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Emotions: Linguistic representation and cultural conceptualization

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Emotions: Linguistic representation and cultural conceptualization

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Content INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. EMOTIONS. LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATION AND CULTURAL CONCEPTUALIZATION by Valentina Apresjan A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Linguistics) December 1995 Copyright 1995 Valentina Apresjan Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9625239 Copyright 1995 by Apresjan, Valentina All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9625239 Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089 This dissertation, written by under the direction of h..Dissertation Committee, and approved by all its members, has been presented to and accepted by The Graduate School, in partial fulfillment of re quirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Dean Date Dec^berw12A t> 1995 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE .... .a C V L iV ..... / VLQUs U L Chairperson Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Valentina Apresjan Bernard Comrie Emotions: Linguistic Representation and Cultural Conceptualization In this dissertation I address two problems: (1) universal principles of linguistic description of emotions and (2) cross-linguistic comparison of emotions as conceptualized in language. I propose a systematic semantic approach to emotions, which affords a sufficiently rigid, accurate description of their linguistic conceptualization, as well as of their cultural peculiarities. My approach combines a unified semantic representation of emotion lexemes with a characterization of their metaphorical associations in language. I apply my approach to the description of five emotion clusters: to the semantic groups 'fear,' 'pity,' 'disgust,' 'boredom/tiredness' and 'sadness1 , including a cross-linguistic comparison of these emotion types in English and Russian. The results of my work are: general theoretical strategies for understanding and describing emotions in different languages; concrete semantic and metaphorical apparatus for describing particular types of emotions; cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparison of a number of emotion concepts in English and Russian; classification of emotion metaphors explaining their linguistic and cross-linguistic properties; lexicographic application of the theoretical description in the form of entries for a dictionary of synonyms. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Acknowledgments, iv. 0. Introduction, v. 1 . Approaches to emotions, 1. 1.1. Psychological account of emotions, 1. 1.1.1. Oatley 1992, 1. 1.1.2. Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988, 5. 1.2. Physiological account of emotions, 8. 1.3. Cultural and linguistic accounts of emotions, 13. 1.3.1. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kovecses 1990, 13. 1.3.2. Lutz 1988, 17. I.3.4. Wierzbicka 1991, 1992, 19. II. A combined linguistic approach, 23. III. English and Russian fear, 41. III. 1. English Tear,1 42. 111.2. Russian 'fear,' 57. 111.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of 'fear' in English and Russian, 76. 111.3.1. Semantics, 76. 11 1 .3.2. Syntax, 81. IV. English and Russian 'pity,' 91. IV. 1. English pity,'91. IV.2. Russian 'pity,' 101. IV. 3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of 'pity' in English and Russian, 122. V. English and Russian 'disgust,' 123. V.l. English 'disgust,' 123. V.2. Russian 'disgust,' 130. V.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of 'disgust' in English and Russian, 143. VI. English and Russian 'be tired of/bored with,1145. VI. 1. English 'be tired ol/bored with,1 146. VI.2. Russian 'be tired of/bored with,' 156. VI.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of'be tired of/bored with' in English and Russian, 168. ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VII. English and Russian 'sadness,1173. VII. 1. English 'sadness,1173. VII.2. Russian 'sadness,1183. VII.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of 'sadness1 in English and Russian, 200. Vm. Emotion metaphors: overt manifestations of emotions and their cross-linguistic conceptualization, 202. VIII.l. The first, or physiological metaphor class, 208. VIII. 1.1. The source domain of the first metaphor class, 209. VIU.1.2. The mapping in the first metaphor class, 210. VIII. 1.3. Metaphors and metonymies in the first class, 210. VIII. 1.4. Linguistic properties of metaphors and metonymies in the first class, 214. VIII.2. The second, or "cultural" metaphor class, 217. VIII.2.1. The source domain of the second metaphor class, 217. VIII.2.2. The mapping in the second metaphor class, 217. VHI.2.3. Metaphors in the second class, 218. VIII.2.4. Linguistic properties of metaphors, in the second class, 228. VIII.3. The third, or "cognitive" metaphor class, 230. Vm.3.1. The source domain of the third metaphor class, 230. vni.3.2. The mapping in the third metaphor class, 231. VIII.3.3. Metaphors in the third class, 233. Vin.3.4. Linguistic properties of metaphors in the third class, 238. IX. Generalizations of the results obtained in the present dissertation, 240. IX. 1. Core feature sets for the description of emotion concepts, 242. IX.2. Correlation among the features and its possible use, 247. References, 251. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Acknowledgments. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Jurij Apresjan, my patient and concerned teacher, for helping me on all stages of my work. His numerous comments and suggestions have been invaluable. I am very grateful to my scientific advisor at the University of Southern California - Bernard Comrie - for his guidance and for his generous help and advice in every aspect of my work, including the style of my work. I would also like to express my gratitude to other members of my dissertation committee - Maria Polinsky and Roger Woodard who have kindly read and commented upon my work. I would like to thank Alexander Zholkovskij and Dean Worth for reading and discussing with me a draft of this work. I would like to thank Anna Wierzbicka and Nina Davidovna Arutjunova who have read a draft of this work and made most valuable comments. I am very grateful to Marina Iakovlevna Glovinskaja for encouraging me on all stages of my work, supplying me with literary examples and commenting upon certain parts of this paper. iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 0. Introduction. Abstract: In this paper I address two problems: (1) universal principles of linguistic description of emotions and (2) cross-linguistic comparison of emotions as conceptualized in language. I propose a combined semantic approach to emotions, which affords a sufficiently rigid, systematic description of their linguistic conceptualization, as well as of their cultural peculiarities. I apply my approach to the description of five emotion clusters: to the 'fear,' 'pity,' 'disgust,' 'boredorrVtiredness' and 'sadness' semantic groups, and I do a cross-linguistic comparison of these emotion types in the English and Russian languages. The results of my work are: general theoretical strategies for understanding and describing emotions in different languages; concrete semantic apparatus for describing particular types of emotions; samples of semantic and pragmatic description of emotions; cross-linguistic comparison of the naive psychology, inherent in English and Russian; lexicographic application of the theoretical description. There has been much previous work in the field of linguistic representation of emotions of which I should like to mention Iordanskaja 1970, 1972; the joint paper Iordanskaja, Mel’ cuk 1990; Zaliznjak 1983; the book Zaliznjak 1992.1 have availed myself of many ideas from Wierzbicka 1990b about the semantics of English verbs denoting 'fear,' and I have also profited from her general approach to semantic description as exemplified in most of her work. Before I take up a detailed discussion of linguistic approaches to emotions, I would like to mention at least some of the work in this domain carried out within v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. non-]inguistic frameworks. A fact worth noting is that although linguistic and non-linguistic frameworks approach emotions from different angles, the resulting descriptions have much in common. vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I. Approaches to emotions. 1.1. Psychological account of emotions. L l.l. Oatley 1992. There has been much research done and many books written on the psychology of emotions (as well as on all other aspects of emotions). Here, I will only be able to look at a very small part of the work done in this area (for an exhaustive list of references in this field see Russell 1991). Keith Oatley is one of the best-known researchers in the psychology of emotions. His book Best laid Schemes: the Psychology of Emotions (Oatley 1992) hypothesizes that emotions derive from cognitive processes; that certain goals underlie every emotion; that certain plans are developed to achieve these goals; that the accomplishment of the plans is limited by the existing resources and by an uncertain environment; that emotions may involve social interaction. According to this hypothesis, "happy" emotions occur when "coordination between plans is being achieved and unanticipated events are assimilated" (Oatley 1992, p. 44). Distressing emotions occur when "coordination fails, or when some plan goes badly, when a problem emerges that cannot be solved from current resources or when an important background goal is violated" (Oatley, p.44). Oatley illustrates his approach with a detailed analysis of five "basic emotions" (as well as of some others). "Basic emotions," in his view, are those that are "physiologically and expressively distinctive and have a biological basis" (Oatley, p.55). I will address his suggestions in turn. Let us first see how the mechanism proposed by Oatley works for different emotions. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This goal-oriented analysis seems to give a good account of such emotions as frustration or satisfaction. These are emotions which occur as a result of, respectively, failure and success in achieving one's goal Indeed, frustration occurs when a person realizes he is unable to achieve his goal, at least with the existing resources. Satisfaction occurs in the opposite circumstances, namely when a person has successfully achieved his goal. However, for the majority of emotions this analysis seems to be inadequate. While frustration clearly involves failure to accomplish a goal as its motivation, sadness (which Oatley analyzes almost in the same way as I analyzed frustration here) can be motivated by many other factors, failure to accomplish a goal being not even the most typical of them. Moreover, sadness is not even always motivated, e.g, one can say I feel sad, I don't know why. Oatley proposes the following explanation for the occurrence of unmotivated emotions: they occur as a result of the fact that the experiencer is in a certain mood, e.g. when a person is in a depressed mood, he is likely to feel sad. However, this does not seem to solve the problem, since the moods themselves are not explained. Thus, the analysis of all emotions in terms of goals is too restricted. In fact, it can only account for a very limited number of emotions. When we try to apply the goal-schema to such intuitively non-goal-oriented emotions as fear, sadness, disgust etc, the explanations become rather artificial and inadequate. To illustrate this inadequacy, let us address Oatley's analysis of the "basic emotions". The five basic emotions, in his view, are happiness, sadness, fear, anger and disgust. Happiness occurs, in Oatley's analysis, when the subgoals are achieved. Sadness 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. occurs at the failure of major plan or loss of active goal. Fear occurs when the "self- preservation goal" is threatened or when there is a goal conflict. Anger occurs when an active plan is frustrated. Disgust occurs when the "gustatory goal" is violated. The analysis of the first two emotions, although it reduces the number of contexts in which they can appear, may still be accepted. Indeed, some of the contexts in which happiness and sadness occur do fall under Oatley's definition. However, his analysis offear, anger and disgust does not capture the peculiarities of these emotions. Anger does not occur when an active plan is frustrated. When a person feels he cannot proceed with the accomplishment of his goal, he may bq frustrated or disappointed, but not angry. Anger arises when the object of emotion does something which the subject of emotion considers wrong. It may destroy the plans of the subject, as a result, but this is not necessary. Parents can become angry when their child misbehaves, although it in no way interferes with their plans. As for the analysis of fear and disgust, it violates the very concept of goal According to Zholkovsky 1964a (p.70-71), X's goal is a situation of which the following conditions are true: (1) X wishes to bring it about; (2) X is ready to act in such a way as to bring it about; (3) X thinks that he can do so with the resourses at his disposal. Thus, to get what we want, we are supposed to perform certain actions and as a result of those, we get it. As soon as we have got it, we do not have this goal any longer; an achieved goal is not a goal anymore, it is an accomplishment. 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Oatley's analysis of fear and disgust deviates from this natural scenario. Such concepts as "self-preservation goal" or "gustatory goal" are contradictory. What does it mean that a person has a "self-preservation goal"? It would mean that all the time the person is applying some effort to achieve this goal But this is not the case; when we are safe, the desired situation holds; thus, this goal is achieved; this means that there is no such goaL We could suppose that this goal occurs when our safety is threatened. But even in this more natural case, we cannot call our wish to escape danger a goal This is merely an axiom of reality (the term is due to Zholkovskij 1964b, p. 8), one of our unconditional reflexes. The same is true of disgust. There is no "gustatory goal" before we taste something unpleasant; and even after we taste something unpleasant, feel disgust and try to withdraw from the situation which causes the bad feeling, our reflex move cannot be considered a goaL Another objection to the goal-based analysis is that this type of analysis necessarily presupposes dividing emotions into two types; positive emotions and negative emotions. Since goals can be either achieved or not achieved, emotions based on goals of different types can be, accordingly, either positive or negative. This is not, however, the case, because there are certain emotions which are neither positive, nor negative. These are the emotions which do not involve any goals or any desires and for which the motivation is neither achievement nor loss. Such are, for instance, surprise and amazement. The valuable part of Oatley's approach is an attempt to explain the internal motivations of emotions. It is very important, since identifying motivations of emotions is one of the best means to identify emotions themselves. The concrete way of doing so, as proposed in this book, seems, however, too 4 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. restrictive and, therefore, adequate only for a limited number of emotions. 1.1.2. Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988. A different psychological (or cognitive) account of emotions is given in Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988. The authors consider emotions to be "valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects, with their particular nature being determined by the way in which the eliciting situation is construed" (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988, p. 13). By "valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects" are meant reactions for which the setting involves some event, agent and object. Apart from the opposition event/agent/object, the authors make use of further oppositions: desirable/ undesirable, prospect relevant/prospect irrelevant, degree of (un)desirability of the event (for object of the emotion/for self) and degree of likelihood of the event. The book is a study of emotion types. Emotions are not divided into negative and positive, but are characterized according to the differences in their cognitive structure. Namely, emotions are divided into types with respect to what they are focused on: event, agent, or object. For example, emotions which are focused on consequences of events are happy for (focus on the desirable consequence for a person other than the experiencer); pity (focus on the undesirable consequence for a person other than experiencer); joy and distress (consequences, respectively desirable and undesirable, for the experiencer). Emotions which are focused on actions of agents are, for instance, pride (the agent is the experiencer himself) or reproach (the agent is somebody else). Emotions which are 5 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. focused on aspects of objects are different kinds of liking and disliking, such as love, hatred, etc. Certain emotions, such as gratitude, remorse or anger, have a complex cognitive structure and are a combination of the event-focused type with the agent-focused type. Another dimension, important for this classification, is the temporal dimension. Emotions for which prospects are relevant are hope, fear (future-oriented) and satisfaction, disappointment (past-oriented). The approach proposed in this book seems to be rather efficient for the description of all types of emotions. Events, agents and objects are inplied in almost every emotion and can, therefore (unlike goals), be used to describe settings of all emotions. Another advantage of the analysis proposed in this book is that it deals with emotion types rather than with separate emotions. An emotion type is a group of "homogeneous" emotions, i.e. a group of emotions which have the same setting. For instance, the 'anger' type group comprises the emotions angry, mad, furious, enraged and the like. The attractiveness of this type of description as compared to the description of separate emotions is that it gives opportunities to draw a general picture of a wide range of emotions. Also, although the authors do not mention it, this approach gives opportunities for describing emotions cross-culturally. Since this analysis does not necessarily refer to specific emotions, it is not one-language-biased. In other words, when we describe an emotion anger, rather than an emotion type 'anger,' we are in danger of becoming English-biased, since other cultures (and languages) do not necessarily contain exactly the same concept of anger as the one in Anglo-Saxon culture. Yet the emotion type 6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'anger' can probably be found in any culture. And, looking at the emotions included under this type and at their relations to each other, we can understand the way in which certain emotions are conceptualized in certain cultures. However, the advantage of the tools proposed in this book turns out to be, at the same time, a disadvantage. First, it is not always possible, using only the proposed oppositions (see above) to draw distinctions between the emotions of the same type, such as, for instance, grief and sadness. These emotions are described as being caused by an undesirable event, and the difference between them is described as a difference in the degree of undesirability of the event (the event being more undesirable for grief). The distinction is, however, more subtle than that. Namely, grief usually implies the loss of a loved person as its cause (but not the loss of a job, although this is an extremely undesirable event). Sadness, on the contrary, can be caused by almost any undesirable event. Second, the above oppositions are sometimes not precise enough even for distinguishing between the emotions of different emotion types, e.g., the emotion type 'fear' is specified as 'being displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event.1 This specification is not sufficiently precise because it does not allow us to distinguish 'fear-type emotions from 'suspicion'-type mental states which can also be described as 'being displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event.’ What distinguishes these two types of psychological states, is the emotional component present in the/ear-type and absent in the suspicion-type. This emotional component consists in the desire to withdraw from the potentially dangerous situation and the feeling of one's own helplessness. One more objection to this approach is that, although it allows one to cover a very 7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. wide range of emotions, it still does not provide any account for such emotions as, for instance, melancholy, which are not focused on any particular event, agent, or object. Another such case which is not covered by this approach is Russian toska Osadness,1 'sorrow'), which can appear without any undesirable event happening. More generally, the emotions that are not strongly motivated are not accounted for in this approach, since it implies that every emotion does necessarily have a motivation. The approach proposed in this book is efficient for a large number of emotion types, namely, for those which are usually motivated. This approach can be applied in a cross-cultural study, since it mostly focuses on prototypes which are to be found in every culture. The results of this approach are partly confirmed by the results of the present study: namely, the cognitive apparatus employed to describe such emotion types as 'sadness,' 'pity,' 'fear' in certain respects is reminiscent of the semantic features used to describe them in the present work. However, this approach is not adequate for describing unmotivated emotions, since it implies that all emotions have motivation, and it is not always sufficiently precise to distinguish between different emotions in a given emotion type. 1.2. Physiological account of emotions. One of the most well-known researchers in this area is Paul Ekman. Here, I will discuss his paper Expression and the nature of emotion (Ekman, 1984). In this paper he 8 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. addresses two major issues: (1) physiological manifestations of emotions; (2) universality of emotions. Ekman considers the following two physiological manifestations of emotions: facial expressions and Autonomic Nervous System activity. His main claim is that fecial expressions and Autonomic Nervous System activity are differentiated for each emotion and, therefore, must be taken into account in the description of emotions together with the cognitive processes underlying the latter. The empirical study conducted by Ekman showed that facial expressions and Autonomic Nervous System activity (ANS activity) are universal and do not vary cross- culturally. The fact that ANS activity is universal is not surprising, since ANS cannot be controlled and, thus, cannot be subject to any culturally determined rules. However, the fact that facial expressions are universal for all cultures is not trivial. As Ekman points out, it can be argued that there are cultural differences in the facial expressions of emotion. Since facial expressions are controllable, there can be various kinds of cultural constraints on "using" them. For example, Japanese cultural rules require a person to smile at getting bad news. It thus seems that facial expressions of emotions may vary from culture to culture. But, as Ekman claims, this is not quite right. The facial expressions are the same: in all cultures smile is associated with positive emotions, tears are associated with negative emotions, raised eyebrows are associated with surprise. What may differ, are the display rules: rules which allow or disallow the expression of emotions in certain circumstances. 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Thus, although both in Russian and Japanese cultures tears are associated with negative emotions, the Japanese are less likely to cry (at least in public) than the Russians, because the constraint on expressing negative emotions in this way is much stronger for the Japanese. But, if shown a picture of a crying person, both Russians and Japanese would be able to identify the corresponding emotional state without difficulties. The experiment conducted by Ekman involved a very detailed examination of possible types of facial expressions and provided a very precise description of physiological activities (such as muscle movements) required to produce these expressions. From the fact that these physiological activities are universal in different cultures, Ekman concludes that emotions are universal, too. As was already mentioned, another piece of data supporting this hypothesis comes from the measurements of ANS activity, namely heart rate and skin temperature. Obviously, they are also culturally universal As Ekman claims, the ANS activity is, like facial expressions, differentiated for every emotion. For instance, for such emotions as anger, fear and sadness the heart rate is high, for such emotions as happiness, disgust and surprise the heart rate is low. Anger differs from fear and sadness in the skin temperature. For anger it is high, for fear1 and sadness it is low. Ekman's claim that facial expressions and ANS activity are differentiated for each emotion has certain implications. Namely, it implies that an emotion can be identified exclusively on the basis of these physiological manifestations. As for measuring the ANS activity, this obviously is not the most convenient way to identify an emotion; it requires certain equipment, and, besides, the measurements must be very precise, lThis is also reported in Scherer, Wallbott & Summerfield,1985, p. 213. 10 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. since for many emotions the differences oare very subtle. For such emotions as anger, fear, surprise etc., the ANS activity is a prominent characteristic, because it deviates strongly from the normal ANS activity. But for many others the deviation from the norm is insignificant. Thus, measuring the ANS activity is not a really promising way of identifying emotions. It only works for a very small group of emotions. The use of fecial expressions as a universal tool of identifying emotions calls for two comments. First, not every emotion is accompanied by a corresponding facial expression. Although this method works for a substantially greater number of emotions than measuring the ANS activity (since a much greater number of emotions is associated with a distinct facial expression than with a distinct ANS activity), still it does not account for all types of emotions. It does account for those emotions which occur spontaneously and are accompanied by a spontaneous reaction. But such emotions as hope, tenderness, even love (and many others) are long-term emotions and are not accompanied by any particular facial expression. In other words, this approach is not applicable to long-term emotions, which do not involve any spontaneous reactions and are, therefore, expressed by words (and by actions) rather than by facial expressions. Second, using English words such as fear, angere tc. as labels for universal emotions, the author mistakes general emotion types for distinct emotions. In fact, the facial expression and the ANS activity associated with what Ekman calls the emotion offear are associated with a whole group of emotions. These are the emotions of being scared, afraid, frightened, terrified etc. The same is true of anger (physiological characteristics assigned by 11 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ekman to anger apply, as well, to rage) and of disgust (the same physiological characteristics are associated with disgust as with repulsion). But, although quite close, the emotions within these groups are still distinct. Ekman does not provide any tool to distinguish between them. Also, the emotions within emotion types may not coincide in different languages. For instance, Russian emotions within the emotion type 'pity,' although close to their English correlates, still differ from the latter in a number of ways, namely in settings in which they occur, in corresponding wishes and actions etc. (see Chapter IV of this manuscript). So, Ekman's generalization about facial expressions needs, in my opinion, to be reformulated as: facial expressions are the same for the same emotion types in different cultures. To summarize, Ekman's approach is appropriate (and, in fact, very useful) in describing emotion types cross-culturally. Having identified the emotion type by the corresponding facial expression, the researcher can then proceed with the investigation of subtle differences among the emotions within a particular emotion type, both within one language (or culture) or cross-linguistically (cross-culturally). The results obtained in this framework are partly confirmed by the results of the present study. Namely, the physiological characteristics of 'fear,' 'anger' and certain other emotions, as reported by Ekman, are reflected in language. Consider, indeed, the following linguistic expressions: to boil with anger, to seethe with anger, to be inflamed with anger (pointing to the raised body temperature, involved in experiencing anger)’ , to freeze with fear, to shake with fear, to have goose flesh because o f fear (pointing to the lowered body temperature, involved in experiencing fear). 12 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This approach is not efficient in describing such emotions as are not manifested in facial expressions; in particular, it does not work for the long-term emotions. 1.3. Cultural and linguistic accounts of emotions. I will start out with discussing the metaphor-based linguistic account of emotions introduced in Lakoff & Johnson 1980 and developed in Kovecs6s 199o. Then I will discuss the culture-based description of emotions given in Lutz 1988.1 will then proceed to the linguistic-cultural approach presented in Wierzbicka 1991 and Wierzbicka 1992. I will conclude by quoting an interesting historical parallel to some of the more seminal linguistic studies of today. 1.3.1. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kovecses 1990. Zoltan Kovecses in his book "Emotion concepts", following the well-known study Lakoff & Johnson 1980, gives a metaphoric (and metonymic) representation of emotions. Essentially, his approach is as follows: different emotions are conceptualized in different conventionalized language metaphors (and metonymies); every emotion can be associated with more than one language metaphor (metonymy); metaphors (metonymies) are mappings of the source domain (for emotions, the source domains are usually various physical phenomena) onto the target domain (emotion); 13 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. these metaphors (metonymies) reveal prototypical cognitive models of emotions. To illustrate this analysis, let us look at one of the emotions Kovecsds examines. According to Kovecs6s, one of the major metaphors for anger is ANGER IS HEAT OF FLUID IN CONTAINER. It explains many metaphoric expressions used to denote anger. The mapping is as follows: ONTOLOGICAL CORRESPONDENCES: container - body heat of fluid - anger heat scale - anger scale container heat - body heat pressure in container - pressure in the body agitation of fluid - physical agitation explosion - loss of control etc. EPISTEMIC CORRESPODENCES: Source: the effect of intense fluid heat is container heat, internal pressure and agitation. Target: the effect of intense anger is body heat, internal pressure and agitation. 14 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Source: when the fluid is heated past a certain limit, pressure increases to the point at which the container explodes. Target: When anger increases past a certain limit, pressure increases to the point at which the person loses control Source: an explosion is damaging to the container and dangerous to bystanders. Target: a loss of control is damaging to an angry person and dangerous to other people. This approach seems to be very promising in many respects. First, since it is based on linguistic facts, it can account for cultural differences (which can be very significant). Second, unlike all previously mentioned approaches, it describes emotions "from the inside"; that is, it describes the ways in which people feel and understand their feelings. All other approaches examined so far describe only the "objective" parameters of emotions, such as settings in which they occur, or their physiological manifestations, but do not touch upon the "subjective" part of emotions, namely actual feelings. There are, however, several objections to this. First, many of the metaphors Kovecs6s bases his analysis on are not specific to any particular emotion, but are rather characteristic of larger emotion types, or even of all emotions. Thus, among the metaphors Kovecs6s gives for anger, are: ANGER IS INSANITY; ANGER IS A BURDEN; EXISTENCE OF ANGER IS PRESENCE. As for the last metaphor, it is characteristic of all objects which can exist; thus it is rather uninformative not only about anger, but about any other emotion, too. 15 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. As for the emotion metaphors ANGER IS INSANITY and ANGER IS A BURDEN, they, unlike the HEAT metaphor, are not peculiar to anger (although in some contexts, they can be used to refer to anger). In fact, insanity is more frequently associated with passion, while burden reminds one of the feeling o f responsibility (unwanted or difficult). Thus, if we are given phrases like He is absolutely crazy about her (the INSANITY metaphor) or She is such a burden to him (the BURDEN metaphor), we would not interpret them as 'he is very angry with her' (although we would predict it, if these metaphors were truly the metaphors for anger). The interpretation of the first phrase would be 'He is very much in love with her’ (the emotion of passion). The interpretation of the second phrase would be 'He is responsible for her; this responsibility is too hard for him to cope with.' So, only those metaphors which are specific to one particular emotion can be used for emotion identification. Maybe an emotion can be uniquely identified as an intersection of several metaphors, but if each of these metaphors is not sufficiently specific to identify the emotion, then it does not explain the way in which the emotion is understood, since there is no strong associative connection between the metaphor and the emotion. This does not mean that metaphors should not be included in the description; in fact, they are most useful for describing emotion. It only means that they are not always sufficient to identify emotions (let alone such emotions as are not associated with any particular metaphors, e.g., apprehension). Also, if we faithfully follow the prototypical scenario in the source domain, and map it one-to-one onto the target domain, as KovecsSs does, without using any independent evidence, we are in danger of becoming too mechanical. Consider his analysis of anger, 16 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. namely the mapping of the EXPLOSION onto the LOSS OF CONTROL. Explosion is damaging to the container and to the bystanders; so is the loss of control The first objection to this is that the loss of control is not necessarily damaging. For instance, passion can also involve the loss of control, consider outbursts o f passion (^uncontrolled manifestations of passion1 ). Nevertheless, this loss of control is not damaging to the experiencer or to the object of passion. So, it is not the loss of control which makes anger dangerous. What makes anger dangerous is the desire to hurt its object. However, Kovecsds does not reflect this desire in his schema; that is why the damage resulting from anger follows, in his analysis, quite mechanically from the metaphor of physical explosion, but does not have any cognitive foundation. To summarize, this approach creates a foundation for describing a feeling per se and for reconstructing its cross-cultural conceptualization. However, it does not allow one to describe emotions which are not associated with any particular language metaphors or to distinguish between emotions associated with similar metaphors. 1.3.2. Lutz 1988. An ethno-cultural approach to emotions is presented in Lutz 1988. Her analysis is based on an empirical study of the emotional concepts in Ifaluk, the language of a Micronesian atoll, Ifaluk. The author points out that a lot of studies on emotions have been influenced by the Western mentality of the scholars. She suggests that emotion concepts should be investigated separately in every culture, and this investigation should be based on 17 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. observing everyday life. Emotional concepts, according to Lutz, are closely connected with culturally specific social and moral values. So, her analysis includes both the description of settings in which emotions occur, as well as the evaluation of emotions by their experiencer and the society. Let us look at one example of interaction between social values and emotion concepts in Ifaluk. Lutz gives a detailed description of 'anger' in Ifaluk. Among other characteristics she assigns to 'anger' is its social value. Thus, among other types of'anger,' she distinguishes a socially important emotion, which she calls 'justifiable anger.’ This type of'anger1 occurs when a person thinks that the object of emotion has committed something that is considered bad or immoral by the society. This 'anger,’ therefore, is not a sign of weakness of the experiencer, but a justified feeling which helps to protect traditional values. She explains this conceptualization of 'anger1 by certain social tendencies which can be observed in Ifaluk culture. One of the most important social values in Ifaluk culture is being together, functioning as one person. Therefore, people tend to look at themselves as parts of the society; thus, 'anger' is also approached from this perspective, and, rather than being a private emotion, becomes a social value. Another highly valued type of behavior is harmlessness, unaggressiveness. This social tendency interacts with the concept of'fear.' 'Fear' is not considered to be a sign of weakness or cowardice; it is considered a sign of harmlessness: if a person is afraid, then he is unprotected and, therefore, harmless. Thus, 'fear' in Ifaluk is a positively connoted emotion concept. 18 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This approach gives very good results. In fact, Lutz gives a brilliant description of emotional concepts in Ifaluk culture and language. Her description of the setting in which an emotion occurs, combined with the cultural conceptualization, gives a complete and adequate picture of emotional life in Ifaluk. This approach is in no way restricted, unlike all the previously discussed approaches and it can be applied with equal success to every emotion and every culture. The only thing which could be added to this description is a more detailed and rigid examination of linguistic data, namely of all the expressions used to denote emotions and the related metaphors. 1.3.3. Wierzbicka 1991,1992. The next approach I will discuss here, is the semantic-pragmatic cross-cultural and cross-linguistic approach presented in Wierzbicka 1991,1992. Wierzbicka's description of emotions is based on the following assumptions: Emotion concepts are not universal (there is no universal concept of "sad,' no universal concept of "happy1 etc.); therefore, emotion concepts should be described independently for every particular language and culture. A proper description of emotions should be done in terms of "semantic primitives" (the most basic concepts which are claimed to be cross-culturally and cross-linguistically universal), because otherwise, if we use more complex concepts, which are not universal, the description becomes ethnocentric. A semantic description of an emotion is the description of the prototypical situation, or the setting, in which it occurs. 19 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Semantic descriptions of emotions consist of describing the prototypical situations of their occurrence, Le., the settings in which they typically occur.2 There are 'cultural scripts' (certain cultural assumptions and behavioral expectations) which determine the way and the degree to which emotions can be manifested overtly (this concept is close to what Ekman calls "display rules"). They are defined on the basis of linguistic facts and should also be given a semantic description in terms of semantic primitives. Let us look at some examples of Wierzbicka's analysis. Sadness (the Anglo-American concept of sadness, not the universal emotion) is described in Wierzbicka's book (Wierzbicka 1991) as follows: sadness X feels something sometimes a person feels something like this: something bad happened I wish it didn't happen (i.e. I would want that it didn't happen) if I could, 2I use this term here in Wierzbicka's sense; Wierzbicka's use of the term "prototypical" is in some contexts different from its usual meaning found in linguistic literature (which is approximately as follows: prototypical X = 'core X, most typical X, X which has all the features that objects X usually have1). She uses the term "prototypical situation of emotion X" to refer to the setting, in which emotion X would usually occur (Wierzbicka 1990b). 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I would do something because of this I can't do anything because of this, this person feels something X feels like this Related Anglo-American cultural scripts are as follows: when I feel something very bad, it is good to think about this if I know why I feel like this, I will not feel like this after this when I feel something very bad, I can think about it if I think about it, I can do something because of this if I do something because of this, I will not think like this I can then feel something good I want people to think that I feel something good all the time In contrast to Anglo-American, the Polish cultural script for feeling bad allows the experiencer to let other people know what he feels. This approach has many advantages as compared to many others. First, it is culturally unbiased; it allows one to describe every emotion in every language and every culture; it includes a culture-specific evaluation of emotions: semantic definitions of emotions are very 21 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. precise; clear structuring of definitions of emotions allows one to capture very subtle differences among emotions of the same emotion type. By way of commenting, I should like to call attention to the following: definitions exclusively in terms of semantic universals, although they have the advantage of not being linguistically esoteric, do not allow one to see natural links among semantically related words, because the description is done on the "atomic" level, the level of (supposedly) absolute primitives. Thus, we cannot see the language-specific system, we only see separate units, unrelated to one another. For instance, it would be very natural to define the concept distrust in terms of a simpler related concept trust or, to give an example from the emotion domain, to define the concept overjoyed through a simpler concept of joy. However, if we are working in terms of semantic primitives only, it is impossible to show these straightforward connections. 22 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13. A combined linguistic approach to the description of emotions. In my analysis, I intend to concentrate on the linguistic aspect of emotions. Therefore, I intend to look more closely at the two main linguistic approaches to emotions and to suggest a linguistic approach of my own. (1) As I have already mentioned, in one of these approaches words designating emotions3 are described by referring to the prototypical situations in which the emotions occur. For fear, for instance, the prototypical situation is that of danger, for shame - that of having done something wrong. This method was first proposed by Wierzbicka (Wierzbicka 1969,1972) and Iordanskaja (Iordanskaja 1970,1972). (2) In the other linguistic approach emotions are described by referring to metaphors in which they are conceptualized in language (first proposed in Lakoff & Johnson 1980; used in Kovecs6s 1990). Here are some examples discussed in these books: LOVE IS A JOURNEY, HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN; EMOTION IS INSANITY; EMOTION IS AN ELECTRIC FORCE; ANGER IS HEAT; ANGER IS INSANITY. A somewhat similar approach is proposed in Uspenskij 1979 and Arutjunova 1988. From this point on I will use the shorter term "emotions" in place of the more precise term "words designating emotions" in contexts where no ambiguity is involved. I will also use the term "lexeme" to refer to a word considered in one of its lexical meanings. Within the framework of the Moscow school of semantics (Apresjan 1974, Mel'fiuk 1974) it is lexemes, not words that are the principal units of the lexicon. I will mean "lexeme" even in contexts where for stylistic reasons I will use the term “word". 23 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The advantage of the metaphoric approach (absent in the prototypical approach) consists in capturing of the feeling proper, since most metaphors related to emotions represent the feeling rather than the setting where it occurs. However, not every emotion is represented by a language metaphor. Therefore, the prototypical approach, which relies on the setting, results in a more systematic description. For a comprehensive, complete description of emotions these two approaches should be combined. The analysis presented in this paper is an attempt at such a combination. It was originally proposed in the joint paper (Apresjan, Apresjan 1993). This combined approach, apart from being prototypical, takes into account "symptomatic" expressions (expressions which designate physical manifestations of emotion, e.g. to grow cold with terror, to turn pale with fright) which are in part metaphoric. Such "symptomatic" expressions constitute one of the most interesting metaphoric groups associated with emotions.4 They point to certain regular ways of metaphorization and allow one to make semantic definitions of emotions more precise and revealing. In the above paper we have noted that many "symptomatic" expressions can refer not only to certain emotions, but also to certain physical states. For example, such symptoms, as growing cold, turning pale, trembling, shaking, blood running cold are associated not only with the emotional state offear, but also with the physical state of cold. Similarly, symptoms of the emotional state of disgust are the same as those of the physical state caused by a very unpalatable taste or a very unpleasant smell. Both disgust and bad taste make the experiencer 4 They have been thoroughly studied in a different framework (that of lexical functions in the sense of Mel'£uk 1974) in Iordanskaja 1970. 24 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. screw up his face, pull faces, be convulsed, vomif. On the initial stages of metaphorization, the reaction of the body to a certain emotional state is likened to the reaction of the body to a certain physical state (sensing fear is like sensing cold, sensing disgust is like sensing bad taste). Then, by metaphorical shift, the reaction of the mind to a certain emotional state is likened to the reaction of the body to a certain physical state (feeling/car is like sensing cold, feeling disgust is like sensing bad taste). To sum up, the metaphor which binds the physical and the emotional, the sense and the feeling can be formulated as follows: feeling (reaction of the mind) is like sensation (reaction of the body) to a certain physical state; the physical symptoms of the feeling are like the symptoms of this physical state. Thus, disgust is metaphorized as moral, psychological nausea, which can be accompanied by areal, physiological nausea; consider: His cowardice is nauseating (moral nausea); When she saw all the dirt and roaches in the kitchen, she almost threw up (physiological nausea). Fear is metaphorized as psychological freezing and paralysis, which can be accompanied by a real, physiological freezing and paralysis, consider the Russian Ego zestokost' ledenit du$u 'His cruelty makes one's soul freeze' (moral freezing); On drozal ot straxa 'He was shaking with fear’ (physiological freezing). This type of metaphor is one of the regular ways in which language conceptualizes feeling proper in emotions, which makes it necessary, in our view, to include it in the 5A similar idea about disgust is expressed in Wierzbicka 19S2. 25 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. semantic description of emotions. Of course, not every emotion will contain such a metaphorical component. There should be a considerable body of consistently organized material to justify the inclusion. More formally, the metaphoric component should be introduced in the definition of a certain emotion if the following two conditions are satisfied: a) there is only one feeling (or one group of homogeneous feelings) which corresponds to a certain metaphor, so that to mention the metaphor is enough to identify the feeling (e.g., if we know that the physiological state of being nauseated was caused by an emotion then the emotion type can be unequivocally identified as 'disgust'); b) there is a certain physical state causing the same symptoms as the feeling in question (this would exclude such symptoms as raising eye-brows\ although raising eye brows unambiguously points to suprise, there is no physical state associated with this symptom). To illustrate how this approach works I will give an example. The difference in 'feeling bad’ between 'anger' and 'fear' emotion types is reflected in the following metaphors: (l)a /f made my blood run hot (l)b It made my blood run cold (l)a can be applied to the emotion of'anger,' but not 'fear,' whereas (l)b describes 'fear' and not 'anger.' I am inclined to think that there is a semantic explanation for this. As was already 26 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. mentioned, the emotion type 'fear' is associated with the physical state of cold; in the semantic definitions of lexemes, denoting emotions of this type, there is a metaphoric part 'the mind of the experiencer feels something similar to what his body feels when he is cold; the body of the experiencer reacts to this feeling as it reacts to cold.*6 Inclusion of this component in the definition makes it possible to explain all other symptomatic expressions used to describe 'fear1 (see above). And, in fact, physiologically, 'fear' acts like cold: it slows down the circulation of the blood which results in feeling cold, in pallor, shaking, etc. The effect of'anger' on the mind and the body of the experiencer is just the opposite: emotionally, it stirs up the experiencer's activity and leads him to quick, drastic actions; physiologically, it quickens the circulation of blood and makes the experiencer feel hot; therefore, 'anger' is associated with heat (see Kovecsds 1990). The conceptualization of this emotion in language confirms this supposition: 'anger' makes one's blood run hot, it makes one flush. Semantically, this can be expressed as follows: 'what happens in the mind of the experiencer is similar to what happens in one's body when one senses heat; the body of the experiencer senses heat.' By and large, the analysis of emotions proposed in this paper will include the following: Interestingly, the etymological origin of the Russian word strax 'fear' is from the verb meaning 'to grow torpid, to freeze1. Its Lithuanian cognate is stregti, stregiu, meaning 'to freeze, to turn into ice* (Vasmer 1971, p. 772). 27 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1) semantic description of the lexeme denoting the emotion (plus the metaphors related to this emotion). Semantic description is constructed according to a scenario which is supposed to reflect all the cognitive, psychological, physiological and behavioral steps involved in the rise and manifestation of emotion. The scenario accepted here is closest to the one proposed in Ju.D. Apresjan 1992b, but differs from it in minor details. It consists of the following: (a) physical perception or mental contemplation of a certain state of things; (b) evaluation of this state of affairs as probable or improbable, desirable or undesirable; (c) feeling proper (the metaphorical part of the definition); (d) wishes which the feeling causes; (e) uncontrollable physiological reactions ("symptoms"); (f) controlled behavioral or speech reactions. Evaluation in (b) can be both rational and irrational Such emotions as surprise or apprehension involve purely rational evaluation of the state of affairs. However, such emotions as horror can be completely irrational (in fact, the experiencer may not be able to rationalize his own feelings). Not every emotion includes all of the above six components; there are many emotions lacking physiological or behavioral reactions. 2) syntactic and morphological properties of the lexeme denoting the emotion. The reason why these should be included in the description is that semantic properties of lexemes impose certain restrictions on their syntax and morphology. 28 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Some intricate instances of this well-known dependency are discussed in VJu. Apresjan 1991,1993. Let us look at an example outside the emotional domain. Compare two Russian verbs, blestet' Oto shine') and svetit' fto shine1 ): (2) Solnce blestit 'The sun shines’ (3) Solnce svetit 'The sun shines’ Their meanings in Russian are quite close, with the common semantic component 'to radiate light.’ However, svetit’ has an additional semantic component, as compared to blestet,' namely, 'to make visible the things in the space where light falls.’ Due to this component svetit’ acquires the so-called benefactive dative complement: (4) Nam svetila luna 'To-us was shining the moon’ Blestet’ cannot occur in this type of construction: (5) * Nam blestela luna 'To-us was shining the moon’ 29 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Why is that so? I think that the component 'to make things visible' implies an observer (who is a potential benefactee), because when a thing is visible, it must be visible to somebody. So, in (4), the implication is that we are able to see things. Unlike this, blestet' does not suggest affecting the perceiver by the process it designates, thus excluding the possibility of a benefactee. Therefore, blestet cannot take the benefactive dative as a complement and, thus, differs syntactically from svetit'. This connection between syntax and semantics is also relevant and important for the lexemes denoting emotions. Because of space limitations, I will not be able to demonstrate this semantics-syntax dependency for all the emotion lexemes I analyze. I will illustrate it with the comparison of the syntactic properties of English and Russian 'fear' lexemes (Section III.3.2. of this manuscript), as well as with the description of the synonymic series7 of the Russian lexeme bojat'sja 'to fear, to be afraid,’ described in Ju.D. Apresjan's framework (see Apresjan 1992a). This framework requires a characterization of similarities and differences between synonyms and groups of synonyms in the domain of meaning, prosody, communicative (theme-rheme) values, pragmatic information, morphological forms, syntactic constructions and co-occurrence properties. It is most frequently the case that for a synonymic group, there is a certain key word - the synonym with the broadest meaning which can be used as a general designation for all the other members of the synonymic group. A perfectly reasonable question may arise in this connection - what criteria are used for establishing synonymic relations among different lexemes and, thus, for determining the 7 By the synonymic series of a lexeme A is meant a group of lexemes synonymous to A, A being the one with the most universal meaning in the group. 30 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. content of synonymic series. There is no problem when we deal with exact synonyms - lexemes with entirely coinciding meanings. However, this is a rather rare case. A much more frequent occurrence is so-called inexact synonymy, when lexemes are considered synonymous on the basis of a partial overlap in meanings. It is extremely important to determine the formal criteria for inexact synonymy, as they are not at all obvious. A tentative answer to this is proposed in Ju.D. Apresjan 1995. Ju.D. Apresjan proposes a rather intricate testing procedure to determine whether a given pair of lexemes can be regarded as synonymous or not. We do not have the space here to go into all its details, therefore, we will discuss only the most relevant points of his analysis. The first step in the process of testing is explicating the meanings of the lexemes in question by means of a special semantic metalanguage. This metalanguage is a subset of the language under analysis, thus, it is language-specific. This metalanguage consists of semantic primitives (words which do not yield further semantic decomposition), as well as of more complex items which can, however, be reduced to primitives in a small number of steps. Syntactically, the metalanguage consists of the simplest syntactic constructions. To account for lexemes with complex logical structures, the logical functions of these constructions are unified. Thus, for Russian, the distribution is as follows: (1) gerundial and participial constructions open the definition, as well as relative clauses inside the definition are used to express presuppositions; (2) main clauses with a finite verb are used to express assertions; (3) modal frames are introduced with the semantic component 'speaker'; 31 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (4) the frames of observation are introduced with the semantic component 'observer1 ; (5) motivations are introduced at the end of the definition with the clause 'X does this because X wants that...’ . After we express the meanings of our lexemes in this semantic metalanguage, we can formulate the definition of synonymy: two lexemes are considered synonymous if the common part of their meanings (formulated in this special semantic metalanguage) exceeds their semantic distinctions. This definition, as Ju.D. Apresjan notes, is quite general and, in many cases, not sufficiently subtle. There are cases when the common semantic part of two lexemes exceeds their non-coinciding part but they still cannot be considered synonymous. Ju.D. Apresjan analyzes the pair Santaz 'blackmail1 and ul'timatum 'ultimatum.' The common semantic part of these lexemes is quite substantial and it is formulated as 'demand that the addressee does something which the subject needs or from which he profits, a demand, very much unwanted by the addressee and accompanied by a threat to harm him in case he does not yield to this demand, so that this harm would largely exceed the harm of doing what is required from him.’ The non-coinciding parts of the meanings are, respectively, 'an immoral threat to reveal to the public something shameful or illegal in the addressee's life or career, something that he hides' (for 'blackmail') and 'the addressee has a very limited amount of time to do what is demanded of him' (for 'ultimatum'). It is clear that quantitavely, the overlapping semantic part of these two lexemes exceeds their non-coinciding part. However, they cannot be considered synonymous and are not treated as synonyms in any synonymic dictionaries. Thus, quantitative measurements are 32 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. insufficient for determining whether or not the common semantic part of a pair of lexemes is large enough for them to be called synonyms. Ju.D. Apresjan proposes the following additional criteria: semantic content and semantic value of components constituting the meanings of the lexemes in question. Semantic content of such a component is the number of semantic primitives into which it can be decomposed. For instance, the components 'immoral,1 'illegal,' 'shameful' which are included in the meaning of'blackmail' have a high semantic content, as they have a complex semantic structure and consist of many simpler components. On the other hand, the component 'amount of time’ in the meaning of 'ultimatum' has a much lower semantic content, since 'amount' and 'time' are, as it seeems, semantic primitives. Semantic value of a meaning component is reciprocal to the number of lexical meanings of which it is part. The smaller this number, the rarer this component occurs and, therefore, the higher its semantic value. The component 'amount of time' in the meaning of 'ultimatum' has a high semantic value, as it is part of only very few other lexical meanings. Because of its high semantic value, the component 'amount of time* still plays an important role in the meaning of the lexeme 'ultimatum1 (despite its low semantic content). To sum up, meanings cannot be compared exclusively by the number of their semantic components; what matters, is the respective weight of these components, and this weight is determined by their semantic content and semantic value. However, this alone cannot account for all possible cases. There is not space for citing any more examples; I will simply list the rest of the formal criteria proposed by Ju.D. Apresjan. As he shows, it is relevant for establishing synonymy that the coinciding semantic 33 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. components are located in the assertion rather than in other parts of the lexemes' meanings. Another important factor is syntactic organization of these semantic components. To sum up, the following is added to the traditional notion of synonymy: (1) the common semantic part of lexemes to be tested for synonymy is to be formulated in the special semantic metalanguage; (2) this part has to include assertions of the respective lexemes; (3) this part has to include the main semantic component of the assertion. In this paper, I have tried to comply with these formal requirements when establishing the content of the synonymic groups analyzed. However, in order to provide a more complete account of the emotion concepts under consideration, I have in one case (to be discussed below) extended this formal notion of synonymy to include certain closely related but not altogether synonymous lexemes into the same synonymic group. Semantic differentiation of the lexemes inside a synonymic group is done by means of semantic features. These features should not be mistaken for semantic components; the semantic definition is not represented as a list of positive and negative values taken by these features. They are just working tools meant to facilitate the description of the items under consideration and extremely useful in cross-linguistic comparison. Semantic features have both theoretical and empirical foundations. Theoretically, they originate from the specific properties of a certain class of objects (material objects, actions, states, emotions) in the extralinguistic world. To illustrate this point, let us look at the synonymic group of the Russian verb te£ ('to flow'), analyzed in V.Ju. Apresjan 1995b. The verbs in this group describe various types of water motion. These 34 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. types differ according to the following parameters: (1) presence/absence of the surface over which the water moves. For example, the process tec’ 'to flow' is a type of motion which requires a surface; therefore, the verb teS cannot be used in describing the movement of the water in a rain. The process lit'sja 'to flow, to pour' is a type of water motion which does not require a surface; therefore, the corresponding verb can be used when talking about rain or about pouring water out of a tea pot); (2) direction of movement. Only the process bit’ 'gush out, well up' is a type of motion in which the water moves up, driven by an inner pressure; all the other are processes in which the water goes down driven by the power of gravity. There are some other parameters which distinguish between types of water motion, but for our purposes the ones already mentioned are sufficient. These encyclopedic parameters distinguishing between types of water motion are the basis for the semantic features distinguishing between verbs denoting these types. Empirical evidence for these features comes directly from language use, for instance, from texts. What corresponds to the features on this level, are the critical, distinctive contexts in which some lexemes can be used, whereas the others cannot. Being abstracted from concrete texts, these contexts become generalized as features. In the case of emotions, the theoretical basis for the features is provided mostly by the above-mentioned scenario. Features originating from this scenario (such as 'setting of the emotion'; 'behavioral manifestations of the emotion1 etc.) do not represent only our extralinguistic knowledge about respective emotions. Since the extralinguistic information 35 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. about emotions is reflected in language, these features also have an empirical linguistic foundation. Namely, the features are the generalizations of certain contexts in which some lexemes denoting emotions can be used, and some cannot. There are, of course, certain differences between items in a synonymic group which cannot be subsumed under the six parameters of the scenario. Some of these differences are culture-specific, some of them are language-specific. Semantic features which account for these differences are formulated exclusively on the basis of texts and native speakers' judgements. To systematize the empirical part of the investigation I have proposed a number of linguistic tests for different features. The notion of a linguistic test requires some clarification. Sometimes, a semantic property A becomes lexicalized to such an extent that it entails some other semantic properties, or some syntactic or communicative or other linguistic properties. In this case, the latter can be used to test the presence of A in a lexeme. For instance, a well- known test for gradability of properties is their co-occurrence with adverbs of degree: those properties which are gradable can co-occur with such adverbs (very sick), whereas those which are ungradable cannot (\ery dead). Similarly, I use a number of tests which are indicative of the presence or absence of certain semantic components in the lexemes denoting emotions. Since this framework is applied cross-linguistically, the following additional questions are raised: 1. which emotions are conceptualized in similar ways across different languages? 2. which emotions are conceptualized in different ways across languages? 36 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the initial stages of my work I proposed the following hypothesis: those emotions which have a strong physiological constituent (such as 'fear,' 'anger,' 'disgust')8 are treated by languages in similar ways. I also proposed the following tentative explanation for this: such emotions usually arise as an immediate reaction to some event and are accompanied by certain physiological symptoms discussed above. Physiological reactions to outward stimuli are presumably more or less the same for all human beings. The metaphors which bear on symptomatic expressions, are, thus, also likely to be similar across languages. On the ther hand, "higher rank" emotions, which are less motivated and not manifested physiologically (such as 'sadness,' 'pity'), or which involve mental operations and evaluation (such as 'boredom') will be more culturally restricted and likely to be conceptualized differently by different languages. In fact, as I show below, this hypothesis turns out to be correct (at least for the data covered in the present work). In this work I analyze in detail five emotion types: namely, 'fear,' 'pity,' 'disgust,' 'sadness,' 'boredom/ tiredness’ in two languages - Russian and English. Besides that, I consider a number of other emotion types, such as 'anger,' 'love,' 'offence,' 'remorse,' 'joy' and some others, from the point of view of their metaphoric conceptualization. As I said, in this work I am mostly concerned with the semantics of these emotion types in the respective languages, and a full lexicographic description is provided only for one emotion type in one language, namely, for the Russian emotion type 'fear' (Appendix). A syntactic cross-linguistic description is also provided for the 'fear' lexemes in English and In Oatley's terminology, "basic emotions". 37 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Russian. There are a few remarks about the structure of the work I need to make. The description of the 'fear' and 'pity' emotion types is structured slightly differently from that of the rest of emotions. Namely, for the 'fear' and 'pity' types, semantic tests are used explicitly. In the rest of my description, I merely state the values of the respective semantic features, without always explicating the testing procedure. I do use the tests to determine these values; however, I do not put this working procedure in writing. The main reason for choosing this format (inconsistent, as it may seem) is as follows: in the beginning, it is important for me to illustrate my framework, to make it transparent for the reader and to show that it allows one to describe linguistic facts objectively. In other words, it is the working process, the functioning of my framework, that I want to show. However, it is very important for my purposes to show not only the functioning of my framework, but also the practical results it gives. Thus, the descriptions of the 'disgust,' 'sadness' and 'boredom/ tiredness' emotion types are carried out in an easier-to-comprehend, more reader-friendly form, without frequent references to the working process itself. They are designed to illustrate the product of my framework. Also, many semantic features are invariant for different emotion types and, thus, obviously, require the same semantic tests to determine their place in the semantic description. Such features are, for instance: 'strength of emotion' (tested by co-occurrence with adjectives and adverbs, denoting degree); 'external/ internal source of emotion' (tested by co-occurrence with the adverb just) and some others (see chapter IX on this). Therefore, it would be simply redundant to repeat the testing procedure again and again, for each of the emotion types. 38 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The metalanguage of my description is a standardized and simplified English language (in terms of both vocabulary and syntax), devoid, as far as possible, of any lexical or grammatical polysemy or homonymy. Following Apresjan 1980, p. 177,1 assume that an ideal metalanguage at the present stage of available semantic formality is a standardized simplified version of the natural language under consideration, which, in my case, would be Russian and English. However, for the sake of unification and convenience, I adopted English as the only language of description. In my semantic definitions I use variables (X, Y, Z, etc.)9 ; however, this does not undermine the claim that my metalanguage is a subset of natural English. These variables stand for the lexemes somebody, something, do, feel, etc., and are used to avoid polysemy, ambiguity or vagueness. The remaining part of the work consists of the following chapters: (IE) English and Russian 'fear'; (TV ) English and Russian 'pity1 ; (V) English and Russian 'disgust'; (VI) English and Russian 'sadness'; (VII) English and Russian 'boredom/ tiredness’ ; (VID) Emotion metaphors: overt manifestations of emotions and their cross-linguistic conceptualization; (IX) Generalizations of the results obtained in this work; Appendix (lexicographic entry for the synonymic group of the Russian lexeme bojat’ sja 'to fear, to be afraid’ in the integral framework of Ju.D. Apresjan). g My definitions are, however, much less formalized than, for example, the definitions of Psych verbs in Jackendoff 1990. Their high degree of formalism, while taking away much of their comprehensibility, does not seem to add anything to their descriptive power. In fact, Jackendoff's definitions are not only unable to distinguish between such emotions as to fear and to be afraid, they do not even distinguish between to fear and to hate, both of which are described as follows: Y fears/hates X. [et.t „ REACT' ([YJ, [X])], which means that X is in a state of negative reaction to Y. 39 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m . English and Russian 'fear.' My data: English1 0 lexemes: to be afraid, to be scared, to be terrified, to fear, to be frightened, to be apprehensive, to be aghast, to be petrified, to get cold feet, to be intimidated. Russian lexemes: bojat'sja Cto be afraid’ ), pugat'sja ('to get frightened’ ),straSit'sja fto fear strongly’ ), opasat'sja ('to feel apprehensive’ ), trnsit (to get cold feet’ ), drejfit' Cto get cold feet1 ), robet'Cto be intimidated1 ), trepetat' ('to tremble with fear’ ), drozaf ('to shake with fear’ ), trjastis' ('to quake with fear’ ). The key words for these synonymic groups are, respectively, to be afraid for English and bojat'sja, for Russian. These appear to be less specified in meaning than the rest and, as a result, are used more frequently and can occur in more diverse contexts. There is a certain core meaning for all the verbs of'fear' which is the same for English and Russian. It may be formulated as follows: 'to feel bad because a certain situation perceived as dangerous is taking place; to wish to escape it; to feel something similar to what one senses when one is cold; to react to this feeling as one reacts to cold.1 1 ’ “American English verbs for 'fear1 differ from British English verbs in that the distinctions among the former are fewer in number and significance than those among the latter. But I cannot make any stronger claims about this difference because I had more American informants than British, and this seeming discrepancy may be due to that. llIn some of the verbs this meaning is part of the assertion, in some of them it is part of the presupposition. The presence of this meaning in either assertion or presupposition of a verb is considered sufficient for it to be attributed to this synonymic group. 40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IQ.1. English "fear.' English lexemes with the meaning of 'fear' differ with respect to the following semantic features: (1) location of the emotional component in the meaning of the emotion lexeme (in the assertion/ in the presupposition/ in the entailment); (2) source of emotion (external/ internal); (3) simultaneous/ future temporal orientation regarding contact with the source of emotion, relative to the moment of reference; (4) presence/ absence of suddenness in the transition to the emotional state; (5) presence/ absence of the attempt to avoid contact with the source of emotion; (6) manifestations of emotion (their presence/ absence, their nature, etc.); (7) presence/ absence of the speaker’ s evaluation of the experiencer; (8) property/ state status of the emotion lexeme; (9) factual/ putative interpretation of the emotion lexeme. (1) Feature: location of the emotional component of the emotion (in the assertive part of the definition/in the presupposition/in the entailment). There is a two-step process to define in what part of the meaning the component 'to feel' is located. Accordingly, there are two tests. 41 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tests: (1) inability to occur in the absolutive construction, such as A X-s, where A is the name of the experiencer and X is the lexeme for 'fear' (the test shows whether or not the component 'to feel* is present in one of the two main layers of meaning: in the assertion or in the presupposition). (2) combination with negation (the test shows in which of the two main parts of meaning the component 'to feel’ is present: in the assertion or in the presupposition). 1) If the lexemes are not able to occur in the absolutive construction, they do not contain the semantic component 'to feel1 in one of the two main layers of meaning; that is, they are closer to mental states rather than to emotional states. I choose this test for the following reason. Lexemes for 'feeling1 are usually "synthetic" in their structure (for English and Russian, at least); that is, one can say 'I experience a certain feeling* by means of the verb or verbal phrase alone (Le. in the absolutive construction), e.g. She is happy, He is angry, Ona raduetsja ('She is happy1 ), On serditsja ('He is angry')1 2 , with no further specification. Contrary to this, verbs for 'thinking' are usually "analytic" in their structure in that they require more than one lexeme to make up a proper utterance. Cf. the ill-formedness of 7 am 12Certainly, this is true only for those emotions that can be objectless, such as 'fear', 'joy1, 'anger1, 'shame1. This test is inapplicable to such object-oriented emotions as 'pity1, 'compassion', 'hatred' whose semantic structure includes a valency of object with an obligatory syntactic expression. 42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sure, 7 consider; such verbs cannot appear in the absolutive construction1 3 . Examples: (6) I am afraid <scared, terrified, frightened, apprehensive, intimidated>. I fear. I am getting cold feet. All the sentences are well-formed; this means that all English lexemes for 'fear' do contain the semantic component 'to feel1 in one of the main layers of meaning. 2) If under the negation of a lexeme X the component 'to feel' also gets negated, this means that in X this component is located in the assertion; if it does not get negated, it means that it is located in the presupposition. Examples: (7) I am not afraid <not scared, not terrified, not frightened, not apprehensive, not alarmed, not intimidated). I do not fear. I am not getting cold feet> = 'I do not feel bad because a certain situation perceived as dangerous is taking place.’ (8) He is not petrified <not aghast> = 'he has not lost his ability to move because of 13As for such well-formed phrases as I think; I wonder; I understand, they are not counter-examples to my statement, since, unlike the phrases She is happy or He is sad, they all involve ellipsis. 43 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. his feeling bad about a certain situation perceived as dangerous'. As we can see from (7) and (8), in to be afraid, to be scared, to be terrified, to fear, to be frightened, to be apprehensive, to get cold feet, to be alarmed, to be intimidated the semantic component 'to feel' is part of the assertion, while in to be aghast and to be petrified it is part of the presupposition. In (7) the very fact of feeling fear is denied; in (8) only the presence of a physiological reaction to feeling fear is denied. To be petrified and to be aghast describe the overt result of the internal condition of a person, not the internal condition itself. Feeling fear, however, is a necessary condition for being aghast or petrified1 4 ; consider the following examples: (9) One stands aghast fo r the moment, frightened at the privation which those fashioned like ourselves in outward seeming can bear and live, shrinking from the recital... (OC)1 5 (10) He placed a loaded pistol against his face and demanded that he dismount. The boy panicked. Petrified, he began to shake and scream, his shrieking voice piercing the silent Berkshire moorland (OC). liPetrified has also another meaning, 'to be turned to stone1, for which fihis assumption does not hold. "OC" refers to "Oxford Corpus, created by Oxford University Press for the use of their lexicographers"; this is the data base, from which most of my English literary examples are taken. 44 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (2) Feature: external/ internal source of emotion. There is only one test for this feature applicable to some of the lexemes. In my judgements I am guided mostly by intuitions of my informants. I distinguish between two main types of sources: outside (external) source and inside (internal) source. By external source of emotion I mean an event in the outside world which directly causes the emotion. By internal source of emotion I mean an event in the inner world of the experiencer which he himself (and, certainly, other people) may not be aware of and which makes him experience the emotion. There are two classes of emotions according to this feature: 1) those which can have an external source only; 2) those which can have either one. 1. External source only: to be frightened, to be petrified, to be aghast, to fear, to be apprehensive, to get cold feet, to be intimidated. 2. Either external or internal source: to be afraid, to be scared, to be terrified. For the lexeme to be assigned to the second class, there is a special test. Test. co-occurrence with the lexeme just; if a lexeme can co-occur with it, then it can have either an external or an internal source. 45 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Examples: (11) I am just afraid <frightened, terrified, 'petrified, ’aghast, scared, *intimidated>. 7 am just getting cold feet. 7 just fear. (12) I thought I 'd got over it but it seems to have come back. I have to skirt round Broad Street because they 're demolishing and there's a great big red one and a yellow one and I'm just terrified. I know it sounds nutty (OC). Only the lexemes to be afraid, to be scared, to be frightened and to be terrified can designate emotions which can appear without the experiencer realizing the reason. (3) Feature: simultaneous/ future temporal orientation regarding contact with the source of emotion, relative to the moment of reference. Test: co-occurrence with a temporal clause beginning with when (without the adverb always in the matrix clause, since this gives the sentence iterative interpretation, as in / am always afraid when I see him). If a lexeme can co-occur with such temporal clauses, it denotes an emotion which can have simultaneous orientation, ie., is caused by an anticipation of a 46 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dangerous contact with its source. Examples: (13) / was " afraid <scared, terrified, intimidated, frightened, petrified, aghast> when I saw him. 7 feared when I saw him. I got cold feet when I saw him. Thus, for to fear simultaneous orientation is completely excluded. Consider a typical use of to fear with the future orientation: (14) Even Nigel Starmer-Smith concluded his editorial piece last month o f the inevitability of the acceptance o f professionalism, with a "hopefully, though, we will fin d that the game will not suffer as much as we fear" (OC). For to be afraid simultaneous orientation is more acceptable, consider: (15) As he tried to grab me, I feinted, slipped back to make him follow me, knowing he would think 1 was afraid, and then I let him have a classic straight left that hit him on the point of the jaw (OC). (4) Feature: 47 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. presence/absence of suddenness in the transition to the emotional state. Test: 1) co-occurrence with the PP containing the indication of suddenness, as by! o f this sudden noise; 2) incompatibility with the PP containing the indication of anticipation, as by I o f my coming exam. Lexemes which satisfy both 1) and 2) have the component 'suddenness' in their meaning. The first test is quite transparent. The second test may need some clarification. What is suddenness? Suddenness involves a quick and unexpected transition to a new state. The second test indicates expectation, which is incompatible with suddenness. Examples: English: (16) I was “ afraid o f <ftightened by, terrified by, petrified by, scared of, intimidated by, * apprehensive of> this sudden noise. I was aghast at this sudden noise. 7 got cold feet at this sudden noise. 7 feared this sudden noise. (17) / am afraid < frightened, terrified,*petrified,* aghast, scared, intimidated, apprehensive> o f <by> my coming exam. I get cold feet when I think about my coming 48 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exam. I fear my coming exam. Lexemes which satisfy both 1) and 2) are to be frightened, to be petrified, to be aghast. They contain the component "suddenness1 in their semantic representations. (5) Feature: absence/presence of the attempt to avoid contact with the source of emotion. This attempt is usually manifested either in avoiding the person perceived as dangerous, or in abstaining from doing something perceived as dangerous (normally, something the person is supposed to do). Test: ability to occur in the following context: A X-s Y but does not try to avoid Y, or A X -edbut A didZ, where A is the name of the experiences X is the lexeme for 'fear,1 Y is the source of emotion and Z - the action which the experiencer is supposed to perform. •Scope of applicability of the test: applicable only to the lexemes denoting more or less permanent or lasting states. Thus, the test is not applicable to the lexemes to be frightened, 49 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to be aghast, to be petrified and to be intimidated. Examples: (18) I am afraid o f it <scared of it, terrified o f it, apprehensive o f it, fear it> but don't try to avoid it. 7 got cold feet but I nevertheless married her. The only lexeme incompatible with this type of context, is to get cold feet. It means that this lexeme includes the semantic component 'presence of the conscious attempt to avoid something perceived as dangerous.' To get cold feet is often used to describe the behavior of a person who suddenly felt afraid of making a commitment and has withdrawn from the situation, especially in reference to matrimonial commitment, e.g.: (19) Baden-Powell contemplated marrying a rich American widow, but got cold feet (OC). Another context where this lexeme is frequently used is politics: (20) One proposed answer to global warming - a greater reliance on nuclear power - does not have too healthy a prognosis. Even the Thatcher government has got cold feet (OC). 50 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ( 6 ) Feature: manifestations of emotion (their presence/ absence, their nature). Test: ability to occur in the following context: A X-ed but A did not let it show, where A is the name of the person experiencing the emotion and X is the lexeme for 'fear.' Those lexemes which cannot occur in this context designate emotions which necessarily have some overt manifestations. Examples: (21) He was afraid <scared, terrified, frightened, apprehensive> but he did not let it show. He feared but he did not let it show. He was intimidated <petrified> but he did not let it show. *He got cold feet but he did not let it show. *He was aghast but he did not let it show. Lexemes incompatible with this type of context are to be aghast, to be petrified and to get cold feet, which means that they imply obligatory overt manifestations. 51 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. There are three main types of overt manifestation of emotion: (1) disfunction of certain organs of the body (Iordanskaja 1972). This includes the loss of ability to move or to control the expression of one’ s face. On this manifestation it is interesting to consider the following passage from M. Zoschenko's "Before the Sunrise": My znaem, cto takoe strax, znaem ego vozdejstvie na rabotu naSego tela. My znaem ego oboronitel'nye refleksy. V osnove ix stremlenie izbezat' opasnosti.l Simptomy straxa raznoobmzny <...> Oni vyrazajutsja v szatii krovesnosnyx sosudov, v spazmax kiSecnika <...>, v serdcebienijax. Krajnjaja stepen' straxa vyzyvaetpolnyj Hi castiaiyjparalic'WQ know what fear is, we know how it affects our body. We know its defensive reflexes. They are based on striving for avoiding danger./ Fear has various symptoms <...> It is manifested in the compression of veins, in the spasms of bowels <...>, in tachycardia. The extreme degree of fear causes a full or partial paralysis'; (2) loss of ability to communicate normally; (3) abstention from doing something one is supposed to do; The first two manifestation types come from a common source: loss of control over one's feelings or over one's body. Whereas (1) implies loss of physical control, (2) implies loss of psychological control. However, (3) is not necessarily related to the loss of control. To be aghast implies inability to move, to control the expression of one's face and the change of facial color: (22) Mrs Lennox's face drained to a pasty white as Maggie told her. 'Oh lassie! " she whispered, aghast, when she’ d finished her tale (OC). 52 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To be petrified implies inability to move and the change of facial color (see the example above). To get cold feet and to be intimidated imply abstention from doing something one is supposed to do (see the example above). (7) Feature: property/ state status of emotion (see also Ju.D. Apresjan 1979). Test: co-occurrence with the adverb always; the verb for 'fear' should be used in the Present Perfect tense, without any specifying context; and the interpretation should not be iterative. A has always X-en Y, where A is the name of the person experiencing the emotion, X is the lexeme for 'fear' and Y is the name of something perceived as dangerous. Example: I have always been afraid of dogs. Examples: (23) I have always been afraid <scared of, terrified of, intimidated b y,? ? frightened 53 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of, * petrified by, * aghast at> dogs. I have always* gotten cold feet at dogs. I have always been apprehensive about dogs. I have always feared dogs. (24) People are naturally afraid o f anything that's powerful... and the more mysterious the power the more they are afraid (OC). (25) I would throw my boyfriend out, but I 'd be scared o f living alone (OC). Lexemes to be frightened, to be petrified, to be aghast, to get cold feet cannot denote permanent properties; in their semantic representations there is an indication that the state they denote is temporary. In some speakers' intuitions, however, the following combination with 'permanent' interpretation is possible: (26) I have always been frightened o f dogs. Consider also the following literary example: (27) The two things the US insurance market is frightened o f are a hurricane moving up the east coast and an earthquake on the west coast (OC). (9) Feature: 54 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. factual/putative interpretation of the 'fear' lexeme. Test: factual/putative interpretation of the that-clause subordinated by the verb. Scope of applicability of the test: not applicable to the verbs which cannot subordinate a f/zaf-clause. These are the lexemes which usually denote temporary states: to be intimidated, to be frightened, to be petrified, to be aghast and to get cold feet. Examples: (28) I am afraid that he is in Moscow. I fear that he is in Moscow. I am apprehensive that he might be in Moscow = "I don't know if he is in Moscow or not. I think he might be there. I don't want this to be, because it can be dangerous either for him or for me (or for my loved ones). I feel bad because of that.' This is a putative interpretation: being in Moscow is a supposition, not a fact. Note: the lexeme to be apprehensive cannot even be used without the indication of uncertainty might be. So, to be afraid and to fear are putatives. (29) I am terrified that he is in Moscow. I am scared that he is in Moscow = 7 know 55 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that he is in Moscow. I don't want this to be, because it can be dangerous either for him or fo r me (or fo r my loved ones). I feel bad because of that.' This is factual interpretation: being in Moscow is a fact, not a supposition. So, to be terrified and to be scared are factives. ffl.2. Russian 'fear.' The Russian lexemes with the meaning of'fear' differ with respect to the following semantic features: (1) location of the emotional component in the meaning of emotion lexeme (in the assertion/ in the presupposition/ in the entailing); (2) source of emotion (external/ internal); (3) simultaneous/ future temporal orientation regarding contact with the source of emotion, relative to the moment of reference; (4) presence/ absence of suddenness in the transition to the emotional state; (5) presence/ absence of the attempt to avoid the contact with the source of emotion; (6) manifestations of emotion (their presence/ absence, their nature, etc.); (7) presence/ absence of the speaker's evaluation of the experiencer; (8) a certain predisposition in the personality of the experiencer for the rise of emotion; (9) property/ state status of the emotion lexeme; 56 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (10) factual/ putative interpretation of the emotion lexeme. (1) Feature: location of the emotional component in the meaning of emotion lexeme (in the assertion/ in the presupposition/ in the entailing) Tests: the same as for English. Examples: (30) Ja bojus' <ispugalas',1 6 stratus', *opasajus', tru$u, drejflju, robeju, trepeScu, drozu, trjasus’>. 7 am afraid <scared,fear strongly, * apprehensive, get cold feet, get cold feet, am intimidated, tremble with fear, shake with fear, quake withfear>.' Thus, for Russian, the situation is different than for English. There is one lexeme which cannot occur in the absolutive construction, namely, opasat'sja. Therefore, opasat'sja does not include the component 'to feel' in the assertion or in the presupposition, whereas the 16The verb pugat 'sja cannot receive the actual-durational interpretation (implied by the test) in the imperfective aspect and is, therefore, tested in the perfective aspect. 57 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rest of the lexemes do. Interestingly, the English correlate for the Russian unemotional opasat'sja (to be apprehensive) does not lack the emotional component. The Russian lexeme expresses a state which is closer to a mental one, whereas the English lexeme expresses a state which is both mental and emotional. In opasat'sja the component 'to feel1 is part of the entailment. The semantic representation of this lexeme looks, therefore, approximately as follows: X opasaetsja = 'X thinks that a certain situation which is dangerous is taking place and, as a result of this, feels bad.’ Ivan oden' opasaetsja itoj vstred ('John is very apprehensive of this meeting1 ) does not mean that John is very scared and feels very bad; it means that John thinks that a certain situation is very dangerous and that John makes attempts to avoid it. Thus, in opasat'sja 'feeling' is secondary, whereas mental perception and evaluation are primary. In to be apprehensive thinking does not outweigh the feeling. Feeling can even be so strong as to have certain overt manifestations, and, thus, be visible to an observer. Consider, e.g., the following sentence: (31) Several times at the beginning o f his stay he had surprised a worried and apprehensive look on her face. He hadn't asked her if anything was wrong, naturally (OC). 58 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In Russian it would be impossible to understand, whether a person experiences opasat'sja Cto be apprehensive’ ), on the basis of his appearance, since the feeling is in no way manifested. The second part of the test is illustrated in the following examples: Examples: (32) Ja tie bojus' (ne stratus', ne truSu, ne drejflju, tie robeju, tie pugajus') = 'I do not feel bad because a certain situation perceived as dangerous is taking place.’ (33) Ja ne trepescu (ne drozu, ne trjasus'pered nirri) = 'I am not trembling in front of him because I perceive him as a dangerous person and feel bad in his presence.’ As we can see from (32) and (33), in bojat’ sja, straSifsja, trusit’ , drejfit', robet' and pugat’ sja the component 'to feel’ is contained in the assertion because it gets denied under negation, whereas in trepetat', drozaf and trjastis' it is contained in the presupposition because it does not get denied under negation. (2) Feature: source of emotion (internal/ external) 59 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. There are two classes of emotions according to this feature: 1) those which can have external source only; 2) those which can have either one. 1. External source only: pugat'sja,stratit'sja, trusit', robet', drejfit', trjastis',drozat' , trepetat'. 2. Either external or internal source: bojat'sja. For the lexeme to be assigned to the second class, there is a special test. Test: co-occurrence with the lexeme prosto 'just.' If a lexeme can co-occur with it, then it denotes an emotion which can have an internal source. Examples: (34) Ja prosto bojus' < pugajus', * stratus’, *opasajustruSu* dreiflju, robeju, * trepescu, * drozu, *trjasus'>. T am just afraid <*frightened, fear strongly, feel apprehensive, ‘get cold feet, ‘get cold feet, ‘am intimidated, ‘tremble with fear, ‘shake with fear, ‘quake with fear’ >. Only the lexeme bojat'sja sto be afraid’ can denote an emotion appearing with seemingly no reason. 60 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I would like to give a further specification to the possible types of emotion sources. In Russian, there are two lexemes which denote a specific type of'fear,' namely, "fear' of a person with a social rank, higher than that of the experincer. These are drozat' ('shake with fear in front of a person of a higher social rank or having the whip-hand of the situation') and trjastis', a lexeme with almost the same meaning, but denoting a greater degree of fear. (3) Feature: temporal orientation regarding contact with the source of emotion (future/simultaneous). Test: co-occurrence with a temporal clause introduced by vo vremja X-a (Muring X'), where X is the name of the situation perceived as dangerous, e.g. vo vremja ikzamena ('during the exam'). If a verb for fear can co-occur with such temporal clauses, then it can have simultaneous orientation; otherwise, it cannot. Examples: (35) Ja bojalsja <pugalsja, *straSilsja, * opasalsja, trusil, drejfil, robel, trepetal, drozal, trjassja>, kogda ego videl <vo vremja ikzamena>. 'I was afraid <frightened, "feared strongly, was "apprehensive, got cold feet, got cold 61 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. feet, got intimidated, trembled with fear, shook with fear, quaked with fear> when I saw him 1 The lexemes bojat'sja, pugat'sja, trusit’ , drejfit', robet', trepetat', drozat', trjastis' can have simultaneous orientation. The rest, namely, opasat'sja and straSit'sja, can only have future orientation. Consider, for instance, the following fragments from M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita" (36) and Z.Shaxovskaja, "Reflections" (37): (36) Ja vooMce nadnaju opasat'sja, do putanica ita budet prodolzat'sja ocen’ dolgoe vremja. '1 start to fear that this confusion will continue for a very long time' (future orientation). (37) Pasxa uze proSla, o cem <...> uznala ja tol'ko potomu, do ne straSas' posledstvij, otec Aleksandr Makovskij priexal iz Gremjaceva pozdravit' so svetlym prazdnikom maloletnjuju zaloznicu. 'Easter has already passed, which I have learnt of only because Father Aleksandr Makovskij, unafraid of the consequences, came from Gremjachev to congratulate the young hostage with the holiday.’ (4) Feature: presence/ absence of suddenness in the transition to the emotional state. 62 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Test1 7 : 1) co-occurrence with the PP containing the indication of suddenness, as vnezapnogo Suma ''by this sudden noise’ ; 2) incompatibility with the PP containing the indication of anticipation, as predstojaScego ikzamena 'by my coming exam’ Examples: (38) Ja * bojalsja itogo vnezapnogo Suma1 8 . Ja ispugalsja <stras ilsja, *opasalsja> itogo vnezapnogo suma. Ja ? strusil < ? sdrejfil,7 orobel, *trepetal, * drozal, *trjassja> ot itogo vnezapnogo Suma. 'I was ‘afraid of this sudden noise. I was frightened < feared strongly, was apprehensive> by <about> this sudden noise. I ’got cold feet, ’got cold feet, ’was intimidated, T trembled with fear <*shook with fear, ‘quaked with fear> at this sudden noise.’ (39) Ja bojus' <*pugajus', straSus, opasajus'> predstojascego examena. J a 7trusu, <? drejflju, ? robeju,7 trepeScu,7 drozu, ? trjasus’> peredpredstojaSdm ekzamenom. 'I am afraid <*fiightened, feared strongly, apprehensive> of my coming exam. I ’get cold feet c’get cold feet, ’intimidated, I tremble with fear, ’shake with fear, ’quake with fear> 17Because of the resultative component present in suddenness, to apply these tests, we have to put the verb in the perfective aspect. Therefore, this test is inapplicable to those verbs which have no perfective counterparts. 18With regard to the required interpretation. 63 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. at my coming exam.' There is only one lexeme which satisfies both 1) and 2), namely pugat'sja ('to be frightened'). It contains the component of 'suddenness' in its semantic representation. Consider the following (quite typical) situation of its occurrence, illustrated in a passage from M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita": (40) Cto-to zadelo Margaritu po golove. Ona vzdrognula. - Ne pugajtes', - sladko uspokoil Korovjev, berja Margaritu pod ruku. 'Something touched Margarita's head <suddenly>. She started. Do not be frightened, - sweetly reassured her Korovjev, taking Margarita's hand.’ (5) Feature: absence/ presence of the attempt to avoid contact with the source of emotion. Test: ability to occur in the following context: A X-sja Y-a, no ne staraetsja izbegat’ Y-a or A X-il, no sdelal Z, 'A is X of Y but does not try to avoid Y or A was X but did Z,' 64 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. where A stands for the experiencer, Y stands for the source of emotion, and Z - for the action which the experiencer is supposed to perform. Inability to occur in this context signifies presence of an attempt to avoid contact with the source of emotion. This test requires a short comment. Lexemes implying some action which a person experiencing the emotion is supposed to accomplish (trusit and drejfit') have a resultative interpretation in the past perfective. It means that in this form the lexemes including the semantic component 'attempt to avoid doing something which should be done,' signify that something which ought to have been done was not done. Therefore, for them, the testing context is put in the perfective. Scope of applicability of the test: applicable only to the lexemes denoting more or less permanent or lasting states. Thus, the test is not applicable to the lexemepugat'sja 'to get frightened.1 Examples: (41) Ja bojus' itogo <strasus’, *opasajus', robeju pered nim, trepescu, drozu, trjasus’>, no ne starajus' itogo izbezat'. 'I am afraid of it <*fear strongly, ‘feel apprehensive, am intimidated, tremble with fear, shake with fear, quake with fear>, but I don’ t try to avoid it.’ (42) *Ja strusil <sdrejfil>, no, tern ne menee, sdelal vse, cto obeScal. 65 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'I got cold feet <got cold feet>, but, nevertheless, did everything I had promised to do.’ The lexemes opasat'sja 'to be apprehensive,' trusit' and drejfif 'to get cold feet' are incompatible with this type of context, which means that they denote a conscious attempt to avoid something perceived as dangerous. Indeed, consider the following example from M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita": (43) Uspokojtes', uspokojtesuspokojtes’ , professor, - bormotal Berlioz, opasajas’ volnovat’ bol’ nogo. 'Calm down, calm down, calm down, professor, - muttered Berlioz, apprehensive about making the sick man nervous.' In the situation, described in this passage, Berlioz tries to avoid the danger (making the professor nervous) by calming him down. Or, consider another passage from the same novel: (44) Vot naprimer, ne strusil ze teperesnij prokurator Iudei, <...> togda, v doline Dev, kogda jarostnye germancy cut’ ne zagryzli Krysoboja-Velikana. 'Thus, for instance, the present procurator of Judaea did not get cold feet back then, in the Valley of the Virgins, when the furious Teutons had almost tom the giant Rat-Killer to pieces.' 66 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This passage describes a situation of not getting cold feet, which means that the experiencer (procurator) did not try to avoid the danger, did not try to escape. The rest do not include that component; the lexeme straSit’sja even includes the component 'danger is unavoidable.' Another test for this feature is co-occurrence with the names of unavoidable events: *Ja opasajus' smerti (N T am apprehensive of death'). Lexemes implying a conscious attempt to avoid danger cannot co-occur with such names. In connection with this, it is interesting to look at a passage from N.J.Mandelshtam's "Memoires" where she discusses the relation between fear and the possibility to avoid the danger which causes it. In a nutshell, what she says is that once we lose all possibilities to avoid what we are afraid of, we lose the feeling of fear, as well: "When at last will the unavoidable come?.. I have lost the feeling of death because I have entered the realm of non-existence. When fate looks you in the face, there is no more fear. Fear is like a ray of light, it is the desire to live, it is self-assertion. It is a profoundly European feeling. It is cultivated in us by our self-respect, by our acknowledgement of our own importance, of our rights, needs and wishes. People stick to what they have and are afraid to lose it. Fear and hope are interrelated. As soon as we lose hope, we lose also fear - we have nothing more to be afraid for" (translation mine). (6) Feature: manifestations of emotion (their presence/ absence, their nature) 67 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Test: ability to occur in the following context: A X-oval, no ne podaval vidu 'A experienced emotion X but did not let it show,1 where A stands for the experiencer and X - for the 'fear' emotion. Inability to occur in this context signifies the presence of obligatory overt manifestations of emotion. Examples: (45) On bojalsja, no vidu ne podaval. On ispugalsja, no vidu ne podal. Ona strati las' ego priezda, no nikak etogo ne pokazyvala. *On robel <*trusil, *drejfil, *trepetal, *drozal, *trjassja>, no nikak itogo ne pokazyval. 'He was afraid but he did not let it show. He got frightened but he did not let it show. She feared his coming strongly but she did not let it show in any way. "He was intimidated c ’getting cold feet, 'getting cold feet,* trembled with fear,* shook with fear* quaked with fear> but he did not let it show. Thus, the lexemes robet', trusit', drejfit', trepetat', drozat' and trjastis' imply obligatory overt manifestations. Robet' 'to be intimidated’ implies inability to behave and especially communicate in 68 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. one's usual manner. Consider, e.g., the following example from M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita", where this feeling is manifested in stammering: (46) Ivan, pervonacal'no zapinajas' i robeja <...> nacal rasskazyvat' vceraSnjuju istoriju. 'Ivan, intimidated and stammering at first, started to retell yesterday's story.' Trepetat' 'to tremble with fear’ implies inability to communicate normally. Drozat' 'to shake with fear1 and trjastis' 'to quake with fear1 have the same manifestations as the previous emotion, but in a greater degree. Trusit' 'to get cold feet’ and drejfit' 'to get cold feet1 are manifested in the inability to do something one is supposed to do. (7) Feature: presence/absence of the speaker's evaluation of the experiencer. There is no special test for this feature. There is one lexeme suggesting the speaker's moral evaluation of the experiencer. This is the lexeme trusit' Cto get cold feet'). Trusit suggests negative evaluation, namely 'the behavior of the person experiencing the emotion is not moral.1 9 1 lsThis is an element of naive ethics of Russian. 69 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (8) Feature: a certain predisposition in the personality of the experiencer for the rise of emotion. There is no special test for this feature. There is one lexeme implying that the emotion appears not only as a result of certain circumstances, but also because of the peculiarities of someone's personality. This is the lexeme trusit' ('to get cold feet1 ). This lexeme implies a predisposition to cowardice. (9) Feature: state/property status of emotion. Test: ability to occur in the following construction in the potential meaning or the meaning of property: A X-sja Y-a, N AX-s Y,' where A stands for the experiencer, X stands for emotion, and Y stands for the source of emotion. 70 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Examples: (47) Ja bojus' <pugajus', stratus', opasajus', *tru$u, *drejflju> itogo celoveka. Ja robeju <trepe$cu, drozu, trjasus'> pered etim aelovekom. 'I am afraid ^frightened2 0 , fear strongly, feel apprehensive, 'get cold feet, 'get cold feet> of this person <about this person>. I am intimidated <tremble with fear, shake with fear, quake with fear> in front of this person.1 Thus, the lexemes pugat'sja, trusitdrejfit' cannot denote permanent properties, whereas the rest of the lexemes can. Consider, for instance, the following typical use of bojat'sja 'to be afraid of as a denotation of a permanent property: (48) Edinstvennoje, cego bojalsja xrabryj pes - eto grozy. 'The only thing the brave dog was afraid of was thunder' (M. Bulgakov, "Master and Margarita". This feature calls for a comment. What it aims to show is the distinction between such states as can in certain contexts be interpreted as properties (they are denoted by lexemes without the component 'temporary' in their meaning) and such states as can never be 2°The lexeme pugat'sja 'to be frightened1 may seem to be able to occur in this construction, although it has the component 'temporary* (even 'momentary1) in its meaning. But, in the case of pugat'sja, the interpretation is resultative, or, more precisely, iterative. Thus, Ja pugajus' ktogo Seloveka ('I am frightened by this man") = 'Every time I see this man, I am frightened1). 71 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interpreted as properties (they are denoted by lexemes with the component 'temporary' in their meaning). The relevance of this distinction is not limited to emotional states only. In fact, it is not even limited to states. It can also be relevant for a description of processes and actions. For instance, the process to bum can be interpreted both as a current process (as in The wood is burning) and as a property (Wood burns). Or, the action to speak can have both the actional interpretation ('He is speaking right now') and the potential interpretation ('He speaks quite well’ ). If we try to schematize this distinction, we will get a scale. Its extremes will be the actional or state interpretation (as in I am frightened), on one end, and the potential interpretation (as in He speaks French), on the other. In between there will be the iterative interpretation (closer to the actional and state extreme), as in He always gets frightened by dogs and the 'property’ interpretation (closer to the potential extreme), as in He is afraid of dogs. The problem which arises in connection with this linguistic fact, is as follows: if a lexeme can have, apart from the actional or state interpretation, some other interpretations as well (e.g., that of a property, as is the case of some of the lexemes for 'fear'), what is the source of these other interpretations? Is this source lexical or grammatical? In other words, should this other interpretation be considered a separate meaning, a different lexeme, or should it be considered to result from grammatical polysemy? It seems that in different cases the answer is different (Glovinskaja 1982). For instance, for the verb 'to speak,’ it is reasonable to set up the potential meaning as a separate 72 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. lexeme (see the examples above), as it is usually done in the dictionaries. However, in the case of the lexemes for 'fear examined here, it seems more reasonable to consider the 'property' and the 'state' to be contextually or grammatically determined interpretations of the same lexeme, rather than two independent lexemes. The reason for it is that for these lexemes, the 'property' interpretation, the rarer one, is always conditioned by the context; the two interpretations are contextually in complementary distribution. What determines the 'state' or 'property' interpretation of a lexeme, is usually the referential status of the object. If the object has a concrete reference, then the lexeme is interpreted as denoting a state. If the object is generic, then the lexeme is interpreted as denoting a property. Different languages use different means to encode the referential status of NPs. English uses articles (versus bare NPs, cf. I fear dogs, with the generic interpretation of the bare plural and the 'property' interpretation of the whole sentence); prepositions (cf. the difference between the "actional" preposition by and the "potential" preposition of); aspects (progressive for the 'state' interpretation versus non-progressive for the 'property' interpretation). Russian uses number (singular for the 'state' interpretation, plural for the 'property' interpretation); aspect of the dependent verb (perfective for the 'state' interpretation, as in Ja bojus' upast' - 'I am afraid to fall <now>,’ imperfective for the 'property' interpretation, as in Ja bojus'padat' - 'I am afraid of falling <in general>’ ) etc. The last thing to be said here about 'state' versus 'property' interpretation is the following: the 'property' interpretation triggers certain semantic deletion rules: for instance, 73 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it requires the deletion of the semantic component 'spontaneous physiological reaction,' present in the 'state' interpretation of'fear' verbs. (9) Feature: factual/putative interpretation of the 'fear' lexeme. Test: factual/putative interpretation of the cto 'that'-clause subordinated by the verb. Scope of applicability of the test: not applicable to the verbs which cannot subordinate a cJo-clause. These are the lexemes pugat'sja ('to get frightened’ ), trusit’ (to get cold feet1 ), drejfit' ('to get cold feet'), robet' ('to be intimidated'), trepetat’ ('to tremble with fear'),drozat’ ('to shake with fear'), trjastis' ('to quake with fear’ ) and straJit’sja ('to fear strongly’ ). Examples2 1 : (49) Ja bojus', cto on v Moskve. Ja opasajus', cto on v Moskve = 'I am afraid that he is in Moscow. I am apprehensive that he is in Moscow.' 21I include in this section the adverbial construction komu-fco straSno to illustrate the difference between factive and putative 'fear' lexemes. However, I do not include it in the synonymic group for morphological reasons, since it is not a verb. 74 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'I don't know if he is in Moscow or not. I think he might be there. I don't want this to be, because it can be dangerous either for him or for me (or for my loved ones). I feel bad because of that.' This is the putative interpretation: being in Moscow is a supposition, not a fact. So, bojat'&ja and opasat'sja are putatives. (50) Mne strasno, cto on v Moskve = 'I am scared that he is in Moscow.' V I know that he is in Moscow. I don't want this to be, because it can be dangerous either for him or for me (or for my loved ones). I feel bad because of that.' This is the factual interpretation: being in Moscow is a fact, not a supposition. So, straSno is a factive. DL3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of 'fear' in English and Russian. m .3.1. Semantics. It is easy to see that the key words in English and Russian have identical semantic characteristics with regard to the semantic features and thus, the same meaning. Digressing somewhat, I can add that they exhibit similar behavior in forming their figurative meanings, 75 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. namely, the meaning which can be defined as 'polite statement of fact.1 It shows up in the following phrases: (51) / am afraid that he is stupid. (52) Ja bojus', cto on durak. 'I am sure that he is stupid, but assuming that for some reason I cannot put it directly, I put it, as if I were not sure, whether he is stupid or not.1 The possibility for this type of meaning to arise is rooted in the putative character of both lexemes (see feature (VII)). The rest of the lexemes display more discrepancy between English and Russian. First, there is almost no lexeme-to-lexeme correlation. For example, opasat'sja and its English counterpart to be apprehensive differ in that the former is purely rational whereas the latter can involve feeling. For many Russian lexemes there is no equivalent in English and vice versa. For example, there is no counterpart in Russian for the English lexeme to be scared; or, rather it has two - bojat'sja and pugat'sja, depending on interpretation. There is no exact parallel for the lexeme to be aghast. The corresponding meanings are still expressed, however, by means of more than one lexical item, Le. to be aghast corresponds to the Russian expression zastyt' na meste ot uzasa. On the other hand, Russian lexemes denoting fear in front of a person of a higher social rank have no correlates in English. In order to express the corresponding meaning, it is necessary to use more than one lexeme: drozat’, trjastis' = 'to 76 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tremble with awe.1 The English lexemes to be intimidated and to get cold fe et occur in slightly (and even not slightly) different contexs than their Russian counterparts robet’ and trusit’. Robet’ is close to the English to be shy, to feel embarrassed. It describes a feeling which occurs because the experiencer feels slighly awkward. Its formal English counterpart to be intimidated denotes a much stronger feeling which occurs as a result of being bullied and intimidated. The emotions to get cold feet and trusit’ , although they imply the same behavioral manifestations, occur in rather different situations; thus, trusit' implies a situation of moral choice, whereas to get cold feet implies a situation of commitment (it is closer to the Russian drejfif). However, if we compare not single lexemes but whole groups there is much less discrepancy. Almost all the features relevant for one language are relevant for the other. Their quantitative distribution is different across these languages; some are more important for English, and some are more important for Russian. But the fact that almost every feature is found in both languages shows that there is a cross-linguistic value to those features. With their help one can describe a certain prototypical, core 'fear' which may be quite similar for different languages. This is quite compatible with the fact that the emotion can be conceptualized in different ways (by means of one or more lexemes, in different metaphors and, of course, in different syntactic constructions). The differences may be language-specific (as between to be apprehensive and its counterpart opasat'sja) or culture-specific (cf.drozat’ and trjastis’ and the absence of such lexemes in English). 77 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I would like to mention a couple of semantic differences between English and Russian which have manifestations at various linguistic levels. First, there is a difference in possible types of overt manifestation of emotion. In English, loss of ability to move as a result of 'fear' is reflected in the lexical meanings of two lexemes - to be petrified and to be aghast. In Russian, loss of ability to move has not been lexicalized to such an extent (cf., however okamenet' - 'to be petrified’ and ocepenef, with a very close meaning). Russian 'fear' is perceived not so much in terms of the cessation of movement, but rather in terms of a specific kind of movement. For instance, the lexemes drozat’, trepetat' and trjastis' have as their first meaning 'to tremble, to shake, to quake’ (a certain kind of movement, the same as the one which is caused by cold). It is, probably, related to the fact that the English lexemes to be petrified and to be aghast contain the element of 'suddenness1 in their meaning; the paralyzing effect of suddenness causes the loss of ability to move. 'Suddenness1 seems to be more important for English lexemes than it is for Russian (in Russian only one lexeme contains this component, whereas in English there are three such lexemes). This is also reflected on the metaphorical level. In English, to refer to 'fear,' the lexeme to strike is usually used: terror-stricken, panic-stricken. This lexeme, in its lexical meaning, contains the element of'suddenness’ and it is also used to describe other unexpected emotions or events: to be struck dumb, an idea struck me. In Russian, to refer to 'fear,' the lexeme oxvatyvat' ('to seize ’ , 'to grasp’ ) is used. This lexeme does not contain the element of unexpectedness in its meaning. It is used to 78 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. describe mostly uncontrollable, but not sudden emotions (fear, passion, despair, but not amazement). Metaphorically English and Russian 'fear' are quite close. The metaphors for 'fear' mostly originate from the symptoms which are typical for this emotion and which are the same as the ones of the physical state of cold. Thus, the general metaphor which binds the emotional state of fear with the physical state of cold, explains most of the concrete metaphorical expressions related to fear, such as to sweat cold or to make one's blood run cold for English and their close Russian correlates xolodnyj pot proMbaet or kroV zastyla v zilax. The similarity in this class of metaphors is not suprising: the physical part of 'fear' and, more general, of any emotion does not vary across languages because spontaneous physical reactions of people are more or less the same in different cultures and languages. There are two more classes of metaphors for 'fear.' The first originates from the analogy with animals' behavior in the case of'fear' (such as to have one’ s tail between one's legs and its close Russian equivalent podzat' xvost). Metaphors from the other class have a more complex structure: they are formed in two steps (like English to have butterflies in one's stomach and its Russian correlate muraSki po koze begajut). First, a certain physical feeling is compared to another physical feeling; then this feeling is associated with the emotion. In this class, there is more discrepancy between Russian and English but it is rather a cultural than a linguistic difference. II.3.2. Syntax. 79 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Syntactic properties of the synonyms are determined by the NP which can fill in the semantic valence of the cause of emotion. If this NP designates a human being, as is the case for robet', trepetat', drozat’, trjastis', then the verb is mostly used with a prepositional phrase with the preposition pered 'at the sight of: (53) Ona robeet <trepescet, drozit, trjasetsja> pered dekanomfakul'teta. 'She is intimidated by the dean <trembles, shakes, quakes> at the sight of the dean.1 All other verbs cannot appear in this type of construction. Those verbs in which the valence of the cause of emotion is filled in not only by the names of human beings, but also by the names of animals, situations, actions, events, can appear in a more general construction with the genitive. These verbs are bojat'sja, pugat'sja, straSit’sja, opasat'sja: (54) Ona boitsja <pugaetsja, straSitsja, opasaetsja> itogo aeloveka. 'She is afraid of <scared of, fears strongly, is apprehensive about> this person.' (55) Ona vsjakij raz pugaetsja sobaki. 'Every time she gets scared by a dog.' (56) Ona straSitsja etoj vstred. 'She is very apprehensive about this meeting.' 80 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (57) On opasaetsja itogo sobytija. 'H e is apprehensive about this event.' Interestingly, the factive/putative interpretation of the previous sentence is different in the case of straSit’sja and opasat'sja: straSit’sja entails a factive interpretation of the sentence in that the 'meeting' 0 event1 ) is understood as something inevitable, something which is going to happen. Opasat'sja, on the other hand, suggests that the 'meeting' ('event') is something which might happen, if the experiencer does not take sufficient precautions. Bojat’ sja, unlike all the other verbs, according to the intuitions of some speakers, can marginally be used with the accusative: (58) On boitsja sobaku. 'He is afraid of the dog (lit. dog).1 There is a semantic difference between the construction with the genitive and the construction with the accusative: the latter requires a specific interpretation for the NP, whereas the former suggests rather a non-specific interpretation, wherever that is possible. For the verbs which can denote not only a temporary state, but also a permanent property (see the section on Semantic features, feature TV), the specific versus non-specific interpretation of the NP has further semantic consequences. If the NP is interpreted specifically, the verb for 'fear' gets interpreted as denoting a temporary state. If the NP is interpreted non-specifically, the verb gets interpreted potentially and the respective emotion 81 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. receives the status of a property. Thus, the 'property' versus 'state' interpretation of the verb depends on the referential status of the NP filling in the semantic valence of the cause of emotion. In two verbs, namely, trusit' and drejfit' the valence of the cause of emotion cannot be expressed syntactically at all. They are normally used in absolutive constructions: (59) On trusit. 'He is getting cold feet.' (60) Ne drejf. 'Do not get cold feet.1 Absolutive use is also possible for the verbs bojat’ sja and robet': (61) Ja bojus'. 'I am afraid.' (62) Ona robela. 'She was intimidated.1 Some verbs, in which the valence of the cause is filled in by the name of a situation, can appear in the construction with the conjunction kogda: 82 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (63) Ja bojus', kogda ty tak govoriS. 'I am afraid when you say so.' (64) MaSa pugaetsja vsjakij raz, kogda vidit sobaku. v Masa gets scared every time she sees a dog.' The verbs bojat'sja and opasat'sja, unlike all the others, can be used with the infinitive: (65) Ja bojus' katat'sja na gornyx lyzax. T am afraid of doing mountain skiing.' (66) Ja opasajus'xodit' tuda odna. 'I am apprehensive about going there alone.1 The verb bojat'sja can have two interpretations, depending on the aspect of the infinitive: if the infinitive is in the perfective, the interpretation is that of a temporary state (Ja bojus’ upast' = 'I am afraid to fall now’ ); if the infinitive is in the imperfective, the interpretation is that of a property (Ja bojus' padat' = 'I am in general afraid of falling’ ). Thus, for the verb opasat'sja, which cannot have a current interpretation, there is an aspectual constraint on the use of the infinitive: opasat'sja can only govern a verb in the imperfective, cf. 83 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (67) Ja opasajus' vstrecafsja s nej. 'I am apprehensive about meeting her,’ but not (68) *Ja opasajus’ vstretit'sja s nej. "I am apprehensive to meet her.’ (69) would have an implication 'I have to meet with her <and therefore I feel apprehensive>.' The verb drejfit' in the present tense is mostly used in the form of negative imperative: (70) Ne drejf. 'Do not get cold feet' and it cannot be used in the first person singular in the present tense: (71) *Ja drejflju. 'I am getting cold feet.' The verb bojat'sja, the most universal one, can also be used in the construction with the preposition iz-za ('because of): 84 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (72) Ja bojus' iz-za togo, cto on uexal odin. ' I am afraid because of him leaving alone.' Bojat'sja and pugat'sja can govern a clause with the conjunction cto ('that'): (73) On ispugalsja, cto ona tak bystro vernulas’. 'He got scared that she came back so fast.1 (74) On bojalsja, cto ego uvoljat. 'He was afraid that he would be fired.’ The verbs designating strong emotions, except for strasit’sja, cannot be used in the construction with negation: (75) "On ne trjasetsja (ne drozit) pered nacal'nikom. '*He does not shake <quake> at the sight of his boss.’ (76) "On ne trepescet pered otcom. 'He does not tremble at the sight of his father.1 However, used with such words as boVSe 'not anymore,1 vovse 'not at all,' these verbs allow negative use: 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (77) On bol’Se ne trjasetsja <ne drozit> pered nadal'nikom. 'He does not shake <quake> at the sight of his boss anymore.1 (78) On vovse ne trepeSdet pered otcom. 'He does not at all tremble at the sight of his father.’ This peculiarity of the verbs denoting strong feelings can be explained by the fact that, under negation, these verbs are not informative for the hearer: they give information about details, without giving any information about the general state of affairs. The phrase (79) On ne trjasetsja pered nadal'nikom. 'He is not shaking with fear at the sight of his boss.’ does not answer a question natural for the hearer (who has no information at all), whether a weaker emotion (Le., being afraid) is taking place. With the words bol’se, vovse the negation is more acceptable because these words imply that the hearer has some information already or that the hearer has some opinion on the matter. For the English lexemes for 'fear,’ the semantic opposition 'property'/'state’ is as important syntactically as for the Russian ones. In Russian, as was shown above, the 'property'/'state’ interpretation depends mostly on the referential status of the syntactic group filling in the semantic valence of the cause of emotion (it can be either an NP or an infinitive). In English, the 'property’ f state’ interpretation of the lexeme for 'fear' depends 86 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. essentially on the same factors. Syntactically, however, the referential status of the syntactic group in question is encoded differently. The most frequent means of marking referential status of an NP in English is, of course, the article. Very often, the 'permanent property’ versus 'temporary state' opposition is encoded by means of bare versus definite NP (in the sense of Comrie, 1978, pp.3,4), e.g.: (80) I am afraid to drink wine. Interpretation: 'I am afraid to drink any wine on any occasion.’ versus (81) I am afraid to drink the wine. Interpretation: 'I am afraid to drink this wine on the present occasion.’ Apart from this one, there are some other, more specific, yet less regular devices to encode this opposition. First, it can be expressed by the use of different prepositions: while o f can be used both with 'property' and 'state' interpretation, by and at are normally used when the interpretation of the emotion is that of a temporary state. By and at are impossible with lexemes that do not denote a transition to a certain emotional state, namely, with to be afraid and to fear. The latter is used with the direct object only and cannot be passivized. Therefore, they cannot be combined with these prepositions: 87 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (82) 7 was afraid by the lightning. (83) 7 was afraid (feared) at the sight o f a tiger. There is the following difference in the meaning of by versus at: while the former preposition implies some outer causation, the latter does not. By describes the situation when an emotion occurs as a result of some action from the outside; at describes the situation when an emotion occurs as a result of the experiencer's perceiving something. To be aghast describes states which occur as a result of the experiencer seeing or hearing something unexpected and frightening. It does not include causation. It is impossible *to make somebody aghast. Therefore, this lexeme is used only with the preposition at and cannot be used with the preposition by: (84) She stood aghast at the sight o f this man. (85) *She was aghast by him. The remaining lexemes can be used with both by and at. Those of them which can denote not only states, but also properties, can be used with o f as well. The next parameter according to which the lexemes differ is the type of verb they can be used with. Usually, it is the auxiliary verb to be: I am afraid <scared, petrified> etc). For to get cold feet it can be, obviously, only to get. 88 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To be aghast and to be petrified differ from all the other lexemes in that they can be used with a full meaning verb. Due to their semantics ('to lose the ability to move’ ), these lexemes are usually used with such verbs as to stay, to sit or to stand (denoting some fixed posture). Those verbs which are semantically focused on the transition to a state (and not on the state itself) can be used with the verb to get: I got scared <petrified> etc. Those which are focused on the state itself (to be afraid and to fear) cannot be used with this resultative verb. 89 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IV. Russian and English 'pity.' My data: English lexemes: compassion, pity, sympathy. Russian lexemes: M ost' Cpity1 ), sostradanie Ccompassion'), socuvstvie ('sympathy'), ucastie ('compassionate help’ ). The key word is Most'. The English group (at least, as I define it here) does not have a key word2 2 . The core meaning is the following: 'to feel that somebody is somehow suffering; to feel bad because of that.’ IV. 1. English 'pity.1 English lexemes for 'pity' differ with respect to the following semantic features: (1) source of emotion (external/ internal); (2) nature of the feeling (sharing one's feelings / own feeling); (3) possible object of emotion (human / animal); (4) experiencer's attitude towards the object of emotion (positive / negative); (5) sincerity of emotion. 22The neutral English term for the 'pity' emotion type is the adjective to be sorry for, which I do not consider here for morphological reasons; also, the term compassion is sometimes used in modern English as a key word for this group. 90 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ( 1 ) Feature: source of emotion (external/ internal). By external source of emotion I mean a certain state of affairs, for instance, someone's suffering from pain, which causes 'pity' feelings in the experiencer. By internal source of emotion I mean a certain way in which the experiencer perceives the existing state of affairs and which makes him experience 'pity' feelings. When it has an internal source, the emotion is inspired not by seeing someone actually suffering, but by the mental contemplation of the object of emotion. It causes the experiencer to think that the object is pitiful in some ways; the object may not be even aware of the fact that there is something in him which can arouse 'pity' feelings. Test: occurrence in such contexts as A feels X fo r Y, although there is no reason for this, since Y is not at all suffering, where A stands for the experiencer, X stands for the feeling and Y stands for the object of emotion. If a word for emotion cannot occur in such contexts, then this word describes a feeling 91 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that cannot have an internal source. If a word for emotion can occur in such contexts, then this word describes a feeling that can have an internal source. Examples: (86) 7 don't know why, but he feels sympathy fo r her, though there is no reason fo r this, since she is not at all suffering. (87) 7 don't know why, but he feels compassion fo r her, though there is no reason for this, since she is not at all suffering. (88) I don't know why, but he feels pity for her, though there is no reason for this, since she is not at all suffering. Thus, while the emotion sympathy and compassion can have only an external source, pity can be internally motivated. (2) Feature: nature of the feeling. Test: 92 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ability to co-occur with such distancing adjectives as contemptuous and ability to be used with respect to oneself; those words which have both these abilities cannot designate shared feelings; those words which do not have these abilities designate shared feelings). Examples: (89) She felt some contemptuous pity for him. (90) True enough, Morrissey disregarded his original bedsit self pity and began to write from the third person (OC). Thus, pity designates a feeling which is not shared with the object. In fact, in modem American use, the word pity is applied in the situations when the experiencer to some extent despises the object of the emotion, thinks that the object is inferior to him. Pity implies a negative, or at least condescending attitude on the part of the experiencer. This word seems to have lost (at least in spoken American English) those positive connotations which it used to have before2 3 . Thus, it can be considered a correlate of the rather positive Russian feeling zalost' only in a very limited number of contexts. However, sometimes, pity is still used in its original sense, and then it denotes a painful emotion of regret over the suffering of another person, consider: “This seems to be sociolinguistically conditioned: my younger informants argued that pity implies contempt, whereas the older generation speakers, especially those well-versed in classical English literature argued against this. 93 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (91) He felt his heart contract in pity. Emily was a fine woman, he admired her composure and he knew how much the facade must cost her, she had loved her father dearly (OC). The emotions of compassion and sympathy cannot be contemptuous or self-directed, cf.: (92) She felt some contemptuous * compassion < sympathy> with him. (93) He felt strong * self-compassion < self-sympathy>. Thus, compassion and sympathy imply that the experiencer shares (at least, to some extent) the feelings of the object. Sympathy implies a great degree of sharing2 4 , while compassion rather implies that the experiencer understands the position of the object. Consider the following illustrative example: (94) They will, he suggests, gain a new appreciation o f the meaning o f sin or afresh sympathy with the Passion o f Christ (OC). Sympathy is a quite positive feeling, consider the following example: 24The component of 'sharing' is also found in the other meaning of sympathy, namely, 'to share one's views/ ideas', e.g., I sympathize with this new approach. 94 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (95) Now it's Noam and I alone with each other. But if I've come to regard him as something o f a stranger, I've also come to view him with something new and comforting, with human sympathy. He's on the mortal sphere now, the sphere o f suffering (OC). Compassion also has a strong positive emotional component. It implies a good attitude towards the object of the emotion, even love, and the desire to help. In this respect it comes close to the Russian zalost'. Consider the following typical example: (96) Many people would say that Jesus could not stop himself from healing people because of his overwhelming feeling of compassion and love fo r them (OC). However, unlike the Russian zalost', the English compassion normally implies respect towards the object of emotion, consider: (97) The greatest good we can do to people is to treat them with compassion, courtesy and respect (OC). Most often, compassion is a spontaneous feeling, occurring as an immediate reaction to someone's suffering. However, because compassion is considered a virtue and is, therefore, something that people strive to attain, it can sometimes have a more rationalized nature. Then, it occurs as a result of mental contemplation rather than emotional impression, consider: 95 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (98) But he provides a juicy role for defence lawyer Clarence D arrow whom Joss Acklandplays with elan, exuding a mixture of personal eccentricity and rational compassion (OC). (3) Feature: possible object of the emotion (human/ animal). Test: co-occurrence with the names of animals. Examples: (99) I felt pity fo r this trapped dying fox. (100) However, 1 had to give in when, a few days later, Christopher returned from school and informed me that his teacher said a dog added to the character o f a child and also taught compassion (OC). Thus, the words pity and compassion can be applied to animals. (101) 7 felt sympathy with this trapped dying fox. 96 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Thus, the word sympathy cannot be applied to animals. The reason for that is, perhaps, that sympathy, apart from emotional sharing, implies also intellectual sharing with the object. It is not possible to share ideas with animals (at least, not for English-speaking people). The distinction between adults and children, relevant (as we will see) for Russian, is not relevant for English. One can have pity, sympathy and compassion with children as well as with adults. There is another important distinction within this feature, namely, the distinction between animate and inanimate objects. While pity and sympathy normally imply an animate object, compassion can be experienced towards inanimate objects as well (such as countries, nations, and the like), consider: (102) In a debt-scourged country, you are looking at a formerly beautiful place now devastated by oil-drilling. What is your dominant emotion ? A compassion <? pity, 1 sympathy> for the country concerned (OC). This distinction is not relevant for the Russian language, as the Russian sostradanie, like the rest of the 'pity' group emotions, can be felt towards animate objects only. (4) Feature: experiencer's attitude towards the object of the emotion (positive / negative). 97 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. There is no special test for this feature. As I mentioned above, pity usually implies a negative attitude towards the object of the emotion; the word pity, therefore, is not normally used with the names of persons whom the experiencer is supposed to love, e.g., it is extremely strange to hear something like (103) 7 ? Ifeel pity fo r my daughter2 6 . Compassion implies a very positive attitude on the part of the experiencer; thus, usages like (104) 7 7 He doesn't like me but he has compassion for me. are highly questionable. Sympathy does not necessarily imply a strong liking but the general attitude of the experiencer to the object of the emotion is rather positive. (5) Feature: sincerity of emotion. 25Again, the adequacy of the lexeme pity in this context was subject to sociolinguistic variation. 98 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Test: co-occurrence with the adjective/a^ or any other indication of insincerity. Examples: (105) He looked at me with false sympathy. (106) "I'm so glad to catch you", Elaine Dodswell said. She wore a tracksuit and an expression o f deep sympathy (OC) - a clearly ironic description of a faked or, at least, exaggerated (and, thus, insincere), sympathy. (107) This display o f armchair compassion strikes me as at least as hypocritical as anything that the Government is proposing (OC). (108) I can hear him now, sniffing and purring under his lank hair, pretending to be fu ll o f "compassion" or concern as he recounts the endlessly embellished details o f my so-called iniquity (OC). Thus, sympathy and compassion do not necessarily imply sincere feelings, as they can be faked. This is probably, due to the fact that both of these feelings are considered virtues, and, thus, for the sake of making a good impression, they might be simulated in the situations when they are not really felt. 99 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (109) ? ? He looked at ms ',vith false pity. Thus, the word pity designates a feeling which is normally sincere. IV.2. Russian 'pity.2 6 ' The synonyms differ with regard to the following semantic features: (1) source of emotion (external/ internal); (2) nature of the feeling (sharing the object's feelings / one's own feeling; characteristics of the feeling in each case); (3) possible object of emotion (human [equal / unequal] / animal); (4) strength of emotion; (5) outward manifestations of emotion; (6) the speaker's attitude to emotion (positive / neutral); (7) sincerity of emotion. (1) Feature: source of emotion (external/ internal). 26Through a personal communication I have learned that the Russian word 'pity' and its synonyms were described by I.B. Levontina. Unfortunately, I have had no opportunity to familiarize myself with this work, so any coincidences that may occur in our descriptions should be attributed solely to the common factual foundation of our work. 100 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Test: co-occurrence with such adjectives as neponjatnyj, neobjasnimyj ('inexplicable1 , 'incomprehensible'). If a word for emotion cannot co-occur with such adjectives, then this word describes a feeling which cannot have an internal source. If a word for emotion can co-occur with such adjectives, then this word describes a feeling which can have an internal source. Examples: (110) Ja ispytyval k nej kakuju-to neponjatnuju dlja menja samogo neob'jasnimuju zalost’ < sostradanie, * socuvstvie>. 'I felt some inexplicable, incompehensible even to myself pity <*compassion, *sympathy’ > for her.’ (111) *On otnosilsja k nej s kakim-to neponjatnym daze dlja nego samogo ucastiem. '"He treated her with compassionate help which was incomprehensible even to himself.1 Thus, zalost’ can have an internal source. Of all these emotions it is the only one which can occur at the mere thought of something pitiful. For example, one can feel zalost’ , but not * sostradanie, * socuvstvie or "ucastie towards King Lear - because King Lear is not a real person, but an invented character. 101 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie require an external source for their occurrence. However, not every kind of external source can cause these feelings. They are caused by actual suffering of the object. There are some other requirements as well. First, the subject and the object should be acquainted. One cannot have sostradanie, socuvstvie or ucastie for the starving children in Ethiopia; the only appropriate word to express one's emotions in this case would be zalost'. For sostradanie the requirements are even more strict: there should be a direct contact between the subject of the feeling and its object. For socuvstvie there is one more requirement, namely that the object of emotion understands himself that he is in a miserable state. Consider, for instance, the following passage from A.Solzhenitsyn's "The GULAG Archipelago": (112) I vyvodnaja kinulas' k svoej zakljudennoj, is da celovedeskogo slitija i socuvstvija. "And the guard threw herself to her female prisoner <who she was guarding>, looking for some human contact and sympathy* (realizing the difficult situation she found herself in, the guard was looking for sympathy). This understanding of one's suffering (by the object of emotion) is also preferable for sostradanie and ucastie. It is not, however, obligatory. 2alosf is not restricted in this way, it can be inspired by someone, unaware of his own 102 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. misfortune. E.g., one can say: (113) Ja ispytyval M ost' k etomu celoveku, eSce ne ponjavSemu vsego uzasa svoego polozenija. 'I felt pity for this person who had not yet understood all the honor of his position.1 1 This is not so good with sostradanie and ucastie, and impossible with socuvstvie: (114) Ja ispytyval7 sostradanie <soatvstvie> k etomu celoveku, eSce ne ponjavSemu vsego uzasa svoego polozenija. 'I felt compassion [sympathy] with this person who had not yet understood all the horror of his position,1 or (115) 7 On otnessja s ucastiem k etoj zenSdne, esce ne ponjavSej vsego uzasa svoego polozenija. 'H e had compassion for this woman who had not yet understood all the horror of her position.1 Ucastie requires that the object of emotion be in a bad situation which, however, can 103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in some way be helped or inproved; this emotion cannot occur when the object does not need help. The opposition 'external/ internal' explains why one cannot have 'compassion' or 'sympathy' for a person whom one considers, e.g., stupid, and why 'pity' is appropriate in this case. When a person is stupid, he does not actually suffer (at least, consciously) from it. While it is possible to feel zalost' for a person whom the experiencer thinks to be miserable in some way, or, simply, inferior to himself, it is impossible to feel socuvstvie, sostradanie or have ucastie in such circumstances. The semantic difference between external and internal source of emotion has some other implications and semantic consequences. Further distinctions between the emotion of zalost', on the one hand, and sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie, on the other, are as follows: ^z/osrimplies an irrational feeling, whereas the other three are rational. Thus, one can can feel illogical, irrational zalost'; consider the following fragment from Z.Shaxovskaja's "In search of Nabokov": (116) Nastal i moj cered, i ja, vdvojne tronutaja i radost’ ju vstred i cem-to, vopreki logike, poxozim na zalost', sobiralas' ego obnjat' i pozdravit'... 'My turn came and I was going to embrace and congratulate him <Nabokov>, moved both by the joy of the meeting and by something, which, contrary to any logic, was akin to pity...’ However, it is odd to feel sostradanie or socuvstvie contrary to logic: 104 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (117)7 Vopreki logike, on ispytyval k nej sostradanie <socuvstvie>. ' ’Contrary to logic, he felt compassion <sympathy> towards her.' (118) 7 Vopreki logike, on otnosilsja k nej s ucastiem. "’He treated her with some illogical compassionate concern.' Zalost' is an immediate emotional reaction to seeing something pitiful or thinking about it; the emotion occurs before any rational evaluation can take place. That is why one can feel zalost' even for a person whom one hates. Zalost' can be thought of as an independent driving force which can uncontrollably 'seize' the experiencer: Ego oxvatila zalost' k nej 'Pity for her seized him.’ This is, however, not true of the other three emotions. Sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie are not independent forces, they are products of the rational evaluation of the existing state of affairs. It is hardly possible, therefore, to say something like Ego oxvatilo rsostradanie <7 ? socuvstvie, *ucastie> k nej 'H e was seized with ’’compassion <” sympathy, ’compassionate concern> towards her.’ Yet another consequence of the external/ internal distinction is that zalost', a subjective irrational emotion, can occur even in situations when the subject of the feeling is, for all intents and purposes, in a much worse situation than the object, e.g.: (119) Ja uvidel neponjatnuju dlja menja zalost' v glazax itogo nisdego. 'I saw inexplicable pity in the eyes of this beggar.' 105 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This example implies that the subject of the feeling is in a much worse situation than the object, yet, the feeling of'pity' is still possible. Those feelings, which have external sources, require the subject of emotion to be in a better position than the object, so that the former is, perhaps, in a position to help the latter; thus, these feelings are impossible in the situation described in the above example. (2) Feature: nature of the feeling (sharing the object's feelings / independent feeling; characteristics of the feeling in each case). Tests: (i) co-occurrence with different descriptive adjectives with the meaning of distancing, such as prezritel'nyj 'contemptuous' or boleznennyj 'sickly.' The words which cannot be defined by the above adjectives designate shared emotions, that is, emotions which are similar to those of the suffering person. The explanation for this fact comes from the semantic structure of the respective words. Shared emotions do not leave any room for observation, judgement, or evaluation because the subject empathizes with the object, that is, takes the point of view of the object. Let us illustrate this point. The semantic explication of such words will have to include the following fragment: A (experiencer) feels X (emotion) for Y (source, object of emotion) = ' Y feels bad; 106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A feels in the same or similar way because of that.' The only semantic component to which the distancing adjective could be attached is 'A feels.' That creates an anomaly because what the experiencer is asserted to feel is suffering, and not contempt or anything else. On the other hand, an adjective of degree, for example, could easily be incorporated in such an explication, because it would specify the degree to which the feeling is shared. Examples: (120) Ja ispytyval k nemu prezritel'nuju <kakuju-to boleznennuju> zalost'. 'I felt a contemptuous <somewhat sickly> pity for him.' (121) Ja ispytyval k nemu boleznennoe * socuvstvie. 'I felt a sickly ‘sympathy with him.' (123) Ja ispytyval k nemu prezritel'noe * sostradanie 'I felt a contemptuous ‘compassion him.’ (123) *On otnosilsja k nej s prezritel'nym ucastiem. “He treated her with contemptuous compassionate help.' (ii) Possibility / inpossibility for the word with the meaning of emotion to be applied 107 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to the description of one's feelings for oneself. Words which cannot be thus applied designate feelings which the subject shares with the object. Indeed, if one applies such a word to describe one's own feelings, an obviously anomalous situation will arise when the subject shares his own feelings. Examples: (124) Kogda ona uvidela <...> Vjazova, u nee guby zadromli otzalosti k samoj sebe. 'When she saw <...> Vjazov, her lips trembled with self-pity’ (V.Kaverin, Scandalist, or the Evenings on Vasiljevsky Island). (125) *On ispytyval k sebe sostradanie <socuvstvie>. '"He felt compassion <sympathy> toward himself.’ (126) *On otnosilsja k sebe s ucastiem. 'He treated himself with compassionate help.’ Thus, the word M ost' designates an independent emotion, whereas the words sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie designate a feeling which the subject to some extent shares with the object. Zalost’ can describe a rather broad range of feelings. It can be a tender, loving, merciful feeling: 108 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (127) Inogda vstrecaetsja na svete bol’Soe sil'noe cuvstvo. K nemu vsegda primesivaetsja zalost'. Predmet nasego obozanija tem bolee kazetsja nam zertvoju, cem bolee my ljubim. 'Sometimes, one comes across a strong feeling <of love>. This feeling is always mixed with pity. The more we adore someone, the more this person seems a victim to us’ (B.Pastemak, Doctor Zhivago). (128) I kogda sozrela v serdce ego ita ljubovnaja zalost' i stalo emu ne po silam nosit' v sebe zrelyj plod eja, to resil on iskat' voploScenija ljubvi i primenenija zalosti. 'And when this loving pity has ripened in his heart <in the heart of Monk Vitaly> and he could not longer bear its ripe fruit within himself, he decided to look for realization of his love and for application of his pity’ (Life of the Saint Monk Vitaly). It can be a very personal, tormenting feeling, akin to pain, which occurs when the experiencer feels he cannot help the suffering object: (129) No vot, zaxvorala <staruxa> uze kak sleduet <...> cto daze u pledstyx nevestokpovernulos' serdce ot zalosti. 'Thus, the old woman fell seriously ill <...> so that even the broad-shouldered daughters-in-law felt that their hearts turned with pity1 (I.Bunin, The cup of life). (130) On ispytyval k nej mudtel'nuju zalost', smeSannuju s raskajaniem.' 109 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'He felt tormenting pity towards her, mixed with remorse.' In many cases, indeed, zalost' feels like a kind of sharp spiritual pain. This is confirmed by a number of language metaphors applied to zalost', such as Scemjascaja zalost' Cpainfulpity1 ), serdce razryvaetsja ot zalosti f one’ s heart is torn with pity'), zalost'pronzila Opity pierced'). It can be a somewhat contemptuous feeling, humiliating for the object, occurring when the experiencer thinks the object to be in some way inferior to himself, and, therefore, pitiful: (131) V samom lucsem slucae <oni> mogli rassdtyvat' na prezritel'nuju nedoumennuju zalost'. 'A t the very best, they could count on contemptuous puzzled pity’ (Brothers Strugatsky, It is difficult to be God). Unlike zalost', sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie are not conceptualized as 'painful* emotions. However, in literature, sostradanie is sometimes metaphorized as 'pain,' consider the following example from Dostoevskij's "Brothers Karamazov": (132) Glubokoe, beskonecnoe sostradanie vdrug oxvatilo i izmudlo ego mgnovenno. Pronzennoe serdce ego straSno bolelo. 'Deep, endless compassion suddenly seized and tortured him <Alesha Karamazov>. His pierced heart ached terribly.' 110 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Since sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie denote shared feelings, they cannot be contemptuous and humiliating. They imply that the experiencer puts himself in the object's place; thus, he cannot look down at the object, as the experiencer of zalost' can. While sostradanie, socuvstvie and ucastie imply equality of the subject and object, zalost' may imply some kind of an adult-child relationship. (3) Feature: object of the emotion (human [equal / unequal] / animal). Test: co-occurrence with the names for animals / names for children. Examples: (133) On ispytyval M ost' < sostradanie, ? ? socuvstvie> k etomu rebenku, kotoryj byl sovsem odin na svete. 'I felt pity <7 compassion for,7 7 sympathy with> this child who was all alone in the world.' (134) On ispytyval M ost' < *sostradanie, socuvstvie> k etomu malen'komu poterjavSemusja Scenku. Ill Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'He felt pity for <* compassion for, ‘sympathy with> this lost puppy.' (135) On otnessja s bol’Sim ucastiem k etomu malen'komu sirote <Scenku>. 'He had compassion for this little orphan <*puppy>.’ Thus, zalost' is applicable to children and animals, consider, e.g., the following passage from Z.Shaxovskaja's "A dog's death": (136) Krestjanin Osip otravil gospodskixsobak, i oni umirajut, korcas’ i xripja <...> I vdrug v sad voM matros <...> Ja brosilas' k nemu: Dobejte, pozalujsta, dobejte, pozalujsta! - bormotala ja skvoz' slezy. Cto-to poxozee na zalost’ proSlo po ego sumracnomu lieu, i on, ne toropjas', otstegnul koburu. 'Osip, the peasant, has poisoned the masters' dogs, and now they are dying, wheezing, in convulsions <...> Suddenly a sailor enters the garden. I throw myself to him: Please, kill them, please, kill them <so that they would not suffer> - 1 mutter through tears. Something akin to pity appears on his gloomy face, and, without haste, he unfastens the holster.' Ucastie is applicable to children but not to animals. The other two emotions, sostradanie and socuvstvie, can be inspired only by adult humans. This is the consequence of the nature of the feeling: while zalost’ is an independent emotion, the other two are emotions which the subject shares with the object who is 112 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conscious of what he feels; in other words, sostradanie and socuvstvie imply intellectual equality between the subject and the object (which is not the case for the situations when the object is a child or an animal). Another semantic restriction on the object of emotion is the following: socuvstvie, sostradanie and ucastie do require a certain psychological or social distance between the subject of emotion and its object, whereas zalost' does not. Thus, it is impossible to have socuvstvie, sostradanie or ucastie with one’ s wife or husband; the relationship between husband and wife implies no distance, so these feelings are impossible between spouses. Zalost' can be felt irrespective of the relationship between the subject and the object. This is, probably, a consequence of a more general distinction between these two types of emotions: socuvstvie, sostradanie or ucastie arise somewhat unexpectedly, they imply a kinder attitude than is required or expected from the subject by the situation. That is why one cannot say that a husband has socuvstvie, sostradanie or ucastie towards his wife: the reason is precisely that a conjugal relationship presupposes being kind to each other. On the contrary, zalost' is an emotion which the experiencer is supposed to have in certain situations (unless he is a cruel person). It is perfectly possible to say: (137) Mne ocen’ stranno, cto ty ne ispytyvaes zalosti k etomu celoveku. 'It seems strange to me that you don’ t feel pity for this person’ ; implication: the object invites pity, and not to feel it is inhuman. Such usage as in the above example is impossible for sostradanie, socuvstvie and 113 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ucastie. (4) Feature: strength of emotion (strong / not characterized). Test: co-occurrence with the adjectives with the meaning of degree. Words which designate strong feelings cannot be used with adjectives of small degree, such as nekotoryj ('some'). Examples: (138) Ja ispytyval k nemu nekotoruju zalost' <nekotoroe socuvstvie, *nekotoroe sostradanie>. 'I felt some pity for <some sympathy with, ‘some compassion for> him.1 (139) On otnessja k nej s nekotorym ucastiem. 'He has treated her with some compassionate help.1 The word sostradanie designates a strong feeling, because it refers to co-suffering, and suffering itself is a strong sensation. The other three words are not characterized with 114 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. respect to this feature (they can be defined by adjectives of both small and high degrees). (5) Feature: outward (behavioral) manifestations of emotion. Tests: (i) co-occurrence with causal phrases, such as iz X-a ('because of X,’ where X is the name of emotion). Those words which cannot co-occur with such phrases designate emotions which do not have any manifestations in behavior. Those words which can thus co-occur designate emotions which can have manifestations in behaviour. (ii) ability to occur in the following context: A otnessja kX-u s bol’Sim Y, no nicem ne smog porno o' 'A had a lot of Y to X, but could not help in any way,1 where A stands for the experiencer, X stands for the object of emotion and Y stands for the emotion itself. If a lexeme cannot occur in this context, it denotes an emotion which has obligatory manifestations in behavior. 115 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Examples: (140) Ja sdelal eto iz zalosti <sostradanija, *socuvstvija, ucastija>. 'I did it out of pity <compassion, ‘sympathy, compassionate concem’ >. (141) On otnessja k nej s bol’Soj zalost'ju <bol’Sim sostradaniem, socuvstviem, *uaastiem>, no nicego ne smog dlja nee sdelat'. 'He had a lot of pity ccompassion, sympathy, compassionate help> for her, but he was not able to do anything for her.’ Thus, zalost' and sostradanie can be manifested in behavior, ucastie has to be manifested in behavior, whereas socuvstvie is usually not manifested in behavior. Socuvstvie is often manifested verbally: (142) Trio pridetsja ostanovit'. Vyrazim socuvstvie Fadeju Kazimirovicu. 'W e will have to stop the trio. Let us express our sympathy with Fadej Kazimirovich1 (B .Pasternak, Doctor Zhivago). It can also be read in the experiencer's eyes: (143) Ot mgnovenija aresta <...> arestant <...> nigde ne dolzen stolknut'sja s podobnym sebe, ni v c'jej ulybke, ni v Sjem vzgljade ne pocerpnut' socuvstvija, soveta, 116 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. podderzki. 'From the very moment of his arrest, the prisoner should not meet anyone like himself, he should not find sympathy, advice, support in anyone's smile or look' (A.Solzhenitsyn, The GULAG Archipelago). The other three emotions can also be manifested in this way, cf. (144) Ona posmotrela na nego s sostradanieml zalost'jul ucastiem. 'She looked at him with compassion/pity /compassionate help.1 Zalost' can also be manifested in tears: (145) Ona zarydala ot zalosti. 'She cried with pity.1 (6) Feature: attitude of the speaker to the emotion (positive/neutral) Test: ability to occur freely in the contexts when the speaker coincides with the subject of emotion: 117 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ja ispytyvaju kX-u Y ('I feel Y towards X1 ), where X stands for the object of emotion, and Y stands for the emotion itself. Those lexemes which cannot occur in this context denote emotions which imply the speaker’ s positive evaluation; the ones which can are neutral with respect to the speaker's evaluation. The explanation for this test is the following. As is known, language use is regulated by the principle of 'modesty' which prohibits the speaker from using words implying his positive evaluation of himself. Consequently, if a word can be thus used, it does not contain the positive evaluation component. Examples: (146) Ja otnosus' k nemu s zalost'ju <socuvstviem>. 'I feel pity/sympathy towards him.’ (147) ? Ja otnosus' k nemu s ‘sostradaniem <s ? ucastiem>. 'I feel compassion ccompassionate help> towards him.' Thus, socuvstvie and zalost' do not imply any evaluation of emotion, whereas 118 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sostradanie and ucastie are positively evaluated emotions2 7 . Positive evaluation in the case of ucastie is probably rooted in the implication of certain charitable activities on the part of the subject. Positive evaluation in the case of sostradanie can be linked to the fact that this emotion is regarded, in a way, as a sign of high morality; it belongs with the same virtues as miloserdie ('mercy, charity1 ), snisxozdenie ('indulgence1 ) and the like. (7) Feature: sincerity of the feeling Test: co-occurrence with adjectives like pritvornyj 'pretended, faked’ or neiskrennij 'insincere.1 Obviously, the lexemes which can occur in such contexts denote emotions which can be insincere or faked; the lexemes which cannot occur in such contexts denote emotions which are always genuine. Examples: 27This is an element of naive ethics inherent in the Russian language. 119 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (148) On posmotrel na nee s pritvornym socuvstviem <'sostradaniem, pritvornoj ? zalostju>. 'H e looked at her with faked sympathy <*compassion, *pity>.' (149) Ee pritvornoe ucastie bylo emu otvratiteVno. 'Her faked compassionate concern disgusted him.1 Socuvstvie and ucastie can be faked, because they are very much conventionalized verbally; they are often expressed even in situations when they are not felt, but are merely expected to be shown by some rules of politeness. Consider an example from I.Bunin's "Late Hour": (150) ...Dvoe sutok lezit v pod’ ezde na traurnom pofcrove stolika list bumagi v traurnoj kajme - na nem raspisyvajutsja v znak socuvstvija vezlivye posetiteli. 'For two days, there lies a sheet of paper, edged with crape, on the crape-banded table on the porch, and the polite visitors put their signatures on it, as a sign of their sympathy.’ IV.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of'pity' in English and Russian. As we can see, the concepts of'pity' are quite different in Russian and English. As has already been mentioned, in Russian 'pity' is conceptualized in the metaphor of 'pain'; we do 120 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not find that in English, at least synchronically. As for the cultural attitude to this feeling, it seems to be much more positive in Russian than in English. In fact, almost every English informant I asked said that 'pity' implied contempt. In the Russian correlates for this lexeme there is no connotation of contempt included. This may be due to certain differences between the Eastern and the Western mentalities on which I can cite the opinion of the Russian phylosopher G.P.Fedotov who, in his Letters on Russian culture writes: My privykli dumaf, cto russkij celovek dobr. Vo vsjakom slucae, cto on umeet zalet'. V russkoj mudtel'noj, kenoticeskoj zalosti my videli osnovnoe razlide naXego xristianskogo tipa ot zapadnoj moral'noj ustanovki 'We are used to thinking that Russians are kind. That, at least, they know how to pity. In our Russian, tormenting, kenotic2 8 pity we saw the main distinction between our type of Christianity and the Western morale2 9 .1 28From the Greek kenosis - 'self-neglect, self-humiliation1 (literally: 'emptying1, 'depletion1). 29Recall also the example from the "Life of the Saint Monk Vitaly", where Zalost' 'pity1 is considered one of the greatest Christian virtues. 121 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V. English and Russian "disgust.' English lexemes: disgust, repugnance, repulsion, revulsion. Russian lexemes: otvraScenie 'disgust, aversion,’ omerzenie 'repulsion,1 brezglivost'-1 'squeamishness, physical disgust,’ gadlivost' 'repulsion, physical disgust.’ The key words for the synonymic groups are disgust and otvraScenie, respectively. The core meaning of these two synonymic groups is formulated as follows: 'feeling bad because of contact with something perceived as physically or morally unclean, contaminating and unpleasant; wanting to withdraw from this contact; feeling and sensing something which is similar to sensing an unpleasant taste or smell; reacting to it as one reacts to an unpleasant taste or smell.’ V.l. English 'disgust.’ The synonyms differ with respect to the following features: (1) source of emotion (physical/ moral dirtyness or unattractiveness of the object); (2) directionality of emotion (object-oriented only/ self-oriented); (3) objectivity/ subjectivity of emotion; (4) nature of the feeling; (5) strength of emotion; (6) manifestations of emotion. 122 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (1) Disgust may have either a physical or a moral source, e.g.: (151) And did the sound o f her mastication and heavy breathing, occasioned by her excessive consumption, arouse in them feelings of disgust (OC) - physical source; (152) In 1948,26-year-old James Hanson left his native Yorkshire in disgust at the nationalization o f his family haulage business (OC) - moral source. Repugnance, as a rule, has a moral source: (153) I could argue that what you are killing isn't a child and that repugnance at an act isn't evidence o f its immorality (OC). Repugnance can be induced by differences in ideological views: (154) Within the political climate of industrialized capitalistic societies, such socialist..sanctions might well be viewed as draconian and ideologically repugnant (OC) or even by differences in tastes: (155) The repugnance they felt towards more decorated churches... (OC). 123 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Occasionally, repugnance can have a physical source: (156) He found that his thoughts moved fast and in the direction o f greater complexity. His immediate emotion had been surprise. It was soon succeeded by disgust and an alarming sort o f fear. He felt a definite physical repugnance?0 at having been touched in that way (OC). Repugnance, if it has a physical source, usually has an animate object: one would feel repugnance at a contact with somebody extremely unpleasant, unclean, but not at a sight of dirty dishes or messy apartment. Repulsion can have either physical, or moral sources: (157) She was a talented pianist, but Mozart found it difficult not to show repulsion at his fat, perspiring, scantily clad pupil (OC); (158) Still later a tinge of repulsion (the same repulsion he felt in regard to his own immorality) became admixed to the love and the esteem... (V.Nabokov, Ada, or Ardor: a Family Chronicle). Revulsion has, as a rule, a physical cause: 30Note the interesting contrast between repugnance and disgust in this example; although they share the same physical cause, repugnance is viewed as a less spontaneous, more complex and more rationalized emotion than disgust; the latter appears as an immediate reaction to an unpleasant contact, whereas the former occurs only after some reasoning on the part of the experiencer. 124 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (159) / looked quickly in his face, searching fo r signs o f his disgust. Here it comes, the male revulsion at the state o f being female (OC). (2) Disgust and repugnance can be felt with respect to oneself, e.g., (160) I felt disgust towards myself (161) I felt moral repugnance with respect to myself Revulsion and repulsion cannot be felt with respect to oneself, cf. the impossibility of: (162) *Ifeel repulsion <revulsion> towards myself. The reason for this difference is, perhaps, that revulsion and repulsion are focused on the antagonism between the experiencer and the object of emotion; since one cannot feel antagonistic towards oneself, these emotions cannot be experienced with respect to self. For disgust and repugnance, however, this impulse to draw away from the object is only a consequence of the unpleasant feeling aroused by the object; the feeling itself is not that of repulsion but rather that of physical or moral sickness. (3) Disgust can be both objective (when the object causing the feeling is objectively, truly repulsive, not only in the eyes of the experiencer) and subjective (when the 125 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unattractiveness of the object is only a matter of the subject's perception). Consider, thus, disgust at the pervading smell and slime o f birds droppings (OC), where disgust is objective, since the object of the feeling would be considered disgusting by the majority of potential experiencers and the reasons for the feeling are self-explanatory. In the phrase (163) There was disgust at the hippies (OC) the emotion of disgust is subjective, since the object of the feeling would be considered disgusting by only a limited number of the experiencers and the reasons for the feeling are not obvious and self-explanatory. Repugnance can be subjective, e.g., (164) The repugnance she had felt the day before seemed absurd, unjust (OC). In this case, the experiencer herself does not understand her reasons for feeling repugnance. More often, however, it is objective, cf. the common expression natural repugnance in the following phrases: (165) It would have been worth overcoming your natural repugnance (OC). (166) Henry had always assumed that this vnos due, on her part, to an entirely natural 126 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. physical repugnance fo r him (OC). (167) Doesn't Mrs Dennison's natural <moral> repugnance tell us something...(OC). Repulsionand revulsion are, as a rule, objective feelings: they are both too strong to be experienced totally without a reason. (4) Disgust is the most general term among the synonyms; it denotes a feeling of sickness, either a physical or moral one, occurring in contact with or at a thought of somebody or something perceived as physically or morally unclean, impure. The experiencer wishes to withdraw from the possible contact with the object of the feeling, as the object is perceived as possibly contaminating. Repugnanceis a less spontaneous and more rational feeling than disgust; since it more often has a moral cause, rather than a physical one, it involves a touch of censure, lacking in disgust. On the other hand, it does not necessarily imply a sickness, whether physical or moral; also, the wish to withdraw from the contact with the object of the feeling is not as strong as in disgust. Repulsion and revulsion are, like disgust, rather spontaneous feelings; they may involve physical sickness; however, what is in focus, is the instinctive wish to withdraw from the contact with the object of emotion. 127 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (5) Revulsion and repulsion are usually strong feelings. Disgust and repugnance can vary in strength considerably. (6) All of the feelings can be manifested in physical sickness: revulsion is usually manifested in this way; for repugnance, due to its moral nature, this a less common manifestation; for disgust and repulsion it is a fairly common, though not an obligatory manifestation. Revulsion, repulsion and disgust can also be manifested in making faces, shuddering, certain sounds, drawing away from the object, cf. (168) I looked quickly into his face, searching fo r signs o f his disgust (OC). (169) Burden made a moue o f disgust (OC). (170) The girls arrived then, breathless and laughing, and making sounds o f disgust at the pervading smell and slime o f birds (OC). Repugnance can be manifested in facial expressions: (171) Morton saw a look of repugnance cross Mrs Livesey'sface... (OC). Disgust and repugnance, when they have a moral cause, are usually behavior ally manifested in avoidance of the object of emotion. 128 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V.2. Russian 'disgust.' The synonyms differ with respect to the following semantic features: (1) source of emotion (physical/ moral); (2) closeness of contact with the object causing the emotion; (3) directionality of emotion (object-oriented only/ self-oriented); (4) objectivity/subjectivity of emotion; (5) nature of the feeling (physical disgust, moral repugnance, rejection, hatred, fear of contact etc.); (6) strength of emotion; (7) manifestations of emotion (physiological and behavioral manifestations); (8) state/property status of emotion. (1) With respect to the first feature the synonyms are divided into two subgroups: otvraScenie and omerzenie, on one hand, and brezglivost' and gadlivost’, on the other. OtvraScenieand omerzenie can be caused both by real, material objects and by non material objects, such as behaviors, actions, etc. Consider the following two examples, where the feeling of'disgust1 is caused by a contact with certain material objects: (172) Ona <Anna> s otvraSceniem otstranilas' ot nego <Karenina>. 'She <Anna> moved away from him <Karenin> with disgust' (L. Tolstoy, Anna 129 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Karenina) and (173) On s omerzeniem posmotrel na grjaznuju i zapuScennuju komnatu 'He looked at the dirty and neglected room with disgust/loathing.1 The moral 'disgust,1 caused by non-material factors, is exemplified in the following two literary sentences: (174) Ja rucajus' golovoju, cto iz tex polutorasta molodyx muzdn, kotoryx ja pocti ezednevno vizu v svoej auditorii <...> edva li najdetsja xot' odin takoj, kotoryj umel by ponimat' nenavist' i otvrascenie k proSlomu Kati, to est' k vnebracnoj beremennosti i nezakonnomu rebenku. 'IH stake my life that out of those one hundred and fifty young men whom I see daily in my audience <...> there will be hardly one who would be able to understand the hatred and the disgust with Katja's past, that is, with a pregnancy out of wedlock and an illegitimate child' (A.P.Chekhov, A Boring story). (175) Usta ee govorili gordye, a ne serdce- s kakim-to omerzeniem proiznesla GruSen’ ka. 'It were her <Katerina Ivanovna’ s> proud lips that were speaking, not her heart, - said 130 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Grushen’ ka with disgust/loathing' (F.M. Dostoevskij, Brothers Karamazov). Otvrascenieand omerzenie, thus, denote emotions which can be both physiologically and morally driven. When otvraScenie and omerzenie are caused by a material object, the feeling is that of physiological repulsion; when they are caused by a non-material object, the feeling is that of a moral repulsion. These two feelings can be caused by virtually all kinds of material or non-material objects, as long as these are perceived as utterly disgusting. Gadlivost' and brezglivosf can only be caused by physical presence of material objects which are perceived as dirty, extremely unpleasant to touch or otherwise repulsive. Consider the following sentences: (176) Grjaznaja posuda v etom kafe vyzyvala v nem cuvstvo brezglivosti. 'The dirty dishes in this cafe stirred up his squeamishness/ disgust'. (177) On <Laevskij> uvidel <...> vzgljad zoologa, polnyj xolodnoj nasmeski i gadlivosti... 'H e <Laevskaj> noticed <...> the zoologist looking at him with cold mockery and loathing/disgust1 (A.P. Chekhov, Duel). Although gadlivost' can be caused by a strong moral (and not only physical) rejection of the object (as in the above-quoted example from Chekhov), the feeling itself is still physiological In other words, the moral disapproval is so strong in the case of gadlivost' that r 131 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it leads to physiological sickness. Brezglivosf and gadlivost' axe caused by different kinds of material objects. Brezglivosf usually occurs as a result of contact with an object perceived as dirty, able to soil everything that comes into closeness with it (e.g., dirty dishes) or as an otherwise physiologically repulsive object (such ^as foul-smelling, spoilt food). Brezglivosf is most natural if the object causing it should, normally, be clean; in other words, it is more likely to be caused by eating from the dirty dishes (which are normally supposed to be clean) than by walking through the fields, dirty after a rain. The closer is the contact with the source of emotion, the stronger is the feeling of brezglivosf. Thus, dirt shown on the TV cannot cause brezglivosf because there is no chance of coming into actual closeness to it. If the feeling of brezglivosf is caused by an animate object, e.g., an animal or human, it is its actual or imagined (by the experiencer) uncleanliness, not any other aspect of its personality that causes the feeling. On the contrary, otvrascenie or omerzenie in this case (especially when the object is human) would be more likely aroused not by physical, but by moral unattractiveness, uncleanliness of the object. Gadlivost', like brezglivosf, requires physical presence of the object causing the feeling. However, the objects able to cause the emotion are slightly different in the case of gadlivost'. Gadlivost' is usually caused by animate objects; in the prototypical case - by animals, traditionally perceived as repulsive and disgusting, e.g., by snakes, toads, rats. In the perception of the experiencer, these animals are both dirty and dangerous, unpredictable; the feeling of gadlivost' combines, thus, repulsion and apprehension, fear of the closer contact with these creatures. Consider the following example from "War and Peace" by L. Tolstoy: 132 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (178) P'er, odnako, sxvatil ee <devocku> i podnjal na ruki; ona zavizzzala otdajanno-zlobnym golosom i svoimi malen'kimi ruconkami stala otryvat' ot sebja ruki P ’ era i soplivym rtom kusat' ix. P'era oxvatilo cuvstvo uzasa i gadlivosti, podobnoe tomu, kotoroe on ispytyvalpri prikosnovenii k kakomu-nibud' malen'komu zivotnomu. 'Pier, however, grabbed her <the girl> and lifted her; she squalled in a desperate and angry voice and with her small hands started to tear Pier's hands off from herself and bit them with her snotty mouth. Pier was seized by a feeling of terror and loathing that he would feel if he touched a small animal’ (2) With respect to the second feature, the synonyms fall into the same two groups, as with respect to the first one. Otvrascenie and omerzenie do not require the actual physical presence of their object, even when they are caused by material objects. They can even occur at the thought about an unpleasant object or event, e.g., (179) I ona <Anna> s otvrasdeniem vspomnila pro to, cto nazyvala toj ljubov'ju. 'And she <Anna> remembered with disgust what she used to call that love (L. Tolstoy, Anna Karenina). (180) On s omerzeniem vspomnil o vceraSnej popojke. 'He recalled yesterday's carouse with loathing.' Brezglivosf:and gadlivost' can only occur in the actual presence of the object causing 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the emotion; they involve fear at the contact with the unpleasant object becoming even closer. Consider the following example from V.P. Bumashev's "Memoires": (181) Romanovic, strastnyj i plotojadnyj ljubitel' itogo roda grjaznyx naslazdenij, nevziraja na to, cto Gogol' o tepereSnej getere otnessja s takoju gadlivostju3 1 , <...> uprosil Gogolja ugostit' ego na darmovSdnku etoju divdnoj. 'Romanovic, a passionate and carnivorous lover of dirty pleasures of this kind, had begged Gogol’ to treat him for free with this girl, despite the fact that Gogol' spoke about this prostitute with such loathing/disgust.' This phrase is possible only in the situation when the experiencer of disgust and the object of disgust (here, the prostitute) are in the same space; otherwise, it would be inappropriate. (3) The third feature gives the same grouping of synonyms as the second one. Both otvrascenie and omerzenie can be felt with respect to oneself, while for brezglivosf and gadlivost' this is impossible. Cf. the following examples: (182) On star i slab, a ja smeju osuzdaf ego! - dumala ona s otvrasceniem k samoj sebe v takie minuty. 31 The lexeme brezglivost ‘ would be appropriate in this context as well. 134 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'He <father> is old and sick, and I dare to judge him! - she <Duchess Maria> thought in such moments, feeling disgust with herself (L. Tolstoy, War and Peace). (183) On ispytyval omerzenie k samomu sebe. 'He felt disgust <Ioathing> towards himself. and the impossible (184) *On cuvstvoval brezglivosf <gadlivosf> k samomu sebe. '*He felt squeamishness <physical loathing> towards himself.’ It seems that in the case of brezglivosf and gadlivost', an interesting psychological phenomenon is reflected linguistically. It is well-known that people do not normally experience physical disgust with respect to themselves, even with respect to their most unclean and unattractive bodily functions. Ungrammatical use of the lexemes brezglivosf and gadlivost' with respect to the experiencer reflects this psychological and physiological phenomenon. Although brezglivosf and gadlivost' denote emotions which occur only when their object is present, they at the same time require a certain distance between the object and the experiencer; thus, these two cannot coincide. (4). With respect to the fourth feature, otvrascenie is opposed to the rest of the synonyms. Otvrascenie can be entirely subjective, while the rest of the synonyms presuppose, 135 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. at least to some degree, some objective disgustingness of the object. OvtraScenie can even be an entirely unmotivated emotion, when even the experiencer himself does not understand the reasons for feeling it: (185) S neponjatnym ej samoj otvrasceniem ona smotrela na ego brituju seju. 'With disgust, incomprehensible even to herself, she looked at his shaved neck.' Omerzenie is too strong an emotion to be felt totally without reason. This can be, however, occasionally disregarded, especially in literature; consider the following example fromL. Tolstoy's "Anna Karenina": (186) Prisutstvie itogo rebenka vsegda i neizmenno vyzyvalo vo Vronskom to strannoe divstvo bespridnnogo omerzenija, kotoroe on ispytyval poslednee vremja. 'The presence of this child always made Vronsky experience that strange feeling of unmotivated loathing/disgust, that he had often felt lately.’ Gadlivost' cannot be felt without a reason either. The speaker's evaluation of the object of emotion may be not as negative as the experiencer's (this is especially true for brezglivosf, often perceived by the speaker as an exaggerated feeling). However, still, there must be something objectively repulsive in the thing that causes the emotion. And, clearly, omerzenie, brezglivosf and gadlivost' cannot be emotions incomprehensible to their experiencer and unmotivated. 136 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (5) With respect to the fifth feature, the synonyms fail into two groups: otvrascenie and omerzenie, which can denote both physiological and moral sensations, and brezglivost' and gadlivost', which are almost purely physiological Omerzeniehas a somewhat stronger physiological touch to it than otvra$cenie\ that is, the feeling is so strong that it receives a physiological component. Omerzenie entails a certain amount of hatred or, at least, anger towards the object of the emotion. Otvrascenie can be a purely moral feeling, without any anger or hatred, a kind of mere moral aversion. It can be felt towards rather abstract objects, e.g., (187) Ego otvrascenie k braku vsem izvestno. 'His disgust/ aversion to marriage is known to everybody.’ This example describes a situation when a person feels aversion towards the entire institution of marriage, not towards a particular situation. Consider also a sentence from L. Tolstoy's "War and peace": (188) Na P’ era ne naxodili, kak prezde, minuty otcajanija, xandry i otvrascenija k zizni. 'Pier, unlike before, did not experience those minutes of despair, spleen and disgust/aversion to life.’ This kind of usage would be impossible for omerzenie. Omerzenie describes a more 137 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. personal feeling felt in more concrete circumstances. Brezglivosf describes an unpleasant physiological feeling occurring when there is a potential contact with a possibly contaminating object; it entails a certain amount of disdain, especially when its object is a human being. Consider the following sentence: (189) Ona brezglivo otodvinulas', kogda on xotelpocelovaf ej ruku. 'She drew back with squeamishness/revulsion, when he tried to kiss her hand.1 Gadlivost' is stronger than brezglivosf. It entails a certain amount of apprehension about coming into a closer contact with the object. Consider a sentence from V. Nabokov's authorized translation of "Lolita": (190) Kak ze tak - my budem spat' v odnoj komnate? - skazala Lolita, dinamiceski grimasnicaja, kak delala, byvalo, bez gneva, bez gadlivosti, no javno na granice etix cuvstv. 'So, how is it going to be - we are going to sleep in the same room? - said Lolita, making faces, as she often did, without anger, without loathing but apparently on the verge of these feelings.' Brezglivosfand gadlivost' are opposed to both otvraScenie and omerzenie in that the former denote feelings occurring when there is a danger of coming into closer contact with an unpleasant object; they imply, therefore, apprehension. Omerzenie and otvrascenie can, on the contrary, occur when the experiencer is 138 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. already in close contact with the object, e.g., (191) Otkazat'sja kak-to neuctivo, nu i eS'; s otvrasceniem, a eS’. "It is rude to reject <food>, so one eats; with disgust but one still does' (N.V. Gogol', Memoirs of a madman). The lexeme omerzenie could also be applied to the above situation; however, brezglivosf and gadlivost’ would be inappropriate. (6) With respect to the sixth feature, the synonyms fall into two groups: omerzenie and gadlivost’ , on one hand, and otvrascenie and breglivost', on the other. The first two are necessarily strong feelings; the second two can come in different degrees. Otvrascenie is a much stronger feeling than gadlivost’ , though. (7) With respect to the seventh feature, the synonyms fall into two groups: otvrascenie and omerzenie, on one hand, and brezglivosf and gadlivost’ , on the other. The first two can have physiological, as well as behavioral manifestations, depending on whether the feeling is a physiological one or a moral one; the second two can only have physiological manifestations. Physiological manifestations of these emotions can vary in intensity and controllability; however, they do have something in common: all these emotions can be physiologically manifested in feeling sick, as if after eating some bad food. 139 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Additionally, otvraScenie can be manifested in vomiting or in shivering or convulsions: (192) Ego peredernulo ot otvrascenija. 'H e was convulsed by disgust/revulsion.' Brezglivost' and gadlivost' (as well as otvraScenie) can be manifested in making grimaces, in spitting, or in reflexive drawing hands back away from the unpleasant object. Omerzenie can be manifested in reflexively throwing away the unpleasant object. Behavioral manifestations of otvraScenie and omerzenie include consciencious attempts to avoid contact with the object causing the emotion. (8) With respect to the eighth feature, the synonyms form two unequal groups: gadlivost' is opposed to the rest of the synonyms. Gadlivost' can only denote a temporary state, but not a permanent property of the experiencer, cf. the following examples: (193) On <Levin> cuvstvoval k nemu <rebenku> tol'ko gadlivost'. 'H e <Levin> felt only repulsion with respect to him <the baby>’ (L.Tolstoy, Anna Karenina), where 'repulsion' is a temporary feeling, experienced at the moment of reference, but not (194) *On otnosilsja k nej s gadlivost'ju. 140 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ' ‘His attitude to her was that of repulsion,' where it is a permanent property. OtvraScenie, omerzenie and brezglivost' can denote temporary states, as well as permanent properties, e.g., (195) Grjaznaja komnata vyzvala u nego otvraScenie <omerzenie>. 'The dirty room stirred up his disgust <repulsion>.’ (196) V dvizenii, kotorym ona podnjala s pola grjaznuju prostynju, by la vidna brezglivost'. 'One could see disgust in the movement with which she picked up a dirty sheet from the floor.’ as well as (197) Ego otvraScenie k braku vsem izvestno. 'His disgust/ aversion to marriage is known to everybody.’ (198) On otnosilsja k nej s omerzeniem <brezglivost'ju>. 'His attitude to her was that of repulsion/disgust.’ 141 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of'disgust' in English and Russian. Linguistically, the concept of 'disgust' is equally well represented in both languages. Synonymic groups in both*languages contain four lexemes. There is much in common between the concepts of 'disgust' in the two languages. Thus, both English and Russian 'disgust' metaphorically (or literally) include the idea of sickness, nausea, as well as the idea of repulsion, drawing away3 2 . The two concepts possess many other coinciding characteristics, such as manifestations of emotion, source of emotion, etc. The semantic feature sets, used for their description, are almost identical. However, there are certain differences between these concepts. For instance, the English concept of'disgust' is focused on the moral side of this feeling, while the Russian one stresses the physiological part more. Thus, in English, there is a special lexeme to denote moral 'disgust,' namely, repugnance, while Russian lacks a specific word for that. However, in Russian, there are two lexemes which denote primarily physiological 'disgust,' namely brezglivost' and gadlivost', while English has only one such lexeme, namely, revulsion. This results in yet another difference. The Russian concept of 'disgust,' unlike the English one, employs the notion of physical presence of the source of emotion. Russian 'disgust' emotions are differentiated with respect to whether they imply the actual physical presence of their source or not. Those 32 The English word repulsion in its first sense means 'drawing away’; the Russian word otvraSSenije is derived from the verb otvraSdat'sja, meaning 'to draw away1. 142 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. emotions that denote primarily physiological disgust turn out to be the ones that imply this presence. Since English 'disgust' is not focussed on physiology, the actual distance between the experiencer and the object of emotion turns out to be unimportant. 143 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VI. English and Russian 'to be tired of/ bored with.' English lexemes: to be tired 2-of something, to be bored with something, to be fed up with something (colloquial), to be sick-2 o f something (colloquial), to be sick and tired of something (colloquial) = 'to feel that something either is inherently unpleasant or uninteresting or has become such because of too long or too frequent contact with it.' Russian lexemes: nadoest'"to have made one bored3 3 ,' literary naskudf 'to have made one bored,’ literary priskudt' 'to have made one bored,’ priest'sja 'to have made one sick3 4 ; to pall on; literally, about food: to become unpalatable as a result of too frequent use,' nabit' oskominu 'to have made one fed up; literally, about food: to become sour and unpalatable as a result of inappropriately large dosage1 ; ostocertet' (colloquial, rude) 'to have made one strongly fed up, sick; to become hateful’ ; opostylet' 'to have made one strongly fed up, sick; to become hateful,' obrydnut’ (colloquial, rude) 'to have made one strongly fed up, sick' = 'to become uninteresting or unpleasant to the experiencer because of too long or too frequent contact.’ It is difficult to formulate the common core meaning for the synonyms in these two synonymic groups, because they belong to different parts of speech and describe the emotion under consideration from two different angles. Bored' in the sense of 'annoyed' 'Sick' in the sense of 'annoyed'. 144 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The most prominent English lexemes for the emotion of 'boredom' are adjectives (mostly deverbal), denoting the experiencer's feelings. In these lexemes, the semantic valency of the experiencer is grammatically expressed as subject, whereas that of the source of emotion is expressed as indirect object. Thus, the English lexemes are grammatically, as well as semantically focused on the experiencer (see their semantic definitions). The most prominent Russian lexemes for this emotion are bivalent verbs, where the semantic valency of the experiencer is expressed as indirect (dative) object, whereas that of the source of emotion is expressed as subject. Thus, the Russian lexemes are grammatically and semantically centered around the source of emotion (see their semantic definitions). The common semantic component for these two synonymic groups can be formulated roughly as follows 'something becomes uninteresting or unpleasant because of too long or too frequent contact.1 VI.1. English 'to be tired ofI bored with.’ The synonyms differ according to the following features: (1) source of emotion (one’ s own activity/ external factors, etc.); (2) temporal orientation of contact with the cause of emotion (present or future); (3) wishes caused by the emotion and the experiencer's behavioral reactions to it; (4) nature of the feeling (correlation of the rational and emotional components, etc.), and its strength. 145 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (1) Within this feature, there are two parameters that are important. The first parameter is the reason for experiencing the emotion. As is clear from the semantic definition, the feeling can be caused either by an inherently bad, unpleasant object or by an object that is not by itself unpleasant, but has become such as a result of too long or too frequent exposure to it. The emotions to be tired, of, to be sick of and to be sick and tired of occur as a result of an either too long or too frequent exposure to their object. The object itself is not necessarily bad; however, too much contact with it has made it unpleasant or no longer desirable to the experiencer. Consider, for instance, the following fragment: (199) Mr Browning, o f course, as Wilson was well aware, held that every minute of every hour of every day was critical and was beside himself with anxiety if his wife confessed to the smallest ache, pain or sensation o f discomfort. She soon grew so tired o f his alarm that it was only to Wilson she spoke, in whispers, o f any ailment (OC). The husband's anxiety and care are not by themselves unpleasant to the wife, perhaps, quite the opposite; however, their excess causes the feeling of being tired of them in her. Consider also the following example: (200) He had underestimated the new mood o f his members who had become sick and tired o f the never-ending series o f disputes... (OC). 146 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Again, it is not the inherent badness of disputes that causes the feeling, but merely their over-frequency. Or, consider the lexeme to be sick o f in the following context: (201) A few months on in their friendship Nigel began to be sick o f the hints of affection dropped by Eleanor (OC). The feeling to be sick of, as illustrated by this example, developes gradually, as its object becomes unpleasant due to too much contact with it. The emotions to be tired of, to be sick of and to be sick and tired o f cannot, thus, occur, unless there was too much contact with the object, no matter how good or bad the object is. The inherent badness of the object cannot, alone, cause the feeling, consider the impossibility of (202) 7 get tired <sick?5 ; sick and tired> when / see all this dirt in your room. The emotions to be bored with and to be fed up with are different from to be tired of, to be sick o f and to be sick and tired of in that the former can be experienced even in the absence of a long or frequent exposure to their objects. They can occur as a reaction to the 35This phrase is possible, though, when to be sick is used in its other sense 'to feel nauseated1. 147 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inherent badness of their objects. Consider the lexeme to be fed up with in following example: (203) I want you to keep your room clean and tidy. When I see the squalor o f your room which is filthy, and has your clothes all over the floor, frankly I get fe d up (OC). This feeling is instantaneous, it arises once the contact with the unpleasant object (dirt and untidyness of the room) has taken place. Consider also the lexeme to be bored with in the following example: (204) The very same women who had been all for their daughters travelling abroad seemed suddenly to get bored with the idea. Here again, the feeling arises instantaneously, even suddenly, unexpectedly towards an object that the experiences did not have a lot of exposure to. In one respect, the lexeme to be bored with is opposed to the rest of the synonyms. Namely, unlike all other synonyms, it implies that the object of the emotion was or has become boring to the experiencer. Therefore, this emotion is caused only by such objects that can become boring or uninteresting, such as different information objects (books, talks, thoughts), activities (or the lack of them), surroundings, people. All these are potentially interesting or boring. Consider the following occurrences of this emotion: 148 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (205) However, the lethargic effects o f dope (incl. grass) can de-motivate young people, making it harder fo r them to get bored with doing nothing (OC). (206) We have since learnt from an unreliable source that Arlo is so named because Mr and Mrs Bez were trying to work their way through a baby's name book and got bored with it by the end of the A section (OC). (207) Andy: I try to go around so often, so much, and try to go to every party so that they'll be bored with me and stop writing about me (OC). The emotion to be bored with cannot, however, be caused by the objects to which the notion of being interesting or uninteresting is not applicable. The following sentence, for instance, describes a situation in which this emotion is inconceivable: (208) * The public is bored with police harassment. Police harassment is not something that can be interesting or boring3 6 ; thus, one cannot get bored with it. The rest of the synonyms are stronger than to be bored, since they imply that the object of emotion is or has become not only uninteresting but bad or otherwise unpleasant. 3 6 Unless it is a topic of discussion or conversation; then, as any kind of information, it can be interesting or boring. 149 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hence, the following contrast between to be bored with and the rest of the synonyms: the emotion to be bored with can be caused by an object that is inherently good and/or pleasant (but simply became uninteresting); the rest of other emotions cannot be caused by inherently good or nice objects. Consider the following example: (209) Personally, I am bored with feeling so nice every Saturday night (OC). All other emotions would be less natural in such a situation, c.f. the pragmatic awkwardness of (210) 7 I am fed up with <? tired of> feeling so nice every Saturday night. (211) 7 I am sick <sick and tired> o f feeling so nice every Saturday night. The second parameter within the first feature, with respect to which the synonyms differ, is the degree to which the source of emotion affects the experiencer. Namely, whether the experiencer is forced into contact with it, or is able to avoid it, whether the experiencer is active or passive, and the like. The emotion to be fed up with is contrasted with the rest of the feelings in that its source necessarily affects the experiencer to quite a large extent. This emotion usually occurs when one is forced into doing or experiencing something one dislikes. For instance, one can 150 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. be fed up with an unpleasant activity one has to perform, or with one's boss's rudeness, or with the difficult and joyless life one cannot change. In other words, the cause of the emotion to be fed up is something (a) that the experiencer does against his wishes and even against his will and (b) that directly affects the experiencer (who is either agent or patient, but not an outside observer). Consider, thus, the following cases when this emotion is appropriate: (212) Enough work so that I could enjoy it but not so much work that I would be fed up (OC). (213) We are fed up with police harassment. We are now considering calling in other groups in Scotland so we can defend ourselves (OC). Thus, one cannot be fed up in, for instance, the following situations: (214) * 1 am fe d up with the political situation in Russia (assuming the experiencer is not a Russian and, thus, is not directly affected by it). (215) 7 am fed up with feeling sad (the experiencer is not forced into it). The rest of the emotions can be felt in the circumstances when there is no direct exposure of the experiencer to the cause of emotion, as well as in the cases when the 151 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. experiencer is not forced into contact with the object of emotion. (2) With respect to the second feature, the emotion to be fed up with is opposed to the rest of the feelings. Namely, it can occur before the actual exposure to the cause of emotion has taken place. In other words, this emotion can be prospective, future-oriented. Consider the following occurrence of this emotion: (216) Sir Hector, who will have his own form to fill in as a farmer in Dumfriesshire, says in the letter: I recognise that many o f you will be fe d up at the prospect o f yet more literature and more form filling (OC). One cannot, however, be * tired (bored, sick, sick and tired) at the prospect of something. (3) With respect to the third feature, namely, wishes caused by the emotion and the experiencer's behavior, the synonyms represent a scale. All of the emotions do, to some extent, imply the experiencer's wish to withdraw from the contact with the cause of emotion. The strongest wish to cease the unpleasant contact is contained in the emotions to be fed up with and to be sick of. The next in strength is to be sick and tired of, then to be tired of, and, finally, to be bored with. Likewise, the emotions to be fed up with, to be sick o f and, perhaps, to be sick and 152 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tired o f have the most drastic and even violent behavioral manifestations. Consider, for instance, the following example: (217) Last year Red got so fe d up with Bart shouting that he hit a ball straight into his ribs (OC). Such a drastic action would be inconceivable in the case of to be tired o f or to be bored with. Consider also the following example of a drastic action, resulting from the emotion to be sick of: (218) He did not commit suicide because he had no patent and had reaped no rewards. He had a patent and had earned millions o f dollars in royalties. He killed himself because he was literally sick to death o f fighting some o f the largest manufacturers ofFM radios for the royalties they owed him (OC). Again, this action would be too strong a reaction to the emotions to be sick and tired of, to be tired o f and to be bored with. Even when the emotion is sufficiently strong to make the experiencer wish to be dead, as is the case in the following lines of Shakespeare's, it will not make him actually commit the suicidal action, cf. (219) Tired with all these, fo r restful death I cry...(Sonnet LXVI). 153 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Consider the following typical behavioral reactions to the emotions to be sick and tired of and to be bored with: (220) Sick and tired o f election fever and politics? Does the sight o f Major, Kinnock or Ashdown make you instantly reach fo r your remote control (OC). (221) The fa c t was that Charles gave up shooting fo r a few years because he had simply grown bored with it (OC). (4) With respect to the fourth feature, nature of the feeling, the emotion to be bored with is contrasted with all others. This emotion implies, in the first place, intellectual boredom and is, therefore, quite rational. It is an intellectual state as much as it is an emotion. The rest of the emotions are non-rational, even irrational, especially those of them which are strong (to be fed up with, to be sick of). Unlike other emotions, to be bored with does not imply a bad attitude to the object of the feeling on the part of the experiencer. This feeling can vary in strength but, compared to the other feelings of this group, it is a weak one. To be tired of, to be sick and tired of, to be sick of imply annoyance with the object of emotion (slighter in the case of to be tired, stronger in the case of to be sick and to be sick and tired). They do imply a negative attitude to the object of emotion (again, ranging from a weaker one in the case of to be tired o f to a stronger one in the case of the other two 154 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. emotions). The emotion to be fe d up with is the strongest in this group. It implies anger, a strongly negative attitude to the object of emotion and, possibly, aggressive behavior. VI. 2. Russian 'to be tired of/ bored with.' The synonyms differ according to the following semantic features: (1) source of emotion (one's own activity/ external factors); (2) frequency and length of contact with the source of emotion; (3) presence/ absence of a direct exposure to the source of emotion; (4) nature of the feeling, wishes of the experiencer and the strength of emotion3 7 ; (5) possible experiencer (individual/ group); (6) state/ property status of emotion. (1) With respect to the first feature, the synonyms fall into the following four groups: 1) nadoest', ostocertet' and obrydnut'; 2) naskudt', priskuat'; 3) priest'sja, nabit' oskominu; 4) opostylet'. 1) Nadoest', ostocertet' and obrydnut' describe emotions that can be caused both by one's own activities and by external factors. Thus, it is possible to say: 37 In fact, these are three distinct features but they are, in the case of this synonymic group, so closely related that it is convenient to consider them together. 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (222) Mne nadoelo <ostocertelo, obrydlo> rabotat' v etoj kontore. "I am bored with <sick of, fed up with> working in this office,1 where the source of emotion is one’ s own activity. It is equally possible to say: (223) Ved! byvaet ze tak, koroleva, ctoby nadoel <ostocertel, obrydl> muz. 'It happens sometimes, Queen, does it not, that one gets bored with <sick of, fed up with> one’ s husband’ (M. Bulgakov, Master and Margarita), where the source of emotion is an external factor, namely, a human being. Nadoest', ostocertet' and obrydnut', however, can be caused by a variety of external factors (and not only by humans). They are caused by situations; by material objects - homes, food, clothes; by informational objects - newspapers, books, etc. 2) Opostylet' is close to nadoest', ostocertet' and obrydnut' in that it can also be caused both by the experiencer's own activities and by external factors. However, this emotion allows a narrower range of sources, as compared to the other three. Namely, if it is caused by an external source, then this source must have some close relation with the experiencer. It can be, for instance, one’ s wife or husband (but not the president of one's country), cf. (224) Ee m uzej davno opostylel. 156 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'She has long been fed up with her husband,' but not (225) 'Emu opostylel prezident El'cm. ' ‘He is fed up with president Yeltsin.' It can be one's home, consider: (226) Ego dom emu opostylel s tex por kak zena pokinula ego. 'H e has become sick of his home since his wife left him,’ but not somebody else's home, cf. the impossibility of (227) 'Emu opostylel dom ego sosedej. '"He has become sick with his neighbors' house.' 3) Naskuat' and priskuat' imply an even narrower variety of emotion sources. These emotions (especially priskuat* ) cannot be caused by external factors; they occur as a result of one's own activity. Consider, for instance, (228) No s teceniem vremeni delo zametno prikucilo <naskucilo> emu svoim 157 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. odnoobraziem. 'But as time went by, he got bored with his job because of its monotony’ (A. Chekhov, Duel). One cannot experience these emotions as a result of, external factors: (229) *Mne naskucilo <priskucilo>, cto on vssgda opazdyvaet. '*1 got bored with his always coming late,’ because the experiencer does not take any part in it himself. The emotion naskuat' (but not priskuat') is often caused by humans, e.g., (230) Odurmanennaja svoimi zelanijami, ona stala ulybat'sja soverSenno neznakomomu celoveku tol'ko potomu, verojatno, cto on staten i vysok rostom, v dva svidanija on naskual ej, i ona brosila ego. 'Intoxicated with her desires, she started to smile to an absolute stanger for the only reason that he was stately and tall; she got bored with him after two dates and she left him’ (A. Chekhov, Duel). This seems to contradict my earlier statement that this emotion can be caused by one’ s own activities only. However, this is not the case. If it is caused by a human, this means that the experiencer has some kind of a relationship with this human, and is, thus, involved in an 158 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. activity (as a relationship requires activity). Thus, naskuat' cannot be imposed on the experiencer by, for example, a teacher in the classroom or a speaker on the TV, as with these humans the experiencer has no special relationship and is, therefore, passive. 4) Nabit' oskominu and priest'sja describe emotions caused by external factors only and not by one's own activities. Consider the following typical use of nabit' oskominu and priest'sja: (231) jtti krasivyje vidy uze nam vsem prielis' <nabili oskominu>. 'All of us are already fed up with these beautiful views.’ One cannot, however, say: (232) *Mne uzeprielos’ <nabilo oskominu> rabotat' nad dissertaciej. '*1 am already fed up with working on my dissertation.1 Not every external factor, however, can serve as a source of nabit' oskominu and • < i 4 0 priest sja . Priest'sja is usually caused by an excess of pleasure which, due to its excessive amount and frequent repetition, becomes boring and loses its attractiveness. As I already said, priest'sja can be caused by food (by good food only); thus, it is possible to say 38 • • Originally, these expressions described reactions to eating excessive amounts of the same food. Synchronically, the expressions nabit' oskominu and priest'sja are used in a wider variety of situations, however, this earlier use is still favored. 159 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (233) Vse iti pirogi uze mne prielis’ . 'I am already fed up with all these cakes,’ but not (234) *Mne prielas' nevkusnaja eda v itom restorane. 'I am fed up with bad food in this restaurant.’ Likewise, one can experience priest'sja with respect to other pleasures, material as well as spiritual ones: parties, mistresses, clothes, etc., consider, e.g.: (235) Ego novaja ljubovnica emu uze prielas'. 'His is already fed up with his new mistress.’ Nabit' oskominu is not necessarily caused by something pleasant; consider, for instance: (236) Vse £ti diskussii o socialisticeskom realizme nabili oskominu. 'Everyone is fed up with all these disputes about socialist realism.1 Nabit' oskominu cannot be caused by a human, consider the impossibility *Ona nabila emu oskominu '*He is fed up with her.’ The most typical sources of nabit' oskominu are 160 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. various kinds of information, e.g., discussions, news, gossips, poetic metaphors, anecdotes, and the like. (2) With respect to the second feature, frequency and length of contact with the source of emotion, the synonyms are divided as follows: nadoest', naskuat' and ostocertet', on one hand, priskuat', priest'sja, nabit' oskominu, opostylet' and obrudnut', on the other. The first three can be caused both by an overly long single contact with the source of emotion or by multiple, overly frequent contacts. Consider the following phrases, where the source of emotion is a single contact, which is too long: (237) Nakonec Margarite Nikolaevne nadoelo <ostocertelo> sluSat' itu tainstvennuju trepotnju... 'Finally Margarita Nikolajevna got bored <fed up> with listening to this mysterious nonsense... (M. Bulgakov, Master and Margarita). (238) Mne naskualo sidet' tut i dtat' gazetu. 'I got bored with sitting here and reading a newspaper.’ Consider also situations when these emotions occur as a result of multiple frequent contacts: (239) (Setyrexstopnyj jamb mne nadoel <naskual>. 161 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'I got bored with the iambic tetrameter...(A.Pushkin). (240) Etot celovek ej ostocertet svoimi grubymi pristavanijami. 'She got fed up with this person’ s rude advances.’ Obrydnut', opostylet', priest'sja, nabit' oskominu and priskuat’ describe emotions which occur as a result of multiple, overly frequent contacts with the source of emotion and which cannot occur after a single, though an overly long contact. Thus, it is possible to say (241) Mne obrydla <priskuala> & ta rabota. 'I am sick of cbored with> this job. (242) Mne opostylel itotgorod. 'I am sick of this city’ . (243) Mneprielis’ <nabili oskominu> iti udovol’ stvija. 'I got fed up with those pleasures.’ It is impossible to say (244) "Mne obrydlo <priskualo, opostylelo> tut sidet’ i zdat' ego. '*1 got sick of cbored with, sick of> sitting here and waiting for him *. 162 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (245) "Mne uze prielas' <nabila oskominu> ita muzyka za oknom. '*1 am already fed up with this music outside the window'. because these examples describe situations of a single contact with the source of emotion. Another point which needs to be made concerns the opinion of the speaker about the frequency and length of contact. All of the synonyms imply that the experiencer considers this contact to be too frequent and/or long. However, only ostocertet', opostylet' and obrydnut' imply that the speaker has the same opinion. Thus, it is possible to say (246) Emu ito sliskom bystro nadoelo <naskualo, priskualo, prielos', nabilo oskominu>. sHe got bored <fed up> with it too fast,' where 'too fast' expresses the opinion of the speaker, which, in this case, does not coincide with that of the experiencer. And it is impossible to say (247) * Emu ito sliskom bystro ostocertelo <opostylelo, obrydlo>. '"He got sick of it too fast,' since ostocertet', opostylet' and obrydnut' imply that the speaker has the same opinion as the experiencer, namely that the contact with the source of emotion was actually too long or too frequent. 163 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (3) With respect to the third feature, namely, presence/ absence of a direct exposure to the source of emotion, the synonyms fall into the following groups: nadoest' and ostocertet', on the one hand, and naskuat', opostylet’ , obrydnut’ , priskuat', priest'sja and nabit' oskominu, on the other. Nadoest' and ostocertet' can occur both with and without a direct exposure to the source of emotion. Thus, one can feel these emotions in both of the following situations: (248) Emu nadoela <ostocertela> ego zena. 'He got bored with <fed up with> his wife,' with a direct exposure to the source of emotion and (249) Emu nadoel <ostocertel> president. 'He is bored with <fed up with> the president,1 with no direct exposure to the source of emotion. Naskuat', opostylet', obrydnut', priskuat', priest'sja and nabit' oskominu can occur only when direct exposure to the source of emotion is present. Priskuat', by definition, cannot occur without a direct exposure to the source of emotion because the source for this emotion is the expriencer’ s own activity. Priest'sja and nabit' oskominu also imply a direct exposure by definition. The former is an emotion, caused by the excess of pleasure that the experiencer is having; the latter is caused by a frequently repeated piece of information, which 164 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the experiencer is directly perceiving. Opostylet' implies a very close contact with the source of emotion; as I said above, this emotion can be caused by a close relative or friend, or by one's own home, i.e., by someone or something really close. Obrydnut' also implies a very personal attitude towards the source of emotion and, thus, requires a direct exposure to it. (4) With respect to the fourth feature, namely, nature and strength of the feeling and the wishes of the experiencer, the synonyms are characterized as follows: ostocertetis a strong, inpatient, almost passionate feeling; the source of emotion has become unbearable, hateful, and the experiencer wishes to withdraw from the contact with it as soon as possible and is ready to act in order to do so; obrydnufis as strong as ostocertet', but this feeling does not imply an impatient desire to withdraw from the situation causing it; rather, it implies despair because the experiencer feels that he is unable to change anything, though he strongly wishes to do so; opostylet' is similar to obrydnut' in its strength and the feeling of despair; however, it does not imply as much hatred towards its source; nabit’ oskominu is a rather strong emotion, similar in nature to the sensation of a person who has eaten too much of the same food and has an unpleasant taste in his mouth; this emotion implies a desire to withdraw from the contact with its source; naskuat', priskuat' and priest'sja are, unlike the other emotions, not particularly strong. Naskuat' and priskuat' do not contain a strong emotional component; rather, they 165 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. describe intellectual boredom and tiredness. Priest'sja implies a loss of interest and emotional involvement with the source of emotion; it is a feeling of satiety with too much of the same pleasure; nadoest' is the most neutral of the synonyms; it can refer to intellectual, as well as emotional boredom or annoyance, accompanied by a desire to withdraw form the contact with the source of emotion. (5) With respect to the fifth feature, namely, the possible experiencer, the synonyms are divided into the following two groups: nadoest' and nabit' oskominu, on one hand, and all the remaining ones, on the other. Nadoest’ md nabit' oskominu denote emotions that can be felt by an entire group of experiences, and for nabit' oskominu this use is even preferred. Thus, it is possible to say: (250) Kommunizm uze nadoel. v <Everyone in the society> is already bored with communism'. (251) Razgovory o demokratii nabili oskominu. '<Everyone in the society> is already fed up with talks about democracy.1 The rest of the synonyms denote individual, personal emotions, which cannot be felt by a whole group of experiences. 166 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (6) With respect to the sixth feature, namely, the property/ state status of emotion, the synonyms are divided as follows: nadoest', naskuat' and ostocertet' can denote both properties and states, whereas the lexemes can denote permanent properties only. Thus, for nadoestnaskuat' and ostocertet' both of the following usages are possible: (252) Mne nadoelo <naskudlo, ostocertelo> sidet' tut i dtat' gazetu. 'I am bored with cbored with, sick of> sitting here and reading the newspaper,1 with the state status of emotion when the experiencer is bored with reading a particular newspaper in a particular place and time and not with reading newspapers in general) and (253) Mne nadoelo <naskualo, ostocertelo> dtat' gazety. 'I am bored with cbored with, sick of> reading newspapers,’ with the property status of emotion; the experiencer is bored with reading all newspapers, at all times and places). VL3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of "to be tired off bored with’ in English and Russian. The concepts of 'boredom’ in English and Russian are quite different, and this is a difference in their linguistic conceptualizations, rather than a difference of cultures. 167 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Their first distinction is the previously mentioned distinction in the semantic focus: the English concept is focused on the experiencer, whereas the Russian one is focused on the source of emotion. This results in another difference, namely, that the English concept is more subjective than the Russian one. Recall that the center of the English concept is the experiencer; the source of emotion is not even always mentioned. The English 'tiredness/ boredom’ can, thus, occur without a source, without a motivation, as a result of certain subjective factors, such as the experiencer’ s mood, e.g., the following: (254) I feel absolutely fed up. (255) He is a sick and tired person. In both of these cases the source of emotion is not mentioned, and the emotion appears to be unmotivated. On the other hand, the center of the Russian concept of'boredom’ is the source of emotion; it cannot be omitted in discourse. Therefore, the emotion cannot appear unmotivated, without a source; thus, the Russian 'tiredness/ boredom’ is a more objective emotional state than its English correlate. This opposition is rather unusual: recall that English emotion concepts are overall more objective than the Russian ones (e.g., 'fear,' 'pity,' 'sadness'). Besides this, the English and Russian concepts of'tiredness/ boredom’ have also other differences. 168 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The English and Russian synonymic groups 'to be tired of/ to be bored with' are linguistically quite different. The English synonymic group does not have a key word, ie. a semantically neutral lexeme with the most general, unspecified meaning; the Russian synonymic group does have one, namely, the lexeme nadoest'. This is not the only lexical difference between English and Russian 'tiredness/ boredom.’ There is no one-to-one correlation among other synonyms, either. Thus, there is no parallel in Russian for the English to be tired', there is no parallel in English for the Russian nabit’ oskominu, opostylet', priest'sja. The remaining synonyms, although they are semantically somewhat closer, still do not have exact parallels in the other language. This results in quite different semantic feature sets for English and Russian. Thus, the feature 'temporal orientation of contact with the source of emotion1 is relevant for the English concept of'tiredness/ boredom’ but not for the Russian one. English 'tiredness/ boredom’ can be caused both by a actual contact with the source of emotion or by an anticipated contact; Russian 'tiredness/ boredom’ cannot be caused by an anticipated contact (which points to its more objective nature). Likewise, the features 'presence/ absence of a direct exposure to the source of emotion,’ 'possible experiencer (individual/ group),’ 'state/ property status of emotion,’ 'frequency and length of contact with the source of emotion’ are not relevant for the English synonyms. English 'tiredness/ boredom’ can be felt both in the presence or absence of a direct exposure to the source of emotion, by an individual or by a group and can be either a state or a permanent property. 169 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This brings us to another difference between the synonymic groups. Namely, the Russian synonyms are more differentiated amongst themselves than the English ones. First, the Russian synonymic group of'boredom' contains eight lexemes, as opposed to the five lexemes in the English synonymic group. In Russian, there are six features to distinguish amongst them, as opposed to the four features in English. English 'tiredness/boredom' has three main aspects: intellectual boredom (represented by the lexeme to be bored); intellectual and/or emotional tiredness (to be tired, to be sick and tired) and emotional annoyance (to be sick, to be fed up). The Russian concept of'tiredness/ boredom' is more versatile: it includes intellectual and/ or emotional boredom (naskuat', prickudt); intellectual annoyance (nabit' oskominu); emotional or aesthetic satiety (priest'sja); emotional annoyance, mixed with anger (ostocertet1 ); emotional annoyance, mixed with despair (opostylet', obrydnuty,; any kind of annoyance or boredom (nadoest1 ). Russian 'tiredness/ boredom' has not only more shades that the English one but also more degrees. English conceptualizes this emotion as either unspecified with respect to degree (to be bored, to be tired), or as strong (to be fed up)3 9 , or as very strong (to be sick, to be sick and tired). The Russian concept of'tiredness/ boredom’ allows for more degrees: from unspecified with respect to degree (nadoest', priskuat’ , naskuat’ , priest’ sja) to strong (nabit' oskominu) to very strong (opostylet) to extremely strong (obrydnut', ostocertet). Certain English expressions for 'tiredness/ boredom' that originated as denoting extremely strong emotions (such as to be fed up) gradually lost their strength and evolved into 39The expression to be fed up can also be used in reference to an emotion of medium or even little strength, e.g., I am beginning to feel slightly fed up with this situation. 17 0 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. designators of emotions of medium strength (see the previous footnote). This peculiarity is not limited to the 'to be tired of/ to be bored with' synonymic group. The English expressions for 'anger' and for 'joy,' such as to be angry or to be happy have also lost much of their original strength and they now refer to the emotions of medium, if not little, strength, much weaker that their Russian correlates gnevat'sja and byt' scastlivym. 171 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VII. English and Russian 'sadness.' English lexemes: sadness, sorrow, grief, melancholy (literary), blues (colloquial). Russian lexemes: grust' ('sadness'), pedal' ('sorrow'), toska4 0 ('sad yearning’ ), gore ('grief), skorb' ('woe') (literary). The key word for the English synonymic group is sadness, the key word for the Russian group is grust', with a similar meaning4 1 . The core meaning for these synonymic groups can be formulated as follows: 'feeling bad because nothing good is happening or because something bad is happening, which can result in a loss of something dear to the experiencer; implicature: the experiencer feels helpless about the situation.1 VII.1. English 'sadness.' The synonyms differ with respect to the following semantic features: (1) source of emotion; (2) subject/ object orientation of emotion; (3) nature of the feeling; (4) wishes caused by the emotion; i0Toska also has another meaning - 'to miss something/ somebody1 - when with the preposition po; I do not consider this meaning here. The key word for this group is not quite the same in its properties as the key words for the groups of 'fear1, 'disgust1 or the Russian 'to be tired of/ bored with1. Namely, although grust1 and sadness do have the most unspecified meaning in their synonymic groups, they are not hyperonyms for the rest of the synonyms. 172 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (5) manifestations of emotion; (6) strength of emotion and the time of its duration; (7) possible experiencer of emotion. (1) With respect to the first feature, namely, source of the feeling, the synonyms fall into three groups: sorrow and grief, on one hand, melancholy and blues, on the other, and sadness, which is somewhere in between. Sorrow and grief imply a serious reason for the feeling, usually some major loss. Melancholy and blues often occur without any reason, or with a much less serious reason than sorrow and grief. Sadness can be both a motivated and unmotivated feeling. The cause of grief, as well as of sorrow is often a loss (possibly through death) of a loved person, e.g. (256) I do understand intense misery and sorrow after losing a child to a terrorist's bomb. I feel sure all mothers worldwide will understand my grief (OC). It can be a different kind of a major loss, as well, as long as this loss somehow affects objects dear to the experiencer or it affects his ability to be close to them. Thus, one can feel grief or sorrow at leaving one's homeland forever, e.g., (257) She showed...very little sign of regret about leaving her country, ... (in contrast 173 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to Mary o f Guise's grief) (OC). The word grief cam . also be (idiomatically) used to refer to the difficult, unpleasant emotional experiences, not necessarily caused by losses: e.g., one can say (258) His son caused him a lot of grief fHis son made him feel bad many times, gave him a hard time, perhaps, disappointed the father with his behavior'). Cf. also (259) One mother, whose daughter has lived with her boyfriend fo r about eight years, constantly nags her daughter about getting married and feels deep personal pain and grief (OC). Grief can never occur without a motivation. For sorrow, it is possible to occur without a motivation, e.g., (260) He felt some strange, deep sorrow, and could not quite understand, why. However, it is more typical for it to occur with a motivation, since this is a rather strong feeling, associated with losses or other events, sad for the experiencer. Sadness can occur both with a motivation and without it. Sadness is also often 174 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. motivated by some kind of a loss, or separation from something dear; however, in the case of sadness this loss is usually less serious than in the case of grief and sorrow. It usually is not a death of someone loved; sadness is not a sufficiently strong feeling to be felt in this case. However, one can feel sad when one’ s child is ill, or when one is temporarily separated from something dear, e.g., (261) For both Jack and Dorothy there is the sadness o f leaving family and friends... (OC) or (262) I realized then that my days with the Scottish Liberal Party were numbered and with much sadness wrote out a letter o f resignation (OC). Melancholy and blues are often felt without a reason; they may be states of low spirits that come and go by themselves. If, however, there is a reason for feeling melancholy or blues, this reason is not as serious as for sadness, let alone grief or sorrow: (263) He was excited by Asquith's successes, cast into melancholy by his defeats (OC). One can also start feeling melancholy after listening to sad music, or reading a sad book; this is usually not possible for sadness, which requires for its occurrence some real 175 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. event to happen. All synonyms, except grief, denote feelings which can be experienced at a thought of something bad, that has not yet happened, cf. (264) I am filled with sorrow! sadness when I think that we might separate. (265) I feel melancholy/blues when I think that we might separate. Grief, however, can never be produced by a thought of something that has not yet happened or by an anticipation of a sad event. Grief is, so to say, factive, Le., incurred by actual facts. (2) With respect to the second feature, namely, subject/ object orientation of the feeling, sorrow is opposed to the rest of the synonyms. All the emotions except sorrow are subject-oriented, that is, a necessary condition for feeling them is that the experiencer is somehow personally affected by the cause of the feeling, i.e. something bad happens to him or to someone he loves. However, sorrow can occur when something bad happens to a person other than the experiencer or his loved ones. Sorrow does not, thus, require a personal involvement of the experiencer with the objects being affected by the loss; for example, one can read in the newspaper about a war in some faraway country and feel sorrow. One cannot feel other emotions of this group in such circumstances (unless one has relatives or friends there, or 176 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. some other kind of very personal involvement with this country). Sorrow may, unlike other emotions, be felt fo r somebody; when, for example, the experiencer sees a mother grieving over her child, he can feel sorrow fo r the mother. In this case, sorrow is close to regret or being sorry for somebody. (3) With respect to the third feature, namely, nature of the feeling, the synonyms are characterized as follows: grief, sorrow and blues are always negative feelings, unpleasant for the experiencer; they cannot be mixed with joy or any other positive feelings. The words grief, sorrow and blues can, thus, only appear in the context of the words denoting other negative feelings, e.g., misery and sorrow, grief, fear and anxiety", blues and depression, but not * grief < sorrow, *blues> and joy. Sadness and melancholy, can, however, appear, if not themselves pleasant, nonetheless accompanied by pleasant feelings, e.g., joy. Consider the following contexts: (266) Lights began to go on in the dark houses, and I relished my melancholy to the last drop (OC). (267) The sadness that followed seemed purged and sweet even... (OC). Melancholy can, however, be also felt as a painful heart-piercing feeling, cf. (268) It pierces me right through, the melancholy. ..(OC). 177 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Grief is the strongest and the most violent feeling; it is akin to shock and can drive the experiencer to a state of temporal insanity, e.g. (269) Crow <...> thought Miss Elizabeth would go insane with grief (OC). It strikes and paralyzes the experiencer; it is like a heavy weight on him: (270) He began to sob and then shudder under the weight o f his grief (OC). Grief, due to its violent and rebellious nature, can make the experiencer aggressive, destructive; it is often combined with anger: (271) We are offering the personal experiences o f women who are writing out o f anger and grief. Grief is a gloomy, desperate, dark feeling: (272) From this point of blackness, he moves on again. Some days, he feels that the grief is lightening... (OC). Sorrow is a feeling, as strong, perhaps, as grief (cf. the impossibility of * light sorrow), but not of a violent, shocking nature; it is deep and intense but not rebellious. If the effect of grief on 178 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the experiencer may be likened to that of a hard unexpected blow, cf. (273) He is suddenly hit by the fu ll force o f his grief all over again.. .(OC), the effect of sorrow is as intense but more prolonged in time. Sorrow is not necessarily a dark feeling. It does not make the experiencer angry or destructive. In fact, one can even feel (274) sweet sorrow.: Parting is such sweet sorrow. Sometimes, however, this difference between grief and sorrow is blurred, and grief is used in contexts where we would normally expect sorrow. (275) The church may begin to experience something o f the grief o f Jesus going through all the towns and villages and being filled with compassion because the crowds were harrassed and helpless...(OC). In this quote, the word grief is used with reference to a feeling close to regret or being sorry for. Melancholy can range anywhere from a painful, hard experience: unrelieved melancholy, persistent melancholy, bitter-doomed melancholy (OC) to a sweet light feeling: (276) I found this <a book> very lyrical, delicate and uplifting <...> at the same 179 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. time <...> tinged with melancholy (OC). Blues is a state of despondency, low spirits, hardly ever pleasant. (4) With respect to the fourth feature, namely, wishes caused by the emotion, the synonyms are characterized as follows: sadness and sorrow do not imply any particular wishes; melancholy and blues induce an overall passiveness on the experiencer and, therefore, imply a lack of any active wishes3 7 . When feeling grief, the experiencer may feel two ways: either an absolute passiveness, absence of any wishes (paralysing grief) or a wish to let the feeling out, to be destructive or self-destructive (grief as madness). (5) Sadness and sorrow can be manifested in tears; grief is manifested in sobs, wringing one’ s hands, tearing one's clothes. Melancholy and blues are hardly manifested in tears; they can be manifested in a fixed expression of the eyes, or lowering down the head. (6) With respect to the sixth feature, namely, strength of the feeling and the time of its duration, the synonyms are characterized as follows: sorrow and grief are necessarily strong and deep3 8 feelings; sadness can be a strong and deep (though not as deep and strong 37 By active wishes I mean wishes to do anything; however, one can feel m^ancholy and wish that life were different. The notions 'deep' and 'strong' with respect to emotions may require certain clarification. The so-called 'deep' feelings affect the experiencer to the bottom of his heart. Intuitively, love is deeper than liking; sorrow or grief are deeper than blues. Linguistically, this intuition is confirmed by the combinatory properties of the respective lexemes: while love, sorrow and grief can co-occur with the adjective deep, liking and blues cannot. Thus, the emotions liking and blues can never be deep. The emotions love, sorrow 180 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as the first two), as well as a weak feeling. Melancholy and blues can also be both intense and weak; however, they cannot be deep feelings3 9 . Sadness is a rather short-lasting state. Sorrow and grief axe usually long-lasting, although grief changes its nature somewhat, as it develops: after the first period of an intense shock the feeling becomes less violent and can actually be reduced to something no more strongly felt than sadness. Thus, one can feel grief over a relative who had died years ago: the feeling, although it is serious and deep, is no longer particularly strong. Grief is a very long-lasting feeling, able to last for years, cf. (277) In his grief Cranmer allowed his beard to grow unshaven fo r the rest o f his life (OC). The word grief is sometimes used terminologically to refer to the entire emotional process, accompanying, e.g., a loss of a loved person; there are studies o f grief, process o f grief, stages o f grief etc. Blues and melancholy can be both short and long-lasting; however, they usually are and grief are not necessarily always deep: accordingly, the corresponding lexemes can occur in such contexts as His love <sorrow, grief> was not deep. There are also emotions which are always deep, such as woe. Accordingly, it is impossible to say *His woe was not deep. The notion of a 'strong' emotion does not coincide with the notion of 'deep' emotion; although 'deep1 emotions are normally also intense (strong) , the reverse is not true. For instance, the emotion exasperation, although normally strong, is not and, in fact, cannot be deep. There are emotions which are necessarily strong and can never be weak (such as horror, terror, cf. the incorrect *weak <slight> terror, horror) ; emotions which can be either strong or weak (such as to be afraid, consider to be very much afraid and to be slightly afraid) and emotions which can never be strong (such as the Russian priunyt' 'to be in slightly low spirits', consider the incorrect 'sil 1 n<^9priunyt1 '*to be very much in slightly low spirits'). They are not caused by serious losses and, therefore, do not imply a serious emotional experience; linguistically, the fact that melancholy and blues are not deep feelings is reflected in that they do not co-occur with the adjective deep: *deep melancholy <blues>. 181 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not momentary states but, rather, longer periods of low spirits. (7) With respect to the seventh feature, namely, possible experiencer of the feeling, the synonyms are characterized as follows: of all synonyms, only grief denotes a feeling that can be experienced by a a group of persons (in contrast to the other synonyms, which denote strictly personal feelings). An entire country can, thus, be cast into grief by, e.g., the death of the king of this country. In this case it is appropriate to talk about civic grief. Grief, thus, unlike other feelings, can be classified; that is, one can speak about different kinds of grief, as felt by different groups of people in different circumstances, cf. the above-mentioned civic grief, or maternal grief, etc. VH.2. Russian 'sadness/ Within this group, the synonyms differ according to the following features: (1) source of emotion (what kind of event, if any, causes the feeling; temporal orientation of the feeling); (2) orientation of emotion (if it is object-oriented or subject-oriented); (3) nature of the feeling (painful, burdensome, etc.); (4) strength of emotion; (5) corresponding wishes; (6) manifestations of emotion; (7) possible experiencer of emotion (an individual or a group). 182 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (1) The first feature gives the following grouping of the synonyms: toska, grust', and pedal', on one hand, and gore and skorb', on the other. The first three emotions differ from the rest in that they can occur without any visible source. Thus, one can feel bespridnnuju toskul grust' Qunmotivated yearning/ sadness), and, though to a lesser degree, bespridnnuju pedal’ ('unmotivated sorrow') or neponjatnuju pedal' ('inexplicable sorrow'). Consider the following example from M. Bulgakov's Master and Margarita: (278) Vse ta ze neponjatnaja toska, do uze prixodila na balkone, pronizala vse ego suSdestvo. 'The same inexplicable yearning, that had already come earlier, on the balcony, pierced his entire being.' Both grust’ 'sadness' and pedal’ 'sorrow' would be appropriate in this context, as well. However, the remaining emotions, namely, skorb’ 'grief, woe' and gore 'grief cannot be felt for some unknown reason. Thus, one cannot experience * bespridnnuju skorb’ ('unmotivated woe') or *bespridnnoe gore ('unmotivated grief). Within each of the groups, there are further distinctions. Toska, grust’ and pedal’ can have an internal, rather than an external source, and there are differences among these feelings with respect to the type of internal source they have. Grust' and pedal’ usually occur when the experiencer feels that there is or will be 183 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. something bad happening (he may not even be aware of what it is). Toska occurs, rather, when the experiencer feels that nothing good is or will be happening: unlike grust' and pedal', it is not a regret over a present or future evil but a feeling of hopelessness, a certainty that nothing good can happen. Grust' and pedal’ are, in a way, more objective than toska: they at least require a thought about something bad, which is happening or will happen. On the contrary, toska sometimes appears from absolutely nowhere, not even as a result of reflection. For instance, one can experience a so-called p'janaja toska 'drunken yearning' (quite a common Russian feeling). It occurs as a result of being heavily drunk - at a stage, when the drinker stops being merry and animated and falls into a pessimistic and depressed mood. Feeling that nobody loves him and life is not worth living, he experiences p'janaja toska. Consider the following sentence from A. Galich: (279) Neznakomyje rozi! moknut v p ’ janoj toske. 'Unknown ugly mugs/ are soaking in drunken yearning.1 Goremd skorb' cannot occur unmotivated; what is more, they cannot even occur at a thought of something bad, hence, the ungrammatically of (280) *Kogda ona dumala, cto ego Met smert', ee oxvatyvalo glubokoe goretglubokaja skorb*. '"When she was thinking that death awaits him, she was seized by deep grief/deep 184 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. woe'. They occur as a reaction to an actual event, e.g.: (281) Izvestie o smerti imperatora poverglo ves' dvor v glubokoe gore/ glubokuju skorb’ . 'The news of the emperor's death caused deep grief/ woe in the entire court.' Toska, grust’ and pedal' can occur at the thought of something bad: (282) Vsjakij raz, kogda ja ob etom dumaju, menja oxvatyvaet toska/ grust’ / pedal’ . 'Every time I think about it, I am seized by yearning/ sadness/ sorrow’ . For toska, thinking about something is the most common setting of occurrence; as a rule, it does not occur as a result of an event. Rather, it is a feeling which occurs when there are no events (good ones) happening and none are coming, e.g., (283) Kogda ja dumaju, cto mne pridetsja vsju zizn' prozit' v etom gorode, menja oxvatyvaet toska. 'When I think that I will have to spend all my life in this city, I am seized by yearning’ (there is nothing good I can expect to happen here). 185 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Toska, thus, is a future-oriented feeling: it is caused by the lack of hope for a better future, by the knowledge that the desired situation can never be attained. Consider the following sentence from M. Bulgakov's: "Master and Margarita": (284) I kakaja-to nelepaja <mysl'> sredi nix o kakom-to dolzenstvujuSdem nepremenno byt' - i s kem?! - bessmertii, pricem bessmertie podemu-to vyzyvalo nesterpimuju, tosku. 'And among them, an absurd thought about immortality, that will by all means happen - and to whom?! - immortality, and this immortality stirred, for some reason, an unbearable yearning.1 The thought of the future immortality, unwanted for some reason, but still inevitable, causes deep toska in the experiencer. Pecal'md grust' can be both future-oriented and present- or past-oriented; they can occur both as a result of thinking about something and as a result of some bad event. Although pedal' and grust' can be caused by a variety of bad events, not any kind of bad event can motivate these feelings. For example, such bad events as failing an exam or burning the cake or crashing the car in an accident are not the ones that can cause pedal' or grust'; what they cause is ogordenie or rasstrojstvo ('being upset1 ). To qualify for causing pedal' and grust', a bad event must be able to produce a sufficiently deep and long-lasting effect on the soul or mind of the experiencer. The above- 186 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. mentioned events, even though very unpleasant, do not disturb the inner peace of the experiencer; they affect the experiencer rather superficially. Pedal' and grust' can occur when, for example, one is being abandoned by a friend, or one has to leave the country one loves against one's will. For example: (285) Razluka s nim povergla ee v grust*/pedal*. 'The separation from him made her sad/sorrowful1 . The events causing these feelings necessarily involve a loss or a separation, against one's wish, from something important for the experiencer, something that the experiencer has good feelings for. It can be a person, an animal, a country, a home; however, it cannot be a car or any other kind of possession, since one cannot be attached to those things with one's heart. PecaV is usually caused by events more serious than those causing grust’ . For example, one can experience grust', but not pedal' in the following circumstances: (286) Kogda ona uznala, cto on ne smozet priexat' k nej v dtot vyxodnoj, ee oxvatila grust*!7 pedal*. 'W hen she learnt that he would not be able to come for the weekend, she felt sad/? sorrowfuI. On the other hand, grust', unlike pedal', cannot be experienced when one learns 187 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. about the death of a loved person, since this event is too serious. Consider the following sentence from M. Bulgakov’ s "Master and Margarita": (287) - Prostite, vy byli drugom moego pokojnogo MiSi? - sprosil on, utiraja rukavom levy} suxoj glaz, a pravym izucaja potrjasaemogo pecalju Korov'jeva. 1 am sorry, were you a friend of my late Misha? - asked he, wiping his dry left eye with his sleeve and studying Korovjev, who was shaking with sorrow, with his right eye.’ This sentence describes a situation of death and the feeling of pedal''sorrow' (even though faked) felt as a result of this event. Grust' 'sadness' would be an inappropriate (insufficient) reaction to the event of death. For gore and skorb', the restriction on the types of possible motivating events is even stronger: they can only be caused by some major losses, e.g., by the death of a loved person. Consider, for instance, an example from M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita" (288) Da, vzmetnulas' volna goijapri strasnom izvestii o Mixaile Aleksandrovice. 'Yes, there arose a wave of grief at the horrible news of Mikhail Aleksandrovich <of his death>,’ or the following sentence (289) Ix skorb' o pogiMix rodstvennikax byla bezmerna. 188 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'Their woe over their lost relatives was infinite.' Gore and skorb' usually occur when something happens to a person other than the experiencer himself, e.g., one can experience them when one's child contracts a deadly illness; however, not when it happens to oneself. In this, they differ from pedal' and grust' which can occur both when something happens to the experiencer himself or to another person. (2) The second feature divides the synonyms into the following two groups: toska and gore, on one hand, and pedal', grust' and skorb', on the other. Emotions in the first group can only be subject-oriented; those in the second can be both subject- and object-oriented. That is, emotions in the first group occur only when something happens that is bad for the experiencer himself. Even though the bad event causing the feeling happens to a person other than the experiencer (as it is in the case of gore), the feeling can occur only if this event does, in some way, affect the experiencer (e.g., when something bad happens to a person loved by the experiencer). Thus, one cannot experience toska or gore, when one sees strangers suffering. In other words, one cannot feel toska or gore for somebody. However, one can experience skorb', grust' and pedal' in such circumstances. For example, one can experience these feelings, looking at a city, destroyed by war, or at the refugees who lost their homes, even when this happens in another country and in no way can affect the experiencer himself or any of his loved ones. Or, when a saint sees the miseries of other people, he can feel skorb’, grust' or pecalal' for them; even though he has no personal interest in the doings of other people, he 1 189 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. can be sorry for them. In this case, skorb', grust' and pedal’ are somewhat close to sympathetic regret. Consider the following illustrative example from E. Trubetskoy's "Russia in its Icon": (290) Pervoe, cto porazaet v dtom izobrazenii - zaxvatyvajuScaja glubina i sila skorbi: ito - ne licnaja ili individual’ naja skorb’, a pedal’ obo vsej zemle russkoj, obezdolennoj, unizennoj i isterzannoj tatarami. 'The first thing that strikes in this icon <of St. Serge of Radonezh> is the moving depth and strength of woe: it is not a personal or individual woe, but a sorrow for all Russia, deprived, humiliated and tormented by the Tatars.’ Gore and toska cannot be felt in such circumstances. (3) Although all synonyms entail feeling bad because of a bad situation, which the experiencer has no power to change, they still do differ significantly in the nature of the feeling. Toska and gore are the most painful feelings. Toska is a kind of a constant tiresome spiritual pain which takes away the experiencer’ s peace of mind. The metaphorical expressions in which this feeling is conceptualized reflect this property, e.g., 190 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (291) Toska gryzet, glozet, sosetlsnedaet. 'Yearning bites/ gnaws/ sucks/ eats’ . (292) Toska razryvaetl razdiraet duSu. 'Yearning tears apart one’ s soul’ . (293) Ego oxvatila zgucaja toska. 'He was seized with smarting yearning.’ Like pain, toska comes in pangs: pristup toski 'a pang of yearning.’ One cannot experience toska together with any positive emotion; one cannot experience toska and be peaceful; the experiencer is constantly tortured. Toska cannot be prijatnaja 'pleasant' (cf. prijatnja grust' - 'pleasant sadness’ ); it cannot be svetlaja 'lightful' (cf. svetlaja pedal' - 'lightful sorrow’ ). This feeling is associated with darkness, gloomyness, e.g., cernaja toska, besprosvetnaja toska ('black yearning’ ; 'lightless yearning’ ). It can totally deprive the experiencer of intellectual control and analytical ability and, thus, have a primitive, animal, elemental quality, e.g., zverinaja toska 'animal yearning’ (impossible for all other synonyms). This feeling is close in its quality to painful yearning for something unattainable and, at the same time, to despair. Gore, although no less painful, has a different quality to it. If toska is like a constant, gnawing pain which is not necessarily very strong but which is impossible to ignore or forget, 191 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. which tortures the experiencer by its permanence, gore is more like a violent blinding attack of pain which makes the experiencer suffer a strong shock and, often, completely lose intellectual and physical control over himself, e.g., (294) Ona obezumela otgorja. 'She went mad with grief.' Gore feels like a burden on the soul of the experiencer. It is so heavy that it can physically change people: (295) Gore sognulo ego; On sognulsja pod tjazest'ju gorja. 'Grief bowed him1 ; 'He bowed under the burden of grief. Consider also the following example from L. Tolstoy's "War and peace": (296) - Drug moj, mamen'ka, - povtorjala ona, naprjagaja vse sily svoej ljubvi na to, ctoby kak-nibud' snjat's nee na sebja izlisek davivsego ee gorja. 'My friend, mother, - she (Natasha) repeated, gathering all her love in order to take off the excess of the grief lying heavily on her <the mother>.’ Both toska and gore exclude the experiencer's humble, accepting attitude towards the situation; they are rebellious in nature, they involve a protest against the circumstances. 192 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Unlike these two, grust', pedal' and skorb' can be accompanied by the acceptance of whatever is happening; for example, one can accept one's bad fate with humility, combined with grust', pedal’ or skorb'. These three feelings are not violent or rebellious. For example, the Virgin Mary could have experienced skorb' or pedal', but not toska or gore when Jesus Christ was crucified, as Her attitude was that of acceptance. Among grust', pedal' and skorb', the first one is the lightest and the least deep. Since this feeling can occur without any serious reason or really bad event happening, it can even be pleasant: prijatnaja, sladkaja grust' ('pleasant, sweet sadness'). For example, one can experience it, remembering one's youth: good memories make the feeling pleasant, while the realization that they are in the past gives it a sad quality; in this case, the feeling is close to sweet melancholy, or being in a sentimental mood. Pedal' can hardly be prijatnaja ('pleasant'), as it does not occur in the pleasant circumstances. However, it can be a lucid, radiant (svetloe4 0 ) feeling, e.g., (297) V ee glazax byla svetlaja pecal'. 'In her eyes, there was lucid sorrow.1 When one experiences 'lucid sorrow,1 one does feel sad, but does not give way to the bad sides of it, does not become overcome by the feeling; rather, one goes through a kind of Unlike its English counterparts, the Russian lexeme svetlyj, apart from its primary meaning, also means 'spiritual; pure; spiritually good, enlightened1, e.g., svetlyj delovek 'lucid, radiant person' = 'spiritually pure; shining with spiritual light'. This meaning is realized in the collocation svetlaja. pa£al ' 'lucid sorrow'. 193 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. catharsis, involving suffering and purification or enlightenment. Consider the following sentence from L. Tolstoy's "War and Peace": (298) Edva tol'ko ona uslyxala ego golos, kak vdrug jarkij svet zagorelsja v ee lice, osveScaja v odno i to ze vremja i pedal’ ee i radost'. 'As soon as she heard his voice, suddenly, a bright light lit up in her face, lighting up both her sorrow and her joy.’ Pecal' is a much deeper feeling than grust'. Skorb' can be an even deeper feeling; it cannot be light or pleasant, as it occurs in circumstances which are too tragic for this. It is a calm, concentrated, deep feeling of sorrow which does not make the experiencer lose control over himself, but which is, however, very strong and almost does not leave space for any other feelings or thoughts. (4) Among the five synonyms, skorb' and gore are the ones that denote necessarily strong feelings. One cannot feel *legkuju skorb'/ *legkoe gore ('‘slight woe’ / ' ‘slight grief). Toska, pedal' and grust' can be experienced in different degrees, e.g., sil'naja/ legkaja toska/ pedal'/ grust' ('strong/ slight yearning/ sorrow/ sadness’ ). Another peculiarity of gore and skorb' is that these feelings are so deep and strong that they do not allow any interruption in time; they are felt without cessation, until they are exhausted. Thus, one cannot say: 194 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (299) *Ja ispytyvaju gore/ skorb' kazdyj raz, kak ja dumaju o ego smerti. '*1 feel woe/ grief each time I think about his death1 . One, however, can experience toska, pedal' or grust' each time one thinks about something (and forget about these feelings in the rest of the time). Gore and skorb’ are also the most long-lasting feelings. (5) Toska and gore are opposed to the rest of the synonyms in that these two feelings may entail certain strong wishes, whereas pedal', grust' and skorb' are not associated with any specific wishes and rather cause the experiencer to fall into a kind of apathy. Toska and gore, due to their rebellious, tormenting, even violent nature can make the experiencer wish to radically withdraw from the intolerable situation. This can be achieved (temporarily) by getting drunk or (permanently) by committing suicide. The following situations are, therefore, quite natural: (300) On zapil s toskit s gorja. 'He started to drink out of yearning/ grief. (301) On s toskif s gorja napilsja. 'He got drunk out of yearning/ grief). (302) On pokondl s soboj ot nevynosimoj to ski. 195 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'He commited suicide out of intolerable yearning'. (303) On povesilsja s gorja. 'He hanged himself out of grief. Such wishes and such behavior are not typical for pedal', grust' or skorb’. Therefore, the following situations are highly unnatural: (304) nOn zapill pokondl s soboj otgrusti/ pecalil skorbi. ' ,?He started to drink/ committed suicide out of sadness/ sorrow/ woe1 . (6) With respect to the feature 'manifestations of the feeling’ gore and toska are, again, opposed to the rest of emotions. The manifestations of these two may be much more passionate, loud than those of the rest. Especially gore can be manifested in sobs, tears, cries, even wailing (rydat', plakat', kricat', vyt' ot gorja); in all kinds of passionate gestures, such as tearing apart one's clothes, wringing one's hands, hitting oneself against the wall. Gore can also have the opposite effect on the experiencer: rather than making him overly active, it paralyzes him: (305) Ona ocepenela ot goija. 'She grew torpid with grief. 196 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The long-lasting effects of gore remind those of an illness or old age: gore suSit kogo- libo 'grief dries one out,’ gore sgibaet kogo-libo 'grief bends one down,’ gore starit kogo- libo 'grief ages one,' consider an example from M. Bulgakov's "Master and Margarita" (306) Vy porjadocno postareli ot gorja za poslednie polgoda, Margarita Nikolaevna. 'You have considerably aged from grief in this last half a year, Margarita Nikolaevna.’ Toskacssi also be manifested in wailing or in wringing one’ s hands; however, usually not in tears. Toska can be manifested in tearless screaming, see the following example from A. Galich: (307) I typo nocam, dolzno byt', I Krids’ ot toski... 'And probably you too scream with yearning in the night...' Toska, however, does not usually have a paralyzing effect on the experiencer: this feeling entails restlessness which makes it impossible to be immobile for longer periods of time. Thus, a person can walk restlessly from one wall to another, as if hopelessly trying to find a way out. Pedal', grust' and skorb' have quieter manifestations. Pedal' and grust' might make the experiencer passive, indifferent to the environment: the experiencer buries his head in his 197 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hands, or hangs his head, or sits stilL Pedal' and grust' can also be manifested in tears. Skorb' can, as well, be manifested in tears; since this feeling usually occurs when someone close or dear to the experiencer dies, and since the event of death is a rather ritualized one, it can also have certain conventionalized manifestations, e.g., covering one’ s head with ashes. (7) Skorb' and gore are opposed to the rest of the feelings in that the former can be group feelings, whereas the latter can only be individual feelings, cf. vsenarodnoe gore! vsenarodnaja sk o rb n a se obscee gore! nasa oMcaja skorb' ('nation-wide grief/ woe; our common grief' woe1 ) with the ungrammatical vsenarodnaja * grust'I *pecal'/ * toska ('nation wide ‘sadness/ ‘sorrow/ ‘yearning’ ) or naSa obScaja *grust'l *pecaTI ‘toska (our common ‘sadness/ ‘sorrow/ ‘yearning’ ). Consider also the following phrase from A. Solzhenitsyn's "The GULAG Archipelago": (308) I vse teper'piSut, govorjat, vspominajut: tridcat' sed'moj! Volna narodnogo gorja! 'And now everyone is writing, saying, recalling: the ’ 37 <year>! A wave of national grief! Skorb' can also be a feeling appropriate for a good citizen in certain circumstances: grazdanskaja skorb' Crivic woe1 ). This expression is, however, presently used only ironically, 198 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. e.g., the following example from I. Brodskij: (309) Ja grazdanskie skorbil Serviruju k stolu. 'I serve the civic woes as a meaL' VII.3. Differences and similarities between the concepts of 'sadness' in English and Russian. From a purely linguistic point of view, English and Russian 'sadness' are quite similar. Thus, both English and Russian synonymic groups are represented by five lexemes. The feature sets used to describe them are identical in English and Russian. Although Russian toska and English melancholy and blues do not have correlates in the other language (these three denote feelings that can occur without a motivation), the rest of the synonyms do have correlates, and quite close ones. The rest of the synonyms denote feelings that cannot occur without a specific motivation. These, as I said, are quite similar in English and Russian. Thus, grief is very close to gore; their only significant difference is that gore, unlike grief, cannot be used in reference to 'hard time’ or 'being upset.’ Sadness is close to grust'. Sorrow corresponds to pedal', but it has a broader meaning than its Russian correlate. This is because English lacks a specific word for skorb' and sorrow is used in reference to this feeling as well. However, there is a cultural gap between the concepts of 'sadness1 in English and Russian. First, blues and melancholy are concepts totally alien to Russian culture. The 1 9 9 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. emotional state of blues does not have any correlate in Russian. Melancholy, even though it does have a Russian correlate, melanxolija, still cannot be considered a prominent Russian concept, but only a borrowed one. The Russian emotion of melanxolija is extremely marginal; the use of this lexeme is limited mostly to romantic literature. Presently it is used only ironically or as a quotation. Likewise, the typically Russian concept of toska is not found in English. This very specific concept is one of the most prominent and important among the Russian emotion concepts (see Wierzbicka 1990a). Also, as statistic analysis (Wierzbicka 1990a) shows, the concept of 'sadness' is, overall, more prominent in Russian than it is in English: in Russian, expressions for 'sadness' are used much more frequently than in English. 200 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VIII. Emotion metaphors: overt manifestations of emotions and their cross- linguistic conceptualization. Overt manifestations of emotions are one of their most important and interesting characteristics, deserving a special discussion. First, as I have stated above, emotions, due to the difficulties in their explication are often verbally referred to by their symptoms, or their internal and external manifestations4 1 . This makes these manifestations an especially interesting field for a linguist working on emotions. Secondly, since these manifestations are used as denotations of the corresponding emotions4 2 , their linguistic expression becomes subject to extensive metonymization and metaphorization, cf. the following mechanism: He raised his eyebrows in surprise -> He raised his eyebrows (as an independent indication of surprise). Since metonymy and metaphor are counted among the most culture and language specific phenomena, metonymic and metaphoric expressions of emotion manifestations become an extremely valuable source for cross-linguistic comparison. Finally, these manifestations or, rather, their linguistic expression provide a basis for research on cultural conceptualization of different emotion types within a given language. Let This peculiarity of psyche, namely, the fact that its activities and states are usually referred to by metaphorical, rather than literal, linguistic means is well-known; see, for example, Searle 1990, p. 313; Vol'f 1989, p. 69. Difficulties in obtaining direct information on emotion^ is also noted in Scherer 1988, p.5. The fact that psychological states are often metaphorically expressed through the denotations of various concrete, physical objects is noted in, for example, Lakoff & Johnson 1980. 201 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. me clarify this statement. Following Ekman 1984,1 presume that different emotion types are characterized by distinct sets of external and internal manifestations. For instance, emotions of the 'anger' type are manifested in raised bodily temperature plus raised nervous activity; 'fear' emotions are manifested in lowered bodily temperature plus raised nervous activity; 'sadness' emotions are manifested in lowered bodily temperature plus lowered nervous activity, etc. However, certain manifestations can be the same for different emotion types, e.g., raised nervous activity for both 'anger' and 'fear' types. The interesting fact is that even though overt manifestations of different emotion types can coincide physiologically, linguistically they are often expressed differently. This phenomenon is described in Ju.D. Apresjan 1992b. He discusses several emotion types, along with their typical manifestations and their linguistic expressions. He notes that 'anger,' 'joy,' and some other emotion types partially share a physiological manifestation, namely, the change in the color of the face: the face of the experiencer becomes redder because of the intensified blood circulation. However, although the manifestations of 'anger' and 'joy' coincide physiologically, they do differ linguistically. Namely, the change in the color of the face, resulting from 'anger' is called pobagrovet' ('to turn scarlet'); polilovet' ('to turn purple'), potemnet' ('to turn dark’ ), pocernet' Oto turn black1 ). The color, resulting from 'joy1 is called porozovet’ ('to turn pink, rosy), zapuncovet' ('to turn bright scarlet’ ), zarumjanifsja ('to pink1 ). This difference in linguistic expressions referring to the same denotatum is explained culturally. In Russian culture, there is a strong opposition of'light' as positive, good versus 202 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'darkness' as negative, bad4 3 . Therefore, light, bright colors symbolize good objects and occurrences, whereas dark colors symbolize bad ones. The lexemes pobagrovetpolilovet', potemnet', pocernet', used to describe 'anger,' denote darker shades of color than porozovet', zapuncovet' and zarumjanit'sja, used to denote 'joy.' 'Anger' belongs to the domain of negative, bad, wicked emotions and is, therefore, associated with darkness; 'joy' is a positive, good emotion and is, therefore, associated with light. This phenomenon is determined by purely cultural factors; the opposition 'light' as 'good' versus 'darkness' as 'bad' is not an inherently linguistic property. Indeed, the English language does contain this opposition; however, English-based pidgins of Surinam do not, although their vocabulary is largely English (my personal communication with George Huttar). This fact proves that the presence of this opposition in a certain language is a reflection of cultural peculiarities. In the case of European culture, it probably is connected with the presence of this opposition in the Christian religion. This chapter is thus devoted to the discussion of emotion metaphors, based on emotion manifestations as a source for ethnolinguistic study and cross-linguistic comparison. There is also an attempt made to create a classification of metaphor types in which emotions are conceptualized in language. Partly, as I have noted, emotions are expressed and named after their physiological symptoms. However, this is not the only possible way of 43This is, in fact, characteristic of the entire European culture; cf. the recent discussion on color metaphors, conducted on the cognitive linguistics list (by electronic mail). The association 'black' = 'bad' seems to be particularly strong, cf., in Spanish, negro 'black' about the emotion 'being upset1 (reports Enrique Palancar) or in Finnish, musta 'black' about 'gloom1, 'sadness1 (reports Jarno Raukko) . The Russian word dernyj 'black1 can also be used in reference to 'sadness' or 'grief' (see chapter VII of the present manuscript). 203 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. metaphorization. Many emotions are expressed otherwise (see Solomon 1981, p.44 on non- symptomatic metaphorization). The proposed classification aims at the description, as well as a prediction of the relevant linguistic properties of metaphoric expressions denoting emotion manifestations. There is no lack of metaphor classifications: let us mention, for instance, the classical works by J. Searle (Searle 1990) and by Ph. Wheelwright (Wheelwright 1962); the pioneering work by G. Lakoff & M. Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). What is the need for a new classification, then? First of all, traditional literature on metaphors deals mostly with individual, literary metaphors, newly created by speakers or writers; much less attention is paid to conventionalized, or language, metaphors. However, for reconstructing the naive picture of the world in a certain language (and this is my purpose in this work), it is the language metaphor that is most important. It is not as interesting from the point of view of literature; but linguistically it is extremely revealing, since it models the intuitions of language speakers. The well established language metaphor reflects the mentality of an entire culture, as it is represented in language. The dead emotion metaphors are, thus, a valuable source of information for a linguist working on reconstructing the naive picture of emotions in a given language. The cognitivists Lakoff and Johnson in their innovative work of 1980, Metaphors we live by, as well as their later followers (e.g., Kovecses 1990), have demonstrated the importance of the language metaphor for describing our mentality, our way of thinking, understanding and conceptualizing things (including emotions). 204 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. However, in their (cognitive) account of emotion metaphors, these scholars do not draw a distinction between different emotion metaphor types. For instance, such intuitively different emotion metaphors as ANGER IS HEAT (stemming from a physiological similarity) and ANGER IS BURDEN (stemming from a cognitive similarity)4 4 do not receive a separate treatment within the cognitive framework. My claim is that these metaphors employ different metaphorization mechanisms. Moreover, I claim that metaphors derived by different metaphorization mechanisms display different linguistic and cross-linguistic properties. Therefore, an adequate linguistic description should treat them differently. Thus, my suggestions for the linguistic approach to emotion metaphors are the following: to reconstruct the naive psychology of a language, it is necessary, among other things, to study language metaphors; i different types must be distinguished among language emotion metaphors; these types are distinguished on the basis of the difference in metaphorization mechanisms; different types of emotion metaphors possess different linguistic and cross-linguistic properties. The present emotion metaphor classification is based, as I said, on metaphorization mechanisms, namely, on the nature of the mapping from the source domain onto the target domain. The source domain in our case comprises the manifestations of emotions, or their 44These examples are taken from Kovecs6s 1990. 205 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. symptoms, such as to be cold, to have pain, to blush etc.; other physical states and sensations, such as heaviness, pain, illness, heat, etc.; other, very diverse phenomena, such as different colors, light, darkness; animals; parts of the body, etc. The target domain comprises emotions themselves. All emotion metaphors have the same basic structure: they liken the feeling, the psychological state, the state of mind or soul, and its effects on the soul and body of the experiencer to a certain physical, material state or phenomenon. Emotion metaphors differ with respect to the phenomena that form the source domain for the metaphorical mapping and with respect to the kind of mapping that takes place. The mapping can be of different types, depending on whether it is based on physiological likeness between the emotion in question and the physical phenomenon in question, or on their cognitive likeness, or on their cultural likeness. The classification is not based on any strict oppositions; rather, it represents a scale. At one pole, there are metaphors formed by the most objective kind of mapping, namely, by the mapping determined by real world, physiological factors, e.g., FEAR IS COLD or ANGER IS HEAT metaphors. At the other pole, there are metaphors formed by the most subjective kind of mapping, namely, by the mapping determined by cultural factors, e.g., PITY IS PAIN or ANGER IS DARKNESS metaphors. In between there are intermediate cases, where the mapping is determined by cognitive4 5 factors. This intermediate class is represented by, for instance, the GRIEF IS BURDEN metaphor. These classes are not discrete; the boundaries between them are rather fuzzy. Thus, in certain cases it is difficult to 45 I call these factors "cognitive" in the absence of a better term. 206 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assign a metaphor to a particular class. In certain aspects, the above classification of metaphors intersects with the already existing ones. As was noted above, it is organized as a scale: from physiological metaphors, based on real, strong similarities to cognitive metaphors, based on weaker similarities and then to cultural metaphors, which are based on the weakest similarities (or which involve no similarities at all) and which require knowledge of the culture in question to be understood. In Searle 1990, pp. 332-334, somewhat similar classes of metaphors are pointed out (Le., those that do imply similarities and those that do not). D. Davidson also notes that not all metaphors are based on similarities (Davidson 1990, p.186). Each of the metaphor types (in the classification below) is characterized by a specific combination of linguistic and cross-linguistic properties. It is, thus, possible to determine certain linguistic properties of metaphoric expressions on the basis of their metaphorization mechanism Therefore, this classification possesses not only a descriptive, but an explanatory and predictive power as well. The metaphor types classification is presented below. v m .l. The first, or physiological metaphor class4 6 . It is appropriate to begin discussion by characterizing the emotion manifestations, as well as their linguistic expressions, which constitute the source domain for the first metaphor type. i6See also Lakoff & Johnson 1990, p. 396 on the physical basis of emotion metaphors. 207 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Vm.1.1. The source domain of the first metaphor class. The source domain of the first metaphor class is formed by different types of emotion manifestations. These emotion manifestations have to meet the following criteria: (a) they are usually uncontrollable, immediate physiological reactions, physiological states, that are short-lasting in time (e.g., trjastis' ot straxa 'to shake with fear,1 Ego toSnilo ot otvrasdenija 'He was sick with disgust,' but not sognufsja ot gorja 'to bend down with grief or sijaf ot radosti 'to radiate joy'); (b) they are usually visible or otherwise easily perceptible to an observer (e.g., to blush, to tremble, but not Ego serdce razryvalos' ot zalosti 'His heart was being tom with pity’ ) ; (c) they are specific to a given emotion or are, at least, its most salient manifestation (e.g., to blush with shame, but not to weep with joy or even to blush with anger). Linguistic expressions denoting emotion manifestations in the first metaphor type are peculiar in the following way: they do not contain any positive or negative evaluation on the part of the speaker, they merely name their denotate. This criterion allows one to distinguish between such expressions as pokrasnef ('to blush'), on one hand, and pobagrovet' ('to turn scarlet1 ), porozovet' Oto turn pink1 ) and the like, on the other. Pokrasnef is a mere denotation of a certain physiological state; pobagrovet' and porozovet', apart from being denotations of, more or less, the same physiological state, have also a connotative function. Namely, pobagrovet' bears a negative connotation, whereas porozovet' bears a positive connotation. This connotative difference is part of the naive picture of the world, as it is presented in the 208 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Russian language, and is a reflection of certain cultural peculiarities. Vm .1.2. The mapping in the first metaphor class. Since there are no particular restrictions on the content of the target domain of emotion metaphor classes, I will proceed by describing the peculiarities of the mapping between the source and the target domains. In the first class of emotion metaphors, the mapping is conditioned physiologically; that is, the metaphors are based on the real world, physiological similarities. Indeed, fear is linguistically conceptualized as cold because the psychological state of 'fear' and the physiological state of'cold' share the same physiological manifestations: the reaction of the body to 'fear' is the same as the reaction of the body to 'cold' (shaking, quaking, temporary paralysis, pallor, etc). By a metaphoric shift, 'fear' becomes conceptualized as 'emotion that has a certain effect on the mind and body of the experiencer, similar to the effect that cold usually has on the body of the experiencer.’ Vm.1.3. Metaphors and metonymies in the first class. The first class is presented by such metaphors as the Russian STRAX-XOLOD 'FEAR IS COLD,’ OTVRASCe NIE-TOSn OTA 'DISGUST IS FEELING SICK,’ VOZMUSCe NIE-2AR 'INDIGNATION-HEAT and the like, as well as their close English correlates. Let us consider these metaphors in more detail. 209 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The metaphor STRAX-XOLOD and its English correlate FEAR IS COLD is based on the following physiological fact: when one feels fear, one's body reacts to this emotion as it reacts to cold. This physiological phenomenon has spread to the understanding of the psychological nature of the feeling. The reaction of the mind to fear became conceptualized by language as the reaction of the body to cold. This conceptualization is reflected in numerous linguistic expressions. Consider the following expressions as the primary designators of fear: the Russian drozat’ ot straxa sto tremble with fear,' trjastis' ot uzasa 'to shake with terror,' ocepenet’ <zastyt',poblednet',pokryt'sja muraskami> ot uzasa 'to freeze <to become cold, to blanch, to have goose-flesh> with terror,1 b y f paralizovannym straxom 'to become paralyzed by fear,' Ego dusa byla skovana straxom 'His soul was bound by fear’ ; the English to get cold feet, blood runs cold with fear, to freeze with terror, to shake with fear, to freeze one's blood, to chill one to the bones, to make one's flesh creep4 7 and the like4 8 . Likewise, the metaphor OTVRASCENIE-TOSNOTA and the corresponding English metaphor DISGUST IS FEELING SICK have a physiological origin: the sensation of sickness is the reaction of the body to the emotion of disgust. A metaphoric shift likens the feeling, i.e., the reaction of the mind, to this bodily sensation. Thus, psychologically, feeling disgust is similar to physiological sickness. Consider the following linguistic expressions, reflecting this conceptualization. The 47Note that all these metaphors are based on the visible, observable manifestations of 'fear1. 4eConsider also reports on symptomatics of 'fear1, recounted by the experiencers, in Scherer 1988, pp. 224-231: cold sweat; feeling cold; wet and cold hands; shaking; paralysis; goose pimples; trembling; pallor, loss of ability to talk; tension of muscles, etc. 210 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. metaphor OTVRASCENIE-TOSNOTA is presented by such expressions as toSnit ot otvrascenija <omerzenija> 'one feels sick from disgust <strong disgust>,' krivifsja ot otvrascenija 'to pull faces from disgust,1 plevat' ot otvraScenija 'to spit with disgust,1 brezglivo <gadlivo> morSdt'sja 'to screw one’ s face with squeamishness <with strong disgust>.’ The English correlate of this metaphor is reflected in such expressions as to be sick from disgust, to feel nauseated with disgust, to throw up with disgust, to have one's stomach upset, to have one's stomach turned over and the like. The metaphor VOZMUSCENIE - 2AR and its English correlate INDIGNATION IS HEAT stem from the heightening of the bodily temperature as a result of anger or indignation. The conceptualization of'anger' type emotions as psychological heat is reflected in such metaphoric expressions as the Russian vskipet’ <vzorvat'sja> ot negodovanija <gneva> 'to boil <to blow up> with indignation <anger> and the English to boil with anger, to explode with rage <indignation>, in the heat o f anger and the like (see Kovecses 1990). Because of space limitations, I am not able to proceed with a detailed discussion of the matter in question; however, I would like to give a representative sample of metaphors of the first type. 1. 'Passion* metaphors: 211 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Russian4 9 : STRAST' - 2AR 'PASSION IS FEVER': gore? strast'ju 'to burn with passion,’ raspalit'sja <strasfju> 'to get inflamed <with passion>,’ soxnu? ot strasti 'to dry out with passion’ ; STRAST’ - JAD 'PASSION IS POISON’ : jad <otrava> strasti 'the poison of passion’ ; STRAST’ - OP’ JANENIE 'PASSION IS DRUNKENNESS’ : p'jane? ot strasti 'to become drunk with passion,’ NEUTOLENNAJA STRAST’ - GOLOD 'UNSATISFIED PASSION IS HUNGER’ : smotre? na kogo-libo golodnymi glazami 'to look hungrily at somebody,’ oblizyvafsja na kogo-libo 'to lick one’ s lips at somebody,’ etc. English: PASSION IS FEVER: to burn with passion <desire>, flaming <glowing, heated> passion; PASSION IS POISON: to be intoxicated with passion', PASSION IS HUNGER: to be hungry with desire, to be starved of passion. 2. 'Anger' metaphors: Russian: GNEV - VYSOKAJA TEMPERATURA 'ANGER IS HEAT’ : kipjatifsja 'to boil <with anger>,5 0 ’ nakaljat'sja 'to heat up.’ English: ANGER IS HEAT5 1 : to boil <to seethe> with anger, to be burned up, to do something in hot blood, the heat o f anger. Apart from the metaphoric ones, there are also other phraseological expressions that meet the requirements formulated for the first class, namely, metonymies. If metaphors liken the psychological feeling to the physical sensation, the metonymies merely refer to the 49I partly avail myself of the material collected in Babenko 1989, A p p e n d ^ . This metaphor does not have a straight symptomatic basis, since the state of boiling cannot be experienced by a human being and, therefore, cannot be a symptom of emotion. This metaphor is formed in two steps: first, the physiological state of the experiencer is likened to the physical state of a boiling liquid and then, the psychological state of the expriencer is likened to his physiological state. :On ANGER IS HEAT metaphor see also Kovecsds 1986, pp. 12-20 and Solomon 1981, p. 37. 212 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. psychological feeling by naming its physical manifestation, without drawing any parallels between the two. Metonymies are not of as much interest for the present discussion; however, it is appropriate briefly to illustrate this subtype of phraseological expressions related to emotions with a few examples. The first class contains such metonymies as STYD-RUMJANEC 'SHAME IS BLUSHING,’ UD1VLENIE-RASKRYTIE GLAZ SIROKO 'SURPRISE IS OPENING ONE'S EYES WIDE’ and their close English correlates SHAME IS BLUSHING and SURPRISE IS RAISING ONE'S EYEBROWS. These metonymies are based on the physical manifestations of emotions. They name the respective emotions by mentioning their symptoms and, thus, contain the information about the physiology of the feelings, but not about their psychology. These metonymies are reflected in such linguistic expressions as the Russian krasnet' iz-za cego-libo 'to blush [implied: with shame] because of something' as a designator of shame, tar as a t’ <raskryvat’> glaza 'to stare <to open one's eyes widely> [implied: with surprise]' as a designator of surprise; the English to blush fo r something, to raise one's eyebrows as designators of the same emotions. Vm.1.4. Linguistic properties of the m etaphors and m etonymies in the first class. The above-discussed peculiarities of the metaphoric mechanism used in the first class have an impact on linguistic and cross-linguistic properties of the resulting phraseological 213 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expressions. I will begin with discussing semantic properties of the metaphors in the first class. The above-discussed peculiarities of their metaphorization mechanism result in the following semantic structure for the metaphors of this class5 2 : '1 . A's mind feels something similar to what A's body senses when A experiences physical state X5 3 ; 2. A's body experiences X.1 Let us exemplify this definition with, e.g., the emotion of disgust. The metaphor for disgust is to be sick. Metaphoric expressions for disgust are to be sick, to vomit, to throw up and the like. The semantic structure of the lexeme disgust includes, besides certain other components, also the following: '1. A's mind feels something similar to what A's body senses when A experiences physical nausea; 2. A experiences physical nausea.' Another linguistic property that the metaphoric expressions in the first type possess 52 For a more detailed discussion on metaphor in the semantic structy^re of emotion words see Apresjan, Apresjan 1993. This part of the definition does not apply to metonymies of the first class, since they do not contain information on the feeling, but only on the sensation, accompanying the respective emotion. 214 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. concerns their linguistic usage. Namely, the metaphors of this type can be used metonymically, as the only designators of the emotions they describe. For instance, the Russian metaphors drozat’ 'to shake,1 trjastis' 'to quake,1 kipet' 'to boil,1 toSrdt 'one is sick1 ; the English metaphors to get cold feet, to explode, to be nauseated are metonymically used as independent designators of'fear,' 'anger' and 'disgust,' respectively. Without any further clarification, they are unmistakenly understood as the expressions of the respective emotions. This is a consequence of the following factor: the metaphors in the first class are based only on such symptomatic expressions that denote the most salient manifestations of emotions, such that by mentioning them, one can unambiguosly identify the emotion. Finally, the metaphors in the first class possess the following cross-linguistic property: they display little or no cross-linguistic variation. Indeed, it is easy to notice that the above discussed metaphors for 'fear,5 4 ' 'anger6 5 and 'disgust’ are almost identical in English and Russian. This property is a consequence of the fact that the metaphors in this class are based not on the cultural links, which differ cross-linguistically but rather on the encyclopedic, real- world links between different phenomena that often coincide for different cultures5 6 . This metaphor is found in other languages, as well, consider, e.g., the Greek tromeros, from tromeo, meaning 'trembling1 or 'fearful'; the verb tromeo itself, meaning both 'to tremble' and, when used with an infinitive, 'to fear to do something1; kruoeis, meaning 'chilling1, as an attribute of 'fear' (I owe these examples to Roger Woodard). Compare the Tok Pisin belhet (from the English 'belly hot'), meaning'angry, impatient, furious, raging1. Of course, real-world background greatly differs from culture to culture in what concerns artefacts, nature and other geography-dependent phenomena; however, human physiology, on which the emotion metaphors of this class are based, is not subject to cross-cultural variation (at least, not to a great extent). 215 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VHX.2. The second, or cultural metaphor class. The second metaphor class contains metaphoric expressions formed by means of a cultural mapping. That is, the objects in the source domain are likened to the objects in the target domain on the basis of their cultural evaluation5 7 . For instance, positive emotions can be likened to 'light,' since in certain cultures light is conceptualized as spiritual goodness; negative emotions can be likened to darkness, since darkness is conceptualized as spiritual evil (see the discussion above). VHI.2.1. The source domain of the second metaphor class. The source domain of the second metaphor class is not as homogeneous as that of the first; therefore, it is difficult to give a unified description of its contents. The source domain of the second class contains the expressions for various sensations, color terms, terms for different kinds of light and many other semantic classes of expressions. vm .2.2. The mapping in the second metaphor class. In the second metaphor class, the mapping between the source domain and the target domain is determined by cultural factors. Namely, the objects in the target domain (feelings) 57See Black 1962, Lakoff & Johnson 1990, p. 404 on culture-specific metaphors. 216 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. are likened to such objects in the source domain with which they share a certain cultural connotation. The above-mentioned metaphors JOY IS LIGHT and ANGER IS DARKNESS illustrate this principle. They liken the feeling, the state of mind and soul, as well as its overt manifestations to the effects of, respectively, light and darkness. Among all emotion metaphors, the ones belonging to the second class reflect the naive psychology, the naive ethics of a language in question to the greatest extent. vm .2.3. Metaphors in the second class. In this class of phraseological expressions, the metaphoric parallels between the objects in the source domain and the objects in the target domain are usually not limited to one particular emotion. Unlike metaphors of the first class, metaphors of the second class can be used as an expression of many different emotions, since they are based not on emotion- specific symptoms, but on more general cultural evaluations. Thus, it is often the case that one object from the source domain corresponds to several objects in the target domain. Therefore, it is more convenient to present metaphors of this class not as was done for the first class, emotion by emotion, but, rather, to consider larger groups of emotions, depending on what object in the source domain they correspond to. I will begin discussion with the group of emotions conceptualized in the LIGHT metaphor (see also V.Ju. Apresjan 1991, 1995c). Even though the range of emotions that fall under the LIGHT metaphorization is rather wide, there is one general restriction on the type of the feeling. It has to be a feeling 217 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with distinct overt manifestations, a feeling that shows itself in the appearance of the experiencer. Moreover, these manifestations must be of a particular kind; the symptoms of fear or disgust would not meet the requirements for the LIGHT metaphorization. The feeling must be manifested in the brightening of the color of the eyes and face5 8 . This brightening gives the effect of light, spreading from the experiencer onto the observers. There are several subtypes within the FEELING IS LIGHT metaphorization type. The first subtype is presented with such metaphoric expressions as the Russian svetit’ sja X-om <ot X-a> 'to shine with X <because of X>’ (where X stands for the emotion), sijafX-om <otX-a> 'to shine, to beam, to be radiant with X <because of X>' and the English to shine <to beam> with X, to be radiant with X, to light up with X. In this first subtype, the source domain expressions denote a bright, soft, warm, pleasant kind of light, which is radiated quite strongly. Pragmatically, these expressions possess a positive connotation. They are normally used to denote the light, emanated by pleasant or friendly objects, such as sun, stars, candles, lamps, etc. Emotions that can be metaphorically described by means of these expressions have to meet the following requirements (besides the one formulated above); (a) the emotions have to be positive, warm, kind (love, but not anger or hatred}', (b) the emotions have to be rather strong, able to spread from the experiencer to the observer (e.g., the strong emotion of happiness, but not the emotion of pleasure, which is not sufficiently strong). The feelings that meet these requirements are delight, happiness, love, tenderness, 58 Namely, the eyes begin to sparkle, and the face blushes. 218 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. joy, and the like, cf. the following Russian and English expressions sijat' ot scastja <radosti, vostorga> 'to beam with happiness <joy, delight>; svetit'sja neznost'ju <ljubov]u> 'to shine with tenderness <love>’ ; to be radiant with happiness; to shine with love <tenderness>; to light up with joy; to beam with delight; to glow with joy; to look sunny fto be joyful’ )- The LIGHT metaphors are also used to describe the changes in the appearance of eyes and face, caused by such feelings, cf. the Russian glaza sijajut <svetjatsja> 'the eyes are beaming <shining>’ ; lico sijalo <svetilos’> 'the face beamed <shone>’ and the corresponding English expressions. The second sybtype is presented by such metaphoric expressions as the Russian goret’ X-om <otX-a> 'to bum with X <because of X>’ (where X stands for the emotion), pylat'X- om <otX-a> 'to flame with X cbecause of X>,’ sverkat’X-om <otX-a> 'to glare, to flash with X <because of X>’ and the English to flame with X, to blaze with X, to be afire with X, to flash with X. In this second subtype, the source domain expressions denote a bright, harsh, strong, hot light, possibly unpleasant for the eyes5 9 . These expressions are often used to denote the light of such unfriendly and dangerous objects as fire, lightning, etc. Due to this, these expressions can often be negatively connoted. Emotions that can be metaphorically described by means of these expressions have to meet the following requirements: (a) they have to be negative (anger, hatred but not happiness, love, tenderness); 59 The component 'unpleasant1 is a weak semantic component in the meaning of these expressions (in the sense of Ju.D. Apresjan 1974) . It is present in neutral contexts; however, if it is explicitly negated, it “disappears", without creating a semantic anomaly. 219 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (b) they have to be strong and possibly dangerous, leading to agression (hatred, but not dislike). Emotions that meet these requirements are hatred, anger, rage and the like, cf. the following Russian and English expressions: Glaza gorjat zloboj 'One's eyes bum with spite'; Glaza sverkajut <pylajut> otgneva 'One's eyes flash <flame> with anger'; Glaza polyxajut ot gneva 'One's eyes blaze with anger'; Glaza mecut molnii 'One's eyes throw lightnings (implied: because of anger)'; metat' grom i molnii 'to be veiy angry; literally: to throw thunder and lightnings'; Glaza gorjat nenavist'ju 'One's eyes bum with hatred'; One's eyes flash with anger <hatred>; One's eyes blaze with anger; One's eyes burn with spite. There is one more, smaller subtype within the FEELING IS LIGHT metaphorization type. It is presented with the following Russian and English expressions: blestet'X-om <ot X-a> 'to sparkle with X cbecause of X>’ (where X stands for the emotion); to glitter with X <because ofX>; to sparkle with X <because ofX>. In their primary, non-phraseological meaning these expressions denote a rather weak, reflected light, unable to spread far from its source or to illuminate objects within its reach (unlike the light denoted by the expressions in the first and second subtypes). This type of light is neutral with respect to its possible friendliness or unfriendliness, it is neither necessarily pleasant nor unpleasant. Emotions that can be metaphorically designated by the expressions denoting this type of light, have to satisfy the following criteria: (a) they have to be either positive or neutral (pleasure, joy or agitation, but not irritation)', 220 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (b) they cannot be strong (e.g., pleasure, but not happiness). The first requirement can be explained by the fact that, in Russian and English naive pictures of the world, light has an overall positive connotation, unless explicated otherwise. The second requirement is trivially explained by the assumption that expressions for a weak light are used to denote weak emotions, just as in the first two subtypes, expressions for a strong light are used to describe strong emotions. Emotions that meet these requirements are content, pleasure, agitation, tenderness and the like, cf. the following Russian and English expressions: Glaza blestjat ot udovol'stvija <volnenija> 'One's eyes sparkle with pleasure <agitation>'; Glaza blestjat ot umilenija <neznosti> 'One's eyes sparkle with tender emotion <tendemess>'; One's eyes sparkle with content <pleasure, tenderness>; One's eyes glitter with joy. The next group of emotions I would like to consider is associated with different color terms. Again, there are several emotion subtypes within the FEELING IS COLOR metaphorization type, with one common restriction: all emotions belonging to this type are (or can be) manifested in the change of facial color. There are two oppositions within this type; one opposition, which was already mentioned, is between light and dark shades of color. The other one spreads on the entire color scale and distinguishes between such colors as blue, green, red, black, white, gray, yellow, etc. as designators of different types of emotions. The first opposition was partly discussed above. As was stated, the overall connotation of light in Russian and English cultures is positive, whereas the connotation of 221 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. darkness is negative6 0 . Due to this, light is often metaphorically mapped onto the domain of positive emotions, whereas darkness is associated with negative emotions. This opposition is valid for different shades of red facial color, as the lighter shades of red are associated with positive emotions (joy, delight), while the darker ones with negative emotions (anger). Moreover, this opposition spreads to the more general designators of facial color changes, such as to brighten, to dear up, on the one hand, and to darken, on the other. Indeed, the Russian posvetletprosvetlet' and their English correlates to brighten, to dear up refer to positive emotions, cf. Ego lico prosvetlelo ot radosti 'His face brightened up with joy,1 whereas the Russian potemnet' and its English correlate to darken refer to negative emotions, cf. On ves'potemnel ot zloby 'H e went dark with anger.’ However, this does not mean that all light facial colors are necessarily associated with positive emotions, although the assumption that dark facial colors necessarily signify negative emotions does hold. Light facial colors do not necessarily mean that the emotion experienced is positive because of the interference of physiological factors. Indeed, the Russian pobelet' or the English to whiten signify a loss of facial color due to a strong shock; in other words, they denote an abnormality; thus, these expressions cannot refer to positive emotions, even though the color they denote is the lightest existing. Besides, certain light colors possess a negative cultural connotation, if used with reference to facial color, e.g., yellow. Yellow color cannot signify a positive emotion, even 60Por Russian, this opposition is extremely important; the LIGHT IS GOOD and DARK IS BAD metaphors are very prominent in Russian culture. Consider, for example, the following metaphors (absent in English): LIGHT IS SPIRITUAL GOODNESS AND PURITY (svetlyj delovek 'pure, good, spiritual person1, literally: 'lucid, radiant person1; svetloe Xristovo Voskresenie 'the radiant resurrection of Christ1) and DARK IS SPIRITUAL EVIL (temnyj delovek 'bad, evil, sinful person’; literally: 'dark person1). 222 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. though it is a light color. Thus, no generalization is possible and each of the colors requires a special comment as to what emotions it can designate. Below, I will present the remaining FEELING IS COLOR metaphors. Overall, distinct and unusual facial colors are more often associated with negative emotions, since the change of facial color signifies a physiological abnormality; only the general lightening and brightening of the face and different shades of pink color signify positive emotions. However, the culture-driven distribution of associations between negative emotions and different colors is interesting and deserves special attention. Thus, in Russian, green is associated with envy and with fury6 1 , cf. the Russian pozelenet' ot zavisti <zloby> 'to turn green with envy <fury>.’ In English, it is associated with envy6 2 and jealousy, cf. to turn green with envy <jealousy>. In Russian, but not in English, yellow is associated with envy6 3 , cf. pozeltet' ot zavisti 'to turn yellow with envy.' Gray is associated with/ear or shock, cf. the Russian poseret' ot straxa 'to turn gray with fear.’ Consider the following example from F. Iskander's "The man and his environment": (310) I vdrug ego xudoe, udlinennoe lico poserelo i on zatravlennymi glazami 62See Ju.D.Apresjan 1992b. This metaphor is also found in Swedish, consider: gron av avund 'green with envy1 (reported by Jussi Karlgren, on the cognitive linguistics list) and in Finnish: vihrea kateudesta 'green with envy1 (reported by Jarno Raukko, on the cognitive linguistics list). “This metaphor is, in some form, found in Modern Hebrew: tsahov 'yellow1 is associated with 'jealousy1 (reported by Niti Mandelblit, cognitive linguistics list). 223 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ogljadel zastolje. 'And suddenly his thin, elongated face turned gray and he looked at the feasting people with the eyes of a cornered animal' (the person described in the novel experienced a strong shock). White is associated with a wide range of negative emotions, such as fear, fury, nervousness, shock, anger and other emotions of 'fear' and 'anger' types, cf. the Russian pobelet' ot straxa <jarosti, volnenija, potrjasenija, gneva> 'to turn white with fear <fury, nervousness, shock, anger> and their English correlates. It must be noted that all of the above-discussed colors, namely, green, yellow, gray and white denote, when used in reference to facial color, general pallor of the face. In other words, when they are used in reference to facial color, they are used metaphorically and refer to more or less the same coloring. That is, facial color can never be a real green or yellow or gray or white; all these expressions are a metaphoric indication of the same denotate (pallor) and differ only pragmatically - in their cultural evaluation. This difference in their cultural conceptualization determines the range of emotions that these color terms can denote. It is due to the naive picture of the world inherent in Russian and English (and not to physiological factors) that yellow and green necessarily refer to spiteful emotions, such as fury and envy. Likewise, the fact that white and gray can refer both to spiteful, aggressive and to passive (such as fear) negative emotions is a consequence of cultural conceptualization, not of physiology. Another interesting example of a culture-based metaphor (unrelated to colors) is the 224 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2AL0ST' - BOL' 'PITY IS PAIN' metaphor which is present in Russian but absent in English. In Russian, zalost' 'pity' is conceptualized as acute, sharp pain (see the chapter on 'pity1 ). Consider the following Russian expressions Serdce razryvaetsja ot zalosti 'The heart is being torn with pity,1 Serdce pronzila zalost* 'The heart is pierced by pity,’ Scemjascaja zalost' 'aching pity.’ Clearly, this conceptualization is not related to physiology, since the 'pity’ feeling is not accompanied by the sensation of physical pain. The ^ALOST' - BOL’ metaphor arises from the following assumption inherent in the Russian culture: the suffering of somebody else should be felt by the experiencer as his own6 4 ; therefore, pity should be felt as one's own suffering or pain; hence, the PITY IS PAIN metaphor. Before I turn to other considerations, I will briefly discuss three more metaphors - the FEELING IS WARMTH, THE FEELING IS COLD and the FEELING IS FLIGHT metaphors. The first two metaphors are interrelated. In Russian and English, they are applied to emotions that necessarily have an object, such as love, friendship, hatred, but not happiness or joy (which have a cause, but not an object). In these two metaphors, the effect that the feeling has on the mind of its object (not its subject, as in all other metaphors examined so far) is likened to the effect that warmth and cold have on the body of a human. Positive, kind emotions, such as love, friendship are likened to warmth; negative, unfriendly emotions, such as hostility, contempf5 are likened to cold. 64Note a special, "humble" attitude to suffering characteristic of the Russian culture in general: in many cases suffering is welcome or at least incepted with resignation; cf. Wierzbicka 1994 on that subject. See Searle 1990, p. 324 on the metaphorization of unemotional as cold and emotional as hot; Searle proves the cultural origin of this metaphor, which is not based on any real similarities. 225 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Indeed, consider the following Russian and English expressions: ljubov' sogrevajet 'love warms’ ; gorjacaja druzba 'warm friendship’ ; xolodnaja neprijazn' 'cold hostility’ ; led prezrenija 'ice of contempt’ ; warm <cold> attitude; to talk to somebody warmly <coldly> (= 'friendly' and 'unfriendly,' respectively); warm-hearted (='kind-hearted'); colloquial cold turkey ('unemotional person’ ), to give somebody the cold shoulder f treat somebody with contempt or neglect’ ) and the like. The last metaphor I will consider in detail in this section, is the FEELING IS FLIGHT metaphor. It is used to describe emotions that imply a large amount of enthusiasm on the part of the experiencer, such as joy, happiness or hope (but not contentedness which is not sufficiently strong). Consider the following Russian and English expressions: letat' <parit’> ot radosti <scast]a> 'to fly <hover> with joy <happiness>’ ; na kryljax nadezdy 'on the wings of hope’ and one’s heart leaps <soars> with joy <happiness>; walk on air; on the wings o f hope. I would like to mention briefly some more of the metaphors in this class. 1. RAVNODUSNOE ILI PLOXOE OTNOSENIE - KAMENNOST’ 'INDIFFERENCE OR BAD ATTITUDE IS STONYNESS’: kamennoe lico 'stony6 6 <indifferent, untouchable> face’ and the English equivalents. 2. RAVNODUSNOE ILI PLOXOE OTNOSENIE - SUXOST’ 'INDIFFERENCE OR BAD ATTITUDE IS DRYNESS6 7 ’ : suxo razgovarivat' 'to speak dryly’ and the English g g Note, however, the positively connoted FIRMNESS IS RELIABLITY metaphg^r, reflected in the expression to be firm as a rock. The following fact proves the arbitrary, cultural nature of this metaphor: the word wet, semantic opposite of dry, is associated not with good or interested attitude, as we would naturally expect, if this metaphor were motivated, but with weakness, inability to make up one’s mind. In this respect, cognitive metaphors differ from cultural ones: the 226 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. equivalents. By themselves, the properties of being made of stone or being dry are neither bad nor good; they do not bear any cognitive evaluation; however, in Russian and English cultures they are conceptualized as negative and, therefore, associated with negative emotions. vm .2.4. Linguistic properties of the metaphors in the second class. The members of the second emotion metaphor class are formed by the cultural metaphorization mechanism. This means that the associative connections between the source and the target domains are rather weak, since the mapping is determined arbitrarily, subjectively, not on the basis of any objective similarity. This calls forth the following linguistic and cross-linguistic properties of the metaphors in this class: (a) linguistically, they frequently cannot be used metonymically, i.e., the metaphoric expression of the emotion cannot, by itself, be used as a denotation of the corresponding emotion. For instance, the Russian expression Serdce razryvaetsja 'The heart is being torn,’ used to describe the emotion M ost' 'pity,' if taken out of context, is an insufficient indication of this emotion: it does not imply that the emotion experienced is necessarily 'pity.' Likewise, to turn black does not, by itself, mean 'to experience anger’ or parit' 'to hover' does not necessarily imply radost' 'joy.' This is not a strict rule (cf. the English to feel blue as an independent indicator of sadness) but rather a strong tendency. former are more motivated and, if a word A is associated with a property B, then the semantic opposite of A is normally associated with the semantic opposite of B, cf. GRIEF IS BURDEN and JOY IS LIGHTNESS metaphors. 227 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Another linguistic peculiarity of metaphors of the second class is the following: unlike metaphors of the first class, they are not included in the semantic definitions of the emotions they correspond to. The reason for this is the weakness of associative connections between the emotion and the source domain object; these associative connections are insufficient to identify the emotion by merely mentioning the source domain object. Metaphors of the second class should be commented on somewhere in the linguistic description of the corresponding emotions but not in their semantic definitions; (b) cross-linguistically, they display a large amount of variation and may differ from culture to culture, even to the point of incomprehensibility6 8 . For instance, the Russian metaphor PITY IS PAIN is incomprehensible to an English speaker6 9 ; likewise, the English metaphorical expression for sadness, to feel blue, does not say anything to a speaker of Russian. More than any other emotion metaphors, the metaphors of this class reflect the naive picture of the world. They reflect naive ethics (cf. the Russian and Armenian PITY IS PAIN metaphor and its absence in English-speaking cultures); naive religion (cf. the POSITIVE FEELING IS LIGHT metaphor, present in European languages, but absent in Njuka); naive psychology (FRIENDLY FEELING IS WARMTH, present in European languages), etc. Vffl.3. The third, or cognitive metaphor class. 68Certainly, all language metaphors may bear a mark of the culture they belong to; however, for the metaphors of the cultural class it is unavoidable, since culture is the main factor that plays role in their formatji^n. See Chapter IV on 'pity' in the present manuscript. 228 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The third emotion metaphor class that is relevant for the present description is represented by, for example, GRIEF IS ILLNESS or the Russian GORE - TJA^EST1 OGRIEF IS BURDEN1 ) and GORE - SMERT' ('GRIEF IS DEATH’ ) metaphors, as well as by NADEZDA - VOSKRESENIE, 2lZN’ 'HOPE IS RESURRECTION, LIFE’ metaphor. The objects in the source domain and the objects in the target domain have a common semantic7 0 component - they are both evaluated either positively or negatively. Thus, both grief and death are considered bad occurrences; both hope and life (as contrasted to death) are considered good occurrences. The likening of the target domain objects to the source domain objects is determined by cognitive factors. Vni.3.1. The source domain in the third metaphor class. The source domain for the metaphors of the third class consists of various physiological sensations. However, it differs from the source domain of the first, physiological class, although the latter is also constituted by physiological sensations. The difference is as follows: sensations in the first class are the obligatory physiological manifestations of the feelings to which they are metaphorically mapped; sensations in the third class are arbitrarily chosen and unrelated to the real manifestations of the corresponding feelings. vm .3.2. The mapping in the third metaphor class. 70And not pragmatic, as in the case of "cultural" metaphors. 229 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In some respects, the mapping in the third class recalls that in the second. Namely, cognitive metaphors, as well as cultural metaphors, are not based on real, strong similarities between the objects in the source and target domains, but on evaluations of these objects. However, these evaluations are of a different nature. If in the second, cultural class these evaluations are determined by purely cultural factors and are often subjective and arbitrary, in the third class they are determined by what I call cognitive factors and are more objective and natural. Thus, in the third class, the mappings between the domains are also more objective than those in the second. In this objectiveness, cognitive metaphors come close to physiological metaphors. Indeed, the mapping between, e.g., 'grief and 'burden* is not arbitrary: 'grief is linguistically viewed as having the same effect on a person as 'burden1 does. Namely, they both bend7 1 a person, cf. On sognulsja pod tjazest'ju meska, kotoryj on nes 'He was bent under the burden of the bag he was carrying' (literally) and On sognulsja pod tjazest'ju gorja 'H e was bent under the burden of his grief (metaphorically). However, there is an essential difference between the mapping in the physiological and cognitive classes. First, in the third class, one emotion can be mapped onto the source domain in many possible ways, as well as one expression from the source domain being mapped onto many different emotions (just as in the second class). In the first class, the correlation between emotions and source domain objects is unmbiguous. 71In the case of burden, the lexeme to bend is used literally; in the case of grief, it is used idiomatically. 230 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Secondly (and this is even more decisive), in the first, physiological class, the similarity between the objects in source and target domains is much stronger than in the cognitive class. Let us consider the first class metaphor STRAX - XOLOD 'FEAR IS COLD.’ It likens the effect that the feeling of'fear' has on a person's mind to the effect that the sensation of'cold' does on a person's body. In this respect, the mapping in the first class does not differ from that in the third. However, there is one more aspect in the metaphor FEAR IS COLD. Namely, this metaphor describes the effect that 'fear' has on the body of a person as the effect that 'cold' does. This effect is the same. One can shake both with 'fear' and with 'cold': the expression to shake is, thus, used literally in both cases. However, if we tried to apply the same strategy to the metaphors of the third class, e.g., GRIEF IS BURDEN, we would fail. This is because 'grief does not have the same effect on one's body as burden does. When we say that a burden bends one down, we use the expression to bend literally, when we say that grief bends one down, we use this expression figuratively. Shaking is a physiological symptom of 'fear' as well as a physiological symptom of 'cold'; this similarity allows us to liken the psychological feeling of 'fear' to the physiological sensation of 'cold.' Bending is not a physiological symptom of'grief; there is no literal similarity between grief and burden. The manifestation of'grief is tears, screaming, wailing, but not bending. The metaphor GRIEF IS BURDEN, thus, does not have a physiological foundation. Thus, the likening of the effect that 'grief has on one's mind to the effect that 'burden' has on one’ s body is determined by cognitive factors, not by physiological ones. 231 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. vm .3.3. Metaphors in the third class. Let us start the discussion with the metaphors conceptualizing grief. These are the Russian GORE - TJA^EST' 'GRIEF IS BURDEN,' GORE - BOLEZN1 'GRIEF IS ILLNESS,’ GORE - SMERT’ 'GRIEF IS DEATH1 and the English GRIEF IS BURDEN and GRIEF IS A BLOW metaphors. The GORE - TJA^EST1 'GRIEF IS BURDEN’ metaphor is the most prominent metaphor for 'grief both in Russian and in English. It is represented by such expressions as the Russian sognut'sja ot gorja 'to be bent with grief; tjazest' gorja 'the heaviness of grief; gore svalilos' na kogo-libo 'grief had fallen on somebody’ ; byt' razdavlennym gorem 'to be crushed with grief and the English to shudder under the weight o f one's grief; grief is already lightening (implication: grief is heavy); heavy-hearted; to be crushed with grief, to be broken with grief; to be cast-down; to be in heavy spirits. This metaphor likens the feeling of 'grief to the sensation of heaviness, of burden. The basis for this metaphoric parallel does not lie in the symptomatics of 'grief,' since the effect of'grief on one’ s body is not the same as the effect of a heavy weight; neither does this metaphor stem from the cultural closeness between 'grief and 'burden,’ since these two concepts do not share any specific cultural connotations. Thus, the association between 'grief and 'burden' has a cognitive foundation: both concepts have an overall negative cognitive connotation. Both imply an unpleasant experience - emotional in the case of'grief; physiological in the case of 'burden.1 Both deprive the experiencer of the ability to act - to think, to feel, to react adequately in the case of'grief; to move around freely in the case of 232 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'burden.' The metaphor 'GRIEF IS BURDEN1 is found in both languages analyzed; another common 'grief metaphor is the 'GRIEF IS ILLNESS’ metaphor. The 'GRIEF IS ILLNESS’ metaphor is presented by such expressions as the Russian gore suSit kogo-libo 'grief dries one out,’ gore paralizuet kogo-libo 'grief paralyzes one,’ gore iznurjaet kogo-libo 'grief wears one out,’ zabolet' ot gorja 'to fall ill with grief,’ zacaxnut’ ot gorja 'to pine with grief or the English to pine away with grief, to waste away with grief, to be ill from grief and the like. The effect that gore 'grief has on one’ s mind is likened to the effect that illness has on one’ s body. Again, this metaphor is not based on the symptomatics of'grief,1 since its symptomatics does not include being paralyzed or falling ill (at least, not literally), but on the cognitive closeness between 'grief and 'illness.' The remaining 'grief metaphors are language specific. Let us analyze them. The Russian GORE - SMERT’ 'GRIEF IS DEATH’ metaphor is presented by the expression byt' ubitym gorem 'to be killed with grief.’ This metaphor likens the effects of 'grief on one’ s mind to the effects of death on one’ s body. It should be noted, though, that death has many different aspects and the GRIEF IS DEATH metaphor does not employ all of them. The physiological phenomenon of death can metaphorically refer to various psychological states, not only grief. Most frequently it is used to describe the state of spiritual emptiness, the end of spiritual activities. The metaphor duxovnaja smert' or spiritual death is based on the following aspect of physiological death: death means the end of evolution, the end of development, the end of life. The metaphor GRIEF IS DEATH is based on other aspects of death. When we say 233 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. byt' ubitym gorem 'to be killed with one's grief,' we do not imply that one's spiritual life has stopped forever; it merely means that one is in a state of spiritual numbness (possibly temporary), that one is unable to feel anything but grief, unable to do anything but grieve. In other words, in this metaphor, 'death' is not understood as the end of life; rather, it is understood as inability to feel or to act. The English GRIEF IS A SLOW metaphor is presented by such expressions as to be hit by grief, to be grief-stricken. This metaphor emphasizes the immediate effect of'grief on one’ s mind: it knocks one out as a sudden stroke. To conclude the discussion of'grief metaphors, I would like to note that they can describe different stages of'grief.’ The GRIEF IS BURDEN metaphor can be equally applied to all stages of'grief.' The GRIEF IS ILLNESS metaphor describes the long term effects of 'grief.' The GRIEF IS DEATH and GRIEF IS A BLOW metaphors describe the first, the strongest (and, perhaps, the shortest) stage of'grief.' Because of space limitations, I will not give any more detailed descriptions of cognitive emotion metaphors; however, I would like to briefly mention some more of them. 1. Taste metaphors. a) LJUBOV'/UDOVOL'STVIE - SLADOST' and 'LOVE/PLEASURE IS SWEET’ : sladost' Ijubvi 'the sweetness of love’ ; sladkaja zenSana 'sweet woman’ ; sladostnye momenty 'sweet moments' ('the moments of pleasure or joy’ ); sweet love; sweet ('pleasant') person, sweet dreams, to be sweet on somebody Oto be in love with somebody'), etc. b) RAZOCAROVANIE - GOREC' and DISAPPOINTMENT IS BITTER: gored razocarovanija 'bitterness of disappointment,' gor'kie mysli 'bitter thoughts' (implied: lacking 234 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. hope or joy); bitter disappointment <disillusionment>; bitter person (implied: one who has lost hope and faith), etc. c) 'Sour' also forms cognitive emotion metaphors both in English and in Russian (of the form SOUR IS FEELING BAD). In Russian, kislyj 'sour' is metaphorically associated with bad mood, low spirits, pessimism; in English, sour correlates with irritation, grudging, feeling offended, consider to be sour on something 'to be tired of something, disgusted with something.' It is interesting that the last major taste - salty - does not form cognitive emotion metaphors, at least, not in the languages analyzed. There are no emotion metaphors based on 'salty' either in Russian or in English. 2. Tactile metaphors. a) XOROSEE OTNOSENIE - MJAGKOST' 'GOOD ATTITUDE IS SOFTNESS': mjagkaja ulybka 'a soft smile,’ mjagko govorit' 'to speak gently.’ The English correlates of this metaphor are, for example, gentle attitude, to speak softly, to smile softly. 'Softness' and 'good attitude1 share a positive cognitive connotation: the former is pleasant physically and the latter - psychologically. b) PLOXOE OTNOSENIE - 2ESTKOST’ 'BAD ATTITUDE IS HARDNESS’: zestkij celovek 'hard person,’ zestkoe obraScenie 'hard treatment’ and the English correlates. 'Hardness' and 'bad attitude’ share a negative cognitive connotation. It is interesting that the lexeme tverdyj 'hard, firm,’ which is semantically close to zestkij 'hard,' has a positive connotation; consider the positively connoted expressions tverdyj celovek, tverdoe reSenie 'firm person,' 'firm decision.’ 235 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This difference is explained by the following: in its first, literal meaning, tverdyj 'hard, firm' means 'o f solid structure.’ The property of being of solid structure does not have anything negative in it; moreover, it may be considered to be positive, since it implies reliability. Therefore, the lexeme tverdyj 'firm' is likely to be metaphorically associated with positively evaluated phenomena. The lexeme zestkij 'hard,' however, means 'harder than is normal; harder than is expected.’ To be harder than expected, to be hard, while expected to be soft, is a negative property. Therefore, the lexeme zestkij is likely to be metaphorically associated with negatively evaluated phenomena. 3. Pain metaphors. a) SOVEST' - GRYZUSCAJA BOL' 'REMORSE IS GNAWING PAIN’ : Russian: sovest' gryzet 'conscience bites one,’ sovest' terzaet 'conscience tears one to pieces.7 2 ’ English: pangs o f conscience, conscience keeps gnawing. b) OBIDA - OSTRAJA VNEZAPNAJA BOL’ 'OFFENCE IS SHARP SUDDEN PAIN’ : Russian: ukol obidy 'prick of offence,' obida ujazvljaet <uscemljajet> 'offence wounds <pinches>.’ English: to be wounded, to be hurt. 72 These two metaphors are formed xn two steps: first, the sensation of acute pain is likened to the sensation of being bitten or torn; then, the feeling of remorse is likened to the sensation of acute pain. 236 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VIIX.3.4. Linguistic properties of the metaphors in the third class. Cognitive metaphors are an intermediate class between physiological and cultural metaphors, with respect to the mechanism of their formation. They are less arbitrary than cultural metaphors in that they are to a larger extent based on similarities between the target and the source domain objects. However, they do not imply as much similarity as physiological metaphors do. This determines their linguistic and cross-linguistic properties. (a) Linguistically, they cannot always be used metonymically, cf. the impossibility of *byt' razdavlennym 'to be crushed' as a metonym for 'grief; cf., however, the possibility of ukolof kogo-libo 'to prick somebody' as a substitute of obidet' 'to offend.' As in the second metaphor class and unlike in the first class, metaphors of the third class are not included in the semantic definitions of the corresponding emotions. There is no one-to-one correlation between metaphors and emotions: more than one metaphor can correspond to one emotion; more than one emotion can correspond to one metaphor. Thus, the associative connections between emotions and metaphors are not sufficiently strong for unambiguous identification. Therefore, metaphors are not included in the definitions themselves; however, they do appear in the semantic description of emotions. (b) Cross-linguistically, metaphors of the third class recall those of the second class in that they can display cross-linguistic variation (they can be invariant). Consider the invariance of the RAZOCAROVANIE - GOREC' and DISAPPOINTMENT IS BITTERNESS or LIUBOV’ - SLADOST' and LOVE IS SWEETNESS metaphors and the discrepancy in the 'grief metaphors (e.g., absence of 'GRIEF IS DEATH’ metaphor in 237 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. English and its presence in Russian). However, unlike cultural metaphors, cognitive metaphors are often intelligible for a speaker of a language in which they are absent. If the cultural metaphor to have the blues as an expression for sadness is totally uninformative for a speaker of Russian, the cognitive metaphor byt' ubitym gorem 'to be killed with grief is, though it is absent in English, still comprehensible to a speaker of this language. Thus, cognitive metaphors, even when they are not present in a given language, are still somewhat informative and understandable for the speakers of this language because they are based on cognitive connotations, shared by different languages. 238 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IX. Generalizations of the results obtained in this work. In the first chapter, I have partly discussed the possible advantages of the framework used in the present work. Now that I have applied this approach to some real data, I would like to demonstrate how the results obtained in this analysis can be further extended and used. Besides their own practical and theoretical descriptive validity, these results can be applied in further research on emotions (and, thus, have a predictive validity as well). Thus, the first (practical) application of these results concerns lexicography. Namely, the descriptions of emotion concepts attained through the use of semantic features can be easily turned into lexicographic entries for an integral explanatory dictionary of synonyms (see Chapter 1 on this). These entries are intelligible to a wide range of readers, even to non specialists. They allow one to make the resulting linguistic descriptions accessible (and possibly useful) outside of the rather narrow domain of semantics - for instance, in anthropology, psychology, sociology. A sample entry (for the Russian bojat'sja 'to fear1 ) is presented in the Appendix. Another important practical application of the results obtained in this work concerns cultural and cross-cultural studies. Semantic features and the lexicographic form of linguistic description easily allow one to draw parallels among emotion concepts in different languages and to create systematic and precise cross-linguistic and cross-cultural comparisons. Some comparisons of this type are presented in this work. Namely, I have compared the concepts of 'fear,' 'pity,' 'sadness,' 'tiredness/ boredom’ and 'disgust1 in the Russian and English 239 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. languages, using their feature-based descriptions. The results of this comparison confirm the initial assumption made in the first chapter of this work, namely, that there is less variation among the so-called basic emotions7 3 , such as 'fear,7 4 ' 'disgust,' 'anger,' 'passion' and more variation among the culture-dependent emotions, such as 'hope,' 'joy,' 'sadness,' 'pity,' 'to be tired of7 bored with,1 etc. This was confirmed both by the results of the semantic study, through the use of semantic features (see the chapters on separate emotions) and by the results of the metaphorical study (see the chapter on emotion metaphors). This tendency can be explained as follows: language conceptualizes different aspects of emotions, such as their physiology, their naive ethics, their moral evaluation, etc. Such aspects as naive ethics or moral evaluation are inherent in a particular culture and, therefore, vary from language to language. On the contrary, their physiology is something that is common for all cultures, that is inherent in human physiology and, therefore, does not vary from language to language. Thus, the basic emotions that do have a biological, physiological basis are more invariant than the ones that do not. The second (theoretical) application concerns the further description of emotions. It seems that the results obtained in this work can be extended further, namely, onto the 73Recall the definition of a basic emotion in Oatley 1992, p. 55: a basic emotion is "physiologically and expressively distinctive and it has a biological basis". I use his definition in my work, however, I do not agree with his list of basic emotions, which includes, among other emotions, 'happiness' and 'sadness'. These two do not meet his own criterion for a basic emotion: namely, they do not have a biological basis, as they do not have obligatory physiological manifestations; they only have manifestations on the level of behavior. The results of my study comply with the assumption these two are not basic emotions: there is quite a lot of discrepancy between the concepts of 'happiness' and 'sadne^' even in such relatively close cultures as English and Russian. This concerns only the so-called "raw", biological, spontaneous fear but not the “respectful", controllable fear, such as the fear of God or the fear of authorities (this distinction is described in Parkin, 1986, p. 158-159 and Wierzbicka 1990b). 240 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. languages and emotions other than the ones analyzed herein. One of the important results is that semantic features, used to describe the same emotions in different languages7 5 , turned out to be largely invariant . We can therefore assume that these features can be extended to the description of the same emotions in languages other than the ones analyzed. Of course, they would form only a core of the description; certain language-specific features will have to be added. Still, this can be a useful tool in understanding and describing emotion concepts, especially in the first stages of work with a new language, when a linguist does not yet have many intuitions and needs some kind of a framework to start the research. Below, I will present such core feature sets for each of the emotion types analyzed in this work. In these sets, I include only those features that proved to be relevant for all of the languages analyzed herein. 1X .1. Core feature sets for the description of em otion concepts. 'Fear' emotion type. Features: (1) Source of emotion (internal/ external; if external, what kind of source - event, human being, etc.); (2) Physiological manifestations of emotion (present/ absent; if present, what kind of manifestations - shaking, trembling, pallor, temporary paralysis, etc); 75 7gEnglish and Russian, in this case. There is certain variation but it is not more than 30 % - approximately two non-coinciding semantic features amongst the six or seven that were used in the description. 241 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (3) Behavioral manifestations of emotion (presence/ absence of the attempt to avoid the contact with the source of emotion); (4) Temporal orientation of the contact with the source of emotion (happening/ anticipated); (5) Suddenness/non-suddenness of this contact; (6) Strength and depth of emotion; (7) Speaker's attitude to the experiencer; (8) State/property status of emotion; (9) Factual/ putative interpretation of the expression of emotion. 'Pity' emotion type. (1) Source of emotion (internal/ external; if external, who can be the object of emotion - equal or unequal being); (2) Nature of the feeling (sharing object's feelings; spiritual pain, etc.); (3) Directionality of emotion (can be felt with respect to oneself or not); (4) Behavioral manifestations of emotion (presence/ absence of the attempt to help the object of emotion); (5) Strength of emotion; (6) Experiencer's attitude to the object of emotion (contemptuous or not); (7) Speaker's attitude to the emotion (necessarily positive or not); (8) Sincerity of the feeling (possibly faked or not). 242 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 'Disgust' emotion type. (1) Source of emotion (internal/ external; if external, material or abstract); (2) Nature of the feeling (moral or physiological repulsion); (3) Directionality of emotion (can be felt with respect to oneself or not); (4) Physiological manifestations of emotion (feeling sick, making faces, etc.); (5) Closeness of contact with the source of emotion; (6) Strength of emotion; (7) State/ property status of the expression of emotion. 'Sadness' emotion type. (1) Source of emotion (internal/ external; if external, what kind of source - a major evil, e.g., death of a loved one, or a minor one); (2) Nature of the feeling (burdensome; light; bitter; painful, etc.); (3) Wishes of the experiencer; (4) Manifestations of emotion (violent behavior; tears; cries, etc.); (5) Strength, depth and time of the duration of emotion; (6) Possible experiencer (individual or group). 'Tiredness/ boredom' emotion type. (1) Source of emotion (too frequent a contact with something; too long a contact with something); (2) Nature of the feeling (intellectual boredom; emotional annoyance, etc.); 243 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (3) Behavioral manifestations of emotion (drastic withdrawal; violence with respect to the object of emotion); (4) Strength of emotion. As one can notice, the feature sets above contain at least three different types of semantic features: (a) psychological features, characterizing the emotions themselves, as they are conceptualized in a particular language and/or culture, e.g., the features 'source of emotion'; 'wishes of the experiencer1 ; (b) purely linguistic features, characterizing the linguistic properties of the expressions, denoting these emotions, e.g., the features 'factual/ putative' or 'state/ property interpretation of the linguistic expression of emotion’ ; (c) ethnolinguistic features, characterizing the naive ethics7 7 , inherent in a particular language, e.g., 'experiencer’ s attitude to the object of emotion’ ; 'speaker’ s attitude to the emotion,' etc. Thus, the naive ethics of the Russian language implies that trusit' 'to get cold feet’ is a bad, mean emotion, which is explicated in the feature 'speaker’ s attitude to the experiencer’ (negative in the case of trusit'). On the other hand, the emotion sostradanie 'compassion' is viewed as a virtue both by speakers of Russian and English, which is explicated in the feature 'speaker's attitude to the emotion' (positive in the case of this emotion). 77 The largest amount of cross-linguistic variation is found among ethnolinguistic features, as naive ethics differs greatly from culture to culture. 244 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. These ethnolinguistic features are extremely important and useful in describing the naive picture of the world inherent in a given language. As I have said above, those features (describing a certain emotion type) that do not differ from language to language can be used to describe the same emotion type in other languages. There are also features that do not differ from emotion to emotion, namely, those features that are invariant for & certain number of emotion types. These can be used to describe new emotion types, beyond the ones analyzed in this work, as they are not specific to any given emotion type. Such features, that can be used for a unified, rigid description of various emotions, are: (1) Source of emotion (internal/ external); (2) Nature of the feeling; (3) Physiological manifestations of emotion; (4) Behavioral manifestations of emotion; (5) Wishes of the experiencer; (6) Strength and depth of emotion; (7) Speaker's attitude to the experiencer; (8) Speaker's attitude to the emotion; (9) Experiencer's attitude to the source of emotion; (10) Presence/ absence of a direct contact with the source of emotion7 8 ; 70Actually, this is a privative (scalar) rather than a dichotomous opposition. It implies different degrees of proximity with the source of emotion, namely: presence/absence of an actual contact with the source of emotion; physical presence/absence of the source of emotion; being 245 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (11) Present/ future temporal orientation of contact with the source of emotion; (12) Possible experiencer (individual/ group). I do not claim that this list is exhaustive; this is the product of analyzing only five emotion types, namely, 'fear, 'pity,' 'sadness,' 'disgust' and 'to be tired of/bored with.' Further analysis will surely reveal more features that are relevant for more than one emotion type. What I would like to show is that even such different emotion types as the ones analyzed here have a lot in common linguistically, and this fact can be used in further research, since it gives an important clue to understanding the general tendencies in linguistic conceptualization of emotions and a useful tool in describing emotion concepts in different languages. EX.2. Correlation among the features and its possible use. Semantic features are related to each other in the following sense: the fact that a feature X takes a certain value in the meaning of a lexeme Y entails that a feature Z takes a certain value in the meaning of this lexeme. For instance, the fact that a 'fear' verb is characterized as 'putative' entails that it will also be characterized as 'future-oriented' (Le., the contact with the source of emotion is in the future, is anticipated). The fact that a 'fear' verb is characterized as 'factual' entails that it will also be characterized as 'present-oriented' (i.e., the contact with the source of emotion is in the present, is taking place). acquainted with the source of emotion (if it is a human) ; actual existence/ non-existence of the source of emotion. 246 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This interesting phenomenon can be made to serve two purposes: (a) it helps to understand the nature of emotions themselves and the peculiarities of their cultural and linguistic conceptualization; (b) it allows one to make predictions about the semantics of the emotion expressions in question. Below, I will present such correlating features and propose explanations as to the reasons for their correlation. The following correlations have been discovered among the features: (1) state/ property status of emotion and the future/ present orientation of contact with the source of emotion: property status - future orientation state status - present orientation; This correlation is rather clear: a temporary emotion, or an emotional state (e.g., to be frightened by a dog) is caused by an actual contact with the source of emotion; an emotional state usually lasts as long as this contact does. Thus, the time of experiencing the emotion coincides with the time of contact with its source, hence the present temporal orientation. On the contrary, when a certain emotion is a property of the experiencer (such as to be afraid of dogs), an actual contact with the source of emotion is not required; the emotion is felt at a thought of this contact, at its anticipation; hence, the future temporal orientation. (2) factual/ putative interpretation and future/ present orientation: future orientation - putative interpretation 247 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. present orientation - factual interpretation The fact that future orientation is related to the property of being putative is clear: future does not imply any sure knowledge, only our suppositions about what can happen. Although there are factuals which, in reference to the future, still remain factuals, such as to know (I know that he will come implies that he will come), nonetheless, in general, future is not something about which one can make strong claims; (3) positive/ negative nature of the feeling, its strength and behavior of the experiencer: strong positive emotion - attempt to establish and/or continue contact with its source strong negative emotion - attempt to interrupt and/or avoid contact with its source This correlation is rather clear: to wish to establish a contact with something pleasant or interrupt it with something unpleasant is very natural. The stronger an emotion, the stronger this wish and, therefore, the resolution to accomplish it. (4) strength of emotion - its rationality/ irrationality: strong emotion - irrational rational emotion - not strong This correlation is also rather natural: strong emotions (e.g., rage, terror, etc.) do not leave any space for intellectual evaluation; they seize the experiencer so that he loses any control over his intellectual powers or behavior. Thus, the fact that an emotion includes a rational component (like the Russian opasat'sja 'to be apprehensive' or the English to be 248 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. bored1 9 ) automatically means that it is not very strong. It must be kept in mind, though, what a strong emotion means. Almost all emotions, rational as well as irrational ones, can be felt strongly; however, not every emotion is inherently strong. Such emotions as rage or terror are inherently strong: they can never be experienced in a small degree; and they cannot be rational. (5) frequency of contacts with the source of emotion - state/ property status of emotion: frequent contacts with the source of emotion - property status of emotion single contact with the source of emotion - state status of emotion This correlation is explained as follows: if emotion is a result of repeated contacts with something, it is not something temporary. Such an emotion has a permanent status, since its cause has a permanent status and does not disappear, as time passes. On the contrary, if an emotion is a result of a single contact with something, it is likely to disappear as soon as its cause disappears; therefore, such an emotion would be temporary and, thus, have a state status. linguistically, the distinction 'rational emotion1 vs 'irrational emotion1 finds a reflection in the semantic structure of the corresponding emotion expressions. Namely, in the expressions of 'irrational emotions' the component 'to feel1 is located in the assertion, whereas in the expressions of 'rational emotions' it is contained in the presupposition. Thus, to be very bored is not interpreted as 'to feel very strongly'; it is interpreted as 'to think that something is very boring'. 249 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Appendix. Synonymic series of the lexeme BOJAT'SJA8 0 . bojat'sja 1 (no form of perfective aspect), pugat'sja (perfective ispugat'sja), literary straSit’sja (no form of perfective aspect), opasat'sja (no form of perfective aspect), trusit' (perfective strusit'), colloquial drejfit' (perfective sdrejfit'), robet' (perfective orobef), literary trepetat' 2 (no form of perfective aspect),drozat’ 2 (no form of perfective aspect), colloquial irjastis* 2 (no form of perfective aspect) = 'feel bad because a situation which is perceived as dangerous, is taking place; wish to escape it; feel and sense something similar to what one senses when one is cold.' MEANING The synonyms differ with regard to the following semantic features: 1) the source of the emotion (person, animal, certain state of affairs); 2) the way in which the situation is perceived (whether it is observed or imagined by the subject); 3) degree of feeling/ degree of intellectual evaluation (whether the experiencer mostly feels or thinks); 4) control over the outward manifestations of emotion and the nature of these manifestations; 5) duration of emotion and its strength; 6) presence/ absence of a conscious attempt to escape danger; 7) presence/ absence of moral evaluation of emotion by the speaker. The first feature divides the synonyms into the following groups: 80See also V.Ju. Apresjan 1995a. 250 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a) emotions which are caused by a certain state of affairs. Those are trusit’ and drejfit’. A person experiences such emotions when he perceives the present state of affairs as dangerous: Ja tak i znal, cto kak tol'/co pojavitsja verojatnost' riska, on strusit i ne pridet. 'I knew that as soon as there would be a possibility of risk, he would get cold feet and he would not come’ ; Kogda nacalsja Storm, on sdrejfil i vernulsja na bereg 'As soon as the storm started, he got cold feet and returned to shore.1 A person can sdrejfit’ (but not strusit’) also when the situation in which he finds himself is not dangerous, but requires certain quick and resolute actions (this makes it very close to the English to get cold feet): No pozdno, ja sdrejfil, i vot - mne otkazJ Kak zal' ee slez! Ja svjatogo blazennej! 'But it is late, I got cold feet and now I am rejected’ (Pasternak, Marburg). b) emotions for which the source is usually a certain person. Those are trepetat’,drozat’ and trjastis’. Feelings described by those words usually occur as a result of contact with a person who is perceived as a potential malefactor. In the cases of trepetat’,drozat5 and trjastis’ the emotion occurs because the person causing it is perceived as being in some way superior to the experiencer, and, therefore, having some sort of power over the experiencer. These three words belong to different speech styles (trepetat’ is literary,drozat’ is neutral, trjastis’ is colloquial); they are, therefore, used in slightly different contexts. Fordrozat’ and trjastis1 the inequality of statuses between the object of emotion and the experiencer is usually of a social nature. Trjastis’ implies that the relations between the subject and the object of emotion are official: trjastis’ pered nacaVnikom 'to tremble in front of one’ s boss.’ drozat’ allows for all kinds of social inequality, not necessarily officiakdrozat’ 251 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pered nacal'nikomf pered strogim otcom 'to tremble before one's boss/ before one's strict father.' Trjastis' and, to a lesser extent,drozat’, imply that the subject of emotion is somewhat humiliated. The last implication does not extend onto those rare cases when the cause of the emotion is a certain state of affairs and not a person: &rez nedelju u nee ekzameny, ona, konecno, trjasetsja <drozit> 'In a week she has to take exams and, of course, she is trembling.' The emotion expressed by the verb trepetat1 can occur in the same circumstances (namely, those of social inequality) as the emotionsdrozat’ and trjastis' but, since it belongs to literary style, it is not used in such everyday contexts as ? trepetat' pered bossom 'to tremble in awe before one’ s boss,1 compare, however, Dvorjane trepetali pered korolevoj 'The nobles trembled before the Queen.1 Another case where emotion trepetat' can occur, is when the experiencer thinks that the object of emotion stands a lot higher than himself in moral respect, intelligence, or creativity: On trepetal pered svoim duxovnym otcom 'H e trembled before his spiritual father'; Mat' trepetala pered svoim genial'nym synom 'The mather trembled before her genius son.1 In this case trepetat' implies that the subject respects the object of emotion and evaluates him highly. What the subject is afraid of is his own possible failure and, as a result, disapproval of the object. c) the third group consists of emotions whose source is a certain state of affairs or a person. These are bojat'sja, pugat'sja, straSit’sja, opasat’sja, robet'. Emotion robet' occurs as a result of one's feeling one's own inferiority, lack of confidence, which a person may feel in the presence of the object of emotion or in the situation causing the emotion. The experiencer, aware of the fact that it is not he who controls the situation and not knowing 252 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. how to behave, feels the emotion of robet’: On, obycno takoj samouverennyj, teper' robel pered itoj devuSkoj 'He, who was normally sc sure of himself, now felt intimidated by this girl1 ; V neprivycnoj obstanovke ona vidimo robela 'In the unusual environment she was visibly intimidated.’ With regard to the second,, feature (the way in which the dangerous situation is perceived) emotions fall into the following groups: bojat’sja, stra£it’sja and opasat’ sja versus all the rest. Bojat'sja, strasit’sja and opasat'sja differ from ail the others in that they can occur not only when the dangerous situation is present, but also at the mere thought of this situation. This means that the lexemes bojat'sja, strasit’sja and opasat'sja can be used in a description of future events: Ja bojus' (stratus’/ opasajus') vstred s nim 'I am afraid of (scared ofr apprehensive about) meeting him.’ Compare pugat'sja and robet', trusit' and drejfit' which occur only when a potentially dangerous situation is already taking place. Of those four, drejfit' is the one which implies the closest contact with the danger; this emotion usually occurs as a reaction to an immediate danger: Kogda nacalsja Storm, on sdrejfil i povernul k beregu 'When the storm started, he got cold feet and headed towards the shore.’ The emotions stra§it’sja and opasat'sja cannot occur when a potentially dangerous situation is already taking place. They occur at earlier stages, either when there is still a possibility of changing the course of events (for opasat'sja), or when the danger is unavoidable (for stra&it’sja). Finally, the emotion bojat'sja, unlike all the others, can appear without any visible source. One can say about oneself: Ja pocemu-to bojus' 'I am afraid <and do not know why>,’ not realizing what the reason for the emotion is. All other synonyms describe strongly motivated emotions. 253 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. With regard to the third feature (degree of feeling/ degree of intellectual evaluation) emotions fall into three groups depending on the presence/absence of feeling or intellectual evaluation. The first group has only one emotion (opasat’sja) which implies intellectual perception of the situation and almost no feeling. When a person oceri opasaetsja 'is very apprehensive1 about a certain event it does not mean that he has very strong feelings; it means that he considers this event very dangerous and that he is, therefore, very cautious. The second group contains only emotion pugat’sja which does not involve any intellectual evaluation, but pure feeling. If a person ocen’ pugaetsja 'is frightened a lot,' it means that he experiences a very strong feeling akin to shock. It does not mean, however, that the situation is evaluated as a dangerous one; since pugat'sja is an instantaneous emotion, it does not leave time for evaluation. The third group consists of emotions which involve both intellectual evaluation and feeling. These are bojat'sja, strasit’sja, trusit', drejfit', robet', trepetat',drozat’, trjastis'. The person experiencing those emotions is both thinking and feeling. Robet', trepetat',drozat’ and trjastis’ contain more feeling and, therefore, less intellectual evaluation than bojat'sja, straSit’sja, trusit' and drejfit'. The feeling in robet', trepetat',drozat’ and trjastis' (especially indrozat’ and trjastis') is so strong that intellectual evaluation becomes almost impossible. The feature emotional/rational in the synonyms is related to the feature perception of the dangerous situation. If an emotion occurs as an immediate reaction to a present danger, it is more likely to involve a lot of feeling and little intellectual evaluation than an emotion which occurs as a reaction to imagining a 254 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dangerous situation. Indeed, the emotion opasat'sja, which occurs as a result of thinking about danger, is purely intellectual Likewise, spontaneous emotions involve less control over the situation. Bojat'sja can also describe an emotion lacking intellectual evaluation, e.g.: Ja pocemu-to bojus' itogo celoveka 'I am afraid of this person <and do not know why>.’ Due to their lack of intellectual evaluation, the emotions pugat'sja and bojat'sja are also characteristic of animals: L o S a d ispugalas' i ponesla 'The horse got frightened and bolted’ ; NaSa sobaka pocemu-to bojalas' dtogo celoveka i zabivalas'pod divan, kogda on prixodil 'For some reason, our dog was afraid of this man and hid under the sofa every time he came.’ All other synonyms are unable to designate emotions peculiar to animals. As for the nature of the feeling, in case of bojat'sja, stra£it’sja, pugat'sja, trusit' and drejfit', the feeling is that of near danger, sometimes inevitable. The experiencer wants to hide from it, he feels helpless. The emotions robet', trepetat',drozat’ and trjastis' imply the feeling of self discontent, apprehension of the person causing the emotion, desire to hide from this person, constraint. With regard to the fourth feature (control over the outward manifestations of the emotion and nature of those manifestations) synonyms fall into the following three groups: emotions which involve small degree of control and, therefore, obligatory outward manifestations, emotions which involve more control and, which, therefore, allow outward manifestations, and emotions which involve the greatest degree of control and, therefore, do not have outward manifestations. 255 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The first group, emotions with obligatory outward manifestations, consists of trusit', drejfit', robet', trepetat',drozat’ and trjastis'. It is impossible to trusit', drejfit', robet', trepetat',drozat’, trjastis', no vidu ne pokazyvat' 'to get cold feet/ to be intimidated/ to tremble/ to shake/ to quake without showing it.’ The emotions robet' and trepetat' are manifested in constrained, somewhat artificial behavior with the person causing the emotion; in a low, breaking voice of the experiencer. The emotionsdrozat’ and trjastis' have the same manifestations, but in a greater degree; thus, the experiencer is constrained, he trembles, talks with effort or loses the ability to talk at all. The emotions trusit' and drejfit' are manifested in passive behavior in those situations which require certain actions from the experiencer, or even in behavior opposite to what was expected; in indecisiveness: On strusil/ sdrejfil i ne prisel 'H e got cold feet and did not come’ (impossible *On strusil/ sdrejfil, no priM 'H e got cold feet but still came1 ). The second group, emotions with optional outward manifestations, consists of bojat'sja and pugat’sja. It is possible to bojat'sja, no vidu ne podavat', ispugat'sja, no vidu ne podat' 'to be afraid but not show it,' 'be frightened but not show it.1 However, if the experiencer is not in control of these emotions, they might be manifested in pallor and trembling. The third group, emotions with no outward manifestations, contains only the emotion stra£it’sja„ There are some reasons why this emotion does not have outward manifestations. Trembling or pallor are not possible because they represent an immediate, physiological reaction of the body to a near danger, whereas the emotion straisit’sja occurs far in advance 256 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the actual danger. Such manifestations as change of behavior in order to avoid the danger are not possible, since in stra&t’sja danger is perceived as unavoidable. With regard to the fifth feature (strength and time of duration) emotions fall into the following groups: strong and unmarked w.r.t. strength, on the one hand, and momentary emotions (states) and unmarked w.r.t. the time of duration, on the other. Strong emotions are stragit’sja, trepetat',drozat’ and trjastis'. One cannot * nemnogo strasit’sja, trepetat', drozat’, trjastis' 'to fear, to tremble, to shake, to quake just a little bit.1 Emotions which are momentary states, are trusit', drejfit' and pugat'sja. They occur when a dangerous situation is taking place, and disappear, as it is over. With regard to the sixth feature (presence/absence of a conscientious attempt to avoid danger) emotions are divided in the following way: emotions opasat'sja, trusit' and drejfit', which necessarily imply an attempt to avoid danger, and all the others which do not. It is, therefore, inpossible to "opasat'sja celoveka, no ne starat'sja ego izbegat1 ’ , opasat'sja vstred, no ne starat’ sja ot nee uklonit'sja 'to be apprehensive of somebody but not try to avoid this person,1 'to be apprehensive of a meeting but not try to avoid it.' It is also impossible to "opasat'sja smerti 'to be aprrehensive of death,1 since death is something one cannot avoid. If a person trusit or drejfit, it means that he does not do what he is expected to do trying, therefore, to avoid the danger. With regard to the seventh feature (moral evaluation of the experiencer by the speaker) emotions are divided into following groups: trusit', which implies such evaluation and all the others, which do not. Trusit' is bad because the person who trusit violates 257 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expectations, betrays or lets down other people. For this emotion to occur, not only is a certain state of affairs required, but also a certain predisposition in the personality of the experiencer. CONSTRUCTIONS Syntactic properties of the synonyms are determined by the NP which can fill in the semantic valence of the cause of emotion. If this NP designates a human being, as is the case for robet', trepetat',drozat’, trjastis', then the verb is mostly used with a prepositional phrase with the preposition pered 'before': Ona robeet [trepescet, drozit, trjasetsja] pered dekanomfakul'teta 'She is intimidated by [trembles, shakes, quakes] before the dean of the faculty.1 All other verbs are unable to appear in this type of construction. Those verbs in which the valence of the cause of emotion is filled in not only by the names of human beings, but also by the names of animals, situations, actions, events can appear in a more general construction with the genitive. These verbs are bojat'sja, pugat'sja, strasit’sja, opasat'sja: Ona boitsja, [pugaetsja, straSitsja, opasaetsja] dtogo celoveka <itoj vstred, sobytija>. Ona vsjakij raz pugaetsja sobaki 'She is afraid of [frightened by, fearful of, apprehensive about] this person cthis meeting, this event>. Every time she is afraid of a dog.' Bojat'sjaand pugat'sja (unlike all other verbs) can also be used with the accusative: On boitsja zenu. On ispugalsja sobaku 'He is afraid of his wife-ACC. He was frightened by a dog-ACC There is a slight semantic difference between the construction with the genitive and the construction with the accusative: the construction with the accusative requires a specific interpretation for the NP, whereas construction with the genitive allows 258 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a non-specific interpretation. In two verbs, namely, trusit* and drejfit* the valence of the cause of emotion cannot be expressed syntactically at alL They are always used in absolutive constructions: On trusit. Ne drejf. Absolutive use is also possible for the verbs bojat'sja and robet': Ja bojus*. Ona robela. Some verbs, in which the valence of the cause is filled in by the name of a situation, can appear in the construction with the conjunction kogda: Ja bojus', kogda ty tak govoris'. MaSa pugaetsja vsjakij raz, kogda vidit sobaku 'I am afraid when you say such things. Masha is frightened every time she sees a dog.’ The verbs bojat'sja and opasat'sja can, unlike all the others, be used with the infinitive: Ja bojus' katat’ sja na gornyx lyzax. Ja opasajus' xodit' tuda odna 'I am afraid of mountain skiing. I am apprehensive about going there alone.1 The verb drejfit' in the present tense is mostly used in the form of the negative imperative: Ne d rejf and it cannot be used in the first person singular in the present tense: 'Ja drejflju 'I get cold feet.' The verb bojat’sja, the most general one, can also be used in the construction with the preposition iz-za: Ja bojus' iz-za togo, cto on uexal odin 'I am afraid because he left alone.’ Bojat’sja and pugat'sja can govern a clause with the conjunction cto: On ispugalsja, cto ona tak bystro vernulas'. On bojalsja, cto ego uvoljat 'H e was frightened that she returned so early. He was afraid that he would be fired.’ The verbs designating strong emotions cannot be used in the construction with 259 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. negation: *On ne strasitsja smerti 'He does not fear death'; * On ne trjasetsja <ne drozit> pered nacal'nikom 'He does not quake <shake> before his boss'; *On ne trepescet pered otcom 'H e does not tremble before his father.1 However, in collocation with such words as bol’Se, vovse 'anymore,' 'at all,’ these verbs allow negative use: On bol’Se ne trjasetsja <ne drozit> pered nacal'nikom'He does not quake <shake> before his boss1 ; On vovse ne trepescet pered otcom 'H e does not at all tremble before his father.' This peculiarity of the verbs denoting strong feelings can be explained by the fact that these verbs under negation are not informative for the hearer: they give the information about details, without giving any information about the general state of affairs. The phrase On ne trjasetsja pered nacal’ nikom 'H e does not quake <shake> before his boss' does not answer a natural question for the hearer (who has no information at all), whether a weaker emotion is taking place. With the words bol’se, vovse the negation is more acceptable because these words imply that the hearer has some information already or that the hearer has some opinion on the matter. COMBINATORY PROPERTIES Verbs denoting strong feelings cannot co-occur with the adverbs of high or small degree: *On ocen’ <slegka> strasitsja <trepe§cet, drozit, trjasetsja> 'He very much <slightly> fears ctrembles, shakes, quakes>.’ The verb opasat'sja which does not imply any feeling, cannot co-occur with adverbs of high degree, emotionally flavored: *bezumno <zutko, uzasno> opasat'sja 'to be madly cterribly, horribly> apprehensive.' The verb bojat'sja, the single verb able to designate emotions which appear without any visible motivation can co-occur with the adverb bespridnno 'without reason': On 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. bespridnno boitsja 'He is afraid without reason.1 Of all the synonyms, the verb bojat'sja is the only one which can co-occur with such adverbs as smertel'no, panicesM, do smerti, kak ognja 'to death,1 'panically,' 'like death.' ILLUSTRATIONS Ja bojus', do nastojaScej literatury u nas ne budet, poka ne perestanut smotret' na demos rossijskij, kak na rebenka, nevinnosf kotorogo nado oberegat'... Ja bojus', do u russkoj literatury odno tol'ko buduscee: ee prosloe (E. Zamjatin, Ja bojus'). I sjadu na xleb na vodu, nidego ne bojus', - kricala SaSen'ka, v svoju ocered' priSedsaja v kakoe-to samozabvenie (Dostoevskij, Selo Stepanchikovo i ego obitateli). On teper' ne bojalsja - Sel s Varvaroju, a ne odin (F. Sologub, Melkij bes). Dovol'no - skazala mat', nadnavsaja bojat'sja, doby sxodstvo ne priblizilos', nakonec, uz cerezcur blizko (N. Gogol’ , Portret). Razgadal ja, kakie cvety / Ty rastila na belom okne. / Ispugalas', navernoe, ty, / Cto menja uvidala vo sne (A. Blok, Razgadal ja). Peredonov podumal, - ne vse gotovo k obedu: uvideli - on idet, ispugalis', toropjatsja (F. Sologub, Melkij bes). Spravljala domaSnjuju rabotu, xodila na rabotu kolxoznuju, ostavajas' na ljudjax tafcoj ze, kakoj byla vsegda, a sama vse vremja oziralas', pugajas' kazdogo postoronnego zvuka (V. Rasputin, 2ivi i pomni). Podumaj, i toncajSaja dremota I Uze vedet menja v tvoi sady, / Gde, kazdogo pugajas' povorota, I V bespamjatstve iscu tvoi sledy (A. Axmatova, Xudozniku). Sel ja k ljudjam s otkrytoj i detskoj duSoj, / Ne pugajas' ljudskoj klevety (A. Blok, Ty tverdiS1 , cto ja xoloden, zamknut i sux). Ona straJilas' ot'ezda i, govorja o nem, snova i mnogo plakala, a ja byla cerstva (I. 261 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Grekova, Vdovij paroxod). StraJites' samomnenija, moj drug (M. Kuzmin, Kryl'ja). Kogda straSiS'sja smerti skoroj, / Kogda tvoi nejarki dni, - I K plitam Sienskogo sobora / Svoj natruzennyj vzor skloni (A. Blok, Sienskij sobor). DuSa bol'naja, no mladaja, / StraSas' sebja (ona prava), / Iskala uieSen'ja: cuzdy / Ej stanovilis’ vse slova (A. Blok, Yozmezdie). Dysu i myslju i terplju. / Krovavyj zapad tak didesen... / Ja itot das, kak son, ljublju, / I sily net straSit’sja pesen (A. Blok, Kak son, uxodit letnij den'). Opasajetes'mikrobov? - ulybnulsja Fedor Mixajlovic (N. Dubov, Nebo s ovchinku). V tu poru, a bylo ito v konce sorokovyx, v tajge mozno bylo opasat'sja tol'ko beglyx arestantov (V. Astafev, Gemofilija). I skol'ko by ni ssylalis' na intrigi tretjego otdelenija, opasavSegosja narodnyx volnenij, nikak do konca ne ponjat', zacem ze vse-taki s takoj tainstvennost'ju, nodju, v soprovozdenii zandarmov, gnat' sani s grobom poeta v Mixajlovskoe? (A. Bitov, Vybor natury). Foma Fomic...pocuvstvovav sebja v soverSennom uedinenii, sredi buri, groma i livnja, prepostydno strusil, povorotil v Stepandkovo i pobezal vsled za Gavriloju (F. Dostoevskij, Selo Stepanchikovo i ego obitateli). Ja ne ljublju sebja, kogda ja truSu (V. Vysockij). Ej, Gavrjuxa, nice go ne drejf: derzis’ za vodu - ne potonef (V. Kataev, Belyj paroxod). On <Stepan Andreevic> vosel v cerkoV poctitel'no i postaralsja orobef, kak robel, byvalo v detstve (S. Zajaitskij, Baklazhany). Vsja trudnaja zizn' moja naudla menja nicego ne bojat'sja, ne robet', na nespravedlivost' nemedlenno davat' otpor (G. Vishnevskaja, Galina). 262 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NedobroMate'nicy iz naSej rodni uverjali, cto ona (mat') trepeicetpered Kostej (V. Nabokov, Dar). Celyjdom drozit pered nim <Gordonom Karpycem> (MAS: Dobroljubov, Temnoe carstvo). Takvot ty, car'Ivan,! Pred kem trjaslas' tak dolgo Rus' (MAS: A.K. Tolstoj, Smart' Ioanna Groznogo). PHRASEMES dusa v pjatki uxodit, ANALOGUES uzasat'sja, prazdnovat’ trusa, (s)malodusnicat’, osteregat'sja, smuScat'sja, stesnjat'sja, ne smet', trevoMt'sja, bespokoit'sja, volnovat'sja; CONVERSIVES strasit', pugat', zapugivat'; DERIVATIVES bojazn', ispug, opasenije, trus, trusost', robost'. 263 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. References: Apresjan Ju.D., 1974. Leksiceskaja semantika: sinonimiceskie sredstva jazyka. Moscow, Nauka. Apresjan Ju.D., 1979. Anglijskie sinonimy i sinonimiceskij slovar'. Anglo-russkij sinonimiceskij slovar'. Moscow. Apresjan Ju.D, 1980. Tipy informacii dlja poverxnostno-semanticeskogo komponenta modeli Smysl-Tekst. Wiener Slawistischer AJmanach, Sonderband 1. Apresjan Ju.D., 1992a. O novom slovare sinonimov russkogo jazyka. Izvestija AN SSSR, serija literatury i jazyka, No. 1, pp. 18-39. Apresjan Ju.D., 1992b. Systemic Lexicography. Euralex '92 Proceedings I-H Tampere, part I, pp. 3-16. Apresjan V.Ju., 1991. Slovamaja stat'ja glagola goret'. Semiotika i informatika, n. 32, pp. 16-34. Apresjan V.Ju, 1993. Prirodnye processy v sfere celoveka. Logiceskij analiz jazyka. Modeli dejstvija. Moskow, Nauka, pp. 150-156. Apresjan V.Ju., 1995a. Sinonimiceskij rjad glagola bojat'sja. To appear in: Novyj Ob'asnitel'nyj Slovar' sinonimov russkogo jazyka: Materialy. Apresjan V.Ju., 1995b. Sinonimiceskij rjad glagola tec'. To appear in: Novyj Objasnitel'nyj Slovar’ sinonimov russkogo jazyka: Materialy. Apresjan V.Ju., 1995c. Glagoly so znaceniem prirodnogo processa v integral'nom leksikograficeskom opisanii (na primere glagolov svetit'sja, merknut' i sijat'). To appear in: Rusistika segodnja. Apresjan V.Ju., Apresjan Ju.D, 1993. Metafora v semanticeskom predstavlenii emocij. Voprosy jazykoznanija, n.3. Arutjunova N.D., 1988. Tipy jazykovyx znacenij. Ocenka, sobytie, fakt. Moscow, Nauka. Babenko, L.G., 1989. Leksiceskie sredstva oboznacenija emocij v russkom jazyke. Sverdlovsk, Izd-vo Ural'skogo universiteta. Black, Max, 1962. Models and Metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 264 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Comrie, Bernard, 1978. Definite Direct Objects and Referent Identification. Pragmatics Microfiche. 3.1 D3. Davidson, Donald, 1990. What metaphors mean. In: Teorija metafory, translated under the ed. of Arutjunova N.D., Zurinskaja M.A., Moscow, Progress, 1990. Ekman, Paul, 1984. Expression and the Nature of Emotion. In: Approaches To Emotion. Ed.: Ekman, Paul and Scherer, Klaus. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. Glovinskaja M.Ja., 1982. Semanticeskie tipy vidovyx protivopostavlenij russkogo glagola. Moscow, Nauka. Iordanskaja L.N., 1970. Popytkaleksikograficeskogo tolkovanija gruppy russkix slov so znaceniem cuvstva. In MaSinnyj perevod i prikladnaja lingvistika, v. 13, pp. 3-26. Iordanskaja L.N., 1972. Leksikograficeskoe opisanie russkix vyrazenij, oboznacajuScix fiziceskie simptomy cuvstv. In MaSinnyj perevod i prikladnaja lingvistika, v. 16. Iordanskaja L.N., 1984. Slovarnyje stat'ji bojat'sja, vostorg, vosxiScat', gnev, strax. In: Tolkovo-kombinatomyj slovar' sovremennogo russkogo jazyka: Opyty semantiko- sintaksiceskogo opisanija russkoj leksikL Vienna, Wiener Slawistischer Almanach. Iordanskaja Lidija & Mel’cuk Igor', 1990. Semantics of two Emotion verbs in Russian: bojat'sja 'to be afraid' and nadejat'sja 'to hope’ . Australian Journal of Linguistics. Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 307-357. Jackendoff, Ray, 1990. Semantic Structures. The MIT Press, Cambridge, London. Kovecses, Zoltan, 1990. Emotion Concepts. Frankfurt-am-Main. Springer Verlag. Lakoff George, Johnson Mark, 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press. Liddell, Henry George and Scott, Robert, 1968. A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lutz Katherine, 1988. Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenge to Western Theory. The University of Chicago Press. Mandelshtam N.J., 1970. Vospominanija. New-York. Mel’cuklgor, 1974. Opyt teorii lingvisticeskix modelej Smysl < = > Tekst. Moscow. 265 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. F. Mixalic, S.V.D., 1971. The Jacaranda Dictionary and Grammar of Melanesian Pidgin. Milton (Q. 1 . d.), Jacaranda Press. Oatley, Keith, 1992. Best Laid Schemes: the Psychology of Emotions. Cambridge University Press. Ortony Andrew, Clore Gerald.L., Collins Allan, 1988. The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. Cambridge University Press. Parkin David, 1986. Toward an Apprehension of Fear. In: Scruton David L., 1986, ed. Sociophobics: the Anthropology of Fear. Westview Press/ Boulder and London. Russell James A., 1991. Culture and the Categorization of Emotions. Psychological Bulletin, v.110, No.3, pp. 426-450. Scherer Klaus R., 1988, ed. Facets of Emotion: recent research. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. Hillsdale, New Jersey, Hove and London. Scherer Klaus R., Wallbott Harald G., Summerfield Angela B., ed, 1985. Experiencing emotion: a cross-cultural study. Cambridge University Press, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. Searle John, 1990. Metaphor. In: Teorija metafory, translated under the ed. of Arutjunova N.D., Zhurinskaja M.A., Moscow, Progress, 1990. Solomon, Robert C., 1981. Love: Emotion, Myth and Metaphor. Anchor Press/Doubleday. Garden City, New York. Uspenskij V.A., 1979. O veScnyx konnotacijax abstraktnyx suscestvitel'nyx. Semiotika and Informatika, v.2, pp. 142-148. Vasmer Max, 1971. Etimologiceskij slovar' russkogo jazyka. Moscow. Vizetelly, Frank H. and Leander J. de Bekker, 1923. A Desk-Book of Idioms and Idiomatic Phrases in English Speech and Literature. Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, New York. Volf E.M. Emocional'nye sostojanija i ix predstavlenie v jazyke. In: Logiceskij analiz jazyka: Problemy intensional'nyx i pragmaticeskix kontekstov. Ed. by Arutjunova N.D.. Moscow, Nauka, 1989, pp. 55-75. Wheelwright, Philip E., 1962. Metaphor and Reality. Bloomington, Indiana University Press. 266 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Wierzbicka Anna, 1969. Dociekania semantyczne. Warszawa. Wierzbicka Anna, 1972. Semantic Primitives. Frankfurt: Athenaum Verlag. Wierzbicka Anna, 1980. Lingua Mentalis. The Semantics of Natural Language. Sydney, New-York, etc.: Academic Press. Wierzbicka, Anna, 1990a. Du$a 'soul1 , toska 'yearning', sud'ba 'fate': three key concepts in Russian language and Russian culture. In: Metody formalne v opisie j^zykdw slowiariskix, ed. Zygmunt Saloni. Dzial Wydawnitctw Filii UW w Biafymstoku. Wierzbicka Anna, 1990b. The Semantics of Emotions: fear and its relatives in English. Australian Journal of Lingusitics. Vol. 10, No.2, pp. 359-375. Wierzbicka Anna, 1991. Goss-cultural Pragmatics: the Semantics of Social Interaction. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Wierzbicka Anna, 1992. Semantics, Culture and Cognition. Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations. Oxford University Press. New York, Oxford. Zaliznjak Anna A., 1983. Semantika glagola bojat'sja v russkom jazyke. Izvestija AN SSSR, serija literaturyi jazyka, No. 1, pp. 59-66. Zaliznjak Anna A., 1992. Investigations in the Semantics of Inner State Predicates. Verlag Otto Sagner, Slavistische Beitrage, Band 298. Munchen. Zholkovskij A.K., 1964a. Leksika celesoobraznoj dejatel'nosti. In MaSinnyj perevod i prikladnaja lingvistika, v.8, pp.67-103. Zholkovskij A.K., 1964b. Predislovie. In MaSinnyj perevod i prikladnaja lingvistika, v.8, pp.3-16. 267 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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Asset Metadata

Creator Apresjan, Valentina (author)

Core Title Emotions: Linguistic representation and cultural conceptualization

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Linguistics

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag language, linguistics,Literature, Slavic and East European,OAI-PMH Harvest

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c17-491888

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