University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

The elephant and the mouse that roared: the prospects of international policy and local authority in the case of the convention on international species (CITES)

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The elephant and the mouse that roared: the prospects of international policy and local authority in the case of the convention on international species (CITES)

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THE ELEPHANT AND THE MOUSE THAT ROARED: THE PROSPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND LOCAL AUTHORITY IN THE CASE OF THE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SPECIES (CITES)

by

Jonathan Liljeblad

_________________________________________________________

A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(POLITICAL SCIENCE)

May 2008

Copyright 2008 Jonathan Liljeblad

ii
Acknowledgements

Deepest gratitude goes to the members of my committee: Alison Renteln,
Richard Dekmejian, and Robert Keim. Additional gratitude also goes to Sheldon
Kamieniecki. Without the guidance and patience of these professors over the years, I
would never have persisted in my studies.
I also wish to dedicate this to my parents, Eileen Aye Liljeblad and Kjell
Liljeblad, as well as my grandparents, Roma Blaschke and Lester Blaschke, whose
sacrifices made this possible, and whose love made me the human being I have come
to be. I only hope that my life is a testament to theirs. My greatest regret is that the
people who were most instrumental in my life are not here to share this moment; this
belongs to them more than it does to me. I wish they were here now. This is for
them.

iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ii
List of Tables iv
List of Figures vi
Abstract xiii
Chapter 1: Statement of Problem 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review 15
Chapter 3: Theory 44
Chapter 4: Linkage 58
Chapter 5: Descriptive Review of Data 84
Chapter 6: Statistical Analysis of Data 135
Chapter 7: Conclusions 154
Bibliography 178
Appendix 1: Survey 194
Appendix 2: Histograms-Issues 218
Appendix 3: Histograms-Domestic Law 242
Appendix 4: Histograms-International Law 262
Appendix 5: Histograms-Demographics 277
Appendix 6: Correlation Matrix-Domestic Variables (Parametric) 284
Appendix 7: Correlation Values-International Variables (Parametric) 375
Appendix 8: The Convention in the International Trade of Endangered Species 448

iv
List of Tables
Table 5-1: Topics 88
Table 5-2: Question Groups 89
Table 5-3. Levels of Importance of Smuggling 92
Table 5-4. Level of Respondent’s Knowledge of Smuggling 93
Table 5-5. Resource Challenges 97
Table 5-6. Level of Knowledge of Domestic Laws 100
Table 5-7. Level of Effectiveness of Domestic Laws 101
Table 5-8. Level of Deterrence of Domestic Laws 101
Table 5-9. Level of Cooperation in Enforcing Domestic Laws 102
Table 5-10. Level of Personal Satisfaction over Searches & Seizures 103
Table 5-11. Level of Organizational Satisfaction over Searches & Seizures 104
Table 5-12. Level of Knowledge of International Laws 105
Table 5-13. Level of Effectiveness of International Laws 106
Table 5-14. Level of Deterrence of International Laws 107
Table 5-15. Level of Cooperation of International Laws 108
Table 5-16. Demographics 110
Table 5-17. Levels of Knowledge of Smuggling Issues 115
Table 5-18. Perceived Importance of Smuggling Issues 116
Table 5-19. Perceived Effectiveness of Domestic and International Laws 117
Table 5-20. Perceived Deterrence of Domestic and International Laws 118
Table 5-21. Perceived Cooperation in Domestic and International Laws 119

v
Table 5-22. Perceived Importance of Trade Issues 121
Table 5-23. ESA Versus Other Domestic Laws 123
Table 5-24. CITES Versus Other International Treaties 126
Table 6-1. Independent and Dependent Variables 140
Table 6-2. Variable Pairs with Pearson’s r>0.5 144
Table 6-3. ANOVA Tests for Dependent Variables with Significant Correlation 146
Values

Table 6-4. beta and sig. for Dependent Variables with Significant Correlation 147
Values

Table A6. Correlation Matrix – Domestic Variables (Parametric) 285
Table A7. Correlation Matrix – International Variables (Parametric) 376

vi
List of Figures
Figure A2-1. Importance of Smuggling – Endangered Species 218
Figure A2-2. Importance of Smuggling – Narcotics 218
Figure A2-3. Importance of Smuggling – Weapons 219
Figure A2-4. Importance of Smuggling – Humans 219
Figure A2-5. Importance of Smuggling – Contraband 220
Figure A2-6. Knowledge of Smuggling – Endangered Species 220
Figure A2-7. Knowledge of Smuggling – Narcotics 221
Figure A2-8. Knowledge of Smuggling – Weapons 221
Figure A2-9. Knowledge of Smuggling – Humans 222
Figure A2-10. Knowledge of Smuggling – Contraband 222
Figure A2-11. Legitimacy of Duty – CITES/ESA You 223
Figure A2-12. Legitimacy of Duty – CITES/ESA Your Org 223
Figure A2-13. Legitimacy of Duty – CNDPS/CSIE You 224
Figure A2-14. Legitimacy of Duty – CNDPS/CSIE Your Org 224
Figure A2-15. Legitimacy of Duty – CNBC/DWMD You 225
Figure A2-16. Legitimacy of Duty – CNBC/DWMD Your Org 225
Figure A2-17. Legitimacy of Duty – CSTP/TVP You 226
Figure A2-18. Legitimacy of Duty – CSTP/TVP Your Org 226
Figure A2-19. Legitimacy of Duty – TRIPS/CBP You 227
Figure A2-20. Legitimacy of Duty – TRIPS/CBP Your Org 227
Figure A2-21. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Money 228

vii
Figure A2-22. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Time 228
Figure A2-23. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Knowledge 229
Figure A2-24. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Training 229
Figure A2-25. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Personal Interest 230
Figure A2-26. Personal Resource Challenges – Excessive Admin Paperwork 230
Figure A2-27. Personal Resource Challenges – Ineffective Technology 231
Figure A2-28. Personal Resource Challenges – Ineffective Strategic Focus 231
Figure A2-29. Personal Resource Challenges – Ineffective Tactical Policy 232
Figure A2-30. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Clarity in Duties 232
Figure A2-31. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm 233
Leaders and Employees

Figure A2-32. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm 233
Co-workers

Figure A2-33. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm 234
International Orgs

Figure A2-34. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm 234
Domestic Orgs

Figure A2-35. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Money 235
Figure A2-36. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Time 235
Figure A2-37. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Knowledge 236
Figure A2-38. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Training 236
Figure A2-39. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Personal Interest 237
Figure A2-40. Org Resource Challenges – Excessive Admin Paperwork 237
Figure A2-41. Org Resource Challenges – Ineffective Technology 238

viii
Figure A2-42. Org Resource Challenges – Ineffective Strategic Focus 238
Figure A2-43. Org Resource Challenges – Ineffective Tactical Policy 239
Figure A2-44. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Clarity in Duties 239
Figure A2-45. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders 240
and Employees

Figure A2-46. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Co-workers 240
Figure A2-47. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm 241
International Orgs

Figure A2-48. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Domestic 241
Orgs

Figure A3-1. Knowledge of Domestic Law – ESA 242
Figure A3-2. Knowledge of Domestic Law – CSIE 242
Figure A3-3. Knowledge of Domestic Law – DWMD 243
Figure A3-4. Knowledge of Domestic Law – TVP 243
Figure A3-5. Knowledge of Domestic Law – CBP 244
Figure A3-6. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – ESA 244
Figure A3-7. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – CSIE 245
Figure A3-8. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – DWMD 245
Figure A3-9. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – TVP 246
Figure A3-10. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – CBP 246
Figure A3-11. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law – ESA 247
Figure A3-12. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law – CSIE 247
Figure A3-13. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law – DWMD 248

ix
Figure A3-14. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law – TVP 248
Figure A3-15. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law – CBP 249
Figure A3-16. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – ESA 249
Figure A3-17. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – CSIE 250
Figure A3-18. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – DWMD 250
Figure A3-19. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – TVP 251
Figure A3-20. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – CBP 251
Figure A3-21. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally – ESA 252
Figure A3-22. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally – CSIE 252
Figure A3-23. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally – DWMD 253
Figure A3-24. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally – TVP 253
Figure A3-25. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally – CBP 254
Figure A3-26. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally – ESA 254
Figure A3-27. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally – CSIE 255
Figure A3-28. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally – DWMD 255
Figure A3-29. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally – TVP 256
Figure A3-30. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally – CBP 256
Figure A3-31. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made 257
by Organization – ESA

Figure A3-32. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made 257
by Organization – CSIE

Figure A3-33. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made 258
by Organization – DWMD

x
Figure A3-34. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made 258
by Organization – TVP

Figure A3-35. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made 259
by Organization – CBP

Figure A3-36. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization 259
– ESA

Figure A3-37. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization 260
– CSIE

Figure A3-38. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made 260
by Organization – DWMD

Figure A3-39. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made 261
by Organization – TVP

Figure A3-40. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization 261
– CBP

Figure A4-1. Knowledge of International Law – CITES 262
Figure A4-2. Knowledge of International Law – CNDPS 262
Figure A4-3. Knowledge of International Law – CNBC 263
Figure A4-4. Knowledge of International Law – CSTP 263
Figure A4-5. Knowledge of International Law – TRIPS 264
Figure A4-6. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support – CITES 264
Figure A4-7. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support – CNDPS 265
Figure A4-8. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support – CNBC 265
Figure A4-9. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support – CSTP 266
Figure A4-10. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support – TRIPS 266
Figure A4-11. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – CITES 267

xi
Figure A4-12. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – CNDPS 267
Figure A4-13. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – CNBC 268
Figure A4-14. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – CSTP 268
Figure A4-15. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support – TRIPS 269
Figure A4-16. Perceived Deterrence International Law – CITES 269
Figure A4-17. Perceived Deterrence International Law – CNDPS 270
Figure A4-18. Perceived Deterrence International Law – CNBC 270
Figure A4-19. Perceived Deterrence International Law – CSTP 271
Figure A4-20. Perceived Deterrence International Law – TRIPS 271
Figure A4-21. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – CITES 272
Figure A4-22. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – CNDPS 272
Figure A4-23. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – CNBC 273
Figure A4-24. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – CSTP 273
Figure A4-25. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs – TRIPS 274
Figure A4-26. Level Cooperation International Orgs – CITES 274
Figure A4-27. Level Cooperation International Orgs – CNDPS 275
Figure A4-28. Level Cooperation International Orgs – CNBC 275
Figure A4-29. Level Cooperation International Orgs – CSTP 276
Figure A4-30. Level Cooperation International Orgs – TRIPS 276
Figure A5-1. Years Employed Current Employer 277
Figure A5-2. Years Employed Law Enforcement 277
Figure A5-3. Years Current Job Title 278

xii
Figure A5-4. Age 278
Figure A5-5. Ethnic Group 279
Figure A5-6. Gender 279
Figure A5-7. Years Education 280
Figure A5-8. Annual Income 280
Figure A5-9. Years Living in US 281
Figure A5-10. Years Living in California 281
Figure A5-11. Years Living in Los Angeles 282
Figure A5-12. U.S. Citizen 282
Figure A5-13. Religious Attendance 283
Figure A5-14. Political Ideology 283

xiii
Abstract

Prevailing U.S. government philosophy espouses the devolution of authority
from federal to local levels. This trend opens the possibility of greater local
involvement in policy implementation, and provides international policy-makers the
opportunity to improve global policies by adding the efforts of local actors to their
implementation framework. Much of international policy involves enforcement
through international-to-national linkages, but devolution offers the potential to
extend the implementation chain by providing national-to-local linkages. The
analysis explores the nature of such linkages, using the case study on the Convention
on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) via its domestic analogue,
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The research finds that while the framework of
CITES enforcement in the U.S. allows for a national-to-local extension in the CITES
implementation chain, it also presents challenges that should be addressed by
international policy-makers who consider devolution as a way of improving global
policy.

1
Chapter 1: Statement of Problem

I. Argument
In the prevailing political climate the U.S. has witnessed a shift in federal
power, with a trend of decentralization in authority to state and local governments.
This is often labeled as devolution, and grouped within discussions on federalism
and state and local jurisdictions. Some areas affected by this mindset include those
dealing with national security, traffic across U.S. borders, and environmental issues.
Steps have already been taken towards allocating what was formerly deemed
exclusive federal jurisdiction onto individual communities, with discussions in
popular and government circles over enforcement of national laws using not only
federal agencies but also local ones.
1
Implicit behind these moves is the belief that

1
Robert Block. “Politics & Economics: Fighting Terrorism By Sharing Data; Homeland
Security Plans To Improve Cooperation With Police Departments”, Wall Street Journal (Eastern
Edition). New York, N.Y.:Oct 16, 2006. p. A6; R. Steven Brown. “States Put Their Money Where
There Environment Is.” Environmental Council of the States. April 1999. URL:
http://www.ecos.org/section/publications. Accessed: November 12, 2007; Fact Sheet: Improving
Border Security and Immigration Within Existing Law. Department of Homeland Security. August
10, 2007. URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1186757867585.shtm. Accessed Sept 26,
2007; Tom Fitton. “Local Law Enforcement Effective in Fighting Illegal Immigration.” The
Conservative Voice, July 24, 2006. URL:
http://www.theconservativevoice.com/articles/article.html?id=16389. Accessed Sept. 25, 2007;
Timothy Lawrence. Devolution and Collaboration in the Development of Environmental Regulations.
Dissertation. Ohio State University (2005); Patrick Poole. “Local Law Enforcement and Homeland
Security.” American Thinker. August 9, 2007. URL:
http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/08/local_law_enforcement_and_home.html. Accessed Sept.
26, 2007; Gretchen Randall. “Devolution to the States is Working for Welfare; It Can Work for Public
Lands”, National Policy Analysis. National Center for Public Policy Research. June 2001. URL:
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA340.html. Accessed Sept 25, 2007; Barry Rabe. “Permitting,
Prevention and Integration: Lessons from the States,” in Environmental Governance: A Report on the
Next Generation of Environmental Policy, Donald Kettl (ed.). Brookings Institution Press (2002);
Denise Scheberle. Federalism and Environmental Policy. Georgetown University Press (2004); Zoe
Tillman. “Crackdown: Immigration supporters react to a resolution passed July 10 in Prince William
County, Va., that empowers local police to determine the status of residents and to arrest illegal

2
implementation of national laws can be served through greater utilization of local
government agencies.
The trend to devolution to local law enforcement seems to open a bridge of
greater community-level inclusion in larger-scale policy implementation—not only
in terms of the local now interacting with the national, but the local now connecting
with the global. This is because national laws are sometimes expressions of U.S.
obligations to international instruments. Hence, enforcement of a national law
effectively means enforcement of an international one.
For global policy-makers, such a scenario suggests another level of linkages
in policy creation. To ensure effectiveness, they must now follow an
“implementation chain” starting from an instrument’s creation, continuing to support
of signatory members, and then extending to the subordinate authorities within each
signatory. This chain can be seen as involving two links between three levels. The
first link is global-to-national, in terms of going from international instruments to
participating national signatories. The second link is national-to-local, extending
from national government to local government.
Much of international policy implementation involves discussions of the first
link. The trend to devolution, however, means a greater role for local government in
global policy, since devolution calls for greater local participation in enforcement of
national laws—national laws which sometimes enunciate U.S. obligations as a

immigrants”. Christian Science Monitor. July 17, 2007. URL:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0717/p01s05-ussc.html. Accessed Sept. 25, 2007; “U.S. Wants Local
Help in Human Trafficking”, Juvenile Justice Digest. Washington: Jul 6, 2004. Vol. 32, Iss. 12,
p. 6.

3
signatory to international law. This suggests an increasing significance for the
second, national-to-local link in discussions over international policy, and also points
out the need to pay more attention to issues at the local level, particularly for policy-
makers who hope to incorporate local agencies in international policy
implementation efforts.
This analysis addresses the potential for involving local government in global
policy implementation, and so encompasses both links between these three levels,
with particular focus on the local level. For this research, this means beginning with
a review of CITES as an international treaty, briefly detailing its framework,
continuing on to an introduction of the ESA and related government agencies, and
finally discussing the nature of connections to Port of Los Angeles Police.
Such speculation, however, assumes that there are, in fact, linkages between
local and national government with respect to international policy. This is not clear.
In order to accept the existence of such linkages, and hence their implications for
policy-makers, there needs to be assurance through analysis. Analysis entails
investigation through theory supported by factual or experimental study to confirm
the nature of local-to-global connections.
This research is a step towards such requirements, and endeavors to provide a
method testing the relationship between international instruments and local
enforcement. The approach will be to utilize a selection of international treaties to
which the United States is a signatory, and for each of which the federal government
has enacted national laws. The selection will provide a case study, with a specific

4
treaty being utilized for in-depth review, and the others serving as controls. The
analysis will then conduct the case study by investigating relevant theory and
conducting field research, with the intent of reviewing both de jure and de facto
connections between local implementation and global policy within the case. The
goal is to obtain results to assess the state of the linkages, and then discuss
implications to theory and policy.
In rough terms, the argument is that the speculations regarding linkages
between local and global levels are not only plausible, but very much true. The hope
is that improving such relationships will assist with the implementation of
international policies. The details of the argument, as well as the research method,
are presented below.

II. Case Study
This analysis adopts the Convention on the International Trade of
Endangered Species (CITES) as a case study. The U.S. is a signatory to CITES, and
has implemented the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) in obligation to its
signatory duties to CITES. In terms of the local-to-global linkage for the U.S., this
turns the research into a study of the relationship between international efforts to
manage the trade of endangered species and the actions of local enforcement
agencies to support them. In so doing, the research becomes an assessment of the
potential the local level has for aiding in the implementation of an international
policy instrument such as CITES.

5
CITES is a particularly useful treaty for a case study, since its enforcement
ultimately devolves to a local level. The design of CITES makes the treaty
dependent on the actions of its signatory members. As a result, it is inherently
tailored toward the inclusion of actors operating below the global level, and allows
the freedom for signatories to incorporate local communities in enforcement of the
treaty. Because CITES revolves around a fundamental principle that each signatory
should be responsible for protecting endangered species within their borders, CITES
creates a decentralized management structure wherein the bulk of enforcement
responsibility and power is retained by the treaty’s member nation-states and a
limited administrative role is reserved in a central CITES Secretariat restricted to
coordinating information and scheduling treaty conferences. This raises the issue of
CITES being dependent on local enforcement for its implementation, with the danger
of failures at the local level degrading the effectiveness of the treaty at the
international level.

III. Methodology
The research method consists of a hypothesis, theory to provide context, a
research sample for study, specification of variables to draw from the sample, and
the research tools to perform the analysis. From this, results are expected that will
evaluate the strength of the hypothesis. The goal is to find insights relevant to theory
with implications for practical policy-making, as well as offer directions for further
useful research.

6
Hypothesis
Following from the argument, the general expectation of this investigation is
that with respect to international policies there are linkages between local
implementation and global instruments, and hence that there are opportunities to
strengthen enforcement of those instruments through greater use of local agents. In
terms of the specified case study, which consists of CITES expressed in the U.S.
through the ESA, this rough statement can be clarified into the hypothesis that there
is a connection between CITES and local law enforcement agencies, and that CITES
success can be improved by greater inclusion of such agencies.
In terms of individual questions, this can be viewed as a set:
• What is the nature of the current relationship between CITES and
relevant law enforcement?
• If the relationship is to be improved, what issues are there to be
rectified?
• If the relationship is to be improved, what are the most effective ways
to integrate local agencies in international policy implementation?

Theory
For theory, the analysis will provide context for the hypothesis and research
method. The analysis will first provide an overview of the arguments regarding
trends of both globalization of topics to international levels and devolution of them
to local ones. After this, the discussion will then present theoretical perspectives of

7
international politics, and highlight those aspects that address linkages between the
global and local—particularly those aspects with insights useful for considering the
dependence of international environmental instruments like CITES upon local law
enforcement agencies subordinate to the U.S. federal government.

Research Sample
The research method utilizes a research sample in two different senses: a
sample in terms of the treaty used for study and a sample from which data was
gathered. In terms of treaty samples, the analysis selects treaties all comparable to
each other, in the sense that they each 1) deal with international traffic in a particular
field, 2) have the U.S. as a signatory member, and 2) have an analogue in U.S.
federal law. With CITES being chosen as the instrument for in-depth analysis
because of the amenability of its structure to test local-to-global linkages, this meant
that other treaties became controls. Based on the criteria, the other treaties adopted
are as follows:
• Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)
• Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (CNDPS)
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons, Chemical
Weapons Convention (CNBC)
• Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons (CSTP)

8
• Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreements (TRIPS)
Each treaty has a domestic analogue, which are, respectively:
• Endangered Species Act (ESA)
• Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (CSIE)
• Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (DWMD)
• Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVP)
• U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Regulations (CBP)
For a data sample, the research involves field data delineated by geography
and sample subjects. The case study here, too, specifies a singular geographic
location and particular set of subjects with characteristics amenable to study testing
the questions of the hypothesis.
Geographically, the analysis focuses on the Port of Los Angeles. Los
Angeles is a major point of entry for international traffic to the United States, being
one of only two major international seaports on the West Coast (the other being
Seattle, Washington). Indeed, it is the busiest port in the western U.S. coast in terms
of incoming tonnage of cargo, receiving more than 50,000,000 tons per year, with
over 45,000,000 coming from foreign sources.
2
This domination extends beyond
shipping traffic to alternative air traffic: in comparison, Miami International Airport,
the busiest U.S. airport in terms of international freight, receives only approximately

2
Port of Los Angeles website, URL: http://www.portoflosangeles.org. Accessed: August 1,
2007; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center, URL:
http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/ndc/wcsc/portname02.htm. Accessed: October 19, 2007; Vanderbilt
Center for Transportation Research, URL:
http://transp20.vuse.vanderbilt.edu/vector/worldkit/index.html. Accessed: October 19, 2007.

9
1.68 million tons of cargo per year, and Los Angeles International Airport, the third
busiest U.S. airport in terms of international freight, only processes a little over
2,000,000 tons per year.
3
The comparative volume of trade at the Port of Los
Angeles, relative to air traffic or other sea ports, makes it a major nexus point for law
enforcement agencies facing international smuggling.
In addition, because of its location on the West Coast, Los Angeles has a
greater proximity relative to most other U.S. cities to international trade from the
Pacific Rim, which is considered one of the greatest sources of endangered species
trafficking.
4
This is compounded by the significant ethnic diversity, containing
populations originating from cultures known for being consumers of endangered
species parts.
5
With respect to local law enforcement, Los Angeles features agencies
which may encounter violations of international trade laws, in particular those at the
Port of Los Angeles.
For data, the study entailed use of publicly available documents on CITES
and ESA enforcement within the U.S., and the Port of Los Angeles in particular. In
addition, it also required the use of interviews and surveys from federal and local
agencies: the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Port of Los Angeles Police.
The FWS is named by the federal government as the CITES administrative office for

3
Miami International Airport Cargo Rankings website, URL: http://miami-
airport.com/html/cargo_rankings_.html. Accessed: January 1, 2008; Los Angeles World Airports
Cargo website, URL: http://www.lawa.org/lax/cargo.cfm. Accessed: January 1, 2008.
4
Stefan Lovgren. “Wildlife Smuggling Bloom Plaguing L.A., Authorities Say”. National
Geographic News. July 26, 2007. URL: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/07/070725-
animal-smuggle.html. Accessed Oct. 1, 2007.
5
Ibid.

10
the U.S., and is also responsible for managing the ESA. The Port of Los Angeles
Police was selected because it is the local law enforcement agency monitoring the
Port of Los Angeles. Under the concept of “local” the agents of interest for this
study are those non-federal field personnel operating at the community level. For the
U.S., the field personnel for community law enforcement under are municipal police,
sheriffs, airports, and port authorities. These bodies operate on a municipal and
county level, counties being the larger-encompassing body with boundaries
containing municipal police departments, the county sheriff, and county ports and
airports—and hence, the Port of Los Angeles Police.

Variables
With respect to the hypothesis and related theories linking local and
international levels, the variables for study are those indicating the nature of
relationship between local law enforcement and CITES via the ESA, the weaknesses
in that relationship, as well as the perceptions of local actors regarding challenges to
their support of CITES.
Because evaluation of the CITES-local law enforcement relationship and its
weaknesses is a qualitative one, there is no explicit declaration of dependent or
independent variables. However, for study of the perceptions of local actors as to the
issues in the relationship, a survey is applied allowing descriptive and statistical
analysis using dependent and independent variables. The dependent variables are: the
perceptions of local law enforcement of CITES in terms of its effectiveness and

11
deterrence value, as well as their satisfaction level over their efforts to enforce it
domestically via the ESA. The independent variables are: the perceptions of local
law enforcement in terms of challenges to their enforcement efforts, cooperation
with other domestic and international law enforcement agencies, and also their
knowledge and recognition of CITES.
Both the qualitative and quantitative variables are used to test the hypothesis.
The hope is that the analysis will utilize them to generate an assessment from the
collected data regarding the potential role for local actors in international policy
implementation.

Research Tools
This study primarily uses qualitative and quantitative data. Determination of
the de jure existence of linkages between local law enforcement and international
policy utilized qualitative information. Evaluation of the de facto nature of such
linkages adopted both quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews.
Qualitative data on de jure relationships is drawn from existing documents
regarding CITES, the ESA, and government actions on devolution. In terms of de
facto connections, interviews come from discussions with representatives of the
FWS and the Port of Los Angeles Police.
Quantitative data is obtained from anonymous surveys administered to the
patrol officers at the Port of Los Angeles Police. Compiling the survey results
allows identification of what patrol officers consider to be major issues in

12
enforcement of national and international laws. Testing the survey results for
correlation and causal relationships help to indicate areas for mitigation to better
integrate port police in the international policy. As a whole, the quantitative analysis
helps evaluate the capacity of patrol officers to accept the potentially greater duty of
enforcing national laws like CITES—laws whose responsibility was originally
outside their jurisdiction but which are increasingly likely to be allocated to them.
Because a national law like the ESA is tied to CITES, this means that the data may
also show the capacity of local law enforcement to play a greater role in
implementing international policy.
In terms of structure, the surveys gather data indicating the nature of
respondent perceptions towards the varying levels of analysis: international policy,
the domestic law equivalent, and the issue addressed by those instruments in general.
This allows better assessment as to whether respondent views are reflective of their
relative personal knowledge of domestic laws, international laws, or related subject
matter.
In addition, the survey also asks respondents with their views to a number of
treaties in addition to CITES. This is meant to provide a “control” to check
respondent answers indicate their own personal feelings regarding the issue of
endangered species traffic, or if they indicate their perceptions towards international
law in general.

13
IV. Expected Findings & Significance
The research is expected to provide data useful in support of the hypothesis,
by producing findings indicating local-to-global linkages. Particularly for CITES,
this would be demonstrated by insights about the connections between local agencies
and CITES implementation.
In terms of answering the research questions of the hypothesis, the
expectation is for the following:
• There are current linkages between local law enforcement and CITES
implementation, and that such linkages are likely to increase
• Local law enforcement perceive manageable challenges to their
involvement in CITES implementation
• It is possible to identify the ways the linkages can be strengthened
The implication of these findings is that international policy-makers should
integrate local actors in designing international policy to improve their effectiveness
and potential for success. In addition, it also implies that policy-makers accept that
international legal instruments are inextricably intertwined with local levels, and that
success at a global level requires success at a local one.
By doing so, the research hopes to contribute to the body of policy studies
that endeavor to improve the effectiveness of legal instruments by increasing their
relevancy to practical implementation issues. This relates to arguments that policy’s
ultimate goal is to affect change in the real world, and hence should have some
orientation towards useful application. For those policies based on theory, this

14
means theory must be translated so as to engage reality, or otherwise it risks being
instruments de jure but never de facto—and thereby principles in words but not in
life.
6

V. Structure
In summary, this analysis follows a method composed of a hypothesis,
context-relevant theory, a research sample, variables of data types to be taken from
the sample, the research tools to study the data, and then a discussion of the results
from the research. In keeping with the method, the investigation is divided into the
following chapters:
• Chapter 2: presentation of theory
• Chapter 3: review of existing literature on CITES
• Chapter 4: qualitative study of linkages between CITES and local law
enforcement
• Chapter 5: descriptive presentation of challenges to linkages with
CITES perceived by local law enforcement
• Chapter 6: quantitative statistical analysis indicating possible
influences on local perceptions
• Chapter 7: findings and discussions

6
For examples, see generally: William Evan. Social Structure and Law. Sage Publications
(1990); Eugene Kamenka, et al. Law and Society: The Crisis in Legal Ideals. St. Martin’s Press
(1978); Stewart Macaulay, et al. Law and Society: Readings on the Social Study of the Law. W.W.
Norton & Company (1995); Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon (eds.). Cultural Analysis, Cultural
Studies, and the Law. Duke University Press (2003); Peter Schuck. The Limits of the Law. Westview
Press (2000).

15
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Within environmental studies, the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES) falls under the domain of biodiversity. Because it
deals with one of the largest drivers of species loss, CITES is commonly viewed as
an instrument of global policy against ongoing extinction rates. The significance of
the treaty is better seen in the context of biodiversity issues.

I. Biodiversity
Biodiversity covers the topics of endangered species, extinction, wildlife
conservation, and ecological preservation. Biodiversity addresses the wide array of
biological life within the Earth's biosphere which exist in an ecology that relates one
species to another. Generally, biodiversity is considered significant to the sustained
health of the planet's ecology, first because research increasingly suggests that each
biological species serves critical roles in ecosystems, and second because diversity in
species ensures the biosphere's ability to adapt to changing stresses upon it.
7

Scientists largely accept that the ecological system of the biosphere relies on the
constant maintenance through the interactions of species within it. While the role of
each species is not entirely understood, it is clear that the disappearance of species

7
See generally: Ronald Bailey (ed.). Earth Report 2000, McGraw-Hill (2000); World
Resources Institute. Earthtrends. URL: http://www.earthtrends.wri.org; UNEP. Global Environmental
Outlook 3. Earthscan (2002); Brian Groombridge and M.D. Jenkins. Global Biodiversity. UNEP
(2000); Charles Harper. Environment and Society. Prentice Hall (2001); Bjorn Lomborg, The
Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge University Press (2001).

16
may unravel the complex ecological relationships harboring them, leading to a
breakdown of the Earth's ecology, and hence the collapse of the Earth's ability to
support life.
8
In conjunction with this, scientists also understand that the
environment's ability to adjust to stress is dependent on widespread genetic diversity.
This is because genetic diversity ensures that the biosphere will have a source of
characteristics or traits from which to draw upon in evolving responses to changes
within it. Bereft of biodiversity, the environment would be less able and less likely
to survive changing conditions or shocks to it.
9

Unfortunately, scientific data indicate that the planetary wealth of
biodiversity is being eradicated at an alarming rate. While there continues to be
ongoing debate regarding the magnitude of species loss relative to past extinction
events, there is general consensus that current rates are profound—enough so as to
warrant questions as to dangers to the global eco-system and genetic diversity.
10

Biodiversity losses are largely attributable to habitat destruction. Habitat
destruction is a direct result of human population growth and its hunger to exploit
new land and new resources.
11
Industrial activities, agricultural practices, and the
raw need for living space incurs increased consumption of natural resources,
generation of pollutants, and eradication of natural environments. Human population

8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Groombridge; Ellen Thomas. Lecture, Environmental Studies Course EES 199. Wesleyan
University. URL: http: ethomas.web.wesleyan.edu/ees123/mass_extinctions.htm. Accessed December
9, 2003; UNEP Global Environmental Outlook 3.
11
Bailey; Jessica Forrest. “Protecting Ecosystems on a Changing Planet.” Earthtrends. URL:
http://www.earthtrends.wri.org. Accessed December 12, 2003; Groombridge; Harper; Lomborg;
UNEP Global Environmental Outlook 3.

17
growth also drives a need for additional food sources, encouraging the profligate
consumption of plant and animal life in a way which decreases species populations
for use by burgeoning human populations. The end result is the elimination of
habitat harboring indigenous flora and fauna. The combination of these factors has
been the dramatic escalation in species extinction rates, and the destabilization of
plant and animal populations to levels tenuous for their long-term survival.
12

Habitat conservation at the level of international policy has been fustrated by
the norms of sovereignty, which assert that each nation-state has the responsibility
and power to manage its own internal affairs. As a corollary, no nation-state has the
right to interfere directly with any other nation-state's internal affairs. Formal
international attempts for global habitat conservation conflict with this, as they
would invariably require that international limits exist on a country's domestic land-
use, and hence act as an external curb on a country's internal governance and land-
use policies. This indicates why so few treaties address habitat conservation, and
those that do frequently provide only general guidelines and principles with little
formal enforcement mechanisms or supporting institutional organization.
Another major source of biodiversity loss has been “takings,” through
hunting and trade of species. While trading in flora and fauna between nations is a
legal component of global economics, there are significant portions of the global
economy fostering takings of endangered species in ways that are illegal. This

12
Bailey; Forrest; Groombridge; Harper; Lomborg; UNEP Global Environmental Outlook 3;
World Resources Institute. World Resources 2000-2001. URL: http://www.wri.org. Accessed
December 12, 2003.

18
illegal market has grown in conjunction with the liberalization of the global
economy, from an estimated annual $50-100 million in the 1970s to approximately
$1.5 billion in the 1980s to potentially $5 billion in the 1990s. As of 2007, the value
has risen to approximately $15-25 billion per year, second in value behind only
narcotics smuggling in terms of illegal black markets.
13
For the U.S. alone, the
estimated value is around $1.4 billion per year.
14

Restrictions on “takings” has been a more opportune ground for international
policy compared to habitat conservation. This is because takings of species often
result in the transportation of captured or destroyed specimens across nation-state
boundaries and international waters, providing international policy-makers with a
means of gaining jurisdiction over the problem without having to negotiate
restrictive issues of sovereignty. The result has been an array of international
treaties dealing with endangered species poaching, hunting, and trade relative to the
number in existence addressing habitat conservation, with CITES being just one of
many.
The spectrum of international efforts to address biodiversity loss is vast, with
action from state and non-state actors being directed at both habitat conservation and
takings. Private groups have bought out natural wilderness to create conservation

13
Levy, Adrian and Cathy Scott-Clark, “Poaching for Bin Laden”. The Guardian. May 5, 2007.
URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,2073168,00.html. Accessed: May 20, 2007;
Lovgren, Stefan. “Wildlife Smuggling Bloom Plaguing L.A., Authorities Say”. National Geographic
News. July 26, 2007. URL: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/07/070725-animal-
smuggle.html. Accessed Oct. 1, 2007.
14
“Congressional Funding For Enforcement of Wildlife Trade Grossly Inadequate”. World
Wildlife Fund Press Release. World Wildlife Fund. July 17, 2003. URL:
http://worldwildlife.org/news/displayPR.cfm?prID=73. Accessed: Oct. 24, 2007.

19
preserves, with the intent of acquiring species-rich habitats before commercial
interests destroyed them. Other entities have pursued “sustainable use” initiatives,
educating governments and communities on the benefits of consuming plant and
animal life in ways which would allow species populations to renew themselves.
There are also “gene banks” to store genetic material of threatened species, as well as
“debt-for-nature” swaps, in which the debt of developing countries are forgiven in
exchange for combating habitats and takings.
15
In addition, there has been a
proliferation in “clearinghouses” to coordinate policies and aid in communication of
scientific and administrative information.
16

Significant treaty instruments include the 1916 Canadian-American Treaty
for Protection of Migratory Birds, the 1933 African Convention Relative to the
Preservation of Flora and Fauna in their Natural State, and the 1946 International
Whaling Commission. These were joined by such notable international
environmental regimes as the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (CWIIWH, more commonly referred to
as the “Ramsar Convention”), the 1973 Convention on the International Trade of
Endangered Species (CITES), the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), the 1987 International Tropical Timber Organization, and the 1992
Caracas Declaration on National Parks. Along with these have been the 1968
Biosphere Conference, the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (more commonly referred to as the “Stockholm Conference”), the 1987

15
See generally: Caldwell.
16
Ibid.

20
Report on the World Commission on Environment and Development (more
commonly referred to as the “Brundtland Commission”), and the 1992 International
Conference on the Environment (the Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro.
17

As an exemplar of international policy on biodiversity, CITES has displayed
some successes. Since its inception in 1975, it has grown from 21 signatory member
nations to over 172 parties as of 2007.
18
In doing so, it has marked a rise in
international attention to the welfare of endangered species, as well as worldwide
consciousness regarding environmental issues.
CITES is designed to regulate the international trade in endangered species—
as either living or dead flora and fauna specimens and parts.
19
Intended to control the
international trade in endangered species, the convention curries international efforts
from members while still recognizing the individual parties' sovereignty over their
own endemic biological resources. CITES, in asserting regulatory norms, makes an
implicit recognition of the global market in endangered species trade, noting its
existence and the scale of its reach. As a result, it is a significant international treaty
in that it not only encourages global participation in endangered species protection,
but also as it focuses on the trade of endangered species itself as a means of
protecting them from extinction—that is, rather than concerning itself with the
number and type of "takings" allowed, the convention instead ostensibly deals with

17
The full list of international biodiversity treaties is extensive and not all are listed here. For a
more complete compilation, please see generally Caldwell.
18
CITES. CITES.org. URL: http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.shtml. Accessed
November 12, 2007.
19
Ginette Hemley (ed.). International Wildlife Trade: A CITES Sourcebook. World Wildlife
Fund (1994).

21
the number and types of species traded between nations.
20
This makes CITES unique
in that it is one of the few international environmental treaties related to endangered
species to do so.
21

Despite such optimism, however, the convention has found itself at tje center
of controversy. Scholars have argued that its effectiveness is questionable. In
particular, they have noted weaknesses in its operation which frustrate its ability to
achieve its stated purpose: to regulate and control endangered species trade.

II. CITES
Study on CITES has come from a variety of disciplines: the social sciences,
including political science and public administration; law; and economics.
Invariably, the research revolves around the treaty’s enforcement issues, with
varying degrees of depth and scope in analysis. Existing studies of CITES and its
implementation have appeared in a wide number of scholarly journal articles,
22

20
Ibid.
21
Other international environmental treaties that deal with trade in endangered species include
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (IWRC) and the African Convention of
1968 (see generally Cyrille de Klemm, Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law. IUCN
(1993)).
22
Specifically, there are: Yale Environmental Protection Clinic. Improving Enforcement and
Compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. URL://
http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/clinic/cities.html. Accessed: September 23, 2007; Kevin Eldridge,
Whale for Sale?, 24 Georgia Journal of International Comparative Law 549-565 (1995); Kathryn
Fuller, Ginette Hemley, and Sarah Fitzgerald, Wildlife Trade Law Implementation in Developing
Countries: the Experience in Latin America, 5 Boston University International Law Journal 289-310
(1987); Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 The American Journal
of American Law 1-43 (1990); Andrew J. Heimert, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 Yale Law
Journal 1473-1506 (1995); Valerie Karno, Protection of Endangered Gorillas and Chimpanzees in
International Trade: Can CITES Help?, 14 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
(1991); Laura Kosloff and Mark Trexler. "The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species: Enforcement Theory and Practice in the U.S." Boston University International Law Journal.

22
government-sponsored agency reports,
23
doctoral dissertations,
24
as well as books,
25

produced by a wide range of sources which include students, professors, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), government agencies, and interested
individuals. In general, these materials are directed at several critical elements

Vol. 5 No. 3 (1987). pp. 327-361; Catharine L. Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species under
CITES: Is It a Sustainable Alternative?, 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Economic Law 461-504 (1996); Susan Lieberman, Improving International Controls on Wildlife
Trade, 20 Endangered Species Bulletin (1995); Karl Jonathan Liwo, The Continuing Significance of
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora in the 1990's,
15 Suffolk Transnational Law Journal 989-1015 (1991); Paul Matthews, Problems Related to the
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species, 45 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 421-431 (1996); Eric McFadden, Asian Compliance with CITES: Problems and Prospects,
5 Boston University International Law Journal 311-325 (1987); Jeffrey Melick, Regulation of
International Trade in Endangered Wildlife, 1 Boston University International Law Journal 249-275
(1982); Bill Padgett, The African Elephant, Africa, and CITES: The Next Step, 2 Global Legal Studies
Journal 529-552 (1995); Shennie Patel. "The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species: Enforcement and the Last Unicorn." Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 18 No. 1
(1995). pp. 157-173; Michelle Ann Peters, The Convention on International Trade of Endangered
Species: An Answer to the Call of the Wild?, 10 Connecticut Journal of International Law 169-191
(1994); Philippe J. Sands and Albert P. Bedecarre, Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species: the Role of Public Interest in Non-governmental Organizations in Ensuring the Effective
Enforcement of the Ivory Trade Ban, 17 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 799-822
(1990); Alan Schonfeld, International Trade in Wildlife: How Effective is the Endangered Species
Treaty?, 15 California Western International Law Journal 111-160 (1985); Gwyneth Stewart,
Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention; Reservations Regarding the
Reservation Clauses, 14 Cornell International Law Journal 429-455 (1981).
23
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna & Flora European
Community Annual Report 1995, European Communities (1998); United States Fish & Wildlife
Service. URL:http://www.fws.gov. Accessed: October 1, 2007.
24
Joni Baker. A Substantive Theory of the Relative Efficiency of Environmental Treaty
Compliance Strategies: The Case of CITES. Texas A&M University (1998); Ian Andrew MacDonald.
Towards a General Theory of Environmental Treaties. Simon Fraser University (1999); Steve
McMullin, Approaches to Management Effectiveness in State Fish and Wildlife Agencies. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (1993); Phyllis Ann Mofson, The Behavior of States in an
International Wildlife Conservation Regime: Japan, Zimbabwe, and CITES. University of Maryland
(1996); Mark Charles Trexler, The Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of
Wild Flora and Fauna: Political or Conservation Success? University of California, Berkeley (1990).
25
Jon Hutton and Barnabas Dickson (eds.). Endangered Species, Threatened Convention: The
Past, Present and Future of CITES. Earthscan Publications (2000); Sarah Fitzgerald. International
Wildlife Trade: Whose Business Is It? World Wildlife Fund (1989); Andrea L. Gaski and Kurt A.
Johnson. Prescription for Extinction: Endangered Species and Patented Oriental Medicines in Trade.
TRAFFIC USA (1994); Ginette Hemley (ed.). International Wildlife Trade: A CITES Sourcebook.
World Wildlife Fund (1994); Simon Lyster. International Wildlife Trade. Grotius Publications, Ltd.
(1985); Rosalind Reeve. Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES Treaty and
Compliance. Earthscan Publications (2002); Willem Wijnstekers. The Evolution of CITES. CITES
Secretariat (2003).

23
related to treaty implementation which can be summarized in three major categories
of criticism: 1) textually-related formulation problems, 2) operational issues in
practical enforcement, and 3) participation barriers. For formulation, the existing
scholarship indicates that CITES suffers from: 1) obscure or ill-defined wording, and
2) omissions or loopholes. For operation, research asserts that CITES is hampered in
its actual application by: 1) politics between signatory members, and 2) a lack of
understanding regarding the realities of implementation. With respect to
participation, the literature indicates that there are barriers which affect the ability of
potential signatories to enforce CITES.

Formulation Problems
CITES contains several problems produced as a result of unclear or
incomplete language. Encompassing confusion over terminology and definitions,
these also include actual loopholes inherent in treaty provisions as well as "tension
points" regarding content interpretation between parties. More specifically, these
difficulties may be listed formally as: 1) linguistic problems over individual phrases,
2) allowance of trade with and among non-parties, 3) abuses of reservations, and 4)
the existence of a "denunciation" option for parties.
26

26
Hemley.

24
Phrasing
First, the linguistic questions which have arisen throughout the existence of
CITES generally tend to center around the meanings of the terms "species",
"endangered" or "threatened", and "commercial trade".
27
First, the word "species"
may taxonomically refer to an animal group native to several different countries. But
this contrasts with the CITES definition in Article I of "species" as "any species,
subspecies, or geographically separate population thereof"—a definition which
requires the distinction of different animal groups in differing geographic areas that
may be taxonomically identical. If the CITES definition is applied and the species in
question is subdivided into further "species" despite being taxonomically identical,
then how is the distinction made in taxonomic terms, and how is this distinction
made clear for inspection and trade purposes?
28

Second is the problem that CITES does not define what constitutes an
"endangered" or "threatened" species. It leaves unspecified thresholds of any sort to
indicate at which point a species is to be considered Appendix I or Appendix II. This
leaves two important questions unanswered by the CITES Secretariat. In relation to
the preceding definition of "species," a species may be endangered in one country
but not necessarily so in another. Does this situation mean that the species in
question is considered endangered intentionally, or not endangered? Turning to pure
delimitation, the absence of definition leaves no consistent means of determining
"endangered" or "threatened" situations. Does this leave individual states with the

27
Eldridge; Fitzgerald; Karno; Krieps; Liwo; Matthews; Melick; Peters.
28
CITES, Article I; Hemley; Liwo.

25
discretion to set their own criteria? While the CITES Secretariat has issued
guidelines attempting to clarify the confusion produced by these two terms that
called for a consideration of "biological data" and "probability of trade", it still has
left the obscure nature of the language intact and subject to continual discussion.
29

Another question is what constitutes "commercial" trade. This term is never
defined explicitly in the CITES text, however, this word critical. Under Article III of
the convention the granting of trade in any Appendix I (endangered) species is
partially reliant on its determination. Any trade deemed "commercial" would
automatically NOT qualify to receive a trade permit. As a result, this implicitly
means that the breadth of whatever definition is adopted to delimit "commercial" will
also delimit the quantity of trade allowed for Appendix I species. While the CITES
Secretariat did release guidelines to define the term "...as broadly as possible", it still
did not specify what the exact definition is, making it open to individual state
determination,
30
thereby allowing the possibility for abuses in application of what
trade is to be deemed "commercial".
31

These linguistic issues are problematic. The terminology leaves the treaty
bereft of uniform specific guidelines to be followed by each signatory member.
Instead, it provides ground for dissension between participants over definition and

29
CITES, Article II; Hemley; Liwo.
30
CITES, Article III; Hemley; Karno.
31
An example of this importation of endangered primates to Polish zoos for non-commercial
purposes, but which were then re-exported by those zoos in what for all intensive purposes were
commercial operations (Karno).

26
standards to be used in controlling endangered species trade.
32
Differing values and
text interpretations allows endangered species traffickers operating under CITES to
follow the lowest common denominator (i.e., the most lenient definitions) in
exploiting flora and fauna. More than this, it gives signatory parties uncertain legal
grounds to pursue traffickers, as the handling of the international trade of endangered
species implicitly assumes the involvement of multiple nations—and so, too,
multiple legal systems—and hence requires some measure of legal commonality to
pursue and capture illegal traffickers trading from one country to another.

Non-Parties
Following this is the question of trade between parties and non-parties to
CITES. Article X requires "comparable documentation" from "competent
authorities" in non-parties to be shown to CITES parties when trading flora and
fauna listed under the convention. Unfortunately, the treaty does not define these
terms, nor does it even indicate what minimum standard would be required to fulfill
such terms, but instead leaves them open for determination by trading CITES parties.
The net result is that non-parties, depending upon the rigor which treaty signatories
interpret and enforce its language regarding trade with countries not members to
CITES, may effectively operate free of CITES requirements. This allows several
problems to limit the treaty: 1) it enables endangered species traffickers to flaunt

32
This is a definite fact and not mere speculation. CITES, in order to observe the sovereignty
of member nations, allows signatories the right to self-determine any phrases or terms that are not
defined in the treaty text. (See Hemley).

27
treaty regulations simply by declaring their products' countries of origin as being
non-signatory states, 2) ensures havens from which endangered species traffickers
may base with impunity trade operations which violate CITES, and 3) preserves
avenues through which the global endangered species trade may conduct business
without regard to CITES requirements.
33

Reservations
There is also the problem arising from abuses of the "reservation" clause in
Article XXIII. Under this article, parties are able to claim reservations to CITES for
which ever species they wish to exercise trade in, free of the provisions in the
convention. Nowhere in the treaty is there a limit as to the number of reservations
which a country can claim. Originally, when the drafts of the convention were first
being introduced, it was expected that the reservation clause would only be used
sparingly. Intended largely to aid in attracting international signatories, the clause
was based on assumptions of sincere and earnest compliance with CITES and did not
presuppose the possibility of abuse, leaving such a possibility open for exploitation
via excessive and unconstrained numbers of reservations.
34
But more than this, the
mere existence of such a clause allows for serious markets in endangered species

33
CITES, Article X; Eldridge; Fitzgerald; Hemley; Karno; Krieps; Liwo; Matthews; Melick;
Peters; Gary Meyers. "Surveying the Lay of the Land, Air, and Water: Features of Current
International Environmental and Natural Resources Law, and Future Prospects for the Protection of
Species Habitat to Preserve Global Biological Diversity.” Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law and Policy. Vol. 3 No. 2 (Summer 1992). pp. 479-634.
34
As an example of how states may claim unconstrained numbers of reservations, Switzerland
has claimed as many as 32 species, Canada 13, Japan 14, and France 7 (See Karno and Stewart).

28
trade to continue unmitigated free of CITES attempts at control and regulation. In
effect, the reservation clause enables continued assurance of such trade, serving for
all intensive purposes as a self-imposed, self-maintained impediment to CITES
success.
35

Denunciation
The "denunciation" clause in Article XXIV is also an issue. Under this
section, any party may choose to withdraw from membership—and hence
participation—from CITES simply by issuing a written notice to the Secretariat.
Such a clause allows any party no longer interested in compliance to the provisions
of the treaty to withdraw un-impeded and without justification, allowing the potential
for abandonment of the convention by any number and type of the members
concerned.
36

The net effect of all the preceding CITES text issues is the politicization of
the convention. The vagueness leaves open significant areas of discussion in which
states may formulate and assert their own definitions and criteria, thus preserving
opportunities for significant inter-member debate and disagreement. The allowance
of trade predominately absent of CITES requirements with and among non-parties to

35
CITES, Article XXIII; Fitzgerald; Favre; Glennon; Heimert; Hemley; Krieps; Liwo;
Matthews; Padgett; Peters; Sands and Bedecarre; Stewart.
36
Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the Environment. Clarendon Press
(1992); CITES, Article XXIV; Favre; Fitzgerald; Glennon; Heimert; Hemley; Krieps; Liwo;
Matthews; Padgett; Peters; Sands and Bedecarre; Stewart; Oran Young. International Cooperation.
Cornell University Press (1989).

29
the treaty ensures the preservation of major avenues for illegal endangered species
trade. The reservation options allow states to exercise trade free of CITES
compliance at their own discretion, offering them participation without obligation.
The denunciation clause gives states a final option of departure and its attendant
threat of CITES breakdown. Combined together, these three factors produce a
situation in which bargaining, negotiation, and interaction will have to occur for any
resolution of ambiguities or differences in treaty interpretation, with the chances of
reservations or even denunciation being the leverage in these processes. Taking into
consideration the lack of an over-arching authority with any level of binding or
sanctioning power, CITES becomes less a "hard law" instrument of binding
international convention and more a "soft law" example of international regimes.

Operational Problems
Not only does CITES have textual vagaries, it also suffers from challenges
endemic to the nature of its subject matter. Arising from the mundane realities of
public policy at both the international and national level, these problems pose a
significant threat to CITES enforcement. Specifically, they are: 1) inspection
complexities for participating national authorities, 2) scientific problems in data
assessment for those authorities, 3) the inherent obstacles which exist whenever
natural phenomenon coincide with policy structures, and 4) the challenges of
operation under signatory conditions.

30
Inspection
First, the enforcement of CITES provisions relies largely on the ability of
individual states to accurately and comprehensively inspect all flora and fauna trade
that passes through their borders. The years of CITES existence have revealed
serious shortcomings in this critical requirement. TRAFFIC investigations reveal that
inspectors cannot accurately recognize the endangered species products passed to
them, or even ascertain which species are listed in the CITES appendices. In
addition, inspectors often experience great difficulty in properly differentiating
between authentic export/import permits and false ones. Compounding the situation,
inspectors have been found to be generally unaware of other nations' or even their
own nation's domestic conservation laws—knowledge of which is critical in
determining the issuance and validity of trade permits. While these problems are not
solely the fault of inspectors (indeed, the mere task of being able to recognize and
distinguish the more than 700 species listed in CITES appendices as well as the
individual domestic endangered species laws of every nation on the earth is a task of
overwhelming proportions), the fact remains that the aforementioned problems are a
significant threat to effective CITES implementation. Such deficiencies are serious,
as they allow trade in endangered species listed in CITES appendices to be allocated
export/import permits regardless of the existence of relevant wildlife laws.
37

37
Karno; Liwo; Melick; Schonfeld; Trexler.

31
Data Assessment
Second, there is the simple problem of basic scientific data collection,
particularly with regards to obtaining correct population counts for CITES purposes.
Accurate numbering of species populations is a notoriously frustrating challenge, as
it often requires the estimation of population numbers in their native habitats in
situations where they cannot be isolated or sampled in a rigorous, empirically
absolute manner. Even with a wealth of financial, administrative, field operative,
technical, or technological resources, the surmising of total population counts has
often proved to be capable of defying complete estimation.
38
Such absence or
weakness of biological population data severely hampers CITES enforcement, as the
Scientific Authority of each state relies on them to determine listing in appendices,
and therefore protection under CITES provisions. This leaves the question of species
status open to non-scientific debate between member nations, and susceptible to
political manipulation and determination rather than empirical biological assessment.
Hence, species for which no accurate population figures may be gained may find
themselves being improperly listed or even excluded from listing in CITES
appendices even while their true numbers would require it.
39

38
Raymond Bonner. At the Hand of Man: Peril and Hope for Africa’s Wildlife. Alfred A.
Knopf (1993); Brian Groombridge (ed.). Global Biodiversity. UNEP (2000); William Robinson and
Eric Bolen. Wildlife Ecology and Management. MacMillan Publishing Company (1989).
39
Karno.

32
Nature
Third, there are the obstacles which are inherent any time policy—
particularly international policy—structures are utilized in an attempt to interact with
natural phenomenon. These difficulties occur because of the simple fact that flora
and fauna behave as biological organisms irrespective of national boundaries. A
specific endangered species may be endangered within the borders of one country
but exist in healthy numbers elsewhere. The African elephant, for example, is
considered on the verge of extinction in Kenya but is yet prospering in South Africa.
Such differences in species welfare has led to confusion and debate between
signatory members as to which species should be given protection under CITES and
which should not. Because CITES is an international treaty assumed to offer
guidelines to be followed by all participants, this lack of consensus erodes CITES
protection of dwindling flora and fauna species. Overall, the treaty is incapable of
exercising full control over the endangered species trade.
40

Signatory
Finally, there is the issue of signatory conditions. The literature observes that
because of its efforts to garner international support from potential signatory
members, CITES was forced to address participant concerns regarding state
sovereignty and hence had to construct a regulatory structure which preserved each
signatory's sovereign power over its own internal affairs. As a result, CITES gave

40
Karno; Padgett.

33
each member nation the right and responsibility to enforce the treaty to the extent to
which it was capable. Because of this, despite being an ostensibly international
treaty, CITES is only effective if its participants are committed to its enforcement.
Unfortunately, not all participants are equally willing or able, as some countries
either do not consider endangered species protection as a national priority, or do not
have the financial, organizational, human, or information resources needed to fully
regulate all endangered species trading activity crossing their borders. In “under-
developed” regions, these realities have a greater proclivity to appear relative to
developed nations due to the extensive pressures which exist in the developing world
form the burdens of income inequality, political and socio-economic instability, poor
health and social services, and widespread poverty. Such conditions cause the
persistence of CITES deficiencies via corruption, inadequate or inconsistent funding,
insufficient or unqualified administration, or outright inattention. Thus, because of
these realities, CITES is considered to be a convention subject to inconsistent
enforcement.
41

Participation Problems
In addition to textual and operational problems, CITES is confronted with
challenges impeding the membership of signatories. CITES, as an international
treaty, is an expression of international cooperation between members. For each
member, however, the decision to join CITES may involve a cost-benefit calculation,

41
Bonner; Fitzgerald; Fuller et al; Karno; Krieps; Liwo; Lyster; McFadden; Melick; Padgett;
Peters; Reeve; Schonfeld; Trexler; Yale Environmental Protection Clinic.

34
involving the weighing of costs and benefits incurred by joining the treaty. In
situations where costs are greater than benefits, potential signatories are discouraged
from supporting the treaty.
42

The costs brought by membership in CITES include the financial, time, and
labor resources committed to maintaining the management authority, scientific
authority, permit office, prohibition and punishment mechanisms, and annual report
filing required under the treaty. Other costs are the transaction costs generated by
interactions between countries in support of CITES, such as negotiations,
information-sharing, or enforcement assistance. Additional costs include the
opportunity costs incurred by a country which surrenders the benefits brought by
endangered species trade in lieu of complying with treaty restrictions.
43

The benefits brought by membership are the general benefits of improved
endangered species survival, which provides biological gains from biodiversity,
emotional and spiritual gains from ecological preservation, scientific gains from
potential biological discoveries, and economic gains from sustainable trade in
conserved natural resources. Further benefits include improved international
cooperation and communication brought by participation in CITES with other
signatories.
44

42
Baker; MacDonald.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.

35
The result of the above-referenced series of implementation problems is that
they hamper the success of CITES as an international legal instrument, essentially
blunting the primary tools CITES is reliant upon to regulate and control the
international trade in endangered species: accurate and timely CITES appendices
listings, accurate and comprehensive trade inspection, and accurate and competent
export/import permitting. The challenges, however, also illustrate the telling and
continuing problem of CITES as a legal instrument attempting to deal with the
practical world—that is, they show the difficulties in linking intention to reality, and
the hurdles which inevitably rise in applying international treaties to large-scale
issues such as global endangered species conservation and trade. In so doing, they
highlight the issues which must be addressed in attempting to establish CITES as an
effective international treaty, and whose presence perhaps also indicate the areas of
international law in need of further development.
45

IV. Literature Critique
This review of existing scholarship suggests that a better understanding of
CITES problems might be achieved through research beyond the current predilection
on nation-state or international levels and further into its implementation at a more
fundamental, basic level: enforcement at the local level, not by the government
which signed and ratified the treaty, but by the entities that may be expected by the
government to actually apply it on a daily basis. Tailoring this analysis to focus on

45
Birnie and Boyle, p. 1-31; Alexander Kiss (ed.). Living with Wildlife: Wildlife Resource
Management with Local Participation in Africa. World Bank (1990).

36
local actors requires guidance from the research literature, since it can point out areas
that benefit from this study’s contribution. Based on the available body of current
work to date, the issues that could utilize this dissertation’s attention can be
organized into the following themes: limitations caused by level-of-analysis
problems in terms of “local” enforcement, excessive breadth which sacrifices close
inspection of a single geographic area in favor of an over-arching generalized
review, an emphasis on non-enforcement issues, a restrictive focus on particular
species, and a lack of timeliness in data and analysis.

Level-of-Analysis
Some of the research literature, while ostensibly targeted at successful CITES
enforcement, focuses on a level-of-analysis that precludes effective understanding of
CITES enforcement in the field. This is due to their attention away from “local”
implementation in lieu of higher level analysis with nation-states or federal
bureaucracies as actors under review. A number of studies concentrate exclusively
on nation-states as actors, and do not devote attention to alternative levels-of-
analysis.
46

This poses some issues, in that by staying at the nation-state level, such
studies lose awareness as to the particularities of enforcement, especially for the
issues confronted by administrative personnel tasked with enforcing CITES on a
day-to-day basis below the operations of national governments. A study addressing

46
Baker; Liwo; MacDonald; Melick; Mofson; Schonfeld.

37
CITES implementation below the nation-state level might better illuminate the
specific problems that impact the effective enforcement of CITES-related national
regulations. This information is important, as it is ultimately the activities of
dedicated personnel in the “field,” defined as the lowest levels below national
government at which CITES enforcement is at its most personal, that determine the
effectiveness and ability of national government to meets its CITES obligations.
Information regarding field-level implementation might allow nation-states to
engage in self-mitigation and self-improvement without the external oversight of
CITES Secretariat or Conference of the Parties (COP). A more useful analysis
addressing this aspect of CITES implementation would deal primarily on the issues
of day-to-day CITES enforcement confronting field personnel.
Some scholars do extend their work to actors below the nation-state level,
with analysis on government agencies tasked with implementing CITES in local
communities.
47
But these studies utilize definitions that are constrained, in that
“local enforcement” is interpreted as being the activities of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service—a federal agency—operating with federal jurisdiction in counties
and municipalities. However, under the possible implications of devolution, such a
definition ignores the potential roles county and municipal entities may play in
federal policy. CITES, as enacted via the ESA, is dependent on reports and referrals
from law enforcement agencies to supplement the reach of Fish and Wildlife Service
inspectors. Hence, U.S. implementation of CITES extends further than the federal

47
McMullin; Melick; Schonfeld; Trexler.

38
jurisdiction of the FWS, and penultimately reaches the domain of non-federal law
enforcement.
48
A more accurate definition of “field” enforcement would encompass
these local, non-federal entities.
Beyond the constraints in definition, current research on community-level
CITES implementation do not entirely relate local enforcement to national or
international levels. In particular, they do not clearly explain how local “field”
enforcement problems create a schism between the realities of implementation and
CITES’ objectives.
49
A study of greater value to CITES would investigate the impact
and relationship of “field” problems to the treaty’s success.
In addition, in dealing with the “field,” existing scholarship retains a focus on
leadership, and shies away from patrol personnel. This level-of-analysis creates a
possible gap in knowledge, in that the responses and perceptions of senior
management may not be the same as their field staff, and the problems confronting
senior management may not be the same as the challenges facing personnel engaged
in patrolling CITES-related traffic.
50
Even for the times when the literature does
provide attention to field issues encountered by lower-level patrol officers, the
analysis is somewhat limited in sampling, with infrequent interviews or surveys.
Instead, the investigations rely on anecdotes or observations from single
subordinates, missing the opportunity to gather more comprehensive feedback from a

48
McMullin; Melick; Schonfeld; Trexler.
49
Trexler.
50
McMullin; Melick; Schonfeld.n.

39
larger cohort of patrol personnel.
51
A more appropriate study would employ a larger
research sample restricted exclusively to field-level CITES-related enforcement,
particularly the issues they face in the day-to-day implementation of CITES.

Breadth of Review
Some literature, while addressing CITES enforcement at the field level below
that of national governments, unfortunately do not directly review enforcement
within the United States. As a result, the work is rendered less germane insofar as it
compounds the level-of-analysis problem by bypassing potential insights of
immediate relevancy to U.S. enforcement. Several scholars target regions other than
the U.S.
52
In doing so, they engage comparative studies of multiple countries. While
useful in summarizing the difficulties confronted by field personnel around the
world, this decreases the depth of their study towards uncovering nuances of
domestic policy environments. A more useful study for understanding enforcement
nuances would devote attention to one nation-state, and dedicate its energies
exclusively to the field-level enforcement problems within that country, with the
goal of performing an investigation comprehensive in its review of field-level CITES
implementation issues but singular in constraining its level-of-analysis to the CITES-
related activities of field personnel.
Even when the literature does focus on the U.S., it employs methodology that
is still comparative, with the focus on state-by-state analysis. Such an approach

51
Liwo; Schonfeld.
52
Fuller; Hemley; Fitzgerald; McFadden.

40
misses the deeper insight that could come from a study targeted solely on a single
geographic location.
53
A single location-specific, issues-identifying case might
unveil more subtle problems of comparable, if not equal, significance to CITES
implementation, as it would afford greater attention and closer inspection into the
challenges of CITES-related field enforcement.

Emphasis on Non-Enforcement Issues
Some of the research fails to deal with CITES enforcement altogether.
Instead, the literature presents a factual description of CITES operation as presented
by the treaty, or turns to philosophical or textual nuances in the treaty. While
relevant, and in some ways insightful for CITES enforcement, this work does not aid
in understanding the day-to-day “field” issues.
54

Admittedly, a few scholars attempt to provide a more comprehensive method,
combining factual presentation with abstract discourse supplemented with
implementation review. But these works tend to present enforcement incidentally to
their main concern, which tend to relate more to questions of treaty semantics, goals,
and administration between signatories, as opposed to field operations supporting
CITES.
55
A study more suited towards policy implementation would put more
emphasis on the problems encountered by patrol personnel.

53
McMullin.
54
Hemley; Krieps; Sands and Bedecarre;
55
Baker; Lieberman; Liwo; Matthew; Peters; Schonfeld; Stewart.

41
Focus on Particular Species or Particular Types of Trade
Several of the studies restrict their attention to specific endangered species or
limited types of endangered species trade (such as exotic medicines).
56
These studies
help provide understanding about CITES in practice, but their restrictions decrease
the cross-application of their observations to other types of flora and fauna, or other
categories of trade. In particular, they do not fully illuminate the nature of CITES-
related enforcement activities pursued by each nation-state signatory, and do not
yield insights into the issues of actual enforcement in the field that must be addressed
to ensure control over endangered species trade as a whole. A more appropriate
study would be more comprehensive, covering the full range of endangered species
protected by CITES, while still being constrained in other ways to field-level CITES-
related enforcement activities.

Need for Current Data and Updated Analysis
Finally, while some of the research is related to CITES enforcement, it
suffers from a lack of timeliness in data. Because of their publication dates, the
literature contains data from the 1980s.
57
Even when the analysis is more recent, it
tends to collect data that is limited in sampling size, making it difficult to extrapolate
identifiable trends to compare against current policy trends.
58
The current state of
knowledge would benefit from data regarding wildlife trade and enforcement

56
Eldridge; Gaski; Glennon; Heimert; Johnson; Karno; Padgett.
57
Fitzgerald.
58
Trexler

42
resources that was more current and more readily tied to current implementation
efforts.

The preceding discussion calls for a study of the highlighted gaps in research.
Specifically, it points out potential areas of research for further understanding into
treaty implementation: 1) analysis focused on the issues of day-to-day field-level
CITES enforcement, 2) a constrained breadth in review targeting a small geographic
area so as to produce more nuances and detail as opposed to broad generalization, 3)
an emphasis on CITES-related enforcement issues, 4) a scope that encompasses a
relatively comprehensive variety of endangered species being transported in
violation of CITES in a particular geographic area, and 5) updated literature with
more timely data reflecting current trends in CITES enforcement issues. Analysis
tailored to addressing these areas may yield further insights into the nature of CITES
enforcement, serving either to expand on prior research or uncovering further
dimensions in problems. Delving into a field-based analysis of enforcement issues
would provide the basis for an in-depth study, with a potentially rich supply of detail
offered by the intricacies of field enforcement, while still affording a basis for
contextual breadth, in that such detail could exist for the myriad range of
enforcement issues. As a dissertation topic, such a target would require some
constraints in scope, beginning with a declaration of theory to define a rubric and an
objective of analysis, a selection of tools to apply the analysis, a statement of
variables upon which the tools are to be applied, and the framework which is to tie

43
the preceding into a coherent body of investigative research fulfilling the objective of
analysis.

VI. Conclusion
The existing research literature on CITES ignores the dependence of CITES
enforcement upon local law enforcement. This analysis hypothesizes that local
actors have an awareness of treaties and see an interest in participating in their
enforcement. The hypothesis is tested using a case study centered around CITES,
with additional smuggling treaties used for comparison, with data gathered from a
local law enforcement agency in Los Angeles dealing with international trafficking
covered by the treaties in the study. The case study first utilizes qualitative
techniques to determine the nature of the linkage between local law enforcement and
CITES along the implementation chain. Subsequently, the analysis then turns to
quantitative techniques to identify issues and possible mitigation in the linkage by
drawing data from the Port of Los Angeles Police regarding their perceptions of
international law, the domestic laws which express international laws within the
United States, and the subject issues they were intended to address.

44
Chapter 3: Theory

The goal of this study is to highlight the relevance of an additional level of
analysis in international policy: the local level. The nature of international policy
has tended to ignore this area, with the bulk of study utilizing frameworks involving
other conceptualizations of the global arena such as nation-states or transnational
non-governmental organizations (i.e., a “higher” level view). In contrast, this
research explores the community level by following developing threads in national-
to-community allocation of law enforcement responsibilities (i.e., a “lower” level
perspective). The intent is to demonstrate the linkage between local and global
realms, and the manner in which potential devolution of authority to local
enforcement may pose issues to international policy implementation.
To better understand this connection, it is somewhat helpful to survey current
theoretical conceptions of international politics. This helps place the study within
the context of international policy. Furthermore, it sets the stage to understand the
implications of the analysis to current theory.

I. Ideas of the Local
Notions of local involvement in larger-scale government actions are not new
with respect to national policy. Both within popular media and research literature,
there has been a discourse of utilization by national policy of local actors. Calls for
greater local authority in administering national policy have echoed in other

45
countries, even with respect to environmental issues.
59
Within the U.S., this has
revolved around a readjustment of authority, with greater allocation of
responsibilities and powers to local communities. Areas where this is more
frequently discussed include border security, human trafficking, and national
security.
60

59
For examples, see generally: Raymond Bonner. At the Hand of Man: Peril and Hope for
Africa’s Wildlife. Alfred A. Knopf (1993); R. Steven Brown. “States Put Their Money Where There
Environment Is.” Environmental Council of the States. April 1999. URL:
http://www.ecos.org/section/publications. Accessed: November 12, 2007; Alexander Kiss and Dinah
Shelton. International Environmental Law. Transnational Publishers, Inc. (1991); Clark Gibson and
Stuart Marks, “Transforming Rural Hunters into Conservationists: An Assessment of Community-
Based Wildlife Management Programs in Africa.” World Development. Vol. 23 No. 6 (June 1995).
pp. 941-957; Jeffrey Hackel. “Community Conservation and the Future of Africa’s Wildlife.”
Conservation Biology. Vol. 13 No. 4 (Aug. 1999). pp. 726-734; Mark Infield. “Cultural Values: a
Forgotten Strategy for Building Community Support for Protected Areas in Africa.” Conservation
Biology. Vol. 15 No. 3 (June 2001). pp. 800-802; Timothy Lawrence. Devolution and Collaboration
in the Development of Environmental Regulations. Dissertation. Ohio State University (2005); Barry
Rabe. “Permitting, Prevention and Integration: Lessons from the States,” in Environmental
Governance: A Report on the Next Generation of Environmental Policy, Donald Kettl (ed.).
Brookings Institution Press (2002); Denise Scheberle. Federalism and Environmental Policy.
Georgetown University Press (2004); Kirsten M Silvius, et al (eds.). People in Nature: Wildlife
Conservation in South and Central America. Columbia University Press (2004); Oswald Braken
Tisen, et al. “Wildlife Conservation and Local Communities in Sarawak, Malaysia”. Paper presented
to Second Regional Forum for Southeast Asia of the IUCN World Commission For Protected Areas.
Dec. 1999. URL: http://www.mered.org.uk/mike/papers/Communities_Pakse_99.htm. Accessed Oct.
24, 2007; David Western, et al (eds.). Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based
Conservation. Island Press. 1994.
60
For examples, see generally: Robert Block. “Politics & Economics: Fighting Terrorism By
Sharing Data; Homeland Security Plans To Improve Cooperation With Police Departments.” Wall
Street Journal. (Eastern Edition). New York, New York. Oct 16, 2006. p. A6; Fact Sheet: Improving
Border Security and Immigration Within Existing Law. Department of Homeland Security. August
10, 2007. URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1186757867585.shtm. Accessed Sept 26,
2007; Tom Fitton. “Local Law Enforcement Effective in Fighting Illegal Immigration.” The
Conservative Voice, July 24, 2006. URL:
http://www.theconservativevoice.com/articles/article.html?id=16389. Accessed Sept. 25, 2007;
Patrick Poole. “Local Law Enforcement and Homeland Security.” American Thinker. August 9,
2007. URL: http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/08/local_law_enforcement_and_home.html.
Accessed Sept. 26, 2007; Gretchen Randall. “Devolution to the States is Working for Welfare; It Can
Work for Public Lands”, National Policy Analysis. National Center for Public Policy Research. June
2001. URL: http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA340.html. Accessed Sept 25, 2007; Zoe Tillman.
“Crackdown: Immigration supporters react to a resolution passed July 10 in Prince William County,
Va., that empowers local police to determine the status of residents and to arrest illegal immigrants”.
Christian Science Monitor. July 17, 2007. URL: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0717/p01s05-

46
This process of devolution reflects a modification of traditional rules of
jurisdiction, which tend to hold that enforcement of national laws fall under
exclusive jurisdiction of federal agencies while local laws are the exclusive
jurisdiction of local agencies. As suggested by popular and scholarly literature,
current trends presume that enforcement of national laws will benefit from the
addition of resources at the local level, and look to the opportunities for local actors
to gain greater jurisdiction over federal laws.
61

II. Encompassing the Local within the Global
Given the prospects for greater enforcement of national law by local actors
implied by the increasing calls for devolution, it would appear a potential equally
beneficial concept for supporting international instruments. Unfortunately, the notion
that local authority can assist policy implementation, while prevalent within the
discourse on national policy, are not so apparent with global ones. The concept of
devolution is largely discussed within the framework of national laws, but less so for
international law.

ussc.html. Accessed Sept. 25, 2007; “U.S. Wants Local Help in Human Trafficking.” Juvenile Justice
Digest. Vol. 32 No. 12 (Jul 6, 2004). pp. 6.
61
For examples, see generally: Kathleen Anders and Curtis Shook. “New Federalism: Impact
on State and Local Governments.” Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, & Financial
Management. Vol. 15 No. 3 (Fall 2003). pp. 466-486; Fred Collie. 21st Century Policing: The
Institutionalization of Homeland Security in Local Law Enforcement Organizations. Master’s Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey: Department of National Security Affairs (2006); David
Thacher. “The Local Role in Homeland Security”. Law & Society Review. Vol. 39 No. 3 (September
2005). pp. 635-676; Charles Wise and Rania Nader. “Organizing the federal system for homeland
security: Problems, issues, and dilemmas”. Public Administration Review. Vol. 62 Special Issue
(September 2002), p. 44-58.

47
The absence of devolution with international policy may be a reflection of
prevailing scholarship. Modern investigations of international policy, as reflected in
the discourse over globalization, utilize a “higher” level-of-analysis paradigm
focusing more on the relations between transnational forces and less on the role of
local actors.
This is apparent in the literature, which addresses globalization from varying
perspectives, including world history, economics, politics, culture, security and
environment, and concerns itself with the impact globalization in these areas has on
human society.
62
Historical research explores the thread of international relations
throughout the past, and compares it to the current era.
63
Economic globalization
studies the proliferation of trans-national trade regimes and multi-national integrated
markets.
64
Political globalization observes how states are increasingly interacting

62
For examples, see generally: Bonaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito
(eds.), Law and Globalization from Below. Cambridge University Press (2005); Robert Gilpin. The
Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21
st
Century. Princeton University Press
(2000); Paul Kennedy, et al. Global Trends and Global Governance. Pluto Press (2002); Richard
Langhorne. The Coming of Globalization. Palgrave (2001); Jan Aart Scholte. Globalization: A
Critical Introduction. St. Martin's Press (2000); P.J. Simmons and Chantal De Jonge Oudraat (eds.).
Managing Global Issues. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2001).
63
For examples, see generally: Clark, Ian. Globalization and Fragmentation. Oxford
University Press (1997); Hanagan, Michael. “States and Capital”, in Ends of Globalization, Don Kalb,
Marco Van Der Land, and et al (eds.). Rowman and Littlefield (2000). pp. 67-86; Giovanni Arrighi.
“Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the Endless Accumulation of Capital”, in Ends of
Globalization, Don Kalb, Marco Van Der Land, et al (eds.). Rowman and Littlefield (2000). pp. 125-
150; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson. “Globalization and the History of the International
Economy”, in Global Transformation Reader, David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.). Polity
(2000). pp. 68-75; Robert K. Schaeffer. Understanding Globalization (2
nd
Ed.). Rowman and
Littlefield (2003); Manfred B. Steger. Globalization. Oxford University Press (2003).
64
For examples, ee generally: C.F. Bergsten. “Globalizing Free Trade.” Foreign Affairs. Vol.
75 No. 3 (May/June 1996). pp. 105-120; Albert Berry. “Who Wins and Who Loses? An Economic
Perspective”, in Civilizing Globalization, Richard Sandbrook (eds.). SUNY Press (2003). pp. 15-26;
Robin Broad (ed.). Global Backlash. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers (2002); Michel
Chossudovsky. The Globalization of Poverty. Zed (1997); Tony Clarke. “Mechanisms of Corporate
Rule”, in The Case Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.). Sierra

48
with both supra-state organizations, which tie them together in a horizontal
arrangement of power, as well as sub-state actors, who interact with states and supra-
states in vertical arrangements of power.
65
Cultural globalization deals with the
increasing integration of values and aesthetics irrespective of national boundaries or
geographic range.
66
Security concerns address the questions of a growing prevalence

Club Books (1996). pp.78-91; Giovanni Cornia. “Poverty and Inequality in the Era of Liberalization
and Globalization”, in Hans Van Ginkel and et al, Human Development and Environment. United
Nations University Press (2002). pp. 55-87; CQ Researcher. Global Issues. Congressional Quarterly
Press (2001); de Sousa Santos; Edward Goldsmith. “Global Trade and the Environment”, in The Case
Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.). Sierra Club Books (1996).
pp. 78-91; William Greider. One World, Ready or Not. Allen Lane (1997); Andrew Hurrell and
Nagaire Woods (eds.). Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics. Oxford University Press (1999);
Martin Kohr. Rethinking Globalization. Zed (2001); Martin Khor. “Global Economy and the Third
World”, in The Case Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.). Sierra
Club Books (1996). pp. 47-59; Langhorne; Kennedy, et al; Scholte; Simmons and Oudraat; Charles
Tilly. “Globalization Threatens Labor’s Rights”, International Labor and Working Class History. Vol.
47 No. 1 (Spring 1995). pp. 1-23; Hans van Ginkel, et al. Human Development and Environment.
United Nations University Press (2002). pp. 55-87; Jeremy Rifkin. “New Technology and the End of
Jobs”, in The Case Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.), Sierra
Club Books (1996). pp. 108-121; Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.). Globalization and the
South. MacMillan (1997); Adrian Wood. North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality. Clarendon
Press (1994).
65
For examples, see generally: Tony Clarke; Ronald Cox. “An Alternative Approach to
Multilateralism for the 21
st
Century.” Global Governance. Vol. 3 No.1 (Jan.-April 1997). pp. 103-116;
David Held. Democracy and the Global Order. Polity Press (1995); Kennedy, et al; Langhorne; Eric
Lee. The Labour Movement and the Internet: the New Internationalism. Pluto (1997); Anthony
McGrew. The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy. Polity Press
(1997); Ralph Nader and Lori Wallach, “GATT, NAFTA, and The Subversion of the Democratic
Process”, in The Case Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.).
Sierra Club Books (1996). pp. 92-107; James Rosenau. Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier.
Cambridge University Press (1997); Simmons and Hopkins; Scholte; Beth Simmons and Daniel
Hopkins. “The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods.” American
Political Science Review. Vol. 99 No. 4 (November 2005). pp. 623-632; Simmons and Oudraat; Jana
von Stein. “Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance.” American
Political Science Review. Vol. 99 No. 4 (November 2005). pp. 611-622; Susan Strange. The Retreat
of the State. Cambridge University Press (1996); Andrew Vandenberg (ed.). Citizenship and
Democracy in a Global Era. MacMillan (2000).
66
For examples, see generally: Broad; Ronald Brown. “Globalization and the End of the
National Project”, in Boundaries in Question, John MacMillan and Andrew Linklater (ed.). Pinter
(1995). pp. 28-60; Mark Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. Zed (2001); Kennedy, et
al; Scholte; Michael Shapiro. “Moral Geographies and the Ethics of Post-Sovereignty.” Public
Culture. Vol. 6 No. 3 (Spring 1994). pp. 479-502; John Tomlinson. “Homogenisation and
Globalisation.” History of European Ideas. Vol. 20 No. 4-6 (Feb. 1995). pp. 891-897; Alan Warde.

49
of violence conducted by non-state entities with objectives unrelated to self-
determination or state sovereignty.
67
Environmental globalization research studies
issues of ongoing natural degradation and resulting international responses.
68

All of these areas of the globalization discourse bypasses focus on local
actors, as much as they are defined as those entities which are not nation-states nor
trans-national non-governmental organizations but are still within the sovereign
borders of nation-states. To the extent the research does review the local, it does so
within analysis of how global and local arenas interact, and does not delve into
notions of the function local actors may play in international policy.

“Eating Globally: Cultural Flows and the Spread of Ethnic Restaurants”, in The Ends of
Globalization, Marco Van Der Land, et al (eds.). Rowman and Littlefield (2000). pp. 219-316;
67
For examples, see generally: Congressional Quarterly; Duffield; Robert Harvey. Global
Disorder. Carroll and Graff Publishers (2003); Hans Holm and Georg Sorenson. “International
Relations Theory in a World of Variation”, in Whose World Order?, Georg Sorensen and Hans Holm
(eds.), Westview (1995). pp. 187-206; Samuel Huntington. Clash of Civilizations. Touchstone (1997);
Robert Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy.” Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 273 No. 2 (Feb. 1994). pp. 44-76;
Kennedy, et al; Langhorne; Paul Richards. Fighting for the Rainforest. Heinemann (1996); Simmons
and Oudraat; Susan Willett. “Globalization and the Means of Destruction”, in Globalization and
Insecurity, Barbara Harriss-White (ed.). Palgrave (2002). pp. 184-202.
68
For examples, see generally: Broad; Lynton Keith Caldwell. International Environmental
Policy. Duke University Press (1996); Akiko Domoto. “International Environment Governance—Its
Impact on Social and Human Development”, in Human Development and the Environment, Hans Van
Ginkel et al (eds.). United Nations University Press (2002). pp. 284-301; Hilary French. “Challenging
the WTO.” Worldwatch. Vol. 12 No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1999). pp. 22-27; Edward Goldsmith. “Global
Trade and the Environment”, in The Case Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward
Goldsmith (eds.). Sierra Club Books (1996). pp. 78-91; Inter-Parliamentary Union. Final Declaration
of the Parliamentary Meeting on the Occasion of UNCTAD X, Bangkok. UNCTAD (February 2000);
Joseph G. Jabbra and Onkar P. Dwivedi (eds.). Governmental Response to Environmental Challenges
in Global Perspective. IOS Press (1998); Martin Khor. “Global Economy and the Third World”, in
The Case Against the Global Economy, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds.). Sierra Club
Books (1996). pp. 47-59; Bjorn Lomborg. The Skeptical Environmentalist. Cambridge University
Press (2001); Scholte; Simmons and Oudraat; Matthew Stilwell, Governance, Globalization and the
Need for WTO Reform. Centre for International Environmental Law (1999); UNDP. Human
Development Report 1999. Oxford University Press (1999); Hans van Ginkel, et al (eds.). Human
Development and the Environment: Challenges for the United Nations in the New Millenium. United
Nations University Press (2002); Gerd Winter (ed.). Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental
Change. Cambridge University Press (2006); World Commission on Environment and Development.
Our Common Future. Oxford University Press (1987).

50
This opens an area for analysis, particularly for policy-makers seeing to
improve the effectiveness of international instruments. In light of federal efforts at
devolution of authority once deemed exclusive to national government jurisdiction,
there appears to be an opening to utilize local actors in international policy
implementation. As the federal government moves to allocate enforcement of
national laws to local government, linkages are created between “lower-level”
communities and larger-scale policies. Because some of the national laws are
domestic expressions of international treaties, these linkages extend from lower-level
law enforcement to “higher-level” global policies. The result is that local actors may
be seen as potential participants in the enforcement of international instruments.

III. Linkages from Global Perspectives to Local Communities
Similar to the research addressing global phenomenon, the focus on higher-
level actors at the expense of lower-level actors is a prevailing feature in
international political theory. Within the context of existing theory, lower-level
(including community-level) actions are overshadowed by perspectives dealing with
trans-national or supra-national activities. Despite this, there are facets of the
scholarship that offer direction regarding sub-nation-state actors and their
relationships with global politics. Understanding them assists in placing community-
level operations within the context of international policy implementation, and
allows connection between local levels to global ones.

51
Theories of the Global
International political theory is built upon several generally recognized major
schools, with each school exercising differing perspectives in studying the world. As
interpreted by the field, such perspectives may be divided into the following distinct
bodies: the realist/neo-realists, liberals/neo-liberals, international legalists, and
structuralists. Realists/Neo-Realists generally view the world as a largely anarchical
system consisting of nation-states as the primary international actors.
69

Liberalists/Neo-Liberalists view the world as composed of nation-states and non-
governmental actors interacting in interdependent relationships.
70
Structuralists,
sometimes labeled “post-behavioral”, “post-modern”, or “critical studies,” argue that
the global arena is essentially an historical construction created and maintained by
actors who have power over actors who do not, with the international community
being a structure organized to preserve and encourage the unequal relationships
between the elites and non-elites.
71

All of the aforementioned theoretical schools, while distinct from each other,
nevertheless tend to emphasize a higher-level worldview, both in terms of their scale

69
See generally: David Baldwin (ed.). Neorealism and Neoliberalism. Columbia University
Press (1993); Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.). International Relations Theory Today. Pennsylvania
State University Press (1995); James Der Derian (ed.). International Theory: Critical Investigations.
New York University Press (1995); James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.). Contending
Theories of International Relations. HarperCollins Publishers (1990); Joshua Goldstein. International
Relations (4th Ed.). Addison Wesley Longman (2001); Phil Williams, et al (eds.). Classic Readings of
International Relations. Wadsworth Publishing Company (1994).
70
Ibid.; Gerhard von Glahn. Law Among Nations. MacMillan Publishing Company (1992);
Ann-Marie Slaughter-Burley. “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda.” American Journal of International Law. Vol. 87 No. 2 (April 1993). pp. 205-255; Steven
Schneebaum. “The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public International Law.” Brooklyn
Journal of International Law. Vol. 8 No. 1 (1982). pp. 289-315.
71
See generally: Der Derian; Goldstein.

52
of analytical boundaries and their classification of actors operating within those
boundaries. All the schools, without exception, generally deal with the world as a
single international arena with nation-states and assorted non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as the primary actors. This suggests that international policy
structures based on such theories are constructions drawn exclusively from these
actors.
Alternatives, however, do exist within the scholarship. The history of
international political theory has sustained a "level-of-analysis" controversy, over
whether the world should be interpreted as a single massive system, a community of
nation-states and NGOs, or as an array of sub-national groups and peoples .
72

Proponents of the latter state that the adoption of a "macro"-level view incorrectly
ignores "micro"-level phenomenon in which the roles of human society and domestic
populations are assumed to be fully capable of influencing global activity. If not this,
then the world should at least be construed as consisting of multiple, interacting
levels in which domestic groups have as vital a role in international relations as the
political institutions which stand above them.
73

72
For introduction, see generally: J. David Singer. “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in
International Relations.” World Politics. Vol. 14 No. 1 (October 1961). pp. 77-92.
73
The literature on this is extensive. For examples, see generally: Yale Ferguson and Richard
Mansbach. “Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International
Theory.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 35 No. 4 (December 1991). pp. 363-386; Peter Haas.
“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” International
Organization. Vol. 46 No. 1 (Winter 1992). pp. 1-35; Samuel Huntington. Clash of Civilizations.
Touchstone (1997); David Putnam. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games.” International Organization. Vol. 42 No. 3 (Summer 1988). pp. 427-460; James Rosenau.
“The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World.” Comparative Politics. Vol. 24 No. 3 (April
1992). pp. 253-272; Ian Rowlands. “The International Politics of Environment and Development:
The Post-UNCED Agenda.” Millenium. Vol. 21 No. 2 (Summer 1992). pp. 209-224; Peter Skalnik.

53
Local Connections to the Global
Lower-level perspectives—particularly in relation to environmental issues—
have accompanied the development of international politics research on
globalization, with studies addressing the shifts in authority between global and
nation-state levels, as well as between nation-state and local levels. A dominant
concern is how complex, interconnected, trans-boundary environmental problems
have affected changes in the international landscape, with a proliferation of actors
accompanied by changes in power across traditional notions of international,
national, and local areas of authority.
74

Research emphasizing the local level within international environmental
policy features the works of Elinor Ostrom and Ronnie Lipschutz, who conceptualize
environmental issues as multi-level phenomenon, and dedicated portions of their
research to investigating “micro”-level phenomenon as it operates with respect to

“On the Inadequacy of the Concept of the 'Traditional State'.” Journal of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial
Law. Vol. 25 & 26 (1987). pp. 301-325.
74
For examples, see generally: Lamont Hempel. Environmental Governance: The Global
Challenge. Island Press (1996); Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Martello (eds.). Earthly Politics: Local
and Global in Environmental Governance. MIT Press (2004); Ronnie Lipschutz. “From Place to
Planet: Local Knowledge and Global Environmental Governance.” Global Governance. Vol. 3 No. 1
(Jan.-April 1997). pp. 83-102; Ronnie Lipschutz and Judith Mayer. Global Civil Society and Global
Environmental Politics: The Politics of Nature from Place to Planet. SUNY Press (1996); Matthew
Paterson. “Interpreting Trends in Global Environmental Governance.” International Affairs. Vol. 75
No. 4 (October 1999). pp. 793-802; James Rosenau. “Governance, Order, and Change in World
Politics,” in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order
and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press (1992); Daniel Press, et al. “The Role of
Local Government in the Conservation of Rare Species.” Conservation Biology. Vol. 10 No. 6
(December 1996). pp. 1538-1548; James Rosenau. “Environmental Challenges in a Turbulent World,”
in Ronnie Lipschutz and Ken Conca (eds.), The State and Social Power in Global Environmental
Politics. Columbia University Press (1993); Ion Bogdan Vasi. “Thinking Globally, Planning
Nationally and Acting Locally: Nested Organizational Fields and the Adoption of Environmental
Practices.” Social Forces. Vol. 86 No. 1 (September 2007). pp. 113-137; Oran Young (ed.). Global
Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience. MIT Press (1997).

54
trans-national environmental problems. Both assert the importance of local activities
in influencing the success or failure of “macro”-level policy instruments. Ostrom
primarily addresses the subject of common pool resources (CPRs), and studies the
role of local solutions relative to national policy. Her work has been extended to
deal with the relationship between local activities and international policies.
Lipschutz similarly focuses on the challenges of environmental problems, and writes
on the importance of local authority in implementing international policy. His
research has also been applied in studying the interaction of actors in the hierarchy of
local and national authority.
Elinor Ostrom argues that much of the environment composes “common pool
resources” which are accessible for use by communities of people, who interact with
the environment as a shared resource. Such CPRs, she notes, are susceptible to over-
exploitation and depletion. Solutions to this problem have tended to center around
debates between those who believe that CPRs are best managed by privatization and
the resulting efficiencies of free market forces versus those who believe that CPRs
are best managed by centralized authorities capable of creating and enforcing laws
on natural resource use. She asserts that there is a third option: local management.
75

Ostrom believes that effective solutions to CPR problems can be created by actors at
the local level through the development of cooperative natural resource use rules
independent of free market economic principles and being enforceable without non-

75
Elinor Ostrom. Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press (1990).

55
local government authority.
76
She believes that actors at the local level are better
suited to managing CPRs, since they are 1) more familiar with the environment in
their communities, 2) more familiar with the nature of their interaction with local
environments, and 3) capable of developing and adapting management rules that are
built of community consensus, and hence more likely to be self-sustaining.
77

Ronnie Lipschutz, compared to Ostrum, extends the arguments for more
"micro"-level conceptions to the notion of international environmental policy
structures. In his work on global environmentalism, Lipschutz notes that existing
international policy dealing with environmental issues is largely implemented with
nation-states and major NGOs as their primary participants. Such action implies that
the creators of such policies, either consciously or unconsciously, are following a
"macro"-level worldview in which nation-states and NGOs are the most effective
actors in the international arena. This ignores the existence of local communities and
social groups, where "local" consists of areas of operation beneath national
governments or nation-states.
78
Lipschutz argues that increasing levels of
globalization is leading to fragmentation and diffusion in political authority. This, he
asserts, increases the role of "local" authority, since "local" authority possesses

76
Ibid.
77
Nives Dolsak and Elinor Ostrom (eds.). Commons in the New Millenium. MIT Press (2003);
Robert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom (eds.). Local Commons and Global Interdependence:
Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains. Sage Publications (1995).
78
See generally: Ronnie Lipschutz. “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global
Civil Society.” Millenium. Vol. 21 No. 3 (Winter 1992). pp. 389-420; Ronnie Lipschutz and Ken
Conca (eds.). The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics. Columbia University
Press (1992); Ronnie Lipschutz. “From Place to Planet: Local Knowledge and Global Environmental
Governance.” Global Governance. Vol. 3 No. 1 (Jan.-April 1997). pp. 83-102.

56
greater familiarity and greater knowledge of community-level conditions and
concerns, and "local" authority is also more responsive to community-level issues.
79

Lipschutz continues by asserting that international policy structures, being
the product of "macro"-level thinking, are inherently incapable of being fully
applicable to local, sub-nation-state situations. This is because international policy
requires a level of abstraction and generalization in which action must be appropriate
to all the situations in which it is to be implemented. Given the inevitable variety of
situations which exist throughout the reaches of the world, and given their propensity
to change in unpredictable manners, the requirement of generalization reduces
international policy to relatively simplistic mechanisms which are insufficiently
flexible or responsive to local contexts. The end result is a gap between policy goals
and actual policy performance.
80

Both Ostrum and Lipschutz share the contention that there is potential for
contributions from the local level to the successful operation of international
institutions. Ostrum asserts this by arguing for greater inclusion of local communities
in resolving global CPR issues because of the greater sensitivity local communities
have to local issues. In contrast, Lipschutz does the same by calling for greater
allocation of authority to local communities in implementing global policy because
of the better responsiveness local communities have to local contexts. For both
Ostrum and Lipschutz, the underlying belief is that local communities have the
capacity and awareness to direct their actions in a way which supports larger-scale

79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.

57
international policy instruments. The implication of their research is essentially this:
there are connections between lower-level community actions and higher-level
international policy, and so implementation at the local level can influence the efforts
of international treaties.

IV. Conclusion
Devolution concepts highlight the use of local actors to help implement
policy—including international ones. While existing research regarding international
policy tends to bypass the function of local actors in supporting international
instruments, it does not refute the possibility, and leaves the question open.
International politics theory provides some threads for investigating the opportunities
posed by having local actors participate in international policy implementation.
Following the directions from international politics theory, particularly from
Ostrum and Lipschutz, this analysis hypothesizes that there are linkages between
local actors and global policy, such that local actors can contribute to their
enforcement. The next chapters conduct the investigation evaluating this hypothesis.

58
Chapter 4: Linkage

Understanding the linkage between local law enforcement and international
policy within the context of CITES involves following a chain of evidence from the
design of the instrument itself to its expression within the U.S., and then onto local
communities. The first link is global-to-national, in terms of going from
international instruments to participating national signatories. The second link is
national-to-local, extending from national government to local government. This
analysis addresses the potential for involving local government in global policy
implementation, and so encompasses both links between these three levels, with
particular focus on the local level. For this research, this means beginning with a
review of CITES as an international treaty, briefly detailing its framework,
continuing on to an introduction of the ESA and related government agencies, and
finally discussing the nature of connections to Port of Los Angeles Police.
The nature of the local-to-global linkage manifests itself in ways different to
the intentions of textual legality, with the de jure guidelines differing from the de
facto expression. The de jure linkage is apparent from the language of the treaty, as
well as the ESA. The de facto linkage is one deduced from discussions with
government officials at both federal and local levels.

59
I. De Jure Linkages
Information regarding de jure connections between local and global levels is
taken from publicly available documents for CITES and the ESA. The full text of
both are accessible on the internet, as is the official websites for the administrative
offices responsible for both. These resources, along with available scholarly
commentaries, indicate linkages going beyond the dual international-national
connection to an additional national-local one.

Global to National: CITES Design and Operation
The main objective of CITES is to ensure the continuing existence of
endangered species of fauna and flora. To accomplish this, it attempts to regulate the
international trade of specimens, managing the traffic of species and taking action
when necessary to ensure their survival.
Generally, the treaty design involves the statement of requirements which
each signatory nation-state is assumed to abide by as its obligatory terms of
membership, with the recognition that "international cooperation is essential for the
protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation
through international trade."
81
In addition, the treaty design compels each member
with the authority and responsibility to implement the laws it deems necessary to
ensure fulfillment of CITES requirements and objectives. The reasoning behind this
is two-fold: 1) that the "peoples and states are and should be the best protectors of

81
CITES, Preamble.

60
their own wild fauna and flora"
82
for reasons of familiarity over endemic ecological
conditions and socio-cultural particularities; and 2) to guarantee some measure of
respect for each state's sovereignty and thereby assuage any possible fears held by
existing or potentially new members of the dangers of acceding powers of political
self-determination to external international entities.
In delegating its signatory members with the authority and responsibility for
enforcement of the treaty, CITES make little effort to create an international
institutional structure. With its deference to each member nation-state's sovereignty,
the treaty avoids the implementation of any independent entity to enforce its
language, but rather prefers to focus on only creating CITES-specific administrative
organizations to support signatories with information and communication.
The CITES text approaches the endangered species trade as consisting of two
areas: 1) the international business of specimens and parts involving transportation
and transactions crossing national boundaries, and 2) the domestic business
composed of takings, transportation, and possession of specimens and parts. The
treaty itself is ostensibly aimed primarily at the international trade in endangered
species, and dedicates the bulk of its content to this issue. Treaty language regarding
domestic trade, while clear, is succinct and contained in several unique sections. To
explicate the operation of CITES in these two areas, it is necessary to summarize the
body of the text and to highlight critical areas in its language.

82
Ibid.

61
International Trade
CITES deals with the international trade of endangered species specimens
and parts through several major mechanisms: 1) the use of permits and certificates,
2) the call for "Scientific Authorities" and "Management Authorities" within each
member party, 3) the listing of species into one of three appendices, and 4) creation
of CITES organizations intended to assist in maintenance and support of the treaty.
The following discussion reviews each of these elements.

1) Permits and Certificates
Permits and certificates are meant to facilitate determination of trade goods as
being legal or illegal. Under CITES, they are needed for any action involving the
trans-national transaction or possession of species listed as being under the
protection of the treaty—both in terms of export and import. Permits and certificates
are issued by the Management Authority of each signatory member, and apply only
to the consignment of specimens and parts for which they were issued. The
requirements for obtaining a permit or certificate vary according as to which CITES
appendix the species in a consignment are listed under, as well as according to
whether or not the issuance of permits and certificates contravene the laws of a
signatory state regarding the species in that consignment. Officially, each permit or

62
certificate must contain identification listing: 1) title of the convention, 2) the name
of the Management Authority granting it, and 3) a control number.
83

2) Scientific and Management Authorities
The call for separate Scientific and Management Authorities is intended to
facilitate state control over both 1) the issuing of permits and certificates, as well as
2) the gathering and organization of scientific information relevant to endangered
species. Each signatory is required to create at least one Management Authority
representative of the signatory with the power to grant permits and certificates.
Similarly, each signatory is also required to create at least one Scientific Authority
whose function is to offer information and advice needed to determine if and to what
extent the trade in a particular species is detrimental to its survival.
84

3) CITES Appendices
The appendices provide a standardized hierarchy of endangered species,
organized by the extent to which the survival of species has been determined and
agreed upon by CITES parties at regularly scheduled CITES conventions. Appendix
I contains the names of those species considered in danger of imminent extinction,
and which "are or may be affected by trade." Species listed under Appendix I "must
be subject to particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their
survival and must only be authorized in exceptional circumstances." Any trade in an

83
CITES, Article VI.
84
CITES, Article IX. See also Articles III-VII.

63
Appendix I species requires the grant and presentation of import and export permits
and certificates which have been issued by Management Authorities under the
consultation and approval of Scientific Authorities regarding 1) the particular
welfare of the specimens and parts being traded and 2) the general welfare of the
species to which those specimens and parts belong.
85

Appendix II holds the names of species which are either 1) not necessarily in
danger of extinction but may become so unless trade in them is placed under control
or 2) needed to be placed under regulation in order to assist the control of species
belonging to 1). In contrast to Appendix I, trade in an Appendix II species only
requires the grant and presentation of permits and certificates for purposes of export.
In addition, trade in Appendix II species only requires Scientific Authorities to
determine that the general welfare of a species is not threatened by the trade of
specimens and parts belonging to it before authorizing Management Authorities to
issue permits and certificates.
86

Appendix III lists those species which "any Party identified as being subject
to regulation. for the purposes of restricting exploitation, and as needing the
cooperation of other parties in the control of trade." Similar to Appendix II, trade in
Appendix III species only requires the grant and presentation of export permits and
certificates. Unlike Appendix II, however, it eliminates the need for Management

85
CITES, Article III.
86
CITES, Article IV.

64
Authorities to seek the approval of Scientific Authorities in issuing permits and
certificates.
87

4) CITES Organizations
CITES also calls for the existence of the organizations dedicated to
supporting its maintenance and operation. Under the treaty text, "a Secretariat shall
be provided by the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment
Programme." The Secretariat may be "assisted by suitable intergovernmental or non-
governmental, international or national agencies and body technically qualified in
protection, conservation and management of wild fauna and flora."
88

The duties of the Secretariat involve the holding of CITES meetings,
coordination of CITES-relevant data and discussions, the undertaking of research
needed for successful CITES implementation, and any other activities necessary to
organize the signatory states in support of the treaty. In line with the treaty language
quoted above, th Secretariat is supported by the World Conservation Monitoring
Centre (WCMC), which collects and analyzes wildlife trade information, and the
network of Trades Record Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC)
offices, who monitor worldwide flora and fauna trade and conduct investigations in
regards to CITES.
89

87
CITES, Article V.
88
CITES, Article XII.
89
World Conservation Monitoring Center. URL: http://wcmc.org.uk. Accessed
December 1, 2003; Geoffrey Lean and Don Hinrichsen. Atlas of the Environment.
HarperCollins Publishers (1994).

65
Domestic Trade
CITES deals with the domestic trade in endangered species through implicit
means stated briefly within its text. Consistent with its structure, which was designed
to preserve the sovereignty of member states, the treaty offers little in terms of
explicit language regarding how or in what manner signatories are expected to
implement endangered species laws. It does, however, note the following:

The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the right of
Parties to adopt:
a) stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade,
taking, possession or transport of specimens and species
included in Appendices I, II, and III, or the complete
prohibition thereof; or
b) domestic measures restricting or prohibiting trade, taking,
possession or transport of species not included in Appendices
I, II, or III.
90

In addition, CITES also states:

The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the
provisions of any domestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving

90
CITES, Artice XIV, Paragraph 1.

66
from any treaty, convention, or international agreement relating to other
aspects of trade, taking, possession or transport of specimens which is in
force or subsequently may enter into force for any Part...
91

The text goes on to observe that CITES requirements must be met by a signatory
regardless of the pre-existing presence or subsequent enactment by that signatory of
other endangered species-related treaties or agreements. Moreover, the text asserts
that CITES may not be interpreted as contravening or contradicting any other
endangered species-related treaties or agreements, and that it should not be construed
as affecting the obligations by CITES parties to the requirements of any such treaties
or agreements of which they are members.
92

On cursory review, it would appear that the treaty is affirming what is already
self-evident, and is repeating what should already be clear from its initial declaration
that "peoples and States are and should be the best protectors of their own wild fauna
and flora" and from its general intentions to respect each member's sovereignty.
Closer inspection, however, suggests that the formal statement of the above rights
and provisions may be taken as a subtle indication that CITES recognizes and
accepts the fact that the international business in endangered species specimens and
parts is predicated on—or at the very least connected to—the takings and
transactions of specimens and parts occurring within the domestic boundaries of each
signatory nation-state.

91
CITES, Article XIV, Paragraph 2
92
CITES, Article XIV, Paragraphs 3-6.

67
In particular, the nature of the language in the first quote given above implies
an awareness that regulation and control of the international endangered species
trade inherently involves regulation and control of domestic trade—in other words,
that CITES is dependent on domestic laws dealing with species listed within the
treaty's appendices. More than this, the quote suggests by its mere presence that the
treaty is reminding its members that there is a need to enact laws which extend
beyond CITES requirements to fully achieve CITES' ulterior objective: the continued
survival of endangered species. This reveals that the treaty is asking signatories to
abide by the "spirit" of its text as much as it is asking them to abide by the language
of it. Indeed, it may be considered as offering an implicit suggestion for member
nation-states to implement and enforce laws addressing all aspects of domestic
endangered species conservation issues as part of their obligations as signatory
parties to CITES.

National to Local: CITES Enforcement in the U.S.
Enforcement of CITES in the U.S. is based on a combination of legal and
administrative instruments. Legal implementation is conducted via the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), which serves to fulfill U.S. obligations as a signatory to CITES,
and thereby establishes a link between the treaty’s international level and U.S.
national level. The ESA was created in 1973 as a federal response to CITES, and
dealt directly with the U.S. implementation of CITES. It is not identical to CITES in
terms of species protected, since species listings within the ESA are determined by

68
the federal government (for CITES, this is done by the signatories) and often deal
with species native to the U.S. The ESA, however, does have considerable overlap
with CITES-listed flora and fauna in fulfillment of U.S. obligations to the
international treaty.
The ESA executes the U.S. duties under CITES by specifying what federal
bodies are to serve as the country's Management Authority, Scientific Authority,
Permit Office, and prohibitions and penalties. The Department of Interior has
responsibility to implement the treaty.
93
Within the department, with respect to
fauna, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) are charged as administrators of CITES, with the FWS having the duty of
enforcement.
94
Holding the role of both Management Authority and Scientific
Authority, the FWS contains the Wildlife Permit Office (WPO) and the Office of
Scientific Authority (OSA).
95
With respect to flora, the Department of Agriculture
functions as administrator of CITES, with the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) carrying out the duties of Management Authority and Scientific
Authority.
96

Like CITES, the ESA is based on a listing of endangered and threatened
species.
97
However, the ESA applies different listing criteria and also expands the

93
16 U.S.C. Section 1537a(a).
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Laura Kosloff and Mark Trexler. "The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species: Enforcement Theory and Practice in the U.S." Boston University International Law Journal.
Vol. 5 No. 3 (1987). pp. 327-361.
97
Ibid., p. 345.

69
scope of species protection beyond just trafficking to more encompassing habitat
conservation.
98
Nonetheless, the ESA does specifically prohibit any trade which is
in violation of CITES.
99
With respect to permits, the ESA applies the CITES system
of permits, requiring licenses for any import or export of species listed under the
ESA.
100

Beyond CITES, the ESA specifies penalties for contravention of the act.
Violations of the ESA are subject to a range of penalties, ranging from those
classified as criminal violations to those falling under civil penalties or
administrative remedies.
101
Violations of the ESA are treated as misdemeanor, with
sanctions being levied under strict liability, so that violators can still be prosecuted
even if they were not aware of the ESA.
102

The ESA comprises the main regulatory instrument through which the U.S.
implements CITES regulations.
103
The ESA is enforced by the U.S. Department of
Interior, which assigns administration of the acts to the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS). To fulfill its mission, the FWS employs two classes of officers: special
agents and wildlife inspectors. Special agents are responsible for conducting
investigations, undercover operations, and court prosecutions, while wildlife

98
Ibid.
99
16 U.S.C. Section 1538(c).
100
16 U.S.C. Section 1538(d).
101
Kosloff and Trexler, p. 347-348.
102
Shennie Patel. "The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species: Enforcement
and the Last Unicorn." Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 18 No. 1 (1995). pp. 157-173.
103
Congressional Research Service. “The Endangered Species Act in the 109 Congress:
Conflicting Values and Difficult Choices”. The Library of Congress. URL:
usinfo.state.gov/infousa/government/branches/docs/IB10144_2006Jan25.pdf. Accessed: January 25,
2008.

70
inspectors process commercial cargo shipments and personal travel goods. Both
types of personnel receive ten weeks of training covering the wildlife trade,
including CITES and the ESA, as well as identification of illegally traded species. In
addition, special agents undergo the standard ten week training required of all federal
law enforcement personnel.
With respect to local law enforcement agencies, the linkage is not so explicit.
While the ESA functions to connect federal authority to CITES as a treaty, and so
bridge the national and global levels, there is nothing so specific to tie local
communities to national ones in the U.S. Based on interviews with both FWS and
the Port of Los Angeles Police, no formal instruments exist connecting the two
entities together in ESA implementation.
This, however, is not to say that there is no linkage between local and
national levels. While being a federal agency, the FWS maintains multiple field
offices in each state, with special agents and wildlife inspectors at each one to
maintain FWS duties, including monitoring of endangered species trade under the
ESA and CITES. Because such field offices deliver FWS representatives to points-
of-entry, from a certain perspective the agency provides its own presence at the local
level, in effect enacting a connection between the federal government and local
communities—albeit not local law enforcement—through which federal authority is
projected at a community level.
104

104
Fish and Wildlife Service. URL:http://www.fws.gov. Accessed: October 1, 2007.

71
In addition, while there is no formal instrument between local agencies and
federal ones, there is an informal one, in that there are referrals whereby port
police—and any local law enforcement agency—can contact FWS with information
on suspected illegal species trade that violates the ESA. In conjunction with this,
local officers are also able to detain suspected violating material until arrival by FWS
representatives.
105

If the current movements by the federal government towards devolution were
to become more substantial, it is conceivable that the aforementioned linkage could
become stronger. Federal adaptation of local police to enforce U.S. immigration
laws sets a precedence for use of local law enforcement in implementing federal law.
It would be a logical extension to consider using local police such as those at the Port
of Los Angeles in upholding the ESA. In principle, the avenues for linkage between
local-to-national levels exist on an informal basis, and so offer extensions with
respect to CITES between international instruments to local communities.

II. De Facto Linkages
Reviewing CITES and ESA documentation may provide the framework for
implementation in principle, but it does not confirm the nature of the linkage
between local law enforcement and international policy. For this, discussions were
arranged with government officials to determine the extent of local-federal
interactions, with the topics for conversation including enforcement operations and

105
Anonymous Interview, Fish & Wildlife Service, October 9, 2007; Anonymous Interviews,
Port of Los Angeles Police, December 16, 2005.

72
coordination between the federal and local levels. It was through these interviews
that a number of issues were revealed regarding the local-federal linkages with
respect to endangered species trafficking under CITES and the ESA—issues which
indicate that while such linkages may exist in principle from local to national to
global, they may do so to a lesser degree in reality.

Referral
Conceptually, FWS stations accept communications regarding potential
violations of the ESA, which indicates that patrol officers at the Port of Los Angeles
can readily contact FWS representatives whenever suspected illegal endangered
species products are observed entering or leaving the port. To some degree, this is
supported by the FWS, which admitted their use of referrals (or “tips” and “leads”)
to seize illegally trafficked goods and their responsible parties. The Port of Los
Angeles Police confirms the act of referrals for any potential smuggling of species its
officers happen to come across.
However, records of referrals in terms of their frequency or percentage out of
total seizures are not kept either by the FWS or the Port of Los Angeles Police. This
makes it difficult to gauge to what extent this connection between Port of Los
Angeles Police and FWS exists. For its part, FWS sources note that the reliance on
referrals from other law enforcement agencies (federal, state, and local) by the

73
agency was significant.
106
Similarly, the Port of Los Angeles Police indicated that
no formal records are kept for referrals, holding instead only records of coordinated
interdiction operations with the FWS—something which is a much lower occurrence
than “tips” or “leads” of smuggled species.
107

The result is that there is no definitive way in terms of numbers to estimate
the strength of the linkage between federal and local levels with respect to the FWS
and Port of Los Angeles Police. At present, there are only the subjective perceptions
of both entities. A record of referrals would be helpful in demonstrating a linkage in
objective terms of the extent of communication between the agencies, as well as
reflective of the level of coordination between the two.

Education
Even if there was an accurate record of referrals between the FWS and the
Port of Los Angeles Police, it might still not be entirely enough to create an effective
linkage. For referrals to the FWS to be useful, they have to be accurate, in the sense
that they lead to discovery of genuine violations of the ESA. Otherwise, the
connection becomes inefficient, indicating a weak linkage between the agencies.
There is reason for concern regarding this issue. FWS personnel receive
training in identifying illegal traded species, but local police do not. FWS special
agents and wildlife inspectors each receive ten weeks of training in identifying
violations of federal wildlife laws, including the ESA and CITES. In addition, when

106
Anonymous Interview, Fish & Wildlife Service.
107
Anonymous Interviews, Port of Los Angeles Police.

74
requested, they provide such training to other federal agencies. However, there is no
training given for local law enforcement at the state or local level, including the Port
of Los Angeles Police.
108

CITES appendices list over 700 species for which trade is illegal. These are
in addition to species listed in the ESA. Identifying suspected illegal trafficking
from this list out of the myriad numbers of general flora and fauna being transported
through the Port of Los Angeles would appear to be a significant challenge for a
trained person. For an untrained one—particularly a patrol officer monitoring other
forms of criminal activity, it would be overwhelming. Expecting untrained
personnel to make accurate referrals to the FWS under such circumstance seems be a
tenuous proposition.
But here, too, there is a paucity of available information. Accuracy in giving
leads about species smuggling requires accuracy in identifying suspects.
Unfortunately, neither the FWS nor the Port of Los Angeles Police compile records
identifying the number or percentage of referrals that prove to be positive (i.e.,
leading to apprehension of goods and parties involved in ESA violations) or false.
The best estimate is subjective, with FWS sources assuring that the majority of tips it
receives are accurate.
109

Without these numbers, there is an open question as to how effective the
connection is between the FWS and Port of Los Angeles Police. While not

108
Anonymous Interview, Fish & Wildlife Service.
109
Anonymous Interview, Fish & Wildlife Service; Anonymous Interviews, Port of Los
Angeles Police.

75
necessary in establishing existence of a linkage, it is relevant in assessing the
capacity of local law enforcement to support the efforts of a federal agency to fulfill
ESA responsibilities.

Jurisdiction
Another issue is the division in jurisdiction between the federal and local
agencies. The FWS holds jurisdiction for violations of federal law, and reserves to
state and local agencies activities covered under their respective laws. The Port of
Los Angeles Police, as local law enforcement, exercises jurisdiction for state and
local crimes, but defers violations of federal law to the federal agencies.
This division in jurisdiction manifests itself in endangered species operations.
Because the ESA is a federal law, the port police do not make seizures citing it, but
instead make referrals to the FWS, whose representatives then respond to inspect the
suspected violation. In addition, the police do not initiate investigations with the
express purpose of catching illegal endangered species being transported through the
port, but instead maintain their focus on crimes under state and local law. Federal
crimes, including those involving species smuggling, are treated as incidental, and so
ones requiring action only if discovered in the course of pursuing a state or local
crime. Even then, the expectation is that the local agency will refer the potential
federal violation to the appropriate federal agency.
110

110
Anonymous Interview, Fish & Wildlife Service; Anonymous Interviews, Port of Los
Angeles Police.

76
Jurisdictional issues means that apprehension of ESA violations requires
coordination between FWS and the Port of Los Angeles Police, with a linkage of
sufficient strength to ensure 1) local law enforcement has the requisite expertise to
identify a potential ESA crime, 2) local law enforcement can readily contact FWS,
and 3) FWS responds to make the apprehension. While both FWS and the Port of
Los Angeles Police offer subjective evaluations to the affirmative that such a linkage
indeed exists, the lack of objective measures makes it difficult to accurately confirm
it.

Field Operations
Apart from the aforementioned issues, there is an added one of field
operations to locate species smuggling. Expectations for a strong local-national
linkage would entail coordination of efforts to identify illegal shipments of flora and
fauna, including inspections of general trade going through the Port of Los Angeles.
However, the depth of such activities is somewhat limited. FWS special
agents, because their jobs focus primarily on investigations, undercover work, and
legal prosecution, do not engage in physical patrol of goods going through the Port
of Los Angeles. FWS wildlife inspectors, who carry a greater responsibility to
identify ESA violations, also do not engage in physical patrol. Instead, they fulfill
their duties by comparing shipping manifests with trade declarations of the shipping
parties. FWS sources assert that both special agents and wildlife inspectors do
conduct on-site search and seizure operations, but that this does not consume the

77
majority of their time, with physical inspections taking place on a random basis and
aimed for specific issues.
111

The lack of such inspections is reasonable given the magnitude of traffic
relative to the number of inspectors. According to the FWS 2006 Annual Report,
there are only 202 special agents and 112 wildlife inspectors spread throughout the
United States among 36 field offices, whose time must be shared between 38 ports,
airports, and border crossing stations receiving international traffic.
112
With respect
to case load, for 2006, the special agents and wildlife inspectors investigate roughly
15,000 cases, processing nearly 183,000 wildlife shipments requiring approximately
145,000 inspections.
113
During this time, the special agents and inspectors located in
the Southern California Torrance and Ventura offices were involved more than
23,000 inspections, which marked only a fraction of the approximately 50,000,000
tons of material which passed through the Port of Los Angeles for the year.
114
Given

111
Anonymous Interview, Fish & Wildlife Service; FWS. Inspector Brochure. Fish & Wildlife
Service. URL: http://library.fws.gov/Pubs/Inspector02.pdf. Accessed October 28, 2007. FWS Wildlife
Inspectors. URL: http://www.fws.gov/le/AboutLE/wildlife_inspectors.htm. Accessed October 1,
2007; FWS Special Agents. URL: FWS Special Agents, URL:
http://www.fws.gov/le/AboutLE/special_agents.htm. Accessed October 1, 2007.
112
FWS. URL:http://www.fws.gov. Accessed: October 1, 2007; FWS Annual Report 2006.
URL: http://www.fws.gov/le/AboutLE/annual.htm. Accessed October 1, 2007; FWS Inspector
Brochure; FWS Special Agents.
113
FWS Annual Report 2006.
114
FWS Annual Report 2006; FWS Torrance Office Directory. URL:
http://www.fws.gov/offices/directory/ListOffices.cfm?statecode=6. Accessed October 28, 2007; FWS
Ventura Staff List. URL:// http://www.fws.gov/ventura/textonly/stafflisting.html. Accessed October
28, 2007; Port of Los Angeles website. URL: http://www.portoflosangeles.org. Accessed: August 1,
2007; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center. URL:
http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/ndc/wcsc/portname02.htm. Accessed: October 19, 2007; Vanderbilt
Center for Transportation Research. URL:
http://transp20.vuse.vanderbilt.edu/vector/worldkit/index.html. Accessed: October 19, 2007.

78
such numbers, it would be difficult, if not inefficient, to require FWS personnel to
physically inspect every item entering the United States, let alone the port.
In contrast, the Port of Los Angeles Police do conduct regular physical
patrols of harbor facilities, including shipping containers. But their patrols are
directed at a wide array of potential crimes, rather than just ESA violations alone,
meaning that their attention must cover a much broader range of priorities than
carried by FWS. Moreover, they do not physically enter shipping containers or
goods to uncover potential species smuggling; as law enforcement agents, their
capacity to make entrance is limited by legal restrictions requiring probable cause
and warrants to investigate private property, meaning that discovery of ESA
violations are made incidental to pursuit of other crimes. Even then, because of
jurisdiction issues, Port of Los Angeles Police cannot initiate seizures for ESA-
related species, but must make a referral to FWS.
This situation is one with a disjuncture in coverage, in that the entity with the
power to make searches and seizures under the ESA does not regularly conduct
physical patrols, and the entity that does do so does not have the jurisdiction to
perform searches and seizures. This makes enforcement of the ESA reliant on the
coordination between FWS and the Port of Los Angeles Police. But as indicated by
the previous discussion, the strength of such linkage is rife with questions and not
entirely affirmative.

79
III. Discussion
As evidenced by the above observations, the nature of local-to-global
connections with respect to CITES and the ESA is somewhat mixed between de jure
and de facto perspectives. De jure, there is a measure of understood linkage between
the Port of Los Angeles Police as local agencies and the FWS as the federal entity,
with the actions of the two organizations supporting CITES as an international
instrument via their support for the ESA. This arrangement is not explicit, with an
operative law dictating cooperation under CITES or the ESA, but there is an
informal one, in that there are referrals whereby port police can contact FWS with
information on suspected illegal species trade that violates the ESA, or detain
suspected violating material until arrival by FWS representatives.
De facto conditions, however, clearly show that the state of this linkage is
still questionable, with a number of unresolved issues regarding potential challenges
that may be responsible for frustrating implementation of CITES and the ESA,
particularly in terms of available information about enforcement and also
disjunctures between federal and local enforcement. Without some resolution, the
situation makes it uncertain as to whether local actors can be incorporated into the
implementation chain that starts from the international level and then descends
downward to the local level.
Regarding the lack of information, the paucity of information regarding
referrals and training prevents determination of the frequency and accuracy of those
referrals, making it difficult to fully ascertain the connections between the Port of

80
Los Angeles Police and the ESA. Subjective assertions by both organizations
suggest that referrals to indeed occur, but data on frequency and accuracy would
indicate the extent of referrals, and hence help assess the strength of the linkage
between the two organizations. It would also clarify what actions could be used to
improve the local-to-national connections. If evidence showed that the frequency of
referrals by port police to the FWS was low relative to the scale of endangered
species trade, it would suggest that the connection between them would benefit from
greater coordination in terms of more communication or better sharing of
information resources. On the other hand, if the evidence showed that the frequency
of referrals was acceptable, but that their accuracy in uncovering actual ESA
violations was not, it would point to a need for better education of the port police
officers sending the referrals to FWS.
With respect to disjunctures, the greater availability of information on
jurisdiction and field operations clearly shows a division in terms of enforcement.
Because the Port of Los Angeles Police and FWS both observe the demarcation in
federal versus local jurisdiction, actions against illegal wildlife shipments requires
coordination between the two, with the port police referring suspected cases to
FWS—a condition whose suspect nature casts doubt as to the effectiveness of the
linkage between the agencies. This problem is compounded by the nature of field
operations, since the entity (the port police) with routine patrols defers ESA
violations to the jurisdiction of an entity that does not (FWS). Because it maintains a
more active field presence, the port police pose a greater level of local expertise in

81
terms of familiarity with port operations, nuances about law enforcement in the port,
and timeliness in responding to newly discovered crimes.
The net result of the current de jure and de facto situation can be summarized
as follows in five major points. First, at the present time, because ESA is a federal
law with an affiliated federal agency and no authority to local actors, formal de jure
CITES implementation extends only to a national level, and not to a local one.
Second, local involvement in ESA enforcement appears de facto informal through a
referral system to FWS. Third, under the de facto conditions, the informal linkage of
local actors (Port of Los Angeles Police) to the national one (FWS) in support of a
national law (ESA) is suspect. Fourth, as a result, ESA and CITES enforcement
misses an opportunity for improvement by avoiding the contributions of a local law
enforcement agency with the potential to assist it. Fifth, integrating local law
enforcement into CITES implementation requires enabling the domestic linkage,
which means that local actors (port police) have greater authority to support a federal
law (ESA) and related federal agency (FWS)—something that is not currently the
case.
A possible solution to this is greater coordination between Port of Los
Angeles Police and FWS. But here, too, this means better information about
referrals and training, returning to the issues of incomplete data held by the two
agencies.
Another potential solution would be an adjustment in jurisdiction and
operational capabilities. This could be achieved under different philosophical

82
approaches: increasing federal power, or increasing local power. If the approach is
to rely upon federal authority, the consistent prescription would be to allow FWS to
maintain its jurisdiction, but then empower it with greater resources (perhaps in
personnel, as well as communication and information retrieval) so that it could gain
the capability to maintain a greater, more consistent field presence to identify
potential ESA and CITES violations.
In contrast, if the approach is to turn to local authority, the natural procedure
would to grant local law enforcement, including the Port of Los Angeles Police,
more jurisdiction to follow-up (via investigations, entrance to goods, etc.—actions
they are jurisdictionally currently forbidden to conduct) on suspected ESA and
CITES cases its regular patrols uncover. This way, while they would still ultimately
relay these cases to the federal jurisdiction of FWS, port police officers would be
better able to exploit their local expertise.
The latter solution is more in keeping with the purpose of this research. It is
sometimes known as devolution, and one that seems to be gaining greater attention
within the federal government. But whether this is a viable option for ESA and
CITES is unclear. It makes a number of assumptions regarding local law
enforcement in terms of capabilities, particularly with respect to their willingness to
accept additional duties and their capacity to do so. It is not clear that steps have
been taken discover if local agencies, particularly the Port of Los Angeles Police in
the present case, can meet these assumptions. Given the question introduced here as

83
to the level of coordination between the Port of Los Angeles Police and FWS, the
prospect of federal inquiry to the port police is not optimistic.
Verifying these assumptions are important. Gaining the feedback from the
local entity upon which more duties may be given would be a logical step in
enhancing policy-making; the success of a policy is dependent on effectively
responding to the problem it is meant to solve, and that means recognizing pre-
existing conditions related to the problem. For ESA and CITES, this means
recognizing the observations of the port police who can offer first-person
information about a major conduit for ESA and CITES violations. Simply ignoring
local authorities is a debatable proposition—that is the current situation, and the
success of it is readily apparent in the ongoing CITES controversy. Ameliorating the
problem calls for a more sensitive approach involving more incorporation of local
law enforcement.
The subsequent steps in this research endeavor to follow through on this call.
The analysis will investigate the Port of Los Angeles Police to determine if its
officers are willing and able to accept greater responsibilities to the ESA and CITES.
In essence, the study will do what it is unclear (and perhaps unlikely) the federal
government has not: ask local actors for feedback regarding issues in their
enforcement of domestic and international policy, to help policy-makers determine
whether—and how—local actors can be given greater responsibility to enforcing
federal law supporting an international implementation framework.

84
Chapter 5: Descriptive Review of Data

Policy-makers intent on utilizing local law enforcement to aid in
implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) are extending the implementation chain an additional link, from the treaty’s
international-to-national framework to a national-to-local extension. Based on the
current framework within the United States, which fulfills U.S obligations to CITES
through the domestic Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the federal government’s
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), creating the national-to-local extension may be
accomplished through three methods: increasing coordination between local officers
and the FWS, adjusting jurisdictional and operational capabilities to increase federal
power, or to adjust jurisdictional and operational capabilities to increase local power.
This study showed that the first method is obstructed by the presence of
incomplete data necessary to improve referrals and training between the FWS and
the Port of Los Angeles Police. The second method to increase federal power by
empowering the FWS with greater resources to enforce of the ESA is viable, but not
one consistent with current philosophical orientation in federal government policy.
Current policy philosophy seems to pursue the third method, which turns to local
authority and looks to add the resources of local actors such as the Port of Los
Angeles Police to existing enforcement framework for CITES.
The latter option is a reflection of the ongoing trend towards devolution,
wherein authority is shifted to the local level. While the concept normally applies to

85
redistribution in power from federal to local agencies, it serves a similar purpose for
international policy-makers looking to grant more responsibilities to local actors.
Whether this can be a viable strategy for CITES, however, is unclear.
Unfortunately, the scholarly literature on CITES largely eschews discussions of local
law enforcement agencies. For those times the body of research addresses local
enforcement of CITES, it does so using FWS branch offices as the “local” level,
even as such offices are still representatives of federal government. In contrast, the
concept of devolution uses the word “local” in jurisdictional terms, with local actors
being those entities with authority over geographically immediate territory outside of
federal jurisdiction. As a result, because the research literature on CITES does not
fully delve into the potential of actors with local jurisdiction, it offers little guidance
about the opportunities for devolution as an international policy strategy.
This stage of the analysis is a step towards mitigating the situation. To
generate assistance for efforts at devolution, this section of the study endeavors to
continue the analysis by further investigating jurisdictionally “local” actors as
utilized by the concept of devolution. For this case study, this means gathering
information about the conditions for the Port of Los Angeles Police. This analysis
accomplishes this by direct research, using a survey instrument administered to port
police, and then reviewing survey data to evaluate devolution and generate
recommendations for policy-makers.
The investigation at this stage presents a description of the results to identify
general trends found from the survey responses gathered from local law

86
enforcement. Such a descriptive analysis involves use of histograms showing the
distribution of answers to the survey questions to infer trends. The histograms are
contained within the appendices. Comments about the highlights from the
histograms are given in within this review, to help outline the larger trends. The
discussion at the end notes the major points of relevance taken from the histogram
highlights.
Generally speaking, the survey was administered via hard-copy to the patrol
officers at the Port of Los Angeles Police during their morning roll call, and included
anyone licensed to carry a firearm and make arrests under the organization’s
jurisdiction. The results were entered into SPSS to create a codebook of responses.
SPSS then created histograms of the survey results, with each question being
assigned a variable for statistical analysis and a histogram for descriptive analysis.
The histograms were exported as graphic files into the appendices of this manuscript
for purposes of publication.

I. Survey Design & Administration
The survey endeavored to gather data regarding attitudes and perceptions of
law enforcement personnel regarding smuggling issues, domestic laws dealing with
each issue, and international treaties connected with each domestic law. To
accomplish this, the survey organized questions into sections covering each of the
three areas, and added a fourth dealing with demographics, resulting in the following
structure:

87
• Section I: Smuggling
• Section II: Domestic Law
• Section III: International Law
• Section IV: Demographics
For purposes of comparison across fields, the survey took responses for
endangered species traffic while also taking responses for other smuggling issues.
The intent was to gauge the existence of potential differences or consistency in
attitudes and perceptions across various fields, which would indicate if survey
participant responses were the result of bias over endangered species traffic relative
to other topics, or the result of their interactions with domestic or international legal
instruments. In essence, endangered species served as the subject of analysis, and
the other topics served as control groups. Towards this end, a range of smuggling
issues were selected based on 1) the existence of international treaties addressing
them and 2) domestic laws implementing those international treaties. In this survey,
this resulted in selection of the topics shown in Table 5-1.

88
Table 5-1: Topics
Smuggling Issue International Instrument Domestic Instrument
Endangered species
traffic
Convention on the International
Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES)
Endangered Species
Act (ESA)
Narcotics traffic Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (CNDPS)
Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act
(CSIE)
Weapons traffic Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
Biological Weapons Convention,
Chemical Weapons Convention
(CNBC)
Defense Against
Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act
(DWMD)
Human traffic Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Persons (CSTP)
Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVP)
Contraband/gray
market traffic
Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Agreements (TRIPs)
U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol
Regulations (CBP)

For questions, the survey endeavored to gather quantitative measures of
participant levels of attitudes and perceptions for each of the above items. Questions
gauged a range of factors dealing with awareness, knowledge, and confidence for
each domestic and international law, as well as identifying perceived challenges to
their enforcement. The survey held a total of 57 questions with each asking for
responses for either the five specified sets of issues and laws or a selected list of
factors. Overall, the survey questions gathered data on 275 variables. Each variable
marked a respondent’s answer that was either ordinal (e.g., from “not at all
knowledgeable” set as a value of 1 to “extremely knowledgeable” set as a value of 7)
or scalar (e.g, “increased,” “decreased,” or “constant”). These variables were

89
distributed among the questions, with the questions organized into major groups
identified in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2: Question Groups
Section Question Groups
Section I: Smuggling Level of importance of smuggling
Level of knowledge regarding smuggling
Legitimacy of duty to deal with smuggling
Resource challenges to performance
Section II: Domestic
Law
Level of knowledge of domestic U.S. laws dealing with
smuggling

Level of effectiveness of domestic efforts regarding
smuggling
Level of deterrence of domestic laws

Level of cooperation of domestic agencies to enforce
domestic laws

Level of satisfaction over results of personal efforts to
control smuggling

Level of satisfaction over results of organization's efforts
to control smuggling
Section III:
International Law
Level of knowledge of international laws dealing with
smuggling

Level of effectiveness of international efforts regarding
smuggling
Level of deterrence of international laws

Level of cooperation between domestic and international
agencies to enforce international laws
Section IV: General Demographics

90
The survey instrument itself is available in Appendix 1. The survey was
anonymous, with identification of respondent. The survey was given blind, with
respondents filling out the hard-copy form without interaction with researchers
during roll call meetings at the beginning of their daily work shifts; law enforcement
personnel who completed the survey returned them anonymously to management,
who delivered them to researchers in batches by U.S. mail. Respondents were Port
of Los Angeles police officers licensed to carry firearms and make arrests under port
police jurisdiction. The questions given to these officers were time-independent, in
that the instrument posed questions asking for responses based on each participant’s
accumulated lifetime of experience.
It should be noted that the survey was a comprehensive questionnaire
intended to get data across a range of international treaties and attendant domestic
instruments for different types of smuggling issues. The goal was to gather
information that could be available for later subsequent research beyond the confines
of the research design constructed for this analysis. As a result, this study draws
upon a selected number of variables in the survey instrument rather than all.

II. Histograms
Review of the raw data offers some direction in finding trends of relevance to
the hypothesis. The raw data is the mass of survey responses from participants,
summaries for which are produced graphically as histograms that make it easier to
observe survey results. Trends, as so far in the nature of responses to survey

91
questions, are reflected in the histograms, particularly in the distributions of answers
given for each survey question.
For this study, recognition of trends can begin by observing the behavior of
the means from the histogram of responses for each survey question. Observing the
trends in the data for each of these categories makes it easier to perceive and
interpret the sentiments of respondents regarding local enforcement of international
law. To help find trends from the means relevant to the hypothesis, the study
organized the means into differing subject matter: questions related to issue area,
performance challenges, those related to domestic law, and those related to
international law.
Comments for each are presented below.

Issues
For respondent data regarding smuggling issues, the survey asked personnel
to provide answers on a ratings scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being the lowest (e.g., “not
at all important” for Level of Importance) and 7 being the highest (e.g., “extremely”
important for Level of Importance). The questions posed the following:
1) The level of importance for smuggling (for each of 5 smuggling
issues)
2) The level of respondent’s knowledge (for each of the 5 smuggling
issues)

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Histograms were generated from the respondent’s answers to each of these
questions. Each histogram was used to produce a mean and an assessment of
respondent’s perspectives with respect to the questions.
For the question asking each survey participant to provide their perspective
on the level of importance for each smuggling topic, the histograms (See Appendix
2) showed a distribution of responses largely skewed towards the higher values of 6
or 7, with the one exception being endangered species smuggling, which had a much
more ambivalent distribution closer to the middle value of 4. The distinction in
levels of importance accorded to each smuggling area is illustrated in Table 5-3.

Table 5-3. Levels of Importance of Smuggling
Histograms - Level of Importance of Smuggling Mean
Endangered Species Traffic 4.33
Narcotics Traffic 6.44
Weapons Traffic 6.53
Traffic in Human Beings 6.19
Contraband/Gray Market Traffic 5.75

This suggests that respondents tended to view the smuggling of endangered
species as being less important than other forms of smuggling, and that endangered
species do not warrant a high level of priority while other types of smuggling do.

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Similarly, with the question asking participants for their level of knowledge
of each area of smuggling, the histograms (see Appendix 2) shows a distribution of
responses placed among the higher values above the middle point of 4, with
endangered species smuggling again being the exception. Endangered species
smuggling received a distribution heavily marked towards the low values of 1 and 2.
The difference in distribution is illustrated by Table 5-4, which shows the relative
means of the histograms for each smuggling issue:

Table 5-4. Level of Respondent’s Knowledge of Smuggling
Histograms - Level of Respondent's Knowledge of Smuggling Mean
Endangered Species Traffic 2.17
Narcotics Traffic 4.83
Weapons Traffic 4.28
Traffic in Human Beings 4.28
Contraband/Gray Market Traffic 4.14

This indicates that with respect to the level of knowledge, respondents
generally considered themselves as having fair knowledge of each smuggling topic
apart from endangered species traffic, which most of them admitted little familiarity.

The dichotomy in responses between endangered species smuggling and the
others presented in the survey were somewhat consistent with the question of

94
legitimacy. On the question of whether participants believed each smuggling issue
to be a legitimate issue for enforcement by them or their organization, the majority
marked all 5 (endangered species, narcotics, weapons, humans, contraband) to be
legitimate duties, but did so in varying degrees. A significant majority recognized
narcotics, weapons, humans, and contraband as legitimate, with only 1 claim being
registered for “no” for narcotics, weapons, and human traffic and only 6 claims of
“no” for contraband.
For endangered species, however, the margin was much closer. While 20
respondents recognized it as a legitimate duty, fully 12 said it was not, producing a
much narrower margin relative to other issues in the extent to which participants
accepted it as a worthy cause for law enforcement.

Performance Challenges
The questionnaire also asked respondents to indicate on the 1-to-7 ratings
scale their perception of:
1) Resource challenges to personal performance
2) Resource challenges to organizational performance
For each question, survey participants were provided a list of 17 potential
challenges and asked to rate each with respect to their level of harm to personal or
organizational performance, with 1 being “not at all harmful” and 7 being “extremely
harmful.” The 17 potential challenges were:
• Lack of money

95
• Lack of time
• Lack of knowledge
• Lack of training
• Lack of personal interest
• Excessive administrative paperwork
• Ineffective technology
• Ineffective strategic focus on organizational mission and purpose by
employer
• Ineffective tactical policy to achieve organizational mission and
purpose by employer
• Lack of clarity in employee duties and responsibility by employer
• Conflict or lack of communication between leadership and employees
• Conflict or lack of communication with co-workers
• Conflict or lack of communication with international and foreign
entities
• Conflict or lack of communication with domestic government
agencies
Histograms for each of the 17 potential challenges, with a set of 17
histograms for the question of challenges to personal performance and another set of
17 for the question of challenges to organizational performance (see Appendix 2).
The histograms display the distribution of results for personnel perceptions of their
weakest and greatest challenges.

96
For what factors participants identified as being weakest and greatest
challenges to their personal or organizational performance, the trends of the
histograms are indicated in Table 5-5, which shows the means for each set of
histograms, with one set of means for the question of personal performance and
another set of means for organizational performance.
With respect to personal performance, the factors that were considered least
harmful by respondents to their personal performance were “lack of money,” “lack
of personal interest,” and “conflict or lack of communication with co-workers.”
Factors that were considered of mediocre or moderate harm were “excessive
administrative paperwork,” “ineffective technology,” “ineffective strategic focus,”
“ineffective tactical policy,” “lack of clarity in duties,” “conflict or lack of
communication between leaders and employees.” Factors that were found to be very
harmful were “lack of time,” “lack of knowledge,” “lack of training,” “conflict or
lack of communication with international and foreign entities,” and “conflict or lack
of communication with domestic government agencies.”

97

Table 5-5. Resource Challenges
Histograms - Resource Challenges
Mean -
Personal
Mean -
Organization
Lack of Money 2.94 2.88
Lack of Time 4.47 4.46
Lack of Knowledge 4.81 4.11
Lack of Training 4.56 4.29
Lack of Personal Interest 2.83 3.35
Excessive Administrative Paperwork 4.03 4.17
Ineffective Technology 4.22 4.29
Ineffective Strategic Focus by Employer 4.28 4.34
Ineffective Tactical Policy by Employer 4.14 4.11
Lack of Clarity in Employee Duties by
Employer
3.97 4.17
Conflict or Lack of Communication between
Leadership & Employees
4.31 4.11
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Co-Workers
3.56 3.49
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
International Entities
4.61 4.66
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Domestic Agencies
4.78 4.54

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In comparison to perceived challenges to personal performance, respondents
found slight degrees of harm to their organization’s performance. Similar to
personal performance challenges, respondents indicated that the least harmful
challenges to their organization’s performance was “lack of money,” “lack of
personal interest,” and “conflict or lack of communication with co-workers.”
In contrast to challenges to personal performance, however, respondents
showed a greater number of factors were considered moderately harmful. These
were “lack of knowledge,” “lack of training,” “excessive administrative paperwork,”
“ineffective technology,” “ineffective strategic focus,” “ineffective tactical policy,”
“lack of clarity in duties,” “conflict or lack of communication between leaders and
employees.”
In addition, while participants identified 5 factors as very harmful to personal
performance, they identified 3 factors as being harmful to organizational
performance: “lack of time,” “conflict of lack of communication with international
and foreign entities,” and “conflict or lack of communication with domestic
government agencies.”
These differences between what respondents perceived as challenges to
personal and organizational performance indicate that with respect to the most
harmful factors, participants tended to distinguish themselves separately from their
organization, with the view that their organization’s available time and training is
more adequate than what they could offer individually. But apart from this

99
distinction, respondents indicated that they viewed the challenges to roughly the
same for them individually as they were for the organization.

Domestic Laws
With respect to personnel attitudes and perceptions towards domestic laws,
the survey utilized the 1-to-7 ratings scale for the following questions:
1) The level of knowledge regarding U.S. laws (for each of 5 smuggling
issues)
2) The level of effectiveness of domestic efforts to enforce U.S. laws
(for each of 5 smuggling issues)
3) The level of deterrence of U.S. laws (for each of 5 smuggling issues)
4) The level of cooperation between domestic agencies to enforce U.S.
laws (for each of 5 smuggling issues)
5) The level of satisfaction over personal efforts to control smuggling
(for each of 5 smuggling issues)
6) The level of satisfaction over organization’s efforts to control
smuggling (for each of 5 smuggling issues)
Results for each question are given by histograms giving the distribution of
responses to each question.
For the level of knowledge given by respondents for each U.S. smuggling
law, the histograms (see Appendix 3) show that respondents perceived themselves as
having a relatively low level of knowledge regarding the domestic laws affiliated

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with each of the 5 smuggling issues, with the ESA being the lowest. This is
exemplified by Table 5-6, which shows the means of the histogram distributions for
each question.

Table 5-6. Level of Knowledge of Domestic Laws
Histograms - Level of Knowledge of Domestic Laws Mean
ESA 1.97
CSIE 3.94
DWMD 3.71
TVP 3.23
CBP 2.97

This shows that while survey participants in general admitted to a low level
of knowledge about U.S. smuggling laws, they hold a dramatically lower level of
knowledge with respect to the Endangered Species Act relative to the other laws.
This pattern is somewhat paralleled by the respondent histograms (see
Appendix 3) for the question of how survey participants viewed the effectiveness of
each U.S. smuggling law, wherein again the participants gave U.S. smuggling laws
low ratings, with the ESA being the lowest. This is reflected in Table 5-7, which
shows the means of each histogram.

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Table 5-7. Level of Effectiveness of Domestic Laws
Histograms - Level of Effectiveness of Domestic Laws Mean
ESA 2.83
CSIE 3.89
DWMD 3.83
TVP 3.14
CBP 3.11

This demonstrates that participants tended to view the laws as having a low
level of effectiveness, but with the ESA have a clearly lower perceived level of
effectiveness.
For deterrence value, the histograms (see Appendix 3) indicate the distinction
between the domestic laws is not so clearly pronounced. While the respondents
continued to mark the domestic laws covered in the study with low ratings for
deterrence, the ESA’s ratings were much closer to the others laws. This is illustrated
by Table 5-8.

Table 5-8. Level of Deterrence of Domestic Laws
Histograms - Level of Deterrence of Domestic Laws Mean
ESA 2.66
CSIE 3.31
DWMD 3.22
TVP 2.86
CBP 2.83

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This suggests that participants hold all domestic smuggling laws with the
same level of deterrence: very low. It also suggests that they consider the ESA to be
similar in deterrence value to other smuggling laws—albeit the least deterrent.
For cooperation, the histograms (see Appendix 3) generate a trend
comparable to that for deterrence value. Respondents perceive U.S. smuggling laws
as receiving little cooperation between domestic agencies in enforcement, with the
ESA being ranked the lowest. This is shown by Table 5-9.

Table 5-9. Level of Cooperation in Enforcing Domestic Laws
Histograms - Level of Cooperation in Enforcing Domestic Laws Mean
ESA 3.25
CSIE 4.11
DWMD 4.11
TVP 3.94
CBP 3.44

Consistent with the trend for deterrence value, but differing in absolute
ratings, it is evident by the closeness of the means to the middle value of 4 that
participants held ambivalent feelings about the level of cooperation between
domestic agencies for the CSIE, DWMD, and TVP. In contrast, the perceived the
CBP and the ESA as having distinctly lower levels of cooperation.

103
Next, the survey asked respondents to mark their level of satisfaction over the
monthly amounts of searches and seizures they were personally involved in. For
both searches and seizures, the histograms (see Appendix 3) display roughly the
same levels of satisfaction for all the laws in this study. This is confirmed by Table
5-10, which shows means for both searches and seizures.

Table 5-10. Level of Personal Satisfaction over Searches & Seizures
Histograms - Level of Personal
Satisfaction over Searches & Seizures
Mean -
Searches
Mean -
Seizures
ESA 2.97 2.53
CSIE 3.38 2.91
DWMD 2.94 2.67
TVP 3 2.67
CBP 3 2.75

It is apparent here that participants held a low level of satisfaction over the
monthly number of searches or seizures they conducted individually, and that the
levels of satisfaction were roughly the same for all the smuggling laws in this study.
The search and seizure question was posed again, but asking each respondent
for their level of satisfaction in their organization’s involvement in searches and
seizures per month. The histograms (see Appendix 3) yield comparable low
satisfaction ratings, but with the ESA having the lowest. This is seen in Table 5-11,
which shows means for both searches and seizures.

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Table 5-11. Level of Organizational Satisfaction over Searches & Seizures
Histograms - Level of Organizational
Satisfaction over Searches & Seizures
Mean -
Searches
Mean -
Seizures
ESA 2.55 2.65
CSIE 3.36 3.29
DWMD 3.03 3.15
TVP 2.66 2.82
CBP 2.71 2.94

Again, it’s apparent that participants held low satisfaction ratings for the
monthly number of searches and seizures performed by their organization. But
compared to personal satisfaction above, it is also apparent that participants held a
slightly lower level of satisfaction in their organization’s searches and seizures in
enforcing the ESA.

International
For respondent’s attitudes and perceptions towards international laws, the
survey continued applying a 1-to-7 ratings scale, using the following questions:
1) The level of knowledge regarding international laws (for each of 5
smuggling issues)
2) The level of effectiveness of international efforts to enforce
international laws (for each of 5 smuggling issues)

105
3) The level of deterrence of international laws (for each of 5 smuggling
issues)
4) The level of cooperation between domestic & international agencies
to enforce international laws (for each of 5 smuggling issues)
Results for each question are given by the histograms for each. The histograms are
contained in Appendix 4.
For the question asking each respondent for their knowledge of international
laws, the histograms generated distributions skewed towards the low end of the 1-to-
7 ratings scale, with values well below the middle point of 4. This reflects a
perception held by respondents that they held little knowledge of international
smuggling treaties. Of the 5 international treaties covered in the survey, CITES
received the lowest marks. This is demonstrated in Table 5-12, which shows the
means from the histogram of each treaty.

Table 5-12. Level of Knowledge of International Laws
Histograms - Level of Knowledge of International Laws Mean
CITES 1.89
CNDPS 3.08
CNBC 2.69
CSTP 2.56
TRIPS 2.31

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This clearly demonstrates that survey participants admitted to having a low
level of knowledge of international smuggling laws, with a distinctly lower level of
knowledge of CITES than they did other international treaties. Such low levels of
knowledge were marked even though each of these treaties held a corresponding
match in the domestic laws mentioned in the survey.
Somewhat similar results were found for the question asking respondents for
the perceived effectiveness of domestic and international attempts to enforce the
treaties posed in the survey. The question was divided into 2 components, with one
directing participants to rate the effectiveness of domestic agencies in enforcing each
international smuggling treaty, and the other directing them to rate the effectiveness
of international agencies to enforce each treaty. The histogram results for both were
generally low, with the majority of responses going towards the low end of the scale
below the middle point of 4 on the 1-to-7 ratings scale. This is seen in Table 5-13.

Table 5-13. Level of Effectiveness of International Laws
Histograms - Level of
Effectiveness of International
Laws
Mean - Domestic
Support
Mean - International
Support
CITES 3.09 2.86
CNDPS 3.67 3.23
CNBC 3.6 3.26
CSTP 3.29 3
TRIPS 3.29 3.17

107
Comparable to the numbers for knowledge of international treaties, the values
for the histograms display a low level of perceived effectiveness for both domestic
and international support, with slightly lower levels for CITES relative to the other
treaties. However, there is a trend apparent in comparison of the above means, in
that survey takers seemed to believe that domestic government support for
international treaties is greater than international support for those treaties.
The low ratings continued with the question asking respondents to mark the
level of deterrence for each international treaty. Here again, the histograms
produced numbers leaning towards the low end of the ratings scale, with means well
below the middle value of 4. The means of the histograms are given in Table 5-14.

Table 5-14. Level of Deterrence of International Laws
Histograms - Level of Deterrence of International Laws Mean
CITES 2.35
CNDPS 2.86
CNBC 2.85
CSTP 2.56
TRIPS 2.5

This shows just how low the ratings were, with all of the international
smuggling treaties in the survey being given ratings well below the mediocre value
of 4, with CITES having only slightly lower values than the others. This suggests

108
that respondents tended to view international treaties as generally having low
deterrence value.
There was little change in the nature of the numbers with the question asking
respondents to rate the level of cooperation in enforcing the treaties at both the
domestic and international levels. The question was divided into 2 parts, with one
part asking participants to mark how much cooperation they perceived from
domestic agencies and another part asking them how much cooperation they
perceived from international agencies. For both parts, the histograms again
displayed low numbers below the middle value of 4, with CITES having slightly
lower numbers. This is indicated by Table 5-15.

Table 5-15. Level of Cooperation of International Laws
Histograms - Level of
Cooperation of International
Laws
Mean - Domestic
Cooperation
Mean - International
Cooperation
CITES 2.73 2.6
CNDPS 3.46 3.22
CNBC 3.23 3.17
CSTP 3.31 2.89
TRIPS 2.97 2.86

This displays how low the ratings were. It also shows that CITES, consistent
with the other questions on international treaties, received lower marks relative to the

109
other treaties in the survey. This suggests that respondents generally perceived little
cooperation—from either domestic agencies or international entities—in enforcing
international treaties, with CITES being seen as gaining less cooperation than others.

Demographics
For demographic data, the survey used a number of different scales of
differing units, arranged as follows:
1) Years Employed – LA Port Police used a scale based on years
2) Years Employed – Law Enforcement also used a scale based on years
3) Age used the respondent’s age in years
4) Ethnic Group used a scale with Caucasian-American being 1,
Hispanic-American being 2, African-American as 3, Asian-American
as 4, and Other being 5
5) Gender was assigned values of 1 for Male, 2 for Female, and 3 for
Other
6) Years Education followed a scale given in years
7) Annual Income followed a scale of 1-to-10, with 1 representing a
bracket of $0-10,000 per year and 10 representing a bracket of
$100,000 or more per year
8) Years Lived in U.S. is given in years
9) Years Lived in California is given in years
10) Years Lived in LA is given in years

110
11) Religious Attendance used a scale of 1-to-4, with 1 being once each
week, 2 being once each month, 3 being a few times each year, and 4
being never
12) Political Ideology used a scale of 1-to-7 representing a continuum
from liberal to conservative, with 1 being extremely liberal and 7
being extremely conservative
The mean and standard deviation for the results for each demographic variable are
given in Table 5-16.

Table 5-16. Demographics
Demographic Mean Standard Deviation
Years Employed - LA Port Police 11.54 9.63
Years Employed - Law Enforcement 14.76 10.65
Age 40.68 9.82
Ethnic Group 2.3 1.43
Gender 1.11 0.4
Years Education 4.92 4.27
Annual Income 8.2 1.89
Years Lived in U.S. 39.25 9.73
Years Lived in California 36.25 10.34
Years Lived in LA 31.23 15.26
Religious Attendance 2.15 1.06
Political Ideology 4.58 1.2

111
Generally, this shows a number of trends:
• Respondents had a wide range of experience both as Port of Los
Angeles Police and as law enforcement professionals, with the
standard deviations showing a significant variation in the range of
experience (9.63 years and 10.65 years, respectively). However, the
histograms for both did not yield a normal distribution curve, but
instead show a slightly heavier weight towards fewer years, with fully
half (18) respondents saying they had less than 10 years in the Port of
Los Angeles Police and almost as many (13) saying they had less than
10 years of law enforcement experience. This makes sense,
considering that managers with more extensive experience would be
fewer in number relative to subordinates with less experience.
• Age, while also having a large range (as indicated by the standard
deviation of 9.82) yielded a normal distribution curve, with fewer
respondents being under 30 or over 50, and the bulk being within the
30-50 age range.
• For Ethnic group, the overwhelming majority were either Caucasian-
American (12 responses) or Hispanic-American (11 responses out of
), with less than half indicating they were anything else.
• For Gender, the vast majority were male (32 out of 36 respondents).
• With Years of Education, there was a marked bifurcation in the
responses. As a result, while there is a mean of 4.92 years of

112
education, the histogram shows a divide skewed towards less
education, with 30 respondents having less than 8 years of education
and 6 having more than 12. This is commensurate with the idea that
managers with more education would be fewer in number relative to
the number of less educated subordinates.
• Annual Income showed a heavy weight towards the higher income
brackets, with the mean of 8.2 on the 1-to-10 scale showing an overall
annual salary of roughly $80,000 per year. The low standard
deviation (1.89) indicates that a majority of respondents earned
around this figure.
• For Years Lived in U.S., Years Lived in California, and Years Lived
in LA, the histograms yielded rough normal distribution curves, with
the majority of respondents grouped around the means for each
question (39.25, 36.25, and 31.23, respectively). However, the range
was extensive, as indicated by the standard deviations (9.73, 10.34,
15.26, respectively).
• For Religious Attendance, even though the mean of 2.15 suggests
monthly attendance, the histogram distribution clearly shows a
bifurcation, with larger numbers attending either weekly (13
respondents) or a few times each year (12).
• For Political Ideology, there is a distinct normal distribution curve,
with the majority of respondents grouped around the mean of 4.58.

113
The standard deviation of 1.58 shows that most respondents placed
themselves around the mean, and very few marked either extreme.

III. Data Trends
With respect to the hypothesis, the next step in the analysis is to generate an
overview from the raw data and determine if there are any patterns demonstrating
similarities or disparities between 1) domestic and international levels, and 2)
endangered species traffic and other areas. Observing the nature of such patterns
will help guide further investigation into the extent of relationships between
international law and local enforcement.
This section begins the discussion with a comparison of data trends between
the domestic and international levels, drawing upon the means calculated for the
histograms in the previous section. In particular, it compares histogram means of
respondent answers to questions regarding:
1) Knowledge of topic issue, domestic law on issue, and international
law on issue
2) Perceived effectiveness of domestic and international law for each
issue
3) Perceived deterrence value of domestic and international law for each
issue
4) Perceived cooperation to support domestic and international law for
each issue

114
The section continues the discussion with a comparison of data trends
between endangered species traffic and other topic issues covered by the survey
instrument. This is accomplished by utilizing the means for the histograms of the
above questions, but organizing them so as to better display the differences and
similarities between responses to endangered species traffic and the other types of
smuggling in this study.

Level of Analysis (variables across differing levels)
Reviewing the histogram means for respondent impressions about attitudes
on knowledge, effectiveness, deterrence, and cooperation yield some observable
differences between domestic and international laws. These differences are clear
when the means are organized for each of these question areas according to differing
levels of analysis. This is seen in the following:

Knowledge (issue, domestic, international)
There was a noticeable disparity between each of the 5 sets of issues,
domestic laws, and international laws regarding how respondents perceived their
level of knowledge. This is plainly evident in comparison of the means from each
set of histograms covering the question of each respondent’s level of knowledge with
respect to a specific smuggling issue, the domestic law addressing that issue, and the
international law connected to the issue, shown in Table 5-17.

115
Table 5-17. Levels of Knowledge of Smuggling Issues
Smuggling Issue International Instrument Domestic Instrument
Endangered species
Mean:2.17
CITES
Mean: 1.89
ESA
Mean: 1.97
Narcotics
Mean: 4.83
CNDPS
Mean: 3.08
CSIE
Mean: 3.94
Weapons:
Mean: 4.28
CNBC
Mean: 2.69
DWMD
Mean: 3.71
Human:
Mean: 4.28
CSTP
Mean: 2.56
TVP
Mean: 3.23
Contraband/gray market:
Mean: 4.14
TRIPS:
Mean: 2.31
CBP
Mean: 2.97

Setting aside the issue of knowledge held by law enforcement personnel of
laws they would conceivably be expected to enforce, there is a consistent difference
between international treaties versus domestic ones, with the survey participants
consistently perceiving their level of knowledge about international laws to be lower
than domestic ones. In addition, despite the low claims of knowledge about
domestic and international laws, for both levels participants still perceived
themselves as having somewhat more knowledge about the general smuggling issues
addressed by each law than they did the laws themselves.
It is interesting to contrast these self-assessments in light of the level of
importance participants assigned to each issue, shown in Table 5-18.

116
Table 5-18. Perceived Importance of Smuggling Issues
Smuggling Issue Mean
Endangered species 4.33
Narcotics 6.44
Weapons 6.53
Human traffic 6.19
Contraband/gray market 5.75

Despite the higher values indicating respondent belief in the importance of the
issues, they still claimed a lower level of knowledge about the laws connected to
each one.

Effectiveness (domestic, international)
For effectiveness, there was not a consistent difference between the perceived
effectiveness of domestic laws versus international laws. This is evident by
comparison of the means for each category, shown in Table 5-19.

117
Table 5-19. Perceived Effectiveness of Domestic and International Laws
International Instrument-
International Support
International Instrument-
Domestic Support
Domestic
Instrument
CITES
Mean: 2.86
3.09
ESA
Mean: 2.83
CNDPS
Mean: 3.23
3.67
CSIE
Mean: 3.89
CNBC
Mean: 3.26
3.6
DWMD
Mean: 3.83
CSTP
Mean: 3
3.29
TVP
Mean: 3.14
TRIPS:
Mean: 3.17
3.29
CBP
Mean: 3.11

However, there was a consistent difference between the perceived
effectiveness of international support from non-domestic entities for international
treaties versus the perceived effectiveness from domestic entities for international
treaties. The means domestic support for international laws was consistently higher,
indicating that respondents perceived domestic agencies as being more effective in
their support for international treaties than international agencies.

Deterrence (domestic, international)
There was a marked difference between the perceived level of deterrence of
domestic laws relative to international laws on corresponding issues. The means for
each set of domestic-international laws are given in Table 5-20.

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Table 5-20. Perceived Deterrence of Domestic and International Laws
International Instrument Domestic Instrument
CITES
Mean: 2.35
ESA
Mean: 2.66
CNDPS
Mean: 2.86
CSIE
Mean: 3.31
CNBC
Mean: 2.85
DWMD
Mean: 3.22
CSTP
Mean: 2.56
TVP
Mean: 2.86
TRIPS:
Mean: 2.5
CBP
Mean: 2.83

The means for the perceived effectiveness of domestic laws, while low, are
consistently higher than those for international laws. This suggests that while
respondents viewed laws on smuggling issues as having low deterrence effect, they
viewed international laws as having much less deterrence value than domestic
ones—even though the domestic laws are the mechanisms for the international ones.

Cooperation (domestic, international)
The bifurcation between the international and domestic levels continued for
the perceived level of cooperation in the enforcement of each respective law. This is
evident from the means given in Table 5-21.

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Table 5-21. Perceived Cooperation in Domestic and International Laws
International Instrument-
International Cooperation
International Instrument—
Domestic Cooperation
Domestic
Instrument
CITES
Mean: 2.6
CITES
Mean: 2.73
ESA
Mean: 3.25
CNDPS
Mean: 3.22
CNDPS
Mean: 3.46
CSIE
Mean: 4.11
CNBC
Mean: 3.17
CNBC
Mean: 3.23
DWMD
Mean: 4.11
CSTP
Mean: 2.89
CSTP
Mean: 3.31
TVP
Mean: 3.94
TRIPS:
Mean: 2.86
TRIPS:
Mean: 2.97
CBP
Mean: 3.44

Overall, the means for cooperation between domestic entities in the
enforcement of domestic laws was perceived by respondents as being consistently
higher than for equivalent international laws. Moreover, the cooperation between
domestic entities in the enforcement of international laws was perceived as being
greater than the cooperation with international ones. This suggests that, while still
viewed as low, cooperation between domestic agencies in the enforcement of laws is
still considered by respondents as being better than the cooperation with foreign
entities.

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Issue: Issue v. issue (variables across differing issues)
The previous section presented histogram means in a way highlighting the
distinctions between domestic and international levels for a variety of question
topics: knowledge, effectiveness, deterrence, and cooperation. The discussion,
however, also benefits by organizing the means in a way which shows the
differences between endangered species traffic and the other forms of smuggling.
Doing so clarifies the nature of the relationship between international law and local
enforcement, especially whether it is issue-specific or if endangered species (and
thereby CITES and the ESA) are different from the other issues. The differences are
displayed in the following:

Environment v. others
With respect to the larger topics related to illegal trade covered in this survey,
endangered species traffic had lower ratings relative to the other topics. This is seen
by comparing the mean values of the histograms from the questions in the survey
that dealt with each topic. The means are given in Table 5-22.

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Table 5-22. Perceived Importance of Trade Issues
Trade Issue
Endangered
Species
Narcotics Weapons
Human
Beings
Contraband
Mean
of
Means
Standard
Deviation
Histogram
Mean -
Importance of
Issue
4.33 6.44 6.53 6.19 5.75 6.19 0.9009
Histogram
Mean - Level of
Respondent's
Knowledge of
Issue
2.17 4.83 4.28 4.28 4.14 4.28 1.0242

For both questions in the survey that dealt with the topics of illegal trade,
endangered species traffic had a lower mean compared to the other topics, indicating
that survey participants viewed it less favorably relative to other forms of illegal
trade.
The extent of these lower ratings can be inferred by using statistical
calculations for the overall mean value of the means for each topic on each survey
question (given in the table above as “mean of means”), as well as statistical
calculations for standard deviation on each question.
For the question asking each participant to rate the importance of each topic
(given in the table above as “Importance of Issue”), the mean of means was 6.19 and
the standard deviation was 0.9009. The mean on the question for endangered species
trade was 4.33, which was well below the low end of the standard deviation at
5.2891 (since 1 standard deviation around 6.19 is 6.19+/-0.9009).

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With respect to the level of respondent’s knowledge (given in the table as
“Level of Respondent’s Knowledge of Issue”), the mean of means was 4.28 and the
standard deviation was 1.0242. The mean for endangered species trade was well
outside the low end of the standard deviation at 3.2558 (4.28+/-1.0242).
The implication for endangered species falling outside the standard deviation
is that survey participants viewed the topic of endangered species with significantly
greater negativity than they did the other issues, and that the subject of endangered
species was a unique one outside the purview of the respondents.

ESA v. others
Among the domestic laws covered in this study, the ESA consistently ranked
as the lowest in the ratings it received from respondents. This is plainly evident in
comparison of the means gathered from the histograms for each question and each
domestic law. The means are given in Table 5-23.
Based on the mean values from the histograms, the ESA was clearly
perceived as deserving of lower rankings by survey respondents. The extent to which
participants marked the ESA lower relative to other domestic laws can be inferred by
using the statistical calculations for the mean of the mean values for each domestic
law from the histograms for each survey question (given in the table above as “mean
of means”), as well as the statistical calculation for standard deviation for the mean
of means.

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Table 5-23. ESA Versus Other Domestic Laws
Domestic Law
ESA CSIE DWMD TVP CBP
Mean of
Means
Standard
Deviation
Histogram Mean - Level of
Knowledge of Domestic
Laws
1.97 3.94 3.71 3.23 2.97 3.23 0.7694
Histogram Mean - Level of
Effectiveness of Domestic
Laws
2.83 3.89 3.83 3.14 3.11 3.14 0.4727
Histogram Mean - Level of
Deterrence of Domestic
Laws
2.66 3.31 3.22 2.86 2.83 2.86 0.2765
Histogram Mean - Level of
Cooperation in Enforcing
Domestic Laws
3.25 4.11 4.11 3.94 3.44 3.94 0.3998
Histogram Mean - Level of
Personal Satisfaction over
Searches
2.97 3.38 2.94 3 3 3 0.1817
Histogram Mean - Level of
Personal Satisfaction over
Seizures
2.53 2.91 2.67 2.67 2.75 2.67 0.1389
Histogram Mean - Level of
Organizational Satisfaction
over Searches
2.55 3.36 3.03 2.66 2.71 2.71 0.3307
Histogram Mean - Level of
Organizational Satisfaction
over Seizures
2.65 3.29 3.15 2.82 2.94 2.94 0.2552

For example, taking the survey question asking for participants’ levels of
knowledge for each domestic law, the mean of the responses for the ESA was 1.97.
The mean on this question for all the domestic laws in the survey was 3.23, with a
standard deviation of 0.7694. This indicates that the ESA was well outside the

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standard deviation, since 1.97 is below the low standard deviation mark of 2.4606 (1
standard deviation around 3.23 is 3.23+/- 0.7694).
Repeating this for the other questions results in finding that the ESA was
inside the standard deviation for perceived effectiveness (2.83, which is within the
low end of 1 standard deviation of 3.14, or 2.6673), perceived deterrence (2.66,
which is within the low end of the standard deviation of 2.5835), “level of personal
satisfaction over searches” (2.97, which is within 1 standard deviation of 3.0, or
.1817), and “level of organizational satisfaction over searches” (2.55, which is within
the low end of the standard deviation of 2.3793).
The ESA falls outside the standard deviation for the remaining questions,
with means outside the low end of the standard deviation for perceived “cooperation
in enforcing domestic laws” (3.25, which is outside the low end of 1 standard
deviation from 3.94, or 3.5402), just outside the standard deviation for “personal
satisfaction over seizures” (2.53, with the low end of the standard deviation being
2.5311), and also just outside the standard deviation for “organizational satisfaction
over seizures” (2.65, versus the low end of the standard deviation being 2.6848).
The implications of the means for the ESA falling outside or within the
standard deviation of the “mean of means” for each survey question is that
respondents evidently had more negative views of the ESA with respect to some
questions than they did others. Taking the questions where the means for the ESA
fell outside the standard deviations, respondents felt dramatically more poorly about
the ESA relative to other domestic laws in the survey with respect to the level of

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cooperation with other domestic agencies in its enforcement, and felt likewise
regarding seizures made under the ESA by respondents as individually and by their
organization as a whole. In contrast, taking the questions where the means for the
ESA fell within the standard deviations, respondents felt negatively about ESA—but
not substantially so relative to other domestic laws—in perceived effectiveness,
deterrence value, or levels of satisfaction regarding searches under the law by the
respondents individually or their organization as a whole.

CITES v. others
CITES had a consistently lower rating than the other international treaties
involved in this survey, as is demonstrated by a comparison of the means gathered
from the histograms for each international treaty for each of the survey questions
involved in this analysis. The value of the mean for the histogram for each survey
question for each international treaty is given in Table 5-24.
For each survey question posed for 5 international treaties in this study,
CITES had the lowest mean, indicating that out of the 5 international treaties it was
perceived by respondents as generally being ranked the lowest.
The extent to which CITES received the lowest ratings in each survey
question is indicated in the above table by the statistical calculations for the mean of
the 5 treaties for each respective survey question (given in the table above as “mean
of means”), along with the attendant standard deviation (given in the table as
“standard deviation”).

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Table 5-24. CITES Versus Other International Treaties
International Law
CITES CNDPS CNBC CSTP TRIPS
Mean
of
Means
Standard
Deviation
Histogram Mean -
Level of Knowledge of
In'l Laws
1.89 3.08 2.69 2.56 2.31 2.56 0.4428
Histogram Mean -
Effectiveness of
Domestic Support for
Int'l Law
3.09 3.67 3.6 3.29 3.29 3.29 0.2411
Histogram Mean -
Effectiveness of Int'l
Support for Int'l Law
2.86 3.23 3.26 3 3.17 3.17 0.1695
Histogram Mean -
Level of Deterrence of
Int'l Laws
2.35 2.86 2.85 2.56 2.5 2.56 0.2243
Histogram Mean -
Level of Domestic
Cooperation for Int'l
Laws
2.73 3.46 3.23 3.31 2.97 3.23 0.2900
Histogram Mean -
Level of Domestic &
Int'l Cooperation for
Int'l Laws
2.6 3.22 3.17 2.89 2.86 2.89 0.2527

Beginning with the survey question asking respondents for their level of
knowledge of a particular treaty, responses for CITES resulted in a mean of 1.89.
For the 5 treaties overall, the mean for that particular question was 2.56, and the
standard deviation was 0.4428. This shows to be within 1 standard deviation of the
overall mean (i.e, “mean of means”) of 2.56, each treaty would have had to have a

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mean value within a range of 2.1172 or 3.0028 (essentially, 2.56 +/- 0.4428).
CITES, with 1.89, was very clearly outside of this standard deviation.
Going through similar calculations for each of the other questions in the
survey, comparison of CITES mean values to those of the overall mean values finds
that CITES is within the standard deviation for the mean of means for “effectiveness
of domestic support for international law” (3.09, which is within the low end of the
standard deviation of 3.0489), and is also within the standard deviation for “level of
deterrence of international laws” (2.35, which is within of the low end of the
standard deviation of 2.3357).
CITES, however, falls outside the standard deviation of the mean of means
for the remaining questions: “effectiveness of international support for international
law” (2.86, which is outside the low end of the standard deviation of 3.0005), “level
of domestic cooperation for international laws” (2.73, which is well outside of the
low end of the standard deviation of 2.94), and “level of domestic and international
cooperation for international laws” (2.6, which is well below the low end of the
standard deviation of 2.6373).
The implication of CITES falling outside or within the standard deviations
for the above questions is that respondents see CITES as being significantly lower
ratings—that, relative to the other international treaties in this survey, CITES is
perceived as being much less known by survey participants and as suffering from
significantly less effective international efforts at enforcement, markedly less
cooperation between domestic agencies for enforcement, and dramatically less

128
cooperation between domestic and international agencies in enforcement. By
comparison, for the questions where CITES falls within the standard deviation, the
implication is that respondents see CITES as having less domestic support and
offering much lower deterrence relative to the other treaties in this study.

II. Discussion
To summarize the findings of this discussion, the comparison of histograms
means highlights a number of intriguing points regarding the relationship between
international treaties and local enforcement that warrant further investigation to
determine the nature of the relationship. In particular, they show distinctions
between domestic and international laws (i.e., level-of-analysis) as well as
distinctions between endangered species traffic and other illegal traffic (i.e., issue-
by-issue). These differences point to issues for policy-makers hoping to use linkages
from the international levels to local ones as a tool to improve implementation of
international instruments. The issues and policy implications are dealt with
separately below.

Level-of-Analysis
With respect to the level-of-analysis between domestic and international law,
it is clear that international laws tended to receive lower marks from respondents
relative to domestic law for the following variables:

129
• level of knowledge held by the respondent of international treaty
versus its domestic law equivalent
• perceived effectiveness of support for international treaty by
international organizations versus support by domestic agencies
• perceived cooperation in enforcement of international treaty versus
cooperation in enforcement of domestic law equivalent
• perceived deterrence value of international treaty versus domestic law
equivalent
• perceived cooperation in enforcement of international treaty between
international organizations versus domestic agencies
• perceived cooperation in enforcement of international treaty versus
domestic law equivalent
Based on the respondent answers, it is apparent that there is a gap in how
local personnel perceive domestic instruments versus international ones, even though
both are dealing with the same issue. More than this, the gap is one that has local
law enforcement largely viewing international law more negatively than domestic
law. The net effect is that local actors, such as the Port of Los Angeles Police, may
be less motivated to support what they consider to be ineffectual international policy
so long as they do not see connections between such policy and the domestic laws to
which they are focused.

130
Issue-by-Issue
With respect to endangered species traffic compared to other smuggling
areas, it is apparent that respondents tended to give endangered species smuggling,
and its related domestic law (ESA) and international treaty (CITES), lower ratings
for the following variables:
• perceived importance
• respondent’s level of knowledge
• perceived effectiveness
• respondent’s level of satisfaction of enforcement, both personally and
by employing organization
• perceived support for enforcement
• perceived cooperation for enforcement
From the survey responses, it is evident that endangered species, along with
its related instruments the ESA and CITES, hold less support from local law
enforcement compared to other issues. This suggests that as subject matter,
endangered species smuggling may be an aberration for law enforcement,
particularly for the Port of Los Angeles Police, and hence that observations drawn
from CITES as a case for international policy-making may not necessarily apply to
other international instruments.
Policy Implications
The underlying purpose of this analysis is to help policy-makers intent on
utilizing local actors in international policy implementation recognize potential

131
issues in linking global enforcement to the local level. The descriptive review of the
data is intended to highlight what local actors professed to be issues in their law
enforcement activities with respect to domestic and international laws. The above
discussion points draws upon these highlights to pose several warnings for policy-
makers aspiring for linkages to local actors to strengthen enforcement of
international policy.
The concept of devolution promises a means of aiding international
instruments by incorporating local actors into implementation. By shifting additional
authority to local entities, devolution extends the implementation chain beyond the
global-to-national link further to national-to-local one. While body of research
literature on CITES focuses primarily on global and national jurisdictions, and
thereby leaves the application of devolution to CITES enforcement an open question,
the results of the histograms here provide some insights as to the potential for greater
local jurisdiction over international treaties.
To begin, it is evident from this research that local entities sometimes
disconnect domestic and international laws, in that their views towards one are not
consistent with their views towards the other—even when both a domestic and
international law are connected to each other. This, however, is not necessarily a
problem for policy implementation. So long as a domestic law is an analogue of an
international one, local support can be transposed between the two, with local views
of more familiar domestic laws influencing views of less well-known international
ones. In this case study, the data shows that Port of Los Angeles Police consider the

132
domestic law ESA more favorably than the international treaty CITES. Because the
ESA is the domestic analogue of CITES, this means that policy-makers can still
expect positive police support for CITES, with local favorable sentiments of the ESA
acting as a mechanism to indirectly transfer such perspectives to CITES.
The risk in this situation for policy-makers is that the relationship may act
negatively. This case study presented survey data wherein local law was considered
more favorable than analogous international law. It is, however, conceivable that
there are domestic policies held in lower esteem than equivalent international ones,
resulting in a situation where dissatisfaction with domestic laws would transpose to
prejudice against equivalent international laws. This would contradict the hope of
policy-makers relying on the greater familiarity with local law over international law
held by local actors.
Another option is to ameliorate the disconnect so that local actors see that
their support for one is connected to the other. Following the devolution concept, this
calls for strengthening the national-to-local linkage. The histograms of the survey
data shows this involves several issues. Based on the observations of level-of-
analysis data, these largely revolve around a lack of awareness or understanding by
local actors of international instruments, and also a dearth of coordination with
policy actors at the national and international levels. The former could be addressed
through a greater commitment to education of local actors regarding their connection
to global policy. The latter could be treated by improving coordination through
greater communication, sharing of resources, and adjustment in jurisdiction. All

133
these measures, in effect, are ones previously prescribed in this research as
mechanisms for improving the linkages in the policy chain from international to
domestic, and from domestic to local levels.
Prescribing which measures to apply, as well as the manner in which to apply
them, requires a better understanding of the factors influencing the disconnect
between views on domestic and international levels. This suggests a need to better
understand the nuances driving the perspectives of local actors. The next stage of the
analysis aims to fulfill this objective, applying statistical methods to the survey data
to determine if there are potential explanatory or causal factors influencing local
officers. The study will then use the results to make policy recommendations.
Regardless of the action taken—to either ignore the disconnect in views
between domestic and international policy and rely on local sentiments towards more
familiar domestic instruments, or to try and ameliorate the disconnect—actions in
extending the policy chain to the local level should be cognizant of issue-specific
idiosyncrasies. From the issue-by-issue data, it is clear that some topics like
endangered species smuggling, along with their attendant domestic and international
instruments, are viewed in markedly different ways by local actors relative to other
topics. As a result, the policy action taken should vary by topic issue on a case-by-
case basis.
The next step in the analysis will investigate if there are any inter-related
influences within the data, with some variables having a determinative relationship
with any of the others. This will determine if the observations made in this

134
discussion are subject to behavioral connections between the data. The presence of
such connections may affect the policy implications, in the sense that they may point
to different explanations for the descriptive trends drawn from the data histograms.
The research will take the descriptive analysis presented here and continue with
statistical analysis. This will involve specification of independent and dependent
variables using the survey questions, calculation of correlations to find potential
causal relationships, and performance of regression analysis to determine the
strength of such possible causal relationships.

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Chapter 6: Statistical Analysis of Data

International policy-makers hoping to utilize local actors in support of policy
are seeking to extend the implementation chain from an international-to-national
level to a national-to-local one. Devolution promises to enable the creation of the
national-to-local linkage by distributing greater authority from federal government to
local agencies with respect to enforcement of national laws that are analogues of
international ones.
A challenge to such aspirations is the potential unwillingness of local actors
to participate in the implementation of international policy. While local actors may
be supportive of domestic policies, and thereby ripe for receiving greater authority to
enforce national laws under devolution, it is not clear that this automatically means
the same for international laws. The analysis showed that there are sometimes
disconnections between local interest in domestic laws versus international
instruments.
For those situations, however, where local views are biased towards domestic
laws, policy-makers can still expect to integrate local actors into the implementation
chain, so long as the domestic law and international laws are equivalent. Under this
condition, local preferences towards the domestic instrument can be transposed to
international policy. Unfortunately, this prescription is qualified, since there is a risk
that local views are negative towards domestic policies, and that such attitudes would
be transposed towards equivalent international policies.

136
Policy-makers hoping to avoid such complications have the option of
ameliorating the disconnect in views between domestic and international
instruments. But doing so requires better understanding of the factors driving local
perspectives towards policy. This is necessary to tailor appropriate actions to
mitigate the factors producing the disconnect.
Following the observations of the histograms, the next stage in the study is to
determine potential relationships between the variables, specifically those that might
demonstrate the connections between the level of success of the legal instruments in
the survey versus potential explanatory factors. In doing so, the analysis may
indicate if respondent views on the efficacy of their enforcement of international or
domestic laws has some basis in their apparent backgrounds or working
environment. If true, it would supply policy-makers with a greater understanding of
what issues they would need to address in strengthening the linkage to local actors so
as to incorporate them into implementation efforts for global instruments.
To accomplish this, the study targets those variables in the survey that dealt
with the level-of-analysis and issue-by-issue disconnections highlighted by the
descriptive analysis, particularly those indicative of respondent views regarding local
law enforcement operations, domestic laws, international laws, and personal
characteristics. By survey section this meant the following variables:
• Section I: Smuggling
o QIA1—Importance of Smuggling
o QIB1—Knowledge of Smuggling

137
o QIE1—Challenges to Personal Performance
o QIE3—Challenges to Organizational Performance
• Section II: Domestic Law
o QIIA1—Knowledge of Domestic Law
o QIIB1—Effectiveness of Domestic Efforts to Enforce
Domestic Law
o QIIC1—Deterrence of Domestic Law
o QIID1—Cooperation of Domestic Agencies
o QIIF1—Satisfaction Over Personal Efforts in Searches
o QIIF3—Satisfaction Over Personal Efforts in Seizures
o QIIH1—Satisfaction Over Organizational Efforts in Searches
o QIIH3—Satisfaction Over Organizational Efforts in Seizures
• Section III: International Law
o QIIIA1—Knowledge of International Law
o QIIIB1—Effectiveness of International Efforts to Enforce
International Law
o QIIIB2—Effectiveness of Domestic Efforts to Enforce
International Law
o QIIIC1—Deterrence of International Laws
o QIIID1—Cooperation of Domestic Agencies
o QIIID2—Cooperation of International Agencies

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• Section IV: Demographics
o QIV—Demographics
Generally, the study applied statistical analysis to the above. The statistical
investigation began with transformation of the data set to allow application of
standard statistical methods, determination of correlation values between the
variables, and then regression analysis to find determinative relationships for those
variable pairs for which there was significant correlation.
The statistical calculations were conducted using a dedicated commercial
software suite: SPSS. All data was entered into SPSS, and all calculations, as well
as graphic output, was produced using SPSS.

I. Transformed Dataset
Because the dataset produced histograms which were frequently skewed, the
analysis performed data transformation. This is because statistical calculations
involve parametric tests and functions which assume a normal distribution (i.e., the
traditional bell curve), and as a result tend to produce misleading results when
applied to distributions that do not follow the normal curve. The histograms in this
study did not match a normal distribution curve, and so called for methods that
would allow statistical techniques while reducing the danger of misleading results.
Ordinarily, the choice when confronted by skewed data is to either transform
the data so that it more closely matches a bell curve and hence becomes ripe for
parametric statistical analysis, or to avoid the use of parametric statistical techniques

139
altogether and instead apply non-parametric ones. Given the tendency for non-
parametric techniques to be less sensitive in detecting potential relationships in the
data, the analysis chose to persist with parametric tests. In an effort to preserve the
applicability of the parametric techniques, the data had to be transformed to more
closely follow a normal distribution curve.
The histograms did present a few data points following bell curves.
However, they frequently displayed distribution curves that were either skewed to
the left (i.e., lower end of the 1-to-7 ratings scale) or to the right (i.e., the higher end
of the 1-to-7 ratings scale). These skewed curves were subjected to transformations,
with curves skewed to the left being transformed via a square root formula (where
xtransformed= sqrt(x)) and curves skewed to the right being transformed via a
reflection and square root formula (where the xtransformed = sqrt (1-x)).
The goal was to produce a dataset for statistical analysis composed entirely of
histograms that followed—as much as possible—normal distribution curves, so as to
maximize the efficacy of the parametric techniques. It was this transformed dataset
that was used for the subsequent parametric tests and functions to find correlations
and explore the possibility of causal relationships between differing variables.

II. Correlations
The initial step in the statistical analysis was an initial determination of the
level of correlation for all the variables, with the goal of using the correlations to

140
identify promising relationships for further statistical calculations and eliminating
less promising ones from review.
SPSS, in order to calculate correlations, requires specification of scalar
independent and dependent variables. In the data selected for this analysis,
dependent variables are taken as those that were indicative of participant attitudes on
efficacy of the laws included in the survey, and the independent variables are taken
as perhaps those that were indicative of participant demographics and working
environment. This produces the arrangement of dependent and independent
variables shown in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Independent and Dependent Variables
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
QIA1--Importance of Smuggling
QIIB1--Effectiveness of Domestic Efforts to Enforce
Domestic Law
QIB1--Knowledge of Smuggling QIIC1--Deterrence of Domestic Laws
QIE1--Challenges to Personal
Performance
QIIF1--Satisfaction Over Personal Efforts in Searches
QIE3--Challenges to Organizational
Performance
QIIF3--Satisfaction Over Personal Efforts in Seizures
QIIA1--Knowledge of Domestic Law
QIIH1--Satisfaction Over Organizational Efforts in
Searches
QIID1--Cooperation Domestic Agencies
QIIH3--Satisfaction Over Organizational Efforts in
Seizures
QIIIA1--Knowledge of International
Law
QIIIB1--Effectiveness of International Efforts to
Enforce International Law
QIIID1--Cooperation of Domestic
Agencies
QIIIB2--Effectiveness of Domestic Efforts to Enforce
International Law
QIIID2--Cooperation of International
Agencies
QIIIC1--Deterrence of International Laws
QIV--Demographics

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The above tables list 10 independent variables and 9 dependent variables, for
a total of 19. However, the actual total of variables is significantly higher. Among
the listings above, 2 deal with challenges to personal and organizational
performance, for which the survey listed 14 for both personal and organizational
performance, making 28 variables. One, demographics, had 7 variables used in this
analysis. In addition, the remaining 16 of the 19 given in the table actually represent
the questions posed to each respondent by the survey, and each question
encompassed the 5 topic issues (endangered species, narcotics, weapons human
traffic, or gray market) or laws (ESA/CITES for endangered species, CSIE/CNDPS
for narcotics, DWMD/CNBC for weapons, TVP/CSTP for human traffic, and
CBP/TRIPs for gray market) covered by this study, making 80 variables. As a result,
the actual total of variables that are involved in the analysis is 115, with 70 falling
under the category of independent variables and 45 under dependent variables.
SPSS allows only 100 variables to be involved in correlation calculations.
This means that SPSS, in generating a correlation matrix, will only allow inclusion
of 100 variables. Since the analysis exceeds this with 115, it was necessary to divide
the variables into groups. In an effort to generate correlation matrices useful to
comparison between dependent variables, the independent variables were retained as
a whole to provide a common point of reference, leaving the dependent variables to
be divided into two groups. This meant that the correlation analysis was done twice,
so that there were two correlation matrices. Each matrix contains all the independent
variables specified in the table. However, one matrix was generated for the

142
dependent variables addressing domestic law, and another matrix was generated for
dependent variables addressing international law. The reasoning is that this still
allowed all dependent variables (both domestic and independent) to be compared on
the basis of the same independent variables. The correlation matrices are presented
in Appendix 6 and 7.
The level of correlation was determined using Pearson’s product-moment
correlation coefficient of r, which indicates the apparent predictive capability of one
variable upon another in the sense that it gives the level of correlation between the
behavior of different variables. An r>0.5 suggests a non-trivial level of predictive
capability, and hence the potential of a causal relationship, thereby warranting
additional statistical analysis to verify or disprove such a potential relationship.
Attendant with correlation is the approximation of variance, which was found
using the coefficient of determination, given by r
2
. This indicates how much of the
variance in one variable can be attributed to the variance of another variable. It is a
measure in percent, and so approximates just how closely connected the behaviors of
2 separate variables are.
All data for all variables were subjected to correlation calculations using
SPSS, resulting in a correlation matrix presenting the Pearson’s correlation value (r)
and a coefficient of determination for each variable pair. The Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient measured the relationship between the variables.
Those variable pairs with Pearson’s correlation values greater than 0.5 (r>0.5) were

143
taken as indicative of potential relationships, and the coefficient of determination
observed for the level of variance.
Of the 115 variables in the study, only a few produced r>0.5. The Pearson’s
values for all the data are given in Appendix 6, which presents the correlation matrix
for variables involved in this research. Out of these correlation values, the variable
pairs that had Pearson’s r>0.5 are presented in Table 6-2, along with their
coefficients of determination.
This is a total of 10 variable pairs, out of a dataset of 115 variables. This
suggests that only a small fraction of the dataset had any relationship, since based on
the Pearson’s r values only a few of the variables shows produced any substantial
level of correlation.
Without exception, the few variable pairs that had r>0.5 also yielded
substantial coefficients of determination. For example, the pair of “Level of
Effectiveness Domestic Law-ESA” and “Level of Cooperation Int’l Orgs to Enforce
Int’l Law-CITES” had the lowest coefficient of determination of 0.252, which meant
that 25% of the variation in one variable is attributable to the variation in the other.
This is a non-trivial sum. The highest coefficient of determination was 0.436, or
43.6% of variance, between “Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-CBP” and “Level
Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce Domestic Law-CBP.”

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Table 6-2. Variable Pairs with Pearson’s r>0.5
Variable Pairs (Transformed)
Correlation:
Pearson's r
Coefficient of
Determination: r
2

Level of Deterrence International Law-CITES 0.508 0.258
Years in California
Level of Deterrence International Law-CNDPS 0.513 0.263
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-CNDPS

Deterrence International Law-TRIPS 0.518 0.268
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-TRIPs

Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-CBP 0.66 0.436
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Domestic Law-CBP

Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-CBP 0.529 0.280
Level Cooperation Int' Orgs to Enforce Int'l
Law-TRIPs

Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-CBP 0.579 0.335
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-TRIPs

Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-ESA 0.527 0.278
Level of Knowledge-Smuggling
Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-ESA 0.569 0.324
Level of Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Domestic Law-ESA

Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-ESA 0.532 0.283
Level of Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Int'l Law-CITES

Level Effectiveness Domestic Law-ESA 0.502 0.252
Level of Cooperation Int'l Orgs to Enforce Int'l
Law-CITES

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Given that there exists a significant level of correlation and related variance
in these 10 variable pairs, the next step is to determine if a readily identifiable
formula exists delineating the relationships. This can be found by performing
regression analysis.

III. Regression Analysis
Regression analysis began with an analysis of variance (ANOVA), and
proceeded with a determination of possible coefficients (beta and sig.).
The ANOVA test determines if the variance between different groups of
variables is statistically significant, with a value of significance (sig.) close to 0
indicating greater potential for a relationship between variables in a variable cluster
which warrants investigation for an appropriate equation with coefficients (beta)
representing the relationship. In other words, ANOVA helps identify variable
relationship clusters between individual dependent variables and multiple potential
independent variables whose behavior can be modeled by linear equations with
coefficients of beta (e.g., x = (beta
1
)(y
1
) + (beta
2
)(y
2
) + (beta
n
)(y
n
)), where x
represents a particular dependent variable, and y
n
represents potential independent
variables and beta
n
the coefficients for each independent variable. Note that variable
relationships involves clusters of variables, so that there may be one dependent
variable (x) with multiple independent variables (y
1
, y
2
, etc.), each of which needs its
own beta (beta
1
, beta
2
, etc.).

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The results of the ANOVA tests for the dependent variables with significant
correlation values are given in Table 6-3, with each F and sig. value assigned for
each dependent variable and its set of independent variables:

Table 6-3. ANOVA Tests for Dependent Variables with Significant Correlation
Values
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F sig.
Level Effectiveness Domestic
Law-CBP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Domestic Law-CBP
10.75 0.000

Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Int'l Law-TRIPS

Level Cooperation Int'l Orgs to Enforce Int'l
Law-TRIPS

Level Effectiveness Domestic
Law-ESA
Level Knowledge Smuggling 5.272 0.003

Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Domestic Law-ESA

Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Int'l Law-CITES

Level Cooperation Int'l Orgs to Enforce Int'l
Law-CITES

Level of Deterrence International
Law-CITES
Years in California 8.713 0.007
Level of Deterrence International
Law-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Int'l Law-CNDPS
11.807 0.002
Deterrence International Law-
TRIPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to
Enforce Int'l Law-TRIPs
11.755 0.002

To determine the hierarchy of influence each set of independent variables had
upon each appropriate dependent variable, the regression analysis found coefficients
and sig. values for each individual independent variable. Beta values for each set of

147
independent variables are useful for showing the relative power of each variable in
determining the behavior of a dependent variable, with the variable having the
highest beta exerting the greatest determinative influence and the variable with the
lowest beta exerting the least. Beta values with sig.>.05 tend to indicate that the
respective variable is not making a significant unique contribution in terms of
helping predict the behavior of the dependent variable.
With these factors, the beta and sig. values for the above variables are given
in Table 6-4.

Table 6-4. beta and sig. for Dependent Variables with Significant Correlation Values
Dependent Variable Independent Variables beta sig.
Level Effectiveness Domestic
Law-CBP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Domestic Law-CBP
0.66 0.000

Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-TRIPS
0.511 0.001

Level Cooperation Int'l Orgs to Enforce Int'l
Law-TRIPS
0.341 0.018
Level Effectiveness Domestic
Law-ESA
Level Knowledge Smuggling 0.282 0.143

Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Domestic Law-ESA
0.569 0.001

Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-CITES
0.33 0.055

Level Cooperation Int'l Orgs to Enforce Int'l
Law-CITES
0.253 0.179
Level of Deterrence International
Law-CITES
Years in California 0.508 0.007
Level of Deterrence International
Law-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-CNDPS
0.513 0.002
Deterrence International Law-
TRIPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs to Enforce
Int'l Law-TRIPs
0.518 0.002

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Based on these numbers, the statistically significant relationships can be
further narrowed down, to just 6 statistically predictive relationships:
• Level effectiveness of domestic law-CBP v. Level cooperation
domestic orgs. to enforce domestic law-CBP
• Level effectiveness of domestic law-CBP v. Level cooperation
domestic orgs. to enforce international law-TRIPS
• Level effectiveness of domestic law-ESA v. Level cooperation
domestic orgs. to enforce domestic law-ESA
• Level deterrence of international law-CITES v. Years in California
• Level deterrence of international law-CNDPS v. Level cooperation
domestic orgs. to enforce international law-CNDPS
• Level deterrence of international law-TRIPS v. Level cooperation
domestic orgs. to enforce international law-TRIPS
The existence of just these 6 relationships out of the entire quantity of
variables measured by the survey poses some material for discussion.

IV. Discussion
The results of the regression indicate some patterns in the predictive
relationships of interest to the hypothesis. The hypothesis offered the argument that
there is a relationship between domestic law enforcement and international treaties,
as expressed in terms of implementation via domestic laws that fulfill treaty
obligations. The study tested this hypothesis using a domestic law (the ESA) that

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met US obligations to an international treaty (CITES) with respect to a specific issue
(endangered species). For comparison, the study also reviewed 5 other sets of
domestic laws-international treaties-issue areas.
Based on the regression analysis of the data for all these sets, there are some
points of discussion in terms of both domestic and international-level relationships.
The data yielded predictive relationships between variables at the domestic level,
with 2 out of the 6 dealing with domestic enforcement of domestic laws. There was
no comparable relationship found for international enforcement of international laws.
With respect to predictive relationships between domestic enforcement and
international laws, there were 4 variable pairs.
These results pose a number of issues for policy-makers attempting to extend
policy linkages to local communities with the goal of involving local actors in
implementation of international instruments. Comments for the confirmed predictive
relationships are given below, and followed by a review of policy implications.

Predictive relationships—domestic enforcement and domestic law
For domestic enforcement of domestic law, the data established predictive
relationships for a specific connection for 2 different issue areas. This was a positive
relationship between perceived cooperation between domestic law enforcement
agencies and perceived effectiveness of domestic law. The relationship was found
for 2 different domestic laws: CBP and ESA.

150
The replication of the same connection between 2 different issue areas
supports assertion of reasoning that a law becomes more effective the more resources
are organized to enforce it. This assertion is qualified, since the 3 remaining issue
areas (narcotics, weapons, and humans trafficking) found no such predictive
relationship. It is, however, supportive of this research’s case study of CITES, since
it does show a relationship between law enforcement and domestic law with respect
to the ESA, which is the domestic law implementing US obligations to CITES.

Predictive relationships—domestic enforcement and international laws
The data did yield relationships between international and domestic levels,
with predictive relationships evident between international treaties and domestic
laws for 4 out of the 6 variable pairs. Of these 4, 1 demonstrated a connection
between the effectiveness of international law (CITES) and a respondents’ term of
residency in California. This is largely irrelevant to the hypothesis, and can be
discarded from discussion. Of the other 3 variable pairs, predictive relationships
were found for 1) perceived cooperation between domestic agencies to enforce
international law and perceived effectiveness of international law, and 2) perceived
cooperation between domestic agencies to enforce domestic law and perceived
effectiveness of domestic law. For the first set of predictive relationships, the
connections were for narcotics traffic (CNDPS) and gray market traffic (TRIPS).
For the second set, the predictive relationship was found for gray market traffic
(CBP).

151
These relationships all involve the level of cooperation between domestic
agencies to enforce international law, and they show that this variable has a
predictive connection to the effectiveness of both the international law (shown for
both TRIPS and CNDPS) and the domestic law fulfilling US obligations to it (shown
for the CBP). This suggests that the domestic law enforcement personnel in this
survey perceive a relationship between the activities of domestic law enforcement
and international law, and believe that there are predictive consequences between
actions of domestic law enforcement and an international treaty.
This indicates that respondents see a connection between themselves and
international policy, and that they believe local actions can influence global ones.
Such support, however, is tempered by the dearth of similar relationships in the other
issue areas, especially for the treaty within this case study: CITES. The topic of
endangered species generated nothing in terms of predictive relationships confirming
comparable connections to those for CBP-TRIPS or the CNDPS. The lack of such a
relationship for CITES is at odds with the findings for the ESA, since the ESA is
ostensibly the US effort to meet its obligations to CITES. The implications of this
disparity is grounds for discussion in the conclusion.

Policy Implications
The above results can perhaps be better reviewed if organized in terms of 2
different categories: 1) the disparity in results between local and international levels,
and 2) the disparity between CITES and other international treaties. For the first, it

152
is apparent that the statistical analysis produced mixed results in terms of finding a
significant determinative relationship between local perspectives of domestic laws
and the equivalent international law. For the second, it is evident that the issue of
endangered species trafficking, along with its respective domestic and international
instruments of the ESA and CITES, was perceived differently by local actors relative
to the other topic areas encompassed in the survey.
For policy-makers aspiring to incorporate local actors into implementation of
international instruments via extension of policy linkages from global to national to
local, the issues revealed in this discussion point to a number of suggestions. First,
based on the feedback in the survey, there is a determinative relationship between
how local law enforcement perceives cooperation between domestic law
enforcement agencies and how they perceive effectiveness of domestic law. This
means that their dedication to domestic laws can be improved by expanding the
interaction between them and other relevant domestic organizations. This can be
translated as involving greater coordination—a point which confirms the policy
findings from the descriptive analysis of the histograms: the linkage between local
actors and national government can be strengthened by improving the coordination
between them, since it acts to increase the authority of local actors in relation to
national laws.
Second, the data yields a determinative relationship between how
respondents perceive domestic cooperation and the deterrence level of international
law. This shows that local actors see a connection between their activities and

153
international policy, particularly when their activities are coordinated with other
national agencies. This again confirms the policy findings of the descriptive
analysis, and reiterates that the linkage from international instruments to local actors
may be directly enhanced by improving their coordination with other domestic law
enforcement organizations.
Finally, the statistical findings, much like the descriptive review, still shows a
disparity by issue topic, with CITES having markedly different results than others.
This leads to the same policy suggestion of the descriptive analysis: extending the
policy chain to the local level should be cognizant of issue-specific idiosyncrasies,
meaning that the level of effort involved in improving coordination between local
actors and national agencies will vary by topic issue.
Having found agreement between this statistical analysis and the previous
descriptive analysis, the next stage is to summarize the results of the research and the
policy recommendations. This will be done in the conclusion, which will extend the
study’s findings to present further implications for theory, and then note additional
areas of potentially beneficial research.

154
Chapter 7: Conclusions

I. Summary of Analysis and Discussion
This research investigated the potential of incorporating local actors in the
implementation of international policy via devolution of authority to local levels that
served to extend the implementation chain from an international-to-national to an
additional national-to-local one. Taking a specific treaty as a case study, it framed
the hypothesis as being that there is a connection between the treaty and local law
enforcement, and that such a connection allows the addition of local law enforcement
to the current national and international implementation efforts sustaining the treaty.
For a subject, the analysis focused on the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES), which by its language places implementation duties
upon its signatory nation-states, with each one holding sovereign authority to define
the means of implementation. The goal of the study was to make findings that could
be enunciated as policy recommendations regarding international law.
Following these guidelines, the case study distilled to several specific
questions for investigation. First, what is the nature of the current relationship
between CITES and local law enforcement? Second, if the relationship is to be
improved, what issues are there needing rectification? Third, if the relationship is to
be improved, what are the most effective ways to integrate local agencies in
international policy implementation?

155
The methodology adopted to answer these questions began with a review of
theory and research literature to develop a context as to existing understanding about
CITES as an international instrument. Based on the literature, both for international
politics and for CITES enforcement, it was apparent that much of the focus on global
policy dealt with the first link in the implementation chain, which involved
international-national interactions. This left relatively open the purview of this
study, which turned on the second link in the implementation chain, which extends
global policy to national-local interactions.
Subsequently, the analysis utilized direct research involving qualitative
materials from public documents and interviews with national and local agencies
related to CITES enforcement within the U.S., from which discussion turned to the
nature of the linkage between the national-local levels with respect to the treaty. The
discussion determined that, based on the current federal-local jurisdictional structure
within the United States, policy-makers intent on utilizing local law enforcement to
aid in CITES implementation may do so through three methods: increasing
coordination between local officers and the FWS, adjusting jurisdictional and
operational capabilities to increase federal power, or to adjust jurisdictional and
operational capabilities to increase local power. The first was problematic, because
of incomplete data that impeded improvement of referrals and training between the
FWS and the Port of Los Angeles Police. The second was contrary to current
government philosophy, which favors decentralization of federal power. The third,

156
was most consistent with ongoing policy perspectives, which call for devolution of
power to local authorities.
Taking the concept of devolution as a direction for creation of the national-
to-local link in the implementation chain, the research proceeded to the next stage of
the research to determine what issues would be involved at the local level if local law
enforcement were to be expected to help support CITES. Much of the CITES
research literature offered little guidance in this area, as it focused primarily on the
international-to-national link, and less so on the national-to-local link. This study
addressed this gap in the literature by using a descriptive discussion of survey results
from local law enforcement personnel regarding their observations of international
and domestic laws, and found that there was a bifurcation in local perspectives
between domestic and international laws, as well as variation in perspectives
depending on the subject matter of the laws. The analysis noted that it is possible that
local views towards international laws could be irrelevant, so long as they
maintained support for domestic laws that were the analogues of international ones.
This condition, however, presupposed local support for domestic law, and hence was
vulnerable to situations where local officers held negative views of domestic
analogues. The study observed than an alternative option to avoid such risk was to
bridge differences in views between domestic and international policies.
To help those policy-makers who chose to connect the divide between
domestic and international levels, the study turned to regression analysis to
investigate if there were any determinative factors producing the trends in the survey

157
data. The goal at this juncture was to find what aspects, if any, could be exploited to
improve local law enforcement support for a greater role in international policy, with
the determinative factors impacting local views on global instruments highlighting
the aspects to be exploited for mitigation. The discussion of the regression results
determined that according to local actors the major determinative factors were the
level of interaction between local and national agencies, with greater levels of
communication and coordination producing greater levels of interest in
implementing laws, both domestic and international.
The findings of the preceding steps are given here, and are taken from the
discussions given in each of the preceding chapters outlined above in the study. This
conclusion also relates the findings to the theory involved in the methodology. In
addition, it offers recommendations based on the findings that can help policy-
makers currently formulating international instruments. To finish, the discussion
notes a number of caveats about the analysis, and poses additional areas for potential
further study.

II. Findings
The findings are best understood by organizing them in relation to the
questions associated with the hypothesis. This makes for three sections: the nature
of the relationship between CITES and local port police, the issues faced by the
police in terms of their inclusion in CITES enforcement, and the potential targets for
solution to mitigate such problems.

158
Nature of linkage
The first stage in analysis endeavored to clarify the nature of the linkage to
local law enforcement. For CITES, this meant investigating the relationship of the
local Port of Los Angeles Police to the federal Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) in de
jure and de facto perspectives.
De jure, the research found that there is a measure of understood linkage
between the Port of Los Angeles Police as local agencies and the FWS as the federal
entity. It is not formally enunciated in law, but rather informally maintained, with
port police making referrals, with either information on suspected illegal species
trade contravening the ESA, or detainment of suspected violations until timely
arrival by FWS representatives.
De facto conditions, however, clearly show that the state of this linkage is
still uncertain, with a number of unresolved issues regarding potential challenges that
may be responsible for frustrating implementation of CITES and the ESA,
particularly in terms of available information about enforcement and also
disjunctures between federal and local enforcement. The first issue is that the
paucity of information regarding referrals and training prevents determination of the
frequency and accuracy of those referrals, making it difficult to fully ascertain the
connections between the Port of Los Angeles Police and the ESA. The second issue
is that the available information on jurisdiction and field operations shows a division
in terms of enforcement between federal and local levels.

159
Because the Port of Los Angeles Police and FWS both observe the
demarcation in federal versus local jurisdiction, actions against illegal wildlife
shipments requires coordination between the two, with the port police referring
suspected cases to FWS. The nature of such a condition is made suspect under this
analysis, casting doubt as to the effectiveness of the linkage between the agencies.
The problem is compounded by the nature of field operations, since the entity (the
port police) that conducts routine patrols defers ESA violations to the jurisdiction of
an entity that does not (FWS). Because it maintains a more active field presence, the
port police pose a greater level of local expertise in terms of familiarity with port
operations, nuances about law enforcement in the port, and timeliness in responding
to newly discovered crimes—factors which policy-makers pursuing devolution to
foster a national-to-local link in the implementation chain would likely seek to
utilize.
The findings regarding de jure and de facto aspects of the local-to-national
linkage generated a number of consequent points relevant to the policy goals of
incorporating local actors into international policy. First, because the ESA is a
federal law with an affiliated federal agency and no authority to local actors, formal
de jure CITES implementation extends only to a national level, and not to a local
one. Second, local involvement by the Port of Los Angeles Police in ESA
enforcement appears to be de facto informal through a referral system to FWS.
Third, de facto conditions suggest that the informal linkage between local actors to
the national level in support of a national law (ESA) is weak. Fourth, this situation

160
means that ESA and CITES enforcement misses an opportunity to include the
contributions of a local law enforcement.
The above leads to the fifth point, which is that solutions to the de jure and de
facto issues may be: increasing coordination between local officers and the FWS,
adjusting jurisdictional and operational capabilities to increase federal power, or to
adjust jurisdictional and operational capabilities to increase local power. Increasing
coordination is frustrated by incomplete agency record preventing diagnosis and
improvement of referrals and training between the FWS and the Port of Los Angeles
Police. Increasing federal power is contrary to current government philosophy,
which favors decentralization of federal authority. Allocating greater capability to
local levels is most consistent with prevailing policy preferences for devolution of
power to local authorities.
Sixth, and finally, the concept of devolution acts to enable the national-to-
local linkage in the implementation chain. Policy-makers seeking to integrate local
law enforcement into CITES enforcement are extending the implementation chain
from international-to-national down to national-to-local. To accomplish this, they
can enable the domestic linkage through devolution, which means that local actors
(port police) should gain greater authority to support a federal law (ESA) and related
federal agency (FWS)—something that is not currently the case.

161
Issues in incorporating local police
To use devolution for creation of the national-to-local link in the
implementation chain, it was useful to determine what issues would be involved at
the local level if local actors were integrated into CITES enforcement. Because
existing CITES research literature focused primarily on the international-to-national
link, the second phase in this study delved into local perspectives to better
understand a potential national-to-local connection. This involved a descriptive
study of data regarding local law enforcement perspectives regarding efforts in
relation to domestic and international law. The data came from a survey
administered to Port of Los Angeles Police, the local agency ripe for devolution of
federal ESA authority. For control purposes, the survey gathered responses
regarding endangered species smuggling in general, ESA as a domestic law, and
CITES as an international one. Also for control purposes, these types of questions
were applied for other smuggling issues and international-domestic laws.
The results highlight a number of points regarding the relationship between
international treaties and local enforcement. They show distinctions between
domestic and international laws (i.e., level-of-analysis disconnection) as well as
distinctions between endangered species traffic and other illegal traffic (i.e., issue-
by-issue disconnection).
With respect to the level-of-analysis results, the histograms of the survey data
show a gap in terms of how local personnel perceive domestic instruments versus
international ones, even though both deal with the same issue. Generally, local law

162
enforcement viewed international law more negatively than domestic law. This
suggests that local actors may be less motivated to support what they consider to be
ineffectual international policy because they do not see connections between such
policy and domestic laws.
In some ways, this is not a problem for policy implementation, because if a
domestic law is an analogue of an international one, local support can be transposed
between the two, with local views of more familiar domestic laws influencing views
of less well-known international ones. The study finds that Port of Los Angeles
Police consider the domestic law ESA more positive than the international treaty
CITES. Since the ESA is the analogue of CITES, this means that policy-makers can
still expect police support for CITES, with local views of the ESA acting as a
mechanism to indirectly transfer enforcement interest in the ESA to CITES.
Such findings should be considered with caution. They are relevant when
local law is perceived more favorably than analogous international law. For
situations where the domestic law is regarded less favorably than its international
counterpart, it is risky for policy-makers to rely on local perspectives of the domestic
instrument to engender support for international policy. Policy-makers would be
advised to adopt a case-by-case approach in applying these findings.
The perceptions of local actors towards CITES is important. This is because
for CITES, domestic law means federal, not local, and thus limits ESA jurisdiction
and operations to a federal agency: the Fish and Wildlife Service. The result is that
U.S. policy framework limits the implementation chain to the international-to-

163
national linkage, and also prevents CITES implementation from taking advantage of
port police sympathies towards the ESA.
Greater linkage between local actors and the federal ESA would render moot
the disparities in local views towards domestic versus international laws. By
granting greater authority to local actors to support federal law, a stronger national-
to-local linkage would be added to the implementation chain incorporating local
actors into ESA enforcement. Because the ESA is the domestic equivalent of
CITES, it would enable CITES policy-makers to exploit local sympathies towards
the ESA in support of CITES, and thereby render port police views towards CITES
irrelevant from an implementation perspective.
Apart from the level-of-analysis results from the histograms, there is also the
disparities in data going issue-by-issue. The histograms show that endangered
species, along with the related ESA and CITES, are deemed by local law
enforcement to be lower in priority compared to other subjects like weapons, gray-
market, narcotics, or human trafficking. This suggests that local perspectives
towards international policy are subject to a case-by-case variations by issue topic,
and that policy-makers looking to devolution to built the national-to-local link in the
implementation chain need to monitor the characteristics of the legal framework
involved in a particular issue area.

164
Targets for solution
For policy-makers seeking to address the disconnect in viewpoints between
domestic and international policy, the final step in the research was to try and
identify specific areas through which policy-makers could attempt to improve the
linkages to the local level. This involved regression analysis to find determinative
factors producing the trends in the survey data, with the expectation that such factors
would highlight what aspects could be exploited to improve local support for
participation in international policy implementation.
The analysis found that there is a determinative relationship in terms of how
local law enforcement perceives cooperation between domestic law enforcement
agencies and how they perceive effectiveness of domestic law. This means that their
dedication to domestic laws can be achieved by increasing the coordination between
them and other relevant domestic organizations, which would serve to increase their
authority in support of federal laws—which may be U.S. domestic expressions of
international law.
In addition, the data yields a determinative relationship between how
respondents perceive domestic cooperation and the deterrence level of international
law. This suggests local actors see a connection between their activities and
international policy, especially when their activities are coordinated with other
national agencies.
Finally, there is a disparity by issue topic in terms of local views on laws,
with endangered species having markedly different results than other topics. This

165
indicates that hopes to strengthen linkages between local actors and national agencies
for the sake of improving policy implementation should be adjusted depending on
the topic issue.

III. Caveats
The findings of the research were hampered by a number of factors which
prevented more conclusive or compelling analysis. Specifically, these were the
limited nature of the data set, the restriction from specific types of data, and the
inability to get security clearance for access to other agencies.

Limited data
The data set in this study was composed of surveys returned from 36
respondents representing all the armed patrol officers at the Port of Los Angeles.
The survey gathered data for 115 variables, from which correlation calculations
produced a regression analysis containing 70 independent variables and 45
dependent variables. This meant that the ratio between the number of independent
variables and the number of respondents was roughly 2:1.
Statistical methods typically employ a rule of 10 entries for each independent
variable, or in this case, a ratio of independent variables to respondents of 1:10.
Statistical methods require a requisite number of data points to yield reliable results,
with the trend being a larger data set yielding more verifiable and robust statistics
and a smaller data set yielding greater chances for error or misleading statistics. The

166
ratio of 1:10 is taken as a rough threshold value indicating a point of reasonable
reliability or risk of error.
In this study, the data set clearly fell below the requisite threshold ratio.
However, this was somewhat unavoidable for a number of reasons: 1) the quantity of
data points could not be increased, because the survey was taken from an agency that
employed only 36 law enforcement officers, and so comprised the entire potential
data set of the available field sample, and 2) the reduction of independent variables
to reach the desired ratio would have reduced the scope of the analysis to an extent
that it undermined its relevancy to the hypothesis.

Types of data
The research method in this study was largely comprised of interviews and
survey data. However, both federal and local agencies involved in the case study did
not retain data regarding the nature of referrals made between them. Specifically,
there were not quantitative data kept regarding the frequency and accuracy of those
referrals made by the Port of Los Angeles Police to FWS for CITES-related
violations. This made it difficult to fully ascertain the connections between the Port
of Los Angeles Police and the ESA, particularly in terms of the level of
communication between the two and the level of training required by local law
enforcement in the event there were allocated more authority in CITES
implementation.

167
Security clearance
The focus of this analysis was on local law enforcement. This was because
the research revolved around the question of integrating local actors into the
international policy implementation, and hence attention to the implementation
chain. In the implementation chain, the first link is global-to-national, in terms of
going from international instruments to participating national signatories, and the
second link is national-to-local, extending from national government to local
government. This analysis, while encompassing both links between these three
levels, focused on the local level. This meant that the research concentrated on local
law enforcement at the Port of Los Angeles, rather than the federal government
offices with comparable jurisdiction over the port.
There are many law enforcement organizations responsible for protection of
the Port of Los Angeles. Each organization has jurisdiction not just geographically,
but also by subject matter. This means that while all may share jurisdiction over a
common area, each one will have exclusive jurisdiction over a specific issue area.
For example, the Coast Guard maintains jurisdiction over the waterways within the
port, and Customs also retains jurisdiction in terms of interdicting commercial
shipping.
While not crucial to the case study of CITES involved in this analysis, the
research would have benefited from a more expansive inclusion of these other
agencies and their jurisdictional issues, since it would have offered a more
comprehensive assessment of the nature of law enforcement activities over

168
international trade. For this study, this would have meant pursuing survey data with
respondents from the other law enforcement agencies covering the Port of Los
Angeles: the Coast Guard, FBI, etc.
Some effort was made to contact these federal agencies. Unfortunately,
responses were not forthcoming. Despite the sponsorship of the law enforcement
agency involved in this study (the Port of Los Angeles Police), there was no approval
granted for study from the other organizations protecting the Port of Los Angeles. In
large part, this is attributable to the nature of the data, which quite possibly infringed
on information considered a matter of security by the agencies in question. Security
clearance, while requested, was either denied or simply not answered, yielding to a
suppression of attempts to gain further data.

IV. Directions for future research
The results of the data were somewhat encouraging, if in some ways mixed.
While the regression analysis showed little connection between local levels and
international treaties, it nevertheless showed a connection between local levels and
domestic laws which were enacted to enforce those international treaties. This
pattern was displayed for not only the case in this study (CITES as the international
treaty and the ESA as the domestic law implementing it within the US), but also for
others. This would warrant additional analysis to further investigate the nature of
connections between international instruments and domestic enforcement.

169
There are some qualifications to make. In particular, there were constraining
factors in regards to the limited data sample, restrictions in data gathering, and lack
of security clearance. All these factors leave much of the analysis and its findings
susceptible to questions.
However, while such questions are cause for reservations about the
regression analysis, the correlation calculations for the data clearly showed
compelling connections between variables suggesting some relationship between
international instruments and domestic enforcement. As a result, even through the
regression analysis was not conclusive, the correlation values still suggest some
value for additional investigations in the future.
With respect to the hypothesis and the methodology in this study, the
statistical calculations support the possibility of more conclusive results through the
extension of the scope of the data. The data was limited in that the lack of response
from other domestic law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over international
trafficking at the Port of Los Angeles constrained the analysis to just a single agency.
This leaves unanswered questions as to the nature of responses that might have been
found from the other domestic agencies, even if federal. Such responses may have
indicated whether different different federal agencies treat US obligations to
international law differently, and whether such differences are displayed in agency
behavior. This would demonstrate that domestic implementation of international
treaties is partially a function of which agencies are involved in treaty enforcement,

170
and could possibly reveal more about the nature of the national-to-local linkage
within the implementation chain of international instruments.
In addition, the data was also limited in that the analysis largely utilized
interviews and survey data. While appropriate for the methodology in this research,
it could benefit from study of other types of data. In particular, it would be
illuminating to find line-item annual budgets, as well as annual search and seizure
rates categorized by the smuggling issues encompassed in this analysis (i.e.,
weapons, narcotics, humans, endangered species, gray market goods) for each
agency. This would provide empirical data to compare to the attitudinal measures of
the survey, allowing better determination of the accuracy of attitudes held by survey
respondents, as well as an opportunity to perform time-series studies of relationships
between empirical variables. This would help to determine if international treaties
are dependent on not only the attitudes of local law enforcement, but also the
resources available to local law enforcement.
Further, the scope of the study generated implications regarding the nature of
international treaties relative to local law enforcement using only smuggling-related
instruments. Verification of such implications could be accomplished by repetition
of the study using non-smuggling international treaties, to determine if the
relationship between international treaties and local enforcement is partially a
function of the nature of the treaty itself.
Moreover, the analysis was constrained by a hypothesis that approached local
level implementation through the views of local law enforcement personnel towards

171
international policy instruments. The opposite approach, however, might prove
useful, in terms of how international policy-making institutions view implementation
at the local level. This would supplement this study in terms of providing insight as
to the relationship between global and local policy from the global perspective. In
particular, it would indicate that, to the extent that local law enforcement holds a role
in implementing international policy, international policy-makers also see the role
that local enforcement may have on the existence of international treaties.
Finally, the data in this study was a single-time sample of respondents. It
would be useful, however, to gather time-series data to see if the perspectives of
local law enforcement changes over time, and if such changes produce a
corresponding result in implementation or perspectives towards international
instruments. This would provide compelling support for the argument that local law
enforcement has an influence on the successful implementation of international
policy.

V. Implications for theory
The implications of the findings are this: there is a connection between
international treaties and local enforcement affecting the enforcement of those
treaties, international policy should reach out to local law enforcement, and
international policy is perhaps more principle while the local is more practical.
The hypothesis was posed as an articulation of an underlying element of
theories of Elinor Ostrum and Ronnie Lipschutz. Ostrum’s and Lipschutz’s theories

172
share the contention that local actors have the potential to contribute to the successful
implementation of international policy. Their common belief is that actors at the
local level have the capacity to direct their actions to support policy at the global
level.
The research produced findings whose significance to Ostrum and Lipschutz
are mixed. To some degree, the research validated the hypothesis and in so doing
provides support for their theories. But this is qualified by the nature of the survey
question answers and the nuances between the different treaties involved in the
survey.
With respect to the survey question answers, it was readily apparent from the
histograms that respondents felt a low level of knowledge regarding the international
treaties in this study, and also perceived them as being largely ineffective and of low
deterrence value. These are discouraging to the underlying theory that local actors
would hold any interest in the enforcement of international policy. In addition, the
histograms showed respondents claiming a low level of cooperation between
domestic agencies in supporting treaties, which further damages the theory that local
actors see a connection between the local level and the global level.
However, these implications are mitigated by other histograms that present
survey participants as holding the treaty topics of international smuggling to be
highly important, and which also present the participants as having low levels of
satisfaction over their personal and organizational efforts in support of the treaties in
the survey. In contrast to the histograms above, these results support the theory that

173
local actors are aware of global issues, and that they do see a connection between
local actions and international policy.
The differences between the varying histogram results may be that the survey
participants involved in this analysis do see themselves and local level efforts in
ways conducive to Ostrum’s and Lipschutz’s concepts of local contributions to
international enforcement, but that they just do not hold the treaties involved in the
survey in high regard. That is, the respondents see a role for themselves—and local
law enforcement—in international policy conceptually, but are not optimistic for
such roles in relation to the treaties encompassed here specifically.
For the various treaties in the survey, the nuances in findings between them
generate implications as mixed as the ones generated from the histograms. The
study consistently found differences between CITES and the other smuggling treaties
in the survey. This disparity was evident in the histograms, the correlation
calculations, and the regression analysis. In all 3 areas of this study, CITES and the
subject of endangered species smuggling yielded a much lower level of respondent
awareness, support, and confidence, as well as a much weaker level of connection
between local actors and international law. This did little to buttress the theories of
Ostrum and Lipschutz.
In contrast to CITES, the other treaties in the survey did more to support the
theory. For the other treaties, the histograms showed there was a higher level of
awareness, support, and confidence. In addition, the correlation calculations and
regression analysis showed 2 of them produced a strong connection between local

174
actors and international law. As a result, unlike CITES, the other treaties are more
supportive of the theory that local law enforcement are cognizant of global issues,
and hold a connection between the local level and international law.
The nuances between the treaties suggest that the strength of Ostrum’s and
Lipschutz’s ideas may be issue-specific and even instrument-specific, with local
recognition and perception of a particular issue area and particular law determining
their responses to questions over local-to-global relationships. That is, respondents
may see a connection between local and international levels as a concept, but their
ability to see or support it is subject dependent.

VI. Ramifications to policy
Continuing from the implications to theory, the findings from this case study
also point to larger ramifications for general international policy. They present a
number of considerations in terms of implementation, particularly for those policy-
makers with aspirations of incorporating the efforts of local actors to those at
national and international levels. Based on the findings from this research, these
considerations can be grouped into several categories: whether local actors can truly
be linked to the implementation chain from the global-to-local level, the challenges
in creating such linkages, and what ways they can be realized.

175
Building the implementation chain
The incorporation of local actors into international policy implementation
essentially means extension of the implementation chain beyond the international-to-
national level to the national-to-local one. The findings indicate that creation of this
linkage is possible through devolution of authority from federal government to local
law enforcement agencies. For those situations where there is existing disjunctures
in jurisdiction or operation, and for those situations where policy preferences eschew
centralized federal power, devolution offers a viable option for integrating local
efforts into international policy.

Possibilities of the local
The findings support the contention that local actors have the capacity to
recognize international policy and to connect local-level activities to it. To some
degree, there is acceptance of a determinative relationship, with local actions—
especially those coordinated between local entities and national ones—influencing
the participation in the implementation of global instruments. This suggests there is a
pre-existing awareness of larger-scale international policy at the local level, and a
recognition of how the two are connected to each other.
For situations where domestic analogues are seen negatively compared to
international ones, the alternative is for more direct engagement of local sentiments
towards international policy. But even in situations where international policy is
viewed negatively compared to domestic policy, there is still a possibility of reaching

176
local actors. In conditions where domestic laws are seen more positively than
international ones, it is still possible to harness local support by exploiting their
sympathies to domestic laws. The findings indicate that while a domestic law may
be an expression of larger international policy, local actors tend to maintain a bias
favoring a domestic instrument over the equivalent international treaty.
Consequently, global policy can still gain local support so long as a consistent
national law exists.
The alternative is to avoid the challenges of adjusting policy framework to
match disparate views between domestic and local levels, by instead focusing on
amelioration of the disconnect itself. This can be achieved by increasing levels of
communication and coordination between local and federal as well as local and
international agencies.

Challenges in linking to the local
The study demonstrated aspirations of encompassing local efforts to global
policy face a number of challenges. Attempts to add a national-to-local link in
implementation requires recognition of the nature of interactions between the two
levels and the manner by which authority is allocated between them. The findings
showed that these issues include the de jure design of national law with respect to
local involvement, as well as the de facto problems of demarcations in jurisdiction
between national and local governments along with the nature of coordination
between national and local actors.

177
Another aspect that poses difficulty is the variation in local attitudes by issue.
The findings clearly showed differences in sentiment towards international and
domestic laws depending on the issue involved. Some topics clearly garnered
different responses than others.
Policy-makers at the international level, if they are intent on involving local
support, would need to familiarize themselves with these kinds of issues. This would
mean investigating the national-to-local dynamics unique to each country, and
adjusting policy design to accommodate for the full spectrum of nation-state
signatories involved in most treaties. It would also mean doing this on a case-by-
case basis for each treaty involving a specific subject matter.

Ways of linking to the local
This research suggests that there are potentially productive ways of extending
international instruments to local levels. Following the findings, the areas
determinative of improving local acceptance of increased involvement in global
policy appear to be authority in terms of enforcement and coordination in terms of
information. De jure, these can be achieved formally in the language of law, either
international or—in cases where local biases favor domestic ones—national, where
the law states the mechanisms by which local actors are involved in implementation
and defines their jurisdiction. De facto, these can be achieved informally via greater
coordination of resources and communications with other organizations—local,
national, or international—to unify energies against specific issues.

178
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194
Appendix 1: Survey

Survey Questions

To:
From: Jonathan Liljeblad
Date:
Re: Instructions & Questionnaire

I. INTRODUCTION
I am currently engaged on research for my doctoral dissertation investigating the
relationship between smuggling, international treaties, and local law enforcement.

As part of the dissertation research, I am conducting this survey to determine the
perceptions and attitudes of field personnel tasked with enforcing international
treaties via domestic U.S. laws. The survey focuses on point-of-entry law
enforcement personnel and smuggling with respect to the following: a) their
awareness of international and domestic laws, b) their understanding of the
connection between international and domestic laws, and c) their concern for
international and domestic laws in the scheme of their and their organization’s
priorities and responsibilities. Point-of-entry law enforcement personnel include the
Port of Los Angeles Police, LAX Police, and U.S. Customs at both the port and the
airport.

II. INSTRUCTIONS
Please complete this survey, preferably during a time you normally use for reflection
and focus (for example, a weekend). You will likely need approximately 30 minutes.
Please answer the questions as honestly and personally as possible using your own
existing base of experience and knowledge.

This survey will be purely confidential, and respondents should feel free to answer as
honestly and personally as possible.

When you are finished, please return this survey and any comments in the attached
self-addressed stamped envelope BY _______________, 2005 to me at the following
location:

1107 Fair Oaks Ave. #264
South Pasadena, CA. 91030

Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

195

Thank You,
Jonathan Liljeblad
JD/PhD Candidate, University of Southern California
liljebla@usc.edu
(818) 209-6915

196
ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS:

Survey questions are oriented to compare question respondent views on a variety of
smuggling issues as a means of providing a basis of reference. The survey questions
revolve around 5 smuggling issues and test respondents on these issues in terms of
their impressions and distinctions between international and domestic instruments,
and between themselves and their organizations. The issues and respective
international and domestic laws are as follows:

Smuggling Issue International Instrument Domestic Instrument
Endangered species
traffic
Convention on the International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES)
Endangered Species Act
(ESA)
Narcotics traffic Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (CNDPS)
Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act
(CSIE)
Weapons traffic Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
Biological Weapons Convention,
Chemical Weapons Convention (CNBC)
Defense Against
Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act
(DWMD)
Human traffic Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons (CSTP)
Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVP)
Contraband/gray
market traffic
Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Agreements (TRIPs)
U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol
Regulations (CBP)

In addition, the above smuggling issues are defined as follows:

Endangered species
traffic
illegal importation into the United States of any species (animal or
plant) threatened with extinction
Narcotics traffic illegal importation into the United States in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances (natural or synthetic)
Weapons traffic illegal importation into the United States of weapons of mass
destruction (nuclear, biological, or chemical)
Human traffic illegal importation into the United States of human beings who
either are intent on criminal activity or are being victimized in
terms of sexual acts, involuntary servitude, and slavery
Contraband/gray
market traffic
illegal importation into the United States of commercial goods

197
I. Smuggling Issues

A) Level of Importance for Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all important and 7 being extremely important.

1. In your opinion, how important is each of the following issues? (circle one)

not at all
important
Extremely
important
Endangered species smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Narcotics smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Weapons smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Human trafficking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Contraband smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. In your opinion, how have these levels of importance changed for each of the
issues during your term of employment with your organization? (circle one)

Endangered species smuggling increased / decreased / constant
Narcotics smuggling increased / decreased / constant
Weapons smuggling increased / decreased / constant
Human trafficking increased / decreased / constant
Contraband smuggling increased / decreased / constant

B) Level of Knowledge Regarding Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all knowledgeable and 7 being extremely
knowledgeable.

1. How knowledgeable are you on each of the following issues? (circle one)

not at all
knowledgeable
Extremely
knowledgeable
Endangered species smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Narcotics smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Weapons smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Human trafficking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Contraband smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

198
2. In your opinion, how has your knowledge changed for each of the issues during
your term of employment with your organization? (circle one)

Endangered species smuggling increased / decreased / constant
Narcotics smuggling increased / decreased / constant
Weapons smuggling increased / decreased / constant
Human trafficking increased / decreased / constant
Contraband smuggling increased / decreased / constant

C) Perceived Legitimacy of Duty to Deal With Smuggling

1. Do you believe it is appropriate that you/your organization has the responsibility
to enforce CITES/ESA, which deal with endangered species smuggling?

For you Yes No Not Applicable
For your organization Yes No Not Applicable

2. Do you believe it is appropriate that you/your organization has the responsibility
to enforce CNDPS/CSIE, which deal with narcotics smuggling?

For you Yes No Not Applicable
For your organization Yes No Not Applicable

3. Do you believe it is appropriate that you/your organization has the responsibility
to enforce CNBC/DWMD, which deal with weapons smuggling?

For you Yes No Not Applicable
For your organization Yes No Not Applicable

4. Do you believe it is appropriate that you/your organization has the responsibility
to enforce CSTP/TVP, which deal with human smuggling?

For you Yes No Not Applicable
For your organization Yes No Not Applicable

5. Do you believe it is appropriate that you/your organization has the responsibility
to enforce TRIPS/CBP, which deal with contraband/gray market smuggling?

For you Yes No Not Applicable
For your organization Yes No Not Applicable

199
D) Level of Public Awareness

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all aware and 7 being extremely aware

1. In your opinion, how aware is the public of each of the following
INTERNATIONAL laws? (circle one)

not at all
aware
Extremely
aware
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. In your opinion, how aware is the public of each of the following DOMESTIC
laws? (circle one)

not at all
aware
Extremely
aware
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. In your opinion, how aware is the public of your organization’s role in enforcing
laws dealing with each of the following issues? (circle one)

not at all
aware
Extremely
aware
Endangered species smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Narcotics smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Weapons smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Human trafficking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Contraband smuggling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

200
E) Resource Challenges to Personal and Organizational Performance

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all harmful and 7 being extremely harmful

1. How have the following challenges harmed your PERSONAL performance of
your professional duties with regards to smuggling? (circle one)

not at all
harmful
Extremely
harmful
Lack of Money 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Personal Interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Excessive Administrative Paperwork 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ineffective Technology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ineffective Strategic Focus on Organizational
Mission and Purpose by Employer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ineffective Tactical Policy to Achieve
Organizational Mission and Purpose by
Employer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Clarity in Employee Duties and
Responsibilities by Employer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of Communication between
Leadership and Employees
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of Communication with Co-
workers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
International & Foreign Entities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Domestic Government Agencies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

201
2. How has the harm of the following challenges to your PERSONAL performance
changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

Lack of Money increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Time increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Knowledge increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Training increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Personal Interest increased / decreased / constant
Excessive Administrative Paperwork increased / decreased / constant
Ineffective Technology increased / decreased / constant
Ineffective Strategic Focus on
Organizational Mission and Purpose by
Employer
increased / decreased / constant
Ineffective Tactical Policy to Achieve
Organizational Mission and Purpose by
Employer
increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Clarity in Employee Duties and
Responsibilities by Employer
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication between
Leadership and Employees
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Co-workers
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
International & Foreign Entities
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Domestic Government Agencies
increased / decreased / constant

202
Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all harmful and 7 being extremely harmful

3. How have the following challenges harmed your ORGANIZATION’s
performance of its duties with regards to smuggling? (circle one)

not at all
harmful
Extremely
harmful
Lack of Money 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Personal Interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Excessive Administrative
Paperwork
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ineffective Technology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ineffective Strategic Focus on
Organizational Mission and
Purpose by Employer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ineffective Tactical Policy to
Achieve Organizational Mission
and Purpose by Employer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Lack of Clarity in Employee
Duties and Responsibilities by
Employer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of
Communication between
Leadership and Employees
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of
Communication with Co-
workers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of
Communication with
International & Foreign Entities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Conflict or Lack of
Communication with Domestic
Government Agencies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

203
4. How has the harm of the following challenges to your ORGANIZATION’s
performance changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

Lack of Money increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Time increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Knowledge increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Training increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Personal Interest increased / decreased / constant
Excessive Administrative Paperwork increased / decreased / constant
Ineffective Technology increased / decreased / constant
Ineffective Strategic Focus on
Organizational Mission and Purpose by
Employer
increased / decreased / constant
Ineffective Tactical Policy to Achieve
Organizational Mission and Purpose by
Employer
increased / decreased / constant
Lack of Clarity in Employee Duties and
Responsibilities by Employer
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication between
Leadership and Employees
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Co-workers
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
International & Foreign Entities
increased / decreased / constant
Conflict or Lack of Communication with
Domestic Government Agencies
increased / decreased / constant

204
II. Domestic Law Questions

A) Level of Knowledge Regarding DOMESTIC U.S. Laws Dealing with Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all knowledgeable and 7 being extremely
knowledgeable

1. How knowledgeable are you on each of the following domestic laws? (circle one)

not at all
knowledgeable
Extremely
knowledgeable
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. In your opinion, how has your knowledge changed for each of the domestic laws
during your term of employment with your current employer? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

205
B) Level of Perceived Overall Effectiveness of DOMESTIC Efforts Regarding
Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all effective and 7 being extremely effective

1. In your opinion, how effective are overall DOMESTIC government efforts in
supporting each of the DOMESTIC U.S. laws dealing with smuggling? (circle one)

not at all
effective
Extremely
effective
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

C) Level of Deterrence of DOMESTIC Laws

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all deterrent and 7 being extremely deterrent

1. In your opinion, how much of a deterrence is each of the following DOMESTIC
laws? (circle one)

not at all
deterrent
Extremely
deterrent
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

206
D) Level of Cooperation Between Domestic Agencies to enforce DOMESTIC Laws

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all cooperative and 7 being extremely
cooperative

1. In your opinion, how cooperative with each other are your organization and other
U.S. government agencies in enforcing each of the following DOMESTIC laws?
(circle one)

not at all
cooperative
Extremely
cooperative
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

E) Results of PERSONAL Efforts to Control Smuggling

1. Approximately what number of searches & seizures are you PERSONALLY
involved in on a monthly basis for each of the following laws:

# SEARCHES # SEIZURES
ESA (endangered species) _____ per month _____ per month
CSIE (narcotics) _____ per month _____ per month
DWMD (weapons) _____ per month _____ per month
TVP (human traffic) _____ per month _____ per month
CBP (contraband goods) _____ per month _____ per month

207
2. In your opinion, how has the number of SEARCHES you PERSONALLY make
under each law changed your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

3. In your opinion, how has the number of SEIZURES you PERSONALLY make
under each law changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

F) Level of Satisfaction over Results of PERSONAL Efforts to Control Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all satisfied and 7 being extremely satisfied

1. How satisfied are you with the number of SEARCHES you PERSONALLY make
under each of the following laws? (circle one)

not at all
satisfied
Extremely
satisfied
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

208
2. How has the number of SEARCHES you PERSONALLY make under each law
changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

3. How satisfied are you with the number of SEIZURES you PERSONALLY make
under each of the following laws? (circle one)

not at all
satisfied
Extremely
satisfied
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. How has the number of SEIZURES you PERSONALLY make under each law
changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

209
G) Results of ORGANIZATION’s Efforts to Control Smuggling

1. Approximately what number of searches & seizures is your ORGANIZATION
involved in on a monthly basis for each of the following laws:

# SEARCHES # SEIZURES
ESA (endangered species) _____ per month _____ per month
CSIE (narcotics) _____ per month _____ per month
DWMD (weapons) _____ per month _____ per month
TVP (human traffic) _____ per month _____ per month
CBP (contraband goods) _____ per month _____ per month

2. In your opinion, how has the number of SEARCHES your ORGANIZATION
makes under each law changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

3. In your opinion, how has the number of SEIZURES your ORGANIZATION
makes under each law changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

210
H) Level of Satisfaction over Results of ORGANIZATION’s Efforts to Control
Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all satisfied and 7 being extremely satisfied

1. How satisfied are you with the number of SEARCHES your ORGANIZATION
makes under each of the following laws? (circle one)

not at all
satisfied
Extremely
satisfied
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. How has the number of SEARCHES your ORGANIZATION makes under each
law changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

3. How satisfied are you with the number of SEIZURES your ORGANIZATION
makes under each of the following laws? (circle one)

not at all
satisfied
extremely
satisfied
ESA (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSIE (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DWMD (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TVP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CBP (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

211

4. In your opinion, how has the number of SEIZURES your ORGANIZATION
makes under each law changed during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

I) Time to Investigate/Seize/Report/Adjudicate

1. For you personally, out of your total PERSONAL monthly work hours, what is the
approximate distribution of hours you devote to each of the following issues:

ESA (endangered species) ______% of total monthly hours
CSIE (narcotics) ______% of total monthly hours
DWMD (weapons) ______% of total monthly hours
TVP (human traffic) ______% of total monthly hours
CBP (gray market goods) ______% of total monthly hours
Other ______% of total monthly hours

2. In your opinion, how has the distribution of your PERSONAL work hours
changed for each of the laws during your term of employment? (circle one)

ESA (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CSIE (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
DWMD (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
TVP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
CBP (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

212
II. International Law Questions

A) Level of Knowledge Regarding INTERNATIONAL Laws Dealing with Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all knowledgeable and 7 being extremely
knowledgeable

1. How knowledgeable are you on each of the following INTERNATIONAL laws?
(circle one)

not at all
knowledgeable
extremely
knowledgeable
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. In your opinion, how has your knowledge changed for each of the
INTERNATIONAL laws during your term of employment with your organization?
(circle one)

CITES (endangered species) increased / decreased / constant
CNDPS (narcotics) increased / decreased / constant
CNBC (weapons) increased / decreased / constant
CSTP (human traffic) increased / decreased / constant
TRIPS (gray market goods) increased / decreased / constant

213
B) Level of Perceived Overall Effectiveness of INTERNATIONAL Efforts Regarding
Smuggling

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all effective and 7 being extremely effective

1. In your opinion, how effective are overall INTERNATIONAL government efforts
in supporting each of the INTERNATIONAL laws dealing with smuggling? (circle
one)

not at all
effective
Extremely
effective
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. In your opinion, how effective are overall DOMESTIC government efforts in
supporting each of the INTERNATIONAL laws dealing with smuggling? (circle
one)

not at all
effective
Extremely
effective
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

214
C) Level of Deterrence of INTERNATIONAL Laws

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all effective and 7 being extremely effective

1. In your opinion, how much of a deterrence is each of the following
INTERNATIONAL laws? (circle one)

not at all
deterrent
Extremely
deterrent
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

D) Level of Cooperation Between Domestic Agencies to Enforce INTERNATIONAL
Laws

Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being not at all cooperative and 7 being extremely
cooperative

1. In your opinion, how cooperative with each other are your organization and other
DOMESTIC government agencies in enforcing each of the following
INTERNATIONAL laws? (circle one)

not at all
cooperative
Extremely
cooperative
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

215
2. In your opinion, how cooperative with each other are your organization and other
INTERNATIONAL agencies (governmental and non-governmental) in enforcing
each of the following INTERNATIONAL laws? (circle one)

not at all
cooperative
Extremely
cooperative
CITES (endangered species) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNDPS (narcotics) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CNBC (weapons) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CSTP (human traffic) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRIPS (contraband goods) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

216
III. General Questions

A) Demographic Information, to be used for statistical purposes only.

1. How many years have you been employed by your current employer? ____ years

2. How many years have you been employed in law enforcement? ____ years

3. How many years have you held your current job title? ____ years

4. What is your age in years? ____ years

5. What is your ethnic group? (check one)
Caucasian-American _____
Hispanic-American _____
African-American _____
Asian-American _____
Other _____

6. What is your gender? Male Female Other

7. How many years of education have you completed? _______
Less than 12 (did not finish high school)
12 years (high school or GED)
14 years (Associate degree)
16 years (Bachelor’s degree)
18 years (Master’s degree)
19 years (Professional degree such as MBA, JD)
20 or more years (Doctorate)

8. What is your personal annual income? (check one)
$0-10,000 _____
$10,001-$20,000 _____
$20,001-$30,000 _____
$30,001-$40,000 _____
$40,001-$50,000 _____
$50,001-$60,000 _____
$70,001-$80,000 _____
$80,001-$90,000 _____
$90,001-$100,000 _____
$100,000+ _____

217
9. How many years have you lived in the following:
U.S. ____ years
California ____ years
Los Angeles ____ years

10. What is your nation of birth? ____________________________

11. Are you a U.S. citizen? Yes No

12. What is your first language? ____________________________

13. How often do you attend a religious institution, such as a church, a synagogue, or
a temple?
Once each week _____
Once each month _____
A few times each year _____
Never _____

14. In terms of political ideology, how do you perceive yourself on a scale of 1 to 7,
with 1 being extremely liberal and 7 being extremely conservative? (circle one)

Extremely
liberal
Extremely
conservative
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

218
Appendix 2: Histograms – Issues

Figure A2-1. Importance of Smuggling – Endangered Species

Figure A2-2. Importance of Smuggling - Narcotics

219
Figure A2-3. Importance of Smuggling - Weapons

Figure A2-4. Importance of Smuggling - Humans

220
Figure A2-5. Importance of Smuggling - Contraband

Figure A2-6. Knowledge of Smuggling – Endangered Species

221
Figure A2-7. Knowledge of Smuggling - Narcotics

Figure A2-8. Knowledge of Smuggling - Weapons

222
Figure A2-9. Knowledge of Smuggling - Humans

Figure A2-10. Knowledge of Smuggling - Contraband

223
Figure A2-11. Legitimacy of Duty – CITES/ESA You

Figure A2-12. Legitimacy of Duty – CITES/ESA Your Org

224
Figure A2-13. Legitimacy of Duty – CNDPS/CSIE You

Figure A2-14. Legitimacy of Duty – CNDPS/CSIE Your Org

225
Figure A2-15. Legitimacy of Duty – CNBC/DWMD You

Figure A2-16. Legitimacy of Duty – CNBC/DWMD Your Org

226
Figure A2-17. Legitimacy of Duty – CSTP/TVP You

Figure A2-18. Legitimacy of Duty – CSTP/TVP Your Org

227
Figure A2-19. Legitimacy of Duty – TRIPS/CBP You

Figure A2-20. Legitimacy of Duty – TRIPS/CBP Your Org

228
Figure A2-21. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Money

Figure A2-22. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Time

229
Figure A2-23. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Knowledge

Figure A2-24. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Training

230
Figure A2-25. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Personal Interest

Figure A2-26. Personal Resource Challenges – Excessive Admin Paperwork

231
Figure A2-27. Personal Resource Challenges – Ineffective Technology

Figure A2-28. Personal Resource Challenges – Ineffective Strategic Focus

232
Figure A2-29. Personal Resource Challenges – Ineffective Tactical Policy

Figure A2-30. Personal Resource Challenges – Lack of Clarity in Duties

233
Figure A2-31. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees

Figure A2-32. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Co-workers

234
Figure A2-33. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm International
Orgs

Figure A2-34. Personal Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Domestic
Orgs

235
Figure A2-35. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Money

Figure A2-36. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Time

236
Figure A2-37. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Knowledge

Figure A2-38. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Training

237
Figure A2-39. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Personal Interest

Figure A2-40. Org Resource Challenges – Excessive Admin Paperwork

238
Figure A2-41. Org Resource Challenges – Ineffective Technology

Figure A2-42. Org Resource Challenges – Ineffective Strategic Focus

239
Figure A2-43. Org Resource Challenges – Ineffective Tactical Policy

Figure A2-44. Org Resource Challenges – Lack of Clarity in Duties

240
Figure A2-45. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees

Figure A2-46. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Co-workers

241
Figure A2-47. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm International
Orgs

Figure A2-48. Org Resource Challenges – Conflict or Lack Comm Domestic Orgs

242
Appendix 3: Histograms – Domestic Law

Figure A3-1. Knowledge of Domestic Law - ESA

Figure A3-2. Knowledge of Domestic Law - CSIE

243
Figure A3-3. Knowledge of Domestic Law - DWMD

Figure A3-4. Knowledge of Domestic Law - TVP

244
Figure A3-5. Knowledge of Domestic Law - CBP

Figure A3-6. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - ESA

245
Figure A3-7. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - CSIE

Figure A3-8. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - DWMD

246
Figure A3-9. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - TVP

Figure A3-10. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - CBP

247
Figure A3-11. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law - ESA

Figure A3-12. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law - CSIE

248
Figure A3-13. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law - DWMD

Figure A3-14. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law - TVP

249
Figure A3-15. Perceived Deterrence Domestic Law - CBP

Figure A3-16. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - ESA

250
Figure A3-17. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - CSIE

Figure A3-18. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - DWMD

251
Figure A3-19. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - TVP

Figure A3-20. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - CBP

252
Figure A3-21. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally - ESA

Figure A3-22. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally - CSIE

253
Figure A3-23. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally - DWMD

Figure A3-24. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally - TVP

254
Figure A3-25. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made Personally - CBP

Figure A3-26. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally - ESA

255
Figure A3-27. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally - CSIE

Figure A3-28. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally - DWMD

256
Figure A3-29. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally - TVP

Figure A3-30. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made Personally - CBP

257
Figure A3-31. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made by Organization - ESA

Figure A3-32. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made by Organization - CSIE

258
Figure A3-33. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made by Organization - DWMD

Figure A3-34. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made by Organization - TVP

259
Figure A3-35. Level Satisfaction Number Searches Made by Organization - CBP

Figure A3-36. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization - ESA

260
Figure A3-37. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization - CSIE

Figure A3-38. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization - DWMD

261
Figure A3-39. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization - TVP

Figure A3-40. Level Satisfaction Number Seizures Made by Organization - CBP

262
Appendix 4: Histograms – International Law

Figure A4-1. Knowledge of International Law - CITES

Figure A4-2. Knowledge of International Law - CNDPS

263
Figure A4-3. Knowledge of International Law - CNBC

Figure A4-4. Knowledge of International Law - CSTP

264
Figure A4-5. Knowledge of International Law - TRIPS

Figure A4-6. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support - CITES

265
Figure A4-7. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support - CNDPS

Figure A4-8. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support - CNBC

266
Figure A4-9. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support - CSTP

Figure A4-10. Perceived Effectiveness International Govt Support - TRIPS

267
Figure A4-11. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - CITES

Figure A4-12. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - CNDPS

268
Figure A4-13. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - CNBC

Figure A4-14. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - CSTP

269
Figure A4-15. Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support - TRIPS

Figure A4-16. Perceived Deterrence International Law - CITES

270
Figure A4-17. Perceived Deterrence International Law - CNDPS

Figure A4-18. Perceived Deterrence International Law - CNBC

271
Figure A4-19. Perceived Deterrence International Law - CSTP

Figure A4-20. Perceived Deterrence International Law - TRIPS

272
Figure A4-21. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - CITES

Figure A4-22. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - CNDPS

273
Figure A4-23. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - CNBC

Figure A4-24. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - CSTP

274
Figure A4-25. Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs - TRIPS

Figure A4-26. Level Cooperation International Orgs - CITES

275
Figure A4-27. Level Cooperation International Orgs - CNDPS

Figure A4-28. Level Cooperation International Orgs - CNBC

276
Figure A4-29. Level Cooperation International Orgs - CSTP

Figure A4-30. Level Cooperation International Orgs - TRIPS

277
Appendix 5: Histograms – Demographics

Figure A5-1. Years Employed Current Employer

Figure A5-2. Years Employed Law Enforcement

278
Figure A5-3. Years Current Job Title

Figure A5-4. Age

279
Figure A5-5. Ethnic Group

Figure A5-6. Gender

280
Figure A5-7. Years Education

Figure A5-8. Annual Income

281
Figure A5-9. Years Living in US

Figure A5-10. Years Living in California

282
Figure A5-11. Years Living in Los Angeles

Figure A5-12. U.S. Citizen

283
Figure A5-13. Religious Attendance

Figure A5-14. Political Ideology

284
Appendix 6: Correlation Matrix – Domestic Variables (Parametric)

Table A6 is broken down into the following 90 sub-tables, arranged in a matrix of 9
rows and 10 columns:

Row 1
Col 1
Row 1
Col 2
Row 1
Col 3
Row 1
Col 4
Row 1
Col 5
Row 1
Col 6
Row 1
Col 7
Row 1
Col 8
Row 1
Col 9
Row 1
Col 10
Row 2
Col 1
Row 2
Col 2
Row 2
Col 3
Row 2
Col 4
Row 2
Col 5
Row 2
Col 6
Row 2
Col 7
Row 2
Col 8
Row 2
Col 9
Row 2
Col 10
Row 3
Col 1
Row 3
Col 2
Row 3
Col 3
Row 3
Col 4
Row 3
Col 5
Row 3
Col 6
Row 3
Col 7
Row 3
Col 8
Row 3
Col 9
Row 3
Col 10
Row 4
Col 1
Row 4
Col 2
Row 4
Col 3
Row 4
Col 4
Row 4
Col 5
Row 4
Col 6
Row 4
Col 7
Row 4
Col 8
Row 4
Col 9
Row 4
Col 10
Row 5
Col 1
Row 5
Col 2
Row 5
Col 3
Row 5
Col 4
Row 5
Col 5
Row 5
Col 6
Row 5
Col 7
Row 5
Col 8
Row 5
Col 9
Row 5
Col 10
Row 6
Col 1
Row 6
Col 2
Row 6
Col 3
Row 6
Col 4
Row 6
Col 5
Row 6
Col 6
Row 6
Col 7
Row 6
Col 8
Row 6
Col 9
Row 6
Col 10
Row 7
Col 1
Row 7
Col 2
Row 7
Col 3
Row 7
Col 4
Row 7
Col 5
Row 7
Col 6
Row 7
Col 7
Row 7
Col 8
Row 7
Col 9
Row 7
Col 10
Row 8
Col 1
Row 8
Col 2
Row 8
Col 3
Row 8
Col 4
Row 8
Col 5
Row 8
Col 6
Row 8
Col 7
Row 8
Col 8
Row 8
Col 9
Row 8
Col 10
Row 9
Col 1
Row 9
Col 2
Row 9
Col 3
Row 9
Col 4
Row 9
Col 5
Row 9
Col 6
Row 9
Col 7
Row 9
Col 8
Row 9
Col 9
Row 9
Col 10

285
Table A6. Correlation Matrix – Domestic Variables (Parametric) (Row 1, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 -0.0784 -0.0965 -0.0759 -0.1760 0.4053 0.0395 -0.1727 -0.1831 -0.0867
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.6496 0.5757 0.6598 0.3047 0.0142 0.8193 0.3137 0.2852 0.6150
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0784 1.0000 0.6310 0.2015 0.4542 0.2640 -0.2259 -0.1211 0.0181 0.0993
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6496 . 0.0000 0.2386 0.0054 0.1198 0.1852 0.4818 0.9165 0.5647
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0965 0.6310 1.0000 0.4053 0.1972 0.2011 -0.2008 -0.1053 -0.0978 0.0536
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5757 0.0000 . 0.0142 0.2489 0.2397 0.2403 0.5409 0.5703 0.7560
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0759 0.2015 0.4053 1.0000 0.1431 0.1065 -0.1408 0.0206 -0.1564 0.0659
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6598 0.2386 0.0142 . 0.4052 0.5366 0.4126 0.9050 0.3622 0.7024
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1760 0.4542 0.1972 0.1431 1.0000 -0.1598 -0.0782 -0.2644 -0.0633 -0.4163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3047 0.0054 0.2489 0.4052 . 0.3520 0.6505 0.1192 0.7136 0.0115
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4053 0.2640 0.2011 0.1065 -0.1598 1.0000 0.2037 0.2523 0.2008 0.3338
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0142 0.1198 0.2397 0.5366 0.3520 . 0.2335 0.1376 0.2402 0.0466
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0395 -0.2259 -0.2008 -0.1408 -0.0782 0.2037 1.0000 0.5816 0.4286 0.5001
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8193 0.1852 0.2403 0.4126 0.6505 0.2335 . 0.0002 0.0091 0.0019
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1727 -0.1211 -0.1053 0.0206 -0.2644 0.2523 0.5816 1.0000 0.3046 0.6419
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3137 0.4818 0.5409 0.9050 0.1192 0.1376 0.0002 . 0.0708 0.0000
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1831 0.0181 -0.0978 -0.1564 -0.0633 0.2008 0.4286 0.3046 1.0000 0.5803
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2852 0.9165 0.5703 0.3622 0.7136 0.2402 0.0091 0.0708 . 0.0002
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0867 0.0993 0.0536 0.0659 -0.4163 0.3338 0.5001 0.6419 0.5803 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6150 0.5647 0.7560 0.7024 0.0115 0.0466 0.0019 0.0000 0.0002 .
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0786 0.0433 0.1506 0.0706 0.0150 0.0094 -0.0175 -0.0949 -0.1211 -0.0438
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6535 0.8050 0.3879 0.6871 0.9319 0.9572 0.9206 0.5878 0.4883 0.8029
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2521 0.0491 0.1354 0.1898 0.0699 0.0171 0.1009 -0.0720 0.1074 0.1384
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1380 0.7762 0.4311 0.2676 0.6854 0.9213 0.5582 0.6766 0.5331 0.4207
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

286
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.0786 -0.2521 -0.0060 -0.1118 0.0017 -0.1143 -0.0332 -0.1285 -0.1699 -0.0555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6535 0.1380 0.9725 0.5161 0.9923 0.5070 0.8474 0.4550 0.3218 0.7476
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0433 0.0491 -0.1074 -0.0574 0.0673 0.1222 -0.0507 -0.0880 -0.0058 -0.0091
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8050 0.7762 0.5329 0.7396 0.6965 0.4777 0.7692 0.6099 0.9732 0.9579
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1506 0.1354 -0.1398 -0.1409 -0.0870 0.0631 -0.0964 -0.2280 -0.0994 -0.1168
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3879 0.4311 0.4162 0.4125 0.6141 0.7148 0.5758 0.1811 0.5643 0.4976
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0706 0.1898 0.0012 -0.0396 -0.1839 -0.0777 -0.2668 -0.2106 -0.1638 -0.1988
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6871 0.2676 0.9945 0.8186 0.2829 0.6526 0.1157 0.2177 0.3397 0.2451
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0150 0.0699 0.0140 0.0473 0.0016 -0.0052 0.0638 0.0616 0.1821 0.1008
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9319 0.6854 0.9356 0.7840 0.9928 0.9760 0.7115 0.7211 0.2879 0.5587
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0094 0.0171 0.0056 0.0112 0.2065 0.0536 0.0157 0.1585 0.0430 0.0533
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9572 0.9213 0.9743 0.9483 0.2270 0.7560 0.9276 0.3558 0.8033 0.7575
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0175 0.1009 -0.0019 -0.0190 0.0853 0.2558 0.2258 -0.0792 -0.0393 0.0626
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9206 0.5582 0.9911 0.9126 0.6208 0.1320 0.1854 0.6460 0.8202 0.7166
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0949 -0.0720 -0.2415 -0.2339 0.2980 0.2285 -0.0585 -0.1197 -0.1135 -0.1099
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5878 0.6766 0.1560 0.1698 0.0775 0.1802 0.7349 0.4868 0.5097 0.5235
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1211 0.1074 0.0093 -0.0248 0.0830 -0.0120 0.0177 -0.0164 0.0170 0.0758
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4883 0.5331 0.9572 0.8859 0.6301 0.9445 0.9184 0.9245 0.9215 0.6605
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0438 0.1384 -0.0687 -0.1326 0.1690 0.2170 -0.0706 -0.1110 -0.1189 0.0121
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8029 0.4207 0.6905 0.4409 0.3243 0.2037 0.6824 0.5192 0.4899 0.9442
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.3118 0.3342 0.2759 0.1914 0.4520 0.3708 0.5510 0.6237 0.5042
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0683 0.0497 0.1087 0.2708 0.0064 0.0283 0.0006 0.0001 0.0020
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3118 1.0000 0.5812 0.4861 0.3338 0.3445 0.2844 0.4073 0.4851 0.5687
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0683 . 0.0002 0.0027 0.0466 0.0396 0.0927 0.0137 0.0027 0.0003
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

287
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm International
Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Domestic
Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.0670 0.0461 0.0229 -0.0208 0.0133 -0.2552 -0.1379 -0.1090 -0.2357 -0.2130
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6979 0.7894 0.8946 0.9041 0.9404 0.1390 0.4295 0.5331 0.1795 0.2193
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0368 -0.0333 0.0465 -0.1078 -0.1596 -0.1996 -0.3436 -0.2567 -0.0838 -0.1647
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8314 0.8470 0.7876 0.5314 0.3674 0.2502 0.0433 0.1366 0.6376 0.3445
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0162 -0.0776 -0.0535 -0.0861 -0.2365 -0.1862 -0.3719 -0.2689 -0.0101 -0.0928
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9253 0.6528 0.7567 0.6178 0.1782 0.2843 0.0278 0.1184 0.9550 0.5960
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1624 0.0044 -0.1854 -0.2570 -0.3896 -0.0401 -0.1642 -0.1838 0.1432 -0.0628
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3439 0.9796 0.2789 0.1303 0.0227 0.8190 0.3458 0.2906 0.4192 0.7202
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2367 -0.1415 -0.0606 0.1232 0.0326 0.0005 -0.0840 -0.0341 0.1655 0.0211
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1646 0.4104 0.7254 0.4741 0.8548 0.9978 0.6316 0.8458 0.3496 0.9040
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0124 0.0984 0.0694 -0.0188 -0.0214 -0.1127 -0.1504 -0.1441 -0.2154 -0.2287
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9427 0.5681 0.6876 0.9131 0.9043 0.5192 0.3884 0.4090 0.2211 0.1863
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0357 -0.0247 0.1843 0.1111 0.2403 0.0762 -0.0412 -0.0791 0.0355 0.1035
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8364 0.8862 0.2818 0.5187 0.1711 0.6634 0.8141 0.6516 0.8419 0.5540
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1635 0.0217 -0.0188 -0.1551 0.2145 -0.0246 -0.2739 -0.3116 -0.0703 -0.0973
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3406 0.9001 0.9134 0.3663 0.2232 0.8886 0.1114 0.0684 0.6926 0.5783
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0869 -0.2842 -0.0105 -0.0370 -0.0719 0.0081 -0.0646 -0.1464 -0.2233 -0.2894
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6142 0.0930 0.9517 0.8303 0.6860 0.9632 0.7124 0.4014 0.2043 0.0917
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0616 0.0032 0.1416 -0.0556 -0.1157 -0.0850 -0.1819 -0.2547 -0.1197 -0.1697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7213 0.9854 0.4100 0.7474 0.5145 0.6275 0.2956 0.1398 0.5001 0.3299
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5982 0.5175 0.3957 0.4968 0.5355 0.3713 0.2971 0.3371 0.4286 0.6521
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0015 0.0186 0.0024 0.0013 0.0306 0.0879 0.0512 0.0128 0.0000
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4964 0.1927 0.4594 0.6319 0.2228 0.4499 0.4761 0.4834 0.5283 0.4741
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0021 0.2602 0.0048 0.0000 0.2053 0.0067 0.0038 0.0033 0.0013 0.0040
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

288
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1288 -0.0368 -0.0218 0.0492 -0.0220 -0.0396 0.0261 0.0753 0.0714 -0.0032
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4609 0.8339 0.9009 0.7792 0.9000 0.8214 0.8818 0.6674 0.6836 0.9852
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2495 -0.2400 -0.2306 -0.3141 -0.1516 -0.0530 -0.3126 -0.3260 0.3292 -0.2346
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1483 0.1649 0.1827 0.0661 0.3846 0.7622 0.0675 0.0560 0.0535 0.1750
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1343 -0.2113 -0.2437 -0.3196 -0.1189 -0.0769 -0.3248 -0.2974 0.1555 0.0142
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4419 0.2231 0.1584 0.0613 0.4961 0.6604 0.0570 0.0827 0.3724 0.9356
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0683 -0.0591 -0.1340 -0.1009 0.0441 0.0348 -0.0833 -0.1055 0.1382 0.0931
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6967 0.7359 0.4429 0.5642 0.8016 0.8425 0.6341 0.5464 0.4284 0.5947
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1518 0.0927 0.1423 0.0087 0.1340 -0.1052 0.0119 0.0191 -0.1336 -0.1776
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3840 0.5964 0.4147 0.9603 0.4430 0.5474 0.9457 0.9131 0.4440 0.3073
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0945 0.0266 -0.0108 0.0917 -0.0517 0.0804 0.0776 0.0426 0.5077 0.0953
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5894 0.8796 0.9507 0.6001 0.7678 0.6460 0.6577 0.8080 0.0018 0.5859
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2007 0.0133 0.0210 0.0127 0.0840 -0.0488 0.1324 0.1116 0.0948 0.6809
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2477 0.9398 0.9048 0.9422 0.6316 0.7808 0.4484 0.5233 0.5879 0.0000
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0701 -0.1614 -0.1416 -0.1453 0.0522 0.0348 -0.1213 -0.1315 0.2332 0.5161
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6890 0.3543 0.4172 0.4050 0.7657 0.8428 0.4878 0.4513 0.1776 0.0015
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0244 -0.0382 -0.1871 -0.0797 -0.2450 -0.4343 0.0368 -0.0734 0.0326 0.1554
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8893 0.8277 0.2818 0.6492 0.1560 0.0091 0.8337 0.6753 0.8525 0.3726
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1510 -0.1665 -0.1946 -0.1955 -0.0940 -0.0865 -0.1600 -0.1675 0.4173 0.3006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3867 0.3390 0.2626 0.2604 0.5912 0.6213 0.3587 0.3362 0.0126 0.0793
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5895 0.3989 0.4226 0.3674 0.4307 0.4065 0.2378 0.2694 0.1149 -0.0396
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0194 0.0128 0.0326 0.0110 0.0171 0.1756 0.1234 0.5176 0.8241
sqrtQ1E1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3837 0.4444 0.5063 0.3689 0.4729 0.2147 0.3700 0.3163 0.1779 -0.1054
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0229 0.0075 0.0019 0.0292 0.0041 0.2155 0.0287 0.0641 0.3066 0.5467
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

289
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.2227 -0.2041 -0.1039 0.1444 -0.3171 -0.0909 -0.1500 -0.0849 0.0838 -0.2341
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1984 0.2396 0.5527 0.4078 0.0634 0.5979 0.3899 0.6276 0.6323 0.1693
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1107 -0.1045 0.1069 0.2197 -0.2167 -0.2119 0.1203 0.1503 0.0825 -0.1871
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5268 0.5503 0.5409 0.2047 0.2111 0.2148 0.4912 0.3886 0.6374 0.2746
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0084 -0.0642 0.2938 -0.0267 -0.1550 -0.2500 0.0406 0.1898 -0.0479 -0.0832
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9620 0.7141 0.0867 0.8791 0.3740 0.1414 0.8168 0.2747 0.7848 0.6295
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0954 -0.0603 0.1321 0.1104 -0.0148 0.0844 0.3279 0.3699 -0.0846 -0.3257
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5856 0.7308 0.4494 0.5279 0.9327 0.6246 0.0545 0.0287 0.6288 0.0526
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1624 -0.0460 -0.2579 -0.1642 -0.4207 -0.2755 -0.0776 -0.2319 -0.1418 -0.3539
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3512 0.7932 0.1347 0.3460 0.0119 0.1039 0.6576 0.1801 0.4164 0.0342
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0299 0.1391 0.0992 0.5266 -0.0525 -0.0257 0.0809 0.0167 0.3969 0.1588
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8644 0.4256 0.5707 0.0012 0.7644 0.8818 0.6440 0.9242 0.0182 0.3550
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5787 0.5195 0.2628 0.0615 0.3300 0.3662 0.0810 -0.0566 0.1620 0.3838
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0003 0.0014 0.1273 0.7258 0.0529 0.0281 0.6435 0.7468 0.3525 0.0208
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6878 0.4150 0.5338 0.2414 0.4299 0.3848 0.4147 0.2175 0.1631 0.3848
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0132 0.0010 0.1623 0.0099 0.0205 0.0133 0.2094 0.3492 0.0205
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3185 0.5869 0.1776 0.0641 0.1815 0.2580 0.1463 -0.0915 0.1132 0.2830
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0622 0.0002 0.3074 0.7145 0.2966 0.1287 0.4016 0.6011 0.5172 0.0944
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4673 0.4621 0.6159 0.2397 0.3448 0.3453 0.3833 0.2676 0.2242 0.3749
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0047 0.0052 0.0001 0.1655 0.0425 0.0392 0.0230 0.1202 0.1955 0.0243
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2166 -0.1300 -0.1190 -0.0595 -0.2248 -0.2630 -0.2881 -0.1696 -0.1783 -0.0002
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2186 0.4636 0.5028 0.7381 0.2013 0.1269 0.0985 0.3377 0.3131 0.9993
sqrtQ1E1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0797 -0.0226 0.0886 -0.0992 -0.1528 -0.0369 -0.0628 -0.0502 -0.0112 0.0226
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6491 0.8976 0.6129 0.5709 0.3809 0.8306 0.7200 0.7744 0.9489 0.8959
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

290
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation -0.1238 -0.1109 -0.2413 0.2661 -0.0291 0.0626 0.1330 0.0417 0.0504 0.0934
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4718 0.5197 0.1563 0.1167 0.8662 0.7167 0.4393 0.8092 0.7840 0.5992
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1524 -0.1102 -0.0459 0.2364 -0.1636 -0.1263 -0.1268 0.0764 0.0604 -0.1690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3747 0.5221 0.7905 0.1650 0.3404 0.4630 0.4612 0.6578 0.7427 0.3392
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0944 -0.1419 0.0556 0.1976 0.0149 0.0214 -0.0633 0.1665 -0.1249 -0.1418
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5838 0.4089 0.7473 0.2480 0.9312 0.9013 0.7139 0.3317 0.4957 0.4236
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0979 -0.2716 -0.1219 0.2932 0.1377 0.1513 0.0183 0.2144 -0.1993 0.0424
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5701 0.1090 0.4788 0.0826 0.4231 0.3783 0.9154 0.2091 0.2741 0.8117
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1055 -0.0945 -0.1092 -0.1569 -0.2225 -0.3094 -0.3146 -0.3942 -0.0240 0.0298
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5404 0.5835 0.5259 0.3609 0.1922 0.0663 0.0617 0.0174 0.8965 0.8673
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0353 0.0993 -0.0364 0.6200 0.2881 0.1094 0.4848 0.2573 0.1235 -0.0133
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8381 0.5645 0.8332 0.0001 0.0884 0.5255 0.0027 0.1297 0.5005 0.9406
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4694 0.3394 0.2517 0.0729 0.5092 0.3940 0.4552 -0.0049 -0.1043 -0.0588
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0039 0.0429 0.1386 0.6725 0.0015 0.0174 0.0053 0.9774 0.5701 0.7410
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4439 0.4604 0.3294 0.4288 0.5158 0.4225 0.4073 0.3248 -0.0699 -0.0020
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0067 0.0047 0.0498 0.0091 0.0013 0.0103 0.0137 0.0532 0.7038 0.9909
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2701 0.1878 -0.0107 0.0309 0.2726 0.1807 0.4165 -0.0180 0.1561 0.1541
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1111 0.2728 0.9505 0.8582 0.1078 0.2915 0.0115 0.9168 0.3935 0.3843
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4805 0.2528 0.1780 0.3750 0.3252 0.3303 0.4434 0.3882 -0.0844 -0.1481
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0030 0.1368 0.2989 0.0242 0.0530 0.0491 0.0068 0.0193 0.6462 0.4032
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1764 -0.1158 -0.0258 -0.0357 -0.3267 -0.3174 -0.2215 -0.1697 -0.2070 -0.0962
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3108 0.5076 0.8832 0.8388 0.0554 0.0632 0.2010 0.3297 0.2638 0.5943
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1106 -0.1264 0.0506 -0.0498 -0.0671 -0.0939 0.0638 -0.0404 -0.1109 -0.2253
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5207 0.4625 0.7696 0.7728 0.6976 0.5860 0.7115 0.8149 0.5457 0.2001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000

291
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.0165 0.0284 -0.0537 -0.2414 -0.2512 -0.2383 -0.3544 -0.3864 -0.1081 -0.2764
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9260 0.8732 0.7628 0.1832 0.1584 0.1817 0.0430 0.0289 0.5628 0.1195
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1062 -0.1074 0.1569 -0.0647 -0.1102 -0.0034 -0.0148 0.0348 -0.0970 0.0090
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5502 0.5454 0.3756 0.7248 0.5417 0.9849 0.9348 0.8502 0.6036 0.9606
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1201 -0.1416 0.0686 -0.1281 0.0011 0.0398 0.0272 0.1298 -0.1550 0.1046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4986 0.4245 0.6998 0.4848 0.9953 0.8261 0.8804 0.4790 0.4051 0.5624
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0528 -0.1716 -0.1147 -0.1500 0.1236 0.1548 -0.0797 0.0007 -0.2176 0.0467
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7668 0.3318 0.5182 0.4124 0.4930 0.3898 0.6594 0.9971 0.2397 0.7965
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3576 -0.3022 -0.0120 0.0052 0.1371 -0.0259 0.0467 0.0663 0.0715 0.2733
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0379 0.0824 0.9462 0.9776 0.4467 0.8863 0.7962 0.7185 0.7024 0.1238
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2251 0.1861 0.1549 -0.0668 -0.1502 -0.0322 -0.0703 -0.0543 -0.0600 -0.2608
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2006 0.2920 0.3818 0.7166 0.4040 0.8587 0.6975 0.7678 0.7487 0.1427
sqrtQ1B1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0835 -0.1039 -0.1528 -0.1191 0.0091 0.0473 -0.0908 -0.0659 0.0786 0.0491
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6387 0.5587 0.3883 0.5162 0.9600 0.7939 0.6152 0.7202 0.6741 0.7860
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1940 0.0901 0.0153 0.0330 0.1041 0.2319 0.0772 0.1019 0.1345 0.0259
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2717 0.6124 0.9317 0.8576 0.5642 0.1940 0.6693 0.5788 0.4708 0.8864
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2198 0.2118 0.1843 0.0503 0.1032 0.1408 0.1034 0.1169 0.0682 0.1668
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2116 0.2291 0.2967 0.7844 0.5677 0.4345 0.5669 0.5239 0.7156 0.3535
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1269 -0.0415 -0.0458 -0.1160 -0.0951 0.0989 -0.1229 -0.0991 -0.1638 -0.1180
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4746 0.8155 0.7971 0.5271 0.5985 0.5840 0.4957 0.5894 0.3787 0.5130
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0437 -0.0732 -0.2009 -0.0570 0.1746 0.1386 0.0894 0.0932 -0.1399 -0.1329
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8092 0.6856 0.2622 0.7608 0.3393 0.4493 0.6266 0.6181 0.4611 0.4685
sqrtQ1E1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2986 -0.1764 -0.1978 0.0787 0.0032 -0.0273 0.0682 0.0585 -0.0793 -0.3969
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0863 0.3182 0.2622 0.6686 0.9858 0.8802 0.7060 0.7504 0.6713 0.0222
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000

292
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation -0.2027 -0.3250 -0.2381 -0.0493 -0.2851 -0.2406 -0.2563 -0.3019 0.1539 -0.0319
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2659 0.0696 0.1971 0.7820 0.1022 0.1704 0.1434 0.0827 0.3774 0.8535
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1862 -0.0960 0.1926 -0.1360 -0.0175 -0.2103 -0.1407 0.0943 0.1940 0.0782
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3075 0.6013 0.2993 0.4430 0.9217 0.2324 0.4275 0.5956 0.2642 0.6503
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0804 -0.0028 0.1787 -0.1850 0.0051 -0.1055 -0.0472 0.0969 0.0303 0.1695
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6616 0.9878 0.3360 0.2949 0.9772 0.5525 0.7910 0.5858 0.8627 0.3229
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0113 -0.1859 -0.1453 -0.1860 -0.0495 -0.0621 -0.1862 -0.1238 0.1534 0.1824
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9510 0.3083 0.4356 0.2922 0.7812 0.7272 0.2917 0.4853 0.3788 0.2870
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0988 -0.0266 0.1380 0.1135 0.2423 0.1325 0.1279 0.2300 -0.2490 0.1344
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5906 0.8851 0.4592 0.5227 0.1673 0.4551 0.4710 0.1907 0.1492 0.4346
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2745 -0.1833 -0.1340 -0.1723 -0.2976 -0.2605 -0.2476 -0.3064 0.5686 0.0163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1285 0.3152 0.4724 0.3299 0.0874 0.1367 0.1580 0.0780 0.0004 0.9248
sqrtQ1B1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0001 -0.0615 -0.0256 0.0632 0.0665 0.0367 0.0117 -0.0274 0.0614 0.4628
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9996 0.7382 0.8912 0.7225 0.7087 0.8366 0.9478 0.8775 0.7262 0.0045
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0341 0.0282 -0.0302 0.1058 0.0136 0.0256 0.1006 -0.0306 0.1530 0.2114
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8531 0.8782 0.8719 0.5514 0.9391 0.8858 0.5713 0.8637 0.3804 0.2159
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1997 0.2083 0.1067 -0.0003 0.1945 0.2078 0.1212 0.1222 0.2038 0.2662
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2733 0.2526 0.5678 0.9989 0.2704 0.2384 0.4949 0.4911 0.2403 0.1166
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1555 -0.1024 -0.0722 -0.1491 -0.1162 -0.1528 -0.1184 -0.0652 0.3504 0.3009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3954 0.5772 0.6997 0.3999 0.5128 0.3884 0.5048 0.7141 0.0390 0.0745
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0513 -0.1180 -0.0339 -0.1628 -0.1273 -0.0821 -0.1608 -0.1548 0.3282 0.2881
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7839 0.5274 0.8590 0.3654 0.4803 0.6495 0.3713 0.3898 0.0581 0.0933
sqrtQ1E1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1848 -0.1055 -0.0919 0.0323 -0.3235 -0.1906 -0.0051 -0.0089 0.3114 0.0694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3112 0.5654 0.6229 0.8563 0.0620 0.2802 0.9770 0.9600 0.0686 0.6877
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000

293
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation -0.1127 -0.1182 -0.1398 -0.0834 -0.0518 -0.1244 -0.1646 -0.1113 0.0214 0.1124
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5128 0.4923 0.4159 0.6445 0.7677 0.4764 0.3448 0.5246 0.9028 0.5139
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0579 -0.0618 0.3553 0.0701 -0.0744 0.0249 0.0051 0.1878 0.2075 0.0021
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7373 0.7201 0.0335 0.6984 0.6711 0.8870 0.9767 0.2800 0.2317 0.9902
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0782 -0.0557 0.3276 0.1064 0.1564 0.1364 0.1535 0.3916 0.2276 0.1330
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6503 0.7470 0.0511 0.5557 0.3696 0.4348 0.3786 0.0200 0.1886 0.4393
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2523 -0.0240 0.2496 0.0308 0.1160 0.1835 0.0920 0.2575 0.1701 0.0575
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1377 0.8894 0.1421 0.8648 0.5069 0.2913 0.5993 0.1353 0.3285 0.7391
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0069 -0.1092 -0.0503 -0.1836 -0.0204 -0.0434 -0.0947 -0.0987 -0.0940 -0.0534
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9683 0.5260 0.7708 0.3065 0.9072 0.8045 0.5886 0.5725 0.5913 0.7571
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0481 0.1280 0.1387 0.4138 0.2400 0.2866 0.2611 0.2429 0.5361 0.1694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7807 0.4570 0.4197 0.0167 0.1649 0.0951 0.1298 0.1597 0.0009 0.3233
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4045 0.3222 0.1691 0.1939 0.3670 0.2308 0.2171 -0.0035 -0.0078 0.2711
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0144 0.0553 0.3241 0.2797 0.0301 0.1821 0.2103 0.9839 0.9646 0.1098
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4489 0.2949 0.2459 0.3706 0.2723 0.4812 0.2043 0.2767 0.2198 0.2907
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0060 0.0808 0.1483 0.0337 0.1136 0.0034 0.2391 0.1075 0.2044 0.0855
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2159 0.4759 0.2935 0.1707 0.1638 0.1396 0.2787 0.0033 0.1284 0.1288
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2061 0.0033 0.0823 0.3422 0.3471 0.4239 0.1050 0.9852 0.4625 0.4541
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3780 0.4396 0.5612 0.3408 0.1460 0.3090 0.2677 0.2737 0.1527 0.0678
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0230 0.0073 0.0004 0.0523 0.4028 0.0709 0.1200 0.1117 0.3810 0.6944
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3869 0.2685 0.2605 -0.0079 -0.1191 -0.1925 -0.1203 -0.0535 -0.0563 -0.0521
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0217 0.1188 0.1307 0.9652 0.4956 0.2680 0.4912 0.7601 0.7519 0.7663
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1221 0.2363 0.1714 0.1206 0.0242 -0.0511 0.1117 0.0041 -0.1385 -0.1679
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4779 0.1653 0.3175 0.5039 0.8903 0.7705 0.5231 0.9813 0.4277 0.3277
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

294
Table A6, continued (Row 1, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.0449 0.0549 -0.0110 0.1272 0.1038 -0.2036 -0.1126 -0.0287 -0.0400 -0.1693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7949 0.7504 0.9491 0.4597 0.5471 0.2408 0.5259 0.8680 0.8195 0.3464
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0023 0.0373 0.0624 -0.1992 0.0760 -0.0784 -0.3136 -0.0640 0.1170 0.3071
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9895 0.8292 0.7177 0.2442 0.6595 0.6545 0.0709 0.7108 0.5031 0.0821
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0860 0.0793 0.2157 0.0037 -0.0544 -0.0162 -0.1166 0.0205 0.1854 0.2647
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6180 0.6459 0.2065 0.9827 0.7528 0.9265 0.5114 0.9057 0.2864 0.1366
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1102 0.1459 0.2396 -0.1471 -0.2229 -0.1433 -0.0908 -0.2604 0.1977 0.1013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5222 0.3959 0.1593 0.3919 0.1914 0.4115 0.6095 0.1250 0.2548 0.5750
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0231 -0.0056 -0.1143 -0.2422 -0.0831 -0.0897 -0.1674 -0.1845 -0.0653 0.0011
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8936 0.9740 0.5070 0.1546 0.6301 0.6085 0.3440 0.2813 0.7093 0.9951
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1797 0.2332 0.1194 0.1477 0.1831 -0.0036 0.1451 -0.1589 0.0121 0.1583
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2943 0.1710 0.4880 0.3899 0.2852 0.9835 0.4129 0.3545 0.9450 0.3789
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2604 0.2177 0.0106 0.0975 -0.1039 0.0204 0.1769 -0.1265 0.0783 0.0522
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1251 0.2021 0.9511 0.5715 0.5464 0.9073 0.3169 0.4621 0.6548 0.7729
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4227 0.2247 0.3393 0.1958 0.0264 0.1837 0.2895 -0.0129 0.0283 0.3089
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0102 0.1876 0.0429 0.2525 0.8784 0.2908 0.0968 0.9406 0.8720 0.0802
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1151 0.2938 0.0382 0.1268 0.0276 0.2654 0.1668 -0.2391 0.1825 0.0541
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5040 0.0820 0.8247 0.4610 0.8732 0.1234 0.3458 0.1602 0.2939 0.7649
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1025 0.1867 0.1958 0.1346 0.0214 0.1990 0.0464 0.0134 0.2487 0.2656
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5518 0.2757 0.2524 0.4339 0.9013 0.2517 0.7946 0.9384 0.1497 0.1352
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1166 -0.0751 -0.1284 0.0884 0.2392 0.3484 -0.0613 -0.0508 -0.1871 -0.1008
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5047 0.6679 0.4624 0.6135 0.1663 0.0435 0.7347 0.7719 0.2894 0.5767
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2175 -0.0209 -0.2123 0.0179 0.0627 0.1729 -0.3000 -0.0716 0.2606 0.1789
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2026 0.9038 0.2138 0.9176 0.7164 0.3206 0.0847 0.6782 0.1305 0.3193
Personal
Resource
Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000

295
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of
Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of
Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of
Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.0060 -0.1074 -0.1398 0.0012 0.0140 0.0056 -0.0019 -0.2415 0.0093 -0.0687
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9725 0.5329 0.4162 0.9945 0.9356 0.9743 0.9911 0.1560 0.9572 0.6905
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1118 -0.0574 -0.1409 -0.0396 0.0473 0.0112 -0.0190 -0.2339 -0.0248 -0.1326
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5161 0.7396 0.4125 0.8186 0.7840 0.9483 0.9126 0.1698 0.8859 0.4409
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0017 0.0673 -0.0870 -0.1839 0.0016 0.2065 0.0853 0.2980 0.0830 0.1690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9923 0.6965 0.6141 0.2829 0.9928 0.2270 0.6208 0.0775 0.6301 0.3243
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1143 0.1222 0.0631 -0.0777 -0.0052 0.0536 0.2558 0.2285 -0.0120 0.2170
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5070 0.4777 0.7148 0.6526 0.9760 0.7560 0.1320 0.1802 0.9445 0.2037
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0332 -0.0507 -0.0964 -0.2668 0.0638 0.0157 0.2258 -0.0585 0.0177 -0.0706
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8474 0.7692 0.5758 0.1157 0.7115 0.9276 0.1854 0.7349 0.9184 0.6824
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1285 -0.0880 -0.2280 -0.2106 0.0616 0.1585 -0.0792 -0.1197 -0.0164 -0.1110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4550 0.6099 0.1811 0.2177 0.7211 0.3558 0.6460 0.4868 0.9245 0.5192
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1699 -0.0058 -0.0994 -0.1638 0.1821 0.0430 -0.0393 -0.1135 0.0170 -0.1189
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3218 0.9732 0.5643 0.3397 0.2879 0.8033 0.8202 0.5097 0.9215 0.4899
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0555 -0.0091 -0.1168 -0.1988 0.1008 0.0533 0.0626 -0.1099 0.0758 0.0121
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7476 0.9579 0.4976 0.2451 0.5587 0.7575 0.7166 0.5235 0.6605 0.9442
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0670 0.0368 -0.0162 -0.1624 0.2367 0.0124 -0.0357 -0.1635 -0.0869 -0.0616
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6979 0.8314 0.9253 0.3439 0.1646 0.9427 0.8364 0.3406 0.6142 0.7213
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0461 -0.0333 -0.0776 0.0044 -0.1415 0.0984 -0.0247 0.0217 -0.2842 0.0032
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7894 0.8470 0.6528 0.9796 0.4104 0.5681 0.8862 0.9001 0.0930 0.9854
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0229 0.0465 -0.0535 -0.1854 -0.0606 0.0694 0.1843 -0.0188 -0.0105 0.1416
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8946 0.7876 0.7567 0.2789 0.7254 0.6876 0.2818 0.9134 0.9517 0.4100
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0208 -0.1078 -0.0861 -0.2570 0.1232 -0.0188 0.1111 -0.1551 -0.0370 -0.0556
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9041 0.5314 0.6178 0.1303 0.4741 0.9131 0.5187 0.3663 0.8303 0.7474
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

296
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Time
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource
Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource
Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource
Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource
Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation 0.3342 0.5812 1.0000 0.9275 0.3493 0.3018 0.6239 0.6827 0.5897 0.6849
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0497 0.0002 . 0.0000 0.0368 0.0736 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2759 0.4861 0.9275 1.0000 0.2734 0.2702 0.5769 0.6850 0.5761 0.6457
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1087 0.0027 0.0000 . 0.1066 0.1110 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1914 0.3338 0.3493 0.2734 1.0000 0.5245 0.3197 0.5547 0.4222 0.4292
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2708 0.0466 0.0368 0.1066 . 0.0010 0.0574 0.0004 0.0103 0.0090
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4520 0.3445 0.3018 0.2702 0.5245 1.0000 0.3484 0.4345 0.5723 0.5320
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0064 0.0396 0.0736 0.1110 0.0010 . 0.0373 0.0081 0.0003 0.0008
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3708 0.2844 0.6239 0.5769 0.3197 0.3484 1.0000 0.5567 0.5629 0.5197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0283 0.0927 0.0000 0.0002 0.0574 0.0373 . 0.0004 0.0004 0.0012
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5510 0.4073 0.6827 0.6850 0.5547 0.4345 0.5567 1.0000 0.8897 0.8164
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0006 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0081 0.0004 . 0.0000 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6237 0.4851 0.5897 0.5761 0.4222 0.5723 0.5629 0.8897 1.0000 0.8650
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0027 0.0002 0.0002 0.0103 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 . 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5042 0.5687 0.6849 0.6457 0.4292 0.5320 0.5197 0.8164 0.8650 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0008 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 .
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5982 0.4964 0.5447 0.4604 0.4211 0.5114 0.4778 0.8107 0.8852 0.8299
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0021 0.0006 0.0047 0.0105 0.0014 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5175 0.1927 0.2645 0.1879 0.3410 0.5958 0.2670 0.5559 0.5402 0.4613
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0015 0.2602 0.1190 0.2724 0.0418 0.0001 0.1154 0.0004 0.0007 0.0046
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3957 0.4594 0.5736 0.5330 0.3925 0.6658 0.3591 0.5279 0.5658 0.6280
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0186 0.0048 0.0003 0.0008 0.0179 0.0000 0.0315 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4968 0.6319 0.6835 0.6132 0.4321 0.5785 0.5291 0.7125 0.7745 0.8215
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0085 0.0002 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

297
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource
Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource
Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic
Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Time
Org Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Personal Resource
Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders
and Employees
Pearson Correlation 0.5447 0.2645 0.5736 0.6835 0.2711 0.4688 0.8329 0.8367 0.3772 0.5046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0006 0.1190 0.0003 0.0000 0.1210 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0279 0.0020
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4604 0.1879 0.5330 0.6132 0.2455 0.3864 0.8421 0.8394 0.3616 0.4976
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0047 0.2724 0.0008 0.0001 0.1617 0.0219 0.0000 0.0000 0.0356 0.0024
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4211 0.3410 0.3925 0.4321 0.4098 0.0904 0.2760 0.2369 0.4965 0.4340
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0105 0.0418 0.0179 0.0085 0.0161 0.6053 0.1085 0.1707 0.0028 0.0092
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5114 0.5958 0.6658 0.5785 0.2648 0.0679 0.1780 0.2168 0.3455 0.5589
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0014 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.1302 0.6983 0.3064 0.2110 0.0454 0.0005
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4778 0.2670 0.3591 0.5291 0.4635 0.3841 0.5886 0.6681 0.3066 0.4503
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0032 0.1154 0.0315 0.0009 0.0058 0.0227 0.0002 0.0000 0.0778 0.0066
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8107 0.5559 0.5279 0.7125 0.3866 0.3242 0.7021 0.6671 0.5175 0.6065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000 0.0239 0.0575 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8852 0.5402 0.5658 0.7745 0.4224 0.3104 0.5752 0.5784 0.5213 0.6251
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0128 0.0696 0.0003 0.0003 0.0016 0.0001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8299 0.4613 0.6280 0.8215 0.4139 0.2282 0.6555 0.6437 0.4520 0.5833
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150 0.1873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0002
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.6103 0.5973 0.8361 0.3253 0.2036 0.5026 0.4964 0.4955 0.5537
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0605 0.2408 0.0021 0.0024 0.0029 0.0006
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6103 1.0000 0.5245 0.4760 0.1459 0.0786 0.2653 0.3241 0.4006 0.4504
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 . 0.0010 0.0033 0.4103 0.6537 0.1235 0.0575 0.0189 0.0066
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5973 0.5245 1.0000 0.7869 0.2008 0.1757 0.5045 0.5332 0.2910 0.4796
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0010 . 0.0000 0.2548 0.3127 0.0020 0.0010 0.0950 0.0036
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8361 0.4760 0.7869 1.0000 0.3785 0.2783 0.6298 0.6691 0.4769 0.6087
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 . 0.0273 0.1055 0.0001 0.0000 0.0043 0.0001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

298
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric) Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic
Focus
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical
Policy
Org Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Org Resource
Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm
Leaders and
Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource
Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Org Resource
Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.5715 0.7606 0.6627 0.7468 0.5058 0.2868 0.7712 0.7446 0.1297 -0.1119
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0948 0.0000 0.0000 0.4579 0.5223
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5343 0.7089 0.6414 0.7607 0.4702 0.2943 0.7224 0.6898 0.1362 -0.2222
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0862 0.0000 0.0000 0.4354 0.1996
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3100 0.3791 0.4666 0.3853 0.4733 0.3287 0.3387 0.3704 0.1985 0.0135
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0699 0.0247 0.0047 0.0223 0.0041 0.0539 0.0465 0.0285 0.2530 0.9384
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3545 0.3099 0.4462 0.2944 0.5096 0.5204 0.3204 0.3419 0.1231 0.1304
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0367 0.0700 0.0072 0.0860 0.0018 0.0014 0.0606 0.0444 0.4810 0.4553
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7341 0.6454 0.4557 0.5999 0.3705 0.2168 0.5919 0.6206 -0.0890 0.1874
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059 0.0001 0.0285 0.2108 0.0002 0.0001 0.6113 0.2811
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6251 0.7928 0.7917 0.7915 0.6182 0.5372 0.6129 0.6329 0.1663 -0.2240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 0.3398 0.1958
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6686 0.7660 0.8024 0.7397 0.6952 0.4737 0.5677 0.5770 0.0529 -0.2112
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0004 0.0003 0.7627 0.2234
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5461 0.7172 0.8184 0.6774 0.6451 0.4299 0.5515 0.5381 0.1278 -0.2785
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0006 0.0009 0.4645 0.1053
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6035 0.7479 0.8003 0.6391 0.7390 0.5035 0.4527 0.5411 0.0748 -0.1977
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0063 0.0008 0.6692 0.2549
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4102 0.4507 0.4718 0.3910 0.5790 0.9287 0.3371 0.4099 0.0207 0.0244
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0144 0.0066 0.0042 0.0202 0.0003 0.0000 0.0477 0.0145 0.9059 0.8893
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3417 0.4554 0.6704 0.5006 0.6766 0.5669 0.5283 0.4958 0.2155 0.0457
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0446 0.0060 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0004 0.0011 0.0025 0.2137 0.7945
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5933 0.6978 0.8536 0.6819 0.7312 0.4613 0.6075 0.6459 0.1088 -0.1031
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0053 0.0001 0.0000 0.5340 0.5558
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

299
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-DWMD
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived
Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1684 0.0131 -0.1704 -0.0207 -0.1588 -0.0216 -0.2723 -0.1568 -0.0097 -0.0349
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3335 0.9404 0.3279 0.9061 0.3621 0.9006 0.1136 0.3684 0.9560 0.8397
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2745 -0.0242 -0.2953 0.0772 -0.1195 -0.0557 -0.2538 -0.1208 0.1033 -0.0367
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1105 0.8901 0.0850 0.6595 0.4940 0.7468 0.1413 0.4895 0.5550 0.8315
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0123 -0.0726 0.1008 0.0554 0.0380 0.0232 -0.0384 -0.0354 -0.0232 0.2299
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9439 0.6784 0.5644 0.7519 0.8286 0.8930 0.8265 0.8402 0.8946 0.1773
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0638 0.1009 0.0404 0.2519 0.0177 -0.0175 0.0173 -0.0679 0.1834 0.2142
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7156 0.5642 0.8177 0.1444 0.9198 0.9193 0.9212 0.6981 0.2917 0.2097
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0578 0.0814 -0.1367 -0.0869 -0.0620 -0.1884 -0.4288 -0.3476 -0.0074 0.0418
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7415 0.6421 0.4337 0.6196 0.7234 0.2711 0.0102 0.0408 0.9665 0.8088
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3036 -0.0651 -0.2731 0.1213 -0.2103 -0.2085 -0.3213 -0.2878 0.0771 0.0674
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0762 0.7100 0.1125 0.4875 0.2252 0.2223 0.0598 0.0936 0.6599 0.6961
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2200 -0.0220 -0.2471 0.0551 -0.2880 -0.2482 -0.2887 -0.3012 0.0662 -0.0343
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2040 0.9003 0.1525 0.7534 0.0934 0.1444 0.0926 0.0787 0.7055 0.8424
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2676 0.0909 -0.1374 0.1344 -0.3218 -0.2057 -0.2773 -0.2312 0.1138 0.0701
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1201 0.6036 0.4314 0.4414 0.0594 0.2287 0.1069 0.1815 0.5151 0.6847
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2397 -0.1073 -0.1200 0.0178 -0.3135 -0.2352 -0.2338 -0.2236 0.0073 -0.0032
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1655 0.5394 0.4922 0.9193 0.0666 0.1673 0.1764 0.1966 0.9669 0.9852
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1690 -0.2804 -0.1781 0.2308 -0.0598 -0.1697 -0.0749 -0.1061 0.0877 -0.0424
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3317 0.1028 0.3061 0.1822 0.7329 0.3223 0.6688 0.5440 0.6164 0.8060
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0794 0.1555 0.0366 0.1476 -0.0264 0.0064 -0.0629 -0.0719 0.1672 0.2196
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6502 0.3723 0.8345 0.3973 0.8804 0.9706 0.7195 0.6815 0.3371 0.1982
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2276 0.0439 -0.0862 0.0080 -0.2122 -0.1523 -0.1881 -0.2038 -0.0003 0.1395
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1885 0.8024 0.6226 0.9636 0.2211 0.3751 0.2793 0.2402 0.9986 0.4172
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

300
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived
Deterrence Domestic
Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation -0.1669 -0.2495 -0.1759 -0.1174 -0.3195 -0.3120 -0.1253 -0.1085 0.1083 -0.0091
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3307 0.1422 0.3048 0.4955 0.0575 0.0639 0.4667 0.5287 0.5553 0.9594
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2088 -0.1770 -0.1284 -0.1545 -0.3802 -0.3942 -0.2011 -0.1170 0.1907 0.0057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2216 0.3017 0.4554 0.3682 0.0222 0.0174 0.2396 0.4968 0.2959 0.9744
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0587 0.0541 0.0138 0.2266 -0.0320 -0.0340 0.0283 0.0558 0.0661 0.0388
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7339 0.7540 0.9362 0.1839 0.8528 0.8439 0.8701 0.7467 0.7192 0.8277
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1684 0.1810 0.1871 0.1332 0.0093 0.1753 0.0584 -0.0042 -0.1616 -0.2565
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3262 0.2909 0.2746 0.4387 0.9570 0.3065 0.7350 0.9804 0.3770 0.1430
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2577 -0.1782 -0.1381 -0.1490 -0.2315 -0.3228 -0.1657 -0.1672 -0.0084 -0.1464
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1292 0.2984 0.4219 0.3857 0.1743 0.0548 0.3342 0.3296 0.9637 0.4087
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1948 -0.1036 -0.1071 -0.0144 -0.3394 -0.4186 -0.1068 -0.0882 0.1466 0.0246
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2549 0.5478 0.5340 0.9337 0.0429 0.0111 0.5354 0.6088 0.4234 0.8902
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1335 -0.0706 -0.0541 -0.0835 -0.3240 -0.3391 -0.1520 -0.1525 0.0448 -0.0462
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4377 0.6824 0.7539 0.6284 0.0539 0.0430 0.3760 0.3747 0.8078 0.7952
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0130 -0.0110 0.0157 -0.0795 -0.2536 -0.2787 0.0556 -0.0516 0.0846 -0.0926
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9399 0.9490 0.9275 0.6447 0.1357 0.0997 0.7476 0.7651 0.6455 0.6025
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0270 -0.0760 -0.0229 -0.1120 -0.3763 -0.3806 -0.1813 -0.1645 -0.0455 -0.1292
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8759 0.6595 0.8946 0.5157 0.0237 0.0220 0.2899 0.3377 0.8047 0.4665
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1768 -0.1162 -0.0757 0.0549 -0.2268 -0.0638 -0.0832 -0.0522 0.0422 -0.1154
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3023 0.4997 0.6608 0.7504 0.1835 0.7115 0.6294 0.7623 0.8187 0.5157
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2174 0.1404 0.1757 -0.1358 -0.1725 -0.1342 0.0026 -0.1031 -0.1438 -0.3227
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2029 0.4140 0.3054 0.4298 0.3143 0.4350 0.9881 0.5496 0.4323 0.0627
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1262 0.0092 0.0275 -0.1864 -0.3066 -0.2523 -0.0655 -0.2033 -0.0994 -0.2261
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4633 0.9574 0.8735 0.2764 0.0689 0.1377 0.7043 0.2344 0.5883 0.1986
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000

301
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.0427 -0.0585 -0.1075 0.1141 -0.0232 -0.0038 -0.0373 -0.0989 -0.0276 -0.1980
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8104 0.7422 0.5451 0.5341 0.8979 0.9835 0.8368 0.5903 0.8830 0.2694
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1015 0.0279 -0.0027 0.1976 -0.0366 -0.0206 0.0343 -0.0256 0.0682 -0.1366
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5680 0.8756 0.9878 0.2784 0.8397 0.9094 0.8496 0.8893 0.7154 0.4485
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0927 0.0833 0.0729 0.0805 0.1213 0.2117 0.0945 0.0923 -0.0718 -0.2252
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6020 0.6396 0.6822 0.6612 0.5011 0.2368 0.6008 0.6155 0.7010 0.2077
sqrtQ1E1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0410 -0.1363 -0.3311 -0.1245 -0.0371 0.0921 -0.1067 -0.1303 -0.1560 -0.2115
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8178 0.4423 0.0558 0.4972 0.8378 0.6104 0.5546 0.4772 0.4019 0.2374
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1622 -0.1558 -0.1023 0.0750 -0.1372 -0.1400 -0.0575 -0.0434 -0.1413 -0.1802
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3595 0.3788 0.5649 0.6834 0.4466 0.4372 0.7506 0.8136 0.4483 0.3155
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1301 0.0206 0.0108 0.1669 0.0401 0.0107 0.0652 -0.0002 -0.0698 -0.2101
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4635 0.9078 0.9515 0.3611 0.8247 0.9528 0.7184 0.9992 0.7093 0.2406
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0279 -0.0811 -0.0942 0.0477 -0.0116 -0.0994 -0.0059 -0.0514 -0.1009 -0.2229
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8753 0.6484 0.5963 0.7956 0.9488 0.5819 0.9739 0.7799 0.5893 0.2125
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0274 -0.1833 -0.1149 0.0840 -0.1195 -0.1611 -0.1174 -0.1774 -0.0227 -0.2694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8778 0.2995 0.5174 0.6476 0.5077 0.3704 0.5154 0.3315 0.9033 0.1295
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1723 -0.2909 -0.1789 -0.0331 -0.0592 -0.1344 -0.1288 -0.1714 -0.1973 -0.2543
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3297 0.0951 0.3114 0.8574 0.7436 0.4557 0.4750 0.3483 0.2875 0.1532
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0713 -0.0724 -0.2049 0.0475 -0.0390 0.0830 -0.0956 -0.1490 -0.1591 -0.1984
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6888 0.6839 0.2449 0.7962 0.8295 0.6461 0.5965 0.4156 0.3926 0.2684
sqrtQ1E1l
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0674 -0.2852 -0.3538 -0.2485 -0.2527 -0.0719 -0.3422 -0.3818 -0.2561 -0.4468
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7050 0.1021 0.0401 0.1703 0.1559 0.6909 0.0513 0.0311 0.1643 0.0091
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2200 -0.3097 -0.3158 -0.0629 -0.1287 -0.1530 -0.1822 -0.2323 -0.1179 -0.3552
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2113 0.0747 0.0689 0.7324 0.4752 0.3954 0.3103 0.2008 0.5276 0.0425
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000

302
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.0821 -0.0850 -0.1499 0.0573 -0.1203 0.0261 -0.1690 -0.1839 0.1295 -0.1696
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6552 0.6439 0.4210 0.7478 0.4978 0.8837 0.3393 0.2978 0.4584 0.3227
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1364 0.0330 -0.0387 0.1218 -0.0259 0.0917 -0.0896 -0.0900 0.1581 -0.2311
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4567 0.8578 0.8362 0.4926 0.8845 0.6059 0.6144 0.6128 0.3642 0.1750
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1211 -0.1269 -0.1392 0.0438 -0.1685 -0.0905 0.0060 -0.0226 0.2187 -0.0790
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5091 0.4889 0.4552 0.8058 0.3409 0.6107 0.9732 0.8991 0.2069 0.6468
sqrtQ1E1e
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1947 -0.2166 -0.1780 -0.1361 -0.1377 -0.1565 -0.1547 -0.1709 0.3565 0.2407
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2856 0.2337 0.3380 0.4427 0.4374 0.3768 0.3822 0.3340 0.0356 0.1573
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0530 -0.1520 -0.2013 -0.0141 -0.0797 -0.0039 -0.1921 -0.1572 -0.0354 0.0213
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7734 0.4061 0.2775 0.9371 0.6541 0.9827 0.2765 0.3745 0.8399 0.9020
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0487 -0.0923 -0.1590 -0.0841 -0.1749 -0.0566 -0.1473 -0.1766 0.3285 -0.1415
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7911 0.6155 0.3929 0.6362 0.3226 0.7505 0.4059 0.3177 0.0540 0.4103
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0750 -0.0966 -0.1189 -0.1267 -0.1559 -0.0755 -0.1363 -0.1435 0.3383 0.0382
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6834 0.5988 0.5240 0.4753 0.3785 0.6711 0.4422 0.4181 0.0468 0.8250
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0687 -0.0852 -0.0667 -0.0320 -0.2148 -0.1023 -0.1130 -0.1166 0.3095 -0.0093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7086 0.6429 0.7214 0.8575 0.2225 0.5646 0.5245 0.5114 0.0704 0.9569
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2072 -0.2420 -0.1481 -0.1224 -0.2159 -0.1763 -0.1437 -0.0984 0.2006 0.1294
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2552 0.1821 0.4265 0.4906 0.2200 0.3186 0.4175 0.5800 0.2479 0.4521
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2524 -0.2989 -0.2417 -0.1231 -0.1713 -0.1942 -0.1863 -0.1976 0.2261 -0.0278
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1635 0.0966 0.1902 0.4881 0.3327 0.2710 0.2915 0.2627 0.1915 0.8719
sqrtQ1E1l
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3581 -0.3934 -0.2447 -0.1401 -0.2608 -0.2933 -0.2497 -0.2169 0.2839 0.1332
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0442 0.0259 0.1845 0.4295 0.1363 0.0922 0.1544 0.2179 0.0984 0.4388
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1514 -0.1940 -0.1619 0.0276 -0.2020 -0.0826 -0.0254 -0.0713 0.2088 0.0700
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4081 0.2874 0.3842 0.8769 0.2518 0.6422 0.8868 0.6887 0.2287 0.6850
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000

303
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric) sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
Level Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-
CNDPS
Pearson Correlation -0.1149 -0.0342 -0.1854 0.0284 -0.3494 -0.3097 -0.1833 -0.2496 -0.0454 -0.1854
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5044 0.8430 0.2790 0.8754 0.0397 0.0702 0.2919 0.1481 0.7956 0.2791
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1980 -0.0110 -0.2242 0.1815 -0.3143 -0.2839 -0.1215 -0.1957 0.0772 -0.1642
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2471 0.9493 0.1888 0.3122 0.0660 0.0984 0.4870 0.2598 0.6593 0.3386
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1071 0.1396 0.0952 0.2646 -0.0257 0.1179 0.0768 0.1020 0.2775 0.2058
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5340 0.4166 0.5809 0.1367 0.8833 0.4998 0.6610 0.5600 0.1066 0.2285
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3647 0.2381 0.2494 0.2109 0.0392 0.0146 0.0791 0.0394 0.1931 0.1350
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0288 0.1620 0.1424 0.2387 0.8230 0.9334 0.6514 0.8221 0.2663 0.4324
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0335 0.0131 -0.1226 -0.1934 -0.3843 -0.4478 -0.3132 -0.3367 -0.1671 -0.1814
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8461 0.9398 0.4762 0.2809 0.0227 0.0070 0.0669 0.0479 0.3375 0.2896
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0162 0.0718 -0.1359 0.0917 -0.2957 -0.2249 -0.1131 -0.1968 0.0834 -0.2790
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9254 0.6775 0.4294 0.6117 0.0845 0.1940 0.5179 0.2572 0.6337 0.0994
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1323 0.1710 -0.0048 -0.0591 -0.3184 -0.3398 -0.2203 -0.2806 -0.0788 -0.3088
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4418 0.3186 0.9778 0.7439 0.0623 0.0458 0.2034 0.1025 0.6526 0.0669
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0524 0.1479 -0.0612 0.1341 -0.1994 -0.2423 -0.0036 -0.1610 -0.0609 -0.2645
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7615 0.3892 0.7228 0.4568 0.2509 0.1608 0.9835 0.3556 0.7280 0.1190
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1660 0.1161 0.0572 -0.1135 -0.2432 -0.2412 -0.1756 -0.1849 -0.2003 -0.3302
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3334 0.5002 0.7403 0.5296 0.1592 0.1628 0.3128 0.2877 0.2487 0.0492
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0690 -0.1745 -0.0507 -0.0093 -0.1364 -0.0657 -0.1034 -0.0830 0.0048 -0.2251
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6893 0.3088 0.7689 0.9590 0.4346 0.7077 0.5545 0.6355 0.9781 0.1868
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0944 0.2105 0.0680 0.0776 -0.1258 -0.2421 -0.0921 -0.1925 -0.0771 -0.0630
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5840 0.2179 0.6937 0.6677 0.4716 0.1611 0.5988 0.2678 0.6596 0.7150
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1161 0.2141 -0.0306 0.0771 -0.0970 -0.2036 -0.0198 -0.1262 -0.1538 -0.1353
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5001 0.2099 0.8595 0.6697 0.5793 0.2409 0.9102 0.4701 0.3778 0.4315
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

304
Table A6, continued (Row 2, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-
CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation -0.1852 -0.0530 -0.1736 0.2114 0.1892 0.1521 -0.2011 -0.0987 -0.0474 0.1173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2795 0.7586 0.3114 0.2158 0.2690 0.3830 0.2541 0.5670 0.7868 0.5155
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1489 -0.0524 -0.1508 0.1371 0.0768 0.1250 -0.2275 -0.0693 -0.0792 0.1329
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3860 0.7616 0.3800 0.4251 0.6560 0.4742 0.1957 0.6881 0.6510 0.4610
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2551 0.1915 0.2529 0.2619 0.2009 0.2528 0.0274 -0.0159 -0.1426 0.1533
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1333 0.2632 0.1366 0.1228 0.2400 0.1428 0.8780 0.9268 0.4139 0.3945
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0927 0.0969 0.0811 0.3080 0.2318 0.4174 0.0237 -0.0877 0.0388 0.2197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5908 0.5738 0.6380 0.0676 0.1738 0.0126 0.8939 0.6111 0.8251 0.2192
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2226 -0.2263 -0.2817 0.3243 0.2996 0.2555 -0.3674 -0.0528 -0.1169 0.1397
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1918 0.1844 0.0960 0.0537 0.0758 0.1385 0.0325 0.7597 0.5037 0.4381
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2551 -0.1966 -0.2426 0.2088 0.2963 0.3183 -0.0811 0.0901 -0.2959 0.0123
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1332 0.2504 0.1540 0.2216 0.0794 0.0624 0.6486 0.6014 0.0843 0.9460
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3368 -0.2681 -0.3346 0.2928 0.4052 0.4473 -0.1987 -0.0004 -0.2056 0.1382
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0446 0.1139 0.0461 0.0831 0.0142 0.0071 0.2599 0.9983 0.2361 0.4431
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3009 -0.1977 -0.3052 0.2937 0.2994 0.3700 -0.2636 0.1326 -0.1085 0.0998
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0745 0.2477 0.0702 0.0821 0.0761 0.0287 0.1320 0.4406 0.5350 0.5805
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3636 -0.2689 -0.3400 0.2933 0.3287 0.4069 -0.2154 0.1726 -0.2587 0.0549
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0293 0.1128 0.0425 0.0825 0.0503 0.0153 0.2212 0.3140 0.1335 0.7615
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2286 -0.2462 -0.2096 0.2187 0.2301 0.3031 0.0993 0.1235 -0.2521 -0.0632
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1799 0.1477 0.2199 0.2001 0.1770 0.0767 0.5762 0.4729 0.1440 0.7268
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1384 -0.0166 -0.1955 0.1870 0.2393 0.2714 -0.0521 -0.0101 0.0640 0.0389
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4207 0.9236 0.2531 0.2749 0.1599 0.1148 0.7700 0.9535 0.7150 0.8299
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2322 -0.0763 -0.2643 0.2684 0.2483 0.3473 -0.1372 0.0575 -0.1378 0.0614
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1729 0.6582 0.1193 0.1134 0.1443 0.0409 0.4391 0.7392 0.4300 0.7343
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000

305
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation 0.0133 -0.1596 -0.2365 -0.3896 0.0326 -0.0214 0.2403 0.2145 -0.0719 -0.1157
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9404 0.3674 0.1782 0.0227 0.8548 0.9043 0.1711 0.2232 0.6860 0.5145
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2552 -0.1996 -0.1862 -0.0401 0.0005 -0.1127 0.0762 -0.0246 0.0081 -0.0850
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1390 0.2502 0.2843 0.8190 0.9978 0.5192 0.6634 0.8886 0.9632 0.6275
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1379 -0.3436 -0.3719 -0.1642 -0.0840 -0.1504 -0.0412 -0.2739 -0.0646 -0.1819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4295 0.0433 0.0278 0.3458 0.6316 0.3884 0.8141 0.1114 0.7124 0.2956
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1090 -0.2567 -0.2689 -0.1838 -0.0341 -0.1441 -0.0791 -0.3116 -0.1464 -0.2547
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5331 0.1366 0.1184 0.2906 0.8458 0.4090 0.6516 0.0684 0.4014 0.1398
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2357 -0.0838 -0.0101 0.1432 0.1655 -0.2154 0.0355 -0.0703 -0.2233 -0.1197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1795 0.6376 0.9550 0.4192 0.3496 0.2211 0.8419 0.6926 0.2043 0.5001
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2130 -0.1647 -0.0928 -0.0628 0.0211 -0.2287 0.1035 -0.0973 -0.2894 -0.1697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2193 0.3445 0.5960 0.7202 0.9040 0.1863 0.5540 0.5783 0.0917 0.3299
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1288 -0.2495 -0.1343 -0.0683 0.1518 -0.0945 0.2007 -0.0701 -0.0244 -0.1510
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4609 0.1483 0.4419 0.6967 0.3840 0.5894 0.2477 0.6890 0.8893 0.3867
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0368 -0.2400 -0.2113 -0.0591 0.0927 0.0266 0.0133 -0.1614 -0.0382 -0.1665
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8339 0.1649 0.2231 0.7359 0.5964 0.8796 0.9398 0.3543 0.8277 0.3390
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0218 -0.2306 -0.2437 -0.1340 0.1423 -0.0108 0.0210 -0.1416 -0.1871 -0.1946
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9009 0.1827 0.1584 0.4429 0.4147 0.9507 0.9048 0.4172 0.2818 0.2626
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0492 -0.3141 -0.3196 -0.1009 0.0087 0.0917 0.0127 -0.1453 -0.0797 -0.1955
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7792 0.0661 0.0613 0.5642 0.9603 0.6001 0.9422 0.4050 0.6492 0.2604
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0220 -0.1516 -0.1189 0.0441 0.1340 -0.0517 0.0840 0.0522 -0.2450 -0.0940
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9000 0.3846 0.4961 0.8016 0.4430 0.7678 0.6316 0.7657 0.1560 0.5912
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0396 -0.0530 -0.0769 0.0348 -0.1052 0.0804 -0.0488 0.0348 -0.4343 -0.0865
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8214 0.7622 0.6604 0.8425 0.5474 0.6460 0.7808 0.8428 0.0091 0.6213
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

306
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation 0.5355 0.2228 0.2711 0.2455 0.4098 0.2648 0.4635 0.3866 0.4224 0.4139
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0013 0.2053 0.1210 0.1617 0.0161 0.1302 0.0058 0.0239 0.0128 0.0150
sqrtQ1E3a
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3713 0.4499 0.4688 0.3864 0.0904 0.0679 0.3841 0.3242 0.3104 0.2282
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0306 0.0067 0.0045 0.0219 0.6053 0.6983 0.0227 0.0575 0.0696 0.1873
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2971 0.4761 0.8329 0.8421 0.2760 0.1780 0.5886 0.7021 0.5752 0.6555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0879 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.1085 0.3064 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3371 0.4834 0.8367 0.8394 0.2369 0.2168 0.6681 0.6671 0.5784 0.6437
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0512 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.1707 0.2110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4286 0.5283 0.3772 0.3616 0.4965 0.3455 0.3066 0.5175 0.5213 0.4520
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0128 0.0013 0.0279 0.0356 0.0028 0.0454 0.0778 0.0017 0.0016 0.0073
sqrtQ1E3e
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6521 0.4741 0.5046 0.4976 0.4340 0.5589 0.4503 0.6065 0.6251 0.5833
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0040 0.0020 0.0024 0.0092 0.0005 0.0066 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5895 0.3837 0.5715 0.5343 0.3100 0.3545 0.7341 0.6251 0.6686 0.5461
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0229 0.0003 0.0009 0.0699 0.0367 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3989 0.4444 0.7606 0.7089 0.3791 0.3099 0.6454 0.7928 0.7660 0.7172
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0194 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0247 0.0700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4226 0.5063 0.6627 0.6414 0.4666 0.4462 0.4557 0.7917 0.8024 0.8184
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0128 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0072 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3674 0.3689 0.7468 0.7607 0.3853 0.2944 0.5999 0.7915 0.7397 0.6774
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0326 0.0292 0.0000 0.0000 0.0223 0.0860 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4307 0.4729 0.5058 0.4702 0.4733 0.5096 0.3705 0.6182 0.6952 0.6451
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0110 0.0041 0.0019 0.0044 0.0041 0.0018 0.0285 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4065 0.2147 0.2868 0.2943 0.3287 0.5204 0.2168 0.5372 0.4737 0.4299
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0171 0.2155 0.0948 0.0862 0.0539 0.0014 0.2108 0.0009 0.0040 0.0100
sqrtQ1E3l
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

307
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric) Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders
and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Domestic
Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation 0.3253 0.1459 0.2008 0.3785 1.0000 0.5117 0.3452 0.3915 0.3655 0.5827
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0605 0.4103 0.2548 0.0273 . 0.0020 0.0455 0.0220 0.0365 0.0003
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2036 0.0786 0.1757 0.2783 0.5117 1.0000 0.5157 0.5404 0.3159 0.4224
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2408 0.6537 0.3127 0.1055 0.0020 . 0.0015 0.0008 0.0688 0.0115
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5026 0.2653 0.5045 0.6298 0.3452 0.5157 1.0000 0.9587 0.4325 0.5495
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0021 0.1235 0.0020 0.0001 0.0455 0.0015 . 0.0000 0.0106 0.0006
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4964 0.3241 0.5332 0.6691 0.3915 0.5404 0.9587 1.0000 0.4030 0.5554
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0024 0.0575 0.0010 0.0000 0.0220 0.0008 0.0000 . 0.0181 0.0005
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4955 0.4006 0.2910 0.4769 0.3655 0.3159 0.4325 0.4030 1.0000 0.7700
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0029 0.0189 0.0950 0.0043 0.0365 0.0688 0.0106 0.0181 . 0.0000
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5537 0.4504 0.4796 0.6087 0.5827 0.4224 0.5495 0.5554 0.7700 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0006 0.0066 0.0036 0.0001 0.0003 0.0115 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000 .
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6035 0.4102 0.3417 0.5933 0.5270 0.4404 0.6191 0.6693 0.4891 0.5929
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0144 0.0446 0.0002 0.0014 0.0081 0.0001 0.0000 0.0033 0.0002
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7479 0.4507 0.4554 0.6978 0.3169 0.3804 0.7509 0.7401 0.4064 0.4743
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0066 0.0060 0.0000 0.0678 0.0242 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0040
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8003 0.4718 0.6704 0.8536 0.3936 0.2420 0.7079 0.6817 0.5428 0.6589
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0213 0.1614 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6391 0.3910 0.5006 0.6819 0.3625 0.2906 0.7829 0.7546 0.3878 0.4762
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0202 0.0022 0.0000 0.0351 0.0904 0.0000 0.0000 0.0234 0.0038
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7390 0.5790 0.6766 0.7312 0.2974 0.1354 0.5025 0.5110 0.5015 0.5461
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0876 0.4381 0.0021 0.0017 0.0025 0.0007
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5035 0.9287 0.5669 0.4613 0.1722 0.1338 0.3496 0.4188 0.4392 0.4573
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0000 0.0004 0.0053 0.3302 0.4436 0.0395 0.0123 0.0094 0.0057
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

308
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.5270 0.3169 0.3936 0.3625 0.2974 0.1722 0.3658 0.3306 0.0390 -0.0192
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0014 0.0678 0.0213 0.0351 0.0876 0.3302 0.0334 0.0562 0.8295 0.9157
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4404 0.3804 0.2420 0.2906 0.1354 0.1338 0.4475 0.3240 -0.0461 0.0654
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0081 0.0242 0.1614 0.0904 0.4381 0.4436 0.0070 0.0576 0.7956 0.7133
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6191 0.7509 0.7079 0.7829 0.5025 0.3496 0.7932 0.7503 -0.0605 -0.2321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0395 0.0000 0.0000 0.7341 0.1865
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6693 0.7401 0.6817 0.7546 0.5110 0.4188 0.7846 0.7474 -0.0674 -0.2196
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0123 0.0000 0.0000 0.7050 0.2120
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4891 0.4064 0.5428 0.3878 0.5015 0.4392 0.3551 0.3623 -0.0472 -0.0513
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0033 0.0171 0.0009 0.0234 0.0025 0.0094 0.0393 0.0352 0.7942 0.7766
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5929 0.4743 0.6589 0.4762 0.5461 0.4573 0.4667 0.4788 0.1397 0.0040
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0040 0.0000 0.0038 0.0007 0.0057 0.0047 0.0036 0.4306 0.9821
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.8327 0.6391 0.7585 0.6652 0.4128 0.6756 0.7328 -0.1555 0.1273
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 0.3798 0.4731
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8327 1.0000 0.8061 0.9043 0.7485 0.4589 0.7970 0.8421 -0.0550 -0.0390
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.7574 0.8266
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6391 0.8061 1.0000 0.8464 0.8618 0.5439 0.7400 0.7592 0.0757 -0.1634
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.6703 0.3557
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7585 0.9043 0.8464 1.0000 0.7352 0.4632 0.8647 0.9029 0.0103 -0.1033
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.9539 0.5610
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6652 0.7485 0.8618 0.7352 1.0000 0.6403 0.5766 0.6412 -0.0102 0.0233
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.9542 0.8959
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4128 0.4589 0.5439 0.4632 0.6403 1.0000 0.4079 0.4448 0.0510 -0.0101
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0137 0.0056 0.0007 0.0051 0.0000 . 0.0150 0.0074 0.7743 0.9546
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000

309
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.0303 -0.0886 -0.1843 -0.2277 -0.0836 -0.1092 -0.3786 -0.3451 -0.0268 0.1820
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8672 0.6241 0.3046 0.1953 0.6435 0.5387 0.0272 0.0456 0.8805 0.3028
sqrtQ1E3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0926 0.0988 -0.1136 -0.4854 -0.1392 -0.1100 -0.4992 -0.5349 -0.2993 -0.0318
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6023 0.5783 0.5224 0.0036 0.4324 0.5294 0.0027 0.0011 0.0855 0.8562
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3174 -0.0808 -0.3351 -0.1021 -0.0383 -0.0571 -0.3467 -0.2541 0.0181 0.0966
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0674 0.6494 0.0527 0.5656 0.8297 0.7444 0.0446 0.1470 0.9191 0.5811
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3426 -0.1142 -0.3563 -0.1307 -0.1078 -0.1662 -0.3921 -0.3198 0.0138 0.0212
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0473 0.5200 0.0386 0.4614 0.5439 0.3401 0.0218 0.0652 0.9381 0.9037
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2463 -0.3220 -0.2003 -0.3810 -0.0911 -0.2312 -0.2518 -0.1239 -0.2828 -0.1174
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1670 0.0677 0.2638 0.0287 0.6143 0.1884 0.1576 0.4922 0.1108 0.5085
sqrtQ1E3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1851 -0.2122 -0.1357 -0.2366 -0.0560 -0.1880 -0.3925 -0.2131 -0.1344 0.0567
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2945 0.2284 0.4440 0.1779 0.7529 0.2795 0.0217 0.2262 0.4486 0.7461
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0578 -0.0183 -0.3113 -0.2429 -0.1166 -0.2037 -0.3930 -0.3754 -0.0089 0.0123
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7453 0.9181 0.0731 0.1663 0.5115 0.2404 0.0215 0.0287 0.9599 0.9442
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1159 0.0093 -0.2705 -0.0434 -0.2037 -0.1511 -0.3373 -0.3108 0.0591 -0.0240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5141 0.9582 0.1218 0.8075 0.2478 0.3864 0.0511 0.0736 0.7397 0.8913
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2554 -0.0599 -0.1713 0.0337 -0.2553 -0.2184 -0.2585 -0.1892 0.0575 0.0280
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1449 0.7366 0.3327 0.8500 0.1450 0.2075 0.1399 0.2838 0.7466 0.8732
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2100 -0.0615 -0.3446 0.1039 -0.1218 -0.0638 -0.2173 -0.1660 0.1668 0.0028
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2333 0.7297 0.0460 0.5587 0.4927 0.7158 0.2169 0.3480 0.3456 0.9874
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0700 -0.0816 -0.0431 0.0070 -0.1588 -0.1119 -0.0977 -0.0339 0.0730 -0.0410
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6942 0.6464 0.8090 0.9685 0.3698 0.5221 0.5824 0.8491 0.6817 0.8153
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2146 -0.2571 -0.2273 0.1828 -0.0749 -0.2212 -0.0937 -0.1064 0.1596 -0.0437
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2228 0.1421 0.1961 0.3009 0.6736 0.2015 0.5980 0.5492 0.3674 0.8030
sqrtQ1E3l
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

310
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation 0.0571 0.1988 0.1558 -0.1416 -0.1553 -0.2637 -0.1839 -0.3699 0.1039 0.0083
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7483 0.2596 0.3789 0.4244 0.3804 0.1318 0.2978 0.0313 0.5713 0.9633
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1643 -0.2421 -0.1999 -0.3091 -0.1766 -0.3089 -0.2466 -0.4410 -0.1815 -0.3427
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3456 0.1611 0.2496 0.0708 0.3101 0.0709 0.1533 0.0080 0.3202 0.0472
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1289 -0.1397 -0.0826 -0.3537 -0.4078 -0.4448 -0.2323 -0.2361 0.1828 -0.0264
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4605 0.4236 0.6372 0.0371 0.0150 0.0074 0.1793 0.1721 0.3167 0.8820
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2015 -0.1769 -0.1079 -0.3828 -0.4665 -0.4764 -0.2813 -0.3095 0.1549 -0.1244
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2458 0.3092 0.5372 0.0232 0.0047 0.0038 0.1017 0.0704 0.3974 0.4834
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1531 -0.3281 -0.1530 -0.1077 -0.2576 -0.1964 -0.3635 -0.1248 -0.0059 0.0976
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3873 0.0582 0.3877 0.5443 0.1414 0.2657 0.0346 0.4819 0.9747 0.5889
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0730 -0.0947 0.0712 -0.2613 -0.1698 -0.1211 -0.2969 -0.2055 0.0181 -0.0742
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6768 0.5885 0.6845 0.1295 0.3295 0.4882 0.0833 0.2363 0.9217 0.6764
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1455 -0.1179 -0.0531 -0.3255 -0.3626 -0.4359 -0.2617 -0.4314 -0.1030 -0.0945
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4042 0.4999 0.7618 0.0564 0.0323 0.0089 0.1289 0.0097 0.5747 0.5952
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1947 -0.1731 -0.1332 -0.2537 -0.3952 -0.4554 -0.1852 -0.2952 0.0030 -0.0635
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2625 0.3200 0.4457 0.1413 0.0188 0.0060 0.2868 0.0851 0.9869 0.7214
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0315 0.0064 0.0423 -0.2208 -0.2891 -0.3082 -0.1271 -0.1596 0.0564 -0.0413
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8575 0.9708 0.8095 0.2025 0.0922 0.0717 0.4670 0.3598 0.7592 0.8166
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1333 -0.0574 -0.0800 -0.1536 -0.3954 -0.4124 -0.1893 -0.1998 0.1495 0.1132
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4451 0.7432 0.6478 0.3784 0.0187 0.0138 0.2760 0.2498 0.4140 0.5240
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0728 0.0405 0.1382 -0.1869 -0.2438 -0.2581 -0.1415 -0.1280 -0.1812 -0.1614
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6778 0.8173 0.4286 0.2823 0.1581 0.1345 0.4175 0.4638 0.3211 0.3618
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1463 -0.0578 0.0074 -0.0403 -0.2859 -0.1912 -0.1542 -0.1118 0.0249 -0.1720
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4018 0.7417 0.9662 0.8182 0.0960 0.2712 0.3764 0.5227 0.8922 0.3306
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000

311
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation -0.0219 0.1669 0.0338 0.2351 0.1849 0.1040 0.3029 0.2800 0.3580 -0.0423
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9035 0.3534 0.8520 0.2029 0.3111 0.5709 0.0919 0.1271 0.0521 0.8211
sqrtQ1E3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2851 -0.0827 -0.2985 -0.0422 -0.0579 -0.1148 0.0942 0.0489 0.0331 -0.2066
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1022 0.6420 0.0863 0.8188 0.7490 0.5247 0.6020 0.7906 0.8622 0.2566
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0122 -0.0278 -0.0434 0.2170 -0.0907 -0.1473 0.0033 -0.0534 0.0150 -0.2404
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9454 0.8758 0.8077 0.2328 0.6158 0.4134 0.9855 0.7714 0.9373 0.1852
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0925 -0.0631 -0.1092 0.2221 -0.1579 -0.1916 -0.0101 -0.0699 0.0300 -0.2542
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6027 0.7230 0.5389 0.2219 0.3802 0.2854 0.9556 0.7038 0.8751 0.1604
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1113 -0.0593 -0.0291 0.0990 0.3142 0.2017 0.2073 0.2104 -0.0761 -0.0309
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5375 0.7429 0.8723 0.5962 0.0799 0.2684 0.2549 0.2558 0.6946 0.8690
sqrtQ1E3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 29.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1182 0.0207 -0.0996 0.1547 0.1915 0.1194 0.2473 0.2243 0.1248 -0.0828
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5056 0.9075 0.5750 0.3979 0.2856 0.5082 0.1652 0.2172 0.5111 0.6521
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1798 -0.1182 -0.2780 0.0181 0.0065 -0.0914 -0.0111 -0.0457 -0.1666 -0.0716
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3090 0.5057 0.1114 0.9215 0.9713 0.6128 0.9510 0.8037 0.3789 0.6968
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0313 -0.1208 -0.2175 -0.0149 -0.1494 -0.2049 -0.1712 -0.2428 -0.1881 -0.2239
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8605 0.4961 0.2165 0.9355 0.4067 0.2527 0.3408 0.1806 0.3195 0.2179
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0606 -0.1634 -0.1491 0.0408 -0.0713 -0.1433 -0.1114 -0.1713 -0.0113 -0.2911
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7337 0.3557 0.4001 0.8244 0.6934 0.4264 0.5371 0.3487 0.9526 0.1060
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1208 0.0484 -0.0657 0.0856 -0.0518 -0.1022 -0.0818 -0.1365 -0.0500 -0.2275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4962 0.7859 0.7120 0.6414 0.7747 0.5713 0.6507 0.4563 0.7932 0.2105
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1786 -0.2959 -0.3507 -0.1579 -0.1401 -0.1380 -0.2720 -0.3148 -0.2330 -0.3411
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3123 0.0893 0.0420 0.3880 0.4368 0.4438 0.1257 0.0793 0.2153 0.0561
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0808 -0.0969 -0.2328 0.0611 -0.0917 0.0628 -0.1113 -0.1717 -0.0982 -0.2143
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6498 0.5855 0.1851 0.7399 0.6118 0.7286 0.5375 0.3475 0.6058 0.2390
sqrtQ1E3l
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000

312
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.1147 0.2068 0.2026 0.2938 -0.0020 0.1196 0.1773 0.0507 0.0342 0.0321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5389 0.2642 0.2829 0.0970 0.9911 0.5074 0.3236 0.7794 0.8503 0.8570
sqrtQ1E3a
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1002 -0.0312 -0.1359 -0.0769 -0.2469 -0.1272 -0.1567 -0.2548 -0.0162 -0.0835
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5916 0.8676 0.4740 0.6707 0.1659 0.4807 0.3838 0.1523 0.9276 0.6336
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0377 0.0008 -0.1124 0.1602 -0.0572 0.0831 -0.0073 -0.0352 0.0263 -0.2797
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8403 0.9967 0.5543 0.3732 0.7519 0.6456 0.9680 0.8456 0.8828 0.1036
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0039 -0.0129 -0.1272 0.1928 -0.0613 0.0732 0.0051 -0.0365 -0.0017 -0.3170
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9835 0.9452 0.5029 0.2824 0.7345 0.6858 0.9774 0.8402 0.9925 0.0635
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0667 -0.0467 0.0184 0.0569 0.0404 0.0799 0.1056 0.1639 0.0645 0.0298
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7263 0.8065 0.9244 0.7571 0.8262 0.6639 0.5652 0.3701 0.7216 0.8673
sqrtQ1E3e
N 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0575 0.0965 0.1260 0.1426 -0.0256 0.0351 0.1059 0.1202 0.2057 0.1275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7587 0.6057 0.5071 0.4285 0.8876 0.8464 0.5577 0.5051 0.2432 0.4656
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0372 -0.1228 -0.2584 -0.0159 0.0131 0.1095 -0.0685 -0.1200 -0.0089 0.0746
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8424 0.5106 0.1680 0.9302 0.9424 0.5440 0.7050 0.5059 0.9604 0.6700
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0405 -0.1945 -0.3508 -0.0815 -0.1644 -0.0078 -0.1907 -0.2575 0.0761 -0.1040
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8286 0.2944 0.0574 0.6523 0.3606 0.9655 0.2878 0.1480 0.6689 0.5522
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0623 -0.1089 -0.1040 0.0959 -0.1575 -0.0297 0.0113 -0.0392 0.1894 -0.0530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7391 0.5599 0.5843 0.5955 0.3813 0.8696 0.9501 0.8285 0.2833 0.7622
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0716 -0.0851 -0.2212 0.0518 -0.0838 0.0907 -0.0948 -0.1891 0.1937 -0.1948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7018 0.6488 0.2402 0.7748 0.6429 0.6159 0.5999 0.2920 0.2723 0.2620
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2299 -0.3350 -0.3020 -0.0302 -0.2300 -0.1855 -0.1098 -0.1310 0.1442 0.0782
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2134 0.0655 0.1049 0.8677 0.1979 0.3014 0.5430 0.4675 0.4157 0.6553
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2361 -0.2702 -0.2399 -0.0611 -0.1596 -0.1677 -0.1387 -0.1842 0.1479 -0.1712
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2009 0.1415 0.2017 0.7354 0.3750 0.3510 0.4416 0.3047 0.4038 0.3254
sqrtQ1E3l
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000

313
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.1374 0.1194 -0.0829 0.0230 -0.1200 -0.1800 -0.1702 -0.2506 -0.0594 0.1036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4386 0.5010 0.6413 0.9024 0.5059 0.3163 0.3436 0.1595 0.7426 0.5598
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0184 -0.0144 -0.1243 -0.2796 -0.3383 -0.3131 -0.2950 -0.4556 -0.3044 -0.2275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9166 0.9344 0.4767 0.1212 0.0503 0.0714 0.0904 0.0068 0.0801 0.1888
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2263 -0.0268 -0.2772 0.0015 -0.3248 -0.3757 -0.1646 -0.3192 -0.1769 -0.2702
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1911 0.8786 0.1069 0.9936 0.0609 0.0285 0.3522 0.0657 0.3168 0.1164
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2731 -0.0901 -0.3359 -0.0421 -0.3530 -0.4226 -0.1937 -0.3354 -0.2034 -0.2894
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1124 0.6066 0.0485 0.8190 0.0406 0.0128 0.2724 0.0525 0.2486 0.0917
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1285 -0.0141 0.0582 0.0959 -0.0810 -0.0355 -0.0343 0.0295 -0.0190 -0.0860
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4688 0.9370 0.7438 0.6079 0.6541 0.8446 0.8497 0.8705 0.9164 0.6287
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2022 0.1224 0.0930 0.0279 -0.1288 -0.1819 -0.0498 -0.1475 -0.0482 -0.0530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2441 0.4838 0.5951 0.8797 0.4677 0.3033 0.7799 0.4051 0.7868 0.7622
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1545 0.1285 -0.1611 -0.1393 -0.1680 -0.2951 -0.1450 -0.2648 -0.1784 -0.1089
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3754 0.4620 0.3552 0.4469 0.3424 0.0902 0.4133 0.1301 0.3128 0.5333
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0208 0.0143 -0.2920 -0.1005 -0.2940 -0.2771 -0.1540 -0.2889 -0.1595 -0.2729
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9058 0.9352 0.0888 0.5842 0.0915 0.1126 0.3846 0.0975 0.3676 0.1127
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0520 0.1151 -0.1516 0.1123 -0.1628 -0.1912 -0.0689 -0.1827 -0.1374 -0.2079
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7667 0.5103 0.3846 0.5406 0.3577 0.2786 0.6984 0.3011 0.4386 0.2306
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0508 0.0448 -0.2749 0.0586 -0.2796 -0.2877 -0.2099 -0.2803 -0.0313 -0.1810
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7718 0.7984 0.1100 0.7501 0.1093 0.0989 0.2334 0.1083 0.8605 0.2982
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1867 0.1597 -0.0643 0.0196 -0.0942 -0.1349 -0.1179 -0.1270 -0.1959 -0.1156
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2828 0.3594 0.7135 0.9153 0.5962 0.4469 0.5066 0.4741 0.2667 0.5086
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0484 -0.2347 -0.2254 0.1302 -0.1171 -0.0328 -0.0436 -0.0632 0.0422 -0.2323
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7826 0.1747 0.1930 0.4774 0.5095 0.8541 0.8068 0.7224 0.8125 0.1792
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

314
Table A6, continued (Row 3, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.0984 -0.0030 -0.0716 0.2920 0.3555 0.2967 0.0015 -0.0107 -0.1731 0.0560
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5798 0.9867 0.6874 0.0938 0.0391 0.0936 0.9932 0.9523 0.3277 0.7609
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2063 -0.2480 -0.3042 0.0029 0.1769 -0.0517 0.0635 -0.0614 0.2567 -0.0784
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2345 0.1509 0.0756 0.9870 0.3093 0.7716 0.7212 0.7262 0.1366 0.6644
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2763 -0.1889 -0.2873 0.2136 0.1306 0.1567 -0.1624 0.0765 -0.0302 -0.1021
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1081 0.2772 0.0942 0.2180 0.4546 0.3763 0.3588 0.6621 0.8634 0.5717
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3140 -0.2335 -0.3437 0.1882 0.1844 0.1301 -0.2116 0.0666 -0.0590 -0.0800
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0662 0.1771 0.0432 0.2789 0.2890 0.4633 0.2296 0.7036 0.7364 0.6581
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0732 -0.0943 0.0318 0.0981 0.0666 0.2704 -0.1671 -0.0981 -0.0177 0.1183
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6808 0.5959 0.8582 0.5809 0.7082 0.1280 0.3526 0.5811 0.9211 0.5189
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0612 -0.0943 -0.0615 0.0572 0.1212 0.2113 -0.0822 -0.0328 -0.2230 -0.0690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7269 0.5899 0.7255 0.7441 0.4880 0.2303 0.6440 0.8516 0.1979 0.7030
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1526 -0.1341 -0.2585 0.2358 0.1196 0.1978 -0.1445 -0.0430 -0.2447 -0.0409
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3814 0.4424 0.1337 0.1726 0.4939 0.2622 0.4148 0.8064 0.1566 0.8211
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2741 -0.2184 -0.3170 0.3248 0.1723 0.1703 -0.1517 0.0874 -0.2093 -0.0088
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1111 0.2074 0.0635 0.0569 0.3222 0.3355 0.3919 0.6176 0.2276 0.9611
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2227 -0.1647 -0.2417 0.2058 0.1873 0.2609 -0.0647 0.0278 -0.2141 -0.0584
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1984 0.3443 0.1619 0.2357 0.2814 0.1362 0.7163 0.8740 0.2168 0.7470
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1936 -0.1137 -0.2185 0.2975 0.1487 0.2110 -0.0922 -0.0212 -0.2333 0.0609
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2650 0.5155 0.2074 0.0826 0.3939 0.2310 0.6041 0.9037 0.1774 0.7362
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1167 -0.1419 -0.1800 0.1614 0.1363 0.2148 -0.1561 0.0376 -0.2012 0.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5043 0.4161 0.3007 0.3544 0.4349 0.2226 0.3780 0.8300 0.2465 1.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2091 -0.2572 -0.1945 0.1144 0.1141 0.1633 0.1102 0.1971 -0.1516 -0.0489
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2279 0.1357 0.2630 0.5127 0.5141 0.3562 0.5349 0.2565 0.3845 0.7870
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000

315
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation 0.0261 -0.3126 -0.3248 -0.0833 0.0119 0.0776 0.1324 -0.1213 0.0368 -0.1600
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8818 0.0675 0.0570 0.6341 0.9457 0.6577 0.4484 0.4878 0.8337 0.3587
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0753 -0.3260 -0.2974 -0.1055 0.0191 0.0426 0.1116 -0.1315 -0.0734 -0.1675
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6674 0.0560 0.0827 0.5464 0.9131 0.8080 0.5233 0.4513 0.6753 0.3362
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0714 0.3292 0.1555 0.1382 -0.1336 0.5077 0.0948 0.2332 0.0326 0.4173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6836 0.0535 0.3724 0.4284 0.4440 0.0018 0.5879 0.1776 0.8525 0.0126
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0032 -0.2346 0.0142 0.0931 -0.1776 0.0953 0.6809 0.5161 0.1554 0.3006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9852 0.1750 0.9356 0.5947 0.3073 0.5859 0.0000 0.0015 0.3726 0.0793
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2227 -0.1107 0.0084 0.0954 -0.1624 0.0299 0.5787 0.6878 0.3185 0.4673
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1984 0.5268 0.9620 0.5856 0.3512 0.8644 0.0003 0.0000 0.0622 0.0047
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2041 -0.1045 -0.0642 -0.0603 -0.0460 0.1391 0.5195 0.4150 0.5869 0.4621
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2396 0.5503 0.7141 0.7308 0.7932 0.4256 0.0014 0.0132 0.0002 0.0052
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1039 0.1069 0.2938 0.1321 -0.2579 0.0992 0.2628 0.5338 0.1776 0.6159
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5527 0.5409 0.0867 0.4494 0.1347 0.5707 0.1273 0.0010 0.3074 0.0001
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1444 0.2197 -0.0267 0.1104 -0.1642 0.5266 0.0615 0.2414 0.0641 0.2397
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4078 0.2047 0.8791 0.5279 0.3460 0.0012 0.7258 0.1623 0.7145 0.1655
sqrtQIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3171 -0.2167 -0.1550 -0.0148 -0.4207 -0.0525 0.3300 0.4299 0.1815 0.3448
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0634 0.2111 0.3740 0.9327 0.0119 0.7644 0.0529 0.0099 0.2966 0.0425
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0909 -0.2119 -0.2500 0.0844 -0.2755 -0.0257 0.3662 0.3848 0.2580 0.3453
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5979 0.2148 0.1414 0.6246 0.1039 0.8818 0.0281 0.0205 0.1287 0.0392
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1500 0.1203 0.0406 0.3279 -0.0776 0.0809 0.0810 0.4147 0.1463 0.3833
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3899 0.4912 0.8168 0.0545 0.6576 0.6440 0.6435 0.0133 0.4016 0.0230
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0849 0.1503 0.1898 0.3699 -0.2319 0.0167 -0.0566 0.2175 -0.0915 0.2676
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6276 0.3886 0.2747 0.0287 0.1801 0.9242 0.7468 0.2094 0.6011 0.1202
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

316
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of Time
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource
Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource
Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource
Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource
Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource
Challenges-Lack of Clarity
in Duties
Pearson Correlation 0.2378 0.3700 0.7712 0.7224 0.3387 0.3204 0.5919 0.6129 0.5677 0.5515
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1756 0.0287 0.0000 0.0000 0.0465 0.0606 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2694 0.3163 0.7446 0.6898 0.3704 0.3419 0.6206 0.6329 0.5770 0.5381
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1234 0.0641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0285 0.0444 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1149 0.1779 0.1297 0.1362 0.1985 0.1231 -0.0890 0.1663 0.0529 0.1278
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5176 0.3066 0.4579 0.4354 0.2530 0.4810 0.6113 0.3398 0.7627 0.4645
sqrtQIIA1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0396 -0.1054 -0.1119 -0.2222 0.0135 0.1304 0.1874 -0.2240 -0.2112 -0.2785
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8241 0.5467 0.5223 0.1996 0.9384 0.4553 0.2811 0.1958 0.2234 0.1053
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2166 -0.0797 -0.1684 -0.2745 -0.0123 0.0638 0.0578 -0.3036 -0.2200 -0.2676
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2186 0.6491 0.3335 0.1105 0.9439 0.7156 0.7415 0.0762 0.2040 0.1201
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1300 -0.0226 0.0131 -0.0242 -0.0726 0.1009 0.0814 -0.0651 -0.0220 0.0909
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4636 0.8976 0.9404 0.8901 0.6784 0.5642 0.6421 0.7100 0.9003 0.6036
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1190 0.0886 -0.1704 -0.2953 0.1008 0.0404 -0.1367 -0.2731 -0.2471 -0.1374
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5028 0.6129 0.3279 0.0850 0.5644 0.8177 0.4337 0.1125 0.1525 0.4314
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0595 -0.0992 -0.0207 0.0772 0.0554 0.2519 -0.0869 0.1213 0.0551 0.1344
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7381 0.5709 0.9061 0.6595 0.7519 0.1444 0.6196 0.4875 0.7534 0.4414
sqrtQIIB1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2248 -0.1528 -0.1588 -0.1195 0.0380 0.0177 -0.0620 -0.2103 -0.2880 -0.3218
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2013 0.3809 0.3621 0.4940 0.8286 0.9198 0.7234 0.2252 0.0934 0.0594
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2630 -0.0369 -0.0216 -0.0557 0.0232 -0.0175 -0.1884 -0.2085 -0.2482 -0.2057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1269 0.8306 0.9006 0.7468 0.8930 0.9193 0.2711 0.2223 0.1444 0.2287
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2881 -0.0628 -0.2723 -0.2538 -0.0384 0.0173 -0.4288 -0.3213 -0.2887 -0.2773
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0985 0.7200 0.1136 0.1413 0.8265 0.9212 0.0102 0.0598 0.0926 0.1069
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1696 -0.0502 -0.1568 -0.1208 -0.0354 -0.0679 -0.3476 -0.2878 -0.3012 -0.2312
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3377 0.7744 0.3684 0.4895 0.8402 0.6981 0.0408 0.0936 0.0787 0.1815
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

317
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation 0.4527 0.3371 0.5283 0.6075 0.3658 0.4475 0.7932 0.7846 0.3551 0.4667
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0063 0.0477 0.0011 0.0001 0.0334 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.0393 0.0047
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5411 0.4099 0.4958 0.6459 0.3306 0.3240 0.7503 0.7474 0.3623 0.4788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0008 0.0145 0.0025 0.0000 0.0562 0.0576 0.0000 0.0000 0.0352 0.0036
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0748 0.0207 0.2155 0.1088 0.0390 -0.0461 -0.0605 -0.0674 -0.0472 0.1397
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6692 0.9059 0.2137 0.5340 0.8295 0.7956 0.7341 0.7050 0.7942 0.4306
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1977 0.0244 0.0457 -0.1031 -0.0192 0.0654 -0.2321 -0.2196 -0.0513 0.0040
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2549 0.8893 0.7945 0.5558 0.9157 0.7133 0.1865 0.2120 0.7766 0.9821
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2397 -0.1690 -0.0794 -0.2276 -0.0303 0.0926 -0.3174 -0.3426 -0.2463 -0.1851
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1655 0.3317 0.6502 0.1885 0.8672 0.6023 0.0674 0.0473 0.1670 0.2945
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1073 -0.2804 0.1555 0.0439 -0.0886 0.0988 -0.0808 -0.1142 -0.3220 -0.2122
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5394 0.1028 0.3723 0.8024 0.6241 0.5783 0.6494 0.5200 0.0677 0.2284
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1200 -0.1781 0.0366 -0.0862 -0.1843 -0.1136 -0.3351 -0.3563 -0.2003 -0.1357
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4922 0.3061 0.8345 0.6226 0.3046 0.5224 0.0527 0.0386 0.2638 0.4440
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0178 0.2308 0.1476 0.0080 -0.2277 -0.4854 -0.1021 -0.1307 -0.3810 -0.2366
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9193 0.1822 0.3973 0.9636 0.1953 0.0036 0.5656 0.4614 0.0287 0.1779
sqrtQIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3135 -0.0598 -0.0264 -0.2122 -0.0836 -0.1392 -0.0383 -0.1078 -0.0911 -0.0560
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0666 0.7329 0.8804 0.2211 0.6435 0.4324 0.8297 0.5439 0.6143 0.7529
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2352 -0.1697 0.0064 -0.1523 -0.1092 -0.1100 -0.0571 -0.1662 -0.2312 -0.1880
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1673 0.3223 0.9706 0.3751 0.5387 0.5294 0.7444 0.3401 0.1884 0.2795
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2338 -0.0749 -0.0629 -0.1881 -0.3786 -0.4992 -0.3467 -0.3921 -0.2518 -0.3925
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1764 0.6688 0.7195 0.2793 0.0272 0.0027 0.0446 0.0218 0.1576 0.0217
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2236 -0.1061 -0.0719 -0.2038 -0.3451 -0.5349 -0.2541 -0.3198 -0.1239 -0.2131
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1966 0.5440 0.6815 0.2402 0.0456 0.0011 0.1470 0.0652 0.4922 0.2262
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

318
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.6756 0.7970 0.7400 0.8647 0.5766 0.4079 1.0000 0.9504 -0.0484 0.0659
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0150 . 0.0000 0.7859 0.7110
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7328 0.8421 0.7592 0.9029 0.6412 0.4448 0.9504 1.0000 -0.0196 0.0912
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 . 0.9124 0.6079
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1555 -0.0550 0.0757 0.0103 -0.0102 0.0510 -0.0484 -0.0196 1.0000 0.0672
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3798 0.7574 0.6703 0.9539 0.9542 0.7743 0.7859 0.9124 . 0.7015
sqrtQIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1273 -0.0390 -0.1634 -0.1033 0.0233 -0.0101 0.0659 0.0912 0.0672 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4731 0.8266 0.3557 0.5610 0.8959 0.9546 0.7110 0.6079 0.7015 .
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0578 -0.1159 -0.2554 -0.2100 -0.0700 -0.2146 -0.0527 -0.0657 0.1034 0.8361
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7453 0.5141 0.1449 0.2333 0.6942 0.2228 0.7670 0.7119 0.5544 0.0000
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0183 0.0093 -0.0599 -0.0615 -0.0816 -0.2571 0.0544 -0.0513 0.1196 0.5001
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9181 0.9582 0.7366 0.7297 0.6464 0.1421 0.7598 0.7732 0.4938 0.0022
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3113 -0.2705 -0.1713 -0.3446 -0.0431 -0.2273 -0.3112 -0.2803 0.3849 0.4842
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0731 0.1218 0.3327 0.0460 0.8090 0.1961 0.0732 0.1084 0.0224 0.0032
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2429 -0.0434 0.0337 0.1039 0.0070 0.1828 0.0091 0.0388 0.4329 -0.0768
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1663 0.8075 0.8500 0.5587 0.9685 0.3009 0.9594 0.8277 0.0105 0.6662
sqrtQIIB1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1166 -0.2037 -0.2553 -0.1218 -0.1588 -0.0749 -0.0232 0.0025 0.1110 0.4760
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5115 0.2478 0.1450 0.4927 0.3698 0.6736 0.8962 0.9889 0.5319 0.0044
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2037 -0.1511 -0.2184 -0.0638 -0.1119 -0.2212 -0.0006 0.0339 0.1865 0.4127
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2404 0.3864 0.2075 0.7158 0.5221 0.2015 0.9973 0.8466 0.2834 0.0137
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3930 -0.3373 -0.2585 -0.2173 -0.0977 -0.0937 -0.2462 -0.1797 0.2766 0.1491
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0215 0.0511 0.1399 0.2169 0.5824 0.5980 0.1605 0.3092 0.1133 0.4000
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3754 -0.3108 -0.1892 -0.1660 -0.0339 -0.1064 -0.2808 -0.1840 0.2318 0.0592
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0287 0.0736 0.2838 0.3480 0.8491 0.5492 0.1077 0.2977 0.1871 0.7394
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

319
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-
DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.0527 0.0544 -0.3112 0.0091 -0.0232 -0.0006 -0.2462 -0.2808 0.0780 0.0612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7670 0.7598 0.0732 0.9594 0.8962 0.9973 0.1605 0.1077 0.6609 0.7268
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0657 -0.0513 -0.2803 0.0388 0.0025 0.0339 -0.1797 -0.1840 0.0915 0.0529
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7119 0.7732 0.1084 0.8277 0.9889 0.8466 0.3092 0.2977 0.6070 0.7629
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1034 0.1196 0.3849 0.4329 0.1110 0.1865 0.2766 0.2318 0.3777 0.2693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5544 0.4938 0.0224 0.0105 0.5319 0.2834 0.1133 0.1871 0.0276 0.1178
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8361 0.5001 0.4842 -0.0768 0.4760 0.4127 0.1491 0.0592 -0.0535 0.3304
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0022 0.0032 0.6662 0.0044 0.0137 0.4000 0.7394 0.7639 0.0525
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.6149 0.6576 -0.0045 0.5128 0.5351 0.3011 0.1858 -0.0096 0.3523
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0001 0.0000 0.9798 0.0019 0.0009 0.0836 0.2927 0.9569 0.0380
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6149 1.0000 0.4377 0.0463 0.2243 0.3008 0.1171 -0.0998 0.1023 0.4352
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 . 0.0086 0.7950 0.2022 0.0791 0.5096 0.5743 0.5648 0.0090
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6576 0.4377 1.0000 0.0776 0.3110 0.3072 0.3580 0.3949 -0.0457 0.3438
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0086 . 0.6625 0.0734 0.0726 0.0376 0.0208 0.7974 0.0431
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0045 0.0463 0.0776 1.0000 0.1981 0.2450 0.5349 0.4394 0.5519 0.2215
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9798 0.7950 0.6625 . 0.2614 0.1560 0.0009 0.0083 0.0006 0.2010
sqrtQIIB1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5128 0.2243 0.3110 0.1981 1.0000 0.8018 0.5968 0.5640 0.2129 0.6609
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0019 0.2022 0.0734 0.2614 . 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.2268 0.0000
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5351 0.3008 0.3072 0.2450 0.8018 1.0000 0.6983 0.5910 0.2437 0.4928
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0009 0.0791 0.0726 0.1560 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0002 0.1582 0.0023
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3011 0.1171 0.3580 0.5349 0.5968 0.6983 1.0000 0.7929 0.2897 0.2899
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0836 0.5096 0.0376 0.0009 0.0002 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0913 0.0911
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1858 -0.0998 0.3949 0.4394 0.5640 0.5910 0.7929 1.0000 0.1306 0.2298
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2927 0.5743 0.0208 0.0083 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 . 0.4547 0.1841
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

320
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation -0.1086 -0.0952 -0.1293 -0.2087 -0.2421 -0.2142 -0.1411 -0.3103 0.2453 0.1317
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5345 0.5864 0.4592 0.2288 0.1611 0.2167 0.4189 0.0696 0.1761 0.4579
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0982 -0.0902 -0.1094 -0.1867 -0.3064 -0.2303 -0.2087 -0.2817 0.2229 0.1558
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5745 0.6063 0.5317 0.2829 0.0735 0.1832 0.2289 0.1011 0.2200 0.3788
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2928 0.2645 0.2577 0.4524 0.1923 0.1286 0.2592 0.2915 0.1780 -0.0639
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0878 0.1247 0.1351 0.0064 0.2684 0.4614 0.1327 0.0893 0.3381 0.7240
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2505 0.1647 0.2162 0.1169 0.5579 0.4830 0.3219 0.1046 -0.2989 -0.0421
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1467 0.3443 0.2123 0.5037 0.0005 0.0033 0.0593 0.5499 0.1023 0.8160
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3738 0.2844 0.3080 0.1547 0.6238 0.5291 0.3785 0.2306 -0.2428 -0.0730
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0270 0.0978 0.0719 0.3750 0.0001 0.0011 0.0250 0.1826 0.1881 0.6864
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4417 0.3312 0.2329 -0.0231 0.4269 0.2014 0.5066 0.0260 -0.3960 -0.2999
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0079 0.0519 0.1781 0.8952 0.0105 0.2461 0.0019 0.8821 0.0274 0.0899
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4388 0.2772 0.3716 0.3023 0.4855 0.4690 0.3910 0.5621 -0.2627 -0.2365
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0084 0.1069 0.0279 0.0775 0.0031 0.0045 0.0202 0.0004 0.1533 0.1852
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1356 0.3730 0.2197 0.5693 0.1905 0.2899 0.4428 0.4588 0.3319 0.1682
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4375 0.0273 0.2048 0.0004 0.2729 0.0911 0.0077 0.0056 0.0635 0.3493
sqrtQIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4546 0.4309 0.4639 0.0661 0.3851 0.4537 0.1976 0.2287 0.0749 0.1145
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0061 0.0098 0.0050 0.7061 0.0223 0.0062 0.2553 0.1864 0.6889 0.5259
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5614 0.4388 0.4160 0.1470 0.3983 0.4759 0.2861 0.1858 0.0368 0.2107
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0004 0.0074 0.0116 0.3922 0.0161 0.0033 0.0907 0.2780 0.8415 0.2316
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5105 0.4286 0.3648 0.4573 0.2551 0.4948 0.2783 0.4224 0.0961 0.2948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0017 0.0102 0.0312 0.0057 0.1392 0.0025 0.1055 0.0115 0.6010 0.0958
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3629 0.2293 0.3390 0.3960 0.2410 0.4631 0.2235 0.6599 0.0448 0.2786
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0322 0.1851 0.0463 0.0185 0.1631 0.0051 0.1968 0.0000 0.8077 0.1164
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 33.0000

321
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.1528 0.1233 -0.0310 0.1081 -0.0190 -0.0441 -0.0271 -0.0745 0.0730 -0.1373
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3884 0.4871 0.8616 0.5558 0.9165 0.8073 0.8812 0.6854 0.7013 0.4536
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1172 0.0962 -0.0495 0.1069 -0.0066 -0.0392 -0.0468 -0.0917 0.0195 -0.1104
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5092 0.5882 0.7811 0.5604 0.9711 0.8284 0.7959 0.6176 0.9185 0.5474
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1953 0.1907 0.1443 0.0910 -0.0026 0.1361 0.1300 0.1002 0.0933 -0.2110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2761 0.2879 0.4232 0.6265 0.9887 0.4576 0.4782 0.5918 0.6239 0.2465
sqrtQIIA1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0100 -0.0919 -0.2454 -0.2978 0.0450 0.1313 -0.1426 -0.0982 -0.1712 0.0731
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9559 0.6109 0.1687 0.1037 0.8069 0.4738 0.4362 0.5991 0.3658 0.6911
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0213 -0.0683 -0.1448 -0.2318 0.0067 0.0908 -0.0922 -0.0454 -0.0465 0.0936
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9063 0.7057 0.4216 0.2096 0.9710 0.6213 0.6158 0.8085 0.8072 0.6102
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0331 -0.3194 -0.3811 -0.4208 -0.2607 -0.1598 -0.3818 -0.3747 -0.2117 -0.0478
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8548 0.0700 0.0287 0.0184 0.1495 0.3824 0.0311 0.0378 0.2615 0.7949
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1394 -0.2384 -0.0992 -0.2024 -0.1504 -0.0577 -0.1521 -0.0974 -0.1059 -0.1474
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4393 0.1815 0.5827 0.2748 0.4113 0.7536 0.4061 0.6022 0.5774 0.4207
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4370 0.2256 0.2721 0.2538 -0.0370 0.1288 0.0064 0.0077 0.1795 -0.1257
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0110 0.2068 0.1255 0.1683 0.8408 0.4825 0.9721 0.9674 0.3338 0.4930
sqrtQIIB1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1969 0.1917 0.1385 0.0846 0.1371 0.2411 0.1298 0.2186 0.0686 0.1714
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2721 0.2851 0.4420 0.6509 0.4543 0.1837 0.4790 0.2374 0.7187 0.3484
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1804 0.1308 0.0380 -0.0322 0.1420 0.2355 -0.0237 0.0333 0.0897 0.1302
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3073 0.4608 0.8310 0.8609 0.4304 0.1871 0.8957 0.8563 0.6312 0.4703
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2762 0.0781 0.1525 0.1084 0.2329 0.3610 0.0264 0.0967 0.0847 0.1798
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1197 0.6657 0.3970 0.5618 0.1995 0.0424 0.8858 0.6046 0.6504 0.3248
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2424 0.0450 0.1999 0.0538 0.2318 0.3369 0.0325 0.1324 0.0333 0.1542
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1741 0.8035 0.2647 0.7739 0.2018 0.0594 0.8599 0.4776 0.8590 0.3996
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000

322
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.1343 -0.0203 -0.1464 0.1575 0.0560 0.2028 -0.0149 -0.1282 0.0915 -0.2006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4715 0.9137 0.4402 0.3814 0.7571 0.2576 0.9343 0.4770 0.6069 0.2480
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1352 -0.0535 -0.1769 0.1793 0.0743 0.2141 0.0084 -0.0901 0.0784 -0.1661
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4685 0.7749 0.3496 0.3180 0.6809 0.2316 0.9629 0.6181 0.6594 0.3401
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1778 -0.0218 0.0465 0.0193 -0.2080 -0.1876 -0.0740 -0.0809 0.6590 0.1279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3385 0.9074 0.8070 0.9151 0.2455 0.2958 0.6823 0.6544 0.0000 0.4639
sqrtQIIA1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0405 -0.2165 -0.2761 -0.1459 0.0339 0.0086 -0.1387 -0.2131 -0.0793 0.3803
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8288 0.2421 0.1398 0.4180 0.8513 0.9621 0.4416 0.2337 0.6557 0.0242
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0044 -0.0586 -0.1283 -0.1299 0.0058 -0.0144 -0.1081 -0.1729 -0.0986 0.3092
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9813 0.7540 0.4994 0.4712 0.9746 0.9366 0.5493 0.3359 0.5790 0.0707
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0641 -0.1677 -0.3042 -0.3558 -0.1177 -0.0806 -0.2696 -0.3563 0.0263 0.2589
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7318 0.3672 0.1022 0.0422 0.5140 0.6556 0.1292 0.0419 0.8827 0.1331
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2061 -0.0797 -0.0096 -0.0812 -0.2433 -0.2486 -0.0398 -0.0119 0.0994 0.1914
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2661 0.6700 0.9597 0.6531 0.1725 0.1630 0.8260 0.9476 0.5760 0.2707
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0293 0.0257 0.0574 0.1174 -0.0546 -0.0153 -0.0298 -0.0830 0.4835 -0.0555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8737 0.8891 0.7589 0.5084 0.7591 0.9317 0.8671 0.6407 0.0038 0.7517
sqrtQIIB1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1514 0.1866 0.0964 0.0895 0.2417 0.2037 0.1533 0.1342 -0.0695 0.0196
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4161 0.3148 0.6124 0.6203 0.1754 0.2554 0.3942 0.4566 0.6959 0.9111
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1885 0.0873 -0.0004 0.0860 0.1414 0.1527 0.0579 -0.0009 0.0358 0.1176
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3015 0.6346 0.9984 0.6285 0.4249 0.3886 0.7448 0.9959 0.8383 0.4946
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2016 0.0999 0.0867 0.2009 0.2686 0.2557 0.2526 0.2093 0.1463 0.0687
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2684 0.5864 0.6428 0.2545 0.1245 0.1444 0.1495 0.2348 0.4090 0.6951
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2406 0.1523 0.2515 0.1265 0.1784 0.1483 0.1568 0.2280 0.1107 0.0435
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1847 0.4053 0.1722 0.4760 0.3127 0.4025 0.3758 0.1946 0.5333 0.8039
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

323
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation -0.0822 -0.0833 -0.2899 0.0245 -0.2336 -0.2472 -0.1951 -0.3522 -0.0468 -0.1102
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6388 0.6342 0.0912 0.8939 0.1837 0.1586 0.2688 0.0411 0.7927 0.5287
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0312 -0.0846 -0.2436 -0.0121 -0.2207 -0.2111 -0.2121 -0.2948 -0.0631 -0.0994
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8589 0.6289 0.1585 0.9477 0.2098 0.2307 0.2284 0.0905 0.7230 0.5698
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1830 0.2485 0.3637 0.2503 0.0416 0.1799 0.1731 0.1626 0.3801 0.0431
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2926 0.1499 0.0317 0.1670 0.8152 0.3086 0.3276 0.3581 0.0266 0.8059
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4524 0.0719 0.0763 -0.1148 0.2483 0.2263 0.0270 0.0105 -0.0543 0.2693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0064 0.6814 0.6631 0.5317 0.1567 0.1980 0.8796 0.9529 0.7602 0.1177
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4340 0.1111 0.1761 -0.1301 0.1409 0.2464 -0.0296 -0.0050 -0.1039 0.1853
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0092 0.5250 0.3117 0.4778 0.4268 0.1601 0.8680 0.9776 0.5586 0.2867
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3175 0.3321 -0.0099 0.0739 0.1655 0.1167 0.2619 -0.0368 0.0341 0.0978
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0631 0.0513 0.9550 0.6879 0.3497 0.5112 0.1346 0.8365 0.8481 0.5762
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3293 0.2041 0.4573 0.1138 0.1424 0.3494 0.1388 0.3325 -0.0834 0.0795
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0534 0.2396 0.0057 0.5352 0.4216 0.0428 0.4338 0.0547 0.6392 0.6497
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0273 0.0725 0.1114 0.5321 0.2194 0.3162 0.2759 0.3309 0.5017 0.1186
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8761 0.6791 0.5242 0.0017 0.2125 0.0685 0.1143 0.0560 0.0025 0.4973
sqrtQIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0674 0.0462 0.1435 0.0973 0.2778 0.2639 0.1422 0.1933 0.2241 0.3412
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7007 0.7924 0.4107 0.5964 0.1116 0.1316 0.4223 0.2733 0.2026 0.0449
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1689 0.1085 0.1543 -0.0121 0.2359 0.2289 0.0429 0.0362 0.1288 0.3312
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3248 0.5288 0.3688 0.9467 0.1724 0.1859 0.8065 0.8363 0.4607 0.0485
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1978 0.1271 0.2987 0.3436 0.3660 0.5023 0.2435 0.4655 0.3036 0.2826
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2546 0.4668 0.0814 0.0542 0.0333 0.0025 0.1652 0.0055 0.0809 0.1000
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1071 0.0802 0.3721 0.4333 0.3414 0.4270 0.2176 0.5794 0.3121 0.3800
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5401 0.6472 0.0277 0.0132 0.0481 0.0118 0.2164 0.0003 0.0723 0.0244
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

324
Table A6, continued (Row 4, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation -0.1208 -0.0355 -0.1904 0.3519 0.2023 0.1834 0.1253 -0.2223 -0.0648 0.0373
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4895 0.8395 0.2734 0.0382 0.2438 0.2991 0.4803 0.1992 0.7114 0.8365
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1121 -0.0277 -0.1476 0.3555 0.1494 0.1617 0.0593 -0.0972 -0.2430 0.0842
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5216 0.8744 0.3974 0.0361 0.3917 0.3608 0.7389 0.5786 0.1595 0.6414
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0968 0.2430 0.1620 -0.1899 -0.0509 -0.2144 -0.0193 0.1354 -0.1746 0.2663
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5802 0.1596 0.3525 0.2746 0.7714 0.2233 0.9150 0.4381 0.3233 0.1406
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2882 0.1645 0.1353 0.0265 -0.0986 -0.1775 0.2925 -0.1068 0.0432 0.0819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0932 0.3450 0.4382 0.8798 0.5730 0.3152 0.0986 0.5414 0.8083 0.6557
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2562 0.1028 0.1436 0.0686 -0.0248 -0.1084 0.2711 -0.0749 0.1244 0.2899
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1374 0.5569 0.4105 0.6955 0.8877 0.5418 0.1271 0.6689 0.4832 0.1076
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0945 0.1248 -0.0195 0.0473 -0.0414 -0.0617 0.2011 -0.0363 0.3014 0.0322
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5894 0.4750 0.9117 0.7873 0.8133 0.7290 0.2619 0.8360 0.0832 0.8611
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1476 0.0430 0.2240 -0.1427 -0.0942 -0.1213 0.0556 0.1172 0.2077 0.1375
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3974 0.8064 0.1958 0.4134 0.5902 0.4943 0.7588 0.5026 0.2385 0.4529
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1411 0.2387 0.1285 0.0551 -0.0629 0.1252 0.0988 -0.0153 -0.1597 0.1598
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4188 0.1673 0.4621 0.7531 0.7195 0.4804 0.5844 0.9305 0.3671 0.3823
sqrtQIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3494 0.3083 0.3184 0.1562 -0.0927 0.0444 0.2648 -0.0239 -0.1045 0.2282
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0396 0.0715 0.0623 0.3702 0.5964 0.8030 0.1364 0.8916 0.5563 0.2090
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3500 0.3999 0.2809 0.1258 -0.0618 -0.0688 0.1586 0.0427 -0.0391 0.3143
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0364 0.0157 0.0971 0.4646 0.7202 0.6947 0.3703 0.8049 0.8237 0.0748
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-
DWMD N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3103 0.4354 0.4060 0.0130 -0.1006 0.0903 0.1183 -0.0332 -0.0354 0.4093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0697 0.0089 0.0155 0.9411 0.5651 0.6115 0.5119 0.8498 0.8425 0.0200
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
SupportTVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3790 0.3948 0.5288 -0.0315 -0.1118 0.0378 -0.0183 -0.0270 -0.1465 0.4199
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0248 0.0189 0.0011 0.8576 0.5224 0.8318 0.9194 0.8775 0.4082 0.0167
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000

325
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation 0.0838 0.0825 -0.0479 -0.0846 -0.1418 0.3969 0.1620 0.1631 0.1132 0.2242
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6323 0.6374 0.7848 0.6288 0.4164 0.0182 0.3525 0.3492 0.5172 0.1955
sqrtQIIC1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2341 -0.1871 -0.0832 -0.3257 -0.3539 0.1588 0.3838 0.3848 0.2830 0.3749
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1693 0.2746 0.6295 0.0526 0.0342 0.3550 0.0208 0.0205 0.0944 0.0243
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1238 -0.1524 -0.0944 -0.0979 -0.1055 0.0353 0.4694 0.4439 0.2701 0.4805
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4718 0.3747 0.5838 0.5701 0.5404 0.8381 0.0039 0.0067 0.1111 0.0030
sqrtQIIC1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1109 -0.1102 -0.1419 -0.2716 -0.0945 0.0993 0.3394 0.4604 0.1878 0.2528
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5197 0.5221 0.4089 0.1090 0.5835 0.5645 0.0429 0.0047 0.2728 0.1368
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2413 -0.0459 0.0556 -0.1219 -0.1092 -0.0364 0.2517 0.3294 -0.0107 0.1780
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1563 0.7905 0.7473 0.4788 0.5259 0.8332 0.1386 0.0498 0.9505 0.2989
sqrtQIIC1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2661 0.2364 0.1976 0.2932 -0.1569 0.6200 0.0729 0.4288 0.0309 0.3750
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1167 0.1650 0.2480 0.0826 0.3609 0.0001 0.6725 0.0091 0.8582 0.0242
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0291 -0.1636 0.0149 0.1377 -0.2225 0.2881 0.5092 0.5158 0.2726 0.3252
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8662 0.3404 0.9312 0.4231 0.1922 0.0884 0.0015 0.0013 0.1078 0.0530
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0626 -0.1263 0.0214 0.1513 -0.3094 0.1094 0.3940 0.4225 0.1807 0.3303
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7167 0.4630 0.9013 0.3783 0.0663 0.5255 0.0174 0.0103 0.2915 0.0491
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1330 -0.1268 -0.0633 0.0183 -0.3146 0.4848 0.4552 0.4073 0.4165 0.4434
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4393 0.4612 0.7139 0.9154 0.0617 0.0027 0.0053 0.0137 0.0115 0.0068
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0417 0.0764 0.1665 0.2144 -0.3942 0.2573 -0.0049 0.3248 -0.0180 0.3882
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8092 0.6578 0.3317 0.2091 0.0174 0.1297 0.9774 0.0532 0.9168 0.0193
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0504 0.0604 -0.1249 -0.1993 -0.0240 0.1235 -0.1043 -0.0699 0.1561 -0.0844
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7840 0.7427 0.4957 0.2741 0.8965 0.5005 0.5701 0.7038 0.3935 0.6462
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0934 -0.1690 -0.1418 0.0424 0.0298 -0.0133 -0.0588 -0.0020 0.1541 -0.1481
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5992 0.3392 0.4236 0.8117 0.8673 0.9406 0.7410 0.9909 0.3843 0.4032
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

326
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.1783 -0.0112 -0.0097 0.1033 -0.0232 0.1834 -0.0074 0.0771 0.0662 0.1138
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3131 0.9489 0.9560 0.5550 0.8946 0.2917 0.9665 0.6599 0.7055 0.5151
sqrtQIIC1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0002 0.0226 -0.0349 -0.0367 0.2299 0.2142 0.0418 0.0674 -0.0343 0.0701
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9993 0.8959 0.8397 0.8315 0.1773 0.2097 0.8088 0.6961 0.8424 0.6847
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1764 0.1106 -0.1669 -0.2088 0.0587 0.1684 -0.2577 -0.1948 -0.1335 0.0130
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3108 0.5207 0.3307 0.2216 0.7339 0.3262 0.1292 0.2549 0.4377 0.9399
sqrtQIIC1c
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1158 -0.1264 -0.2495 -0.1770 0.0541 0.1810 -0.1782 -0.1036 -0.0706 -0.0110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5076 0.4625 0.1422 0.3017 0.7540 0.2909 0.2984 0.5478 0.6824 0.9490
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0258 0.0506 -0.1759 -0.1284 0.0138 0.1871 -0.1381 -0.1071 -0.0541 0.0157
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8832 0.7696 0.3048 0.4554 0.9362 0.2746 0.4219 0.5340 0.7539 0.9275
sqrtQIIC1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0357 -0.0498 -0.1174 -0.1545 0.2266 0.1332 -0.1490 -0.0144 -0.0835 -0.0795
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8388 0.7728 0.4955 0.3682 0.1839 0.4387 0.3857 0.9337 0.6284 0.6447
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3267 -0.0671 -0.3195 -0.3802 -0.0320 0.0093 -0.2315 -0.3394 -0.3240 -0.2536
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0554 0.6976 0.0575 0.0222 0.8528 0.9570 0.1743 0.0429 0.0539 0.1357
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3174 -0.0939 -0.3120 -0.3942 -0.0340 0.1753 -0.3228 -0.4186 -0.3391 -0.2787
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0632 0.5860 0.0639 0.0174 0.8439 0.3065 0.0548 0.0111 0.0430 0.0997
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2215 0.0638 -0.1253 -0.2011 0.0283 0.0584 -0.1657 -0.1068 -0.1520 0.0556
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2010 0.7115 0.4667 0.2396 0.8701 0.7350 0.3342 0.5354 0.3760 0.7476
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1697 -0.0404 -0.1085 -0.1170 0.0558 -0.0042 -0.1672 -0.0882 -0.1525 -0.0516
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3297 0.8149 0.5287 0.4968 0.7467 0.9804 0.3296 0.6088 0.3747 0.7651
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2070 -0.1109 0.1083 0.1907 0.0661 -0.1616 -0.0084 0.1466 0.0448 0.0846
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2638 0.5457 0.5553 0.2959 0.7192 0.3770 0.9637 0.4234 0.8078 0.6455
sqrtQIIF1a
N 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0962 -0.2253 -0.0091 0.0057 0.0388 -0.2565 -0.1464 0.0246 -0.0462 -0.0926
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5943 0.2001 0.9594 0.9744 0.8277 0.1430 0.4087 0.8902 0.7952 0.6025
sqrtQIIF1b
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

327
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders
and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation 0.0073 0.0877 0.1672 -0.0003 -0.0268 -0.2993 0.0181 0.0138 -0.2828 -0.1344
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9669 0.6164 0.3371 0.9986 0.8805 0.0855 0.9191 0.9381 0.1108 0.4486
sqrtQIIC1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0032 -0.0424 0.2196 0.1395 0.1820 -0.0318 0.0966 0.0212 -0.1174 0.0567
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9852 0.8060 0.1982 0.4172 0.3028 0.8562 0.5811 0.9037 0.5085 0.7461
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0270 -0.1768 0.2174 0.1262 0.0571 -0.1643 -0.1289 -0.2015 -0.1531 -0.0730
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8759 0.3023 0.2029 0.4633 0.7483 0.3456 0.4605 0.2458 0.3873 0.6768
sqrtQIIC1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0760 -0.1162 0.1404 0.0092 0.1988 -0.2421 -0.1397 -0.1769 -0.3281 -0.0947
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6595 0.4997 0.4140 0.9574 0.2596 0.1611 0.4236 0.3092 0.0582 0.5885
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0229 -0.0757 0.1757 0.0275 0.1558 -0.1999 -0.0826 -0.1079 -0.1530 0.0712
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8946 0.6608 0.3054 0.8735 0.3789 0.2496 0.6372 0.5372 0.3877 0.6845
sqrtQIIC1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1120 0.0549 -0.1358 -0.1864 -0.1416 -0.3091 -0.3537 -0.3828 -0.1077 -0.2613
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5157 0.7504 0.4298 0.2764 0.4244 0.0708 0.0371 0.0232 0.5443 0.1295
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3763 -0.2268 -0.1725 -0.3066 -0.1553 -0.1766 -0.4078 -0.4665 -0.2576 -0.1698
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0237 0.1835 0.3143 0.0689 0.3804 0.3101 0.0150 0.0047 0.1414 0.3295
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3806 -0.0638 -0.1342 -0.2523 -0.2637 -0.3089 -0.4448 -0.4764 -0.1964 -0.1211
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0220 0.7115 0.4350 0.1377 0.1318 0.0709 0.0074 0.0038 0.2657 0.4882
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1813 -0.0832 0.0026 -0.0655 -0.1839 -0.2466 -0.2323 -0.2813 -0.3635 -0.2969
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2899 0.6294 0.9881 0.7043 0.2978 0.1533 0.1793 0.1017 0.0346 0.0833
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1645 -0.0522 -0.1031 -0.2033 -0.3699 -0.4410 -0.2361 -0.3095 -0.1248 -0.2055
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3377 0.7623 0.5496 0.2344 0.0313 0.0080 0.1721 0.0704 0.4819 0.2363
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0455 0.0422 -0.1438 -0.0994 0.1039 -0.1815 0.1828 0.1549 -0.0059 0.0181
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8047 0.8187 0.4323 0.5883 0.5713 0.3202 0.3167 0.3974 0.9747 0.9217
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1292 -0.1154 -0.3227 -0.2261 0.0083 -0.3427 -0.0264 -0.1244 0.0976 -0.0742
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4665 0.5157 0.0627 0.1986 0.9633 0.0472 0.8820 0.4834 0.5889 0.6764
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

328
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.0089 0.0591 0.0575 0.1668 0.0730 0.1596 0.0780 0.0915 0.3777 -0.0535
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9599 0.7397 0.7466 0.3456 0.6817 0.3674 0.6609 0.6070 0.0276 0.7639
sqrtQIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0123 -0.0240 0.0280 0.0028 -0.0410 -0.0437 0.0612 0.0529 0.2693 0.3304
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9442 0.8913 0.8732 0.9874 0.8153 0.8030 0.7268 0.7629 0.1178 0.0525
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1455 -0.1947 0.0315 -0.1333 0.0728 -0.1463 -0.1086 -0.0982 0.2928 0.2505
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4042 0.2625 0.8575 0.4451 0.6778 0.4018 0.5345 0.5745 0.0878 0.1467
sqrtQIIC1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1179 -0.1731 0.0064 -0.0574 0.0405 -0.0578 -0.0952 -0.0902 0.2645 0.1647
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4999 0.3200 0.9708 0.7432 0.8173 0.7417 0.5864 0.6063 0.1247 0.3443
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0531 -0.1332 0.0423 -0.0800 0.1382 0.0074 -0.1293 -0.1094 0.2577 0.2162
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7618 0.4457 0.8095 0.6478 0.4286 0.9662 0.4592 0.5317 0.1351 0.2123
sqrtQIIC1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3255 -0.2537 -0.2208 -0.1536 -0.1869 -0.0403 -0.2087 -0.1867 0.4524 0.1169
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0564 0.1413 0.2025 0.3784 0.2823 0.8182 0.2288 0.2829 0.0064 0.5037
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3626 -0.3952 -0.2891 -0.3954 -0.2438 -0.2859 -0.2421 -0.3064 0.1923 0.5579
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0323 0.0188 0.0922 0.0187 0.1581 0.0960 0.1611 0.0735 0.2684 0.0005
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.4359 -0.4554 -0.3082 -0.4124 -0.2581 -0.1912 -0.2142 -0.2303 0.1286 0.4830
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0089 0.0060 0.0717 0.0138 0.1345 0.2712 0.2167 0.1832 0.4614 0.0033
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2617 -0.1852 -0.1271 -0.1893 -0.1415 -0.1542 -0.1411 -0.2087 0.2592 0.3219
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1289 0.2868 0.4670 0.2760 0.4175 0.3764 0.4189 0.2289 0.1327 0.0593
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.4314 -0.2952 -0.1596 -0.1998 -0.1280 -0.1118 -0.3103 -0.2817 0.2915 0.1046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0097 0.0851 0.3598 0.2498 0.4638 0.5227 0.0696 0.1011 0.0893 0.5499
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1030 0.0030 0.0564 0.1495 -0.1812 0.0249 0.2453 0.2229 0.1780 -0.2989
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5747 0.9869 0.7592 0.4140 0.3211 0.8922 0.1761 0.2200 0.3381 0.1023
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0945 -0.0635 -0.0413 0.1132 -0.1614 -0.1720 0.1317 0.1558 -0.0639 -0.0421
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5952 0.7214 0.8166 0.5240 0.3618 0.3306 0.4579 0.3788 0.7240 0.8160
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000

329
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-
DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.0096 0.1023 -0.0457 0.5519 0.2129 0.2437 0.2897 0.1306 1.0000 0.3947
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9569 0.5648 0.7974 0.0006 0.2268 0.1582 0.0913 0.4547 . 0.0190
sqrtQIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3523 0.4352 0.3438 0.2215 0.6609 0.4928 0.2899 0.2298 0.3947 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0380 0.0090 0.0431 0.2010 0.0000 0.0023 0.0911 0.1841 0.0190 .
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3738 0.4417 0.4388 0.1356 0.4546 0.5614 0.5105 0.3629 0.4218 0.7070
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0270 0.0079 0.0084 0.4375 0.0061 0.0004 0.0017 0.0322 0.0116 0.0000
sqrtQIIC1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2844 0.3312 0.2772 0.3730 0.4309 0.4388 0.4286 0.2293 0.6887 0.7158
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0978 0.0519 0.1069 0.0273 0.0098 0.0074 0.0102 0.1851 0.0000 0.0000
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3080 0.2329 0.3716 0.2197 0.4639 0.4160 0.3648 0.3390 0.6295 0.7057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0719 0.1781 0.0279 0.2048 0.0050 0.0116 0.0312 0.0463 0.0001 0.0000
sqrtQIIC1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1547 -0.0231 0.3023 0.5693 0.0661 0.1470 0.4573 0.3960 0.2706 0.1456
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3750 0.8952 0.0775 0.0004 0.7061 0.3922 0.0057 0.0185 0.1159 0.3968
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6238 0.4269 0.4855 0.1905 0.3851 0.3983 0.2551 0.2410 0.1892 0.4140
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0105 0.0031 0.2729 0.0223 0.0161 0.1392 0.1631 0.2764 0.0121
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5291 0.2014 0.4690 0.2899 0.4537 0.4759 0.4948 0.4631 0.0624 0.2772
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0011 0.2461 0.0045 0.0911 0.0062 0.0033 0.0025 0.0051 0.7218 0.1017
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3785 0.5066 0.3910 0.4428 0.1976 0.2861 0.2783 0.2235 0.3114 0.4821
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0250 0.0019 0.0202 0.0077 0.2553 0.0907 0.1055 0.1968 0.0686 0.0029
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2306 0.0260 0.5621 0.4588 0.2287 0.1858 0.4224 0.6599 0.1347 0.1970
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1826 0.8821 0.0004 0.0056 0.1864 0.2780 0.0115 0.0000 0.4403 0.2495
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2428 -0.3960 -0.2627 0.3319 0.0749 0.0368 0.0961 0.0448 0.3509 0.0198
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1881 0.0274 0.1533 0.0635 0.6889 0.8415 0.6010 0.8077 0.0490 0.9143
sqrtQIIF1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0730 -0.2999 -0.2365 0.1682 0.1145 0.2107 0.2948 0.2786 0.0264 -0.0600
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6864 0.0899 0.1852 0.3493 0.5259 0.2316 0.0958 0.1164 0.8841 0.7359
sqrtQIIF1b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000

330
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation 0.4218 0.6887 0.6295 0.2706 0.1892 0.0624 0.3114 0.1347 0.3509 0.0264
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0116 0.0000 0.0001 0.1159 0.2764 0.7218 0.0686 0.4403 0.0490 0.8841
sqrtQIIC1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7070 0.7158 0.7057 0.1456 0.4140 0.2772 0.4821 0.1970 0.0198 -0.0600
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3968 0.0121 0.1017 0.0029 0.2495 0.9143 0.7359
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.7854 0.7500 0.1421 0.4954 0.4056 0.5049 0.1962 -0.1034 -0.0933
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.4083 0.0021 0.0141 0.0017 0.2515 0.5733 0.5996
sqrtQIIC1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7854 1.0000 0.8881 0.1721 0.4002 0.2645 0.3961 0.1353 0.1572 0.0273
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.3154 0.0156 0.1191 0.0168 0.4312 0.3902 0.8782
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7500 0.8881 1.0000 0.1015 0.4195 0.2573 0.3373 0.2347 0.0279 -0.0544
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.5559 0.0109 0.1298 0.0442 0.1683 0.8797 0.7597
sqrtQIIC1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1421 0.1721 0.1015 1.0000 0.3596 0.3998 0.4744 0.7020 0.1672 0.3170
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4083 0.3154 0.5559 . 0.0312 0.0157 0.0035 0.0000 0.3603 0.0677
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4954 0.4002 0.4195 0.3596 1.0000 0.7912 0.7777 0.4620 -0.0303 0.0519
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0021 0.0156 0.0109 0.0312 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.8691 0.7706
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4056 0.2645 0.2573 0.3998 0.7912 1.0000 0.6143 0.5201 0.1342 0.2091
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0141 0.1191 0.1298 0.0157 0.0000 . 0.0001 0.0012 0.4640 0.2353
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5049 0.3961 0.3373 0.4744 0.7777 0.6143 1.0000 0.5351 -0.0326 -0.0090
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0017 0.0168 0.0442 0.0035 0.0000 0.0001 . 0.0008 0.8595 0.9596
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1962 0.1353 0.2347 0.7020 0.4620 0.5201 0.5351 1.0000 0.0996 0.2217
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2515 0.4312 0.1683 0.0000 0.0046 0.0012 0.0008 . 0.5875 0.2076
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1034 0.1572 0.0279 0.1672 -0.0303 0.1342 -0.0326 0.0996 1.0000 0.6732
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5733 0.3902 0.8797 0.3603 0.8691 0.4640 0.8595 0.5875 . 0.0000
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0933 0.0273 -0.0544 0.3170 0.0519 0.2091 -0.0090 0.2217 0.6732 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5996 0.8782 0.7597 0.0677 0.7706 0.2353 0.9596 0.2076 0.0000 .
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000

331
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.2551 0.2542 0.1100 0.3098 -0.0409 0.0593 0.1240 0.0757 0.1888 -0.0139
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1518 0.1534 0.5421 0.0899 0.8240 0.7470 0.4989 0.6858 0.3092 0.9398
sqrtQIIC1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1852 0.0788 -0.0102 0.0847 0.1217 0.1817 0.1424 0.1474 0.0694 0.0275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2943 0.6579 0.9544 0.6447 0.4998 0.3115 0.4293 0.4207 0.7105 0.8792
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0618 -0.1706 -0.1906 -0.0578 0.1047 0.1401 -0.0225 -0.0104 0.0856 0.0662
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7283 0.3346 0.2803 0.7532 0.5621 0.4368 0.9013 0.9550 0.6472 0.7144
sqrtQIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1614 0.1366 0.0367 0.2510 0.1619 0.2002 0.2154 0.1954 0.3536 0.1334
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3619 0.4413 0.8366 0.1658 0.3682 0.2640 0.2287 0.2838 0.0510 0.4593
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0422 0.0323 -0.0428 0.2035 0.1719 0.1889 0.2193 0.2129 0.2107 0.0879
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8127 0.8560 0.8101 0.2639 0.3388 0.2925 0.2202 0.2421 0.2552 0.6268
sqrtQIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3935 0.2463 0.2367 0.1514 0.2960 0.3434 0.1798 0.1733 0.0271 -0.0230
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0213 0.1603 0.1777 0.4082 0.0944 0.0504 0.3168 0.3429 0.8850 0.8991
sqrtQIID1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0824 0.1099 0.0496 -0.0021 0.1672 0.1936 0.1428 0.1879 0.1796 0.1240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6433 0.5360 0.7807 0.9908 0.3523 0.2804 0.4280 0.3032 0.3337 0.4919
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1670 0.2001 0.1165 0.0533 0.2021 0.2325 0.1237 0.1631 0.2930 0.2362
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3453 0.2566 0.5116 0.7718 0.2593 0.1930 0.4929 0.3724 0.1097 0.1857
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1665 0.0086 -0.0644 -0.0222 -0.0028 0.0634 -0.0628 -0.0794 0.0420 -0.0692
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3467 0.9616 0.7174 0.9041 0.9876 0.7261 0.7286 0.6659 0.8225 0.7020
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2978 0.0796 0.2376 0.1342 0.1548 0.1909 0.0819 0.1017 -0.0078 -0.0200
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0872 0.6544 0.1760 0.4640 0.3898 0.2872 0.6503 0.5797 0.9668 0.9120
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5796 0.7533 0.8848 0.8285 0.4214 0.3478 0.6597 0.6210 0.7871 0.4942
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0182 0.0552 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0055
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7245 0.6788 0.7336 0.5764 0.7665 0.6453 0.5768 0.5788 0.5120 0.6379
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0038 0.0001
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000

332
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation -0.0588 0.0945 0.0260 0.1436 0.0039 -0.0174 0.0510 -0.0092 0.3917 0.0541
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7491 0.6070 0.8897 0.4179 0.9825 0.9223 0.7744 0.9590 0.0220 0.7578
sqrtQIIC1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0193 0.1494 0.0663 0.0412 0.0701 0.1075 0.1420 0.0257 0.1148 0.1423
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9164 0.4144 0.7229 0.8170 0.6935 0.5453 0.4232 0.8853 0.5114 0.4077
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0170 0.0809 0.1001 0.1208 0.0877 0.0608 0.2231 0.1479 0.1131 0.3808
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9264 0.6596 0.5923 0.4960 0.6219 0.7326 0.2047 0.4040 0.5177 0.0219
sqrtQIIC1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0798 0.2586 0.2142 0.3111 0.1568 0.1510 0.3306 0.1842 0.1576 0.2260
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6640 0.1530 0.2473 0.0733 0.3759 0.3940 0.0562 0.2971 0.3660 0.1850
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0001 0.1787 0.1866 0.2111 0.0767 0.0350 0.2468 0.1727 0.1061 0.2386
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9994 0.3278 0.3149 0.2308 0.6662 0.8441 0.1594 0.3288 0.5441 0.1611
sqrtQIIC1e
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0076 -0.0686 -0.0324 0.0094 -0.0666 -0.0122 -0.0624 -0.1582 0.4921 -0.0045
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9673 0.7090 0.8626 0.9577 0.7081 0.9454 0.7259 0.3714 0.0027 0.9794
sqrtQIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0213 0.1323 0.1161 0.0319 -0.0020 -0.0246 0.0971 0.0194 0.1822 0.3594
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9079 0.4705 0.5339 0.8581 0.9910 0.8903 0.5850 0.9133 0.2949 0.0314
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2443 0.2878 0.2620 0.1892 0.1949 0.1845 0.2698 0.1941 0.1739 0.2141
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1778 0.1102 0.1544 0.2839 0.2692 0.2963 0.1228 0.2715 0.3177 0.2098
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0376 0.0027 -0.0678 -0.0689 -0.1476 -0.0801 -0.0294 -0.1602 0.3406 0.1873
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8383 0.9882 0.7172 0.6988 0.4047 0.6527 0.8689 0.3655 0.0453 0.2741
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0601 0.0722 0.1311 0.0001 -0.0710 -0.0528 -0.0016 0.0240 0.2939 -0.0578
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7437 0.6946 0.4821 0.9996 0.6898 0.7670 0.9927 0.8928 0.0866 0.7378
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5548 0.7332 0.7178 0.7082 0.5702 0.5733 0.6263 0.6210 0.1595 -0.2604
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.3914 0.1501
sqrtQIIF1a
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7696 0.5478 0.4943 0.5305 0.6961 0.7451 0.5343 0.4745 0.0123 -0.0590
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0014 0.0055 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0053 0.9459 0.7403
sqrtQIIF1b
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000

333
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0046 0.1755 -0.0018 0.2122 0.2049 0.1394 0.2250 0.0476 0.4904 0.0787
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9790 0.3132 0.9917 0.2437 0.2450 0.4319 0.2007 0.7890 0.0032 0.6532
sqrtQIIC1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2017 0.3117 0.1198 0.3401 0.5149 0.3926 0.4720 0.3427 0.3647 0.4576
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2382 0.0642 0.4865 0.0528 0.0015 0.0197 0.0042 0.0439 0.0312 0.0050
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3712 0.4705 0.3193 0.2408 0.5659 0.4120 0.4143 0.2866 0.1651 0.4182
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0258 0.0038 0.0577 0.1771 0.0004 0.0139 0.0134 0.0951 0.3432 0.0111
sqrtQIIC1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2599 0.3727 0.1159 0.2690 0.4611 0.3707 0.3336 0.2052 0.3332 0.3940
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1258 0.0252 0.5007 0.1301 0.0053 0.0284 0.0502 0.2371 0.0504 0.0174
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2426 0.2825 0.1462 0.1855 0.4708 0.3322 0.3138 0.2598 0.2442 0.3400
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1540 0.0950 0.3949 0.3015 0.0043 0.0512 0.0664 0.1318 0.1574 0.0425
sqrtQIIC1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2147 0.0503 0.2763 0.4991 0.2806 0.5210 0.2009 0.5555 0.5936 0.3070
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2087 0.7707 0.1029 0.0031 0.1026 0.0013 0.2473 0.0005 0.0002 0.0686
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3425 0.2440 0.2423 0.1915 0.5766 0.4744 0.4123 0.2704 0.2898 0.4537
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0409 0.1515 0.1546 0.2858 0.0003 0.0040 0.0139 0.1162 0.0913 0.0054
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2766 0.0821 0.3109 0.2390 0.4849 0.4952 0.3257 0.3519 0.2354 0.4372
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1025 0.6342 0.0649 0.1804 0.0032 0.0025 0.0562 0.0381 0.1735 0.0077
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2122 0.3122 0.1111 0.4288 0.6054 0.4910 0.5899 0.4028 0.3361 0.3733
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2140 0.0638 0.5190 0.0128 0.0001 0.0027 0.0002 0.0164 0.0484 0.0249
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0853 0.0620 0.3090 0.4754 0.2277 0.4178 0.2129 0.5841 0.3215 0.1751
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6209 0.7192 0.0667 0.0052 0.1884 0.0125 0.2195 0.0002 0.0597 0.3069
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3081 -0.2370 -0.0338 0.2053 -0.0610 0.1003 -0.0060 -0.0102 0.3038 -0.0310
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0863 0.1916 0.8543 0.2764 0.7446 0.5915 0.9744 0.9566 0.0966 0.8662
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0163 -0.1305 -0.0017 0.2206 0.1343 0.2765 -0.0108 0.1857 0.2751 0.1960
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9273 0.4620 0.9922 0.2250 0.4562 0.1194 0.9524 0.3007 0.1212 0.2665
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000

334
Table A6, continued (Row 5, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.1115 0.2480 0.0831 0.1876 0.0378 0.1429 -0.1010 0.1827 0.0216 0.2361
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5236 0.1509 0.6350 0.2804 0.8294 0.4200 0.5759 0.2936 0.9033 0.1933
sqrtQIIC1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4223 0.4518 0.3324 0.2983 0.0382 0.1987 0.3658 0.1860 0.0146 0.1464
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0103 0.0057 0.0476 0.0772 0.8248 0.2526 0.0334 0.2774 0.9339 0.4161
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3910 0.4833 0.3326 0.1508 0.0199 0.1412 0.2188 0.1353 0.0876 0.2418
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0184 0.0028 0.0475 0.3799 0.9083 0.4184 0.2137 0.4313 0.6167 0.1752
sqrtQIIC1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4290 0.4344 0.2971 0.1551 0.0073 0.2144 0.2415 0.1855 -0.0115 0.1152
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0090 0.0081 0.0785 0.3663 0.9665 0.2161 0.1688 0.2788 0.9476 0.5233
Perceived
Deterrence
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3660 0.3482 0.2789 0.0644 -0.0168 0.1352 0.0767 0.2336 0.0314 0.1854
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0281 0.0374 0.0995 0.7089 0.9227 0.4387 0.6664 0.1704 0.8580 0.3016
sqrtQIIC1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3896 0.3778 0.5037 0.1145 0.1167 0.1560 0.1165 -0.1753 0.0904 0.4608
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0188 0.0231 0.0017 0.5063 0.4977 0.3707 0.5116 0.3065 0.6055 0.0070
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4986 0.3942 0.3621 -0.0166 -0.0436 -0.0670 0.3660 -0.1921 0.0446 0.1078
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0174 0.0300 0.9236 0.8008 0.7021 0.0333 0.2618 0.7993 0.5503
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4416 0.3629 0.4183 0.0281 -0.0079 -0.0168 0.3984 -0.2136 0.0309 0.1871
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0070 0.0296 0.0111 0.8708 0.9636 0.9238 0.0196 0.2110 0.8601 0.2972
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3532 0.3892 0.2200 0.0224 0.0079 -0.0141 0.3035 -0.0707 0.0867 0.0611
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0346 0.0190 0.1973 0.8967 0.9637 0.9361 0.0810 0.6818 0.6206 0.7357
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2419 0.1522 0.4283 -0.0467 0.0137 0.0940 0.0006 -0.0284 0.0727 0.3480
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1553 0.3755 0.0092 0.7866 0.9367 0.5911 0.9973 0.8692 0.6780 0.0472
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0546 0.1186 0.1090 0.1736 0.0936 0.2097 0.1776 0.0042 -0.2700 0.1344
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7666 0.5181 0.5527 0.3421 0.6104 0.2575 0.3391 0.9818 0.1350 0.4788
sqrtQIIF1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2685 0.3540 0.3607 0.2036 0.0815 0.2987 0.2395 -0.1961 -0.2826 0.2361
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1247 0.0400 0.0361 0.2481 0.6470 0.0913 0.1794 0.2662 0.1054 0.1933
sqrtQIIF1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000

335
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation 0.0165 -0.1062 -0.1201 -0.0528 -0.3576 0.2251 -0.0835 0.1940 0.2198 0.1269
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9260 0.5502 0.4986 0.7668 0.0379 0.2006 0.6387 0.2717 0.2116 0.4746
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0284 -0.1074 -0.1416 -0.1716 -0.3022 0.1861 -0.1039 0.0901 0.2118 -0.0415
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8732 0.5454 0.4245 0.3318 0.0824 0.2920 0.5587 0.6124 0.2291 0.8155
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0537 0.1569 0.0686 -0.1147 -0.0120 0.1549 -0.1528 0.0153 0.1843 -0.0458
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7628 0.3756 0.6998 0.5182 0.9462 0.3818 0.3883 0.9317 0.2967 0.7971
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2414 -0.0647 -0.1281 -0.1500 0.0052 -0.0668 -0.1191 0.0330 0.0503 -0.1160
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1832 0.7248 0.4848 0.4124 0.9776 0.7166 0.5162 0.8576 0.7844 0.5271
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2512 -0.1102 0.0011 0.1236 0.1371 -0.1502 0.0091 0.1041 0.1032 -0.0951
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1584 0.5417 0.9953 0.4930 0.4467 0.4040 0.9600 0.5642 0.5677 0.5985
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2383 -0.0034 0.0398 0.1548 -0.0259 -0.0322 0.0473 0.2319 0.1408 0.0989
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1817 0.9849 0.8261 0.3898 0.8863 0.8587 0.7939 0.1940 0.4345 0.5840
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3544 -0.0148 0.0272 -0.0797 0.0467 -0.0703 -0.0908 0.0772 0.1034 -0.1229
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0430 0.9348 0.8804 0.6594 0.7962 0.6975 0.6152 0.6693 0.5669 0.4957
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3864 0.0348 0.1298 0.0007 0.0663 -0.0543 -0.0659 0.1019 0.1169 -0.0991
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0289 0.8502 0.4790 0.9971 0.7185 0.7678 0.7202 0.5788 0.5239 0.5894
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1081 -0.0970 -0.1550 -0.2176 0.0715 -0.0600 0.0786 0.1345 0.0682 -0.1638
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5628 0.6036 0.4051 0.2397 0.7024 0.7487 0.6741 0.4708 0.7156 0.3787
sqrtQIIH1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2764 0.0090 0.1046 0.0467 0.2733 -0.2608 0.0491 0.0259 0.1668 -0.1180
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1195 0.9606 0.5624 0.7965 0.1238 0.1427 0.7860 0.8864 0.3535 0.5130
sqrtQIIH1b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2027 -0.1862 -0.0804 0.0113 0.0988 -0.2745 -0.0001 -0.0341 0.1997 -0.1555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2659 0.3075 0.6616 0.9510 0.5906 0.1285 0.9996 0.8531 0.2733 0.3954
sqrtQIIH1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3250 -0.0960 -0.0028 -0.1859 -0.0266 -0.1833 -0.0615 0.0282 0.2083 -0.1024
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0696 0.6013 0.9878 0.3083 0.8851 0.3152 0.7382 0.8782 0.2526 0.5772
sqrtQIIH1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000

336
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.0437 -0.2986 0.0427 0.1015 0.0927 -0.0410 -0.1622 0.1301 -0.0279 -0.0274
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8092 0.0863 0.8104 0.5680 0.6020 0.8178 0.3595 0.4635 0.8753 0.8778
sqrtQIIF1c
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0732 -0.1764 -0.0585 0.0279 0.0833 -0.1363 -0.1558 0.0206 -0.0811 -0.1833
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6856 0.3182 0.7422 0.8756 0.6396 0.4423 0.3788 0.9078 0.6484 0.2995
sqrtQIIF1d
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2009 -0.1978 -0.1075 -0.0027 0.0729 -0.3311 -0.1023 0.0108 -0.0942 -0.1149
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2622 0.2622 0.5451 0.9878 0.6822 0.0558 0.5649 0.9515 0.5963 0.5174
sqrtQIIF1e
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0570 0.0787 0.1141 0.1976 0.0805 -0.1245 0.0750 0.1669 0.0477 0.0840
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7608 0.6686 0.5341 0.2784 0.6612 0.4972 0.6834 0.3611 0.7956 0.6476
sqrtQIIF3a
N 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1746 0.0032 -0.0232 -0.0366 0.1213 -0.0371 -0.1372 0.0401 -0.0116 -0.1195
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3393 0.9858 0.8979 0.8397 0.5011 0.8378 0.4466 0.8247 0.9488 0.5077
sqrtQIIF3b
N 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1386 -0.0273 -0.0038 -0.0206 0.2117 0.0921 -0.1400 0.0107 -0.0994 -0.1611
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4493 0.8802 0.9835 0.9094 0.2368 0.6104 0.4372 0.9528 0.5819 0.3704
sqrtQIIF3c
N 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0894 0.0682 -0.0373 0.0343 0.0945 -0.1067 -0.0575 0.0652 -0.0059 -0.1174
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6266 0.7060 0.8368 0.8496 0.6008 0.5546 0.7506 0.7184 0.9739 0.5154
sqrtQIIF3d
N 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0932 0.0585 -0.0989 -0.0256 0.0923 -0.1303 -0.0434 -0.0002 -0.0514 -0.1774
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6181 0.7504 0.5903 0.8893 0.6155 0.4772 0.8136 0.9992 0.7799 0.3315
sqrtQIIF3e
N 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1399 -0.0793 -0.0276 0.0682 -0.0718 -0.1560 -0.1413 -0.0698 -0.1009 -0.0227
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4611 0.6713 0.8830 0.7154 0.7010 0.4019 0.4483 0.7093 0.5893 0.9033
sqrtQIIH1a
N 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1329 -0.3969 -0.1980 -0.1366 -0.2252 -0.2115 -0.1802 -0.2101 -0.2229 -0.2694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4685 0.0222 0.2694 0.4485 0.2077 0.2374 0.3155 0.2406 0.2125 0.1295
sqrtQIIH1b
N 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0513 -0.1848 0.0821 0.1364 -0.1211 -0.1947 -0.0530 -0.0487 -0.0750 -0.0687
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7839 0.3112 0.6552 0.4567 0.5091 0.2856 0.7734 0.7911 0.6834 0.7086
sqrtQIIH1c
N 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1180 -0.1055 -0.0850 0.0330 -0.1269 -0.2166 -0.1520 -0.0923 -0.0966 -0.0852
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5274 0.5654 0.6439 0.8578 0.4889 0.2337 0.4061 0.6155 0.5988 0.6429
sqrtQIIH1d
N 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000

337
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders
and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.1723 0.0713 -0.0674 -0.2200 -0.0219 -0.2851 -0.0122 -0.0925 -0.1113 -0.1182
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3297 0.6888 0.7050 0.2113 0.9035 0.1022 0.9454 0.6027 0.5375 0.5056
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2909 -0.0724 -0.2852 -0.3097 0.1669 -0.0827 -0.0278 -0.0631 -0.0593 0.0207
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0951 0.6839 0.1021 0.0747 0.3534 0.6420 0.8758 0.7230 0.7429 0.9075
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1789 -0.2049 -0.3538 -0.3158 0.0338 -0.2985 -0.0434 -0.1092 -0.0291 -0.0996
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3114 0.2449 0.0401 0.0689 0.8520 0.0863 0.8077 0.5389 0.8723 0.5750
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0331 0.0475 -0.2485 -0.0629 0.2351 -0.0422 0.2170 0.2221 0.0990 0.1547
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8574 0.7962 0.1703 0.7324 0.2029 0.8188 0.2328 0.2219 0.5962 0.3979
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0592 -0.0390 -0.2527 -0.1287 0.1849 -0.0579 -0.0907 -0.1579 0.3142 0.1915
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7436 0.8295 0.1559 0.4752 0.3111 0.7490 0.6158 0.3802 0.0799 0.2856
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1344 0.0830 -0.0719 -0.1530 0.1040 -0.1148 -0.1473 -0.1916 0.2017 0.1194
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4557 0.6461 0.6909 0.3954 0.5709 0.5247 0.4134 0.2854 0.2684 0.5082
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1288 -0.0956 -0.3422 -0.1822 0.3029 0.0942 0.0033 -0.0101 0.2073 0.2473
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4750 0.5965 0.0513 0.3103 0.0919 0.6020 0.9855 0.9556 0.2549 0.1652
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1714 -0.1490 -0.3818 -0.2323 0.2800 0.0489 -0.0534 -0.0699 0.2104 0.2243
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3483 0.4156 0.0311 0.2008 0.1271 0.7906 0.7714 0.7038 0.2558 0.2172
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1973 -0.1591 -0.2561 -0.1179 0.3580 0.0331 0.0150 0.0300 -0.0761 0.1248
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2875 0.3926 0.1643 0.5276 0.0521 0.8622 0.9373 0.8751 0.6946 0.5111
sqrtQIIH1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2543 -0.1984 -0.4468 -0.3552 -0.0423 -0.2066 -0.2404 -0.2542 -0.0309 -0.0828
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1532 0.2684 0.0091 0.0425 0.8211 0.2566 0.1852 0.1604 0.8690 0.6521
sqrtQIIH1b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2072 -0.2524 -0.3581 -0.1514 0.1147 -0.1002 0.0377 0.0039 0.0667 0.0575
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2552 0.1635 0.0442 0.4081 0.5389 0.5916 0.8403 0.9835 0.7263 0.7587
sqrtQIIH1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2420 -0.2989 -0.3934 -0.1940 0.2068 -0.0312 0.0008 -0.0129 -0.0467 0.0965
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1821 0.0966 0.0259 0.2874 0.2642 0.8676 0.9967 0.9452 0.8065 0.6057
sqrtQIIH1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000

338
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1798 -0.0313 -0.0606 0.1208 -0.1786 0.0808 0.1528 0.1172 0.1953 -0.0100
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3090 0.8605 0.7337 0.4962 0.3123 0.6498 0.3884 0.5092 0.2761 0.9559
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1182 -0.1208 -0.1634 0.0484 -0.2959 -0.0969 0.1233 0.0962 0.1907 -0.0919
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5057 0.4961 0.3557 0.7859 0.0893 0.5855 0.4871 0.5882 0.2879 0.6109
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2780 -0.2175 -0.1491 -0.0657 -0.3507 -0.2328 -0.0310 -0.0495 0.1443 -0.2454
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1114 0.2165 0.4001 0.7120 0.0420 0.1851 0.8616 0.7811 0.4232 0.1687
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0181 -0.0149 0.0408 0.0856 -0.1579 0.0611 0.1081 0.1069 0.0910 -0.2978
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9215 0.9355 0.8244 0.6414 0.3880 0.7399 0.5558 0.5604 0.6265 0.1037
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0065 -0.1494 -0.0713 -0.0518 -0.1401 -0.0917 -0.0190 -0.0066 -0.0026 0.0450
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9713 0.4067 0.6934 0.7747 0.4368 0.6118 0.9165 0.9711 0.9887 0.8069
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0914 -0.2049 -0.1433 -0.1022 -0.1380 0.0628 -0.0441 -0.0392 0.1361 0.1313
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6128 0.2527 0.4264 0.5713 0.4438 0.7286 0.8073 0.8284 0.4576 0.4738
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0111 -0.1712 -0.1114 -0.0818 -0.2720 -0.1113 -0.0271 -0.0468 0.1300 -0.1426
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9510 0.3408 0.5371 0.6507 0.1257 0.5375 0.8812 0.7959 0.4782 0.4362
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0457 -0.2428 -0.1713 -0.1365 -0.3148 -0.1717 -0.0745 -0.0917 0.1002 -0.0982
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8037 0.1806 0.3487 0.4563 0.0793 0.3475 0.6854 0.6176 0.5918 0.5991
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1666 -0.1881 -0.0113 -0.0500 -0.2330 -0.0982 0.0730 0.0195 0.0933 -0.1712
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3789 0.3195 0.9526 0.7932 0.2153 0.6058 0.7013 0.9185 0.6239 0.3658
sqrtQIIH1a
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0716 -0.2239 -0.2911 -0.2275 -0.3411 -0.2143 -0.1373 -0.1104 -0.2110 0.0731
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6968 0.2179 0.1060 0.2105 0.0561 0.2390 0.4536 0.5474 0.2465 0.6911
sqrtQIIH1b
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0372 -0.0405 -0.0623 0.0716 -0.2299 -0.2361 0.1343 0.1352 -0.1778 -0.0405
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8424 0.8286 0.7391 0.7018 0.2134 0.2009 0.4715 0.4685 0.3385 0.8288
sqrtQIIH1c
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1228 -0.1945 -0.1089 -0.0851 -0.3350 -0.2702 -0.0203 -0.0535 -0.0218 -0.2165
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5106 0.2944 0.5599 0.6488 0.0655 0.1415 0.9137 0.7749 0.9074 0.2421
sqrtQIIH1d
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000

339
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-
DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.0213 -0.0331 -0.1394 0.4370 0.1969 0.1804 0.2762 0.2424 0.2551 0.1852
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9063 0.8548 0.4393 0.0110 0.2721 0.3073 0.1197 0.1741 0.1518 0.2943
sqrtQIIF1c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0683 -0.3194 -0.2384 0.2256 0.1917 0.1308 0.0781 0.0450 0.2542 0.0788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7057 0.0700 0.1815 0.2068 0.2851 0.4608 0.6657 0.8035 0.1534 0.6579
sqrtQIIF1d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1448 -0.3811 -0.0992 0.2721 0.1385 0.0380 0.1525 0.1999 0.1100 -0.0102
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4216 0.0287 0.5827 0.1255 0.4420 0.8310 0.3970 0.2647 0.5421 0.9544
sqrtQIIF1e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2318 -0.4208 -0.2024 0.2538 0.0846 -0.0322 0.1084 0.0538 0.3098 0.0847
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2096 0.0184 0.2748 0.1683 0.6509 0.8609 0.5618 0.7739 0.0899 0.6447
sqrtQIIF3a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0067 -0.2607 -0.1504 -0.0370 0.1371 0.1420 0.2329 0.2318 -0.0409 0.1217
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9710 0.1495 0.4113 0.8408 0.4543 0.4304 0.1995 0.2018 0.8240 0.4998
sqrtQIIF3b
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0908 -0.1598 -0.0577 0.1288 0.2411 0.2355 0.3610 0.3369 0.0593 0.1817
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6213 0.3824 0.7536 0.4825 0.1837 0.1871 0.0424 0.0594 0.7470 0.3115
sqrtQIIF3c
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0922 -0.3818 -0.1521 0.0064 0.1298 -0.0237 0.0264 0.0325 0.1240 0.1424
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6158 0.0311 0.4061 0.9721 0.4790 0.8957 0.8858 0.8599 0.4989 0.4293
sqrtQIIF3d
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0454 -0.3747 -0.0974 0.0077 0.2186 0.0333 0.0967 0.1324 0.0757 0.1474
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8085 0.0378 0.6022 0.9674 0.2374 0.8563 0.6046 0.4776 0.6858 0.4207
sqrtQIIF3e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0465 -0.2117 -0.1059 0.1795 0.0686 0.0897 0.0847 0.0333 0.1888 0.0694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8072 0.2615 0.5774 0.3338 0.7187 0.6312 0.6504 0.8590 0.3092 0.7105
sqrtQIIH1a
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0936 -0.0478 -0.1474 -0.1257 0.1714 0.1302 0.1798 0.1542 -0.0139 0.0275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6102 0.7949 0.4207 0.4930 0.3484 0.4703 0.3248 0.3996 0.9398 0.8792
sqrtQIIH1b
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0044 -0.0641 -0.2061 -0.0293 0.1514 0.1885 0.2016 0.2406 -0.0588 0.0193
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9813 0.7318 0.2661 0.8737 0.4161 0.3015 0.2684 0.1847 0.7491 0.9164
sqrtQIIH1c
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0586 -0.1677 -0.0797 0.0257 0.1866 0.0873 0.0999 0.1523 0.0945 0.1494
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7540 0.3672 0.6700 0.8891 0.3148 0.6346 0.5864 0.4053 0.6070 0.4144
sqrtQIIH1d
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000

340
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation -0.0618 0.1614 0.0422 0.3935 0.0824 0.1670 0.1665 0.2978 0.5796 0.7245
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7283 0.3619 0.8127 0.0213 0.6433 0.3453 0.3467 0.0872 0.0005 0.0000
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1706 0.1366 0.0323 0.2463 0.1099 0.2001 0.0086 0.0796 0.7533 0.6788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3346 0.4413 0.8560 0.1603 0.5360 0.2566 0.9616 0.6544 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1906 0.0367 -0.0428 0.2367 0.0496 0.1165 -0.0644 0.2376 0.8848 0.7336
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2803 0.8366 0.8101 0.1777 0.7807 0.5116 0.7174 0.1760 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0578 0.2510 0.2035 0.1514 -0.0021 0.0533 -0.0222 0.1342 0.8285 0.5764
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7532 0.1658 0.2639 0.4082 0.9908 0.7718 0.9041 0.4640 0.0000 0.0006
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1047 0.1619 0.1719 0.2960 0.1672 0.2021 -0.0028 0.1548 0.4214 0.7665
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5621 0.3682 0.3388 0.0944 0.3523 0.2593 0.9876 0.3898 0.0182 0.0000
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1401 0.2002 0.1889 0.3434 0.1936 0.2325 0.0634 0.1909 0.3478 0.6453
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4368 0.2640 0.2925 0.0504 0.2804 0.1930 0.7261 0.2872 0.0552 0.0001
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0225 0.2154 0.2193 0.1798 0.1428 0.1237 -0.0628 0.0819 0.6597 0.5768
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9013 0.2287 0.2202 0.3168 0.4280 0.4929 0.7286 0.6503 0.0001 0.0004
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0104 0.1954 0.2129 0.1733 0.1879 0.1631 -0.0794 0.1017 0.6210 0.5788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9550 0.2838 0.2421 0.3429 0.3032 0.3724 0.6659 0.5797 0.0002 0.0005
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0856 0.3536 0.2107 0.0271 0.1796 0.2930 0.0420 -0.0078 0.7871 0.5120
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6472 0.0510 0.2552 0.8850 0.3337 0.1097 0.8225 0.9668 0.0000 0.0038
sqrtQIIH1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0662 0.1334 0.0879 -0.0230 0.1240 0.2362 -0.0692 -0.0200 0.4942 0.6379
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7144 0.4593 0.6268 0.8991 0.4919 0.1857 0.7020 0.9120 0.0055 0.0001
sqrtQIIH1b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0170 0.0798 -0.0001 0.0076 0.0213 0.2443 -0.0376 0.0601 0.5548 0.7696
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9264 0.6640 0.9994 0.9673 0.9079 0.1778 0.8383 0.7437 0.0015 0.0000
sqrtQIIH1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0809 0.2586 0.1787 -0.0686 0.1323 0.2878 0.0027 0.0722 0.7332 0.5478
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6596 0.1530 0.3278 0.7090 0.4705 0.1102 0.9882 0.6946 0.0000 0.0014
sqrtQIIH1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000

341
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.7313 0.5797 0.4657 0.5591 0.6764 0.4465 0.4105 0.3897 0.4268
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0003 0.0072 0.0007 0.0000 0.0092 0.0196 0.0333 0.0149
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7313 1.0000 0.7169 0.6807 0.5486 0.5190 0.7523 0.7255 0.6509 0.3596
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0433
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5797 0.7169 1.0000 0.7289 0.4745 0.3973 0.6643 0.7251 0.6841 0.4701
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0003 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0053 0.0220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4657 0.6807 0.7289 1.0000 0.5968 0.5129 0.8531 0.8036 0.8695 0.5237
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0003 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 29.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5591 0.5486 0.4745 0.5968 1.0000 0.9043 0.8000 0.7986 0.5377 0.7351
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0007 0.0009 0.0053 0.0003 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 29.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6764 0.5190 0.3973 0.5129 0.9043 1.0000 0.6771 0.6858 0.4429 0.6575
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0020 0.0220 0.0027 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0161 0.0001
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 29.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4465 0.7523 0.6643 0.8531 0.8000 0.6771 1.0000 0.9817 0.8011 0.5959
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0092 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 29.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4105 0.7255 0.7251 0.8036 0.7986 0.6858 0.9817 1.0000 0.7575 0.6179
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0196 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0003
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 29.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3897 0.6509 0.6841 0.8695 0.5377 0.4429 0.8011 0.7575 1.0000 0.5635
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0333 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0161 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0010
sqrtQIIH1a
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4268 0.3596 0.4701 0.5237 0.7351 0.6575 0.5959 0.6179 0.5635 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0149 0.0433 0.0066 0.0030 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0010 .
sqrtQIIH1b
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5651 0.4941 0.5140 0.6182 0.7857 0.6880 0.6316 0.6371 0.6477 0.8623
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0009 0.0047 0.0031 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000
sqrtQIIH1c
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 29.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4198 0.6397 0.7036 0.8025 0.5823 0.4611 0.8117 0.8170 0.8656 0.7164
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0187 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIH1d
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 29.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 31.0000 32.0000

342
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.5651 0.4198 0.2940 0.2630 0.4814 0.5506 0.2574 0.1324 0.2282 -0.1073
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0009 0.0187 0.1148 0.1392 0.0046 0.0009 0.1481 0.4625 0.2015 0.5459
sqrtQIIF1c
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4941 0.6397 0.5099 0.4935 0.4272 0.4932 0.4714 0.3442 0.3475 -0.1862
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0047 0.0001 0.0040 0.0035 0.0132 0.0035 0.0056 0.0498 0.0475 0.2916
sqrtQIIF1d
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5140 0.7036 0.7828 0.5765 0.5366 0.5155 0.5662 0.6302 0.0369 -0.2143
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0013 0.0021 0.0006 0.0001 0.8384 0.2236
sqrtQIIF1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6182 0.8025 0.7226 0.8414 0.5591 0.6354 0.7640 0.6940 0.0369 -0.2298
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.8440 0.2058
sqrtQIIF3a
N 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7857 0.5823 0.5732 0.5160 0.7108 0.7434 0.6066 0.5249 0.0173 0.2334
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0007 0.0012 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0020 0.9252 0.1912
sqrtQIIF3b
N 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6880 0.4611 0.4521 0.4233 0.6323 0.6439 0.4735 0.4059 0.0867 0.2856
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0103 0.0138 0.0158 0.0001 0.0001 0.0062 0.0212 0.6371 0.1071
sqrtQIIF3c
N 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6316 0.8117 0.7800 0.6789 0.5801 0.6169 0.7237 0.6489 0.1116 -0.0151
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.5432 0.9337
sqrtQIIF3d
N 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6371 0.8170 0.8132 0.6569 0.6032 0.6209 0.7275 0.6992 0.0707 0.0478
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.7056 0.7951
sqrtQIIF3e
N 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6477 0.8656 0.8161 0.8866 0.5679 0.6450 0.8188 0.6878 -0.0251 -0.1300
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.8951 0.4858
sqrtQIIH1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8623 0.7164 0.6404 0.5014 0.9492 0.8736 0.6697 0.6697 -0.3571 0.1708
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0448 0.3420
sqrtQIIH1b
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.8049 0.6353 0.6101 0.8754 0.9709 0.7089 0.6169 -0.1949 0.0105
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.2934 0.9543
sqrtQIIH1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8049 1.0000 0.8696 0.7497 0.7198 0.7897 0.8697 0.7940 -0.0654 -0.0886
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7265 0.6297
sqrtQIIH1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000

343
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0488 -0.0392 -0.0602 0.4435 0.1011 0.3299 0.1786 0.2511 0.5201 0.1855
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7841 0.8259 0.7351 0.0110 0.5758 0.0608 0.3199 0.1587 0.0019 0.2934
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0947 -0.0314 0.0150 0.2604 0.0871 0.2153 0.0672 0.0566 0.4447 0.1989
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5944 0.8599 0.9327 0.1500 0.6299 0.2288 0.7103 0.7544 0.0095 0.2594
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2657 -0.1991 0.0981 0.2121 -0.0502 0.1230 -0.0398 0.1207 0.2564 -0.0087
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1288 0.2589 0.5810 0.2440 0.7813 0.4951 0.8258 0.5034 0.1498 0.9610
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1798 -0.1325 -0.0454 0.3182 0.0867 0.2661 0.1688 0.1825 0.2906 -0.0217
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3249 0.4699 0.8051 0.0865 0.6428 0.1480 0.3640 0.3258 0.1128 0.9062
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3223 0.1035 0.2106 0.3040 0.3808 0.4816 0.2133 0.3763 0.4033 0.4067
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0673 0.5664 0.2393 0.0964 0.0315 0.0053 0.2412 0.0338 0.0221 0.0188
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3829 0.1528 0.2647 0.3853 0.3658 0.5200 0.2908 0.4083 0.5036 0.4391
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0279 0.3960 0.1366 0.0323 0.0395 0.0023 0.1064 0.0204 0.0033 0.0106
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0305 0.0265 0.1542 0.2708 0.2297 0.3456 0.1853 0.2402 0.3891 0.2233
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8661 0.8835 0.3915 0.1406 0.2060 0.0527 0.3099 0.1855 0.0277 0.2116
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0673 0.0400 0.2479 0.2642 0.2515 0.3374 0.1772 0.2662 0.3926 0.2580
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7146 0.8277 0.1713 0.1583 0.1723 0.0635 0.3401 0.1477 0.0289 0.1539
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1069 -0.1186 -0.0656 0.3384 0.1763 0.3406 0.1787 0.0870 0.2735 0.1755
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5672 0.5252 0.7258 0.0726 0.3513 0.0655 0.3448 0.6475 0.1436 0.3451
sqrtQIIH1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 29.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1289 -0.0993 0.0559 0.1287 0.2798 0.4085 0.2376 0.2795 0.2978 0.3326
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4747 0.5825 0.7572 0.4901 0.1210 0.0203 0.1904 0.1213 0.0979 0.0586
sqrtQIIH1b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0961 -0.0148 -0.0148 0.3094 0.2055 0.3510 0.2264 0.2817 0.3123 0.3441
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6009 0.9359 0.9361 0.0962 0.2675 0.0528 0.2207 0.1247 0.0871 0.0538
sqrtQIIH1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0641 0.0261 0.0853 0.3239 0.2069 0.3231 0.2829 0.2414 0.2975 0.2385
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7273 0.8873 0.6425 0.0808 0.2642 0.0762 0.1231 0.1908 0.1041 0.1886
sqrtQIIH1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000

344
Table A6, continued (Row 6, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.2705 0.3665 0.3880 0.3371 0.1761 0.3641 0.4104 -0.0459 -0.1944 0.2775
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1218 0.0330 0.0234 0.0512 0.3192 0.0373 0.0177 0.7964 0.2706 0.1242
sqrtQIIF1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2750 0.3306 0.2890 0.1211 0.0531 0.1787 0.3166 -0.1818 -0.2812 0.2006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1154 0.0562 0.0974 0.4950 0.7657 0.3198 0.0726 0.3034 0.1072 0.2709
sqrtQIIF1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0801 0.0958 0.1683 0.0991 0.0508 0.2001 0.1539 -0.0809 -0.2682 0.1522
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6525 0.5900 0.3414 0.5770 0.7754 0.2643 0.3925 0.6491 0.1252 0.4058
sqrtQIIF1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1006 0.1558 0.1522 0.0535 0.0241 0.3517 0.1114 0.0366 -0.2630 0.0779
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5840 0.3946 0.4056 0.7710 0.8958 0.0523 0.5506 0.8425 0.1458 0.6826
sqrtQIIF3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4854 0.5636 0.5579 0.1137 0.0626 0.4703 0.3467 -0.2480 -0.2199 0.2636
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0042 0.0006 0.0007 0.5287 0.7294 0.0066 0.0519 0.1641 0.2189 0.1519
sqrtQIIF3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5242 0.6369 0.6178 0.1636 0.1178 0.4902 0.3564 -0.1760 -0.1814 0.3096
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0017 0.0001 0.0001 0.3628 0.5139 0.0044 0.0453 0.3273 0.3123 0.0901
sqrtQIIF3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3272 0.3511 0.3574 -0.0107 -0.0033 0.3475 0.2840 -0.1771 -0.2564 0.1763
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0631 0.0451 0.0412 0.9529 0.9853 0.0513 0.1152 0.3242 0.1498 0.3428
sqrtQIIF3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3460 0.3644 0.3926 0.0292 0.0070 0.3792 0.2612 -0.1990 -0.2412 0.2026
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0524 0.0403 0.0262 0.8738 0.9698 0.0354 0.1559 0.2748 0.1836 0.2830
sqrtQIIF3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2923 0.2228 0.2138 0.0160 0.0259 0.1566 0.3603 -0.0264 -0.2494 0.0261
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1105 0.2284 0.2482 0.9319 0.8901 0.4084 0.0548 0.8880 0.1839 0.8953
sqrtQIIH1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 29.0000 31.0000 30.0000 28.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4241 0.3613 0.4736 0.1020 0.0479 0.1802 0.3797 -0.0114 -0.2635 0.1321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0139 0.0388 0.0054 0.5723 0.7911 0.3237 0.0351 0.9497 0.1451 0.4864
sqrtQIIH1b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3949 0.4161 0.4864 0.1657 0.0824 0.2596 0.3078 -0.1064 -0.2441 0.1971
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0253 0.0179 0.0048 0.3647 0.6538 0.1584 0.0980 0.5621 0.1857 0.3054
sqrtQIIH1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000 31.0000 29.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3012 0.2656 0.3513 0.0801 0.0561 0.2312 0.3320 0.0077 -0.2446 0.1049
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0938 0.1418 0.0487 0.6630 0.7604 0.2107 0.0730 0.9666 0.1848 0.5881
sqrtQIIH1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000 31.0000 29.0000

345
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.2381 0.1926 0.1787 -0.1453 0.1380 -0.1340 -0.0256 -0.0302 0.1067 -0.0722
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1971 0.2993 0.3360 0.4356 0.4592 0.4724 0.8912 0.8719 0.5678 0.6997
sqrtQIIH1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0493 -0.1360 -0.1850 -0.1860 0.1135 -0.1723 0.0632 0.1058 -0.0003 -0.1491
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7820 0.4430 0.2949 0.2922 0.5227 0.3299 0.7225 0.5514 0.9989 0.3999
sqrtQIIH3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2851 -0.0175 0.0051 -0.0495 0.2423 -0.2976 0.0665 0.0136 0.1945 -0.1162
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1022 0.9217 0.9772 0.7812 0.1673 0.0874 0.7087 0.9391 0.2704 0.5128
sqrtQIIH3b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2406 -0.2103 -0.1055 -0.0621 0.1325 -0.2605 0.0367 0.0256 0.2078 -0.1528
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1704 0.2324 0.5525 0.7272 0.4551 0.1367 0.8366 0.8858 0.2384 0.3884
sqrtQIIH3c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2563 -0.1407 -0.0472 -0.1862 0.1279 -0.2476 0.0117 0.1006 0.1212 -0.1184
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1434 0.4275 0.7910 0.2917 0.4710 0.1580 0.9478 0.5713 0.4949 0.5048
sqrtQIIH3d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3019 0.0943 0.0969 -0.1238 0.2300 -0.3064 -0.0274 -0.0306 0.1222 -0.0652
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0827 0.5956 0.5858 0.4853 0.1907 0.0780 0.8775 0.8637 0.4911 0.7141
sqrtQIIH3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1539 0.1940 0.0303 0.1534 -0.2490 0.5686 0.0614 0.1530 0.2038 0.3504
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3774 0.2642 0.8627 0.3788 0.1492 0.0004 0.7262 0.3804 0.2403 0.0390
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0319 0.0782 0.1695 0.1824 0.1344 0.0163 0.4628 0.2114 0.2662 0.3009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8535 0.6503 0.3229 0.2870 0.4346 0.9248 0.0045 0.2159 0.1166 0.0745
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1127 -0.0579 0.0782 0.2523 0.0069 0.0481 0.4045 0.4489 0.2159 0.3780
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5128 0.7373 0.6503 0.1377 0.9683 0.7807 0.0144 0.0060 0.2061 0.0230
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1182 -0.0618 -0.0557 -0.0240 -0.1092 0.1280 0.3222 0.2949 0.4759 0.4396
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4923 0.7201 0.7470 0.8894 0.5260 0.4570 0.0553 0.0808 0.0033 0.0073
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1398 0.3553 0.3276 0.2496 -0.0503 0.1387 0.1691 0.2459 0.2935 0.5612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4159 0.0335 0.0511 0.1421 0.7708 0.4197 0.3241 0.1483 0.0823 0.0004
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0834 0.0701 0.1064 0.0308 -0.1836 0.4138 0.1939 0.3706 0.1707 0.3408
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6445 0.6984 0.5557 0.8648 0.3065 0.0167 0.2797 0.0337 0.3422 0.0523
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

346
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.0339 -0.0919 -0.1499 -0.0387 -0.1392 -0.1780 -0.2013 -0.1590 -0.1189 -0.0667
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8590 0.6229 0.4210 0.8362 0.4552 0.3380 0.2775 0.3929 0.5240 0.7214
sqrtQIIH1e
N 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1628 0.0323 0.0573 0.1218 0.0438 -0.1361 -0.0141 -0.0841 -0.1267 -0.0320
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3654 0.8563 0.7478 0.4926 0.8058 0.4427 0.9371 0.6362 0.4753 0.8575
sqrtQIIH3a
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1273 -0.3235 -0.1203 -0.0259 -0.1685 -0.1377 -0.0797 -0.1749 -0.1559 -0.2148
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4803 0.0620 0.4978 0.8845 0.3409 0.4374 0.6541 0.3226 0.3785 0.2225
sqrtQIIH3b
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0821 -0.1906 0.0261 0.0917 -0.0905 -0.1565 -0.0039 -0.0566 -0.0755 -0.1023
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6495 0.2802 0.8837 0.6059 0.6107 0.3768 0.9827 0.7505 0.6711 0.5646
sqrtQIIH3c
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1608 -0.0051 -0.1690 -0.0896 0.0060 -0.1547 -0.1921 -0.1473 -0.1363 -0.1130
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3713 0.9770 0.3393 0.6144 0.9732 0.3822 0.2765 0.4059 0.4422 0.5245
sqrtQIIH3d
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1548 -0.0089 -0.1839 -0.0900 -0.0226 -0.1709 -0.1572 -0.1766 -0.1435 -0.1166
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3898 0.9600 0.2978 0.6128 0.8991 0.3340 0.3745 0.3177 0.4181 0.5114
sqrtQIIH3e
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3282 0.3114 0.1295 0.1581 0.2187 0.3565 -0.0354 0.3285 0.3383 0.3095
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0581 0.0686 0.4584 0.3642 0.2069 0.0356 0.8399 0.0540 0.0468 0.0704
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2881 0.0694 -0.1696 -0.2311 -0.0790 0.2407 0.0213 -0.1415 0.0382 -0.0093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0933 0.6877 0.3227 0.1750 0.6468 0.1573 0.9020 0.4103 0.8250 0.9569
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3869 0.1221 -0.1149 -0.1980 0.1071 0.3647 0.0335 -0.0162 0.1323 0.0524
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0217 0.4779 0.5044 0.2471 0.5340 0.0288 0.8461 0.9254 0.4418 0.7615
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2685 0.2363 -0.0342 -0.0110 0.1396 0.2381 0.0131 0.0718 0.1710 0.1479
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1188 0.1653 0.8430 0.9493 0.4166 0.1620 0.9398 0.6775 0.3186 0.3892
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2605 0.1714 -0.1854 -0.2242 0.0952 0.2494 -0.1226 -0.1359 -0.0048 -0.0612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1307 0.3175 0.2790 0.1888 0.5809 0.1424 0.4762 0.4294 0.9778 0.7228
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0079 0.1206 0.0284 0.1815 0.2646 0.2109 -0.1934 0.0917 -0.0591 0.1341
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9652 0.5039 0.8754 0.3122 0.1367 0.2387 0.2809 0.6117 0.7439 0.4568
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

347
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.1481 -0.2417 -0.2447 -0.1619 0.2026 -0.1359 -0.1124 -0.1272 0.0184 0.1260
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4265 0.1902 0.1845 0.3842 0.2829 0.4740 0.5543 0.5029 0.9244 0.5071
sqrtQIIH1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1224 -0.1231 -0.1401 0.0276 0.2938 -0.0769 0.1602 0.1928 0.0569 0.1426
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4906 0.4881 0.4295 0.8769 0.0970 0.6707 0.3732 0.2824 0.7571 0.4285
sqrtQIIH3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2159 -0.1713 -0.2608 -0.2020 -0.0020 -0.2469 -0.0572 -0.0613 0.0404 -0.0256
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2200 0.3327 0.1363 0.2518 0.9911 0.1659 0.7519 0.7345 0.8262 0.8876
sqrtQIIH3b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1763 -0.1942 -0.2933 -0.0826 0.1196 -0.1272 0.0831 0.0732 0.0799 0.0351
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3186 0.2710 0.0922 0.6422 0.5074 0.4807 0.6456 0.6858 0.6639 0.8464
sqrtQIIH3c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1437 -0.1863 -0.2497 -0.0254 0.1773 -0.1567 -0.0073 0.0051 0.1056 0.1059
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4175 0.2915 0.1544 0.8868 0.3236 0.3838 0.9680 0.9774 0.5652 0.5577
sqrtQIIH3d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0984 -0.1976 -0.2169 -0.0713 0.0507 -0.2548 -0.0352 -0.0365 0.1639 0.1202
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5800 0.2627 0.2179 0.6887 0.7794 0.1523 0.8456 0.8402 0.3701 0.5051
sqrtQIIH3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2006 0.2261 0.2839 0.2088 0.0342 -0.0162 0.0263 -0.0017 0.0645 0.2057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2479 0.1915 0.0984 0.2287 0.8503 0.9276 0.8828 0.9925 0.7216 0.2432
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1294 -0.0278 0.1332 0.0700 0.0321 -0.0835 -0.2797 -0.3170 0.0298 0.1275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4521 0.8719 0.4388 0.6850 0.8570 0.6336 0.1036 0.0635 0.8673 0.4656
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1660 0.0690 0.0944 0.1161 0.1374 0.0184 -0.2263 -0.2731 0.1285 0.2022
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3334 0.6893 0.5840 0.5001 0.4386 0.9166 0.1911 0.1124 0.4688 0.2441
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1161 -0.1745 0.2105 0.2141 0.1194 -0.0144 -0.0268 -0.0901 -0.0141 0.1224
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5002 0.3088 0.2179 0.2099 0.5010 0.9344 0.8786 0.6066 0.9370 0.4838
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0572 -0.0507 0.0680 -0.0306 -0.0829 -0.1243 -0.2772 -0.3359 0.0582 0.0930
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7403 0.7689 0.6937 0.8595 0.6413 0.4767 0.1069 0.0485 0.7438 0.5951
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1135 -0.0093 0.0776 0.0771 0.0230 -0.2796 0.0015 -0.0421 0.0959 0.0279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5296 0.9590 0.6677 0.6697 0.9024 0.1212 0.9936 0.8190 0.6079 0.8797
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000

348
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.2584 -0.3508 -0.1040 -0.2212 -0.3020 -0.2399 -0.1464 -0.1769 0.0465 -0.2761
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1680 0.0574 0.5843 0.2402 0.1049 0.2017 0.4402 0.3496 0.8070 0.1398
sqrtQIIH1e
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0159 -0.0815 0.0959 0.0518 -0.0302 -0.0611 0.1575 0.1793 0.0193 -0.1459
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9302 0.6523 0.5955 0.7748 0.8677 0.7354 0.3814 0.3180 0.9151 0.4180
sqrtQIIH3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0131 -0.1644 -0.1575 -0.0838 -0.2300 -0.1596 0.0560 0.0743 -0.2080 0.0339
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9424 0.3606 0.3813 0.6429 0.1979 0.3750 0.7571 0.6809 0.2455 0.8513
sqrtQIIH3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1095 -0.0078 -0.0297 0.0907 -0.1855 -0.1677 0.2028 0.2141 -0.1876 0.0086
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5440 0.9655 0.8696 0.6159 0.3014 0.3510 0.2576 0.2316 0.2958 0.9621
sqrtQIIH3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0685 -0.1907 0.0113 -0.0948 -0.1098 -0.1387 -0.0149 0.0084 -0.0740 -0.1387
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7050 0.2878 0.9501 0.5999 0.5430 0.4416 0.9343 0.9629 0.6823 0.4416
sqrtQIIH3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1200 -0.2575 -0.0392 -0.1891 -0.1310 -0.1842 -0.1282 -0.0901 -0.0809 -0.2131
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5059 0.1480 0.8285 0.2920 0.4675 0.3047 0.4770 0.6181 0.6544 0.2337
sqrtQIIH3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0089 0.0761 0.1894 0.1937 0.1442 0.1479 0.0915 0.0784 0.6590 -0.0793
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9604 0.6689 0.2833 0.2723 0.4157 0.4038 0.6069 0.6594 0.0000 0.6557
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0746 -0.1040 -0.0530 -0.1948 0.0782 -0.1712 -0.2006 -0.1661 0.1279 0.3803
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6700 0.5522 0.7622 0.2620 0.6553 0.3254 0.2480 0.3401 0.4639 0.0242
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1545 0.0208 0.0520 -0.0508 0.1867 -0.0484 -0.0822 -0.0312 0.1830 0.4524
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3754 0.9058 0.7667 0.7718 0.2828 0.7826 0.6388 0.8589 0.2926 0.0064
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1285 0.0143 0.1151 0.0448 0.1597 -0.2347 -0.0833 -0.0846 0.2485 0.0719
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4620 0.9352 0.5103 0.7984 0.3594 0.1747 0.6342 0.6289 0.1499 0.6814
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1611 -0.2920 -0.1516 -0.2749 -0.0643 -0.2254 -0.2899 -0.2436 0.3637 0.0763
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3552 0.0888 0.3846 0.1100 0.7135 0.1930 0.0912 0.1585 0.0317 0.6631
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1393 -0.1005 0.1123 0.0586 0.0196 0.1302 0.0245 -0.0121 0.2503 -0.1148
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4469 0.5842 0.5406 0.7501 0.9153 0.4774 0.8939 0.9477 0.1670 0.5317
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000

349
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1283 -0.3042 -0.0096 0.0574 0.0964 -0.0004 0.0867 0.2515 0.0260 0.0663
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4994 0.1022 0.9597 0.7589 0.6124 0.9984 0.6428 0.1722 0.8897 0.7229
sqrtQIIH1e
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1299 -0.3558 -0.0812 0.1174 0.0895 0.0860 0.2009 0.1265 0.1436 0.0412
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4712 0.0422 0.6531 0.5084 0.6203 0.6285 0.2545 0.4760 0.4179 0.8170
sqrtQIIH3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0058 -0.1177 -0.2433 -0.0546 0.2417 0.1414 0.2686 0.1784 0.0039 0.0701
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9746 0.5140 0.1725 0.7591 0.1754 0.4249 0.1245 0.3127 0.9825 0.6935
sqrtQIIH3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0144 -0.0806 -0.2486 -0.0153 0.2037 0.1527 0.2557 0.1483 -0.0174 0.1075
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9366 0.6556 0.1630 0.9317 0.2554 0.3886 0.1444 0.4025 0.9223 0.5453
sqrtQIIH3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1081 -0.2696 -0.0398 -0.0298 0.1533 0.0579 0.2526 0.1568 0.0510 0.1420
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5493 0.1292 0.8260 0.8671 0.3942 0.7448 0.1495 0.3758 0.7744 0.4232
sqrtQIIH3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1729 -0.3563 -0.0119 -0.0830 0.1342 -0.0009 0.2093 0.2280 -0.0092 0.0257
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3359 0.0419 0.9476 0.6407 0.4566 0.9959 0.2348 0.1946 0.9590 0.8853
sqrtQIIH3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0986 0.0263 0.0994 0.4835 -0.0695 0.0358 0.1463 0.1107 0.3917 0.1148
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5790 0.8827 0.5760 0.0038 0.6959 0.8383 0.4090 0.5333 0.0220 0.5114
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3092 0.2589 0.1914 -0.0555 0.0196 0.1176 0.0687 0.0435 0.0541 0.1423
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0707 0.1331 0.2707 0.7517 0.9111 0.4946 0.6951 0.8039 0.7578 0.4077
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4340 0.3175 0.3293 0.0273 0.0674 0.1689 0.1978 0.1071 0.0046 0.2017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0092 0.0631 0.0534 0.8761 0.7007 0.3248 0.2546 0.5401 0.9790 0.2382
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1111 0.3321 0.2041 0.0725 0.0462 0.1085 0.1271 0.0802 0.1755 0.3117
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5250 0.0513 0.2396 0.6791 0.7924 0.5288 0.4668 0.6472 0.3132 0.0642
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1761 -0.0099 0.4573 0.1114 0.1435 0.1543 0.2987 0.3721 -0.0018 0.1198
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3117 0.9550 0.0057 0.5242 0.4107 0.3688 0.0814 0.0277 0.9917 0.4865
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1301 0.0739 0.1138 0.5321 0.0973 -0.0121 0.3436 0.4333 0.2122 0.3401
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4778 0.6879 0.5352 0.0017 0.5964 0.9467 0.0542 0.0132 0.2437 0.0528
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000

350
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence
Domestic Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation 0.1001 0.2142 0.1866 -0.0324 0.1161 0.2620 -0.0678 0.1311 0.7178 0.4943
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5923 0.2473 0.3149 0.8626 0.5339 0.1544 0.7172 0.4821 0.0000 0.0055
sqrtQIIH1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 30.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1208 0.3111 0.2111 0.0094 0.0319 0.1892 -0.0689 0.0001 0.7082 0.5305
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4960 0.0733 0.2308 0.9577 0.8581 0.2839 0.6988 0.9996 0.0000 0.0015
sqrtQIIH3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0877 0.1568 0.0767 -0.0666 -0.0020 0.1949 -0.1476 -0.0710 0.5702 0.6961
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6219 0.3759 0.6662 0.7081 0.9910 0.2692 0.4047 0.6898 0.0007 0.0000
sqrtQIIH3b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0608 0.1510 0.0350 -0.0122 -0.0246 0.1845 -0.0801 -0.0528 0.5733 0.7451
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7326 0.3940 0.8441 0.9454 0.8903 0.2963 0.6527 0.7670 0.0006 0.0000
sqrtQIIH3c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2231 0.3306 0.2468 -0.0624 0.0971 0.2698 -0.0294 -0.0016 0.6263 0.5343
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2047 0.0562 0.1594 0.7259 0.5850 0.1228 0.8689 0.9927 0.0001 0.0014
sqrtQIIH3d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1479 0.1842 0.1727 -0.1582 0.0194 0.1941 -0.1602 0.0240 0.6210 0.4745
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4040 0.2971 0.3288 0.3714 0.9133 0.2715 0.3655 0.8928 0.0001 0.0053
sqrtQIIH3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1131 0.1576 0.1061 0.4921 0.1822 0.1739 0.3406 0.2939 0.1595 0.0123
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5177 0.3660 0.5441 0.0027 0.2949 0.3177 0.0453 0.0866 0.3914 0.9459
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3808 0.2260 0.2386 -0.0045 0.3594 0.2141 0.1873 -0.0578 -0.2604 -0.0590
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0219 0.1850 0.1611 0.9794 0.0314 0.2098 0.2741 0.7378 0.1501 0.7403
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3712 0.2599 0.2426 0.2147 0.3425 0.2766 0.2122 0.0853 -0.3081 0.0163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0258 0.1258 0.1540 0.2087 0.0409 0.1025 0.2140 0.6209 0.0863 0.9273
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4705 0.3727 0.2825 0.0503 0.2440 0.0821 0.3122 0.0620 -0.2370 -0.1305
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0038 0.0252 0.0950 0.7707 0.1515 0.6342 0.0638 0.7192 0.1916 0.4620
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3193 0.1159 0.1462 0.2763 0.2423 0.3109 0.1111 0.3090 -0.0338 -0.0017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0577 0.5007 0.3949 0.1029 0.1546 0.0649 0.5190 0.0667 0.8543 0.9922
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2408 0.2690 0.1855 0.4991 0.1915 0.2390 0.4288 0.4754 0.2053 0.2206
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1771 0.1301 0.3015 0.0031 0.2858 0.1804 0.0128 0.0052 0.2764 0.2250
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 30.0000 32.0000

351
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.2940 0.5099 0.7828 0.7226 0.5732 0.4521 0.7800 0.8132 0.8161 0.6404
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1148 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0138 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
sqrtQIIH1e
N 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 29.0000 31.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2630 0.4935 0.5765 0.8414 0.5160 0.4233 0.6789 0.6569 0.8866 0.5014
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1392 0.0035 0.0004 0.0000 0.0025 0.0158 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0035
sqrtQIIH3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4814 0.4272 0.5366 0.5591 0.7108 0.6323 0.5801 0.6032 0.5679 0.9492
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0046 0.0132 0.0013 0.0011 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0009 0.0000
sqrtQIIH3b
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5506 0.4932 0.5155 0.6354 0.7434 0.6439 0.6169 0.6209 0.6450 0.8736
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0009 0.0035 0.0021 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000
sqrtQIIH3c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2574 0.4714 0.5662 0.7640 0.6066 0.4735 0.7237 0.7275 0.8188 0.6697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1481 0.0056 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIH3d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1324 0.3442 0.6302 0.6940 0.5249 0.4059 0.6489 0.6992 0.6878 0.6697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4625 0.0498 0.0001 0.0000 0.0020 0.0212 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIH3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2282 0.3475 0.0369 0.0369 0.0173 0.0867 0.1116 0.0707 -0.0251 -0.3571
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2015 0.0475 0.8384 0.8440 0.9252 0.6371 0.5432 0.7056 0.8951 0.0448
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1073 -0.1862 -0.2143 -0.2298 0.2334 0.2856 -0.0151 0.0478 -0.1300 0.1708
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5459 0.2916 0.2236 0.2058 0.1912 0.1071 0.9337 0.7951 0.4858 0.3420
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0488 -0.0947 -0.2657 -0.1798 0.3223 0.3829 0.0305 0.0673 -0.1069 0.1289
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7841 0.5944 0.1288 0.3249 0.0673 0.0279 0.8661 0.7146 0.5672 0.4747
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0392 -0.0314 -0.1991 -0.1325 0.1035 0.1528 0.0265 0.0400 -0.1186 -0.0993
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8259 0.8599 0.2589 0.4699 0.5664 0.3960 0.8835 0.8277 0.5252 0.5825
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0602 0.0150 0.0981 -0.0454 0.2106 0.2647 0.1542 0.2479 -0.0656 0.0559
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7351 0.9327 0.5810 0.8051 0.2393 0.1366 0.3915 0.1713 0.7258 0.7572
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4435 0.2604 0.2121 0.3182 0.3040 0.3853 0.2708 0.2642 0.3384 0.1287
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0110 0.1500 0.2440 0.0865 0.0964 0.0323 0.1406 0.1583 0.0726 0.4901
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 29.0000 31.0000

352
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.6353 0.8696 1.0000 0.7125 0.6618 0.6001 0.7868 0.8589 -0.0741 0.0419
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.6970 0.8230
sqrtQIIH1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6101 0.7497 0.7125 1.0000 0.6130 0.6788 0.8916 0.7986 -0.0604 -0.0652
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7386 0.7142
sqrtQIIH3a
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8754 0.7198 0.6618 0.6130 1.0000 0.9254 0.7391 0.7418 -0.2741 0.1475
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1227 0.4051
sqrtQIIH3b
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.9709 0.7897 0.6001 0.6788 0.9254 1.0000 0.7810 0.6712 -0.2059 0.0407
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.2502 0.8193
sqrtQIIH3c
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7089 0.8697 0.7868 0.8916 0.7391 0.7810 1.0000 0.9142 -0.0964 0.0350
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.5935 0.8442
sqrtQIIH3d
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6169 0.7940 0.8589 0.7986 0.7418 0.6712 0.9142 1.0000 -0.1520 0.1237
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.3984 0.4857
sqrtQIIH3e
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1949 -0.0654 -0.0741 -0.0604 -0.2741 -0.2059 -0.0964 -0.1520 1.0000 0.2259
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2934 0.7265 0.6970 0.7386 0.1227 0.2502 0.5935 0.3984 . 0.1919
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0105 -0.0886 0.0419 -0.0652 0.1475 0.0407 0.0350 0.1237 0.2259 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9543 0.6297 0.8230 0.7142 0.4051 0.8193 0.8442 0.4857 0.1919 .
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0961 -0.0641 -0.0855 -0.0204 0.1099 0.1363 0.0782 0.0256 0.3507 0.8490
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6009 0.7273 0.6474 0.9090 0.5360 0.4420 0.6603 0.8858 0.0389 0.0000
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0148 0.0261 -0.0285 0.0002 -0.0091 0.0272 0.1255 0.1069 0.5148 0.6948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9359 0.8873 0.8788 0.9990 0.9594 0.8786 0.4794 0.5475 0.0016 0.0000
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0148 0.0853 0.2824 0.0318 0.0986 -0.0189 0.1446 0.3204 0.4789 0.6515
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9361 0.6425 0.1237 0.8584 0.5792 0.9153 0.4146 0.0647 0.0036 0.0000
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3094 0.3239 0.3147 0.3058 0.1909 0.2906 0.3321 0.2186 0.3686 -0.0887
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0962 0.0808 0.0964 0.0888 0.2952 0.1066 0.0633 0.2294 0.0379 0.6235
sqrtQIIID1a
N 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000

353
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation -0.0855 -0.0285 0.2824 0.3147 0.1952 0.2686 0.1647 0.2562 0.2060 0.2287
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6474 0.8788 0.1237 0.0964 0.3014 0.1512 0.3844 0.1717 0.2747 0.2159
sqrtQIIH1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 29.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0204 0.0002 0.0318 0.3058 0.2213 0.3407 0.1701 0.1917 0.1149 0.1964
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9090 0.9990 0.8584 0.0888 0.2159 0.0524 0.3439 0.2852 0.5244 0.2657
sqrtQIIH3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1099 -0.0091 0.0986 0.1909 0.2514 0.3091 0.1712 0.2375 0.2231 0.3192
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5360 0.9594 0.5792 0.2952 0.1581 0.0801 0.3408 0.1833 0.2121 0.0658
sqrtQIIH3b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1363 0.0272 -0.0189 0.2906 0.2606 0.3617 0.2459 0.2791 0.2606 0.3171
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4420 0.8786 0.9153 0.1066 0.1430 0.0386 0.1678 0.1158 0.1430 0.0677
sqrtQIIH3c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0782 0.1255 0.1446 0.3321 0.3865 0.4591 0.3474 0.3436 0.1569 0.2830
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6603 0.4794 0.4146 0.0633 0.0263 0.0072 0.0476 0.0503 0.3831 0.1048
sqrtQIIH3d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0256 0.1069 0.3204 0.2186 0.2565 0.3025 0.2382 0.2872 0.0475 0.1744
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8858 0.5475 0.0647 0.2294 0.1496 0.0871 0.1820 0.1051 0.7929 0.3238
sqrtQIIH3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3507 0.5148 0.4789 0.3686 0.1688 0.1747 0.2413 0.1641 0.4457 0.1327
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0389 0.0016 0.0036 0.0379 0.3399 0.3232 0.1692 0.3537 0.0082 0.4474
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8490 0.6948 0.6515 -0.0887 0.3611 0.1456 0.2324 0.0813 0.0042 0.3385
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6235 0.0331 0.4041 0.1791 0.6425 0.9810 0.0435
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.7061 0.6206 0.1355 0.3847 0.3799 0.3031 0.2621 0.1217 0.3611
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0001 0.4522 0.0225 0.0244 0.0768 0.1282 0.4862 0.0305
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7061 1.0000 0.6351 0.2733 0.3798 0.1910 0.4205 0.2136 0.1578 0.3697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.1238 0.0244 0.2718 0.0119 0.2180 0.3651 0.0265
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6206 0.6351 1.0000 0.1785 0.2279 0.2346 0.1730 0.3145 0.1320 0.2666
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 . 0.3202 0.1880 0.1750 0.3203 0.0657 0.4499 0.1159
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1355 0.2733 0.1785 1.0000 0.6244 0.7451 0.7309 0.8610 0.6773 0.4875
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4522 0.1238 0.3202 . 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

354
Table A6, continued (Row 7, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.2694 0.2167 0.3099 -0.0097 0.0371 0.2499 0.2606 -0.0777 -0.2274 0.1074
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1427 0.2416 0.0898 0.9588 0.8429 0.1829 0.1721 0.6780 0.2268 0.5864
sqrtQIIH1e
N 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 29.0000 31.0000 30.0000 28.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2917 0.3070 0.2616 0.0443 0.0329 0.2085 0.1032 -0.0003 -0.2805 0.0473
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0941 0.0774 0.1351 0.8035 0.8535 0.2442 0.5742 0.9986 0.1139 0.8004
sqrtQIIH3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3596 0.4034 0.4203 0.1762 0.0884 0.2821 0.3122 -0.0973 -0.2809 0.2016
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0367 0.0180 0.0133 0.3188 0.6193 0.1117 0.0819 0.5840 0.1133 0.2767
sqrtQIIH3b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3551 0.4368 0.4287 0.2587 0.1112 0.3266 0.3255 -0.0759 -0.2665 0.1985
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0393 0.0098 0.0114 0.1396 0.5311 0.0636 0.0691 0.6695 0.1338 0.2843
sqrtQIIH3c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3395 0.3652 0.3657 0.0605 0.0392 0.2759 0.2533 0.0446 -0.2701 0.0586
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0495 0.0337 0.0334 0.7340 0.8259 0.1201 0.1619 0.8023 0.1285 0.7540
sqrtQIIH3d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2175 0.2460 0.2936 -0.0270 0.0141 0.2502 0.0530 0.0377 -0.2608 0.0391
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2165 0.1608 0.0919 0.8794 0.9371 0.1603 0.7731 0.8325 0.1427 0.8344
sqrtQIIH3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1273 0.2966 0.1620 -0.0305 0.1332 0.1338 -0.1075 -0.1239 -0.1046 0.2577
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4660 0.0836 0.3525 0.8618 0.4456 0.4505 0.5515 0.4782 0.5559 0.1545
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2883 0.3935 0.2210 0.1503 0.1325 0.2814 -0.0871 -0.0378 -0.0375 0.0529
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0882 0.0176 0.1953 0.3817 0.4412 0.1015 0.6241 0.8268 0.8308 0.7698
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3753 0.4306 0.3836 0.2397 0.2001 0.3763 0.0113 -0.0143 -0.0063 0.2063
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0241 0.0087 0.0209 0.1591 0.2421 0.0259 0.9496 0.9342 0.9714 0.2495
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3133 0.4785 0.2707 0.0857 0.1293 0.3482 -0.1313 -0.0541 -0.0047 0.0506
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0628 0.0032 0.1102 0.6190 0.4522 0.0404 0.4593 0.7538 0.9785 0.7798
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2476 0.3484 0.3784 0.0085 0.1471 0.2982 -0.1273 -0.1297 0.0381 0.2530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1454 0.0373 0.0229 0.9607 0.3918 0.0819 0.4732 0.4509 0.8280 0.1554
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5190 0.5302 0.5762 0.0581 -0.0825 0.2669 0.2827 -0.1366 0.0378 0.2165
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0015 0.0004 0.7480 0.6479 0.1397 0.1233 0.4485 0.8375 0.2420
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000

355
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.0518 -0.0744 0.1564 0.1160 -0.0204 0.2400 0.3670 0.2723 0.1638 0.1460
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7677 0.6711 0.3696 0.5069 0.9072 0.1649 0.0301 0.1136 0.3471 0.4028
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1244 0.0249 0.1364 0.1835 -0.0434 0.2866 0.2308 0.4812 0.1396 0.3090
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4764 0.8870 0.4348 0.2913 0.8045 0.0951 0.1821 0.0034 0.4239 0.0709
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1646 0.0051 0.1535 0.0920 -0.0947 0.2611 0.2171 0.2043 0.2787 0.2677
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3448 0.9767 0.3786 0.5993 0.5886 0.1298 0.2103 0.2391 0.1050 0.1200
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1113 0.1878 0.3916 0.2575 -0.0987 0.2429 -0.0035 0.2767 0.0033 0.2737
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5246 0.2800 0.0200 0.1353 0.5725 0.1597 0.9839 0.1075 0.9852 0.1117
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0214 0.2075 0.2276 0.1701 -0.0940 0.5361 -0.0078 0.2198 0.1284 0.1527
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9028 0.2317 0.1886 0.3285 0.5913 0.0009 0.9646 0.2044 0.4625 0.3810
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1124 0.0021 0.1330 0.0575 -0.0534 0.1694 0.2711 0.2907 0.1288 0.0678
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5139 0.9902 0.4393 0.7391 0.7571 0.3233 0.1098 0.0855 0.4541 0.6944
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0449 0.0023 0.0860 0.1102 -0.0231 0.1797 0.2604 0.4227 0.1151 0.1025
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7949 0.9895 0.6180 0.5222 0.8936 0.2943 0.1251 0.0102 0.5040 0.5518
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0549 0.0373 0.0793 0.1459 -0.0056 0.2332 0.2177 0.2247 0.2938 0.1867
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7504 0.8292 0.6459 0.3959 0.9740 0.1710 0.2021 0.1876 0.0820 0.2757
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0110 0.0624 0.2157 0.2396 -0.1143 0.1194 0.0106 0.3393 0.0382 0.1958
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9491 0.7177 0.2065 0.1593 0.5070 0.4880 0.9511 0.0429 0.8247 0.2524
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1272 -0.1992 0.0037 -0.1471 -0.2422 0.1477 0.0975 0.1958 0.1268 0.1346
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4597 0.2442 0.9827 0.3919 0.1546 0.3899 0.5715 0.2525 0.4610 0.4339
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1038 0.0760 -0.0544 -0.2229 -0.0831 0.1831 -0.1039 0.0264 0.0276 0.0214
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5471 0.6595 0.7528 0.1914 0.6301 0.2852 0.5464 0.8784 0.8732 0.9013
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2036 -0.0784 -0.0162 -0.1433 -0.0897 -0.0036 0.0204 0.1837 0.2654 0.1990
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2408 0.6545 0.9265 0.4115 0.6085 0.9835 0.9073 0.2908 0.1234 0.2517
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

356
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-
Lack of Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.1191 0.0242 -0.3494 -0.3143 -0.0257 0.0392 -0.3843 -0.2957 -0.3184 -0.1994
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4956 0.8903 0.0397 0.0660 0.8833 0.8230 0.0227 0.0845 0.0623 0.2509
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1925 -0.0511 -0.3097 -0.2839 0.1179 0.0146 -0.4478 -0.2249 -0.3398 -0.2423
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2680 0.7705 0.0702 0.0984 0.4998 0.9334 0.0070 0.1940 0.0458 0.1608
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1203 0.1117 -0.1833 -0.1215 0.0768 0.0791 -0.3132 -0.1131 -0.2203 -0.0036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4912 0.5231 0.2919 0.4870 0.6610 0.6514 0.0669 0.5179 0.2034 0.9835
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0535 0.0041 -0.2496 -0.1957 0.1020 0.0394 -0.3367 -0.1968 -0.2806 -0.1610
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7601 0.9813 0.1481 0.2598 0.5600 0.8221 0.0479 0.2572 0.1025 0.3556
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0563 -0.1385 -0.0454 0.0772 0.2775 0.1931 -0.1671 0.0834 -0.0788 -0.0609
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7519 0.4277 0.7956 0.6593 0.1066 0.2663 0.3375 0.6337 0.6526 0.7280
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0521 -0.1679 -0.1854 -0.1642 0.2058 0.1350 -0.1814 -0.2790 -0.3088 -0.2645
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7663 0.3277 0.2791 0.3386 0.2285 0.4324 0.2896 0.0994 0.0669 0.1190
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1166 -0.2175 -0.1852 -0.1489 0.2551 0.0927 -0.2226 -0.2551 -0.3368 -0.3009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5047 0.2026 0.2795 0.3860 0.1333 0.5908 0.1918 0.1332 0.0446 0.0745
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0751 -0.0209 -0.0530 -0.0524 0.1915 0.0969 -0.2263 -0.1966 -0.2681 -0.1977
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6679 0.9038 0.7586 0.7616 0.2632 0.5738 0.1844 0.2504 0.1139 0.2477
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1284 -0.2123 -0.1736 -0.1508 0.2529 0.0811 -0.2817 -0.2426 -0.3346 -0.3052
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4624 0.2138 0.3114 0.3800 0.1366 0.6380 0.0960 0.1540 0.0461 0.0702
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0884 0.0179 0.2114 0.1371 0.2619 0.3080 0.3243 0.2088 0.2928 0.2937
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6135 0.9176 0.2158 0.4251 0.1228 0.0676 0.0537 0.2216 0.0831 0.0821
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2392 0.0627 0.1892 0.0768 0.2009 0.2318 0.2996 0.2963 0.4052 0.2994
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1663 0.7164 0.2690 0.6560 0.2400 0.1738 0.0758 0.0794 0.0142 0.0761
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3484 0.1729 0.1521 0.1250 0.2528 0.4174 0.2555 0.3183 0.4473 0.3700
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0435 0.3206 0.3830 0.4742 0.1428 0.0126 0.1385 0.0624 0.0071 0.0287
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

357
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders
and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm
Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack
of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.2432 -0.1364 -0.1258 -0.0970 -0.1200 -0.3383 -0.3248 -0.3530 -0.0810 -0.1288
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1592 0.4346 0.4716 0.5793 0.5059 0.0503 0.0609 0.0406 0.6541 0.4677
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2412 -0.0657 -0.2421 -0.2036 -0.1800 -0.3131 -0.3757 -0.4226 -0.0355 -0.1819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1628 0.7077 0.1611 0.2409 0.3163 0.0714 0.0285 0.0128 0.8446 0.3033
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1756 -0.1034 -0.0921 -0.0198 -0.1702 -0.2950 -0.1646 -0.1937 -0.0343 -0.0498
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3128 0.5545 0.5988 0.9102 0.3436 0.0904 0.3522 0.2724 0.8497 0.7799
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1849 -0.0830 -0.1925 -0.1262 -0.2506 -0.4556 -0.3192 -0.3354 0.0295 -0.1475
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2877 0.6355 0.2678 0.4701 0.1595 0.0068 0.0657 0.0525 0.8705 0.4051
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2003 0.0048 -0.0771 -0.1538 -0.0594 -0.3044 -0.1769 -0.2034 -0.0190 -0.0482
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2487 0.9781 0.6596 0.3778 0.7426 0.0801 0.3168 0.2486 0.9164 0.7868
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3302 -0.2251 -0.0630 -0.1353 0.1036 -0.2275 -0.2702 -0.2894 -0.0860 -0.0530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0492 0.1868 0.7150 0.4315 0.5598 0.1888 0.1164 0.0917 0.6287 0.7622
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3636 -0.2286 -0.1384 -0.2322 0.0984 -0.2063 -0.2763 -0.3140 -0.0732 -0.0612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0293 0.1799 0.4207 0.1729 0.5798 0.2345 0.1081 0.0662 0.6808 0.7269
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2689 -0.2462 -0.0166 -0.0763 -0.0030 -0.2480 -0.1889 -0.2335 -0.0943 -0.0943
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1128 0.1477 0.9236 0.6582 0.9867 0.1509 0.2772 0.1771 0.5959 0.5899
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3400 -0.2096 -0.1955 -0.2643 -0.0716 -0.3042 -0.2873 -0.3437 0.0318 -0.0615
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0425 0.2199 0.2531 0.1193 0.6874 0.0756 0.0942 0.0432 0.8582 0.7255
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2933 0.2187 0.1870 0.2684 0.2920 0.0029 0.2136 0.1882 0.0981 0.0572
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0825 0.2001 0.2749 0.1134 0.0938 0.9870 0.2180 0.2789 0.5809 0.7441
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3287 0.2301 0.2393 0.2483 0.3555 0.1769 0.1306 0.1844 0.0666 0.1212
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0503 0.1770 0.1599 0.1443 0.0391 0.3093 0.4546 0.2890 0.7082 0.4880
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4069 0.3031 0.2714 0.3473 0.2967 -0.0517 0.1567 0.1301 0.2704 0.2113
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0153 0.0767 0.1148 0.0409 0.0936 0.7716 0.3763 0.4633 0.1280 0.2303
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

358
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1680 -0.2940 -0.1628 -0.2796 -0.0942 -0.1171 -0.2336 -0.2207 0.0416 0.2483
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3424 0.0915 0.3577 0.1093 0.5962 0.5095 0.1837 0.2098 0.8152 0.1567
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2951 -0.2771 -0.1912 -0.2877 -0.1349 -0.0328 -0.2472 -0.2111 0.1799 0.2263
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0902 0.1126 0.2786 0.0989 0.4469 0.8541 0.1586 0.2307 0.3086 0.1980
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1450 -0.1540 -0.0689 -0.2099 -0.1179 -0.0436 -0.1951 -0.2121 0.1731 0.0270
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4133 0.3846 0.6984 0.2334 0.5066 0.8068 0.2688 0.2284 0.3276 0.8796
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2648 -0.2889 -0.1827 -0.2803 -0.1270 -0.0632 -0.3522 -0.2948 0.1626 0.0105
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1301 0.0975 0.3011 0.1083 0.4741 0.7224 0.0411 0.0905 0.3581 0.9529
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1784 -0.1595 -0.1374 -0.0313 -0.1959 0.0422 -0.0468 -0.0631 0.3801 -0.0543
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3128 0.3676 0.4386 0.8605 0.2667 0.8125 0.7927 0.7230 0.0266 0.7602
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1089 -0.2729 -0.2079 -0.1810 -0.1156 -0.2323 -0.1102 -0.0994 0.0431 0.2693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5333 0.1127 0.2306 0.2982 0.5086 0.1792 0.5287 0.5698 0.8059 0.1177
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1526 -0.2741 -0.2227 -0.1936 -0.1167 -0.2091 -0.1208 -0.1121 0.0968 0.2882
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3814 0.1111 0.1984 0.2650 0.5043 0.2279 0.4895 0.5216 0.5802 0.0932
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1341 -0.2184 -0.1647 -0.1137 -0.1419 -0.2572 -0.0355 -0.0277 0.2430 0.1645
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4424 0.2074 0.3443 0.5155 0.4161 0.1357 0.8395 0.8744 0.1596 0.3450
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2585 -0.3170 -0.2417 -0.2185 -0.1800 -0.1945 -0.1904 -0.1476 0.1620 0.1353
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1337 0.0635 0.1619 0.2074 0.3007 0.2630 0.2734 0.3974 0.3525 0.4382
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2358 0.3248 0.2058 0.2975 0.1614 0.1144 0.3519 0.3555 -0.1899 0.0265
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1726 0.0569 0.2357 0.0826 0.3544 0.5127 0.0382 0.0361 0.2746 0.8798
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1196 0.1723 0.1873 0.1487 0.1363 0.1141 0.2023 0.1494 -0.0509 -0.0986
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4939 0.3222 0.2814 0.3939 0.4349 0.5141 0.2438 0.3917 0.7714 0.5730
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1978 0.1703 0.2609 0.2110 0.2148 0.1633 0.1834 0.1617 -0.2144 -0.1775
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2622 0.3355 0.1362 0.2310 0.2226 0.3562 0.2991 0.3608 0.2233 0.3152
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

359
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.1409 0.1655 0.1424 0.2194 0.2778 0.2359 0.3660 0.3414 0.2049 0.5149
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4268 0.3497 0.4216 0.2125 0.1116 0.1724 0.0333 0.0481 0.2450 0.0015
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2464 0.1167 0.3494 0.3162 0.2639 0.2289 0.5023 0.4270 0.1394 0.3926
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1601 0.5112 0.0428 0.0685 0.1316 0.1859 0.0025 0.0118 0.4319 0.0197
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0296 0.2619 0.1388 0.2759 0.1422 0.0429 0.2435 0.2176 0.2250 0.4720
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8680 0.1346 0.4338 0.1143 0.4223 0.8065 0.1652 0.2164 0.2007 0.0042
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0050 -0.0368 0.3325 0.3309 0.1933 0.0362 0.4655 0.5794 0.0476 0.3427
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9776 0.8365 0.0547 0.0560 0.2733 0.8363 0.0055 0.0003 0.7890 0.0439
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1039 0.0341 -0.0834 0.5017 0.2241 0.1288 0.3036 0.3121 0.4904 0.3647
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5586 0.8481 0.6392 0.0025 0.2026 0.4607 0.0809 0.0723 0.0032 0.0312
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1853 0.0978 0.0795 0.1186 0.3412 0.3312 0.2826 0.3800 0.0787 0.4576
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2867 0.5762 0.6497 0.4973 0.0449 0.0485 0.1000 0.0244 0.6532 0.0050
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2562 0.0945 0.1476 0.1411 0.3494 0.3500 0.3103 0.3790 0.1115 0.4223
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1374 0.5894 0.3974 0.4188 0.0396 0.0364 0.0697 0.0248 0.5236 0.0103
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1028 0.1248 0.0430 0.2387 0.3083 0.3999 0.4354 0.3948 0.2480 0.4518
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5569 0.4750 0.8064 0.1673 0.0715 0.0157 0.0089 0.0189 0.1509 0.0057
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1436 -0.0195 0.2240 0.1285 0.3184 0.2809 0.4060 0.5288 0.0831 0.3324
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4105 0.9117 0.1958 0.4621 0.0623 0.0971 0.0155 0.0011 0.6350 0.0476
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0686 0.0473 -0.1427 0.0551 0.1562 0.1258 0.0130 -0.0315 0.1876 0.2983
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6955 0.7873 0.4134 0.7531 0.3702 0.4646 0.9411 0.8576 0.2804 0.0772
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0248 -0.0414 -0.0942 -0.0629 -0.0927 -0.0618 -0.1006 -0.1118 0.0378 0.0382
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8877 0.8133 0.5902 0.7195 0.5964 0.7202 0.5651 0.5224 0.8294 0.8248
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1084 -0.0617 -0.1213 0.1252 0.0444 -0.0688 0.0903 0.0378 0.1429 0.1987
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5418 0.7290 0.4943 0.4804 0.8030 0.6947 0.6115 0.8318 0.4200 0.2526
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

360
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation 0.5659 0.4611 0.4708 0.2806 0.5766 0.4849 0.6054 0.2277 -0.0610 0.1343
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0004 0.0053 0.0043 0.1026 0.0003 0.0032 0.0001 0.1884 0.7446 0.4562
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4120 0.3707 0.3322 0.5210 0.4744 0.4952 0.4910 0.4178 0.1003 0.2765
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0139 0.0284 0.0512 0.0013 0.0040 0.0025 0.0027 0.0125 0.5915 0.1194
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4143 0.3336 0.3138 0.2009 0.4123 0.3257 0.5899 0.2129 -0.0060 -0.0108
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0134 0.0502 0.0664 0.2473 0.0139 0.0562 0.0002 0.2195 0.9744 0.9524
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2866 0.2052 0.2598 0.5555 0.2704 0.3519 0.4028 0.5841 -0.0102 0.1857
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0951 0.2371 0.1318 0.0005 0.1162 0.0381 0.0164 0.0002 0.9566 0.3007
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1651 0.3332 0.2442 0.5936 0.2898 0.2354 0.3361 0.3215 0.3038 0.2751
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3432 0.0504 0.1574 0.0002 0.0913 0.1735 0.0484 0.0597 0.0966 0.1212
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4182 0.3940 0.3400 0.3070 0.4537 0.4372 0.3733 0.1751 -0.0310 0.1960
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0111 0.0174 0.0425 0.0686 0.0054 0.0077 0.0249 0.3069 0.8662 0.2665
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3910 0.4290 0.3660 0.3896 0.4986 0.4416 0.3532 0.2419 0.0546 0.2685
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0184 0.0090 0.0281 0.0188 0.0020 0.0070 0.0346 0.1553 0.7666 0.1247
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4833 0.4344 0.3482 0.3778 0.3942 0.3629 0.3892 0.1522 0.1186 0.3540
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0028 0.0081 0.0374 0.0231 0.0174 0.0296 0.0190 0.3755 0.5181 0.0400
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3326 0.2971 0.2789 0.5037 0.3621 0.4183 0.2200 0.4283 0.1090 0.3607
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0475 0.0785 0.0995 0.0017 0.0300 0.0111 0.1973 0.0092 0.5527 0.0361
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1508 0.1551 0.0644 0.1145 -0.0166 0.0281 0.0224 -0.0467 0.1736 0.2036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3799 0.3663 0.7089 0.5063 0.9236 0.8708 0.8967 0.7866 0.3421 0.2481
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0199 0.0073 -0.0168 0.1167 -0.0436 -0.0079 0.0079 0.0137 0.0936 0.0815
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9083 0.9665 0.9227 0.4977 0.8008 0.9636 0.9637 0.9367 0.6104 0.6470
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1412 0.2144 0.1352 0.1560 -0.0670 -0.0168 -0.0141 0.0940 0.2097 0.2987
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4184 0.2161 0.4387 0.3707 0.7021 0.9238 0.9361 0.5911 0.2575 0.0913
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 31.0000 33.0000

361
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.1011 0.0871 -0.0502 0.0867 0.3808 0.3658 0.2297 0.2515 0.1763 0.2798
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5758 0.6299 0.7813 0.6428 0.0315 0.0395 0.2060 0.1723 0.3513 0.1210
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3299 0.2153 0.1230 0.2661 0.4816 0.5200 0.3456 0.3374 0.3406 0.4085
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0608 0.2288 0.4951 0.1480 0.0053 0.0023 0.0527 0.0635 0.0655 0.0203
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1786 0.0672 -0.0398 0.1688 0.2133 0.2908 0.1853 0.1772 0.1787 0.2376
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3199 0.7103 0.8258 0.3640 0.2412 0.1064 0.3099 0.3401 0.3448 0.1904
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2511 0.0566 0.1207 0.1825 0.3763 0.4083 0.2402 0.2662 0.0870 0.2795
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1587 0.7544 0.5034 0.3258 0.0338 0.0204 0.1855 0.1477 0.6475 0.1213
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5201 0.4447 0.2564 0.2906 0.4033 0.5036 0.3891 0.3926 0.2735 0.2978
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0019 0.0095 0.1498 0.1128 0.0221 0.0033 0.0277 0.0289 0.1436 0.0979
sqrtQIIID2a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1855 0.1989 -0.0087 -0.0217 0.4067 0.4391 0.2233 0.2580 0.1755 0.3326
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2934 0.2594 0.9610 0.9062 0.0188 0.0106 0.2116 0.1539 0.3451 0.0586
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2705 0.2750 0.0801 0.1006 0.4854 0.5242 0.3272 0.3460 0.2923 0.4241
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1218 0.1154 0.6525 0.5840 0.0042 0.0017 0.0631 0.0524 0.1105 0.0139
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3665 0.3306 0.0958 0.1558 0.5636 0.6369 0.3511 0.3644 0.2228 0.3613
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0330 0.0562 0.5900 0.3946 0.0006 0.0001 0.0451 0.0403 0.2284 0.0388
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3880 0.2890 0.1683 0.1522 0.5579 0.6178 0.3574 0.3926 0.2138 0.4736
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0234 0.0974 0.3414 0.4056 0.0007 0.0001 0.0412 0.0262 0.2482 0.0054
sqrtQIIID2e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3371 0.1211 0.0991 0.0535 0.1137 0.1636 -0.0107 0.0292 0.0160 0.1020
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0512 0.4950 0.5770 0.7710 0.5287 0.3628 0.9529 0.8738 0.9319 0.5723
sqrtQIVA1
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1761 0.0531 0.0508 0.0241 0.0626 0.1178 -0.0033 0.0070 0.0259 0.0479
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3192 0.7657 0.7754 0.8958 0.7294 0.5139 0.9853 0.9698 0.8901 0.7911
sqrtQIVA2
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3641 0.1787 0.2001 0.3517 0.4703 0.4902 0.3475 0.3792 0.1566 0.1802
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0373 0.3198 0.2643 0.0523 0.0066 0.0044 0.0513 0.0354 0.4084 0.3237
sqrtQIVA3
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 30.0000 32.0000

362
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.2055 0.2069 0.1952 0.2213 0.2514 0.2606 0.3865 0.2565 0.1688 0.3611
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2675 0.2642 0.3014 0.2159 0.1581 0.1430 0.0263 0.1496 0.3399 0.0331
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3510 0.3231 0.2686 0.3407 0.3091 0.3617 0.4591 0.3025 0.1747 0.1456
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0528 0.0762 0.1512 0.0524 0.0801 0.0386 0.0072 0.0871 0.3232 0.4041
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2264 0.2829 0.1647 0.1701 0.1712 0.2459 0.3474 0.2382 0.2413 0.2324
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2207 0.1231 0.3844 0.3439 0.3408 0.1678 0.0476 0.1820 0.1692 0.1791
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2817 0.2414 0.2562 0.1917 0.2375 0.2791 0.3436 0.2872 0.1641 0.0813
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1247 0.1908 0.1717 0.2852 0.1833 0.1158 0.0503 0.1051 0.3537 0.6425
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3123 0.2975 0.2060 0.1149 0.2231 0.2606 0.1569 0.0475 0.4457 0.0042
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0871 0.1041 0.2747 0.5244 0.2121 0.1430 0.3831 0.7929 0.0082 0.9810
sqrtQIIID2a
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3441 0.2385 0.2287 0.1964 0.3192 0.3171 0.2830 0.1744 0.1327 0.3385
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0538 0.1886 0.2159 0.2657 0.0658 0.0677 0.1048 0.3238 0.4474 0.0435
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3949 0.3012 0.2694 0.2917 0.3596 0.3551 0.3395 0.2175 0.1273 0.2883
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0253 0.0938 0.1427 0.0941 0.0367 0.0393 0.0495 0.2165 0.4660 0.0882
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4161 0.2656 0.2167 0.3070 0.4034 0.4368 0.3652 0.2460 0.2966 0.3935
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0179 0.1418 0.2416 0.0774 0.0180 0.0098 0.0337 0.1608 0.0836 0.0176
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4864 0.3513 0.3099 0.2616 0.4203 0.4287 0.3657 0.2936 0.1620 0.2210
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0048 0.0487 0.0898 0.1351 0.0133 0.0114 0.0334 0.0919 0.3525 0.1953
sqrtQIIID2e
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1657 0.0801 -0.0097 0.0443 0.1762 0.2587 0.0605 -0.0270 -0.0305 0.1503
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3647 0.6630 0.9588 0.8035 0.3188 0.1396 0.7340 0.8794 0.8618 0.3817
sqrtQIVA1
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0824 0.0561 0.0371 0.0329 0.0884 0.1112 0.0392 0.0141 0.1332 0.1325
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6538 0.7604 0.8429 0.8535 0.6193 0.5311 0.8259 0.9371 0.4456 0.4412
sqrtQIVA2
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2596 0.2312 0.2499 0.2085 0.2821 0.3266 0.2759 0.2502 0.1338 0.2814
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1584 0.2107 0.1829 0.2442 0.1117 0.0636 0.1201 0.1603 0.4505 0.1015
sqrtQIVA3
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000

363
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.3847 0.3798 0.2279 0.6244 1.0000 0.8026 0.8367 0.7218 0.5215 0.7429
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0225 0.0244 0.1880 0.0001 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3799 0.1910 0.2346 0.7451 0.8026 1.0000 0.7652 0.8388 0.5921 0.5740
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0244 0.2718 0.1750 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3031 0.4205 0.1730 0.7309 0.8367 0.7652 1.0000 0.7454 0.5839 0.5336
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0768 0.0119 0.3203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0003 0.0010
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2621 0.2136 0.3145 0.8610 0.7218 0.8388 0.7454 1.0000 0.6301 0.5652
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1282 0.2180 0.0657 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0001 0.0004
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1217 0.1578 0.1320 0.6773 0.5215 0.5921 0.5839 0.6301 1.0000 0.6279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4862 0.3651 0.4499 0.0000 0.0016 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 . 0.0001
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3611 0.3697 0.2666 0.4875 0.7429 0.5740 0.5336 0.5652 0.6279 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0305 0.0265 0.1159 0.0040 0.0000 0.0003 0.0010 0.0004 0.0001 .
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3753 0.3133 0.2476 0.5190 0.7025 0.6777 0.5202 0.5840 0.6703 0.9533
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0241 0.0628 0.1454 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4306 0.4785 0.3484 0.5302 0.7276 0.6264 0.6078 0.5612 0.6914 0.8766
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0087 0.0032 0.0373 0.0015 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3836 0.2707 0.3784 0.5762 0.5567 0.6783 0.4824 0.6977 0.7477 0.8155
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0209 0.1102 0.0229 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2397 0.0857 0.0085 0.0581 0.0086 -0.0119 -0.0012 0.0231 0.1966 0.1894
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1591 0.6190 0.9607 0.7480 0.9607 0.9460 0.9943 0.8954 0.2577 0.2685
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2001 0.1293 0.1471 -0.0825 -0.1697 -0.1323 -0.1856 -0.1187 -0.0114 -0.0352
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2421 0.4522 0.3918 0.6479 0.3297 0.4488 0.2858 0.4972 0.9483 0.8386
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3763 0.3482 0.2982 0.2669 0.0685 0.1054 0.0864 0.1817 0.2231 0.1060
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0259 0.0404 0.0819 0.1397 0.7003 0.5531 0.6269 0.3039 0.2047 0.5445
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

364
Table A6, continued (Row 8, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.7025 0.7276 0.5567 0.0086 -0.1697 0.0685 0.3836 -0.0858 -0.0429 0.0741
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.9607 0.3297 0.7003 0.0276 0.6240 0.8094 0.6821
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6777 0.6264 0.6783 -0.0119 -0.1323 0.1054 0.4469 -0.0358 -0.0303 0.1898
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.9460 0.4488 0.5531 0.0091 0.8381 0.8650 0.2901
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5202 0.6078 0.4824 -0.0012 -0.1856 0.0864 0.2712 0.0676 -0.0118 -0.0347
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0014 0.0001 0.0033 0.9943 0.2858 0.6269 0.1269 0.6997 0.9471 0.8479
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5840 0.5612 0.6977 0.0231 -0.1187 0.1817 0.1971 -0.0335 -0.0056 0.2431
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.8954 0.4972 0.3039 0.2716 0.8485 0.9749 0.1728
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6703 0.6914 0.7477 0.1966 -0.0114 0.2231 0.2822 -0.1921 -0.0879 0.3376
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2577 0.9483 0.2047 0.1115 0.2689 0.6211 0.0588
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.9533 0.8766 0.8155 0.1894 -0.0352 0.1060 0.3539 -0.2484 -0.1162 0.2327
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2685 0.8386 0.5445 0.0400 0.1441 0.5061 0.1925
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.8595 0.8809 0.1438 -0.0574 0.0931 0.3854 -0.2283 -0.1323 0.2434
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.4026 0.7393 0.5947 0.0244 0.1805 0.4485 0.1723
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8595 1.0000 0.8018 0.1731 -0.0246 0.2020 0.2961 -0.2587 -0.1031 0.2934
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.3128 0.8869 0.2446 0.0890 0.1276 0.5554 0.0974
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8809 0.8018 1.0000 0.2164 0.0058 0.2163 0.2794 -0.1450 -0.0616 0.3916
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.2050 0.9734 0.2120 0.1096 0.3986 0.7254 0.0242
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1438 0.1731 0.2164 1.0000 0.5700 0.6709 0.0655 0.0921 0.0066 0.4036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4026 0.3128 0.2050 . 0.0003 0.0000 0.7130 0.5932 0.9698 0.0198
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0574 -0.0246 0.0058 0.5700 1.0000 0.5323 -0.0997 -0.0019 -0.0312 0.3057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7393 0.8869 0.9734 0.0003 . 0.0010 0.5748 0.9913 0.8587 0.0836
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0931 0.2020 0.2163 0.6709 0.5323 1.0000 0.0292 -0.1935 0.0019 0.2858
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5947 0.2446 0.2120 0.0000 0.0010 . 0.8717 0.2654 0.9917 0.1128
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000

365
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.1126 -0.3136 -0.1166 -0.0908 -0.1674 0.1451 0.1769 0.2895 0.1668 0.0464
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5259 0.0709 0.5114 0.6095 0.3440 0.4129 0.3169 0.0968 0.3458 0.7946
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0287 -0.0640 0.0205 -0.2604 -0.1845 -0.1589 -0.1265 -0.0129 -0.2391 0.0134
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8680 0.7108 0.9057 0.1250 0.2813 0.3545 0.4621 0.9406 0.1602 0.9384
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0400 0.1170 0.1854 0.1977 -0.0653 0.0121 0.0783 0.0283 0.1825 0.2487
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8195 0.5031 0.2864 0.2548 0.7093 0.9450 0.6548 0.8720 0.2939 0.1497
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1693 0.3071 0.2647 0.1013 0.0011 0.1583 0.0522 0.3089 0.0541 0.2656
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3464 0.0821 0.1366 0.5750 0.9951 0.3789 0.7729 0.0802 0.7649 0.1352
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

366
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.0613 -0.3000 -0.2011 -0.2275 0.0274 0.0237 -0.3674 -0.0811 -0.1987 -0.2636
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7347 0.0847 0.2541 0.1957 0.8780 0.8939 0.0325 0.6486 0.2599 0.1320
sqrtQIVA5
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0508 -0.0716 -0.0987 -0.0693 -0.0159 -0.0877 -0.0528 0.0901 -0.0004 0.1326
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7719 0.6782 0.5670 0.6881 0.9268 0.6111 0.7597 0.6014 0.9983 0.4406
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1871 0.2606 -0.0474 -0.0792 -0.1426 0.0388 -0.1169 -0.2959 -0.2056 -0.1085
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2894 0.1305 0.7868 0.6510 0.4139 0.8251 0.5037 0.0843 0.2361 0.5350
sqrtQIVA8
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1008 0.1789 0.1173 0.1329 0.1533 0.2197 0.1397 0.0123 0.1382 0.0998
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5767 0.3193 0.5155 0.4610 0.3945 0.2192 0.4381 0.9460 0.4431 0.5805
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

367
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.2154 0.0993 -0.0521 -0.1372 0.0015 0.0635 -0.1624 -0.2116 -0.1671 -0.0822
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2212 0.5762 0.7700 0.4391 0.9932 0.7212 0.3588 0.2296 0.3526 0.6440
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1726 0.1235 -0.0101 0.0575 -0.0107 -0.0614 0.0765 0.0666 -0.0981 -0.0328
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3140 0.4729 0.9535 0.7392 0.9523 0.7262 0.6621 0.7036 0.5811 0.8516
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2587 -0.2521 0.0640 -0.1378 -0.1731 0.2567 -0.0302 -0.0590 -0.0177 -0.2230
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1335 0.1440 0.7150 0.4300 0.3277 0.1366 0.8634 0.7364 0.9211 0.1979
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0549 -0.0632 0.0389 0.0614 0.0560 -0.0784 -0.1021 -0.0800 0.1183 -0.0690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7615 0.7268 0.8299 0.7343 0.7609 0.6644 0.5717 0.6581 0.5189 0.7030
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000

368
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity
in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1445 -0.1517 -0.0647 -0.0922 -0.1561 0.1102 0.1253 0.0593 -0.0193 0.2925
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4148 0.3919 0.7163 0.6041 0.3780 0.5349 0.4803 0.7389 0.9150 0.0986
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0430 0.0874 0.0278 -0.0212 0.0376 0.1971 -0.2223 -0.0972 0.1354 -0.1068
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8064 0.6176 0.8740 0.9037 0.8300 0.2565 0.1992 0.5786 0.4381 0.5414
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2447 -0.2093 -0.2141 -0.2333 -0.2012 -0.1516 -0.0648 -0.2430 -0.1746 0.0432
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1566 0.2276 0.2168 0.1774 0.2465 0.3845 0.7114 0.1595 0.3233 0.8083
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0409 -0.0088 -0.0584 0.0609 0.0000 -0.0489 0.0373 0.0842 0.2663 0.0819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8211 0.9611 0.7470 0.7362 1.0000 0.7870 0.8365 0.6414 0.1406 0.6557
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000

369
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIIB1a
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CSIE
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-DWMD
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt SupportTVP
Perceived Effectiveness
Domestic Govt Support-CBP
sqrtQIIC1a
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.2711 0.2011 0.0556 0.0988 0.2648 0.1586 0.1183 -0.0183 -0.1010 0.3658
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1271 0.2619 0.7588 0.5844 0.1364 0.3703 0.5119 0.9194 0.5759 0.0334
sqrtQIVA5
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0749 -0.0363 0.1172 -0.0153 -0.0239 0.0427 -0.0332 -0.0270 0.1827 0.1860
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6689 0.8360 0.5026 0.9305 0.8916 0.8049 0.8498 0.8775 0.2936 0.2774
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1244 0.3014 0.2077 -0.1597 -0.1045 -0.0391 -0.0354 -0.1465 0.0216 0.0146
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4832 0.0832 0.2385 0.3671 0.5563 0.8237 0.8425 0.4082 0.9033 0.9339
sqrtQIVA8
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2899 0.0322 0.1375 0.1598 0.2282 0.3143 0.4093 0.4199 0.2361 0.1464
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1076 0.8611 0.4529 0.3823 0.2090 0.0748 0.0200 0.0167 0.1933 0.4161
Political
Ideology
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000

370
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIC1c
Perceived Deterrence Domestic
Law-TVP
sqrtQIIC1e
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIF1a
sqrtQIIF1b
Pearson Correlation 0.2188 0.2415 0.0767 0.1165 0.3660 0.3984 0.3035 0.0006 0.1776 0.2395
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2137 0.1688 0.6664 0.5116 0.0333 0.0196 0.0810 0.9973 0.3391 0.1794
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1353 0.1855 0.2336 -0.1753 -0.1921 -0.2136 -0.0707 -0.0284 0.0042 -0.1961
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4313 0.2788 0.1704 0.3065 0.2618 0.2110 0.6818 0.8692 0.9818 0.2662
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0876 -0.0115 0.0314 0.0904 0.0446 0.0309 0.0867 0.0727 -0.2700 -0.2826
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6167 0.9476 0.8580 0.6055 0.7993 0.8601 0.6206 0.6780 0.1350 0.1054
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2418 0.1152 0.1854 0.4608 0.1078 0.1871 0.0611 0.3480 0.1344 0.2361
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1752 0.5233 0.3016 0.0070 0.5503 0.2972 0.7357 0.0472 0.4788 0.1933
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 30.0000 32.0000

371
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIF1c
sqrtQIIF1d
sqrtQIIF1e
sqrtQIIF3a
sqrtQIIF3b
sqrtQIIF3c
sqrtQIIF3d
sqrtQIIF3e
sqrtQIIH1a
sqrtQIIH1b
Pearson Correlation 0.4104 0.3166 0.1539 0.1114 0.3467 0.3564 0.2840 0.2612 0.3603 0.3797
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0177 0.0726 0.3925 0.5506 0.0519 0.0453 0.1152 0.1559 0.0548 0.0351
sqrtQIVA5
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 29.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0459 -0.1818 -0.0809 0.0366 -0.2480 -0.1760 -0.1771 -0.1990 -0.0264 -0.0114
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7964 0.3034 0.6491 0.8425 0.1641 0.3273 0.3242 0.2748 0.8880 0.9497
sqrtQIVA7
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1944 -0.2812 -0.2682 -0.2630 -0.2199 -0.1814 -0.2564 -0.2412 -0.2494 -0.2635
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2706 0.1072 0.1252 0.1458 0.2189 0.3123 0.1498 0.1836 0.1839 0.1451
sqrtQIVA8
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 30.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2775 0.2006 0.1522 0.0779 0.2636 0.3096 0.1763 0.2026 0.0261 0.1321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1242 0.2709 0.4058 0.6826 0.1519 0.0901 0.3428 0.2830 0.8953 0.4864
Political
Ideology
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 30.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 28.0000 30.0000

372
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIH1c
sqrtQIIH1d
sqrtQIIH1e
sqrtQIIH3a
sqrtQIIH3b
sqrtQIIH3c
sqrtQIIH3d
sqrtQIIH3e
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.3078 0.3320 0.2606 0.1032 0.3122 0.3255 0.2533 0.0530 -0.1075 -0.0871
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0980 0.0730 0.1721 0.5742 0.0819 0.0691 0.1619 0.7731 0.5515 0.6241
sqrtQIVA5
N 30.0000 30.0000 29.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1064 0.0077 -0.0777 -0.0003 -0.0973 -0.0759 0.0446 0.0377 -0.1239 -0.0378
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5621 0.9666 0.6780 0.9986 0.5840 0.6695 0.8023 0.8325 0.4782 0.8268
sqrtQIVA7
N 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2441 -0.2446 -0.2274 -0.2805 -0.2809 -0.2665 -0.2701 -0.2608 -0.1046 -0.0375
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1857 0.1848 0.2268 0.1139 0.1133 0.1338 0.1285 0.1427 0.5559 0.8308
sqrtQIVA8
N 31.0000 31.0000 30.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1971 0.1049 0.1074 0.0473 0.2016 0.1985 0.0586 0.0391 0.2577 0.0529
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3054 0.5881 0.5864 0.8004 0.2767 0.2843 0.7540 0.8344 0.1545 0.7698
Political
Ideology
N 29.0000 29.0000 28.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 31.0000 32.0000 33.0000

373
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0113 -0.1313 -0.1273 0.2827 0.3836 0.4469 0.2712 0.1971 0.2822 0.3539
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9496 0.4593 0.4732 0.1233 0.0276 0.0091 0.1269 0.2716 0.1115 0.0400
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0143 -0.0541 -0.1297 -0.1366 -0.0858 -0.0358 0.0676 -0.0335 -0.1921 -0.2484
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9342 0.7538 0.4509 0.4485 0.6240 0.8381 0.6997 0.8485 0.2689 0.1441
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0063 -0.0047 0.0381 0.0378 -0.0429 -0.0303 -0.0118 -0.0056 -0.0879 -0.1162
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9714 0.9785 0.8280 0.8375 0.8094 0.8650 0.9471 0.9749 0.6211 0.5061
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2063 0.0506 0.2530 0.2165 0.0741 0.1898 -0.0347 0.2431 0.3376 0.2327
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2495 0.7798 0.1554 0.2420 0.6821 0.2901 0.8479 0.1728 0.0588 0.1925
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000

374
Table A6, continued (Row 9, Col 10)
Correlation Matrix, Dependent
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation
International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.3854 0.2961 0.2794 0.0655 -0.0997 0.0292 1.0000 -0.2149 -0.1246 -0.1715
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0244 0.0890 0.1096 0.7130 0.5748 0.8717 . 0.2223 0.4828 0.3480
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2283 -0.2587 -0.1450 0.0921 -0.0019 -0.1935 -0.2149 1.0000 -0.0698 -0.0214
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1805 0.1276 0.3986 0.5932 0.9913 0.2654 0.2223 . 0.6904 0.9059
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1323 -0.1031 -0.0616 0.0066 -0.0312 0.0019 -0.1246 -0.0698 1.0000 0.0146
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4485 0.5554 0.7254 0.9698 0.8587 0.9917 0.4828 0.6904 . 0.9356
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2434 0.2934 0.3916 0.4036 0.3057 0.2858 -0.1715 -0.0214 0.0146 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1723 0.0974 0.0242 0.0198 0.0836 0.1128 0.3480 0.9059 0.9356 .
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

375
Appendix 7: Correlation Matrix – International Variables (Parametric)

Table A7 is broken down into the following 72 sub-tables, arranged in a matrix of 8
rows and 9 columns:

Row 1
Col 1
Row 1
Col 2
Row 1
Col 3
Row 1
Col 4
Row 1
Col 5
Row 1
Col 6
Row 1
Col 7
Row 1
Col 8
Row 1
Col 9
Row 2
Col 1
Row 2
Col 2
Row 2
Col 3
Row 2
Col 4
Row 2
Col 5
Row 2
Col 6
Row 2
Col 7
Row 2
Col 8
Row 2
Col 9
Row 3
Col 1
Row 3
Col 2
Row 3
Col 3
Row 3
Col 4
Row 3
Col 5
Row 3
Col 6
Row 3
Col 7
Row 3
Col 8
Row 3
Col 9
Row 4
Col 1
Row 4
Col 2
Row 4
Col 3
Row 4
Col 4
Row 4
Col 5
Row 4
Col 6
Row 4
Col 7
Row 4
Col 8
Row 4
Col 9
Row 5
Col 1
Row 5
Col 2
Row 5
Col 3
Row 5
Col 4
Row 5
Col 5
Row 5
Col 6
Row 5
Col 7
Row 5
Col 8
Row 5
Col 9
Row 6
Col 1
Row 6
Col 2
Row 6
Col 3
Row 6
Col 4
Row 6
Col 5
Row 6
Col 6
Row 6
Col 7
Row 6
Col 8
Row 6
Col 9
Row 7
Col 1
Row 7
Col 2
Row 7
Col 3
Row 7
Col 4
Row 7
Col 5
Row 7
Col 6
Row 7
Col 7
Row 7
Col 8
Row 7
Col 9
Row 8
Col 1
Row 8
Col 2
Row 8
Col 3
Row 8
Col 4
Row 8
Col 5
Row 8
Col 6
Row 8
Col 7
Row 8
Col 8
Row 8
Col 9

376
Table A7. Correlation Matrix – International Variables (Parametric) (Row 1, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 -0.0784 -0.0965 -0.0759 -0.1760 0.4053 0.0395 -0.1727 -0.1831 -0.0867
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.6496 0.5757 0.6598 0.3047 0.0142 0.8193 0.3137 0.2852 0.6150
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0784 1.0000 0.6310 0.2015 0.4542 0.2640 -0.2259 -0.1211 0.0181 0.0993
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6496 . 0.0000 0.2386 0.0054 0.1198 0.1852 0.4818 0.9165 0.5647
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0965 0.6310 1.0000 0.4053 0.1972 0.2011 -0.2008 -0.1053 -0.0978 0.0536
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5757 0.0000 . 0.0142 0.2489 0.2397 0.2403 0.5409 0.5703 0.7560
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0759 0.2015 0.4053 1.0000 0.1431 0.1065 -0.1408 0.0206 -0.1564 0.0659
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6598 0.2386 0.0142 . 0.4052 0.5366 0.4126 0.9050 0.3622 0.7024
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1760 0.4542 0.1972 0.1431 1.0000 -0.1598 -0.0782 -0.2644 -0.0633 -0.4163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3047 0.0054 0.2489 0.4052 . 0.3520 0.6505 0.1192 0.7136 0.0115
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4053 0.2640 0.2011 0.1065 -0.1598 1.0000 0.2037 0.2523 0.2008 0.3338
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0142 0.1198 0.2397 0.5366 0.3520 . 0.2335 0.1376 0.2402 0.0466
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0395 -0.2259 -0.2008 -0.1408 -0.0782 0.2037 1.0000 0.5816 0.4286 0.5001
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8193 0.1852 0.2403 0.4126 0.6505 0.2335 . 0.0002 0.0091 0.0019
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1727 -0.1211 -0.1053 0.0206 -0.2644 0.2523 0.5816 1.0000 0.3046 0.6419
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3137 0.4818 0.5409 0.9050 0.1192 0.1376 0.0002 . 0.0708 0.0000
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1831 0.0181 -0.0978 -0.1564 -0.0633 0.2008 0.4286 0.3046 1.0000 0.5803
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2852 0.9165 0.5703 0.3622 0.7136 0.2402 0.0091 0.0708 . 0.0002
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0867 0.0993 0.0536 0.0659 -0.4163 0.3338 0.5001 0.6419 0.5803 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6150 0.5647 0.7560 0.7024 0.0115 0.0466 0.0019 0.0000 0.0002 .
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0786 0.0433 0.1506 0.0706 0.0150 0.0094 -0.0175 -0.0949 -0.1211 -0.0438
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6535 0.8050 0.3879 0.6871 0.9319 0.9572 0.9206 0.5878 0.4883 0.8029
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

377
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.0786 -0.2521 -0.0060 -0.1118 0.0017 -0.1143 -0.0332 -0.1285 -0.1699 -0.0555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6535 0.1380 0.9725 0.5161 0.9923 0.5070 0.8474 0.4550 0.3218 0.7476
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0433 0.0491 -0.1074 -0.0574 0.0673 0.1222 -0.0507 -0.0880 -0.0058 -0.0091
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8050 0.7762 0.5329 0.7396 0.6965 0.4777 0.7692 0.6099 0.9732 0.9579
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1506 0.1354 -0.1398 -0.1409 -0.0870 0.0631 -0.0964 -0.2280 -0.0994 -0.1168
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3879 0.4311 0.4162 0.4125 0.6141 0.7148 0.5758 0.1811 0.5643 0.4976
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0706 0.1898 0.0012 -0.0396 -0.1839 -0.0777 -0.2668 -0.2106 -0.1638 -0.1988
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6871 0.2676 0.9945 0.8186 0.2829 0.6526 0.1157 0.2177 0.3397 0.2451
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0150 0.0699 0.0140 0.0473 0.0016 -0.0052 0.0638 0.0616 0.1821 0.1008
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9319 0.6854 0.9356 0.7840 0.9928 0.9760 0.7115 0.7211 0.2879 0.5587
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0094 0.0171 0.0056 0.0112 0.2065 0.0536 0.0157 0.1585 0.0430 0.0533
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9572 0.9213 0.9743 0.9483 0.2270 0.7560 0.9276 0.3558 0.8033 0.7575
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0175 0.1009 -0.0019 -0.0190 0.0853 0.2558 0.2258 -0.0792 -0.0393 0.0626
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9206 0.5582 0.9911 0.9126 0.6208 0.1320 0.1854 0.6460 0.8202 0.7166
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0949 -0.0720 -0.2415 -0.2339 0.2980 0.2285 -0.0585 -0.1197 -0.1135 -0.1099
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5878 0.6766 0.1560 0.1698 0.0775 0.1802 0.7349 0.4868 0.5097 0.5235
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1211 0.1074 0.0093 -0.0248 0.0830 -0.0120 0.0177 -0.0164 0.0170 0.0758
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4883 0.5331 0.9572 0.8859 0.6301 0.9445 0.9184 0.9245 0.9215 0.6605
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0438 0.1384 -0.0687 -0.1326 0.1690 0.2170 -0.0706 -0.1110 -0.1189 0.0121
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8029 0.4207 0.6905 0.4409 0.3243 0.2037 0.6824 0.5192 0.4899 0.9442
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.3118 0.3342 0.2759 0.1914 0.4520 0.3708 0.5510 0.6237 0.5042
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0683 0.0497 0.1087 0.2708 0.0064 0.0283 0.0006 0.0001 0.0020
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

378
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.0670 0.0461 0.0229 -0.0208 0.0133 -0.2552 -0.1379 -0.1090 -0.2357 -0.2130
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6979 0.7894 0.8946 0.9041 0.9404 0.1390 0.4295 0.5331 0.1795 0.2193
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0368 -0.0333 0.0465 -0.1078 -0.1596 -0.1996 -0.3436 -0.2567 -0.0838 -0.1647
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8314 0.8470 0.7876 0.5314 0.3674 0.2502 0.0433 0.1366 0.6376 0.3445
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0162 -0.0776 -0.0535 -0.0861 -0.2365 -0.1862 -0.3719 -0.2689 -0.0101 -0.0928
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9253 0.6528 0.7567 0.6178 0.1782 0.2843 0.0278 0.1184 0.9550 0.5960
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1624 0.0044 -0.1854 -0.2570 -0.3896 -0.0401 -0.1642 -0.1838 0.1432 -0.0628
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3439 0.9796 0.2789 0.1303 0.0227 0.8190 0.3458 0.2906 0.4192 0.7202
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2367 -0.1415 -0.0606 0.1232 0.0326 0.0005 -0.0840 -0.0341 0.1655 0.0211
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1646 0.4104 0.7254 0.4741 0.8548 0.9978 0.6316 0.8458 0.3496 0.9040
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0124 0.0984 0.0694 -0.0188 -0.0214 -0.1127 -0.1504 -0.1441 -0.2154 -0.2287
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9427 0.5681 0.6876 0.9131 0.9043 0.5192 0.3884 0.4090 0.2211 0.1863
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0357 -0.0247 0.1843 0.1111 0.2403 0.0762 -0.0412 -0.0791 0.0355 0.1035
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8364 0.8862 0.2818 0.5187 0.1711 0.6634 0.8141 0.6516 0.8419 0.5540
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1635 0.0217 -0.0188 -0.1551 0.2145 -0.0246 -0.2739 -0.3116 -0.0703 -0.0973
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3406 0.9001 0.9134 0.3663 0.2232 0.8886 0.1114 0.0684 0.6926 0.5783
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0869 -0.2842 -0.0105 -0.0370 -0.0719 0.0081 -0.0646 -0.1464 -0.2233 -0.2894
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6142 0.0930 0.9517 0.8303 0.6860 0.9632 0.7124 0.4014 0.2043 0.0917
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0616 0.0032 0.1416 -0.0556 -0.1157 -0.0850 -0.1819 -0.2547 -0.1197 -0.1697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7213 0.9854 0.4100 0.7474 0.5145 0.6275 0.2956 0.1398 0.5001 0.3299
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5982 0.5175 0.3957 0.4968 0.5355 0.3713 0.2971 0.3371 0.4286 0.6521
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0015 0.0186 0.0024 0.0013 0.0306 0.0879 0.0512 0.0128 0.0000
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

379
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity
in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1288 -0.0368 -0.0218 0.0492 -0.0220 -0.0396 0.0261 0.0753 0.0714 -0.0032
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4609 0.8339 0.9009 0.7792 0.9000 0.8214 0.8818 0.6674 0.6836 0.9852
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2495 -0.2400 -0.2306 -0.3141 -0.1516 -0.0530 -0.3126 -0.3260 0.3292 -0.2346
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1483 0.1649 0.1827 0.0661 0.3846 0.7622 0.0675 0.0560 0.0535 0.1750
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1343 -0.2113 -0.2437 -0.3196 -0.1189 -0.0769 -0.3248 -0.2974 0.1555 0.0142
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4419 0.2231 0.1584 0.0613 0.4961 0.6604 0.0570 0.0827 0.3724 0.9356
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0683 -0.0591 -0.1340 -0.1009 0.0441 0.0348 -0.0833 -0.1055 0.1382 0.0931
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6967 0.7359 0.4429 0.5642 0.8016 0.8425 0.6341 0.5464 0.4284 0.5947
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1518 0.0927 0.1423 0.0087 0.1340 -0.1052 0.0119 0.0191 -0.1336 -0.1776
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3840 0.5964 0.4147 0.9603 0.4430 0.5474 0.9457 0.9131 0.4440 0.3073
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0945 0.0266 -0.0108 0.0917 -0.0517 0.0804 0.0776 0.0426 0.5077 0.0953
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5894 0.8796 0.9507 0.6001 0.7678 0.6460 0.6577 0.8080 0.0018 0.5859
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2007 0.0133 0.0210 0.0127 0.0840 -0.0488 0.1324 0.1116 0.0948 0.6809
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2477 0.9398 0.9048 0.9422 0.6316 0.7808 0.4484 0.5233 0.5879 0.0000
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0701 -0.1614 -0.1416 -0.1453 0.0522 0.0348 -0.1213 -0.1315 0.2332 0.5161
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6890 0.3543 0.4172 0.4050 0.7657 0.8428 0.4878 0.4513 0.1776 0.0015
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0244 -0.0382 -0.1871 -0.0797 -0.2450 -0.4343 0.0368 -0.0734 0.0326 0.1554
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8893 0.8277 0.2818 0.6492 0.1560 0.0091 0.8337 0.6753 0.8525 0.3726
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1510 -0.1665 -0.1946 -0.1955 -0.0940 -0.0865 -0.1600 -0.1675 0.4173 0.3006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3867 0.3390 0.2626 0.2604 0.5912 0.6213 0.3587 0.3362 0.0126 0.0793
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5895 0.3989 0.4226 0.3674 0.4307 0.4065 0.2378 0.2694 0.1149 -0.0396
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0194 0.0128 0.0326 0.0110 0.0171 0.1756 0.1234 0.5176 0.8241
sqrtQ1E1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

380
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)

Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation -0.2227 -0.2041 -0.1039 0.2661 -0.0291 0.0626 0.1330 0.0417 0.1539 -0.0319
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1984 0.2396 0.5527 0.1167 0.8662 0.7167 0.4393 0.8092 0.3774 0.8535
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1107 -0.1045 0.1069 0.2364 -0.1636 -0.1263 -0.1268 0.0764 0.1940 0.0782
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5268 0.5503 0.5409 0.1650 0.3404 0.4630 0.4612 0.6578 0.2642 0.6503
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0084 -0.0642 0.2938 0.1976 0.0149 0.0214 -0.0633 0.1665 0.0303 0.1695
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9620 0.7141 0.0867 0.2480 0.9312 0.9013 0.7139 0.3317 0.8627 0.3229
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0954 -0.0603 0.1321 0.2932 0.1377 0.1513 0.0183 0.2144 0.1534 0.1824
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5856 0.7308 0.4494 0.0826 0.4231 0.3783 0.9154 0.2091 0.3788 0.2870
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1624 -0.0460 -0.2579 -0.1569 -0.2225 -0.3094 -0.3146 -0.3942 -0.2490 0.1344
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3512 0.7932 0.1347 0.3609 0.1922 0.0663 0.0617 0.0174 0.1492 0.4346
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0299 0.1391 0.0992 0.6200 0.2881 0.1094 0.4848 0.2573 0.5686 0.0163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8644 0.4256 0.5707 0.0001 0.0884 0.5255 0.0027 0.1297 0.0004 0.9248
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5787 0.5195 0.2628 0.0729 0.5092 0.3940 0.4552 -0.0049 0.0614 0.4628
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0003 0.0014 0.1273 0.6725 0.0015 0.0174 0.0053 0.9774 0.7262 0.0045
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6878 0.4150 0.5338 0.4288 0.5158 0.4225 0.4073 0.3248 0.1530 0.2114
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0132 0.0010 0.0091 0.0013 0.0103 0.0137 0.0532 0.3804 0.2159
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3185 0.5869 0.1776 0.0309 0.2726 0.1807 0.4165 -0.0180 0.2038 0.2662
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0622 0.0002 0.3074 0.8582 0.1078 0.2915 0.0115 0.9168 0.2403 0.1166
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4673 0.4621 0.6159 0.3750 0.3252 0.3303 0.4434 0.3882 0.3504 0.3009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0047 0.0052 0.0001 0.0242 0.0530 0.0491 0.0068 0.0193 0.0390 0.0745
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2166 -0.1300 -0.1190 -0.0357 -0.3267 -0.3174 -0.2215 -0.1697 0.3282 0.2881
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2186 0.4636 0.5028 0.8388 0.0554 0.0632 0.2010 0.3297 0.0581 0.0933
sqrtQ1E1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

381
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation -0.1127 -0.1182 -0.1398 -0.0834 -0.0518 -0.1244 -0.1646 -0.1113 0.0214 0.1124
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5128 0.4923 0.4159 0.6445 0.7677 0.4764 0.3448 0.5246 0.9028 0.5139
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0579 -0.0618 0.3553 0.0701 -0.0744 0.0249 0.0051 0.1878 0.2075 0.0021
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7373 0.7201 0.0335 0.6984 0.6711 0.8870 0.9767 0.2800 0.2317 0.9902
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0782 -0.0557 0.3276 0.1064 0.1564 0.1364 0.1535 0.3916 0.2276 0.1330
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6503 0.7470 0.0511 0.5557 0.3696 0.4348 0.3786 0.0200 0.1886 0.4393
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2523 -0.0240 0.2496 0.0308 0.1160 0.1835 0.0920 0.2575 0.1701 0.0575
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1377 0.8894 0.1421 0.8648 0.5069 0.2913 0.5993 0.1353 0.3285 0.7391
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0069 -0.1092 -0.0503 -0.1836 -0.0204 -0.0434 -0.0947 -0.0987 -0.0940 -0.0534
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9683 0.5260 0.7708 0.3065 0.9072 0.8045 0.5886 0.5725 0.5913 0.7571
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0481 0.1280 0.1387 0.4138 0.2400 0.2866 0.2611 0.2429 0.5361 0.1694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7807 0.4570 0.4197 0.0167 0.1649 0.0951 0.1298 0.1597 0.0009 0.3233
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4045 0.3222 0.1691 0.1939 0.3670 0.2308 0.2171 -0.0035 -0.0078 0.2711
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0144 0.0553 0.3241 0.2797 0.0301 0.1821 0.2103 0.9839 0.9646 0.1098
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4489 0.2949 0.2459 0.3706 0.2723 0.4812 0.2043 0.2767 0.2198 0.2907
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0060 0.0808 0.1483 0.0337 0.1136 0.0034 0.2391 0.1075 0.2044 0.0855
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2159 0.4759 0.2935 0.1707 0.1638 0.1396 0.2787 0.0033 0.1284 0.1288
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2061 0.0033 0.0823 0.3422 0.3471 0.4239 0.1050 0.9852 0.4625 0.4541
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3780 0.4396 0.5612 0.3408 0.1460 0.3090 0.2677 0.2737 0.1527 0.0678
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0230 0.0073 0.0004 0.0523 0.4028 0.0709 0.1200 0.1117 0.3810 0.6944
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3869 0.2685 0.2605 -0.0079 -0.1191 -0.1925 -0.1203 -0.0535 -0.0563 -0.0521
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0217 0.1188 0.1307 0.9652 0.4956 0.2680 0.4912 0.7601 0.7519 0.7663
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

382
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.0449 0.0549 -0.0110 0.1272 0.1038 -0.2036 -0.1126 -0.0287 -0.0400 -0.1693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7949 0.7504 0.9491 0.4597 0.5471 0.2408 0.5259 0.8680 0.8195 0.3464
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0023 0.0373 0.0624 -0.1992 0.0760 -0.0784 -0.3136 -0.0640 0.1170 0.3071
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9895 0.8292 0.7177 0.2442 0.6595 0.6545 0.0709 0.7108 0.5031 0.0821
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0860 0.0793 0.2157 0.0037 -0.0544 -0.0162 -0.1166 0.0205 0.1854 0.2647
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6180 0.6459 0.2065 0.9827 0.7528 0.9265 0.5114 0.9057 0.2864 0.1366
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1102 0.1459 0.2396 -0.1471 -0.2229 -0.1433 -0.0908 -0.2604 0.1977 0.1013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5222 0.3959 0.1593 0.3919 0.1914 0.4115 0.6095 0.1250 0.2548 0.5750
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0231 -0.0056 -0.1143 -0.2422 -0.0831 -0.0897 -0.1674 -0.1845 -0.0653 0.0011
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8936 0.9740 0.5070 0.1546 0.6301 0.6085 0.3440 0.2813 0.7093 0.9951
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1797 0.2332 0.1194 0.1477 0.1831 -0.0036 0.1451 -0.1589 0.0121 0.1583
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2943 0.1710 0.4880 0.3899 0.2852 0.9835 0.4129 0.3545 0.9450 0.3789
sqrtQ1B1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2604 0.2177 0.0106 0.0975 -0.1039 0.0204 0.1769 -0.1265 0.0783 0.0522
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1251 0.2021 0.9511 0.5715 0.5464 0.9073 0.3169 0.4621 0.6548 0.7729
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4227 0.2247 0.3393 0.1958 0.0264 0.1837 0.2895 -0.0129 0.0283 0.3089
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0102 0.1876 0.0429 0.2525 0.8784 0.2908 0.0968 0.9406 0.8720 0.0802
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1151 0.2938 0.0382 0.1268 0.0276 0.2654 0.1668 -0.2391 0.1825 0.0541
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5040 0.0820 0.8247 0.4610 0.8732 0.1234 0.3458 0.1602 0.2939 0.7649
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1025 0.1867 0.1958 0.1346 0.0214 0.1990 0.0464 0.0134 0.2487 0.2656
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5518 0.2757 0.2524 0.4339 0.9013 0.2517 0.7946 0.9384 0.1497 0.1352
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1166 -0.0751 -0.1284 0.0884 0.2392 0.3484 -0.0613 -0.0508 -0.1871 -0.1008
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5047 0.6679 0.4624 0.6135 0.1663 0.0435 0.7347 0.7719 0.2894 0.5767
sqrtQ1E1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000

383
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation -0.0064 -0.2026 -0.1399 -0.1844 -0.1375 0.0635 -0.1400 -0.1490 -0.1739 -0.1067
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9707 0.2431 0.4228 0.2889 0.4309 0.7170 0.4155 0.3930 0.3177 0.5418
Importance of
Smuggling-
Endangered
Species
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0953 -0.0939 -0.1566 0.1203 0.2347 -0.0980 -0.2238 -0.1267 -0.1105 0.2468
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5861 0.5916 0.3690 0.4913 0.1747 0.5752 0.1895 0.4683 0.5275 0.1530
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2405 -0.0183 -0.1390 0.0633 0.0805 -0.2608 -0.1688 -0.1742 -0.1375 0.0546
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1640 0.9171 0.4259 0.7179 0.6458 0.1302 0.3251 0.3169 0.4308 0.7554
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0748 0.0756 0.0127 0.3355 0.0279 -0.0043 -0.0924 -0.0036 0.0211 -0.0489
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6693 0.6662 0.9425 0.0488 0.8734 0.9806 0.5921 0.9838 0.9042 0.7801
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1673 -0.1348 -0.1235 -0.1088 -0.0004 0.0880 -0.0269 0.0691 0.0792 0.1141
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3368 0.4401 0.4797 0.5340 0.9980 0.6151 0.8762 0.6933 0.6511 0.5139
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0681 -0.0359 0.0250 0.0906 -0.0557 0.1703 -0.1663 -0.0192 -0.0832 -0.1506
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6975 0.8376 0.8865 0.6047 0.7504 0.3279 0.3324 0.9128 0.6345 0.3878
sqrtQ1B1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1725 0.0272 0.1208 0.1077 -0.1535 -0.0971 0.1388 0.1538 -0.0643 -0.1250
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3218 0.8767 0.4893 0.5380 0.3787 0.5789 0.4195 0.3778 0.7136 0.4744
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Narcotics
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0706 0.2148 0.1422 0.4559 -0.1759 -0.1032 0.0372 0.1431 -0.0915 -0.0492
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6870 0.2153 0.4153 0.0059 0.3121 0.5551 0.8294 0.4121 0.6011 0.7790
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Weapons
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1040 0.1398 0.2626 0.1624 0.1760 0.0728 0.1104 0.2286 0.2052 0.0019
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5521 0.4231 0.1275 0.3514 0.3119 0.6776 0.5215 0.1865 0.2371 0.9914
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Humans
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0096 0.0816 0.0814 0.4283 0.1273 -0.1897 -0.1968 -0.1430 -0.1544 -0.0110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9563 0.6412 0.6421 0.0103 0.4662 0.2749 0.2501 0.4124 0.3759 0.9499
Knowledge of
Smuggling-
Contraband
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2349 -0.2137 -0.2595 -0.2588 -0.1575 -0.2875 -0.1912 -0.1564 -0.1366 -0.2977
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1811 0.2249 0.1384 0.1394 0.3737 0.0993 0.2712 0.3771 0.4411 0.0873
sqrtQ1E1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

384
Table A7, continued (Row 1, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation -0.0130 -0.1800 -0.1525 -0.1876 -0.2288
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9419 0.3008 0.3893 0.2880 0.1930
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered Species
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0318 -0.0176 -0.0339 0.0861 0.0816
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8582 0.9199 0.8490 0.6281 0.6463
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0482 0.0683 -0.0370 0.1095 0.1691
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7867 0.6968 0.8356 0.5376 0.3391
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1489 -0.0639 -0.0869 -0.0435 0.0131
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4006 0.7152 0.6249 0.8072 0.9413
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2777 -0.2819 -0.2016 -0.2844 -0.2906
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1118 0.1009 0.2528 0.1031 0.0954
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2686 0.1986 0.2744 0.2154 0.1255
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1245 0.2528 0.1163 0.2211 0.4795
sqrtQ1B1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1304 0.0605 0.1023 -0.1387 -0.1891
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4625 0.7297 0.5650 0.4340 0.2840
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0255 0.1466 0.1886 0.0749 0.0148
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8863 0.4006 0.2855 0.6737 0.9337
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1806 0.1650 0.2258 0.1630 0.1067
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3069 0.3436 0.1991 0.3570 0.5481
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1805 0.1186 0.0909 0.1928 0.1510
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3069 0.4974 0.6090 0.2745 0.3941
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1274 -0.1727 -0.2354 -0.1428 -0.1289
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4729 0.3212 0.1802 0.4205 0.4675
sqrtQ1E1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

385
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-
Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-
Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.2521 0.0491 0.1354 0.1898 0.0699 0.0171 0.1009 -0.0720 0.1074 0.1384
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1380 0.7762 0.4311 0.2676 0.6854 0.9213 0.5582 0.6766 0.5331 0.4207
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0060 -0.1074 -0.1398 0.0012 0.0140 0.0056 -0.0019 -0.2415 0.0093 -0.0687
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9725 0.5329 0.4162 0.9945 0.9356 0.9743 0.9911 0.1560 0.9572 0.6905
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1118 -0.0574 -0.1409 -0.0396 0.0473 0.0112 -0.0190 -0.2339 -0.0248 -0.1326
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5161 0.7396 0.4125 0.8186 0.7840 0.9483 0.9126 0.1698 0.8859 0.4409
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0017 0.0673 -0.0870 -0.1839 0.0016 0.2065 0.0853 0.2980 0.0830 0.1690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9923 0.6965 0.6141 0.2829 0.9928 0.2270 0.6208 0.0775 0.6301 0.3243
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1143 0.1222 0.0631 -0.0777 -0.0052 0.0536 0.2558 0.2285 -0.0120 0.2170
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5070 0.4777 0.7148 0.6526 0.9760 0.7560 0.1320 0.1802 0.9445 0.2037
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0332 -0.0507 -0.0964 -0.2668 0.0638 0.0157 0.2258 -0.0585 0.0177 -0.0706
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8474 0.7692 0.5758 0.1157 0.7115 0.9276 0.1854 0.7349 0.9184 0.6824
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1285 -0.0880 -0.2280 -0.2106 0.0616 0.1585 -0.0792 -0.1197 -0.0164 -0.1110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4550 0.6099 0.1811 0.2177 0.7211 0.3558 0.6460 0.4868 0.9245 0.5192
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1699 -0.0058 -0.0994 -0.1638 0.1821 0.0430 -0.0393 -0.1135 0.0170 -0.1189
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3218 0.9732 0.5643 0.3397 0.2879 0.8033 0.8202 0.5097 0.9215 0.4899
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0555 -0.0091 -0.1168 -0.1988 0.1008 0.0533 0.0626 -0.1099 0.0758 0.0121
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7476 0.9579 0.4976 0.2451 0.5587 0.7575 0.7166 0.5235 0.6605 0.9442
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0670 0.0368 -0.0162 -0.1624 0.2367 0.0124 -0.0357 -0.1635 -0.0869 -0.0616
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6979 0.8314 0.9253 0.3439 0.1646 0.9427 0.8364 0.3406 0.6142 0.7213
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0461 -0.0333 -0.0776 0.0044 -0.1415 0.0984 -0.0247 0.0217 -0.2842 0.0032
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7894 0.8470 0.6528 0.9796 0.4104 0.5681 0.8862 0.9001 0.0930 0.9854
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

386
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation 0.3118 1.0000 0.5812 0.4861 0.3338 0.3445 0.2844 0.4073 0.4851 0.5687
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0683 . 0.0002 0.0027 0.0466 0.0396 0.0927 0.0137 0.0027 0.0003
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3342 0.5812 1.0000 0.9275 0.3493 0.3018 0.6239 0.6827 0.5897 0.6849
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0497 0.0002 . 0.0000 0.0368 0.0736 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2759 0.4861 0.9275 1.0000 0.2734 0.2702 0.5769 0.6850 0.5761 0.6457
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1087 0.0027 0.0000 . 0.1066 0.1110 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1914 0.3338 0.3493 0.2734 1.0000 0.5245 0.3197 0.5547 0.4222 0.4292
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2708 0.0466 0.0368 0.1066 . 0.0010 0.0574 0.0004 0.0103 0.0090
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4520 0.3445 0.3018 0.2702 0.5245 1.0000 0.3484 0.4345 0.5723 0.5320
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0064 0.0396 0.0736 0.1110 0.0010 . 0.0373 0.0081 0.0003 0.0008
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3708 0.2844 0.6239 0.5769 0.3197 0.3484 1.0000 0.5567 0.5629 0.5197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0283 0.0927 0.0000 0.0002 0.0574 0.0373 . 0.0004 0.0004 0.0012
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5510 0.4073 0.6827 0.6850 0.5547 0.4345 0.5567 1.0000 0.8897 0.8164
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0006 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0081 0.0004 . 0.0000 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6237 0.4851 0.5897 0.5761 0.4222 0.5723 0.5629 0.8897 1.0000 0.8650
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0027 0.0002 0.0002 0.0103 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 . 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5042 0.5687 0.6849 0.6457 0.4292 0.5320 0.5197 0.8164 0.8650 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 0.0008 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 .
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5982 0.4964 0.5447 0.4604 0.4211 0.5114 0.4778 0.8107 0.8852 0.8299
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0021 0.0006 0.0047 0.0105 0.0014 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5175 0.1927 0.2645 0.1879 0.3410 0.5958 0.2670 0.5559 0.5402 0.4613
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0015 0.2602 0.1190 0.2724 0.0418 0.0001 0.1154 0.0004 0.0007 0.0046
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

387
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict
or Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation 0.4964 0.1927 0.4594 0.6319 0.2228 0.4499 0.4761 0.4834 0.5283 0.4741
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0021 0.2602 0.0048 0.0000 0.2053 0.0067 0.0038 0.0033 0.0013 0.0040
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5447 0.2645 0.5736 0.6835 0.2711 0.4688 0.8329 0.8367 0.3772 0.5046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0006 0.1190 0.0003 0.0000 0.1210 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0279 0.0020
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4604 0.1879 0.5330 0.6132 0.2455 0.3864 0.8421 0.8394 0.3616 0.4976
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0047 0.2724 0.0008 0.0001 0.1617 0.0219 0.0000 0.0000 0.0356 0.0024
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4211 0.3410 0.3925 0.4321 0.4098 0.0904 0.2760 0.2369 0.4965 0.4340
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0105 0.0418 0.0179 0.0085 0.0161 0.6053 0.1085 0.1707 0.0028 0.0092
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5114 0.5958 0.6658 0.5785 0.2648 0.0679 0.1780 0.2168 0.3455 0.5589
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0014 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.1302 0.6983 0.3064 0.2110 0.0454 0.0005
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4778 0.2670 0.3591 0.5291 0.4635 0.3841 0.5886 0.6681 0.3066 0.4503
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0032 0.1154 0.0315 0.0009 0.0058 0.0227 0.0002 0.0000 0.0778 0.0066
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8107 0.5559 0.5279 0.7125 0.3866 0.3242 0.7021 0.6671 0.5175 0.6065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0009 0.0000 0.0239 0.0575 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8852 0.5402 0.5658 0.7745 0.4224 0.3104 0.5752 0.5784 0.5213 0.6251
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 0.0128 0.0696 0.0003 0.0003 0.0016 0.0001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8299 0.4613 0.6280 0.8215 0.4139 0.2282 0.6555 0.6437 0.4520 0.5833
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0000 0.0150 0.1873 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0002
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.6103 0.5973 0.8361 0.3253 0.2036 0.5026 0.4964 0.4955 0.5537
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0605 0.2408 0.0021 0.0024 0.0029 0.0006
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6103 1.0000 0.5245 0.4760 0.1459 0.0786 0.2653 0.3241 0.4006 0.4504
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 . 0.0010 0.0033 0.4103 0.6537 0.1235 0.0575 0.0189 0.0066
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

388
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.3837 0.4444 0.5063 0.3689 0.4729 0.2147 0.3700 0.3163 0.1779 -0.1054
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0229 0.0075 0.0019 0.0292 0.0041 0.2155 0.0287 0.0641 0.3066 0.5467
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5715 0.7606 0.6627 0.7468 0.5058 0.2868 0.7712 0.7446 0.1297 -0.1119
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0948 0.0000 0.0000 0.4579 0.5223
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5343 0.7089 0.6414 0.7607 0.4702 0.2943 0.7224 0.6898 0.1362 -0.2222
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0862 0.0000 0.0000 0.4354 0.1996
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3100 0.3791 0.4666 0.3853 0.4733 0.3287 0.3387 0.3704 0.1985 0.0135
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0699 0.0247 0.0047 0.0223 0.0041 0.0539 0.0465 0.0285 0.2530 0.9384
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3545 0.3099 0.4462 0.2944 0.5096 0.5204 0.3204 0.3419 0.1231 0.1304
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0367 0.0700 0.0072 0.0860 0.0018 0.0014 0.0606 0.0444 0.4810 0.4553
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7341 0.6454 0.4557 0.5999 0.3705 0.2168 0.5919 0.6206 -0.0890 0.1874
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059 0.0001 0.0285 0.2108 0.0002 0.0001 0.6113 0.2811
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6251 0.7928 0.7917 0.7915 0.6182 0.5372 0.6129 0.6329 0.1663 -0.2240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 0.3398 0.1958
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6686 0.7660 0.8024 0.7397 0.6952 0.4737 0.5677 0.5770 0.0529 -0.2112
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0004 0.0003 0.7627 0.2234
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5461 0.7172 0.8184 0.6774 0.6451 0.4299 0.5515 0.5381 0.1278 -0.2785
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0100 0.0006 0.0009 0.4645 0.1053
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6035 0.7479 0.8003 0.6391 0.7390 0.5035 0.4527 0.5411 0.0748 -0.1977
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0063 0.0008 0.6692 0.2549
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4102 0.4507 0.4718 0.3910 0.5790 0.9287 0.3371 0.4099 0.0207 0.0244
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0144 0.0066 0.0042 0.0202 0.0003 0.0000 0.0477 0.0145 0.9059 0.8893
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

389
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation -0.0797 -0.0226 0.0886 -0.0498 -0.0671 -0.0939 0.0638 -0.0404 0.3114 0.0694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6491 0.8976 0.6129 0.7728 0.6976 0.5860 0.7115 0.8149 0.0686 0.6877
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1684 0.0131 -0.1704 -0.1174 -0.3195 -0.3120 -0.1253 -0.1085 0.1295 -0.1696
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3335 0.9404 0.3279 0.4955 0.0575 0.0639 0.4667 0.5287 0.4584 0.3227
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2745 -0.0242 -0.2953 -0.1545 -0.3802 -0.3942 -0.2011 -0.1170 0.1581 -0.2311
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1105 0.8901 0.0850 0.3682 0.0222 0.0174 0.2396 0.4968 0.3642 0.1750
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0123 -0.0726 0.1008 0.2266 -0.0320 -0.0340 0.0283 0.0558 0.2187 -0.0790
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9439 0.6784 0.5644 0.1839 0.8528 0.8439 0.8701 0.7467 0.2069 0.6468
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0638 0.1009 0.0404 0.1332 0.0093 0.1753 0.0584 -0.0042 0.3565 0.2407
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7156 0.5642 0.8177 0.4387 0.9570 0.3065 0.7350 0.9804 0.0356 0.1573
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0578 0.0814 -0.1367 -0.1490 -0.2315 -0.3228 -0.1657 -0.1672 -0.0354 0.0213
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7415 0.6421 0.4337 0.3857 0.1743 0.0548 0.3342 0.3296 0.8399 0.9020
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3036 -0.0651 -0.2731 -0.0144 -0.3394 -0.4186 -0.1068 -0.0882 0.3285 -0.1415
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0762 0.7100 0.1125 0.9337 0.0429 0.0111 0.5354 0.6088 0.0540 0.4103
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2200 -0.0220 -0.2471 -0.0835 -0.3240 -0.3391 -0.1520 -0.1525 0.3383 0.0382
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2040 0.9003 0.1525 0.6284 0.0539 0.0430 0.3760 0.3747 0.0468 0.8250
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2676 0.0909 -0.1374 -0.0795 -0.2536 -0.2787 0.0556 -0.0516 0.3095 -0.0093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1201 0.6036 0.4314 0.6447 0.1357 0.0997 0.7476 0.7651 0.0704 0.9569
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2397 -0.1073 -0.1200 -0.1120 -0.3763 -0.3806 -0.1813 -0.1645 0.2006 0.1294
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1655 0.5394 0.4922 0.5157 0.0237 0.0220 0.2899 0.3377 0.2479 0.4521
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1690 -0.2804 -0.1781 0.0549 -0.2268 -0.0638 -0.0832 -0.0522 0.2261 -0.0278
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3317 0.1028 0.3061 0.7504 0.1835 0.7115 0.6294 0.7623 0.1915 0.8719
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000

390
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.1221 0.2363 0.1714 0.1206 0.0242 -0.0511 0.1117 0.0041 -0.1385 -0.1679
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4779 0.1653 0.3175 0.5039 0.8903 0.7705 0.5231 0.9813 0.4277 0.3277
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1149 -0.0342 -0.1854 0.0284 -0.3494 -0.3097 -0.1833 -0.2496 -0.0454 -0.1854
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5044 0.8430 0.2790 0.8754 0.0397 0.0702 0.2919 0.1481 0.7956 0.2791
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1980 -0.0110 -0.2242 0.1815 -0.3143 -0.2839 -0.1215 -0.1957 0.0772 -0.1642
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2471 0.9493 0.1888 0.3122 0.0660 0.0984 0.4870 0.2598 0.6593 0.3386
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1071 0.1396 0.0952 0.2646 -0.0257 0.1179 0.0768 0.1020 0.2775 0.2058
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5340 0.4166 0.5809 0.1367 0.8833 0.4998 0.6610 0.5600 0.1066 0.2285
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3647 0.2381 0.2494 0.2109 0.0392 0.0146 0.0791 0.0394 0.1931 0.1350
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0288 0.1620 0.1424 0.2387 0.8230 0.9334 0.6514 0.8221 0.2663 0.4324
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0335 0.0131 -0.1226 -0.1934 -0.3843 -0.4478 -0.3132 -0.3367 -0.1671 -0.1814
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8461 0.9398 0.4762 0.2809 0.0227 0.0070 0.0669 0.0479 0.3375 0.2896
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0162 0.0718 -0.1359 0.0917 -0.2957 -0.2249 -0.1131 -0.1968 0.0834 -0.2790
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9254 0.6775 0.4294 0.6117 0.0845 0.1940 0.5179 0.2572 0.6337 0.0994
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1323 0.1710 -0.0048 -0.0591 -0.3184 -0.3398 -0.2203 -0.2806 -0.0788 -0.3088
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4418 0.3186 0.9778 0.7439 0.0623 0.0458 0.2034 0.1025 0.6526 0.0669
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0524 0.1479 -0.0612 0.1341 -0.1994 -0.2423 -0.0036 -0.1610 -0.0609 -0.2645
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7615 0.3892 0.7228 0.4568 0.2509 0.1608 0.9835 0.3556 0.7280 0.1190
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1660 0.1161 0.0572 -0.1135 -0.2432 -0.2412 -0.1756 -0.1849 -0.2003 -0.3302
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3334 0.5002 0.7403 0.5296 0.1592 0.1628 0.3128 0.2877 0.2487 0.0492
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0690 -0.1745 -0.0507 -0.0093 -0.1364 -0.0657 -0.1034 -0.0830 0.0048 -0.2251
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6893 0.3088 0.7689 0.9590 0.4346 0.7077 0.5545 0.6355 0.9781 0.1868
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

391
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation -0.2175 -0.0209 -0.2123 0.0179 0.0627 0.1729 -0.3000 -0.0716 0.2606 0.1789
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2026 0.9038 0.2138 0.9176 0.7164 0.3206 0.0847 0.6782 0.1305 0.3193
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1852 -0.0530 -0.1736 0.2114 0.1892 0.1521 -0.2011 -0.0987 -0.0474 0.1173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2795 0.7586 0.3114 0.2158 0.2690 0.3830 0.2541 0.5670 0.7868 0.5155
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1489 -0.0524 -0.1508 0.1371 0.0768 0.1250 -0.2275 -0.0693 -0.0792 0.1329
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3860 0.7616 0.3800 0.4251 0.6560 0.4742 0.1957 0.6881 0.6510 0.4610
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2551 0.1915 0.2529 0.2619 0.2009 0.2528 0.0274 -0.0159 -0.1426 0.1533
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1333 0.2632 0.1366 0.1228 0.2400 0.1428 0.8780 0.9268 0.4139 0.3945
sqrtQ1E1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0927 0.0969 0.0811 0.3080 0.2318 0.4174 0.0237 -0.0877 0.0388 0.2197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5908 0.5738 0.6380 0.0676 0.1738 0.0126 0.8939 0.6111 0.8251 0.2192
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2226 -0.2263 -0.2817 0.3243 0.2996 0.2555 -0.3674 -0.0528 -0.1169 0.1397
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1918 0.1844 0.0960 0.0537 0.0758 0.1385 0.0325 0.7597 0.5037 0.4381
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2551 -0.1966 -0.2426 0.2088 0.2963 0.3183 -0.0811 0.0901 -0.2959 0.0123
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1332 0.2504 0.1540 0.2216 0.0794 0.0624 0.6486 0.6014 0.0843 0.9460
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3368 -0.2681 -0.3346 0.2928 0.4052 0.4473 -0.1987 -0.0004 -0.2056 0.1382
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0446 0.1139 0.0461 0.0831 0.0142 0.0071 0.2599 0.9983 0.2361 0.4431
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3009 -0.1977 -0.3052 0.2937 0.2994 0.3700 -0.2636 0.1326 -0.1085 0.0998
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0745 0.2477 0.0702 0.0821 0.0761 0.0287 0.1320 0.4406 0.5350 0.5805
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3636 -0.2689 -0.3400 0.2933 0.3287 0.4069 -0.2154 0.1726 -0.2587 0.0549
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0293 0.1128 0.0425 0.0825 0.0503 0.0153 0.2212 0.3140 0.1335 0.7615
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2286 -0.2462 -0.2096 0.2187 0.2301 0.3031 0.0993 0.1235 -0.2521 -0.0632
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1799 0.1477 0.2199 0.2001 0.1770 0.0767 0.5762 0.4729 0.1440 0.7268
sqrtQ1E1l
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000

392
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation -0.0956 -0.2154 -0.1101 -0.0530 -0.1510 0.0062 -0.0700 -0.0091 0.0651 -0.3510
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5850 0.2139 0.5290 0.7623 0.3866 0.9719 0.6849 0.9587 0.7104 0.0387
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2034 -0.0827 0.0931 -0.2529 0.0737 0.1504 -0.1352 0.0324 0.0864 -0.2624
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2413 0.6366 0.5948 0.1427 0.6740 0.3884 0.4316 0.8534 0.6215 0.1278
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3054 0.0084 0.1671 -0.2368 0.1633 0.2613 -0.0590 0.1201 0.1846 -0.1527
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0744 0.9619 0.3372 0.1708 0.3486 0.1295 0.7324 0.4918 0.2884 0.3813
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0309 -0.1206 -0.0900 -0.0121 -0.1018 0.0297 -0.2124 -0.0477 -0.1587 -0.1752
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8601 0.4903 0.6072 0.9450 0.5608 0.8654 0.2137 0.7857 0.3624 0.3141
sqrtQ1E1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0115 0.0496 -0.0073 0.0842 0.0038 -0.0745 -0.1055 -0.1486 -0.1759 -0.0981
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9479 0.7772 0.9670 0.6304 0.9825 0.6707 0.5403 0.3943 0.3121 0.5751
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1319 -0.2363 -0.1399 -0.4103 -0.1608 -0.2308 -0.2806 -0.2593 -0.3074 -0.4159
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4501 0.1717 0.4228 0.0144 0.3560 0.1823 0.0974 0.1325 0.0725 0.0130
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0853 -0.1917 -0.1101 -0.3056 -0.0425 0.0858 -0.2536 -0.1277 -0.0767 -0.3050
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6263 0.2700 0.5288 0.0742 0.8085 0.6243 0.1356 0.4648 0.6616 0.0748
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0370 -0.1551 -0.1324 -0.2738 -0.0525 -0.0236 -0.1759 -0.1634 -0.0979 -0.2758
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8328 0.3737 0.4485 0.1115 0.7643 0.8931 0.3047 0.3483 0.5756 0.1088
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0098 -0.2370 -0.1041 -0.2881 -0.0701 0.0245 -0.2140 -0.0981 -0.0273 -0.3199
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9555 0.1704 0.5517 0.0933 0.6892 0.8887 0.2102 0.5749 0.8762 0.0610
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1040 -0.2256 -0.1972 -0.2288 -0.0133 -0.0914 -0.2336 -0.2435 -0.1599 -0.1964
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5520 0.1925 0.2561 0.1861 0.9397 0.6015 0.1703 0.1586 0.3588 0.2582
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0079 -0.1511 -0.2570 -0.0268 -0.1266 -0.1545 -0.3019 -0.3558 -0.3583 -0.2201
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9641 0.3864 0.1362 0.8784 0.4687 0.3755 0.0735 0.0359 0.0346 0.2040
sqrtQ1E1l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

393
Table A7, continued (Row 2, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation -0.0227 -0.1933 -0.2392 -0.1474 -0.1336
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8984 0.2659 0.1730 0.4054 0.4511
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack
of Time
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1436 -0.1942 -0.1883 -0.0882 -0.1212
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4178 0.2635 0.2861 0.6198 0.4949
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack
of Knowledge
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2489 -0.1335 -0.0929 -0.0110 -0.0391
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1557 0.4446 0.6012 0.9509 0.8263
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack
of Training
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0011 -0.0670 -0.1292 -0.0682 -0.0948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9951 0.7022 0.4664 0.7015 0.5939
sqrtQ1E1e
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0863 0.0710 -0.0352 0.0703 0.0453
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6274 0.6851 0.8432 0.6927 0.7992
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0601 -0.1989 -0.2150 -0.1691 -0.1778
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7357 0.2520 0.2220 0.3391 0.3144
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1613 -0.1192 -0.1036 -0.0263 -0.0441
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3622 0.4952 0.5597 0.8824 0.8043
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0791 -0.1536 -0.1582 -0.0663 -0.0602
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6564 0.3784 0.3716 0.7097 0.7352
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1031 -0.2089 -0.1724 -0.0819 -0.0985
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5619 0.2285 0.3295 0.6452 0.5795
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack
of Clarity in Duties
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0448 -0.1851 -0.2172 -0.0987 -0.0891
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8012 0.2871 0.2173 0.5788 0.6165
Personal Resource Challenges-
Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders and
Employees
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0890 0.0138 -0.1029 0.0099 -0.0275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6167 0.9375 0.5627 0.9558 0.8771
sqrtQ1E1l
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

394
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered
Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
Pearson Correlation 0.0229 0.0465 -0.0535 -0.1854 -0.0606 0.0694 0.1843 -0.0188 -0.0105 0.1416
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8946 0.7876 0.7567 0.2789 0.7254 0.6876 0.2818 0.9134 0.9517 0.4100
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0208 -0.1078 -0.0861 -0.2570 0.1232 -0.0188 0.1111 -0.1551 -0.0370 -0.0556
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9041 0.5314 0.6178 0.1303 0.4741 0.9131 0.5187 0.3663 0.8303 0.7474
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0133 -0.1596 -0.2365 -0.3896 0.0326 -0.0214 0.2403 0.2145 -0.0719 -0.1157
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9404 0.3674 0.1782 0.0227 0.8548 0.9043 0.1711 0.2232 0.6860 0.5145
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2552 -0.1996 -0.1862 -0.0401 0.0005 -0.1127 0.0762 -0.0246 0.0081 -0.0850
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1390 0.2502 0.2843 0.8190 0.9978 0.5192 0.6634 0.8886 0.9632 0.6275
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1379 -0.3436 -0.3719 -0.1642 -0.0840 -0.1504 -0.0412 -0.2739 -0.0646 -0.1819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4295 0.0433 0.0278 0.3458 0.6316 0.3884 0.8141 0.1114 0.7124 0.2956
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1090 -0.2567 -0.2689 -0.1838 -0.0341 -0.1441 -0.0791 -0.3116 -0.1464 -0.2547
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5331 0.1366 0.1184 0.2906 0.8458 0.4090 0.6516 0.0684 0.4014 0.1398
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2357 -0.0838 -0.0101 0.1432 0.1655 -0.2154 0.0355 -0.0703 -0.2233 -0.1197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1795 0.6376 0.9550 0.4192 0.3496 0.2211 0.8419 0.6926 0.2043 0.5001
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2130 -0.1647 -0.0928 -0.0628 0.0211 -0.2287 0.1035 -0.0973 -0.2894 -0.1697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2193 0.3445 0.5960 0.7202 0.9040 0.1863 0.5540 0.5783 0.0917 0.3299
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1288 -0.2495 -0.1343 -0.0683 0.1518 -0.0945 0.2007 -0.0701 -0.0244 -0.1510
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4609 0.1483 0.4419 0.6967 0.3840 0.5894 0.2477 0.6890 0.8893 0.3867
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0368 -0.2400 -0.2113 -0.0591 0.0927 0.0266 0.0133 -0.1614 -0.0382 -0.1665
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8339 0.1649 0.2231 0.7359 0.5964 0.8796 0.9398 0.3543 0.8277 0.3390
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0218 -0.2306 -0.2437 -0.1340 0.1423 -0.0108 0.0210 -0.1416 -0.1871 -0.1946
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9009 0.1827 0.1584 0.4429 0.4147 0.9507 0.9048 0.4172 0.2818 0.2626
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

395
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-
Excessive Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-
Ineffective Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation 0.3957 0.4594 0.5736 0.5330 0.3925 0.6658 0.3591 0.5279 0.5658 0.6280
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0186 0.0048 0.0003 0.0008 0.0179 0.0000 0.0315 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4968 0.6319 0.6835 0.6132 0.4321 0.5785 0.5291 0.7125 0.7745 0.8215
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0085 0.0002 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5355 0.2228 0.2711 0.2455 0.4098 0.2648 0.4635 0.3866 0.4224 0.4139
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0013 0.2053 0.1210 0.1617 0.0161 0.1302 0.0058 0.0239 0.0128 0.0150
sqrtQ1E3a
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3713 0.4499 0.4688 0.3864 0.0904 0.0679 0.3841 0.3242 0.3104 0.2282
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0306 0.0067 0.0045 0.0219 0.6053 0.6983 0.0227 0.0575 0.0696 0.1873
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2971 0.4761 0.8329 0.8421 0.2760 0.1780 0.5886 0.7021 0.5752 0.6555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0879 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.1085 0.3064 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3371 0.4834 0.8367 0.8394 0.2369 0.2168 0.6681 0.6671 0.5784 0.6437
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0512 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.1707 0.2110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4286 0.5283 0.3772 0.3616 0.4965 0.3455 0.3066 0.5175 0.5213 0.4520
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0128 0.0013 0.0279 0.0356 0.0028 0.0454 0.0778 0.0017 0.0016 0.0073
sqrtQ1E3e
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6521 0.4741 0.5046 0.4976 0.4340 0.5589 0.4503 0.6065 0.6251 0.5833
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0040 0.0020 0.0024 0.0092 0.0005 0.0066 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5895 0.3837 0.5715 0.5343 0.3100 0.3545 0.7341 0.6251 0.6686 0.5461
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0229 0.0003 0.0009 0.0699 0.0367 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3989 0.4444 0.7606 0.7089 0.3791 0.3099 0.6454 0.7928 0.7660 0.7172
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0194 0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0247 0.0700 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4226 0.5063 0.6627 0.6414 0.4666 0.4462 0.4557 0.7917 0.8024 0.8184
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0128 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0072 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

396
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Pearson Correlation 0.5973 0.5245 1.0000 0.7869 0.2008 0.1757 0.5045 0.5332 0.2910 0.4796
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0010 . 0.0000 0.2548 0.3127 0.0020 0.0010 0.0950 0.0036
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8361 0.4760 0.7869 1.0000 0.3785 0.2783 0.6298 0.6691 0.4769 0.6087
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 . 0.0273 0.1055 0.0001 0.0000 0.0043 0.0001
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3253 0.1459 0.2008 0.3785 1.0000 0.5117 0.3452 0.3915 0.3655 0.5827
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0605 0.4103 0.2548 0.0273 . 0.0020 0.0455 0.0220 0.0365 0.0003
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2036 0.0786 0.1757 0.2783 0.5117 1.0000 0.5157 0.5404 0.3159 0.4224
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2408 0.6537 0.3127 0.1055 0.0020 . 0.0015 0.0008 0.0688 0.0115
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5026 0.2653 0.5045 0.6298 0.3452 0.5157 1.0000 0.9587 0.4325 0.5495
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0021 0.1235 0.0020 0.0001 0.0455 0.0015 . 0.0000 0.0106 0.0006
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4964 0.3241 0.5332 0.6691 0.3915 0.5404 0.9587 1.0000 0.4030 0.5554
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0024 0.0575 0.0010 0.0000 0.0220 0.0008 0.0000 . 0.0181 0.0005
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4955 0.4006 0.2910 0.4769 0.3655 0.3159 0.4325 0.4030 1.0000 0.7700
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0029 0.0189 0.0950 0.0043 0.0365 0.0688 0.0106 0.0181 . 0.0000
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5537 0.4504 0.4796 0.6087 0.5827 0.4224 0.5495 0.5554 0.7700 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0006 0.0066 0.0036 0.0001 0.0003 0.0115 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000 .
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6035 0.4102 0.3417 0.5933 0.5270 0.4404 0.6191 0.6693 0.4891 0.5929
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0144 0.0446 0.0002 0.0014 0.0081 0.0001 0.0000 0.0033 0.0002
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7479 0.4507 0.4554 0.6978 0.3169 0.3804 0.7509 0.7401 0.4064 0.4743
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0066 0.0060 0.0000 0.0678 0.0242 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0040
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8003 0.4718 0.6704 0.8536 0.3936 0.2420 0.7079 0.6817 0.5428 0.6589
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0213 0.1614 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

397
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity
in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.3417 0.4554 0.6704 0.5006 0.6766 0.5669 0.5283 0.4958 0.2155 0.0457
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0446 0.0060 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0004 0.0011 0.0025 0.2137 0.7945
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5933 0.6978 0.8536 0.6819 0.7312 0.4613 0.6075 0.6459 0.1088 -0.1031
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0053 0.0001 0.0000 0.5340 0.5558
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5270 0.3169 0.3936 0.3625 0.2974 0.1722 0.3658 0.3306 0.0390 -0.0192
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0014 0.0678 0.0213 0.0351 0.0876 0.3302 0.0334 0.0562 0.8295 0.9157
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4404 0.3804 0.2420 0.2906 0.1354 0.1338 0.4475 0.3240 -0.0461 0.0654
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0081 0.0242 0.1614 0.0904 0.4381 0.4436 0.0070 0.0576 0.7956 0.7133
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6191 0.7509 0.7079 0.7829 0.5025 0.3496 0.7932 0.7503 -0.0605 -0.2321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0395 0.0000 0.0000 0.7341 0.1865
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6693 0.7401 0.6817 0.7546 0.5110 0.4188 0.7846 0.7474 -0.0674 -0.2196
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0123 0.0000 0.0000 0.7050 0.2120
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4891 0.4064 0.5428 0.3878 0.5015 0.4392 0.3551 0.3623 -0.0472 -0.0513
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0033 0.0171 0.0009 0.0234 0.0025 0.0094 0.0393 0.0352 0.7942 0.7766
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5929 0.4743 0.6589 0.4762 0.5461 0.4573 0.4667 0.4788 0.1397 0.0040
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0040 0.0000 0.0038 0.0007 0.0057 0.0047 0.0036 0.4306 0.9821
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.8327 0.6391 0.7585 0.6652 0.4128 0.6756 0.7328 -0.1555 0.1273
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0000 0.0000 0.3798 0.4731
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8327 1.0000 0.8061 0.9043 0.7485 0.4589 0.7970 0.8421 -0.0550 -0.0390
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.7574 0.8266
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6391 0.8061 1.0000 0.8464 0.8618 0.5439 0.7400 0.7592 0.0757 -0.1634
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.6703 0.3557
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000

398
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-
CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic
Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation -0.0794 0.1555 0.0366 -0.1358 -0.1725 -0.1342 0.0026 -0.1031 0.2839 0.1332
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6502 0.3723 0.8345 0.4298 0.3143 0.4350 0.9881 0.5496 0.0984 0.4388
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2276 0.0439 -0.0862 -0.1864 -0.3066 -0.2523 -0.0655 -0.2033 0.2088 0.0700
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1885 0.8024 0.6226 0.2764 0.0689 0.1377 0.7043 0.2344 0.2287 0.6850
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0303 -0.0886 -0.1843 -0.1416 -0.1553 -0.2637 -0.1839 -0.3699 0.0342 0.0321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8672 0.6241 0.3046 0.4244 0.3804 0.1318 0.2978 0.0313 0.8503 0.8570
sqrtQ1E3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0926 0.0988 -0.1136 -0.3091 -0.1766 -0.3089 -0.2466 -0.4410 -0.0162 -0.0835
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6023 0.5783 0.5224 0.0708 0.3101 0.0709 0.1533 0.0080 0.9276 0.6336
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3174 -0.0808 -0.3351 -0.3537 -0.4078 -0.4448 -0.2323 -0.2361 0.0263 -0.2797
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0674 0.6494 0.0527 0.0371 0.0150 0.0074 0.1793 0.1721 0.8828 0.1036
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3426 -0.1142 -0.3563 -0.3828 -0.4665 -0.4764 -0.2813 -0.3095 -0.0017 -0.3170
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0473 0.5200 0.0386 0.0232 0.0047 0.0038 0.1017 0.0704 0.9925 0.0635
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2463 -0.3220 -0.2003 -0.1077 -0.2576 -0.1964 -0.3635 -0.1248 0.0645 0.0298
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1670 0.0677 0.2638 0.5443 0.1414 0.2657 0.0346 0.4819 0.7216 0.8673
sqrtQ1E3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1851 -0.2122 -0.1357 -0.2613 -0.1698 -0.1211 -0.2969 -0.2055 0.2057 0.1275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2945 0.2284 0.4440 0.1295 0.3295 0.4882 0.0833 0.2363 0.2432 0.4656
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0578 -0.0183 -0.3113 -0.3255 -0.3626 -0.4359 -0.2617 -0.4314 -0.0089 0.0746
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7453 0.9181 0.0731 0.0564 0.0323 0.0089 0.1289 0.0097 0.9604 0.6700
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1159 0.0093 -0.2705 -0.2537 -0.3952 -0.4554 -0.1852 -0.2952 0.0761 -0.1040
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5141 0.9582 0.1218 0.1413 0.0188 0.0060 0.2868 0.0851 0.6689 0.5522
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2554 -0.0599 -0.1713 -0.2208 -0.2891 -0.3082 -0.1271 -0.1596 0.1894 -0.0530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1449 0.7366 0.3327 0.2025 0.0922 0.0717 0.4670 0.3598 0.2833 0.7622
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

399
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0944 0.2105 0.0680 0.0776 -0.1258 -0.2421 -0.0921 -0.1925 -0.0771 -0.0630
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5840 0.2179 0.6937 0.6677 0.4716 0.1611 0.5988 0.2678 0.6596 0.7150
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1161 0.2141 -0.0306 0.0771 -0.0970 -0.2036 -0.0198 -0.1262 -0.1538 -0.1353
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5001 0.2099 0.8595 0.6697 0.5793 0.2409 0.9102 0.4701 0.3778 0.4315
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1374 0.1194 -0.0829 0.0230 -0.1200 -0.1800 -0.1702 -0.2506 -0.0594 0.1036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4386 0.5010 0.6413 0.9024 0.5059 0.3163 0.3436 0.1595 0.7426 0.5598
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0184 -0.0144 -0.1243 -0.2796 -0.3383 -0.3131 -0.2950 -0.4556 -0.3044 -0.2275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9166 0.9344 0.4767 0.1212 0.0503 0.0714 0.0904 0.0068 0.0801 0.1888
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2263 -0.0268 -0.2772 0.0015 -0.3248 -0.3757 -0.1646 -0.3192 -0.1769 -0.2702
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1911 0.8786 0.1069 0.9936 0.0609 0.0285 0.3522 0.0657 0.3168 0.1164
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2731 -0.0901 -0.3359 -0.0421 -0.3530 -0.4226 -0.1937 -0.3354 -0.2034 -0.2894
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1124 0.6066 0.0485 0.8190 0.0406 0.0128 0.2724 0.0525 0.2486 0.0917
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1285 -0.0141 0.0582 0.0959 -0.0810 -0.0355 -0.0343 0.0295 -0.0190 -0.0860
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4688 0.9370 0.7438 0.6079 0.6541 0.8446 0.8497 0.8705 0.9164 0.6287
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2022 0.1224 0.0930 0.0279 -0.1288 -0.1819 -0.0498 -0.1475 -0.0482 -0.0530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2441 0.4838 0.5951 0.8797 0.4677 0.3033 0.7799 0.4051 0.7868 0.7622
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1545 0.1285 -0.1611 -0.1393 -0.1680 -0.2951 -0.1450 -0.2648 -0.1784 -0.1089
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3754 0.4620 0.3552 0.4469 0.3424 0.0902 0.4133 0.1301 0.3128 0.5333
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0208 0.0143 -0.2920 -0.1005 -0.2940 -0.2771 -0.1540 -0.2889 -0.1595 -0.2729
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9058 0.9352 0.0888 0.5842 0.0915 0.1126 0.3846 0.0975 0.3676 0.1127
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0520 0.1151 -0.1516 0.1123 -0.1628 -0.1912 -0.0689 -0.1827 -0.1374 -0.2079
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7667 0.5103 0.3846 0.5406 0.3577 0.2786 0.6984 0.3011 0.4386 0.2306
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

400
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation International
Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation -0.1384 -0.0166 -0.1955 0.1870 0.2393 0.2714 -0.0521 -0.0101 0.0640 0.0389
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4207 0.9236 0.2531 0.2749 0.1599 0.1148 0.7700 0.9535 0.7150 0.8299
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2322 -0.0763 -0.2643 0.2684 0.2483 0.3473 -0.1372 0.0575 -0.1378 0.0614
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1729 0.6582 0.1193 0.1134 0.1443 0.0409 0.4391 0.7392 0.4300 0.7343
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0984 -0.0030 -0.0716 0.2920 0.3555 0.2967 0.0015 -0.0107 -0.1731 0.0560
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5798 0.9867 0.6874 0.0938 0.0391 0.0936 0.9932 0.9523 0.3277 0.7609
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2063 -0.2480 -0.3042 0.0029 0.1769 -0.0517 0.0635 -0.0614 0.2567 -0.0784
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2345 0.1509 0.0756 0.9870 0.3093 0.7716 0.7212 0.7262 0.1366 0.6644
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2763 -0.1889 -0.2873 0.2136 0.1306 0.1567 -0.1624 0.0765 -0.0302 -0.1021
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1081 0.2772 0.0942 0.2180 0.4546 0.3763 0.3588 0.6621 0.8634 0.5717
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3140 -0.2335 -0.3437 0.1882 0.1844 0.1301 -0.2116 0.0666 -0.0590 -0.0800
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0662 0.1771 0.0432 0.2789 0.2890 0.4633 0.2296 0.7036 0.7364 0.6581
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0732 -0.0943 0.0318 0.0981 0.0666 0.2704 -0.1671 -0.0981 -0.0177 0.1183
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6808 0.5959 0.8582 0.5809 0.7082 0.1280 0.3526 0.5811 0.9211 0.5189
sqrtQ1E3e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0612 -0.0943 -0.0615 0.0572 0.1212 0.2113 -0.0822 -0.0328 -0.2230 -0.0690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7269 0.5899 0.7255 0.7441 0.4880 0.2303 0.6440 0.8516 0.1979 0.7030
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1526 -0.1341 -0.2585 0.2358 0.1196 0.1978 -0.1445 -0.0430 -0.2447 -0.0409
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3814 0.4424 0.1337 0.1726 0.4939 0.2622 0.4148 0.8064 0.1566 0.8211
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2741 -0.2184 -0.3170 0.3248 0.1723 0.1703 -0.1517 0.0874 -0.2093 -0.0088
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1111 0.2074 0.0635 0.0569 0.3222 0.3355 0.3919 0.6176 0.2276 0.9611
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2227 -0.1647 -0.2417 0.2058 0.1873 0.2609 -0.0647 0.0278 -0.2141 -0.0584
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1984 0.3443 0.1619 0.2357 0.2814 0.1362 0.7163 0.8740 0.2168 0.7470
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000

401
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic
Govt Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0969 -0.0059 0.1059 -0.0239 0.1707 0.0143 -0.0332 -0.0437 0.0061 -0.0147
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5796 0.9731 0.5449 0.8917 0.3268 0.9352 0.8475 0.8032 0.9725 0.9332
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0293 -0.1643 -0.0594 -0.1830 -0.0412 0.0406 -0.0816 -0.0825 0.0094 -0.2366
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8671 0.3457 0.7348 0.2927 0.8142 0.8167 0.6362 0.6376 0.9571 0.1712
Personal
Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2950 -0.2137 -0.1631 -0.3862 -0.4157 -0.0814 0.0519 0.1264 -0.0265 -0.3064
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0903 0.2249 0.3568 0.0241 0.0145 0.6472 0.7708 0.4764 0.8818 0.0780
sqrtQ1E3a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3238 -0.3496 -0.2681 -0.4731 -0.4350 -0.2053 -0.0762 -0.0086 -0.1177 -0.4033
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0617 0.0427 0.1253 0.0047 0.0101 0.2442 0.6635 0.9616 0.5073 0.0180
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Time
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2335 -0.0496 0.1261 -0.3492 0.0666 0.1962 -0.0103 0.0951 0.1774 -0.1934
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1838 0.7807 0.4773 0.0429 0.7081 0.2661 0.9530 0.5926 0.3156 0.2732
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Knowledge
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1683 -0.1123 0.0400 -0.3882 -0.0282 0.1238 -0.0907 0.0106 0.0964 -0.2887
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3413 0.5272 0.8221 0.0233 0.8743 0.4854 0.6045 0.9526 0.5875 0.0977
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of
Training
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2437 -0.2697 -0.3545 -0.2357 -0.2222 -0.1391 -0.1881 -0.2252 -0.1995 -0.2178
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1717 0.1291 0.0429 0.1867 0.2140 0.4400 0.2867 0.2077 0.2657 0.2234
sqrtQ1E3e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2578 -0.2462 -0.2551 -0.3611 -0.2810 -0.1720 -0.0829 -0.1254 -0.1523 -0.3237
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1410 0.1604 0.1454 0.0359 0.1075 0.3306 0.6359 0.4799 0.3898 0.0618
Org Resource
Challenges-
Excessive
Admin
Paperwork N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0493 -0.1009 -0.0495 -0.3719 -0.1349 -0.1102 -0.1216 -0.0894 -0.0826 -0.4039
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7819 0.5704 0.7811 0.0303 0.4469 0.5351 0.4865 0.6153 0.6425 0.0179
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Technology
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1769 -0.0510 0.0676 -0.3289 0.0191 0.1170 -0.1063 -0.0245 0.0094 -0.3116
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3169 0.7747 0.7040 0.0575 0.9148 0.5100 0.5435 0.8907 0.9580 0.0728
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Strategic Focus
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0713 -0.0928 0.0108 -0.2646 -0.0281 0.1517 -0.0316 -0.0081 0.0558 -0.2169
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6887 0.6016 0.9517 0.1305 0.8745 0.3917 0.8570 0.9638 0.7540 0.2178
Org Resource
Challenges-
Ineffective
Tactical Policy
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

402
Table A7, continued (Row 3, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation 0.1652 -0.0285 -0.0537 0.0106 -0.0186
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3504 0.8710 0.7631 0.9526 0.9167
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0992 -0.1505 -0.1993 -0.0862 -0.1104
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5767 0.3883 0.2584 0.6278 0.5341
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1657 -0.2059 -0.1578 -0.2465 -0.3178
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3567 0.2503 0.3804 0.1668 0.0715
sqrtQ1E3a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3343 -0.3432 -0.3385 -0.3835 -0.4523
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0572 0.0469 0.0540 0.0276 0.0082
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1838 -0.1343 -0.1171 -0.0609 -0.0694
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3060 0.4489 0.5165 0.7365 0.7011
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Knowledge
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1669 -0.1932 -0.1836 -0.1057 -0.1328
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3531 0.2736 0.3065 0.5581 0.4614
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3023 -0.2822 -0.4482 -0.3229 -0.2711
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0927 0.1116 0.0101 0.0715 0.1334
sqrtQ1E3e
N 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1881 -0.1751 -0.2797 -0.2230 -0.2009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2944 0.3219 0.1149 0.2122 0.2622
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0267 -0.1899 -0.1943 -0.1590 -0.1737
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8828 0.2820 0.2786 0.3768 0.3335
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2110 -0.1182 -0.0957 -0.0160 -0.0507
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2385 0.5056 0.5961 0.9295 0.7792
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Strategic
Focus
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1542 -0.1002 -0.0906 -0.0142 -0.0390
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3916 0.5731 0.6163 0.9374 0.8294
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Tactical
Policy
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

403
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered
Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
Pearson Correlation 0.0492 -0.3141 -0.3196 -0.1009 0.0087 0.0917 0.0127 -0.1453 -0.0797 -0.1955
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7792 0.0661 0.0613 0.5642 0.9603 0.6001 0.9422 0.4050 0.6492 0.2604
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0220 -0.1516 -0.1189 0.0441 0.1340 -0.0517 0.0840 0.0522 -0.2450 -0.0940
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9000 0.3846 0.4961 0.8016 0.4430 0.7678 0.6316 0.7657 0.1560 0.5912
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0396 -0.0530 -0.0769 0.0348 -0.1052 0.0804 -0.0488 0.0348 -0.4343 -0.0865
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8214 0.7622 0.6604 0.8425 0.5474 0.6460 0.7808 0.8428 0.0091 0.6213
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0261 -0.3126 -0.3248 -0.0833 0.0119 0.0776 0.1324 -0.1213 0.0368 -0.1600
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8818 0.0675 0.0570 0.6341 0.9457 0.6577 0.4484 0.4878 0.8337 0.3587
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0753 -0.3260 -0.2974 -0.1055 0.0191 0.0426 0.1116 -0.1315 -0.0734 -0.1675
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6674 0.0560 0.0827 0.5464 0.9131 0.8080 0.5233 0.4513 0.6753 0.3362
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0714 0.3292 0.1555 0.1382 -0.1336 0.5077 0.0948 0.2332 0.0326 0.4173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6836 0.0535 0.3724 0.4284 0.4440 0.0018 0.5879 0.1776 0.8525 0.0126
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0032 -0.2346 0.0142 0.0931 -0.1776 0.0953 0.6809 0.5161 0.1554 0.3006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9852 0.1750 0.9356 0.5947 0.3073 0.5859 0.0000 0.0015 0.3726 0.0793
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2227 -0.1107 0.0084 0.0954 -0.1624 0.0299 0.5787 0.6878 0.3185 0.4673
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1984 0.5268 0.9620 0.5856 0.3512 0.8644 0.0003 0.0000 0.0622 0.0047
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2041 -0.1045 -0.0642 -0.0603 -0.0460 0.1391 0.5195 0.4150 0.5869 0.4621
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2396 0.5503 0.7141 0.7308 0.7932 0.4256 0.0014 0.0132 0.0002 0.0052
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1039 0.1069 0.2938 0.1321 -0.2579 0.0992 0.2628 0.5338 0.1776 0.6159
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5527 0.5409 0.0867 0.4494 0.1347 0.5707 0.1273 0.0010 0.3074 0.0001
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2661 0.2364 0.1976 0.2932 -0.1569 0.6200 0.0729 0.4288 0.0309 0.3750
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1167 0.1650 0.2480 0.0826 0.3609 0.0001 0.6725 0.0091 0.8582 0.0242
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

404
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation 0.3674 0.3689 0.7468 0.7607 0.3853 0.2944 0.5999 0.7915 0.7397 0.6774
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0326 0.0292 0.0000 0.0000 0.0223 0.0860 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4307 0.4729 0.5058 0.4702 0.4733 0.5096 0.3705 0.6182 0.6952 0.6451
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0110 0.0041 0.0019 0.0044 0.0041 0.0018 0.0285 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4065 0.2147 0.2868 0.2943 0.3287 0.5204 0.2168 0.5372 0.4737 0.4299
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0171 0.2155 0.0948 0.0862 0.0539 0.0014 0.2108 0.0009 0.0040 0.0100
sqrtQ1E3l
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2378 0.3700 0.7712 0.7224 0.3387 0.3204 0.5919 0.6129 0.5677 0.5515
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1756 0.0287 0.0000 0.0000 0.0465 0.0606 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2694 0.3163 0.7446 0.6898 0.3704 0.3419 0.6206 0.6329 0.5770 0.5381
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1234 0.0641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0285 0.0444 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1149 0.1779 0.1297 0.1362 0.1985 0.1231 -0.0890 0.1663 0.0529 0.1278
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5176 0.3066 0.4579 0.4354 0.2530 0.4810 0.6113 0.3398 0.7627 0.4645
sqrtQIIA1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0396 -0.1054 -0.1119 -0.2222 0.0135 0.1304 0.1874 -0.2240 -0.2112 -0.2785
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8241 0.5467 0.5223 0.1996 0.9384 0.4553 0.2811 0.1958 0.2234 0.1053
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2166 -0.0797 -0.1684 -0.2745 -0.0123 0.0638 0.0578 -0.3036 -0.2200 -0.2676
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2186 0.6491 0.3335 0.1105 0.9439 0.7156 0.7415 0.0762 0.2040 0.1201
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1300 -0.0226 0.0131 -0.0242 -0.0726 0.1009 0.0814 -0.0651 -0.0220 0.0909
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4636 0.8976 0.9404 0.8901 0.6784 0.5642 0.6421 0.7100 0.9003 0.6036
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1190 0.0886 -0.1704 -0.2953 0.1008 0.0404 -0.1367 -0.2731 -0.2471 -0.1374
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5028 0.6129 0.3279 0.0850 0.5644 0.8177 0.4337 0.1125 0.1525 0.4314
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0357 -0.0498 -0.1174 -0.1545 0.2266 0.1332 -0.1490 -0.0144 -0.0835 -0.0795
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8388 0.7728 0.4955 0.3682 0.1839 0.4387 0.3857 0.9337 0.6284 0.6447
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

405
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Pearson Correlation 0.6391 0.3910 0.5006 0.6819 0.3625 0.2906 0.7829 0.7546 0.3878 0.4762
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0202 0.0022 0.0000 0.0351 0.0904 0.0000 0.0000 0.0234 0.0038
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7390 0.5790 0.6766 0.7312 0.2974 0.1354 0.5025 0.5110 0.5015 0.5461
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0876 0.4381 0.0021 0.0017 0.0025 0.0007
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5035 0.9287 0.5669 0.4613 0.1722 0.1338 0.3496 0.4188 0.4392 0.4573
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0000 0.0004 0.0053 0.3302 0.4436 0.0395 0.0123 0.0094 0.0057
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4527 0.3371 0.5283 0.6075 0.3658 0.4475 0.7932 0.7846 0.3551 0.4667
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0063 0.0477 0.0011 0.0001 0.0334 0.0070 0.0000 0.0000 0.0393 0.0047
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5411 0.4099 0.4958 0.6459 0.3306 0.3240 0.7503 0.7474 0.3623 0.4788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0008 0.0145 0.0025 0.0000 0.0562 0.0576 0.0000 0.0000 0.0352 0.0036
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0748 0.0207 0.2155 0.1088 0.0390 -0.0461 -0.0605 -0.0674 -0.0472 0.1397
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6692 0.9059 0.2137 0.5340 0.8295 0.7956 0.7341 0.7050 0.7942 0.4306
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1977 0.0244 0.0457 -0.1031 -0.0192 0.0654 -0.2321 -0.2196 -0.0513 0.0040
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2549 0.8893 0.7945 0.5558 0.9157 0.7133 0.1865 0.2120 0.7766 0.9821
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2397 -0.1690 -0.0794 -0.2276 -0.0303 0.0926 -0.3174 -0.3426 -0.2463 -0.1851
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1655 0.3317 0.6502 0.1885 0.8672 0.6023 0.0674 0.0473 0.1670 0.2945
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1073 -0.2804 0.1555 0.0439 -0.0886 0.0988 -0.0808 -0.1142 -0.3220 -0.2122
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5394 0.1028 0.3723 0.8024 0.6241 0.5783 0.6494 0.5200 0.0677 0.2284
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1200 -0.1781 0.0366 -0.0862 -0.1843 -0.1136 -0.3351 -0.3563 -0.2003 -0.1357
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4922 0.3061 0.8345 0.6226 0.3046 0.5224 0.0527 0.0386 0.2638 0.4440
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1120 0.0549 -0.1358 -0.1864 -0.1416 -0.3091 -0.3537 -0.3828 -0.1077 -0.2613
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5157 0.7504 0.4298 0.2764 0.4244 0.0708 0.0371 0.0232 0.5443 0.1295
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

406
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity
in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation 0.7585 0.9043 0.8464 1.0000 0.7352 0.4632 0.8647 0.9029 0.0103 -0.1033
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.9539 0.5610
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6652 0.7485 0.8618 0.7352 1.0000 0.6403 0.5766 0.6412 -0.0102 0.0233
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.9542 0.8959
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4128 0.4589 0.5439 0.4632 0.6403 1.0000 0.4079 0.4448 0.0510 -0.0101
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0137 0.0056 0.0007 0.0051 0.0000 . 0.0150 0.0074 0.7743 0.9546
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6756 0.7970 0.7400 0.8647 0.5766 0.4079 1.0000 0.9504 -0.0484 0.0659
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0150 . 0.0000 0.7859 0.7110
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7328 0.8421 0.7592 0.9029 0.6412 0.4448 0.9504 1.0000 -0.0196 0.0912
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 . 0.9124 0.6079
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1555 -0.0550 0.0757 0.0103 -0.0102 0.0510 -0.0484 -0.0196 1.0000 0.0672
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3798 0.7574 0.6703 0.9539 0.9542 0.7743 0.7859 0.9124 . 0.7015
sqrtQIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1273 -0.0390 -0.1634 -0.1033 0.0233 -0.0101 0.0659 0.0912 0.0672 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4731 0.8266 0.3557 0.5610 0.8959 0.9546 0.7110 0.6079 0.7015 .
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0578 -0.1159 -0.2554 -0.2100 -0.0700 -0.2146 -0.0527 -0.0657 0.1034 0.8361
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7453 0.5141 0.1449 0.2333 0.6942 0.2228 0.7670 0.7119 0.5544 0.0000
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0183 0.0093 -0.0599 -0.0615 -0.0816 -0.2571 0.0544 -0.0513 0.1196 0.5001
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9181 0.9582 0.7366 0.7297 0.6464 0.1421 0.7598 0.7732 0.4938 0.0022
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3113 -0.2705 -0.1713 -0.3446 -0.0431 -0.2273 -0.3112 -0.2803 0.3849 0.4842
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0731 0.1218 0.3327 0.0460 0.8090 0.1961 0.0732 0.1084 0.0224 0.0032
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3255 -0.2537 -0.2208 -0.1536 -0.1869 -0.0403 -0.2087 -0.1867 0.4524 0.1169
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0564 0.1413 0.2025 0.3784 0.2823 0.8182 0.2288 0.2829 0.0064 0.5037
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

407
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation -0.2100 -0.0615 -0.3446 -0.1536 -0.3954 -0.4124 -0.1893 -0.1998 0.1937 -0.1948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2333 0.7297 0.0460 0.3784 0.0187 0.0138 0.2760 0.2498 0.2723 0.2620
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0700 -0.0816 -0.0431 -0.1869 -0.2438 -0.2581 -0.1415 -0.1280 0.1442 0.0782
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6942 0.6464 0.8090 0.2823 0.1581 0.1345 0.4175 0.4638 0.4157 0.6553
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2146 -0.2571 -0.2273 -0.0403 -0.2859 -0.1912 -0.1542 -0.1118 0.1479 -0.1712
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2228 0.1421 0.1961 0.8182 0.0960 0.2712 0.3764 0.5227 0.4038 0.3254
sqrtQ1E3l
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0527 0.0544 -0.3112 -0.2087 -0.2421 -0.2142 -0.1411 -0.3103 0.0915 -0.2006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7670 0.7598 0.0732 0.2288 0.1611 0.2167 0.4189 0.0696 0.6069 0.2480
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0657 -0.0513 -0.2803 -0.1867 -0.3064 -0.2303 -0.2087 -0.2817 0.0784 -0.1661
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7119 0.7732 0.1084 0.2829 0.0735 0.1832 0.2289 0.1011 0.6594 0.3401
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1034 0.1196 0.3849 0.4524 0.1923 0.1286 0.2592 0.2915 0.6590 0.1279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5544 0.4938 0.0224 0.0064 0.2684 0.4614 0.1327 0.0893 0.0000 0.4639
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8361 0.5001 0.4842 0.1169 0.5579 0.4830 0.3219 0.1046 -0.0793 0.3803
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0022 0.0032 0.5037 0.0005 0.0033 0.0593 0.5499 0.6557 0.0242
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.6149 0.6576 0.1547 0.6238 0.5291 0.3785 0.2306 -0.0986 0.3092
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0001 0.0000 0.3750 0.0001 0.0011 0.0250 0.1826 0.5790 0.0707
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6149 1.0000 0.4377 -0.0231 0.4269 0.2014 0.5066 0.0260 0.0263 0.2589
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 . 0.0086 0.8952 0.0105 0.2461 0.0019 0.8821 0.8827 0.1331
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6576 0.4377 1.0000 0.3023 0.4855 0.4690 0.3910 0.5621 0.0994 0.1914
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0086 . 0.0775 0.0031 0.0045 0.0202 0.0004 0.5760 0.2707
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1547 -0.0231 0.3023 1.0000 0.3596 0.3998 0.4744 0.7020 0.4921 -0.0045
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3750 0.8952 0.0775 . 0.0312 0.0157 0.0035 0.0000 0.0027 0.9794
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000

408
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNDPS
Pearson Correlation -0.0508 0.0448 -0.2749 0.0586 -0.2796 -0.2877 -0.2099 -0.2803 -0.0313 -0.1810
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7718 0.7984 0.1100 0.7501 0.1093 0.0989 0.2334 0.1083 0.8605 0.2982
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1867 0.1597 -0.0643 0.0196 -0.0942 -0.1349 -0.1179 -0.1270 -0.1959 -0.1156
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2828 0.3594 0.7135 0.9153 0.5962 0.4469 0.5066 0.4741 0.2667 0.5086
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0484 -0.2347 -0.2254 0.1302 -0.1171 -0.0328 -0.0436 -0.0632 0.0422 -0.2323
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7826 0.1747 0.1930 0.4774 0.5095 0.8541 0.8068 0.7224 0.8125 0.1792
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0822 -0.0833 -0.2899 0.0245 -0.2336 -0.2472 -0.1951 -0.3522 -0.0468 -0.1102
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6388 0.6342 0.0912 0.8939 0.1837 0.1586 0.2688 0.0411 0.7927 0.5287
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0312 -0.0846 -0.2436 -0.0121 -0.2207 -0.2111 -0.2121 -0.2948 -0.0631 -0.0994
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8589 0.6289 0.1585 0.9477 0.2098 0.2307 0.2284 0.0905 0.7230 0.5698
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1830 0.2485 0.3637 0.2503 0.0416 0.1799 0.1731 0.1626 0.3801 0.0431
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2926 0.1499 0.0317 0.1670 0.8152 0.3086 0.3276 0.3581 0.0266 0.8059
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4524 0.0719 0.0763 -0.1148 0.2483 0.2263 0.0270 0.0105 -0.0543 0.2693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0064 0.6814 0.6631 0.5317 0.1567 0.1980 0.8796 0.9529 0.7602 0.1177
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4340 0.1111 0.1761 -0.1301 0.1409 0.2464 -0.0296 -0.0050 -0.1039 0.1853
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0092 0.5250 0.3117 0.4778 0.4268 0.1601 0.8680 0.9776 0.5586 0.2867
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3175 0.3321 -0.0099 0.0739 0.1655 0.1167 0.2619 -0.0368 0.0341 0.0978
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0631 0.0513 0.9550 0.6879 0.3497 0.5112 0.1346 0.8365 0.8481 0.5762
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3293 0.2041 0.4573 0.1138 0.1424 0.3494 0.1388 0.3325 -0.0834 0.0795
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0534 0.2396 0.0057 0.5352 0.4216 0.0428 0.4338 0.0547 0.6392 0.6497
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2147 0.0503 0.2763 0.4991 0.2806 0.5210 0.2009 0.5555 0.5936 0.3070
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2087 0.7707 0.1029 0.0031 0.1026 0.0013 0.2473 0.0005 0.0002 0.0686
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

409
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation -0.1936 -0.1137 -0.2185 0.2975 0.1487 0.2110 -0.0922 -0.0212 -0.2333 0.0609
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2650 0.5155 0.2074 0.0826 0.3939 0.2310 0.6041 0.9037 0.1774 0.7362
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1167 -0.1419 -0.1800 0.1614 0.1363 0.2148 -0.1561 0.0376 -0.2012 0.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5043 0.4161 0.3007 0.3544 0.4349 0.2226 0.3780 0.8300 0.2465 1.0000
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2091 -0.2572 -0.1945 0.1144 0.1141 0.1633 0.1102 0.1971 -0.1516 -0.0489
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2279 0.1357 0.2630 0.5127 0.5141 0.3562 0.5349 0.2565 0.3845 0.7870
sqrtQ1E3l
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1208 -0.0355 -0.1904 0.3519 0.2023 0.1834 0.1253 -0.2223 -0.0648 0.0373
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4895 0.8395 0.2734 0.0382 0.2438 0.2991 0.4803 0.1992 0.7114 0.8365
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1121 -0.0277 -0.1476 0.3555 0.1494 0.1617 0.0593 -0.0972 -0.2430 0.0842
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5216 0.8744 0.3974 0.0361 0.3917 0.3608 0.7389 0.5786 0.1595 0.6414
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0968 0.2430 0.1620 -0.1899 -0.0509 -0.2144 -0.0193 0.1354 -0.1746 0.2663
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5802 0.1596 0.3525 0.2746 0.7714 0.2233 0.9150 0.4381 0.3233 0.1406
sqrtQIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2882 0.1645 0.1353 0.0265 -0.0986 -0.1775 0.2925 -0.1068 0.0432 0.0819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0932 0.3450 0.4382 0.8798 0.5730 0.3152 0.0986 0.5414 0.8083 0.6557
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2562 0.1028 0.1436 0.0686 -0.0248 -0.1084 0.2711 -0.0749 0.1244 0.2899
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1374 0.5569 0.4105 0.6955 0.8877 0.5418 0.1271 0.6689 0.4832 0.1076
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0945 0.1248 -0.0195 0.0473 -0.0414 -0.0617 0.2011 -0.0363 0.3014 0.0322
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5894 0.4750 0.9117 0.7873 0.8133 0.7290 0.2619 0.8360 0.0832 0.8611
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1476 0.0430 0.2240 -0.1427 -0.0942 -0.1213 0.0556 0.1172 0.2077 0.1375
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3974 0.8064 0.1958 0.4134 0.5902 0.4943 0.7588 0.5026 0.2385 0.4529
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3896 0.3778 0.5037 0.1145 0.1167 0.1560 0.1165 -0.1753 0.0904 0.4608
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0188 0.0231 0.0017 0.5063 0.4977 0.3707 0.5116 0.3065 0.6055 0.0070
sqrtQIID1a
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000

410
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation 0.3327 0.0813 0.1920 -0.2197 0.0979 0.3006 0.0163 0.0677 0.1315 -0.2121
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0545 0.6477 0.2767 0.2118 0.5819 0.0841 0.9259 0.7037 0.4586 0.2285
Org Resource
Challenges-
Lack of Clarity
in Duties
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0754 0.0064 0.0358 -0.0850 0.0186 0.0223 -0.0426 -0.0429 -0.0296 -0.1714
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6715 0.9713 0.8409 0.6326 0.9170 0.9002 0.8079 0.8097 0.8680 0.3325
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders
and Employees N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0932 -0.1091 -0.1849 -0.0527 -0.1333 -0.0406 -0.2661 -0.2775 -0.2669 -0.2123
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6002 0.5389 0.2951 0.7673 0.4523 0.8198 0.1223 0.1120 0.1270 0.2280
sqrtQ1E3l
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2832 0.1308 0.2590 -0.2290 0.0608 0.3056 0.1232 0.1663 0.1619 -0.1664
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1045 0.4611 0.1391 0.1926 0.7328 0.0788 0.4807 0.3474 0.3603 0.3469
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
International
Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3080 0.1546 0.2420 -0.1671 0.0971 0.2810 0.0813 0.0729 0.0951 -0.1498
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0763 0.3825 0.1679 0.3448 0.5848 0.1074 0.6426 0.6820 0.5925 0.3977
Org Resource
Challenges-
Conflict or Lack
Comm
Domestic Orgs N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0247 -0.0648 -0.0003 0.2744 -0.0187 0.0859 -0.1132 -0.0123 0.0350 -0.0527
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8897 0.7158 0.9985 0.1163 0.9165 0.6289 0.5175 0.9448 0.8441 0.7674
sqrtQIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1568 0.1600 0.1399 0.1966 -0.1450 -0.2168 0.1569 0.0572 -0.1782 -0.0990
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3758 0.3661 0.4301 0.2651 0.4132 0.2182 0.3682 0.7480 0.3134 0.5775
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CSIE
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1206 0.2547 0.2321 0.3377 -0.0499 -0.1875 0.2273 0.1671 -0.0809 0.0247
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4970 0.1461 0.1865 0.0508 0.7792 0.2884 0.1890 0.3449 0.6494 0.8899
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
DWMD
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0057 0.1065 0.2695 0.1316 -0.0001 -0.0108 0.0865 0.1800 0.0953 -0.1032
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9743 0.5489 0.1232 0.4583 0.9997 0.9518 0.6212 0.3082 0.5921 0.5613
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
TVP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2156 0.0538 0.0025 0.3787 -0.0424 -0.2641 -0.0420 -0.0507 -0.1559 0.0099
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2207 0.7625 0.9889 0.0272 0.8119 0.1312 0.8105 0.7758 0.3785 0.9556
Knowledge of
Domestic Law-
CBP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1642 0.1981 0.0815 0.4622 0.0588 0.2048 -0.1007 0.0232 0.0226 0.0926
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3458 0.2540 0.6415 0.0052 0.7372 0.2379 0.5589 0.8948 0.8976 0.5967
sqrtQIID1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

411
Table A7, continued (Row 4, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation 0.3285 -0.0233 0.0148 0.0927 0.0415
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0620 0.8961 0.9350 0.6078 0.8187
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity in
Duties
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0814 -0.1401 -0.1366 -0.0755 -0.0712
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6526 0.4295 0.4484 0.6764 0.6938
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1503 -0.0049 -0.0698 0.0361 -0.0295
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4037 0.9779 0.6995 0.8420 0.8704
sqrtQ1E3l
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2394 0.0697 0.0573 0.0872 -0.0110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1796 0.6952 0.7514 0.6293 0.9517
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2852 0.0777 0.0412 0.1203 0.0296
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1077 0.6621 0.8198 0.5050 0.8703
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2077 0.0923 0.1583 0.1952 0.1391
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2460 0.6036 0.3790 0.2762 0.4402
sqrtQIIA1a
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2020 0.2064 0.1450 -0.0198 -0.0354
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2596 0.2416 0.4209 0.9129 0.8450
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1522 0.2612 0.2506 0.1034 0.0802
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3977 0.1357 0.1595 0.5669 0.6573
Knowledge of Domestic Law-DWMD
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0323 0.0634 0.1953 0.0621 -0.0023
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8583 0.7217 0.2762 0.7312 0.9898
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0883 0.1344 0.0791 0.1447 0.1648
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6250 0.4486 0.6619 0.4216 0.3594
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1755 0.2461 0.2282 0.2866 0.2789
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3208 0.1540 0.1943 0.1003 0.1102
sqrtQIID1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

412
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered
Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.0291 -0.1636 0.0149 0.1377 -0.2225 0.2881 0.5092 0.5158 0.2726 0.3252
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8662 0.3404 0.9312 0.4231 0.1922 0.0884 0.0015 0.0013 0.1078 0.0530
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0626 -0.1263 0.0214 0.1513 -0.3094 0.1094 0.3940 0.4225 0.1807 0.3303
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7167 0.4630 0.9013 0.3783 0.0663 0.5255 0.0174 0.0103 0.2915 0.0491
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1330 -0.1268 -0.0633 0.0183 -0.3146 0.4848 0.4552 0.4073 0.4165 0.4434
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4393 0.4612 0.7139 0.9154 0.0617 0.0027 0.0053 0.0137 0.0115 0.0068
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0417 0.0764 0.1665 0.2144 -0.3942 0.2573 -0.0049 0.3248 -0.0180 0.3882
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8092 0.6578 0.3317 0.2091 0.0174 0.1297 0.9774 0.0532 0.9168 0.0193
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1539 0.1940 0.0303 0.1534 -0.2490 0.5686 0.0614 0.1530 0.2038 0.3504
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3774 0.2642 0.8627 0.3788 0.1492 0.0004 0.7262 0.3804 0.2403 0.0390
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0319 0.0782 0.1695 0.1824 0.1344 0.0163 0.4628 0.2114 0.2662 0.3009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8535 0.6503 0.3229 0.2870 0.4346 0.9248 0.0045 0.2159 0.1166 0.0745
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1127 -0.0579 0.0782 0.2523 0.0069 0.0481 0.4045 0.4489 0.2159 0.3780
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5128 0.7373 0.6503 0.1377 0.9683 0.7807 0.0144 0.0060 0.2061 0.0230
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1182 -0.0618 -0.0557 -0.0240 -0.1092 0.1280 0.3222 0.2949 0.4759 0.4396
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4923 0.7201 0.7470 0.8894 0.5260 0.4570 0.0553 0.0808 0.0033 0.0073
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1398 0.3553 0.3276 0.2496 -0.0503 0.1387 0.1691 0.2459 0.2935 0.5612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4159 0.0335 0.0511 0.1421 0.7708 0.4197 0.3241 0.1483 0.0823 0.0004
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0834 0.0701 0.1064 0.0308 -0.1836 0.4138 0.1939 0.3706 0.1707 0.3408
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6445 0.6984 0.5557 0.8648 0.3065 0.0167 0.2797 0.0337 0.3422 0.0523
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0518 -0.0744 0.1564 0.1160 -0.0204 0.2400 0.3670 0.2723 0.1638 0.1460
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7677 0.6711 0.3696 0.5069 0.9072 0.1649 0.0301 0.1136 0.3471 0.4028
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

413
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.3267 -0.0671 -0.3195 -0.3802 -0.0320 0.0093 -0.2315 -0.3394 -0.3240 -0.2536
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0554 0.6976 0.0575 0.0222 0.8528 0.9570 0.1743 0.0429 0.0539 0.1357
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3174 -0.0939 -0.3120 -0.3942 -0.0340 0.1753 -0.3228 -0.4186 -0.3391 -0.2787
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0632 0.5860 0.0639 0.0174 0.8439 0.3065 0.0548 0.0111 0.0430 0.0997
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2215 0.0638 -0.1253 -0.2011 0.0283 0.0584 -0.1657 -0.1068 -0.1520 0.0556
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2010 0.7115 0.4667 0.2396 0.8701 0.7350 0.3342 0.5354 0.3760 0.7476
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1697 -0.0404 -0.1085 -0.1170 0.0558 -0.0042 -0.1672 -0.0882 -0.1525 -0.0516
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3297 0.8149 0.5287 0.4968 0.7467 0.9804 0.3296 0.6088 0.3747 0.7651
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3282 0.3114 0.1295 0.1581 0.2187 0.3565 -0.0354 0.3285 0.3383 0.3095
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0581 0.0686 0.4584 0.3642 0.2069 0.0356 0.8399 0.0540 0.0468 0.0704
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2881 0.0694 -0.1696 -0.2311 -0.0790 0.2407 0.0213 -0.1415 0.0382 -0.0093
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0933 0.6877 0.3227 0.1750 0.6468 0.1573 0.9020 0.4103 0.8250 0.9569
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3869 0.1221 -0.1149 -0.1980 0.1071 0.3647 0.0335 -0.0162 0.1323 0.0524
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0217 0.4779 0.5044 0.2471 0.5340 0.0288 0.8461 0.9254 0.4418 0.7615
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2685 0.2363 -0.0342 -0.0110 0.1396 0.2381 0.0131 0.0718 0.1710 0.1479
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1188 0.1653 0.8430 0.9493 0.4166 0.1620 0.9398 0.6775 0.3186 0.3892
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2605 0.1714 -0.1854 -0.2242 0.0952 0.2494 -0.1226 -0.1359 -0.0048 -0.0612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1307 0.3175 0.2790 0.1888 0.5809 0.1424 0.4762 0.4294 0.9778 0.7228
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0079 0.1206 0.0284 0.1815 0.2646 0.2109 -0.1934 0.0917 -0.0591 0.1341
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9652 0.5039 0.8754 0.3122 0.1367 0.2387 0.2809 0.6117 0.7439 0.4568
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1191 0.0242 -0.3494 -0.3143 -0.0257 0.0392 -0.3843 -0.2957 -0.3184 -0.1994
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4956 0.8903 0.0397 0.0660 0.8833 0.8230 0.0227 0.0845 0.0623 0.2509
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

414
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.3763 -0.2268 -0.1725 -0.3066 -0.1553 -0.1766 -0.4078 -0.4665 -0.2576 -0.1698
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0237 0.1835 0.3143 0.0689 0.3804 0.3101 0.0150 0.0047 0.1414 0.3295
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3806 -0.0638 -0.1342 -0.2523 -0.2637 -0.3089 -0.4448 -0.4764 -0.1964 -0.1211
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0220 0.7115 0.4350 0.1377 0.1318 0.0709 0.0074 0.0038 0.2657 0.4882
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1813 -0.0832 0.0026 -0.0655 -0.1839 -0.2466 -0.2323 -0.2813 -0.3635 -0.2969
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2899 0.6294 0.9881 0.7043 0.2978 0.1533 0.1793 0.1017 0.0346 0.0833
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1645 -0.0522 -0.1031 -0.2033 -0.3699 -0.4410 -0.2361 -0.3095 -0.1248 -0.2055
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3377 0.7623 0.5496 0.2344 0.0313 0.0080 0.1721 0.0704 0.4819 0.2363
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2006 0.2261 0.2839 0.2088 0.0342 -0.0162 0.0263 -0.0017 0.0645 0.2057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2479 0.1915 0.0984 0.2287 0.8503 0.9276 0.8828 0.9925 0.7216 0.2432
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1294 -0.0278 0.1332 0.0700 0.0321 -0.0835 -0.2797 -0.3170 0.0298 0.1275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4521 0.8719 0.4388 0.6850 0.8570 0.6336 0.1036 0.0635 0.8673 0.4656
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1660 0.0690 0.0944 0.1161 0.1374 0.0184 -0.2263 -0.2731 0.1285 0.2022
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3334 0.6893 0.5840 0.5001 0.4386 0.9166 0.1911 0.1124 0.4688 0.2441
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1161 -0.1745 0.2105 0.2141 0.1194 -0.0144 -0.0268 -0.0901 -0.0141 0.1224
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5002 0.3088 0.2179 0.2099 0.5010 0.9344 0.8786 0.6066 0.9370 0.4838
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0572 -0.0507 0.0680 -0.0306 -0.0829 -0.1243 -0.2772 -0.3359 0.0582 0.0930
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7403 0.7689 0.6937 0.8595 0.6413 0.4767 0.1069 0.0485 0.7438 0.5951
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1135 -0.0093 0.0776 0.0771 0.0230 -0.2796 0.0015 -0.0421 0.0959 0.0279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5296 0.9590 0.6677 0.6697 0.9024 0.1212 0.9936 0.8190 0.6079 0.8797
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 31.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2432 -0.1364 -0.1258 -0.0970 -0.1200 -0.3383 -0.3248 -0.3530 -0.0810 -0.1288
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1592 0.4346 0.4716 0.5793 0.5059 0.0503 0.0609 0.0406 0.6541 0.4677
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

415
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity
in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.3626 -0.3952 -0.2891 -0.3954 -0.2438 -0.2859 -0.2421 -0.3064 0.1923 0.5579
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0323 0.0188 0.0922 0.0187 0.1581 0.0960 0.1611 0.0735 0.2684 0.0005
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.4359 -0.4554 -0.3082 -0.4124 -0.2581 -0.1912 -0.2142 -0.2303 0.1286 0.4830
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0089 0.0060 0.0717 0.0138 0.1345 0.2712 0.2167 0.1832 0.4614 0.0033
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2617 -0.1852 -0.1271 -0.1893 -0.1415 -0.1542 -0.1411 -0.2087 0.2592 0.3219
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1289 0.2868 0.4670 0.2760 0.4175 0.3764 0.4189 0.2289 0.1327 0.0593
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.4314 -0.2952 -0.1596 -0.1998 -0.1280 -0.1118 -0.3103 -0.2817 0.2915 0.1046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0097 0.0851 0.3598 0.2498 0.4638 0.5227 0.0696 0.1011 0.0893 0.5499
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0089 0.0761 0.1894 0.1937 0.1442 0.1479 0.0915 0.0784 0.6590 -0.0793
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9604 0.6689 0.2833 0.2723 0.4157 0.4038 0.6069 0.6594 0.0000 0.6557
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0746 -0.1040 -0.0530 -0.1948 0.0782 -0.1712 -0.2006 -0.1661 0.1279 0.3803
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6700 0.5522 0.7622 0.2620 0.6553 0.3254 0.2480 0.3401 0.4639 0.0242
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1545 0.0208 0.0520 -0.0508 0.1867 -0.0484 -0.0822 -0.0312 0.1830 0.4524
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3754 0.9058 0.7667 0.7718 0.2828 0.7826 0.6388 0.8589 0.2926 0.0064
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1285 0.0143 0.1151 0.0448 0.1597 -0.2347 -0.0833 -0.0846 0.2485 0.0719
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4620 0.9352 0.5103 0.7984 0.3594 0.1747 0.6342 0.6289 0.1499 0.6814
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1611 -0.2920 -0.1516 -0.2749 -0.0643 -0.2254 -0.2899 -0.2436 0.3637 0.0763
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3552 0.0888 0.3846 0.1100 0.7135 0.1930 0.0912 0.1585 0.0317 0.6631
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1393 -0.1005 0.1123 0.0586 0.0196 0.1302 0.0245 -0.0121 0.2503 -0.1148
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4469 0.5842 0.5406 0.7501 0.9153 0.4774 0.8939 0.9477 0.1670 0.5317
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1680 -0.2940 -0.1628 -0.2796 -0.0942 -0.1171 -0.2336 -0.2207 0.0416 0.2483
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3424 0.0915 0.3577 0.1093 0.5962 0.5095 0.1837 0.2098 0.8152 0.1567
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

416
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.6238 0.4269 0.4855 0.3596 1.0000 0.7912 0.7777 0.4620 0.1822 0.3594
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0105 0.0031 0.0312 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.2949 0.0314
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5291 0.2014 0.4690 0.3998 0.7912 1.0000 0.6143 0.5201 0.1739 0.2141
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0011 0.2461 0.0045 0.0157 0.0000 . 0.0001 0.0012 0.3177 0.2098
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3785 0.5066 0.3910 0.4744 0.7777 0.6143 1.0000 0.5351 0.3406 0.1873
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0250 0.0019 0.0202 0.0035 0.0000 0.0001 . 0.0008 0.0453 0.2741
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2306 0.0260 0.5621 0.7020 0.4620 0.5201 0.5351 1.0000 0.2939 -0.0578
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1826 0.8821 0.0004 0.0000 0.0046 0.0012 0.0008 . 0.0866 0.7378
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0986 0.0263 0.0994 0.4921 0.1822 0.1739 0.3406 0.2939 1.0000 0.2259
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5790 0.8827 0.5760 0.0027 0.2949 0.3177 0.0453 0.0866 . 0.1919
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3092 0.2589 0.1914 -0.0045 0.3594 0.2141 0.1873 -0.0578 0.2259 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0707 0.1331 0.2707 0.9794 0.0314 0.2098 0.2741 0.7378 0.1919 .
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4340 0.3175 0.3293 0.2147 0.3425 0.2766 0.2122 0.0853 0.3507 0.8490
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0092 0.0631 0.0534 0.2087 0.0409 0.1025 0.2140 0.6209 0.0389 0.0000
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1111 0.3321 0.2041 0.0503 0.2440 0.0821 0.3122 0.0620 0.5148 0.6948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5250 0.0513 0.2396 0.7707 0.1515 0.6342 0.0638 0.7192 0.0016 0.0000
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1761 -0.0099 0.4573 0.2763 0.2423 0.3109 0.1111 0.3090 0.4789 0.6515
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3117 0.9550 0.0057 0.1029 0.1546 0.0649 0.5190 0.0667 0.0036 0.0000
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1301 0.0739 0.1138 0.4991 0.1915 0.2390 0.4288 0.4754 0.3686 -0.0887
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4778 0.6879 0.5352 0.0031 0.2858 0.1804 0.0128 0.0052 0.0379 0.6235
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1409 0.1655 0.1424 0.2806 0.5766 0.4849 0.6054 0.2277 0.1688 0.3611
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4268 0.3497 0.4216 0.1026 0.0003 0.0032 0.0001 0.1884 0.3399 0.0331
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

417
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.3425 0.2440 0.2423 0.1915 0.5766 0.4744 0.4123 0.2704 0.2898 0.4537
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0409 0.1515 0.1546 0.2858 0.0003 0.0040 0.0139 0.1162 0.0913 0.0054
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2766 0.0821 0.3109 0.2390 0.4849 0.4952 0.3257 0.3519 0.2354 0.4372
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1025 0.6342 0.0649 0.1804 0.0032 0.0025 0.0562 0.0381 0.1735 0.0077
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2122 0.3122 0.1111 0.4288 0.6054 0.4910 0.5899 0.4028 0.3361 0.3733
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2140 0.0638 0.5190 0.0128 0.0001 0.0027 0.0002 0.0164 0.0484 0.0249
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0853 0.0620 0.3090 0.4754 0.2277 0.4178 0.2129 0.5841 0.3215 0.1751
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6209 0.7192 0.0667 0.0052 0.1884 0.0125 0.2195 0.0002 0.0597 0.3069
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3507 0.5148 0.4789 0.3686 0.1688 0.1747 0.2413 0.1641 0.4457 0.1327
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0389 0.0016 0.0036 0.0379 0.3399 0.3232 0.1692 0.3537 0.0082 0.4474
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8490 0.6948 0.6515 -0.0887 0.3611 0.1456 0.2324 0.0813 0.0042 0.3385
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6235 0.0331 0.4041 0.1791 0.6425 0.9810 0.0435
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.7061 0.6206 0.1355 0.3847 0.3799 0.3031 0.2621 0.1217 0.3611
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0001 0.4522 0.0225 0.0244 0.0768 0.1282 0.4862 0.0305
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7061 1.0000 0.6351 0.2733 0.3798 0.1910 0.4205 0.2136 0.1578 0.3697
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.1238 0.0244 0.2718 0.0119 0.2180 0.3651 0.0265
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6206 0.6351 1.0000 0.1785 0.2279 0.2346 0.1730 0.3145 0.1320 0.2666
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 . 0.3202 0.1880 0.1750 0.3203 0.0657 0.4499 0.1159
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1355 0.2733 0.1785 1.0000 0.6244 0.7451 0.7309 0.8610 0.6773 0.4875
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4522 0.1238 0.3202 . 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3847 0.3798 0.2279 0.6244 1.0000 0.8026 0.8367 0.7218 0.5215 0.7429
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0225 0.0244 0.1880 0.0001 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

418
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.4986 0.3942 0.3621 -0.0166 -0.0436 -0.0670 0.3660 -0.1921 0.0446 0.1078
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0174 0.0300 0.9236 0.8008 0.7021 0.0333 0.2618 0.7993 0.5503
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4416 0.3629 0.4183 0.0281 -0.0079 -0.0168 0.3984 -0.2136 0.0309 0.1871
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0070 0.0296 0.0111 0.8708 0.9636 0.9238 0.0196 0.2110 0.8601 0.2972
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3532 0.3892 0.2200 0.0224 0.0079 -0.0141 0.3035 -0.0707 0.0867 0.0611
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0346 0.0190 0.1973 0.8967 0.9637 0.9361 0.0810 0.6818 0.6206 0.7357
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2419 0.1522 0.4283 -0.0467 0.0137 0.0940 0.0006 -0.0284 0.0727 0.3480
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1553 0.3755 0.0092 0.7866 0.9367 0.5911 0.9973 0.8692 0.6780 0.0472
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1273 0.2966 0.1620 -0.0305 0.1332 0.1338 -0.1075 -0.1239 -0.1046 0.2577
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4660 0.0836 0.3525 0.8618 0.4456 0.4505 0.5515 0.4782 0.5559 0.1545
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2883 0.3935 0.2210 0.1503 0.1325 0.2814 -0.0871 -0.0378 -0.0375 0.0529
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0882 0.0176 0.1953 0.3817 0.4412 0.1015 0.6241 0.8268 0.8308 0.7698
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3753 0.4306 0.3836 0.2397 0.2001 0.3763 0.0113 -0.0143 -0.0063 0.2063
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0241 0.0087 0.0209 0.1591 0.2421 0.0259 0.9496 0.9342 0.9714 0.2495
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3133 0.4785 0.2707 0.0857 0.1293 0.3482 -0.1313 -0.0541 -0.0047 0.0506
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0628 0.0032 0.1102 0.6190 0.4522 0.0404 0.4593 0.7538 0.9785 0.7798
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2476 0.3484 0.3784 0.0085 0.1471 0.2982 -0.1273 -0.1297 0.0381 0.2530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1454 0.0373 0.0229 0.9607 0.3918 0.0819 0.4732 0.4509 0.8280 0.1554
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5190 0.5302 0.5762 0.0581 -0.0825 0.2669 0.2827 -0.1366 0.0378 0.2165
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0020 0.0015 0.0004 0.7480 0.6479 0.1397 0.1233 0.4485 0.8375 0.2420
sqrtQIIID1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000 33.0000 32.0000 31.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7025 0.7276 0.5567 0.0086 -0.1697 0.0685 0.3836 -0.0858 -0.0429 0.0741
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.9607 0.3297 0.7003 0.0276 0.6240 0.8094 0.6821
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000

419
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation -0.1373 0.1711 0.2136 0.2584 -0.1565 -0.0136 0.2940 0.2628 0.0732 -0.0167
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4315 0.3258 0.2179 0.1339 0.3694 0.9382 0.0817 0.1271 0.6760 0.9240
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSIE
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0172 0.3376 0.2338 0.5121 0.0070 0.0614 0.3304 0.2299 0.0664 0.1741
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9221 0.0473 0.1764 0.0017 0.9684 0.7259 0.0490 0.1840 0.7045 0.3172
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0777 0.1300 0.2622 0.2625 -0.0204 0.1299 0.1501 0.2681 0.1924 -0.0877
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6573 0.4566 0.1281 0.1276 0.9075 0.4570 0.3824 0.1195 0.2682 0.6165
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TVP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1536 0.2426 0.1368 0.4177 0.2302 0.0198 -0.0320 -0.0107 0.0123 0.1787
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3784 0.1603 0.4334 0.0125 0.1834 0.9103 0.8530 0.9512 0.9443 0.3043
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CBP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1480 0.0277 0.0397 0.1457 -0.0020 0.1665 -0.0081 0.0002 0.0866 -0.1267
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4036 0.8765 0.8238 0.4111 0.9910 0.3466 0.9631 0.9991 0.6261 0.4753
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2197 0.0289 0.0850 0.0740 0.0353 -0.2977 0.1148 0.0020 -0.0391 0.0128
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2047 0.8689 0.6274 0.6727 0.8407 0.0824 0.5048 0.9910 0.8236 0.9418
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0906 0.1552 0.1381 0.2132 -0.0432 -0.1840 0.1046 0.0359 -0.0149 -0.0767
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6045 0.3733 0.4288 0.2189 0.8055 0.2900 0.5439 0.8376 0.9322 0.6616
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0221 0.1203 0.2295 0.1222 0.1111 -0.0513 0.1474 0.1471 0.2077 -0.0486
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8996 0.4911 0.1847 0.4845 0.5253 0.7697 0.3911 0.3992 0.2313 0.7816
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1440 0.0930 0.0052 0.3129 0.2043 -0.2656 -0.0094 -0.1126 -0.0855 0.1779
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4093 0.5953 0.9763 0.0672 0.2390 0.1231 0.9568 0.5194 0.6252 0.3065
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3557 0.3476 0.3254 0.3420 0.2169 0.4180 0.1142 0.3432 0.3670 0.1490
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0457 0.0513 0.0692 0.0554 0.2332 0.0173 0.5268 0.0545 0.0388 0.4158
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1559 0.4002 0.4193 0.3435 0.1338 0.3119 0.4791 0.4991 0.4630 0.2319
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3787 0.0190 0.0136 0.0467 0.4507 0.0726 0.0036 0.0027 0.0058 0.1870
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

420
Table A7, continued (Row 5, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation -0.1107 0.3696 0.4242 0.1500 0.1731
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5331 0.0289 0.0124 0.3972 0.3274
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSIE
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0364 0.4777 0.3842 0.2883 0.3046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8382 0.0037 0.0249 0.0983 0.0798
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-DWMD
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1560 0.3611 0.4525 0.2792 0.2723
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3784 0.0331 0.0072 0.1098 0.1193
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TVP
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2050 0.3365 0.2793 0.3933 0.4889
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2447 0.0481 0.1097 0.0214 0.0033
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CBP
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3025 0.1548 0.1877 0.2515 0.2017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0871 0.3819 0.2956 0.1579 0.2602
sqrtQIIIA1a
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0562 0.0659 0.0997 -0.0240 0.0218
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7522 0.7067 0.5748 0.8929 0.9024
sqrtQIIIA1b
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0174 0.1306 0.1179 0.1012 0.0999
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9223 0.4547 0.5067 0.5689 0.5742
sqrtQIIIA1c
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2362 0.0957 0.1858 0.1545 0.1787
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1786 0.5844 0.2929 0.3830 0.3119
sqrtQIIIA1d
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0568 0.1706 0.0721 0.1855 0.2334
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7495 0.3272 0.6852 0.2935 0.1841
sqrtQIIIA1e
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4114 0.4041 0.3840 0.4812 0.4420
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0193 0.0197 0.0300 0.0053 0.0113
sqrtQIIID1a
N 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1404 0.5133 0.5190 0.3622 0.3664
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4284 0.0016 0.0017 0.0353 0.0330
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNDPS
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

421
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.1244 0.0249 0.1364 0.1835 -0.0434 0.2866 0.2308 0.4812 0.1396 0.3090
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4764 0.8870 0.4348 0.2913 0.8045 0.0951 0.1821 0.0034 0.4239 0.0709
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1646 0.0051 0.1535 0.0920 -0.0947 0.2611 0.2171 0.2043 0.2787 0.2677
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3448 0.9767 0.3786 0.5993 0.5886 0.1298 0.2103 0.2391 0.1050 0.1200
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1113 0.1878 0.3916 0.2575 -0.0987 0.2429 -0.0035 0.2767 0.0033 0.2737
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5246 0.2800 0.0200 0.1353 0.5725 0.1597 0.9839 0.1075 0.9852 0.1117
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0214 0.2075 0.2276 0.1701 -0.0940 0.5361 -0.0078 0.2198 0.1284 0.1527
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9028 0.2317 0.1886 0.3285 0.5913 0.0009 0.9646 0.2044 0.4625 0.3810
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1124 0.0021 0.1330 0.0575 -0.0534 0.1694 0.2711 0.2907 0.1288 0.0678
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5139 0.9902 0.4393 0.7391 0.7571 0.3233 0.1098 0.0855 0.4541 0.6944
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0449 0.0023 0.0860 0.1102 -0.0231 0.1797 0.2604 0.4227 0.1151 0.1025
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7949 0.9895 0.6180 0.5222 0.8936 0.2943 0.1251 0.0102 0.5040 0.5518
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0549 0.0373 0.0793 0.1459 -0.0056 0.2332 0.2177 0.2247 0.2938 0.1867
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7504 0.8292 0.6459 0.3959 0.9740 0.1710 0.2021 0.1876 0.0820 0.2757
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0110 0.0624 0.2157 0.2396 -0.1143 0.1194 0.0106 0.3393 0.0382 0.1958
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9491 0.7177 0.2065 0.1593 0.5070 0.4880 0.9511 0.0429 0.8247 0.2524
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1272 -0.1992 0.0037 -0.1471 -0.2422 0.1477 0.0975 0.1958 0.1268 0.1346
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4597 0.2442 0.9827 0.3919 0.1546 0.3899 0.5715 0.2525 0.4610 0.4339
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1038 0.0760 -0.0544 -0.2229 -0.0831 0.1831 -0.1039 0.0264 0.0276 0.0214
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5471 0.6595 0.7528 0.1914 0.6301 0.2852 0.5464 0.8784 0.8732 0.9013
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2036 -0.0784 -0.0162 -0.1433 -0.0897 -0.0036 0.0204 0.1837 0.2654 0.1990
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2408 0.6545 0.9265 0.4115 0.6085 0.9835 0.9073 0.2908 0.1234 0.2517
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

422
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-Excessive
Admin Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Clarity in Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.1925 -0.0511 -0.3097 -0.2839 0.1179 0.0146 -0.4478 -0.2249 -0.3398 -0.2423
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2680 0.7705 0.0702 0.0984 0.4998 0.9334 0.0070 0.1940 0.0458 0.1608
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1203 0.1117 -0.1833 -0.1215 0.0768 0.0791 -0.3132 -0.1131 -0.2203 -0.0036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4912 0.5231 0.2919 0.4870 0.6610 0.6514 0.0669 0.5179 0.2034 0.9835
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0535 0.0041 -0.2496 -0.1957 0.1020 0.0394 -0.3367 -0.1968 -0.2806 -0.1610
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7601 0.9813 0.1481 0.2598 0.5600 0.8221 0.0479 0.2572 0.1025 0.3556
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0563 -0.1385 -0.0454 0.0772 0.2775 0.1931 -0.1671 0.0834 -0.0788 -0.0609
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7519 0.4277 0.7956 0.6593 0.1066 0.2663 0.3375 0.6337 0.6526 0.7280
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0521 -0.1679 -0.1854 -0.1642 0.2058 0.1350 -0.1814 -0.2790 -0.3088 -0.2645
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7663 0.3277 0.2791 0.3386 0.2285 0.4324 0.2896 0.0994 0.0669 0.1190
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1166 -0.2175 -0.1852 -0.1489 0.2551 0.0927 -0.2226 -0.2551 -0.3368 -0.3009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5047 0.2026 0.2795 0.3860 0.1333 0.5908 0.1918 0.1332 0.0446 0.0745
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0751 -0.0209 -0.0530 -0.0524 0.1915 0.0969 -0.2263 -0.1966 -0.2681 -0.1977
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6679 0.9038 0.7586 0.7616 0.2632 0.5738 0.1844 0.2504 0.1139 0.2477
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1284 -0.2123 -0.1736 -0.1508 0.2529 0.0811 -0.2817 -0.2426 -0.3346 -0.3052
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4624 0.2138 0.3114 0.3800 0.1366 0.6380 0.0960 0.1540 0.0461 0.0702
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0884 0.0179 0.2114 0.1371 0.2619 0.3080 0.3243 0.2088 0.2928 0.2937
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6135 0.9176 0.2158 0.4251 0.1228 0.0676 0.0537 0.2216 0.0831 0.0821
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2392 0.0627 0.1892 0.0768 0.2009 0.2318 0.2996 0.2963 0.4052 0.2994
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1663 0.7164 0.2690 0.6560 0.2400 0.1738 0.0758 0.0794 0.0142 0.0761
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3484 0.1729 0.1521 0.1250 0.2528 0.4174 0.2555 0.3183 0.4473 0.3700
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0435 0.3206 0.3830 0.4742 0.1428 0.0126 0.1385 0.0624 0.0071 0.0287
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

423
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or
Lack Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.2412 -0.0657 -0.2421 -0.2036 -0.1800 -0.3131 -0.3757 -0.4226 -0.0355 -0.1819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1628 0.7077 0.1611 0.2409 0.3163 0.0714 0.0285 0.0128 0.8446 0.3033
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1756 -0.1034 -0.0921 -0.0198 -0.1702 -0.2950 -0.1646 -0.1937 -0.0343 -0.0498
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3128 0.5545 0.5988 0.9102 0.3436 0.0904 0.3522 0.2724 0.8497 0.7799
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1849 -0.0830 -0.1925 -0.1262 -0.2506 -0.4556 -0.3192 -0.3354 0.0295 -0.1475
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2877 0.6355 0.2678 0.4701 0.1595 0.0068 0.0657 0.0525 0.8705 0.4051
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2003 0.0048 -0.0771 -0.1538 -0.0594 -0.3044 -0.1769 -0.2034 -0.0190 -0.0482
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2487 0.9781 0.6596 0.3778 0.7426 0.0801 0.3168 0.2486 0.9164 0.7868
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3302 -0.2251 -0.0630 -0.1353 0.1036 -0.2275 -0.2702 -0.2894 -0.0860 -0.0530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0492 0.1868 0.7150 0.4315 0.5598 0.1888 0.1164 0.0917 0.6287 0.7622
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3636 -0.2286 -0.1384 -0.2322 0.0984 -0.2063 -0.2763 -0.3140 -0.0732 -0.0612
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0293 0.1799 0.4207 0.1729 0.5798 0.2345 0.1081 0.0662 0.6808 0.7269
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2689 -0.2462 -0.0166 -0.0763 -0.0030 -0.2480 -0.1889 -0.2335 -0.0943 -0.0943
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1128 0.1477 0.9236 0.6582 0.9867 0.1509 0.2772 0.1771 0.5959 0.5899
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3400 -0.2096 -0.1955 -0.2643 -0.0716 -0.3042 -0.2873 -0.3437 0.0318 -0.0615
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0425 0.2199 0.2531 0.1193 0.6874 0.0756 0.0942 0.0432 0.8582 0.7255
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2933 0.2187 0.1870 0.2684 0.2920 0.0029 0.2136 0.1882 0.0981 0.0572
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0825 0.2001 0.2749 0.1134 0.0938 0.9870 0.2180 0.2789 0.5809 0.7441
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3287 0.2301 0.2393 0.2483 0.3555 0.1769 0.1306 0.1844 0.0666 0.1212
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0503 0.1770 0.1599 0.1443 0.0391 0.3093 0.4546 0.2890 0.7082 0.4880
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4069 0.3031 0.2714 0.3473 0.2967 -0.0517 0.1567 0.1301 0.2704 0.2113
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0153 0.0767 0.1148 0.0409 0.0936 0.7716 0.3763 0.4633 0.1280 0.2303
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

424
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Strategic
Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Tactical
Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity in
Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.2951 -0.2771 -0.1912 -0.2877 -0.1349 -0.0328 -0.2472 -0.2111 0.1799 0.2263
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0902 0.1126 0.2786 0.0989 0.4469 0.8541 0.1586 0.2307 0.3086 0.1980
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1450 -0.1540 -0.0689 -0.2099 -0.1179 -0.0436 -0.1951 -0.2121 0.1731 0.0270
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4133 0.3846 0.6984 0.2334 0.5066 0.8068 0.2688 0.2284 0.3276 0.8796
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2648 -0.2889 -0.1827 -0.2803 -0.1270 -0.0632 -0.3522 -0.2948 0.1626 0.0105
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1301 0.0975 0.3011 0.1083 0.4741 0.7224 0.0411 0.0905 0.3581 0.9529
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1784 -0.1595 -0.1374 -0.0313 -0.1959 0.0422 -0.0468 -0.0631 0.3801 -0.0543
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3128 0.3676 0.4386 0.8605 0.2667 0.8125 0.7927 0.7230 0.0266 0.7602
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1089 -0.2729 -0.2079 -0.1810 -0.1156 -0.2323 -0.1102 -0.0994 0.0431 0.2693
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5333 0.1127 0.2306 0.2982 0.5086 0.1792 0.5287 0.5698 0.8059 0.1177
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1526 -0.2741 -0.2227 -0.1936 -0.1167 -0.2091 -0.1208 -0.1121 0.0968 0.2882
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3814 0.1111 0.1984 0.2650 0.5043 0.2279 0.4895 0.5216 0.5802 0.0932
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1341 -0.2184 -0.1647 -0.1137 -0.1419 -0.2572 -0.0355 -0.0277 0.2430 0.1645
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4424 0.2074 0.3443 0.5155 0.4161 0.1357 0.8395 0.8744 0.1596 0.3450
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2585 -0.3170 -0.2417 -0.2185 -0.1800 -0.1945 -0.1904 -0.1476 0.1620 0.1353
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1337 0.0635 0.1619 0.2074 0.3007 0.2630 0.2734 0.3974 0.3525 0.4382
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2358 0.3248 0.2058 0.2975 0.1614 0.1144 0.3519 0.3555 -0.1899 0.0265
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1726 0.0569 0.2357 0.0826 0.3544 0.5127 0.0382 0.0361 0.2746 0.8798
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1196 0.1723 0.1873 0.1487 0.1363 0.1141 0.2023 0.1494 -0.0509 -0.0986
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4939 0.3222 0.2814 0.3939 0.4349 0.5141 0.2438 0.3917 0.7714 0.5730
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1978 0.1703 0.2609 0.2110 0.2148 0.1633 0.1834 0.1617 -0.2144 -0.1775
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2622 0.3355 0.1362 0.2310 0.2226 0.3562 0.2991 0.3608 0.2233 0.3152
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

425
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.2464 0.1167 0.3494 0.5210 0.4744 0.4952 0.4910 0.4178 0.1747 0.1456
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1601 0.5112 0.0428 0.0013 0.0040 0.0025 0.0027 0.0125 0.3232 0.4041
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0296 0.2619 0.1388 0.2009 0.4123 0.3257 0.5899 0.2129 0.2413 0.2324
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8680 0.1346 0.4338 0.2473 0.0139 0.0562 0.0002 0.2195 0.1692 0.1791
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0050 -0.0368 0.3325 0.5555 0.2704 0.3519 0.4028 0.5841 0.1641 0.0813
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9776 0.8365 0.0547 0.0005 0.1162 0.0381 0.0164 0.0002 0.3537 0.6425
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1039 0.0341 -0.0834 0.5936 0.2898 0.2354 0.3361 0.3215 0.4457 0.0042
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5586 0.8481 0.6392 0.0002 0.0913 0.1735 0.0484 0.0597 0.0082 0.9810
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1853 0.0978 0.0795 0.3070 0.4537 0.4372 0.3733 0.1751 0.1327 0.3385
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2867 0.5762 0.6497 0.0686 0.0054 0.0077 0.0249 0.3069 0.4474 0.0435
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2562 0.0945 0.1476 0.3896 0.4986 0.4416 0.3532 0.2419 0.1273 0.2883
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1374 0.5894 0.3974 0.0188 0.0020 0.0070 0.0346 0.1553 0.4660 0.0882
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1028 0.1248 0.0430 0.3778 0.3942 0.3629 0.3892 0.1522 0.2966 0.3935
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5569 0.4750 0.8064 0.0231 0.0174 0.0296 0.0190 0.3755 0.0836 0.0176
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1436 -0.0195 0.2240 0.5037 0.3621 0.4183 0.2200 0.4283 0.1620 0.2210
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4105 0.9117 0.1958 0.0017 0.0300 0.0111 0.1973 0.0092 0.3525 0.1953
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0686 0.0473 -0.1427 0.1145 -0.0166 0.0281 0.0224 -0.0467 -0.0305 0.1503
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6955 0.7873 0.4134 0.5063 0.9236 0.8708 0.8967 0.7866 0.8618 0.3817
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0248 -0.0414 -0.0942 0.1167 -0.0436 -0.0079 0.0079 0.0137 0.1332 0.1325
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8877 0.8133 0.5902 0.4977 0.8008 0.9636 0.9637 0.9367 0.4456 0.4412
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1084 -0.0617 -0.1213 0.1560 -0.0670 -0.0168 -0.0141 0.0940 0.1338 0.2814
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5418 0.7290 0.4943 0.3707 0.7021 0.9238 0.9361 0.5911 0.4505 0.1015
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

426
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-
CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.3799 0.1910 0.2346 0.7451 0.8026 1.0000 0.7652 0.8388 0.5921 0.5740
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0244 0.2718 0.1750 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3031 0.4205 0.1730 0.7309 0.8367 0.7652 1.0000 0.7454 0.5839 0.5336
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0768 0.0119 0.3203 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0003 0.0010
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2621 0.2136 0.3145 0.8610 0.7218 0.8388 0.7454 1.0000 0.6301 0.5652
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1282 0.2180 0.0657 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0001 0.0004
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1217 0.1578 0.1320 0.6773 0.5215 0.5921 0.5839 0.6301 1.0000 0.6279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4862 0.3651 0.4499 0.0000 0.0016 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 . 0.0001
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3611 0.3697 0.2666 0.4875 0.7429 0.5740 0.5336 0.5652 0.6279 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0305 0.0265 0.1159 0.0040 0.0000 0.0003 0.0010 0.0004 0.0001 .
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3753 0.3133 0.2476 0.5190 0.7025 0.6777 0.5202 0.5840 0.6703 0.9533
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0241 0.0628 0.1454 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4306 0.4785 0.3484 0.5302 0.7276 0.6264 0.6078 0.5612 0.6914 0.8766
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0087 0.0032 0.0373 0.0015 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3836 0.2707 0.3784 0.5762 0.5567 0.6783 0.4824 0.6977 0.7477 0.8155
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0209 0.1102 0.0229 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2397 0.0857 0.0085 0.0581 0.0086 -0.0119 -0.0012 0.0231 0.1966 0.1894
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1591 0.6190 0.9607 0.7480 0.9607 0.9460 0.9943 0.8954 0.2577 0.2685
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2001 0.1293 0.1471 -0.0825 -0.1697 -0.1323 -0.1856 -0.1187 -0.0114 -0.0352
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2421 0.4522 0.3918 0.6479 0.3297 0.4488 0.2858 0.4972 0.9483 0.8386
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3763 0.3482 0.2982 0.2669 0.0685 0.1054 0.0864 0.1817 0.2231 0.1060
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0259 0.0404 0.0819 0.1397 0.7003 0.5531 0.6269 0.3039 0.2047 0.5445
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000

427
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-
CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.6777 0.6264 0.6783 -0.0119 -0.1323 0.1054 0.4469 -0.0358 -0.0303 0.1898
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.9460 0.4488 0.5531 0.0091 0.8381 0.8650 0.2901
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5202 0.6078 0.4824 -0.0012 -0.1856 0.0864 0.2712 0.0676 -0.0118 -0.0347
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0014 0.0001 0.0033 0.9943 0.2858 0.6269 0.1269 0.6997 0.9471 0.8479
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5840 0.5612 0.6977 0.0231 -0.1187 0.1817 0.1971 -0.0335 -0.0056 0.2431
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.8954 0.4972 0.3039 0.2716 0.8485 0.9749 0.1728
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6703 0.6914 0.7477 0.1966 -0.0114 0.2231 0.2822 -0.1921 -0.0879 0.3376
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2577 0.9483 0.2047 0.1115 0.2689 0.6211 0.0588
sqrtQIIID2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.9533 0.8766 0.8155 0.1894 -0.0352 0.1060 0.3539 -0.2484 -0.1162 0.2327
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2685 0.8386 0.5445 0.0400 0.1441 0.5061 0.1925
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.8595 0.8809 0.1438 -0.0574 0.0931 0.3854 -0.2283 -0.1323 0.2434
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.4026 0.7393 0.5947 0.0244 0.1805 0.4485 0.1723
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8595 1.0000 0.8018 0.1731 -0.0246 0.2020 0.2961 -0.2587 -0.1031 0.2934
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.3128 0.8869 0.2446 0.0890 0.1276 0.5554 0.0974
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8809 0.8018 1.0000 0.2164 0.0058 0.2163 0.2794 -0.1450 -0.0616 0.3916
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.2050 0.9734 0.2120 0.1096 0.3986 0.7254 0.0242
sqrtQIIID2e
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1438 0.1731 0.2164 1.0000 0.5700 0.6709 0.0655 0.0921 0.0066 0.4036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4026 0.3128 0.2050 . 0.0003 0.0000 0.7130 0.5932 0.9698 0.0198
sqrtQIVA1
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0574 -0.0246 0.0058 0.5700 1.0000 0.5323 -0.0997 -0.0019 -0.0312 0.3057
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7393 0.8869 0.9734 0.0003 . 0.0010 0.5748 0.9913 0.8587 0.0836
sqrtQIVA2
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0931 0.2020 0.2163 0.6709 0.5323 1.0000 0.0292 -0.1935 0.0019 0.2858
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5947 0.2446 0.2120 0.0000 0.0010 . 0.8717 0.2654 0.9917 0.1128
sqrtQIVA3
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000

428
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation 0.2587 0.4481 0.3594 0.5053 0.1435 0.3704 0.2959 0.4183 0.3540 0.2732
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1396 0.0079 0.0369 0.0023 0.4182 0.0311 0.0844 0.0138 0.0400 0.1180
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1978 0.2144 0.2962 0.2311 0.0865 0.2711 0.1921 0.3409 0.3637 0.0294
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2621 0.2234 0.0889 0.1885 0.6265 0.1209 0.2688 0.0485 0.0345 0.8689
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2126 0.3788 0.2614 0.4608 0.2805 0.2119 0.1305 0.2503 0.2974 0.2889
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2273 0.0272 0.1353 0.0061 0.1081 0.2289 0.4549 0.1533 0.0876 0.0976
Level
Cooperation
Domestic Orgs-
TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4195 0.3876 0.3475 0.3129 0.2167 0.5197 0.1652 0.3219 0.3378 0.2198
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0135 0.0235 0.0440 0.0716 0.2182 0.0016 0.3429 0.0634 0.0507 0.2118
sqrtQIIID2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1624 0.4505 0.4534 0.2656 0.2185 0.2670 0.5128 0.5663 0.4353 0.3588
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3512 0.0066 0.0062 0.1231 0.2074 0.1210 0.0014 0.0004 0.0090 0.0343
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1984 0.4780 0.4594 0.3022 0.1824 0.3083 0.4738 0.5873 0.4240 0.3588
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2532 0.0037 0.0055 0.0777 0.2943 0.0715 0.0035 0.0002 0.0111 0.0343
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3855 0.5216 0.5874 0.4195 0.3356 0.4554 0.4903 0.5798 0.5840 0.3442
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0222 0.0013 0.0002 0.0121 0.0488 0.0060 0.0024 0.0003 0.0002 0.0429
Level
Cooperation
International
Orgs-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2763 0.5079 0.4070 0.4028 0.2909 0.2723 0.2993 0.3613 0.3289 0.4039
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1081 0.0018 0.0153 0.0164 0.0900 0.1136 0.0762 0.0329 0.0537 0.0161
sqrtQIIID2e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1782 0.2722 0.2774 0.0196 0.1426 0.0926 0.1125 0.0462 0.0332 0.0644
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3058 0.1136 0.1067 0.9112 0.4137 0.5967 0.5135 0.7923 0.8498 0.7133
sqrtQIVA1
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0242 0.0745 0.0593 -0.0905 0.0608 -0.0717 -0.0722 -0.1269 -0.1260 -0.0295
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8901 0.6705 0.7351 0.6052 0.7286 0.6824 0.6756 0.4676 0.4709 0.8662
sqrtQIVA2
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1562 0.2499 0.1811 0.1192 0.1856 0.0613 0.0622 0.0050 0.0971 0.0772
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3777 0.1540 0.3054 0.5018 0.2933 0.7305 0.7226 0.9778 0.5847 0.6644
sqrtQIVA3
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

429
Table A7, continued (Row 6, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation 0.2254 0.5154 0.4894 0.4695 0.4147
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2000 0.0015 0.0033 0.0051 0.0148
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNBC
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2957 0.4105 0.4361 0.3984 0.3734
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0895 0.0143 0.0099 0.0196 0.0296
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSTP
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2565 0.4502 0.3524 0.4778 0.5183
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1431 0.0067 0.0409 0.0043 0.0017
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TRIPS
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4155 0.5007 0.5383 0.5214 0.4913
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0162 0.0026 0.0012 0.0019 0.0037
sqrtQIIID2a
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0632 0.4565 0.4485 0.2979 0.3037
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7226 0.0058 0.0078 0.0870 0.0808
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CNDPS
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0656 0.4414 0.4658 0.2980 0.2853
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7123 0.0079 0.0055 0.0870 0.1020
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CNBC
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2914 0.4868 0.5196 0.4211 0.3893
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0945 0.0030 0.0016 0.0131 0.0229
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CSTP
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1783 0.4431 0.3962 0.4276 0.4373
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3131 0.0077 0.0204 0.0117 0.0097
sqrtQIIID2e
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2992 0.2639 0.1990 0.2562 0.2434
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0856 0.1255 0.2591 0.1436 0.1654
sqrtQIVA1
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1420 0.0879 0.0462 0.1140 0.1050
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4232 0.6155 0.7953 0.5209 0.5547
sqrtQIVA2
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3380 0.2481 0.1772 0.2924 0.3016
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0544 0.1571 0.3238 0.0987 0.0880
sqrtQIVA3
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

430
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.1126 -0.3136 -0.1166 -0.0908 -0.1674 0.1451 0.1769 0.2895 0.1668 0.0464
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5259 0.0709 0.5114 0.6095 0.3440 0.4129 0.3169 0.0968 0.3458 0.7946
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0287 -0.0640 0.0205 -0.2604 -0.1845 -0.1589 -0.1265 -0.0129 -0.2391 0.0134
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8680 0.7108 0.9057 0.1250 0.2813 0.3545 0.4621 0.9406 0.1602 0.9384
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0400 0.1170 0.1854 0.1977 -0.0653 0.0121 0.0783 0.0283 0.1825 0.2487
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8195 0.5031 0.2864 0.2548 0.7093 0.9450 0.6548 0.8720 0.2939 0.1497
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1693 0.3071 0.2647 0.1013 0.0011 0.1583 0.0522 0.3089 0.0541 0.2656
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3464 0.0821 0.1366 0.5750 0.9951 0.3789 0.7729 0.0802 0.7649 0.1352
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0064 -0.0953 -0.2405 0.0748 -0.1673 0.0681 -0.1725 -0.0706 0.1040 0.0096
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9707 0.5861 0.1640 0.6693 0.3368 0.6975 0.3218 0.6870 0.5521 0.9563
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2026 -0.0939 -0.0183 0.0756 -0.1348 -0.0359 0.0272 0.2148 0.1398 0.0816
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2431 0.5916 0.9171 0.6662 0.4401 0.8376 0.8767 0.2153 0.4231 0.6412
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1399 -0.1566 -0.1390 0.0127 -0.1235 0.0250 0.1208 0.1422 0.2626 0.0814
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4228 0.3690 0.4259 0.9425 0.4797 0.8865 0.4893 0.4153 0.1275 0.6421
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1844 0.1203 0.0633 0.3355 -0.1088 0.0906 0.1077 0.4559 0.1624 0.4283
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2889 0.4913 0.7179 0.0488 0.5340 0.6047 0.5380 0.0059 0.3514 0.0103
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1375 0.2347 0.0805 0.0279 -0.0004 -0.0557 -0.1535 -0.1759 0.1760 0.1273
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4309 0.1747 0.6458 0.8734 0.9980 0.7504 0.3787 0.3121 0.3119 0.4662
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0635 -0.0980 -0.2608 -0.0043 0.0880 0.1703 -0.0971 -0.1032 0.0728 -0.1897
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7170 0.5752 0.1302 0.9806 0.6151 0.3279 0.5789 0.5551 0.6776 0.2749
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1400 -0.2238 -0.1688 -0.0924 -0.0269 -0.1663 0.1388 0.0372 0.1104 -0.1968
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4155 0.1895 0.3251 0.5921 0.8762 0.3324 0.4195 0.8294 0.5215 0.2501
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

431
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective Tactical
Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity in
Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.0613 -0.3000 -0.2011 -0.2275 0.0274 0.0237 -0.3674 -0.0811 -0.1987 -0.2636
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7347 0.0847 0.2541 0.1957 0.8780 0.8939 0.0325 0.6486 0.2599 0.1320
sqrtQIVA5
N 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0508 -0.0716 -0.0987 -0.0693 -0.0159 -0.0877 -0.0528 0.0901 -0.0004 0.1326
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7719 0.6782 0.5670 0.6881 0.9268 0.6111 0.7597 0.6014 0.9983 0.4406
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1871 0.2606 -0.0474 -0.0792 -0.1426 0.0388 -0.1169 -0.2959 -0.2056 -0.1085
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2894 0.1305 0.7868 0.6510 0.4139 0.8251 0.5037 0.0843 0.2361 0.5350
sqrtQIVA8
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1008 0.1789 0.1173 0.1329 0.1533 0.2197 0.1397 0.0123 0.1382 0.0998
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5767 0.3193 0.5155 0.4610 0.3945 0.2192 0.4381 0.9460 0.4431 0.5805
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2349 -0.0956 0.2034 0.3054 -0.0309 -0.0115 -0.1319 0.0853 -0.0370 -0.0098
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1811 0.5850 0.2413 0.0744 0.8601 0.9479 0.4501 0.6263 0.8328 0.9555
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2137 -0.2154 -0.0827 0.0084 -0.1206 0.0496 -0.2363 -0.1917 -0.1551 -0.2370
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2249 0.2139 0.6366 0.9619 0.4903 0.7772 0.1717 0.2700 0.3737 0.1704
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2595 -0.1101 0.0931 0.1671 -0.0900 -0.0073 -0.1399 -0.1101 -0.1324 -0.1041
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1384 0.5290 0.5948 0.3372 0.6072 0.9670 0.4228 0.5288 0.4485 0.5517
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2588 -0.0530 -0.2529 -0.2368 -0.0121 0.0842 -0.4103 -0.3056 -0.2738 -0.2881
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1394 0.7623 0.1427 0.1708 0.9450 0.6304 0.0144 0.0742 0.1115 0.0933
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1575 -0.1510 0.0737 0.1633 -0.1018 0.0038 -0.1608 -0.0425 -0.0525 -0.0701
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3737 0.3866 0.6740 0.3486 0.5608 0.9825 0.3560 0.8085 0.7643 0.6892
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2875 0.0062 0.1504 0.2613 0.0297 -0.0745 -0.2308 0.0858 -0.0236 0.0245
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0993 0.9719 0.3884 0.1295 0.8654 0.6707 0.1823 0.6243 0.8931 0.8887
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1912 -0.0700 -0.1352 -0.0590 -0.2124 -0.1055 -0.2806 -0.2536 -0.1759 -0.2140
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2712 0.6849 0.4316 0.7324 0.2137 0.5403 0.0974 0.1356 0.3047 0.2102
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000

432
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.2154 0.0993 -0.0521 -0.1372 0.0015 0.0635 -0.1624 -0.2116 -0.1671 -0.0822
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2212 0.5762 0.7700 0.4391 0.9932 0.7212 0.3588 0.2296 0.3526 0.6440
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1726 0.1235 -0.0101 0.0575 -0.0107 -0.0614 0.0765 0.0666 -0.0981 -0.0328
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3140 0.4729 0.9535 0.7392 0.9523 0.7262 0.6621 0.7036 0.5811 0.8516
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2587 -0.2521 0.0640 -0.1378 -0.1731 0.2567 -0.0302 -0.0590 -0.0177 -0.2230
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1335 0.1440 0.7150 0.4300 0.3277 0.1366 0.8634 0.7364 0.9211 0.1979
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0549 -0.0632 0.0389 0.0614 0.0560 -0.0784 -0.1021 -0.0800 0.1183 -0.0690
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7615 0.7268 0.8299 0.7343 0.7609 0.6644 0.5717 0.6581 0.5189 0.7030
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1040 0.0079 0.0969 -0.0293 -0.2950 -0.3238 0.2335 0.1683 -0.2437 -0.2578
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5520 0.9641 0.5796 0.8671 0.0903 0.0617 0.1838 0.3413 0.1717 0.1410
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2256 -0.1511 -0.0059 -0.1643 -0.2137 -0.3496 -0.0496 -0.1123 -0.2697 -0.2462
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1925 0.3864 0.9731 0.3457 0.2249 0.0427 0.7807 0.5272 0.1291 0.1604
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1972 -0.2570 0.1059 -0.0594 -0.1631 -0.2681 0.1261 0.0400 -0.3545 -0.2551
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2561 0.1362 0.5449 0.7348 0.3568 0.1253 0.4773 0.8221 0.0429 0.1454
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2288 -0.0268 -0.0239 -0.1830 -0.3862 -0.4731 -0.3492 -0.3882 -0.2357 -0.3611
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1861 0.8784 0.8917 0.2927 0.0241 0.0047 0.0429 0.0233 0.1867 0.0359
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0133 -0.1266 0.1707 -0.0412 -0.4157 -0.4350 0.0666 -0.0282 -0.2222 -0.2810
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9397 0.4687 0.3268 0.8142 0.0145 0.0101 0.7081 0.8743 0.2140 0.1075
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0914 -0.1545 0.0143 0.0406 -0.0814 -0.2053 0.1962 0.1238 -0.1391 -0.1720
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6015 0.3755 0.9352 0.8167 0.6472 0.2442 0.2661 0.4854 0.4400 0.3306
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2336 -0.3019 -0.0332 -0.0816 0.0519 -0.0762 -0.0103 -0.0907 -0.1881 -0.0829
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1703 0.0735 0.8475 0.6362 0.7708 0.6635 0.9530 0.6045 0.2867 0.6359
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000

433
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Strategic
Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Tactical
Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity in
Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.1445 -0.1517 -0.0647 -0.0922 -0.1561 0.1102 0.1253 0.0593 -0.0193 0.2925
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4148 0.3919 0.7163 0.6041 0.3780 0.5349 0.4803 0.7389 0.9150 0.0986
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0430 0.0874 0.0278 -0.0212 0.0376 0.1971 -0.2223 -0.0972 0.1354 -0.1068
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8064 0.6176 0.8740 0.9037 0.8300 0.2565 0.1992 0.5786 0.4381 0.5414
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2447 -0.2093 -0.2141 -0.2333 -0.2012 -0.1516 -0.0648 -0.2430 -0.1746 0.0432
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1566 0.2276 0.2168 0.1774 0.2465 0.3845 0.7114 0.1595 0.3233 0.8083
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0409 -0.0088 -0.0584 0.0609 0.0000 -0.0489 0.0373 0.0842 0.2663 0.0819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8211 0.9611 0.7470 0.7362 1.0000 0.7870 0.8365 0.6414 0.1406 0.6557
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0493 0.1769 0.0713 0.3327 0.0754 0.0932 0.2832 0.3080 0.0247 -0.1568
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7819 0.3169 0.6887 0.0545 0.6715 0.6002 0.1045 0.0763 0.8897 0.3758
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1009 -0.0510 -0.0928 0.0813 0.0064 -0.1091 0.1308 0.1546 -0.0648 0.1600
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5704 0.7747 0.6016 0.6477 0.9713 0.5389 0.4611 0.3825 0.7158 0.3661
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0495 0.0676 0.0108 0.1920 0.0358 -0.1849 0.2590 0.2420 -0.0003 0.1399
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7811 0.7040 0.9517 0.2767 0.8409 0.2951 0.1391 0.1679 0.9985 0.4301
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.3719 -0.3289 -0.2646 -0.2197 -0.0850 -0.0527 -0.2290 -0.1671 0.2744 0.1966
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0303 0.0575 0.1305 0.2118 0.6326 0.7673 0.1926 0.3448 0.1163 0.2651
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1349 0.0191 -0.0281 0.0979 0.0186 -0.1333 0.0608 0.0971 -0.0187 -0.1450
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4469 0.9148 0.8745 0.5819 0.9170 0.4523 0.7328 0.5848 0.9165 0.4132
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1102 0.1170 0.1517 0.3006 0.0223 -0.0406 0.3056 0.2810 0.0859 -0.2168
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5351 0.5100 0.3917 0.0841 0.9002 0.8198 0.0788 0.1074 0.6289 0.2182
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1216 -0.1063 -0.0316 0.0163 -0.0426 -0.2661 0.1232 0.0813 -0.1132 0.1569
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4865 0.5435 0.8570 0.9259 0.8079 0.1223 0.4807 0.6426 0.5175 0.3682
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

434
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.2711 0.2011 0.0556 0.1165 0.3660 0.3984 0.3035 0.0006 -0.1075 -0.0871
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1271 0.2619 0.7588 0.5116 0.0333 0.0196 0.0810 0.9973 0.5515 0.6241
sqrtQIVA5
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0749 -0.0363 0.1172 -0.1753 -0.1921 -0.2136 -0.0707 -0.0284 -0.1239 -0.0378
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6689 0.8360 0.5026 0.3065 0.2618 0.2110 0.6818 0.8692 0.4782 0.8268
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1244 0.3014 0.2077 0.0904 0.0446 0.0309 0.0867 0.0727 -0.1046 -0.0375
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4832 0.0832 0.2385 0.6055 0.7993 0.8601 0.6206 0.6780 0.5559 0.8308
sqrtQIVA8
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2899 0.0322 0.1375 0.4608 0.1078 0.1871 0.0611 0.3480 0.2577 0.0529
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1076 0.8611 0.4529 0.0070 0.5503 0.2972 0.7357 0.0472 0.1545 0.7698
Political
Ideology
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1206 -0.0057 -0.2156 0.1642 -0.1373 0.0172 0.0777 0.1536 0.1480 -0.2197
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4970 0.9743 0.2207 0.3458 0.4315 0.9221 0.6573 0.3784 0.4036 0.2047
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2547 0.1065 0.0538 0.1981 0.1711 0.3376 0.1300 0.2426 0.0277 0.0289
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1461 0.5489 0.7625 0.2540 0.3258 0.0473 0.4566 0.1603 0.8765 0.8689
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2321 0.2695 0.0025 0.0815 0.2136 0.2338 0.2622 0.1368 0.0397 0.0850
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1865 0.1232 0.9889 0.6415 0.2179 0.1764 0.1281 0.4334 0.8238 0.6274
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3377 0.1316 0.3787 0.4622 0.2584 0.5121 0.2625 0.4177 0.1457 0.0740
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0508 0.4583 0.0272 0.0052 0.1339 0.0017 0.1276 0.0125 0.4111 0.6727
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0499 -0.0001 -0.0424 0.0588 -0.1565 0.0070 -0.0204 0.2302 -0.0020 0.0353
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7792 0.9997 0.8119 0.7372 0.3694 0.9684 0.9075 0.1834 0.9910 0.8407
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1875 -0.0108 -0.2641 0.2048 -0.0136 0.0614 0.1299 0.0198 0.1665 -0.2977
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2884 0.9518 0.1312 0.2379 0.9382 0.7259 0.4570 0.9103 0.3466 0.0824
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2273 0.0865 -0.0420 -0.1007 0.2940 0.3304 0.1501 -0.0320 -0.0081 0.1148
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1890 0.6212 0.8105 0.5589 0.0817 0.0490 0.3824 0.8530 0.9631 0.5048
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 36.0000

435
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0113 -0.1313 -0.1273 0.2827 0.3836 0.4469 0.2712 0.1971 0.2822 0.3539
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9496 0.4593 0.4732 0.1233 0.0276 0.0091 0.1269 0.2716 0.1115 0.0400
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0143 -0.0541 -0.1297 -0.1366 -0.0858 -0.0358 0.0676 -0.0335 -0.1921 -0.2484
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9342 0.7538 0.4509 0.4485 0.6240 0.8381 0.6997 0.8485 0.2689 0.1441
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0063 -0.0047 0.0381 0.0378 -0.0429 -0.0303 -0.0118 -0.0056 -0.0879 -0.1162
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9714 0.9785 0.8280 0.8375 0.8094 0.8650 0.9471 0.9749 0.6211 0.5061
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2063 0.0506 0.2530 0.2165 0.0741 0.1898 -0.0347 0.2431 0.3376 0.2327
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2495 0.7798 0.1554 0.2420 0.6821 0.2901 0.8479 0.1728 0.0588 0.1925
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 31.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0906 0.0221 -0.1440 0.3557 0.1559 0.2587 0.1978 0.2126 0.4195 0.1624
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6045 0.8996 0.4093 0.0457 0.3787 0.1396 0.2621 0.2273 0.0135 0.3512
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1552 0.1203 0.0930 0.3476 0.4002 0.4481 0.2144 0.3788 0.3876 0.4505
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3733 0.4911 0.5953 0.0513 0.0190 0.0079 0.2234 0.0272 0.0235 0.0066
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1381 0.2295 0.0052 0.3254 0.4193 0.3594 0.2962 0.2614 0.3475 0.4534
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4288 0.1847 0.9763 0.0692 0.0136 0.0369 0.0889 0.1353 0.0440 0.0062
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2132 0.1222 0.3129 0.3420 0.3435 0.5053 0.2311 0.4608 0.3129 0.2656
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2189 0.4845 0.0672 0.0554 0.0467 0.0023 0.1885 0.0061 0.0716 0.1231
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0432 0.1111 0.2043 0.2169 0.1338 0.1435 0.0865 0.2805 0.2167 0.2185
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8055 0.5253 0.2390 0.2332 0.4507 0.4182 0.6265 0.1081 0.2182 0.2074
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1840 -0.0513 -0.2656 0.4180 0.3119 0.3704 0.2711 0.2119 0.5197 0.2670
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2900 0.7697 0.1231 0.0173 0.0726 0.0311 0.1209 0.2289 0.0016 0.1210
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1046 0.1474 -0.0094 0.1142 0.4791 0.2959 0.1921 0.1305 0.1652 0.5128
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5439 0.3911 0.9568 0.5268 0.0036 0.0844 0.2688 0.4549 0.3429 0.0014
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000

436
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.3854 0.2961 0.2794 0.0655 -0.0997 0.0292 1.0000 -0.2149 -0.1246 -0.1715
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0244 0.0890 0.1096 0.7130 0.5748 0.8717 . 0.2223 0.4828 0.3480
sqrtQIVA5
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2283 -0.2587 -0.1450 0.0921 -0.0019 -0.1935 -0.2149 1.0000 -0.0698 -0.0214
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1805 0.1276 0.3986 0.5932 0.9913 0.2654 0.2223 . 0.6904 0.9059
sqrtQIVA7
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1323 -0.1031 -0.0616 0.0066 -0.0312 0.0019 -0.1246 -0.0698 1.0000 0.0146
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4485 0.5554 0.7254 0.9698 0.8587 0.9917 0.4828 0.6904 . 0.9356
sqrtQIVA8
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2434 0.2934 0.3916 0.4036 0.3057 0.2858 -0.1715 -0.0214 0.0146 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1723 0.0974 0.0242 0.0198 0.0836 0.1128 0.3480 0.9059 0.9356 .
Political
Ideology
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1984 0.3855 0.2763 0.1782 0.0242 0.1562 0.0328 0.0335 -0.0231 0.2201
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2532 0.0222 0.1081 0.3058 0.8901 0.3777 0.8561 0.8485 0.8969 0.2261
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4780 0.5216 0.5079 0.2722 0.0745 0.2499 0.2991 -0.1257 -0.0308 0.4071
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0037 0.0013 0.0018 0.1136 0.6705 0.1540 0.0908 0.4717 0.8626 0.0207
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4594 0.5874 0.4070 0.2774 0.0593 0.1811 0.2419 -0.0801 -0.0099 0.3012
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0055 0.0002 0.0153 0.1067 0.7351 0.3054 0.1750 0.6473 0.9556 0.0939
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3022 0.4195 0.4028 0.0196 -0.0905 0.1192 0.1576 -0.0728 -0.0175 0.3948
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0777 0.0121 0.0164 0.9112 0.6052 0.5018 0.3811 0.6779 0.9216 0.0253
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1824 0.3356 0.2909 0.1426 0.0608 0.1856 0.0041 -0.0496 0.0029 0.2883
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2943 0.0488 0.0900 0.4137 0.7286 0.2933 0.9821 0.7774 0.9871 0.1095
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3083 0.4554 0.2723 0.0926 -0.0717 0.0613 0.1734 -0.1063 0.0146 0.1494
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0715 0.0060 0.1136 0.5967 0.6824 0.7305 0.3344 0.5435 0.9346 0.4145
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4738 0.4903 0.2993 0.1125 -0.0722 0.0622 0.3514 -0.1471 -0.0184 0.1564
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0035 0.0024 0.0762 0.5135 0.6756 0.7226 0.0416 0.3918 0.9166 0.3848
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 36.0000 35.0000 34.0000 36.0000 35.0000 33.0000

437
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0328 0.2991 0.2419 0.1576 0.0041 0.1734 0.3514 0.3829 0.2354 0.2132
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8561 0.0908 0.1750 0.3811 0.9821 0.3344 0.0416 0.0279 0.1872 0.2337
sqrtQIVA5
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0335 -0.1257 -0.0801 -0.0728 -0.0496 -0.1063 -0.1471 -0.1731 -0.1295 -0.0469
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8485 0.4717 0.6473 0.6779 0.7774 0.5435 0.3918 0.3200 0.4586 0.7891
sqrtQIVA7
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0231 -0.0308 -0.0099 -0.0175 0.0029 0.0146 -0.0184 -0.0119 0.0174 0.0445
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8969 0.8626 0.9556 0.9216 0.9871 0.9346 0.9166 0.9468 0.9221 0.8027
sqrtQIVA8
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2201 0.4071 0.3012 0.3948 0.2883 0.1494 0.1564 0.0496 0.1094 0.2555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2261 0.0207 0.0939 0.0253 0.1095 0.4145 0.3848 0.7875 0.5512 0.1581
Political
Ideology
N 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.7636 0.8062 0.5292 0.7056 0.8056 0.4510 0.4958 0.6488 0.4657
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 0.0025 0.0000 0.0048
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7636 1.0000 0.9132 0.6349 0.7493 0.6343 0.7499 0.6431 0.7008 0.7017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8062 0.9132 1.0000 0.5235 0.7334 0.6969 0.7610 0.7462 0.7991 0.5885
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5292 0.6349 0.5235 1.0000 0.4709 0.4086 0.3338 0.3151 0.3586 0.4627
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0011 0.0000 0.0012 . 0.0043 0.0148 0.0500 0.0652 0.0344 0.0051
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7056 0.7493 0.7334 0.4709 1.0000 0.4600 0.4526 0.3972 0.5582 0.8042
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 . 0.0054 0.0063 0.0181 0.0005 0.0000
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8056 0.6343 0.6969 0.4086 0.4600 1.0000 0.6332 0.7003 0.7898 0.4604
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0148 0.0054 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0054
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4510 0.7499 0.7610 0.3338 0.4526 0.6332 1.0000 0.8873 0.8335 0.6530
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0063 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 36.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000

438
Table A7, continued (Row 7, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation -0.0075 0.4989 0.4474 0.3039 0.2187
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9676 0.0031 0.0102 0.0908 0.2291
sqrtQIVA5
N 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1880 -0.0425 0.0134 0.0734 0.0788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2870 0.8086 0.9403 0.6800 0.6580
sqrtQIVA7
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0705 -0.0988 -0.1175 -0.0663 -0.0625
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6966 0.5781 0.5149 0.7138 0.7296
sqrtQIVA8
N 33.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2135 0.2477 0.1788 0.3414 0.3245
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2408 0.1646 0.3276 0.0559 0.0700
Political Ideology
N 32.0000 33.0000 32.0000 32.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7639 0.5533 0.6067 0.6772 0.6301
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
sqrtQIIIB1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5705 0.7873 0.7518 0.7584 0.7619
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIB1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6313 0.7282 0.7956 0.7142 0.7007
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIB1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3251 0.4763 0.4219 0.4746 0.4727
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0606 0.0044 0.0130 0.0046 0.0048
sqrtQIIIB1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5667 0.5801 0.5304 0.6505 0.7090
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0005 0.0003 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIB1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5408 0.4957 0.5929 0.5253 0.4501
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0010 0.0029 0.0002 0.0014 0.0076
sqrtQIIIB2a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2645 0.6657 0.7119 0.5112 0.5163
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1306 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0018
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNDPS
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

439
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 1)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Importance of Smuggling-Endangered Species
reflectsqrtQ1A1b
reflectsqrtQ1A1c
reflectsqrtQ1A1d
reflectsqrtQ1A1e
sqrtQ1B1a
Knowledge of Smuggling-Narcotics
Knowledge of Smuggling-Weapons
Knowledge of Smuggling-Humans
Knowledge of Smuggling-Contraband
Pearson Correlation -0.1490 -0.1267 -0.1742 -0.0036 0.0691 -0.0192 0.1538 0.1431 0.2286 -0.1430
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3930 0.4683 0.3169 0.9838 0.6933 0.9128 0.3778 0.4121 0.1865 0.4124
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1739 -0.1105 -0.1375 0.0211 0.0792 -0.0832 -0.0643 -0.0915 0.2052 -0.1544
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3177 0.5275 0.4308 0.9042 0.6511 0.6345 0.7136 0.6011 0.2371 0.3759
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1067 0.2468 0.0546 -0.0489 0.1141 -0.1506 -0.1250 -0.0492 0.0019 -0.0110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5418 0.1530 0.7554 0.7801 0.5139 0.3878 0.4744 0.7790 0.9914 0.9499
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0130 0.0318 -0.0482 -0.1489 -0.2777 0.2686 -0.1304 -0.0255 0.1806 0.1805
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9419 0.8582 0.7867 0.4006 0.1118 0.1245 0.4625 0.8863 0.3069 0.3069
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1800 -0.0176 0.0683 -0.0639 -0.2819 0.1986 0.0605 0.1466 0.1650 0.1186
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3008 0.9199 0.6968 0.7152 0.1009 0.2528 0.7297 0.4006 0.3436 0.4974
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1525 -0.0339 -0.0370 -0.0869 -0.2016 0.2744 0.1023 0.1886 0.2258 0.0909
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3893 0.8490 0.8356 0.6249 0.2528 0.1163 0.5650 0.2855 0.1991 0.6090
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1876 0.0861 0.1095 -0.0435 -0.2844 0.2154 -0.1387 0.0749 0.1630 0.1928
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2880 0.6281 0.5376 0.8072 0.1031 0.2211 0.4340 0.6737 0.3570 0.2745
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2288 0.0816 0.1691 0.0131 -0.2906 0.1255 -0.1891 0.0148 0.1067 0.1510
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1930 0.6463 0.3391 0.9413 0.0954 0.4795 0.2840 0.9337 0.5481 0.3941
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

440
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 2)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQ1E1a
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of
Knowledge
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E1e
Personal Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Technology
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Strategic Focus
Personal Resource Challenges-Ineffective
Tactical Policy
Personal Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity in
Duties
Pearson Correlation -0.1564 -0.0091 0.0324 0.1201 -0.0477 -0.1486 -0.2593 -0.1277 -0.1634 -0.0981
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3771 0.9587 0.8534 0.4918 0.7857 0.3943 0.1325 0.4648 0.3483 0.5749
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1366 0.0651 0.0864 0.1846 -0.1587 -0.1759 -0.3074 -0.0767 -0.0979 -0.0273
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4411 0.7104 0.6215 0.2884 0.3624 0.3121 0.0725 0.6616 0.5756 0.8762
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2977 -0.3510 -0.2624 -0.1527 -0.1752 -0.0981 -0.4159 -0.3050 -0.2758 -0.3199
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0873 0.0387 0.1278 0.3813 0.3141 0.5751 0.0130 0.0748 0.1088 0.0610
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1274 -0.0227 0.1436 0.2489 -0.0011 0.0863 0.0601 0.1613 0.0791 0.1031
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4729 0.8984 0.4178 0.1557 0.9951 0.6274 0.7357 0.3622 0.6564 0.5619
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1727 -0.1933 -0.1942 -0.1335 -0.0670 0.0710 -0.1989 -0.1192 -0.1536 -0.2089
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3212 0.2659 0.2635 0.4446 0.7022 0.6851 0.2520 0.4952 0.3784 0.2285
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2354 -0.2392 -0.1883 -0.0929 -0.1292 -0.0352 -0.2150 -0.1036 -0.1582 -0.1724
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1802 0.1730 0.2861 0.6012 0.4664 0.8432 0.2220 0.5597 0.3716 0.3295
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1428 -0.1474 -0.0882 -0.0110 -0.0682 0.0703 -0.1691 -0.0263 -0.0663 -0.0819
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4205 0.4054 0.6198 0.9509 0.7015 0.6927 0.3391 0.8824 0.7097 0.6452
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1289 -0.1336 -0.1212 -0.0391 -0.0948 0.0453 -0.1778 -0.0441 -0.0602 -0.0985
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4675 0.4511 0.4949 0.8263 0.5939 0.7992 0.3144 0.8043 0.7352 0.5795
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

441
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 3)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Leaders and Employees
sqrtQ1E1l
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm International Orgs
Personal Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack
Comm Domestic Orgs
sqrtQ1E3a
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Time
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Knowledge
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Training
sqrtQ1E3e
Org Resource Challenges-Excessive Admin
Paperwork
Pearson Correlation -0.2435 -0.3558 -0.0437 -0.0825 0.1264 -0.0086 0.0951 0.0106 -0.2252 -0.1254
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1586 0.0359 0.8032 0.6376 0.4764 0.9616 0.5926 0.9526 0.2077 0.4799
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1599 -0.3583 0.0061 0.0094 -0.0265 -0.1177 0.1774 0.0964 -0.1995 -0.1523
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3588 0.0346 0.9725 0.9571 0.8818 0.5073 0.3156 0.5875 0.2657 0.3898
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1964 -0.2201 -0.0147 -0.2366 -0.3064 -0.4033 -0.1934 -0.2887 -0.2178 -0.3237
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2582 0.2040 0.9332 0.1712 0.0780 0.0180 0.2732 0.0977 0.2234 0.0618
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0448 0.0890 0.1652 0.0992 -0.1657 -0.3343 0.1838 0.1669 -0.3023 -0.1881
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8012 0.6167 0.3504 0.5767 0.3567 0.0572 0.3060 0.3531 0.0927 0.2944
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1851 0.0138 -0.0285 -0.1505 -0.2059 -0.3432 -0.1343 -0.1932 -0.2822 -0.1751
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2871 0.9375 0.8710 0.3883 0.2503 0.0469 0.4489 0.2736 0.1116 0.3219
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.2172 -0.1029 -0.0537 -0.1993 -0.1578 -0.3385 -0.1171 -0.1836 -0.4482 -0.2797
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2173 0.5627 0.7631 0.2584 0.3804 0.0540 0.5165 0.3065 0.0101 0.1149
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0987 0.0099 0.0106 -0.0862 -0.2465 -0.3835 -0.0609 -0.1057 -0.3229 -0.2230
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5788 0.9558 0.9526 0.6278 0.1668 0.0276 0.7365 0.5581 0.0715 0.2122
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0891 -0.0275 -0.0186 -0.1104 -0.3178 -0.4523 -0.0694 -0.1328 -0.2711 -0.2009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6165 0.8771 0.9167 0.5341 0.0715 0.0082 0.7011 0.4614 0.1334 0.2622
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 32.0000 33.0000

442
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 4)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Technology
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Strategic Focus
Org Resource Challenges-Ineffective Tactical Policy
Org Resource Challenges-Lack of Clarity in Duties
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack Comm Leaders
and Employees
sqrtQ1E3l
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack Comm
International Orgs
Org Resource Challenges-Conflict or Lack Comm Domestic
Orgs
sqrtQIIA1a
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CSIE
Pearson Correlation -0.0894 -0.0245 -0.0081 0.0677 -0.0429 -0.2775 0.1663 0.0729 -0.0123 0.0572
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6153 0.8907 0.9638 0.7037 0.8097 0.1120 0.3474 0.6820 0.9448 0.7480
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0826 0.0094 0.0558 0.1315 -0.0296 -0.2669 0.1619 0.0951 0.0350 -0.1782
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6425 0.9580 0.7540 0.4586 0.8680 0.1270 0.3603 0.5925 0.8441 0.3134
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.4039 -0.3116 -0.2169 -0.2121 -0.1714 -0.2123 -0.1664 -0.1498 -0.0527 -0.0990
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0179 0.0728 0.2178 0.2285 0.3325 0.2280 0.3469 0.3977 0.7674 0.5775
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0267 0.2110 0.1542 0.3285 0.0814 0.1503 0.2394 0.2852 0.2077 -0.2020
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8828 0.2385 0.3916 0.0620 0.6526 0.4037 0.1796 0.1077 0.2460 0.2596
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1899 -0.1182 -0.1002 -0.0233 -0.1401 -0.0049 0.0697 0.0777 0.0923 0.2064
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2820 0.5056 0.5731 0.8961 0.4295 0.9779 0.6952 0.6621 0.6036 0.2416
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1943 -0.0957 -0.0906 0.0148 -0.1366 -0.0698 0.0573 0.0412 0.1583 0.1450
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2786 0.5961 0.6163 0.9350 0.4484 0.6995 0.7514 0.8198 0.3790 0.4209
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1590 -0.0160 -0.0142 0.0927 -0.0755 0.0361 0.0872 0.1203 0.1952 -0.0198
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3768 0.9295 0.9374 0.6078 0.6764 0.8420 0.6293 0.5050 0.2762 0.9129
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1737 -0.0507 -0.0390 0.0415 -0.0712 -0.0295 -0.0110 0.0296 0.1391 -0.0354
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3335 0.7792 0.8294 0.8187 0.6938 0.8704 0.9517 0.8703 0.4402 0.8450
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000

443
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 5)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Knowledge of Domestic Law-DWMD
Knowledge of Domestic Law-TVP
Knowledge of Domestic Law-CBP
sqrtQIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSIE
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-DWMD
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TVP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CBP
sqrtQIIIA1a
sqrtQIIIA1b
Pearson Correlation 0.1671 0.1800 -0.0507 0.0232 0.2628 0.2299 0.2681 -0.0107 0.0002 0.0020
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3449 0.3082 0.7758 0.8948 0.1271 0.1840 0.1195 0.9512 0.9991 0.9910
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0809 0.0953 -0.1559 0.0226 0.0732 0.0664 0.1924 0.0123 0.0866 -0.0391
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6494 0.5921 0.3785 0.8976 0.6760 0.7045 0.2682 0.9443 0.6261 0.8236
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0247 -0.1032 0.0099 0.0926 -0.0167 0.1741 -0.0877 0.1787 -0.1267 0.0128
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8899 0.5613 0.9556 0.5967 0.9240 0.3172 0.6165 0.3043 0.4753 0.9418
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.1522 -0.0323 -0.0883 0.1755 -0.1107 -0.0364 0.1560 0.2050 0.3025 -0.0562
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3977 0.8583 0.6250 0.3208 0.5331 0.8382 0.3784 0.2447 0.0871 0.7522
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2612 0.0634 0.1344 0.2461 0.3696 0.4777 0.3611 0.3365 0.1548 0.0659
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1357 0.7217 0.4486 0.1540 0.0289 0.0037 0.0331 0.0481 0.3819 0.7067
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2506 0.1953 0.0791 0.2282 0.4242 0.3842 0.4525 0.2793 0.1877 0.0997
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1595 0.2762 0.6619 0.1943 0.0124 0.0249 0.0072 0.1097 0.2956 0.5748
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1034 0.0621 0.1447 0.2866 0.1500 0.2883 0.2792 0.3933 0.2515 -0.0240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5669 0.7312 0.4216 0.1003 0.3972 0.0983 0.1098 0.0214 0.1579 0.8929
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0802 -0.0023 0.1648 0.2789 0.1731 0.3046 0.2723 0.4889 0.2017 0.0218
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6573 0.9898 0.3594 0.1102 0.3274 0.0798 0.1193 0.0033 0.2602 0.9024
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 33.0000 33.0000 33.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

444
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 6)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIA1c
sqrtQIIIA1d
sqrtQIIIA1e
sqrtQIIID1a
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNDPS
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-CSTP
Level Cooperation Domestic Orgs-TRIPS
sqrtQIIID2a
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CNDPS
Pearson Correlation 0.0359 0.1471 -0.1126 0.3432 0.4991 0.4183 0.3409 0.2503 0.3219 0.5663
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8376 0.3992 0.5194 0.0545 0.0027 0.0138 0.0485 0.1533 0.0634 0.0004
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0149 0.2077 -0.0855 0.3670 0.4630 0.3540 0.3637 0.2974 0.3378 0.4353
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9322 0.2313 0.6252 0.0388 0.0058 0.0400 0.0345 0.0876 0.0507 0.0090
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation -0.0767 -0.0486 0.1779 0.1490 0.2319 0.2732 0.0294 0.2889 0.2198 0.3588
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.6616 0.7816 0.3065 0.4158 0.1870 0.1180 0.8689 0.0976 0.2118 0.0343
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0174 0.2362 0.0568 0.4114 0.1404 0.2254 0.2957 0.2565 0.4155 0.0632
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.9223 0.1786 0.7495 0.0193 0.4284 0.2000 0.0895 0.1431 0.0162 0.7226
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1306 0.0957 0.1706 0.4041 0.5133 0.5154 0.4105 0.4502 0.5007 0.4565
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.4547 0.5844 0.3272 0.0197 0.0016 0.0015 0.0143 0.0067 0.0026 0.0058
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 33.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1179 0.1858 0.0721 0.3840 0.5190 0.4894 0.4361 0.3524 0.5383 0.4485
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5067 0.2929 0.6852 0.0300 0.0017 0.0033 0.0099 0.0409 0.0012 0.0078
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.1012 0.1545 0.1855 0.4812 0.3622 0.4695 0.3984 0.4778 0.5214 0.2979
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5689 0.3830 0.2935 0.0053 0.0353 0.0051 0.0196 0.0043 0.0019 0.0870
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0999 0.1787 0.2334 0.4420 0.3664 0.4147 0.3734 0.5183 0.4913 0.3037
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.5742 0.3119 0.1841 0.0113 0.0330 0.0148 0.0296 0.0017 0.0037 0.0808
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 32.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 34.0000

445
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 7)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CNBC
Level Cooperation International Orgs-CSTP
sqrtQIIID2e
sqrtQIVA1
sqrtQIVA2
sqrtQIVA3
sqrtQIVA5
sqrtQIVA7
sqrtQIVA8
Political Ideology
Pearson Correlation 0.5873 0.5798 0.3613 0.0462 -0.1269 0.0050 0.3829 -0.1731 -0.0119 0.0496
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0003 0.0329 0.7923 0.4676 0.9778 0.0279 0.3200 0.9468 0.7875
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4240 0.5840 0.3289 0.0332 -0.1260 0.0971 0.2354 -0.1295 0.0174 0.1094
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0111 0.0002 0.0537 0.8498 0.4709 0.5847 0.1872 0.4586 0.9221 0.5512
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.3588 0.3442 0.4039 0.0644 -0.0295 0.0772 0.2132 -0.0469 0.0445 0.2555
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0343 0.0429 0.0161 0.7133 0.8662 0.6644 0.2337 0.7891 0.8027 0.1581
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.0656 0.2914 0.1783 0.2992 0.1420 0.3380 -0.0075 0.1880 -0.0705 0.2135
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7123 0.0945 0.3131 0.0856 0.4232 0.0544 0.9676 0.2870 0.6966 0.2408
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4414 0.4868 0.4431 0.2639 0.0879 0.2481 0.4989 -0.0425 -0.0988 0.2477
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0079 0.0030 0.0077 0.1255 0.6155 0.1571 0.0031 0.8086 0.5781 0.1646
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000 35.0000 34.0000 33.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4658 0.5196 0.3962 0.1990 0.0462 0.1772 0.4474 0.0134 -0.1175 0.1788
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0055 0.0016 0.0204 0.2591 0.7953 0.3238 0.0102 0.9403 0.5149 0.3276
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2980 0.4211 0.4276 0.2562 0.1140 0.2924 0.3039 0.0734 -0.0663 0.3414
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0870 0.0131 0.0117 0.1436 0.5209 0.0987 0.0908 0.6800 0.7138 0.0559
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2853 0.3893 0.4373 0.2434 0.1050 0.3016 0.2187 0.0788 -0.0625 0.3245
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1020 0.0229 0.0097 0.1654 0.5547 0.0880 0.2291 0.6580 0.7296 0.0700
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000 34.0000 33.0000 32.0000

446
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 8)
Correlation Matrix, International
Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIB1a
sqrtQIIIB1b
sqrtQIIIB1c
sqrtQIIIB1d
sqrtQIIIB1e
sqrtQIIIB2a
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support-CNDPS
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support-CNBC
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support-CSTP
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt Support-TRIPS
Pearson Correlation 0.4958 0.6431 0.7462 0.3151 0.3972 0.7003 0.8873 1.0000 0.8936 0.5154
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0652 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0015
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6488 0.7008 0.7991 0.3586 0.5582 0.7898 0.8335 0.8936 1.0000 0.5664
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0344 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0004
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4657 0.7017 0.5885 0.4627 0.8042 0.4604 0.6530 0.5154 0.5664 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0048 0.0000 0.0002 0.0051 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0015 0.0004 .
Perceived
Effectiveness
Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000 35.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7639 0.5705 0.6313 0.3251 0.5667 0.5408 0.2645 0.2496 0.4308 0.2822
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0606 0.0005 0.0010 0.1306 0.1545 0.0110 0.1058
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.5533 0.7873 0.7282 0.4763 0.5801 0.4957 0.6657 0.5452 0.5366 0.5869
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.0003 0.0029 0.0000 0.0009 0.0011 0.0003
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6067 0.7518 0.7956 0.4219 0.5304 0.5929 0.7119 0.6459 0.6345 0.5227
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0130 0.0013 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0015
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6772 0.7584 0.7142 0.4746 0.6505 0.5253 0.5112 0.4094 0.5227 0.5275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 0.0014 0.0020 0.0162 0.0015 0.0013
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6301 0.7619 0.7007 0.4727 0.7090 0.4501 0.5163 0.3886 0.5216 0.5756
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0048 0.0000 0.0076 0.0018 0.0231 0.0016 0.0004
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

447
Table A7, continued (Row 8, Col 9)
Correlation Matrix, International Variables (Parametric)
sqrtQIIIC1a
sqrtQIIIC1b
sqrtQIIIC1c
sqrtQIIIC1d
sqrtQIIIC1e
Pearson Correlation 0.2496 0.5452 0.6459 0.4094 0.3886
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1545 0.0009 0.0000 0.0162 0.0231
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CNBC
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.4308 0.5366 0.6345 0.5227 0.5216
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0110 0.0011 0.0001 0.0015 0.0016
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-CSTP
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.2822 0.5869 0.5227 0.5275 0.5756
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1058 0.0003 0.0015 0.0013 0.0004
Perceived Effectiveness Domestic Govt
Support-TRIPS
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 1.0000 0.6496 0.6973 0.8380 0.7747
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIC1a
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6496 1.0000 0.9330 0.9192 0.9080
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIC1b
N 34.0000 35.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.6973 0.9330 1.0000 0.8768 0.8417
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000 0.0000
sqrtQIIIC1c
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.8380 0.9192 0.8768 1.0000 0.9629
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . 0.0000
sqrtQIIIC1d
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000
Pearson Correlation 0.7747 0.9080 0.8417 0.9629 1.0000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 .
sqrtQIIIC1e
N 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000 34.0000

448
Appendix 8: The Convention in the International Trade of Endangered Species

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora
Signed at Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973
Amended at Bonn, on 22 June 1979
The Contracting States,
Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an
irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this
and the generations to come;
Conscious of the ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic,
scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points of view;
Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be the best protectors of their
own wild fauna and flora;
Recognizing, in addition, that international co-operation is essential for the protection
of certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through
international trade;
Convinced of the urgency of taking appropriate measures to this end; Have agreed as
follows:
Article I
Definitions
For the purpose of the present Convention, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Species" means any species, subspecies, or geographically separate population
thereof;
(b) "Specimen" means:
(i) any animal or plant, whether alive or dead;

449
(ii) in the case of an animal: for species included in Appendices I and II, any readily
recognizable part or derivative thereof; and for species included in Appendix III, any
readily recognizable part or derivative thereof specified in Appendix III in relation to
the species; and
(iii) in the case of a plant: for species included in Appendix I, any readily
recognizable part or derivative thereof; and for species included in Appendices II and
III, any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof specified in Appendices II and
III in relation to the species;
(c) "Trade" means export, re-export, import and introduction from the sea;
(d) "Re-export" means export of any specimen that has previously been imported;
(e) "Introduction from the sea" means transportation into a State of specimens of any
species which were taken in the marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any
State;
(f) "Scientific Authority" means a national scientific authority designated in
accordance with Article IX;
(g) "Management Authority" means a national management authority designated in
accordance with Article IX;
(h) "Party" means a State for which the present Convention has entered into force.
Article II
Fundamental Principles

1. Appendix I shall include all species threatened with extinction which are or may
be affected by trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be subject to
particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their survival and must
only be authorized in exceptional circumstances.
2. Appendix II shall include:
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may
become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in
order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; and
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in specimens
of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought
under effective control.

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3. Appendix III shall include all species which any Party identifies as being subject
to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting
exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of trade.
4. The Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I,
II and III except in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention.
Article III
Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix I
1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix I shall be in accordance
with the provisions of this Article.
2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require the
prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be
granted when the following conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will not
be detrimental to the survival of that species;
(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was
not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and
flora;
(c) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living
specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage
to health or cruel treatment; and
(d) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that an import permit
has been granted for the specimen.
3. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require the
prior grant and presentation of an import permit and either an export permit or a re-
export certificate. An import permit shall only be granted when the following
conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of import has advised that the import will be
for purposes which are not detrimental to the survival of the species involved;
(b) a Scientific Authority of the State of import is satisfied that the proposed
recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it; and

451
(c) a Management Authority of the State of import is satisfied that the specimen is
not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.
4. The re-export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I shall require
the prior grant and presentation of a re-export certificate. A re-export certificate shall
only be granted when the following conditions have been met:
(a) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that the specimen
was imported into that State in accordance with the provisions of the present
Convention;
(b) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that any living
specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage
to health or cruel treatment; and
(c) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that an import
permit has been granted for any living specimen.
5. The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I
shall require the prior grant of a certificate from a Management Authority of the
State of introduction. A certificate shall only be granted when the following
conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction advises that the introduction
will not be detrimental to the survival of the species involved;
(b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that the proposed
recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it; and
(c) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that the specimen
is not to be used for primarily commercial purposes.
Article IV
Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix II
1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix II shall be in accordance
with the provisions of this Article.
2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the
prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be
granted when the following conditions have been met:

452
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such export will not
be detrimental to the survival of that species;
(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was
not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and
flora; and
(c) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living
specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage
to health or cruel treatment.
3. A Scientific Authority in each Party shall monitor both the export permits granted
by that State for specimens of species included in Appendix II and the actual exports
of such specimens. Whenever a Scientific Authority determines that the export of
specimens of any such species should be limited in order to maintain that species
throughout its range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosystems in which it
occurs and well above the level at which that species might become eligible for
inclusion in Appendix I, the Scientific Authority shall advise the appropriate
Management Authority of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export
permits for specimens of that species.
4. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require the
prior presentation of either an export permit or a re-export certificate.
5. The re-export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II shall require
the prior grant and presentation of a re-export certificate. A re-export certificate shall
only be granted when the following conditions have been met:
(a) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that the specimen
was imported into that State in accordance with the provisions of the present
Convention; and
(b) a Management Authority of the State of re-export is satisfied that any living
specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage
to health or cruel treatment.
6. The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species included in Appendix
II shall require the prior grant of a certificate from a Management Authority of the
State of introduction. A certificate shall only be granted when the following
conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction advises that the introduction
will not be detrimental to the survival of the species involved; and

453
(b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is satisfied that any living
specimen will be so handled as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or
cruel treatment.
7. Certificates referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article may be granted on the advice
of a Scientific Authority, in consultation with other national scientific authorities or,
when appropriate, international scientific authorities, in respect of periods not
exceeding one year for total numbers of specimens to be introduced in such periods.
Article V
Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix III
1. All trade in specimens of species included in Appendix III shall be in accordance
with the provisions of this Article.
2. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III from any State
which has included that species in Appendix III shall require the prior grant and
presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be granted when the
following conditions have been met:
(a) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was
not obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and
flora; and
(b) a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any living
specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage
to health or cruel treatment.
3. The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III shall require,
except in circumstances to which paragraph 4 of this Article applies, the prior
presentation of a certificate of origin and, where the import is from a State which has
included that species in Appendix III, an export permit.
4. In the case of re-export, a certificate granted by the Management Authority of the
State of re-export that the specimen was processed in that State or is being re-
exported shall be accepted by the State of import as evidence that the provisions of
the present Convention have been complied with in respect of the specimen
concerned.

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Article VI
Permits and Certificates

1. Permits and certificates granted under the provisions of Articles III, IV, and V
shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
2. An export permit shall contain the information specified in the model set forth in
Appendix IV, and may only be used for export within a period of six months from
the date on which it was granted.
3. Each permit or certificate shall contain the title of the present Convention, the
name and any identifying stamp of the Management Authority granting it and a
control number assigned by the Management Authority.
4. Any copies of a permit or certificate issued by a Management Authority shall be
clearly marked as copies only and no such copy may be used in place of the original,
except to the extent endorsed thereon.
5. A separate permit or certificate shall be required for each consignment of
specimens.
6. A Management Authority of the State of import of any specimen shall cancel and
retain the export permit or re-export certificate and any corresponding import permit
presented in respect of the import of that specimen.
7. Where appropriate and feasible a Management Authority may affix a mark upon
any specimen to assist in identifying the specimen. For these purposes "mark" means
any indelible imprint, lead seal or other suitable means of identifying a specimen,
designed in such a way as to render its imitation by unauthorized persons as difficult
as possible.
Article VII
Exemptions and Other Special Provisions Relating to Trade

1. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to the transit or
transhipment of specimens through or in the territory of a Party while the specimens
remain in Customs control.
2. Where a Management Authority of the State of export or re-export is satisfied that
a specimen was acquired before the provisions of the present Convention applied to
that specimen, the provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to that
specimen where the Management Authority issues a certificate to that effect.

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3. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to specimens that are
personal or household effects. This exemption shall not apply where:
(a) in the case of specimens of a species included in Appendix I, they were acquired
by the owner outside his State of usual residence, and are being imported into that
State; or
(b) in the case of specimens of species included in Appendix II:
(i) they were acquired by the owner outside his State of usual residence and in a
State where removal from the wild occurred;
(ii) they are being imported into the owner's State of usual residence; and
(iii) the State where removal from the wild occurred requires the prior grant of
export permits before any export of such specimens; unless a Management Authority
is satisfied that the specimens were acquired before the provisions of the present
Convention applied to such specimens.
4. Specimens of an animal species included in Appendix I bred in captivity for
commercial purposes, or of a plant species included in Appendix I artificially
propagated for commercial purposes, shall be deemed to be specimens of species
included in Appendix II.
5. Where a Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that any
specimen of an animal species was bred in captivity or any specimen of a plant
species was artificially propagated, or is a part of such an animal or plant or was
derived therefrom, a certificate by that Management Authority to that effect shall be
accepted in lieu of any of the permits or certificates required under the provisions of
Article III, IV or V.
6. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to the non-commercial
loan, donation or exchange between scientists or scientific institutions registered by a
Management Authority of their State, of herbarium specimens, other preserved, dried
or embedded museum specimens, and live plant material which carry a label issued
or approved by a Management Authority.
7. A Management Authority of any State may waive the requirements of Articles III,
IV and V and allow the movement without permits or certificates of specimens
which form part of a travelling zoo, circus, menagerie, plant exhibition or other
travelling exhibition provided that:

456
(a) the exporter or importer registers full details of such specimens with that
Management Authority;
(b) the specimens are in either of the categories specified in paragraph 2 or 5 of this
Article; and (c) the Management Authority is satisfied that any living specimen will
be so transported and cared for as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or
cruel treatment.
Article VIII
Measures to Be Taken by the Parties

1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the
present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These
shall include measures:
(a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both; and
(b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export of such specimens.
2. In addition to the measures taken under paragraph 1 of this Article, a Party may,
when it deems it necessary, provide for any method of internal reimbursement for
expenses incurred as a result of the confiscation of a specimen traded in violation of
the measures taken in the application of the provisions of the present Convention.
3. As far as possible, the Parties shall ensure that specimens shall pass through any
formalities required for trade with a minimum of delay. To facilitate such passage, a
Party may designate ports of exit and ports of entry at which specimens must be
presented for clearance. The Parties shall ensure further that all living specimens,
during any period of transit, holding or shipment, are properly cared for so as to
minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.
4. Where a living specimen is confiscated as a result of measures referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article:
(a) the specimen shall be entrusted to a Management Authority of the State of
confiscation;
(b) the Management Authority shall, after consultation with the State of export,
return the specimen to that State at the expense of that State, or to a rescue centre or
such other place as the Management Authority deems appropriate and consistent
with the purposes of the present Convention; and

457
(c) the Management Authority may obtain the advice of a Scientific Authority, or
may, whenever it considers it desirable, consult the Secretariat in order to facilitate
the decision under sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, including the choice of a
rescue centre or other place.
5. A rescue centre as referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article means an institution
designated by a Management Authority to look after the welfare of living specimens,
particularly those that have been confiscated.
6. Each Party shall maintain records of trade in specimens of species included in
Appendices I, II and III which shall cover:
(a) the names and addresses of exporters and importers; and
(b) the number and type of permits and certificates granted; the States with which
such trade occurred; the numbers or quantities and types of specimens, names of
species as included in Appendices I, II and III and, where applicable, the size and sex
of the specimens in question.
7. Each Party shall prepare periodic reports on its implementation of the present
Convention and shall transmit to the Secretariat:
(a) an annual report containing a summary of the information specified in sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 6 of this Article; and
(b) a biennial report on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures taken to
enforce the provisions of the present Convention.
8. The information referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article shall be available to the
public where this is not inconsistent with the law of the Party concerned.
Article IX
Management and Scientific Authorities

1. Each Party shall designate for the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) one or more Management Authorities competent to grant permits or certificates
on behalf of that Party; and
(b) one or more Scientific Authorities.
2. A State depositing an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
shall at that time inform the Depositary Government of the name and address of the

458
Management Authority authorized to communicate with other Parties and with the
Secretariat.
3. Any changes in the designations or authorizations under the provisions of this
Article shall be communicated by the Party concerned to the Secretariat for
transmission to all other Parties.
4. Any Management Authority referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall, if so
requested by the Secretariat or the Management Authority of another Party,
communicate to it impression of stamps, seals or other devices used to authenticate
permits or certificates.
Article X
Trade with States not Party to the Convention

Where export or re-export is to, or import is from, a State not a Party to the present
Convention, comparable documentation issued by the competent authorities in that
State which substantially conforms with the requirements of the present Convention
for permits and certificates may be accepted in lieu thereof by any Party.

Article XI
Conference of the Parties

1. The Secretariat shall call a meeting of the Conference of the Parties not later than
two years after the entry into force of the present Convention.
2. Thereafter the Secretariat shall convene regular meetings at least once every two
years, unless the Conference decides otherwise, and extraordinary meetings at any
time on the written request of at least one-third of the Parties.
3. At meetings, whether regular or extraordinary, the Parties shall review the
implementation of the present Convention and may:
(a) make such provision as may be necessary to enable the Secretariat to carry out its
duties, and adopt financial provisions;
(b) consider and adopt amendments to Appendices I and II in accordance with
Article XV;
(c) review the progress made towards the restoration and conservation of the species
included in Appendices I, II and III;
(d) receive and consider any reports presented by the Secretariat or by any Party; and

459
(e) where appropriate, make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the
present Convention.
4. At each regular meeting, the Parties may determine the time and venue of the next
regular meeting to be held in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this
Article.
5. At any meeting, the Parties may determine and adopt rules of procedure for the
meeting.
6. The United Nations, its Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, as well as any State not a Party to the present Convention, may be
represented at meetings of the Conference by observers, who shall have the right to
participate but not to vote.
7. Any body or agency technically qualified in protection, conservation or
management of wild fauna and flora, in the following categories, which has informed
the Secretariat of its desire to be represented at meetings of the Conference by
observers, shall be admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present object:
(a) international agencies or bodies, either governmental or non-governmental, and
national governmental agencies and bodies; and
(b) national non-governmental agencies or bodies which have been approved for this
purpose by the State in which they are located. Once admitted, these observers shall
have the right to participate but not to vote.
Article XII
The Secretariat
1. Upon entry into force of the present Convention, a Secretariat shall be provided by
the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme. To the extent
and in the manner he considers appropriate, he may be assisted by suitable inter-
governmental or non-governmental international or national agencies and bodies
technically qualified in protection, conservation and management of wild fauna and
flora.
2. The functions of the Secretariat shall be:
(a) to arrange for and service meetings of the Parties;
(b) to perform the functions entrusted to it under the provisions of Articles XV and
XVI of the present Convention;

460
(c) to undertake scientific and technical studies in accordance with programmes
authorized by the Conference of the Parties as will contribute to the implementation
of the present Convention, including studies concerning standards for appropriate
preparation and shipment of living specimens and the means of identifying
specimens;
(d) to study the reports of Parties and to request from Parties such further
information with respect thereto as it deems necessary to ensure implementation of
the present Convention;
(e) to invite the attention of the Parties to any matter pertaining to the aims of the
present Convention;
(f) to publish periodically and distribute to the Parties current editions of Appendices
I, II and III together with any information which will facilitate identification of
specimens of species included in those Appendices;
(g) to prepare annual reports to the Parties on its work and on the implementation of
the present Convention and such other reports as meetings of the Parties may
request;
(h) to make recommendations for the implementation of the aims and provisions of
the present Convention, including the exchange of information of a scientific or
technical nature;
(i) to perform any other function as may be entrusted to it by the Parties.
Article XIII
International Measures

1. When the Secretariat in the light of information received is satisfied that any
species included in Appendix I or II is being affected adversely by trade in
specimens of that species or that the provisions of the present Convention are not
being effectively implemented, it shall communicate such information to the
authorized Management Authority of the Party or Parties concerned.
2. When any Party receives a communication as indicated in paragraph 1 of this
Article, it shall, as soon as possible, inform the Secretariat of any relevant facts
insofar as its laws permit and, where appropriate, propose remedial action. Where the
Party considers that an inquiry is desirable, such inquiry may be carried out by one
or more persons expressly authorized by the Party.

461
3. The information provided by the Party or resulting from any inquiry as specified
in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be reviewed by the next Conference of the Parties
which may make whatever recommendations it deems appropriate.
Article XIV
Effect on Domestic Legislation and International Conventions

1. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the right of Parties
to adopt:
(a) stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, possession
or transport of specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III, or the
complete prohibition thereof; or
(b) domestic measures restricting or prohibiting trade, taking, possession or transport
of species not included in Appendix I, II or III.
2. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the provisions of
any domestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving from any treaty,
convention, or international agreement relating to other aspects of trade, taking,
possession or transport of specimens which is in force or subsequently may enter into
force for any Party including any measure pertaining to the Customs, public health,
veterinary or plant quarantine fields.
3. The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the provisions of,
or the obligations deriving from, any treaty, convention or international agreement
concluded or which may be concluded between States creating a union or regional
trade agreement establishing or maintaining a common external Customs control and
removing Customs control between the parties thereto insofar as they relate to trade
among the States members of that union or agreement.
4. A State party to the present Convention, which is also a party to any other treaty,
convention or international agreement which is in force at the time of the coming
into force of the present Convention and under the provisions of which protection is
afforded to marine species included in Appendix II, shall be relieved of the
obligations imposed on it under the provisions of the present Convention with
respect to trade in specimens of species included in Appendix II that are taken by
ships registered in that State and in accordance with the provisions of such other
treaty, convention or international agreement.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles III, IV and V, any export of a specimen
taken in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article shall only require a certificate
from a Management Authority of the State of introduction to the effect that the

462
specimen was taken in accordance with the provisions of the other treaty, convention
or international agreement in question.
6. Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the codification and
development of the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly of
the United Nations nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State
concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State
jurisdiction.
Article XV
Amendments to Appendices I and II

1. The following provisions shall apply in relation to amendments to Appendices I
and II at meetings of the Conference of the Parties:
(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to Appendix I or II for consideration at
the next meeting. The text of the proposed amendment shall be communicated to the
Secretariat at least 150 days before the meeting. The Secretariat shall consult the
other Parties and interested bodies on the amendment in accordance with the
provisions of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article and shall
communicate the response to all Parties not later than 30 days before the meeting.
(b) Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and
voting. For these purposes "Parties present and voting" means Parties present and
casting an affirmative or negative vote. Parties abstaining from voting shall not be
counted among the two-thirds required for adopting an amendment.
(c) Amendments adopted at a meeting shall enter into force 90 days after that
meeting for all Parties except those which make a reservation in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this Article.
2. The following provisions shall apply in relation to amendments to Appendices I
and II between meetings of the Conference of the Parties:
(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to Appendix I or II for consideration
between meetings by the postal procedures set forth in this paragraph.
(b) For marine species, the Secretariat shall, upon receiving the text of the proposed
amendment, immediately communicate it to the Parties. It shall also consult inter-
governmental bodies having a function in relation to those species especially with a
view to obtaining scientific data these bodies may be able to provide and to ensuring
co-ordination with any conservation measures enforced by such bodies. The

463
Secretariat shall communicate the views expressed and data provided by these bodies
and its own findings and recommendations to the Parties as soon as possible.
(c) For species other than marine species, the Secretariat shall, upon receiving the
text of the proposed amendment, immediately communicate it to the Parties, and, as
soon as possible thereafter, its own recommendations.
(d) Any Party may, within 60 days of the date on which the Secretariat
communicated its recommendations to the Parties under sub-paragraph (b) or (c) of
this paragraph, transmit to the Secretariat any comments on the proposed amendment
together with any relevant scientific data and information.
(e) The Secretariat shall communicate the replies received together with its own
recommendations to the Parties as soon as possible. (f) If no objection to the
proposed amendment is received by the Secretariat within 30 days of the date the
replies and recommendations were communicated under the provisions of sub-
paragraph (e) of this paragraph, the amendment shall enter into force 90 days later
for all Parties except those which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3
of this Article.
(g) If an objection by any Party is received by the Secretariat, the proposed
amendment shall be submitted to a postal vote in accordance with the provisions of
sub-paragraphs (h) , (i) and (j) of this paragraph.
(h) The Secretariat shall notify the Parties that notification of objection has been
received.
(i) Unless the Secretariat receives the votes for, against or in abstention from at least
one-half of the Parties within 60 days of the date of notification under sub-paragraph
(h) of this paragraph, the proposed amendment shall be referred to the next meeting
of the Conference for further consideration.
(j) Provided that votes are received from one-half of the Parties, the amendment shall
be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties casting an affirmative or negative
vote.
(k) The Secretariat shall notify all Parties of the result of the vote.
(l) If the proposed amendment is adopted it shall enter into force 90 days after the
date of the notification by the Secretariat of its acceptance for all Parties except those
which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.

464
3. During the period of 90 days provided for by sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 or
sub-paragraph (l) of paragraph 2 of this Article any Party may by notification in
writing to the Depositary Government make a reservation with respect to the
amendment. Until such reservation is withdrawn the Party shall be treated as a State
not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade in the species concerned.
Article XVI
Appendix III and Amendments thereto

1. Any Party may at any time submit to the Secretariat a list of species which it
identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose
mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article II. Appendix III shall include the names of the
Parties submitting the species for inclusion therein, the scientific names of the
species so submitted, and any parts or derivatives of the animals or plants concerned
that are specified in relation to the species for the purposes of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article I.
2. Each list submitted under the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat as soon as possible after receiving it.
The list shall take effect as part of Appendix III 90 days after the date of such
communication. At any time after the communication of such list, any Party may by
notification in writing to the Depositary Government enter a reservation with respect
to any species or any parts or derivatives, and until such reservation is withdrawn,
the State shall be treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect
to trade in the species or part or derivative concerned.
3. A Party which has submitted a species for inclusion in Appendix III may withdraw
it at any time by notification to the Secretariat which shall communicate the
withdrawal to all Parties. The withdrawal shall take effect 30 days after the date of
such communication.
4. Any Party submitting a list under the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article
shall submit to the Secretariat a copy of all domestic laws and regulations applicable
to the protection of such species, together with any interpretations which the Party
may deem appropriate or the Secretariat may request. The Party shall, for as long as
the species in question is included in Appendix III, submit any amendments of such
laws and regulations or any interpretations as they are adopted.
Article XVII
Amendment of the Convention

1. An extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by
the Secretariat on the written request of at least one-third of the Parties to consider

465
and adopt amendments to the present Convention. Such amendments shall be
adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting. For these purposes
"Parties present and voting" means Parties present and casting an affirmative or
negative vote. Parties abstaining from voting shall not be counted among the two-
thirds required for adopting an amendment.
2. The text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated by the Secretariat to
all Parties at least 90 days before the meeting.
3. An amendment shall enter into force for the Parties which have accepted it 60
days after two-thirds of the Parties have deposited an instrument of acceptance of the
amendment with the Depositary Government. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter
into force for any other Party 60 days after that Party deposits its instrument of
acceptance of the amendment.
Article XVIII
Resolution of Disputes

1. Any dispute which may arise between two or more Parties with respect to the
interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention shall be
subject to negotiation between the Parties involved in the dispute.
2. If the dispute can not be resolved in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article,
the Parties may, by mutual consent, submit the dispute to arbitration, in particular
that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and the Parties submitting
the dispute shall be bound by the arbitral decision.
Article XIX
Signature

The present Convention shall be open for signature at Washington until 30th April
1973 and thereafter at Berne until 31st December 1974.

Article XX
Ratification, Acceptance, Approval

The present Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval.
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the
Government of the Swiss Confederation which shall be the Depositary Government.

466
Article XXI
Accession

The present Convention shall be open indefinitely for accession. Instruments of
accession shall be deposited with the Depositary Government.

Article XXII
Entry into Force

1. The present Convention shall enter into force 90 days after the date of deposit of
the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, with the
Depositary Government.
2. For each State which ratifies, accepts or approves the present Convention or
accedes thereto after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, the present Convention shall enter into force 90 days after the
deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession.
Article XXIII
Reservations

1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not be subject to general
reservations. Specific reservations may be entered in accordance with the provisions
of this Article and Articles XV and XVI.
2. Any State may, on depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession, enter a specific reservation with regard to:
(a) any species included in Appendix I, II or III; or
(b) any parts or derivatives specified in relation to a species included in Appendix
III.
3. Until a Party withdraws its reservation entered under the provisions of this Article,
it shall be treated as a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to
trade in the particular species or parts or derivatives specified in such reservation.

467
Article XXIV
Denunciation

Any Party may denounce the present Convention by written notification to the
Depositary Government at any time. The denunciation shall take effect twelve
months after the Depositary Government has received the notification.
Article XXV
Depositary
1. The original of the present Convention, in the Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited with
the Depositary Government, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all States
that have signed it or deposited instruments of accession to it.
2. The Depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States and the
Secretariat of signatures, deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession, entry into force of the present Convention, amendments thereto, entry
and withdrawal of reservations and notifications of denunciation.
3. As soon as the present Convention enters into force, a certified copy thereof shall
be transmitted by the Depositary Government to the Secretariat of the United
Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter
of the United Nations.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized to that
effect, have signed the present Convention.
Done at Washington this third day of March, One Thousand Nine Hundred and
Seventy-three.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract Prevailing U.S. government philosophy espouses the devolution of authority from federal to local levels. This trend opens the possibility of greater local involvement in policy implementation, and provides international policy-makers the opportunity to improve global policies by adding the efforts of local actors to their implementation framework. Much of international policy involves enforcement through international-to-national linkages, but devolution offers the potential to extend the implementation chain by providing national-to-local linkages. The analysis explores the nature of such linkages, using the case study on the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) via its domestic analogue, the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The research finds that while the framework of CITES enforcement in the U.S. allows for a national-to-local extension in the CITES implementation chain, it also presents challenges that should be addressed by international policy-makers who consider devolution as a way of improving global policy.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Liljeblad, Jonathan (author)

Core Title The elephant and the mouse that roared: the prospects of international policy and local authority in the case of the convention on international species (CITES)

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publication Date 05/13/2008

Defense Date 11/20/2007

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag convention on international trade of endangered species,devolution,Endangered species,environment,International,Law,local,OAI-PMH Harvest,politics

Language English

Advisor Renteln, Alison Dundes (committee chair), Dekmejian, Richard H. (committee member), Keim, Robert G. (committee member)

Creator Email jonathanstarlight@gmail.com

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1243

Unique identifier UC1132833

Identifier etd-Liljeblad-20080513 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-80014 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1243 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Liljeblad-20080513.pdf

Dmrecord 80014

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Liljeblad, Jonathan

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu