minimum, informed by theory) reveals itself: it can
account for culture as a causal variable in a manner that
more conventional, hypothesis testing, "normal science"
case studies cannot.
The cases themselves are clinical and follow long-
established qualitative standards of inquiry using the
method of structured, focused comparison.
30
In addition,
the cases include a quantitative and qualitative analysis
of the economic and political standing of culturally
protected industries relative to the national economies
under study.
31

30
Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory
Development," Presented to the Second Annual Symposium on
Information Processing in Organizations at Carnegie-
Mellon University (15-16 October 1982).
31
For an example of this approach see, Helen V. Milner,
Resisting Protection: Global Industries and the Politics
of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988).
24

1.6 The Cases
The first case examines a trade dispute between
France and the United States, culminating in a battle
between the European Union and several governments
outside Europe. This dispute grew from attempts to limit
the amount of "foreign" television programming that might
be shown in European markets. The second case details the
efforts of the Japanese government to limit the import of
foreign-grown rice to the island nation. In both cases,
trade officials claimed that their protectionist policies
would limit the impact of foreign ways and ideas on their
populace while also promoting native expressions of
culture. They claimed that their demands for protection
were not based on political or economic considerations.
Both cases occurred during the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations, helping to ensure that the nations
did not act for domestic reasons. Both also occurred at a
time when the formal expression of globalization, in the
form of the negotiations over the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), appeared to reach its apex.
International cooperation and interdependence were at
their peak and the rationale of being part of the system–
-instead of removed from it–-was clear.
Additionally, both France and Japan have histories
of promoting their cultures, a condition that addresses
25

the "least-likely" case selection approach. (In this
approach, cases are chosen because they are "least-
likely" to confirm one's [original] hypothesis.) Having
these well-known traditions also limits the possibility
that these instances of cultural protection are "one shot
affairs," with little chance of arising again in the same
countries or elsewhere. Also, France and Japan are
industrialized "first world" nations, making it unlikely
that their protectionism was not designed to develop
viable local industries. In a number of developing
countries, moves to protect the rights of indigenous
peoples--who can constitute the majority population--are
well recognized by academic studies. These efforts are
considered a reaction by "minority" peoples, and their
advocates, against the dominance enjoyed by "majority"
peoples. In a sense, the citizens of both France and
Japan enjoy being part of the first world's domineering
majority. Thus, by choosing these two countries, this
dissertation avoids becoming a study of the rights of
indigenous peoples.
The cases were also selected because of the obvious,
significant differences between France and Japan. France
is a European nation with European cultural traditions.
In contrast, Japan is an Asian country with Asian
26

cultural norms.
32
This helps remove geography and even
specific "types" of culture as causal variables for
protection. While both governments can be described as
democracies, their political power structures are
different. France is led by a president with significant
power over a variety of ministries and bureaucracies
which, in turn, are noted for their at-times imperial
attitude toward business and the citizenry. Japan also
has a president, but with comparatively little power. Its
ministries and bureaucracies, in marked contrast to
France, are known for their ties to the business world
and, to a lesser extent, with the citizenry. This
difference helps remove governmental type as a causal
variable.
The relative strength of France and Japan's
economies is also considered. At the time of the GATT
talks, France was muddled in a protracted recession and
suffering from a well-documented case of national
malaise. Could such an economic predicament, combined
with widespread unease, lead to cultural protection? Not

32
It must be acknowledged that both of these
characterizations of the cultures of the nations under
study are overly broad and careful study reveals numerous
exceptions to them; however, they are put forth only to
make a larger point about the case selection for the
dissertation.
27

when Japan's case is considered. At the time of the
dispute, Japan was enjoying the fruits of years of
stunning economic growth and was displaying a national
confidence that many foreign observers considered
arrogant. Finally, consider the industries under study.
Does the desire for national cultural protection come
only from established industries? What about new
businesses? Or those that create traditional goods? Or
those offering services? By studying two different
industries, one service-oriented with new and ever-
changing product offerings laden with cultural overtones
(the French television programming case) and the other, a
long-established, more conventionally traded product with
little obvious cultural content (the Japanese rice case)
this study avoids these questions in favor of addressing
the larger concerns.

1.7 Significance of the Study
The study seeks to bring culture back into
economically and politically oriented debates on the
impact of globalization. Culture matters in trade
relations. This study suggests that political economists'
theories to understand the development of trade and
economic foreign policy can be applied to supposedly non-
28

economic areas of world politics. At the same time, the
study points out that these theories must be modified and
put into careful context to avoid simplistic explanations
for the cultural passions that emerge in international
politics. Building on this, the study offers hypotheses
to explain national cultural protection specifically and,
more generally, cultural conflict in an era of
globalization. The policy implications are clear that,
"The cultural and social dimensions in international
economics have been underrated for a long time. They are
taking their revenge in the form of economic nationalism
which is undermining multilateral globalism."
33

Ultimately, openness to trade and economic globalization
is a political choice. Policymakers determine the degree
of openness they believe will benefit their nation. Thus,

33
Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Globalization’s Discontents,"
American Prospect (January, 2002). See Raymond Vernon’s
Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S.
Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971), for a
frequently cited work in this tradition. For an opposing
argument, see Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson,
Globalization in Question (London: Polity Books, 1996).
See also William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The
Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1998); and, Sergio Arzeni, "The End of
Globalism?" In The International System after the
Collapse of the E-W Order, edited by Armand Clesse,
Richard Cooper, and Yoshikazu Sakamato (Dordrecht:
Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).
29

a better understanding of the relationship between
culture and economic nationalism might help policymakers
stave off similar, possibly more serious, conflicts in
the future.
For the United States, the implications of wide-
scale protection--especially in products or services with
cultural content--are significant. As Peter Drucker
observed, "In the United States, information flows--and
the goods needed to carry them--have become the largest
single source of foreign currency income."
34
Indeed,
entertainment products are America's second-largest
export revenue earner, trailing only the defense
industry. The stakes in goods and services with perceived
cultural components are high, and because trade disputes
can become trade wars, or even more serious forms of
conflict, American policymakers must understand the
reality behind such disputes.

1.8 Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of three parts. Part II
explores the variety of theory that informs the study.

34
Peter F. Drucker, "Trade Lessons from the World
Economy," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994).
30

Chapter 2 looks at globalization, the debate that
surrounds it, and explores how national cultural
protection fits into a larger problematic. Chapter 3
explores the literature dealing with trade and
protection, and examines how scholarship focused on
culture might add to it. Part III presents the case
studies, and draws some conclusions. The final chapter
compares the findings from the two cases and draws some
tentative conclusions, placing them within the larger
tradition of international political economy. Avenues for
future research are proposed by offering some hypotheses
on the puzzle of national cultural protection.

31

Chapter 2

Globalization

Globalization has economic roots and political
consequences, but it has brought into focus the
power of culture in this global environment.

David Rothkopf
"In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?"

2.1 Introduction
This chapter places the dissertation's central
puzzle of national cultural protection within the context
of globalization. The first section looks at how the
globalization debate breaks down on the lines of "for and
against," and examines a few authors’ key contributions.
Next, it explores the definitions and context used by
scholars, politicians, and pundits when addressing the
subject. The last section examines some of the myths and
realities surrounding globalization, and attempts to
define its true meaning by exploring the specific area of
national cultural protection.

32

2.2 The Globalization Debate
The globalization debate involves diverse
individuals and groups, all coming at the problem from
varied and often unexpected perspectives. Dramatic
changes in everyday life, many of which seem to have
their impetus in far-away events, are sure to provoke
comment, particularly if they are popularly regarded as
negative. Indeed, at its most basic level, the
globalization debate is split into two camps: those who
favor it, and those against it.
Many see globalization as a force of evil in the
world, blaming it for a host of evils: rising
unemployment in industrialized nations, cultural anarchy
in once homogenous societies, the deterioration of the
earth's environment, and even increasing levels of
teenage sexual promiscuity.
1
Some even deny that

1
Put simply, the literature on globalization is vast. A
helpful starting point is the bibliographic essay on the
subject by Peter J. Dougherty called, "The Wealth of
Notions: A Publisher Considers the Literature of
Globalization," Chronicle of Higher Education (July 16,
2004). A popular text that provides a good overview of
the subject is Thomas L. Friedman’s updated The Lexus and
the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999 and 2007); also,
Friedman's, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the
Twenty First Century (New York: Farr, Strauss, and
Girouz, 2006) does a good job of putting the problem in
historical context. More scholarly works by economists
include Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its
Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); Jagdish

33

globalization is a new or real phenomenon, claiming that
increasing international contact almost inevitably leads
to misunderstanding and conflict.
2

Bagwhati’s In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004); Robert Shiller, The New
Financial Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003); and, Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). Some other well-
known examples which come at the issue from largely
critical perspectives are: Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus
McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995); Jeremy Brecher and
Tim Costello, Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic
Reconstruction from the Bottom Up (Boston: South End
Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of
Modernity (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994); R. Falk, On
Humane Governance: Towards a New Global Politics--The
WOMP Report of the Global Civilization Project (Oxford:
Polity Press, 1995); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control:
Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21
st
Century (New York:
Charles Scribner, 1993); and, Samuel P. Huntington, The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon Schuster, 1996).
2
For a systematic look at the categorization of the many
debates on globalization, see Mauro F. Guillen, "Is
Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A
Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science
Literturae." Annual Review of Sociology, 2001. 27: 235-
260. A similar review can be found in Bernhard G. Gunter
and Rolph van der Hoeven’s "The Social Dimensions of
Globalization: A Review of the Literature," Working Paper
No. 24 (Geneva: World Commission on the Social Dimension
of Globalization, June 2004). See also, Alfred
Kleinknecht and Jan ter Wengel, "The Myth of Economic
Globalisation," Cambridge Journal of Economics 22 (1998):
637-647; or, the World Bank's senior economist, L.
Pritchett, "Forget Convergence: Divergence Past, Present
and Future," Finance Development (June 1995): 40-43.
Dani Rodrik's essay, "How to Save Globalization from its
Cheerleaders" (KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-038),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019015, continues the debate,
34

In contrast, champions of globalization believe that
it is leading to marked increases in world-wide economic
growth and prosperity, the creation of a global "civil
society" which will render war unthinkable, and even as a
step toward the "end of history," as nation-states become
more liberal, more democratic, and more capitalistic.
3

Interestingly, neither the critics nor the champions
fall into neat ideological camps. For example, critics--

while adding his call for a better understanding of the
policy implications of liberalized global trade.
3
In contrast to those many writers who identify
themselves as critics of globalization there are
relatively few who overtly champion the notion in and of
itself; a few examples include: Jagdish Bagwhati’s In
Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), and his earlier work, Protection
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); see also, Paul Krugman and
Robert Lawrence's, "Trade, Jobs and Wages," Scientific
American 270, no. 4 (April 1994), which explores whether
trade really causes unemployment in industrialized
nations. (As Krugman said in another article ("Is Free
Trade Passé?" Economic Perspectives 1, no. 2 [1996]):
"If there were an Economist's Creed it would certainly
contain the affirmations, 'I believe in the Principle of
Comparative Advantage,' and 'I believe in free trade.'").
See also, Richard N. Haass and Robert E. Litan,
"Globalization and Its Discontents: Navigating the
Dangers of a Tangled World," Foreign Affairs (May/June
1998). The notion of an "end to history" was, of course,
first advanced by Hegel; more recently Francis Fukuyama's
The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free
Press, 1992) extended the argument to the age of
globalization in a manner far more subtle than the
characterization in the text suggests.
35

particularly those concerned with social cohesiveness and
economic justice–-include the traditional left, such as
liberals, Marxists, and advocates of multiculturalism.
4

Among them are journalist William Greider, academic
Immanual Wallerstein, and politician Jesse Jackson.
5

Making remarkably similar arguments, but coming from the
extreme right, are political hopefuls, like perennial
American presidential candidate and strident social
critic Patrick Buchanan, France's xenophobic Jean-Marie
Le Pen, and Russian ultra-nationalist, Vladimir
Zhirinovsky.
6
Even business luminaries such as Britain's

4
See Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market
Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Insecurity (New
York: Anchor Books, 2004) for an interesting argument
that ethnic conflicts are increasing because of
democratization and globalization. While provocative, the
bulk of Chua's evidence is from Southeast Asia and
doesn't appear extendable to other areas.

5
William Greider, One World, Ready or Not--The Manic
Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1997); Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism
(London: Verso, 1983).
6
For a discussion of responses to globalization coming
from the extreme right see, Dani Rodrick, "Sense and
Nonsense in the Globalization Debate," Foreign Policy,
Summer 1997, 32-35.
36

Sir James Goldsmith and Hungarian financier George Soros
line up against globalization.
7

Unlikely alliances also exist on the pro side of the
globalization debate. Economist and columnist Paul
Krugman
8
and Microsoft chief executive officer Bill Gates
stand figuratively alongside the likes of author Marshal
McLuhan, who theorized about the appearance of a "global
village" built around "cosmopolitan" cultural norms.
9

Even Bill Clinton and George Bush (and more recently, Al
Gore and George W. Bush)--bitter opponents on many
significant issues--agree in principle that economic
globalization is good for the world in general and great
for the United States in particular.
10
In former President

7
James Goldsmith, The Trap (London: Macmillan, 1994);
George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," Atlantic Monthly
(February 1997).
8
Over the years, Krugman has modified his views, as have
other once prominent boosters of globalization such as
Larry Summers, and Alan Blinder. See, Paul Krugman,
"Trade and Inequality, Revisted," (June 15, 2007),
available at: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/261;
Lawrence Summers, Financial Times, October 29, 2006; and,
Alan Blinder, "Offshoring: The Next Industrial
Revolution?" Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2006).

9
Paul Krugman, "Is Free Trade Passé?" Economic
Perspectives 1, no. 2 (1996); Bill Gates, The Road Ahead
(New York: Viking, 1995); Marshal McLuhan, The Gutenberg
Galaxy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).
10
Vice President Al Gore is seen by many who oppose the
unfettered markets that globalization seems to imply as
37

President Clinton's words, a global market "means jobs
and rising living standards for the American people--low
deficits, low inflation, low interest rates, low trade
barriers and high investments."
11

2.3 'Globalization': Meanings and Usage
A computerized search of the University of Southern
California’s library catalogue reveals that the word
"globalization" appeared in the title of more than 500
journal articles and books published between 1992 and
1998, when the word became part of our vernacular. Many
of these have remarkably little to do with one another
beyond shared vocabulary.
12
From 1998 to 2007, another
1,400 titles appeared, which again covered a wide array
of subjects.
In spite of what may look like intellectual anarchy,
there are patterns of generally accepted meaning and

an ally largely because of his book, Earth in the Balance
(London: Earthscan Publications, 1992), which contain a
number of passages noting the ill-effects trade has on
the environment.
11
The Boston Globe, 10 July 1994.
12
The search was carried out using the University of
Southern California Library System's "Homer"
computerized, internet-based, search software.
38

common usage that can be found in most discussions of
globalization--patterns that go beyond a simple "for-or-
against" dichotomy. In the first category, the term
globalization emerges as a shorthand reference to a
process of ever-increasing, worldwide interaction between
once distant peoples. This usually relates to economic
matters, but also appears in political and cultural
affairs. The second category views globalization as part
of a larger debate that places the modern era apart from
the past. In the third category, globalization is again
used as a descriptive foundation to predict what the
coming years might hold.
Like the globalization debate itself, these
categories are somewhat amorphous and arbitrary. Authors
use "globalization" to describe a process of economic
convergence, for example. They will then turn to a larger
argument on social upheaval, or make predictions based on
their supposed expert knowledge of the subject.
Additionally, few authors' work fits neatly within the
confines of these headings. Nonetheless, labeling and
briefly exploring these categories provides a first step
toward understanding of what is at stake in the
globalization problematic, and toward an understanding of
national cultural protection.
39

Most who write and speak on globalization use the
term to describe a process, both historical and ongoing,
of ever-increasing intercourse between previously
distinct populations, particularly in economic matters.
13

Webster's New Riverside University Dictionary defines
process as "a series of actions, changes, or functions
that achieve an end or result."
14
In economic
globalization, these actions include policy measures
adopted by the governments to liberalize international
monetary and trade relations. Over the past few decades,
such measures have combined with rapid advances in
technology and communications, as well as the private
sector's efforts to benefit from a freer, more
interdependent world economy. The result: a world in

13
There are a number of publications dealing with the
process of economic globalization, one that makes an
explicitly historical case is a collection of readings
edited by James Foreman-Peck, Historical Foundations of
Globalization (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998). Included
in the book is a particularly valuable essay by Jeffrey
G. Williamson, "Globalization, Convergence, and History":
103-132. See also, Charles P. Kindleberger, "The Rise of
Free Trade in Western Europe," in International Political
Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth (3
rd
),
edited by Jeffry A. Frieden and David Lake (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1995).
14
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary
(Boston: The Riverside Publishing/Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1984), 938.
40

which capital, goods, and services flow easily and
rapidly between nations.
15
This understanding of
globalization--as a historical and ongoing process that
subjects national economies to forces from the
international marketplace--is the starting point for most
discussions of globalization.
Of course, any numbers of issues related to economic
globalization are worthy of study. Notable are those
mainstream scholars and students who argue that recent
profound changes in the world economy render the lessons
of classical and neo-classical economics all but
meaningless.
16
Taking it further are those who believe
that the very idea of free trade in an era of

15
Accounts of the many structural and institutional
changes in economic history, especially those dealing
with the post-World War Two world, are legion;
particularly helpful for understanding economic
globalization is Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital:
A History of the International Monetary System
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
16
See Lester C. Thurow, The Future of Capitalism: How
Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World (New York:
Penguin, 1996), and James Fallows, Looking at the Sun:
The Rise of the New Asian Economic and Political System
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). For an even more
critical view of a global economy see Immanuel
Wallerstein, The Modern World System I (New York:
Academic Press, 1974), and his Unthinking Social Science:
The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms (Cambridge:
Polity Press in Association with Basil Blackwell, 1991).
41

globalization will doom already developed nations. At a
minimum, these writers suggest, the fortunes of today's
powerful nations will shift dramatically, rendering
established, military-based, power relationships all but
meaningless.
17
In response, scholars advocate the reform
of current international institutions, and the creation
of new ones. They see this as a way to manage the
economic and political tumult they expect as the process
of globalization continues.
18

Taking this further, a number of academics and
"policy entrepreneurs"
19
(usually American) have achieved

17
The work most responsible for popularizing this thesis
is Paul Kennedy's, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(New York: Random House, 1987).
18
See Peter F. Cowhey and Jonathan D. Aronson, Managing
the World Economy: The Consequences of Corporate
Alliances (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1993), Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in
Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities
of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), and
Benjamin J. Cohen, "Toward a Mosaic Economy: Economic
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," in International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Wealth and
Power, 3
rd
Edition, edited by Jeffry A. Frieden and David
A. Lake (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 519-531.
19
Economist Paul Krugman uses this term, in a derisive
manner, to refer to non-professional, non-academic
"talking heads" who offer their opinions on a variety of
national and international policy matters irrespective of
the fact that, in Krugman's view, most of them are
neither trained nor qualified to do so. See Paul Krugman,
Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the
42

great notoriety and influence by weighing in on the so-
called "competitiveness" controversy. These pundits
maintain that developed nations, usually referring to the
United States, must abandon economic market forces as the
determining factor in the success or failure of a given
industry. Instead, they suggest that governments should
actively manage domestic investment and promote strategic
international trade to enable their nation to compete
successfully.
20
Economic globalization, they assert, is
the international consideration that drives such national
policy necessities.

Age of Diminished Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton
Company, 1994), 10-15.
20
See Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing
Ourselves for the Twenty-First Century Capitalism (New
York: Vintage, 1992), Robert B. Reich and Ira Magaziner,
Minding America's Business (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1982), Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing
Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1992), and, Claude V. Prestowitz, Jr., "Beyond Laissez
Faire," in International Political Economy: Perspectives
on Global Wealth and Power, 3
rd
Edition, edited by Jeffry
A. Frieden and David A. Lake (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1995), 506-518. For a neat counter argument see
Paul Krugman's Strategic Trade and the New International
Economics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986) and Peddling
Prosperity. Also J. David Richardson, "Strategic Trade
Policy," International Organization 44, no. 1 (Winter
1990), 107-135.
43

Clearly the consequences of economic globalization
go far beyond the market. Several authors argue that
national sovereignty is at stake as policymakers rush to
overturn long-standing, domestic political and social
arrangements that could make their own country less
competitive in a global economy.
21
In turn, business
leaders weaken sovereignty as "industries of all kinds
are losing their national identity as they roam the
planet for capital, markets, labor, and technology."
22

This perspective reached its logical extreme in 1969,
when political economist Charles Kindleberger declared,
"the nation-state is just about through as an economic
unit."
23

21
See J. Dunn, editor, Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-
State? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), Saskia Sassen, Losing
Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), and K. Ohmae, The
End of the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995).
22
This is how the debate is characterized by Ethan B.
Kapstein in his extended challenge to the notion,
Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and
the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 2.
A contrary perspective can be found in David Armstrong,
"Globalization and the Social State," Review of
International Studies 24 (1998), 461-478. For an example
of an affirmative view of the proposition see, Robert
Reich, "Who is US?" Harvard Business Review 44 (January-
February 1990), 53-64.
23
As quoted in Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money
(Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 12.
44

Still other writers take careful note of economic
globalization and suggest that its disruptions and
dislocations are spreading into the international
political arena, with anarchy or worse soon to follow.
24

Those who examine the globalization phenomenon and see
social or cultural problems use similar logic. They
believe that conflicting values, and differing
perceptions of world events, are the paramount security
crisis facing world leaders today.
25

Obviously globalization--whether played out on an
economic, political, or cultural stage--challenges
scholars and policymakers alike: something new and
different seems afoot and understanding it is difficult.
Better academics demand theoretical precision as well as
rigor, and the variety of interpretations of
globalization can be frustrating. Confused officials
managing globalization and its consequences find it hard,

24
See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil
on the Eve of the 21
st
Century (New York: Charles
Scribner, 1993), and Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy:
How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and
Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our
Planet," Atlantic Monthly (February, 1994), 44-76.
25
See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996), also Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld (New
York: Times Books, 1995).
45

if not impossible, to administer and control something
they do not understand. Perhaps, as John Ruggie has
suggested, we need a new "postmodern" vocabulary for
describing the international system.
26

This effort to develop apt descriptions and
vocabulary is the focus of the second category: the
notion of globalization as part of a larger polemic built
around the exploration of modernity.
27
A dedicated group
of philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists,
geographers, literary critics, and international
relations scholars, argue that globalization has changed
basic concepts of time, space, and place.
28
As a result,

26
John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond:
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,"
International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993), 139-
174.
27
There is a substantial body of writing that explicitly
and self-consciously defines itself as "postmodern" and
which sometimes touches upon globalization; however, this
work usually is concerned far more with the exploration
of notions like the 'death of the narrative' and the
'destruction of the false-god of science' than exploring
more mundane topics like trade balances, debt-crises, or
national cultural issues. Thus, for the purposes of this
dissertation the postmodern debate and postmodern
thinking will not be explored in detail.
28
For a good introduction to postmodern thinking that
deals specifically with international relations see the
collection of essays edited by Michael J. Shapiro and
Hayward R. Alker, Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows,
Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996). Also, Rodney Bruce Hall, National

46

the ways governments relate to one another, or even how
people define themselves as individuals, have been
altered.
29
As Geraóid Ó Tuathail puts it, "globalization
problematizes the very geopolitical structure of
international politics as sovereignty becomes
increasingly fictive, territoriality is displaced by
speed, and states diffuse governance upwards, sideways or
abdicate it altogether."
30
Put another way, we now live in
an era that is postmodern--rather than merely modern--and
being redefined by globalization.
31
Viewed from that

Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International
Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
29
See David Campbell, Writing Security: U.S. Foreign
Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1992), James Der Derian,
AntiDiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War (Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1992).
30
Geraóid Ó Tuathail, "Political Geography III: Dealing
with Deterritorialization," Progress in Human Geography
22, no. 1 (1998), 85.
31
Within discussions of postmodernism and globalization
there are those who see globalization as a consequence of
modernity, see Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of
Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990);
and those who see modernity as a consequence of
globalization, see Roland Robertson, Globalization:
Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992).
For an extended treatment of the modernity problematic
which touches upon the erosion of sovereignty, see
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992),
3-7. Also, Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and
the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), although far
47

perspective, the condition of man today is far from
ideal. Postmodernists argue "that modernity is no longer
a force for liberation; instead, it is a source of
subjugation, oppression, and repression."
32

Much of the literature that comes out of this
tradition provides what is a weak foundation for those
interested in exploring further globalization, or even
modernity. This is because postmodernism "rejects
epistemological assumptions, refutes methodological
conventions, resists knowledge claims, obscures all
versions of truth, and dismisses policy
recommendations."
33

The final category of globalization's meaning and
usage is filled by authors who acknowledge common
conceptions of the process of globalization, and agree
that the international world is fundamentally different
than just a few decades ago. They do not, however, agree
with some of the more extreme postmodern claims that "all

from a postmodernist, makes an interesting argument that
the modern era is fundamentally different than that which
proceeded it.
32
Pauline M. Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social
Sciences: Insights, Inroads, Intrusions (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992), 4.
33
Ibid., 3. [P. Rosenau]
48

is new." These authors then combine the two as a
foundation for making predictions about the coming years.
Occupying a central place here are the critics of
globalization's excesses. Extrapolating trends, and often
seeing patterns that others do not, these authors and
commentators declare that economic globalization will
ruin the industrialized world's middle and lower
classes
34
; or that capitalism itself will soon face a
crisis similar to that which doomed communism.
35

Comparable arguments exist for the impending demise of
cultural plurality, the sure ruin of the environment, and
for the decline of the moral stock of the world's
population.
36

34
See William Greider, One World, Ready Or Not, and
Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, Global Village or Global
Pillage.
35
See George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," Atlantic
Monthly (February 1997).
36
On cultural plurality see Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at
Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), or the contentious
work by Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
Schuster, 1996). On the environment see Hayward Alker and
Peter M. Haas, "Rise of Global Ecopolitics," in Global
Accord: Environmental Challenges and International
Responses, edited by N. Chouciri (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1993), and W.H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Garden
City: Anchor Books, 1976). On moral decay see the
discussion of Lee Kuan Yew's views in Joel S. Kahn,
Culture, MultiCulture, PostCulture (London: Sage, 1995),
49

These categories are useful for exploring the many
facets of the globalization debate. And the previously
cited writings reveal the serious attention given the
subject by the debate's participants. As a result, they
provide a good starting point for those pondering what is
"really going on" in the world today. Unfortunately, the
categories also reveal that these same scholars,
journalists, policymakers, politicians, and journalists
are talking past one another, largely because they are
not addressing the same subjects. Thus, this dissertation
first defines globalization, and subsequently explores
what fits, and what does not fit, this definition.
2.4 Toward a Definition
Good scholarship--whether quantitative or
qualitative, hypothesis-testing or hypothesis-generating-
-must be rigorous, based on thoughtful, accurate, and
generally agreed-upon definitions. Unfortunately, the
widely divergent views and positions on globalization,
and the many uses of the term, make arriving at a solid,
workable definition a difficult task. First, too many
rewarding definitions can be adopted, and some have
already gained widespread acceptance. Second, some

Sage, 1995), 124-5.
50

definitions are arbitrary, misleading, and ultimately
contentious. Clearly this is a primary source of the
globalization debate's poor status.
Therefore, in this study I have crafted a broad
definition of globalization: The ever-increasing levels
of economic, political, and cultural intercourse between,
and interdependence among, once distant peoples.
In this sense, globalization can best be understood
by what it is not, and that is value-laden. Rather, it is
a historical and ongoing phenomenon to which individuals
and groups are reacting--both positively and negatively.
It is also not directly part of the postmodernists' on-
going dialogue concerning modernity. Their take on the
subject touches upon my understanding of globalization
but is, in the end, part of a larger (and to my mind
fatuous) philosophical and intellectual movement. And
finally, it is difficult to extrapolate trends from it.
Globalization is too widespread, multi-faceted, and
complex to provide a foundation for the often-
ideologically inspired predictions that many have tried
to make about the world following the Cold War and
entering the new millennium.
In the end, my view of globalization recognizes that
many aspects of human life have changed dramatically
during this time. In today's global economy, capital,
51

goods, and services move rapidly and relatively freely
around most of the world. Consequently events or
decisions in one locale--whether economic, political or
cultural--can dramatically affect other regions.
Therefore, the once-immovable boundaries of time, space,
and place that have separated people throughout human
history are eroding. Globalization, it seems, has changed
much (though common sense should tell us it has not
changed everything).

2.5 Globalization's Realities
Such a broad definition raises an important
question: can every happening in the world today be
attributed to globalization? Do interest rate changes in
Germany drive employment in America's cities? Do movies
made in Hollywood destroy the moral fabric of Indonesia?
Do the regulatory measures of the European Union lead to
the destruction of the Brazilian rainforest? These are
not idle questions. They are asked--but too often
answered dubiously--in response to concerns brought about
by a rapidly changing world.
To understand the realities of globalization and its
consequences it helps to explore the work of a
knowledgeable writer who has supported his assertions
52

with evidence rather than rhetoric. Consider management
consultant and erstwhile economist Byron G. Auguste, who
grouped the phenomena surrounding globalization into four
categories: the untrue; the true but not new; the new
phenomena whose influence is waning; and, the phenomena
which will radically transform the world in the next 25
years.
37

In the "untrue" category, Auguste includes the
notion that globalization is leading to income
convergence in less-developed nations, to wage inequality
in the United States, and to the end of autonomy for
national governments.
38
His "true but not new" category
includes the belief that globalization has increased the
international migration of people, and fostered the
international exchange of ideas, as well as in

37
Byron G. Auguste, "What's So New About Globalization?"
New Perspectives Quarterly (Winter 1998), 16-20.
38
Of all of Auguste's assertions, the one concerning the
end of national sovereignty as "untrue" is probably the
most debatable. For an argument that supports Auguste's
position see Ethan B. Kapstein, Ethan B, Governing the
Global Economy: International Finance and the State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). For a
challenge see Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large:
Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis
(University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 18-23.

53

international trade and direct investment. In contrast,
Auguste labels the spread of American popular culture and
the increase in the scale and importance of foreign
exchange markets as "true, new, and stable."
As his final category, Auguste argues that over the
next 25 years the most significant and "radical change
... will be the globalization of much of the service
sector and of a few lagging manufacturing industries such
as food processing." This change, he challenges, "will
raise the globally exposed portion of the world economy
from 15 percent to 60 percent."
39
And, presumably increase
the level of political and cultural globalization to
proportionate levels.
Auguste's discussion is basically sound. Some might
quibble over the details, but the weight of the evidence
is on his side.
40
Of course, it would be a mistake to

39
Ibid., 19.
40
See Alfred Kleinknecht and Jan ter Wengel, "The Myth of
Economic Globalisation," Cambridge Journal of Economics
22 (1998): 637-647, Paolo Giussani, "Empirical Evidence
for Trends Toward Globalization: The Discovery of Hot
Air," International Journal of Political Economy 26, no.
3 (Fall 1996): 15-38; Robert Went, "Globalization: Myths,
Reality, and Ideology," International Journal of
Political Economy 26, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 39-59; and, Dani
Rodrik, "Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate,"
Foreign Policy (Summer 1997): 19-36.
54

discuss globalization exclusively or even primarily in
economic terms--a mistake Auguste largely avoids.
41
Other
areas of human life are greatly affected by economic
globalization, just as economics are shaped by political
and cultural factors.
42
Indeed, this is where the
globalization debate intersects with this dissertation's
central problematic of national cultural protection.
The benefits of freer trade and capital movement are
well known and widely accepted. But at what cost? What
happens when the forces of economic globalization collide
with the established and accepted political and cultural

41
See, for example, the textbook by Tom Riddel, Jean
Shackelford, and Steve Stamos, Economics: A Tool For
Critically Understanding Society, Fifth Edition (Reading:
Addison-Wesley, 1998), which declares that "Globalization
affects trade, finance, production, communications and
technological change," and goes on to categorize the
phenomenon's winners and losers in exclusively economic
terms: 18, 23-25.
42
Noël O'Sullivan is another scholar who has explored the
myths and realities that surround globalization,
particularly as they relate to non-economic issue areas.
O'Sullivan argues that there are four features of
international life novel to the contemporary era. He sees
globalization as signaling the end of Western
international political hegemony, portending global
cultural change, leading to the erosion of national
sovereignty (in opposition to Auguste), and toward ever-
greater pollution of the environment. See Noël
O'Sullivan, "Concept and Reality in Globalization
Theory," in Globalization, Privatization and Free Market
Economy, ed. C.P. Rao (Westport: Quorum Books, 1998).
55

life of a given nation? Dani Rodrik suggests that these
issues should be central to policymakers because: "Trade
exerts pressure toward another kind of arbitrage ...
arbitrage in national norms and social institutions. This
form of arbitrage results, indirectly, as the costs of
maintaining divergent social arrangements go up. As a
consequence, open trade can conflict with long-standing
social contracts that protect certain activities from the
relentlessness of the free market." This, Rodrik argues,
"is a key tension generated by globalization."
43
In day-
to-day life this tension becomes contentious "when it
unleashes forces that undermine [or even give the
appearance of undermining] the social norms implicit in
domestic practices."
44

Is this at the root of the national cultural
protection efforts we have seen over the past decade, and
even today? One answer can be found in the literature
dealing with economics and trade, an exploration that

43
Dani Rodrik, "Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization
Debate," Foreign Policy (Summer 1997), 27.
44
Ibid., 28. Also consider George Tsebelis's "Nested
Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), for a classic,
rational-choice based, game-theoretic approach to the
interplay between elites and the masses in an "iterated
game" such as long-running trade negotiations and
election cycles.
56

comprises the first half of the next chapter. Another
approach is to take a cultural or identity-based
perspective, the focus of the latter portion of the next
chapter.
57

Chapter 3

Trade, Protection, and Culture

As Adam Smith well understood, economic life is
deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot be
understood apart from the customs, morals, and
habits of the society in which it occurs. In
short, it cannot be divorced from culture.

Francis Fukuyama
Trust

3.1 Introduction
This chapter first explores what the current
scholarship coming from the discipline of economics and
the sub-discipline of political economy can contribute
to our understanding of national cultural protection.
Second, it acknowledges the limitations of this
literature to account convincingly for culture and
cultural concerns as significant causal variables.
Third, it suggests ways to overcome these limitations to
achieve a more complete understanding of national
cultural protection.
With this in mind, the chapter opens with a look at
what the scholars in economics and international
political economy say about international trade, trade
policymaking, and protection in general, and more
specifically, about national cultural protection. The
58

chapter explores how the academic discipline of
economics regards mankind, and examines the limitations
and strengths of the assumptions forming the
intellectual foundation for an "economic way of
thinking."
Next to be summarized are economists' arguments for
and against free trade. The nascent theories that partly
explain the more traditional forms of protection are
then covered, with specific attention focused on those
that might be particularly helpful in understanding
national cultural protection in the chapter's
penultimate sections. The chapter concludes by
suggesting ways the political economic perspective can
be broadened to account for national cultural
protection.

3.2 An Economic View of Man
Economics is arguably the most powerful of the
social sciences.
1
Since Adam Smith championed unilateral

1
Unless otherwise qualified in the text or in the
footnotes, the term "economics" is used in this chapter
specifically, as well as throughout the dissertation, as
a convenient way of referring to Western, liberal,
classical economics as it is usually taught in American
universities.
59

free trade--established the study of economic matters as
a stand-alone discipline, it has provided remarkable
insights into man's relationship with the material world.
Theories on consumption, monetary issues, the concepts of
rent and diminishing returns, profit, value, and the idea
of the market as an entity in its own right, are among
the most elegant and persuasive in all of social theory.
2

However, the "economic way of thinking" cannot explain
everything, because it is limited when extended to non-
economic or, more accurately, non-material areas of human
behavior. Such areas are often difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify.
To give due credit, several complex arguments
championed by economists have moved beyond the rarified
world of academia, where theory and argument hold sway,
and into the popular imagination. For example, most
educated people today are familiar with the basic ideas
behind such commonly used phrases as "supply and demand,"
"unemployment and inflation," and even "deficit
spending." Unfortunately, this recognition has caused a
few of the field's leading practitioners to a remarkable

2
These are the categories of economic theory employed by
Thomas Sowell in Classical Economics Reconsidered
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
60

degree of intellectual hubris relative to many other
academic disciplines.
3
They say that nearly everything
can be explained by a few basic assumptions borrowed from
economic theory and then re-examining problems that long
have challenged scholars in other fields. For example,
some of the world's most prominent economists have
received acclaim in recent years by applying economic
methods to such non-economic phenomena as politics,
bureaucracy, racism, the family, fertility, and even the
behavior of animals.
4

3
Similar arguments are common, one that informs this
dissertation directly is Francis Fukuyama's, Trust: The
Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York:
Simon Schuster, 1995), 13-32.
4
See Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner's
bestselling work, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist
Explores the Hidden Side of Everything (New York: William
Morrow, 2006). For an example of "household economics"
see also Gary Becker, A Treatise on the Family
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1981), and The Economic
Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1976). For his efforts, published in other
studies, Becker was awarded the Nobel Prize for
Economics. See also, Theodore W. Schultz, ed., Economics
of the Family (Chicago: University of Chicago Press for
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1974); Harvey
Leibenstein, "An Interpretation of the Economic Theory of
Fertility: Promising Path or Blind Alley?" Journal of
Economic Literature 12, no. 2 (June, 1974). J.H. Kagel et
al., "Demand Curves for Animal Consumers," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 96, no. 1 (February, 1981), 1-15.
61

A popular and widely used introductory-level
economics textbook proclaims, "The applicability of the
economists' thought tools is practically unlimited."
5
Yet
another title declares that the field of economics is not
merely the study of man's relationship with the material
world, but rather is "a tool for critically understanding
society."
6
Given the success and influence enjoyed by
economists, and the universality of their approach,
scholars in other fields have embraced their assumptions
and methods. Advocates of "so-called rational-choice
theory, which attempts to explain politics using an
essentially economic methodology," today often dominate
the political science departments of some of the world's
leading universities.
7

5
Paul Heyne, The Economic Way of Thinking (Upper Saddle
River: Prentice-Hall, 1997), xii. [Emphasis added]. To be
fair to Prof. Heyne, he does admit that economists have
"imperialist ambitions" and includes in his textbook, by
way of conclusion, a chapter on the "Limitations of
Economics": 5, 561-564.
6
Tom Riddell, Jean Shackelford, and Steve Stamos,
Economics: A Tool for Critically Understanding Society
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1998).
7
Fukuyama Trust, 17. For a systematic critique of
rational-choice see also Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro,
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of
Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994). Rational choice sees politics as
individuals maximizing their respective situations under
a given set of restraints. However, these restraints
62

Why does this pose a problem? After all, studies of
non-economic phenomena by economists, and even by
political scientists adopting economic assumptions and
methods, have provided new insights into difficult
issues. These insights, however, come at a price. Other
ways of viewing, approaching, and ultimately
understanding a given issue are, by definition, all-but-
disallowed by the "economic way of thinking."
8

Why? Because the economic view of the world assumes
that man is a rational, utility-maximizing creature:
people make decisions in response to the expected
benefits and costs to themselves, with the goal of
maximizing pleasure or, conversely, avoiding pain.
9
One

usually reflect those chosen by economists to model
behavior relating directly to the material world; thus
giving rise to the challenge that rational choice
explanations would differ significantly if the restraints
were instead defined in terms of power, pride, or as the
case may be, culture.
8
Borrowing from the popular view of the subject,
"economics" is regarded as a synonym for liberal
economics. It is acknowledged, of course, that there are
other, markedly different approaches to the subject,
which are often highly critical of liberal economics and
its assumptions.
9
Each of these terms is subject to qualification by
careful economists and those who embrace the economic
approach; however, in general terms the notion of man as
rational and utility maximizing is accepted by most
liberal economists.
63

of the textbooks cited above declares, "All social
phenomena emerge from the choices individuals make in
response to expected benefits and costs to themselves."
10

In the descriptions of man as rational and utility
maximizing, "rationality" refers to the cost/benefit
calculus individuals are assumed to make for most choices
in life. "Utility," on the other hand, refers to
maximizing pleasure that, in economic terms, usually
means the satiation of material wants. Unless "utility"
is re-defined to the point of theoretical absurdity, this
leaves little room for non-economic motivations in human
affairs--even if those affairs are economic in nature. In
social scientist Francis Fukuyama's words on the subject:

At its most extreme, 'utility' becomes a purely
formal concept used to describe whatever ends or
preferences people pursue. But this type of formal
definition of utility reduces the fundamental
premise of economics to an assertion that people
maximize whatever it is they choose to maximize, a
tautology that robs the model of any interest or
explanatory power. By contrast, to assert that
people prefer their selfish material interests over
other kinds of interests is to make a strong
statement about human nature.
11

10
Heyne, Economic Way of Thinking, 5. [Emphasis added]
11
Fukuyama, Trust, 19.
64

With this in mind, consider: how does a view of man
as a purely rational, utility-maximizing individual
accommodate the human attributes of pride and revenge,
the desire for recognition and power, and, most pertinent
to this dissertation, of culture and its preservation?
So, how does the "economic way of thinking" account
for any intervening effects of these variables in
economic matters? It usually doesn't, and when it does it
does so poorly.
12
Even those possessing just a passing
familiarity with the "laws" of economics can understand
the strong links between economic and cultural matters,
if only on an intuitive level. Unfortunately, this level
of understanding too often escapes the modern disciplines
of economics and the field of international political
economy.

12
To a degree this argument about the narrowness of
economists' assumptions is exaggerated. Classical
economists would surely bristle at such an abstract view
of man; for a discussion of this see, Thomas Sowell,
Classical Economics Reconsidered (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974), 3-32. Additionally, today's more
cautious economists hesitate to attribute all human
behavior to rational utility maximization. Nobel laureate
Gary Becker, for example, challenges that he has "tried
to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about
self-interest. Behavior," he argues, "is driven by a much
richer set of values and preferences," as quoted in
Fukuyama, Trust, n.15, 365. Nonetheless, the rational
utility maximizing model is integral to a classically
liberal, "economic way of thinking."
65

This is somewhat of an argumentative straw man.
Careful scholars who employ economic methods or who build
upon those insights are recognize that their assumptions
and simplifications depart significantly from reality,
Such abstractions are employed, they argue, "in order to
facilitate scientific research; no science is possible
without them. What is more important, as defenders
correctly point out, is that they should be judged by
their results and ability to predict rather than by their
alleged reality."
13
Indeed, we must give the result of
such scholarship its due, for it is significant. At the
same time, we must appreciate the limitations of the
"economic way of thinking." Doing so better illuminates
those parts of human life that are often ignored or
subordinated by the discipline of economics.
These observations are central to achieving a better
understanding of national cultural protection.
Comparative advantage and the case for free trade, as
well as explanations for the more traditional--and
usually material--rationales behind protection, are
explained well, but not completely, by economic and
political economic theory. When trying to understand

13
Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations, 44.
66

national cultural protection, for example, an honest
observer must acknowledge the role of culture in driving
at least part--possibly that awkward 20 percent if not
more--of this "irrational" phenomenon in today's
international political economy.

3.3 Comparative Advantage and the Argument for Free Trade
A key part of the epistemological foundation of this
dissertation is an acceptance of classical and
neoclassical, liberal economic arguments about the
comparative advantage and the resultant benefits of free
trade. Most economists today accept the logic of
comparative advantage, and argue that freer trade is
better than restricted trade in terms of its material
benefits to society.
14
These beliefs are pervasive leading
one of today's best-known economic authorities to
declare: "If there were an Economist's Creed it would
certainly contain the affirmations, 'I believe in the

14
Note the qualification attached to the statement in the
text: "... in terms of its material benefits to society
as a whole." Usually, it is the distribution of those
material benefits, and the disruption to long-standing
social convention, that contemporary opponents to the
free trade ideal cite to make their case.
67

Principle of Comparative Advantage,' and 'I believe in
Free Trade.'"
15
Like most profound observations, these
principles are easy to explain and understand, but their
implications are extraordinarily powerful.
16

The principle of comparative advantage, "the most
powerful argument in favor of free trade," is associated
primarily with the classical economist, David Ricardo.
17

He believed that individuals, as well as nations, should
do what they do best and trade for the rest. For example,
a highly paid attorney should not waste his energies
mowing his own yard, even if he is better and faster than
anyone he might hire. Instead, he should concentrate on

15
Paul Krugman, "Is Free Trade Passé?" Economic
Perspectives 1, no. 2 (1996).
16
Virtually every economics textbook has a chapter
devoted to explaining the principle of comparative
advantage and another on free trade. For easy to follow
introductions to the subjects, largely written in jargon-
free English, see Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld,
International Economics: Theory and Policy (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 1-31; Campbell R,
McConnell, Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies,
Tenth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 835-846. Or
even, Leonard Silk, Economics in Plain English (New York:
Touchstone, 1986), 67-9.
17
Henry William Spiegel, The Growth of Economic Thought
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 328.
68

doing what he does best--practicing law in this case--and
hire others to do what they do best.
18

On a global scale, this translates into a given
nation producing goods in which it has comparative
advantage--meaning those goods that it can produce more
efficiently than others--and trade with other countries
for the goods it cannot make efficiently. As one
economist writes: "Countries have an incentive to
specialize in producing the goods for which their
resources and know-how suit them, and to trade these for
goods produced elsewhere." He continues, "It's no mystery
why Brazil exports coffee and Saudi Arabia exports oil--
or [that through trade other nations capitalize on] such
created differences in resources as differences in
education or in the accumulated stock of capital per
worker."
19

The principle of comparative advantage also suggests
that nations that specialize their labor, capital, and
natural reserves will derive the maximum benefits, and
largely avoid wasting or inefficiently using those

18
See Leonard Silk, Economics in Plain English (New York:
Simon Schuster, 1986), 67-68.
19
Paul Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and
Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations (New York:
W.W. Norton Company, 1994), 229.
69

precious resources. In the end, nations benefit when they
produce goods they have a comparative advantage in
supplying and trading for the rest. Policymakers,
therefore, should exploit their own country's differences
by building on comparative advantage and encouraging
trade. With this principle in mind, it follows that free
trade--trade carried out without governmental
intervention--benefits nations and their citizenry better
than trade that is constrained.
The argument for free trade employs a number of
abstractions that departed from reality in significant
ways. For example, it ignored the costs of
transportation, which were quite significant in the days
of sailing ships and horse-drawn coaches. Additionally,
there was little direct evidence to support the thesis.
The classic case for free trade was, in reality, a
sophisticated and persuasive polemic directed against
what was then common sense thinking on national wealth
and power.
The "neoclassical reformulation"–-now known by
economists as the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samueulson theory of
international trade--is the generally accepted, liberal
70

position that informs most thinking on global exchange.
20

This more refined argument asserts–-in more cautious, if
less elegant, terms–-"a country will export (import)
those commodities which are intensive in the use of its
abundant (scarce) factors."
21
With this reformulation,
"modern trade theory has ... become more fluid, dynamic,
and comprehensive than the classical theory of
comparative advantage."
22
With its empirical improvements
and more qualified phrasing, free trade has gone from a
convincing argument to a full-fledged law for many
economists. The belief in free trade is so great that
most Western, and particularly American, economists
advocate it unilaterally.
23

20
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987),
175. Like Gilpin, throughout this dissertation the term
"liberal" in used in its European sense, that is a
philosophical perspective committed to individualism, the
free market, and private property.
21
Ali M. El-Agraa, The Theory of International Trade
(London: Croom Helm, 1983), 77. As quoted in Gilpin,
Political Economy, 175.
22
Gilpin, Political Economy, 175.
23
See, Jagdish Bhagwati, Protection (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1988), 24; Krugman, Peddling Prosperity, 240.
71

3.4 Challenges to the Free Trade Ideal
The argument for free trade has provoked significant
criticism, with the sharpest criticism coming from
economists themselves. "It is only a mild caricature,"
according to Jagdish Bhagwati, "to say that, ever since
Adam Smith invented the case for the Invisible Hand (and
hence also for free trade), economists have made their
reputation by inventing reasons why the Invisible Hand
fails."
24
This is not surprising, since the free trade
argument itself is a criticism of the earlier and once
commonly accepted view of international trade--
mercantilism.
Originating in the 16
th
and 17
th
centuries, this view
of international economics and politics holds that
mutually beneficial exchange is nearly impossible because
the world's wealth is fixed, or at least severely
constrained. Trade, therefore, is seen as a zero-sum game
with clear winners and losers.
25
Thus, a mercantilist

24
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, "Fair Trade, Reciprocity, and
Harmonization: The Novel Challenge to the Theory and
Policy of Free Trade," in Fair Trade and Harmonization:
Prerequisites for Free Trade, edited by Jagdish N.
Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996), 32.
25
See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987), 32.
72

policy advocates the accumulation of wealth by the state,
historically, in the form of gold and silver, to expand
the power and reach of individual governments. In its
day, "mercantilism and its legitimization of autarkic
protective policies seemed only common sense," a
contemporary economist writes, "reminding one that common
sense is what makes a person assert that the earth is
flat, for that is how it appears to the naked eye."
26

Jacob Viner, the author of a definitive treatment on
the subject, suggests that all mercantilists subscribe to
four basic propositions:

1) Wealth is an absolutely essential means to power,
whether for security or aggression.

2) Power is essential or valuable as a means to the
acquisition or retention of wealth.

3) Wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of
national policy.

4) There is a long-run harmony between these ends.
27

Thus, policymakers endorsing mercantilism should employ
"joint and harmonized considerations of power and

26
Bhagwati, Protection, 24.
27
Jacob Viner, The Long View and The Short (New York:
Free Press, 1958), 286.
73

economics."
28
This means that a nation's leaders must
pursue intertwined economic and political objectives in a
world where other, equally competitive states, attempt to
do the same. The national interest lies in ensuring that
the relative strength and wealth of one's nation are
higher than those of other countries.
Adam Smith viewed mercantilism in a far more
critical light. He argued that the "mercantilist doctrine
was a way of rationalizing, as being in the general
interest, policies whose main motivation lay in special
interest, notably the desire of merchants and
manufacturers to monopolize the home market."
29
But what
of those desires that cannot be reduced exclusively to
materialism?
Mercantilism, for example, concerns itself with
matters that go far beyond pure economics–-namely,
national power. Similarly, the myriad other political-
economic theories and policy prescriptions that oppose
the liberal notions of free trade--from statism and

28
Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of
Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries," World Politics 1 (1948), 29. [Emphasis added]
29
J. Marcus Fleming, "Mercantilism and Free Trade Today,"
in The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of Adam
Smith, edited by Thomas Wilson and Andrew S. Skinner
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), 164-5.
74

traditional protection, to the German historical school
and the more recent "New Protection"–-embrace a common
idea: that "economic activities are and should be
subordinate to the goal of state building and the
interests of the state ... [Such 'economic nationalism']
in its more benign or defensive form ... attempts to
protect the [domestic] economy against untoward external
economic and political forces."
30
In the case of national
cultural protection this impulse extends beyond material
matters to shield those norms and social conventions that
form the subtle, yet powerful bonds that hold a nation
together.

3.5 Contending Views of Protection
Given the benefits of free trade, and despite the
influence of classically liberal economists in academia
and in policymaking circles, the fact is that few nations
enjoy anything approaching the unilateral free trade
ideal. The reason is that the decision to liberalize
trade is a political one. Like most political decisions,
a move toward freer trade by a nation's leadership

30
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations, 31 and 33.
75

involves considerations of human affairs that go far
beyond economic matters, extending into the political,
social, and cultural life of a nation. Policymakers must
balance the potential material benefits of free trade
against the potential impact trade might have on the
total well-being of their societies. Unfortunately for
this dissertation, the body of scholarship that explores
trade in general and trade policymaking in particular is
relatively new. It is also primarily concerned with
understanding trade policymaking for conventional goods,
and understanding protection only in its most traditional
manifestations.
Most studies of trade and protection have been
limited to the economic side of the equation, even when
political, social, and cultural matters may be
significant independent variables. For example, studies
of tariffs and even harder-to-measure non-tariff barriers
abound. Yet efforts to explain why national leaders make
tariff decisions are relatively few and less rigorous in
methodology.
31

31
A notable exception to this is Helen V. Milner's,
Resisting Protection: Global Industries and the Politics
of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988), in which the demand for protection is
studied carefully.

76

Indeed, political economy theories trying to explain
the actions of governments in matters of international
trade and studies of protection and protectionism seldom
use the rigor of the hard sciences, econometrics, or even
traditional economics.
32
Instead, loosely verified "facts"
often combine with ardently championed ideologies to
shape most of the work in the field and the resulting
policy prescriptions.
33
Predictably, studies of protection
approach the problematic from a wide variety of ways,
ranging from econometrics to studies based almost
exclusively on qualitative means.
34
Nonetheless, the
nascent field of trade theory–-as the body of knowledge
is commonly known–-provides a number of welcome insights
into traditional manifestations of protection,
particularly in terms of its supply and demand.

32
Definitions of the academic discipline of political
economy abound, however, for the purposes of this
dissertation I have adopted the commonly accepted view
that political economy operates at the nexus of politics
and economics and tries to explain and understand their
interplay.
33
One of the most prominent textbooks in the field labels
competing perspectives in the field "the three ideologies
of political economy." [Gilpin, Political Economy]; see
also Gilpin's discussion of the state of the field in the
same work, 183-4.
34
See, Jagdish Bagwhati, Protection,
77

John Odell suggests that a combination of insights
coming from economics, political science, and history,
has synthesized the thinking and knowledge in this
otherwise immature field.
35
Odell categorizes the varied
theoretical approaches through a four-level schema. He
proposes that most studies of trade, protection, and
protectionism, employ either an institutional
perspective, a global political-economic structure
perspective, a market perspective, or, a cognitive
perspective.
36

The institutional perspective suggests that states'
behavior in international trade is dictated by
constraints of the international system.
37
Similarly, the

35
John Odell, "Understanding International Trade
Policies: An Emerging Synthesis," World Politics 43, no.
1 (October 1990), 139-167. Note that while Odell limits
his review to trade policy/protection he does acknowledge
the broad variety of scholarship that surrounds
international monetary and trade exchange more generally.
36
Odell presents his categories in an order different
than this; however, here they are reviewed in order of
their apparent relevance for explaining and understanding
national cultural protection. It should be noted as well,
that these categories are not mutually exclusive; instead
they are offered as a means to the end of better
understanding an often confusing, and contradictory, body
of scholarship.
37
Odell cites David Lake's Power, Protection, and Free
Trade (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), as
emblematic of this approach.
78

global political-economic perspective, or structuralist
approach, focuses on the limits that "national political
institutions impose on individuals and groups, and the
effects of institutional change on the broad patterns of
trade policy."
38
In other words, both perspectives
consider institutions–-usually states–-and the formal
systems in which they operate, ahead of individuals. From
this perspective, individuals are constrained by the
state or larger institution in which they operate. Thus,
policy choices, and their resulting outcomes, are driven
by macro-forces far removed from specific people, the
ideas they may create and share, and those societal norms
and cultural beliefs that may shape them.
The market perspective, the broadest of Odell's
categories, offers some insights into national cultural
protection. It argues "generally that market conditions
shape trade politics and policies."
39
Some scholars
working from this perspective and at the international
level of analysis argue that economic downturns or

38
Odell, "Synthesis," 152. I.M. Destler's American Trade
Politics: System under Stress (Washington, D.C. and New
York: Institute for International Economics and the
Twentieth Century Fund, 1986) is referenced by Odell as
an institutional-approach study.
39
Odell, "Synthesis," 141.
79

protracted depressions lead to protectionist pressures.
40

In other words, bad times favor protection and vice
versa.
41
It is plausible that such economic forces, when
combined with the rapid globalization of once exclusively
domestic affairs--especially those touching on identity--
help drive national cultural protection. Unfortunately,
many instances of such protection occurred in recent
years during periods of relative prosperity for the
nation under study. However, the idea of outside pressure
(in the form of globalization in its broadest terms), and
domestic responses to it, offers a theoretical foundation
leading to a better understanding and more complete
explanation for cultural protection.
Other sources demanding protection are the
beleaguered domestic businesses lobbying their
governments. This is another form of the market-based
perspective offered by scholars trying to explain such
demands by interest groups during the Great Depression.
42

40
See Timothy Mckeown, "Firms and Tariff Regime Change,"
World Politics 36 (January 1984), 215-233; and, Wendy
Takacs, "Pressures for Protection: An Empirical Study,"
Economic Inquiry, Volume 19 (1981), 687-693.
41
Odell, "Synthesis," 147.
42
The intellectual benchmark on the subjects of trade and
protection is E.E. Schnattschneider, Politics, Pressure,
and the Tariff (New York: Prentice Hall, 1935).
80

Their argument suggests that businesses trying to stave
off international competition will almost inevitably, and
usually successfully, lobby their governments to provide
protection. The benefits from free trade are usually so
diffuse that other firms--and the general public--who
could profit from operating in a more open international
economic environment, will not counteract the
protectionist impulse.
43
As the case studies that follow
will show, it is not surprising that businesses and their
leaders--whose livelihoods might be hard hit by the
opening of their nation's economies to world markets--are
often at the forefront of cultural protectionist

Schnattschneider highlights the weak leadership of the
president (the supply-side) as well as the demand side.
43
Helen Milner, whose study helps to identify which
sectors industry will demand shelter from foreign
competition, makes a nuanced extension of this tradition
in, Resisting Protection: Global Industries and the
Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988). It should be noted that Milner
uses businesses' demands for protection as her dependent
variable. See as well Milner with Peter B. Rosendorff,
and Edward Mansfield, "International Trade and Domestic
Politics: The Domestic Sources of International Trade
Agreements and Institutions,"
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007296, where they posit that
many of the terms of international agreements-
specifically the "escape clauses" of treaties--are
determined by domestic politic. For another look at
domestic politics, see also, George Tsebelis, Nested
Games, for a rational choice, game theoretic look at the
interplay between elites and masses.
81

movements. Their behavior is predictable. Harder to
understand is the high level of sympathy these industries
receive from political leaders coming from both the left
and right, and the impassioned response of much of the
citizenry.
Odell's final category is the cognitive, or
ideational, perspective on trade and protection. It is
worth special attention because it offers insights that
may help account for political and popular support for
national cultural protection. Odell describes the
approach as follows:

Thinking about trade policy [that] begins with the
premise that political behavior is partly a function
of leaders' and publics' values, policy beliefs, and
ideologies, and that differences and changes in
these ideas will shift policies accordingly. This
general argument, springing from roots in Weber and
elsewhere, assumes that policy ideas, while affected
by material interests, are not simply reducible to
them; values and beliefs have more complex origins
and can have independent effects on policy content.
This ... perspective aspires not simply to describe
policy more accurately, but to help explain it and
its changes.
44

44
Odell, "Synthesis," 149. Odell goes on, in a footnote
found in the same location as the above citation, to
quote Weber's own, novel formulation on the approach:
"Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly
govern man's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world
images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has
been pushed by the dynamic of interests." Gesammelte
Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. I, p. 252, quoted
in From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, trans., ed., and

82

Odell suggests that the cognitive perspective is partly
an intellectual and methodological reaction against the
narrowness implied by a purely economic way of thinking
toward human behavior, a way of thinking that reached its
peak in political science circles with the earlier noted
"rational choice" approach to understanding political
behavior.
45

Reinforcing this point, Odell quotes Robert Baldwin,
who declares that exploring some samples of the rational
choice approach toward understanding political events in
general, and economic policy more specifically, leads to
the "broad conclusion ... that the models focusing
exclusively on short-run, direct self-interest are
insufficient for explaining the wide range of behavior
patterns observable in the trade policy arena. Models
that include behavior based on either long-run self-
interest or concern for the welfare of other groups

with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 63-64.
45
A similar observation can be found in John Kurt
Jacobsen's review essay, "Much Ado about Ideas: The
Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," World Politics 47
(January 1995), 283-310.
83

and the state are also necessary to account for the
actions of voters and public officials."
46

For the purposes of this dissertation, however, the
works cited by Odell do not offer arguments that comport
well with his broad explanation of the cognitive
perspective, or with Baldwin's admonition. In fact,
Odell's literature review implies that economic ideas or
ideologies, or those ideas that relate directly to
economic matters can affect policymaking and outcomes.
For example, Odell cites Jagdish Bhagwati's
collection of Ohlin lectures, titled Protection, and its
chapter on "Interests and Ideology" as representative of
the approach. Bhagwati, however, looks primarily at ideas
as they relate to thinking about economics.
47

Additionally, Bhagwati notes that classic liberals think
along predictable lines about fiscal policy. Marxists, in
contrast, think differently. Thus, the ideational
approach appears limited to ideas that relate directly to
thinking on economic and material matters. It is not

46
As quoted in Odell, "Synthesis," 151: Robert Baldwin,
The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1985), 174.
47
Bhagwati goes into more depth with this argument in his
chapter, "Culture Imperiled or Enriched," In Defense of
Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

84

currently an approach that accounts well for how culture
might inform, shape, influence, or even cause, those same
ideas.
48

3.6 The Cognitive Approach and the Notion of 'Economic
Culture'
A cognitive perspective on national cultural
protection might supplement understanding of the
phenomenon more so than those offered by the more
traditional "economic ways of thinking" or political
economic theories. However, it is helpful to distinguish
between what Paul Egon Rohrlich describes as "economic
ideas,"–-the means to reach socially approved ends--and
"consensual social beliefs"--those commonly held
interests and ideologies that shape and define the

48
This version of the ideational approach is markedly
similar, though admittedly more exhaustive, to Keynes's
flippant observation that "Practical men, who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influence, usually are slaves of some defunct economist.
Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air ... [who]
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler
of years back. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt Brace
and World, 1936), 383.

85

legitimacy of economic ideas specifically, and of the
resultant economic activity more generally.
49

As noted, it is the first of Rohrlich's categories--
economic ideas--that Odell and others have focused almost
exclusively upon. In contrast, these same scholars
largely neglect Rohrlich's second category--consensual
social beliefs--which he also describes as economic
culture.
50
Rohrlich asserts that his categorizations,
while not "neat" because they are not mutually exclusive,
can be found, to varying degrees in most instances of
making and implementing economic policy. He also asserts
that researchers must consider both economic ideas and
economic culture to realize a true understanding of the
international political economy.
In the case studies of national cultural protection
that follow, and in many of those reported in the

49
As explained in Jacobsen, "Much Ado," 287: Paul Egon
Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The
Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy Making,"
International Organization 41 (Winter 1987).
50
See John Kurt Jacobsen, "Much Ado about Ideas: The
Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," World Politics 47
(January 1995), 283-310. In Odell's own study of the
making of monetary policy, he employs a cognitive
approach, though one again focused on economic ideas: see
John Odell, U.S. Monetary Policy: Markets, Power and
Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982).

86

international press, economic ideas can be discerned
quite clearly. These ideas stem from classical economics
and posit that freer trade is materially better for all
nations than trade that is limited or restricted. This
forms an intellectual cornerstone for domestic and global
economic policymaking in most industrialized nations, and
serves as a legitimate rationale for leaders intent on
liberalizing their national economies. At the negotiating
table during such trade-liberalizing efforts as the GATT,
the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), these ideas are
ultimately expressed by the leaders of nations with
otherwise dissimilar interests and cultures. These ideas
also help determine the scope and scale of the agendas
for these talks. Thus, economic ideas play a clear role
in a nation's initial entry into, and ongoing support
for, a more liberalized world economy. However,
manifestations of national cultural protection stand as
stark repudiations of such classically liberal ideas by
nearly all the parties involved. This after the countries
involved have sent their representatives to the
negotiating table. Can the source of such repudiations be
found beyond economic ideas and in Rohrlich's "consensual
social beliefs" or "economic cultures?" After all, these
nations' deep-set beliefs and cultures presumably help
87

determine the very acceptability of those economic ideas
that evolve from theory to reality in the form of
implemented policy.
As outlined by Rohrlich, an economic culture (built
on a foundation of consensual social beliefs) has three
characteristics:

1) It is a base of consensual knowledge of a non-
factual nature, a set of values and beliefs about
social economics that guides and legitimates
policymaking.

2) It is an autonomous variable, not derived from
the material interests of social actors but
rather characterizing a whole society across
social cleavages.

3) It is specific to a particular time and place,
representing a cultural adaptation of a generic
economic ideology.
51

Thus conceived, economic culture provides a litmus
test by which a society can judge economic ideas and, to
a degree, the policies that flow from them. Put another
way, long before a GATT, WTO, or NAFTA-type negotiation
begins, the elites and the bulk of the populace of most
developed nations participating in these talks must
broadly accept, if not overtly support, such abstract
notions as capitalism, competition, and even winners and

51
Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and Foreign
Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy
Making," International Organization 41 (Winter 1987), 71.
88

losers. Such beliefs provide one piece of the puzzle of
national cultural protection--a piece that is missing
from more traditional political economic, models and from
most of the current cognitive studies. They help explain
how economic ideas and policies become elevated when, in
practice, they are antithetical to the cultures of the
nations helping drive their international acceptance.
To determine whether economic culture is, in fact,
driving policymaking, Rhorlich says there must be
evidence that "persons of different material backgrounds
were found to support the same policy outcomes."
52

Clearly, at least in case studies, individuals from
markedly different backgrounds--political, social, and
material--have initially joined ranks to support or, at a
minimum, not directly oppose many aspects of global
economic liberalization.
However, Rohrlich also asserts it is not enough to
simply state the thinking behind a policy. "The causes of
the creation of and changes in economic culture must be
sought; the reasons for the advent of new ideas that
precipitate altered perceptions of proper action and the
outcome of changed policy must be articulated."
53
So where

52
Ibid.

53
Ibid., 72.
89

where can such "causes" and "reasons" be found in
instances of national cultural protection? The answer
lies in culture itself, particularly in how a given
society or nation--with a common cultural identity--will
react to "non-economic" policy outcomes. After all, in
instances of national cultural protection the issue is
not how purely economic ideas originate from or gain
acceptance in a given nation, or how a society or country
might react to the economic implications of policies or
policy outcomes; instead, the crux of the matter lies in
how a particular society or nation with a common culture
will react when such ideas and policies confront,
challenge, and appear to conflict with national cultures.

3.7 National Cultures and Economic Policies
But, what is culture? Sociologists, anthropologists
and other academics endeavor to distinguish between what
they regard as pure culture and the social structures
that they posit are manifestations of culture. Pure
culture, they say, consists of the ideas, norms,
meanings, symbols, and beliefs that individuals and
societies share to help make sense of the world around
them. Social structures, such as family, class, religion,

90

and nations, are distinct from culture itself and are the
outward expressions or products of culture.
54

These scholars admit that while this distinction is
necessary for their academic efforts, it is misleadingly
refined. Taken together these notions can account for
most human activity. Real world culture plays an enormous
role in shaping social structures, and those same social
structures influence culture. For example, as noted by
Max Weber, the individualistic and capitalistic outlook
of Protestants is shaped by their religion, while their
religious practices and institutions are based upon
individual material attainment and achievements because
that is what its participants demand.
55

A more broadly drawn concept of culture can allow
for its abstract and ephemeral nature and incorporate its
visible manifestations in social structures. This form is
closer to the more popularly held views of culture: a way
of understanding and contextualizing identity. It is not
only who "we" are (and especially why "we" are not
"them"), but also those institutions through which we

54
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New
York: Basic Books, 1973).

55
Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930).

91

live our lives. One contemporary author calls this form
an "inherited ethical habit."
56
It is inherited because
identity is passed from generation to generation. It is
ethical in that it acts as a basis for judging right and
wrong. And it is a habit because it becomes a way of
doing things without thinking, without engaging in the
rational calculus assumed and beloved by economists.
57

Similarly, it is what Nietzsche regarded as the ethical
codes and institutions by which societies judge and
regulate behavior--the "language of good and evil" put in
practice and writ large.
58

Thus understood, culture ultimately shapes, defines,
and connects elites, the public, and their social and
political institutions by forming the foundation on which
identity rests, moral calculus is performed, and societal

56
Fukuyama, Trust, 34.

57
Ibid., 33-36.

58
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, translated by Walter
Kaufmann, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy
of the Future(New York: Random House, 1989).
92

wishes are expressed. In instances of national culture
protection, however, outside forces far removed from the
day-to-day lives of a nation's citizenry challenge
identity and morality. Globalization, and the changes it
brings thus threatens a nation's cultural existence in a
manner that mere economic ideas and policy simply do not.
93

Chapter 4

France, The E.U., and the Audiovisual Indusrties

The sickly cultural pathos which the whole of
France indulges in, that fetishism of the
cultural heritage.

Jean Baudrillard
America, "Utopia Achieved"

4.1 Introduction
In the late 1980s, French government officials,
acting with popular support, attempted to curtail the
import of foreign-produced--especially American--
audiovisual products and software, such as motion
pictures, television shows and radio programming.
Eventually, their protectionist stance, and, to a degree,
their attitude toward these products, was adopted by a
number of other European Union states. This led to the
near collapse of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
when E.U. trade officials, prodded by Paris and
authorized by Brussels, squared off against their
Washington counterparts. The conflict centered on whether
to allow foreign audiovisual products into once-
culturally homogenous nations.
Because they are relatively young, these industries
have always been subject to protectionist efforts. For
94

example, from nearly the beginning of the film industry
at the turn of the last century, many governments have
attempted to control the import and distribution of
foreign films into their domestic markets. More recently,
as globalization progressed, and with the specter of a
single, "one-world-culture" on the horizon, policymakers
in a few nations focused their attention on almost all
audiovisual software, even if the cultural content of
such products amounted to only the spoken language or the
producer's nationality. The consistent "leader" in these
efforts: France.
The case opens by examining of the early attempts by
European governments to challenge America's dominance of
their domestic cinema markets. This context helps clarify
the unique aspects of France's more recent protectionist
efforts. The first section looks at France's efforts to
establish pan-European broadcast regulations through the
E.U. The second section looks at the mid-1980s through
today. The stage then shifts to the Uruguay Round of GATT
talks, and finally to more contemporary conflicts between
Hollywood and Europe.
95

The historical sections are supplemented by an
examination of the economics of the international trade
in film, an analysis of Hollywood's ascendant position in
global markets, and finally, consideration of the
cultural aspect of audiovisual products.

4.2 Hollywood Goes to Europe
The story of France's national cultural protection,
directed first against American film and later against
other forms of audiovisual products and software, is
rooted in the dominant market position that Hollywood
obtained in Western Europe after the First World War.
*

Before 1914, France led all nations in the export of
motion pictures. However, the War's devastation left the
French, British, and the German film industries with
virtually no production capabilities or distribution
channels to compete with non-European producers.
1

*
Although motion pictures and other audiovisual software
products originate outside Southern California,
"Hollywood" is used as a catch-all term to refer the
American audiovisual industries.
1
Ian Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North
Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 275.
96

Hollywood's film-makers exploited Europe's weakened
position by exporting their products to Europe and to
movie-hungry South America and Australia. Before the War
these markets were dominated by European producers,
particularly the French who exploited the economic and
linguistic legacy of Paris's former colonies.
2
By 1919,
however, Americans had the advantage of an operating
production base, a global distribution system, and most
importantly, economies of scale enjoyed by the giant
Hollywood movie companies which had thrived during the
War.
3
This enabled Hollywood to virtually dominate the
European movie business. "By 1925, American films had
captured 95 percent of the British market and 70 percent
of the French market. In Italy during this same period,
American films accounted for 68 percent of screen time
... In the smaller countries the situation was quite the
same."
4

In 1926, European producers saw an opportunity to
regain their domestic markets: talking pictures. No

2
Ibid., 276.
3
Thomas H. Guback, The International Film Industry:
Western Europe and America Since 1945 (Bloomington and
London: Indiana University Press, 1969), 9.
4
Ibid., 8-9.
97

longer would the inexpensive use of inter-titles in
silent films--easily translated and then cut into a
film's final print--disguise the national origins of a
motion picture. Foreign films would be in foreign
tongues. Domestic markets would favor productions that
mirrored their local culture if only from a linguistic
perspective. Nonetheless, Hollywood continued to
dominate. Its size and market momentum allowed it to
establish de facto technological standards for sound in
film or to purchase rival patents and processes. This,
along with the ability to produce movies more cheaply
than its foreign competitors enabled the American
international film business to steam-roll European
producers.
5

Pressured European governments reacted predictably.
German and Italian markets were closed to U.S. films. In
the United Kingdom, the largest foreign market for U.S.
moviemakers, the British film industry sought government-
enforced protection against Hollywood's onslaught. France
imposed quotas on imports and established a 4:1 ratio in
the number of French to American movies that could be
shown in French movie theaters.
6

5
Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 7.
6
Guback, International Film Industry, 16-21.
98

Economic considerations and national culture were
used to justify this protectionism. For example, a
proponent of France's quota system declared that American
movies would result in a "change in French taste [which]
may be irreversible and fatal ... for a Frenchman, this
amounts to giving up his citizenship."
7
In the U.K.,
leading political and cultural figures declared that
"important as is the commercial aspect of this problem,
high national and patriotic interests are involved ...
The bulk of the films shown in this country have, to say
the least of it, a non-British atmosphere ... Many of
them are inferior productions, neither healthy nor
patriotic in tone, while the psychological influences
which they convey may have far-reaching consequences."
8

Similarly, a high-ranking British military official,
after meeting a young Londoner speaking with an affected
American accent, wrote an editorial asking: "What good
can all this do to England? Will it create patriots? I
doubt it. But quite definitely it is creating a race of
youths belonging to all classes whose experience of life

7
Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The
Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York: Twayne
Publishers, 1992), 56.
8
Quoted in Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 106.
99

is based on the harrowing and frequently sordid plots of
American films."
9
Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of
the Exchequer, suggested that a tax on imported American
films might help Britain's domestic producers, declaring:
"It would naturally give me great pleasure in this
country, if any revenue could be derived from the profits
of American film producers."
10

Despite spirited protests and the new restrictions
they inspired, Hollywood remained the clear market leader
in European cinema through World War II.
11
Continental
film distributors and movie-house owners catered to the
enormous appetite of Europe's masses for Hollywood's
offerings, ignoring their governments' regulations and
rendering them meaningless. World War II, in turn,
destroyed whatever was left of these protective
measures.
12

9
Quoted in David Ellwood, "Hollywood's Star Wars,"
Modern History 44, no. 4 (1994): 6.
10
Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1991), 474.
11
Nonetheless, one analyst describes the 1930's as the
"true heyday of European cultural protectionism."
(Ellwood, "Hollywood's Star Wars.")
12
Diana Quintero, "American Television and Cinema in
France and Europe," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
18 (Summer/Fall 1994): 116.
100

By close of fighting in 1945, the future looked all-
but-guaranteed for American film-makers. No serious
competition existed and most governments were in
shambles, with few established policies to check their
influence. Smaller European countries had no economic
restrictions on the import of American movies.
13

Nonetheless, Hollywood's studio chiefs were deeply
concerned about retaining their dominant position
overseas and sought to increase gross receipts from their
lucrative international –and in particular European--
screens to cover the ever-rising production costs and to
ensure the long-term viability of their businesses.
14

The post-war economic crises, coupled with the
luxury that films represent, set the stage: Paris and
London again challenged American film hegemony by
attempting to control both the significant flow of
capital from Europe to the United States, and the
messages expressed through the powerful cultural medium
of film.
15

13
Guback, International Film Industry, 19.
14
Ibid., 16-7.
15
Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 204-5.
101

Diplomatic arm-twisting from Washington, however,
made this difficult. America, through the Marshall Plan,
held the economic key to European recovery. In exchange
for its largess, it demanded access to Europe's fragile
markets for its goods, including film. Most famously,
Leon Blum and James Byrnes, through the Blum-Byrnes
Accords, gave France American aid in exchange for entrée
into key sectors of the French economy, including film.
16

Although the Blum-Byrnes Accords were re-negotiated in
1948 on terms more favorable to the French, after the war
the European film industry found itself relegated to a
secondary role in every major global market, including
its own.
Still, leaders in Paris and London continued their
efforts to re-build their domestic film industries. After
prolonged negotiations with Washington, they instituted
production subsidies, taxes on imports, exemptions for
native production, and aid for distributing films, all
controlled by government-led film associations. France,
and to a lesser extent Britain, eventually succeeded in
returning their respective motion picture producers to a
degree of financial health.

16
Quintero, "American Television," 116.
102

Hollywood greeted these efforts with hostility,
culminating in the 1947-48 American film producers'
boycott of the British market. This was an aggressive
response to Britain's announcement to limit the amount of
distribution profits that could be converted into dollars
and repatriated. As a result, the British capitulated,
agreeing to a limit on gross profits by American movie
houses. But, the limit did little to curb Hollywood's
domination of British and Continental screens.

4.3 The GATT, Film, and TV Programming
Also in the late 1940s, spats over a wide variety of
more conventional products and services threatened to
destroy whatever chance the world economy had for
recovery. In response, leaders from a number of countries
gathered in Havana to create the International Trade
Organization (ITO) to deal with trade rules, foreign
investments, labor standards, and modernization levels
for developing states.
17
The ITO was meant to manage
global trade in the same way the International Monetary

17
Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International
Economic Relations, 3d ed., (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985), 94-5.
103

Fund managed international indebtedness and monetary
order.
18
U.S.-U.K. disputes over the ITO's reach, however,
led to an interim arrangement that included free trade
principles and rules for trade dispute resolution, but
nothing else. This interim document, known as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (GATT), was intended to
be a part of the much more ambitious ITO. However,
shortly after the Oct. 30, 1947 signing of the GATT, the
ITO was killed when the U.S. Congress refused to ratify
the charter.
19
Without a larger International Trade
Organization in place, "the articles of the GATT
agreement became the basic rules of international trade,

18
Ibid., p. 94; see also, Peter Lane, Europe Since 1945:
An Introduction (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes Noble Books,
1985), 15 and 294. [The motivations for the creation of
the ITO and the GATT are the subject of an ongoing and
very interesting debate in academic circles. One camp
argues that "the GATT system of trade liberalization was
based on the idea of permitting the market to determine
the international location of economic activities"
(Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International
Relations [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1987], 228); the other claims that in addition to
such market ideals, "trade policies were further
buttressed by a concern that was at the top of almost
everyone's list: countering the threat of communism"
(I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 2d ed.,
[Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1992], 7.).
19
Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United
States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 95.
104

and the GATT organization at Geneva the central
institution supporting international negotiations and the
reduction of trade barriers."
20

European governments welcomed the liberal economic
notions of GATT in principle. But protectionist-minded
film industry leaders in Paris and London quickly
realized that an overly broad GATT accord would doom
their sheltered, but weak, businesses. The British
responded by negotiating an agreement with the United
States, putting quotas on screen time, but not on
distribution.
21
The French hammered out an agreement which
regulated the number of foreign films they allowed into
their country and, for a time, limited remittances.
Italy, Germany, and Spain granted only fixed numbers of
import licenses to U.S. distribution companies, and in
the Spanish case, demanded reciprocal distribution
privileges in the United States.
22
Thus, from its

20
I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 2d ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1992), 436.
21
Jarvie, Hollywood's Overseas Campaign, 252.
22
Guback, International Film Industry, 19 and 24-7.
105

earliest days, GATT allowed exceptions to a free-trade
ideal for audiovisual products.
23

Such bi-lateral agreements, however, were eventually
subsumed by the multinational nature of the GATT, and
specific declarations eventually agreed to by most
parties dealing which dealt directly with film.
Specifically, the GATT contains two articles pertinent to
international trade in motion pictures--Article III,
concerning national treatment, and Article IV, dealing
specifically with quotas on foreign film showings.
Article III "requires that a Contracting Party's
internal taxes and regulations cannot discriminate
against foreign products once they enter local
commerce."
24
This implies that any quotas or special taxes

23
Steven S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, International
Trade in Films and Television Programs (Cambridge:
American Enterprise Institute/Ballinger Publishing,
1988), 136.
24
Cline N. Smith, "International Trade in Television
Programming and GATT: An Analysis of Why the European
Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," International
Tax Business Lawyer 10, no. 97 (1993): 114. [The Article
itself reads: "The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale ..." (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, Art.
3(2), 61(5) Stat. A18, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.)].
106

taxes on foreign products, including motion pictures,
would violate the agreement. Exceptions to this "national
treatment" standard are allowed when the standard affects
national security or when a government procures goods for
domestic needs.
25

Article IV allows governments to discriminate
against the exhibition of foreign movies in favor of
screening domestic productions. It amends the "national
treatment" standard with regard to motion pictures;
however, this discrimination can only take the form of
"screen quotas."
26
(Article IV reads, "If any contracting
party establishes or maintains internal quantitative
regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films, such
regulations shall take the form of screen quotas."
27
)
Thus, taxes aimed only at foreign films, or even special
tax breaks for domestic productions, violate the spirit
of the original GATT treaty.

25
Smith, "International Trade," 116.
26
Ibid., 117; and, Jon Filipek, "'Culture Quotas': The
Controversy over the European Community's Broadcasting
Directive," Stanford Journal of International Law 28:323
(1992), 338-9.
27
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30,
1947, Art. 4 (Special Provisions Relating to Cinema
Films).
107

Original drafts of the ITO included similar
provisions exempting cinema from liberal trade ideals.
These were found both in the ITO charter and the signed
GATT, driven by representatives of France,
Czechoslovakia, Norway, and the United Kingdom, all of
whom couched their support in terms relating to the
cultural importance of film.
28
Yet even at the original
GATT signings, skeptics charged that these countries were
less concerned with preserving and strengthening their
national cultures, and more concerned with preserving the
potentially lucrative domestic industries.
29

Hollywood studio executives shared the latter
perspective, but screen quotas allowed under the GATT
ultimately had little impact on their dominance in
European markets. By the 1970s, the GATT's screen quotas
were nearly meaningless because most European countries
did little to enforce them. Most E.U. leaders had little
reason to do so since all easily overcame their
politically determined minimums for domestic showings.
30

28
Smith. "European Television Directive," 119.
29
Ibid.
30
Guback, International Film Industry, 35-6; and,
Quintero, "American Television," 118.
108

In 1947, the GATT did not deal with television
software or the secondary offerings of contemporary
Hollywood. The United States attempted to remedy this
omission in 1961 by fighting the increasing restrictions
on the import of Hollywood's products. In response, GATT
officials established a "Working Party" to address these
issues resulting in three distinct positions on the
applicability of the GATT to a broader range of
audiovisual products.
31

One school of thought, championed by the United
States, argued that television and other audiovisual
products should fall under the GATT's Article III
concerning "national treatment," rather than under
Article IV dealing with motion pictures.
32
A second view
held that the similarities between motion pictures and
other forms of cultural material are extensive.
Therefore, Article IV should be applied "mutatis mutandis
to trade in television programming."
33
These advocates,
not led by any one nation, also challenged the U.S.
position that reasonable access for foreign producers

31
Filipek, "Culture Quotas," 340-2.
32
For an extended legal analysis of this position, see
Smith, "European Television," 21-6.
33
Filipek, "Culture Quotas," 342.
109

should be ensured if domestic television stations (at
that time, usually under government control) reserve any
significant time for domestic showings.
34
A third
perspective came from the French, who argued that
television and other audiovisual materials should be
considered services rather than goods; therefore, the
GATT did not apply at all.
35
The three perspectives were
never resolved, but nearly derailed the Uruguay Round of
GATT talks.

34
Ibid., 341.
35
Ibid., 342. Note that "services" was not a term used
widely until the late 1970s.
110

4.4 The E.U.'s Green Paper and Directive on the
Audiovisual Industries
Although the battle lines were drawn between
individual European governments and Hollywood, not until
the mid-1980s did the E.U.'s regulatory attentions turn
to the broader notion of the "audiovisual" sector. A 1984
Green Paper, "Television Without Frontiers,"
36
began a
process that culminated with the Uruguay Round of the
GATT talks. Led by the French, the E.U. began fashioning
common broadcasting standards for television--in
technical and legal terms as well as in content--to
further create a greater "common market" and aid in the
preservation and strengthening of "European culture."
*

36
"Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the
Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting,
Especially by Satellite and Cable," Luxembourg: Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities,
1984. COM(84) 300 final: "Green Paper"; and, final/2:
"Green Paper Summary" (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter "Green
Paper" or "Green Paper Summary"].
*
Ironically, as recently as 1983 the EEC was taking
legal action (began in 1979) against France, Italy,
Denmark, and Germany for their film aid programs which
EEC officials argued violated the "free market"
principles of the Treaty of Rome. In less than a year,
Community officials would all but reverse course and urge
all member states to adopt quotas and support-directed
taxes to help domestic producers. See, James Park, "EEC
Body Turnaround on Film Aid Treaty of Rome," Variety
(March 9, 1983): 1.
111

The removal of competing, nation-specific policies
in this growing sector of the European economy was
designed to promote rapid internal growth, and enhance
Europe's competitive position in the global economy. The
Green Paper was of special interest to Hollywood. It
focused on technological advances of the television
industry, particularly through satellite and cable
delivery systems, and the lucrative and growing after-
markets in video rentals--all sources of profit beyond
traditional box-office receipts. In this phase of the
debate, traditional film intended for theaters, covered
by the GATT, was downplayed while television programming,
cable, and satellite transmission were stressed.
"Television Without Frontiers" begins with a brief
reference to the economic consequences of closer European
cooperation in the audiovisual sector. It maintains that
"action needs to be taken at the present time in the
broadcasting field because of the importance of its
effect ... on the process of European integration."
37
The
Green Paper argues further that "broadcasting is a
powerful medium for the communication of all kinds of
information, ideas and opinion," and that "cross-frontier

37
"Green Paper Summary," II:4, 2.
112

broadcasting, particularly of television, offers the most
potentially effective means for guaranteeing that the
traditional pluralism of ... [the E.U.'s] political
systems develops a healthy Community dimension."
38

Stressing the "healthy community" aspect, the document
suggests E.U.-wide restrictions on tobacco and alcohol
advertising.
39
) The Green Paper's suggestions were
intended to help Europe's small and fragmented
audiovisual industries "counterbalance ... the dominance
of the big American media corporations," and "allow
European firms to improve their competitiveness," and
worried Hollywood.
40

Some of these worries appeared well founded in 1987
when, E.U. leaders, again prodded by France, established
the MEDIA Plan. MEDIA had broad goals to: 1) create
synergies that would help small, geographically isolated
audiovisual companies work together to stave off
competition coming from larger Hollywood firms; 2)
support small and mid-sized European audiovisual
companies with direct financial and technical assistance;

38
Ibid., II:6, 3; and, II:8, 4.
39
Ibid., IV:31; and, 32, 11.
40
"Green Paper," 33.
113

and, 3) promote "linguistic and cultural pluralism."
41
In
its early years, MEDIA couldn't reach its goals, largely
because of its relatively meager $29 million budget of
$29 for 1987-1990. That equaled the amount Hollywood
would typically spend to produce just one movie. In 1991-
1995, MEDIA's budget grew to $270 million--most of it to
strengthen the infrastructure supporting the European
audiovisual industries.
*
In a short time, the MEDIA Plan
achieved tangible successes: it helped finance more than
1,500 productions; it helped create a pan-European film
distribution cooperative; and it helped train more than
3,200 people for employment in the industry. Still, U.S.
observers did not see the MEDIA Plan as a serious threat
to Hollywood's privileged position in European markets.
A more dramatic development came in 1989 when the
European Council considered giving the "Television
without Frontiers" Green Paper the force of law in the

41
This three-fold strategy is overtly stated in the MEDIA
Plan. A cogent analysis of it in terms of supporting
culture has been done by Hernan Galperin in his paper:
"Cultural Industries Policy in Regional Trade
Agreements: The Case of NAFTA, the European Union and
MERCOSUR." Presented to the International/Development
Communication Division, International Communication
Association, 1998 Annual Conference." p. 10.
*
For the most recent period, 1996-2000, MEDIA's budget
has been set at $510 million.
114

European market. The directive would reserve at least 50
percent of European television air time for domestic
programming, and was more economically focused than
cultural. Its objective was to challenge Hollywood's
market presence, but virtually ignored the cultural
concerns mentioned in the Green Paper.
42

In the ensuing battle to ratify the directive,
protectionist-minded European governments, led by the
French and supported by high-placed, European
entertainment industry officials, lobbied the European
Parliament. They wanted quotas on the amount of European
production to be shown on European movie and television
screens included in any approved document.
43
Given
Hollywood's domination of the entertainment industry,
this requirement threatened to limit the amount of
American products allowed into the common market. Notable
European producers and movie stars joined the fray by
renting a "Train Called Culture" to carry them from Paris
to the European Parliament in Strasbourg to make their

42
Ibid., 9-11.
43
Bruce Alderman, "Euro Commission is Fighting Against
'Obligatory and Enforceable' Program Quotas," Variety, 31
May 1989, 58.
115

point--that quotas of at least 60 percent were necessary
to save their industry.
44

These pro-protection states and groups initially
wanted a binding, "obligatory and enforceable" mandate
that at least 60 percent (later reduced to 50 percent) of
all broadcasting in the E.U. would have European origins.
This demand, while carefully cloaked as a mere protection
of European culture, appeared to Americans as "firmly
rooted in cold-blooded business considerations."
45
Given
the rigidity of the European proposals, many in Hollywood
wondered if the next European Parliament directive might
convey a message of "video sales without frontiers," or
even "cinema films without frontiers."
46

In contrast, pro-quota Europeans argued that the
"issue is not as clear-cut as some would like to present
it, nor is it the kind of villainous anti-American plot
that some U.S. executives envision."
47
Not everyone
supported this largely French-inspired protectionism.

44
Bruce Alderman, "Euro Pic Powers Pushing to Lift TV
Quotas past 50%," Variety, 17 May 1989, 39.
45
Fred Hift, "European TV Quotas: Angry Yanks and a
Community Divided." Variety, 24 May 1989, 4.
46
"Buddy Can You Spare a Reel," The Economist, 19 August
1989. p. 57.
47
Hift, "European T.V. Quotas," 4.
116

Representatives from West Germany, Belgium, and Denmark
balked at the quota, doubting that the EEC's purview
extended to cultural affairs. Critics in the British
press challenged that Community leaders were not
genuinely concerned about European culture, but rather
were engaging in "senseless protectionism."
48
Even in
France, privately-owned television and satellite channels
warned their government that the directive would harm
their growing businesses and their ability to compete
within Europe itself.
49

Ultimately, E.U.-member governmental holdouts,
combined with intense Hollywood lobbying efforts led by
Jack Valenti, the chairman of the Motion Picture Export
Association of America, (MPEAA), pressured the Council to
reject the specific percentage formulations championed by
the French, and pass a directive
50
urging European
broadcasters to "where practicable[,] ... reserve for
European works ... a majority proportion of their

48
"Buddy Can You," 57.
49
Ibid.
50
Article IV of Council Directive 89/552, "On the
Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid down by Law,
Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States
Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting
Activities," O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 298) 23 (1989)
[hereinafter Directive].
117

transmission time." This ambiguous phrasing did not
define a "European work," or clearly explain the meaning
of "practicability."
51
The French were mollified with
assurances that future E.U. leaders would support the
European entertainment industry through more other means
than quotas, such as taxes on imports or production
subsidies for native offerings.
52

The council's decision to enforce quotas as a
political rather than legal matter pleased Hollywood.
Thus, the E.U. would not take a channel or country to
court for violating the directive, but only urge them to
change.
53
One E.U. official shrugged: "A directive is a
directive, and it is obligatory. We will have to monitor
the broacasters [sic]. If the quotas haven't been met,
the Commission will report to the Council and the
Parliament."
54
Beyond that, no sanctions are specified.

51
Ibid., 4:1, p. 26. ["Member States shall ensure where
practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters
reserve for European works ... excluding the time
appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and
teletext services.]
52
"EU Adopts Quota Directive, To Take Effect in 18 mos.,"
Variety, 4 October 1989, 1.
53
Ibid., 1.
54
Ibid., 2.
118

Despite the document's "soft" wording, Hollywood and
U.S. trade officials saw it's as a defeat of free-trade.
One pro-Hollywood analysis reflected: "This agenda [laid
out by the directive] is clear-cut; European TV will
expand, and Europeans must develop their own production
industry rather than relying on imports to fill all
future demand ... [however,] the quotas set within are so
vaguely written and open to so many interpretations that
all the quota can do is set the tone rather than legally
dictate."
55
More ominously, the MPPEA's Valenti argued:
"In time, these quotas will bite, wound or bleed those
that adopt them." U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills
responded by placing the French and all other E.U. member
states on a "priority watch list" to encourage them to
modify or drop limits on foreign-origin programming or
face retaliatory trade sanctions by the United States.
56

Others noted that the "Television Without Frontiers"
directive would do little to change the dominant market
position of America in European markets. Most European
broadcasters already used a majority of domestic

55
Bruce Alderman, "Quid Pro Quota?" Variety, 11-17
October 1989, 51.
56
Elizabeth Guider, "Tit for Tat: U.S. Ticked on EC
Program Quotas," Variety, 6 May 1991, 317.
119

programming to fill their air-time. And, European
production capacities would fall far short of demand if
Hollywood's contributions were excluded from Europe
altogether.
57
Pragmatic executives in Hollywood took few
chances, however, and turned quickly to co-production
with European companies--taking advantage of the
directive's hazy definitions of a "European work," thus
ensuring access to the single market through 1992.
58
The
accounting firm of Coopers Lybrand suggested that the
real value of the directive was not the quota issue and
its affect on Hollywood, but rather the shift of power
away from national governments and toward the emerging
E.U. powers in Brussels and their stance at future trade
negotiations.
59
Indeed, "Television Without Frontiers" did
reflect E.U. attitudes and actions, inspired and directed
largely by the French, toward the coming Uruguay Round of
the GATT negotiations.

57
"TV '92 Study: Quotas No Problem, But Beware EC's
Rising Power," Variety, 29 November 1989, 54(1).
58
"Europe's Film Industry: Sleeping with the Enemy," The
Economist, 26 October 1991, 91.
59
"TV '92 Study," 54(1).
120

4.5 The GATT Conflict
The Uruguay Round of the GATT began in September
1986. For the first time, negotiators seriously tackled
new issues such as trade in services and intellectual
property rules. The initial agenda included the "service"
industries of film and television, industries with
unresolved trade issues between the United States and the
European Union.
60

In such a large and protracted negotiation,
disagreements threatened to derail the entire process.
61

Late in the talks, French representatives pressed to
exclude what they described as the "culturally sensitive"
audiovisual industries from the final agreement. The
French wanted a "cultural exemption" written into the
GATT, which would permit signatories to adopt
protectionist policies when a national or regional
culture might be harmed by trade. Given the E.U.'s
internal battles over the "Television Without Frontiers"
directive, the French wanted to impose a tax--in addition
to quotas--on U.S. audiovisual products to support

60
Jeffrey J. Schott and Johanna W. Buurman, The Uruguay
Round: An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1994), 3.
61
Ibid., 3-5.
121

domestic producers.
62
Again, the French insisted that
their interest in a GATT exemption for audiovisual
software was purely cultural.
Jacques Toubon, the French Cultural Minister,
declared: "GATT rules are not compatible with the
existence of an autonomous cultural system."
63
The French
seemed more worried about U.S. culture than their own--
that American cultural products might overwhelm French
ideas and norms, tradition, and even the French language
itself. President François Mitterand, speaking at the
GATT talks stated, "No single country should be allowed
to control the images of the whole world ... what is at
stake is the cultural identity of our nation, and the
right of each people to its own culture."
64

Several European entertainment business leaders, as
opposed to artistic leaders, vigorously dissented,
worried that protectionism would do more harm than good
to the Community. The manager of Europe's largest
multiplex argued that "these people are sitting on their

62
Matthew Fraser, "A Question of Culture," Maclean's. 27
December 1993, 51.
63
Adam Dawtrey, "GATT Gets France's Goat," Variety, 27
September 27, 1993, 31.
64
Ellwood, "Hollywood," 9.
122

cloud, kicking wildly without having any contact with the
consumer."
65
In the six weeks preceding his statement,
movie-goers at his theaters bought more than 140,000
tickets to see "Jurassic Park," but just under 16,000 for
the French-produced hit "Germinal."
66

From the American perspective, the French-E.U.
demand for a cultural exemption was more about protecting
ticket sales than culture. The MPEAA's Valenti claimed
that culture was irrelevant to France's demands. "This
[request]," he argued, "is all about the hard business of
money."
67
Those in Bonn, Brussels, and Copenhagen, as well
as in Washington, were dismayed that France's obsession
with a relatively small sector of the world economy might
derail a new GATT treaty.
68
U.S. trade representatives in
Washington saw the demand for a cultural exemption as an
"intractable" negotiating position that would protect
Hollywood's foreign rivals while doing little to benefit

65
Hilary Clarke, "Kantor Offers GATT 'Flexibility'," The
Hollywood Reporter, 8 December 1993, 1.
66
Ibid. Note that "Germinal" was the number one box
office producer for French movies that year.
67
Keith Bradsher, "Movies, TV and Financial Services are
Some of the Areas Left Out," New York Times, 15 December
1993, A1.
68
Dawtrey, "GATT," 33.
123

while doing little to benefit cultural plurality in
Europe.
69

Such sentiments waned after the European release of
"Jurassic Park" decimated "Germinal," the year's most-
promising French offering.
70
Many newly aware E.U.
officials challenged claims by Valenti and others that
the cultural posturing of the French was a ploy for more
traditional protectionism. In light of "Jurassic Park's"
stunning success, officials began to believe that the
European audiovisual industry may need some form of
protection. The French "cultural" arguments allowed it to
avoid running afoul of GATT directives concerning more
purely economic issues. Renaud--the star of "Germinal"--
saw it as a zero-sum debate, claiming that "It's 'Dallas'
or French creativity."
71

In the weeks before the GATT treaty would be
ratified, the cultural exemption question emerged as the
last major stumbling block for negotiators. The French
appeared willing to sacrifice the entire GATT to win this
concession from the United States. Mickey Kantor, the

69
Clarke, "Kantor Offers," 1.
70
Ellwood, "Hollywood," 9.
71
Clarke, "Kantor Offers," 1.
124

U.S. Trade Representative to the GATT, was frustrated by
what he saw a risky, winner-take-all French-E.U. tactic.
72

The E.U.'s chief negotiator, Sir Leon Brittan, offered a
compromise to scrap E.U. television-broadcasting quotas
in exchange for a more narrowly drawn cultural exemption.
Remarkably, Brittan had to retract his offer under
pressure from the E.U. President, Frenchman Jacques
Delors.
73
The issue then became whether foreign producers
could share in proceeds from taxes the Community intended
to levy "on blank video cassettes and tapes, and its
refusal to clarify limits on the broadcast of foreign
films and television programs."
74
Under pressure from
other member states, France and the E.U. agreed that the
audiovisual sector should be included generally in the
GATT treaty, but that individual nations should be
allowed to opt out of the treaty on cultural grounds.
75

The demand for a cultural exemption remained intact.
76

72
Ibid.
73
Christian Moerk and Michael Williams, "Moguls Swat
GATT-Flies: Recession and Eurocrats Can't Nix Global
Ties," Variety, 20 December 1993, 62.
74
Bradsher, "Big Cut," D18.
75
Ellwood, "Hollywood," 9.
76
Dawtrey, "GATT," 32.
125

The French and the E.U. bet that the United States
would not allow one industry to derail the entire GATT
ratification, and they were right. The American
delegation, after much posturing and saber rattling,
acquiesced to a fully intact cultural exemption clause.
77

Representative Kantor decided to deal with cultural
issues outside of the GATT's legal framework on a bi-
lateral, country-by-country basis.
78
In the end, the
United States retained retaliation rights only if the
E.U. singled out American audiovisual products.
79

While officials in Washington, including President
Clinton, downplayed the capitulation of the United States
to the E.U.’s demands, Hollywood saw the GATT's cultural
exemption as an "unexpected coup for France."
80
European
commentators noted the French made the "GATT deal hostage
to their national concerns,"
81
and France did little to
alter this perception. Communications Minister Alain

77
James Ulmer, "U.S. Bows to France on Audiovisual
Issues," Variety, 14 December 1993, 1.
78
Fraser, "A Question of Culture," 50.
79
Bradsher, "Big Cut," D18.
80
Pia Farrell, "French Remain on Guard Despite Success in
GATT," The Hollywood Reporter, 21 December 1993, I1.
81
"EU and GATT," The Economist, 49.
126

Carignon gloated, "This is a great and beautiful victory
for Europe and for French culture," Adding that "Our
hands are now free to adapt television quotas as we see
fit and enforce regulations in the burgeoning areas of
digital and pay TV to protect our industry."
82
A more
lofty declaration came from filmmaker Jean-Jacques
Beineix, who likened the French victory to the "birth of
a second Europe, a cultural Europe, which by defending
the identity of its cinema and television industries has
acquired a spiritual dimension."
83

4.6 After the Uruguay Round
Although most Hollywood executives were disappointed
with the results of the Uruguay Round, they looked
forward to the calm in its wake.
84
Instead, the Uruguay
Round was a precursor of things to come. Britain,
Germany, and Italy were awakened by the Hollywood-France
debate and began referring to the audiovisual policy of

82
Farrell, "French Remain." [emphasis added]
83
Ibid. [emphasis added]
84
Moerk and Williams, "Moguls Swat," 1.
127

the European Union in cultural terms, similar to France.
85

British producer Chris Autry noted, "Before the GATT, the
English business community was completely neutral, but
GATT is suddenly awakening some elements of the British
audiovisual community to the fact that audiovisual is a
cultural item."
86

The new concern for culture coincided with the
release of E.U. reports spotlighting that Hollywood
products had thoroughly dominated thoroughly the movie
and television screens of most European countries during
the early 1990s. For example, in 1993 some 19 of the
U.K.'s top-20 grossing films were American made, while in
France, nearly all prime-time television programs were
produced in the United States.
87
French Culture Minister
Jacques Toubon proclaimed, "Culture is about diversity
and pluralism. That is why I am fighting for the creation
of a European distribution system."
88
His successor,
Hubert Astier, added that "the time has come to move to

85
Michael Williams and Adam Dawtrey, "GATT Spat Wake-up
on Yank Market Muscle," Variety, 27 December 1993, 45.
86
Williams and Dawtrey, "GATT Spat," 45.
87
"Movies Eclipse Film," The Economist, 5 February 5
1994, 89.
88
Dawtrey, "GATT Gets France's Goat," 31.
128

the offensive. We want the European Union to develop a
truly industrial policy."
89

By mid-1994, worries over the viability of the
European entertainment industry were still growing. On
the heels of a highly-protectionist report by an E.U.
think-tank,
90
European officials called for the breakup of
United International Pictures (UIP), a distribution
company jointly owned by American production giants
Paramount, Universal, and MGM.
91
These officials claimed
that UIP functioned as a choke point for broader
distribution of European films. Despite the threat by
1995 Hollywood was more focused on the enforcement of the
"Television Without Frontiers" quotas
92
because the
technocrats of Britain, Germany, and Italy, were
increasingly siding with the French to present Hollywood
with a unified, pan-European challenge.

89
Williams and Dawtrey, "GATT Spat," 48.
90
"Report by the Think-Tank on the Audiovisual Policy in
the European Union." Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1994.
91
James Bates, "Official Says Europe Willing to Do
Lunch," Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1994.
92
Mavis Clarence, "EC's Talking Quotas Today," The
Hollywood Reporter, 8 February 1995, 1.
129

France held the E.U. presidency in the first half of
1995 and pushed the Council to tighten enforcement of the
original "Television Without Frontiers" guotas and make
them legally binding.
93
These fights illustrate a long
tradition of European countries trying to control the
fate of their entertainment business and, as they might
put it, preserve European culture and way of life.
94

4.7 The World Audiovisual Market
In the international market the stakes are high for
audiovisual products. At the time of this case and
continuing through the late 1990’s, revenue from
theatrical sales of movies represented billions of
dollars annually for the global economy. And as worldwide
VCR and DVD player ownership explodes, videocassette
sales and rentals are reaching similar figures, and
eventually will surpass them. Perhaps more remarkably,
revenue from expanded and improved cable and satellite
services could soon dwarf the box office receipts and
those coming from video sales and rentals. This puts the

93
Alan Riding, "New Curbs Proposed on Foreign TV Programs
in Europe," New York Times, 23 March 1995, D8.
94
"Report by the Think-Tank."
130

French-led, E.U.-U.S. battle over quotas in a decidedly
economic light. The E.U. claims "the prospect of a
Community-wide audiovisual [policy and] market offers
vast potential, the interest of which is not confined to
the Europeans."
95

The lucrative nature of the audiovisual market is
reflected in the extraordinary efforts Hollywood studios
and U.S.-based music companies have employed to prevent
piracy--the illegal copying and selling of programs and
videos. Hollywood says piracy costs nearly $1 billion
annually in lost movie and video revenues,
96
so it now
uses and is fighting it with specially-formatted,
computer-encoded videotape to thwart copying, offers
substantial rewards for information on pirating
operations, and even employs private investigative
services to nab scofflaws.
97

95
"The Audio-Visual Media in the Single European Market"
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
Communities, 1988), 7.
96
As of 1988 (Wildman, Steven S. and Siwek Stephen E.,
International Trade in Films and Television Programs
[Cambridge: American Enterprise Institute/Ballinger
Publication, 1988], 1.).
97
Keith Acheson, Christopher Maule and Elizabet Filleul,
"Folly of Quotas on Films and Television Programmes,"
World Economy 12 (1989): 516.
131

During the Uruguay Round of GATT talks--and
continuing through today--the U.S. audiovisual industry
thoroughly dominates global markets in film, video, and
television software. In the words of one report from that
period: "It is estimated that around one-half of all the
world's imported television software originates in the
United States, and about 80 percent of official box
office revenues in countries where American movies are
shown."
98
Seen in context, even the combined efforts of
the next three leading export nations did not match that
of Hollywood in terms of earnings.
99

By 1985, Hollywood enjoyed a positive annual trade
balance exceeding $1 billion.
100
By 1992, when the Uruguay
Round was to end, the trade surplus from Europe alone
amounted to nearly $3.7 billion.
101
Entertainment products
were the United States' second-largest export earner
after defense.
102
So the sense of concern and urgency

98
Jörn Kruse, "The EC-US Trade Conflict over Film and
Television Software," Intereconomics (November/December
1994): 284.
99
Wildman and Siwek Wildman, International Trade in Films
and Television Programs, 1.
100
Ibid.
101
Quintero, "American Television," 119.
102
"Buddy, Can You," 56.
132

's
f its
urgency expressed by Washington officials and Hollywood
own lobbyists over the prospect of possible restrictions
to the European market is understandable. Put another
way, a strict quota system by the E.U., regardless o
justification, would hit one nation hardest: the United
States.
The European market provides Hollywood its global
economic might. In 1992, European revenue totaled $3.7
billion; just one year later that figure jumped 21
percent to $4.5 billion, providing more than half of
Hollywood's gross revenue--even more than the revenue
coming from its own domestic markets.
By 1995, in the wake of the case, the audiovisual
trade gap between the E.U. and the United States had
grown to $6.3 billion in favor of the United States.
103

This came over a 15-year period when European audiovisual
gross revenues were rising, while market share for
domestic producers declined from 65 percent to less than
10 percent in some cases.
104
Table 4.7.A illustrates is
point dramatically, especially in the case of Germany,
where U.S. films captured more than 82 percent of the

103
"EU-US Audio-visual Trade Gap Increases," Screen
Digest (January, 1997), 1.
104
"Think-Tank," 6.
133

market by 1992, having held only a 66 percent share just
three years earlier. The French, though holding onto a
tenuous 34 percent share of their own market, saw
Hollywood slightly increase its nearly 60 percent market-
leading position. Even in Greece, where American films
held an 86% share in 1989, Hollywood expanded its share
to 92 percent by 1992.

Table 4.7.A

Market Shares of Domestic and U.S. Films in
European Union Countries, 1989-1992

Country
'89 '90 '91 '92 '89 '90 '91 '92
Germany 66% 84% 80% 83% 17% 10% 14% 10%
Belgium 70% 73% 80% 73% 3% 4% 3% 4%
Denmark 64% 77% 83% 78% 15% 15% 11% 15%
France 56% 56% 58% 58% 34% 38% 31% 35%
Greece 86% 87% 88% 92% 9% 8% 7% 2%
Ireland 75% 87% 92% -- 2% 5% 2% --
Italy 73% 75% -- 54% 17% 19% -- --
Luxembourg 87% 80% 85% -- 2% 2% 2% --
Netherlands 76% 86% 93% 79% 5% 3% 2% 13%
Portugal 81% 85% 85% -- 1% 1% 1% --
Spain 73% 72% 69% 77% 7% 10% 10% 9%
U.K. 84% 89% 84% -- 10% 7% 14% --
U.S. Films Domestic Films

Source: Kruse. "E.U.-U.S. Trade Conflict," p. 285 (citing:
European Cinema Yearbook, 1993).

134

Similarly, Table 4.7.B shows Spain's all-time, top-
10 grossing films as of May, 1985. None were domestically
produced and most originated in America--a situation
remarkably similar at the time to most other E.U. member
states.
105

Table 4.7.B

Variety Estimates of All-Time Highest
Grossing Releases in Spain (in US$)

Rank Film Revenues (M)
1 E.T. $9.6
2 Raiders of the Lost Ark $4.7
3 Superman $4.1
4 Gremlins $3.8
5 Star Wars $3.7
6 Tootsie $3.5
7 Indiana Jones $3.5
8 Police Academy $3.5
9 Return of the Jedi $3.3
10 Gone with the Wind $3.3

Source: Wildman and Siwek, International Trade in Films
and Television Programs. p. 23 (citing: "Alltime B.O.
Champs in Spain," Variety, May 1, 1985, p. 410.).

U.S. dominance was not as great in the television
programming market. Table 4.7.C shows that 44 percent of
Italy's programming time was dedicated to European

105
In 2007, with the exception of the British-produced
Harry Potter series, Spain's top-grossing releases were
still all American-produced.
135

programs. At the opposite extreme, Germany and Greece
broadcasters aired about 70 percent European shows.
(Television share numbers are almost the inverse, in
terms of "leading" countries, of the film share figures
in Table 4.7.A.)

Table 4.7.C

Europe's 1988 Share of Television
Program Content, By Country (in %)

Country "A" "B"
Germany 83% 69%
Belgium 71% 75%
Denmark 77% 58%
France 67% 66%
Greece 78% 75%
Ireland 61% 61%
Italy 54% 44%
Luxembourg 48% 48%
Netherlands 70% 64%
Portugal 66% 65%
Spain 65% 57%
United Kingdom 69% 55%
United States 1-2%*

"A": Uses E.U. definition of quotas (no sports,
news, game shows or ads); weighted by audience. The
higher the ratings, the higher the show is counted.
"B": Uses E.U. definition of quotas based on raw
counting of minutes regardless of audience.
* Estimates of foreign penetration into U.S.
domestic markets vary, but seldom exceed 2%.

Source: "Quid Pro Quota," Variety, October 11-17, 1989.
p. 63; for the United States, the figures represent the
overall foreign penetration of the audiovisual market:
"Report by the Think-Tank on the Audiovisual Policy in
the European Union," p. 12.
136

Table 4.7.C also reveals that except Italy and
Luxembourg, all of the E.U. members--except for Italy and
Luxembourg--already complied with the "majority
programming rule" of the "Television Without Frontiers"
directive. Indeed, some states--such as France and
Germany--had established television quotas before the
controversial E.U. legislation, while others increased
them soon after its adoption.

4.8 An Analysis of American Dominance of International
Audiovisual Markets
How then did the American film industry build and
retain its dominant international presence? Why were the
national film industries of the E.U. unable to compete
globally? The E.U. view is that Hollywood's ascendancy
can be explained, albeit simplistically, by looking at
the past and seeing that the Americans had "'shaped [the
market] to ensure it would play in their favor' while
their [U.S.] market remains practically closed to
imports."
106

106
Ibid., 11.
137

More than three decades ago, Thomas Guback
concluded, "In one way, Europeans have themselves to
thank or blame for this state of affairs."
107
Not much has
changed, Guback remarked, since Europe invited U.S. co-
productions into its respective film industries and
discouraged competition by limiting imports. Further,
Guback pointed out that America "is a market without a
screen quota or an import quota."
108
The barriers to
foreign producers attempting to enter the U.S. market,
according to Guback, come from extraordinarily well-run,
and tightly-controlled, distribution systems coupled with
an over-supply of films, a situation he calls as a
"monopolize[d] home market."
109

Recognizing the strong export incentives inherent to
the audiovisual industry,
110
Jörn Kruse examined

107
Guback, The International Film Industry, 201.
108
Ibid., 68.
109
Ibid., 69.
110
Kruse makes careful note of two economic
characteristics of the world trade in audio-visual
products: first, is non-rivalry in consumption (in other
words, there is little cost in the reproduction of
"software" once the original is created); second, there
is a "cultural discount" which implies that a given
audience prefers "local" stories, characters, and actors.
138

Hollywood's strength overseas, and the weakness of the
industry in Europe. He found four factors leading to U.S.
success:

1) The American film and television industries
have always been businesses where entertainment
value is the key to success.

2) Given that the "outstanding determinant of
profits" is consumer attraction, total costs
and prices in production are "almost secondary
issues." Thus, the supply of risk capital
available to Hollywood is critical to its
success.

3) America's audiovisual industry is highly
competitive and horizontally integrated due to
economically driven incentives and antitrust
policy.

4) Hollywood enjoys an enormous domestic market
which helps to offset the cultural discount of
export.
111

In short, Kruse argues, "The American success basically
accrues to superior products and efficient production and
marketing."
112

Despite the European commission's earlier claims to
the contrary, strategies to strengthen Europe's audio-
visual industry reflected Kruse's assessments. In 1994,
the Green Paper titled "Strategy Options to Strengthen

111
Kruse, "The EC-EU Trade Conflict," 286-287.
112
Ibid., 288.
139

the European Programme Industry in the Context of the
Audiovisual Policy of the European Union,",
113
and the
"Report by the Think-Tank," reveal a three-level plan to
resuscitate the E.U.'s entertainment industry.
First, on the regulatory level, an extension and
strengthening of the controversial quota system was
considered.
114
Existing quotas on overall transmission
times were rejected in favor of limiting foreign
programming broadcasts "to certain days of the week and
certain hours."
115
Or, quotas could be applied to the
"financial amount of software purchases."
116
In either
case, limited access to European markets would
effectively constrain Hollywood.
Second, on the financial level, the E.U. considered
directly subsidizing the production and distribution of
its audiovisual industries. This was to be paid for by a
levy on box office receipts, video cassettes, advertising
revenues, and broadcasting fees. Unofficial sources

113
European Commission. "Strategy Options to Strengthen
the European Programme Industry in the Context of the
Audiovisual Policy of the European Union," Green Paper.
Brussels, 1994.
114
"Think-Tank," 48.
115
Ibid.
116
Kruse, "The EC-EU Trade Conflict," 291.
140

suggested the levy might be as high as 5 percent.
117
The
protectionist implications were obvious: the Think-Tank
warned cinema owners that their eligibility for such
monies would "be closely tied to the condition of showing
a certain number of European films."
118

Third, the plan suggested similar financial support
on the promotional and distribution level, Monies would
be targeted at taking national productions into other
European countries, encouraging pan-European promotion,
and using public broadcasting to push European
products.
119
And once again, the E.U. considered a
punitive move to counter Hollywood's dominance: the
dismantling of the earlier-mentioned, cooperative
distribution company, United International Pictures. In
sum, adopting this new, three-level industrial policy
would combine "culture quotas" with levies, subsidized
production, and state-encouraged consumption of European
products over those coming from Hollywood.

117
Ibid.
118
"Think-Tank, 48.
119
Ibid., 55.
141

4.9 The Cultural Case Considered
Free-market economists (along with U.S. Trade
Representatives and officials from the MPEAA) have
portrayed the long-standing battles between the E.U. and
Hollywood as a classic trade dispute and nothing more.
However, the protests of French and E.U. officials--that
the dominance of Hollywood products represents an
important cultural issue--merits serious attention. Film
and audiovisual products have a unique "cultural
component" compared to more traditional commodities such
as wheat or steel. Films and television programs can
reflect the beliefs and visions of their creators and
shape those of their consumers. As one French director
declared, "Audio-visual is the most powerful instrument
of culture in our century ... It must not be likened to
other products and services."
120
Even the "general
principles of international law recognize [this with] a
'cultural exception' for products that have a 'cultural
character'."
121

120
Quintero, "American Television," 120. [Citing Suzanne
Pery, "Film-Makers Threaten to Take EC to Court on Trade
Rules." The Reuter Library Report, 4 October 1993.]
121
Filipek, "Culture Quotas," 349.
142

According to the E.U.'s Think-Tank on audiovisual
policy, the most important non-economic aspect of trade
disputes with Hollywood reflects this thinking and boils
down to "Europe ... staunchly defending its cultural
identity."
122
Even the controversial Article 4 of the
"Television Without Frontiers" directive--which U.S.
officials contend imposes limits on the importation of
foreign audiovisual products--is justified "as a
legitimate method of preserving national and regional
identities," and not as an economically-driven
protectionist barrier.
123
Given that "an American child
born today will spend approximately nine years of its
life watching television (and a European child not much
less), the importance of these manufactured dreams can be
gauged," and the E.U. perspective better appreciated.
124

For European officials, the messages that can be
transmitted through film and television could strengthen

122
"Think-Tank," 11.
123
Paul Presburger and Michael R. Tyler, "Television
Without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created by the
New European Community Directive," Hastings International
and Comparative Law Review 13 (1990): 505.
124
C.W.E. Bigsby, "Europe, America and the Cultural
Debate," in Superculture: American Popular Culture and
Europe. ed. C.W.E. Bigsby (Bowling Green: Bowling Green
University Popular Press, 1975), 5.
143

national cultures. Simultaneously, and perhaps more
importantly from the perspective of E.U. leadership,
these messages could promote a common European identity--
an identity critical for a deepened European unification.
In the words of the "Television Without Frontiers"
directive:

[Media can] play an important part in
developing and nurturing awareness of the rich
variety of Europe's common cultural and
historical heritage. The dissemination of
information across national borders can do much
to help the peoples of Europe to recognize the
common destiny they share in many areas.
125

it is this "cultural dimension" that E.U. officials claim
they want to protect, develop and nurture through
subsidies and aid, their native, and presently fragile
audiovisual sector, ironically, "in the same way as it is
promoting the technical and economic aspects [of other
sectors]."
126
In the end, advocates claim, a culturally-
protectionist stance will "not ... close the European
market to Americans, but ... [only serve to] open the
European market to Europeans."
127

125
"Green Paper," 28.
126
"The Audio-Visual Media in the Single European Market"
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
Communities, 1988), 49.
127
Quintero, "American Television," 122. [citing "Belated
Bonhomie," The Economist, 2 October 1993, 50.]
144

Those who advocate limiting American access to
European audiovisual markets face the problem of
determining what constitutes a European identity. The
"Television Without Frontiers" directive implies that
while individual national cultures exist, a pan-European
identity or culture has yet to be created. Presumably,
any product created by Europeans and marketed to them
would foster such a European identity, but, as several
scholars point out, the definition of a "European Work"
contained in "Television Without Frontiers" of what
constitutes a "European Work" is enigmatic at best. One
author even argues that the directive's language would
permit an episode of "Dallas," if shot in Paris with a
French crew, to be described as "European."
128
Indeed, the
actions of European directors and producers to attract
U.S. partnerships so that their combined efforts meet the
directive's European origin requirements, strike some
observers as evidence that motives of the directive's
most vocal supporters are, at a minimum, more economic
than cultural in nature.
129

128
Filipek, "Culture Quotas," 358.
129
Ibid.; see also, "Sleeping with the Enemy," The
Economist, 26 October 1991, 91.
145

According to legal scholars, international law
historically recognizes only the protections for national
cultural reasons; it is unclear if a "regional" culture,
like a "European identity," merits the same exception.
130

More broadly: are the similarities between British and
Spanish culture greater than those between Britain and
the United States? Or would the people of Portugal find
German television more culturally relevant than that
coming from Brazil? As U.S. Trade Representative Hills
said during the "Frontiers" debate:

We do not understand why the Spanish culture is
more protected by a film produced in Germany by
'Europeans' than by a Spanish film of Mexican
origin, or why the English culture is promoted
more by a film produced in France by
'Europeans' than by a film of New Zealand
origin. We do not understand why a film about
French cultural history, in the French
language, promotes French culture any less
simply because it is 'not of European origin.'
The definition of 'European works' is economic,
not cultural.
131

In short, it could be argued that the United States has
more in common culturally with a number of E.U. member
states than those states have in common with other Union

130
Filipek, "Culture Quotas," 359.
131
Presburger and Tyler, "Television Without Frontiers,"
505. [citing Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Press Release No. 56, at 1 (Oct. 10, 1989).]
146

states, and more broadly, that the cultural argument
advanced by E.U. officials is but a red herring to
distract from the economic motives for protectionism.
There is an additional aspect of the E.U.'s cultural
argument that must be addressed, but which is more
difficult to put into the context of the GATT trade
dispute. For many in Hollywood, it is very real, and
comes from the long-standing tradition in European
intellectual circles of denigrating the cultural efforts
of the United States, as well as the tradition's more
pedestrian cousin, blatant European anti-Americanism.
Nowhere do both problems manifest themselves with such
vigor as in the nation that argues strongest for cultural
protectionism: France. This subject addressed by Richard
F. Kuisel in his book "Seducing the French,"
132
and by
Diana Quintero in an essay focused on the issue of the
earlier-discussed GATT negotiations over film.
133

As Kuisel points out, the French long have had a
love-hate relationship with les Américains: in addition
to "anxiety about America's new power in international

132
Kuisel, Richard F., Seducing the French: The Dilemma
of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993).
133
Quintero, "American Television."
147

affairs, [and] its economic weight," over the past 50
years the French asserted the superiority of their own
culture and civilization relative to the "superficial"
and "materialist" products coming from the home of
Disneyland.
134
To this, Quintero adds that increasing
economic frictions between the United States and France,
and now between the United States and the European Union,
have exacerbated these fears. Unfortunately, she warns,
"One should expect continued Franco-American rivalry."
135

To be fair, it must be acknowledged that American
popular culture tends to overwhelm more traditional
native cultures. No less than F. Scott Fitzgerald
compared the impact of American culture in Europe to a
train rushing blindly forward, and described Americans
who export their views to the world without
discrimination as "fantastic Neanderthals."
136
However,
the "culture quotas" of France, the most strictly
enforced in the E.U., have done little to lessen the
popularity of American audiovisual products. Nor have
they increased the demand for those of French origin, or

134
Kuisel, Seducing the French, 17.
135
Quintero, "American Television," 126 and 124.
136
Bigsby, "Europe, America," 1-2.
148

changed the tastes of the viewing public. In fact, even
French television stations have complained about the
deleterious effects of the quotas on their ratings: their
combined losses totaled $50 million in the year following
implementation. Still other observers quip that "even the
French will not watch bad programmes out of patriotic
pride."
137
Even more dramatic is the following comparison:
"In a decade in which French films have been more heavily
subsidized than those in any other European country,
domestic attendance at French films has plummeted from 90
million per year to 45 million, while attendance at
American offerings in France has remained constant, at 80
million."
138

Ironically, regardless of the validity of the
worries expressed by French and E.U. officials about the
loss of European identity or creeping Americanization,

137
"Buddy Can You," 57.
138
Tyler Marshall, "EU Panel Urges Tighter TV Import
Quotas," Los Angeles Times, 23 March 1995.
149

the words of the director of the European Institute for
the Media, George Wedell, may prove prophetic: "There is
a danger that [in the end] European rubbish will be no
better than the American rubbish."
139

139
Quintero, "American Television," 122.
150

Chapter 5

Japan and the Rice Trade

It has often been pointed out that the Japanese
are uncomfortable with the idea that they might
actually be understood. The uniqueness and the
spiritual dimension of being Japanese, which by
definition cannot be grasped by foreigners (as
Japanese constantly persuade themselves in
schools and via the media), is too important an
ingredient of Japanese self-esteem. In practice,
therefore, "mutual understanding" implies that
foreigners should accept the picture of Japan
presented by its spokesmen.

Karel G. van Wolferen
"The Japan Problem"

5.1 Introduction
Agriculture long has been subject to careful
oversight by national governments. However, in 1986, at
the Uruguay Round of trade talks, major trading nations
took steps to liberalize farm product trade by calling
for an end to domestic production schemes, distribution
controls, marketing programs, export subsides, and
especially, restrictions or bans on the importation of
foreign foods. Nearly all of the countries participating
in the talks had imposed one or all of these barriers to
free trade; predictably, negotiations on agricultural
reform always proved extraordinarily difficult.
For Japan, the task was nearly impossible because its
151

its cherished "staple food," rice, carries a cultural
significance that goes far beyond the common view of food
products as mere commodities. Allowing for trade in rice
through the GATT talks would cost the nation's long-
ruling Liberal Democratic Party, (LDP), its usual,
dominant position, and it proved a divisive social issue
when Japan was forced to decide whether its cultural
traditions should take a secondary role to the reality of
a globalizing world economy.
This study of Japan's fight against the
liberalization of its rice market opens with an in-depth
look at Japanese domestic and international rice
policies. Next examined are the politics of rice in
Japan, the politics of agriculture in relation to past
GATT agreements and the world market in cereal products.
These background sections are followed by a discussion of
Japan's cultural relationship to rice. The case concludes
with a history of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks on
agriculture in general, and on the effort to open Japan's
rice market.

5.2 Japan's Rice Policy
On the eve of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, Japan
had in place a complex series of rules and regulations to
152

control the production, marketing, and consumption--and
nearly everything in between--of rice. Collectively known
as Japan's rice policy, these rules originated from the
experiences of the Japanese people during and immediately
after World War II, and the resulting and lasting belief
that self-sufficiency particularly in rice, is a worthy
and necessary goal of government policy.
During World War II, the Japanese military
oligarchy--in an effort to deal with food shortages,
rampant profiteering, and to avoid outflows of much-
needed foreign exchange reserves--enacted the "Staple
Food Control Act of 1942." This legislation placed rigid
government controls on rice, wheat, barley, and potatoes,
setting prices, forcing producers to sell exclusively to
the government, and allowing consumers to buy only from
the government or approved outlets. Officially, the law
was intended "to control food and to carry out the
adjustment of supply and demand and prices and also
control distribution in order to secure food for people
and to ensure stability in [the] national economy."
1

1
Staple Food Control Act, Article 1. Quoted in Fumio
Egaitsu, "Japanese Agricultural Policy," in U.S.-Japanese
Agricultural Trade Relations, ed. Emery N. Castle, Kenzo
Hemmi, with Sally A. Skillings (Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future, Inc., 1982).
153

Viewed another way, it amounted to bringing even food
into an ultimately-doomed war effort.
2

For Japanese citizens during the war, getting enough
food proved was extraordinarily difficult and the
inflexibility of the Staple Food Control Law only made
things worse. When the war ended and the subsequent
occupation by Allied forces, the supply of food dried up
and Japan found itself on the brink of mass starvation.
3

Diverting huge stockpiles of food intended for U.S.
troops
*
to an increasingly hungry Japanese populace kept
starvation at bay, at least in the short-term.
4
The
collective memory of this period "profoundly influenced
Japan's agricultural policy to the present time."
5

2
For a general discussion of Japan's "home front" in the
war effort see Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A
Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 497-499.
3
Frank Gibney, The Pacific Century: America and Asia in
a Changing World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1992), 196.
*
To a degree, the Japanese had themselves to thank for
the ability of their occupiers to provide them food:
after a peaceful reception by the Japanese, US leaders
decided to cut American troops from 600,000 to 200,000
leaving an enormous stockpile of surplus rations behind.
4
Roger C. Thompson, The Pacific Basin Since 1945
(London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1994), 9.
5
Egaitsu, "Japanese Agricultural Policy," 150.
154

To stave off further famines, and widespread
rebellion in their wake, American occupiers continued
regulating most food markets, while starting to reform
Japan's agricultural system to ensure a long-term
solution to its food woes.
6
General Douglas MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers occupying the
defeated nation, ordered the Japanese Diet to "destroy
the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese
farmer for centuries of feudal oppression."
7
This
translated to a sweeping land reform program.
This was one of the few reforms championed by the
occupiers and supported by the vast majority of the
Japanese people and their representatives in the Diet.
Resistance to the plan was limited to absentee landowners
who backed away from any real confrontations with
occupying Americans.
8

The land reforms saw the government purchase 1.7
million hectares of land* and transfer ownership to
former tenants. Ownership was limited to less than three
hectares per family (the limit of what a single family

6
Thompson, Pacific Basin, 6-7.
7
As quoted in Gibney, Pacific Century, 189.
8
Ibid. For a broad discussion of Allied planning and
Japanese resistance see Thompson, Pacific Basin, 5-8.
155

might effectively work during a growing season), and to
resident owners only. The reforms were successful. At the
end of the war, approximately 50 percent of arable land
was owned by absentee landlords and worked by ill-paid
tenant farmers. After the reforms, less than 10 percent
of the farms in Japan were being worked by non-owners.
9

The result: farm productivity and food supplies rose
dramatically. Most restrictions covering potatoes were
lifted in 1950, and those dealing with wheat in 1952.
10

Nonetheless, from the onset of war through the late
1960s, Japan imported virtually every important cereal
grain, including rice. By the late 1950s, with price
controls over most agricultural products remaining in
place, urban workers enjoyed a transfer of wealth coming
from the countryside.
11
To deal with this growing income
disparity, and to improve agricultural productivity the
government enacted the "Agricultural Basic Law of 1961."
12

9
Egaitsu, "Japanese Agricultural Policy," 151.
10
Ibid., 152.

*
A hectare is a metric unit of land measurement equal to
2.471 acres.
11
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Japan's Rice Policy,
report prepared by William T. Coyle, Foreign Agricultural
Report Number 164 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1981), 2.
156

1961."
12
Combined with remnants of the Staple Food Act and
the post-war land reform, this became the basis of
Japan's rice policy for decades to come.
On the domestic level Japan's pre-Uruguay Round rice
policy consisted of two components: price controls and
crop diversion schemes. Price controls were intended to
raise farmers' income to levels roughly equal to that of
non-farm workers, and to encourage the citizenry to eat
rice, (a domestically produced crop) over wheat (an
imported commodity). Crop diversion schemes were intended
to avoid rice surpluses by using some of Japan's
available acreage for crops other than rice. This policy
also tied directly into Japan's traditional goal of self-
sufficiency.
13

As chart 5.2.A shows, price controls severely
distorted the cost of rice to Japanese consumers relative
to the rest of the world and even in other Asian nations
with price controls. In 1976-80, for example, the farm-
level price of rice in Japan was 391 percent of the world
price.

12
The Agricultural Basic Law of 1961 was largely inspired
by earlier, successful rural-farm income-parity efforts
in France and Germany.
13
For an in-depth look at Japan's domestic rice policy,
see USDA/Coyle, Japan's Rice Policy, vi-19.
157

Table 5.2.A

Farm-Level Price of Rice as a Percentage
of World Price, 1961-80

1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80
Japan 203% 228% 246% 391%
S. Korea 119% 104% 111% 187%
Malaysia -- -- 149% 173%
Taiwan 160% 134% 150% 168%
China 109% 96% 71% 76%
India 146% 109% 98% 76%
Thailand 71% 55% 62% 70%
Pakistan -- -- -- 48%
Burma 56% 42% 44% 37%

Source: Randolph Barker, Robert W. Herdt, with Beth Rose,
The Rice Economy of Asia (Washington, D.C.: Resources for
the Future, Inc., 1985), Table 16.2, 237.

This situation worsened over time: by 1985, the Japanese
government paid its rice growers nearly $2,200 per metric
ton, more than 10 times the world market price.
14
In the
years preceding the Uruguay Round, Japanese consumers
were paying, on average, seven to 10 times the world
price for their own rice.
To a degree, such policies helped bring the farmers'
income to parity with non-farm workers, though "growth in

14
U.S. Congress, U.S.-Japan Rice Trade: Hearing before
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
99th Cong., 2nd sess., 21 October 1986, 5.
158

off-farm income was more important in raising rural
income as the agricultural component of farm household
income dwindled from about 50 percent in 1960 to 30
percent in 1978."
15
Indeed, "part-time" farmers grew about
85 percent of Japan's rice at the time of the case.
16

However, the pricing regulations' greatest impact was to
create a surplus in rice as farmers responded to their
government's economic incentives. The viability of rice
farming became so great relative to other crops--even
with the government's diversion programs in place--annual
rice surpluses were regular occurrences for Japan since
the 1960s. Despite government efforts to encourage
farming of other crops, self-sufficiency in other
commodities actually decreased after the Agricultural
Basic Law of 1961 was passed, largely because of the
attractive prices paid directly to farmers for their
rice.
Table 5.2.B shows that from 1960-1977, Japan enjoyed
a self-sufficiency rate in rice of about 110 percent. In
contrast, the rate for wheat plummeted from around 40

15
USDA/Coyle, Japan's Rice Policy, 5.
16
Emiko Oknuki-Tierney, Rice as Self: Japanese Identities
through Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), 17.
159

percent to 4 percent; barley went from 104 percent to
less than 10 percent; and soybeans from 28 percent to 3
percent. The cost to the Japanese economy for the
government's subsidy of rice production went beyond these
declines. Rice policies alone accounted for 16.8 percent
of the entire Japanese agricultural budget in 1960,
rising to 31.1 percent by 1980.
17
By the mid-1980s, the
Japanese people spent more than $25 billion annually to
prop up rice production.
18

17
USDA/Coyle, Japan's Rice Policy, Table 2, 4.
18
U.S. Congress, U.S.-Japan Rice Trade, 5.
160

Table 5.2.B

Japan's Domestic Production, Import, Export, and
Self-Sufficiency Rates for Selected Farm Commodities
(absolute numbers in 1,000 metric tons), 1960-77

Year
Domestic
Production
Imports Exports
Sufficiency
Rate (%)
Total Cereals

1960 17,101 4,500 48 83%

1970 13,858 15,803 835 48%

1977 13,585 22,709 104 40%
Rice

1960 12,858 219 -- 102%

1970 12,689 15 785 106%

1977 13,095 71 -- 114%
Wheat

1960 1,531 2,660 47 39%

1970 478 4,621 46 9%

1977 236 5,662 4 4%
Barley

1960 1,206 30 1 104%

1970 418 1,072 1 28%

1977 167 2,238 0 7%
Soybeans

1960 418 1,081 -- 28%

1970 126 3,244 -- 4%

1977 111 3,602 0 3%

Source: Yoshimi Kuroda, "The Present State of Agriculture
in Japan," in U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade Relations,
Emery N. Castle and Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally A. Skillings
(Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1982),
Table 4-A-28, 138-40.

Internationally, the rice policy had two components:
a surplus disposal program accomplished mainly through
subsidized exports, and the goal of totally banning
imported rice. The disposal program allowed for
161

government-subsidized exports of stockpiled rice and
attempted to create other uses for rice, such as
producing sake, rice flour, soy sauce, and rice cakes,
and as animal feed. The government justified a ban on
imports by appealing to the popular view of rice as
sacred in Japanese life; by invoking the experiences of
the war years; and by pointing out that Japan must
maintain self-sufficiency in this product.
Before the mid-1960s, Japan was a net importer of
rice; by the late-1960s, responding to government
incentives, growers began producing more rice than Japan
needed domestically. Thus, in 1968, a government-directed
surplus disposal program began as Japan sent 30,000
metric tons of surplus rice abroad. This "first wave" of
rice exports lasted through 1974, and successfully
reduced Japan's surplus stocks of rice by approximately
3.1 million metric tons.
19
During this period, commercial
sales were negligible: most of the rice sent abroad was
in the form of food aid or as loan packages.
20
A second
wave of Japanese exporting began in 1979, when domestic
stockpiles again reached what the government described as

19
USDA/Coyle, Japan's Rice Policy, 14-5.
20
Ibid., 14.
162

"burdensome" levels.
21
This time, however, commercial
sales made up a large part of the disposal effort, even
though they were made with "highly concessional terms,
effectively far below the prevailing world rice price."
22

Despite its goal of "not one grain" of foreign rice
entering Japan, the island nation has, even in surplus
years, imported a small amount of foreign-grown rice
every year. This, however, usually accounts for less than
two-tenths of 1 percent of all the rice consumed annually
in Japan and is of a special type used for ceremonial
candies and cakes.
23
To a degree then, Japan's ban on
imported rice on the eve of the Uruguay Round was a very
real, and highly successful, part of its overall rice
policy.

5.3 Domestic Politics of Rice in Japan
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the
politics of rice are the politics of Japan. The country's
long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party traditionally owed

21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., 15.
23
U.S. Congress, U.S.-Japan Rice Trade, 5.
163

its parliamentary majorities to rural voters, as have the
parties which have recently challenged the LDP's
ascendant position. Conversely, the countryside
electorate expects, and usually receives, the largesse of
Japan's politicians in return for their ballots. Perhaps
most important, the local farm cooperatives, which at
first glance appear to serve only the basic needs of
Japan's growers, actually serve as fundamental components
of Japan's larger political economy.
Japan's parliamentary districts were drawn after
World War II, when the nation's population was split
almost equally between the countryside and urban centers.
Seats in the House of Representatives were roughly
proportionate to the number of voters in each district.
However, with the post-war economic recovery and
resultant urbanization, rural voters began enjoying a
disproportionate influence on national election. Despite
a reduction in their absolute numbers, rural
constituencies have the same level of representation in
the Diet as in the past.
24

24
It is worth noting that the direct electoral influence
of the farm bloc is often questioned, but that in terms
of policy outcomes--such as the rice price--few challenge
the idea that rural voters usually have their way. See
William W. Kelly, "Japanese Farmers," Wilson Quarterly
14, no. 4 (Autumn 1990), 36.
164

By the mid-1970s, the ratio of electoral influence
of rural voters over urban citizens had risen to almost
5:1.
25
Even when districts were redrawn before the 1976
national election, the level remained at 3:1.For the
House of Councilors, the ratio remained at a constant
5:1.
26
By 1990, the situation had not changed: the vote
weight difference between rural and urban Japan stood at
3.38:1.
27
This gave the LDP--the established party of
farmers and other rural voters--a substantial advantage
in the number of seats it maintained in the Diet. For
example, in the 1976 election, after an effort to redraw
the voting districts, the LDP won 249 seats out of 511
(there are 512 seats today). According to one oft-cited
analysis, if districts were drawn more strictly to
reflect population, the LDP's seats would have been
reduced to 222, not enough to retain its unchallenged

25
Kenzo Hemmi, "Agriculture and Politics in Japan," in
U.S. Japanese Agricultural Trade Relations, ed. Emery N.
Castle, Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally A. Skillings (Washington,
D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1982), 227.
26
Ibid.
27
Chen-Tian Kuo and Takuya Yanagisawa, "The Politics of
Japan's Rice Trade," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies
(Winter 1992), 25.
165

majority leadership in the Diet.
28
The LDP is the only
political party which caters to rural voters. The former
dean of the faculty of agriculture at the University of
Tokyo, states that all of Japan's political parties take
a protectionist stance toward the farming sector a,
differing only in the means to do so.
29

Consider that the Japanese House of Representatives
works as a "medium constituency system;" nearly every
voting district is represented with three to five seats.
However, most of the districts contain significant
numbers of rural voters who dominate the urban dwellers
living in the same areas. In fact, only 83 of the 512
seats in the House--16 percent--represent strictly urban
populations.
30
Rural voters enjoy a disproportionate
influence over national politics compared to those living
in large towns or cities, even when it is not the LDP
which represents them.
31

28
The analysis was done by Japanese political scientists
on behalf of the newspaper Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), March
5, 1979.
29
Hemmi, "Agriculture and Politics," 225.
30
Ibid., 228.
31
Ibid.
166

As mentioned earlier, the LDP is most identified
with rural interests. But what do those rural interests
expect from LDP politicians in return for their votes?
The LDP representatives must take an active interest in
their constituencies' local affairs and must also
introduce and support legislation and policies that favor
voters whose livelihoods depend on agriculture.
"Specifically, the farmers' demands usually include
guaranteed prices for rice and other crops and produce,
as well as adequate subsidies for land improvement, farm
land consolidation, and river improvement projects."
32

To appreciate the influence of the farm bloc on
national politics, consider the members of the Diet whom
the Japanese press derisively refers to as the "Viet
Cong." ("Viet Cong" are the communist forces who resisted
U.S. troops in Vietnam, and a play on words. It sounds
like the Japanese abbreviation "beikon," which stands for
the "Rice Price Meeting of Diet Members.") When the Diet
holds its yearly rice price deliberations, the Japanese
Viet Cong--who do not constitute a formal group--rally
together to raise the price of rice. Once the new, higher
rice price is set, the group disappears.
33
This is more

32
Ibid., 231.
167

disappears.
33
This is more than an amusing side note to
understand Japanese national politics. As of the Uruguay
Round of GATT talks, "no [other] interest group had
sufficient incentive to exercise countervailing power
against the strong political pressures of the farm
bloc."
34

The power of Japanese farmers is channeled through
the local agricultural cooperatives to which, by law,
requires all Japanese farmers to join. These
cooperatives, called Nokyo, function like the rural farm
cooperatives found across the United States or Canada,
offering members (supposedly) discounted prices on seeds,
fertilizer, and farm equipment; providing technical
exchange and advice; and, acting as intermediaries in
business or legal transactions or disputes.
35
However,
the Japanese versions depart from their Western
counterparts by also offering members subsidized loans,

33
Ibid., 239.
34
Yujiro Hayami and Yoshidhisa Godo, "Economics and
Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Perspective on the
Uruguay Round," Working Paper Series, Number 5341
(Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995),
5.
35
Susumu Yamaji, "The Unsung Mainstays (2): Agriculture,"
in Politics and Economics in Contemporary Japan, ed.
Murakami Murakami and Johannes Hirshmeir (Tokyo: Japan
Culture Institute, 1979), 191.
168

subsidized loans, credit, and myriad other financial
services.
36
When viewed as a whole, the agricultural
cooperatives constitute "by far the largest insurance
company in the world."
37
Further, the national government
licenses the cooperatives to act as the state's buying
agent for nearly all important crops, including rice.
38

This authority, coupled with the aforementioned financial
activities, gives the Nokyo enormous economic influence
over everyday life in rural Japan--and over the lives of
Japanese far removed from the farm.
Equally important to the Nokyo's economic powers are
its local administrative activities. Virtually all of the
important decisions regarding village life, from
construction permits to water rights, are handled by the
cooperatives; even candidates for local political office
are vetted through them. This does not suggest that the
wishes of everyday citizens in rural communities are
ignored; instead, the Nokyo play an important role in
decision-making at virtually every level of Japanese

36
Honman Masayoshi, "Rice and the Six-Year Grace Period:
Opportunity for Realism," Japan Quarterly (April-June
1994), 160.
37
Kelley, "Japanese Farmers," 37.
38
Yamaji, "Unsung Mainstays," 191.
169

consideration."
40

social life--on farms, in villages, and even in large
corporations.
39
In this regard, the "forging of a
consensus among constituent members of a given
organization ... [is] always the primary
This consensus-building by the local cooperatives is
organized into economic federations, and nationally, into
the giant National Federation of Agricultural
Cooperatives, or Zennoh. Controlling this is yet another
national organization, the Central Union of Agricultural
Cooperatives, called Zenchu.
The Zenchu is, by law, supposed to be non-partisan,
but it manages to extend its influence to nearly every
level of Japanese political life. One well-regarded
western observer of Japan suggests that the Zenchu
functions much like Japan's industrial keiretsu, in which
"groups of corporations [are] tied together by
interlocking directorates and mutual shareholding".
41
In
turn, the keiretsu works to ensure "fair" markets (at

39
See Karel van Wolfren, The Enigma of Japanese Power:
People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), for an extended discussion of the
Japanese "system."
40
Hemmi, "Agriculture and Politics," 242.
41
van Wolfren, Enigma, 60.
170

least for their members), and just as important,
favorable legislation for members, no matter which party
is in power. Less kind perspectives are offered by more
critical--often Japanese--observers. Many see the
Nokyo/Zenchu system as a special interest group--
extremely powerful even in comparison to its corporate
cousins--that usually gets what it wants.
42
Others find
parallels between the Nokyo/Zenchu system and the
political machines of turn-of-the-century America. These
machines "enlisted illiterate and helpless immigrants in
urban areas ... [and] offered small services or material
favors in exchange for their constituents' votes", a
relationship remarkably similar, these authors suggest,
to that of the Nokyo and everyday farmers in rural
Japan.
43

There is another level of interest in Japan's rice
policies coming from government bureaucracies. The
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, (MAFF),
guards Japan's heavily protected rice farmers and, seeks

42
Hayami and Godo, "Economics and Politics," 5-9.
43
Tani Satomi, "The Japan Socialist Party before the Mid-
1960s: An Analysis of Its Stagnation," in Creating Single
Party Democracy: Japan's Postwar Political System, ed.
Kataoka Tetsuya (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1992), 97.
171

of

'votes' as the stakes."
45

and, seeks to preserve its political and economic turf,
as does Japan's Food Agency, which holds monopoly powers
over the rice trade. In the years leading up to the GATT,
both agencies "consistently and openly opposed rice
imports, even at the risk of disobeying the Prime
Minister's statements that implied rice
liberalization."
44
However, the existing relationship
economics and politics between Japan's rice farmers,
their local Nokyo, the Zenchu, national political
parties, and finally the MAFF and the Food Agency, is an
interdependent one: "In a sense, [it is] a game of
influence peddling with 'subsidies' ... [and] with

5.4 Agriculture and the GATT before Uruguay
Traditionally, agriculture resisted economic
liberalization. Production quotas, marketing schemes,
import restrictions, export subsidies, and price
stabilization efforts were the norm for most nations,
because most believed that food is too important to be

44
Kuo and Yanagisawa, "Politics," 30.
45
Hemmi, "Agriculture and Politics," 233.
172

left to market forces.
46
In addition, the United States--
the architect of the post-World War II liberal trade
regime--exempted agriculture from the jurisdiction of the
GATT. The GATT was intended as stop-gap measure destined
to become a single part of the much more ambitious
International Trade Organization, (ITO). However, within
months of the GATT's 1947 signing, the larger ITO was
dumped because the U.S. Congress refused to ratify
American membership.
47
As a result, the GATT became the
foundation for international trade rules for decades to
come.
48
But the GATT also allowed for significant
exemptions to a free-trade ideal, particularly in
agriculture--exemptions that mirrored America's domestic
policies.
Prior to the GATT, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933 shaped U.S. policy allowing the executive branch
to establish import quotas if the long-term survival of

46
Asian Development Bank, Evaluating Rice Market
Intervention Policies: Some Asian Examples (Manila: ADB
Press, 1988), 364.
47
Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United
States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 95.
48
I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 2d ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1992), 436.
173

American farms was in question, a provision used widely
by the United States up to the Uruguay Round of GATT
talks. These policies went beyond the mere survival of
farms by permitting domestic price controls and, relevant
to this case, export subsidies. In turn, the GATT
codified these American-inspired notions at the global
level.
While the GATT's Article XI calls for the
elimination of quantitative trade restrictions, its
exemptions for farm commodities allows signatories " to
impose agricultural import controls to protect their
domestic farm industries ... [and] were also allowed to
restrict farm exports during times of severe shortages."
49

Although the original version of the GATT did not
"proscribe export subsidies, Article XVI:4 was added
later to prohibit export subsidies on all products except
primary agricultural commodities."
50
The GATT's Article
XVI:3 somewhat limits such subsidies by barring nations
from gaining more than an "equitable share of world
trade" through their use.
51
On top of all this, and with

49
Ronald T. Libby, Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and
the Growth in World Grain Trade (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1993), 118.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
174

with the strong backing of U.S. officials, regulation of
food exports and surplus disposal was taken the GATT and
given to the "much less demanding" Food and Agriculture
Organization.
52

Coming out of the War, most post-War governments
shared America's views on the special nature of
agriculture. More than 50 million people died because of
fighting, genocide, disease, and starvation. Major
European and Japanese cities were reduced to rubble. Most
major roads and railways, the principal means of
transportation between urban centers and the countryside,
were beyond repair. Oil and coal production had all but
ceased. As a result, industry came to a near stand-still.
More important, food was scarce and becoming more so;
nations faced amine and disease. For the war's European
and Asian survivors, the future looked bleak. The notion
that self-sufficiency in food might be impossible because
market forces could re-direct food trade away from areas
that needed it most--and toward areas with the greatest
capital--was unacceptable. So, although initially shaped
by American interests, the post-war food regime also

52
Theodore H. Cohn, The International Politics of
Agricultural Trade (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1990), 52.
175

eased the concerns of most of the world's other powers as
well. American interests held sway again in 1955 when
Washington negotiators demanded and received a waiver
allowing U.S. domestic farm policies to contradict--and
take precedence over--GATT requirements imposed on other
nations.
53

By the early 1960s, however, high costs and growing
inefficiencies, combined with an increasing balance-of-
payments problem, prompted the United States to call for
global trade liberalization in agriculture.
54
At the same
time, the European Community's Common Agricultural
Policy--a formidable protectionist barrier to outsiders
interested in tapping European markets--moved Canada to
join the United States in calls for reform. Both nations
pressed to have the agricultural sector included on the
agenda at the Kennedy Round (1964-67) of GATT talks.
The U.S. and Canadian goal at the Kennedy Round was
to reduce the E.C.'s protection levels. The two countries
also wanted an increase in the minimum world wheat price
and more equitable levels of burden sharing in food aid.
55

53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
176

aid.
55
However, negotiators were far apart in demands,
and unwilling to reform domestic policies, and therefore
unable to reach an agreement with and any significant
breakthroughs for agriculture.
56
Ironically, the United
States weakened its negotiating position when it allowed
for import restrictions on meat products while
simultaneously calling on the E.C. to reduce protection
on cereal commodities.
In the end, the Kennedy Round produced a new
International Grains Agreement, (IGA), which reset wheat
floor prices
*
and created a new, more ambitious and
broadly-supported food aid system. Other than that,
however, the Kennedy Round failed to significantly reform
international trade in agricultural products beyond some
minor tariff cuts and bindings.
57
One outcome bears
however, particularly in the context of this case: the

55
Ibid.
56
James P. Houck, "Agreements and Policy in U.S.-Japanese
Agricultural Trade," in U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade
Relations, ed. Emery N. Castle, Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally
A. Skillings (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future,
Inc., 1982), 69-70.
*
Ultimately, the floor price for wheat was set too high
and as a result was soon ignored by virtually every
signatory of the GATT. Cohn, International Politics, 52-
53.
57
Houck, "Agreements," 70.
177

United States and Japan reached bilateral settlement on
some U.S. agricultural products shipped to Japan.
Although minor, the settlement covered $240.4 million in
agricultural products, equal to 31 percent of the 1964
value of total farm trade between the two nations.
58

The next attempt by the United States and Canada, to
liberalize trade in agricultural products came at the
Tokyo Round of GATT talks (1973-1979). The two exporting
nations sought greater European market access for their
grains and grain products. In turn, other countries
demanded that the United States and Canada relax controls
on meat and dairy imports. The Americans believed that
without serious talks on agriculture there could be no
settlement on broader trade issues. U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Strauss, in charge of the U.S.'s
negotiating team, said America would make no concessions
without serious movement towards liberalization in
agriculture.
59
Although most nations at the Tokyo Round
agreed in principle to decrease and hold their tariffs,
further steps towards liberalization were halted when the
United States held to its demand that farm products be

58
Ibid., 70-1.
59
Cohn, International Politics, 53.
178

negotiated on basis equal to industrial goods. In
response, the E.C., in an ultimately successful tactic,
argued that farm goods be treated differently from
industrial products.
60
In the end, the Tokyo Round
produced substantial, across-the-board tariff cuts for
industrial goods but only a few, item-by-item cuts for
farm products. However, the United States and Japan again
reached substantial agreements dealing with agriculture
on a country-to-country level. Japan agreed to bind
tariffs on several U.S. agricultural imports and, most
importantly, agreed to a zero-tariff binding on soybean
imports. This concession produced an estimated $460
million annually for the United States in new trade.
61

5.5 The World Market in Cereal Products
Rice and wheat are the world's two most important
crops, providing the majority of calories for most of the
earth's population and taking up nearly one-fourth of the
world's arable land
62
They represent billions of dollars

60
Ibid.
61
Houck, "Agreements," 78.
62
Randolph Barker and Robert W. Herdt, with Beth Rose,
The Rice Economy of Asia, (Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future, Inc., 1985), 1.
179

for the global economy. However, their markets and
production methods are different, particularly in
international trade.
Wheat is generally grown on large farms, many of
which exceed 500 or 1,000 hectares. The sheer size of the
operations requires enormous capital investment and
mechanical means in nearly all phases of the crop life-
cycle. This often means that wheat farms are owned by
large-scale national or multi-national corporations and
generally are located in two wealthy land-rich countries:
the United States and Canada.
Both countries grow far more wheat, and most other
cereal crops, than domestic needs usually require. As a
result, international markets have long been a target for
North American agricultural exporters. In recent years,
the United States has managed to exported more than 25
percent of its agricultural output; Canada, 30 percent to
35 percent.
63

As a result, both countries enjoy significant
positive agricultural trade balances. As seen in Table
5.5.A, the United States enjoyed an average annual
positive agricultural trade balance of over $5 billion

63
Cohn, International Politics, 12.
180

(U.S.) from 1983-1987; likewise, in the early 1980s
Canada enjoyed an annual positive agricultural trade
balance that exceeded $4 billion (Cdn).

Table 5.5.A

U.S. and Canadian Agricultural, Non-Agricultural,
and Total Trade Balances, 1983-1987

(U.S. figures in U.S.$ billions;
Canadian in Cdn$ billion)

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
United States
Agricultural $ 18 $ 16 $ 7 $ 3 $ 6
Non-Agricultural $(82) $(139) $(140) $(159) $(177)
Total $(64) $(122) $(133) $(156) $(171)
Canada
Agricultural $ 4 $ 4 $ 3 $ 2 $ 2
Non-Agricultural $ 9 $ 10 $ 8 $ 2 $ 3
Total $ 13 $ 14 $ 11 $ 4 $ 5

Source: Theodore H. Cohn, The International Politics of
Agricultural Trade (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990), tables
1-7 and 1-8, 9-10.

Over the same period, the U.S. and Canada together
accounted for 14.8 percent of all world food exports, by
dollar value.
64

64
Ibid.
181

The importance of the food trade to the North
American economy is still greater. In 1987, agricultural
exports amounted to 11.3 percent of the U.S.'s total
exports, while Canada's agricultural percentage equaled
7.3 percent.
65
Although only about 4 percent of each
nation's labor force is directly engaged in agricultural
production, 20 to 25 percent of Americans and Canadians
owe their livings directly or indirectly to participating
in the food system at some level.
66

In 1986-87, the U.S. exported 27.3 million metric
tons
*
of wheat, 38.2 million tons of corn, and 3.0
million tons of barley. During the same period, Canada
exported 20.8 million tons of wheat, 0.1 of corn, and 6.7
of barley.
67
Both countries send anywhere from 60 to 70
percent of their yearly wheat harvest abroad, than nearly

65
Ibid., 6.
66
Ibid., 7.
*
A metric ton is equal to 2,204 pounds.
67
U.S. Department of Agriculture/Mary Anne Normile and
Carol A. Goodloe, US-Canadian Agricultural Trade Issues:
Implications for the Bilateral Trade Agreement
(Washington, D.C.: US Department of Agriculture, March
1988), 5.
182

any other crop.
68
Worldwide, 24 percent of yearly wheat
production is traded internationally.
69

As the forces of globalization push nations closer
together economically and allow poorer nations to
develop, the consumption and trade of wheat and wheat
products has grown. Trade in rice, however, is in
relative decline (though it is increasing in absolute
terms). This trend is particularly pronounced in Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan--where "the per capita
consumption of rice ... has leveled off or begun to
decline as higher quality and more costly food items are
substituted in the diet."
70
Rice, however, remains
important to virtually every country in Asia. "Within the
region, rice dominates not only production and
consumption patterns, but is also inextricably woven into
the social and economic fabric of life."
71

68
Cohn, International Politics, 12.
69
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 1.
70
Ibid., 9. A number of economists doubt that this trend
is due to a demand for more expensive goods, suggesting
instead that the inroads made by wheat have more to do
with a relative decline in wheat prices. See Ammar
Siamwalla and Stephen Haykin, The World Rice Market:
Structure, Conduct, and Performance (Washington, D.C.:
International Food Policy Research Institute, June 1983),
29-33.
71
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 1.
183

In contrast to wheat production, the vast majority
of the world's rice is grown on family-run paddies, most
of which are less than three hectares in size and located
in the monsoon regions of Asia. Mechanization is uncommon
on these farms, and human labor dominates. As a result,
far more people per capita are involved in producing rice
in Asia than in the growing of comparable crops elsewhere
(e.g., wheat grown in the U.S. and Canada). Indeed, Asian
rice farms are far from the multi-national, corporate-
controlled behemoth's known to North Americans. The very
farmers and their families who grow it, consume most of
the world's rice.
72
For example, for most of the 1980s and
1990s, only 50 percent of Thailand’s entire rice crop was
sent to market.
73

This is reflected by international trade statistics.
As Table 5.5.B shows, little of monsoon rice Asia's
production makes it out of domestic markets. In contrast,
the rest of the world's rice-producing nations enjoy
comparatively large ratios of export.

72
Siamwalla and Haykin, Rice Market, 9.
73
Ibid., 11.
184

Table 5.5.B

Ratio of Rice Trade to Production,
By Region, 1950-1979

1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975-
54 59 64 69 74 79
Monsoon Asia
Exporting Countries 5.7% 6.0% 6.0% 4.2% 4.6% 4.8%
Importing Countries 7.3% 7.1% 6.2% 4.7% 4.7% 3.8%

Rest of World
Exporting Countries 24.5% 27.7% 23.6% 28.5% 25.3% 27.0%
Importing Countries 47.5% 71.5% 55.8% 64.6% 69.0% 85.7%

Source: Ammar Siamwalla and Stephen Haykin, "The World
Rice Market: Structure, Conduct, and Performance,"
(Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research
Institute), Table 3, 16.

Such a production/consumption pattern is reflected in the
domestic markets of most Asian nations: people living in
rice-producing regions consume far more rice than those
living in urban centers.
74

Within Asia, India and China dominate rice
production; together they account for the bulk of rice
farms and for about one-third of world production and
acreage.
75
However, unlike the United States and Canada,
that are major producers and exporters of wheat, India

74
Ibid., 11-12.
75
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 1.
185

and China are not always significant players in the
international rice market. Instead, major exporters
usually include Thailand, Pakistan, the United States, in
some years the People's Republic of China, and recently
Myanmar (Burma). Major importers also vary from year to
year depending on domestic supplies and resultant demand.
(Before World War II, the world's leading rice exporters
were Korea and Taiwan, then colonies of Japan used by
Tokyo as relatively inexpensive sources of food. Other
major exporters included Burma and Vietnam, nations so
mired in conflict that it would be decades before they
would approach their pre-war levels of agricultural
production and trade.
76
)
Despite the size of the international rice market,
and rice's role as the most important source of calories
for most of the world, trade in rice is small in terms of
production volumes and especially when compared to other
cereals. International trade in rice only accounts for 5
percent of its overall market versus 24 percent for
wheat.
77
And, although more than 90 percent of rice is
grown in Asia, more than half of the 5 percent that

76
Ibid., 188-189.
77
Siamwalla and Haykin, Rice Market, 11.
186

crosses national borders is produced outside of Asia,
primarily in the United States.
78
In most years, the
United States exports more than 60 percent of its annual
rice harvest, which amounts to more than half of all of
the rice traded internationally.
79

Nations dependent upon rice for food, and on the
world rice market were subject to the volatile
international market for rice. National players
constantly change; prices vary widely; demand seldom
matches supply; and, unpredictable monsoons often disrupt
production. It is a far-from-ideal market made worse by
governments trying to keep its ill effects from affecting
their citizens.
80

Economists describe the international rice market as
thin and residual,
81
referring to the scant volume of
trade relative to rice's level of production. This small
ratio brings with it relatively high transaction costs
or, in more formal terms, high search costs. Brokerage
fees of 5 to 10 percent are common in rice trading

78
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 1-4.
79
Cohn, International Politics, 12.
80
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 185-201; Siamwalla and
Haykin, Rice Market, 11-28; ADB, Evaluating, 362.
81
Ibid.
187

houses--percentages unheard of in the trade of other
agricultural commodities. Exacerbating the effect of
these fees is the absence of a central "clearing house"
for rice trading. Nothing similar to the Chicago Board of
Trade (for wheat and corn) or the London daily price (for
sugar) exists to facilitate exchange or open-bid pricing
for rice.
82
At the end of any given trading day, no
worldwide average price is even known by most of the
market's players.
To control the rice market's unpredictable nature,
governments often originate major sales and buying
contracts. In most years, government-to-government deals
account for more than 50 percent of rice's international
trade. Even when governmental agencies or the various
rice trading houses manage to locate sellers and buyers,
there is no guarantee their respective needs will be met.
Rice, unlike most other cereal grains, comes in a number
of varieties and national preferences are well-
established and, change little over time. As a result,
while one nation may have a large surplus of rice ready
for export, another nation facing a shortage may not buy

82
Siamwalla and Haykin, Rice Market, 9.
188

it if the proffered rice is of a different type and
perceived quality than consumers are used to.
Most of the world's rice consumers falsely equate
the grain's appearance with quality.
*
Rice is categorized
as short-, medium-, or long-grained, and by whether it is
nonglutinous or glutinous (in other words, sticky). The
former characteristic--the size of the grain--is
critically important for international rice trade while
the latter is of little consequence because the
consumption of glutinous rice is limited. Medium- and
long-grained rices are the most readily available on the
world market; however, consumers in the principal
importing nations, Japan and Taiwan, demand the short-
grained variety and reject most attempts to alter their
preferences. Even in times of critical shortages,
overcoming this aesthetic hurdle is formidable, producing
mismatches in supply and demand. Additionally, the global
demand for short-grained rice has increased since the
1970s. This comes in the wake of successful marketing
efforts by exporting nations, primarily the United

*
Other cereal grains are marketed for both human and
livestock consumption. Thus, when they have a flawed
appearance there is a ready outlet available beyond human
consumers. In contrast, nearly all of the world's rice
production is destined for use as human food.
189

States, to open "new" markets in the Middle East and
Africa, regions which now share a taste for short-grained
varieties. So on a given trading day, Basmati rice may
fetch $600 per metric ton, while Thai C1 broken rice
will command only $200 per metric ton, even though the
two varieties are identical in nutritional terms.
83

To protect consumers from such uncertainties, and to
ensure domestic social and political stability, virtually
every Asian government--including the traditionally
laissez faire-oriented government of Hong Kong--has
"instituted some or all of the following policies:
striven for self-sufficiency; protected internal markets
against the price fluctuations of the international
market; controlled domestic marketing of rice; set price
floors and ceilings; imported large volumes of rice in
election years; and provided rice rations to politically
powerful interest groups such as civil servants."
84
Given
an imperfect competitive global rice market, and the
"long-standing lesson of history ... that food is too
important to leave to markets,"
85
such policies are

83
Siamwalla and Haykin, Rice Market, 33.
84
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 2.
85
Asian Development Bank, Evaluating, 364.
190

understandable; but they usually have a negative effect
on the market's already fragile nature.
For example, domestic rice production subsidies,
combined with marketing controls, disrupt basic supply-
and-demand relationships. They divert surpluses away from
willing consumers, or in worst-case scenarios, discourage
production when needs are greatest. On the international
level, domestic price controls--which offer some
stability for consumers in individual countries--
nonetheless lead to a separation of the home-market from
world prices. For example, in Japan from 1961-1980, the
coefficient of variation for domestic prices was 10.81
percent, against 30.29 percent for world prices.
86

So, well-intentioned rice policies add to the
volatile nature of the world's market rather than calming
it. "All countries in Asia intervene in their rice
markets ... [and] the primary analytical methodology used
by economists to understand the impact of intervention
... says they should not."
87
One scholar claims that
because of such policies "it is unlikely that the world

86
Barker and Herdt, Rice Economy, 195.
87
Asian Development Bank, Evaluating, 362.
191

rice market could handle the full brunt of an aggregate
supply failure."
88

5.6 Rice in Japanese Culture
Cultural forms, symbols, and metaphors unique to a
given people are difficult for "outsiders" to comprehend.
An illustration of this occurred when Japanese officials
at the Uruguay Round of GATT talks attempted to explain
the special role that rice fills in the in the Japanese
culture.
*
Their claims were met with incredulity and
skepticism from representatives of other countries in
attendance. But for the Japanese people, rice and rice
cultivation are primary metaphors for self and family,
community, and even the nation. Thus, their efforts to
exempt rice from an international trade agreement are not
surprising, given that "Japanese attitudes and behaviors
toward rice are not governed by economic rationale."
89

Put another way, rice--particularly Japanese-grown rice--

88
Siamwalla and Haykin, Rice Market, 9.
*
When speaking of culture and cultural forms it is often
necessary to refer to groups of individuals in general
terms; of course, this is not meant to imply that "all
Japanese" or "every Japanese" thinks or acts in a
certain, or predetermined way.
89
Emiko Oknuki-Tierney, Rice as Self: Japanese Identities
through Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), 29.
192

is arguably the single-most important symbol of what it
means to be Japanese. Even in this era of globalization
it is a symbol most Japanese prefer to preserve.
In Japanese culture, rice is a metaphor, or symbol,
of "self."
90
The Japanese see each kernel of rice and its
relation to the stalk, and in turn, the stalk's role in
the paddy, as representing an individual within a family,
and that family within the larger community or nation.
Further, they believe that "each rice grain has a soul,
and that rice is alive in the hull"; indeed, such views
"are fundamental to the meanings assigned to rice in
Japanese culture."
91

At the familial level, and in social intercourse,
rice also occupies prominent functional and symbolic
roles in Japanese life. It is the center of nearly every
meal, and even when other dishes are offered, dining
would not be complete without at least some rice being
served. In this regard, rice is viewed not only as the
primary, or staple, food of Japan, but also symbolizing
health and prosperity. To appreciate this, consider that
Japanese children are commonly warned that leaving even a

90
Oknuki-Tierney, Rice as Self.
91
Oknuki-Tierney, Rice as Self, 55.
193

single grain of rice in a bowl is a sure invitation to
ruin. Families also use rice as an honorific device.
Expensive and coveted varieties are given as gifts on
special occasions. It occupies a central place in holiday
or religious celebrations and feasts. Rice wine is drunk
to consummate Shinto marriages. And, rice is customarily
offered to ancestors in household shrines honoring the
dead.
92

In Japanese communities, particularly those in the
countryside, rice and its cultivation are tangible
expressions of a shared existence and common fate. For
centuries, planting and harvest festivals--particularly
the seasonal events surrounding rice growing--have been
the primary social gatherings for rural Japanese. The
basis for these festivals is that rice and farming
demonstrate the need for cooperation among all people so
that the common goals of survival and continued good
fortune might be realized. These perspectives reinforce
rice's obvious value as a source of food, and its

92
Richard H. Moore, "Resistance to Japanese Rice Policy,"
Political Geography 12, no. 3 (May 1993), 295n.
194

historical use for taxation, measuring wealth, and even
as a form of money beyond simple barter.
93

The notion of an idealized agrarian-communalism is
shared by most Japanese city-dwellers, many of whom are
only a single generation removed from the countryside.
Like those who actually work on farms, nearly every urban
Japanese sees rice as a unique cultural symbol necessary
for continued civic harmony and, of course, economic
prosperity. From this perspective, Japanese culture is
often characterized by "groupism ... verticality and
dependence," distinct from other cultures, particularly
those of the West, which supposedly focus only on
"individualism, horizontality and independence (self-
autonomy)."
94
Observers of Japanese culture attribute this
gap--which helps define a popular notion of Japanese
uniqueness--to "earlier productive modes, maintaining
that differences in productive base and diet have led to
the emergence of different cultural patterns in history:
the Japanese, being agriculturists (or rice cultivators),

93
G.B. Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, [1931] 1972), 306-7; 174; 466.
94
Kashaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary
Japan: A Sociological Enquiry (London: Routledge, 1992),
17.
195

have developed a highly communal way of life."
95
Thus, the
Japanese commonly believe that they are "unlike
Westerners--and, the Chinese--who are individual and
unconnected like grains of sand, the Japanese, as a
result of their 'wetness' and 'softness,' stick together
like glutinous rice."
96

Although most of the world's people receive their
cultural cues in subtle ways through history and day-to-
day practice, the Japanese also have a veritable
industry, called nihonjinron, dedicated to the
examination, reformulation, and promotion of their
culture. The nihonjinron, or the "thinking elites," ideas
of Japanese uniqueness
97
functions as a national booster
club, promoting the idea that Japan's economic success
can be traced to its supposedly unique culture of
interdependence or communalism.
The nihonjinron's views on this subject have gained
wide acceptance throughout Japan. In 1980, a study-group

95
Ibid., 20.
96
Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power:
People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 264.
97
Yoshino, 17.
196

convened by then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira gave this
perspective a quasi-official air:

Unlike Western societies [which are based on
the "individual" or "self," the basic
characteristic of Japanese culture is that ...
it values the "relationship between persons
(hito to hito no aidagara). In examining
Japanese culture closely, we discover that this
basic characteristic permeates, and acts as a
living foundation for, the workings and the
system of the Japanese economy ... [Thus,] the
superiority (yui-sei) of the Japanese economy
is unlikely to be lost in the near future.
98

The notion of the uniqueness of Japanese culture--
with its origins believed to be rooted in the island
country's peasant and rice-growing heritage--is sometimes
used for critical discourse concerning Japanese society.
However, the idea all-too-often carries with it the
belief that the Japanese are inherently superior to other
peoples.
99
This idea is usually intended only for domestic
consumption, but at seemingly inopportune times it draws
the attention of international observers as well. For

98
"Bunka jidai no keizai unei kenkyu gurupu," Hokoku-sho,
12 July 1980, 72 and 81; trans. Kenneth B. Pyle in The
Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1992),
51-2.
99
For a full account of this cultural phenomenon see
Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1986).
197

well. For example, in 1986, in the midst of a Japan-U.S.
trade spat over car imports, Americans were shocked when
then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone told the LDP that
the United States would continue to lag Japan
economically because in North America "there are many
blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans, and seen on an
average, America's per capita level of intelligence, as
gained through education and the mass media is still
extremely low."
100
Even those Japanese critical of such
thinking point out that it is not limited to a handful of
elites:

Deep down, a majority of the Japanese people
agreed with their prime minister's assessment
that the Japanese society is at a "higher
level" in certain aspects. The Japanese belief
in their own superiority seems to be more
deeply ingrained than ever because of their
ability to produce superb industrial products
and high technology. . . [At the same time,]
deep in their heart they have a certain enmity
toward Americans ... [and] they look down on
fellow Asians.
101

Such views on Japan, combined with the symbolic
importance of rice as the foundation of Japanese culture

100
Quoted in Pyle, Japanese Question, 100.
101
Japan Economic Journal, 11 October 1986; quoted in
Pyle, Japanese Question, 101.
198

make it difficult for Japan to reform its rice market
under the GATT.
Indeed, "statements such as 'we do this because it
is our culture' ... are not perceived as tautology [by
the Japanese] but are believed to give a valid reason for
accepting all manner of practices" in political and
economic life.
102
Commentators, business leaders, and
government officials often echo this sentiment. During
the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, they declared that
cultural reasons best explain Japan's role in world
affairs, and further, because they are rooted in Japanese
culture, their negotiating tactics or refusals to accept
reforms are somehow immune from foreign scrutiny and
reproach. When outside criticism becomes too sharp, these
leaders usually respond by arguing foreign observers
misunderstand the Japanese side. In the end, Japan's rice
culture--with its origin in the country's agrarian past
and in the nihonjinron's continuous efforts to shape it--
"constitutes a pervasive, powerful creed that feeds
communal sentiment and supports and justifies" all sorts
of social, political, and even economic arrangements.
103

102
van Wolferen, Enigma of Japanese Power, 246.
103
Ibid., 248.
199

5.7 U.S. and Japanese Economic Relations before Uruguay
At the end of World War II, John Foster Dulles--then
a lawyer appointed by Washington to handle peace and
occupation negotiations--described Japan as "a basket
case." At the time, few would have disagreed with his
assessment. The island nation's infrastructure lay in
ruins and agricultural production had all but collapsed.
The citizens of the once-proud country were on the verge
of starvation and freezing to death. Instead of allowing
this to happen and bringing about Japan's complete
"pastoralization," American occupiers decided to help the
Japanese restore their economy.
*
No one predicted that
within 25 years Japan's economic power might rival the
United States, or that by 1986, at the start of the
Uruguay Round of GATT talks, most Americans would view

*
Of course, this was not done for entirely altruistic
reasons. There were many in Washington and in other
Allied capitals who would have enjoyed seeing both Japan
and Germany "pastoralized"; however, then Under Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, Navy Secretary James Forrestal,
and the head of the Department of State's Policy Planning
Staff George Kennan, succeeded in changing this view by
arguing that in the future, U.S. and European security
would need strong bulwarks against communism in place in
the form of the restored, though demilitarized, nations
of Japan and Germany.
200

the economic strength of Japan as a greater threat to
their well-being than the military threat coming from the
then Soviet Union.
104

After World War II, Japan's remaining political and
business leaders faced the daunting task of rebuilding
their country. At the time, Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru explained their focus: "Japan has regained
political independence ... Now we must see to it that
economic independence is achieved. Without this,
political independence has little meaning."
105
Japan's
agricultural economy was already showing signs of
recovery, and Yoshida's advisors were aware of their
country's limited natural resources and knew their
occupiers would preclude any form of colonial expansion.
So they made plans to tie their nation's fortunes to
restoring their domestic manufactures and international
trade. Yoshida's cabinet created the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, (MITI), and then the
Japan External Trade Organization, (JETRO). MITI took
charge of the post-war national economy while JETRO

104
John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy, 1995 (Chicago: The Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, 1995), 23.
105
As quoted in Gibney, Pacific Century, 210.
201

served Japanese business interests abroad by helping
search for and evaluate export markets.
Within a few years, the efforts of these agencies,
combined with a cooperative business sector and a
populace eager to improve their standard of living
*
, saw
Japan's growth leap from a negative rate in the year
immediately after the war, to a positive 9.7 percent from
1947-50. During the same period the U.S. economy grew by
only 2.4 percent.
106
From 1951-60, Japan's economy
continued on an even steeper trajectory, growing nearly
11 percent annually, compared to an average U.S. rate of
under 4 percent.
107
By 1961, the Japanese used most of
their 20 percent savings rates to plow nearly 23 percent
of GNP back into infrastructure to ensure long-term
continued economic growth.
108

Such increases improved standards of living for most
Japanese. In the months after Japan's surrender, Prime

*
For a good discussion of the interplay between the
Japanese government, business, and labor see Gibney's
"inside" account, Pacific Century, pp. 220-28.
106
Economist. One Hundred Years of Economic Statistics.
Viewed another way, Japanese industrial production in
1946 had fallen to less than half of what it had been in
1934, Friedman and Lebard, 107.
107
Economist. One Hundred Years of Economic Statistics.
108
Gibney, Pacific Century, 223.
202

Minister Yoshida announced plans to double income levels
by 1971. This lofty goal was realized three years early,
in 1968.
109
Although growth rates slowed as its domestic
economy matured, Japan's gross domestic product (GDP)
grew at an average of 6 percent per year through the
1980s. In contrast, the United States managed to grow
only 1.9 percent, and Western Europe between 2 percent
and 3.5 percent.
110
Viewed another way, from 1960-80,
Japan's share of the world's GNP rose from a meager 3
percent to more than 10 percent.
111

Paul Krugman argued that "nobody really knows why
Japan surged from defeat to global economic power after
World War II." But, in addition to its dedication to
quality and the diligent efforts of its workers, Japan's
prosperity was based primarily its ability to sell its
manufactured goods overseas.
112
To illustrate, Japan's

109
Ibid., 229.
110
U.S. Congress: Office of Technology Assessment,
Competing Economies: America, Europe, and the Pacific
Rim, OTA-ITE-498 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, October 1991), 5.
111
I.M. Destler, American Trade Politics Second Edition
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1992), 51.
112
Paul Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and
Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations (New York:
W.W. Norton Company, 1995), 24.
203

merchandise trade grew faster than its GNP growth rate.
Merchandise trade rose "by 17.2 percent annually in the
1960s, and by 8.5 percent (from a much larger base)
between 1970 and 1982."
113
As Table 5.7.A shows, exports
became an increasing part of Japan's economy after the
war. In 1955 they amounted to only 3.48 percent of GNP;
after 1970 exports contributed an average of 11 percent
to GNP.

Table 5.7.A

Japanese Exports as a Percentage of GNP;
and, Exports to the U.S. as a Percentage of GNP, 1955-88

1955 1965 1970 1975 1980 1988
Japanese Trade/GNP
3.5% 9.1% 10.9% 12.0% 13.1% 9.1%
Japanese Trade with the U.S./GNP
0.9% 2.7% 2.8% 2.2% 2.9% 3.1%

Sources: Japan Statistical Yearbook; George Friedman and
Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With Japan (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1991), Table 6-3, 152.

Table 5.7.A also shows that after 1960, exports to
the United States accounted for nearly 2.75 percent of
the entire Japanese GNP. Ironically, America’s
willingness to shoulder the costs (both economic and

113
Destler, American Trade, 51.
204

political) of creating and maintaining a global free-
trade regime after the war played a significant role in
contributing to Japan's economic "miracle." In the early
1950s the United States was spending as much as 11.9
percent of its GNP on defense, while Japan spent
virtually nothing to enjoy America's protections.
114

Japan had been prohibited from incurring a similar
defense burden by Article IX of its post-war constitution
(drafted by its occupiers), which made it illegal to
rearm the country. Most Japanese leaders welcomed this
restriction because it freed them to focus on economic
matters. Prime Minister Yoshida stated: "To equip the
nation with an effective means of defense would have been
tantamount to crippling Japan's convalescent economy."
115

Although in many ways satisfying to the Japanese,
this situation became increasingly untenable to
Washington officials and to the American public. Along
with providing for Japan's defense, many believed that
the United States "permitted Japan to close its consumer

114
Mary Schumacker, "Keeping the Cold War Cold: Dick
Cheney at the Department of Defense," Kennedy School of
Government Case C16-90-1019.0 (Cambridge: Harvard
College, 1990), Exhibit 4: in 1955, US defense outlays
dropped to 8.4% of GNP and thereafter averaged
approximately 6-7%, until the late 1980s.
115
Quoted in Gibney, Pacific Century, 209.
205

and capital markets to American companies, while allowing
Japanese companies access to American markets."
116
Thus
there was a growing view of Japan as a "free-rider" and
unfair competitor in the global political economy.
117

Further, in 1971--after nearly a century of positive
trade balances--the United States began experiencing
large, growing aggregate trade deficits, and with Japan
in particular. In 1971, the United States had a negative
trade balance of $2.3 billion, $6.4 billion in 1972,
$33.9 billion in 1978, and $159.5 billion in 1987.
118

Japan's share of the U.S. trade deficit grew as well,
from $4 billion in 1972, to $11.6 billion in 1978, to
$56.3 billion in 1987.
119
Japan's government and
businesses--and their trade practices--were not entirely
to blame for America's trade deficit. But after the

116
George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War
with Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 7.
117
Destler, American Trade, 52.
118
Ibid., 45.
119
Ibid., 48-9.
206

early
.
120

e
the

Japanese direct investment in the United States was still
as
s
ssed a resolution condemning the
"bilateral trade imbalance" and calling on President
-1980s recession, Americans were looking for
somebody to blame for their perceived economic decline
American pundits and politicians also noted that th
United States had become Japan's favorite investment
target. From Rockefeller Center in New York City to
Pebble Beach Golf Resort in California, many Americans
believed that the Japanese buying their country out from
under them. It mattered little that in the 1980s,
lower than that from Europe or even Canada
121
. Japan w
fast becoming the bogeyman of the U.S. economy.
American politicians, particularly those from the
so-called "rust-belt," ran explicitly anti-Japanese
campaigns; meanwhile nativist "buy-American" campaign
were becoming popular across the country. By May 1985
these issues reached the U.S. Senate floor. In a 92-0
vote, the Senate pa

120
Thomas J. Duestenberg, "Trade, Investment, and
Estrangement in the U.S.-East Asian Relationship," in New
Forces in the World Economy, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge:
121
U.S. Congress: Office of Technology Assessment,
The MIT Press, 1996), 121.
Competing Economies, 92-3.
207

the
ch
rs,
e,
he
--
Japanese. By 1987, President
Ronald Reagan imposed 100 percent tariffs against Japan
Ronald Reagan to take immediate measures to retaliate
against Japan.
122

But perhaps no spat was more symbolic of the
increasingly acrimonious trade relationship between
United States and Japan in the 1980s than that whi
surrounded semiconductors. In 1985, the Semiconductor
Industry Alliance (SIA), representing U.S. manufacture
filed a Section 301 case against Japan.
123
In the face of
its stagnating share of the global market, the SIA
alleged that early government support of Japan's
semiconductor industry, combined with import resistanc
constituted an "unreasonable" barrier to U.S. trade.
After more than a year of contentious negotiations, t
Japanese agreed to remedy the situation. Ironically,
these efforts may have helped the situation deteriorate
to the advantage of the
because of its perceived "inability to enforce" the
agreement. Although the punitive tariffs were eventually

122
Destler, American Trade, 221.
123
Section 301 is a provision of the US Trade Act of 1974
which requires the USTR to act decisively to remove
barrier to trade created by a foreign government. See
I.M. Destler, "Targeting the World: Section 301," in
American Trade Politics, Second Edition (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for International
any
,

Economics, 1992), 126.
208

lower
d their
rs
alone.
127
As a result, U.S.-Japanese trade and political
ed, the semiconductor agreement remained for the
rest of the decade.
124

Thus, it is not surprising that Americans in the
1980s made a best-seller of an academic tome exploring
the decline and implied demise of the United States;
other publications explored the (supposed) superiority of
Japan's economic system compared to the faults of the
U.S.'s.
125
A leading Japanese politician joined the fray,
offering his analysis of the flaws of Americans an
country.
126
In parallel, Japan developed an almost smug
sense of national pride and a belief that global
leadership in the next century would be theirs and thei

124
An extensive account of the semiconductor trade
dispute can be found in chapter 4 of Laura D'Andrea
Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflicts in High-
Technology Industries (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1992).
125
See Paul Kennedy,

The Rise and Fall of the Great

claim It (New York: Basic Books,
one
Coming War with Japan, published in

Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); Clyde W.
Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We are Giving Our Future
to Japan and How to Re
1988); or, James C. Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr.,
Kaisha: The Japanese Corporation (New York: Basic Books,
1985).
126
Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No: Why
Japan Will Be First Among Equals (New York: Touchst
Books, 1991 [1985]).
127
A "#1 best-seller" in Japan was George Friedman and
Meredith Lebard's The
209

just as the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations began.

5.8 The Uruguay Round Conflict over Agriculture
relations became increasingly fractious in the 1980s,
reaching their nadir

In the early 1980s, the United States began pushing
for a new round of multilateral trade talks on trade. At
the time, America was experiencing an economic recession
and ever-escalating domestic pressures for protectionist
trade policies. These pressures increased with the
strengthening of the dollar abroad, which diminished the
appeal of U.S. exports. In addition, many believed that
increasing imports contributed to rising unemployment in
American industry. The Republican administration in
Washington tried to blunt these domestic pressures by
calling for a new round of negotiations. It wanted to
extend trade liberalization to sectors of the world
economy in which it was competitive: agriculture,

the US in 1991 (New York: St. Martin's Press); see also,
Hajime Karatsu, Tough Words for American Industry
(Cambridge: Productivity Press, 1987), which when
published two years earlier in Japan had a title that
translated to "Straight Talk to American Industry That is
Being Hollowed Out."
210

xtiles, and services.
128
However, a lack of support by
her major trading nations would make it several years
held
with
ring
r

te
ot
before a new round of trade negotiations would be
agriculture, textiles, and services on the agenda.
The new round of GATT talks were launched in
September 1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The guiding
principle of the negotiations, put forth by GATT
Director-General Arthur Dunkel, was "tariffication
*

without exception" to liberalize trade by eliminating
quantitative import controls.
129
Although agriculture
accounted for just 13 percent of world trade, the
negotiating countries, prodded by Dunkel, sought to b
this traditionally protected and subsidized sector in
line with GATT rules. The United States welcomed this
possibility.
In terms of agriculture, the primary target fo
American officials was the E.C. and its heavily protected
and subsidized farm system. U.S. trade analysts had long

128
Jeffrey J. Schott, The Uruguay Round: An Assessment
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1994), 4-5.

*
Tariffication is the conversion of quotas and other
import restrictions to tariffs——starting at 100%——which
nagisawa, "Politics," 30.
then would be reduced to zero over a specified period of
time.
129
Kuo and Ya
211

compl United

d for
al
ved
th
s and the Cairns Group. Nonetheless,
Japan's agricultural minister, Tomio Yamamoto, moved to
ained that it distorted global markets.
130
The
States was not alone. On the eve of the Uruguay Round, 15
other countries, known as the Cairns Group
*
, calle
"the removal of barriers to the access to agricultur
markets; for substantial reductions in agricultural
subsidies; and for the ultimate elimination of all
agricultural subsidies affecting trade, to be achie
within an agreed period."
131

Japan and its near total ban on rice imports--and
South Korea's similar ban--were secondary issues for bo
the United State
allay the fears of his countrymen, and especially rice
farmers. He declared that while other sectors of Japan's
economy would be subject to negotiation at the GATT
talks, outsiders would be made to understand the special,
cultural significance of rice in Japan and its role as

130
Ibid., 31.
*
The Cairns Group consisted of Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Fiji, Hungary,
ruguay, with Australia taking the most
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Thailand, and U
prominent, and vocal, role at the GATT talks.
131
Libby, Protecting Markets, 123.
212

uguay
g price supports, import
controls, export subsidies, and supply management, to be
ile

trast, responding to the U.S.'s broad
deman
establish a fair and market-oriented trading system in
the nation's "principal food," and thus exempt it from
deliberations.
132

However, American representatives opened the Ur
Round with a call to completely eliminate all domestic
national farm programs includin
implemented over ten years. The U.S. proposal, along with
the Cairns Declaration, provoked an immediate and host
response by E.C. representatives. Frans Andriessen, the
E.C.'s commissioner for agriculture, said the U.S.
reforms were "impractical" and went "too far too fast."
133

The E.C.'s external relations commissioner, Willy de
Clerq, maintained that talks on farm trade reform were
inseparable from other, more important issues and that
the E.C. would not "bow to pressure" created by the U.S.
proposal.
134
In con
ds, Minoru Endo, Japan's GATT ambassador, sounded a
diplomatic note: "It is important," he urged, "to

132
Kyodo (Tokyo), 18 July 1990; trans. Foreign Broadca
Information Service—East Asia,
st
kyo), 21 June 1990;
18 July 1990, 10-11
[hereafter FBIS-EAS]; and, Kyodo (To
FBIS-EAS trans. 22 June 1990, 12.
133
Agra Europe, 24 July 1987.
134
Agra Europe, 27 March 1987.
213

ound
s
ests
"
ly
e to Europe's protectionism
and subsidies.
136
)
trading system in the field of agriculture." He implied,
however, that this same system should "reflect the
special nature of agriculture as well as the different
conditions which exist among countries."
135

High-ranking officials in Europe worried about the
domestic backlash that would follow if the Uruguay R
resulted in the dismantling of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), a program which offered substantial
protection for European farmers from non-European import
and subsidized the Community's agricultural exports as
well. These officials were also skeptical about the
sincerity of U.S. reform demands, believing that the
Reagan administration would have an equally difficult
time selling similar changes to American farm inter
as they would in Europe. (Ironically, at the same time
the United States was challenging the E.C. to dismantle
the CAP, it had its own "Export Enhancement Program
[EEP]. The EEP, American officials assured the E.C., on
existed as a counter-measur

135
Kyodo (Tokyo), 23 July 1990; trans. FBIS-EAS, 25 July

1990, 12. [emphasis added]
136
Agweek, 13 February 1989.
214

set

ion on agriculture and agreed to a
compr

, and
over
EC representatives thought that the dollar's
fluctuations in world markets and Japan's ever-growing
trade surpluses with the rest of the world should be the
focus of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks.
137
French
representatives went further, demanding that farm
protection and agricultural export subsidies not even be
discussed.
138
Given these seemingly irreconcilable
positions by the United States and the E.C. at the out
of the talks, it is no surprise that it would take four
years for the Uruguay Round to produce any serious
negotiations on agricultural trade. But first, all talks
nearly fell apart, largely because of the sensitive
domestic issues surrounding trade in farm products.
At a ministerial meeting in Brussels in December
1990, the United States backed away from its original,
laissez-faire posit
omise offered by Mats Hellström, the Swedish
minister of agriculture who was also the chairman of the
GATT's farm negotiation group. Hellström called for a "30
percent cut in export subsidies, import restrictions
domestic supports from 1990 levels, to be phased in

120.
137
Libby, Protecting Markets,
138
Ibid., 121.
215

ld
nd
criti
s.
141

86
, a

five years."
139
E.C. representatives refused to discuss
Hellström's proposal claiming the conversations wou
exceed the limits of their mandates from their home
governments. This prompted the Cairns Group to storm out
of the Brussels talks, protesting the Europeans'
recalcitrance.
140

Although it appeared that the entire Uruguay Rou
of GATT talks might collapse, this proved to be a
cal turning point. All parties recognized that
agriculture should be included in any new multilateral
trade agreement, forcing the E.C. to reconsider its
position on domestic and international farm policie
However, almost as soon as E.C. negotiators signaled
their willingness to begin anew, their attention turned
to Japan and its closed-to-imports rice market--a shift
in focus the Japanese hoped to avoid. Until the Uruguay
Round, American farmers were nearly alone in their
protests over Japan's total ban on imported rice. In 19
and in 1988, the U.S. Rice Millers' Association (RMA)
group representing American rice growers and refiners,

139
Schott, Uruguay Round, 45.
ting Markets, 122-3.
140
Libby, Protec
141
Schott, Uruguay Round, 45.
216

STR), complaining that Japan's import
contr
tates

-at
ict
h failed,
filed Section 301 petitions with the U.S. Trade
Representative, (U
ols unfairly discriminated against their products.
USTR put these appeals on hold because the United S
intended to use the Uruguay Round to pressure the
Japanese government to dismantle its decades-old rice
policies.
142

However, the early focus of the United States at the
Uruguay Round was on the E.C.'s agricultural policies-
least until the disastrous meeting in Brussels. A few
months before the meeting, the secretary-general of
Japan's LDP, Ichiro Ozawa, expressed hope that Japan
might ride out the U.S.-E.C. dispute and avoid confl
with its trading partners over the rice issue. If that
strategy worked, he reasoned, Japan could appeal to the
international community for "understanding" of rice's
special role in Japanese life.
143
If that approac
Japan planned to demand that GATT officials seriously
consider the culturally sensitive issue of self-
sufficiency in rice.
144
Indeed, Koicki Kato, the chief

142
Kuo and Yanagisawa, "Politics," 32.
143
Kyodo (Tokyo), 20 July 1990; trans. FBIS-EAS, 25 July
91; trans. FBIS-EAS, 30
1990, 12-13.
144
Kyodo (Tokyo), 29 January 19
January 1991, 7.
217

gitimate loophole through which Japan could
avoid
ly
was
der
'
rt
e
t
le
be crucial to the
the GATT talks
chief cabinet secretary, argued that "food security"
might be a le
lifting its ban on imported rice.
145

Japanese officials vowed that "not one grain" of
foreign rice should enter their domestic market. In ear
1991, during the GATT talks, this hard-line position
dramatically demonstrated when Tokyo police, acting un
orders Japanese agriculture officials, threatened to
arrest American exhibitors at a food show. The Americans
crime? They dared to display a 10-pound bag of U.S.-
grown rice in a Plexiglas case, openly defying the impo
ban. (Acting on the advice of their embassy, the
exhibitors removed the offending display.) Although th
Americans exacerbated the situation by handing ou
stickers that read, "Have a Rice Day," Japan's inflexib
position was clear to U.S. observers and to the Japanese
public.
146
This was due largely to upcoming local
elections where farmers' votes would
survival of the ruling LDP. However, at
Japanese trade officials began indicating their

145
Kyodo (Tokyo), 13 December 1990; trans. FBIS-EAS, 13
March 1991.
December 1990, 1-2.
146
The Economist, 23
218

willingness to consider a limited opening to their rice

giving
148

were
r
gerent
covery was largely based on its ability to
compete effectively in a relatively free global economy,
as
market.
One month later--after a successful electoral
campaign by the LDP--at a closed-door meeting with
President George H. Bush in Newport Beach, California,
Japanese Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu, acknowledged that
his country might have to give some ground in the rice
negotiations.
147
For its part, the United States suggested
a restrained opening in the Japanese rice market,
over just 3 percent to imports and then using a
tariffication program to be phased in over 10 years.
Japanese agriculture officials and LDP party chiefs
still feared an electoral revolt if rice policies
changed, but, they also worried that refusing to conside
some reform might jeopardize the entire GATT talks.
Further, if negotiations collapsed, Japan's belli
stance might be viewed as the cause. Ironically, Japan's
post-war re
partly because of GATT rules and regulations. This w

147
The Economist, 6 April 1991.
148
The Economist, 23 March 1991.
219

ing that

the s
ts

addition, a public opinion poll found more than 65
not lost on officials in Tokyo. Even Shin Kanemaru, the
"godfather" of the LDP, declared "Under a free-trade
system, Japan cannot refuse to import rice while selling
millions of cars to America."
149
Nonetheless, Kanemaru's
party decided to wait out the E.C.-U.S. spat, hop
Japan might avoid becoming the center of controversy. At
ame time the LDP-dominated Japanese government was
reeling from a campaign finance scandal which cost
Kanemaru his position and brought in a new
administration. With the change in personnel came an
apparently fresh Japanese position at the GATT talks.
New Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa signaled that
Japan would allow some liberalization of its rice marke
in the form of a "minimum import access," to avoid a more
radical opening.
150
Miyazawa's shift was a calculated bet
that his government could ride out any electoral backlash
from rural Japan, a backlash that would follow any
concessions. He knew that his countrymen had not yet
taken to the streets--like in the E.C. and in South
Korea--to protest agricultural tariffication. In

149
The Economist, 23 November 1991.
vember 1991.
150
Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 No
220

ed
ackage" for
la
Hills, the USTR representative, demanded: tariffication
ng
ial
.S.-
ard a
ll showed
mal

percent of Japanese supported total or partial
liberalization of their rice market, versus just 50
percent a year before.
151
To be safe, his party float
the idea of a "judicious farm compensation p
agricultural workers if the rice ban was lifted.
152

In response to Miyazawa's tentative overtures, Car
or nothing.
153
This hard-line stance was in the backdrop
of America's upcoming elections in which both parties
used Japan as a "whipping boy" for American economic
woes. Union leaders and congressional candidates from the
rust-belt states appeared on American newscasts taki
sledge hammers to Japanese-built cars, while president
candidates jostled with to appear the "toughest" on U
Japanese trade relations.
154

About the same time, the Japanese government he
growing din from rural Japan. A February 1992 po
that public support of the LDP had plummeted to a dis
31.9 percent, from an already record low of 39.5 percent

151
Ibid.
152
The Economist, 30 November 1991.
153
The Economist, 23 November 1991.
154
The Economist, 11 January 1992.
221

one m
he
,
negotiation at the GATT
talks
s,
onth earlier. Recognizing this, the vice chairman of
the National Federation of Farm Cooperatives, Sato
Ryoichi, in a break with tradition, declared that "The
farmers have been continually betrayed by the LDP [at t
GATT talks]"; therefore, rural voters should vote for
whom they want rather than along party lines.
155
In
response, the LDP's chief cabinet secretary, Koichi Kato
in a strategy designed to take the party through March's
local elections, announced that rice, starch, and dairy
products would be excluded from
. The tactic worked. The LDP won its majority and in
July 1992, was returned to Japan's Upper House.
156

With their domestic situation temporarily secure,
leaders in Tokyo tried to jump-start stagnant GATT talks
by proposing that agricultural deliberations be set aside
and other issues discussed.
157
U.S. congressional
leaders, led by erstwhile presidential candidate and
long-time Japan critic Richard Gephardt, in full pre-
election bluster tried to force legislation imposing
harsh sanctions against Japan for its trade practice

rch 1992.
155
Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 Ma
156
Ibid.
157
Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1992.
222

iled,
but n
eement
ft

f

particularly those surrounding rice. The USTR could not
stomach these efforts, cautioning Congress that "However
well-intentioned [the legislation] may be, the effect is
very likely to be a trade contradiction. And that would
be destructive in a time when our growth and our jobs are
so closely linked to exports."
158
The legislation fa
ot before sending a strong message to Japan’s
leaders.
In Tokyo, officials were more concerned with the
U.S.'s entry into the North American Free Trade Agr
(NAFTA) than with the rhetoric of Washington. Being le
out of such an enormous market signaled Japan's ruling
circles that the same might happen on a global scale i
Japan became the "odd man out" of a new GATT accord
because of its stance on rice. Prime Minister Miyazawa
added that whatever the final agreement, "Japan must
avoid being blamed for the collapse of the round."
159

Nonetheless, the beleaguered but still powerful LDP
teamed with the Miyazawa administration to continue
championing a total ban on rice imports.
160

158
Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 May 1992.
Tokyo), 15 December 1992; trans. FBIS-EAS, 15
160
The Economist
159
Kyodo (
December 1992, 1.
, 28 November 1992; Far Eastern Economic
Review, 3 December 1992.
223

c
when the Food Agency announced that, for the
first time since the mid-1960s, Japan would face a severe
f
2

nt
ban on
imports, declared that he only wanted the issue to be put
ng
ics

In November 1992, this tactic assumed tragicomi
proportions
shortage in domestically grown rice. In the face of
emergency imports, and despite complaints by the makers
of miso paste, sake, and rice crackers, Miyazawa
announced that his administration would continue to
oppose liberalization of Japan's rice market.
161
His
position was echoed by Mitsugi Horiuchi, the president o
the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, who
thundered, "We must prevent tariffication without
exception. It would inflict irrevocable damage ..."
16
With no apparent irony, a farmer demonstrating in fro
of the MAFF's headquarters for continuing the
to rest. In his view the "real" problem was that:
"Politicians are trifling with farming."
163

With the shortage, however, cracks began appeari
in Japan’s facade of national unity. Kazo Watanabe, the
head of MITI, challenged, "what is needed is polit

161
The Economist
3 December 1992.
, 28 November 1992.
162
Far Eastern Economic Review,
163
Kyodo (Tokyo) 15 December 1992; trans. FBIS-EAS, 15
December 1992, 1.
224

ice

he
d
ad
food
produ
,
that finally uses some brains ... the Prime Minister
should take a political decision [to liberalize the r
import market]."
164
Additional support for liberalization
came simultaneously from the other nations working on
terms of a new GATT agreement.
Attention turned toward Japan after the E.C. and t
United States finally agreed in principle on terms of
trade concerning oilseeds after a bitter and protracte
bilateral debate. The rapprochement occurred only after
the United States threatened the Community with bro
retaliatory measures against other exported
cts.
165
It led to a compromise solution in
agriculture and help to establish the eventual agreement
on agriculture for the Uruguay Round.
*
For the Japanese
however, this reconciliation of E.C.-U.S. differences
meant an unwelcome renewal of outside interest in their
trading practices. This time it came from the United

164
The Economist, 28 November 1992.
165
Schott, Uruguay Round, 46.
*
The November 1992, "Blair House" EC-US agreement on
s
originally put forth by American representatives, but in

bsidies to
ts.
farm products was less ambitious than the proposal
all likelihood far more than their European counterparts
had wanted. It called for domestic farm su be
reduced by 20 percent over six years and for a 21 percent
cut in the volume of subsidized expor
225

State
r face
.C.

d

n tense, there can be no political
dialo zed
lose
began calling for concessions at the GATT talks,
especially because the rice harvest would again fall far
s, the Cairns Group of countries, as well as the
European Community.
After meeting with Japanese officials, Van den
Broek, the E.C.'s external relations commissioner,
declared that Japan would have to reduce substantially
its $30 billion (U.S.) trade surplus with Europe o
changes in the way Japan did business with the E
Pointing to Japan's closed rice market and its
restrictive auto import regulations, van den Broek warned
Prime Minister Watanabe that without change, Japan coul
face political hostilities from its trading partners. Van
den Broek's spokesman stated: "Politics and trade are
closely linked and have to develop in parallel ... if
trade relations remai
gue with Japan."
166
Japan's fear of being ostraci
and isolated by the international community seemed c
at hand.
In 1993, normally reticent Japanese business leaders
short of demand and imports would be necessary.
167

166
Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 January 1993.
167
The Economist, 27 November 1993; Far Eastern Economic
Review, 28 October 1993.
226

o late to
market. Tomoyasu Watabe, the head of a rice
farme
ing to
ot be
declared that his customers would not eat imported rice:
According to the president of the Japan Federation of
Employers' Association, Takeshi Nagano, "It's to
debate whether to open the (rice) market," it simply must
occur.
168
Takeshi Kazama, the president of a large sake
brewery, said that he was looking forward to the day when
his company might begin "buying good quality rice from
abroad." He reasoned: "Rice is about 50 percent of our
cost of production, so cheaper rice would have a good
impact on our profit margins."
169

Some Japanese remained opposed to liberalization of
their rice
rs' cooperative in Yunotani, a town of 478 people,
said that he and his fellow farmers "will do anyth
stop the market opening." He reasoned: "If farming
deteriorates the villages may disappear ... We cann
persuaded by politicians' arguments that the Japanese
farmer can survive once the market is opened."
170
In the
cities, anti-liberalization arguments also were heard.
Hideo Takahashi, a manager at Sato Food Industries,

FBIS-EAS,
168
Kyodo
169
Far Eastern Economic Review
(Tokyo), 15 December 1992; trans. 15
December 1992, 1.
, 29 April 1993.
170
Ibid.
227

1

entered the
inter
d
is
s

o

"It isn't just the taste ... They'd know [it's imported]
because Japanese rice feels differently in the mouth."
17
The LDP claimed that its defiant stance on concessions
was partly to protect poor nations from price increases
if Japan, with its monetary muscle,
national market for rice.
172
Opposition came to a
head in the form of enormous demonstrations in Tokyo, an
still larger ones in neighboring South Korea.
173

Outwardly, new Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, a
member of the Japan New Party, continued parroting h
LDP predecessors' hard line toward liberalization. But
behind the scenes at the GATT talks, his representative
signaled their willingness to consider opening their rice
market to imports.
174
Even with this apparent break, Toky
held out hope that an escalating squabble between the
French and the United States over agriculture and
audiovisual products might distract the international
community from the rice issue.
175
It was an ill-founded
hope.

171
Ibid.
172
Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 October 1993.
tern Economic Review, 28 October 1993.
173
The Economist, 11 December 1993.
174
Far Eas
175
Ibid.
228

face-to-
d

impor
y

DP administration explained his party's position
this way: "The Emperor also plants rice ... we must fight
The South Koreans recognized this and after
face meetings between Korean President Kim Young Sam an
U.S. President Bill Clinton, announced they would
gradually open their closed domestic rice market to
ts.
176
The Japanese, in contrast, appeared willing to
scuttle the entire GATT agreement to keep their market
closed. On national television, the Hosokawa
administration's chief cabinet secretary, Masayoshi
Takemura, assured the Japanese people that their
government would continue to stand firm against
liberalization.
177
At the same time, leaders of virtuall
every opposing political party--including the LDP--
claimed that if they were in power they would not
capitulate to tariffication.
178
The head of MITI under an
earlier L
for the nation."
179

176
Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993.
177
ASAHI Television Network Broadcast (Tokyo), 28
.
ans. FBIS-EAS, 10
179
(Tokyo), 10 December 1993; trans. S, 10
993, 4.
November 1993; trans. FBIS-EAS, 1 December 1993, 6
178
Kyodo (Tokyo), 9 December 1993; tr
December 1993, 2.
Kyodo FBIS-EA
December 1
229

at the
e
n,
, we can
e
e
a move calculated to humiliate their
domestic opponents, and hinting to the Japanese public
–
make a
e also
On December 5, 1993, 30 Japanese rice growers
reflected these positions while demonstrating alongside
3,000 farmers from the E.C. in a mass protest
GATT's Geneva headquarters.
180
Days later in Japan, th
LDP continued its firm opposition to liberalizatio
declaring that "this is a deception of the public
never approve the Uruguay Round negotiations."
181
LDP
spokespeople said the party wanted the Japanese to b
able to eat "safe and delicious rice," free from th
danger of the chemicals supposedly used on foreign- grown
crops.
182

The deputy chief cabinet secretary for the Hosokawa
administration, made
where the GATT talks might be heading. He admonished
those--like the protesting farmers and the LDP elites
who refused to go along with modifying Japan's ban on
rice imports by stating that they were failing "to
decision to give priority to national interests." H

180
Kyodo (Tokyo), 5 December 1993; trans. FBIS-WEU, 10
December 1993, 2.
181
Kyodo (Tokyo), 10 December 1993; trans. FBIS-EAS, 10
December 1993, 4.
182
Ibid.
230

e
the
ons
ptions [like for Japan and rice] ... we must
have

made it clear that the administration still opposed th
notion of "tariffication without exception."
183
Others in
the cabinet, siding with Hosokawa, made it clear that
Prime Minister's hands might be tied at the talks.
According to foreign minister Tsutomo Hata: "Negotiati
are generally drawing to a conclusion and it is difficult
to make exce
[national] resolution to decide on accepting the
GATT proposal."
184

Despite the rancorous debates in Japan, and even in
his own party, on December 14, 1993, hours after a
negotiating deadline for the Uruguay Round appeared to
pass without concessions, Prime Minister Hosokawa first
apologized and then declared on national television that
Japan would end its traditional ban on rice imports, but
would not immediately accept tariffication.
185
Many in
Japan were stunned. Hosokawa's fellow party member, and
the vice minister of the MAFF, Maki Murazawa, resigned in

Tokyo), 13 December 1993; trans. FBIS-EAS, 13
23 December 1993.
183
Kyodo (Tokyo), 9 December 1993; trans. FBIS-EAS, 10
December 1993, 3.
184
Kyodo (
December 1993, 5.
185
Far Eastern Economic Review,
231

in the community of nations. The
decis
,
protest as farmers again took to the streets.
186

Nonetheless, within days, Hosokawa and other ranking
government officials attempted to spin their partial
capitulation on the rice issue into a sign of Japan's
increasing leadership
ion, they claimed, was the single most important
reason for a successful GATT agreement. The Prime
Minister claimed that he "made a painful decision," but
always had "in mind our national interest in the
future."
187
To aid the cause--though after a bitter
debate--the Social Democratic Party of Japan, (SDPJ),
formally announced that, along with the Japan New Party
it too would accept changes in the rice import ban.
188

5.9 The Concessions
The move opening of Japan's and South Korea's ric
markets to imports at the Uruguay Round of GATT talks w
more symbolic than substantive. Special negotiated
e
as

186
Kyodo (Tokyo), 15 December 1993; trans. FBIS-EAS, 15
FBIS-EAS, 16
December 1993, 2-3.
December 1993, 3.
187
Kyodo (Tokyo), 16 December 1993; trans.
December 1993, 2.
188
NHK General Television Broadcast, 14 December 1993;
trans. FBIS-EAS, 15
232

s
rket
a,

another postponement.
189
So, both countries' concessions
would have little impact on their respective farm
haps they would have a substantial
impac
t
provisions meant Japan would establish a "minimum acces
quota," initially allowing 4 percent of its rice ma
to be imported. That percentage would rise to 8 percent
by the year 2000. Korea agreed to a 1 percent quot
growing at 0.25 percent per year for four years,
eventually reaching 4 percent in 2004. After that, both
nations would have to agree to tariffication--unless they
could convince their trading partners to accept yet
economies, though per
t on national culture. In the first year, Japan
imported only about 3.5 million metric tons of rice,
roughly the same amount it imported during its recen
harvest shortages. However, the debate over the wisdom of
allowing foreign rice into the country continues.
190

189
Schott, Uruguay Round, 51-2; and, Far Eastern E
Review, 23 December 1993.
190
Schott, Uruguay Round, 52.
conomic
233

6.1 Conclusion
Chapter 6

Conclusion

McDonalds in Moscow and Coke in China will do
more to create a global culture than military
colonization ever could.

Benjamin R. Barber
Jihad versus McWorld

Without culture, and the relative freedom it
implies, society, even when perfect, is but a
jungle.
Albert Camus
"The Artist and His Time"

As globalization's pace and impact have increased,
the leaders of "first world" nations, once at the
forefront of efforts to liberalize the world economy,
have reversed course. They have sought to limit or
eliminate international trade in goods and services that
they believe have special significance to the cultures of
protection." This form of protection disrupted, and
nearly derailed, long-planned trade talks. It also caused
serious diplomatic rifts between otherwise amicable
nations, played a key role in driving high-ranking
officials and ruling parties from office, and even
their nations, engaging in "national cultural
234

sparked large and sometimes violent riots in the nations
in question.
protection is incomplete. Those who champion such a
stance domestically and internationally, claim they want
to shield or preserve their cultures from the threats and
vagaries that economic globalization seems to imply. In
contrast, those opposing national cultural protection say
it is onal protectionism dressed u
sophisticated arguments that pander to popular tastes,
fears, and prejudices.
porary accounts are biased, assuming that
it is
thers
sm
ly
gap
al
political economy. This study’s centering question asks:
Still, our understanding of national cultural
traditi p with more
Most contem
a cultural issue with little to do with matters
that typically surround trade and trade politics. O
retort that national cultural protection is little
different from more traditional forms of protectioni
used to defend conventional industries and products.
Academic studies that examine trade and trade politics
are incomplete, tending to explore the issue on
tangentially. Even then, those perspectives have
difficulty accommodating economic, political, and
cultural matters.
The goal of this dissertation is to bridge this
between national cultural protection and internation
235

when it is not in its "rational" economic
interests. Asked another way: what drives the phenomenon?
al-

menon.

the
uls,
ials they supported, were the
loude
why does a country adopt national cultural protection
measures even
To provide the answer, the study takes a politic
economic perspective. Viewing national cultural
protection like one might look at more conventional
international trade disputes and protectionist responses.
This approach, and its accompanying body of thinking in
international political economy, provides a well-
developed foundation upon which to build an improved
understanding of the pheno
From this foundation, national cultural protection
is understandable in terms of base material and cynical
political and economic interests, regardless of the
proponents' protests to the contrary. Some of the
evidence supports this perspective. In nations that
engage in cultural protection, one can find impacted
industries and interest groups actively lobbying
politicians interested in currying their favor--the
"usual suspects" behind protectionist efforts. In
France case, for example, French movie industry mog
and the elected offic
st voices demanding protection of the French
audiovisual industries. Similarly, in Japan the
agriculture lobby publicly stipulated that, in exchange
236

took

an
wer
itself, or more
accur
or
t.
might
r
er
for the critical support of farmers, the ruling party
would champion and protect their products from
international trade. Most Japanese politicians apparently
this stance without objection.
Such an approach provides only a limited
understanding of the phenomenon. This is apparent if,
from the outset, culture is considered as an independent
variable. Taking a political-economic perspective,
broadened to allow for consideration of culture as
independent variable, the dissertation provides an ans
to the centering question: culture
ately put, concerns over its decline or demise,
plays a role at least equal to that of economics and
politics. The study thus challenges a more "obvious"
conventional understanding of the issue.
In the French audiovisual case study the usual
rogue's gallery of protectionism supporters are eviden
However, the very notion that the French language
come under siege because of liberalized trade in
audiovisual products was a political and cultural
obstacle for even the most ardent free traders to
overcome. Proponents' protectionist warnings to thei
fellow citizens, and to the rest of the E.U.'s memb
states, rested on culturally laden fears.
237

ce
lowing
of a strong farm
lobby. Nonetheless, bringing foreign-grown rice to the
ce

of
at
ations. Human
affairs cannot be reduced to fit theoretical abstractions
omic,
Similarly, farmers in the case study on Japan's ri
trade understood the economic implications of al
trade in foreign agricultural products. And, ruling
politicians recognized the importance
dinner table at the expense of domestically produced ri
struck most Japanese as tantamount to renouncing their
identity.
In the end, this study argues that culture plays a
strong part in instances of national cultural protection,
and in the international political economy. Students
the international political economy need to engage in
least three categories of inquiry: trade and economic
exchange, culture and cultural exchange, and the
relationship between these two sets of rel
that focus solely on "economic rationality" or, for that
matter, on culture. National cultural protection is a
phenomenon driven by a complex combination of econ
political, and cultural forces.

6.2 Hypotheses and Paths for Research
The primary goal of this study is to add to our
understanding of national cultural protection. During the
238

resea
at

l
entity movements and protection, shares this
trait. Could nations that actively support and manipulate

ng
t
s of cultural
otection.
Such hypotheses raise a number of questions. Future
on cultural
prote
rch, several promising hypotheses and a number of
potentially rewarding paths that researchers might
explore emerged. More specifically, the hypothesis th
national culture might lead a nation to embrace national
cultural protection seems plausible. Both France and
Japan have well-developed traditions of cultural
"advocacy." Canada, another frequent champion of nationa
cultural id
their national cultures on a domestic level be driving
toward a self-fulfilling prophecy in the form of national
cultural protection on the international stage?
Similarly, could the impetus for national cultural
protection come from the type of support that ruli
political parties enjoy domestically? Leaders of both
France and Japan relied heavily on the nationalistic
sentiment that relates directly to national cultural
protection. This hypothesis could be extended to sugges
that the type of industry that provides the political
support also drives manifestation
pr
researchers should ask why states aband
ction. Is it because leaders have surrendered a
particular aspect of their culture to the world at large?
239

ook

and
d a
of
own
s will
llenging task for future researchers.
Is it a negotiating ploy? Or, is it because the
citizenry does not, in fact, share the cultural outl
of the ruling class?
Similarly, national cultural protection might reveal
the limits of so-called "epistemic communities." Such
communities are found among international trade
negotiators and policymakers who strongly support free
trade. However, those individuals, societies, or cultures
that are not immediate members of the community may
ultimately reject its ideas and policy proscriptions. Is
this the case in national cultural protection?
Finally, how closely related are nationalism
national cultural protection? Nationalism has playe
significant role in helping to inspire and spawn some
the past century's most horrifying international
conflicts. Is national cultural protection a watered d
version of nationalism, a harbinger of further
nationalist conflict? Or, is it something distinct,
something more closely related to identity than to
nationalist political ideologies? Such question
provide a cha
240

Reference List

"American-Japanese Trade The Economist
April 1991, 68-70.
: Open Season." , 6
"Away
ugust
"EC Adopts Quota Directive, To Take Effect in 18 mos."
s of
or
." The
est
"Impacts of Liberalizing Trade in the World Rice Market."
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75
(February 1993): 219-226.
"Japan and America: Not a Rice Day." The Economist, 23
March 1991, 36-37.
from the Brink." Far Eastern Economic Review, 3
December 1992, 53.
"Buddy Can You Spare a Reel." The Economist, 19 A
1989, 57.
"Cinema Wars." Sight & Sound (November 1993): 3/11.
"Culture and Trade: Cola v. Zola." The Economist, 16
October 1993, 8.
"E.U. and GATT: Drinks all Round." The Economist, 18
December 1993, 49.
Variety, 4 October 1989, 1.
"Europe Broadcast Content." New York Times, 28 November
1994, D5.
"Europe in a Changing World: The External Relation
the European Community." Luxembourg: Office f
Official Publications of the European Communities,
1993.
"Europe's Film Industry: Sleeping with the Enemy
Economist, 26 October 1991, 91.
"EU-US Audio-Visual Trade Gap Increases." Screen Dig
(January 1997): 1.
"Film Strategy for Europe." New York Times, 4 July 1994,
39.
241

"Japan: Rice Pudding." 28 November 1992,
37.
The Economist
Economist
"Japanese Rice: The End of an Era." The Economist, 20
"Movies Eclipse Film." omist, 5 February 1994,
Far Eastern Economic Review
l
Communities, 1994.
27 November 1993, 30.
"Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the
icial Publications
"Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the
nication from the Commission to the Council."
"The Audio-Visual Media in the Single European Market."

The Economist,
"Japan: Situation Vacant." , 11 May 1991,
32.
The "Japan: Tarrifying." , 23 November 1991, 38.
August 1994, 52-53.
The Econ
89.
"Producers Vie for $70 mil in Film, TV Subsidies."
Variety Europe, 10 February 1992.
"Reject Managed Trade." , 4
November 1993, 26.
"Report by the Think-Tank on the Audiovisual Policy in
the European Union." Luxembourg: Office for Officia
Publications of the European
"Rice Production: Stars-and-Stripes-Sushi." The
Economist,
"South Korea: Reaching Out." The Economist, 25 December
1993, 46.
Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting,
Especially by Satellite and Cable." COM(84) 300
final. Luxembourg: Office for Off
of the European Communities, 1984.
Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting,
especially by Satellite and Cable, SUMMARY
(Commu
COM(84) 300 final/2. Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1984.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
Communities, 1988.
242

fficial Publications of the Communities, 1995.
Evaluating Rice Market

1988.
"TV '92 Study: Quotas No Problem, But Beware EC's Rising
"Vice of Rice." , 11 December 1993, 33-34.
0
can Trade Disputes. Ann Arbor:
Aches
Alderman, Bruce. "Euro Commission is Fighting Against
Alder
Altsh
Books, 1983.
"The European Union and World Trade." Luxembourg: Office
for O
Asian Development Bank.
Intervention Policies: Some Asian Examples. Manila:
ADB,
"Trade Made the Ship Go." The Economist, 11 January 1992,
11-12.
Variety Power." , 29 November 1989, 54.
The Economist
"World Trade Talks: Over to Tokyo." The Economist, 3
November 1991, 71-72.
Acheson, Keith, and Christopher Maule. Much Ado about
Culture: North Ameri
University of Michigan Press, 2001.
on, Keith, Christopher Maule, and Elizabeth Filleul.
"Folly of Quotas on Films and Television
World Economy Programmes." 12 (1989).
'Obligatory and Enforceable' Program Quotas."
Variety (May 31, 1989).
Alderman, Bruce. "Euro Pic Powers Pushing to Lift Quotas
Past 50%." Variety, 17 May 1989, 39.
man, Bruce. "Quid Pro Quota?" Variety, 11 October
1989, 51.
Alker, Hayward and Peter M. Haas, "Rise of Global
Ecopolitics," in Global Accord: Environmental
Challenges and International Responses. Edited by N.
Chouciri. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
iller, Donald, ed. Free Trade versus Protectionism.
New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1988.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso
Editions of New Left
243

Appadjurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural
f Globalization. Minneapolis: University
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions
Arzeni, Sergio. "The End of Globalism?" In The
ter the Collapse of the E-W

.
Far Eastern
Globalization and Europe:
8.
imes
Barker, Randolph, Robert W. Herdt, with Beth Rose.
Becke u .
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Anisuzzaman, and Anouar Abdel-Malek, eds. Culture and
Thought. New York: The United Nations University
with MacMillan Press, 1983.

Dimensions o
of Minnesota Press, 1996.
Appadurai, Arjun.
of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996.
Armstrong, David. "Globalization and the Social State."
Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 461-478.
International System af
Order. Edited by Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper, and
Yoshikazu Sakamato. Dordrecht: Marinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1993.
Attali, Jacques. "The Crash of Western Civilization: The
Limits of the Market and Democracy." Foreign Policy
(Summer 1997): 54-63.
Auguste, Byron G. "What's So New About Globalization?"
New Perspectives Quarterly (Winter 1998): 16-20
Awanohara, Susumu. "Super 301: the Sequel."
Economic Review, 28 May 1992, 49-50.
Axtmann, Roland, ed.
Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. London:
Pinter, 199
Barber, Benjamin. Jihad versus McWorld. New York: T
Books, 1995.
The
Rice Economy of Asia. Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future, Inc., 1985.
Bates, James. "Official Says Europe Willing to Do Lunch"
Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1994, B1.
r, Gary. The Economic Approach to H man Behavior
244

.,
y
3.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. sm. Cambridge: MIT Press,
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., and Robert E. Hudec. de and
ites for Free Trade
Bigsby, C.W.E. "Europe, America and the Cultural Debate."
d
Blinder, Alan. "Offshoring: The Next Industrial
n Affairs (March/April, 2006).
Press, 1995.
The
Hollywood Repor
Bray,
s. Berkeley: University
Brecher, Jeremy, and Tim Costello, illage or
Bestor, Theodore C. "Tokyo Mom-and-Pop." Cramer, Gail L
Eric J. Wailes, and Shangnan Shui. Wilson Quarterl
14, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 27-3
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. In Defense of Globalization. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004.
Protectioni
1988.
Fair Tra
Harmonization: Prerequis .
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
In Superculture: American Popular Culture an
Europe, edited by C.W.E. Bigsby. Bowling Green:
Bowling Green University Popular Press.
Revolution?" Foreig
Bloom, William. Personal Identity, National Identity, and
International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
Bohannan, Paul. How Culture Works. New York: The Free
Boliek, Brooks. "Clinton: AV Fight Not Over."
ter, 17-19 December 1993, 3.
Boucher, David. Political Theories of International
Relations: From Thucydides to the Present. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998.
Bradsher, Keith. "Big Cut in Tariffs: Movies, TV and
Financial Services are Some of the Areas Left Out."
The New York Times, 15 December 1993, A1.
Francesca. The Rice Economies: Technology and
Development in Asian Societie
of California Press, 1986.
Global V
Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the
Bottom Up. Boston: South End Press, 1994.
245

.
hical Indications and Cultural Protection in
ol: Global Turmoil on
Buchanan, James M. "Economic Science and Cultural
ssex:
Diversity." International Affairs 72,
Camar ives
on Nationalism and War
Campb S. Foreig
Carmody, Chios C., "Creating Shelf Space: NAFTA's
Brenner, Neil. "Global, Fragmented, Hierarchical: Henri
Lefebvre's Geographies of Globalization." Public
Culture 10, no. 1 (1997): 135-167
Brooks, David. "Never for GATT." The American Spectator,
January 1994, 34-37.
Broude, Tomer. "Taking 'Trade and Culture' Seriously:
Geograp
WTO Law" (May 1, 2005).
http://ssrn.com/abstract=714981 or
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.714981.
Out of Contr Brzezinski, Zbigniew.
the Eve of the 21
st
Century. New York: Charles
Scribner, 1993.
Post-Socialist Political Economy: Diversity." In
Selected Essays by James M. Buchanan. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, 1997.
Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: The National
Security Problem in International Relations. Su
Wheatsheaf, 1983.
Cable, Vincent. "The New Trade Agenda: Universal Rules
Amid Cultural
no. 2 (1996): 227-46.
off, John L., and Paul C. Stern, eds. Perspect
. Gordon and Breach
Publishers, 1995.
ell, David. Writing Security: U. n Policy
and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
Experience with Cultural Protection and its
Relevance for the WTO." Asian Journal of WTO &
International Health Law and Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2
(September 2007): 287-312.
246

Publishers,
Castle, Emery N., Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally A. Skillings,
icultural Trade Relations
Cheah mopolitics:
on. Minneapolis:
Choi,
S FTA Talks and Convention on
Asian Journal of WTO &
2
Clarence, Mavis. "EC's Talking Quotas Today." The
Clark, Ian. "Beyond the Great Divide: Globalization and
national Relations."
Clarke, Hilary. "Kantor Offers GATT 'Flexibility'." The
.
omic
Cohen
ar Era,
omy: Perspectives on
Global Wealth and Power, 3
rd
Edition. Edited by
Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1995: 519-531.
Castells, Manuel. The Power of Identity. Volume 2, The
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture.
Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Blackwell
1997.
U.S.-Japanese Agr eds. .
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc.,
1982.
, Pheng, and Bruce Robbins, eds. Cos
Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nati
University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
Won M. "Screen Quota and Cultural Diversity:
Debates in Korea-U
Cultural Diversity."
International Health Law and Policy, Vol. 2, No.
(September 2007): 267-286.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019389.
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Chua, Amy.
Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global
Insecurity. New York: Anchor Books, 2004.
Citron, Alan. "The Gaul to Help Gain Entree to Europe."
Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1994.
Hollywood Reporter, 8 February 1995, 1.
the Theory of Inter Review of
International Studies 24 (1998): 479-498.
Hollywood Reporter, 8 December 1993, 1
Clifford, Mark. "The Sacred Chow." Far Eastern Econ
Review, 27 August 1992, 56-57.
, Benjamin J. "Toward a Mosaic Economy: Economic
Relations in the Post-Cold W " in
International Political Econ
247

of
ress, 1997.
sh
The
W
Nijhoff
Colli
ank
Collins, Richard. , and National
to:
Commission of the European Communities. "Commission
uropean
ders to
7-117.
e
Cohen, Raymond. Negotiating Across Cultures:
International Communication in an Interdependent
World. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
Peace P
Cohn, Theodore H. The International Politics of
Agricultural Trade. Vancouver: University of Briti
Columbia Press, 1990.
Coker, Christopher. "The New World (Dis)Order." ." In
International System after the Collapse of the E-
Order, edited by Armand Cleese, Richard Cooper, and
Yoshikazu Sakamoto. Dordrecht: Marinus
Publishers, 1993.
er, Paul. "Globalization, Growth and Poverty:
Building an Inclusive World Economy," in World B
Policy Research Report. Washington D.C.: December,
2001.
Culture, Communication
Identity: The Case of Canadian Television. Toron
University of Toronto Press, 1990.
Communication on Evaluation of the Action Programme
to Promote the Development of the E
Audiovisual Industry (Media) (1991-1995)." Com(93)
364 final. Brussels, July 23, 1993.
Congleton, Roger D. "The Globalization of Politics:
Rational Choice and the Internationalization of
Public Policy" (April 10, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=979459.
Conley, Janet L. "Hollywood's Last Hurrah? 'Television
Without Frontiers' Directive May Close Bor
the European Community's Broadcast Market."
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Business Law 14, no. 1 (1993): 8
Costigliola, Frank. France and the United States: The
Cold Alliance Since World War II. New York: Twayn
Publishers, 1992.
248

ination of

Cowen
ltures (Princeton: Princeton
Cowhe
ns
Dawtrey, Adam. "GATT Gets France's Goat." Variety, 27
De Bièvre, Dirk. "International Institutions and Domestic
de Grazia, Victoria. "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The
.
Delfs, Robert. "Question of Survival: LDP Toughens Its
Economic Review,
Destl Edition).
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Council Directive 89/552 (1989). "On the Coord
Certain Provisions Laid down by Law, Regulation or
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning
the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities,"
O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 298) 23 (1989). Also known as
the "Directive on Broadcasting."
, Tyler. Creative Destruction: How Globalization is
Changing the World’s Cu
University Press, 2002).
y, Peter F. and Jonathan D. Aronson, Managing the
World Economy: The Consequences of Corporate
Alliances. New York: Council on Foreign Relatio
Press, 1993.
Dale, Peter N. The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1986.
September 1993, 31.
Coalitions: The Differential Effects of Negotiations
and Judicialization in European Trade Policy"
(2003). EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2003/17.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=574501.
American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960."
Journal of Modern History 61 (March 1989): 53-87
Line on Rice Imports." Far Eastern
12 March 1992, 11.
Der Derian, James. AntiDiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed
and War. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992.
er, I.M. American Trade Politics (Second
Economics, 1992.
249

Dischamps, Jean Claude. "The European Community,
do Rosario, Louise, and Susumu Awanohara. "Round and
do Rosario, Louise. "Against the Grain: Japan Likely to
Far Eastern Economic
do Rosario, Louise. "Japan Can Say 'Yes'." Far Eastern
Donnelly, Michael W. "Setting the Price of Rice: A Study
Dougherty, Peter J. "The Wealth of Notions: A Publisher
Drache, Daniel and Marc D. Froese. "The Global Cultural
rad
: The MIT Press, 1996.
Dunn, J. ed. Contemporary Crisis of the Nation-State?
Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Deudney, Daniel, and G. John Ikenberry. "Wither the
West?" In The International System after the
Collapse of the E-W Order, edited by Armand Cleese,
Richard Cooper, and Yoshikazu Sakamoto. Dordrecht:
Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993.
International Trade, and World Unity." California
Management Review 35, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 104-117.
Round: Japan Fails to Kick-Start GATT Talks." Far
Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1992, 70.
Buckle under Rice Pressure."
Review, 21 November 1991, 58.
Economic Review, 27 August 1992, 56-57.
in Political Decisionmaking." In Policymaking in
Contemporary Japan, edited by T.J. Pempel. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1977.
Considers the Literature of Globalization,"
Chronicle of Higher Education, July 16, 2004.
Commons after Cancun: Identity, Diversity and
Citizenship" (2005). CLPE Research Paper No. 2.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829987.
Drucker, Peter F. "Trade Lessons from the World Economy,"
Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (1994).
Duesterberg, Thomas J. "Trade, Investment, and
Estrangement in the U.S.-East Asian Relationship."
In New Forces in the World Economy, edited by B
Roberts. Cambridge
250

on."
ward
Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study Theory in Political
cal Science:
stein
.-
Eiche tal: A History of the
Intern
n History
European Commission. "Strategy Options to Strengthen the
Europ on in
the Internal Market.
Falk,
ion
5.
New York:
Farrell, Pia. "French Remain on Guard Despite Success in

onalism,
Dunton, Davidson. "The Response to Cultural Penetrati
In Canada-United States Relations, edited by Ed
H. English. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
The Handbook of Politi Science." In
Strategies of Inquiry, edited by Fred I Green
and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading: Addison Wesley
Publishing Company, 1975.
Egaitsu, Fumio. "Japanese Agricultural Policy." In U.S
Japanese Agricultural Trade Relations, edited by
Emery N. Castle, Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally A.
Skillings. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the
Future, Inc., 1982.
ngreen, Barry. Globalizing Capi
ational Monetary System. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996.
Moder Ellwood, David. "Hollywood's Star Wars."
44, no. 4 (1994): 6-9.
European Programme Industry in the Context of the
Audiovisual Policy of the European Union," Green
Paper. Brussels, 1994.
ean Commission. Pluralism and Media Concentrati
COM (92) 480 final. Brussels.
R. On Humane Governance: Towards a New Global
Politics--The WOMP Report of the Global Civilizat
Project. Oxford: Polity Press, 199
Fallows, James. Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New
Asian Economic and Political System.
Pantheon Books, 1994.
GATT." The Hollywood Reporter, 21 December 1993, I1.
Global Culture: Nati Featherstone, Michael, ed.
Globalization, and Modernity. London: Sage
Publications, 1990.
251

y
Filip
aw 28
.
Clarendon Press, 1976.
Standoff." Maclean's, 27
Fried
The Coming War
Cultur .
Fried Tree. New
York: Anchor, 1999 and 2007.
y of
y. New York: Farr, Strauss,
t Man.
1992.
Featherstone, Mike and Scott Lash. "Globalization,
Modernity and the Spatialization of Social Theory:
An Introduction." In Global Modernities, edited b
Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson.
London: Sage Publications, 1995.
ek, Jon. "'Culture Quotas': The Trade Controversy
over the European Community's Broadcasting
Directive." Stanford Journal of International L
(Spring 1992): 323-370.
Fleming, J. Marcus. "Mercantilism and Free Trade Today."
In The Market and the State: Essays in Honour of
Adam Smith, edited by Thomas Wilson and Andrew S
Skinner. Oxford: The
Foreman-Peck, James, ed. Historical Foundations of
Globalization. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,
1998.
Fraser, Matthew. "A Question of Culture: The Canadian
Solution Resolves a GATT
December 1993, 50-51.
land, Jonathan. "Traveller's Tales." Far Eastern
Economic Review, 29 April 1993, 28.
Friedman, George, and Meredith Lebard.
with Japan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
al Identity and Global Process Friedman, Jonathan.
London: Sage Publications, 1994.
man, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive
Friedman, Thomas L. The World is Flat: A Brief Histor
the Twenty First Centur
and Girouz, 2006.
Fukuyama, Francis. "Virtue and Prosperity." National
Interest 40 (Summer 1995): 21-27.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Las
New York: Free Press,
252

Fuller, Chris. "EC's MEDIA Maps New Direction for 2000."
Funabasi, Yoichi New Perspectives
Gaddis, John Lewis. "International Relations Theory and
greeme
l

ation of the
Conflict between Trade Liberalization and Domestic
Restrictions on Certain Cultural Products."
007): 313-344.
Gardels, Nathan. "Global Fusion: Asian Ideals and Anglo-
Gates ead. New York: Viking, 1995.
ell

Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the
Creation of Prosperity. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1995.
Variety, 29 November 1993, 59(2).
Fuller, Chris. "Wars of Words Rages over UIP Exemption."
Variety 28 February 1994, 59.
. "Globalize Asia."
Quarterly 9, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 23-27.
the End of the Cold War." International Security 17,
no. 3 (1992-1993): 5-58.
Galperin, Hernan. "Cultural Industries Policy in Regional
Trade A nts: The Case of NAFTA, the European
Union and MERCOSUR." A paper presented to the
International/Development Communication Division,
International Communication Association. 1998 Annua
Conference (October, 1997).
Gao, Henry S. "The Mighty Pen, the Almighty Dollar, and
the Holy Hammer and Sickle: An Examin
Cultural Policy with Special Regard to the Recent
Dispute between the United States and China on
Asian
Journal of WTO & International Health Law and
Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 2
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019394.
New Perspectives Quarterly Saxon Norms." (Winter
1998): 2-3.
, Bill. The Road Ah
Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Corn
University Press, 1983.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. October 30, 1947,
55 U.N.T.S. 187.
253

um on Information Processing in Organizations
Northeast Asian

Gilbe
Gilpin, Robert. my of International
Giuss
3
Goldi
cation, the New
Goldscheider, Calvin. "Population, Ethnicity, and Nation-
d
Goldsmith, James.
George, Alexander L. "Case Studies and Theory
Development," Presented to the Second Annual
Symposi
at Carnegie-Mellon University (15-16 October 1982).
George, Aurelia. "Japan as America's Global Partner:
Journal of Problems and Prospects."
Studies (Winter 1992): 3-18.
George, Jim. "Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism
and New/Old World Orders." Millennium 22, no. 2
(Summer 1993): 197-234.
Gibney, Frank. The Pacific Century: America and Asia in a
Changing World. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1992.
Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
rt, Martin. Churchill: A Life. New York: Henry Holt
Company, 1991.
The Poltical Econo
Relations. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1987.
ani, Paolo. "Empirical Evidence for Trends Toward
Globalization: The Discovery of Hot Air."
International Journal of Political Economy 26, no.
(Fall 1996): 15-38.
ng, Peter, and Phil Harris, eds. Beyond Cultural
Imperialism: Globalization, Communi
International Order. London: Sage, 1997.
Building: Themes, Issues, and Guidelines." In
Population, Ethnicity, and Nation-Building, edite
by Calvin Goldscheider. Boulder: Westview Press,
1995.
The Trap. London: Macmillan, 1994.
Goldstein, Carl. "Trading Troubles." Far Eastern Economic
Review, 30 December 1993, 12.
254

of
ions
tive. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

ington
Guider, Elizabeth. "Tit for Tat: U.S. Ticked on EC
Variety
Guill
Critique of Five Key
Annual
Gunte
Globalization: A Review of the

Haass, Richard N. and Robert E. Litan, "Globalization and
ed
(May/June 1998).

Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. Pathologies
Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applicat
in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1994.
Greider, William. One World, Ready or Not: The Manic
Logic of Global Capitalism. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1998.
Greider, William. One World, Ready or Not--The Manic
Logic of Global Capitalism. New York: Simon
Schuster, 1997.
Grillo, R.D. Pluralism and the Politics of Difference:
State, Culture, and Ethnicity in Comparative
Perspec
Guback, Thomas H. The International Film Industry:
Western Europe and America Since 1945. Bloom
and London: Indiana University Press, 1969.
Program Quotas." , 6 May 1991, 317.
en, Mauro F. "Is Globalization Civilizing,
Destructive or Feeble? A
Debates in the Social Science Literature."
Review of Sociology, 2001. 27: 235-260.
r, Bernhard G., and Rolph van der Hoeven, "The
Social Dimensions of
Literature," Working Paper No. 24 (Geneva: World
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization,
June 2004).
Ethnic Conflict in Gurr, Ted Robert, and Barbara Harff.
World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
Its Discontents: Navigating the Dangers of a Tangl
World." Foreign Affairs
Hall, John A., and Ralph Schroeder, eds. An Anatomy of
Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
255

ocial
Handley, Paul. "Paddies of Change." Far Eastern Economic
Hayami, Yujiro, and Yoshidhisa Godo. "Economics and

ural
e
Globalizing
n.
ted
A.
Herma
al
erican
Heyne
Hicks, George. an's Hidden Apartheid: The Korean
Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson, in
Hall, Rodney Bruce. National Collective Identity: S
Constructions and International Systems. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999.
Review, 2 December 1993, 71.
Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Perspective on
the Uruguay Round." Working Paper Series (Number
5341) Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1995.
Hedetoft, Ulf. "Constructions of Europe: Territoriality,
Sovereignty, Identity: Disaggregations of Cult
and Political Space." In Territoriality in th
Society: One Place or None, edited by
Stefan Immerfall, acting editor Jürgen von Hage
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1998.
Hemmi, Kenzo. "Agriculture and Politics in Japan." In
U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade Relations, edi
by Emery N. Castle, Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally
Skillings. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the
Future, Inc., 1982.
ns, Hubert J.M., and Harry J.G. Kempen. "Moving
Cultures: The Perilous Problems of Cultur
Am Dichotomies in a Globalizing Society."
Psychologist (October 1998): 1111-1120.
, Paul. The Economic Way of Thinking (Upper Saddle
River: Prentice-Hall, 1997.
Jap
Minority and the Japanese. Aldershot, England:
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997.
Hift, Fred. "European TV Quotas: Angry Yanks and a
Community Divided." Variety, 24 May 1989, 1.
Globalization
Question: The International Economy and the
Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1996.
256

Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith. ing and
Hoon, Shim Jae. "Ritual Sacrifice: Cabinet Reshuffled
Far Eastern Economic
Hopkins, Raymond F. "Food Security, Policy Options and
e
Hollist, 3-36.
o
.:
Hughes, Henry J. "Between the Waves: A Stranger's Home in
e
o. 3
the
ster,
ics and
ute, 1979.
Hirst, Paul, and Grahame Thompson. Globalization in
Question. London: Polity Books, 1996.
Explain
Understanding International Relations. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990.
Hoon, Shim Jae. "Crop Circles: Rice Imports Decision
Sparks Wave of Protests." Far Eastern Economic
Review, 16 December 1993, 13.
after Rice-Market Opening."
Review, 30 December 1993, 13-14.
the Evolution of State Responsibility." In Food, Th
State, and International Political Economy, edited
by F. LaMond Tullis and W. Ladd
Lincoln London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.
Houck, James P. "Agreements and Policy in U.S.-Japanese
Agricultural Trade." In U.S.-Japanese Agricultural
Trade Relations, edited by Emery N. Castle, Kenz
Hemmi, with Sally A. Skillings. Washington, D.C
Resources for the Future, Inc., 1982.
Howard, Rhoda E. "Human Rights and the Culture Wars."
International Journal (Winter 1997-8): 94-113.
Niigata." Japan Quarterly (July-September 1994):
336-344.
Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilization? Th
Next Pattern of Conflict." Foreign Affairs 72, n
(1993): 22-49.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and
Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon Schu
1996.
Hyoe, Murakami and Johannes Hirschmeir, eds. Polit
Economics in Contemporary Japan. Tokyo: Japan
Culture Instit
257

ocalization:
toriality in
gen.
1998.

ess,
n
(1989) 1991.
n
Islam
Islam, Shada. "Actions Not Words: EC Warns Japan to Open
ve
Jacob
d the State." Sociological Forum 12, no. 1
Jarvi
950. Cambridge:
Johns
y 22, no. 1 (1998): 129-132.
Immerfall, Stefan, Patrick Conway, Carole Crumley and
Konrad Jarausch. "Disembeddedness and L
Terri The Persistence of Territory." In
the Globalizing Society: One Place or None, edited
by Stefan Immerfall, acting editor Jürgen von Ha
Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
Iriye, Akira. Power and Culture: The Japanese-American
War, 1941-1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Pr
1981.
Ishihara, Shintaro. The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japa
Will be First Among Equals. New York:
Touchstone/Simon Schuster, Inc.,
Ishiyama, John T., and Marijke Breuning. Ethnopolitics i
the New Europe. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1998.
, Shada. "A Deal, of Sorts: GATT Comes up with an
Far Eastern Economic 11th-Hour Global Trade Accord."
Review, 23 December 1993, 54.
Markets." Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 January
1993, 51.
Jacobsen, John Kurt. "Much Ado about Ideas: The Cogniti
Factor in Economic Policy." World Politics 47
(January 1995): 283-310.
son, David. "New Frontiers: Territory, Social
Spaces, an
(1997): 121-133.
e, Ian. Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North
Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920-1
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
ton, Ron. "Replacing Geography." Progress in Human
Geograph
Kahn, Joel S. Culture, Multiculture, Postculture. London:
Sage Publications, 1995.
258

e
Kapla
Kapstein, Ethan B.
tional Finance and the State
Katao :
Kelly, William W. "Japanese Farmers."
Kindleberger, Charles P. "The Rise of Free Trade in
id Lake. New Y St.
itions for the
Identity. Minneapolis: University
Klein, Thomas. "'Globalization' as a Strategy of Capital:
International
ambridge Journal
22 (1998): 637-647.
Kammen, Michael. "Culture and the State in America." Th
Journal of American History (December 1996): 791-
814.
n, Robert. "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime,
Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly
Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet."
Atlantic Monthly (February, 1994): 44-76.
Governing the Global Economy:
Interna . Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994.
ka, Tetsuya, ed. Creating Single-Party Democracy
Japan's Postwar Political Structure. Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1992.
Wilson Quarterly
14, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 34-41.
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New
York: Random House, 1987.
Keohane, Robert O. ed. NeoRealism and its Critics. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Western Europe," in International Political Economy:
Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth (3
rd
). Edited
by Jeffry A. Frieden and Dav ork:
Martin's Press, 1995.
King, Anthony D. ed. Culture, Globalization and the World
System: Contemporary Cond
Representation of
of Minnesota Press, 1997.
New Thinking in Modern Capitalism?"
Journal of Political Economy 26, no. 3 (Fall 1996):
60-68.
Kleinknecht, Alfred and Jan ter Wengel, "The Myth of
Economic Globalisation." C of
Economics
259

ics 22 (1998): 637-647.
Kobrin, Stephen J. "Electronic Cash and the End of
Kroeber, A.L., and Clyde Kluckhohn. "Culture: A Critical
Ethnology 42,
Krugm
Krugman, Paul and Robert Lawrence. "Trade, Jobs and
Krugman, Paul. "Is Free Trade Passé?" Economic
Krugman, Paul. "Trade and Inequality, Revisted"(15 June,
.
Krugm
Kruse, Jörn. "The EC-US Trade Conflict over Film and
ereconomics
Kuise
ization. Berkeley: University of California
Northeast Asian
Studies (Winter 1992): 19-39.
Kleinknecht, Alfred and Jan ter Wengel. "The Myth of
Economic Globalisation." Cambridge Journal of
Econom
Kobayashi, Yotaro. "Re-Asianize Japan." New Perspectives
Quarterly 9, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 20-23.
Foreign Policy (Summer 1997): 65- National Markets."
77.
Review of Concepts and Definitions."
no. 1 (1952).
an, Paul and Maurice Obstfeld. International
Economics: Theory and Policy. New York: HaperCollins
Publishers, 1991.
Wages." Scientific American 270, no. 4 (April 1994).
Perspectives 1, no. 2 (1996).
2007). http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/261
an, Paul. Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and
Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations. New
York: W.W. Norton Company, 1994.
Krugman, Paul. Strategic Trade and the New International
Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986.
Television Software." Int
(November/December 1994): 284-291.
l, Richard F. Seducing the French: The Dilemma of
American
Press, 1993.
Kuo, Cheng-Tian, and Takuya Yanagisawa. "The Politics of
Japan's Rice Trade." Journal of
260

astle, Kenzo Hemmi,
Europe Since 1945: An Introduction
Lapid, Yosef, and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds.
lture and Identity in IR Theory
Lapid, Yosef. "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in
The Return of
1996.
Leffl ower: National
Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold
tion 13, no.
Levis, Nicholas. "Globalization and Kulturkampf."
onomy 26, no. 3
Levis
J 26, no. 3
Levit
dden Side of
Everything. New York: William Morrow, 2006.
Kuroda, Yoshimi. "The Present State of Agriculture in
Japan." In U.S.-Japanese Agricultural Trade
Relations, edited by Emery N. C
with Sally A. Skillings. Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future, Inc., 1982.
Lane, Peter. . Totowa,
New Jersey: Barnes Noble Books, 1985.
The Return
of Cu . Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1996.
International Relations Theory," in
Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Edited by Yosef
Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers,
Leffler, Melvyn P. "New Approaches and Prospective
Reconfigurations." Diplomatic History 19, no. 2
(1995): 173-196.
er, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of P
War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
Lehman, Cheryl R., and Russell M. Moore, eds.
Multinational Culture: Social Impacts of a Global
Economy. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992.
Lemish, Dafna, Kirsten Drotner, Tamar Liebes, Eric
Maigret, and Gitte Stald. "Global Culture in
Practice." European Journal of Communica
4: 539-556.
International Journal of Political Ec
(Fall 1996): 81-129.
, Nicholas. "Introduction to the Special Issue."
International ournal of Political Economy
(Fall 1996): 3-14.
t, Steven D. and Stephen J. Dubner. Freakonomics: A
Rogue Economist Explores the Hi
261

e
Cornell
Linco
Changing
opean Journal of
Lloyd
Lovett, William A. "Current World Trade Agenda: GATT,
"
MacIver, D.N. "Ethnic Identity and the Modern State." In
2-ORG.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=371034
an
Mann, Michael. Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A
.
Marden, Peter. "Geographies of Dissent: Globalization,
Libby, Ronald T. Protecting Markets: U.S. Policy and th
Growth in World Grain Trade. Ithaca London:
University Press, 1992.
ln, Edward J. Japan's New Global Role. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993.
Litwak, Robert S. "The Imperial Republic Post 9/11"
Wilson Quarterly (Summer 2002): 76-82.
Livingstone, Sonia. "Mediated Childhoods: A Comparative
Approach to Young People's Media
Environment in Europe." Eur
Communication 13, no. 4: 435-456.
-Owen, Jonathan. "Queue Here for Rice." Japan
Quarterly (July-September 1994): 287-296.
Regionalism, and Unresolved Asymmetry Problems.
Fordham Law Review 62 (1994): 2001-2045.
National Separatism, edited by Colin H. Williams.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1982.
Magala, S.J., "Elective Identities, (Culture,
Identization and Integration)" (10 October, 2002).
ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2002-9
.
Makoto, Ni'ide. "Rice Imports and Implications." Jap
Quarterly (January-March 1994): 16-24.
The
History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Identity and the Nation." Political Geography 16,
no. 1 (1997): 37-64.
262

er and Christopher C.
5.

969.
Masayoshi, Honma. "Rice and the Six-Year Grace Period:
arterly (April-
d the

roblems,
McCormick, Thomas J.
McGui
d
Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in
International Security
15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56.
Marks, Stephen P. "Education, Science, Culture and
Information." In United Nations Legal Order Volume
2, edited by Oscar Schact
Joyner. New York: The American Society of
International Law and Cambridge University Press,
1991.
Marshall, Tyler. "EU Panel Urges Tighter TV Import
Quotas." Los Angeles Times, 23 March 199
Masao, Maruyama. Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese
Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1
Japan Qu Opportunity for Realism."
June 1994): 157-164.
Multinational Corporations an Mattelart, Armand.
Control of Culture: the Ideological Apparatuses of
Imperialism. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982.
Economics: Principles, P McConnell, Campbell R.
and Policies, Tenth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1987.
America's Half Century: United
States Foreign Policy in the Cold War. Baltimore
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
gan, Jim. Cultural Populism. London: Routledge,
1992.
McKeown, Timothy. "Firms and Tariff Regime Change." Worl
Politics 36 (January, 1984): 215-233.
McLuhan, Marshal. The Gutenberg Galaxy. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1962.
Plagues and Peoples McNeill, W.H. . Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1976.
Europe After the Cold War."
263

sance
Mill,
al Economy
and the Politic Trade.
tutions."
Moerk
Global
Vari
77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 94-104.
: A
ity of Denver (2005),
Nordenstreng, Kaarle, and Herbert I. Schiller, eds.
Ablex
Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "Political Geography III: Dealing
Progress in Human
Odell, John S. "Understanding International Trade
Policies: An Emerging Synthesis," World Politics 43,
no. 1 (October, 1990): 139-167.
Menzel, Ulrich. "New Images of the Enemy: The Renais
of Geopolitics and Geoculture in International
Relations." International Journal of Political
Economy 26, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 69-80.
J.S. Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of
Politic . London: John W. Parker, 1844.
Milner, Helen V. Resisting Protectionism: Global
Industries s of International
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Milner, Helen V., Peter B. Rosendorff, and Edward
Mansfield. "International Trade and Domestic
Politics: The Domestic Sources of International
Trade Agreements and Insti
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007296.
, Christian, and Michael Williams. "Moguls Swat
GATT-Flies: Recession and Eurocrats Can't Nix
ety Ties." , 20 December 1993, 1.
Moïsi, Dominique. "The Trouble with France." Foreign
Affairs
Moore, Richard H. "Resistance to Japanese Rice Policy
Case-Study of the Hachirogata Model Farm Project."
Political Geography 12, no. 3 (May 1993): 278-296.
Murray, William D. "A Dialogue on Globalization,"
Univers
www.cudenver.edu/International/CIBER/Documents/Dialo
gue_on_Globalization.pdf.
Beyond National Sovereignty: International
Communication in the 1990s. Norwood:
Publishing Corporation, 1993.
with De-territorialization."
Geography 22, no. 1 (1998): 81-93.
264

Ohnuk e Identities
Through
Orridge, A.W. "Varieties of Nationalism." In -
ed by
ree
orum
Paarl n Policy:
ited States
Papkov, Irina. "International Relations in the Post 9/11
Paper
nal
l,
Parks
Variety
Patel, Surenda J. "The South and GATT Negotiations on
734.

Press,
Plath, David W. "From the Mikado to Gung Ho: Imagining
umn
Ohmae, K. The End of the Nation State. New York: Free
Press, 1995.
i-Tierney, Emiko. Rice as Self: Japanes
Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993.
The Nation
State: the Formation of Modern Politics, edit
Leonard Tivey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
O'Sullivan, Noël. "Concept and Reality in Globalization
Theory." In Globalization, Privatization and F
Market Economy, edited by C.P. Rao. Westport: Qu
Books, 1998.
berg, Robert L. Food Trade and Foreig
India, the Soviet Union, and the Un .
Ithaca London: Cornell University Press, 1985.
World: Reconceptualizing the West's "Other,""
presented at the annual meeting of the Internatio
Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hote
Montreal, Quebec, Canada (Mar 17, 2004).
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p74376_index.html/.
, James. "EEC Body Turnaround on Film Treaty of
Rome." , 9 March 1983, 1.
Service Sector." Economic and Political Weekly
(November 30, 1991): 2732-2
Payne, Richard J. The Clash with Distant Cultures:
Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign
Policy. Albany: State University of New York
1995.
Pempel, T.J., ed. Policymaking in Contemporary Japan.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
the Japanese." Wilson Quarterly 14, no. 4 (Aut
1990): 21-26.
265

,"
r of Inis L. Claude, Jr.
Posen, Barry R. "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military

n
Pritc
2.
Rao,
. Westport: Quorum Books, 1998.
.
Porter, Brian. "Nationalist Ideals and Ethnic Realities
in Community, Diversity, and a New World Order:
Essays in Hono , edited by
Kenneth W. Thompson. Lanham: University Press of
America, 1994.
Power." International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall
1993): 80-124.
Presburger, Paul and Michael R. Tyler. "Television
Without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created by
the New European Community Directive." Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review 13 (1990):
495-509.
Prestowitz, Claude V., Jr., "Beyond Laissez Faire," i
International Political Economy: Perspectives on
Global Wealth and Power, 3
rd
Edition. Edited by
Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1995: 506-518.
hett, L. "Forget Convergence: Divergence Past,
Present and Future." Finance Development (June
1995): 40-43.
The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose Pyle, Kenneth B.
in a New Era. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 199
Quintero, Diana. "American Television and Cinema in
France and Europe." The Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs 18 (Summer/Fall 1994): 115-128.
Ramirez De La O, Rogelio. "You Can't Globalize Halfway."
New Perspectives Quarterly (Winter 1998): 21-22.
C.P., ed. Globalization, Privatization, and Free
Market Economy
Reich, Robert B. "Who is US?" Harvard Business Review 44
(January-February 1990): 53-64.
Reich, Robert B. and Ira Magaziner, Minding America's
Business. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982
266

:
Richardson, J. David. "Strategic Trade Policy,"
ganization
Riddel, Tom, Jean Shackelford, and Steve Stamos.
l For Critically Understanding
Ridin
" New York Times, 23 March 1995, D8.
Riell
ity." In Global Mode ,
Robertson, Roland.
Rodrik, Dani. "How to Save Globalization from its
Cheerleaders" (September 2007). KSG Working Paper
nternational
Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic Policy
Making." International Organization 41 (Winter
1987), 61-92.
Reich, Robert B. The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves
for the Twenty-First Century Capitalism. New York
Vintage, 1992.
International Or 44, no. 1 (Winter 1990):
107-135.
Economics: A Too
Society, Fifth Edition. Reading: Addison-Wesley,
1998.
g, Alan. "New Curbs Proposed on Foreign TV Programs
in Europe.
Rieff, David. "A Global Culture." World Policy Journal.
Vol. X, no. 4 (Winter 1993-4).
y, John E. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign
Policy. Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations, 1995.
Robertson, Roland. "Glocalization: Time-Space and
Homogenity-Heterogene rnities
edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland
Robertson. London: Sage Publications, 1995.
Globalization: Social Theory and
Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992.
No. RWP07-038 Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019015.
Rodrik, Dani. "Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization
Debate." Foreign Policy (Summer 1997): 19-36.
Rodrik, Dani. Has Globalization Gone Too Far?
Washington, D.C.: Institute for I
Economics, 1997.
Rohrlich, Paul Egon. "Economic Culture and Foreign
267

1993.
ics and
Rosen
. Princeton:
omic and Cult 945.
on
in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati on
Rothk

661-670.
47, no. 1
Rundell, John, and Stephen Mennell, eds.
Romm, Joseph J. Defining National Security: the Non-
Military Aspects. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press,
Rosenau, James N. "Distant Proximities: The Dynam
Dialectics of Globalization." In International
Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder,
edited by Björn Hettne. Halifax: Fernwood
Publishing, 1995.
au, Pauline M. Post-Modernism and the Social
Sciences: Insights, Inroads, Intrusions
Princeton University Press, 1992.
Rosenberg, Emily S. Spreading the American Dream:
American Econ ural Expansion, 1890-1
New York: Hill and Wang, 1982.
Rosendorff, B. Peter. "Ideas, Interests, Institutions and
Information: Jagdish Bhagwati and the Political
Economy of Trade Policy." Prepared for presentati
at the Conference
the occasion of his 70th birthday at Columbia
University, New York, August 5-6, 2005.
opf, David. "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?"
Foreign Policy (Summer 1997): 38-52.
Roudometof, Victor. "Preparing for the 21
st
Century."
Sociological Forum 12, no. 4 (1997):
Ruggie, John Gerard. "Territoriality and Beyond:
Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations." International Organization
(Winter 1993): 139-174.
Ruggie, John Gerard. "The Past as Prologue? Interests,
Identity, and American Foreign Policy."
International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 89-
125.
Classical
Readings in Culture and Civilization. London:
Routledge, 1998.
268

d
r
. Boulder London: Lynne
Sanso d:
Sasse s. New
nive
tion." In Creating
Postwar Political
Sayle
Schnattschneider, E.E. d the
Schott, Jeffrey J. The Uruguay Round: An Assessment.
uguay
itute
Seggal, Marshall H., Walter J. Lonner, and John W. Berry.
er 1998):
Shafer, Boyd C. Faces of Nationalism. New York: Harcourt,
Shapiro Michael J., and Hayward R. Alker, eds.
ries: Global Flows, Territorial
Identities. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996.
Ruppel, Fred J. and Earl D. Kellogg, eds. National an
Regional Self-Sufficiency Goals: Implications fo
International Agriculture
Rienner Publishers, 1991.
m, G.B. Japan: A Short Cultural History. Stanfor
Stanford University Press, 1978 (1931).
n, Saskia. Globalization and Its Discontent
York: The Free Press, 1998.
Sassen, Saskia. Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of
Globalization. New York: Columbia U rsity Press,
1995.
Satomi, Tani. "The Japan Socialist Party before the Mid-
1960s: An Analysis of Its Stagna
Single-Party Democracy: Japan's
System, edited by Kataoka Tetsuya. Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1992.
, Murray. "The Social Contradictions of Japanese
Capitalism." Atlantic Monthly. June, 1998: 84-94.
Politics, Pressures, an
Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, 1994.
Schott, Jeffrey J., and Johanna W. Buurman. The Ur
Round: An Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Inst
for International Economics, 1994.
"Cross-Cultural Psychology as a Scholarly
Discipline." American Psychologist (Octob
1101-1110.
Brace, Jovanovich, 1972.
Challenging Bounda
269

Siamwalla, Ammar and Stephen Haykin.
Silk, Leonard.
(Cannan Edition). New
Smith, Anthony D. Na
Smith, Charles, and Jonathan Friedland. "Staple of
"
mic Review,
20 January 1994, 16.
view,
Smith, Clint. "International Trade in Television
Prog
er 10,
Shiller, Robert. The New Financial Order. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003.
The World Rice
Market. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy
Research Institute, 1983.
Economics in Plain English. New York:
Touchstone, 1986.
The Wealth of Nations Smith, Adam.
York: Modern Library, 1937 (1776).
tional Identity. Las Vegas:
University of Nevada Press, 1991.
Smith, Anthony D. The Geopolitics of Information: How
Western Culture Dominates the World. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980.
Dispute: Tokyo Hints at Concessions on Rice Trade.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 October 1993, 22.
Smith, Charles. "Black Rice: 'Free' Traders Erode
Bureaucrats' Control." Far Eastern Econo
Smith, Charles. "Rice Resolve: Tokyo Makes Last-Minute
Concession on Imports." Far Eastern Economic Re
23 December 1993, 14.
Smith, Charles. "Steamed Up: Japan's Rice-Import Ban
Stays." Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 October
1993, 73.
Smith, Charles. "Wake-Up Call." Far Eastern Economic
Review, 16 December 1993, 12.
Programming and GATT: An Analysis of Why the
European Community's Local ram Requirement
Violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade." International Tax and Business Lawy
no. 97 (1993): 97-137.
270

:
ub 10,
Soros
n University Press, 1974.
n's Rice and
ernational
Economic Thought.
Stern
Steve
The Sociological Quarterly
Steyn
C.: Regnery Publishing Inc.,
Stigl
ospect (January, 2002).
Back
is L.

Summe Times, October 29, 2006.
Smith, Neil. "The Satanic Geographies of Globalization
Uneven Development in the 1990s." P lic Culture
no. 1 (1997): 169-189.
, George. "The Capitalist Threat," Atlantic Monthly
(February 1997).
Sowell, Thomas. Classical Economics Reconsidered.
Princeton: Princeto
Spahni, Pierre. "Producers' Entitlement Guarantees: A
Serious Option for Liberalizing Japa
Food Policy 17, no. 4 (August 1992): Dairy Sectors."
296-307.
The Politics of Int Spero, Joan Edelman.
Economic Relations (Third Edition). New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985.
The Growth of Spiegel, Henry William.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1991.
, Andy. "Euro Commish Dish." Variety, 28 November
1994, 2.
nson, Nick. "Globalization, National Cultures and
Cultural Citizenship."
38, no. 1 (1997): 41-66.
, Mark. America Alone: The End of the World as We
Know it. Washington D.
2006.
itz, Joseph E. "Globalization’s Discontents,"
American Pr
Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and Its Discontents. New
York: W.W. Norton, 2002.
Sugar, Peter F. "From Ethnicity to Nationalism and
Again." In Nationalism: Essays in Honor of Lou
Snyder, edited by Michael Palumbo and William O.
Shanahan. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981.
rs, Lawrence. Financial
271

ral Policy Making." In U.S.-
ral Trade Relations

Taylor, Brian K. "Culture, Whence, Whither and Why?" In
Brian K. Taylor, and John M. Welton. New
Thomp
94.
. New York:
Thussu, Daya Kishan. "Privatizing the Airwaves: The
." Media, Culture
Ticker, J. Ann. "Identity in International Relations
The Return of
Publishers, 1996.
cago Press,
Tsebe Rational Choice in
Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Political Geography III: Dealing
Takacs, Wendy. "Pressures for Protection: An Empirical
Study." Economic Inquiry 19: 687-693.
Talbot, Ross B., and Young W. Kihl. "The Politics of
Domestic and Foreign Policy Linkages in U.S.-
Japanese Agricultu
Japanese Agricultu , edited by
Emery N. Castle, Kenzo Hemmi, with Sally A.
Skillings. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the
Future, Inc., 1982.
The Future of Cultural Minorities, edited by Antony
E. Alcock,
York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
son, Roger C. The Pacific Basin Since 1945. London:
Longman Group, Ltd., 19
Thurow, Lester C. The Future of Capitalism: How Today's
Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World
Penguin, 1996.
Impact of Globalization on India
Society 21, no. 1 (1999): 125-131.
Theory: Feminist Perspectives," in
Culture and Identity in IR Theory, edited by Yosef
Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner
Toulmin, Stephen. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of
Modernity. Chicago: University of Chi
1992.
lis, George."Nested Games:
Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990.
with Deterritorialization." Progress in Human
Geography 22, no. 1 (1998): 81-93.
272

U.S. the
ry.
U.S. ting
.
U.S.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing

Ulmer
mber 1993, 1.

van Elteren, Mel. "GATT and Beyond: World Trade, the Arts
:
The Enigma of Japanese Power: People
lfred
Vernon, Raymond. "The Japan-U.S. Bilateral Relationship:
Tyson, Laura D'Andrea. Who's Bashing Whom? Trade
Conflict in High-Technology Industries. Washington,
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992.
Congress. U.S.-Japan Rice Trade: Hearing before
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forest
99th Cong., 2nd sess., 21 October 1986.
Congress: Office of Technology Assessment. Compe
Economies: America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim
OTA-ITE-498. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, October 1991.
Department of Agriculture. Japan's Rice Policy, by
William T. Coyle. Foreign Agricultural Economic
Report Number 164. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1981.
US-Canadian Agricultural
Trade Issues: Implications for the Bilateral Trade
Agreement, by Mary Anne Normile and Carol A.
Goodloe. Washing
Office, March 1988.
, James. "EC Won't Budge on Barriers to U.S. Film,
TV." The Hollywood Reporter, 15 Dece
Ulmer, James. "U.S. Bows to France on Audiovisual
Issues." The Hollywood Reporter, 14 December 1993,
vol. 1.
and American Popular Culture in Western Europe."
Journal of American Culture 19, no. 3 (Fall 1996)
59-73.
van Wolfren, Karel.
and Politics in a Stateless Nation. New York: A
A. Knopf, 1989.
Its Role in the Global Economy." In New Forces in
the World Economy, edited by Brad Roberts.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996.
273

in
Véron, Luc. "The Competitive Advantage of Hollywood
g

ao/wps/ve101].
nd The Short
Voon, Tania S., "A New Approach to Audiovisual Products
.
cal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Historical Ca
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Unthinking Social Science: The
Véron, Luc. "Hollywood and Europe: A Case of Trade
Cultural Industries, the 1993 GATT Dispute." Los
Angeles: School of International Relations at USC,
1999. Available from CIAO working papers (Columbia
International Affairs Online)
[wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/ve102].
Industry." Los Angeles: School of International
Relations at USC, 1999. Available from CIAO workin
papers (Columbia International Affairs Online)
[wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ci
Viner, Jacob. "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of
Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries," World Politics 1 (1948).
The Long View a Viner, Jacob. (New York: Free
Press, 1958.
in the WTO: Rebalancing GATT and GATS," UCLA
Environmental Law Review 14, No. 1 (2007).
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012213
Walker, Rob. Inside/Outside: International Relations as
Politi
Press, 1993.
pitalism. London:
Verso, 1983.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World System I. New
York: Academic Press, 1974.
Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms. Cambridge:
Polity Press in Association with Basil Blackwell,
1991.
Walter, Andrew. World Power and World Money.
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
274

d

5.
Weinb of
e
nd
ienner
ernational Journal of Political
Wildm tional
Wilhe
William, Michael. "Films Without Frontiers?"
Willi End of History.
Willi
en: Yale
Yamaji, Susumu. "The Unsung Mainstays (2): Agriculture."
In Politics and Economics in Contemporary Japan,
edited by Murakami Murakami and Johannes Hirschmeir.
Tokyo: Japan Culture Institute, 1979.
Wasko, Janet. "Jurassic Park and the GATT: Hollywood an
Europe--An Update." In Democracy and Communication
in the New Europe: Change and Continuity in East and
West, edited by Farrel Corcoran and Paschal Preston.
Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc., 199
Globalization Waters, Malcolm. . London: Routledge, 1995.
erg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History
World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994.
Wendt, Alexander. "Identity and Structural Change in
International Politics," in The Return of Cultur
and Identity in IR Theory. Edited by Yosef Lapid a
Friedrich Kratochwil. Boulder: Lynne R
Publishers, 1996.
Went, Robert. "Globalization: Myths, Reality, and
Int Ideology."
Economy 26, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 39-59.
an, Steven S., and Stephen E. Siwek. Interna
Trade in Films and Television Programs. Cambridge:
American Enterprise Institute/Ballinger Publication,
1988.
lm, Donald. Global Communications and Political
Power. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990.
Variety
Europe, 10 February 1992, 31.
ams, David. Japan: Beyond the
London: Routledge, 1994.
ams, Michael, and Adam Dawtrey. "GATT Spat Wake-up
on Yank Market Muscle." Variety, 27 December 1993,
45.
Wolf, Martin. Why Globalization Works. New Hav
University Press, 2004.
275

Yoshi
25, no. 1
Yoichi, Tashiro. "An Environmental Mandate for Rice Self-
sufficiency." Japan Quarterly (January-March 1992):
34-44.
no, Kosaku. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary
Japan: A Sociological Enquiry. London New York:
Routledge and LSE, 1992.
Zolberg, Vera L. "Museum Culture and the Threat to
National Identity in the Age of GATT." The Journal
of Arts Management, Law, and Society
(Spring 1995): 5-16.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This dissertation explores national cultural protection in the era of globalization. As the pace of globalization increases, national leaders, with the support of concerned and sometimes radicalized citizenry, are "defending the local" by trying to shield their cultures from the impact of international trade. Given its apparent disruptive influence on the global political economy, national cultural protection should be of concern to politicians and academicians alike. However, much of the literature available to understand the phenomenon is incomplete. The goal of this dissertation is to provide a more complete understanding of national cultural protection than is available today.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

The globalization of cultural industries: Nollywood – the view from the South

PDF

Foreign-related activities of the Chinese local governments and agents of globalization: a case study of 31 provinces in mainland China

PDF

The global citizenship initiative: a case study examining the leadership of Pacific Coast Community College implementing organizational change in response to globalization

PDF

A case study: one California high school's commitment to preparing students for a global world

PDF

Elevated: Ballet and culture in the United States, World War II to the National Endowment for the Arts

PDF

Technical base, interests, and power in the two-level game of international telecom standards setting: the political economy of China's initiatives

PDF

A case study examining how a land-grant research university integrated global initiatives into its mission and institutional program

PDF

Getting a new blanket: China’s conceptualization of “security” in the post-Deng Xiaoping era

PDF

A two-level analysis of foreign policy decision making: an empirical investigation of the case of China-Taiwan

PDF

Preparing our nation’s youth for success in the 21st century: a case study on the implementation of globalization in educational practices and curriculum

PDF

Leading while expanding: a case study examining the changing nature of an American land grant public research university in response to the forces of globalization

PDF

Spaces of market-culturalism: the case of Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong

PDF

National transgressions: Representing the mobile, boundary-busting American during periods of major economic crisis

PDF

Factors contributing to transforming school culture: a case study of the advancement via individual determination program

PDF

In search of a “genuine” Southern California park: evaluating the early cultural landscapes of Ralph Cornell for today

PDF

Raising Niños Bien Educados: a case study of a culturally relevant parenting program in an inner city community

PDF

China's investment in the United States and the public relations implications: A case study of the Lenovo-IBM acquisition

PDF

Labor, performance, and theatre: Strike culture and the emergence of organized labor in the 1930's

PDF

The formation and representations of a new trend of labor migration: a case study on Taiwanese working holiday makers in Australia

PDF

High school math reform and the role of policy, practice and instructional leadership on math achievement: a case study of White Oak Tree High School

Asset Metadata

Creator Dennehy, Brian K. (author)

Core Title Case studies of national cultural protection in the era of globalization

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program International Relations

Publication Date 06/24/2010

Defense Date 03/31/2008

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Globalization,International trade,OAI-PMH Harvest,protection

Language English

Advisor Aronson, Jonathan (committee chair), Bar, Francois (committee member), Lamy, Steven (committee member), Wilkie, Simon J. (committee member)

Creator Email dennehy@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1287

Unique identifier UC1433406

Identifier etd-Dennehy-20080624 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-77175 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1287 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Dennehy-20080624.pdf

Dmrecord 77175

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Dennehy, Brian K.

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu