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Challenging migrant worker policies in Korea: settlement and local citizenship

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Challenging migrant worker policies in Korea: settlement and local citizenship

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CHALLENGING MIGRANT WORKER POLICIES IN KOREA:
SETTLEMENT AND LOCAL CITIZENSHIP

by

Sagang Kim

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(PLANNING)

August 2010

Copyright 2010 Sagang Kim
Table of Contents

List of Tables iii

Abbreviations iv

Abstract v

Introduction 1
Migration Reality in Korea 1
Theoretical Background 7
Research Methods and Self-Reflection 12
Structure of Dissertation 19
Map of the Field Study Site 22

Chapter 1: Emergence of Migrant Workers in Korea 23
Contexts of International Labor Migration to Korea 24
Arrival of Migrant Workers 35

Chapter 2: Rise of the Human Rights Issues in Labor Migration System 48
Coexistence of Formal and Informal Systems 49
Demand for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers 61
Debates over the Reform of Labor Migration System 70

Chapter 3: Settlement of Undocumented Migrant Workers 82
Economic Crisis and the Survival of Migrant Workers 83
Towards the New Labor Migration System 96
Legalization and the Settlement of Migrant Workers 117

Chapter 4: Migrant Families and Advent of Multiethnic Society 143
Formation of Migrant Families 144
Human Rights of Migrant Families 165
Families of International Marriages and Social Integration Policies 178

Chapter 5: Local Citizenship For Migrant Workers 202
Community Formation by Migrant Workers 204
Incorporation of Migrant Workers into Local Communities 234

Conclusion 254

Bibliography 260

ii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Gross Domestic Product by Industires 30

Table 1.2. Workers’ Annual Wages by Firm Sizes 32

Table 1.3. School Enrollment and Economic Activities 33

Table 1.4. Labor Shortage Rates 34

Table 2.1. Number of Migrant Workers in Korea, 1992 – 2008 57

Table 3.1. Unemployment Rate of Domestic Work Force 85

Table 3.2. Number of Forcibly Deported Undocumented Migrants, 1998 – 2002 107

Table 3.3. Number of Forcibly Deported Undocumented Migrants, 2003 – 2007 128

Table 3.4. Number of Undocumented Migrants over 10 years 138

Table 4.1. Recipients of Financial Aid for Medical Expenses Provided by 160
the Medical Mutual Aid Union for Migrant Workers

Table 4.2. Number of School-Attending Children of Migrant Workers 171

Table 4.3. Trends of International Marriage in Korea, 1991 – 2008 180

Table 5.1. Foreign Residents in Seoul Metropolitan Area, 2006 – 2009 213

iii
ABBREVIATIONS

EPS: Employment Permit System

ETU-MB: Equality Trade Union – Migrants’ Branch

IOM: International Organization for Migration

ITS: Industrial Trainee System

JCMK: Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea

KCTU: Korean Confederation of Trade Unions

KFSB: Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business

KRIWHJ: Korea Research Institute for Workers’ Human Rights and Justice

MTU: Migrants’ Trade Union

NHRCK: National Human Rights Commission of Korea

NMR: Network for Migrants’ Rights

SMBA: Small and Medium Business Administration

UN CEDAW: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women

UN CERD: United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination

UN CESCR: United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

UN CRC: United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child

UN ESC: United Nations Economic and Social Council

UNPD: United Nations Population Division

WATS: Work after Training System

iv
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to examine the processes of the settlement of
migrant workers in Korea and their acquisition of local citizenship. Since the early 1990s,
when migrant workers from neighboring Asian countries began to be officially admitted
to Korea, the Korean government has upheld a temporary rotation policy for migrant
labor. Concerned about potential socio-economic burdens that the settlement of unskilled
migrant workers might bring to the society, the government has maintained a restrictive
immigration policy while limiting the rights of migrant workers. Nevertheless, a large
number of migrant workers have prolonged their stay and have become long-term settlers
despite the lack of permanent residence and formal citizenship. Focusing on how they
have challenged the nation’s policies on migrant workers, this study looked into the lives
and experiences of long-term migrant workers in Korea.
Both policy analysis and ethnographic field research were employed in this study.
The policy analysis, which was based on data from various sources, showed how the
Korean government’s migrant workers policies have evolved over time and changed
under which circumstances. Twenty month-long ethnographic field research in Ky ǒnggi
province, Korea, including participant observation in migrant communities and in-depth
interviews with forty-three migrant workers, provided detailed explanations on how
migrant workers survived crackdowns and the repatriation policy, brought in or formed
families, and built communities while making claims for their rights to work and stay in

v
Korea. Additional interviews with two government officials and six migrant human rights
activists were also conducted.
The findings of this study revealed that the settlement of migrant workers has
proceeded with the enhancement of their rights. With the support of migrant advocacy
organizations, migrant workers have fought for their rights and demanded the Korean
government improve its migrant workers policies. They have also appealed to the
international organizations while taking advantage of the desire of the Korean
government to be recognized as human rights country. As a result, they have achieved the
reform of labor migration system, the amendment of the nationality law, the right to get
public education for their children, and several amnesties although temporarily, all of
which have facilitated their settlement. Furthermore, long-term migrant workers have
become a part of their local communities by increasing their presence through the
formation of grassroots organizations and the establishment of migrant communities.
Their entitlement of various social rights, mainly provided by local migrant advocacy
organizations in collaboration with local governments, has even granted them local
citizenship that challenges the traditional notion of formal citizenship.
In conclusion, this study suggests that planners and policymakers in local
governments should take a more active role in improving migrant workers policies in
Korea than those in the national government who put control and regulation over social
integration. By understanding the realities of migrant workers and hearing their voices,
local governments should acknowledge the contributions of migrant workers to their

vi
localities’ cultural and economic vitality and embrace long-term migrant workers who
have already settled in to be incorporated as members of the society.

vii
INTRODUCTION

Migration Reality in Korea

On a Sunday afternoon in July 2007, about forty migrant workers from Vietnam,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal gathered in the dining room of Jeon Jin Sang
Welfare Center at Anyang City, Ky ŏnggi Province. It was right after their Korean
language class provided by Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center, an affiliated migrant
advocacy organization under the Welfare Center. They were there to learn about the
newly amended Immigration Control Act, which for the first time offered the possibility
of granting the right of permanent residence to unskilled migrant workers in Korea. As
the staff explained that the eligibility criteria required a minimum of five years of legal
stay in Korea, the room filled with dissatisfied murmurings from the audience, most of
whom had stayed in Korea for more than five years but without a valid visa. Their
murmurings soon turned into sighs when the staff conveyed news about the intensive
crackdown operation on undocumented migrant workers from August to the end of the
year. Their frustration was greater than ever because they expected more from the Roh
Moo Hyun administration that had been adopting migrant-friendly policies since its
beginning, and especially since 2006.
In the history of international migration to Korea, the year 2006 was a significant
turning point both in terms of public discourse and policymaking. The mass media

1
covering the issues of migrants and ethnic minorities in Korea highlighted the importance
of multiculturalism and social integration while questioning Koreans’ long-held pride in
ethnic homogeneity. Experts and policy makers inside and outside the government raised
the possibility of Korea becoming an immigration society with various policies for an
ethnically plural and culturally diverse society. The government established the
Immigration Policy Committee under the Prime Minister with the slogan of “the
realization of an open society living together with foreign residents.” Different
government ministries soon brought forward various programs to provide social services
and promote social integration for all kinds of migrant or ethnic minority residents,
including migrant workers and their families, migrant spouses of Korean nationals and
their biracial children, and refugees.
These tremendous changes in 2006 were triggered by a seemingly unrelated
incident. In April, a few months after he was named MVP of the Super Bowl, the
American football player Hines Ward visited Korea, his mother’s homeland. As his
success story as a sports star was connected with the shameful truth of Korea’s long
ignorance and exclusion of biracial people, which had led his mother to decide to leave
Korea with her two-year-old infant, the Korean public realized that his achievement
would not be possible if he grew up in Korea.
1
Consequently, a guilty feeling about the
continuing discrimination against bi-racial people, the number of whom had been
increasing rapidly due to the growing number of international marriages between

1
The life story of Hines Ward and lessons from it were covered in numerous newspaper articles and
editorials throughout the country. See Han’gy ŏre (2006a), Korea Herald (2006), or Munhwa Ilbo (2006) for
example.

2
migrants and Korean nationals, spread across the country.
2
At the same time, the public
consciousness about prejudice and discrimination against migrant or ethnic minority
residents in general was also heightened.
However, this so-called “Hines Ward Syndrome” would not have aroused broader
public sympathy and brought an immediate government action, if not for the unceasing
efforts by civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations to call for justice and
human rights for migrants and their families. While revealing the harsh, inhumane and
unjust conditions that migrants and their families had been facing in Korea, they appealed
to the desire of the public and the government for Korea to be recognized as democratic
human rights country by international community. The growing presence of migrant or
ethnic minority residents in many localities coupled with the prediction that their number
would exceed one million by 2010
3
and the immigrant unrest in France and the racial
violence in Australia in 2005 also speeded up Korea’s recognition of its transformation
from a homogenous to multicultural society (Ch ŏng 2006).
The multiculturalism discourses and official social integration policies that swept
Korea in 2006 would have been unimaginable two decades before, when migrants from
abroad began to enter Korea to work in manufacturing industries suffering from labor
shortages. Few expected that labor migration would lead to permanent settlement and
bring any significant social or cultural changes to Korean society. Migrant workers were

2
The proportion of international marriages to all marriages in Korea has exceeded over ten percent starting
from 2004. See Table 4.3 in chapter 4 for detail.
3
According to the immigration statistics, the number of all foreigners staying in Korea, including short-
term visitors, already reached 1,000,254 as of August 2007, and 56 percent of them are migrant workers
(Ministry of Justice 2007). Although the proportion of migrant residents to total Korean population is only
two percent, it is extraordinary for an ostensibly homogenous society like Korea.

3
assumed to be temporary laborers who would go back to their home country once their
labor was not needed anymore or when they earned enough money to improve the
situation of their families back home. The government’s commitment to control the
number and the duration of the stay of unskilled migrant workers as well as its reluctance
to grant full labor rights or any other social rights to them intensified the belief.
Therefore, ethnic community formation, growing cultural diversity and the emergence of
multicultural society were hardly envisioned by either the public or experts in Korea, for
whom giving unskilled migrant laborers the rights of citizenship was unthinkable.
Scholarly work on international migration to Asia also supported this belief.
Although many studies on European Guestworker programs and the American Bracero
program, which were also designed to utilize temporary migrant labor while reducing the
possibility of settlement, had shown that temporary migrants had become permanent
residents and led the emergence of multicultural societies (Martin and Miller 1980,
Castles 1986, Massey 1986, Hollifield 1992) scholars studying migration to Asia argued
that Asia was different (Spencer 1992, Weiner 1998). They pointed out that legal
frameworks and policy settings as well as the strong sense of ethnic homogeneity in
Asian countries allowed little chance for migrants to settle down while the relatively
small number of migrants would reduce any permanent social and cultural impacts.
However, the settlement of migrant workers in Asian countries, although on a
limited scale, was reported as early as the late 1990s. The “myth of temporariness,” the
belief that migration is motivated by short-term economic considerations and will not
lead to long-term settlement, was contradicted (Castles 2000: 110). Policy makers and

4
scholars, who used to concentrate only on the regulation of migration and on labor-
market issues, were forced to consider the need to develop policies focusing on the long-
term rather than short-term consequences of labor migration (Debrah 2002). In Korea, as
migrant workers have become long-term settlers, the key question has shifted from
whether it will become a land of immigration to what kind of immigration country it will
be (T Lim 2006: 236). Nevertheless, until very recently, scholars insisted that there were
no discernible signs of migrant settlement in Korea (Seol and Skrentny 2004: 505). On
the grounds that migrant workers do not have opportunities for family reunification or
permanent residency and migrant spouses do not make up ethnic enclaves due to their
marriage to Koreans, they have argued that migrant settlement is a still rare phenomenon
(Seol and Skrentny 2009).
In this dissertation, however, I will argue that migrant workers have settled in
Korea, and are demanding an enhancement of their rights. The Korean government
clearly has maintained a restrictive immigration policy, especially towards unskilled
migrant workers. Even after declaring the need to prepare for an open society that would
promote diversity and multiculturalism, the government has continued to view migrant
workers, who consist of the majority of foreign residents in Korea, as temporary
members of society. The principle of migrant workers’ rotation, the persistent
crackdowns on long-term undocumented migrants, and the prohibition of family
reunification have not been changed. Yet, emphasizing the government restrictive
policies fails to recognize the realities of migrant workers’ settlement in Korea.
Throughout the dissertation, I will show that migrant workers have not passively

5
acquiesced to those restrictive government policies, but have survived crackdowns and
the repatriation policy, brought in or formed families, and built communities while
making claims for their rights, all with the support of civil society.
Furthermore, I will argue that long-term migrant workers have been integrated
into the local communities where they settled and have become local “citizens.” From the
standpoint of the Korean government, the distinction is quite clear between migrant
workers who are not entitled to the rights of citizenship or permanent residency and
migrants who have those rights due to their Korean descent, marriage to Korean citizens,
or approval of refugee status. Only the latter groups of migrants are considered legitimate
and permanent members of society and perceived as future citizens. However, the
distinction is fluid in reality where some migrant workers become legitimate citizens or
denizens by marrying Koreans or applying for refugee status while some migrant spouses
or refugees lose their legal status after divorce or choose to leave Korea for another
country. Moreover, long-term migrant workers have obtained what scholars called
“substantive citizenship rights” (Marshall 1964) by achieving “insurgent citizenship”
(Holston 1999) or “local citizenship” (Tsuda 2006), as they have been entitled to various
socio-economic rights and social membership,
4
especially in their local communities. In
this dissertation, I will show how migrant workers in Korea have challenged the
traditional notion of citizenship by turning their local communities into the sites of
struggles over rights and belonging.

4
In contrast to formal or legal membership that is conferred to those who hold national citizenship, social
membership can be granted to immigrants without citizenship as they participation in the civil society,
daily life, labor and housing markets, leisure time activities, and associational life over a long period of
time (Bauböck 1994).

6
Theoretical Background

Regardless of countries’ openness to immigration, national governments receiving
migrants have taken various measures to control the influx of international migrants and
have classified them as desirable or undesirable, and made efforts to curb the latter. Even
in the era of globalization, which is characterized by declining state institutions and
blurring national boundaries, national governments’ efforts to restrict the movement of
people across borders remain unchanged (Richmond 1994, Stalker 2000). Yet, their
efforts to manage migration often fail to achieve the declared objectives as exemplified
by the growing number of undocumented migrants in most countries. Cornelius and
Tsuda (2004) explain this gap between official immigration policies and actual policy
outcomes by flaws in policies themselves, changes in macro-structures, and domestic and
international political constraints. Similarly, Castles (2004) provides three sets of factors
that cause this situation: factors arising from the social dynamics of the migration
process, factors linked to globalization, and factors within political system.
As a social process rather than a formulated transaction, migration cannot be
turned on and off like a tap by national governments’ policy settings. People make a
decision to migrate to another country with their agency and with the support by their
family and community (Nagayama 1995). Their migration is facilitated by migrant
networks and the migration industry (Tilly 1990, Goss and Lindquist 1995), and
perpetuated by structural dependence on both emigration in sending countries and
immigration in receiving countries (Saith 1997, Cornelius 1998). Globalization,
accompanied by growing inequality among countries and a free flow of information, also

7
expands the scale and scope of international migration to a degree that individual states
cannot control (Castells 1996, Castles and Miller 2003, Iredale et al. 2003). More
importantly, the liberal democratic systems adopted by many migrant-receiving states
keep national governments from acting arbitrarily in immigration policy making. The
voices of various groups with conflicting interests, such as employers, labor unions, and
local workers and residents, cannot be ignored in policy formation. The growing ability
of civil society organizations and grassroots migrant organizations to claim the rights of
migrants on the basis of domestic social welfare provisions and/or international human
rights instruments also influences the direction of government policies (Sassen 1996a,
Joppke 1999, Freeman 2004, Hollifield 1992; 2004).
Therefore, focusing on the declared objectives of national governments’ policies
can blind us from seeing the whole picture. Likewise, perceiving international migration
as something ineluctable in globalization process can limit our understanding. In this
context, some scholars argue that we should view international migration from a local
perspective, and examine cities and regions as units of analysis, the sites where migration
policies are actually applied and contested (Friedmann and Lehrer 1997, Tsuda 2006,
Alexander 2007).
There have been attempts to place cities in the context of globalization of both
capital and labor in various social science disciplines including planning, as expressed in
the literature on “world city” (Friedmann 1995) or “global city” (Sassen 1991).
Originally focusing on cities as concrete sites where complicated economic globalization
processes are materialized, the literature has gradually included another equally important

8
process occurring on a global scale, that is, international migration. Sassen (1996b;
2000), for example, calls for the recovery of place in analyses of global migration,
particularly place as constituted in major cities, or global cities, where most immigrants
are concentrated, because it allows us to understand multifaceted aspects of international
migration that cannot be represented in terms of the dichotomy between the national and
the global. According to her, disadvantaged workers in global cities, including
immigrants, do not just stay powerless while being undervalued by global economy and
bounded by restrictive state control. Instead, they acquire presence in a broader political
process that goes beyond the boundaries of the formal polity by reconfiguring the spaces
of and social relations in global cities in new ways (Sassen 2000: 58). From this
perspective focusing on local level, we can see how immigrants find their voice and make
claims on the cities where they reside, rather than being entangled between global forces
and national policies.
The emergence of cities as the spaces for claim-making by immigrants raises a
question about the notion of citizenship. In modern democratic society, citizenship refers
to the membership of individuals in a particular country or nation. The state, usually in
the form of a national government, gives the status of citizenship to whom it considers its
legitimate members and grants its citizens a wide range of rights, including civil, political
and social rights. According to Marshall (1964: 71-2), those rights constitute substantive
citizenship in liberal states, in that the civil element refers to the right of individual
freedom, the political element involves the right to participate in the political process, and
the social element encompasses the rights to economic welfare and security, and the right

9
to share social heritage and to live a civilized life. The underlying assumption to grant
those rights is that there is a shared community and culture with shared interests and
purposes among citizens, despite individual or group differences (Holston and Appadurai
1996: 191-2, Castles and Davidson 2000: vii).
However, the growing presence of immigrants in global cities undermines this
assumption. As Sandercock (1997; 2003) points out, international migration brings new
residents with different histories, cultures, and needs to cities built along a modernist
paradigm and transforms the cities to cosmopolises or multicultural cities. For her, the
presence of these new residents disrupts the very notion of a shared culture or shared
interests while creating a struggle over belonging in these multicultural cities. By
working in sweatshops, setting up places of worship, and building ethnic neighborhoods,
immigrants imprint new identities on cities and claim spaces for themselves as well as
their rights. In this sense, Sandercock (1997: 15) views immigrants’ struggles over
belonging as taking form of struggles over citizenship, in its broadest meaning. In a
similar vein, Holston (1999) argues that cities and regions with a large number of
immigrants are being transformed from modernist spaces to insurgent spaces of
citizenship. According to him, the doctrine embedded in modernist political project that
state is only legitimate source of citizenship rights, meanings, and practices is no more
valid in spaces of insurgent citizenship where organized grassroots mobilizations try to
derail or subvert state agenda and carry on struggles over what it means to be a member
of the society.

10
Immigrants’ struggles for membership and rights are often aided by non-
governmental civil society organizations and sometimes even by local governments. As
Tsuda (2006) points out, local organizations and governments help immigrants gain local
citizenship, which consists of basic sociopolitical rights and services as legitimate
members of local communities. When scholars consider sources of citizenship rights for
immigrants outside the nation-state, they usually turn to international or supranational
organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union and argue for
transnational, postnational or global citizenship (Bauböck 1994, Soysal 1994, Urry 2000).
Although such citizenship rights can inspire national governments to expand the range of
rights offered to immigrants, the enforcement still depends on the nation-state. On the
contrary, local citizenship rights, which may also find its legitimacy in international
human rights, are actually implemented and guaranteed at the local level by non-
government organizations and/or local governments (Tsuda 2006: 10-11). As a result,
immigrants can enjoy considerable substantive rights and social services in certain
localities despite the lack of formal citizenship.
5

To understand the migrant settlement process fully, not only immigration policy
but also immigrant policy should be looked into.
6
To this end, both national-level and
local-level analyses are needed. Examining how various actors, including international
organizations, national governments, local governments, non-governmental civil society

5
Furthermore, as Harvey (2008) points out, the right to the city goes beyond the individual liberty to access
urban resources. According to him, as one of fundamental human rights, the right to the city is a common
rather than an individual right to make and remake the city through the exercise of a collective power.
6
The distinction between immigration policy and immigrant policy is made by Hammer (1985: 7-9).
According to him, the former deals with “the regulation of flows of immigration and control of aliens” and
the latter refers to “the conditions provided to the resident immigrants.”

11
organizations, and grassroots immigrant organizations, compete and cooperate to shape
and reshape policies around immigration and immigrants will give us a better insight into
the realities, challenges, and prospects of international migration.

Research Methods and Self-Reflection

For this dissertation research, I used a combination of policy analysis and
ethnographic field study as my main methodologies. Through policy analysis, I intended
to examine how the Korean government’s immigration and immigrant policies have
evolved over time and what has created the circumstances for the evolution of those
policies. During my twenty month-long fieldwork at Ky ŏnggi Province in Korea, from
August 2006 to March 2008, I collected data from various sources for this policy
analysis, including government reports and press releases, legislative and legal
documents, articles from newspapers and magazines, and booklets, newsletters, and
reports published by migrant advocacy organizations. I also attended seminars, forums,
and symposiums held by government agencies, such as the National Human Rights
Commission of Korea, and by non-governmental coalitions of migrant advocacy
organizations, such as the Network for Migrants’ Rights. In addition, I interviewed two
government officials, one from the Ministry of Justice and the other from the Ky ŏnggi
Provincial Office, both of whom had been involved in the legislation and the
implementation of immigration and immigrant policies, along with six activists from
migrant advocacy organizations at Ky ŏnggi province, who had devoted themselves to

12
changing and improving those policies while fighting for the expansion of migrants’
rights. By reviewing data and information obtained from secondary sources, various
meetings, and interviews, I was able to build the framework for my dissertation.
However, to learn about the migration and settlement process of migrant workers
in Korea, as well as their everyday experiences and struggles to survive Korea’s
restrictive immigration policy, cope with their situations, and build their communities, I
needed to apply ethnographic methods. Initially, I undertook my participant observation
in a local migrant advocacy organization called “Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center” at
Anyang City, Ky ŏnggi province, where I had worked as a volunteer throughout the whole
time of my fieldwork period. The Center provided labor- and health-related counseling
services for local migrant workers, presented Korean language and computer classes to
them, and offered meeting spaces for grassroots migrant organizations. It also organized
and sponsored various events for and by local migrant workers, such as picnics and
camps, holiday parties and festivals, and sports tournaments. As a volunteer, I often
helped with counseling and accompanied migrant workers to the local labor offices,
courts, and hospitals. I also actively participated in almost all the activities and events
held in and organized by the Center. By doing so, I was able to meet and acquaint myself
with many local migrant workers and become friends with some of them.
Once I got close to some of the migrants, I could expand my ethnographic filed
study to include participant observation of migrant communities at Anyang, Kunpo, and
Ŭiwang, three adjacent cities in Ky ŏnggi province, and conduct in-depth interviews with
migrants residing in those areas (see the map in page 22). They invited me to their houses

13
for dinner, to ethnic restaurants or bars to hang out, to birthday parties or weddings, and
to religious worship services held in private premises, where I could observe their usually
invisible daily lives. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I had to recruit migrant interview
participants for my research from those whom I met in the Center and then through their
referrals, but by virtue of these casual encounters with new people, I was gradually able
to snowball my interview sample.
I ended up interviewing forty-three migrants, thirty women and thirteen men,
from six different countries, including Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Vietnam,
Mongolia, and the Philippines.
7
In-depth interviews, which usually took over two hours,
were conducted mostly at interviewees’ home or an ethnic grocery store in case the
interviewee was the owner, but sometimes in an available empty room at the Center when
they preferred to do so. The interviews were often supplemented by follow-up informal
conversations in various settings. All the interviews and conversations were done in
either Korean or English. On average, interview participants had stayed in Korea for 8.2
years, so their Korean was good enough for the interviews. English was used only with
Filipino participants, but still together with Korean. The interviews consisted of open-
ended questions about their life history, especially focusing on work, family, and
community in relation to migration and settlement process, as well as their concerns and
expectations about their lives in Korea and in their community, in particular. In general,

7
Migrants of Korean descent, mainly from China and comprising roughly a quarter of all migrant workers
in Korea, were excluded from my research, because the history and contexts of their migration are different
from non-ethnic Korean migrants. Also, they are controlled and managed by different regulations in terms
of duration of stay, visa type, and eligibility for citizenship or permanent residency.

14
interview participants were willing to answer most of the questions including even
personal or sensitive ones.
However, approaching the migrant workers to ask for an interview was not
always easy. Since my intention was to learn about the settlement process of migrant
workers, I tried to interview long-term migrants, who were invariably undocumented
under the Korean governments’ restrictive labor migration system. The constant
crackdowns on undocumented migrants by the Immigration Service made them worried
about exposing their identities; thus, I had to overcome their suspicions or concerns in
order to get close to potential interviewees. For instance, when I went to a Filipino
grocery store in Kunpo with my Filipina friend, Sarah,
8
to ask the owner to be my
interviewee, she and other customers in the store gave me a suspicious look and talked to
Sarah in Tagalog with a frown on their faces. When I asked Sarah what they were talking
about, she told me that they were wondering if I was hiding a camera. It was after one of
the customers recognized me from the Center and explained to them who I was that they
loosened up. In many cases, when I asked people for an interview, their first question was
that if they would be on TV or newspapers, which they were reluctant to be.
For this reason, I needed to build relationships and earn their trust before I
received permission for an interview from most undocumented migrant workers. For
example, Yoanna, a Filipina migrant, was very wary of me and my research the first time
I approached her for an interview. She cancelled our interview appointments several
times. However, after she found out that I was helping her pregnant friend, whose unborn

8
All the names of migrant participants in my dissertation research are pseudonyms.

15
baby had a heart problem, by accompanying her to several hospitals for consultations, she
gradually opened herself to me. The night her friend delivered a baby we were together in
the waiting room at a hospital and she started telling me about her children in the
Philippines and her new boyfriend in Korea even though I did not ask her to tell me her
story. The next morning we made a new interview appointment and finally, we could sit
together in her room for the interview.
My efforts did not always succeed. Another Filipina migrant, Emma, refused my
interview request by saying that she should ask her boyfriend first. I was told that she had
married a Korean man once but divorced him after she got Korean citizenship and then
was living with a Filipino man at that time. Although I asked her again for the interview
later and she said yes, I did not conduct it because she suddenly stopped answering my
phone calls. She might have been worried that I would judge her life or I would tell her
story to others.
9
Indeed, topics like divorce, cohabitation, or abortion were particularly
sensitive to many migrant women so they just did not tell me the whole story or simply
lied to me, especially before they came to trust me. The untold stories or lies of my
interviewees were usually come out later by themselves, as I met them several more
times and gained their full trust.
On the contrary, other people were very eager to share their stories. Yet, they
sometimes exaggerated their answers to please me. For example, my first interview with
Bayarmaa, a Mongolian woman who had stayed in Korea almost ten years, lasted more

9
Fortunately, this was the only one occasion that I was turned down by a potential interviewee. There were
two more interviews I could not conduct after I received permission. One was due to the arrest and
deportation of the migrant and the other was due to the move to another province by the migrant.

16
than four hours. She went on and on talking about her family back home and how much
she missed them, about her work in Korea and how tough it was, and about her friends
who left Korea to reunite their family. So I asked her, “isn’t it hard to live in Korea as an
undocumented migrant?” She answered to me that it was very much so that she could not
go out, except going back and forth from home to work, and that she could not have any
social life. After the interview, I met her several more times and found out that she was a
very active member of a church, had many friends, and often went out to hang out with
them. Afterwards, I stopped asking rhetorical questions in my interviews. Also, to make
sure the stories of my interviewees were trustworthy, I always conducted informal
follow-up conversations with them and tried to meet them in casual settings as often as
possible.
From my experience of living in the US as a non-resident foreigner and as a non-
native English speaker, I thought that I could easily relate to the experiences of the
migrants in Korea and in return, they could feel comfortable with me. However, from
their point of view, I was just like other Koreans who do not have to worry about visa
status, who can speak up about any problems anywhere in fluent Korean, and most of all
who might judge them for their life style. Although living with one’s boyfriend or
girlfriend without getting married, having children out of wedlock, and aborting a baby
are common phenomena among Koreans, my interviewees often studied my face when
they were talking about those kinds of subjects. When describing fights or conflicts
within their ethnic community, they usually made an additional remark such as “it is a

17
shame,” or “what would Koreans think about us?” Throughout the interviews, I had to
avoid making any judgments and maintain a neutral position.
An ethnographic field study takes a long time, especially when it deals with
people who try to make themselves as invisible as possible, and thus, are relatively
understudied like undocumented migrants in Korea, because establishing relationships
and building trust should precede listening to their stories and observing their lives. Yet,
the process is worthwhile because it gives us a better chance to understand what is going
on in reality. The immigration statistical data of Korea, published annually by the
Ministry of Justice, include the number of undocumented migrants by their duration of
stay. According to 2008 data, for example, 46,000 undocumented migrants have lived in
Korea over five years, which accounts for less than seven percent of all migrant workers.
Those who have stayed over ten years account for only three percent. Based on these
figures, some might conclude that there is no migrant settlement in Korea. However,
migrants who have been back home and then returned to Korea again are not counted in
this number. People who have never been recorded because they migrated through an
illegal channel or children of migrants who were born in Korea but have not been
registered due to the lack of documents are also excluded. Ethnographic field studies
enable us to find these missing people who are not reflected in statistical data.
Studies based on survey research also have limitations, since they simply ask
migrants’ intention to settlement. Most of my interview participants told me that they had
not intended to stay in Korea for a long time, but regardless of their original intention,
they were all there living their lives. Some hoped to return to their home countries soon

18
while others wanted to stay as long as they can. Some were held back by economic or
political constraints in their home countries while others already grew attachment to
Korean society. All had their will and agency with multiple identities and life trajectories,
which cannot be summed up by simple questions.
Migration and migrant settlement are processes carried out through the dynamic
interactions among individuals, families, organizations, and communities. The restrictive
conditions of undocumented migrants in Korea may limit those interactions to some
degree, but over time, they find ways to survive and cope with those conditions in their
everyday practices, and furthermore, begin to claim their rights to be recognized as
valuable members of Korean society and of their communities. Findings from my
ethnographic studies in Ky ŏnggi Province, together with policy analysis, will unfold the
experiences of undocumented migrants that have been neglected in Korean migration
policy studies.

Structure of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, I will analyze how long-term migrant workers and their
families and communities have experienced and challenged the immigration and
immigrant policies of Korea. I will focus particularly on the migrant settlement process
that goes with the process of ensuring substantive citizenship rights for migrant workers.
In the first three chapters, I will track the chronological evolution of the Korean
government’s labor migration policy, especially related to migrants as workers. In the last

19
two chapters, I will put more emphasis on the changes in immigrant policy where
migrants are considered as members of family and parts of a local community.
Chapter 1 describes how foreign migrants came to Korea for work and what the
Korean society’s responses were to those new workers in the early 1990s. Structural
changes that raised the demand for migrant workers, conflicts of interests around
importing foreign labor, and the convergence of different opinions to call for an official
labor migration system are covered in this chapter.
Chapter 2 examines how migrant workers in Korea achieved basic labor rights
during the mid 1990s. I investigate how the Korean government’s labor migration system
caused poor working conditions and human rights violations to migrant workers and how
migrant workers fought for protection by basic labor laws. The rise of migrant advocacy
organizations and their role in supporting migrant workers’ fights and pressuring the
government to improve its labor migration system are also discussed.
Chapter 3 explores the settlement process of migrant workers. Migrant workers
survived the Korean government’s repatriation policy during economic crisis in the late
1990s and expanded their social and political activities during temporary amnesty periods
in the early 2000s. Organized grassroots movements also emerged to demand the
government reform labor migration system and fully legalize undocumented migrants. I
discuss how these experiences paved the way to the settlement of migrant workers in
their communities.
Chapter 4 deals with the issues brought by migrant families and examines how the
presence of families and children has expanded the discourses regarding migrant rights.

20
Despite the anti-immigration policy of the Korean government, migrant workers have
brought in or formed families and raised children in Korea. International marriages
between migrants and Korean citizens have increased with marriage migration. Migrants
and their advocacy organizations began to call for the government to protect the rights of
family members of migrants. I look into how all those phenomena have influenced both
the national and local governments’ policies around migrants and ethnic minorities.
Chapter 5 focuses on the process of migrant workers becoming local citizens
regardless of their residence status. Migrant workers in Korea have built their own
communities in their neighborhoods by establishing ethnic businesses, places of worship,
and migrant grassroots organizations. Collaborating with various local organizations,
migrant advocacy organizations have supported migrant communities and incorporated
migrants into local communities. I examine how these processes have influenced migrant
settlement and challenged traditional concept of citizenship.
The concluding chapter addresses lessons from the experiences of migrant
workers in Korea and suggests the policy and planning implications of my study for the
national and the local levels.

21

Kunpo
Anyang
Ŭiwang
Inch ŏn City
Seoul City
Ky ŏnggi Province

Map of the Field Study Site (Anyang, Kunpo, and Ŭiwang Cities in Ky ŏnggi Province)

22
CHAPTER 1. EMERGENCE OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN KOREA

The migration of people across borders in search of work has always been a part
of Asian history. However, international migration within Asia, especially in the form of
labor migration, has grown enormously in recent decades. As developing Asian countries
began to participate in the globalization process, they became economically integrated
with each other, which has led to not only capital flows within the region but also labor
migration across borders (Athukorala and Manning 1999; Iredale et al. 2003; Akaha and
Vassilieva 2005). Although most labor importing countries in Asia adopted a restrictive
migration policy, their reliance on migrant labor has been increasing due to various
structural changes accompanied by globalization.
With other newly industrialized countries in Asia, Korea transformed from a
former labor exporting country to a labor importing country from the late 1980s. The
structural changes in Korean economy as well as demographic transition resulted in labor
shortages in certain sectors of industry and consequent demand for migrant labor. At the
same time, Korea’s attempts to be one of the leading countries in Asia, by exporting
goods, investing capital, and publicizing its image, attracted migrant workers from less
developed Asian countries. However, the entry of migrant workers into Korea caused
public concerns as well as the demand for a proper labor migration system.
In this chapter, I place Korea in a broader picture of structural changes and
globalization within Asia and look into the contexts of international labor migration to

23
Korea in detail. Focusing on the early period of labor migration into Korea, that is, from
the late 1980s to early 1990s, I examine how migrant workers began to enter Korea, what
consequences they brought to Korean society, and how the Korean government
responded to those consequences.

Contexts of International Labor Migration to Korea

Until two to three decades ago, migrant workers from Asia were more likely to
move out of the region in search of jobs. Yet, now they are more likely to find a job
within the region (Debrah 2002: 2). At the close of the 1970s, fewer than six percent of
Asian people leaving their countries for work were migrating to countries within the
region, but over the second half of the 1990s, the percentage went up to over forty. The
estimated number of migrant workers within Asia has increased from one million at the
beginning of the 1980s to 6.2 million in 2000 (Abella 1995: 125, IOM 2003: 197-199).
The migration of workers within Asia was mostly to oil-rich countries in the
Middle East from the mid-1970s to late 1980s, but the direction changed to Japan and
newly industrialized countries, including Korea, from the late 1980s. Economic
integration and globalization within the region increased the flows of labor migration
more than ever before. In this section, I examine the structural changes that happened
from the 1980s to early 1990s, which stimulated international labor migration within
Asia. I first look into the South-North migration within the region in general, and then
move to the migration from South and Southeast Asian countries to Korea in particular.

24

Structural Changes and Migration within Asia
Large-scale international migration within Asia began in the mid-1970s when the
oil-rich countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab
Emirates, recruited masses of migrant workers from countries like Bangladesh, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Korea for construction and industrialization. At first, most were
men working in construction projects for facilities and infrastructures. Later the demand
of migrant labor expanded to service sectors, including domestic service, and women
from countries like the Philippines and Sri Lanka joined in the flow of labor migration
towards the Middle East. By 1989, five million migrants from Southeast and East Asia
were working in the Middle East (Stalker 1994: 241). Yet, the decline of oil prices and
the political tensions in the Gulf region in the late 1980s and early 1990s led migrant
labor flows to take new routes such as to Japan and the newly industrialized economies
(NIEs) of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea.
Until the mid-1980s, the intra-Asian migratory flows except the Middle East were
largely limited to the city-states like Singapore and Hong Kong both of which recruited
workers mainly from their natural hinterlands, Malaysia and China respectively. The
scale and scope were extended from the late 1980s when countries like Japan, Taiwan
and Korea experienced labor shortages after rapid economic growth and became
attractive for workers from various countries in South and Southeast Asia (Fong 1993,
Pongsapich 1995, Battistella 2003).
10
These new flows of labor migration were

10
Malaysia and Thailand also have substantial in-migration, but they differ from countries in East Asia in
that they started to use migrant workers at an early stage of development and they are still sending a

25
stimulated by demographic transitions and changes in labor market structures in more
industrialized countries and facilitated by globalization throughout the region.
First, as demographic transitions occurred more rapidly in some Asian countries
than others, these countries experienced serious labor shortages. Although the overall
population in Asia had increased, its growth had slowed between 1970 to 1990
throughout the region, especially in the countries experiencing rapid economic
development, such as Japan and the NIEs. In those countries, fertility rates had dropped
sharply by the late 1980s (Bloom and Williamson 1998, Feeney and Mason 2001). For
example, the fertility rates declined from 6.0~6.1 in the early 1970s to 4.3~5.5 in the
early 1990s for Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, whereas the fertility rates
decreased from 4.0~5.5 in 1970 to 1.5~1.8 in 1990 for Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
(UNPD 1997; 2004).
11
Along with the decline in mortality, decreasing fertility rates
resulted in rapid population aging and consequent shortages in the working age
population.
12

Second, changes in the industrial structure together with the improvement of
educational attainment of population in Japan and the NIEs in the period of 1980 to 1990
transformed their labor market structures and created constant labor shortages in certain
sectors of industry. During the period, Japan and the NIEs experienced the decline of

significant number of workers to neighboring Asian countries. For different experiences of labor migration
among Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, see Athukorala and
Manning (1999).
11
The fertility rate of Japan was already low at 2.1 in 1970 and declined further to 1.5 in 1990.
12
The United Nation Population Division 2001 report expects that the projected population decline and
population ageing in the countries like Korea and Japan will force the governments to reconsider many
established economic, political, and social policies and programs including those relating to international
migration, because a large scale of immigration will be needed to offset population ageing.

26
manufacturing industry and the growth of service industry both in terms of production
and employment (Stahl 1991, Athukorala and Manning 1999).
13
Employment expansion
in the service sector was accelerated as more people got higher education and new labor
market entrants began to eschew low-paid and less-valued manual labor.
14
Consequently,
small- and medium-size manufacturing industry, which had relatively poorer working
conditions, began to suffer from constant labor shortages.
Finally, globalization within Asia, characterized by economic integration through
liberalization and cultural integration through the development of telecommunication and
transportation technologies, caused and eased the mobility of labor throughout the region.
Most of all, economic integration within Asia in the 1980s, characterized by intra-
regional trade and the movement of capital in the form of foreign direct investment,
closed the distance between countries within Asia (Schott 1991, Urata 2001, Munakata
2006, Cai 2007).
15
Exports of capital and the relocation of production sites originally
took place in order to alleviate labor shortages while reducing production costs. Yet, they
not only deepened labor shortages for small- and medium-size manufacturers who lacked
capital and the ability to relocate production facilities abroad, but also built particular
migratory linkages from the invested countries to the investing ones (L Lim 1992, Sassen
1988). For example, capital investment from Korean companies to China, Indonesia and
other parts of South Asia and relocation of Taiwanese companies in China and Southeast

13
By the early 1990s, the service sector accounted for over 50 percent of total production and employment
in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea.
14
For the improvement of education attainment in East Asia, see Ahlburg and Jensen (2001).
15
Intra-regional trade rose from some $190 billion in 1980 to almost $450 billion in 1989. FDI (Foreign
direct investment) inflows in the forms of relocation of manufacturing firms and joint ventures from Japan
and NIEs to ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, also rose
sharply from the mid-1980s. China and Vietnam joined as the FDI destinations from the early 1990s.

27
Asia during the 1980s led to the labor flows in the form of industrial training in the late
1980s and the early 1990s (Harris 1995: 67-75). In addition, the cultural integration of
Asian region lubricated the flows of intra-regional migration. The dissemination of
information through mass media made people in the less industrialized Asian countries
aware of industrialized Asian countries, develop positive images towards them, and
consider working there as a plausible option.
Changes in migratory direction within Asia, which occurred from the mid- 1980s
to early 1990s, resulted from both demographic and economic imbalances among Asian
countries as well as the integration and globalization of the region. In the process, some
countries underwent a major transition, that is, from a former country of emigration to a
new country of immigration, and Korea was one of them (Fields 1994, Park 1994).

Changes in Industrial Structure of Korea
The industrialization of the Korean economy, starting from the 1960s, was
achieved largely without depending on migrant workers from other countries until the
country reached a relatively advanced stage of economic development in the late 1980s.
Instead, young people from rural areas, who suffered from a decline of agricultural
employment due to the low rice policy implemented by the government, supplied the
necessary labor force. A significant number of those young workers were women and
they were absorbed in low-wage, labor-intensive light manufacturing industries, such as
garments, textile, footwear, and electrical appliances, which had been promoted by
export-oriented policy of the Korean government in the 1960s and the early 1970s.

28
Female factory workers were hired for extremely low wages with long hours of work and
forced to sacrifice themselves for the good of the nation while being extolled as
“industrial soldiers” and “pillars of exports.” By 1975, these “feminine industries”
composed 70 percent of total export of Korea (H Kim 2000: 51).
From the mid-1970s the government promoted heavy manufacturing industries,
such as automobiles, machinery, shipbuilding, steel, and petrochemicals, and supported
the growth of large business conglomerates, the “chaebol,” to do that (Rhee 1994, E Kim
1996; 1997, H Lim 1998). Benefiting disproportionately by government subsidy in loans,
the chaebol invested in heavy manufacturing and construction industries.
16
Construction
was not only a way to develop heavy manufacturing firms at home, but also a way to earn
foreign capital by obtaining large construction contracts from the Middle East and
sending construction companies with a large number of recruited workers. With the
endorsement of the government, chaebol construction companies exported male
construction workers to the Middle East from the mid-1970s, which peaked in 1982 with
the number of over 190,000 workers. The number was equivalent to approximately 20
percent of total employment in domestic construction work (Hyun 1989: 144-5).
17

However, labor exports fell sharply in the late 1980 when Middle East countries reduced
development and infrastructure spending as their oil revenues declined. Chaebol
construction companies working in the Middle East began to employ cheaper Filipino

16
The Korean government has partnered with the chaebol from the beginning of its economic development
based on the belief that small- and medium-sized businesses could not provide measurable gains in
economic development in a short period of time.
17
Construction workers hired by the chaebol companies were also sent to Vietnam and Thailand in the
1960s, but the number was relatively small around 10,000 (Fong 1993: 301, E Kim 1997: 131).

29
and Thai workers to replace Korean workers and stopped sending Korean workers after
1988 (Alburo 1994: 54-55, Pongsapich 1995: 23).
By the end of the 1980s, the growth of manufacturing industries stabilized, but the
structure of manufacturing industries got segmented with the booming heavy
manufacturing industries by the chaebol and large-scale firms and declining light
manufacturing industries by small- and medium-scale firms.
18
Meanwhile, the service
industries grew during the 1980s, although at a moderate rate (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1. Gross Domestic Product by Industries

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 26.7 24.6 14.4 12.1 8.0 5.7
Manufacturing 16.2 19.7 21.7 24.4 24.5 24.9
Light Manufacturing 9.6 9.9 9.1 8.9 7.1 5.8
Heavy and Chemical Manufacturing 6.6 9.8 12.6 15.5 17.4 19.1
Construction 4.7 4.2 7.1 6.6 10.2 10.5
Service 40.8 39.6 42.1 42.3 44.5 46.7
Others 11.7 11.9 14.7 14.6 12.8 12.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: For 1970-1990, Economic Planning Board. Korea Statistical Yearbook, each year. For
1995, National Statistical Office. Korea Statistical Yearbook.

As the industrial structure has been upgraded, the labor force has moved from the
manufacturing sector to the service sector. Service sector absorbed new workers as well
as former factory workers, especially women. In 1980, 22 percent of female labor market
participants were in manufacturing industries and 32 percent of them were in service

18
In 1987, top five chaebol groups shared 75.2 percent in total sales in GDP in manufacturing of Korea (E
Kim 1997: 183).

30
industries. In 1990, the percentage in service industries increased to 52 percent while the
percentage in manufacturing industries was 28 percent (Kang and Sin 2001: 77).
19

In addition to the changes in industrial structure, demographic and educational
transformation as well as democratization and labor movements resulted in the changes in
labor market structure and brought about consequent labor shortages in certain sectors of
manufacturing industry.

Changes in Labor Market
From the beginning of the economic development, the Korean government had
maintained an oppressive labor policy that violated the basic rights of workers guaranteed
by the Labor Standards Act because it believed that low labor costs with high labor
productivity were the only way for Korea to be competitive in a world market. The
patriarchal relationship between employers and workers, as well as the idea that
collective action by workers was inspired by communists, also justified the restrictive
labor policy (Ogle 1990). Despite tight control over labor activities by the government,
the unionization movement and the struggle for labor rights burgeoned from the early
1970s, especially by women workers in textile factories. The labor movement became
more militant during the 1980s with the support by college students, intellectuals, and
radical members of religious organizations. Simultaneously, the suppression by the
government also became more violent (S-k Kim 1997, Koo 2001).

19
Although the percentage of those in manufacturing sector was also increased due to the dramatic decline
of the employment in agriculture, from 47 percent to 20 percent, the increase rate was far below than that of
in service sector.

31
The resentment toward the military government gradually built up, and finally in
1987 a massive uprising of workers occurred. Not only students and the activists from
radical organizations but the middle class and white-collar workers also joined in the
labor uprising. The government was pushed to make a series of democratic reforms
including the withdrawal of its restrictive labor regulations. Workers organized
independent labor unions and demanded the improvement of working condition. The
wage was increased, the working hour was reduced and basic labor rights were secured.
However, the improvement was made mainly in large-scale heavy manufacturing firms
while workers in small- or medium-scale labor-intensive firms still remained in poor
working conditions. As a result, the wage gap between the two widened. The average
workers’ wage in small-size firms was 72 percent of those in large-size firms in 1980, but
it dropped to 58 percent in 1990 (Table 1.2). Consequently, workers came to be attracted
to large-size firms with better working conditions, and small- and medium-sized firms
began to suffer from labor shortages.

Table 1.2. Workers’ Annual Wages by Firm Sizes (million won)

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Small (5 ~ 49 employees) 0.33 1.38 2.28 4.79 9.76
Medium (50 ~ 299 employees) 0.43 1.62 2.81 6.08 12.53
Large (300 or more employees) 0.52 1.91 3.46 8.20 17.01

Note: Only manufacturing firms with more than five employees were surveyed.
Source: For 1975-1985, Economic Planning Board. Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey,
each year. For 1990-1995, National Statistical Office. Report on Mining and
Manufacturing Survey, each year.

32
The problem of labor shortages in small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms
got worse as more young people attained higher education and fewer young people,
especially in the age between 15 and 24, worked (Table 1.3). Besides, even after finishing
school, they were not willing to work in so-called 3-D industries, that is, dirty, dangerous,
and difficult industries, where the workload was heavy, the work hour was long, and the
wage was low. Labor shortage rate in manufacturing industries increased from 2.0 in
1985 to 7.0 in 1991 and particularly, unskilled labor shortage rate in small-sized
manufacturing firms with less than 30 workers grew from 4.0 to 44.8 during the same
period of time (Table 1.4). The textile and garment manufacturing firms had the highest
labor shortage rate in the early 1990s, reflecting how few low-wage female workers were
available for labor intensive manufacturing industries.

Table 1.3. School Enrollment and Economic Activities (%)

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
School Enrollment Rate
1)

High School 31.3 (26.2) 48.8 (44.3) 64.2 (61.7) 79.4 (77.2) 82.9 (82.4)
College & University 06.7 (04.3) 11.4 (06.6) 22.9 (16.2) 23.6 (19.1) 36.0 (31.7)
Population Engaged in Economic Activities by Age Group
2)

15 ~ 19 years old 47.0 (47.6) 30.0 (34.0) 16.5 (19.1) 12.5 (16.7) 9.1 (11.5)
20 ~ 24 years old 68.2 (56.5) 60.8 (53.0) 43.9 (49.8) 46.4 (51.4) 49.3 (53.7)
25 ~ 29 years old 65.6 (35.6) 60.7 (30.2) 61.4 (35.2) 55.7 (29.8) 60.7 (39.4)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of women.
Source: 1) Ministry of Education & Human Resources and Korean Education Development
Institute. Statistical Yearbook of Education, each year.
2) Korea National Statistical Office. Population and Housing Census (Economic
Activity), each year except 1985. For 1985, Ministry of Labor. 1986. Yearbook of Labour
Statistics.

33
Table 1.4. Labor Shortage Rate

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
By Industry
All industries
1), 2)
1.8 2.3 3.3 3.5 3.2 4.3 5.5
Manufacturing 2.0 2.9 4.4 4.7 4.2 5.6 7.0
Mining 3.2 4.0 2.2 2.5 3.6 7.1 8.9
Construction 2.0 1.3 3.3 1.4 2.1 5.1 3.2
By Skill Level
3)

All skill level 2.4 3.2 4.8 5.2 4.9 6.9 9.1
Unskilled workers 4.9 8.3 11.1 12.3 11.8 16.2 20.1
Unskilled Labor Shortage Rate by Firm Size (Number of Employees)
10 ~ 29 4.0 6.4 21.8 29.4 28.8 39.4 44.8
30 ~ 99 5.3 8.1 12.6 16.2 13.3 17.7 22.1
100 ~ 299 5.7 10.5 14.0 12.7 11.0 18.2 23.5
300 ~ 499 3.6 5.1 9.6 11.6 13.0 17.1 18.3
500 or more 4.7 8.3 7.2 7.0 7.5 7.4 11.1

Note: 1) All industries except agriculture, forestry, and fishery
2) Only businesses with 10 or more employees were surveyed.
3) Only those who involved in manual work
Source: Ministry of Labor. Report on the Labor Demand Survey, each year.

To avoid labor shortages and growing demand for higher wage, some of the labor-
intensive manufacturing firms began to relocate their production sites to other Asian
countries where the labor was cheap and easy to control. In the early 1980s, Korea’s
foreign direct invest (FDI) accounted for less than 200 million US dollars, but it reached
over 2,000 million US dollars in 1990. Particularly, from 1988, FDI by Korean
manufacturing firms to Southeast Asia grew remarkably, and by 1992, more than 50
percent of FDI went to the Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand (Shin and Lee 1995, Tcha 1998). However, not all manufacturing firms facing
labor shortages could afford to relocate their firms. Especially, most of the small-sized
manufacturing firms that suffered from labor shortages the most could not possibly move.

34
Arrival of Migrant Workers

Beginning in the late 1980s, Asian migrant workers began to be attracted to
Korea, as it was known as one of the fast growing economies, through its export goods
and foreign investment. In addition, two international sports games hosted by Korea, the
1986 Asian games and 1988 Olympic games, drew their attention. Those international
games changed the image of Korea from a poor, war-torn country to a remarkably
developing one, which the Korean government eagerly promoted through the events.
Until the mid-1980s the Korean government had kept a tight border control not only over
the entry of foreigners but also over the exit of its nationals in order to limit the outflow
of domestic capital.
20
However, in both 1986 and 1988, it made the entry process easy by
implementing temporary exceptional rules to the existing immigration law, that is, the
Immigration Control Act, to lure more foreign visitors. Those who visited Korea during
those game periods, as well as those who watched it on TV, came to feel friendly towards
Korea. Asian migrants who used to look for overseas work in Hong Kong or Singapore
began to see Korea as a desirable destination. In this section, I examine the situation of
Asian migrant workers in Korea before the implementation of formal labor migration
system in 1992. I also look into the changes in public attitudes as well as the
government’s responses toward those migrant workers.

20
It was 1989 when the Korean government deregulated oversea traveling for its nationals.

35
Arrival of Early Comers
Before 1992, there were no regulations on international labor migration in Korea.
Only professional workers, such as professors, foreign language instructors, or engineers,
were admitted with work visa and unskilled migrants were not allowed to work in any
occupation. Yet, there were a small number of unskilled migrant workers under the name
of “foreign industrial trainees” who were hired in overseas branches of Korean FDI firms
in their country and sent to the parent firms in Korea for training purpose. The “foreign
industrial trainee system” was originally created to teach and transfer skills to the trainees
from less developed countries, but rather than getting training, they were just placed to do
the manual jobs that Korean workers were unwilling to do (Iju Y ŏs ŏng In’gw ŏn Y ŏndae
2002: 16). Those foreign trainees entered with three-month trainee visa and got training
at the designated workplace while being paid with small amount of allowance. The
number of foreign trainees admitted per year increased from 525 in 1985 to 3,313 in 1990
(Ministry of Justice 1985, 1990).
Beside those foreign trainees, there were also “undocumented migrant workers”
who entered Korea mostly with tourist or business visa and then overstayed or violated
visa status.
21
At first, most of these undocumented migrant workers were ethnic Koreans
from China, but soon after people from Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan, joined them.
22
Although there were no formal data on
unskilled migrant workers before 1992, the Ministry of Justice estimated that there were

21
There are various terms indicating undocumented migrants, such as illegal migrants, unauthorized
migrants, or irregular migrants. In this dissertation, I use “undocumented migrants” to refer migrants who
overstay their visa, who work with non-working visa, or who work outside their designated work place
without formal process, thus lose their legal status.
22
The number of ethnic Koreans entering from China had increased from 1,660 in 1988 to 20,925 in 1990.

36
more than 10,000 undocumented foreigners in 1989 and assumed that most of them were
working as unskilled laborers in factories, construction sites, or service industries (C Kim
1990: 4). According to another source, the estimated numbers of undocumented migrant
workers almost grew ten times from 4,217 in 1987 to 41,877 in 1991 (Seol and Skrentny
2004: 484).
Undocumented migrant workers who entered Korea earlier than the
implementation of formal labor migration system came to know employment
opportunities in Korea through various channels. Some heard about job opportunities in
Korea after they went to another country for work and then changed their final
destination to Korea. Mihir from Bangladesh was one of them:
I first visited Korea with my father during 1988 Olympic games. We watched
several games, enjoyed sightseeing, and went back home. I was running my own
business back then, but it went down. So I sold it out and decided to go abroad to
work. First I went to Hong Kong and there I heard from other Bangladeshi people
that there were many jobs available in Korea. So I just bought a plane ticket and
entered this country with tourist visa. It was February 1992. I was very surprised
because Korea was much more advanced than it had been in 1988. (Mihir,
Bangladeshi, male, 40)

Roshan also changed his destination from Belgium to Korea:
One of my very close friends was working in Belgium, and he told me to come
and join him. He advised me to go to Hong Kong first and applied for visa from
there. So I went to Hong Kong in 1991. But after six months in Hong Kong, I
could not get Belgium visa. And since I had to get out of Hong Kong twice for my
Hong Kong visa renewal, I already spent all the money I brought. I began to work
in Hong Kong, but there were only daily-basis jobs. Then I heard from other
people about Korea. They said there were a lot of stable jobs in Korea and the pay
was really good. Back then it was really easy to enter Korea. No need to apply for
visa, no need for this, no need for that. So I decided to come to Korea. When I
arrived at the airport, I told the immigration officer that I was a merchant.
Because I had visa stamps from different countries in my passport, he believed
me. I got three-month business visa at the immigration counter and entered Korea.
(Roshan, Bangladeshi, male, 38)

37
Others decided to come to Korea with more direct information, like Nadia who came to
Korea in 1991:
I had a neighbor who was already working in Korea. Her boss sent her to get
more people who would work in his company. She convinced me and 17 other
people from my neighborhood to come and work with her. At that time, we didn’t
have to apply for visa to come to Korea. I just arrived at the airport and got a 15-
day entry stamp. The very next day, I began to work in a textile company in
Suw ŏn, Ky ŏnggi-Do. (Nadia, Filipino, female, 46)

Although not so sure where to work like Nadia, many decided to come to Korea
for work after their friends, relatives, and other acquaintances, who already had working
experiences in Korea, told them to. Once arrived, they could easily find a job in a factory
through those who encouraged them to come or illicit brokers who charged a fee for a
referral. The experiences of the early comers clearly show that migrant networks were
already established by the early 1990s from which they received a great help in coming to
and finding a job in Korea.
23
Kumar who came to Korea in 1992 was one of those who
got his first job thorough his friends who were already working in Korea:
Before I came to Korea, I had worked in India with my friends. After we came
home, some of the friends went to Korea for work. They told me that I could earn
a lot of money by working in Korea, so I decided to come and join them. At that
time, there was no non-stop flight between Nepal and Korea. I stopped over Hong
Kong, stayed there for two weeks, and then entered Korea with 15-day tourist
visa. After staying with my friends a couple of days, I began to work in a small
goldsmith factory in Sŏngnam, Ky ŏnggi-Do. I was lucky that I had friends who
referred a job to me, because I knew that many had to pay a broker to get a job.
(Kumar, Nepalese, male, 42)

Raman from Nepal also had a similar story:

23
Migrant networks can be defined interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-
migrants in origin and destination countries through kinship, friendship, and shared community origin
(Massey et al. 1998:42). Migrant networks not only encourage potential migrants in the countries of origin
to migrate by providing information and resources, but also facilitate the incoming migrants to adjust to and
settle in the countries of destination by assisting them in finding a job and housing (Tilly 1990).

38
I was a trading merchant going back and forth to Hong Kong. From 1991, many
of my friends, who used to work in the same business with me, left for Korea for
better-paying jobs. They said they earned about 500 US dollars per month. That
was much better than what we could earn in the trading business. So I decided to
come. With four other friends, I arrived in Korea in March 1992. Our friends who
came earlier than us helped us get a job. I got in a paper box factory in Songt’an,
Ky ŏnggi-Do, and four other friends who came with me got in a nearby factory.
(Raman, Nepalese, male, 35)

In the early days, the job brokers for migrant workers were mainly doing their
business in It’aew ŏn, the commercial area near Yongsan Garrison (the US military base
in Seoul). It’aew ŏn had been a popular place for foreign sojourners in Korea since there
had been a variety of ethnic restaurants, grocery stores, and religious centers. As more
and more migrant workers visited It’aew ŏn, businesses targeted especially to migrant
workers, such as job brokers, foreign currency exchangers, and private bankers, also
flourished.
24
Even though migrant workers did not always get a job through a job broker,
they still went to It’aew ŏn to get information about job opportunities from other fellow
migrant workers gathering there. Roshan already knew about It’aew ŏn before he came to
Korea, so he directly went there right after he arrived:
As soon as I got out of the airport, I grabbed a taxi and asked the driver to go to
It’aew ŏn. All I heard about It’aew ŏn was that there was a Mosque, and but I
figured that when I got there I could meet people from my country and got some
help. At the Mosque I met some Pakistani people. They told me that I could find
work if I went to Anyang, Ky ŏnggi-Do. They gave me a phone number of a
Bangladeshi migrant worker at Anyang and let me know how to get there. I went
to Anyang, met the Bangladeshi guy, and he introduced me a job at an injection
molding factory.

The experiences of those early comers about how to come to Korea and find their
jobs show that migrant networks had already been established in Korea by the early

24
It’aew ŏn and other popular gathering places for migrant workers in the 1990s played an important role in
the establishment of grassroots migrant organzations. See chapter 5 for detailed discussion.

39
1990s. They also show that not only prevalent labor shortages but also the relative
easiness to enter the country and find a job attracted more and more migrant workers into
Korea. As the number of undocumented migrants increased, public concerns and
demands began to rise.

Conflicted Interests around Migrant Workers
As migrant workers became visible by the early 1990s, the media started to pay
attention to them and cover the stories of undocumented migrant workers such as
Bangladeshi workers in sweatshops, Chinese workers of Korean descent in construction
sites, and Filipina workers in domestic service. Although the media acknowledged the
seriousness of labor shortages in small- and medium-sized manufacturing industries, their
coverage of migrant workers was mainly negative in tone in the beginning.
25

Most of all, the media usually expressed concerns about socio-economic impacts
that migrant workers would bring about. For example, they argued that migrant workers
would disturb the domestic labor market in the long run by creating unemployment and
job shortages for Korean workers, bring about social conflicts in case of long-term
settlement by having alien language, culture, and customs, and contaminate our “pure
blood” or ethnic homogeneity by marrying Korean nationals. In addition, they often
viewed migrant workers as potential criminals who had a high tendency to commit
crimes such as theft, robbery, or sexual assault.
26
By frequently using the term “illegal

25
The paragraphs below are based on my review of articles and editorials about migrant workers from
seven different Korean newspapers published from 1990 to 1992.
26
According to a report published in 1994 by the Korean Institute of Criminology (KIC), more than 60
percent of crimes committed by foreigners between 1988 and 1992 were done by Americans, most of

40
sojourners” instead of “migrant workers,” the media emphasized their illegality of stay in
the country. They even accused migrant workers of being responsible for the spread of
AIDS in Korea and argued all undocumented migrants should get tested for HIV.
The hostility towards migrant workers led the media to demand the government
take strong action against these “unwelcomed foreign guests.” In January 1990, president
Roh Tae Woo expressed his concerns on increasing undocumented migrant workers and
said that the immigration inspection should be tightened and the supervision on already
entered foreigners should be strengthened (Kungmin Ilbo 1990). Soon after, the Ministry
of Justice, which is in charge of immigration control, announced that it would investigate
the legal status of 6,876 entrants from underdeveloped Asian countries, such as the
Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (Han’guk Ilbo 1990). Those who were
found to be undocumented would be fined and deported and officials added that the
Ministry would amend the Immigration Control Act to enhance the penalty for hiring
undocumented migrant workers.
27

While pressuring the government, the media also suggested alternative options to
resolve the problem of labor shortages without importing migrant workers. At first, they
hoped to persuade the younger generation to take hard but honest work in manufacturing

whom belonged to the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Korea, while less than three percent of crimes were
committed by South or Southeast Asians (Ch’oe and Ch’oe 1994). Although the media have always talked
about increasing crime rates among undocumented migrant workers, there is no evidence that migrant
workers committed more crimes than their population proportion. Another KIC report published in 2006
reveals that foreigners from countries with a large number of undocumented migrants in Korea, such as
China, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, and the Philippines, commit less crimes than those from the US,
Canada, Germany, France or Japan. According to the Report, undocumented migrants have fewer
tendencies to commit crimes because they are afraid of being deported once they are detected. Rather, they
can easily be targets of crimes due to their vulnerable position (Ch’oe 2006).
27
In June 1990, the Ministry of Justice announced that they would fine undocumented migrant workers up
to five million won and punish employers and job brokers with up to 3 years of imprisonment or up to three
million won fine. Yet, the actual amendment was less severe than what had been proposed.

41
sector. They criticized young workers by saying that Korea’s GNP per capita barely
exceeded 5,000 USD recently, but the young had already gotten indolent and wanted easy
jobs. Yet, appealing to moral values could not lure educated young workers with high job
expectations to manual labor. Then the media turned its attention to absorbing married
women, the elderly, and the disabled into the labor market. However, the elderly and the
disabled could not handle the workload of labor-intensive manufacturing sectors. The
employment of married women was more complicated.
The use of female labor to ease the labor shortages was originally proposed by the
Ministry of Labor. Quoting the survey results by Economic Planning Board in 1989 that
the nation had 1,690,000 potential unemployed workers, and 77.9 percent of them were
female, the Ministry of Labor argued that bringing only some of these unemployed
women into the labor market could solve the labor shortage problem (Park 1994: 155).
However, necessary conditions for facilitating the employment of women, especially
married women, were hard to meet. Most of all, women’s labor force participation had
fallen not only due to rising women’s education level but also due to the patriarchal
“marriage bar” that forced women to quit their formal sector jobs upon marriage. Also,
the wide wage gap between women and men discouraged women from continuing work
after marriage (Seguino 1997).
28
Although promoting gender equality at work and
providing public childcare programs were discussed, those goals were not likely to be
achieved in the near future.

28
As of June 1990, the average wage of women in manufacturing was 299,982 won (417 USD), which was
only 55 percent of that of men at 560,762 won (781 USD) (Ministry of Labor 1991).

42
With few alternatives available, businesses suffering from labor shortages, such as
manufacturing, construction, and mining industries, began to appeal to the government
that importing migrant labor was the only way for them to survive. For example, in 1989
the Housing Development Association demanded that the government should allow them
to use foreign labor in construction sites and the Coal Mining Association proposed the
Ministry of Energy import foreign labor for mining industry. In 1990 voices from
businesses became louder: the Electronic Industries Cooperative, the Korea Federation of
Small and Medium Business, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and a
group of exporting businesses requested the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to create
a legitimate way to import migrant workers from Southeast Asia and China (Han’guk
Ilbo 1990b, Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1990, S ŏul Sinmun 1990, S ŏl 1992: 134-5).
Those who advocated importing labor argued that migrant workers would not
replace Korean workers, but complement domestic labor. In other words, utilizing
migrant workers would not cause the unemployment of Korean workers, because they
would only take jobs that most Korean workers would not accept. Yet, those who
opposed importing labor showed their concerns not because migrant workers would take
jobs from Korean workers but because they would delay the improvement of working
conditions. For example, when the idea of importing migrant workers in construction
sector was proposed, the Daily Laborers’ Association opposed it out of the fear that
employing migrant workers would limit wage increases (C Kim 1990: 7). As many
business owners openly admitted, they supported importing migrant labor because they
could utilize cheap labor without worrying about labor disputes.

43
According to the newspaper articles in the early 1990s, the wages of migrant
workers’ were far less than those of Korean workers. Migrant workers got paid from
70,000 to 250,000 won (about 98 to 351 USD) per month in 1990 and approximately
350,000 won (about 448 USD) per month in 1992, which was at best less than 45 percent
of the average monthly wage of Korean workers in manufacturing.
29
Migrant workers
were welcomed because they were cheap and obedient. According to a survey conducted
by Kuri Nodong Sangdamso (Kuri Labor Counseling Office) in 1992 of 1,042 small- and
medium-sized business owners who employed migrant workers, 92 percent of the
business owners said they were satisfied with migrant workers because they did whatever
they were told to do without resistance (Tonga Ilbo 1992). Besides, the employers of
migrant workers were often reported not to pay them on time or at all and to fire them
without notice. These exploitative practices reinforced the concerns that the employment
of migrant workers would deteriorate the overall working condition in manufacturing
sector.

From Absolute Prohibition to Gradual Permission
In the early stage, the Korean government was adamant that it would only allow
professionals and skilled workers that could not be substituted by domestic workforce to
migrate and would never import unskilled foreign labor. The biggest concern of the
government was the long-term settlement of a large number of migrant workers and the
consequent socio-economic burden on the government, such as housing, health care, and

29
In manufacturing industries, average monthly wage for Korean workers were 590,760won (about 829
USD) in 1990 and 798,548 won (about 1,022 USD) in 1992 (Ministry of Labor 1991, 1993).

44
education. Also, the government worried about social conflicts and ethnic tensions that
long-term migrant workers would bring to Korean society.
30
Therefore, the government
refused to formalize a labor migration system despite the insistence of the business circle.
It also maintained its principle of “arrest and deportation” of undocumented migrant
workers. In 1991, the Ministry of Justice announced two “intensive crackdown periods”
to reduce the number of undocumented migrant workers.
However, as the demands from the business circles got louder, some of the
ministries began to take different positions. In the Cabinet meeting in February 1991, for
instance, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Construction proposed that migrant
labor should be imported in some sectors of industries, such as mining and construction,
while the Ministry of Justice opposed the idea (Segye Ilbo 1991). It was very unusual for
the Ministry of Labor, because it had been opposed imported labor, arguing that
balancing the labor supply and demand would eliminate the problem of labor shortages. It
even suggested importing ethnic Koreans from China as one way to relieve the concern
of social conflicts that migrant workers might cause.
31
The Ministry of Energy and
Industry also joined in the pro side of the debate and insisted that existing foreign
industrial trainee system should be extended so that manufacturing firms without
overseas investments could utilize migrant workers (Kungmin Ilbo 1991).
Finally, in November 1991 the Ministry of Justice announced the expansion of the
existing “foreign industrial trainee system.” The expansion allowed manufacturing firms

30
The concerns about potential impacts of mass immigration on Korean society resembled the anti-
immigration arguments in the US made by, for example, Briggs (1992) or Brimelow (1995).
31
The idea that utilizing ethnic Koreans from China or the former Soviet Unions as supplementary labor
had been thought to be relatively acceptable from the beginning because they share common language,
culture, and value with “us,” therefore, less problematic.

45
that had overseas investments to import trainees from the invested countries, with the
number of trainees up to 50 per company or 10 percent of the company’s workforce and
the duration of training for up to one year.
32
Also, to placate the opposition of the small-
sized firms without overseas branches, the government decided to condone the
employment of undocumented migrants in the manufacturing industries experiencing
extreme labor shortages, such as textile, foot wear, and sewing industries, for a limited
period time. Particularly, ethnic Koreans from China were allowed to work in any legal
occupation. The Korean government had changed its position from absolute prohibition
of importing foreign labor to gradual permission of utilizing it though limited in terms
and condition.
However, these temporary remedies neither could cure the problem of labor
shortages nor relieve public concerns. In addition, the government’s ambiguous attitude
towards migrant workers was criticized as shortsighted and irresponsible, thus
aggravating the demand for more systematic labor migration policy.

Chapter Summary

During the late 1980s, Korea transitioned from a labor exporting country to a
labor importing one. One of the main catalysts for the transition was labor shortages in
Korea caused not only by low fertility rates and rapid population aging but also by labor

32
Before that, a company could only have the number of trainees up to one percent of its workforce for
three months. However, the new system allowed a small- or medium-sized company to have the number of
trainees up to ten percent of its workforce or a large-sized company to have the number of trainees up to
five percent of its workforce. The newly accepted trainees would get six-month trainee visa with a possible
six-month extension.

46
market mismatch in which well-educated youth became unwilling to do low-skilled, low-
paying, manual jobs in small- and medium-sized businesses. The improvement of
working conditions due to constant labor movements by workers with a support of civil
society mostly occurred in large-sized businesses, thus worsened the labor shortage in
small- and medium-sized businesses. In addition, economic integration between Korea
and some of the less-developed Asian countries, especially in the form of foreign direct
investment, paved the way for people from the latter countries to come and look for work
in Korea. Finally, two international sports games and consequent loosening of the
Immigration Control Act facilitated the entry of migrant workers into Korea.
As the number of migrant workers increased in the early 1990s, concerns about
potential socio-economic impacts that they might bring to Korean society grew. The
government tried to control labor migration by arresting and deporting undocumented
migrant workers, but had to face strong opposition by the businesses dependent on
migrant labor. As a result, the Korean government proposed the expansion of the “foreign
industrial trainee system” in order for businesses experiencing labor shortages to use
foreign trainees as unskilled workers. Meanwhile, it decided to condone the employment
of undocumented migrants for a limited time period. Yet, these temporary solutions could
neither satisfy small- and medium-sized businesses nor relieve the public concerns about
growing number of undocumented migrant workers. The inflow of migrant labor began
to be understood as an inevitable phenomenon and the Korean government was pushed to
come up with a new labor migration system.

47
CHATER 2. RISE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN LABOR MIGRATION
SYSTEM

In the early 1990s, as the number of undocumented migrant workers grew and
labor shortages in manufacturing, construction, and some of the service industries
deepened, the Korean government began to consider the introduction of an official labor
migration system. During the preparation stage, labor migration policies of Asian
countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, and those of European countries, such
as Germany and France, were reviewed and compared (C Kim 1990, Ministry of Labor
1993). For the government, the worst scenario was that temporary migrant workers would
turn into long-term settlers and finally become permanent immigrants as in Germany or
France. Officials worried about the socio-economic costs and conflicts that a large
number of migrant workers would bring to the ethnically homogeneous Korean society.
In addition, importing migrant workers officially and giving them work visa like Hong
Kong or Singapore were thought to be economically irrational, because that would force
the government to grant basic labor rights to them, and consequently would offset the
expected benefits of using migrant labor. For these reasons, the Korean government
decided to emulate Japanese labor migration policy, which did not allow the migration of
unskilled workers officially but only utilized them as trainees for a limited time period
(Seol and Skrentny 2004: 493). The trainee system was believed to prevent the settlement
of migrant workers while denying their rights as workers.

48
However, the trainee system did not eliminate or reduce the already existing
undocumented migrant workers. Rather, it added to the number of undocumented
migrants by pushing the trainees out of system due to human rights infringement. Also,
the Korean government, which was led by the first non-military democratic
administration with the ambition of Segyehwa (globalization), could not ignore the rights
of trainees as well as undocumented migrant workers. Civil society of Korea, which grew
significantly after the labor uprising in 1987, also pressured the government by adopting
the normative aspects of globalization, that is, human rights and democratization, while
supporting migrant workers and representing their voice (Moon 2000, T Lim 2003).
Consequently, migrant workers began to secure their rights as workers one by one.
In this chapter, I show how the Korean government introduced the first official
labor migration system while condoning the use of undocumented labor and how this
two-tiered system produced various problems including human rights violations towards
migrant workers. Then I look into how migrant workers fought for their human rights,
particularly for their rights as workers, with the support of civil society. Finally, I
scrutinize the process towards the reform of labor migration system before the onset of
the economic crisis in 1997.

Coexistence of Formal and Informal Systems

Since the early 1990s, the Korean government has had a two-tiered labor
migration system to control migrant workers. On one hand, it expanded the “foreign

49
industrial trainee system” that allowed the formal import of migrant labor under the name
of trainees, not workers. On the other hand, it pursued a policy where it combined “tacit
approval of undocumented migrant workers with periodical crackdown system” that
condoned the employment of undocumented migrant labor (Seol and Skrentny 2004, T
Lim 2006). Although there have been changes in the formal system, the coexistence of a
formal labor migration system and a tacit approval of undocumented migrant workers has
continued until now as a way to restrict the rights of migrant workers while minimizing
the possibility of long-term settlement and consequent socio-economic burdens.
However, migrant workers and concerned civil society groups began to organize to
protest and challenge the system. In this section, I examine how this two-tiered labor
migration system had evolved and what kinds of problems it had produced.

Tacit Approval of Undocumented Migrant Workers
The Korean government’s decision to expand the “foreign industrial trainee
system” in 1991 generated criticism both from the general public and from business
circle. Most of all, the expanded trainee system was viewed as far from a perfect solution
to labor shortages because the employment of trainees was limited only to the firms that
had overseas investments while firms that needed workers the most were small- and
medium-sized ones that could not afford to invest overseas. Also, the number of trainees
that could be accepted per firm was too small and the duration of the training, or the
utilizing labor as a matter of fact, was too short to resolve labor shortage. As a
representative organization of small- and medium-sized manufacturing businesses, the

50
Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business (KFSB), demanded that the “foreign
industrial trainee system” should be fully expanded so that the businesses suffering from
labor shortages the most were allowed to have “foreign trainees.”
However, the Korean government was reluctant to make extensive changes in its
labor-import system, because it was not ready for the social burdens and political
responsibility that the formal admission of a large number of migrant workers would
cause. Although the government decided to allow ten designated 3D industries, such as
dyeing, gilding, and leather industries, that had no overseas investments to import foreign
trainees from September 1992, officials preferred the informal use of undocumented
migrant labor, which was believed to be more flexible than the use of formal migrant
labor.
33

Under the tacit approval of the government, the number of undocumented migrant
workers kept increasing. When the Ministry of Justice announced a “voluntary reporting
period” for undocumented migrants and their employers from June to July 1992 to grasp
the situation, 61,126 undocumented migrants and 10,796 employers reported themselves.
Among the reported undocumented migrants, 42,480, which comprised almost 70
percent, were employed in manufacturing industries (Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1992).
34, 35

Knowing that sweeping away undocumented migrants would close down many

33
This partial expansion of the foreign industrial trainee system was proposed by the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry that accepted the requests from the 3D industries experiencing extreme labor
shortages.
34
The number of documented migrant workers, i.e. “industrial trainees,” was less than 6,000 at that time
whereas the number of undocumented migrant workers was estimated to be 70,000.
35
About 40 percent of the reported undocumented migrants were ethnic Koreans from China. The second
most group was Filipinos, followed by Bangladeshis, Nepalese, and Pakistanis. Yet, among those who were
employed in manufacturing industries, Filipinos accounted for 40.0 percent whereas ethnic Koreans from
China accounted for 16.7 percent (Ministry of Justice 1994).

51
businesses relying on them, the Ministry of Justice decided to allow about 38,000 of them
to be registered to extend their stay by the end of the year. Yet, by the strong request of
the small- and medium-sized manufacturing industries, with the KFSB taking the lead,
the government extended the grace period for the registered migrant workers until June
1993. It also decided not to arrest and deport non-registered undocumented migrant
workers employed in manufacturing industries.
36

While the government condoned the employment of undocumented migrants,
public concern about the growth of undocumented migrants increased. Among other
reasons, public worried about increasing crimes committed by or against undocumented
migrant workers. The media told stories of illegal brokers who extorted money from job-
seeking migrants, human traffickers who coerced migrant women into the sex industry,
and organized criminals who forged passports, visas or extension permits. Minor offenses
by undocumented migrants, such as shoplifting or disorderly behaviors, were frequently
exaggerated on the newspapers as serious crimes. At the same time, extreme exploitation
and human rights violations against undocumented migrant workers at workplace also
became serious issues. The stories of undocumented migrant workers who did not get
paid on time or at all, who suffered from industrial accidents without getting any
compensation, and who experienced verbal, physical, and sexual assaults by their
employers were repeatedly covered by the media.
Pressured by the public to resolve the problems of undocumented migrant
workers, the Ministry of Justice announced the enactment of a newly amended

36
However, the Ministry of Justice decided not to condone those who were employed in service industries
because of the concern that they might take away jobs from Korean workers.

52
Immigration Control Act in April 1993 that included intensified punishments against
undocumented migrant workers and their employers.
37
It also promised undocumented
migrant workers that it would not impose penalty if they left the country voluntarily
before the enactment of the amended law. At the same time, it strongly affirmed that
there would be no more extensions of the grace period for the registered migrant workers.
To fill the expected vacancies after the departure of a large number of undocumented
migrant workers, the Economic Planning Board announced the expansion of the “foreign
industrial trainee system” (Han’gy ŏre 1993a).
However, the KFSB opposed the decision of the Ministry of Justice. Based on its
own survey research on labor supply trend, the KFSB argued that small- and medium-
sized manufacturing industries were short approximately 170,000 unskilled workers and
the demand for labor could not be met without migrant workers (Han’guk Ilbo 1993).
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry also supported the KFSB in pressuring the
Ministry of Justice. Consequently, the different government ministries, such as the
Economic Planning Board, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, and the Ministry of Labor, gathered to discuss the issue and finally agreed to
extend the grace period for the registered migrant workers for another six months, that is,
until December 1993 (S ŏul Sinmun 1993b).
38
Yet, they decided to repatriate all
undocumented migrant workers by the end of the year while amending the existing
“foreign industrial trainee system” to benefit a wider range of businesses.

37
The amended Immigration Control Act stated that undocumented migrants would be fined up to ten
million won and their employers would be either fined up to five million won or imprisoned up to one year.
38
The number of remaining registered migrant workers was estimated to be 25,000 in June 1993.

53
Introduction of the Industrial Trainee System
As the due date of the grace period approached, however, complaints once again
came from everywhere. The media covered the difficult situation of small-sized 3D
industries claiming that mass deportation of migrant workers would paralyze the
production and force many businesses to close down. The KFSB, the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, and even the ruling party of the National Assembly pressured
the Ministry of Justice not to implement the mass deportation plan. Despite strong
resistance by the Ministry of Justice, the grace period for the registered migrant workers
was extended for a fourth time. As a result, approximately 13,000 remaining registered
migrant workers got their stay extended to May 1994. Meanwhile, the government
proposed the enactment of a new “Industrial Trainee System (ITS)” to replace
undocumented migrant workers with formally admitted trainees.
The newly introduced ITS was different from the old “foreign industrial trainee
system” in various ways. Most importantly, the manufacturing companies that neither
had overseas investments nor were included in the designated 3D industries became
qualified to employ foreign trainees. Accordingly, the number of admitted trainees
increased. At first, 20,000 trainees from eleven countries were to be admitted by the first
half of 1994, but serious labor shortages in textile and footwear industries forced the
government to allow 10,000 more trainees, preferably women, by the latter half of 1994.
The duration of training was extended from up to one year to up to two years.
39, 40
Also,

39
Eleven countries included China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran and Thailand. Ironically, countries that had been the major origins of
undocumented migrant workers, such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, or Nepal, were selected
preferentially. Korea’s globalization drive initiated and officially promoted under the Kim Young Sam

54
the KFSB, which is a private industry association, took charge of operating the ITS.
41

The KFSB had exclusive rights to select manufacturing companies that could hire foreign
industrial trainees and overseas recruitment agencies that could recruit and send
trainees.
42
Shifting the duty of administering its formal labor migration system to a
private organization gave the Korean government room to avoid responsibility, but at the
same time, made it hard for the government to reform the system in the future.
After the announcement of the ITS, the government also declared that it would
deport approximately 45,000 unregistered undocumented migrant workers by the end of
1993. However, the elimination of all undocumented migrant workers did not seem
possible. The government was neither capable of arresting and deporting all of them, nor
did the undocumented workers trust the will of the government.
43
By repeatedly breaking
its word about the extension of grace period, the government unwittingly encouraged
undocumented migrants to come and stay in Korea. A survey of 1,079 undocumented
migrant workers revealed that the majority of them were willing to come back to Korea

administration (1993~1998) pushed the government to promise various Asian countries to open or increase
trainee quotas expecting more trades, stronger economic cooperation and closer diplomatic relations.
Consequently, Uzbekistan (1994), Mongolia (1996), Kazakhstan (1996), and Kyrgyzstan (1997) were
included as trainee-sending countries one after the other. Later, Cambodia (2002) and Ukraine (2003) were
also included and the total number of trainee-sending countries became seventeen.
40
The trainee quota escalated from 30,000 in 1994 to 50,000 in 1995, and to 80,000 in 1996. Also, the
duration of training extended from two years (one-year visa with possible extension of one more year) in
1994 to three years (two-year visa with possible extension of one more years) in 1996.
41
Before 1994, the “foreign industrial trainee system” was administered by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry.
42
Although the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, the Construction Association of Korea, and
the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation also joined as operating organizations of the trainee
system later in 1996, 1997, and 2002 respectively as the government decided to import trainees for
fisheries, construction, and agricultural industries, the KFSB remained the main operating organization
because the majority of foreign trainees had been admitted for manufacturing industries.
43
In 1993, there was only one detention center in Korea with the capacity of 150 persons.

55
even after being deported (Kungmin Ilbo 1993b).
44
The continuous existence of
undocumented migrant workers, therefore, was expected despite the introduction of ITS.
Nevertheless, the official position of the Korean government was that it would not
tolerate undocumented migrant workers and only permit temporary labor migration in the
form of industrial trainees. Although the government had to refrain from arresting and
deporting undocumented migrant workers as the process of importing trainees was
delayed, the Ministry of Justice announced the crackdown on undocumented migrant
workers soon after the first trainees entered Korea in May 1994. When the government
decided to admit 10,000 more trainees for textile and footwear industries in the later half
of 1994, the Ministry of Justice announced an “intensive crackdown period.” As a result,
by the end of 1994, the number of undocumented migrant workers decreased for the first
time, and the proportion of undocumented migrants dropped below 60 percent of all
migrant workers (Table 2.1). However, the number increased again the very next year,
partly because the continuing growth of visa violators or visa overstayers and partly
because trainees ran away and became undocumented migrant workers due to the
numerous problems with the ITS.

44
The survey was conducted by the Catholic Counseling Center for Foreign Workers under the
Archdiocese of Seoul.

56
Table 2.1. Number of Migrant Workers in Korea, 1992-2008
Documented Workers Undocumented Workers
3)

Year Total Number
Professional
Workers
1)

Unskilled
Workers
2)

Total Number
Proportion
(%)
1992 41,094 (39.5) 3,862 (23.6) 6,343 (33.3) 30,899 (42.8) 75.2
1993 66,997 (31.8) 3,873 (25.0) 8,616 (30.8) 54,508 (32.5) 81.4
1994 84,630 (30.5) 5,556 (26.6) 30,843 (30.9) 48,231 (30.7) 57.0
1995 137,225 (33.3) 9,284 (29.7) 44,838 (34.7) 83,103 (33.0) 60.6
1996 204,179 (31.5) 13,868 (32.5) 61,257 (30.1) 129,054 (32.1) 63.2
1997 231,839 (31.5) 14,739 (32.9) 69,052 (30.5) 148,048 (31.9) 63.9
1998 158,603 (33.9) 12,057 (31.2) 47,009 (33.1) 99,537 (34.6) 62.8
1999 219,202 (34.4) 14,410 (36.5) 69,454 (31.6) 135,338 (35.5) 61.7
2000 285,506 (34.5) 17,000 (43.7) 79,511 (29.0) 188,995 (36.0) 66.2
2001 329,015 (35.4) 19,036 (47.4) 54,773 (29.1) 255,206 (35.9) 77.6
2002 362,597 (35.4) 21,506 (43.0) 51,852 (27.4) 289,239 (36.3) 79.8
2003 388,816 (33.3) 20,089 (37.6) 230,671 (32.3) 138,056 (34.2) 35.5
2004 421,104 (31.3) 20,331 (37.2) 212,827 (28.6) 187,946 (33.6) 44.6
2005 347,545 (27.7) 23,406 (37.9) 143,347 (18.6) 180,792 (33.5) 52.0
2006 448,260 (28.3) 27,231 (37.0) 209,041 (20.4) 211,988 (35.0)
47.3
2007 638,308 (32.9) 31,300 (37.0) 383,544 (31.8) 223,464 (34.3) 35.0
2008 693,188 (33.8) 35,228 (38.2) 457,471 (33.5) 200,489 (33.9)
28.9

Notes: 1) Professional Workers include professors, language instructors, researchers, engineers,
entertainers, and other professionals (E-1~E-7 visa holders).
2) Unskilled workers with documents include those who entered under the Industrial
Trainee System, the Employment Permit System or the Visitors’ Employment System,
who got work visa after training, who got work visa through amnesty, and other non-
professional workers who have work visa (D-3, E-8, E-9, and H-2 visa holders).
3) Undocumented workers include all undocumented foreigners between the age of
16~60 regardless of their entry visa status or current occupation.
* The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of women.
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration Statistics Yearbook, each year.

Problems of the Two-tiered System
Under the ITS, trainees were placed in a company regardless of their desire, but
could not transfer to another company except in rare circumstances, such as closedown or
bankruptcy of the assigned company. Trainees often chose to run away from their

57
assigned company and become undocumented migrant workers. About 10 percent of all
admitted trainees in 1994 ran away, with the percentage rising to 30.1 in 1996 when, in
addition to runaways, trainees whose visa expired began to disappear and overstay
instead of going home (KFSB 1996: 12). After all, the formal system that was proposed
as an alternative for the use of undocumented migrant workers was actually producing
more undocumented migrants.
What pushed trainees to be out of the system? Most importantly, extremely low
wages made trainees leave their assigned company. Trainees were provided monthly
wages under the name of “training allowances,” which were fixed beforehand according
to the arrangement between the KFSB and the recruitment agencies in their home
countries. Yet, the allowances were far below the prevailing wages in manufacturing
industries. Out of their small allowances, trainees were charged a monthly service fee by
their management agency.
45
Some trainees did not even get their allowances at all.
Instead, their management agency received the allowance from their company, charged
the fee, and sent the rest of the money back home on behalf of them. The problem was
that trainees already had paid a lot of money, between 1,300 to 3,000 USD, to the
recruitment agencies and brokers before they came to Korea.
46
Since they had borrowed
money to pay the fee, they were eager to pay the debt as soon as they began to work. Yet,
their income was too small to pay it back and to save additional money within their visa

45
The KFSB made the recruitment agencies in sending countries manage the trainees they sent, so they
either open a branch or make a contract with a Korean company to have a management agency in Korea.
46
At first, trainees had paid relatively reasonable cost to come to Korea, but the cost went up as more and
more people wanted to come and illegal brokers lured people by promising to speed up the process.
Consequently, in addition to the official charge to the recruitment agencies, trainees should pay to brokers
often as much as the official fee.

58
term. For this reason, after they realized that the wages of undocumented migrant
workers were much higher than their allowances, they chose to run away to get a better
paying job.
47

As the number of runaway trainees increased, companies hiring trainees began to
put aside up to 20 percent of their allowance under the name of deposit to prevent them
from running away.
48
Also, some companies confiscated trainees’ passports and nearly
confined them by imposing curfew or only allowing supervised outings.
49
These
practices, however, produced a reverse effect. The trainees, who were already forced to
work extremely long hours, felt locked up and even felt like a slave, thus they decided to
run away.
50
The story of Huong, who came to Korea as a trainee in 1995, illustrates this
situation:
My first company in Korea was a footwear factory at Pusan. It was a very big
company and there were about 300 workers, for Vietnamese only. Including
Koreans, probably more than 2,000 workers in total. I only got 40 dollars per
month at first. They said I would get a raise after three months to 150 dollars, and
to 300 dollars after one year. But I ran away before three months, because, apart
from the low wage, I didn’t have freedom. Well, the first month was okay. They
let us go out. But people began to run away, and the company set the rule that we
had to stay in the dormitory after work. They even didn’t allow us to go out on
Sundays. If you really needed to go out, you had to get a permission by signing up
your name, getting a co-sign from your friend, and so on and so forth. But it was
not easy [to get the permission], so we just didn’t bother to try. Then my
roommate told me that she knew a Vietnamese women working in Seoul, and she
was coming to Pusan on that weekend. So we decided to sneak out. We couldn’t

47
According to the survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor, the wages of trainees were between
250,000 to 400,000 won (311~497 USD) whereas those of undocumented migrant workers were between
500,000 to 800,000 won (622~995 USD) in 1994 (Han’gy ŏre 1994).
48
The trainee-hiring companies were sensitive to the runaway cases, because they not only lost financially
by not being refunded the deposit they had paid to the KFSB for receiving trainees but also got punished by
not being able to get more trainees in the future.
49
The confinement was possible, because it was mandatory for companies to provide boarding to trainees
and the boarding facilities were often located inside the company.
50
Timothy Lim (2003: 433) views that trainees’ leaving the system and becoming illegal sojourners is their
“everyday acts of resistance.”

59
bring anything. The company was keeping our passport, so we didn’t have it
either. We just ran away, met her, and came to Seoul with her. As soon as we got
to Seoul, we began to work in a small garment factory. I started as an assistant
sewer and my salary was 450,000 won (583 USD). Ten times! No, it was more
than ten times than what I had made as a trainee in the footwear factory. (Huong,
Vietnamese, female, 34)

Except higher wages, however, the situation of undocumented migrant workers
was hardly better than that of trainees. Like trainees, undocumented migrant workers
often experienced overtime work without extra payment, overdue or unpaid wages, and
workplace violence by their employers, managers, or Korean co-workers, including
verbal, physical and sexual abuses. For this reason, it was common for undocumented
migrant workers to change jobs frequently until they found a safe and sound one. Tien,
who ran away from her assigned company one year after she entered Korea as a trainee in
1995, chose to leave her second job in four months:
When I was working as a trainee in a textile factory in Ky ŏngsan, my salary was
so small. After the mandatory deposit and deduction for meals, I got almost
nothing. Besides, we were not allowed to go out of the dormitory. I had my
boyfriend from Vietnam working in a different company in the same city, but the
guard only gave me a fifteen-minute permit when he came to see me on
Weekends. Finally, I ran away with him to Taej ŏn and got in a factory producing
beekeeping boxes. With three Thai workers beside us, all workers there were
foreigners. I think that’s why the boss treated us so badly [because we were
foreign workers]. He forced us to work from eight in the morning to twelve at
night. We were always exhausted. And he didn’t pay us on time. He always told
us to give the money in ten days, and then another ten days, like that. We all were
very unsatisfied, so we decided to run away together. For four-month of working
there, my boyfriend and I only got two-month salaries. (Tien, Vietnamese, female,
32)

The ITS along with the tacit approval of undocumented migrant labor inherently
generated those problems. On the one hand, the ITS used trainees as workers but did not
treat them like ones. In other words, because of their status as trainee, they were not

60
protected by the labor laws, such as the Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act,
and the Industrial Accident Compensation Act. Undocumented migrant workers, on the
other hand, were treated as if they were criminals who were not entitled to any rights,
although most of them merely violated the terms of their visa. Their resident status as
undocumented migrants limited their access not only to the protection by the labor laws
but sometimes to the protection by criminal laws. The threat to report them to the
immigration often forced them to remain silence when victimized by violence or crime.
Not being protected under the laws was making the already marginalized position of
migrant workers more vulnerable.

Demand for the Human Rights of Migrant Workers

As the situation of migrant workers, especially the exploitation of migrant
workers and human rights violation against them, were revealed, concerned civil society
groups and religious organizations in Korea came to pay attention to the human rights of
migrant workers as well as the problems embedded in the labor migration system. Among
others, civil society groups focusing on economic justice and/or human rights began to
challenge the government’s labor migration system.
51
More traditional labor movement
groups also joined them with the belief that the discrimination against migrant workers
based on nationality or resident status would create a stratified labor structure, which

51
The growth of civil society in Korea was mainly owed to the labor and democracy movements in the late
1980s. Particularly, the 1987 labor uprising and the consequent collapse of the authoritarian regime
provided an impetus to the proliferation of civil society groups for new social movements (H-R Kim 2000).
Between 1988 and 1993, for instance, forty-seven new civil society groups were formed, which tripled the
total number (S Kim 2000:108).

61
would undermine all workers’ conditions (J Kim 2003: 254-5). Religious organizations
were particularly active in helping individual migrants suffering from industrial
accidents, violence at work, or nonpayment of wages, but they also collaborated with
civil society groups to make changes in the labor migration system and to promote
migrant workers’ rights. With the support of civil society groups advocating migrants’
rights, migrant workers themselves also voiced their discontents and demands. In this
section, I look into the early efforts by civil society groups as well as migrants themselves
to challenge the government’s labor migration system in order to secure and enhance the
basic labor rights and human rights of migrant workers.

Formation of Migrant Advocacy Organizations
One of the first migrant advocacy organizations started with a religious meeting
of migrant workers. In early 1992, a Catholic church at Chayang-dong, Seoul began to
offer a Tagalog mass service by a Filipino priest. Words spread rapidly and soon
hundreds of Filipino migrant workers gathered there every Sunday to attend the mass. As
previously isolated migrant workers got together in the same place, problems that they
were facing were shared and conveyed to the Catholic Church. A group of nuns began to
provide counseling services to the migrant workers coming to the Chayang-dong church,
which stimulated about 50 concerned citizens, consisting of scholars, lawyers, doctors,
religious leaders, and labor activists, to form the Association for Foreign Workers’
Human Rights which provided professional counseling. Furthermore, the Association

62
conducted researches about the conditions of migrant workers and demanded the reform
of Korean migration policy based on their researches (Han’gy ŏre 1992).
Soon after, the Archdiocese of Seoul and the Labor Pastoral Center, which had
assisted Korean workers and had been involved in labor movements since 1979, decided
to establish the Counseling Center for Foreign Workers. While providing counseling and
assistance for migrant workers, the Center also publicized the situation of migrant
workers based on their counseling data and surveys. Also, from early 1993, the
Archdiocese of Seoul and the Counseling Center for Foreign Workers encouraged
Catholic-based organizations formerly involved in labor movements to open their doors
to migrant workers. With the support of Catholic Church, they transformed their
organizations from serving Korean workers to providing counseling and education for
migrant workers as well.
52

Unlike Catholic-based migrant advocacy organizations, Protestant-based ones
were initially formed by individual local churches in the areas where manufacturing
industries were concentrated. There were already more than 30 individual churches
operating counseling centers and/or shelters for migrant workers in 1993, so the
Protestant Church decided to establish a representative organization called the Missionary
Association for Foreign Workers (Kungmin Ilbo 1993a, S ŏul Sinmun 1993a). Buddhist-
based organizations were also formed to provide counseling, free medical treatment,
and/or shelters for migrant workers. Unlike Catholic or Buddhist organizations, however,

52
Beside Seoul, those organizations were located in traditional manufacturing cities such as Anyang,
Inch’ ŏn, Taegu, and Kumi (Interview with the former director of the Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center in
February 2008). The formation of local migrant advocacy organizations and their activities are discussed in
detail in chapter 5.

63
Protestant Church weighed more on the missionary work than on the enhancement of
migrant workers’ human rights. Yet, religion-based migrant advocacy organizations often
put their efforts together along with civil society groups in advocating the rights of
migrants.
In the early 1990s, few migrant advocacy groups were not based in religious
institutions. Although many civil society organizations supported the rights of migrant
workers, their activities were not exclusively for migrant workers. Besides, unlike
religious migrant advocacy organizations, they put more stress on institutional changes
rather than providing direct assistance for individual migrant workers. For this reason,
they formed coalitions when necessary, such as when conducted public campaigns,
organized protests, filed lawsuits or appealed to international community, and pressured
the government to make changes or create measures to improve the rights of migrant
workers. One of the first coalitions was formed in 1994, when a group of undocumented
migrant workers held a sit-in protest demanding compensation for industrial accidents
and payment of their wages.

Rights to Get Compensation for Industrial Injuries
For migrant workers, injuries caused by an industrial accident were very common.
It is partly because of the unsafe nature of 3D manufacturing industries where they are
working, but also because of the lack of skill training and miscommunication due to the
language barrier. Yet, in many cases, sufficient medical treatment and financial

64
compensation are up to their employer. The situation was worse when they were not
protected by the Industrial Accident Compensation Act.
53

From October 1991, the Ministry of Labor had allowed undocumented migrant
workers to be paid the industrial accident compensation based on the Article 5 of the
Labor Standards Act, which states no discrimination based on nationality. However, as
the number of undocumented migrants needing insurance benefits increased, it became a
great burden for the government. The Ministry of Justice argued that undocumented
migrant workers should not be covered because the employment of undocumented
migrant workers was illegal and the Labor Standards Act only applied to those who
legally employed. Accepting the argument, the Ministry of Labor decided not to protect
undocumented migrant workers by the Industrial Accident Compensation Act starting in
August 1992.
Not much later, migrant advocacy organizations and civil society groups began to
challenge the decision. There was a lawsuit case filed by a Filipino migrant worker in
June 1993 who lost three fingers while he was working in a plastic injection company at
Seoul but was rejected by the local labor office when he asked for industrial accident
compensation (Han’gy ŏre 1993a). During the lawsuit, the Catholic Labor Pastor Center
pressured the government by insisting that the international labor standards articulated by
the International Labour Organization (ILO) acknowledged the validity of the labor
contract of undocumented migrant workers. This appeal to ILO standards was a very

53
The Industrial Accident Compensation Act requires all the employers to subscribe national industrial
accident insurance in order to cover the medical treatment fees as well as the compensation for the
employees with work-related injuries or illnesses. Yet, many employers are reluctant to file in case of
industrial accident because they neither want the insurance fee to go up nor want to lose the government
benefits offered to accident-free companies.

65
effective strategy because the Korean government was extremely sensitive to situations in
which domestic laws or practices contradicted international standards (T Lim 2006: 253-
4).
54
Finally, in November 1993 the Seoul Superior Court ruled that the Filipino migrant
worker should receive compensation for his injuries, even though he stayed in Korea
illegally, and affirmed that labor issues should be considered under the labor laws, not
under the immigration laws (Kungmin Ilbo 1993c).
However, despite the court decision, there was little change in practice because
local labor offices were still reluctant to protect undocumented migrant workers. In
January 1994, a group of thirteen undocumented migrant workers from Nepal,
Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Ethiopia staged a sit-in protest at the headquarters of the
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) in Seoul. Eight of them had serious
industrial injuries but had not received compensation, and five of them protested non-
payment of their wages. This first public protest by migrant workers in Korea raised a
human rights issue when the protestors held a picket saying, “We are humans, too.” The
CCEJ along with other migrant advocacy organizations and civil society groups
organized to support their protest and demanded the government protect undocumented
migrant workers under the labor laws. Worried about being disgraced as a backward
country in terms of human rights, president Kim Young Sam ordered the Ministry of
Labor to develop measures to treat undocumented migrant workers in a more humane

54
Since Korea became a member state of the ILO and the UN in 1991, the Korean government was eager
to be recognized as an advanced country by international community. As a result, civil society groups and
migrant advocacy organizations have often relied on the international standards and norms to pressure the
government to promote the rights of migrant workers. How international human rights become a force that
undermine the exclusive authority of the state over its nationals as well as alien residents, and how
individuals uses the force to make claims on grounds that are not derived from the authority of the state are
discussed in various literature, including Franck (1992) or Soysal (1994).

66
way. The sit-in protest, which lasted 29 days, finally ended when the Ministry promised
not only to protect undocumented migrant workers with the Industrial Accident
Compensation Act in the future, but also to compensate and pay for those who had had
industrial accidents or unpaid wages retroactively up to three years.
55

Migrant advocacy organizations and civil society formed the “Citizens’ Coalition
for Compensating Industrial Injuries and Unpaid Wages of Returned Migrant Workers”
in May 1994 to ensure the governement fulfilled its promise. Delegates from the
Coalition visited Bangladesh, Thailand, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Philippines to
investigate the situations (Han’guk Ilbo 1994). Concerned about growing anti-Korean
sentiments in other Asian countries spread by injured or unpaid returned migrant
workers, the government responded quickly. The Ministry of Labor announced that it
would send compensations or unpaid wages to the qualified returned migrant workers if
they reported their cases to the Korean embassy in their countries (Segye Ilbo 1994).
56
It
also ordered the local labor offices to take legal actions against employers who abused
migrant workers.

Protest by Runaway Trainees
Ironically, while undocumented migrants were granted more rights as workers,
formally admitted and legally staying trainees were still outside the protection of labor

55
However, the Ministry of Labor stated that it could not fully protect undocumented migrant workers by
the Labor Standards Act, because it would not be fair to Korean workers who were working in a company
with less than five employees – the condition that the Labor Standards Act was not applied to.
56
The Citizens’ Coalition discovered 23 cases in those five countries and submitted them to the Ministry of
Labor. The activities of the Citizens’ Coalition continued in 1995 when they visited China and found 549
cases to submit to the Ministry.

67
laws. Exactly one year after the sit-in protest by undocumented migrants, the simmering
discontents by trainees burst into a flame. In January 1995, a group of 13 Nepalese
runaway trainees held a sit-in protest at My ŏngdong Cathedral at Seoul, the symbolic site
of labor and democracy movements in Korea. The protest was directly sparked by the
physical assault and rape of Nepalese runaway trainees by their factory manager, but the
protestors also disclosed the hardships they had suffered as trainees, such as the
confinement and passport confiscation by their assigned companies and the confiscation
of their allowances by the management agencies. Pickets saying, “Do not beat us,” “Pay
us our salary,” “Return our passports,” and “We are not machines, we are humans” drew
instant public attention (Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1995).
Korean activists from the migrant advocacy organizations joined in the sit-in to
support the protestors. Also, 38 civil society organizations and migrant advocacy
organizations, including the Preparatory Committee for Korean Confederation of Trade
Unions, Catholic Priests Association for Justice, and the Citizens’ Coalition for
Economic Justice, formed “Joint Action Committee for Protection of Human Rights of
Foreign Trainees” to urge the government to take an action. The Joint Action Committee
stated that it was a shame that a government pursuing globalization let these inhumane
practices towards migrant workers happened. It also decided to submit an appeal to the
ILO and to file a petition to the Constitutional Court. The media also covered the issue in
detail. They criticized the government for not providing appropriate protection for
trainees while asking the public to reflect on themselves about discrimination and
prejudice against “foreign workers.” They particularly expressed their concerns about

68
anti-Korean sentiments or diplomatic problems that might be caused by infringing upon
human rights of migrant workers.
Quickly the government began to respond. The Prosecutors’ Office announced to
investigate all the allegations brought up by the protestors and to punish those responsible
for any violation of laws. The Ministry of Labor promised to improve the conditions of
trainees by protecting them under the basic labor laws while reforming the ITS. And the
Board of Audit and Inspection announced that it would conduct special inspections to see
if there was any corruption and bribery in the KFSB, recruitment agencies, or
management agencies. Soon the specific demands by the protestors, such as arresting the
rapist, returning their passports, and paying their overdue allowances, were fulfilled.
Despite the government’s responses, however, the protestor maintained the sit-in
and requested the recovery of their trainee status, the apology by the government, and the
fundamental reform of the ITS.
57
Confronted with this firm attitude, the government even
had to ask the Nepalese ambassador in Japan to come to Korea and persuade the
protestors to resolve the sit-in.
58
The sit-in protest lasting nine days finally ended when
the government along with the KFSB promised to implement stronger measures to
protect the human rights of industrial trainees while amending the ITS by raising the
training allowances, providing industrial accident compensation for the injured trainees,
and disqualifying recruitment agencies committing misconducts.

57
Previously sympathetic media soon changed their tone and blamed the “leftist non-pure groups,” that is
civil society groups advocating the rights of migrant workers, of manipulating the protestors.
58
At that time, there was no Nepalese embassy in Korea, so the Nepalese embassy in Japan was providing
services to Nepalese nationals in Korea, too.

69
However, the promises offered by both the government and the KFSB were far
from a solution either to the problems of the ITS or to the growth of undocumented
migrants. As long as migrant workers remained as trainees, their rights could not but be
limited, which would keep pushing them to be out of the ITS. Also, as long as the KFSB,
a private profit organization, operated the system, there would be always a circle of
pointing fingers where the government blamed the KFSB and the KFSB blamed the
recruitment agencies or management agencies. The fact that one of the protestors ran
away again from his newly assigned company two months after the sit-in, demanding the
return of his passport indicated that little had improved in terms of the actual conditions
of trainees. Yet, the journey to the new labor migration system was not ended, but just
started with this sit-in protest as a momentum.

Debates over the Reform of Labor Migration System

Right after the sit-in protest by runaway trainees ended in February 1995, the
Ministry of Labor introduced the “Guideline for protection and Management of Foreign
Industrial Trainees.” The Guideline stated that trainees were granted limited rights as
workers, including rights to get above minimum wage, to get overtime payment, to be
covered by industrial accident insurance, and to be covered by the national health care. It
also demanded the employers pay trainees directly, not confiscate trainees’ passports, and
exchange written contracts with trainees. The KFSB agreed to follow the Guideline and

70
promised to improve its supervision over management agencies as well as trainee-hiring
companies.
However, civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations insisted that
more fundamental changes than minor improvements in the ITS should be introduced in
labor migration system. After forming a coalition called, “Joint Committee for Migrant
Workers in Korea (JCMK),” they systematically challenged the government migration
policy through open forums and public campaigns.
59
Particularly, they opposed both the
trainee system and the tacit approval of undocumented migrant workers with periodical
crackdown on them. Instead, they argued for a new labor migration system that would be
operated by a public agency and would guarantee full social benefits for migrant workers
(KRIWHJ 1995: 297-301).
Although the Ministry of Labor and the National Assembly consented to the need
of an alternative system, other government ministries, such as the Ministry of Trade and
Industry or the Ministry of Justice, as well as the KFSB strongly against it.
60
In this
section, I look into the debates over the introduction of a new system among different
parties.
61

59
The JCMK was formed in July 1995 as a coalition of over ten migrant advocacy organizations, and as of
2006, it has more than forty organizations under its umbrella. As a coalition, the JCMK has played a
leading role in migrant rights advocacy movement, along with the Network for Migrants’ Rights (NMR)
and the Migrants’ Trade Union (MTU). The divergence of migrant movement is described in detail in
chapter 3.
60
The Ministry of Trade and Industry was renamed from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy
in 1994, which resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of
Energy and Resources in 1993. In 1998, as responsibility of international trade issues was moved to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry was reorganized and its name was changed to the
Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy.
61
According to Freeman (1995), immigration policy in liberal democracies is often shaped by special
interest groups, including employer groups, religious groups, immigrant advocacy groups, and labor
unions, which he refers to “client politics.” Although Cornelius and Tsuda (2004: 12) argue that

71
Proposals for New Labor Migration System
Following the enactment of the Guideline by the Ministry of Labor, various
government ministries proposed plans to enhance the rights of migrant workers. The
Ministry of Health and Welfare announced that it would include trainees in the national
healthcare system, the Ministry of Justice stated that immigration officials would resolve
any problems that arrested undocumented migrant workers might have, such as unpaid
wages or industrial injuries, before deporting them, and the Ministry of Trade and
Industry declared that it would increase the monthly allowances of trainees while making
recruitment process transparent to reduce the fees and charges that trainees might have
spent during the migration process.
Despite partial improvement of the ITS and the conditions of migrant workers, the
labor migration system still had fundamental flaws. Most of all, the persistent wage gap
between trainees and undocumented migrant workers were not only making trainees run
out of the system but also leading potential migrants to seek to come to Korea through
other ways than through the ITS. As a result, the migrant labor market structure was
distorted in that there were much more undocumented migrant workers than documented
trainees (see Table 2.1). Besides, trainees were still technically not workers, thus low
wages and limited rights for trainees were justified, and it continued to cause exploitation
and human rights violation against them.

immigration policy of Korea is dominated by bureaucrats who are less susceptible to pressures from special
interest groups, the interest-group politics have always influenced immigration policy as well as immigrant
policy of Korea.

72
As a government ministry in charge of protecting and promoting the rights of
workers, the Ministry of Labor was obliged to take further action. Particularly, since
Korea was preparing to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in 1996, the Ministry tried to emulate the labor migration system
of other advanced countries.
62
It argued that Korea should implement a system to issue
migrant workers work permits before becoming a member of the OECD, because the
system has been practiced in semi-developed countries like Taiwan and Singapore, as
well as developed countries in Europe (Maeil Ky ŏngje 1995).
63
Finally, in May 1995, the
Ministry of Labor decided to propose a bill, “Employment and Management of Foreign
Workers Act,” that would abolish the ITS and implement the Employment Permit System
(EPS). The EPS would allow unskilled migrants to be admitted as workers, permit
employers who failed to hire Korean workers to employ certain number of migrant
workers, and grant migrant workers all the rights as workers including the rights to
organize, bargain collectively, and strike. Besides, the Ministry of Labor also suggested
the legalization of undocumented migrant workers for limited time.
The JCMK and supporting civil society groups also prepared to propose a similar
bill, “Protection of Foreign Workers Act,” that argued for the Work Permit System
(WPS). The WPS would grant the full rights to migrant workers under the labor laws
while giving more freedom to choose one’s work place to migrant workers than the EPS

62
Part of the reasons why the Ministry of Labor had strongly argued for the compensation for the migrant
workers with industrial injuries was that it wanted to ratify one of the reservations in the ILO covenant, that
is, Article 19 on equal treatment for accident compensation, before joining the OECD (Han’guk Ilbo 1995).
Yet, the ratification was made five years later in 2001. See Chapter 3 for detail.
63
However, the opponents argued that Japan was still practicing the Industrial Trainee System, thus the
system had nothing to do with the prestige of a country.

73
(JCMK 2001: 182). While holding public campaigns to obtain signatures to bring up the
bill, they also turn to the international organizations to pressure the government. For
example, the submission of the counter reports in 1995 and in 1996 by Minbyun
(Lawyers for a Democratic Society) and other migrant advocacy organizations to the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and to the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, resulted in the recommendations by the UN
Committees to the Korean government to improve the conditions of migrant workers
(UNCESCR 1995, UNCERD 1996).
Followed by the Ministry of Labor and the JCMK, some members of National
Assembly also decided to propose a bill on new labor migration system in 1996.
Although preparing reform bills separately, both the ruling New Korea Party and the
oppositional National Congress for New Politics Party shared the thought that current
migration system yielded human rights violation and discrimination against migrant
workers and should be changed. They were particularly concerned about the reputation of
Korea in the international community and insisted that the recruiting process should be
publicized and migrant workers should be fully protected under the labor laws.
However, the KFSB strongly opposed the introduction of a new system. Based on
its own survey of 2,850 trainee-hiring companies, the KFSB claimed that the EPS would
bring a great burden to the migrant-hiring companies due to the increase of wages along
with bonuses and severance pay required by the labor laws (S ŏul Sinmun 1995). Based
on another survey, it argued that the majority of trainee-hiring businesses were satisfied
with the ITS and they wanted to expand the number of trainees and the duration of the

74
training rather than to employ migrant workers through the EPS (Han’guk Ilbo 1996).
64

Due to the concerns about unionization or collective bargaining by migrant workers with
full labor rights, four other major business owners’ associations, including the Federation
of Korean Industries, the Korea Employers Federation, the Korea Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, and the Korea Foreign Trade Association, also supported the position of the
KFSB in opposing to the EPS (Kungmin Ilbo 1997a).
65
Furthermore, the KFSB and its
supporting associations made it clear that the labor migration system is not about
protecting human rights but about relieving labor shortages in a cheap and flexible way.
66

Among the government bodies, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Small and
Medium Business Administration and the Ministry of Justice were openly and constantly
against the EPS.
67
The Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Small and Medium
Business Administration were with the KFSB arguing that the EPS would increase labor
costs. They also claimed that the ITS was improving and the number of runaway trainees
was decreasing; thus, the ITS should not only be maintained but also be expanded. The
Ministry of Justice also dissented from the new system assuming that it would make it
harder to control migrant workers. For the Ministry of Justice, the problem was

64
The demand by the KFSB to expand the ITS was accepted and the government announced that it would
admit 10,000 more trainees for up to three years from July 1996.
65
According to a report published by the affiliated research institute of the Federation of Korean Industries,
the EPS would put a great burden on the small businesses and finally made them use undocumented
migrant workers instead. Thus, it concluded that the ITS should be maintained (S Park 1996).
66
While emphasizing the importance of flexibility in labor migration system, they argued that the
employment permit system would jeopardize reunification efforts because the system would make it
difficult for the government to send migrant workers back to their home countries when the government
needed to hire a massive number of North Korean workers after Korean reunification (Korea Herald 1997).
67
The Small and Medium Business Administration was established in 1996 as an independent government
agency, which resulted from the separation of the Bureau of Small and Medium Businesses under the
Ministry of Trade and Industry from the Ministry. Since its establishment, the Administration has taken
charge of supervising the KFSB and operating the ITS.

75
undocumented migrants, not trainees. Therefore, it suggested continuous crackdown on
undocumented migrant workers while inflicting more severe punishment for them and
their employers.

Unresolved Debates
As the debates on the EPS got heated, the Korean government held meetings of
relevant ministries several times in 1996 and 1997. Different positions of each ministry
prevented them from reaching an agreement at first, but the circumstances both at home
and abroad made them consent to reform the ITS. Most of all, the number of migrant
workers already exceeded one percent of total labor force of Korea by the end of 1996,
which was beyond the threshold considered controllable, and over 60 percent of them
were undocumented migrant workers.
68
Second, thousands of employment fraud cases
against ethnic Koreans from China were discovered in 1996. The corruption of trainee
recruitment agencies and the frequent intervention in the recruitment process by illegal
brokers were pointed out as one of the causes.
69
Third, anti-Korean sentiments were
spreading in Southeast Asian countries, which sometimes expressed in the form of
violence against overseas Koreans or protest against the Korean government. For
instance, there was a protest by returned migrants with industrial injuries in front of the
Korean embassy in the Philippines where the protestors held pickets saying, “Abolish the

68
The number of Koreans employed in paid work was 13,218,000 and the number of migrant workers was
204,179 as of December 1996. (Han’gy ŏre 1997b, Ministry of Justice 1996).
69
After the discovery of employment fraud against ethnic Koreans from China, many religious
organizations for them, including Chos ŏnjok Church at Seoul, urged the government to take reparatory
measures for the victims of the fraud. As a result, the government decided to offer a temporary quota of
1,000 trainees exclusively for the victims in 1997.

76
Industrial Trainee System,” or “Filipino workers are not slaves of Korean economy
(Ikonomis ŭt ŭ 1996).” Consequently, the pressure from civil society to abolish the ITS
increased. With the JCMK on the center, migrant advocacy organizations held press
conferences, public campaigns, and sit-in protests while appealing to the international
organizations. Finally, the government decided to submit the bill to implement the EPS
proposed by the Ministry of Labor in 1997.
However, the KFSB, the strongest proponent of the ITS, was refused to simply
accept the government’s decision. It mobilized trainee-hiring business owners to protest
against the abolition of the ITS. When the ruling New Korea Party and the oppositional
National Congress for New Politics tried to submit reform bills to the National Assembly
to replace the ITS with the Work Permit System in 1997, thousands of business owners
staged a rally organized by the KFSB in front of the central government complex
building claiming that a new system was unnecessary (Seol and Skrentny 2004: 495). The
KFSB also lobbied the members of the National Assembly to block the submission of
reform bills. It kept emphasizing the huge burden that would be brought by the new
system not only to migrant-hiring companies but also to the society as a whole, while
publicizing the improving conditions of trainees, including the increase in their wages,
based on its own researches.
Beneath the ostensible reason that the ITS was necessary for its member
businesses to be supplied with cheap labor, however, the KFSB had a more specific
reason to support the ITS. Under the ITS, the KFSB dealt with recruitment agencies in
sending countries and received deposits from them to confirm the fulfillment of contract.

77
It also got processing fee and deposit from trainee-hiring companies and monthly fee
from trainees via management agencies (Seol and Skrentny 2004: 498-499, T Lim 2006:
263). Those deposit and interests had been vested in the KFSB in case trainees ran away
from their assigned companies, therefore the KFSB had nothing to lose whether trainees
ran away or not.

The ITS was a highly profitable business for the KFSB.
70

In addition to the militant opposition by the KFSB, the worsening economic
situation of Korea hindered the submission of the reform bills to the National Assembly.
In 1997, seven of the top 30 chaebol corporations went into bankruptcy, dragged down
by excessive investment, declining profits, and a substantial debt burden, which led to
chain bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized firms, particularly those subcontractors of
the chaebol (Baliño and Ubide 1999: 28). Also, a lot of companies reduced or
temporarily ceased manufacturing operation, thus many workers lost their jobs. The
KFSB used the situation to insist that it was not a good time to implement the EPS and
showed that more than 90 percent of the small- and medium-sized businesses opposed the
EPS based on its survey of 225 businesses (S ŏul Ky ŏngje 1997). Consequently, the
government could not but defer the submission of the bill for the EPS.
Nevertheless, the reform of the ITS was still necessary since the trainees’ limited
rights as workers even compared to undocumented migrant workers kept causing a lot of
criticism.
71
Instead of the EPS, the government proposed the “Work after Training

70
It was proved that there were more than official profits when top executives of the KFSB and the
officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry were found to be bribed by recruitment agencies or
management agencies in return for selecting them (Han’gy ŏre 1997d).
71
For example, undocumented workers were granted the right to receive severance pay under the Labor
Standards Act after the court decision in 1997 while trainees did not have the right (T Lim 2006:248).

78
System” under which trainees become workers after a given period of time of training.
72

Even though the KFSB kept its right to administer the recruitment process, it opposed the
government proposal, claiming that financial situations of small- and medium-sized
businesses were too bad to provide more benefits, such as bonus or severance pay, to
migrant workers.
In December 1997, the Korean government signed the IMF bailout agreement and
began to carry out structural adjustment program supervised by the IMF. Going through
major changes in its economic structure, the government needed to put off all the
proposals for the reform of its labor migration system. In addition, as the unemployment
rate of Korean workers was expected to go up, the government decided to cancel or
postpone the importation of trainees who were already recruited. The Ministry of Justice
also announced that it would put extra efforts to arrest and deport undocumented
migrants while intensifying the immigration procedures for people from countries that
were the major origins of undocumented migrants. After almost two years of debates, the
new labor migration system was stopped due to the economic crisis, and did not come up
again until 2000.

72
The system was originally proposed by the legislative Budget Office of the National Assembly
Secretariat in 1996, but did not draw much attention at that time (Y Kim 1996).

79
Chapter Summary

Since the introduction of the new Industrial Trainee System in 1994, the Korean
government had maintained a two-tiered labor migration system in which it officially
imported trainees while condoning the employment of undocumented migrants. Under
this system, trainees were not legitimate workers and undocumented migrant workers
were not legitimate residents, thus they both were exposed to a highly exploitative
situation without proper protection. However, as shown in the protests by undocumented
migrants and runaway trainees, migrant workers in Korea began to claim their rights as
workers with the support of civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations. The
court decision and international standards also pressured the Korean government to
improve the condition of migrant workers. Consequently, migrant workers secured their
rights as workers little by little.
Furthermore, migrant advocacy organizations formed a coalition, the Joint
Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea, and demanded the government reform its
labor migration system so that migrant workers could be entitled to the full rights and
benefits as workers. Concerned about being criticized as a human rights violating
country, the Ministry of Labor and the National Assembly proposed a bill for a new
system respectively. After long debates among different ministries, the government
decided to implement the Employment Permit System. However, the opposition by
business circles, especially by the KFSB, was vehement. Besides, Korean economy was
confronted by an unprecedented crisis that resulted in the intervention by the IMF in

80
1997. The efforts to reform the labor migration system was set back and migrant workers
were pushed to fight for survival.

81
CHAPTER 3. SETTLEMENT OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGREANT WORKERS

As shown in the previous chapter, the Korean government adopted the trainee
system in order to minimize the rights of migrant workers while preventing them from
settling down in Korea. Yet, the pressure from civil society as well as international
community pushed the government to gradually grant some labor rights to migrant
workers. Likewise, despite the government’s intention to make migrant labor temporary
and disposable, migrant workers began to be long-term settlers in Korean society.
Ironically, the evidence for that was clearly shown during the economic crisis. The Asian
financial crisis that hit the Korean economy in 1997 and lasted almost two years made the
government take a repatriation policy towards migrant workers. Nevertheless, the
majority of them remained in Korea and some of those who had chosen to leave even
came back after the economy began to be recovered.
The settlement of migrant workers in Korea was encouraged when the
government granted temporary amnesties to undocumented migrant workers from 2002
to 2004 while preparing the reform of labor migration system. During those amnesty
periods, migrant workers not only viably participated in community activities set up by
local migrant advocacy organizations and their own grassroots organizations but also
actively engaged in migrant rights movements. Instead of preparing to go back to their
home country, which was the government’s original intention when it decided to give
those amnesties, migrant workers became attached to Korean society, and to their local

82
communities in particular, and began to claim their rights to stay in Korea. Despite the
harsh crackdown policy enacted by the government after the temporary amnesties ended
and the new labor migration system, that is, the Employment Permit System, was
introduced, more and more undocumented migrant workers turned into long-term settlers
and those who brought in or formed their family also increased.
In this chapter, I first look into how migrant workers survived the economic crisis
and the Korean government’s repatriation policy. I then review the process of the reform
of labor migration system, in which not only the government and the business circles but
also civil society and migrant workers themselves played important parts. Finally, I argue
that undocumented migrant workers became long-term settlers in Korean society during
temporary amnesty periods provided by the government before the reform and their
experiences of those periods gave them the strength to go on their lives in Korea despite
constant fear of arrest and deportation.

Economic Crisis and the Survival of Migrant Workers

The financial crisis and the consequent IMF intervention suspended the reform of
the labor migration system of Korea. To make matters worse, the crisis even reversed the
efforts to provide human rights protection for migrant workers, replacing it with
restrictive and anti-migrant policies by the government. As the crisis generated a massive
unemployment of Korean workers, the government decided to repatriate migrant workers
in order to make opportunities for Koreans who had lost jobs. The idea that migrant labor

83
is temporary and disposable was clearly shown in this attempt to dump migrant workers
due to the crisis. However, many migrant workers were reluctant to leave Korea even
when they were laid off from their jobs. At the same time, unemployed Korean workers
were unwilling to take the jobs formerly held by migrant workers. Soon after, small- and
medium-sized manufacturing industries requested the government allow them to keep or
rehire migrant workers. As the economy recovered, the demand for migrant workers
increased and the need for the reform of the labor migration system once again was
raised. The Korean government was pushed to create policy changes this time.
In this section, I introduce the Korean government’s efforts to replace migrant
workers with Korean workers and examine why those efforts ended up failing. I also look
into how migrant workers survived the crisis despite their economic difficulties in
addition to the hostile atmosphere towards them. Then I show the signs of settlement of
migrant workers after the crisis.

Plans to Replace Migrant Workers
After the agreement between the Korean government and the IMF was made in
December 1997, the IMF imposed structural adjustment programs on the Korean
economy including a range of structural reforms in the financial and corporate sectors.
Particularly, enhancing flexibility in labor market was regarded as one of the key
elements to realize corporate restructuring. Consequently, the quasi-lifetime employment
of Korean workers, which has been an important characteristic of employment system in
modern Korea, was required to change. A tripartite committee between the government,

84
business, and labor was formed to discuss the matter and finally decided to amend the
Labor Standards Act in February 1998 to allow layoffs for managerial reasons (Hong and
Lee 2000: 218-220, Lee and Lee 2000: 69-70). Labor outsourcing by manpower
supplying agencies also became popular as a way of enhancing labor market flexibility,
since it replaced regular full-time workers with non-regular part-time workers. As a
result, for the first time in its modern economic development, Korea experienced massive
unemployment of its workers.
After just one year in the financial crisis, the unemployment rate almost tripled
and the number of unemployed reached 1.49 million (Table 3.1). Considering that the
unemployment rate is usually underestimated in times of economic downturns as people
tend to give up job seeking efforts, the unemployment after the crisis could be assumed
much more serious than shown in the table below. The resistance against large-scale
layoffs resulted in protests by labor unions and their withdrawal from the tripartite
committee. The government offered public work programs and extended unemployment
insurance coverage to mollify the laid off workers, but that was not enough. In order to
free up jobs for Korean workers, the government decided to repatriate migrant workers.

Table 3.1. Unemployment Rate of Domestic Work Force

Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Unemployment
Rate (%)
2.9 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.6 7.0 6.3 4.1 3.8 3.1
Number of
Unemployed
(in thousands)
571 504 430 435 568 1,490 1,374 913 845 708

Source: Ministry of Labor. Yearbook of Labour Statistics, each year.

85
Forecasting that the soaring unemployment rate would continue for the next
couple of years, the government proposed to reduce the number of migrant workers by
freezing the trainee quota while deporting undocumented workers. Particularly, the
government focused on reducing the nearly 150,000 undocumented migrant workers,
who accounted for more than 60 percent of all migrant workers at the end of 1997. Yet,
before the government took any action, the number of migrant workers was already
dropping from November 1997 for the first time since record keeping began in 1992.
Some of them departed Korea after they lost their jobs due to the closures or
retrenchments of factories and found it difficult to get a new job. Some of those who
managed to keep their jobs also chose to leave as their remittance nearly halved due to
the depreciation of the Korean won. Newspapers began to cover the stories of
undocumented migrants who were willing to leave the country but could not because of
the high fines for their illegal stay imposed under the Immigration Control Act.
Hearing this reason, the Ministry of Justice decided to grant a voluntary departure
period from December 1997 to March 1998 and offer an exemption for undocumented
migrant workers who reported themselves and left Korea voluntarily. It also promised to
remove the ban on the re-entry of undocumented migrants if they left during the
voluntary departure period.
73
However, after the voluntary departure period the Ministry
planned an intensive crackdown on undocumented migrants with the full penalties. After
the announcement, a massive exodus of undocumented migrant workers began and over

73
Before the voluntary departure period, undocumented migrants were fined 2 million won (2,097 USD as
of 1997) for every year for their illegal stay when they left Korea and could not re-enter the country up to
two years.

86
46,500 people, or more than 30 percent of total undocumented migrants, left by the end
of the three-month voluntary departure period (Maeil Ky ŏngje 1998a).
When the due date passed, however, the Ministry of Justice could not launch its
crackdown operation immediately. Because so many people rushed to leave the country
in such a short time, a lot of willing-to-leave migrants could not get a seat on a plane
home. Also, there were many undocumented migrants who were waiting in hopes of
getting their delayed wages, severance pays, or industrial accident compensations before
they went home. Their forced deportation was expected to bring about resistance and
criticism as an unjust action. Actually, in a fear of being deported without getting paid, a
group of undocumented migrant workers organized a protest to request the extension of
the voluntary departure period.
74
Also, the JCMK (Joint Committee for Migrant Workers
in Korea) announced that it would work with the Asian Migrant Center in Hong Kong to
report the cases of migrant workers who were facing deportation without getting paid
their wages or industrial injury compensations to the UN Commission on Human Rights
and the ILO (Han’gy ŏre 1998a). Finally, the Ministry extended the voluntary departure
period to the end of April 1998. After that, with the request by other ministries of the
government and/or by the business circles, it had to offer a voluntary departure period
two more times until the end of 1998.

74
Twenty-three undocumented migrants from Bangladesh and Pakistan requested the Seoul immigration
office for the exemption of penalties and the extension of their stay until they got paid. When rejected, they
submitted a petition to their embassies and the Ministry of Justice, and even tried to protest in front of the
presidential compound, Ch ŏng Wa Tae, to take the matter directly to the President. Worried about a
possible diplomatic dispute, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade requested the Ministry of Justice to
smooth things over (Korea Times 1998).

87
While the Ministry of Justice induced undocumented migrant workers to leave the
country voluntarily by granting the exemption of penalties, other government ministries
encouraged business owners to replace migrant workers with Korean workers. In April
1998, the Small and Medium Business Administration (hereafter SMBA) proposed an
incentive program that would provide low-interest loans up to 300 million won to small-
and medium-sized businesses that let migrant workers go and hire Korean workers
instead. After hearing the complaints from the business owners that it was hard to replace
migrant workers because of the higher wage expectations of Korean workers, the
Ministry of Labor decided to offer subsidized wages of 200,000 won per each Korean
worker to the employers who hired them to fill the vacancies left by migrant workers.
Meanwhile, the different government ministries agreed that no more trainees should be
admitted in order to free up jobs for Koreans.
However, the replacement plans did not work well. Korean workers were not
attracted to the 3-D jobs that migrant workers used to do.
75
Besides, they could not
endure the workload of factories because many of the newly unemployed Koreans were
not accustomed to manual work. Small- and medium-sized factory owners complained
that they could not find Korean workers willing to take a job and even if they could, the
replaced Korean workers often quit the job within a week or two. The fact that Korean
workers were very reluctant to take 3-D jobs was clearly shown in various data. For
example, according to the Seoul Job Bank, out of 389 job openings received from 3-D

75
According to previous studies, in the segmented labor market structure of industrialized societies some of
the bottom-level work is so stigmatized that native workers often shun it even when they are unemployed.
Based on that, they concluded that immigrant workers do not have a major impact on the employment
opportunities of natives (Borjas 1990, Waldinger and Lichter 2003).

88
industries between April and June 1998, only 97 jobs were taken. Similarly, the KFSB
(Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business) assisted 570 Korean job seekers
during the same period but only 120 people took a job at small- and medium-sized
manufacturing companies. A survey conducted by the SMBA indicated that there was a
serious discrepancy between hiring companies and job seekers in that companies wanted
workers for production line whereas people looking for job wanted office work or
supervisory or managerial positions (Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1998). Because of these
different expectations, more than 70 percent of newly replaced Korean workers
reportedly quit their jobs within a month (S ŏul Sinmun 1998a).
Although the SMBA offered to raise the amount of low-interest loans and
subsidized wages for the businesses that replaced migrant workers, the business owners
were reluctant to take advantage of the incentive program. The program turned out to be
ineffective when only 70 companies applied for it and 205 Korean workers were hired by
the end of June 1998 (Kungmin Ilbo 1998). Facing labor shortages in the middle of the
unprecedented high unemployment rate, business owners who had tried to hire Korean
workers requested the government allow them to hire migrant workers again and reopen
the door to trainees. The KFSB backed up their request with their survey result of 750
businesses with less than 300 employees that 42.9 percent of migrant-hiring companies
were unwilling to replace them with Korean workers (Han’gy ŏre 1998b). As the demands
for migrant workers rose, the number of undocumented migrant workers began to bounce
back. After all, the financial crisis confirmed what Cornelius (1998) called the “structural
embeddedness” of the demand for migrant labor in Korea.

89
Surviving the Crisis
During the first year of the financial crisis, a large number of migrant workers,
both trainees and undocumented workers, left Korea.
76
In most cases, they left voluntarily
because of the economic constraints. According to the Ministry of Justice, about 64,000
undocumented migrant workers left voluntarily during the three times of the voluntary
departure period in 1998 while only 5,435 were forcibly deported in that year (S ŏul
Sinmun 1998b, Ministry of Justice 1999). Yet, there were still more migrant workers who
chose to stay in Korea because the financial crisis also attacked other Asian countries
including their own home countries. For example, from the mid-1997 to the end of the
1998, one in every five jobs had been lost in the Philippines as firms contracted and laid
off workers (Valenzuela 2000:20). Also, the unemployment rate in Thailand and
Indonesia more than doubled during the same period (Knowles et al. 1999:8). As
deported migrant workers came back home, the labor market situation got worse in
sending countries, which made many migrants decide not to go home or go abroad for
work again.
77

Those who stayed in Korea, however, had a hard time trying to survive, often
without earnings for months. Huong and her husband were laid off due to the
retrenchment of their factory and had to make do for several months without a job:
In Spring 1998, I was working in a plastic injection factory at Anyang with my
husband. But we both were fired from there because there was no more work. A
lot of our friends went back home during the IMF.
78
We also wanted to go home,

76
From December 1997 to December 1998, the number of trainees and undocumented workers dropped by
22,043 (32 %) and 48,511 (33%), respectively (see Table 2.1).
77
The Asian Migrant Center estimated that more than 900,000 migrants were repatriated in 1998 from
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea (Varona 1999:6-7).
78
In everyday conversation, the term “IMF” usually refer to the financial crisis in the late 1990s in Korea.

90
but we couldn’t. We knew that there would be no jobs in Vietnam, either. “If we
stay in Korea, things will get better soon, and then we will be able to get a job
again. If we go home, we will never find a job.” That’s what we thought and
that’s why we chose to stay. It was hard, though. We should live with our little
savings for months. We only had two meals a day with same food for breakfast
and dinner. (Huong, Vietnamese, female, 34)

Dung and his wife were able to keep their job, but suffered from the sharply reduced
income for a couple of months:
When the IMF came, my wife and I were working in a yarn factory at Suwon,
where we had worked for more than two years. I had earned 1.2 million won per
month before, but our boss cut my salary after the IMF. He gave me 200,000 won
sometimes and 300,000 won at other times. My wife didn’t even get any money.
Because we couldn’t make a living with that money, we decided to quit the job
and go home. But there were no plane tickets available. They [the travel agency]
said that all the flights to Vietnam were booked for a month. We had no choice
but to stay. To see if there were any jobs available, I visited my old company at
Sungnam. The boss told me to come and work there with my wife. We moved
there and started from the entry-level wages, which were 900,000 won for me and
700,000 won for my wife. (Dung, Vietnamese, male, 37)

In addition to the economic difficulty, migrant workers also had to endure
hostility towards them. Conflicts between migrant workers and their Korean co-workers
and the consequent assaults on migrant workers were often reported on the news. The
public attitudes in general were also hostile to migrant workers. Bijendra’s encounters
with outraged Koreans showed the anti-migrant sentiments during the economic crisis:
You know, I look like a Korean, so I was okay when I moved around alone. But
when I went out with my friends who had dark skin, Korean people would
provoke a quarrel by saying, “You bastards, what are you still doing here instead
of going back to your country?” (Bijendra, Nepalese, male, 33)

Hakim said he was even afraid to go out:
Korean people thought that foreigners took away all the dollars and that’s why
they were attacked by the IMF. They just had no idea at that time. Whenever I
went out, people would say, “Hey, why don’t you go home? It’s already hard
enough for us to feed ourselves here.” (Hakim, Bangladeshi, male, 35)

91
Unlike the xenophobic responses from the general public, labor unions and
migrant advocacy organizations tried to embrace migrant workers.
79
They tried to remind
Koreans that migrant workers were also victims of the economic crisis. Both of the major
labor unions, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), and the JCMK argued that Western-led
globalization, characterized as neo-liberalism and neo-imperialism, as well as the
distorted economic structure of Korea caused by government-chaebol collusion were to
blame for taking jobs away from Korean people, not migrant workers (Moon 2000: 167-
169). They also paid attention to the difficulties that migrant workers experienced under
the economic crisis and urged the government to intensify the supervision over any
human rights abuses practiced by employers who made ill use of the repatriation policies
of the government.
80

Moreover, as migrant workers were not eligible for any public supports provided
by the government, many local migrant advocacy organizations took part in providing
services such as shelters, meals, or even job placement assistance for unemployed

79
As shown in the US or European experiences, labor unions were historically against immigration with
the assumption that it would bring adverse effects to native workers, but their anti-immigrant position has
gradually changed, especially from the late twentieth century, as they realized immigration became
increasingly common and difficult to regulate. Consequently, they began to lobby for moderate, maybe not
fully open, immigration policy. Moreover, they realized that the expansion of legal protection for
immigrant workers would advance the interests of native workers. As a result, they began to support the
rights of immigrant workers while encouraging them to organize (Haus 1995, Watts 2002). In Korea, too,
labor unions initially resisted to the idea of importing migrant labor. Yet, once migrants entered Korea and
became another group of workers in the lower rung of the labor market, labor unions began to pay attention
to the issues around migrant workers and to support their fight for their basic labor and human rights
(Moon 2002, Gray 2007). For Korean labor unions’ supports for the organization of migrant workers, see
chapter 5.
80
For example, some employers used the voluntary departure periods granted by the Ministry of Justice,
during which they were also exempted from any penalties, as an opportunity to report their migrant
employees for illegal stay, especially those who claimed their rights to get proper wages, severance pays, or
industrial accident compensations.

92
migrant workers.
81
After being kicked out of the dormitory of his company due to the
layoff, Hakim managed to put himself in a shelter run by a local migrant advocacy
organization:
I was working in a milling factory at Suwon in 1997, but the factory was closed
down. The boss introduced me to another factory, but the situation there was bad,
too. Although they provided a room and meals, they rarely paid me. For more
than seven months I worked there, all I got was less than 800,000 won [573
USD]. When they finally fired me, I found myself homeless. I stayed from place
to place and often skipped meals to save money. My friends told me to go back to
Bangladesh with them. My father also said to me over the phone, “Just come
home. Everybody else was already back. Are you going to starve to death there
alone?” But I still had debts to pay back and I believed that the economy would
get better. One day I heard that there was a shelter for migrant workers in Ansan,
so I went there. About 40 to 50 people were staying there and I began to share a
room with over ten guys. The room was free and the meal was affordable. I had
stayed at the shelter almost four months until I got a new job.

From the late 1998, a year after the crisis, the Korean economy began to recover,
and soon migrant workers could sense the revival of the real economy. Munkh, who came
to Korea in 1997 and suffered from repeated layoffs, was one of them:
I didn’t know the [Korean] economy would go down like that when I decided to
come to Korea. All my friends who came ahead of me told me to come and they
helped me get a job in a paint-spraying factory at Inch ŏn. I got used to the work
after three months, but then the situation of the company went bad. There was less
and less work and the boss began to fire the workers, foreigners first. There were
more than 60 workers at first but only 20 people, all of who were Korean
managers and salesmen, were left when I was fired. While having a hard time to
find another factory job, I managed to get myself in a chicken farm. Room and
food were provided but no wages. After a month and a half of working there, I got
a job in a plastic injection factory with the help of some friends. But the company
also slowed down. For three months until July 1998, there were no work in the
company and I had to take leave. When I almost made my mind to go back home,
the company called me to come and work again. A month later, my friends in
Kunpo told me to come for a better paying job. I moved there in September 1998

81
A civil society group called the National Movement Committee for Overcoming Unemployment
supported the efforts of these local migrant organizations by providing financial assistance for shelter, fuel,
and food (Asian Migrant Center 1999: 185).

93
and started to work at a molding factory in the industrial complex at Kunpo. I saw
idle factories open again and more and more of them lighted up at nights. It was
then when I knew that the work would get busier and all I had to do was work
hard. Instead of my going back home, I called in my wife to Korea so we could
earn together. (Munkh, Mongolian, male, 41)

As manufacturing production increased back, the demand for migrant labor grew
again rapidly.
82
While the Korean government was still reluctant to admit new trainees,
migrant workers rushed back through informal channels. Consequently, the number of
undocumented migrants bounced back from its lowest level of 92,686 in August 1998 to
over 100,000 by January 1999, and almost reached back to the level before the crisis by
the end of 1999 (Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1999a, Ministry of Justice 1999).
83
Among those
who arrived Korea, there were also migrant workers who had returned home due to the
crisis but decided to come back to Korea again. Nadia, who left Korea after making a
scanty living since her layoff, came back in four months when she heard from her friends
in Korea that the situation was getting better:
My company, where I had worked for two years, closed in fall 1997 like so many
other companies. I had to leave the dormitory too, but I don’t have money to rent
a room. So I moved in my friend’s place in Suw ŏn. Three of her friends, who also
lost their jobs, were already there, so five of us should be crammed in her small
rented room. There was a local migrant center run by a Catholic church that I had
been attending since they had a Filipino priest in 1995. Once in a while the center
introduced us a part-time job in a nearby greenhouse to pick up vegetables, but
that hardly gave us enough money to feed ourselves. So the center sometimes
gave us food like rice and meat. We were barely scraping a living. Winter came

82
For example, the number of trainees demanded by small- and medium-sized manufacturing industries
was more than quadrupled from 1,364 in the second quarter of 1998 to 5,856 in the first quarter of 1999
(Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1999b).
83
In order to reduce the number, the Ministry Justice repeatedly granted grace periods offering exemption
of penalties for undocumented migrants who reported themselves and left the country voluntarily while
threatening to implement intensive crackdown and hasher punishment after each grace period. Also, the
SMBA once again announced incentive programs for the businesses replaced migrant workers with
Koreans. Yet, those proposals could neither keep migrants from entering Korea nor discouraged employers
from hiring migrant workers.

94
but there was no heating in our room and I just couldn’t stand anymore. With my
little emergency money, I decided to buy a plane ticket to the Philippines.

For the first time in six years, I went home. All my children were very happy,
although the youngest one didn’t remember me at first. At that time my husband
was driving a taxi, but only worked three days a week. And we had five children
to feed, clothe and educate. About four months later, I called my friends in Korea.
She said there were some companies hiring people, so I decided to come back.
But I was worried that my previous record of illegal stay might prevent me from
reentering Korea. So I made a passport with another person’s name.

When I arrived Korea, I was interrogated by the immigration at the airport. I was
very nervous, but I convinced the immigration officer that I was just a tourist
visiting Korea. It was still early 1998 and there were few people entering Korea
for work. He believed me and gave me a 15-day stamp. But when I came back to
Suw ŏn, it was not easy for me to get a job. Even my friend who said things were
getting better didn’t have a job. The center again helped us for food. We had been
on and off work, and anyone who was working at the time paid the rent. It was
October 1998 when I finally got a stable factory job. One year later, I asked my
husband to come and join me. (Nadia, Filipino, female, 46)

For those coming back, Korea was already a familiar place. Besides, illegal
migration broker businesses, which were revitalized as the economy recuperated,
smoothed their transition.
84
Shanker came back to Korea less than a year after he left with
the help from one of those brokers:
I first came to Korea as a trainee, but when the IMF came I was pulb ŏp.
85
When I
was having hard time to find a job, I heard that the government let us go without
fine. I took the chance and went home. But I found that the economic situation got
worsened in Nepal than before I left home. I had to go abroad for work again. I
was thinking of going to other countries, but I already accustomed to living in
Korea. I knew how to speak Korean, I knew what to do in Korea, and I had

84
According to Seol and Skrentny, a web of brokers involved in illegal migration from various parts of
South and Southeast Asia to Korea was developed along with a network of official migration recruiters and
brokers under the ITS (2004: 492).
85
Undocumented migrant workers in Korea usually called themselves “pulb ŏp (illegal)” or “pulb ŏp saram
(illegal person)” both of which derived from “pulb ŏp ch’eryuja (illegal sojourner),” the term used officially
and by the public to indicate a foreigner who stays in Korea without a proper visa. However, migrant
advocacy organizations have tried to use the term “mid ŭngr ŏk iju nodongja (undocumented migrant
worker)” instead of “pulb ŏp ch’eryuja (illegal sojourner)” because the latter implicates undocumented
migrant workers are criminals who break the law while diluting the socio-economic context of international
migration.

95
friends in Korea. With my savings and personal loans from my brothers, I could
get a broker who helped me get a business visa. I came back to Korea in 1999 and
got a factory job in Inch ŏn. I had worked there for three years. In 2003, I had my
wife come here, also through a broker. (Shanker, Nepalese, male, 38)

The reentry of return migrants to Korea showed that migrant workers had already
formed an attachment to Korea as a place to live and work. Moreover, as shown in the
stories of Munkh, Nadia, and Shanker, their witness of the quick recovery of Korean
economy and their experiences of being able to keep a job for a relatively long time made
themselves decide to bring in their spouse. These situations after the crisis indicate that
migrant workers in Korea began to become long-term, maybe not permanent, settlers
despite the government’s intention to use migrant workers as temporary labor that should
be rotated periodically and disposed whenever necessary.
86

Towards the New Labor Migration System

As the Korean economy got out of the crisis and the number of undocumented
migrants increased, the reform of labor migration system, which had been put aside for a
while, was moved to the center of attention again. The ITS (Industrial Trainee System)
was already transformed into the “Work after Training System” in early 1998. Yet, for
migrant advocacy organizations, which had insisted on the abolition of the ITS, the new
system was nothing but a disguised form of the ITS, thus could not be counted as a

86
In his comparative study on immigration policy in Europe and Asia, Castles (2000) show that the
settlement of migrant workers became apparent after economic recession – oil crisis in the early 1970s for
Europe and financial crisis in the late 1990s for Asia – when migrant workers, who were assumed to be
sent home easily in the event of recession, decided to stay and even to bring in their family.

96
reform. Moreover, neither system provided a solution for existing undocumented migrant
workers who had been the majority of Korea’s migrant labor population.
From the year 2000, the Kim Dae Jung administration restarted the reform
process for labor migration system with a goal to build up its reputation as a human rights
country by improving the conditions of migrant workers. However, with the pressure
from the various groups with different positions on the reform, the process drifted for
several years without tangible result. Particularly, the government’s efforts to deport
massive numbers of undocumented migrants were constantly criticized not only by
migrant advocacy organizations but also by migrant-hiring businesses. While the
government’s plan for undocumented migrant workers kept swinging from crackdown to
amnesty, migrant workers lost their trust in the government. Moreover, vacillating
government policy even encouraged migrant workers to stay put as long as they could by
giving them a hope that they would be legalized someday.
In this section, I review the labor migration reform processes while exploring
what pushed or pulled back the Korean government’s reform drive and why. I also look
into the government’s efforts to control undocumented migrant workers and explain why
they ended up in vain.

Second Attempt to Introduce the Employment Permit System
After the first attempt to abolish the ITS and to introduce the EPS failed in 1997,
the government managed to make a partial change in the trainee system and introduce the
Work after Training System (WATS). The WATS was originally proposed when the

97
debate on the reform of the labor migration system was overheated among the supporters
of the ITS, represented by the KFSB, the proponents of the EPS, represented by the
Ministry of Labor, and the advocates of the WPS (Work Permit System), represented by
the JCMK. As a way to compromise the contending positions, the government designed
the WATS to include elements taken from both the ITS and the EPS/ WPS.
87
As a result,
under the WATS, labor migrants were still admitted as trainees, whose recruitment and
management were in charge of the KFSB, but were allowed to become workers after
certain period of time so that they could be fully protected by the labor laws. Yet, neither
the supporters of the ITS nor the proponents of the EPS/ WPS welcomed the government
proposal, and the WATS seemed to fade away from the reform debate.
However, in March 1998, when little attention was paid to the reform of the labor
migration system due to the financial crisis, the government rushed to enforce the
WATS.
88
According to the WATS, trainees who passed a skill test after their two years of
training could obtain a visa that allowed them to spend their third year as workers fully
protected by the labor laws. The skill test was to be administered by the Human
Resources Development Service of Korea, which is a public agency under the Ministry of
Labor. By giving trainees the opportunity to be workers and putting the system under the
supervision of a public agency, the government intended to solve the two major problems
of the ITS that had been pointed out by migrant advocacy organizations and the Ministry

87
Although there were differences between the EPS and the WPS in the degree of rights granted to migrant
workers, two systems shared a common ground that labor migrants should be treated as workers, not as
trainees.
88
The JCMK made a statement to criticize the sudden enactment of the WATS by the government, but
could not focus its full attention to the issue because there was a more urgent agenda, that was, to assist
migrant workers suffering from deteriorated conditions due to the crisis.

98
of Labor, that is, the human rights infringement of trainees and the management of the
system by corrupted private agencies. Despite its limitation, the WATS finally made it
possible for unskilled migrant workers to be acknowledged as legitimate workers in
Korea for the first time.
For almost two years, the WATS had not drawn much attention partly because of
the financial crisis and partly because of the interval between its enactment and the
appearance of post-training workers.
89
As the Korean economy got over the crisis and the
number of undocumented migrant workers went up, the need to reform the labor
migration system came up again. The more direct trigger was the publication of a report
on the conditions of industrial trainees by the JCMK in March 2000 (JCMK 2000). Based
on the counseling data from its member organizations, the report revealed the various
cases of human rights violation against trainees and how they were linked to the inherent
problems of the trainee system. Particularly, it pointed out that the corruptions in the
trainee system by the KFSB, recruitment agencies, and management agencies, cost
trainees a fortune to come to Korea, and as a result, pushed them out of the system to
become undocumented migrant workers to earn more money. Consequently, trainee-
hiring employers tried to keep the trainees by confiscating their passports, forcing them to
deposit their allowances, and even confining them. Yet, more often than not, those
attempts thrust them out and created more undocumented migrants. The report concluded
that trainee system was a modern form of slavery that should be abolished and a new

89
The WATS applied to those who entered Korea after its enactment, so post-training workers (E-8 visa
holders) began to appear from the year 2000.

99
system that could provide full protection for migrant workers should be adopted.
Furthermore, it claimed that any new system should allow existing undocumented
migrant workers to be legalized before its implementation.
The report elicited an instant response from the Kim Dae Jung administration,
which was very keen to the issues of human rights since its launch in 1998. Besides,
president Kim Dae Jung was expected to be awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his
life long work for democracy and human rights in Korea, thus the administration could
not but be concerned about its international image.
90
At a weekly briefing by the ruling
Democratic Party leaders in April 2000, the president ordered them to come up with
measures to protect the human rights of migrant workers while saying, “The
discrimination against foreign workers is humiliating and lamentable for Korea, a country
moving forward to be an advanced country in terms of human rights (Han’gy ŏre 2000).”
The Democratic Party soon formed a working group consisting of seven National
Assembly members to design measures to protect the human rights of migrant workers.
Since there was a consensus that much of the human rights problems experienced by
migrant workers had their root in the trainee system, the working group also decided to
push forward the enactment of the EPS to replace the WATS.
91

90
There had been pressures by international organizations as well. For example, when the secretary general
of the Amnesty International visited Korea in 1998, he asked the Kim Dae Jung Administration to put more
efforts to improve the human rights of migrant workers. In response to the request, the Ministry of Justice
proposed to establish the National Human Rights Commission and legislate the human rights law (Maeil
Ky ŏngje 1998b).
91
Yet, the capability of the working group to reform the trainee system lost credibility from the beginning
when one of the members was found to be the former president of the KFSB, who was on trial at the time
for bribery in connection with the appointment of trainee management agencies.

100
As expected, the opposition by the KFSB was as vehement as in 1997. About a
month after the formation of the working group, it published a report that criticized the
EPS. In the report, the KFSB argued that the EPS would increase the financial burden for
migrant-hiring companies and create labor disputes through collective actions by migrant
workers with full labor rights. Also, it insisted that the EPS would not be able to respond
to the labor demand fast enough due to its complicated process to import foreign labor,
thus would generate more undocumented migrant workers than the current system
(Munhwa Ilbo 2000). The KFSB also publicized the survey of 794 trainee-hiring
companies and their 913 trainees conducted by its affiliated research institute showing
that 69.5 percent of the companies opposed to the EPS and 89.7 percent of trainees were
satisfied with their lives in Korea (Maeil Ky ŏngje 2000). In addition, the KFSB with four
other major business owners’ associations held a press conference to oppose to the EPS.
They all expressed great concerns that the EPS would cause the increase in wages of
migrant workers and then Korean workers, which would consequently weaken the
competitiveness of Korean businesses in the world market.
To refute the arguments by the KFSB and support the enactment of the EPS, the
Ministry of Labor soon published a report (Im and S ŏl 2000). According to the report, the
EPS would not increase labor cost of migrant workers because trainees already got
overtime pay, bonus, and soon would receive severance pay.
92
Besides, although migrant
workers would be treated equally with Korean workers, wage differentials based on

92
In 2000, a Filipino trainee filed a lawsuit for her right to receive severance pay. Despite the interference
by the KFSB and the recruitment agency in the Philippines, she won the case in March 2001 and the court
ruled that trainees should get severance pay (Han’gy ŏre 2001).

101
productivity would be allowed, therefore, the wages of migrant workers would not go up
very high. For the concerns about labor disputes, the report assured that the annual
renewal of the employment contract under the EPS discouraged migrant workers to make
an unreasonable demand through collective bargaining. It also explained that the EPS
would make the timely supply of migrant labor possible by merging the labor import
operations of the various ministries and agencies into one channel. In addition, by
showing that more than 20 percent of the trainees had run away since the WATS, the
report countered the argument of the KFSB that the trainee system had stabilized already.
Furthermore, it showed contradictory survey results where 67.8 percent of the public was
in favor of the EPS and 85.9 percent of them thought that the human rights of migrant
workers were seriously infringed upon under the trainee system (Ibid: 119-120). After
showing the examples of EPS-adopting countries, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Singapore, the report concluded that considering its position in the international
community now was the time for Korea to have a new labor migration system that
complied with the international standards of human rights.
Despite the strong driving force towards the EPS by the president, the Democratic
Party, and the Ministry of Labor, the submission of the bill to the National Assembly was
not easy. Most of all, opposition from the KFSB and business owners’ associations was
adamant. Especially for the KFSB, giving up its privilege to operate the trainee system
would be a great loss.
93
The KFSB submitted a petition against the EPS signed by over

93
According to the data that the KFSB submitted for the National Assembly Inspection in 2002, it had total
revenues of more than 56.5 billion won (approximately 45.2 million USD as of 2002) by operating the
trainee system from 1996 to 2001 (Han’gy ŏre 2002b).

102
188,000 business owners and executives to the presidential office, the prime minister’s
office, and every political party. It also organized protests with thousands of business
owners in front of the National Assembly building.
Not only the KFSB, the JCMK with various civil society groups advocating the
rights of migrant workers also expressed their discontent with the EPS. For them, the EPS
proposed by the government still had limitations in terms of the rights of migrants.
Among others, the EPS limited the right of migrant workers to change their work place
by not giving them a work permit but only issuing employment permits to their
employers. They claimed that the government should implement the WPS rather than the
EPS, under which migrant workers would get work permit renewable up to five years and
then would be given an opportunity to extend their stay in Korea with a special permit
(JCMK 2001). Upon the oppositions by both business circles and civil society, the
Democratic Party held a public hearing in October 2000. However, as the involved
parties were unable to reach an agreement, the government once again failed to submit
the EPS bill to the National Assembly in 2000.

Changes within the Trainee System
Despite the failure to enact the EPS, the Kim Dae Jung Administration and the
Democratic Party made it clear that the abolition of the trainee system and the enactment
of the EPS were just deferred, not canceled, and that they would keep making efforts to
protect the human rights of migrant workers. Especially after the awarding of the Nobel
Peace Prize to the president Kim Dae Jung in October 2000, the government tried to

103
adopt policies to eliminate the discrimination against migrant workers and to enhance
their human rights in accordance with international norms, such as the ILO covenants and
the UN human rights conventions, in order to be acknowledged by the international
community as a human rights country. For example, a couple of weeks ahead of the 57
th

session of the UN Commission on Human Right in March 2001, the Ministry of Labor
ratified some of the reserved ILO covenants including Article 19 on equal treatment for
accident compensation and the Ministry of Education decided to allow the children of
undocumented migrants to be admitted to elementary school legitimately to pursue the
equal rights to all children under the UN International Human Rights Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the UN Human Rights Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
94

Pressured to take more responsible in protecting the rights of trainees, the SMBA
and the KFSB also proposed various plans. For example, in January 2001, the SMBA
introduced a general plan to improve the WATS by intensifying the supervision over the
recruitment agencies, management agencies, and trainee-hiring companies. In June, it
proposed an amended guideline for the operation of the trainee system where it became a
rule for trainee-hiring businesses to get mandatory human rights education. It added that,
in case of violating the rights of migrant workers, the businesses would be barred from
receiving trainees or post-training workers for the future. The KFSB also formed a
counseling team for trainees in trouble and a human rights advisory committee for the
improvement of the conditions of trainees.

94
The issues around the admission of the children of undocumented migrants into the public education
system are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

104
However, those changes could not solve the problems embedded in the trainee
system, such as corruption or high brokerage fee, especially when the KFSB itself was
deeply involved in those problems. In August 2001, the SMBA founded out that the
KFSB had manipulated the number of trainees and the percentage of runaways.
According to the SMBA, not only had the number of trainees already exceeded the total
quota of 80,000, but also the percentage of run-away trainees was almost 45 percent,
which was way over 20 percent alleged by the KFSB. It concluded that the KFSB had
been fabricating the numbers in order to make a false profit as well as to maintain their
privilege to operate the trainee system (S ŏul Ky ŏngje 2001). As a result, the SMBA
decided to stop admitting trainees for the next six months and to amend the WATS in the
mean time.
After a four-month long coordination among different ministries, the government
finally revised the WATS in December 2001. According to the revision, trainees would
take a skill test after one year of training to obtain a two-year work visa. The reduction of
the training period was proposed to serve two purposes. First, it would grant labor rights
to migrant workers longer than before so that the government would be able to avoid the
criticism that it exploited migrant workers under the name of trainees. Second, it would
eventually allow manufacturing industries to utilize up to 240,000 documented migrant
workers – 80,000 trainees and 160,000 post-training workers – without expanding the
trainee quota.
95

95
The trainee quotas for manufacturing and construction, which were 80,000 and 2,500 respectively, had
not changed after the revision. Yet, the quota for fishery was expanded from 1,300 to 3,000. Therefore, the
total trainee quota was decided to be 85,500 for 2002.

105
When the WATS was under revision, however, the number of undocumented
migrant workers was growing rapidly, exceeding 200,000 by March 2001. To reduce the
number, the Ministry of Justice announced a voluntary departure period from June to July
during which it would not impose penalties against undocumented migrants who chose to
leave. At the same time, the Ministry decided to have an intensive crackdown operation
joint with the police. Although the crackdown operation during the voluntary departure
period was severely criticized as a contradictory policy, the crackdown was enforced
anyway and more than 2,000 undocumented migrant workers were arrested at home, at
work, and on the street in just one month.
96
Migrants and their advocacy organizations
defined the crackdown operation as human hunting, criticized the human rights abuses in
the process of arrest and detention, and protested against the crackdown.
97
As migrant
workers left their work place out of the fear of being caught, the migrant-hiring business
owners joined to criticize the government as it was causing labor shortages. Their
complaint about lack of workers got worse after the government stopped importing new
trainees. Concerned about human rights violation and labor shortages caused by
crackdown and deportation policy, the government could not but loosened the crackdown
operation. Still, the number of forcibly deported undocumented migrants reached its
highest point in 2001 during the Kim Dae Jung administration (Table 3.2).

96
The crackdown on undocumented migrant workers was justified by following two reasons. First, the
number of crime committed by foreigners was increasing and the growing number of undocumented
migrants would worsen the situation. To diminish crime and eliminate potential criminals, undocumented
migrant workers should be removed. Second, more than 30 percent of the undocumented migrant workers
were ethnic Koreans from China. By usually working in service or construction industries with their
language fluency, they were thought to take jobs from Koreans and raise the unemployment rate among
Koreans. To give more employment opportunities to Koreans, undocumented migrant workers should go.
97
Religious organizations for ethnic Koreans from China even staged a hunger protest requesting a special
exemption for our “compatriots.”

106
Table 3.2. Number of Forcibly Deported Undocumented Migrants, 1998 – 2002

Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Forcible
Deportation
5,435 6,412 6,890 10,301 5,670

Source: Ministry of Justice. Immigration Statistics Yearbook, each year.

Achievement of Partial Reform
As the year 2002 approached, the Korean government was pressured to do
something more about undocumented migrant workers than just cracking down on them.
One of the biggest reasons was that Korea was to host the World Cup and the Asian
Games in 2002 and the government worried that those events would attract migrant
workers who would be added to already very high numbers of undocumented migrant
workers.
98
In addition, the government concerned that the human rights infringement on
migrant workers in Korea would be widely known to the world during those two
international sports game and would consequently tarnish the nation’s image. The
concerns enhanced when the JCMK presented its report on human rights conditions of
migrant workers in Korea in various international forums and workshops (JCMK 2001).
Moreover, a large-scale strike by over one hundred undocumented migrant workers from
nine different countries working in a furniture factory at Poch’un due to repeated
payment delay in January 2002 spurred the government to take an immediate action.
After several discussion meetings among the relevant ministries, the government
finally came up with comprehensive measures to prevent the undocumented stay of

98
Indeed, the percentage of undocumented migrants reached almost 80 percent of all migrant workers, with
the number estimated at 255,206, by the end of 2001 (see the Table 2.1).

107
migrants in March 2002. First, the government decided to grant a grace period, under the
name of departure preparation period, up to one year until the end of March 2003 for
those who reported themselves to the local immigration offices during a two-month of
voluntary reporting period. Yet, the Ministry of Justice clearly stated that all
undocumented migrant workers would be deported after the grace period. Second, the
government prepared to implement the EPS starting in 2003. The government assumed
that the proposed one-year departure preparation period would encourage undocumented
migrant workers to leave the country voluntarily by giving them enough time to prepare
to go home, which would enable the government to make a clean start for the EPS.
However, migrants and their advocacy organizations responded negatively. The
JCMK and other civil society groups thought that granting a grace period was not a
fundamental solution for the current situation of undocumented migrant workers but a
mere makeshift in order to get through the World Cup season without creating a bad
image. They argued that the government was punishing migrant workers for its own
policy failure by changing its policies constantly, that is, by threatening to deport them all
at one time and then granting them amnesty at the next time. Some religious
organizations, especially those advocating the rights of ethnic Koreans from China,
requested the government to grant a longer grace period, at least five years, so that ethnic
Korean migrants could pay off their debts that they had owed for migration to Korea and
save some money to bring back home.
99
Yet, most of the other migrant advocacy

99
Their request for the government to provide differentiated measures for ethnic Korean migrants was
based on following two reasons. First, ethnic Koreans were not same as other migrant workers because they
were “our blood.” Second, ethnic Koreans paid the highest price to come to Korea. According to a report
published by Korea Labor Institute, ethnic Koreans from China spent 8.44 million won (6,748 USD) on

108
organizations, along with migrant workers, condemned the government’s policy and
called for a complete legalization for all undocumented migrant workers so that they
could be absorbed into the newly implemented system.
Particularly, the stance of the Equality Trade Union – Migrants’ Branch (ETU-
MB) was the toughest.
100
The ETU-MB was concerned that the temporary permit issued
to those who reported themselves would put undocumented migrant workers in more
vulnerable position by forcing them to put up with human rights violations at work place
because migrant workers needed to remain in the company where they were working at
the point of report in order to keep their permit valid. Also, it feared that the personal data
reported by undocumented migrant workers to local immigration offices would be used to
trace them back for arrest and deportation after the grace period. With the support of over
60 civil society groups, the ETU-MB staged a 77-day sit-in protest at My ŏngdong
Cathedral from April 2002 requesting for the complete legalization of undocumented
migrant workers.
At first, few migrant workers reported themselves to get the permit to stay while
condemning the inconsistency of the government policy on them. For the first month of

average for the cost of migration while other groups of migrants spending less than 6 million (4,797 USD)
(Yu and Yi 2002: 77). Although not surveyed according to ethnicity, the average monthly wages for
migrant workers were 822,930 (658 USD) for trainees and 858,260 (686 USD) for undocumented migrants
respectively (Ibid: 84).
100
The unionization efforts for migrant workers began in 2000 when a group of radical activists from
migrant advocacy organizations and the leaders of grassroots migrant organizations got together and
formed the Struggle Network for Migrant Workers’ Labor Right and Freedom of Migration (Interview with
the former secretary general of the ETU-MB). After one year of preparation, the ETU-MB (Equality Trade
Union – Migrants’ Branch) was established in May 2001 as a sub-branch of the Seoul/ Ky ŏnggi/ Inch’ ŏn
Region Equality Trade Union under the KCTU (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions). The mission of
the ETU-MB was to organize and empower migrant workers as main actors in the migrant rights
movements. In its inaugural statement, the ETU-MB declared that it would fight for the legalization of all
undocumented migrant workers, the abolition of the trainee system, and the full protection of the rights of
migrant workers under the labor laws (ETU-MB 2001).

109
the voluntary report period, only 19,169 undocumented migrants came forward (Ministry
of Justice 2002). However, as the due date was coming, more and more undocumented
migrant workers were inclined to report themselves in to get the permit. Unlike the ETU-
MB, many migrant advocacy organizations, including the JCMK, also softened their
original position and helped undocumented migrants get the permit.
101
When the two-
month voluntary report period ended, 255,978 people, approximately 96.2 percent of all
undocumented migrants, reported to immigration officials.
102
The reality that almost all
undocumented migrant workers came forward showed how much undocumented
migrants longed for legitimate resident status. For them, the opportunity to stay and work
in Korea without fear of being arrested and deported was too big to just give up, even
though it was only one year.
Migrant workers, civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations, and
small- and medium-sized manufacturing industries all anticipated that the government
would introduce the EPS by 2003. Besides, there was a hope that the undocumented
migrant workers would get their grace period extended or even would get legalized
before the new system was enacted. On the contrary, in July 2002, one and a half month
after the World Cup, the government announced an unexpected decision. First, the trainee
system (WATS) was expanded with the total trainee quota increasing from 85,500 to

101
The JCMK changed its position because it came to think that the temporary permit might not improve
the conditions of undocumented migrant workers but it would not deteriorate them either. Besides, it
expected that there might be an extension of the grace period just as in 1993 and 1994 (Simin ŭi Sinmun
2002).
102
By nationality, the largest group was Chinese with 151,313 including 91,276 ethnic Koreans followed
by Bangladeshis with 17,087, Filipinos with 16,078, Mongolians with 13,952, and Vietnamese with 10,608.
By industrial sector, 89,174 were in manufacturing, 55,907 in construction, 34,573 in restaurants, 9,500 in
domestic work, and 2,400 in farming. Finally, by region, 77 percent was concentrated in the Seoul
Metropolitan Area with 99,000 in Ky ŏnggi Province, 82,000 in Seoul City, and 14,000 in Inch’ ŏn City
(Tonga Ilbo 2002).

110
145,500 including new trainee quota assigned to agriculture.
103
Second, a new system, the
Employment Management System (EMS), which only applied to ethnic Koreans from
China, was introduced.
104
Finally, as the expanded WATS and the EMS were to be
effective from November 2002, all undocumented migrant workers with the permit would
be deported by the end of March 2003 as originally proposed.
The decision was made in a way to satisfy the interests of all the involving parties
both in the government and in the major business organizations but to exclude the voices
of migrant workers, civil society, and small-sized businesses. On one hand, the expansion
of trainee system gave more power to various government bodies, such as the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry and Energy, the SMBA, the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and the Ministry of
Agriculture, over the labor migration system as well as the private operating
organizations, such as the KFSB, the Construction Association of Korea, the National
Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, and the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation. On the other hand, the introduction of the Employment Management System
enabled the Ministry of Labor to operate a whole new labor migration system and to
manage at least a quarter of all documented migrant workers in addition to post-training

103
The trainee quota increased from 80,000 to 130,000 for manufacturing and from 2,500 to 7,500 for
construction. Trainee quota for fishery remained the same at 3,000 but new quota of 5,000 was open for
agriculture.
104
The Employment Management System was similar to the EPS in that employers would get employment
permits to hire migrant workers who registered local job centers under the Ministry of Labor. Yet, the
program was exclusively for ethnic Koreans from China who were over the age of 40 and either having
family members or close relatives in Korea or having their own or their lineal ascendants’ name in a family
register in Korea. Qualified applicants would receive special two-year visa to work in service industries,
such as restaurants, hotels, cleaning companies, or nursing facilities. The government expected that
between 40,000 to 50,000 overseas Koreans could take advantage of this new program (S ŏul Sinmun
2002a)

111
migrant workers. Of course, the Ministry of Justice would maintain its power to control
undocumented migrants as it had always been.
Consequently, migrants and their advocacy groups as well as small-sized business
owners hiring undocumented migrants opposed the government’s decision. They were
not only disappointed that the EPS was not proposed again but also frustrated that there
was no plan for undocumented migrant workers but deportation.
105
Religious
organizations for ethnic Koreans from China, the JCMK, and the ETU-MB protested the
government’s decision in various ways both together and individually. They called for
the abolition of the ITS, the introduction of the WPS, and the legalization of all
undocumented migrant workers. Religious leaders from Catholic, Protestant, and
Buddhist faiths supported them by staging a hunger protest. Scholars and professionals in
labor, law, and economics also took stands against the government and made a statement
that the government should withdraw its decision.
Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice began to crack down on undocumented
migrant workers starting in August 2002, targeting especially on those who had
participated in protests or had actively involved in the ETU-MB, regardless of the
expiration date of their permits.
106
Places where migrant workers were highly
concentrated, thus the centers of advocacy activities, came under intense scrutiny. More
than 230 civil society groups issued a statement opposing the arrest and deportation of
undocumented migrant workers with no other alternatives. As the Ministry announced

105
In addition, many migrant advocacy organizations criticized the government that it discriminated
migrant workers by ethnicity.
106
According to an official from the Seoul Immigration Office, migrants who disturbed the public order by
leading the protests were subject to arrest even if they had permits to stay (Han’gy ŏre 2002a).

112
that it would enact a more comprehensive crackdown starting in November, the time
when the Asian Game ended and the expanded WATS and the EMS came into operation,
the voice of opposition grew louder. Delegates from four different embassies, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka, requested the Korean government
reduce the undocumented migrants in a more humane way with patience. Small- and
medium-sized businesses hiring undocumented migrant workers also condemned the
crackdown plan. Out of both diplomatic and economic concerns, the government decided
to extend the grace period one more year until March 2004. Yet, the extension was
granted only to those who had stayed in Korea for less than three years, the number of
which was estimated around 107,000, and the rest of permit holders, approximately
149,000, and those who had no permit were subject to arrest and deportation if they did
not leave the country voluntarily by the end of March 2003 (S ŏul Sinmun 2002b).
However, the deportation of more than 150,000 migrant workers all at once was
neither possible nor desirable. Especially, as Roh Moo Hyun, who was the successor of
liberal president Kim Dae Jung and who himself was a devoted human rights and pro-
democracy activist during the country’s authoritarian period, was elected as a new
president, the Presidential Transition Committee felt it a great burden for the new
administration to enact a massive deportation right after its launch in February 2003.
107

Right at the time, in December 2002, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea
(NHRCK) published a report on the human rights conditions of migrant workers where it
recommended the government to enact the EPS first before making plan to deport

107
In addition, among his election pledges, one of the most important pledges was to make laws to ban
discriminations against women, the less educated, the disabled, irregular workers, and migrant workers.

113
undocumented migrants and to absorb them into the new system as much as possible.
108

The Ministry of Labor took advantage of the situation to push for the EPS. While
pointing out the urgency of the introduction of a new labor migration system in the face
of chaos that would be created by massive deportation, the Ministry persuaded the
Presidential Transition Committee to take an immediate action. The Committee accepted
the proposal by the Ministry of Labor and agreed to work together to have the EPS bill
passed within the year 2003 and implemented it from 2004.
In February 2003, President Roh Moo Hyun took office and a month later, right
before the due date of the extended grace period, the government granted another
extension for over 150,000 undocumented migrant workers until August 2003. The
government also promised to have the EPS bill passed before the newly extended grace
period ended.
109

As expected, the KFSB and four other major business owners’ associations
strongly opposed the government’s decision to abolish the trainee system and adopt the
EPS. Yet, they were not representing the voice of all small- and medium-sized
manufacturing businesses. Especially, small-sized business owners who had constantly
suffered from labor shortages expressed their willingness to accept the higher labor cost

108
According to the report, 97.8 percent of Koreans thought that the government would not be able to
deport all undocumented migrant workers by March 2004 and it would rather improve the conditions of
migrant workers by reforming the current labor migration system (NHRCK 2002: 221-2). Also, when
migrant workers were asked what would be the most important thing that the Korean government should
consider in making labor migration policy, the number one answer was the extension of the duration of stay
followed by the improvement of human rights of migrant workers, the supervision over migrant-hiring
companies about their observation of the labor laws, the improvement of working conditions, and the
change of the status of trainees into legitimate workers (Ibid: 214).
109
In April 2003, the President Roh said at the Cabinet meeting that despite the concerns of business circles
about the increase of labor cost or the possibility of labor disputes, the implementation of EPS was
inevitable for Korea at this point in time when it was moving toward the human rights country and trying to
become an economic hub of East Asia (Han’gy ŏre 2003a).

114
that might be caused by the EPS as long as it provided enough number of workers they
needed. By arguing that less than 6 percent of businesses were benefiting from the
current trainee system, they called for the government to introduce the EPS as early as
possible (Korea Times 2003a). However, through their connections in the National
Assembly and the Ministry of Justice, the KFSB tried to hinder the abolition of trainee
system.
110
The submission of the EPS bill to the National Assembly failed repeatedly by
June and the due date of the extended grace period for over 150,000 undocumented
migrant workers was coming.
To avoid any more delay in legislating the EPS, the Ministry of Labor decided to
compromise by deleting the clause about the abolition of the trainee system from the EPS
bill, which enabled the EPS bill to be submitted to the National Assembly in July and
eventually to be passed on July 31, 2003.
111,

112
According to the bill, newly established
“Foreign Workforce Policy Committee,” chaired by the minister of the Office for
Government Policy Coordination and consisting of vice ministers from ten different
government ministries, would decided how many migrant workers should be admitted
from which countries and what kinds of occupations should be allowed to them. The
selection and management of migrants would be performed by public agencies assigned

110
During the 16
th
term of the National Assembly, from 2000 to 2004, there were three assemblymen both
in the ruling Millennium Democratic Party and the main oppositional Grand National Party who had been
former presidents of the KFSB. During their term of office, one of them was an honorary president and two
others were advisors of the KFSB (Han’gy ŏre21 2002). Also, during the same time, the head of the KITCO
(Korea International Training Cooperation Corps, the main organizational body in charge of the trainee
system under the KFSB) was the former head of Seoul immigration office under the Ministry of Justice.
111
As a result, the EPS and the trainee system were to be implemented simultaneously from August 2004.
Migrant advocacy organizations strongly criticized the government by not abolishing the trainee system.
112
In the bill, it stated that the EPS would be enacted after one year of preparation. The government
announced that during the preparation period it would sign a memorandum of understanding with the
governments of migrant-sending countries while determining the number of migrant workers admitted.

115
by the Ministry of Labor. Upon entering Korea, migrant workers would be assigned to
companies where the employers filed a request to local job centers under the Ministry of
Labor after proving the proof that they had been unable to find Korean workers. Migrant
workers would be allowed to work in Korea for three years while renewing their
employment contracts annually. They would be granted various benefits, including
industrial accident compensation insurance, minimum wages and national health care, as
well as labor rights, including three basic privileges – the rights to form trade unions,
collective action and collective bargaining (Law Number 6967). Although it was only a
partial reform because it failed to end the trainee system, the passage of the EPS bill
finally made it possible that unskilled migrants would be admitted as legitimate workers
within the official labor migration system for the first time in a decade.
113, 114

113
When the EPS was implemented in August 2004, the government announced that the official labor
migration system would be merged into the EPS from 2007. Despite the persistent opposition by the KFSB
and three other private agencies operating the trainee system, the trainee system was finally abolished in
January 2007 and the remaining trainees and post-training workers were absorbed to the EPS. Also, from
March 2007, a new system called the Visitors’ Employment System (VES) was introduced, which is
exclusively applicable to ethnic Korean migrant workers from China and the CIS. Those who enter Korea
under the VES are given a work visa valid up to five years and allowed to work not only in manufacturing
industries but also in service and construction industries.
114
Right before the abolition of the trainee system in the late 2006, the Foreign Workforce Policy
Committee announced to include the KFSB and other private agencies operating the trainee system in
operating the EPS in an attempt to appease their opposition. Upon the news, migrant advocacy
organizations, the MTU, and other civil society groups formed a joint action committee to protest against
the government’s plan. They also started a sit-in protest along with street demonstrations and campaigns
(Based on my participant observation in the protests). After all, the Foreign Workforce Policy Committee
decided to let a government agency, the Human Resources Development Service of Korea, operate and
manage the EPS. However, it also allowed the KFSB and three other private agencies to participate in the
EPS by doing agency business on behalf of the employers of migrant workers (Ministry of Labor 2006).

116
Legalization and the Settlement of Migrant Workers

As soon as the EPS bill was passed in the National Assembly, the government
decided to enact temporary legalization for undocumented migrants in order to absorb
them into the new system. Unlike previous amnesties, when undocumented migrants had
been given special permits, this time they were allowed to get work visa if they registered
during a two-month reporting period ending in October 2003.
115
However, the
government did not abandon its principle that migrant workers should remain as
temporary and disposable labor force. As a result, unlike other migrant receiving
countries, the Korean government took an approach that those who come first should go
first. Therefore, the undocumented migrant workers who had stayed in Korea over four
years were disqualified from getting a visa.
With the basic rule that no one should be allowed to stay in Korea more than five
years, those who had stayed less than three years were allowed to remain up to two years.
Those who had stayed between three and four years had to leave the country first and re-
enter to get work visa up to one year.
116
Anyone who had stayed for more than four years
was not qualified to get visa. The government lured them to leave the country voluntarily
by offering the exemption from any type of punishments and promising to allow reentry
after August 2004 if they went through the proper procedures under the EPS. Meanwhile,

115
Later, the reporting period was extended by the end of November 2003 as many undocumented migrants
failed to report themselves in time because they could not obtain sponsorship from their employer, which
was required for registration along with other documents. To include migrant workers in the new system as
many as possible, the Ministry of Labor allowed them to register without sponsorship and extended the
reporting period.
116
The estimated number of undocumented migrants qualified for legalization was 227,000, which was
almost 80 percent of all undocumented migrants.

117
it planned to enact crackdown on and deportation of undocumented migrant workers after
the reporting period ended.
By giving different deadlines to undocumented migrant workers from at least
three months to the maximum of two years based on their length of stay, the government
expected to reduce the accumulated number of undocumented migrants gradually. Yet,
the decision to legalize only those who had stayed in Korea less than four years was not
welcomed by migrant workers, their advocacy organizations, and migrant-hiring
companies. While pointing out the inefficiency of kicking out those who not only were
accustomed to Korean language and culture but also mastered the skills needed at work,
they called for the full legalization for all undocumented migrant workers regardless of
their years of stay in Korea. Because of the strong resistance, the government’s plan to
deport unqualified undocumented migrant workers was repeatedly delayed until March
2004.
For almost two years, from the grace period under the name of departure
preparation period began in March 2002 until the launch of the harsh crackdown on
undocumented migrants in March 2004, the government had kept extending the grace
period or changing its words on the crackdown plan. Consequently, undocumented
migrant workers had been relatively free from the fear of being arrested and deported.
They were able to enjoy their social lives and participate in community activities more
openly, which made them feel more attached to Korean society. These experiences
encouraged them to continue their lives in Korea even after the harsh crackdown was
resumed after the implement of the EPS.

118
In this section, I review the criticisms against the partial legalization of
undocumented migrant workers and the partial reform of labor migration system by civil
society and migrant advocacy organizations as well as migrant workers themselves. I also
look into how their different positions divided migrant advocacy organizations. Then I
show how the amnesty periods offered by the government have changed the lives of
migrant workers. Finally, I examine how and why undocumented migrant workers have
tried to settle down despite constant crackdown after the amnesty periods.

Protests for Full Legalization
Despite its remarkable reforms of the labor migration system, that is, the
legislation of the EPS bill and the legalization of the majority of undocumented migrant
workers, the government was criticized by civil society groups and migrant advocacy
organizations more than ever for two reasons. First, by leaving the trainee system intact
and allowing it to be operated along with the EPS, the government failed to abolish the
root of human rights infringement on migrant workers. Besides, the dual system would
create discrimination between documented migrant workers who have a trainee visa and
those who have a work visa. Second, excluding undocumented migrant workers who had
stayed in Korea more than four years from legalization was not reasonable. Even if the
government promised to give them an opportunity to come back later under the EPS,
many of them, who already lost their trust of the government, would not comply with the
government’s decision. Therefore, the civil society groups and migrant advocacy

119
organizations called for the government to abolish the trainee system and legalize all
undocumented migrant workers.
However, the government was adamant that it would deport long-term
undocumented migrants. As the reporting period for undocumented migrant workers
came to an end, the fear of arrest and deportation spread among disqualified migrant
workers, which made some of them even choose to commit suicide.
117
The news of
suicides of undocumented migrants provoked strong resentment among civil society
groups and migrant advocacy organizations. Right after the announced deadline for
voluntary departure ended on November 15, 2003, about a thousand of migrant workers
and activists from their advocacy organizations started sit-in protests at six different
places with the support of various civil society groups.
Although the sit-in protestors demanded the government retract its crackdown
plan and legalize all undocumented migrant workers, their positions and perspectives
towards the direction of labor migration system were different. For example, about 300
protestors at Korean Christian Building, led by Chos ŏnjok Church and a group of
religious organizations for ethnic Korean migrants from China, called for the special
treatment of ethnic Koreans. Around 60 activists from the JCMK, who staged at Seoul
Anglican Cathedral, called for full legalization. Yet, they withdrew their original support
for the WPS and accepted the EPS proposed by the government. Lastly, about 100
migrant workers and Korean activists from the ETU-MB, who gathered at My ŏndong

117
Starting with a Sri Lankan migrant worker in November 2003, about eight undocumented migrant
workers were reported to commit suicide by the end of the year due to their hopeless situation.

120
Cathedral, strongly requested the introduction of the WPS as well as the legalization of
undocumented migrants for all.
118

As the sit-in protests continued into the next year, the government proposed a
negotiation to the leaders of the protests, except the ETU-MB. In the negotiation table,
the government offered the extension of the voluntary departure period to the end of
February 2004. It also promised to give those who left the country voluntarily by the
deadline a preference to re-enter Korea under the EPS. After accepting the offer, the
participated organizations ended their sit-in protests. Furthermore, some of the
organization leaders even persuaded long-term undocumented migrant workers to leave
while asking them to trust the government’s promise.
Disappointed by the changes in the position of the JCMK, a group of migrant
advocacy organizations established another coalition. As the number of local migrant
advocacy organizations increased, there were concerns that the JCMK was not able to
represent the diverse views and positions of all the organizations. Also, since many
member organizations were based on religion, the JCMK had the tendency to put their
priority in religious mission towards migrant workers while denying the agency of
migrants in political activism.
119
The lack of democratic communication between the
leadership and member organizations as well as the religious and paternalistic approach
towards migrant workers led some of the organizations and activists to withdraw from the
JCMK. Those who were seeking to build a more gender-sensitive and activism-oriented

118
Based on my interview with the former secretary general of the ETU-MB.
119
The number of migrant advocacy organizations was around 90 in 2000 and reached more than 150 in
2003. More than 80 percent of them were religious based organizations and over 36 percent of them saw
their main activity as being evangelism and conversion (S ŏl 2003: 24).

121
coalition, formed the Human Rights Solidarity for Women and Migration in Korea in
2001, and then started the Taej ŏn Forum to develop a new direction for migrant rights
movements. After witnessed the compromise of the JCMK with the government, they
finally formed a separate coalition called the Network for Migrants’ Rights (NMR) in
2004.
120

Meanwhile, the ETU-MB continued its sit-in protest at My ŏngdong Cathedral
with migrant workers and Korean activists together. All the migrant protestors were long-
term undocumented workers, who were facing deportation under the partial legalization,
and thus could not stop their fight. While continuing the sit-in protest, ETU-MB also
organized street campaigns and demonstrations with the help of many civil society
groups. Yet, the government not only refused to talk to them but also repressed them by
arresting and deporting the leaders of the ETU-MB. Besides, protestors became
exhausted as the sit-in lasted over a year. Many left to work again after the crackdown
plan was postponed, and only one third of initial sit-in members remained. Finally, the
ETU-MB ended its 380-day long sit-in protest in November 2004.
Although the sit-in protest by the ETU-MB ended without achieving its ultimate
goals, it demonstrated that migrant workers in Korea had changed from being the objects
to the subjects of migrant rights movements (Gray 2007). In April 2005, about six months
after the end of the sit-in protest, the ETU-MB was transformed into an independent and
separate trade union for migrant workers, the Migrants’ Trade Union (MTU).
121
Yet, the

120
Based on my interview with the former president of the NMR.
121
Based on my interview with the former secretary general of the ETU-MB. The role of the MTU is
discussed in detail in chapter 5.

122
Ministry of Labor rejected the application for approval submitted by the MTU and the
Immigration Service under the Ministry of Justice arrested the president of the MTU.
The repression of the MTU, as well as the exclusion of migrant workers from
discussion and negotiation, clearly showed that the Korean government, even with the
most democratic and human-rights interested administration, was not ready to
acknowledge the rights of migrants even after the declaration of the full labor rights
including the rights to organize for migrants under the EPS. The contradiction was
inevitable under the rotation policy that the government had held to from the beginning in
order to prevent the settlement of migrant workers. However, the MTU survived all the
repressions and moreover, long-term undocumented migrants continued their lives in
Korea despite the threat of forcible deportation with the strength nourished by the
experiences during the amnesty periods.

Lives of Migrant Workers during Amnesty Periods
Although protests against the partial legalization continued, many qualified
undocumented migrant workers registered themselves to get a temporary visa. According
to the data provided by the Ministry of Justice, during the three-month of voluntary
reporting period from September to November 2003, 184,199 undocumented migrant
workers came forward, an estimated 81 percent of those qualified. Specifically, 89
percent of those who had stayed in Korea less than three years and 62 percent of those
who had stayed between three and four years became legalized (Ministry of Justice
2003b). The registration rate for the latter was lower because many of them either

123
thought that it was not worth to spend money on traveling forth and back to get a visa for
less than one year or thought that they might not able to come back to Korea once they
left. The deep distrust in the government’s policy was clearly shown by the reality that
only 19 percent of disqualified undocumented migrant workers left voluntarily within the
voluntary departure period even though the government promised to give them priority to
reenter Korea under the new EPS (Ministry of Justice 2003a). Still, owing to the
legalization, the proportion of undocumented migrants of all migrant workers dropped
from 79.8 percent in 2002 to 35.5 percent by the end of 2003 (see Table 2.1).
As the crackdown on undocumented migrant workers was postponed repeatedly
by the early 2004, they could continue their relatively fear-free lives in Korea.
Consequently, for almost two years, from the departure preparation period of 2002 until
2004, migrant workers were able to enjoy their lives in Korea at personal and social
levels. Some of those who were legalized took a vacation back home to meet family.
Those who could not go back home still enjoyed their social lives more openly than ever
by socializing with friends and engaging in various activities. For example, Hira told me
how they used to get together on weekends during those periods:
Until 2004, there were few crackdowns on people (undocumented migrants), so
we used to get together almost every weekend. Because five of the tenants of my
house [one of the multi-unit houses close to the industrial complex at Kunpo]
were Nepalese, people liked to come to my place to hang out. Over thirty people
came in on Saturday night to spend the weekend. In each room, there were full of
people who wanted to eat and drink, to play cards, to sing and dance, and so on.
Those who became bored with hanging out at my place went out to the clubs in
Itaewon, Seoul at one or two o’clock in the morning. It was not like now. These
days, we should be careful even when we went out for grocery shopping. (Hira,
Nepalese, Female, 37)

Sajjad had a similar story as Hira:

124
Before the harsh crackdown began, Bangladeshi people in this neighborhood used
to enjoy the weekends together. Especially, on Saturday nights during summer,
about one or two hundreds of us gathered under the Anyang riverbank to have
parties. I was often the only cook making food for all those people, so after the
weekend my body ached all day. But it was really fun. (Sajjad, Bangladeshi,
Male, 31)

Interaction with people who were from the same country and lived in the same
neighborhood in Korea naturally led migrant workers to know about and participate in
the activities of local migrant advocacy organizations. A staff from Anyang Migrant
Workers’ Center, described those days like this:
In 2002 and 2003, when most of undocumented migrant workers had a permit or a
visa, a lot of new people came to visit the Center with their friends who already
knew about us. They were all comfortable to come and go. At that time, we had
an empowerment program to train migrant workers as volunteer counselors for
the Center. For the 12-week intensive program, almost 40 or 50 migrant workers
attended every weekend with no one dropping out. After the program, they came
to take important parts in our counseling service. It was possible because there
was no crackdown.

Furthermore, many migrant workers also participated in migrant rights
movements. For instance, Hira often joined in protests or demonstrations organized by
the ETU-MB:
In 2003 and 2004, there were many demonstrations requesting the Korean
government to give us [undocumented migrant workers] a visa. At that time the
leader of the ETU-MB was Nepalese. I was not a union member but many of my
friends in the neighborhood [Kunpo] were. So when there was a demonstration on
weekend, they came by my place during the week and asked me to come with
them. We rent a bus and went to My ŏngdong, Chongno, or Ansan, to anywhere
there was a demonstration.

Some were more actively involved in the movements, like Sajjad:
I joined the ETU-MB in 2002, one year after the union was organized. Because
there were many Bangladeshi people in Anyang-Kunpo area, I took charge in
mustering them under the union. I persuaded them to stand up and fight for our
rights by ourselves rather than sit down passively and expect Korean activists

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(from migrant advocacy organizations) to do something for us. In 2003, the ETU-
MB began the sit-in protest at My ŏngdong Cathedral requesting for work visa for
all. Although I didn’t join in the sit-in, I organized people to attend street
campaigns and demonstrations every weekend to support the protest. We had to
rent buses every time because 200 or 300 people showed up to attend those
events.

Migrant women also became main actors in migrant rights movements during those days.
Although there were not many women members in the ETU-MB, many took part in mass
demonstrations and protests like Hira. Besides, some migrant women organized by
themselves to address women’s issue in migrant rights movements:
We Filipino migrant workers had many grassroots organizations in Korea and
among them there was a women’s organization called WeMove (Women on the
Move). I heard that it started in 1999 but there were few members at first. But in
2002, the situation changed. Because so many people got permits, we could come
together easily. I myself also got a permit in 2002, and then a two-year visa in
2003. I joined in WeMove in 2002 and began to organize Filipina women. The
number of members increased to almost 60. We not only fought for the rights of
migrant workers in general but also for the rights of migrant women. You know,
the Filipino government has encouraged women to go abroad to work, but has not
done much to protect and promote their rights. So we often held demonstrations in
front of the Philippine Embassy in Seoul to demand to pay attention to the lives of
Filipina migrants in Korea. (Betty, Filipino, Female, 32)

Although the Korean government offered over two years of amnesty periods with
the intention to clear up the accumulated undocumented migrant workers while keeping
track of them, migrant workers took these as an opportunity to enrich their social lives as
well as to participate in local community activities or migrant rights movements.
According to my interviews with migrant workers, many described those days as their
golden days. They also agreed that that was the time when they began to think about the
possibility of being part of the Korean society some day. What migrant workers
experienced during the amnesty periods transformed them from being passive victims or

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support recipients to empowered agents in their community activities and migrant rights
movements, and furthermore, gave them the strength to go on during the harsh
crackdown afterwards.

Settlement of Undocumented Migrants despite Crackdown
When the extended voluntary departure period for long-term undocumented
migrants ended in February 2004, the Ministry of Justice began to crack down on
undocumented migrant workers again. The Ministry thought that it was necessary to
reduce the number of undocumented migrant workers as many as possible for the
successful implementation of the EPS. For the government, the most effective way to do
that was to enforce a series of intensive crackdowns. As one of the immigration official
from the Ministry of Justice said, “the intention of the roundup is not to deport every
undocumented migrant worker in the country but to give a warning to the rest. Even if we
are successful in rounding up only some 10,000 (undocumented foreign workers), it will
certainly give a warning to the remaining 110,000” (Korea Times 2004). By periodical
crackdowns every month, more than 19,000 undocumented migrants were arrested and
forcibly deported in 2004.
As the visa term for legalized migrant workers expired in 2005, the arrest and
deportation of undocumented migrant workers became a high priority activity of the
Ministry of Justice. After setting the year 2005 as “the first year of decrease in the
undocumented migrants population,” the Ministry formed a raid squad with the
cooperation of Prosecutors’ Office and the Police to crack down on undocumented

127
migrant workers (Ministry of Justice 2005). Although many civil society groups, migrant
advocacy organizations, and the MTU strongly criticized the violence that occurred
during the arresting process and the human rights abuses in overcrowded detention
centers, the severe crackdown continued.
122
As a result, the number of forcibly deported
undocumented migrants peaked in 2005 (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3. Number of Forcibly Deported Undocumented Migrants, 2003 – 2007

Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Forcible
Deportation
5,867 19,307 38,019 18,574 18,462

Source: Ministry of Justice. Immigration Statistics Yearbook, each year.

Although the government’s crackdown on undocumented migrant workers
became less intensive after 2005 owing to the resistance from civil society groups and
migrant-hiring businesses, it continued and has become routine since then. The Korean
government clearly intended to make migrant labor as temporary and disposable as
possible by using the threat of deportation.
123
Indeed, the fear of being arrested and
deported by the Immigration Service became a part of the everyday lives of
undocumented migrant workers. Sometimes, when the crackdown is particularly severe,
even moving around is difficult for undocumented migrant workers. Nevertheless,

122
With the assistance of the NMR (Network for Migrants’ Rights), IOM (International Organization for
Migration) Seoul Office, and Public Interest Lawyers group, the National Human Rights Commission of
Korea investigated the human rights abuses against undocumented migrant workers occurring both during
the arresting process and in the detention facilities in 2005 and recommended the Ministry of Justice to
improve apprehension procedure and conditions of detention facilities (NHRCK 2006)
123
As De Genova (2002: 438) puts it, “it is deportability, and not deportation per se, that has historicall
rendered undocumented migrant labour a distinctly disposable commodity.”

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undocumented migrant workers have developed various strategies to avoid and survive
crackdown on them.
In most cases, undocumented migrant workers try to stay down to avoid
crackdown by refraining from going out during the day. Many of them choose to work
the night shift, go grocery shopping at night, and some migrant women even quit their
factory job to become a stay-in domestic workers. Rosita was one of them:
I stopped working in the cell phone factory because I was scared. You know, the
immigration make a raid on many companies.
124
They just come in and arrest
illegals [undocumented migrant workers]. Also, there are many immigration
(officers) around factory area. I met the immigration twice when I had a visa. The
first time was on my way to work. The second time was at a bus stop near the
factory. Even though I had a visa, I was so nervous and scared. The first time I
was stopped, I even got sick so I had to take a day off. (laugh) That’s why I
decided to become a domestic helper because it is safer to work in a house. I had a
friend who was working in a house at Seoul. I called her to ask if she knew
someone who was looking for a DH, a domestic helper, and she introduced me an
internet website. I visited the website and there were many people looking for a
domestic helper or a baby sitter all around. I called one in Suwon and they said
okay. I worked there for five months. I stayed in from Monday to Saturday.
Saturday afternoon, I came home here in Kunpo and I went back there Monday
morning. Now I am working in a house at Seoul. It’s far from here, but it’s better
because I don’t work on Saturday. I get out from the house at 8 pm on Friday and
go back at 9 am on Monday. (Rosita, Filipino, Female, 37)

If they need to go out, undocumented migrant workers try to avoid possible
immigration checkpoints, such as subway stations or bus stops. This strategy often makes
them to use taxi as a main transportation mode although it is expensive. For example,
Huong said she had never taken a subway by herself since she heard one of her friends
got arrested at a subway station:

124
In everyday conversation for migrant workers, “immigration” refers to immigration officials and/or
police officers who attempt to arrest undocumented migrants.

129
I knew that subway stations are the most dangerous spots for the illegal. That’s
why I don’t take subway. I take a bus or a taxi. But I also heard that immigration
officers are sometimes hiding near bus stops to raid on the illegal. So when I am
waiting for a bus and it does not come for a while, I just grab a taxi. It’s
expensive, but it’s safe. But when I need to take a long trip, I cannot take a taxi. In
that case, I bring my one-year-old son with me and take a subway, so that people
will think of me as a foreign wife (of a Korean man). (Huong, Vietnamese,
Female, 34)

Pretending to be a migrant wife is indeed a common strategy for women migrant
workers to avoid crackdown, as the number of international marriages, especially
between migrant women and Korean men, has increased.
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Not only on the street to
elude the immigration officers, they sometimes introduce themselves as a migrant wife to
get by at work, like Tien:
After my one-year temporary permit was expired, I was fired. It was really hard to
get another factory job. At that time there were posters everywhere saying that
those who employed the illegal would be fined. Immigration raids were frequent,
too. So factory owners were afraid to hire the illegal. If an (factory) owner had
guts, he would hire the illegal. But if not, he wouldn’t. Luckily, through a referral
of my previous boss, I got in a restaurant in the Kunpo industrial complex. The
owner couple was quite nice. But they asked me to tell others [co-workers] that I
was a wife of a Korean man. They said that others might report me to the
immigration. So I lied to them. Until now, they think I have a Korean husband.
(Tien, Vietnamese, Female, 32)

Those who have a similar look as Koreans even pretend to be a Korean by not
speaking their native language outside. Bayarmaa from Mongolia has been in Korea more
than nine years and she was a well-connected networker who is always on the phone

125
International marriage between migrant women and Korean men has become popular in Korea since the
late 1990s. For migrant women, international marriage is used as a way to get out of poverty or to get a
chance to work abroad while for Korea men, especially those who live in rural areas and/or are hard to
attract Korean women for various reasons, it is viewed as a way to get a naïve and obedient wife who
would perform domestic work for their household. At first, the migrant wives were mostly ethnic Koreans
from China but since 2000, more and more women come from various Asian countries, such as Vietnam,
Cambodia, or the Philippines. For further discussion about international marriage, see chapter 4.

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referring jobs to her unemployed friends. However, since crackdown became intense, she
began to be careful when talking to her friends over the phone on the street:
This crackdown really makes my life tough. When I am working at the factory, I
often watch the door to see if anyone (from the immigration) comes in. When I
am at home, even the knock on the door makes me freak out. When I got a phone
call from my (Mongolian) friends on the street, I don’t talk to them in Mongolian.
I only speak in Korean when I am outside. But still, I have this accent. I can be
passed as Korean by my look, but because of my accent… I usually make the
phone call as short as possible. (Bayarmaa, Mongolian, Female, 45)

However, as crackdown became a routine part of their everyday lives,
undocumented migrant got less and less intimidated by it. After all, they have to move on
and live their lives in Korea as long as they can. When I was volunteering at Anyang
Migrant Workers’ Center, Tien came there almost every Sunday to study Korean – she
already had an official certificate of intermediate Korean language proficiency – and to
help her friends in trouble by bringing them for counseling. When asked whether it was
not scary to come to the Center so often, she responded like this:
Yes, of course I am worried about being caught (by the Immigration Service). But
I think it like this way. If you are meant to be, you will be caught even though
you’re at home. But if you are not, you will never get caught even though you
always go out. Right? If you are afraid that much, you can’t come to the Center,
you can’t study (Korean language), and you can’t go anywhere. I think it’s up to
your fate. I believe in God. I pray always and I believe that God will protect me.

Also, since the Korean government has granted temporary amnesty for various
occasions, there is always a rumor among undocumented migrants that the government
will offer another grace period or legalization. For example, Yoanna persuaded her
boyfriend to stay in Korea after she heard that the Korean government’s policies around
undocumented migrant workers would be changed after the presidential election in
December 2007:

131
Who do you think will win the election? All my Korean friends told me that the
number two [a candidate from the conservative Grand National Party] is going to
win. Is that true? I hope not, because I heard that if the number one [a candidate
from the liberal Uri Party] was going to win, there would be registration for the
pulb ŏp saram [undocumented migrants] in next January like before in 2003.

As I told you, I love Korea. (laugh) I don’t have a plan to go back to the
Philippines right now. My boyfriend, he wants us to go back and then apply for a
visa to Canada. He said we could stay there as long as we want, but here it was
only temporary. But I don’t think so. Only if I can get a visa or a citizenship…
What I am praying for these days is to have a citizenship here in Korea. You
could say that I am a Korean already because I have stayed here for almost nine
years. (Yoanna, Filipino, Female, 35)

Besides, many undocumented migrant workers believe that they can find a way to
come back even if they are arrested and deported by the Immigration Service. As shown
in the cases of those who returned to Korea after the financial crisis, the proliferation of
brokerage businesses, including those engaged in forgery of passports or visa, as well as
the corruption in public agencies engaged in labor migration in many South and
Southeast Asian countries assure their belief.
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For example, Nadia came to Korea three
times by using different passports each time:
When I came to Korea for the second time in 1998, I had a forged passport with
another person’s name. I paid only 10,000 pesos, about 200 dollars, to a
middleman for that. In 2002, the Korean government gave us one-year permits
because of the World Cup. At that time, I reported myself to get a permit. And my
information in the forged passport left in the record. I left for home in 2003 and
came back to Korea in 2004. At the third time, I used my own passport, but a
renewed one. I was with my daughter who was a freshman in college. We stopped
over Hong Kong to get visa stamps and then entered Korea. We told the
immigration officer at the airport that we were traveling together during my
daughter’s summer break. Of course, there was no record of illegal staying on me
in the system so we could get in easily. I think I can come back even if I am
arrested by the immigration. (Nadia, Filipino, Female, 47)

126
According to a report published by the NMR, the bribery and corruption in the recruitment process of
migrant workers has not diminished under the EPS. Thus there is plenty of room for brokers to be involved
in the process. (NMR 2006)

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Roshan was even arrested and deported by the immigration but came back later
without problem:
I came to Korea in 1992. But in 1997, I was caught by the immigration. I was
waiting for a bus at a bus stop and someone grabbed me behind my neck. I
thought it was my friend playing a practical joke on me. But another man
approached to me and grabbed my waist. They told me that they were from the
immigration and showed me their IDs. I was dragged into a van and sent to the
Mokdong immigration office. After questioning me, they sent me to the detention
center at Ch ŏngnyangni. I had stayed there about a week and then was deported to
Bangladesh. After a year, I came back to Korea with a new passport with
someone else’s name. Coming back is not a problem if you have money. If I
would be caught again? I will have to go home. But I will find a way to come
back. (Roshan, Bangladeshi, male, 38)

Still, it does not mean that they are not concerned about being arrested and
deported. Then why undocumented migrant workers do not leave Korea despite all the
anxieties caused by constant crackdown? Most of them say that there is just no job for
them if they go back home. Even if there are jobs, they are already too old for the job or
the wages are too low. Yoanna, who was a high school English teacher in the Philippines
and has stayed in Korea over eight years, described the situation as follows:
It’s not like there is no job in the Philippines. In fact, there are a lot of factories.
But the problem is that they only hire young girls, like between 18 and 25 years
old. If you’re over 25, you cannot get in. And they only offer five- or six-month
contracts. If you’re lucky and your boss likes you, you may get a permanent
position and continue to work until 50 or 60. But it rarely happens. Besides, the
factory will probably shut down before you get that age. So most of the people in
their 30s and 40s in the Philippines, they just do sales. Like selling things in the
market. It’s not that better for the well educated, either. If you finish high school
and work in a factory, you’ll get 100 to 150 dollars per month. If you graduate
from college and become a teacher, you’ll get 200 dollars. It’s just like that.
That’s why almost everyone in the Philippines wants to go abroad.

Indeed, it is economic hardship back home that keeps undocumented migrant
workers from giving up their opportunity to support their family by working in Korea

133
despite their unstable status. Once they pay off their debts for migration, they need to
send remittance back home to be consumed for the family’s daily living, education for
younger siblings or children, and health care for parents. Moreover, they already have
goals, such as sending their children to college, building a new house for their family, or
opening their own business, when they decide to come to Korea for work. In order to
achieve their goals, they want to stay in the country as long as possible. The story of
Paulina illustrates how personal goals push people to go abroad for work and stay there
as long as possible:
I used to work in a municipal government in Batangas, the Phillippines. But I
resigned from the job because I earned very little money. Then I worked in a
private real estate development firm. It was a little bit better (in terms of salary),
but still not enough. At that time, I was raising my two children without the
support of my husband, so the money was always tight. Also, my children and I
were staying at my parents’ house with some of my nephews and nieces left by
my sisters and brother who went abroad for work. My children were growing up
and we needed our own house. That’s why I decided to go abroad to work. At
first, I went to Taiwan. There I had worked for three years in a camera factory.
Because there were almost no illegal people [undocumented migrant workers] in
Taiwan, I didn’t even think about overstaying my visa. After my visa expired, I
went back to the Philippines. With the money I had saved, I built a house for my
children and me. I stayed at home for a while, but as a sole breadwinner, I needed
to go abroad to work again. My children understood when I told them so. They
knew that we needed to separate again.

There was a lady in my neighborhood who was a trading merchant going back
and forth to Korea. She told me that there are a lot of Filipinos working in Korea.
So I decided to come to Korea. Because I heard that being admitted as a trainee
was very competitive and took a long time, I didn’t apply for it. I entered Korea
with a tourist visa in 2000. After three months, I became illegal. But there was no
problem working in a factory. In 2002, I got a one-year permit and the next year, I
got a two-year visa. I even visited home to see my children when I had a visa. It
was good days.

My visa expired in 2005 and the crackdown became furious. But I managed to get
a new job in a plastic injection factory in Kunpo. I have worked there for two
years. This year, many new workers with EPS visa came. The boss promised not

134
to fire us [Paulina and other undocumented migrant workers], but he did. I have
no work for three months by now and I am afraid of being caught. But I just can’t
go back home now. My daughter goes to the number one nursing school in the
Philippines and the tuition is very expensive. I need to send money. She said to
me the other day over the phone, “Mom, after I finish school, I will go to Canada
[to work as a nurse]. Then I will be the one who support you.” So I said to her,
“Okay, call me when you get a job already so that I don’t have to work anymore. I
am so tired.” (laugh) She will be all right. She is bright and she got good
education. I will support her until she graduated from the nursing school.
(Paulina, Filipino, Female, 39)

Some say that the situation back home has changed since they left. Especially,
prices went up so high that they cannot but extend their stay to achieve their goals.
Dolgor, who was a news anchor in Mongolia, complained about the rise of housing prices
back home:
When my husband and I decided to come to Korea for factory work, we thought
that three years would be long enough for us to save enough money to buy a
house for our family. We believed that our dream would come true much quicker
if we worked in a factory here than worked as an engineer and an anchorwoman
in Mongolia. We left our two children to my parents and came here in 2003 as
trainees. For the first six months, we lived apart because we were assigned to
different factories. I was lonely and it cost a lot of money. To live together, we
quit our job and became illegal. But it was hard to find a job where we could work
together. For the next six months, only my husband earned money as a part-time
construction worker. After paying rent, bills, and living expenses, only a small
amount of money left, which we sent to the bank in Mongolia to pay off our debts
for coming to Korea. In the second year, I got a janitor job in a church, where I’ve
been working almost four years by now. These days we manage to send 1.5
million won [1,360 USD] to my parents every month. But I don’t know when we
can buy our house. A condominium in Ulan Bator was about 15 million won
[12,590 USD] when we left home, but it is now almost a hundred million won
[90,630 USD]. I heard that housing prices in the city has skyrocketed after
foreigners, such as Japanese and Koreans, came to Mongolia and began to buy
real estate. (Dolgor, Mongolian, Female, 32)

Although many undocumented migrant workers want to go back home someday
after they achieve their goals, some express their wish to stay in Korea as they experience
the differences in the standards or ways of living between Korea and their home country.

135
Although living in a small one-bedroom unit attached in an old house with her husband
and three little children, Emily seemed to be happy with what she and her family could
enjoy in Korea:
I am sometimes worried about our unstable status in Korea, but I try not to think
about it. What can they [the immigration officers] do? They will only send us to
the Philippines, right? They can’t do anything more. (laugh) As long as possible,
we will stay in Korea, because it’s very hard to live in the Philippines. My mom
always tells me it’s hard to have family in the Philippines. She even told me not to
come back. You cannot enjoy what you are enjoying here in Korea. You cannot
have two computers (at home). You cannot have a brand-new cell phone like this.
No, you cannot buy them. In the Philippines, it’s hard to raise children. If you
don’t have money, you cannot send your children to the best school. I want to be
here for the sake of my children. (Emily, Filipino, Female, 34)

A sense of security and/or a sense of freedom are another reasons why
undocumented migrant workers, especially women, want to stay in Korea. It is ironic that
undocumented migrants, who are believed to feel unsafe and restrained due to the
constant fear of being arrest, feel that living in Korea is safer and freer than living in their
home country. For example, Christina said that she was sometimes afraid of going out
because she did not have a visa, but she still thought that Korea was safe:
I really like to stay here. It’s peaceful and safe, not like our country. You can walk
in the middle of the night even if you are alone. In our country, you always have
to watch out your belongings, like cell phone, money, jewelry, especially when
you walk alone. If you’re unlucky, someone will take your money or something
like that. You have to be careful not just on the street, but in a jeepney, in a bus,
or in anywhere. (Christina, Filinpino, Female, 26)

Chin-ju’s husband was arrested by the Immigration Service and deported in 2006. When
he went back to Vietnam, he brought their one-year old baby with him. Although missing
her baby very much, Chin-ju had no plan to go back home for a while because she could
enjoy her single life in Korea:

136
When I was here with my husband and the baby, it was really hard for me. I had
to work during day and had to take care of my baby at night. My husband gave
little help with housework just like any other typical Vietnamese men. Of course,
I was sad when they left but I had no choice because at least one of us should earn
money. But after a while, I became used to my single life. During weekends, I
often have parties with friends. I cook and invite my friends, Koreans and
Vietnamese all together. You know, Korean women, they are fun to hang out
with. I have a lot of close Korean ŏnni-d ŭl [sisters], who are single.
127
They often
bring me to a restaurant, to a movie theater, or to a club. Here, I can do whatever I
want. But if I go back to Vietnam, I can’t. I have family and especially my
mother-in-law… (laugh) My husband is the first son, so he is living with his
parents. If I go back, I have to live with them. There will be no more freedom for
me. (Chin-ju, Vietnamese, Female, 31)

In addition, for those who came to Korea at a very young age and have stayed in
the country for a long time, it is harder to just abandon their life in Korea and go back
home. For example, Bijendra, who came to Korea when he was only 19 years old, said
that it would be more comfortable for him to live in Korea than in Nepal:
I had played soccer in Nepal until I graduated from high school. I often watched
soccer games held in Korea on TV and wished to play in such a good field. When
I heard about an opportunity to go to Korea, I was excited. I thought, “I will be
able to learn soccer while earning some money by working at a factory. Then I
will come home and get back into soccer.” But since I came here, I have never
seen a single soccer field. All I have seen were factories all around. (laugh) Now I
gave up soccer. I’m too old for that.

If I stay in Korea for three more years, I will have lived here longer than in Nepal.
Who am I? Am I Nepalese or am I Korean? My family is not poor. All my
younger siblings graduated from college and my parents own their house. If I go
back to Nepal, I will not be worried about how to make a living or how to feed
and clothe my family and myself. It is not about money. I am just already
accustomed to the lifestyle in Korea. I will not be as comfortable in Nepal as in
Korea. (Bijendra, Nepalese, Male, 33)

Whatever the reasons are, undocumented migrant workers, especially those who
have lived in Korea for long, tend to stay put despite the fear of crackdown. According to

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In Korea, sibling terms like “ ŏnni (sister)” or relative terms like “ajumma (aunt)” are often used to
address or refer friends, casual acquaintances, or even strangers who are older than oneself.

137
the data released, the number of undocumented migrants who have stayed in Korea more
than 10 years has kept growing despite constant crackdown (Table 3.4). The actual
number would be higher considering those who went back home and returned to Korea.

Table 3.4. Number of Undocumented Migrants over 10 years
2005 2006 2007 2008
Number 7,493 12,500 20,692 20,787
Proportion (%) 4.2 6.7 9.3 10.4

Source: Ministry of Justice. Immigration Statistics Yearbook, each year.

Furthermore, long-term undocumented migrant workers often claim their rights to
be here while criticizing the strict immigration policy of Korean government. Most of all,
they feel that the government should acknowledge their contribution, like Roshan:
For 13 years in Korea, I have never loafed on the job. I have worked and worked,
day and night. I have made a lot of products with my two hands and got them
exported. Korea has sold them to other countries and made money. This country
has not built by Koreans alone. From 1988, foreigners have come here and helped
to build this country. That’s what I think. That’s why I think Korea should do
something for us, too. For those who want to live in this country, because not
everybody wants to live here, at least for them, there should be a way (to stay in
Korea). Whatever the way it is, whether an exam or a skill test, it should be
provided. A lot of people lost their hand or leg under a press machine and got sick
due to poisonous chemicals. And some even lost their lives. For what? For the
economy of this country! That’s why the (Korean) government should care about
us. When they needed us, they called us. And now, they are saying that they don’t
need us anymore. They are telling us to get out. Okay, I understand. This country
is for Koreans. If Koreans don’t like us, we have to leave. But they should think
again what they are doing. They should realize that what they are doing is bad.
We should talk about this in a more humane way. Not in a legal way, but in a
humane way. (Roshan, Bangladeshi, male, 38)

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Bayarmaa also believed that the government should reward those who have worked hard
with a visa:
I’ve been in Korea 10 years. I have a lot of good memories here. I like Korean
people and I like this country. I hope the Korean government give a chance to
people like me, people who like this country. Of course, I earn money from
working in a factory. But because of my working, Korea makes money, too. I am
not a person who is bad at work or who just stays at home. I wish the government
would give a visa to people like me. If the government cannot be sure who is a
good worker and who is not, then it can allow a company to write some kind of
recommendation. If the recommendation says, “We can guarantee that this person
is really good at work. She is working in our company. We know her very well.
Please give her a visa,” then the government will know that she is worthy to get a
visa. How wonderful it would be?

But it’s useless if the government give us only one year like before [in 2002]. It
should be at least three to five years. Or there should be no time limit. I am not
going to live in Korea forever. I will go back to Mongolia someday. But I just
want to get a visa so that I can visit my family back home once in a while. I heard
that in America, I don’t know if it’s true, I just heard so, in America, the
government gives a chance to visit home for those [undocumented migrants] who
have stayed there over five years. You know, we all miss our family and our
hometown. But we can’t just go for a visit because it’s difficult to come back.
How grateful it would be if we could go home and come back here without
problem? If the government says that all I need is a sponsor, like I told you
before, I can find a plenty of Sajangnim [business owners] who are willing to
write a recommendation for me. (Bayarmaa, Mongolian, Female, 45)

Some argue that they are not asking for a mercy but claiming their legitimate
right. Sajjad, who was an active member of the MTU, expressed his opinion like this:
The Korean government should give a citizenship to long-term migrant workers.
That’s a must. In our country, there is a law that if one has occupied a piece of
land for more than 10 years, the land becomes his property. The real owner cannot
kick him out. It’s like that. I think if one has lived in a country for more than 10
years, he should be given the right of permanent residence. Why? Because he has
devoted himself to the country for 10 years. Ten years of his life! It is a long time.
I heard that there is a law in Korea too that one can get the right of permanent

139
residence if he has lived in Korea for 10 years legally.
128
But how many migrant
workers can stay in Korea for 10 years legally? The government only allows
three-year visa for migrant workers. They have to get out after three years. And if
they want to come back, they should go through the same procedures as new
comers. Who know how long it [the procedure] will take? The government just
wants to kick out the old ones and get new ones. They don’t appreciate our
contribution. They don’t care about our rights. (Sajjad, Bangladeshi, Male, 31)

Although many undocumented migrants have hoped the Korean government
would change its deportation policy towards them and offer a chance for legal residence,
the basic principles, such as no family reunion, no settlement, and periodical rotation, has
not changed so far. To their disappointment, the government did not offer another grace
period either before the merger of labor migration systems into the EPS in 2007 or after
the inauguration of the new president in 2008. Yet, as shown in the stories of long-term
undocumented migrants, they already have developed their own ways to cope with the
strict government policy, claimed their rights to be part of Korean society, and shown the
signs of settling down. Moreover, the emergence of migrant families, including those of
migrants and Korean citizens by international marriages, the establishment of migrant
communities, and the support from local civil society and municipal governments have
begun to challenge and change the government policies towards undocumented migrant
workers.

128
Migrant workers became eligible for the right of permanent residence since 2007. However, the
procedure is very complicated and it is very difficult for them to be eligible. The establishment and the
criteria of the right of permanent residence are discussed in chapter 4 in detail.

140
Chapter Summary

When the Korean economy experienced the unprecedented crisis starting in 1997,
the government proposed various plans to repatriate migrant workers and replace them
with newly unemployed Korean workers. However, the government’s assumption that
migrant workers in Korea could be called in when necessary and sent back in the
recession proved wrong. The number of migrant workers did not dropped to the expected
level and increased again as soon as the economy recovered. The failure of replacement
plans showed the limited ability of the government to control international labor
migration. The economic structure already depended on migrant labor and migrant
workers became attached to Korean society.
After the economic crisis, the debates over the reform of labor migration system
of Korea reopened. The different perspectives on the direction of the reform among the
government, civil society, and business circles delayed the reform, but two consecutive
human rights-oriented administrations, which not only cared about the human rights of
migrant workers but also were concerned about international reputation, managed to
improve the trainee system and finally were able to implement the Employment Permit
System in 2004. However, the decision to maintain the trainee system along with the new
system caused strong criticism from civil society and migrant workers. Moreover, partial
and temporary amnesty for undocumented migrant workers from 2002 to 2004 created
conflicts among migrant advocacy organizations due to their different positions on the
policy.

141
In the meantime, migrant workers began to speak up for their rights to stay in
Korea. Their experiences during two years of amnesty surely enabled them to be
empowered and transformed themselves from passive recipients to active agents in
migrant rights movements. Consequently, despite the government’s principle of non-
settlement of migrants, which was clearly shown in its “first come, first go” policy and
following crackdown enforcement, long-term undocumented migrant workers have
developed their own ways to settle down and continue their lives in Korea.

142
CHAPTER 4. MIGRANT FAMILIES AND ADVENT OF MULTIETHNIC
SOCIETY

From the beginning of the introduction of labor migration policy, the major
concern of the Korean government has been the long-term, if not permanent, settlement
of unskilled migrants, and the socio-economic burden that might follow their settlement.
As shown in the previous chapters, the government policy has upheld the principle of
temporary rotation of migrant labor that only allows individuals to migrate for certain
periods of time. At the same time, neither family unit migration nor family reunion is
permitted for unskilled migrant workers, thus they cannot enter Korea with their family
or bring in their family members later in an authorized way.
However, many individual migrants have decided to prolong their stay despite the
government’s attempts to repatriate them and rotate them in favor of new migrants. In
addition, those who have settled down in Korea began to bring in their family or start a
new one, although the Korean Nationality Act does not grant citizenship to the children
of migrants and the Immigration Control Act offers little chance to obtain the right of
permanent residence. Furthermore, more migrants have married Korean citizens and are
becoming Korea citizens themselves. Migrant spouses and their biracial children have
challenged not only the notion of ethnic homogeneity of Korean society but also the
legitimacy of exclusion of migrant families from various social rights. Migrant advocacy
organizations have appealed both to domestic legal systems and international human

143
rights conventions to pressure the government to protect the rights of long-term
undocumented migrants and their families. The formation of migrant families including
the families of international marriages now in turn influences the government policies
around migration in both national and local levels.
In this chapter, I examine how the rights of migrants in Korea have been
enhanced by forming family and/or raising children. I first illustrate different types of
migrant families and show how migrant women and men have responded subversively to
the oppressive government policies against them. Then I look into the enhancement of the
rights of migrant workers by having and raising their children in Korea. Finally, I
examine the emergence of the families of international marriage and its consequences on
the Korean government migration policies and the Korean society in general.

Formation of Migrant Families

Most migrant workers enter Korea alone even though they are married, not only
because there is no dependent visa for the spouse of unskilled migrant workers but also
because they do not want to take the economic risk of family migration. However, once
they settle in, they either bring in their family, especially spouse, or start a family by
getting married and/or having children. While most studies on migrant workers in Korea
have focused on their “workerness” and their rights as workers, few studies have paid

144
attention to the families of migrant workers until recently.
129
One of the first researches
that gives a glimpse of migrant families is a report published by the National Human
Rights Commission of Korea in 2002. According to the report, 49.1 percent of
undocumented migrants are married and 52.8 percent of them are living with their
spouse, which means approximately a quarter of undocumented migrant workers are
living with their spouses.
130
It also indicates that about 9.1 percent of undocumented
migrants who have children are living with their children in Korea (NHRCK 2002: 197-
8). Yet, it still does not reveal the changes in the forms and structure of migrant families
according to their migration and settlement stages.
I interviewed 43 migrants (30 women and 13 men, including six couples) for this
study. About half of them (21 persons) were single and the rest (22 persons) were married
when they first came to Korea, but all of them entered alone regardless of their marital
status. However, 30 of them were living with a partner of opposite sex at the time of the
interview whether legally married or not. If including those who ever have lived with a
partner during their stay in Korea but divorced, separated or left alone at the time of the
interview, the total number reaches 36, which is over 80 percent of all interviewees. Then
how do migrants who entered alone end up living with a partner and/or forming a family?
And how do they cope with the constant threat of deportation to survive as a family? I
attempt to answer those questions in this section.

129
Examples of scholarly work focusing on the rights of migrants as workers include Moon 2002, J Kim
2003, T Lim 2006, and Gray 2007.
130
The result was based on the survey of 1,091 undocumented migrant workers who are not ethnic Korean.
For ethnic Korean undocumented migrant workers, 74.5 percent (n = 232) are married and 65.2 percent of
them are living with their spouses.

145
Bringing in Family
As mentioned before, married couples can rarely migrate to Korea together
legally. A couple could apply as individuals for the Employment Permit System (or the
Industrial Trainee System until 2007) at the same time, but the chances that they both
would be admitted simultaneously are very low because of the high competition in
recruitment process. Even for those who enter Korea with other types of visa such as
tourist or business visa, migrating alone is preferable because it is less expensive and less
risky. Yet, as migrants have settled in Korea, some of them decide to bring their spouse,
children, and even extended family members into Korea both for emotional and
economical reasons. Since migrants cannot sponsor their family to come to Korea, they
often find illegitimate ways to bring in their family members no matter how much money
and time they need to spend. Undocumented migrants are most likely to do this since they
do not want to take a risk of leaving the country but want to live with their family.
Raman, who entered Korea with a 15-day tourist visa and has stayed in Korea for
15 years, brought in his wife five years ago through a broker:
After ten years of working in Korea, I managed to save some money. But it was
still not enough for building a house and starting my own business back home.
And the cost of education for my two daughters kept rising. So I decided to spend
the saving to bring my wife here so that we could work together. I paid a broker
6,000 dollars and he promised me to bring her to Korea via the Philippines. But
while she was in the Philippines the broker ran away, so she had to go back home.
I could not give up because I already started this. So I found another broker. The
second guy asked me 8,000 dollars. I only paid him 4,000 dollars and said to him
that I would pay the rest when I met her in Korea. He got her an entertainer visa
and put her name in a group of singers and dancers who were invited to Korea for
a performance. They all were supposed to leave the country after the performance,
so I had to snatch my wife from the group the night they arrived in Korea
(Raman, Nepalese, Male, 35).

146
This type of family migration, in which husbands migrate first and then wives
and/or children are brought in later, is referred to as “associational migration” and has
been very common in international migration (Thadani and Todaro 1984). However,
research on migrant women has shown that women often migrate independently whether
they are single or married unlike the traditional assumption in migration studies that
women migrate as dependents of men (Pedraza 1991, Chant and Radcliffe 1992, Lim and
Oishi 1996, Oishi 2005). For this reason, the separate migration of family is also referred
as “family stage migration” in order to break the assumption that women become
migrants only by association, that is, women migrate as dependents of men (Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1994: 39). According to my interview data, the patterns of family migration are
more dynamic in Korea since husbands do not always initiate the family migration and
families do not always stay together once they enter the country. The migration
experience of Nadia’s family illustrates that:
I decided to work abroad because we had five children and my husband’s income
was just not enough. When I first came to Korea in 1991, I hired a nanny for
babysitting and household chores. I returned to the Philippines in 1997 due to the
IMF, but had to come back here again. Because we let the nanny go while I was
there, my husband quit his job and began to take care of our children.

After our youngest entered high school, I decided to bring in my husband. My
husband was already 46 years old, so it was not that difficult for him to get a
tourist visa. He came to Korea in 2001 and started to work in the factory where I
was working. In 2003, our second son got his girlfriend pregnant, so I went back
home to talk to him. While my husband was working alone in Korea, I had stayed
with our children in the Philippines for about nine months.

In my third time entering Korea, I brought our college-attending daughter with
me. While staying in Korea, she had worked as an English teacher for Korean
children. About five months later, she went back home to continue her study. In
2004, my husband’s visa [which he got from the temporary legalization in 2003]
was expired and he was laid off from his company. He tried to get a new job, but

147
no factories wanted a 50 year-old foreigner as a new employee. Finally, he went
back home in 2005. (Nadia, Filipino, Female, 47)

As shown in Nadia’s family migration, it is not unusual for women to migrate
first and then help their husband to come. Although not yet joined with her husband, Julia
was hoping her husband would come to Korea and help her out to support their two
children in the Philippines:
I have been a sole breadwinner of my family for seven years. First in Japan, and
then in the Philippines, and now in Korea. I am very tired. My husband has not
been working almost two and a half years now. He said that he was trying to find
a job there, but there’s none. He also said that he was busy taking care of our
children, but I know that it is his mother who is looking after them. I told him to
come to Korea and help me. I told him to apply to the POEA so that he could
come here with EPS.
131
I sent him money to study Korean language. He applied
and he is waiting for an examination (for Korean language) now. I hope that he
will be changed when he comes here, that he will be more responsible. (Julia,
Filipino, Female, 25)

Although family migration rarely includes children, more long-term migrant
workers are doing it, especially when they stay in Korea with their spouse.
132

Undocumented migrants who bring in their child to Korea usually utilize brokers who
will either process passport and visa applications for the child or include the child on the
passport of someone else, who has a Korean visa, as if the child is her or his own. Yet,
some of them do it by themselves by one of the parents leaving the country temporarily
and bringing the child with her or him (NHRCK 2003: 47-8). Mara, a Mongolian woman

131
The POEA (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration) is an official agency that is in charge of
recruiting and sending migrant workers to Korea under the Employment Permit System.
132
Brining in children is more common for Mongolian migrants whom are believed to have stronger family
ties than other migrant groups due to their nomadic tradition in which families move together. As the
number of Mongolian children increased, the Mongolian school, which was the first international school
for the children of migrant workers, was established in 1999 at Seoul. The school was officially approved
by the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education in 2005 (C-w Kim 2006; H Yi 2007).

148
who has been in Korea for nine years, even used the deportation of her husband by the
Immigration Service as an opportunity to bring in her son to Korea:
I came to Korea in 1999, six months later than my husband. We both entered with
15-day tourist visa and got a job with the help of my brother-in-law who was
already in Korea. Two years later my husband was arrested by the immigration
and deported to Mongolia. After two months, he came back to Korea with
someone else’s passport. This time he was with our 6-year-old son. We thought it
[the deportation of the husband] was a great opportunity for us to bring in our son
whom we had missed so much (Mara, Mongolian, Female, 35).

In general, migrants bring in their children in order to be together with them, but
in some cases, they do that in order to have their children work or to provide them with
better chance in terms of education or medical care. Bayarmaa once had her daughter in
Korea for medical treatment and now wants her son to come for better education:
My daughter had had epilepsy since she was a little girl. After I came to Korea, I
heard that it could be cured by surgery, so I had her come here in 2002. At first,
she had only been treated by medication, but two years later she got an operation.
After the operation, my daughter got better and she even got married to a
Mongolian guy, who was working in the same factory with me. My son-in-law
was illegal but voluntarily left for Mongolia with my daughter in 2005 after he
heard that he could return to Korea under the EPS after one year. But when he
tried to apply for the EPS in Mongolia, he was told that he could not because he
had stayed in Korea illegally before. See? The Korean government, they promised
to allow us to come back again, but it was all a lie.

My son, he came to Korea when my daughter had an operation. He got a visa
issued to him as her guardian. But he was only 15 years old when he came, so I
sent him to the Mongolian School in Seoul. After three months, his visa was
expired. The crackdown was very harsh at that time, and going back and forth to
Seoul seemed too risky. So I had him quit school. After a while, he asked me to
let him work in the factory where I was working. He wanted to buy things just
like other teenagers but knew that I could not give him any money because of my
daughter’s medical bill and all. He was so young, but my boss allowed him to
work when it’s very busy so that he could earn his allowance. He left Korea in
2006 because his father, my ex-husband, wanted him back so badly.

I hope I can live with my children again in Korea, especially with my son. I am so
sorry for him. I don’t feel sorry for my daughter, because I was with her when she

149
was a little girl, I took care of her illness, and now she is married and has her own
family. But for my son… I have done nothing for him. I have always been away
from him. Even when he was here, I couldn’t take care of him. I let him work
instead of letting him go to school. I just want to do something for him now. I
want him to come to Korea and attend college here. He will be better off if he
studies here in Korea. (Bayarmaa, Mongolian, Female, 45)

Bringing in family often goes beyond the boundary of nuclear family to include
siblings and/or close relatives of migrants. Although not always living together in the
same place or at the same time, many migrants have their extended family members in
Korea whom they encouraged to migrate or by whom they were encouraged to come.
Family members of migrants help each other in finding jobs and settling in a new
environment. Migrants married to a Korean are more active in bringing in their family
members, even though they cannot secure stable resident status for them. Having
extended family sometimes makes a semi-permanent settlement possible for migrants by
enabling them to start their own businesses.
133
The story of Joanna’s family is a good
example for that:
In 1991, my cousin came to Korea as a factory worker. She met a Korean man in
her factory and got married to him in 1996. After marriage, she started a Filipino
grocery store in Ŭij ŏngbu City with her husband. Because she needed someone to
supply Filipino foods and goods, she called in my elder sister. My sister went
back and forth between the Philippines and Korea to help my cousin’s business,
first with a business visa and then with a multiple visa.134 The business went
well and they need more help, so I joined in from 2001.

In 2003, my sister decided to start her own business in Ŭiwang City with her
husband and called in my brother and his wife for help. At that time my cousin
already brought in her own sisters and brothers to get help, so all we had to care
about was my sister’s business. In the mean time, I met a Filipino factory worker

133
I use the term “semi-permanent settlement” because they think their stay in Korea rather permanent than
temporary, but they often do not have permanent residence status.
134
A multiple visa is issued to a person who entered Korea with a business visa more than five times with
no record of illegal stay. It is valid for one year and a person with the visa can enter Korea several times
during the term with up to 30 days of stay every time.

150
in Korea and got married. After my husband’s visa was expired he went back to
the Philippines. He stayed there for two years while I was going back and forth
and helping my sister’s business. In 2005, he applied for a business visa and
joined me to help my sister’s business.

In 2007, my brother and her wife opened their own store in Kunpo City. They also
started a street vendor business on Sunday in Hyehwadong, Seoul.135 Now my
husband and I are usually working at my brother’s store, and sometimes going to
my sister’s to help her out. We are all satisfied with our lives in Korea except the
fact that we cannot have our children here with us. (Joanna, Filipino, Female, 34)

Above examples of family stage migration clearly show that one of the main
principles of the Korean government’s migration policy, that is, no family reunion for
unskilled migrant workers, has failed. Ironically, the restrictive migration control, which
allows little chance for undocumented migrant workers to visit their family by imposing
high penalty for illegally stay with the prohibition of reentry for at least a couple of years,
encourages rather than prevents migrant workers from bringing in their family.

Cohabitation and Marriage
While some of the married migrants bring in their spouse and/or other members
of their family as they settle down in Korea, others, especially those who had problematic
marital relationships back home, choose not to bring in their family. Indeed, almost half
of married women in my study (8 out of 18) migrated alone as a main or sometimes sole
breadwinner of their family after separation or divorce with their husband. Instead of
bring in their husband, they choose to live alone or with roommates of same sex. More
often, however, they choose to cohabit with a partner of opposite sex for one reason or

135
“Dong” is a smallest administrative district in a city. Hyehwadong has been a famous Sunday gathering
place for Filipino migrants since Hyehwadong Catholic Church began to offer a Sunday afternoon mass in
Tagalog from 1995. For more information on Filipino community in Hyehwadong, see chapter 5.

151
another. Hira, a Nepalese woman who migrated to Korea because her husband had
stopped supporting the family, began to live with a boyfriend when she needed physical
help and emotional stability:
My husband migrated to Belgium for work in 2000. Not much later, he stopped
sending us money. I heard from Nepalese people there that he met a woman and
got married without even getting a divorce with me. Two years later, when my
two children grew a little older, I decided to migrate to Korea for work to support
them. At first, I lived with four other Nepalese women in one room because I
needed to spare money to pay my debts that I owed to come here. In about six
months my roommates left one by one for another job and I ended up living alone.
After one year of living alone, I got an industrial accident at work, because of
which I could not use my one hand for two months. One of my co-workers, who
was living next door, helped me a lot. He even cooked and cleaned for me. We
became very close and moved in together eventually. (Hira, Nepalese, Female,
37)

Although some migrant women are concerned about being criticized as immoral,
many see the extramarital relationship understandable or even inevitable partly because
of an economic reason and partly because of a safety reason. Bayarmaa came to Korea to
support her children after she divorced her husband who had left her for another woman.
She has stayed single in Korea for nine years, but knows that it is hardly an option for
many women because women’s wage are much lower than that of men:
136

It is hard for a woman to make a living in Korea and support their family back
home at the same time by herself. If you are a man, you are okay. If you are a
woman working with your husband, you are fine. But a woman who lives alone
just can’t save enough money. In my current job I do the same work as men,
which is operating machines. But I earn only 45,000 won (48 USD) per day while
men earn 70,000 won (75 USD). I don’t blame the women who live with a man
without getting married.

136
According to the survey of migrant-hiring companies by the Korea Labor Institute, migrant women
work longer than migrant men but get paid less. When compared with the hourly rates, undocumented
migrant women get paid 3,800 won (3.19 USD) while their male counterparts get paid 5,300 won (4.45
USD) (Yu et al. 2004:76).

152
Migrant women without a husband or a boyfriend often feel vulnerable to sexual
harassment by their employer or co-workers. Sarah, who divorced with her Korean
husband and have been living with female roommates since then, once had a bad
experience:
One night, my boss dropped by my home drunk, without notice. I was alone
because my roommates were working at night shift. Even though I didn’t want to,
he just let himself in. Nothing happened because he was so drunk, but he slept
over at my room that night. After the incident, I quit the job. But he keeps sending
me text messages like “What are you going to do this Sunday? How about going
out with me?” or “Sweet dream, my little girl.” When I told this to my friends,
they said Korean bosses would do that if a Filipina did not have a husband or a
boyfriend. Some Filipino men even offered me to be my boyfriend to protect me.
(Sarah, Filipino, Female, 26)

Being a couple is especially common among Filipino migrants since they have
higher proportion of women compared to other migrant groups. Christina, a Filipina who
ran away from her Korean husband and is now living with roommates, does not have a
boyfriend but is always asked why by everybody around her:
A Filipino friend once told me that he was impressed because I didn’t have a
boyfriend after one year (since I ran away from my husband) because other
Filipina women would just get a boyfriend one week after (they left their Korean
husband). No, not me. Some say it is impossible for a Filipina not to have a
boyfriend. Almost all Filipinas have a boyfriend here, even though they have their
husband in the Philippines. Women can get a boyfriend if they want to because
there are more men than women here. But I really don’t want to (get a boyfriend).
One of my friends said to me, “If you have a boyfriend, he can help you, like
money and everything. And it’s too boring to be alone.” I know a boyfriend
would help me financially. But I don’t want to complicate things. You know, I’m
not in the same situation like others. I married a Korean man, I got a son, and I’m
not divorced, yet. I am preparing to divorce and I don’t think it will look good if I
have a boyfriend. I already had a lot of problems and I don’t want additional
problems. But some people just don’t believe me not having a boyfriend.
(Christina, Filipino, Female, 26)

153
Not all couples live together, but once they begin to live together, they are not that
different from married couples. They have children together, plan for the future together,
and more importantly, want to extend their stay in Korea as long as possible in order to
stay together. Tony and Lisa, each of whom has a spouse and a child back in the
Philippines, have lived together for five years in Korea, and were expecting a baby at the
time of the interview:
We are going to send our baby after it is born, and Lisa’s mother will take care of
it. We want to stay in Korea as long as we can because we want a good education
for our child. Also, we probably will not be able to live together if we go back to
the Philippines. So it’s better for us to be here. (Tony, Filipino, Male, 32/ Lisa,
Filipino, Female, 31)

While those who were married at the time of migration but are not able to or do
not want to bring in their spouse choose to cohabit with a partner of opposite sex, those
who were single at the time of migration often choose to get married. Indeed, many
migrants are single when they first enter into Korea, because the labor market of Korea
usually demand young people in their twenties for factory workers. As single migrant
workers prolong their stay in Korea and get older, they decided to get married in Korea.
Their family, especially parents, back home also pressure them to get married, because
they are concerned about their children getting older without marriage, like Jose and
Angelina conple’s:
When I was single, my parents back in the Philippines were worried about me.
Whenever I called my parents, they said, “What are you doing? You’re not
getting younger.” It was the same for her [Angelina’s] parents, too. (Jose,
Filipino, Male, 31)

My parents were worried a lot [about my staying single] because this is my
second country where I came for work. I had worked in Taiwan for three years
and as soon as I went back home I applied for the EPS and came here. I had no

154
choice because my parents were too old and I had to support the education for my
two younger sisters and one younger brother. I met him [Jose] through my friend
four month after I came to Korea and we decided to get married the next year. My
parents were happier than me when I told them I was going to get married.
(Angelina, Filipino, Female, 32)

For migrant women, finding a spouse among migrant workers of the same
nationality is relatively easy since there are more men than women. Yet, migrant men
more commonly marry a Korean woman.
137, 138
Among twelve migrant women from my
study who entered Korea as single, ten got married in Korea (eight of them with a man of
same nationality and two of them with a Korean man) whereas among nine migrant men
who entered Korea as single, only five of them got married (two of them with a woman
of same nationality and three of them with a Korean woman).
For migrant women who got married in Korea with migrant men, a proper
wedding is important because it can differentiate them from those who just cohabit with a
partner without marriage. Yet, economic constraints as well as their illegal status often
make it difficult for them to have a wedding. For these reasons, Tien had to wait for five
years to get married:
I decided to get married to my husband in 1997. But because of the IMF, we had
to put off our wedding. Instead, we just began to live together. After a couple of
years, we managed to save some money, but then we were afraid to have a
wedding ceremony because we both were illegal. For five years, I kept it a secret
to my parents, because I knew that my parents would be disappointed if they
found out that I was living with a man without getting married. In 2002, we got
visa [one-year temporary permit to stay for those who reported themselves

137
There are also a great number of migrant women who have married Korean men. Most of them met their
Korean husband in their home country through international marriage agents or brokers, got married within
a week, and then came to Korea with a spouse visa. I will use the term “marriage migrant women” to refer
to them to distinguish them from those who migrate Korea for work, although the boundary between
female migrant workers and marriage migrant women blurs as Piper and Roces (2003) argue, especially
because the latter often do not stay married and/or are involved in paid work outside home.
138
The experiences of migrants who got married to a Korean are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

155
voluntarily], so we finally decided to have a wedding ceremony and get married
legally. We told our parents, too. They couldn’t come but they met in Vietnam
and had a small ceremony without us. (Tien, Vietnamese, female, 32)

Huong also postponed her wedding for three years because of the financial crisis, but
could not register the marriage even after the wedding:
When I lived alone, it was hard for me to make ends meet. As you know, women
get lower wage than men in Korea. But the rent is same whether you are a woman
or a man. All my girlfriends had a boyfriend and they lived together to save the
rent. But living with a man without getting married did not look good to me. So I
decided to get married. One of my friends introduced a Vietnamese man and we
became close. We planned to get married in 1997, but before we had a wedding
we both lost our job because of the IMF. We had no choice but to move in
together without getting married.

For three years, we had saved money for our wedding. Finally, in 2000, we were
able to have a wedding. My husband invited his father for our wedding. I wanted
to invite my parents, too, but they were too old to fly here. But all our friends, our
boss and the co-workers, Koreans and foreigners altogether, came to celebrate our
wedding. We exchanged marriage vows in front of almost a hundred guests. But
we still haven’t registered our marriage because I entered Korea with someone
else’s passport. (Huong, Vietnamese, female, 34)

While the Korean government does not pay attention to marriages between
migrant workers, local communities including churches and migrant advocacy
organizations often help migrant workers have a wedding ceremony. Emily began to live
with her husband in 2000 and has had three children, but did not have a wedding
ceremony until 2007 when a local Catholic church and a local migrant advocacy
organization offered her a free wedding ceremony and reception:
I was so excited when I heard that I could finally get married in church. I’d
always dreamed about it, but I thought I would not be able to have it. We already
had three kids and we could not save enough money for a wedding because my
husband had been only one working in the family. You wouldn’t imagine how
glad I was when I heard that I could have a wedding. (Emily, Filipino, Female,
34)

156
Although long-term migrant workers choose to get married and start a family
while expecting to stay together in Korea at least by the time they fulfill their goals, they
have to live with the fear of being separated by the deportation of their spouse. However,
the arrest and/or deportation of their spouse does not always mean the separation of their
family, since there is a way to be released or to come back. Chin-ju got married to a
Vietnamese migrant worker in 2003 and had a baby girl, but is now living by herself
because her husband was arrested by the Immigration Service and left for Vietnam with
her daughter. Yet, she is expecting her husband to come back in a year or two:
I was feeding dinner to my baby when I got a phone call from my husband from
the Mokdong Immigration Office at Seoul. He said that he was arrested by the
immigration in the factory. I was so shocked and didn’t know what to do. I called
my friends and asked for help. One of them gave me a phone number of a
minister. I called him and asked what to do. He told me that my husband could be
released if he submitted a birth certificate of our daughter and paid the bail.
139
For
the next few days, I borrowed money from my friends and prepared the birth
certificate. With the money and the birth certificate, the minister went to the
Mokdong Immigration Office and had my husband released.

My husband got a three-month temporary staying permit and then he extended it
for another two months. After five months, he could not extend the permit
anymore. We decided that I would stay and continue to work in Korea and he
would leave for Vietnam. And because I couldn’t take care of our daughter while
working alone, we agreed to let her go with him. I was so sad, but we had no
choice. Right now, my husband is not working, but just staying at home taking
care of our girl. But in next year or the year after next, he will come back to
Korea. He said he would apply a business visa once his record was going to be
cleared. (Chin-ju, Vietnamese, Female, 31)

Betty herself had been arrested, but released after getting a temporary staying permit. She
was overstaying her permit period more than five months at the time of the interview:

139
According to the article 65 of the Immigration Control Act, a detained foreigner can be released under
some extenuating circumstances if the detainee deposit refundable bail money up to 10 million won and
promised to leave the country before the specified date on the temporary staying permit issued to her or
him by the Immigration Service.

157
I was arrested by the immigration on the street when I was seven-month pregnant
with my second child. Before, they did not arrest pregnant women, but because of
the massive crackdown, the immigration arrested undocumented migrants with no
exception. I told the immigration officer who caught me that I was pregnant, but
he said it didn’t matter. He said, “You’re illegal. We can arrest you because you
are overstaying here,” and then he went on, “Why didn’t you go to your country
when you found out you were pregnant?” So I said to him, “I don’t have money to
go home, yet.” He got angry with me and put me into a van. There were other
people in that van, people from Vietnam, Mongolia, and Thailand. We all were
brought to the Mokdong immigration office.

You know, when they arrest you, they take your cell phone, so you can’t have a
chance to call people. But when you are sent to the detainee area, there is a phone
booth. So in that evening, I called my friend who was working for KASAMAK-
KO.
140
He then called the people in the MTU (Migrants Trade Union) and
Minbyun (Lawyers for a Democratic Society). With the help of a lawyer from
Minbyun, I was released three days after my arrest. Usually, you have to deposit
three to ten million won for the bail, but somehow I didn’t have to. I got a
temporary staying permit valid until May 14, 2007, which was a month after my
due date.

I was actually thinking about going home with my newborn baby, but my husband
persuaded me not to go. He said to me, “Why do you try to give up your second
chance? You were not deported anyway. I will stay here until I am arrested and
deported to the Philippines, and I want the same from you.” He is ten years older
than me and he is afraid of going back because he thinks he will not have any
opportunity to get a job in the Philippines. That’s why I am still here with my
baby. Right now, we have no plan to go back. (Betty, Filipino, Female, 32)

As expressed in the stories of undocumented migrant workers who found a
partner or got married in Korea, they not only want to stay in Korea as long as they can
but also intend to come back even after they are deported. Also, as already shown in
some of the stories, many of them also start a family by having children.

140
KASAMMA-KO (Katipunan ng mga Samahan ng Migranteng Manggagawa sa Korea) is an alliance of
Filipino migrant workers’ organizations in Korea, which is established in 1999. Betty is a member of an
organization called “WeMove (Women on the Move),” which is a member organization of the
KASAMMA-KO.

158
Having Children
For most migrant workers, having children in Korea is not an easy decision partly
because of economic constraints and partly because of legal reasons. Once they decide to
have children and get pregnant, they have to pay for the medical examination and baby
delivery, which is a big burden for migrant workers, especially for undocumented
migrant workers who are not covered by the national healthcare. Besides, women migrant
workers are often fired when they are found to be pregnant, that is, when they need
money the most. Particularly, those who entered under the ITS faced the termination of
employment contract and forcible deportation in case of pregnancy. Even after migrant
workers including trainees began to be protected by the Labor Standard Act under which
the employers are required to provide paid maternity leave to their pregnant employees, it
has been up to individual employers whether pregnant migrant workers can keep their job
or not. For these reasons, regardless of their resident status, most of pregnant migrant
workers have been forced to get an abortion (Kim and Oh 2002: 56-7).
Nevertheless, the number of women migrant workers who have a child in Korea
has been increasing. Although only counted those who were a member of the Medical
Mutual Aid Union for Migrant Workers and applied for an aid for their medical bill, the
Table 4.1 shows the growing number of migrant women who give birth to a child in
Korea.
141

141
The Medical Mutual Aid Union for Migrant Workers is a non-profit, non-governmental organization
established in 1999 to provide health insurance for undocumented migrants. See chapter 5 for detail.

159
Table 4.1. Recipients of Financial Aid for Medical Expenses Provided by
the Medical Mutual Aid Union for Migrant Workers

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All Recipients 113 281 332 404 296 318 311 361 325
Recipients Treated
for Pregnancy and/or
Childbirth
*

026
(23.0)
075
(26.6)
115
(34.6)
145
(35.8)
148
(50.0)
103
(32.3)
110
(35.3)
140
(38.7)
143
(44.0)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of the recipients who have been treated for
pregnancy and/or childbirth.
Source: Migrant Health Association in Korea (Pak 2008: 20)

However, even though they decide to give birth to a child despite the economic
burden and/or the chances to be fired, raising the child in Korea is hard because both
parents have to work and child support is either unavailable or expensive. Besides, the
child of migrant workers cannot get a stable resident status, especially when the child is
born to undocumented migrant parents. Since the Nationality Act of Korea follows jus
sanguinis (law of blood) not jus solis (law of soil), a child born to foreign parents are not
granted to Korean citizenship. Instead, migrant workers in Korea must register their
newborn child as an alien resident. However, undocumented migrant workers cannot
register their child, thus the child becomes undocumented if it stays in Korea. Because of
the legal constraints as well as economic burden, migrant workers often decide to send
their child to their home country and support her or him via long distance parenting.
142

142
Families that live separately from each other across national borders, yet hold together under the
“familyhood” refer to “transnational families” (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 3). For studies on transnational
motherhood, see Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) and Parreñas (2001).

160
The child that has been sent is usually taken care of by family members back home, such
as the mother, sister, or other female relatives of migrant workers.
In some cases, especially when they have a visa, migrant workers choose to bring
their child to their home country by themselves. For example, Betty got a visa from the
temporary legalization in 2003, which was still valid when she gave birth to her first
child, so she brought her one-month-old baby girl herself to the Philippines:
When I was pregnant with my first baby, I had an E-9 visa. My boss didn’t fire
me because I was legal. So I had worked there until I became eight-month
pregnant. And my boss allowed me to have a vacation. So I delivered the baby in
Korea and then a month later, I went to the Philippines with her. My parents were
already taking care of my nephews and nieces, so I left my daughter with my
parents-in-law’s. They were very happy to have her because she was their first
grandchild.

Angelina, who entered Korea under the EPS, also brought her baby to her parents by
herself:
My boss gave me a four-month maternity leave. A month after I took the leave, I
delivered a baby girl at a hospital in Kunpo. Because I got a medical insurance
and gave a natural birth, it didn’t cost much. Two months after she was born, I
brought her to the Philippines. It was very hard to travel with a two-month-old
baby on a three-hour flight, but I thought it was better for me to bring her than to
have someone else to take her. When I got home, my parents were very happy.
They were excited to see the baby. I stayed at home for a month with my baby
and then came back to Korea by myself. Now she is being taken care of by my
mother.

However, most undocumented migrant workers pay someone else to take their
child back home. They often send their child when it is less than one month old in order
to avoid any penalty.
143
Tony and Lisa, with whom I was in a hospital when Lisa

143
According to the Immigration Control Act of Korea, a child born to foreign parents should be registered
and get a resident status within a month of the birth, otherwise the parents would be charged a penalty up to
one million won. However, since undocumented migrant workers cannot register their child, they should
pay the penalty when they send the child over one-month-old. Besides, the Immigration Service also

161
delivered their baby, sent their newborn daughter to the Philippines a day before she
turned one month old with the help of a friend:
Of course, we wanted to keep her here. But if the baby stays here, she (Lisa)
cannot work. Why we are here, if we don’t work? We sent the baby October 24
th

[who was born in September 25
th
], because we didn’t want to pay the penalty. We
have a friend who does business going back and forth from Korea to the
Philippines. She agreed to bring our baby with her when she went back to the
Philippines. We just paid for the airline tickets, for her and the baby.

Although their decision is made after deliberating what is the best for their child,
sending a child, especially a baby, is a painful experience for migrant women. Tien’s
voice was shaking and her eyes filled with tears when she told me how she sent her six-
month-old baby home:
My husband and I thought over and over again whether we sent our baby or not.
But when time came for me to get a job again, we had no choice. I could make
800,000 won at best, but sending the baby to a daycare cost almost 400,000 won.
If I spent half of my income for the daycare and the rest half for feeding and
clothing the baby, what would be left in my hand? My heart was aching, but I
decided to send the baby for her future. I gave her a Korean name “Chang-mi
[which means rose in Korean],” so that she could remember that she was born in
Korea.

She was already six months old when we sent her, so it cost a lot. We knew
someone working in Vietnamese embassy in Korea and he helped us get the
paperwork done. He also referred us a broker who would bring our baby. In sum,
we paid two million won. I later heard that my baby cried all the way for four
hours in the plane to Vietnam. (tears in her eyes) Imagining how hard it must have
been for her… I am still smarting from just thinking about it.

Although this long distant parenting enables the migrant women to keep working
and save money for the future of their child, they often resent that they cannot be there
for their child. As a result, those who regret their previous decision to send their child

imposes the penalty of illegal stay to a child based on their duration of stay (at least 100,000 won per
month). Therefore, it is better for undocumented workers to send their baby when it is less than one month
old.

162
sometimes decide to keep their second child in Korea. Huong regretted her decision to
send her first son and wanted to raise her second son in Korea:
After my first baby was born, there was registration (for temporary legalization).
Since we heard that those who registered and left the country voluntarily could
get a visa and come back, my husband reported in and went back to Vietnam. He
did that because he thought that it would be better for our baby if at least one of
the parents were legal. But he could not come back right away. He had to wait for
almost two years. During those years, I had a hard time to take care of our son all
by myself. Besides, he got sick very often so I was always exhausted taking him
to a hospital. And the hospital bills… Without insurance, it was too much burden
for me. So when my husband finally came back, I talked with him and we decided
to send our son to my parents. My friend, who was running a small business in
Korea, brought my baby to Vietnam with a forged paper saying that he was her
own. But after I sent him, I regretted a lot. I missed him a lot and I was sorry for
him.

Last year, I had another son. He is healthy and I have my husband around to help
me. So it is not as hard as the first time. Because now we are running our own
business [a small Vietnamese grocery store], I can take care of my son while
working. I will not send him to Vietnam. I hope I can bring my first son here, too,
if possible. Only if they can have visa and health insurance, it will be much better
for them to go to school here.

Munkh and his wife are also raising their fourth child in Korea, although they sent their
third one back to Mongolia before:
We already had two sons when we were in Mongolia. When I left for Korea, the
first son was eight and the second one was five. A year later, my wife came. Since
then my parents have been taking care of them. We had our third son in 2000. For
about two years, I had worked alone and my wife had stayed at home taking care
of him. In 2002, we decided to send our son to my parents. We thought, “If we
send him, we can work together. And if two of us work hard a couple of more
years, we can go back home with enough savings.” So even though it was tough,
we let him go. One of the relatives of my wife happened to plan to go back to
Mongolia, so we asked her to bring him with her. After our son left, my wife and I
cried a lot.

But things did not go well as we had planned. We haven’t saved much, but the
prices in Mongolia went up, and all our friends and family in Mongolia told us not
to come because there was nothing to do. In 2007, we had a daughter. Actually,
we didn’t plan to have one, but it happened. It’s our first girl and she is just

163
adorable. We are not going to send her. If we stay, she will stay with us and if we
go, she will go with us. I am sorry for my sons that I wasn’t there for them when
they were little and I haven’t stayed with them throughout their childhood. It’s
been more than ten years since I saw my two older sons and now they don’t say to
me to come home soon anymore. Maybe that’s why I want to be with my
daughter and see her growing up. (Munkh, Mongolian, male, 41)

Of course, there are also some long-term undocumented migrant workers who
never think about separating with their children. Emily has been staying at home since
she was pregnant with her first daughter in 2001 and she is now raising three daughters.
Although it is not easy to make a living only with her husband’s income, she has never
thought about sending her children away:
I don’t understand those who send their baby to the Philippines. If they will not
take care of their own children, why give birth to them in the first place? I want to
take care of my kids personally. If I send them to the Philippines, they might not
recognize me. As much as possible, I want to be with them. I know some
Filipinos talk about us behind our back that what we are doing is stupid, that we
should send the kids and both of us should work. But I think they are just jealous
of us.

As the number of migrants who raise their children in Korea – whether brought in
from their home country or born in Korea – has grown, the needs for childcare and
education have also increased. Just like the issues of the workers’ rights of migrants, it
was civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations that paid attention to the
issues of the rights of the children of migrant workers at first. They also began to
challenge the government to consider the rights of migrants and their family, especially,
their children.

164
Human Rights of Migrant Families

From the late 1990s, migrant advocacy organizations began to pay attention to the
children of undocumented migrant workers, especially their rights to be cared and
educated. Since most of the school-aged children of migrant workers could not go to
school, they were often left at home without any proper care while both of their parents
were out to work. Some children even worked in a factory with their parents despite the
Labor Standards Act prescribing that a minor under 15 years old should not employed in
any work. As the number of the children of migrant workers increased, local religious
organizations and migrant advocacy organizations began to offer childcare or education
programs for those children while demanding the government allow them to access to
public education.
After the Korean government granted the right to get public education to the
children of migrant workers in 2001, the deportation of the children and/or their parents
and the consequent separation of migrant families were brought up as another issue. As
the massive crackdown on undocumented migrant workers began after the enactment of
the EPS in 2004, the issue became one of the major concerns of many undocumented
migrant families. Once again, civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations
pressured the government to protect the right of migrant families to stay together,
especially those with children. The Korean government, which has desired to be
recognized as a human rights country by the international community, could not but
respond to the demand.

165
In this section, I examine how the children of migrants have achieved the right to
get education and how the right in turn has secured their parents’ stay in Korea. I
particularly look into how the civil society has used international human rights
conventions to urge the government to promote the rights of migrant families.

Rights of the Children of Migrants
The issue of the rights of the children of migrant workers, especially their right to
get education drew attention for the first time in 1999 when the media began to cover
stories about the children of migrants attending school. With the help of local migrant
advocacy organizations, they were able to go to local elementary schools. Yet, the
requirements for a foreign child to be a regular student included a certificate of residence
statement and a certificate of immigration record, both of which could hardly be issued to
undocumented foreigners. Therefore, undocumented children were attending school as
irregular students who were admitted at the discretion of individual principals. For
example, there were six children of migrant workers attending a local elementary school
in Sŏngnam City, Ky ŏnggi Province, but only two of them had a visa and regular
students, while the other four without visas were irregular students (Munhwa Ilbo 1999).
Due to the difficulties for the children of migrants to be admitted to public school, one of
the local migrant advocacy organizations at Seoul even established a school for the
children of Mongolian migrant workers. Although it was located in the basement of a
building and had only four classrooms divided by movable partitions, 46 students were
attending the school as of December 2000 (S ŏul Sinmun 2000).

166
In order to grant the children of migrants the right to get an education, civil
society groups and migrant advocacy organizations appealed both to the national law on
primary and secondary education and to international human rights laws. Particularly, a
migrant advocacy organization at Sŏngnam City was eager to find a way for the children
of migrants to become regular students. At first, the organization found out that according
to the Decree of the Primary and Secondary Education Act, the children of migrants
could be admitted to elementary school only if they provided either a certificate of
residence statement or a certificate of immigration record, not both of them. Although the
children of migrants without visa could not obtain a certificate of residence statement,
they were able to get a certificate of immigration record if they were not born in Korea.
Consequently, the organization requested the Ministry of Education to offer an official
response to the question if the children of migrants without a certificate of residence
statement could be admitted to elementary school, and the Ministry answered in the
affirmative. As a result, as of March 2000, five children in Sŏngnam and one in Seoul
became regular students in their local elementary school although they did not have a visa
(Han’gy ŏre 21 2000).
However, the result did not guarantee all the children of migrants the right to
access to public education regardless of their residence status or their place of birth.
Therefore, civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations decided to pressure
the Korean government by submitting a counter report to the UN Committee on

167
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN CESCR).
144
The first counter report, a
summary report prepared by 16 non-governmental organizations in Korea including the
JCMK, addressed the issue of the right to education of the children of migrant workers,
which was not mentioned in the government report (Minbyun 2000: 20) After reviewing
both the State party report and the Non-governmental party report, the UN CESCR raised
the issue in broader way by requesting the Korean government to indicate the steps that
have been taken to protect and enhance the rights of migrant workers (UN CESCR 2000).
Finally, two months before the submission of a reply report to the issues raised by the UN
CESCR, the Ministry of Education announced that it would allow the children of
undocumented migrants to attend local elementary school if they could prove that they
lived in that school district. Although the Ministry of Education decided not to prescribe
it as a law because of the opposition by the Ministry of Justice, which was concerned that
it would encourage the settlement of undocumented migrants, the Ministry conveyed a
guideline to the local offices of education to admit children of undocumented migrants to
their local elementary schools. It also added that beginning in 2002 when middle school
education would become compulsory, the children of migrants would be admitted to
middle school as well (Maeil Ky ŏngje 2001).
A month after the announcement by the Ministry of Education, the 57
th
session of
the Commission on Human Rights was held in Geneva, Switzerland, where the

144
The Korean government ratified the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in 1990 and has submitted reports to the UN Economic and Social Council periodically since then in
conformity with the Covenant. In 1999, the government submitted its second periodic report
(E/1990/6/Add.23) to the UN Economic and Social Council to provide the information about human rights
conditions in Korea including the rights to work, health, and education. To supplement and criticize the
government report, non-governmental organizations in Korea also submitted a summary counter report in
2000 and then a full counter report in 2001.

168
representative of Korea to the UN in Geneva presented the Ministry’s decision as one of
the Korean government’s achievements in promoting the rights of migrant workers:
Since coming to power in 1998, President Kim Dae-jung had made the defence of
human rights one of his priority domestic and foreign policies. The rights enjoyed
by legal foreign workers had been extended to undocumented workers to provide
them with a social safety net and the children of undocumented foreign workers
had been allowed to attend primary school. (Comment by Mr. Chung Eui-Yong,
UN ESC 2001)

The Korean government also submitted the reply to list of issues to the UN CESCR, in
which it proudly stated that “From a humanitarian point of view, the government is in
practice undocumented foreign workers’ children access to primary education (UN
CESCR 2001a).”
However, the self-praise of the Korean government was soon condemned by a
sarcastic comment by a member of the UN CESCR in the following committee meeting:
It should be noted that the rights of children were, regardless of their parent’s
status, rights erga omnes, in other words universally binding obligations, which
meant that any State was obliged, from the moment it became aware of a child’s
presence on its territory, to guarantee that child the protection and enjoyment of
all the rights set forth in the Covenant. Therefore, there was no reason for the
State party to refer to humanitarian reasons; it was simply fulfilling the
obligations it had incurred under the Covenant. (Comment by Mr. Ceausu, UN
CESCR 2001b)

In addition, the civil society groups and migrant advocacy NGOs criticized the
ambivalent attitude of the Korean government in their second counter report, which was
prepared by 17 NGOs including the JCMK and the Struggle Network for Migrant
Workers’ Labor Rights and Freedom of Migration, the predecessor of the MTU:
Social discrimination against the non-documented migrant workers causes the
destruction of family, too. […] Most of children old enough to go to school could
not go to school until recently when the Minister of Education gave them
admission to school. According to this policy, the children of non-documented

169
workers can go to school in legal sense. However, the implementation of this
policy is questionable because the Ministry of Justice still insists on driving out
the non-documented workers. (Minbyun 2001: 29-30)

While neglecting the concerns about the separation of the family of
undocumented migrant workers, especially the separation between the children and the
parents due to the deportation of the parents, the Korean government widened the
opportunity to attend school for the children of migrant workers by allowing them to be
admitted to middle school and high school in 2003 in accordance with the
recommendation by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC).
145
As a
result, the number of the children of undocumented migrants attending elementary,
middle, and high school as regular students grew from five in 2000 to 139 in 2003.
Although the number of children of undocumented workers has not been collected
separately since 2005, based on the proportion of the year 2003 and 2004, it could be
assumed that at least 150 to 250 of them could have been attending school each year
(Table 4.2).
As the number of the children of migrants increased, the Ky ŏnggi Provincial
Office of Education designated two elementary schools in its district to operate special
classes for the students of migrants, including those of undocumented migrants, in
2006.
146
Yet, in order to fully ensure the right to education for the children of migrant

145
In March 2003, the Committee recommended that the Korean government should amend domestic laws
so that they could ensure equal access to education and social welfare services for all foreign children,
including those of undocumented migrant workers (UN CRC 2003)
146
Two designated schools were located in Ansan City and Sih ŭng City that ranked first and third
respectively in migrant population among 31 cities and towns in Ky ŏnggi Province according to the 2006
survey (Gyeonggi Research Institute 2006: 29)

170
workers, the stable residence status not only for the children but also for their parents was
necessary.

Table 4.2. Number of School-Attending Children of Migrant Workers
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Elementary School 570 (131) 615 (84) 995 1,115 755 981
Middle School 191 (6) 207 (26) 352 215 391 314
High School 76 (2) 99 (5) 227 61 63 107
Total 837 (139) 921 (115) 1,574 1,391 1,209 1,402

Note: Numbers indicate the school-attending children of all migrant workers including both
professional and unskilled workers, and both documented and undocumented workers.
Numbers in parentheses are the children of undocumented migrant workers. According to
the e-mail correspondence with an official in the Education Welfare Division at the
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the number of children of undocumented
migrant workers has not been collected separately since 2005 due to the concerns about
human rights violations.
147

Source: Han’gy ŏre (2003c), for 2004. National Assembly Secretariat (2004: 147), for 2004. The
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2009), for 2005~2008.

Special Permit to Stay for the Migrant Students and Their Parents
As the number of children of undocumented migrants living in Korea increased,
the separation of the family, especially the separation between the children and the
parents, due to arrest and forcible deportation became a great concern for migrant
families. Nevertheless, there were few grounds for migrants and/or their advocacy groups
to demand the Korean government make an exception for those who had children.
However, after the government allowed the children of undocumented migrants to go to
school, they were able to point out the contradiction among the government policies

147
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology was renamed from the Ministry of Education in
2008, which resulted from the merger of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and
Technology.

171
towards migrants. On the one hand, the government granted the right to education to the
children of undocumented migrant workers. On the other hand, it threatened the right to
continue the education by not securing the residence status for the children and their
parents. Although the issue remained below the surface until 2004 when most
undocumented migrant workers had temporary permits to stay or even got a visa, it
resurfaced in 2005 when the crackdown on undocumented migrants became harsher than
ever before.
In 2005, an online newspaper covered a story of four students in Mongolian
School at Seoul who were left alone after their undocumented parents were arrested and
deported (Oh My News 2005). Since it happened after the school was officially approved
as a formal educational institution by the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education, civil
society groups and migrant advocacy organizations questioned the will of the Korean
government to grant the right to education to the children of undocumented migrants.
Hundreds of organizations formed a joint action committee to call for the legal residence
status for the children of migrants. They pointed out that many children of migrants were
born in Korea, thus had never crossed the border or violated their visa term, but became
subject to arrest and deportation because of the jus sanguinis (law of blood) principle of
Korean citizenship. They argued that the Korean-born children of migrants should be
granted permanent residence status and then given an opportunity to choose their
nationality when they reached the age of eighteen. In addition, for the children of
undocumented migrants who were brought in Korea also should be provided a way to

172
stay in Korea legally so that they could continue their school education without the fear
of arrest and deportation (Reib ŏ t’udei. 2005).
In 2006, the pressure by the civil society escalated since it was revealed that the
Immigration Service tracked down undocumented migrants through their school
attending children. For example, the Immigration Service arrested a Sri Lankan migrant
woman who was in her way to bring her son from a school in Ansan City, which was the
one of the two schools operating a special class for the children of migrants under the
supervision of Ky ŏnggi Provincial Office of Education. As undocumented parents of the
students in the two designated schools operating a special class were arrested and/or
deported, the number of students dropped from seven to five in the school at Ansan City
and from twelve to nine in the school at Sih ŭng City. The remaining students were also
stirred by the arrests of the parents of their classmates (Munhwa Ilbo 2006). While
demanding the release of the parents who were not deported yet, civil society groups and
migrant advocacy organizations called for the government to protect the rights of the
children of migrants.
148
Facing the possibility of closing down the special education
program for the children of migrants a couple of months after launching it, the Ministry
of Education called on the Ministry of Justice not to track down undocumented parents
through their school attending children (Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 2006).
By the early 2006, the position of the Ministry of Justice was clear that it would
not stop arresting undocumented migrants even though they were the parents of school
attending children and it would not grant legal residence status for the children of

148
Also, they began to urge the government to ratify the UN International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

173
undocumented migrants (Ministry of Justice 2006a). Yet, the pressure by the civil society
and the request of the Ministry of Education shook its adamant position. In addition,
Korea was elected as a member state of the UN Human Rights Council in May 2006, the
membership of which requires to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and
protection of human rights (UN General Assembly 2006: 3).” Less than a week later the
election, the Ministry of Justice suggested the possibility of legalizing undocumented
migrants if their children were in Korea attending school in order to secure the rights of
the children, especially their right to education, in conformity with the UN convention on
the Rights of the Child (Han’gy ŏre 2006b).
The issue was discussed in the first meeting of the Immigration Policy Committee
held on May 26, 2006, and the Committee reached to an agreement that it would come up
with a measure to provide permission to stay for the children of undocumented migrants
who were attending school and already adjusted to their lives in Korea, thus were
expected to experience difficulties if they were sent back to their home country. It also
decided to allow undocumented parents to stay with their school-attending children so
that the family could live together in Korea (Immigration Policy Committee 2006: 36).
149

Finally, in August 2006, the Ministry of Justice announced that it would grant a special
permit to stay in Korea to undocumented migrant children attending school and their
parents, if they reported themselves to a local immigration office by November 2006.
Yet, the special permit was temporary, valid up only until the end of the school year of
2007, which was February 2008, and applied only to elementary school students and their

149
The establishment of the Foreigner Policy Committee is discussed later in this chapter.

174
parents (Ministry of Justice 2006b). In essence, the special permit was designed to give
some time to undocumented migrant families to prepare to return to their home country
rather than to protect the rights of migrant children.
The Ministry of Justice estimated that the number of eligible children, that is,
those who are at elementary school age, would be more than one thousand.
150
Yet, at the
end of the voluntary reporting period, only 213 children had reported.
151
Some of the
migrant parents could not report because they did not have required documents, such as a
passport or an official document proving the relationship between them and their
children, but others chose not to report in because they thought that a temporary permit
would lead them to be deported. For example, Mara and her husband were raising two
children and one of them was in elementary school at the reporting period, but they did
not apply for the special temporary permit:
I heard that we could get a visa, but we didn’t report ourselves because my
husband entered Korea with someone else’s passport. But even if he had had his
passport, I don’t know whether we would have applied for the visa or not. What
are we going to do after the visa is expired? Going home? No, we don’t have a
plan to go back to Mongolia, at least not in the near future. My son came to Korea
when he was in the first grade, when he didn’t even learn how to write
Mongolian. He graduated from Korean elementary school here, and now he goes
to middle school. Not alone writing, he can barely speak Mongolian. For him, it is
unimaginable to go back to Mongolia. If we had reported in, it would have been
used to track us down, to kick us out of Korea.

150
According to the Ministry of Justice, the number of undocumented children under the age of 18 was
8,184 as of July 2006, and among them 4,188 were elementary school age. Yet, if only included the
children from migrant sending countries, such as China, Mongolia, and the Philippines, the number of
eligible children would be 1,130. Of course, those who were born in Korea were not counted in these
figures.
151
The number is based on my interview with a senior staff at the Residence Policy Division of the
Immigration Service.

175
Although many migrants shared the concerns like Mara’s, others expected that the
granting a permit to stay to school-attending children and their parents would be
established as a new policy eventually. Emily, whose three daughters were born in Korea,
hoped that her family could get a visa after her first daughter enter elementary school:
Last year, the immigration gave a visa to the parents who have a child whose age
is six or older. But Jamila [Emily’s first daughter] was only four, and that’s why
we could not apply for it. We are praying that we can get a visa when Jamila gets
six years old and becomes an elementary school student. I will tell them
[immigration officials] that all my children were born in Korea and they all have
the rights to go to school here in Korea. I wish they will understand our situation.

To their disappointment, however, the special temporary permit expired after one
year and four months including one-month extension, and the Ministry of Justice has no
plan to grant it again. Mr. Choi, a senior staff at the Residence Policy Division of the
Immigration Service, explained the position of the Ministry of Justice as follows:
We granted special permits to them last year because (migrant) human rights
organizations had kept demanding us to secure the residence status for the
children (of undocumented migrants). Before giving out the permits in 2006, we
made a deal with the parents. We said, “We are going to let you stay and allow
you to work for more than a year, and you are going to prepare to go home in the
mean time.” They said they would. But from January of this year [2008], the
media and human rights organizations began to pressure the government to extend
the permit. So we visited schools, including W elementary school in Ansan, S
elementary school in Sih ŭng, and Mongolian school in Seoul, to meet and talk to
the parents, teachers, and principals. They [the parents] agreed that they should
keep their words because it was a promise between the government and the
parents.

We asked them if it [the reason why they wanted to get extension] was because of
the education of their children or there were any other reasons. At first, they said
it was for their children’s education. But then they said that they had been in
Korea for five, seven, ten years, and if they went back now there would be no job
for them and it would be so difficult for them to make a living, so gave them more
time to work in Korea to save money. We said that if it was purely an educational
reason, they might be able to leave their children behind and go home. But they
said they couldn’t do that. Frankly speaking, meeting them and talking to them in

176
person made me feel sorry for them. Some of them were living with their spouse,
but most of them were single parents, and they were raising two, three, even five
children, by themselves. Personally, I wanted to help them. But it was a
government policy decision.

We also went to the discussion meeting with human rights organizations hosted
by the National Human Rights Commission. We explained to them that we could
not but enforce the law as we planned at first because the government policies
should remain consistent. Yet, we decided to give one more month, by the end of
March (2008), so that the families would be able to prepare for the departure.
Also, we made an exception for those who were under inevitable circumstances,
such as industrial injuries or illness, so they could extend their stay. They
[migrant rights activists] should understand that the law is the law and the
government policy is the government policy. I think they were too much
empowered. They often mention about the UN Convention of the Rights of the
Child, but why should the parents get the residence status for the children’s right
to education?

Although Mr. Choi emphasized the importance of consistency in the government
policies, the Korean government policies around labor migration, especially on
undocumented migrant workers, have been far from consistent. As Betty, a Filipina
migrant, said, “For the Korean government, there is a law today, and tomorrow, it
changes. Who knows what will happen in next month or next year?” Therefore, even
though the special temporary permit ended as a one-time offer, undocumented migrant
workers still have hope that they will get a visa someday. Their hope may not be just a
hope since the migration policies of Japanese government, which Korean government has
both emulated and influenced since the introduction of the trainee system, have changed
to grant a special residence permit to undocumented migrant families.
152
Also, as the

152
According to the Japanese Justice Ministry’s guideline for issuing a special residence permit, which was
published in 2006, undocumented migrants can get the permit if they were recognized as long-term settlers
in Japan who are supposed to have considerable difficulties in terms of adjusting if they are sent back to
their country of origin. Although there are no specific qualifications, so far undocumented migrant families
that consist of children, who attend middle school or higher, and their both parents, who have lived in Japan
for more than 10 years, have been granted the special residence permit (Yamaguchi 2007).

177
number of migrants who obtained Korean citizenship through marriage and were raising
their children in Korea increase, the integration of them into Korean society has become
one of the biggest tasks for the government. The exclusion of migrant families, especially
children, from the social integration policy based on their residence status can hardly be
justified.

Families of International Marriages and Social Integration Policies

One of the main reasons why the Korean government has adhered to the principle
of temporary migration has been to maintain the country’s ethnic homogeneity. As a
basis of national identity as well as national pride, the strong sense of ethnic homogeneity
or common blood has played an important role both politically and socially in modern
Korean history. Yet, it also has been used to justify the exclusion of or discrimination
against non-ethnic Koreans or biracial Koreans (Shin 2006). Furthermore, the myth of
ethnic homogeneity has denied the very existence of ethnic Chinese who became a part of
Korean society in the late 1800s and biracial or “mixed blood” people ensued from the
presence of U.S. soldiers since the Korean War. Until recently the Korean government
has declared without any hesitation that Korea is an ethnically homogeneous country,
thus has no conflict or discrimination based on race.
153
Therefore, it is no wonder that the
major concerns of the government about the settlement of migrant workers have been

153
For example, the government’s report submitted to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in
2002 state that “The Republic of Korea is composed of only one race, and therefore does not have any
conflict or discrimination on account of race.” (UN CRC 2002: 12)

178
their marriage to Korean nationals, having biracial children, and possible social conflicts
based on race or ethnicity.
Nevertheless, the international marriages between Koreans and migrants have
increased rapidly, especially since the early 2000s. Given the dramatic demographic
transition characterized by low birth rate and the industrial transition accompanied by the
decline of rural communities, some have even called for the government to encourage
international marriage, especially between Korean men residing in rural areas and
migrant women. Consequently, the myth of ethnic homogeneity has faded out and the
need for social integration has arisen. From the mid-2000s, the government began to
promote multiculturalism by initiating various programs to support not only marriage
migrants and their biracial children but also ethnic Korean migrants, refugees, and even
non-ethnic Korean migrant workers. In this section, I examine how the government
policies and attitudes towards international marriage between Korean citizens and
migrants have been changed over a decade or so and how those changes have influenced
the lives of marriage migrants as well as migrant workers including undocumented ones.

Emergence of Migrant Husbands and Challenges to Patrilineal Laws
Before the influx of migrant workers into Korea, international marriage was not
popular in Korea and it was mostly between Korean women and Japanese or American
men. The families of international marriage were not only small in number but also
typically left Korea. However, the emergence of migrant workers changed the situation.
Korean women began to marry migrant workers from South or Southeast Asia and

179
instead of moving abroad with their husband they chose to settle in Korea.
154
Also, more
and more Korean men married migrant women, not only those who came to Korea for
work but also those who came to Korea with the intention of marriage. In 1991,
international marriages comprised only 1.2 percent of all marriages, but the percentage
began to exceed ten from 2004 (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. Trends of International Marriage in Korea, 1991 – 2008

International Marriages Foreign Wives Foreign Husbands
Year

Total
Marriages
Number of
Marriages
Proportion
(%)
Number of
Marriages
Proportion
(%)
Number of
Marriages
Proportion
(%)
1991 416,872 5,102 1.2 663 13.0 4,439 87.0
1992 419,774 5,534 1.3 2,057 37.2 3,477 62.8
1993 402,593 6,545 1.6 3,109 47.5 3,436 52.5
1994 393,121 6,616 1.7 3,072 46.4 3,544 53.6
1995 398,484 13,494 3.4 10,365 76.8 3,129 23.2
1996 434,911 15,946 3.7 12,647 79.3 3,229 20.2
1997 388,591 12,448 3.2 9,266 74.4 3,182 25.6
1998 375,616 12,188 3.2 8,054 66.1 4,134 33.9
1999 362,673 10,570 2.9 5,775 54.6 4,795 45.4
2000 332,090 11,605 3.5 6,945 59.8 4,660 40.2
2001 318,407 14,523 4.6 9,684 66.7 4,839 33.3
2002 304,877 15,202 5.0 10,698 70.4 4,504 29.6
2003 302,503 24,776 8.2 18,751 75.7 6,025 24.3
2004 308,598 34,640 11.2 25,105 72.5 9,535 27.5
2005 314,304 42,356 13.5 30,719 72.5 11,637 27.5
2006 330,634 38,759 11.7 29,665 76.5 9,094 23.5
2007 343,559 37,560 10.9 28,580 76.1 8,980 23.9
2008 327,715 36,204 11.0 28,163 77.8 8,041 22.2

Source: Korea National Statistical Office. Demographic Trends Statistical Year Book
(Marriage and Divorce Part), each year.

154
It was more likely for male migrant workers to get married to Korean women because it is hard for them
to meet women of same nationality due to the smaller proportion of women compared men. It is
particularly true for migrant workers from countries like Bangladesh or Pakistan where emigration of
women are restricted by the government until recently (Oishi 2005: 60). According to the data provided by
the Korea National Statistical Office, Pakistani has been the fifth or the sixth largest group of foreign
husbands of Korean women since 2001.

180
As the number of families formed by Korean women and migrant men rose, the
Nationality Act of Korea prescribing the naturalization of foreign spouses and the
citizenship of the children of international marriage began to be challenged. From its
enactment in 1948, the Nationality Act of Korea had kept its patrilineal principle that not
only made it harder for foreign husbands to be naturalized than foreign wives but also did
not grant citizenship to the children whose father was not a Korean citizen. According to
the old Nationality Act, foreign husbands of Korean women should stay at least three
years in Korea to be eligible for naturalization while foreign wives of Korean men could
get Korean citizenship as soon as they got married. Also, since children of a Korean
mother and a foreign father could not obtain Korean citizenship, they either should be
listed under their mother’s family registry as if they were out-of-wedlock or fatherless
children or should be registered under their father’s name but as foreigners.
155
In the early
1990s when Korea became a member state of the UN, the government attempted to
amend the Nationality Act to grant Korean citizenship to a child if either of the parents
was Korean so that it could withdraw a reservation on the Article 9 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) demanding
states parties to grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their

155
Traditionally, married couples in Korea retain their respective pre-marital family names, but until its
amendment in 2005 the Civil Law had prescribed that a child must take its father’s family name unless it
was either unknown or unavailable (Article 781 of the Civil Law).

181
children.
156
The attempt was failed due to the vehement opposition by the
Confucianists.
157

In 1997, the amendment of the Nationality Act was discussed again when a group
of Korean wife and migrant husband couples called on the government to abolish the
discriminatory laws against them. They demanded that the migrant husbands should get
secure residence status and their children should be given Korean citizenship. Indeed,
they were all suffering from the unstable status of the migrant husbands, because unlike
migrant wives who would be issued a spouse visa (F-2), migrant husbands were issued a
visitor’s visa (F-1), which allowed only three- or six-month of temporary stay and was
not renewable in Korea. Not to mention the economic burden from the travel expenses of
the husbands to renew the visa, the husbands, especially if they had been undocumented
migrants in Korea, were often banned from re-entering Korea. Some even did not register
their marriage in order for their children to get Korean citizenship, which prevented their
husbands from getting a visa, even a short-term visitor’s one. In order to improve their
situation, the group had regular meetings for consciousness raising and information
sharing with each other, organized demonstrations in various places to publicize their
demands, and finally appealed to the court. Migrant advocacy organizations, led by the
JCMK, as well as women’s rights organizations, led by the Korean Women’s Association
United, also supported their activities by submitting a petition to the National Assembly

156
The Korean government ratified the UN CEDAW in 1984, but left Article 9 (equal rights of women and
men with respect to the nationality) and Article 16 (elimination of any discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations) on reservation.
157
When the government announced the plan to amend the Nationality Act, the Confucianists in Korea,
who are strong supporters of the male blood-line succession system, argued that granting Korean
citizenship to a child of a Korean mother and a foreign father would contaminate the “pure Korean blood,”
as if women’s blood did not matter to the “purity” of Korean ethnicity (Segye Ilbo 1992).

182
demanding the reform of the Nationality Act while submitting a report to the UN
Commission on the Status of Women (Han’gy ŏre 1997c, Kungmin Ilbo 1997b).
At first, the Ministry of Justice was reluctant to amend the Nationality Act
worrying that it would encourage the settlement of undocumented migrant workers in
Korea by marrying a Korean woman. Yet, the government’s desire to be recognized as a
human rights country overcame the reluctance. Finally in November 1997, the
Nationality Act was amended to eliminate gender discriminatory elements after 50 years
of its patrilineal tradition by allowing children whose either parent was a Korean citizen
to be granted Korean citizenship and by offering the same period for both foreign
husbands and foreign wives of Korean citizens to be eligible for naturalization. The
amendment enabled the Korean government to withdraw the reservation on the Article 9
of the UN CEDAW and the government immediately published the change in the states
parties report to the UN CEDAW in 1998 (UN CEDAW 1998: 43).
However, instead of letting migrant husbands to be naturalized right after the
marriage, the amended law made both migrant wives and migrant husbands wait for two
years to be eligible to apply for Korean citizenship. The rationale behind that decision
was to reduce the marriage frauds between migrant women and Korean men, especially
between ethnic Korean women from China and Korean men living rural areas, while
achieving nominal gender equality in naturalization process.
158
Besides, during the two-
year waiting period to be eligible for naturalization, migrant husbands still had to reside
with a short-term visitor’s visa that did not authorized them to work. Thus, migrant

158
The marriage fraud involving Korean men and migrant women is discussed later in this chapter.

183
husbands either stayed in poverty without job or worked illegally just as other
undocumented migrant workers.
The experiences of Mihir, a Bangladesh man who has been married with a Korean
woman for 14 years, illustrate the unfair situations that migrant husbands had to go
through due to the discriminatory law and practices based on gender and nationality:
After I got married in 1993, I had to be in and out of the country every three
months to renew my visa. Sometimes I went to Bangladesh and other times I went
to Hong Kong. Most of the money I earned from working here was spent on my
trips. The law was very harsh on us [migrant husbands married to Korean women]
at that time. There was no problem for Korean men to get married to foreign
women, but there were so many difficulties for Korean women to get married to
foreign men.

But still, it was okay if you were from Europe or America. The people at the
Immigration Service or the Korean Embassy would be nice to you and gave you
visa easily. But they treated us [Southeast Asian husbands] differently. They
looked down on us and thought that we just got married to Korean women to stay
in Korea and earn money. If you were from rich countries, they would welcome
you to stay. But if you were from poor countries, they would tell you to go and
live in your own country with your wife and kids. It was like there were two
different laws in one country.

Because the law was particularly tough on us, we organized a group, the husbands
and the wives together, to fight against it. We men were people from various
countries, like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, the Philippines, and China. Director
Yang from S ŏngnam Migrant Workers’ Center helped us to organize, and we had
meetings here in Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center. We fought really hard. We
went for demonstrations to My ŏngdong (Cathedral), Ansan, and everywhere. I
think it was in 1998 when the law changed. But I had to wait until 1999 before I
got a one-year visa that is renewable in Korea. (Mihir, Bangladeshi, male, 40)

The story of Kumar, who married a Korean woman in early 1998 and participated in the
same group as Mihir, shows that the visa situation had not changed despite the changes in
the Nationality Act:
When I got married I was an illegal [undocumented migrant] and there was no
Nepalese embassy in Korea. So my wife and I went to Nepal to register our

184
marriage. When I applied my visa in the Korean embassy in Nepal, they only
gave me one-month visa. We came back to Korea together, but I had to leave the
country to renew my visa one month later. I first went to Hong Kong, but the visa
regulation was changed in Hong Kong that Nepalese people could not enter the
country without visa. Because I didn’t have a Hong Kong visa, I was sent to the
Nepal. I got three-month visa (to Korea) there and then came back. Three months
passed really quickly and this time I could not afford to go to another country for
visa renewal. My wife and I decided to go to the immigration office in Seoul to
extend my stay, but we were not sure if we could make it by ourselves. So we
asked the director of the migrant center in our neighborhood to accompany with
us. She fought for us at the immigration office, so that I could get my visa
renewed in Korea. But I only got three months.

At that time my wife and I were in a group organized by people like us [migrant
men and Korean women couples]. There were Korean wives married Pakistani
men and they told us that the immigration office in Inch ŏn was easy on us. With
their help, we changed our address to Inch ŏn and then went to the Inch ŏn
immigration (office). There I got six-month visa. I was so happy. Since then, we
became more involved in the activities of the group. We went to demonstrations
in My ŏng-dong or Hyehwa-dong [both of which are traditionally popular places
for street protest in Seoul] and demanded the government to give us a long-term
visa. The situation got better little by little. Many people got six-month visa and
then one-year visa. (Kumar, Nepalese, male, 42)

As shown in the stories of Mihir and Kumar, the group of Korean wives and
migrant husbands continued to fight for the stable residence status for the husbands.
Recognizing the issue as one of the legal discriminations based on gender, not only
migrant advocacy organizations but women’s rights organizations also supported their
fight. Different visa status for migrant husbands and migrant wives was also reported as a
problem to the UN CESCR by a group of non-governmental organizations (Minbyun
2001: 30). Consequently, in 2001 the Ministry of Justice decided to amend the Decree of
the Immigration Control Act so that migrant husbands could also get a long-term spouse
visa. The enactment of the amended Decree of the Immigration Control Act in 2002 as
well as the grant of temporary permit and legalization to undocumented migrant workers

185
encouraged the registration of de facto marriages between Korean women and migrant
men. As a result, the number of international marriages more than doubled from 4,839 in
2001 to 11,637 in 2005 (see Table 4.3).
However, the change in legal status had little impact on the lives of migrant
husbands for they were still viewed as foreigners or migrant workers by society in
general. Most of them were employed in similar occupations as before, that is,
manufacturing jobs, thus still fell into the category of poor working class. Also, migrant
husbands and their Korean wives often encountered disdain and hostility not only from
the public at large but also from the administrative officials.
159
For example, if they went
to extend the stay of the migrant husbands, immigration officials would use impolite
languages and derogatory remarks, especially when the husbands were from South or
Southeast Asian countries (Cho 2004). However, the situation has changed gradually as
international marriage, especially that between Korean men and migrant women, became
more and more popular and migrant spouses and their biracial children began to be
permanent residents and/or citizens of Korean society.

Increase in Migrant Wives and Measures for Social Integration
Unlike international marriage between Korean women and migrant men, that
between Korean men and migrant women has often been accepted and even encouraged
not only by the general public but also by the government. Under the patrilineal tradition

159
The hostility towards migrant husbands can be explained from two aspects. From the patrilineal point of
view of Korean society, migrant husbands and their children are contaminating ethnic homogeneity. Also,
from the masculine point of view of the Korean nation, migrant husbands are slighting the sovereignty of
Korea and the masculinity of Korean men by taking away its women who belong to the Korean nation and
to Korean men, in particular (Yuh 2002: 163).

186
of Korea, women were not considered as the carrier of a bloodline, thus migrant wives
were not viewed as a threat to ethnic homogeneity of Korea unlike migrant husbands. In
addition, the decline of the marriage rate together with that of the birth rate, especially in
rural areas, became a big concern for many local governments of Korea, and the
problems were believed unsolvable without importing wives from abroad. At the same
time, with the limited opportunities to migrate to Korea, foreign women, especially those
who had fewer resources, chose marriage as a way to come to Korea.
160
As a result, the
phenomenon of marriage migration of women, that is, migration within or as a result of
marriage, became popular in Korea.
The phenomenon of marriage migration to Korea started in the early 1990s when
Korean Chinese women migrated to Korea as a wife of a Korean man with the
establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992. Many ethnic
Koreans residing in China wanted to come to Korea for work, but the official channels
for them were very limited. Consequently, some women decided to come to Korea by
marrying a Korean man. At the same time, Korean men, to whom Korean women were
not attracted as marriage material, such as farmers in rural areas, disabled men, or
middle-aged divorcees, also sought a wife from abroad. As a foreign wife, Korean
Chinese women were preferred to others because of a common ethnicity and language,
which were believed to cause fewer conflicts. International marriage agencies began to
proliferate to arrange the marriages between Korean men and Korean Chinese women.

160
Marriage migration has been pointed out as the most efficient and sometimes the only way available to
disadvantaged women to realize social and economic mobility (Sinke 1999, Palriwala and Uberoi 2008: 23-
4).

187
Some local governments, especially in rural areas, also encouraged this phenomenon (H
Lee 2003: 143). As a result, the number of international marriages by Korean men
increased rapidly.
Starting in 1993, the media began to cover the marriage frauds between ethnic
Korean women from China and Korean men in rural areas, in which the wives ran away
to the cities for work after getting citizenship while leaving behind the husbands and/or
children. Some estimated that more than ten percent of the marriages ended with run-
away migrant wives (S ŏul Sinmun 1993c, Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun 1993). As the marriage
fraud cases increased, the Korean government signed a memorandum of understanding
with Chinese government that Chinese women who wanted to marry a Korean man had
to go through complicated procedures to prove the marriage was authentic (Ky ŏnghyang
Sinmun 1996). After the signing of the memorandum, the number of international
marriages declined. The amendment of Nationality Act that prevented foreign wives from
getting citizenship right after the marriage also discouraged women from choosing
marriage migration.
Yet, the number of international marriages between Korean men and migrant
women went up again starting in 1999 when the Korean government decided to
deregulate the establishment of private marriage agencies. The abolition of the
memorandum with Chinese government in 2003 also contributed to the increase in
numbers (Han’gy ŏre 2003b). The nationalities of migrant wives also became more
diverse, including Vietnamese, Filipina, Thai, and Mongolian. From 2004, international
marriages have accounted for more than ten percent of all marriages and about three

188
quarters of those marriages were between Korean men and migrant women (see Table
4.3). Local governments’ support through the implementation of an ordinance to offer an
international marriage subsidy also encouraged the increase.
161

However, since the marriages have often been arranged by international marriage
agencies or religious organizations, particularly, the Unification Church, without much
information on future spouses and have been processed with haste, many couples have
experienced marital problems.
162
Language barriers, cultural differences, and consequent
conflicts, which sometimes have resulted in domestic violence, have also aggravated the
situation and even led to broken marriages. According to the data provided by the Korea
National Statistical Office (2009: 14), the number of divorces of international marriage
couples increased by 6.5 times from 2002 to 2008 while the overall number of Korean
divorces decreased. Particularly, the number of divorces between Korean husbands and
migrant wives increased by more than 20 times. If we include those who have separated
without getting a divorce, the number would be much higher.
The stories of Sarah and Christina, both of whom were marriage migrants from
the Philippines, show why so many marriage migrants have failed. For example, Sarah
married a man with mental problem, but had not been told by her international marriage
agency about her husband’s condition:

161
As of 2007, 60 out of 246 municipal governments in Korea have an ordinance to support international
marriage financially. They offer government subsidy of three to eight million won for local men who want
to get married to a foreign woman. Since the subsidy is for marriage expenses, civil society groups have
criticized that it would only benefit to international marriage brokerage agencies while commercializing
women (Han 2007, Ch’oe 2007).
162
According to a survey conducted of 932 migrant wives of Korean men, 46.2 percent of women had met
their future husband less than twice before the marriage (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2005: 72).

189
I heard about the opportunity to get married to a Korean guy from a friend of
mine. At that time, I was very stressed out from my work [she was a salesperson
in a department store in Manila] and was thinking about quitting the job. So I
decided to give it a try. I thought that I might start a new life in Korea. I got a
phone number of a Filipina who were doing this marriage business. When I called
her, she told me to come to her house. I expected a blind date or something like
that, but the meeting was totally different from what I imagined. There was one
Korean guy who wanted to marry a Filipina, two international marriage agents
from Korea and the Filipina lady whom I talked to over the phone. Also, about
twenty something Filipina women who came to meet the guy were there, too. The
guy picked me and other woman for his final choices, so all other women left the
house and two of us remained. They talked to each other in Korean, which I
didn’t understand a bit, and then told me that he wanted to marry me. It happened
so fast and out of my control. I don’t know why I said okay. It was like I was
possessed or something. The next day we [her future husband and two Korean
agents] went out for shopping and the third day we got married. Since it happened
so quickly, I couldn’t even invite my parents in Samar Province for the wedding. I
had stayed with my husband for a couple of days in his hotel room, and then he
left for Korea. I had stayed in the Philippines waiting for my visa for about a
month, and then entered into Korea by myself. It was August 2006.

At first, I didn’t notice anything strange about my husband. I just thought that he
was very shy. But as days went by, I felt something was wrong. He always looked
for his mother as if he was a child. But I couldn’t ask why because I couldn’t
speak Korean and he and his mother couldn’t speak English. About a couple of
weeks later, his cousin visited home. She could speak English, so I asked her why
my husband acted so weirdly. She said, “Didn’t you know? He is mentally
retarded.” I was very shocked. I thought I could not live like that. It was around
that time when I brought to the Center [Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center] by my
mother-in-law and her friend. They wanted me to learn Korean there but when
they saw a lot of Filipino migrant workers, they freaked out. They were afraid that
I would have an affair with a Filipino guy there. So they told me not to go to the
Center.

But I was desperate to get out of the house. I couldn’t breathe in the house. I
sometimes sneaked out of the house to go to the Center to meet other Filipinos. I
got some phone numbers and made some friends. Later, I was invited to a
Christmas party and met more Filipino migrant workers. I asked around if they
knew somewhere to work. In January, one of them called and told me there is a
factory looking for workers. I asked my mother-in-law to allow me to work. She
was very suspicious and asked me a lot of questions, but said yes at last. But after
I began to work, my husband became very anxious and got violent. I ran out of
the house in February and began to live with my current roommate, Grace, who
was also a run-away Filipina migrant wife.

190
I know people would think that I ran away because my original intention to come
to Korea was for work or for money, not for marriage. But it was not true.
Before… when I didn’t know about his [the husband’s] condition, I wanted to
have a good marriage. Yes, I wanted to work someday, but not like this. I wanted
to have a family. I wanted to live a happy life like other women. But after I found
out (that he was mentally retarded), I lost my hope. Yes, I just could have gone
back to the Philippines. But I thought, “Why should I go back now? I am in Korea
now anyway and I can work here. If I go back to the Philippines, I am no longer a
single woman. And to work again, I should start from the very first beginning.”
So I decided to stay here and work as long as I had a visa. (Sarah, Filipino,
Female, 26)
163

Christina ran away from her husband because he was an alcoholic and often used
violence against her:
I have always wanted to travel around since I was a little girl. So after I got
graduated from college, I began to work in a maritime company. There I got
training and preparing for an exam to become a seaman. After three years, I took
a test and got a seaman’s license. Around that time, I broke up with my boyfriend.
I just wanted to get out of the country, but I had to wait for months to be on board.
Then one of my friends, who was working at an international marriage agency,
said to me, “Why don’t you just try to marry a Korean guy?” I just wanted to
leave our country as fast as I can, because I was so hurt at that time. I wanted to
forget everything. So I said, “Okay, I will give it a try,” and we set a date. There
was one guy waiting in a hotel with a Korean manager [marriage agent] and me
and another girl went there with our agent. That was the first time I met a Korean
guy. He chose me and I said okay. The next day, I married him. (laugh) He said
he liked me already. But for me…You know, it’s impossible that you like
someone in the first meeting. But I was only thinking whether I could leave the
country or not. That’s why I said yes. After the wedding, I had stayed with him in
the hotel for three days. Then he left and about two month later I came here.

I began to live with him in Puch ŏn City [Ky ŏnggi Province] and had stayed with
him for about one month and a half. (laugh) Well, it’s because… he didn’t know
how to speak English and I don’t know how to speak Korean. So it was
communication problem at first. And then there was… I’m not saying that it’s all
his faults. But the first thing that I really hated about him was that he drank a lot.

163
I accompanied Sarah to a family court as a witness and a translator when she got divorced from her
husband. Her mother-in-low and aunt-in-low were there with the husband. They told me that the marriage
failed because they brought a “too smart girl” and that they should have picked a less-educated and more
obedient girl instead. Their statement explains one of the reasons why Korean men and their family choose
international marriage, that is, they want a traditional wife who is more submissive and obedient to her
husband.

191
He didn’t go to work but stayed at home everyday drinking soju [popular Korean
alcoholic beverage]. He was an alcoholic. And when he got drunk, he shouted at
me. He told me to go out and threw my stuffs out. But where could I go? I didn’t
know where to go. I was just new in this country. So I didn’t go out, but just stood
in front of the door. When he kept shouting at me to go out, I cried. I always cried
when I was with him. I cried because I didn’t like the guy, I didn’t like the
situation that I was in and I didn’t know what would happen to me. He always
said, “Go Philippine, go! Give me money back!” He also talked me a lot of things
and then asked, “Yes? No? Yes, sir? No, sir?” But how can I answer yes or no if I
don’t understand what he’s asking?

There was a Filipina sister who helped me. My husband was a Catholic and one
Sunday he brought me to his Church. A sister there told me she had a Filipina
friend, who was also a sister, and she’d like to introduce her to me. So the next
day I met the Filipina sister. I went to their center and started to study Korean
language. And when I had a problem with my husband I talked about it with her. I
showed her my bruises, which I got when he grabbed me and told me to go to the
Philippines. The sister said to me, “You’re going to be okay. You are already
here. If he’s going to hurt you again, we are going to help you to separate with
him.” Several days later, my husband threatened me with a knife while drunk. I
was very terrified. I thought, ‘What if he stab me or himself?’ It was a disaster.
The next day, I came to the sister and told her that I needed to leave him and get
out of this kind of relationship. That’s when she sent me to a migrant women’s
shelter in Anyang.
164
(Christina, Filipino, Female, 26)

Failed marriage often led migrant wives to lose their residence status since the
amendment of the Nationality Act in 1998, under which they had to stay married and live
in Korea more than two years to be eligible for naturalization. Accordingly, migrant
wives who got divorced, separated, or even were widowed before the naturalization
ended up becoming undocumented migrants.
165
There was no exception even though they
had children to raise. Therefore, in order to keep their residence status, some migrant

164
Christina was pregnant when she was sent to the shelter. She had stayed there for six months and then
transferred to another shelter to give a birth to a son. When her son was two months old, she sent her son to
a group foster home for temporary care and came back to the shelter in Anyang. After she found a job, she
got out of the shelter. At the time of the interview, she was working and earning money to prepare to bring
her son back and raise him by herself.
165
The spouse visa (F-2) that migrant wives were issued could not be renewed without the consent of their
husbands. Therefore, non-naturalized migrant women who got divorced or separated could not but become
undocumented once their visa was expired.

192
wives, especially those who had children, put up with various problems within their
marriage including domestic violence while staying with their husband. For this reason,
civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations demanded that the government
should amend the Nationality Act again so that migrant wives could get out of abusive
marriages without worrying about their residence status and/or their right to keep and
raise their children (Y ŏs ŏng Sinmun 2002).
166
Finally, the bill to amend the Nationality
Act was passed in the National Assembly, and from 2004 migrant wives and migrant
husbands whose Korean spouse was dead or missing, who could not stay married due to
their spouse’s fault, or who had a child born within the marriage to raise, became eligible
for naturalization even though they had stayed married less than two years.
Despite the amendment, not all divorced migrant wives can be eligible for
naturalization, especially because it is hard for them to prove that their divorce was not
their fault. For example, Sarah filed a lawsuit with a help of a public interest pro bono
lawyers’ group against her international marriage agency claiming that her failed
marriage was caused by the lack of the information on her husband’s mental condition,
which was concealed by the agency on purpose. Although she won the lawsuit, she only
got one-year visa extension. On the contrary, Christina, who had a son to raise by herself
after her ex-husband gave up the custody, not only could renew her visa but also was
expected to be eligible for naturalization. The difference between the two marriage
migrants shows that the Korean government thinks that migrant women who are the
mothers of Korean children deserve more rights than those who do not have or raise

166
The Ministry of Justice opposed the amendment arguing that migrant wives could abuse the law and use
the marriage as a way to get Korean citizenship.

193
children. In other words, it views migrant women as means to reproduce and raise the
next generation of Korean citizens and only then they can be accepted as a part of the
Korean society.
167

Social Integration Policies for a Multiethnic Society
As international marriages began to account for more than ten percent of all
marriages from 2004, the issues went beyond the legal status of migrant spouses. Most of
all, as the number of non-ethnic Koreans with Korean citizenship, that is, migrant spouses
and biracial children, increased, the prejudice and discrimination against ethnic minorities
encouraged by the strong sense of ethnic homogeneity were criticized and the need to
prepare for a multiethnic or multicultural society emerged (S ŏl 2005). The changes were
clearly shown in the state reports submitted by the Korean government to the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD) in two different
points in time. According to the 2003 report, the government seemed to pay little
attention to the existence of ethnic minorities and the racial discrimination against them.
It stated that “Korea is an ethnically homogeneous country” and the number of people
defined as ethnic minorities is relatively small (UN CERD 2003: 3). Furthermore, the
government found that “there is no institutional discrimination against them [ethnic
minorities]” although “sentiments and prejudice against children of mixed marriages”

167
It is also clearly shown in the municipal governments’ policies to promote international marriages.
According to the Rural Development Administration, “the families of international marriage were
important assets in rural areas that can save many communities from the crisis of population decline and
low birth rates.” (Han’gy ŏre 2006c)

194
might exist in personal level (Ibid.: 9). However, the government’s attitude dramatically
changed in the 2006 report:
As an ethnically homogeneous State, the Republic of Korea has been traditionally
unfamiliar with the problems of ethnic minorities. However, the dynamic
exchange of human resources between countries and an increase in the number of
interracial marriages have recently raised a range of concerns involving ethnic
minorities. The principle of the “pure-blooded,” based on the Republic of Korea’s
pride in the nation’s ethnic homogeneity, has incurred various forms of
discrimination, largely invisible and not illegal, against so-called “mixed-bloods”
in all areas of life including employment, marriage, housing, education and
interpersonal relationships. This is particularly serious since such practices are
passed down from one generation to the next. The Government is formulating a
comprehensive and integral set of measures including an institutional reform to
remedy sources of discrimination (…) Given that most of the “mixed-bloods” and
ethnic minorities have low-wage jobs and are subject to poverty, the Government
is particularly keen to devise a comprehensive plan for their welfare and safety,
including employment training and housing support. Moreover, the Government
is stepping up its efforts to make prompt changes in social awareness through
education and public-awareness campaigns in order to eliminate sources of
discrimination and prejudice (UN CERD 2006: 10).

This change occurred because of the fear of ethnic conflict that might be caused
by the exclusion of and/or discrimination against the families of international marriages,
especially the children of those families.
168
Indeed, the survey on the living conditions of
migrant wives by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2005 revealed that migrant wives
were excluded from various social services, including education, welfare, and child care,
and their biracial children were bullied and alienated at school. According to the survey
report, most migrant wives experienced difficulties in their marriage due to language

168
The concern for ethnic conflict was increased by the immigrant unrest in France in 2005. With the
recognition that such an incident could happen in Korea in near future, all the media called for the
government’s attention to the social integration of migrant settlers and their children, especially migrant
spouses and their biracial children, whom were believed to become second class citizens without
institutional and structural changes. As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the visit of the
half-Korean American football player, Hines Ward, in April 2006 also stimulated the changes in the
immigrant policies of the Korean government.

195
barrier, cultural difference, and domestic violence, but did not get necessary education or
counseling. Many of them also had hard time raising and educating their children not
only because of economic constraints but also because of the prejudice against biracial
children. Besides, poverty was found to be a serious problem for them with more than 50
percent of the families of migrant wives living under the absolute poverty line and not
being able to access to social welfare services (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2005).
Particularly concerned about the marginalization of migrant wives and their
biracial children, different government ministries came up with various measures to
integrate the families of international marriage into Korean society while providing
support programs for them. For example, the Ministry of Gender Equality decided to
operate support programs providing migrant wives with Korean language education,
childbirth and childcare assistance, and legal and medical counseling in case of domestic
violence (Ministry of Gender Equality 2006). The Ministry of Education proposed to
offer special after school programs and counseling services for the students from families
of international marriages while promoting multicultural education at schools (Kungmin
Ilbo 2006). The Ministry of Health and Welfare published living guidebooks for migrant
wives in four different languages to provide various information including social services
available for them (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2006).
Furthermore, the need to embrace other groups of migrants and ethnic minorities,
who might not be Korean citizens but continued to be part of Korean society, also arose.
Research funded by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in 2004 to develop
a comprehensive plan to promote human rights of migrants and ethnic minorities in

196
Korea addressed eight different groups that needed to be taken into consideration:
migrant workers, migrant workers’ families and children, migrant women including both
labor migrants and marriage migrants, ethnic Korean migrants, refugees, North Korean
refugees, ethnic Chinese residents, and biracial people (NHRCK 2004).
169
In 2006, the
government established the Immigration Policy Committee in order to develop more
comprehensive and systematic policies around all migrants and ethnic minorities residing
in Korea and to coordinate the various programs implemented by different government
ministries.
170
In its first meeting, the Committee agreed that Korea was becoming a
multicultural society and thus needed to have social integration policies to avoid possible
conflicts due to the discrimination and exclusion of migrants and ethnic minorities
(Immigration Policy Committee 2006).
As the number of foreigners in Korea reached more than one million in 2007,
which comprised over two percent of total population, the need for social integration of
migrants and the demand to prepare for a multiethnic and multicultural society grew as
well. Both the ruling and opposition parties proposed a bill to support the families of
migrants regardless of their residence status, with particular emphasis on the education of
their children and the inclusion of multicultural education into school curricula. (Ky ŏnggi
Ilbo 2007, Naeil Sinmun 2007) The Ministry of Justice also amended the Decree of the

169
The research results were used for the establishment of the National Action Plan for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights (NAP) in 2007 by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, which
was recommended by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2001 (UN CESC
2001c: 7)
170
The Committee was chaired by the Prime Minister and consisted of 25 committee members including
the ministers from 17 different government agencies and experts from academia and civil society.

197
Immigration Control Act to open the opportunity for unskilled migrant workers to obtain
the right of permanent residence, although it made the procedure very difficult.
171, 172

Nevertheless, the Korean government’s integration policies clearly draw the line
between those who have citizenship or the right of permanent residence and those who
have not. For example, the second Immigration Policy Committee meeting concluded
that the government’s integration policies and support programs should focus on those
who are or will be the permanent parts of the society, such as marriage migrants and their
children, professional migrants and their families, and refugees rather than on unskilled
migrant workers (Immigration Policy Committee 2007). Considering the rare possibility
for unskilled migrant workers to obtain the right of permanent residence, let alone
citizenship, unless they marry to a Korean citizen, the government virtually decided to
exclude almost half of all foreigners residing in Korea from its integration policies.
Moreover, the exclusion of undocumented migrant workers is even clearer. As
stated in the report published by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, the
government holds on to the idea that the regulation and deportation of undocumented
migrant workers are the rights of a sovereign state, thus cannot be counted as human
rights infringements on migrant workers (NHRCK 2004: 49). Not only ineligible for the
right of permanent residence but also subject to arrest and deportation, undocumented

171
The right of permanent residence was first introduced in Korea in 2002. Yet, before the amendment of
the Decree of the Immigration Control Act in 2007, it was only applicable to the spouses of Korean citizen,
refugees, and foreign investors who have stayed in Korea for five years.
172
The procedures for unskilled migrant workers to be eligible for the right of permanent residence are as
follows: At first, migrant workers need to stay in Korea for five years legally to get a resident visa (F-2).
Yet, since the employment permit or the work visa (E-9) for unskilled workers expires in three years, they
must exit and come back again under the lawful procedure. After they get a resident visa, they need to stay
in Korea another five years legally to be eligible for permanent resident status (F-5). Besides, to be
qualified, they ought to have some kind of official certificate proving their technical skills or to earn
income over a certain level, in addition to have a certain amount of personal property.

198
migrant workers are not considered as a group to be integrated. According to the
government’s comprehensive plan, the minimum human rights should be granted to
undocumented migrant workers. For example, they should be protected by labor laws
when they do not get paid, they should be assisted when they become a victim of crime,
and they should be treated fairly when they are arrested and detained by the Immigration
Service. Also, their children should be given the right to get education and should not be
deported in the middle of semester (Immigration Policy Committee 2006). Yet, the
government clarified that it would not condone undocumented migrant workers anymore.
With the recognition that recurrent amnesties to undocumented migrants made room for
migrant workers to resist the crackdown policy and furthermore to demand for
legalization in alliance with migrant advocacy organizations, it determined to build close
coordination between the Ministry of Justice, the police, and the prosecution to arrest and
deport undocumented migrants while punishing their employers or the brokers to reduce
and prevent illegal migration (Immigration Policy Committee 2007: 34-5).
However, the government fails to recognize that the boundary between migrant
spouses and migrant workers is not that clear. Like Mihir and Kumar, many migrant
workers become migrant husbands and like Sarah or Christina, many migrant wives
become migrant workers. In many cases, they do the same work, they are in the same
economic class, and most importantly, they share same race/ethnicity. The public in
general also does not see them differently. Moreover, long-term undocumented migrants,
who are more likely to be adjusted to Korean society than recent marriage migrants with
Korean citizenship, are already an important part of local communities in terms of

199
economically, socially and culturally. Differentiating them based on their residence
status, especially based on their citizenship status, and excluding migrant workers,
especially undocumented ones, from social integration policies not only will contradict
with the government’s principle that it will protect and promote the human rights of
migrants but also will conflict with its aim to prepare for a multiethnic and multicultural
society by embracing ethnic minorities.

Chapter Summary

As migrant workers settled down in Korea, they began to bring in their family or
to form a new family although the Korean government did not allow family reunion of
migrant workers and little social support was available for the migrant families. The
growing number of migrant families having and raising children challenged the
government’s perspective on labor migration. Not only the rights as workers, migrant
workers and their children demanded more rights as human beings. Civil society groups
and migrant advocacy organizations pressured the government to grant the right to
education to the children of migrants and the right to stay together to the migrant families
with children by appealing international human rights norms. The Kim Dae Jung and Roh
Moon Hyun administrations, both of which were eager to get Korea recognized as a
human rights country, accepted the demands. The children of migrant workers were
admitted to public school and the migrant parents were given a special permit to stay
although temporarily.

200
Migrants who formed their family by international marriage, that is, by marrying
a Korean citizen, brought more challenges to the Korean government and society in
general. The patrilineal tradition in the nationality law was changed and the emphasis of
ethnic homogeneity of Korean society was criticized. The increase of non-ethnic Korean
citizens and their biracial children called for the government to prepare for a multiethnic
society. The Korean government established the Immigration Policy Committee to
develop a comprehensive plan to integrate various groups of migrants and ethnic
minorities into Korean society. Although undocumented migrants were mostly excluded
from the plan, they already began to be considered as an important part of local
communities.

201
CHAPTER 5. LOCAL CITIZENSHIP FOR MIGRANT WORKERS

In 2007, the Korean government granted unskilled migrant workers the
opportunity to obtain permanent residency. Yet, the chances for them to become
permanent residents let alone to become Korean citizens are very limited unless they get
married to Korean citizens. Particularly, despite some occasional amnesties,
undocumented migrant workers have never been considered to deserve the right to
permanent residence or to citizenship in Korea. The government has allowed some social
rights for undocumented migrant workers, such as the right to education for their children
or the right to receive subsidized medical services in case of emergence, with the desire
to be recognized as a human rights country. However, it has simultaneously reinforced
immigration control in an attempt to discourage undocumented migrants from settling
down in Korean society. For the Korean government, unskilled migrant workers are
always temporary sojourners regardless of the length of their stay in Korea and are not
viewed as members of society.
Nevertheless, long-term undocumented migrant workers have become a part of
Korean society. By building communities and forming grassroots organizations, they
have gradually increased their presence in many localities and become acknowledged as
residents and members of local communities. Moreover, migrant advocacy organizations
have devoted themselves to facilitating the social integration of migrant workers by
providing basic social services to them and pressuring the government to enhance the

202
rights for them. Various local organizations and institutions, such as religious
organizations, schools, and hospitals, have embraced migrant workers as a part of their
communities as well. Recently, local governments that have been delegated the authority
to implement social integration programs by the national government began to include
undocumented migrant workers, although limited in scale and scope, while working with
local migrant advocacy organizations. Consequently, long-term undocumented migrant
workers in Korea have been incorporated into local communities and entitled to local
citizenship rights.
In this chapter, I present grounds for the argument that long-term migrant workers
are becoming local citizens and cities with considerable number of migrant population
are becoming the sites for challenging the national government’s notion of citizenship.
The main sites of my field research, that is, Anyang, Kunpo, and Ŭiwang, are used for
primary places for my argument, but other cities are also included as examples. First, I go
through how migrant workers have built their own communities and have become
members in local communities. Then I examine the role of local migrant advocacy
organization as well as other local organizations and institutions in helping migrant
workers achieve the rights as local citizens. I also look into the difference between the
national government and local governments in incorporating migrants into the Korean
society.

203
Community Formation by Migrant Workers

As ethnic minorities in a county with a strong sense of ethnically homogeneity, as
cultural outsiders in a society where language and culture are different from their own
and as a socio-economically marginalized group with limited resources and rights,
migrant workers in Korea have sought to build their own communities.
173
At first, with
the basic need to meet their own people in order to overcome isolation and share
information, migrant workers formed interpersonal networks. As they realized the need to
cope with their socio-economic disadvantages by themselves, they developed some of the
networks into formal organizations for self-help. Yet, in early days, places where they
could gather and interact with were limited in number and usually far from where they
lived.
However, the increased concentration of migrant workers in specific localities has
enabled them to enjoy social and organizational activities in their neighborhood while
building their communities. The community building by migrants, including establishing
ethnic businesses, setting up places of worship, and forming and/or strengthening their
grassroots organizations, has been proceeded with the support and involvement of local
Korean residents and organizations. Increased opportunities of social gathering and

173
Castles and Miller differentiate two forms of group that long-term migrants build in the receiving
country: ethnic communities and ethnic minorities. For them, migrants who are granted permanent
residence or citizenship and accepted as part of multicultural society form ethnic communities while those
who are denied the rights of settlement and citizenship are led to form ethnic minorities (Casteles and
Miller 2003: 33). According to them, what unskilled migrant workers in Korea have formed are ethnic
minorities, not ethnic communities. In this dissertation, however, I use the term “ethnic communities” or
“migrant communities” to refer to both informal and formal networks, organizations, and/or places that
migrant workers have formed and built to fulfill their social, cultural, and/or political needs regardless of
their residence status.

204
interaction among not only migrants but also with local Korean residents in their
neighborhood have enabled migrant communities to become a part of local communities.
In this section, I examine how migrant workers have built their communities and
formed their organizations. Various types of migrant organizations and their communities
are covered and the experiences of migrant workers engaged in them are discussed.

Gathering Places for Migrant Workers outside Their Neighborhoods
From the beginning of the emergence of migrant workers in Korea, they have
worked and lived in specific areas where manufacturing industries are concentrated. Yet,
in the earlier days, no ethnic communities were visible in those areas because migrant
workers were usually isolated in boarding houses provided by their companies with lack
of telecommunication access.
174
There were no ethnic stores, religious institutions, or
migrant advocacy organizations in their local communities. In order to meet friends,
exchange information, and socialize with each other, they needed to get out of their
localities and go to popular gathering places for foreigners in big cities, such as It’aew ŏn
at Seoul.
As briefly mentioned in chapter one, It’aew ŏn, the commercial area near Yongsan
Garrison (the US military base in Seoul), has been a place not only for American soldiers
but also for foreign visitors or sojourners in Korea with various ethnic backgrounds.
Owing to the constant presence of diverse ethnic groups, it was one of the few places

174
By the early 1990s, ethnic communities in Korea were located in a handful of areas across the country,
almost all of which were for Chinese or Japanese immigrants whose history of migration dated back to the
late 19
th
century.

205
where migrant workers could go around without getting a strange look from Korean
people. The variety of ethnic restaurants and grocery stores, religious institutions
including a Mosque and churches offering services in foreign languages, and job brokers
or currency dealers for foreigners also attracted migrant workers. Therefore, for early
comers, visiting It’aew ŏn on weekend to meet friends, get news and information, send
remittance back home, attend religious services, and buy ethnic foods and products was
almost a ritual. Raman described the weekend scene at It’aew ŏn in the early 1990s:
About fifteen years ago, we didn’t have anywhere to go but It’aew ŏn. On
weekends, hundreds or thousands of migrant workers gathered there. You know,
few people had a mobile phone or a PC (for internet access) back then, so they
couldn’t make an appointment or anything like that. But people knew that they
could meet their friends if they went to It’aew ŏn on Saturday nights. I myself also
went there almost every weekend. I met friends, had dinner in an Indian
restaurant, went to bars or nightclubs, and stayed all night hanging around. On
payday weekend, I exchanged my salary to dollars in It’aew ŏn so that I could
send money home. (Raman, Nepales, male, 35)

It’aew ŏn was especially popular among Muslim migrant workers from
Bangladesh or Pakistan, because the oldest and biggest Mosque in Korea was located
there, surrounded by Muslim restaurants and grocery stores. Roshan, who went directly
to the Mosque at It’aew ŏn as soon as he entered Korea for the first time in 1992, used to
be a regular visitor to It’aew ŏn:
When I first came to Korea, I went to It’aew ŏn almost every weekend to pray at
the Mosque. It [the Mosque] was very crowded because Muslims from all over
the country came there. Those who came from far away even sleep in the Mosque
on Saturday night. I also went to It’aew ŏn every time I wanted to eat a
hamburger, because no restaurants except those in It’aew ŏn sold halal burger at
that time. (Roshan, Bangladeshi, male, 38)

The growing number of Muslim migrant workers also influenced the scene of It’aew ŏn.
According to a newspaper article in 1997, more than five thousand Muslim migrants from

206
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia congregated in and around the Mosque at It’aew ŏn
to celebrate Eid ul-Fitr (the end of Ramadan festival). The number had drastically
increased compared to three or four years before when only a couple of hundred people
from the Middle East with a small number of Korean Muslims gathered for the festival.
The newspaper article also added that the police assisted the festival by assigning its
officers to direct traffic around the Mosque instead of arresting undocumented migrant
workers because it decided not to ruin the meaningful holiday for Muslims in Korea
(Han’gy ŏre 1997a). The expansion of Muslim attendants to the Mosque also led to the
increase of small businesses for Muslims as well as the establishment of weekend street
vendors around the Mosque.
Similarly, Tongdaemun, the famous wholesale fashion districts at Seoul, has been
a popular gathering place for migrant workers, especially those from Central Asia, such
as Uzbekistan or Mongolia. When Russian merchants came to Tongdaemun in search of
clothing products after the establishment of diplomatic relation between Korea and
Russia in 1990, they established small businesses for Russians including restaurants,
grocery stores, and bars. Due to the common language and culture, migrant workers from
Central Asia went to Tongdaemun to hang out. As the number of Mongolian migrant
workers and merchants visiting Tongdaemun increased, businesses exclusively targeting
Mongolians sprang up in the late 1990s and resulted in the formation of “Mongol

207
Town.”
175
Munkh, a Mongolian migrant worker who came to Korea in 1997, visited
Tongdaemun on the weekend when he was new in Korea:
In the late 1990s, there was no Mongolian restaurants or grocery stores in my
neighborhood at Kunpo. That’s why I often went to Mogol Town at Tongdaemun.
There were restaurants, bank branches, shipping companies, grocery stores, cell
phone stores, hair shops and everything. I went there to buy a calling card and
food, to send remittance back home and to meet friends and have dinner and
drinks with them. But I don’t go to Tongdaemun anymore. When I want to meet
friends and have some Mongolian food, I go to a Mongolian restaurant at Kunpo,
which opened about six years ago. (Munkh, Mongolian, Male, 41)

Places like It’aew ŏn or Tongdaemun were already established commercial and
shopping areas attracting foreign visitors and merchants long before large numbers of
migrant workers entered Korea. In other words, they were neither made for migrant
workers nor exclusively served migrant workers. Nevertheless, as shown in the growth of
small businesses for Muslim migrants or Mongolian migrants in those areas, they have
been also reshaped and transformed by the presence of migrant workers. Another
example of such places is Hyehwa-dong at Seoul.
Unlike It’aew ŏn or Tongdaemun, Hyehwa-dong was not a popular place for
foreigners at first. However, when Hyehwa-dong Catholic Church began offering
Tagalog mass on Sundays, it attracted Filipino migrant workers from Seoul and Ky ŏnggi
Province. At first, the gathering place for Filipino migrant workers was a Catholic church
at Chayang-dong, one of the traditional industrial areas in Seoul with a growing number
of migrant workers. As the church began to offer Tagalog mass for Filipino migrant
workers within its parish from 1990, Filipino migrants who lived outside its parish also

175
Although it is called “town,” it refers to a ten-story building in Tongdaemun with full of small
businesses for Mongolian migrant workers and merchants including restaurants, grocery stores, shipping
companies, and currency exchange stations (Tonga Ilbo 2007b).

208
congregated in Chayang-dong Catholic Church on Sundays.
176
However, the church was
too small to accommodate the growing number of Filipino mass attendants, thus the
Mission Society of the Philippines decided to provide a bigger space for Filipino
migrants and, with the support of the Archdiocese of Seoul, the Tagalog mass service was
moved to Hyehwa-dong Catholic Church in 1995 (Giovanni 2002). Several Catholic
churches in other Archdioceses

also began to provide mass service for Filipino migrants
(Yi 2003: 34-6).
177
Nadia, who began to go to Chayang-dong Catholic Church from
1992, experienced this change:
My first company in Korea [a textile factory at Suwon, Ky ŏnggi Province] was
located in a remote area and I was living in the dormitory inside the factory. I
always felt locked up. One day, one of my Filipina co-workers told me about the
Tagalog mass in Chayang-dong Church at Seoul. I really wanted to go there, so I
asked her to bring me with her. It took more than two hours to get there because
we had to transfer from a bus to intercity bus and then to a subway. But it was
worth it. It was really good to meet all those Filipino people. There were Korean
people who helped us, too. They gave us counseling and fought for our
legalization. Since then, I went there every Sunday. The church was full every
time. I think there were more than 500 people coming for the mass. I made a lot
of friends there and I even joined a choir. In 1995, the Tagalog mass service
moved to Hyehwa-dong church and most of people followed. But I didn’t,
because I decided to go to a church at Suwon that just began to offer English mass
for foreigners. (Nadia, Filipino, Female, 47)

Despite some loss of attendants like Nadia, Hyehwa-dong Catholic Church
became a new gathering place for Filipino migrants and soon attracted more than a
thousand of Filipino migrants every Sunday. Consequently, the area around the Hyehwa-
dong Catholic Church has been transformed into “Little Manila” although only on

176
As described in chapter two, the massive congregation of Filipino migrant workers at Chayangdong
Catholic Church initiated migrant advocacy activism mobilized by concerned citizens and civil society.
177
As of 2006, there are 17 Catholic churches offering either Tagalog or English mass for Filipino migrants
nationwide but Hyehwadong church accommodates the largest number of Filipino Catholics in Korea,
which is estimated to be 1,300 or more (Maeil Ky ŏngje 2006).

209
Sundays. Vendors selling all sorts of things, such as food, groceries, clothes, calling
cards, CDs and video tapes, and magazines and newspapers, began to gather along the
street from the Hyehwa-dong subway station to the church. Metro bank of the Philippines
set up a Sunday booth for those who wanted to send remittance back home. Some of the
restaurants serving Korean customers during weekdays started to open for Filipino
migrants on Sundays selling Filipino foods. As a result, those who came to Hyehwa-dong
Church could also enjoy eating home food and shopping while meeting friends and
socializing.
Places described above were not just for entertainment, consumption or religious
practices. They were also places where migrant workers could expand their interpersonal
networks. As migrant networks intermingled and interacted in those places, more formal
grassroots migrant organizations began to form. The experience of Raman shows how the
congregation of migrant workers in popular gathering places offered an opportunity for
them to expand their interpersonal networks and to form their own organizations:
In one of those days when I was a regular visitor to It’aew ŏn, I made a lot of
friends. At first, I only hung around the friends from my hometown with whom I
had worked in Hong Kong as a merchant. But after a while, I came to know other
Nepalese people who were the friends of my friends and then their friends, and so
on. Some of them were Buddhists like me, so we sometimes went to famous
temples around the country both for praying and for sightseeing. There we found
out that most of the tourist guidance signs in those temples said that Buddha was
Indian. But it was not true. Buddha was born in Nepal and he got Nepalese family
name. We thought that we had to do something to inform Korean people of the
truth. That’s why we formed the NBF (Nepalese Buddhist Family). The Mercy
House of the Buddhist Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice rent us one of
their office rooms for free.
178
Although we started as a religious organization, we

178
The NBF was formed in 1994, not long after the first sit-in protest by migrant workers held at the
headquarter of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) in Seoul. During the 29-day long sit-in,
the Buddhist Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, a member organization of the CCEJ, provided free

210
have also helped our members when they encounter problems, like
unemployment, industrial accident, or illness.

Similarly, Hyehwa-dong, and previously Chayang-dong, too, provided a platform
for Filipino migrant workers to form organizations. For example, the first publicly known
Filipino migrants’ organization, the Filipino Community, was formed in 1992 by those
who congregated in Chayan-dong Catholic Church for Sunday Tagalog Mass. The
organization was dissolved within a month under pressure from the Korean government,
which was afraid of its developing into an ethnic ghetto. Its members reorganized soon
afterwards, founding another organization called “Sampaguita Philippines Community”
with the support of the Catholic Church. After the Tagalog mass service was moved to
Hyehwa-dong church, a new organization called “Hyehwadong Filipino Catholic
Community” was formed (Yi 2003: 34-6). These organizations have basically
emphasized religious activities, but they also have tried to promote mutual friendship and
provide assistance for fellow migrant workers.
179

These early migrant gathering places enabled migrant workers in Korea to
maintain and expand their interpersonal networks, some of which later developed to
grassroots migrant organizations. However, geographical distance from their living
places as well as the fear of immigration patrols discouraged many long-term
undocumented migrants from visiting those places. Besides, as shown in the story of
Munkh or Nadia, migrant workers gradually were able to find gathering places in or near

lunch for the protestors. Since then Buddhism in Korea have been involved in migrant rights advocacy
movement.
179
For example, the activities of both “Sampaguita Philippines Community” and “Hyehwadong Filipino
Catholic Community” included operating sports and leisure programs, publishing newsletter, offering labor
counseling and providing mutual aid for their members.

211
their neighborhoods, such as ethnic stores and restaurants, religious institutions and other
various local organizations. The establishment of those places in a locality where a large
number of migrants worked and lived also encouraged migrant workers to become a part
of local communities while building their own community.

Migrant Communities
As mentioned before, migrant workers in Korea usually live in urban areas where
manufacturing industries are located. Yet, until recently, before the Korean government
began to pay attention to the integration of and/or the support for migrants, no statistical
data on the migrant population at a local level has been available.
180
Since 2006, the
Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs has collected and published
population data of all registered foreign residents including migrant workers, migrant
spouses and their bi-racial children, and others like business people, international
students, or professional workers in every municipality in Korea.
181
According to the
data, the majority of foreign residents live in Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA), that is,
Seoul City, Ky ŏnggi Province, and Inch ŏn City. The population concentration in the
SMA has been a traditional phenomenon for Korea and has accelerated since its

180
Prior to the nationwide survey, there was a report published by Gyeonggi Research Institute in 2006.
Based on the data provided by the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Justice, it estimates that 44 percent
of all migrant workers (146,783 out of 332,653 as of August 2005, including undocumented migrants) in
Korea live in Ky ŏnggi Province. Particularly, according to its estimation, more than 50 percent of all
migrants in Ky ŏnggi Province are concentrated in eight cities out of 31 cities and towns within the Province
(Sin and Kim 2006: 30).
181
Although the Ministry claims that the data include undocumented migrants, it has not collected them
separately and the number is based on the estimation provided by local migrant advocacy organizations,
thus cannot be said to be accurate. Yet, the data are the best we have that represent the distribution of
migrant population in Korea.

212
industrialization. Yet, the degree of the population concentration is higher for foreign
residents in general and migrant workers in particular (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Foreign Residents in Seoul Metropolitan Area, 2006 – 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009
All Foreign Residents Number 536,627 722,686 891,341 1,106,884
Proportion
1)
(%) 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2
Migrant Workers Number 255,314 259,805 437,727 575,657
Proportion
2)
(%) 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.4
All Foreigners Residing in SMA (%) 65.6 64.4 65.9 65.1
All Koreans Residing in SMA (%) 48.1 48.5 48.7 48.9
Migrant Workers Residing in SMA (%) 70.3 65.4 71.2 70.9
Korean Workers Residing in SMA (%) 48.8 49.2 49.5 49.7

Note: 1) The proportion of all foreign residents to Korean population
2) The proportion of migrant workers to economically active Korean population
with the age of over 15
Source: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs. Survey of Foreign Residents,
each year. National Statistical Office. Survey of Economically Active Population, each
year.

Furthermore, migrant workers are concentrated in several municipalities within
the SMA that are home for multiple manufacturing industries. The 2008 survey data
reveal that majority of migrant workers reside in only 18 out of total 232 municipalities
in Korea, many of which are well known for their industrial complex. For example, over
four percent of migrant workers (17,909 persons) reside in Kuro-gu at Seoul, which has
been famous for Kuro Industrial Complex designed in the late 1960 as the first industrial
complex in Korea. Also, almost six percent of them (26,349 persons) live in Ansan City
at Ky ŏnggi Province, which developed as a satellite city in the late 1970s to decentralize

213
manufacturing industries in Seoul with two large industrial complexes called Panw ŏl and
Sihwa.
The residential areas adjacent to industrial complexes in many municipalities,
originally occupied by young Korean workers in the 1970s and 1980s, have experienced
a decline of population due to the changes in industrial structure and labor market
structure described in the first chapter. Yet, migrant workers gradually filled the
vacancies left by Korean workers during the 1990s as they have looked for a place to stay
that is close to work and cheap to rent.
182
Consequently, the local economies have been
revitalized (Pak and Ch ŏng 2004, Yi 2005, Chang 2006, Cho 2006). For example,
according to Pak and Ch ŏng (2004), W ŏn’gok-dong in Ansan City regained its
population in the 1990s as migrants working in nearby industrial complexes rushed in,
which resulted in the revival of the housing market and small businesses in the area.
Besides the old multiplex houses called “beehives,” dormitory-like apartment buildings
have been built to accommodate the growing number of migrant workers, employment
agencies for migrant workers seeking day labor as well as short- or long-term irregular
work have sprung up, and grocery stores, restaurants, and places of entertainment have
been either transformed to cater to these new clients or newly established targeting them,
all of which have intensified the concentration of migrant workers to the area.
In addition to the revitalization of local economy, the concentration of migrant
workers in specific locations has led to the formation of migrant communities in those

182
The residential areas near industrial complexes were usually comprised of the houses called “p ŏlchip
(beehive).” They were named such because they had a lot of tiny rooms partitioned by thin panels for
several tens of tenants but were always overcrowded by factory workers seeking for cheap rent.

214
areas. Castles and Davidson (2000: 130) mention a number of interlinked processes
involved in community formation. At first, there is an individual or family level “home-
building” process, which may be extended into the more collective activity of “place-
making.” More or less simultaneously, there are processes including the development of
ethnic economic infrastructures, the setting up of religious institutions and various types
of association, and the emergence of group-specific forms of political mobilization.
Although varying in degree, those processes have been carried out in the specific
neighborhoods of the municipalities in Korea with a relatively large number of migrant
workers.
“Home-building” can be defined as “the building of a feeling of being at home”
by, for example, using native language, cooking and eating ethnic food and decorating
the home in traditional ways in the search of security and familiarity (Hage 1997). Yet,
the practice of home-building by migrants often goes beyond the boundary of the private
sphere through its spatial extension as a result of ethnic clustering. This process, also
referred to “place-making,” brings about cultural changes to their neighborhood through
signs on shops and restaurants, ethnic markets and a different use of public space (Castles
and Davidson (2000: 131).
183
In his study on the settlement of Italian migrants, Pascoe
(1992) describes their place-making processes in Australia as involving three sets of
strategies, that is, naming, rituals and institutions. Naming is the practice of giving
homeland names to places in the new country or putting business signs in homeland
languages. Rituals include public events or festivals to affirm the belonging and the

183
Place-making by migrants through using public space differently is well illustrated in Yeoh and Huang’s
study on Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong (1998).

215
cohesion of migrants. Institutions refer to welfare associations, sporting and other clubs,
churches, revolving credit associations and so on that both demonstrate the presence of a
community and provide the services it needs.
In the newly emerged migrant communities in Korea, the practice of place-
making described by Pascoe as well as other processes of the community formation, such
as the establishment of ethnic businesses, religious institutions and various types of
organizations for migrants have taken place, although they have not been exclusively
initiated by migrants. The involvement of Koreans in migrant community building,
especially in the early stages, has been inevitable to some degree because migrant
workers in Korea had neither the financial resources nor stable legal status. For example,
ethnic businesses owned and run by migrants in migrant communities are still small
compared to those of Koreans not only in number but also in size.
184
Mariam, a Filipina
migrant wife who had longed to have her own business, experienced difficulties in
starting her business due to the financial constraints:
Since I came to Korea, I’ve always wanted to have my own business, like a small
grocery store like this. But my husband and my parents-in-law were not
supportive. They told me that I should work and earn money by myself if I
wanted to open a store. So when my second son turned three years old, I began to
work in a factory. After two years of working there, I was able to start my
business. But at fisrt, I just sold goods at home. I bought calling cards, videotapes,
music CDs and some can foods at Hyehwa-dong street market on Sundays, laid
them on the shelves in my living room, and sold them with a small profit to my
friends and neighbors who didn’t have time or were afraid to go to Hyehwa-dong
by themselves. My parents-in-law got angry with me and told me not to turn the
house into a store. In the Philippines, you can do whatever you want if you have a

184
According to a study on ethnic businesses in W ŏn’gok-dong, Ansan City, only 45 out of more than 400
small businesses catering to migrants, such as grocery stores, restaurants, karaoke bars, video shops, travel
agencies, mobile phone stores and so on, are registered under foreign owners, although it is assumed that
more businesses are actually run by migrants considering the cases of using others’ name for business
registration or being owned by naturalized citizens (Chang 2006).

216
house. If you want to sell things, you stack them in your house and then tell your
friends to come and buy. I learned that from my experiences in the Philippines. So
I thought it would be okay to do the same here. But they [the parents-in-law]
scolded me every time they saw me, so I had to close my home store.

There had been a Filipino grocery store here in Kunpo since 2002, which had
been owned by a Korean man. But he passed away in 2006 and his son took it
over. One day, I had a chance to talk to the son, the new owner. When I told him
that I was also interested in running a Filipino grocery store, he said to me that he
was thinking of closing the store because he was not good at managing it, so if I
wanted to, I could take it over. I accepted his offer. He first asked me 20 million
won [about 20,000 USD] as a premium, but when I told him that I didn’t have that
much money, he cut it down to 8 million won. That’s how I was able to take over
and began to run this store. Officially, the store is still under his name, but I am
the one who is running it. I pay him monthly rent, and that’s it.

I am still working in a factory, so the store is not open all day. I open the store at
7:00 am and then close it at 8:00 am to go to work. I put a sign on the door saying
what time it will be open again and leave my cell phone number. On days when
new products come in or when I get a call from a customer, I come here during
lunchtime. Otherwise, I just reopen the store around 8:30 pm and close around
10:00 pm. On Saturday, the work at the factory ends earlier, so I reopen at 6:00
pm. Saturday night is the busiest time. The customers do not just buy things and
leave but stay for a drink and hang out with their friends in that small, attached
kitchen. So I stay open as long as there are customers. On Sunday, I open from
10:00 am till midnight. All of my customers are migrants living in this
neighborhood, mostly Filipinos but some Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. They
know me and they know the schedule (of business hours), so closing during the
day is not a problem. Besides, most of them are factory workers like me, so they
can’t come during the day anyway. (Mariam, Filipino, female, 34)

In addition, unlike Korean-owned ethnic businesses, migrant-owned ones do not
always have signs in foreign languages, which often makes them unnoticeable by
outsiders. Keeping old signs or not putting signs in their own languages are one of the
strategic decisions that migrant ethnic business owners have made to protect their
undocumented customers. Yet, just like Mariam’s store, they still attract migrants in the
neighborhood regardless of their irregular opening hours or lack of signs, since they
provide their customers with a place for gathering and sharing that is free from prejudice

217
or judgement by mainstream society. Furthermore, migrant-owned ethnic businesses are
often used as a place to cultivate self-help among migrants within the community.
Huong, who has been running a small Vietnamese grocery store in Anyang, compared her
store with a nearby store owned by a Korean:
When I opened my store in 1998, it was the only place where Vietnamese
migrants could come and buy home food or calling cards in this neighborhood.
Although it was a small store attached my home and I didn’t put a sign outside,
every Vietnamese around the area knew about my store. Sometimes, migrants
from other countries like Thailand or Indonesia also came here for shopping. But
a few years ago, another store for migrants was opened a few blocks from here.
The owner is Korean. It is bigger than my store, has a big sign saying “Asia
Market” and has variety of goods from different countries. Those who came to
Korea recently, so have visa and don’t know about my store, go there. But
Vietnamese, especially, who are illegal and have lived here a long time still come
to my store. They say that it’s not fun to go there because they cannot spend time
there like in my store. And they also say that they don’t like the owner because he
doesn’t use the honorific language to them.
185
Here in my store, they can come
anytime they want even if they have nothing to buy. They just sit here with me
and talk about everything. If some bad news comes up, like someone is sick or
having trouble at work, we think together how to help her. Sometimes we decide
to put a donation box in my store, other times we decide to ask for a help from the
Center [Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center]. (Huong, Vietnamese, female, 34)

However, migrants and local Koreans tend to be more cooperative than
competitive in the process of migrant community building. One of the notable examples
of this cooperation is the establishment of religious institutions for migrants, which is
another important step toward migrant community building. In many cases, already
established local religious institutions have opened their door to migrants in their
neighborhood as illustrated in the case of Chayang-dong Catholic Church at Seoul. In

185
In Korea, people generally use honorifics to someone who is superior in status or older in age. Also, if
the person is a stranger or a customer, you are supposed to use honorifics even if she or he is younger than
you. Yet, many of my migrant interviewees said that Koreans usually did not use the honorific language to
them even when they were a customer in a store or in a restaurant and pointed out that as one of the
unpleasant experiences that they had in Korea.

218
Anyang and Kunpo city, too, many Protestant churches began to provide separate worship
services for different migrant groups as early as the late 1990s. For example, a
Presbyterian church in Anyang set up five missionary ministries for migrants from China,
Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines that have provided Sunday worship
services, seasonal retreat programs and other religious activities for each migrant group.
Yet, the church is more than a place to practice religion for its migrant members who find
a sense of belonging, safety and comfort there, which strengthens bonds and creates a
feeling of being home with their fellow compatriots. Adya, who even got her job from the
church, expressed her feelings as a member of the church as follows:
Before I work here, I used to work at a laundry factory and then at a garment
factory in Anyang. I could stand hard work but constant immigration raids on
nearby factories made me nervous. So I quit the factory job and got a new job in a
motel as a cleaning lady. They provided me a room to stay but I had to work from
nine o’clock in the morning till one o’clock in the next morning. I was exhausted
everyday and I couldn’t go to church on Sunday. One day, a deacon from our
church called me and said there was a job for me. That’s how I started this janitor
job at the church’s community center. The work starts at nine in the morning and
ends at six in the evening, so it’s much easier. People [Korean co-workers] are
friendlier and nicer to me. No one look at me differently because I am a foreigner.
Everyone treats me with respect. Maybe that’s because they are all believers. I am
really grateful for the church to let me work here. There are five more Mongolians
working here with me.

But that’s not all I like about being a part of the church. The church tries to help
us in various ways. When some of us get sick or injured, the church help us get
medical treatment. Sometimes we would like to go on a trip or something like that
together, but we are afraid because many of us don’t have a visa. Then the church
provides us transportation and a safe place to rest in one of its facilities. Also,
many of us have been here for a long time and haven’t visited home since we got
here. So whenever missionaries from the church visit Mongolia, they contact our
families, deliver gifts from us, take pictures and videos of our families and bring
them to us. We feel welcomed, protected and cared for in the church. (Adya,
Mongolian, female, 41)

219
In other cases, local religious institutions have encouraged migrants to set up their
own place of worship. For example, a Korean Muslim founded a small Mosque in
Anyang in 1992. As it attracted more and more migrants of the Islamic religion from
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia from Anyang but and other nearby cities, the
founder of the Mosque let Muslim migrants take it over. They later made a united effort
to extend the Mosque. In 1998, they finally were able to add one more story to the
building (Han’gy ŏre 21 2004). Now the Anyang Mosque has an Imam sent from
Bangladesh and represents the center of Muslim community around the area.
186

Unlike the Anyang Mosque, places of worship established by migrants are usually
modest and often invisible. Small prayer-rooms for Muslim migrants or chapels for
Catholic migrants have often been set up in individuals’ homes or business premises. Yet,
in one way or another, they are supported by local religious institutions as well. For
example, the Diocese of Suwon has sent a priest to the basement of a Filipino grocery
store at Ŭiwang, an adjacent city to Anyang and Kunpo, to provide monthly mass service
to local Filipino migrants. Once a month, the basement of the store, which is normally
used as a dining and drinking place for its customers, is transformed into a mass chapel.
When I visited the place on a Saturday night right before the monthly mass began, people
were busy putting away tables, mopping the floor and rearranging chairs. Although the
area of the basement was less than 250 square feet, almost 50 migrants including children
were there to attend the mass. Emily, one of the regular attendants of the mass service at

186
According to my participant observation, migrants go to the Anyang Mosque not just to practice their
religion and maintain their identity but also to turn to in times of trouble. For example, when a migrant
worker experiences abuse at work or loses his job, he go to the Mosque to ask for help. Then the Imam
and/or the old members of the Mosque help him to solve the problem by either referring him to the Anyang
Migrant Workers’ Center or providing a shelter for him.

220
the store, explains why Filipinos prefer to have their own mass in their own place
however humble the place is:
When I attended mass at Lily’s store [the Filipino store at Ŭiwang hosting
monthly mass service] last Saturday, there was a journalist from the Py ŏnghwa
Sinmun [a Catholic newspaper in Korea] and I had an interview with her after the
mass. She asked me how we could have mass in such a filthy place. What kind of
question was that? Does it matter where we have mass? That was ridiculous.
People come there are mostly illegal and cannot go to Hyehwa-dong or Suwon.
We have mass at Lily’s store not because it is big and clean but because people
feel safer and more comfortable there.

Frankly, there are some people who just come there to enjoy the after-mass
reception. Many, especially men, just stay for drinking or playing poker after the
place turns from a chapel to a bar again. I once heard from my friend that her
husband lost his one-month salary in the poker game after mass. Of course, I
don’t like that, but if they really have to do, I think it’s better for them to do at the
Filipino store. If they drank, gambled and fought elsewhere, what would Koreans
think about us, Filipinos? (Emily, Filipino, Female, 34)

As shown in the Huong’s Vietnamese grocery store or Lily’s basement chapel,
migrants’ place-making within their neighborhood is often carried out invisibly to
outsiders to ensure their safety and protection. Yet, another important process of migrant
community building, that is, the establishment of local migrant advocacy organizations
and grassroots migrant organizations, has taken places in a more visible way and has
clearly demonstrated the emergence and the development of migrant communities in
Korea.

Migrant Advocacy Organizations as Sanctuaries
One of the results of the concentration of migrant workers in specific localities
was the establishment of migrant advocacy organizations in those areas. Religious
organizations, labor organizations, or concerned citizens’ groups that had been originally

221
established to support local Korean workers by providing labor-related legal counseling
and education programs began to encounter new faces in the early 1990s when migrant
workers came to seek help after hearing their reputation for helping workers in trouble.
At first, they just offered free consultation to individual migrant workers who brought
legal or medical problems to them and helped to solve those problems within their
capacity. As they had more and more migrant visitors wanted help and as they realized
the need for a specific approach to provide proper assistance, they set up migrant
advocacy organizations, usually in the form of counseling centers, either under their
organizations or separately.
187
Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center, my fieldwork site, was
established through this process:
Our center [Jeon Jin Sang Welfare Center] was established in 1969 as a workers’
hall with the funding from an international Catholic laity group called AFI
(Association Fraternelle Internationale). It was the time when Anyang was going
through modern industrialization and thousands of young girls and boys from
rural areas rushed in to become factory workers. For almost twenty years, the
center had provided accommodation and education for those young factory
workers and had played an important role in the labor rights movement in Anyang
area by offering consciousness raising programs and labor counseling. But the
number of factory workers dropped throughout the 1980s and the center was
challenged to change its role in the community from the late 1980s. It was when I
joined the center and found out that migrant workers were replacing those young
Korean factory workers in manufacturing industries here and were facing the
same old problems that their predecessors had. Around the same time, migrants
working in nearby factories began to come to our center to ask for help. With the
request from the Counseling Center for Foreign Workers under the Archdiocese
of Seoul, we started to provide counseling service for migrant workers from 1993.
Four years later, when we reorganized our center, we set up a separate
organization dedicated to various programs exclusively for migrant workers and
named it “Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center.” (Ms. Lee, the former director of
Jeon Jin Sang Welfare Center)

187
In case of religious organizations, the process was often supported and sometimes even carried out by
high-level institutions. How Catholic Church and Protestant Church involved in the establishment of local
migrant advocacy organizations is described in chapter 2.

222
In addition to providing labor- or health-related counseling, local migrant
advocacy also offered various education programs for local migrants. One of the most
popular programs was Korean language education because language was considered as a
powerful tool for migrant workers to survive and to claim their rights in Korean society.
Besides the language education, education on labor laws regarding workers’ rights, social
provisions available migrants, and sexual harassment and violence prevention were also
provided on an irregular basis. As mentioned in Chapter 3, they occasionally conducted
empowerment or leadership training for migrant workers, too.
The establishment of local migrant advocacy organizations has continued since
the mid-1990s and virtually all localities with a relatively large number of migrants came
to have them by the early 2000s. The number of migrant advocacy organizations reached
almost 150 as of 2003 (S ŏl 2003) and according to the 2009 Survey of Foreign Residents
in municipalities, conducted by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home
Affairs, there are more than 400 non-governmental organizations provide services and/or
programs for migrants either taking the form of migrant advocacy organizations or
merely having some programs for migrants. It also reveals that 131 out of total 232
municipalities in Korea have those kinds of NGOs. As described in previous chapters,
local migrant advocacy organizations soon discovered that many of the problems that
migrant workers faced were structurally rooted, therefore required changes not only in
government policies but also in society at large. Consequently, they began to be involved
in political activism, fighting for migrants’ rights and demanding the improvement of

223
government’s policies on migrants while working together through networking and
forming coalitions.
At first, the Korean government attempted to restrain migrant advocacy
organizations from becoming involved in the political activism for migrant workers. In
June 1996, in the midst of the signature campaign for the enactment of new labor
migration system proposed by the JCMK (Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in
Korea), an immigration raid was conducted in a migrant advocacy organization called
“Sungnam Migrant Workers’ House,” whose director was a pastor and the president of
the JCMK. While immigration officials were trying to apprehend a Nepalese
undocumented migrant couple inside the House, the director and staffs intervened and
then were arrested for obstruction of justice. Right after the incident, the JCMK, the
National Council of Churches in Korea, the KCTU, and other civil society groups and
religious organizations formed a Joint Action Committee and strongly criticized the
government for suppressing migrant workers’ human rights movement. Amnesty
International and other international organizations, especially Christian-based ones, also
sent letters to the Minister of Justice expressing their concerns and requesting the release
of the arrested. Upon the demand from both domestic and international organizations that
the Korean government should observe democratic practice by letting civic organizations
to do their work, the Ministry of Justice finally announced that it would not make
immigration raids on migrant advocacy organizations, religious organizations and other
human rights organizations (Kungmin Ilbo 1996, Moon 2000: 153-4).

224
After this incident, local migrant advocacy organizations became sanctuaries for
migrant workers. Migrant workers visited there not only to get counseling or education,
but also to socialize and interact with each other without fear of immigration raids.
Accordingly, local migrant advocacy organizations came to serve as bases for grassroots
migrant organizations and helped them to be rooted in local communities.

The Formation of Grassroots Migrant Organizations
For many migration scholars, the formation of migrant organizations has been
understood as something that would happen in the later stages of migration process as
migrants settle down in a new country (Castles and Miller 2003: 32). Yet, as early as the
late 1980s, not long after the flow of labor migration to Korea started, migrant workers in
Korea began to form their own organizations.
188
As mentioned previously, the early
grassroots migrant organizations were formed through the interaction among migrant’s
interpersonal networks in some of the popular gathering places. Also, as shown in the
case of the Nepalese Buddhist Family or the Filipino Catholic Community, they were
often based on religious centers since it allowed migrants to express and maintain their
culture and identity in a new society while guaranteeing support and protection at the
same time. Yet, the establishment and increase of various amenities and organizations for
migrants in migrant-concentrated local areas, such as ethnic stores or restaurants,
religious institutions, and migrant advocacy organizations, have enabled grassroots

188
According to the history of KASAMMAKO (Katipunan ng mga Samahan ng Migranteng Manggagawa
sa Korea, The Unity of Filipino Migrant Workers Associations in Korea), Filipino migrants already had
several organizations of their own as early as 1987 and tried to set up an alliance to support each other and
collaborate together (KASAMMAKO 2008).

225
migrant organizations to have a regular meeting place or their own office in those areas,
which has led them to be based on and work together with their local community. The
formation of grassroots migrant organizations has continued throughout the 1990s and
the 2000s. Many of these organizations have worked with Korean civil society groups,
labor unions, and migrant advocacy organizations on various issues.
189, 190

Just like migrants elsewhere, migrants in Korea have formed organizations to
create, express, and maintain a collective identity as ethnic minorities and cultural
outsiders in the host society (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Besides, their status as
socio-economically marginalized workers with limited social rights has pushed them to
build a system for mutual aid and collective action. Most of the grassroots organizations
have been formed by those who are from same country whether they are based on
religion, community of origin, or political orientation, and the size of them varies from
several tens to hundreds of participants depending on whether they are locally based ones
or nationwide ones.
The grassroots migrant organizations share several common characteristics: First,
they are organized for self-help or mutual aid. With a monthly membership fee from
5,000 to 10,000 won (about 5 to 10 USD), migrant organizations help their members in
case of emergency, such as industrial accident, illness or unemployment. Since most

189
One of the earliest examples of the collaboration occurred in 1995 when grassroots migrant
organizations of six different countries, including Bangladesh Association, Filipino Community, Nepalese
Consulting Committee, Sri Lankan Association, Chinese Workers’ Association and Myanmar Association,
set up sisterhood ties with Korean trade unions to secure their rights as workers (S ŏl 1998: 264-270, J Kim
2003: 258).
190
Although there are no data available on the number of grassroots migrant organizations in Korea, many
migrants in my interview said that there were so many organizations that they did not even know the exact
number. For example, according to my interviewees, there are more than 50 Nepalese migrant
organizations representing over 5,000 Nepalese migrant workers in Korea.

226
migrants work in low-paid jobs with few benefits, their organizations provide financial
aid like insurance for them. Also, when one of the members is arrested and deported by
the Immigration Service but has no money to buy a plane ticket home, the organization
helps him or her out. It explains why undocumented migrants are more likely to join in
migrant organizations than documented ones, as Tony explained:
We have a Filipino association here in Kunpo called KUPAS (Kunpo Unlimited
Philipino Association). There were 26 members when I was a secretary, but I
don’t know how many now. Must be around thirty something. We built the
association to help illegals like me. If there’s a problem to any member, like
hospitalization, he reports it to one of the board members. Then we make
solicitation for him, for financial help. We don’t have health insurance like legals.
So it’s important for us to have this kind of association. (Tony, Filipino, male, 32)

In many cases, these locally based grassroots migrant organizations maintain close
relationships with migrant advocacy organizations in their neighborhood in order to get
more professional assistance when their members face problems beyond their capacity,
such as labor disputes or workplace injuries.
Second, grassroots migrant organizations promote cohesion and solidarity among
migrants while expressing and maintaining their identity. They celebrate their holidays,
organize festivals or events and have sports games, often with the support of local
migrant advocacy organizations or religious institutions.
191
For example, Bangladeshi
migrant organizations celebrate Eid ul-Fitr and Nepalese organizations celebrate Dashain
(15-day harvest festival celebrated in Nepal based on Hindu tradition). Many migrant
organizations host concerts during Korean holidays by inviting singers and dancers from
their home country to cheer up fellow migrant workers who cannot enjoy the holidays

191
How grassroots migrant organizations and local institutions work together to organize cultural events is
discussed in the next part of this chapter.

227
with their families like fellow Koreans.
192
Indonesian migrant organizations arrange
soccer tournaments while Filipino organizations arrange basketball tournaments, both of
which are the most popular sports games in each country. Through these various cultural
events, grassroots migrant organizations not only alleviate feelings of homesickness but
also foster cohesion among participating members and build a feeling of being at
home.
193
For migrant workers, these cultural events are a big part of their lives in Korea:
Last Chus ŏk [Korean Thanksgiving], our organization (Gurung Family) hosted a
concert in Dongguk University Auditorium. We invited singers, dancers, and
comedians from Nepal with the help of Anyang Migrant Center. I even quit my
job to prepare the concert. (laugh) Having concerts or celebrating Dashain is
really important for us. Because it is when all the Nepalese in Korea can get
together reminiscing about home while forgetting about all the hardships we are
experiencing here. Also, proceeds of those events can help Nepalese migrants
who are sick or injured as well as people in need back home. (Shankar, Nepalese,
male, 38)

Third, grassroots migrant organizations are often transnational, that is, maintain
their relationships with their home country by conducting economic, political, or cultural
initiatives.
194
For some organizations, the transnational activities are only one-time things
in case of emergency. For example, when the tsunami struck South Asia in 2005, a Sri
Lankan migrant organization in Ansan collected donations from Sri Lankan migrants in
Korea to help the victims in their home country (Han’gy ŏre 2005). Yet, for many other
organizations, helping their home country is included as one of their ordinary activities.

192
Since grassroots migrant organizations cannot sponsor visa for them, they often ask migrant advocacy
organizations or religious institutions that they associate with to sponsor visa.
193
These efforts are what Pascoe (1992) describe as “rituals,” one of the practices for “place-making” by
migrants.
194
Portes defines transnational activities as “those that take place on a recurrent basis across national
borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants,” which include
economic, political, cultural and religious initiatives either by powerful actors, such as national
governments and multinational corporations or by immigrants and their home country counterparts (Portes
1999: 464).

228
Through various fund raising events, they send money back home for the development of
their hometown. A Nepalese migrant organization formed by those who are from the
same village is one of them:
My hometown in Nepal was very poor and remote village that there were no
paved roads. So our organization decided to raise money to send to our hometown
so that they can build some roads. Not only us in Korea, but also other Nepalese
migrants from our village working in other countries have also decided to help the
project. We [Nepalese migrants] believe that helping the people in our country is
one of our duties. I know that the ticket proceeds from the last Dashain festival
were also sent to Nepal to build a school for children. (Raman, Nepalese, male,
35)

The organizational activities of migrants have aroused their collective
consciousness as an economically, socially, and culturally marginalized group. Also, the
interaction with civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations has encouraged
them to form more politically oriented and/or socially conscious grassroots organizations,
whose scope of the activities range from supporting the struggle of people in their home
country for freedom and democracy to fighting for their own rights and welfare as
migrant workers in Korea.
For example, Burmese migrants formed an organization called the Democratic
Friends of Burma in Korea in 1998, which soon was transformed to the National League
for Democracy – Liberated Area (NLD-LA), Korea branch in 1999.
195
With the support
of other civil society groups in Korea, they have organized regular demonstrations in

195
The National League for Democracy (NLD) is a Burmese political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. It
failed to take the power despite the winning of the parliamentary elections in 1990 due to the suppression
by the existing military government. Consequently, those who supported the NLD founded the National
League for Democracy – Liberated Area (NLD-LA) in the Tahi-Burma border areas and have demanded
the military government give freedom and democracy for Burmese people. Later, Migrants from Myanmar
(Burma) founded the branches of NLD-LA in six different countries including Korea. For more
information, see the NLD-LA website at www.nldla.net.

229
front of the Myanmar Embassy at Seoul, led street campaigns to raise public awareness
about the political situations in Myanmar, published a newsletter for migrant workers
from Myanmar, and held discussion meetings with Korean activists from various non-
governmental organizations. Because of their political position against their current
government, the members of the NLD-LA Korea, all of whom were undocumented
migrants, applied for refugee status out of the fear of political persecution in case of
arrest and deportation, which opened a whole new dimension of migration and human
rights in Korea.
196
After members were granted refugee status, the NLD-LA Korea
escalated their political struggle against the authoritarian government of Myanmar.
While Burmese migrant organizations have mainly put their emphasis on the
freedom and democracy of the people in their own country, Filipino migrant
organizations have fought for the human rights of not only those who are at home but
also those who are in Korea. For example, in 1998, an alliance of five existing Filipino
organizations, called KASAMMAKO (Katipunan ng mga Samahan ng Migranteng
Manggagawa sa Korea, The Unity of Filipino Migrant Workers Associations in Korea)

196
In 2000, the leader of the NLD-LA Korea was arrested by the Immigration Service and faced forcible
deportation. With the support of 14 civil society groups including Minbyun (Lawyers for Democratic
Society), he applied for refugee status in the detention center and was released. After the incident, all 21
members of the NLD-LA Korea decided to apply for refugee status. Although Korean government ratified
the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1992 and began to accept application from 1994,
no one had been approved as a refugee by 2000. The NLD-LA Korea, the civil society groups in Korea as
well as international organizations including UNHCR demanded the Korean government to implement the
ratified refugee convention. Upon the pressure from both domestic and international organizations, out of
more than a hundred of applicants, the Ministry of Justice gave refugee status to an Ethiopian asylum
seeker in 2001 for the first time in seven years. Among the members of the NLD-LA Korea, three people
were approved in 2003 and four were approved in 2005. Except those who had already left for the third
country, nine members who were denied in 2005 appealed to the Seoul High Court and then to the Supreme
Court, and were finally approved as refugees in September 2008. As of May 2008, there are 1,951 refugee
applicants in Korea, but only 76 had been granted refugee status and 55 were given humanitarian status.
(Minbyun et al. 2004, C Kim et al. 2008).

230
was founded.
197
The organizations decided to work together with the goal to organize and
mobilize Filipino migrants in Korea to improve their rights and welfare in Korea while
raising political consciousness to support and participate in the struggle of Filipinos at
home for freedom and democracy. Betty, who joined one of the member organization
under the KASAMMAKO banner and is a treasurer of the KASAMMAKO, explained
their activities like this:
I first joined in the Southern Tagalog Organization (STO) when I saw its one-year
anniversary celebration advertisement in the newsletter at Hyehwa-dong Catholic
Church. It was a very active and progressive organization fighting for the
migrant’s rights. There were more than two hundreds members in the STO and we
could get help from the organization when we didn’t get paid or experienced
human rights abuses like violence at work. Since it was a member organization of
the KASAMMAKO, we also worked on broader issues like the expansion of the
labor rights for migrant workers and legalization of undocumented migrants. The
STO got a little bit inactive after its president was arrested and deported, so I
moved to WeMove (Women on the Move), which was another organization under
the KASAMMAKO.

It may sound a little bit too big, but the main goal of the KASAMMAKO is to
make a society where families do not have to be torn apart in order to survive and
people have equal opportunity to live a humane life. That’s why we think not only
our situations in Korea as migrant workers but also the economic and political
situations in the Philippines should be improved. When there’s something to
condemn about political situations in the Philippines, we organize a rally in front
of the Philippines Embassy in Seoul. We’ve also had demonstrations and sit-in
struggles a lot to demand the Korean government to abolish the trainee system
and to legalize undocumented migrants. We’ve worked together with the MTU
(Migrants Trade Union), the KCTU (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions), and
Minbyun for those causes. (Betty, Filipino, Female, 32)

The most radical grassroots migrant organization fighting for the rights of
migrants is the Migrants Trade Union (MTU), formed by migrants from different

197
As of 2008, there are 11 member organizations under KASAMMKO, including Bicol Association, New
Era Foundation, Federation of Filipino Workers in Korea, Quezon Association in Korea, Women on the
Move, Association of Filipino Migrant Workers in Kwangju Korea, Sama Sama sa Korea, Southern
Tagalog Organization, Filipino Workers Association, Aguman Kapampangan and Seoul Migrants
Association (KASAMMAKO 2008).

231
countries. As mentioned in chapter 3, the migrant rights movement has been mainly led
by Korean activists from various civil society groups and migrant advocacy groups by the
early 2000s. Although many of them have worked together with migrant workers and
their grassroots organizations, most of their approaches have been paternalistic. Migrant
workers have been viewed as passive victims to be saved and protected by them, which
indirectly, and sometimes directly, has discouraged the grassroots migrant rights
movement from developing.
198
Consequently, some of the leaders of grassroots migrant
organizations and young radical Korean activists gathered to establish a labor union by
migrant workers.
199
They first founded the Struggle Network for Migrant Workers’ Labor
Right and Freedom of Migration, which later developed into the ETU-MB (Equality
Trade Union – Migrants’ Branch) as a KCTU’s affiliate.
200
Empowered by the 380-day
sit-in struggle at My ŏngdong Cathedral in 2003 and 2004, which demanded the
government introduce the Work Permit System and legalize all undocumented migrants,
the members of the ETU-MB formed an independent union, called Migrants’ Trade

198
The former leader of the ETU-MB, Shamar Thapa, explains the situation like this: “I know that the
Korean activists from the JCMK and its member organizations have helped migrant workers a lot. When a
migrant worker doesn’t get paid or get injured at work, they helped him get his wage or receive his
industrial accident compensation. Since many (migrant workers) know that they can get helped by those
counseling centers [migrant advocacy organizations] when they encounter any problems, they tend to
depend on those centers instead of helping themselves. I heard that some of the activists from religious
organizations even told migrant workers not to go the demonstrations… Until when should we ask Koreans
for help? We should try to solve our own problems by ourselves.” (Py ŏn 2003: 117)
199
The unionization movement was triggered by the different positions between migrant advocacy
organizations and grassroots migrant organizations on the direction of the new migration system. See
chapter 3 for detail.
200
The organizations that have been devoted to the Korean labor movement, including the KCTU,
understood the issue of migrant labor as part of the wider problem of irregular labor. Also, the KCTU
recognized that migrant workers did not compete with the KCTU’s main constituency of regular workers in
large corporations. Thus it decided to embrace them within its affiliate union, the ETU (Equality Trade
Union, a union for irregular workers). Since the establishment of the ETU-MB, the KCTU have provided
financial support and supplied manpower so that migrant workers could be organized and fight for their
rights through rallies, demonstrations, campaigns, and so on (Gray 2007: 312-313). Although the Migrants
Trade Union (MTU) became independent from the ETU, it is still an affiliate union of the KCTU.

232
Union (MTU).
201
The process of the formation of the MTU is meaningful because
migrants from different countries have worked together to have this new form of labor
movement organization where they are the subject of migrant rights movement.
202
Sajjad
explains his devotion to the MTU as follows:
I know that there were many centers [local migrant advocacy organizations]
helping migrant workers. But, frankly speaking, who wouldn’t want to stand up
by himself? For example, if we go to the center, we have to ask someone else to
solve our problem. But if migrant workers have their own union approved by the
Korean government, we can claim our rights squarely and solve our problems by
ourselves. Isn’t that the way migrant workers in other countries do? Fighting for
themselves by their own rights no matter how long it takes? We are not strong
enough yet even though we became an independent union, so we still need
supports from centers, civil society groups, and the KCTU. But I think if we
struggle hard enough, we can stand up on our feet someday.

What concerns me these days is that it gets harder to recruit new union members,
especially those who have a visa. I used to visit newly migrated people in my
neighborhood door to door to persuade them to join the union. But most of them
said no, because they have no worry because they have visa. Some of them said
they wanted to, but couldn’t because they didn’t speak Korean. Most of the
current members have been in Korea for a long time. Who knows how many of us
can stay here to fight for our rights without getting caught (by the Immigration
Service)? That’s why we need new members, especially members with visa.

I don’t know how long I can stay in Korea. I could be caught tomorrow or next
month. But I will keep fighting as long as I am here. I may not be able to get any
benefits from my struggle. But if my struggle brought some changes to the
Korean government’s policies so others could work and live in a better condition
without having to worry about being kicked out, then no one could say my efforts
were meaningless. (Sajjad, Bangladeshi, male, 31)

201
According to my interview with the former secretary general of the ETU-MB, the main activities of the
MTU include struggling against the Korean government on its migration policies, counseling for union
members, recruiting new union members and educating them, and promoting international solidarity. It has
three to four hundred members, but active ones, that is, those who pay the membership fee and attend
general meetings, are around one hundred.
202
The founding members of the MTU are from countries with longer history of migration to Korea, such
as Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Although the membership is open to migrant workers from all
over the world, the active members are still from those countries and most of them are undocumented.

233
Grassroots migrant organizations vary in size and in their objective. Yet, all of
them take part in migrant community building by enhancing solidarity, maintaining
cultural identity, and claiming their rights while working together with local migrant
advocacy organizations. In addition, they sometimes try to give back to the community
by making a donation or volunteering in their local communities.
203
All those
organizational activities of migrant workers have enabled them to become a part of their
local community.

Incorporation of Migrants into Local Communities

Migrants in Korea have gradually become a part of Korean society by building
their own communities and organizations. However, migrant communities have often
been viewed as a threat to social cohesion and even to national security by the national
government, thus have been suppressed and sometimes destroyed by the government.
The unstable status of migrant workers has also made it difficult for them to maintain
their communities. The implementation of target crackdowns in specific migrant
communities and the deportation of the leaders and active members of grassroots migrant
organizations have often undermined migrant communities and their grassroots
organizations. Nevertheless, despite the ups and downs depending on the national

203
For example, in 1997, Bangladeshi and Filipino migrant organizations in Sungnam collected money to
help North Koreans together with Sungnam Migrant Workers’ House (Han’guk Ilbo 1997). In 2003, a
coalition of Nepalese migrant organizations, United Nepalis Migrant Association, made a donation for the
victims of Taegu subway fire victims (Munhwa Ilbo 2003). A Bangladeshi migrant organization
established in 2003 at S ŏngsu-dong, Seoul, has been volunteering at a local facility for the disabled for
several years (Tonga Ilbo 2007a).

234
government’s immigration control policies, many migrant communities and grassroots
organizations have survived and remained in existence.
The Korean government’s suppression of migrant workers and their communities
has faced strong resistance not only from migrant workers themselves but also from local
residents, migrant advocacy organizations, and various other organizations. On the one
hand, they have confronted the government’s authority and tried to protect migrants as a
part of their local community. On the other hand, they have come up with various
programs to incorporate migrants into their community and provided social services that
used to be available only to Korean citizens. As a result, migrant workers, who are
excluded from the right to national citizenship, have obtained local citizenship.
In this section, I explain why and how the Korean government has suppressed
migrant communities and grassroots organizations. Then I look into how local residents
and organizations have responded to the government’s suppressive policies. Lastly, I
examine the local efforts to foster migrant communities, to incorporate migrants, and to
grant them local citizenship.

The Government’s Suppression on Migrant Communities
As mentioned before, forming and maintaining grassroots migrant organizations
has been one of the important parts of migrant community building in Korea. Yet, as
Schrover and Vermeulen (2005) point out, in countries where migrants are treated as
temporary sojourners, maintaining migrant organizations is not always easy due to both
external and internal obstacles. In other words, migrant organizations are undermined not

235
only by the restrictive government that regards organizational activities of migrants as
undesirable or even threatening but also by the high turnover of the members in
organizations who often cannot stay long enough to have a stabilizing effect on their
organizations. The same explanation is true for grassroots migrant organizations in
Korea. The Korean government has often suppressed specific grassroots migrant
organizations through immigration raids and arrested their leaders and active members
with the intention of destroying them. Besides, the constant fear of apprehension has
sometimes discouraged members from engaging in organizational activities or even made
them leave the community. The loss of the members cannot but lead the organizations to
be weakened or cease to function.
Then why has the Korean government repressed grassroots migrant
organizations? In general, for the Korean government, the growing number of long-term,
undocumented migrants means losing control over its migration policies. More
specifically, the concentration of migrants in specific localities and the consequent advent
of migrant communities with grassroots organizations raises complicated problems that
may challenge its various policies economically, socially and politically. On the one
hand, the Korean government was concerned that migrant communities might become
ethnic ghettos or slums that would create economic and/or social burden.
204
On the other
hand, as more and more grassroots migrant organizations have become engaged in
political activism demanding their rights and/or requesting migration policy reform, the

204
As mentioned earlier, this was the reason given by the government when it pressured the Filipino
Community based on Chayang-dong Catholic Church to be dissolved.

236
government began to consider them subversive for trying to challenge the government’s
authority.
Without legitimate grounds to suppress migrant organizations and their
communities, the Korean government has used the Immigration Control Act, which
clearly disallows overstaying and the violation of visa conditions. Since most of the
migrants involved in organizational activities are undocumented, their arrest and
deportation was justified as proper actions by law enforcement. In July 1996, the
Immigration Service raided a grassroots migrant organization called the Chinese
Workers’ Association. Formed by ethnic Korean Chinese migrant workers in 1995 and
with about 750 members, the Association had been very active not only in mutual help
but also in the migrant rights movement as an affiliated organization of the JCMK. Yet,
the immigration raid resulted in the arrest of the leader and 29 board members, which led
to the dissolution of the Association. The Ministry of Justice later announced that it made
the arrest because they violated the Immigration Control Act that prohibited not only the
illegal stay of foreigners but also their engagement in disapproved activities (Han’gy ŏre
1996a; 1996b).
205

The Korean government’s suppression of grassroots migrant organizations has
been harsher since 2000, as more and more grassroots migrant organizations have
participated in political activism for migrant rights and the reform of migration system.
For example, in 2002 the government granted temporary amnesty to undocumented

205
According to the Clause 2 of Article 17 of the Immigration Control Act, foreigners residing in Korea
cannot be engaged in any political activities. The Ministry of Justice regarded the Association’s attendance
in May Day convention in 1996 as a political activity.

237
migrants but many of them, especially those involved in grassroots migrant organizations
including the ETU-MB, and Korean activists from local migrant advocacy organizations
protested against it and demanded full legalization. The Ministry of Justice responded to
their protest by cracking down in Mas ŏk, Ansan, Sŏngnam and Kuro with help from the
National Intelligence Service. All of the areas were strongholds of migrant rights
movement. Mas ŏk had the main chapter of the ETU-MB, Ansan and Sŏngnam was the
home of leading migrant advocacy organizations of the JCMK, and Kuro was the center
of advocacy movement for Korean Chinese migrant workers. Particularly, the target
crackdown in Mas ŏk clearly showed the will of the government to suppress political
activism of grassroots migrant organizations. The Immigration officials, who arrested two
leading members of the ETU-MB in front of other members, gave a strict warning to
other members not to be involved in demonstrations or the unionization movement
anymore (Break News 2002).
Worried that the organizational activities of migrants empower them to grow as a
political force, the government has even branded some grassroots migrant organizations
as anti-Korean or terrorist groups threatening national security. For example, in April
2004, when protests by organized migrant workers for the legalization of all
undocumented migrants and the reform of labor migration system were stronger than ever
and when the sit-in protest at My ŏngdong Cathedral by the ETU-MB was going on, the
Ministry of Justice released a report stating that the foreigners who led or actively
participated in demonstrations against the government’s policies or who made political
claims and criticized the government’s policies were engaging in anti-Korean activities,

238
thus migrant organizations that had such individuals as members should be under a strict
scrutiny (Han’gy ŏre 21 2004). The arbitrary definition of anti-Korean activities by the
Ministry has often used to suppress grassroots migrant organizations, especially those
involved in political activism.
Also, the allegation of some grassroots migrant organizations being a threat to
national security has justified the Korean government’s suppression on them and migrant
communities on which they are based. For instance, in October 2004, six months after the
release of the report by the Ministry of Justice, an Assemblyman of the conservative
Grand National Party publicly accused a Bangladeshi migrant organization, “Dawatul
Islam Korea,” based at the Anyang Mosque of being engaged in anti-Korean activities in
connection with an international terrorist group. Since Korea was on high alert for
possible terrorist attacks because of the news from Al Jazeera saying that Al-Qaida was
urging young men of Islam to attack the US and its allies including South Korea, the
government promptly responded to his accusation (Korea Times 2004a; 2004b).
Although the accusation turned out to be groundless, that was only after a target
crackdown on not only the members of Dawatul Islam Korea but also other
undocumented migrants in Anyang. Subsequent attacks by the Immigration Service were
completed in Kunpo and Ŭiwang, two adjacent cities to Anyang, upon the request of the
National Intelligence Service (Han’gy ŏre 21 2004, J-S Kim 2006: 23-4). Sajjad, an active
member of the MTU who has been lived in Kunpo for almost ten years, thinks that the
incident was a scheme by the government to undermine their community in which many
migrant residents were engaged in organizational activities and/or political activism:

239
When there was the sit-in protest at My ŏngdong Cathedral going on by the ETU-
MB, there were more than 300 union members here in Kunpo- Ŭiwang area. So
whenever there was a supporting demonstration or rally, we would rent two or
three big buses to go there all together. Those who were not union members
would also join us. With other migrants and Korean activists from all over the
country, more than a couple of thousands people would usually congregate. Then
the government folks, I mean the immigration folks, would come and watch us
checking from where all those people came. I think they must have figured out
that the largest number of the protestors came from our neighborhood. So when
the assemblyman released the false information to the media, they must have
thought that as a great opportunity to sweep us away.

The police officers… No, you can’t call them police. They were more like
gangsters. Anyway, they stormed in our neighborhood, rushed into houses, broke
down the doors, and arrested people randomly. It didn’t matter whether they were
Bangladeshis or not. Men or women, Bangladeshis, Nepalese, or Filipinos, it
didn’t matter. Once I saw a woman being dragged by the hair by two men right in
front of my house. It was not immigration patrol. It was human hunting and it
continued more than a month.

It was proved later that the assemblyman just said that without any evidence and
he apologized to the public. But for what? More than half of my neighbors were
already gone and our community broke down. There used to be three or four
Bangladeshi grocery stores in our neighborhood, but they were all closed. Many
of those who survived the crackdown also left the neighborhood. And as they
wished, the union activities have shrunk.

Since 2004, when the temporary amnesty was ended and the new labor migration
system, the Employment Permit System, was launched, the crackdown on undocumented
migrants has become routine, and particularly, surveillance and consequent arrest of
leaders and/or active members of grassroots organizations engaged in political activism
has expanded. Among others, policing over the MTU has continued while official
approval of it as a labor union has been pending.
206
The government’s discomfort over

206
As mentioned in chapter 3, the MTU submitted its application for union status to the Ministry of Labor
in 2005, but it was rejected on the ground that undocumented migrant workers do no have the right to form
a labor union. After this decision, the MTU began a legal battle with the Ministry of Labor based on the
claim that labor law, which grants all workers the rights to organize, had already been applied to
undocumented migrant workers and should be distinct from the immigration law, which governs work and

240
the MTU’s activities is well represented in the following comments by Mr. Choi, a senior
staff at the Residence Policy Division of the Immigration Service:
Spontaneously formed groups [grassroots migrant organizations] and their
friendly get-togethers are fine. But some of the organizations are trying to become
a political force. That’s unacceptable. You know they have a lot of
demonstrations, especially the union [MTU]. If they just demand better working
conditions, that’s understandable, but they go beyond that. They dare to
demonstrate on political issues and even demanding for the resignation of the
head of the Immigration Service. Then even come and protest in front of the local
immigration offices. Can you believe that? Those kinds of actions cannot be
condoned.

In my personal opinion, Korean labor unions and NGOs [migrant advocacy
organizations] are instigating much of their activities. Relying on them, they act
like they are above the law. But they should know that they are illegal and their
union is illegal. Although the case [the MTU’s legal battle with the Ministry of
Labor on its official approval] is still in the Supreme Court, I believe that they
will not win the case. Which country on earth has allowed illegal aliens to form a
labor union? Organizations that are trying to become a political force, making
excessive demands beyond the law or causing disturbances in front of the
government offices should not be tolerated.

The government’s suppression of grassroots migrant organizations usually takes
the form of a target crackdown on actively participating individuals, and as shown in the
case of Dawatul Islam Korea, they are often carried out concurrently with the crackdown
on undocumented migrants in specific local communities on which the organizations are
based or around which their activities are centered. As a result, the recurrent suppression
can weaken the whole migrant community in the area. Yet, for migrants who already feel
at home in the neighborhood where migrant communities have been established, leaving

residence permits for migrant workers. The MTU was first defeated by the Seoul Administrative Court in
2006, but then over a year later, the decision was overturned by the Seoul High Court, who upheld the
MTU’s claim. Since then, the Ministry of Labor has appealed to the Supreme Court, which has yet to
deliver a decision (Han’gy ŏre 2007, Korea Times 2007).

241
their community is as hard as leaving the country.
207
Indeed, many of my interviewees,
especially long-term migrants, have been living in the same neighborhood or have come
back to their old neighborhood even after they left for a better paying job or safer place to
live. As Bijendra put it, their community is their second hometown that they do not want
to leave again:
I like this neighborhood, Anyang and Kunpo. I have lived here in Tangj ŏng-dong
[at Kunpo city] for almost ten years. I used to live in Taej ŏn, Seoul, Ŭij ŏngbu,
Kimpo, and so on, but I like this neighborhood best. I first came to know this
neighborhood when I came for a meeting [for a grassroots Nepalese organization]
at Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center. Then I found out that the Center helped
people like us sincerely. So I came to the Center every time my friends or I are in
trouble at work and all. I also got to know people [migrants] fought for our rights.
Somehow I could find a job in Tangj ŏng-dong so I moved here. There used to be
Nepalese grocery stores, Bangladeshi grocery stores, and many other stores and
restaurants for people from different countries. During these couple of years,
many of them have been closed and many people have left due to the constant
crackdown. But I don’t want to leave here. For me, this neighborhood is the same
as my hometown in Nepal. (Bijendra, Nepalese, male, 33)

Considering that migrant communities are already a part of local communities
both economically and socially, their decline cannot but affect local communities as well.
Therefore, local residents and organizations have strongly opposed the government’s
suppression of migrant communities.

Local Responses to the Government’s Suppression
Civil society groups and migrant advocacy organizations have constantly
criticized the government’s suppression of grassroots migrant organizations and migrant

207
Although migrant workers are regarded to change jobs and move more frequently, studies show that
they tend to be less mobile as they spend longer in a country, and particularly as they have stayed in
immigrant clusters (Kritz and Nogle 1994, Rosenberg 1995).

242
communities. Since one of their main activities is to promote the rights of migrants as
residents while encouraging self-organization of migrant workers, their opposition to the
target crackdown on migrant communities and the arrest of leaders of grassroots
organizations was something that can be expected.
208
Yet, the government did not expect
local Koreans to resist, yet the opposition has mounted as crackdowns on undocumented
migrants in their community have escalated.
For example, in the early 2005, soon after the Ministry of Justice announced the
intensive crackdown on undocumented migrants, immigration officials raided Ansan
repeatedly. Due to the high concentration of migrant workers in the city, even the
officials from other jurisdictions conducted raids there to meet their performance goals.
The shrinking of migrant communities in Ansan and the consequent withering of local
economy that depended on them led to an organized resistance from local residents,
especially from those who were running businesses. About 600 local entrepreneurs
started a signature campaign against the government’s crackdown policy on
undocumented migrants while insisting that immigration officials should not just come
and arrest undocumented migrants in Ansan because the local economy could not survive
without them (Oh my news 2005a).
209

Furthermore, harsh crackdowns led to confrontations between the government
authority and local residents. For example, in October 2005, an immigration squad made

208
According to the survey on migrant advocacy organizations in 2000, one of their top three agenda is to
support migrant workers’ grassroots organizations to be vitalized (S ŏl and Pak 2000)
209
The media also covered local resident’s concerns about the decrease of migrant population in their
neighborhood. In a newspaper interview, a realtor in Ansan said, “Due to the crackdown, many migrants
are leaving this neighborhood and the vacancy rate is higher than ever.” A hair shop owner also echoed the
concerns and added, “We were worried that local economy might collapse if the harsh crackdown
continued like this.” (Naeil Sinmun 2005)

243
a raid on the factories and dormitories in the furniture factory complex at Mas ŏk in
Namyangju City, Ky ŏnggi Province. When the squad team finished the raid and arrested
31 undocumented migrants, almost 300 local Korean residents including managers and
co-workers from the factories, staffs and volunteers from a local migrant advocacy
organizations, and ordinary residents came out, blocked their way and requested the
release of the arrested migrants. The nine-hour-long confrontation ended when the head
of the squad team promised to release the arrested if they were found not to commit any
other crimes except visa violation after interrogation. He also assured that even those who
were not eligible for release would be recommended to leave the country voluntarily
instead of being deported forcibly.
210

With the realization that migrant workers are valuable assets to their communities,
local residents not only have protested against crackdowns on them but also have
developed ways to embrace them as local partners. In W ŏngok-dong, Ansan city, the
residents’ association began to give honorary committee membership to the leaders of
local grassroots migrant organizations in 2000, in order to include them in decision-
making process (Pak 2002). The president of W ŏngok-dong Residents’ Association
explained the reason behind their decision as follows (Ibid.: 129-130):
Kicking out foreigners from W ŏngok-dong will not make our town better. Since
Koreans don’t want to come and live here anymore, if foreign workers left, our
town would experience decline again and become a slum. For our survival, it is
inevitable for us, local residents, to find out a way to live together with foreign

210
The reason behind this vehement resistance is well expressed in the comment by a factory owner in
Mas ŏk who said, “If the crackdown continued without giving us any other option, over 300 factories, which
consist of most of the factories in the complex, would be closed down.” (Han’gy ŏre 2005) The JCMK also
commented on the incident by saying, “Reckless and relentless crackdowns will hurt the local economy in
many communities.” (Reib ŏ T’udei 2005a)

244
workers while working together with their organizations to minimize possible
conflicts. We need mutual cooperation now.

Still, the general public is not always in favor of grassroots migrant organizations
and their activities, especially those involved in political activism. When I marched with
migrant workers from various grassroots organizations and Korean activists from migrant
advocacy organizations in a street demonstration at Seoul in October 2006 demanding the
government abolish the Industrial Trainee System and pass the legalization of
undocumented migrants, some people on the street showed their hostility by saying that
illegal migrants should not dare to claim their rights in broad daylight. However, local
residents in migrants concentrated areas, especially those who are running businesses
depending on migrants either as customers or employees, respond differently. Some even
support organizational activities of migrants like Sajjad’s employer:
My boss isn’t against my MTU activity. He wants work from me and I want
money from him. Anything else is personal business, right? (laugh) Actually, he
even encouraged me to do it so that he could hire me legally. You know, we are
different from Korean unions. Usually, a union is organized by workers in one
company and asks, for example, more wages or better benefits from the company.
In that case, the bosses or managers may not like the union and suppress the union
members. But in case of the MTU, we are asking the government [not individual
company] to give us visa or freedom to stay and work. My boss tells me to fight
harder so that I can get a visa sooner.

These examples illustrate that local residents recognize migrants as an important
part of their local economy. They not only try to protect migrants in their community
from the government’s crackdowns but also support migrants’ organizational activities to
secure their rights to work and stay legally. Their willingness to embrace migrant workers
as members of their communities has been enhanced by the efforts of local migrant

245
advocacy organizations that have tried to grant local citizenship rights to migrant workers
and to build a bridge between local residents and their migrant neighbors.

Efforts to Incorporate Migrants into Local Communities
As locally based organizations, migrant advocacy organizations have tried to
provide basic sociopolitical rights and services to migrant workers as legitimate members
of local communities, which is referred to as local citizenship by some scholars (Tsuda
2006). As shown before, they have fought for migrants’ protection through by labor laws,
to have a family and raise children, to get healthcare, and to organize for self-help or
political activism. In the process of securing those rights, they have closely worked with
various local institutions, such as professional associations, schools, hospitals, and labor
unions, while pressuring the national government to acknowledge those rights.
For example, to provide healthcare for undocumented migrant workers, migrant
advocacy organizations agreed to establish a non-profit, non-governmental insurance
organization called Medical Mutual Aid Union for Migrant Workers in 1999 in
partnership with local clinics and hospitals.
211
Once undocumented migrant workers join
the Union through their local migrant advocacy organizations by paying registration and
monthly fee, they can visit any partner clinics or hospitals and get their medical bills
covered up to 50 percent. The children of undocumented migrants can also join by
registering under their parent’s name. As of 2008, there were 650 clinics and hospitals in

211
Korea has a national healthcare system for all citizens and legal residents. From 1995, unskilled migrant
workers with valid visa have been also included in the system. Yet, undocumented migrants are excluded
from the system.

246
the partnership. Over 60 of them were located in Anyang – Kunpo area.
212
In addition,
many migrant advocacy organizations have worked with local hospitals or medical
professionals’ associations to provide free medical clinics for migrant workers.
213
In the
meantime, they have kept pushing the national government to include undocumented
migrants in the government subsidized emergency medical care for the underprivileged.
Finally, in 2005, the Ministry of Health and Welfare decided to grant subsidies to
undocumented migrants for hospitalization and operation in all national medical centers
and red-cross hospitals.
While playing their roles as service providers and rights advocates for local
migrant workers, migrant advocacy organizations have gradually taken on their role as
socio-cultural mediators in their local communities. They added this new role as they
searched for a new direction for their activism in the middle of sudden increase of
government sponsored service centers for migrants:
Since 2004, the Korean government began to sponsor local governments to build
service facilities for migrants. For example, the Ministry of Labor funded for the
support centers for migrant workers and the Ministry of Health and Welfare
funded for the support centers for migrant families. They have many programs
similar to those we [migrant advocacy organizations] have had, such as
counseling and Korean language education. I think that’s good thing because I
believe that providing social services for migrants should be the role of the
government, not the role of non-governmental organizations like us. I think what
we need to focus now is to change the public consciousness towards migrants and
to empower migrants. Of course, we need to keep our mission to demand to
government to improve its migration policy. And since undocumented migrants
are reluctant to go to the government-sponsored service centers, we still need to
keep our role as service providers for them. (Mr. Choi, an activist from Incheon
Migrant Workers Human Rights Center)

212
Based on an inside document of the Medical Mutual Aid Union for Migrant Workers.
213
For example, a general hospital in Anyang has been providing free medical treatment for local migrant
workers on the first Sunday of each month. The Anyang dentisits association has also expanded their free
Sunday clinic for underpriviledged local residents to include undocumented migrant workers.

247
Among others, local migrant advocacy organizations have held migrant festivals
with grassroots migrant organizations in various local communities. Whether the festivals
are for migrants from various countries or for a single ethnic group, they have provided
an opportunity for migrant workers to celebrate their cultural identities while being
intermingled with local residents. Besides, unlike the migrant festivals hosted by either
the national or local governments where migrants are treated as guests, those hosted by
local migrant advocacy organizations have encouraged local migrant workers to
participate in the preparation process as well as in the events themselves.
214

For example, Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center has hosted Dashain festival for
Nepalese migrants since 2004. I participated and observed the third Happy Dashain
Festival held in October 2006. The festival was organized by six different Nepalese
organizations including Ne-Ko (Nepalese-Korean Couples Group), Lumjung Family,
Limbu Family, Rai Family, NBF (Nepalese Buddhist Family), and NCC (Nepalese
Consulting Committee). The members of these organizations participated in the whole
process of setting up programs, inviting performers, and making posters and invitations.
Meanwhile, as a host, Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center pulled together the available
resources from the local community. The Center applied and received a sponsorship from
Ky ŏnggi provincial government, rented the necessary equipment from local schools,
religious organizations, and other institutions, and publicized the event in both local and
national newspapers.

214
For example, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has been organized a festival for migrants in Korea
called “Migrant Arirang” since 2005. The preparation committee consists of government officials, Korean
NGO workers, and Korean volunteers while migrants are invited as guests.

248
During the final week of preparation, Nepalese migrants from grassroots
organizations built a stage and a swing in the backyard of the Center. The day before the
festival, they gathered to prepare the food. Men worked in the backyard of the Center to
butcher a goat while women cooked Roti in the kitchen. On the day of the Happy Dashain
Festival, more than one thousand of Nepalese migrants and local residents came together.
They went through several Dashain rituals, such as Tika (putting a red powder on one’s
forehead), Puja (lighting a candle), and riding a swing; they also looked around
exhibitions, shared traditional Nepalese foods, and enjoyed cultural performances
together.
In addition to migrant festivals, local migrant advocacy organizations have
developed multicultural education programs for local residents. Although the Korean
government began to promote multicultural education in the mid-2000s, it has focused on
teaching migrants Korean language, customs, and culture, exclusively for migrant
spouses and their biracial children. Therefore, the government-led multicultural education
has been criticized as assimilation education that only includes migrants with citizenship
while excluding unskilled migrant workers (Oh et al. 2007, Yun 2008). On the contrary,
multicultural education designed by local migrant organizations has put more emphasis
on informing local residents of the cultures of migrants from various countries, so that it
could reduce the possibility of potential conflicts or misunderstandings between local
Korean residents and migrants. At the same time, they have utilized local migrants as
instructors in the education programs, which has inspired migrants to have self-pride and

249
self-esteem in their cultures and identities. A staff member of Anyang Migrant Workers’
Center explained the purpose of their multicultural education as follows:
We started our multicultural education program in 2005.
215
We thought that if we
educated local residents, especially children and young students, about diverse
cultures of their migrant neighbors, we would be able to promote cross-cultural
understanding and tolerance. We also decided to have migrants as volunteer
instructors of the program so that they could develop self-esteem while
strengthening their sense of belonging to the local community. For this year’s
program, we have worked together local schools and youth centers in developing
curriculum and scheduling classes, and received funding from a local government
agency called Ky ŏnggi Volunteers’ Center. We believe that those kinds of
programs will pave a road towards a truly multicultural society.

Roshan, who was one of the instructors of the multicultural education program organized
by Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center, was highly satisfied with the program:
I was very happy when I was at the S ŏksu Youth Center [a local youth center at
Anyang] giving a class to the children. They seemed to be really interested in
Bangladeshi culture and eager to listen to my lecture. Usually, when I go to places
like supermarkets or restaurants, Koreans treat me differently. They don’t call me
names or swear at me, but use different languages to me. I feel like they look
down on me and it makes me feel unpleasant. But when I was at the classroom
with the children, they treated me like I am their teacher. It really felt good. They
[the students] can learn something new, so it [multicultural education program] is
good for them. But it is also good for me, because it makes me feel respected.

Another migrant instructor, Dayani, clearly understood the positive effects of the
multicultural education program not only at the personal level but also at the societal
level:
Korean people have some kinds of prejudice against us [migrants]. Some people
have hostility toward us thinking that we are taking jobs from Koreans. Others
have pity on us and see us as poor people from backward countries. I am raising
two children and I don’t want them to be discriminated when they grow up.
That’s why I am volunteering in this cultural education program as an instructor. I

215
During my fieldwork at Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center, I participated and observed the multicultural
education classes instructed by Nepalese, Bangladeshi, Vietnamese, Sri Lankan, and Pakistani migrants.
Being held at local schools, youth centers, or the Center, classes included the history and culture of the
country, basic language learning, trying on traditional clothes, and tasting ethnic food.

250
believe that it is important to enlighten children and young people, because they
are the future of this country where my children grow up and live. If more and
more young Koreans get to know about different cultures and different ways of
living other than their own, there will be more chances for me and my children to
be accepted.

Every time I go to give a talk, I bring my children. The students give us a wary
look at first. Some ask me if I can speak Korean while others ask me why my skin
is so dark. But once I tell them about Sri Lanka, how people live there, why some
Sri Lankan people come to Korea and how we live here in Korea, their eyes are
filled with curiosity and interest. They ask a lot of questions about me, about Sri
Lanka, and about what I think about Korea and Korean people. By the time I let
them try on traditional Sri Lankan clothes and taste some Sri Lankan food, they
already become so open and friendly to me and my children. I am sure that the
cultural education program can make Koreans accept us as their neighbors and
friends. (Dayani, Sri Lankan, female, 32)

Various cultural and/or educational programs developed by local migrant
advocacy organizations have empowered migrants and transformed them from service
recipients into local partners. Besides, they have also encouraged local Korean residents
to acknowledge migrants as not only economic but also socio-cultural assets to their
communities.
As shown in the Happy Dashain Festival and multicultural education program
offered by Anyang Migrant Workers’ Center, local governments or their agencies have
sponsored various cultural and/or educational programs carried out by local migrant
advocacy organizations. They have also sponsored social service programs provided by
migrant advocacy organizations. Considering that those programs are often designed for
long-term undocumented migrant workers, although not exclusively, and are made
possible by their participation, the support from local governments seemingly contradicts
the national government’s principle of the exclusion of undocumented migrants from

251
their social integration programs. An official of Ky ŏnggi Provincial Office explained
their position as follows:
When the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affair ordered all
municipal governments to impose an ordinance to support its foreign residents
and to integrate them into local communities, it provided a standard guideline. In
the guideline, it was clearly stated that only legally staying foreign residents
should be included under the ordinance. So front-line local governments had no
choice but to accept it [the guideline] in their ordinances. Local foreign workers’
centers set up by the Ministry of Labor also exclude undocumented migrant
workers from their services in principle.

Yet, we have a lot of migrant workers in Ky ŏnggi Province and the majority of
them are undocumented migrants. We can’t just ignore them, because as a local
government, we are responsible for the welfare of all local residents. If we
exclude undocumented migrants and neglect their needs, it will bring negative
social impacts on the community as a whole. That’s why we work together with
local NGOs [migrant advocacy organizations]. By supporting and funding them,
we are indirectly supporting undocumented migrants as well. After all, what we
need to pursue is social integration, not social conflicts.

While local governments have redefined or negotiated the national government’s
social integration policies as they have collaborated with local migrant advocacy
organizations, long-term migrant workers have become entitled to local citizenship rights.

Chapter Summary

Long-term migrant workers in Korea have established migrant communities. As
the number of migrants increased and as they concentrated in specific localities, ethnic
business, religious institutions, migrant advocacy organizations, and grassroots migrant
organizations have emerged based on the localities. Migrant community building has
usually taken place with the support from local residents and their associations as well as

252
from local religious institutions and migrant advocacy organizations, which has
empowered migrant workers and integrated them into local communities.
The national government of Korea has suppressed migrant communities and their
grassroots organizations in order to maintain their control over immigration and
immigrant policies. Yet, local residents and various local organizations have resisted the
government suppression while embracing migrants as local citizens. Moreover, local
migrant advocacy organizations have developed various programs that local residents can
take part in and share their community with their migrant neighbors. In cooperation with
them, local governments have also included long-term migrant workers in their social
integration policy implementation regardless of their legal status. Consequently, local
communities have become the sites for challenging the traditional concept of citizenship
or membership to the society.

253
CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that migrant workers in Korea have
become long-term settlers despite the restrictive immigration policy of the Korean
government and have obtained local citizenship rights even though they lack formal
citizenship. By examining migration and settlement processes based on the everyday
experiences and struggles of migrant workers, I have tried to reveal how the
government’s immigration and immigrant policies are understood, contested, and
renegotiated. Particularly, I have focused on the expansion of the rights of migrant
workers in Korea as an important factor leading to their settlement and the entitlement to
social membership to the society in general and local communities in particular.
As shown in the preceding chapters, migrant workers in Korea have secured their
socio-economic rights little by little with the support of civil society groups and migrant
advocacy organizations. During the 1990s, they had to fight for migrants’ rights as
workers, such as rights to get proper wages, to work in humane working conditions, and
to receive medical treatment and compensation in case of industrial injuries or work-
related illnesses. Since the Korean government’s labor migration system did not
acknowledge labor migrants as legitimate workers, whether they were trainees or
undocumented workers, demanding the government grant labor rights to migrant workers
and reform its labor migration system was the most pressing issue for the migrant rights
movement. Despite the conflicting interests of the parties involved, the government

254
provided various measures to protect migrants as workers and introduced a new labor
migration system.
From the late 1990s, the social rights of migrant workers and their families have
emerged as new issues. The increase in international marriages and the growing number
of biracial children have pressured the government to amend the laws on nationality and
develop social integration policies for multiethnic society. Yet, the Korean government
has categorized migrants into desirable and undesirable and differentiated those who are
eligible for membership from those who are not. Falling into the latter group, unskilled
and/or undocumented migrant workers and their families have begun to struggle for their
rights and belonging to the national community. In the meantime, by building
communities and forming grassroots organizations, they have become a part of local
communities and have been accepted as local citizens by local residents, local migrant
advocacy organizations, and local governments.
Nonetheless, the expansion of the rights of migrant workers is not a lineal or
universal process. Laws and rules on migrant labor rights have been improved, but their
implementation still depends on individual workplaces. Social integration programs have
been introduced, but the eligibility varies from one locality to another. Moreover, migrant
settlement and community formation are constantly threatened by immigration
crackdowns and are not always welcomed by local residents. The new government
administration inaugurated in 2008 is taking backward steps in migrant workers policies.
As a result, migrant advocacy organizations as well as grassroots migrant organizations
have been continuing their political activism.

255
The findings of my dissertation suggest several policy and planning implications,
both national and local. For the national immigration policy, it is necessary to understand
why migrant workers chose Korea in the first place and why they have prolonged their
stay in Korea. According to them, many had experienced economic and cultural
encounters with Korea in their home countries, which gave them a good impression about
Korea. The proliferation of recruitment agencies and brokers, as well as already
established migrant networks, encouraged their migration. Indeed, facing dramatic
structural changes in industry, labor markets, and demography, Korea was in demand for
migrant labor. Also, the Korean government used to make an agreement with various
countries to admit their people for work purposes in exchange of more export and
investment opportunities. After all, for migrant workers, it was Korea that approached
them first and called for their labor.
However, once they entered Korea, they experienced exploitation and
discrimination in their work place. While moving from one work place to another, they
lost their visa status. Even though they remained in the same work place, they soon faced
the expiration of their visa term due to the temporary rotation principle of the Korean
labor migration policy. Not being able to achieve their expected goals, they decided to
extend their stay and became long-term settlers. Penalties for illegal stay and restrictions
on reentry even discouraged them from leaving the country and led them to bring in their
family. Accustomed to their life in Korea, some of those who had left or been deported
also came back again. Meanwhile, as the Korean government repeatedly granted grace
periods or temporary amnesties to undocumented migrant workers and constantly

256
changed its labor migration system, long-term migrant workers began to hope for
legalization.
As for the Korean labor migration policy, it is important to remember that it was
the Korean government that paved the road and opened the door to labor migration, set
the unrealistic rotation policy, has been reluctant to protect migrant rights as workers, and
has changed its position constantly. Therefore, instead of holding on to crackdown
policy, the Korean government should make some provision for undocumented migrants
and their families and take responsibility for those who have contributed to and sacrificed
in Korea for a long time. Granting full amnesty to all undocumented migrants may be
impossible, but the government should make some criteria and give the qualified
individuals the chance to stay and work legally. Also, the requirements for permanent
residency for unskilled migrant workers should be adjusted according to their terms under
the current labor migration system. Most of all, the conditions of migrant workers should
be monitored so that their labor rights can be protected as ruled by the courts or as stated
in the related laws.
As for immigrant policy, it is necessary to understand everyday needs and
concerns of migrant workers. As more and more migrant workers began to live with their
family and raise children, the needs for various social services, such as healthcare,
childcare, education, and affordable housing, have arisen. However, for the Korean
government, social services are only for legitimate members of society. Thus, migrant
workers, who have been viewed strictly as temporary labor force and alien outsiders,
have been excluded from most of the social provisions. Consequently, they have formed

257
self-help grassroots organizations and claimed their rights as members of society. Also, to
overcome discrimination and exclusion, they have tried to build their own community
and redefine the conditions of belonging. Yet, the national government has suppressed
them, recognizing these efforts as subversive activities.
It was migrant advocacy organizations that began to pay attention to the social
rights of migrant workers and their families. Particularly, for the right to get education for
the children of migrants and for the migrant families’ right to stay together, they have
constantly appealed to the UN Human Rights Committees. The Korean government has
responded quickly by coming up with measures to ensure those rights, but they have
often been provided for a limited period of time. Facing the government’s exclusive
provision of social services and integration programs, migrant advocacy organizations
have tried to include migrant workers and their family, especially undocumented ones,
into their local community and embrace them as local citizens by changing the
consciousness of local residents as well as local governments.
In making truly inclusive migrant workers policies, the role of migrant advocacy
organizations and local governments are more important than that of the national
government. Migrant advocacy organizations can play a role as a mediator, with their
experiences of working together with local residents, migrant workers, and the
government. Yet, they should acknowledge that migrant workers are not just victims of
human rights violations or service recipients but equal partners or main agents in migrant
rights movement. At the same time, local governments need to get away from either their
role as service deliverers delegated by the national government or their role as financial

258
sponsors for migrant advocacy organizations. Instead, they should take a more active role
in improving migrant workers policies in Korea from the local level.
Particularly, planners and policymakers in local governments should understand
that the national migrant workers policies have resulted in unexpected outcomes because
they failed to include one of the key elements of planning, that is, the complicated and
interconnected characteristic of actual social life. Unlike those in the national
governments, planners and policymakers in local governments can take a close look at
the realities of migrant workers and can see that the presence of migrant workers and the
diversity that they have brought to the community are not burdens but assets that can
contribute to the society’s cultural and economic vitality. At the same time, they are able
to identify conflicting local interests and needs and coordinate them. Therefore, it should
be their role to initiate social services and integration programs to incorporate long-term
migrant workers as members of the Korean society.

259
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266
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Seoul: JCMK.

_______. 2001. Oegugin iju nodongja in’gw ŏn paeks ŏ (The Report on the Migrant
Workers in Korea). Seoul: Tasan g ŭlbang.

Joppke, Christian. 1999. Immigration and the Nation-state. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.

Kang, I-su and Ky ŏng-a Sin. 2001. Y ŏs ŏng kwa il: Han’guk y ŏs ŏng nodong ŭi ihae
(Women and Work: The Understanding of Korean Female Labor). Seoul:
Dongny ŏk.

KASAMMAKO. 2008. The Tenth Year Anniversary Celebration and Third Biennial
General Assembly.

KFSB. 1996. Oegugin san ŏp kisul y ŏnsu paeks ŏ (White Paper on Foreign Industrial
Trainees). Seoul: Chungso Ki ŏp Hy ŏptong Chunganghoe (Korea Federation of
Small and Medium Business).

Kim, Chong-ch ŏl, Ch’i-hwan Yun and P’il-kyu Hwang. 2008. “Nanminb ŏp chegaej ŏng
nonŭi ŭi chaengj ŏm (The Issues of the Reform of the Refugee Act).” Paper
presented at the Nanmin ŭi siltae wa p ŏpch ŏk chiwi e kwanhan semina (Seminar
on the Conditions and Legal Status of Refugees). Seoul Bar Association, Seoul,
Korea. 15 July.

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Kim, Ch ŏng-w ŏn. 2006. “Kungnae monggol ch’ulsin oegugin k ŭlloja chany ŏ hakkyo
kyoyuk siltae puns ŏk (The Realities of Schooling for Migrant Workers’ Children
from Mongolia in South Korea).” Kyoyuk Sahoehak Y ŏn’gu (Korean Journal of
Sociology of Education) 16(3), pp. 95-129.

Kim, Chun. 1990. Uri nara ŭi oegugin nodongja munje (The Problems of Foreign
Workers in Korea). Seoul: Kukhoe Tos ŏgwan Ipp ŏp Charyo Puns ŏksil. (National
Assembly Library Office of Legislative Data Analysis).

Kim, El-lim and Ch ŏng-jin Oh. 2002. Oegugin y ŏs ŏng nodongja ŭi in’gw ŏn pojang
y ŏn’gu (A Study on the Human Rights of Foreign Women Workers). Seoul:
Han’guk Y ŏs ŏng Kaebarw ŏn (Korean Women’s Development Instutite).

Kim, Eun Mee. 1996. “The Industrial Organization and Growth of the Korean Chaebol:
Integrating Development and Organizational Theories.” In Gary G. Hamilton
(ed.) Asian Business Networks. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

____________. 1997. Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South
Korean Development, 1960-1990. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Kim, Hy ŏn-mi. 2000. “Han’guk ŭi k ŭndaes ŏng kwa y ŏs ŏng ŭi nodonggw ŏn (Modernity
and Women’s Labor Rights in South Korea).” Han’guk Y ŏs ŏnghak (Journal of
Korean Women’s Studies) 16(1), pp. 37-64.

Kim, Hyuk-Rae. 2000. “The State and Civil Society in Transition: The Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations in South Korea.” The Pacific Review 13(4), pp. 595-
613.

Kim, Ji-s ŏn. 2006. “Oegugin kongdongch’e ŭi hy ŏnhwang kwa hwaltong: oegugin
kongdongch’e, han’guk sok chakk ŭn han’guk (Foreign Workers’ Communities
and Activities).” Minjok Y ŏn’gu 28, pp. 20-28.

Kim, Joon. 2003. “Insurgency and Advocacy: Unauthorized Foreign Workers and Civil
Society in South Korea.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 12(3), pp. 237-
269.

Kim, Seung-kyung. 1997. Class Struggle or Family Struggle? The Lives of Women
Factory Workers in South Korea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kim, Sunhyuk. 2000. The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil
Society. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

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Kim, Yang-g ŏn. 1996. Oegugin k ŭlloja daech’aek e daehan k ŏmt’o (Study on the
Alternative Plans for Foreign Workers). Seoul: Legislative Budget Office of the
National Assembly Secretariat.

Knowles, James C., Ernesto M. Pernia, and Mary Racelis. 1999. Social Consequences of
the Financial Crisis in Asia. (Economic Staff Paper No. 60). Manila: Asian
Development Bank.

Koo, Hagen. 2001. Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation. Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press.

Korea Herald. 1997, 2 June. “Firms Against Equal Treatment for Foreign Workers.”

___________. 2006, 31, March. “Editorial: Designating ‘Expats’ Day.”

Korea National Statistical Office. 2009, 27 April. “2008-y ŏn ihon t’onggye ky ŏlgwa
(Divorce Statistics for the year 2008).”

Korea Times. 1998, 13 April. “Illegal Foreign Workers Protest at Chong Wa Dae.”

__________. 2003, 16 April. “Conflicts Emerging Among SMEs Over Work Permit
System.”

__________. 2004a, 10 February, “Migrant Workers Refuse Departure.”

__________. 2004b, 3 October, “Seoul on Alert After al-Qaida Calls for Attacks.”

__________. 2004c, 24, October, “Anti-Korean Group Linked to Bangladeshi Islamic
Party.”

__________. 2007, 21 August. “History of Migrant Workers Trade Union.”

KRIWHJ. 1995. Oegugin nodonja ch ŏngch’aek kwa poho taech’aek (Policies and
Protective Measures Concerning Foreign Migrant Workers). Seoul: Korea
Research Institute for Workers’ Human Rights and Justice.

Kungmin Ilbo. 1990, 24 January. “Kongjik pujori ŏmdan, No taet’ongry ŏng chisi
(Misconduct by Government Officials Must Be Punished, President Roh
Ordered).”

___________. 1991, 23 March. “Chejo ŏp illy ŏk suip sasilsang h ŏyong: kisul y ŏnsu
chedo t ŭng hwaryong (De facto Approval of Labor Import in Manufacturing
Industries: Utilizing the Skill Training System and Others).”

271
___________. 1993a, 17, February. “Pulb ŏp ch’wi ŏp oegugin ‘s ŏn’gyo,’ Kallilli t ŭng 30
yŏ kyohoe. (‘Missonary Work’ for Illegally Employed Foreigners, Over 30
Churches including Galilee).”

___________. 1993b, 16 June. “Kangje ch’ulguk toedo chaeipkuk, kungnae ch’eryu
oegugin k ŭlloja silt’ae (Will Come Back in case of Deportation, Survey of
Foreign Workers in Korea).”

___________. 1993c, 26 November. “Oegugin k ŭllo ch ŏngchaek chaeg ŏmt’o pulgapi,
piin sanjae posang s ŭngso ŭimi (The Reexamination of Foreign Labor System is
Inevitable, What the Wining of the Lawsuit for Industrial Accident Compensation
by a Filipino Means).”

___________. 1996, 6 June. “Imsin oegugin nodongja y ŏnhaeng, malli n ŭn mokhoeja
nŭn kusok (Pregnant Migrant Worker Was Arrested, Pastors Who Tried to Stop
Was Prisoned).”

___________. 1997a, 28 May. “Oegugin koyong h ŏgaje chung-ky ŏng kalt ŭng (Conflicts
between Political and Business Leaders on the Employment Permit System).”

___________. 1997b, 28 July. “Pugye hy ŏlt’ong kukch ŏkpŏp kaej ŏng haeya, oeguk
nams ŏng kwa ky ŏrhon 5 ch’ ŏn yŏ ssang (Patrilineal Nationality Law Should be
Amended, There Are about 5,000 Marriages with Foreign Men).”

___________. 1998, 2 July. “Chungso k ŏns ŏl chiw ŏn chag ŭm 9 cho w ŏn hwakch’ung
(Expansion of the Aid Fund for Small- and Medium-sized Construction Industries
to 9,000 Billion won).”

___________. 2006, 20 February. “Honhy ŏrin kyoyuk ch’aby ŏl ŏpsaenda, kyoyukpu kot
kuch’e pangan mary ŏn (Discrimination in Education Will Be Eliminated, The
Ministry of Justice Will Come Up with Specific Measures Soon.)

Ky ŏnggi Ilbo. 2007, 9 March. “Ijumin y ŏs ŏng – adong poho chiw ŏn pŏban ch’ujin (A
Bill to Protect and Support Migrant Women and Children in the Works)”

Ky ŏnghyang Sinmun. 1990, 1 November. “Haeoe illy ŏk suip k ŏnŭi, chejoŏpkye:
chung·so t ŭng tongp’o t ŭl us ŏn ch’wi ŏp (Suggestion of Importing Foreign Labor,
by Manufacturing Industries: Ethnic Koreans from China and the Soviet Union
Should Be Given a Priority).”

_________________. 1992, 4 August. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryu oegugin 7 man y ŏ my ŏng
(Illegally Staying Foreigners, approximately 70,000).”

272
_________________. 1993, 30 November. “Chungguk kyopo wijang k ŏrhon ch ŏnmy ŏn
chosa: p ŏmmubu, ch ŏnw ŏn kangje ch’ulguk choch’i kiro (Korean Chinese
Involved in Marriage Fraud Will be Investigated: The Ministry of Justice Decides
to Deport Them All).”

_________________. 1995, 11 January. “Oeguk k ŭlloja to saram daej ŏp ŭl (Treat
Foreign Workers as Humans).”

_________________. 1996, 12 June. “Han chung, chos ŏnjok y ŏs ŏng wijang ky ŏrhon
taechaek kolmol (Korea and China Are Trying to Come Up with a Solution for
the Marriage Fraud of Korean Chinese Women).”

_________________. 1998, 23 July. “Silchikcha n ŏmch’y ŏnado saengsan rain ŭn
t’ ŏngt’ ŏng (Despite the Numerous Jobless People, No Workers on Production
Line).”

_________________. 1999a, 25 January. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryuja n ŭr ŏ, chungguk t ŭng
kyŏnggi akhwa ro idal 10 man my ŏng nŏm ŭl t ŭt (Illegal Stayers Increased, Due to
the Declining Economy in Countries like China the Number Will Exceed 100,000
This Month).”
_________________. 1999b, 3 May. “Oegugin y ŏnsusaeng suyo, chungbu kyuje pulgu
kŭpch ŭng (The Demand for Foreign Trainees Increased, despite the Government
Restriction).”

_________________. 2006, 1 May. “Chany ŏ ch’uj ŏk pulbop ch’eryuja tansok an handa,
kyoyukbu ‘tamunhwa kaj ŏng’ chiw ŏnchaek (No More Tracking Down on Illegal
Stayers through Their Children, Ministry of Education Announces a Support Plan
for Multicultural Families).”

Lee, Hye-Kyung. 2003. “Gender, Migration and Civil Activism in South Korea.” Asian
and Pacific Migration Journal 12(1-2), pp. 127-153.

_____________. 2006. “International Marriage and the State in South Korea.” Paper
presented at the International Conference of International Marriage, Rights and
the State in Southeast and East Asia. Asia Research Institute, National University
of Singapore, 21-22 September.

Lee, Young Youn and Hyun-Hoon Lee. “Korea: Financial Crisis, Structural Reform and
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Lim, Haeran. 1998. Korea’s Growth and Industrial Transformation. New York: St.
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Lim, Timothy C. 2003. “Racing from the Bottom in South Korea? The Nexus between
Civil Society and Transnational Migrants.” Asian Survey 43(3), pp.423-442.

_____________. 2006. “NGOs, Transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of Rights in
South Korea.” In Takeyuki Tsuda (ed.) Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of
Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective. Oxford, UK: Lexington Books.
pp., 235-269.

Maeil Ky ŏngje. 1995, 20 February. “Oegugin koyong h ŏgaje nollan, nodongbu chŏkkŭk
ch’ujin …t’ongsangbu sigisangjo chujang (Employment Permit System, the
Ministry of Labor is Strongly for It while the Ministry of Trade and Industry Says
the Time is Not Mature Yet).”

____________. 1998a, 2 April. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryu oegugin 3 w ŏl mal kkaji han’guk ppajy ŏ
nagan nodongja 46,000 y ŏ my ŏng (Approximately 46,000 Illegally Staying
Foreigner Workers Left Korea by the End of March).”

____________. 1998b, 12 September. “‘Oegugin k ŭlloja to tongd ŭng taeu’ Pak Sang-
ch’ ŏn pummubu changgwan (‘Equal Treatment to Foreign Workers,’ said the
Minister of Justice Pak Sang-ch’ ŏn).”

____________. 2000, 28 June. “Oegugin san ŏp yŏnsusaeng taedasu han’guk saenghwal
manchok (Most of the Foreign Industrial Trainees Are Satisfied with the Lives in
Korea).”

____________. 2001, 7 February. “Pulbop Ch’eryuja chany ŏ ch’od ŭnghakkyo iphak
hŏyong (The Admission to Elementary School Is Allowed for the Children of
Illegal Stayers).”

____________. 2006, 27 June. “S ŏul Hyehwadong s ŏngdang s ŏ 10-y ŏn tchae pillipin
saram ŭl wihan misa (Hyehwadong Catholic Church at Seoul Have Been Offering
Mass for Filipinos for 10 years).”

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________________, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino and
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Minbyun. 2000. NGOs’ Counter Report (Summary): Economic, Social and Cultural
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the Second Report
Submitted by the Republic of Korea under Article 16 & 17 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

________. 2001. NGO’s Alternative Report: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the
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_________, Choh ŭn pŏtt ŭl, and P’inanch ŏ. 2004. Kungnae oegugin nanmin in’gw ŏn
siltae chosa pogos ŏ (A Report on the Human Rights Conditions of Refugees in
Korea).

Ministry of Gender Equality. 2006. 2006-y ŏn to chuyo ŏmmu sihaeng kyehoek (Main
Tasks in 2006).

Ministry of Health and Welfare. 2005. Kukche ky ŏrjpm iju y ŏs ŏng siltae chosa mit pog ŏn
pokji chiw ŏn ch ŏngchaek pangan (Foreign Wives’ Life in Korea: Focusing on the
Policy of Welfare and Health).

_________________________. 2006. Living Guide for Immigrant Women on Marriage:
Beginning a Happy Life in Korea, English Version.

Ministry of Justice. 1985~2008. Ch’uripkuk kwalli tonggye y ŏnbo (Immigration Statistics
Yearbook).

_______________. 1994. Chajin sin’go oegugin ch’ ŏri hy ŏnhwang (Condition of
Voluntarily Reported Foreigners).

_______________. 2002, 22 April. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryu oegugin chajin sin’goja k ŭpch ŭng
(The Number of Self-reported Illegally Staying Foreigners Has Increased).”

275
_______________. 2003a, 17 November. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryu oegugin 23,441 my ŏng chajin
ch’ulguk (23,441 Illegally Staying Foreigners Left the Country Voluntarily).”

_______________. 2003b, 1 December. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryu oegugin happ ŏphwa ch ŏpsu
magam ky ŏlgwa palp’yo (Results of the Legalization of Illegally Staying
Foreigners).”

_______________. 2005, 3 March. “P ŏmmubu, k ŭmny ŏn ŭl pulb ŏp ch’eryuja kamso
w ŏnnyŏn ŭi hae ro ch ŏnghago t’ ŭkpyŏl taechaek kangny ŏk ch’ujin. (The Ministry
of Justice, sets this year as the first year of decrease in the Illegally Staying
Foreign Population).”

______________. 2006a, 8 February. “ Ŭiryo sagak pangch’i toen pulb ŏp ch’eryu chany ŏ
kwally ŏn podo haemy ŏng (Explanation on the Newspaper Report about the
Children of Illegal Stayers Marginalized from Health Services).”

______________. 2006b, 21 August. “P ŏmmubu, ch’od ŭng hakkyo chaehak pulb ŏp
ch’eryu adong ege hansij ŏk t’ ŭkpyŏl ch’eryu h ŏyong (The Ministry of Justice
Grants a Special Temporary Permit to Stay to Illegally Staying Children
Attending Elementary School).”

______________. 2007, 24 August. “Ch’eryu oegugin 100 man-my ŏn tolp’a (Foreign
Residents Exceeded One Million).”

Ministry of Labor. 1991~2002. Nodong tonggye y ŏn’gam (Yearbook of Labour
Statistics).

______________. 1993. Oegugin nodongja munje ŭi ch ŏngchaekch ŏk kwaje: chuyo
suipkuk ŭi ch ŏngchaek siltae e taehan pipanch ŏk k ŏmto (Policy Plan to Solve the
Problems of Foreign Workers: Critical Review on the Policies of Major Labor-
Importing Countries).

______________. 2006, 30 November. “Naeny ŏn put’ ŏ oegugin k ŭlloja n ŭn koyong
hŏgaje roman toip hagiro k ŏlj ŏng (Foreign Workers Will Be Admitted under the
Employment Permit System Only from Next Year).”

Moon, Katharine H.S. 2000. “Strangers in the Middle of Globalization: Migrant Workers
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_________________. 2002. “Migrant Workers’ Movements in Japan and South Korea.”
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ch’eryu oegugin chany ŏ kyoyuk sagak pangch’I (Irregular Students in Elementary
School? The Children of Undocumented Migrants are Being Marginalized from
Education).”
___________. 2000, 17 May. “Ch ŏngbu ‘oegugin koyong h ŏgaje’ toip ch’ujin (The
Government Pushes forward the Introduction of the ‘Employment Permit
System’).”

___________. 2003, 7 April. “Nep’arin do taegu ap ŭm hamkke (Nepalese People Share
the Pain of Taegu).”

___________. 2006, 6 April. “Han’guk to ije tainjong tamunhwa sahoe: pibusaek
swaegukju ŭi kkaeja (Korea Is Now a Multi-ethnic, Multi-cultural Society: Let’s
Eliminate Discrimination Based on Skin Color).”

___________. 2006, 11 April. “Pulb ŏp ch’eryu tansok aid ŭl ŭn ŏtch ŏna – ky ŏnggido
kyoyukch’ ŏng, oegugin chany ŏ hakk ŭp unyŏng kon’gy ŏng e (Crackdown on
Illegal Stayers But How about the Children? – Ky ŏnggi Provincial Office of
Education Falling into a Difficult Position in Operating the Classes for the
Children of Foreigners).”

Naeil Sinmun. 2005, 16 November. “Nodong ch ŏngchaek s ŏ imin ch ŏngchaek ŭro
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___________. 2007, 3 May. “Tamunhwa kajok chiw ŏnbŏp par ŭi (Multicultural Family
Support Bill Is Proposed).”

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________. 2006. Mid ŭngnok oegugin tansok mit oegugin poho sis ŏl siltae chosa (Survey
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Asset Metadata

Creator Kim, Sagang (author)

Core Title Challenging migrant worker policies in Korea: settlement and local citizenship

School School of Policy, Planning, and Development

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Planning

Publication Date 08/02/2010

Defense Date 06/03/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag local citizenship,migrant settlement,migrant workers in Korea,OAI-PMH Harvest

Place Name Korea (countries), Kyǒnggi (counties)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Sloane, David C. (committee chair), Banerjee, Tridib (committee member), Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette (committee member)

Creator Email sagan12@hotmail.com,sagangki@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3244

Unique identifier UC1145134

Identifier etd-Kim-3880 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-362280 (legacy record id),usctheses-m3244 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Kim-3880.pdf

Dmrecord 362280

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Kim, Sagang

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu