A study of the war time control imposed on the civilian motion picture industry and with some reference to those affecting the Army motion pictures during World War II

PDF

Download

Open document

Flip pages

Summarize

Download a page range

Download transcript

Copy asset link

Request this asset

Transcript (if available)

Content A STUDY OF THE WAR TIME CONTROL IMPOSED ON THE CIVILIAN MOTION PICTURE II\IDUSTRY A'JD WITH SOME REFERE2JCE TO THOSE AFFECTING THE ARMY MOTION PICTURES DURING WORLD WAR I1 Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Cinema The University of Southern California In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts by Major Robert Bernhard Randle June 1950 This thesis, written by - - ---- - - ~~bbezli- -B*- 3ans&?- ---- -- - - -- - - - -- - -- - --- - --- * - - - - - - - -- -- - -- under the guidance of h-k--. Faculty Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Council on Graduate Study and Research in partial fulfill- ment of the requirements for the degree of Faculty Committee Chairman TABLE OF CO3TE;ITS C iJAPTEF. I* IIJ?'P.ODTICTIO;J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statement of the problem . . . . . . . . Importance of the study . . . . . . . . Definitions of terms used- . . . . . . . . . Ikthod of pocedure . . . . . . . . . . . . Organization of remainder of the thesis . . I1 BACICGROU!?;D OF WAR-CAUSED MOTIOI! PICTURE CE::SORSIIIP PF13R TO WORLil IzrAFZ 11 . . . . . . Civilian production urior to World War I1 . Army motion picture d-evelopment up to 1dorld War I1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. CE:'SORSFiIP K:D SECT3 TY REGULATIOIdS IIIPOSED Oii VIE CIVILIA;; 1;IDIJSTW . . . . . . . . . . IV. THE E4OTIOII PICTURE IPJDUSTRY TJIiDER GOVERlfl~Ei~iT COITTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Early phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forced production cliangee . . . . . . . . First censors:iip of exported films . . . Picture lots closed to public . . . . . . Aid of Hollywood enlisted to produce information pictures . . . . . . . . . PAGE CMPTER The Office of War Information . . . . . . Army requested check on films about it . Bureau of Government Films isstzed Manual for Moti~n Picture Industry . . . Hollywood war effort, and the Government s desires at end of 1942 . . . . . - . . . Fear of Government dictatorship in the film industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hollywood aid against war in North Africa requested . . . . . . . . . . . . Producers try to ease wartime censors hi^^ . Later phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Government not in the motion ~3icture business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Objections to Hollproor?' E! war-time pictures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Atrocities eliminated from pictures by War Department request . . . . . . . . Films told to fight apat!?;r . . . . . . . Censorship of films for troops overseas . Basic information prohibited from export or import . . . . . . . . . . . . Pictures dubbed in Japanese and for Europeans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii PAGE CHAPTER In conclusion .............. V MILITARY CEZSORS-YIP AI. TD SECIJRI TY REGULATIOIIS AS APPLIED "i' O4Y IrlOTION PICTUFUZS .... Brief history of the Army Pictorial Service ................. ... Problems at the start of World War I1 The photographic mission of Army Pictorial Service ................. Production program .. Signal Corps Photo- graphicCenter ............. Controls applied to Army motion pictures . Problems which arose from the combat foot- ................... age Arrny teciitlical advieors assigned to ................ Hollywood ................ Conclusion ........... VI • SUT*li. iARY AIID COi4 C LU SI OiJ S .................. Summary .......... The military summary ................ Concl~zsione ................... BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER I INTRODUCTI OM The entry of the United States into World War I1 im- mediately made it necessary that new laws, rules and regula- tions be established for all types of industry within the United States. These new regulations were of local, state and federal magnitude, and were invoked to insure as great a degree of security as could be obtained for our nation, its - .. people, and its industr??. It became imperative that this -, nation be protected from any aggressor, and at the same time produce everything necessary to support the United States Army, Navy and Air Force on the field of battl$ - The motion picture industry was recognized by the Government as a medium which could easily sway public opinion i ') - if the subject in question were properly filmeq. It there- l?If I' '1 f~re,~became necessary,,that rules and regulations be estab- I i.' - lished to effect censorship and security measure s4. This action by the Government was instituted as a means of helping the motion picture industry guide the thoughts and actions of the citizens of the United States toward cooperation in % I* i.j -, an all out war effort.. The control was also necessary to prevent the revelation, on the screen, of information which r> -j might be used by the enemy again8 t the United State9 2 1. THE PROBLEX Statement the problem. It is the purpose of this etudy to examine the background of security regulations and cenaorehip rules as they affected the commercial motion pic- ture industry in Hollywood. The fears of the industry as to what might happen to it, and the actual effects of the regu- lations will also be discussed. Further there will be an analysis of the changes in ~~roduction methods and the regu- lations set up for making of Army films by the Signal Corps of the United States Army, as well as a discussion of the overall change in production methods and the increases in the amount and type of pictures produced for tkae war effort. (The Army portion of the study is not as complete as the writer desired, due to the classification of the subject by the Army and the inability to get to tile files of Army In- telligence. The problems brought up in the study furnish a basis for further investigation at a later date. ) Importance the 8tud.y. The writer chose this sub- ject because he waa impressed by the need for a comprehensive etudy of the problems mentioned above. This study will serve to furnish the writer with a very valuable background in his professional career as a Signal Corps, Regular Army officer. Inasmuch as the author's field of specialization is in the photographic division of the Signal Corps, and he has begun 3 this study of the motion picture industry it should serve him well when he is assigned to the SignaJ. Corps Photograpinic Center at a later date. The production of motion pictures for the Army requires the ability to know how to deal with the problems in both the Army and the civilian motion pic- ture industry. During the past war there was a great deal of work done in close harmony by the civilian motion picture industry and the Army motion picture agency. The civilian industry received instructions, rules, regulations and advice on how to produce pictures, what should be etressed and what should be repressed in picturee. Many of these guides to proper production came from the Army, as well as from the Govern- ment. Controls also were established for the Army production of films by the Army, and the Government. There has not been a study made to date to determine what the rules and regulations were, how they were met, and the effects on both the civilian motion picture induetry and the Army film pro- duction. Tilie thesis represents the first study of the prob- lems resulting from war time control of motion picture pro- duction and how they were handled. It is the desire of the writer that this study form a basis for close understr-nding of the problems particular to the civilian industry, and those of the Army so that in the event of any future national emergency there will be a 4 basis from which to work. The material found in the study may also prove to be of historical value. 11. DEFIIiITIONS OF TmS USED Any terms used in this study which might seem ambig- uous will be explained by the writer in the body of the thesis. Tne word "~ensorshi~" has a variety of meanings. In this study the only meaning given to the word will be that sort of regulation or suppression of material which if shown in pictures might hurt the war efforts of this nation. Cen- sorship for moral reasons is not considered in this study. Security regulations are those regulations set up which =e necessary to prevent the enemy from obtaining val- uable military or politi cal Information. 111. METHOD OF PROCEDURE The data from wlhich this study has been derived were gathered from several sources. As far as could be determined there were no published books on the subject. T-he problem of control, or censorship and eecurity regulations, of motion picture production during World War 11, had not been etudied in any over-all consideration as to its effects on the in- dustry. It was therefore necessary to gather data from periodicals, trade papers, from Army training f ilms, from Government publications, from letters written by peraons 5 connected with the indastry during the war, from conversa- tions with people involved in the work during that period. and from personal experiences of the writer during the past eleven years. A few books were found which contained ma- terial related in some small way to the subject and were used where possible. T:hese sources made up the study. The con- clusions are those ~f the writer. IV. ORGMII ZATION OF RDliAIrdDEH OF THE TEESIS A brief background of motion pictures relative to the problems w-hich war-time censorship caused from World War I up to World War I1 will be the subject of the next chapter. This problem is to be attacked from both tile civilian and the Army side. Chapter I11 analyzes the need of war-time regulations and censorship rules as they arose and were in- volved between 1940 and September 1945. Problems of rela- tions with the motion picture industry will be discussed in C-hapter IV. Chapter V considers military censorship and the regulations imposed on the production of Army films, both the training films and the films about the war as it was be- ing fought. The concluding chapter, Chapter VI , surnrnarizes the i~revious chapters. This summary will be in tize form of a discussion of the over-all effects of the war-time restric- tions and the requlrements placed on the motion picture in- dustry, both civilian and military, and will include 6 conclusions avld recommendations for procedures to be fol- lowed in the event of any future war. CHAPTER I1 BACKGROUND OF WAR-CAUSED I*IOTION PICTURE CSJSORSIIIP PRIOR TO WORLD WiU3 I1 The motion picture industry as it is known today, was a very young industry, by conparison, at the start of the first World War. It was clear that as the industry grew and developed it would be an important factor in helping to shape the thoughts of the public. A few days after the declaration of war in 1916 the theaters of the nation began to show patriotic slides and full length pictures which were intended to sell the war to the public. The pictures made along these lines idealized the Americans and their Allies, while they made the Germans the most terrible, heartless and ruthless people in existence. Examples were pictures such as "The Kaiser -- Beast of Ger- many1' and "Shoulder Arms.' This was the picture as it was in 1916. Civilian wroduction prior & World x. The stert of dark clouds predicting war in the offing for the United States which began in about 1939 and continued to grow until December seventh 1941 made this country aware of the danger which was about to become a reality. With this danger there was t-he rush to arm and become as invulnerable as possible. This speed to arm caused many people to leave the quiet of their homes and steady jobs for the activity and Mgh wages of the defense jobs. Men and women, by the millions, began b working in arsenals, factories, shipyards and all sorts of industry that were new to them and which were producing war materials. These people had to be taught new skills and duties quickly and in detail so that they would be able to I produce as much as possible in the shortest possible time. The civilian motion picture industry, in con junct ion with the sixteen millimeter producers, at the request of the United States Government, made many instructional films which enabled the nation to arm as rapidly as possible. There was no question but what the speed of preparation for war was more rapidly accomplished by the use of audio-vistral methods than would have been possible without them. Other needs such as security problems wLdch had to be taught to the American public as soon as possible and which had to be given as wide a distribution as possible were put on film and shown in all the theaters in the country. This job was done by the civilian industry in the main, at the first of the war, and did great good in teachine; the public ita part in the war effort. There will be further discus- sion of this subject in the body of the study. Army motion picture development a & World IT. The Army motion picture set-up which llad functioned so 9 efficiently during the progress of the first World War was cut out along with many other important functions as a result of the drastic military cuts made in the peace-time Army. 1 There was a certain amount of photographic work done at the Army War College in Washington, D.C., but the production of motion pictures, even training f ilme , was discontinued. In 1925 photographic courses were re-instated in some small studios at 39 Wllitehall Street, New York City. It was at this time that World War I film and other nore current foot- age in the files was made available to the newsreel companies. In 1931 the first Army sanctioned program was offered in which Signal Corps men were given one year in an inatruc- tion program at the Hollywood studios to train them in the professional motion picture craft. The program was designed to acquaint them with the radically new developments in sound recording and reproduction which would be used in future Signal Corps films. By the next year sound films were being produced. Re- quests for visual aids by the rest of the military eatablieh- ment began to swamp the photographic facilities of the Army. About five years later it was necessary to set up a Train- ing Film Production Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and a similar laboratory at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio to take care of the visual aid film needs of the Army and the 10 December seventh, 1941 found the motion picture branch of the Army in a precarious position. This branch of the Signal Corps of the Army was not prepared for the tremendous task wnich lay ahead. The time factor in modern warfare is something which is of vital importance. Millions of every- day American citizens were inducted, or enlisted in the serv- ices of the nation. These men and women had to be oriented, indoctrinated, and taught the new skills and duties of the services. They needed to know about many new and strange items of equipment, and how to take care of themselves in certain conditions. They had to know how to act if they should ever come in contact with the enemy and a multitude of other things. It was at thie time tlhat the production of Training Films for the Army really was begun on a great scale. With the increasing requeets for filmic visual aides it became ne- cessary to have adequate personnel and studio space to pro- duce the required footage. As a result of this need the Army purchased the Eastern Service Studios at Astoria, Long Island, New York, on the twenty seventh of January, 19LJ.2, This studio was built by Famous players-Lasky in 1920 at an es- timated cost of ten million dollars. With the advent of talking pictures and the consequent demaqd for I!ew York Stage actors and actresses, Paramount Films used the studio for production of some of their early "talkies." 11 With this increased apace available as well as the technically qualified personnel that had been brarght into the Army, the Signal Corps began to attack the problem of teaching the vast numbers of persons who had come into the Services military duties. A training program of Audio-Visual methods was begun. There had never before been such a pro- gram set up to help traln as large a number of people. All tilis increased production, while necessary, had to be rigidly controlled so that information given in tile films would be used only by authorized personnel. To do this it was necessary to put certain classifications on the various films produced, and to restrict the audiences which could view certain pictures. All of this will be discussed in de- tail later in the study. I CHAPTER 111 CEIISORSXIP AI?;D SECUX TY REGULATI OfJS IMPOSED 013 THE CIVI LIAN I;!DUSTRY Motion pictures are all made in Hollywood. That is the thought most of the people in the United States lzave when anybody says anything about the home of that wonderful image that is seen on t:m silver screen, or in color in the theaters of this land. Hollywood is more than a place- It is a word that has many meanings. To some it is the fairy land of the impossible come true; to others it is an insane asylum run by the inmates, and t? still others it ia the end of the rainbow. It is, and always has been, all of these things, and many more. Hollywood is the head.quarter8 of an industry worth more than two-billion-dollars, that has made the art of en- tertainment it s business. For many years the world has known the movie business and the people who have worked In it a8 those who work hard and play hard. The Hollywood columnist8 have told the world about their long hours in the studios, and tne interminable shoptalk has been spread around the world as has the lavishness of their parties, the splendor of their homes, the big cars and boats, and the number of their swimming pools. Hollywood had its premieres amid bat- teries of searchlights, flanked by temporary grandstands. 13 Its clothes were flamboyant and its manners informal. Underneath all this gaudy sort of living, Hollywood, as a community, bas much in common with other American com- munities. Long before Pearl Harbor one could. have found in any American community a group of people who sensed the grow- ing menace of fascism and the coming of a war. This group could be found in Hollywood also. The belief grew a bit faster and greater in Hollywood than in most other cities in America for the motion picture industry's artists and tech- nicians came from all over the world, and because before the war its pictures were produced for a world market. As the war clouds darkened, the market grew smaller and smaller as the fascist-minded countries began to bar the American film. About the middle of' 1938, Walter Wanger produced "~lockade," a picture dealing with the Spanish Civil War. While the film only indicated the oppoaing forces and did not identify then, its sympathies were clearly with the Loyalists. The picture was really mild in its scope, but it created a furore and was picketed in some cities and banned in others. 1 "Confessions of a Kazi SpyU was produced by Warner Brothers about a year later. This picture was based on- evidence presented at a trial of German spie~ in New York l~ovie -- Lot To Beachhead, The Xotion Picture Goes to War and Prepares for the Future (~ew York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 19451, p. 7. lp CHAPTER IV i I THE MOT1 ON PICTURE INDUSTRY UIiDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL I I* EARLY PHASES There was a need for some sort of central, or Govern- mentd control over the motion picture industry to take ef- fect in war-time. This fact had arisen to some extent with the formation of the United States Film Service when it wap estzblished to get Governmental control over Just Government film production and distribution. Tlre attempt to develop a clearing house for Government motion pictures had failed due to the lack of cooperation frqm agencies which were Jezlous of their rights. About all that organization was able to do was to prepare a listing of all Government pictures available for distribution. Early in January of 1943, President Roosevelt ap- pointed Mr. Lowell Mellett, director of tk Office of Govern- ment Films. he president stated in a letter written about the same time that he wanted no censorship of motion pictures. Tlzere was to be no exact and strict control of pictures to be produced. The industry figured that the new office and the president's letter would have just a moral effect upon state regulations and comercial production. The new Office of Government Films stated that it6 18 duty would he to meet wl th t-he leaders chosen by the indus- try and impart the Governmental views and regulations per- taining to the movies. At first the industry was up in the air as to what to expect. There was no indication as to the kind of pictures desired, to lift the morale, to bring out patriotic feeling, and in general to excite the public to back tile war effort. The views of the Government indicated that the public did want to see some comedy, ana not to remove the whole field of entertainment from life. In additiofi the aovernment felt that there was a place for war pictures in the pattern of motion pictures to be produced, or in other words to see life as it was being lived. Mr. Mellett, in one of his first messages to the in- dustry stated that unless the people associated with picture production were called by the Government for a specific task they could give their best war service by remaining in Holly- wood and making more and better motion pictures. This state- ment was made from two motivating factors. One was the truth of the statement, and the other was to stop the rush for commissions of persons above the draft age. 1 Forced production changes. Early in January 1942 the Army found it necessary to imj~ose restricti~ns which were to 1 ~aily Variety, Hollywood, California, January 18, 1942. 19 last until tne end of the war on tne southern California area. As a result of these regulations practically all scripts in work and tnose in yroduction had to be revised extensive- ly. not because of story content so much as the actual physi- cal production problems involved. The Army decrees all but drove the producing companies back wi thin their studio lots for productions. Wilenever it became of vital necessity for there to be location work, the entire personnel neceasary had to go beyond the blachut areas and tlie areas of military "alertH control. This meant to Arizona, Iievada or Iiew Mexico. Some of the "don* ts" of product ion that the studios were controlled with in the early stages of the war were as in the city such as scenes at street intersections or involv- ing exteriors of mansions or other buildings, as well as midtown chase scenes, were out. The reason was: (1) such scenes draw big crowds upon which the Army frowned at the time; (2) more important, no policemen were available to handle the crowds. Train shots were out, as the armed forces had requi- sitioned all extra rolling stock available. Only under the 2~~ll~~od Reporter, Hollywood., California, January 3, 1942. moet fortuitous combination of circumstances would the studios be able to engage a train. 14otion picture companie~ on location could make no scenes near the entrance to a rail- road tunnel or near a railroad bridge. As a protection against possible sabotage, all tunnels and bridges were un- der armed guard along the entire Pacif ic coaet. Sirens were forbidden in any chase sequences, even in the open country, with the anti-siren law being rigidly enforced. 3 ?'fie airplane restrictions were the heaviest. There could be no air shots, since all private planes had been grounded. Howcver the new rules went beyond that and made it against the law to photograph any airport for motion picture purposes. It was permissible to photograph an airplane, but it could not be done at any recognized airport and it had to be a stationary s5ot. It was forbidden to even taxi the plane. If it was desired or necessary to have the motor of A tne plane running, the propellor had to be removed first, so tlhat it would be physically impossible to get the ship off the ground. If a -,lane were to be used it had to be dis- mantled and taken to the spot wnere tb shot was to be taken. At that spot, it could be reassembled under the eyes of armed soldiers, who were to step back when the shot was tak- en, but who must stay within gun range. 21 No motion pictures could be taken anywhere near any Army reservation or near any dam. There could not be any pictures taken in coastal h~rbors from San Diego to Seattle. Motion picture companies were not allowed to operate any boats for picture purposes in any coastal waters. 4 Even daytime locations in the hills or desert regions of Califorliia, the type of desolate spots usually used for westerns had become subject to many uncertainties. The Army was not announcing where it was going to establish anti- aircraft batteries, and the result was that some of them eprang up near some of the favorite close-in western location sites. 5 Long sliots of manufacturing plants, simply to estab- lish such plants for interiors and close exterior scenes were completely banned, since the great majority of the larger United States industrial plants were engqed in the manufac- I) ture of war materials. 6 A11 of these restrictions meant that, when possible, the location sites ,"lad to be duplicated within the studio walls or had to come out of the scripts. Shooting schedules were lengthened to allow for all-daylight efforts. This did add. considerably to the costs of pictures because of the 4 Ibid. - 6 Ibid. - 22 additional expenditure for high salaried principals who had to be kept on the payroll longer and whoee additional stipend was more than the limited saving which the studios might realize from the elimination of overtime. The one thing about all these regulations which helped tile studios in the eyes of the Government was that tne studio executives who were going to be nurt by the regulations contended that they had always w solved their problems in time of emergency and would solve I tk se. First censorship - of ex-12orted films. Mexico was the first nation outside the United States that felt the iron grip of the new war-tlme restrictions of tNs country. About the first of February 19b.2 strict censorship of all American newsreels going into Mexico was put into effect. This was the first drastic censorship since America's entry into the war. Be:?ind the Government clampdown was the known presence *I * of many Axis agents in Mexico who were busy inspecting every reel shown in Mexican theaters for any and all data they might pick up and forward to their home government. The newsreels that were being shipped out of the country by the five leading newsreel companies had always been subject to Army and Navy censorship, but the new order was an effort to tighten the regulations and prevent as many as possible of 23 This new censorship and the complete inspection of every foot of film that entered or left the boundaries of the United States included film featuree, newsreels, documentaries, and any other type of film that might be sent either way. The regulation was put into effect under the "~rading With the Enemy Act" of 1917.7 All pictures and every print of each picture had to carry a censorship stamp secured at the port of de,parture in order to facilitate censorship and in- spection. The customs house officials informed Hays office personnel that they would have special inepec tors available on one hour1 s notice to see the films projected. This was the procedure which existed during World War I. Tbre wa6 great concern by the motion picture executives at first re- garding the new regulations, especially since they had not been informed what type of material would be banned for ex- wrt. This matter wa& cleared up in a matter of time, but at first tine Customs ofr'icials refused to elaborate on the statement that they would bar shipping of all material con- sidered to be against the interests of the government. Shots of the Pacific coastline or other defense locations, for example, were taboo. The result was that Paramount hati to re-edit and cut he Hollr wood Re~orter, Los Angeles, California, T-f- I?ebruaryT 19 12 24 the latest Dorothy Lamour film which they had made. he lee t ' s ~n, ti which showed sailors disembarking and in addi- tion, some views of the coastline. Universal was notified that its newsreel on Hawaii could not leave the country. None of the Pearl Earbor footage wihich was filmed or edited by the commercial companies was allowed to leave the United States - for several years. (It has been stated that the I'!avy re- leased its footage shot prior to and subsequent to the De- cember seventh attack af ter censoring it. ) Film companies sought a list of types of footage taboo for export from the Treasury Department such as the one that they had received from t5e Army and Havy. This action was necessary to anticipate the questionable, and thus protect themselves at the source of the picture. There was one isolated incident which caused the State Department to cr~nsieer local censorship by consuls in all foreign countries of newsreels and other news material on film. The situation arose f rom a one year old newsreel wlnic h was shown in a Mexican town in February 1942. The reel had a clip or" General MacArthur explaining the strategic im- portance of the Philippines and explaining how its defenses made it impregnable from attack. Screening of this reel at this late date, aroused considerable laughter, hooting and derision from tine Mexican audience, all to the detriment of tile United States, according to the local consul, who suggested the State Department gut this local censorship in- I ! to effect to avoid such happenings. 8 I The regulations were tightened by the Office of Cen- eorship so that the producers instead of obtaining only a general approval from the Army, Xavy or other government bureau had henceforth to have specific approval for export from the various bureaus. The new order stated: In cases where the Los Angeles Board of Review of the Office of Censorship requires written approval from the War, idavy, or other government agency, it is necessary that the letxer state that the agency interested approved tile subJect for export. The Los Angeles Board of Hevie requires photostatic copys of such letters of approval. 4 The Boards of Review were set up in three citiefl by Mr. Byron Price, Director of Censorship in 1942. These boards were located at Hollywood, California and New York City to examine commercial product and a special board was set up at Rochester, :'ew York, to check 16 mm film processed at the Eastman Kodak laboratories. Picture lots closed to nublic. There was no outward attempt on the part of the government to keep the public who had for years been allowed to take every advantage of seeing the stare at work and at the big premieres apart, but the *~ailr Varlets, Las Angelen, California, February 2, 1942. '11911 wood Re2orter, Los Angeles, California, Febru- + ary 25, 19 3. 26 security regulations laid down made it mandatory that such action be taken. The result was tliat orders were set up with rigid restrictions against visitors on any sets in the studios where training films were being made. These restrictions r were indicated by the use of large signs denoting that the set was closed and restricting all visitors. This action fell into line with a tightening of the general regulations under wldch training films were made in Hollywood. Tile Army would much prefer to make its own f ilma as it was able to control closely the personnel t.kt worked on the films. However due to the necessity of producing a great number of films on a great variety of subjects in a very short period of time it was impossible to make all the pictures In the facilities available within the Army stages. Instructions had been sent to Hollywood that everyone as- signed to such productions must he able to certify American citizenship and must have available at all times birth cer- tif icates for inspection by authorized representatives of the War Department. Prior to the war one of the most interesting sights for t,% public who happened to be in Hollywood at the time of tne opening of a new picture was the premiere wi%h the searchlights, the police, the grandstands, and all the people trying to get a look at the stars. The Army issued a set of rules for such demonstrations which curtailed certain of the 27 elements of the spectacles. It was ruled that no slcy-reach- ing lights could be used, although floods, spots and other lighting could be used if they were not aimed upwan-1; at- tendants had to be on hand to shut off lights in case of air raid alarms and. lights should he hooked into a sinrle switch where possible; streets had to be kept clear of seating stands, equipment, crowds or anything else that might im- pede tral'fic; no more than five tnousand persons including those witnin the tneater, could gather in the vicinity, and the studio showing the picture must see that police kept the crowd from exceeding that number. 10 In connection with the Army regulations on the use of 1 searciilights at premieres the Army had also issued regulations B h pertaining to the use of lights by the studios d.uring the I filming of night outdoor shots. In I'lovember 1942 the Army became quite ircensed at the studios for violating the dim- out regulations on the night shooting of films. When such s:moting waR to be done it had to have the approval of the Army and then only if there were to be canvas stretched over the top of t-he set snooting area so that the light rays would not go up into the sky. One of the studios decided that it being a hot night, and the amount of light needed for the shot increa~ed the heat to such an extent under the canvas roof, they would just forget the ban and take the canvas off 'O~he Holl ood Reporter, Hollywood, California, --7-Y- February 26, 19 2 28 the top of the set. At three in the morning several Army planes with pLhotograpchers flew over the studio and took pictures of the activities. The next morning the Western Defense Command took action against tL%t particular studio and all others. The studios were told that the dirnout regulations would be complied with regardless of weather elements or heat. Fur- ther the order stated that lights under no circumstances could be visible from the outside. In addition studio^ were also ordered to blacken all outside lighting on thoroughfares leading to stages and streets on the lots. The next day all the studios were active in painting out lights, checking all poeeihle light leaks, and putting add-itional doors on entrances to stages wlhere light might creep through. The Western Defense Command had made it clear that any violation of the dim-out laws would be prosecuted to the fullest extent. 11 Aid of Hollywood enlisted produce information pic- -- tures. From the very first of the w:ir there wag a cry coming from some sources for a picture, or series of pictures to be made with the over-a11 theme of one world and one war. It was thought that if such a picture were made and nad orig- inal material shot on sea, air and land battlefronts in all he Holl wood Rerjorter, Hollywood, California, --+ 3ovenber 3, 19 2. 29 parts of the world, documented with scenes of civilian war activity on the home front in all the anti-Axis countries it would do a great deal to add to the effort to get the Job over with and the war won. This idea did not take form in the Pllmlng of one picture, but there were a group of pic- tures w:nich were produced during the war which did the same job. A number of projects were started by the industry at the request of tie different governmental agencies portray- ing economic and diplomatic pmblecls. These pictures along with the uninterrupted flow of entertainment films made up the bulk of the work done on films by that industry for the war effort. At first the government asked that over twenty films be made along information and morale lines to fall in- to the category of a few features and some short sub jects. The request for the pictures was made by the government, but the method for selling the pictures to the public was left up to the industry. The picturea had to be distributed commercially to tne theaters. The distributors got together and decided to sell the j~ictures to the exhibitors at a reducert cost which would Insure the widest possible distribution. This action took care of the theatrical distribution of the government inspired films, and there was a separate government dlatri- bution system organized to handle the sixteen millimeter 30 non-theatrioal circulation. All this time the Office of Emergency 14anagement Film Service, the official producing agency for the coordinator of films, continued to expand-. In its two year history they imb prahuceh ov er t\n's_~ty f YT e 3Lcturea on as%\&nnent f ram I the various government agencies. Part of these films were distributed by tne War Activities Committee. Tnere was some concern over the fact that the Army w~s controllirg so much oi' the material about the war effort by its strict censorship and security regulations timt it was imposrible to show the public pictures of the all out effort being made by Americans in the different states. This con- dition brought about an increasing opportunity to cover all aspects of the war effort on the part of the newsreels by a ruling of the War Department. The new ruling did permit for the first time, extensive camera coverage, by pool and by assignment from all companies, of accomplishments on the production front. The next step was to grant entry, under auspices of the Army to gun factories, tank works, vast new aircraft plants, areenals and other defense plants. The newsreels were allowed to filrr., at unidentif led locritions, long lines of tanks, guns, jeeps and other equipment flow- ing at record breaking rates. Pictures of women at work in shell loading plants, the swift movement of material to the f ighticg forces and demonstrations of chemical and mobile warfare were arranged. Kewsreel spokesmen, grateful for the relaxation of rules to permit better coverage of the home front, at the same time expressed the hope tihat they would be granted fuller privileges on the fighting fronts. Tney pointed out that Pearl Harbor and Marshall Island were the only battle sequen- ces issued to that time. Both newspapers and still photo- grapnic servioes, t,hey declared, had been grmted special privileges not afforded the newsreels on the fighting fronts. It was shortly after this that the newsreels got permission to film pictures at the fighting fronts and were able to get their own material on the screens in thla country. There were restrictions on the way the film was handled for pro- cessing, but at least the newsreels did get to shoot their otm material. Most of the material that got on the newsreel screens was that shot by the cameramen of the services with additional material added by that shot by the comparatively few commercial newsreel men that were in the different the- aters of operation to cover the war. The Office of War Information. Elmer Davis, the fa- - mous newspaper man and Columbia Broadcasting System news analyst, became the first d.irector of t-w Office of War In- formation when President Roosevelt issued the long-expected order gathering all varied government press and information 32 services under one leadership. Mr. Davis was also given brom authority and specific duties relative to the motion picture production. The president directed Mr. Davis to coordinate, and Issue, all war informaiion consistent with government policy and in consultation with a newly formed advisory war Informa- tion council of War, Navy, State, Inter-American, Psychologi- cal Warfare Committee and other department chief 6. Mr. Davis was to have equal rank with Mr. Byron Price, chief censor. 12 The Chief of the Office of War Information was in- structed to formulate and carry out, throiqh the use of press, radio, motion picture and other facilities, the information programs designed to facilitate the development of an in- formed and intelligent understanding of the status and prog- ress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities and aims of the Government. In addition to this he was to review, clear and approve all proposed radio and motion- picture programs sponsor ed by the Federal Department s and agencies, and to serve as the central point of clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion picture indus- tries, respectively, in their relationships with the Federal Departments and agencies concerning such Government programs. lZl4otion Picture Herald, June 20, 1942. The Office of War Information was to take over the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government Reports, the office of the Coordinator of Government Films, the Foreign Information Service, and the publicity department of the Office for Emergency Management. One of the first t5Angs the newly created I4otion Pic- ture Bureau of the Office of War Information did was to oon- duct a survey, with Kelson H. Poynter who was the :%ad of the Hollywood branch of tile bureau for Om, and Warren H. Pierce, his assistant, to cover all tne pictures released between March first 1942 and September first 1942. Also in- cluded in the survey were those pictures awaiting release, in production, in preparation or proposed. OWI took into account the development of new problems which would be con- fronting the American people in the following six months to a year and also reviewed the probable status of those prob- lems which were current at the future dates. The results of the survey indicated that the industry was moving steadily in the direction of giving the American people a better understanding of the nation' s war l~roblerns. Ho~~ever, despite the great improvement in the over-all balance of picture production, there still seemel! to be many gaps ~.rMci? might be serious in nature as to tne amount of 34 war information which was being given out. It was the opinion of the board that the empihasis in the entire industry seemed to be too much on the exciting hlood-and-t9under aspects of the war, with too little on the equally important problems arising in every day civilian life and dealing with the basic issues of the war, and the peace to come. OWI attempted to persuade the producers and distributors to juq~le release dates on pictures which were completed or approaching completion so as to present more balanced programs for the public. As a yardstick to measure the contributions of the motion pictures toward the war effort the Office of War In- formation used six general categories which were set forth in trle Government Information Manual which inad been circu- lated throughout tLhe picture industry. The survey uncovered the following facts: The first of these ca.tegories clealt with the iesues of the War for which the IJnited States was fighting. From flarch to the end of August 1942 only one f ea- ture in that class had been released and one other was await- ing release. It was true t:-t at that time there were eignt features of major importance, in some stage of preparation. Tne second category dealt with the enemy, his ideology, obJectives, and tactics. A large share 01' the war pictures released to that time had fallen under this classification. Most of tnem dealt witn the subjects such as spies, saboteurs, or fifth column activities. At least thirty- four such pictures nad been released in that ~eriod of a few rno:~tIla. It was true that when the survey was made the vol- ume of such pictures Maa declining, but nineteen such film8 were awaiting release and some twenty more were in some stage of preparation or production. The third Office of War Information category was that i i called the United ;:ations -- our brothers-in-arms -- and this I category was covered by only t-bee pictures at the time cur- I I rently showing with three more of the typ awaiting release. This one, all important subject bd been tackled in force I by the industry and tlhere were forty-six pictures of that ! nature in preparation or proposed by the end of August 1942. i Tile fourth Office of War Information category was that of tlhe Production Front. In tnis category there were four features and two shorts dealing with the subJect on the screen at the time and only one feature and two shorts were awaiting release. There were six f ea'bures showing America' s batCle on the production line in preparation, and a number of shorts on the subject were either in preparation or Wd been proposed. The fifth category of the Office of War Information survey was called that of the Home Front, and there had been released three features an?. there were five more waiting to be released. There were sixteen others in preparation of 36 feature length and twenty-eight nhorts in preparation or awaiting release. Seven shorts on the subject were being ehown. The last category of t:w survey condrlcted by the Of- fice of War Information, was that which dealt with the Fight- ing Forces. There were sixteen features, only four of which were combat films, and six others, half of which were combat films awaiting release. This was the category that was the easiest to dramatize and the great numbers of this type of f ilma that followed dealing with the Fighting Forces fully reflected this. There were at the end of August 1942 sixty- eight features of that nature in preparation, about half of wMch were about combat of the American soldier and sailor. 14 Tile Office of War Informa'sion was greatly concerned over the number of such features which were c ontenplated for production. The experience gained by t!le results in England had shown that the public shortly became tired of too many combat films and demanded an opportunity to to to the theater without having to witnes~ bloodshed and fighting d-urlng the only period of relaxation that they had. Another of the screen's most conspicuous wedcnesses, according to the Office e ! of War Information, was t he f allure to slzow how vigorously and powerfully and yet idealistically the American people met I 14~oxoff ice, Los Angeles, California, September 12, 1942. 37 the great emergency. Also lacking were l~ictures that tended to reflect accurately the virtues of' American life in such a way as to give the Allies W~IO see the picture a genuine un- derstanding of the Anierican people. Of couree it must be understood that the period that the Office of War Information was considering was about tne firet of September 1942, and after tizat time most of the items that were pointed out in the survey at the end of August 1942 had been corrected. Tilere was no Intention on the part of the government to aee the screen filled with nothing but war subjects. OWI did state that the bureau felt the future called for fewer and better war :~ictures with 'netter over-all balance between the imliortant topics to he shown. It was decided that the quality of the films might be improved if lesser features wl'clch were dragging in the war were to abandon the war theme entirely and become purely escape pictures. Tnis would al- low important war subjects to be confined to pictures of suf- ficient quality to carry the vital message over without being a bore to the public. Army requested check on films about urn The great number of pictures that were made at the start of the war used Army personnel, or were about Army personnel, or in some remote way had a. connection with service personnel. Such films wnen made by Xollywood, had to be registered and filed 38 wit:^ the Amy. The purpose was to provide the Army heads with an ac- curate view as to how the Army was being presented on the screen and to cotrnsel producers before they spent money on pictures. that would prove detrimental to the military forces and which would hsve to be withheld from the public. The registration plan was started as a means of keep ing a certain studio from indefinitely tying up a subject which the Army was interested in getting on the screen quick- ly as an aid to recruiting. The need for certain specialists such as flyers, navigation personnel and bombardiers, required that stories be written about these groups and gotten on the screen in the shortest possible time. The Army also cautioned producers asainst portraying officers and soldiers "carelesslyH even though Army coopera- tion had not been asked for on the production. It was felt tlmt the Army deserved to be properly portrayed to the world through film8 as one means for tne people to learn of the greatness of the Army. In summary the Army asked that the studios notify it whenever feature or s-brt productions were contemplated in which Army cooperation would be sought; that Army cooperation not be required when process backgrotxnds of the Army were to be used; that the Army be notified when actors were to portray officers or soldiers. It was realized at the outset of tlMs request for the 39 registration of titles anci subjects tiit the succer3G of the plan depend-ed on the complete cooperation of the industry. Tile ~3lan was set to work rouk~hly in the following mmrler. Titles of stories would be placed on file and all other strrclios trould be notffieci of prior claim. The Arrny ~roulc? notify the studi?~ whez there vns a defi~ite an$- urgent need. for Fame ;xirticular subject, as has heen i-ndicnted before, and if the first sturlio, tkt cr)ntrql7f~~ the story, found that it FraP ~ot going to be %KLe tn start it on time then the story could be switched to atother 6tud.iq. A syatem waF devi~ed to ?lace the numerous titles, covering practically every battle or ~ignif icmi feature of the way to the ai3Cile of June 19112, at the time or file in the 3ays office, In the Ifar De,>artnentt s Arrny Title-Su11ject Registration File. Priqr tc~ that time miters and studios IxId rushed tbxougn slcetc!iily o~rtlinerl ideas to clairq rights to film such feazures, and there Izad been z [;reat scramble over I)riorities. 3oll)wood was doing everythin@ in it? 1JoJ:er- to 2-13 the war effort and to brinz oixt v-h!.t t.%? War Dei,nrt- nent wanted shawn on the screen. ?he features completed-, or i:1 ,,rod-uction tirroughotrt the WP.~ covered every bra~cil of arned services ~tr,~ civilian service. This title registration h;; the Army in no way co1.1I.d be construed as censorship in the Arerican way of t:;linkimg, but kras rnther designed as a mild security measure to see tlwt the Amy Tf7as correctly rco portrayed and to aid the Hollywood studios in making films about the Army. Bureau of Government Films is~ued Manual for Motion Picture Indlxstry. At the end of June 1942, tile Bureau of Government Films, an agency of the Office of War Information issued a fifty page mimeographed manual, suh ject "Government Inforrnation I~Zanual for the l~lotion Picture Industry. III~~ manual w2s given to a number of the producers, writers, directore, stlldio heads and a few agents. It was offered aa a subject of study and discussion at meetings of various guilds a?d other film organizations, as well as for personal conferences with individual creators. TLle booklet outlined the views of the government to- ward the i3roduction of motion pictures, and suggested many direct ways for creators to help in the war effort* There were some direct suggestions made to the producers such as showing films portraying the Russian farmer destroying his fields and home before the enemy could profit by them; or slzowing the Chinese peasant fighting with outdated rifles against tile Japanese tanlrs; or- the Yugoslav guerril.la sacri- ficing his family rather t,w-n come to terms with the tyrant. All of these things, the government felt could be shown lS~ollywood Reporter, Yol?ywood, California, June 30, dramatically and heroically in motion pictures. ?'here was a section devoted to the Fighting Forces. In this section it was stated that American Commanders had Allied troops and naval unite under their command in certain theaters of the war, and it was also necessary for American Army and iiavy units to be under Allied commanders in other war areas. The unity of the Allies had to be presented as a sign of strength and mutual trust. 'ihere were challenges made to tne imagination of writers and producers by some of the comments in the manual. It stated that it was really very easy to glorify the Air Corps, the men who parachuted to ground and the tankers. How- ever it was more difficult, but just as necessary to drama- tize the infantryman, with his grim coml3ination of danger and discomfort. It was also difficult to glamorize the men in the Service of Sv~ply, the truck drivers and otners who kept the goods rolling to the front in spite of all %:he elements which xight and often were against them. It was suggested that the merc'xmt marine, the women's Army Corps, and the Ivledical Corps might also be made screen topics in order to offer as complete a panorama as possible to the millions of , theater goers. A final item in t_Xs part of the manual noted that under the democratic process t lze unilerprivileged had be- come less underprivileged as a result of being able to fight for the same tning that the rest of the country was fighting 42 Hoarding and labor shirking were two items touched on as dangers to the war effort. There v!a8 a lot of unwarranted : criticism of the British, and a patronizing attitude toward the Cninese, rumors, f ifth column t~ilk, that the manual stated was the duty of the motion 1:ictures to diepel. In ad- dition the problem8 of war productir3n and agriculture were brought out as reminders to the writers of what to glorify in the scripts. All of these things were to be fought in an effort to guide the public to de~ired thinking imbits. The manual definitely bd a strong impact on the mo- tion picture industry, and the ~hilosoplzy, facts and quota- tions from some of tne speeches of t,;le President of the United States, and other government and military officials found their way into many pictures produced after the manual was distributed to the industry. 16 Hollywood war effort, and the Government.' s desires at end of 1942. The Office of War Information was opened ir- --- May 1942, and it stated t!iat wiwt it expected from Hollywood was for those who made pictures for American and foreign audiences to recognize ar?d accept their full responsibility in the war effort. Thia was exactly what it expected of every other American industry and IndiviSlual citizen. The 16?:ie - Hollywood Reporter, Yollywnod, California, June 30, 1942. 43 government did not want Hollywood to trifle with the war. It did not want the war looked upon as merely another vehicle, or a passing pLh.ase of life upon wi~ich to hang a movie script. Every picture touching upon or dealing with the war must be regarded purposefully an,d t2loughtrlllly for what it could do to help win the war. It meant that tnere should be fewer, better and more carefully selected war $.ctures -- fewer blood-and-thunder combat thrillers and more serious works which would help to public understanding of the war, its causes, the sacrifice and. hard work that it demanded. (These statements had been made in about all of the early comments about the industry during the first stages of the war. They have already appeared in the text of this study, but are re- peated at this point to indicate again what tile feeling of the government was as to the direction in which the motion plotures should be moving. They indicate the regulations - that were being placed on the industry and while not exactly censorship or security regulations, they are closely allied with that sort of control.) The Office of War Information had learned in the aeveral months of its existence that the motion picture in- dustry was eager to cooperate in the war effort, and anxious to do everything possible to help with the war.+ It had al- so learned that the most useful function of the Office of War Information was to provide =direct and clear a ohannel 44 of information between the motion picture industry and the Government as was possible. The Office had nothing to do with the personal appearances of stars; it was not to attempt any film production other than official documentaries. Its most important function was to let the movie maker know what hli Government wanted and needed in the way of war informa- tion passed along ta the theater-going public of America. Once the picture producer was informed, it was his responsi- bility and obligation to make the beat possible use of the weapon of information in his hands. This problem of making the pictures thnt the Government desired to have made brought up the question: Should all the pictures be war pictures? Of course the answer was "no. t1 There was a need for purely esca-pist entertainment pictures. I-iowever even in tnese pictures the producer was faced with the responsibilities arising from the war -- of being sure that tlie picture would not create adverse opinions of American life in foreign countries, or bad opinion of any of the United >!ations at home, and of seeing that conditions por- trayed in contemporary pictures as far as possible faithful- fully reflected life as it was at the time the film was re- w leased, and not the unreality of pre-wa.r daya. a Another question was whether or not the Office of War Information forbad the making of certain types of pic- tures, or demanded the production of another type. Of 45 course the answer wan in the negative. The Office of War Information was charged with the responsibility of express- ing the Government ' s viewpoint regarding a picture to the producer. It then became the producer' s responsibility to decide wnether that pioture should be made and how it should be made. The Government respected freedom of expression on the screen as it did in the press, on the radio, on the cracker- barrel or on tne lecture platform. In total war it was ne- cessary to use every weapon toward the eventual victory. There was no question at any time of the importance of the screen as a weapon of total war. However the Office of War Information believed that a free screen could fight more ef- fectively than could a regimented group of artists and tech- nicians. Tne vast pool of technical knowledge and entertain- ment talent of Hollywood was the greatest in one place in the world. The Office of War Information believed that an even better job could be done witi-rout molding Hollywood to its will, simply by telling free men and women, ere are certain problems facing your Government and the United States. They are YOUR problems. It is up to you to use creative gifts to help solve them. " Hollywood was not concerned with the problems of day- to-d-ay information. That was the province of the newsreels, the press, and the radio. T9e problems of the motion ;?lcture 46 industry were those of dramatizing the intangible phases of the war information program. That industry could best in- terpret and make real the underlying issues of the war. Why was the world at war? What could finally bring peace? Who was the enemy and what did he stand for? What was it that made all the sacrifice worth while? How could the Allies consolidate their efforts in winning the war and assuring the peace? How was it possible for each of the one hundred and thirty million Americans to best serve his country in the gigantic struggle? How could the "Home Front" best sup- port those on the fighting front?l? It was the primary joh of the Hollywood office of the Office of War Information to keep the induetry abreast of these problems. Due to the necessary time lag between the inception of a picture idea and Its peak dietribution, keep ing abreast meant looking ahead, from nine months to pos- sibly a couple of years in the future. Up until the end of 1942 the war had touched America only lightly. It was the following period that would be the real test as to the ability of the motion picture to carry its part of the load. Total war meant grim tnings for t& nation. Total war meant that nemly every able-bodied man in 17 Daily Variety, Hollywood, California, October 19, 1942 47 the nation would either be in the armed forces or in essen- tial war work. It meant that there would be real casualty lists. It meant that there would be many, many women -- many of them mothers and homemakers -- in industry; t,here would be lots of cndldren in nursery schools; homes would be dis- rupted, and the general home life of the American family would be upset It also meant that there would be sharper and more far-reaching rationing. Tile public would be obliged to get along on less than t~ey had formerly been able to buy. It meant longer and harder hours of labor. These were the jobs that the Office of War Information wanted tackled by the motion picture industry. It was a ter- rific job, and that was a fact realized by both the industry and by the Government. To help producers and writers de- termine wnet,her their product was measuring up to the stand- ards set by the Government, the Office of War Information prepared a guide for producers. The Ohrl: guide raised the following questions : Would the picture help win t-he war? What war information problem did the picture seek to clarify, dramatize or interpret? Was it an excape picture? Would it harm the war effort by creating false pictures of the American, hls allies or the world of the day? Did the picture contribute somet.tling NEW to the understanding of the world conflict and the various forces involved, or lmd the subject already been adequately 48 covered? Did it merely make use of the war as the basis for a profitable picture, contributing nothing of real signifi- cance to the war effort and possibly lessening the effect of other pictures of some importance? At the time that the pic- ture reached its maximum circulation on tL1e screen, would it reflect conditions as they were and fill the need of the current time, or would it be outdated? Did tne picture tell the truth or would the young people of the day scorn i t a few years later, and say they had been misled by propaganda? 18 The Bureau of Motion Pictures of the Office of War Information had stated, in easy-to-understand terms, what it expected from Hollywood. The next question was to figure out now the industry stood as of the first of October 1942. A survey was pre- pared to shm three things: first, pictures being exhibited at the time; second, pictures completed and ready for re- lease; and third, pictures proposed or in various stages of preparation or production. The list of features classified according to the six basic themes of the War Information program as outlined by President Roosevelt in his address on the State of the Nation is shobm below: 19 18 Daily Variety, Hollywood, California, October 19, 1942. The ISSUES: What We Are Fighting For; The American Way of Life. Released from July 1, 1942 to October 1, 1942 . . 3 ......... Completed and awaiting release 0 Proposed or in preparation ........... 15 The ENEMY: His Ideology, Aims and Metnods. Released from July 1, 1942 to October 1, 1942 . . 24 Completed and awaiting release ......... 17 ........... Proposed or in preparation 35 The UNITED EiATIONS: Our Bro thers-In-Arms. Released from July 1, 1942 to October I, 1942 . . 3 ......... Completed and awaiting release 5 ........... Proposed or in preparation 54 The PRODIlCTIOkT FROITT : Supplying the materials for 'Jictory. Released from July 1, 1942 to October 1, 1942 . . 2 ......... Completed and awaiting release 2 ........... Proposed or in preparation LO The HOME FRONT: Civilian Responsibility. Released from July 1, 1942 to October 1, 1942 . . 2 Completed and awaitlng release ......... 3 ........... Proposed or in preparation 23 Tlie FIGHTING FORCES. Eeleased frori July 1, 1942 to October 1, 1942 . . 4 ......... Completed and awai tlng release 9 ........... Proposed or in preparation 90 There will be a comparison made later in the study between tile above chart and material in 1944. The Off ice of War Inf'ormatlon was concerned about the total industry output of war films for two main reasons. It felt t1m.t certain phases of the war ,had been overstressed (espionage and sabotage)¶ while other phases of equal or greater importance had been neglected. Another reason for concern was due to tile experience of picture producers in England which demonstrated that too much ernphaeis on was, war pictures of all kinds, and t-hereby endangered the entire function of the motion pictures. The chief failure in the picture production program of Hollywood to the end of 1942, was the failure to achieve the goal set up by the Office of War Information, for fewer and- better war pictures with better over-all interpretation of the underlying issues of the war being shown. Elmer Davis, the director of tile Office of War Information, said in one of his talks about the functions of t;?e industry as he saw it, tnat the movies should give information, but that they could also do more than that, they could give the public un- derstanding. 20 They could clarify problems which might be complex and confusing. They could focus attention upon key problems and the essential issues which the people must de- cide; the basic choices were the things the people had- to nake. Pictures make clear and intelligible the enormous complexities of global geography, military tactics, economic dilemmas, poll tical disputes, and psychological warfare. T-he medium of pictures could be used to give the public clear, continuo~rs, and comprehensive images of the total pattern of the total war. The Office qf War Information survey ind-icated that Daily Variety, Hollywood, California, October 19, 51 the industry had been doing a good job as far as it vent, but tnat the war films were not focusing tha key problems which tne people must grasp. They were not rnakiw clear the enormous complexities of the global warfare as they might do, aid a tiling wnich later the industry did do to tile best of its ability. Hollywood was eager to cooperate in tile war effort, and rnost anxious to do everytning possible to help with the struggle for victory. The industry made a promise, after the report, for a better-balanced program of war films. These pictures would deal adequately, provocatively and inspiring- % ly with all phases of the war. c Fear of Government actatorship fn the film industry. -- P ' T,kre was at one time or another during ti= first phases of C the war a fear t-hat the Government might get too much control over the motion gicture industry. The trend toward the I Government "dictatorshipM of the film industry in England, Y which had been growing steadily in British trade circles, uF was reflected in the United States. Picture company heads I had been putting queries to tneir British trade representa- t- tives and officials visiting in America about the problems b of government control of films in England. This fear was-\ reported resulting from the increasing Government activity r in film production and non-theatrical distribution on the i 52 British side of the ocean. TLk apparent tendency in Washington and London to follow each other' s governmental directives in general war- time economic and social structares had given rise to specu- lation whether the United States industry would be reshaped to the same extent. Officially, the apprehension in both tne British and American picture circles was groundless. The industry based its fears on tile uses being made by the various Government departments for more film for non-commer- screen purposes than the picture industry was using itself. Government films, those produced to inform the public as to what was happening in the United States and the rest of the world, were being made in great numbers and many thousands of feet. These films were not intended to compete with the commercial motion pictures; tney were to be in addition to the Hollywood entertainment film and were to carry a message tihat was informative rather than entertaining. There were many reels of t;ds type of picture being made and all were receiving a tremendous audience due to the fact that they were shown without cost to the public. It was the intention- of the Government to bring the subjects to the foreground, and the intent was acdeved. In doing so, however, t:le total production of film was reaching an amazim number of feet* Thus the worry of the industry. The fear was that the Gov- ernment might not stick strictly to informative subjects. 53 Though t'cle British Government production had embraced feature length films, and non-theatrical distribution via mobile units had become one of the most important aspects of wartime screen fare in England, official entry into all phases of production and distribution on a permanent commer- cial basis was remote. It was further pointed out that, insofar as the United States f iln trade was concerned, Government production ac- tivities had cut even les~ into commercial territory in the States, since they had been purposely limited to short, fac- tual films. The Office of War Information had discontinued the production of fictional shorts nearly as soon as they had begun them. The civilian industry had attempted to get the Government to cut out all it8 motion pictures except those for the Armed Services. The idea was tnat the Goverxnent in making picturee of any sort was cutting Into the market of the industry. As far as the British production went, it owes much to Government activities on the other side of the ocean ac- cording to the authoritative circles, because it had been possible to produce a considerable number of domestic films of better-than-average qua11 ty through the cooperation ac- corded the British Ministry of Information by the War Office. As a Government bureau tile British Iblinistry of Information had been able to give tile loan of star performers. Army and 54 iJavy requirements rank first of course, but the British Ministry of Information ranked third. Players needed for productions could thus be loaned back since the various branches of the services could tell within short notice whe- ther the players could be spared from active duty. Loans of players from the armed forces were at a minimum, however, since they were used only in important feature length pic- tures. In the United States, were playere such as James Stewart or Tyrone Power released for feature-length film production to be shown commercially it would be assumed that the studio holding prior contract rights could claim the services of the performer for the same purpose. ~ollywood aid wainst war in i:orth Africa requested. The motion pictures in the war had another vital use which I had not been discussed to date in this study, that of a pro- i paganda force. The truth of t:ds was shown duriLrg tk Ameri- can invasion of French 14orocco and various other countries in North Africa. Special French la~guage newsreels were i i prepared and shipped by United Fewsreel, tile composite reels compiled by the filrn unit of the Office of War Infor- mation for dlstribution in Allied and neutral countries. Fiction films, documentaries, Victory shorts and every type of motion picture that would show French speaking people in Africa the American way of life, and w-ich would carry the I message of the United Nations in the war against the Germans were also used. ( Every major producing company in Hollywood was coop- erating with the Office of War Information in making films available for ~hipment to Africa. Thefie pictures had French sound tracks or special French titles. Distribution was handled in North Africa by representatives of the American distrlk~utors in cooperation with the Office of War Informa- tion men stationed in the different cities. In October 1942 Vichy, the French capital at that time, banned importation or exhibition of American films in Algiers, where approximately two hundred and sixty theaters were in operation. By November of t,%t year all of the theaters were showing free ITnited States films, and the Of- fice of War Information had replaced the Sazi-made propganda pictures with our films in Algiers and every other Arnerican- held territory in Xorth Africa. The natives who saw the pictures cheered the Hollywood films and the newsreels. A bit of good propaganda was injected into the newsreel by some footage of President Rooaevelt delivering a speech in French to the French people in North Africa. The newsreel had been planned weeks in advance of the invasion, and there were others that followed quickly to keep the feeling strong toward the Americans and their cause in North Africa. In addition it was requested that as soon as the land was 56 secure, any ~icture that showed the Americans and what they were dotng for the war effort or that presented a story of national unity in the United States, or anything that eold thlscountry's participation with the Allies in the war, go over. There was some concern in certain quarters as to whe- ther our propaganda pictures would off set those which the Germans sent into neutral countries as well as Africa, but it was quickly realized that tile great motion picture industry of America with all its facilities and talent muld easily outdo what Hitler haa done in the war of propaganda through the screen. The long range program for Africa and the other in- vaded countries was designed to keep the newsreels and the entertainment films flowing into the picture houses in those countries, and at the same time embark on an extensive short subJect program for theatrical and non-theatrical di stribu- tion. A program wae started which put sixteen millimeter propaganda films in England, India, Egypt and other coun- tries. Sixteen millimeter f ilrns were made in six to twelve d-ifferent languages. Tilese pictures were sent into places where tnere ilru?. never before been any motion pictures, and covered a range of subjects from dental care and public health to engineering. The use of the sixteen millimeter films had been grow- ing rapidlyj however the British were using them a great 57 deal more than the Americans had up to the war. In England tne people had been educated to the factual film more than they had in t;ze States. There it was widely used in factories, clube, trade unions and schools. The reeult was that there were lots of halls set up to stmw the sixteen millimeter filma, made by the United Statee, to get the message to the masses of the people. - Producers try to ease wartime censorship. Tile foreign market had been restricted to almost nothing due to the enemy occupied nations and the fact that in the countries which tne Allies were occupying there was no revenue from the f ilms. Another cause for concern that, the industry felt was the necessity for drastically altering the type and man- ner of presentation of screen stories due to the wartime censorship. Individual producers began complaining about wAhat they regarded as too severe interpretation of the pic- tures by the censors. The amount of revenue lost could not be estimated, but the fact that it was a great deal was recognized. By the first of January, 1943, about a dozen pictures had been de- finitely turned down by the Office of Censorship on export licenses. Others had been granted pernission for export to certain areas only, the companies eigning stipulations that the films wuld not be exhibited elsewhere. Still 58 other films bd been partially re-shot, or re-cut in order to get the Office of Censorship seal of approval. The producers complained that the censorship was over unimportant factors in their stories. For example, anything showing an American Government official as crooked was banned. A crooked official in city, county or state govern- ment was, and is, practically a stock character in Hollywood films. One picture wes refused a seal of approval due to the emphasis on rationing of sugar. The complaining producers claimed that many ordinary human frailties, such as a soldier going Absent without Leave, could not be worked into the t stories. I I The Office of Censorship, established in Hollywood in- June of 1942 had been reading all scripts presented to it in advance of production. It offered suggestions and infoma- tion in an effort to help producers before the story was put on film. However the bureau was bound by rules as laid dom by the Chief of the Office of Censorship and by Colonel W. Preston Corderman, Army officer assigned to the Office of Censorship, who a0 clief postal censor had been nandling zuch of the film end of the censors;~ip job. The Office of War Information, a separate bureau but working closely with t-he Office of Censorship in Hollywood, was also aiding in advance of production when it had a c-lance. The Hollywood Off ice of War Information had even gone to the point of tipping off studios tihat certain books or plays might not meet with Government approval, if it had read or heard that the studios were interested in purcha~ing the stories. At least one big Broadway production d-id not reach t,% screen hecanse word had, been passed to the studio that the Office of War Irformation would not approve it. The effect of censorship on the industry was not as great as the industry at first feared. However it was agreed tllat entertainment loses its flavor when restrictions are too stringent. It was a bit difficult to present all Americans as knights in shining armor. Throughout the entire war the Administration insisted- that there was no censorshlp, actual or intended. Persons in the Industry had various views ranging from face acceptance of the word of the Government to belief tL%t there was a cen- sorship of fear. In other words, the suggestion of one of the Adninistration's qents had better be followed because tls, Government harJ_ many varied and specific almost life-and- death powers wnich could be exercised indirectly. T-Us much of the study in. cbapter IV has been about the early phases of the controls imposed by the Government and its agencies on the civilian motion picture industry. The industry received the controls and suggestions of the Government with varying degrees of cooperation at first, but later found out tnat the best action was to follow closely 60 the pattern and thus eliminate the trouble which was sure to arise with violation of the controls. 11- LATER PIUSES The later phases of the war and the regulations im- posed on the civiliasl industry involved little argument. The industry knew by that time they had a job to do and that the rules for tire job had been laid dotin. Any violation of the regulations would hurt only the industry in that they would have to either re-edit pictures that had been Amde, or else they would have to put the picture on a shelf as being one that oould not be shown until after the war. The agencies that were dictating these controls were in the main, the Office of War Information, the Office of Postal Censor, the War Depa~tment, the Hays Office, and any state regulations that might be in force. The Office of War Information, with its Bureau of Motion Pictures Ahas been discussed at length in the study. l1le Office of Postal Censor was an agency of the Federal Government which had a great deal to do witn winat would be shipped out of the country, as well as general rules and regulations wiiich would not be allowed broken. It was in this office where the most of the Army Censorsldp of the films made by the people in Hollywood were viewed to make sure that there were no violations of the Army regulations "I for the production of motion pictures by the civilian in- dustry. The War Department sent out a list of things that went to form the items which were controlled in tile making of motion pictures during tk World War, The Yays office controlled the civilian industry as,, to the morals of the pictures, the language and the like of that. They were in existence long before the war and trill be in some capacity or other for many years to come, and their job will remain much the same as it has been for the years. It might be said one of the missions for which the Hays of- fice was bmught into being, was that of cleaning up the motion pictures as to morals and giving whatever help neces- sary to the industry as to passable film; this mission has been accomplished in a very efficient manner. The Government agency in Hollywood was the Office of War Information's Bureau of Motion Pictures, as has been stated before in this study, It should- be remembered that the Motion picture interests themselves went to Washington early in the start of the war to inquire -how they could help best in the war effort. The result was the creation of the bureau, at the consent and hearty approval of all members of the industry. The bureau offered much advice, many sug- gestions and had given extensive cooperation to picture pro- ducers. It was true that some of the suggestions had not 62 been accepted and some, on the other hand, lmd heen ac- cepted. IVo instance had come to the general notice of pres- sure on a producer to accept bureau service or of any re- prisal for not accepting it. The nearest trling to actual censorship came from the Armed Forces ol'ficers wno had a very direct interest in pic- tures snowing armed men in this or that phase of military life. Leading producers said that no instance of sizable friction had arisen between the officers and the producers. Tihe Bureau of Motion Pictures requested produoera to submit scripts and rough cut films for review. It was not compulsory, unless they felt the compulaion of fear. Some of the producers responded and others did not. There were some easily excitable persons in the film capital and there were some who seemed to fear a rigid Administration censor- ship and thought that freedom of speech was going with a Wasl~ington wind. The Government men who headed up the Bureau of Motion Pictures tried to calm the fears of the producers as best they could. 21 Tlhe situation was one of the minute and nothing that lasted for any great length of tine, and there was notiring new in the scheme of things which should have worried the LJ. The Los Anaeles Times, Los Angeles, California, - February 28, m3. 63 men in the industry. There had been a period of time which had passed with the new restrictions caused by the war being carefully observed by the men who were charged with assist- ing the industry in making sure that nothing got filmed which would Impede the war effort. Prior to this time there had been no one but the Hays Office and political censor- ehip boards in various states and citiea to regulate the industry in any way. It might have just been the artistic temperament coming to the fore but in any case it was tem- porary. The Government, the public, and the industry itself - knew that the motion pictures of this nation had been doing the best possible job to aid the war effort to date, and a job so well done tihat it did not seem possible that anybody could ever fear that the Government was going to do anything to hurt the industry. Government not in a motion picture business. The Government was not going into the motion picture business, arid more than tLht it lzad no fault to find with those that were running the business. Mr. Lowell Mellett, head of the 'd~reau of Motion Pictures, Office of War Information, in Washington, D.C., tried to reassure tk industry by tell- ing them that the Government had confidence in their merit. That cqnfidence could be exhibited in about sixteen thousand theaters in America and unnumbered t30uaands of theaters in other lands. The Government and the motion picture industry 64 ha3 developed the proper relationship with one another. It was true that it was a different one from that of normal or peace times, and it was due in the main almost wholly to the spirit, the patriotic spirit, of the men and women who com- posed the picture industry. The industry had offered to help ti= Government, and the Government had offered to assist the industry in carry- ing out t;le desire to play a full pert in the war. A prac- tical workable rnetnod of cooperation had- developed from the two parallel proposals, and tine result on the wnole had been gratifying to both parties. 22 ?'here had been some concern at times on the part of people within and without the industry lest in the fact that they seemingly placed themselves to some degree in the hands of the Government, the custodians of the great creii.tive art might endanger the freedom of the art. It was a natural concern, one which those charged with carrying out the Government' a half of the cooperation had had full sympathy. They had been very determined that they should not wln tile war through processes that trould lose the important things for wlilch tihe war was being fought. One of these t:;lings was freedom of expression. 23 LL Daily Variety, Hollywood, Calif ornia, March 5 , 1943. I i mutual enterpriee had demonstrated that it was possible for 1 the Government in real democracy to marshal tLhe voluntary i I services of all its people without transgressing on the 24 fundamental liberties of any of them. The pictures that the Government had made were limited to those factual pictures, deslgned simply t-, give the peo- ple of America information t'ley needed to have and which they were entitled to :have, and w.3.ch the Government, in its war effort needed the people to have. Beyond that the Gov- ernnent did not think Its function s~iould go* The result was the pictures about salvage of tin cans, old rubber, tubes, old rusty machinery, about saving fats and greases, about the kind of work for w2Ach men and women were needed, about the foods that snould be eaten, about why in times like war times the public cannot eat all the thing^ they would like to eat, about tk sharing of care, and man1 similar such unromantic sublects. In normal time8 these pictures would seem to be very dull, but the movie-goers did not apgear to find them dull, mainly because they were ,~icturee dealing with matters with which they were intimate- ly concerned. 25 24~a~l:L Variety, m. s. 25 Loc. e. - 66 More important than what the government did in the matter of making pictures, was what tile Government did not do* The Government did not, tirough the use of pictures endeavor to regiment the mtlons of the American people. To do this was and is not a function of any government in democracy. Educate yes, but not regiment the public. Obfections IIoll~wood' s war-time jlictures. There were comments raised 1:: some parts of the country, ar:d some r from overseas that the pictures being produced in Hollywood were not what they should be making. This cry was from the minority, but it is felt that it sllould be told in this L study. - The 3ollywood Reporter had an editorial which read t as follows: Some of the movie producers are doing an asinine Job in presenting war to the cinema lovers. I saw a film tile other night in wr~ich t.he Army was composed mostly I of trombone slayers a:ld Jazz singers done up on uniform. Men wiio are supposed to be in the business of saving this country danced and giggled and made jokes. Girl I helpers -- I dont t know what they were doin? at the camp -- wifi'led a rumba. And everybody saluted every- 1 hody else and made love in out-of-the-way corners of the camp. I i Then suddenly a sergeant-major -- or maybe he was a general -- came out on the stage of the benefit per- formance (there was a benefit performance) and said: "Boys, your country is calling! I' And away the men went. Armed to the teeth and grinning as if they were cats come from Cheshire. would be so pleased. 26 Tire Stars and Strims was the official Army paper - printed in the European Theater of Operation during the war. This paper was run entirely by the soldiers in that theater of operation. It was one of the first, if not the first army paper to take exception to the type of pictures that were being shipped to the rnen overseas. The following is a quotation from that paper: " F1 ag Wav ingn Recently we ~iave been sickened by the way Hall-ywood at its worst, has "waved the flag." We are proud of the American flag, for it represents the United States of America. . .our liomelmd and people. yo see that flaq "ballyhooed1' by Hollywood is disgusting, for it doesn t need FIoliywood, however must have heroes to bring nickle s into the box office; so during this war we're all heroes. It woul&~'t be gui te so bad. if Hollprood movies were shown only in America; but tlwy re widely distributed here in Britai~. In such circumstances it is hard to see yourself portrayed on the screen as a "bloody kro" when you know you're surrounded by rien, women and chil- dren who hve definitely groved they are brave beyond the ability of IIollywood to portray. Then to see our beautiful flag, flying proudly in the breeze, every third scene, is just too much. It is chean and done to secure applause where the director, tizrougi< his own weakness, is unable to create patriotic emotion ix a legitimate manner. 1:e would appreciate the Hays office nore if it spent- less t4me cutting swear words from the scripts of po- tential war movies and gave a little more thought to "good tasteH in the movie scripts designed for foreign 26~he Hollywood Reporter, Hollywood, California, June 30, m2. 68 consumption. We feel that in ad(7ition to news censor- silip, movies should be censored for good taste before they are exported to foreign countries and that such censorship by the Says Office would eliminate distrust of America that bad films show the minds of people w-lo should be otxr bc st friends. 37 The Iiotion Picture Producers and Distributors of I America took strong exception to this letter or editorial i and attempted to learn the motive behind the "flag waving" I comments, and also aiternpted to learn which pictures or picture that the Stars - and Stripes had. in mind. Tile attitude of t11e motion picture inaustry was that they v~elcome~ criti- w cism, but unless some constructive euggestion wa6 made, such sweeping accusations really serve no purpose. As far as can be found nothing came of the comments in the Arrny paper I inasmuch as the real cause of the comments was never disclosed. Atrocities elimi~ated from pictures Demrtment request. A~other wartime restriction which the industry ran into was the directive from the War Department against the showing or reference to in dialogue, of atrocities committed by the Japanese against an American civilian or military pri-soner of war. This edict took Hollywood by surprise and caused considerable confusion, since several major studios had pictures in production dealing with the Japanese 27~he - Stars and Stri~es, London, England, April 13, 1943. 69 atrocities. The action came on the heels of the Government warning that films treating upon the current juvenile de- linquency problem would not be regarded as euitable for ex- hibition outside this country. Films of this sort were be- ing used by the Germans to s-how that in a Democracy such as the United States the children were allowed to run wild and had no idea as to right or wrong. They, the Germans, were taking the pictures and running them all over the world, es- pecially in South America, wl~ere they hired halls and used the pictures as a means of laughing at tLhe Democracy of t-he IJnitea States. Some producers thought that when this restric- tion was put on them tnat all freedom of production had been taken away. The truth was that the regulation was put on the production of that sort of film only after the Govern- ment had been informed that the enemy nation was using the pictures as had been mentioned to the detriment of tMs na- tion. After this fact had been explained to the industry clearly they did not protest the regulation any more, and tempered the scripts to do away with this eort of thing. It was certain that while Federal Censor~hip as such' dia not exist it was clear that powerful influence was ex- erted over the industry through the expediency of threatening to deny export licenses due to picture8 regarded as inimical- to wartime American interests. i3early all tne f il!cs about the war in the Pacific contained scenes and, or dialogue 70 dealing witiz abuses perpetrated by Jayanese officials or soldiers. Among pictures which were affected b;- the new edict were, ?letrols "Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo," and "Dragon Seed"; Fox I s "Purple Heart, I' dealing with vrotmnd-ed soldiers in the Pacific area, and "Horror Islar.rl," a less imposing subject to treat apecirically with Japan1 s intention to propc?~nte a hy- brid I'i-nporzese race hy the Irzterrna~riqe of its natimal~ with slrbjugated people; Warper's "Destinatior. -- Tokyo" and Unl- versal's proposed east of the Ea~t." In Metro's "Cry 11 Iiavoc, the climactic scenes sbwed nurlses marclhing out of their dugout to su-render to the Japanese. As it was orig- inally filmed it was to the accompaniment of screarns and shrieks intimating the nurses were atrocity victims -- the sound track was later eliminated. The reason for the request that atrocities not be shown was given as fear of further cruelties against Americans who were at the time -hela by the Japanese. The theory was that the Japane~e might figure that as long as they arere being charged vrith the crimes, and would have to pay for them lat- er, they niight as well continue them. Hollywoofi never assumed, really, that ldashington had- attempted to arbitrarily dictate just what should or should- not be used in commercial pictures Sl.eallng with war issuee. However many suqgestions" emanating from the dlff erent 71. Government departments were embodied into sictures on the recominendation of the Office of War Information. One of the most striking examples was a picture produced by Paramount, titled I' The liitler Gang. liZ8 When the film was first d-is- cussed in ~cript form, the producer atated that he intended to siloti through the inception, ~rowth, sad development of the :Jazi party that Germany was ii? the hands of a mob of crlnifial gangsters. Ee had visualized the film on the scale of a "superu gangster epic, analogous to the American gangsterism of the prohibition era, in whicn the it crime-does-not-pay" climau would be sho~trn in tlze military defeat of Germany, The film ''The Hitler Gang," aa it was made, did not touch on the past ~.7&r, World tllirr 11, and ended with the 1936 blood purge. The gangster element^ and the "insic?el' depraved lives and careers of the "itler party leaders played a part in t-he factual plot, but more significantly, the German Junkers and army officer cliques portrayed the important 17art they played in the growth of the Xazi movement. This phase of the picture, included and stressed at the insistence of the Office of War Information, was done at the "unofficial suggestion" of the State Department. Tiie expl.r.nation ~lf this was due to Wasili~ton's clesire to emphzsi-e the theory that the removal of the Hltler clique would not solve the 28~ditorirrl in the -- ::ea York Times, ivovernber 14, 1943. 72 German problem, and that the people of tne democracies must be on guard against the fascist-minded Gerrnan Army groups who might overthrow the Nazi Government to seek a negotiated This idea was also brought orzt in n series of fllrne made by the United States Army to educate the service men as to the background of the German thought toward war and peace. In contrast to the attitude of the Government toward films showing juvenile delinquency, gancsters and the Japan- ese atrocities, Washington wanted a speedy foreign distribu- tion of the film. The picture was edited and assembled as it was shot in order that It could be silown as early as pos- sible. It was one of the fastest pictures made by any com- pany in the war years. There was nu difficulty in showing the picture in the Alliecl countries, but there was some dif- ficulty in getting release of the motion picture in tlze neutral countries. Tiowever this situatio!~ wa.8 overcone to some extent by zaking a number of sixteen millimeter prints of the film so t-hat they were smuggled into thoee territories for "contraband" showixs. Films told to fi~ht a9ath.r. As the war progressed the Government continually felt the fear of the nation becoming apathetic to the war effort. It was a long war and as time 29~ditorinl in the i:e~q: York Times, :-overnber 14, 1943. 73 went on the gub7ic read the 2apers and knew t:%t war was a tragedy. However, it seemed to be the way things were ~nit they might as well let it go at that and hope that it would soon be over. Stanton Griffis, cilief of tiw Domestic Divi- sion of tile Office of War Information's Filrn Bureau, told the industry at one of his meetings with the War Activities Com- mittee, that the primary duty of tlie motion pictures tras to correct any a~athy towarc? the tmr. One of the trays $flat the apathy was evidenced was in the black markets. Another of the dc-ngers was the talk that tine war would he over in a few months and t,%t the people could let down in the war effort. Griffis eaid that he thought t!ze American p~iblic could face fqcts if the filrna gave them the truth. It appeared t-hat economic problems were of vital im~ortance. There must be no interest in political irn~licatior~s, and the job was to tell the public what tlhey as Americans must do on the lzome front to wia the war. lir. Griffis' idea was to make a series of short subjects OP things like food production and conserva- tion, as well as sgorts on gasoline conservn.tion. More of these shqrts were t~ he mad-e at later dates. They were made, as has been discussed before i3 t:;lls study, on such su'x)Jects, as rubber conservation, tin conservation, fate and several other eubjects. Always ti* aim was to keep the nation aware of their vital part in the var effort even though they were at home. Tile medium of the f ilrns made it possible for the 74 subjects to :lave the widest pos~ible distribution. The program of the information shorts was set u;> for an average of one short or bulletin every two weeks. The distribution was handled through tile War Activitie~! Conunit- tee b:{ the newsreel companies. There were additional special subjects made by the Army and :;avy on recent campaigns, such aF the "Liberatiorl of Rome," and were released as soon as they were ma4e available b:,r the services, to the Office of War Inf orrnation. For the fiscal year 1945 Congress appropriated $54,428 for film activities for the domestic branch of the Office of War Information. 90 It was urith this money that subjects such as those listed earlier, plus film8 about the need for women recruits in the anmed forces, manpower problems, War Bond ap?eals, pader salvage, the que stio:~s of price-fixing and economic stabilization were em2hasl zed in shorts. In addition, other f ilns touching on the, subject of returning soldiers, and on the work of the United Relief Administration were included in the program. Cersorshi~ or films troops overseas. A cry vras set rrp in 1944 &bout tne control of pictures serlt overseas to the troops. It was inplied that the Office of War 30~:1e - l!:otion Picture iieral-d, !:er YorB City, July 22, 75 Information -had a policy influence on these films. T?ds allegation was vigorously denied by t:he Office of WELT Infor- mation offlclrls, who stated that the policy set down by the War Activities Committee to show no ;,olitical pictures, ha8 not been deviate6 froni i~ the least. It was true that the Office of War 1nforr:lation did control the motion picture en- tertainment of the troops overseae. They viewed all films designed for exgort with the object of Ilelqing the industry jjroduce pictures t-k~t night help t-he war effort. Frequently it was possible to introduce new and helpful subject matter to the screen and make it possible for the troops to be bet- ter informed and entertained.. It was also true that the Of- fice of V!ar Information produced. :.ictures of its okm and dls- trihuted them overseas. f t wa true that thece ;;ictures vere t1 proyagand.a," and vere inte~cled to il~duce n certain state of mind OP t!"re part ~f those that saw the l~icture~. Hot+rever, this in itself was not ol~jectionable. It was in li:~e with the Goverxment policy. This policy included a Congressional ban on the d.is- seminatioi: anong soldiers in the field, of any political propaganda. The ban caused e considerable headache to the Army officials concerned with tlhe distribution of magazines through post exchan+es, but it really created no great dif- ficulty with respect to the motion 2ictures. Tile ban vas a ;;rovislon of t-he Federal soldier-vote laxpi, W-hlcn was an 76 amendment to the :i!atch Act proillbiting tile use of Federal funds or spnsorship to influence the Armed Forces in voting in Federal elections. 31 The ban was aimed at offsetting the tremendous advantage which the Arlnir-iistration held tL~ou[;h its oneration of the Office of War Information and the post I exchanges, ships' stores and other frcilities for providing information and recre;~tion to servicenen, in );ressiry: Presi- dent Fcosevelt's election. The rules were designed to e2f orce ~trict imaartiality in the d-issemination of political information to serviceaen overseas through printed material, films and radio. Tlhese rules were tran smitted to all Army commanders throughout the world. by the ?!Jar Department. The rules vere revised, modi- fied and amended from time to time since their original pub- lication in an effort to meet protests that certain i~n~~ortant na;;azil=les were being denied soldiers hecause of political bias of the content. Wlth respect to motion pictures, the instructions per- taining to the distribution or presentation of material, both inside aid outside t-he !Jnited States, provided that material which was for ectertainment p~rposes must not contnir! polit- ical argument or propaganda. liaterial which was pre selited- as coverage of news or information of public eventfi and 31:iotior. Picture BeralO, *'ew York, July 22, 1944. Tile nature of no tion j~lic t~refi made f t rather ea.sy to - I meet the reqrlirements for the fndnstry. Few feature picture^ were ::oli tlcally slanted since, if for no other reason, ti-ze producers wanted the tqrldest -27~27.572272~ ,w~d_ience fur Z4eYz9 films and ilia not wish to take t're risk of alienating any part of it by taking one side of a controversial subject. The netrs- reels, like the news columns of any good daily pa?er, lmd to cofifine t erns selves to f:i,cts a?d events a1d found Democrats and liepublicans equally photogenic. The heaviest j.r;.lpact of tie political ~rolllbition was on the Office of War Inf oma- tion newsreels. Their content was carefully watched by -ugh officials of the bureau, t.r:?o vrere very cognizant of the fact that they were subject to fines of as much as one thousand dollars and imprisonment if they violated the law. Ilo motion pictures were barred from the service men by t'le Army under the provisions of the law. The magazines did not fare so well, but there ras an attempt to get the law relaxed some 00 tAht t:he~e nagazines could be distributed to the servicemen. There vas one te?porarzr exception an6 that was f iln "~!ilson. @'I"ii s 2fcture declared to be orle with a political slagt ar,d for a matter of a couple of ciays it was held up afi a film F~'IIC!I vl~lilted the Soldier Vote Law. T1d.s actiou? cau~ed great concern and much cop;r vas written about it. However, in a matter of a few days it was all 78 cleared up and the film va6 giver. general diatribtztion. Basic ir.formt?on ijrohiblted from exmrt or inuort. - 32 I From time to time as the need for the pul~licr.ti??. of new directives to cove- tile changing situation arose the Office of Censors-hip in Hssiington, D. C. 1:ubliehed nemornndn which served. as a guide for nnterial :~rohiblted from exk~ort or im- I gort in the form nf motion gictures. ir: June of 1?114 one of tile last of such memoranda wns l~uhlished wit;? some of the f ollowing general and specific material to be found in it. "I1':ie export of films was deerned tn cover all points I outside tile cnctinental United Statei with the exceytiog of Canada, Xawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico a!?d tlie Virgil Islands. I The purpose of pictorial ceneorshi~~ was to Beep infor- I mation concer-ing possible hombizg objectives, techqical data, mllitarg or econ?nic conditions, and adverse propagagda I %armful to tile war effort from leaving tS country. Also f iln censorship w~s designed to prevent eneriiy propaganda and information leading to subversive activities from entering the co ~ultry. There was no hard and fast rule of thumb applying to cel?.sorship. Interpretation and application of the d.iff erent JL Government ilemora?dum, a Office nf Censorshirr, Ckief Postal Censor (washington, D. C. : Government Printing - Off ice, June 'm44). I 79 principles must be governed by the 'knowledge, under standing and judgment of tihose applying them. The final responsibil- ity for war-time export and import censorahip of motion pic- tures and ner~~sreels rested the Filn Censorship Boards of T'eview of the Office of Censorship. Certain types of material also required official written apgroval from t:le War Degart- ment, ::avy Department, or other Government acencies :.laving direct eu-:emrisiol? over the subject involved. Approval by any other agency repesented release only i-nsofar as that a&ency was concerned, and was not birding on the Board of Re- view. The Los Angeles Board of Review, under the Chief Postal Sensor, Byron Price, w~.s responaible for ce)?sorshlp examina- tion of all dramatic and other comnerclal film produced on the West Coast for exlport. The ;:ew Yorlr Board of Review was resgonsible for the examination of all newsreels offered for exl!ort, regardless. of ~mrt of exit, and for a11 incoming .iewsreels, regardless of port of entry. It was responsible also for dramatic pictures, commercial and industrial f ilns and short^" ;jrociuced in the ec%st, or in-jorted tinrough ports of entry in the eastern half of the United States. Foreig:] language titles an4 translations were reviewed by whichever b~a~17d originally examined the picture on which titles were sui~erimposed. Foreign titles and translations for a i2icture produced in Holl.yl.rood would be reviewed by I 80 the Los Angeles Roard. Simiiarly, the York Board re- viewed foreign language title E an3 translations for pictures rod-uced i? the eastern area or imported through portu of entry In the eastern half of t?~ iJnited state^. This latter wac a change and was made in the helief that the Board of Re- view that originally pagsed on the picture wae 11: a much bet- ter poeiticrn to conalder proposed foreign language changea tllan a board without previous kno~~leitge of the gict~~re. These regulations ap~c>lled only when it was necessary to re- view any changes in a film. The photographic shots which required approval by the Army, the ;;avy or any other a9propriate authority includ-ed: 33 a. All aerial pliotogra~hs and fietailed close-ul-, air shots of war ;~roduction plants, flocks, shipyards, ra? lroad terminals, dame, power plants, storage tanks, reservoirs, raaq tozrers, arsenals, munitionfi durn~~s, forts ancl a11 otner military instellat ions, incltrding all air fields a!iB military depots; detailed close-up shots or :xmoramic s5ots of civil 2,s ve?-1. aF mil1tar:r air fields, cities, factories, or ter- rair shoving distingui8hl.n~ 'niri18Ltng~ or landmarks in rela- tion to ench other or to the general landscal~e; any picture of a net-type plzne, tank, gir!? or otller military equipgent. b. Detailed pllotograplis of identifiable beaches and 33~~iii., pp. 1-4. i 81 coastline^ whicn would aid tLhe enemy landing parties or any seacoast of the United States, its territories or posFes- sions. ll;lis did not include conver?tional lsrcenic views of coastline trhich ciib not disclose inf ormati011 of strategic value to tLe enemy. c. Tec:inical data of any kind (oi;her tinan that which disclosed krell-knowr, processes, ineta1latior.s and other in- formation of little importance to the military, naval or eco;lom?c war efforts of the United States) whic'? coirlt! be ~sed or adapted for use in connectio~ with any process, syn- thesis or operation in the production, manufacture, recon- ~truction, servicinq, repair or use of any article for ally 3hase of' warfare. The list was so comprehensive that tech- nical data generally was prohibited except that contained In industrial films approved 'ny the Office of Economic War- fare and a 3oard of Review. d. l.$ovements of land, air or sea forces, a::d merchant slhips, when identification, origin or destination was in- diczted. . - e. Views of Army, ,:avy, or Ilarine Corps activities and detailed views of equipment. f. iiovernent of :lava1 or merclliant ships in the coastal waters of the United States, its possessions, or naval. bases r.~vlich might be of value to the enemy witil regard to attack, sabotage, or anytili~g else. 82 g. Pictures of inte~nnent cm?s or of persons interned. In addition, labor, class or other disturbar~ces sii;ce 1917 wili ch rnight be di atorted into enerny propaganda general- ly were prohibited for exsort. Such nceriee a;iown as an i:;- cident to tie main t-?erne of a picture ~~hich, in the opinion of the 23oard of Review having jurisdiction, were not harmful to the war effort might be used ir. dramatic productio,ls. Scenes of lavleasness or disorder i? which order vras restored arxJ the offenders -itmi shed might be apruved if l av~lersne ss vrzn not the main theme andaas not ty5.e mjo? part ~f the lro- auction. l!t~ile it was realized t.bt "gangster" productions reflected discredit on the American fiystern of gove--nment in tie eyes of foreign audiences, such ecenes T*?ere not p~ohibited altogether. C:le 3oard of Review 'having jurisdiction would give an unofficial opinion o:? such scenes, yrior to comple- tion of tne gicture, but any such 0ginioi-i would not be bin+ ing inasmuch as firm1 rl,ctis! ~roul4 not be tn!cen o:~ the pro- d~~ction until it had been completed. "ndue ern2haain could not be placed on rationing of ee- sentials or other information revealing economic pre;mration by this country for prolongecl vor effort. The derogatory picturization or presentation of na- tionals of the klliell nations or of the neutral countries was considered objectionable. The Allied armed forces vlere not to be T)urlesquefi, 83 held up to ridicule or shown as unwort,hy representatives of their governments as t5e main theme or major part of any dramatic production. Briefer seqtxences of such nature were oh j ectionable in newsreels. The censorship examination of photographic information and com~unications coming into the United States hai! the basic function of preventing enemy propaganda from entering tile country, and also hzlted information which night lead to sabotage or other sul~versive activity. All of t~zis information as to the types of things that were being screened was not all-inclusive but did serve a8 a guide. Tney were modified from time to time. The Of- fice of the Chief Postal Censor always reserved the right to take appropriate action in caseg where any scenes or text would impede the war effort. picture^ dubbed in Japanese and for Euroneans. While --- the regulatlnns a~ to wh?.t might be shov~~ and what night not be ship-:led into or ~ut of thifi nati~n ?.ere a1b:ays being chan:;ed to meet the changing co?ditions, so were the picture prod-ucers king asked to make ch:tnges in their gict~res for the foreign market. In May of 19!~4 the industry was ar3ked again to make more ;~icttrres 5:vailable for t'le foreign market. They were asked to make a series of d-ocumentaries to supple- ment the Office of War Information films, a!?C al::o to 84 recruit production personnel for the lrew York and Londor! staffa of the Office of War Information. At the same time it was announced that the first Hollywood films were being dubbed in Japanese. (Dubbed, a term meaning that the narra- tion was being changed t? Japanese frorr, the origin8.l English.) Tile work was done in iiew York and. the ;,ictures were to be sent to Japan an? to be shorn in the Ja+nese t3eaters one step after the land was taken frqm the Jap.nese. The inil~rs- try was asked to rrtd:e 217n~t tlrelve shcrt srrhjects for foreil,;n consumption. The 9rocedure was to take all the enemy footage ar?d euhetitute the American made footage r.rit!~ the story or les-on that our country wanted to get across to these l>eople. Then after the eysten was esta1)lished it wa& the intent and actually did happen, to turn the theaters back to tile owners. A11 this sort of t:Mng vas done by t.3e Office of War Infor- mation, working as n unit of the Payclzological Warfare Branch of the Army. In Eurove the samc procedure of having dubbed fllms sent in as soon as possible -had been the standard operating procedure. By mid July of I9kLc more than fifty films had been dub'yed Into French and Italian by five r:ajor cornpanlea and the Overseas Film Division of the Office of War Info-"ma- tion arranged wit4 the companies for release of two pict~xres each for their dietribution as soon afi France and t51e other European countries were freed. The~e were followed ul. by 85 many others as the war progressed. Some of the coni2anI.e~ were a ::it slow turning over dubbed films to the Office of War Information, as they said they would prefer to wait llntil the milt tary situation in Europe would permit distribu- tion of t-he pl-ctures t-!wough their own c-hannels. TTowever, the necessity for the problem being handled in the rnanrer that the Government requested was explained and the comgc?.nies fell. into line an3 turned over the d~zb??ed picttrres as re- queste3. The dubbed versions were in =;?ition to the forty pic- tures vrl.th su:?er-imposed titles which all tie f iln cornpaniee had mr5de avxilahle in the latter part of 1942. Warner Bro- thers led in tne dubbing with eighteen ~)Ictures in French and about ten in Italizn. iezetro Goldwyn i:!ayer ,kid five in French tu-~l;d about six in Itall~n; IIniversal ilad flve in Fre?ch; Co- lumbia had ei,rht in French and I talian; Twentieth Century-Fox had one in French a!!d several others in production in July 1344. Paramount, and United Artists, were waiting to see how the situation developed before going ahead with their dubbing. They later dubbed several pictures, but did not catch up with the others who had started earlier. A partial list of the dubbed versiolls included: 34 Warner Brothers : "Princess C? 'Rotzrke, " ''?he Ma-lteee J7 Xotion Picture Herald, ?Tew York, July 1, 86 ~alcon, ' "Strawberry Blonde, "Sergeant ~ork, ' "~i,zCcee Doodle Dandy," ''Air Force," "The Great Lie," "All This cn.3 FTeaven Too, I' "Alway 3 in Xy Yeart, ' "They Erive by :light ," "Virginia qity," "Till We 1:eet Again," "Sea Wolf," "The Sea HatrIc," -- all. in French. "Sergeant York, I' "Sea ~iawlc, 'I and "Yankee II Do~dle Dandy, in Italian. Universal: "It Started vlth Eve, I' "Destry Rides Agai.1, 'I both of trl-ric I vere made avail~13le t~ the Office of Var Inforination; "P:lnntom of tile Osera, I' "Rlack Street ,I1 and "~lesh and Fantasy, 'I all in French. "Shadow of a Doubt ," "Appointment for Love," in Italian. Columbia: "Cover Girl, "Sahara,' "Adam Had Four Sons, " "This T,ling Called ~ove, " I' The Des;)er:~does, 11 11 ;r -err Re- long to IdIe ," "The Lady Is I:'illing, " and 'Illen in Eer Life, II a11 i.n French. :!etro: 'I"' lLze Zie~feld G'rl, " "Shop Around the Corner, " sere among others they dubbed in French. As wac ent tinned Fefore, these were 'oi~t z few of tl~e films that were dubbed and sGlippec3 to the occupied cot~ntrles right after they were occupied. T:lese filmfi vere considered- by the ir~dustry and the G0vern~en.t an goo2 ones to uh?v to the nations t,kt were looking to the United States as the great h~pe of tie future. They were the best gictures avail- able tq give the oppressed nations a feeling of relief and this was the rnaili reason they were chosen to he dubbed in the foreign languages. In conclusion. The ~notlon aictrlre induetry ap a - whole offered to help the war effort of the TJnIted States of America from the first signs of war. This Industry gave its every effort to the task, including the time of all of its high and lov~ paid prsonnel, its equipment, ita stuflios, i..nci even the films thnct were made b:r it. T'wy villin~yy ~nde changes i!~ the prod-ucti~n sc:?edu7e@, cut ol~t loc~tior r70rlc, s )ent much money for sets that in normal times t~oulcl not 'I:.ve to be done; took aclvice from the outside an to wlut pic- tures to nake ant! ra:;lat stories were to l~e told. They let their Et he rrsed as a means of propa~andn, of education, a8 an inspir~~tion and as a morcle builder so tlmt tie war could be quickly 2nd- successfully tern5nated. It was true t%t at tines there vere those in the in-' dustry who were dguhtful as t -: the vrisd-om of su'?mission to the dernan2 s of the Goverr,r:ent. !They feared tll:it much of the freedom, the s_,qntaneity, the money making ywer of the films v~ould be lo~t forever. However, all of these fears were ter;~,)orary eleinents v-hich alway~ arise in the :lorma1 course of a t'~r am3 vere the r-ecessary controls forcet'l upon all ind-ustry by an all out effort t-, attain ixace vrlt'rl the gre:.test sneed and t!?e least arno~rnt of loss to the j~ublic of this nation. 88 The motion pictures did a job t21fit could not have been done by any other rnedium in anything like the s:znrt period of time it wae done by them. Their accomplis-bent will long be remembered by the people of the Unl tea States whose morale was lifted and who were educated to the require- ments and sacrifices of the war as was the whole of the liberated or neutral world. The gictures made ir Hollywood for consumption of the United Sta-tee agd of the free world brought the lesqons intended to be taught, home with force nnil reality that could not be done by any other medium. A11 of this was done by Americans bent on helpirg other Americans and free yeople of the world to maintain or re- attain f reedom. 90 Brief hlstorx the Arm:[ Pictorial Service. T:w Sigr?al Corps Fhotograp,hic Service really began with Idatthew Brady during the Civil War when he obtained permission from President Lincoln to photog~aj$~ ecenes at the front. By 1865 LIr. Rrady and his assistants had male over seven thou- sand phrltographs of the %far; thzt vras really the first live action shots ever made of any war in which the TJnited States wa.s involveci. In the year 1381 the first millta-ry ~~hotographer took 12ictures for the Army when General Adolphus Greely, who was Chief Signal Officer at the tirne, produced a series of wet- ?late photographs rnade during his Arctic exlxdition. When Generzl Greely returned to Wasnington, -he set up a military photographic laboratory at; what is now Fort Qer, Virginia. During the struggles ir Cgba and the PIiilippines at tile time of t!le Spanish-American War a number of Signal com- panies were issued ;~hotographic equipment with t!ze assignment of photographing the history of the engagements. Tne success of this A,ilotographic effort stimulated the Cnlef Signal Of- ficer, in 1903, to equip several units for field ~iiotograp'hy with tine express mission of recording hiotorical events. There seems t~ 5e no specific date at which the first motion picture camera was used In the Army, hut ir. 1909 it is recorded that the Signal Corps notion picture camera men recorded the momentous, official, test-flighte of the Wright Brothers in their new flying machine. From that time on the notion plcture canera becnrne a recognized part of the equipment of the Signal Corps of the United States Army. Both still nr?d motion picture canermen plnyeci a great part in the war. 1 3 ~n the years that followed, until al,otlt 19318 the photograp!zic branch of the Army was olle of the functions tht felt the Imife eQe along wit:1 the 6e:;eral tlilitery cuts of the i)eriod. Ir? the :fez?- 1931 a pogram was begun which of- fe-;ed one year instruction in iioll,ywood at t:~ studio8 which trained Signal Corps Officers in the professional motion pic- ture craft and acquainted them with the radical new develoy- ments in sound recording and reproduction which were to be n" used in future Signal Corps films. i:le next year savT the first sound motion pictures beizg yroduced hy the Army, and in ;-t.bout five :lea??s thc requests for Trainine Filmfi heccme PO numerous that it was necessary to set u;7 new 1.aboratoriee to procesc the needs. 2 Problems & the start - of IhJorld hrar 11. While the nun- 5er of notion pictures na-de by the Army prior to the start of World War I1 been gettir~g greater and greater all the 2 Captc.in Frank P. Liheman, "A I'istor~r nf Arrrly rhotog- rcPhy,l1 Rusines Screen, VII (December, 19451, 72. 92 time, the total number was not very high. This factor was attributed to several causes. In the first place tine irn- nortance of the work -had not been impressed on the General Staff to the extent that they were willing to recommend -Ugh appropriat i~ns necessary to r:dce any great number of ~~icture s* Fu.rthernore the size of the Army was small ancl tile personnel was quite stable and they coulci be trczi%?ed by the nen that were in the ~rnit~ a.ld kaew a11 ai~out the needs of the newer men. Trai nlng aids were , to the Army, !lot too important. I;I 'the fall of 1939 there were less than two hundred thousand men in the Army. There was little new equipment being made for tire services and that w:lich was new was easily taught to men who were life-long soldiers interested in arid familiar with the type of equipment. Then in the fall of 1940 and t 3.e sp-ini:. of 19!i,l there was :a definite and sud6en exi2ansion of the services. This expansion contir.ued up until about the month of liay, 1945, wizn it is eetimated that the ~eak of over twelve million men and women was reached. It was with this expansior: that the lack of adequate motion gicture trzining aids was really felt. The few films that were available and current enough to be of value were spread so thinly across the na.tion in the new trainin? camps that they really were of little value. These f ilms were strictly of the "nuts and bolts'' tyye. They had no story; they were not at all pictorial, and tney were not 93 the type of film that the new Army man needed anc? wCm.ter3_ in order to learn the lessons of warfare in the shortest amount of time. The result was that in the early days of training for World War I1 the instruction wac given to new recruits by men who !lad no teaching experience, were not particularly in- terested in teaching, moreover were un&p;)y about the idea of teaching a lot of fresh civilians some of whom had had a lot of education and had made a succese in busixess only to be drafted into the Army. The result was that most of the rnen chosen as instructors at the first of the war did not ~iorlr out at all well. Tlzere was no stand md method of teaching a certain operation, and this was very necessary if the neY1 eoldiers were to he ready to fight the e!?erny i:: a s3ort length of time. There was no question ir, t3.e early gears nf prepma- tion for the war thg-t the Army :>la.n for the production and txse of visual aids in trrining was sound, but it was the ex- ecution of the ;>Ian th;, WFLS cigantic. The General Staff believed that a, centralized War Deprtrnent film unit could insure uniform and cofisistent military doctrine. Also that it would eliminate duplication of equipment, materials and labor; that it would facilitate production of restricted and confidential, as well as secret material; that it would utilize to the greatest degree available distribution, 94 storage and library facilities; and finally, t:-at War Depart- ment producti~n lrrorrld save in cost of productio:~. There were three problems that arose out of the idea that the Amy 3roEuce its own films. First the problem of space, second the problem of ~jersonnel to carry out the ?PO- duction, and thirdly, the problem of vrnere to get the film equipmemt. Tile space problem was solved by buying the East- ern Service Studios, Long Islmc! City, :!ear York. T:le ],rob- lem of perc.or.rle1 was solved by the fact that tLwre were many writers, cameramen, directors, ,woject officers, soundmen, a26 editors who were Reserve Corps men, or who obteined di- rect commissions from civilian life. Many otlwrs enlisted and vere pickeg outof recruitment and receptiolz centers. Others were trained for the joh. Tke t::ird prohlern, t'xt of the ne~essa.-~: fil-m foqtnge, 2nd t'le equipnert wer solved rather easily, si.?ce the War Department specifications did nqt differ greatly from those qf the civilian industry. Some iterns were !%rd to obtain, 73ut vrke.7 tllat corldition arose it was the same with the civil- ian i.~Austr;r ar.d st~bstitutions were rnexle. It must be stated here tl13.t the Fesearch Council 9f the Academy of :dotion Picture Arts ancl Scj.encee did all in its >over tc~ assist the Var Dega-trnent a~d definitely nlade a substantial coltribu- tion to t:ie productl_or! success of the Army film program. 95 The pilot oaraphic mission a Army Pictorial Service. - The Arny Pictorial Service had n 6efi:lite mission in tie Army and hat mission is carried out 11: tiwee ways. Pictures must be iroduced or 13rocured. There must be a ;)urgose for L bne 1 l~ictures 1:: order trj J:rstify the ixrsonnel and money in- volved. The last function of the mission is to :lave an audience for the pictures after they have been obtained. Prohc?.hly tire best way to sliow t le missior; is to break it down i- 2, sort of' clmrt form as follows: 3 Produces and procures For the purpose of: Customers films: TRAI1II:IG FILT,IS (Training To train troops in All Arrkly films; Film Rul1.etins; milita-ry doctrine; Troops 3ritich, Commercial, an6 Use and care of ;Ii,sc. Aciaptatlons; Fri- Weapons; tactics; vately SL70nsored- Train- :Iilitary Law; etc. ing Fil!-ns; ~ilmstrl~s). TRAI':IeG FIL:;S (~oreiqn To train foreign Foreign lnnguaqe vcrsiq2s). troops ir, Bzerican Troops serv- i.lilitary doctrine. ing wit 'z American forces, un- der Americn- c o 1nrnai1 cl . STAF? F1LI.I REPORTS (Pro- To make available ( SECXT ducecl weekly from coxhat combat photography Limited to ~'ootage during war). for ailitary plan- the C:iief of ning and irlf orna- Staff, Corn- tion purposes. manding Generals. J Colonel Fi. C. Barrett, "The Signal Ccrps Photogra:phic II Center, Ytlsiness Screen, VII (~ecember, l?kj), 72. 96 Produces and. procures For tile purpose of: Customers films: CO14E3AT DIlLLETI?<S ( Pro- To inform troops of All troops. d~rced weekly from cqrnbat war progress in all f on tnge during war). theaters. To orient tro7ps to corr.l~at con- ditions. To document cam- TiEC:C!ICkL FIL", AT~ID PXOJECT TEC FILM BULLETI7JS. 3ULLETI :S To allotr critical X\; I CAL analysis of weapons and material, com- bat tactics. C&.;PAIG;: REPORTS k::D 5s- To record short pic- Tr!SICAL FILfiS torial histories of military opera- tions. 031 GiTATI Oli FI L'I.IS To define ?d-mm we f igizt nnd wihy; to acquaint trooi~s :+ri th our allies. G.I. bf9VIE IbZEKLY To impove troop morde; to Increase understanding of the war. To improve troop morale; to increase understandf?g ~f the the tsrnr. 1::DTJSTRIAL SERVI SE FILIIS To increase morale among war workers; to increase war pro- duction. EITJCRTIOiIAL FILMS To re-orient troops prior to discharge. Post-war 31 sto rical stur'ly by mili t nry arld public agencies. All Arms anct Services. All troops and the 2ub- lic . All. TJnited S tnte 8 Armed- forces. All rJ~i te& States Armed forces. Troops of the lJnited States and Allies. War plant workers ( Thm ugh Bureau of Public Re- lations). All troops. 97 Produces and procures For the purpose of : Customere films: REC 0:'DITI Op?IITG AlTD To >rovide mental, Convalescent RECHEATIOITAL FILMS physical, and voca- troops. tionel rehabill tation. S1ECIAL IjRODTJCTIOi-S AXD Vnr ious All Arms and SlECIAL PROJECTS Servi ces. Army Pictorial Service Procures the following films. (a) Entertainment films To entertain troops All troop of 2nd to instruct. the T!nl.ted States rlld Allied nations. (b) Tecb~lical training To entertain troops (Same as films and to instruct. above. ) iXKilED PICTORIAL SmVI ('E To document the war, Cliief of Staff; P3ODIJCES STILL FHOTOG2APHS provide strategic Commanding and tactical informa- Generals of tion; publicize and Theatere of inf om; provide operations, evidence for identi- War Department fication and legal staff agencies, purpo ses; and to all -hnt3 and train troops. Services; Bureau of Pub- lic Relati~ne, Government agencies, Conmercial, Priva-te . PROCESSES ALL V-?:!AIL: To conserve shipping All troops A:'D OFFICIAL PIIOT0f:N L space and. speed corn- and the munication public. TRAIIJS PERSOI:?JEL To 2rovid-e tech- Signal Corps nicians for dl rho to graphi c photographic opera- organiza- tions. tion; Other Arrny units an% Unlted I!ations per- sonpel. I Produces and procures For the purpose of: Customers films : 1.TkINTXliS Oi;E OF T3.E To rnaint ain the Authorized LAHGEST FILM LIBRAHIES Army1 s pictorial a;yenci es. If? TIYE WORLD (motion reco rds. and still). OPERATES TiU LA3GEST To facilitate utili- All troops. FI L1.1 DI STRIBIJTI 0:): zation of dl films 0RGA;jIZATIO;: IK THE ~roduced, so that WORLD. troops are: trained in military doctrine; oriented to the war; informed of progress; entertained. CONDUCTS EXTE;:SIVE To improve photo- A11 Arnis and RESEARCH IN PHOTOGRAPYY. graphic and process- Services of ing techniques; to the Army. improve photographic equipment. SELECTS AI:D APPROVES To ascrlre avzilabil- All Arms and PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT itp of the proper Services ( ex- A:;D SIJPPLIES TO BE equipment to Signal cept Air PROCURED. Corps rho tographic Force and 11111 t P and ilrr2.n~ he s ; Army i'ln.3 to provide ran fi3 m service). stock of necessary anowlt and type for use by Army. Production program -- Signal Corps Photographic m- ter. The production program at the Signal Corps Photograph- - ic Center. 'i':-.~e production program at the Signal Corps Pirotographic Center was the place where the censorship and security regulations were imposed. It was here determined what was to be classified. and to whom the films would be shown. In addition to this it was at the Photographic Cen- ter where the footage to be released had been studied and 99 cleared for wimtever classification it mignt receive. This latter :had to do with the clearance given to the showings of the films. Wnen a film was requested by one of the Arms or Services qf the Army the classification of title film was usually stated. However, t-here were alwa,ys several things that came up between the time a picture was requested and tie time necessary to clear the idea, writing of the script, getting the picture approved by the budget camnittee, and getting it in production. Tflen by the time tA%-t the final print was made and the fllm was ready for distribution, more time i%c? elapsed. At any one of these steps the clas- sif ication of the film might be c:mnged due to circumstances which arose with the passage of time. The variety of subjects i;roduced a-t the Center was almost; unbelievable as they ran fro:n body to soul, from cook- ing to maintaining troop morale, from booklreeping to gunnery. The $rod-uction of a year might run from a film strip on clean- ing a vegetable steamer to a Chaplain Corps film on pastoral colrnseling. There had never been a problem of finding sub- jects to film. The kroblem llari always been one of election from t?le mu]-titude nf requests made fqr motion pictures each year. During the w;7r gearfi each fllm requested was given a ~riority and then the 3icture was ma& according to h91~ hlgh the -,rlorit;y was qn the list, as soon as there was space available for the filming of the picture and the availability 100 of a crew. Tne subjects were arranged in priority order within classes and each subject was accompanied by a description of it3 scope and technical nature. If tLhe subject was a general one and embraced several specific subjects, these were described in d.etai1. All Arfmlnistratlve and technical lists trllich contained the requirements for the training film program were submitted through the Army Field Forces Headquarters for coilsideration from the sta-ndpolnt of the over-all Army training needs and the s-pecific needs of the Arnrjr during the days of war. Each su3 ject was then recommended for approval or disapproval, and if it was disapproved then the reason for this action was stated. After the request9 for film had cleared the Army Field Forces the requests were forwarded to the Director of Logis- tics, or tLhe Commanding General, Army Service Forces as it was drlring the most of the war. After further careful study of the list with the interest of tile Army as a whole in nincf, the Adjutant General notified the Slgn8.1 Corps Photographic Center, through the Army Pictorial Service Di- vision, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, that certain subjects had been tentatively approved for production. As has already been mentioned, these lists generdlly had a priority indicated for each subject, with the subjects 101 having the greatest application listed to receive the itligh- est ;?riority. The priority li8ts were established by the Director of flilitary Training, Amy Service Forces, General Staff, and Army Grour.2 Forces. So all tbe Signal Corps had to c?o was tq fit the productior?s into their schedule. The material in the preceding paragraph def initely shows that the production of motion pictures by the Photo- grr.;nhic Center ax.: not a hit or miss cff'air. It was a well- considered, well-planned decision based on tne training needs of the various ~gencies of tile Amy, weighed and evaluated in reference to the needs of the e~tlre Army no matter where they night have been. Once a picture request was on the schedule, the film projects fell nore or les~ 2aturally into a certain clas- sif ication dictated by t ne purllose 5eLMnd the film. Train- i2g films were perhaps the largest siiigle group, ar,? they were the instructiormal film6 t-kt were in great dema~d and for the nqst part needed to be mde quic'dy and gotten out to the field. The film had to show swiftly and efficiently why u certain job hzd to be done, wilat the problemfr might be tht had to be slrmounted, and how the job was to be perfo:v.ed. Besides the training film tnere were several other type8 of pictures _nrod~iced by the Center and each had a de- fin1 te mission to perform, t~%-t is when j~rojected before a certain audience the content of the film was designed to 102 carry over an idea to the viewer which, it was hoped., muld stay with him. Controls a:,r~lied t., Amy motion -~lctures. While ra- ther complete information wa? available on censorship and contr~l ~f motion pictures for civilian consumption during World War 11, as yet it is im-oossible to obtain a com,)lete picture of the st1.rne yyocesses as aimlied to films for mili- tary gersonnel. This is due to lac,:< of sufficient research material availaSle in California for such a study. This L~roblem should be investigated ir the future if there is to be complete understanding of the entire prob- lem. This investigation will of necessit:r have to be made in Washington, D. C. and in Lon? Island City, Eret: Yo~llc. The Army hag alweys been and undoubtedly will ?:e slow and care- ful in its release of miterial pertaining to security and censors-hip. The result is that muck of the inforrAmt ion in tilis sectiqn is taken from pe~sonal exyerience of the writer as !le saw the procedure in actual operation durll?g ti?e 2nst war RP well ap f rorn !nowledge of the operations of the War Department rl uring the past war. The outbreak ~f the war found the Army with a. very insufi'icient supply of f ilms to train the troops that were pouring into its ranks. This fact has been mentioned before in tile study. The problem exinted and the o~ly solrltlon to it was to produce motion pictures to meet the needs as fzst as it could be done. TlMs task was attacked with all the energy available i:: the War Department. Every orgarization ti=t lad any kind of problem tizut might be taught or the teaciiing of which night he aided by the use of motion pic- * ture~ began to swamp the Army Pictorial Service with re- quests. The result was the screening of requests and the establishment of priority listfi already discussed in this study. The first security mensures weye instigated at t,his phase by the Army. The subject desired had to :have some sort of clafisffication put on It and these classifications during the war included Restricted, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. There were other higher classifications with local code names put on a certain few pictures that were produced., but these were very few 3nd due to their nature canmt be discussed in this study. As ,has been stated in an earlier part of this etudy some of the classifications put on the scripts as of the date of request were often changed by the time the picture was fifiished due to t3e t?ne 125 ir the ,;reduction of the film. For example, a film or. the operation of a iece of equip- ment, at the time of request for the picture, might be clas- sified Secret, but by the time the film had been completed ti% equipment had become known to the pabllc, or to the Army as a whole md so the classification as Secret on the film 104 would limit the number of troop8 that might need to see the film. The result vra8 that a revised classificntion had to be put on it prior to release. Then the next place where classified film requests ma2e a difference was in the production of the films. Cer- tain personnel assigned to get the film produced might not have a security clearance high enough to be able to work on the entire film and lrnortr all about it. This problem of- ten came up, and t3.e re~ult was that one soldier, r>r civilian working on the ;?icture at the Signal Corps Photograijhic Cen- ter xight 5e a3le to work on only part of a picture. This means of control kept tht~t pereon from Yaowing the whole story of the film and thus from knowing the final cut version of the film. By doing this the Army was a\le to nalre pic- ture~ with the personnel available and still not slow doh1 the operation of the Photographic Center by having to obtain clearances on the --uestio:~able personnel. An alternative used in some caees was to take other people off one job and put them on the classifle? film because of pereonnel clear- ances. The problem of the f i~al ap-groval of film clearances ttl'iich were to be checked and assigned to the picture vihen it was completed and ready for turning over to the Distribu- tion Branch of the Signal Corps Photographic Center was ac- complished.. It was done ofily after the film and its 105 implications were studied, and the overall needs of the Array and of the war effort as a w-hole were v:.eighed. Problems v~hlch arose frorn the conb:~t f oota~e. Vhen c~mhzt footqe arrived ir tie Signal Corps Photographic Cen- ter, or irz Washington, D.C. from overseas theaters of o2era- tion tlGLere was a great security problem as to what sjnnuld be offered to the newsreel cornp,?nies, brh~t was t3 be shor:n to the troops, ar,d tlnat WZE vital for showing to t:le General Staff of the War Department. Even the film taken by the civilian newsreel -,hotographers to be cen~orea. The ,~hoto,r;raj$hers had learned exactly how the film shot was to he captioned to make sure t:mt it all could be properly identifielci, wihat to fihoot a~d w1ha.t not to siiootj ti& plans for getti26 the footxe back t-) the Signzl Corps Photographic Laboratory haci been caze. It was determined that t;le lal-~oratory cou!-ci handle as much as fifty t:?ousand feet a v-eek. Trlis vas ample for the needs, it vap found, as the limit could even be s'cretcM- by run?ing the laboratory twenty-four houra a day. The next poblern vas that of getting the film hack from the beaclxheads and frorn the other bnttlefieldls as the war progr~ssed. At first it was decided tkt there would be focal points on the beaches ar.d that the film would be sent from the caneraman to these centers wi--c:i were marked by I 106 special flags and tlie commanding officers of tine message center would lmve a special arm ban% Then the negative was placed in press sacks marked "URGEIIT" and ferried across to dngland on fast boats. Special courier officers were $laced on tge docks and Jetties at the British ports to take off the sacks and rush them to the office of British Winistry of Information in London. Each of the agencies, TJnited States Army, British Forces, tzr,? French and Canad-ian vere called to come and get tiieir negatives as quickly as they arrived. As the war grogressed thle method of delivering the film cbn~ed a bit in tha: the focal point9 or message cen- ters were set up at landing strips right behind the Allied lines, and special planes picked up the exposed film and flew it directly to the closest landing field to London. There I the film was picked u;3 by rnessengers and hurried by car or motorcycle to t'le laboratory. During the first days of the invasion the laboratory worked around tne clock. The film was immediately developed and after it was processed it went immediately to the pro- jection rooms. The~e rooms and the theater in connection were closely guareed by I~Iilitary Police and designated as SHAEF Theaters. It was in these theaters that the film was first viewed and then only before a group of officers from the United States, British, Canadian and. French Armies. 107 T!-rese few officers had the -%ghest yoseihle clearance and that was necessary due to the fact that they sar~~ a great deal of footage which could not be sAbLoh.n to any excei~t the Supreme Allied Expeditiona~y Forces Commanding General and his immediate staff. Of course this footage that was so l1Aghlg secret was a very small part of the footage, Sut still the first censorship was :lecesFary. The ce3sors used a filr! punch system to ind-icate the censored portions of the film without the d-elay of actually cutting the negative. Thus every frame that was shot came to Washington where the un- censored portions vere released as the situation demanded. Censorshi3 of newsreel war material was not as severe as might be imagined judging by the lengths that the Services went to in taking adequate security precautions agaii?st anything gettir~t: released x-r'nic!~ should- not be showr in i.>ublic. The ?Jar 3epartment made t'lis clear in a report vhici? revealed that onl:r 3 per cent of the combat footage filmed by newsreels from Pearl Harbor nntil the end of tine war :had been vit_hheld for reasons of security. The bulk of tne Impounded ~naterial. was later released as soon as military operations pe-mitted, so that actually mly 1 per cent of the total newsreel footage was withheld. The cooperation extended by tlie Army to newsreel cor- respond-ents was as great as any extended to the Army 108 photograpl~ers themselves. Cameramen in combat areas were provided free transportation, their exposed film was shipped to England and then back to Waslzington by air, anci was giver; clearance over all other footage. About thirty-six hours was the estimated time lapse between the arrival of the film in tl~e United States and its release to the ne~csreel companies. ::oreover the cnrcera urlits of the Army Signal Corps and. the Army Air Forces released to the newsreels hun- dreds of different subjects which totaled well over three hundred thousand feet of film. All of this should give n good idea of tL% cooperation whlch the Army extended the commercial newsreel men and how quickly the censorslLip pro- cedure, involved as f t was, waa carried out. The theater of operations In ~sihich this happened was the European thee.ter. Xowever, just because the mention is of t-!mt theater of war it did not mean that the cooperation was only extenfied to the commercial newfireel men in that area. The newsreels were given all the assistance possible; their film was returned to the States, processed, and. released to the public with equal speeB from all the fighting fronts. Army teclmlcal ad-visors assi~r.ed to I30ll~wood. One of the key steps w~hich showed close cooperation between the civilian induetry in Hollywood and the Army was the initia- tion of the policy for the assignment of Service pereonnel 109 to any studio which was going to use military uniforms or a military background In pictures. By the use of Army uniforms is meant where Army personnel was represented hy actors. The feeling of the Army on the matter was that there should be no misuse of the Army uniform, either by the way it was worn, the actions of persons in uniform or anything about the Army which was out of line. The American soldier wae to be represented as doing the proper thing at all times and wearing the uniform cor- rectly. This was a morale factor which was important clue to the fact that so many of the audi ence seeing a picture would have relatives and loved oqes in the services. In adciltion, the Arrny representatives assigned to the studios had a num- ber of other jobs besides looking out for the uniforms and actions of actors representing Army personnel. They made sure the tactics were correct, and that the equipment was properly used. The desire to have personnel from the Amy assigned to the studios making war pictures was not a one- si?ed deal. Both the industry and the Army wanted it, and tlie result was that the relatiionsLbip between the two was of the best throughout the war. Conclusion. The security regulations and censorship imposed on the Arrny I-~roauced motion i7ictures during the war were more of ar! internal item t,blar, one of the outside 110 elements tellirg the Army what they could do an4 what they should not do- This was a natural action due to the fact tnat the Army was supr~osed to know how to fight a wnr and in doing so it was necessary to be exceedingly careful of every- tMng that was spoken, published, or put on f ilm for publio exhibition. The Army found that it had to put security regu- lations in force within itself in order to guard its new equipment and the lives of its soldiers, as well as wln the Wm quickly. As tihe Army grew in size the need for more and more pictures to aid in the training of the new soldiers was found necessary and tlzis meant t*ht there -had to be lots of motion pictures made on many, many different types of subjects. In order to make these pictures it was necessary that many people help in the increased production. This meant that the regulations pertaining to the production of motion pictures ,had to undergo extensive chm-gee as to se- ourity investigations rnad.e on the people employed in the production of the films. There has been no mention of tihe most obvious of the censorship films and security films tlmt were made by the Services during the war. This oversight has not been in- tended to inclicate tlwt these films, or films of this sort were not made by the Army. There were several films made on th" 8 subject pertaining to censorship of the mails, cen- sorship of sipeech, and the tdkfng abmt the departure time 111 of troop s!Yt.ps, as well as many other subjects. Yo~rever, the reason for leaving these pictures, or this subject, out of the study is that the irnplicatlone of this type of se- curity regulationa, wlrlile they did arise during the war, were clear and there wae no question ahout them. The aim of the writer was rather to bring out the implications of the mean- ing of censorship and security regulations as they applied to the civilian industry and to the Army production of no- tion ~ictures. After this discussion of the Army production of mo- tion pictures during the past war it should be quite clear t-mt a whole new aspect of film making was begun about the first of the year l9b2 and t:lis new system has been imj~roved. upon until the present. If the war not cone a?? forced the groduction of Army films to tne high peak that they at- tained it is doubted that there would be nearly as great a development In the use of training and educational films as there is today. CHAPTER VI The motion ~icture was recognized as a powerful force in World War I1 and the tJnited States Government made the best of tktis tool to speed the .(;ray to a successf~~l CCIRC~U- sion. The civilian motion 2icture industry in Yollywood, California had. known for a long time that it was a powerful agency of influence in the world an8 especial-ly in the United- States. The war really made the awere of the imnort- ance of that profession. There were times when the Induetry\ felt that the regulations of tie Government were a little more thari they a.~ free America? citizens, in a free Govern- ment, liked, but they could ?o notsnq &out it except com- plain a little and tlien redouble their efforts toward winning the war. If a fiqal is ever made in years to come, it rill und.otzhtedly slmw that the motion picture industry of this nation did as much to win the war as was done by a-y industry in the 1J;:ited States. !!ollywood started at the very beginqing of hostilities to do all that it could to help win the war. It had been accused of inciting the American people to war by the 113 pictures that it produced and distributed prior to Pearl darbor which told of the horrors of the Idazi regime. There were other pictures also that brought to the attention of the American people the awful things that were happening all over the world in the Sazi and Japanese controlled areas. Bowever, it was soon realized that those who were criticizing the Hollywood movie industry were doing it an injustice* The 13icture inclustry offered its servicee to the Government. It offered its actors and technicians to the Government, but was told that the best glace for those skilled. men and t.:omer? was right on the job in Hollywood un- t 11 called specifically by the Government, The security rules laid down by the Government, the Army, and the I.ievy all cost the studios money, but tlmt was small in compariFon to what it might cost if the United States lost the war, ai~d wlth this thought in mind the atuflios did an excellent job of carrying out the wishes of the Gov- ernment. They were guided as to the stories they could pro- duce; they were told what they could put into a picture, and what they were not allowed to put into a picture. They- were told what hours they could shoot and under what co~di- tions the gictures could be filmed. They were told how many pictures they should dub in the different foreign languages, and how many they should put in foreign titles. They were told what stories they could not shoot if they wanted to get 114 a foreign market for their pictures. They were told to make more pictures to build up the morale of the American p~iblic, and they were to13 to make pictures to instruct and educate those same American people. All of tlhese regulations were laid down by the differ- ent Government %yencies;in normal time8 the artistic tem- perament of the people in the motion picture industry 1oul8 reject such regulation. Yoasever, durl?.g; the war the pro- tests, vhile very few in comparison to the amount of regula- tions and rules laid dot,m, were very mild and did not amount to anything v~hich would in any way hinder the work toward t,b goal of total victory for the Allied nations. In t'm long run all the people of the world were the recipients of the wonderful wo~k done by the civilian motion picture industry In the !-Jollywood area, and- they should all be deeply grateful to the splendid. cooperation given the United States Government, in spite of hardships, to win the war. T_% s job ~f winning the war was not done done by the film industry, For was it done entirely by the fighting men of the Unite8 States and the rest of t-he Allies. The job was done wit5 tlze aid- cooperation of all those that - Itchec? in and Fir? their part, be it on the field of battle, or in the war plants, or in the fieliifi of our nation, or In the motion picture industry. The latter did a great share in keeping t'k morale of those on the home front at a high level so tikt they continued to nake the production reach 115 peaks never before known. It was thus that the motion pic- ture industry in spite of or because of -- which is not ' known -- the security regulations and censors-clip still ren- dered a aost valuable service to the country that it had ever been able to do while still maintaining its integrity as an individual induetry able to serve the nation and still entertain it in the same way as they nad always done. The nilitarv summarx. The -2roblem of getting the - message of milit=ary technique t-bough to the millions of troops tdd.ch were trained between fall of 1940 and the end of t5-e vrar in September, 3.919 wac a tremendous ta~k and took the combined resources of all avc~.ilahle rnindfi to get the mis- sion accompli~hed in time to be ~f help to win the war. The task had been of the first inport:ince In World ??ar I, ~"nd 5g the time World Y2r 11 came along It -%d Increased to suer1 ~~roporzlons tea L, It definitely constituted a real f ac- tor in military operations, and shortened the time required for converting a civilian into a skilled soldier capable of taking care of izimself in the face of the enemy. The Army Pictorial Service Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer had the task of provi9ing all the military photographic services necessary to tk Army in modern warfare, with the exception of the aerial photogra-phy , which was handled by the Air Forces. There were pictures produced for the Army by the civilian motion picture in- dustry, but these were under the guidance of the Army and so it was true that the Pictorial Services of the Army saw that the Army as a whole was furnished with all the motion ;,ictures necessary as soon as it was humanly possihle to get the pic- tures into the :hands of t!?e Film Libraries which served as the distribution system for the Amy films. The pictures were i.)roduced for many purposes as is indicated by the following which were discussed in more de- tail in the body of the stt~~y. There were motion pictures produced for historical record: the combat films , the views of maneuvers, the photographic preservation of the parades, ceremonies, and many other important occasions; for infor- mation: these were picture records to assist in planning strategy, to lay the basis for decisions as to where and how military operations should be conducted, and to aid in anticipating enemy actions; for training: these were de- signed for aiding in the classroom teaching of many import- ant subjects such as the operation of new equipment, the execution of different types of operations, the ability to protect oneself in the face of the enemy, and a host of other eub jects. There were films made for identificatllon, such as those used to air7 in the safeguarding of military information and establishments, of keeping undesirables out of important and busy war installations, either military or 117 or civilian, and to safeguard correspondence. These and many other types of notion pictures pro- duced by the Army and for the Army during the war were the products of much closer su~ervision and censorship. Then the next step in the secrlritg regulations enforced at the time was to make sure that the films were shown only to the authorized personnel. This was importrlnt inasmuch as some of the filmfi told stories that needed to be guarded and kept from the public as they contained nany of the secrets of war which it was hoped v~ould make a speedy conclusion to the struggle a reality. The reason that these subjects were made the material for motion piotures was that the items, the operation, or wAbtever it was, needed to be shown to groups of soldiers in order that there be the best under- st:-.riding possible about the subject. These things were ne- cessary to the Army, but the showing of the films -had to be guarded to allow only the f et~ that were interested in the item to see the pioture. All the branches of the Army were involved in some way with the notion pictures produced during the war, by or for the Army. Everybody in the Services had tq see certain pictures; they had to be aware of the cla~siflcatlon of the aictures which they saw; the C.ief of Staff wanted films produced-, and all of the Arms and Services of the Army re- quested motion pictures which were used as educational, 118 training and informational f ilms. All of these f ilms were subject to the restrictions as far as the security rules of the day were enforced-. It meant that everything that was made into a motion picture was of necessity guarded and protected by the rules of censorship and security regula- tions. However, In spite of all this the job done by the motion yictures in the Army was something which -had never before been attempted, but which bras a terrific success in training, ,education, information and as a historical medium. 1 The civilian motion picture industry In Southern California, and the Army production of motion pictures dur- ing World War I1 set u;, a program with the aid of tlze United States Government, v!li C!I was an overwhelming success from the point of view of the ac!&evement of the objectives laid out for it. One cannot tell for sure if the performance of the functions wa8 done with the mavirnum possible efficiency. Xowever, it is true that the miesion was accomplished. There were some faults in the system of cooperation which might be avoided in any future wars. At the beginning of the last war the industry 1 For educational implications see Charles F. Hoben, I4ovies that Teach (~Jew York: Dryden Press, 1946), 189 pp. ; also J. R. IiIiles and C. R. Spain, Audio-Visual Aids & the Armed Services (Washington, D.C. : American Council of Edu- cation= 96 pp. 119 personnel went to Was-hington and asked the Government wlmt they could do to help in the war effort. The Government gave then a stnncl-off answer at the time and. then as tlme went on the program of what was to be done, and how it was to be done, what was not to be done, and a11 the other rami- fications of the program a-eviced. All of thi s corlld be made much easier if now, while the experiences are still rather fresh in the rninds of bth the Government and the civilian motion pictury industry, a mobilization plan is es- tablished in detail to organize the whole industry and the Government, as well as the Army motion picture production set up as to specific duties, responsibilities, and assign- ments in the event of any future war. If there were a blueprint plan made by the Governme~t as to that bureau is going to take over the job of control- ling the notion picture production of the civiliar! industry as far as the security and censorship regulations are con- cerned, the propaganda production, the information and edu- cational program, and what to do about the foreign markets, as well as the morale elements in time of war, the motion picture industry cotzld get off t s a fast start and with as little lost motion as possible. Thus one agency would be at the head of mqtlon picture production for the Government. A program such as the one outlined above, which would be formulated well in advance of any cofllict In which this 120 nation might become involved would be the best neans of eliminating the fears that arise when a civilian i~ldustry is talcen over by the Government to help in the speedy con- clusion of ar,y war. !!OW is the time to set up the progri1?n. An industry ~f artists nates to be controlled by any outside element, as they fear that their artistic endeavors will be lost to the demands of outsidem, and thus the art that goes into the I;rofeszior: will be lost. If the plan of vrbat; is to happen in time of emergency is made clear and agreed upon prior to any trouble, plans made to dictate the action be- fore tLk time for such action comes, then t here would be no fears, ad the industry would be able to bend its full force to getting the assigned mission completed. The suggeetiona as to improved production as far as the Army is concerned would be that the mobilization 2lan of the Army include not only what the Signal Corps Photographic Center would do, and how they vrould make the pictures, 5ut also to get the entire Army lined u2 as to how pictures should he requested, who would have to clear them in order that the production be speeded up to the fastest rate ps- sible. The requests for pictures which %!ere needed would be made and the general idea or plan as to what was needed would be in mind and it would be easy to get the picture cleared for production, a classification put on it, and the production schedule set up, and the picture produced and 121 placed in the hands of the distribution agency. This would permit pictures to be made rapidly and distributed to t-he troops which needed the picture. There would be tine saving of time k,r:d.ch in the past, was lost by the many times that picture requests had to be checked as to the advisability of producing a particular picture and t3e other check points requests had to clear throq!l before the ;;icture was prlt on t!2e production schedule. If the two suggestions relative to the civilian mo- tion picture ind-ustry and the Army production of notion pic- tures were carried out then there would. be just one further step tihat should be made to complete the cycle and make the production of pictures in time of war one of the smoothest working of all the mediums helping this country on to vic- torjr. The third sugc;estion would be that there be a meeting of the minds of the bureau in Washington representing the Government ideas, the civilian industry and the Army at regular intervals to iron out any suggestionc: which might creep up from time to time as the conditions change in re- gard to the prod-uction of ;~ictures. This meeting woula also nl1ot.r everybody concerned to find out t?~ latest i2eas and inventions ar.d operations in the motion picture industry. At the resent time there is quite a hit of Jealousy between the mem\ers of the civilian industry. Herr-ever, there LZRS never been anything but the hest of cooper:ition between the 122 civilian industry and the Army. T!i s may be due to a. num- ber of reasons, but one sure tiling is the fact that the Army is not a competitor of the civilian industry. These meet- ings would form a firm vorking understanding between the in- dustry and the Govepnnent and the servlces which would pay great dividends during time of war especially, but nll the time as well. There Is one last remark the writer feels should be made 112 concluding this study, and that is that as far as the Army portion of the investigation goes it wool6 a-pear thzt the point9 brought up have ramifications which sliould be cleared up but ~rhich require research beyond the limits of this investigation. At some future date it might be possihle to get more inf omstion from the f iles of the Army in Washington, D.C. on the subject of military censorship and security regulations. BISLIOcI.WHY A. BOOKS Beman, Lamar T., Censorshiu of the Theater and Plotion Pic- tures. >Tew York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1931. 359 pp. Davis, Harry Meyer, and F. G. Fassett, Jr., W-kt You Should Know About the Signal Corps. ?,Jew York: W. W. I.Iorton - and Company, Inc. , 19143. 210 pp. Dohh , Leonard W. , Propaganda. ?letr !!ark: Yenry Felt and Company, 1935. 350 PP. Ernst, ilorris L., and William Seagle, To the Pure, A Study of Obscenlt anit the Censor. New York: The viZing zed 300 pp. Hoban, Charles F., Movies that Teach. New York: Dryden Press, 1946. 1- Hovland, Carl I., Arthur Lumsdaine, and Fred D. Sheff ield, Experiments on idass Communication. Princeton, Kew Jersey: The Princeton University Press, 194. 261 PI>. l<iles, J. R., and C. R. Spain, Audio-Visual Aids in Armed Services. tJas;zlngton, D. C . : American Council on Education, 1947. 96 pa. Issues for the years 1941 to 1946 inclusive. Eoxoff ice, Los Angelea, California, and Flew York City, iqew York. Business Screen, Chicago, Illinois. Citizens Yews, Hollywood, H01lyw00A.j California. Film Yetre :ietr York City, :!ew York. - -8 Film World, Los AngeLes, California. - Hollywood Renor ter, Hollywood, California. l~iotion Picture Herald-, New York City, Mew York. ':ew York Iierald Tribune, 2ew York City, iTew York. -- Flew York Times, riel>~ York City, ?few York. -- Variety, (Daily and ~eelcl~), ~iollywood, California, and BTew York City, biew York. C PER1 ODICAL ARTICLES Barrett, Colonel 9. C. , "The Signal Corps Photograp-Mc Cen- ter," Susiness Screen, VII (December, 1945), 35-37, 76, 76, 80. Brown, Thomas C., "Army Film Utilization," Business Screen, VII (~ecember, 1945) , 41, 83. Cohen, Colonel Emanuel, "~ilm Is a Weapon, " Rusiness Screen, VII (~ecember, 19&5), 43, 72-74,. I1 Ermini, Captain Aldo, Foreign Language Films," Business Screen, VII (December, 19451, 52, 92. Errigo, Tech. Sat. Frank S., I'Shooting Army Color," Business Screen, VII (~ecernber, 134,5), 59-51. IIicks, Lt. Colonel Ortor! H., "Army Pictures Reach 'Round II tile World, Business Screen, VII (~ecember, 1945), 53- 54, 88. Horgan, Lt. Colonel Paul, he Measure of Army Films, II Business Screen, VII (December, 19451, 38-40, 87. Johnson, Captain 3odell C., nAnimation for Army Filns, 11 Busj-nesc Screen, VII (~ecember, lglkj), 44, 98. Jones, Dorothy B., "The Xollywood War Film: 1942-19&1~," Xollywood Quarterly, I (~ctober , 1945 1, 1-19. , ''The Holl~woodl s War Films, 1942-lqW, Ho7lyr.ood Quarterly, Supplement to Volume I (1946 , 46-59. I1 Liberman, Captain Frank P., A Sistory of Army Photography,' Business Screen, VII (December, 191+5), 15-17, 94-95. Munson, Brigadier General E. L. , "Army Pictorial Service," Business Screen, VII (~ecernber, 19451, 33. >lathan, George Jean, "1f Hollywood Came to Dunsinane, It American Mercury (IJovemher, 191+6), 21, I1 Sontheimer, Lt. Morton, Photographic Operations in the Pacific, * Business Screen, VII (~ecember, 19451, 45, 90 Tirasher, Frederic 11., "Some Educational Aspects of Ivlotion Pictures," Journal of Educational Sociology. lfrilllams, Ii!ajor Dennis R., "~ight Time, Figfit Place, and Right Flllm," Eusiness Screen, VII (~ecember, 1945), 55- 57, 97- D. TJI.!ITED STATES GOVERTI4EI:T P1rBI.J CAT1Oi:S Armed Forcfs Information School, "~Wslng .'~rmy 140tlon Pic- tures, Arrng Information Digest. Carlisle Barraclcs, l'enn~ ylvanla, Jt~lyr 1949. Ileadquarters Sixth Army , "Film Catalog, Includi?~; I.lotion Pictures, Film Strips, Filrn Slides an? Transcriptions for Use in Training, Information and Educa.tion Program, II Presidio of San Francisco, California: Sixth Amy Hanual &-2, Headquarters Sixth Army, Septemi~er, 19':FI. :!istoy5 ::is~ior, af tile Sip:na!. Corps Phof opra~hic m- ter. Sigral Corps Photogra~hic Center, Low Island my, e or, 1-ovember 15, 1949- War Department, '~ist of War Department Films, Film Strips and Recognition Film slides," Department Field Eianual, a-2, United States Printing Office, Wash- ington, January, 1946. OF-28 flA Defeated People." 1-3327 nAir Force Intelligence. It OF-3 "Divide and. Conquer. 11 M-1171 "G-5 in Action -- European Theater. II TFU 50-20 "G-5 in Action -- Germany. ?*!-lo57 'Geography of the Jalxtnese Empire. II 19-2032 "Guarding Against Sabotage. " OF-11 "Here Is Germany. fl EF-5 "It ' s Your America. " M-1342 'Lest We org get. " 1-3306 nPhoto Intelligence in Bombardment Aviation. a 21-1265 "prep. for Overseas I.Iovement. II 11-324 " Safeguardiw Military Information. 11 30-2033 Sucker Bait. OF-2 he ;:azis Strike,'' 14-1211 "Tne True Glory. " OF-? Illfar Comes to America." FB-56 "Western Battle ~ront."

Abstract (if available)

Abstract It is the purpose of this study to examine the background of security regulations and censorship rules as they affected the commercial motion picture industry in Hollywood. The fears of the industry as to what might happen to it, and the actual effects of the regulations will also be discussed. Further there will be an analysis of the changes in production methods and the regulations set up for making of Army films by the Signal Corps of the United States Army, as well as a discussion of the overall change in production methods and the increases in the amount and type of pictures produced for the war effort. (The Army portion of the study is not as complete as the writer desired, due to the classification of the subject by the Army and the inability to get to the files of Army Intelligence. The problems brought up in the study furnish abasis for further investigation at a later date.

Linked assets

University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses

Conceptually similar

PDF

A study of the war time control imposed on the civilian motion picture industry and with some reference to those affecting the Army motion pictures during World War II

PDF

Detecting joint interactions between sets of variables in the context of studies with a dichotomous phenotype, with applications to asthma susceptibility involving epigenetics and epistasis

Asset Metadata

Creator Randle, Robert Bernhard (major)

Core Title A study of the war time control imposed on the civilian motion picture industry and with some reference to those affecting the Army motion pictures during World War II

School Department of Cinema

Degree Master of Arts

Publication Date 06/01/1950

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag Army Pictorial Service,Bureau of Governement Films,censorship,closures,combat footage,forced production,Hollywood,OAI-PMH Harvest,office of war information,photography,production,Signal Corps Photographic Center,technical advisors

Place Name California (states), Hollywood (city or populated place), Los Angeles (city or populated place), Los Angeles (counties), USA (countries)

Format iv, 127 leaves ; 29 cm. (aacr2), masters theses (aat)

Language English

Contributor Digitized by the University of Southern California (provenance)

Advisor Finn, James D. (committee chair), Bettman, Ralph (committee member), Elkin, Frederick (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m1

Unique identifier UC1109637

Identifier etd-Randle-195006 (filename),usctheses-m40 (legacy collection record id),usctheses-c127-830 (legacy record id),usctheses-m1 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-Randle-195006.pdf

Dmrecord 830

Document Type Thesis

Format iv, 127 leaves ; 29 cm. (aacr2),masters theses (aat)

Rights Randle, Robert Bernhard, Major

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions (213) 743-1672; https://www.usc.edu/isd/libraries/locations/grand/

Repository Name Libraries, University of Southern California

Repository Location Los Angeles, California

Repository Email cisadmin@lib.usc.edu