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China’s panda diplomacy: the power of being cute

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China’s panda diplomacy: the power of being cute

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Content CHINA’S PANDA DIPLOMACY: THE POWER OF BEING CUTE

by
Yi Xing
___________________

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
(EAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES)

August 2010

Copyright 2010 Yi Xing
ii

Table of Contents

List of Tables iii

Abstract iv

Chapter One: Introduction 1

Chapter Two: Literature Review: Achievements and Flaws 3
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy 3
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the Chinese Context 8
Alternative Resource and New Goals: Think Outside the Box 14

Chapter Three: Panda Diplomacy: From Theory to Practice 19
Rationales of Panda Diplomacy 20
Panda Diplomacy’s Diplomatic Objectives 25
Forms of Panda Diplomacy 28

Chapter Four: Three Case Studies on Panda Diplomacy: An Empirical Analysis 31
Panda Diplomacy during the Republican Period 31
Between Foes and Friends: Panda Diplomacy in the Early PRC 37
Goodwill from the Motherland: Panda Diplomacy in Taiwan 48

Chapter Five: Conclusion 60

Bibliography 64

Appendix 75

iii

List of Tables

Table 1: Pandas in Foreign Countries 75

Table 2: Pandas in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 76

iv

Abstract
This thesis provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a unique diplomatic
tool possessed by China, panda diplomacy. By borrowing theories from the fields of
anthropology, international relations, and communications, my inter-disciplinary study
conceptualizes the notion of panda diplomacy in terms of its rationales, diplomatic
objectives, and forms. Based on data collected from newspapers and public opinion polls
in Mainland China, the U.S., and Taiwan, I also examine three major panda diplomacy
practices in the 20
th
and 21
st
centuries.
My research aims to improve the extant literature on China’s soft power and
public diplomacy by teasing out a long-overlooked power resource and redefining
China’s public diplomacy objectives. Through detailed discussion on panda diplomacy, I
argue that the universal appeal of pandas serves as an important alternative soft power
asset that enables China to approach a much broader audience in foreign countries. In
contrast with the conclusion drawn by the current scholarship, my thesis suggests that
short-term objectives are indispensable for China’s public diplomacy practitioners and
manage to facilitate, rather than hamper, China’s long-and-medium-term diplomatic
strategies.

1

Chapter One: Introduction
In the past two decades, scholarship has revolutionarily changed the way a
country’s power assets are measured. Unlike their predecessors, more and more
researchers have shifted academic focus from one nation’s military and economic
capacity to its “soft power”—the ability to get others to want what it wants through
attraction and persuasion. On the other hand, the past decades have also witnessed the
increasingly important role foreign publics play on achieving one country’s diplomatic
objectives, and the term, public diplomacy, has started to appear in the academic
literature on International Relations (IR) and Communication Studies. Seeing the
growing influence publics wield upon governments’ decision-making, many scholars
have paid adequate attention to how public diplomacy strategy serves to translate one
country’s soft power resources into desired policy outcomes. Soon after being introduced
to China, the two concepts sparked heated debates among China experts who have made
great contributions to enriching the literature by applying their academic discussion in the
Chinese context. Despite the remarkable achievements, a thorough literature review
provided in this thesis reveals aspects disregarded by the scholarship. Though
successfully unearthing many of China’s unique soft power resources, scholars have
failed to notice one alternative power asset China wields—the power of attraction
possessed by its native animal. With respect to the objectives of China’s public
diplomacy, most researchers primarily concentrate on the long-and-medium-term goals
and exclude short-term objectives from their discussion. This methodology, however, has
made the nuanced characteristics of China’s public diplomacy unmarked.
2

The purpose of this thesis is to render my effort to fix these two flaws in the
current literature by providing a theoretical and empirical analysis of one long-
overlooked diplomatic tool in modern Chinese history: panda diplomacy. Through giving
an analytical discussion on its basic rationales, major diplomatic objectives, and various
forms in Chapter Three, I will conceptualize the notion of panda diplomacy and offer my
standpoints on the following issues: how the image of pandas
1
becomes an alternative
soft power resource for China and why short-term objectives are indispensable for
China’s public diplomacy strategy. Based on the theoretical framework built in Chapter
Three, one empirical research on panda diplomacy will be provided in Chapter Four
which spotlights three important case studies in contemporary China and scrutinizes how
panda diplomacy practitioners convert the charm of pandas into desired policy outcomes
for their motherland.

1
The world “panda” in this thesis refers to the giant panda (Ailuropoda melanoleuca).

3

Chapter Two: Literature Review: Achievements and Flaws
SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
The notion of soft power was first introduced by American IR theorist Joseph S.
Nye in 1990. Against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and the prevailing
prediction of a declining American power,
2
Nye brought up a brand-new concept that
serves to revolutionize the way power is defined. In Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature
of American Power, Nye argues that “a country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in
world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that
produces such effects.”
3
According to Nye, this new facet of power, or what he later calls
“soft power”, finds its resources from a country’s culture (in places where it is attractive
to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its
foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).
4
This
“second face of power”—the ability to get “others to want what you want”— depends on
“the attraction of one’s idea or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that
shapes the preferences that others express”
5
while “hard power” derives its power
resources in the military and economic realm
6
that resorts to coercion (stick) and

2
Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990),
2-4.

3
Ibid., 31.

4
Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8-12.

5
Nye, Bound to Lead, 31.

6
Ibid., 32.
4

inducement (carrot). For Nye, soft power is a more sophisticated means to achieve one
country’s policy objectives because “when you can get others to admire your ideas and to
want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move
them in your direction”
7
which “increases the probability of obtaining its desired
outcomes.”
8
In other words, if a nation’s soft power, namely, its culture, political value,
and foreign policies, are seen as attractive, legitimate, and credible by others, it costs less
to accomplish its diplomatic goals in the international community.
Since its debut in 1990, the notion of soft power has invited heated debate on its
definition and even the validity of this nascent concept among scholars. Many researchers
simply see Nye’s dualist view as a misleading method to understand power: “soft power
is not a type of power at all… any resource, including military capability, can be soft
power inasmuch as society approves its use for some purposes.”
9
For Li, what matters in
the discourse of power is not its resources but how those resources are used. Soft power,
according to Li, should be interpreted as “soft use of power.”
10
Gilboa denies the
universal attraction of soft power because it “may be relevant to one society but exactly
the opposite for another.”
11
Mattern gives a second thought on the origin of attraction by

7
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), x-
xi.

8
Ibid., 11.

9
Javier Noya, “The Symbolic Power of Nations,” Place Branding 2, no. 1 (January 2006): 54.

10
Mingjiang Li, ed., Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham and
Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 7.

11
Eytan Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 616, no.1 (2008): 62.
5

seeing it as a socially produced reality through inter-person/inter-state communication in
which morally righteous norms are constructed in a sociolinguistic way. According to
Mattern, this so-called “representational force” coerces other states, which are afraid of
violating the constructed norms, into following the countries that wield such normative
power. In this sense, soft power is not “soft” at all.
12
Some more critical scholars cast
doubt on the practicality of soft power in terms of resources conversion. Ding notices
Nye’s failure to “provide a clear or persuasive model to explain how state actors convert
their potential soft power resources to realize power.”
13
For those critics, Nye fails to
explain how intangible power assets, such as culture, would be translated into desired
policy outcomes in world politics. In other words, those critics question if there is any
instrument which could convert soft power assets into desired policy outcomes.
For Nye and his proponents, criticism of soft power in terms of its lack of power
conversion instrument is not substantial. By incisively including the notion of public
diplomacy into their discussion, those scholars have managed to shed light on the means
that translates intangible soft power resources into concrete policy outcomes. In his 2004
book, Nye rightly points out that the state employs public diplomacy to convert its soft
power resources into government policies.
14
Melissen concurs with Nye in the sense that

12
Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft, Power in World Politics,” in Power in World
Politics, ed. Felix Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 106-117.

13
Sheng Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lanham and Plymouth:
Lexington Books, 2008), 39.

14
Nye, Soft Power, 31.

6

“public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments.”
15
Cull sees the linkage
between soft power and public diplomacy in American international lexicon as
“frequent.”
16
Gilboa asserts that “public diplomacy means yielding soft power” and “is
presented as an official policy translating soft power resources into action.”
17
It is evident
that public diplomacy is regarded by Nye and his supporters as the nexus between soft
power resources and favorable policy outcomes. Their arguments thus make a brief
discussion on the notion of public diplomacy necessary and inevitable in the following
paragraphs.
It is believed that the term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1965 by Edmund
Gullion. According to Gullion, public diplomacy “deals with the influence of public
attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies,” and its tasks include “the
cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries”, “the interaction of
private groups and interests in one country with another”, and “the reporting of foreign
affairs and its impact on policy.”
18
In the next forty-five years after the birth of the notion,
scholarship has developed the understanding of public diplomacy by seeing it as a
communication process in which information exchange and mutual understandings,

15
Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in The New Public
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005), 4.

16
Nicolas Cull, “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy,”
in Owning the Olympics: Narrative of the New China, ed. Monroe Edwin Price and Daniel Dayan (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 117.

17
Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” 61.

18
Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, “Public Diplomacy Defined,”
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm.
7

rather than one-way indoctrination, are conducted. By approaching foreign audiences in
a more sophisticated way, public diplomacy practitioners help their motherland generate
a positive public opinion that serves to prompt favorable government policies in the
targeted countries. Tuch, for example, sees public diplomacy as a government’s attempt
not only to bring about its “national goals and politics” to foreign publics but also to
enhance the latter’s “understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and
culture.”
19
Frederick sees public diplomacy work most effectively “in the field of
information, education, and culture” so as to “influence a foreign government, by
influencing its citizens.”
20
Sharp argues that public diplomacy is “the process by which
direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend
the values of those being represented.”
21
Cull underpins the importance of direct
interaction between foreign publics and foreign policy makers through cultural diplomacy,
network-building, and international broadcasting.
22
Melissen sees public diplomacy as a
“two-way street” communication “in the sense that public diplomacy… listens to what

19
Hans Tuch, Communicating With the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas (Houndmills and New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1990), 3.

20
Howard H. Frederick, Global Communication and International Relations (Belmont: Wadsworth Pub.
Co., 1992), 229.

21
Paul Sharp, “Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy,” in The
New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Houndmills and New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 106.

22
Cull, “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy,” 117.
8

people have to say”
23
and takes foreign publics’ opinions into consideration, which
differs itself from propaganda that neglects feedback from the receiving end.
Based on the previous analysis, the arguments put forward by Nye and his
proponents appear to be logical and persuasive. As a public engagement tool, public
diplomacy helps a country approach foreign audiences more effectively and project a
positive national image in the targeted state by tapping its soft power resources. The
favorable public opinion resulting from a successful public diplomacy strategy in turn
presses the targeted state to adopt policies that favor the country practicing public
diplomacy, which converts intangible soft power resources into concrete policy outcomes.
And this illustrates why “publics matter to governments as tools of national foreign
policy.”
24

SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT
While debates on the general definition of soft power, public diplomacy, and their
relationship are in full swing among scholars, how and whether these two concepts could
be applied in the Chinese context have received China experts’ close attention. Inspired

23
Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practices,” in The New Public
Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005), 18.

24
Brian Hocking, “Rethink the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy.” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in
International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 41.

9

by Nye’s theoretical framework on the “second face of power,”
25
many scholars have
developed the discourse on soft power by answering the following question in the
Chinese context: whether or not China shares the same power assets categorized by Nye.
If not, what kind of unique resources does China have? In addition, the nature and goals
of China’s public diplomacy have sparked intense debates among scholarship.
After the notion of soft power was introduced to China, many Chinese scholars
have accepted Nye’s theoretical framework in the sense that Chinese cultures, according
to those “culture school”
26
scholars, are the core of China’s soft power resources. Wang,
as the first scholar to bring the notion of soft power to China, argues that admirable
culture and ideology are the main resources of China’s soft power.
27
The traditional
Chinese cultures, such as Confucianism, are thus seen by scholars like Chen as China’s
major power of attraction to the world,
28
which is illustrated by Beijing’s Harmonious
Society theory and the expansion of Confucius Institutes. On the other hand, some
scholars, though acknowledging the importance of Nye’s framework, argue that resources
of soft power must be re-defined in the Chinese context since “the discussion in China is

25
Mingjiang Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect,” in Soft Power: China’s
Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li (Lanham and Plymouth: Lexington Books,
2009), 25. Sheng, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings, 23.

26
Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing
Debate, Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States,” in Chinese Soft Power and Its
Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World, ed. Carola
McGiffert (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 13.

27
Huning Wang, “Zuowei Guojia Shili de Wenhua: Ruan Quanli,” [“Culture as National Power: Soft
Power”] Fudan Xuebao (Sheke Ban) [Journal of Fudan University Social Science] 3, (1993): 91-96, and 75.

28
Yugang Chen, “Shilun Quanqiuhua Beijingxia Zhongguo Ruanshili de Goujian,” [Discourse on Building
China’s Soft Power against the Background of Globalization] Guoji Guancha [International Outlook] 2,
(2007): 36-59.

10

wider in scope and sometimes emphasizes areas that Nye paid little attention to.”
29

Several researchers argue that China’s soft power borrows resources from its hard power
counterpart. Zheng and Zhang, for example, derive China’s soft power assets not only
from Beijing’s multilateralism and “good neighbor policy” but also from its economic
diplomacy,
30
a hard power resource. Gong re-shuffles China’s soft power assets and sees
them coming from “institutional power” (the ability to establish international institutions),
“identifying power” (the ability to gain global leadership through influencing other
countries), and “assimilating power” (the attraction of one country’s cultures, ideologies,
and social institutions).
31
Seeing the incompleteness of Nye’s argument, Meng adds the
following elements to China’s soft power arsenal: developmental model, international
institutions, and international image.
32
Some authors, like Yan, have gone even further by
denying culture as a country’s soft power resource and seeing political power and
political credibility as China’s main assets.
33
This argument, not surprisingly, is refuted
by scholars who see China’s political power not as an asset but the liability of its soft
power. Gill and Huang correctly assert that China’s “confident foreign policy” and “rigid

29
Li, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse”, 25.

30
Yongnian Zheng and Chi Zhang, “Guoji Zhengzhi Zhong de Ruanliliang yiji dui zhongguo ruanliliang de
guancha,” [“Soft Power in World Politics and Observation of China’s Soft Power”] Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics] 7, (2007): 6-12.

31
Tieying Gong, “Lun Ruanquanli de Weidu,” [“Dimensions of Soft Power”] Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
[World Economy and Politics] 9, (2007): 16-22, and 3.

32
Honghua Meng, “Zhongguo Ruanshili Pinggu Baogao Shang Xia,” [“Evaluation Report on China’s Soft
Power Part One and Part Two”] Guoji Guancha [International Outlook] 2, (2007): 15-26, and 3 (2007):
37-46, and 28.

33
Xuetong Yan, “Ruanshili de Hexin Shi Zhengzhi Shili,” [The Core of Soft Power is Political Power]
Huanqiu Shibao, [Global Times] 22 May 2007, Section 12.

11

political system” have caused imbalance in its soft power implementation.
34
Qian
incisively argues that the absence of institutional building and rule of law in China’s
political landscape serves to hamper its soft power.
35
All those scholars agree that
China’s current political system would be regarded as an attractive soft power resource
only to authoritarian dictators, rather than foreign publics in general terms.
When the notion of public diplomacy is applied to the Chinese context, it invites a
major academic contention regarding its nature and tasks. Some scholars, like
Shambaugh, simply see China’s public diplomacy parallel to its notorious external
propaganda strategy.
36
More researchers, on the other hand, have given positive, if not
uncritical, assessment of Beijing’s public diplomacy practices. Cull notices the long
history of China’s foreign engagement and gives credit to Beijing’s effort to reform its
public diplomacy.
37
D’Hooghe notes the new dynamics of China’s public diplomacy
owing to the participation of Chinese individuals and civil society groups.
38
Wang,
though acknowledging the influence of external propaganda system, correctly points out
China’s successful public diplomacy practices that benefit from the country’s economic

34
Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese “Soft Power,” Survival 48, no 2 (2006):
30.

35
Haijing Wang, “Qian Chengdan: Zhidu Jianshe Chengqi Ruanshili,” [Qian Chengdan: Institutional
Building Supporting Soft Power] Liaowang Zhoukan, [Outlook Weekly] 11 (2007): 27.

36
David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Progress and Efficacy,” The China
Journal, no 57 (January 2007): 47-50.

37
Cull, “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy,” 126-128.

38
Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of
International Relations, 2007), 1-38. Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of
China,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen
(Houndmills and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 88-105.

12

and political development, massive population, and Beijing’s rich political, economic,
and cultural resources.
39

In contrast with their heated debates over the nature of public diplomacy in the
Chinese context, scholars seem to reach consensus on the objectives China’s public
diplomacy practitioners aim to achieve. Accepting Melissen’s argument that public
diplomacy “should be in tune with medium-term objectives and long-term aims” and
“works best with a long horizon,”
40
most researchers assert that China’s public diplomacy
should serve the country’s long-and-medium-term diplomatic strategies. For those
scholars, the objectives of China’s public diplomacy are summarized as follows: to make
the Chinese government’s statements and policies heard by the outside world so as to
seek other countries’ understanding and support, to project a positive image of China as a
responsible and non-threatening nation that brings peace and prosperity to the global
community, to rebut distorted reports on China and create a favorable international
environment that respects China’s culture and history, and, to exert influence upon other
states’ foreign policy-making.
41
The current scholarship is absolutely correct in the sense
that accomplishing those long-and-medium-term goals is the most fundamental task for
China’s foreign policy-makers, including its public diplomacy practitioners. Shaping a
positive national image abroad, for example, helps China in its quest for a favorable

39
Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no 1 (March 2008): 257-273.

40
Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 15.

41
Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” 268, and d’Hooghe, “Public Diplomacy
in the People’s Republic of China,” 93-94.
13

global environment under which its rapid development will endure in the years to come.
Promoting China as a responsible stakeholder and a trustworthy economic partner serves
to counter hostile misperceptions overseas and facilitates China’s smooth integration into
the international community.
Admittedly, China experts have enriched the current literature by disclosing
important characteristics of soft power and public diplomacy in the Chinese context.
However, the academic journey to explore China’s soft power and public diplomacy has
not been completed and the extant research on these two concepts is far from definitive.
Despite its major contributions to theorizing soft power and public diplomacy in general
and in Chinese terms, existing scholarship has not yet provided satisfactory empirical
research on the two notions in the Chinese context. If scholars are correct that public
diplomacy plays an important role in translating soft power resources into desired policy
outcomes, a persuasive case study is needed to verify their conclusion in real life.
Although their efforts to re-define China’s soft power resources have been productive, it
is highly possible that some less noticeable but equally important power resources have
not been properly addressed by scholars. With respect to the objectives of China’s public
diplomacy, one cannot help but wonder if Melissen’s argument is universally correct.
Questions, such as whether or not short-term objectives are also crucial for China’s
public diplomacy practitioners, still remain unmasked. In the following section, I will
elaborate my critique of the extant research and give my answers to the questions raised
above.
14

ALTERNATIVE RESOURCE AND NEW GOALS: THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX
The previous literature review has demonstrated the following fact: China’s soft
power arsenal, according to most scholars, is beyond Nye’s categorization and thus owns
weapons other countries might not possess. This consensus has led to an in-depth
discussion on China’s alternative soft power resources by the scholarship. In spite of their
contributions to re-defining China’s soft power assets, researchers fail to notice one
unique and important resource China wields.
Cull, in his analysis of the Beijing Olympics, rightly points out that China’s NBA
star Yao Ming has become China’s newest resource to approach the world.
42
As Ding
notices, Yao, as China’s premier “athlete-ambassador”, is the “exact personification of
China’s growing soft power—affable, strong, confident without being arrogant, and
focusing on success.”
43
His character, according to Ding, represents “what Beijing wishes
to be seen as synonymous with a rising China.”
44
Tapping the positive image of its
famous sports star as one resource of soft power certainly reflects China’s policy-makers’
creative development of its power assets. Owing to his sportsmanship and other favorable
characteristics, Yao Ming becomes the representation of China and serves to project a
positive image of his motherland to the foreign public.
Cull and Ding are right in the sense that the charm of one successful Chinese
citizen, like Yao Ming, definitely helps China obtain leverage to attract their target

42
Cull, “The Public Diplomacy of the Modern Olympic Games and China’s Soft Power Strategy,” 131.

43
Ding, The Dragon’s Hidden Wings, 70.

44
Ibid.
15

audiences. However, both scholars, though noticing the attractive character of individuals
as China’s alternative soft power resource, fail to see the flaw of their arguments and thus
miss the chance to uncover one similar but more important asset of China’s soft power.
Despite his huge success in the NBA, Yao’s case is rare and sporadic. The relatively
small number of their world famous cultural and sports stars makes China’s soft power
policy-makers more or less frustrated when they employ this power resource. Moreover,
the fame these individuals own is more often than not associated with their success in one
specific area, which makes their charm attractive to limited audiences. In other words,
cultural and sports stars, if regarded as China’s new soft power resource, lack universal
appeal and are less capable of remaining a long-term attraction to China’s audiences,
especially after their retirement. Though the intrinsic flaws of Chinese celebrities might
disappoint scholars in their quest for China’s alternative soft power resources, one
important but long-overlooked power asset would ignite their hope—the power of
attraction possessed by China’s unique animal. Baker rightly notices how the “animal
symbolism” could serve as an expression of one country’s “national character.”
45

According to Baker, a nation’s unique animal, in some sense, is given a symbolic power
that makes it a natural representation and perfect depiction of its country’s nationhood
and identity.
46
Seen as a national icon, the image of a country’s unique animal is closely
associated with this specific country. Moreover, the attractiveness of animals, unlike that
of their human counterparts, results from natural and biological characteristics that are

45
Steve Baker, Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity and Representation (Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press, 1993), 33.

46
Ibid., 34-36.
16

not tied with career performance in a particular field. Although human societies’ diverse
aesthetic and cultural standards have made their definitions of “attractive animals”
different from each other, China, however, does possess one unique animal characterized
by its “universal appeal”—the panda. Owing to its exclusiveness to China, the panda
becomes a natural symbol of China’s national identity, which transforms its animalhood
into a representational form of China’s nationhood. The panda’s universal appeal, which
will be elaborated in the next chapter, gives it a unique power of attraction and thus
makes the panda one major alternative resource of China’s soft power.
When it comes to the goals of public diplomacy in general terms, Melissen is
correct in the sense that a country’s public diplomacy objectives should be tied with its
long-and-medium-term foreign policies—otherwise, they run the risk of being relegated
to propaganda.
47
However, it is naïve to unconditionally accept Melissen’s argument and
apply it in the Chinese context without taking China’s particularity into consideration.
Rawnsley rightly points out the power liabilities, such as political system, that decrease
China’s attraction to its foreign audiences.
48
For Wang, China has “the huge cultural and
language gap in communicating with the world.”
49
Both scholars’ arguments incisively
disclose one of the toughest challenges China’s public diplomacy practitioners (or in a
broader sense, its foreign policy-makers) are facing: what if a distrustful or indifferent

47
Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” 15.

48
Gary D. Rawnsley, “A Survey of China’s Public Diplomacy,”
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/070502_a_survey_of_chinas_public_dip
lomacy/.

49
Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” 266.
17

foreign public rejects or simply does not care about China’s soft power resources, let
alone actively responds to it? China’s public diplomacy (or foreign engagement)
strategy—no matter how sophisticated it is—would not accomplish any of its long-and-
medium-term objectives, if its foreign audiences take no interest in China in the first
place or see China with a pre-existing bias. In this sense, China’s public diplomacy
practitioners should find no excuse to exclude the following short-term goals from their
agenda: approaching foreign audiences effectively and making them willing to listen to
what China wants to say. In other words, how to increase China’s publicity overseas and
get the foreign public intrigued by China’s soft power resources should be treated as a
prior task for its public diplomacy practitioners. It is true that China’s public diplomacy
should ultimately serve the country’s long-and-medium-term diplomatic objectives.
However, attaining the short-term objectives noted above is not contradictory to China’s
effort to accomplish its long-and-medium-term strategies. Instead, they contribute to
laying the solid foundation upon which China’s long-and-medium-term goals are easier
to be achieved.
It is obvious from my critique noted above that the academic discussion on
China’s soft power resources and its public diplomacy objectives is not perfect or
satisfactory. In the rest of the thesis, I will provide my effort to improve the current
literature by conducting a theoretical and empirical research on China’s unique
diplomatic tool, panda diplomacy. Through a detailed discussion on this important but
poorly researched subject, I intend to elaborate how the panda’s universal appeal
becomes an alternative soft power resource and why short-term objectives are
18

indispensable for China’s public diplomacy practitioners. Chapter Three will
conceptualize the notion of panda diplomacy in terms of its basic rationales, major
diplomatic objectives, and various forms. Based on the theoretical framework constructed
in Chapter Three, an empirical study will be presented in Chapter Four which spotlights
three important episodes of panda diplomacy in contemporary China and tests the validity
of the arguments I put forward in previous chapters.

19

Chapter Three: Panda Diplomacy: From Theory to Practice
As early as the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), pandas were given by China’s
imperial courts as gifts to its neighboring countries.
50
In modern times, this widely
popular animal has continued to serve as a strategic tool by the Chinese government to
achieve its diplomatic goals. In short, panda diplomacy is a public diplomacy instrument
that enables the Chinese government to reach overseas audiences, in hopes of projecting a
positive national image of China and increasing its publicity among the foreign public.
Unlike other soft power resources that encounter “huge cultural and language gap,”
51

panda diplomacy is able to engage a broader audience in foreign countries, owing to the
universal appeal of the panda as a new soft power resource. As I will argue in the rest of
the thesis, panda diplomacy, by sending pandas as a gesture of goodwill and symbol of
friendship, serves to give China a high profile in targeted countries and getting its
overseas audiences interested in China. Tapping the positive foreign public opinion
generated by its short-term goals, panda diplomacy also contributes to achieving China’s
long-and-medium-term diplomatic objectives in the targeted country. Based on rich
research in the field of anthropology and international relations, this chapter will
conceptualize the notion of panda diplomacy by unraveling its fundamental rationales,
elaborating the different diplomatic objectives it aims to achieve, and distinguishing its
various forms.

50
It is believed that two living pandas and seventy panda hides were given by Tang court as gifts to the
Japanese Emperor in 685. Refer to Ramona and Desmond Morris, The Giant Panda, rev. ed. (New York:
Penguin Book, 1982), 20.

51
Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” 266.
20

RATIONALES OF PANDA DIPLOMACY
Cute, cuddly, friendly, innocent, unaggressive, naïve, and playful, the panda
seems to represent all the positive images humanity could give to an animal. Having an
extremely adorable exterior, the panda has such attractive charm that no one on earth can
resist. The panda’s universal appeal, taken for granted by most people, is actually the first
and most fundamental rationale of panda diplomacy. Based on pioneering research done
by anthropologists in terms of human-animal relations, the following section will provide
an in-depth analysis on how pandas’ animalhood is transformed to one major resource of
China’s soft power.
Mullan and Marvin incisively argue that the “giant panda… is a unique animal in
the sense of its almost universal appeal.”
52
With regard to the reasons why human beings
have a special affection towards some species of animals, anthropologists see the nexus
through the prism of “neoteny.” According to Lawrence, “[n]eoteny refers to a condition
in which there is retention of youthful characteristics in the adult form.”
53
Ethologist
Lorenz argues that the physical configuration of a high and slightly bulging forehead,
large brain case in proportion to the face, big eyes, rounded cheeks, and short, stubby
limbs calls forth an adult nurturing response to such a “lovable” object, moving people to
feelings of tenderness.
54
For Lorenz, animals, if embodying the essence of being

52
Bob Mullan and Garry Marvin, Zoo Culture, 2
nd
ed. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
1999), 25-26.

53
Elizabeth Z. Lawrence, “In the Mick of Time: Reflections on Disney’s ageless Mouse,” Journal of
Popular Culture 20, no. 2 (1986): 67.

54
Stephen Jay Gould, “Mickey Mouse Meets Konrad Lorenz,” Natural History 88, no. 5 (1979): 30-36.
21

“round”—round head, round cheeks, short rounded limbs and plump, have the neotenous
traits and thus obtain affection from humans.
55
Mullan and Marvin add to the discourse of
neoteny by contending that an animal’s posture would enhance its neotenous
characteristic if it could maintain itself vertically.
56
Ramona and Desmond Morris imply
that such neotenous sentiment is not limited to adults—older children also have the same
feeling because they have the tendency to see their favorite animals as infant-figures.
57

Based on scholarship’s research on humanity’s penchant for neotenous character,
Ramona and Desmond Morris argue that there are several physical and behavioral traits
that make the panda popular and attractive to human beings, including a flat face that
resembles human beings, large eyes (actually they are black patches, not real eyes) which
gives the panda an innocent child-like quality, a small or no tail, and the ability to sit up
vertically and manipulate small objects.
58
Besides, the panda has evolved from a
carnivorous killer into a bamboo-eater which appears to be harmless and friendly to
human beings who in turn are not embarrassed by the panda, owing to the latter’s lack of
any externally or anatomically sexual features.
59
As a playful, clumsy, soft, round, and
black-and-white giant, the panda has an easy name and, more importantly, a historically
popular precursor: the teddy bear.
60
It is evident from Morris’s summary that pandas’

55
Ibid., 30-36.

56
Mullan and Marvin, Zoo Culture, 25.

57
Ramona and Desmond Morris, The Giant Panda, 172.

58
Ibid., 173-174.

59
Ibid., 174.

60
Ibid., 176.
22

physical traits perfectly cater to humanity’s “neoteny” sentiment. In addition, several of
pandas’ behavioral characteristics—the ability to sit up vertically and manipulate small
objects—greatly resemble that of human beings, which significantly enhances people’s
affection for pandas. Moreover, Ramona and Desmond Morris, on the basis of a popular
survey, assert that the cuddly, friendly, and sexless exterior of pandas even wins young
children’s favor since such an image fits “the role of omnipotent parents.”
61
Suffice it to
say that human beings’ subconscious preference, neoteny or craving for parental care,
makes their affection for pandas extend beyond age and demographic boundary, which
makes the “universal appeal” of pandas noticeable. In this sense, when the panda is used
as an “image ambassador” overseas, it succeeds in overcoming the barriers produced by
lingual and cultural difference and effectively approaches audiences regardless of their
various ethnicity and nationality given its charismatic attraction deeply rooted in our
subconsciousness. In other words, panda diplomacy, by exploiting pandas’ “universal
appeal”, is more capable of engaging a broader audience in foreign countries and gives
China high publicity in the targeted society owing to its publics’ interest in pandas sent
by China. Such qualities differ panda diplomacy from China’s other public diplomacy
tools.
The second rationale of panda diplomacy lies in the panda’s exclusiveness to
China. It is known that this white-and-black animal is only native to China’s western
mountainous area and cannot be found anywhere else in the world. Its uniqueness has
made China the only country that could associate its national icon with the panda and

61
Ibid., 172.
23

render the latter a symbolic representation of China’s nationhood. Although animal
diplomacy is not a novel invention by China,
62
using the panda as its diplomatic tool to
represent the country is monopolized by the Chinese. When analyzing Australia’s
platypus diplomacy in the 1940s, Cushing and Markwell rightly point out that the success
factor of animal diplomacy lies in the fact that “the animals involved had to be distinctive
and preferably naturally occurring only in the donor country, such that they were
associated with it exclusively.”
63
That is to say, the nexus between the image of animals
and a successful animal diplomacy rests upon how directly and explicitly these two could
be associated with each other. For foreign audiences, the more spontaneous this
connection is, the more likely it would draw their attention not only to the animal itself
but also to the country of its origin. Thanks to its Chinese-ness identity, the panda is seen
as the expression of China’s nationhood, or what Baker calls “national character,”
64
and
possesses a symbolic power of representing the image of China. Given its universal
appeal, the panda, to some extent, also serves to promote a positive national image of
China to the foreign public.
The final reason for putting panda diplomacy into practice involves a simply but
crucial fact: pandas sent by the Chinese government are housed in the most high-profile
zoos in foreign countries. When analyzing the cultural status of zoos, Mullan and Marvin

62
For example, platypus diplomacy by Australia, see Nancy Cushing and Kevin Markwell, “Platypus
Diplomacy: Animal Gifts in International Relations,” Journal of Australian Studies 33, no.3 (September
2009): 255-271.

63
Cushing and Markwell, “Platypus diplomacy,” 256.

64
Baker, Picturing the Beast, 33.
24

incisively point out that zoos differ from other public entertainment places, like museums
or art galleries, owing to two important characteristics. For the two authors, museums and
art galleries, to some extent, make their visitors feel “intimidated” because “often the
items on exhibition are difficult to understand and need interpretation.”
65
A zoo, unlike
its high-culture counterparts, does not possess such a quality—“items on exhibition in the
zoo…do not need to be interpreted;” instead, what it provides is purely “an enjoyable
experience.”
66
In this sense, the target audience of the zoo is not limited to people with
special knowledge or technique, such as connoisseurship. As a result, a zoo is frequented
by people from different social strata. It is also noteworthy that a zoo is not a place for
individuals; rather, “people visit zoos in family or social groups” because the zoo
experience “seems to be something which is shared, the animals are spoken about,
marveled at or laughed at with others.”
67
This argument is especially persuasive,
considering a zoo’s incredible attraction to children who more often than not need their
parents to accompany them when visiting zoos. To sum up, a zoo, given the two traits
listed above, is able to engage an audience beyond the limitation of social stratum and
age. Accordingly, a zoo manages to present the image of the panda to a broader audience
and serves to extend the influence of this cute animal to the mainstream society in foreign
countries, which helps China overcome the “language and cultural gap”
68
that challenges
its other public diplomacy tools. If pandas’ “universal appeal” explains the fundamental

65
Mullan and Marvin, Zoo Culture, 126.

66
Ibid., 126.

67
Ibid., 132.

68
Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” 266.
25

rationale to which panda diplomacy resorts to approach foreign audiences, then an
analysis of a zoo’s social function signifies where such an engagement happens.

PANDA DIPLOMACY’S DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES
It is evident from previous chapters that the ultimate goal of a country’s public
diplomacy is to achieve its diplomatic objectives by influencing overseas publics and
there is no exception for panda diplomacy. As noted above, the current scholarship tends
to associate China’s public diplomacy goals solely with its long-and-medium-term
foreign policies. Although reflecting the nature of public diplomacy in general terms, this
argument fails to notice its unique adaptation in the Chinese context. Analysis made in
Chapter Two has made it clear that achieving short-term objectives is equally, and in
some way even more, important for China’s public diplomacy practitioners given the
challenges mentioned before. In addition, accomplishing public diplomacy’s short-term
goals is not contradictory to China’s long-and-medium-term strategies; rather, increasing
China’s publicity in overseas countries and getting its target audience interested in China
serve to lay the firm foundation to attain the long-and-medium-term diplomatic
objectives made by Chinese foreign policy-makers. In other words, achieving short-term
goals and accomplishing long-and-medium-term strategies should not be treated as
separate tasks for China’s public diplomacy practitioners; instead, they are closely
integrated. Panda diplomacy perfectly embodies such procedural integrity in which both
short-term and long-and-medium-term objectives are included.
26

With respect to its short-term goals, panda diplomacy, by tapping the universal
appeal of the panda, enables China to enhance its publicity in targeted countries and
makes it particularly noticeable in the eyes of the foreign public. Normally seen as a
high-profile event by overseas audiences, sending pandas helps China obtain
considerable public attention in the foreign country and serves to create a prevailing
infatuation for pandas by the public, also known as panda-monium. The panda fever is
important in the sense that it more often than not arouses foreign publics’ great interest in
China, the native country pandas come from. Making the overseas public intrigued by
their motherland thus gives Chinese public diplomacy practitioners leverage to get the
target audience willing to listen what China wants to say, which makes it easier for China
to accomplish other diplomatic objectives. Moreover, giving pandas as a gesture of
goodwill to other countries also serves to project a friendly and approachable image of
China in the eyes of the foreign public whose opinion of China will be increased
accordingly.
Thanks to the high profile in the targeted countries and the relatively favorable
public opinion towards China, panda diplomacy also serves to accomplish China’s long-
and-medium diplomatic objectives. These include maintaining a close relationship with
its alliance and keeping China high on targeted countries’ diplomatic and political
agendas, defusing tension with China’s former adversaries so as to pave the way for a
major diplomatic shift in the international community, and creating a more cooperative
cross-strait relationship to facilitate national re-unification between Mainland China and
Taiwan.
27

To begin with, panda diplomacy, by tapping the positive policy outcomes
resulting from its short-term objectives, helps to strengthen China’s bilateral diplomatic
relationship with major allies. Under such circumstances, the Chinese government, by
sending pandas, aims to bring a strong ideological commitment and sincere friendship to
the foreign audience and get China high in the target country’s political and diplomatic
agenda. This tactic is obviously perceived when panda diplomacy was adopted by the
Republic of China (ROC) to tighten relationship with the U.S. in World War II and when
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sent pandas to the Soviet Union in the 1950s to
underpin their communist brotherhood, which was crucial for Beijing’s survival. The
second objective plays an opposite but equally important role as the first one: pandas are
employed to thaw tense relationship with China’s foes. Unlike a tool to tighten
connection with allies, panda diplomacy, in this case, intends to drive China’s diplomatic
re-orientation on the global stage. Through ameliorating the negative impression of China
once held by the target audience, panda diplomacy works to create a relatively favorable
public opinion that is conducive, at least not harmful, to the improving relationship
between China and its former adversaries. The best example that illustrates this tactic is
the famous panda diplomacy in 1972 when the PRC gave a pair of pandas to the U.S.
after President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing. Lastly, panda diplomacy serves
Beijing’s national re-unification strategy that specifically aims at Taiwanese society.
Claiming the island as a part of the PRC, Beijing certainly would not see any relationship
with Taipei as “diplomacy” per se. However, Taiwan’s de facto independence and deep
suspicion of the PRC have made Beijing’s re-unification project even more challenging.
28

Panda diplomacy, in this sense, is employed to reach Taiwanese audiences and soften
their hostile attitude toward the PRC. By creating a more cooperative cross-strait
relationship, the PRC hopes panda diplomacy will narrow the gap between Mainland
China and Taiwan and thus contribute to national re-unification in the years to come.

FORMS OF PANDA DIPLOMACY
The form of panda diplomacy has experienced three major changes in the past
sixty years. The first stage lasted for over forty years starting in 1941. During this period,
pandas were given as free gifts by the Chinese government to achieve the first two long-
and-medium-term objectives, namely, tightening relations with allies and serving its
diplomatic re-orientation. The first phrase ended in the early 1980s when panda
diplomacy was transformed from a diplomatic tool to a money-driven business. Helping
China to resume diplomatic relations with most capitalist countries after Nixon’s visit,
panda diplomacy’s political implications became less important in the early 1980s.
Seeing pandas’ immense popularity overseas, China started to loan pandas to foreign
zoos for commercial display,
69
which only drew criticism from animal rights activists
who saw it as a serious threat to panda conservation
70
and eventually led to official

69
For example, China loaned pandas to Los Angeles for exhibition during the 1984 Summer Olympics.
Refer to “Two Pandas Also Coming to Olympics, Chinese Say,” Los Angeles Times, 24 May 1984, p. A1.

70
World Wild Fund, Position Statement on Exhibition Loans of Giant Panda, quoted in George B. Schaller,
The Last Panda (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 275.

29

suspension by foreign governments.
71
It was not until the mid-1990s when American
zoos were allowed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to borrow pandas from China in
the form of scientific research project that would “directly benefit panda conservation
through a coordinated effort that supports China's National Plan, National Survey, or
Captive Breeding Plan.”
72
Since 1996 twelve zoos in eight countries
73
have signed
agreements with the Chinese side to borrow pandas for public exhibition and scientific
research (Table 1). It is noteworthy that this inter-state loan is restricted to requests from
overseas countries
74
and is not applied to domestic zoos in Mainland China, Hong Kong,
Macao, and Taiwan (seen as “domestic” by Beijing) which receive pandas as goodwill
gifts from the central government (Table 2).
Based on my analysis of panda diplomacy’s rationales, diplomatic objectives, and
various forms, the next chapter will spotlight three important episodes of panda
diplomacy in contemporary China—the giving of pandas to the United States by the
Chiang Kai-shek government during the Second World War, by Beijing during Nixon’s
historic visit to the PRC in 1972, and to Taiwan to improve cross-straits relations in the

71
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “Policy on Giant Panda Permits,” 3,
http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/giant%20panda%20policy.pdf.

72
Ibid., 1.

73
Refer to Table 1. Mexico is the only country whose living pandas are the descendants of pandas sent by
China as free gifts and thus has ownership of the pandas. Zoo Berlin’s panda, Bao Bao, is the only live
panda that was sent by Beijing as a free gift to foreign countries. Germany borrowed one panda, Yan Yan,
from China in 2001and it died in 2007. Other pandas in Table 1 are either directly borrowed from China or
cubs of the pandas loaned by China.

74
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
“Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,”
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#texttop.
30

21
st
century. By providing an empirical analysis of the three case studies of panda
diplomacy in three different historical periods, the following chapters will demonstrate
how this public diplomacy instrument helps China translate its alternative soft power
resource, the charm of pandas, into desired policy outcomes by approaching a broader
audience in foreign countries.

31

Chapter Four: Three Case Studies on Panda Diplomacy—An Empirical Analysis
PANDA DIPLOMACY DURING THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD
The first live panda seen in Western society was called Su-Lin. As a cub, it was
captured by a New York fashion designer, Ruth Harkness, on the border of Tibet and
Sichuan in 1936, and brought back to the U.S. the following year.
75
In early February, the
Chicago Zoological Park in Brookfield agreed to temporarily display Sun-Lin
76
and
eventually purchased it for permanent exhibition in April.
77
Over 325,000 people visited
this baby panda within a six-month period.
78
A dozen or so articles in the Chicago
Tribune in 1937 reported stories on Su-Lin, along with coverage on daily life in Chinese
societies.
79
Although Su-Lin was not given by the Chinese government to serve any
diplomatic purpose, it did serve to spark the American public’s great interest in China.
It was not until the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Party
(KMT) government that the age of panda diplomacy officially began. The year 1941
witnessed how China was suffering from the bitter war against Japan. Due to the
isolationism that dominated American politics in the early 1940s, Washington refused to
provide war-torn China with the aid it needed to sustain the endless war. However,

75
For more information regarding Mrs. Harkness’s adventure in China, please refer to Vicki Constantine
Croke, The Lady and the Panda: the True Adventure of the First American Explorer to Bring Back China’s
Most Exotic Animal (New York: Random House, 2005).

76
“Panda will visit Brookfield,” Chicago Tribune, 22 January 1937, p. 2.

77
“Su-Lin Likes It at Brookfield: So She'll Stay,” Chicago Tribune, 20 April 1937, p.1.

78
“325,000 Gape at Panda, Panda Yawns at 325,000,” Chicago Tribune, 18 July 1937, p. 19.

79
For example, “Tells how old and new Meet in China Today,” Chicago Tribune, 7 April 1937, p. 29.
32

humanitarian supplies collected by American NGOs were continuously shipped to China
and became significantly important for the Chinese people. As a gesture of deep
appreciation of the selfless help from the American public, the government of the ROC
announced in September 1941 that it would give one panda (later a pair) to the United
China Relief, one of the most influential American NGOs that sent aid to China, shortly
after Pandora, a panda housed in the New York Bronx Zoo, died on May 13, 1941.
80
On
November 9, 1941, five days before the two pandas were shipped to the U.S. from
China’s war-time capital, Chongqing, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, China’s First-Lady,
delivered a radio speech to the American people:
Through the United China Relief, you, our American friends, are alleviating the
suffering of our people and are binding the wounds which have been wantonly
inflicted upon them through no fault of their own. As a very small way of saying
'Thank you', we would like to present to America, through you, Mr. Tee-Van, this
pair of comical, black-and-white, furry pandas. We hope that their cute antics will
bring as much joy to the American children as American friendship has brought to
our Chinese people.
81

According to Mme. Chiang’s speech, it is tempting to interpret the ROC’s panda
diplomacy as merely a gesture of goodwill to express China’s great gratitude and sincere
friendship towards the American public. In return for America’s selfless help towards the
Chinese, the ROC sent a pair of pandas to console the American people’s sorrow from
losing their beloved animal star. However, the ROC’s panda diplomacy, under close

80
Refer to “Pandora Dies At Zoo: Popular Giant Panda Is Victim of Unidentified Ailment,” New York
Times, 14 May 1941, p. 23; “Bronx To Get New Panda: Mme. Chiang Kai-shek Allows Gift in Thanks for
China Aid,” New York Times, 12 September 1941, p.23; and Ramona and Desmond Morris, The Giant
Panda, 70.

81
Ramona and Desmond Morris, The Giant Panda, 72.
33

scrutiny, bore more important political and diplomatic implications. By giving its unique
animals to the U.S., the ROC hoped pandas would remind the American public of the
pain and suffering their country was bearing and thus arouse a sympathetic domestic
public opinion towards China, which pressed Washington to change its isolationist policy.
Apart from the gratitude and goodwill conveyed in her speech, Mme. Chiang also
reminded her American audiences of the humanitarian disasters in China caused by
war—poorly-equipped doctors had to use bamboo and artillery shells to make stretchers
and scalpels in their hospitals and numerous patients’ lives were jeopardized everyday
due to the lack of sophisticated medical appliances, such as X-Ray machines, which
heavily relied on foreign aid.
82

Given that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and America’s participation in World
War II occurred only weeks after the handover of the two pandas, it is true that the extent
to which panda diplomacy succeeded in accomplishing its original diplomatic purpose—
prompting Washington’s war-time aid to China—is difficult to measure. Panda
diplomacy, however, did manage to achieve one positive diplomatic outcome for China.
Through presenting a pair of pandas to the U.S., panda diplomacy gave China and its
leader high publicity in American society and further tightened Sino-U.S. relations in the
1940s by enhancing the mutual understandings of people in the two countries. After Mme.
Chiang made the announcement in September, a series of follow-up reports on the panda
handover were published by the New York Times, in which Mme. Chiang’s name and her

82
“Jiaohuan zhengui Qinqie de Youqing, Jiang Kong liangfuren duimei guangbo—tongshi songli,”
[“Exchange of Precious Friendship, Mme. Chiang and Mme. Kung making speech to the U.S. and sending
pandas”] Zhongyang Ribao [Central Daily], 10 November 1941, section 2.
34

appreciation of the help from America were mentioned over and over.
83
One special
report published one day after the panda handover held in Chongqing quoted Mme.
Chiang’s speech and underlined China’s goodwill and friendship to the U.S. conveyed by
China’s First Lady.
84
Apart from giving high publicity to Mme. Chiang, panda diplomacy
was also a good opportunity for Chinese officials, and the Chinese commoners, to come
under the media spotlight. When covering the pandas’ formal debut in the Bronx Zoo,
one New York Times article reported how China’s gifts were presented to the American
public by Dr. Tsunechi Yu, China’s Consul General in New York City, along with an
illustration showing a two-year-old Chinese child inspecting one of the two pandas.
85
At
least three other Chinese children were invited as representatives of China and United
China Relief to the Bronx Zoo’s panda-related events in the next year.
86
The arrival of the
two pandas also triggered a nation-wide name selection contest co-sponsored by CBS,
United China Relief, and the New York Zoological Society in 1942,
87
which not only

83
“Bronx To Get New Panda: Mme. Chiang Kai-shek Allows Gift in Thanks for China Aid,” New York
Times, 12 September 1941, p. 23; “Zoo Sending For Panda: Staff Man to Fly to China for Gift of Mme.
Chiang Kai-shek,” New York Times, 23 September 1941, p. 25; “Giant Panda on Way Here,” New York
Times, Oct 22 1941, p. 25; “Zoo To Get Two Pandas Male and Female Awaiting Shipment From
Chungking,” New York Times, 27 October 1941, p. 19.

84
“Two Pandas Are Presented to Bronx Zoo By Chinese at Ceremony in Chungking,” New York Times, 10
November 1941, p. 19.

85
“Newcomer To The Zoo Gets Acquainted,” New York Times, 31 December 1941, p. 19.

86
“Panda Party Leads to Panda-Monium: Zoo Marks First Birthday of Female Presented by Wife of Chiang
Kai-shek,” New York Times, 31 March 1942, p. 28; “Pan-Dee and Pan-Dah Cut Capers Before Accepting
Names at the Zoo,” New York Times, 28 May 1942, p. 19.

87
“Pandas’ Names Selected,” New York Times, 26 April 1942, p. 32.
35

brought the charm of pandas to every corner of the country but also spread China’s
influence from metropolitan New York City to other parts of the U.S.
88

Unlike previous panda-moniums in the western world,
89
the years of 1941 and
1942 witnessed the first time in modern history when pandas were employed by the
Chinese government as a diplomatic tool to approach foreign audiences. Mme. Chiang’s
speech made it clear that the major recipient of the two pandas was not the American
government but ordinary people in the U.S., such as American children.
90
Her telegram
sent to United China Relief in September 1941 called the panda (only one panda was
given to the U.S. at first
91
) “a token of appreciation to the citizens of New York.”
92

China’s intention was well-received by the American media. When reporting the two
pandas’ arrival and their display in the Bronx Zoo, New York Times articles referred to
both of them as a “gift to the American people.”
93
Although no substantial evidence
shows sending a pair of pandas to the U.S. resulted from a sophisticated public diplomacy
strategy designed by the KMT government, it might be safe to argue that the Chinese
policy-makers back to the early 1940s had had a rough understanding of the important
role foreign publics played in achieving one country’s diplomatic goals, which serves to

88
The winner of this contest, Nancy Lostutter, came from Columbus, Indiana. Refer to note 86.

89
Such as the one in 1936 when Ruth Harkness brought the first live panda to the U.S.

90
Refer to note 81.

91
More detail on how the second panda was decided to send out could be found in Ramona and Desmond
Morris, The Giant Panda, 71.

92
“Bronx To Get New Panda: Mme. Chiang Kai-shek Allows Gift in Thanks for China Aid.”

93
For example, “Pandas Come From China: Pair Arrive in San Francisco in Convoy with Wounded,” New
York Times, 26 December 1941, p. 15.
36

explain the origin of the ROC’s panda diplomacy in 1941. In addition, offering two
pandas to replace the Bronx Zoo’s Pandora, whose death sorrowed the American public,
reflected Chinese leaders’ (at least Mme. Chiang’s) keen awareness of their foreign
audience’s emotional needs. By giving a quick response to its foreign audiences’ needs
and taking it into policy-making, the ROC’s panda diplomacy is, in some way,
characterized by a two-way communication that is seen as one of the symbols of modern
public diplomacy.
The ROC’s panda diplomacy in the 1940s was unprecedented and historically
significant also in the sense of giving its initiating country a lot of publicity among the
target audiences. It is true that the effect of panda diplomacy by the ROC should not be
overestimated in terms of prompting Washington’s war-time aid to China, considering
the U.S.’s declaration of war on Japan in December 1941, only weeks after the panda
handover. However, the good publicity and increasing public awareness of China (and
Chinese leaders) resulting from panda diplomacy contributed to laying a solid foundation
for deeper cooperation between the two countries. When Mme. Chiang had her celebrity-
like visit to the U.S. in 1943, her fame and charisma were not only well-received by
America’s top politicians but also drew welcome greetings from thousands of ordinary
people in American society.
94
If Mme. Chiang’s visit to the U.S. did serve to deepen the
bilateral relations between the two countries in the war period, as argued by some

94
Refer to New York Times and Washington Post articles published from 13 February 1943 to 18 July 18
1943. Mme. Chiang was also made the cover of the March 1 issue of Time Magazine in 1943.
37

scholars,
95
her popularity might be partially attributed to the extensive publicity she and
China enjoyed in 1941 and 1942.
In terms of increasing China’s influence among foreign audiences and
consolidating relations with its American alliance, the ROC’s panda diplomacy was a
great success in the 1940s.
96
However, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime was defeated by its
communist adversaries in the subsequent civil war and driven to Taiwan, an island
thousands of miles from the pandas’ habitats in western China. Hence, the era of the
ROC’s panda diplomacy ended. However, the heyday of panda diplomacy was not over
in 1949. The newly-founded People’s Republic of China (PRC) would soon inherit this
policy and lead it to its peak in the following decades.

BETWEEN FOES AND FRIENDS: PANDA DIPLOMACY IN THE EARLY PRC
Established by communist revolutionaries in 1949, the PRC spontaneously chose
the Soviet Union as its ideological patron in hopes that aid from the latter would help it
build a strong and prosperous communist country. Therefore, strengthening its
relationship with Moscow and getting China high in the Soviet Union’s political agenda
became the top priority for Beijing’s foreign policy-makers in the 1950s. It was under
such circumstances that panda diplomacy was adopted by the PRC as a way to engage its
powerful neighbor. In 1957 and 1959, China gave two pandas, Ping-Ping and An-An, as

95
More detail on Mme. Chiang’s visit to the U.S. in 1943, please refer to Jing Zeng, “Lun 1943nian Song
Meiling zai Meiguo de Yanjiang jiqi Yingxiang,” [On Song Meiling’s Speech in the U.S. And Its Influence
in 1943] Xueshu Luntan Lilun Yuekan, [Journal of Academic Theory Forum] 7 (2009): 52-54.

96
Chiang Kai-shek’s regime also gave one panda named Lien-Ho (lit. “unity”) to London Zoo in 1946.
38

free gifts to Moscow, hoping they would present Beijing’s ideological commitment and
sincere friendship to its Russian audiences. In this sense, the PRC’s panda diplomacy
towards communist countries
97
shared the same objective as that of its ROC predecessor:
using pandas as goodwill gifts to important allies to tighten relations. The next case study
will spotlight how panda diplomacy achieved its second diplomatic purpose: working as
an engagement tool to increase China’s benign profile in foreign countries where China
had tension and to change their publics’ negative perspective of China. In the following
paragraphs, I will provide an empirical analysis of the PRC’s panda diplomacy to the U.S.
during and after President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972 and discuss how panda
diplomacy served as a tool for the PRC’s attempt to improve relations with its former
adversary by approaching the American public.
It was the common anxiety of the Soviet expansion in the Far East that brought
the two former enemies, the PRC and the U.S., together in the early 1970s. Beginning in
the mid-1960s, disputes over interpretation on communism and intermittent border
clashes between the two communist states eventually led to Moscow’s aggressive nuclear
blackmail against the PRC in 1969. Seeing the Soviet Union as an immediate threat,
Beijing came to realize the necessity and possibility of building a closer relationship with
Washington,
98
whose new administration had been trying to put an end to America’s war
in Vietnam and itself began to re-evaluate Beijing’s importance in the Sino-Soviet-U.S.

97
It is believed that at least five pandas were given as free gifts by the PRC to North Korea since the 1960s.

98
Chen Jian and David Wilson, “'All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos': Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border
Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69,” Cold War International History
Project Bulletin 11, (winter 1998): 166-168 and 170-171.
39

relations.
99
In a sign of goodwill to the U.S., Beijing released several American citizens
detained in China and invited the U.S. table tennis team to visit China.
100
Such gestures,
parallel to the Nixon Administration’s new China Policy,
101
served to improve the
American public’s opinion of the PRC to some extent.
102
However, the negative impact
of Beijing’s self-isolation and revolutionary radicalism in the past twenty years was not
easily eliminated from American society and the general public, as Harding argues, still
“remained highly skeptical about China, with pluralities opposing diplomatic relations
with Peking and China’s membership in the United Nations.”
103
MacMillan rightly
notices the impact American public opinion wielded upon Washington’s foreign policy-
making
104
and an unfavorable image of the PRC in the eyes of the American public
would undoubtedly hamper efforts by both governments to thaw their bilateral
relations.
105
Beijing, to ensure a smooth transition of Sino-U.S. relations, was in need of
improving its image in the U.S. and approaching the American public to change their
negative views of the PRC. It was against this historical backdrop that panda diplomacy

99
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 33-47;
Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport and
London: Greenwood Press, 1984), 135.

100
Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 38.

101
Harding, A Fragile Relations, 33-47, and Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao (New York: Random
House, 2007), 110-146.

102
Refer to note 99.

103
Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 40.

104
MacMillan, Nixon and Mao, 7; also refer to Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 131-135.

105
Refer to note 101.
40

was adopted by Beijing to achieve its second diplomatic objective during and after
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.
After Henry Kissinger’s two trips to China and extensive preliminary preparations,
on February 21, 1972, Air Force One landed at the Beijing Airport and Richard Nixon
became the first American president who set foot on Chinese soil. On February 22, a state
banquet was held at the Great Hall of the People in honor of President Nixon. According
to Chinese sources, the PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, after the welcome music, offered a
pack of China’s Panda Cigarettes to Mrs. Nixon. Her answer was, “No, I do not smoke.”
Zhou pointed at the panda on the cigarette pack and said, “Do you like this? Beijing Zoo
will give two pandas to the American people.”
106

After being confirmed by Mrs. Nixon to the American media, Zhou’s promise,
“[w]e'll load up the plane with pandas,”
107
greatly resonated with American society and a
fanatic panda-monium soon swept across the U.S., arousing intense excitement from zoo
keepers, politicians, animal lovers, businesspersons, and the general public. Their
positive reaction gained the attention of America’s mainstream newspapers whose news
reports vividly reflected the American public’s positive response to Beijing’s panda
diplomacy in 1972.

106
“Guobao Xiongmao Nayiduan Wangshi,” [“The Story of Pandas, China’s National Treasure”] Jiefang
Ribao [Liberation Daily], 20 July 2006, section 4.

107
“China Giving US Two White Pandas,” Washington Post, 22 February 1972, p. A6.
41

With the destination of China’s pandas undecided,
108
the competition to get them
started in no time. It was reported that zoos in Chicago, Honolulu, Washington D.C., and
Milwaukee vied to be chosen to house the two pandas.
109
Major politicians in Illinois
started lobbying to get the two pandas for the Brookfield Zoo. The equally avid Bronx
Zoo in New York City directly appealed to Nixon himself through a telegram signed by
Laurance Rockefeller.
110
Animal keepers in the National Zoo voiced their right to get the
two pandas since Washington had the tradition of housing diplomatic gifts from foreign
countries.
111
This dispute eventually came to an end when the First Family announced on
March 14 that “the two giant pandas from China should go to the National Zoo” because
“this is a gift of the people of China to all the people of the United States.”
112

Just like their anxious zoo keepers, ordinary Americans could not contain their
enthusiasm for the two cuddly animals. The precise arrival date of China’s pandas, for
example, was subject to so much attention that the Washington Post published at least
five articles in the preceding month to cover their most recent itinerary.
113
Before Dr.
Theodore Reed, director of the National Zoological Park, left for Beijing to pick up the

108
“Destination Undecided,” New York Times, 23 February 1972, p. 15.

109
“US Zoo clamoring for Chinese Pandas,” Washington Post, 26 February 1972, p. A6.

110
“American Zoos Vying for 2 Gift Pandas,” New York Times, 1 March 1972, p. 1.

111
“About Those Pandas,” Washington Post, 2 March 1972, p. A18; “Great Panda Squabble,” Washington
Post, 3 March 1972, p. B1.

112
“Home for Peking's Pandas,” Washington Post, 14 March 1972, p. B1.

113
Refer to “Chinese Pandas Due Here April 1,” Washington Post, 11 March 1972, p. A6; “Picking up the
Pandas,” Washington Post, 6 April 1972, p. D2; “Pandas to Begin Trip This Week,” Washington Post, 13
April 1972, p. B 5; “Pandas' Arrival Set This Morning,” Washington Post, 16 April 1972, p. D7; “Panda
Protocol: Government secret?” Washington Post, 17 April 1972, p. B1.
42

two pandas, a special press conference was held in which fifteen questions were fired at
Dr. Reed on the pandas’ names (the two pandas’ names, Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing,
were not released to the public until their arrival in the U.S.), weight, and their
dispositions.
114
One National Zoological Park officer announced that she would “jump
off the Calvert Street bridge” if she could not see the two pandas transported to the
National Zoo in two days.
115
An artist creatively designed a bumper sticker reading “I
Love Zoo" with the two O's in "zoo" represented by pandas' heads.
116
Neil Ball, the
White House’s only panda liaison, had to leave for Canada to escape the public zeal.
117
A
prevailing panda-monium made some toy factory owners boast their panda products with
“tremendous buyer acceptance”
118
which was verified by New York stuffed animals
salespersons’ astonishment at the high demand of panda toys and the unbelievable
popularity of a button product with a picture of a panda.
119
The National Zoo decided to
“open a special kiosk near the panda house,” selling various panda souvenirs.
120
As
testimony to the public’s insatiable appetite for more panda news, the government drew

114
“Pandas’ Place,” Washington Post, 29 March 1972, p. B1.

115
“The Panda Watch; Panda Watch: Nothing Yet,” Washington Post, 14 April 1972, p. D1.

116
Ibid.

117
Ibid.

118
“Toy Makers Gear For Panda Craze,” New York Times, 6 March 1972, p. 11.

119
Ibid.

120
“The Panda Watch; Panda Watch: Nothing Yet.”
43

much criticism when it secretly transported pandas from Andrews Air Force Base to the
National Zoo on April 16.
121

Perhaps nothing could reflect American society’s panda fever better than the
soaring attendance at the National Zoo. The first public open day on April 22 witnessed
more than 8,000 people, children and adults alike, waiting in the rain for at least half an
hour to see the embodiment of China’s panda diplomacy. Over 1,200 visitors per hour
walked past the two pandas’ glass-lined cage to have a brief glimpse at them.
122
When the
weather got better the next day, twice as many people passed the pandas’ quarters by 4
p.m., the closing time of National Zoo, with the average hourly number of panda viewers
reaching 2,000 to 2,500 for seven hours, in spite of their ten-second stay in front of the
pandas.
123
A Washington Post article published that May reported skyrocketing zoo
attendance since the pandas’ debut a month earlier: the National Zoo received 427,439
more people from the same four weeks the year before and the total number of zoo
visitors from April 20 to May 23 reached 1,130,608, with the average daily attendance
being 34,216. Photographs and color slides of the pandas became the hottest item at the
Smithsonian Institution's Photographic Services Division—between 200 and 250 pieces
had been sold during the last three weeks.
124

121
“Panda Protocol: Government Secret?”

122
“Sleepy Pandas Ignore 8,000 Visitors to Zoo,” Washington Post, 23 April 1972, p. C1.

123
“Trying to See the Pandas,” Washington Post, 24 April 1972, p. B1.

124
“Zoo-Goers Going,” Washington Post, 27 May 27 1972, p. B3.
44

Without doubt, pandas’ incredible popularity in American society gave the PRC a
great opportunity to raise its profile in the U.S. during and after Nixon’s visit and
conveyed its gesture of goodwill to millions of the American people. By sparking the
American public’s curiosity and interest in the two animals, panda diplomacy helped
Beijing remain on the radar of the major American newspapers months after Nixon’s
China visit was over in February.
125
The month-long panda handover and the follow-up
reports on their lives in the National Zoo also made the American public acquainted with
the full title of the Chinese government: the People’s Republic of China, instead of the
simple “Communist China” as it was branded before.
126
Although Washington had
changed the way the PRC was officially addressed in the late 1960s,
127
ordinary
Americans mostly ignored such nuance. The heavy coverage on the two pandas resulting
from Beijing’s panda diplomacy, however, made the PRC a household name to the
American public when they read news reports on pandas that appeared to be more
captivating than news reports on U.S.-China relations. Titled as “the gift from the people
of China to all the people of the United States,”
128
the two pandas, thanks to their
universal appeal, attracted millions of visitors to the National Zoo and managed to

125
For example, “Politicos’ Pre-Peking Panda Peek,” Washington Post, 7 June 1972, p. C4.

126
Refer to Washington Post articles published from 22 February

to 22 July 1972, and New York Times
articles published during the same period. The author of one New York Times article published on 23 April
1972, for example, still called the PRC “Communist China.” But that is more as a sarcastic comment on
Washington’s refusal to allow one Chinese panda, Chi-Chi, enter the U.S. in the 1950s since it was “a
product of Communist China.” Refer to “Pandas: A China Doll and Pal Come To Town,” New York Times,
23 April 1972, p. E5.

127
Harding, Fragile Relationship, 35.

128
“Home for Peking's Pandas.” Also refer to “Awwwwwwww, They’re Cute,” Washington Post, 21 April
1972, p. A1 and “Picking up the Pandas,” in which the two pandas were referred as gifts from China to the
people of the U.S.
45

convey the PRC’s goodwill to many more American audiences by serving as the symbol
of a new Sino-U.S. friendship. The two pandas’ symbolic meanings became so influential
that visiting them in the National Zoo became a regular routine for American delegations
before their trip to China in 1972.
129

Beijing’s panda diplomacy also made it possible for both the U.S. and China to
have low-level exchanges regarding the panda handover, which was particularly
beneficial to the PRC in terms of conveying goodwill directly to its American audiences.
As the representative from the recipient country, Dr. Reed went to Beijing to pick up the
two pandas from his Chinese counterparts, which was reported not only by the American
media but covered by China’s mainstream newspaper.
130
Before Dr. Reed’s departure
from Beijing, one Chinese official, Dr. Ting Hung, and one senior panda keeper, Yang
Chung, were chosen to accompany them to the U.S.
131
Although the spotlight was
squarely on the animals, the two individuals accompanying the pandas did serve to
project a positive image of the Chinese people and present China’s gesture of goodwill
directly to the American public. One Washington Post article reported the two Chinese
guests as people with good table manner and highlighted their toast to peace, Nixon, Mao,
and pandas.
132
When a special ceremony was held by the National Zoo to welcome the
pandas on April 20, the two Chinese guests were invited to the event and Dr. Ting jointly

129
“Politicos’ Pre-Peking Panda Peek.”

130
“Beijingshi Geweihui Zhuren Wude Huijian Husong Shexiangniu de Meiguo Keren,” [Wude, Director
of the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, Received American Guests who Sent Musk Oxen to
China”] Renming Ribao, [People’s Daily] 14 April 1972, section 5; “Picking up the Pandas.”

131
“Picking up the Pandas.”

132
“The Panda Watch,” Washington Post, 18 April 1972, p. B1.
46

presented the pandas with Mrs. Nixon on behalf of the Chinese government. The picture
of Dr. Ting and Mrs. Nixon standing together in front of one panda appeared on the front
page of the Washington Post published the next day,
133
bringing the symbolic message, a
sign of the U.S.-China rapprochement, to millions of American people. After the formal
welcoming ceremony, Dr. Ting “unveiled a large photograph of two pandas” and was
given an opportunity to deliver a speech to the public in which he called the two pandas
“a symbol of friendship between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of
America.”
134
Although two Chinese guests’ stay in the U.S. only lasted a few days, they
did enhance American society’s perception of the PRC by attending various public events
and brought the message of friendship directly to American audiences.
It is unquestionable that Beijing’s panda diplomacy in 1972 was a breakthrough
for the new Sino-U.S. relations in the following decade. By triggering a prevailing panda-
monium in the U.S., panda diplomacy managed to boost the PRC’s profile in American
society and helped Beijing inject a sense of goodwill directly to the American people.
Although its effort should not be overestimated, it might be safe to argue that the 1972
panda diplomacy served as an important factor that lifted the American public’s view of
the PRC from a favorable rating of 23% in 1972 to 49% in 1973 while decreased those
with an unfavorable rating by almost 30% within a year,
135
paving the way for the
normalization of Sino-U.S. relations in 1979. The 1972 panda diplomacy was later

133
“Awwwwwwww, They’re Cute.”

134
Ibid.

135
Harding, Fragile Relationship, 363.
47

adopted as a diplomatic paradigm for Beijing’s policy-makers: from 1972 to 1982,
another 14 pandas were given as goodwill gifts to six major capitalist countries, all of
which established diplomatic relations with the PRC by the early 1980s.
136

Though the 1972 panda diplomacy was overall a success, a close scrutiny on the
subject also shows many flaws. When approaching the American public, Beijing
appeared to be cautious and passive. In contrast with Mme. Chiang’s visit to the U.S. in
1943, the PRC did not have any follow-up action after the panda handover in 1972 and
neither side conducted any panda-related events in the years to come. Although panda
diplomacy did increase the PRC’s image in the U.S., it seemed as if China’s decision-
makers lacked other long-term strategies build upon this success. No high-profile
exchange was followed after the two pandas’ debut in the National Zoo. Moreover,
Beijing’s two representatives, though projecting a positive image of the PRC in the U.S.,
did not have adequate contact with the American public, let alone any two-way
interaction between the two parties. Given the fact that the PRC was still under the
radical Cultural Revolution when anti-Americanism had been prevailing for decades,
such flaws are understandable and it might have been overly ambitious for the PRC
government to fully open up dialogue with the United States in the early 1970s. In this
sense, much credit should be given to the PRC’s 1972 panda diplomacy in terms of its
contributions to Beijing’s successful diplomatic re-orientation in the 1970s by improving

136
Four were given to Japan (1972, 1980, and 1982), one pair in France (1973), Great Britain (1974), West
Germany (1974), Mexico (1975), and Spain (1978), respectively.
48

its image overseas and sending goodwill message to foreign publics who previously saw
China in a negative perspective.

GOODWILL FROM THE MOTHERLAND: PANDA DIPLOMACY IN TAIWAN
In spite of its unique diplomatic role, panda diplomacy, after helping the PRC
normalize relations with most of its former adversaries in the late 1970s and the early
1980s, ceased to carry diplomatic implications and was replaced by apolitical exchanges,
such as commercial panda displays and scientific research projects, in the rest of the
century.
137
It was not until the advent of the new millennium that panda diplomacy
regains its significance in Beijing’s foreign policy-making and has started to perform its
third diplomatic function.
After the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the political separation
across the Taiwan Strait has become a major headache for the PRC’s leadership, which
has been pursuing national re-unification since then. However, the rising call for
independence on the other side of the strait
138
and the deep distrust of Beijing’s
authoritarian regime by the Taiwanese public have made the prospect of the PRC’s re-
unification strategy less promising. The victory of the pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections further aroused
Beijing’s anxiety, especially after the re-elected DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian,

137
Refer to Chapter Three.

138
More information regarding the rise of Taiwan Independence Movement, please refer to Daniel Lynch,
Rising China and Asian Democratization: Socialization to “Global Culture” in the Political
Transformations of Thailand, China, and Taiwan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 150-181.
49

indicated in December 2004 that his administration might seek to revise the ROC
Constitution to legalize Taiwan’s separation from China.
139
As a response, the PRC
passed the Anti-Secession Law on March 14, 2005, giving Beijing legal rights to use
military force if Taipei declared independence. Such hard-line posture not surprisingly
worsened the public opinion of the PRC in Taiwanese society. One poll conducted in
March 2005 showed that around 70% of the respondents saw Beijing as “hostile/not
friendly” towards the Taiwanese government and people,
140
reaching the highest
unfavorable rate in the recent years. Intensifying the Taiwanese public’s opposition
towards Beijing certainly contradicted the PRC’s basic Taiwan Policy.
141
In this sense, a
prior task for Beijing’s policy-makers was to reach Taiwanese audiences and to soften
their hostile attitude towards the PRC. It was against this historical backdrop that panda
diplomacy was given its third diplomatic objective after Lien Chan’s landmark visit to
Mainland China in 2005: to approach the Taiwanese public and serve to defuse their
hostility towards the PRC.
From April 26 to May 3, 2005, Lien Chan, the Honorary Chairman of KMT,
travelled to Mainland China for a party-to-party visit at the invitation of Hu Jintao, the

139
Robert S. Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March - April
2006): 144.

140
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “Minzhong Duiyu Liangan Guanxi Wei Youshan huo Didui de Kanfa,
[“Public Opinion on the Cross-Strait Relations: Friendly or Hostile”] 10.
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771333410.pdf.

141
One of the fundamental guidelines of the PRC’s Taiwan Policy is to solidify the Taiwanese compatriots
to deter Taiwan Independence, as reflected by Hu Jinto’s speech made on March 4
th
, 2005. “Hujintao jiu
Xinxingshi xia Fazhan Liangan Guanxi Tichu SidianYijian,” [Hu Jintao Puts Forward Four Points on
Developing the Cross-Strait Relations in the New Context] http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-03-
04/17225269441s.shtml.
50

General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Lien’s formal visit was seen
by both sides as a big step for the two parties to fix their tense relationship since 1949 and
a great opportunity for the PRC side to approach its Taiwanese audiences through this
high-profile visit. On May 3, before Lien’s return to Taiwan, Chen Yunlin, director of the
Taiwan Work Office of Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Taiwan
Affairs Office of the State Council, announced in Shanghai that the PRC would give a
pair of pandas to the Taiwanese and hoped pandas “with their tame nature, air of
nobleness and cuddly looks will bring joy and laughter to the Taiwan compatriots,
children in particular.”
142

Essentially, Beijing’s 2005 panda diplomacy shared many similarities with its
1972 predecessor: both aimed to engage a not-that-friendly foreign audience (Beijing
definitely did not regard the Taiwanese as a foreign audience, nor did it treat Taiwan as a
foreign nation) by sending pandas as a gesture of goodwill; both intended to change the
negative public opinion of the PRC in order to promote a better bilateral relations; and,
both were conducted during a high-profile visit which received a lot of public attention in
Beijing’s targeted societies.
143
However, Beijing’s 2005 panda diplomacy, in a technical
sense, encountered challenges and changes its 1941 and 1972 predecessors never met,
which rendered itself as a distinctive case.

142
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, “Mainland presents giant pandas to Taiwan,”
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=Headlines&title=Search&m_id=369.

143
With regard to public attention of Lien’s visit to Mainland China, refer to Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC), “Jiushisi niandu minzhong dui Guomingdang Zhuxi Lianzhan Fangwen Dalu de Kanfa,” [Public
Opinion on Lien Chan’s Trip to Mainland China in 2006]
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771364217.pdf.
51

Unlike the overwhelming panda-monium in the U.S. a few decades ago,
Taiwanese society’s response to Beijing’s gesture of goodwill was relatively frigid. Not
surprisingly, President Chen Shui-bian immediately expressed his indirect disapproval of
pandas’ transportation to Taiwan on May 3
144
which was endorsed by his DPP
subordinates.
145
Even the Taiwanese public’s response to Beijing’s pandas was not very
positive. Several scholars saw the two pandas as Beijing’s attempt to “downgrade
Taiwan's status to become part of China,”
146
a way to “destroy Taiwan's psychological
defenses,”
147
and “goodwill gifts in order to achieve China's goal of undermining our
[Taiwan’s] sovereignty and dividing Taiwan.”
148
Taiwan’s animal conservationists
argued Beijing should make its pandas “remain in their natural habitat”
149
and called the
offer “a gift … in the name of peace for their political games.”
150
According to polls
conducted days after Beijing’s announcement, a slight majority of the respondents
thought that Taiwan should accept the two pandas. However, the public still remained

144
“Bian: Zengsong Maoxiong shi Kebuke de Wenti,” [Chen Shui-bian: Sending pandas is an issue of Yes
or No] Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], 4 May 2005, p. A5.

145
“MAC looks gift pandas in the mouth; says ‘no thanks’,” Taipei Times, 3 May 3 2005, p. 16.

146
Ibid.

147
“'Rebuff China's pandas': Groups,” Taipei Times, 6 May 2005, p. 2.

148
Ibid.

149
“Animal activists condemn panda offer,” Taipei Times, 4 May 2005, p.1.

150
“Taipei plans ‘panda task force,’ while activists protest,” Taipei Times, 5 May 2005, p. 2.

52

suspicious of Beijing’s intent with over 40% of the respondents seeing the two pandas as
the PRC’s United Front tool, instead of a gesture of goodwill.
151

It might be the first time in history that China’s panda diplomacy lost its efficacy.
Although Beijing instantly dissociated pandas with a “United Front tool,”
152
it did realize
its poor credit among the Taiwanese audiences and started to downplay the role
governmental organizations played by inviting other non-official players to participate in
its panda diplomacy, a new phenomenon never seen in previous cases.
On August 27, 2005, a special conference on panda conservation was held in the
Woolong Giant Panda Research Center by the China Wildlife Conservation Association
(CWCA). Seventeen Taiwanese guests, including zoologists, zoo keepers, representatives
from animal conservation groups and other NGOs, were invited to attend the conference
in which both sides exchanged their knowledge and experience on animal conservation,
panda breeding, and daily care. Representatives from the Taipei City Zoo expressed their
welcome to the two pandas and invited the Mainland experts to visit Taiwan in the future.
The CWCA experts hoped the Taiwanese guests could bring their goodwill to the
Taiwanese people, which was answered by the latter’s promise to urge the DPP
government to approve the panda handover as soon as possible.
153
In October 2005, Lien

151
“Jiushisi Niandu Minzhong dui Guomingdang Zhuxi Lianzhan Fangwen Zhongguo Dalu de Kanfa.”

152
People’s Daily Online, “Wangzaixi Qiangdiao Songxiongmao Gei Taiwantongbao jueduibushi
Tongzhan,” [“Wang Zaixi Stressed Pandas Sent to Taiwan Compatriots Were Not a United Front Tool”]
http://tw.people.com.cn/GB/14810/3365703.html.

153
Zhonghua Wang [China.org.cn], “Zuguo Dalu Zengsong Taiwan Tongbao Daxiongmao Zuotanhui
Zaichuan Juxing,” [“Conference on Pandas Sent to Taiwan was Held in Sichuan”]
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/jdty06/953981.htm.
53

Chan was invited by the PRC to visit the Woolong Giant Panda Research Center. Now
known as a peace-bringer in Taiwan, Lien expressed his “efforts to promote the earlier
arrival of the panda couple from the Chinese mainland” and saw the two pandas as
“goodwill, friendship, sincerity and an undescribable feeling” from the Mainland to
Taiwan.
154
Before his departure to Beijing at the invitation of Hu Jintao, James Soong,
Chairman of the People’s First Party, also urged Taipei to accept the two pandas, which
were not a “United Front tool” but gifts that belong to every Taiwanese.
155

Perhaps the most drastic change of the 2005 panda diplomacy was the broader
participation of the Chinese public. On January 6, 2006, Cao Qingyao, the spokesman of
State Forestry Administration, declared that a two-week event would be held for the
Chinese public to recommend names for the two chosen pandas via the Internet and text
message.
156
Six Chinese media
157
were responsible to collect votes from the Chinese
public and sent the ten most-recommended pairs to the China Wildlife Conservation
Association.
158
The ten pairs, after the audit of CWCA, would be announced during the

154
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, “Lien Chan to promote earlier arrival of mainland panda
envoys,” http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=Headlines&title=Search&m_id=470.

155
Lianhe Zaobao, “Sung Chu-yu Daqiaoqian he Hsieh Chang-ting Huimian Shangtan,” [James Soong
Meeting with Frank Hsieh before His Trip to Bridget Mainland China and Taiwan]
http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/taiwan/pages8/taiwan050506a.html.

156
Xinhua News Agency, “Zengtai Daxiongmao Ruming Zhengji Huodong Jiri Qidong,” [The Event to
Name the Pandas Sent to Taiwan Starts Today] http://news.xinhuanet.com/tai_gang_ao/2006-
01/06/content_4017418.htm.

157
They were the People’s Daily, China Central Television, China National Radio, China Green Times,
www.chinataiwan.org, and www.sina.com.cn.

158
Sina.com, “Zengtai Daxiongmao Zhengming Huodong Jiezhi Jin Sishiwang ren Tongguo Xinlangwang
Canyu,” [Around 400,000 People Participated in the Name-picking Event for the Pandas Sent to Taiwan
via Sina.com] http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-01-22/06088934812.shtml.
54

2006 Spring Festival Gala (SFG) held on January 28 and the Chinese public would be
given another chance to vote their favorite pair from the ten choices. When the first round
of voting ended on January 21, it is estimated that over 1.3 million Chinese participated
in the event.
159

Involving the Chinese public’s participation in the form of a national ballot
reflects a new trend of panda diplomacy by its practitioners. Realizing Taiwanese
society’s deep distrust, Beijing hoped the participation of the Chinese public would
enhance credibility for its panda diplomacy and made the pair of pandas a sincere gesture
of goodwill from the Chinese masses, rather than the product of a government-directed
propaganda campaign. Moreover, by giving the Chinese public the right to vote on
pandas’ names, Beijing intended to demonstrate a transparent decision-making process to
the Taiwanese public, which served to project a positive image of Beijing as a
government that respects public opinion and democracy. This strategy appeared to be
more crucial when the final names, Tuan-Tuan and Yuan-Yuan, were chosen at the end
of the 2006 SFG. Meaning “re-union” in the Chinese context, Tuan-Tuan and Yuan-Yuan
were interpreted as a sincere call for re-unification between Mainland China and Taiwan
by the Chinese public, a reflection of the collective mentality of the Chinese people in
general, which was not part of Beijing’s political propaganda. In other words, Beijing’s
effort to engage Taiwanese audiences and pursue a national unification through its panda
diplomacy was justified, and was supported by millions of mainlanders.

159
Taiwan Affairs Offices of the State Council, “Press Conference of Taiwan Affairs Office on 1 January
2006,” http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwfbh0.asp?xwfbh_m_id=60.
55

In spite of its major improvements, Beijing’s panda diplomacy towards Taiwan
was hamstrung by one insurmountable obstacle its practitioners never encountered before:
Taipei’s pro-independence government constantly refused to accept the pandas, leaving
the charm of Beijing’s engagement tools inaccessible to its target audience. President
Chen Shui-bian stressed the political implication of Beijing’s pandas in January 2006,
160

which cast a shadow upon the prospect of the panda handover. On March 31, 2006, the
Council of Agriculture of the Executive Yuan formally refused to issue the permit for
panda exportation, on the ground that the two panda bidders in Taiwan—the Taipei City
Zoo and the Leofoo Village Zoo—did not have necessary facilities to house the
pandas.
161
Taipei’s “panda embargo” brought a suspension to Beijing’s panda diplomacy
for almost two years. It was not until KMT’s crushing victory over DPP in the 2008
presidential election that re-activated Beijing’s panda diplomacy. The elected-president
Ma Ying-jeou implied his approval of the panda handover days after winning the
election.
162
Nine months later, after waiting for over three years, the two pandas were
eventually shipped to Taipei on December 23, 2008.
Although receiving a setback in 2006 due to DPP’s opposition, Beijing’s panda
diplomacy did cause positive effects in Taiwanese society. According to one poll

160
Liberty Times Online, “Bian: Xinge Xurentong Jiji Guanli Youxiao Kaifang Zhengce,” [Chen Shui-bian:
The New Cabinet Should Reach Agreement on the Active Management and Effective Opening Policy]
http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/jan/8/today-t1.htm.

161
Council of Agriculture of the Executive Yuan, “Taipei Shili Dongwuyuan Tongguo Nongweihui
Daxiongmao Shuru zhi Shencha,” [The Taipei City Zoo’s Proposal on Exporting Pandas was Approved by
the Council of Agriculture] http://www.forest.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=28701&ctNode=2577&mp=41.

162
TVBS Online News, “Maoxiong Nenglai le? Ma: Xian Jiejue Guonei Zhengyi,” [Will the Pandas Come?
Ma: Internal Dispute First] http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/news_list.asp?no=aj100920080323193059.
56

conducted in July 2008, over 70% of the respondents were aware of the panda handover
and only around one-fifth of them still refused to accept the two pandas, a 10% decrease
in comparison to the result of the 2005 poll.
163
A poll conducted days before pandas’
arrival showed that less than 50% of the respondents still held the negative view of
Beijing in terms of its attitude towards the Taiwanese government and people, a much
more promising sign compared to the rating three years ago.
164
Based on one TVBS poll
done hours after the two pandas landed in Taiwan, 90% of the respondents knew their
arrival, 63% of them welcomed Beijing’s pandas, and only 22% still saw pandas as
Beijing’s United Front tool.
165
After their arrival, Tuan-Tuan and Yuan-Yuan managed to
attract millions of people to the Taipei City Zoo where they were housed. Three months
after their debut, Tuan-Tuan and Yuan-Yuan received over one million visitors.
166
When
the zoo authority celebrated the pandas’ one-year anniversary in Taiwan last December,
over three million people had visited to the panda couple.
167

Suffice it to say that Beijing’s panda diplomacy to Taiwan demonstrates many
improvements that reflect its practitioners’ new thinking of their diplomatic weapon.

163
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “Minzhong dui Liangan Jingmao ji Teding Jiaoliu de Kanfa,”
[“Public Opinion on the Cross-Strait Economic and Trading Communication and Other Exchanges”] 6,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9739423126.pdf.

164
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “Minzhong dui Dalu Zhengfu dui Wo Taidu de Kanfa” [Public
Opinion on Mainland Government’s Attitudes towards Our Government and People] 2,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/911150224926.pdf.

165
TVBS Poll Center, “Dalu Maoxiong Laitai Mindiao,” [“Poll on Mainland Panda arriving in Taiwan”]
http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200812/doshouldo-20081224194941.pdf.

166
“Pandas receive one millionth visit,” Taipei Times, 18 April 2009, p. 4.

167
TVBS Online News, “Tuan-Yuan Laitai Man Zhounian Canguang Renshu Tupo 300 Wan,” [“More than
300,000 people Visited Tuan-Yuan After Their First Year in Taiwan”]
http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/news_list.asp?no=yehmin20091223180352.
57

Getting the Chinese public involved in panda diplomacy, for example, shows Chinese
policy-makers’ deeper understanding of the role the domestic public could play in their
foreign engagement strategy. Obtaining the participation of the general public, NGOs,
and even influential non-PRC political leaders serves to enhance the credibility of
Beijing’s panda diplomacy and renders the two pandas not as a government-driven
propaganda tool, but as a people-to-people gift that represents the goodwill of the
Chinese public which calls for a cross-strait “re-union,” as the two pandas’ names suggest.
It is also noteworthy that Beijing’s panda diplomacy towards Taiwan, unlike its
predecessor in 1972, is part of a more sophisticated engagement strategy that included
programs with long-term effects. Beijing’s panda offer was originally associated with
several major policies that served to promote the cross-strait exchanges in the field of
agriculture and tourism.
168
Along with the agreement on the panda handover signed in
November 2008, other more far-reaching plans were agreed by both sides, including
financial cooperation, direct flight, and cross-strait postal service.
169
Different from the
1972 panda diplomacy, the PRC held many panda-related events after the panda
handover. A panda theme park, for example, was built in Taipei this year, where
Taiwanese people could interact with their Mainland counterparts, who came directly

168
People’s Daily Online, “Chen Yunlin Shouquan Xuanbu Dalu Tongbao Xiang Taiwan Tongbao
Zengsong DaXiongmao deng,” [Chen Yunlin Was Authorized to Give Taiwan Compatriots Pandas on
Behalf of Mainland Compatriots] http://tw.people.com.cn/GB/14810/3365339.html.

169
Xinhua News Agency, “Lianghui Lishixing Taipei Huitan Jishi,” [“Record on the Historic Summit by
the Two Foundations in Taipei”] http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-11/06/content_10317630.htm.
58

from pandas’ hometown in Sichuan province.
170
When one Mainland delegation visited
Taiwan for a cross-strait economic cooperation event, its leader updated his Taiwanese
audiences with the recent news about the two pandas and paid a visit to the Taipei City
Zoo soon after his arrival in Taiwan.
171

As noted above, Beijing’s panda diplomacy to Taiwan aims to soften its
audiences’ hostility to the PRC government and increase the cross-strait trust and mutual
understanding. In spite of its major setback in 2006, it is safe to contend that panda
diplomacy has managed to achieve its third diplomatic objective. According to a major
opinion poll conducted in April 2010, the disapproval rating of the PRC held by the
Taiwanese public deteriorated significantly since December 2008, maintaining at around
40%
172
from 2009 to 2010. Thanks to pragmatic policies of governments on both sides,
the cross-strait relationship has been improved tremendously since 2008, and efforts to
deepen the cross-strait cooperation, such as the negotiation on the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA), received positive responses from the Taiwanese
public.
173
Serving as the spearhead of the PRC’s cross-strait engagement strategy, panda
diplomacy, by approaching the Taiwanese audience before and after the arrival of its
pandas, became one of the major instruments that decreased Taiwanese publics’

170
ChinaNews, “Liuqibao Fangtai Xian Xiongmaore Zhufu Tuan-Tuan Yuan-Yuan Zaoshengguizi,”
[“Panda-monium after Liu Qibao’s Visit to Taiwan; Good Wishes to the Panda Couple”]
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/tw/tw-ztjz/news/2010/05-24/2300596.shtml.

171
Ibid.

172
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), “Minzhong dui Dangqian Lianan Guanxi zhi Kanfa,” [Public
Opinion on the Current Cross-Strait Relations] 1,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/052010534391.pdf.

173
Ibid., 2.
59

disapproval and distrust of the PRC. As a result, panda diplomacy served to lay a solid
foundation for Beijing’s improving relations with Taipei and even contributed to
Beijing’s long-term re-unification strategy in the future.

60

Chapter Five: Conclusion
The panda, due to its universal appeal and exclusiveness to China, helps the
Chinese governments (both the ROC and the PRC regime) discover an alternative
resource of China’s soft power that is beyond Nye’s categorization. An anthropological
analysis in Chapter Three has unearthed the fact that people’s acceptance and monomania
for pandas are deeply rooted in the human subconsciousness, which is beyond the limits
of nation, ethnicity, and age. Such quality manages to overcome the “language and
cultural gap” frustrating many of China’s soft power policy-makers. Being a unique
animal only native to China’s western mountainous area, the panda has always been seen
as a natural representation of China’s nationhood. The symbolic association between the
panda’s universal appeal with its Chinese-ness identity thus becomes the fundamental
rationale of panda diplomacy, which gives China leverage to attract the foreign public.
Moreover, the zoo, as a low-culture public place visited by families and other social
groups, also helps present the panda’s attractive image to millions of people, which
serves to disseminate China’s gesture of goodwill to a broader audience in the targeted
country.
Since the first pair of pandas was sent to the U.S. in 1941 by the KMT regime,
panda diplomacy has been employed by the Chinese government as a unique engagement
tool to achieve its various diplomatic objectives. Mainly aiming to approach the foreign
public, panda diplomacy, through translating pandas’ attractiveness into a prevailing
panda-monium, bears the responsibility of increasing a high profile for China and getting
its target audience intrigued by China. Tapping the favorable public opinion realized by
61

its short-term strategy, panda diplomacy also serves to accomplish three major long-and-
medium-term diplomatic objectives: tightening relations through an alliance, facilitating
diplomatic re-orientation, and promoting a more robust cross-strait relationship. As the
three case studies in the previous chapter demonstrate, panda diplomacy in general has
been a successful tactic that either brought its diplomatic objectives into reality or put it
closer to final success. The ROC’s panda diplomacy, by increasing the publicity of China
and Chinese leaders in American society, contributed to a close Sino-U.S. alliance in
World War II. Beijing’s practice in the 1970s advanced the mutual understanding
between people on both sides and decreased the unfavorable opinion of the PRC once
held by the American public, which served to facilitate China’s changing relations with
its former enemy. The advent of the new millennium witnessed both setback and
modification of panda diplomacy. The Taiwanese audience’s negative reaction made
Beijing resort to its domestic public for popular support. The participation of Chinese
people gave panda diplomacy unprecedented credibility and legitimacy to approach the
Taiwanese public. By softening Taiwanese society’s hostile and distrustful attitude
towards the PRC, the new generation of China’s panda diplomacy practitioners helped to
cause a more cooperative cross-strait relationship between the two sides and benefit
Beijing’s national re-unification strategy in the long run.
Despite these achievements, panda diplomacy also has several technical
weaknesses that need to be addressed. First of all, the rarity of pandas makes it
impossible for the use of panda diplomacy as a diplomatic panacea. The fact that only
62

eleven countries/regions
174
have received pandas from China exposes the limitation of
panda diplomacy as a regular diplomatic tool. As a member of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) since 1981,
China has not given any panda to foreign countries as free gifts.
175
Under the current
framework of the panda scientific research project, foreign zoos need to pay one million
dollars per year to borrow one panda from China, with an extra sum of six hundred
thousand dollars for each panda cub born in the zoo. This large expense has made panda
diplomacy mostly applicable to developed countries
176
whose zoos could afford millions
of dollars for their partners in China (Table 1). In this sense, panda diplomacy is logically
excluded from Chinese foreign policy-makers’ diplomatic agenda when approaching
foreign audiences in Third World countries, which is also a major task for Beijing’s
decision-makers. Secondly, the effect of panda diplomacy is difficult to measure
quantitatively. Even though China's approval rate increased after each panda diplomacy
practice, there may also be other variables affecting these statistical results. America’s
participation in World War II, for example, made the ROC a major ally in East Asia
against Japan, and this certainly served to improve the American public’s favorable view
on the ROC and its leaders in the following years. The more cooperative and pragmatic
policies of governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait also served to lift Taiwanese

174
Refer to Table 1 and Table 2. The pandas sent to Singapore and Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo will not arrive until
2011.

175
This international regulation made Beijing’s Panda Diplomacy to Taiwan even more difficult since
giving pandas to Taipei as free gifts, for many pro-independence activists, implied Taiwan be a part of the
PRC.

176
Thailand is the only exception and pandas housed in Mexico are descendants of the pair sent by China
as free gifts in the 1980s.
63

society’s approval rate of the PRC, as the opinion polls showed in 2010. In this sense, it
is harder to give a systematic and quantitative evaluation on its effect in terms of
producing a pro-China public opinion in foreign countries.
Notwithstanding its various flaws, the role panda diplomacy played and will play
in the future should not be negated. It is proven that panda diplomacy, by tapping pandas’
charm as one alternative resource of China’s soft power, successfully attracts the
attention of foreign publics and increasing China’s publicity in targeted countries, both of
which serve as short-term objectives that lead to the success of China's long and medium-
term strategies. As China’s hard and soft powers are growing rapidly in the 21
st
century,
panda diplomacy might not be employed as a foreign engagement as frequently as it used
to be in the last six decades. However, panda diplomacy, thanks to its unique
characteristics, will not disappear from China’s diplomatic arsenal, either. Beijing’s
recent announcements of loaning pandas to Australia, Singapore, and Japan
177
show its
leaders’ enduring confidence in their diplomatic weapon in the future. As a unique
engagement tool, panda diplomacy will continue to serve China’s foreign policies in the
21
st
century and pass the torch to generations to come in the future.

177
People’s Daily Online, “China to Offer a Pair of Giant Pandas to Japan for Joint Research,”
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6405348.html; People’s Daily Online, “China to
Send Two Pandas to Australia for Joint Research,”
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6821610.html; and China Daily Online News, “Hu:
China to Offer Pandas to Singapore,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-
11/12/content_8953360.htm.
64

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75

Appendix
Table 1: Pandas in Foreign Countries*
Zoo’s name Country How many pandas Panda’s name
The San Diego Zoo The U.S. 5 Bai Yun, Gao Gao, Su Lin, Zhen Zhen, Yun Zi
The Memphis Zoo The U.S. 2 Ya Ya and Le Le
Zoo Atlanta The U.S. 3 Lun Lun, Yang Yang, and Xi Lan
The National Zoo The U.S. 2 Mei Xiang and Tian Tian
Zoologico de Chapultepec Mexico 3 Hua, Shuan Shuan, and Xin Xin
Adventure World Japan 6 Eimei, Rauhin, Aihin, Meihin (Male), Meihin (Female) and Eihin
The Oji Zoo Japan 2 Dan Dan and Xing Xing
The Ueno Zoo Japan 2 Undecided†
The Chiang Mai Zoo Thailand 3 Chuang Chuang, Lin Hui, and Lin Ping
The Adelaide Zoo Australia 2 Wang Wang and Funi
Zoologischer Garten Berlin Germany 1 Bao Bao
Tiergarten Schönbrunn Austria 2 Yang Yang, and Long Hui
Zoo Aquarium de Madrid Spain 2 Bing Xing and Hua Zuiba
Undecided Singapore 2 Undecided‡
*: until May 2010
†: President Hu Jintao announced in 2008 that a pair of pandas would be loaned to Ueno Zoo in 2011.
‡: China announced to loan two pandas to Singapore in November 2009, and they will arrive in 2011.
Source: Chengdu Research Base of Giant Panda Breeding, Panda Profile:
http://www.panda.org.cn/english/profile/2.htm. Pandas Live on: http://www.pandasliveon.com/ and other
online information from the websites of foreign zoos listed above.

76

Table 2: Pandas in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan*
Zoo’s name Special Administrative Region
(SRR)/Taiwan
How many pandas Panda’s name
Ocean Park Hong Kong SAR 4 Jia Jia, An An, Ying Ying and Le Le
The Taipei City Zoo Taiwan 2 Tuan Tuan and Yuan Yuan
The Seac Pai Van Park Macao SAR 2 Shu Xiang and Qi Miao†
*: until May 2010
†: President Hu Jintao announced on December 19, 2009 that Beijing would confer one pair of pandas to
Macao Special Administrative Region as its ten-year anniversary present. On May 30, 2010, the State
Forestry Administration announced that two pandas, Shu Xiang and Qi Miao, were chosen as gifts to
Macao SAR.

Source: Hong Kong Ocean Park: http://www2.oceanpark.com.hk/panda/index.html, the Taipei City Zoo:
http://www.zoo.gov.tw/panda/, and China National Radio:
http://www.cnr.cn/gundong/201005/t20100529_506501279.html.

Abstract (if available)

Abstract This thesis provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a unique diplomatic tool possessed by China, panda diplomacy. By borrowing theories from the fields of anthropology, international relations, and communications, my inter-disciplinary study conceptualizes the notion of panda diplomacy in terms of its rationales, diplomatic objectives, and forms. Based on data collected from newspapers and public opinion polls in Mainland China, the U.S., and Taiwan, I also examine three major panda diplomacy practices in the 20th and 21st centuries.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Xing, Yi (author)

Core Title China’s panda diplomacy: the power of being cute

School College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Degree Master of Arts

Degree Program East Asian Area Studies

Publication Date 08/03/2010

Defense Date 06/28/2010

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag china,OAI-PMH Harvest,panda diplomacy,Public Diplomacy,soft power

Place Name China (countries)

Language English

Contributor Electronically uploaded by the author (provenance)

Advisor Cross, Mai'a (committee chair), Cooper, Eugene (committee member), Rosen, Stanley (committee member)

Creator Email ethan.xing@gmail.com,yixing@usc.edu

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-m3258

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Legacy Identifier etd-Xing-3812.pdf

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Rights Xing, Yi

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

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Repository Location Los Angeles, California

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