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The theories, practices and objectives in national social planning

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The theories, practices and objectives in national social planning

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Content THE THEORIES, PRACTICES AND OBJECTIVES IN NATIONAL SOCIAL PLANNING by Nick Massaro A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Sociology) June 1955 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 UMI DP23026 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. UMI Number: DP23026 Ph. 0 So 'ss wm 't This dissertation, written by .......... nick massaro............ under the direction ofl&X3..Guidance Committee, and approved by a ll its members, has been pre sented to and accepted by the Faculty of the Graduate School, in partial fu lfillm e n t of re quirements fo r the degree of D O C TO R O F P H IL O S O P H Y r\ _ _ Date.. Dean /Sr Guidance Com m ittee f,n Chairma. o ■ -...... TABLE.OF ^CONTENTS--- ------------------ - HAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION ................................. 1 The problem............................. . 1 Statement of the problem ......... 1 Importance of the study............. 2 Definitions of terms used ................ 2 Social disorganization ... ............ 3 National planning ....... ........ 3 Social organization .................... 3 Social control . ........................ 4 Social institution................... 4j Social planning . .................... 4 Society.............. 5 1 Review of the literature............... 5; Method of procedure and sources of data . . 8j i 1 Organization of the remainder of the study . 8| II. THE BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL PLANNING....... IQ* i Classic Greek statements of planning . . . 12 j The Middle Ages and planning......... 14; The depression era and planning..... 30! III. DEFINITIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL 1 PLANNING............................... 34| IV. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PLANNING .... 451 i Other criteria for classifications of ! j ! planning.............. 52! CHAPTER I V. FACTORS ESSENTIAL IN NATIONAL PLANNING THEORY The definition of national social planning K" Use of governmental control............ Rational factor in planning ............ The element of choice in planning . . . . Policy and planning ... .............. The planning process............... . . . The time factor in planning ............ Approaches to the planning process . . . . The planning situation .................. The modern national planning situation . . VI. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE ON SOCIAL PLANNING................ ................. The industrial situation and planning . . Influences of technology on human life . . VII. BUREAUCRACY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON PLANNING . . Ideology and the practice of planning . . The bureaucratic influence in planning . . VIII. THE HUMAN AND RATIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING ................................... Rationalism as a factor in planning . . . IX. CONSENSUS OF PLANNERS AND THE PLANNED COMPARED FOR DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN SOCIETIES . Consensus in the practice of planning . . Planners and the planned ................ I '... ' .... ~ ~ V CHAPTER PAGE The planned, and the practice of planning . 161 Democracy and the practice of planning . . 168 | X. BASIC SOCIAL VALUES ESSENTIAL IN PLANNING . TECHNIQUES AND GOALS . . . .................. 182 Objectives for the general social welfare 187 Equality as an objective............. 192 Freedom and choice................... 196j The balance factor essential in social planning........................... 200 Efficiency as a factor and objective in planning........................... 202 Full employment as an objective ..... 209j Planning for the general welfare..... 212; i ! XI. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES IN POST WAR NATIONAL ! 1 PLANNING............................... 215! i ; XII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS........ 243- BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 250J i CHAPTER! — INTRODUCTION "7 Social planning concerns more of the sciences than sociology alone; the economist and the political scientist, \ lto name but two, are particularly interested in this subject. The approach in this study, however, has been one of a 'Sociological nature, with an objective point of view. Planning would not be ’ ’social" unless it concerned human beings in group relationships, sharing common ob jectives in some program of action. The ramifications of Social planning in social life are both simple and complex; they also have far-reaching consequences insofar as cultural 'patterns are concerned. There are problems and issues which result from competition and conflict, and thus various forms of social control are brought into play. The objectives of one group may clash with those of another, perhaps requiring some form of planning that will benefit a specific group rather than society in general. Planning costs, however, not only in monetary terms and economic goods, but in terms ) of human and social costs. These latter costs are often the more important ones. I. THE PROBLEM Statement of the problem. The purpose of this study was to analyze the theories, practices, and objectives of social planning that have significance for the United States, particularly at the national level. The analysis was de signed to show: (a) whether social planning as a process also deserves to be called scientific in its methods, es pecially because of its dependence upon prediction; and (b) whether an integrated theory of social planning exists, 'or, what elements should belong in such theory. ' Importance of the study. Planning is not a modern /innovation. Certain aspects of it have been found in pri- / / vate life, industry, and political organizations back /through the centuries. Since World War I, however, a new / | , | phase of planning has come into vogue— that of national ' \ planning in which the power of the state or its government \ Is emphasized. Soviet Russia’s Five-Year Plans provided in great measure the impetus for the planning trends in the United States and other countries. Planning on a national scale is of such importance that the people affected by it, / directly or indirectly, should have some understanding of ! its dynamics and the costs involved. Sufficient data are | available for an objective investigation of the practical as /well as the utopian aspects of national planning. II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED Several of the terms that are basic in the development of this study need to be, defined in an introductory manner, although authors cited may at times deviate from the pattern of thought presented at this point. The definitions which ■follow are in part adaptations, in part literal, as shown. Social disorganization, as cited from Ernest R. Mowrer, is a concept that describes a breakdown in the functioning of the related parts in a social system. There 1 !is evidenced in the social system social-economic mal functioning requiring socio-economic changes toward the re- 1 1 ■integration of the system. a process of purposeful action to attain ends which are con ceived in the interests of the entire nation by means of Icoordinated policies which involve all groups of people and i 1 2 which are applied on a national scale. Social organization, as used by John P. Cuber and Robert A. Harper, refers to the integrated factors, such as physical objects, values, sentiments, ideologies and customs that bind individuals together and make them interdependent. i The parts are integrated into a general pattern which is ! 3 consistent with itself. AErnest R. Mowrer, Disorganization, Personal and Social (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1942),'p. 15* 2Emory S. Bogardus, Sociology (New York: The Mac millan Company, 1954), P- 401. 3john P. Cuber and Robert A. Harper, Problems of American Society: Values in Conflict (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), pp. 43£P4_39• Social control is, in the usage of Richard T. La ! {Piere, a continuous process of the use of means in a socie- | jty, covert and overt, that affect and define permissible be-; ! jhavior and objectives of its various members. Social con trol is also a continuous attempt at adjusting the various ! 4 social patterns present in a society. Social institution, as defined by Kingsley Davis, is . . . a set of interwoven folkways, mores and laws built around one or more functions. It is a part of the social structure, set off by the closeness of its organization and by the distinctness of its functions.5 Davis also points out that institutional norms form a definite structure, each of the institutions, whether economic, political, religious, or other, 11. . . represent ing a distinguishable set of interrelated folkways, mores, and laws, coherently organized and capable of performing distinct functions."^ /'-n Social planning, as used in this study, refers to planning which involves a major portion of a society. It i does not include the planning activities of families, business organizations, interest groups and the more common .associations of people. Various definitions are cited in ^Richard T. LaPiere, Social Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 195^), PP- 70-71• ^Kingsley Davis, Human Society (New York: The Mac millan Company, 1949), pp* 71-72. j 6Ibid. {chapters which follow, and no one definition needs to be given here as a specific choice. \ Society is defined as a human aggregate in which be havior is typically oriented toward the basic values in the culture. Society is a psychological concept denoting that a group of interacting individuals is participating in and sharing accepted values generally identified with the group as a whole.^ III. REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE The greater bulk of planning literature emerged dur ing the world-wide depression which began in the latter part of 1929* Much of this literature was subjective and utopian. The following studies have been selected as pebtinent to this dissertation. Karl Mannheim's treatise, Freedom, Power, and Demo cratic Planning is pertinent because therein he attempts to j {set forth a construct of a planned society which is called i ' J , the Third Way, and which attempts to resolve the extremes of Q collectivism and laissez faire. Lewis Lorwin, who hSs — — — — 9 A- worked as a planning expert for the New Deal administration, ( deals with the planners' worship of science and technique, ^Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19^9), p. 134. ®Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Plan ning (London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 5 6) " . especially in his Time for Planning. He gives scant at tention to the practical problems involved in the planning Q 10 process. George Lundberg, in Can Science Save Us? stresses the point that the ability to plan on a national ;scale will not become possible until successful methods have been devised to analyze human behavior, especially as it re- i dates to national social problems. In contrast to the views of Lundberg and Lorwin is Ithat taken in Leonard Doob1s work, The Plans of Men, which gives a detailed presentation of the problems in planning as Irelated to human behavior. He stresses environmental and social aspects, which are assumed to be essential in plan ning. 11 Robert Merton's treatise, Social Theory and Social ! m i.rr-1 i .«................. i ...i.......... . i ..................... Structure, deals with problems of theory and research which I 12 have a bearing on national social planning. Robert Mac- Iver, in The Web of Government, gives a critical analysis of ! the organization of the state and of problems resulting from 1 conflicts between science and technology on the one hand, ! IQ jand political and social ideologies on the other. D A ^Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper 'and Brothers, 1945)* J -^George Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1$47). 11Leonard Doob, The Plans of Men (New Haven: The Yale University Press, 1$407"T 1 P Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press'," 19W) • ______ ^Robert Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: symposium, Planning for America, edited by George B. Gallo way, is especially relevant because it contains so-called authoritative opinions and statements of issues involved in ; planning in the United States.1^ A useful text in the 1 15 theory of planning is Claude D. Baldwin’s Economic Planning, i which contains an analytical survey of problems that beset the federal government in resorting to or promoting national planning. The text by Paul Meadows, The Culture of Indus trial Man, is useful because it attempts to substantiate the need for national planning in the present-day technological 16 social order. Howard Odum, in American Sociology, summarizes past (sociological planning theory and appraises trends toward ' 17 national planning in modern society. Included in the book, Problems of Post-War Reconstruction, edited by Henry p. Jer- gen, is an article by Howard Becker, who agrees with the views of several authors he cites and notes that the age of The Macmillan Company, 19^7)* f -^George B. Galloway (ed.), Planning for America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19^-17^ •Claude D. Baldwin, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 194'2)\ ^Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: The University of Nebraska Press, 1950)' 1^Howard Odum, American Sociology (New York: Long mans, Green and Company, 1951)* planning has arrived. These works on planning provide a frame of reference within which the problems of this study may be approached. Others will also be drawn upon for specific points of view. , The extensive bibliography indicates the wide range of ma- I terials consulted. i ! IV. METHOD OP PROCEDURE AND SOURCES OF DATA The method of research and analysis employed in this study is essentially that of library research. The materi als taken into account include numerous monographs, books fetnd articles reflecting not only private, but government- sponsored research. I V. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE STUDY /^Chapter II deals with the background of social plan ning. Chapter III presents some of the definitions and atti- i jbudes toward social planning theoryi Chapter IV organizes the classification of social planning. Chapter V deals with< the factors essential in national planning theory. Chapter VI shows the influence of social structure on social plan ning. Chapter VII shows the characteristics of bureaucracy and its influence on planning. Chapter VIII emphasizes the •^Henry P. Jergen (ed.), Problems of Post-War Recon struction (Washington, D. C.: American Council of Public Affairs Press, 19^2). need for the rational element in social planning. Chapter IX stresses the consensus of planners and the planned, com- ; pared for democratic and authoritarian societies. Chapter X j Ideals with the basic social values essential in planning techniques and goals. Chapter XI reviews the policies and i t objectives in post-war national planning. Chapter XII sum marizes the study and presents conclusions. There is a comprehensive bibliography at the end of the study. I ....‘ .. .... ' CHAPTER II"" " j i t [ j THE BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL PLANNING ; i The purpose of this chapter is to supply the back ground not only for the concept of planning as a process which has slowly emerged through the ages, but also to call , attention to the way in which planning has arisen in the } United States. Social planning has emerged as societies, whether preliterate or culturally advanced, have sought for solutions to their problems. The essence of social planning has been j a growing awareness of the need to control both natural and social factors in life for objective purposes. 1 ___ i A major element in the planning process is its rational aspect— the rational attempt to control human be havior toward designated social goals. There are theorists who assert that planning has been practiced in almost every age of history. To some small extent, preliterate groups ! have been credited with having consciously controlled their ! 2 social organizations. The belief, however, that planning existed on the part of preliterate people, may be the result of glorified accounts presented in some anthropological ^H. B. Sumner, Planned Economy (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 19^0),”"p" . • 2Pitirim Sorokin, "Is Accurate Social Planning Possi ble?" American Sociological Review, 1:12-28, February, 1936. | Primitive behavior is viewed mainly in the following I terms: folkways, customs, mores, institutions, and other I ^traditional cultural values. These do not readily lend j themselves to rational planning techniques, but are gradual- i ly transformed according to the changing needs of the social order. There is some evidence in Biblical and other ancient literature that the ancients of the Near East attempted 4 ^social planning on an extensive scale. Ancient samples of planning may contain ideas and values of significance for contemporary scientific research concerning the art of plan ning. Justus Fredericks'* claims that leaders of ancient kingdoms in the Middle East attempted governmental planning. Leaders such as Hammurabi, a king of Babylonia (B.C. c.1955- I913), had plans for the construction of dams, canals, roads, mines, tombs, temples and other similar projects. No doubt i his outstanding example of social planning was the code of law. The Egyptian pharoahs, and Alexander the Great (King ^Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19^8), pp. 4?6 ff.; Bronislaw Malinowski, Coral Gardens (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1935)* ^Claude D. Baldwin, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 19^3)> pp. 10- 11. 5 ! ^Justus G. Fredericks, Readings in Economic Planning (New York: The Business Bourse, 1932), pp. 2d ff. I 12 of Macedon, B.C. 336-323) undertook planning on the grand I scale of an empire. Even though such monarchs made and : carried out many plans for specific purposes, their over-all I (purpose was the expansion and consolidation of the empire. j .They differed in their ideas of what the empire should be like and how it should be governed, which indicates that they planned according to their own lights. Classic Greek statements of planning♦ Early Greek literature furnishes examples of rational approaches to planning which, however, have been known only as utopian constructs. Earliest examples of leadership were Lyeurgus, reformer of the Spartan constitution (circa B.C. 9th century), Xenophon (B.C. 434?-355?) who wrote the Anabasis, and Plato i (B.C. 427?-347). Plato's Republic proposed, as a plan for dealing with the complexity of social interaction and organi zation, an arbitrarily determined social structure based on a three-fold stratification of society. His construct was, of course, a utopia. The Republic presents an ideal-type Construct of an authoritarian social organization which is I utopian, not only in its method, but in its basic assumptions and definitions of human behavior. Plato placed each indi vidual functionally in the social hierarchy to exemplify his understanding of justice in society. ^B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato (Oxford: jThe Clarendon Press, 1 8 71). In the theories of Pythagoras (B.C. 587-507) and Democritus (B.C. 460-362), two outstanding philosophers of " i jthe early Greek period, are presented opposed assumptions of | 'social planning. Pythagoras advocated in his philosophical construct a regimented social order, and he viewed social phenomena in absolute categories. Democritus, on the contrar ry, assumed the relativity of natural and social phenomena. National planning may be practiced especially when a state is threatened by war or other emergencies. There are (innumerable instances in history where planning on a nation al scale has been stressed because of and during major cri ses. When war prevails, military aims tend to have priority j and planning will be directed accordingly. An excellent illustration of a people’s failure to meet and plan for im minent threats of war is that of the Athenians and the people of other Greek city-states, who, in spite of repeated warnings by Demosthenes, were conquered one by one by Philip 7 pf Macedon. ' • Another illustration of war planning under a crisis situation is that of ancient China under the Manchus and the Mings. There was a continual need for planned social order because the threat of invasion was ever recurrent. War planning served not only for the purpose of protection but also to keep the autocracy in power and in control of the I \ t ^Frederick H. Cramer, "Demosthenes Redivivus," Foreign Affairs, 19:530-550* April, 1941. state. To maintain the social- system, a technique was de veloped to capitalize on the perpetual threat of real or imaginary foreign invasion. The fear technique, as a factor in social control, has been exploited generally in inter national conflict, not only in ancient but in modern times, also in internal political situations. I There are other ancient autocratic states that can be jstudied for historical instances of social planning though hot identical with present-day situations. In the ancient societies, controls were identified with family, clan, tribe, or kingdoms and even empires, and with authoritative heads of families, chiefs of tribes, or kings, all of these social elements being examples of social norms exemplified in insti tutions. Any planning had to be in terms of traditional ,o folk patterns and norms. The Middle Ages and planning. Throughout the Middle Ages, social change was relatively slow. Criticism of the prevailing social structure was all but absent during this i period. The Catholic religious organization was the primary ! kgency for control of medieval society and its jurisdiction included political and economic activity, religion, art and i ®Ch’a -Ting Chi, Key Economic Areas*in Chinese Histo ry (London: G, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 193677 Chapter II> Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1 9 3 8), pp. 372-375; George B. Galloway, Planning in America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937)? pp. 'tyl- 5 1. ” ' .. " ............. ■ ' “ 15 other areas of life. The Church, through the control of the guilds, regulated almost everything in life, from technology t to prices, work and leisure. The social situation of the times was conducive to this type of order and was centered jin a town economy. The individual was unable to escape the control of the small city-state.. The controlling body of the city-states was necessary and all spheres of social life were subjected to it. In this way it was able to dominate i 9 the individual and thereby control the entire society. The concept of planning, as understood in the twenti eth century, was practically unknown during the Middle Ages. Society was principally controlled by religious leaders and Usually a subordinate political ruler. The architecture of the cathedrals symbolized the absolutistic attitudes and rigid ideology of the period. The design and structure reflected the absolutistic "truth'* represented by the Church. j Social change, though slight during this period, was either of an accidental nature or to serve the purposes of the church. I It was in the latter half of the fifteenth century ^Henry Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medi eval Europe (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937)> ppT“AT-5T7” ■^Joseph Mayer, Social Science principles in the tight of Scientific Method (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19^4), p. 3 8. jthat an incipient change took place in men's ideas which was to lead to major social changes that are still in evidence, such as the Copernican (1473-15^3) treatise setting forth his beliefs concerning the universe; the work of Galileo (1566-1642) whose persistent investigation of natural laws 'laid the foundation for modern experimental science; and the beginning of explorations of unknown waters and lands.11 Western social structure up to the eighteenth century was transformed slowly. This was followed by a. period when ban's interests changed and became involved with what Howard Odum has construed as ”. . . from the human man-land, man- labor emphasis to technology; from ideologies to science; 12 from a producer's to a consumer's world. . . ., 1 I Prior to the industrial revolution, man was con ditioned to the prevailing dogmatic ideology and accepted social vicissitudes as ’ 'natural.” Furthermore, as Read Bain says, there was a philosophy which enabled him to rational- ! 13 .ize and comprehend social and natural occurrences. ^ I | / The industrial revolution helped to bring about a radical change in man's patterns of behavior and attitudes. The emphasis on technological change became increasingly i -^William Ogburn, Social Change (New York: The Viking Press, 1950), Chapter III. ■^Howard Odum, American Sociology (New York: Long- mans, Green and Company, 1951), PP• 56-57* j 1%ead Bain, ’ ’ Natural Science and Value-Policy, ” Phi losophy of Science, 16:182-192, 19^9* important in war, peace and commerce. However, even more important, was the change in social ideas. Social ideas 'such as those advanced by John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Spinoza (I6 3 2-I6 7 7), Montes quieu (1689-1 7 5 5) were fundamental in the transition of the middle class from having the status as subjects to that of rulers. Their social ideas are examples of the changes in thought that took place. Mannheim believed that their phi losophical theories foreshadowed the planned mentality of 14 our time. As Max Lerner has said, during the eighteenth century, the existing social organizations were challenged by the dual growth of thing-tools and social ideals. The prevailing ideology of the pre-industrial period was changed by the de velopments in material things. The redefinition of the social situation came about slowly at times, and revolution- 15 ary at others. ^ , From antiquity to the present, there has been a i social literature that is, in content, called Utopian social thought. , Utopian proposals for social organization are of i ■^Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Plan-' ning (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 146. ■^jyjax Lerner, Ideas for the Ice Age (New York: The Viking Press, 1941), pp. 20 ff., p. 432; also see Harvey W. Peck, "The New Economy and .the Machine," Social Forces, 22: 47-55* October, 1 9 4 3. ^interest in a study of planning, owing to the nature of their ideals and the social patterns devised. Utopian liter ature, at the time of writing, ordinarily reflects the in fluence of the prevailing ideological theories. The utopias of antiquity, for example, stressed the significance of the state; the utopias of the Middle Ages reflected the religi ous aspect; the utopias of the nineteenth century stressed socio-economic equality; the twentieth century has stressed 16 the importance of science and institutions. Extended monographs have been written regarding classical examples of utopias, among them being the follow ing: Utopias of antiquity: I Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus Xenophon Plato's Republic ' Utopias, The Renaissance: Thomas Moore, Utopia Tommaso Campanella: The City of the Sun. Valentin Andrea: Christianopolis. Francis Bacon; New Atlantis. Francis Rabelais: The Abbey of Theleme. Among utopias of the English Revolution: Gerard Winstanley: The Law of Freedom. ^Glen Negley and J. Max Patrick, The Quest for Utopia (New York: Henry Schuman, 1952), pp. 2-8. | : ....'------- r9 j Utopias of the Enlightenment: I Gabriel DeFoigny: A New Discovery of Terra In- j cognita Australis. Diderot: Supplement to Bougainville 1s Voyage. I i ; Utopias of the Nineteenth Century: Etienne Cabet: Voyage to Icaria. Lord Lytton: The Coming Race. Edward Bellamy: Looking Backward and Equality. William Morris: News from Nowhere. j Eugene Richter: Pictures of a Socialistic Future. Modern utopias: Theodor Hertzka: Freeland. H. G. Wells: A Modern Utopia and Men Like Gods, j i Zamyatin: Nous Autres. j t Aldous Huxley: Brave New World and A Tramp * s j Utopia. I These utopias and others, are discussed in Journey | . i Through Utopia by Marie Louise Berneri, and in other works by J. 0. Hertzler, Lewis Mumford, Mauritz Kaufmann and | others. Utopias are discussed as value patterns in social re-i form in several books in current use, among them those writ- f ten by Jerome Davis, Harry W. Laidler, William N. Loucks and. J. Weldon Hoot, Philip Taft and Russell E. ; i P - — - - -................... _ 20' S 17 Westmeyer. Besides the "literary1 1 utopias, mention should he made of actual experiments in cooperative communal living, such as the planned communities of the Shakers, Rappists, 1 ft Mennonites, Hutterites, Dukobors, Owenites, and Icarians. It is of interest to note here that the authors and | I followers of Marxist and Communist philosophies claim to be ; Scientific but are at best pseudo-scientific, and in some j basic aspects these and other collectivist movements have j been and are actually utopian. %arie Louise Berneri, Journey Through Utopia (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951); Joyce Oramel Hertzler, The History of Utopian Thought (London, 1923); Lewis Mum- Tord, The Story of Utopias (New York, 1922); Moritz Kaufmann, Utopias: or Schemes of Social Improvement, from Sir^Thomas I Moore to" Karl Marx (London, 1879j; Alexander ' C r a y ' ' , ' The Socialist Tradition, Moses to Lenin (London, 19^6); Jerome Davis, Contemporary Social Movements (New York: The Century Company," 1930); Harry W. Laidler, Social-Economic Movements (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1944); William N. | Loucks and J. Weldon Hoot, Comparative Economic Systems (Newl York: Harper and Brothers, 1938); Philip Taft, Movements i for Economic Reform (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., { 1950); ahd Russell E. Westmeyer, Modern Economic and Social ' Systems (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1940)7 See 1 also John Eric Nordskog, Contemporary Social Reform Move- j ments (New York: CharlesScribner's Sons, 1954)> PP• I* 24,j 1 2 ' 8 " , and Karl Mannheim's article "Utopia" in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. | ^Negley and Patrick, loc. cit. Another excellent source for rounded discussion of secular and religious Utopian socialist thought and of communitarian experiments in terms of ideological patterns of this type is available in Donald Drew Egbert and Stowe Persons (eds.), Socialism and American Life, Vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), with extensive classified bibliography in Vol.: II. ! ___ ^This view is taken by Nordskog, op. cit., p. 124, j ~ ‘21 Contemporary social planning has directly or indirect ly been influenced by utopian concepts that have long exist-' ed in the cultural heritage, but actual planning has become more essentially material and technological in nature, j rather than utopian in the hope or assumption that political i - - - - - - - - - - - - - - planning can solve the critical problems in economic or other areas of life. | Such speculation about political planning would apply to recent efforts to establish political controls over the production and distribution of commodities, control over acreage and commodities, national experiments in electifi- cation as by the TVA, or the proposals of the National Re sources Planning Board. Legislative regulations for inter state commerce, railroads and pipelines, banking and finance, health and sanitation, and things of this nature are not to be confused with federal programs like the A.A.A., N.R.A. and Federal Area of labor legislation, like the Wagner Act. Charles Merriam, a past member and vice chairman of ! ""x the National Material Resources Planning Board, states that planning has existed at all levels of our national life, both public and private, since the beginning of the thirteen and has been discussed at length by Abram L. Harris, 'Utopi an Elements in Marx1s Thought," Ethics, 60:79-99, January, 1950. 20 George Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 19^7), pp* 1B2-186; Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939j, pp» 2 6 0 -2 6 5 ♦ colonies. He says; i .. . our forefathers . . . deliberately planned to make j America an industrial as well as an agricultural socie ty. They planned the use of our public landsj they planned our broad system of public education; they plan ned the growth of transportation even before railways came, helping the railways by huge grants of public : lands.21 Xilienthal concurs with Merriam's point of view, especially, with regard to the planning that has dealt with the granting of Western lands for agricultural and railroad development | A when*he states: . . . land planning by the Royal Proclamation 1763, the colonists were barred from free access to the West, through the ordinance of 1787, the politicians es tablished a different conception of land planning: The opening of the Western lands to settlers, and finally the Homestead Act of 1862.22 There are good reasons for regarding as examples of early instruments for American planning, The Mayflower Com pact, the Constitution of the United States, Alexander Hamilton's "Report on Manufacturers" (printed in 1791), ballatin's plan for internal improvements, such proposals as John Quincy Adams' Grand Plan for the development of the t national domain, and Henry Clay's-"American System" in which emphasis was placed upon tariffs and internal improvements. Concerning plans of this type, the following citations show how contemporary writers regard them. Lorwin cites Charles 21Charles E. Merriam, "The Possibilities of Planning," The American Journal of Sociology, 49:398, March, 1944. 22David Lilienthal, TVA - Democracy on the March (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 193-194. ! and Mary Beard who credit the Pilgrim Fathers as follows: I ... The Pilgrim Fathers ... by solemn compact bound themselves into a body politic. They agreed to enact ! and abide by the laws and ordinances for the general I good. Although they adopted the idea of individual i property in land, the Plymouth settlers retained a high degree of collective control in the name of the common good. Most minute affairs of private life were subject- ! ed to the searching scrutiny of the Elders.23 ^here are elements in the above statement which de serve further analysis in the light of present-day efforts in social planning. The Pilgrim Fathers attempted to es tablish virtually an authoritarian social organization. They attempted to regulate public life and the private lives bf the citizens, as well. Secondly, since time immemorial, rulers have used, controlled, and even crushed, segments of the population in the name of the "common good." Thirdly, those in control of the state have usually attempted to propagandize the ruled into believing that what was being planned was for their’"welfare" or’ &ood." However, post facto, the results have seldom compared with the verbalized prospectus. Glowing terms such as "welfare," "good," and i . . . . . "common good," in time lose the values Imputed to them through diverse experiences and become subjected to misin terpretation, criticism, and social rejection. Robert M. Maclver credits the beginning of social planning in the larger community to the introduction of some protective ^Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^5), P* 93, citing Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, Vol. I, pp. 50-51* (measures against the consequences of the growing mechanical Isystem of production which started in the nineteenth centu ry. He observes that the planning process was developed for [the purpose of dealing with concrete objectives, such as the i following: .. . to shorten the cruelly long hours of women and children, to prevent very young children from being em- j ployed as "apprentices, 1 1 to prescribe some safeguards against accidents, to require certain sanitary con ditions in factories and workshops and to regulate oper ations in unhealthy and dangerous occupations. ^ The rise of this social outlook on planning began in the nineteenth century, Maclver believes, when the need for a different social approach came to be recognized. Prevail ing laws and social conditions revealed the failure of so ciety to deal competently with certain social problems. It was during that time, for example, that the traditional poor laws came under severe criticism from many areas of socie- ty. 25 Once the United States was established as an inde pendent nation, wide-range plans were drawn for land de velopment, public debt management, expansion of transpor tation, and development of industries. An example of a national industrial plan would be that of Alexander Hamilton as set forth in the "Report on Manufacturers" which was pre sented in 1791* This was an integrated plan devised to 2^Robert M. Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: ;The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 336T” 1 25Ibid.,p. 337- stimulate industrial expansion. Although the plan was "national” in scope, it was "regional" ihnpractice. Hamil ton's plan was designed to regulate and protect industrial 26 development in the Northeastern states of the new Republic. Thomas Jefferson advocated the need for planning to preserve ? America's natural resources and develop an agrarian econo- I my.2^ The Grand Plan, sponsored by John Quincy Adams, of fered a plan for the development of the national domain. His plan was not adopted, but planning advocates now assert that the later development of the American homestead policy 28 of 1862 was a realization of his plan. Henry Clay's "American System" was a later proposal for national planning, in which emphasis was placed on tariffs and internal improvements. Examples of national planning on specific issues after the Civil War would in clude the evolution of the fair trade practice rules, the slow accretion of various types of social legislation, the development of railroad and public utility regulation, the ! growth of the conservation movement, and the development of pq City and regional planning. * ^Galloway, op. cit., pp. 5 ff. 2^Charles E. Merriam and Prank p. Bourgain, "Jeffer- bon as a Planner of National Resources," Ethics, 53:284-292, July, 19^3• ^Galloway, loc ♦ cit. 29Ibid. Some advocates of planning assume that there has been [continuous planning in the United States. These authors i ^specially stress the trend after the Civil- War. They claim ! ;that the development of railroad and public utility regu lations, the growth of the conservation movement, the evo lution of the fair trade practice rules, the federal edu- ? national policy of granting public lands for school purposes, ,with additional amounts for land-grant and other colleges, all indicate that the American people have a traditional tendency to plan. To be specific regarding the legislative trend, certain enactments of Congress may be enumerated: the Interstate Commerce Act ( 1 8 8 7); the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1 8 9 0); the Elkins Act (February 19, 1903); the Hepburn Rate Bill (June 29, 1906); the Pure Food and Drug Act (June 30, 1906); the Mann-Slkins Act (June 18, 1910); the Webb- Kenyon Interstate Shipment Act (March 1, 1913); -the Glass- Owen Bill (December 2 3, 1 9 13); the Clayton Anti-Trust Act l(0ctober 15, 191^); the Keating-Owen Act (September 1, 1916); the Adamson Act (September 5, 1916); the Capper Volstead Act (February 18, 1923); the Glass Steagall Banking Act (August 23> 1935); the Securities and Exchange Act (June 6, 193*0; i and the Public Utilities Act (Wheeler-Rayburn Act)(August 2 6, 1935) . 30 The definition of national planning apparently de pends not only on historical phases of the development of j 30Nordskog^ cit., pp. 315-31 6, 3 8 3^ jthe nation economically and politically, but also from the [perspective or bias of the would-be definers. The conservation program, which began with Taft’s ad ministration and became more dynamic under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, established a program to protect and conserve the nation's resources. While considering the conservation program, Galloway remarks: "This wide-ranging movement, based on study of prevailing trends, constitutes a striking example, of intelligent and forward-looking nation al policy." ^ 1 But Galloway takes the view that such an ex ample of "national policy" would not be an example of national planning. There is a significant difference be tween national planning and a national policy. Planning, as it is generally understood today, began about 1913 or 1 9 1 ^ Previous to this date, and especially since 19 07, a departure from the tenets of individualism be gan. The protection of labor and the enactment of social legislation became state and national problems. Gradually, ; i bhe state governments adopted workmen's compensation laws, enacted or improved child labor laws, and strengthened their I laws for safety and sanitation in factories, mines, minimum- 1 | wage laws, and laws limiting the hours of work, et cetera. ! i i ^Galloway, ojD. cit., p. 491- 32Lorwin, op. cit., p. 109; Ferdynand Zwelg, The Planning of Free Societies (London: Seeker and Warburg, 19^2), p. 68; Galloway, op. cit., p. 5* According to some of the ’ ’ authorities" cited, legislation of jthis nature is not over-all national planning. Of course not, hut state governments and even the national government establish policies toward problems and then proceed to enact bill after bill to meet the needs of specific problems or situations. ' y' In general, it may be said that, as the extent to / /which socio-political crises increase within a national state, the greater will be the incentive to find and supply solutions to social problems. For example, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, in the last half of the nineteenth ^century enacted labor legislation to/appeasp the increasing lunrest of labor. Later, in the United States, this class of legislation was enacted, also the rather unique anti-trust laws were passed to ameliorate social problems caused by trusts and monopolies. As Zweig33 and other noted students of planning have observed, planning arises in the social crises, and most nations have been in a severe state of socio-political crisis since 1914. The severe crises ex- ! perienced by many nations since 1914 have led to the belief that specific laws to deal with particular problems were no longer sufficient and therefore over-all national planning has become necessary. Zweig points out that "... the planned society known to us cannot be considered apart from 33zweig, o£. cit., p. 6 7* this emergency, because they are partly its outcome and (partly its cause. Galloway and associates select 1914 as the date for the rise of planning, because: . . . political and general social life has become in creasingly complex, [and] we have found more and more areas within which individual foresight and action are inadequate. There are also many problems which are recognized as incapable of satisfactory solution through private, as distinct from public agencies. This has been especially pressed upon us by the world-wide dis organization since 1 9 1 4 .3 5 ! Lorwin, as it happens, selects 1913 as the beginning of the present age of planning. He quotes from a speech H. G. Wells delivered in that year before the Royal Institute of London: I believe that the time is drawing near when it will be possible to suggest a systematic investigation of the future. And you must not judge-the practicability of this enterprise by the failure of the past. So far nothing has been attempted, so far, no first-class mind has ever focused itself upon these issues. 3o The 1913 date is also accepted by W. V. Henderson and by Walter Rathenau; the latter is a recognized planning authority and is considered to be the founder of modern 07 national planning.^' Galloway claims that when the United States joined the allied nations in World War I, it became 34 Ibid, ^Galloway, 03c. cit., p. 3 3 1* 3^Lorwin, ojd . cit., pp. viii-ix. 37w. V. Henderson, "Walter Rathenau, A Pioneer of the Planned Economy," Economic History Review, 4:98-108, 1951* I necessary for this country to plan for war on a vast scale. The depression era and planning. During the early years of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, the concept of planning reached the peak of its popularity in ■30 the United States. Although there had been numerous plan ning programs of the federal government in the past, the great depression caused politicians and their followers to j i advocate national planning on a more comprehensive basis. The measures undertaken by the federal government at that time were mainly of an emergency nature. The national en actments were based on expediency, subject to trial and error. Nevertheless, although there was no visible blue- I print and any attempt at so-called national planning was ex-i i perimental, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.claimed thatj things were being done "according to plan." { 1 The American conception of planning previous to the j I New Deal and especially during the New Deal was influenced I by foreign ideologies, although the degrees to which Germany, ! I Italy and Russia patterned their economies and cultures in | the direction of totalitarianism went far beyond what the 1 American people would subscribe to. The totalitarian countries adopted not merely national planning, but planned i economies, planned education, planned arts and so on, within; \ . ! ^Galloway, op. cit., p. 248. ! ; ^^Seymour Harris, Economic Planning (New York: j Alfred A . Knopf, and Company, 1948), p. 15. I 31 a more or less integrated scheme of over-all control quite foreign to the American way of life which could not so i easily be given up. The concept of national planning, how- i lever, had an emergency appeal during the depression and ! 40 post-depression period. Our 1 1 self-regulating" or free-enterprise economy was shaken, and since revival did not come automatically, the government began a series of tentative and experimental interventions in the economic and social fields. These ex pedients took the form of government subsidies or loans to institutions, banks, railroads, industrial corporations, agriculture; also relief and security measures were provided for individuals, the aged, the unemployed and the underpaid. In some instances, the laws served to promote the political careers of federal officeholders, though this was not the stated purpose for which the laws were enacted. The govern ment's experiments led to deficit financing as a policy and i {fulfilled realistically Adolph Wagner's law of "continual • ^1 Increase of public spending." Public expenditures served not only as a means of stimulating economic activity, but became a means for I electing or re-electing federal officeholders. The under lying objectives of political vested interests thus became ^°Cf. Nordskog, 0£. cit., pp. 405, 435, 496. ^Zweig, op. cit., pp. 53 If* ' ~ 32 Important, besides the asserted planned goals. Politicians have been adept at taking advantage of federal expenditures {to influence the voting of the electorate. Baldwin has asserted that national planning was not | practiced during the depression: I ... If the word planning has any meaning at all, it cannot be applied to much that governments have done during the last few years. If it is true that not all ! the measures of state economic action can be described | as planning, it may still be true that these measures are "economic, political and social" in character.^ 2 Without disparaging the lessons to be learned from the past, it should be recognized that our problems are in : ! the present. 4 3 It is in relation to the present that the { analysis of theory, practice and objectives of national ! social planning need to be studied. The present is an era | of recurrent crises and of rapid socio-economic change. As j i Lynd remarks: | The analogical appeal to past situations tends to blur . . . precisely the elements of greatest hope or perplexity, namely, the new factors, which were not ■ present in the earlier situations. 44 i This chapter on national planning has attempted to j i show that history has much to offer toward an understanding pf present-day social problems, although in the present com plex social order, plans would necessarily differ in degree ^Baldwin, o£. cit., p. 20. ^Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), P* 131- 44Ibid., p. 132. r -" ' ..... ......... ■ — ... — 33 land in content from the planning measures recorded in the past. Planning in terms of present-day cultures and problems requires different methods, practices and theory adaptable to the realm of national social planning, and the !following chapters develop these aspects of planning. ............ CHAPTER H I --------------- | DEFINITIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL PLANNING i i After several years of living and working under a national planning program, England's social scientists were still trying to answer the basic question: "What is plan ning?"1 There is much diversity in the forms of national planning because the planners tend to advocate their own I particular ideas of planning. There is no consensus as to what could be constructed as a comprehensive, integrated, and acceptable planning theory. The object of the following discussion is to determine in what respects planning author- o ities are in agreement with reference to specific elements and factors deemed essential in planning theory. f Lewis Lorwin discounts the use of planning toward 2 primarily Ideological goals. There are, nevertheless, countries where the concept of planning is wedded to an ide ology which sets up general goals as objectives. According i ;to his view, "Planning ... is a technique, a procedure, a 1 3 methodology, and not a system of government." distinction should be drawn between the concepts \ / f s "plan" and "planning." Planning is a method, a procedure, J -^John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (New York: The Mac millan Company, 19^8), p .lOTTT p Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^5)* p. viiTT” 3Ibid. /' and an approach, whereby a patterned solution to social problems may be achieved. The ‘ plan/is the patterned so- I ' — '" 4 lution, the organized outcome of planning. Ideologies carry no blueprint for proceeding toward pertain goals. If leaders and their followers in reform or revolution are to reach the goals defined in their programs, they must devise their own plans. This is equally true whatever ideologies or countries are concerned. The extent to which things and people can be planned is dealt with by Huxley in Brave New World and cited by Baldwin: If it could be possible to plan people as well as things, then perhaps all our problems would be solved by the simple expedient of telling people what they want, and training them to be happy with what they shall get. 5 National planning as a process of control necessarily involves the choice of methods and goals to be achieved. As Galloway states, "Planning is merely a process of coordi nation, a technique of adopting means to ends, a method of j g bridging the gap between fact-finding and policy making." The difference between a planned and an unplanned state is, i ^Ernest M. Patterson (ed.), National and World Plan ning (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1932), p. 3 6. i 5 A i d 0 U S Huxley, cited in Claude D. Baldwin, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois JPress, 1942), p. 6l. ^George B. Galloway, Planning for America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941), pp. 5-6. 36 as Barbara Wooton sees it, ”... not that human volition is i absent from the unplanned, but that the scope of particular ■decisions is there more narrowly limited.1 *^ In other words, 1 iin an unplanned state, there is a larger area of human be- ‘ i havior that is not controlled by the national government I ..--than is characteristic in a planned social order. ' Another distinction of the unplanned state is con sumer- sovereignty, which Harris has referred to: ... In the planless society, consumer demand largely, if not exclusively, determines what is produced. Con sumers’ sovereignty is the cornerstone of the system; and it is the task of the producer to anticipate the needs and desires of the consumer. Indeed, in some re spects consumers' sovereignty is a mirage. Producers (by controlling the range of goods or commodities avail able) .o. • will often deprive the consumer of his free choice. This does not mean that the consumer in a planned society has no control over what is produced. Harris goes on to clarify this point: ! ' . . . Consumers' sovereignty, impaired as indicated above, nevertheless is a dominant element in the plan- ; less society, and not, as we shall see, a negligible factor in even the planned one. In a capitalist economy, it largely determines not only the allocation of eco- ! nomic resources, but also, within the limits set by re- ' sources and biological factors, the total amount of re- 1 sources made available. Businessmen, indeed, made the decisions concerning the quantity to be produced, the distribution of output among capital and consumption goods, and among the sub-species of both; to some extent ^Barbara Wooton, Freedom under Planning (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1945), p. .40. 8 Seymour E. Harris, Economic Planning (New York: Alfred A. Knopf and Company, 1948)i _ , p_. 13. ______ they determine the quality of the items to be produced. They are, nevertheless, servants of the consumers— with the reservations noted above. In addition, the govern- ; ment to some extent protects the consumer from dishonest ' producers and sellers, and from himself, insofar as com- I modifies he desires might be harmful.° | All types of government utilize forms, means, methods, land techniques of control, but national governments vary in itheir qualities as a planned or an unplanned social order. There are other questions and other criteria besides human volition which point up differences between the planned and unplanned state, as Robert Lynd has observed: . . . there are some basic questions in the time phase and objectives that need clarification before an un questionable distinction can be made between the planned and unplanned state. 10 Significant questions would be: What is to be planned? When is it to be done? Can the plan be relied upon? For how far ahead can a plan be made? Will the conditions of the future support a present plan?'1 '1 - . National planning must take into account the social \ / ' / /classes and other organizational aspects of a society if it . i I is to meet the needs and wants of the different social I 2.2 i groups in the society. Knowledge of the social structure \of a state is therefore another useful criterion to / \ S v 9Ibid., p. 14. 10Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939)/ PP* 470-471* n Ibid. I 12Ibid., p. 472. determine whether a society is planned or unplanned. If an over-all national plan, or some sub-plan within it, does not meet the needs of the people or is incompatible with their basic values, mores, and institutions, the ’ 'plan’1 would not be likely to succeed. Insofar as essential cultural ele ments would persist, they would provide obstacles to change. Social planners assume that human groups can plan their behavior and therefore can control the consequences of' their actions. G. D. H. Cole, of Oxford University, who was In charge of a social reconstruction survey undertaken in England in 1941, indicates his faith in planning as follows: ... We have to take it for granted that the new order must be highly centralized and basically a planned order 1 in its methods of handling all the essential services, and that the foundations of this new order must be laid at once. I say this not because I like it, but because it is true, and it does not matter whether I like it or not.13 ! On the other hand, after England had undertaken plan ning in several critical areas of the economy, the London * Economist, long an advocate of national planning, ruefully admitted in 1947 that "Planning as practiced by the present 14- government is now clearly bankrupt." But why should plan ning in England be regarded as bankrupt? Would it possibly be due to any or all of the conditions suggested by Galloway: "is it planning itself that Is the problem; or the means \ l^G. D. H. Cole, Programme for Visitors (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1941), p. 87* 14 i London Economist, August 16, 1947, P* 266. iused in the planning procedure; or is it the planning goals?"1' * ; Other examples of current confusion in expectations from planning procedure may be cited. Wirth refers to :". . . fragmentary, self-contradictory, unintelligent plan ning . . . He acknowledges uncertainty about the self- I ^contradictory planning which is going on in society, but i feels that planning is one of the sure roads by which a 17 democratic society is preserved. 1 Lederer conceives of actual planning as meaning anything from the introduction of partial planning measures to the complete transformation of 18 the entire social system. Graham's confidence in planning goes to the extreme where he claims that: "The degree of civilization that man kind has yet attained, and any conceivable progress therein, „19 has been and will be, attained by planning. ; Appraisals of planning differ in other respects. O 1 j ^Galloway, op. cit., p. 4 7. •^Louis Wirth, "The Prospects of Regional Research in Relation to Social Planning," in Herbert Blumer and Ernest Burgess, The Human Side of Planning (Chicago: American Sociological Society, 1935)# P* 107* ■^Louis Wirth, cited by Howard Odum, American Soci ology (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1951)1 P* 2 3 3. •^Emil Lederer, "National Economic Planning," Encyclo pedia of the Social Sciences, 11:197-205,^ January, 19'4 '8 . D. Graham, "Review of Friedrich A. Hayek, Indi vidualism and Economic Order," in American Economic Review, ; 3 ' 9 " : 775-7777~7une7~T94^♦ .... .. . “ ~ -------- iLorwin claims that "Planning must be ajo§tional function in method as well as in purpose and must have a measure of i O Q government authority." Baldwin, taking an opposite point !of view, says that planning may be undertaken by agencies ! i 21 other than the state. Dimock believes that planning is neither "crystal gazing" nor "blue printing," but rather "looking ahead." 22 Apparently planning should be regarded not as a pass ing fad, but as a vital principle which offers a new ap proach to our social problems and which lends itself to a gradual extension and elaboration both in thought and in practice. It is, as Harris states, "... possible to plan for a capitalist, a socialist, or a fascist state; and in i 23 fact, all types of governments indulge in planning. . . ." There are exponents of planning who would limit national planning to the conservation of natural, economic and fi nancial resources. But, planning may also be regarded as a psychological process of changing social unawareness to social awareness. There is also the notion that social planning does not deal particularly with individual or group interests but primarily is concerned with the welfare of the 20Lorwin, o£. cit., p..44. “ ^Baldwin, 0£. cit♦, p. 16. 22Marshall Dimock, Business and Government (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 194$j, p. 731”' j ^Harris, o£. cit., p. 1 3. ^population as a whole. | There also are doubtful or negative views toward :social planning. Some sociologists are not convinced of the 'feasibility of planning. Pitirim Sorokin, for example, i says, . . . the possibility of planning will have to be measured in terms of the results achieved with those predicted, and as yet, social prediction of social phenomena is an unsolved problem.2^- There is not a little negative feeling toward social planning. The English writer on planning, John Gloag, at tributes present unpopularity of planners and planning to the misinterpretation of these terms by politicians, econo mists and sociologists.2^ In a goodly amount of political literature the terms ’ ’ planner” and "planning" are used in a derogatory manner. Planners are, for instance, lumped to gether and identified as "social engineers," or "those high-; brows who want to push others around." Planning is becoming a word that is suspect. | Occasionally, writers and planners have dodged the ! usage of the terms "plan" and "planning," seeking some more attractive terms to escape emotional reactions of a negative nature. Instead of "planning," the term "policy" appears to be more pleasant. Lerner and Lasswell have suggested that i ^Pitirim Sorokin, "Is Accurate Social Planning Possi ble?" American Sociological Review, 1:12, February, 1936. 25john Qioag, "Planning and Ordinary People," Town ; and Country Planning, 25:509-515, March, 1953- j Impolicy” or ’ 'development” would mean the same thing as 26 j"planning." Other substitutions have been mentioned by ^Meadows, who agrees that planners and social scientists use i 27 smany terms and phrases suggestive of the planning concept. Because some form of hierarchical social structure is in- I herent in national planning, the terms "executive leader ship," "due process of administration," " industrial juris prudence," and "the managed market," are often used as sub stitutes for national planning. In sociological literature, such terms as "subsidy," "public welfare," "conservation of resources," "social justice," and "the general welfare" are used to rationalize the planning concepts and their impli cations . Bowdry believes the word "social," as used in nation al social planning, is an attempt, primarily, to denote with a single word that planning deals with the behavior of people mainly in groups, and that all planning, whether it 1 is called political, economic, psychological or administra- pQ tive must be thought of in a social configuration. All i planning is social planning. The use of the adjective 1 Pfi Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1950); Harold Lasswell and Alba Lerner, The Policy Sciences (Stan ford: Stanford University Press, 1951), Chap. VI. j j ^Meadows, op. cit., pp. 192-193• j 2®Barbara Bowdry, "Usages of the Term 'Social'," Phi losophy of Science, 9:356-361, October, 194-2. ! | ' ” “ ' ^2 { ’ ’social" indicates that human interaction is a dynamic If actor in planning. The word "planning" needs to be considered not only in the context of definition, but of authoritative action. What has been said about planning also applies to the "plan" which is the result of planning. So much misconstruction and misuse of these terms has occurred that, as Sumner r e 7 marks, "People become afraid to use the word ‘plan. 1 It is supposed to be radical or something bad."2^ There are people who regard these concepts positively and hopefully, and freely use them as symbols or shibboleths, even though spe- j cific meaning and insight are lacking. i Baldwin has said that the word planning is misunder stood as a symbol both by reactionaries and liberals, eitherj i of whom may attack and/or defend it, according to the inter/ ests of either group. Moreover, the concept may be accepted or refuted on sectional and regional grounds.3* often plan- i ning is viewed in abstraction, disregarding its being a process of social control. It should be remembered, however, that to plan is to order or organize, and to organize is to j 2%i. B. Sumner, Planned Economy (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 19*1-0), p. 63* 3°Edward c. Lindeman, "Planning an Orderly Method for Social Change," The Annals, 162:12-18, July, 1932. ^ B a l d w i n , op. cit., p. 2 7. For a partisan analysis of the word "planning," see Lewis Wirth, Community for Peace; Time Living (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19%5T> j Introduction. ...... i control. The state or national government may, at times, ■and all too often, exercise control without first having ! , carefully planned its action or having looked ahead to an- i tieipate the possible outcome. Planning, which of course may be concerned with the control over things, also affects the behavior of people concerned. Limits may be set to the i movements and choices of the people. Social control is therefore an essential factor in the theory of planning, and a criterion by means of which to designate types of social planning, as is undertaken in the next chapter. I - CHAPTER IV — I I ; THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PLANNING I I ! | ' There are so many criteria for the classification of social planning into categories that a detailed presentation of those commonly used is essential for this study. The basic criteria include the control element in planning, in stitutional emphases, centralization or decentralization, di rected or strategic nature, direct or indirect, individual or group planning, qualitative factors, social activities concerned, geographical area concerned, physical and eco nomic, budget planning, structural and functional, emergency or permanent, long-range or short-range, balanced planning. All these forms of classification will now be considered to t indicate another problem that is persistent for an under standing of the literature on social planning. Meadows has ; shown that planning authorities have discussed five differ- : ! ent types of "control planning." They are: ‘ t j 1. No-control type of planning. 2. Business control-planning. 3. Mixed-control planning. 4. Selected favor control planning. 5 . Total control planning. 1 These types may be explained and described briefly as follows: ! ■^Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: University ofNebraska Press, 19$0j, pp. 190-192.! 1 1. No-control type of planning is a construct gener- i {ally used for comparative and descriptive purposes. This {classification is also used to refer to a preliterate social organization in which there is comparatively little formal social control, especially as conceived of in present-day ; planning. 2. Business control planning designates the situation in which business is largely self-regulatory, subject to a minimum amount of state interference. It suggests the im- • j plications of laissez faire. Meadows says the doctrine of i ! laissez faire is predicated on the assumption that en lightened self-interest can be depended upon to satisfy the 2 economic needs and wants of the people. Where laissez faire i obtains, business supposedly exercises control over im- | portant areas of political, economic, and social life. The primary function of the state then is presumed to be the protection of life and property.^ Instead of laissez faire ^ there is an optional term, ’ ’ private control planning,” which( 1 I ! Is undertaken without recourse to the national government, i : i The planning initiative rests in the hands of private business or industry. Hans Spier, as well as Meadows, uses > ( the term "private control planning.” If, on the other hand,! • i the government were to' take over the responsibilities of | 2Ibid., p. 1 9 3. ^Loc. cit. planning, Spier wonders whether the substitution of public j l initiative for private activity in planning may not 11. . . j i j . I 'require the sacrifice of other American traditions?” | f • 1 though Spier's question may be apt enough, it should not be | ! ! overlooked that business interests may at times shift re sponsibilities to public or state planning, especially in | cases of emergency. As Meadows states the situation: j ; | There are times, where the private planners in pri- ! vate business undergo defeats at the hands of panic and ; depression. Their harrassed ranks in retreat, the pri- i vate planners grudgingly though desperately turn to the ! state.5 ] I Baldwin suggests another term to use for this second ! : i type, "minimum control type of planning," a form which may have been applicable in an earlier stage of industrial so- 6 ciety. Although today there still are verbal usages of the term laissez faire, the realities of modern industrial so- " " ' i r T " " " 1 1 1 1 1 » ciety have made it archaic and irrational, or a survival j lacking empirical content. Baldwin uses the concept of laissez faire as if it possessed a sort of "ideal type" j j : meaning: "Laissez-faire in a capitalist system is opposed . to anarchism, which assumes no government, and is the polar ; extremity of economic planning."^ But laissez faire is a ] ^Hans Spier, "Freedom and Social Planning," The Ameri- ban Journal of Sociology, 42:463-483, 1937- j c i -'Meadows, o£. cit., p. 201. ' ^Claude D. Baldwin, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1942), p. 24. ! 7Ibid. myth. i 3- Mixed-control planning assumes there is an inter relationship and an integration of government controls and l jsocio-economic group controls. In this type, which some :think ideal for a democratic society, socio-economic group I ' controls and governmental controls, may he regarded as com- j plementary and harmonious, neither form being dominant. t Erwin Ross, an economist, states that where this type of j planning has been attempted, ”. . .a painstaking effort is | made in a mixed program to insure that the planning be as j Q | democratic and decentralized as possible.” He further ! states that an absolute balance can never exist, has never i i ^xisted, but, assuming its existence, ”. . .a thorough go- ■ ing mixed planning will be a feat of political and social ! \ engineering, the magnitude of which has seldom been seen in this country.”^ 4. In selected favor control planning, the state’s 1 > efforts are directed toward intense control of specific , ' * socio-economic activities. This type of planning was ; j characteristic of the mercantilistic policies of the Britishj government during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centu ries. Charters for monopolistic controls in certain trade j areas were granted by the Crown on the basis of special ; 1 1 " ' ■ ■ ..." r I ®Erwin Ross, Strategy for Liberals (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^9)> P* 9- : ____ 9Ibld., p. 1 4 3.____________ _______________ favor, and some of them were self-governing, as in the East {India Company. Favoritism influenced governmental taxation of imports and exports, although, in the mercantilist policy, j i 'a favorable balance of trade was a prime objective; the ex- j | ! ! j ports were to exceed imports. The government showed favor- , itism while imposing heavy taxes to subsidize industry, i trade and commerce. Today there are numerous examples of i ! I favored-nation clauses in tariff legislation within the ; I • I British Commonwealth of Nations and also between many nations that are independent of such bonds of sympathy. ! j 5- Total-control planning provides for total or over-all control by the government. This system of planning may also be regarded as an ideal-type construct. As the term is used by Doob, it signifies ". . .a plan that seeks J i or attains a rigid control over a significantly large { portion of human activity.”1^ ! : The Soviet System has featured total-control plan- 1 ! 1 ning, but nevertheless it has been characterized by gradual-! Ism and still is far from comprehensive. Under the Five ! : i Year plans, which were presumed to cover many interrelated ! phases of social and economic activity, the degree and j thoroughness of planning has varied.1' 3 ' ! 10Leonard Doob, The Plans of Men (New Haven: Yale ; University Press, 19^0), p. 1?2. ~See also Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (Chicago: North- { western University Press, 19^4), p• 595- I 13-S. Strumilin, Problems of Planning in the USSR .(Moscow: Academy of Science, 193^)> PP• 16-21. ^ ___■ ' Not enough attention has been given to social welfare^ ! I jin Soviet planning. In fact, Lorwin questions that total j i jnational social planning has or is taking place in Russia. ! jin his judgment, j j } Soviet planning is primarily a planning of production, a system of production budgeting which views the entire j productive equipment of the country as a unit to be used for developmental purposes determined by the govern- j ment.1^ j In the Soviet Union the attainment of set production ! goals through industrial planning has been achieved at the j i expense of human needs. Oxenfeldt, among other critics, | emphasizes this, where he says: j The execution of industrial plans and goals, rigidly ! supervised and enforced by the state are at the expense , of other basic cultural needs. In fact, voluntary ac tivity by labor, management and consumers is not evi denced or allowed.*3 That Soviet Russia is an actual example of total con- ! trol planning is, in a sense, a myth. This myth can be "de-! bunked" by realizing, with Lorwin, that i . . . no country is capable of total planning: There j are planners who believe that national planning cannot i be carried out at all unless it is comprehensive in j ! scope and embraces all phases of the society.1^ j Florinsky agrees that flexibility in Soviet planning . i 12Lewis L. Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^5)> pp• 35-36. •^Reinhart Oxenfeldt, Economic Systems in Action: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the~United Kingdom pTew York: Rinehart and Company, 1952), p. 13&• • ^Lorwin, op. cit., pp. 11-12. is essential because in Soviet planning, as in any other j aystem of national planning, it is necessary to make cor- j 'rections from time to time to remedy situations incident to j 0 ve r- f ul f i 1Iment and under-fulfillment of specific details j in plans being enforced.1" * 1 i t In total control planning, where edicts and ukases I ; S are enforced upon individuals and groups, human choices are j virtually eliminated.1^ * : I There is a difference between over-all planning and j over-all control. Over-all planning requires attention to i innumerable details or minutiae; detailed instructions about; nearly every phase of the activity are drawn up and are ex pected to be carried out. In over-all planning, the nation al government deals with not only economics but practically all phases of human activity. | Total planning is sometimes conceived of as tran scending national boundaries. Alvin Hanson states that total planning should not be limited to national planning because ; , i planning for the future cannot stop short at national bounda- 17 ries. ' Flanders agrees with Hanson, that planning must be ■^Michael Florinsky, Toward an Understanding of Russia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193*5)/ PP* 91-97* , -^George b . Galloway, Planning for America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19^-1), pp. 50^-505* ^Alvin Hanson, et ajL., The United States after the War (New York: Cornell University Press, 19^5)> PP• 7-1B/24. ..... *............. ~ 52. 18 ! world planning or it will not be planning. And Lorwin, j 1 f who has given particular attention to the international j i ! aspects of planning, maintains that no country is in a po- | j j |sition at present to contemplate total planning as a practi-; i IQ ! cal possibility. ^ ■ Total-control type planning is limited by resources, j ( * by psychological, national and international considerations,! i t and by the lack of experience and necessary information con cerning individual and social behavior. Concerning total j planning, the economist Wright observes: j If a large and dynamic society attempts to plan all I its activities for a long future within its entirety, the governing authority will presently lack any object- ; ive standards for guidance other than the complaints , which the administration of the plan enlists. If it , ! heeds the complaints, its plan will cease to be general | and permanent. If it ignores them, administration of ! the plan will be Increasingly resisted. If it suppres ses them, it will have abandoned democracy and libertyr0 Other criteria for classifications of planning. The , planning constructs do not form exclusive categories, though; it may be assumed that they do so for purposes of comparison. f 1 ! They are developed and typed according to subject matter ; j emphasized, such as economic, political, social, l%lalph g. Flanders, "Limitations and Possibilities { of Economic Planning," in Ernest M. Patterson (ed.), Nation-! al and World Planning,(Philadelphia: American Academy of . Political and Social Science, 1932), p. 42. •^Lorwin, o£. cit., pp. 35 ff. 2%avid McCord Wright, Capitalism (New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951), P_._ 214. _____________ ! institutional, and industrial. Planning may be undertaken by an individual or a group. Classifications have been made iunder the three categories, business, socialistic, and socid- | i | 21 ! •progressive. Planning may also be public or private. j i | i Baldwin remarks, owing to the overlapping and interrelated- | : ' ‘ f ness of planning, that, j . . . not to distinguish between the types of planning j on the basis of what part of life is being affected I leads to confusion and loose thinking, although all I types are obviously inextricably interconnected.22 j Sorokin also observes that almost all planning repre sents a mixture of different types of planning constructs.2^ i Among the factors that designate types of planning is the degree of centralization or decentralization which it | pk 1 possesses. These two aspects are emphasized by Meadows 25 ' and by Robbins, whereas Zweig claims there is a reciprocal relation between centralization and planning. To be sure that his view is understood, he should be cited exactly: i . . . the mere existence of centralization leads to planning of some kind. ... we may say, in general, j that planning leads to centralization and centralization 21Lorwin, op. cit., p. 130. 22Baldwin, 0£. cit., p. 80. t 23pitirim Sorokin, "Is Accurate Social Planning Possi ble?" American Sociological Review, 1:12, February, 1936. 1 ^Meadows, op. cit., p. 200. 2^Lionel Robbins, The Economic Basis of Class Conflict and Other EssaysTn Political Economy ^London: The Macmillan Company, Ltd., 1939}> PP* 50-51- I 26 l e a d s t o p l a n n i n g . T h e c h o i c e b e t w e e n c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a n d d e c e n t r a l i - ! j ! ' z a t i o n o f p l a n n i n g h a s b e e n o f s o m e c o n c e r n t o t h e p e o p l e o f t | t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g t h e l a s t g e n e r a t i o n . S o m e p l a n n e r s a n d s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s h a v e v i e w e d t h e N e w D e a l a s a t r e n d j 27 ' t o w a r d c e n t r a l i z e d n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g . ' G a l l o w a y , h o w e v e r , j o b s e r v e s t h a t m o s t p l a n n i n g i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o d a t e h a s | b e e n o f t h e " . . . b a s t a r d t y p e o f i n t e r e s t - g r o u p p l a n n i n g ' f o r i n d u s t r y , a g r i c u l t u r e , o r l a b o r a n d n o t g e n u i n e s o c i a l ! 28 p l a n n i n g i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y . " J. M. 1 C l a r k s t a t e s , i n S o c i a l C o n t r o l o f B u s i n e s s : j ! T h e N e w D e a l , a s t o p l a n n i n g t h e c o n t r o l o f d e p r e s - j s i o n s , i s i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f a d o c t o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g r e s t o r a t i v e s t o a p a t i e n t a n d w a t c h i n g w h i l e t h e p a t i e n t a l t e r n a t e l y r e v i v e s a n d r e l a p s e s . : A c c o r d i n g t o L a n d a u e r , t h e N e w D e a l d i d n o t e v e n a t t e m p t " p a r t i a l p l a n n i n g , " b u t w a s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p h y s i c a l e f - ; 80 f e c t s o f i m m e d i a t e e c o n o m i c a c t i o n s . j I n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e r e h a s b e e n a d r i f t t o w a r d 1 of u F e r d y n a n d Z w e i g , T h e P l a n n i n g o f F r e e S o c i e t i e s 1 ( L o n d o n : S e e k e r a n d W a r b u r g , 1942), p . 17. ] 2^Harold Laski, Trade Union in the New Society (New ; York: The Viking Press, 1949), Chap. I. ! 1 2 ® G a l l o w a y , o p . c i t . , p . 6 . : 2 % . M . C l a r k , S o c i a l C o n t r o l o f B u s i n e s s ( C h i c a g o : ! T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 9 2 6 7 7 P • 4 5 5 • ; 1 3 ° C a r l L a n d a u e r , T h e T h e o r y o f N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c P l a n - h i n g ( B e r k e l e y : T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 4 7 ) 7 p7“T91. i n c r e a s i n g t h e f e d e r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r g e n e r a l s o c i a l w e l f a r e , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , a s G a l l o w a y r e m a r k s , " . . . t h e i d e a o f t h e p u b l i c w e l f a r e i s l e a d i n g t h e v i s i b l e h a n d o f t h e s t a t e t o r e p l a c e t h e i n v i s i b l e h a n d o f A d a m S m i t h . " ^ 1 T h o u g h G a l l o w a y m a k e s n o c l a i m t h a t c o m p l e t e n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g h a s n o t b e e n r e a l i z e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , h e d o e s s a y t h e t r e n d i s t o w a r d p l a n n i n g a n d a n i l l u s t r a t i o n g i v e n i s t h e T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y ' . H e s a y s t h e T V A i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t s c h e m e o f r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g a n d i s n o t a p a r t o f a n a t i o n a l p l a n , f o r n o n e e x i s t s . H e s a y s f u r t h e r , t h e T V A i s r e a l l y a h y b r i d b e t w e e n a p l a n n e d e c o n o m y a n d a s c h e m e o f 12 g r e a t p u b l i c w o r k s . i A c c o r d i n g t o L i l i e n t h a l , t h e p a s t d i r e c t o r o f t h e T V A ! S p r o j e c t , t h e T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y i s a d e m o n s t r a t i o n ■ ! o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t . ^ B u t G r e e n , f o r m e r l y a n e c o n o m i s t i n g o v e r n m e n t j I s e r v i c e , s a y s t h e T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y i s n o t a t y p e j i l p f d e c e n t r a l i z e d p l a n n i n g .J \ ^Galloway, ioc. cit. j 32Ibid., p. 105- i i i j 33David E. Lilienthal, "The TVA: An Experimentation 1 in the Grass Roots, Administration of Federal Functions,” ari address before the Southern Political Science Association, | November 10, 1939, Knoxville, Tennessee; see also David E. < Lilienthal, TVA— Democracy on the March (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^4), Chap. II. ^ C l a r e n c e J . G r e e n , A n A n a l y s i s o f t h e R e a l C o s t o f ; T V A P o w e r ( W a s h i n g t o n : C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e o f t h e U n i t e d • S t a t e s , 1 9 4 8 ) , p . 1 9 0 . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ T h e n a t u r e o f p o l i c i e s a p p l i c a b l e t o n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g s e r v e s a s t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r a s i x - f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ’ j s u b m i t t e d b y S u m n e r : ; i 1 ) b r o a d p o l i c i e s ( m o n e t a r y , f i s c a l , l a b o r ) w i t h i n > I p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e a n d p r o f i t s e e k i n g ; 2 ) v o l u n t a r y p r o - i j d u c t i o n p l a n n i n g ( a d v i s o r y o n l y ) ; 3 ) m i x e d v o l u n t a r y - I j c o m p u l s o r y p r o d u c t i o n p l a n n i n g a s i n N R A ; 4 ) c o m p u l s o r y ' ! i n p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y ( f a s c i s m o r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s m ) ; | 1 5 ) m i x e d p u b l i c - p r i v a t e e c o n o m y w i t h m u c h c o l l e c t i v e ; m a n a g e m e n t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e v e n u n d e r a l i b e r a l ' g o v e r n m e n t ; 6 ) p u b l i c - e c o n o m y i n w h i c h m o s t l i n e s o f i ; p r o d u c t i o n a r e s o c i a l i z e d i n c o n t r o l a n d management. 3 5 | I n t h e a b o v e c a t e g o r i e s , t h e r e a r e b o t h v o l u n t a r y a n d c o m - ! p u l s o r y p o l i c i e s a f f e c t i n g r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p r i v a t e e n t e r - ' p r i s e a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h e s e w o u l d b e i n f l u e n c e d b y I i c e r t a i n i d e o l o g i e s . J A n o t h e r t y p e o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n e m p l o y s i n s t i t u t i o n a l | c o n t r o l s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o l s , i n t u r n , m a y b e u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e p l a n n i n g i s s t r a t e g i c t o m e e t s o m e p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m , o r , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d i r e c t o r o p e r a - ! q6 | t i v e a s r e l a t e d t o s o m e p l a n i n c o n t i n u o u s o p e r a t i o n . J A g o o d e x a m p l e o f d i r e c t p l a n n i n g , a c c o r d i n g t o j ' S c h w a r t z , i s a f f o r d e d b y S o v i e t R u s s i a : j T h e d i r e c t t y p e o f p l a n n i n g i s l i k e t h e t y p e o f c o n - J t r o l i n S o v i e t p l a n n i n g . T h e d i r e c t i v e s a r e i s s u e d t o ! d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f t h e e c o n o m y t o p r o d u c e c e r t a i n q u a n t i t i e s o f c o m m o d i t i e s . 3 7 3.5h . b . Sumner, Planned Economy (New York: H. W. i Wilson Company, 19^0), pp. 6 - 7 . 36Lorwinj op< cit., pp. 57-58; Galloway, o£. cit., p. 3 3 - •^Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy (New York: Trentice-Ha1 1 Inc., 1950), p. 111. _ i .................................................................... - "57 I n t h e R u s s i a n s o c i a l o r d e r t h e r e i s a d i r e c t e d e c o n o m y — i t i Sis a p l a n n e d e c o n o m y I n t h e s t r i c t s e n s e o f t h e t e r m — b u t , ! j f a s i s c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e , t h e r e a r e m a n y o t h e r a r e a s i n t h e j i i | C u l t u r a l l i f e o f t h e p e o p l e t h a t a r e m i n u t e l y d i r e c t e d a n d j p l a n n e d b y t h e c e n t r a l i z e d h e a d o f t h e h i e r a r c h y . T h e I i ! s y s t e m d e p e n d s u p o n c o n s t a n t p o l i c e c o n t r o l a n d c e r t a i n • j ! f o r m s o f p a r t y c o n t r o l , a n d t h e u s e o f s t r o n g m e t h o d s t o j , i ‘o v e r c o m e c o n t i n u o u s s o c i a l c r i s e s w i t h i n R u s s i a a n d i n t h e j s a t e l l i t e s w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t o r b i t . I n R u s s i a t h e p l a n n i n g d i r e c t i v e s c a n b e c h a n g e d a t j a n y t i m e o n l y b y t h o s e w h o r u l e n o t o n l y t h e e c o n o m y b u t t h e c o u n t r y a s a w h o l e . S t a l i n c l a i m e d t h a t p l a n n i n g i n R u s s i a : d i f f e r s f r o m s o - c a l l e d c a p i t a l i s t i c p r o g n o s i s p l a n n i n g , t h e : l a t t e r d e p e n d i n g o n g u e s s p l a n s w h i c h b i n d n o o n e . C i t i n g S t a l i n ' s o w n c o m p l i m e n t s f o r t h e S o v i e t t e c h n i q u e , h e s a y s , 1 . . . o u r o w n p l a n s a r e n o t p r o g n o s i s , g u e s s p l a n s , b u t i n s t r u c t i o n s w h i c h a r e c o m p u l s o r y f o r a l l m a n a g e m e n t s ■ a n d w h i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e f u t u r e c o u r s e o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f o u r e n t i r e country. 3 o j M a n y p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s f o l l o w a s i m i l a r l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g i i l a n d c l a i m t h a t n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g n e e d s t o b e h i g h l y d i r e c - i i t i v e . I n t h e i r v i e w , p l a n n i n g b y d i r e c t i o n i s n e e d e d t o b r i n g o r d e r o u t o f c h a o s . j i L e r n e r a n d M e a d o w s a s s u m e t h a t w h e r e s o c i a l c h a o s i t e x i s t s t h e d i r e c t e d t y p e o f p l a n n i n g p r e s u m a b l y w i l l b r i n g , qO ' 3 John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (New York: The Mac- piillan Company, 19^8), pp. 9• I QQ •about order. The directed type of planning in the United States is often opposed in theory by the business segment of ithe population. Opposition has risen against directive i ; i planning on the grounds that it diminishes democratic con- ; trol, and even more to be feared, directive planning has a j i ' t strong tendency to become a continual spiral of directives j I for the maintenance of control. ; In a general way, distinctions exist between indi vidual planning and group planning.^ 0 Baldwin holds that | i group planning includes five types of groups: (1) the fami ly, church, school, or other social groups; (2) an indi vidual business firm; (3) an industry or group of firms; ‘ (4) the state; ( 5) international planning.^ The nature of . planning in any of these groups would depend upon the degree to which freedom or arbitrary government would prevail. In: total national planning, social groups serve as convenient and essential agencies for control. j Another classification is based on a qualitative : judgment of planning with types suggested as follows: ' 1 (1) static or dynamic; ( 2) conservative or progressive; ; : i ; --------------- j ^Alba p. Lerner, "Review of W. Arthur Lewis* Princi ples of Economic Planning," Journal of Economics, 59:537* i December, 1951; Meadows,' op. cit., p. 200’. ; s ^Galloway, o£. cit., p. 6. 1 ^Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 15 ff« / \ 42 I i(3) restrictive or expansive. Fellows classifies the major types of social planning' by the social activities they are concerned with, such as: ! | 1(1) production and distribution of economic goods; (2) de- ; i i velopment and conservation of national resources; (3) popu- j I lation growth and distribution; (4) scientific research; i |(5) education and communication; (6) health; (7) recreation * and use of leisure time.^3 Fellows states that any given j I instance of planning is likely to involve more than one area 44 ! of planning. i Another classification is based upon geographical ; i criteria, noting whether the planning is national or region-j j al. The regional type may, of course, be under the juris- i diction of a federal government or under some other form of , I central government. | i Baldwin mentions physical and economic planning as types. Physical planning may impinge on economic planning, t and may be undertaken without consideration of or with j little relationship to economic factors.^ Baldwin also ^2A. Goldschmidt, "On Economic Planning," in Manny 1 Fledderus and Mary von Kleeck (eds.), Technology and Liveli- i hood (New York: Russel Sage Foundations, 1944), p. 18. , ^Erwin W. Fellows, "The Sociologist and Social Plan-j ning," Sociology and Social Research, 36:220-226, March, 1952.. 44Ibid. ^Baldwin, op. eft., p. 11. ‘ 60 46 ‘ draws a distinction between social and economic planning. These forms may overlap, however; social planning may have ( (economic implications and economic planning has social im- | •plications. ! i 47 ; Slichter emphasizes budget and non-budget planning, ‘ j i ! In the budget type, the government determines how much of each good is to be produced; in the non-budget type, the government exercises general control over the size of in comes, but leaves people free on the whole to produce and consume as they see fit. He believes that neither type is 48 likely to prevail in the United States. Nevertheless, some factors of both types are now in evidence in the Ameri can economy. ! Zweig dichotomizes planning systems into structural ! 4q and functional types. ^ The structural type, he says, aims j I at changing the socio-economic structure and is revolutiona-! ‘ . i ry; functional planning would fit only into the framework of :. | the existing order and be conservative. In these categories!, I ' the function is related to the structure, and the structure j makes function possible. But every kind of planning, after j i 46 1 Ibid., p. 15. i ^Sumner H. Slichter, The American Economy (New York:! Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 98-lOTI ‘ ^8Ibid. ^Zweig, op. cit., pp. 97 ff* 'a certain time, becomes functional and structural. The 'structural-functional type of planning is based on the as- i I sumption that there is only one type of planning, that is, ! i j human planning. National planning functions for and through the human aggregate. J I Robert Lynd, in Knowledge for What? deals with the ; ;"do-nothing" type of planning.-*0 This type is in evidence when persons concerned excuse themselves from taking action i to ameliorate a situation because of their optimistic belief 1 that "things are getting better" and "all things will j straighten themselves out in time." This attitude usually ! t has some adherents, though the do-nothing type of planning j cannot be planning because nothing is planned. i Meadows and Zweig also offer a two-fold classifi- 51 : cation, the emergency or permanent types. The goals of so-called permanent planning are not fixed though the plan- ; i ning organization has a relatively permanent character. Emergency planning, in contrast, is timely and expedient in nature and designed for the adjustment of specific instances; t j of social disorganization. This expedient type of planning ; was attempted by the New Deal. . , There are planning exponents who prefer to use still J other designations for types of planning, for example, longJ 5°Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939)> pp. lOO-lOl. ^ M e a d o w s t o p cit., p. 201; Zweig, op. cit., p. 79. ! f --------- ' — ----— --------“621 I range or short-range. The National Resources Planning Board claimed that its primary function was long-range planning. As Millett remarks: The board disavowed any interest in current operating decisions of the government. It seemed to suggest that there was a dividing line between long-range and short- range planning, and that the second was of lesser im portance .52 1 Long-range planning implies effective and efficient use of the nation's resources, which, according to present views, should include the human element. Hanson advocates the long-range type of planning and deplores the lack of it in j the United States owing to the present waste of human tech- j niques and skills.^3 j Long-range planning is characteristic of Soviet j Russia, the Five Year Plans being an essential part of the j process. The governmental authorities use production ' figures specified in the plans to regulate the tempo that j 1 industrial managers and workers must pursue to attain spe- i Rli ,cific goals. | "Balanced planning" is a type which draws desirable | i features from several classifications. This type is pre- j sumed to serve no special interest group and only to promotej 52John d. Millett, The Process and Organization of J Government planning (New York: Columbia University Press, \ 1947), p. 50. I I ^Hanson, 0p. cit., p. viii. ' ^Landauer, op. cit., p. 76. j ; the general welfare. It proposes to balance the use of [ t : f available resources, industrial production and consumer j needs. Balanced planning is regarded as a middle ground be-j :tween total planning and no-planning. In terms of national I control, it strikes a balance between regulated and unregu lated economy. All the different phases of the social order ' 55 are somehow to be scaled and equated. ^ The principle of i balanced planning is that it must be consistent with human j purposes and democratic methods.^ Some planners justify ; the balanced type of planning as an ideal, although they 1 I feel it can never be completely attained. j I Lederer believes that a balanced type of planning can: 57 I be evidenced in a free competitive society.^' However, : monopolies, through the control of the market and mainte- i | nance of prices of goods through efficient marketing organ!-' zation, interfere with the realization of the balance which * is theoretically possible between industrial and trade or ganizations. j ; i Some advocates regard balanced planning as essential-| ly democratic, believing that there is less social conflict , when balanced planning is undertaken. Mannheim observes . I philosophically that, ". . . social cohesion and integration; i 55Qan 0way, o£. cit., pp. 46 ff. 5%eadows, op. cit., p. 202. i 57Emil Lederer, "National Economic Planning," Encyclo pedia of the Social Sciences, 11:197, January, 1948, ^ depend, above all, upon the proper balance of the rational and irrational factors dominant in industrial mass socie- ; I by."5 Later he wrote that the balanced concept of social j planning arose in the social philosophy of the early ‘ j eighteenth century, and found its major application in the j American Constitution. The rational idea of balance is bad-j ly in need of skilful reinterpretation, which has not been j d o n e . Finally, balanced planning is a process of adjust- j ing opposing group and class interests. In all these theo- j retical types of balanced planning, the basic problem is how to balance the changes from the old to the new attitudes and i values, sciences and folk beliefs, technologies and tradi tions.^0 ' ; s Some planners claim that the balanced type is a neu tral approach to resolve problems. However, Maclver says ; I that anyone who believes that planned action is neutral, en-j gages in myth making.^1 The planning presumably is for spe cific national objectives. To plan in terms of specifics is to choose certain objectives and not to engage in neutrality^ i 5®Karl jyjannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Recon- , struction: Studies in Modern Social Structure (New York: ; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948), p. 106. 5%arl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Plan- ■ ning (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 147 • ^°Howard Odum, "National Social Planning," Sociology and Social Research, 29:303-313> October, 1927* 0lRobert Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 199• ; r 65 j i This review of types of planning shows a need for ! ;sound classification. The concept of national social plan ning may encompass Soviet planning, Fascist planning, Nazi ! i planning, planning under the New Deal, war planning, plan- 1 i \ ning in the United Kingdom, the "scientific” planning advo- 62 cated hy the progressive men of science, and others. The conclusion that can he drawn with regard to types 68 ! of planning was stated by Bessie McClenahan. ^ Planning is i i f hot strictly physical planning, economic planning, regional ’ 1 t planning, or war planning, but essentially is human planning;. ------ i i i Planning authorities classify planning phenomena into| different categories according to their partiality for a : particular methodological approach, their objectives and other biases. A great deal of work on classification and I development of sound criteria needs to be done. ^ 2 Z w e i g , q£. cit., p. 59* ^3-gessie ^ McClenahan, "The Sociology of planning," Sociology and Social Research, 28:182-193, January, 1944L__ | ....... "CHAPTER*'V -------------- -------- j FACTORS ESSENTIAL IN NATIONAL PLANNING THEORY j | j The definition of national social planning. The j purpose of this chapter is to present additional factors in { I 1 jsocial planning that are emphasized by national planners. ; i Writers on the subject are not in agreement concerning ; factors ascribed to planning, though they claim to be scien-j :tific in their development of definitions and classifi- - rations. ; i Schumpeter finds fault with the critics who believe j that planning is a nearly meaningless term, and yet have not! < been able to produce a more meaningful substitute.1 Lorwin ! i remarks, "it is merely another panacea in line with ration- i alization and stabilization to which the world pinned its faith in succession in recent years." I Inherent in the concept of national planning is the 1 role of national government. National planning must be understood on a national basis. Planning is often described as collectivist, though planners are not in complete agree- , ment about this. The term planning has been so generally | | associated with the regimentation of Soviet Russia that it ! has acquired a somewhat derogatory connotation among •^Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Demo cracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1 % 0 ) , p. ix. ; 2Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^5)> p T lJ o . planners and the public. The collectivist methods employed | I i by a government could possibly be an effective technique of I j (control, though not necessarily a desirable factor in socialj i q ! planning, especially in a democracy. : j I : Meadows, in a simple definition, says that planning I 4 I means looking ahead. But looking ahead is not always | i simple. The process of preparing for future contingencies j involves deliberation, the analysis and investigation of all' ■the factors involved, not only to realize the goals for j which the planning is undertaken, but to meet any unforeseen i contingencies that may arise. Otherwise, it would hardly bet possible to make a distinction between social planning and j unplanned national activity. One may consider, in related j i sequence, Garis1 definition of planning as a process of pre-« paring wiser decisions. Meadows says further that there is no aspect of con- 1 temporary experience which is untouched by the attempt to J I formulate a scheme of development which, in the final analy- J i sis, is the essence of the planning idea.^ And as Karl i 3Lewis Wirth, Community planning for Peace Time Liv- i ing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1945)> P* 5> see j also Claude D. Baldwin, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illinois:, The University of Illinois Press, 1942), Chap. I. | ^Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln^, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1950), p. 3* -\john M. Garis, "The Planning Process in Government," American Economic Review, 36:409, June, 1946. i ^Meadows, op. cit., p. 196. Mannheim remarks, analysis reveals that the growth of modern industrial society has destroyed the basic form of free Integration in society and therefore there is need for the j ! I planning and regulation of the physical structure of socie- | ty-^ I Galloway points out that planning is the opposite of I ; i improvising. On the contrary, it is organized foresight plus : I corrective hindsight. So broad is his conception of plan- j ning that ! It takes all public problems for its premises and ; pertains to all the problems of government, economy and ; society. It involves the cooperation of all the social,) physical and natural sciences.° j Social planning, as seen by Patterson, is not merely ' an engineering and economic task but a social-psychological endeavor, ". . .a means for redirecting human behavior in ) terms of a reintegrated collective purpose."^ Haan brings 1 "incentives” into his conception of planning where he says: ; I i Planning sees its incentives more in effects than in j l profits. Planning breaks away from crystallized habits ! and from the opinion that economics, industry, business,; production and so forth, are ends in themselves, . . .10 , I ( i ?Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Plan- ! ning (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 143- ; ^George Galloway, Planning for America (New York: 1 Henry Holt and Company, 1941),ppT 5-6. j ^Ernest M. Patterson, National and World Planning ! (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1932), p. 16. ^°Hugo Haan, "international Planning: Its Necessity and Its Special Features," The Annals, 162:39, July, 1932. ' Hayek, an outstanding critic of national planning, ;says it means a centrally planned direction of the whole ■ 11 ^economic system according to one unified plan. Such plan-! I ' I jning is essentially a complex of interrelated decisions ! I i based on reliable knowledge undertaken by a centralized j I i government. Contrary to national planning would be compe- j titive enterprise and also decentralized state activity, I 1 neither of which would have a unified plan. Oxenfeldt, ; ; I taking a positive view, says planning is a form of project- I ling changes from the present; that is, planners decide in | what ways existing arrangements might be improved. Briefly, j 12 ' planning is a method of orderly change and progress. Al- ; though Lorwin claims that planning is not by itself a process of change, he does regard change as the objective of; I'D planning. I The views just cited show a lack of consensus regard-; ; I ing the nature of planning. There are factors commonly recognized as essential in planning, though some difference 1 i i 'in opinion obtains even for these factors, the principal j ones including the following: j i Use of governmental control. Social planning is I ^Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and the Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 79* i p Reinhart Oxenfeldt, Economic Systems in Action: the United States, the SovietUnion, and the "United Kingdom York: Rinehart and Company, 1952), p. 59* ■^Lorwin, op. cit., p. 89. frequently of such breadth and scope as to concern a nation j [as a whole. The national organization of planning requires [ Isystematic control. Lindeman has remarked that ". . . plan-! ! • j ning depends upon the planners' ability to create a new iI l ! science of social control. Wirth assumes that the con- j i _ ! trol factor in planning can be democratic, even though the , control is centralized. This, he thinks, is possible only j if the society learns to utilize effective techniques of j wide range communication now available for the first time ini 15 { history, for generating a sense of popular understanding. | ! There are planning authorities, however, who state that it [ is impossible to define a planned society in terms of de- ' grees of control, or spheres of social order, which are 1 subject to control. Zweig thinks that a planned state, as a social concept, must be explained by the method of ideal i types, rather than by logical definitions of degrees of con- 4 - trol. Controls used in planning have different social implif i cations. Whittaker refers to the subordination of individu- 1 17 i al and groups to a social plan of action. Merriam thinks ^ > 1 Edward C. Lindeman, "Planning.an Orderly Method for; Social Change," The Annals, 162:16, July, 1932. j ■^Lewis Wirth, "Localism, Regionalism and Centrali- [ zation," The American Journal of Sociology, 42:493-509, ' January, 1937* l6perdynand Zweig, The Planning of Free Societies (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1942), p. 28. j ^Edmund Whittaker, "Some Fundamental Questions on I 1 planning is designed to release human abilities and person- I 18 * alities. The most important factor of planning, according 'to Zweig, is control, and on a national level the control j I tends to coincide with the political territory concerned. | i 1 He lists several factors responsible for this: J ; 1 .. . 1. The steady utilization of economics is possi- j ; ble if their control is backed by a political power j which is also the executive power. 2. Planning tends j not only towards national control but also toward j nationalistic control in the sense of closed frontiers. 1 3. National planning pursuing its own ends alone, dis- { regards the needs and requirements of an international ; world and opposes internationalism. It makes use of ex-; change control, import and export quotas, managed cur- j rency, all of which create obstacles to closer inter national c o o p e r a t i o n . j It should be noted here that most utopian planning, ! from Plato onward, employs the control techniques in a ! closed or authoritative social order. Planning is viewed as rational, to establish centralized control of society, whether economic, social, or political. Of these areas of control, neither one excludes the other; they should be j considered as complementary. The underlying assumption of ; social-political control is the extension of the functions 1 of public authorities so that certain objectives may be ! t achieved which could not be achieved in an unplanned social j Economic Planning, 1 1 South African Journal of Economics, 3: 190, 1935- ^Charles Merriam, "The Possibilities of Planning," The American Journal of Sociology, 49:401, March, 1944. -^Zweig, op. clt., pp. IO6-IO7. order. | In national planning, the controls imposed place 20 limits on the decisions individuals can make. J 1 | Peterson stresses the factor of control in planning j when he states: ". . .a planned society means the deliber ate control or attempted control of social forces by some I group for the purpose of attaining or progressing toward ! 21 1 some goal." Rationing, for example, can be planned and be! ; t an essential part in a more comprehensive scheme of plan ning. Effective planning requires effective control in spe cific related areas. "Control is to mean the power to say: This and that plan is to be carried out . . . not merely 22 this and that plan is prohibited." ! i Loucks' thinking is that planning, through its f structure, limits or shapes individual, group and corporate \ activity into group-defined spheres of action which are rationally mapped out and fitted into a coordinated whole, j The purpose is to achieve certain rationally conceived and socially comprehensive goals. 20Ephraim Llpson, A Planned Economy or Free Enter- | prise (London: Adam and Charles Black', l^Tf, p. 31 A. J pi r ^ G. Peterson, Planned Economy (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1937), p. 200. 22F. Cohen, "Socialist Planning and a Socialist j Program, " in Harry W . Laidler, Social-Economic Movements ; (New York: Thomas H. Crowell and Sons, 19^B), p..70. ; 23w. N. Loucks, "Public Works Planning and Economic Control] Federal, State and Municipal," The Annals, 162:113- 11k, July, 1932 r ..... ..... | Sumner, who stresses the control element in planning,! I 1 makes no specific application in the area of economic and j social life where planning is undertaken, but he emphasizes (the need for one final authority, lest a hopeless and aggra- ) i (vating tangle of activities might be the result. In other ' 24 ' words, control must be centralized. j There is no need for complete control of all phases of social phenomena in national social planning; limited controls of certain areas of the economic or social patterns! may suffice for the purposes of a specific plan. Consider, J for example, the possible effect on the national economy if the Federal Reserve System were to change its policies drastically in a short space of time. Federal spending and taxation have far reaching effects on the economy of the nation and may even affect the economies of other nations. Lorwin has written: ( It is obvious that planning implies power of the i planning group, however small or large, whether an indusf i try, a region or a whole nation, to determine the larger; ; policies to which the actions of the individual members 1 ' must c o n f o r m . ; Controls in the planning process operate primarily • through social institutions. Institutions and forms of ( t i ! grouping that function as controls may need to be revised in| i Order that specific plans may become enforceable. Public I 2*H. B. Sumner, Planned Economy (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1940), p. 56. j _ 25(Lorwin, op. c i t p., 5 8. ; controls may encroach upon private controls. J ; J There is a consensus among planning authorities that j ! i Jthe control factor, overt or covert, is an essential elementj : j in national social planning theory. ; j i Rational factor in planning. Rationalism is a basic element in planning, and this is especially evident in the i ‘ t organization of resources, including both material and human resources, which are interrelated. Planning is purposive, - 26 • which implies rationality. Wherever decisions are based ; on facts, carefully collected and analyzed, interpreted and j applied, intelligence and rationalism are required. Genuine; prediction and forecasting are rational practices. As ! ! Galloway states, "Planning efforts amount to an intelligent : 27 forecast of the nation's future." The forecasting may be ; incorrect, however, inasmuch as the forecasters may not have control over all the factors involved. ; Ludwig von Mises, Wooton, and others, view planning ! I oft as a rational activity. There is marked agreement then, that to plan is to act rationally, so that the best means j available may be chosen if socio-economic goals are to be ! i ■realized. I 1 ‘ 2^Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 12-13. ^Galloway, op. cit., p. 489. 2®Ludwig von Mises, Socialism (New York: The Mac millan Company, 1936), pp. Ill ff. i I The element of choice in planning. Along with con trol and rationalism, choice is a factor in planning. Of course, the factor of choice would operate differently in a ! I democratic or free society than in a dictatorial or totali- 1 f I i f tarian state. Choice is not unlimited in any society, but j ^ I depends on the cultural environment and the way of life | i I pursued. In brief, the social scientist must work within j actual cultural limits, and so must the social planners. i Merton gives an illustration of this where he says that: j .. . a technician will accept alternative proposals for’ policy as a basis for research, providing only these al ternatives (choices) be technically amenable to research;. Now the researcher may have an opinion about segregation,: but since it is feasible to test psychological measures , for improving the morale of Negro workers without elimi-; nating segregation, the technician finds this definition; of the problem adequate and confines himself according ly.29 Even the adoption of certain inventions as a part of ' i planning may lead to some essential restrictions of choices. Meyer observes that ”. . . in a somewhat thoroughly planned , i society the success of an invention would within certain i I limits not be a matter of guess work, but of deliberate ; choice by the planning b o a r d . " ^ 0 i i It is important to note that in states having planned] ^Robert K. Merton, "The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum, Philosophy of Science, 16:172, No. 1, May, 1949* 3°Gerhard Meyer, "Note on Technological Trends and Social Planning," The American Journal of Sociology, 44:955, July, 1938. social orders, freedom of choice has been minimized or eliminated. In the area of production, the "planned socie ties," such as Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, and Fascist i i jltaly, minimized or abolished choice in certain aspects of ! ! work and production. They not only abolished the right to i strike, but limited the workers' range of personal choices. The USSR labor books, introduced in 1939, contain not only 1 i personal particulars about the holder, but his past employ- ! ment and reasons for leaving or dismissal from previous jobs:. Planning, therefore, may imply, and eventually re- j quire, a substantial remodeling and recasting of the whole ! 31 field of personal choice. This aspect of planning has be-! come suspect. As Mosse gives warning, planning could become a symbol of evil by reason of the limitation of the factor of choice once planning is undertaken.^2 > Policy and planning♦ The determination of policy and planning are reciprocally related. MacGregor says that ! I whereas policy is a directive toward a specific sector of ; the system, planning - covers the most significant phases of , 33 ! the social order. ° Landauer suggests that planning as a I I 1 :_______________ I S^-Zweig, 0£. cit., p. 62. 3 2 R o b e r t M0sse, "Economic Planning and Freedom," | journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 13:122-133, Fall, 1944'. 33d. MacGregor, Economic Thought and Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 194$), pp. 132 tf. ....~ ' ~ “ 77 method of procedure should be distinguished from a determi- < nation of policy, even though the latter is concerned with j I ! effects and the former with objectives, both of which entaili I -ak ' 'analysis and choice. Millett's view is that the federal j administration functions according to certain basic policies i and these policies fix the terms of reference within which ) • 5 c ; i plans are prepared. J The policy delimits the alternative i f j lines of action possible in the planning process. As Merton ! states: "Planners need to know the limits of their planning 06 ' as found in the general policy of the administration."- 5 « Hauser points out basic differences between policy 1 f and planning. The formation of social policy, he says, is t not a scientific function, but the process of planning can I 1 1 be. The formation of policy, the reaching of decisions, the conduct of action programs, should not be regarded as re search functions, but as administrative functions, and as ! I such might more appropriately be referred to as "social 1 engineering," than as "social s c i e n c e . 1 S^Carl Landauer, The Theory of National Economic Planning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19^7), 1 pp. 13 ff. ! 35j0hn D. Millett, The Process and Organization of 1 Government Planning (New York: Columbia University Press, ; 1947), P* 12; see also Landauer, loc. cit. 36Merton, loc. cit. i 37phiiip m . Hauser, "Social Science and Social Engi neering," Philosophy of Science, 16:209-238, 1949. B a i n , S h i l s , 39 ana Bierstedt,2 *0 agree that there is a basic difference between social planning and social policyj. These authors claim that policy can be interdependent with { i j planning in practice. They are separate, however, in both | i logical and empirical categories. Bain states: i The degree to which the policy-maker will use [plan- I ning] science depends upon the amount of confidence he has in its adequacy . . . There are notable limits to the role played by scientific knowledge in the con- ; struction of policy.^1 i And according to Shils: "Policy is forced by the irreduci- ! bility of ethical judgments. The results of social research' do and can play only a restricted part in the higher levels t lip ! of policy." | Differences between policy and planning appeared in f the Russian Communist Party's rise to political power. Popper claims that the words of Marx were useless to aid the new power-elite in the field of social engineering, and states further: I ... The vast economic researches of Marx did not even ! touch the problems of a constructive economic policy, for 3®Read Bain, "Natural Science and Value-Policy," Phi-1 losophy of Science, 16:182-192, 1949* 1 ~ I ^Edward shils, "Social Science and Social Policy," Philosophy of Science, 16:224-239, 1949. } ^°Robert Bierstedt, "Social Science and Social Policy," American Association of University Professors Bulletin, 3^: 2T0-2T37 Summer, T9TO1----------- --------------------- ^Bain, op. cit., p. 188. ^Shils, 0£. cit., p. 226. j example, economic planning. As Lenin admits, there is hardly a word on the economics of socialism to be found in Marx's work . . . apart from such useless slogans as "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” The reason is that the economic research of Marx is completely subservient to his historical pro-I phecy. But we must say even more. Marx strongly empha sized the opposition between his purely historicist method and any attempt to make an economic analysis with a view to rational planning.. Such attempts he denounced as utopian and illegitimate.^3 ! It may be commented, however, that Marxian ideology I ‘ i was not altogether "useless,” inasmuch as Marxism has, from 1 the beginning of the Soviet revolution, served for a funda mental statement of general goals, though no blueprint was ; given to point the way. i 1 It is necessary to distinguish between policy formu- | i lation and planning, even though some writers, among them j f Lasswell and Lerner, claim it would be preferable to give to; 44 1 planning the name, "The Policy Science." A clear dis- j ] tinction between planning and policy is, of course, diffi- | cult, owing to the equivocal use of the two terms by some Social scientists. The utilization of methods in planning. Planners emphasize method as one of the essential factors in social planning. Planning requires conscious selection of means 43Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, i"950), p. 79* ^Harold Lasswell and Alba Lerner, The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), Introduction. and ends, which involves both a method and an i d e o l o g y . 5 J i I National planning, as a method, utilizes techniques J to realize national goals. Social planning is essential fop ! I the implementation of the basic ideology in a closed-system j i ! type of social order (e.g., a totalitarian order). On the ; ! ! other hand, in an open system or democratic social order, i planning would allow for discussion, research, and consensus Lorwin believes emphasis on blueprinting as a method of j planning is an effort to adjust static analysis to a rapidlyj 46 changing situation. Merriam has stated that planning, as a method means: : i Planning is looking backward at what we can learn : from experience, looking around at what we can learn j from observation, and looking forward to see where we ! are going. The more difficult the situation and the ' uncertain, the greater the need for careful consider- ; ation of the course of action or alternative course of i action. More than ever before, it is necessary to consider our way of action with all the facts, all the intelligence, all the judgment and vision at our com mand. ^7 The coordination of means and ends or of methods and j ( 48 goals cannot be separated and is at the heart of planning. 1 ; W. Fellows, "The Sociologist and Social Plan-' ning," Sociology and Social Research, 36:220-226, March, 1952. 46 Lorwin, 0£. cit., p. xi. 47 i 'Merriam, op. cit., p. 399• Planning involves a continuous interaction between method and goals, with goals ; developing from the process of planning as well as influen cing its method. The latter approach is particularly associ ated with the work of William James, John Dewey, and the school of pragmatism and instrumentalism. ' l i f t i __ Galloway, op. cit., p. 411; Fellows, op. cit., p. Not only sociologists, but economists, political scientists, and others interested in planning have emphasized methodolo- ; I gy in planning. j National planning does not necessarily have to pro- ! !vide for a comprehensive concrete proposal all of which j f I 1 t would be put into effect at once, as if that would be possiJ ! ; ble. Some planners, however, take the view that the term j ’ ’ planning” should be used to represent only preconceived j plans, and not be applicable to partial planning. On the j other hand, there are writers who regard the term "planning” as used properly to represent plans which meet specific j problems that belong within the major plan, or which may ; jarise unexpectedly while trying to carry out the objectives | ■of the preconceived plan. The resolution of this inconsis tency in usage may be accomplished by evaluating two quali- : ties of the planning process— experimental!sm and gradualism^ Gradualism would no doubt be characteristic in longer-range ; fulfillment of a preconceived plan. It is likely, however, ! I ; ! that the need for experimentation will arise in planning, ; l I 1 and there is, consequently, a plan in the method of experi- : mentalism. In such instances, experimentalist planning i I would not be a preconceived plan; the plan would be immanent i iin the process of action, and conceived by and during that process. And so, to proceed by experiment is to proceed by ; 220; G. D. H. Cole, Principles of Economic Planning (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935)* .P.* 31^• _ r ' "" "■-------------------------- ■ ■ — 8 2 : {constant planning, but not to proceed ’ ’according to plan." j For a scholarly clarification of the meanings involved in j this issue about planning, the following excerpt from a work j I • i by Ernest Barker is of outstanding merit: j i s This experimental!sm, if it may be so called, is J ■ something different from "gradualism." Gradualism means, that you start from, and stick to, a preconceived plan, j though you move slowly and with a Fabian cunctation to-! wards its achievement. Experimentalism means that you j start from the postulate of the sanctity of human rights — but also from the postulate of the constant growth of ! new rights (or the constant reinterpretation and ex- i tension of old rights) and the consequent need of adjustj- ment between the new and the old— and that you are al- < ways seeking to discover, by fresh thought and experi- ; ment as you come to each new problem in each new gener- j ation, how you can meet the demands of your double | postulate. But just as experimentalism is not gradual- : ism, so neither is it opportunism; and just as it is not a plan or "blue-print," inherited from some past prophet-, for the methodical shaping of the future, so neither is ; it a matter of immediate and extemporized expedients in-! tended merely to meet an immediate contingency. Its es sence is indeed the freedom of the present to shape and ; determine itself by its own motion, in the light of the situation immediately presented for decision. But it is also the essence of experimentalism that the situation so presented has itself been prepared by thought, experi ment, and debate, and is thus, as it were, a "planned situation," which as such suggests and invites a planned: and deliberate decision. There is thus, after all, a plan in the method of experimentalism. But the plan is > not a transcendent scheme, preconceived before the be- > ginning of action: it is immanent in the process of ; | action, and conceived by and during that process. To : proceed by experiment is to proceed by constant planning; but not to proceed "according to plan."^9 t | Planning is not a social panacea, in the opinion of j f most planners. Rather, it is a method of procedure, which ^Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political > ’ irheory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951)* P* 2 5 5. Also see William N. Loucks and J. Weldon Hoot, Comparative Economic Systems (New York: Harper and Brothers', 1938), pp. | ..-.... — ......... 7 ----------- 83 makes provision for scientific and systematic analysis and forecasting to accomplish socio-economic goals. Odum, while appraising method in social planning, credits it as ; I i / i ... the best planning, the social research an^' as the j nearest composite summary and integration of what social ; science and social inventions can achieve as the best i results of purposive science.5° In the theory of social planning, the factors of rationalism, choice, control, and method in attaining socio-' c 1 economic objectives clearly are significant variables, and there is a high degree of consensus that they are inherent j s in a theory of national social planning. j i i The planning process♦ Another aspect of planning as j j a process is that it may include a series of related phases j i | or stages. The first phase is an awareness of the need to ; make over-all national decisions. This first phase includes: the decision to plan on a national level.There may, of course be a decision not to plan at all. • 459-477. j 5°Howard W. Odum, "Patrick Geddes* Heritage to the ; Making of the Future," Social Forces, 22:279, October, 1943 v The following references support a similar view: Arthur j Lewis Wood, "The Structure of Social Planning," Social ; Forces, 22:392, October, 1944; Hugo Haan, "International \ Planning: Its Necessity and Its Special Features," loc. £it> cf. Lorwin, op. cit., p. viii, who says that planning is ". . .a tecEnique, a procedure, a methodology, and not a system of government"; Lindeman, o£. cit., p. 15> Lorwin, op. cit., p. 124. ^Fellows, q£. cit*, PP* 220-226; Bessie A. McClena- han, "The Sociology of Planning," Sociology and Social Re search, 28:182-193, January, 1944; Galloway, op. cit.,jp._496. The second phase of planning is the determination of pbjectives or goals. Planners emphasize the need of spe cific objectives in planning. This step of the planning j process is concerned particularly with inventory and needs, ' i : 52 1 goals and purpose. j j I i The third step is the fact-finding or research phase,; i characterized by observation and systematic tabulation of | ' I ^11 pertinent data, including geographical, social, economicj, physical and natural resources, also the historical and J governmental factors. j The fourth step, or phase, is the evaluation of possi-r- ble plans in the light of the research findings and the ! understandings achieved. This step is referred to as the ' design or lay-out of the program for positive action. Plan-; hers may list from two to seven phases in this stage of the planning process. There is a high degree of consensus on 53 i the four phases mentioned above. J j The process of social planning is not clarified by j Landauer where he states: ”... planning must be carried ’ 52Arthur Hillman, Community Organization and Plannings (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950)> P* 350; Robert j Beishline, Military Management for National Defense (New I York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950 ), P- 61; Zweig, "op. cit., j pp. 120 ff. j -^Francis J. Brown, "Social Planning through Edu cation," American Sociological Review, 1:33-37, February, 1936; Sidney Hook,. "The Philosophic Implications of Economic Planning," in Findlay MacKenzie (ed.), Planned Society; Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc".1 " , T937)7“ppT W3-Wr- I out in two phases. First, a plan must be compiled, and second, it must be executed."-^ The four phases or steps in planning stated above mayj | ! be compared with authoritarian aspects or phases in the pre-| I i paration of the Soviet Five Year plans, which can be divided; into four stages: ! i i The first stage, the highest political authorities j set down general directives that indicate the basic j goals to be pursued. The second stage is objectives, ; specifically, output goals are set for most industries; ; the third stage is the adoption of the detailed plans. ; Finally the execution of the plans.55 ; t In comparing these phases of Soviet planning with four enumerated by the economist Sweezy, certain similar!- I ties become apparent. Sweezy's requirements are: first, a central planning authority; second, the authority must have effective control; third, the individual units of the system1 must be administered and coordinated so as to be responsive to complex directives; and fourth, the planning authority i must be in a position to check and enforce plan fulfill- J ment.^ I The nature of Soviet planning is more dynamically de-’ scribed by Loucks and Hoot. First, and fundamental to the i rest, all economic planning in the Soviet Union is based on J -j-------------------------------------------------- I ^Landauer, op. cit., p. 4. ^^Oxenfeldt, o£. cit., p. 63; Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 150. -^Paul M. Sweezy, Socialism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p* 2 5. jthe social or governmental ownership of all natural re- : t Sources and large-scale man-made producers' goods. Briefly,} :the planning and the owing agencies are the same, that is, j j both are extensions of the same sovereign government. j i 1 Second, Soviet planning is not "economic forecasting” in the i capitalistic usage of the term. Nor, third, does Soviet i planning consist of pushing trend lines into the future and j i than labeling them "economic plans." The essence of Soviet j _ i planning, whether it is successful or a failure, is the J f choosing of comprehensive goals (which are not merely pro- | j jected trends) and the apportioning to the separate economic; I units of the specific tasks involved in achieving these | I goals. This has been called the "teleological" or "purpos- j ive" approach to planning. Finally, although the term j economic planning denotes a restricted scope of plans, this * cannot be true in the Soviet economy. Actually, the Five ; i Year Plans all have included programs for public health, ; I education, recreation, and many other non-economic social J knd cultural phases of the nation's life. It is logical, j therefore, to use the expression "social-economic planning" rather than merely "economic planning” in Soviet Russia. Ati the top of the hierarchical system controlling social- ! economic planning in the Soviet Union stands the leadership j group of the Communist Party, even the Gosplan and other 57 Commissions being thus subordinated. ^Loucks ana Hoot, op. cit., pp. 459-465; see also : Each Five Year Plan follows In general the following : - i I pattern: • 1. General goals and objectives are formulated. j j t 2. The tentative plan Is sent out for consideration ! I ! by the respective Commissariats. j 3- The tentative plan is broken down into its de- J tailed parts and relayed to the smaller and less extensive I units. 4. The tentative plan is considered by each unit and1 each agency to which it applies. j 5 . Suggestions, criticisms and counter-plans are as- i sembled for submission to the State Planning Commission. j 6. The State Planning Commission draws the final I 1 plan. 1 7* The plan is finally adopted by the party and the i government. 8. The finally adopted plan is subdivided and sent ; 58 out to the agencies concerned with its execution. j All these stages are discussed with more detail by ' Loucks and Hoot, but the purpose in submitting this broad outline of the procedure has been to show that the leaders I I in the most autocratic and responsible positions in Soviet , Russia must base their decisions on the concerted findings Ralph H. Blodgett, Comparative Economic Systems (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944),pp. 144-153^ ^Loucks and Hoot, op. cit., pp. 459-465- bf numerous Commissions or organizations which stand sub ordinate to one another in a vast hierarchical structure. Eventually, once the plan has been adopted by the State Planning Commission, power exercised within the Soviet Union Iruns ’ ’ from the top down.” There are views of planning which stress only three phases; objectives, situations, and program of action. The initial decision to plan is not included by them as a formal 60 stated phase of planning. Most planners stress research-- the gathering of accurate facts— as the most important phase! in the planning process.^1 Galloway, for example, has r pointed out that the gathering of data represents a plan for. planning. He stresses the collection of elaborate basic ; data from original inquiry, careful analysis of these data and cautions the planners that various sub-plans should 62 ’ neither duplicate, nor work against, each other. ; In summary, these four phases of planning theory— de-, cision, objective, research, and choices— are necessary j steps in the process, according to the majority of authori- 1 ties. 1 I The time factor in planning. National planning, and j 59xMd., pp. 465-471. ■ ^°Millett, op. cit., p. 32; Zweig, op. cit., pp. 120 ff; ^Beishline, op. cit., p. 8l; Hillman, op. cit., pp. 350.ff. — ! cp i Galloway, > op. cit., p. 411. ; the phases or stages incident to it, take time to be real ized. Planning presupposes that certain things are under- ! I taken in a certain sequence. As planning becomes more spe- I bific, the time factor becomes more important, because the content and effectiveness of planning depends upon the con ditions of the period of time for which they are drawn up. Programs of action, whether national or individual, need a time table. The time schedule need not be rigid. The Soviet Five Year Plans are examples of planning and regimen tation according to a time schedule. Time is a control | j ! factor in judging whether industry is producing according to] plan. As a general evaluation, Oscar Lange remarks that: The Soviet economy was planned not for the harmony of! its different branches, but for one single purpose, ' namely, the most rapid industrialization and preparation of effective national defense. The industrialization program was considered by the Soviet government as a race against time.63 , Lange notes, as a part of the situation, that those in au- . thority and the workers are liable for criminal action if : I 6 A ^ production does not maintain the time schedule. i 1 In the United States, the time factor is involved in ! I the planning of long-range and short-range projects. The same is true in other countries. The program of the Labor | Government in Great Britain has been referred to by j ! -------72------ I I -^Oscar Lange, "The Working Principles of the Soviet , Economy,1 ' in USSR Economy and the War (New York: Russian Economic.Institute^ 1943), p. 43. L _ _ _ _ _ _... „ 90 Oxenfeldt as an example: i I 1 Before one judges how much planning is ultimately in-^ | tended by the labor party, he should recall that when it was in power, it was dedicated primarily to resolving j short-run problems. A large proportion of England’s ad=-’ ministrators were engaged in meeting immediate problem^ j I Millett remarks that long-range planning gives mean- ! ing to effects of short-range planning. This may be valid ' i l i for certain industries or corporations, though not so fully j i applicable to areas of national planning where innumerable j social and technological changes or other imponderables may J ! i interfere within the nation and even international factors 1 may interfere with the fulfillment of a plan. ! Social problems would not necessarily be entirely j ! 1 solved by long-range planning. They would only be lessened | i jthereby. Wooton states: "Planning covers short periods i . 67 ; mainly so no change in plans need be made." 1 • t If the time factor were overlooked, unbalanced plan- i ning may result. Social changes could produce conditions j which would require solutions other than those proposed. Long-range planning may turn out to be an unrealistic ; rationalization. Millett has said, regarding the National i Resources Planning Board (1932) that emphasis on long-range ‘ ^^Qxenfeldt, op. cit♦, p. 1 3 3. ^Millett, op. cit., p. 51* ^ B a r b a r a Mooton, Plan or No Plan (New York: Earrar and Rinehart Company, 1935}, P* 331* | go planning was a "psychopathic desire to escape reality." j Inadequacies of long-range planning boards were re- j t yealed by the War Production Board, set up long before the } i outbreak of World War II, especially in the early stages of ! j ;the war. The country actually was forced to proceed on a | ; i day-to-day basis in wartime and in civilian production. | The National Resources Planning Board similarly was ' | | not prepared, during the recession of 1937> to advise the | President as to desirable government counter-measures. With! reference to this point, Millett remarks: j A program of increased public works and works relief expenditures was rushed to Congress upon the recommen- ; dation of other advisers than the National Resources Planning Board. It had no general policy to present and no proposals for making a policy effective, if there had been one. Rather, the board obtained an arrangement whereby its staff had an opportunity to comment on spe- : cific plan locations before approval by the office of production management. The National Resources Develop- : raent Report for 1942 recalled that no^definite policy, or plan had emerged from this action. , The importance of time as a factor in planning is i obvious. Authorities agree that day-to-day decisions are j ' ! not worthy of being called planning and that planning of a ivery long-range nature is difficult to carry out. Therefore, ! ! planning is, in the final analysis, designed for limited, j i designated periods. Clear objectives, taking into consider-; ation the element of time, are necessary in working out the j 68Millett, o£. cit., p. 52. 69Ibid., p. 3 6. detailed structure and for adequate functioning of national social planning. ; ; x I I Approaches to the planning process. Various plannersj Snd social scientists are in agreement that some form of j national organized planned action needs to be undertaken to I meet problems of full employment, housing, labor relations, f education, improvement of the national highway system, de- j : } linquency and crime, et cetera. However, granting the need,! the approach to planning needs to be determined, and each problem requires its own consideration of approach. As Lerner has said, “First of all, there is need to decide be- ; i tween the use of the different instruments where more than one of them can bring about a primary objective.'1 ^0 There iis wide disagreement in the theory of planning, regarding the choice of approach. There is a lack of consensus con cerning the means to attain designated social goals. In the words of Haan: I . . . owing to its practical, scientific and progressive^ character, the approach as to the technique and the j tools of planning needs to be decided before designing a J plan that seems best suited to the American tradition.'^ A planning approach suited to the United States would differ from the Russian approach, inasmuch as the conditions' ^°Alba P. Lerner and Frank D. Graham (eds.), Planning and Paying for Full Employment (Princeton: Princeton Uni- I versity Press, 1945), p. 182. 71 Haan, o£. cit., p. 3. 'for planning in the United States would be fundamentally in-j ; i fluenced by social values of freedom and democracy whereas j f in Russia's Soviet system, totalitarian controls would oper-l ate from the top to the bottom of the hierarchical structure. In Russia, state-planned economic objectives are * ! primary and individual group goals are secondary insofar as | I they are permitted at all. Loucks says: j What naturally follows and what has transpired in the! Russian orbit is the fusion of industry, business, j social policies into the state. The Politburo operates j the socio-economic and political phases of the nation j for its own chosen purposes without regard to conse quences to the people. / 2 j There are planning advocates, such as Landauer, i Millett, Rose, Hillman, and others, who stress the signifi- j I 7 q ; dance of leadership in the approach to planning. J Rose i gives an extensive outline that stresses leadership among the other variables. These "before action" considerations of leadership are: i i 1. What kinds of people, especially in the community! leadership, will be the most cooperative with the action! program? 2. To what extent is potential leadership ; actual leadership? Can some of.the unused leadership be^ drawn into the action program?™ , i The indirect planning approach, first searching for j ^2Loucks, o£. cit., p. 114. ; 73;Landauer, op. cit., pp. 13 ff.; Millett, 0£. cit*, ' pp. 48 ff.; A. M. Rose, "Where Social Action and Social Re search Meet," Sociology and Social Research, 36:283-290, May, 1952; Hillman, op♦ oiTT, pp. 11 ff. ^Rose, o£. cit., p. 2 8 3. the leaders and then influencing the masses, is an approach j 'which will greatly enhance the possibility of planning. 1 ! i 1 1 The United States affords many examples or Instances j I i !of planning efforts in the realm of community planning. ! i This aspect of community planning has been stressed by Lindeman,^ and Landauer, in his analysis of the approach to planning, agrees that i . . . planning means coordination through a conscious j effort, instead of the automatic coordination that is in; the unplanned social order . . . therefore, planning is i an activity of a collectivistic character and is the ; regulation of the activities of individuals by the com- j munity.f® i Though planners have for some years emphasized the j role of the federal government, and favored the extension ofj ; i existing federal powers of control, the new dynamics of con-' trol in national planning have been particularly noteworthy in the business and industrial fields.^ The greater the ; extent to which the federal government restricts and directs^ the activities of privately operated business units or of i i I entire industries, the greater will be the extent to which j i * the government becomes the main controlling factor in the ; operation of business and industry, that is, a centralized ; political organ of administrative authority. j . I : During World War II the United States government } I * i ! ^Lindeman, op. cit., pp. 16-17- I "^Landauer, 0p. cit., p. 12. ^Loucks, oj>. cit., pp. 114-115- _ _ j 'turned to scientific management and planned national control techniques. The government adopted measures to control, in greater detail, the wartime activities of industry, involv ing priorities, rationing of gasoline, tires, food, housing ; j and rent controls, and many others. In England, as John | i Jewkes states: . . . Large Government staffs were required in the vari ous regions. There were more government employees posted at all large firms. So long as the war lasted, the number of staff used by the Government for these various purposes continued to grow.78 I ! That the British government was in some areas rather J unsuccessful in national planning during World War II, has been pointed out by David Novick: I . . . even under duress of conflict and the agreement on« objectives, the administration of wartime industrial mo-| bilization was continually resorting to a variety of j piecemeal, half-way measures which applied a number of j different management techniques to individual material, j component and end-Item situations, apparently reflecting! the hope that something short of complete scheduling ! would be reasonably effective in providing a solution to the universally recognized problem.<9 j There is, in planning theory, a "delayed action" type of approach, which has been referred to by Merton. The j t = purpose of this technique is to enable "... Individuals or organizations to delay action to the point where the pressure ^John Jewkes, Ordeal by Planning (London: The Mac millan Company, 19^8), pp" . 48^9• 79paVid Novick, Melvin Anshen, and W. C. Truppner, Wartime Production Controls (New York: Columbia University Press,' 19^9), p. 26$. (for action from others is eliminated."^ The result of this j approach, Merton says: 1 i ... is intended not to lead to action, but to precludej it. The function of the research is to allay criticism j of inaction. Public officials not infrequently author- > ize a "thorough study" of a problem on which they do not! wish to take action.®1 { A similar planning approach is referred to by Newton D. i Baker: j j i j ... first, the Bourbon approach which advocates doing j nothing and letting nature take its course. Second, the: liberal approach which trusts to human intelligence and ' the evolutionary process to remedy the situation. And third, the radical approach, which demands immediate and1 drastic action.®2 j I National planning perforce must deal with human re- j sources. It is generally conceded that it is not possible ! to exercise complete control of human resources. The com plex social interactional patterns are, however, almost un- , l predictable in any social system. There are planners, such , as Galloway, who believe that: "... many mistakes in the i planning approach will be made, since public officials are neither omniscient nor omnipotent,"®8 At this point, the distinction between an unplanned ; i ®°Merton, o£. cit., p. 1 6 9. i 8lIbid. 82Galloway, o£. cit., p. 3 3 1. i 83Ralph E. Flanders, "Limitations and Possibilities of Economic Planning," in Ernest Minor Patterson (ed.), National and World Planning (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1932), p. 37* i I national social system and the so-called "scientific” plan ned system should be made. Ralph Flanders believes that: | . . . the difference between a planned and unplanned ap proach is that the planned techniques are equipped with statistical and other factual information, as a basis for description of the past, analysis of the present, and forecast of the future . , . Many of the promoters of American planning urge first of all a ’ ’ great survey” but even those who hesitate to think in terms of plan-ok ning at all, urge a better organization of statistics j Apparently, the use of the statistical technique is a basic criterion to distinguish between a planned and an un- ; planned social order. However, national statistical data have been useful in unplanned social orders as well as in those that are’ ’ planned.” The departments and bureaus of the United States government lead the world in the collection of i a tremendous amount of statistical data on a multitude of national socio-economic phenomena, but the collecting of j istatistics does not signify that the United States actually :is a planned nation. There is agreement among social scien-;^ jtists that statistical facts are important in planning. How!- I it ; ! ever, statistical data are only a part of the total data y \ /' needed in the development of a theory of planning. ^ ; The planning situation. National planning does not take place in a social vacuum, but rather in a concrete socio-economic situation. Mumford emphasizes the fact that: . . . all associations and organizations are carried on through physical structures that exist in space, and ^Quoted by Galloway, op. cit., p. 50 1 that are geographically conditioned; only imaginary so- I cieties can do [exist] without a parcel of earth for j site and the physical means of coming t o g e t h e r . j In general it is true that American planning represents a j gradual development of theory and practice that is founded I i j ;on depression and war, and that American city and regional : ; I planners, architects, engineers, builders, conservationists ! : - i and social scientists have cooperated to create the planning i . movement in an attempt to overcome some of the specific national social economic problems. j Fellows has suggested some of the conditions facing j planners, including: I i 1. The fact that the habit of change has become { established as a result of the role of science and tech nology in contemporary culture, j 2. The existence of public education and highly de- ' veloped means of communication, 3. The presence of abundant material resources, and ; 4. The fact that foundations have been laid in the j social sciences which will contribute to the possibili- ; ties and methods of planning. 1 ° | Fellows, North, Mannheim and Doob are some of the i ! I sociologists who have emphasized present-day social situ- I 1 I ations that have given rise to planning. There are other j planning advocates who emphasize the need for planning in J i the national situation mainly because they take a dim view ; ^ L o u i s M u m f o r d , T h e C u l t u r e o f C i t i e s ( N e w Y o r k : H a r c o u r t , B r a c e a n d C o m p a n y , 1 9 3 8 ) , p p . 3 7 8 - 3 7 9 - ^Fellows, cit., p. 224. r ' .......“ ' ■ “ ~ “ 9^ of the large amount of waste and Inefficiency in the present j day social order. The types of waste are viewed in terms of natural resources, human energy, unemployment, duplication ! ! ' ■ ! of effort by competing enterprises, destruction of economic j | j goods to maintain price levels, restriction of production or t productivity, and waste associated with the business cycle. Two other factors in the modem situation which call for ■ planning are: the developments in modem technology, and j the decline of the idea that group needs and progress follow inevitably when each individual acts in his own interests.^ The nature of a nation's technology is an important consideration in any theory of planning. In Soviet Russian ; planning, mechanization has in some respects become an end i in itself regardless of the geographical, economic or social situations found there. The obstacles to the introduction i of mechanized farming in Russia have been well stated by Ingov: i ' I * ... at the beginning of one of the five-year plans, j several agriculture experts tried to point out that the ; answer to the question of whether tractors or draft- cattle should be used in agriculture depended on local circumstances and on such factors as the availability of: oil and spare parts, and should not automatically be de-| cided in favor of tractors. The official answer was that those who had made the point were reactionaries, and enemies of the new planning era. The plan to use tractors regardless of advisability, had become an end in itself . . . in the USSR the plan is merely the sum j of administrative orders for a given period. The central committee of the communist party must retain its freedom to maneuver, increasing or decreasing the tasks ®^Doob, op. cit., p. iv. oo set in accordance with changing conditions. With reference to England under planning, Jewkes observes: ; ... There is importance to keeping the plan so flexi- f ; ble and altering it so swiftly that reality will never 1 | falsify the plan. Thus Mr. Dalton has said: "These | i plans must not be mere essays. They must be consistent with practical possibilities. They must not be too rigid or hidebound. They must be capable of continuous adjustment in the light of changing conditions. We j shall never be able to sit back as some planners imagine* and close our eyes and let the plan take charge, like J one of the automatic pilots in an aeroplane. Eternal ! vigilance is the price of successful planning .'®9 j Jewkes also cites Morrison's speech of September 6, 1947* j i j concerned with the balance-of-payments crisis, which agrees j with Jewkes' own view: We have had to modify our plans quickly. . . . The I course of international politics, and economics, and even of nature itself, has been far more unfavorable to us than could reasonably have been expected. ... l - Earlier this summer the Government announced that it was! working on a Pour Year Plan. That plan is being modi fied to cut out the frills and concentrate on essentials. When it has been completed it will be announced. But it is unreasonable to ask the Government in a flash to pro duce a master plan to solve all the difficulties of a disorganized, uncertain world.9° Ingov relates that Russian government leaders evade , responsibilities for their failures by shifting in their l ■ i technique in planning, and by resorting to symbols, scape- ! 91 goats and other deceptive psychological factors. This ; Ingov, Russia's Economic Front for War and Peacel (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19421, pp. 7-8. | ® 9 j e w k e s , op. cit., p. 46., quoting Dalton, Labor : representative in the House of Commons, February 5, 1946. 9QIbid., pp. 350-351. 91Ingov, op. cit., p. 108. I view is expressed by Speier: The hectic character of modern dictatorships results from the incessant spreading of symbols of fictitious danger. The selfish kulak, the wicked capitalist, the intriguing Jew, the secretive freemason . . . they all ! serve to create the psychological emergency situation I which, functioning like real danger devitalizes dissent i and increases morale among those whose actions are plan- j ned.92 The crises that prove embarrassing to planners are varied and complex. They may, for example, Include war, de pression, a level of living below the desired standard, or j drought. Crisis situations may involve such factors or ele-j 1 ments as the following, enumerated by Odum: equalization ofj | opportunities, margins of abundance, scarcities, efficiencies and deficiencies, social values, conflicting issues between ■ mass rule and representative government and between geogra phic and occupational representation, conflicts between minority propaganda and majority rights, and stress between ; politicians and experts.^3 j i Lundberg, Meadows, and Wood assume that there are | ' i other contemporary social conditions favoring social plan- j i i ning, besides a crisis situation: j 1. The increased use of the expert and bureaucracy : in government. 2. Increased public control of social | behavior. 3* The general acceptance of relatively ! rapid social change in spheres of social behavior (eco- ; nomlc, marital and educational relationships). 4. Lossj 92Hans speier, "Freedom and Social Planning," The American Journal of Sociology, 42:472, January, 1937* 93fioward W. Odum, "National Social Planning," Sociolo gy and Social Research, 29:307, October, 1927*_____ . r~ .* “ ' “.“ .....— ----------------:102 ! I of primary group controls. 5* Growth of special inter est groups. 6. Modern means of communication and prop ar i ganda at the disposal of the national government.94 j 1 \ In time of emergency, planning usually is facilitated> especially in time of war. In a state of war, the problem ! of planning revolves around the national objective of de- j feating the enemy. A national goal is easier to achieve s : I where government planners and the general public are in ! agreement.99 The government can integrate production, \ ' I distribution, education, communication, transportation, and manpower into a functional unit directed toward a single purpose. A result of such integration is that conflicts be-> tween different social interests are lessened. The military, r economic, political, and social interests tend to become 96 ' coordinated. However, planning, once undertaken, tends W establish a precedent. As Corwin says, while referring to 1 planning experience in the United States during World War II: . . . the control over industry recently exerted by the government through priorities and price regulation in the name of war power could be at any moment reasserted under the "commerce” clause for purposes of social plan-1 j ning.9 ‘ ! I > 9\ood, op. cit., p. 397; also see Meadows, o£. cit.,; p. 51; George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: i Longmans, Green and Company,' 1947), PP* Bl ff- i 95 , ! •\Landauer, o£. cit., p. 141. ; 96james p. Magu and William J. Roman, Our War Economy (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1943), pp. 20 ?f. 9^Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19^7)^P* 17^• If, accordingly, national social planning in the United States were to he continued on this level, it would i require a socio-economic and political system similar to bhat developed by the United States government during World i War II. If a governing segment of the population of the United States were to extent or expand national governmental-f ism rather than leave matters to local controls, sooner or j ! later the people would become regimented, as happened in the late German, Italian, and the present Russian states. The modern national planning situation. Zweig be- ^ ; r lieves that the concept of national planning in the middle of the twentieth century has increased in significance, especially with rapid development of technology and the s c i e n c e s . He also believes that modern technology, social' psychology and politics, which were combined to fight liberal capitalism, have been broken apart by the centralistlc I l trends of modern technology. The final blow came from poll-’ go ; tics and the wars. Mayer, however, instead of emphasizing technology as the foundation for social planning, stresses * I ; i the political factor in modern national planning. Modern j industry, left to its own devices, has been used as a ! ! i tribute-rendering mechanism for a favored few whereas it j could be planned to promote the reasonable well-being for : 9®Zweig, Qp. cit., p. 39. ! "ibid.. Odum believes that in early non-technological social systems the social pressure from the traditions and customs j in the culture were favorable to an unplanned social organi- ? i I zation. The social situation has changed, however, into a ! complex urban industrial society, powerfully conditioned by i physical factors and technology that are favorable to plan- i ! 101 m , | ning. Flanders says: . . . Here the promoters almost agree to think that \ laissez-faire no longer suits the present stage of a ' mechanized mass society, and that the time is ripe to j build the individual enterprise ihto some organized j form of concerted social action. 102 ; i Planning, then, must be conceived in terms of modern i technology wherever it permeates areas of modern social life;. But planning cannot be confined to the technological field alone. The social, economic, political and historical i phases of the situation are also of great importance.10^ Zweig thinks the reason that technological progress has been!, to a large extent, responsible for planning, is that rt. . . j it has brought about a high degree of specialization”; but ; 100Joseph Mayer, Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941), p. 3 8 1. ; 1010dum, "National Social Planning,” op. cit., p. 279\, 1 102Flanders, ' o£. cit., p. 37. i 103Mumford, op. cit., pp. 3^7 ff; Meadows, op. cit., p. 1 9 8. ....... ' ‘ 105j he goes on to remark that, ”... technological progress has been a primary contributor to the process of concentration 1 of machines and population within a small geographical 104 area.” The trend toward concentration of men and ma chines within limited areas, which supposedly has been con ducive to planning and control, was speeded up by the needs of World War II. Meadows states that modern technology lessens the significance of the individual and raises the importance of large numbers of people. Mass society means (mass business, mass movements and mass education. The scalej 10R ! of modern American living is massive. The present situation in technological societies points toward uniformity and standardization of human experi ence . This condition may be advantageous for the advocates of an authoritarian society in which singleness of ideas and purposes would be cherished. This view is incompatible with the traditional view expressed by Chief Justice Holmes, that: ”The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas. The test of truth is the power of thought to get ; itself accepted in the competition of the market-place.” j i Nordskog has held that, whatever trends there may be in the United States toward mechanical uniformity and efficiency •^^Zweig, op. cit♦, p. 41. 105Meadows, op. cit., pp. 100-101. ! 1Q6Ibld., pp. 102-103. land the problems resulting therefrom, the solution cannot be 107 found in dictatorial authoritarianism. | Views toward social planning differ according to j whether observers are "conservative," "radical," or "re actionary." The planning approach may not be based upon some intrinsic and definite ideological system but be guided; by experience, or the planning may be influenced by some j existing ideology such as socialism or communism, or an 1 ideological philosophy may be developed to rationalize statej i planning, as in the case of Italian fascism. Of course, the! i planners' awareness of their lack of control over certain j E socio-economic factors is important in planning. And an ap-! predation of the social norms of the people affected by the! plan is crucial in determining the structure of a good ! , , , 108 ■ social plan. The conditions necessary for the attainment of i national social planning, Doob believes, are: j . . . that social planning proceeds within the tradition- | al framework of a free society. The second prerequisite, ; a thorough restatement of the conception of individual ism, democracy and humanitarian!sm, a statement with reference not to the pioneer period, but to the realities of an urban and technical civilization. The third con dition is to secure participation of specialists and technicians in the undertaking, in their proper function ing . 1^9 107<John Eric Nordskog, Contemporary Social Reform Movements (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 195*0, PP* 117-118,"22!, 285-286, 322. lO^Meadows, o£. cit., pp. 196-197* 5 109jjeonard Doob. The Plans of Men (New Haven: Yale University Press, 194-0), p. 11. . __ ___ ____ 'In other words, social scientists and planners should view | The American national situation in the traditional cultural jsetting of a free and open society and also from a present- day technological situation that modifies the traditional ! i social patterns. The problem becomes one of an actual need j Tor more fundamental social research into the situation to discover whether national planning is compatible with some accepted traditional and underlying patterns of socio- j i economic behavior. ! ; ' ! In summing up the definition of the situation,snot j ; ■ I only the natural and material environment, but the people j concerned make up the national situation in which planning I } would be expected to function. The attitudes, feelings and : needs of the people are an essential part of the planning situation, yet may not be sufficiently provided for in national centralized planning. ~CHA'PTER~VI--- THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE ON SOCIAL PLANNING Planning is viewed as a group process requiring j | I organization depending on its objectives. Applied to the i national situation, planning would necessarily have to deal with a society consisting of interrelated and interdependent; groups, all of which are organized for some recognized i purpose. Changes called for by planning may affect society j i i in general, or certain interest groups and indirectly, other! groups touched by these Interests. Institutions, attitudes,, and social values are also affected as these are interre- j ; i lated in group life patterns. Lindeman indicates such i interdependence where he says: . . . changes in economic production should be reflected in education, in resolution, and in creative outlets for the imagination. Otherwise, planning may merely result in reducing our society to efficiency plus cultural medir ocrity.1 ! The most urgent need of mankind, according to Bain, j is the rapid development of scientific social knowledge and j 2 science-based techniques of social organization. There are* planners, economists, and sociologists who claim that practif i cal social knowledge has been developed and is available for 1Edward C. Lindeman, ’ 'Planning: An Orderly Method for Social Change,” The Annals, l62:7> July, 1932. %ead Bain, "Sociology as a Natural Science,” Ameri- Journal of Sociology, 13*. 16, July, 19^7* use, and when It is applied to national problems of social ^organization, the results could be revolutionary .3 Von Wiese says that organization is a basic problem 1 i i of planning. A social order may be unplanned and yet be i organized; but what are the criteria needed to discriminate I between an unplanned and a planned system? Lorwin conceives of the work of planning as ". . . essentially collective and cooperative In character and which must be properly organized to be effective."''* An organized social system devised for the achievement of spe cific ends is distinctively different from an unplanned ! organized social order that lacks planned objectives. j 1 The realization of a planned social organization is a1 necessary requisite for dealing effectively with socio- i f\ < economic problems. As Merriam says, ". . . it is not plan-, ! i ning that has made difficulties in the smooth working of free competition, that has fostered monopolies, cartels, and! 3Ibid. ----- i ^Leopold von Wiese, "Social Theory and Social j Practice," in E. W. Burgess,and Herbert Blumer (eds.), Human' Side of Social Planning (Chicago: American Sociological So- ciety, 1935 b P* 5^* j ^Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945)> P• i'l• ^Charles E. Merriam, "The Possibilities of Planning," American Journal of Sociology, 49:405# March, 1944; George . Galloway, Planning for America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19^1), p* 4; R. E. Flanders, "Limitations and Possi bilities of Economic Planning," The Annals, 162:30, July, 1932- . . . . j 7 racketeering, but the lack of it. j The concept of social organization for contemporary i f planning is valuable in that it reflects and facilitates j interpretation of concrete relations in society. Generali- I i | zatlons about the process of organization, such as . . . j 1 i j ( whatever system is most capable of contribution to order is j 8 1 destined sooner or later to come into being ...” assume ; too freely that changes in society are innate and inevitable! in culture. The practices of national social planning j should be examined in terns of their relation to the inte- i I grated social system within which the plan is to function* 1 Practices in planning differ among nations owing to their yariation in social structure. Prediction, which is the purpose of planning, would be limited by the given national-4, structure and cultural patterns and the changes to be af fected in them. Social structures, as Merton notes, ... do not have a random assortment of attributes, but; these are variously interconnected and often mutually sustaining. To recognize this, is not to adopt an un critical affirmation of every status quo; to fail to recognize this, is to succumb to the temptations of radi cal utopianism.“ i Social practices in planning cannot deal with all the! attributes of social structure, but emphasis is placed on ^Merriam, loc. cit. ®J. R. Bellerby, Economic Reconstruction (London: The Macmillan Company, 193*0> P• 39* %obert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19^9)> P» ^-2. ______ on the major social activities that are stabilized, regular ized, and repetitive in the social organization. The term ."structure" is sometimes used interchangeably with "social j organization." Parsons conceptualizes the term "structure" ; as a set of relatively stable patterned relationships of , social units.10 This is similar to Znaniecki's definition ! t of social organization: i i I . . . organization generally means a dynamic system of j human actions. Social organization is commonly used to ; denote the organization of actions of several agents who1 cooperate for the achievement of a common purpose.I1 j ! The planned societies developed in Europe since World War I reflect diversity of cultural structures in the plan- ; ; I ning practices utilized. Zweig says, for example, there is j | ho one single shape, no one single type of planned economy, 1 12 but many divergent types with different social structures. , Especially in a period of national crisis, people in differ-; ent countries turn to different techniques of reform in their organization. History is replete with instances where| | ! certain populations have depended upon personal leadership, : 10Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,' 1937), p* 60. ■^Florian Znaniecki, "Social Organization and Insti tutions," in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Twentieth Century Sociology (New York: The Philosophical j Library, 1945), pp. 199-200; also see Talcott Parsons, "The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic Theory in Sod-, ology," in Gurvitch and Moore, o£. cit, pp. 60 ff. I 12 Ferdynand Zweig, The Planning of Free Societies .(London: Seeker and Warburg, 1942), pp. 60-6l. 112 1 i ■or have rationalized an exaggerated nationalistic spirit, orj an ideology or other motivations which have influenced I j i organization in planning. Looking hack through history, D. ! | ! R. Scott observes, ' i * ' \ ; ... it would be a reasonably accurate generalization i to say that when a given basis of social organization has been lost men have turned to government by dictators or tyrants or to some other form of personal govern- j ment.1’ j i Robert Maclver says that men who live exclusively for the i I state, if indeed such a being exists, are either tyrants or ! lit ! slaves. t i The existing social situation in a nation, at any j time, provides a point of departure or a baseline for plan- I hers, whatever kind of rationalization seems opportune to leaders or planners. Whatever attempts may be made to de fine a situation that would be favorable to planning, the actual plan, to be realistic, would have to take into ac- ! < count different group interests such as those of the general 15 i public, industry, labor, agriculture, and government. j Most planners think that the crises in modern nations1 i are conducive to planning, especially where the responsibili! ty for the general welfare is assumed by the state. j ; \ R. Scott, "Freedom in an Age of Science and Ma- j chines," Journal of Social Philosophy, 2:321, July, 1937. j ■^Robert Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947j, p. TT4. •^Merriam, op. cit., p. 486. Crossman, In a Fabian address, has observed how crisis situ-j ations open up possibilities for planning, where he noted j i i that "... without two world wars very little of what we ! how know as the British Welfare State would exist." A i i national crisis of such major proportions as war has a pro- j nounced effect on socio-economic change— a change which may be directed by the national government. Hans Speier states that: . . . war has always been a primary force toward social planning. In all social structures with a centralized and bureaucratic organization of the fighting forces, i.| e., with the equipment provided by the state and not by : individual fighters, planning has necessarily been a : vital concern of governments.1' Zweig observes that in England, when the present < International crisis has passed, "... the excesses and aberrations of planned economy will pass with it; but it is I safe to suppose that planning will constitute a permanent l8 element in world economy." The definition of the national situation, so basic in | i working out a planning process, would have to recognize the < existing patterns of folkways, customs, mores, institutions, 1 I and laws, all of which underlie any planned action. As : 1 Thomas and Znaniecki have said: H. S. Crossman, "Values in a Changing Civili- j zation," Fabian Tracts, 186:16, November, 1950. i •^Hans Speier, "Freedom and Social Planning," The American Journal of Sociology, 42:472, January, 1937* -^Zweig, o£. cit., p. 39* , ~ - ~ — ' “ 1X4 . . . one of the fundamental functions of institutions is to ’ ’ define the situation" for action. Once a situ- j ation is defined and the definitions upheld by an ade- ! quately integrated system of sanctions, functions tend I to conform to the defined expectations.*9 j I j Odum takes the view that "... planning programs are; the framework of understanding society and of so analyzing J i the total situation as to effect empirical study and plan- I p o i ning." Chapin insists that research methods in sociology i i depend on the kind of social situation that is to be studied. Naturally, the choice of methods will vary according to the , 21 kind of problem on which research is to be done. - Although the national social situation may be thought; of in terms of an aggregate or mass configuration, Bain be- ■ ; i lieves that defining the national situation in a mass frame , of reference limits the functioning possibilities of nation- 22 al planning. Merton says that in the study of an organi- i zation, ”. . . the units of the organization are not unat- ; ! I tached individuals but organized aggregates of interrelated , individuals."^ i ; i J ------------ — I 19w. I. Thomas and Plorian Znaniecki, The Polish ! Peasant in Europe and America (Chicago: University of Chi- ! cago £ress, l91o),' Vol. 1, pp. 4-5. 20Howard W. Odum, American Sociology (New York: Longmans Green and Company, 1951)> pp. 156-157« 21F. Stuart Chapin,' "The Main Methods of Sociological; Research," Sociology and Social Research, 33 *.33, September- ; October, 19W , 22Read Bain, "Natural Science and Value-Policy," Phi losophy of Science, 16:183, 1949* I 2%obert K. Merton, "The Role of Applied Social ! The interpretation of the social order as an over-all aggregate structure has led to the devising of new techniques i ‘ to comprehend and control social processes. Lorwin, for instance, says: 11. . . it is out of the relationship of :these mass ideals to modern techniques that the concept of i p h j eocial planning arises.” Zweig goes so far as to say: | j ”The planned world that is developing before our eyes, is an 1 p C | entirely new civilization.” j Planners have developed a rationale to support their j assumption of the ’ ’ mass man.” According to Mannheim, it is | s ". . . not men in general who think, act and choose, but men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of I 26 thought and behavior in response to the situation.” How- : ever, Mannheim rejects the concept of group-mind or folk- mind. He merely stresses the interdependence of the indi- 1 27 i vidual life and the group situation. i Social analysis is seemingly simplified when a word j 1 i such as ”mass” is made to imply the over-all modern national; l f Science in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum,”; Philosophy of Science, 16:176, 19^9* , • ' f ^Lorwin, o£. cit., p. 280. j 25zweig, o£. cit., p. 2 6 7* ; 2^Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1 9 36),p. 3. 27Ibld., p. 25. 116 28 situations. Such simplification tends to hide the com plexities in the present national situation. Certain ’ 'isms” and ideologies have been offered to an unwary public by i using the mass concept to conjure with. Bridgman, a physi cist, has stated, paradoxically, the effects of the mass concept on the present-day situation where he writes: . . . social thinking particularly exploits the intel lectual device of giving the same name to recognizably different things when these things are equivalent in the limited range of use which is of most importance to us. i In this way a great simplification of thought is often accomplished; to bring about a simplification in this way may constitute an intellectual invention of the | first rank. But there is also danger in this exercise ! of intellectual invention, as already suggested, becausej we are likely to be caught unaware when an extension of experience dissolves the equivalence of the different things which we had fused under a single name. The only defense is an analysis that recovers and emphasizes the complexities of the original situation, instead of dis carding them.29 Furthermore, an approach through the mass concept in planning leads to the demands of the masses and as Lorwin says, "... the objectives the masses seek cannot be achieved by leaving the guidance of economic and social life ! OQ to the interplay of independent individuals.,,J However, definition of the national situation in terms of the mass tends to lessen individuality and individual choices. Where 2®Cf. Jose Ortega y Gasset, in Revolt of the Masses (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1932). 2% . W. Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist (New York: Philosophical Society, 1950), p. ^8^ ^Lorwin, op. cit., p. 80. ~ ~ ~ ...‘ 117 emphasis is placed upon ’ ’ mass” of population, one or a few individuals may attempt to organize the social structure for! ; j their own power goals. The mass concept is inherent in the j i I present national technological situation, and serves as a means of control over the behavior and opinions of the masses. j 1 The industrial situation and planning. The ethos of I present-day American culture is said to be machine technolo-! gy.31 iphe technological trend in Western society is a ’ "32 I distinct and prevalent feature of the twentieth century. ( Social tensions and maladjustments have accompanied techno logical changes in the industrial economy, and a leading issue now is governmental interference. As Maclver has said, a neutral form of government is a thing of the p a s t . 33; The implications of massed mechanization and planning have • I been suggested by Meadows, as follows: ; ! ... the society of massed mechanization in these days j ; of its maturity has reached a new age, a planned age. ; . . . [The use of a] one factor causal method and a sharp demarcation between the economic and the political are a fiction of the myth minded. As a matter of fact, j it is altogether likely that the failure to establish a 1 working relationship between-these facts of our exist- j ence underlies what most of us rather casually call the j 31cf. Patrick Mullahy (ed.), A Study of Interpersonal! Relations (New York: Hermitage Press, Inc., 19^9), PP• 27 ■ TT, “ 32MacIver, pp. cit., p. 434. 33jbid., p. ^35- ok | social problems of our lives. And Meadows claims, further, that whatever future industri- alization may have, depends largely on planning. i Lorwin also holds that the present-day machine situ- : ation calls for national planning and he believes that the lack of proper organizational structure has been a factor which has made modern man the servant of the machine, in- ■of. ' stead of its master.-’ The technological situation, Gallo way assumes, makes adjustments within the social order more and more difficult. Therefore, in the present national situ- f ation, planning is ordinarily conceived as a program for di-j recting, regulating, or controlling the industrial mechan- 1 ism.37 j Relatively few planners are content to say that central planning is desirable, but take the view that there is little choice about accepting it. As Hayek expresses it,' i most of them 1 i . . . affirm that we can no longer choose, but are com- J [ pelled by circumstances beyond our control to substitute' planning for competition. The myth is deliberately cultivated that we are embarking on a new course, not out of free will, but because competition is spontane- ; ously eliminated by technological changes which we ‘ i > - - - - - - ■ ! ! 3 ^ P a u i A. Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man {Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1950)» p p . 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 . 3 5 r b i d . , p p . 15 0 - 1 5 1 . 3^Lorwin, op. cit., pp. 2-3* | __ 37Galloway, op. cit., p. 464. _ ______ ■a« neither can reverse nor should wish to prevent.J This myth, says Hayek, is devoid of foundation. He presents several arguments employed to demonstrate the inevitability i of planning. The one most frequently heard is, i ; ... that technological changes have made competition ! impossible in a constantly increasingly number of fields. And that the only choice left to us is between control | of production by private monopolies and direction by the I government.39 1 I ; This belief, Hayek states, derives mainly from the doctrines' of Marx. . j Another argument is that, "... the complexity of pur modern industrial civilization creates new problems with which we cannot hope to deal effectively except by central planning.But this view is based on a complete misappre- t hension of the working of competition. c Another argument offered connects the growth of mono polies with technological progress: . . . The theory is, it is contended, not that modern technique destroys competition, but that, on the contra-’ i ry, it will be impossible to make use of many of the new technological possibilities unless protection against ^ : competition is granted, i.e., a monopoly is conferred. 1 Hayek cites "The Times" (London) as follows: "When authority presents itself in the guise of organization it 3®Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1"9A5), p • 39lbid., p# 4 8. develops charms fascinating enough to convert communities of 42 free people into totalitarian States." But a population i cannot accept a totalitarian structure of the state without paying costs in terms of freedom and liberty, and so Hayek's 'citation from Milton is of special interest: .. . Is it just as reasonable, that most voices against the main end of government should enslave the less if number that would be free? More just it is, doubtless, if it came to force, that a less number compel a greater to retain, which can be no wrong to them, their liberty, than that a greater number, for the pleasure of their baseness compel a less most injuriously to be their fellow slaves. They who seek nothing but their own just liberty, have always the right to win it, whenever they have the power, be the voices ever so numerous that op pose it.^3 i Lewis Corey discusses the following theme: j i . . . The crisis of the individual arises out of the ; crisis of liberal democracy, a form of society built on ; the recognition of man's right to liberty, personal identity, and moral responsibility. This crisis, in i turn, is part of the crisis of a changing social order j whose drives may lead to great liberty, or to an abso- j lute state whose power-needs destroy liberty.^ j 1 Liberal democracy, to live and grow, must overcome four dangers, as freely condensed from Corey's essay: One danger comes from the diehards of capitalist "economic individualism." ... A second danger comes from Fascism, which represents a frustration of pro- ; gressive social change. ... A third threat comes from ! ^2Ibid., p. 181. ^3Ibid., p. 202. ^Lewis Corey, "Economic Planning Without Statism: i Planning in the Framework of Liberty," in Feliks Gross (ed.), European Ideologies: A Survey of Twentieth Century Politi- . cal Ideas (Mew York: The Philosophical Library, 1948), p. : T035. ..... 1 I 2 H Communism, which also destroys liberty and degrades the ! individual, but through a perversion of progressive ! social change. . . . Finally, and a more subtle danger, is the drift of an increasing number of "liberals” to ward totalitarian ideas, which increases the danger of j the submergence of the individual in all-inclusive j statism.^5 ! In the light of such dangers Corey inquires: "is survival of liberty and the individual— their further de- ; i velopment through greater economic, social-political, and cultural freedom— a lost cause?To which he answers: ... It is not, providing we muster every resource of intelligence and social action to master the crisis of social change for libertarian values, to work out new institutional arrangements within which all institutions, including the state, will recognize and expand the rights of man in greater social-economic and cultural fulfill- i ment.^? Has this been the trend in the United States? Corey recognizes the trends toward nationalization, or social!- f zation, characteristic in several countries even in the West^ t and by way of criticism, he makes this comment: j 1 . . . National economic planning need not be absolute or! totalitarian. It can be limited to strategic factors of* policy, price-and-profit, over-all investment (not all 1 investment), with supplementary resort to fiscal i measures for desirable social-economic objectives. There can be decentralization in planning, too, down to the grass-roots level. Planning can draw John Deyey's [sic] important distinction between a total^planned so ciety and a continuously planning society ^ ibid., p. 1 0 3 6. 46Ibid. 47Ibid., pp. 1036-37. ^8Ibid., p. 1 0 5 2. I2 ' 2 Planning now is a common characteristic of modern industrial states and, as Maclver states: The industrial age, so far from rendering unnecessary- ‘ the welfare functions of the state, called for a great i | expansion of these functions. The mobility of industri-i ! al man, the detachment of the unitary family from the I kin and its economic isolation in the new urban life, I ! and the sharp fluctuations of the volume of employment j created hazards of a kind scarcely known before. The ! virtues to which the individualist ethics appealed, J diligence, self-help, and thrift, offered scant assur- I ance to those whose livelihood was at the mercy of | circumstance. Labor had become a "commodity," bought > and sold in the market, but so long as it was.a commodi-j ty and nothing more it could not control the price it sold for or the usage it received, nor could it decide ! the crucial question of its being bought at all. The I consequences of its commodity condition, as they came to! the consciousness of the people, slowly forced the ' government to enter into a new range of services. Its new function was to define, set up, and maintain ‘ standards for the conditions of workaday living, mini- j mum standards applicable to all citizens.^9 ! i Wirth also maintains that the industrial situation ; has been a primary factor in the growth of interest and de velopment in national social planning in recent decades. He: asserts that, "... whatever the apologies for each of ; jthese conceptions of social organization the trend toward i i . i centralization seems to be undeniable and consistent with I j the technological development. i In technological development, both the enhancement ofj i i productivity and the specialization of labor are favorable j ^Maclver, ojd. cit., pp. 335-336. ! ^ ° L e w i s viirth, "Localism, Regionalism, and Centrali zation," The American Journal of Sociology, 42:502, January, 1937. ! " 123 | t o a p l a n n e d d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s o c i a l o r d e r o n a n a t i o n a l j b a s i s . I n f l u e n c e s o f t e c h n o l o g y o n h u m a n l i f e . T h e n a t u r e o f h u m a n l i f e i s i n e v i t a b l y i n f l u e n c e d b y m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n t e c h n o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s . T h i s h a s b e e n e m p h a s i z e d b y L u n d - j b e r g : i . . . o u r t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d o u r m e t h o d s o f , c o m m u n i c a t i o n h a v e r e s u l t e d i n a f u n d a m e n t a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e w h i c h d o m i n a t e s o u r l i v e s . T h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s r e q u i r e s t h a t w e b r i n g o u r s o c i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s i n t o l i n e w i t h t h i s b a s i c t e c h n o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n . 5 1 L a s k i s t a t e s t h a t m o d e r n t e c h n o l o g y m a y c a u s e i n c o n v e n i e n c e s t o s o c i e t y t h a t a r e j u s t , a s g r e a t a s t h e s o c i a l 52 1 a n d e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g f r o m i t . O n e o f t h e i n c o n - ! \ v e n i e n c e s i s t h a t , t h r o u g h t h e i m p r e s s o f t h e m a c h i n e , t h e r e : i * m a y c o m e a n i n d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e h u m a n f a c t o r i n t h e s i t u - : c o a t i o n . T h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r a n d t h e s p e c i a l i z a t i o n o f $ f u n c t i o n i n t h e m o d e r n m a c h i n e s i t u a t i o n i n f l u e n c e s e c o n o m i c 1 o p p o r t u n i t i e s . S u c h a s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e e n c o u r a g e s c e r t a i n 1 * I ; t y p e s o f g r o u p a c t i v i t i e s t o t h e n e g l e c t o f o t h e r s . T h e m a - i c h i n e s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r e s a c t s o f c h o i c e a n d t h o u g h t o n t h e j p a r t o f s o m e p e o p l e , s u c h a s t h e e n t e r p r i s e r s a n d m a n a g e r s , ■ i w h i l e o t h e r s a d j u s t t o t h e m a c h i n e a n d f o r t h e m o s t p a r t j ^ I g e o r g e A . L u n d b e r g , C a n S c i e n c e S a v e U s ? ( N e w Y o r k : ! L o n g m a n s , G r e e n a n d C o m p a n y , 1 9 ^ 7 ) , P - 3 6 T 1 i 5 % a r o l d i i c i s i d L j " T h e L i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e E x p e r t , " H a r p e r * s M o n t h l y , 1 6 2 : 1 0 9 > D e c e m b e r , 1 9 3 0 * L. _ . 53Ibid-, p._ 107. _ , i £ 5 2 4 . forego thought and choice. ! Besides the material or technological aspects of planning, the human element is especially important. i Drucker claims that mass production is not so much a mechani- i cal as a human thing: ; 1 I . . . The mass-production principle is not a mechanical 1 principle: If it were, it could never have been applied beyond manufacturing, and independently of assembly line!, I conveyor belt and interchangeable parts. It is a social; principle of human organization. What was new in Ford’s ' plant was not the organization of mechanical forces, but the organization of human beings performing a common task.55 ! Industrial and business leaders have not necessarily | i 1 understood the implications of the change-over to a techno logical system. Industrial management, especially in the past, has dealt in an impersonal manner with the labor force; I as a factor in production. In consequence, individual, 1 industrial, and business units had developed impersonal re lations within and without the industrial framework. By I t maintaining impersonal relations, many large industries werej 66 ; found to have greater protection, power and immunity. Schlessinger says of many corporations that they have neither 5^Ibid. 55peter F. Drucker, New Society; The Anatomy of the ! Industrial Order (New York: Harper and Brothers, 195^)> PP-- T F = 5 ~ . ----------------------- ! 560f. Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1§50), Chap. II., for an excellent analysis of the power of secret organizations. t ^7 a body to be kicked nor a soul to be damned.-" A planned social order based mainly on technology may bring us nearer i jthe state of affairs described by John Stuart Mill: j i j ! ... nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating j the world with nothing left to the spontaneous activity j of nature; with every rod of land brought into culti- i vation, which is capable of growing food for human ! beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed ! j up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated j | for man's use exterminated as his rivals for food, every! hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a ■ ; place left where a wild shrub or flower could grow with-! out being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved ' agriculture.58 ; 1 The modern technical situation, in which the practices of planning would have to take place, is strongly ! • ! deprecated in the words of the Pulitzer Prize physicist, j I Erwin Schr&dinger: 1 I consider it extremely doubtful whether the happi- , ness of the human race has been enhanced by the techni- ' cal and industrial developments that followed in the wake of rapidly progressing natural science.59 The supreme problem to emphasize in the structure and! function of planning is the factor of unanticipated conse- j 1 60 ’ (juences, which is also referred to as the "serendipity” ^ k r t h u r Schlessinger, The Vital Center (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1949)>p. 4. 58j0j in stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book IV (New York: Appleton Company, 1909), Chap. VI; p. 27;. I I 59Erwin schr&dinger, Science and Humanism (Cambridge:; Cambridge University Press, 1951)» P* 3* 60 Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," American Sociological Review, 1:894-904, 1936; Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Is Accurate Social Planning Possible?" American Sociological Review, 1:12-28, j 61 factor in scientific research. ! The results of national planning will not necessarily i 62 1 be those which were predicted. As Chapin, Merton, and j bthers have stated, the consequences of planning will not ! necessarily be restricted to the specific objectives which have been designated but the activity will affect interre lated fields— areas possibly ignored at the time of planning. i \ In other words, the results of the practice of planning may j be different from the expected goals. As Inkeles concretely! reveals in his review of Soviet Russia’s planning: j . . . least of all were they prepared to anticipate the i possible diverse social consequences of any specific social action, or to recognize the imperatives which in-i hered in certain forms of social organization once they were instituted. Thus, they did not anticipate, and had no advance program to meet, the implications of the com-, mitment to develop large-scale industry, with its in- ' herent demands for hierarchical authority, technical ! competence, labor discipline, and the integration of ! complex tasks, and which therefore required the training; of new personnel, inculcation of new habits of work, de velopment of chains of command and channels of communi cation, of systems for allocating rewards and other ad- 1 justments. : These examples of the consequences of centralized j social planning as they emerge from the Soviet experi- ‘ ence do not express the political reality of Soviet so- j ciety with its monopoly of power, its secret police, and* February, 1936; see also Parsons, The Structure of Social Actions, op. cit., introduction. j ^Earle Young, “Environmental Stresses and Personal ■ Adjustment,” Sociology.and Social Research, 35:91-96, November, 195^"* ^2F. Stuart Chapin, "Social Theory and Social Action," American Sociological Review, 1:1-11, February, 1936; Merton, Hoc. cit. forced labor, Its censorship and absence of personal i liberty and freedom, and its sacrifice of human comfort and dignity to the demands of a totalitarian power 1 group.d3 j i As an illustration of the gains of "serendipity” in j planned organization, Ogburn refers to the invention of the I i » ( automobile, which has changed American cultural patterns be-! 64 : yond the farthest reaches of the imagination. The changes brought about by this invention are actually incalculable, | though in retrospect some of the socio-economic effects can ■ ! be seen. The railroads with their miles of track have been ! i affected by the automobile, as reflected in the movement of 1 populations out from the central urban areas, changes in the distribution of business and in marketing practices. The i j building of roads, mechanization of transportation, the l function and organization of the government, courts, law en-: ! forcement agencies are just a few of the factors in the culture that have been affected by the invention of the i t automobile. J Since the theory of nuclear fission has become a reality in the atomic bomb and is being put to other practi-j cal uses as well, no one in authority is able to predict ac-< curately all of its numerous ramifications in culture and j j i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i ^Alex inkeles, "Social Change in Soviet Russia," in Morris Berger, Theodore A. and Charles H. Page, Freedom and , Control in Modern Society (New York: D. Van Nostrand Compa-; hy, Inc., 1953)/ PP- 263-264. ^William F. Ogburn, "How Technology Changes Society," Sociology and Social Research, 36:75-83, November, 1951* i j 128 its consequences. i ; I I In summary, planning practices can deal only with stated objectives, since no one actually is able to estimate i j the 1 1 serendipity" results of a planned national program. i i , j Planners can only acknowledge unexpected results that have ; ! ; occurred and which would not have been in evidence had not 6 5 i the national planning effort taken place. An unforeseen consequence of the planning practice, i especially on a national scale, is its tendency to take unto( itself prerogatives above the needs and Interests of the ( i individual, group and community. The national planning j practices tend to submerge both individuals and groups. The planning practices observed in England have tended to atom- j 66 ize and organize human relations, and even more evident have been such results in totalitarian countries. During the Great Depression there was a critical test- > 1 Ing of traditional mores and folkways concerning money and | 1 the marketing system. Odum, writing in 1937, raised the : criticism that: "... the national government could have < I done something else with unsaleable goods rather than j ! 67 i destroy them."' During the New Deal administration, ___________ ‘ 1 6f>cf. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of ; Purposive Social Action," loc. cit. j ^Robert E. Lane, "Problems of a Regulated Economy," Social Research, 19:277-299, September, 1952; see also i Austen Albu, "Socialism and the Study of Man," Pabian Tracts, 283:1-20, October, 1950. i ^Howard W. Odum, "Notes on the Technic Ways in ( ..." ■ 129’ ■various economic principles and mores were patently disre- 68 1 jgarded to carry out experiments in planning. 1 i | Owing to modern technology, the present national situi- 1 ation cannot be unduly limited by traditional practices, I Which seems to be somewhat inconsistent with the Burgess generalization that the planning practice must follow a bourse in line with American traditions. Technological change, especially that due to the electronic and atomic era that the United States is just entering, will affect not . only our folkways, customs, mores, technicways and insti- j \ tutions, but will greatly affect planning on a national scale. Davis shows he is aware of this where he writes: "Modern technology at least as found in the United States ! transcends the folkways and mores and modifies human be- 69 havior and institutions in unexpected, unforeseen ways." Actually, technology, indirectly and in unexpected ways, has greatly modified and still is changing the total interre- : 70 lated social structure. ■ - ■ - - • ) | Contemporary Society," American Sociological Review, 2:343, , June, 1937- ; 68 i Cf. John Eric Nordskog, Contemporary Social Reform | Movements (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 195*0, PP* : 427-429, for specific examples. ; ^A. Davis, "Time and the Technicways: An Experiment; in Definition," Social Forces, 19:177, December, 1940. 1 ^Odum, o£. cit., pp. 336-3^6] see also A. Davis, "Technicways in American Civilization; Notes on a Method of Measuring their Point of Origin," Social Forces, 18:317-330,, March, 1940... . ■ ~ ' “ CHAPTER "VII------------------------T-q "i BUREAUCRACY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON PLANNING | ; i : t ; j Present-day planning by states or nations ordinarily ; i Is influenced by some basic ideology. In free societies, j the leading ideology presumably is democracy, though the j 1 j more complex and inclusive the planning program becomes, the greater will be the tendency to evade the limitations of I < ' f democracy. The alternative would be some form of collectlv-i ; i ist influence whether socialist, communist, or fascist in I t ! nature. In the latter, or collectivist societies, there is , an innate tendency toward authoritarian bureaucratic organi zation and control, extending even to totalitarian regimen- j tation of the life of the society concerned.1 | Ideology and the practice of planning. Whether ide- : ologies emphasize respect for human integrity and personal , property or for collectivized property and other social j • I Values, they serve as necessary presuppositions for much I ‘ i formal and informal organization of human behavior in socie-l Robert K. Merton, Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, ; Illinois: The Free Press,”1952); Richard LaPiere, A Theory ■ of Social Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.j 1^5A); Wilbur E. Moore, Industrial Relations and the Social j Order (New York: The Macmi11an Company, 1951); John Eric Nordskog, Contemporary Social Reform Movements (New York: Charles Scribner 's Sons, 195fO • 2Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure- (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19^977 P- 3&* " " 131 Simpson points out that social scientists are frequently tainted with ideological biases. But social ■ i 'scientists should, if they actually are scientific, avoid being biased or prejudiced. They must strive for objectivi- 1 J ty. The more they accept the role of the technician, the I greater is the expectation of objectivity, which presumably ; • 3 1 is in itself a reward for being scientific. ; i Ideological planning is likely to be partisan in somej particulars. National planning may be influenced by some j » ideology, and this may acquire a bias of some sort. Ideolo-| i l gically oriented planning may be for the society in general I or for the benefit of specific groups. Conflicting groups , such as farmers versus laborers, rural versus urban, employ ers versus employees, liberals versus conservatives, nation alists versus internationalists, may all wish to protect a ; vested interest, or attempt to promote one, and their ideo- : logical views may of course differ. Meadows believes that 1 4 all interest associations have become ideological groups. , i i Von Wiese has concluded that ^national planning may be possi-j i ble if the proponents of various "isms” are prevented from \ getting access to the practitioners who do the planning i 5 practice. - - r _ _ _ _ _ r_ _ i ^George Simpson, "The Scientist— Technician or Moral-1 1st?" Philosophy of Science, 17:97, January, 1950. ^Paul Meadows, The Culture*1 of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 194$), p. 152. I c ! ________Leopold .von Wiese, "Social Theory and Social_______ T h e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h e s e r v i c e s o f " o b j e c - : t i v e " s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , w h o , e v e n t h e m o s t i m p a r t i a l o r O b j e c t i v e a m o n g t h e m , m u s t r e c o g n i z e a n d d e a l w i t h i n f l u e n c e s o f t h e v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s o f i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d o r g a n i z e d g r o u p s . P l a n n e r s m a y r a t i o n a l i z e t h e i r m o t i v e s a n d o b j e c t i v e s s t a t e d i n p l a n s a s b e i n g j u s t i f i e d i d e o l o g i c a l l y , ' ; ! i a n d y e t c o n t r a r y t o t h e i r p u b l i c a v o w a l s , t h e y m a y d e p a r t f r o m t h e i d e o l o g y . L e o n t i e f , f o r e x a m p l e , s t a t e s t h a t j " . . . p l a n n i n g [ i n R u s s i a ] i s n o t c a r r i e d o n a c c o r d i n g t o a n y s p e c i f i c p l a n n i n g t h e o r y . " ^ B u t M a r x i s m , L e n i n i s m , a n d j I S t a l i n i s m a l l p r o v i d e d t h e i d e o l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i o n . M a r x i s m ; ; h a s c o n t i n u e d a s r e i n t e r p r e t e d b y L e n i n a n d l a t e r b y S t a l i n ( — a n d n o w b y t h e n e w r u l e r s o f S o v i e t R u s s i a . T h e b u r e a u c r a t i c i n f l u e n c e i n p l a n n i n g . N a t i o n a l s o c i a l p l a n n i n g u s u a l l y a c q u i r e s a b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e . M e a d o w s u s e s t h e s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l t y p e o f a n a l y s i s t o c r i t i c i z e t h o s e w h o q u e s t i o n t h e g r o w t h o f t h e m o d e r n ; i b u r e a u c r a t i c s o c i a l s y s t e m . H e v i e w s b u r e a u c r a t i c g r o w t h a s I a n e x t e n s i o n o r a d a p t a t i o n o f t h e t h e m e s a n d p r a c t i c e s o f j b u s i n e s s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . H i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t : i s : P r a c t i c e , " i n H e r b e r t B l u m e r a n d E r n e s t W . B u r g e s s ( e d s . ) , 1 H u m a n S i d e o f S o c i a l P l a n n i n g ( C h i c a g o : A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y , 1 9 3 5 7 7 " P * 5 & . j ^ W . W . L e o n t i e f , S r . , " S o v i e t P l a n n i n g : T h e P r o b l e m | o f E c o n o m i c B a l a n c e , " R u s s i a n R e v i e w , 6 : 3 3 # A u t u m n , 1 9 ^ 6 . . . . The state is an enterprise, a set of public enter prises. The newly emerging state is patterned, adminis tratively after the paradigms of business organization. From Taylorism, government is learning scientific management, and from business administration it is de veloping the technic and acquiring the skills of plan ning .' Kimball Young explains the growth of bureaucracy as the result of people asking the state to do more and more for the people: j It has been a demand made by the people through their legislators, sanctioned by the people through their courts, passed upon by the people in many elections and shared by the people throughnthe new words and agencies which have been established. i ! i Why is there a fear of bureaucracy? Lynd, Laski, and Maclver, to name a few, are critical of bureaucratic plan- j ning practices.^ They have analyzed the concept of bureau- ' i i cracy from a negative approach. Among them, Lynd believes j ; j that people may have negative views toward bureaucracy be- ! cause they think in terms of the kind of culture they now : ; i in • have. In other words, they fear that bureaucracy may i i ^ P a u l Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1950), i pp. 187-188. ! ; ®Kimball Young, "Society and the State," American j Sociological Review, 11:137, 1946. . ! — j ^Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939)> PP• 210 ff; Robert Mac- Iver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Compa-; 1947), p. 3£>0;Harold J. Laski, Freedom (London: Archi-; tectural Press, 1944), pp. 8-15; Harold J. Laski, Will Plan-1 hing Restrict Freedom? (Cheam, England: The Architectural Tress"; rg^r;------- change the situation or the status quo. ( Another negative aspect of bureaucracy is represented by what Veblen terms "trained incapacity," the situation j being that patterns of behavior based upon training and skills which have been successfully applied in the past, may ' 11 result in inappropriate responses under changed conditions': In general, bureaucratic planners tend to repeat patterns of behavior and decision making that have been ap- . j \ propriate in the past, but may be other than that required j bnder new conditions. This is especially so when the con cept is used in terms of state bureaucracy. When the state j ! begins to interfere in the culture patterns, then, Laski says> : S ". . . the spectre of bureaucracy begins to haunt the imagi- IP nation." The inference may be made that a form of bureau- ; ) cracy will be emergent, once a planned state is organized. ; Laski wonders whether it would be possible to build a plac id ned society free from the virus of bureaucracy. I The principal criticism of bureaucracy made by many | i social scientists is that bureaucracy means the subordi- f ! ! nation of life to rules. Adherence to rules usually found j j in bureaucratic structure may be disruptive to the reall- j zation of the planning objectives which the bureaucratic 1 1 A Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System (New York: B. W. Heubsch, Inc., 1$21), p. 60. 12Laski, Freedom, op. cit., p. 19* L ^Ibid., p. 8. structure is supposed to serve. I Regulations are in many cases applied even though circumstances which initially made them functional and ef- ! i ' i fective have changed. In a sense, rules may be said to in- | 1 i crease the area in which an awareness of the consequences is! t ‘ required. And, finally, dysfunction results from bureau- ? cratic devotion to rules. Lane, the noted English social j scientist, has reviewed many such factual cases, one examples i jbeing noted here: j The man who sought to build a small garage for his j car was ordered to submit architects' plans and a plan of> the site in triplicate, was visited by five officials on; four different occasions, was denied a license to ; purchase the raw materials, found a nearby unused garage, with sufficient lumber, but was denied permission to move this lumber without a formal permit, and finally ! gave up in frustration.1^ j Bureaucracy is said to develop such an egocentric 1 respect for rules and the letter of the law that bureaucrats are incapacitated for dealing freely with situations which require flexibility and what may be termed a "purposive ap- ; proach."1^ The enforcement of bureaucratic rules in England1 , ! shows a variety of these bureaucratic impasses. The symbolic significance of bureaucratic planning on: planners is viewed by Merton as a situation in which the j bureaucrats' pattern of behavior is planned; he mentions, ! ■^Robert E. Lane, "Problems of a Regulated Economy," Social Research, 19:279* September, 1952. ! Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure of Personality," Social Forces, 1 6:560-56 8, 1940._____ _ __ for example, .. . the organizational devices of graded career, of I promotion by seniority, pensions, incremental salaries, : all of which are designed to provide incentives for i disciplined action and conformity to the official regu lations. 16 The end product of bureaucratic behavior is that there will j be a secondary consideration of goals, but primary emphasis 17 on the means as interpreted through the rules. In bureaucratic practice there is a tendency for the 18 personnel to be overly cautious. Bureaucratic behavior usually reflects a status quo point of view because of vested Interests and the officials' identification with the bureaucratic way of life.1^ Doob, however, indicts the bureaucratic attitude because: t ; High officials desire to have their departments run j ! as smoothly as possible and therefore they usually are j more eager to appoint a sound stolid individual rather | than one with a flair for innovations. 20 Administration, however, is not synonymous with bureaucracy. As Huron has distinguished these terms, ■^Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 146.| ^Laski, Freedom, pp. 75 ff; Merton, Reader in ! Bureaucracy, especially, for a comprehensive coverage of the development of bureaucratic personality patterns. -^Leonard Doob, The plans of Men (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 84; Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 157* -^Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. i 156-1 6 0. ( j 20Doob, op. cit., p. 84. , _ I37 ... Bureaucracy is ineffective, crippled and unadapted administration. It is administration which has bound i itself with rules made into absolutes and which has through its rulesJUjreed itself from public scrutiny and j public sentiment. 1 | 1 Bureaucratic planning has often been criticized as inefficient. Theoretically, Merton thinks this criticism has some validity, especially because, "... the chief merit of bureaucracy is its technical efficiency, with a premium placed on precision, speed, extent of control, con- 22 tinuity, discretion and optional returns on input." However, judging from England's experience with national planning in the 1940's, inefficiency was the result of government bureaucratization. And Lane concludes that bureaucratic inefficiency might be said to be the "normal" j characteristic.23 Actually, many cases of inefficiency can j be cited, an illustration being the following: 1 j Thus in order to carry electricity to a farm, it is j necessary to obtain clearance from: one, the owner of j the land; two, the local electric authority; three, the | 1 County Council; four, the Postmaster-General; five, the i Farm and Country planning authority; six, the National Parks Commission; seven, the Air Ministry; eight, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; and nine, the Forestry Commission.2^ The main conclusion to be drawn is that the 21J. M. Huron, Bureaucracy (New York: The Hayes Publishing Company, 1944), p. 120. Op Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 152. 2^Lane, ojd. cit., p. 281. 2^Ibid. bureaucratic official usually loses efficiency because he is once or more removed from the lives and events he, regulates; he loses touch with important and vital details that affect planners and the planned. Moreover, the practice so easily leads to what Laski summarizes as the planners’ lack of that social quality which makes him see . . human personali ties as units in a statistical table for the bureaucrat.1 ' 2^ : Obviously, realities seen in planning practices re fute the contention of Lundberg that a social scientist can j do his work in different types of social orders. He has strongly advocated utilizing statistical techniques in the study of interpersonal relations between groups: ... under a scientific approach, what would become of 1 that sixty-four dollar question at present in the fore- j ground of discussion? The virtue of private ownership and enterprise versus socialism and/or communism? The i first fact that would have to be faced, I think, is that men have survived and have possibly even been moderatelyj happy under both s y s t em s .; ! i There is a significant difference between the type of social; [system and the type of social research to be performed. A j planned bureaucratic social structure has tremendous control^ over the social problems to be studied and how they are to j be studied, which in turn exerts a great deal of pressure ori i t j the structure of social science. This apparently is • 1 i —. I ; t ^Harold J. Laski, "The Limitation of the Expert," J Harper1s Monthly, 33:104, December, 193°• I 2^George A. Lundberg, "Applying the Scientific Method to Social Phenomena, 1 1 Sociology and Social Research, 3^*6, September, 1949-___.______ ; I ~ - ------------- -— 13s Merton’s meaning where he says, ”... these incipient and [actual attacks upon the integrity of science have led most ■ 1 i ,scientists to recognize their dependence on particular types i 1 0 7 I of social structure." ' This is not to assert that scien- j | tific research depends solely on private enterprise. As a j i matter of fact, some research programs, such as that on j j atomic energy, are beyond the capacity of the largest pri- j 1 vate corporation. Actually, present-day scientific research 1 needs the cooperation of both government and private enter prise . 28 Wood observes that bureaucracy is particularly j i 1 characteristic of modern governmental organizations, whetherj they practice planning or not, and a type of structure seem-l ingly inevitable for large-scale enterprises unless a dicta- 29 ' porial one is accepted. ^ Maclver notes that modern governments are bureaucra- : tically organized and that governments with or without plan-! ning rise and fall but the bureaucracy stays on. Maclver i ! says: 1 t The bureaucracy has the expertness, the mastery of the techniques. The leaders must depend on it in many respects, must work through it and learn from it the ^Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 307* 28 Arthur Lewis Wood, "The Structure of Social Plan- , hing," Social Forces, 32:395, October, 1944] see also Bessie1 McClenahan, "The Sociology of Planning," Sociology and Social Research, 28:191-192, January, 194T; : 2%ood, loc. cit. ways of administration. The leaders are exposed to public criticism [and] to the attacks of the opposition. ; The bureaucracy is withdrawn from these commotions.30 t I It is possible, according to Merton, that persons re-. i ' i ! sponsible for the effects of these practices on a national ; ; \ jlevel may dweli in the realm of good intentions, but the j practices may be socially harmful because of their bureau- j i cratic nature.J Simpson says bureaucracy, by reason of its i formal structure tends to become authoritarian. The present day social order constantly requires more specialization. j This specialization is found not only in formal government j I organization but also in scientific research. The conse- j i quence noted is that only bureaucratic structures will have ! the necessary division of labor and tools for required re search and for political and industrial planning. Eventual-, ly the search for valid knowledge becomes a function of the division of labor, and the scientist becomes bureaucratized by his own subject matter. i ! I : i i i i 3°MacIver, op. cit., p. 320. ^Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 171 ff. 32Simpson, op♦ cit., p. 98. CHAPTER VIII THE HUMAN AND RATIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL PLANNING A purely mechanistic approach to human organization or to social planning would be quite inefficient and unreal. The principles of human organization must be accounted for in an analysis of national social planning. An overemphasis on mechanistic values may have results that are undesirable> i jan example being that low morale arises among factory workers from merely tending automatic machines. Efficiency rises when more emphasis is placed upon human organization instead of upon the mechanical structure.* Just as an overemphasis on the mechanistic factor in industrial production may have undesirable social or human effects, so an overemphasis on mechanistic aspects in national planning may lead to unforeseen negative social consequences. ! National planning has to take account of the fact that men’s interests are exceedingly diverse, and in plan- j ning, both individuals and groups are directly and indirectly ■^Kurt Riezler, Man, Mutable and Jnmutable: The Funda- ; mental Structure of Social Life (Chicago: Henry Regnery s Company, 1951), introduction; Robert Maclver, The Web of 1 Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, TW777-PP» 20 i ff.; Peter Drucker, The New Society (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 4-5> Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of . an Industrial Civilization (Boston: HarvardUniversity Press, 1946), pp. Ib0-lb2; Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. w . t z t t t .... ......................... .... affected. The planners must not forget that these individu als and groups are human beings and not machines. The situ ation is a complex one, as has been shown by Maclver: ! ! . . . The attitudes of every group differ from the atti- j tudes of every other. There is much incompatibility of outlook, of opinion and belief, of interpretation, of 1 enjoyment, of the whole realization of life. In the practice of planning, collectivism is stressed in stead of individualism, according to John Stuart Mill. And yet, men who have advanced the human race throughout historyj are those who have stood for individual behavior as compared! to mass behavior.^ Through planning it is nevertheless | hoped that a social organization may be improved so that the individual may find an adequate expression for his person- 1 ality. i l As governments introduce national planning, more spe-; i cific knowledge is needed concerning human behavior. j Through an understanding of the human element, the practices, 4 of planning may be described and studied. j : Bentham's ’ ’ economic man” supposedly is activated ! j mainly by motives of rational self-interest. But to assume ; 2M a c I v e r , 0 £ . c i t . , p . 422. ! 3 j o h n S t u a r t M i l l , U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , L i b e r t y a n d t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e G o v e r n m e n t ( O x f o r d : B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 0 7 ) , p « 3 0 * ^ L e o p o l d v o n W i e s e , " S o c i a l T h e o r y a n d S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e , " i n H e r b e r t B l u m e r a n d E r n e s t W . B u r g e s s ( e d s . ) , ■ H u m a n S i d e . o f S o c i a l P l a n n i n g ( C h i c a g o : A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i - c a l S o c i e t y , 1935)* P ♦ 57; a l s o s e e R o b e r t L y n d , K n o w l e d g e f o r W h a t ? ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , ' 1 9 3 9 ) 7 P * 1557 “ — ........ ............................ ...._ _..................................................... “ ' 143' human behavior only in its economic aspects is to dispute well-known facts of psychology, psychiatry and sociology.-* i The nature of human activity may be viewed also in terms of ! i utilitarianism which briefly means the greatest happiness of i ,the greatest number. This phrase also is essentially mythi cal in nature and function. From another angle, Oliver i Wendell Holmes has said: "To regard every human being as an end in himself and not as a means is hardly possible in the j 6 * mechanized specialized modern culture." j Symbolic phrases like Bentham's "economic man" do not describe or represent the human factor realistically, and i may, in fact, be mythical. Such mental constructs have i nevertheless greatly influenced the thinking of economists, ! planners, and related social scientists. Myths should not be disregarded altogether, because i they express ideals toward which to work or to plan. They offer, however, no blueprint to follow in realizing the : social goals implied or hinted at in the phraseology. Not j myths, but realism is essential in understanding the human j and social factors with which planners must unavoidably dealt I ! In national planning, the social role of man is con- j , i ceived impersonally in an equalitarian sense, all men to be ; ! i I ^E. A. Shils, "Social Science and Social Policy," i philosophy of Science, 17:219-224, 1949. . ! ^Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Papers (New York: Peter Smith Publisher, 1952), p. 304. r .... ~ ■ - — 1^4 treated as equal for planning purposes. Some men are superior in status, others inferior. National planning may create conflicts in the social system by presenting an equalitarian program, if the social status structure of a society or community is not taken into consideration. All i occupations should be respected, for all are necessary to i the common life in a given area, though they may have vary- j 7i ing degrees of prestige and power and be ranked accordingly'.j I The nature of man needs to be conceptualized accord- j ing to specific social and cultural situations. Mead, ' Cooley and Dewey have repeatedly stressed that human be- i havior is sociologically determined. Man's needs and de- j sires are shaped by folkways, mores, and institutions; the J nature of man is a resultant of human interaction influenced by his social and cultural milieu. Maclver notes that: ! . . . human beings are everywhere members of groups. They are utterly dependent on their relations with one another within these groups, dependent on their nature, ! their modes of living, their economic substance, and thej continuance of their species.° I i 1 i Planners should strive to organize society so as to regulate, more rather than less, the interaction of human ! beings as a factor in reaching the planned goals. One of ; the means to this end for planners is to condition "the planned" to consider the future, rather than to dwell in the; i ^Lloyd Warner, Democracy in Jonesville (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), PP* 293-295. [________________________________ ^Maclver, op. cit., p. 410. ; I present or past. The planning of human actions and atti tudes will have to take into account the expected emphasis i bn the values of machine technology, assuming that the con- ; q j ditions of tomorrow will be better than those of today. A j i heed in the planning process, then, is to recast the value j orientations of the planned, through education. i ; In society, individuals are exposed to "expected" b e - j * havior patterns, and this is true whether the social organi- i zation is planned, or unplanned. However, through planning,! i i a new direction may be given to "expectations" as an element 10 ' in the human interaction process. Another hypothesis of human behavior as related to ; J v [ planning is that individuals either do not know what would ; be to their best interest or that their conception of their ; ! i interest may not represent the general interest. In an un- ! planned society, it is implied that every man knows what is , I his own best interest and acts accordingly, and that the ef-: fects of his acts are not contrary to the general interest, i Zweig declares, ! 1 i . . . planning implies essentially that what is desired j by men as good may not be their "real" good, and ^Robert Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown in Tran sition (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19377> PP* 1 46$ ff; Margaret Mead, Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937)• 10MacIver, o£. cit., p. 412; see also P. W. Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist (New York: Philosophical Library; 1950), pp. 252,263-.-____ - therefore a clash between the actual desires of men and | the "general1 ' desires imposed on men In their own inter est may occur.H In Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia, i jthe rulers acted on the belief that they, the rulers, knew what would be good for the people in their countries j respectively, and the people were presumed to be unable to j determine what would be for their own good. That rulers or planners assume that they know what is good for the popu lation, if carried to extremes, will, according to Mumford, [result in people lacking organic relationships, lacking a means of achieving an autonomous education or preserving 1 i autonomous political activities in their working and living ; ; ( relations, and becoming more subject to external routine and; 1 12 ! manipulation. I Lundberg is criticized for regarding social science as lacking a definite scale of values, as if there were an i i approach to planning which would not impose an ethical phi- t V plosophy. But through the assumption of different scales of |values, planning can and may give different solutions to ! i problems, according to whether the social objective is se- | ' - i ! curity, health, power, liberty, equality, purity of race, j 13 I high living standards, or whatever the community wants. ; ■^Ferdynand Zweig, The Planning of Free Societies (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1942), pp. 23b-239. j 12Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, "1938), p. 386. | ^Sgweig, op. cit., p. 260; also see George Simpson, j ! Rationalism as a factor In planning. Another as sumption in planning literature is that human beings act mainly in a rational manner. Rational behavior is usually i understood as overt, cognitive activity to attain specific i goals. It is purposive activity. Although in planning it is assumed that man is a rational being, Park states that "... most men are timid, f Irrational and sentimental creatures, controlled by all 1 i sorts of personal Interests and irrational affectations and j lA I antipathies." If reason could govern human actions and destinies j entirely, the chances for a coming era of national planning | would be enhanced. Merton and others have emphasized the unanticipated consequences that follow the process of both • 1*5 ! unorganized and formally organized social action. 5 Much ' ! the same is implied where Lasswell remarks: "The human animal distinguishes himself by [an] infinite capacity for j making ends of his m e a n s . ; There are countless possibilities of error in "The Assault on Social Science," in Alfred M. Lee, Readings : in Sociology (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1951), pp. 4ll- | W5. 1 ii * Robert E. Park, "Social Planning and Human Nature,1 " in Blumer and Burgess, op. cit., p. 21. ■^Robert K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences , of Purposive Social Action:. A Research Memorandum," Ameri can Sociological Review, 1:894-904, 1936. j 1^Ibid., p. 901, quoting Lasswell. planning, among them such as follow: . . . the appraisal of the present situation, in the ! inference from this to the future objective situation, in the selection of the course of action, . . . 1 frequently involved in the too-ready assumption that ! actions which have in the past led to the desired out- I come will continue to do so.1? Human behavior is usually conceptualized as rational in planning theory. Human behavior is in part based on habit structure, some of which, as involved in planning, may have become irrational, or outmoded. As Maclver states, ^'Habits are ordered, responsive habits, responsive to the 1 f t * power of institutions,’ but planners regard these as subject to change. Planning practice has to consider the orientation of individuals relative to their social and group affiliations. The behaviors, interests, attitudes, and objectives of indi viduals are related to group patterns in society. Planning may come into conflict with institutional symbols and norms. As Durkheim has said, the practice of planning, which is based on known facts concerning phases of society and nature, comes into psychological, and not mainly logical conflict with the ritualized attitudes found in the social order. 17Ibld. : •*-®MacIver, o£. cit., p. 192. j l^Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religi- - ous Life (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, Inc., 1$47), FPZJTTf. .................... _ | r ' - ' i k ' 9 i PO The practice of planning is regarded as an "as if.” j i -As Simpson states, “Ideally, men would act as social science indicates. But this must not be taken to mean that the uni-J ,21 verse of nature, man and society is rationally structured. ; , , .,22 This, he says, is the ’fallacy of misplaced rationality.” However, in any case, the attainment of a rational society is, as yet, utopian. First, there is need of competent j knowledge so that a start can be taken toward enlightened ♦ p l a n n i n g . Carl Becker says that, 11. . .in daily living . one cannot scrutinize every word, concept, symbol or other institutionalized desire, but must take these largely whole-! 24 ^ sale, in patterns ...” He says, further, that the ac- ! ceptance of the institutionally given definitions need con form to no system of logic or reason, for ”... human beings are notoriously adroit in thinking up good reasons to' explain what they habitually do."2' * I I __________________ < , « 20Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of "As If" (New • York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935T*" • ! j i 21George Simpson, "The Scientist— Technician or Moralist?" Philosophy of Science, 17:100, January, 1950. ; 22Ibld. j 23Alvin Hansen, et al., The United States after the ■ War (New York: Cornell University Press, 1945), p. 5. . 2^Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth ! Century Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, I9 3 2), p. 47;also Lynd, Knowledge for What? pp. 55 ff• 25-gecker, loc. cit. ( To reiterate, the practice of planning is built on the assumptions of rationality in human behavior. In spite j of this, perhaps Alfred Whitehead, as quoted by Friedrich Hayek, has viewed the advance of civilization correctly I where he says: It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all ' copy-books and by eminent people when they are making ' speeches that we should cultivate the habit of thinking ! what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. j Civilization advances by extending the number of im- j portant operations which we can perform without thinking about them.2' j Insofar as planners may stress rationalism in their I planning practices, they are acting within the meaning of what Summer H. Ward has designated as social telesis, which ; may be rephrased as societal self-direction. I ^Quoted by Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and the Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^b) , ■p. 8 f c > " . i ' . CHAPTER IX------------------------ CONSENSUS OP PLANNERS AND THE PLANNED ! COMPARED FOR DEMOCRATIC AND ! ' ! AUTHORITARIAN SOCIETIES j I | i : Consensus In the practice of planning. Consensus Is i an essential factor In planning, because without reasonable j agreement nothing could be achieved. Any voluntary social i i i order is, in the final analysis, an integrated system based on mutual agreements. Consensus makes it possible to carry on the functions of government and especially its planning | ] aspects. Governments must have authority and be able to usei i force, but authority in any form of government does not . ! create and sustain the social order over which it presides. < This is well stated by Maclver: "There is [an] authority beyond the authority of government. There is a greater con sensus without which the fundamental order of the community : would fall apart."1 ] ! i j The process of consensus works differently under different forms of government. Maclver says concerning con-! sensus: "... always, whether mainly acquiescent or i I creatively active, it is the ultimate ground on which the l p unity and the order of the state reposes." i It is a paradox that planning depends upon logical i ^-Robert Maclver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 194-7), p.T^* ! 2Ibid. ; ■reasoning, yet, successful or functional integration is best jsecured if it can count on a non-logical consensus. No i formula of arriving at consensus among individuals and be- j ;tween groups has, as yet, been empirically established. 1 3 However, in the works of Moreno, Lewin, Lippitt, and Likert the development of consensus is discussed. The group dyna- imists, especially in their small group studies, have re- i yealed the consensual process and the numerous adjustments ! possible through that technique, but have not been able to ! i set forth the principles of why a group arrived at decisions S and choices which lessened frustration and enhanced adjust- t ment. The problem here may be that of . tiying to understand' s non-logical behavior through a logical orientation. The j i problem of achieving consensus, is, moreover, highly unpre- , dictable; if the analogy is not too far afield, Meadows re marks that: "... chain reactions set in at the slightest motion and strike out in ungoverned directions; there are no' ,,4 cyclotrons for harnessing social energy. National social ; t ! • i planning, as said, would involve a consensual process. I There must be consensus on the part of those who decide upon! ! _ . 3jacob c. Moreno, Who Shall Survive? (New York: | Beacon House, 1953); Ronald Lippitt, Studie's in Topological ( and Vector Psychology (Des Moines: University of Iowa j Studies in Child Welfare, 1948); Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts (New York: Harper, 1948); Rensis Likert and Gardner Murphy, Public Opinion and the Individual (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938). ^Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1950), PP» 197-198. the social objectives for planning and the modes of social r action to be utilized. Reaching a consensus when planning bn a national scale would imply regard for each business, i each social activity, each political activity, as a part of j j a general interdependent whole. Simmel says, "... the first condition of having to plan with somebody at all is to know with whom one has to deal."'’ A simple illustration of consensual interaction in human relations is given by Lilienthal: . . . the phrase in our language [which] an American uses when he says to those with whom he has been in disagree ment [is]: "I’ll go along." It is this acknowledgment of opinions of others through which consensus arises, and final judgment is the product of all concerned.6 In states that are free or democratic, the problem of consensus does not imply uniformity as to ideals, methods of procedure, or objectives to be sought. Uniformity is, how- 1 ever, the objective in an authoritarian state, and this re quires the pursuit of a deliberate policy in education and ‘ 7 1 other phases of a regimented society. Planning, as the j term is used in most social science monographs, stresses j homogeneity but not uniformity. j There are socio-economic and political precepts which! society accepts without conscious analysis and evaluation, j : ________________ i ^Kurt n. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel ! (Glencoe, Illinois: TheHFree Press, Inc.", 1950)j P • " 307. ; ^David E. Lilienthal, This I Believe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^9), P* 35* . __ ^Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy (New York: I These have the sanction and sentiment of tradition. These jprecepts not only regularize overt behavior but also draw I the individual participant into an emotional consensus with ;others. Parker claims that "... there is need to discrimi nate between uniformity and conformity of consensual be- 8 havior." In case of uniformity . . we do the same things, but we do them individually; in conformity, we do the same things, but together."^ Both forms exist in socie ties, but the importance of consensus as a factor in social integration applies in either case. Theodore Abel suggests j this where he says: j i > i The ideas common to a culture [are] based on latent | ; consensus, which is conceived to be the basis of social j organization. Consensus based on similarities of atti- j ! tudes is the integrative factor in society.10 1 ; The problem of consensus in the practice of planning ■ is not agreement on the already accepted social patterns of ; ; I activity but in the area of difference as to means of at- j taining certain national objectives. The phenomenon of t I planning is not only a concept that applies to the functions i 'of national governments, but is one of the basic problems in Prentice-Hall, Inc., 195°). 1 8 1 Emory S. Bogardus, Democratic Planning According j to Mannheim," Sociology and Social Research, 36:11, November, 195! • ! ^Frederick B. Parker, "Social Control and the Tech- • nicways," Social Forces, 22:165, October, 19^3* I 10Theodore Abel, "The Present Status of Social Theo ry , " American Sociological Review, 117:157, April, 1952.___ • (social science research. I Is it possible to establish agreement on long-range ■goals among planners and between planners and the planned? j Fellows believes that: ! ! j | ! .. . answers to these questions may be found in the j historical record. Social science research might make ! the answers more adequate. Though latent consensus may j be highly evident among members of a social system where there was not the necessity nor the opportunity to re- j ■ define the existing situation, and little social change i prevails, and behavior is mainly determined by tra- { dition.1! | i Fellows does not claim that social science has the j answers to these questions, but he goes on to say that the ■ J historical record of past decisions, based on the mores, j traditions and customs, may to some extent give a valid clue! to the questions.^2 : ; Sumner stressed a similar viewpoint in his Folk- j 1*5 i ways. Lundberg stresses the point that ”... the methods of consensus vary all the way from purest democracy, through jthe various types of aristocracy and authority to so-called j 14 j ■absolute dictatorships.” j 1 The observation has been made that there is need for \ ^Erwin W. Fellows, ”The Sociologist and Social Plan ning,” Sociology and Social Research, 36:224-225, March, ' 1952. i i 12Ibid., pp. 225-226. ; ^William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston: Ginn and • Company, 1907)• ^George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: [Longmans, Green and Company, 1947), PP• 150 £f• j . ___... . __ _- 156 an assumption of consent, even in dictatorial Russia, for a constant barrage of propaganda to build up favorable public iopinion toward the policies the elite are pursuing: The strong are never so strong that they do not try j to turn might into right and obedience into duty. And, j as is often experienced through listening and reading j the speeches of autocratic leaders, such as Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin, [they] must win the consent of the governed, at least by pretending to speak in their name, in some things.- ‘ ■5 Where Lundberg views consensus as possible outside an authoritarian social order, it is not similar to the defi nition of consensus emphasized by most social scientists. In the execution of social planning, there may arise a ne- 1 cessity for a degree of coercion in the execution of plans. ! I The necessity for coercion arises to the extent that volun- j i ,tary cooperation is not offered by or cannot be obtained j j ! from, the persons whose activities are planned. However, j 1 1 this is a problem of the administration of the plans rather | than precisely of social planning. Social planning, one J must remember, is the process that culminates in plans. The execution of plans is by administrators, though plans are 16 ! only possible if the planning process has taken place. | i Consensus, in the strictest sense of the word, is not - ’ •Scharles E. Merriam, ’ 'The Possibilities of Planning,” The American Journal of Sociology, 49:402, March, 1949* i ■^Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper j and Brothers, 19^5), pp. 28 ‘ ft; also see Hans Speier, "Free-: dom and Social Planning,” The American Journal of Sociology, 42:463-483, January, 1937* 1 _ 157 jsought in totalitarian organizations. In the main, the to talitarian solution follows the absolutist approach in de- i jveloping a paternalistic attitude in which the authorities ; jclaim to know what is good for the planned. This is anti- j j 1 thetlcal to the democratic consensus approach, as regimen- I I | tation and paternalism curtail the opportunities of the citi zens to make significant decisions. But, as Mannheim says, : I planning means a conscious consensual approach to social j ; i problems on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the whole ; 17 ! mechanism of society and the way it works. The social fa-: cillties for consensus already exist in the social organi- j Ization, and for all levels of the individual and group be- I ; I havior. j What has been said concerning consensus is perhaps : commonplace. Nevertheless the basic importance of consensus seems in general not to be understood. Mullahy, a social ; psychologist, has concluded in an empirical work in anthrop-! i plogy that: "The ultimate criterion of value interpretation ! " i and even existence in the world of socialized behavior is 18 nothing more than consensus of opinion." ( Consensus of opinion is not a cultural pattern that i 1 applies to all phases of the social order. There is not, 1 -^Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Recon- struction; Studies in Modern Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace and-Company, 1948), pp. 111-114. •^Patrick Mullahy (ed.), A Study of Interpersonal Re lations (New York: Hermitage Press, Inc., 1949), P* 243. and has not arisen a general consensus in various social and {economic phases of social organization, though in the poli tical area, there is a higher degree of consensus as to the ways and means for the government to be structured and to function. Consensus is influenced by the size of groups con- i jcerned. It is more difficult to arrive at consensus on a national scale than it is on a neighborhood or community S level. Simmel has observed that, ". . .as the size of the | group increases, the common features that fuse its members | 20 E into a social unit become fewer." ! Another factor which works against consensus even on j a national scale and which is related to the practice of j i planning, appears where vested interests take precedence over the exercise of intelligence. The need is not particu-i i larly for the most efficient social practice, but for one J i that is acceptable. And acceptable social action usually I i departs little from traditional patterns of social behavior ! j on j that are characteristic of vested interest groups. j I Planners and the planned. "The planned" as used here; refers to the people affected by planning. In free societies, ■^Harold J. Laski, Freedom (London: Architectural Press, 1944), p. 2 9. 20, Wolff, op. cit., pp. 39 7-3 9 8* i 21P. ¥. Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 249 ff. jan optimal degree of consensus among planners, leaders and I t jthe public is needed for the practice of national planning. This requires compromises among the planners and the plan ned. The compromise is not one-sided; the general public is' i i helpless without the expert, the technician and managers; i the planners need the willing cooperation on the part of 22 business, labor, farmer and government. j ; i The planner may have the necessary facts to carry on j ; i the planning practice, but facts by themselves may not carry! conviction. The general population can be biased and pre judiced toward scientific facts. And Margeneau observes that ". . .we recognize this bias and correct it by supply ing a teachable doctrine of democracy ... In other words, the development of consensus between social scientists and 2*3 ' general population." J ' Galloway observes that planning groups, on the whole, " . . . are strong for the scientific democratic planning of i i i the American economy, and have no vested interests in an un-! «24 planned and chaotic society.” i One wonders whether planners are likely to develop a j i . ------------------- I pp f David E. Lilienthal, TVA— Democracy on the March : '(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. lT5 -12 O'. 2%enry Margeneau, "Formal and Operational Procedures in Science," Main Currents.in Modern Thought, 9:15# March, 1952. : 24 / George B. Galloway, Planning for America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941), p. 85. vested interest in a planned social order. It seems that ;if the advocates of specific social practices are to develop jspecial interests as planners, the real issue is the reali sation of vested-interest objectives regardless of any I i general use of such terms as 1 1 scientific" and ’ ’democratic." However, Galloway does say that: ... it would be unfortunate to define the extent of his rightful place in thinking up new ideas, new tech- | i nics, new solutions for the many social problems. j Equally unfortunate would be adoption of expert solu- j j tions without debate, deliberation and the right of de- i cision by those affected.25 j \ i { Planning practices deal basically and specifically * with human beings. The problem of consensus between the ex-' i perts and the planned is further aggravated by experts who, ; 1 i having achieved marked success and reputation in a special- i ized professional business or industrial field, assume that , their opinions are of equal validity in dealing with humans on a national basis. As Rebecca West, the novelist, has put it, ’ ’ The study of physics or chemistry is no more likely than the study of harmony or counterpoint to develop social j ' 2 6 bmnlscience.” ! i Another problem of consensus between planners and the] planned is that of resolving the choice of ends. Conflict > ' 1 obviously arises if planners choose one end, to the disad- : vantage of another. The choosing of greater national power,* ; f 25r b id . , p. 5 1 1. ! [ 26The Judge, 1922. j national health, equality, or other values, may be at the ex pense of other ends. The planners may emphasize a specific end or even a group of goals while society, or a group in the j social order may stress another end as equally desirable. ! The planned and the practice of planning. Planning, as with any type of governmental function, involves the : i ordering of people. The state is recognized as a part of ! the culture because in some manner it satisfies basic socie tal needs, and this is also true of the government. How- j ever, the processes of government are weakened to the extentj that such practices do not fulfill the obligation to societyl The planned, therefore, become the basic material to be manipulated in the practice of planning. Concerning the I i government, Laski has emphasized that, i . . . neither good will nor efficiency in performance j ever compensates in a state for failure to elicit the interest of the plain man in what is being done, for thet nature of the results is largely unknown save as he re- { ports his judgments upon it.^T I i j : The problem of planning in free societies, therefore,! t 1 Is not merely that of devising an appropriate structure, andj then leaving the planners in complete charge, but also that ! of devising means whereby the people affected somehow may have a vital part in the planning operation. The involve- j ment of the planned is by open consent of the governed and 2^Harold J. Laski, ’ ’ The Limitations of the Expert,” Harper's Monthly, l62:!0o, December, 1930* 'is not as it is in Russia where coercion is used. Some kind of acceptance of the practices of planning obtains in auto- j i ! cratic planning, where the state orders the people to per- ; i I ’ form certain acts. Acceptance in these states was subject j to force, as represented by the Gestapo in Nazi Germany, and the OGPU, CHEKA, NKVD or MVD in Soviet Russia. These secret ; j terror organizations may be considered a monument to the ; : ' 1 terrible importance of having the people acquiescent and j t subservient to state planning policies. As Blodgett remarks! in respect to planning under Nazism, ". . . there is little ; doubt that the operation of the German economy under Nation-j 28 i al Socialism should be described as ’planned1." j ; . 1 There was no indication that any attempt was made in ! I Nazi Germany to plan for the actual wishes and desires of i the German people. Only the interests of the State were 1 2Q * deemed worthy of consideration. v i An illustration of an attempt at some form of plan- i \ ining practice in the United States is to be seen in the j t 1 organization and practices of the NRA in the early New Deal ! of 1935* Zweig observes that: ; j ... the public did not understand the idea of the NRA | and what is more, did not accept its programme as its j ; own. NIRA used an alien body suddenly introduced into ; American life, completely unfamiliar to American . t oft 1 ^Ralph H. Blodgett, Comparative Economic Systems :(New York; The Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 189-170. 29Ibid. I OQ ; tradition and the American way of life.-* National social planning in the United States is not ■ i | jlikely to succeed where the general population has not ac- j i i pepted the planning goals and does not cooperate to realize ; I these goals. In contrast to the opposition to the NRA may i he seen the story of production and sacrifice during World ; War II where the people responded to the goals set by the j government. But the whole structure of the NRA was built on opportunism. It was a collection of inconsistent, incidental. ! elements involving conflicting interests, aims and goals. j Zweig, in his penetrating analysis, concludes that: Neither the framers of the act itself nor the ad- j ministration really knew what they wanted to achieve. ; They wanted to achieve something, possibly with the i greatest speed and with the greatest publicity in press 1 and radio but they did not really know for what object- , ive.31 Under conditions as vague as this would imply, it would be ! natural for the people— the planned, those who are supposed j to be the beneficiaries of planning--to inquire: for whose i l benefit is the planning project? In the final analysis, | planning should be for the benefit of the people, which in i 1 turn would depend upon whether the social system is one of a totalitarian or of a democratic nature. In a totalitarian i social system, the leaders may say that the practice is for ; ’ i 3 ° F e r d y n a n d Zweig, The Planning of Free Societies ;(London: Seeker and Warburg, 1942), pp. 207-20B"! j 31Ibld., p. 208. the benefit of the people but in actuality it is to realize the power goals of the ruling elite even at the expense of jthe general public. ; As Alex Inkeles has observed concerning Russian auto-! I i cratic rulers: The Soviet leaders failed, for example, to give adequate consideration to the interrelatedness of the t elements of the social system; that is, they failed to recog- ; i nize the extent to which it was indeed a system such that ! basic changes in any major institution would have important ; implications for the functioning of other institutions, and i hence for the structure as a whole. Thus, they initially j showed no real awareness of the implications of family and j ; ! educational policy for the rest of the system— in particu- j lar, the impact it would have on the fundamental attitude > toward authority which would be inculcated in youths raised i in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion of the earliest • i authority models, the parent and the teacher. : ■ They neglected to weigh the influence of inherited i motivational systems, and the culturally determined behavior t patterns and expectations of the population. Thus, in their( policy in regard to the remuneration of labor in-both Indus-; try and agriculture, they were faced with a prolonged strug-; ! gle with apathy, lack of incentive, and consequent low pro- j iductivity and high mobility of labor. This, in significant measure, resulted from the absence of any correspondence between the system of rewards r " .— — ------- m i which they had devised, and the expectations of the popu lation. They over-estimated the ability of formal verbal I ‘ pressures of propaganda significantly to affect behavior in I the absence of legal sanctions and social norms even when the behavior required no counter to the existing personal motivations of individuals, and particularly when that moti-j j vation was lent support by pressures generated in the life j situation of individuals. Hence, the failure of their I propaganda efforts against abortion when it was legal and j free, and when the individuals concerned had strong desires j ; i to avoid having children in the face of the pressures of 1 Inadequate income, housing, and other requirements of stable; 1 -ap i family life. In a free society, however, the people pre- ; sumably have a voice through the exercise of their popular Sovereignty, so that the process and objectives of planning ’ ! can actually be directed for their general welfare. In the totalitarian state, the government is one of j ; ■ I the rule of men, while in a democratic society, the govern- , ment is one of a rule of law; which certainly has a bearing 1 j on whether the planning will be for the benefit of the i people primarily, or whether the people will be exploited by( the government. The decision to make is, whether the people; are to be the end for which planning is undertaken, or the ! ^ Adapted from Alex Inkeles, "Social Change in Soviet Russia," in Morris Berger, Theodore A. and Charles H. Page, freedom and Control in Modern Society (New York: D. Van Nostrand"Company, Inc., i95*U, PP* 26 3-2 6 5. ; people are to be the means toward governmental ends. j i Social planning, by its very nature, demands a high j level of Informed public opinion to support the planning i functions. Participation by the beneficiaries of the plan, j including individuals and/or societal groups, is an ingredi-j 1 I ! ent needed for the attainment of objectives in national I 1 planning practices. J i Laski remarks that, in planning, ". . .a genuine i equality of personal and group participation cannot be hoped for because it departs too widely from the historic tra- I „ 1 4 I ditions of our society."-’ { 5 Another point concerning the planned in free socie ties is the assumption that they not only participate in the; I planning but do not ignore the traditional or established i • } guidance of the people. As an ideal, each person would, in his particular social situation, regard issues as construe- | tively as possible. Such an expectation may not be real istic, because, as Wirth has commented, the predication of • I the practice of planning on idealistic assumption places the! planning process in the utopian realm instead of the area ofj ■3R I possibility, not to speak of probability.-’ - ' j i ^Laski, Freedom, pp. 14-16. j 3^lbid., p. 22. 1 ^Lewis wirth, "Localism, Regionalism and Centrali zation," The American Journal of Sociology, 42:493-509, January, 1937; see also Edwin G. Nourse, The 19501s Come First (NewYork: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), P- 176 - __ ! Ernest Barker raises another issue, that of voluntary' : ' i versus involuntary social adjustment between conflicting interest groups.^ ne reviews the historical background of the rise of voluntary adjustment in England and then, with the rise of power of the labor government and the passing of a new type of statutory rules emphasizing legal compulsion, the decline of voluntary settlement of group conflict. Consequently, in England, the planned, instead of realizing ; a greater participation in the planning process, found them- I selves more and more subordinated to the arbitrary policies by the labor government and its planning procedure. It was assumed generally that the issues in planning were beyond the power of the masses to comprehend, but that the labor leaders knew what was best for the people. Laski proposed I as a requirement, though probably it would be beyond the keri i of most individuals, that the people should have an informed; 07 1 opinion as to what they want on a national level. A sug- j gestion of this kind may be utopian, but Lilienthal also i 1 suggests that a man's conviction of being part of something { far more important than himself is a measure to him of the I ! ' ! importance of planning. The planned, in other words, would ; not feel they are planned, but become an essential element j ^Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1^51), pp. 252 'iff • for a thorough presentation of the problem of agreement with and ; without the intervention of the state. 1 ______^Laski, Freedom, p._3,8. j j — .....................168 'in the practice of planning. j The public, Zweig concludes, 11. . . expects to derive i • ! enjoyment from planning, but it entails, so far as we know 1 QQ in practice, only sacrifices."-3' ' Park asserts that "Social i . i programs must be conceived and formulated in ways that are j ! designed to capture the imagination of the people whose ; l j . Q j world they seek to improve. I 1 _ I It needs to be recognized that those for whom plan- } ning is practiced are mainly moved by familiar words and j slogans, by political habits and traditional loyalties, by lingering memories of personal likes and dislikes, by fear i of social readjustments, and by a thousand and one inarticu-j late but nonetheless powerful feelings for or against some- ! i i in thing or someone. Planning practice should take into ; i consideration the underlying homogeneity of values and atti tudes of the people to be planned. i Democracy and the practice of planning. There are Jsocial scientists such as Lorwin, Mannheim, and Heaton who ^Lilienthal, TVA— Democracy on the March, p. 122. 3%weig, op. cit., p. 2 5 0. ! ^°Robert Park, "Social Planning and Human Nature," ini Herbert Blumer and Ernest W. Burgess (eds.), Human Side of j Social Planning (Chicago: American Sociological Society, ' 1935), P- 25. 1 ^Martin S. Dworkin, "Disagreement: The Situation of Reason," The Scientific Monthly, 75:117-119, August, 1952; isee also Lorwin, op. cit., pp. 159-163* L .... _ ! ^re convinced that national social planning is only possible I in a democracy, primarily because the power of consensus is greatly limited in other forms of national states. There fore, it seems advisable to determine what planners mean by democracy and how the practice of national planning hinders I i i p or enhances the function of a democratic state. The problem becomes one of how to practice planning I and at the same time preserve the underlying values of demo cracy. Since the world-wide depression of 1929* many nations other than Russia have been striving toward national! planning. Planning was thought of as a way out of the ex isting social disorganization but today, as Mosse believes, planning can be a serious threat to freedom as understood In; Western democratic countries. J It appears to be doubtful whether national planning could be adjusted to democracy and' I not become a dictatorship. Benito Mussolini was an ardent planning advocate before he came into power, and in time he ! organized a dictatorship. But American planning, if it is to be consistent with American democracy, must follow demo- i cratic processes and seek social objectives determined by ------------------ I ^2K. L. Heaton, "The Role of Social Research in World^ Affairs," The Scientific Monthly, 74:303-307* May, 1952; Karl; Mannheim, Freedom,LPower and Democratic Planning (London: I Oxford University Press, 1950); Lewis Lorwin, "Planning in a Democracy," in Burgess and Blumer, 0£. cit., pp. 41-48. > ^%obert Mosse, "Economic Planning and Freedom," Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 13:122-133* Fall, t i 44 ipajority rule. ! Planners and social scientists distinguish between I ' ’democratic planning practice" and "autocratic planning ! ,.45 practice. There are planners who believe, with Galloway, that to analyze the possibility of whether democracy and national planning are compatible is . .to destroy faith in demo- cracy." The assumption that national planning and demo- \ pracy may be compatible depends upon whether actual demo- bratic methods and goals characterize the planning, or, on the other hand, arbitrary methods and goals are to prevail. Wood assumes the compatibility of planning and democracy where he states: 1 What is important to many Americans is the possibili-j ty of democratic social planning in this country. Our traditions and constitutional rights to givil liberties ! and political democracy are in its form.^' i The idea of a pre-established harmony between an ; existing type of state— whether planned or unplanned— and I democracy is, as John Dewey writes, ". . .as absurd a ! piece of metaphysical speculation as human 44 Galloway, op. cit., p. 1 3. ^Merriam, o£. cit., p. 400. ! ^Galloway, op. cit., p. 450. ^Arthur Lewis Wood, "The Structure of Social Plan ning," Social Forces, 3 2: 38 9, October, 1944. ' “ “ 171 hQ history has ever evolved." Democracy is not a term for which a strictly scien tific definition has been provided, yet scientists use the i l i . Q term in their research. v Scientists not only undertake re search utilizing the term "democracy," but the majority of ! American social scientists are advocates of what they believe i democracy to mean; they are enthusiastic about the possible i 1 Social resultants of the democratic process. Thomas Jeffer son said concerning democracy that ". . .we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor tolerate error as ; long as reason is left free to combat it."^° Basic to the democratic process is the inherent right of enlightened opinion to be heard. Democracy is in a sense measured by the extent to which doctrinal dictatorship in a field of thought and conceptualization is not permitted. It is based on the accepted premise that one may think his own thoughts and express them so that they may be appraised in the court of public opinion. As Mather asserts: Each scientist is not only permitted but encouraged to form and express his own Independent judgment. When , hO ^°John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: Putnam and Company, 1939), p. ?£• ^Theodor W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, i960), intro duction and Chap. I; Moreno, op. cit.; Leonard Doob, The Plans of Men (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^0); Mac- Iver, o£. cit. ^ ° Q u o t e d by K. F. Mather, "The Problem of Antiscien- jfciflc Trends Today," Science, 115:536, May, 1952- _ 1T2 he thinks others are wrong, he says so. By the same token, he is ready to submit his own opinion to the j judgment of his f e l l o w s . 51 It is assumed that from the clash of opinions, a consensus will be formed that will be generally acceptable to all. In i other words, the behavior of scientists in the interacting I process manifests the democratic process. Lundberg, however, has remarked that "... scien- i tists must recognize that democracy for all its virtues, is only one of the possible types of organization under which men have lived and achieved civilization."^2 Lundberg observes that the pursuit of social science , is possible under any type of government. He states: ; . . . The mere fact that I, personally, happen to like j the democratic way of life with all its absurdities, that I would find some current alternates quite in tolerable, and that I may even find it worth while to go. to any length in defense of democracy of the type to which I am accustomed are matters of little or no im portance as touching the scientific question.53 Although there have been several noted Russian socio-j logists, it is of interest that sociology, as a scientific discipline and as a study course, is not at present taught t I or listed in the curricula of Russian universities. There ; appears to be the rationalization that there Is no need to ! have a science of society where the rulers have the answers : 5 1 i b l d . 5 2 j , u n d b e r g , o£. cit♦, p. 45. 53ibid., p. 46. as to how, what, when, where, and why human beings behave as they do- In the United States, of course, the elected \ i I government officials do not have all the answers, and, as | Lillenthal experienced as head of the TVA, "We make the ' .*54 answers up as we go along. i , In a democratic state, constructive criticism is not suppressed. It should not be assumed that if democratic national planning were inaugurated, a higher or different ; 55 1 standard of criticism would be incorporated. However, J over-all national planning tends to become authoritarian and t to be intolerant of overt criticism. Democracy implies in i some respects assent of the minority to the decisions of the; majority, but there remains the function of the minority to ; exercise constructive criticism of the policies or acts of j the majority. Although an authoritarian state may have a majority of the people behind it, and might have attained control by j the approved methods of democracy, there is the possibility j i that it will flagrantly abuse and even overthrow the demo- ' 56 ! cratic principle.-' The following questions listed by David Lilienthal j i I I : 5^Lilienthal, This I Believe, p. 20. 55oavid m . Wright, Capitalism (New York: McGraw-Hill iBook Company, Inc., 1951 )> P* 4b; Mannheim, Freedom, Power : and Democratic Planning, pp. 35 ' 56j y j acIver^ op> cit., p. 197* serve the purpose of making one aware of the meaning of democracy as a functional reality: . . . one, has the individual less or has he greater room to exercise his talents for the arts, for self-ex- j presslon, for inquiry and thought? Two, are science and; technology, and business and government used as means j for making the individual smaller, less important, while! machines and corporations and government become more im portant? Three, or are science and technology and j business and government tools that are consciously and , deliberately developed and used to make the individual i count for more and more for himself, according to his I own talents, aspirations and capacities?57 | The meaning of democracy depends upon various forms | i i of social participation and experience. However, there is j general consensus that democracy stresses the worth of the | I individual man. This is in harmony with Cooley's statement that democracy is a social system in which the self-expres- j I e f t ; sion of all the people plays an increasing part.-' ; Master plans imposed from the top, in states where ' [individual expression is inhibited in realizing planning 1 i goals, defeat the democratic process. Bessie McClenahan : I writes concerning this aspect of planning, "... even | i , ! though the plan may be ideally desirable, it may defeat the j democratic process. i Some ardent defenders of democratic processes, ! ^Lilienthal, This I Believe, p. xxii. j ^Quoted by Seba Eldridge in American Sociological Re view, 1 7: 6 3 2, October, 1952, in a review of Robert MacIverT, Conflict of Loyalties (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952). 5%essie ^ McClenahan, "The Sociology of Planning," ; Sociology and Social Research, 28:190, January, 1944. ; ~ 175 according to Lundberg, are not aware of the idea that . i in clinging to certain traditional democratic practices we inay be retaining the shadow and sacrificing the substance of ! democracy. ; Social scientists are wont to emphasize the individu-j ! ! al's role in society but have no clear conception of the j i "worth" of the individual. Lorwin states that one of the ; i basic premises of an adequate conception of democracy is ". . . respect for the dignity of man and recognition of the essential human equality of all people. But Bridgman takes a different view: . . . Previously society did not resent the individual of exceptional abilities but took pride in him. It I seems to me that a certain crabbed and ungenerous spirit of envy and resentment against unusual ability is grow- ! ing.o2 Burgess has come to a similar conclusion and states that a change has taken place in the meaning of democracy; "... it now glorifies the average'man and discounts the man of exceptional ability."^ The emphasis given by Merriam is t that: "The democratic process to be effective demands mass participation on a fair basis in the gains of modern 6°Lundberg, 0p. cit., p. 52. ! Lorwin, 0£. cit♦, p. 8 3. 62Bridgman, op. cit., pp. 273-274. ■ 63grnest Burgess, "Social Planning and the Mores," lin Blumer and Burgess, op. cit., p. 4. _ __ ........... ■ --------— ire 6 4 [society." From a practical standpoint, modern social plan ning has been found wanting in its understanding of social ! i ■ ■ I phenomena. I Utopian planning such as that of Fourier, Bellamy, [ ; t and Owen, lost its ideological impact because of the advance of science during the second half of the nineteenth i 65 ■ ' [century. Scientific advances led to the rapid development, i !of industry and engineering, and placed utopian social plans- in the field of escape literature. The changed social situ-j ation, founded on industry and efficiency, caused Western ! man to adopt a new perspective. Rapid, sound changes made j ! i complete ideological systems archaic and relegated them to ; fif\ ■ the realm of pleasant phantasy. ; There are factors in democracy which have been tra ditional in American history, which still should have some ; influence on the approach taken by planners in state or 1 national planning within the United States. The following (examples may be cited: The concept of community has been a I I J [consistent element in American political democracy. In its j most elementary form it is represented in the earlier New ' i ! I England town meetings. And this pattern still exists in j some New England towns. Maclver has remarked: ‘ 'Democracy j 6 ^ M e r r i a m , o p . e f t . , p . 3 9 7 - ^Erwin Schr8dinger, Science and Humanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 10. j 66Ibid., pp. 397-398. .............. ... ....... ~ “ T77 is founded in the free responsiveness of the state to the 67 community." Girvetz also states that democracy cannot exist un less men have a sense of 1 1 community. And Burgess says ! that the achievement of democracy in the United States has been . . . not in the field of politics, but in industrial, civic and social life. The organization of business enterprises, employers' associations, labor unions, j boards of arbitration, represent significant achieve- j ments of democracy . 6 9 It is misleading to identify democracy with any spe cific creed other than the recognition of the individual ! participating in a community. As Maclver asserts, 11. . . j ( j any particular democracy may be associated with a particular: i ! jethos but that is because the community is permeated by thisj I ! 70 * ethos, not because the state demands it. ! ' s Crossman, the noted British socialist and planner, ■ views democracy as having grown organically through social movements which develop their own ethos, struggle ahead ; I phrough generations, and gradually achieve power to civilize: i the community. This sort of pattern cannot be imposed from ^^Maclver, op. cit., p. 201. ^Harry K. Girvetz, Prom Wealth to Welfare (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1950), p. 220. j ^Burgess, op. cit., p. 9* 7°MacIver, op. cit., p. 206. 178' I 71 outside.1 | Democratic processes in a free state cannot be "en forced" autocratically on a people. Planners, even though j jthey might assume that their planning is democratic, would ' negate the meaning of democracy if they would Impose a national master-plan on the population. As Maclver says, j . . where opinion is free to determine government, polity; i is not a function of force, nor of the acquiescence that ; submits to force but of actual consent. n^2 It is important to note that Crossman, in a Fabian address, advocates the j lessening of national social planning and that the party i t should forego further state acquisition of property and re- ' • 70 turn to a more competitive national situation. J The term "democracy" implies, then, that the people of a state determine the policies they wish their government; to pursue. Final decisions of the rightness and wrongness of public policy lies with the people. But, as Lorwin j ' I states, "it takes time to test the validity and workability J of a plan." Planning could make democracy more effective , 75 ; by responding to the felt needs of people. ^ I 1 j 7%. s. Crossman, "Values in a Changing Civilization,"! Fabian Tracts, 286:14, November, 1950- I ; I ^2MacIver, op. cit., p. 205. ^Crossman, op. cit., p. 15* ^Lorwin, o£. cit., p. 1 8 0. ! _ ^Galloway, op. cit., p. 25. ! The planning advocate, Baldwin, suggests that conflict may arise between the democratic patterns of elections for short terms of office, and the practices of planning, where he says, "... frequent elections and short terms of office would destroy the continuity of planning | i j fjC which is in its essence long.run."' 1 Mannheim asserts that a synthesis is possible between national planning and democracy.' He believes that . .it Ls quite possible to draw a dividing line between the spheres which must be standardized for the sake of planning j [ and those in which individual freedom may be permitted."^ Democracy is not primarily based on a way of govern ing for long or short periods of time; it is, however, a i i ■ f queans of choosing who shall govern and broadly to what ends, ryO though the ends are never completely achieved. ! I Democracy, as a way of life, is not limited to any j distinct form. Though democracy is also a form of govern ment, Lilienthal regards it mainly as ". . .a society of the greatest imaginable diversity and flexibility rather than a stereotyped hard and fast system."^ Lilienthal also! ‘ J j yfi j ; ' Claude D. Baldwin, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illi-i hois: The University of Illinois Press, 1942), p. 64. ^Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc- ; tion, p. 349* j ^Maclver, op. cit., p. 175; see also Merriam, loc. cit. j ^Lilienthal, This I Believe, p. xix. ! 180; aas said that it may be because of the open-system nature of democracy that ”... planning has failed in democratic ; ! • I countries in peace-time, while in war, it worked fairly suc- ■ 80 cessfully." However, in time of war, social diversity and flexibility in the society are lessened to attain the goal J Q - i of national self-preservation. 1 It is precisely because a democratic system does not order the people without their consent that planning is a complicated function for a democratically oriented social order; planning, on the other hand, is much simpler in a j dictatorship. In a self-governing society, as distinguished; from an autocratic one, it is, in principle, not a single individual or a small group that sets the goals but the general population. In a dictatorship, in contrast, the ; planning is simply to achieve goals determined by the dic tator or the ruling elite. The practice of planning could become compatible with! ! democracy if the need for the people to choose a new govern-j i ment from time to time would not conflict with the planning ; process. However, owing to the time element in some areas ! i of planning, some planners state that for planning to be ef fective, there must be a recasting of our general theory of 1 8oibid. 8l Zweig, op. cit., p. 120. I 82 democracy. i There is at present in some so-called democratic i countries a growing doubt concerning democracy. A reason I for this may be, as Zweig states, . . . that the traditional forms of democracy are too weak to be able to bear the full weight of a planned economy. A nation which plans itSQeconomy requires a greater measure of national unity.°3 ^2G-alloway, op. cit., p. 510; see also Lorwin, op. cit., p. 65. CHAPTEITX BASIC SOCIAL VALUES ESSENTIAL IN PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND GOALS j The basic social values found in the social order are | affected by the changes that take place through planning j practices and goals. The determination and choice of these | goals, both immediate and ultimate, are often stressed as i ! j being the most difficult to resolve, not only for planners j and policy makers, but also for the general public.'*' The ^ J most important thing about national planning is that it sets; i people to thinking collectively about the purposes of j 2 ! national life. In fact, many social scientists assert thatj the main responsibility in any type of planning is the de- ! termination of the goals to be sought, both immediate and ultimate. A basic question for planners is whether they should be concerned with ’ 'what ought to be" in planning objectives,! i or whether planners should be concerned solely with the j methodology useful for their immediate purpose in planning. ! \ Both aspects reflect a choice of values or ideals to work j I I ^George B. Galloway, Planning for America (New York: Henry Holt and Company', 1941), pp. 260-261; Claude D. Bald win, Economic Planning (Urbana, Illinois: The University of, Illinois Press'," 1942) / P- 32; Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1950),p. 9 6. ; 2Lewis Lorwin, Time for Planning (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19^5)^ p. 16. toward. The significance of "what ought to be" for planners1 | I is suggested by Morris Cohen: Those who boast that they are not, as social scien tists, interested in what ought to be, generally assume j ; (tacitly), that the hitherto prevailing order is the | proper ideal of what ought to be . . .A theory of values like a theory of metaphysics is none the better because it is held tacitly and is not, therefore, criti- ! cally examined.3 j The need of choosing goals or values in planning is i i inescapable. As Lynd states, goals or values in planning i Will be a part of planning, whether directly or indirectly, j 4 I overtly or covertly, explicitly or implicitly. Stating the! i objectives of planning ordinarily is a difficult step in the' planning process.^ This is the element of planning that has' 6 | been least developed. Planners, like other social scien- | tists, should examine searchingly the meaning and purpose of their work.' Gillette goes even further than this and says i that it is imperatively incumbent on social leaders and | social scientists to characterize the goals of planning, so : ^Morris Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York: Har- court, Brace and Company, 1931)* p• 343. ^Robert Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p• lB4. 5j0hn Leighton, The Individual and the Social Order (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1 9 " 2 " 6 ' ), pp. 30-31 • ^Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 193&), p• 3?7• ^Jessie Bernard, "The Art of Science, A Reply to Red- jfield," American Journal of Sociology, 15:2-3, July, 1949* .......... ....... ' — ----------184 o that they will stand out in clear outline. i Granting that there is consensus among social leaders; and the general public, there still remains the problem of preventing the means from becoming ends in themselves. Thisj i i may apply even to rules of procedure as Merton has shown: j . . . when rules of procedure, originally conceived as : ; means, become transformed into an end in itself, there i occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals, j whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal end.y Values and objectives are considered in a different j frame of reference by Lundberg. He states that it is not the business of the social sciences to answer (except condition-! i » ally as citizens) the question of what form of government there should be, what the treatment of other races should bej whether to tolerate or persecute certain religious groups, ; whether and to what degree civil liberties should be main- : i tained, and a multitude of other social, economic and poli- , tical questions.10 However, he raises the question of basic; importance to all social scientists, ’ ’ What, then, are social1 , «11 1 scientists for and what should they be able to do? j There is, and can be, agreement concerning general ; ®John W. Gillette, "Can We Plan Successfully for ; Normal Society?" Sociology and Social Research, 24:109, ' November, 1939* ^Robert k . Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, Inc., 19^9)> P* 155* " 10George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 19^7)* P* 29. L U Ibid., p. 30-__ ............. ... __ , p ... 185 goals which are relatively stable and common to most of man kind. Among these, Bain lists the following: The desire to live as long and be as healthy as possi ' ble; to have adequate food, shelter and clothing; to en joy security of person and property; to have recreation al and artistic opportunities; to gain status and reeog- : nition.12 Values of this kind vary in time and place, both within and between various social aggregates: nations, regions, and social classes. However, there is a basic core of per sistent similarity among them in all cultures. The power of human beings to satisfy their basic needs has been increasing at an accelerated rate, although in some respects there might have been local and temporary stagnations and setbacks.^ Lorwin believes that in the past, people have realized their needs and wants through a trial and error process and not by means of a planned process to reach certain objectives. But, he asks: ’ ’ How can it be otherwise, with a multitude of smaller and larger groups, pursuing their group interests and trying to in- 1 „lii fluence public opinion in favor of their particular aims. 15 Lundberg, in historical retrospect, says that ■^Read Bain, ’ ’ Natural Science and Value-Policy, ” American Journal of Sociology, 13:9# July, 1947. ■^Hornell Hart, ’ ’ Social Science and the Atomic Crisis," The Journal of Social Issues, Supplement:l-30, April, 19^97 ■^Lorwin, op. cit., p. 62. i , op. cit- . - , p. 98/ _ 18 "6 individuals in their pursuit of ends, are doing that which is common to all individuals, and the ends thus sought are jthe results of cumulative experiences of the human species i throughout the centuries. The present-day patterns of 'satisfying general wants are largely an aspect of the cultural heritage. As these represent values and objectives, he remarks: . . . In all the talk about objectives and values, it is interesting to note that the most important fact, namely, I the remarkable agreement in the human race upon the principal ends of human striving, is rarely emphasized. : Our common humanity indeed determines the more general of these objectives ! j He mentions the following as representative of the principal; i t Igoals upon which there has been almost unanimous consensus: | I ) ( . . . physical survival, security, and a livelihood for | the individual and for the group. It has also been j agreed with remarkable unanimity throughout the ages I that satisfying group association, activity, and growth J for its own sake, the type classified broadly as re- j creational, in which is included artistic, religious, ! and spiritual experiences.1' i These ends transcend those which might be considered ! personal and are those that man has pursued through the ; l centuries. Collectively, man has pursued these ends becausej he is the kind of organism that craves these satisfactions ! l8 * and finds them worth while. I ! I ! There usually are, of- course, nonconformists who are ! l6Ibid. 17Ibid., p. 99- l8Ibid. not in agreement about the general, or even specific, goals to be sought. But in the end, as Lundberg affirms, the group values will be determined by what the people consti tuting the group believe to be the facts.^ | What are some of the objectives in contemporary national planning and are these aims compatible with each ! other? And if planning is not just for the sake of having a planned social order, it is for more production, more leisure, greater equality, military preparedness, or what? Objectives for the general social welfare. There are national planning objectives that are closely connected, in 20 fact, interconnected, so that one leads toward another. As Hugh Dalton says, 11. . . there need not be only one ob jective in planning. There may be several jointly 21 ■ pursued." Many of the goals in a planned society are the , Isame as those found in an unplanned society. Therefore, it j i |seems needless to elaborate, as such planners as Sturmthal, \ kerriam, Lorwin, Galloway, and others have done, that the \ primary general objectives of American national planning are; : I to enable every human being within the United States to 1 realize the promise of American life in food, shelter, I I ! f | | 19Ibld., p. 100. ! 2<^Perdynand Zweig, The Planning of Free Societies ; (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1942), p. 76. 21Hugh Dalton, Practical Socialism for Britain '(London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1936), p. 249- clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, 22 opportunity to advance, adventure, and basic freedoms. The planners may assume that these objectives should be re garded as inherent formal rights found in the American culture. Nevertheless, whether such goals are overtly j stated or not, they can be attained only through human ef fort i : i Planning objectives of some kind are to be seen also j ( in European countries. The means used in planning and the I i ends achieved reveal basic differences in the social and po-j litical systems of these countries, although the planning j authorities in these countries may claim that a broader pro vision of basic social objectives is essential and planning i i | is required to attain them. Briefly, Lorwin, Pegrum, Flanders and others state that in all forms of national planning there is a trend ! ! toward progressively higher material and cultural standards j ! 24 of living. I ! 2 Adolf Sturmthal, A Survey of Literature on Postwar ' Reconstruction (New York: New York University Institute on ; Postwar Reconstruction Series of Publications, 1943), PP- I-1 4; Charles E. Merriam, "The Possibilities of Planning,” The : American Journal of Sociology, 49:397-407, March, 1944; Lorwin, 0£. cit., pp. 21, 228; Galloway, o£. cit., p. 28. ; 23gturmthal, o£. cit., p. 5- ! Oil Lewis Lorwin, "Planning in a Democracy," in Ernest , if. Burgess and Herbert Blumer (eds.), Human Side of Social ! Planning (Chicago: American Sociological Society, 1935), P* 43; R. E- Flanders, "Limitations and Possibilities of Eco nomic Planning," The Annals, 162:3-23, January, 1949; D. F. J "...... " ' ' ' ' 189 However, even though the general objectives stated [above are essential for the survival either of a planned or j Ian unplanned social order, a fundamental problem in planning ! | lis to determine the relative position of the individual in > 1 , i the social system. Meadows states that "... people them- j ) selves are after all the most important objective in the j 1 2S 1 planning process." 3 i I | » I The people affected by planning may prefer inde- I i pendence even though it costs them the material well-being j of a higher standard of living. As to the significance of t [the place of man in society, Bridgman, the Nobel prize physij- • i cist, states that the planned society needs to be so con- f structed in terms of objectives as to allow . . . the maximum number of its members to lead a good life while at the same time the minimum of dictation and interference from the state as to the determining of what shall constitute the good life.26 j ! To illustrate: a planned society may succeed in terms of ; attaining its expressed objectives, but fail in its respect : for the human individual. A totalitarian society such as i that in Russia is a point in question: there, a man accepts his status in society and may anticipate happiness if he | i i i_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I Pegrum, "Are We Building a Better Social and Economic Order?'' Social Science, 10:131-136, 1935- i ^ Me adows, op. cit., p. 196; cf. also, Leighton, loc♦ [ cit. 2^Paul W . Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 285. thinks and acts as the state desires him to; but he may ex- 27 pect to be liquidated if he questions or opposes the state. ! Does planning mean standardization of man’s behavior?! ! - I {Planners and scientists, regardless of the objectives that | i 1 I are stressed, differ widely in regard to the ends for which j i ! the state should plan: whether for maximum efficiency, i national aggrandizement, greater production, or maximum indi- ; 28 vidual choice. In this connection, Baldwin observes: . . . the extent to which Individuals are willing to pursue one objective rather than another may be measured5 by asking them to pay the price for their choice by j foregoing other goals. Too few persons realize the im- J plications of their espousing ends which may lead to an I incompatibility with other ends considered equally, de sirable. ^ | ! f The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that j i national planning makes no allowance for social mobility, or that a society must become static in structure and function.! | As Mannheim observes: | I I It is not necessary to accept social trends that make5 | inevitable extremes of poverty and wealth, or a planned j j society in which all human freedom vanishes. It is not j ■ necessary to accept deterioration of the democratic way ! i of life as inversible nor embrace the first chance ex- j periment or reorganization in totalitarian states as the, only possible course.30 However, though the general populace may want to live with 2?Ibid., p. 2 8 9. I 2®Zweig, op. cit., pp. 15-16. ! 2%aldwin, op. cit., p. 1 7 2. Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power, and Democratic Plan ning(London.: Oxford University Press, 1950)> P • ' 2 9. ____; ' ' ' “ " ' 1 9 1 i t s e y e s c a s t h o p e f u l l y i n t o t h e f u t u r e , R o b e r t a n d H e l e n L y n d h a v e s a i d t h a t " . . . t h e f u t u r e b e c o m e s a n d l o o k s t o o h a z a r d o u s a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e y l o o k s t e a d i l y t o w a r d t h e k n o w n p a s t . " 3 1 : T h e p l a c e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e s o c i a l o r d e r c a n ; i b e m e a s u r e d b y t h e n u m b e r o f c h o i c e s o n e c a n m a k e i n h i s d a i l y l i f e . A s Z w e i g o b s e r v e s , T h e f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e o f i n d i v i d u a l s , w h e t h e r e n t r e - , p r e n e u r s o r w o r k e r s , i s b a s i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d b y t h e s c o p e o f t h e p l a n . P l a n n i n g i m p l i e s t h a t e s s e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l a n d g r o u p v a l u e s w i l l b e t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m e n t r e - j p r e n e u r s , w o r k e r s a n d c o n s u m e r s t o t h e p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t y . 3 2 R e g a r d l e s s o f t h e d e g r e e s o f f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e t h a t a p l a n n e d o r u n p l a n n e d s o c i e t y m a y p e r m i t , c h o i c e s a r e l i m i t e d . A s M u l l a h y s u m s i t u p , . . . a p e r s o n i s r e l a t e d t o p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l g r o u p s . H e i s a p e r s o n o f p a r t i c u l a r a g e , l i f e h i s t o r y , e c o n o m i c s t a t u s a n d t h e r e s t , f o r w h o m u n l i m i t e d c h o i c e i s a l m o s t a n i l l u s i o n a n d w h e r e c h o i c e o c c u r s , i t i s s o n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d b y h a b i t , s o c i a l c u s t o m s , s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s a n d o t h e r f a c t o r s , t h a t i t h a r d l y m a k e s a c h o i c e a t a l l . 3 - 3 A s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , p l a n n e r s i n f r e e s o c i e t i e s s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e t h e d i g n i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s a n d r e s p e c t t h e i r r i g h t s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i r o w n e n d s o r f r e e c h o i c e s ; b u t p l a n n e r s h a v e • ^ R o b e r t L y n d a n d H e l e n L y n d , M i d d l e t o w n i n T r a n s i t i o n ( N e w Y o r k : H a r c o u r t , B r a c e a n d C o m p a n y , 1 9 3 7 ) > P * m : . 3 ^ Z w e i g , o p . c i t . , p . 1 8 . ! • 3 3 p a t r i c ^ M u l l a h y ( e d . ) , A S t u d y o f I n t e r p e r s o n a l R e l a t i o n s ( N e w Y o r k : H e r m i t a g e P r e s s , I n c . , 1 9 ^ 9 ) > P « 2 5 6 . { oil h o t y e t b e e n a b l e t o p l a n t o t h a t e n d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . J i ( E q u a l i t y a s a n o b j e c t i v e . T h e t e n d e n c y t o w a r d s o c i a l i i a n d e c o n o m i c e q u a l i t y i s c o v e r t l y o r o v e r t l y s t a t e d i n p l a n - ! I h i n g t h e o r i e s . E q u a l i t y , i n a s o c i a l a n d m a t e r i a l c r l t e r i o d , m a y a p p e a r e i t h e r a s a p r i m a r y o r a s e c o n d a r y o b j e c t i v e , o r j a s a b y - p r o d u c t o f o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s . ^ F o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e j p l a n n e d s o c i a l o r d e r o f R u s s i a , o n e o f t h e o b j e c t i v e s w a s t o j b e e q u a l i t y o f i n c o m e . Z w e i g ' s s t u d y r e v e a l s : j T h e r e i s n o a b s o l u t e e q u a l i t y [ i n t h e R u s s i a n s o c i a l j o r d e r ] , b u t a r e a s o n a b l e e q u a l i t y w h i c h t e n d s t o w i d e n j t h e r a n g e o f i n c o m e s e v e r y y e a r . A s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , i i t i s m o r e r e a s o n a b l e t o s p e a k o f a p l a n n e d i n e q u a l i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e S o v i e t state.3© I T h e i d e a o f e q u a l i t y a s a n o b j e c t i v e i n p l a n n i n g h a s m a n y r a m i f i c a t i o n s . D i s t i n c t i o n s h o u l d b e m a d e b e t w e e n d e - ! s i r a b l e a n d u n d e s i r a b l e f o r m s o f e q u a l i t y . O n e f o r m o f ! e q u a l i t y i s t h a t w h i c h i s c o n n e c t e d w i t h o c c u p a t i o n a l r o l e s , o f g r o u p s . T h e s i m i l a r i t y o f m a n y o c c u p a t i o n a l r o l e s , b a s e d o n t h e m e c h a n i c a l e q u a l i t y t h a t i s r e f l e c t e d i n s i m i l a r i t y j o f i n c o m e s , c r e a t e s a n i m p r e s s i o n o f s o c i a l e q u a l i t y i f p r o - 1 1 I j e c t e d i n t o t h e s o c i e t y a t l a r g e . A r t h u r S a l z s p e a k s o f t h e ! " . . . d e h u m a n i z i n g e f f e c t s o f e q u a l i t y a n d t h e a b s e n c e o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r p e r s o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s o r f o r c r e a t i v e ; 3^Merriam, o p . cit., p . 406. ^Mannheim, o p . cit . , p p . 83-84. 3 ^ Z w e i g , o p . cit., p . 74. | '----------- — -— 193 o u t l e t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e p o i n t c a n n o t h e s t r e s s e d e n o u g h t h a t \ i t h e q u a l i t a t i v e c o n c e p t o f e q u a l i t y i s i n t e r w o v e n w i t h t h e ! j ! } S o c i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e s i r e " t o h e l i k e " a n d " t o h e d i f f e r e n t " from others. And in planning, the problem is: when do » p l a n n e r s k n o w w h e n s o c i a l c l a s s e s a n d o c c u p a t i o n a l g r o u p s i w a n t t o h e l i k e o t h e r s a n d w h e n d o t h e y w a n t t o b e d i f f e r e n t ? T h e L y n d s 1 s t u d y s h o w s t h a t " T h e r e i s p e r s o n a l a n d g r o u p I s e c u r i t y i n b e i n g l i k e o t h e r s . " 3 ® A n d y e t , p e o p l e n o t o n l y i w a n t t o b e , h u t a r e d i f f e r e n t . A n e u r i n B e v a n , t h e E n g l i s h i s o c i a l i s t a n d l a b o r l e a d e r , r e v e a l s a n o t e o f d e f e a t i s m c o n - j b e r n i n g t h e p r o b l e m o f e q u a l i t y , w h i c h i s s i m i l a r t o t h e 1 s o c i o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f s t a t u s , w h e n h e c o n c l u d e s t h a t i t w i l l b e d i f f i c u l t t o h a v e n a t i o n a l s o c i a l p l a n n i n g u n t i l , : I . . . a c i t i z e n r y i s p r o d u c e d t h a t i s c a p a b l e n o t o n l y o f s e l e c t i o n s b u t o f r e j e c t i o n s ; w h i c h s a y s n o t o n l y w h O i g o e s a t t h e h e a d o f t h e q u e u e , b u t w h o g o e s r i g h t a t t h e ; b o t t o m o f t h e q u e u e . 3 9 I n a d d i t i o n , p l a n n i n g o n a n a t i o n a l s c a l e e n t a i l s a s t r a t i f i e d o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s , M a n n h e i m s t a t e s , " . . . j i , i b r e e d s e x c l u s i o n a n d s e g r e g a t i o n a n d t u r n s t h e p r e s s u r e o f ; t h e u p p e r i n t o o p p r e s s i o n o f t h e l o w e r c l a s s e s . " ^ T h e s e ; I - I 3 7 A r t h u r S a l z , " S p e c i a l i z a t i o n , " E n c y c l o p e d i a o f t h e | S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , 11:284, J a n u a r y , 1948. 3 ® L y n d a n d L y n d , o p . c i t . , p . 448. ; 3 A n e u r i n B e v a n , " D e m o c r a t i c V a l u e s , " F a b i a n T r a c t s , i 280:12, 1950. ^Mannheim, op. cit., p. 85. differences in responsibilities and duties which arise from different occupations are inherent throughout the social System. Differential occupational behavior and responsibili ty establish differential status. Moreover, differences in i status groups hinder communication and exchange that force socio-psychological segregation among the different groups j 4l ' found within the planned state. ! i In American life there is a correlation between I personal power and social status, so it would not be sur- * . 1 prising if planners would advocate social equality as reali-, zable in their type of planning, but which would allow personal power and heightened social status to accrue to themselves. The principal planning objectives determined byj the dominant social groups may be uncritically accepted by i the general public as the purpose of a given plan. These ' objectives, paradoxically, may be goals that enhance the i status of the dominant social group. As Mannheim has ob- i l served, j : I j These are interested in nature or in man only insofar} as these promise profits and power. And they are inter-; ested in other countries only as markets, colonies, and 1 military bases. ^ > ' Equality seldom is found in any type of social system, planned or unplanned. As Knight observes: i The real scarcity which seriously afflicts ; ^~ 1Ibid., pp. 8 3-8 5. [_ ___ ^2Ibid., pp_. 8-9^__ _ ..... “.......... ~ .~... ~ ~ — ......X” 95: individualistic civilization is the scarcity of such things as social distinction, creative status, acquiring achieved prestige, power— which is clearly not to he cured by application of scientific technique or planning. I It is impossible to plan so that everyone is in the fore front in terms of attainment.43 Planning, especially that found in a closed ideologi-j cal system, usually fosters unwarranted hopes among the J general population. As a British coal-miner ruefully re marked long after the mines had been nationalized under the long-range planning of the government, ‘ ’ Nationalization ; i don't help. There's still the bloody boss." j The situation of superordination and subordination isj not solved in a planned social order where the ownership of > I i production and distribution is transferred from private ! ■ 45 ' ownership to the national government. v National planning, ! instead of providing for equality and improved status for all, seems merely to substitute one status group for another! Advocates of national planning who propose objectives other than those prevailing in the unplanned society are, to i I a degree, attempting to change the criterion used in the al-; I * location of prestige and status. Hans Speier has summed up j this situation as follows: ! ! I It entails the substitution of the party member for j » , { 1 ^Sprank Knight, Freedom and Reform (New York: Harper. And Brothers, 1947), PP •41-42. ! Il Il *. Jt l Robert E. Lane, "Problems of a Regulated Economy, i Social Research, 19:289, September, 1949* L_____ _^Ibid,, p 290 __ ___ _ _ ... ........ | the businessman as the most widely recognized social image and the application of social incentives different from J the profit motive. Everyone who analyzes the attempts in Soviet Russia to build up a collectivistic society is im4 pressed by the extraordinary importance of honorific means of social distinctions. It is this control of social esteem or prestige which must be considered in order to understand important implications of planning, j Freedom and choice♦ National social planning is a means, not an end, and it should be as possible to plan the 47 social order to realize freedom as to plan for anything else. Freedom is the organization of positive opportunities for the fulfillment of personality, a society in which men I and women are ends and not means. As Harold Laski states, . . . it is historically legitimate to argue that to the degree that social purpose has prevailed over private property as a genuine societal framework, to that extent freedom has prevailed. The statutory limitation of the hours of, labor has added.to, and not subtracted from, > f r e e d o m . 4 8 j This is actually a reiteration of the previously made point j that national planning is the ordering of people relative to I the attainment of certain goals. However, one may inquire, 1 ; does the eradication of some of the existing social problems^ i such as poverty, allow greater social participation and ! personal and group choice? Does abundance mean freedom? j Barbara Wooton writes, "A condition of well-fed, well-housed[ ^%ans Speier, "Freedom and Social Planning, " The j American Journal of Sociology, 4 2 : 4 7 9 - 4 8 0 , January, 1 9 3 7 * ! ^Harold Laski, Freedom (London: Architectural Press, 1 9 4 4 ) , p . 30. I ^8Ibid. 1 ' ... ' .. 197 w e l l - c l a d , e v e n w e l l - e n t e r t a i n e d s l a v e r y i s n o t a n i m a g i n a r y i m p o s s i b i l i t y . 50 C h o i c e m e a n s t h e p o w e r t o a c t . A s a n i d e a l , a n ■ | [ i n d i v i d u a l o r s o c i e t a l a c t i o n s h o u l d b e a r a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h | ! i i ; | t o a c h o s e n g o a l . I f t h e g o a l i s b a s e d u p o n a f a l s e o r i n - j a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t i o n o f o n e s e l f a n d t h e s o c i e t a l s i t u a t i o n , j ! I t h e a c t i v i t y t o a c h i e v e s o m e a i m m i g h t b e f u t i l e , w a s t e f u l , j o r d e s t r u c t i v e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e m a y c h o o s e n o t t o a c t I . i I f h e b e l i e v e s t h a t n o t h i n g c a n b e d o n e , t h a t w h a t i s , i s , a n d w h a t w i l l b e , w i l l b e . T h e n t h e a t t i t u d e t o w a r d l i v i n g w o u l d b e a p a t h e t i c a n d a n y k i n d o f p l a n n i n g w o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e impossible.-^ O n e w o u l d t h e n b e u n a b l e t o m a k e a c h o i c e [ b e t w e e n d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n c o m e a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n o f w e a l t h , i 1 i g r e a t e r p r o d u c t i o n v e r s u s m o r e l e i s u r e t i m e , g r e a t e r i n d i - j Y i d u a l m o b i l i t y v e r s u s s t a t e d o m i n a t i o n , f r e e t r a d e v e r s u s I ! p r o t e c t i o n i s m , a n d s o f o r t h . ; A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s p o p u l a r a g r e e m e n t o n t h e g o a l s i t o b e p u r s u e d , a n a d d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m i s r a i s e d b y Z n a n i e c k i I a s t o " T h e s o c i a l o r g a n i z e r s , l e a d e r s a n d p l a n n e r s w a n t : j i : ^ B a r b a r a W o o t o n , F r e e d o m u n d e r P l a n n i n g ( C h a p e l j H i l l s , N o r t h C a r o l i n a : U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a P r e s s , j 1 9 ^ 5 ) , P - ^ 9 . 5 ° J o h n D e w e y , L i b e r a l i s m a n d S o c i a l A c t i o n ( N e w Y o r k : G . P . P u t n a m C o m p a n y , 1 9 3 5 ), P * 9 ^ * S ^ - R e a d B a i n , " N a t u r a l S c i e n c e a n d V a l u e P o l i c y , " P h i - i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e , 1 6 : 1 8 9 , S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 ^ 9 . 52Baldwin, op. cit., p. 39* j plans which fit their purposes; seldom are they willing to I C Q [ iadopt new purposes."-'0 Simmel is concerned about the result! after a goal has been chosen: Must it be independent of the! I ^ change that may have taken place among the people who are , going to be affected? "Fiat Justitia, Pereat Mundus--" 54 ! Justice will be done, even if the world perish. However, ; pne should not conclude from the above that choice in plan ning is impossible. Doob believes that: i ... the objective of planning can be whatever the so ciety desires; limited, however, by the modern industri al situation, which means that social planning cannot look backward to goals that will emphasize an earlier era. And no social plan can ever completely abandon j what already has been achieved, regardless of whether ] that something is considered "good" or "bad" in terms of the plan itself.55 Though choices may have alternatives, such a problem ; ! ' | would not be in the realm of social scientists who are in- 1 volved in the planning process. As Shils observed: "Social scientists are rather viewed as instruments for the report- » ! ing of descriptive data about particular and.concrete situ- ! ations."-^ Social scientists who supply the policy makers 1 or planners with data need to consider alternatives because j 53j>iorian znaniecki, "Sociological Ignorance in Social Planning," Sociology and Social Research, 30:88, December, 194-5 • 5^KUI»t h , wolff, The Sociology of George Simmel (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, Inc., 1950), p. 42. 55;Leonard . Doob, The Plans of Men (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 4 9. 56e> Shils, "Social Science and Social Policy," Philosophy of Science,..l6j.223# 1.949* _ • _ .. . 199 of the probability that certain results will occur if the planners act in one way and other results will occur if they act in another. Shils concludes that, ". . . the inventories of esti mates of magnitude with which social scientists furnish i i planners are used by them as data for their own interpre tations .1,57 1 ! i Lynd maintains that, 1 .. . never before have we had such an urgent sense of the difference it can make to know what current tenden cies mean to know what to value, and why and how to ma terialize those values.5° The basic value, as noted by Fellows, Clark, Doob, Lynd and i others, is human expression at times other than when there I is a threat to the basic social values such as societal. | ! 5 9 i Survival and security.* ' ■ ' It is fitting to conclude the problem of choice and j ' 5 human expression by quoting Albert Einstein: ". . . concern; tor man himself and his fate must always form the chief I I interest of all technical endeavor; never forget this in the 60 ^ midst of your diagrams and equations.1 j . I 57ibid., p. 224. 5®Lynd, op. clt., p. 186. \ 5%rwin Fellows, "The Sociologist and Social Plan-! hing," Sociology and Social Research, 36:220-226, March, i 1952; .John M. Clark, Guideposts in .Time of Change (New York:| iiarper and Brothers, 1949)> P* 4TJ" Lynd, op. citT, p. 114; j Doob, op. cit., p. 52. ; ] ^°Q,uoted by Lynd, op. cit., p. 114_ __ I I .......... 200 I I The balance factor essential in social planning. A somewhat intangible, but nevertheless real, planning ob jective is the desire of people for equilibrium, or homeo- i l stasis— more generally called "balance." This objective is J the human search to realize a relationship that in scien- I tific argot is called the best "fit" between human beings and the environment. It is the creation of cultural ; patterns and behavioral patterns which allow man to control j his environment rationally. The history of human society is| 6x i in a sense, a record of a changing balance. j National planning, at the present stage, would involve t the balancing of the interests of different groups; for ex ample, greater production interests versus more leisure, j greater individual property regulation versus state domi- > nance and control, greater freedom of trade versus pro- • i tection. Lorwin believes, "it is this fact which makes many i either skeptical of planning or fearful that it must lead toj 62 a large measure of 'dictatorial control1." j The balance factor in planning can be seen in an edu-j cational situation, when deciding whether to emphasize j specialization or general education in the curriculum. As j I Baldwin observes: "Educators are telling' us that the in- J 1 pistence upon teaching students how to make a living instead fii ' Cf. Paul Meadows, "Balance and Imbalance in Human Social Adjustment," Social Forces, 22:415, October, 1943- /TO i Lorwin, Time for Planning, p. 52•_ _____________ __l of how fco live is producing a civilization of money-making i ■ *63 * morons: J ! I The stress on balance in planning is toward uniformi- J ty, conformity and routine. ’ ’ Central control of the economy i • ! trends toward monistic solutions, solutions based on j I one single principle applied to every part of the social • 64 j life." However, Field observes that the national govern ment has already undertaken to balance the different phases of social phenomena: The government has assumed responsibility to inter- j fere when necessary in all phases of social life to re- j dress a balance that causes political discontent and paiv ticularly to assure^the continued smooth operation of ' economic processes.®5 ! ; The United States government therefore finds it es- ' sential to balance different societal phases. Individuals ; change, groups change, society changes, national goals change, and consequently there is need for readjustment of planning policies. However, there always is a certain j amount of disequilibrium, and an on-going process to attain , an equilibrium. It may be necessary, at times, to choose between j i i factors or objectives which conflict with or exclude one ! ^Baldwin, ££. cit., p. 5 5. 64 Zweig, 0£. cit.,, p. 2 7. Lowell Field, Government in Modern Society (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951)> P* 59; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace land Company, 1935), p. 1 8 8. * ~ ~ 202 another. As Baldwin states: To secure maximum production it may he necessary, for example, to make technological improvements (labor- saving machinery) which either injure the capital in vestment in some industry that has more antiquated ma chines or throw men out of work and disrupt their se curity. Thus the very effort to get maximum production will defeat the end of economic security. Though some sort of balance is sought by most societies. Efficiency as a factor and objective in planning. inj i industry, production, social institutions, individual test- : Ing, material distribution and in almost every phase of j American life, the emphasis is upon efficiency. Efficiency | is a highly complex and often elusive quality that cannot be; inferred from even the most punctilious examination of humerous criteria. However, essentially, efficiency con sists of creating the maximum realization of social and individual goals within an acceptable, realizable period of time. The goal of efficiency is stressed by various plan- i ning authorities. j Dimock describes the effect of subtle control on social behavior through an emphasis on the goal of i ^Baldwin, o£. cit., p. 53* j | ^^William Ogburn, "Man and His Institutions," in I Burgess and Blumer, op. cit., p. 32; Fellows, loc. cit. K. 1 j?. Mather, "The Problem of Antiscientific Trends Today," ! Science, 115:533-537, May, 1952; Mannheim, Freedom, Power j and Democratic Planning, p. 47; Robert Maclver, The Web of j Government (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947)> P* ^55 • I efficiency. To cite him, "New laws, new customs, new eco- j nomic theories, which permit of greater cooperation, greater Integration, greater efficiency is machine-like and inhuman 1 in operation."^ What is the criterion that can be used in ! measuring efficiency? Fellows says it is . . the extent to which intended consequences are achieved, what unintendedj consequences appear and the cost of achievement.”^ j i The approach of some planners to societal problems is; predicated on the rationalization that planning will bring greater efficiency of production and therefore will increase 70 total social welfare. However, actually, putting planning J proposals into practice to increase efficiency in industry does not seem to substantiate the above hypothesis. Lane, ! in his study of the British economy under the labor govern- , ment, stressed efficiency. But the government planners 1 found that a planned state that is 'effective in increasing ! efficiency in one area may be characterized by decreased ef-l ficiency in another area of the economy. "The basic diffi- j eulty is that a regulatory system that is effective is like-! ly to close [because] of wise and useful Irregularities, as ; 68 ! D Marshall E. Dimock, Free Enterprise and the Ad- ; ministrative State (Birmingham, Alabama: University oF Ala-; bama Press, 1951), p. 1^7* I ^Fellows, op. cit., pp. 22t-225* ' I 7°D. p. Pegrum, "Economics and Philosophy in Social Planning," Journal of Social Philosophy, 2:305-316, July, 1937; Barbara Wooton, Plan or Ho Plan~~CNew York: Farrar and Rinehart Company, 1935), P* 312. _ ; well as genuinely wasteful practices."^1 As Milne has caustically observed, "in Great Britain,! ; i i . t planning has efficiently provided free dentures but almost | * 72 I ino meat for them to chew." And Wilson, in a study of the j British railways under the national government, has pointed j out that: | : The British railways operated in the red in 19^8, and the British Transport Commission frankly stated in its j voluminous first annual report that the future outlook j for adequate earning power is not good.'3 | The coal mining industry, the nationalized aviation system, i and some other industries, were operated at a loss, although) t £he labor government stressed the operation of nationalized j 74 ! industries at a profit. \ Planners in England had claimed that nationalization would increase the efficiency of the industries affected, ; but this claim was not evidenced through actual experience. ; British experience has shown that nationalized industries | ' i have demonstrated lessened efficiency. When this became ; i 1 evident, and the grounds for nationalization were altered, 1 ! ^Robert E. Lane, "Problems of a Regulated Economy," j Social Research, 19:291> September, 19^9* . j ; 7 2 r. Milne, "Britain’s Economic Planning Ma chinery,” American Political Science Review, 46:406-420, I June, 1952. 1 1 73Qeorge Lloyd Wilson, "An Appraisal of Nationalized i Transport in Great Britain," Part I, American Economic Re- I view Proceedings, 15:239., May, 1950. 74 1 Harold J. Laski, Trade Unions in the New Society j (New York: The Viking Press, 1949), P • 159 •_____________ _ j | ' " 205! i t he planners turned to the improvement of working conditions! Jrather than efficiency, as the goal to be rationalized.7* ^ ! i Studies reveal that national planning is not neces- * t f sarily as efficient in terms of costs as an unplanned state. I i As Grosvenor Plowman states: | I . . . there are duplications, frustrations and multipli-, cations of effort caused by the addition of upper eche- . Ion management levels. The increase in working forces i and decrease in managerial skill [is] due to placing ! within the organization so very many functional compart-; ments.76 j i Much the same story could be told concerning Russian experi ence. A factual illustration may be given by referring to Sovietized power production, which is typical of much other Russian production: To produce the same amount of power, the Kemerovo power plant employs ninety-one office workers and three hundred and eighty-nine others, while the power plant at; South Amboy, New Jersey, employs seventeen office i workers and thirty-four others. Checking up by higher : industrial agencies has increased over a period of time.' In addition, there is checking up by planning agencies, , banks and the Communist party.77 j Williams declares that the United States, with a third of ! i the number of workers used in Russia, has an output three I 78 I times higher than that in the USSR. Other estimates have ' 7^Lane, loc . cit. 7^E. GroSvenor Plowman, "An Appraisal of Nationalized! Transport in Great Britain," Part II, American Economic Re view Proceedings, 11:252, May, 1950. 77Ibid. 7®A. R. Williams, The Soviets (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937)* pp. 287-2 8 8. j I - ............. .................................................. ............................-206' | j placed the American ratio even higher. : | I The comparison of efficiency between a planned and anj : | unplanned state is stressed by Clark; for the post World War! II period, he estimates, ”... the average productivity per man hour in the United States is eight times that of the i TQ Soviet Union.” 'y This confirms the conclusions of Zweig: , i ”The question whether planning can achieve higher industrialj productivity per head has been mainly answered in the nega- Bo tive.” Summers, however, believes that: There is a need for a system of planned industry and . that industries cannot plan on a national scale to co ordinate the different productive units. It is impossi ble for industries to do it alone. They won't do it; they have not done it; and they will not do it. The only power that can put it into effect is government a c t i o n . ' Ogburn further states: ' It must not be taken for granted that efficiency willj be less under a union of industry and state. Efficiencyj under a union of state and industry may indeed be in- | creased, because of the better possibilities, for in- j stance, of planning oforelationships outside a particu- ; lar plant or industry.0^ T i j It is precisely on the basis of the efficiency ob- J ! i jective that Mannheim bases his theory of the planned state: ■ Planning can undertake the task to substitute new ! ?%ew York Times, August 21, 19^9- j ^°Perdynand Zweig, Economic Ideas (New York: j Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 152. Q i ’ Harrison B. Summers and Robert E. Summers, Planned Economy (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 19^0), p. 57* 82 , i Ogburn, op. cit., p. 36. __.. _ ________ 1 ! controls for ineffectual ones in order to eliminate j waste, restore efficiency, give scope to foresight and i do all this without inhuman regimentation or needless interference with the normal aspirations of the citizen- j ry.°3 i i I And Pegrum concludes that, with few exceptions, i : i The approach of planners is predicated on the as- J sumption that nationalization under planning will bring greater efficiency of production and hence will increase the total economic welfare.84 Bridgman challenges the tacit assumption of more and j i more economic efficiency: ”We are already so far ahead ! I with our labor-saving devices that we can produce more than ' 85 ; we use." And he adds further on, 1 1 Why should we want the maximum efficiency if that J means that we are getting ourselves into the position of having to support the entire world. It seems that a j little less efficiehcy is indicated. Once we have made j up our minds to put up with a little less efficiency j many of the problems raised by planning would solve I themselves.86 ! Furthermore, how can one estimate when, through planning, I efficiency actually has been realized? Soule asks: I j Which is more efficiency— an economy that employs I only three-quarters of its workers and of its productive equipment at a high standards of efficiency and has to support the rest in idleness, or an economy that employs all its labor and resources at a somewhat lower standard of living?®? j 83Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, | )?* * 7 . j f t l L ! Pegrum, ’ ’ Economics and Philosophy in Social Plan- | hing," loc. cit.; also see Wooton, Plan or No Plan, p. 312. , 88Bridgman, cit., pp. 325-326. I 86Ibid. ! ______^George Soule, A Planned Society (New York: The j | “ ‘ 208 ' ' i Orton contends that the problem of efficiency is not one that can be rationalized by emphasizing human needs. In an industrial society, he says, i | A man controls a machine by doing just what the ma- I chine requires. He achieves just what the machine is capable of achieving. In the end, for practical ; purposes, he becomes what the machine permits him to be come— just that, no more.°° i i | Planning for efficiency and in terms of efficiency is not j : i restricted to any one particular ideology. As Maclver ! States: The standard of technology is efficiency, and since the advancing technology is identical with the more ef- : flcient technology its results anywhere compel sooner orj later its acceptance everywhere.°9 A similar conclusion is drawn by Meadows: "Modern social life is based on the principles of science and ! centers around the machine as a system of controlled ef ficiency."^0 And there is nothing valid in the assumption | that production planning with the goal of efficiency as the primary aim will satisfy human needs. On this point Simmel ; i I observes: ; f Human needs cannot be rationalized in the way pro duction can be. They seem to have a contingency or in- calculability about them, which is the reason why their Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 91. ®®William A. Orton, Economic Role of the State (Chi cago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 1 3 ^ J ^Maclver, loc. cit. 1 ^0Mea,d.Ows, The Culture of Industrial Man, p. 211. ~ M ~ * " r r ■inrrrn- ' rT_l 1 ~ i . 1 irr i - t - r I satisfaction can be achieved only at the cost of pro- i ducing innumerable irrational and unusable goods.”1 In national planning, not only the objective of ef ficiency needs to be evaluated and measured, but also the j * political, social and psychological effects of planning. As! Oxenfeldt states, A socio-economic system that is considered efficient at the expense of individual insecurity, suppresses ex pression, restricts movement, or violates personal, moral and ethical codes, such a system, obviously must ! be considered insufficient in respect to these latter [ matters.92 j J I And Hillman criticizes planners who may be so occupied with J i notions of efficiency: They [the planners] may overlook the fact that some , ; people might prefer to suffer certain wants rather than ' ! abandon certain rights. Efficiency may be imposed upon * the people at too high a price in human values.93 ; Full employment as an objective. Hanson asks this question: National planning for what? He assumes that con- t i sensus exists among planning authorities for the attainment Qii of reasonably full employment. However, the term "full employment'1 is often misunderstood and requires at least a j i ; brief explanation: , ^Wolff, op. cit., p. 8 9. ! 92Reinhart Oxenfeldt, Economic Systems in Action (New! York: Rinehart, 1952), pp. 5 -6 . j 93Arthur Hillman, Community Organization and Planning (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 122. I ^Alvin Hanson, et al., The United States After War [(New York: Cornell University Press, 19^5) > P* 19* _ _ _ _ _ ____ j ... a highly dynamic society in which new industries ; ; are developing and some old ones are declining we must > I retain a high degree of labor mobility. In like manner, ; regional population shifts will occur in an expanding, ! developing economy. In addition, in a democratic socie- j ty with freedom of occupational choice, some considera- | ble labor turnover is not only inevitable but, indeed, i beneficial. Accordingly there will always be, in a so- , ciety such as ours, a large amount of transitional unem-', ployment. For these reasons in an economy as large as ; that of the United States, it is probable that at full i employment, there would be at any one time, 2 to 3 million temporarily unemployed. 95 The concept of full employment can acquire a definite mean- i ing only when it is conceived within the prevailing social customs and traditions. "Full employmentH means to Hanson, . . . that the normal labor force is working at the custom ary and prevailing work week."98 Zweig agrees that full employment is an important ob jective of a planned social order. Full employment, in his ; 97 1 view, is inherent in the nature of a planned society. j However, full employment very rarely appears as an ultimate objective in itself. Full employment is a means to other : 98' ends, such' as defense or the development of backward areas. ( 1 Planners assert that through national planning unem- ! ployment can be abolished. The planning experiments in j "ibid., pp. 21-22. 96Ibid., p. 22. 9?zweig, The Planning of Free Societies, p. 70. 98Ibid., p. 71. Russia, Germany and Italy have shown quantitatively that un employment may he reduced. However, Baldwin states: I The mere fact that all the able-bodied are employed ; at some task or other does not indicate whether they are actually employed in tasks for which they are suited. j Do the Red Army, the Labor fronts, represent a solution to the unemployment p r o b l e m ? 9 9 The attainment of full employment may not work for the preservation of the existing social order, as was provedj in Germany under Hitler. Actually, a marked degree of unem ployment may be a challenge to the existing social system?'00 Furthermore, as Meadows observes, a full employment goal i i 101 Would not solve many major social problems. However, the man living in contemporary industrial society quite literal- 102' ly depends upon the success of a full employment program. Hanson compares the need for full employment in the i modem industrial social order with the right to free land ! which was the objective one hundred years ago: ’ ’ The right ' i to useful, remunerative and regular employment is the symbolj i of opportunity today.”10^ Nevertheless, the tangible ob- j ; jective of acquiring unsettled land is quite different from j the socio-economic objective of full employment. As Baldwinj observes, j ; ^%aldwin, o£. cit., p. 41. : 100Galloway, o|>. cit., p. 1 8 9 * l01Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man, p. 6 3. 102Ibid. 1 _____ 103Hanson, op. cit., p. 17.____ ____________ ‘ 212 The possibility of foreseeing many of the danger signals through planning would tend to minimize fluctu ations, but there seems no adequate proof that such would be the case anymore for a planned or unplanned social o r d e r .1°4 Planning for the general welfare. The general wel fare is an all-inclusive concept that some planners empha size as the major planning goal.10- * Galloway says, “planning is aimed at the highest possible standards of production and; at the translation of national production into human wel- | fare. Brown says, "We can achieve social planning only by redefining democracy— originally and constitutionally de- 107 fined— to promote the general welfare." Merrlam remarks that, "... the government is an instrument that may be used for many kinds of cases for the promotion of general i - | aO . welfare.” Lilienthal states that relative dollar cost i was only one factor to be considered in the TVA program, and! that the most important and final question among the plan- J • i hing professions and technicians was: "What course of ! ( 10^Baldwin, ojd. cit., p. 16. J 10^Lorwin, "Planning in a Democracy," in Burgess and j Blumer, op. cit.; Galloway, op. cit., p. 506; Francis J. ; Brown, "SocialPlanning through Education," American Soci ological Review, 1:934-942, February, 1936; Frederick Allen, The Big Change (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 2^0. 10^Galloway, loc. cit. j 10^Brown, o£. cit., p. 941. * 1 a A i I ___ Merriam, op... . cit., p 402. ................. ! : '...: ...' .. ..~ “ 2X3; action would yield the best results as judged by the common purpose? The goal of the whole undertaking [was] the wel fare of the people of the region."10^ Reimer, however, 3tates that, . . . the problem of planning for the general welfare is! obviously a very vague and general objective and as far as being able to plan in terms of tangible objectives ! the term is a hindrance instead of a guide.11® Regardless of what the term welfare may mean to a so ciety, Lundberg says it is gratuitous to assume that there is any such thing as the good life for all times, places and ill conditions of men. Baldwin, the planning expert, asks, Just what constitutes the utilization of the means of ! production for the common good, or for the general wel- | ! fare, is a matter of considerable disagreement. Just j I when is national planning promoting the general welfare,! j and when is it not?112 j i A large number of general planning objectives could ; be listed, discussed, and integrated into the theory of planning objectives. Yet there are, as Sturmthal states, a ifew planners who emphasize a simple policy or objective. **A surprisingly large number, however, would agree on a number 10%)avid E. Lilienthal, TVA— Democracy on the March j (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 6 9. i 110Svend Reimer, ’ ’ Social Planning and Social Organi- 1 :zation,, f The American Journal of Sociology, 52:510, May, 1947. li:LGeorge A. Lundberg, "Applying the Scientific 1 kethod to Social Phenomena," Sociology and Social Research, ; 34:10, September, 1949- : ; np i .._ Baldwin, op, cit., pp 29-30 _____________ ! of objectives in which there is a high degree of agree- j ment."113 j j Regardless of the planning objectives stated, such asj 'social security, minimum standard of living, full employ- | ! ment, the development of the arts, health, leisure, and so 11 ii 1 on, the problem from a policy standpoint is the agreement bn the methods to be applied to reach the stated objectives. • ■ ; ^Various writers advocate different policies to attain the same ends.113 There is often a lack of agreement between proposed , i objectives and their Interpretation into specific planning goals. A generalization, when interpreted empirically, usually gives rise to disparity and disagreement among plan-; ' , * ners and public alike.11^ , 113sturmthal, oj). cit., p. 3 2. 11^Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? pp. 8 7-8 8. 113Sturmthal, ojp. cit., pp. 33-3-4-. 11^Brown, op. cit., p. 9^2. ...... CHAPTER XI------------------------- POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES i IN POST WAR NATIONAL PLANNING > I j Many treatises and monographs have been written aboutj ! the Five Year Plans initiated in Soviet Russia. Traditions ; and myths have grown up around them, their general policies, methods, and objectives. Planners who have tried to intro duce planning techniques in countries other than Russia ! have, of course, been greatly influenced by propaganda con- j cerning planning in the Soviet Union. j That Soviet planning exemplifies both theoretical and- practical aspects of planning would be evident to any student of the problem. Rather than go into innumerable de tails to analyze several consecutive plans in Russia, it is j i deemed preferable to state, as a general perspective regard ing planning, the essential features revealed in several i plans devised by different countries after World War II. i ; The Fourth Russian Plan happens to coincide with the other j plans to be considered, so the practical difference in the j i policies, methods, objectives, and general social philosophy of the plans of these countries serve to present a cross section. The plans to be considered are for the following j countries: the United States; the United Kingdom, and more j ’ t briefly, the Dominionsof Australia and Canada; India; Germa ny; Greece; Japan; Norway; the Netherlands; France; Poland, ! Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; the USSR; and the Argentine. For each of these national plans a general statement will be i made regarding the long-range or short-range program, enumerating essential factors to indicate the scope of the planning, as well as the objectives postulated. It will readily become apparent that all these plans j jemphasize changing relations between the national govern ments and the economies concerned. The plans considered here reveal that these countries have not advanced equally in the direction of a planned economy. The United States is cited to represent an approach to planning. The United Kingdom and certain dominions have gone further with plan ning than has the United States. India’s plan has been de scribed as an exercise in economic arithmetic, which is more hopeful and speculative than other contemporary examples. } Germany, subject to post-war occupation, represents a j country in which plans have been .imposed upon the people. j : j For Greece, similarly, the plan came from abroad. The plan j representing Japan has been characterized as diagnosis with-' out therapy. Norway, however, provided not only for diag- . nosis and prognosis, but initiated an actual program of ; planning. The Netherlands is significant as an example of planning under distress. In France, however, planning was | undertaken to modernize the economy. All these countries may in general be grouped as free jto plan for themselves, with some exceptions for Germany and. ~ ' ............. ~ ."" 2X7' Xreece. In none of these countries has the purpose been the realization of a fully planned economy, but rather to pro- ! vide for postwar reconstruction and the expansion of the I ! economy. Quite different would be the appraisal for the other ! countries yet to be considered. For Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the plans reveal approaches to a fully planned j economy, obviously under the tutelage of the Soviet Union. ! ! I ( The USSR is cited as an example of a planned economy. The J < Argentine, where fascist ideology has been so influential, j serves as an example of planning toward autarchy. j i The following data regarding specific plans have been freely adapted from the source material in Seymour E. Harrisl, 1 1 Economic Planning♦ The data thus adapted would be sub- i stantiated in Lewis Lorwin's book, Postwar Plans in the United Nations In the United States, a long-range program designed j j f c o strengthen the structure of the American economy should j ; * t include policies toward: (l) efficient utilization of the j 1 / V 1 labor force; (2) maximum utilization of productive resources; ,(3) encouragement of free competitive enterprise; (^) pro- j moting welfare, health and security; (5) cooperation in ! i ! s ■ ! ■^Seymour E. Harris, Economic Planning (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19^9)• O Lewis Lorwin, Postwar Plans of the United Nations '(New York: Twentieth Century Eund, T£43")'• " international economic relations; and (6) combating economic I q fluctuations. j The efficient utilization of the labor force would j require a working population that is well-trained, enjoys / high standards of health, education, security, and personal j i and political freedom. In the maximum utilization of pro- I ductive resources, the plans deal with agriculture, regional! development, federal aid programs, public works, research, I and patents. i ! Planning practices for the encouragement of free competitive enterprise stress the enforcement of existing ' antitrust laws and the encouragement of small businesses. ! The plans of the United States government to promote j j welfare, health and security came to be looked upon as ”wel-i fare programs.” Under these plans, the responsibility for | employment, unemployment, retirement, pensions, health, • public health and education, and social security was mainly vested in the federal government. ! i ! The American practices in international economic re- | lations were to be cooperative with the United Nations in J promoting economic stability, expansion of world trade, sta- i ’ : bilization of exchange rates, and reciprocal tariff negoti- j ations.1 * I : i ^Harris, ojp. cit♦, p. 101. ^Ibid., pp. 111-112. : To combat economic fluctuations, there were such de vices as a well-integrated program of employment stabili sation, improvements in the process by which workers could I I find jobs and employers find workers, improvements in the ; ; ! jtax structure, wise management of the public debt, and a flexible credit policy. • ; i In American planning, emphasis was placed on the Em- j ; • } ployment Act of 19^6 in which Congress had spelled out in ! i unequivocal terms as a "continuing policy and responsibility of the federal government" something which hitherto had onlyi i t fallen ambiguously within the general welfare clause of the i Constitution. j In this act a mandate was laid on the President and ! the executive department and Congress to pursue the goal of , promoting maximum production of the nation’s resources, natural and human. : The nation's economic budget, as part of the plan, ! i was designed to control the flow of funds by which major economic groups could be interrelated in the national econo my. To this end it considered the incomes of consumers, i [ t businesses and the government, as well as the balance of ■ I international trade.^ 1 The principal subjects dealt with included: (l) Our J ability to grow. (2) The development of natural resources 5Ibid., pp. 115-121. ' " “~ “220 and capital equipment. Details for natural resources in cluded land, water, forests, minerals, and regional develop ment; the data for capital equipment included productive capacity, modernization of facilities, programs and respon- i i i sibilities. (3) The third long-range objective was con cerned with the institutions and practices for a high pro- j - duction economy; special attention was given to industrial price-wage-profit policies, agricultural and food policies, 1 taxation and debt management and international economic re- j lations. (4) The emphasis in long-range planning was the I timing of economic programs to promote stabilization. Laterj economic reports of the President to the Congress pointed } but guides to be followed in the longer-ranged plans and thei f adjustments to be made in attempts to meet problems, old or ; hew.^ The Lorwin statement about planning in the United I States during and after the war includes the following I interesting data. United States plans of economic and i > ■ ! social organizations can be arranged in four groups: :(1) those which advocate the maintenance of the prewar 1 1 status quo; (2) those which aim to establish a "new public ' i ^ j capitalism" based on the partnership of industry and govern-: ment; (3) those which advocate a gradual but systematic de- 1 i velopment of public ownership; and (4) those which would j r j find a compromise in some "mixed economic system." 6Ibid., p. 1 5 7. ! ?Lorwin, o£. cit., p. 41. I ...................... “ ' “ 2 2 '1 ! I i Lorwin cites the following as the general areas where 8! postwar planning has been taking place in the United States : j j(l) Demobilization of the Armed Forces, and the resultant i effect on the labor force, educational system, and specific occupations. (2) Reconversion of plant facilities and pro- , duction, and its consequences on the (3) the need to aid i ' i n d u s t r y . ( 4 ) T r a n s p o r t a t i o n d e v e l o p m e n t , v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s of which were being studied by the Department of Commerce, ! 1 the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Maritime Commission * i and several other agencies. (5) Social Security, particulars i ly the need to expand the Social Security Act that was j t p a s s e d i n 1 9 3 5 * a n d a m e n d e d i n 1 9 3 9 * T h i s w o u l d i n c l u d e u n - | e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t s , o l d - a g e p e n s i o n s , o l d - a g e s u r v i v o r s ; b e n e f i t s , h e a l t h b e n e f i t s f o r d e p e n d e n t s , a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n , o f t h e s e b e n e f i t s t o a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r , d o m e s t i c s e r v i c e , 1 public employment, service for non-profit institutions, and ; self-employed persons. In general, as Lorwin remarks, "The * Social Security Board recommends sweeping readjustments for , ' | t h e c o n t i n u i n g a d v a n c e t o w a r d e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y w h i c h i s o n e j Q ' of the main objectives of the United States.”- * (6) Federal s o c i a l s e r v i c e s w e r e t o b e e x t e n d e d i n t h e a r e a s o f h e a l t h , j i | n u t r i t i o n a n d p u b l i c h e a l t h . ( 7 ) U r b a n a n d R u r a l H o u s i n g . i The National Resources Planning Board in 1943 set I 8Ibid., pp. 44-51, 9Ibld., p. 49- j . . ........................................................ _ _ _ _ _ _ 222 jforth its assumptions and principles in the following parti culars. Three general aims were stated: First, to obtain jthe fullest development of the human personality, compatible with justice, liberty, and democratic order. Second, to de velop fully all our productive resources, material and I human, in such a manner as to provide full employment, con- i tinuity of income, and equal access to minimum security and living standards so as to maintain a balance between eco- i nomic stability and social advancement. And third, to J establish an effective social order of the world outlawing j violence and imperialism. The National Resources Planning Board stated these general aims in its "Bill of Rights": ! 1. The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive years; I 2. The right to fair pay, adequate to command the ( necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, : ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable service; ; 3* The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, j and medical care; j 1 4. The right to security, with freedom from fear of ; ; old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment, and | accident; j 5. The right to live in a system of free enterprise,; free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power,! arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies; j I 6 . The right to come and go, to speak or be silent, | free from the spying of secret political police; 7. The right to equality before the law, with equal ; access to justice in fact; 8. The right to education for work, for citizenship, I ___and for personal growth and happiness; a n d _______ , 9- The right to rest, recreation, and adventure, the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in an advancing ; civilization.10 i In his general appraisal of planning, Lorwin shows that: | , The USSR and the industrially less developed, e.g., Latin America, India and China stress the idea of "high- er living standard" through more production and greater productivity. The.concrete objectives, however, are alike— an increase in the material goods of life, better nutrition, housing, health and education, as a means for a larger spiritual and cultural life of all people. j Most plans also imply that bettering the conditions of the people will bring about a greater economic and social equality among all groups and classes.11 Most postwar plans stress as objectives the following!: social insurance, expansion of social services, assistance ! in getting an education or a vocation; better nutrition; de-1 i cent homes and good health, means to maintain themselves in J : l old age, minimum wages, shorter hours of work, creating a ! better physical environment, better transportation, cities and towns more spacious. In most countries, there is also the notion that education and recreation offer a growing field for the use of workers and labor and for employment directed not so much to the material needs as to the com- 12 forts and amenities of an advancing civilization. i . The objectives found in most national plans reflect a growing demand for a basic "social minimum as a right" of 1QIbld., pp. 51-52. n Ibid., p. 292. 12Ibid., pp. 292-29.4. ~ " — 224 the individual or family in return for productive and other ; 15 services to the community. ; ! To return to the digest from Harris' statement, the I next countries to be considered are the United Kingdom and the Dominions of Australia and Canada. In the United King- i dom, as in other countries, planners had to decide how much planning to undertake, and this was set forth in the British 14 I White Paper on Employment Policy (1944). The principal j considerations were: (l) The international and industrial ’ background. (2) The transition from war to peace. (3) The { balanced distribution of industry and labor. (4) General conditions of a high and stable level employment. In this fourth category, the plan dealt with the maintenance of | I total expenditures for a given level of wages and prices; j consequently, the maintenance of total expenditure required a reasonable stability of prices and wages. Another feature; was the mobility of labor, to which end the government would assist in bringing the men to the work and the work to the j men. (5) The plan also dealt with measures to maintain ; i total expenditure, capital expenditure, consumption expendi-J ture, and in general central finance. j In submitting proposals for an extension of state j i control, the government would have to learn from experience ! 13Ibid., p. 293- ^Harris, o£. cit., p. 158. * -225 and would Invent and improve the instruments of the new policy as the government moved forward to its goal. It was understood that unexpected obstacles would arise in practice. The government intended to establish on » i a permanent basis a small central staff qualified to measurej * I ! and analyze economic trends and submit an evaluation of themj to the ministers concerned. It was understood that the success of the Government's policy would depend on the skill shown in putting general ideas into day-to-day practice. Certain classes of sta- ' i tistics were to be kept consistently. i Further insight into economic planning in the United j kingdom was given in The Economic Survey for 19^7• This [ survey stated that the objective of economics was to use the natural resources in the best interest of the nation as a i whole. The workers and the goods and services they produced j J were to satisfy five main national needs: (l) defense, i(2) payment for imports, (3) capital equipment and mainte- j j nance, (4) personal consumption, (5) public services. j : I In determining the kind of plan to be adopted, it was; essential to recognize the differences between totalitarian } and democratic planning, and the conditions of war emergency' as being different from those of normal peace times. As a ! 1 basic principle, it was held that a democratic government must conduct its economic planning in a manner which allows the maximum possible freedom of choice to the individual citizen.1^ When applying the methods of democratic economic planning, the plans must have regard for the special eco nomic conditions of Great Britain and also be as flexible as possible. | A long-term plan was then being developed for a ’ i | number of basic industries and services— coal, power, steel, agriculture, transport, building construction, and others, j i The Government avowedly was seeking to develop a j system of economic planning, of which the following were thej chief elements: j (a) An organization with enough knowledge and relia- j ble information to assess national resources and to formu- ! j late the national needs; (b) a set of economic "budgets” ; > I which relate the needs to the resources, and which enable the Government to say what is the best use for the resources in the national interest; (c) a number of methods, the com- j bined effect of which will enable the government to in- j fluence the use of resources in the desired direction, wlth-j : i out interfering with democratic freedom. I i The long-term program of the United Kingdom submitted to the organization for European Economic Cooperation (1st j | October, 19^8), set forth, (1) the general objectives; j i 1 ( 2 ) problems before the United Kingdom; (3) the nature of J 15Ibid., p. 188. .... ' 227 the solution proposed; and (4) considered the progress made since 1947. The general policies stated dealt with the pro motion of understanding and common effort, and set forth the i . principles which should guide the financial policies of the i United Kingdom. Another consideration at that time was the role of external assistance, especially that from the United; States f ‘ Australia developed her own plan of meeting the problems of unemployment, the details of which were de termined by Australia as a sovereign state. That plan took into account private and public investments, the problem of inflation and wages, and the mobility of labor essential for IT 1 l a full employment economy. i i Canada also formed plans with reference to employmentj and income in 1945* the object being full employment. ! Factors in the plan included public investment policy after ' the war, and the working out of soundly planned projects to | which increased public investment expenditures could be de- j voted; and the implementation in cooperation with the ) i provinces, of a new dominion policy of expenditure on the development and conservation of natural resources. The plan was also concerned with the mobility of labor and the fiscal: policy of the government, especially as related to deficits j I i l6Ibid., pp. 188-229- 17Ibid., pp. 224-227- and increases in the national debt resulting from its employ^ l8 fnent and income policy. | I i India launched a hopeful plan for postwar recon- 1 i struction and economic expansion which was set forth in 1944. This plan was written by enlightened leading businessmen in ! India, who wrote A Plan for Economic Development for India, now known as the Bombay Plan.^ This plan was little more than a statement of objectives. The statement of the ob- ! i jective of the plan is especially significant for this study; and it follows briefly: The principal objective of our plan is to bring about! a doubling of the present per capita income within a i period of fifteen years from the time that the plan comes into operation. Allowing for an increase in popu lation of 5 million per annum, which is the rate dis closed by the last decennial census, we estimate that a ; doubling of the per capita income within a period of fifteen years will necessitate a trebling of the present aggregate national income. To achieve this increase, we1 propose that the plan should be so organized as to raise, the net output of agriculture to a little over twice the present figure, and that of industry to approximately five times the present output. This would still leave j our economy mainly agricultural in the sense that the j greater part of the population would continue to be en- ; gaged in agriculture and allied occupations although the; present preponderance of agriculture would be consldera-j bly reduced.20 i An important part of the proposals of the Bombay Plan regarding industrial development was the suggestion that in j the initial stages, attention should be directed primarily : l8Ibid., pp. 228-229- 19Ibid., pp. 230-255. 2QIbid., p. 233- | — .'----------- — --------229 |bo the creation of industries for the production of power and capital goods. Furthermore, the proposal was subject to; the important qualification that provision should be made atj I j the same time for the manufacture within the country for the; I I most essential classes of consumption goods. Another im- i portant suggestion was that in the production of these es- | sential consumption goods, the fullest possible use should j i * be made of small-scale and cottage industries. In this way,j besides providing employment there would be reduced need for, t purchasing expensive plant and machinery. j Practically all aspects of the Indian economy were { i considered insofar as essential in long-range planning. And; i not the least important was the problem of borrowing funds from foreign countries. ; I The planners in India thought in terms of several J i stages for the completion of the plan, the following factors to be taken into account: ; . . . (a) the extent to which natural resources, labor, ! capital goods, and managerial ability could be made available, (b) the necessity of giving priority to certain kinds of development over others for the success! of the whole plan, and (c) the importance of avoiding j too great a strain on the country's economy in the exe- > cution of the plan.*1 For purposes of execution, three five-year plans werej proposed with specific objectives for industry, agriculture,j communication, education, health, housing and miscellaneous J 21Ibid., p. 252. - '230 items. A feature of the plan was the stepping up of expend!' tures for successive plans for all areas mentioned so that [the plans definitely provided for the economic expansion so I critically needed for India to improve her status in the family of nations. | Germany has, of course, been subject to occupation after the war, and certain plans have been imposed upon the people. The plan for Germany developed by the United States 22 was for corrective and constructive measures. Greece also received a plan from abroad dealing with possibilities for development. Immediate and transitional problems and long- range objectives were stated for agricultural development ' 23 and general economic and industrial development. I With reference to Japan, the Japanese government Issued on July 7, 1947, an Official White Paper on Economic I Conditions of Japan. The document, a lengthy one, presented; 5 | in part one an over-all analysis of the economy of the ■ nation. In part two an objective statement presented details concerning the following: (l) prices, wages and cost of j living; (2) the people’s livelihood; (3) production; J (4) transportation; (5) public finance and banking; . ;(6) labor and employment; and (7) foreign trade. A general conclusion is given in part three of the report. This white 22Ibid., pp. 257-282. 23ibid. paper actually Is little more than a diagnosis of economic disease, little attention being given to therapeutics. The {idea is that before there can be prescription for any reform 24- in the economy of Japan there must be first a diagnosis. Norway is another country for which the plan offers an excellent example of diagnosis, prognosis, and a program, the details of which appear in the Norwegian National Budget l for 19^7• In general, the economic policy in Norway since j World War II has primarily been concerned with general re- ; S i construction. The principal aim of economic policy has been to restore the productive capacity to its prewar level as j quickly as possible. Planning in Norway has had both ; national and international features. Account was taken of i changes from 1946 to 1947 in production, imports, exports, j 2B 1 consumption, and real investments. ^ The Netherlands represents a country in which there j has been planning under duress, as reflected in First Memo- : randum on the Central Economic Plan 1946 and National Budget; bf 1947♦ This planning memorandum was the product of Pro- ' fessor J. Tingerger. j A feature of the plan was the assumption of maximum 1 i freedom of choice. However, the stress on freedom of choice ' j was to be under the controlling principle that "first things^ 24Ibid., pp. 2 8 3-3 1 9. 25Ibid., pp. 347-360. come first.” Another significant feature of the plan was a , mixture of control by planners and consumer’s sovereignty. j Briefly, it was intended that the sovereignty of the con sumer should continue to play a large part in the allocation] of economic resources. Since prices would not serve their usual function in scarce markets, the consumer would not be able to make the adjustments unaided. It was, therefore, ! necessary to have rationing as a feature of the plan. Provision was made for a central economic plan in 1946, to be drafted by a Central Planning Bureau. Apparent ly it was realized that the central economic plan had to I I allow for transitional phases, it being expected that the j plan would be drawn up at regular intervals for the purpose : i of coordinating the government policies in economic, social and financial spheres. It was understood that the Global Plan of 1946, de- j vised by the Netherlands planners, would be followed by a j * j more comprehensive memorandum, giving more details on the subject of production, imports and exports. The preliminary! plan presented contained the main features regarding con- ; 26 I sumption, investments and public services. I i In the case of Prance, the emphasis in the practice • i of planning was to modernize the economy of the country. Iri 1946 to 1947, the French government issued its First Plan of 26Ibid., pp. 361-392. Modernization and Equipment (the Monnet Plan), which em bodied over-all plans for the entire economy 1947-1950, and j mapped the economic plans for 1947 in greater detail. i The ultimate objectives were a higher standard of living and full employment. These objectives were to be at-j tained by means of a rise in productivity through moderni- | i j zation and an increase in capital, and by improving the 27 standard of management. A governmental decree of January 3> 19^6 provided for the establishment of a ’ ’ first overall plan for the moderni- j zation and the economic equipment of Metropolitan France and! 28 her overseas territories." Among the particular object- j ives to be noted are the following: (l) the development of j 1 national production and foreign trade especially in the 1 spheres in which the French position is most favorable; 1 (2) the increase in the output of labor; (3) the guarantee i of full employment; (4) a rise in the standard of living of , the people, and improvement in living standards. j The plan included the reorganization of stocks of j tools and equipment either public or private, damaged or ! destroyed as a result of warfare. The planning document i : I sets forth the objectives of production and the measures re-, commended for modernization from then until 1950* ' ! ! 27Ibid., p. 393- ' 28Ibid., p. 395* . _ . _ _ _ _ _ 2 3 1 f Furthermore it set up the means of insuring the realization bf the plan: material, investment, financing, and method of execution. i Modernization was held to he a necessary road to re covery. One of the justifications for modernization was the need to strengthen the nation’s military security. The plan demanded postponement of investments in I I luxury trades, and even investments which would be useful , i but less useful than those outlined in the plan. The huge I ! j amount of investment in financing the plan could be realized with the limited resources at the disposal of the govern- I mental planners only if there were agreement between the j plan and utilization of material resources and the use the j population made of its income. x The planners held that the interrelation between the . three items— production, income and expenditures— was basic,! since upon this interrelation would depend the equilibrium ! or disequilibrium of the economy of France. j \ This was the frame of reference within which the j ! t planners were to visualize the financial possibilities of j i carrying out the plan. The planners realized that all largej nations today base their budgetary and economic policies on ! p Q I the concept of national income. y I i The plans of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary ; 29Ibid., pp. 393-^31. represent detailed approaches to a fully planned economy for each of these countries. Specifically stated were general 'guiding principles for economic reconstruction, including production policies, investment policies, foreign trade 'policies, distribution in the home market, employment policy (to maintain full employment), cooperation in industry, and regulation in private enterprise, agriculture being excluded* In Poland's plan there were provisions for problems of distribution and finance, for controlling the distri bution of the national income, also for price and wage policies. A significant feature of Poland's plan was the ; nationalization of industry. Quite similar in nature was the Two-Year Plan of Czechoslovakia. There were details j concerning production and industrialization, with special i attention to agricultural production, which was to reach the! prewar level in 1948. Attention also was given to the I building program to relieve the housing shortage. All kinds of transport— rail, road, water and air— were to be improved, so that its capacity was to reach the 1937 level within the j Two-Year Plan.^0 I : ! ! The government was to grant extraordinary financial j and material aid to those districts in Czech lands which sustained particularly heavy damage during the war. Among ; t 3°Ibld., pp. 433-454. ....... 236 ;he conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the two-year plan in Czechoslovakia, notice was taken of the following: i overcoming labor shortage; the organization of the pro duction and distribution of machinery, (the organization of j ' j nationalized industry was to be completed as soon as possi- ; ; i ble and placed on a sound and financial and commercial basis); 1 1 reform and stabilization of the currency; financial policy | and organization of banking; taxation reforms, and the de- j 1 velopment of foreign trade. j Other features of the two-year plan included the J i raising of the standards of the people, with emphasis on ! 31 social health and cultural policies. For Hungary, a Three-Year Plan was drawn up as of March 1947* This plan was the result of the coalition of | ; i several parties, including the Communist, Soviet Democratic ! party and other political factions. In general the three-year plan aimed not only at the 1 } strengthening of the economy of the country, but also at the| i : raising of the cultural and physical welfare of the working , i classes. J 1 Topical emphasis was placed upon the development of 1 i the national income under the influence of the Three-Year | Plan, the management of man-power and development of the i ; i j>rice and wage levels. Provision was made for financial < 31Ibid., pp. 454-470. 'implementation of the three-year plan. i The law passed by Parliament stated in general that an economic plan of three years, to begin on August 1, 19^7* j Should be drawn up in the interest of encouraging the eco- i S j nomic and cultural rehabilitation of the country as well as of consolidating the democratic regime; such plan should en sure the intensified application and nationalized use of J productive energy and the coordination of the various j 1 "32 branches of production in the interest of the masses. The law made it binding for every Hungarian and every foreigner.in the possession of a working permit in Hungary j to collaborate to the maximum of his powers and abilities ini furthering the aim of the plan and to place all moral and ! : 1 material means at his command in the service of the plan. j These prescriptions applied equally to Hungarian legal J persons (joint-stock companies, cooperative societies, etc.): and to foreign legal persons possessing assets serving eco nomic purposes in Hungary, The law authorized the government to work out in de- i tail and execute the Plan and provide for the setting up of a National Planning Council and a National Planning Office j I in the interest of the accomplishment of this work. The j jgovernment was further authorized to promulgate decrees j necessary for the execution of the Plan. Finally, the law j 32lbid., p. 486. r “ ------- 238 declared any contravention of such decrees and, in general, any obstruction of the accomplishment of the Plan, to be a I j [criminal offense, thus making it possible to punish with the full rigor of the law the enemies of the Hungarian people, enemies that might seek to thwart the aims of the Three-Yearj ■ 33 ' Plan.JO | i [ The Government organization necessary for the imple- : mentation and execution of the Plan consisted of the Nation- » al Planning Council and the National Planning Office created1 , under the terms of the law. To cite essential particulars stated in the law: j It is incumbent upon the ’ ’ National Planning Council” ! to assert the opinion and will of the political parties 1 forming the coalition and of the organizations repre senting the working masses. The members of the Council 1 are appointed by the President of the Republic from [ : among the representatives, the four political parties in' the Coalition, the Trades Union Council, the National Agricultural Council, and the National Center of Co- I operative Societies . . . It is incumbent upon the "National Planning Office" • to elaborate the details and.to direct and control the 1 ; execution of the Plan. The "National Planning Office" j , will periodically frame detailed plans related to the. j various branches of the state and administrative life. ! Pinal approval of the Plans drafted shall be given by * the Council of Ministers. ! I Control (for supervision of the measures introduced for the realization of the Plan) can be really effective! only if it reaches down to each single enterprise . . . ; • An adequate financial organization is also part and parcel of the carrying out of the Plan . . . It Is an imperative necessity in Hungary, too, that the principle financial institutes should be nationalized! I i 33Ib id ., p. 487- and that the other banks be placed under strict state control.3^ By way of comment, the planning provisions for Hunga ry indicate clearly the autocratic patterns of control, i which bear definite characteristics of totalitarianism in fluenced by the patterns of Soviet Russia. The same obtains1 for Poland and Czechoslovakia, and for other sovietized satellites. For the USSR, the fourth Five-Year Plan would be the one to compare with the postwar plans of other nations that have been referred to. Details would be too numerous to mention but the general scope should be indicated. This J ! i Plan provided for increased production and development. Provisions for industry included iron and steel, non-ferrous, metal industry, coal industry, peat extraction, gas pro- I duction, electric power development, machine-building, the j chemical industry, rubber industry, building materials, i timber industry, paper industry, textile and light indus- [ I i "tries, food industry and industrial construction and instal- J } lation. Under agriculture, there were specifications concern ing grain, industrial crops, animal husbandry. Under trans-J portation, details were specified for railroad transport, j inland water transport, the merchant marine, motor transport! and motor roads, air transport and communications. | Another section of the Plan provided for the material' and cultural advancement of the people, with ; ’ *r specific i attention to labor and industrial personnel, cultural and ’ health, housing and municipal development.33 ; Planning for the Argentine area is significant be- cause it was, and still is, pointed toward autarchy. In a J | * Five-Year Plan for the Argentine, the government proposed a : ! ■ | program for industrialization and vast increases in state | { t control. j i The main objective was a greatly strengthened nation.' This goal was to be reached according to the plan, through j i measures taken to stimulate industry, to increase the popu- j lation, to break up the vast estates, through a progressive I i and generous lending policy. The increase in population was' 1 to be absorbed through industrialization and improvement in , living conditions on the farm and through public investment ! i programs. ! i Industrialization, more than any other program, was the core of the Five-Year Plan of Peron, who supported it tor its contribution to the economic, social, and political advancement of the nation. ! The extension of state control was a cardinal prinei-! ■ i I i pie of the planners, in part, to push the industrialization ! program and in part for other reasons. The state was to 33Ibid., pp. 496-535. ' 'confirm the output, allocation, and prices of power, and to I control output and prices of raw materials, assuring stabili ty of prices to the consumer. I There were details in the plan concerning population and labor, housing and public works, and industrialization. The population problems dealt with the marriage rate, promotion of the birth rate, mortality, immigration and I colonization, the colonization of large estates and specific division regarding labor. The reasons given to justify industrialization were ♦ Classed as political, social, economic and financial, with j 1 several subpoints under each. ; i I Other general developmental measures included were J i I defense tariffs, exemption or reduction of custom duties, i : i subsidies, exchange control, tax reduction, financing and ! credit. There were provisions for improvement of industrial; i technology, including machines and technological processes. Such was the purpose and scope of the plan proposed f ; by Peron, which was to apply to the Five-Year Period from I947-I95I. Since the Argentine developed into a dictator ship under Peron, a dictatorship greatly Influenced by fascist philosophy, it would now be an interesting study to 1 trace the fulfillment of the plan.^ j ? The plans so broadly outlined show the nature of : policy formation and similarity in objectives for some four teen countries, whether democratic or collectivist in nature. j ' All of them have been concerned with rehabilitation, recon- - struction, or expansion of the economy, depending on the ef- ! i fects of World War II. Attention to the general social wel- I fare is more apparent in the plans for the democratic countries. The plans reveal the trend to emphasize the \ ! power of the state, which is at its maximum in Soviet Russiai and its satellites. These plans show that democracies can ytse planning without becoming planned-states, though con- j ditions of emergency may involve features of political con trol which challenge or threaten traditional forms of demo- ' cratic control. ! CHAPTER XII “ SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS t i The purpose of this study was to analyze the theories!, j | practices and objectives of social planning, particularly at: the national level, and to consider the implications of f social planning for the United States. j t i 1 [ The orientation of this study has been built around two basic points of inquiry: (l) whether an integrated theory of planning exists, or in lieu of this, what elements ; I ■belong in planning theory; and (2) whether social planning j as a social process is scientific in its methods, especially': : ■ i because of its reliance on prediction based on the findings | i bf several social sciences. 1 i : It has been shown that planning has an ancient back- j • i ground and has become more specific and inclusive with the i progress of history. In ancient examples, one can only note' the forms of social and cultural change for which some de- i i ! gree of planning must have been a prerequisite and which j usually was associated with outstanding rulers. The re corded details for ancient times are too meager to make possible a scientific statement of any guiding principles ofj planning comparable to those associated with contemporary i ’ I planning. ■ i Certain literary treatises of a utopian nature date ' back to ancient Greece, but an overwhelming percentage of the utopias have been written since the time of Thomas More. Jtopian works influenced value-patterns in social reform, land this is especially evident in extant ideologies. 0 o - > operative communal organizations were considered objectively i i as resultants of utopian ideologies and other social and economic factors. The background and development of planning, character- ! istic of different phases of American history from the co lonial times to the present, were broadly outlined. It soon became apparent in this study that there is no definition of social planning which would serve all es sential purposes, nor is there any consensus as to what may be constructed as an acceptable planning theory. Social planning is a process in which there are innumerable ap- i | proaches, means, objectives, and techniques to be utilized, j Every plan is essentially unique in some particulars. Ef- t } forts to define social planning necessarily depend upon j i time, place and the point of view of the one who would construct the definition. Definitions of planning are in- 1 I fluenced by ideologies and other social theories, and by the nature of the social organization of the societies con- 4 cerned. Planning is also a means of social control, which in itself suggests complex relationships among innumerable i factors. | The variations in definitions and attitudes toward j planning are reflected in the categories of classification (to which Chapter IV was devoted). So many criteria have ; “ .....................“ " ' ------- ------ ----- -— ' — ----- — 2*5 been used merely for purposes of classification that no jgeneral definition of planning could account for all of them in any practical way. These criteria cannot be applied uni formly, but give meaning to planning as a process. The j 1 types of classification are labeled according to control factors, time element, regionalism, directive or emergency, ! democratic or authoritative, and several other character- i i istics. The criteria used for classification are largely de pendent upon the basic forms of social organization with which planners have to work. Social planning does not oper-j hte in a social vacuum, but must deal with society as a i going concern, and no two societies are alike except in the j most general terms. The societies may range widely from ; free and democratic to autocratic and authoritarian, and I definitions and classifications would range just as widely. ! i | There are factors essential in national planning con-! cerning which planners and writers manifest agreement, i i though they vary in their emphasis. Factors specified in- ! elude governmental control, regionalism, element of choice, the relation between policy and planning, methods utilized, ! time factor, planning as a process, approaches to planning, the importance of the situation. These factors are the ones planners and writers are most frequently concerned about, but the range of ideas evidently is too great and diverse for any one to formulate a simple statement for practical | ~ ~ "" 1 “ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 21r6 purposes. However essential such factors may be, they are explained and weighed in different manner according to time, place and the planning situation. Planners draw upon these | 'factors according to their insight and the objectives which concern them. I Certain other factors are dealt with in a more ex tended fashion because of their relative importance; for ex- i ample, there is the influence of social structure which un avoidably greatly influences social planning and the enforce ment of plans devised. Basically, the details of social planning must be realistic in terms of the social situation if the plan is to be enforceable. : Other factors that influence planning are bureaucracy with all its implications, the rational element without which there could not be any planning, and the consensus of the planners and the planned. With reference to consensus, planners and authors differ in their judgment of the reality i of consensus and its function in democratic as compared with i authoritarian societies. Emphasis is placed in this study, I pn the importance of giving the fullest consideration to the I ' j welfare of the "planned” without which there can be no real consensus in the relation between the planners and the plan ned. ; i Not least among the factors are the basic social j values essential in planning techniques and goals. Besides i the material objectives for the general social welfare, j ' ' ~ ' 24? there are the questions of social equality, freedom and choice, balance of interests, efficiency and objectives in planning, full employment as an objective, and other similar heeds that would lend themselves to planning. In the development of definition, classification into types, and the survey of factors that are ordinarily charac teristic of theoretical statements about social planning, statements were supported by citing actual planning experi ences. However complex may be the current conceptions of planning, it is understood that such concepts should have a j practical value. This has been demonstrated by presenting j data from actual plans drawn up by fourteen countries after ! i World War II, for purposes of reconstruction, expansion of j i the economy, modernization, and for the general social wel- j I fare during situations of a critical nature. ; These examples reveal that plans cannot be uniform in' i i their methods, approaches, the means utilized, and the ob- S I jectives, but have elements of uniqueness because no two \ nations are alike in the critical importance of problems f i jthat need amelioration through planning. ! Among the findings, the following points have general! I '-r~-T ’ significance: = 1. There is no consensus as to what could be con- | structed as an acceptable integrated planning theory. 2. Definitions and content of national planning are j (influenced by ideologies and other social theories, also by ....' ..' .......... ~ 248 the social organization of the societies concerned. 3. Social planning is a process in which there are innumerable approaches, means, objectives, and techniques to f be utilized. 4. Social planning utilizes many areas of scientific I and technological knowledge, and the data concerned lend themselves to elaborate classification and ordering; in these respects social planning as a process qualifies as being scientific in its methods, though it would not be cor rect to say that social planning is a science. ! 5. Social planning is a method of control, the overtj I aspects differing between democratic and totalitarian states^ but, ultimately, the willingness of the people to conform cannot be entirely ignored. 6. Planners stress the rational qualities of plan ning and the need for consensus, though all do not recognize) : | the need of consensus, inclusive of "the planned." j ! ! 1 7- To regard national planning as over-all planning 1 ! I is fallacious; account must be taken of transitional phases,; * j subplanning, experimentation, and adjustments to impondera- j bles. ’ 8 . National planning has virtually become an ideolo gy, with its pros and cons, and has not been free from utopif an implications and myths. I : I 9. National social planning has not, as yet, solved \ the contradictions between freedom and authority, ownership j “ ' ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------— ----------------------------------------------- 2^9 and control, centralized planning and self-government, national planning and international cooperation. 10. In democratic countries and in the United Statesj With its federal structure, the principal political issue is! to keep planning strictly within the law and to prevent such planning from becoming identified'with a planned economy or a planned state. National planning should be a means to an end, and not an end in itself. i In conclusion, owing to the present vogue of national planning not only in autocratic or totalitarian countries, j but in those regarded.as democracies, it has become es sential for planners, social scientists, and the general : i public to have a clearer understanding of the meaning of I | I planning and its consequences. National planning should not be an instrument of any i j political party or vested interest, but a technique to be : used carefully and rationally to ameliorate specific | I j problems and particularly for the general welfare. ; i 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY A• BOOKS Abel, Theodore. Systematic Sociology In Germany. 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History of Chinese Society: Liao, 907-1125• New York: The Macmillan i Company, 1949- 752 pp. Wolff, Kurt H. The Sociology of Georg Slmmef. Glencoe, i Illinois: The Free Press,“The., 1950• ^45 pp. Wooton, Barbara. Freedom under Planning. Chapel Hill, i North Carolina! University of North Carolina Press, 1945. 180 pp. _______ . Plan or No Plan. New York: Farrar and Rinehart j Company, 1935* 380 pp. ! ! i ___. Testament for Social Science. London: George } 1 Allen and Unwin Company, Ltd., 1950. 197 PP* | Wright, David McCord. Capitalism. New York: McGraw-Hill | Book Company, Inc., 1951* 24"6 pp. £ipf, George K. National Unity and Disunity. Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, 1941. 408 pp. Znaniecki, Florian. Cultural Sciences. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1952. 438 pp. s i Zweig, Ferdynand. Economic Ideas. New York: Prentice-Halli Inc., 1950. ! . The Planning of Free Societies. London: Seeker and Warburg, 19427 T 67 PP* B. PERIODICAL ARTICLES Abel, Theodore, "The Present Status of Social Theory," Amerir can Sociological Review, 117:156-164, April, 1952. j Adler, Franz, "The Social Thought of Jean-Paul Sartre," The 5 American Journal of Sociology, 55:284-290, September, ! I W _ , Albu, Austen, "Socialism and the Study of Man," Fabian Tracts. 283:1-20, October, 1950. ; Allin, Bushrod, "Is Planning Compatible with Democracy?" The! American Journal of Sociology, 42:510-520, January,. 1937i* Angell, Robert C., "Cooley's Views on Social Planning," Sociology and Social Research, 9:179-186, 1925* Bain, Read, ’ ’ Natural Science and Value-Policy, ” Philosophy of Science, 16:182-192, 1949- i_ _ _ _ , "Sociology as a Natural Science," The American Journal of Sociology, 53:9-16, July, 19^7• 1 I j ______ , "Verbal Stereotypes and Social Control," Sociology j i and Social Research, 23:431-446, May-June, 1939• i | j Banfield, Edward C., "Organization for Policy Planning in . the U. S. Department of Agriculture,” Journal of Farm Economics, 13:133-163? February, 1952. I t Beck, Lewis ¥., "Constructions and Inferred Entities," Phi- j losophy of Science, 17:74-86, January, 1950. . j i Becker, Howard, "Sargasso Iceberg: A Study in Cultural Lag : and Institutional Disintegration," The American Journal i of Sociology, 3^:^98-509? November, T$2W. ■ Bentley, Arthur P., "Kinetic Inquiry," Science, 112:775-783? December, 1950. Bernard, Jessie, "The Art of Science: A Reply to Redfield," The American Journal of Science, 55:1-9? July, 1949* Bernard, L. L., "The Method of Generalization for Social j Control," American Sociological Review, 5:3^0-350? June, 1940. Bevan, Aneurin, "Democratic Values,” Fabian Tracts, 282:1- 14, 1950. Bierstedt, Robert, "Social Science and Social Policy," Ameri- I Association of University Professors Bulletin, 34:310-319? ; Summer, 1948. I Blanchard, Paul, "Socialist and Capitalist Planning," The Annals, 162:6-11, July, 1932. Bogardus, Emory S., "Democratic Planning According to Mann- 1 i heim," Sociology and Social Research, 136:110-115, November, 1951* , "Types of Sociological Planning," Sociology and ' Social Research, 22:568-576, 1938. . : ' . I Bohr, Niels, "On the Notions of Causality and Complementari-. ty," Science, 3:51-54, January, 1950. Bowdry, Barbara, "Usages of the Term 'Social,'" Philosophy L_ Science, 9:356-361_? October, 1942. ! Brown, Francis J., "Social Planning through Education," ■ American Sociological Review, 1=33-37, February, 1936. Burgess, Ernest W., "Social Planning and the Mores," Publi- i cation of the American Sociological Society, 29=1-16, I February, 1935• Burrows, H. R., and J. K. Horsefield, "Economics of Planning) Principles and Practice," American.Academy of Political ; and Social Science, 32:88-112, June," 1935* i Cartwright, Dorwin, "Basic and Applied Social Psychology," Philosophy of Science, 16:198-208, 1949. ► Chapin, F. Stuart, "The Main Methods of Sociological Re- ! search," Sociology and Social Research, 33=3-40, September]^ 1948. ! i _______, "Social Theory and Social Action," American Soci- j ological Review, 1:1-11, February, 1936. Compton, Karl T., "Long-Range Budgeting of Public Capital Expenditures," The Annals, 162:127-132, July, 1932. Cooke, Morris L., "Some Implications of Multiple-Purpose River Planning.and Development," The Scientific Monthly, 75=84-88, August, 1952. . j Coons, Arthur G., "The Nature of Economic Planning in Demo cracy," Plan Age, 5=43-57, February, 1939* Corey, L., "Economic Planning without Statism; Planning in the Framework of Liberty," Commentary, 4:137-147* i August, 1947. J Cramer, Frederick H., "Demosthenes Redivivus," Foreign i 1 Affairs, 19=530-550, April, 1941. Crossman, R. H. S., "Values in a Changing Civilization," Fabian Tracts, 186:1-16, November, 1950. j Davis, A., "Technicways in American Civilization; Notes on a Method of Measuring their Point of Origin," Social Forces, 18:317-330, March, 1940. j ______ , "Time and the Technicways, An Experiment in Defi- 1 nition,” Social Forces, 19=175-189, December, 1940. bonham, Wallace, "Can Planning be Effective without Control?” The Annals, 162:1-5, July, 1932. Dworkin, Martin S., "Disagreement: The Situation of Reason/' The Scientific Monthly, 75:117-119, August, 1952. i Eldridge, Seba, "Review of Robert Maclver's Conflict of j I Loyalties (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952),Tr~ i American Sociological Review, 17:632, October, 1952. Fellows, Erwin W., "The Sociologist and Social Planning," Sociology and Social Research, 36:220-226, March, 1952. j I Finer, Herman, "The Central Planning System in Great j Britain,1 1 Public Administration Review, 12:63-70, i ; Autumn, 19^8. j ! Flanders, Ralph E., "Limitations and Possibilities of ; Economic Planning," The Annals, 162:27-35, July, 1932. j t Frank, Jerome, "The Place of the Expert in a Democratic So- | ciety," Philosophy of Science, 16:3-23, January, 1949* Garis, John M., "The Planning Process in Government," Ameri-i can Economic Review, 3 6:409-412, June, 1946. | Gillette, John W., "Can We Plan Successfully for Normal So- * ciety?" Sociology and Social Research, 24:103-110, j December, 1939. ! Gloag, John, "Planning and Ordinary People," Town and i Country Planning, 2 5: 509-51 5, March, 1953* Graham, F. D., "Review of Friedrich A. Hayek's Individualism1 and the Economic Order," American Economic Heview,39: 775-777, June, 1 9 W * Gross, Neal C., "A Post Mortem on County Planning," Journal 1 of Farm Economics, 25:645, August, 1943. j — — — r r ' —“ 1 , l Haan, Hugo, "International Planning: Its Necessity and Its j Special Features," The Annals, 162:36-42, July, 1932. Hart, Hornell, "Social Science and the Atomic Crisis," The Journal of Social Issues, 2:1-30, April, 1949* ! i ! Hartung, Frank E., "Science as an Institution," Philosophy j of Science, 18:35-54, January, 1951* j Hauser, Philip M., "Social Science and Social Engineering," Philosophy of Science, 16:209-238, 1949- . ! Heaton, Kenneth L., "The Role of Social Research in World Affairs," The Scientific Monthly, 74:303-307, May, 1952.. Henderson, W. V., "Walter Rathenau, A Pioneer of the Planned Economy," Economic History Review, 4:98-108, 1951* Hertzler, J. 0., "The Effects of Dictatorship," Sociology ; and Social Research, 24:111-123, 1939* Homan, P. T., "Economic Planning: The Proposals and the Literature,1 1 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 47:102-122,j November, 1932. } Hoover, Calvin B., "Economic Planning and the Problem by Government," Southern Economic Journal, 4:277-290, j January, 1938* j ijensen, Howard, "Sociology as a Science: Autonomous or Natural?" Sociology and Social Research, 18:503-518, August, 1934T Karpman, Ben, "A Psychiatrist Looks at the Social Scien tists, " The American Journal of Sociology, 53:131-1^2, September, 1947 * | | Kattsoff, Louis 0., "Social Science and Purposive Behavior,"j The Scientific Monthly, 76:24-28, January, 1953* j LaFleur, Laurence, "On the Nature of Scientific Law," The J Scientific Monthly, 74:247-252, May, 1952. j Landauer, Carl, "Recent Literature on Planning," Social Re- ! search, 20:504-511, November, 1935* ! Lane, Robert E., "Problems of a Regulated Economy," Social » Research, 19:277-299, September, 1952- j Laski, Harold J., "The Limitations of the Expert," Harper's Monthly, 162:101-110, December, 1930. Lauffer, Max A., "Form and Function: A Problem in Bio- s physics," The Scientific Monthly, 75:79-83, August, ! 1 1 9 5 2. . : Leontief, W. W., "Soviet Planning: The Problem of Economic J Balance," Russian Review, 6:33-36, Autumn, 1946. i Lerner, Alba p., "Review of W. Arthur Lewis' Principles of I Economic Planning," Journal of Economics,m’ "5 9:537, December, 1951"* . j Lindeman, Edward C., "Planning an Orderly Method for Social i Change," The Annals, 162:12-18, July, 1932. .. ' 270; Lindsay, R. B., "The Survival of Physical Science," The Scientific Monthly, 74:139-144, March, 1952. Lorwin, Lewis, "A Five-Year Plan for the World," The Survey, | 67:231-235# -December, 1931- Loucks, William N., "Public Work Planning and Economic Con trol: Federal, State and Municipal, The Annals, 162: . 114-120, July, 1932. I Lundberg, George A., "Applying the Scientific Method to Social Phenomena," Sociology and Social Research, 34:3- 12, September, 1949- Lynd, Robert, "The Implications of Economic Planning for Sociology," American Sociological Review, 9:14-20, | February, 19441 ; McClenahan, Bessie A., "The Sociology of Planning," Sociolo-j gy and Social Research, 28:182-193, January, 1944^ } 1 MacKenzie, Catherine, "Democracy Wins," The New York Times : Magazine Section, December 15, 1940. Mather, Kirley F., "The Problem of Antiscientific Trends To-! day," Science, 115:533-537, May, 1952. i Margenau, Henry, "Formal and Operational Procedures in Science," Main Currents in Modern Thought, 9:10-16, March, 195*^ I Meadows, Paul, "Balance and Imbalance in Human Social Ad justment," Social Forces, 22:415-419, October, 1943. ; "" r.-- ^ . . \ j______ , "Planning in Mass Society and in Differential So ciety," Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 2:17- : 35, ApriT7"T944. Merriam, Charles E., "The National Resources Planning Board:! A Chapter in American Planning Experience," American Po litical Science Review, 38:1075-1088, December, 1944. J______ , "The Possibilities of Planning," The American ; Journal of Sociology, 49:397-407, March, 1944. j ______ , and Frank P. Bourgain, "Jefferson as a Planner of \ Natural Resources," Ethics, 53:284-292, July, 1943* Merton, Robert K., "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality,"; Social Forces, 1 8: 5 6 0-5 6 8, May, 1945- i i 1 r ~ " ~ ■ " “■ ■ ” "271] I Merton, Robert K., "The Role of Applied Social Science in ! the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum," Phi losophy of Science, I6:l6l-l8l, 1949- i , "The Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucra- i cy," Social Forces, 23:405-416, May, 1945* ; _______ , "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,1 1 American Sociological Review, 1:894-904, 1936. Meyer, Gerhard, "Note on Technological Trends and Social Planning," The American Journal of Sociology, 44:951- 963* July, 1938• Mills, C. Wright, "The Professional Ideology of Social Path ologists, The American Journal of Sociology, 49:165- 1 8 1, 1944. Milne, R. S., "Britain's Economic Planning Machinery," Ameri4 can Political Science Review, 46:406-420, June, 1952. ' Mitrany, D., "Political Consequences of Economic Planning," American Sociological Review, 7:1-4, Morgantheau, Hans J., "The Limitations of Science and j Problems of Social Planning," Ethics, 54:174-182, 1944. I , "Scientific Man Versus Power Politics," Social ' Forces, 25:473-474, March, 1947. Morrison, Herbert, "Economic Planning," Public Adminis- ; tration, 24-25:85-99* Spring, 1947. 1 --------- i Mosse, Robert, "Economic Planning and Freedom," Journal of ; j Legal and Political Sociology, 13:122-133,.Fall, 19477 Neal, Alfred C., "The Planning Approach in Public Economy," i Quarterly Journal of Economics, 54:246-250, 1940. | I Odum, Howard W., "National Social Planning," Sociology and ! Social Research, 2 9: 30 3-3 1 3, October, 1927* j ! ; , "Patrick Geddes1 Heritage to 'The Making of the I ‘ Future,'" Social Forces, 22:275-280, October, 1943* ' \ , "A Sociological Approach to National Social Plan- j . ning," Sociology and Social Research, 19:303-313, April,1 1935> . , Ogburn, William F., "How Technology Changes Society," Soci- « ology and Social Research, 36:75-83, November, 1951- Oppenheimer, Robert, "Encouragement of Science," Science, 121:373-375» 1950. j_ _ _ _ _ _ , "Notes on the Technicways in Contemporary Society," American Sociological Review, 2:336-346, June, 1937* Parker, Frederick B., "Social Control and the Technicways," ; Social Forces, 22:163-168, October, 1943* ! Peck, Harvey W., "The New Economy and the Machine," Social Forces, 22:47-55* October, 1943* I * ' Pegrum, D. F., Are We Building a Better Social and Economic: Order?" Social Science, 10:131-136, 1935* I t _______, "Economics and Philosophy in Social Planning," : Journal of Social Philosophy, 2:305-316, July, 1937* Person, H. S., "The Approach of Scientific Management to the Problem of National Planning," The Annals, 19:162, 1932* Porterfield, Austin L., "Imagination in Social Research," Sociology and Social Research, 20:219-228, 1936. Rautenstrauch, Walter, "What is Scientific Planning?" Phi losophy of Science, 1 2: 8-18, January, 1945* i Reimer, Svend, "Social Planning and Social Organization," j The American Journal of Sociology, 52:508-517, May, 1947* Richards, Paul I., "On Come Learning Machines," The Scien- ! tific Monthly, 74:201-205, April, 1952. ; | Rose, Arnold M., "The Selection of Problems for Research," j The American Journal of Sociology, 54:219-227, November,; 1948. ' I , , "Where Social Action and Social Research Meet," ; * Sociology and Social Research, 3 6: 283-2 9 0, May, 1952. I Ryan, Bryce, "Democratic Telesis and County Agriculture Plan ning," Journal of Farm Economics, 22:120-124, November, : 1940.. | i Scott, D. R., "Freedom in an Age of Science and Machines," J Journal of.Social Philosophy, 2:317-326, July, 1937* ; Shils, Edward A., "Social Science and Social Policy," Phi- i losophy of Science, 16:224-239, 1949* ! Simpson, George, "The Scientist— Technician or Moralist?" ! L Philosophy of Science, 17:95-108, January, 1950. j " _ _ _ _ 2T3 Sorokin, Pitirim, MIs Accurate Social Planning Possible?” American Sociological Review, 1:12-28, February, 1936. Soule, George, ’ ’ Must Planning be Military?” Plan Age, 4:1- 11, January, 1938. Speier, Hans, ’ ’ Freedom and Social Planning,” The American Journal of Sociology, , 42:463-483, 1937* j Staleg, Eugene, ’ ’ Economic Planning and Free Institutions,” j Plan Age, 4:34-43, February, 1940. Tadeusch, Carl E., ’ ’ The United Freedom: Science,” The Scientific Monthly, 75:12-18, July, 1952. ... ' I Taylor, Carl C., ’ ’ The Sociologist1 s Part in Planning the Columbia Basin,” American Sociological Review, 11:321- 330, June, 1946. Timasheff, N. S., ’ ’ Definitions in the Social Sciences,” The American Journal of Sociology, 53:201-209. November, --------------------------- Tugwell, Rex G., ’ ’ Government Planning Machinery at Mid- Century,” Journal of Politics, 13:133-163. May, 1951* Turner, Ralph H., "Statistical Logic in Social Research," 1 Sociology and Social Research, 32:697-704, January, 1948. Vincent, Melvin J., "Lester F. Ward and Social Planning," i Sociology and Social Research, 2 5: 51 7-52 5, July, 1941. J Ward, Barbara, "Greatest Single Error the West Can Make," j i The New York Times Magazine Section, 12-17, March 8, i | 1953- I i i Weinland, Clarence E., "Creative Thought in Scientific Re- ! search," The Scientific Monthly, 75:350-354, December, i 1952. Whittaker, Edmund, "Some Fundamental Questions on Economic 1 1 Planning,” South African Journal of Economics, 3:185- ! 192 , 1 9 3 5 , Williamson, Rene de Visne, ”A Theory of Planning," Plan Age,I 33:14-29, 1939. j Wirth, Louis, "Localism, Regionalism, and Centralization,’ ’ 1 The American Journal of Sociology, 42:493-509, January, t ^ _ 7 _ j " ....... -*— 274 Wood, Arthur Lewis, "The Structure of Social Planning,” Social Forces, 22:388-397, October, 1944. Young, Earle, "Environmental Stresses and Personal Adjust ment,” Sociology and Social Research, 35=91-96, November, l95Q^ . | Young, Kimball, "Society and the State," American Sociologi-i cal Review, 11:137-146, 1946. j Znaniecki. Plorian, "Sociological Ignorance in Social Plan ning, Sociology.and Social Research, 30:87-100, December, 1945* C. ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES Lederer, Emil, "National Economic Planning," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XI, 197-205. New York: The ' Macmillan Company, 1948. Mannheim, Karl. "Utopia," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XV, 200-203. New York: The Macmillan Company, i9^r. i D. NEWSPAPERS London Economist, August 16, 1941. E. LECTURES Lilienthal, David E., "The TVA: An Experimentation in the Grass Roots, Administration of Federal Functions." A lecture given before the Southern Political Science As sociation, November 10, 1939, Knoxville, Tennessee. lirtK/ersltv of Southern California

Abstract (if available)

Abstract The purpose of this study was to analyze the theories, practices, and objectives of social planning that have significance for the United States, particularly at the national level. The analysis was designed to show: (a) whether social planning as a process also deserves to be called scientific in its methods, especially because of its dependence upon prediction

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Asset Metadata

Creator Massaro, Nick (author)

Core Title The theories, practices and objectives in national social planning

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Sociology

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,Ph.D So '55 M414

Language English

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Advisor Nordskog, John E. (committee chair), Harley, J. Eugene (committee member), McDonogh, Edward C. (committee member), Neumeyer, Martin H. (committee member), Vincent, Martin J. (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c17-601248

Unique identifier UC11351016

Identifier etd-MassaroNick.pdf (filename),usctheses-c17-601248 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier etd-MassaroNick.pdf

Dmrecord 601248

Document Type Dissertation

Rights Massaro, Nick

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA