University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Land readjustment in Bangkok

(USC Thesis Other)

Land readjustment in Bangkok

PDF

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content

LAND READJUSTMENT
IN BANGKOK

by
Salinee Sukolratanametee

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PLANNING)

August 2007

Copyright 2007 Salinee Sukolratanametee

ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to my committee chair,
Prof. Harry Richardson, for his valuable advice and guidance throughout my study. I
also would like to express my profound gratitude and heartfelt thanks to Dr. Eric
Heikkila for providing constructive advice, unfailing guidance and comments, and
also serving as a committee member. Special appreciation and sincere respect is due
to Dr. Baizhu Chen, the other committee member, for encouraging me with
thoughtful inputs. Without whom I mentioned, this work could hardly have reached
its present shape.
I would like to acknowledge the contributions of Mr. Thuanthong
Sirimongkolvichaya and other local officials at the DTCP and BMA for valuable
information and required materials. Very special thanks to the team of interviewees
for unfailing help and encouragement; thanks sincerely also to the landowners of the
two LR pilot projects who spent their time to participate in my survey study.
Faculty of Architecture at King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology,
Ladkrabang, deserves sincere appreciation for accepting me to join in the Department
of Urban and Regional Planning and study abroad.
Finally, I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to my beloved parents for their
unconditional love, inspiration and support; thanks also to my husband, sisters, aunt,
friends, and relatives in Los Angeles. Special appreciation is also due to June
Muranaka for all her effort and unfailing help with my graduation paperwork.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ii

List of Tables vi

List of Figures vii

Abstract viii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Introduction 1
Statement of the Problem 3
The Objectives 5
Scope of the Study 6
Limitation and Constraints 7

Chapter 2: Land Readjustment Process and Practice 8
Land Readjustment Process 8
1. Framework 8
2. Procedures 10
3. Financial Plan 10
4. Land Valuation 12
Land Readjustment in Various Countries 14
1. Japan 15
2. Germany 18
3. Western Australia 20
4. South Korea 21

Chapter 3: Applicability to the Bangkok Setting 24
The Bangkok Setting 24
1. Factors of Urban Expansion 24
2. Expanding Boundaries 25
3. Agricultural Land Conversion 26
4. Central Bangkok and Urban Fringe Development 27
5. Urban Policies 28
Historical Perspective in Applications of Land Readjustment 29
1. Relations to Urban Planning 29
2. Related Agencies 30
Key Lessons from the Study of Potential Applicability 31
1. The Department of Town and Country Planning 32

iv
2. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 33
3. The National Housing Authorities 35
Implementation of Land Readjustment in Thailand 36

Chapter 4: Literature Review 39
The Property Rights Approach 39
1. Pigou’s Traditional Approach to Planning 40
2. The Coase Theorem 41
Coase’s Transaction Costs Theme 45
Property Rights Approach to Land Readjustment 49
1. Land Readjustment and Property Rights 49
2. The Presence of Transaction Costs 55

Chapter 5: Comparative Country Analysis 57
Ideal Conditions or Circumstances of LR Schemes 57
Comparative Country Analysis 62
1. Compulsory Readjustment Scheme 63
2. Compulsory Land Purchase Scheme 72
3. Voluntary Readjustment Scheme 75
Land Readjustment Approach for Thailand 78

Chapter 6: Research Design 81
Research Methodology 82
1. Case Studies Selection 82
Criteria for Case Studies Selection 85
Suan Luang Rama 9 Land Readjustment Project 86
Nong Bua Mon Land Readjustment Project 91
2. Data Collection 100
Key Informant Pre-Interviews 100
Questionnaires 103
Unstructured Interviews 106

Chapter 7: Analyses and Results 109
Questionnaires 109
1. Analysis Method and Score Assignments 109
2. Descriptive Statistics 110
3. Individual Remarks in Questionnaires 119
Interview Results 121
1. Local Characteristics of Land Holdings 121
2. Landowners of Small Plots 122
3. Major Landowners or of Large Plots 124
4. Strong Opposition from Some Landowners 126
5. Local Officials and Policy Makers 128
6. Legal System and Financial Support 129

v
7. Summary of Interviews 130

Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 133
Research Findings 133
Analytical Conclusions 141
Recommendations 144

Bibliography 147

Appendices 155
Appendix A 155
Appendix B 157
Appendix C 159
Appendix D 162
Appendix E 165
Appendix F 182
Appendix G 184

vi
LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Characteristics of land readjustment in Japan 17
Table 2.2: Characteristics of land readjustment in Germany 19
Table 2.3: Characteristics of land pooling in Western Australia 21
Table 2.4: Characteristics of land readjustment in South Korea 23
Table 4.1: Property rights to land readjustment 51
Table 5.1: Different variations of land readjustment schemes 58
Table 5.2: Compulsory land readjustment 66
Table 5.3: Compulsory land purchase for readjustment 73
Table 5.4: Incentives by the land readjustment schemes 80
Table 6.1: Comparing activities for case studies selection 85
Table 6.2: Voluntary land readjustment 97
Table 6.3: Questionnaire formulation, data collection and analysis methods 98
Table 6.4: Questionnaires return 104
Table 6.5: Individual remarks in questionnaires 105
Table 6.6: Summary of respondents’ characteristics 107
Table 7.1: Local and socio-economic characteristic items 111
Table 7.2: Items of attitudes toward land readjustment 112
Table 7.3: Items of attitudes toward land readjustment (continued) 113
Table 7.4: Socio-economic characteristic items 114
Table 8.1: Survey findings for voluntary readjustment 134

vii
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Before- and after- land readjustment 9
Figure 2.2: Basic procedure of land readjustment 11
Figure 2.3: Financial plan 12
Figure 4.1: Conversion of property rights through LR (an example from
a project in Japan) 50

Figure 4.2: Land contribution ratios for public facilities 53

Figure 6.1: Case studies in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area 83

Figure 6.2: Overview of Suan Luang Rama 9 LR Project 86

Figure 6.3: Condition of infrastructure (small walkway) in Suan Luang
Rama 9 LR Project 88

Figure 6.4: Existing buildings in Suan Luang Rama 9 LR Project 89

Figure 6.5: Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road 90

Figure 6.6: Location of Nong Bua Mon LR Project 92

Figure 6.7: Outer Ring Road 93

Figure 6.8: Bridge and concrete sidewalk along the canal 94

viii
ABSTRACT

The primary objective of the research is to examine the LR system as a viable
alternative for financing urbanization in the case studies of LR projects in the
Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The study develops comparative country analysis of
different variations of LR schemes in four selected countries using the property rights
approach (1960) and framework of transaction costs to examine the establishment and
exchange of property rights to the LR system. The main questions are: is there the
relevance of the Thai local characteristics that affect the initial distribution of land
rights in the circumstances in Bangkok? What are the effects of transaction costs
associated with the exchange process?
The study gleans some insight from the survey findings to provide, firstly, that
the local characteristics of “blind land” experiencing land-development problem
situations affect the demand for LR projects by means of partial land contribution for
locating public facilities. Secondly, the findings strongly indicate that potential
increase in land value generally motivated most of the landowners in the joint effort
of cooperative LR projects. However, the study found it is difficult to proceed with
project implementation because landowners were willing to give up in the lower
amount (11-20 percent) of land contribution than requirement to make the projects
self-financing. This could be explained by the dominance of small plot size and
possession of a house somewhere else. Thirdly, under the circumstances of urban
development in Bangkok, it appears that high transaction costs associated with the

ix
exchange process have resulted in the long delay of project implementation. Fourthly,
it seems somewhat skeptical about sound management of the LR Association which
is central to the LR system.
Lastly, the research concludes that the LR system attempted to apply in the
case studies is very difficult to implement for Bangkok. The main limitations are a
lack of legal and procedural bases of LR, lack of financial support, lack of skillful
staff and sound management. In addition, it is suggested that policy makers and urban
planners consider compulsory land acquisition with risk and reward borne by
landowners as one finds in Australia.

1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction
There has been a growing concern about increasing levels of urbanization and
urban population that have tremendously pressured land markets of many developing
countries. Rapid population growth from high rates of natural increase and rural-to-
urban migration has generated a high rate of consumption of urban land. While
supply of urban land is limited, most of this urban growth takes place by conversion
of urban-fringe lands from rural to urban uses. The urban-fringe lands are typically
subject to the problems of fragmentation of land holdings, scattered land and building
development, inefficient land use, poor subdivision layouts, extreme land speculation
and high land prices.
Governments in many countries are unable to provide adequate supply of
infrastructure and public utilities to efficiently match the demand from rapid urban
expansion. Traditional land development systems such as land subdivision by private
developers and land expropriation by government are not effective to integrate urban
development and often distribute benefits inequitably to merely some landowners. In
the lack of equitable and efficient land development policies, land markets are
becoming blockages in the development process thus exacerbating urban problems
and quality of urban environment. Land readjustment (LR) is one of the policy

2
instruments that can be used to reduce these problems and assure an adequate land
supply in the urban-fringe areas.
LR has been widely used in several major countries through relatively
different schemes varying by its process and legal binding. In general, it is a method
whereby a pool of scattered and irregular land plots are assembled for unified
planning, basic infrastructure improvement and well-designed subdivision as a single
estate. With regards to the voluntary LR scheme or privately-initiated projects, the
project costs and benefits are shared equitably between landowners. This scheme is
thus attractive to landowners in terms of considerable increase of land value through
the process. Its attraction to the planning authorities is in light of the financial
constraints to the government in that provision of urban infrastructure and public
facilities for urban and infrastructure development is mostly self-financing.
The voluntary LR scheme is an alternative approach compare to direct public
action (land condemnation/ expropriation) and private land acquisition in acquiring
land for development sites. It aims to expedite the management of urban land, finance
basic infrastructure and public services, preserve landownership rights at the existing
location, and enhance quality of life and urban planning. Nonetheless, it is to the
concern of urban planners and academic researchers that different circumstances of
cities imply the necessity for study of applicability of LR to local society.
The practical experience with applications of LR in Thailand is considered in
the middle stage of implementation since introduction in 1987. With the technical
cooperation of the government of Japan, research studies were made in collaboration

3
between the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Thai local
authorities of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and Department of
Town and Country Planning (DTCP), to fully study its applications for the Thai
conditions. The studies mainly concluded on proposing a LR legal system to secure
project system of Thailand, and supporting the implementation system for many pilot
projects in terms of site selection, feasibility analysis, land subdivision design and
layout plan, and implementation plan. Before the LR Act was passed in 2004, there
had been lengthy delay in implementing LR projects due to the requisite for consent
of all landowners and conflict of interest between the landowners.
This study addresses on the challenging issue of establishing LR system based
on the property rights approach and transaction costs concept by examining the case
studies of two LR pilot projects in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. It attempts to
analyze the establishment of property rights by LR and investigate the effects of
transaction costs associated with the exchange process. Drawing from Coase’s
framework of transaction costs (1960) and Fischel’s application of the property rights
concept (1979, 1985), an institution (such as LR) can emerge as a result of public
choice to maximize net benefits from land use in the context of high transaction costs.
Statement of the Problem
A large volume of literature which discusses about experiences and expertise
based on projects implemented in many countries as the subject of substantial
international interest has made a strong contribution to the transfer of case-study
research and LR technique as an alternative for financing urbanization to many

4
developing countries. Japanese planners and researchers have been outstandingly
influential in supporting LR for land development due to the reason that its urban
areas have been most extensively developed with this technique. Other countries
which have played an important role in sharing their experiences and expertise
include South Korea, Germany, Western Australia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines,
Nepal, etc.
Since 1987, research studies on LR were made in collaboration between the
JICA and DTCP to fully study its applications for the Thai conditions. The studies
include the establishment of LR legal system and supporting system for LR
implementation, and the application of voluntary LR scheme for several pilot projects
in Bangkok including site analysis, subdivision design and layout plan, feasibility
analysis and implementation plan. By transferring of LR technique to related public
agencies during these years, many pilot projects have been launched both within the
Bangkok Metropolitan Area and other provincial cities in Thailand.
Although the LR Act was passed in 2004, the legal and procedural bases for
LR are still under a draft delaying the enforcement of the ministerial regulation to
take effect. As a result, some pilot projects which have gained a majority of
landowners’ agreement are subjected to the delay for the implementation stage.
Besides, the new LR Act defined its objectives as “the development and improvement
of public facilities and the promotion of site utility to provide suitable sites for
housing and orderly future urban development”.

5
The Objectives
The primary objective of the research is to examine the LR system as a viable
alternative for financing urbanization in the case studies of LR projects in the
Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The study develops comparative country analysis of
different variations of LR schemes in four selected countries using the property rights
approach (1960) and framework of transaction costs to examine the establishment and
exchange of property rights to the LR system. Different variations of the LR schemes
are examined to address the conditions of developmental settings where one scheme
works better over the others. Redistribution of land rights and the extent of
transaction costs differ comparably among these experienced countries.
In order to achieve the primary objective mentioned above, more specific
objectives are set up as guidelines for the entire research study. They are defined as
follows:
1. To examine the effects of local characteristics (existing land holdings and
socio-economic characteristics of local landowners) on the demand for
initial redistribution of land rights.
2. To examine the effects of transaction costs associated with a negotiated
settlement on the exchange process.
3. To make recommendations for policy makers on transaction costs
considerations in implementing successful future LR projects.

6
Scope of the Study
The scope of this study is to examine the effects of the initial redistribution of
land rights through LR and transaction costs associated with the exchange process
regarding information accessibility to landowners, landowners’ understanding and
involvement, powerful authorities against minority of holdout landowners, skillful
staff and sound management, and legal and financial support. These aspects are
studied from the viewpoint of the landowners and related government officials
involving in the implementation of the LR pilot projects in Bangkok.
The case study focuses on the two LR pilot projects undertaken in Bangkok
by the guidance of the BMA (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration). They are
specified as follows:
1. “Suan Laung Rama 9 LR Project” is located about 20 km southeast from
the central Bangkok (Cultural Center/Rattanakosin Area) covering an area
of 10.04 ha (100,369 sq m or 25,092.2 sq wa). The area is consisted of 59
land plots and there are 36 landowners.
2. “Nong Bua Mon LR Project” is located about 25 km northeast from the
central Bangkok (Cultural Center/Rattanakosin Area) covering an area of
148.5 ha (1,485,264 sq m or 371,316 sq wa). The development phases are
divided into 2 phases. The case study focuses on Phase 1 which covers an
area of 76.1 ha (761,040 sq m or 190,260 sq wa). Phase 1 is located on the
west side of the project consisting of 243 land plots and there are 154
landowners.

7
Limitations and Constraints
The research has limitations and constraints that can be identified as follows:
1. As the study has focused on LR pilot projects that have been initially
launched within Bangkok before the establishment of LR Act of 2004, the
research can cover only projects that have high potential for
implementation with regards to a majority of participation from most
landowners.
2. Although the LR Act was passed in December 2004, the legal and
procedural bases for land readjustment are still under a draft. None of LR
projects have been implemented. Since the lengthy delay of project
implementation for the two selected case studies are anticipated, this
research will investigate the case studies since initiation until July 2006.
3. In regards to the first LR pilot project in Bangkok namely “Rama 9 Road
LR Project”, the DTCP could get almost all landowners’ agreement to
implement the project as well as establish models of land evaluation and
replotting design for the LR system in Thailand. However, the long
duration since the first meeting of landowners in 1993 and more than a
total of 50 meetings held inconsistently have created a difficult task for the
research in terms of data collection. Many landowners are apparently
bored of the delay without implementation and refused to participate in the
survey. Therefore, the “Rama 9 Road LR Project” is not possible to be
included in the case study.

8
CHAPTER 2
LAND READJUSTMENT PROCESS AND PRACTICE

Land Readjustment Process
LR is widely used in several major countries as one of the policy instruments
for urban development through relatively different names such as “land readjustment”
in Japan and South Korea, “land pooling” in Australia and Nepal, “land replotting” in
Canada, and “land consolidation” in Taiwan and Indonesia (Archer, 1990). Besides
adoption on the basis of similar concepts, these names contributed to the relative
differences in terms of the evolving processes and legal settings.
1. Framework
By definition, LR is an instrument for which a pool of landowners of scattered
and irregular plots of land cooperates in a compulsory (or voluntary) partnership for
land development (or redevelopment) of unified planning, construction of roads and
major infrastructure, subdivision of serviced land into urban plots and partial
contribution of plots for project cost recovery. For urban planning, it is an approach
by which local or central government could undertake the projects to promote
rearrangement of land and property rights in urban-fringe areas in stead of land
expropriation with compensation. It is advantageous to private landowners who could
enjoy newly developed public facilities at existing location through partial land
contribution instead of displacement.

9
The requirement for cooperative landowners is the partial contribution of
approximately 30 percent of their land holdings
1
for the provision of roads, parks or
open space, and reserved land. The “reserved land” or “financial resource land” is
captured through land valuation method estimating the sale of the reserved land to
cover designated project costs. The development costs and benefits are shared among
landowners for the voluntary LR scheme. Different variations of LR schemes are
discussed in Chapter 5. The contribution ratio for landowner varies proportionally by
plot which is calculated using land valuation of before- and after-LR project.

Figure 2.1: Before- and after- land readjustment. Source: Nagoya City Planning Bureau, 1982: 2.

1
Land contribution ratios varied among LR projects, for example, about 30% of the total land holding
(Sorensen, 1999); 21.7% in Nagoya (Doebele, Matsubara and Nishiyama, 1986: 83). Japan Land
Readjustment Association (1983) collected data among various projects in districts during 1970-
1980 and concluded that the land contribution is averagely 29.6% of total land holding (19.2% for
public facilities and 10.4% for reserved land).

10
Figure 2.1 illustrates the transformation of private land and land rights
through the use of LR instrument. The process of transformation to newly serviced
plots is called “replotting”. The lower part of Figure 2.1 demonstrates land replotting
and contribution portions of landowners. Through the replotting process, land area of
each plot reduces as a result of partial land contribution (dotted areas in Figure 2.1) to
public facilities (roads and park) and the reserved land. Each landowner remains
his/her rights on the existing location. Land price, in turn, increases due to the
enhancement of the urban environment.
2. Procedures
The entire process of LR depends on the setting of LR legal system. The
implementation bodies initiating and carrying out the projects can be public sectors or
private associations (see Figure 2.2). The organization structure of the implementing
agency is composes of administrative, planning, replotting, engineering,
compensation, and geographic survey divisions.
3. Financial Plan
In terms of the financial plan, disposition of the reserved land and funding
from other financial resources (i.e. government subsidy, grants from municipal
authorities, loans) are secured to cover project costs depicted in Figure 2.3. Project
costs are categorized into costs of construction, compensation and relocation, survey,
planning and design
2
, administration
3
, and interest for the loans.

2
The total amount of survey, planning and design usually ranges from 10% to 20% of the construction
cost (Nagano, 1994).
3
The administrative cost is estimated at 7% to 10% of the total project costs (Nagano, 1994: 39).

11

Implementing Body: Association Implementing Body: Public Sector

Figure 2.2: Basic procedure of land readjustment. Source: Japan Land Readjustment Association,
1996.
Master Plan of City Planning
Preliminary Study and Survey
to Designate Land Readjustment Project Area
City Planning Approval of
Land Readjustment Project Area
Discussion about Implementation Plan
(Layout Plan and Financial Plan)
Establishment of
Implementation
Ordinance

Validation of Implementation Plan
and the Articles of Association
Preparation and Validation of
Establishment of Association
Validation of Implementation Plan
and Implementation Articles
- Establishment of Association (Agreement of 2/3 Landowners)
- Foundation of General Meeting & Representative
- Election of Officials for Association
Establishment of Land Readjustment Council
Replotting Design
Designation of Provisional Replots
Construction Work Preparation and Validation of
Replotting Plan
Disposition of Reserved land
Enforcement of Replotting
Transfer of Public Utilities to
Management Authorities
Registration and Equity to
Landowners
Dissolution of Association or Council

12

REVENUES:

EXPENSES:

Figure 2.3: Financial plan. Source: Japan Land Readjustment Association, 1996.

4. Land Valuation
By means of exchange of land rights, determination of land value is aimed for
calculation of increase ratio (from before LR to after LR), replotting design and
acreage of the reserved land. Land valuation using the street value method is widely
practiced in Japan. Street value is defined as the value of utilizing a standard land plot
per unit price under the assumption that such plot is accessible to street. For the
purpose of calculation, street value (SV) is the sum of street coefficient (SC),
accessibility coefficient (AC) and land coefficient (LC) as follows:
SV = SC + AC + LC where;
Others Financial
Resources:
- Subsidies
- Grants
- Loans
Financial
Resources

Compensation &
Relocation
- Demolition of
buildings
- Reconstruction
- Temporary
houses

Survey,
Planning
& Design,

Construction
- Land filling
- Road
- Park
- Drainage
- Water Supply
Interest
For Loans
Administration
- Office supply
- Staff Salary
- Equipments

Reserved
Land

13
SC determines the value of the plot in related to the adjacent street in accounts
of width, condition and connection of that street to other streets. AC recognizes the
value of the plot in regards to accessibility of the plot within a walking distance to
surrounding public facilities such as bus stop, park, school, hospital and market. LC
estimates the value of the plot considering the physical conditions of the plot. The
detail calculation of the method is found in DMUD (2002).
After the estimation of street value, we can calculate land value of each plot
by multiplying street value by individual factors of the land plot. Individual factors
consider the location of the plot to adjoining streets, shape of the plot and other uses
of the location.
The acreage of replotting area (Ei) is simultaneously obtained by dividing
replottable index (Ri) by street value index of after LR project (ei) where;
Ei = Ri/ei,
Ri = (Ai x ai) x ,
Ai = acreage of parcel area of before LR,
ai = street value index of before LR, and
proportional ratio
Note that proportional ratio is the total value of all after LR plots divided by
total value of all before LR plots. The term “street value index” is derived from
designating the highest street value of before LR project to equal 1,000 units and
adjusting other streets in comparison to the highest street value.

14
It is significant to calculate for the contribution ratio (CR) to indicate the
feasibility of the project and landowners upon deriving the acreage of replotting area.
CR is eventually estimated as follows:
CR = ((Ai-Ei)/Ai) x 100
Land Readjustment in Various Countries
The practical experience in the use of LR was initially conceived in the City
of Frankfurt in Germany and mainly applied in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
parts of India (Bombay region) and in Australia in the region around Perth. In other
countries of Europe, its legal structure was established in France and Sweden. In
America, projects were implemented in some cities in Canada whereas the concept
has been introduced to the United States since George Washington initiated the
L’Enfant plan for Washington, D.C. in 1791. Several enabling legislations were
examined in the states of California, Florida, and Hawaii. The work by Liebmann
(1998) has a brief summary of the principal enactments in these countries and a draft
statue for the American conditions. In several developing countries, trials have been
made with neither support of enabling legislations nor establishment of LR laws
including Indonesia, Nepal and Thailand.
This section clarifies some central ideas of LR instrument in notable examples
of Japan and Germany, and selective countries of Western Australia and South Korea.
A broad overview of its applications and issues commonly discussed in literature
review are provided in accordance with tables listing important characteristics of

15
comparative analysis of the LR process that would lead to identify the key differences
of LR in each selected country.
1. Japan
The widespread use of LR in approximately one-third of all urban areas in
Japan has manifested its central part of the Japanese urban planning system and its
significant role in the development of Japanese urban planning practice. After World
War II, LR was used for reconstruction from war damage countrywide in various
applications such as new urban area development, sprawl prevention, urban renewal,
urban center development and urban reconstruction. The prototypical application is in
the development of new urban land on the fringe of growing cities (Sorensen, 1999).
The arrangements of LR are distinguished into compulsory LR scheme
4
, voluntary
LR scheme
5
and compulsory land purchase scheme. Table 2.1 lists important
characteristics of LR in Japan.
The development of a large volume of literature discussing experiences and
expertise in existing case studies of Japan has made a strong contribution to the
transfer of LR research and practice to developing countries. The technology transfer
has been a major focus in the planning literature with particular emphasis on the
issues of replotting design guidelines (Nagoya City Planning Bureau, 1986; Tamano

4
Compulsory LR scheme is initiated by public initiators including local public bodies (prefectures and
municipalities), administrative agencies (the minister of construction, governors of prefectures, and
heads of municipalities), and public corporations (Japan Housing Corporation, a regional development
corporation, and a New Town development corporation) (Miyazawa, 1982).
5
Voluntary LR is initiated by private initiators including landowners and land readjustment
association (a corporation organized by landowners and lessees of land in the project area) (Miyazawa,
1982).

16
Consultants, 2000), financing urbanization (Doebele, 1982; Schnidman, 1989),
institutional organization and landowner involvement (Larsson, 1993; Schnidman,
1993), legislations and legal structure (Nakamura, 1986; Tokunaka, 1997) and
implementing plan (Satoh, 1986).
For example, the replotting design guidelines for project preparation provided
by the Nagoya City Planning Bureau (1986) involves a site plan subdividing into
regular-shape plots for landowners and areas for public facilities in an appropriate
design pattern. Doebele (1982) provides with financial analysis of the reserved land
to determine whether the after-readjustment land values are significantly sufficient to
recover the project costs of installing the infrastructure. Schnidman (1989) supports
the local government to expand the possible scope of redevelopment through cost
sharing with landowners.
Schnidman (1993) addresses the significance of organizing landowners’
participation and educating public officials. The legislative history and legal structure
of LR in Japan found in the work of Nakamura (1986) investigates the initiation of
LR in the period of urbanization after the Meiji Restoration (1867), however
formation of legitimate LR laws was until the first City Planning Act of 1919. Satoh
(1986) points to the bureaucratic nature of the land readjustment process associated
with legal and administrative system suggesting bureaucratic remedy and the fullest
implementation of democratic provisions in the related laws and regulations.

17
Characteristics Description
Objective Development of public facilities; increase of use in building lots.
Legal Basis Land Readjustment Law (1954)
Target Areas Applied broadly from urbanized area to new town; mostly for residential use.
Project Size Several hectares (ha).
Project Duration 2-3 years (public projects); 10-20 years (private associations).
Initiation and Private initiators; associations; local public bodies; administrative agencies;
Management public corporations.
Relation to Legal requirement in conforming with city plan.
Master Plans
Layout and A gridiron-street-pattern basis in consistency with city plan.
Design
Land Valuation Street value method.
Revenue Financial resource land; subsidies from national government; support from
administrator of public facilities; grants from local public administrations,
and loans.
Interim Availability of government loans (up to a miximum of 1/3 of total project
Financing cost as of 1979; with 5-year redemption term; no redemption required
for the first 3 years).
Deficits and For voluntary readjustment: legal requirement for cash payments (deficits) and
Surpluses profit returns (surpluses) equitably among landowners.
For compulsory readjustment: deficit coverage by public funds whereas surpluses
solely for improvement of that project.
Equity Issues Monetary compensation to landowners for any inequity resulted from
replotting.
Social Concerns Assignment of lots for public housing, schools, collective housing blocks, or
farming blocks in special LR projects.
Political Aspects Objections: a nationwide organization opposed for "no area deduction" and
against "no adjustment money".
Acceptance: establishment of associations to promote projects at locations
of lower land price and easy-absorbing profits.
Market Effects Successful projects where unfill demand for urban lots and housing;
unfavorable at areas in which land prices are very high or very low;
insignificant effect on the increase in value of land surrounding projects due to
time comsumption for project maturation.
Complaints Prefact and postfact procedures; complaints mostly about replotting and
disputes about the amount of money for readjustment.
Table 2.1: Characteristics of land readjustment in Japan

18
On one side of the planning discourse, the more conventional planners
favored discussion of case studies and its extensive use for urban redevelopment at
the scale of individual project. In contrast, that observing the spatial patterns of
dispersion and current change in urban structure such as Sorensen (1999), argued that
the approach to which private associations organized and managed LR projects
apparently affected the development patterns of urban sprawl on the fringe of Japan’s
metropolitan region. His findings apparently shows that the use of LR prevented the
haphazard growth along existing rural roads efficiently within the projects by
provision of orderly and structured framework of public facilities; however, it
promoted the patterns of leapfrog development at the scale of city and region.
2. Germany
The practical experience with LR in Germany in recent years has been for
urban expansion and renewal in peripheral areas. The initial application in 1891 by
voluntary contracts was aimed to restructure agricultural land during the first half of
the 19
th
century; nonetheless the extensive use was to reorganize urban structure from
massive destruction during World War II and the large wave of urbanization. Due to
the Building Law Code of 1986 which established legal basis for legitimate land
readjustment of planning, building, urban renewal, expropriation and valuation; LR
has been exercised as part of a complex urban planning system for land use controls
with more government interventions than those in many other countries.

19
Characteristics Description
Objective Increase of supply of scarce building land; development of public facilities.
Legal Basis Building Law Code 1986 (Baugesetzuch-BauGB)
Target Areas Town expansion and development of existing towns with fragmented
property structures for new settlement areas; compulsory readjustment applied
especially in industrial and commercial areas for mixed buiding uses.
Project Size Several hectares (ha).
Project Duration usuallly 2-3 years (compulsory readjustment); 6 years (compulsory land purchase).
Initiation and Individuals; developers or commercial builders; local authority; state
Management government.
Relation to Requirement for a development and microzoning plan based on master plan.
Master Plans
Layout and In consistency with the development and microzoning plan.
Design
Land Valuation Market price comforming with rules of the Ordinance on market value assessment.
Revenue Compulsory readjustment: sale of cost-equivalent land (about 10-15% of land
contribution) recommended by local authorities and decided by local council.
Compulsory interim purchase: sale of serviced plots; subsidies from governments.
Interim Compulsory readjustment: local authority charges contributions to landowners
Financing up to 90% of the costs of infrastructure provision or 30% of parcels' input value;
administrative costs are financed by general funds from public authorities.
Compulsory interim purchase: loans for financing infrastructure.
Deficits and deficit coverage imposed to and surpluses attained by local authority.
Surpluses
Equity Issues Compulsory readjustment: monetary compensation paid by landowners to
tenants who suffer the loss of property through local authority.
For compulsory land purchase: monetary compensation to tenants who
suffer the loss of property with reference to the market value of the land.
Social Concerns Compulsory land purchase: allocating of a high percentage of plots for
social housing for low-income population.
Political Aspects Objections: controversial when introduced in first decade of 20th century.
Acceptance: growing opinion about combining compulsory readjustment with
compulsory land purchase in redevelopment areas.
Market Effects Successful projects where high demand for building land as they brought about
relatively low land price; savings of transportation costs and provision of
public infrastructure facilities to surrouding towns.
Complaints Compulsory readjustment: appeals mostly against land valuation either by
values or amount of land contribution.
Compulsory land purchase: main complaint about relatively low
compensation amount due to special rules of such purchase.
Table 2.2: Characteristics of land readjustment in Germany

20
The arrangements of LR in Germany are distinguished into voluntary
arrangements, compulsory LR scheme and compulsory land purchase scheme.
Voluntary arrangements are initiated by private land exchange and interim purchase
either by developers or commercial builders. However, more areas were developed by
voluntary land purchase than by land exchange (Seele, 1982: 177). Table 2.2
summarizes important characteristics of LR in Germany.
3. Western Australia
‘Land pooling’ is a related term used in Western Australia for the unified re-
subdivision and new subdivision of private landholdings. The practical experience
with land pooling has been for overcoming problems of landholdings by redesigning
and servicing undeveloped subdivisions rather than for stage of urban redevelopment.
It entails compulsory partnerships after consultation with landowners at which local
municipal councils manage for the land consolidation, redesigning, servicing and
subdivision. Its application differs from the extensive Japanese experience to the
extent of smaller-scale projects and the type of arrangement merely by compulsory
LR scheme. Table 2.3 summarizes important characteristics of land pooling in
Western Australia.
A case study of typical land pooling project is found in the work of Archer
(1988) discussing the initiatives of the instrument since 1951 mostly in the Perth
metropolitan area which accounted for a total of 56 pooling projects by 1982. Archer
(1978) suggests for the improvement and expansion of land pooling to the full
potential in improving urban development through the adoption of a standard pricing

21
Characteristics Description
Objective Management and financing for land-development problem situations.
Legal Basis Town Planning and Development Act of 1928
Target Areas Applied limitedly in Perth area for residential land subdivision.
Project Size From 2 ha. (for 10 homesites) to 303 ha. (for 1,839 homesites).
Project Duration 2 1/2 years.
Initiation and Local government' s councils.
Management
Relation to Conforming with the town-planning schemes.
Master Plans
Layout and Within the context of the municipal planning scheme.
Design
Land Valuation Market value assessment.
Revenue Cost-equivalent land.
Interim A short-term bank loan.
Financing
Deficits and Deficit coverage by project revenues whereas distribution of cash surpluses
Surpluses only between landowners.
Equity Issues An alternative to sell their land or claim for monetary compensation for
landowners who opt out of the project; payment or receipt of cash adjustment
to/from landowners upon land value assessment.
Social Concerns No concerns.
Political Aspects No public opposition to land pooling; no apparent opposition from private
land developers; public lack of understanding of land pooling.
Market Effects Successful projects resulting from significant increase in market value;
unsucessful projects due to the lack of skillful management by experienced
staff.
Complaints A few cases of complaints on mismanagement of the projects against the
councils.
Table 2.3: Characteristics of land pooling in Western Australia
policy and format schemes, the expansion into large-scale projects, and progressive
implementation as the part of a metropolitan expansion program.

4. South Korea
The practical use of LR in Korea has been persistent since the earliest stage of
urban expansion following post-war period of urban development. Introduced during

22
the colonial period in 1934, its dominant mode of supplying new urban lands has
been historically exceptional to meet the need for provision of public facilities and
infrastructure regarding the shortage of available financial public resources. Many
fast-growing cities in Korea heavily relied on LR to supply land for most of its urban
expansion. The types of arrangement include voluntary LR scheme and compulsory
readjustment scheme. Table 2.4 summarizes important characteristics of LR in South
Korea.
Among the literature, Lee (1997) provokes for modification of the
applicability of LR in regards to the perceived problems and limitations in the Korean
experience during the course of development. The problems and limitations involved
excessive rates of land contribution to participating landowners due to increasing
construction costs and withholding land for low-income housing provision, conflicts
in assessment of land valuation and replotting design, poor quality of space provided
for roads and public facilities with regards to voluntary LR scheme which pressured
the landowners for maximum return, land price hike in projected area, ineffective
development control of project period and land use patterns, and substantial
development costs associated with large size of projects.

23
Characteristics Description
Objective Improved utilization of private land; provision of infrastructure and services to
peripheral urbanization.
Legal Basis Provision of relevant laws.
Target Areas Applied dominantly to urbanized peripheries of cities; mostly for residential
uses and to a considerable amount of industrial and commercial uses.
Project Size Several hectares (ha).
Project Duration 10 years up.
Initiation and Ministry of Construction; municipalities; certain public corporations;
Management associations of private landowners.
Relation to Consistency with the master plan.
Master Plans
Layout and In coordination with a National Land Development Plan.
Design
Land Valuation Based on an evaluation conducted by the Board of Appraisal.
Revenue Financial resource land.
Interim Sufficiency of large surplus from yearly sale of financial resource land to cover
Financing interim financing of infrastructure costs in Seoul. Availability of commercial
banking loans at a 12% interest rate in the Jamsil District.
Deficits and Voluntary readjustment: monetary return to landowners upon a resolution by the
Surpluses association members.
Compulsory readjustment: deficit coverage by project revenues whereas surpluses
for expansion of public facilities or in funding account for future LR projects.
Equity Issues Monetary compensation for removal of buildings or trees in an amount less
than market value; cash payment for increases and decreases in the plot area;
profits inequitably go to speculators rather than farmers (original landowners).
Social Concerns A massive housing program was launched in 1980 to provide cross-subsidizing
LR sites for housing lower-income families.
Political Aspects Criticism of specific aspects of the administration of projects, relatively less
public criticism of the system.
Market Effects Successful projects in the active land market of the peripheries of large cities
due to shortage of housess resulting from growing inflow of population;
unfavorable in small cities where there are less pressures for growth and
lack of demand; insignificant effects on value of surrounding areas due to
relatively tight system of land-use controls.
Complaints Complaints and appeals vary by characteristics of project area; landowners
generally have become coperative and favorable to the projects.
Table 2.4: Characteristics of land readjustment in South Korea

24
CHAPTER 3
APPLICABILITY TO THE BANGKOK SETTING

The Bangkok Setting
1. Factors of Urban Expansion
Since the mid-1980s, the structure of the Thai economy has transformed from
agriculture to export-oriented manufacturing based on foreign direct investment. With
accelerating growth in manufactured exports of textiles, electronic goods, and other
labor-intensive manufactured goods, the national economic growth recorded the
annual growth rate of 12 percent for real gross domestic product (GDP) between 1987
and 1990, and 8 percent between 1991 and 1995. After the financial crisis, which
began in July 1997, the economy experienced a slowdown contracting GDP growth to
4.3 percent in 2000. World Bank (2000) estimates that exports still remain the main
driver of growth.
Economic changes were reflected in the distribution of employment: a shift of
labor force from relatively low-productivity uses (rural agriculture) to higher-
productivity uses (urban manufacturing and services). There had been substantial
increases in employment in manufacturing and related service sectors while
proportion of labor force engaged in agriculture shrunk dramatically (Douglas, 1995;
McGee, 1995). These significant changes in the structure of the economy and
employment had provided the basis for a substantial increase in household income
(McGee, 1995). Although the incidence of absolute poverty declined considerably,

25
income distribution appeared to have become more uneven throughout the country: at
constant 1990 prices, per-capita household income was $1635 for the Bangkok
metropolitan region against that of $746 for the country (Bangkok Post, 1995).
Due to its central location for employment opportunities, Bangkok mega-
urban region
6
hosts an increasing share of the national population. World Bank data
(1997) recorded an urban population of 11.6 million in Bangkok accounting for one-
fifth of Thailand’s total population. Urban population was doubling its size in less
than 15 years in Bangkok (Douglas, 2000). It was projected that 40 percent of the
population of Thailand will live in Bangkok by 2025 (Kaothien and Webster, 1998).
Rapid population growth indicates that the new economic era has been
accompanied by rapid urbanization and uneven spatial development. Bronger (1985)
observes that the high degrees of urban spatial concentration and increasing levels of
regional inequality existed in Bangkok and few other Asian cities. High concentration
of urban activities includes national bank headquarters, information services,
educational facilities, infrastructure development, political and administrative
decision-making functions, and energy consumption.
2. Expanding Boundaries
Bangkok urban area has expanded extensively during the past few decades.
The administrative boundaries of the Bangkok metropolitan administration (BMA),

6
Mega-urban region is a synonym researcher and analysts used to express the large urban
agglomerations including superconurbation and extended metropolitan region (Robinson, 1995). In the
past decade, United Nations defined large urban agglomerations with 8 million populations or more at
urban levels in regardless of the administrative boundaries.

26
originally united Pra Nakhorn and Thon Buri in 1972 to cover an area of 1,565 sq km
within a distance of 30 km from the central Bangkok.
During the past two decades, the larger Bangkok metropolitan region (BMR),
extended into the adjacent five provinces (Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakarn,
Samut Sakhon, and Nakhon Pathom) surrounding the BMA to cover an urban area of
7,758 sq km within a distance of 50 km from the central Bangkok. Robinson (1995)
indicates about the rapid population growth in these five provinces and the sub-region
beyond the BMR boundaries. Therefore, Bangkok mega-urban region (MUR) was
redefined to include the sub-region bounding with a 100-kilometer radius of the
central Bangkok.
3. Agricultural Land Conversion
Rapid population growth from high rate of national increase and rural- to-
urban migration has generated a high rate of consumption of urban land. The land use
survey in 1958 by Lichfield, Whiting, Bowne and Associates (1960) found most of
physical urban structures in low-density pattern of residential use and shop-houses,
both of which rarely exceeded five stories in height. UNESCAP (1998) reports that
the percentage of land use before the 1960s for agriculture, the built-up area and
vacant land accounted for 50 percent, 30 percent, and 20 percent, respectively.
Suburban growth since the 1960s was resulted from strong population growth in the
BMR following the macroeconomic policy toward regional and international markets
(Browder, Bohland and Scarpaci, 1995).

27
While supply of land is limited, most of the urban growth takes place by
conversion of urban-fringe land from rural to urban uses. Setchell (1991) illustrates
the expansion of the Bangkok urban area from roughly 470 sq km

in 1974 to an
estimated 1,100 sq km

in 1988. While 45.4 percent of land was converted to urban
uses during the 1974-84 period at a distance of 11 to 20 km from the central
Bangkok, the same percentage of land conversion during the 1984-1988 period was
recorded at a distance of greater than 30 km. Dowall (1992) in his study of Bangkok
land and housing market found the extensive pattern of land conversion from rural,
largely agricultural uses to urban activities mostly by private developers.
4. Central Bangkok and Urban Fringe Development
Rapid urbanization has resulted in the patterns of expanding central city and
urban fringe development. In the large core of central Bangkok, a number of central
business districts were unified and eventually has become concentration of high-rise
office buildings, shopping centers, and government departments. New demand for
land has replaced a range of low-density, low-rise residential structures of traditional
village style with modern high-rise office buildings, hotels, and condominiums. Land
prices have increased, accordingly. There were signs of substantial slum eviction and
demolition in the central location for large-parcel land acquisition and urban renewal
(Pornchokchai, 1985; Rabibhadana, 1993).
A fragmented configuration of road network has led to the congestion in the
central location at which construction of expressways in a later stage of development
and major thoroughfares aiming to distribute traffic and increase accessibility are

28
unfortunately linked with inadequate secondary road system which has little or no
internal road network. Public transit system was constructed and is under construction
including sky trains and subways, however with incomplete network system to
connect to other existing public transit modes.
The industrial and urban development in the urban-fringe areas has occurred
in the form of sprawl and leapfrog development. Sprawl expansion spatially leads out
of the central Bangkok along the three major transportation corridors to the
southwest, southeast, and north. Leapfrog development resulted from the rapid land
conversion and inefficient land use has left large gaps of unused land in between the
development pattern. New towns, housing estates, industrial zones, and long
commercial strips of shop-houses are scattered in between leisure developments of
golf courses, entertainment centers, and suburban malls. These developments have
taken place with provision of incomplete network system of public transit and poor
accessibility to connect to road network. There have left about 2 million plots of
“blind land” accumulating to 20 percent of urban land in Bangkok. The prolonged lag
of development behind economic growth has not only threatened the physical and
social development but also deteriorated environment by means of pollution and loss
of natural areas.
5. Urban Policies
In the past decades, Thailand has adopted the national economic growth
policies in conjunction to the National Economic and Social Development Plans
(NESDP) focusing on planned decentralization of population to secondary cities and

29
new towns proposed by the MIT Consultants Team (1993, 1996). The important
policy issues are elaborated into the categories of mega-urban scale and urban scale.
At the mega-urban scale, the proposed polycentric development to correct for chronic
traffic congestion of the existing decentralized spatial structure however has been
dictated by market forces. The pattern of urban development was caused by
ineffective strategic plans and managerial deficiencies in urban spatial reorganization
to coordinate with adequate delivery of urban services and infrastructure. The
discrepancies of macroeconomic policy towards economic growth and urban
development are critically costly in terms of provision of urban services and
infrastructure at the later stage of urban development. At the urban scale, the
Bangkok long-term comprehensive plans have incorporated land use zoning with
ineffective controls.
Traditional land development systems such as land subdivision by private
developers and land expropriation by government are not effective to integrate urban
development and often distribute benefits inequitably to merely some landowners. In
the lack of equitable and efficient land development policies, land markets are
becoming blockages in the development process thus exacerbating urban problems
and quality of urban environment. LR is one of the policy instruments that can be
used to reduce these problems and assure an adequate land supply in the urban-fringe
areas. The LR Act was passed in December 1994.
Historical Perspectivein Applications of Land Readjustment
1. Relations to Urban Planning

30
In the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, the comprehensive plans and specific
plans are enforced according to the Town Planning Act of 1975. The revised
Bangkok Comprehensive Plan of 1999 adheres the policies stated in the Eight
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) focusing on balancing
economic growth as well as urban development. The Plan envisages revitalization of
the Bangkok urban areas resulted from rapid growth during the past decades. It
focuses on solving the problems of inadequate supply of public facilities to cope with
rapid urban growth, inefficient land use and ineffective road network system, serious
traffic congestion, environmental degradation, land speculation, and inadequate green
areas.
The voluntary LR scheme is an alternative approach compare to direct public
action (land condemnation/ expropriation) and private land acquisition in acquiring
land for development sites. It aims to expedite the management of urban land, finance
basic infrastructure and public services, preserve landownership rights at the existing
location, and enhance quality of life and urban planning. Nonetheless, it is to the
concern of urban planners and academic researchers that different circumstances of
cities imply the necessity for study of applicability of LR to local society.
2. Related Agencies
The Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP) in the Ministry of
Interior, in cooperative with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have
been examined the potential applicability of LR pilot projects since 1987. The JICA

31
study team formulated the manuals and standards of the LR method as well as
specific application schemes for educating and training the Thai officials.
By the order of the Cabinet to implement LR pilot projects, the Urban LR
Committee under the Ministry of Interior was formed in 1992. The Division of Land
Readjustment and Urban Renewal was officially established within the DTCP in
1995. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), a local authority, was
simultaneously authorized to establish the Division of Urban Renewal and Land
Readjustment to promote pilot projects in practice.
Key Lessons from the Study of Potential Applicability
JICA (1993) conducted a poll survey of landowners’ attitudes towards LR for
the first proposed pilot project launched, Rama 9 Road LR Project, to study its
applications for the Thai conditions. Out of estimated 679 landowners in the proposed
study area, 217 of them participated in the survey which was carried out in two
methods including personal interviews and mailed questionnaires.
In terms of the general opinions regarding LR, a majority of the landowners
(82%) had no prior knowledge of the system; yet LR concept seemed to be easily
perceived by most of them (62%) after reading the materials for the first time. One of
the reasons for the understanding was that a majority of landowners (71%) realized
the necessity of achieving the prime objectives of solving traffic congestion, road
width, access roads, and better public facilities. However, the statistical data reported
that only 35% of them immediately decided to participate in LR whereas the same
percentage would like to join meetings for more information.

32
Less than a majority of landowners (60%) agreed with the concept of a New
Urban Center in the area and; only one-fourth of them are willing to cooperate in
favor of LR while one-third cooperated conditionally based on a majority of
landowners’ agreement. In terms of land use, it was mostly used for residential
purposes presently and for the future use. In terms of landownership, it seemed that
most land holdings (69% of landowners) were purchased whereas 24% of them were
inherited. A majority of landowners has held their land titles for 6-10 years.
The studies mainly concluded on proposing a LR legal system to secure
project system of Thailand, and supporting the implementation system for many pilot
projects in terms of site selection, feasibility analysis, land subdivision design and
layout plan, and implementation plan. Before the LR Act was passed in 2004, there
had been lengthy delay in implementing LR projects due to the requisite for consent
of all landowners and conflict of interest between the landowners.
1. The Department of Town and Country Planning
In 1993, the DTCP initiated Rama 9 Road LR Project (see Figure 6.1) to
promote for commercial development covering an area of 16.64 ha (41,600 sq wa).
The development phases were divided into 2 phases. With regards to the content of
landowners’ agreements; the DTCP could get almost all landowners’ agreement to
the project (Phase1) in 3 years in terms of the LR implementation plan, the
contribution ratio and the replotting plan. After more than 50 meetings of landowners
and implementing body, 20 out of 21 landowners agreed to participate in the project.

33
The DTCP (2002) report prepared for a seminar of LR generated discussion
among audiences of various agencies. The DTCP past experience derived four key
lessons. First, the lack of explicit policy directives had limited inter-agency
coordination and arrangement merely to personal and informal contacts due to the
differences in rules and regulations abiding by most of the public agencies. Secondly,
public funding to continuously support preliminary survey and feasibility studies
were insufficient. Thirdly, the lack of policy measures to motivate the Thai
landowners’ interest and willingness to participate had delayed the initiation of LR
projects. Several potential measures to encourage participation include, for example,
subsidies for interim financing of construction for roads and other public services,
and reduction or exemption of taxes and fees for LR. Finally, the level of uncertainty
from landowners’ perspective was high during the early years of introducing LR into
Thailand without the legitimate legal support.
2. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
The study rendering options for financing infrastructure expansion for the
Phahon Yotin-Rattana Kosin Sompoch Road Pilot Project is found in SEC (1994).
The BMA was assigned to carry out the project for implementation of land
acquisition designated in the first Bangkok Comprehensive Plan (1992-1997). The
large-scale project was eventually abandoned due to the long duration of completion
and its technical imperatives. The BMA selected to study the Nong Bua Mon LR Pilot
Project by the approval of the LR Committee in 1998. JICA (1999) assisted with
replotting design and the implementation plan. Two other sites were also selected for

34
pilot projects including: the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR Project initiated in 1999, and the
Lamban Tapo LR Project started in 2000 (BMA, 2001).
SEC (1994) examines the significant issues of legal, institutional and
operational requirements. It is common in most countries implemented LR systems
that legislation is enforced to initially provide a framework and legitimately bind
landowners for participation. The legislation legitimizes to conform the conceptual
framework to function in respect to these following issues, for example, the equitable
distribution of benefits among landowners, preservation of rights of landownership,
percentage of majority of the landowners’ agreement, authorities of implementing
bodies, assertion of land value after LR, maximization of land utility from the
perspectives of individual landowner and the community, assertion of systematic and
orderly urban land development by which effective joint efforts between public and
private sectors are fostered, and the non-profit basis of joint participation.
The establishment of supportive institutional structures to foster
implementation of LR is composed of three main institutions: the National Urban LR
Committee, the Bangkok Metropolitan Urban LR Committee, and the Provincial LR
Committee. Operational level institutions are the Office of Urban LR, the consultants
group and the implementing agencies.
Operational requirement emphasized on the prerequisite for explicit policy
directives and legal support. In regards to the past experiences, the implementing

35
agencies were retarded to effectively coordinate with several related agencies due to
different sets of rules and regulations
7
.
3. The National Housing Authority
NHA, a public cooperation, undertook a feasibility study of LR instrument at
Lad Krabang-West aiming for land utilization in 1992. The potential site met the
criteria for development demonstrating blind land plots without road access, small
number of landowners, and agricultural land maturely for urban use. The site seemed
physically, economically, and politically viable composing of positive significant
features including none-existence of serious flooding, potential land value increase
and potential landowners’ cooperation.
Unfortunately, the proposed project was terminated in the interim as a
consequence of large-parcel purchase (one-sixth of the total project area) by a private
developer. Otherwise, its adoption would conform to one of the public policy
objectives in generating partial land for construction of low-income housing (SEC,
1994: 24).
Chanond (1997) identified key lessons derived from NHA’s past experience
with applicability of LR. First, LR approach was technically feasible to the NHA due
to the similarity to past slum upgrading programs; however practical training and
supervision of personnel were important for establishing the competent organization.
Secondly, the approach appeared financially feasible in terms of sharing increased

7
The related agencies include the Budget Bureau, the Department of Public Works, the Department of
Drainage and Sewage, the Department of Social Welfare, District Offices, the National Economic and
Social Development Board, the Government Housing Bank, the Department of Lands, and various
educational institutions (SEC, 1994: 30).

36
value of less land; however accuracy and equity of land appraisals was essential due
to the complicated land valuation system. Thirdly, the system seemed politically
sensitive in regards to the operation in the Thai land markets where brokers could
provide low-cost method of selling and buying lands. It was doubtful whether the
legal and time constraints would, to some points, push LR mechanism to remain
alternative solutions to urban development. Finally, the delay in passing of LR
legislation had been a consequence of political factors.
Implementation of Land Readjustment in Thailand
This section summarizes the circumstances in Thailand in related to LR and
how those might affect the manner in which LR is implemented. Bangkok and many
cities in Thailand have urban-fringe development problems by which LR can be
considered to reduce the problems. The circumstances of urban areas that are of
advantages for the government in application of LR in Thailand are as follows:
1. Conditions of urban-fringe lands are fragmentation of land holdings
resulted from subdivision for agriculture use without road connection.
Land assembly and urban development mostly by private developers have
bypassed suitable land and left large gaps of unused land in between the
development pattern. Some landowners withhold their land from sale for
speculation. The “blind land” with no road access accumulates to about 2
million plots or 20 percent of urban land in Bangkok. LR provides an
alternative for consolidate and re-subdivide these plots.

37
2. Government land acquisition for provision of highway construction is
usually obtained by the 1954 Eminent Domain Act. The growth in
population of Bangkok and many cities is not matched by growth in
delivery of land for urban services and infrastructure. Since land prices
have increased in urban-fringe areas, these provisions by traditional land
acquisition can be costly at the later stage of urbanization.
3. In undeveloped areas, past acquisition of land to the public for road
construction can be potentially found through dedication or gift. While
private citizen enjoyed the increase in land prices in exchange of partial
land contribution, the local government only subsidized the construction
costs as part of the responsibility.
4. The development of new suburban areas is often backlogs of needed
public roads, water supply and drainage lines. The urban development is
dictated by market forces with little reservation or construction of road
network such as sub-arterial and distributor roads.
5. The project system is secured by the establishment of the 2004 LR Act.
Now, it is subjected to the delay for enforcement of the ministerial
regulation to take effect.
The circumstances of urban areas that are of disadvantages for the government
in application of LR in Thailand are as follows:
1. Unplanned developments resulting in the patterns of sprawl and leapfrog
development make it difficult to devise LR as a means of preventing urban

38
sprawl. Other limitations to implement LR at the urban scale include
ineffective land use controls, a lack of policy directives to coordinate
inter-agencies, and a lack of well-trained personnel.
2. Since the urban areas are invaded by market-induced developments,
developers in Bangkok have been efficient in providing a profile of well-
performing land and housing market (Dowall, 1992). The timely land
development by LR may affect its attractiveness to provide suitable sites
for housing in a short time.

39
CHAPTER 4
LITERATURE REVIEW

The Property Rights Approach
This chapter examines LR issues based on the theoretical framework of the
property rights approach. LR, as practiced in several major countries through
relatively different names, is at the political level, an instrument for spatial
arrangements of urban renewal and urban redevelopment. LR is, at the economic
level, considered as a means to replace government land acquisition for allocation of
public infrastructure and service facilities in the exercise of eminent domain (land
expropriation/condemnation) by exchanging of partial private land and land rights for
replotting planning and infrastructure installment which in turn preserving private
property rights at the existing location. From this view concerning allocation of
property rights to use land, LR is consistent with Coase’s perspective in “The
Problem of Social Cost” (1960).
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 provides with the
discussion of the property rights approach based on the Coase Theorem of transaction
costs as opposed to Pigou’s traditional approach to negative externalities. Section 2
reviews the theoretical and analytical studies developed on Coase’s transaction costs
theme. Based on the literature review, Section 3 establishes a consistent framework of
LR using the concept of transaction costs and property rights framework. It will
provide a context for comparative country analysis (including Japan, Germany,

40
Australia and Korea) in the next Chapter. In addition, it will present a meaningful
interpretation and evaluation of LR for the case studies of Bangkok.
1. Pigou’s Traditional Approach to Planning
The Pigovian traditional approach provides justification for government
zoning. Zoning, a key instrument in land use planning regulation, functions to
segregate incompatible land uses, integrate compatible uses and reserve land for
community uses. It is exercised by governments in most countries as a means to
delineate rights over land within certain spatial boundaries.
From the historical perspective, the post-World War II rise of planning was
influenced mainly by the European economic thought and political experience. Two
leading streams of economic theorization, including the Pigovian and Coasian
paradigms, dominated the study of zoning during the 1950s and 1960s. The Pigovian
paradigm or interventionists concept is based on Professor Arthur C. Pigou’s thesis in
“The Economics of Welfare” (1932) emphasizing the role of zoning or government
regulatory measure of the land market. On the other hand, the Coasian paradigm or
anti-interventionism is developed primarily on the basis of Ronald Coase’s 1960
Noble Prize paper, “The Problem of Social Cost”, providing alternative solutions
against zoning for the analysis of externality problems.
The interventionist economic theories are justified by the Pigovian welfare
economics theses of market failure (Pigou, 1932), remarkably the concept of
externalities (Samuelson, 1958) and public goods (Samuelson, 1955). It is argued that
government should intervene in the land market to attain the efficient ground of

41
resource allocation through zoning which corrects market failure of externalities and
arranges the spatial allocation of public goods. A large numbers of analytical and
empirical studies support the Pigovian paradigm on the economic discourse of zoning
(Fisher and Peterson, 1976; Crone, 1983).
Pigou’s approach determines to correct price signal by using taxes and
regulations thus promoting economic efficiency in the presence of negative
externalities. An externality or external cost arises as a victim situation in which a
party caused harm on another is legally liable for charges. On the contrary, positive
externality arises as a ‘free ride’ situation where the party gained benefits produced
by another is captured at no cost. These costs or benefits occurred outside the market
price system are then developed into social costs borne or social benefits obtained by
third parties. Thus, land market fails to obtain Pareto optimality in generating an
allocation. Pigovian theorists propose that government intervention is necessary to
correct market failure of externalities so that the social costs and benefits are taken
into account to transmit externality effects through market prices and suggest using
taxes and subsidies. The socially efficient equilibrium is achieved when the price
mechanism reflects the presence of externalities. Examples include imposing a
pollution tax to correct for a negative externality and granting mortgage interest
deductibility or an incentive subsidy to correct for a positive externality (Lai, 1998).
2. The Coase Theorem
Coase’s arguments in his 1960 seminal paper challenge to Pigou’s approach
of interventionist solutions. Coase discusses transaction costs in regards to the choice

42
between alternative means for treatment of negative externalities. Firstly, he opposes
to Pigou’s characterization of the problem by providing an alternative interpretation
of rights and harmful activities. While Pigou conceptualizes land use conflicts as a
victim situation in which one party is assumed legally liable, Coase argues that the
problem of negative externalities is a conflict of rights arising from incompatible
interactions between two parties. The harmful activities are reciprocal which are
caused by interactions between both parties rather than actions of one upon the other.
Furthermore, Coase provides the range of possible solutions to maximize the social
product by emphasizing the possibility that B may be able to accommodate A more
cheaply than A can accommodate B (Butler and Garnett, 2003). As Coase states that:

The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that
has to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A
inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A?
But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To
avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be
decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?
The problem is to avoid the more serious harm. (Coase, 1960: 2)

Then, Coase develops his arguments by examining the problem under the
standard assumptions of zero transaction costs. Using his classic example of the
possible economic conflicts of rights to use land between a farmer and a cattle raiser,
Coase indicates that private bargaining of rights can yield an efficient allocation in
the absence of transaction costs. Resource allocation is the same regardless of which
party holds the legal liable for the damage caused. Under the ideal circumstances, the
market can internalize these negative externalities through assigning property rights

43
thus leading to the ultimate result which maximizes the value of production. In other
words, the parties’ trade of rights can reach an efficient resource allocation which
maximize joint wealth. The notion of the “Coase Theorem” which was first invented
by George Stigler, is defined by Cheung (1990) as follows:

If property rights are clearly delineated and if all costs of transactions are
zero, then resource use will be the same regardless of who owns the property
rights. (Cheung, 1990: 11)

Coase apparently attacks Pigou’s analysis of external effects which is
described as the divergence between the private and social products. Externalities or
external effects explained by Samuelson (1955) are considered harmful effects in the
legal concept of “nuisance”, and the environment concept of “pollution”. Opposed to
Pigou’s proposal for government regulatory measure of the land market to correct
price signal of negative externalities, Coase simply restates that the problem of
externalities is fully self-correcting.
Stigler in “The Theory of Price” (1966) initially invents the popular version of
the so-called Coase Theorem on the purpose of describing Coase’s ideas of perfect-
market result. He was the most influential interpreter of Coase’s 1960 article and
University of Chicago colleague (Butler and Garnett, 2003). Stigler recognizes the
importance of transaction costs and supports Coase’s arguments for laissez-faire. Yet,
he is among many followers of Coase who tend to present an invariance view of
laissez-faire that externalities require no government interference. Coase (1988)

44
himself carefully declares these interpretations as the reduction versions of his
arguments to zero transaction cost world.
In the second stage of analysis entitled “The Cost of Market Transactions
Taken into Account” (1960: 15), Coase then examines the problem under the
assumption of positive transaction costs. He provides that, in reality, market
transactions can be costly for carrying out, informing people, bargaining, agreeing on
the contracts, and enforcing agreements and states that:

Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into
account…the initial delimitation of rights does have an effect on the efficiency
with which the economic system operates (Coase, 1960: 15-16)

Coase underlies this essential part in “Essays on Economics and Economists”
as follows:

When we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive
transaction costs, what becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance
of the legal system (Coase, 1994: 10)

In the presence of transaction costs, the crucial economic or legal problem is
the selection of the social arrangement which is suitable for handling the harmful
effects. Coase further explains that, due to the high costs of handling some problems,
neither the governmental administrative regulation nor the market or the firm shall
lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. The selection for the suitable social
arrangement requires a flexible, case-by-case approach to which it contains detailed
examination of the actual results of how, in practice, the market, firms, and

45
governments handling the problem in different ways. The priority is to identify the
economic approach to the problem.
Coase’s Transaction Costs Theme
Coase’s approach has motivated the development of transaction cost based
property rights analysis. It has also influenced the expansion of anti-interventionist
tradition in the field of economics in the United States and Western Europe. Regards
this tradition, the anti-interventionist researchers present opposite view against the
Pigovian scholars to which they continuously return analytical and empirical support
for their theoretical constructs, thus producing the economic discourse on zoning very
distinguishably in American Literature (Lai, 1998: 59-64). The anti-interventionists in
favor of deregulation tend to judge zoning as undesirable in improving economic
efficiency (Siegan, 1972; Ellickson, 1973; Nelson, 1977; Fischel, 1978, 1979).
Siegan (1972) implies for the abolition of zoning by pointing to the case of
non-zoning in Houston that contractual obligation voluntarily made among
individuals is quite sufficient. However, abolition of zoning involves substantial
transaction costs in altering existing land uses from developed or slowly developed
neighborhoods. In this regards, Ellickson (1973) directs straight to the use of nuisance
law and eminent domain proposals to compensate existing landowners for
reassignment of land rights. This concept providing for possibilities of exchange of
land rights and zoning restrictions distinguishes current land use and the institutional
persistence of zoning. Nonetheless, the limitation of compensation can reduce the
property rights to the community and accordingly stimulate their powerful

46
oppositions. Nelson (1977) proposes for salable zoning restrictions exclusively in the
developed neighborhood, not the vacant land. These arguments were largely made
against exclusionary zoning.
Fischel (1979) intriguingly presents an analytical model of land rights to
evaluate the equity and efficiency aspects of zoning, which is viewed on the basis of
the property rights approach. The analysis adopts a paradigmatic suburban
community to conceptualize that equity is dependent of the establishment of the
initial distribution of land rights whereas efficiency is dependant of the possibilities
for mutually advantageous exchanges between landowners and community residents.
After comparative assessment of several reform proposals, he suggests an alternative
reform which is a more efficient means of distributing land rights than government
imposed zoning. It requires that the landowners finance additional community
services occurred as a result of their new development in order to be politically
acceptable to the community residents.
A growing number of academic scholars and professions are interested in the
issue of property rights and transaction costs in planning. Fischel (1985) develops the
sophisticated model to examine land use issues in “The Economics of Zoning Laws:
A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls”, drawing an
intellectual insight from the interdisciplinary fields of economics, planning, and law.
Lai (1998) establishes a property rights framework of zoning to empirically test its
impact using the marine fish culture zoning of Hong Kong as a case study. The result
indicates the significant contribution of exclusive property rights as well as the

47
economic benefit of restrictions of freedom to land subdivision/combination in
regards to land value enhancement. In the recent book, “Property Rights, Planning
and Markets” (2003), Webster and Lai apply the property rights framework to
understand the economics of urban communities and urban planning. Various
institutional arrangements in small communities which emerge by market forces are
perceived to evolve through individual co-operation in seeking to reduce transaction
costs leading potentially to a balance in the allocation of rights. In larger
communities, however, the role of public policies lies significantly in clarification of
property rights for reduction of transaction costs.
Most researchers of transaction costs theme discuss transaction costs in
regards to the choice between alternative means for resolving externalities. More
recently North (1995) demonstrates the relationship between institutions, transaction
costs and economic performance in which transaction costs are explained as a source
of change in the institutions to increase the economic performance. He underlies the
making of institutions with credible commitment for the purpose of reducing
uncertainty in human interactions of economic and political exchange. Accordingly, it
provides alternatives for the developing and transition economies of Third World
countries and the Eastern Europe in the creation of non-existent or improvement of
ineffective market.
Transaction costs are incorporated into an analytical model of institutional
change in the work of McCann (2004) that develops an induced institutional
innovation model to describe the reduction of transaction costs in the case of

48
developments with respect to native titles in Australia. The Native Title Act of 1993
has introduced factors that have reduced transaction costs associated with the native
title process including the need for negotiation and improved relationships with
interest parties and the development of trust between parties to the negotiation
process. The analysis which treated data on the time taken to achieve negotiated
settlements as a proxy for transaction costs, along with other determinants (trust, laws
and institutions, uncertainty, information accessibility, size of claim, and number of
claimants) provides a functional model for further empirical study on the issues of
institutional changes experienced. The feasibility of the research requires data on
future increase in numbers of claims settled by litigated cases versus agreements
settled by negotiated cases.
Some experimental studies have been conducted in the past decades to
illustrate the application of the Coase Theorem for resolving externalities. The Paper
River exercise is a classroom experiment developed by Hoyt, Ryan, and Houston
(1999); and modified by Andrews (2002). The original Paper River exercise
simulates the situation of conflicts of rights to use common property under the
assumption that transaction costs are sufficiently low. More realistically, the modified
version inserts the element of true common property and the addition of substantial
transaction costs. There are other classroom experiments including the work of
Delemeester and Neral (1995: 115-119) and Stodder (1996). In addition, Nugent
(1993, 1997) and Hazlett (1995) apply the property rights approach to experiment the
allocation of pollution emission rights.

49
Property Rights Approach to Land Readjustment
1. Land Readjustment and Property Rights
Property rights or land rights are known as the rules to resolve the conflict in
relation to land. LR emerges as an attempt to redistribute private property rights from
those who owned under-utilized lands to those owners who needed serviced building
lands and urban infrastructure. It involves landowners to the adjustment of lot shape
and land conditions in exchange of partial land contribution for locating public
services for community use. Private property rights are combined for unified planning
and re-subdivision of land under the legitimate LR laws. From historical records of
several LR projects (Japanese LR Association, 1986; Lee, 1997), it is apparent that
the after-LR land which was assigned with invariably smaller in plot size and more
regular in lot shape captured an increase in land value (Figures 4.1(a) and (b)). In this
regards, LR indicates the significant contribution of rights conversion and the
economic benefit of redistribution of land in regards to land value enhancement. It
results in expansion of the utilized land available for development in the land market.
Several major cities have apparently made significant use of LR mechanisms
for the purpose of accumulating public services as well as adjusting lot shape for
urban use. Intensive land subdivision to meet rising demand for land during
urbanization is conducive to poorly defined property rights; exhibiting patterns of
fragmentation in land holdings, irregular-shape lots, inadequate provision of public
services, etc. LR combines private property rights for redistribution of land into well-

50
planned serviced building site and partial land contribution for financing construction
costs without incurring costly burdens to the governments.
LR redistributed property rights to land into three major types of
arrangements: compulsory LR, voluntary LR and compulsory purchase for LR. Table
4.1 demonstrates each type of arrangements into project phases. It was revised based
on an analytical land management framework of Doebele, Matsubara and Nishiyama
(1986)
8
.

(a) Irregular land plots without (b) Regular land plots
public services (A result of through LR
intensive land subdivision)

Figure 4.1: Conversion of property rights through LR (an example from a project in Japan). Source:
Nishiyama, 1987.

8
Besides the first book in English on LR edited by Doebele (1982); Doebele, Matsubara and
Nishiyama (1986) began the theoretical underpinning in explaining the LR mechanism to the
understanding of wider audiences. LR has become a common terminology at present.

51
Types of Management
Arrangement Before LR Project During LR Project After LR Project
1. Compulsory • Temporary quasi-expropriation • Private lands • Redistribution of land • Land reverts back in private
readjustment ownership
• Temporary municipal • Contribution of reserved lands
ownership of land and • Land is acquired for urban
redistribution to private owners • Disposal of reserved lands infrastructure through land
at project completion readjustment
• Public assistance
• Deficit coverage by public funds
Surplus gains to improve LR
projects
2. Voluntary • (Majority/ all) landowners' • Private lands • Redistribution of land • Land reverts back in private
readjustment agreement before constituting ownership
a legal binding • Contribution of reserved lands
• Land is acquired for urban
• Temporary quai-expropriation • Disposal of reserved lands infrastructure through land
readjustment
• Temporary municipal • Interim financing from
ownership of land and government loan
redistribution to private owners
at project completion
• Deficits share by cash payment
and profits return to landowners
3. Compulsory • Compulsory purchase of land • Private lands • Municipal ownership of • Priority of repurchase given
purchase for at existing land values all lands to original owners
readjustment
• Partial freehold lands sold at
market value
• Public lands
Table 4.1: Property rights to land readjustment (revised from Doebele, Matsubara and Nishiyama 1986: p. 84)
Project Phases

52
For “compulsory purchase for LR”, the municipality initially establishes
rights of land acquisition and municipal ownership of under-utilized lands where
original private land rights are extinguished by specific government Acts.
Landowners are monetarily compensated due to losses for the amount at existing
market value before the LR project. Landownership titles are collectively unified for
replotting into regular-shaped lots equipped with public services and converted into
publicly-owned lands. After project completion, priority of purchase is given to
original landowners and the rights of land disposal are given to the municipality for
selling partial lands at market value or leasing out to private sectors. In England,
rights to land use were restricted to positive development control over the new built-
up of war damaged areas for orderly comprehensive redevelopment. Hence, it derives
all betterment of lands and public facilities for public purposes.
The more popular type of arrangement is “compulsory LR”. Redistribution of
land rights are managed by “temporary quasi-expropriation” or “temporary municipal
ownership” whereby the owner retains the ownership rights to transfer for replotting
disposition. Under the legislative laws, the municipality initially delimits collective
property rights of ownership by imposing temporary municipal ownership for land
replotting, land contribution (Figure 4.2), and disposal of reserved land. Private lands
are redistributed into regular-shaped lots equipped with necessary public services and
reverted back in private ownership at project completion. The owner has the right to
obtain unearned land value increment as a result of increasing utility value. Rights to

53
land use are restricted to zoning regulation in consistent with other planning tools to
control urban environment as a whole.

Figure 4.2: Land contribution ratios for public facilities. Source: Nishiyama 1980: 16.

The LR trends towards urban redevelopment in Japan have derived sub-type
of arrangement for conversion of land rights into “vertical replotting” in order to
arrange for high-rise redevelopment and achieve wider implementation of LR
projects. Conversion of land rights into “vertical replotting” is managed by two
different types of arrangement. The right conversion by compulsory LR scheme
retains property rights of landownership, land lessee and house lease and converts
into the new high-rise redevelopment. On the other hand, the right conversion by
compulsory land purchase scheme
9
expropriates private land rights settled either by
contract or eminent domain which allows for compensation. For those who consider

9
Right conversion by compulsory LR is used for moderate-size projects (areas under 1 ha.), whereas
rights conversion by compulsory purchase scheme is employed for large projects (areas over 1 ha.)
(Doebele, Matsubara, and Nishiyama, 1986).

54
moving elsewhere, they have rights to freely transfer private land to publicly-owned
land for compensation. For those who consider staying, the rights to land are
attenuated by requirement of joint landownership with the property of other owners in
the new building structures.
In contrast, “voluntary LR” is triggered by the content of landowners’
agreements before constituting a legal binding to temporary quasi-expropriation of
land redistribution. The content of any agreements (including project initiation) must
be approved by over two-thirds of the numbers of landowners comprising two thirds
of the land in acreage for projects voluntarily executed by associations. All
landowners must agree for projects executed by individuals (Nagoya City Planning
Bureau, 1986; Sorensen, 1999).
Compared to “compulsory LR” which offers public assistance (or government
subsidy) to those owners whose rights are temporarily attenuated by the designation
of municipal regulation for rights conversion to redistribute land, “voluntary LR” is
self-financing through land disposal without incurring burdens to the governments. In
most cases, the voluntary LR scheme is usually authorized to receive interim
financing from government loan for installation of public services as a matter of fact
that reserved land may not be sold immediately for interim financing of construction
costs. Similar to the compulsory LR scheme, the owner has the right to obtain
unearned land value increment as a result of increasing utility value. As trust in
association/ group of individuals is high for the voluntary LR scheme; private
landowners share responsibility for contribution of privately held land for public

55
services as well as its profits and deficits, thus lowering transaction costs of
negotiated settlement.
2. The Presence of Transaction Costs
Coase (1960) indicates that private bargaining of rights can yield an efficient
allocation in the absence of transaction costs and through assigning of clear and
relevant property rights. However, in the real world, negotiated solutions to resolve
conflicts of interests are not entirely practical. Neither do they work costlessly. There
are costs of transacting involved in exchange of rights. Transaction costs arise when it
is difficult or costly to reconcile for the negotiated solutions between two parties. It
includes the costs of bringing together partners with which to transact, the costs of
bargaining and enforcing agreement. If the costs of the transaction are prohibitive, so
the exchange of entitlements is likely to be assigned at some sub-optimal allocation,
instead of the efficient allocation.
When private bargaining is precluded by high transaction costs, the allocation
of entitlements may not achieve the most efficient solution. In such cases, Butler and
Garnett (2003) provide that efficient accommodation requires a clear and
economically correct assignment of property rights to which the burden of
accommodation is made responsible for by the least-costly accommodators. It
emphasizes the reciprocal nature of the problems to be decisive for efficiency
consideration in the presence of transaction costs. Frank and Bernanke (2001)
underlie that laws and regulations of allocating legal land rights can promote
efficiency in situations where transaction barriers are costly, given that the burden of

56
adjustment is placed on the low-cost accommodators. An example is drawn by
McCloskey (1998) in his analysis of noise pollution around airports based on the
Coase Theorem. It illustrates how the laws that permit noisy commercial airplanes to
fly over private property without permission or reimbursement can promote
efficiency.
When transaction barriers are costly and the need for development is urgent,
public authorities extinguish private land rights for public purposes as it is the case of
compulsory purchase scheme. The need for taking and eminent domain allows
compensation to those (low-cost accommodators) who loss land rights and are
burdened by displacement. In many instances, government interventions to provision
of urban infrastructure and public services for all expanding urbanized areas can
become increasing costly as the city expands its boundaries. Voluntary or compulsory
LR scheme can play an important role in reducing transaction costs involved in the
exchange process of land rights by providing clear and stable property rights. The
next Chapter examines different variations of LR schemes under the ideal conditions
or circumstances of developmental settings. Then, the analysis of LR practiced in
four selected countries (Japan, West Germany, South Korea and Australia) is
discussed to provide explicit reasons and evidence for understanding of the
economics of LR.

57
CHAPTER 5
COMPARATIVE COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Ideal Conditions or Circumstances of LR Schemes
This section examines different variations of LR schemes arranged in four
selected countries. It distinguishes on the advantages and disadvantages of each type
experienced in these countries and the ideal conditions or circumstances of
developmental settings where one scheme works better over the others. Table 5.1
summarizes these aspects in the variations of LR schemes.
The compulsory LR scheme has been arranged in several cities of the four
selected countries (Japan, West Germany, South Korea and Australia) under certain
circumstances of urban areas. It enforces redistribution of land rights through public
authorities in settings where high demand for land during the process of urbanization
or the need for solving land-development problems is necessitated. Secondly, it is
successfully applied in undeveloped areas where lands will be ripe for urban
development and landowners will potentially receive substantial benefits from
projects due to increases in land price (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982; Sorensen,
1999). It can be used for stabilization of land price as the supply of utilized land is
enlarged. Thirdly, it has been developed to lower transaction costs associated with
timing of project development. The scheme is more practical when trust between
parties in LR association is relatively low to engage in the negotiation process.

58
Types of Where Advantage Disadvantage
Arrangement
1. Compulsory Japan • National subsidies • Less emphasis on protecting landowners' 1. High demand for land in central urban
readjustment Germany • Gov' t loan and special financial interest areas/ peripheral areas; need for building
Korea arrangement • Excessive rates of land contribution major urban infrastructure or; experiencing
Australia • Conflict in assessment of land valuation land-development problem situations
and replotting 2. Potential increase in land price, or
• Lack of incentive for public sector such stabilization in land price
as profit-sharing (in Australia) 3. When transaction costs were high
4. When trust in LR association was low
Compulsory Japan • Implementation on a massive • Restrict in cash transfer from public 1. Need of redevelopment of large-scale
readjustment scale sector to landowners destroyed cities was urgent
w/ compensation • Reducing conflict of interest since 2. When transaction costs were very high
low amount of contribution
2. Voluntary Japan • Landowner involvement • Bureucratic nature of process 1. Demand for urban land and shortage of
readjustment Korea • Minimizing of dispute • Time-consuming for completion housing in periphery areas of large cities
(2/3 of landowners' • Maintaining equity among • Lack of expertise and skillful 2. Potential increase in land price and financial
agreement) landowners management viability
• Minor administrative assistance • Insufficient land secured for public 3. When transaction costs were moderate
from public authorities purposes 4. Trust in LR association was high
• Risk associated with sale of reserved
land and project interruption
• Development pattern of urban sprawl
Voluntary Japan • Maintaining equity among • Implementation on a small scale 1. Land price was very low
(all landowners' Korea landowners • Time-consuming for completion 2. When transaction costs were very low
agreement) • No legal appeals • Development pattern of urban sprawl 3. Trust was very high
3. Compulsory Japan • Partial provision for low-income • Conflict and political opposition from 1. Need of redevelopment for public purposes/
land purchase for Germany housing landowners massive urban projects
readjustment • Orderly urban development • Relatively low amount of compensation 2. Need for takings and eminent domain
Table 5.1: Different variations of land readjustment schemes
Ideal Conditions
or Circumstances

59
One of the advantages of this scheme is that progress of projects is accelerated
by various public incentives such as national subsidies, government loan and special
financial arrangements from the public sector. It, thus, made more supply of serviced
land available shortly for potential residents and land acquisition for public purposes.
The disadvantages of compulsory LR scheme include less emphasis on protecting
private landowners’ interest, excessive rates of land contribution, and conflict in the
assessment of land valuation and replotting. In Australia, the local governments are
lack of incentive, particularly profit-sharing with landowners, to implement projects
area wide.
The relatively different arrangement of compulsory LR scheme is the use of
municipal ordinance proceedings to compensate landowners for excess land
contribution and redistribution of land rights. The compulsory LR scheme with
compensation was applied in settings where large-scale and rapid redevelopment was
called for. It was particularly significant in Japan for redevelopment of large-scale
damage areas of cities after the great earthquake in 1923, the destruction in the
aftermath of World War II, and typhoons and other disasters. It had reduced high
transaction costs associated with difficulties in handling complex interest
relationships in damaged areas especially the delays in public decision processes by
the use of municipal ordinance for compensating excess land contribution to
landowners. The Special Planning Act for earthquake rehabilitation effort stated that
monetary compensation was given for land contribution in excess of 10% of their
area and in excess of 15% of their area for the war damage rehabilitation effort.

60
This scheme worked generously to bring supply of land into development due
to the low amount of land contribution. According to Nakamura (1986), the
Earthquake Damage Land Readjustment Project generally covered an area of 2,000
has between 1923 and 1930; and the War Damage Rehabilitation Plan ultimately
reconstructed 102 damaged cities covering an area of about 28,000 has. The latter
plan which was aimed initially to undertake an area of over 65,000 ha was reduced in
the scope due largely to financial shortages in the public sector. The extensive used of
the generous assignment had restrict cash transfers from the public sector to the
landowners.
Dissimilarly, the voluntary LR scheme is organized and managed by a
majority of landowners’ agreement. It was applied in peripheral areas of large cities
farther from existing development where unfilled demand for urban land and shortage
of housing are supported by negotiated settlement. Secondly, the potential increase in
land price and financial viability has necessitated the likelihood of success of the
negotiation process. Miyazawa (1982) indicates that landowners have never involved
in the negotiated settlement under the conditions where land prices were very low and
not rising since the sales of reserved land could hardly cover project costs. It is
important to note that the number of agreements reached and the likely time taken to
reach voluntary agreement can make the process complicated thus increasing
transaction costs. In addition, agreements will occur only where large gains from
trade exist, even with high transaction costs (McCann, 2004). In this regards, trust

61
between negotiating parties engaged in the process is high to facilitate the negotiated
outcome.
This scheme, as practiced in Japan and Korea, has the advantages of
landowners’ involvement for implementation of projects thus minimizing the
disputes, minor administrative assistance from public authorities, and maintaining
equity among the landowners involved according to the share of profits and deficits
(Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982; Miyazawa, 1982). Its disadvantages consist of
bureaucratic nature of the process, time-consuming for project completion, lack of
expertise and skillful management, insufficient land secured for public purposes, risk
associated with the sale of reserved land and project interruption, and development
pattern of urban sprawl (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982; Satoh, 1986; Sorensen,
1999).
The voluntary LR scheme can be organized and managed by the content of all
landowners’ agreement. Its origin was historically traced to the early period of
Japanese urbanization aiming for agricultural land consolidation. It was seemingly
applied in settings where potentially nonexistent transaction costs and very low land
price attended the redistribution of land rights by private initiators. Under the special
circumstances, the calculation of the costs and benefits of redistribution of land rights
for installation of public facilities could make economic sense. In addition, the
accomplishment of voluntary LR merely by the private sectors (including individuals,
groups of individuals and associations) indicates that trust of contracting parties in the
agreement was perceived to be very high.

62
It was observed that this scheme reached by all landowners’ agreement rather
than resulted in legal appeals has easily maintained equity among landowners.
However, small-scale projects were usually implemented and covered only 6.8
percent of the total project area (or an area of 207 sq km) in Japan by 1994 (City
Planning Association, 1995). In Seoul, the percentage of projects carried by all
private landowners was even smaller which covered only 4.58 percent of the total
project area (Hwang, 1977). Similarly, its disadvantages include time-consuming for
completion and development pattern of urban sprawl (Sorensen, 1999).
Lastly, the compulsory land purchase scheme expropriates rights of all
landowners in settings where the need of redevelopment for public purposes or
massive urban projects is dictated by the use of takings and eminent domain. This
scheme has been arranged in Japan and Germany. It is justified for public purposes by
provision of partial land for low-income housing programs as well as aesthetic
considerations for orderly urban development. On the other hand, its drawbacks
include setting the stage for conflict and political opposition from landowners as well
as relatively low amount of compensation.
Comparative Country Analysis
This section provides with the reasons to support the ideal conditions or
circumstances of the developmental settings of the LR schemes based on country
comparison. The discussion focuses on three major schemes which have been more
widely used including compulsory LR, compulsory land purchase and voluntary LR
schemes.

63
1. Compulsory Readjustment Scheme
Since rapid urbanization had several effects on the demand for land in central
urban areas and a sharp rise in land prices on the peripheral areas followed by a
serious housing shortage, this scheme was taken to alleviate these effects enforced
through public authorities. In this regards, Doebele (1982) presents the dual character
of the Japanese model which is accomplished largely by public when applied for
development of more central urban areas and largely by private when applied in the
peripheral areas. For example, in the case of Nagoya, urban redevelopment in the
central area was the main focus of the public sector whereas peripheral development
was carried out by private associations (Hayashi, 1982). Records show that publicly
initiated projects accounted for as high as 58 percent of the total project area or 1,753
sq km by 1994 (City Planning Association, 1995: 114; Sorensen, 1999).
In South Korea, compulsory LR scheme was of great importance in rebuilding
the entire urban infrastructure in the lack of fiscal resources after the devastation of
the Korean War. Many projects were initiated with the primary intention of securing
land for developing major radial arterial roads and expressways. During rapid
urbanization, it had worked well in supplying housing sites at the peripheries of large
cities where in-migration of population to cities had been strong pressures for growth
compared to small cities where it had occasionally resulted in the premature
installation of urban services. Records show that most projects in Seoul were carried
out by the municipality of Seoul of which 92.92 percent of all projects (38 projects
out of 43 projects) had been initiated by 1977 (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982).

64
It has been used on a significant scale for “problem areas” including old
subdivision plans that need design improvement, re-subdivision of lands adjoining to
new major roads, subdivision in swampy areas requiring special drainage works,
subdivision with other special capital requirements, or the subdivision of small areas
that are blocking larger developments in some municipalities in the state of Western
Australia (Archer, 1982). The extent to which local councils initiated projects was
collected by a survey made by the Town Planning Department in 1976 identifying all
40 projects developed entirely by local councils in the Perth metropolitan area (Carr,
1976).
In Germany, this scheme is the favored method for peripheral areas. If there is
sufficient demand for building land, the municipalities may legally force for orderly
development based on the Federal Building Act. The important use of compulsory LR
is recognized for postwar rehabilitation of damaged cities and accommodation of
urbanization for large- and mediums-sized towns. Records show that compulsory LR
projects accounted for more than 50 percent of new development in some large- and
medium-sized towns, but it had proved unnecessary in some small towns and villages
(Seele, 1982).
Secondly, it is successfully applied in undeveloped areas where lands will be
ripe for urban development and therefore, landowners will potentially receive
substantial benefits from projects due to increases in land price. When a project is
publicly announced, the land prices increase about 10-20 percent in the project area

65
(Hayashi, 1982). However, the excessive development through LR in Nagoya
10

which provided a great supply of building land apparently resulted in lower land price
in Nagoya, on the average, relative to other similar cities.
In Korea, land value rose very high as projects progressed due to shortage of
building sites (Doebele, 1982). For example, average land value increased 3.9 times
the original value after deducting an average land contribution rate of 40 percent
11
for
Dalsoe projects in Daegu (in 1977); the increment was higher in Seoul; and Yeong
Dong which had a massive urban project in Seoul had one of highest rates of value
appreciation (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982). The problem, then, was that the
increase in land prices generated large benefits to large-scale landowners and
speculators rather than the low-income farmers.
When projects were applied for “problem areas” in Australia, landowners
perceived significant financial gains by means of more valuable serviced-sites in
well-designed estate (Archer, 1982). In addition, a case study of the Tribute Street
Land Pooling Project in Perth carried out by the Canning Town Municipal Council
during 1972-1974 exhibits an increase in land prices at the owner’s value ratio
12
of
1.97 in 1974 (Archer, 1980).

10
In Nagoya, LR project began in 1905 and has made it the mechanism for which about 90 percent of
the urban areas have been developed by 1979 (Hayashi, 1982: 109).
11
For detail of appraised values of housing sites before and after readjustment in Korea, see M.C.
Hwang (1977).
12
The “owner’s value ratio” is the ratio of the total value of new lots minus the scheme costs to the
total value of old lots (Archer, 1980).

66
Ideal Conditions
or Circumstances Literature Quotes Evidence
1. High demand for land in central urban • Used by public authorities for development/ • Accounted for as high as 58% of all projects or 1,753
areas/ peripheral areas; need for building redevelopment of more central areas in Japan sq.km. by 1994 in Japan (City Planning Association, 1995;
major urban infrastructure or; experiencing (Doebele, 1982) Sorensen, 1999)
land-development problem situations
• Tied to meet shortage of houses by in-migration • Municipality developed 92.92% of all projects or 38
and develop radial arterial roads and expressways projects in Seoul by 1977 (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele,
in Korea (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982) 1982)
• Used for "problem areas" in Australia: subdivision • 40 projects developed entirely by councils in the Perth
of inappropriate plans, lands adjacent to major new metropolitan area by 1976 (Carr, 1976)
roads, in swampy areas requiring drainage works, of
small areas blocking larger development (Archer,
1982)
• Legally applicable if sufficient demand for building • Accounted for over 50% of new development in some
land, favored in peripheral areas (Seele, 1982) large- and medium-sized towns in Germany (Seele, 1982)
2. Potential increase in land price, or • When publicly announced, land prices in project • Average land price in Nagoya cheaper than similar cities
stabilization in land price area rose 10-20% (Hayashi, 1982) due to excessive development through LR (Hayashi, 1982)
• Due to shortage of building sites, land value rose • i.e. in Seoul ; Dalsoe project in Daegu (in 1977) average
very high as projects progressed (Doebele, 1982) land value increased 3.9 times original value (Kim, Hwang,
and Doebele, 1982)
• Yeong Dong, massive urban project in Seoul , had one of
highest rates of value appreciation
• Landowners in Australia perceived significant • Owner' s value ratio increased at 1.97 for Tribute Street
financial gains by means of more valuable serviced- L/P project in Perth in 1974 (Archer, 1980)
sites in well- designed estate (Archer, 1982)
• As supply of land been enlarged, prices were • Towns with intense application enjoyed relatively lower
reduced in Germany (Seele, 1982)
land-price level--increased 30% of input value (Seele, 1982)
Table 5.2: Compulsory land readjustment
Reasons

67
Ideal Conditions
or Circumstances Literature Quotes Evidence
3. When transaction costs were high • Gov' t facilitate exchange by subsidizing costs of • 2-3 years for completion of serviced plots but longer for
public facilities as parts of responsibility--up to sites fully built, compared to 10-20 years for voluntary LR
2/3 of costs (Miyazawa, 1982) in Japan (Hayashi, 1982; Sorensen, 1999)
• Accelerated by various public incentives: tax • More than 10 years for completion in Korea due to large-
privileges for disposal of land to real demand, tax size projects (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982; Lee, 1997)
removal for new development (Kim, Hwang, and
Doebele, 1982)
• Negotiated settlement before acquisition reduced • 2 years for land acquisition and 1/2 year for subdivision-
landowner resistance (Archer, 1982) work completion for Tribute Street L/P project in Perth
(Archer, 1980)
• Landowners' appeals carried out equitably and • At most 3 years for land acquisition and 3 years for fully
legally such that implementation not impeded (thus built-up in Germany . Objections were infrequent
reducing transaction costs ) (Seele, 1982) (Seele, 1982)
4. When trust in LR association was low • Consistency and determination of policy support • The act allowed implementation in existing built-up
from local gov' t or policy makers (Archer, 1986) area and removal of buildings created many disputes in
Nagoya (Hayashi, 1982)
• Voluntary projects often interrupted when financial • Seoul City never needed interim financing: surpluses go to
resource land not sold rapidly for interim financing special fund account for future other projects.
(Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982) • Protection of owners' interest was less emphasized
(Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982)
• Minority owners had right to opt out by selling • In Australia , most owners stayed and received their share
land or cash compensation (Archer, 1982) of building sites (Archer, 1982)
• Political goal of preserving and dispersing private • In several towns in Germany ; 50% of original owners
ownership (Seele, 1982) stayed, 15% occupied for new owners need housing and
little for speculation (Seele, 1982)
Reasons
Table 5.2: Compulsory land readjustment (continued)

68
It can be used for stabilization of land price in Germany as the supply of
utilized land is enlarged and the cost of housing is likely decreased. Seele (1982)
reported that towns with intensive application of compulsory LR scheme were
enjoying a relatively lower land-price level which normally increased to at least 30
percent of the plots’ input value.
Thirdly, it can be successfully developed to lower transaction costs associated
with timing of project development. The Japanese government enforced project
implementation through various national subsidies and special financial arrangements
as parts of the responsibility for the costs of public facilities. The national
government may subsidize up to two-thirds of the estimated costs of public facilities
for the improvement of arterial roads contained in the project area (Miyazawa, 1982).
It, thus, made more supply of serviced land available widely for potential residents. In
addition, it reduced the delay for completion of serviced land for building sites from
10-20 years for typical completion of privately initiated projects to 2-3 years for
publicly initiated projects (Hayashi, 1982; Sorensen, 1999). However, the full
development can take much longer and will vary in various parts of the city.
The Korean government enforced project implementation through various
public incentives to increase negotiation and landowners’ agreement such as tax
privileges for disposal of land to real demand, tax removal for new development, tax
exemption for the sale of reserved land, etc. As a result, the original owners preferred
to dispose of their land before completion and the significant portions of the
increments profited local real-estate brokers. It can be explained that the original

69
owners were mostly farmers of very small plots
13
allocated from the postwar agrarian
reform programs, fairly uneducated rural dwellers and afraid of a process involving
complex negotiations with the government officials. Therefore, they sold out before
or during the readjustment process by accepting substantially high offer from the
brokers which was much lower than potential benefits to be realized. The government
revised the 1980 Korean master plan to cross-subsidize for housing lower-income
groups. In the Korean case, nonetheless, the time taken to achieve completion (for
almost half of all the projects by 1977) was prolonged up to more than 10 years partly
due to the massive size of urban projects (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982; Lee,
1997).
Negotiated settlement before adopting compulsory land acquisition in
Australia reduces resistance from landowners thus lowering transaction costs. Local
governments (or local municipal councils) particularly focus on consultation with all
landowners involved both a proposed map of land re-subdivision and detailed written
statement of the costs and benefits (Archer, 1982). In this regards, compulsory LR
scheme in Australia is comparatively distinctive from those in other selective
countries. In addition, the case study of the Tribute Street Land Pooling Project in
Perth shows that it reduced the delay for completion of serviced land for building
sites relative to those in other selective countries by taking 2 years for land
acquisition and half year for subdivision-work completion.

13
Records from various projects show that the average plot size is 2,544 sq m by which most owners
(58 percent) involved in the process had a quarter acre or less of landholdings (Kim, Hwang, and
Doebele, 1982: 155-156).

70
In Germany, landowners’ appeals were carried out equitably and legally such
that project implementation was not impeded thus reducing transaction costs. It was
observed that despite a number of complaints to compulsory LR projects such as
against the assignment of land valuation, the amount of land contribution, or the
location of the projects; objections to the judicial determination by special courts of
law were infrequent (Seele, 1982). This can be explained by professional
qualification of the authority responsible for the projects, avoidance of contradictions
by coordinating plans and landowners’ strong protection by appeals. Hence, the time
taken to achieve project completion is normally as less as 1-2 years by which 3 years
is the maximum. Most plots which were built up shortly (about 3 years after LR) can
be partially contributed to the fact that land speculation is usually low.
Lastly, the compulsory LR scheme can be successfully applied when trust to
voluntarily engage landowners in the exchange process is low. In this regards, Archer
(1990) discusses that successful project implementation is backed by consistency and
determination of policy support from local governments or policy makers. The
Nagoya experience shows that consistency and policy support to devise LR has
developed for about 90 percent of the urbanization in the city. Yet, the Act allowed
implementation in existing built-up areas and the removal of buildings and structures
created difficulties by which it should proceed only if at least 30 percent of the area
was vacant land (Hayashi, 1982). There were complaints related to an increased land
contribution rate, unequal or unexpected treatment in replotting or location, and the
condition of infrastructure.

71
Unlike voluntary projects which were often interrupted when reserved land
was not sold rapidly for interim financing, the Korean government was determined to
devise compulsory LR scheme in making the provision of public services completely
self-financing. According to Kim, Hwang, and Doebele (1982), Seoul City never
needed interim financing: while the deficits rarely occurred due to the conservative of
government in estimating its costs
14
, the surpluses were either used to expand public
services for the project area or reserved in special fund account for future projects.
The unexpected delays in selling reserved land were extremely advantageous to
produce large surplus from enormous inflation in land prices. However, protection of
landowners’ interests was less emphasized due to higher rate of land contribution.
The land contribution rate was as high as 40 percent
15
(1960-1975) although the
actual expenses for engineering and construction comprised of only half of the total
expenses
16
.
This scheme has not generally been resisted by landowners in Australia since
they have been consulted in advance and uniquely have right to opt out by selling
their land or lodging a claim for cash compensation (Archer, 1982). A number of
projects experienced in Perth sufficiently demonstrate that most landowners stayed

14
A study made by a certified public accountant of 18 projects completed in Seoul by 1977 showed
that total revenues historically exceeded expenditures by 63 percent (Kim, Hwang and Doebele,
1982).
15
The government conservatively reserved about 8-12 percent of land for financing and 24-28 percent
for public services (Kim, Hwang and Doebele, 1982).
16
The rest of the expenses include administrative costs (8-10 percent), cash payments to landowners
including compensation for removal of buildings (15 percent), and cash adjustment for decreases in
acreages of the allocated lots less than entitled (20 percent) (Kim, Hwang and Doebele, 1982).

72
with the exchange process coordinated by the local councils and received their share
of building sites.
This scheme can also be applied to meet the political goal of preserving and
dispersing landownership. Experiences from several towns in Germany show that
compulsory readjustment redistributed lands back to about 50 percent of original
landowners who had been in possession of their land for generations, 15 percent for
new owners needed housing, and 20 percent for owners purchased land for resale or
speculation (Seele, 1982). Table 5.2 summarizes the supportive reasoning of the ideal
conditions for compulsory readjustment scheme.
2. Compulsory Land Purchase Scheme
The compulsory land purchase scheme expropriates rights of all landowners
in settings where the need of redevelopment for public purposes or massive urban
projects is distinguished. The English Comprehensive Development Areas scheme
expropriate lands for positive development control of new built-up of war damaged
areas conforming to master layout plan approved by Town Planning Board
(Nishiyama, 1982; Kuppers and Nishiyama, 1986). Expropriation of lands of the War
Damage Rehabilitation scheme in Japan was limited to zoning and improvement of
basic urban infrastructure. At the time, the English scheme hinged on legitimate
public purposes of preventing “piecemeal” development in a matured society which
was full of public facilities whereas the Japanese scheme relied on accumulation of
public services responding to a period of rapid urbanization.

73
Ideal Conditions
or Circumstances Literature Quotes Evidence
1. Need of redevelopment for public • Positive development control (Nishiyama, 1982) • Comprehensiveness of urban development and built-up
purposes/ massive urban projects of war-damaged areas in England (Kuppers and
Nishiyama, 1986)
• Necessarily carried out to realize development plan • 40 development areas (100 million sq.m
2
) by 1979 and
under Act on Promotion of Urban Development took 6 years for completion in Germany (Seele, 1982)
(Seele, 1982)
• Stabilization of land prices was one goal of urban • Authority decided purchase prices and priority given for
development (Seele, 1982) repurchase to former owners and non-landowners. Large
plots to social housing in Germany (Seele, 1982)
2. Need for takings and eminent domain • Rights were obtained/ extinguished by contracts/ • Vesting rights for land upon fair compensation in
eminent domain with compensation (Doebele, England (Kuppers and Nishiyama, 1986)
Matsubara, and Nishiyama, 1986)
• In Germany , often appeals against expropriation and new
subdivision completed after legal proceedings settled
(Seele, 1982)
• Rights to new buildings partially provided for former
owners in Japan (Doebele, Matsubara, and Nishiyama,
1986)
• State-owned land by takings and state direct • Land was not a commodity and non-transferable while
allocation and planning of land use (Han, 1998) housing allocated as welfare entitlement, under socialist
ideology in Maoist era (1949-1978) in China (Friedmann,
2006; Han, 1998)
• Problems in land and housing utilization emerged such as
inefficient occupation of land parcels, inequality in housing,
lack of construction funds, and shortage of housing (Qu,
Heerink, and Wang, 1995)
Reasons
Table 5.3: Compulsory land purchase for readjustment

74
In Germany, the scheme was only applied to development areas under the Act
on the Promotion of Urban Development, StBauFG. The local authority necessarily
expropriated rights of all landholdings to realize development plan when voluntary
land redistribution could not be accomplished due to resistance from landowners.
During 1972-1979, forty development areas covering about 100 million sq m were
established with a reasonably large share in the Bonn area (Seele, 1982). The time
taken to execute expropriation could be delayed up to 3 years accumulating to more
than 6 years to achieve completion. The need of redevelopment for public purposes
also determined its aim for stabilization of land prices. In this regards, the local
authority reserved the rights to decide about the purchase prices and priority was
given for repurchase to former owners and non-landowners. In addition, a large
portion of land plots was distributed for social housing program.
It can be applied when the need of takings or eminent domain hinges on
legitimate public purposes and fairness considerations. Table 5.3 summarizes the
supportive reasoning of the ideal conditions for compulsory land purchase scheme. In
Japan, rights were obtained or extinguished by contracts or eminent domain with
compensation whereas rights for relocation to new buildings were partially provided
for former landowners (Doebele, Matsubara, and Nishiyama, 1986). The English
scheme permitted vested development rights for lands upon payment of fair
compensation (Kuppers and Nishiyama, 1986). Yet, it set the stage for conflict and
political opposition from landowners in Germany against expropriation and relatively

75
low amount of compensation by which the new subdivision could not be completed
before the legal proceedings were settled (Seele, 1982).
Under socialist ideology in Maoist era (1949-1978) in China, state
extinguished land rights by takings and state direct allocation and planning of land
use (Han, 1998). Conversion of all private lands to public ownership was not fairly
compensated at existing land value. According to the Chinese socialist ideology, land
was not a commodity and non-transferable while housing was allocated as welfare
entitlement (Han, 1998; Friedman, 2006). Problems in land and housing utilization
emerged such as inefficient occupation of land plots, inequalities and shortage of
housing, and lack of construction funds (Qu, Heerink, and Wang, 1995). Since 1978,
the government introduced a land tenure system to replace government control of its
land administration as a part of a nationwide economic restructuring program.
3. Voluntary Readjustment Scheme
This scheme was applied in peripheral areas of large cities farther from
existing development where unfilled demand for urban land and shortage of housing
were supported by negotiated settlement. As stated by Doebele (1982) that projects
were accomplished largely by private when applied in peripheral areas. Records show
that privately initiated projects comprised as much as 42 percent of the total project
area or 1,279 sq km in Japan by 1994 (City Planning Association, 1995: 114;
Sorensen, 1999). Subsequently, in the mature stage of urban development with
adequate provision of public services, many projects in Japan were initiated in the
least-developed areas much farther away from existing development due to the

76
difficulties in gaining consensus by negotiated settlement in closer locations to
existing built-up areas where land price was already high. This land development has
been criticized to result in pattern of urban sprawl on the fringe of Japan’s
metropolitan region.
Archer (1990) discusses its potential of land redistribution in developing
countries where ownership of urban-fringe lands is fragmented with numerous
separate holdings and there is sufficient demand for serviced building sites and access
to public roads. He further suggests that there are a number of land development
situations which could gain support of the landowners including opening up untapped
lands for urban development by providing public road access to the rear land plots,
which are also referred to locally as “blind land”.
Secondly, the potential increase in land price and financial viability has
necessitated the likelihood of success in the negotiation process. Potential increase in
land price was found where land price of undeveloped land was not very high or very
low (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982). When land prices were very low and not
rising, the sales of reserved land could hardly cover project costs (Miyazawa, 1982).
On the other hand, when land prices were high and rising rapidly, landowners were
unable to profit handsomely by the involving complex procedure (Doebele, 1982).
The explanation is that financial viability for this scheme is limited largely to
the sale of reserved land. Records show that the largest funding source for privately
initiated projects resulted from the sale of reserved land (64 percent) and 31 percent
from local funding (Japan LR Association, 1983). As landowners are motivated by

77
the benefits they expect to gain, Archer (1990) emphasizes on financial viability of
the project which leaves landowners with significant land value gain.
In the decision making process of this scheme, the large number of
agreements reached and the likely time taken to reach agreement can make the
negotiation process complicated thus increasing transaction costs. The difficulties in
involving majority of landowners or all landowners to initiate a project had resulted
in the delay of project completion, normally taking up to 10-20 years for privately
initiated projects in Japan.
In regards to several international conferences about transferring of voluntary
LR scheme to developing countries, a number of the literature discusses some
implications which can be developed to reduce transaction costs associated with the
negotiated settlement. For example, information accessibility to provide information
on the Act and negotiation process would decrease information costs and thus
reducing uncertainty for negotiating parties (McCann, 2004). Landowners’
understanding and involvement which would reduce the time taken to reach
agreements are achieved by educating landowners about LR and its necessity through
meetings and workshops (Schnidman, 1993). Revelation of majority opinion and
minority preferences would reduce time spent crafting detailed replotting design;
however exercising the power of compulsory land acquisition against any minority of
holdout landowners would place time limits on negotiation (Archer, 1990; McCann,
2004). Development of human resources and technical requisites in accordance with
management by skilled and experienced staff would increase acceptance of the

78
complex process and reduce uncertainty for negotiating parties (Archer, 1990;
Akiguchi, 1997). In addition, establishment of the legal system and implementation
by the financial support would limit overlapping and conflicting claims and facilitate
the exchange process (Akiguchi, 1997). Establishment of legal system is prerequisite
particularly the exemption of taxes and land registration fees for exchange of land
titles (JICA, 1993).
Finally, it can be applied when trust between the negotiating parties was high
to facilitate the negotiated outcome. As Webster and Lai (2003) deem that the
efficient allocation of the good is achieved by unrealistic institutions of perfect trust
under a market supply with perfect information and zero transaction costs. However,
with imperfect information and positive costs of acquiring information and
organizing collective landowners, there is a risk that the good is either undersupplied
or not supplied at all. In Korea, transaction costs were associated with possible delays
in the sale of reserved land and the risk of interim financing thus resulting in
protection of private landowners’ interest and securing insufficient amount of land for
public purposes. Hayashi (1982) discussed a generic problem in the case of projects
carried out by private sectors particularly in Japan and Korea that completion would
be left to private owners who may hold back construction for opportunity costs of
increased land value from speculation when demand was very intense.
Land Readjustment Approach for Thailand
The LR approach has been used in several countries with different level of
success. It has been successful in relatively more developed than the developing

79
countries. A number of differences exist between the circumstances of developmental
settings of developing countries and those in the developed world. Specifically,
differences exist in their ability to pursue the LR technique. Kitay (1985) considers
some main features required for the developing world in pursuing the LR approach as
follows:
1. Support from national, provincial and local governments
2. Sympathy from decision -makers
3. Requirement for major new enabling legislation or related laws
4. An efficient system of cadastration or title registration
5. Well-trained and objective real estate appraisers
6. Highly skilled negotiators and administrators
These are considered essential requirements for the developing countries to
use LR in provision of basic services and infrastructure at no acquisition cost to the
municipality.
Among the Asian countries, Japan has used LR most extensively and actively
encouraged the technology transfer projects to the developing countries. There are
many reasons for successful use of LR for urban redevelopment projects in Japan.
They include an institutional framework and skilled manpower resources obtained
from the extensive use in urban-fringe development projects over a long period, the
use in combination with some government land purchase, Japanese cultural
preference for negotiation and consensus, and provision of government contributions
and subsidies to LR projects (Archer, 1993).

80
Types of Risk/ Reward Borne Risk/ Reward Borne
Arrangement by Agency by Landowners
Compulsory Japan Australia
Land Readjustment Korea
Germany
Voluntary Japan
Land Readjustment o Korea
Thailand
Compulsory Land Purchase Japan
Germany o
Note: o = noncorresponding matters
Table 5.4: Incentives by the land readjustment schemes

According to Table 5.4, this study would recommend the LR approach for
Thailand as one finds in Australia. Compulsory land acquisition with risk and reward
be born by the landowners would be appropriate to secure land for public facilities
and solve land development situations quickly. Voluntary LR scheme would be
problematic because it involves complex legal procedure, time-consuming
negotiation, and crucial cooperation between the landowners and government.
Compulsory purchase for LR would be useful for development of serviced land for
housing low-income families.

81
CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to achieve the primary objective of examining the LR system as a
viable alternative for financing urbanization in the case studies of LR projects in the
Bangkok Metropolitan Area, the study develops comparative country analysis of
different variations of LR schemes in four selected countries using the property rights
approach (1960) and framework of transaction costs to examine the establishment and
exchange of property rights to the LR system. Different variations of the LR schemes
are examined to address the conditions of developmental settings where one scheme
works better over the others. Redistribution of land rights and the extent of
transaction costs differ comparably among these experienced countries. The main
questions are: is there the relevance of the Thai local characteristics that affect the
initial distribution of land rights in the circumstances in Bangkok? What are the
effects of transaction costs associated with the exchange process?
The general assumptions of the research are that there is the relevance of the
local characteristics (the existing land holdings and socio-economic characteristic of
landowners) and the demand for initial distribution of land rights; and there are
transaction costs associated with the exchange process regarding information
accessibility to landowners, landowners’ understanding and involvement, powerful
authorities against minority of holdout landowners, skillful staff and sound
management, as well as legal and financial support.

82
Research Methodology
The study methodology focuses on examining the LR scheme that would
lower transaction costs associated with the exchange process and take place in
accordance with the Thai local characteristics. Case studies of two LR projects were
conducted in the Bangkok metropolitan area comprising of Suan Laung Rama 9 LR
Project and Nong Bua Mon LR Project. The cases selected focuses on the LR pilot
projects that already set up associations and have high potential for implementation
due to a majority of participation from most landowners. In addition, the two projects
are undertaken by the guidance of the BMA and got the agreements through meetings
of landowners about implementation plan, master plan and land replotting plan. The
methods of collecting data are questionnaires and unstructured interviews with the
landowners in the selected projects.
1. Case Studies Selection
Although the selection process attempted to select several case studies to be
representative of future LR projects of Bangkok, a few other projects are not possible
to be included in the research. Figure 6.1 maps the location of case studies and other
LR pilot projects in the Bangkok general plan. The two projects chosen were initiated
around the same time under the guidance of the BMA and JICA experts. The Suan
Laung Rama 9 LR Project is carried out to promote for residential development and is
a relatively small-size project compared to the other project. The Nong Bua Mon LR
Project is created to serve as District Center of mix-use development with residential
community and commercial activities, public facilities and transportation system.

83

Figure 6.1: Case studies in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. Source: Department of Town and
Country Planning, the Ministry of the Interior, 2004.

It is important to note that the first LR pilot project in the Bangkok
Metropolitan Area, Rama 9 Road LR Project, was excluded from the selection. At the
time of the survey, it was found that some landowners in Phase 2 who initially agreed
with LR concept sold out many land plots to real estate developers during the long
delay of establishing the LR Act and implementation which might make the proposed
urban development project impossible.
Pre-survey had been made to identify target respondents for Rama 9 Road LR
Project by contacting landowners for mailing questionnaires. Some landowners were
willing to participate in the dispatched questionnaires; however some refused to

84
participate due to their small plots and boredom of the delay without implementation.
The difficulties remained on large plots owned by various companies because their
representatives whom consistently attended meetings have changed during these
years. Pre-interview with the former chairman of the Rama 9 Road LR Association
found that the project had no activities for about 3 years and no meetings was held
after the LR Act of 2004 passed. Hence, data collection would be impossible for this
project.
There are two other pilot projects at the planning stage in the Bangkok
metropolitan area. The BMA is contacting landowners of the Lam Bantapo LR
Project for introductory meetings of LR concept. The project covers an area of about
41.6 ha (0.42 sq km) and there are 184 landowners in this area. The other project,
Ladkrabang LR Project, is comparable to Nong Bua Mon LR Project at the
community level. However, it is in the period of development study of application
scheme to serve as a district center.
There are 12 pilot projects launched in many provinces (DTCP, 2005). The
DTCP acting as a national public agency has promoted LR system to landowners and
local public implementing bodies countrywide. A few projects in provincial districts
have high potential for implementation regarding a majority of participation from
most landowners such as Lum Pang LR Project and Yala LR Project. The former
project is initiated to implement in accordance with planned construction of the
arterial road designated in the Comprehensive Plan of Lum Pang province which
made available local government’s subsidies as part of the responsibility. This project

85
Suan Luang Rama 9 Nong Bua Mon
LR Project LR Project
(Residential type) (Mixed-use Type)
LR Project Planning Stage
1. Survey & study 1999 1999-2000
2. Approved by BMA LR committee 2000 1998
3. Formation of master plan (preliminary LR design, 1999 1999
implementation plan)
4. Preliminary replotting design 2000 2003
5. Explanatory meeting with landowners 2000 2000
6. Establishment of LR association by Thai 2004 2001
commercial law
7. Decision about boundary of LR project Not finalized 2002
(Phase 1.1, 1.2)
Replotting Design and LR Project Implementation
Stage
8. Land valuation before LR decision of boundary 2002 2003
(each parcel)
9. Land valuation after LR 2003 2003
10. Modification of LR design & implementation plan 2000-2004 2003-present
11. Cancellation of LR association and proposal for 2005 2005
association abide by the LR Act of 2004
12. Modification of replotting design 2001-present 2003-present
Activities
Year
Table 6.1: Comparing activities for case studies selection
covers an area of 12.8 ha and there are 30 landowners in the area. For the latter
project, a majority of landowners’ participation is influenced by strength of local
leadership. This project is relatively large in size covering an area of 56 ha and there
are 98 landowners. It is worthwhile to mention that, besides subsidies and local leader
influence, the moderately low land price is the other factor of well-reception by
landowners in these provinces.

Criteria for Case Studies Selection
The criteria for case studies selection were based on the activities of the
projects which are more likely reach implementation stage, since LR projects can take
a very long time from initial conception to completion. Case studies that had involved

86
landowners in meetings about replotting design and land valuation were selected
because these factors have an influence on the initial distribution of land rights. The
selected case studies are the two most matured projects in the Bangkok metropolitan
area likely proceeding to decision about replotting plan. In addition, they were
initiated at around the same time before establishment of the LR Act under the
guidance of the same public authority. Table 6.1 summarizes the activities which
involved landowners in the exchange process for these two LR projects.
Differences of the case studies include project size, type of development,
average size of land plots and numbers of landowners. The representative case studies
met the conditions of voluntary LR scheme that physical characteristic of existing
land condition is untapped lands without access roads.

Figure 6.2: Overview of Suan Laung Rama 9 LR Project

87
Suan Luang Rama 9 Land Readjustment Project
The project site is in the southeast part of Bangkok, covering an area of 10.04
ha with 59 land plots, 500 meters along the road alignment (Figure 6.2). The project
is designated for opening up the untapped land without access roads since the area is
enclosed by a major park, “Suan Laung Rama 9” and BMA striped land plots at the
frontage (see Appendix F). The BMA, the implementing agency of the project
attempts to promote residential development for the project area in conformity with
the Comprehensive Plan and the Fifth Bangkok Metropolitan Development Plan
(1997-2001) which incorporated implementation of LR pilot projects. The LR design
for the site covers circulation patterns, open space and play ground, individual parcel
layout, public utilities, and the reserved land.
There are 55 privately owned plots and 4 plots owned by the BMA. The
existing land plots range from 200 sq m (0.02 ha) to 10,700 sq m

(1.07 ha), with an
average of 1,000 sq m (0.1 ha) which is physically suitable for private residential
development. Landowner cooperation is found since the number of landowners is
small (36 landowners). Most parts of the site are unused land (because of
abandonment of farming in the period of urbanization) locating on the flooded area
(Figure 6.3) with poor condition of infrastructure. There are only 40 low-income
wooden houses and rental shacks locating in the south of the area (Figure 6.4) which
belong to the landlords and low-income workers. The residents find accessibility to
Charlerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road (Figure 6.5) by walking along narrow lane with
crooked surface.

88

Figure 6.3: Condition of infrastructure (small walkway) in Suan Laung Rama 9 LR Project

89

Figure 6.4: Existing buildings in Suan Laung Rama 9 LR Project

90

Figure 6.5: Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road

Accordingly, the conditions of voluntary LR scheme can be met because there
exists potential land value increase due to the conversion of “problem area” (where
land prices are low) to urban uses. The BMA had conducted survey of the land titles
and topography and revised preliminary conceptual plans several times through
meetings with landowners. After the first two explanatory meetings, almost all
landowners agreed to the LR concept (BMA, 2001). Upon meetings about land
valuation of each parcel and land contribution rate, the replotting plan was
determined based on grouping fragmented plots of same landowner and family
together. Therefore, the replotting plan (see Appendix F) was formulated by land
holdings consisting of three large groups of same family-owned plots, a group of
BMA plots and a group of plots owned by small landowners. The existing land

91
conditions exhibit salient feature of extreme fragmentation of land holdings which
could gain support of the landowners.
The financial plan was estimated to include complete landfill for drainage and
flood protection. Total costs of the project based upon 2004 costs totaled to 111
million Baht ($ 2.8 million US). Land values after LR are estimated to increase by
1.67 times, on the whole. Land plots would be averagely reduced to 73.89 percent of
the landowners’ original land plots depending on exact location thus contributing
about 11.17 percent for public services and 14.94 percent for cost recovery.
There are some constraints associated with the exchange process. Before the
LR legal system, times were taken to gain all landowners’ agreement. The project
implementation was extremely difficult to proceed in the lack of supporting systems
in terms of tax exemption, land registration and financial supporting systems.
Modification of LR design, LR implementation plan and replotting design has taken
several years to reach negotiated agreement. As a result, decision about boundary of
LR project has not been finalized. The project period has been prolonged along with
the delay of the legal proposals. At the replotting design and implementation stage,
the BMA (2004) states that 31 landowners returned letters of consent for participation
in the project accumulating to 86 percent of all landowners.
Nong Bua Mon Land Readjustment Project
The project site is in the northeast part of Bangkok, covering an area of 148.5
ha with 319 land plots, and situates along frontage road of Eastern Outer Ring Road
by its eastern boundary (Figure 6.6). It is aimed to promote mix-use development of a

92
District Center. It got an approval from the BMA LR committee in 1998. The master
plan (see Appendix G) for the site covers circulation patterns connecting to road
network system; individual parcel layout for residential, commercial and industrial
uses; drainage to existing canals and ponds, waste water treatment, water supply and
electricity; pocket and neighborhood parks, kindergarten and community facilities;
and the reserved land. Population in the LR project area
17
is estimated for 48,187
persons in 2049 (BMA, 2004).

Study Area

Nong Bua Mon LR Project

Figure 6.6: Location of Nong Bua Mon LR Project. Source: The Department of Land Readjustment,
BMA.

17
From Planning Standard of DTCP, number of population in LR project area is estimated from
standard of medium-density residential use in the average of 52 persons/400 sq m.

93

Figure 6.7: Outer Ring Road

94

Figure 6.8: Bridge and concrete sidewalk along the canal

95
Due to its large size, the project is divided into 2 developmental phases. Phase
1 covers an area of 76.1 ha (761,040 sq m or 190,260 sq wa) and locates on the west
side of the project consisting of 243 privately owned plots and 2 BMA plots. Phase 2
covers an area of 72.4 ha (724,224 sq m or 181,056 sq wa) and locates on the east
side of the project consisting of 73 privately owned plots and a BMA parcel. There
are 154 private landowners for the former phase and 67 landowners for the latter
phase. Criteria for developmental phases are determined by large number of
landowners willing to cooperate, clustering of land plots for consolidation, and
connection to road system.
In regards to existing land holdings, plot size ranges from 161,696 sq m

(16.17
ha) to 160 sq m (0.02 ha) with the average of 401-800 sq m (0.04-0.08 ha), creating
opportunities for mix-use development. The reason that most plots are small is
because of subdivision for agricultural purposes. Most parts of the site (82.28 percent
of the project area) are currently used for rice fields and plantation (refer to Appendix
G for the topographic map). There are some ponds, canals and 11 existing small
houses. In this regard, the successful conditions of voluntary LR scheme can be met
because there are no sufficient access roads to the area besides Eastern Outer Ring
Road (Figure 6.7). Agricultural land use only established landfill road, lanes along the
dike of rice fields and concrete sidewalk along the canals (Figure 6.8). Potential land
value increase exists since land prices are very low and haphazard development
gradually increases around the project area (JICA, 1999).

96
The BMA held many activities in the planning stage (see Table 6.1). Upon
majority of landowners’ agreement through group meetings, decision was made for
implementation of Phase 1.1 (41.12 ha with 19 plots) following by Phase 1.2.
Landowner cooperation is expected in Phase 1.1 due to small number of landowners
(26 landowners). The master plan combines mixed-use development with land
expropriation for a future main-arterial road (Route No.Cho 1) designated by the
Department of Public Works. It is 60 meters in width passing through the project area
from east to west and is in the acquisition stage. Due to withdrawal of a landowner
whose parcel is at the road frontage, the BMA most recently proposes 4 alternatives
of replotting design in an upcoming meeting of the landowners (BMA, 2006).
The financial plan of Phase 1.1 demonstrated that most of the expenses are
derived from the complete landfill for existing conditions of flat and lowlands, and
some ponds (4.50 and 7.00 m in depth). Since land expropriation for the road will be
compensated, total costs of the project based upon 2003 costs are estimated for 210
million Baht ($ 5.3 million US). Land values after LR are estimated to increase by
1.67 times on the whole. Landowners’ land plots will be reduced averagely to 76.85
percent of their original land plots depending exactly on location thus contributing
about 5.78 percent for public services and 17.37 percent for cost recovery.
According to the BMA report (2004), the extent of constraint associated with
the exchange process is similar to the former project due to the lack of the LR legal
system and supporting system for implementation. Times were taken for several years
to gain all landowners’ agreement and there are oppositions from some landowners.

97
Ideal Conditions Literature Quotes
or Circumstances
1. Demand for urban land and shortage of • Ownership of urban-fringe lands is fragmented with numerous separate holdings (Archer, 1990)
housing in periphery areas of large cities • Sufficient market demand for serviced building sites (Archer, 1990)
2. Potential increase in land price and financial • Where land price was not very high/ low (Kim, Hwang, and Doebele, 1982)
viability • Unsuccessful when suburban land prices were high and rising rapidly since landowners unable to profit
handsomely without involving complex procedure (Doebele, 1982)
• Unable to cover project costs when land prices were very low and not rising (Miyazawa, 1982)
• Financial viability which leave landowners with significant land value gain (Archer, 1990)
3. When transaction costs were moderate
3.1 Information accessibility • Providing information on the Act and negotiation process would decrease info. costs and reduce
uncertainty for negotiating parties (McCann, 2004)
3.2 Landowners' understanding and • Educating landowners about LR by arranging meetings (Schnidman, 1993)
involvement • Landowners understand the necessity of LR (Schnidman, 1993)
3.3 Powerful authority against minority of • Power of compulsory land acquisition against any minority of holdout landowners (Archer, 1990)
holdout landowners • Reveal preference of majority and minority of landowners (McCann, 2004)
3.4 Skillful staff & sound management • Skilled and competent staff (Archer, 1990)
• Sustained by development of human resources or technical requisites (Akiguchi, 1997)
3.5 Legal and financial support • Security of project system by legal system and implementation by financial support (Akiguchi, 1997)
• Establishment of legal system for exemption of taxes and land registration fees is prerequisite (JICA, 1993)
• Local authorities expand possible scope of redevelopment through cost sharing with landowners
(Schnidman, 1989)
4. Trust in LR association was high • Completion left to private owners who may hold back land for speculation (Hayashi, 1982)
4.1 Support of government policy • Consistency and determination of policy support from local gov' t or policy makers (Archer, 1990;
Schnidman, 1993)
Table 6.2: Voluntary land readjustment

98
Data Analysis
Collection Methods
1. Demand for uban land 1.1 Socio-economic Characteristics
and shortage of housing Residence/ homeownership Q. 1 Percentile
Present employment Q. 2 Percentile
Occupation Q. 3 Percentile
Education Q. 4 Mean
Personal income Q. 5 Mean
1.2 Local Characteristics of Existing Land Holdings
Plot size Q. 6 Percentile
Existing physical conditions
Poor conditions of infrastructure Q. 7 Percentile
Numbers of existing buildings on the land Q. 8 Percentile
Utilization at present Q. 9 Percentile
1.3 Demand for serviced building sites
Demand for distribution of land for access road connecting to road network system Q. 10 Mean
Demand for distribution of land for park and open space creating good environment Q. 11 Mean
Demand for distribution of land for financial resource land to recover costs Q. 12 Mean
Demand for landfill, drainage, and public utilities (water supply, electricity,etc.) Q. 13 Mean
2. Potential increase in land price Expected increase of land price created by the joint effort of LR Q. 14 Mean
and financial viability Trustworthy calculation of land value both before and after LR Q. 15 Percentile
Acceptability of the replotted plot in terms of reduced land and location Q. 16 Percentile
Amount of partial land contribution to achieve sucessful implementation of LR Q. 17 Mean
3. Transaction costs 3.1 Information accessibility to landowners
(Institutional Constraint on Information on the LR Act to facilitate recognition of LR Q. 18 Percentile
Exchange) Information on the LR Act to facilitate the negotiation process Q. 19 Percentile
Q = Questionnaire Items, I = Interview
Table 6.3: Questionnaire formulation, data collection and analysis methods
Questionnaire Formulation
Ideal Conditions Items

99
Data Analysis
Collection Methods
3.2 Landowners' understanding and involvement
Educating landowners for understanding of LR Q. 20 Percentile
Necessity of LR for improving urban area Q. 21 Percentile
Participation in meetings Q. 22 Mean
3.3 Powerful authorities against minority of holdout landowners
Majority of landowners' agreement I Content analysis
Opposition from some landowners I Content analysis
3.4 Skillful staff and sound management
Technical imperatives for local officials I Content analysis
3.5 Legal and financial support
Delay of legal system constraining exchange of land rights Q. 23 Percentile
Lack of supporting systems -Exemption of taxes Q. 24 Percentile
-Exemption of land registration fees Q. 24 Percentile
-Financial support I Content analysis
4. Trust Consistency and determination of policy support from policy makers I Content analysis
Decisions
Co-operation with other landowners in LR project Q. 25 Percentile
Plan for land utilization in the future Q. 26 Percentile
Q = Questionnaire Items, I = Interview
Table 6.3: Questionnaire formulation, data collection and analysis methods (continued)
Questionnaire Formulation
Ideal Conditions Items

100
2. Data Collection
Table 6.2 summarizes the ideal conditions of developmental settings for
voluntary LR scheme discussed in Chapter 5 to provide framework for examining LR
projects undertaken in Bangkok. Questionnaire formulation is accordingly defined in
Table 6.3 including the methods for data collection and analysis for each question. In
terms of the demand for initial distribution of land rights, the Thai local
characteristics are examined in related to the circumstances that there is sufficient
demand for serviced building sites. The local characteristics include the
characteristics of existing land holdings (plot size and existing physical conditions)
and socio-economic characteristics of landowners (homeownership, present
employment, occupation, education, and personal income).
Key Informant Pre-Interviews
Pre-interviews with three government officials were conducted in November
2002. Mr. P. Ronarong
18
initially introduced the Japanese LR to Thailand, as a tool
for land development focusing on improving urban environment and quality of life.
While Mr. T. Sirimongkolvichaya
19
has begun his role in co-operation with the JICA
in setting up the LR system in Thailand since 1992 and launched the Rama 9 Road

18
Mr. Preecha Ronarong was the director of Land Readjustment Bureau, Department of Town and
Country Planning (DTCP), Ministry of Interior.
19
Mr. Thuanthong Sirimongkolvichaya is a town planning analyst 7 in Land Readjustment Bureau,
Department of Town and Country Planning (DTCP), Ministry of Interior.

101
LR project, Mrs. C. Nilsiri
20
started her role with other 7 staff when the BMA
initiated the Suan Luang Rama 9 Road LR project.
Demand for initial distribution of land rights by means of demand for serviced
building sites were discussed to distinguish into distribution for access road; park and
open space; reserved land; and landfill, drainage and public utilities. The
circumstances that there are potential increase in land prices and financial viability
were explained by expected increase in land price, land valuation, and land
contribution rate.
Key informants described that the value of plots with no road access (before
LR) was estimated exactly the same price per sq m at any location. Land contribution
rate for each plot differed depending upon location and land valuation after LR. The
shape of land parcel, location, street layout and other public facilities affected land
contribution rate. Upon meetings with the landowners about the preliminary
replotting plan, local officials had to revise and re-adjust the plans several times. The
adjustments took about one year in accordance with consistent meetings with the
landowners. One of them mentioned that the replotted plot would be acceptable after
single landowner compared to the adjacent plot in terms of reduced land and location.
A number of constraints associated with the exchange process were described
to add cost to or delay the project implementation. Times were taken to promote
recognition of LR to wider public interest in the lack of legal and supporting systems.
Therefore, the DTCP had encouraged related local agencies and provincial officials

20
Mrs. Chukwan Nilsiri was a town planner in the Land Readjustment Sub-division, Department of
City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA).

102
about information accessibility by implementing LR projects in every province. One
of the key informants described that understanding from landowners played an
important role in strong landowners’ participation in meetings. While the local
agencies (the BMA, DTCP, etc.) needed to explain the LR concept to landowners
individually in Bangkok, local leadership played a major role in strong participation
of landowners for pilot projects in Yala province. In general, landowners’
involvement could be expected after understanding the necessity of LR for improving
urban areas. Almost 80 percent of landowners’ agreement was found in undeveloped
areas which were critically blockaded from accessibility.
However, strong oppositions from some landowners have caused the lengthy
delay of project implementation. A key informant described about the delay for
negotiation with the landowners who have accessibility to road to open up the access
way for the project area. For example, a private landowner of a plot already adjacent
to the road opposed against the rate of land contribution and inclusion of his/her plot
in the LR project, whereas a finance company holding a large parcel adjacent to the
road was motivated by the potential increase in land price after LR. The boundary of
the project was eventually re-defined into phases to focus on the small number of
landowners. In general, small landowners preferred to unify the small plot with
his/her family’s plots in the area into one large single plot.
Key informants described about technical imperatives from the complexity of
replotting design method causing the delay in calling the meetings. The delay of
establishing the legal LR system had been mentioned as a major constraint causing

103
the lengthy delay of LR implementation. Delay of the legal system had caused the
slowing down of all the projects in many ways such as requirement of all landowners’
agreement, high costs of taxes and fees imposed to landowners in compliance with
the subdivision regulations, establishment of the LR associations under the Civil and
Commercial Code, etc.
Key informants described about the lack of financial supporting system to
move the projects forward. One of the key informants cited that the LR account
deposited 50 million Baht about 10 years ago for interim financing. However, it has
never been authorized for withdrawal to support any projects financially. The sale of
the reserved land is, thus, the only source of interim financing. Although subsidies
from the national government was impossible, subsidies from the BMA as a local
government implementing LR projects should be available through allocation of
annual budget for financing construction of public roads. More importantly, there
have not been consistency and determination of policy support for LR from the policy
makers. The weak policy support adversely affects landowners’ confidence in
participation and creditability to local officials.
Questionnaires
The questionnaire consists of 4 parts (see Appendix A for the questionnaire).
Part 1 consists of 9 questions regarding the respondents’ socio-economic and local
characteristics of existing land holdings in terms of plot size and physical conditions
such as poor conditions of infrastructure, numbers of existing buildings on the land,
and utilization at present. Part 2 and 3 contain statements and questions regarding

104
Suan Luang Total
Phase 1.1 Phase 1.2 Rama IX
Mailed questionnaires 25 129 36 190
Return before follow-up 8 28 7 43
Return after follow-up 6 19 5 30
Personal dispatched questionnaires n/a 36 6 42
Total return questionnaires 14 83 18 115
Total return rate 0.56% 0.64% 0.50% 60.52%
Nong Bua Mon
Table 6.4: Questionnaires return
landowners’ attitudes towards LR in terms of their demand for distribution of land
rights, some institutional constraints during the process, and their decisions. Part 4
consists of an open-ended question for landowners’ comments. Each questionnaire
was systematically labeled to enable geo-coding of each survey for future follow-ups.
The survey was commenced during May-June 2006. In the survey process,
each questionnaire in Thai language was enclosed in a package composed of a cover
letter, the questionnaire form, a sheet showing existing land plots of the LR project
compared to the replotting plan, and a postage-paid self-addressed envelope. The
questionnaires were mailed to the houses of the landowners who join the two LR
projects by which the contact address was assembled from the BMA. A total of 36
questionnaires were mailed for the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project; and 25 and 129
for the first and second phase of the Nong Bua Mon LR project, consecutively.

The follow-up was conducted about ten days after the questionnaires were
mailed. Follow-up letters reminding the landowners in the LR projects to answer the
questionnaires were mailed out to those who had not returned the questionnaires.
After the follow-up, the collective number of questionnaires returned from Phase 1.1

105
Total Existing
Return Building
7 No
9 Yes = 1
6 No
3 No
2 No
3 No
2 No
1 No
33 No = 32
Yes = 1
Table 6.5: Individual remarks in questionnaires
Plot Size Land Utilization
1,200-1,999 sq.wa
2,000-3,999 sq.wa
Less than 200 sq.wa
200-399 sq.wa
400-799 sq.wa
800-1,199 sq.wa
Not using = 6
For farming = 1
Not using = 4
For housing = 1
For farming = 4
Not using = 4
For rent/lease = 2
For farming = 12
at Present
4,000-7,999 sq.wa
For farming = 2
Not using = 1
For farming = 2
For farming = 2
8,000 sq. wa and over
Total
For rent/lease = 1
Not using = 2
Not using = 18
For housing = 1
For farming = 1
Not using = 1
For rent/lease = 1
and 1.2 of the Nong Bua Mon project, and Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project were 14,
47, and 12, respectively. The returned rate of the questionnaires only in Phase 1.1 of
the Nong Bua Mon project exceeded 50 percent. Table 6.4 summarizes the returned
questionnaires. Therefore, personal dispatch was considered essential and
consecutively conducted in phase 1.2 of the Nong Bua Mon project, and Suan Luang
Rama 9 LR project.

The personal dispatched questionnaires were conducted by a team of four
interviewees a week after the follow-up since a key informant mentioned about lower
educational level of some landowners who may not be able to response to the mailed
questionnaires. 42 additional questionnaires were collected. The collective number of

106
questionnaires returned from Phase 1.2 of the Nong Bua Mon project and Suan
Luang Rama 9 LR project were 83 and 18, respectively. The returned rate of the
questionnaires for the two projects exceeded 50 percent.
It is interesting to note that there were 33 questionnaires returned with the
individual remarks on the open-ended question. Table 6.5 summarizes the remarks
returned by some local characteristics of existing land holdings in terms of plot size
and physical conditions including existing buildings on the land and land utilization.
Unstructured Interviews
The unstructured interviews were conducted at the end of the completion of
the questionnaire survey. For the interviews, a set of main questions was developed
referring to Table 6.3 as broad guidelines for interviewer and respondents. These
interview questions consist of general introductory questions asking respondents
about the acquisition of their land holdings, their demand for serviced building sites,
and the constraints causing lengthy delay of progress. Then, additional questions were
asked to clarify some important issues during the interview. Due to each respondent’
particular interest and circumstances, these additional questions were moderately
different from one respondent to another.
The main interview questions were categorized as follows:
1. How do you describe about the acquisition of your land holding?
2. In terms of LR, do you agree with the issues of infrastructure
improvement, land valuation of existing conditions and after LR, amount
of land contribution, and the replotting design?

107
Plot size* Respondents Gender Age Projects Existing Participation Years of
(sq.wa) # Buildings in Meetings* Holdings
1 1 F 40' s Suan Luang Rama 9 Yes 3 20
1 2 F 60' s Suan Luang Rama 9 No 2 2
1 3 M 50' s Nong Bua Mon Yes 3 10
2 4 F 50' s Suan Luang Rama 9 Yes 3 10
2 5 F 50' s Suan Luang Rama 9 No 2 20
2 6 M 60' s Nong Bua Mon No 3 10
3 7 F 50' s Suan Luang Rama 9 Yes 3 100
3 8 M 60' s Nong Bua Mon No 3 25
3 9 M 60' s Nong Bua Mon No 2 10
4 10 M 50' s Suan Luang Rama 9 No 3 20
4 11 M 40' s Suan Luang Rama 9 No 1 30
4 12 F 40' s Nong Bua Mon No 2 20
5 13 M 60' s Nong Bua Mon No 3 20
6-8 14 F 40' s Nong Bua Mon No 0 10
6-8 15 M 50' s Suan Luang Rama 9 No 3 30
Note: Plot size* 1 = Less than 200 sq.wa
2 = 200-399 sq.wa
3 = 400-799 sq.wa (1-1.99 rai)
4 = 800-1,199 sq.wa (2-2.99 rai)
5 = 1,200-1,999 sq.wa (3-4.99 rai)
6 = 2,000-3,999 sq.wa (5-9.99 rai)
7 = 4,000-7,999 sq.wa (10-19.99 rai)
8 = 8,000 sq. wa and over (20 rai and over)
*Refer to Table 7.3 for participation in meetings.
Table 6.6: Summary of respondents' characteristics
3. How do you describe about opposition from some landowners?
4. Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the work done by the BMA?
5. What do you think about the delay from the legal system and financial
support?

Most of the interviews were carried out either in the respondents’ houses
during weekends or in the office during week days. They were asked to participate in
the interviews by telephone contact for an appointment. Three respondents freely
requested to participate by telephone survey. Each interview lasted between 45

108
minutes to one hour. Handwritten notes were taken during the interviews and
reviewed immediately following each interview for examination of recurring
subjects. The numbers of respondents participated in the interviews were 8 for the
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project and 7 for the Nong Bua Mon LR project. Table 6.6
summarizes respondents’ characteristics.

109
CHAPTER 7
ANALYSES AND RESULTS

Questionnaires
1. Analysis Method and Score Assignments
The data collected from the questionnaire was standardized and analyzed
using the statistical software, SPSS. The demand for serviced building sites and
expected increase in land prices (item 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) were measured on the
basis of a 5-point scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Not Sure, Agree, and Strongly
Agree. With regards to score assignment for each response question in these items of
attitudes towards LR, the most positive answer choice was assigned the highest score
and vice versa (i.e., a score of 5 was assigned to the “Strongly Agree” answer choice,
versus a score of 1 to the “Strongly Disagree” answer choice). Most other questions
about landowners’ attitudes towards LR and some institutional constraints during the
process were related to the facts which could be more determined for measurement
(i.e., Yes, No, and Not Sure/don’t know). These response questions were items 15,
16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25 in Table 6.3 (see Appendix B for a complete score
assignment for the questionnaire).
The items related to socio-economic aspects (present residence, present
employment, occupation, level of education, and personal income), and some
decisions and information on LR were classified in related to the past research by the
JICA (1993) on the application scheme of LR in Thailand. These response questions

110
were items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, and 26 in the questionnaires. Item 22 was
measured to determine whether landowners’ participation was strong or weak on the
basis of a 4-point frequency scale: Frequently, Sometimes, Rarely, and Never.
Finally, an open-ended question in item 27 was used to blend with the statistical data
collection.
2. Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics were applied to provide an overview of the data and
explain the characteristics of the respondents. The local and socio-economic
characteristic items and some items of attitudes toward LR with qualitative data were
processed for their percentage of categories (Table 7.1 and 7.2). Some other items of
socio-economic characteristic and attitudes toward LR with quantitative data were
processed for their means and standard deviations (Table 7.3 and 7.4). The item of
plot size was respectively sorted by ranking into groups adapted from the BMA report
(2003).
The respondent characteristics are explained as follows:
1. Most respondents are in possession of their housing in all the LR projects.
2. About 80% of the respondents from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
and the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2 are employed. However,
senior citizen has the largest share in the land from the Nong Bua Mon LR
project-Phase 1.1.
3. By profession, government service has the largest share followed by
entrepreneur and housewives.

111
1. Your present residence:
Self own
Family' s own
Rent
2. Your present employment:
Unemployed
Employed
Retired
3. Occupation:
Governtment service
State Enterprise
Employee
Self-employed
Entrepreneur
Housewife
Others
6. The size of your land plot (in sq.wa):
Less than 200 sq.wa
200-399 sq.wa
400-799 sq.wa
800-1,199 sq.wa
1,200-1,999 sq.wa
2,000-3,999 sq.wa
4,000-7,999 sq.wa
8,000 sq. wa and over
7. The poor conditions of infrastructure on your land:
No access road (or frontage) to the land
Poor access road (narrow, bad surface, crooked)
Lacking public utilities (water supply, electricity)
Multiple poor conditions chosen**
8. Any existing building or structure on your land:
No
Yes, 1-2 storey wooden house
Yes, 1-2 storey building
Yes, others such as garage, storage, etc.
9. Utilization of the land at present:
Not using
For housing
For rent/ lease
For farming
For sale
*Exclude missing data
**The respondent chose more than one choice for poor condition of infrastructure
5.6
-
- 8.9
30.8 3.8
33.3
81.3
-
18.8
27.8
11.1
16.7
5.6
79.7
3.8
16.5
-
30.8
15.4
36.7
5.1
7.7
7.7
16.5
6.3
22.8
- 2.6
78.5
-
-
-
33.3 19.0
2.5 -
25.6
91.7 66.7
7.1
42.9
8.3
-
35.7
64.3
7.7
16.7
7.1
65.4
3.8
5.6
16.7
77.8
-
83.3
-
16.7
-
83.3
19.7
15.8
53.9
10.5
93.6
-
5.1
1.3
2.6
46.2
23.1
23.1
78.6
-
14.3
7.7
50.0
-
11.8
-
-
5.9
35.3
35.3
-
11.8
9.1
3.9
3.9
1.3
42.9
19.5
14.3
5.2
21.4
14.3
14.3
7.1
-
21.4
21.4
Nong Bua Mon
Table 7.1: Local and socio-economic characteristic items
Physical and socio-economic characteristic items
Suan Luang
Rama IX Phase 1.1 Phase 1.2
Valid percent*
-
Valid percent* Valid percent*

112
15. Is the calculation of land value for your plot(s), both
before and after the readjustment, trustworthy?
No
Yes
Not sure/ Don' t know
16. Are the location and reduced land of your replotting
plot acceptable?
No
Yes
Not sure/ Don' t know
18. Have you been informed about establishment of the
2004 LR Act?
No
Yes, from the BMA officials
Yes, from newspaper/ television/ radio
Yes, from multiple sources**
19. According to the Act, implementation of a project
requires 2/3 of landowners' agreements both in the
number and the area. Do you agree with it?
No
Yes
Not sure
20. Do you think you understand the LR system and its
process?
No
Yes
Not sure
21. Do you consider LR as an applicable way of
improving "blind land" in your area?
No
Yes
Not sure
23. Will you be committed to participate in the project
upon enactment of legal and procedural bases for
LR?
No commitment
Positively committed
Commitment if it gets a majority of consents
24. Will you participate in the project if taxes and land
registration fees are not exempted?
No
Yes
Not sure 29.4
76.9
7.9
15.4
76.9
7.9
15.4
58.8
58.8
57.1
42.9
6.3
48.1
45.6
92.9
7.1
22.2
- 5.6
66.7
11.1
-
7.1
-
85.0
3.8
11.3
-
-
82.4
6.3
55.6
92.9 94.1
76.9
76.3
38.9
17.6
-
17.5 5.9
7.9
15.4
70.5
10.3
19.2
71.4
-
7.1
50.0
43.8
3.8
2.5
78.6
-
63.8
7.5
57.1
12.7
60.8 43.8
35.7 26.6 56.3
- 7.1
21.4 28.8 11.1
21.4
Valid percent* Valid percent*
Phase 1.2 Rama IX
Valid percent*
Nong Bua Mon Suan Luang
72.2
16.7
33.3
66.7
-
Table 7.2: Items of attitudes toward land readjustment
Items of attitudes toward Land Readjustment Phase 1.1

113
25. Would you finally join your land with other
landowners in LR project by means of land
contribution for roads, parks and the reserved land?
No
Yes
Not sure
26. How are you going to use the land in the future?
No plan
Use it for housing
Use it for family business
Sell it out
Develop it for residential/ commercial project
Lease it
Chose multiple utilization**
*Exclude missing data
**The respondent chose more than one choice
Valid percent* Valid percent*
Phase 1.1 Phase 1.2
Valid percent*
Table 7.2: Items of attitudes toward land readjustment (continued)
Nong Bua Mon Suan Luang
Items of attitudes toward Land Readjustment Rama IX
16.7
5.6
-
30.0
10.0
-
14.3
7.1
21.4
12.5
38.8
3.8
42.9
-
100.0
-
7.1 27.8
-
82.5
5.0
12.5
44.4
-
88.9
5.6
5.6
5.6 5.0 7.1
Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
10. Land readjustment can provide my land plot with 4.71 0.47 4.73 0.55 4.67 0.59
access road connecting to road network system.
11. Provision of park and open space will bring good 4.00 0.56 3.83 0.79 3.65 1.06
environment to this area.
12. It is necessary to reserve some land plots for sale to 3.93 0.62 3.80 0.83 4.06 1.09
recover the project cost.
13. Land fill, drainage and other public utility works are 4.00 0.56 3.83 0.79 3.94 1.09
necessary on my land.
14. I can expect for an increase of land prices created by 4.29 0.61 4.26 0.78 4.41 0.71
the joint effort of Land Readjustment.
17. Which is the appropriate amount for your land 1.54 0.78 1.70 0.84 1.31 0.60
contribution to achieve successful implementation
of LR project in your area?
(1=11-20% of land contribution, 2=21-30% of
land contribution, 3=31-40% of land contribution)
22. How often do you join the meetings of landowners in 1.64 1.15 0.74 0.89 1.71 1.26
implementing of the project?
(0=never, 1=rarely, 2=sometimes, 3=Frequently)
Table 7.3: Items of attitudes toward land readjustment (continued)
Nong Bua Mon
Items of attitudes toward Land Readjustment Phase 1.1 Phase 1.2
Suan Luang
Rama IX

114
Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
4. Education Level 3.25 1.55 3.91 1.28 3.33 1.37
(1=Lower than high school, 2=High school,
3=Vocational Certificate/Diploma, 4=Bachelor' s
degree, 5=Master' s degree, 6=Doctorate degree)
5. Personal Income/ Month 4.00 2.00 2.88 1.39 3.00 1.50
(1=less than 10,000 Baht, 2=10,000-29,999 Baht,
3=30,000-49,999 Baht, 4=50,000- 69,999 Baht
5=70,000-99,999 Baht, 6=100,000 Baht and over)
Table 7.4: Socio-economic characteristic items
Nong Bua Mon
Socio-economic characteristic items Phase 1.1 Phase 1.2 Rama IX
Suan Luang

4. On the average, the respondents received vocational certificate or diploma
for the level of education.
5. By personal income, the average respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR
project-Phase 1.1 are the wealthiest followed by those from the Suan
Luang Rama 9 LR project and the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2.

The local characteristics of existing land holdings are classified as follows:
1. Small land plots are dominant in plot size of respondents from the Suan
Luang Rama 9 LR project and the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2.
For the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2, the largest share (42.9%)
possesses plots of less than 200 sq wa (800 sq m) in size. For the Suan
Luang Rama 9 LR project, the largest share (35.3%) is equivalent for less
than 200 sq wa (800 sq m) and 200-399 sq wa (800-1,599 sq m). Plot size
is more diverse from the Nong Bua Mon project-Phase 1.1.

115
2. 77.8% of the respondents from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
answered that their lands have either poor or no road access and lacking of
public utilities (multiple poor conditions were chosen). For the Nong Bua
Mon LR project-Phase 1.1 and Phase 1.2, multiple poor conditions of
infrastructure existed for 23.1% and 53.9%, respectively. These conditions
exhibit land development situations which could gain support of the
landowners.
3. More than 78% of the respondents do not have existing buildings on the
land in all the LR projects.
4. Majority of the respondents from all the LR projects are not utilizing their
land. However, 42.9% of the respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR
project-Phase 1.1 and 25.6% of those from Phase 1.2 utilize the land for
farming.

The landowners’ opinion survey regarding their demand for distribution of
land rights by LR in terms of demand for serviced building sites and potential
increase in land price are outlined as follows:
1. The agreement to LR in terms of providing road access connecting to road
network system is well-received, on the average.
2. The respondents did not decisively give affirmative agreement, on the
average, for the provision of park and open space, the reserved land, and
land filling, drainage, and other public utility works. The means of

116
agreement (over 4.0) can be confirmed only from respondents of the Nong
Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1 for the provision of park and open space,
of the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project for the reserved land, and of the
Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2 for landfill.
3. The respondents averagely agreed that the increase of land prices can be
expected by the joint effort of LR in all the LR projects.
4. 56.3% of the respondents from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
reported that land valuation of existing conditions and after the
readjustment is reliably calculated. The majority of respondents from the
Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1 and Phase 1.2 reported hesitantly
that they are not sure or do not know about the land valuation
accumulating for 57.1% and 60.8%, respectively.
5. Majority of the respondents accepted the replotting in terms of reduced
land and location (the acceptability of respondents from the Nong Bua
Mon LR project-Phase 1.1, Phase 1.2, and the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR
project was 78.6%, 63.8%, and 72.2%, respectively).
6. On the average, the respondents chose for land contribution in the amount
of 11-20% of their land for public facilities.

The landowners’ opinion survey about some institutional constraints during
the process is summarized as follows:

117
1. The proportions of the respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-
Phase 1.1, Phase 1.2, and the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project whom have
been informed by the BMA officials about the establishment of the LR
Act were 71.4%, 43.8%, and 66.7%, respectively. Half of the respondents
from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2 have not been informed.
The information on the Act to facilitate recognition of LR may not be
widespread.
2. More than 70% of the respondents gave affirmative agreement to abide by
the LR Act, of which were relatively lower than the requirement of two-
thirds of landowners’ agreement in implementation of voluntary
readjustment scheme. The respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR
project-Phase 1.1, Phase 1.2, and the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
whom reported uncertainly that they are not sure were 15.4%, 19.2%, and
17.6%, respectively.
3. Almost 100% of respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase
1.1(92.9%) and the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project (94.1%) claimed that
they have knowledge and understanding of LR system and its process.
There are some doubts from respondents of the Nong Bua Mon LR
project-Phase 1.2 (17.5%).
4. The applicability of LR to improve the land without road access is likely
to be positively answered by a large percentage of respondents (92.9%
from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1, 85% from Phase 1.2, and

118
66.7% from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project). There are some doubts
from respondents of the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project (22.2%).
5. On the average, the respondents rarely participated in meetings. The
means of participation (0.74) from respondents of the Nong Bua Mon LR
project-Phase 1.2 appears to be relatively weak.
6. Majority of the respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1
and 1.2 gave affirmative answers to commit to the projects for the
proportions of 57.1% and 48.1%, respectively. Of these two phases, as
high as 42.9% and 45.6% of the respondents, respectively, are willing to
be committed on the condition that it gets a majority of consents. For the
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project, 55.6% of the respondents are willing to
be committed on the condition that it gets a majority of consents while
38.9% gave affirmative answers to commit to the projects.
7. The respondents did not decisively give negative answers for the charges
of taxes and land registration fees. Majority of the respondents from the
Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1 and 1.2 were uncertain for the
proportions of 42.9% and 41.8%, respectively. The proportions of
negative and positive answers for the charges were equivalent (58.8%)
from the respondents of the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project.

The landowners’ opinion survey regarding their decisions is outlined as
follows:

119
1. More than 82% of the respondents from all the LR projects
overwhelmingly expressed an intention to cooperate with the projects,
with only about 5% responding negatively.
2. Majority of the respondents cited that they will use their land for future
residence. Since they are mostly homeownership, this may be interpreted
that they have an intention to transfer their property to their descendents.
Large numbers of the respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-
Phase 1.2 (30%) want to sell their land, 21.4% of those from the Nong
Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1 have multiple purposes, and 27.8% of
those from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project have no plans.

Among the items described in Table 7.1-7.4; present employment was the only
item that accounted for the highest variations among the projects surveyed. While
81.3% of the respondents from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project reported that they
are employed, 35.7% of the respondents from the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase
1.1 reported so about their present employment. Majority of landowners in particular
projects are uncertain about trustworthy calculation of land valuation and charges of
taxes and fees. The results from other items were relatively comparable among the
selected projects.
3. Individual Remarks in Questionnaires
In addition to the questionnaire survey, the results of individual remarks
indicated some important issues of the respondents’ concern. With regards to the

120
local characteristics, some respondents mentioned about their existing land holdings
which are tied up with the family’s will, the existing conditions that are blockaded
from road access by developers, and deterioration of existing housing. Several
respondents commented on the distribution of land rights regarding unequal treatment
in the replotting design between small and large land holdings, large amount of land
contribution for the reserved land, the amount of land contribution concerning small
land holdings, and the reduced plots in location and size. In order to open up the blind
land for road access, an incentive should be provided for cooperation from the plots
with road access at the entrance of the project area.
A number of respondents reiterated on the lengthy delay for progress and the
need for project completion very quickly. Some respondents complained about
insufficient information on LR to facilitate its recognition and accessibility for
understanding about the LR act and its process. Technical imperatives to the staff and
inconsistency of policy support from the policy makers to implement the projects
truly for public’s interest are also the factors affecting lengthy delay for progress.
Of all the remarks and complaints, 19 respondents gave affirmative answers to
commit to the projects while 13 respondents were willing to commit on the condition
that it gets a majority of consents. Only one respondent answered negatively. The
necessity to join with other landowners in cooperative LR projects seemed to be
obviously recognized by almost all the respondents by which one respondent
mentioned that this problem can not be solved by landowners alone. Table 6.5
summarizes the characteristics of the respondents returning individual remarks by

121
plot size, existing buildings, and utilization at present (refer to Appendix D for a
complete translation of the individual remarks).
Interview Results
1. Local Characteristics of Land Holdings
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
Interview respondents in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project described their
land holdings to be obtained by inheritance and personal purchase. The respondents
mentioned about the possession of their land for a period of 2-3, 10, 20 and 35 years.
One respondent described that her family land holdings occupied for about 50% of
land in the project area. The rest of the land was in possession of another family
(about 20%), a major large land holder, the BMA, and several small landowners.
Two respondents who resided on the land described about the fragmentation
of land holdings. In the old days, the land was subdivided into small plots by
inheritance for agricultural use of which road provision for automobile was not
necessitated. The conversion of major canal into main road, Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9
Road, about 10 years ago had shut down the access. One of the respondents added
about transformation of the deteriorated canal into small walkway by residents and an
attempt to open up the blind land by which some striped plots connecting for road
access were purchased by cooperative landowners.
Nong Bua Mon LR project
Interview respondents in the Nong Bua Mon LR project mostly described their
land holdings to be obtained by inheritance. Two of them have purchased their lands.

122
The respondents mentioned about the possession of their land for a period of 10 and
25 years. Of the two respondents related by kinship, one of them described about past
acquisition of land holdings by their family of about 16.0 ha of land in the project
area and utilization for rental farming. The latter respondent explained that some
share of the land (3.2 ha) was recently subdivided into small plots and sold for
agricultural purposes. Appendix G exhibits patterns of land subdivision in the map of
the existing land holdings.
One respondent who lived on the land described about the existing poor
condition of infrastructure and the hardship in emergency when an ambulance could
not directly reach his house to pick up the patient. When asked about difficulties in
removal of the existing housing and relocation for infrastructure installment, he
considered that they were accepted because removal of his old house would be
compensated in cash.
2. Landowners of Small Plots
Several interview respondents claimed about their small plots while
expressing their opinion. These respondents were ranked by respondent number 1, 2,
4, 5, and 7 in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project; and number 3, 6, and 8 in the Nong
Bua Mon LR project (see Appendix E).
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
All these respondents in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project completely
agreed with infrastructure improvement in related to provision of road access to open
up the blind lands. Many of them complained about the width of the main arterial

123
road which was unnecessarily too large to accommodate for residential use. The
provision of a park in the community had not received much acceptability due to its
existing location which was adjacent to a major park and the safety issue of a
community park. Several of them complained about the large amount of contributed
land for the reserved land to recover the project costs. Provision of land filling at a
depth of 2 meters was obviously recognized to increase land utilization for residential
purposes for respondents of small plots in the flood-prone area.
The provision of public facilities clearly affected the amount of contributed
land to the respondents. When the respondents were asked to identify the appropriate
amount of land they were willing to give up, none of them allowed the amount of
over 20 percent of their land. With regards to land valuation, two respondents
observed about the low land value at the existing conditions to the extent that it
affected land reduction. Three respondents who did not know about the calculation of
land value accepted the land valuation; otherwise their plots would be left unused and
subjected to be bought up by developers or landowners of adjoining plots with public
road frontage at a very low price, they claimed.
All respondents concerned about the replotting design in terms of location and
size of the after-LR plots. Three respondents regarded their small plots and preference
for relocation to the back of the project area. While two of them complained about the
width of their plots which was designed narrowly. One respondent concluded that full
provision of public facilities as a good demonstration project might not be considered
necessary for landowners of small plots. However, since some plots were sold

124
sporadically, the fragmentation of their family’s land holdings could be gathered
together by the LR concept.
Nong Bua Mon LR project
All respondents of small plots in the Nong Bua Mon LR project agreed with
infrastructure improvement in related to provision of road access. One respondent
valued the future arterial road which would support mix-use development in the
project area. When the respondents were asked to identify the appropriate amount of
land contribution; one of them mentioned to give up as high as 25 percent of his land.
In terms of land valuation, two respondents whom frequently attended the meetings
accepted the calculation of land valuation because the untapped lands would
otherwise be left unused or sold at a very low price. Another respondent complained
about the estimate of land value before LR that it was quite low.
All respondents mentioned about the recurring adjustments to the replotting
design. Another respondent whose future plan would be for housing preferred to
relocate to the back of the project area. When asked about financial viability of the
project in terms of the sale of reserved land, two of them believed that the land would
be purchased either by future residents or a major landowner who would consolidate
the land with his large plot in the project area.
3. Major Landowners or of Large Plots
Several interview respondents were referred to as major landowners or
landowners of large plots. These respondents were ranked by respondent number 10

125
and 15 in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project; and number 12, 13, and 14 in the Nong
Bua Mon LR project (see Appendix E).
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
Two respondents, former chairman and vice-chairman of the Suan Luang
Rama 9 LR Association, expressed their agreement with infrastructure improvement
in terms of opening the accessibility to the blind land. The provision of a park in the
community had not received much acceptability due to its existing location which
was next to a major park, however playground could be accepted. One respondent
thought that the necessity for provision of land filling was not obviously considered
by some large landowners since it increased project costs considerably.
Of the two respondents whom frequently attended the meetings; one of them
mentioned about the critical issue of land contribution when it was initially
introduced to the landowners since the construction of public facilities was
traditionally provided by the governments by land expropriation. Another respondent
revealed that his family had donated some share of land for the major park and some
stripe-shape plots for shared private roads which were not legally permitted by the
BMA for connection to public roads. Moreover, he added that the BMA was not
intended to reduce its plots for any partial land contribution.
The respondents accepted the calculation of land valuation which was
estimated by the Department of land valuation because they believed that the land
value after LR would increase accordingly. One of them criticized that the replotting

126
plans had not been clear because designation of the boundary of the project was not
finalized.
Nong Bua Mon LR project
Of the three respondents who were referred to as major landowners or
landowners of large plots in the Nong Bua Mon LR project; one of them agreed with
the lower rate of land contribution by implementing the project in accordance with
the royal decree of land expropriation for future arterial road which would be fully
subsidized by the Department of Public Works. But, the demand for land filling
would increase project costs significantly because several plots were like ponds.
Most of the respondents in the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.1 was
willing to contribute land for the project, one respondent claimed. However, another
respondent said that the amount of land contribution was not yet settled by majority
of the landowners in Phase 1.2. Recently, the actual announcement of expropriation
for future road had caused the withdrawal of consent to participate by some
landowners.
4. Strong Opposition from Some Landowners
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
Most of the respondents described that the opposition from some landowners
had resulted in the slowdown of the project. One of the respondents explained that the
opposed landowners in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project were against their higher
amount of land contribution than others taking into account that their existing plots
were in the closest proximity to road access. The respondent who opposed to the

127
project described about the high rate of land contribution (25%) for his family’s plots
which occupied almost 20 percent of the land in the project area and the detour of
accessibility to their plots in the initial replotting plans. Although he agreed with
infrastructure improvement to open up the blind land, land filling was not considered
necessary as it contributed to the high project costs. Before the enactment of the LR
Act, he filed lawsuit against the BMA for the legitimate accessibility to any blind
land. Part of the lawsuit was that the Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road was supposed to
be fully constructed in width where their plots would be frontal accessibly, but the
BMA had left striped-shape land which was 4-meter in dept along the road blocking
all lands in the area.
Nong Bua Mon LR project
One of the respondents in the Nong Bua Mon LR project notified that
oppositions from landowners were quite trivial. According to her, the establishment
of the Nong Bua Mon LR association had not otherwise been supported by majority
of landowners and especially by many major landowners. One respondent whom
frequently attended the meetings said the problem was that the replotting design was
adjusted in almost every meeting in order to gain all landowners’ agreement which
limited the exchange process.
Yet, one respondent who opposed against the project explained about the high
rate of land contribution for his plot (more than 22 percent) and the relocation to the
very back of the project area. He agreed with infrastructure improvement to open up

128
the road access; however the excessive amount of the reserved land was critical to the
rate of land reduction.
5. Local Officials and Policy Makers
Almost all of the respondents in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project and Nong
Bua Mon LR project were satisfied with the BMA local officials in handling the
negotiation. Two respondents who opposed against the project entirely returned with
disagreement. The LR concept was very new and critical to many landowners,
however they eventually agreed with the project after several meetings. By that, two
respondents who frequently attended the meetings observed that participation in the
meetings was strong once the landowners understood the LR concept. Nonetheless,
the decline in recent years was resulted from inconsistency of the meetings being held
such as once or twice a year. This was due to the complexity of the replotting design
and method of land valuation, one of the respondents added. Two respondents who
opposed against the project, the replotting design should be more flexible and some
sessions should be provided for public hearing of what the landowners actually
wanted.
Several respondents described that the local officers had attempted to
negotiate and persuade the landowners who opposed against the projects by arranging
focus-group meetings. One respondent clarified that the negotiation had not been
settled because there was no urgent need for land utilization by most landowners and
particularly by landowners of large plots who might want to wait for speculation.

129
Some respondents mentioned about the weakness of policy support to move
the project forward. Two respondents referred to the shift and promotion of the
Director and Chief of the Department of LR to other positions several times which
had resulted in the changes of policy and budget plans. One respondent stated that
these changes affected the creditability of the BMA to the landowners. To some
extent, these changes discouraged several local officials who regularly took
responsible for both projects. Another respondent claimed that the high-rank official
who was in charge of the decision making, was not determined to authorize the loans
from LR funding account for actual land filling of road construction which had left
project completion unanticipated. However, the confidence in the LR association for
management of the sale of reserved land was questionable by one respondent who
had higher level of education. She claimed about the risk of large-scale mix-use
development project and source of funding for interim financing, and suggested that
management of the LR association must be transparent, equitable and rational.
6. Legal System and Financial Support
Most of the respondents complained about the delay of legal and procedural
basis which had resulted in the increase of construction materials and project costs.
They added that it affected directly the increase of land contribution. One respondent
stated that the longer delay would be anticipated after the legal and supporting basis
would be in effective because submission of the project for approval by the LR
committee would be bureaucratic and time-consuming. Another respondent referred
to the delay caused by re-establishment of the LR association by the LR act.

130
One respondent complained that the lack of financial support had added cost
to and delay the implementation. According to him, as much as 20 million baht from
the LR funding account had subsequently been depleted during these years for
arranging meetings with landowners, survey, and research which were just in the
planning and replotting design stage.
7. Summary of Interviews
With regards to the acquisition of the land holdings, most of the respondents
described their land holding to be obtained by inheritance. Several respondents
described their land holding to be obtained by purchase. Fragmentation of land
holding with several groups of holdings in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project was
described to exhibit the pattern of past land subdivision for agricultural purposes. One
respondent who lived on the land described about the hardship for living on the land
with poor conditions of infrastructure and no road access in emergency.
With regards to the attitudes of landowners toward LR, all respondents
expressed their demand for infrastructure improvement particularly the provision of
road access to the blind lands. The respondents in the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project
did not sufficiently expressed their demand for park and open space due to its
location adjoining to a major park. The respondents variably mentioned about their
demand for landfill and other public facilities. While respondents of small plots had
higher level of demand for land filling if his/her future plan would be for residential
use, respondents of large plots did not sufficiently demand for land filling if future
plan was not decided. Generally, the respondents desired for lower amount of land

131
contribution (on the average of 11-20 percent) than required, especially respondents
of small plots who did not plan to sell the lands. Many respondents of small plots, on
the other hand, desired for relocation to the back of project area for lower amount of
land contribution.
The respondents believed that they could expect for potential increase in land
value by co-operating in LR projects because land value at existing conditions was
very low. Some respondents of small plots concerned about land valuation before LR
to the extent that it affected land reduction. Some respondents of large plots believed
that land value after LR would increase accordingly to the official estimate of land
valuation. One respondent questioned about the risk of large-scale mix-use
development project and the source of funding for interim financing.
Most of the respondents described that the opposition had caused the
slowdown of the projects. Both respondents who strongly opposed against the LR
projects complained that they disagree with large amount of land contribution and the
adjusted location in the replotting plans. One respondent who frequently attended the
meetings of landowners said the replotting plans were adjusted in almost every
meeting in order to gain all landowners’ agreement which limited the exchange
process.
In general, almost all of the respondents were satisfied with the local officials
in handling the negotiation. Two respondents who frequently attended the meetings
mentioned about the inconsistency of meetings held partly because of the complexity
of the replotting design and method of land valuation to the local officials. Two

132
respondents who opposed against the projects complained that the replotting design
was not flexible and preference of the landowners was not formally obtained before
the complicated design process.
Some respondents mentioned about the weakness of policy support to move
the project forward. It also had an effect on the credibility of the parties involved.
Two respondents mentioned that the shift and promotion of high-rank officials to
other positions were the reasons for several changes in policy and budget plans. One
respondent claimed that non-determined decision makers to authorize the loans for
interim financing had left the LR project completion unanticipated. The management
of the LR association about the sale of the reserved land was also questionable.
Most of the respondents complained about the long delay of enforcing legal
and procedural bases of LR affecting higher project costs. One respondent stated that
longer delay would be anticipated with regards to the approval process of the LR
committee which would be bureaucratic and time-consuming. One respondent also
complained that the lack of financial support had added cost to and delay the
implementation causing depletion in the LR funding account which was used for just
planning and replotting design stage.

133

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Research Findings
Based on the primary objective of the research, the study relates the findings
to identify the significant conditions that affect the initial distribution of land rights
and transaction costs associated with the exchange process that affect the delay for
progress. Table 8.1 summarizes the major findings derived from the analysis of the
results.
The study gleans some insight from the survey findings to provide, firstly, that
the local characteristics of “blind land” experiencing land-development problem
situations affect the demand for LR projects by means of partial land contribution for
locating public facilities. The interview results indicate that the decision to co-operate
with LR projects is related to existing physical conditions because the support of the
landowners for LR was an attempt to open up the existing poor conditions of
infrastructure which are blockaded from road access and, to some extent, to
consolidate their fragmented family’s land holdings. The level of infrastructure
conditions is reported comparably poor implying the problems in using and
developing their land at existing condition.

134
Ideal Conditions Reasons
or Circumstances Literature Quotes Survey Findings
1. Demand for urban land and shortage • Ownership of urban-fringe lands was fragmented with • Fragmentation of land holdings with several groups of
of housing in periphery areas of large numerous separate holdings (Archer, 1990) holdings is tied up with the family' s will
cities
• Sufficient market demand for serviced building sites Serviced building sites:
(Archer, 1990) • Demand for openning blockage from road access
• Insufficient demand for park and open space if location
nearby a major park
• Higher level of demand for land filling from small
landowners if future plan for residential uses
• Insufficient demand for land filling from major landowners
or of large plots if decision for future plan was not made
• Preference for lower amount (on the average of 11-20%)
of land contribution than required
The relevance of local characteristics:
• Dominance of small plot size affected preference for
relocation to the back of project area for lower amount of
land contribution
• Mostly being homeownership somewhere else affected the
demand for redistribution of land
• Higher level of demand for redistribution of land in each
item from wealthier owners
2. Potential increase in land price and • Where land price was not very high/ low (Kim, • Some small landowners concerned about estimate of low
financial viability Hwang, and Doebele, 1982) land value before LR as it affected land reduction
• Unsuccessful when suburban land prices were high • Potential increase in land value was expected by the joint
and rising rapidly since landowners unable to profit effort in LR projects due to low land price at existing
handsomely without involving complex procedure condition.
(Doebele, 1982) • Landowners were basically motivated by increase in land
• Unable to cover project costs when land prices were value
very low and not rising (Miyazawa, 1982)
Table 8.1: Survey findings for voluntary readjustment

135
Ideal Conditions Reasons
or Circumstances Literature Quotes Survey Findings
• Financial viability which leave landowners with • Landowners questioned about the risk of large-scale
significant land value gain (Archer, 1990) mix-use development project and source of funding
• Implementation of LR projects in accordance with land
expropriation for main arterial road would reduce amount
of land contribution
3. When transaction costs were moderate
3.1 Information accessibility • Providing information on the Act and negotiation • Information accessibility to landowners appeared to be
process would decrease info. costs and reduce inconsistently enough to facilitate recognition of LR and the
uncertainty for negotiating parties (McCann, 2004) negotiation process
3.2 Landowners' understanding and • Educating landowners about LR by arranging meetings • Newness of LR concept was critical to many landowners,
involvement (Schnidman, 1993) but after several meetings landowners' understanding about
• Landowners understand the necessity of LR LR concept could be gained
(Schnidman, 1993) • Participation in meetings was retatively weak, on average
3.3 Powerful authority against • Power of compulsory land acquisition against any • Strong opposition from some landowners had slowed
minority of holdout landowners minority of holdout landowners (Archer, 1990) down the project
• Reveal preference of majority and minority of • Landowners complained about and strongly opposed
landowners (McCann, 2004) against high amount of land contribution and relocation
• All landowners' agreements to the replotting design was
found to limit the exchange process
3.4 Skillful staff & sound • Skilled and competent staff (Archer, 1990) • The complexity of replotting design and land valuation is
management • Sustained by development of human resources or found to be technical imperatives to the staff and caused
technical requisites (Akiguchi, 1997) inconsistency of meetings
• The replotting design were complicated and preferences of
collective landowners were not formally obtained before
complicated design process
3.5 Legal and financial support • Security of project system by legal system and • The long delay of enforcing legal and procedural bases of
implementation by financial support (Akiguchi, 1997) LR affected higher project costs and larger land contribution
Table 8.1: Survey findings for voluntary readjustment (continued)

136
Ideal Conditions Reasons
or Circumstances Literature Quotes Survey Findings
• Establishment of legal system for exemption of taxes
• Longer delay with regards to the LR Act because approval
and land registration fees is prerequisite (JICA, 1993) process from LR committee be bureaucratic and
• Local authorities expand possible scope of time-consuming
redevelopment through cost sharing with landowners • The lack of financial support was costly causing depletion
(Schnidman, 1989) in LR funding account for just planning and replotting
design stages
4. When trust in LR association was high
4.1 Support of government policy • Consistency and determination of policy support • The weakness of policy support had an effect on the
from local gov' t or policy makers (Archer, 1990; credibility between parties involved
Schnidman, 1993) • Shift and promotion of high-rank official several times
• Completion not left to private owners who may resulted in changes of policy and budget plans
hold back land for speculation (Hayashi, 1982) • The management of the LR Association needs to be
transparent, equitable and rational
• Non-determined decision maker to authorize interim
financing left project completion unanticipated
Table 8.1: Survey findings for voluntary readjustment (continued)

137
In terms of the demand for serviced building sites, the findings indicate that
the landowners completely agreed to the concept of land redistribution for LR in
terms of providing road access, however did not decisively agreed to the provision of
park and open space, the reserved land, and other public utilities. There are many
reasons for the indecisiveness. For example, the landowners from the Nong Bua Mon
LR project appeared to question about the incredibility of selling the reserved land
from the management of LR association and the risk of large-scale development. The
landowners from the Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project had not been particularly
desired for provision of park and open space for concerning the nearby major park.
The landowners decisively planned for future residential uses on their lands have
been found to have higher level of demand for landfill. Therefore, the findings yield
some difference about demand for provision of land filling between landowners of
large plots and of small plots.
Secondly, the findings strongly indicate that potential increase in land value
generally motivated most of the landowners in the joint effort of cooperative LR
projects. It appears that small landowners concerned about joining in LR projects
because otherwise the low land value and unused plots would be subjected to buy-out
from developers. The landowners of large plots, on the other hand, focuses on the
large benefits of return generated from cooperation with LR project.
However, the study found it is difficult to proceed with project
implementation because landowners were willing to give up in the lower amount (11-
20 percent, on the average) of land contribution than requirement to make the projects

138
self-financing. The findings yield relatively lower amount of land contribution
compared to the estimate of land contribute rate (estimate of 26.11 percent for the
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR project and 23.15 percent for the Nong Bua Mon LR
project). Apparently, financial support from local government for LR projects
implemented in combination with arterial roads may secure project implementation.
This could be explained by the dominance of small plot size in the project
area and possession of a house somewhere else. The local characteristic of plot size
affects the demand for land reduction and the adjusted location. According to the
interview results, many small landowners repeated on the preference for relocation to
the back of the project area for reduction in the amount of partial land contribution.
For the case studies, being homeownership seems to affect the demand for initial
distribution of land rights in terms of allocation for public facilities less than required
to reduce the amount of land contribution. The socio-economic characteristic of being
homeownership or possession of a house found to influence the demand for initial
distribution of land rights in a negative way.
The other socio-economic characteristic, personal income, seems to affect the
demand for allocation in public facilities in a fairly positive way. It is found that the
landowners from the Nong Bua Mon LR project – Phase 1.1 who were the wealthiest
on the average agreed to the provision of park and open space, and land filling and
other public facilities in a higher level than those from other projects. They also
reported as being mostly the senior citizen whose previous occupation before
retirement was government service or housewife. The interview results indicate that

139
these items of demand for serviced building sites could be considered not necessary
for the lower income level.
Thirdly, under the circumstances of urban development in Bangkok, it appears
that high transaction costs associated with the exchange process have resulted in the
long delay of project implementation. The findings show that the lengthy delay for
progress was partly caused by all landowners’ agreements and strong opposition from
some landowners. The implementing bodies also have an effect on the delay with
particular regards to the weakness of policy support, the lack of financial support,
technical imperatives to the local officials, and the lengthy delay of enforcing legal
and procedural bases of LR.
To some extent, information accessibility might not be consistently enough to
facilitate recognition of LR and the negotiation process for landowners involvement
and to gain wider public understanding. With regards to the survey findings, the
information on the Act to facilitate recognition of LR for public understanding was
not widely announced to landowners. It appears that the newness of LR concept
which was critical at the beginning can be understood and eventually agreed upon by
landowners’ involvement in the projects. But, it was found that landowners’
participation in meetings was relatively weak on the average.
The results show that political process among the landowners was inherently
time-consuming and strong opposition from some landowners had slowed down the
projects. Most landowners’ complained about the time-consuming process in gaining
all landowners’ agreement when there were no related laws to facilitate the exchange

140
of LR system since the projects were initiated long before the 2004 LR Act. All
landowners’ agreements in the contractual LR arrangements were found to limit the
exchange process resulting in lengthy delay of implementation and increase of project
costs. The LR system is lack of powerful authority against minority of holdout
landowners.
Local officials and policy makers, to some extent, have not been influential in
reducing the lengthy delay for implementation. The interviews show that the
complexity of replotting design and method of land valuation was technical
imperatives to the local officials and reasons of inconsistency in arranging meetings.
The lack of financial support is found to add cost to and delay the LR
implementation. Moreover, it results in the depletion in the LR funding account. The
interview results report that the long delay of enforcing the legal and procedural bases
to allow the exchange by LR has burdened on the higher cost of projects and larger
amount of land contribution. It is found that the project system is not secured in the
lack of crucial legal system to allow the exchange of land rights.
Fourthly, it seems somewhat skeptical about sound management of the LR
Association which is central to the LR system. The question is about the sale
transaction of the reserved land for interim financing. The weakness of policy support
has an effect on trust between parties involved, for example, the shift of high-rank
officials to other positions which resulted on several changes in the policy and budget
plans, non-determination of decision makers to authorize the loans for interim
financing which left the LR project completion unanticipated, etc.

141
Analytical Conclusions
This section relates the findings to address the issue – whether the LR system
is a viable approach for financing urbanization in the case studies of LR projects in
the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The voluntary LR scheme adopted in the case
studies is regarded as a self-financing approach and successfully used in several
countries when applied under certain circumstances of urban areas. According to this
research, the demand for serviced building sites by means of LR is supported by a
majority of landowners in the case-study areas. The results of the research indicate
that the case-study areas are experiencing land development situations which could
gain landowners’ support characterized by “blind land” or untapped lands without
road access, fragmentation of land holdings, vacant land with small numbers of
existing buildings on the land, and small percentage of present utilization.
In particular, the survey findings provide that a majority of landowners is
willing to contribute partial land for locating public facilities. They did not decisively
agree to the provision of parks and open space, landfill, and the reserved land. There
were several reasons to explain about the indecisiveness, for example, the advantage
of existing location adjoining to a major park, the incredibility of the LR associations
in dealing with sale transaction of the reserved land, undecided plan for land
utilization in the future making costly land filling unnecessary, etc.
The survey findings strongly indicate that potential increase in land value
generally motivated most of the landowners in the joint effort of cooperative LR
projects. Due to the relatively low land price of “blind land”, the case-study areas

142
selected have potential profitable subdivision and conversion into serviced building
sites. It seems unlikely that private landowner alone can negotiate and conclude
several exchange transactions for opening up road access. The interview results
indicate that, otherwise, the plots would be left unused or bought up by developers or
landowners of adjoining plots with public road frontage at a very low price.
However, the study found it is difficult to proceed with project
implementation because landowners were willing to give up in the lower amount (11-
20 percent, on the average) of land contribution than requirement to make the projects
self-financing. This could be explained by the dominance of small plot size and
possession of a house. It has an implication on securing insufficient amount of land
for public purposes and the lengthy delay to reach agreement. The source of interim
financing was questioned along with the risk of large-scale mix-use development.
The interview indicates about the potential for implementation of LR projects in
accordance with arterial roads and financial support which result in the lower amount
of land contribution for landowners and make the projects financially viable.
Under the different circumstances of urban development in Bangkok, the
findings reflect that high transaction costs were associated with the exchange process
of the adopted LR system. Transaction costs were, to some extent, caused by
providing information accessibility inconsistently to landowners and to wider public.
Transaction costs associated with landowners’ understanding and involvement were
found. While landowners’ understanding could be gained by a majority of political
acceptance, involvement by participation in the meetings appeared to be relatively

143
weak. Transaction costs were found to be associated with strong opposition from
some landowners and all landowners’ agreement. It is apparent that powerful
authorities for compulsory land acquisition against minority of holdout landowners
could lower some transaction costs considerably.
The interview results indicate that transaction costs were caused by technical
imperatives to the local officials regarding the complexity of the replotting method.
The findings provide strong evidence that high transaction costs were associated with
the long delay of enforcing legal and procedural bases of LR to allow the exchange of
land rights, and the risk and uncertainty of interim financing to start implementation
stage. Even though loans were provided for interim financing, it is skeptical about
management of the LR association particularly the sale of the reserved land. The
weakness of policy support was found to have an effect on creditability or trust
between parties involved in project implementation.
Lastly, the research concludes that the LR system attempted to apply in the
case studies is very difficult to implement for Bangkok. The main limitations are a
lack of legal and procedural bases of LR, a lack of financial support, a lack of skillful
staff and sound management. In addition, it is suggested that policy makers and urban
planners consider compulsory land acquisition with risk and reward borne by the
landowners as one finds in Australia. It might work better under the conditions of
urban areas in Bangkok when a number of transaction costs are associated with the
exchange process and trust in the LR association is low. In this regards, the

144
alternative of LR for financing urbanization could be viably achieved to bring more
supply of land and public facilities to the urban areas.
Recommendations
The survey findings from the study address important issues for
recommendation to policy makers and future research directions. The research
identifies that government policy should support changes in institutional design
which can reduce transaction costs associated with the LR system. Under the
circumstances of developmental settings in Thailand; it is recommended that the
government undertake future LR projects compulsorily and subsidize the costs of
infrastructure as part of the responsibility in exchange for partial land contribution. In
other words, the local government can authorize full or partial subsidies by means of
implementation of the LR projects compulsorily in accordance with provision for
urban infrastructure, such as arterial roads. Since the case studies were overwhelmed
with the customary delay for interim financing both by the disposition of the reserved
land and unavailability of the loans, project implementation which make the
voluntary LR scheme completely self-financing is unlikely secured.
While the LR act has already allowed a redistribution of land rights, rules and
regulations should be designed to reduce transaction costs due to large numbers of
parties involved. The LR system should be designed to prevent conflict by means of
consultation with the landowners before compulsory binding as in the case of
Australia. It should provide an equitable legal framework for the landowners decide
to opt out of a project by selling their land for potential new residents or by giving

145
fair compensation and violence control in taking their land for roads and the reserved
land to recover project costs. The government agencies could purchase the land plots
to provide low-income housing. In addition, it should provide some incentives to
encourage land contribution from landowners in improving urban areas such as a
framework for risks and rewards borne by the landowners which is similar to the
business improvement districts in the United States. The delay in drafting of the legal
and procedural bases could be advantageous considering some local experience
gained. Modification of the property rights to LR system rather than direct
government action may lead to an efficient outcome in acquiring land for public
purposes at the later stage of urbanization.
Future research could explore how compulsory binding to the establishment
of land rights with regards to the local characteristics of land holdings affects the
viability of LR. It could investigate whether government subsidies influence the
political acceptance and success of the LR projects from the landowners’ perspective.
An empirical study of transaction costs associated with the exchange process should
receive particular attention from future research. For example, McCann’s study of
transaction costs incorporated various determinants and data on the time taken to
achieve agreements as a proxy for transaction costs, as a function of the institutional
changes experienced. A numbers of factors affecting the extent of transaction costs
associated with the exchange process discussed in this research and the time taken
could be analyze to determine institutional design to minimize transaction costs.

146
In addition, future research could focus on the perspective of landowners
about trust to engage in the exchange process affected by compulsory binding, the
reduction of risks and uncertainty associated with future sale of the reserved land, and
how trust would reduce transaction costs involved with negotiation. The further
exploration could result in a better recognition of positive transaction costs and
highlight of the economics of the institutions designed to lower them, thus leading to
a prescriptive scheme that might also be appropriate for implementation of LR
projects in other countries.

147
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akiguchi, M. (1997). Development of Land Readjustment and International
Cooperation, proceedings of the 9
th
International Seminar on Land
Readjustment and Urban Development in Bangkok, Thailand. November 12-
14, 1997.

Andrews T.P. (2002). The paper river revisited: a common property externality
exercise. The Journal of Economic Education. 33 (4): 327-335.

Archer, R.W. (1978). Land pooling for planned urban development in Perth, Western
Australia. Regional Studies 12: 397-408.

-------. (1980). Case study of a municipal land pooling project in Perth. Australian
Journal of Public Administration 39 (1): 70-88.

-------. (1982). Land pooling by local government for planned urban development in
Perth. In Land Readjustment: A Difference Approach to Financing
Urbanization. Doebele, W. ed. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 29-56.

-------. (1988). Land pooling for resubdivision and new subdivision in Western
Australia. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 47(2): 207-222.

-------. (1990). The prospect for urban land pooling/readjustment in Thailand, 2
nd

edition. HSD Working Paper No. 28. Bangkok: Asian Institute of Technology.

-------. (1993). Urban redevelopment with landowner participation using the land
pooling/readjustment technique. HSD Working Paper No. 44. Bangkok: Asian
Institute of Technology.

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, BMA. (2001). Land readjustment for urban
development of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (in Thai). Paper prepared for a
seminar of land readjustment on August 28, 2001.

-------. (2004). A study of land readjustment pilot project at Nong Bua Mon, Bangkok,
Thailand. (in Thai).

-------. (2006). Progress of Nong Bua Mon Pilot LR Project (in Thai). Report
prepared for a general meeting with landowners in June, 2006.

Bangkok Post. (1995). Growth hides rising poverty. Bangkok Post: Economic
Review, Year End 1995.

148

Bronger, D. (1985). Metropolitanization as a development problem of third world
countries: a contribution towards a definition of the concept. Applied
Geography and Development 26:71-97.
Browder, J.O., J.R. Bohland, and J.L. Scarpaci. (1995). Patterns of development on
the metropolitan fringe: urban fringe expansion in Bangkok, Jakarta, and
Santiago. Journal of the American Planning Association 61(3): 310-327.

Butler, M.R. and R.F. Garnett. (2003). Teaching the Coase theorem: Are we getting it
right? Atlantic Economic Journal 31 (2):133-150.

Car, D. (1976). The development game in Perth. The Developer (Sydney). 13(4):57-
71.

Chanond, C. (1997). The Thai National Housing Authority’s experience with land
readjustment for housing and new town development, proceedings of the 9
th

International Seminar on Land Readjustment and Urban Development in
Bangkok, Thailand. November 12-14, 1997.

Cheung, Steven N.S. (1990). On the New Institutional Economics. (Discussion Paper
Series No. 118). Hong Kong: Department of Economics, the University of
Hong Kong.

City Planning Association. (1995). City Planning Handbook. Tokyo: Ministry of
construction.

Coase, R.H. (1960). The problem of social cost. The Journal of Law and Economics 3
(October): 1-44.

-------. (1988). The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

-------. (1994). Essays on Economics and Economists. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Crone, T.M. (1983). Elements of an economic justification for municipal zoning.
Journal of Urban Economics 14: 168-183.

Delemeester, G., and J. Neral. (1995). Classroom experiments: To accompany
Taylor’s economics: A user’s guide. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Department of Town and Country Planning, DTCP. (2005).Land readjustment pilot
projects in 2005. Bangkok: DTCP.

149
------. (2002). Land readjustment for urban development (in Thai). Paper prepared for
a seminar of land readjustment on June 14, 2002.

DMUD, (2002). Land valuation method and replotting design (in Thai), project on
the Development of the Method of Urban Development (DMUD), Tamura, I.,
Nishimura, K., Phopattanachai, B., Sirimonkolvichaya, T., eds. Bangkok:
Department of Town and Country Planning in cooperation with Japan
International Cooperation Agency.

Doebele, W.A. (1982). Synopsis. In Land Readjustment: A Difference Approach to
Financing Urbanization. Doebele, W. ed. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
11-28.

Doebele, W.A., J. Matsubara and Y. Nishiyama. (1986). Conceptual models of land
readjustment. In Land readjustment, the Japanese system: a reconnaissance
and a digest, Minerbi L., P. Nakamura, K. Nitz and J. Yanai, eds. Boston,
MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. p. 81-96.

Douglas, M. (1995). Global interdependence and urbanization: planning for the
Bangkok mega-urban region. In The Mega-Urban Regions of Southeast Asia,
McGee and Robinson, eds. Canada: UBC Press, 45-77.

------. (2000). Mega-urban regions and world city formation: globalization, the
economic crisis and urban policy issues in Pacific Asia. Urban Studies.
37(12): 2315-2335.

Dowall, D.E. (1992). A second look at the Bangkok land and housing market,
Berkeley: Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of
California at Berkeley.

Ellickson, R.C. (1973). Alternatives to zoning: covenants, nuisance rules and fines as
land use controls, University of Chicago Law Review. 40 (Summer): 681-782.

Fischel, W.A. (1978). A property rights approach to municipal zoning. Land
Economics. 54 (February): 64-81.

------. (1979). Equity and efficiency aspects of zoning reform. Public Policy 27 (3):
301-331.

-------. (1985). The economics of zoning laws: a property rights approach. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

150
Fisher, A.C. and F.M. Peterson. (1976). The environment in economics: a survey.
Journal of Economic Literature 14 (March): 1-33.

Frank, R. and B. Bernanke. (2001). Principles of Microeconomics. Boston: McGraw-
Hill Irwin.
Friedmann, J. (2006). Four theses in the study of China’s urbanization. International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30 (2): 440-451.

Han, S.S. (1998). Real estate development in China: a regional perspective. Journal
of Real Estate Literature 6: 121-133.

Hayashi, K. (1982). Land readjustment in Nagoya. In Land Readjustment: A
Difference Approach to Financing Urbanization. Doebele, W. ed. Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books. 107-126.

Hazlett, D. (1995). An EPA-style auction of pollution permits. Classroom
Expernomics 4(1): 3-7.

Hoyt, G.M., P.R. Ryan, and R.G. Houston, Jr. (1999). The paper river: a
demonstration of externalities and Coase’s Theorem. The Journal of
Economic Education. 30 (2): 141-147.

Hwang, M.C. (1977). A search for low-cost land development technique,
International Conference on Low Income Housing-Technology and Policy,
Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, June 1977.

Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA. (1993). The study on application
scheme of land readjustment in national urban development trust of Thailand,
final report. In corporation with Yachiyo Engineering Co., Ltd. (July).

------. (1999). The first draft of land readjustment design and land readjustment
implementation of BMA land readjustment pilot project at Nong Bua Mon,
Bangkok, Thailand. (November).

Japan Land Readjustment Association. (1983). Tochi Kukaku Seiri Jigyo no Doko to
Kongo no Kadai (Trends for land readjustment projects and their future
themes). Tokyo: Kagaikyoshitsu-Sha.

------. (1986). Statistical information and tables, translation and summary by Jane
Yanai. In Land readjustment, the Japanese system: a reconnaissance and a
digest, Minerbi L., P. Nakamura, K. Nitz and J. Yanai, eds. Boston, MA:
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 216-243.

151
Japanese Land Readjustment Association. (1996). Urban development project in
Japan. Japan: City Bureau, Ministry of Construction.

Kaothien, U. and D. Webster. (1998). New regional development models for Thailand
in the context of decentralization and globalization. Paper presented to the
Global Forum on Regional Development Policy, United Nations Center for
Regional Development, Nagoya (December).

Kim, I.J., M.C. Hwang and W. Doebele. (1982). Land readjustment in South Korea.
In Land Readjustment: A Difference Approach to Financing Urbanization.
Doebele, W. ed. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 127-174.

Kitay, M.G. (1985). Land acquisition in Developing Countries: policy and procedure
of the public sector. Oelgeschlager, Gunn& Hain in association with the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Kuppers, H. and Y. Nishiyama. Selected European land readjustment experiences,
summary by Peter Nakamura. In Land readjustment, the Japanese system: a
reconnaissance and a digest, Minerbi L., P. Nakamura, K. Nitz and J. Yanai,
eds. Boston, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. p. 33-39.

Lai, L.W. (1998). Zoning and property rights: a Hong Kong case study. (2
nd
edition).
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Larsson, G (1993). Land readjustment: a modern approach to urbanization. England:
Avebury Publishing Ltd.

Lee, T.I. (1997). The contributions and limitations of land readjustment in Korea’s
urban development, proceedings of the 9
th
International Seminar on Land
Readjustment and Urban Development in Bangkok, Thailand. Nov 12-14,
1997.

Liebmann, G.W. (1998). Land readjustment for America: a proposal for a statue.
Boston, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper.

Lichfield, Whiting, Bowne and Associates. (1960). Greater Bangkok Plan 2533. New
York.

McCann, L. (2004). Induced institutional innovation and transaction costs: the case of
the Australian National Native Title Tribunal. Review of Social Economy. 62
(1): 67-82.

McCloskey, D.N. (1998). The so-called Coase Theorem. Eastern Economic Journal.
24(3), 367-371.

152

McGee, T.G. (1995). Metrofitting the emerging mega-urban regions of ASEAN: an
overview. In The Mega-Urban Regions of Southeast Asia, McGee and
Robinson, eds. Canada: UBC Press, 3-26.

MIT Consultants Team. (1993). Strategic Planning for Metropolitan Bangkok, final
report-phase III. Submitted to City Planning Division Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration, Thailand. Unpublished Report (December).

------. (1996). The Bangkok Plan: A Vision for the Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration Area, 1995-2005. Prepared through a collaborative effort of
the BMA Department of City Planning, the MIT Consulting Team and the
EC/BMA Project Team. Unpublished Report (January).

Miyazawa, M. (1982). Land readjustment in Japan. In Land Readjustment: A
Difference Approach to Financing Urbanization. Doebele, W. ed. Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books. 91-106.

Nagano, K. (1994). Land readjustment implementation manual. Bangkok:
Department of Town and Country Planning.

Nagoya City Planning Bureau. (1982). Introduction to land readjustment practice.
Nagoya, Japan: City of Nagoya.

------. (1986). Land readjustment practice. In Land readjustment, the Japanese
system: a reconnaissance and a digest, Minerbi L., P. Nakamura, K. Nitz and
J. Yanai, eds. Boston, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 97-130.

Nakamura, P. (1986). A legislative history of land readjustment. In Land
readjustment, the Japanese system: a reconnaissance and a digest, Minerbi
L., P. Nakamura, K. Nitz and J. Yanai, eds. Boston, MA: Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy. 17-32.

Nelson, R.H. (1977). Zoning and Property Rights. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Nishiyama, Y. (1980). Historical analysis of land consolidation in Nagoya-Urban
mosaic of private land consolidation projects. A paper given at International
Conference on Planning and Management of Metropolitan Regions in
Nagoya, Japan. October 22-29.

------. (1987). Kukaku-Seiri (Land Readjustment): A Japanese land development
technique. Land Assembly and Development. 1 (1): 1-14.

153

North, C.D. (1995). Five propositions about institutional change. In Explaining Social
Institutions, J. Knight and I. Sened, eds. University of Michigan Press, 15-26.

Nugent, R. (1993). Pollution rights trading game. Classroom Expernomics 2 (2): 3-5.

------. (1997). A pollution rights trading game. Economic Inquiry. 35 (3): 679-685.

Pigou, A.C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare, 4
th
ed. London: Macmillan.

Pornchokchai, S. (1985). 1020 Bangkok slums (in Thai). A research study of the
School of Urban Community Research and Actions. Bangkok: Center for
Japanese Volunteers in Thailand.

Qu, F. T., N. Heerink, and W.M. Wang. (1995). Land administration reform in China.
Land Use Policy 12(3): 193-203.

Rabibhadana, A. (1993). Rise and fall of a Bangkok slum (in Thai). Bangkok: Amarin
Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd.

Robinson, I.M. (1995). Emerging spatial patterns in ASEAN mega-urban regions;
alternative strategies. In The Mega-Urban Regions of Southeast Asia, McGee
and Robinson, eds. Canada: UBC Press, 78-108.

Samuelson, P.A. (1955). Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure.
Review of Economics and Statistics 36: 350-356.

------. (1958). Aspects of public expenditure theories. Review of Economics and
Statistics (November): 332-338.

Satoh, T. (1986). Land readjustment problems in implementation and representation.
In Land readjustment, the Japanese system: a reconnaissance and a digest,
Minerbi L., P. Nakamura, K. Nitz and J. Yanai, eds. Boston, MA: Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy. 150-160.

Schnidman, F. (1989). Financing land readjustment, proceedings of the 5
th

International Seminar on Land Readjustment and Urban Development in
Kuala Lumpur, Singapore.

------. (1993). Institutional matters concerning land readjustment: educating and
organizing landowners to participate in land readjustment, proceedings of the
7
th
International Seminar on Land Readjustment and Urban Development in
Bali, Indonesia.

154
Seele, W. (1982). Land readjustment in the Federal Republic of Germany. In Land
Readjustment: A Difference Approach to Financing Urbanization. Doebele,
W. ed. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. p. 175-206.

Setchell, C.A. (1991). Urban transportation in Thailand: a review and evaluation of
policy and research needs. Unpublished report to the International
Development Research Center and the Chulalongkorn University Social
Research Institute, Bangkok.

Siegan, B.H. (1972). Land Use without Zoning. Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington.

Socio-Economic Consultants, SEC. (1994). Study of options for financing
infrastructure expansion phase II, final report. Submitted to Office of The
National Economic and Social Development Board, Thailand. (February).

Sorensen, A. (1999). Land readjustment, urban planning and urban sprawl in the
Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Urban Studies 36(13): 2333-2360.

Stigler, G.J. (1966). The Theory of Price, 3
rd
ed. New York: Macmillan.
Stodder, J. (1996). An experiment on externality rights. Classroom Expernomics 5(1):
5-7.

Tamano Consultants. (2000). Land readjustment project implementation course: land
readjustment planning and implementation plan. Japan: Tamano Consultants.

Tokunaka, Y. (1997). The legal system of land readjustment in Japan: its social
background and developing process, proceedings of the 9
th
International
Seminar on Land Readjustment and Urban Development in Bangkok,
Thailand. November 12-14, 1997.

United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).
(1988). Human Settlements Atlas for Asia and The Pacific, Part III. Bangkok:
United Nations.

Webster, C. and L.W. Lai. (2003). Property Rights, Planning and Markets:
Managing Spontaneous Cities. MA.: Edward Elgar.

World Bank. (1997). World Development Report 1997. Washington, DC: World
Bank.

------. (2000).
http://www.Inweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/Thailand0900/$
File/Thailand.pdf

155
The objectives of the questionnaire are to 1) examine the socio-economic and local characteristics of landowners and;
2) examine landowners' attitudes toward Land Readjustment and some problems during the process.
This research study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board -Human Subjects in Research, University of Southern California. For research-related questions
regarding subjects' rights, you can contact the University Park Institutional Review Board (UPIRB) through Dr. Marlene S. Wagner, UPIRB Chair, Office of the Vice Provost for Research
at +1(213) 740-6709 (email: upirb@usc.edu). You may also contact Salinee Sukolratanametee, the student investigator, at King Mongkut's Institute of Technology Ladkrabang,
Department of Urban and Regional Planning at 0-2280-1290 (email: sukolrat@usc.edu) with regards to any questions concerning the study. Salinee's Dissertation Committee Chair,
Professor Harry Richardson, can be reached at +1(213) 740-3954 (email: hrichard@usc.edu).
PART 1: About yourself and your land plot(s). Please answer all questions in this part.
1 Your present residence: Self own Family's own
Rent
2 Are you presently: Unemployed Employed Retired
3 Present ccupation or before retirement:
Government service State Enterprise Employee
Self-employed Entrepreneur Housewife
Others (please specify) ..............................................
4 Education Level Lower than high school High school Vocational Certificate/Diploma
Bachelor's degree Master's degree Doctorate degree
5 Personal Income/ Month less than 10,000 Baht 10,000 to 29,999 Baht
30,000 to 49,999 Baht 50,000 to 69,999 Baht
70,000 to 99,999 Baht 100,000 Baht and over
6 The size of your land plot(s) is/are ……………………….. Sq. Wa, or ………………………. Rai.
7 What are the existing poor conditions of infrastructure on your land? Please check all that apply:
No access road (or frontage) to the land Lacking public utilities (water supply, electricity, etc.)
Poor access road (narrow, bad surface, crooked, etc.) Others (please specify) ................................................
8 Is there any existing building or structure on your land?
No
Yes, what kind of building or structure? 1-2 storey wooden house 1-2 storey building
Others (please specify) ........................................
9 How are you using the land at present?
Not using For housing For business For rent/ lease
For farming Others (please specify) .........................................
PART 2: There are statements in this part that you may agree or disagree with. Please record the first impression that
occurs to you and answer every statement.
Strongly Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
10 Land readjustment can provide my land plot with access road
connecting to road network system.
11 Provision of park and open space will bring good environment
to this area.
12 It is necessary to reserve some land plots for sale to recover
the project cost.
13 Land fill, drainage and other public utility works are necessary
on my land.
14 I can expect for an increase of land value created by the joint
effort of Land Readjustment.
Please continue on the reverse side of this survey
APPENDIX A
THE QUESTIONNAIRES

156
PART 3: Your opinion about Land Readjustment and problems during the process. Please answer all questions in this part.
15 Is the calculation of land value for your plot(s), both before and after the readjustment, trustworthy?
No Yes Don't know/ Not sure
16 Are the location and reduced land of your replotting plot acceptable?
No Yes Don't know/ Not sure
17 Which is the appropriate amount for your land contribution to achieve successful implementation of Land
Readjustment project in your area?
11-20% of land contribution, providing arterial and access roads, expected increase of land value is fair
21-30% of land contribution focusing on residents' sense of community, expected increase of land value is high
31-40% of land contribution, providing land for other services such as shopping center, school, hospital, etc.,
expected increase of land value is very high
18 Have you been informed about establishment of the 2004 Land Readjustment Act?
No
Yes, how did you come by this information? The BMA officials Newspaper/ Television/ Radio
Others (please specify) …………….………...………….....
19 According to the Act, implementation of a project requires 2/3 of landowners' agreements both in the number and
the area. Do you agree with the requirement?
No Yes Not sure
20 Do you think you understand the Land Readjustment system and its process?
No Yes Not sure
21 Do you consider Land Readjustment as an applicable way of improving "blind land" in your area?
No Yes Not sure
22 How often do you join the meetings of landowners in implementing of the project?
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently
23 Will you be committed to participate in the project upon enactment of legal and procedural bases for Land
Readjustment?
No commitment Positively committed
commitment on the condition that it gets a majority of landowners' consent
24 Will you participate in the project if taxes and land registration fees are not exempted?
No Yes Not sure
25 Would you finally join your land with other landowners in cooperative Land Readjustment project by means of partial
land contribution for roads, parks and the reserved land?
No Yes Not sure
26 How are you going to use the land in the future?
No plan Sell it out
Use it for housing Develop it for residential/ commercial project
Use it for family business Others (please specify) …………….......................
PART 4: Comments and suggestions.
27 Please make any additional comments regarding any related issues that you have been asked in this questionnaire.
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE !
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid envelope
To: Salinee Sukolratanametee, 210 Krung Kasem Road, Bangkunprom, Pranakorn, Bangkok 10200 NB-1

157
PART 1: About yourself and your land plot(s). Please answer all questions in this part.
1 Your present residence: Self own 1 Family's own 2
Rent 3
2 Are you presently: Unemployed 0 Employed 1 Retired 2
3 Present ccupation or before retirement:
Government service 1 State Enterprise 2
Employee 3 Self-employed 4
Entrepreneur 5 Housewife 6
Others (please specify)…... 7
4 Education Level Lower than high school 1 High school 2
Vocational Certificate/Diploma 3 Bachelor's degree 4
Master's degree 5 Doctorate degree 6
5 Personal Income/ Month less than 10,000 Baht 1 10,000 to 29,999 Baht 2
30,000 to 49,999 Baht 3 50,000 to 69,999 Baht 4
70,000 to 99,999 Baht 5 100,000 Baht and over 6
6 The size of your land plot(s) is/are ……………………….. Sq. Wa, or ………………………. Rai.
Less than 200 sq.wa 1 1,200-1,999 sq.wa 5
200-399 sq.wa 2 2,000-3,999 sq.wa 6
400-799 sq.wa 3 4,000-7,999 sq.wa 7
800-1,199 sq.wa 4 8,000 sq.wa and over 8
7 What are the existing poor conditions of infrastructure on your land? Please check all that apply:
No access road (or frontage) to the land 1 Lacking public utilities (water supply, electricity) 3
Poor access road (narrow, bad surface, crooked) 2 Multiple poor conditions chosen 4
8 Is there any existing building or structure on your land?
No 0
Yes, what kind of building or structure? 1-2 storey wooden house 1 1-2 storey building 2
Others (garage, storage, etc.) 3
9 How are you using the land at present?
Not using 0 For housing 1 For business 2
For rent/ lease 3 For farming 4 Others (please specify) ..... 5
PART 2: There are statements in this part that you may agree or disagree with. Please record the first impression that
occurs to you and answer every statement.
Strongly Agree Not Sure Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
10 Land readjustment can provide my land plot with access road
connecting to road network system. 5 4 3 2 1
11 Provision of park and open space will bring good environment
to this area. 5 4 3 2 1
12 It is necessary to reserve some land plots for sale to recover
the project cost. 5 4 3 2 1
13 Land fill, drainage and other public utility works are necessary
on my land. 5 4 3 2 1
14 I can expect for an increase of land value created by the joint
effort of Land Readjustment. 5 4 3 2 1
APPENDIX B
SCORE ASSIGNMENT

158
PART 3: Your opinion about Land Readjustment and problems during the process. Please answer all questions in this part.
15 Is the calculation of land value for your plot(s), both before and after the readjustment, trustworthy?
No 0 Yes 1 Don't know/ Not sure 2
16 Are the location and reduced land of your replotting plot acceptable?
No 0 Yes 1 Don't know/ Not sure 2
17 Which is the appropriate amount for your land contribution to achieve successful implementation of Land
Readjustment project in your area?
11-20% of land contribution, providing arterial and access roads, expected increase of land value is fair 1
21-30% of land contribution focusing on residents' sense of community, expected increase of land value is high 2
31-40% of land contribution, providing land for other services such as shopping center, school, hospital, etc.,
expected increase of land value is very high 3
18 Have you been informed about establishment of the 2004 Land Readjustment Act?
No 0
Yes, how did you come by this information? The BMA officials 1
Newspaper/ Television/ Radio 2
Others (multiple sources chosen) 3
19 According to the Act, implementation of a project requires 2/3 of landowners' agreements both in the number and
the area. Do you agree with the requirement?
No 0 Yes 1 Not sure 2
20 Do you think you understand the Land Readjustment system and its process?
No 0 Yes 1 Not sure 2
21 Do you consider Land Readjustment as an applicable way of improving "blind land" in your area?
No 0 Yes 1 Not sure 2
22 How often do you join the meetings of landowners in implementing of the project?
Never 0 Rarely 1 Sometimes 2 Frequently 3
23 Will you be committed to participate in the project upon enactment of legal and procedural bases for Land
Readjustment?
No commitment 0 Positively committed 1
commitment on the condition that it gets a majority of landowners' consent 2
24 Will you participate in the project if taxes and land registration fees are not exempted?
No 0 Yes 1 Not sure 2
25 Would you finally join your land with other landowners in cooperative Land Readjustment project by means of partial
land contribution for roads, parks and the reserved land?
No 0 Yes 1 Not sure 2
26 How are you going to use the land in the future?
No plan 0 Sell it out 3
Use it for housing 1 Develop it for residential/ commercial project 4
Use it for family business 2 other ( Lease it) 5
Other (Multiple utilization chosen) 6
PART 4: Comments and suggestions.
27 Please make any additional comments regarding any related issues that you have been asked in this questionnaire.
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE !
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed postage-paid envelope
To: Salinee Sukolratanametee, 210 Krung Kasem Road, Bangkunprom, Pranakorn, Bangkok 10200 NB-1

159

Statistics
14 14 14 14
0 0 0 0
80 79 80 80
0 1 0 0
18 16 18 18
0 2 0 0
Valid
Missing
N
Valid
Missing
N
Valid
Missing
N
project
NB 1.1
NB 1.2
SR
co-operation
with other
landowners
trustworthy of
land valuation
before and
after LR
acceptability
of replotted
plot
land
utilization in
the future

Statistics
14 13 14 14 12 14 13
0 1 0 0 2 0 1
77 76 78 78 79 79 79
3 4 2 2 1 1 1
17 18 18 18 18 16 18
1 0 0 0 0 2 0
Valid
Missing
N
Valid
Missing
N
Valid
Missing
N
project
NB 1.1
NB 1.2
SR
lot size
(sq.
wa)
condition
of
infrastruc
ture
existing
building
on the
land
land
utilization
at
present
status
of
residen
ce
present
employ
ment
occupa
tion
APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OUTPUT

Frequencies Output

160

Statistics
14 13 14 14 14 14
0 1 0 0 0 0
80 78 80 80 79 79
0 2 0 0 1 1
18 17 17 18 18 17
0 1 1 0 0 1
Valid
Missing
N
Valid
Missing
N
Valid
Missing
N
project
NB 1.1
NB 1.2
SR
info. on
LR Act
of 2004
requirement
of 2/3 of
landowners'
agreements
understand
LR system
and its
process
applicable
to improve
your area
commit to
participate
upon
enactment
tax and
land
registr.
fees

Frequencies Output

Means Output

Descriptive Statistics
12 1 5 39 3.25 .446 1.545
13 1 6 52 4.00 .555 2.000
11
77 1 6 301 3.91 .146 1.279
76 1 6 219 2.88 .159 1.385
73
18 1 5 60 3.33 .323 1.372
17 1 6 51 3.00 .364 1.500
17
Education level
Personal income
Valid N (listwise)
Education level
Personal income
Valid N (listwise)
Education level
Personal income
Valid N (listwise)
project
NB 1.1
NB 1.2
SR
Stat Stat Stat Stat Stat
Std.
Error Stat
N Min. Max. Sum Mean
Std.
Deviati

161

Descriptive Statistics
14 4 5 66 4.71 .13 .469
14 3 5 56 4.00 .15 .555
14 3 5 55 3.93 .16 .616
14 3 5 56 4.00 .15 .555
14 3 5 60 4.29 .16 .611
14
80 2 5 378 4.73 .06 .551
80 1 5 306 3.83 .09 .792
80 1 5 304 3.80 .09 .833
80 1 5 306 3.83 .09 .792
80 1 5 341 4.26 .09 .775
80
18 3 5 84 4.67 .14 .594
17 1 5 62 3.65 .26 1.057
17 1 5 69 4.06 .26 1.088
17 1 5 67 3.94 .26 1.088
17 3 5 75 4.41 .17 .712
16
Access road connecting
to road network
Provision of park and
open space
Necessity of reserved
land
Neccesity of land fill,
drainage and utilities
Expected increase of
land value
Valid N (listwise)
Access road connecting
to road network
Provision of park and
open space
Necessity of reserved
land
Neccesity of land fill,
drainage and utilities
Expected increase of
land value
Valid N (listwise)
Access road connecting
to road network
Provision of park and
open space
Necessity of reserved
land
Neccesity of land fill,
drainage and utilities
Expected increase of
land value
Valid N (listwise)
project
NB 1.1
NB 1.2
SR
Stat Stat Stat Stat Stat
Std.
Error Stat
N Min. Max. Sum Mean
Std.
Devi

Means Output

162
Individual Remarks in Questionnaires (collected in Thai and translated in English)
Respondents Remarks
Suan Luang Rama 9 LR Project
1 I am a representative of 5 other land plots which are tied up with the family's will.
2 The project should be completed quickly because it already took 4-5 years with no
progress.
3 (i) I am unable to fix existing building deterioration in my land because it will be
pulled down once the LR project is authorized and compensation cost for demolition
of building was already evaluated.
(ii) I need updating news from the BMA regularly.
4 Confidence in government agencies affects landowners' participation
Nong Bua Mon LR Project (Phase 1.1)
1 (i) I am a retired officer and I am always willing to cooperate with government sectors.
(ii) there has been unequal treatment between the rich and the poor.
2 My question is about the sale of the reserved land whether it will be for the seller's
interest.
3 (i) Location of the replotted plot is undesirble to the original plot which is adjacent to
the canal.
(ii) LR project is a good idea. I attended the seminar and tour about LR in Japan. But,
there are difficulties of implementation and long delay resulting from the newness to
both Thai landowners and staff.
(iii) Determination of policy support for implementation of LR from policy maker is
vital to be publicly accepted country-wide.
4 (i) Large numbers of landowners do not understand the LR Act and its process.
They do not know about responsible organization to contact, project costs and fees.
(ii) A total of 100 rai in this area including mine are blockaded from accessibility to
any access roads because some real estate develpers bought up all land
in the surrounding area.
5 Landowners of large plot take advantage of small plots. Thus, I do not agree with
the requirement of "2/3 of landowners' agreements in the area", but I agree with "2/3
of landowners' agreements in the number". This is unfair to small landowners
because the requirement will allow large landowner of majority in area to develop
for self interest and promote capitalism, not public's interest.
APPENDIX D
INDIVIDUAL REMARKS IN QUESTIONNAIRES

163
Respondents Remarks
Nong Bua Mon LR Project (Phase 1.2)
1 Large plots are of advantageous. The corner plots after LR gain more than the ones
with one-side street access. There are likely bias treatment favoring some parties.
2 I agree with LR under the condition that it treats all income groups fairly.
3 I need to gain confidence about land contribution for some public facilities and
whether replotted plot will be desirable.
4 (i) The difficult remains for implementation because large numbers of landowners
do not co-operate. They are afraid of a disadvantage and inequity.
(ii) Most landowners are rich. No difficulties for leaving their land undeveloped.
5 I need completion of the project quickly. Although I have a small plot, I am willing to
take responsible for appropriate charge of taxes and fees.
6 Constraint of land development is that large numbers of landowners do not
co-operate since information on LR is insufficient.
7 (i) Government policy on Land Readjustment has not been articulated clearly.
(ii) Question is about control of development after the readjustment.
8 I need the improvement of poor access from any government sectors for thriving
community and landowners' benefit. It cannot be solved alone.
9 I always attended meetings and keep myself follow-up. However, there has been no
activities from the BMA after 3-4 meetings were held 4 years ago.
10 Several meetings were held but no decision was made because it was very
disadvantageous to landowners.
11 (i) The project should be completed quickly. It already took 5 years but no progress.
(ii) My family occupies about 80 rai in this area.
12 (i) Landowners of large plots take advantage of small plots.
(ii) The project should be completed quickly.
13 In Thailand, landowners of large plots take advantage of small plots.
14 (i) The first priority of concern is about fair amount of land contribution to everyone.
(ii) Justice and no corruption are necessary for the implementing bodies.
15 I need updating news regularly.

164
Respondents Remarks
16 It is government's duty to sincerely develop urban areas for public's interest, not for
someone's own people.
17 I never attended meetings, please inform me if any meetings coming up.
18 The project should be completed quickly. It has been long delayed. It need
determination for implementation of LR.
19 (i) I observed from meetings that most landowners do not understand LR process.
(ii) It is unacceptable for small landowners to contribute large portion of land to be
reserved for sale. In fact, it is quite too much concerning their very small plots.
(iii) Exemption of tax and fees is rational for landowners whom already contribute
partial land for public services. There should be no charges to landowners because
implementing bodies can gain a lot more from selling the reserved land than can
co-operative landowners.
20 The project has been long delayed and the government is relatively, overly taking
advantage of landowners. That is why it has never been settled.
21 (i) I would like to join in cooperative LR project by contributing partial land for road
solely. The amount of contribution for landowners should not exceed 3%. The
government must subsidize the project as they can increase revenues from
collecting taxes from the new development.
(ii) The government is taking up too much reserved land from the landowners. That
is why most landowners do not cooperate. Free from corruption are necessary for
implementing bodies.
(iii) It can be very easy and fast to implement the LR project by declaring land
expropriation Act in the area for only access roads to all plots. The land should,
of course, be taken with compensation.
22 I agree with the development if it is for public's interest, thriving communities,
residents' welfare and safety.
23 It should be developed without influential politicians.
24 The problem is that there are majority of small plots in the area which will get much
smaller plots to accommodate future utilization after the readjustment. In most cases,
small landowners ended up selling out their plots at a much lower price to adjacent
plots which have accessibility to street. Thus, LR could unlikely happen.
25 (i) LR design for access roads may not necessarily be straight line.
(ii) Landowner whose plot is currently accessible to road should be compensated
for opening up the pocket land for all plots being blockaded.

165
The interview was conducted in Thai and translated in English
Respondent # 1
1. Local characteristics
The property was inherited as family asset for more than 20 years
My family's land holdings are about 32 rai (50%) in this area.
Many years ago, the property had been surrounded by canal that connected to
Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road which was also a canal. We used to commute by
small boat. The land used to have accessed to canal and was once utilized for
agricultural purpose.
I have several rental shacks and my house on the land. There is no trouble
continuing to live here on montly rent. However, infrastructure improvement would
create comfortable life.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Main street is too large to accommodate the residential area.
Provision of a community park is not necessary for the residents because the
location is in front of a major park already. The BMA has designed to provide a
playground for the community instead.
Agreement to land contribution
Amount of land contribution should not exceed 20%.
Agreement to land valuation
Land valuation is acceptable.
Agreement to the replotting design
The front accessibility of my replotted plot is too narrow to construct a building. It
need to be wider.
3. Opposition from some landowners
There are strong opposition from a family against the BMA while most other
land holders eventually consent to the project.
They participate in the meetings but do not agree with the concept of land
contribution.
4. Local officials and policy makers
The BMA officials performed very well.
Recently, the meeting has been postponed for nearly 2 years.I participated in
most of the meetings except on the weekend.
The issues of the discussion never have been progressed. The meeting has not
been held constantly enough to provide information.
5. Legal system and financial support
The longer the delay of legal and procedural draft, the higher the increase of
construction materials and project costs.
APPENDIX E
THE INTERVIEWS

166
Respondent # 2
1. Local characteristics
I represent my daughter who has been working in the other country.
I bought the property for her about a couple years ago.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Main street is too large to necessarily accommodate the residential area.
Agreement to land contribution
This has been an issue of discussion in every meeting. I think amount of land
contribution should not exceed 15%. I thought of purchasing more land but the
calculated land value is very high after the replotting design.
Agreement to land valuation
I don't know. I just attended the meetings after the purchase of land.
Agreement to the replotting design
The front of my replotted plot is too narrow to construct a building. It needs to be
wider, at least 16 meters.
I want to relocate my land to the back of the project area for lower amount of land
contribution, but it depends on the decision of major land holder.
3. Opposition from some landowners
I am not sure about this.
4. Local officials and policy makers
The BMA officials we contact with, has handled the meetings quite well.
The project has been well-planned, but it will take quite some time for further
progress and achievement.
There is no progress in the past meetings.
5. Legal system and financial support
I don't know that this area is undergoing improvement by the LR project until the land
was purchased. It should be publicly announced by the LR Act.
Future Plan
Future utilization has not been decided yet, probably using it for housing.

167
Respondent # 3
1. Local characteristics
There are approximately 10 existing houses in this area including mine. I have an
access to a parking on the other side of the canal where there is a bridge to walk
across the canal to my home. In an emergency, it was troublesome to move my
old mother to ride in an ambulance which could not directly reach my house.
Most land in this area used to be tied up with the family's will. Nowadays, some land
had been subdivided into small plots and sold.
Long time ago, the area was utilized for agricultural purpose.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
It has been very tough living on the land which is inaccessible to street. I strongly
agree with provision of all the public facilities.
Agreement to land contribution
The contribution rate is about 20%. However, small landowners gain not enough
confidence in land contribution from the government sector.
Agreement to land valuation
It is acceptable because the Department of land valuation confirmed that land value
will increase as calculated by Street Method of Valuation.
Agreement to the replotting design
I attended meetings regularly. The meetings are going in circle. They are all about
adjusting replotting design to satisfy every single landowners.
3. Opposition from some landowners
Some landowners whose plots are going to be accessible to streets which are also
at the entrance of project area may not participate. It is understandable since their
plots are not equipped with poor conditions of infrastructure.
4. Local officials and policy makers
The only activitity that had been held is the local meetings which were inconsistent
sometimes only once or twice a year.
Up to their limit, the local officers has been able to handle and make decision very
well. But, the higher-rank officials were afraid to make big decision about authorizing
to use the LR fund account.
5. Legal system and financial support
Since an LR fund account was established to support the project financially, why
don't we borrow money from the account for contruction of public road in the area, as
it is supposed to? There might be more landowners in a wider area participated.
I wonder if the Act will legitimately be enforced.
Future Plan
When the project is completed, I have no plan to continue living on this land but sell
it out. Small landowners do not have money to build a new house on the replotted
plots. I can have some money left from the sale to buy a cheaper land and be able to
build a new house.
As far as I know, most small landowners want to sell their land after project
completion whereas larger landowners have not yet made decision until the outcome
is yielded.

168
Respondent # 4
1. Local characteristics
The property was inherited as family asset for more than 10 years, but it belongs to
my family for one hundred years.
The property has no accessibility to road for more than 10 yeas after Chalerm Prakiat
Rama 9 Road has been constructed. Before that, the property has accessibility to
canal that connected to Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road which was also a canal. The
land was once utilized for farming.
I have several rental shacks for workers of the central park. My house is the biggest.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Infrastructure improvement would create comfortable life. The present condition has
been very uncomfortable.
Main arterial road from the replotting design which is 12-meter width is too large to
accommodate the residential area.
Provision of park or playground is not necessary in this community.
Agreement to land contribution
At the beginning, some landowners do not undertand LR and opposed to land
contribution. Eventually most landowners agree if every plot contributes land equally.
I think the appropriate amount of land contribution should not exceed 20%.
Agreement to land valuation
Land valuation for my original plot before LR is a little low.
Agreement to the replotting design
My family holds 30 land plots in this area currently. These plots were fragmented
since some family members sold their share of land. The replotting design of LR
would gather these remaining plots together.
My preference is relocation to the back of project area for lower land contribution.
3. Opposition from some landowners
One landowner file legal proceedings against the BMA because his land contribution
is higher than others.
4. Local officials and policy makers
In 2002, there was an invitation from the BMA to participate in LR and meetings were
held for about 4-5 years. Participation in meetings was strong once everyone
understands the LR concept. But, participation has declined in recent years since
the meetings were not held constantly and there is no progress in the topics of
discussion. I am willing to continue to participate for public's benefit.
The local officers has tried hard to handle the negotiation with landowners who
opposed by arranging focus-group meetings. But, it has not been settled.
5. Legal system and financial support
The longer the delay of legal and procedural draft, the higher the increase of
construction materials and project costs. I need completion of the project quickly.
Information about the LR Act has not been clearly explained.

169
Respondent # 5
1. Local characteristics
The property is bought 20 years ago. Due to our Chinese tradition, we planned to
have our extended family on the property.
However, we are not using the property currently because all family members are
already homeownership.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Agreement with the infrastructure improvement in this area which will increase
utilization of land and benefit every landowner.
Agreement to land contribution
Preference for relocation to the back of project area for lower land contribution.
Agreement to land valuation
Not sure.
Agreement to the replotting design
It depends on the major land holders in this area. Most of small holders co-operate
with the project.
3. Opposition from some landowners
I participated in the meetings whenever I had time. There is not much progress
because of strong oppositions from some major land holders. It may be that there is
no urgent need for land utilization and, as a matter of fact, large landowners might
purchase land for speculation.
4. Local officials and policy makers
I appreciate all the job the BMA has done, but they should start to implement a real
project.
5. Legal system and financial support
I am tired of long delay without progress.
It is necessary to have an influential leader in order to progress.

170
Respondent # 6
1. Local characteristics
The property is by inheritance for more than 10 years.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Agreement with the wideness of main arterial road since the area is planned for
mix-use development.
Agreement to land contribution
The large amount of land contribution (25%) is acceptable because land value after
LR will increase significantly.
Agreement to land valuation
The valuation method is complicated, however it is acceptable due to formal approval
by the Department of land valuation.
Agreement to the replotting design
There have been changes many times for the replotting plan. At least now we can
see the progress how we could relocate and how the future plan would look like.
3. Opposition from some landowners
I participated in the meetings frequently. Opposition from some landowners had been
the major constraint.
The LR committee should be more flexible to move the project ahead.
As the negotiation has taken so long, the opportunities have started to walk away.
4. Local officials and policy makers
From the beginning, many people disagreed because of the new method of
development. It might be quite complicated to understand.
When a late-60s lady attended a meeting invited for the first time, she disagreed to
join the project with the reason that she wanted to keep the land for her children.
After full explanation in the detail, she agreed that the participation will increase the
value of her land. That is how she co-operates with the project
Since the high-rank official who is in charge of the decision making has gained
no knowledge and understanding about LR. There cannot be any progress from the
local officials.
The government should fully step in because it will benefit the country in economic
and social aspects as well as transportation system. This project should be set up
as a good example for future land development areawide in order to increase land
utilization.
5. Legal system and financial support
At least the start of landfill for road construction will be able to ensure people that the
future is creditable. Strong participation in the project can be anticipated.
The LR Act was enacted. Now we are waiting for the legal and procedural basis.
Although the legal and supporting systems are ready, we still need to submit the
LR project to the LR committee for approval which will take quite some time.

171
Respondent # 7
1. Local characteristics
I represent my property and my children's. At the beginning, nobody wanted to get
involve with the project because we did not understand about giving up the land. But
my husband who understand most about the project has convinced all of us to
co-operate with the BMA.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
It is impossible to have this project achieved without the public sector. In fact,
landowners who have more property should rather make their own garden in the
backyard. It is safe and easier.
Agreement to land contribution
I think the amount of land contribution should not exceed 20%.
The larger land holder should sacrify in higher percentage. They have more land, so
they would benefit more.
The project costs are a little too high affecting land contribution.
Agreement to land valuation
Estimate of Land value at the existing condition is important, but it is not important
to me after the readjustment. It might be of importance for someone who plan to sell
it.
Agreement to the replotting design
The full option the BMA offered may not be necessary in opinion since my plot is
small.
3. Opposition from some landowners
Someone oppose to the project strongly.
4. Local officials and policy makers
I appreciate the work from the local officials.
5. Legal system and financial support
The LR law is necessary, otherwise it is unlawful. The charges for taxes and fees are
much too high, therefore taxes and fees must be exempted.

172
Respondent # 8
1. Local characteristics
The property is acquired by purchase 25 years ago.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Strong agreement for providing access road to my property, landfills and public
utilities.
Agreement to land contribution
The amount of land contribution should not exceed 15%
Agreement to land valuation
Land valuation from the existing condition is too low. It is not appropriate.
Agreement to the replotting design
The replotting design was the main topic of discussion in every meeting. I attended
the meetings frequently. I would prefer to relocate to the back of the project area for
lower rate of land contribution since land utilization in the future would be just for
housing.
As far as the meetings has gone, I can accept the location of my replotted plot.
3. Opposition from some landowners
Opposition from some landowners has slowed down the process.
4. Local officials and policy makers
The meetings had been inconsistently held.
They should get to implementation quickly.
5. Legal system and financial support
Due to the new law and regulations, the former LR association has to be
re-established.

173
Respondent # 9
1. Local characteristics
The property was acquired for by purchase about 10 years ago.
I have been doing real estate business for many years.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
I agree with the principle of LR in terms of providing accessibility to my propert, but
not in practice by the BMA.
It is all about the return of benefit, not exactly for the public's interest. A group of
landowners gathered to combine their small individual plots into one large plot.
LR is regarded as taking without compensation. In fact, the ones who sacrify their
land for the public are supposed to be compensated fairly.
Agreement to land contribution
I would have to split my share of land for more than 22% which is way too much. At
first, I thought I can give up some land but didn't think it would be this much. I would
had accepted it, if it would had been less.
The rate of land contribution should be upon by the willingness to contribute. It
should not be equivalent in all respects.
I would like to sell the land. It could be arranged by any staff. But the deal should be
transparent and fair.
Agreement to land valuation
I am not sure. Several meetings were held about this issue.
Agreement to the replotting design
From the beginning, I was not satisfied with the relocation to the very back of the
project area. It was too far away. They roused my anger since the very beginning.
In addition, too much land has been reserved for sale.
3. Opposition from some landowners
N/C
4. Local officials and policy makers
I attended the meetings sometimes.
I do not want to co-operate with the LR project. I have seen the process for more than
5 years. It is not certain whether it will be achieved and what would happen during the
readjustment.
In addition, the commitment requires that consent form is legibly signed and all
the requirements are obligations. Nothing could be done without authorization during
the readjustment. I don't like it.
5. Legal system and financial support
I don't know about the enactment of the LR Act. It has been long delayed. But I am
not agreed with the requirement of 2/3 of landowners, it should be by all landowners.

174
Respondent # 10
1. Local characteristics
The property is by inheritance and I would like to pass it along to my children for
housing in the future. I also represent some other plots in the meetings.
The property is fragmented around in this area. I already share some striped plots
with other holders. If possible, I would not want to give up anymore land. My family
once donated some land for the major park, "Suan Luang Rama 9".
The BMA has caused the inaccessibility to road. The "canal" has been deteriorated
and practically transformed into small walkway. But, the small walkway has not been
legally accepted for public use. As a matter of fact, part of the canal has been
dumped in order to partially locate a local road construction warehouse of the BMA.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Agreement with LR concept in terms of opening accessibility to blind land. The whole
concept is the right thing to do, but I am not really satisfied.
I don't see why we should build a small park next to the major park. Providing small
playground could be acceptable.
Agreement to land contribution
The amount of land contribution should be between 15-20%
Agreement to land valuation
It is acceptable.
Agreement to the replotting design
The replotting design had not been clear in details.
3. Opposition from some landowners
Several landowners opposed to the project.
4. Local officials and policy makers
I appreciate all the work the local officials had done for us. Landowners in this area
were invited by the BMA since the participation would control housing development
to get on well together with the panorama of the major park.
The government should be more serious and keep track of their work.
5. Legal system and financial support
The management should be organized by landowners themselves abide by the law.
Decisions
I am committed to the project because there are no better alternatives.

175
Respondent # 11
1. Local characteristics
The propert of 12 rai* was purchased by my forefather about 35 years ago before the
construction of Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road. In the past decade, the estate by
heirship was divided into 6 plots for his children. I represent my father's plot.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Agreement with LR concept in terms of opening accessibility to blind land, but not
in practice by the BMA. The landfill is unnecessary as it will cut down project costs
significantly.
Agreement to land contribution
According to the initial replotting plan, we lost about 25% for land contribution which
was higher than others. Appropriate amount of land contribution should not exceed
5% taking into account our existing location which is better than others.
Agreement to land valuation
Don't know.
Agreement to the replotting design
The detour of accessibility to my plots would be 700-800 meters along the road
according to the intial replotting. Our family's plots presently are located just four
meters away from Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road excluding the parallel pavement. In
fact, the road was supposed to be fully constructed in width where our plots would be
frontal accessibly. Anyway, the BMA has left stripe-shape land which is 4-meter in
depth along the road blocking land in this area.
3. Opposition from some landowners
Since the exclusion and blockade to my plot were heard, I filed lawsuit against the
BMA for the legitimate accessibility to any blind land. But case was dismissed. It is
now brought to the appeal court. I am going to proceed to the supreme court
Because the initial lawsuit was filed before the enactment of the LR Act. I have got no
choice, otherwise the blockade to my plot will be forever.
The BMA takes advantage of us and the project should be cancelled
for this area. Let all the landowners sue for access roads to their plots themselves.
4. Local officials and policy makers
A letter of invitation was sent to us for participating in a meeting held on July 9, 2000
with no obligations to participate. It was quite critical to some land holders though
they eventually agree to the project.
There were no sessions held for public hearing to see what we actually want for
public services, amount of land contribution, road width, etc. They should adopt more
standard procedures.
After attending a couple of initial meetings, I noticed that the BMA which holds some
land plots in the project area did not intend to contribute any partial land by
participating in LR. I attended no more meetings ever since.
5. Legal system and financial support
I don't know when the prolonged legal and procedural draft will be completed, perhaps
will take 3-4 years more.

176
Respondent # 11 (continued)
Decisions
Currently, I made my decision not consented to co-opeate because there is no
certainty about the process.
* 12 rai is equivalent to 19,200 sq.m. or 1.92 ha

177
Respondent # 12
1. Local characteristics
The property is by inheritance for my mother. My grandma resettled here since
World War II.
Of about 100 rai* of land in this area used to be tied up with the family's will and it
has been utilized for rental farming. Nowadays, some share of land has been sold
by subdivision into small plots for farming.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
The question is about the risk of developing large LR project. How can you it get the
funds for construction?
Agreement to land contribution
For the Nong Bua Mon LR project-Phase 1.2, the topic has not been settled yet.
Need to build conscious mind in partial contribution to society.
Agreement to land valuation
N/A
Agreement to the replotting design
I have not seen the replotting plans, only the draft of master plans.
3. Opposition from some landowners
I attended the meetings sometimes, but noticed that strong opposition is not so
much. Otherwise, the former LR association could not be established.
Many larger landowners are willing to co-operate. Educating every landowners
for understanding about LR and for acceptability by wider public is necessary.
In the lack of knowledge and understanding from landowers, the project is incredible
the project is incredible and uncertain. I think participation model is helpful in building
landowners' understanding. It need "knowledge and understanding" from landowners
and all government sectors.
4. Local officials and policy makers
The shift or promotion of high-rank officials to a new position every 4 years has
limitely changed policy and budget plans of project. It has caused discouragement
to local officials regularly reponsible for the project.
5. Legal system and financial support
The longer the prolonged project, the more the boredom from landowners. The
prolonged project also results in uncertainty and incredibility. This is the constraint
for the policy makers.
Management of the LR association must be transparent, equitable and rational.
"Communication" consistently and seriously to landowners thus are highly significant.
Then, progress and success of project implementation will be achieved.
* 100 rai is equivalent to 160,000 sq.m. or 16.0 ha

178
Respondent # 13
1. Local characteristics
Of more than 80 rai* of land in this area is tied up with the family's will. I thought it
could possibly be developed and implemented for a demonstration project.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
Although the royal decree of land expropriation for the major road, 60-meters in width,
is announced to pass through the project from east to west, it will not be accessible
to all plots or under construction until the next 5 years. Land readjustment in
accordance with land expropriation for major road will provide accessibility to all
plots. The rate of land contribution will be lower since the road is fully subsidized
by the Department of Public Works.
Agreement to land contribution
Almost all landowners of Nong Bua Mon, Phase 1.1, are willing to participate in
the project. Some plots are pondlike and landfill will cost as much as 40 million baht.
Agreement to land valuation
It has been approved by the Department of Land Valuation.
Agreement to the replotting design
The replotting design for Phase 1.1 has been drafted at least 3 times. The next
meeting regarding some changes in the replotting design is anticipated.
3. Opposition from some landowners
Some opposition have delayed progress. It has been prolonged for more than 5 years
and I almost lose my interest in pushing the implementation and very discouraged.
LR is acceptable in principle, but very poor when it comes to practice.
4. Local officials and policy makers
There are several changes to the director and chief of Department of Land
Readjustment at the BMA and only a couple of local officials are regularly working
for the project.
5. Legal system and financial support
The project cannot progressed to the implementation due to the lack of financial
support from boards of the Department of the Interior and BMA.
As much as 20 million baht from the LR fund account had been depleted during
these years for arranging meetings with landowners, survey, research, etc.
I am afraid that some real estate developers will buy out the land in this area.
* 80 rai is equivalent to 128,000 sq.m. or 12.8 ha

179
Respondent # 14
1. Local characteristics
The property is by inheritance to my mother's holding for more than 10 years.
The property is located right by canal. It was mainly accessible by boat in the old
days.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Agreement to infrastructure improvement
It is a good project and it will benefit the public sector. It will also help improving
my plot since the land could not be utilized for a long time.
Agreement to land contribution
I would like to co-operate with the BMA for partial land contribution. The amount of
land contribution could be between 10-20%.
Agreement to land valuation
N/A
Agreement to the replotting design
I would like to know whose plots are surrounded my plot from the replotting plan.
3. Opposition from some landowners
N/A
4. Local officials and policy makers
I don't know.
I have heard about this project from my former lawyer whom represented our property
in the meetings of landowners. However, I had never attended any meetings.
5. Legal system and financial support
I had never been informed about the LR Act by any sources. However, I am very
willing to participate and commit to the LR project once gain more knowledge about
LR because it will increase utilization of my property.
Future plan
So far, I have no plan for utilization in the future. It should be in compliance with the
surrounding development.

180
Respondent # 15
1. Local characteristics
The major land holder acquired many plots in the area by purchase about 30 years
ago. The plots are fragmented around in the area. He also shares some striped plots
with other holders. I represent him and always attended meetings on his behalf.
The BMA did not fully construct Chalerm Prakiat Rama 9 Road in width. The land
left stripedly belongs to the municipalities.
2. Attitudes toward LR
Majority of landowners' agreement to infrastructure improvement
Infrastructure improvement in terms of providing access roads to open blind land is of
significance to all landowners' agreement. It is of interest to all landowners. However,
provision of playground has not been accepted much. Many of them complained
that too much land are contributed for main arterial road and reserved land.
Some small landowners agreed with land filling which is about 2-meter in height
because the area is prone to flooding. Some large landowners thought it is
unnecessary since it increases project costs significantly.
Majority of landowners' agreement to land contribution
It is critical in terms of land contribution and we are just beginning to adopt LR. In the
past, provision of infrastructure and public facilities is financed by the government.
Once you contribute your land for road, the government is obliged to construct it.
I think the appropriate land contribution should not exceed 20%.
Majority of landowners' agreement to land valuation
It is acceptable because it is done by the Department of land valuation such that
land value after the readjustment will increase accordingly.
Majority of landowners' agreement to the replotting design
Most of land holders can accept the replotted plots in terms of reduced size. They
seems to agree with the replotting plan, yet it has not been finalized depending on
how far the boundary of the project is defined. Numbers of land holders participated
will determine the amount of contribution for the reserved land.
The method of calculation is fixed by its profit of no more than 20% increase in total
land value each plot.
This project is arranged for full option by the BMA to be a demonstration project. But
the BMA claims that its public land cannot be acquired for land contribution by law.
3. Opposition from some landowners
This has been an issue in almost every meeting. They were not convince due to
the high rate of their land contribution. So far, we just wait for the 2/3 landowners'
agreement to be abided by the LR Act. Presently, he files lawsuit against the BMA.
The land holder of smallest plot is the only one who has never participated in any
meetings. His plot is presently mortgaged to the bank. This is not a problem because
the association plans to relocate him a new plot or buy the plot if he decide to sell it.
4. Local officials and policy makers
The BMA informed meetings via letters and telephone call. The meetings were held
twice a year. More than 50% of landowners' participated in each meeting totalling to
10 sessions. The last meeting was about cancellation of the LR association to be
established abide by the new LR Act, There has been no progress in the content and
detail of the topics of discussion. I am pretty sure they all understand the subject

181
Respondent # 15 (continued)
matter. Now we are waiting for the legal and procedure draft to be issued.
The local officials co-operated very well.
5. Legal system and financial support
The prolonged enactment of LR Act and issuance of legal and procedure draft
legitimately affect progress in implementation. Otherwise, charges for taxes and fees
would be enormous.
Decisions
We will be commited to co-opeate because there are no other choices. All plots are
not accessible to roads and the government offers only this alternative. We are all
indirectly obliged to participate in the project.

182
APPENDIX F
SUAN LUANG RAMA 9 LR PROJECT

Existing land holdings: Suan Laung Rama 9 LR Project. Source: Department of Land
Readjustment, BMA.

183

Proposed replotting design (From the 7
th
meeting, September 12, 2004). Source: Department of
Land Readjustment, BMA.

184
APPENDIX G
NONG BUA MON LR PROJECT

Existing land holdings: Nong Bua Mon LR Project. Source: Department of Land Readjustment,
BMA.

185

Topographic map: Nong Bua Mon LR Project. Source: Department of Land Readjustment, BMA.

186

Draft of master plan or land use plan: Nong Bua Mon LR Project. Source: Department of Land
Readjustment, BMA.

Proposed replotting design. Source: Department of Land Readjustment, BMA.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The primary objective of the research is to examine the LR system as a viable alternative for financing urbanization in the case studies of LR projects in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The study develops comparative country analysis of different variations of LR schemes in four selected countries using the property rights approach (1960) and framework of transaction costs to examine the establishment and exchange of property rights to the LR system. The main questions are: is there the relevance of the Thai local characteristics that affect the initial distribution of land rights in the circumstances in Bangkok? What are the effects of transaction costs associated with the exchange process?

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

From “squatters” to citizens? Slum dwellers, developers, land sharing and power in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

PDF

Bank community development coporation investments in community economic development

PDF

A comparative study of administrative corruption in ancient and modern China

PDF

From structure to agency: Essays on the spatial analysis of residential segregation

PDF

Testing the entrepreneurial city hypothesis: a study of the Los Angeles region

PDF

Information sharing, deliberation, and collective decision-making: A computational model of collaborative governance

PDF

Fostering a newly defined entrepreneurship in impoverished communities: a key component of the solution for eradicating poverty in America

PDF

A multi-regional computable general equilibrium model in the Haritage of A. Anas and I. Kim

PDF

Urban spatial structure, commuting, and growth in U.S. metropolitan areas

PDF

The social construction of brownfields

PDF

Spaces of market-culturalism: the case of Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong

PDF

Social entrepreneurship and urban tourism as economic development: best practices from Long Beach, California

PDF

The impact of public expenditures on health care on total health expenditures: an exploratory analysis of selected OECD countries

PDF

Legislative term limits in California and the faces of change

PDF

Gang injunctions and community participation

PDF

Recent experience in the utilization of private finance for American toll road development

PDF

Order before zoning: land use regulation in Los Angeles, 1880-1915

PDF

Bottle to bottle: a guide to achieving closed loop recycling for California's PET beverage containers

PDF

Beyond the limits to planning for equity: the emergence of community benefits agreements as empowerment models in participatory processes

PDF

Individual differences in trust development: Assessing the effects of trustor attributes on trust building, stability, and dissolution

Asset Metadata

Creator Sukolratanametee, Salinee (author)

Core Title Land readjustment in Bangkok

School School of Policy, Planning, and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Planning

Publication Date 06/12/2009

Defense Date 09/06/2006

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag land readjustment,OAI-PMH Harvest

Place Name Bangkok (city or populated place), Thailand (countries)

Language English

Advisor Richardson, Harry W. (committee chair), Chen, Baizhu (committee member), Heikkila, Eric J. (committee member)

Creator Email sukolrat@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m527

Unique identifier UC1131282

Identifier etd-Sukolratanametee-20070612 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-503106 (legacy record id),usctheses-m527 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Sukolratanametee-20070612.pdf

Dmrecord 503106

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Sukolratanametee, Salinee

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu