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A critical analysis of thematic content of United States army orientation films of the Korean War, with implications for formulating limited war orientation objectives

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A critical analysis of thematic content of United States army orientation films of the Korean War, with implications for formulating limited war orientation objectives

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Content This dissertation has been
microfilmed exactly as received
69-4537
MYRICK, Howard Anthony, 1934-
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THEMATIC CONTENT
OF UNITED STATES ARMY ORIENTATION FILMS
OF THE KOREAN WAR, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR
FORMULATING LIMITED WAR ORIENTATION
OBJECTIVES.
University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1968
Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc.. A nn Arbor, Michigan
^ HOWARD ANTHONY MYRICK 1969
© _
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OP THEMATIC CONTENT OF UNITED STATES
ARMY ORIENTATION FILMS OF THE KOREAN WAR, WITH
IMPLICATIONS FOR FORMULATING LIMITED WAR
ORIENTATION OBJECTIVES
by
Howard Anthony Myrick
A Dissertation Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Communication— C inema)
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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
UNIVERSITY PARK
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90007
T h is d isse rta tio n , w ritte n by
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m itte e , a n d a p p ro v e d by a ll its m em bers, has
been prese n te d to a n d accepted by the G ra d u a te
S ch o o l, in p a r tia l f u lfillm e n t o f re q u ire m e n ts
f o r the degree o f
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y
June,...1.9.68...
DISSERTATION C O M I\m T E E _ _
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES....................................... vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.................................vii
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION.............................. 1
The Problem
Statement of the problem
Importance of the problem
Limits of the Study
Definition of Terms Used
Organization of Remainder of the Study
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Literature on Previous Film Studies
Literature on the Korean War
Literature on the Sociology of the
American Soldier
Literature on Content Analysis
Other Literature
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Formulating Criteria
Selection of Films
Content Analysis
Interpreting the Results
IV. AMERICAN WAR IDEOLOGY EXAMINED
Resentment of war
The righteous cause
The morally repugnant enemy
Isolationism
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Chapter Page
Crusade for democracy and belief
in a better world order
Summary
TOTAL WAR VERSUS LIMITED WAR-
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA .
Total War ^
Limited War
Historical precedents
The rationale of limited war
Containment
The new imperatives
The Dilemma
Summary
KOREA— THE LIMITED WAR
Brief Background
Limited Objectives and Limited Means
Controversy and Public Opinion
The surprise
The misunderstanding
The contradiction between reality
and predisposition
Frustration for the Soldier
Summary
RATIONALE OF MILITARY ORIENTATION FILMS . . 106
Rationale of World War II Orientation
Films
Criteria for Analysis
Rationale of Limited War Orientation
Criteria for Analysis for Limited
War Films
Selection of Films for Analysis
Summary
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
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Chapter
Introduction
The audience
The stimulus materials (films and scripts)
Results of Analysis of "Prelude to War"
Percentage of "yes" replies
Average intensity rating
Results of Analysis of "Why Korea"
Percentage of "yes" replies
Average intensity ratings
Results of Analysis of "Why Vietnam"
Percentage of "yes" replies
Average intensity rating
Comparison Between Civilian and Military
Responses
Detailed Analysis of "Why Korea"
Detailed Analysis of "The Crime of Korea"
Comparison of Responses from Audiences
of Differing Sizes
Summary and Comparative Analysis of
"Prelude to War," "Why Korea," and
"Why Vietnam"
Percentage of "yes" replies
Average intensity ratings
Summary
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Restatement of the problem
Limitations of the method
Analysis Results
Conclusions
Implications
Recommendations
APPENDIXES.............................................. 203
A. Script: "Prelude To War".....................204
B. Script: "Why Korea" (Narration) ............ 247
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Page
C. Script; "Why Korea"
(Visual Continuity) ................. . 265
D. Script: "Why Vietnam" .......................274
E. Script: "The Crime of Korea"
(Narration).................................298
F. Script : "The Crime of Korea"
(Visual Continuity) ...................... 307
G. Script : "Youth Wants To K n o w " .............. 312
H- Questionnaire...............................331
I. Letter: Motion Picture Division ......... 335
J. Letter: Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corporation ....................337
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 339
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LIST OP TABLES
I. Frequency of Appearance of Designated
Themes in "Why Korea" ...........
II. Frequency of Appearance of Designated
Themes in "Crime of Korea"............... 159
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure Page
1. Questions Related to Total W a r ..............114
2. Questions Related to Limited W a r ............122
3. Percentage of "yes" replies to
"Prelude to War" .......................... 132
4. Average Intensity Rating
"Prelude to War" .......................... 136
5. Percentage of "yes" replies to
"Why Korea".................................139
6. Average Intensity Rating
"Why Korea".................................145
7. Percentage of "yes" replies to
"Why Vietnam"...............................147
8. Comparison Between Military and
Civilian Response......................... 152
9. Instructions to the Review Analyst........... 155
10. Comparison of Responses From Different
Audiences...................................165
11. Percentage of "yes" Responses to
"Prelude to War," "Why Korea," and
"Why Vietnam"...............................168
12. Comparative Intensity Ratings on
"Prelude to War," "Why Korea," and
"Why Vietnam"...............................169
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
War, that state of armed conflict which is under
taken in pursuit of national objectives unobtained by dip
lomatic means, like almost no other crisis faced by a na
tion, requires for its successful conduct the mobilization
of both the physical and spiritual resources of the nations
waging it. Man, that indispensable ingredient of a nation's
pursuit of victory, must not only possess the capability to
fight, but also the "will" to fight. The will to fight, in
a democratic society at least, usually has its genesis in an
aroused public opinion which is based, in part, on righteous
indignation and a sense of campaign in a righteous cause.
Theoretically, the emotional preconditioning of the nation's
soldiers recruited from among its citizens should be a pro
duct of,the prevailing public opinion.
The history of the United States' involvement in
past wars has chronicled this nation's extraordinary abi
lity to mobilize its resources and coalesce public opinion
with respect to these wars. This historical fact becomes
even more extraordinary in the light of the historical
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2
reluctance on the part of Americans to engage in interna
tional armed conflict— a reluctance born of a passionate
horror of war and its consequences. As Hob an observed:
"There is no warrior cult in the United States.
The foregoing attitude and disposition historically
have found this courtry ill-prepared for war materially and
spiritually at the outset. Its citizens in general and
those citizens who by necessity become soldiers have been
found to be lacking in factual knowledge of the events
leading up to the particular war. As a consequence, the
period immediately preceding this country's entry into war,
and the early phases of that war have witnessed an extra
ordinary acceleration of the nation's efforts to coalesce
public opinion. Agencies concerned with indoctrination
have sprung into heightened— even frenzied activity to in
vest the country's citizens with the will to fight. To
those citizens who do not become soldiers, the will to
^Charles F. Hoban, Jr. and Edward B. van Ormer,
Instructional Film Research 1918-1950 (Rapid Mass Learning).
The Instructional Film Research Program, Pennsylvania State
College. (Washington: U. S. Department of Commerce, Office
of Technical Services, 1951), pp. 5-12.
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i 3
î fight means, essentially, as Hans Speier^ terms it, the
will to work.
To the nation's armed forces falls the task of con
verting the multitude of mostly reluctant recruits from
normally peaceful civilians into aggressive, physically and
emotionally toughened warriors. For this task the armed
forces have utilized every conceivable medium— the human
voice, the printed word, the phonograph, radio, and film.
Also, the minds and talents of some of the nation's fore
most social scientists and communication theorists have
been employed.
Of particular interest to this present writer is the
role that film has played in the Army's efforts in this
attitude-formation sphere. Thus, the concern of this
present study is with the Army's use of film as an instru
ment of persuasion. Understandably, then, the World War II
period which occasioned, to that date, the unprecedented
use of film by the Armed Forces stands out in this writer's
mind as indeed significant. It is noted, for example, that
the energy, both creative and scientific, which was expended
The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, Wilbur
Schramm (ed.), (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
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in these efforts produced the "why we fight" films, a series
used in an extensive experiment in troop orientation. Al
though the results of these experiments have been recorded
elsewhere^ it is significant to note here that these films,
though successful in increasing the soldiers' factual knowl
edge , were essentially unsuccessful in modifying conduct
motivation to any experimentally significant degree. Sev
eral hypotheses have been offered to explain the fact that
the films failed to achieve the objective of increasing
soldiers' motivation to serve in the Armed Forces. These
hypotheses will be discussed in the following chapter.
The concern of this present study, however, was not
whether the films were successful or not, rather, the prob
lem was to test a general hypothesis suggested by Kracauer'^
and others which holds that film, as a tool of social
1954), p. 447.
^Carl I. Hoviand, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Fred D.
Sheffield, Experiments On Mass Communication (Vol. Ill in
Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. 4 yols.;
Princeton: Princeton Uniyersity Press, 1949).
‘ ^Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler — A
Psychological History of The German Film (Princeton:
Princeton Uniyersity Press, 1947), 361 pp.
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5
’ science research, can be used as an index of a peoples'
mentalité. This hypothesis seemed to hold the promise of
providing the social scientist, the cultural anthropologist,
and the communication theorist with another potentially lu
crative research tool with which to evaluate the prevailing
ideology in a given period of a nation's history. Whether
this hypothesis would apply to military propaganda films
of a nation presented a provocative question— a question
which this study was undertaken to explore.
For this study, army orientation films of the Korean
War period were chosen because of the peculiar set of cir
cumstances involved in this period of American history,
i.e., (1) the suddeness of the outbreak of this war ;
(2) the less than clearly enunciated ideology underlying
the nation's entry into this war; (3) its conduct in pur
suit of limited objectives, that is, of objectives which
fell short of total victory; (4) the evolvement of a dif
ferent diplomatic and strategic concept, i.e., the concept
of limited war ; and (5) the engagement against an enemy
about whom the nation's citizens knew little.
Whereas World War II presented the required morally
repugnant enemy, a perceived do-or-die threat to the na
tion's survival (in other words, the ingredients for
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6
traditional and comparatively clear-cut orientation objec
tives) , Korea, on the other hand, presented few of these
conditions. The question arose, then, did the military
orientation films of the era reflect these changes?
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem. The problem of this study
was to test the following hypotheses :
1. That the military orientation films of the Korean
War period provided an index of the American
mentality and ideology regarding that war.
2. That these films reflected the peculiarities of
the era, notably, the emotional and psychologi
cal changes attendant to the concept of limited
3. That these films contained identifiable persua
sive tactics and orientation approaches to the
psychological and emotional changes referred to
4. That the thematic content utilized in these films
to influence attitudes and opinions differed
from the ideological and factual themes used in
support of orientation objectives of the World
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7
war II films.
Importance of the problem. In the ideologically
divided world which has evolved since World War II and the
advent of the "atomic age," the concept of limited war
threatens to become the modus of modern survival. The cur
rent status of international affairs, at least, seems to
support this appraisal. While limited war may preclude the
ultimate holocaust so much feared in the world, the concept
holds certain inherent, though not so obvious, dangers and
many unanswered questions. Among these questions are :
(1) Can a people who have historically expected total
victory in war ideologically adjust to the requirements of
limited wars fought in pursuit of limited objectives?
(2) Will serious attitudinal problems impair the motivation
of the nation's citizens and soldiers?
If there is any validity to the assertion that the
attitudes and psychological dispositions of a people in
fluence the course of events in a nation, any extension of
knowledge about a nation's attitudes with regard to pre
vailing issues of gravity will certainly serve a valuable
purpose. If a nation's films hold the promise of provid
ing such an index, they should be studied. This should
indeed be the case if there is any truth to Kracauer's
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contention that "films of a nation reflect its mentality in
a more direct way than other artistic media. , ."^
To date, as far as is known by this writer, no such
study based on the above stated premises have been made
with military orientation films.
Another point of significance involves the need for
knowledge, on the part of film makers and planners of film
orientation objectives, of the "latent and manifest feel
ings of civilians and soldiers. . . . It is not enough to
consider the situation obtaining at the moment when trying
to form attitudes or mold existing ones.
This study was undertaken with the above considera
tions in mind. An attempt was made to employ techniques
which promised to provide knowledge in these areas.
II. LIMITS OF THE STUDY
The films selected for analysis in this study were
limited to those produced immediately before and during the
Korean War which were determined to be specifically intended
Rationale of United States Military Film Propaganda in World
War II" (unpublished Master's thesis. The University of
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9
;for attitude orientation. That is to say that not all films
of this period were selected; notably, campaign (Historical
Record) films and training films were excluded.
It was recognized that owing to the lack of any ac
curate unit of analysis, i.e., pictorial or iconic sign, in
the content analysis of any film (a film is in fact an
audiovisual presentation involving an unspecified "mix" of
pictorial and verbal elements) the results, by necessity,
could not be devoid of a subjective component. This is un
fortunately a still unsolved problem in the science of vi
sual perception— a problem which is central to a presently
evolving science of audiovisual communication.^
A further limitation imposed on this study was the
author's decision to avoid the inclusion of consideration
of the morality or immorality of the psychosocial phenom
enon known as propaganda. While not rejecting the moral
Southern California, Los Angeles, 1957), p. 97.
by: James Q. Knowlton, "A Socio- and Psycho-Linguistic
Theory of Pictorial Communication." (Lafayette: Indiana
University, Division of Educational Media and Audio-Visual
Center, 1964. U.S. Office of Education Contract No. 3-16-
019. Mimeographed).
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( 10
dimension of the phenomenon, it was felt that this aspect
constitutes a study unto itself and was beyond the scope of
this present study.
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
Several of the terms described below have already
been used earlier in this chapter. In such cases their
usages have conformed to the popularly accepted meanings.
The more technical definitions were constructed to dif
ferentiate, in some cases, between several words which are
generally perceived to be synonymous, and in other cases
to provide elaborate on meanings which are often, but er
roneously, assumed to be widely understood.
Attitudes. Allport defined the concept as "a mental
and neural state of readiness, organized through experience,
exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the indivi
dual 's response to all objects and situations with which it
is related."®
Opinion. Opinions are closely related to attitudes.
Although they are commonly thought to be synonymous, there
G. H. Allport, "Attitudes," A Handbook of Social
Psychology, Murchison, C. (ed.),(WorChester, Massachusetts;
Clark University Press, 1935), p. 798.
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11
are some significant differences. First, an opinion is a
more rational construct in its relationship to behavior,
that is, it is always concerned with uncertainties, prob
lems, and issues in a situation. "Every opinion is, in
large degree, an expression of one or several attitudes,
but usually the attitudes are not immediately and obviously
apparent."® For the purposes of this study no attempt has
been made to impose any fine line of distinction between
the terms "attitude" and "opinion."
Propaganda. Of the several definitions offered by
various writers, the following seemed to serve the purpose
of this study:
Propaganda. . . the deliberate attempt by some indi
vidual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes
of other groups by the use of the instruments of com
munication, with the intention that in any given situa
tion the reaction of those so influenced will be that
desired by the propagandist.^®
Eugene L. Hartley, Ruth E. Hartley, and Clyde Hart,
Attitudes and Opinions," The Process and Effects of Mass
Communication, Wilbur Schramm (ed.), (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1954), pp. 222-223.
'Terence Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological
Warfare (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962), p. 27.
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12
Army orientation film. As used in this study, the
term referred to any film produced or sponsored by the
United States Army for the purposes of influencing the at
titudes and opinions of military personnel in a direction
iwhich is in consonance with the ideological basis of any
existing or impending threat to the aims and security of
the United States. The terms, "orientation" and "propa
ganda" are virtually synonymous, as used in this study. It
should be noted, however, that neither term, as herein used,
connoted any of the popularly ascribed negative elements,
i.e., that propaganda is something inherently dishonest.
In general, the process involved the reliance on efforts to
increase factual knowledge of a situation to effect attitude
and opinions.
Trained observers. As used in this study, the term
referred to those participants in the analysis of film con
tent who were selected because of the training they had re
ceived as students in a semester-long course entitled
Seminar in the Propaganda Film." More detailed informa
tion regarding the composition and training of this group
of observers is included in chapters III and VIII. The
suggestion for the use of the title "trained observers" was
derived from the Writings of Dale, wherein the term had
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jbeen used to designate those persons who were used in his
jresearch on the content of motion pictures,One dis-
jtinction, however, between Dale's and this present writer's
jusage of the term should be noted. Dale's trained obser
vers were trained stenographers ("training" had no reference
ito film) who endeavored to keep a running stenographic nar-
jrative of the scene changes and content of the films used
Iin the research. This present researcher endeavored to use
[analysts of considerably more formal training. As in Dale's
experiments, however, the observers in this present study
Iwere supplied with analysis schedule sheets containing major
I
jthemes to be identified. A more detailed description of
these procedures is contained in chapter III.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE STUDY
Chapter II contains a review of the literature. It
includes a review of (1) related previous studies; (2) lit
erature pertaining to historical and sociological background
and circumstances related to the United States' involvement
^^Edgar Dale, The Content of Motion Pictures - Motion
Pictures and Youth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935) ,
p. 6.
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; 14
in the Korean War; (3) literature on the sociology of the
American soldier; (4) literature on the military orienta
tion film; and (5) literature dealing with content analy-
Chapter III was devoted to a discussion of methods,
procedures, and techniques utilized in the study. Chapter
IV contains a discussion of American ideology concerning
war. The intention here was to explore, from a historical
and sociological point of view, the attitudes of Americans
with regard to participation in war.
Chapter V was devoted to a discussion of tbe dis
tinctions between total war and limited war. Specific
effort was made to identify and relate, what may be termed,
;the imperatives of limited war to American ideological pre
dispositions about war in general.
; Chapter VI contains a discussion pertaining to the
'events leading to the Korean War. Efforts were made to
compare the circumstances surrounding this war with those
of previous wars in which Americans participated. The ma-
iterial contained in this chapter represents the results of
the author's search for information which might relate to
the formulation of army orientation objectives.
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15
Chapter VII was devoted to a discussion of army
orientation films of the World War II period and those of
limited war. In this chapter the author endeavored to re
late the rationale and orientation objectives of these
films to, what has been termed, traditional American war
ideology.
In chapter VIII the results of the content analysis
of the selected films were reported, compared, and assessed.
In chapter IX the overall results of the study were
summarized; conclusions are drawn; and recommendations pre
sented .
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE
I. LITERATURE ON PREVIOUS FILM STUDIES
It is safe to say that almost any study of the type
undertaken here and begun at this stage in the development
of social science research involving film must, by neces
sity, begin with the now-classic experimental studies done
by Hoban and van Ormer for the Research Division of the
Troop Information and Education Office of the Department
of the Army during World War II. The results of these
studies have been reported definitively in Instructional
Film Research 1918-1950.^ This study not only provided the
results of the World War II studies, but also a comprehen
sive compilation of the results of significant studies done
prior to Hoban's and van Ormer's studies. Thus, this pub
lication served to lead the way to the total literature in
this field.
The results of the World War II studies were also
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reported, in perhaps more readable form, by Hovland in
Experiments on Mass Communication.^
It should be noted that the World War II studies,
reported in the above-mentioned publications, represent one
of the most extensive bodies of experimental research find
ings ever assembled on the subject of film and attitude for
mation. The unprecedented availability of subjects (sol
diers passing through training and replacement centers)
during the war years provided researchers with a signal
opportunity. It was a credit to the War Department, not
only that they recognized the significance of this situa
tion, but also, that they assigned scientists who did such
splendid work.
These studies, as previously mentioned, evaluated
the persuasive effects of army orientation films on the
attitudes of soldiers. The primary objective of these ex
periments involved the utilization of film in attempts to
motivate willingness to serve in the army. The approach
used, essentially, centered around efforts to increase the
soldier's factual knowledge of events leading to the Second
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18
World War, with the expectation that this would lead to a
greater willingness to fight the nation's enemies.
The results of these studies indicated that the films
were, essentially, unsuccessful in increasing motivation.
They were successful, however, in raising the level of fac
tual knowledge. The hypotheses offered for their failure
to motivate were : (1) previous civilian indoctrination had
already achieved near maximum effect in molding the sol
diers' opinions related to orientation objectives; (2) the
orientation content of the films was in conflict with ex
isting motivations; (3) sizable changes in motivation were
unlikely due to a single fifty-minute film presentation;
(4) the lack of specific coverage in the film of items,
i.e., reliance on treatment of general questions related
to orientation objectives; and (5) need for a "sinking in"
period, that is, a greater lapse of time between showing
the film and measurement of its effects.^
Among the unpublished works in this area which proved
to be of signal interest and utility was Gallez's master's
thesis, "An Exploratory Study of the Rationale of United
^Ibid., pp. 65-72.
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19
States Military Film Propaganda in World War 11."“ ^ This
was a study which undertook a search for a rationale based
upon an American ideology and mentalité upon which any suc
cessful orientation objective would have to be based. Af
ter finding what he regarded as an American war ideology,
he then compared its elements to the army orientation ob
jectives of World War II. Further, he subjected the World
War II orientation film, "The Battle of San Pietro," to
quantitative content analysis to determine if its themes
were in consonance or ran counter to the soldiers' basic
motivations gained through their cultural heritage as
Americans. Specifically, his objective was to test Hov
land' s second hypothesis concerning conflicting motiva
tions. Although his findings did not convincingly dis
prove Hovland's hypothesis, they did raise some provocative
questions and implications which seem to warrant further
study.
The following were some other unpublished works
(all done in the Department of Cinema at the University of
Southern California) which appeared to relate to this
present study; (1) William McSwain, "Visual Education and
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20
National Defense," 1942; (2) Melvin Greenstadt, "A Critical
Survey of United States Government Films in World War II,"
1949; and (3) Robert B. Randle, "A Study of the War Time
Control Imposed on the Civilian Motion Picture Industry and
With Some References to Those Affecting the Army Motion
Pictures During World War II," 1950.
Except for background material, these works were not
of much value to the present undertaking— primarily, be
cause they were addressed to different kinds of problems.
Gallez’s thesis contains a more thorough evaluation of
their content in his review of literature.
Of direct concern to this present writer was the
absence of research literature on the films of the Korean
War period. To date, no published materials have been
found.
II. LITERATURE ON THE KOREAN WAR
In the interest of placing the Korean War in proper
historical and sociological perspective, numerous sources
were sought to provide the necessary insight into the cir
cumstances which led this nation into that particular war.
This search led to several histories of this period and to
published reminiscences of some of the important decision
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21
makers of the period. In reviewing this literature, the
several authors and their works discussed herein were re
vealed to be of considerable assistance in this present
endeavor.
Of particular historical interest was Crofts' and
served to give insight into the history of this nation's
involvement in the whole of the Far East and in Korea.
Both authors, as well as being university professors in
Far Eastern Affairs, are also exceedingly well-qualified in
this area as a result of living and teaching in Asia. Both
served, also, on military intelligence staffs in this area.
Their work, therefore, is characterized by scholarship and
expertise gained through personal experience.
Douglas MacArthur's Reminiscences,^ although pub
lished for the purposes and in the style of a personal
autobiography, provided much useful information. Under
standably, the Korean War occupied a prominent place in
Far East (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958), 626 pp.
^Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1964), 438 pp.
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22
the general's professional life. Written in a highly per
sonal style, the book presents an eyewitness' account of
the development of the Korean crisis and an appraisal of
the conduct of the war from MacArthur's point of view.
Understandably, much emphasis was given to the controvers
ial aspects involved in this war.
Of particular interest, to this reviewer, were the
accounts of the general's grappling with the thorny prob
lems evolving out of the concepts of limited war versus
"all-out victory." Whatever shortcomings this book may have
contained owing to its highly personal nature, it must be
reported that the exposition of MacArthur's views greatly
facilitated a clearer understanding of the ideological and
operational dichotomy between total war and limited war
which arose during the Korean War. Whether one agrees or
disagrees with MacArthur's point of view is really not
germane in this connection.
The following listed books served several purposes,
notably in providing historical and analytical material
concerning the Korean War. Most importantly, however, was
the treatment given to the emergence of the limited war
concept, i.e., its origins, rationale, and special problems.
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23
These books were: Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy;^ Smith's U. Military Doctrineand Millis'
nd Men.
Another book which proved to be exceedingly useful
was Robert Endicott Osgood's definitive treatise on limited
war. The fact that it is listed herein under the section
devoted to Literature on the Korean War is not intended to
suggest the limits of the book's interest. Indeéd, Osgood
does treat the subject of the Korean War very comprehensi
vely but his chief interest centers on the broader subject
of limited war. Osgood explores the genesis of the concept
of limited war, its historical precedents, and most im
portantly, he thoroughly investigates the concept of limited
^Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), 463 pp.
^Dale O. Smith, U. _S. Military Doctrine— A Study
and Appraisal (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955),
256 pp.
^Walter Millis, Arms and Men— A Study of American
Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956)
382 pp.
l^Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War— The Challenge
to American Strategy (Chicago: The Univ of Chicago Press,
1957), p. 191.
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24
war as it applies to modern American Military and political
strategy.
For an introduction to the literature on the Korean
War, Blanchard's bibliography^^ was consulted. This bib
liography which was published by the Korean Conflict Re
search Foundation served to facilitate, especially, the
search for statistical and historical data on the Korean
War.
III. LITERATURE ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
THE AMERICAN SOLDIER
The literature on the sociology of the American
soldier represents a highly specialized field of study.
It is a field which is dominated by a very few, but highly
capable writers. Morris Janowitz is one of these writers.
The following listed books are several of his works which
have been devoted to the task of identifying the American
soldier— his motivations, incentives, and ideology. These
books are: Sociology and the Military Establishment;^^
Maps of Korea (New York: Korean Conflict Research Founda
tion, 1964)
^^Morris Janowitz and Roger Little, Sociology and the
Military Establishment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
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25
The New Militaryand The Professional Soldier.
Several other useful sources which fall in this cate-
ton's The Soldier and the State.
The significance of the above-mentioned books to
this present study was, essentially, centered in their
wealth of material relating to the ideology of the American
soldier. They provided insight on questions regarding what
motivates the soldier ; what his commitments are; how, and
why he fights. These books provided a valuable complement
and another dimension to the campaign histories which are
so readily available.
1965), 136 pp.
Morris Janowitz (ed.), The New Military— Changing
Patterns of Organization (New York: Russell Sage Founda
tion, 1964), 369 pp.
Illinois : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 464 pp.
^^Samuel A. Stouffer, ^ . , The American Soldier
Vols. 1 and 2 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
16
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
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26
In attempting to examine sociologically the character
of the American soldier it was recognized early in this
present study that any such endeavor would have to include
considerations of the characteristics of the larger society
from which the soldier is recruited. Distinctions, also,
had to be made between professional soldiers and the larger
body of citizen-soldiers who fill the ranks, especially
during war. It had to be recognized, for example, that
professional soldiers constitute a sub-culture within the
larger society— a sub-culture possessing some attitudes,
problems, values, and attributes that are in some measure
different from those of the larger society. At the same
time, however, the pervasive influence of American culture
on all of the nation's citizens had to be considered. It
was recognized, therefore, that every effort had to be
made to consider the soldier in the larger context of a
study of, what may be called, the American National
character.
The following books were found to be of assistance
in these endeavors. The first of these is Brogan's, The
American Character. Brogan's excellent book provided
W. Brogan, The American Character (New York:
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27
insight into, what may be termed, American ambivalence to
war and violence as a national characteristic— a charact
eristic also manifested by the nation's citizen-soldiers.
The same kinds of considerations as those mentioned
above were treated also by Commager in his book. Living
war figured significantly in this present researcher's
approach to understanding the American soldier.
Of assistance in these efforts, also, was Morison's,
The Oxford History of the American People. The principal
value of this book centered on the author's interpretation
and chronicle of the reactions of Americans to their wars.
He endeavored to record and interpret the motivations, re
sponses, and the pùblic and private debate surrounding
America's moments of crises.
Vintage Books, 1956).
la
Henry Steele Commager (ed.), Living Ideas In
America (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1951).
American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
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IV. LITERATURE ON CONTENT ANALYSIS
Because the author found no one technique of content
analysis to be wholly suited to the present study, several
different approaches were studied with the intention of
finding usable ideas on which to base an approach which was
suitable. The results of this search, of course, are made
evident in Chapter III of this study under "Methods and
Procedures. "
Of the sources investigated, the following listed
ones were most useful; Berelson's Content Analysis in
Pictures ; Dorothy Jones' paper, "The Quantitative Analy
sis of Motion Picture Content ; " Handel's Hollywood Looks
Research (Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press of Glencoe,
1952) .
York: The Macmillan Company, 1935).
Picture Content," Public Opinion Quarterly, VI (1942),
pp. 411-428; XIV (1950), pp. 554-558.
A Report of Film Audience Research (Urbana: The University
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A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International
Crisis
24
Berelson's book definitively treats such subjects as:
(1) content analysis in the social sciences and in the
humanities; (2) the quantitative and qualitative methods;
and (3) procedural matters, i.e., units of measurement,
sampling, reliability, etc. These were all matters of
vital concern to this reviewer.
Dale's work, which was a report of his experiments
involving the effects of movie themes on children, was of
interest for two reasons— first, for his methods of iden
tifying and evaluating themes, and secondly, for the pro
cedural details involved in utilizing trained observers to
secure critical information.
The other books listed above served a similar pur
pose of providing usable elements to constitute an approach
which would serve the purposes of this study.
of Illinois Press, 1950) .
^'^Robert C. North, et. , Content Analysis— A Hand
book with Applications for the Study of International
Crisis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963)
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V . OTHER LITERATURE
Also consulted in the preparation of this study were
several bibliographies and indexes which seemed to promise
some relevant information. Among these were : Index of
Army Motion Pictures ; Index of Military Publications 7
and Berelson's bibliography on content analysis.
The Index of Army Motion Pictures was, of course,
indispensable; for it provided a compilation of the films
under study, with synopses of their thematic content. This
facilitated the selection of films for this study.
The Index of Military Publications, as the name
suggests, served primarily as a reference book to current
publications prepared by the army.
Berelson's bibliography provided a valuable survey
of the existing literature on content analysis.
Department of the Army, Index of Army Motion
Pictures, Film Strips, Slides, and Phono-Recordings (DA
PAM 108-1) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957) .
^^Department of the Army, Index of Military Publica
tions (Washington: Government Printing Office, ____).
^^See t
pp. 199-220.
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31
All of the foregoing studies and references have
been used to (1) place the subject in proper historical
perspective, and (2) assist the present writer in the form
ulation and use of suitable research techniques and methods.
The following chapter on methods and procedures was largely
based on the references discussed herein.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The methods used in this study were empirical and
critical. These two methods were determined to he appropri
ate to the objectives of the study after the problem was
thoroughly analyzed and found to be essentially one of de
scription and analysis.
There were essentially six developmental phases in
volved in the design and execution of the study. They
were: (1) formulating a set of criteria for the analysis
of film content; (2) selection of films ; (3) content analy
sis; (4) thematic analysis by trained observers ; (5) col
lating, comparing, and interpreting the results of the
analyses; and (6) drawing conclusions.
I. FORMULATING CRITERIA
Fundamental to the problem of formulating criteria
was a need for the acquisition of insight into matters
which influence— or should influence— the selection of
orientation objectives. In other words, the question to
be answered was : what themes should be included in an
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33
army orientation film which is designed to motivate sol
diers towards the will to serve and the will to fight?
Further, what is the rationale underlying the selection of
themes? What are the intrinsic ideological reasons under
lying the selection? What are the external determinants?
The list of themes which theoretically should be
treated then becomes the set of criteria for evaluation.
Preceding from the theory that these themes should be a
product of intrinsic (ideological) and extrinsic ingred
ients (circumstances surrounding a particular war or threat
of war), it was therefore necessary to investigate matters
relating to the background, inception, and conduct of the
Korean War. The selection of criteria, therefore, evolved
out of research in the following areas : (1) American war
ideology, i.e., traditional orientation regarding war in
general; (2) ideological basis of the Korean War in parti
cular ; and (3) rationale of World War II army film propa-
Investigation of the above-cited areas essentially
involved library research. However, orientation films of
the World War II era were viewed for background information.
The library research was undertaken to secure opinions of
sociologists, historians, and political scientists in order
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34
to find concepts on which a rationale of Korean War propa
ganda and criteria for evaluating it could be based.
The criteria which were formulated are reported in
Chapter VII of this study.
II. SELECTION OF FILMS
The total quantity and variety of films produced by
the army during the Korean War years was, indeed, extensive.
They comprised films of numerous categories. For example,
there were training films on every imaginable subject— from
weaponry and electronics to religious films produced for
the Chaplains' Corps. Among the films listed in the Index
of Army Motion Pictures^ under "Troop Information, Educa
tion, and Orientation" there were thirty-seven; and under
"Korean War Campaign Films" there were twelve.
The diversity in numbers and variety, therefore,
dictated the need for selection criteria. A review of
thematic synopsis provided in the Index of Army Motion
Pictures facilitated the establishment of criteria. For
^Department of the Army, Index of Army Motion
Pictures, Film Strips, Slides, and Phono-Recordings (DA
PAM 108-1) (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1957) .
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35
example, the synopsis revealed that there were only nine
which met the following requirements: (1) produced not
more than one year preceding the out-break of the Korean
War, (2) produced not later than the year in which the war
ended, (3) the overall theme of the film was clearly and
primarily devoted to attitude-formation, as contrasted to
skill training or combat-historical reportage, and finally
(4) a viewing of the film selected under the above criteria
substantiated its classification as an orientation film.
In addition to the Korean War films which were
selected under the criteria described above, two additional
films were selected. One of these latter two was a World
War II orientation film and the other was an orientation
film of the Vietnam era. Both films were used for the
purpose of comparison. The objective here was to determine
if there were differences in orientation objectives (thema
tically) between the films of the Korean War and those of
World War II and Vietnam. Identical content analysis
criteria were applied to the films of all three periods.
The films which were finally selected are listed and
described in chapter VII of the study.
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III. CONTENT ANALYSIS
The content analysis techniques used were of two
types. The first type was the so-called "quantative," a
technique used to measure the frequencies of appearance of
pre-determined content items. Unlike the procedure used
by Gallez^ however, the unit of content analysis was con
siderably larger. The larger unit of content analysis was
adopted after preliminary trials had shown that the indivi
dual sentence in narration or individual "shot" were, in
deed, too small and fragmented to serve a useful purpose.
Therefore, the pre-determined content item used as a unit
of measurement in this study was the "theme" which con
formed to the formulated criteria.
The second analysis technique was similiar to that
used by Dale.^ Trained observers were utilized to indicate
Douglas Warren Gallez, "An Exploratory Study of the
Rationale of United States Military Film Propaganda in
World War II" (unpublished Master's thesis. The University
of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1957), p. 97.
Pictures and Youth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935),
p. 6.
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37
the presence of absence of predetermined themes. Using a
schedule sheet containing the list of predetermined themes,
each observer, after viewing the films, recorded his re
sponses. These responses constituted the data used in the
analysis,
In both procedures described above, the initial anal
yses were performed by the author. Later, for comparison,
the same films were viewed and analyzed by other observers.
The procedures followed by the author were (in the
order listed): (1) Each film was projected and viewed at
least twice, (2) Each film was viewed at reduced speed or
frame by frame in a moviola, (3) A tape-recorded transcrip
tion was made of the narration and sound track, (4) A writ
ten transcript was made from the tape, and (5) Using the
script as a guide, each film was analyzed for thematic con
tent based on predetermined criteria.
The next major step involved the analysis by others,
in this case, by the trained observers who were all parti
cipants in a Seminar in the Propaganda Film which was con
ducted in the Cinema Department at the University of
Southern California.
Utilizing the questionnaire form (schedule sheet)
containing the criteria provided by the author,the observers
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38
viewed the films and indicated their response. Additional
observations beyond the limits of the criteria were also
solicited.
The trained observer group consisted of fourteen
members (averaged attendance). Out of concern for the
possibility that this group was too small, or too select to
provide valid results, the author decided that the responses
of this group should be compared with the responses of a
larger and more heterogeneous group. The results of these
comparisons are reported in Chapter VIII.
IV. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
After collecting and collating the results of the
analysis performed by the observers, they were compared
with the results of the author's analysis. The results
were then tabulated to determine the themes which were
actually treated in the films.
Specifically, answers to the following questions
were sought : (1) What were the themes used in films?
(2) Were the themes used in the films in consonance or con
flict with the basic ideological motivations of American
soldiers? (3) Did the thematic content reflect the pecu
liarities of the era, notably, the emotional and psycho-
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39
logical changes attendant to the concept of limited war?
(4) Were the films vastly different from the World War II
films, that is, in thematic content?
The answers to these questions led to the conclus
ions which were enumerated in chapter IX.
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CHAPTER IV
AMERICAN WAR IDEOLOGY EXAMINED
Americans— not unlike other peoples who have shared
common historical experiences, similar economic and social
conditions, and essentially similar natural surroundings—
manifest certain explicit credos and psychological disposi
tions which represent or express what may be called their
collective mentality. This collective mentality, in fact,
is the sum of their national characteristics. These na
tional characteristics, in turn, are the by-products of
what may be called the American culture.
For reasons which the author hopes to make clear in
this present chapter, the contention is offered that no
clear understanding of the American approach to war is pos
sible without consideration of certain peculiar aspects of
American history and the American cultural heritage.
It is not, however, the author's intention here to
recount in detail all the episodes of American history, nor
to correlate in depth all of the nation's war slogans and
military attitude-orientation themes to their primodial
cultural origins. It is doubtful that such an undertaking
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41
is completely possible; further, the former task has been
accomplished so well by so many other more capable authors
and the latter has been attempted with a great deal of suc
cess by at least one other writer.^ The intention here is
merely to provide the reader with sufficient material to
facilitate an understanding of the attitudinal components
of the total war— limited war dichotomy which is discussed
later in this present work. This dichotomy has its dis
tinct cultural basis, and the overriding contention here
is that there can be no understanding of this dichotomy and
its attendant conflicts without reference to American his
tory and culture.
Culture, according to the anthropologist, Edward T.
Hall, "...has long stood for the way of life of a people,
for the sum of their learned behavior patterns, attitudes,
and material things."^ Hall further asserts that the ef
fects of culture on behavior are pervasive. "Culture
Rationale of United States Military Film Propaganda in
World War II" (unpublished Master's thesis. University of
Southern California, Los Angeles, 1957)
mier Publications, Inc. ed.; New York: Doubleday and Co.
Inc., 1959), p. 31.
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42
controls behavior," he says, "in deep and persisting ways,
many of which are outside of awareness and therefore beyond
conscious control of the individual. Although Hall was
referring to individual behavior patterns in these specific
quotations, the implications for analysis of collective
behavior are apparent, and by extension, of national charac
teristics .
In this present chapter, it has been the author's
intention to explore, though of necessity briefly, the
effects of the American national mentality on America's
traditional outlook and approach to war. The basic assump
tion is that a set of peculiarly American psychological
dispositions have traditionally governed the "why" and the
"how" Americans fight. The contention is that these psy
chological dispositions have influenced American behavior
with regard to war in the past and will have to be reckoned
with in the future.
As a general, but justifiable, statement, it may be
said that Americans have traditionally manifested a per
plexing ambivalence to war. On the one hand, historically
Americans have resented war profoundly, and on the other
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43
hand, they have heeded the call to arms and performed gal
lantly in war. This resentment for war, however, cannot
be equated with pacifism; nor can the American capability
in war be regarded as nationalistic and vainglorious mili
tarism.*^ This apparent contradiction regarding war was
consummately stated by Brogan as follows:
The lesson of American history is that no nation
more cheerfully turns swords into plowshares...
The other side of the lesson is that no nation
turns plowshares into swords with such speed or
has so many plows to turn.^
What is truly germane in this present discussion,
however, is the realization that there are certain condi
tions or certain ingredients which can stimulate the fight
ing spirit in Americans, but before considering these, it
appears helpful to consider the question: Why do Americans
harbor a traditional resentment of war?
Resentment of war. The true meaning and degree of
this resentment is perhaps best expressed with the term
distinction between militarism and the military way in A
History of Militarism— Civilian and Military, Meridian
Books, Inc., 1959, pp. 13-32.
^D. W. Brogan, The American Character (New York:
Vintage Books, 1956), p. 198.
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"hatred of war;" for that is indeed the historic American
reaction. In a word, it may be said that this aversion to
violence has its basis in the great liberal and humane
ideals of Christianity and the Enlightenment. Further, in
a more mundane but just as valid an approach, it must be
recognized that Americans are by nature— actually by force
of environment and socioeconomic development--a practical
people who are imbued with great idealism. Also, on the
practical side, Americans recognize, as Osgood terms it,
that;
War upsets the whole scale of social priorities
of an individualistic and materialistic scheme of
life, so that the daily round of getting and spend
ing is subordinated to the collective welfare of
the nation in a hundred grievous ways— from taxa
tion to death.
Although, in large measure, the aversion to war
springs from self-interested motives, it must be recog
nized that with a people who are so fond of social order
and material well-being, the reaction to the interference
imposed by war can be just as compelling as the moral
aversion.
Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War— The Challenge
to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1957), p. 33.
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45
Also of extreme importance to this present discourse
is the understanding that there are several different as
pects and reactions on the part of Americans to the idea
of violence. First there is the inconsistency in the
American interpretation of violence. For example, as
Osgood points out;
In American domestic politics the liberal and
humane ideals grow somewhat ambiguous amid the
competing claims upon them put forth by scores
of groups and individuals caught up in the con
test for power; but in the sphere of inter
national relations, where the issues are com
paratively remote from everyday experience,
ideals carry great and unembarrassed conviction.^
Specifically, then, with regard to war, it can be
said that the aversion to violence does not result in an
unswerving adherence to pacifism. "It does not prevent
participation— in fact, enthusiastic participation— in war
when war cannot honorably be avoided."®
At the risk of oversimplifying, suffice it to state
for the moment that for Americans, as one writer stated
it, "...the natural reaction to war's threat to the security
'Ibid., p. 32.
^Ibid., p. 33.
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46
and happiness of the individual is to try to end the war as
soon as possible by destroying the enemy.
As Kennan observed, with regard to the genesis of
the American way in war :
Democracy fights in anger— it fights for the very
reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights
to punish the power that was rash enough and hos
tile enough to provoke it— to teach that power a
lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing
from happening again...
Thus, the lessons of history show the American
people, on the one hand, holding passionately to peace
and reluctant to let go, yet on the other hand, just as
passionate in rising to the occasion in the face of real
or imagined provocation— and with all the zeal they are
peculiarly capable of mustering in what they perceive as a
righteous cause.
The righteous cause. The idealistic component of
the American mass-personality places a high premium on the
causes for which Americans fight. As the history of this
nation's involvement in armed conflict has demonstrated.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 65-66.
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47
its citizens must perceive that it is going to war for a
just and moral cause. Further, the American conscience
cannot countenance any suspicion that it is the Americans
who are the aggressors in the instigation of armed conflict.
Historical proof exists to support the contention
that where these essential ingredients were missing, in
such cases the wars were both poorly managed and poorly
fought. Notable among these rare instances were the War of
1812 and the Mexican War. Both of these wars were fought
for what was perceived at the time to be prosaic ends which
did not solicit the zealous campaign spirit which histori
cally has served psychologically to galvanize American pub
lic opinion and incite the required degree of moral in
dignation which has been shown to be the well-spring of
American pugnacity in war.
Illustrating the unpopularity of the War of 1812,
the historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, has recounted the
following specific examples. Referring to Massachusetts,
Morison recounts that "The lower house issued a manifesto
urging the country to 'organize a peace party' and 'let
there be no volunteers. ' "H Further, Rhode Island and
^^Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford History of the
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48
Connecticut "refused to call state militia into national
service, and Federalist merchants refused to subscribe to
war bonds..."
These reactions in the New England States were all
the more significant in light of the fact that this bitter
opposition was maintained, "despite the fact that war built
up their economy,
Understandably, the militiamen themselves were not
unaffected by the indecision and devisiveness existing in
the country during the War of 1812. The story is told of
Major General Samuel Hopkins, of the Kentucky militia,
while carrying out a punitive expedition against the
Indians responsible for the massacre at Fort Dearborn, hav
ing been advised by a council of his officers to retreat
with his 4000 man force, appealed directly to his troops,
asking for 500 volunteers to continue the mission. "Not
one man offered himself."
m14
American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
p. 383.
l^ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 395
^"^Ibid., p. 384.
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49
As for political support of the war, the most cur
sory review of the events leading to the war will reveal
that the war might not have been fought at all had it not
been for the support of the Southern and inland Western
states; for eight senators, a large majority of the con
gressmen from the New England states, from New York, New
Jersey, and Maryland voted against the declaration of war.
New England, where three-quarters of American
shipping was owned, and which supplied more than
that proportion of American seamen, wanted no
war and agitated against it to the brink of trea-
Assessing the administration's military strategy,
Morison contends that "the conduct of this conflict offered
many lessons in how not to fight a war and how not to organ
ize and lead armies. In a word, according to Morison,
"The administration's military strategy was as stupid as
its diplomacy.
Without going into great and complicated details of
the Mexican War, suffice it to say that internal confusion
^^Ibid.,
, P-
379
^^Ibid., , p. 399
Ibid.,
■ p.
383
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50
and conflict similar to that experienced in the War of 1812
once again plagued the country. The exhilarating fragrance
of "manifest destiny" was in the air, but seemingly not
equally appreciated, nor easily breathed by all Americans
alike. There were those Americans ardently in favor of
westward expansionism; there were others who were just as
ardently opposed. The issues were further complicated by
the slavery question.
As an overall statement, it can be stated with
justification that there was hardly unanimous consent on
the part of the population to the Mexican War. Protest
came from many quarters. Henry Thoreau, for example, made
his private protest against the war by refusing to pay the
state poll tax— justifying his action in his essay on Civil
Disobedience, he wrote:
Witness the present Mexican War, the work of com
paratively a few individuals using the standing
government as their tool ; for, in the outset, the
people would not have consented to this measure.
James Russel Lowell's Biglow Papers, similarly
castigated the Mexican War.
Chicago: The Great Books Foundation, 1955), p. 1.
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51
Similarly, the government's actions were charac
terized by indecisiveness and confusion, "Congress was
within an ace of abolishing 'undemocratic' West Point when
war was declared, and the army was as unprepared for war as
in 1812,
The general and overriding implication of all of the
foregoing was perhaps best summarized by Commager in his
assessment of the American way in war :
.,,Americans must be convinced that the war they
are fighting is just, that the cause they champion
is good, and that they are not the aggressor. They
have ever been reluctant to start wars, and they
have never fought well in wars whose motives or
character they distrusted. The themes of the just
cause and of nonaggression run all through American
history.
Even the national anthem sounds this note : "Then
conquer we must, for our cause, it is just, and
this be our motto, in God is our trust,",,,
Commenting on the effects of the absence of the
citizens' perception of the righteous cause, Commager stated
further : "As many people in the United States doubted the
America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp, 607-
608,
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52
righteousness of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, both
were badly managed and feebly supportedFurther allud
ing to opposite incidents he provides the reminder that
"... both Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt devoted an immense
amount of thought and energy to making clear the moral is
sues of the wars into which they led the U. S. people.
The foregoing is viewed as being directly in conson
ance with Osgood's observation that the vengeance and pug
nacity of which Americans are capable is not cunning and
premeditated. Because it is not premeditated "...
American pugnacity is perhaps all the more passionate for
that reason, because it springs from righteous indignation
rather than from design.To this it should be added
that the American capacity for feelings of righteous in
dignation are most incisively expressed when they are di
rected toward a perceived morally repugnant enemy.
The morally repugnant enemy. Anger must have its
object. In war the convenient object is the enemy— who is
21 Ibid.
22ibid.
23
Osgood, op, cit., p. 34.
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53
perceived collectively as a depraved and godless destroyer
who is disrespectful to womanhood and a slaughterer of
children. If this description sounds like a collection of
propaganda slogans it is intentional; for enormous effort
is exerted by all belligerents to cast their enemies in
this descriptive mold— America not excluded. The point is;
these are descriptive attributes or characteristics that
have served to incite the righteous spirit among Americans
at war; for the romantic and the bold characterize the
American. The American relates to these concrete, prosaic
symbols far more than he does to the enemy ideology. In
this context, also, it is well to remember that war acts
as a powerful cathartic for releasing man's suppressed
capacity for hatred. The enemy, therefore, presents a
convenient and legitimate channel for the release of hate.
As Walter Lippmann observed, murderous hate is controlled in
civil life, but "... if a war breaks out, the chances are
that everybody you admire will begin to feel the justifica-
Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 178.
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54
The morally repugnant enemy, therefore, is the cen
tral character in all so-called "hate" propaganda. Admit
ting that World War I was the period in which the Allies
most frequently resorted to "atrocity" and "hate" propa
ganda, the theme of the morally repugnant enemy has figured
prominently in every period in which this country has been
engaged in war.
The following examples of World War I propaganda
themes reported by Lasswell will serve to illustrate how
central the theme of resentment for the morally repugnant
enemy was. He listed the following themes :
1. The enemy is a menace. (German militarism
threatens us all.)
2. We are protective. (We protect ourselves and
others.)
3. The enemy is obstructive. (They block our future
4. We are helpful. (We aid in the achievement of
positive goals.)
5. The enemy is immoral and insolent. (They vio
late legal and moral standards and they hold everyone else
in contempt.)
6. We are moral and appreciative. (We conform to
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55
moral and legal standards and we respect others.)
7. The enemy will be defeated.
8. We will win.
Without belaboring the point, suffice it to say that
the continued value of the perceived morally repugnant en
emy in mobilizing hatred of the enemy is attested to by re
curring war films containing this as the central theme.
The film, The Crime of Korea, which will be discussed, here
in, is such a film.
Isolationism. Although the number of times this
country has been involved in grave international struggles
in its short history would perhaps suggest the contrary, it
is nevertheless significant to note that isolationism as a
national proclivity has played a significant part in the
formulation and exercise of American war ideology.
When it is considered that the doctrine of isola
tionism has been, and still is to a degree, expressive of
the American personality regarding "getting involved with
things over there" its relevance to American war ideology
becomes apparent.
Public Opinion and Communication, ed. Bernard Berelson, and
Morris Janowitz (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1953)
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56
The very genesis of America as a nation forecasts
the evolution of an isolationist ideology. It need only be
recalled that the Pilgrims' migration to America was, in
the first place, an exodus in anger and dissatisfaction
with Europe. The successful American revolution served to
facilitate a still greater disengagement from foreign af
fairs and foreign influence in the sense that it broke the
forced tie with England.
American isolation also grew out of a variety of
other considerations. As Commager has observed, "It grew
out of the obvious factor of geographical isolation. It
grew out of a perfectly logical fear of embroilment in Old
World wars. " On the sentimental and psychological side,
Commager observed further that isolationism "...grew out of
the romantic assumption that the New World was innocent and
virtuous, the Old World decadent and depraved, and that the
less the two had to do with each other the better.
The theme of isolationism courses through American
history. Almost without exception, the great politicians
pp. 265-277.
26,
Commager, op. cit., p. 653.
27ibld.
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57
of the country have spoken and written about the dangers of
"foreign entanglements." Only recent history has chronicled
the tentative preachments to the contrary.
It was faith in the future success of American iso
lationism along with anti-military feelings that led to the
post-Revolutionary War demobilization that left the new
country with a regular army of eighty enlisted men and with
a universal conviction that "standing armies are ever a
menace to the liberties of the people."^®
History has shown, however, that abject adherence to
a policy of non-intervention and isolationism was not to
last. The fact that it did, however, last for almost 100
years certainly left its mark on American thinking.
That this nation did evolve from isolationism to
interventionism is now a matter of well-known history. Be
cause of the limitation of this present study, the highly
interesting account of this evolution— its causes and pro
cesses— cannot be treated here. However, suffice it to say
(although risking over-simplification) that with the coun
try's increasing power and wealth among nations came
Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), p.
46.
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58
increasing responsibilities. As Franklin Roosevelt stated
it:
We have learned that we cannot live alone, at
peace; that our own well-being is dependent on
the well-being of other nations, far away. We
have learned that we must live as men, and not
as ostriches. . . . We have learned to be citi
zens of the world, members of the human commun
ity.
The significant implication of this still not com
pletely eradicated American proclivity is that variously
it has proved to be a formidable obstacle to overcome at
times of crises as this nation has approached the threat
of international armed conflict.
Crusade for democracy and belief in a . better world
order. Still another aspect of the American personality is
the firm belief in the notion that the attainment of a bet
ter world order is within the capacity of men and nations
to achieve. This notion is related to yet another facet
of the American personality— this facet is characterized
by a crusading belief in the superiority of democracy as
a form of government and as a political philosophy.
Certainly, since the demise of abject adherence to
Address," January 20, 1945.
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59
isolationism, it may be said with justification that Ameri
cans, prideful of their "democracy," constantly have en
deavored to sell democracy throughout the world.
To the reader who might understandably relate the
foregoing statements only to the foreign aid programs and
the USIA-type programs of recent history, the following ob
servation by a perceptive Scottish visitor to America in
1846 is cited to suggest the depth of this peculiar Ameri
can characteristic. He wrote;
Every American is . . . the apostle of a partic
ular political creed, in the final triumph and
extension of which he finds both himself and his
country deeply involved. Much of the self-im
portance which the American assumes, particularly
abroad, is less traceable to his mere citizen
ship than to his conscious identification with
the success of democracy.
It involves not only his own position, but also
the hopes and expectations of humanity.
Summary. The topics treated in this chapter by no
means represent the complete description of Americans; nor
do they cover all the large and varied historically and
cultural issues and developments which have contributed to
Alexander Mac Kay, The Western World or Travels in
the United States in 1846 and 1847, III, cited by Henry S.
Commager (ed.), Living Ideas in America (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1951), pp. 230-231.
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60
the formation of an American ideology. The intention has
been, rather, to provide some gross, though valid, indi
cators of the influences which bear on the historic approach
of Americans to participation in war. The endeavor has
been to seek some ideological rationale to the American way
To briefly summarize, it may be reported that Ameri
cans have :
1. Traditionally manifested a resentment for war.
2. Given certain appropriate pre-conditions, have
nevertheless demonstrated a capacity for successfully con
ducting war. Among these pre-conditions are :
a) belief in the righteousness of the cause
for which they fight.
b) belief in the notion that they are acting
in response to aggression and are not themselves the ag
gressors .
3. Historically performed poorly in wars in which
the nations motives were suspect and in wars which did not
appear to satisfy basic attitudinal pre-conditions.
4. Traditionally manifested a capacity for venge
ful moral indignation and resentment when forced by what
they perceive to be a morally repugnant enemy.
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61
5. Demonstrated persisting isolationist tendencies.
6. Possessed a crusading zeal about their democracy.
7. Believed that the attainment of a better world
order could be achieved through military victory.
8. Regarded speedy destruction of the enemy as
appropriate reaction to the threat of war.
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CHAPTER V
TOTAL WAR VERSUS LIMITED WAR
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
Armed conflicts between belligerents throughout
history have taken many forms and have been referred to
by many names. They variously have been referred to as
"civil," "revolutionary," "global," and wars of "libera
tion," to name a few. Of the various types, however, there
are two major designations which have served to distinguish
between two broad categories which are of particular in
terest to contemporary observers and participants in war.
The terms used to designate and differentiate these two
types are : "total war" and "limited war."
Essentially, the distinction between limited and
total war is a matter of degree or amount of mobilization
and the amount of force exerted to achieve certain objec
tives— with the choice of objectives also constituting a
determinant as to whether it is a limited or total war.
Although there are other determinants aside from the matter
of degree, "the distinction is clear enough in practice to
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63
have immense significance for national policy.
I. TOTAL WAR
Total war has been described by Osgood as "that
distinct twentieth-century species of unlimited war in
which all the human and material resources of the belli
gerents are mobilized and employed against the total na
tional life of the enemy.
As a working definition, his is certainly adequate
for the purposes of this study. It should be noted, how
ever, that as Osgood himself later points out--total war
as a concept and method is not new to this century. For
example, the following listed conflicts, in all essential
respects, were unlimited wars : (1) the Religious Wars of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, (2) the Napoleonic
Wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, (3) the
French Revolutionary War, and (4) the two World Wars of
the twentieth century.
^Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War— The Challenge
to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1957), p. 3.
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64
Total or unlimited war usually involves a fight for
the destruction of the enemy and his unconditional sur
render. In short, all means are applied to achieve total
victory. Total victory is the objective; not negotiated
settlements or stalemates. As General Poch phrased it;
"... Not until the enemy has been crushed in battle and
annihilated by pursuit is there any question of parley
with him."^
Interestingly, the religious wars referred to earlier
represent, perhaps, the prototype of the unlimited war.
Fomented and sustained as they were by religious pas
sions— dividing nations, cities, and families— they were
examples of the ferocity that can spring from moral in
dignation and the spirit of a righteous crusade.
Osgood cites Martin Luther's appeal to his friend
Spalatin as an example of the call to unlimited war :
I implore you, if you rightly understand the gos
pel, do not imagine that its cause can be fur
thered without tumult, distress, and uproar . . .
The word of God is a sword, is warfare, is de
struction, is wrath, is spoiling, is an adder's
■^Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, trans. J.
de Morinni (New York: H. K. Fly, 1918), p. 27.
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tongue, and as Amos says, like the Lion on the
footpath and the Bear in the forest."^
The Second World War, of course, is so recent that
only a few remarks seem necessary to summon recollections
of its scope and ferocity. In fact, just a few of the new
words this conflict added to the lexicon of war terms would
appear to serve this purpose. The following are but a few:
blitzkrieg, feuersturm (fire storm), overkill (actually a
post-war term to designate the application of excessive
fire-power), atomic bomb, etc. In the vernacular of cer
tain total war politicians there were older words which
took on new and ominous meanings, i.e., "the final solution','
genocide, extermination, and so on.
II. LIMITED WAR
Limited war, as may be deduced from the foregoing
discussion, involves a different relationship between means
and ends. Limited war, unlike total war, is one in which
. . . the belligerents restrict the purposes for
which they fight to concrete, well-defined ob
jectives that do not demand the utmost military
effort of which the belligerents are capable and
Johannes Janssen, History of the German People at
the Close of the Middle Ages, III, trans. A. M. Christie
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., 1900), p.100
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66
that can be accomplished in a negotiated settle-
Further, limited war, generally speaking, involves
only a very few belligerents— usually only two. Unlike
total wars which in contemporary thinking are global in
scope, limited wars are confined to a relatively small
geographical area. Their circumscribed character usually
permits the economic, social, and political patterns of
existence to continue without serious disruption.
Some examples of modern limited wars are : (1) the
Greek Civil War, (2) the Korean War, and (3) the Indo
china War.
What may seem surprising to all but the student of
history is the fact that all the wars of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries except the French Revolutionary
and the Napoleonic were limited wars— that is, wars fought
for limited and prosaic ends, such as, adjusting local
boundaries, settling arguments over trade rights, etc. In
terestingly— to the present writer at least— was the revela
tion that the understanding of the concept of limited war
seems decidedly clearer when the phenomenon is viewed in
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67
historical perspective. In fact, understanding seems to be
facilitated by the study of historical precedents.
Historical precedents. For reasons which will be
mentioned briefly later, the eighteenth and nineteenth cen
turies were essentially centuries of limited war. These
were periods in which statesmen were willing to fight for
limited objectives and well-defined "reasons of state,"
that is, adjustments in balance of power, exploitation of
foreign markets, etc.
Specifically, "the periods from the Peace of West
phalia in 1648 to the French Revolutionary War and the pe
riod from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to World War I"®
were periods of limited war.
One notable exception during this period was the
American Civil War (1861-1865) which was equalled only by
the Napoleonic Wars in terms of ferocity, physical dimen
sions and magnitude of objectives.
Some of the limited wars of the period were:
1. Austro-Russian War (1866)
2. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871)
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3. Russo-Turkish War (1877)
4. Spanish American War (1898)
5. Boer War (1899-1902)
6. Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)
Interestingly, all the above-listed wars, except the
Boer War, involved major powers, they were all relatively
short, fought in pursuit of limited objectives, and caused
little disruption to society.^
To this list should be added, also, two earlier wars
in which Americans were involved: the War of 1812 and the
Mexican War (1846-1848).
As mentioned earlier, the period since World War II
has been a period of limited war— with the Korean War (1950-
1953), Indo-China (first ending 1954), and the current Viet
nam Conflict (a resumption or continuation of the Indo-
China War) as notable examples.
The rationale of limited war. When the question
"why limited war" is considered, several fairly simple
answers may be found. Some of these answers apply to both
the limited wars of modern western history and the earlier
ones and some do not.
^Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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69
For example, the limited wars of eighteenth century
Europe were often--perhaps more often than not--as much a
matter of "style" as they were response to external cir
cumstances. It should be recalled, for example, that wars
of this era generally were not fought by conscripted citi-
zen-soldiers, but by paid mercenaries who were not inflamed
with patriotic zeal or nationalistic loyalty. Armies were
officered by aristocrats who figuratively conducted war
like a game of chess. War was a gentleman's sport. This
state of affairs was hardly conducive to the development
of a collective hatred of the enemy which so characterizes
total war.
Further, as mentioned earlier, the objectives of
war were prosaic and limited— usually not requiring an
aroused citizentry, nor an enormous war-chest (which was
actually a chest of currency with which to finance the war).
The situation, to say the least, was ideally suited to-a
code of conduct which allowed for mutual agreement between
belligerents as to time and place of engagement, capitula
tion terms, etc. War was a limited affair.
Limited war since 1945, on the other hand, although
characterized by implicit if not explicit concessions by
parties to the conflict, has been characterized by decidedly
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70
more deadlines. But first, just a word about mutual con
cessions . Recall that the United Nations command in Korea
conceded communist forces a "privileged sanctuary" north
of the Yalu and refrained from bombing Chinese mainland
targets. The communists, on the other hand, conceded air
superiority to United Nations over Korea and refrained
from bombing American ports of supply in Korea and airbases
in Japan and Okinawa.^
The reasons for limited war in the post-war era,
however, are not to be deprecated. They are grave and
dangerous. First, and most importantly, limited war has
been a shaky alternative to a precariously maintained avoid
ance of a much-feared total war. In a word, then, it
is a response to aggression, on the part of the great powers
at least, which falls precipitiously short of triggering the
ultimate apocalypse— nuclear war.
Just as importantly, however, when the United States
had the atomic monopoly, there still were considerations
which favored— even dictated— adherence to the concept of
limited war. Reference is made here to Forrestal's comment
Osgood, op. cit., p. 125.
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71
on the inapplicability of atomic monopoly to international
crises of the period— an inapplicability born of what
Forrestal termed— the acute awareness of "the limitations
of our military power to deal . . . with the various po
tentially explosive areas over the world.
Further, given the ideological struggle between the
two great nuclear powers which has (to use the cliché)
divided the world into two hostile camps, the incidence of
smaller "brush-fire wars" which have threatened the peace
of the whole world, have been frequent— and, seemingly, in
evitable. America's response to date has been in conson
ance with the imperatives of limited war— that is, has
sought to limit the application of means to those minimally
suited to achieve specified limited objectives. The strat
egy is called; meeting limited aggression with limited
means. The rationale is: containment of communist aggres-
Containment. By containment is meant the attempt
to contain the spread of communist influence in the world—
a widening of influence which is perceived to be perpetrated
James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries (New
York: Viking Press, 1951, p. 374.
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72
by Russia in the guise of so-called "peoples' wars," "wars
of liberation," and so forth.
The concept of containment was first stated implicit
ly by President Truman. The occasion was the announcement
of the Truman Doctrine and the Greek-Turkish Aid Program in
March, 1947. He pleaded movingly to a joint session of
Congress in his now-famous speech of March 12, 1947 for aid
to Greece and Turkey to curb communist aggression— to help
"free peoples. . . . maintain their free institutions and
their national integrity against aggressive movements that
seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.
The strategy was later given its definitive ex
position by George F. Kennan in his famous article (written
under the pseudonym, Mr. X) titled, "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct" (published in the July, 1947 issue of Foreign
Affairs magazine). The overriding objective of contain
ment, he asserted, is to keep the Soviet sphere of control
Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, March
12, 1947. Public Papers of the Presidents— Harry S. Truman,
1947. (Washington: United States Government Printing Of
fice, 1963) p. 178.
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73
from expanding beyond its post-war boundaries by building
local situations of strength and by demonstrating a capa
city to meet force with counter force.
The strategy of containment as elaborated by Kennan
is based on the assumption, as he stated it, that communism
"is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is
permitted to move, toward a given goal.
The rationale of the strategy as an imperative of
limited war is variously related to the argument that had
Britain and France been willing to fight limited wars in
the 1930's— i.e., in response to Hitler's reoccupation of
the Rhineland— the global holocaust of World War II could
have been avoided. The reasoning, rightly or wrongly, is
that Hitler's early unchecked aggressions were part of a
grand design for world conquest and that today's little
clashes "... from Cyprus to Guatemala, from Indo-China
to Algeria, from Suez to Kenya, are but parts of a strategy
X (George F. Kennan, Anonymous) "The Sources of
Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs— ^ American Quarterly
Review. Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1947, New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, Inc, p. 581.
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74
calculated to exploit the weakness of the free nations in
conventional ground forces, without offering any targets
for the new superweap
to use superseapons.
The new imperatives. Understandably, adherence to
a policy of limited war and containment at a time when
America is in possession of an arsenal of superweapons
which are veritably capable of extinguishing any foe pre
sents several new imperatives. First, given the under
standing that the nation's major foe also has a similar
capacity for destruction, it becomes apparent that the
first imperative is to avoid a total war which is likely
to incur the risks of nuclear war.
Accruing to this fundamental imperative of avoiding
total war, while still seeking to curtail the spread of
communism by responding to local conflicts with limited but
effective means, are several other concommitant— but no less
complex— imperatives. Among these is the necessity to re
vise the nation's traditional war ideology regarding the
^^Frederick Martin Stern, The Citizen Army— Key to
Defense in the Atomic Age (New York; St. Martin's Press,
1957) , p. 25.
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75
notion of total destruction and unconditional surrender
of the enemy. Another concerns the nation's traditional
impatience with war— that is, the pursuit of ending the
war as quickly as possible by any and all means available.
Further, if the record of recent limited warfare is any
indication, it seems imperative also that the traditional
idea of "victory" be re-examined; for the lesson of limited
wars is that they are likely to yield "peace without vic
tory. " The point is this; in the equation of containment—
avoidance of total war— and curbing aggression, "victory"
takes on a meaning which is significantly different from
that of the World War II era.
Ranking high in importance among the new imperatives
is the requirement for patience and perseverance on the
part of Americans when they are engaged in limited war
against communist foes. The truth of this statement can be
best understood in the context of an analysis of the psycho
logical orientation and resultant strategies of the com
munists. Reference is made here, especially, to the re
puted persistence and patience of communists in the pur
suit of their strategic goals. The ability to accept
momentary set-backs and the absence of any apparent psycho
logical time-table seem to be endemic to their ideological
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76
orientation in their struggle against capitalist forces.
Armed with the belief that capitalist societies contain the
seeds of their own destruction, coupled with a belief in the
invincibility and inevitable triumph of world communism,the
Kremlin, as Kennan noted, "is under no ideological compul
sion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Considering
that, traditionally, patience has not been a distinguishing
characteristic of the American way in war, the importance
of this imperative can not be overemphasized, especially,
if the communists are counting on American impatience to
lead to an American abandonment of the struggle. It appears
unlikely that the communists would hope for an impatient
American response which would be characterized by the em
ployment of unlimited means (i.e., superweapons) to end the
struggle as soon as possible. This latter response is,
however, a distinct possibility, and one which is central
to the dilemma that Americans face in this era of limited
war.
III. THE DILEMMA
When America's traditional approach to war is ex
amined and found to be in consonance with an ideology
^Ibid., p. 574.
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77
about war that is deeply ingrained in its citizens; and,
further, found that this traditional approach and ideo
logy are antithetical to the imperatives of limited war,
the new America dilemma becomes apparent. This dilemma is
based, therefore, on the fact that most of the strongest
American traditions in warfare and foreign policy run
counter to the fundamental requirements of a strategy of
limited war.
That such a contradiction, as described above, does
exist is attested to, it is contended, by the befuddled
response on the part of Americans to the limited wars in
which this nation has been involved. Not only have the
nation's citizens at large demonstrated that, in the first
place, they were nearly incapable of understanding the
rationale of limited war, they have further demonstrated
a profound reluctance to acquiesce to the new requirements.
This, it is contended, is manifested in extreme impatience
with governmental policy concerning these wars and the con
stant public debate over such fundamental issues as the
rightness or wrongness of the nation's involvement in a
particular war. In short, the divergence between the state
of public opinion that existed during periods of total war
and that which has existed during periods of limited war
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78
is indeed a meaningful indication of the dilemma that
limited war creates in the American society.
What is more important, it is felt, is the response
to limited war manifested by some of the nation's leading
officials. Their response to limited war has been charac
terized by most of the same ingredients that make up the
public's response. But this is understandably— they, too,
are Americans.
To illustrate the last point, it can be reported
that no less a person— and famous American— than General
Douglas Mac Arthur grappled with this dilemma (according
to some reports, unsuccessfully). It has been charged,
for example, that Mac Arthur, "a soldier to the core . . .
could not understand a 'policeman's' mission, but held
that 'there is no substitute for victory
By "victory" Mac Arthur meant a clear-cut military
victory in the traditional sense of the word, that is, of
destroying the enemy with superior military force and bring
ing the war to a decisive end. As Mac Arthur stated it:
Far East (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958),
p. 497.
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79
"... once war is forced upon us, there is no other al
ternative than to apply every available means to bring it
to™a swift end. War's very object is victory, not pro
longed indecision.Mac Arthur's statement was and is,
this writer contends, a true and accurate expression of the
American war ideology. His conception of "victory" showed
him to be a true exponent of the guiding American ideals
concerning war. But herein also lies the dilemma; for
. . . here the American people faced . . . a
situation in which 'victory' had become at once
too expensive in life, too barren of any visi
ble political result and too likely to invite
much greater catastrophes, to be an acceptable
goal.
The commentary of the foregoing is simply this:
just as the American people at large find, in the main, the
imperatives of limited war morally and emotionally repug
nant, so have some of our best military minds. And what is
also important to recognize in this connection is that Mac
^^The Mac Arthur Hearings, pp. 3615-3516, cited by
Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac Arthur— A Precis
in Limited War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960), p.
145.
^^Walter Millis, Arms and Men— A Study of American
Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956),
p. 336.
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80
Arthur's dismissal by President Truman was not only con
cerned with his alledged insurbordination to civilian au
thority and his alledged political transgressions, but,
more importantly, it was related to the frustrations at
tendant to the dilemma of limited war versus total war
which arose out of the ideological schisms and conflicting
interpretations of purposes between military and civilian
leaders.
Further drawing attention to the relationship be
tween Mac Arthur's attitudinal orientation and that of the
general public's, one writer has summarized that Mac Arthur
reflected the
. . , fundamental American faith that the great
sacrifices of all-out wars were justifiable when
the smaller losses of limited wars were not.
Smacking distinctly of the Puritan doctrine that
pugatory or limited war was an unnecessary and,
indeed, immoral compromise with evil, . .
IV. SUMMARY
The primary objective of this chapter was to in
vestigate the distinctions between limited war and total
war and to relate these differences to the traditional
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81
American war ideology. Considerable attention, also, has
been paid to the question of whether or not the traditional
American war ideology is consistent with the strategy of
limited war.
As an overall statement, it can be reported that
there are various and significant differences between total
war and limited war. Some of the most significant differ
ences may be stated as follows :
1. Total war is characterized by pursuit of swift
and total victory, that is, complete destruction of the
enemy and unconditional surrender— and the use of unlimited
means to achieve these objectives.
2. Limited war is characterized, in the first place,
by the selective restriction of objectives to those that
do not demand the utmost effort of which the nation is
capable. Further, American limited war strategy involves
the attempt to contain the enemy and the spread of his
influence rather than his annihilation or complete sur
render. Thus, instead of a complete and decisive victory,
negotiation and compromise are sought.
This exploratory study revealed that there are cer
tain critical prerequisites peculiar to the conduct of
limited war. These requirements, the author has termed.
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82
"the imperatives" of limited war. Expressed in terms of
what the nation's citizens must understand about limited
war, some of the major imperatives may be stated as follows:
1. Limited war is not fought for the total destruc
tion of the enemy, but to counter or halt his aggressions.
2. The objective is to "contain" the enemy, that
is, the containment of the spread of communism.
3. Limited war is fought in order to avoid or cir
cumvent total war.
4. Limited war against communism requires patience
and perseverance.
5. Limited war requires the willingness to forego
the utilization of some of the destructive power of which
the nation is capable— that is, requires the suppression
of the temptation to use indiscriminately every possible
means to achieve a quick and total victory.
6. Limited war may require the willingness to
accept something less than total victory.
Of particular interest to this present study was
the revelation of the extent to which these imperatives
of limited war run counter to traditional American war
ideology. The divergence is so great, in fact, that
what results is veritably a dilemma which holds threatening
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83
implications for America's capacity to respond to today's
strategic challenges.
One overriding implication of the foregoing set of
imperatives reveals itself. It is this : proceeding from
the premise that the nation's soldiers, too, are products
of the American tradition and ideology, what predispositions
might they be expected to have regarding the imperatives of
limited war? Must they be given a different kind of orien
tation which is in consonance with the new imperatives?
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CHAPTER VI
KOREA— THE LIMITED WAR
The incidents and issues leading to this nation's
involvement in the Korean War are now a matter of history.
Therefore, no attempt has been made here to recount all of
the episodes, battles and campaigns which constituted the
conflict. Rather, what has been attempted may be summarized
as follows :
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to pro
vide a brief report on those salient peculiarities which
distinguishes this war from World War II. This survey was
undertaken with special reference to the question of how
these distinguishing characteristics might relate to the
overall purposes of this present research.
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND
The genesis of the Korean War (1950-1953) must be
traced back at least to the end of World War II. Actually,
it could be traced back to the original Japanese occupa
tion of Korea which dates from 1910. However, for the pur
poses of this study, the date of American military
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85
involvement in Korea is more appropriate.
At the end of World War II Korea had been divided
roughly across the middle, along the thirty-eighth paral
lel. The purpose of this division was to facilitate the
surrender of the Japanese occupation troops. The northern
part of the country was to be liberated and occupied by the
Russians and the southern part of the United States. "This
happened before the Russians had demonstrated that by tem
porary occupation they meant permanent communization.
The Russians set up a totalitarian "People's Republic of
Korea" headed by Kim II Sung, a young Moscow-trained commu
nist. The Western allies brought back the aged Syngman
Rhee who had been forced into exile for his anti-Japanese
and nationalistic activities.
Syngman Rhee who had studied under Woodrow Wilson—
earning his doctoral degree in political science at Prince
ton ^— had carried on his work for Korea independence while
in exile in America. After World War II he returned to
^Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford History of the Ameri
can People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
p. 1065.
Far East (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958),
p. 461.
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86
Korea, which was, indeed, in the throes of a political
vacuum, to continue his work for independence and unifica
tion, During this period he was also active in the U. S.
Military Government of Korea.
The first international effort to unify Korea came
at the Moscow conference of December 1945 at which the
United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom participated,
with China adhering. These discussions and later ones were
stalemated by Soviet attempts to prevent the participation
of certain Korean groups. All other efforts to secure
agreement between Russia and the United States on the uni
fication of Korea failed.^
In elections supervised by the United Nations, Rhee
was elected chairman of the National Assembly on May 10,
1948. A constitution was adopted. Rhee was elected presi
dent on July 20, 1948. The Republic of Korea was inaugu
rated on August 15, 1948, concurrently, on that day the
U. S. military government ended. Leaving behind a 500-man
U. S. military advisory group, the United States completed
the withdrawal of its military occupation forces on June
^"Korea," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1957 éd.. Vol 13.
p. 484.
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complete withdrawal of its troops from North Korea— "aclaim
that the UN Commission was not permitted to verify.
The rest is, indeed, well-known history, what is
significant here is this: there were two distinct govern
ments in Korea— one in the north and one in the south— both
claiming and vying for control of the country.
On June 25, 1950, North Korea launched a full-scale
military attack southward across the thirty-eighth parallel.
At the request of the United States, the United Na
tions Security Council was convened on June 25 (United
States Time) to consider the crisis. With Russia fortu
itously absent (in boycott over the question of United
Nations membership for Nationalist China), the Council de
clared the attack a breach of peace and issued sanctions
against North Korea. Two days later the Security Council
passed a resolution recommending that United Nations members
furnish "... such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
'^Ibid.
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was deemed necessary"^ to repel the attack and restore
peace. Earlier that same day, President Truman had given
orders to American air and naval forces to provide cover
and support for the South Korean forces.
On June 29, President Truman ordered General Mac
Arthur to commit additional military forces— notably
ground forces.
As General Mac Arthur was later to report (and in
the tone which characterized his disagreement with the
Administration's policies):
Thus, step by hesitant step, the United States
went to war against Communism in Asia. I could
not help being amazed at the manner in which this
great decision was being made. With no submission
to Congress, whose duty it is to declare war, and
without even consulting the field commander in
volved, the members of the government agreed to
enter the Korean War. All the risks inherent in
this decision— including the possibility of Chinese
and Russian involvement— applied then just as much
as they applied later.7
The foregoing statement by Mac Arthur was made, of
course, in response to his critics who accused him of
6 .,
Vol. 13, p. 487.
Korean War" Encyclopedia Britannica, 1957 éd..
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 331.
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89
wanting to incur the risks of "the wrong war, at the wrong
time, in the wrong place." His contention was that "...
this was far more than a 'police action,' as President
Truman was to euphemistically characterize it, , . .
II. LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND LIMITED MEANS
Although Korea was this nation's third greatest
foreign war in terms of casualties, cost and duration, it
was nevertheless a limited war. That it yas a limited war
can be measured in terms of its objectives and the means
applied to achieve these objectives. This is not, however,
to say that the objectives or the means were at all times
clear in the minds of those officials charged with running
the war.
In spite of the scope and complexity of this war, it
was undertaken in pursuit of something short of total vic
tory, in the traditional sense of the word, and, further,
it did not incur the use of the nation's super weapons; nor
the employment of its total manpower. As Millis observed,
"... it was strangely unlike any foreign war we had
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90
previously experienced. Officially it was not a 'war' at
all, but a United Nations police operation."® As strange
as it was, however, when war’s criteria are applied, it is
revealed to have, indeed, been a war. The casualty reports,
the "defense budget" and the duration soon rendered the
euphemism as nothing more than euphemism.
As stated earlier, this was the America's third
largest foreign war. In casualties alone, it ranks high
among the nation's wars. There were more than 157,000
American casualties reported— of these there were at least
33,000 battle deaths. Totally, this amounted roughly to
one-third of the total World War I casualties. The war
lasted for nearly three years. In terms of the average
time each individual serviceman spent overseas, in World
War I, five and a half months; in Korea, a little more than
thirteen months.^®
The Korean conflict was perhaps best described by
Military History (New York: Gp. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956),
Maps of Korea (New York: Korean Conflict Research Founda
tion, 1964), p. iii.
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Blanchard, who stated:
It was a limited war; but not a minor one. In
some respects it was the second largest conflict
in which the United States participated in the
twentieth century . . .
Yet, there are those who maintained it was not
a war at all. Congress never declared war on the
North Koreans and Chinese ; and courts have ruled
in a number of cases that it was not a war in a
legal sense. President Truman, . . . called it a
'police action.' Some reporters insist it was not
an American war, but the first United Nations' War.
And so it goes— even on so simple a matter as giv
ing the conflict a name there is controversy.^
III. CONTROVERSY AND PUBLIC OPINION
The fact that there was controversy is, no doubt,
suggested by the foregoing. But the extent and far-reach
ing effects of this controversy are points of major impor
tance to this study.
The surprise. In the first place, all evidence
points to the fact that the Korean War came as a surprise
to the public. It appeared that in the post-war weariness
that followed World War II, no one wanted to contemplate
the possibility of another war. And the term "limited war"
was hardly in currency at the time.
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92
Even those who did foresee the possibility of an
other war did not expect anything so novel as Korea. The
following statement by no less a person than General George
C. Marshall is perhaps characteristic. General Marshall
wrote in 1945:
We can be certain that the next war, if there
is one, will be even more total than this one.
The nature of war is such that once it begins it
can end only as this one is ending, in the de
struction of the vanquished.^
Similiarly, a large segment of the American public,
as late as 1949 (more appropriately stated : as close to
the Korean War as 1949), seemed to doubt the eventuality
of another war. For example, an opinion poll conducted in
August 1949 by the National Opinion Research Center ob
tained the following responses to the question, "Do you
expect the United States to fight in another war within
the next ten years?" The response: forty-four percent
answered "no"; forty-seven per cent answered "yes"; and
^ The War Reports of Generals of the Army George Ç.
Marshall, H. H. Arnold and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
(Philadelphia, 1947), p. 299, cited by Trumbull Higgins,
Korea and the Fall of Mac Arthur— A Precis in Limited War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 4.
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nine percent answered "don't know.
The misunderstanding. Significant also, were the
findings that the Korean War was not understood by the
nation's citizens and officials. As one writer stated the
case; "Perhaps no war in our history has been so fully re
ported and at the same time so little understood as was the
Korean War. " Unlike the Second World War which was per
ceived as a great crusade and therefore regarded as tem
porary in duration and effects, Korea, and its surrounding
effects, was no crusade "... and by that very fact em
bedded its consequences deep in the permanent structure of
our society.
Another indication of the lack of understanding of
the kind of conflict this was is perhaps indicated by the
results of another national opinion poll conducted by the
American Institute of Public Opinion, August 19, 1950. The
question was asked: "Do you think the United States is now
^^Mildred Strunk (ed.), "The Quarter's Poll," Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 1949-50), pp.
725-726.
New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1954), p. 8.
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94
actually in World War III— or do you think the present
fighting in Korea will stop short of another war?" The
responses were:
Fifty-seven percent answered: Now in World
War III.
Twenty-eight percent answered: Will stop
short of war.
Fifteen percent: Had no opinion.
To that date, with the possible exceptions of the
War of 1812 and the Mexican War, the United States had
never fought a more unpopular and controversial war than
the Korean War. "The civilian and military leaders of this
period held strong and frequently conflicting views as to
the purpose of the war and the manner of conducting it.
The American public was bewildered.
The contradiction between reality and predisposition.
— When the administration and Americans in general began to
realize the complexity and novelty of the course of this
war— and the course of world politics in general, frus
tration arose— a frustration which may be attributed to
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the nation's
. , . inability to reconcile this course with
America's traditional image of itself as a bold
and idealistic nation untrammeled by the moral
ambiguities, the restraints and frustrations, of
controlling, balancing, and moderating national
Although America's response was to a clearly un
provoked attack, and although its response enjoyed com
plete United Nations' sanction,— this was not Pearl Harbor.
The American reaction was not one of massive unity and will
to retaliate. There were no impassioned nationalistic ans
wers to its demands. Instead, the response was, rather,
one of bewilderment. It was uncertain, divided and often
unenthusiastic.
The manifestation of the above-described state of
affairs resulted in a dangerous impulse to either win the
Korean War or to pull out of it altogether. In other words,
impatience and frustration generated an "all-or-nothing"
attitude.
^^Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War— The Challenge
to American Strategy (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press,
1957), p. 191.
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96
The strains of this contradictory state of affairs
took many forms. For example, there were demands for with
drawal to "fortress America"; advocacy of "preventive atom
ic war;" bitter attacks on Secretary Acheson; the phenome
non of Mac Carthyism; and astounding national passion at
tending General Mac Arthur's relief from command.
But the cruelest blow of all came when the war
refused even to end properly. Being a perverse
war, it could not just come to a nice, simple,
meaningful conclusion, ^^t had to end "not with
a bang, but a whimper."
IV. FRUSTRATION FOR THE SOLDIER
In attempting to assess the effects of the pecu-
larities of the Korean War on the attitudes of American
servicemen, it was found that all evidence seemed to point
to one dramatic generalization. The following statement,
although not made in reference to this particular war,
summarizes this generalization concisely:
Modern mass armies are characteristic of
the societies from which they are drawn, and
in basic patterns of response, soldiers ex
press the values of their societies as clearly
^^Dille, op. cit., p. 13.
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97
as their civilian compatriots.^^
With regard to Korea, suffice it to say for the
moment that, it was not idle rhetoric or mere coincidence
that prompted General Mac Arthur to use the title "Frustra
tion in Korea, 1950-51for one part (Part Nine) of his
Reminiscences. Of course it must be admitted that any
attempt to cast General Mac Arthur in the role of the
supreme embodiment— or better stated, the collective em
bodiment— of the frustrated American soldier would be
fraught with inadequacies, indeed. The difference in view
from his vantage point and that of the individual soldier
is too obvious to warrant further comment. The fact, how
ever, that he was a soldier makes it imperative to con
sider his attitudes and opinions regarding this war. In
a word, he found this a frustrating war.
Mac Arthur's disagreement with the administration's
war policies and his subsequent dismissal are now a matter
of history. It was, however, interesting to recall one
Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day (New York: George Stewart
Pub., Inc.), p. 143.
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writer's description of Mac Arthur's historical parallel
which reads as follows: Mac Arthur must have felt like
General Winfield Scott in 1846, who said:
I do not desire to place myself in the most
perilous of positions, a fire upon my rear, from
Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexi
cans ,
Another statement which seemed to be of signifi
cance to this present undertaking reads as follows:
If American civilians were inclined to op
pose limited war because of their temperament
and tradition, the attitude of the soldiers , . .
tended to be hostile to the Korean War on purely
military grounds.
Regarding the foregoing statement, it must be re
ported that, were it not also true that there were a num
ber of other pressures acting upon the soldiers, aside
from purely military matters, it could be accepted as en
tirely accurate. But such was not the case. There were,
for example, emotional problems which accrued to the new
(1) induction and assignment policies, (2) rotation poli
cies, (3) compact age distribution, and (4) the use of
1943), pp. 198-200, cited by Trumbull Higgins, Korea and
the Fall of Mac Arthur— A Precis in Limited War (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1960), p. 32.
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99
native Korean troops as "fillers" in American platoons.
Although the scope of this present study precludes
any detailed discussion of the problems referred to above,
just a few remarks about them, however, would appear pro
fitable to make. For example, on the subject of "compact
age distribution" there were several effects reported that
appeared germane to this study.
It was reported that due to the fact that quotas
were filled primarily with men who were recent high school
graduates, rather than from an age-diversified manpower
pool, the soldier pupulation was relatively youthful. This
relative youth of the soldier population resulted in a
homogeneity of attitude and behavior which might have dif
fered if each platoon had included an age distribution
comparable to World War II combat units. The emergence
during the period of such terms as "bug out" were probably
a reflection of a subculture of late adolescence. Also,
the norm of minimizing personal risk, similarly, might
have been an analogue of "playing it cool
,.27
mance," The New Military— Changing Patterns of Organization,
ed. Morris Janowitz (New York: Russell Sage Foundation),
pp. 195-223.
^^Ibid., p. 220.
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100
Because this was a war in which America's manpower
resources far exceeded the requirements of the war, it
appeared only fair that those soldiers who were exposed to
the hazards of combat should be rotated periodically in
order to fairly distribute these risks. Therefore, as
Millis termed it, "A nine-month 'rotation period' was es
tablished as a rough measure of justice in a war in which
only a few at a time could be used in combat service."^®
Similar conclusions, in this connection, were also sug
gested by Roger Little in his study, that is, that "In
the absence of explicit national goals--for example, 'vic
tory ' in World War II— such a rotation policy was probably
essential,"
In short, the rotation procedure was an attempt to
solve some of the emotional problems which limited war pre
sented "to a technical age in which the old solutions of
small, long-service, professional and volunteer armies
were no longer viable.
^®Millis, op.
' p.
329
^^Little, op. cit.
^°Millis, op. cit. ,
, p.
330
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101
It was noted that the orientation theme "confidence
in our allies," a theme which had figured prominently in
the United States Army's film orientation program in World
War II, again received similiar emphasis during the Korean
War— applying equally to the South Koreans as well as to
the other United Nations' allies. The author wondered if
this interest had any special relationship to the fact that
native Korean troops were used as "fillers." There is suf
ficient evidence to suggest that the use of native "fillers"
did present a novel aspect to the problem of social cohes
ion among American soldiers. It happens, also, that there
is much evidence to support the contention that American
soldiers held the "integrity and fighting ability" of their
Korean allies as suspect. For example, the following state
ment attributed to General Mac Arthur gives credence to
this contention: "The South Korean forces are in confusion,
have not seriously fought, and lack leadership .... As
a result they have either lost or abandoned their supplies
and heavier equipment .
m31
^^The Mac Arthur Hearings, p. 1012, cited by Higgins,
pp. cit., p. 26.
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102
Although, the foregoing statement was made in ref
erence to his observations made on his initial reconnais
sance of the front lines in Korea (June 30, 1950) similar
statements are oft-quoted by American veterans of the
Korean War. Whether this situation remained throughout
the war or not is not so important as the fact that this
was the mental picture that American soldiers retained.
Still in the emotional and attitudinal sphere, it
must be reported that American soldiers suffered the con
stant feeling that they were not being supported by the
American people or the administration. It was probably
a bit too much to ask them to realize that their suspicions
of the administration probably grew out of the administra
tion's desire to limit this war.
Then there were the men who had been drafted or
called unwillingly back from the reserves and the National
Guard. Those from the reserves and National Guard, par
ticularly those who had served in World War II, felt that
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103
the call to service in Korea was a form of "double jeo
pardy,
Variously, also, the charge has been raised that
American troops lacked sufficient psychological precon
ditioning for duty in the Korean War. One version of such
a charge was made in a report to the House Committee on
Un-American Activities in which it was stated, in connec
tion with an investigation on communist "brainwashing" and
American "turn-coats," that the Communists were able to
impose their version of American action in Korea because
the American forces on the whole lacked any other infor
mation about American policy towards communism.
Such charges concerning American "turn-coats"
understandably, have been received with consternation and
bewilderment by the American people. It does not help, as
one writer has stated it, that "These numbers (reportedly,
twenty-one out of more than 7,000 American prisoners of
war) . . . fade into insignificance compared with the
Warfare— Brainwashing, 85th Cong., consultation with Edward
Hunter, March 13, 1958, p. 17.
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104
thousands who have defected from East to West. " All
that mattered was that this was the first time American
prisoners of war had refused to return home.
Finally, it must be stated that the observations and
opinions are many and varied regarding the question of
whether or not there was, and to what extent was the frus
tration endured by American servicemen in Korea. It can,
however, be said with certainty that this war produced no
parallel to the World War I ditty: "We won't be back till
it's over over there 1"
V. SUMMARY
In summary, despite some evidence to the contrary,
it can be reported that the Korean War was a limited war.
When the criteria of limited objectives and limited means
are applied, the limited character of the Korean War stands
out above all other characteristics.
Because it was a conflict containing all the new
imperatives of limited war, it created enormous controversy
and bewilderment among the American people and their govern
ment. The internal confusion on the part of the citizens
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105
and the government can be attributed to what has been
termed the "contradiction between reality and predisposi
tion"— that is, the contradiction between the psycholo
gical requirements of limited war and the traditional
American war ideology.
Of particular relevance to this present study was
the evidence which suggested the deleterious effects of
the limited war character of the Korean War on the attitude
of American soldiers. In a word, it can be reported that
they, too, shared the frustrations of their civilian com
patriots— frustrations attributable to Korea, the limited
Warfare (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962),
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CHAPTER VII
RATIONALE OF MILITARY ORIENTATION FILMS
In Chapter.I of the present study, the author at
tempted to draw attention to the important role that film
has played in military orientation programs. Particular
attention was given to the United States Army film orienta
tion program of World War II which occasioned the produc
tion of the famous "Why We Fight" series of films. It
was pointed out that the "Why We Fight" films were de
signed specifically for the purpose of influencing the
attitudes of soldiers toward a willingness to serve and
fight. In other words, they were "motivational" films.
Further, it was stated that these films were designed to
achieve six orientation sub-objectives which theoretically
would facilitate the accomplishment of the main objective
of increasing motivation.
Also in Chapter I, it was stated that Hovland, and
others,^ had cited several hypotheses regarding the failure
Sheffield, Experiments on Mass Communication, Vol. Ill of
Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (4 vols.;
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107
of these films to achieve the main orientation objective
of increasing soldiers' motivation to serve in the Armed
Forces. Two of these hypotheses were:
1. previous civilian indoctrination had already
achieved near maximum effect in molding the soldiers' opin
ions in accordance with the objectives set for the orienta
tion films; and
2. the soldiers were motivated in directions con
flicting with the orientation content.
A close examination of these two hypotheses will re
veal that they are directly related to attitudinal precon
ditioning attributable to the pre-military life of the
soldiers— that is, attributable to the values and ideals
of the larger civilian society. The first hypothesis sug
gests that no change in attitude could be expected on film
themes that were already in consonance with civilian opin
ions or ideals regarding war in general and this war in
particular. The second hypothesis suggests that some items
of film content were contradictory to civilian-held opin
ions and ideals.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
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108
One of the main purposes of this present study, as
was the purpose of one previous study by Gallez,^ was to
investigate the validity of these two hypotheses— not as to
whether they are valid or invalid reasons for the failure
of the films to achieve their objectives, but rather, to
test them solely in relation to the film content. In short,
the question to be answered was: were the thematic con
tents of the films in consonance or in conflict with Ameri
can public opinion and traditional war ideology?
The other purpose of this study was to extend this
investigation to include the films of the limited war era—
the emphasis being given to the orientation films of the
Korean War period.
The first step in this investigation involved ef
forts to reconstruct the rationale of the World War II
film orientation program and relate this rationale to, what
has been termed, the traditional American war ideology; then
to investigate the new imperatives of limited war, and com
pare these with the traditional American war ideology, and
Rationale of United States Military Film Propaganda in World
War II" (unpublished Master's thesis. University of South
ern California, Los Angeles, 1957)
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109
to construct a hypothesized rationale of orientation films
for limited war. Finally, an attempt has been made to
formulate a set of criteria for evaluating selected films
to determine, first if they were or were not in consonance
with American war ideology, and, second, to determine if
the films were in consonance with the attitudes and events
prevailing at a given time in American history. As stated
earlier, the two periods under consideration were the
World War II period, representing the prototype of total
war, and the Korean War period, representing limited war.
The author's efforts in this present chapter, there
fore, are in pursuit of the objectives described in the
preceeding paragraph.
I. RATIONALE OF WORLD WAR II
ORIENTATION FILMS
Fortunately, as stated in Chapter I, the World War
II film orientation program has been well-documented by
several very capable researchers and writers. Therefore,
the list of orientation objectives was readily available—
thus, eliminating speculation on the part of the present
writer. As stated by Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield
(all members of the original research organization
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110
responsible for the conduct and analysis of this experi
mental film program) , the objectives were to foster :
1. A firm belief in the right of the cause for
which we fight.
2. A realization that we are up against a tough
job.
3. A determined confidence in our ability and the
abilities of our comrades and leaders to do the job that
has to be done.
4. A feeling of confidence, insofar as is possible
under the circumstances, in the integrity and fighting
ability of our Allies.
5. A resentment, based on knowledge of the facts,
against our enemies who have made it necessary for us to
fight.
6. A belief that through military victory, the
political achievement of a better world order is possi
ble. 3
Essentially, the style of the films was objective
and documentary, with heavy emphasis on direct quotations.
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I l l
references to official sources, and "clips" from domestic
and foreign newsreels. Although the general tenor of the
films was "the facts speak for themselves" they could not
be considered dryly factual. In fact, it is apparent that
every effort was made to achieve films of the highest cine
matic quality.
What is important to note here is the fact that the
rationale underlying this orientation program and, thus,
the production of these films was based on the following
assumptions ;
1. That a sizable segment of the draftee
population lacked knowledge concerning the
national and international events that resulted
in America's entrance in the war.
2. That a knowledge of these events would
in some measure lead men to accept more willingly
the transformation from civilian to Army life and
their duties as soldiers."'^
II. CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS
In the original evaluative studies done on the
"Why We Fight" films, the criteria for testing the intended
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112
effects of the films were derived from the stated objectives
of the films y the criteria for testing the material covered
(or thematic content) were derived from content analyses of
Ira coverage
In a similar manner, this present investigator for
the purposes of this study has chosen to utilize the stated
objectives as a basis for content analysis— but with the
following modifications in procedures :
1. First, the six stated sub-objectives have been
utilized as criteria for content analysis— that is, to de
termine if a particular film contained thematic material in
support of these objectives. (Note: Although not each
film was designed specifically to contain all of these in
dividual objectives; none of these films were to run counter
to any of these objectives; therefore, in a sense each film
had these objectives in view.^ As will be discussed later,
the basis for selection of a representative World War II
film, centered on the choice of one which seemed most likely
to contain thematic content related to all of the objec
tives . )
°Ibid., p. 24.
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113
2. Trained observers have been utilized to analyze
the selected films as to thematic content.
3. The trained observers have endeavored not only
to identify the thematic content but also to indicate the
relative emphasis given to the themes (according to their
individual perception.)
4. Observer-responses have been collated and com
pared as data for this investigation.
It should be noted, also, that added to these six
original objectives was one which has been formulated by
the present writer for the purpose of endeavoring to ob
tain the most clear-cut indication possible regarding the
question of whether or not a particular film expressed
the total war ideology. It reads as follows : "Our mission
is to 'wipe out' the enemy and his ideology . . . i.e., to
rid the world of the menace."
Figure 1 on the following page depicts the total
war portion of the questionnaire form used by the ob
servers to record their responses. The instructions given
to the observers are shown at the top of the questionnaire
form. These instructions were standard throughout the
observer analysis process.
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Questionnaire (An excerpt)
Instructions: This is an exercise in content analysis.
Please indicate with a check mark in the space provided
if you detected any of the themes listed below. If you
are uncertain, do not make any check mark. Also indi
cate the relative intensity of treatment of the theme
. , , rate the intensity on a ten point scale, that is,
1 = WEAK 5 = MEDIUM 10= STRONG
****** *** ***** ***** *************************************
We are fighting for a righteous cause.
Yes () No ( ) 123456789 10
We face a tough job.
Yes () No ( ) 123 456789 10
We can do the job which has to be done.
Yes () No ( ) 1234 5678 9 10
We have confidence in the integrity and fighting abil
ity of our allies.
Yes ( ) No ( ) 1234 5678 9 10
Resentment of the enemy— a resentment based on facts as
presented in the film.
Yes () No ( ) 1 2 3456789 10
Through military victory, the political achievement of
a better world order is possible.
Yes ( ) No ( ) 1234 5678 9 10
14, Our mission is to "wipe out" the enemy and his ideo
logy , , , that is, to rid the world of the menace.
Yes () No ( ) 12 34 56789 10
Figure 1, Questions Related to Total War
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III. RATIONALE OF LIMITED WAR
ORIENTATION FILMS
Unfortunately, the Korean War did not occasion the
establishment of a parallel to the World War II film orien
tation program. This investigator's efforts to discover
whether or not such a program existed led, finally, to
direct correspondence with the Department of Defense (Direc
torate for Armed Forces Information and Education.) In a
letter of reply received from the Chief of the Motion Pic
ture Division of the Directorate, the following state
ment was made :
I found no evidence that any studies were con
ducted by our Research Division in those days on
the effectiveness of our media as related to the
Korean War.^
The task that fell to this writer, therefore, was
the construction of an after-the-fact rationale, and a set
of analysis criteria for limited war films— a task which
appeared feasible in light of the availability of certain
Letter from Paul J. Murdock, Chief, Motion Picture
Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 29,
1967.
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116
literature on limited war in general and the Korean War in
particular. Of material assistance in this task also was
the receipt of several so-called "Fact Sheets" (again,
from the Defense Department), published by the Armed Forces
Information and Education Division during the Korean War.
These "Fact Sheets,"® actually pamphlets, were published
for the use of Commanding Officers to assist them in their
troop information programs. Their value to this study
evolved out of the fact that their contents expressed the
then-current official thinking on orientation matters.
On the subject of a rationale for film orientation
during the Korean War, it can be reported that the findings
discussed in the preceding chapters (Chapter IV - American
War Ideology, Chapter V - Limited War Versus Total War, and
(a) Fact Sheet No. JL, "Why We Fight" (U. S. Govern
ment printing Office : published by the Armed Forces Infor
mation and Education Division, OSD, August 4, 1950).
(b) Fact Sheet No. 4. "What Next in Korea" ( U. S.
Government Printing Office: published by the Office of
Armed Forces Information and Education, DD., June 1953).
(c) Fact Sheet No. j6. "Our Unfinished Business"
(U. S. Government Printing Office; published by the Office
of Armed Forces Information and Education, D. D., Sept.,
1953) .
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117
Chapter VI - Korea— The Limited War), along with the infor
mation discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this sec
tion, suggested the rationale and analysis criteria dis
cussed in the remainder of this present section.
First, it was clearly evident that the orientation
approach used in other media was based (just as in World
War II) on the assumption that efforts to increase the
servicemen's factual knowledge would result in increased
motivation to serve in the Armed Forces. The following
excerpt from the Fact Sheet "Why We Fight" will illustrate
this point;
Servicemen and women must be motivated :
they must have a deep sense of personal mis
sion based upon the conviction that the cause for
which they fight is a just cause. KNOWLEDGE OF
THE FACTS— AND OF WHAT THE PACTS MEAN— WILL GIVE
’ THEM THAT SENSE OF MISSION.
Further evidence of this reliance on the factual
approach is succinctly presented in the following excerpt
from a section of Fact Sheet No. 1 (the section titled
"Note to Commanding Officers"):
. . . An information program in the Armed
Forces is nothing more or less than the dis
semination of facts to Service personnel in
zations were used in the original text.)
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order to build mental fitness for combat. It
is not necessary to 'propagandize' our men and
women. We do not. Facts alone, effectively
presented . . . are sufficient to achieve . . .
that mental fitness which reflects itself in
eagerness for training, desire to achieve effi
ciency at arms, and determination to use that
efficiency in the destruction of a personal enemy.
This investigator's analysis of the content of the
above-mentioned "Fact Sheets" revealed that many of the
themes treated were essentially identical to those em
phasized during World War II. Notably, there were such
themes as : (1) the righteous cause, (2) destruction of
the enemy, (3) resentment of the enemy, (4) facing a tough
job, (5) capability to do the job, (6) through military
victory, the political achievement of a better world order
is possible, and (7) confidence in the integrity of Allies.
There were also several themes which fell into what
this investigator has termed, limited war themes. They
were :
1. This fight (or war) is likely not to be the
last confrontation with the communist enemy. (This theme
was suggested by the statement : "We must . . . recognize
^^Ibid. , Fact Sheet No. 1^, p. 14 (Note: The under
lined in the above quotation appeared in italics in the
original text.)
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119
the possibility that armed agression may take place in
other areas")
2. Stop aggression now and avoid total war later.
3. Fight to uphold the integrity of the United
Nations.
Interestingly, it was found that little or no con
cise treatment was given to the concept of "containment"
or to, what has been termed, the new imperatives of limited
war, that is, as a new American strategy. References to
these matters were vague at best. Certainly, there was
nothing so pointed as President Johnson's statement (para
phrasing from the Bible) made in reference to the Vietnam
Conflict: Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.
There was also little thematic material to suggest directly
and clearly that the aim was not ultimately to destroy the
enemy, or more accurately stated : there seemed to have
been too little attention paid to clarifying the distinc
tions between total war and limited war.
^^Ibid., p. 1.
in Southeast Asia," Department of State Bulletin, LII, A
speech made at John Hopkins University, April 26, 1965,
pp. 606-610.
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120
Although the foregoing comments regarding orienta
tion objectives and thematic content were evolved from
orientation media other than film, the implications for
analysis of films of the era are apparent.
IV. CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS OF LIMITED
WAR FILMS
From the sources discussed in the preceding sec
tion of this chapter and from the information reported in
Chapter V, (Total War Versus Limited War) a set of hypo
thesized criteria has been developed by the author for
analyzing orientation films of the limited war era. It
should be noted that the term "Hypothesized criteria" is
used because the criteria were actually formulated prior
to viewing the films selected for analysis. The object of
this procedure was (1) to formulate orientation objectives
which were based on the new imperatives of limited war— as
culled from the best current thinking on the subject, and
(2) to cross-reference these objectives to the American
traditional war ideology. It was considered essential that
this selection procedure not be influenced by prior screen
ing of the selected films.
The themes selected, therefore, became the criteria
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121
for analysis. Figure 2 on the following page depicts the
limited war portions of the questionnaire used by the train
ed observers.
In addition to the analysis procedure just described,
it should be noted, also, that, as stated in Chapter III
(Section III, Content Analysis), yet another analysis pro
cedure was employed. This latter procedure involved a more
detailed analysis of certain film scripts. In fact, this
procedure involved a "shot" analysis of both the verbal
and visual components of two films selected for subjection
to this method of content analysis.
Utilizing this latter method, the author, while
viewing the films with a "start-stop" projector coded in
dividual "shots" according to predetermined analysis cri
teria. The criteria used, except for some more detailed
elaborations, conformed to the analysis criteria reported
earlier in this present chapter. The object of this pro
cedure was to determine the frequency of appearance of
certain themes. The results of this analysis were then
subjected to review by other analysts for the purpose of
verifying or correcting the author's findings.
The two films chosen for analysis by this method
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Questionnaire (An excerpt)
7. We do not fight for the total destruction of the
enemy (that is, his unconditional surrender), hut
to counter his aggressions.
Yes ( ) No ( ) 123 4567 8 9 10
8. Our job is to "contain" the enemy, that is, our mis
sion is the "containment" of the spread of communism
(NOTE: remember the concept of containment).
Yes () No() 123456 789 10
9. This fight (or war) is likely not to be the last con
frontation with the communist enemy.
Yes () No ( ) 1 2 3456789 10
10. We will meet force with counterforce.
Yes () No() 1234567 89 10
11. We fight to stop aggression now in order to avoid
total war later.
Yes () No ( ) 123 456789
12. We fight to uphold the integrity of the United Nations
Yes () No ( ) 123456 789 10
13. We are fighting a "limited action" or "police action."
Yes () No() 123456 789 10
15. Compared to our other wars, this one requires a new
(extra) measure of patience and perseverance because
of the insidious and patient ideology of the enemy.
NOTE: Was the concept of "limited war" (as we discussed it
in class) mentioned or referred to in this film?
Yes () No ( ) 123 4567 8 9 10
If so, how was it treated? (Circle one of the descriptions
below or describe in own words): (a) with candor (b) de
ceptively (c) Indirectly, but with no apparent attempt to
deceive (d) In rhetorical generalities (è) other . . .
Figure 2. Questions Related to Limited War
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123
were "Why Korea" and "The Crime of Korea." The considera
tion underlying the selection of these two films was re
lated to the fact that the Korean War period was the period
of major emphasis in this present study; and therefore,
more detailed analyses of the films of this period seemed
warranted.
V. THE SELECTION OF FILMS FOR ANALYSIS
Because it was decided that the films of the Korean
War era should not be considered and analyzed in a his
torical vacuum, so to speak, films of the World War II era
and films of the post-Korean War era (for example, of the
Vietnam Conflict), also, were considered.
It was decided, also, that an attempt be made to
select films from the three eras which seemed to have been
addressed most clearly to the question, "Why We Fight"--the
rationale being that these would be the films most suited
for the revelation of fundamental ideological trends. It
was further assumed that these films would most likely pro
vide the clearest exposition of the external (that is,
political causes) as well as the intrinsic (ideological)
determinants contributing to the nation's involvement in
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124
Pursuant to the above-stated criteria, and those
cited in Chapter III, the following films were selected as
the primary ones for analysis:
1. "Prelude to War"
2. "Why Korea"
3. "Why Vietnam"
In addition to the above-listed films, two other
films of the Korean War period were studied. These were :
1. "Crime of Korea"
2. "Youth Wants to Know" subtitled: "Korea and
Communism in the Pacific"
The reasons for the selection of these latter two
films were as follows : In the case of "Youth Wants to
Know," which was actually a kinescope of a popular audience-
participation television program of the era on which young
people asked distinguished panelists questions on current
events, it was felt that this film would provide examples
of some of the questions about Korea that plagued Ameri
cans. Apparently, the military adapted this film (kine
scope) for information and orientation purposes for similar
reasons.
The film, "The Crime of Korea" seemed to hold the
prospect of providing official reasons for "why the enemy
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125
should be hated." The importance of this element in the
effort to create the motivation to fight is, indeed, ap
parent .
VI. SUMMARY
The guiding consideration in this chapter has been
concerned with the author's desire to coalesce all of the
various preparatory elements leading to the actual analysis
of the films selected for study. It was felt that such an
effort was indispensable at this point in this study in
view of the variety of subjects constituting the prelimi
naries to the main task.
Without endeavoring to recount all that has gone
before, it would appear profitable, however, to reiterate
several of the main points covered in this chapter. The
first among these points concerns the rationale of mili
tary orientation programs. In this connection the follow
ing must be reported :
It was found that the overriding consideration in
volved in the conduct and organization of military orienta
tion programs springs from two basic assumptions. These
assumptions are:
1. That a large number of draftees will lack
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126
knowledge concerning the national and international events
resulting in America's participation in war.
2. That a knowledge of these events will increase
motivation and willingness to serve in the Armed Forces.
The Armed Forces' orientation programs, therefore, have
been characterized by a heavy reliance on a so-called fac
tual ("let the facts speak for themselves") approach to
persuasion.
Regarding the subject of criteria for content analy
sis, it was found that the orientation objectives formu
lated during World War II appeared suitable, in the main,
for analysis undertaken for the discovery of traditional
orientation themes (and those considered appropriate for
periods of total war). Criteria for analysis of limited
war films, however, presented a problem— a problem which
appears to have been solved by the approach suggested in
this study. The problem was that there were no already-
formulated criteria like those which were systematically
applied in the experimental film orientation program of
World War II. The approach taken to this problem by this
investigator involved the formulation of analysis criteria
based on significant indicators taken or deduced from per
tinent literature on limited war (particularly about the
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127
Korean War) and from existing orientation media other than
film.
The films selected for analysis in this study were
those which seemed to conform essentially to two main cri
teria : (1) being addressed to the question, "Why we fight,"
and (2) having been produced during the three main periods
under study, that is, during World War II, the Korean War,
and during the current Vietnam War.
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CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is devoted to reporting the results of
evaluation and analysis. Mindful of the dictum, however,
that the evaluation of any communication must involve con
sideration of the audience, the situation, the stimulus
material (or message) , and so on, it seems mandatory, there
fore, to provide some preliminary information regarding the
audience (in this case, trained observers), some additional
information about the films and scripts, et cetera.
The Audience. Except for several cases where lar
ger or more heterogeneous audiences were used for the pur
pose of comparison, the results reported herein were com
puted from the responses of the trained observers. As
reported in Chapter III, the trained observers were all
participants in a semester-lone graduate seminar (Seminar
in the Propaganda Film) conducted at the University of
Southern California during the period February through
June 1967.
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129
An average number of fourteen trained observers par
ticipated in the analysis of each film. The composition of
this group was roughly as follows (averaged):
1. seven civilians
- • 2. seven military servicemen
The civilian group was comprised of graduate stu
dents (majoring in either cinema, drama, or education-in
structional technology.) The military group consisted of
Navy, Marine Corps and Airforce non-commissioned officers,
and one Naval Commissioned-Officer (Lieutenant). Among
the military group two were college graduates (one of these
was pursuing a Masters degree in cinema), the others were
participants in a special one-year course (non-degree) for
Naval cinematographers. Although the author's responses
were not recorded among this group of trained observers,
his status should be recorded as "Army officer (Major) , pur
suing a post-graduate degree in Communications (cinema)."
The average age of the civilian group was twenty-
six. The average of the military group was thirty.
The stimulus materials (films and Scripts). It
should be noted that the trained observer group was not
provided with the scripts of the films. Their job was to
record their responses to the questionnaire items after
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130
only one viewing. (The author's reasoning here being that
the films were made for a target audience that would prob
ably see the films but once and without benefit of prior
acquaintenance with the scripts).
Those persons, however, who assisted the author in
his detailed content analysis were provided with scripts.
These assistants, who were selected from the large group
of trained observers, have been designated "review-analy-
sts" for the purposes of this study.
A further word about the films and scripts seems
to be in order here. It should be noted that all of the
films used in this study except one ("Why Vietnam") were
no longer in current circulation. The copies viewed were
"record copies" provided by the Motion Picture Branch of
the Directorate of Armed Forces Information and Education
(Department of Defense.) A similar situation was en^
countered in the search for the original scripts. To illu
strate: the scripts for "Prelude to War" and "The Crime
of Korea" were obtained from the United States Army Pic
torial Center (Long Island City, New York). The script of
"Why Vietnam" was obtained from the Motion Picture Branch
of the Directorate for Armed Forces Information and Educa
tion (Washington, D. C.). Efforts to procure the script.
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131
"Why Korea" led finally to correspondence with Twentieth
Century Fox Studios in Hollywood— unfortunately no script
was available (see letter of response from Twentieth
Century Fox in Appendix J). Such was the case also with
"Korea and Communism in the Pacific." It was necessary,
therefore, that these latter two scripts be transcribed
from the sound tracks of the films. (Copies of all the
scripts referred to have been included in the appendices
to this study.)
II. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF
"PRELUDE TO WAR"
Percentage of "yes" replies. The results of the
analysis are recorded in Figure 3. Examination of this
data will reveal that:
1. All six of the traditional war themes were
treated in this film.
2. The "righteous cause", "the tough job" themes
received one-hundred per cent "yes" responses from the
audience of trained observers, thus suggesting both pre
valence and emphasis of these themes in the film.
3. The theme, "Our mission is to 'wipe out' the
enemy ..." also received a high percentage of "yes"
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630.
1-T
I I
18.7 18.7
I I
I I
I I V'
II I
: 1
P S Î H o Pn f ï i
TRADITIONAL & TOTAL WAR
LIMITED WAR
Figure 3. Percentage of "yes" replies to "Prelude to War"
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133
replies. This theme, it should be recalled was formulated
by the author to solicit the clearest possible answer to
the question of whether or not a particular film expressed
pro total war sentiments. The ninety-three point seven
per cent "yes" replies, therefore, would suggest that "pre
lude to War" was indeed a total war film.
The results of the application of limited war cri
teria to "Prelude to War" (also recorded in Figure 3) re
vealed the following:
1. All, except one theme, received, expectedly,
a very low percentage of "yes" responses--indicating the
absence of limited war content.
2. The one exception referred to above was the
theme "we will meet force with counter force." An explana
tion for this seeming inconsistency, however, was ob
tained in interviews with respondents after the results
had been compiled. First, the theme was sufficiently
ambiguous to solicit "yes" responses with both total and
limited war films. Secondly, the respondents did not
understand the subtle difference between the two possible
meanings of this theme. For example, the limited war
meaning of counterforce, connotes the application of only
such counterforce as is solicited by the enemy's use of
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134
force. It connotes a desire to restrict the use of total
possible force to the minimum amount appropriate to the
enemy's threat. Whereas in the total war context it im
plies "whatever force the enemy can muster, we can muster."
It further implies the willingness and intent to use maxi
mum, unrestricted force to bring the war to a quick and
decisive end.
3. The theme, "We do not fight for the total de
struction of the enemy," received a significantly small
number of "yes" replies, but the fact that this clearly-
stated limited war theme received any "yes" responses was
surprising. One explanation which may be offered suggests
the influence of prior knowledge of the outcome of World
War II--more pointedly stated— the very existence of today's
Germany and Japan as viable and prosperous nations in the
community of nations is sufficient proof that America and
the allies did not intend to destroy them, therefore, they
still exist. This explanation regarding prior knowledge
is further supported by the fact that these "yes" responses
were made in spite of the fact that both in the prologue and
in the conclusion of "Prelude to War" it was clearly stated
that the aim was to destroy the enemy.
This internal contradiction on the part of the
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135
viewers is further evidenced by their high percentage of
"yes" replies to the pointed question (number fourteen),
"... our mission . . . to 'wipe out' the enemy." The
contradiction is apparent,
4. The theme, "... extra patience and perse
verance . . .," was another theme that could be interpreted
quite honestly in two ways in spite of the author's inten
tion that it be interpreted only in the limited war con
text. It must be admitted, therefore, that the thematic
content of the film which treated the pervasity and power
of Nazism, for example, could certainly suggest the require
ment of patience to achieve its destruction.
5. Most significantly, however, the specific ques
tions regarding "limited war," "police action," and "con
tainment" solicited negative responses.
6. Finally, it can be reported that "Prelude to
War" did not express limited war sentiments.
Average intensity rating. Figure 4 depicts inten
sity ratings. The ratings represent the respondents judg
ment as to the relative intensity of treatment of each
theme perceived to be present in the film. That is to say,
it represents the raters' opinion of how much emphasis was
given to each theme in the film in relation to each other
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r
g ^
I
g 2
TRADITIONAL & TOTAL WAR
LIMITED WAR
Figure 4. Average Intensity Rating "Prelude to War"
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137
in the overall film. Of course, these ratings are under
standably and unavoidably, subjective. This part of the
questionnaire was designed to solicit subjective responses.
It must be reported, however, that the initial examination
of these tabulated results was indeed perplexing— for rea
sons which will be explained presently.
First, it should be understood that each viewer was
required to rate each theme (which received his "yes" re
sponse) on a ten-point intensity scale. The viewer was
instructed that number one on the intensity scale repre
sented strong emphasis (with numbers in between represent
ing degrees of emphasis along the continuum) .
The cause of perplexity; As Figure 4 illustrates,
all themes— whether total war or limited war— received
from medium to strong ratings. The answer to this problem,
it is felt, can be found by comparing the percentages of
"yes" answers (Figure 3) theme by theme with their re
spective intensity ratings (Figure 4). It will be noted
that even a theme which received a negligible percentage
rating nevertheless received a high emphasis rating. The
answer suggested is this : even though only a few respond
ents perceived, or thought they perceived the presence of
a particular theme— when they did, they felt that it
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138
received considerable emphasis.
Understandably, the above-described situation caused
the author to doubt the value of these ratings as an indi
cation of relative emphasis. In fact, the frequency of
"yes" responses seemed to offer a more reliable measure of
emphasis. This opinion is based on the rationale that the
more people who detected a particular theme, the clearer
that theme was (with thematic emphasis being at least one
factor causing perception).
III. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF
"WHY KOREA"
Percentage of "yes" replies. The results of the
analysis are recorded in Figure 5. Examination of this
data reveals:
1. All six of the traditional war themes were pre
sent. If frequency of "yes" responses is a reliable indi
cator, these themes were highly in evidence. That these
themes were present and emphasized, although they are in
consonance with total war sentiments, and, also, that they
were present and coexisting, as it were, with limited war
themes in the same film would suggest a grand contradiction.
The fact is, thematically, there were conflicting
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p^50.
TRADITIONAL & TOTAL WAR
LIMITED WAR
Figure 5. Percentage of "yes" replies to "Why Korea"
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140
ideals presented in the film. That is to say that at one
and the same time there were thematic materials which sug
gested the limited nature of the Korean conflict and mater
ials expressive of total war, but, most importantly, there
is yet another aspect to this seeming contradiction. That
is: the traditional war themes are so fundamental to the
American ideology about war that they could not feasibly
be expected to be absent in any American military film
about war. Also, recalling that theatrical films have been
known to follow "formula," there is every reason to suspect
that military films, too, will follow "formula." Recall
that the Korean Conflict occured in the wake of World War
II, and the six objectives orientation formula was devised
in World War II. The implications, it is felt, are apparent.
2. Interestingly, the theme, "... can do job
..." received a higher percentage rating in the analysis
of "Why Korea" than "Prelude to War." This is attributable,
it is felt, to the fact that initially there was a wide
spread belief that Korea would be a quick easy job— that
"the boys would be home by Christmas." For example, one
writer discussing the American expectation for an easy vic
tory, illustrated the point by relating the story of one
Air Force officer who "in criticizing Mac Arthur's call for
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141
ground troops, remaried: 'The old man must be off his
rocker. When the Fifth Air Force gets to work on them,
there will not be a North Korea left in North Korea.'
3. Significantly, however, and quite appropriately,
the total war theme "... 'wipe out' the enemy ..."
was indicated as not being very much present in this film
(unlike "Prelude to War").
4. Of extreme significance to this present study
were the results pertaining to limited war themes— notably
that almost all of the limited war themes received signi
ficantly high ratings.
The four themes receiving the highest percentage of
"yes" answers (each ninety-two point eight) were:
a) "This fight (or war) is likely not to be the
last confrontation with the communist enemy."
b) "We will meet force with counterforce."
c) "We fight to stop aggression now in order to
avoid total war later."
d) "Compared to our other wars, this one re
quires a new (extra) measure of patience and perseverance
^Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of Mac Arthur—
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142
5. The next highest ranked themes were: (in order
of ranking)
a) "Our job is to 'contain' the enemy ..."
(eighty-five point seven per cent)
b) "We do not fight for the total destruction
of the enemy, . . . but to counter his aggressions."
c) "We fight to uphold the integrity of the
United Nations." (seventy-one point four per cent)
d) "We are fighting a 'limited action' or
■police action.'" (fifty seven point one per cent)
e) "... concept of 'limited war' ..."
(fifty-seven point one per cent)
A closer examination of these results will reveal
several that warrant further attention. For example, note
the highly ranked theme— "Compared to our other wars, this
one requires a new (extra) measure of patience and perseve
rance . . ."— when contrasted with the equally highly ranked
theme "... can do job . . ."— an apparent contradiction
emerges. These results suggest that there were contradic
tory thematic materials present in this film— a suggestion
A Precis in Limited War (New York: Oxford University Press,
1960), p. 27.
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143
that this viewer, at least, is prepared to accept as valid.
Two other themes and their response-results seemed
to warrant further examination. The first one was the
theme, "We are fighting a 'limited action' or 'police ac
tion. '" The other was, "... concept of 'limited war'
. . ." Both these themes received only fifty-seven point
one per cent ratings— the lowest among the limited war
themes. Considering that the term 'police action' had been
the subject of considerable controversy, it might appear
strange that it (and the concept it represented) did not
receive clearer exposition in the film. It is suggested
that it was precisely because of the controversy associated
with the term and its meaning that it did not receive clear
er treatment.
Regarding the theme, "... concept of 'limited
war' . . .," recalling that its statement on the question
naire read very pointedly: "Was the concept of 'limited
war' . . . mentioned or referred to in this film?"— its
relative low response rating suggests a significant im
plication (if not a conclusion). It appears that either
through inadvertency or by intention the concept of limi
ted war did not receive clear exposition. As an explana
tion, the author can offer the hesitant suggestion that
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144
perhaps, as Osgood criticized the Administration for its
"hiding tactics" with regard to explaining limited war and
the concept of containment,^ film-makers, too, were either
engaged in "hiding tactics" or were not themselves suffici
ently well-versed on the concepts— the latter seems to be
a more reasonable assumption.
Average intensity ratings. Figure 6 depicts the
average intensity ratings for each theme. Examination of
these ratings indicate again that little difference ex
isted in the degree of emphasis given to the two cate
gories of themes. The validity of this indication, how
ever, appears suspect when the differences in "yes" re
sponses for each theme are compared. Again, and for the
same reasons discussed earlier in the section on intensity
ratings for "Prelude to War," the author's analysis of this
situation leads to the conclusion that these ratings are
not suitable indicators for judging differences in the
degree of emphasis between traditional themes and limited
war themes.
to American Strategy (Chicago; The Univ. of Chicago Press,
1957), p. 192.
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g 5.
I
, 1
i l :
Hi
I I I
1 1 1
I. I _ L
TRADITIONAL & TOTAL WAR ,
LIMITED WAR
Figure 6. Average Intensity Rating "Why Korea"
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IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF
"WHY VIETNAM"
Percentage of "yes" replies. As indicated in Figure
7, a significantly large number of "yes" responses were re
corded for the six original traditional war themes. This
was again interpreted as an indication of presence and em
phasis accorded these themes. In the author's interpreta
tion this accrues to the fundamental relationship of these
themes to American traditional war ideology. That is to
say that these themes, whether appropriately or not, will
be present in films expressive of total or limited war ideo
logy. Therefore, "Why Vietnam," although it belongs to the
limited war genre of films, nevertheless relied upon the ex
position of the traditional themes to a high degree to
achieve its purpose.
Regarding question number fourteen, "... 'wipe
out' the enemy . . .," the question devised by the author
to solicit the clearest indication of whether a particular
film expressed primarily total war sentiments, the audience-
response to "Why Vietnam" indicated that the film did not
express this total war ideal. In fact, there were twice as
many people who answered "no" as there were who answered
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= 40 .
I I
Figure 7. Percentage of "yes" replies to "Why Vietnam"
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148
"yes." The one reservation the author has, however, about
this interpretation hinges on the fact that the "no" ans
wers constituted slightly less than fifty per cent of the
total possible answers. In short, slightly less than fifty
per cent of the trained observers agreed that this pro total
war sentiment was not expressed in this limited war film.
Among the limited war themes, several solicited
some interesting, if not surprising, responses. For example
question number nine, "... likely not to be the last con
frontation with the communist enemy ..." only fifth-three
point eight per cent of the respondents agreed that this
theme was treated in the film. This ambivalence on the
part of the viewers could suggest a degree of ambivalence
in the treatment of the theme in the film.
Theme twelve, "... fight to uphold the integrity
of the United Nations" received a phenomenally low number
of "yes" responses. In fact, only fifteen point three per
cent agreed that the theme was treated in the film. This,
of course, suggests that the Vietnam War, unlike Korea
which enjoyed veritably unanimous United Nations' support,
lacks this ingredient which has such a potential for con
tributing to the ideal of the "righteous cause."
The following themes all received more than
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149
sixty-nine point two per cent "yes" replies, (most of them
more) thus indicating that the film, in these essential re
spects at least, conformed to the imperatives of limited
1. "... do not fight for the total destruction
of the enemy ..."
2. " Our job is to 'contain' the enemy ..."
3. "... meet force with counterforce."
4. "... fight to stop aggression . . . to avoid
total war later."
5. "... fighting a 'limited action' or 'police
action.'"
6. "Compared to our other wars, this one requires
a new (extra) measure of patience and perseverance ..."
"Yes" responses to the question, "Was the concept
of 'limited war' . . . mentioned or referred to in the
film?" were relatively low— only sixty-one point five per
cent. Regarding the question of how the theme was treated,
if treated at all: only two of the thirteen viewers ans
wered, "treated with candor." Five answered, "treated in
directly, but with no apparent attempt to deceive." One
answered, "treated in rhetorical generalities." (These
were the responses given by the eight viewers who answered
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150
"yes" to the question in reference to the concept of limited
war.)
Average intensity rating. The intensity ratings
for "Why Vietnam," with but a few exceptions, ran essen
tially in the same pattern indicated for "Prelude to War"
and "Why Korea." The few exceptions will be discussed in
a later section devoted to a comparison of these three films.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY RESPONSES
In an earlier part of this chapter it was stated
that both military and civilian personnel comprised the
group of trained observers. In this connection, it should
be confessed that the author was indeed concerned about the
possibility of a "military bias" emanating from prior knowl
edge on the part of the servicemen. Such a bias would, of
course, affect these research efforts adversely. It was
therefore decided early in the study that some procedure
should be devised to determine if such a bias existed.
Fortunately, such a procedure was facilitated by the near
parity between the civilian and the military members of the
trained observer group. The procedure adopted was as fol
lows : Utilizing a trained observer group comprised of
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151
seven civilians and seven military, the film "Why Korea"
was subjected to analysis in the usual manner (that is, as
done throughout the entire study.) Identical questionnaire
forms were used by all individuals in the two groups. After
completion of the questionnaire, the results were separated
into two groups— military and civilian respectively. It
should be noted that neither group was aware that such a
comparative study was being made.
Figure 8 contains the results of this comparative
study. It will be noted that little difference in the
number of "yes" responses existed between the two groups.
In fact, almost consistently, it was noted, one less civi
lian than military answered "yes" on the themes. It was
found in post-test analysis that this disparity could be
contributed to a single individual civilian who voted con
sistently in a manner contrary to his fellow civilians.
This individual, it was found in post-test interviews, was
a newly immigrated foreign-born student who possessed
strong anti-war sentiments. His anti-war sentiments were
so strong, in fact, that it rendered objective discussion
on the subject veritably impossible.
There were two themes, however, which did solicit a
considerable difference in response between the two groups.
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lüL
[MILITARY (N=7)
I CIVILIAN (N=7)
Figure 8. Comparison Between Military and Civilian Response
to "Why Korea."
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153
The first of these was theme twelve: "... fight to up
hold the integrity of the United Nations." On this theme,
all seven military answered "yes," compared to only three
civilians. The answer suggested for this disparity evolved
out of the group discussion following the screening of this
film by the trained observers. It appeared that individual
ly and collectively the servicemen detected the slightest
inference made to the United Nations, whereas the civi
lians did not. This, it was felt, was attributable to what
might be called "prior knowledge" on the part of the ser
vicemen— that is, they seemed to be predisposed to relate
any American military effort to the United Nations, whether
it was specifically stated or not.
A reverse situation existed with regard to the
question: "Was the concept of limited war . . . mentioned
or referred to . . ." In the first place, the total number
of "yes" responses was low for both groups, but there were
two more civilians answering "yes" (five of seven) than
there were servicemen (three of seven) .
On the question of intensity ratings, it was found
that the military group consistently rated higher than the
civilian group. Again, this appeared attributable to the
fact that the servicemen seemed to be already familiar with
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154
the thematic content of the film. Even though most of them
professed that they had never seen this particular film be
fore, they stated that they had seen many like it, and,
thus, they professed familiarity with the "formula." There
fore, what appeared subtle to the civilian viewers appeared
clearly obvious to the servicemen.
VI. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF
"WHY KOREA"
As described in an earlier section of this chapter,
the film, "Why Korea" was subjected to a "detailed" con
tent analysis by the author. The results of this analy
sis (expressed in the frequency of appearance of designated
themes) are recorded in Table I. As can be seen in the
script of this film (see appropriate appendix), theme code
numbers have been inserted in parenthesis behind what the
author perceived as appropriate indicators. It should be
noted that the author's analysis was subjected to the re
view of two review-analysts. The results reported in
Figure 9 are therefore those that have been agreed upon be
tween the author and the review-analysts. The coding scheme
used was that depicted on the instruction sheet to the re
view-analysts, (Figure 9) .
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FREQUENCY OF APPEARANCE OF DESIGNATED
THEMES IN "WHY KOREA"
Frequency of
THEMES Appearance
Aural Visual
1. We are fighting for a righteous cause. 34 20
2. We face a tough job. 7 6
3. We can do the job which has to be done. 19 16
4. We have confidence in our allies . . .
a. in their fighting ability 2 1
b . in their integrity 14 21
5. Resentment for the enemy. 5 2 47
6. Through military victory, the political
achievement of a better world order is
possible. 2 2
7. We do not fight for the total destruc
tion of the enemy (i.e., his uncondi
tional surrender,) but to counter his
aggressions. 2 0
8. Our job is to "contain" the enemy (i.e.,
the containment of the spread of commu
nism) 6 0
9. This fight (or war) is likely not to be
the last confrontation with the comm
unist enemy. 5 0
10. We will meet force with counterforce. 8 3
11. We fight to stop aggression now in order
to avoid total war later. 36 43
12. We fight to uphold the integrity of the
United Nations. 12 7
13. We are fighting a "limited" or "police"
action. 0 0
14. Our mission is to "wipe out" the enemy
and his ideology. 0 0
15. Compared to our other wars, this one re
quires a new (extra) measure of patience
and perseverance because of the insidious
and patient ideology of the enemy. 1 0
16. Pacifism and horror of war. 63 73
17. Unable to classify. 2 11
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156
The following code (numbers) have been used to indi
cate themes in both the script and in the visual continuity:
1. We are fighting for a righteous cause.
2. We face a tough job,
3. We can do the job which has to be done.
4. We have confidence in our allies . . .
a. in their fighting ability
b . in their integrity
5. Resentment for the enemy. (NOTE: This code number is
used to identify any comment or visual which is used
to summon RESENTMENT toward the enemy)
6. Through military victory, the political achievement of
a better world order is possible.
7. We do not fight for the total destruction of the enemy
(i.e., his unconditional surrender), but to counter his
aggressions.
8. Our job is to "contain" the enemy (i.e., the contain
ment of the spread of communism.
9. This fight (or war) is likely not to be the last con
frontation with the communist enemy.
10. We will meet force with counterforce.
11. We fight to stop aggression now in order to avoid total
war later.
12. We fight to uphold the integrity of the United Nations.
13. We are fighting a "limited" or "police" action.
14. Our mission is to "wipe out" the enemy and his ideo
logy, i.e., to rid the world of the menace.
15. Compared to our other wars, this one requires a new
(extra) measure of patience and perseverance because
of the insidious and patient ideology of the enemy.
16. Pacifism, i.e., love of peace and the peaceful and
resentment and horror of war.
17. Not coded due to inability to classify.
INSTRUCTIONS : Please review the original content
analysis provided. PROCEDURES : (1) check the code numbers
appearing in parenthesis following portions of commentary
and visuals (2) if you disagree with the theme designation,
circle the code number in question. . . then write in the
code number you feel to be appropriate (NOTE: It is not
sufficient to merely disagree.) (3) for elaborations or
additional comments, use the attached REMARKS sheet . . .
cross-reference all remarks to the original content analy
sis by page number, line and code number.
Figure 9. Instructions to the Review-Analyst.
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157
Concerning this particular method of analysis, it
must be reported that contrary to expectations, the results
were far less than satisfactory. The general complaint with
this method evolves around the revelation that it requires
an excessive amount of fragmentation— and the revelation
that so many fragmented parts did not always equal the
whole. So often it occurred that the gestalt of a scene was
not expressed by the individual sentences comprising the
aural component or by the individual "shots" comprising the
visual component.
Additional proof of the foregoing problem is evi
denced by the contradiction between what the trained ob
servers reported they perceived (thematically) and the ex
istence of no recorded appearances for, say, themes thirteen
and fourteen (see Table I).
The most that can reasonably be interpreted from
these results is perhaps contained in the following state
ment: "We are fighting a righteous cause. We resent the
enemy. We fight to stop aggression now in order to avoid
total war later. We are pacifistic and horrified by war."
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VII. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF
"CRIME OF KOREA"
The detailed analysis of "Crime of Korea" yielded
results which appeared more reasonable than those achieved
with the film "Why Korea," Table II contains a summary of
these results.
Significantly, it will be noted that theme five
"Resentment for the enemy . . ." had the highest number of
rated appearances. Theme sixteen "Pacifism . . ." had the
next highest number of rated appearances.
The results of the analysis suggest the following :
1. The film, "Crime of Korea," was apparently de
signed specifically to summon resentment of the enemy.
2. The content of the film supports an ideological
position which might read as follows; "We resent the
morally repugnant enemy who has made it necessary for us to
fight, but we still love peace."
3. The notable absence of limited war themes sup
ports the contention that extreme passion is inconsistent
with limited war. "Crime of Korea" plays heavily on pas-
4. The main approach to the achievement of the
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FREQUENCY OP APPEARANCE OF DESIGNATED
THEMES IN "THE CRIME OF KOREA"
THEMES
Frequency of
Appearance
Aural Visual
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
righteous cause. We are fighting for :
We face a tough job.
We can do the job which has to be done.
We have confidence in our allies
a, in their fighting ability
b. in their integrity
Resentment for the enemy.
Through military victory, the political
achievement of a better world order is
possible.
We do not fight for the total destruc
tion of the enemy (i.e. his uncondi
tional surrender,) but to counter his
aggressions.
Our job is to "contain" the enemy (i.e.,
the containment of the spread of
communism.)
This fight (or war) is likely not to be
the last confrontation with the communist
enemy.
We will meet force with counterforce.
We fight to stop aggression now in order
to avoid total war later.
We fight to uphold the integrity of the
United Nations.
We are fighting a "limited or "police"
action.
Our mission is to
and his ideology.
Compared to our other wars, this one re
quires a new (extra) measure of patience
and perseverance because of the insidious
and patient ideology of the enemy.
Pacifism and horror of war.
Unable to classify.
"wipe out" the enemy
5
7
17
3
42
0
23
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160
objective of creating resentment of the enemy centers on
the following:
a) Showing the enemy as a wanton slayer of
innocent women and children.
b) Showing the enemy as ruthless and immoral
(supported by numerous references, both aurally and visu
ally to the enemy's practice of shooting captives while
their hands were tied behind their backs).
c) Depicting the enemy as the perpetrators of
the unprovoked attack on the "peace-loving" South Koreans.
VIII. COMPARISON OF RESPONSES FROM AUDIENCES
OF DIFFERING SIZES
Still another source of concern to the author was
the possibility that the trained observer group used in
this study was too small to provide valid results. This
concern led the author to subject one of the stimulus films
to analysis by two audiences of differing sizes and composi
tion. The responses from these two audiences were then com
pared with the responses obtained with the same film from
the trained observer group.
The film chosen for comparative analysis was "Why
Vietnam." This film was chosen because of the relative
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161
ease involved in assembling audiences for participation in
this experiment. Efforts to acquire audiences for the
older films were met with indifference from potential view
ers. A willing attitude on the part of the audience was
regarded by the author as a necessary condition in these
undertakings.
The Audiences. The first of the two audiences was
heterogeneous, indeed, with regard to diversity in age, oc
cupation, and interests. At the same time, however, this
audience evinced homogeneity in one critical aspect. In
a word, this audience was notably anti-(Vietnam) war in
sentiment and highly emotional. These latter attitudinal
characteristics can be understood best in the context of
the following description of the circumstances surrounding
the screening of the film, "Why Vietnam."
To assemble this audience an announcement was made
campus-wide (University of Southern California) that a
screening of the film "Why Vietnam" would be presented
(April 28, 1967) and that it would be followed by a pro
vocative panel discussion. Considering the current con
cern about Vietnam among college students, such an announce
ment, it was felt, was certain to solicit an audience. The
result: fifty-nine respondents, most of whom, apparently.
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162
came prepared to be provoked. Some measure of their senti
ments regarding the Vietnam issue is indicated, it is felt,
by their response to a poll taken on the question, "are you
in favor of the war in Vietnam, i.e., that we should pursue
the war in Vietnam?" Forty-two responded that they were
against the war in Vietnam; seven answered that they were
pro government policy in Vietnam; ten abstained.
This audience was comprised of college students (un
dergraduates and graduates), college professors and other
adults who were not students nor faculty members. This
latter segment of the audience constituted approximately
one-quarter of the total group. Ages in the group ranged
from twenty to fifty-five. The average age was twenty-nine.
The group was comprised of forty-eight men and eleven women.
Prior to the presentation of the film and the ques
tionnaire the author presented a standard briefing on the
test procedures and a short orientation on limited war ver
sus total war, the concept of containment, ^t cetera. This
orientation, in digest, conformed to the information pro
vided in the earlier chapters of this study. These latter
efforts were undertaken in the interest of soliciting the
highest possible degree of objectivity from the audience
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163
and also to insure that there was a common base of infor
mation which the author considered minimally required to
facilitate meaningful responses from the audiences. These
procedures were conducted with every group tested through
out the study.
The second group was comprised of twenty-five under
graduate students who were enrolled in a course in "Mass
Communication" which was being conducted in the Department
of Telecommunications at the University of Southern Cali
fornia. All students were either Telecommunications (radio
and television) or Journalism majors. There were fifteen
males and ten females. The average age was nineteen. At-
titudinally, in the author's opinion, this group was char
acterized by a diversity of opinions and, unlike the first
group, manifested no highly emotional attitudes about the
Vietnam War. The film and questionnaire were presented
to this group May 4, 1967.
The third group was the trained observer group
(fourteen members) that was used throughout the study. As
stated earlier, the responses obtained from the other two
groups were compared with the responses recorded by the
trained observer group. The purpose of these comparisons,
of course, was to determine what responses might be obtained
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164
from audiences of varying sizes and composition, and, fur
ther, to determine if these responses would be notably dif
ferent from the responses of the trained observer group.
The results of these comparisons are depicted in Figure
10.
Analysis of the comparative data depicted in Figure
10 shows that, although, there were differences in per
centages of "yes" replies between the three groups, the
deviations from theme to theme were essentially in the
same directions. Note, for example, that a theme which
rated comparatively low among the overall responses in one
group, similiarly, rated comparatively low among overall
responses with the other two groups.
There were a few exceptions to the above stated
generalizations. For example, in the case of theme four,
"... confidence in our allies . . .", note that groups
I and II showed a marked decrease in the number of "yes"
replies to this theme in relationship to the neighboring
total war themes (numbers three and five). Group III (the
trained observer group), on the other hand, showed an in
crease in the opposite direction in relationship to the
neighboring themes. Of course, no accurate explanation can
be given for this difference, however, a reasonable
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PERCENT (%) "YES" ANSWERS
I Righteous cause
Tough job
I Can do Joh
Resent enemy
Counter aggression
Integrity of U. N,
Wipe out enemy
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156
suggestion seems to be that the trained observer group,
through prior exposure to the other films of this genre,
was more perceptive of the indicators suggesting the pres
ence of this theme in the film content.
A similiar situation to that described above, but
of lesser magnitude, occurred in the case of theme seven,
". . .do not fight for total destruction of the enemy . . ."
In this case groups II and III recorded almost identical
responses to this question, while the rating recorded by
group I stands alone at a point approximately ten per
centage points lower. Although this constitutes no great
difference, it was interesting to note that group I, com
prised mostly of persons who confessedly were anti-(Viet
nam) war, rated lower on this theme than the other two
groups. Considering the strong views held by this group
it could be suspected that the factor of selective per
ception could have figured considerably in their responses.
One overriding implication of this phase of the study
relates to the fact (as depicted in Figure 10) that the
directional fluctuations in ratings from theme to theme
with all three groups ran almost parallel. The author
viewed this as, at least, a tentative suggestion that re
sults similiar to those obtained with the small trained
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167
observer group would have been obtained, also, from even
larger and more heterogeneous groups than groups I and II.
In short, it appears that the small trained observer group
was adequate for the purposes of this study.
IX. SUMMARY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF "PRELUDE TO WAR," "WHY KOREA,"
AND "WHY VIETNAM"
One of the overriding assumptions in this study has
been that certain significant differences would exist cer
tainly between "Prelude to War," and "Why Korea,"— and pos
sibly between these two and "Why Vietnam." This section is
devoted, therefore, to reporting on the outcome of this
assumption. In a word, the three main films of this study
are herein compared.
Percentage of yes replies. Figure 11 contains the
comparative results expressed in the percentage of "yes"
responses to the designated themes. Figure 12 contains the
relative intensity ratings.
The graphic presentation in the two tables referred
to above, it is felt, provides a more vivid comparison than
is possible with words, therefore, only a few remarks of
elaboration will be made here.
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PERCENTAGE OF "YES" REPLIES
Righteous Cause
3 Can do job
Faith in Allies
Better world
Wipe out enemy
Counter aggression
Containment
Counter force
3 Avoid total «
Integrity of U.
Police action
"Prelude to Waf
"Why Kored'
"Why Vietnam"
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AVERAGE INTENSITY RATING
5 ^ Faith in Allies
If I
Better world
Wipe out enemy
Counter aggression
Containment
n Counter force
Integrity of U.N.
Police action
New patience
"Prelude to War"
"Why Korea"
"Why Vietnam"
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170
Regarding the traditional war themes, it was found
that, with only a few exceptions, all three films received
a significantly large number of "yes" responses. It was
interesting to note that theme one, "... The righteous
cause," received a decrease in the number of "yes" responses
(in descending order from World War II to Vietnam.) This
was interpreted as a suggestion of a slightly diminishing
emphasis of this theme in the limited war films. Regarding
the significant exceptions referred to above, theme six—
"Through military victory the political achievement of a
better world order is possible"— received a comparatively
small number of "yes" responses in the case of "Why Viet
nam." This phenomenon of itself is significant, but there
is sufficient evidence to support the suspicion that the
audience's response to this theme, as well as to others in
this film, accrues to the fact that the Vietnam War is cur
rently in progress and therefore many of the audience's
perceptions are indeed selective, that is to say, they see
what they want to see. It should be noted that this inter
pretation is not intended to be a criticism, rather, it is
merely intended to draw attention to a well known fact of
communication theory that perception is selective. This is
all to say that although a small number of "yes" responses.
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171
theoretically, is consistent with the imperatives of limi
ted war, the fact that this war is still in progress must
be remembered when attempting to interpret responses solic
ited by the film, "Why Vietnam."
The other exception concerns theme fourteen (devised
by the author) which reads : "Our mission is to 'wipe out'
the enemy ..." There was an extremely wide disparity
between the number of "yes" responses recorded for World
War II as compared to Korea and Vietnam. The indication is
that this theme was appropriately absent from the limited
war films— if not absent, certainly not emphasized.
The results recorded for themes two (Tough job) and
three (can do the job) demonstrate a meaningful compari
son between the three films. A glance at Figure 11 will
reveal an almost proportionate deviation on these two themes
between "Prelude to War" and "Why Vietnam," In "Why Korea','
however, there appears to have been less emphasis on the
"tough job" and more emphasis on "can do the job." This
relates, it is felt, to the statement made earlier in the
discussion on the background to the Korea War regarding the
expectations of an easy victory.
Theme four (confidence in allies) appears to have
received greater emphasis in the limited war films than in
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172
"Prelude to War." Considering the amount of evidence sug
gesting a lack of confidence on the part of Americans with
regard to the indigenous allies (South Koreans and South
Vietnamese), it would appear that emphasis on this theme
was for the purpose of counteracting negative feeling about
these allies. This interpretation could be accepted as
completely valid were it not for the fact that in the Korean
War there were numerous allies (many more than in Vietnam).
In the case of the Korean War, therefore, emphasis on this
theme could have been related to the necessity of pointing
out that America was not alone--that there were many others
engaged in this just cause.
Comparatively, again, there was a decrease in the
number of "yes" responses to the "resentment of the enemy"
theme in Korea and Vietnam. Theoretically, this, too, is
in consonance with the new imperatives.
Regarding the limited war themes, several signifi
cant comparisons were noted between the three films. Some
of them were as follows :
The increasing number of "yes" responses on theme
seven (not the total destruction of the enemy), especially
the increase between Korea and Vietnam, suggest a refine
ment in the expression of this important limited war
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173
imperative. The treatment of "containment" (theme eight),
on the other hand, appears almost identical in Korea and
Vietnam. What is most important, however, is that they
both received a significantly large number of "yes" re
sponses. Recalling the nebulous treatment given to this
theme in orientation media other than film during the
Korean War, this response to "Why Korea" was viewed with
special interest by the author.
It was noted that the responses to theme nine ( . . .
not the last confrontation . . .) received an appropriately
low response for "Prelude to War;" an exceedingly large
(appropriate) response for "Why Korea," and only moderate
response for "Why Vietnam." If, indeed, this latter re
sponse is indicative of weak treatment of this theme, it
would suggest that this important limited war theme is
being inappropriately slighted. Of course, a matter of
degree is being discussed here. What is perhaps more im
portant is the indication that the theme was treated.
Regarding theme ten ( . . . meet force with counter
force) , the matter of ambivalence of its meaning has al
ready been discussed with regard to the question of why
"Prelude to War" also received a significantly large number
of "yes" responses. Again, what is important is that "Why
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174
Korea" and "Why Vietnam" were similarly and appropriately
rated.
Significantly, the preventive war and limited war
character of the Korean War was appropriately expressed in
"Why Korea" as indicated by the responses to themes eleven
through sixteen— but to a lesser extent by responses to
themes thirteen and sixteen. Theme thirteen ( . . . police
action), for example, received only fifty-seven point one
per cent "yes" replies. The same was the case with theme
sixteen ( . . , concept of limited war). This would indi
cate, it was felt, that in the first case, as mentioned
earlier, the idea of a so-called "police action" did not
seem to please the American people. And, further, be
cause it was a controversial idea its exposition was prob
ably avoided in the film. (It should be noted that this
is only a supposition.)
Theme twelve ( . . . uphold the integrity of the
United Nations) presents a striking comparison between
Korea and Vietnam, notably in regard to the low response
to "Why Vietnam." As suggested earlier, this is probably
attributable to the differing set of external conditions
surrounding these two wars with regard to the United Na-
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175
Average intensity ratings. Figure 12, containing
the comparative intensity ratings, is included for the
reader's information. Again, it must be stated that the
author places little reliance on these ratings as an index
of emphasis. For reasons described earlier, it is still
maintained that the frequency of "yes" responses effective
ly serves this end.
Summary. It can be reported that numerous signi
ficant differences did exist between the three films, "Pre
lude to War," "Why Korea," and "Why Vietnam." Further,
these differences were related to the distinctions between
total and limited war. Indications regarding relationship
of these differences to American war ideology were also
present— these, however, will be discussed in the follow
ing chapter.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents a summary of the dissertation,
the conclusions reached as a result of the study, recom
mendations for further study, and implications.
I. SUMMARY
Restatement of the problem. The problem of this
study was to test the following hypotheses:
1. That the military orientation films of the
Korean War period provide an index of the American mentality
and ideology regarding that war.
2. That these films reflect the peculiarities of
the era— notably, the emotional and psychological changes
attendant to the concept of limited war.
3. That these films contain identifiable persuasive
tactics and orientation approaches; and that these tactics
and approaches were appropriate to the new emotional and
psychological problems attendant to limited war.
4. That the thematic content utilized in these
films to influence attitudes and opinions differed from
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177
the ideological and factual themes used in support of orien
tation objectives of the World War II films.
Limitations of the method. The first limitation con
cerns the use of the "detailed content analysis" methods.
These methods involved efforts to analyze the films "shot"
by "shot" and to code both the visual and verbal components
separately.
Early in this study it became apparent that attempts
to analyze the picture (visual) component alone for content
utilizing the "detailed content analysis" method presented
an uncertain undertaking. When it was recognized that pic
tures, inherently, are more iconic, and less literal (if at
all literal) the problem came immediately into focus. The
author's attempt, therefore, to overcome this limitation
involved efforts to view the picture with a half-cocked ear,
so to speak, to what was said and to what had gone on be
fore while still trying to interpret the separate visual as
a distinct entity carrying its own meaning. At best, it
was an unavoidable compromise which yielded questionable
results.
Other reservations were developed regarding the "de
tailed content analysis" method because it involved too much
fragmentation— the suspicion being that these fragmented
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178
parts did not equal the whole meaning of the film or its
individual themes.
Because of the limitations just described the author
placed heavy reliance on the "trained observer question
naire" method which seemed appropriate to the purposes of
this study. This method involved the use of "trained ob
servers" to indicate the presence of predetermined content
items (themes) and to rate the emphasis accorded these
themes within the films. The one limitation experienced
with this method concerned the observers' efforts to pro
vide relative "intensity ratings" on the various themes.
It became apparent to the author that the high degree of
subjectivity involved in this part of the analysis would
provide data of questionable reliability. The data col
lected from the "frequency of yes replies" recorded by the
trained observers did not appear to suffer from this limi
tation. Therefore, the conclusions reported herein pri
marily have been based on these data.
Analysis results. The following information is
condensed from the report of the results of the content
analysis which was presented in Chapter VIII, Analysis and
Evaluation. Primarily, the information presented here
centers on the films, "Prelude to War," "Why Korea," and
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179
"Why Vietnam." This approach is based on the author's de
sire to compare "Why Korea" with "Prelude to War" and
"Why Vietnam. In these comparative efforts, it should be
noted that "Why Korea" was selected as the representative
troop orientation film of the Korean War era— a period of
limited war. "Prelude to War" is representative of the
World War II era— a total war period. "Why Vietnam" repre
sents a later period of limited war..
In the case of "Prelude to War," the following analy
sis results were recorded:
1. All traditional war themes were treated in this
film.
2. All traditional war themes were highly in evi-
3. Except for those limited war themes which also
might have been appropriate, or those which reasonably might
have been interpreted to have been appropriate to total war,
"Prelude to War" had little thematic content addressed to
the subject of limited war,
4. In all essential respects, "Prelude to War" con
formed to the orientation criteria for total war.
In the case of "Why Korea," the following results
of analysis were recorded:
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180
1. All traditional war themes were present and
highly in evidence.
2. All of the limited war themes were present.
Significantly, they were either as much or even more highly
in evidence than the traditional themes.
3. There were two significant exceptions to the
above stated generalization regarding the prevalence of
limited war themes. These exceptions involved what the
author regarded as perhaps the two most clearly stated
limited war themes. The first one was the theme, "We are
fighting a 'limited action' or 'police action.'" The
other was, "Was the concept of 'limited war' . . . mentioned
or referred to in this film?" Both these themes received
only fifty-seven point one per cent ratings— the lowest
among the limited war themes.
4. At times there were conflicting ideals pre
sented in the thematic content of this film (see discus
sion in the preceding chapter). These conflicts can be
attributed to the fact that both limited war themes as
well as themes expressive of total war sentiments were pre
sent in the film.
5. Because of contradictory thematic content the
concept of limited war did not receive clear exposition.
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181
Analysis of "Why Vietnam" revealed the following
results :
1. All traditional war themes were present in this
film.
2. All limited war themes were present.
3. Several important limited war themes, although
present, received a very low number of "yes" responses.
For example, theme number nine, "... likely not to be
the last confrontation with the communist enemy . . ." re
ceived only fifty-three point eight per cent "yes" replies.
Only fifteen point three per cent of the respondents agreed
that there was any effort to associate the Vietnam War with
United Nations' objectives. This latter observation was
deduced from the responses to theme twelve, "... fight
to uphold the integrity of the United Nations."
4. In most respects, especially as regards the con
tradictory thematic content, the results of the analysis of
"Why Vietnam" were very similiar to those of "Why Korea."
The overall results of the comparative analysis of
the three primary films revealed that, although similiar-
ities as noted above existed, there were also significant
differences which were attributable to the distinctions
between total and limited war. Specifically, reference is
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182
made here to the data (provided by the trained observers and
the author's analyses) which support the hypothesis that the
films of the limited war periods differed from the World
War II orientation films. The analysis results showed, for
example, that "Why Korea" and "Why Vietnam" contained themes
(limited war themes) that were not present to any apprecia
ble degree in "Prelude to War."
In the following section under the discussion of
conclusions, the matter of conflicting thematic content
is explored. The intention has been to relate these ap
parent contradictions to certain American ideological and
emotional ambivalences associated with participation in
limited war.
II. CONCLUSIONS
In this section which is devoted to presenting con
clusions, the four hypotheses constituting the problem of
this study will be discussed in the order in which they
were presented in the original statement of the problem.
The first hypothesis, restated as a question for ease
of discussion, could be phrased as follows : Did the mili
tary orientation films of the Korean War period provide an
index of the American mentality and ideology regarding that
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183
war? The answer to that question, of course, must begin
with a description of the American attitude and reaction
to that war. At this point the author must ask the reader
to recall the information presented in the early chapters
of this study— especially Chapter V, "Total War Versus Lim
ited War— An American Dilemma" and Chapter VI, "Korea— The
Limited War," A review of this information will reveal
that, in the first place, the suddeness of the outbreak of
this war apparently did not facilitate a clearly enunciated
ideology regarding the nation's entry into this war. Al
though the nation, officially, had made its pledges to de
fend the sovereignty and independence of "free peoples"
around the world (including South Korea) , the outbreak of
the Korean War found the American people ideologically un
prepared for the Korean War. Coupled with the sheer sur
prise of the war's outbreak was also the concurrent evolve-
ment of the new and different diplomatic and strategic con
cept of limited war. The nation's engagement against an
enemy about whom the nation's citizens knew very little
further added to a sense of confusion. And while the war
was in progress there existed the difficult requirement
for the American people and the nation's soldiers to try
to understand and adjust to what has been termed, the
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184
"imperatives" of limited war.
Considering the circumstances described above, there
is little wonder then that ideologically there was confus
ion, irresoluteness, public and private recriminations, and
impatience. On the one hand, there were the traditional
motivations towards ending the war as soon as possible,
securing a total victory, jet cetera, and on the other hand,
there was the desire not to become embroiled in a larger
war, not to use nuclear weapons, and so on.
Did the military orientation films of the Korean
War period reflect the ideological predicament that Ameri
cans faced during these crucial times? Can it be deter
mined from viewing these films what the American mentality
was regarding this war? The author's answer to both ques
tions is a qualified "yes," This answer, hopefully, will
be made clear in the following discussion.
One dominant characteristic of the film "Why Korea"
seemed to hold important implications for drawing conclus
ions about the American mentality regarding the Korean War,
This characteristic has been referred to earlier in this
chapter as "conflicting thematic content," It was found
in the analysis that this film was comprised of total war
themes and limited war themes which were mutually con
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185
tradictory. Although it has been conceded that the total
or traditional war themes are probably so fundamental to
the American traditional ideology about war that they could
not conceivably be expected to be excluded from an Ameri
can military orientation film like, "Why Korea," it never
theless creates a conflicting set of attitudinal suggestions
which hold, at least potentially, the ingredients for con
fusion. In this connection, it need only be remembered
that such ambivalences were not present in the World War II
film, "Prelude to War." The author suggests, therefore,
that this conflicting thematic content was related to the
absence of a clearly enunciated ideological basis for this
war— thus, as a by-product, it serves as an indicator of
the confusion that Americans (including American film
makers and propagandists) experienced during this period.
Considering the fact that "Why Korea" conformed
thematically to the criteria of limited war, in the sense
that all of the pre-determined limited war themes were
present, it would appear that no such deductions as those
stated above could be made. To this the author can only
state that the limited war themes appeared to have been
included in these films along with the total war themes
because they represented the least that could be said in
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186
light of the ideological peculiarities of this war as com
pared to World War II. Because there were no well-defined
and systematically devised film orientation objectives for
the Korean War film program, as there had been in the World
War II period, there is every reason to believe that the
formulators of Korean War orientation policy were clever
enough to know that there had to be another dimension to
the orientation formula which had been devised in World War
II, but there was uncertainty about whether this new limi
ted war dimension should supplaint the previously estab
lished total war objectives. Apparently the decision was
made to include both categories of themes. Considering the
amount of uncertainty and confusion in official circles re
garding the kind of war this was and how it should be con
ducted, it becomes apparent that film-makers and others in
volved in military orientation programs could not have been
expected to speak in their respective media with clarity
and precision. What is important to this present study, of
course, is the evidence that the military orientation films
of the period provide which suggests that these films were
made at a time in a nation's history that was deeply trou
bled by ambiguities and conflicting motivations regarding
a war that did not conform to the nation's ideology about
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The second hypothesis is closely related to the
first— so closely related, in fact, that it may justly be
considered an intrinsic part of the first. This hypothesis,
restated as a question for ease of discussion, could be
phrased as follows: Did the thematic content of "Why Korea"
reflect the peculiarities of the era, notably, the emotional
and psychological changes attendant to the concept of limi
ted war? Regarding this question, a qualified "yes" answer
must be given. As previously reported, contextually there
were thematic materials which were addressed to the new
imperatives, but, too often, cloaked in terms more suitable
to traditional war themes— in a manner, in fact, which sug
gested efforts to cloak the new psychological requirements
in a familiar capsule, so to speak, which would be swallowed
by the new patient because he, too, was American.
This film, like the other Korean war films viewed
during the course of this study, did not reflect the na
tion's (the public's and administration's) near incapacity
to cope with the new necessity for restraint and patience.
Or, better stated, there was little or no thematic con
tent addressed to the emotional and psychological tensions
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188
which resulted from these new requirements. The author's
previous interpretation of conflicting thematic content
not-with-standing, it can be reported that the limited war
films still evinced the traditional American boldness, ide
alism, and even resoluteness— in spite of the actual cir
cumstances and actions which bespoke a contrary set of pre
vailing emotional conditions.
Regarding the third hypothesis, it will be noted
that it is actually comprised of two questions. First is
the question; Did the Korean War films contain identifi
able persuasive tactics and orientation approaches? Sec
ondly: Were these tactics and approaches appropriate to
the new emotional and psychological problems attendant to
limited war? The answer to the first question is an un
qualified "yes." A partial proof, at least, of this fact
is indicated by the presence of identifiable themes which
were recognizable to both trained and untrained observers.
This latter comment applies especially to the limited war
themes because they were the ones which had to be devised
for the purposes of this study since the Korean War did
not occasion the systematic formulation of film orienta
tion objectives and subsequent film research as had been
done during the World War II period. The persuasive tactics.
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189
therefore, involved the use of both traditional war themes
and limited war themes which were addressed to the primary
objective of increasing soldiers' motivation to serve in
the Armed Forces. Just as in World War II, the thematic
approach was "let the facts speak for themselves." Charac
teristic of this approach was the heavy reliance on such
devices as the insertion of newsreel footage of official
statements of important officials and events. The liberal
use of historical motion picture footage juxtaposed with
current combat footage was also a common practice. These
persuasive techniques, of course, held a tremendous po
tential for endowing these films with creditability.
Although the major concern of this study was with
thematic techniques and approaches, and not with the general
theories of communication, just a few more remarks concer
ning the applied communications techniques seem warranted.
It was observed, for example, that a number of frequently
used persuasive techniques were employed in these films.
These techniques included the use of the two-sided argument
— an approach which had been shown during the World War II
experiments to be effective with the more intelligent
soldiers. To facilitate the two-sided argument approach,
rhetorical questions were often included in the dialogue.
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190
There was also some reliance on the use of the so-called
"hate" or "atrocity" propaganda techniques. It was ob
served, however, that, with the exception of the film "The
Crime of Korea," the Korean War films, generally, relied
on "atrocity" technique to a lesser degree than the films
of the World War II era.
The second question concerned the appropriateness
of these thematic approaches to the new emotional and
psychological problems attendant to limited war. In the
first place, as reported earlier, the limited war themes
which were observed as constituting a part of the thematic
content of the film, "Why Korea," were in consonance with
the new requirements. Because of the fact, however, that
these themes were often contradicted by the total war
themes, it cannot, therefore, be conceded that the overall
thematic approach within the film was appropriate. Rather,
it can be reported that the thematic approaches were appro
priate only as regard the limited war themes. This is not
to suggest, however, that all of the traditional war themes
are antithetical to limited war orientation requirements.
In this connection, for example the merest reflection will
probably reveal that such themes as " . . . righteous
cause," and "... can do job" are appropriate to films
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191
made during periods of total or limited war. Such total
war themes as " . . . total destruction of the enemy," and
others which are clearly antithetical to the ideological
requirements of limited war cannot, in this observer's
opinion, coexist contextually in the same film with limited
war themes— not to any effective end, at least.
Regarding the, "let the facts speak for themselves"
approach or technique, there certainly can be no complaint
with this approach. The results of this study would sug
gest, however, that there should have been more facts— facts
regarding the new demands posed by pursuit of limited war
as a national strategy. The rationale underlying this
criticism hinges on the author's assertion that the under
standing of limited war and its imperatives is so important
that every effort should be made to present the clearest
possible exposition of its requirements— and without hesi
tancy.
Another question which conceivably can be regarded
as related to the foregoing question regarding appropriate
ness of thematic content may be phrased as follows : Were
the themes used in the Korean War films in consonance or
conflict with the basic ideological motivations of Ameri
can soldiers? To this question, the following can be re-
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192
ported ;
In that "Why Korea," a representative example of a
Korean War film addressed to the question of "how and why
Americans fight," contained both traditional and limited
war themes, the answer to the question regarding basic
motivations must be phrased accordingly— that is, the
question must be entertained in each context (total war and
limited war) separately. Concerning the traditional themes,
therefore, it can be reported that this film was in con
sonance with the traditional American ideology of war. As
regard the limited war themes which were shown to be present
it can be reported that this film was not in consonance with
traditional American war ideology; for most of the limited
war themes happen to be contrary to the fundamental Ameri
can disposition toward war. But this, then, is precisely
the problem faced by the formulators of film orientation
objectives, film-makers, and other persons working in this
sphere of activity.
The fourth hypothesis poses the question of whether
or not the films of the Korean War period were different
from the films of World War II in thematic content. Again
the answer must be a qualified one. In a word, the Korean
War films were different while yet not different. This
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193
seeming contradiction can be described as follows: As the
data of this study indicated, all of the limited war themes
were treated to some degree in, for example, "Why Korea,"
but the format in which they were treated and presented was
often muddled by the total war themes. More importantly,
however, was the discovery that the presentation format was
decidedly similiar to the formula and approach used in World
War II. Adherence to theformat, it was felt, often inter
fered with the exposition of the new themes. It can be re
ported, therefore, that the Korean War films, except for
the inclusion of the limited war themes, were similiar in
all essential respects to the orientation films of World
War II. The overall ideological approach, with the ex
ception of the emphasis accorded limited war themes, was
essentially the same. The factual themes, of course, were
concerned with the current events of the Korean War period.
In this writer's opinion, the new ideological re
quirements for limited war which emerged during the Korean
War era were important enough to warrant greater dissimi-
liarities between the films of World War II and Korea. For
example, the emphasis accorded the limited war themes, it
is felt, should have so overshadowed the traditional themes
that it would have been patently obvious that these films
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194
were addressed to a new generation of Americans who faced
a new and demanding kind of national undertaking. There
were, in the author's opinion, too many efforts made to
draw parallels between the reasons Americans went to war
in World War II and why they had to fight in Korea. The
most casual survey of the historical facts, of course, will
reveal the dissimiliarities of the differing sets of cir
cumstances and objectives. It appeared ill-advised, there
fore, to rely so heavily on such an orientation rationale.
The author suspects that, to an audience of soldiers who
had at least some recollections of World War II, these
motivational efforts seemed like just so many clichés.
The author formulated several hypotheses which are
presented as possible explanations for the shortcomings
described above. First, it is hypothesized that the formu
lators of the orientation objectives failed to take suf
ficient note of the prevailing trend of public opinion re
garding this so-called "police action," and, thus, adjust
or address the thematic content accordingly. Secondly, the
concept of limited war was too new to have affected the
thinking of film makers and propagandists of the period.
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III. IMPLICATIONS
The Korean War is now a fact of history. No amount
of effort, therefore, can reverse any of the decisions and
actions which were taken in the conduct of the war or in
the conduct of the war's troop orientation program. How
ever, what can be done is to seek to uncover the lessons
of the past and to apply these lessons to the problems of
the present and the future. This is precisely the end that
the author hoped these present research efforts would serve.
Fortunately, it appears that these research efforts have
yielded some implications which seem to hold some value for
both the analysis and solution of some of the new orienta
tion problems.
It should be stated at the start that the implica
tions discussed herein have been based on the assumption
that there is a need to align the troop orientation efforts
with the new limited war imperatives of today. The author
believes that this need does, indeed, exist. The implica
tions discussed here, therefore, will be those which appear
to be implications for practical application. A discussion
of implications for futher study has been reserved for a
later section of this chapter.
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196
Although it cannot be stated with absolute certainty
that limited war is the only type of war that is likely to
occur in the future, the fact that the alternatives to limi
ted war hold such catastrophic potentials, it seems reason
able to assume that until some alternative to war in general
is found, the great international powers will continue to
exercise restraint in the application of the degree of force
of which they are ultimately capable. If it appears, then,
that a strategy of limited war has become the modus of sur
vival, can it not be said that the nation's citizens and
soldiers must be made to understand the requirements of this
strategy? Is not complete candor essential at this time
when world opinion and public debate are so accessible
through the new electronic media— that is to say— at a time
when citizens and especially the soldiers are constantly
confronted with, at least, a two-sided argument (often
more) concerning the issues about which they are expected
to fight and die? In short, does not the speed and ac
cessibility of the new media of communication render the
need for psychological preparedness acute? The answer to
all of these questions, in this observer's opinion, is an
unqualified "yes."
Although the results of this study do not conclusively
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197
indicate that the producers of the troop orientation films
were endeavoring to be evasive about the facts of limited
war (in fact, as noted earlier, the "let the facts speak
for themselves" approach was followed), it remains, how
ever, that the analysis of the film content did not reveal
that an adequate job had been done of clearly addressing
either the factual or psychological components of the dilem
ma of limited war. In these connections the following ques
tions should be asked: Is there not at least a modicum of
truth in the charge that American troops in Korea lacked
psychological preparedness? Did the American soldier in
Korea understand his nation's mission and objectives as well
as his World War II counterpart? The implication the author
is endeavoring to point out here is this : The American
soldier today by comparison to his earlier counterpart is
a much better informed soldier as a result of the electronic
age in which he lives. He also faces a type of interna
tional strife which is fraught with ambiguities and devoid
of the simplicities of the "cowboy and Indians" morality
and the overly simplistic "good guys versus bad guys" di
chotomies which were not too inappropriate to the global
wars of earlier periods. His orientation film fare must
not, therefore, resemble his entertainment war film fare.
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198
Every indication points to the new requirement for the pro
ducers of troop orientation films to, first, learn as much
as possible about the new imperatives of limited war, and,
secondly, to learn as much about the national psychology
of the American people and how the peculiarities of limited
war impinge upon the American predispositions toward war.
These lessons must then be applied to the troop orientation
efforts.
To this point the author's remarks have been addres
sed mainly to soldiers. Lest the impression be given that
these remarks contain no implications for the community at
large, the author hastens to add that, in his opinion, Amer
ican civilians, in general to date, have shown little real
understanding of the complexities of limited war. The be
fuddled state of public opinion that exists today in Amer
ica concerning the current Vietnam War appears to be a pro
duct of doubt, misunderstanding, and a near-incapacity to
understand the requirements of limited war. This last
comment, it should be noted, is not intended as a criticism
or as a plea for abandonment of free public discourse.
Rather, it is suggested that the remarks regarding the need
for increased knowledge about the strategy of limited war
and about the people who may be called upon to fight or
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199
support limited war are indispensable to enlightened and
appropriate action.
To return to the subject of the influence of the
mass media on the opinions of soldiers, it appears essential
to note yet another dangerous potentiality which is in
herent in a situation characterized by a wide divergence of
broadly promulgated opinions. Reference is made here to
the influence of conflicting opinions and the potentially
negative influence this could have on the creditability of
the groop orientation efforts. In a word, can not the phe
nomenon of the so-called "creditability gap" occur among
soldiers as it reputedly has among civilians? In contem
plating an answer to this question, it was recalled that
the Experimental Film Research Program of World War II
(discussed in Chapter I of this study) investigated the
effects that resulted when the soldier detected or sus
pected the presence of, what he termed, "propaganda." In
such cases it was found that he tended to be influenced in
a direction negative to the direction intended by the prop
agandist.
The implication of the foregoing discussion is this :
Every effort should be made to insure that the content of
troop orientation films contain no material that is likely
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200
to falter under the test of creditability. Any persuasive
tactic that might cause the nation to incur the criticism
of its soldiers on this account would be tantamount to the
most flagrant disservice that an orientation film-maker
could commit. It is further suggested that a tactic of
evasion of counter arguments to the orientation message
also contains the seeds of incredulity. Again, this is
a result of the accessibility of counter opinions which
abound in the mass media.
When the characteristics of the Korean War films,
as revealed by this study, are viewed in the light of the
current state of public opinion, it now appears extremely
important that people engaged in orientation efforts under
stand that public dissension, and even anti-war sentiments
are perhaps implicit in a limited war situation involving
Americans. Further, the level of intensity of anti-war
sentiments (which seems to be increasing at this time be
cause of the Vietnam War,) would suggest that these senti
ments and their manifestations cannot be ignored or treated
with silence— as was nearly done in the film, "Why Vietnam."
Rather, they must be addressed directly and with candor in
the orientation media. It does not appear unwarranted, in
fact, that this should become a new orientation objective
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201
or theme to be added to the limited war themes which have
been discussed in this study. The admonition, however, is
given that every effort should be made in this thematic
approach to avoid taking issue with anti-war sentiments
in an ultra-patriotic manner. Rather, it would appear that,
armed with sufficient knowledge of the American war men
tality and the imperatives involved in the pursuit of limi
ted war, officials involved in orientation efforts should
be able to argue from a more enlightened point of view. In
this observer's opinion, this is the only course that ap
pears to hold any chance for success,
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this study appear to justify the
following recommendations:
1, Military officials charged with the responsi
bility for the formulation of orientation objectives should,
through specialized study, acquire extensive knowledge of
the sociology of the American soldier. They should also
acquire some basic knowledge of the principles and facts
of cultural anthropology,
2, Film propagandondists should acquire, at least,
a working familiarity with the results of film research
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202
studies— especially of those research studies conducted
with military orientation films.
3. Film propagandist should acquire academic pre
paration in psychology, sociology, and communication theory.
4. Film research should be undertaken to test ex
perimentally the unresolved hypotheses concerning the pre
conditioned motivations of soldiers.
5. Continuing studies should be conducted to facili
tate the interpretation of shifts in American attitudes
about international issues which are likely to cast the
nation into armed conflict; for no orientation objectives
for the nation's soldiers can be effective unless they are
addressed to the current ideological problems as well as
to the pre-conditioned attitudes which have been gained
through civilian life.
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APPENDIXES
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APPENDIX A
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Research Council
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences
W A R D EPARTMENT
PH OT OG RAP HI C SC ENA RIO
WAR FILM
T H E U. S. ARMY PR ESE NTS
"THE PRELUDE TO WAR"
A Special Service Orientation Film No. 1
OFFICIAL
COPY NO. 47 OF 50 COPIES
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PHOTOGRAPHIC S C E NAR I O
Special Service Division Orientation Film #1
The Prelude to War
August 3, 1942
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FADE IN
Main Title:
THE
U. S. ARMY
PRESENTS
SUPERIMPOSED over Eagle Insignia background.
DISSOLVE TO:
Second Title:
THE
PRELUDE
TO
WAR
SPECIAL SERVICE DIVISION
ORIENTATION FILM #1
SUPERIMPOSED over same background.
DISSOLVE TO:
Credit Title:
PRODUCED BY
THE
WAR DEPARTMENT
WITH
THE COOPERATION OF
THE RESEARCH COUNCIL
of the
ACADEMY OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS AND SCIENCES
SUPERIMPOSED over same background with crossed flags of
Signal Corps in one corner and Academy Insignia in the other.
DISSOLVE TO:
FORWARD ON ROLLING MAT over same Insignia:
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Standard Synchronization Leader
Fade in to Main Title:
"The U. S. Army Presents"
Dissolve to Second Title:
"The Prelude to War"
Dissolve to Standard Title:
Special Service Division Orientation
Film #1
Dissolve to
"Produced by the War Department"
Dissolve to
"Through cooperation of the
Rearch Council,
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and
Sciences 1942"
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209
8/10/42
This film, the first of a series, has been prepared by the
War Department to acquaint members of the Army with factual information
as to the causes, the events leading up to our entry into the war and
the principles for which we are fighting. A knowledge of these facts
is an indispensable part of military training and merits the thought
ful consideration of every American soldier.
We are determined that before the sun sets on this terrible
struggle our flag will be recognized throughout the world as a symbol
of freedom on the one hand, of overwhelming power on the other. No
compromise is possible and the victory of the democracies can only be
complete with the utter defeat of the war machines of Germany and
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff,
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FADE IN
3(S) MILITARY REVIEW (STOCK)
Colors pass CAMERA, which
PANS TO AS WIDE AN ANGLE
as possible of marching
troops in mass review.
QUICK MONTAGE bombing
of Pearl Harbor (STOCK)
Scenes end with views of
crippled ships, ruined
barracks.
Orientation Film #1
SOUND; Swell in quickly Military
SOUND : Fades out.
NARRATOR: Well, what is it about?
Why are we Americans on the March?
SOUND : Explosion and bombardment.
SOUND: Same.
SOUND: Abruptly fades as we come
to wreckage and there is momentary
silence. Then:
NARRATOR: Is it because of Pearl
Harbor? Is that why we are fighting?
Or is it because of . . .
LONDON fire and blitz.
(STOCK)
WIPE TO:
Invasion of France (STOCK)
Use scene of Swastika going
over Eiffel Tower or of the
armistice signing in Compiegne.
WIPE TO:
FAST MONTAGE (STOCK) of
swift moving German troops,
tanks and planes, advancing
at a constantly accelerated
pace. The speed of the
cutting finally evolves into
a whirling mass, which
finally smoothes out into:
. . . England
. or of France?
SOUND: Rumble of guns, planes.
NARRATOR: Or of Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belguim,
Holland, Albania, Yugoslavia,
Greece . . . or Russia?
4D MAP OF UNITED STATES
(DISNEY) SUPERIMPOSED
(S) OVER it SHOTS of war pro
duction. (STOCK)
Just what was it that made us
change our way of living over
night? What turned our resources.
. . .our machines . . . our whole
nation into one vast arsenal . . .
(CONTINUED)
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211
Orientation Film #1
The war production SHOTS
FADE OUT as CAMERA PULLS
BACK to:
A map of the whole world.
(DISNEY) It is animated
with little American flags
at every point where Ameri
can troops are based.
SUPERIMPOSED over this are
marching American soldiers.
As if in answer to the
question, a title ZOOMS
UP INTO FOREGROUND,
SUPERIMPOSED over scene,
it reads :
"This is a fight between
a free world and a slave
world ..."
And beneath this in similar
"Vice President Henry A.
Wallace, New York, May 8
1942."
5D DISSOLVE
ANIMATED DRAWING (DISNEY)
Two globes spin slowly
on opposite sides of the
screen. Both globes are
almost translucent.
A vast shadow slowly
spreads across the right-
hand globe, wiping out its
brilliance.
CAMERA MOVES IN ON the
still shining globe.
producing more and more weapons of
war instead of the old materials of
What put us into uniform, ready to
engage the enemy on every continent
and every ocean?
What are these two worlds of which
Mr. Wallace spoke . . . the free
. . . and the slave? Let's take
the free world first . . .
. . . our world.
SOUND: Musical underscoring
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By now CAMERA HAS MOVED
through globe into a
CLOSEUP of the Ten Com
mandments (DISNEY) en
graved on a doublefaced
stone tablet.
NARRATOR: How did it become free?
Only through a long and unceasing
struggle inspired by men of vision.
SOUND: At mention of his name
there is a break in the music.
Now CAMERA MOVES DOWN TO
one Commandment. "Thou
shalt not covet that which is
thy neighbor's."
DISSOLVE
CLOSE SHOT - the Koran
(DISNEY)
The pages riffle until
CAMERA FOCUSES on a
quotation: "Mankind is
one community."
DISSOLVE
CLOSE SHOT - The Aphor
isms of Confucius (DISNEY)
The pages riffle until the
CAMERA FOCUSES on the
quotation: "What you do
not want done to yourself,
do not do to others."
DISSOLVE
NARRATOR: . . . Mohammed . . .
SOUND: Again the break in music.
NARRATOR: . ... Confucius . . .
SOUND : Again the break in music.
CLOSE SHOT - the Holy Bible.
DISSOLVE
The pages riffle until the
CAMERA FOCUSES on the words :
"For freedom did Christ set
us free," or "Truth shall
make you free," (?) or "You
. . Christ .
SOUND: Again the break in the
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shall know the truth and
the truth shall make you
DISSOLVE TO
213
Orientation Film #1
7(D) The two globes again.
(DISNEY)
(S) THE CAMERA BEGINS TO MOVE
IN ON the shaded globe.
The globe opens so that
a map of the whoId world
fills the screen.
From Tokyo, a dark, inky
poison spreads out, filling
the borders of Japan.
The same poison now spreads
from Berlin over Germany.
The same poison spreads from
Rome, engulfing Italy.
CAMERA MOVES IN ON Italy.
The borders of which become
a VIGNETTE framing the
Fascist march on Rome (STOCK)
The VIGNETTE FADES OUT leav
ing the MONTAGE OF STOCK
SCENES of Italy.
NARRATOR: But what of this other
world?
SOUND: Sharp musical interjection.
. . . Here, men insisted . . .
. . . that progress
freedom.
lay in killing
Here they were putting out the
light-houses . . . one by one.
Here the march of history was
reversing itself.
In Italy it began when an am
bitious rabble rouser set his
followers marching on Rome.
The country . . . like every other
country after the last war . . .
was torn by political unrest . . .
hard times . . . unemployment.
Two courses were available to the
Italian people. They could solve
their problems in a free, demo
cratic way, or they could let some
one do the solving for them. They
made the tragic mistake of using
the second course.
They put their trust and faith in
this one man. They believed he
represented them. Actually he plan
ned to betray them for the selfish
interests of himself and the group
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214
Orientation Film #1
The VIGNETTE begins to
come in again.
back of him . , .
. . . just as he had earlier be
trayed those who first supported
WIPE RIGHT TO:
Boundaries of Germany.
(DISNEY) VIGNETTING early
Munich brownshirt parade.
(STOCK)
The VIGNETTE FADES OUT,
leaving STOCK SCENES of
Germany.
The VIGNETTE begins to
come in again.
WIPE LEFT TO
In Germany another and even more
forceful demagogue, set his fol
lowers marching from the Munich
beer-halls.
He, too, had the sinister oppor
tunity to take advantage of post
war chaos. He also had certain
distinctive German characteristics
to play on. To start with, the
Germans have an inborn national
love of regimentation and harsh
discipline. He could give them
that. The German army . . . and
through them the people . . . had
never acknowledged German defeat
in the last war and were anxious
for revenge. That, too, he
promised them. The wealthy and
powerful industrialists were fear
ful of losing any of their wealth
and power. They were ready to
back anyone who would retain it
for them.
This man cunningly played all
these ends against the middle
and set out to ruthlessly murder
the new-born German Republic.
Borders of Japan.
(DISNEY) VIGNETTING a group
of Japanese generals (STOCK)
VIGNETTE FADES OUT
leaving Japanese
STOCK scenes.
In Japan you'd expect things to be
done a little differently. They
were. Not one man, but a gang
............... disguised their
schemes as the will of the em
peror. And to the Japanese people
the emperor is God. Taking ad
vantage of their fanatical worship
of the God-Emperor . . . it was
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215
Orientation Film #1
DISSOLVE TO
LONG SHOT crowd of Japanese
bowing and cheering the war
lords. (STOCK)
WIPE RIGHT TO
LONG SHOT Germans
frantically hailing their
Führer. (STOCK)
WIPE LEFT TO
LONG SHOT Italians before
Mussolini's palace, cheer
ing (STOCK)
no great trick to take away what
little freedom they had ever known.
Yes . . . In these lands the people
surrendered their llberltles and
threw away their human dignity . . .
SOUND; The crowd roars "BanzaiI
Banzai!"
NARRATOR: . . . gave up their
rights as Individual human beings.
SOUND: "Selg Hell: Selg Hell:"
NARRATOR: And became part of a
mass, a human herd.
SOUND: Vive 11 Duce: Vive 11
Duce:"
DISSOLVE TO
8(D) DISNEY Animation
(PRODUCTION) World map
with attenuated line
linking the three
countries and finally
actually spelling out the
word "A-X-I-S"
DISSOLVE TO
9(S) Blackshirts In early
scuffles. (STOCK)
WIPE RIGHT TO
Brownshlrts In early
scuffles (STOCK)
WIPE LEFT TO
NARRATOR: Although these countries
were far apart and different In
custom and In language the same
poison made them much alike. Each
got a new uniform.
In Italy, the new bosses wore
blackshirts,
In Germany, they wore brownshlrts.
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Japanese Generals
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
9(D) DISNEY Animation of
Japan with Black Dragon
sign SUPERIMPOSED.
WIPE RIGHT TO
DISNEY Animation of
Germany with swastika
SUPERIMPOSED,
WIPE LEFT TO
DISNEY Animation of Italy,
with lictor's faces
SUPERIMPOSED.
DISSOLVE TO
10(S)Stormtroopers lined up
in military formation.
DISSOLVE TO
Blackshirts line up in
same formation.
DISSOLVE TO
216
Orientation Film #1
In Japan, they hid behind the
uniform of the army, but really
they belonged to a sinister secret
society.
Their symbol was a black dragon.
The other fellows had to have a
symbol too. In Germany, a swastika.
In Italy, the old Roman symbol
of the fasces.
In Germany they called the order
National Socialism or Naziism.
. . . Italy they had a shorter
word. Fascism!
Japanese soldiers lined
up in the same formation.
. . . In Japan they had lots of
names for it. The New Era of
Enlightenment . . . The New Order
in Asia . . . the Co-Prosperity
Sphere. But no matter how you
slice it, it was just plain old-
fashioned militaristic im
perialism. The Japs would get the
prosperity and the others would get
the "co."
DISSOLVE TO
CLOSE UP OF Hirohito
(STOCK) or INSERT from
photograph (PRODUCTION)
They say trouble always comes in
threes. Take a good close look at
this trio . , .
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217
Orientation Film #1
WIPE TO
BIG HEAD CLOSE UP Mus
solini (STOCK) in one of
his tirades.
WIPE TO
. . . remember these faces.
BIG HEAD CLOSE UP of
Hitler, rendered in the
same manner. (STOCK)
FRAME PRINT STILL of Hitler,
and PULL BACK to reveal the
heads of Mussolini and
Hirohito beside his.
CAMERA MOVES IN ON
Hitler. Again the NORMAL
PRINTING; again the shouts.
LONG SHOT cheering Nazi
crowds.
remember them well.
The New Order Boys. If you ever
meet them . . . don't hesitate.
NARRATOR: "Stop thinking and
follow me," cried Hitler. "I
will make you masters of the world I
And the people answered "Heill"
CLOSE SHOT Mussolin
(STOCK)
orating
LONG SHOT Crowds cheering.
"Stop thinking and believe in me,"
bellowed Mussolini, "and I will
restore the glory that was Rome."
And the people answered "Ducel
Japanese general exhorting
an audience. (PRODUCTION
if necessary)
LONG SHOT Japanese crowd
applauding (STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
"Stop thinking and follow your
God Emperor," cried the Japanese
war lords. "And Japan will rule
the world."
And the people answered, "BanzaiI
Banzai I"
SHOT of the old Reichstag
Building in Berlin, with an
inscription over it: "To
the German People."
(STOCK)
Each system was alike in that the
constitutional law-making bodies
gave up their power . . . the
Reichstag in Berlin . . .
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218
Orientation Film #1
SHOT of the House of
Deputies in Rome (STOCK)
SHOT of the Diet in Tokyo.
THREE SHOTS (ALL STOCK) of
the members of these bodies
applauding.
the House of Deputies in Rome
. . . the Diet in Tokyo , . .
. . . and these elected representa
tives become collections of stooges,
rubberStamp organizations, applaud
ing on cue of the words of the
leaders.
DISOLVE TO
11(P)CLOSE SHOT a poster on
wall. (PRODUCTION
NOTE: Heller get copy) In
German it announces the
banning of all meetings.
English lettering
SUPERIMPOSED over bottom of
frame, explains it.
DISSOLVE TO
12(S)Whirling presses grinding
out newspapers. (STOCK)
12(P)CLOSE SHOT papers
(PRODUCTION) as they pile
up one on top of the other.
They each bear a Berlin date
line and the imprint of a
swastika.
DISSOLVE TO
14(S)CLOSE SHOT a judge's bench
at which sit three judges
. . . behind them the in
evitable swastika.
(PRODUCTION)
Each system did away with free
speech and free assembly.
Each system did away with a free
press . . .
. . . and substituted a press con
trolled by the party.
13(P)INSERT (PRODUCTION)
plaque on side of building,
identifying it as Ministry of radio.
Propaganda and also the in
evitable swastika.
Each took complete control of the
theatre . . . the movies . . . the
Each did away with free courts and
trial by jury and substituted courts
and judges run by the party.
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Orientation Film #1
16(S)Labor gang working in
drill-like precision on
canal project (STOCK)
17(F)CLOSE SHOT the Nazi in charge
(PRODUCTION) as he raises a
whistle to his lips and blows
a shrill blast.
18(S)The labor gang men (STOCK)
as they break off their
work, "Heil Hitler" and
resume work.
Each abolished labor unions and the
rights of bargaining for wages . . .
And under the pretext of patriotism
established a system of forced
DISSOLVE
19(F)A man's arm, the swastika
on his sleeve, banging on
a door with the butt of a
gun. (PRODUCTION)
Each enforced its decrees by an
army of secret police, who held
the power of life and death over
every individual.
DISSOLVE TO
20(F)"MEIN KAMFF" by Adolf
Hitler" (PRODUCTION)
which opens to a page in
German.
And for the few who still believed
in freedom and said so. . . there
was a ready answer.
The page DISSOLVES into the
English translation: "The
application of force alone
. . . can never bring about
the destruction of an idea
. . . unless one is ready
ruthlessly to exterminate
the last upholder of that
idea and wipe out any tradi
tion which it may leave
behind." Mein Kampf, page
187, German Edition; Page
221 English edition.
"Only . . . the application
of brute force, used con-
tinously and ruthlessly, can
bring about the decision in
favor of the side it supports.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Mein Kampf, Page 189, German
edition. Page 223, English
edition.
22 0
Orientation Film #1
DISSOLVE TO:
21(P)CL0SE SHOT of a black
shirt addressing a group
of followers and demon
strating with his black
jack. (PRODUCTION)
22(S)A GROUP OF BLACKSHIRTS
shouting approval (STOCK)
WIPE TO
23(P)A STORMTROOPER
speaking to a group of
his fellows.
(PRODUCTION)
24(S)A group of stormtroopers
shouting approval. (STOCK)
25(P)Over crowd is SUPERIMPOSED
an enormous pistol which
moves UP INTO CAMERA as the
crowd in background FADES
OUT.
BLACKSHIRT: Con una Mazza si
puo imporre silencio ai piu grandi
intelletti del mondo.
NARRATOR: (Translating)
"The greatest intellect in the
world can be silenced with this."
That is an exact translation of the
words these blackshirts cheer so
lustily.
STORMTROOPER: "Wenn ick dash wort
Kultur hore, so grief ick gleich
nach meinen revolver." (Errors in
spelling contained in original)
NARRATOR: (Translating)
"Whenever I hear anyone mention
the word 'culture' . . . the first
thing I do is reach for my gun."
Yes . . . they had the answer . . .
The blackjack . . . and the gun.
The gun fires, starting a
MONTAGE of newspaper head
lines of political assassina
tions (PRODUCTION). The first
paper ZOOMS INTO CAMERA . . .
holds a minute . . . the gun
fires again . . . another paper
ZOOMS UP . . . and after five
or six such deliveries CAMERA
HOLDS ON paper announcing
assassination of General Von
Schleicher. Date-line on paper
should be distinct, and head
line should read :
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
221
Orientation Film #1
"Former German
Chancellor Assassinated"
Under this a sub-head:
"Leader Who Opposed
Hitler Murdered in his
Beside this is a picture
of the Chancellor.
26(P)During this the gun has
FADED OUT and, in its place, has
been SUPERIMPOSED a CLOSE SHOT
of a door which opens, reveal
ing five storm troopers. One
of them speaks: STORMTROOPER: (Sharply)
General Von Schleicher I
REVERSE ANCLE. Seated at
a desk, BACK TO CAMERA,
is the General, talking into
a telephone. On the wall
over the mantle is the in
signia of the German Re
public. As the General
starts to turn toward
CAMERA, CAMERA MOVES FOR
WARD PAST him toward in
signia. There are five
shots off scene and the SOUND: Five shots,
insignia is shattered by
a bullet.
27(P)The SUPERIMPOSED SCENE
DISSOLVES OUT leaving the
newspaper which is replaced
by another paper announc
ing the death of Giacomo
Matteotti. NARRATOR: In Italy they did it
differently.
Now the paper and date
line is distinct and the
headline across it reads :
"MATTEOTTI KIDNAPPED AND
SLAIN." Beneath this a
sub-head: "Spokesman for
opposition parties murdered."
Over it is SUPERIMPOSED
(PRODUCTION)a quick FLASH
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
Orientation Film #1
of a large sedan, vintage
1924, which roars past
CAMERA.. As it does so, the
door is opened and a lifeless
body hurled out into the
street. The PRODUCTION
SCENE FADES OUT leaving the
paper which is replaced by
another paper, with distinct
dateline, announcing the
death of Viscount Saito.
28(P)The headline reads: "VIS
COUNT SAITO ASSASSINATED
BY ARMY CLIQUE." Beneath
this a smaller head:
"Japanese Diplomat Murdered
in his Bed."
SUPERIMPOSED (PRODUCTION)
CLOSE SHOT five Japanese
Officers firing pistols
straight into CAMERA.
CLOSE SHOT a thin, emaciated
body crumplint to the floor.
29(P)SUPERIMPOSED MATERIAL FADES
OUT leaving newspaper which
is replaced by a continuation
of MONTAGE, headlines now
announcing more executions
of political opposition
(notably Roehm assassina
tion) Over this SUPER
IMPOSE (PRODUCTION) im
pressionistic MONTAGE of
firing pistols . . , guil-
liotine axe falling . . .
firing squad.
DISSOLVE TO
30(S)LONG SHOT of ancient German
cathedral. (STOCK)
While in Japan
To their names can be added those
of hundreds and thousands of others
who stood in the way of the new
Finally, there is only i
Stacie left.
SOUND: The musical scoring fea
tures a definately religious theme.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Orientation Film #1
31(P)INT, CHURCH (PRODUCTION)
In the foreground a few
people kneel quietly, lit
by the strong rays shining
through a stained glass
window in the background.
CAMERA MOVES FORWARD to
inscription on wall:
"I am the Light of the
World; He That Followeth Me
Shall Not Walk in Darkness."
32(P)CAMERA PANS UP to the stained
glass window,
(S)which shows Christ.
The word of God and the word of
Fuhrers cannot be reconciled.
HARSH VOICE: Then God must go!
Process
Over this a rock comes
crashing through the
window . . . shattering the
glass. Through the hole is
evident (TRANSPARENCY) a
building across the street
which is covered with a por
trait of Hitler, and over it
the words, "Heil Hitler," SOUND: Roar of crows : "Heill
Heil!"
DISSOLVE TO
33(S)CLOSE SHOT Rosenberg speak
ing in German to a party
congress. (STOCK)
SUPERIMPOSE TITLE:
"Doctor Alfred Rosenberg,
Chief of the Political
Bureau of the Nazi party, at
Nuremberg Congress, 1938,"
HARSH VOICE: (Translating)
"I am absolutely clear in my own
mind, and I think I can speak for
Führer as well, that both the
Catholic and Protestant churches
must vanish from the life of our
people."
Nazi party members applaud,
34(P)DISS0LVE TO
EXTERIOR CHURCH (PRO
DUCTION) LOW ANGLE
NARRATOR: Thus spoke Doctor
Alfred Rosenberg, And if you have
any doubt that he spoke for his
Führer, here is what happened :
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
224
Orientation Film #1
SHOT SHOOTING UP TOWARD
top of church from which
two uniformed Nazis are
just removing the cross.
Two others place the
swastika in its stead.
SUPERIMPOSED over this:
"... the Christian
cross is to be removed
from all churches and
cathedrals and is to be
replaced by the immortal
symbol of Germany, the
swastika." Article XXX
German Church Regulations.
DISSOLVE TO
35(P)Wall on which is the plaque
of two tablets engraved with
the Ten Commandments in Ger-
(PRODUCTION)
NOTE: This should be an exact
replica of the earlier Ten
Commandments tablet, so that
it will be quickly recognized.
SUPERIMPOSE TITLE: "Courthouse
in Bremen, Germany, 1934." The hands
of stormtroopers remove the plaque
with hammers and chisels.
DISSOLVE TO
36(P)Jewish inscription over
entrance to Tabernacle.
(PRODUCTION) Flames from
below CAMERA lick at it
hurriedly. SUPERIMPOSE
Title : "Berlin, Germany,
1934."
DISSOLVE TO
37(P)INT. CATHOLIC CHURCHDAY
(STOCK) CAMERA reveals the
wreckage of shattered
statuary and religious sym
bols lying on the floor before
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
Orientation Film #1
the alter. SUPERIMPOSE TITLE:
"Church of Our Lady, Landau,
July 12, 1939."
DISSOLVE TO
38(P)SOLID WOODEN GATE PRODUCTION
On it is a sign reading, in
German: "Young Lutherans
League" and over which is a
cross. A stormtrooper nails
up a new sign over it. On
top of an enormous swastiak
is printed, "Eintrett Ver-
boten." Over it is SUPER
IMPOSED TITLE: "700,000
members of the Protest and Youth
organizations were forced to
disband."
DISSOLVE TO
39(S)CLOSE UP Goebbels.
(STOCK) SUPERIMPOSE
TITLE: "Doctor Goebbels,
February 17, 1927."
DISSOLVE TO
CLOSE UP - Streicher
orating. (STOCK)
SUPERIMPOSE TITLE;
"Julius Streicher,
publisher of 'Der Steurmer',
Munich, July, 1935."
40(P)DISSOLVE TO
MON-)MONTAGE OF NEWSPAPER HEAD-
TAGE)LINES announcing the arrest
and persecution of religious
figures. After four or five
a newspaper announces the
attack on the palace of Car
dinal Faulhaber in Munich.
DISSOLVE TO
VOICE: (On filter) Our Führer
is the intermediary between his
people and the Throne of God.
Everything the Führer utters is
religion in the highest sense.
VOICE (On filter) It is only on
one or two exceptional points
that Christ and Hitler stand com
parison, for Hitler is far too big
a man to be compared with One so
NARRATOR: On November 12, 1938,
vandals ruthlessly sacked the home
of Cardinal Faulhaber.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Newspaper headline
announcing imprisonment
of Pastor Niemoller.
Now the MONTAGE resumes
faster and ever faster.
226
Orientation Film #1
On March 2, 1938, Pastor Niemoller
disappeared into a concentration
Thousands of other men of God
. . . Protestant . . . Catholic
. . . Jewish . . . were persecuted,
arrested, confined in concentration
camps.
The MONTAGE continues
suddenly stopping on a
DIRECT CUT to:
41(P)INTERIOR CLASSROOM
(PRODUCTION) Little German
children singing, in German,
their eyes fixed adoringly on
a picture of Hitler in Knight's
accoutrements. On the bottom
of the screen is SUPERIMPOSED
line by line, the translation of
their song:
"Adolf Hitler is our savior, our hero.
He is the noblest being in the whole
wide world.
For Hitler we live.
For Hitler we die.
Our Hitler is our Lord
Who rules a brave new world."
DISSOLVE TO
42(P)INT. ANOTHER CLASSROOM
(PRODUCTION) Little
Italian children salut
ing the portrait of Mus
solini.
DISSOLVE TO
43(P)INT. ANOTHER CLASSROOM
Little Japanese children
bowing.
44(S)CLOSE SHOT - Picture of
Hirohito on his horse.
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
Yes . . . take children from
the faiths of their fathers and
teach them the state is only
church.
and the head of the state . .
is the voice of God.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Japanese children march
ing (STOCK).
227
Orientation Film #1
Military band.
Italian children marching
(STOCK)
German children marching.
(STOCK)
Japanese youths marching.
(STOCK)
WIPE TO
Italian youths marching.
WIPE TO
German youths marching.
(STOCK)
Japanese soldiers marching.
(STOCK)
Italian soldiers marching.
(STOCK)
German soldiers marching.
(STOCK)
WIPE TO
STOCK SHOTS people on streets
watching . . . reflecting their
degradation, behind the locked
arms of the Nazi guards, end
ing with HIGH ANGLE SHOT SHOOTING
over heads of three women DOWN
to parade below. (STOCK).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45 (p)REVERSE ANGLE (PRODUCTION)
(Shooting into window to the
three women) their faces
showing their fear and frus
tration ending with one woman
finally raising her hand in a
faltering Nazi salute,
DISSOLVE TO
46(D)WORLD MAP with aggressor
nations stippled in.
(DISNEY PRODUCTION)
The map folds up into
darkened world.
CAMERA NOW PULLS BACK
to reveal the two worlds.
CAMERA MOVES in toward
still shining one.
The world opens up into
another map, and CAMERA
MOVES DOWN on the United
States (DISNEY)
DISSOLVE TO
46(S)Signing of the Nine Power
Treaty, with SUPERIMPOSED
TITLE identifying it.
WIPE TO
Signing of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact (STOCK)
with SUPERIMPOSED TITLE
identifying it.
WIPE TO
Meeting of Washington
Disarmament Conference.
(STOCK)
That was the way of life . . .
or better, the way of death . .
. . . in that other world.
Now, what of our world . . .
. . . the democratic world.
We belong to it. What did we
want? And what did we do about it?
First of all we wanted peace and
security.
We signed treaties that outlawed
war as a means of settling inter
national disputes.
And to prove our sincerity, we
initiated the Washington Disarma
ment Conference, as a result of
which . . .
DISSOLVE TO
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
229
Orientation Film #1
Scrapping of ships.
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE
47(D)DISNEY ANIMATION showing
comparative size, popula
tion, etc., of the United
States and Portugal, with
comparative strength of
48(S)WORLD PEACEWAYS ADVER
TISEMENT (PRODUCTION)
. . . we willingly scrapped seventy
per cent of our naval tonnage.
. . . and reduced our army 120,000
men, a smaller force than that
maintained by the tiny state of
Portugal.
When collective force might have
saved the peace of the world, we,
like the other democracies, failed
to back our convictions.
DISSOLVE TO
Pickets outside White
House, carrying peace
We let ourselves be influenced by
those who said that we could find
security through isolation. Here
is a slice of public opinion as
it appeared in Pathe News in
DISSOLVE TO
MONTAGE OF American
Public opinion. (STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
49(S)MONTAGE of manifestations
against war. (STOCK)
INTERCUT with three INSERTS
(PRODUCTION) of banners
demanding "No foreign
entanglement.
DISSOLVE TO
50(S)Depression shots (STOCK)
We let our hopes for peace become
so strong that they grew into a
determination not to fight unless
directly attacked. We simply did
not want to understand that our
individual and national problems
were, and always will be, dependent
upon the problems of the whole
And we had individual and national
problems to worry about. Plenty
of them. Just as Germany, Italy,
and Japan had. But we faced them
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DISSOLVE TO
230
Orientation Film #1
in a democratic way.
President Roosevelt
signing the National Labor
Relations Act (STOCK) with
SUPERIMPOSED title.
QUICK CUTS of new civic
buildings. (STOCK)
QUICK CUTS of Boulder
and other big dams.
(STOCK)
C.C.C. boys at work.
(STOCK)
We passed laws to give working men
a chance to improve their lot.
A Federal Works program came into
being and changed the face of our
nation with new roads, bridges,
schools.
We built great new dams which
brought the miracle of electricity
to millions of our people.
We organized the C.C.C. to provide
our young men with healthy and
useful employment.
51(P)Newspaper headlines
announcing Unemployment
Insurance Act passage.
We established an insurance pro
gram for those without jobs.
52(P)Another newspaper carrying
an account of Social
Security Laws passage.
53(P)Newspaper INSERTS
announcing passage of
Labor and Hours Act and
other bills. (PRODUCTION)
Heller: check research
DISSOLVE TO
54(S)Campaign scenes from
last elections. (STOCK)
SHARP WIPE TO
Vote "Ja for Hitler"
We began to give our old folks
protection against want and hunger.
Yes . . . we made mistakes and
we were far from perfect, but we
were moving steadily forward. And
we never had a thought of losing
the free institutions we were born
John Q. Public still ran the
country. And he'd have laughëd
at you if you'd told him this .
could possibly happen to him.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
scenes. (STOCK)
55(P)Bookshop window (PRODUC
TION) with passers-by
reflected in glass. On
exhibition are all con
troversial books , . .
"Mein Kampf", "Wave of the
Future," etc.
SHARP WIPE TO
56(S)Book burning in Germany
(STOCK)
57(P)CLOSE SHOT section of fire
PRODUCTION as into it are
thrown books . . . their
titles clear before they are
consumed by the flames. They
should include "Farewell to
Arms," "All Quiet on the
Western Front," "Martin Eden,"
"The Magic Mountain" the Poems
of Heinrich, Heine, and Mendel
ssohn's "Spring Song."
DISSOLVE TO
58(S)exterior church (STOCK)
with people entering
231
Orientation Film #1
He still read what and when he
pleased. And although he heard
of books being burned in other
countries . . .
. . . he dismissed the thought it
could ever happen to his.
SOUND: Choir singing over.
NARRATOR: And on Sunday . . .
if he felt like it . . . John Q
went to any church he pleased.
59(P)INT. CHURCH (PRODUCTION)
Section of choir, INTER
CUT with three or four CLOSE UPS
of kids . . . Negro and White
singing the hymn
DISSOLVE TO
60(S)MONTAGE of American kids
at play, (STOCK from "The
City") to cover final
footage of MONTAGE
And most of all he got a kick out
of seeing his kids grow up.
He was quite unconscious of the
fact that some people had this in
mind for little John Q.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
232
Orientation Film #1
WIPE TO
QUICK MONTAGE (STOCK)
of German, Italian and
Jap children drilling
. . . wearing gas masks,
etc. Over final footage
61(P)INT. American schoolroom.
DAY - (PRODUCTION) CLOSE
SHOT of sign on contri
bution box which reads :
"Japanese earthquake re
lief." CAMERA PULLS BACK
to show kids dropping coins
into the box. Beside it
there is a small poster
"Help the Japanese children.'
DISSOLVE
62(S)The most ludicrous shots
of Goering, Ciano, etc.,
(ALL STOCK) in strutting
attitudes.
Yes . . . while their children
were trained to kill . . .
John Q's kids were giving their
pennies to help them
And when we saw these men in
the news reels, quite often we
laughed. To us they looked like
characters in a musical comedy.
But they weren't comic. They
weren't funny. They were deadly
serious. They were out for world
conquest.
PANNING SHOT of cheering
German, Italian and
Japanese crowds (STOCK)
CLOSE SHOT Hitler
orating
SUCCESSIVE CLOSE UPS
(STOCK) of the sweating,
distorted faces of the
Nazis addressing a meet
ing (Triumph of the Will)
And what made it doubly serious
was that there were 70 million
Japanese . . . 45 million Italians
and 80 million Germans, all hopped
up with the same idea.
Their leaders told them they were
supermen. "Herrenvolk" the Nazis
called it . . . the master race. .
destined to rule all other peoples
on earth.
Take a good look at these men.
These were to be the rulers of the
ruling race.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and some for Italian
and Japanese, if
possible.
BIGGER CLOSEUPS of
German leaders haran-
WIDE ANGLE SHOT of
wildly cheering throngs.
(STOCK)
63(F)CLOSE UP Banner printed
in Italian.
64(S)WIDE ANGLE SHOT Italian
crowd roaring.
65(P)CLOSE SHOT banner
printed in German
66(S)WIDE ANGLE SHOT cheering
Nazi throng (STOCK)
67(P)CLOSE SHOT banner
printed in Japanese.
68(S)WIDE ANGLE SHOT
Japanese mob shrieking
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
233
Orientation Film #1
"Obey us blindly and you will
attain your rightful place in
the world. All other people
will be your slaves."
That's what they promised them.
That Americans, Chinese, Russian,
South Americans . . . all the free
peoples would work for them and
make them rich. And how they ate
it up.
SOUND : A roar of "Heils - Duces -
Banzais."
NARRATOR: We shall restore the
glory that was Rome.
SOUND: Ducel Ducel Ducel
Corsical Ethiopial Ducel
NARRATOR: (Translating) "Today
we rule Germany - tomorrow the
world."
SOUND: Heill Heill Heill
NARRATOR: (Translating)
The Pacific is ours.
SOUND: Banzai 1 Banzai 1 Banzai 1
German, Italian and Japan
ese representatives sign
ing the Tripartite Pact.
NARRATOR: It was inevitable that
these countries should gang up on
us. The little man is our friend
Kurusu, who smiled his way into
our hearts in early December of
1941. What are they doing? Carv
ing up the world in advance . . .
staking out their claims. This
was the bite the Nazis reserved
for themselves.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
234
Orientation Film #1
DISSOLVE TO
69(D)World Map (DISNEY)
It is animated with two
shades of stippline . . .
one to show German claims
for actual occupation,
which should include the
Ukraine, Poland, Czecho
slovakia, Siberia, etc.,
the other, lighter in color,
which spreads over a far
greater radius, should in
clude all of South America
and Central America, with
arrows pointing up into the
United States.
The Italian claims are now
animated in with different
stippling.
SUPERIMPOSED over map
is a CLOSE SHOT of the
Tanaka Memorial.
The book FADES OUT and a
fourth kind of stippling
comes in to cover the
Japanese claims.
The darker portions were to become
part of the Reich. The lighter
portions . . . we . . . they were
described as "spheres of influence"
which means controlled completely
by Germany, all others keep out.
The Italians were to get this
little hunk.
. . . they were to recapture the
old Roman empire, control of the
Mediterranean and all the lands
it touches . . . "Mare Nostrum,"
"Our Sea" they called it.
And as for the Japanese - they had
some pretty good ambitions, too.
They were set down in a very
interesting document by their
Prime Minister Baron Giishi Tanaka
and presented it to the Emperor
on July 25, 1927.
Here were their plans : first,
conquer Manchuria for raw material.
Second, conquer China for man power.
Third, establish bases in the South
Pacific for the final goal. Fourth
and finally, conquer the United
Now stippling covers the
West Coast of the United
The map is now practically
entirely covered with their
claims.
There it is, gents. There's the
world we are to live in. . .
according to them. And did they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DISSOLVE TO
7G(S)CLOSE SHOT - Admiral
Yamamoto. (STOCK)
SUPERIMPOSED TITLE:
"Admiral Yamamoto,
Commander in Chief of
the Japanese Navy."
71(S)Washington background
with Japanese troops
71(P)SUPERIMPOSED,
235
Orientation Film #1
Listen . . . "When war comes be
tween Japan and the United States
I shall not be content merely to
occupy Guam, the Philippines,
Hawaii and San Francisco. 1 look
forward to dictating the peace
to the United States in the White
House at Washington." Yamamoto
wrote those words in January of
1941. Yes, the conquering Jap army
down Pennsylvania Avenue.
That was the final goal. You will
see what they did to the men and
women of Nanking, Hong Kong and
Manila. Imagine the field day
they'd enjoy if they marched
through the streets of Washington.
DISSOLVE TO
72(D)CLOSE SHOT - Globe
(DISNEY)
At mention of each city,
a radio tower is suddenly
Now the towers start
furiously pounding out
their message . . . the
dashes going in all
directions.
CLOSE SHOT radio towers
(DISNEY) with rays shoot
ing out which spell "LIES I
LIES : LIES ! SUPER
IMPOSE heads of actual
speakers (STOCK) shouting
into microphones.
But before striking, a preliminary
step was necessary.
From Berlin . . . from Rome. From
Tokyo . . . the campaign started.
Propaganda to confuse . . .
divide . . . soften up their
intended victims.
Put them on the defensive: Holler
you're abused. Shout you're
oppressed. The world's wrong -
you're right. If you shriek it
loud enough and often enough -
they'll believe you. Above all,
use their free press and their
free speech to destroy them.
73(P)The towers FADE OUT
leaving only the heads of the
actual speakers and their
voices become clear. They
are all shrieking for one
thing: SOUND: "LebensraumI Lebensraum!
LebensraumI
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
236
Orientation Film #1
DISSOLVE TO
74(D)Map of section of Europe
(DISNEY) showing the
borders of Germany, Italy
bulging in all directions.
75(P)PANNING SHOT (PRODUCTION)
on long row of kids up to
mother with child in arms
as Italian officer pins
medal on her.
NARRATOR: "Lebenstraum" they de
manded, Living room. Our lands
are overcrowded.
But at the same time they gave
prises to the mothers who bore
the most sons.
They brought together large groups
of young men and young girls for
human breeding.
DISSOLVE
76(P)INSERT (PRODUCTION) of
German newspaper "Der
Hammer."
Now over "Der Hammer" is
SUPERIMPOSED A ROLLING
TITLE which reads: "Round
up a thousand German girls.
Isolate them in a camp.
Then let them be joined by
a hundred German men. If
a hundred such camps were
set up, you would have 100,000
thoroughbred children in
one stroke."
Dr. Willibaud Hentschel.
DISSOLVE TO
77(S)Baby clinic scenes (STOCK) Of course the children from this
assembly line belong to the state
. . . to be scientifically trained
for conquest.
QUICK CUTS Hitler, Mussolini Another howl was a lack of raw
and Japanese general in materials. They clained they were
violent outburst (STOCK) the "have nots" and we were the
Military review from
"Das Deutsches Heer."
But out of this supposed lack, they
built up the greatest war machines
the world has ever known.
78(D)Disney animation showing
annual increase of
These are the published figures
for the German military budget.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
military budget in Germany.
The published figures were
as follows:
1932 253,500,000
1934 381,800,000
1935 2,600,000,000
1936 3,600,000,000
1938 4,400,000,000
1939 (?)
1940 (?)
1933-39 80,000,000,000
79(S)PANZER DIVISIONS ROLLING
(STOCK)
MOTORIZED COLUMNS
ROLLING (STOCK)
INFANTRY MARCHING (STOCK)
GERMAN PLANES IN FLIGHT
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
80(D)Disney animation con
trasting the volume
of bread, milk, meat, etc.
that could have been
purchased against the guns,
planes and tanks that were
purchased.
DISSOLVE TO
81(P)Headline of military
appropriations (PRO
DUCTION)
237
Orientation Film #1
Actually, between 1933 and 1939
Hitler spent over 80 billions of
dollars for rearmament.
The Nazis alone amassed a striking
force of. . .
. . . 30 Panzer Divisions . . .
. . . 70 motorized Divisions
. . . 140 Divisions of Infantry
, . . plus the Luftwaffe . . .
the world's largest air force.
And they had no raw materials.
Think of the bread . . . the
automobiles . . . the good things
of life that the German, Italian,
and Japanese leaders might have
given their people if they spent
this money for peace instead of
You know what billions we are now
spending to match their military
force. No. . . these arguments
were all smoke screens.
DISSOLVE TO
82(S)Impressive scenes of
German, Italian and
Japanese military might
(STOCK)
When war came, the democracies
proved to be the "have nots" and
our enemies the "haves."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
Orientation Film #1
DISSOLVE TO
83(D)Circling globe again.
(DISNEY)
Ominous clouds come
across globe.
A vivid flash of light
ening suddenly strikes at
Manchuria, globe stopping.
CAMERA MOVES DOWN to
smoking Manchuria and out
of the smoke, rises a date in
vivid lettering:
"September 18, 1931."
DISSOLVE TO
And when war came .
where did it come?
Where and when did they strike?
Remember that date. September
18, 1931. A date we should
remember as well as December 7,
1941. For on that date in 1931
the war we are now fighting began.
Map of the Pacific
(DISNEY)
Manchuria's borders are
animated in.
The place was Manchuria . . .
the northernmost province of
China. . .
Animation shows great
distance,
000 miles from San Francisco.
CAMERA MOVES in on the
Manchurian-Korean area.
Animation shows the course
of the railway with little
Jap flags showing the garri-
Manchuria! The first objective
in the Tanaka plan.
By September 18, the Japanese, who
by treaty patrolled the Southern-
Manchurian Railway . . .
. . . had determinedly and illeg
ally increased their garrisons.
DISSOLVE TO
The borderline is now
animated in.
On the Korean-Manchurian border
an entire Japanese army . . .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The army springs to life i
the border.
DISSOLVE TO
84(S)Mukden Express (STOCK)
85(D)Animated drawing (DISNEY)
section of railway track,
showing one rail out and
two fish plates.
DISSOLVE TO
239
Orientation Film #1
. . . was secretly assembled con
veniently equipped for a winter
campaign.
All they needed was their excuse.
They made their own.
At ten thirty that night, just
after the Mukden Express had
passed by . . .
. . . a section of track was
dynamited, causing damage to one
rail and two fish plates.
86(D)INSERT: The rising sun
flag (PRODUCTION). Be
hind the flag can be seen
indistinct shots of fire .
Jap soldiers running for
ward . . . shooting . . .
Chinese fleeing.
DISSOLVE TO
88(S)LONG SHOT of Japanese
troop movements (STOCK)
89(D)MAP with Japanese advance
shaded in. (DISNEY)
Japan's honor had been violated.
Within half an hour the Japanese
railroad garrison launched a
coordinated attack on the sleep
ing Chinese army barracks at Mukden.
The slaughter was appalling.
By midnight the conveniently
placed Japanese army poured
across the border and the first
open act of aggression - the in
vasion of Manchuria was on.
In four days that had occupied
the whole of Southern Manchuria
Now the shading carries
over the rest of the
country.
On the map, over which is
printed "Manchuria" an un
seen hand wipes out the
lettering and "Manchukuo"
appears in the place.
And shortly thereafter
the whole country.
Manchuria became Manchukuo, a
puppet state with an obedient
stooge on the throne.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90(S)CLOSE SHOT Henry Pu-Yi
(STOCK)
91(P)QUICK MONTAGE newspaper
headlines denouncing the
aggression. (PRODUCTION)
92(S)LONG SHOT - League of
Nations Building (STOCK)
CLOSE SHOT of Litvinov,
preferably speaking at the
League (STOCK),
CLOSE SHOT Henry L.
Stimson (STOCK)
240
Orientation Film #1
. . . Henry Pu-Yi, a weakling
whom the Japanese had prepared
for the job for seven years with
women and song . . .
The voices of two men rose high
over the chorus of world protest.
At the League of Nations at
Geneva . . .
Maxim Litvinov . . . then Foreign
Minister of Russia and now Am
bassador in Washington, demanded
action against the aggressor.
In Washington, Henry L. Stimson,
then Secretary of State, now
Secretary of War, sent out a
blistering denunciation of the
DISSOLVE TO
Newsreel shot - the
Lytton Committee (STOCK)
Lord Lytton making his
report to the league
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
The League of Nations sent a
Committee of five, headed by Lord
Lytton, and including our own
General Frank McCoy, to Manchuria
to investigate.
In October of 1932, the Committee
issued its report.
INTERIOR League of Nations
(STOCK)
On _________________the League
condemned Japan as an aggressor
nation.
In answer, the Japanesi
knowing there were no guns behind
this condemnation, smiled, took up
their briefcases and marched out of
the League. More than Manchuria
was dead. Collective security was
dead. The green light had been
given to the aggressors.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DISSOLVE TO
241
Orientation Film #1
Japanese diplomats smiling
unctuously and shaking
Young man pushing a plow
through even furrows
(STOCK)
Driver propelling bus
through London traffic
CLOSE SHOT waiter in Paris
cafe (STOCK)
We and the rest of the world knew
that these aggressors shquld be
stopped and punished . , . but we
were unwilling to make the neces
sary sacrifices to back up that
opinion.
It was impossible to convince the
farm boy in Iowa . , .
the driver of a London
or a waiter in a Paris
Scenes of Manchurian
war with mud huts burn
ing (STOCK)
Continue with Manchurian
battle scenes.
DISSOLVE TO
93(P)INSERT (PRODUCTION)
the Tanaka plan. It is
lettered very simply:
"Phase one, conquest of
Manchuria. Phase two,
conquest of China. Phase
three, bases in South
Pacific. Phase four.
Conquer the United States.
A hand comes in and makes
a check mark opposite
Manchuria.
DISSOLVE TO
That he should go to war because
of a mud hut in Manchuria.
Yet, the subsequent course of
history makes it clear that that
incident . . . so many miles
away . . . is the reason that
you . . . and millions of others
are in uniform today.
The Japs had Manchuria. Phase
Number one of the Tanaka plan .
. . . was completed. Phase number
two . . . the conquest of China . .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94(D)Map of China (DISNEY)
CAMERA MOVES DOWN to
Shanghai.
DISSOLVE TO
95(S)Street fighting (STOCK)
96(D)Map again (DISNEY) with
animation showing the big
jump from Shanghai
242
Orientation Film #1
In 1932, without warning, the Japs
attacked the Chinese city of
Shanghai.
Here they met such stubborn re
sistance, that they had to pour
more than 75,000 troops into this
local battle before capturing the
city. This resistance made them
decide . . .
. . . to shift their campaign to
the north and in 1933 they added
the province of Jehol to Man-
DISSOLVE TO
97(S)Chinese army in review
before Chiang Kai-Shek
(STOCK)
Japan launched the second phase
of the Tanaka plan. But she has
yet to finish it. Under the in
spired the leadership of Chiang
Kai-Shek fought and still fight
FADE OUT
FADE IN
98(D)Revolving globe, which
turns slowly away from
the Orient until the
European scene appears.
(DISNEY)
99(S)CLOSE SHOT Hitler and
Mussolini in one of their
Brenner Pass meetings
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE
Hitler reviewing troops
(STOCK)
DISSOLVE TO
Mussolini reviewing troops
(STOCK)
Meantime, what of Japan's
partners?
What helpless people were they
planning to bomb . . . slaughter
. . . drive into slavery?
Hitler was not yet ready.
But Mussolini was. Mussolini had
to be. His people were growing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243
Orientation Film #I
restless. Fascism hadn't pro
duced the heaven on earth he had
promised them. So he pulled the
old trick of launching a foreign
war to divert attention from
troubles at home.
CLOSE SHOT Mussolini
(STOCK) over which
SUPERIMPOSE TITLE:
"Three cheers for war.
So Mussolini beat his chest like
Tarzan and looked around for a
worthy foe. He found one.
Ethiopia:
100
(D)
May I be permitted to raise
this cry. Fascism believes
in neither the possibility
nor in the utility of per
manent peace. Three cheers
for Italy's war . . . noble
and beautiful . . . and
three cheers for war in
general." New Italian En
cyclopedia. The lettering
FADES OUT leaving Mussolini
still ranting.
WIPE SWIFTLY TO
Map of the Red Sea outlining
Ethiopia (DISNEY)
DISSOLVE TO
A good country for the beginning
of a "glorious empire."
101 Shots of the Ethiopian
(S) army equipped with
spears (STOCK)
The one airplane (STOCK)
WIPE TO
SHOTS of the Italian war
machine (STOCK)
Its army had no machine guns.
Its army had no tanks.
Its army did have an air force
. . . exactly one old airplane
One airplane against the nation
which had developed the new
theory of total air war . . . of
the blitz which would wipe out
cities, destroying civilians . .
man, woman and child.
DISSOLVE TO
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102 Map showing area described.
(D) (DISNEY)
244
Orientation Film #1
In October of 1935 . . . following
the Japanese example . . . an in
cident was provoked in the little
town of Wal Wal near the border of
Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland.
Shortly after . . .
DISSOLVE TO
Troops boarding transports,
etc. (STOCK)
INT. LEAGUE OF NATIONS
with Haile Selassie
pleading before it.
CLOSE SHOT Haile
Selassie making his plea
(STOCK)
INT. the League of Na
tions with the delegates
discussing the case
(STOCK) featuring if
possible, the swathy face
of Pierre Laval.
DISSOLVE TO
Ethiopian war scenes
(STOCK)
. . . refusing any arbitration,
Mussolini moved the whole might
of his army through the Suez Canal
to overrun the undefended country.
Ethiopia's emperor, Haile Selassie,
appeared before the League of Na-
"I must still fight on until my
tardy allies appear and if they
never come, I say to you with
out bitterness , the West will
Members of the League half
heartedly stopped trading with
Italy, but refused the only thing
that will stop any aggressor.
Force. Ethiopia was left to her
self.
The people of Ethiopia . . . with
their spears and bare hands, faced
the guns and tanks of the invaders,
fighting desperately and gallantly
to save their country from con
quest. They fought and they died
but in the end . . . there could
be but one result. Might triumphed.
Italy conquered Ethiopia.
DISSOLVE TO
Roosevelt in his
"Quarantine the
aggressor" speech
(STOCK)
Many of our elected leaders warned
us of danger . . .
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT: (Use quote
from speech)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
245
Orientation Film #1
DISSOLVE TO
104 DISNEY map animated to
(D) feature North America,
with vast expanse of
ocean on either side,
with sailing vessels
moving very slowly across
NARRATOR: . , . but we would not
listen. We were still hypnotized
by the fact that two broad oceans
stood between us and the rest of
world, not realizing that our own
native inventions . . .
Animation now of fast ships,
submarines. . . airplanes
, . . moving across the
oceans.
The size of the oceans
begins to shrink and
the continents move closer
to each other.
DISSOLVE TO
. . . fast motorized transports,
submarines . . . aircraft carriers
. . . had shrunk the earth to
smaller dimensions. Yes, we
were a nation that wanted peace,
but we hadn't learned that peace
for us depends on peace for all.
105
(S)
Manchurian and
Ethiopian war scenes
(STOCK)
Nobody would run the risk of war
because of some mud huts and
barren plains in Ethiopia any more
than we would run the risk for
some quite similiar huts and plains
in Manchuria.
DISSOLVE TO
German, Japanese and
Italian men shaking hands
as though in congratu
lations (STOCK)
106 World map showing
(D) Japan's gains up to
about 1937 (DISNEY)
Animate Italy's gains
up to same time.
Animate circle around
Germany.
Scenes of German army
movements, with Hitler
reviewing. (STOCK)
Correctly interpreting our
attitude, the aggressors were all
the surer that they could get what
they wanted.
Japan had started on her march of
conquest . . .
Italy had begun her new empire
. . . And the third gangster?
What about him?
When would he join his partners
in the enslavement of all mankind
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107 The marching German
(S) troops now merge into a
MONTAGE of marching
Italian and Japanese.
The MONTAGE DISSOLVES
108 the two globes again, one
(D) bright, one dark.
108 (DISNEY)
(S) Slowly . . . as CAMERA
MOVES INTO IT . , .
marching soldiers appear
over the globe of the free
As they move past CAMERA
they are seen to be wearing
the uniforms of all the
United Nations.
246
Orientation Film #1
For this is what we are fighting:
Freedon's oldest enemy, the
passion of the few to rule the
many. This is not war as we
have known war in the past. This
is the final revolution against
the enemies of human progress.
Two worlds stand against each other.
SOUND: Triumphant march.
NARRATOR: This world must
triumph.
SOUND: Military band swells to a
triumphant finale.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
W H Y KOREA
(MUSIC)
_American men have died in a place called Korea. Why?
Thousands dead, thousands missing, many thousands wounded. Why
Korea? (2-5-16) who can estimate the cost of war? (16)
2. In World War II, 30 million lives were lost. What were they
worth? (16)
3. The British lost over one-quarter of a million men. We lost al
most as many. Australains, Canadians, Czechs, Poles, Greeks,
Dutch, Norwegians, the list is endless. (16)
4. How do you estimate the cost of war? Only five years have passed
and once again men are dying. This time in far away Korea. (16)
5. Why? Why should American blood be spilled for a place so far
away that few of us ever heard of it. (16)
6. This was Korea before the war, (16)
7. A mountainous land, poor for the life that it has to support.
There is some mining, manufacturing and trading. (16)
8. But most Koreans survive by working the land. There are many
mouths to feed in Korea - 30 million of them. (46-16)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9. The staff of life is rice. (46)
10. When all goes well, almost everybody gets his share. (46-16)
11. This is Seoul, the capital city. (16). It is mostly in the
cities that one sees the influence of 35 years of Japanese oc
cupation. (5)
12. But even here, we see how doggedly the Koreans resisted a foreign
influence. (46)
13. Many centuries ago it was named the Land of the Morning Calm.
(46-16)
14. But, it is calm no longer for the Communists have made it a battle
ground. (5)
15. And Americans may well wonder why their sons must interrupt their
careers and leave their schools, all because of Korea - the Land
of the Morning Calm. (16)
16. Why should we, the American people and all other free peoples of
the world who want peace. (1-4-16)
17. Why should we send our men to fight, all because of Korea - a far
away place that we know so little about. Why? What is the ans
wer? (16)
18. This was Manchuria about 20 years ago. It too was a far away
place that few people had heard about. (11)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
250
19. Surrounded by a great wall from ages past, it was an intriguing
place for Western explorers. (17)
20. To the Japanese, Manchuria looked inviting and they decided to
take it. (11)
21. This was in 1931, and the world wasn't accustomed to the new way
of doing things. (11)
22. There wasn't even a declaration of war. (11)
23. All Japan wanted was peace and Manchuria. (11)
24. Unanimously, the League of Nations condemned Japan's active ag
gression, but all Mr. Matsuoka wanted was peace. (11-16)
25. MATSUOKA ADDRESSING LEAGUE: It is a matter of common knowledge,
that Japan's policy is fundamentally inspired by a genuine desire
to guarantee peace in the far east and to contribute to the main
tenance of peace throughout the world. Japan, however, finds it
impossible to accept the resolve adopted by the Assembly. (11-16)
26. And then for her aggression, Japan walked out. (11-16)
27. The world considered the aggression shocking, but what could we
do? What was Manchuria to us? (16)
(MUSIC)
28. The free world was shocked at Manchuria, but it was Mussolini who
saw its importance. The Duce strutted and blustered and stormed,
and it seemed inconceivable that he meant what he said. But he
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28. (CONTINUED)
did. (11-16)
(MUSIC)
29. Mussolini decided to attack Ethiopia. (11-16)
30. Once again, a far away and unimportant place was attacked.
(11-16)
31. To Western eyes, the Ethiopian natives looked strange. (46)
32. In speech after speech, the aggression was condemned, but no real
action was taken. We were shocked, but after all what could we
do? (11-16)
33 &
34. We couldn't go to war for a little place like Ethiopia.
35. The idea of aggression was spreading, and in a short time it was
Finland's turn. (11-16)
36. The Russian bombers brought destruction to Helsinki. (5-11-16)
37. Stalin claimed that Finland had attacked Russia. But to the rest
of the world, Finland's only crime was that she was small and
weak. Her total population was much smaller than Russia's army
alone. (5-11-16)
(MUSIC)
38. Meanwhile, Molotov and Von Ribbentrop got together and the Nazis
and Communists signed a pact of friendship. (11-16)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39. They said they wanted peace. (11-16)
40. And they signed a pact to wage war. Russia expected that the
Nazis and allies would so weaken each other that she could then
step In and take them all over. (5-11-16)
41-
43. And Hitler, the champion aggressor of them all, went Into high
gear. (11-16)
44. He didn't like to eat very much.
45. But he had a tremendous appetite for conquest. (11-16)
(MU SIC)
46. Soon, country after county fell before the overwhelming Nazi
assault. (11-16)
47. And soon. It was to be Russia's own turn. There was no honor
among thieves. (5-11-16)
48. We thought the Russians had learned a lesson. (1)
49. And we came to their aid. (1-16)
50. Without our help, the Russians would surely have lost. Before
the holocaust was over, 30 million died. (16)
51. We had good reason to wonder how many might have been saved. If
Japan had been stopped In Manchuria, Mussolini In Ethiopia, Hitler
In Austria and Stalin when he attacked Finland. (11-16)
52. They had all been unimportant and far away lands, and we did
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52. (CONTINUED)
nothing. (16)
(MUSIC)
53 &
54. In the end, the price was much higher. (11-16)
(MUSIC)
55. The war was over in the West, the war was over in the East. And
in the East was Korea. (3)
56. Korea was held by the Japanese.
57. And the United States came to liberate it. (1-3)
58. Defeated, the Japanese soldiers surrendered their weapons. (3)
59. For the Koreans, it was the end of 35 years of Japanese oc
cupation. (1-3)
(MUSIC)
60. And the Americans were welcomed by the liberated South Koreans.
(4b-16)
(MUSIC)
61. The Russians had moved into North Korea from Manchuria. They
were supposed to liberate the North Koreans. (5)
62. As a temporary measure, Korea was divided into two parts at the
38th Parallel.
63. Russia and the United States agreed that as soon as possible,
they would work out a plan for turning over both parts to a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
254
63. (CONTINUED)
united Korean government elected by the Korean people. (16)
64. A commission was set up by the United States and Russia to work
out a plan. (16)
65. But after 62 minutes, it was clear that the Russians had no in
tention of letting the Koreans govern themselves. (1) (5)
66. At the request of the United States, the problem was taken over
by the United Nations. (1) (12)
67 &
68. In complete violation of their agreement with the United States,
the Russians set about imposing a totalitarian Communist state
in North Korea and they drew an iron curtain around it. (5)
69. Under the supervision of the United Nations, a free election was
set for South Korea. (12-16)
70. Pamphlets announcing the election was prepared. (4b-16)
71. And planes flew them into the remotest areas. (16)
72 &
73. The obstacles were many, but they were overcome. (3-16)
74. While the United States made every effort to help the United
Nations Commission prepare for a free election, (1-12-16) the
Russians refused to permit the United Nations Commission to
even enter North Korea. (5)
(MUSIC)
75. In South Korea, the election machinery was set and the candidates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255
75. (CONTINUED)
quickly learned that posters help in winning votes. Using
microphones and loudspeakers, the various parties extrolled
the virtues of their candidates. (1) (4b)
76. For the Koreans, a full blown Democratic election was a novel
experience, but they liked it. (1) (4b)
(MUSIC)
77 &
78. On May 10, 1948, the people of South Korea went to the polls,
(4b)
79. Supervising the election were the members of the United States
Korean Commission. (1) (12)
80. It was a free election with the people going to the polls of
their own choice to vote for candidates of their own choosing.
(1) (4b)
81. And the choice was made by closed ballot. (4b)
82. All was going smoothly until the Communists tried to cause riots.
(5) Before the police could get things under control, a hundred
people were killed. (5)
83. With the returns in, the Americans turned South Korea over to
the new government. This was Korea in 1948. (l-4b-12)
(MUSIC)
84. But in 1948, most of the world had their eyes focused on the
Kremlin for the world was living under the shadow of a Cold War.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84. (CONTINUED)
(5-16)
85. The Communists wanted peace, they said. And they stirred up
trouble, confusion and fighting. (5-16)
86. In country after country, they seized power and imposed totali
tarian governments. (5)
87. Mukden. The Cold War started even before World War II was over.
Russia invaded Manchuria to liberate it from Japanese control
and stayed on to strip it of all machinery and to impose a Com
munist regime, (5-16)
88. Poland.
89. Russian agreed to conduct a free election. Instead, she gave
the Poles no choice but Communists canidates and a government
taking orders from Moscow. (5)
90. Czechoslovakia.
91 &
92. In complete violation of a written treaty, the Red army stood
ready as the Communists seized power and imposed a ruthless
dictatorship on one of the truly democratic nations of Europe.
(5)
93-
96. The free world mourned the death of Jan Masaryk. The Communists
announced that he took his own life, but nobody believed it. (5)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
257
97. Hungary. When Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested, the world got
another view of Communist methods. (5)
98. The Communists forced the Hungarian Prime Minister Nagy to re
sign by kidnapping his child. (5)
99. The whole family was then forced to leave their country. (5)
100. France. (17)
101-
103. The Communists used Frenchmen to fight Frenchmen. Under directions
from Moscow, the Communists tried to sabotage and destroy the
economic life of the country. They instigated strikes and created
disorder and even set fire to warehouses storing food. (5)
(MUSIC)
104. Italy. Brother was set against brother. As the Communists tried
through strikes and riots to bring the economic life of that
country to a standstill. (5-16)
105. Bogota, Columbia. Even in the Western Hemisphere, the tentacles
from Moscow reached out and disrupted a peaceful international
meeting. (5-16)
106. And in New York, the II top leaders of the Communist party of the
United States were tried for plotting to overthrow the American
government by violence. Under Judge Medina, they were given a
fair and open trial. In Russia, they would just have been liqui
dated. (5) After months of rangling during which the Defendants
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258
106. (CONTINUED)
and their attorneys tried by every possible means to upset the
Court and obstruct the proceedings, they were found guilty. They
were using the liberties of democracy to destroy the democracy
itself. (5)
107. In Greece, China, Indochina, Iran, Great Britian, wherever and
whenever they could, the strategists in the Kremlin pulled the
strings and puppets moved. This was a cold war which we did not
fully understand. It was a war in which Russia created civil
wars wherever she could, pitting brother against brother, and
never did she have to use her own manpower. (1-2-5)
(MUSIC)
108. And at the conference table, Russia always maintained she worked
for peace. (5)
109. And Gromyko used every strategem to obstruct agreement. There
was always a walk-out in his bag of tricks. At conference after
conference, G. confused and stalled the proceedings into a dead
lock. When these tactics failed, he ended things with a veto.
(5)
110. As Vishinsky obstructed efforts for peace, country after country
lost its freedom. (1-5)
111. Like G. Malik liked the walk-out. There he goes. (5)
(MUSIC)
112. Remember Mr. Matsuoka's walk-out on the League of Nations 20 years
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112. (CONTINUED)
ago? Looks familiar, doesn't it? (1-11)
113. Instead of one world, the Communists created two. (5)
(MUSIC)
114. In spite of all this, Russia was invited to join in the Marshall
plan to help build for peace. She refused. And the free nations
of the West went ahead without her. (1-5-16)
115. Soon the Communists decided to strike again. This time by
blockading Berlin. (5)
116. Cutting off all means of transportation, the Russians hoped to
force the Allies out of Berlin. (5)
117. Under the direction of General Clay, the West initiated the
airlift. American and British flyers transported food and fuel
and astounded the Russians. (3)
(MUSIC)
118. The blockade failed. And we had won another phase of the Cold
War by acting decisively. (3)
119. On the morning of June 25, South Korea was attacked. (16)
(MUSIC)
120. It was an unprovoked and wilful aggression by Russian backed
North Korea. (5-16) This was the test. What would the free
peoples of the world do. Would this be another Manchuria?
Another Ethiopia? With the free people of the world looking out
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260
120. (CONTINUED)
the window as aggressors enslaved another faw away land. (1-5-11)
121. No. The free peoples had learned their lesson. They acted.
(1- 11)
(MUSIC)
122. Fifty-Three nations decided that an attack on one nation was an
attack on all nations. What was at stake was the right of nations
to live peacefully without fear of attack. (1-10-12-16)
123. Russia wasn’t interested in stopping the aggression. She wasn't
even there. (5) The United Nations asked all nations to stop
the invaders. (12)
124. Under the superb leadership of General MacArthur, the forces of
the United Nations quickly moved in to stop the invaders.
(3-11-12)
125. Fighting side by side were Americans, Philippines, Koreans,
Greeks, Australians, South Africans, British, Siamese, Turks,
Dutch, French, Canadians, (12)
126. When it became Malik's turn to become Chairman of the Security
Council, he returned to the United Nations after a six-month
boycott. (5)
127. The Soviet Union was for peace, and Malik used every conceivable
tactic to stall, confuse and obstruct the efforts to stop war.
(5)
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261
128. Here was the climax of five years of Communist aggression, lies
and deceit. Here was a man, and his was a nation that would go
to any length to achieve their purpose of world domination.
(5-8)
(MUSIC)
129. Speaking for the United States, Mr. Roston said:
Roston: All these performances that have occurred here creating
a very bad impression I am sure upon all peace loving nations
just delay the day of consideration of a resolution before us
that has a sincere motive of peace and of assistance to those
who are trying to carry out the peace-making functions of the
United Nations. (1-5-16)
130. When Mr. Roston produced a Russian gun taken in Korea stamped in
1950, Mr. Malik wasn't very happy. The Communists had claimed
that all Russian equipment in North Korea was several years old.
(5)
131. When crossed, a good Communist walks out. (5)
132. Once again, the free people of the world had shown that they will
fight back once aroused. The casualties are high. The losses
great. What have they taught us? (1-2-3-4-5)
133. In Korea we have learned that only by being strong is there any
chance for peace. Had we been well prepared, it is doubtful
that the Communist aggression in Korea would have occurred. Only
by firmness of purpose and superiority of strength can we con-
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262
133. (CONTINUED)
vince the Communists that aggression won't pay. (2-6-11-16)
134. What has Korea taught us? . . .
Returning to San Francisco from his historic meeting with
General MacArthur, President Truman summed it up :
TRUMAN: We are increasing our arms strength because Soviet
policies leave us no other choice. The Soviet Union
and its colonial satellites are maintaining armed
forces of great size and strength in both Europe and
Asia. Their vast armies pose a constant threat to
world peace. So long as they persist in maintaining
these forces and in using them to intimidate other
countries, the free men of the world have but one
choice if they are to remain free. They must oppose
strength with strength. (1-2-3-5-10-16)
135. What has Korea taught the Russians? The Russians supplied the
North Koreans with guns and sent them over the border to con
quer South Korea. (5) All they expected was protests and at
the most, mild sanctions. But the free people of the world
acted. (3-10)
136. The United Nations is here to stay. (12) They will no longer
tolerate any Manchurias, Ethiopias, Findlands. (1-10-11) We
hope the Russians have learned that all aggression brings is
destruction and ruin and hundreds of thousands of men lost.
(8-10-16)
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263
137. As the President has said:
Truman: Now the Soviet Union can change this situation. It
has only to give concrete and positive proof of its
intention to work for peace. If the Soviet Union
really wants peace, it must prove it not by promises
and false propaganda but by living up to the principles
of the United Nation's Charter. (3-5-12-16)
138. What has Korea taught us for the future? We had victories and
we hoped it would soon be over, but once again aggressors attacked
in overwhelming force, this time the Chinese Communists and once
again we learned that we must be strong. (2-3-9-10)
(MUS I C)
139. The North Korean Communists were pushed out of South Korea
once. (3) And Syngman Rhee and his legally elected government
returned to Seoul. (1) But so long as there are aggressors on
the face of the earth, we must never again be lulled into a sense
of false security. (9)
140. Truman: We must continue to increase our production for mili
tary purposes. We must continue to increase the
strength of our armed forces. Army, Navy and Air Force.
We must devote more of our resources to military pur
poses and less to civilian consumption. All this
will be difficult, and it will exact many and great
sacrifices. But we are aware of the dangers we face
and we are gonna be prepared to meet them. (APPLAUSE)
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140. (CONTINUED)
Let no aggressor make any mistake about that,
(APPLAUSE) (2-3-7-10-15)
141. There are no longer any geographic boundaries. Blood shed in
Korea today is the same as if blood were shed in Rome, Paris,
London, New York, Washington, Chicago or San Francisco. (1-12)
It is Seoul today, but tomorrow it might be almost any other
city on the face of the earth. Korea is but an example. There
are many Koreas on the face of the earth and none is safe until
aggression is stopped. (9-11)
142. What we are defending are not geographic areas, (7) but a way
of life. (1-6) Our fight in Korea is to all intents and pur
poses a fight on our own land. (1-8-11) That is why Korea.
If we don't fight there, we will have to fight here. (8-11)
143. Until the day when peace is assured, we have no choice but to
be prepared and strong. (1-3-9-16)
144. We are determined, if necessary, to defend freedom anywhere in
the world because inevitably, our own freedom will be at stake.
(1-3-9) But until we are convinced that the Russians have
learned that aggression won't pay, our strength lies in our
constant vigilance, our armed force and our will to work for
145. Let's face the facts. There is no other choice. (1-3-10-11-16)
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APPENDIX C
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VISUAL CONTINUITY
Why Korea?
OPENING: Titles and Credits SUPERED OVER relief map of Korea.
1. Helicopters landing among American G.I.s in battle zone in Korea
MONTAGE of field hospital and emergency medical facilities . . .
frenzied activity . . . (2-5-16)
2. Helicopter being loaded with wounded soldiers . . . takes off. .
(2-5-16)
3. More loading of wounded . . .(2-5-16)
4. Large medical airlift . . . many wounded being loaded on C-124-
type aircraft. (2-5-16)
5. More wounded being loaded aboard aircraft. (2 5-16)
6. Train traveling through Korean countryside . . . past houses and
farms. (16)
7. SHOTS of houses and farms viewed from moving train. (16)
8. Korean peasants herding poultry stock . . . seen from moving
train. (4b-16)
9. MONTAGE: . . . rice farming, primitive irrigation, etc. (4b-16)
10. MONTAGE: farming sceenes. (4b-16)
11. CUT TO low aerial view of large city. (16)
12. Crowd scene . . . CUs old men's faces . . . (4b)
13. Street parade of women in white . . . solemn paced marchers.
(4b-16)
14. More Korean city scenes . . . faces, etc. (4b-16)
15. Young American men in civilian clothes . . . taking induction
oath. (16)
16. CUT TO G.I.s at Seattle Port of Debarkation . . . loading onto
ship . . . (10)
17. Troop ship loaded with G.I.s . . . waving to families from
decks. (10-16)
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267
18. CUT TO Stock footage of China Wall. (11)
19. PAN (aerial) along wall. (11)
20. Japanese troops attacking and burning Manchuria. (11-16)
21. Hordes Japanese troops in Manchuria. (11-16)
22. More Japanese troops. (11-16)
23. Japanese troops engaged in city-fighting . . . war-torn streets.
(11-16)
24. INTERIOR League of Nations Assembly. Japan's delegate, Mr.
Matsuoko, addressing the assembly. (11-16)
25. FULL SHOT, Mr. Matsuoko . . . addressing assembly. (11-16)
26. Mr. Matsuoko walks out of assembly. (11-16)
27. PAN with Matsuoko and Japanese delegation leaving assembly.
(11-16)
28. CUT TO Mussolini strutting among Italian troops in parade
formation. (11-16)
29. Italian troops on the march . . . in foot-convoy. (11-16)
30. Italian tanks. (11-16)
31. Shabbily-clad Ethiopian native troops. (4b)
32. MONTAGE: Italian troops, field guns . . . attacking. (11-16)
33. Mussolina on horseback . . . other Italian officers. (11-16)
34. Rows of Ethiopians bowing down. (4b-11-16)
35. Russian airplanes in flight formation. (11-16)
36. Russian planes dropping bombs. (11-16)
37. MONTAGE: Air attack on Findland . . . (11-16)
37A. Finnish civilians lined-up faces against walls of buildings for
protection during air raid. School children huddled against
hillside . . . (11-16)
37B. Burning buildings, etc. (11-16)
38. CUT TO Train pulling into railroad station in Germany. Hitler
and staff waiting on platform. (11-16)
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268
39. Hitler and Molotov . . . exchanging greetings. (11-16)
40. Hitler, Molotov, and staffs entering building. (11-16)
41. Hitler in open car . . . waving and saluting crowds. (11-16)
42. Cheering, saluting Germans. (11-16)
43. Hitler descends from car. (11-16)
44. Hitler eating with German officers in the field . . . declines
offering of more food. (11-16)
45. Nazi bombs dropping on city. (11-16)
46. Jubilant Nazi soldiers removing emblem from Austrian building.
(11-16)
47. ANIMATION; Map of Germany with Swastika . . . black spreading
out over other countries. (11-16)
48. Nazi tanks and armored vehicles advancing through Russian
streets. (11-16)
49. Russian peasants . . . holding hands. (11-16)
50. MONTAGE: Russians, German tanks, aircraft crews, Russian
peasants weeping . . . (11-16)
51. MONTAGE: Nazi airborne troops, combat footage, etc. (11-16)
52. MONTAGE: (continued) (11-16)
53. MONTAGE: (continued) (11-16)
54. MONTAGE : (continued) (11-16)
55. CUT TO American troops parading in front of Capitol building in
Seoul, Korea. (3)
56. American Peace delegation taking seats . . . in preparation for
Japanese surrender of Korea. (3)
57. Japanese delegation signing surrender. (3)
58. Defeated Japanese surrendering weapons to G.I.s. (3)
59. Japanese flag being lowered. (3)
60. Korean children, waving, greeting, G.I.s . . . old man smiling
broadly, clapping hands . . . (4b-16)
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61. American flag being raised in Seoul. (1)
62. G.I. standing next to sign reading: "38th Parallel, ..."
(1)
63. American and Russian Truce teams meeting together. (16)
64. Three flags (U .S ., U.N., and South Korean) flying on masts in
Seoul. (12)
65. Americans and Russians seated at conference table. (16)
66. CU seated Russian representative. (17)
67. CU seated American representative. (17)
68. Crowd scene with North Koreans raising arms and shouting ex
citedly . . . gives impression of "red" fanaticism. (15)
69. Small U. S. army airplane being loaded with leaflets announcing
South Korean elections. (4b-16)
70. Airplane carrying leaflets takes off . . . (16)
71. Dropping leaflets. (16)
72. Korean villagers rushing to pick-up leaflets. (4b)
73. More Koreans rushing into fields to pick up leaflets. (4b)
74. U. N, Commission arriving at North Korean border and being denied
permission to enter. (5)
75. MONTACE: South Korean electioneering. (4b)
76. MONTACE: Crowd, faces of South Koreans reacting . . . showing
interest in candidates, speeches. (4b)
77. Korean man reading voting slate. (4b)
78. Lines of Koreans waiting to enter voting station . . . (4b)
79. U. N, observers at polls. (12)
80. MONTACE: Voting and activity at the polls. (4b)
81. Korean nuns voting. (l-4b)
82. Street mobs (reputedly communists) surging, fighting with
police, etc. (5)
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83. Election officials counting ballots. (4b)
84. The Kremlin . . . intercut picture of Stalin. (5)
85. Russians parading military might in Red Square, i.e., soldiers
with glittering bayonets, tanks, and other war machinery. (2-5)
86. FULL SHOT Russian tanks moving menacingly across screen. (5)
87. Mukden, North Korean, pompous, strutting Russian military
officers getting into staff cars. (5)
88. Somewhere in Poland. (17)
89. MONTAGE: Polish election. (17)
90. Somewhere in Czechoslovakia. (17)
91. Stalin, standing overseeing (apparently) the signing over by Czech
statesmen of their country to Russia. (5)
92. ANIMATION: spreading dark lines on map of Czechoslovakia . . .
symbolizing communist take-over. (5)
93. Man dressed in black (apparently) giving eulogy for Jan Masaryk,
foreign minister. (5)
94. Solemn military funeral processional. (5)
95. Weeping citizens lining funeral parade route. (5)
96. Mourning nuns in funeral parade. (5)
97. CU Catholic cardinal (apparently, Mindszenty). (5)
98. Hungarian prime minister, Nagy, and family descending from the
plane (TWA). (1-5)
99. Nagy at press conference . . . holding his son (who had been
kidnapped allegedly by the communists) . . . kisses his son.
(1-5)
100. STOCK SHOTS of France, . . . i. e., well-known land marks, etc.
101. MONTACE, etc., showing communist inspired sabotage, destruction,
burning, etc. (5)
102. Same as above.
103. Same as above.
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104. MONTAGE: Surging crowds in Italian Street--insert of agitated
speaker, that is, inciting crowds, idle trains (indicating
labor strike), idle people standing by empty trains (Montage
depicts the effects of Communist-inspired labor strikes.) (5)
105. MONTAGE: (Bogota, Columbia). Rioting crowds filling streets,
burning buildings, policemen, etc. (All depicting Communist-
inspired disorder.) (5)
106. MONTAGE : (New York City Court House). Trial of eleven American
Communists, shots of Judge Medina, of, the accused eleven, trucking
shot of the convicted eleven--finally being loaded into paddy
wagon. (1-5)
Long MONTAGE of violence, rioting, policemen, agitators--depicting
Communist inspired unrest in Greece, China, Iran, Britain, etc.
(5)
INTERIOR UN Assembly--showing delegates with raised hands, voting.
(1-12-16)
FULL SHOT Gromyko preparing to walk out in protest--he walks out.
(5)
110
111
113
114
115
116
Vishinsky, MEDIUM SHOT, smiling (17)
CU Malik preparing to walk-out of UN Assembly in protest--he
walks out. (5)
FLASHBACK OF Japan's Matsuoko walking out in protest at League
of Nations. (11)
ANIMATED map of world dividing into two worlds. (5-16)
INTERIOR International conference (on Marshall Plan); INTERCUT
shots of "business," that is, papers being signed, etc. (1-16)
Map of Germany (17)
Short MONTAGE depicting effects of Berlin Blockade, that is,
empty railroad tracks, idle boats, etc. (5)
Group shot of General Clay with allied officers in Berlin--then
into MONTAGE of US cargo planes flying over roof-tops in Berlin
(depicting the Big Airlift) (3-4b)
Rows of cargo planes on Berlin airfield. Food being unloaded.
(1-3)
Map of Korea. ANIMATED "Pop-on" of the date; June 25, 1950. (11)
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120. MONTAGE: (War In Korea) Explosions, hurrying military vehicles,
etc.,--then shots of smoldering devastation in countryside.
(16)
121. Military vehicles, that is, moving into combat. (3)
122. INTERIOR UN Assembly. (1-12)
123. FULL SHOT empty seat of Russian delegate (absent in boycott).
(5)
124. GROUP SHOT: General Mac Arthur and staff in Korea. (3)
125. MONTAGE: American troops debarking from landing crafts in Korea
. . . shots of South Korean soldiers . . . other UN soldiers
. . . all in combat dress. (3-4-10-12)
126. Russia's Malik (INTERIOR UN Assembly) returning to UN . . . takes
seat as Chairman of the Security Chairman. (17)
127. Malik speaking to Assembly (narration over.) (17)
128. Malik still speaking. (17)
129. United States' delegate, Mr. Roston addressing Assembly. (17)
130. Mr. Roston passing Russian-made gun around for inspection. (1-16)
131. Malik walks out in protest. (5)
132. MONTAGE : Heavy fighting in Korea . . . explosions, heavy guns
firing, soldiers firing rifles and machine guns, etc. (5-16)
133. MONTAGE : (depicting U.S. military power.) Airplanes dropping
bombs, naval bombardment of Korea, etc. (3)
134. President Truman on podium . . . speaking . . . (1)
135. MONTAGE: (depicting the devastation of war in Korea) . . . burn
ing buildings, bomb-out buildings, etc. (5-16)
136. Soldier pushing rifle barrel through a framed photograph of
Stalin . . . then jeep wheel running over another photograph of
Stalin (this takes place in North Korea). MONTAGE: many
captured North Koreans. (3-5)
137. President Truman speaking. (1)
138. MONTAGE: Korean civilians smiling broadly and waving flags at
American soldiers as they pass through villages . .. more soldiers
on the tanks, trucks, etc . . . children waving (depicting grati
tude). (1-3-16)
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139. American flag being raised again in Seoul. (3) CUT TO Mac
Arthur and Syngman Rhee . . . Rhee addressing crowd, Mac Arthur
applauding . . . then shakes Rhee's hand. (1-3-6-16)
140. President Truman . . . speaking (1)
141. ANIMATED rotating globe . . . then MONTAGE OF typical scenes of
Rome, Paris, London, New York . . . skylines, etc. (16)
142. MONTAGE of typical American scenes and people . . . factory
workers, farm workers ("the good folks") . . . shots of power
ful dam (that is, generating electric power). (16)
143. American soldiers marching en masse in parade dress (depicting
military strength) (3-6)
144. MONTAGE : Marching United Nations' troops from various countries.
(1- 12)
145. FULL SHOT United Nations' flag flying proudly . . . (1-12)
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APPENDIX D
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
President Johnson,
on camera.
"WHY VIETNAM"
My fellow Americans. Not long ago,
I received a letter from a woman in
the midwest. She wrote:
"Dear Mister President:
"In my humble way, I am writing
to you about the crisis in
Vietnam. My husband served in
World War II. Our country was
at war. But now, this time, it's
just something that I don't under
stand . Why?
FREEZE FRAME
MAIN TITLE
Hitler and Mussolini in
car, passing cheering
crowds in Munich.
Chamberlain arrives
by air at Munich.
NARRATOR:
Munich --- 1938.
A conference is about to be held
between the German Chancellor,
Adolph Hitler . . .
. . . and British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain.
A good close shot as he
deplanes. Then Chamber-
lain enters conference
building. We see Hitler
and Mussolini high on a
balcony, being cheered after
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(CONTINUED)
the conference. Then we
go to a LIVE SOUND sequence
of Chamberlain, in which he
states that he and Hitler
have agreed that England and
Germany will never go to war
again. As Chamberlain finishes
his speech, he looks directly
at the audience and we FREEZE
FRAME: Over this. Narrator
picks up again . . .
Shots of World War II rubble;
demolished buildings and
homes
Mussolini: CU of him
shaking fist. Then Shots
of horses against flame
thrower tanks in Ethiopia.
Haille Selassi protests
at Geneva--leaves the podium,
Nazi Swastika, then shot of
Hitler on balcony, and of sad
old Austrian man giving
Japanese fighting Chinese
in Manchuria.
Burning town, in China,
1938.
NARRATOR:
"Peace in our time." . . ,
. . . A shortcut to disaster.
But, even then, this was no
new lesson:
It had stared us in the face,
with Mussolini, in Ethiopia:
. . . and nothing was done.
We'd seen the Anschluss in
Austria . . . and nothing was
And on the other side of the
earth, we'd watched Japanese
aggression swallow Manchuria.
In all these, there was a
lesson we needed to learn.
President Johnson has phrased
"Aggression unchallenged--is
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9. LBJ on camera
FADE OUT:
FADE IN:
10. FREEZE FRAME: AV of
Dien Bien Phu
277
aggression unleashed."
LBJ: (ON CAMERA)
Why must young Americans, born
into a land exultant with hope
and with golden promise, toil
and suffer and sometimes die
in such a remote and distant
place? The answer, like the
war itself, is not an easy one.
But it echoes clearly from the
painful lessons of half a
century. Three times in my
lifetime--in two World Wars and
in Korea--Americans have gone
to far lands to fight for free
dom. We have learned, at a
terrible and brutal cost, that
retreat does not bring safety--
and weakness does not bring
peace. And it is this lesson
that has brought us to Viet Nam.
NARRATOR:
How, then, did American involve
ment in Vietnam begin?
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278
Hanoi, in 1954. Old
people in streets, thin
and threadbare. The
French leaving Red flag
flying on pole. Red troops
inarching in.
12. Geneva meeting: We see
Mendes France, Chou En
Lai, Molotov. The
document is signed.
The streets of Hanoi in 1954
reflect the ravages of long
and bitter warfare. But now
the fighting is over . . . the
French are leaving . . . The
Red Star flies over Hanoi . . .
and the victorious communist
forces are moving in.
At a conference in Geneva, an
agreement has been reached.
It divides Viet Nam into North
and South; turns over the North
to the Communists; and marks
the end of French colonial rule.
The document signed here also
provides--in theory, at least--
the means of bringing true peace
to all of Viet Nam. Unfortuna
tely, this depends on the good
faith of the Communists.
13. Molotov and Chou shake
hands, beaming. Then
shots of ragged refugees
on their way south.
The French defeat is a victory
for the Communist world, and
there are broad smiles . . .
but not on the faces of the
more than one million Vietnamese
who desert their homes and flee
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13. (CONTINUED)
FADE OUT:
FADE IN:
ISA TITLE: White letter on
black screen. Heading at
top of screen reads :
"U.S. INVOLVEMENT
IN VIET NAM"
POP ON:
"PHASE I: 1954-1957"
POP ON:
"phase II; 1957-1961"
POP ON:
"PHASE III: 1961-1964"
POP ON:
"Phase IV: Aug. 1964"
southward rather than live under
a Communist regime.
NARRATOR:
The chronology of United States
involvement with Viet Nam falls
into five phases, each important
to understand:
In Phase One, from 1954 to
1957, United States economic
aid helps a newborn South Viet
Nam to prosper.
In Phase Two, 1957 to 1961,
North Viet Nam begins and then
increases its campaign of terror
and aggression.
Phase Three begins when South
Viet Nam asks for and receives,
greatly increased help in the
form of military aid and ad-
Phase Four begins with attacks
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13A. (CONTINUED)
POP ON:
"PHASE V: May 1965"
on American ships in the Gulf
of Tonkin, and the first re
taliatory strikes into North
Viet Nam itself.
And Phase Five is begun in May
of 1965, with the arrival in
Viet Nam of the first American
combat troops.
13B TITLE: White letters on
black screen. Large,
Centered, the single line:
"PHASE I: 1954-1957"
The black screen now becomes
a FREEZE FRAME picture of the
map which shows Viet Nam divided
at the 17th Parallel.
UNFREEZE map and POP OFF
title:
14. Aerial Views of Viet
namese terrain.
15. Ho Chi Minh plays with
small children in North
Viet Nam.
NARRATOR:
with that background, let's
take it step by step
Divided at the 17th Parallel,
as Korea was divided at the
38th--with the North firmly under
communist dominâtion--Viet Nam
in 1954 faces the future.
An imaginary line runs from
border to border; symbol of a
separation which is far from
imaginary.
For the propaganda camera, Ho
Chi Minh--Communist leader of
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281
15. (CONTINUED)
16, People building new
thatched huts, in the
Rice fields, harvesting
18. Men bringing in sheaves
of rice. The, shots of
peaceful Saigon harbor,
with fishing boats.
Shadow of machine gun
on water. FREEZE FRAME,
after narrator's word,
"But." and then POP ON
SUPERIMPOSED TITLE:
"PHASE II: 1957-1961"
North Viet Nam plays the kindly,
smiling grandfather. But the
unforgiving record of history
shows that behind the smile is
a mind which is planning a long
term reign of terror in which
children like these will be
killed in their sleep, or while
they scream in the dark of night.
Now, in the South, peace brings
a fresh beginning. The people
set about building new homes
. . . new hopes.
Land reforms redistribute
farmlands so that peasants own
their own fields and reap,
themselves, the benefit of their
toil.
From 1954 to 1957, with American
economic aid, the South begins
to prosper . . . and the hopes
of the people are for peace.
But . . . (FREEZE FRAME) . . .
When Hanoi sees that the South
is not going to collapse, as
expected . . . (POP ON TITLE)
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19. (CONTINUED) Phase Two begins.
UNFREEZE pix and POP OFF
TITLE.
20. Shots of Viet Cong moving
stealthily through brush,
and then running through
burning village.
21. Shots of bodies in village.
22. Rice harvesting and
milling in south.
23. Shots of mining in the
A furtive and remorseless of
terror, pillage and assassina
tion called by Hanoi a "War of
Liberation."
It did not seem so to the
hundreds of anti-communist
civilian leaders, teachers--and
their wives and children--who
were visited in the night by
Viet Cong "persuasion squads."
This is the prize the Communist
are after: South Viet Nam.
Rich in Rice--and standing at
the gateway to the rice-rich
nations of Cambodia and Laos,
Thailand, Burma, East Pakistan,
and the Asian communists have
said: "A grain of rice is worth
a drop of blood."
There are also natural resources:
coal . . . phosphate . . . zinc
. . . tin . . . manganese. The
raw materials on which to base
industrialization--or feed a
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23. (CONTINUED)
24. Man taps rubber tree.
25. Latex processing plant,
then shots of modern
textile mill machinery,
in operation.
26. Guards load onto armored
283
war machine.
Natural rubber: South Viet Nam
has this, too . . .
. . . and latex processing
facilities which make of raw
rubber the vitally important
material it is, in today's
world. This then, is another
aspect of the South Viet Nam
which the north covets. A
nation mobing toward greater
industrialization . . . a rich
prize indeed, in the eyes of
communist strategists.
NAREATOR:
By 1960 every area of life in
the south has become a combat
zone: (train tracks blow up)
(LBJ: VOICE OVER):
This is a different kind of war.
There are no marching armies or
solemn declarations.
But, this is really war. It
is guided by North Viet Nam and
it is spurred by Communist China.
Its goal is to conquer the
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26. (CONTINUED)
Silhouette shots, at dusk,
as tired Viet soldiers climb
a hill.
28. Jet taxis in at Saigon
Airport, "United States
of America" is lettered
on it.
FREEZE FRAME, and POP
ON title:
"PHASE 111: 1961-1964"
Maxwell Taylor talks to
people at Planeside.
30. Air Force Advisors
and Vietnamese jet
pilots. Plane takes off.
31. Special Forces advisors
teaching small arms to
32. LIVE SOUND: Young Special
Forces advisor teaching
carbine to group of Viet
namese, speaking in their
284
South, and to extend the
Asiatic dominion of Communism.
And there are great stakes in
the balance. No people see
this more clearly than the
embattled, hard-pressed Viet
namese: and by 1961 they send
out an urgent call for help.
The answer to that call is
prompt in arriving: --
--and the third phase of the
conflict begins.
America promises substantial
military and technical aid :
Machines and equipment to
resist aggression . . .
. . . and trained men to teach
Vietnamese fighting forces how
to put them into effective use.
The advisors are specialists,
highly trained and motivated,
often able to speak to trainees
in their own language :
(LIVE SOUND PLAYS ON ITS OWN,
THEN WE OVERRIDE IT FOR NARRA-
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32. (CONTINUED)
language.
33. LIVE SOUND: Special
Forces sergeant, using
interpreter this time,
debriefs a Viet patrol,
correcting mistakes in
weapons technique.
34. Advisors show map to
Viets. Viet soldiers
move out on patrol.
35. Shots of combat in field.
TION TRANSITION:)
Instructors and advisors,
willing and able to teach,
find men whose freedom is at
stake eager and quick to learn.
(LIVE SOUND PLAYS)
At this stage, however, the
American advisors are here
to do only that. They have
no official combat role, as
such. It is the men they
train, and encourage, and
come to admire, who must do
the actual fighting . . . go
into the hiding place of the
enemy and seek him out.
This guerrilla warfare is the
latest step in the global
communist plan . . . a few
years before in the early
1950's, open attack in Korea
had fallen short of its goal.
Then came the worldwide com-
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286
35. (CONTINUED)
36. Viet Cong prisoners.
Special Forces medics
treating villagers in
free clinic set up in
village temple.
38. AV of very numerous copters
revving on an airstrip.
Then shots of U. S. copter
pilots conferring before
•• ■ take-off.
munist effort to dominate new
territory through economic aid
and restrictive trade agreements.
That was a failure too. So,
beginning in 1957, Viet-Nam
becomes a testing ground for
the next communist tactic the
guerrilla "war of liberation."
As the months go by, the Viet
Cong lose a lot of people. But
a great many more are ready to
replace these losses, as they
move down into South Viet Nam
from the North.
Meantime, in addition to train
ing Vietnamese fighting men,
American advisor teams are
working to help relieve the
human suffering of remote
villagers: providing tangible
aid in place of Viet Cong
promises and threats.
The scale of aggression grows,
and the flow of American weapons,
equipment, and advisors is in
creased. It is the only means
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287
38. (CONTINUED)
39. Viet troops load into
copters, and they take off.
We see the Viets inside, as
we zoom toward objective.
40. Viet troops are off-loaded
into rice paddy area, move
off on their mission.
41. Copter approaches isolated
men in jungle; we see them
waving, below.
Copter pilot and Special
forces officer, shouting
over noise of rotors, as they
stand in jungle by the copter,
which has now landed.
44. Loading Viet and U. S.
wounded into the copter
of meeting the rising tide of
infiltration and attack from
the north.
Superior equipment and mobility
are used to full advantage, now,
to carry the fight to the enemy,
swiftly, wherever his presence
becomes known.
The Vietnamese forces soon
learn the techniques involved
in copter-borne counter-action
to Communist raids on country
villages--and they use their
new knowledge well.
Even with superior equipment,
however, this is a difficult
war to prosecute. There are
no front lines, here. The war
is everywhere--against an enemy
that is seldom clearly seen.
In these scenes of casualty
evacuation, the enemy is not
far away--certainly within
shouting distance.
The enemy is not seen . . . but
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(CONTINUED)
then it takes off.
Viet Marines land on
beach, go on inland,
fighting as they go.
American and Vietnamese
fighting men bear on their
bodies the painful evidence
that he is still here . . .
still determined . . . still
deadly.
During this time, the combat
capability of South Viet Nam's
military forces is also grow
ing . . . and American advisors
work to bring the level of
training and combat readiness
of these forces as high as
possible. They train hard, and
they fight well.
But despite the bolstering of
conventional forces, there
remains the growing need for
greater numbers of fighting
men. The losses suffered by
the Vietnamese in combat are
cruelly heavy, for a nation with
a population no greater than
that of New York State.
47. Shots of Viet casualty In fact, in proportion to
being treated. He does not
survive, and we see his Buddhist population, Vietnamese losses
comrade in arms praying by the
46. Viet regulars fighting in
brush and hills.
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47. (CONTINUED)
shrouded body.
48. FREEZE FRAME: The
Presidential Seal.
POP ON SUPERIMPOSED
TITLE:
"PHASE IV: AUG. 1964"
49. LBJ on camera, as he
announces the U, S. action
in reply to attacks on U. S
Destroyer in the Gulf of
Tonkin.
50. Jets striking targets
with Rockets
51. LIVE SOUND: McNamara
briefing, where he says
"We wish to emphasize that
we seek no wider war . . ."
but that it depends on the
communists.
52. Shots showing large cache
of Viet Cong Armament:
in combat are ten times as
great as those suffered by
the United States in Korea
. . . greater even than our
total losses in World War
Two.
(PICTURE PLAYS FOR A BIT ON
ITS OWN, AS THIS FACT SINKS
IN.)
Then, in August of 1964: A
new phase of the fighting
begins:
LBJ: LIVE SOUND
NARRATOR:
For the first time.
American fighting men and
machines strike directly into
North Viet Nam. And Secretary
of Defense McNamara, in August
1964, sets the record straight:
LIVE SOUND: McNAMARA
We wish no wider T
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52. (CONTINUED)
ammunition and weapons,
Chinese markings on them.
53. End of courage of the
arms cache, and beginning
of shots showing Ho Chi
Minh in conference
54. Ho Chi Minh in conference
55. LBJ ON CAMERA
find ample evidence that there
is no relenting on the part of
the North. In this one captured
shipment of Viet Cong arms are
a million rounds of small arms
ammunition . . . 35 hundred
rifles and submachine guns . . .
some four thousand rounds of
antitank and mortar ammunition.
And no doubt about the source:
the Chinese markings are un
mistakable .
In meeting the aggression so
unmistakably evidenced here,
we have consistently sent
strength to meet strength: But
we have also, repeatedly, sent
word that we are willing to talk.
(LBJ: VOICE OVER)
Fifteen efforts have been made
to start these discussions, with
the help of 40 nations throughout
the world. But there has been
no answer.
(LBJ: ON CAMERA)
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55. (CONTINUED)
56. Shots of demolished heli
copters on airfield, and of
barracks hit by high ex
plosives. End on Picture
of Little blonde girl, in a
broken frame; visually
symbolizes the whole thing.
291
"We do not seek the destruction
of any Government nor do we
covet a foot of any territory.
But we insist and we will al
ways insist that the people of
South Viet Nam shall have the
right of choice, the right to
shape their own destiny in free
elections in the South or through
out all Viet Nam under interna
tional supervision, and they
shall not have any government
imposed upon them by force and
terror so long as we can pre-
We do not want an expanding
struggle with consequences that
no one can foresee, nor will we
bluster or bully or flaunt our
power. But we will not surrender.
and we will not retreat.
NARRATOR:
The answer to American offers
to move from the battlefield
to the conference table con
tinues to come in the form of
high explosives aimed at
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292
55. (CONTINUED)
Shots of American troops
as they evacuate from a
downed copter, under small-
arms fire as they dodge across
rice paddy.
59. Shots of American wounded
in hospital shed.
Shots of American
flag-draped coffins, loaded
into aircraft by a four-
service honor guard.
the men who bear arms.
(PAUSE) The American Embassy,
in Saigon itself becomes a grim
battleground scene, as Viet
Gong terrorists single it out
for a bomb attack. It is all
part of the carefully calculated
and continuing campaign of
Increasingly, now, Americans
function directly in the fight
for freedom in this far, foreign
corner of the earth. They know
what they are doing. And they
do it willingly, accepting the
risks involved because they under
stand the necessities involved.
Those risks are real, just as
the stakes for which the risks
are taken are real. People get
hurt, in Viet Nam . . .
. . . but Americans risk--and
sometimes give--all that they
have, half a world away from
home because they know that^
today, half a world away has
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293
60. (CONTINUED)
61. Shots of faces of people of
various Aslan nations.
FREEZE FRAME
FREEZE FRAME, of troop
ship loaded with American
soldiers landing in Vietnam,
Then POP ON SUPERIMPOSED
TITLE:
"PHASE V: 1965"
POP OFF title, and UNFREEZE
picture, as LBJ's voice
picks up again. We see the
men debarking (elements of
the 101st Airborne) and
loading into trucks and de
parting the dock area.
become our front door. If
freedom is to survive in any
American home town . . . it
must be preserved in such
places as South Viet Nam. And,
as President Johnson has pointed
out, it is UP to us:
LBJ: VOICE OVER
Most of the non-communist na
tions of Asia cannot, by them
selves and alone, resist the
growing might and the grasping
ambition of Asian Communism.
NARRATOR:
Because this is true . . .
. . . 1965 marks the begin
ning of Phase Five in the Viet
Nam conflict,
LBJ: VOICE OVER
We intend to convince the
Communists that we cannot be
defeated by force of arms, or
by superior power. I have
asked the commanding general.
General Westmoreland, what more
he needs to meet this mounting
aggression. He has told me.
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294
62. (CONTINUED)
63. Shots as U. S. Marines go
down landing nets from ships
into landing craft, move out,
and land on beach.
64. American advisors at
tactical map.
65. Shots of terrified women
and children awaiting
And we will meet his needs.
NARRATOR:
For the first time, U. S. Army
combat units land on Vietnamese
soil. And the message of their
presence is plain: whatever
the present or future needs of
the fight for freedom in Viet
Nam . . . they will be met.
Crack units of the United States
Marine Corps arrive . . . the
first time that Marines in full
combat gear have hit the beach
in an active combat zone since
Korea. They carry with them,
here as there, the determined
support of their fellow Ameri-
cans--the knowledge that what
they are doing needs to be done--
and the professional competence
to do it well.
And so . . . the war goes on.
The Communists have made that
And--as always--the innocent
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65. (CONTINUED)
copter evacuation from the
scene of a Viet Cong attack.
66. Series of shots of appeal
ing Viet children, as they
wash, eat, and work in a
Vietnamese nursery school.
67. LBJ: On Camera
Shots of young Americans
working, laughing, etc.
Close shots, in succession,
of Kosygin, and Mao, and Ho
Chi Minh, as the President's
off-screen voice goes on:
For the children of South Viet
Nam--and of all Southeast Asia--
the future is in the balance.
They will pay, if we do not
now think . . . decide . . . act
. . . rightly, in these troubles
which are not of their making,
if they are to be free to realize
the heritage of free men tomorrow
--there are for us, today, hard
realities to be faced.
LBJ: ON CAMERA
1 do not find it easy to send
the flower of our youth, our
finest young men, into battle.
LBJ: VOICE OVER
1 have seen them in a thousand
streets of a hundred towns in
every state in this Union;
working--and laughing--and
building--and filled with hope
and life.
But as long as there are men who
hate and destroy, we must have
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69. (CONTINUED)
70. Shots of the. various
services: Air Force
planes in flight.
Marine amphibious vehicle on
the move, Army AFC's driving
through a village, A Navy
carrier launching aircraft
etc. The President's voice
continues.
296
the courage to resist.
We did not choose to be the
guardians at the gate, but
there is on one else. Nor
would surrender in Viet-Nam
bring peace, because we
learned from Hitler at Munich
that success only feeds the
appetite of aggression . . .
More over, we are in Viet-Nam
to fulfill one of the most
solemn pledges of the American
nation: Three presidents--
President Eisenhower,
President Kennedy and
your present president--
over eleven years, have
committed themselves and have
promised to help defend this
small and valiant nation.
LBJ: ON CAMERA
Strengthened by that promise,
the people of South Viet-Nam
have fought for many long years.
Thousands of them have died.
Thousands more have been crippled
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71. (CONTINUED)
FREEZE FRAME, and
FADE OUT.
and scarred by war. And we
just cannot now dishonor our
world, or abandon our commit
ment, or leave those who be
lieved us and who trusted us
to the terror and repression
and murder that would follow.
This, then, my fellow Ameri
cans, is why we are in Viet-
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APPENDIX E
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The Crime of Korea
Narration:
1. It was a quiet country in 1945. (16)
2. I was-there as a war correspondent when the Americans came over
to accept the surrender of jap troops below the 38th parallel. (3)
2k. I remember how restful the green rice paddies looked . . . the
peaceful villages and towns . . . like Taejon. (16)
3. It didn't amount to much . . . like any small town anywhere . . .
but it was home to these people. (16-4b)
4. Seoul was different . . . it was a big town . . . the capitol
city with one and a half million people . . .
5. and they were all gay . . . (16) Seoul was celebrating freedom
after forty years of jap rule (16) . . . of Russian interference
under the czars . . . and centuries of Chinese domination. (5)
6. (Deleted)
7. It was gay for these Americans, too. Every G.I. was a symbol
of liberation . . . to the natives. (6-16)
8. I learned something about Koreans. I learned that these people
. . . so remote from us . . . strange even to their fellow
Asiatics . . . were simple human beings who wanted to live in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
peace and independence. (16-4b)
9. They took me around their colorful, five hundred-year-old city
. . . showed me the buildings they were proud of. . .
the capitol . . .
the fine arts museum . . .
Chang Dok Palace . . .
Duk Soo - - -
the Chosen Bank Building . . . (16-4b)
9A. It was a city of vivid scenes . . . an oriental blend of the
ancient and modern. (16)
10. I remembered it all when I came back to Korea five years later
. . . again as a war correspondent . . . again with American and
other United Nations troops bringing liberation. (12-4-3)
11. I was glad I remembered because so much of it was gone . . .
the towns . . . the public buildings . . . the people . . .
destroyed by war. (16)
12. This time the liberation had to be fought for bitterly . . .
heartbreakingly. (2)
13. This time there was no celebration and no gaiety . . . tanks . .
not floats . . . paraded in the streets . . . and the air was
filled with bullets . . . not confetti. (16)
14. For months death and destruction ran amok in Korea . . . war is
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a wanton destroyer of property and lives. (16)
This shattered body , . .
This burning hut . . .
are tragic symbols of the havoc war creates. (16)
15. Even men of good will must fight fire with fire . . . must kill
and destroy to bring a swift end to death and destruction.
(1-4-10-5-6-16)
16. Our soldiers learned early, however, that in this battle there
were terror and savagery beyond that of war alone. (5-15-2)
16A. These were their comrades-in-arms . . . prisoners of the com
munists . . . shot with their hands behind their backs (5)
. . . near Waegwan.
17. This was Taejon when our counterattacking forces . . . breaking
out of their Pusan bridgehead . . . retook the town (3) . . .
what there was of it. (5) Taejon was razed . . . leveled . . .
like Manila or Warsaw. (5-16)
18. These men, women and children were not killed accidentally in the
heat of battle . . . (5)
They were murdered . . . cold-bloodedly . . . deliberately . . .
(5)
The humble and the meek , . .
butchered to spread terror . . . to warn the survivors . . .
that if you did not let the communist monster swallow you alive
. . . he'd rather have you dead. (5)
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19. The horror of Taejon was only a pale reflection of Seoul . . ,
where a great city (4b) . . .
19A. the heart of a nation was ravaged. (5)
20. Brilliant leadership . , , and the hammer blows of a great
fighting team . . . the Navy . . . Air Force . . . Army and
Marines working with other United Nation Forces had snapped
the spine of the North Korean aggressor. (3-4a-12)
21. The enemy was paralyzed . , . (3) but communist fanaticism was
determined that if it must perish (3) it would destroy what it
could (5) . . .
22. devouring these brave men (5-4) . . .
23. slaughtering the innocent (5) . . .
24. ruining . . . wrecking . . . leaving waste . . . (5)
25. The public buildings that served as the nerve center of this
Capitol city . . . were gutted shells scooped out by fire and
explosion. (5)
26. The factories became funeral pyres of this poverty-striken
people's hard-won hopes for economic betterment. (5-4b)
27. These ashes were our receipt for the hundreds of millions of
dollars . . . the years of patient teaching of industrial
techniques we had lavished here, (5)
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28. (deleted)
29. But Seoul was not unique anymore than Taejon. Our troops ad
vancing from north and south found that only the place names
were different . . .
It was the same story at. . .
Chongju . . .
Mokpo . . .
Suchon . . .
Yangpyang . . . (5)
30. Burning farms . . . shattered homes . . .
A. blasted shops . . .
B. and everywhere lay the murdered dead. (5) (16)
31. The scenery of destruction is monotonous. Atrocity stories
keep repeating themselves. (5)
32. How can I tell you . . . What can I show you of the ten thousand
human beings slaughtered in Seoul? (5-16)
33. Perhaps it isn't exactly ten thousand . . .
Perhaps the total figure right now is approximate--if that makes
any difference. (5)
34. In time we will get a careful tabulation . . . we will learn the
exact number of the slaughtered down to the last corps. (5)
35. Of course, some atrocities will not be counted at all . . . be-
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304
cause they were perpetrated on the living . . . atrocities of the
spirit, (5-16)
35A. The heartbreak . . . (5-16)
36, The shattered families . . . (5-16)
37, The broken lives, (5-16)
38, All the dead, however, will be certified by the United Nations
Commission on Korea, (12) Each case will be thoroughly docu
mented, (3) The doubters and the cynic , , , the hard-boiled
sophisticates who scoffed at the stories of Dachau and Buchenwald
, , , and called it propaganda , , , will be able to check the
record , , , if they wish, (5-16)
39, The slayers of our soldier dead , , , one out of every twenty
Americans were killed as prisoners of war , , , will be re
morselessly tracked down wherever possible and brought to
judgment, (5-3)
40
41 &
42, (deleted)
43, But what of the greatest atrocity of all , , , the instigation
of this wanton war? (5-16)
44, What of the cynical murderers who ordered it , , , what penalty
for them? (5)
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45. This need never have been. (5-16)
46. These honored dead need never have sacrificed their lives for
American honor and good faith. (1-5-16)
47. These cities . . .
A. These homes . . . need never have been destroyed. (5-16)
48. These primitive North Koreans . . . (5) these misguided fools
need never have been led to the slaughter. (5-16)
49. (deleted)
50. Their minds and emotions set ablaze by false promises and giant
lies . . . perverted by those who would make all mankind their
dupes . . . in the lust for world control. (5)
51. (deleted)
52. This--communist imperialism--is the real criminal (5).
Its crime in Korea (5) was a mistake . . . a costly one (16)
. . . not for them . . . for us. We paid . . . (5-16)
53. (deleted)
54. (deleted)
55. And the people of Korea paid (5-16) . . . because we refused
to see the criminal threat. (16)
56. Boldness, skill and fighting heart defeated the threat in
Korea . . . (3-6)
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57. (deleted)
58. But the criminal is still at large. (9) Its appetite for
aggression unappeased. (9-5)
59. (deleted)
60. (deleted)
61. There must not be other Koreas in other lands. (16)
There will not be as long as we remain vigilant and strong
(3-6-7-8-9-10)--not only these men . . .
62. but all of us . . . the civilian . . . the citizen . . . the
worker and taxpayer. (2-3)
63. The cost will not be small . . . liberty is never cheap. (2-1)
The price we pay will be bargain insurance, however, if it
prevents . . .
64. more of this ! (1-2-3-6-10) Let us not forget this for our
sake . . . As well as for the rest of the world's (6).
64A. If we value our lives . . .
64B. Our homes . . .
and our freedom . . .
let us remember the crime of Korea. (1)
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APPENDIX F
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VISUAL CONTINUITY
The Crime of Korea
OPENING: Panoramic scene, rice paddies on terraced hillsides . . .
representative of the "Land of the morning calm." (16)
TITLE: "The Crime of Korea" Supered over: title fade out,
1, Same pastoral scene as above; PAN start to reveal quiet, scenic
beauty, (16)
2, CUT TO American soldiers parading in front of Capitol building in
Seoul in 1945, i.e., after WWII, (1-2)
3, CUT TO pastoral scene, rice paddies, etc, (16) , , , and old men
having tea, (4b-16)
4, Another pastoral scene , , , but this time to Seoul; then reveal
ing busy city streets and people, (16)
5, More of crowded, busy Seoul, (16)
6, (deleted from original script)
7, American G.I.s distributing candy to children, cigarettes to men,
(16)
8, CLOSE-UPS of faces in the crowd , , , noble and proud faces,
(4b-16)
9, Busy street scene in Seoul, (16) Museum, Capitol, etc, (4b)
9A, More busy streets, (16)
10, Sharp CUT TO G.I.s in combat-gear moving cautiously (1-16)
SOUND: Ominous, foreboding chord,
11, Burning, charred buildings , , , dead women face down on the
ground, (5-16)
12, FULL SHOT G.I.s moving into battle, (3) , , , G.I.s rush by w/
a wounded soldier on a stretcher, (2-5)
13, Fleeing refugees on crowded road, (5-16) , . , intercut MS GI
with rifle, (1-5)
14, GIs fighting, shooting in war-torn streets, (2-5) Dead bodies,
burning buildings, (5)
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15. FS grimacing GI firing sub-machine gun into doorway. (2 3-5)
. . . airplane dropping bombs. (3)
16. Dead soldiers with hands tied behind backs . . . rows of dead
Koreans with hands tied. (5)
16A. More dead. (5)
17. Smoldering, burning buildings. (5) . . . US combat soldiers
enter ravaged, war town city. (5)
18. Yard filled with hundreds of dead bodies (5) . . . dead children
(5) . . . open trench grove with row of dead. (5)
19. More shots of smoldering city, depicting the horror of Taejon.
(5)
19A. Seoul: charred and burned out buildings. (5)
20. General MacArthur and staff viewing US Naval bombardment of
Korea. (3)
20A. . . . US plane dropping bombs. (3)
. . . field artillery piece firing. (3)
. . . GI shooting. (3)
21. GIs and combat vehicles passing burned-out enemy tank. (3)
. . . and burning building (toppling). (5)
22. Stretcher-bearers rushing by with the wounded. (5-2)
23. Civilian dead. (5)
24. More burning buildings, factories, etc. (5-16)
25. Smouldering, burning, public buildings. (5)
26. Industrial buildings burning, blazing. (5)
27. Industrial buildings burning, blazing. (5)
28. (deleted)
29. Column of GIs in foot-country down dusty road . . . tired; some
eating C-rations while working (2) names of cities SUPERED OVER
Wonju, Chongu, etc. (3)
30. CUT TO blazing houses, farms, etc. (5-16)
31. More burning buildings and destroyed stores . . . then dead
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32, More dead bodies, (5-16)
33, SPECIAL EFFECT: Newspaper spiralling into full frame headlines
reads , , , "Reported 10,000 slain in Red Rule of Seoul,
SPECIAL EFFECTS: another, same as above; reads: Korean atrocity
Toll at 25,000, (5)
34, Rows of dead, (5)
35, Korean children looking at the dead, (5-16)
35A, Crying women attempting to find and identify dead relatives,
(5-16)
36, Crying Korean child, (5-16)
37, US military funeral , , , draping casket with American flag, (5)
38, American and Korean soldiers taking finger prints of the dead,
(5)
39, Dead G,I, , , , then CUT TO two G,I,s walking among American
dead , , , searching to identify, (5)
40, (deleted)
41,
43, Korean refugees families, carrying belongings on their backs,
(5-16)
44, (deleted)
45, Destroyed country-side , , , peasants slowly wondering through.
(5-16)
46, American Catholic priest saying mass at funeral , , , American
graveyard with rows of white crosses, (1-5)
47, Bombed-out town , , . homes, etc, , , children walking through
(5-16)
48, North Korean dead , , , then North Korean with gun pointed
walks through, (5)
49, (deleted)
50, Captured North Koreans being searched by G.I.s (3)
51, (deleted)
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52. North Korean Communist rally . . . gesticulating speakers . . ,
parades with red-banners. CUT TO war-worn G.I.s carrying
stretcher with wounded comrade. (3)
53. (deleted)
54. (deleted)
55. Korean refugees followed by frail, limping child. (5-16)
56. General MacArthur conferring with other high-ranking Americans.
CUT TO G.I.s firing rifles. (3)
57. (deleted)
58. Parading North Koreans carrying Red-banners. (5-9)
59. (deleted)
60. (deleted)
61. G. I. firing bazooka. CUT TO Navy crew aboard ship . . . tanks.
(3)
62. Crowd of American factory workers entering factories, . . .
punching time-clocks, etc. (1-3)
63. Interior of American defense plant . . . helmets coming off
assembly line, rifles, etc. (3)
64. CUT TO G.I.s fighting in streets of Korea. (2-3)
64A. Rows of dead Korean civilians. (5-16)
64B. Burning homes and factories (5-16) ENDS with G. I.s bravely
advancing through war-torn streets of Korea. (3)
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APPENDIX G
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YOUTH WANTS TO KNOW
What can be done to improve our propaganda program
in the Far East?
Is there any justification to the accusation by the
International Red Cross that we are maltreating our
prisoners?
When the Korean War ends, how long will it take the
Republic of Korea to re-establish its economy?
These are but a few of the questions young America is asking today.
What are the answers? Youth wants to know.
The National Broadcasting Company presents "Youth Wants To Know."
A program dedicated to the principle that the future of America rests
with the young people of our nation. The founder and moderator of
Youth Wants to Know, Theodore Dranek, is vacationing, but here is guest
moderator, Frank Blair.
BLAIR: In the year ahead, generals, statesmen and politicians
will be deeply concerned about Korea. Many will suggest possible
solutions. Others will admit that this Far Eastern trouble spot has
them baffled. Today, Youth Wants to Know presents as its guest a
distinguished author who recently visited this war torn land and re
turned to write the Way It is in Korea, the lead article in the current
January issue of the Reader's Digest, America's leading magazine. Our
guest is Pulitzer Prize winner James Michener, whose tales of the South
Pacific served as the basis for the smash broadway musical "South
Pacific." In his Reader's Digest article, Mr. Michener says that we
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314
have no choice but to hold on in Korea and make the Communists pay as
heavy a price as possible. We know the young people who are with us
today, Mr, Michener, will want to question you on this and other state
ments, As you know, they appear on "Youth Wants To Know" through the
cooperation of the American Legion, Also, the Korean Ambassador has
expressed such great interest in today's program and in our guest, Mr.
Michener, that we invited him to be with us today, I should like, at
this time, to have you meet his Excellency, Dr, Yung, the Ambassador
from Korea,
Now, Mr, Michener, if you are ready, we'll take our first question,
MICHENER: I am very glad that Dr, Yung is going to be here and
as soon as I get over my depth, I can call on him for some support,
BLAIR: You have a backstop, in other words.
What is your question, young man?
Mr, Michener, my name is Whit Swaney, and I want to know what can
be done to improve our propaganda program in the Far East?
MICHENER: In the first place, the problem is different there
than it is in Europe because there aren't as many radios for the people
to whom we are trying to get our message across to get our radio broad
casts, So that it comes down pretty much to two things - the example
of very good technicians, state department men, military leaders, G.I.s
that we send over there. They can see us and know that we are reasonably
decent Americans hoping for the best for them and for ourselves. The
second thing is, I think, we can distribute more books, more printed
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315
material. I happen to write books and maybe that's a prejudiced opinion,
but the fact is that Russia is selling an enormous number of books over
there at about 4h a copy, ours cost about $3,00, which would you buy?
BLAIR; Your question please.
My name is Byron Titman. Could you please enlarge your statement
about the trend which endangers us to loose the Pacific as well as Asia
and Africa,
MICHENER: Yes. There is a great danger that America might make
tragic mistakes in the next few years, Asia is in turmoil, Africa is
certainly coming into turmoil, as you well know. The problem is basically
that people who have been repressed and held down are now insisting that
they have equal rights with the rest of us. Unfortunately, at the same
time this great world movement-Communism is afoot so that unless we step
in and pick up these movements fast as our friends. Communism will in
evitably step in and take them as our enemies. So, General Eisenhower's
problem in the next four years is to give ample evidence of the fact that
America while it will not have any tuck to do with Communism will never
theless listen to the legitimate aspirations of Asians, Africans or Amer
icans or anybody else in the world who does have a legitimate aspiration,
BLAIR: Thank you Mr, Michener,
Young man in the plaid tie,
Mr, Michener, my name is Dick Watt. Do you think that the Far East
has been slighted by Western Civilization?
, MICHENER: Well, I think the last election was interesting to me
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316
ill this respect. I wasn't greatly excited over which team was going to
win, but when I was in Asia, I could get somewhat excited about it in
that most of the Americans who were interested in Asia and who were out
there looking around happened to be a Republican, The Democratic party
did slight Asia without much question. None of our Secretaries of State
ever go out to Asia, few of our national leaders got out to Asia. Every
body wants to junket off to Europe. Well, the proportion of our interest
in world affairs is not that way. The proportion of our interest in
world affairs lies in Asia, and I am glad to see that we now have some
men in power who are--who do have an interest in Asia and will undoubtedly
have a continuing interest there.
BLAIR: Young lady your question.
Mr. Michener, my name is Helen Ann Chuzeck. You have been quoted
as saying that unless an agrarian reform takes place in the Far East
countries, that they will go Communist. I would like to know, even if
such a reform did take place, wouldn't those countries go Communist just
as China did under the guise of reform?
MICHENER: That's a tough question.
That's a very tough question. We are faced with the problem if
we do something that is necessary, are we sure that the countries will
respond as we expect. We are not sure. And we are not sure, but we can
be sure of this that unless we do do it, they will do the other thing.
I can visualize a program here ten years from now. But some says yes,
we sponsored an agrarian reform, but they went Communist anyway. It will
be a tragedy if it happens. But I believe from the depth of by being
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317
that if we don't sponsor agrarian reform, inevitably they will go
Communist. Alright, we're gambling on what--10%--I think it's a good
thing to gamble on. I am for the reform,
BLAIR: I wonder if you would spend a moment, Mr. Michener, on
what you mean by agrarian reform.
MICHENER: Well, I'll leave Korea and go to India where they had
a system of land ownership which means that every son of a family gets
an equal proportion of the land when the father dies. That means that
lands over there, sometimes l/60th of an acre in size. What can you
do with land 1/60th of an acre in size in intelligent agriculture.
Secondly, lands in that part of the world are often owned by inter
mediaries who grew up by accident. They don't farm the land. They
have no title to the land. They are called Samendaries and they are
very bad and corrupt men. To use two words that I know you know the
meaning of. They are bad and they are corrupt and they have got to be
gotten rid of. Those are the sort of things I mean. Consolidation of
land so that it can be used more fruitfully. Introduction of new live
stock and production of new grains and seeds. The introduction of a
system of what is our County Agents who give farmers help. But primarily,
a new system of land ownership. It must not be taken as socialism.
Believe me, it is not socialism. It is an inevitable problem that must
be solved before Russia solves it for us.
BLAIR: Do you have another question?
Do you think that the mutual security agents have been of assist
ance in helping to show the countries in the Far East the ways to self
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support themselves.
MICHENER: Yes. The Mutual Security Agency, I am sorry to say,
is one of the things I know least about, because I haven't worked with
it directly. But I have seen evidences in three countries, one where
there was a great military problem. I'm not going to specify the
country, and it seemed to me that MSA was of far less importance in
military aid, and we were therefore held up as militarists. I have
seen it in two other countries. India, among others. Where it has
done a great deal of good. I would be very proud to go Overseas any
time as an agent of MSA. I think what I have seen of it, it is doing
good. But to give an over-all estimate, I am sorry, but I am not com
petent to do that.
BLAIR: Your question please.
Mr. Michener, my name is Cathy O'Conner and I want to know would
the Communist spiritual vision of a world that Whittaker Chambers
talked about, would that vision accompany a political loss of the East
to Communism?
MICHENER: Well, Communism in the East has one great advantage.
It's dealing with people who don't have much. Now all of us who have
studied Communism in action in other countries know two things. We
know that everybody who helps the Communists into power has to be
executed. It's a cruel thing. But if one of you in this audience who
has a name for helping Communism into power in the United States, you
can rest assured that when they come into power, they are going to have
to shoot you. Now, we are beginning to know that. The people involved
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319
don't know it sometimes. The second fact is there is a dream of plenty
connected with the Communists. And that's very persuasive. If I know
nothing, and somebody came along and told me that by changing over a
little bit, I'd get everything. I might change. I'm not lying about
that. It's a very persuasive dream. So that Communism has an edge in
Asia that we don't have. Therefore, unless we are extra smart with
what we do have, we are going to lose out.
BLAIR: Next question please,
Mr, Michener, my name is John Sittero. You said there seems to
be no reasonable alternative to the war in Korea, in a recent article
in the Reader's Digest. Don't you think with hundreds of thousands of
American lives at stake, we should find an alternative and find it
quickly, American lives are not expendable,
MICHENER; Yes, Here is a profound question which if we had all
day, I could not answer adequately. Briefly, if you will forgive me
for this briefness, is this. Korea. I've been there. I've flown over
it, I've risked my life there. I'm not some gab mouth who is sitting at
home talking a dream world, I know Korea very well. I've seen the death
there and seen my friends killed there, and I'm not taking it lightly.
The fact is that Korea is one part of a vast problem. It's only one
part of the vast problem, and I have to say honestly that our losses
there have not been out of line with the vastness of the gains we've
made. We are engaged in a world war against Communism, We happen to
be be fighting it in this unfortunate and cruel terrain. Alright, if
we pull out, we surrender that war. Are you willing to do that? That's
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320
the question you've got to ask along with any question of total casual
ties. What is the nation going to do with itself. Is it going to
retreat on every front? Is it going to have to have certain casualties
at certain times in order to preserve its freedom? Those are the great
fundamental questions which, in a few minutes I cannot answer, but from
the way I have answered them, I think you must know that I would say
that our venture in Korea has not been a total loss. Our venture in
Korea has had many gains in the world fight against Communism, it is
one of the great battlefields, and I do feel as I said that we are com
mitted to it and if I were the wisest man in America today, I would not
know how to get out of it right now,
BLAIR: Young lady,
Mr, Michener, my name is Barbara Underhill, Wouldn't it be
possible for the South Koreans to take over the entire land defense so
as to help a sea and air support from us. Wouldn't that cut down the
American casualties?
MICHENER: You people certainly must have gotten together to think
up all the tough ones,
BLAIR: They probably read your articles, Mr, Michener,
MICHENER: I am gonna be just as tough and I am going to answer
just as honestly as I can. Supposing we remove today every American
from the front lines in Korea, We would have to leave behind these men
all of our Air Force, we would have to step it up because the risk would
be greater and we would have to have more air power. All of our aerial
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321
mechanics. Korea could not provide them. All of our sonar men. All
of our "Flash Bang" men. All of our heavy artillery men. All of our
artillery observers. All of our forward air observers. I've served
with Korean units, they're wonderful men. I just came home from one.
And with every unit, you have to have 10 or 11 American men there for
translators, to help them out. They want it that way. We could re
move quite a few Americans from the lines in Korea. But friends, one
of the most tragic moments in our American history is when peace comes
in Korea and everybody doesn't come home. They're not going to come
BLAIR: What do you mean by that.
MICHENER: Because they are going to have to stay to help support
the Korean arms. They have no heavy industry. They have no artillery.
They have no airplanes. They have no fleet. We're going to have to
keep, I think, about 65% of the number of men we now have there for
some time to come. And no military man I know dreams of coming home.
What we could do is use more Koreans; they're very gallant and fine
soldiers, in the front and let them bear the risks of getting killed
along with our men. But, we are already doing it. There are an
enormous amount of Korean troops in the front. We could turn over the
whole line to them. I would even be willing to do that if you left
65% of Americans who are there now for an extra five or ten years. I
believe that's going to happen.
BLAIR: Mr. James A. Michener, noted author who has just recently
returned from Korea, is providing the answers that Youths Want To Know
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322
I'll take a question from the man with the Christmas tie.
Mr. Michener, my name Is Ernest Hart. I would like to know
whether you think the recent elections In Korea were fair ones?
MICHENER; This Is an extraordinarily difficult question because
It happened--! was there--while It took place. I had just left America
where we had about 50 people aspiring for the Presidency of America In
a terrifically brutal battle for votes and everything. And In Korea
until three weeks before the election, If I understand correctly and
I'm not one of the world's great experts on this, there was practically
no opposition to Mr. Rhee, and when the election took place, the opposi
tion was not what I would call striking or startling. That naturally
raises one fundamental question. Did Rhee stifle the opposition which
was very little. Or did the people honestly want Sing M. Rhee elected
again. Rhee Is a competent politician. He obviously tried to work things
so that people of Korea did want him. I had to conclude, and I caution
you again I am not a great expert on this, that the people of Korea
wanted him. He helped them to want him. But they wanted him, and the
election was by external evidence a fair election.
YOUTH: But you haven't said whether he did stifle the opposition
or not. Would you care to make a statement on that.
MICHENER: I can't answer that. I think we have a distinguished
gentleman here who knows far more about It than I, Ambassador Yung of
Korea. I think we could appeal to him for an honest answer to that
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question.
BLAIR: Ambassador Yung, would you care to answer that question
for us at this time? His Excellency, the Ambassador from Korea.
YUNG: Yes. I would be very happy to substantiate practically
what Mr. Michener has said. But I would point out this much to you,
that our president who was elected with a landslide did not make one
speech, he did not even go outside. Now to give you some idea, there
were no force used or police. Sometimes it has been alleged police
were used and so on and so forth. I point out to you the next highest
man in getting the votes was elected a leftist and communist inclined.
His name was Cho Bung Hai. Among all those people, he came second.
Now you know if any force or any urging was used naturally Communists
couldn't have gotten that much vote.
BLAIR: Alright.
We have another question.
Mr. Michener, my name is Ned, and I would like to know when the
Korean war ends, how long will it take the Republic of Korea to re
establish its economy.
MICHENER: Yes. That, of course, is in the realm of what we call
an ify question in that we don't know the extent to which America is
going to pitch in to contribute to help Korea. I would advise all
Americans to remember this, that it has been by the cruel chance of
war, the American force of arms which has destroyed Korea in a large
extent. Our bombers, our ammunition, our men taking villages, the
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324
Communists forced us into it, and the fact remains that there is a bad
taste in the mouths of many Koreans over the vast destruction of the
country. I, myself, have been on record for sometime as feeling that
America has no moral position in Asia at all unless as soon as the
Korean War is terminated in some way or another, we pitch in and help
rebuild Korea. I would, however, again rightly defer the rest of the
question to the distinguished Ambassador from that country.
BLAIR: Ambassador Yung.
YUNG; It all depends what sort of peace we are talking about.
I'm hoping that you're speaking of a victorious peace. Not some other
kind of peace. By victorious peace I mean the victor will dictate the
peace terms and Korea is re-united again under one free, independent and
democratic government. That is, the Republic of Korea. If that is so,
then I think economic recovery will be much faster. But if Korea is
left divided with some other kind of a peace, so-called peace, then I
would say the economic stabilization or recovery will be practically im
possible. And also, it depends upon how much help and how soon the
United Nations and the United States can rebuild the industry that has
been all destroyed. So, there are various factors, and I am sure none
of us can predict how long it'll take. It all depends upon the United
States' help and the United Nations' help.
BLAIR: Any further comments Mr. Michener?
MICHENER: No. I think that an admirable summary of the problem
that's facing us. I go along with that.
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BLAIR: Thank you Mr. Ambassador for being with us today.
Now, take the lady in the dark blue dress.
Mr. Michener, you said that General McArthur's plan was "one way
to victory" and I wondered if you thought that way at the time he was
recalled from Korea.
MICHENER: Yes, I believe I'm on record to the effect that the
time General Mac Arthur was recalled from Korea, I never deviated from
my belief that militarily his plan was the only way available to attain
a victory by arms in the Korean Peninsula. I said so recently again
and even today that General MacArthur's plan is the best plan that I
know of. Obviously, the military leaders know a lot that I don't know,
so they know something that is much better. I never deviated from that.
At the same time, I must say that I, myself, agree with President Truman
that General MacArthur should be recalled home, because we are there not
talking about a military problem, we're talking about a political problem
in which the future of the political structure of our nation was at stake.
So I think it is perfectly legitimate for me as a confused individual to
be for General MacArthur's plan militarily and against General Mac
Arthur's behavior politically.
YOUTH: I wonder if it would be possible for me to ask the Ambas
sador how he feels about that question. If he is in agreement with
General MacArthur's plan?
BLAIR: Alright, we'll ask Ambassador Yung that question.
Mr, Yung, how do you feel about that?
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326
YUNG: Frankly, I'm still a diplomat. Therefore, I leave that
matter entirely in your hands. Whatever you think is best or what
you thought was best. I don't think I should make any statement on
BLAIR: Thank you Mr. Ambassador. That's what I thought the
Ambassador would say. Next question.
Young lady in the white blouse.
Mr. Michener, I am Janet James.
If there were worthwhile targets in North Korea, would the use
of the atom bomb be beneficial or detrimental to the United States?
MICHENER: I keep getting tough questions. I would say this.
I've served along every inch of the front in Korea. I know many
military leaders there. I know many military leaders elsewhere. I
can honestly tell you I have never heard the phrase atom bomb used.
And this is from five star generals on down. I've never heard the
words atom bomb used. It's no secret that although I know a lot
about Korea, I don't know anything about that. The only phrase I
have heard used is by an aviator of the rank of Commander in the
Navy who flies over North Korea all the time. And he says that now
for the first time there is an accumulation of targets which from the
simple point of view of dollars and cents would warrant the use of an
atom bomb. It has not been true up to the last few months. No point
in using an atom bomb. Now there is a point, perhaps, he says.
Morally, I would suspect it would be a mistake and I would be strongly
against it now.
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327
BLAIR: Thank you Mr. Michener. Young lady in the front row
Mr. Michener, my name is Joan Allen. There have been some reports
that the South Koreans do not want the Chinese nationalists troops used
in Korea. What is the reason for this?
MICHENER: You people all ought to go to Congress, believe me.
Again, I am going to be as honest as you are. There are very few
military men who want the Chinese troops in Korea. There are practi
cally none, believe me. Because it is simply going to incréase the
problem. W'e don't know how many of them are still semi-loyal in their
hearts to the other side. A great many of them have been away from
home for six or eight years, and we don't know how many of them want
to go home. I'm not speaking about cowardice or anything like that.
They're men just like us. But more than that, it increases the supply
problem, it increases the translation problem, it increases the liaison
problem. It would help politically, I think to get Changs troops on
record as being with us. The advantages militarily, the disadvantages
militarily we might forgive for the moral and political advantage
we would get. But don't get the mistaken idea that turning these
loose men--these men loose--on Korea is going to make any change mili
tarily. It probably would slow things down a little bit.
BLAIR: Mr. Michener. In line with what you said at the outset,
we hope that Youth Wants To Know will inspire some of these young
people to go to the halls of Congress.
Your question please.
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328
Mr. Michener, my name is Magery Silcox. When you were in Korea,
did you see anything that would justify the International Red Cross
accusing us of maltreating our prisoners?
MICHENER: I have to make this clear though I've been in Korea
a great deal what one man sees Is really very little and you've hit
again a point about which I don't know very much. I do know from
the other point this. I've been In front lines with front line units
a great deal In Korea. I have never once been with a front line unit
In Korea but that night we took around five or six or seven voluntary
prisoners from the Chinese Communists. These men came over In the
face of the greatest odds, they might get shot If we see them. They
might freeze to death. Every night they come over to surrender to
us. They do that because the word has gone round that we treat our
prisoners pretty well. So that Is a fact. That, I know. I also know
that the conduct of the prison camps at Tno Chi Do In the Southern
part of Korea has been a very sad affair. A part Is due to the fact
that these--some of the men down there are brutally determined to make
us look bad and are men you can answer only with bullets. A part of
It Is bad administration on the part of the Army and we have suffered
from it. By and large, they still keep coming. They want to get on
our side, and we don't have one Instance of a fellow from our side
going over to them.
BLAIR: What Is your question?
Mr. Michener, my name is Larry Terms. To change the subject a
little bit, I would like to know what advice you, as an author, can
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329
give the young people who are seeking to enter literary occupations?
MICHENER: Well, I can give you my blessing as far as work.
I would say this though. Learn to write a sentence. That seems to
me most important. Short sentences particularly. Then you need wide
experience, and I think to get an idea of what you could write, you
ought to read some of the very great novels and then from my personal
experiences, a good thing to do is to have Rogers and Hammerstein
read what you've written.
BLAIR: We are running out of time, Mr. Michener. Make your
answer to this one short. Do you think the peace talks have been a
failure?
MICHENER: The peace talks in a sense have been a failure in that
the Communists have used them to build up a strength that is now
superior to ours.
BLAIR: I am sorry, but that is all the time we have for today's
discussion. Thank you very much James A. Michener for helping to
provide the answers that Youth Wants to Know. Next week. Youth Wants
To Know will again originate in Washington and present as guest
Republican Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas, one of the original backers
of General Eisenhower for President. And now, this is Frank Blair,
speaking for the founder and moderator of Youth Wants to Know, Theodore
Dranek, and bidding you good bye from Washington.
You have been listening to Youth Wants To Know. Mr. Michener
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330
appeared through the cooperation of the Reader's Digest. Youth Wants
To Know is presented by the National Broadcasting Company in coopera
tion with the American Legion. Technical direction by William Wells,
directed by Joseph Brown. This is Jack Rhoney speaking. Youth Wants
To Know has come to you from Washington.
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APPENDIX H
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Questionnaire TITLE OF FILM VIEW:_
STATUS (GRAD OR UNDERGRAD):________________ DEGREE_OBJECTIVE:_____________
AGE:___________ SEX:___________
INSTRUCTIONS: This is an exercise in content analysis. Please indicate
with a check mark in the space provided if you detected any of the
themes listed below. If you are uncertain, do not make any check mark.
Also indicate the relative intensity of treatment of the theme . . .
rate the intensity on a ten point scale, i.e.,
1 = WEAK 5 = MEDIUM 10 = STRONG
THEMES :
1. We are fighting for a righteous cause.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. We face a tough job.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3. We can do the job which has to be done.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4. We have confidence in the integrity and fighting ability of our
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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5. Resentment of the enemy--a resentment based on facts as presented
in the film.
Yes( ) No( ) 12 3 45678 9 10
6. Through military victory, the political achievement of a better
world order is possible.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 W
7. We do not fight for the total destruction of the enemy, (i.e.,
his unconditional surrender), but to counter his aggressions.
Yes( ) No( ) 123 4 567 8 9 10
8. Our job is to "contain" the enemy, i.e., our mission is the
"containment" of the spread of communism (NOTE: remember the
concept of containment.)
Yes( ) No( ) 12 3 45678 9 10
9. This fight (or war) is likely not to be the last confrontation
with the communist enemy.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 34567 89 10
10. We will meet force with counterforce.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 345 6 7 89 10
11. We fight to stop aggression now in order to avoid total war later.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 345 6 7 89 10
12. We fight to uphold the integrity of the United Nations.
Yes( ) No( ) 1234 567 8 9 10
13. We are fighting a "limited action" or "police action."
Yes( ) No( ) 1234 567 8 9 10
14. Our mission is to "wipe out" the enemy and his ideology . . . i.e.,
to rid the world of the menace.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 3 456 7 89 10
15. Compared to our other wars, this one requires a new (extra)
measure of patience and perserverance because of the insidious
and patient ideology of the enemy.
Yes( ) No( ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Was the concept of "limited war" (as we discussed it in class)
mentioned or referred to in this film?
YesC ) No( ) 1 23 4 56 7 89 10
If so, how was it treated? (Circle one of the descriptions
below or describe in own words):
(a) with candor (b) deceptively (c) indirectly, but
with no apparent attempt to deceive
(d) in rhetorical generalities (e) other, . .
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APPENDIX I
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D C. 20301
March 29. 1967
Maj, Howard A. Myrich
4221 W 58th Place
Los Angeles, Calif. , 90043
Dear Major Myrich:
Pursuant to our telecoi of March 28, I a m sending three
Fact Sheets produced by this office during the Korean war that'
m ay be of some interest in your project.
I found no evidence that any studies were conducted by our
Research Division in those days on the effectiveness of our media
as related to the Korean War.
I understand our Los Angeles office (AFRTS) 1016 North
McCadden Place produced a number of radio shows in that era
that might offer some potential for study. Suggest you call
Bob De La Torre if you are interested.
Sincerely,
'-PAUL/J. M U R D O C K
Chiel^/Motion Picture Division
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APPENDIX J
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I C u j
STUDIOS
B EVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA
JAMES FISHER May 1, 1967
Mr. Howard Myrick
4221 West 58th Place
Los Angeles, California 90043
Dear Mr. Myrick:
I am attaching herewith a very
brief review of WHY KOREA? As
I told you on the phone, there
is no script on this project
here at the studio and whether
or not you might be able to
obtain one from our New York
office is a ponderous question.
However, it might be worth a try
and if you wish to make the attempt,
I would suggest that you address a
letter to their exploitation
department at 444 West 56th Street,
New York, New York IOOI9.
incerely.
ames F .sher
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BIBLIOGRAPHY-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY-
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Blanchard, Carroll H. Korean War Bibliography and Maps
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Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960.
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McKay, Alexander. The Western World or Travels in the
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1967.
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Asset Metadata

Creator Myrick, Howard Anthony (author)

Core Title A critical analysis of thematic content of United States army orientation films of the Korean War, with implications for formulating limited war orientation objectives

Contributor Digitized by ProQuest (provenance)

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Program Political Science

Publisher University of Southern California (original), University of Southern California. Libraries (digital)

Tag OAI-PMH Harvest,political science, international law and relations

Language English

Advisor [illegible] (committee chair), [illegible] (committee member)

Permanent Link (DOI) https://doi.org/10.25549/usctheses-c17-185149

Unique identifier UC11349388

Identifier 6904537.pdf (filename),usctheses-c17-185149 (legacy record id)

Legacy Identifier 6904537.pdf

Dmrecord 185149

Document Type Dissertation

Rights MYRICK, HOWARD ANTHONY

Type texts

Source University of Southern California (contributing entity), University of Southern California Dissertations and Theses (collection)

Access Conditions The author retains rights to his/her dissertation, thesis or other graduate work according to U.S. copyright law. Electronic access is being provided by the USC Libraries in agreement with the au...

Repository Name University of Southern California Digital Library

Repository Location USC Digital Library, University of Southern California, University Park Campus, Los Angeles, California 90089, USA